

**COUNTERFACTUALS IN THE *AENEID***

**Anita Frizzarin**

**RHUL**

**Submitted for the Degree of PhD**

**September 2016**

**Declaration of Authorship**

I Anita Frizzarin hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own. The work of others is always clearly stated.

Signed: *Anita Frizzarin*

Date: *29 - 9 - 2016*

## Abstract

This thesis examines the counterfactuals, both syntactic and structural, of Virgil's *Aeneid*. These are alternative stories presented by speakers (primary narrator and characters) as conceivable but only partly or not at all materialized; they clash with the more visible story of the fated advent of Rome and Augustus. The purpose of the study is to envisage some alternatives to the *Aeneid* as readable from the actualization, in some cases already under way, of the counterfactuals scrutinized; these include the universe and the text not starting or collapsing, Troy surviving, the Greeks losing the Trojan war, Aeneas repeatedly failing to carry out his mission, and Turnus defeating him. Virgil's counterfactual language and images are examined in relation to a number of obvious sources as well as developments contemporary to Virgil, as relevant to the individual case: Homer (particularly *if not* constructions in the *Iliad*: A would have happened, if not B), pre-Stoic and Stoic studies of conditionals, linguistic changes in Latin (uses of the indicative / subjunctive and coordination / subordination), the practice of comparison between pairs of differently actualized entities in Livy and earlier historians (*synkrisis*) and political language in Horace. The main strands of modern thought on counterfactuality from logical, linguistic, narratological and psychological viewpoints are also taken into consideration. An attempt has been made to examine all syntactic counterfactuals spoken in the *Aeneid*, including some but not all cases of possible counterfactuals, such as wishes, and two types of structural counterfactuals: those which become such when characters are saved through the diversion of weapons, and those which depict partial Troys. The different types of analyses have been as far as possible integrated. My conclusion is that Virgil was revealing but also deflecting alternative stories to that of the destiny of Rome and Augustus as well as those of Aeneas' career circulating at the time.

## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Preface</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Chapter One: Views on Counterfactuals</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1. Philosophical Views of Counterfactuals</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1.1. Counterfactuals as Conditionals</b>	
<b>1.2. Relevant Logic</b>	
<b>1.2.1. Relevant Logic in Antiquity</b>	
<b>1.2.2. Relevant Logic and Modal Logic in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries</b>	
<b>1.3. Counterfactuals, or Subjunctive Conditionals: Are They Different from Indicative Conditionals?</b>	
<b>1.3.1. Counterfactuals as Propositions and Counterfactuals as Worlds</b>	
<b>1.3.2. Counterfactuals Involve Forks</b>	
<b>1.4. Independent and Biscuit Conditionals</b>	
<b>2. Cognitive Studies of Counterfactuals</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>2.1. The Suppositional Three-Way and the Mental Models Two-Way</b>	
<b>2.2. Indicative, Counterfactual and Deontic Conditionals; and Conditionals with Negations</b>	
<b>2.3. Pragmatics and the Heuristic-Analytic Theory</b>	
<b>2.4. Psychologists, Ramsey, Stalnaker and Lewis</b>	
<b>2.5. Empirical Testing of Counterfactuals</b>	
<b>2.6. Psychologists and Adams 1975</b>	
<b>2.7. Two more Experiments</b>	
<b>3. Linguists' Views of Counterfactuals</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>3.1. Linguists who are Philosophers</b>	
<b>3.1.1. Kaufmann 2006</b>	
<b>3.1.2. Barker 2006</b>	
<b>3.2. Linguists who are Linguists</b>	
<b>3.2.1. Givón</b>	
<b>3.2.1.1. Modality</b>	
<b>3.2.1.2. Position of Adverbial Clauses</b>	
<b>3.2.2. Timberlake 2007</b>	
<b>3.2.3. Thompson et al. 2007</b>	
<b>3.2.4. Declerck and Reed 2001</b>	
<b>3.2.4.1. Counterfactuals</b>	
<b>3.2.4.2. Unless</b>	
<b>3.2.5. Conditionals as Mental Spaces: Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)</b>	
<b>3.2.5.1. If I hadda known you were coming, I woulda stayed home</b>	
<b>3.2.5.2. Clause Order</b>	
<b>3.2.5.3. Unless</b>	

<b>4. Counterfactuals in Literary Theories</b>	<b>51</b>
4.1. Dannenberg 2008: <i>Coincidence and Counterfactuality</i>	
4.2. Ronen 1994: <i>Possible Worlds. Counterfactuals and Degrees of Actualization</i>	
4.3. Prince: <i>The Disnarrated</i>	
4.4. Ryan 1991: <i>Possible Worlds</i>	
4.5. Action Theory	
<b>5. Counterfactual History</b>	<b>57</b>
5.1. Tetlock and Belkin 1996: <i>Counterfactuals as Tools for Political Analysis</i>	
5.2. Psychological Biases in Counterfactual Thought and Politics	
5.3. Alkon 1994: <i>Alternate and Parallel Histories</i>	
5.4. Cowley 1999: <i>Thirtyfive What-Ifs by Military Historians</i>	
5.5. Beckett ed., 2011: <i>The Prime Ministers Who Never Were</i>	
<b>6. Counterfactuals and the Ancient Historians</b>	<b>63</b>
6.1. Zhang 2008	
6.2. Livy's Alexander Digression	
6.3. Counterfactuals, Historiography and Cicero	
<b>7. Greek Conditionals. Wakker 1994</b>	<b>76</b>
7.1. Propositional, Illocutionary, Predicational Conditionals	
7.2. Positions and Functions of Conditionals	
7.3. Conditionals Come from Wishes	
7.4. Wishes Come from Conditionals	
7.5. Greek Counterfactuals with Present Reference	
7.6. Greek Counterfactuals with Past Reference	
7.7. Homeric Counterfactuals: Present	
7.8. Homeric Counterfactuals: Past	
<b>8. More on Homeric If-Nots. De Jong 1984</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>9. "Beinahe-Episoden" in the <i>Aeneid</i> and before. Nesselrath 1992</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>10. Latin Conditionals</b>	<b>89</b>
10.1. Martín Puente 2009: <i>Conditionals of the Predication, Proposition, Enunciation</i>	
10.2. Origins of Latin Conditionals: Parataxis?	
10.3. The Rise and Fall of the Latin Subjunctive	
10.4. Orlandini 2005: Mitigators	
10.5. Torrego 1999: <i>Latin If-Nots with Indicative Apodoses</i>	
<b>11. How Virgil Fits in</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>Chapter Two. <i>Counterfactuals and the Collapse of the Text</i></b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Chapter Three. <i>How If-Nots Keep the Poem Going</i></b>	<b>114</b>

<b>Chapter Four. <i>How many Troys?</i></b>	<b>129</b>
<b>Chapter Five. <i>Indicative Apodosis Counterfactuals and Similar Subjunctive Ones</i></b>	<b>143</b>
<b>Chapter Six. <i>The Counterfactuals of the Games for Anchises</i></b>	<b>168</b>
<b>Chapter Seven. <i>The Rest: End of the Story, Time-Cutting, Regrets, Materialized Counterfactuals, Dido and Aeneas, Aeneas' Self-Defence, Ethnic Identity, Evander to Pallas</i></b>	<b>184</b>
<b>Chapter Eight. <i>Fate versus Counterfactuals</i></b>	<b>207</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>219</b>

## Preface

Counterfactuals are particularly salient in the *Aeneid* because of the concept of fate that runs through it, which emphasizes the inevitability of the current regime. They present alternatives to that narrative, relegated to syntactic or structural non-actuality. How each operates, particularly in relation to the principal themes of the poem, to my knowledge has never been analyzed. Nesselrath (1992) on "Beinahe Episoden" in ancient epic has done useful work in bringing together syntactic and structural patterns of counterfactuality on the model "A, if not B". This thesis is inspired by that work, and by Hornblower's related analyses of Thucydides.

Counterfactuals are divided into groups according to grammatical features and theme, starting from the most momentous. The alternative *Aeneid* that emerges is examined in chapter eight.

In order to understand how the counterfactuals function in the text, an integrated view has to be taken of how counterfactuals work both generally and specifically in Latin. This requires a survey of how counterfactuals as a linguistic phenomenon encode philosophical, cognitive and narratological concepts that have a role to play in historical and epic narrative. I am aiming to take a unified view of all the different areas of theory where counterfactuals are thought about, and to use this to look at how Virgil problematizes Roman destiny.

## Chapter One: Views on Counterfactuals

### 1. Philosophical views of counterfactuals

#### 1.1. Counterfactuals as Conditionals

Counterfactuals are types of conditionals. Philosophers look at conditionals as consisting of *antecedent* (the linguists' *protasis*; *if*-clause) and *consequent* (the linguists' *apodosis*; main clause). Examples of conditionals in English are: (1) "If there was a run on sterling, interest rates rose"; (2) "If there had been a run on sterling, interest rates would have risen"; (3) "If there is a run on sterling, interest rates will rise". (1) and (3) are classed as indicative conditionals, and (2) as subjunctive or counterfactual (*conditional*, Cohen 1995: 147). Broadly speaking, a subjunctive or counterfactual conditional contains an antecedent believed by the speaker to be contrary to fact and unchangeable; the precise difference between the two is a matter of some debate. Antecedent and consequent are generally considered *propositions* (*conditional*, Cohen 1995: 147). "It is raining", "Il pleut" and "Es regnet" are three separate sentences, but they express the same proposition (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 12). The term *statement* is sometimes used interchangeably with *proposition*, but the distinction is not settled (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 13).

The two propositions antecedent and consequent form a compound proposition (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 19). In traditional logic a proposition can be true or false, as established by Aristotle: "... while every sentence has meaning, ... not all can be called propositions. We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity" (Arist. *Int.* 17a,1).

In truth-functional logic, associated with the mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), compound propositions are linked by *operators* (also called *connectives* and *constants*). These are: *negation* ( $\neg p$ , contradictory of  $p$ ; if one is true, the other is false), *conjunction* ( $p \& q$ , "p and q"; also  $p \wedge q$ ), *disjunction* ( $p \vee q$ , "p or q"), *implication* (as in conditionals:  $p \rightarrow q$ , "if p, then q"; also  $p \supset q$ ; but see below) and *material equivalence* (as in *biconditionals*,  $p \leftrightarrow q$  "p materially implies q and q materially implies p") (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 19-20); *propositional forms* can be constructed on the basis of these compounds, with propositions expressed symbolically by the variables  $p$  and  $q$ . The relation of material implication,  $p \rightarrow q$  is true if and only if (iff) it is not the case that  $p$  is true and  $q$  is false; (Cohen 1995: 147; Wolfram 1995: 530); the relation of material equivalence,  $p \leftrightarrow q$  is true iff  $p$  and  $q$  have the same truth-value (Wolfram 1995: 248).

The way the truth of propositions can be tested is through the mechanical use of the *truth table*. Ascribed to Wittgenstein, it establishes the overall truth-value of a compound proposition, based on every possible combination of truth-values attributed to the components (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 27; 3; 75). The following is a truth-functional truth table:



$p$	$q$	$p \& q$	$p \vee q$	$p \rightarrow q$	$p \leftrightarrow q$
T	T	T	T	<b>T</b>	T
T	F	F	T	<b>F</b>	F
F	T	F	T	<b>T</b>	F
F	F	F	F	<b>T</b>	T

The truth table as represented here contains three principal sources of problems for conditionals (truth table Harrison-Barbet 2001: 19-20). Column five, highlighted, shows some problematic evaluations. Rows one and three concern the viability of the concept of truth for  $p \rightarrow q$  when the consequent is true. If all that is needed for truth is lack of contradiction between the antecedent and the consequent (column five, row one), conditionals such as the following will be considered true: (4) “If Oxford is a city, then Italy is sunny” (*material implication*, Wolfram 1995: 530); there is clearly no necessary logical relation between Oxford being a city and Italy being sunny. A false antecedent (column five, row three), similarly does not invalidate the overall truth of the conditional: the conditional statement  $p \& \neg p \rightarrow q$ , derived from a sentence such as (5) “The forest is green and the forest is not green; therefore tomorrow is Christmas”, is accordingly true (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 88). That anything follows from a contradiction was the medieval *ex falso quodlibet* (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 89). On the truth table, even a false antecedent and a false consequent will produce a true conditional (column five, row four). The attribution of truth to conditionals which appear absurd because they show no relationship between the antecedent and the consequent constitutes the *paradox of material implication*; and the way the truth-value of the compound proposition is evaluated in these cases is said to be *extensional*, i.e. based on the truth relations of the constituents with minimum regard for meaning (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 22; Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 87).

One solution is to tighten the logical link required between antecedent and consequent. This has been done in various ways. One kind of conditional which is always true is a strong form of material implication, *entailment*. (6) “If all cats are black and Tibby is a cat, then Tibby is black” and (7) “If a man is a bachelor, then he is unmarried” are *necessarily true* propositions regardless of facts; this is because the first statement is a valid deductive argument, with true premisses and a true conclusion, and the second contains the consequent in the meaning of the antecedent. (8) “If the animal is a unicorn, it has only one horn” well illustrates this principle: the conditional is necessarily true, although unicorns do not exist (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 22; Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 3; 75). In examples (7) and (8), the meaning of the constituent propositions matters, and the interpretation in this case is said to be *intensional* (Harrison-Barbet 2001: 22-23).

But entailment itself remains controversial. An impossibility entails everything and a necessary truth is entailed by everything in truth-functional logic (*entailment*, Kirwan 1995: 237; Read 1988: 20). There are also statements which appear to be strictly truthful because obviously unfalsifiable, such as this example of *logical truth*, a subgroup of *analytic proposition* (Wolfram 1989: 90): (9) “If the rooster crows on the manure pile, either the weather will change or it will stay as it is”,  $(p \rightarrow q \vee \neg q)$ . This conditional is true, but only because it is vacuous. Its form, *tautology*, makes it true, regardless of meaning; no eventuality is left out (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 57-58).

Further problems with apparently inescapable truths are circularity and (more) vacuousness. The way a valid inference (example 6) is spotted is ultimately circular. Philosophers start from examples which seem acceptable, and give an explication of what they observe. That becomes a definition of a valid inference (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 81; 118). John Rawls invented the concept of “reflective equilibrium” for this process of constructing theories: our opinions on particular examples have to come to an agreement with the general definition (Hoyningen-Huene 2004: 119-20). A related case is (7), “If a man is a bachelor, then he is unmarried”. Here the consequent is a restatement of the antecedent. This is a tautology, a self-evident and *analytic* proposition (Wolfram 1989: 89). Since it is synonymy that makes it true, it is vacuous. Being “uninformative” is indeed one of the charges levelled at analytic propositions. Even the whole of mathematics and formal logic have been considered uninformative by some (*conventionalism*, Wolfram 1989: 89). Locke, who distinguished between analytic and necessarily true propositions on the one hand, and synthetic, contingent and empirical ones on the other,<sup>1</sup> also separates the informative ((10) “The external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles”. 4.8.8) and the trifling ((11) “A triangle has three sides”. 4.8.7). But the two only differ in degree of complexity (Wolfram 1989: 89; 124n7).

Quine (1943) attacked the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions on grounds of circularity. Any statement is liable to revision in the light of experience (*analytic and synthetic statements*, Lowe 1995: 28). While the number 9 and the number of planets may seem interchangeable, for instance, “Necessarily 9 is greater than 7” is true, but “Necessarily the number of the planets is greater than 7” is false (Quine 1943: 119-21; Wolfram 1989: 96-97). On the opposite side, Kripke defended the concept of necessary truth, from the very minimum statement of the form “ $x$  is  $x$ ”, to “ $x$  is  $y$ ” based on the “essential properties” of the objects under discussion. A lectern, for instance, will be made of wood and not of ice (Kripke 1971: 86-87; Wolfram 1989: 110-11). Kripke also developed the concept of a weaker logical truth. In relation to conditionals, these are steps towards an understanding of the logical link that can be expected to connect antecedent and consequent for the conditional to be true.

As a consequence of the problems connected with truth-functionality, many

---

1 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1690. Terms coined by Kant.

philosophers have abandoned the concept of truth in relation to conditionals. In *relevance* or *relevant* logic, there must be sharing of content between premisses and conclusion, and dependency between the two (Read 1995: 758).

## 1.2. Relevant Logic

### 1.2.1. Relevant Logic in Antiquity

Sextus Empiricus reported the opinions of earlier Greek philosophers on conditionals (Read 1988: 119-20). Material implication and the logic of conditionals were discussed by the Stoics according to Sextus, who wrote a history of Scepticism around 200 AD (Bailey 2002: 17). Sextus cites the Stoics as saying that of the four combinations of truth-values attributed to antecedent and consequent, “only that which begins with truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, and the rest valid. ‘Antecedent,’ they say, is ‘the precedent clause in a hypothetical syllogism which begins in truth and ends in truth.’ And it ‘serves to reveal the consequent,’ since in the syllogism ‘If this woman has milk, she has conceived,’ the clause ‘If this woman has milk’ seems to be evidential of the clause ‘she has conceived’” (Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 2.105-06). The Stoics’ identification of the combination of true antecedent and false consequent as invalid appears to match that of the truth-table.

Sextus does not specify who “those who introduce ‘connection’ or ‘coherence’” in their analysis of hypothetical syllogisms are. Such people reject the truth of “If atomic elements of things do not exist, atomic elements exist” because validity occurs “whenever the opposite of its consequent contradicts its antecedent clause”; and they accept the truth of “If day exists, day exists” (*Pyr.* 2.111). Sextus quotes more unidentified philosophers: those who “judge by implication” and consider true a conditional “when its consequent is potentially included in its antecedent”; they nonetheless judge “If day exists, day exists” as “probably” false, “for it is not feasible that any object should itself be included in itself” (*Pyr.* 2.112). Elsewhere, Sextus gives more examples of inconsistency between premisses and conclusions in a conditional: “‘If it is day, it is light; but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore it is light.’ For we see that in this instance neither the clause ‘if it is day’ has any relevance and connection with the clause ‘wheat is being sold in the market,’ nor either of these with the clause ‘therefore it is light,’ but each of them is inconsistent with the others” (*Against the Logicians* 2.430).

Sextus also explicitly refers to the debate between the pre-Stoic philosophers Philo and Diodorus Cronus (Long & Sedley 1987(1): 504). Philo, of around 300 BC (*Philo the Dialectician*, Denyer 1995: 660), like the Stoics later, in Sextus says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is “‘that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,’ as for instance the syllogism ‘If it is day, I converse,’ when in fact it is day and I am conversing”. Diodorus

defines it “as ‘that which neither was nor is capable of beginning with a truth and ending with a falsehood’” (*Pyr.* 2.110; *Against the Logicians* 113-15). A truth for Diodorus has to be such over time, a related concept to that of the “Master Argument”, which sees identity between what is possible and what is real (Brisson 1997: 154-55; *Cic. Fat.* 7.13; 9.17). The contrast between the two positions is most noticeable in the following: according to Philo, “If it is day, it is night” is false during the day, because it begins with a truth and ends with a falsehood; and “If it is night, it is day” is true, because it begins with a falsehood, and ends with a truth (*Against the Logicians* 2.114; 2.117); but according to Diodorus, “If it is night, it is day” is false, because “it admits of beginning, when night comes on, with the truth ‘It is night’ and ending in the falsehood ‘It is day’” (*Against the Logicians* 2.117).

These philosophers judge propositions in relation to the time and place of assertion (Long & Sedley 1987(1): 205). Sextus concludes that “it is to be feared that the task of distinguishing the valid hypothetical is impracticable” (*Against the Logicians* 2.118).

Chrysippus, considered the principal Stoic (ca. 280-206 BC), in Cicero’s *De Fato* (44 BC) questions the observations by astrologers of apparently related events: “If (for instance) a man was born at the rising of the dog-star, he will not die at sea” (*Cic. Fat.* 6.12; Ierodiakonou 2006: 512-13). The existence of signs of this kind was a fact of life for the Stoics. Cicero states: “Their view is that the world was from its beginning set up in such a way that certain things should be preceded by certain signs, some in entrails, others in birds, others in lightning ...” (*Cic. Div.* 1.117-8; Long & Sedley 1987(1): 261; 264; Sharples 1991: 8). Sextus says that they made a parallel with a conditional sentence: the Stoics “state that ‘A sign is an antecedent judgment in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves to reveal the consequent’” (*Pyr.* 2.104; Long & Sedley 1987(1): 264).

The Cicero of *De Fato* (44 BC), who thinks that events are often accidental (*Cic. Fat.* 3.5), outlines one main difference between Diodorus and the apostrophized Chrysippus: “he says that only what either is true or will be true can happen, .... You say that things that will not happen, too, can happen (*Cic. Fat.* 7.13). Chrysippus “hopes that the astrologers ... will not make use of conditionals, but rather of conjunctions”, and suggests the reformulation of the conditional as a negated conjunction: *non et ... quis ... et is ...*, “not both p and not-q” is preferable to *si quis ... is ...*, “not possibly both p and not-q” (*Non et <cui> venae sic moventur et is febrim non habet* rather than *Si cui venae sic moventur; is habet febrim.* *Cic. Fat.* 8.15) (Sharples 1991). The difference between the two seems to be that what is observed not to happen (conjunction) is not the same as what necessarily cannot happen (conditional) (Sharples 1991: 169n15). In relation to Virgil, the date of these debates, as reported in Rome, is important: this is the time he was beginning to write.

The Aristotelian philosophers too, it is interesting to observe in view of the assumed difference between the two branches of logic, were involved in discussions of the hypothetical

sylogism as a conditional, conjunction and disjunction. The ancients treated the Aristotelian philosophers as rivals of the Stoics; their inferences were based on the relations between terms, with predication as the fundamental relation (*S is P*), whereas the Stoics worked with inferences based on the relations between sentences, including hypothetical syllogism (Barnes 1984: 282; 279-80). But Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* says that Theophrastus, successor of Aristotle as head of the Lyceum, "mentions [hypothetical syllogisms] in his own *Analytics*, and so do Eudemus and certain others of Aristotle's associates" (Alex. *A.Pr.* 390.2-3). Philoponus and Boethius repeat this, attributing "lengthy treatises" and "elements" on the subject to Theophrastus (Philoponus, in Alex. *A.Pr.* 242.18-21; Boeth. *Hyp. syll.* 1.1.3; Barnes 1984: 285; 1999: 78).

Barnes says: "First, Theophrastus developed a reasonably detailed *theory* of wholly hypothetical syllogisms. Secondly, he denied that they constituted an independent body of logical science - rather, they are in some sense reducible to categorical syllogisms" (Barnes 1999: 80). Alexander and Theophrastus wanted to "reduce" (ἀνάγειν and ἀναλύειν) "wholly hypothetical syllogisms" to categorical syllogisms, by the so-called "method of selection" (ἐκλογή). What is meant by "reduction" is not clear. Of Alexander's possible meaning Barnes (1984), counterfactually, says "I suspect that, if pressed, he would acknowledge that he is really after a genuine sense (I) derivation." Barnes' "sense (I) " consists in reducing a syllogism to another, and has Alexander think, "mistakenly", that the procedure reduces *modus ponens* (if *P*, then *Q*; and *P*, therefore *Q*) to a categorical syllogism. "Alexander is in a muddle" (Barnes 1984: 286-87n3).

The point is that Theophrastus found an analogy between the two kinds of logic which over the centuries became predicate and propositional logic: "For being a consequent or apodosis is analogous to being predicated, and being antecedent to being subject - for in a way it is subject for what is inferred from it" (Alex. *A. Pr.* 326.31-2). Aristotle's ἔπρεσθαι (Arist. *A. Pr.* 43b3, 44a14, 56a21) and ἀκολουθεῖν (Arist. *A. Pr.* 43b4) confirms Theophrastus' point that the consequent "follows" the antecedent (Barnes 1984: 309n4).

### 1.2.2. Relevant Logic and Modal Logic in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries

In the twentieth century, among key figures are C.I. Lewis, W. Ackermann, and A. Anderson and N. Belnap. C.I. Lewis is credited with starting modern interest in *modal logic* (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 549-50). His and Langford's *Symbolic Logic* (1932) uses  $P \Theta Q$  as an abbreviation for  $\sim \Diamond(P \sim Q)$ , "it is not possible that *P* and *not-Q*";  $P \Theta Q$  also codifies the link of necessity as  $P \Theta Q = \Box(P \supset Q)$ , "it is necessary that if *P* then *Q*" (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 549-50, 555; my English).

But C.I. Lewis, whose *Survey of Symbolic Logic* was published in 1918, when arguing after MacColl (1906) that one proposition strictly implies another iff it is impossible for the first to be true and the second false, is not far off the truth-functional system (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 549; Mares 2004: 9). This is the case although he uses the modal notions of possibility and necessity. One important move away from that was Ackermann (1956). He objected to much of C.I. Lewis's work, and especially to *ex falso quodlibet*: if  $A$  is to entail  $B$ , there must be a logical connection between the two; and this is not the case when  $A \wedge \sim A \rightarrow B$ , "if  $A$  and *not*- $A$ , then  $B$ " is accepted (Ackermann 1956: 113; Read 1988: 125-26; Mares 2004: 96). Ackermann insisted that there should be a logical relationship between the content of statements. He did not, however, formulate a theory about content (Read 1988: 126; Mares 2004: 96-97).

Anderson and Belnap devised a system for tracking down the relevance of premisses to the conclusion and of antecedents to consequents. A simplified version of their technique for so-called "relevant logic R" is illustrated in Mares' "Relevance Logic" (2012):

- |                                |                      |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. $A_{\{1\}}$                 | Hyp                  |
| 2. $(A \rightarrow B)_{\{2\}}$ | Hyp                  |
| 3. $B_{\{1,2\}}$               | 1,2, $\rightarrow$ E |

This is a case of *modus ponens*, "If  $p$  then  $q$  and  $p$ , therefore  $q$ " (*modus ponens*, Williamson 1995: 583). "The numbers in set brackets indicate the hypotheses used to prove the formula. We will call them 'indices'. The indices in the conclusion indicate which hypotheses are really used in the derivation of the conclusion" (Mares 2012). "E" means "entailment". At the very least, for antecedent and consequent to be related, it is necessary that propositions "share a variable" (Anderson & Belnap 1975: 33).

Making truth relative to an index was a step towards *world semantics for modal logic*. Kripke, amongst others, expanded Leibniz's seventeenth-eighteenth century idea of possible worlds in the 1950s and 60s (Mares 2004: 23). A possible world is a universe connected to another through a binary (two-place) relation called an "accessibility relation". Read outlined the "Australian plan", based on the *dialetheist* ideas that propositions can be both true and false at the same time:  $A$  can be true at a situation  $x$ , and untrue at a situation  $x^*$  (Read 1988: 138-140); the "American plan" has four truth-values: true, false, both, neither (Read 1988: 143); and Read's own "Scottish plan" argued that  $A$  and  $\sim A$  can be true "fuse" (non-truth-functional "and")  $B$  false, because fusion "expresses a logical connection between propositions, that the truth of one does not preclude that of the other" (Read 1988: 147; 191; 81). Richard Routley and Bob Meyer in 1973 introduced worlds which relate to one another in a ternary relation (R; a relation in which the places are three); the Routley and Meyer truth condition for implication is: " $A \rightarrow B$  is true at a situation  $s$  iff for all situations  $x$  and  $y$  if  $Rsxy$  and ' $A$ ' is true at  $x$ , then ' $B$ ' is true at  $y$ "

(Mares 2004: 27-28). Mares translates: “ $A \rightarrow B$  is true in a situation  $s$  iff, when we postulate the existence of any situation in the same world in which  $A$  holds, we can infer that there is a situation in that world in which  $B$  holds” (Mares 2004: 51).

In the 1920s, Frank Ramsey suggested that in order to evaluate indicative conditionals, such as “If  $A$  will  $C$ ?”, people add  $A$  to their stock of knowledge and then argue about  $C$ . “We can say that they are fixing their belief in  $C$  given  $A$ ” (Ramsey 1929: 143; Bennett 2003: 28). This is the Ramsey test, hugely exploited by philosophers. Not all indicative conditionals, however, can accommodate that procedure: in “If my business partner is cheating me, I will never realize that he is”, the consequent becomes unacceptable when I pretend to believe the antecedent (Bennett 2003: 28-29). Bennett suggests a version of the test with a different use of probability: after adding a probability of 1 for  $A$  to the set of probabilities which constitute my belief system, it needs to be evaluated whether the conservatively obtained result includes a high probability for  $C$  (Bennett 2003: 29). There is here no pretence to believe the antecedent. Bennett’s “Ratio Formula”,  $\pi(C/A)$ , also builds on Ramsey: the probability of  $C$  given  $A$  is the probability of  $A \& C$  divided by that of  $A$  (Bennett 2003: 51-52).

Ernest Adams is one of the principal philosophers to exploit Ramsey, with the notion of probabilistic validity (Bennett 2003: 28). An indicative conditional can be truth-functionally invalid, but probabilistically valid (Bennett 2003: 131). The higher the probability of  $A$ , the nearer the indicative (non-truth-functional) conditional and the material (truth-functional) conditional are to being equal. This is captured by:  $U(A \rightarrow C) = U(A \supset C) + P(A)$ ; the uncertainty of an indicative conditional equals the uncertainty of the corresponding material conditional divided by the probability of its antecedent (Adams 1975: 2-3; Bennett 2003: 133-34). Adams uses Venn’s diagrams, too. Ovals, which represent propositions, overlap, or do not, and are sized differently to indicate degrees of probability in a person’s belief. The value of someone’s probability for  $A \rightarrow C$  equals the proportion of the  $A$  oval lying within the  $C$  oval (Adams 1975: 9-10; Bennett 2003: 134-35).

Frank Jackson argued that  $A \rightarrow C$  is assertible by me to the extent that I consider  $C$  robust in relation to  $A$  (Jackson 1987: 22-32; Bennett 2003: 34). The meaning of the “if” of indicatives for Jackson contains something stronger than the implicature that Grice calls “conversational”. According to Grice (1967a; 1967b), hearers draw inferences because they assume speakers are being helpful. Grice’s horseshoe analysis of the 1960s, according to which the material implication  $A \supset B$  means the indicative conditional  $A \rightarrow B$ , equates disjunctive syllogism to an indicative conditional: “If Booth did not shoot Lincoln, someone else did” means “Either Booth shot Lincoln or someone else did” (Bennett 2003: 20). This has been criticized for allowing the antecedent and the consequent to be unconnected; it also relies on the speaker not being dishonest or teasing when presenting alternatives. Bennett claims he knows, for instance, that one of the two options is wrong in “Either my father was F.O. Bennett or my father was Stafford

Cripps” (Bennett 2003: 20-22; 24). Jackson accepts that  $A \supset B$  is  $A \rightarrow B$  (Jackson 1987: 5) but sees the latter as stronger; the “conventional”, rather than “conversational” implicature of  $A \rightarrow B$  is that its speaker implies his perceived robustness of  $B$  with respect to  $A$  (Jackson 1987: 28-29; 31; Bennett 2003: 38). A parallel relationship Jackson envisages between sentences joined by “and”, “but” and other conjunctions: “If I say 'Hugo is bad at mathematics; nevertheless, he is a fine chess player', what I want you to believe is that Hugo is a fine chess player, not something else” (Jackson 1987: 94; Bennett 2003: 37).

Jackson himself acknowledges that the parallel between conjunctions such as “but”, “however” etc. and “if” is not watertight. Two sentences linked by a conjunction can be assertible but improbable, whereas an indicative conditional requires that the consequent should be highly probable for the conditional to be assertible (Jackson 1987: 39; Bennett 2003: 39). Also, “if” cannot easily be replaced by “and” or omitted as other conjunctions can with no change to truth conditions (Bennett 2003: 41). Bennett claims that Jackson by letter added “unless” to “if” as structurally different from “and” (Bennett 2003: 41).

### **1.3. Counterfactuals, or Subjunctive Conditionals: Are They Different from Indicative Conditionals?**

No philosopher has yet incontrovertibly identified the difference between subjunctive and indicative conditionals. Bennett held his nose, but kept the opposition (Bennett 2003: 12). Edgington's “One Theory or Two?” opts for “one”, the difference being “mainly” one of tense (Edgington 1995: 314-15; 2007: 206-07). Yet spotting counterfactuals does not seem difficult: a counterfactual in English is a conditional built on the pattern given in example (2): “If there had been a run on sterling, interest rates would have risen”. Since this implies that there was not a run on sterling, the common view is that the falsity of the antecedent is what gives a counterfactual its name. But that falsity is only the case in the mind of the speaker (Bennett 2003: 11-12).

For Dudman, the dividing line groups together “Does-will” with “Would” conditionals against the rest. This is the Relocation Thesis, based on the rationale that a counterfactual expresses a Does-will conditional at a later time: “If you had swum in the sea yesterday, your cold would have got worse” seems to derive from the earlier “If you swim in the sea today, your cold will get worse” (Bennett 2003: 13). Gibbard called the Does-will conditionals “grammatically subjunctive”, and those without time shift (Does, with future consequent) “grammatically indicative” (Gibbard 1981: 222-26; Bennett 2003: 14- 15). But Bennett, a former relocater, finds that counterfactuals do not stand or fall with their corresponding Does-will conditionals when the acceptability of the Does-will depends on a kind of evidence which does



not apply at a future time. “If I touch that stove, I shall be burned” does not generate a valid counterfactual if its speaker has a vague memory of being hypnotized to think that the stove was hot but not believing it (Bennett 2003: 13; 343; 348; 351).

Further problems include Dudman's opposition between “conditionals” (Does-wills and subjunctives), and “hypotheticals” (the rest). The distinction is partly based on the argument that “conditionals” are reached by reasoning from proposition to proposition, and “hypotheticals” by developing a sequence of events (Dudman 1984: 153; Bennett 2003: 351). Moving from proposition to proposition is how sequences of events are imagined (Bennett 2003: 351). Edgington offers many objections to Dudman. We accept (from Jackson 1987: 74) “If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, things would have been different from the way they actually are (were / will be)”, but neither “If it rains, things will be different from the way they actually will be” nor “If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, things were different from the way they actually were”; this is because the Had-would conditional expresses our thought conditionally on an antecedent we think did not happen, whereas the other two represent our belief about the actual world. The speaker's epistemic state, again, makes a difference to the viability of the two respective cases.

While the Relocation Thesis, which groups together Wills and Woulds, earns some sympathy from Edgington and once persuaded Bennett (Edgington 2007: 213; Bennett 2003: 13), the speakers' epistemic conditions in the two respective cases are clearly not the same.

### **1.3.1. Counterfactuals as Propositions and Counterfactuals as Worlds**

Amongst the philosophers who support separating subjunctive from indicative conditionals, some face the question in terms of propositions, and some in terms of worlds. The first group stems from Nelson Goodman's 1947 “Support” theory, and the second from Robert Stalnaker's and David Lewis' 1960s-70s concept of worlds (Bennett 2003: 302).

According to Goodman,  $A > C$  is true if  $C$  is entailed by a combination of the following: a true proposition Support, the antecedent  $A$  and the causal laws of the actual world. What is the true proposition Support? “If I had taken aspirin my headache would have gone by now” does not tell us what makes it true. Support brings in contingent facts which help confer truth to the counterfactual (Bennett 2003: 302-03). It must be compatible with  $A$  & laws of nature. But other conjuncts of it are more difficult to pin down. Chisholm emphasized the speaker's intentions: “we can usually tell, from the context of a man's utterance, what the supposition is and what the other statements are with which he is concerned” (Chisholm 1955: 101; Bennett 2003: 305). But in most cases, speakers cannot know what those statements are (Bennett 2003: 305-06).

A related problem is that of irrelevant particular facts. Goodman says that Support must be “cotenable” with  $A$  (Goodman 1947: 120-21; Bennett 2003: 308). That condition, however,

does not exclude undue influence on the evaluation of a counterfactual by extraneous facts. Philosophers are divided, for instance, on assessing the following: a coin tossed by an objectively random coin-tossing machine has come down heads when triggered by Joe; we say: “If Susan had pressed the button at  $T_A$  [time of the antecedent], the coin would have come down heads.” Consideration of post-antecedent particular facts makes that counterfactual true, because the coin coming down heads occurs both in the counterfactual and in the actual world. Stalnaker's theory makes it indeterminate, because there is no single closest antecedent world. David Lewis' similarity of worlds theory as tightened in 1979 to state the unimportance of post-antecedent particular facts would consider it false: the closest  $A$ -worlds contain both outcomes (Bennett 2003: 234; 309; Lewis 1979: 472; Stalnaker 1981: 87; Edgington 1995: 256; 259; 2007: 147; 150). Edgington summarizes the pitfalls inherent in paying attention to particular facts: if Hitler had died in infancy and we evaluated a counterfactual which said that in that case the 1930s and 40s would have been different, emphasis on the similarity between the overall state of the actual world and that of the consequent in the counterfactual would rule that “then the 1930s and 40s would have been different” is false, because a world which contained a figure similar to Hitler would be nearer to the actual one than one without it. “The difficulty is general” says Edgington (1995: 255; 2007: 146). Bennett discusses Pollock's 1976 objection to Goodman's concept of cotenability between Support and  $A$ : just arguing that  $\neg(A > \neg \text{Support})$  should have been formulated as the stronger  $A > \text{Support}$ ; the only problem this retains is that of infinite regress in the definition of Support (Pollock 1976: 11; Bennett 2003: 308-09).

Edgington comments: “we need cotenability to define counterfactuals and counterfactuals to define cotenability” (Edgington 2007: 139).

Thinking of ways things could have been has suggested the concept of worlds. Bennett describes the shared kernel of world theories as: the conditional  $A > C$  is true just in case  $C$  obtains at all the closest  $A$ -worlds (Bennett 2003: 165). Possible worlds are alternative realities, and facts about the actual world decide what possible worlds are to be considered when evaluating counterfactuals. Stalnaker talks of a “function” which selects the  $A$ -world closest to the actual world (Stalnaker 1981: 103). This follows from *modal logic*, especially Kripke's work of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Modal logic uses the concepts of necessity ( $\Box$ ) and possibility ( $\Diamond$ ), and involves worlds which hold a relation of accessibility to each other. Stalnaker proposes: “Consider a possible world in which  $A$  is true, and which otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. *If  $A$ , then  $B$*  is true just in case  $B$  is true in that possible world (Stalnaker 1968: 102). Todd had talked of similarity between worlds in 1964: “It has to be supposed that this hypothetical world is as much like the actual one as possible” (Todd 1964: 107; Bennett 2003: 166).

Lewis (1972, 1973), writing exclusively on counterfactuals, reached similar views to Stalnaker (Bennett 2003: 152). But he conceived differently of closeness between worlds:

“Stalnaker's theory depends for its success not only on the Limit Assumption that there never are closer and closer  $\varphi$ -worlds to  $i$  [real world] without end, but also on a stronger assumption: that there never are two equally close closest  $\varphi$ -worlds to  $i$ , but rather (if  $\varphi$  is true at any world accessible from  $i$ ) there is exactly *one* closest  $\varphi$ -world” (Lewis 1973: 77). A formulation of his truth conditions for counterfactuals includes: "a counterfactual is non-vacuously true iff it takes less of a departure from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent true without the consequent" (Lewis 1973b: 560; Edgington 2007: 143).


Stalnaker's logical truth is the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle:  $\Vdash (A \supset C) \vee (A \supset \sim C)$  (Stalnaker 1981: 89); “(if  $A$ ,  $B$ ), or (if  $A$ ,  $\neg B$ )” (Edgington 2007: 172). A complex sentence may be neither true nor false if it includes component sentences which have (permissible) truth-values which clash (Stalnaker 1981: 87-104; Bennett 2003: 184). When the selection function does not select one closest  $A$ -world because there is a tie, the conditional of which it is part is neither true nor false (Bennett 2003: 183-84). The pair of examples attributed to Quine by Stalnaker, are: "If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian" and "If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French"; these are false according to Lewis and indeterminate according to Stalnaker (Stalnaker 1981: 91-92; Lewis 1981: 60-61).

One consequence of the Conditional Excluded Middle according to Lewis (1973), is the loss of the difference between *would* and *might* counterfactuals (Lewis 1973: 80). Stalnaker argues that Lewis treats "If ... might ..." as an idiom, rather than keeping the meanings of *if* and of *might* apart, and of recognizing that the expression normally indicates the speaker's knowledge. He also attacks Lewis' s definition of *would* and *might* in terms of each other, emphasizing rather the epistemic sense of *might* (Stalnaker 1981: 98-101]. Lewis defends a different position: "If I had looked, I might have found a penny" is false, because the penny was not there, and I did not look; but Stalnaker considers it true, because he judges the conditional on the basis of "for all I know". He talks of a "quasi-epistemic" possibility "relative to an idealized state of knowledge" (Lewis 1973: 80; Stalnaker 1981: 100-01).


### 1.3.2. Counterfactuals involve forks

Followers of Stalnaker-Lewis largely agree on the following: "the truth value of  $A \supset C$  depend[s] on whether  $C$  is true at the  $A$ -worlds that are (1) like the actual world in matters of particular fact up to the antecedent time and (2) perfectly like the actual world in respect of causal laws" (Bennett 2003: 198). Bennett conceives of a "ramp" that goes from the actual world ( $\alpha$ ) to the antecedent (TA). At world  $w$  events take a different course at the time of the antecedent, as illustrated in the following representations of three major theories:


(a)



(b)



(c)



(Bennett 2003: 215). Bennett's own "Simple" theory (1984), is meant to avoid the bump Jackson's suffers from, since Jackson considers the pre-antecedent time as being exactly like actuality; Jackson would have "If there had been no cars on the road just then [when the dam burst], no lives would have been lost" imply that the cars were there until the time of the

antecedent, and then suddenly disappeared (Jackson 1977: 9; Bennett 2003: 208-10). Bennett's Simple Theory says that a counterfactual is true iff "C obtains at the legal  $A$ -worlds that most resemble  $\alpha$  in respect of their state at TA". There is here no sudden departure from reality, as indicated in (b) by the two diverging lines (which are not meant to intersect). But Bennett finds the Simple Theory faulty too (Bennett 2003: 209; 216; 213). Consider: "If the German army had reached Moscow in August 1941, it would have captured the city"; that may seem true if we think the hypothetical Soviet troops in August 1941 would be the same as at  $\alpha$ . But that would not have been the case. The Simple Theory avoids Jackson's bump, but also lacks the correct kind of run-up away from actuality to the antecedent (Bennett 2003: 213).

How, then, do we theorize a departure from our world? Lewis, whose 1979 "Time's Arrow" description of overall closeness is largely behind these concepts, talks of "small miracles", and Bennett of "exploding differences". A small miracle is an illegal event which occurs just before the time of the antecedent, as shown in (c), and does not obtrude on the thoughts of people who evaluate the counterfactual; an exploding difference is the final result of tiny, legal differences that have been accumulating for a long time (Bennett 2003: 217).

#### 1.4. Independent and Biscuit Conditionals

These may be either indicative or subjunctive and are not very interesting. Logically necessary independent conditionals are "If the closing date is Tuesday the 14<sup>th</sup>, then the closing date is a Tuesday"; and "If the river were to rise another two feet, it would be two feet higher than it is now". No matters of particular fact intervene here between antecedent and consequent. A causal independent conditional is "If that particle had been two light years from here a month ago, it would not have been here now". This is a matter of physics. A simpler form than the conditional would make the same point: "no particle can travel faster than the speed of light" (Bennett 2003: 16-18).

Biscuit conditionals are named after J. L. Austin's "There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some" (Austin 1970: 212). This could be interpreted as an ordinary conditional, but in most cases is not: the question "And if I don't want them?" shows that. DeRose and Grandy (1999: 412) argue that saying  $A \rightarrow C$  is asserting  $C$  conditionally on  $A$  being true in both indicative and biscuit conditionals; in the latter, however, the speaker's uncertainty concerns not the truth of  $C$ , but the relevance of  $C$  to the hearer's interest.<sup>2</sup>

Biscuit and "nonconditional conditionals" are discussed by Geis and Lycan (1993). A nonconditional conditional is: "If I may remind you, I have been working here for seventeen

---

2 Wakker (1994) calls these "illocutionary", and Martín Puente (2009) "conditionals of the enunciation".

years” (Geis & Lycan 1993: 39).<sup>3</sup> Lycan later decided that these are conditionals after all comparable to non-interference ones (Lycan 2001: 206-10; Bennett 2003: 125-26). A non-interference indicative conditional is one which after the Ramsey test has a high probability for *C* because the speaker has already given it one; you may want to reassure me that the refrigerator will not explode if you open its door as I fear; you cast that in a conditional, but there is no link between the antecedent and the consequent (Lycan 2001: 89-90; Bennett 2003: 122-24).

## **2. Cognitive studies of counterfactuals**

Psychologists test conditionals empirically (Evans & Over 2004: 33). Two major contemporary figures in this field are Jonathan Evans and David Over, the former supervised for his PhD by the founder of those experiments, Peter Wason, and the latter by the philosopher Edgington. Their 2004 book *If* was intended to bring the philosophy and psychology of conditionals together (Evans & Over 2004: vi); and the periodical *Thinking & Reasoning*, started in 1995 and edited by Evans, dedicates around 50% of its space to the empirical study of conditionals. What follows is largely based on the former publication.

### **2.1. The suppositional three-way and the mental models two-way**

Evans and Over consider themselves the opponents of Johnson-Laird and Byrne, whose theory they consider more popular (EO 2004: 59). The difference concerns the mental representation of conditionals, and both start from the truth table task.

The suppositional (three-way) theorists, such as Evans and Over, claim that people reason with representations which resemble three-valued truth tables, and draw support principally from testing participants by the "truth task": people are asked to decide whether the combination of antecedent and consequent makes a given rule true, false or irrelevant. Wason introduced the notion of "defective truth table", which contains the judgment "irrelevant". From the results of one version of the "selection task", he hypothesized that people assume that a conditional has three values; "If it rains, I shall go to the cinema" becomes irrelevant when the weather is good (Wason 1966: 146-47). Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969) are attributed the first truth table experiment which confirmed the judgment "irrelevant" for false antecedent cases. People were asked to evaluate the rule: "If there is an A on the left then there is a 7 on the right";

<sup>3</sup> Wakker (1994) calls these "propositional" and Martín Puente (2009) "conditionals of the proposition".

many put cards without an A on the left (false antecedent) into the group "irrelevant" (EO 2004: 34-36). This kind of test has been replicated many times since; De Finetti (1967; 2008) used "null" as the third value (Sevenants et. al 2011: 214-15).

The "confirmation bias", later "matching bias", was identified from the "selection task". Participants were asked to choose which cards needed to be turned over in order to confirm or falsify the statement: "If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other"; the four cards showed A, D, 3,7 (true antecedent, false antecedent, true consequent, false consequent). Most people chose A and 3, trying to prove the conditional true. The intended solution was A and 7 (Wason 1966). People tend "to see cases whose lexical content matches the explicit values in the conditional statement as relevant and conversely to fail to see the relevance of the mismatching cases" (EO 2004: 41; 74-75; Evans 1972). By "bias", psychologists mean systematic non-logical influence on behaviour (EO 2004: 41). That was then counteracted by the use of explicit negations, harder to process (Oaksford and Chater 1994).

Processing difficulties were also considered the reason for discarding false antecedents as irrelevant at a preconscious stage. This was disproved: experiments involving participants talking aloud (Evans 1995), computerized inspections of decision times (Evans 1996), eye movement (Ball et al. 2003) and the presentation of two identical consequents with different antecedents (Handley et al. 2002) showed that people think before replying, and do not just eliminate problems without reasoning.(EO 2004: 77-78). Evans and Ball (2010) reconsidered the eye movement study, and confirmed that a two-stage process of evaluation which involves conscious analysis takes place.

Another non-logical response to conditionals which was observed is the unjustified reading of biconditionality (Braine 1978; EO 2004: 95). Evans and Newstead's large data sets (1977) show large percentages of "irrelevant" responses for false antecedent and true consequent cases, *FT*, and for *FF*, but also a large number of "false" for *FT*. This means that many accept the denial of the antecedent, the fallacy *if p then q; not-p therefore not-q* (EO 2004: 42-43). The trend, however, is for people to endorse the denial of the antecedent less than the affirmation of the consequent, the fallacy *if p then q; q therefore p*; and *modus ponens (if p then q; p, therefore q)* more than *modus tollens (if p then q; not-q, therefore not-p)*; this partly excludes older children, strangely, who correctly endorse *modus tollens* more than adults and younger children do (Barrouillet et al. 2000; EO 2004: 47; 50; 51). Stanovich (1999) found that brighter participants are better at suppressing prior belief which leads to biases (EO 2004: 79).

For a while psychologists thought that realistic rather than abstract material would produce more logically correct results. That worked with "Every time I go to Manchester I travel by train" (Wason & Shapiro 1971) but not, later, with "If I eat haddock, then I drink gin" and other food and drink conditionals (Manktelow & Evans 1979) and the idea lost support (EO

2004: 80). In the first deontic selection task, however (response to a conditional aimed at regulating behaviour), the people who made the right choice were those who had experienced the rule: presented with "If a letter is sealed, then it must have a 50 lire stamp on it", participants who were familiar with that postal arrangement checked the correct envelopes (Johnson-Laird et al. 1972); the others did not (Griggs & Cox 1982). It was concluded that familiarity makes the difference. Under those circumstances, or when the rule is well explained, most people will choose the  $p$  and  $not-q$  cards, and that regardless of intelligence. Griggs and Cox (1982) called this familiarity effect the "memory-cue hypothesis", and Cosmides (1989) "availability" theory. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed "pragmatic reasoning schemas": people would learn sets of rules for reasoning about certain situations, grouped in an abstract structure. But since this structure is expressed by the authors as sets of conditionals that contain deontic modals ("If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied"), circularity has been found in that argument (EO 2004: 83-84). Cosmides (1989) has also argued that detecting cheaters, as in the Drinking Age Rule ("If people are drinking beer, then they must be over 21 / 18 years of age"), has evolutionary advantages, and later that hazard management is innate in people (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). EO asked whether that relates specifically to "if" (EO 2004: 82-86).

Abstract conditionals are not processed deeply. When communicating, people juggle effort and cognitive effect; the latter is "a worthwhile difference to the individual's representation of the world" (Sperber & Wilson 2002). A deontic context can stimulate a deeper reading when people are instructed to seek cheaters: "If a person is drinking beer then that person is over 18 years of age" induces the representation of an underage drinker, *if p then not-q*. People then have no problem understanding and following the instructions. Conversely, there is no incentive in the non-deontic selection task for participants to go beyond intuition (Sperber & Girotto 2002: 287; 280). Most conditionals equally do not require deep processing: "If you stay an extra hour tonight, I will pay you double time" probably does not lead to thoughts of *if p then not-q*; but "If you want to keep this job, you will wear a tie to work every day" does, because *if p then not-q* is a live issue to the listener who may lose his job (EO 2004: 88). Relevance, then, equates "epistemic utility" in indicative conditional reasoning, and costs and benefits in deontic conditional reasoning (EO 2004: 88-89).

This research points to an application of logic which is not that of the two-way truth table. The mental model (two-way) theorists, however, such as Johnson-Laird and Byrne, claim precisely that. They draw support principally from the "possibilities task": people are asked to evaluate whether a certain combination of antecedent and consequent is possible in relation to a given rule (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991; 2002; Sevenants et. al 2011: 214-15). This approach emerges from the thinking of Piaget (1960s), which trusted logic to provide the correct account for reasoning (EO 2004: 33).



For Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), "If Arthur is in Edinburgh, then Carol is in Glasgow" is true even when Arthur is not in Edinburgh. Conditional assertions "suggest" a relation of causation between antecedent and consequent, but retain the truth-table as the basis for evaluating conditionals; this includes: "If you are a millionaire then it will rain tomorrow". They comment that in this case theorists "face a choice: to abandon the truth-table analysis of conditionals ..., or to accept the validity of these apparently paradoxical deductions and to explain why they seem improper. We shall embrace the second alternative". The explanation given for the "improper" appearance of those conditionals is that they "throw semantic information away", which is one of the three things which contravene the constraints of deductive competence (JLB 1991: 7-8; 73-74; 20-22; EO 2004: 63-64). JLB, however, repeatedly distinguish between logical validity and the complexity of life (JLB 1991: 20).

JLB also depart from the standard truth table in two ways. They maintain that people construct mental models of what is true, but not of what is false ("principle of truth"); and that many people initially only have shortened representations of conditionals, the false antecedent cases becoming the subject of what Johnson-Laird (1995) calls "mental footnotes" (EO 2004: 61; 101). Also, JLB's 2002 article quotes various forms of "semantic" and "pragmatic modulation" (context, relevant knowledge, default assumptions, attempts at consistency) as regulatory mechanisms in the understanding of conditionals; these include the influence of the order in which information is learned (JLB 2002: 658-60; 667). JLB, then, acknowledge that more than strict adherence to the truth table comes into play in the evaluation of conditionals.

Two interesting findings have been replicated by a study published in 2011. Participants who judge false antecedent cases as irrelevant and examine both true-true and true-false conditionals rather than just the first, score more highly on intelligence tests; but the nature of the experiment influences the results: the truth-task produces a larger proportion of three-way answers, and the possibilities-task produces a larger proportion of two-way answers (Sevenants et. al 2011: 214-15).

## **2.2. Indicative, counterfactual and deontic conditionals; and conditionals with negations**

Psychologists divide conditionals into indicative, counterfactual and deontic. Deontic conditionals try to influence behaviour ("If the traffic light is red then you must stop". EO 2004: 2-3). Speech acts such as tips, warnings, promises and threats are also somewhat deontic:

"If you avoid the motorway then you will get there quicker" (tip; more indicative)

"If you clean my car then you can borrow it tonight" (promise; more deontic)

"If you smoke cigarettes then your health will suffer" (warning; more indicative)

"If you arrive late again, I will fire you" (threat; more deontic) (EO 2004: 3-4).

To psychologists, the motives of the person uttering the deontic conditional matter. The speaker may have power over the consequent: promises and threats contrast with tips and warnings (EO 2004: 3). Also, the probability that the antecedent is true seems to be irrelevant to the listener, though EO bemoaned the lack of research as yet into conditionals and decision making (EO 2004: 4).

Conditionals with negations are also of interest to psychologists. As Wason (1972) has argued, negative statements are often meant to deny presuppositions. We say that a dolphin is not a fish, but not normally that a horse is not a fish. When we imagine a different state of the world, we can think of something that is true being false, and the other way round; and we can envisage either positive or negative possibilities: "What if we take up salsa dancing?" and "What if we do not go the meeting?". In counterfactual form we can imagine: "What if we had gone for a long walk?" and "What if we had not had too much to drink?" (EO 2004: 4).

### **2.3. Pragmatics**

Pragmatics goes beyond linguistics. It concerns "the way in which prior knowledge and belief influences communication between people". If we observe a woman rushing into her house and we hear her husband say "It is on the table", we cannot understand the verbal message without further information. She has just phoned about her passport. The verbal part is the least important, as the husband's pointing to the table would be just as effective. Both linguistic and non-linguistic means of this kind are commonly used in communication (EO 2004: 5).

Context, therefore, crucial for successful communication, matters in conditionals too. From the conditional promise "If you clean my car then you can borrow it tonight", we can make pragmatic inferences unrelated to the truth of the premises: the speaker has power over the listener, does not want to clean the car, and believes that the listener wants to borrow it; the speaker uses the conditional as a way of influencing the behaviour of the listener, but may relent should the listener offer to clean the car on the next day. None of this relies on strict logic (EO 2004: 6).

The "principle of relevance" (Sperber & Wilson 1986; 1995) says that "all communications convey a guarantee of their own relevance". Grice's (1975) pragmatic implicature included not saying less than is meant. As applied to deontic conditionals, that means that asserting the consequent alone is often enough: "If you clean my car then you can borrow it tonight" is either biconditional, or the antecedent is unnecessary. If the listener knows that the speaker sometimes gives in, an infringement of the rules of conversation occurs. "If"

needs to be studied in relation to more than principles of conversation (EO 2004: 6-7).

A theory developed by Evans (1984; 1989) is the "heuristic-analytic theory". It surmises that we form a representation of what is relevant and act accordingly, sometimes wrongly because of a biased selection of information. EO conceived of two cognitive systems: 1 is unconscious, or pragmatic, and evolved earlier; 2 is conscious, or analytic, and relates to language and general intelligence. The suppression of pragmatic influences and the ability to reason slowly and abstractly are heritable features of System 2. This is what is involved in hypothetical thinking: while both humans and animals make decisions based on past experience, only humans can imagine the possible results of actions, and make decisions on a balance of probability and utility; though evidence exists of biased decisions (Shafir et al. 1993; Baron 1994) and logical flaws. Humans act according to past experience, too: "If I go to a departmental meeting, I get a headache"; but, differently from animals, they can tell someone why they avoid the meeting, and to reason about causes (EO 2004: 6-9). Evans, Over and Handley (2003) formulated three principles: the singularity principle (we only consider one hypothesis at a time); the relevance principle (the possibility considered is the most relevant and plausible in the given context); and the "satisficing" principle (we keep the current model if it satisfies our constraints and goals. EO 2004: 9-10).

#### **2.4. Psychologists, Ramsey, Stalnaker and Lewis**

EO take the Ramsey test as expressing "the degree of confidence one should have in the ordinary conditional by relating it to conditional probability" (EO 2004: 21). Stalnaker (1968) used the Ramsey test for cases in which we must change our beliefs before applying them because our suppositions contrast with the antecedent. We need to reduce the conflict which results from our hearing "If Linda is a feminist and a banker, then she will vote for the Conservative Party", when we think that she is actually a non-feminist (EO 2004: 22). We will need to make minimal readjustments to our beliefs before considering that conditional. JLB (2002) objected that making that change can be a psychological problem; EO replied that revising beliefs in the light of experience is normal behaviour (EO 2004: 22-23).

We evaluate conditionals by forming a representation of the antecedent and the consequent and by comparing it with one of the antecedent and the negation of the consequent. System 1 is involved if we count how often we had headaches after departmental meetings, and System 2 if we build causal models and make conditional probability judgments; with the possibility of biases, such as relying on unrepresentative but easily retrievable examples (EO 2004: 24-26). Our mental constructs are the psychological equivalents of Stalnaker's worlds: if we usually carry an umbrella, and we forget it once and get wet, we will perceive a world in

which we take one as close, and will even feel regret; whereas if we never take an umbrella, we will consider a world with an umbrella in it as distant and will not feel too bad about getting wet. Our probability judgments are linked to closeness judgments (EO 2004: 28).

In 1976, David Lewis revealed that the probability of a conditional as meant by Stalnaker cannot equal the conditional probability of  $q$  if  $p$  (Lewis 1976: 297-315; 1986: 133-156; Bennett 2003: 60). "The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods, wherefore he is willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably true" (Lewis 1976: 297; 1986: 133). Consider: "If the teapot is dropped, then it will break". We think of four future possibilities. The teapot not being dropped and not breaking (false antecedent and false consequent,  $FF$ ), which is what we are trying to achieve by carrying the teapot carefully, Stalnaker would judge to depend on whether that world is closer to "the teapot is dropped and breaks" ( $TT$ ), or to "the teapot is dropped and does not break" ( $TF$ ). Psychologists have found that people's judgments, based on past experience (of dropping china) or on causal models (of how china breaks), are that  $FF$  is closer to  $TT$  than to  $TF$ . Therefore, were we to follow Stalnaker, we would say that people consider true a conditional which has a false antecedent and a false consequent (EO 2004: 28-29). As against this possibility, which results from the model Edgington calls "T2" (2003), and against the mechanical application of the truth table too ("T1"), EO support the non-truth-functional "T3" model of conditionals throughout their book. T3 maintains that there is no truth outside of pragmatic considerations. Conditional probability depends on a subjective degree of conditional confidence, as argued in Adams' (1975) reworking of Ramsey; and it is different from the probability of the conditional actually happening (EO 2004: 29; 31).

In tests, people mix up the probability of the conditional and the conditional probability, but also reject the material conditional. EO comment that empirical studies of conditional probability are only very recent, and that psychologists mix up the two different probabilities themselves (EO 2004: 133).

Hadjichristidis et al. (2001) ran an experiment in which people evaluated couples of conditionals such as: "Peter said the following: If horses have steneozoidal cells, then cows will have steneozoidal cells. How likely do you think it is that what Peter said is true?"; and "Suppose you knew that horses had steneozoidal cells. How likely would you think it was that cows have steneozoidal cells?" The ratings between judgments of the probability of the conditional (first question) and those of conditional probability (second question) were highly correlated, 0.99 (EO 2004: 134-35).

Evans et al. (2003) measured three probabilities: conditional, material conditional and conjunctive. Participants were asked how likely certain claims, cast as conditionals, were about objects of which they had read a description ("If the card is yellow then it has a circle printed on it"; *if p then q*). The cards were declared either red or yellow with either a circle or a diamond printed on and in these combinations. People overall rejected the probability of the material

conditional: 33 cards out of 37 do not confirm "If the card is yellow then it has a circle printed on it". There was high correlation between the other two probabilities and the estimated probability of the conditionals. Moreover, people rated the probability of conditional and contrapositive statements (the latter being on the pattern: "if not  $Q$ , then not  $P$ " in relation to "if  $P$ , then  $Q$ ") independently, although they are logically equivalent; there was a small trend to judge the conditional as less likely when the probability of the antecedent was lower. These results flatly contradict the rules of the truth table (EO 2004: 136).

Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003), also using conditionals "impoverished" of a context, independently replicated these findings. About half the participants matched the probability of the conditional to the conditional probability; the material conditional was again largely rejected.

A study which remedied lack of context, by Over et al. ("in preparation"), involved asking people to evaluate claims such as: "If the cost of petrol increases then traffic congestion will improve". Knowledge of the world has a bearing on this kind of reasoning. A probabilistic version of the truth table task was used, with  $TT$ ,  $TF$ ,  $FT$ ,  $FF$  having to add up to 100%: "Petrol cost increases and traffic congestion improves", "Petrol cost increases and traffic congestion does not improve" etc. The overall result was relatively clear: the association of the probability of the conditional with the conditional probability was stronger than in the two studies which involved frequency distribution and mental arithmetic, and the material conditional was again rejected (EO 2004: 138-40).

## 2.5. Empirical testing of counterfactuals

EO and others tried to demonstrate that the same mental process is involved in the evaluation of both counterfactuals and indicative conditionals. When people know an event has happened, they are more likely to think of it as inevitable ("hindsight bias"; Baron 2000; Roeser 2004); but that does not affect the relationship between the perceived probability of the conditional happening and the conditional probability. People were asked to consider the state of the world five years earlier, and to evaluate the probability of counterfactuals such as "If New York had not been attacked by terrorists in 2001, then the US would not have attacked Iraq"; and also to consider Does/Will conditionals ("If Queen Elizabeth dies then Prince Charles will become king") and Had/Would counterfactuals ("If Queen Elizabeth had died last year, then Prince Charles would have become king") in all their permutations ( $TT$ ,  $TF$ ,  $FT$ ,  $FF$ ). "What is very striking ... is that results are very similar for indicative and counterfactual conditionals and for ratings of probability or causal strength"; there was high correlation between the conditional probability and the probability of the whole conditional (EO 2004: 140-41). Real people treat

counterfactuals similarly to indicative conditionals, and mix up the conditional probability with the probability of the conditional.

There were no studies of people's probability judgments about counterfactuals before the early 2000s, according to EO (2004: 120). These need to be integrated with philosophical logic: Chisholm, Goodman, Stalnaker, Lewis, Dudman, Edgington and Ramsey are of most interest to EO. By making adjustments to our beliefs, we can apply Ramsey to counterfactuals (EO 2004: 115-17). People have been found to have intuitions about the closeness of possibilities (EO 2004: 117), though often biased ones, such as selecting versions of themselves when performing better than usual, and generally perceiving those past situations which were successful rather than not, the "availability heuristic" (EO 2004: 117-18). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) proposed the "simulation heuristic", which involves a simulation model derived from a possible condition, the antecedent, a process which is however fraught with biases, such as the rejection of relatively unlikely events when we evaluate counterfactuals (EO 2004: 118). EO see the simulation heuristic as akin to the Ramsey test, and both in need of further experimentation (EO 2004: 119).

Thompson and Byrne's 2002 article on reasoning counterfactually EO select for criticism: the authors are accused of encouraging pragmatic rather than logical inferences when they asked people what they thought the speaker of a counterfactual meant to imply. Participants were presented with possibilities such as the truth or falsity of antecedent and consequent. As expected, subjunctive, as opposed to indicative conditionals were interpreted as more likely to be counterfactual, namely not to have happened; but, surprisingly, although the "nothing implied" response was more likely for indicative conditionals, people also read an implication of truth or falsity in one of the two components of indicative conditionals, especially consequents (Thompson & Byrne 2002: 1158-59). The idea that counterfactual and causal thinking are related was confirmed: more counterfactual interpretations were made of causal than of non-causal materials; and when the antecedent or the consequent were considered false. According to Thompson and Byrne, people "flesh out" the default mental model *TT* with the mood and content of the conditional, and the perceived necessity of the antecedent (Thompson & Byrne 2002: 1166-67).

EO comment that what is lacking is evidence that people will not spot the falsity of: "If I had taken that pawn, then I would have won the game", said after I lost. They expect an attribution of probability: "Some of these experiments should be on counterfactuals ... and their relation to indicative conditionals ..., and on the relation between degrees of confidence in both of these conditional types and conditional probability judgments". This kind of approach is not strictly logical. Elsewhere, not enough emphasis on pragmatics is the accusation (to JLB; EO 2004: 63).

One 1970s psychological account of conditionals would apply to counterfactuals (EO

2004: 121-25). Rips and Marcus (1977) conceived of suppositions people make when considering an indicative conditional, as parallel to possible worlds. They rank progressively less discardable sets of beliefs. The antecedent is added to the top belief; if a set of propositions which feels consistent is hit, and it contains the consequent, then the conditional is considered true. EO find this theory in advance of its time, because the possibility of having more than one consistent set suggested the concept of conditional probability (EO 2004: 53-55). But it had two shortcomings: the implication that those sets would be equally probable, and the impossibility for people to hold sets of possible worlds in their heads, and to recall all their beliefs about something when asked (EO 2004: 55-56).

## **2.6. Psychologists and Adams 1975**

EO find that Dorothy Edgington's T3 model (2003), as opposed to the T1 (the truth-table) and the T2 (Stalnaker 1968), comes closer to the truth about indicative conditionals: there is no truth outside of pragmatic considerations. Conditional probability depends on a subjective degree of conditional confidence. This was Adams' 1975 interpretation of Ramsey. But there are problems with T3 as well as with more truth-functional theories: these involve negations, conjunction, disjunctions and embeddings (Bennett 2003). T3 is dismissed by the only psychologists EO know to have taken it seriously, JLB (1991), who define validity in terms of truth conditions: an inference is valid iff its conclusion must be true given the truth of its premises (EO 2004: 29).

## **2.7. Two more Experiments**

Garcia-Madruga et al. (2009) carried out experiments meant to compare inferences from "unless" to "if not" and from "unless" to "only if" in factual and counterfactual conditionals. The report declares allegiance to the mental models theory of JLB (1991, 2002); reasoners keep few possibilities in mind, because of limited working memory. Having discarded the epistemic models of EO (2004), which add knowledge and probabilities to mental models, GM acknowledge the importance of pragmatic knowledge (GM 2009: 222).

Participants were given sets of problems (such as: "Sergio would have been in Granada only if Cristina had been in Lisboa") and three possible conclusions (such as: "1) Victor was in Madrid; 2) Victor was not in Madrid; 3) There is no valid conclusion"). Reasoners were able to understand and reason from counterfactual "unless" assertions, thus confirming its acceptability as recently claimed by linguists, but denied formerly. Also, while reasoners treated factual and counterfactual "unless" similarly, there was a trend to increase the difference between

affirmative and negative inferences in counterfactual "unless" and "only if" (GM 2009: 243; 227; 235). "Unless" still presented problems with high asymmetrical responses, for instance, which implies misunderstanding of "unless" (especially amongst people with low working memory), perhaps due to superficial bias. Counterfactual "unless" was understood better (GM 2009: 237).

Quelhas et al. (2008) found an identical counterfactual thinking style (upward or downward, for instance) amongst depressed and non-depressed participants; this contradicts Roese and Olson's (1995) supposition that the depressed counterfactualize downward to make themselves feel better. The non-depressed, however, showed a higher tendency towards spontaneous counterfactualizing, which counters the idea that the depressed are more inclined to counterfactualize (Quelhas et al. 2008: 359-62).

### **3. Linguists' Views of Counterfactuals**

#### **3.1. Linguists who are Philosophers**

##### **3.1.1. Kaufmann 2006**

Kaufmann (2006: 6) keeps the basic tripartite grouping of conditionals, as outlined at 1.1, adding that indicative conditionals may also be *predictive* (Does/will) and *nonpredictive* (Did/did).

An interesting view of Kaufmann's is that *if A, B* asserts that *B* follows from *A* "without asserting either *A* or *B*". That opinion probably agrees with current concepts of degrees of speaker's confidence in an utterance (Givón 2001; Edgington: 2007). The relation between *A* and *B* can be causal or inferential. But *B* can also be *relevant* if *A* is true, as in "If you want to meet, I am in my office now". Or the conditional may be a speech act, such as "If you will be late, give me a call" (command); or a metalinguistic comment of the consequent, such as "If you excuse me saying so, she is downright incompetent". An *if-then* sentence which is not a conditional is "If these problems are difficult, they are also fascinating".

Conditionality may also be expressed in other forms: "Should the sun come out, Sue will go on a hike"; "Buy one - get one free"; "Give me \$ 10 and I will fix your bike". But *if* remains the prototypical conditional marker in English. Modality, a form of which is the use of the auxiliaries *will* and *would*, temporal relations and pragmatic factors all play a role in the use of conditionals cross-linguistically.

Kaufmann highlights four aspects of "Truth-Conditional Semantics", each constituting a



more advanced phase in the understanding of conditionals.

**Material Conditional (or material implication)** allows intuitively unacceptable conditionals, as we saw in the philosophical section, because it is a truth function equal to conjunction and disjunction. The following is acceptable as a conjunction, but unacceptable as a conditional: "If today is Friday, it is raining, and if today is Friday, it is not raining". Strictly logical truth conditions, therefore, have been altered to include pragmatic considerations. One of them is the "assertibility" of the conditional (Jackson 1987). Two conditions must be met for *if A then B* to be assertible:  $A \rightarrow B$  must be highly probable and it must remain so in case *A* turns out true; the conditional probability of *B* given *A* has to be high.

A different approach has used the concept of *possible worlds*. *A* cannot be true without *B* also being true: "*if A then B* is true at a possible world *w* relative to an accessibility relation *R* iff (if and only if) for all possible worlds *w'* such that  $wRw'$  and *A* is true at *w'*, *B* is true at *w*". This approach includes a relation *R* which decides the *modal base* (set of possible worlds; Kratzer 1981) relevant to the truth of the conditional at *w*. Under (*variably*) *strict implication* all possible worlds are relevant, and the conditional is true iff *B* is a logical consequence of *A*; at the other extreme, in the case of the material conditional, the only world relevant to *w* is *w* itself.

Conditionals, then, need to be evaluated by reference to speaker's beliefs, information available and possible future courses of events; which constitute "different choices of the accessibility relation". A given conditional can be true and false at the same time, depending on its modal base. The evaluator may lack information and judge a true conditional false, as with: "If this material is heated to 500°, it will burn". This approach makes truth relative to a certain index and escapes the shortcomings of the material conditional. But flaws remain, such as Strengthening of the Antecedent, which allows: "If this material is placed in a vacuum chamber and heated to 500°, it will burn". There is no link of necessity between the two. Kaufmann presents two possible solutions to this.

**"Relative Likelihood"**. Default assumptions about the first example include air being present. Such assumptions are "an *ordering source*", a set of propositions that are normally true at *w* (Kratzer 1981) and preorder the worlds in the modal base. Kaufmann's improved formulation of the possible world approach is as follows: "*If A then B* is true at *w* relative to a modal base *MB* iff for every *A*-world *w'* in *MB*, there is an *AB*-world in *MB* that is at least as normal as *w'* and not equalled or outranked in normalcy by an *A*-world in *MB* at which *B* is false" (Kaufmann 2006: 7). Every antecedent-world at which the material is placed in a vacuum chamber is outranked in normalcy by another at which it is not. The order achieved Kaufmann likens to that envisaged in the concept of "comparative similarity" between possible worlds used by Lewis and Stalnaker regarding counterfactuals (and indicative conditionals in Stalnaker 1975).

A second solution ("**Probability**") consists in rejecting "the universal quantification

over possible worlds". On this account (Adams' *probabilistic entailment*, 1975), modal bases and ordering sources are replaced by different probabilistic distributions over possible worlds. But this did not resolve all complications: Lewis (1976) showed that there is a difference between the conditional probability and the probability that the conditional is true. That conditional sentences should be propositions at all, therefore, is now in doubt, and philosophically-inclined linguists tend to look at how conditionals are used (Jackson 1987).

Kaufmann's final comment is that Kratzer is the most influential theorist amongst linguists, and that probabilistic accounts and artificial intelligence have been studied extensively by philosophers. Kratzer's collected essays on conditionals, highly theoretical, was published in 2012. Choosing between theories is difficult for linguists, because the issues involved in studies of conditionals are not obviously linguistic. One theory works better than another, depending on the purpose of the study (Kaufmann 2006: 8).

### 3.1.2. Barker 2006

Barker (2006), on counterfactuals, comments that the speaker's knowledge of the falsity of the antecedent is not a mark of counterfactuals; mere improbability may justify the utterance, and some indicative conditionals may also be asserted with known false antecedents: "If Bill Clinton was bald, no one knew about it." Future open conditionals, in particular, appear to fall in both camps because of the syntactic tense shift and modal auxiliary in the consequent: "If Clinton goes bald, everyone will know about it." Truth conditions also constitute a problem, which begins with indicative conditionals; "probabilistic assertability condition semantics" has developed as an alternative (Adams 1975). How probabilistic semantics applies to counterfactuals, however, remains unresolved. Barker identifies two main approaches to truth conditions for counterfactuals: the *metalinguistic* (older) and the *possible worlds* (more recent), both based on Ramsey (1929).

**Metalinguistic Approaches.** These consist of the following argument: the antecedent  $P$  and laws of nature  $L$  plus facts cotenable with  $P$  (legitimate factual premises) entail or probabilize the consequent  $Q$ . As we saw in the philosophical section, this presents two challenges: the avoidance of circularity in the definition of the conditions for premise  $A$  to be cotenable with  $P$ , and the conception of law (Barker 2006: 259).

Natural laws present another problem: it is not obvious why some generalities support counterfactuals and others do not. My inference "all organisms living in the shade have a temperature of 98.6° F", based on my taking the temperature of lizards in the shade, can confirm "all organisms living in the sun have a temperature of 98.6°F", although I have observed that those lizards were in the shade rather than in the sun (Barker 2006: 260).

**Possible Worlds Approaches.** These run into even more problems with laws. The closest *P*-worlds to the actual will be worlds which diverge from it shortly before the time of the antecedent; there is then a small miracle of divergence, and those worlds then develop according to the laws (Barker 2006: 260).

Lewis' temporal asymmetry (the dependence of the future on the past rather than the opposite) worries Barker. Concerning physical determination, Barker refers to Elga (2000). Elga asks: assuming that at 8 Greta cracked an egg onto a frying pan, are the following true? "If Greta hadn't cracked an egg, then at 8.05 there wouldn't have been a cooked egg on the pan / ... at 7.55 she wouldn't have taken an egg out of the refrigerator". Which possible world amongst the *non-crack* worlds is the closest to the actual world? For that to be decided, history before 8 has to be almost like actual history, and history after 8 has to be very different from it. On those conditions, the second counterfactual ("at 7.55 ...") will almost never turn out true (Elga 2000: 314). Elga's argument involves the world of thermodynamics: here, "the existence of apparent traces of an event ... falls far short of entailing that the event occurred" (Elga 2000: 324). Dunn (2011) rebuts: entropy "does not seem to refer to a perfectly natural property". "The Second Law [of thermodynamics] would be very complex if formulated by referring only to perfectly natural properties" (Dunn 2011: 83). The laws to be respected are rather "new science laws" (Dunn 2011: 84). Are there different kinds of natural laws, through which we can evaluate counterfactuals? Loewer (2012)'s view is that there are no additional, ontologically independent dynamical or causal special laws; there is, however, "a law that specifies an objective probability distribution over initial conditions compatible with the very low entropy state of the universe at the time immediately after the Big Bang" (Loewer 2012: 13; 18).

Lewis' insistence on temporal asymmetry fails in relation to physical indeterminism, too, according to Barker (2006). Consider: "If I had bet on heads I would have won", said after the coin lands heads. That will always be false if we adopt Lewis's rule 4 and rule out approximate agreement of fact after the time of the antecedent as relevant to similarity of worlds. Ruling it in would have the same results, since Lewis seeks global similarity between the counterfactual and the actual world, rather than patterns of causation (Barker 2006: 261).

Barker concludes that the lovers of world semantics may prefer a version of it which has *impossible* rather than possible worlds (Barker 2011: 573). In a physically deterministic world, the divergence between the counterfactual and the real world results in inconsistency of laws, which possible world theories ignore. The "*pragmatic* or *metalinguistic* approach", on the other hand, views counterfactuals as "incomplete representations of divergence, representations that never register the inconsistency" (Barker 2011: 573). A game, rather, "can ensue between assertor and assessor depending on how much detail" they may want; an uncooperative audience may well ask too many questions about the precise causal path and lead to a collapse of the counterfactual (Barker 2011: 573).

## 3.2. Linguists who are Linguists

This section will consider linguists who take a more technical approach to the study of conditionals.

### 3.2.1. Givón

Givón considers himself a "functionalist" and declares his lineage back to Aristotle, who saw a correlation between bodily form and function; although he also founded the opposite approach, structuralism, by recognizing the arbitrariness of linguistic signs, which modern structuralists have "unreflectively" extended to grammar. Saussure's "fateful" opposition between *langue* (ideal system) and *parole* (observable linguistic behaviour), Givón argues, neglects the role of mental processing, which was present in Aristotle (Givón 2001(1): 3-5).

Givón asks whether thought precedes syntax and whether grammar is the manifestation of syntactic structures. This is self-reportedly done in the spirit of Chomsky, who after many changes of heart "decreed" syntactic structures to be "figments of the methodologist's imagination" in 1992. Plato (for pre-existing ideals) and the Positivists (against) also "loom over" Givón's approach. Givón claims to seek universals while "affirming the reality of syntactic structures", and admits the principles he discovers are "elusive" (Givón 2001(1): xv-xvi). Some consider Givón an authoritative linguist and typologists, a follower neither of Chomsky's formalism nor of any particular version of functionalist linguistics (Kulikov 2004: 419). Others find his analysis superficial and inconsistent (Carroll 1985: 343-47).

For Givón (2001), counterfactuals are adverbial clauses that constitute a branch of conditionals, but "fall under the scope" of *negation* rather than that of *irrealis* modality.

#### 3.2.1.1. Modality

Counterfactuals (and conditionals) are expressions of **modality**. This concerns the way the speaker's attitude towards the proposition is coded: speakers make a judgment which can be epistemic (truth, probability, certainty, belief, evidence) or evaluative / deontic (desirability, preference, intent, ability, obligation, manipulation), and often both. A modal "shell", or "envelope", encases the event:

- a) Darla shot the tiger
- b) *It's too bad* that Darla shot the tiger
- c) *If* Darla shoots the tiger, ...
- d) Darla *didn't* shoot the tiger
- e) *He told Darla that she should* shoot the tiger
- f) Shoot the tiger, Darla!
- g) *Did* Darla shoot the tiger?

The subject-agent (Darla), the object-patient (the tiger) and the transitive event (shoot) are relatively unaffected by the different modal encasings (Givón 2001(1): 300).

In Aristotle, emphasis is on epistemic modalities, which are kinds of truth: necessary / factual / possible / and non-/ truth; and their modern equivalents in communicative terms are assertions: presupposition and realis / irrealis / negative assertion (Givón 2001(1): 301). These are no longer treated as properties of propositions, but considered to be pragmatic. The following is a shortened version of Givón's 2001 reformulation of his own work on epistemic modality in communicative terms and more widely of the linguistic trends which followed from Austin (1962), who drew a distinction between utterances that cause something to be done and those that do not, Searle (1969), who elaborated the concept of speech always being a form of action, and Grice, whose "conversational implicature" and "reflexive intention" put meaning in the speaker's attitude to utterances (Grice 1975):

**Presupposition.** The proposition is *taken for granted* to be true, either by definition, prior agreement, generic culturally-shared convention, ... or by having been ... left unchallenged by the hearer.

**Realis assertion.** The proposition is *strongly asserted* to be true. But challenge from the hearer is deemed appropriate.

**Irrealis assertion.** The proposition is *weakly asserted* to be either possible, likely or uncertain (epistemic sub-modes), or necessary, desired or undesired (valuative-deontic sub-modes). But the speaker is *not* ready to back up the assertion ... and challenge from the hearer is readily entertained.

**Negative assertion.** The proposition is *strongly asserted* to be *false*, most commonly in contradiction to the hearer's explicit or assumed beliefs. A challenge from the hearer is anticipated, and the speaker has evidence or other strong grounds for backing up their strong belief.

These views reveal the shift that has occurred from logic to "matters of *subjective certainty*", and from "speaker-oriented *semantics* to interactive *pragmatics*" (Givón 2001(1): 301-02).

Givón discusses four grammatical contexts across which modality, which is universal, is distributed: (1) the inherent modality of lexical verbs; (2) tense-aspect and auxiliaries; (3) modal adverbs; and (4) clause type, subdivided into (4a) main declarative affirmative clauses, (4b) verb-complement clauses, (4c) relative clauses, (4d) adverbial clauses (which include conditionals and counterfactuals) and (4e) non-declarative speech acts. The four modalities can also be divided between *fact* (presupposition and realis assertion) and *non-fact* (irrealis assertion and negative assertion) (Givón 2001(1): 302-03; 305; 440; 442; 477n2).

(1) Most verbs are inherently realis, unless under a *non-fact* operator (Givón 2001(1): 304; 443).

Modality is distributed in (2) tense-aspect in the following way: past and present qualify as *fact*, and future qualifies as *non-fact*. The future tense allows a non-referring interpretation along with the aspect *habitual* and with *negation* ("He *will eat* / *always eats* / *did not eat* a sandwich") (Givón 2001(1): 305; 443).

*Epistemic adverbs*, (3), such as "maybe" and "probably" tend to make propositions irrealis and to override realis tense-aspects: "*Maybe* she ate a sandwich" (Givón 2001(1): 305). *Evaluative adverbs* such as "hopefully" cast realis scope, whereas "preferably" projects into the future and casts irrealis scope.

(4a) The declarative, affirmative clause is the default type and has a realis status which can be modified by the means just discussed (Givón 2001(1): 305-06).

(4b) Only modality verbs and auxiliaries concern us here. Modal verbs have high inherent irrealis status. In English, they form the class of *modal auxiliaries*: "can", "could", "may", "might", "will", "would", "shall", "should", "must". These started off having evaluative-deontic senses (intent, ability, necessity, obligation, permission, preference) and acquired epistemic senses like lower certainty or probability; the still evolving new modals have not acquired any epistemic sense yet: "have-to", "got-to", "need-to", "be-able-to". Evaluative-deontic irrealis sub-modes always involve *epistemic uncertainty*. The evaluative-deontic senses are *future projecting*, an obviously irrealis epistemic mode. Many English modals code more than one irrealis sub-mode, such as "can" and "may", which can indicate ability, probability and permission; "should" and "must" are more deontic and can indicate either obligation or probability (Givón 2001(1): 306-08).

(4d) Adverbial subordinate clauses generally come under the scope of **presupposition** ("*When she found a house*, it was too expensive" (temporal); "*Although she found a house*, she refused to buy it" (concessive); "*Because he met a new guru*, he left the church" (cause); "*Since she has a job*, she can afford it" (reason)), **irrealis** ("*When you get a loan*, I'll sell you my car"

(future time); "If you get a loan, I'll sell you my car" (**conditional**); "In order for you to get a loan, I'll have to co-sign it" (purpose) and **negation (counterfactual**: "If you had got a loan, I would have sold you my car") (Givón 2001(1): 311).

Adverbial conditional clauses can be: *irrealis*, *counterfactual*, *conditionals with intermediate truth value* and *concessive conditionals*.

*Irrealis conditionals* have a "pending truth value" which is extended to the main clause and applies also to the past tense ("If they arrived that late, they must be tired") and to the habitual aspect ("If he works that hard, he has no time for this"); they have an "implied *futurity*" ("If you finish on time, you can have this") and the sub-mode of *prediction* ("If she was there, then she did see it"). Irrealis conditionals also resemble irrealis *when*-clauses in many languages, the speaker's expectation of the eventual truth of the whole sentence just being lower in the case of conditionals. Moreover, both irrealis *if* and irrealis *when* behave like bi-conditional connectors: here Givón parts ways from logic, as he comments himself, since only *modus tollens* (denying the consequent) is valid in logic (Givón 2001(2): 332; 387n4). To most people, "If you bring it, I *will* pay you" implies "If you *don't* bring it, I *won't* pay you".

Some languages have a "NEG-conditional subordinator" meaning *if not*. This is demonstrated by the "rough equivalence" of "Unless you pay up, we'll have you arrested" and "If you *don't* pay up, ...". Haiman (1978) has suggested that conditional clauses are "topics", therefore "pragmatically presupposed" without truth value. This probably applies only to pre-posed adverbial clauses.

*Counterfactuals* stand in contrast with irrealis conditionals by falling under the negative, epistemic scope of non-fact. Counterfactual modality is also associated with main clauses such as "You *should have* told me he was here" and complement clauses such as "I wish you *were* here" (Givón 2001(2): 332-33). Cross-linguistically, counterfactuals tend to be marked by semantically contradictory inflections: the realis past, perfective and perfect, and the irrealis future, subjunctive, conditional or modal. "I wish you *were* here" uses the past as a subjunctive.

*Conditionals with intermediate truth value* are those between conditionals (possibly true) and counterfactuals (not true). The same combinations of forms used in counterfactuals are often used to code low-probability conditionals: "If I *were* to do this, I *would* die" / "If I *was* to have *done* this, I *would have* died".

Of *concessive conditionals*, Givón observes that in some languages they use a special morpheme rather than the combination "even if", as in English (Givón 2001(2): 330-35).

### 3.2.1.2. The Position of Adverbial Clauses

Adverbial clauses may precede or follow their main clause, the latter not attested in all

languages. The different "grounding properties" of the two cases oppose semantics to pragmatics: "A post-posed ADV-clause tends to have more local, semantic connections to its main clause ..."; "A pre-posed ADV-clause tends to have more global, diffuse pragmatic connections to its discourse context ...". An example from Ramsay (1987: 405) illustrates the difference: "*If they had not seen him already, they would not see him if he remained still*". The pre-posed clause reaches "diffusely back across several preceding chains" (rifles shooting, then silence ...), whereas the post-posed clause remains fixed to the main clause, what has to happen for it to take place (Givón 2001(2): 345-46). Pre-posed adverbial clauses are "coherence bridges", which link back to the preceding discourse and forward to the main clause (Givón 2001(2): 345-07).

Closely related is the concept of iconicity, i.e. how grammar mirrors events. Givón thinks there is a "naturalness of grammar" (Givón 2001(1): 34). Chomsky's (1968) argument that animal communication consists of signals associated with the non-linguistic, whereas human language is arbitrary and symbolic, Givón sees as a good summary of the views of Aristotle and De Saussure, respectively, on the arbitrariness of the sign, and of those (1920s-30s) of Leonard Bloomfield, "the father of American structuralism" (Chomsky 1968: 69-70; Givón 2001(1): 36; 5). On the opposite side, Peirce (1934, 1940), like Givón, found that most grammatical constructions contain a mixture of devices which go from the more iconic to the more arbitrary (Givón 2001(1): 34). Less predictable information chunks, for instance, are stressed. "Information chunks that belong together conceptually" are packed together spatially and within "a unified melodic contour". Predictable or unimportant information is left out, whereas important information is fronted, and "[t]he temporal order in which events occurred will be mirrored in the linguistic report of the events" (Givón 2001(1): 34-35).

In a language which has the subjunctive, the two semantic domains occupied by that category are the epistemic and the evaluative-deontic irrealis; the former indicates low certainty and the latter weak manipulation, and both sub-modes accommodate gradation.

In main declarative clauses (and yes/no questions), old past forms of the modals are used in English as subjunctive markers: "She would / might / could / should come"; this has the lowest certainty, as opposed to the highest certainty of "He will come" and the lower certainty of "He may / can / shall come" (Givón 2001(1): 313-14). In manipulative speech acts, strength of manipulation is coded by a three-way opposition between imperative / simple modal and past modal: "Leave!" / "You may / can leave" and "You might / could leave".

In different languages, adverbial clauses and / or their main clauses are marked by combinations of subjunctive and non-subjunctive forms depending on levels of epistemic certainty. English uses modals and their old past forms: "When she *comes*, we *will* consider it" (irrealis *when*; high certainty); "If she *comes*, we *will/shall* consider it" (**irrealis *if*; lower certainty**); "If she ever *came*, we *would/might* consider it" (**subjunctive *if*; even lower certainty**);



**certainty**); "If she had *come*, we *would have/might have* considered it" (**counterfactual if; lowest certainty**) (Givón 2001(1): 317; 324).

### 3.2.2. Timberlake 2007

Timberlake (2007) also emphasizes modality. He even argues that realis past narrative may be a record of conditions and consequences that are fulfilled, without any explicit conditional construction (Timberlake 2007: 322). The possibility "to consider alternatives from the perspective of an authority", is also at work "in seemingly innocuous assertions in the indicative (realis) mood" (Timberlake 2007: 283; 315- 16). Darwin's report of spotting whales near the coast, for instance, tacitly tells the addressee that there were two alternative courses of events, and the less expected occurred: "On one occasion I saw two of these monsters, probably male and female, slowly swimming one after the other, within less than a stone's throw of the shore". The speaker points to the expected, that whales do not come close to the shore, and informs the addressee that it was the opposite that took place. The passage demonstrates that alternative courses of events are always present in language ("Tierra del fuego", 22 Jan. 1823; Timberlake 2007: 321).

Timberlake identifies three forms of modality: epistemology, as instanced in questions, inferential constructions ("It seems that ..."), and indicative assertions; obligation, as expressed in commands, weaker or stronger; and contingency, as in conditionals (Timberlake 2007: 316-19; 329-30). Authority, which resides in the speaker in various ways in all other cases, in a conditional is assigned to another situation. Explicit conditionals distinguish the contingency (protasis) and the consequence (apodosis) (Timberlake 2007: 321). "[F]olk reasoning" infers that if the contingency is removed, the consequence is too. The condition is in some way considered uncertain, and that can be in one of three time-oriented ways: in general, or iterative conditionals, the condition is known to occur on and off, and the consequence with it, as in "Whenever ..." constructions; in counterfactual conditions, the condition "is known to be not actual, yet it is considered worth discussing as an alternative reality"; potential conditions are future-oriented and have an uncertain fate. Epistemic conditions, as in "If Jack fetched the water, (you can be sure that) Jill was pleased", are "parasitic" on other conditional structures (Timberlake 2007: 322-23).

General conditions are often treated as aspectual: aspect "is concerned with the relationship between situations ... and time", and general conditions are expressed similarly to iterative events (Timberlake 2007: 303; 325). Condition and consequence tend to be marked differently, the protasis receiving a mark of uncertainty. Counterfactuals are usually

distinguished from other conditionals and marked by the past tense, but are not always marked as less actual than other types (Timberlake 2007: 325-26).

Cross-linguistically, a mood other than the unmarked realis indicative and the imperative is often available as a general-purpose way of expressing uncertainty. Terms for this mood include *subjunctive*, which indicates its featuring in embedded clauses, *conditional*, which shows it is used to mark explicit conditional structures, *potential* and the general *irrealis* (Timberlake 2007: 326).

Speech inevitably contain a modal component: "at each point, the current predication is compared to the prior expectations, and, at each point, the current predication allows one to project and anticipate possible futures" (Timberlake 2007: 332).

### 3.2.3. Thompson et al. 2007

Thompson et al. distinguish between *reality* and *unreality* conditionals as occurring in most languages. Reality conditionals refer to "real" present ("If it's raining out there, my car is getting wet"), "habitual/generic" ("If you step on the break, the car slows down") or past situations ("If you were at the party, then you know about Sue and Fred"). Unreality conditionals can be *imaginative* - either *hypothetical* ("If I saw David, I'd speak Barai with him"; this might happen) or *counterfactual* ("If you had been at the concert, you would have seen Ravi Shankar"; this did not or could not happen) - or *predictive* ("If he gets the job, we'll all celebrate") (Thompson et al. 2007: 255-56).

Most languages use subordinating morphemes, such as *if*, to mark conditionals, and these precede the (adverbial) clause in head-initial languages (like English). Adverbial clauses as a whole are "less subordinate" than the other subordinate clauses, which are complements (clauses within noun phrases) and relative clauses (modifiers of nouns); subordination and coordination are generally considered to be points along a continuum (Thompson et al. 2007: 238). Pre-posed adverbial clauses are widely acknowledged to have a cohesive function in all languages, and often repeating information, whereas post-posed, they tend to link primarily to the main clause, and to introduce new information and to mark a turning point ("He was up in the tree, picking apples, *when the wolf came along*") (Thompson et al. 2007: 295-96). In conversations in English, a higher frequency of post-posed temporal, conditional and causal clauses has been observed (Thompson et al. 2007: 297). Pre-posed adverbial clauses have been considered as topic (Thompson et al. 2007: 291-92). In imaginative conditionals (counterfactuals and hypotheticals), a special marker is common, such as *would* in English; this marker also features in non-conditional imaginative sentences, as in "Would that he were here now!". In some languages, there is no distinction between *if* and *when* clauses (Thompson et al.

2007: 256-57).

Are predictive clauses real or unreal? Different languages group these conditionals syntactically either with one group or with the other. English marks predictive clauses as real. Semantically speaking, the future is unreal because it has not come yet (Thompson et al. 2007: 258-59).

Some languages mark all imaginative conditionals with the same unreality aspect, whereas others differentiate between counterfactuals expressing what could not happen, and the rest. In English, the former group is marked by an *if* clause which contains *had* and a past participle, and a *then* clause which contains *would* and an uninflected verb: "If we *had wanted* a quiet evening, we *would have left* you at home". The other imaginative conditionals are marked by an *if* clause which has the verb in the subjunctive (identical with the past tense, except with *be*), and a *then* clause, which has *would* and uninflected verb: "If I *saw* Jimmy Carter, I *would faint*" (what might happen) / "If I *were* you, I *would write* a book" (what could not happen) (Thompson et al. 2007: 259-60).

Two more groups of conditionals are identified: negative and concessive conditionals. Many languages have a morpheme to mark a negative condition, such as *unless* in English ("Unless you get there by 6.00, we're leaving without you"; "We'll go to Chicago unless the airport is snowed in"). These conditionals signal that the proposition in the main clause depends on a certain condition not obtaining. The authors do not discuss clause position, but mention a difference in implication between the negative conditional morpheme and the conditional morpheme used with a negative: in "If it *doesn't rain*, we'll have our picnic", the implication is that the speaker thinks it is likely *not* to rain. In "Unless it *rains*, we'll have our picnic", the speaker is neutral. Negative conditionals behave syntactically and semantically like other conditionals in the given language (Thompson et al. 2007: 260-61). Concessive conditionals code "frustrated implication": "Even if it rains we'll have our picnic"; "He wouldn't have passed even if he had turned in his term paper" (Thompson et al. 2007: 261).

*Indicative* versus *subjunctive* is the basic opposition of verbal moods adopted by Thompson et al. (2007); *optative*, *potential* and *consequential* they consider more specific. The purpose of the subjunctive in complements is to code dependency (Thompson et al. 2007: 102). The complements of propositions which are asserted as factual have a *realis* modality (indicative); those of propositions which express doubt have an *irrealis* modality (subjunctive or other non-indicative mood): these include negative propositional attitudes (*doubt*, *deny*), hypothetical propositions and commands / requests / desires (Thompson et al. 2007: 108-09).

### 3.2.4. Declerck and Reed 2001

Declerck and Reed (2001), on conditionals in English, reject the labels "hypothetical" and "subjunctive", and two-clause structures in which the subordinate clause is introduced by *as if*, or is a subject or object clause introduced by *if* meaning *whether*. A conditional is "a two-clause structure in which one of the clauses is introduced by *if* (possibly preceded by *only*, *even* or *except*) or by a word or phrase that has a meaning similar to *if* (e.g. *provided*) or *except if* (viz. *unless*)". That definition follows consideration of the very wide variety of semantic dependency there can be between an *if*-clause and its head-clause, as shown in the following examples:

the actualization of the *P*-situation will trigger the actualization of the *Q*-situation: *If you hit me, I'll hit back*

the *P*-clause expresses a relevance condition for uttering the *Q*-clause: *If you're interested, there's someone peering at your house*

both clauses express a fact; the *Q*-clause boosts the meaning of the *P*-clause: *If my room is a bit messy, yours is a pigsty*

if *P* is true, *Q* is true: *If this is Brussels, it must be Tuesday*

the hearer is invited to conclude from the evident falsity of *Q* that *P* must also be false: *If that witness is speaking the truth, I'm the next President of the US* (DR 2001: 8-9; 13-14).

Besides conditional sentences introduced by connectors such as *if*, *even if*, *unless*, *in case*, *lest*, *whether ... or*, necessity connectors *providing / provided (that)*, *on condition that*, *on the understanding that*, and inversion conditionals (*Had he seen this, he would have been curious*), DR include subclauses that may have "a conditional connotation", such as relative or temporal clauses (*Any mistake that should be made is immediately corrected by the machine itself* = *If a mistake should be made, ...*; *You will be paid after the job is finished, not before* = *You will [only] be paid if ...*), "comparative conditionals" (*The more we hurry, the sooner we'll get there*), paratactic conditionals (*Do that or I'll punish you*), and *until*-, *as soon / long as*-, and *when*-clauses. DR make most conceivable sentences seem possible conditionals.

DR (2001) present a possible-worlds-based typology in their analysis. This is mainly for "case-specifying" conditionals, i.e. conditionals in which *P* specifies cases in which *Q* "actualizes" (as opposed to "relevance conditionals", such as *If you are a Catholic, there is a Catholic church in Broad Street*; DR 2001: 262). Their classification is summarized in the following (page numbers in brackets):

Possible *P*-worlds:

- factual: *I (always) avoided her if I could*; factual performative: *Excuse me, please, if I decline* (66, 68)

- theoretical (non-factual)

- neutral theoretical: *If the slugs eat more lettuce than you do, here is the solution* (73)

- non-neutral theoretical

-closed (echoic of other propositions): *If it's already 8.45, I'd better hurry up* (83)

- open: *If the train is late, we will miss our connection in London* (91)

- tentative: *Would you mind if I used your phone?* (97)

- **counterfactual**: *If you weren't such a blockhead you would be much easier to work with* (99) (DR 2001: 66; 109).

Given the magnitude of DR's 2001 work, only counterfactuals are treated next.

### 3.2.4.1. Counterfactuals

DR (2001) view counterfactuality as "a special type of negation": both clauses of a counterfactual implicate, in Grice's sense of implying according to the principles of conversation, that it is not the case that either *P* or *Q* is true. *I would've been happy if he'd come* implicates "it is not the case that I am happy" and "it is not the case that he came" (the implicature is blocked in cases such as *If I'd been there, I wouldn't have protested to what he said*, because "I wasn't there" excludes "I protested". DR 2001: 12). A condition *P* is counterfactual if it is "assumed to be true in a possible world which is incompatible with the real (actual) world", as in: *If he had been here, he would not have approved of this decision* (DR 2001: 13; 99). Sentences often called "hypothetical", DR call "tentative", such as *If he found out about our plans, he could ruin everything*. These are not considered counterfactuals because the fulfillment of the condition is considered unlikely by the speaker, but not impossible. Counterfactuals have an irrealis meaning, along with "imaginary-*P*" conditionals: *In your place I wouldn't have helped him unless he had paid me for it*; this does not say whether I helped him or not (DR 2001: 54-55).

But some counterfactuals imply factuality, such as those with *unless* and *if not*, since *P* in those case has its negation reversed: *Unless you'd helped me / If you hadn't helped me, I wouldn't have finished the job in time* (DR 2001: 69; 140; 244; 246). This is also the case in *ad*

*absurdum* counterfactuals: *If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, I'm Shakespeare* (DR 2001: 70; 100; 140-41; 176). Other "indirect inferentials" are of the type: *If (as you say) he really fought in Vietnam for three years, he would know / have known a lot about warfare*. Here, the counterfactuality of *Q* suggests that *P* is false too, although there may be ambiguity (DR 2001: 141; 153). When *P* identifies two incompatible entities with each other, there is inherent counterfactuality, as in: *I would reconsider my assumptions if I were you*; Goodman (1983) calls these "counteridenticals". The deictic centre presents a problem here, resolved by keeping the referent of the subject of *P* as the referent of the subject of *Q*: *I would ... if I / \*you were you* (DR 2001: 101-02). This is DR's subdivision:

#### **Counterfactual *P* and factual (in an imaginary world) *Q***

*If we had taken the other road, we would also have been here in time* (DR 2001: 104; 258; 266).

#### **Tentative *P* and factual *Q***

*If it were ever lost or stolen, your card can usually be replaced within 24 hours*. "Ad absurdum" tentative conditional: *Pigs will fly if she manages that* (DR 2001: 175-76; 233).

#### **Counterfactual *P* and imaginary *Q***

*If I had your genes, I would have curly hair* (DR 2001: 243).

#### **Imaginary *P* and imaginary *Q***

These are thought experiments with no implications that the speaker considers them true or otherwise: *Would he be talking to her if she was busy?* (DR 2001: 244).

### **3.2.4.2. *Unless***

DR 2001 consider three cases of *unless* clauses: integrated and non-integrated non-irrealis, and irrealis.

**Integrated non-irrealis *unless* clauses** equate "*Q* except if *P*": *Unless / except if / if you don't point out the consequences, people ignore the warning* (DR 2001: 447-48). *Unless* is not interchangeable with *if not* when it means "*Q* results from [not *P*]": *I will be surprised if that book does not sell well / \*unless ....* (DR 2001: 450-51).

**Non-integrated non-irrealis *unless* clauses** typically take a postscript position. Since "*Q* unless *P*" entails "*Q* - (but) not *Q* if *P*", the following are interchangeable: *She'll be here by nine - unless / except if / but not if the traffic is bad / but only if the traffic isn't bad* (DR 2001: 452-53).

**An irrealis *unless* clause** "is one which is not presented as possibly matching the actual world": *P* is either counterfactual or imaginary, in both cases existing only in the speaker's mind (DR 2001: 453-54). Interchangeability with *except if* only applies to imaginary conditionals, and interchangeability with *if not* to counterfactuals (especially in post-posed *unless* clauses) (DR 2001: 456-57). Out of context, this type could be read both ways: *I couldn't have got to Slough in time unless (except if) I'd had a helicopter* (it did not happen); *I couldn't have got to Slough in time unless (if it hadn't been for the fact that) I'd had a helicopter* (it happened) (DR 2001: 458). Counterfactual *unless* means "if it hadn't been the case that", i.e. can be replaced by *if not* but not with *except if*, and has a factual implication: *But unless I'd gone along with you* (if it hadn't been the case that I went ...), *you'd have told your husband, I bet*; and *I couldn't have finished this in time unless* (if it hadn't been for the fact that) *you'd helped me*. The *unless* clause in a counterfactual states what happened; it is not itself counterfactual, and is not interchangeable with an *except if* clause (DR 2001: 458-59).

### 3.2.5. Conditionals as Mental Spaces: Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)

Dancygier and Sweetser justify their 2005 book on four grounds: linguists' neglect of uses of *unless* and *since*; apparently coordinate constructions such as "Take another step and I'll shoot"; clause order (DS 2005: 5; 7).

"Mental Spaces Theory" frames DS's analysis (DS 2005: 11; Fauconnier 1994, 1997). This relates to possible worlds: saying that an *if*-clause "evokes a Possible World within which a *then*-clause holds", is similar to saying that "an *if*-clause sets up a Mental Space within which is the background for the construal of the *then*-clause." In "If we leave it open it will be so hot", the *if*-clause sets up a space in which the window is left open, and within that space the speaker predicts that the room will become too hot (DS 2005: 11). In the world at which the window is open, the speaker considers it highly likely that the room becomes too hot.

There are different types of mental spaces: **content**, **speech-act**, **epistemic** and **metalinguistic spaces**. An instance of mental **content** is provided by the *if*-clause in "If I tie my handkerchief around it it'll stick"; the prediction only works within that *if*-clause. But the speaker sets up a discourse context, a **speech-act space**, in: "If I don't see you before Thursday, have a good Thanksgiving!". In this case, the relationship marked by *if* holds between "the possible scenario portrayed by the *if*-clause and the speaker's act of well-wishing" (DS 2005: 16).

The concept of **epistemic conditionals** refers to the space set up by the speaker's conditional reasoning process. The speaker's belief and her conclusion are set out in the two clauses: "If you don't own a House, then (I guess) you (must) materialize in a Port" (from Neal

Stephenson's *Snow Crash*, 1992) (DS 2005: 17). Another type of conditional involves **metalinguistic** negotiation, as in: "The philosophy of life, *if it could be defined by such a phrase*, was beyond his grasp". Here, the narrator is commenting on his own use of words. In all these cases, the *if*-clause sets up a mental space and "request[s] construal of something", the *then*-clause, within that space (DS 2005: 18).

### 3.2.5.1. "If I hadda known you were coming, I woulda stayed home"

DS's are suspicious of the label "counterfactual". The speaker of "if you got me a cup of coffee, I'd be very grateful", utters a counterfactual, but does not think it contrary to fact (DS 2005: 58-59). The term "irrealis", DS consider equally unhelpful, as it applies also to predictive conditionals, non-conditional predictions and subjunctives, including, therefore, forms which mark a positive epistemic stance (DS 2005: 58-59). Similarly, all predictive conditionals, rather than just counterfactuals, can be said to be "hypothetical", and even with past temporal reference, the contrary-to-fact reading of a counterfactual depends on context (Comrie 1986). For instance, after "At that moment, if I'd tried to slip further into the bushes he would have seen me", the speaker may well go on to say that he did not know whether he had been seen or not (DS 2005: 59-60).

The use of past tense meanings ("temporal distance"), moreover, has been observed cross-linguistically to be closely related to conditionals (James 1982), but also to perform social and epistemic distancing functions (Fleischman 1989). The term "distal" has been used for past forms of modals and other auxiliaries, to include both temporal and epistemic distance (Langacker 1978; Sweetser 1990). In English, one distancing layer consists in the backshifting of the protases of predictive conditionals, which are expressed in the present although they refer to the future: "If you get me a cup of coffee, I'll be grateful" (DS 2005: 60-61). The term "counterfactual", therefore, DS reserve "for specific interpretations involving a construed contradiction with 'reality'" (DS 2005: 58).

DS note that many English speakers register a difference in the degree of speaker's dissociation from belief between these two examples: "If he was President, he wouldn't ..." and "If he were President, ..."; the latter seems more remote (DS 2005: 61). Also, the speaker of: "If I was running a car factory, I wouldn't let workers drive cars home or borrow tools ..." (Neal Stephenson, *Snow Crash*, 1992), goes on to say that he does precisely that, since he lets his workers go home with computer data in their heads (DS 2005: 62). DS, therefore, argue that "the only 'true' counterfactuals in modern English" are American colloquial forms which written may be *hadda*, *woulda*, or *had've*, *would've* or *had of*, *would of*. These show evidence that the speaker does not think that the described situation holds in reality. In the protasis of "If I hadda



known your were coming, I woulda stayed home", the auxiliary is derived from the contraction of the non-occurring form "had have". The speaker has transferred the negative stance observed in apodoses ("would have" etc.) to protases; also, "hadda" (with back-formation "had've" and "had of") was created by analogy with "woulda", "coulda" and "shoulda", and "hadn'ta" was created alongside "wouldn'ta", "couldn'ta" and "shouldn'ta" (Fillmore 1990). In British English, a similar phenomenon occurs in Dorothy Sayers' *The Nine Tailors*: the most extreme form of it is "If I hadn't a-been ill, I'd a-got him away all right ..." ("The Slow Work"). There is no "hadn't have been" as source for "hadn't a-been" (DS 2005: 63).

Only context will give some idea of whether a sentence is to be interpreted counterfactually or not (DS 2005: 71). The question becomes more complicated when counterfactuals interact with other space-building mechanisms.

Fauconnier (1996) argues that counterfactuals often create irrealis space for the purpose of evaluating the actual space, as in: "Had I been he, I would have thrown me out, but he said no, sure he'd talk, he'd be happy to, if I didn't mind these goddamn phones going off all over the place" (Jonathan Raban, *Old Glory*. 1981). The speaker here constructs a conditional space which contains someone else's imagined viewpoint, and embeds that space in a past narrative. Because of past time embedding, there is another layer of past morphology (DS 2005: 68). Both the distanced space ("I" = the other character) and the reality space ("me" = the narrator), are described from the narrator's viewpoint. These situations have been described as blended spaces, or cases of blended perspectives (Fauconnier & Turner 2002; DS 2005: 69).

### 3.2.5.2. Clause Order

"There is something intuitively natural about the idea that the space-builder clause should precede the contents which elaborate the space". This is what happens with most *if*-clauses (DG 2005: 173).

But there are many possibilities:

(1) *if P, Q* "If the home computer breaks down, I'll work in my office"

(2) *Q, if P* "I'll work in my office, if the home computer breaks down"

(3) *Q if P* "I'll work in my office if the home computer breaks down"

(4) *if P Q* "If the home computer breaks down I'll work in my office" (DG 2005: 174).

The *if*-clause can also be placed medially, and that position says that the clause is a pertinent comment to a part of *Q* ("The philosophy of life, *if it could be defined by such a phrase*, ...) (DG 2005: 176). The presence or absence of commas is taken to indicate intonation: comma intonation has been observed to correlate with conceptual subordination (DG 2005: 174).

DG conclude that since *if* is not a topic marker, the *if*-clause can follow *Q*, especially

when *Q* is old information. Space-builders, whether they are building actively or evoking, present material relative to the contents of the new space (DG 2005: 183).

### 3.2.5.3. *Unless*

*Unless* behaves in the opposite way to *if*. A sample from the *Wall Street Journal* showed twenty-seven post-posed *unless*-clauses, mainly preceded by a comma, and one pre-posed *unless* clause (DG 2005: 183). *If* sets up a neutral space, often as background for the hearer to connect *Q* to the mental-space structure of the ongoing discourse: "If Christo hadn't been injured, he'd have made the swim with Karl. If he had been injured, however, Karl would have left him where I was sitting ..." The narrator is trying to figure out what may have happened to Christo. *Unless* sets up a space which is the unlikely alternative to the already established space within which *Q* is said to hold. "'Unless ...' I muttered, clicking my fingers ... Unless he'd been killed outright at sea, ..." *Unless* starts a new line of reasoning, at a different level of hypotheticality from the previous *ifs*. Then: "'Or...!' Or he'd only been injured a little." *Or* here opens a third hypothetical space after rejection of the whole previous line of reasoning, an alternative which turns out later to be the correct one. *Unless* and in this case *or*, are used as tools for new departures in the narrative (DG 2005: 185-86).

There are also contexts where the *unless*-clause precedes the main clause. In that position, it tends to function as a hedge on the following speech act, as in: "Dancing all night on top of a journey is a jolly poor joke. Unless you want me, I'll wait here for the papers" (DG 2005: 186-87).

*Unless* is not interchangeable with *if not*. Also, it is thought that *unless* clashes with counterfactuals, as in "I wouldn't have finished unless you had helped me"; this sentence is unacceptable to some speakers. A corpus of data by Declerck and Reed (2000), however, has shown that *unless* is indeed used in counterfactuals (DG 2005: 189); but it has to be embedded, and those forms are rare. DG explain as follows.

The initial *if*-clause sets up a distanced space, and within that the speaker expects something which *unless* rules out: "and if miss Catherine had the misfortune to marry him, he would not be beyond her control, unless she were extremely and foolishly indulgent" (Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*) (DG 2005: 189-90). The spaces here are not counterfactual; no space clashes with the base space: the marriage space (*if*-clause) has mere future reference, so *except if* can replace *unless* (DG 2005: 195-96).

But consider: "'I have pulled my tail off,' replied the younger Mouse, 'but as I should still be on the sorcerer's table unless I had, I do not regret it'" (Andrew Lang, *Red Fairy Book*). The *unless*-clause here stands in opposition to the base space fact, so *unless* can be replaced by

*if not* and not by *except if* (which is non-factual, whereas *unless* is not necessarily non-factual) (DG 2005: 194).

The following is DG's explanation of the lack of acceptability of *except if* as substitute for counterfactual *unless* (as in the mouse example). *Except if* embeds recursively, with local exceptive meaning: "... a year is a leap year if it is divisible by 4, except if it is divisible by 100, except if it is divisible by 400. Or in other words: All years divisible by 4 are leap years except for years divisible by 100 but not by 400."; counterfactual *unless* does not embed recursively, but sets up a new space, relatively separate from previous ones (DG 2005: 198-200).

## 4. Counterfactuals in Literary Theories

### 4.1. Dannenberg 2008: Coincidence and Counterfactuality

According to Dannenberg (2008: 109), literary scholars have paid relatively little attention to counterfactuals in novels and films.

Plot is "the dynamic interaction of competing possible worlds"; during the reading, "the authoritative version is one of many competing possibilities" (Dannenberg 45). In detective stories, "X murdered Z" is valuable because "Y murdered Z" is temporarily possible. Gwendolen Harleth in George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* (1876) speculates on future possible lives for herself, and after entering a marriage which turns out undesirable, imagines counterfactual versions of her life without that marriage (Dannenberg 45-46; 195-96).

Gwendolen Harleth's counterfactualizing confirms what psychologists have observed in human thinking. Both people and characters or narrators contemplate how things could have been better ("upward" counterfactualizing) or worse ("downward"), with regret or satisfaction, respectively (Dannenberg 112-13; 242n5). When themselves the agent, people tend to regret things they did not do rather than the opposite (Gilovich & Medvec 1995: 271; Dannenberg 113). Also, counterfactual thoughts are more often provoked by radical changes from the expected and by negative rather than by positive events (Olson, Roese & Deibert 1996: 300; Dannenberg 125). Fictional examples of the upward and downward cases are, respectively, Gwendolen Harleth's musings after her unhappy marriage, and Robinson Crusoe's gratefulness to God that his shipwreck was not far from the coast (Dannenberg 45; 195-96; 185). Some argue that popular fiction contains more downward counterfactuals, explained by the enhancing effect they have on actuality. But Dannenberg presents evidence that there is an even spread (Dannenberg 113). Ryan (2001) talks of "immersion" to describe the effect these narrative

strategies have on readers: realist fiction works because it draws the reader into the text, rather than because of its seemingly realistic details (Ryan 2001: 161; Dannenberg 5; 21-22).

Some events, then, are in the text but do not happen. Prince (1992) calls these the "disnarrated", and Ryan (1991) refers to the complex systems of alternative possible worlds that are presented in narratives as the "principle of diversification" (Prince 1992: 30; Ryan 1991: 156; Dannenberg 46). Out of all these worlds, one exists at closure in "realist" texts, since we apply real-world ontology to these narratives; but many worlds may exist by the end of "nonrealist" texts (Dannenberg 47). The human mind thinks in multiple worlds: Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 217) observed that "People pretend, imitate, lie, fantasize, deceive, delude, consider alternatives, simulate, make models, and propose hypotheses" (Dannenberg 2008: 47). About ontological spheres, Doležel (1998) says that by "setting boundaries, we avoid confusion whenever our aesthetic desire or cognitive project invite us to transworld travel". But Fauconnier and Turner (2002) have shown that the mind makes sense of complexity precisely by blending ontological boundaries (Doležel 1998: xi; Dannenberg 47-48). "We live in a counterfactual zoo of absent or negative things" (Fauconnier & Turner 2003: xv). There seems to be a mismatch, therefore, between expectations of one-world ontology, and thinking in multiple-worlds. Ryan (1991) argues that it is precisely the characters' attempts to turn virtual worlds into real ones that generate the plot. That idea is derived from Todorov's 1969 catalogue of modalities for narrative propositions: obligatory, optative, conditional and predictive modes (Todorov 1969: 46-49; Ryan 1991: 110; 119-20; Dannenberg 48).

Either God or Providence often govern the degree of factuality of narratives. In the nineteenth century chance or destiny or confusion got to rule narratives, notably in Thomas Hardy (Dannenberg 102). With the demise of belief in Providence, counterfactual history also developed, as consideration that things could have been different became more plausible (Rodiek 1993: 266). That was reinforced by Darwin's demonstration (in *The Origin of Species*, 1859) that mammals took alternate forms on different regions, suggesting a forking of paths (Dannenberg 200). But plurality of perspectives, and the resulting conflicts, are present "within any author, culture or period" (Dannenberg 103). Narrators sometimes comment on that obvious artificiality: "Had she given way and sobbed aloud, ... he would have melted at once ... But then where would have been my novel?" (Anthony Trollope, *Barchester Towers*, 1857; Dannenberg 124).

#### **4.2. Ronen's *Possible Worlds* (1994): Counterfactuals and Different Degrees of Actualization**

Ronen (1994) concentrates on the metaphor of possible worlds, which began with Leibniz. She intends to bring together philosophy and fiction, considered contradictory from Plato to Russell

(Ronen 1994: 5-7). Below is material not covered above.

There has been a move in literary studies from structuralism to philosophically-inspired semantics of possible worlds; from abstract studies of syntax to considerations of literary content and referents (Ronen 1994: 173). Emphasis has been placed on the way propositions are presented by speakers with varying degrees of authority, the resulting fictional world depending on the interaction between those variations of authority (Ronen 1994: 176). The fictional world is a self-sufficient construct which the cultural context decides is fictional, such as *Anna Karenina* in relation to Michelet's *A History of France* (Ronen 1994: 10). It is considered modal, made of "facts, quasi-facts and nonfacts": different degrees of actualization are attributed to each fictional fact, depending on whose point of view it is presented from and how; narrators' and characters' beliefs, thoughts and predictions make up the text (Ronen 1994: 8; 176-77; 220-27).

Eco, Vaina, Margolin, Doležel, Pavel and Ryan, who continued the formalist tradition of literary analysis into the early 1990s, were some of the first to adopt the possible world framework. This involves "accessibility among worlds, necessity and possibility, nonexistence, counterfactuality, cross-world identity and epistemic worlds" (Ronen 1994: 19). The "basic intuition" was that there were many ways things could have been (Ronen 1994: 21). In postmodernist fiction, there are logical and epistemic impossibilities: Eco suggested that these "are simply *mentioned*, as it happens with the magic operators in fairy tales" (Eco 1989: 353; Ronen 1994: 55-56). Doležel asked whether we have to accept Leibniz's restriction on possible worlds, that they have to be free of contradiction (Doležel 1989: 231; Ronen 1994: 56). "Authentication" was meant to distinguish between facts (authentic motifs) and nonfacts (non-authentic motifs), depending on the authority attributed to the presenter of those motifs (Doležel 1980; Ronen 1994: 56n4).

Important for the study of fictional entities, and of non-actualized states of affairs such as counterfactuals, is Kripke's question of whether proper names transfer across worlds. He and Donnellan have argued that a name will refer to a given individual although that individual does not satisfy the set of descriptions associated with it (Kripke 1972; Donnellan 1966). It is possible to imagine Nixon, for instance, not being elected president. That is because a concept attached to a name in one world may not be at another. "H<sub>2</sub>O" did not refer to water before the formula was discovered. "A name is tied to its referent not by identifying properties necessarily, but by the discursive practice in which such a tie is assumed" (Ronen 42). A name can be a "rigid designator" used "intensionally" in modalized contexts (such as "it is believed that *p*" or "it is possible that *p*"): this means that we can talk about objects we do not know much about. Loux observed that meaning can be "extensional", but also modal (Loux 1979: 35; Ronen 42-43; 133-36).

But what about "baptising"? Since "Sherlock Holmes" has not been attributed to an

existent at any time, there cannot be rigid designation. Literary theorists, however, go beyond the "existential condition": Pavel (1979) argues that what is considered real at one time is not at another, and this leads to blocks in the history of naming. "Zeus", for instance, was real at one time, but not later. The god's name, therefore, was cut off from anything existent. Names do not carry properties with them (Ronen 45).

An important concept relevant to counterfactuals is that of "incompleteness". Ingarden argued that "Every literary work is in principle incomplete and always in need of further supplementation; ... however, this supplementation can never be completed" (Ingarden 1973: 251; Ronen 108). The absence of a referent means that properties cannot be verified. Ronen describes four main approaches to incompleteness.

According to the *actualist approach* (Plantinga 1974), any object that could exist does, and fiction cannot be about incomplete nonexistents (Ronen 116-17). For the "quasi-actualist" Parsons (1980), fictional objects differ from real ones only by their ontological properties, the characterization of their modal status (possible or impossible), and technical properties such as incompleteness. Fine (1982) suggests a distinction between actuals and possibles (Ronen 117n2).

Another approach involves the hypothesis of *various modes or degrees of being*. Pavel says that to "be existent without existing is a sophisticated property equally shared by mathematical entities, unfinanced architectural monuments ..." (Pavel 1986: 31; Ronen 117-18). Wolsterstorff proposed a theory of *kinds*: Gogol's "Chichikov" is a certain kind of person, "the Chichikov in *Dead Souls* kind". The problems of both fictional existence and incompleteness are resolved, if we consider characters as "maximal components" of the fictional (possible) world (Wolsterstorff 1980: 155; Ronen 119). Inwagen considers fictional beings to exist (Inwagen 1977: 302-03; Ronen 119).

The incompleteness of fictional entities has also been interpreted in relation to their *mode of construction*. Howell (1979) found fictional entities to be only *nonradically incomplete*. Tolstoy selected a limited number of properties for Anna Karenina, and attached those to her. Castaneda (1979) considers that the "building blocks" of fictional entities are the same as those of real objects, but fewer of them are presented (Castaneda 1979: 53). According to Walton (1990) and Searle (1969), speakers who use names for fictional entities pretend to refer to something which exists (Ronen 119-120; 86).

Fictional incompleteness can be considered an *object of aesthetic considerations*. "Empty domains are constituents of the fictional world no less than 'filled' domains" according to Doležel (1988: 486). Pavel (1986) maintains that "authors and cultures have the choice of maximizing or minimizing" the "unavoidable incompleteness of fictional worlds" (Pavel 1986: 108). Goffman proposed that what the text presents may be enough for the audience "to place themselves properly in regard to the unfolding events" (Goffman 1986: 149; Ronen 121).

### 4.3. Prince: The Disnarrated

"The disnarrated" is what does not happen in a narrative, but could have. This includes characters' beliefs, hopes and calculations, paths not followed and narrative strategies not used. It is not the non-narrated or unnarrated ("I will not recount what happened during that fateful week") or inferable from chronological lacunae; the unnarratable, which is not worth narrating because it is uninteresting or violates generic, authorial or social conventions; and denarration, which is the narrator's denial of a state of affairs stated earlier (Prince 2005: 118; 1992: 30).

The disnarrated points to unrealised possibilities. It can delay the presentation of action or function as a device to add to characterisation; it can help elaborate a theme, such as the opposition between illusion and reality, or depict the relationship between narrator and narratee by showing that the narrator has the power to multiply potential lines of development. But its most important function is to say why the narrative is worth telling: it is because it could have been otherwise. "A less truthful man might have been tempted into ... a less sane man might have believed ... but Silas was both sane and honest" (George Eliot, *Silas Marner*, 2010: 11; Prince 1992: 35; 2005: 118).

The disnarrated has ancestors. These include Shklovsky's 1917 essay on the role of art to make the familiar look fresh: "Habitualization devours work, clothes, furniture ... The purpose of parallelism, like the general purpose of imagery, is to transfer the usual perception of an object into the sphere of new perception" (Shklovsky 1965); and Labov's "comparators", such as negatives and modals, as devices for comparing unrealised with realised events: "The use of negatives ... expresses the defeat of an expectation that something would happen. Negative sentences draw upon a cognitive background considerably richer than the set of events which were observed" (Labov 1972: 380-81). Mary Louise Pratt (1977) found the "narrative syntax" that Labov observed in real-life conversations in fiction and emphasized the role of speaker and addressee (Prince 1992: 31; Pratt 1977).

### 4.4. Ryan 1991: *Possible Worlds*

Marie-Laure Ryan's 1991 *Possible Worlds* concentrates on "virtual embedded narratives": these are representations which are in characters' minds, and sometimes also outside, in the narrated world. Ryan says of counterfactuals: "The pragmatic purpose of counterfactuals is not to create alternate possible worlds for their own sake, but to make a point about the actual world" (Ryan 1991: 48; Prince 1992: 31-32). Ryan (1991) largely agrees with Lewis' 1978 application of the

possible worlds approach to fiction, which we apply when we judge, for instance, "If Napoleon had not escaped from Elba he would not have died on St. Helena" on the basis of the causal chain which led to his dying on St. Helena; we conclude that a world in which he does not escape from Elba and does not die on St. Helena differs from reality less than one in which he does not escape from Elba but dies on St. Helena. It is by this principle, that of "minimal departure" from reality, that we form representations of the worlds created through discourse (Ryan 1991: 49-52).

Todorov (1969) and Bremond (1973) were "the first to point out that underlying the physical events presented as facts in the narrative universe is a complex network of events and states that never take place, such as possibilities contemplated by the characters and suppressed plot-lines contemplated by the reader" (Ryan 2006: 647; 1991: 110). Characters attempt to reduce "the distances between their model worlds and the actual world", a movement that ends when "the experiencer is no longer willing or able to take steps toward" a resolution. Conflict itself, a feature of the universe, remains (Ryan 2006: 649-50). We use the same skills to extract "a story out of a text" as to interpret human behaviour and make decisions (Ryan 2006: 647).

Klauk (2011) argues against that parallelism. Counterfactual sentences (which can result from faulty knowledge) and counterfactual scenarios (like imagining another German chancellor than Angela Merkel) are different. Thought experiments involve steps which do not apply in literature: we imagine a scenario, judge it and make use of this judgment; the third step is missing in literature (Klauk 2011: 31-33).

#### **4.5. Action Theory**

This is a branch of analytical philosophy which explores ontological and epistemological aspects of human action, and which narrative analysts have applied to the study of stories (Herman 2005: 2). Davidson (1980) asked what events in a life reveal agency, as opposed to "mere happenings in history" (Davidson 1980: 43; Herman 2005: 2). Von Wright (1967), the pioneer of the theory, defined acting as intentionally bringing about or preventing a change. A description of an action involves initial and end states, and a middle *acting situation*, or *opportunity* of action. We need to be told what the initial and end states are, but also what the world would be like without the agency: "[e]very description of an action contains, in concealed form, a counterfactual ... When we say, e.g., that an agent opened a window, we imply that, had it not been for the agent's interference, the window would, on that occasion, have remained closed" (von Wright 1967: 124; 1983: 111; Herman 2005: 2).

Bremond (1973) and Labov (1972) talked of narratives unfolding against a background of what might have been, but was not; that may be described more or less explicitly. Negative



sentences underline the significance of paths chosen "within a network of paths *not* chosen" (Herman 2005: 2).

## **5. Counterfactual History**

Dannenberg (2005) divides works of counterfactual history into three groups: those which function as analytical tools in political sciences (Tetlock & Belkin 1996); counterfactual historical essays (Squire 1972); and fictional works of alternate history (Alkon 1994). Historical theorists regard only plausible scenarios as valid (Dannenberg 2005: 86); this matches the behaviour of lay people, who do not imagine miracle-world counterfactuals, such as "If the Romans had had machine-guns, ..." (Byrne 2005: 10). Historical counterfactuals focus on turning points in history, the failed invasion of the Spanish Armada in 1588 or the Allied victory in 1945 (Dannenberg 2005: 86). Demandt (2011) considers a Persian victory at Marathon (490 BC), as contemplated by Herodotus (from 6.109), Pontius Pilatus pardoning Jesus, and Hitler dying in 1938. These are typical subjects of counterfactual history. Historical figures themselves, of course, also use counterfactuals. Byrne (2005) quotes Martin Luther King's speech made ten years after he was nearly stabbed to death in 1958: "... if I had sneezed, I wouldn't have been around here in 1960 when students all over the South started sitting in at lunch counters ... I wouldn't have been here in 1963 when the black people of Birmingham, Alabama aroused the conscience of this nation and brought into being the Civil Right bill ... " (King 1968; Byrne 2005: 1). A relatively minor event, not sneezing, is presented by King as crucial to the growth of the civil rights movement in the US. Byrne reminds us that King was assassinated the next day.

### **5.1. Tetlock & Belkin 1996: sixteen essays on Counterfactuals as Tools for Political Analysis**

Social scientists use counterfactual thinking in a variety of topics, such as the spread of religious and philosophical ideas (Weber 1949; Fogel 1964). Not all, however, agree on its usefulness. For some, determinism, fate and free-will are best left alone (Fisher 1970: 18; Taylor 1954); E.P. Thompson, not quoted in TB, thought counterfactual history "unhistorical sh\*t" (Thompson 1978: 300). Yet, non-causal narratives would make it hard to learn "lessons from history", and would be incoherent. Historical counterfactualizing may be open or concealed, but is always present (Fogel 1964; TB 1996: 4).

All contributors agree that potential causes in world politics are complex. Causal reasoning must invoke counterfactual arguments about what would have happened in "some hypothetical world in which the postulated cause took on a different value from the one it assumed in the actual world" (TB 1996: 6; Fogel 1964; Fearon 1991). Some counterfactuals concentrate on points of indeterminacy at historical junctures ("idiographic"; Khong 1996 examines what Prime Ministers might have opposed Hitler; TB 1996: 6, 7); some apply theoretical or empirical generalizations to well-defined antecedents ("nomothetic"; Russett 1996 argues for a democracy-peace hypothesis; TB 1996: 6; 9); others combine the two approaches (conceivable cause, deductive theory and empirical observation; to examine the impact of an asteroid to explain the extinction of dinosaurs; game theory: "no-one stands to gain from unilateral defection"; TB 1996: 6; 10-11; Bueno de Mesquita 1996; Weingast 1996); in computer simulations, counterfactuals may reveal theoretical contradictions by capturing key properties of actual history (Cederman 1996: hegemony emerges in computer-simulated anarchy; TB 1996: 6; 13); or counterfactuals may reveal psychological contradictions in belief systems, by pointing out unexpected causal chains in possible worlds (Kahneman 1995; Turner 1996; TB 1996: 6-7; 13). Overlapping with these categories are six widely supported normative criteria for judging counterfactuals: clarity (well-specified antecedents and consequents); consistency (logical: cotenability; historical: minimal re-write; theoretical; statistical); projectability (TB 1996: 16-18).

We will look at one of the sixteen essays in some details. Lebow and Stein (1996: 119-48) test twelve existing counterfactuals (ten explanatory and two predictive) about the Cuban Missile Crisis. They first ask why people scoff at this counterfactual: had students not committed electoral fraud in 1960, there might have been a nuclear war (as Nixon rather than Kennedy would have become president of the US) (LS 1996: 119). Studies of chaos have shown that distant, small events can have large consequences. They then discard TB's fourth and fifth criteria as irrelevant, claiming there are no law-like and few statistical generalizations in international relations (LS 1996: 127). Two instances of applications of the discarded criteria are: theoretical consistency (fourth criterion), greatly advocated by the economic historian Fogel, and invoked by Kiser and Levi to argue that revolutions are inevitable under certain structural preconditions (international and demographic pressures, fiscal crisis, divisions in the dominant class, mass mobilization of the discontented) (Fogel 1964: 224; Kiser and Levi 1996: 187-207; TB 1996: 27); and statistical consistency (fifth criterion), applied by the opponents of the argument that if all states in the twentieth century had been democratic, there would have been fewer wars: there are not enough democracies, wars and uninterrupted periods of time for evaluators to judge (Russett argues that there are, and includes Greek city-states and tribal societies as data sources. TB 1996: 29; 31; Russett 1996: 182-84).

Nine of the twelve counterfactuals about the Cuban Missile Crisis meet "a reasonable

approximation" of TB's first criterion, "clearly specified antecedents and consequents and 'plausible worlds'" (LS 1996: 127-28). One that fails is the "early warning" counterfactual (Kruschchev might not have sent missiles if Kennedy had sent an early warning). The compound counterfactuals which are necessary for its evaluation are implausible: early on (April), Kennedy had no reason to expect missiles. Similarly, the argument that if there had been public health measures, mortality from the Black Death would have been reduced, fails because additional conditions, such as people realizing they could affect the spread, were not in place (Hawthorn 1991: 31-60; LS 1996: 128-29).

Some of the Missile Crisis counterfactuals specify no connections between antecedent and consequent. "Revisionists", for instance, do not explain why they think that Krushchev would have responded positively if Kennedy had made a secret overture to him before the blockade. It is as plausible that Krushchev would have increased the pace of construction of missile sites in Cuba (LS 1996: 130). "Consistency with well-established facts" is also infringed by some of the counterfactuals, those which require too much re-writing of history. Evidence shows that Krushchev was impressed by Kennedy's performance in Vienna. The counterfactual about a greater American resolve preventing Soviet missiles therefore fails. Another instance of excessive re-writing of history involves Churchill replacing Chamberlain as British Prime Minister in 1938: since his personality prevented that, there is no viable antecedent in a counterfactual which asks whether a 1938 Prime Minister Churchill would have stopped Hitler (Khong 1996: 112).

Finally, the criterion of projectability requires that counterfactuals generate theories that can be used to make predictions. Most of the Cuban Missile Crisis fail to specify antecedents that can be projected to new cases, or fail to make explicit the connecting principles between antecedents and consequents. Therefore most of the counterfactuals do not pass the test of projectability. Krushchev, for instance, formulated his counterfactual according to the (later) Marxist-Leninist principle that capitalists would not risk nuclear war, and would not react to a deployment of missiles in Cuba. That theoretical framework did not fit reality (LS 1996: 132-33).

LS conclude that evidence of policy before, during and after the Missile Crisis shows that five of the counterfactuals are most likely invalid, and seven untestable. Both American and Soviet counterfactuals, explanatory or predictive, were a function of political belief systems rather than deriving from compelling evidence; and adequately specified counterfactuals which are based on false assumptions are likely to be wrong (LS 1996: 142-44). On the other hand, time is short: "[p]olicy makers can wait even less than scholars for the verdict of history; both need to evaluate competing counterfactuals with incomplete evidence (LS 1996: 145). LS then add three criteria of their own: tighten the link between antecedent and consequent and amongst other events, and allow for additional consequents. History does not allow "cut-and-paste

reassembly of elements" with counterparts and situations unchanged (LS 1996: 146; Turner 1996: 292). All criteria put together should at least help reject a bad counterfactual, a more important matter in the authors' view than spotting a good one (LS 1996: 147).

## **5.2. Psychological Biases in Counterfactual Thought and Politics**

Olson, Roese and Deibert show that the same biases that occur in counterfactual thinking can affect theorists' counterfactual reconstructions of political events (ORD 1996: 296-97; opposite view: Kahneman 1995).

People construct counterfactuals which are consistent with their own beliefs. High self-esteem people focus on their own actions ("If not for me, we would have failed") when successful, and on others' actions ("If not for him, we would have succeeded") when unsuccessful (Roese & Olson 1993; ORD 1996: 297). Political scholars behave likewise: "had the West succumbed to the pacifists, the Cold War would still be ongoing" (Perle 1992) exists alongside the opposite view, that in spite of armaments, there was international cooperation (Levy 1994; ORD 1996: 298).

Widely cited is the perceivers' bias toward unusual antecedents. Subjects judge that a man who leaves work early, takes the normal route home and has an accident, would have been safe if he had left work at the normal time (Kahneman & Tverski 1982; ORD 1996: 298). That conclusion is illogical. In world politics, crop failures, market crashes and sudden technological innovations are converted "to reestablish the trajectory of historical trends that were interrupted by the unusual event". Political assassinations, for instance, are only considered when they actually occur, and scholars wonder what would have happened if routine had continued (Breslauer 1996; Kiser & Levi 1996). Historians speculate on how European religious affairs would have developed, had Henry of Navarre not been assassinated, and the Edict of Nantes not been repealed (Toulmin 1990; ORD 1996: 299).

Negative outcomes are more likely to trigger counterfactual thinking. This is considered to have evolutionary significance, as states of crisis require a fast response ("fight or flight"; Taylor 1991). More counterfactual thoughts were generated in relation to an academic failure scenario than to a success one in experiments (ORD 1996: 299). In world politics, theorists tend to want to explain negative outcomes, and especially war (Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1959; Holsti 1985). The undefended border between Canada and the US, for instance, receives less attention than the First World War (Christensen & Snyder 1990; Sagan 1986; ORD 1996: 300).

Awareness of cognitive constraints may offer new perspectives on historical events and present ways of examining issues which are ruled out by unrecognized biases.

### 5.3. Alkon 1994: Alternate and Parallel Histories

Alkon (1994) defines alternate history "as essays or narratives exploring the consequences of an imagined divergence from specific historical events"; this is in opposition to parallel histories, which just offer some different past or present from the ones we know (Alkon 1994: 68).

Nabokov's *Ada*, for instance, is a fantasy about a similar planet to the earth without twentieth-century wars, but no study of causation (Alkon 1994: 68). Alternate history, on the other hand, requires more historical knowledge on the part of the reader, and is therefore relatively little known. Alkon (1994), identifies the first instance of the genre in Louis Geoffroy's 1836 *Napoléon et la conquête du monde - 1812 à 1832 - Histoire de la monarchie universelle*. He then discusses three twentieth-century "classics", before describing more recent alternate histories (Alkon 1994: 69)

The first "classic" is Winston Churchill's essay "If Lee Had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg" (1931). Events that happened, such as the First World War, are presented in the essay as the counterfactual world about which someone speculates from a reality which involves the Confederate General Lee's victory, the South offering to abolish slavery, the formation of the Union of the English Speaking Peoples, and that of a United States of Europe led by Kaiser Wilhelm II. Churchill was to use that technique again when he invited his audience to imagine a dreadful future as "an alternate past wrenched out of time", to prevent which something could still be done. That was in his speech to Parliament on 18/6/1940 to persuade Britain not to capitulate to Hitler (Alkon 1994: 69-70). Counterfactuals and futures, two closely-related non-facts, are similar.

Another work on the popular theme of "[v]ictorious Confederacies", instances of "downward" counterfactualizing since they make people feel better about their own times (McMullen, Markman & Gavanski 1995: 134) is Ward Moore's *Bring the Jubilee* (1953). The narrator, "Hodge", born in 1921, recounts his experiences living in an impoverished United States which never recovered from a Confederate victory. Alkon speculates that the technological backwardness of that world must have symbolized "the moral retrogression" of a slaveholding universe for American readers of the 1950s. Hodge is in love in an alternate twentieth-century New York. He also travels back and corrects the Confederate victory, so invalidating his initial presence in the alternate world. There are, however, realistic studies of the relevant battles, and emphasis on the advantages of living in the readers' own time (Alkon 1994: 71-72).

Robert Harris' 1992 *Fatherland* is set in 1964. Joseph (not John) Kennedy is American President and 75-year old Hitler rules Europe. The novel portrays a convincing Nazi Berlin, and features the hard-boiled, divorced detective in conflict with his superiors, who has a female

lover. These clichés are applied in the strange Nazi setting, but the world from which the protagonist is alienated in Alkon's view suggests actuality. The detective ends up vainly preparing to face his Gestapo pursuers after he has discovered material that will incriminate the regime. An "Author's Note" gives details of how real and imaginary history mix in the text (Alkon 1994: 75-77).

The next alternate histories discussed by Alkon are of a postmodernist type. These include William Gibson and Bruce Sterling's *The Difference Engine* (1991). Here, Charles Babbage's analytical engine is being used by the nineteenth-century English and French governments to keep track of people. Other twentieth-century machines are also present (Alkon 1994: 80). Particularly dislikable according to Alkon is the mock-Victorian language and melodramatic plot. The alternative is not to history, but to fiction, and there is no appendix of historical material, nor explanations of how the engine came to be supported by governments. Alkon objects to the gratuitousness of many aspects of the novel, such as John Keats working with prototypes of the cinema (Alkon 1994: 81).

Alkon concludes that late twentieth-century alternate history may enhance awareness of the past as well as of the present, but also blunt awareness of historicity. There are, therefore, two strands of alternate history: one, represented by *Fatherland*, which continues the "classical mode" (Louis Geoffroy, Churchill), and another, exemplified by *The Difference Engine*, that verges on parallel history. There has to be a forking time, when courses of events diverge from actuality, for alternate history to be meaningful (Alkon 1994: 83-84).

#### **5.4. Cowley 1999: Thirty-five What-Ifs by Military Historians**

Cowley's anthology (2000) contains thirty-three essays on thirty-five "what might have been" chosen and written by military historians. "History is properly the literature of what did happen", he comments, but "what ifs" can lead us to reconsider assumptions and to define turning points (Cowley 2000: xi-xii). The subjects treated are: World War Two (seven), World War One (four), American Civil War (three), American War of Independence (three), Napoleon (two); and one each of: Spanish Armada, Spanish not in America, Christians in the Balkans, Turks / Mongols / Arabs in Europe, Roman Empire surviving, Romans keeping Germany, Alexander dying younger, Persians / Cimmerians in Greece, Assyrians keeping Jerusalem, Cold War, Chinese Revolution, Vietnam War and USSR-US 1983 nuclear war.

Josiah Ober's on Alexander's early death is the counterpart to Arnold Toynbee's on Alexander's late death. Alexander has been a popular subject for counterfactual speculation, starting from Livy's (9.16.9-19), as we will see shortly, and including current websites. Toynbee's older Alexander becomes a peaceful world-ruler. With Alexander dying younger, in

334 BC when he nearly did die, the Persian Empire survives and there is no Hellenistic period. But the older Alexander, we are told, may have damaged Hellenism anyway, because of his cruel disposition. The counterfactual narrative branches off from the point of Alexander's near-death. After a sequence on what a non-Western world would have been like ("no Renaissance, no Enlightenment, ...", Ober 1999: 54), the essay ends with reference to what Ober considers another counterfactual: the future of the empire, which Alexander envisaged as absorbing Persian customs and army, and his bodyguard as remaining Macedonian. Alexander killed the bodyguard, and the world confirmed neither prospect: the empire crumbled (Ober 1999: 39-56).

### **5.5. Francis Beckett ed., *The Prime Ministers Who Never Were* 2011**

This anthology of biographies includes, amongst others, Oswald Mosley and Normal Tebbitt. Under the heading of Francis' Beckett's "Prime Minister Smith looks to Brussels, not Washington", comes the Labour leader John Smith. He appoints Ken Livingstone as Transport Secretary: the railways are renationalized, and tolls are introduced on motorways.

## **6. Counterfactuals and the Ancient Historians**

### **6.1. Zhang 2008**

Counterfactual argumentation in the ancient historians is the subject of a 2008 PhD by Yongle Zhang. These works are rare.

Conjectural reasoning took a variety of forms in the Greco-Roman world, and its role in divination, legal practice and medical writing has often been observed. In book 7 of Herodotus, Themistocles reasons that if the oracle had meant that Athens would be defeated, it would not have said "blessed Salamis", but would have said "cursed Salamis" (7.141-2). In book 1, Croesus learns from the delegation sent to Delphi that he had drawn the wrong inference from the oracle's response: the "great empire" that would fall was clearly not that of the enemy, but his own (1.91) (Zhang 20-22). Long before Herodotus, the Homeric ἵστῶρ had to adjudicate between stories, those presented by litigants (*Il.* 18.501; 23.486; Nagy 1990; Ginzburg 1999).

Herodotus uses *modus tollens*: if *A*, then *B*; but *B* is false or ridiculous, so *A* is also false. This is the method of political and legal debates and Hippocratic argument. Reasoners start from their adversaries' account (*B*) and argue counterfactually: the Aeginetans and the Athenians so

discredit each others' version of events at Hdt. 5.86 (Zhang 31-32; 25; Lloyd 1996). Herodotus' narrator examines which version of the causes of the war between Greeks and barbarians is correct (1.1), and at 8.118-19 considers two versions of how Xerxes retreated to Persia, and makes a decision: Xerxes would not kill off the political Persian elite so easily (Zhang 27). At 7.139 he asks: what if Athens had not resisted the Persians by sea? The two possibilities are that Sparta resists or that it collaborates with the Persians. Either way, Greece would fall to Xerxes. Athens, therefore, saved Greece.

Counterfactual argumentation is also used by Herodotus to challenge Homer's authority, and in the words of wise political advisors (Solon, Croesus, Artabanus); their job is to "emphasize the role of contingent and uncontrollable elements in the course of events" (Zhang 35; 38).

Thucydides, Zhang estimates, has as many counterfactual situations, namely 50. In the archeology, Thucydides says he will use conjectures to reconstruct the remote past from clues (1.9.5); he then applies the same method to the future: "if Athens should suffer the same fate, its power would, I think, from what appeared of the city's ruins, be conjectured double what it is." (1.10.2. Zhang 53). Likelihood rather than necessity underpins these inferences, so difficult are clues to interpret.

Another form of counterfactual argument in Thucydides happens through speeches. In paired speeches, one becomes policy and one is aborted and becomes the alternate possibility. At 1.81, Archidamus says Sparta is not prepared for war and leaves it to future generations, but that does not materialize; Pericles' first and third speeches (1.140-4, 2.60-4) outline a strategy later forsaken by successors (Zhang 82).

An antithetical structure that invites to counterfactual thinking runs through the whole of Thucydides: the war is between two powers, and we find the oppositions democracy / oligarchy (embodied in Corcyra), active / conservative (Athens / Sparta), intelligence / chance, and paired speeches throughout the work (Zhang 86). This also marks a difference from Herodotus, as polarized thinking and writing became more common during the fifth century because of the expansion of law courts and political assemblies (Zhang 90). A tacit counterfactual underpins the whole of Thucydides: Athens would have won the war if Pericles had led it to the end (Zhang 91).

Hornblower's work on *if-not* situations in Thucydides (1987; 1994; 2004; 2008; 2011) must be mentioned here. The author's 1994 study was intended to apply some of the insights of narratology to the analysis of ancient history (Hornblower 2011: 59; also Grethlein 2010). With so many *if-nots*, Thucydides' world is one of contingency and counterfactuality, which many modern historians, such as Niall Ferguson in his seventy-page introduction to the 1997 anthology *Virtual History*, tend to ignore (Hornblower 2011: 7-8). In Thucydides, hinge-moments in history are underlined by the Homeric *if-not* device, the topic of "important work"



by Irene de Jong (1987) and Nesselrath (1992. Hornblower 2011: 8-9; 59).

The *if-not* structure can be less than "full-dress", as in "and they [Spartans] would have done [invaded Attica], but they were prevented by an earthquake" (1.101.2), or full-dress, as in the pair paraphrased as "Mytilene / Syracuse would have fallen, had it not been for the arrival of the second trireme / Gylippos" (3.49.4, 7.2.4 respectively), both ending in an explicit remark about the near miss (Hornblower 2011: 9; 89-90). A wider notion of counterfactuality than the strict *if-not* is envisaged here. Flory (1988) counts only nineteen narratorial counterfactuals in Thucydides, and judges Xenophon's continuation of Thucydides up to 404 BC to be counterfactual-free (Flory 1988: 44-45; 48); Hornblower would probably spot at least *Hell*. 1.3.17-8 (408 BC): "Clearchus ... arranged everything ... But ... those who wanted to betray the city of Byzantium set about their work ...".

The most developed counterfactual in Thucydides appears towards the end of book 8, the third of a cluster: "and if the Peloponnesians had been more enterprising, they could easily have executed such a plan. Either they might have cruised near, ... or ..."; this culminates in the fall of the Athenian empire to the Peloponnesians (8.96.4; previous two 8.86.4, 8.87.4; Hornblower 2011: 9; 89; 2008, on 8.96.4). The "true parent" of such narrative devices is Homer, although Herodotus produced his own *if-nots* and counterfactuals (nine according to Flory 1988: 47), such as 7.139.3: "Had the Athenians, in terror at the approaching danger, left their country, ..." and surrendered to Xerxes, ... (Hornblower 2008, on *Thuc.* 8.96.4; 2011: 9-11; 279). The Pisistratid tyrants fall as the result of sexual jealousy, also the result of "contingency causation" (6.54.1. Hornblower 2004: 301n46). Kleinknecht (1940) had attributed Herodotus 7.139 to the model of argumentation used in Ionian science and medicine, which involves testing a thesis by comparing its denial with empirical facts. Demand (1987) found Herodotus' claim that if the Athenians had not stayed, Greece would have fallen to the Persians, quite different from Kleinknecht's reconstruction of the Hippocratic argument: it is rather, "if *A* had not occurred, *B* would not have occurred" (Demand 1987: 748). Flory (1988: 47-48n11) agrees. Historians may also have different reasons for counterfactualizing. Thucydides may have had a political point, or quoted an actual debate which included the abandoned course (Hornblower 2011: 98); and in Flory's view Herodotus 7.139.3 seems to reflect a post-war topic of conversation current at Athens (Flory 1988: 43n11).

With Polybius, counterfactual reasoning becomes an integral part of writing useful history. Zhang counts over 150 explicit counterfactuals, many in clusters; not many given the size of his (extant) work. According to Polybius, the historian should ask "Why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably accepted" (3.31). But reasonable expectations clash with Fortune, which rules world affairs (1.4.1) (Zhang 93-94). In book 2, Polybius narrates the downfall of Cleomenes, king of Sparta: "Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the weightiest issues against reason. For on this

occasion Cleomenes, had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to Sparta after battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown" (2.70). Cleomenes could have made the correct prediction, but he did not; the materialized path of history departed from expectation (Zhang 95).

It has been commented that Polybius often invokes Fortune (τυχή) when there are perfectly rational explanations for the way events turned out (Walbank 1957: 17). In the case of Cleomenes' and Perseus' downfall, the explanation is their own cowardice or folly (Zhang 103). But Polybius' "one-sidedness" is rooted in Aristotle, who tells the story in *Physics* 2.4-6 of a man who happens to collect money owed him, because he accidentally finds himself in the right place. Polybius' Fortune, therefore, contains a "core" which is the disparity between rational expectation and the materialized, unplanned result. In counterfactual arguments, the author or historical actors reconstruct a picture in accordance with the regular pattern in human affairs, and compare it with the real path of history. That comparison shows how, by a narrow margin, things happened differently (Zhang 105-06). Also, τυχή is no bad thing, because it provides the opportunity to show one's "excellence" (καλός) (Zhang 108). Hannibal, for instance, the enemy general on whose defeat the Romans built their strength, faces his τυχή admirably, and this is conveyed by the narratorial comparison between reality and a likely, counterfactual scenario: "Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would assuredly have suffered defeat; but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front ..." (3.14; Zhang 109-10). The *if-not* variant is sometimes used: the army would have been destroyed, had he not ... (3.53; Zhang 111).

Providing exemplars for "men of affairs" was another of Polybius' purposes (9.9; Zhang 113). That involves showing also wrong decisions: "... had he [Hannibal] begun with the other parts of the world and finished with the Romans none of his plans would have failed to succeed" (11.19). Philip V could have avoided a miserable death, had he followed the example of his predecessors Philip II, who had shown clemency to the Athenians, and Alexander, who had spared the temples of both Thebans and Persians (5.8-11; 23.10; Zhang 115).

Comparing an estimation of reasonable expectations against reality is also necessary for a study of causation. Highlighting the significance of antecedents is necessary for the past to be a guide to the future, because human affairs behave with regularity; political regimes, for instance, go in cycles (6.9; 12.25b; Zhang 121-22).

Counterfactual argumentation can also be understated. Zhang compares the three different approaches by Thucydides, Polybius and Plutarch to Nicias' decision to delay in Sicily due to the moon eclipse. Where Thucydides refrains from commenting counterfactually on the case (6.23.2), Polybius states that "had he [Nicias] only inquired from men acquainted with

astronomy ... he could have utilized the ignorance of the enemy" (9.19). Plutarch merely comments that the habitual soothsayer, Stilbides, has recently died (*Nic.* 23.5; Zhang 125-26).

Polybius' counterfactuals, such as the one about Hannibal doing better if he had tackled the Romans last, are not as closely related to context as those of Thucydides and Herodotus. Bent on arguing for the usefulness of history, Polybius makes frequent authorial interventions in counterfactual form (Zhang 128-30).

## 6.2. Livy's Alexander Digression

An important counterfactual in relation to those of the *Aeneid* is Livy's passage on Alexander (9.16-19). It was probably composed in 25-23 BC (Luce 1965: 228; Ligeti 2008: 250), the same decade Virgil was writing his own counterfactuals. Livy, like Sallust, Cato the Elder and Tacitus, was concerned with promoting traditional Roman virtue against the perceived decadence which followed contact with the Greek world (*Liv., Praef.*; Zhang 2008: 132); his Alexander counterfactual was part of that project.

Morello (2002) analyzes it thoroughly. During narration of the 321 BC Roman defeat by the Samnites at the Caudine Forks and subsequent retaliation led by Papirius, Livy states that the general was considered a match for Alexander, if the latter had attacked Europe (*Quin eum parem destinant animis magno Alexandro ducem, si arma Asia perdomita in Europam vertisset.* 9.16.19). He then apologizes for breaking the chronological sequence, and adds that he had himself wondered (*quinam eventus Romanis rebus, si cum Alexandro foret bellatum, futurus fuerit.* 9.17.1-2). An Alexander (of Epirus, uncle of the other) landing in Italy had already been introduced in book 8, and could have attacked Rome (*quod bellum, si prima satis prospera fuissent, haud dubie ad Romanos pervenisset.* 8.3.6; expanded at 8.17 and 8.24). So, when we come to Alexander the Great in book 9, an Alexander threatening Rome has already been mentioned. Rome would have won, the narrator estimates, and on four grounds: the soldiers' numbers and manliness, the leaders' abilities, and fortune (9.17.3). Macedonian and Roman military leaders (9.17.5-18.19) and their armies (9.19) are compared, to the Romans' advantage, fortified as they are by military discipline (9.17.10-11); if peace continues, Livy says, that will guarantee safety (9.19.17). Alexander is outperformed "in virtually every sentence" (Morello 63).

Scholars have not liked the digression. But Morello considers it part of the Roman counterfactual tradition. It alludes to the rest of Livy and links "in theme and language to Sallustian debates about Roman virtue and the dangers of *magnitudo*", and to Catonian historiography; it provides *exempla*, and also examines "the place of *unus homo* both in *res publica* and in *res gestae*" (Morello 65).

Evidence for the first point Morello finds in Appius Claudius Caecus' speech of 280 BC to the senate reported by Plutarch, against a treaty with Pyrrhus: "Where is your usual boldness of speech in the face of all men (ὁ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους θρυλούμενος ἀεὶ λόγος) to the effect that if the great Alexander himself had come to Italy and attacked us ... he would not now be celebrated as undefeated ..." (Plut., *Pyrrh.* 19; Morello 66). The thought "we could have defeated Alexander, and Pyrrhus is less than he" may have been a rhetorical commonplace (Kennedy 1972: 28-29), and only Plutarch mentions the habitual boasting, but repeated discussions are clearly indicated (Morello 66). Livy talks as if working within an existing Alexander tradition of counterfactuals as well as *synkrisis* (comparison of subjects): *dictitare solent* (9.18.6) "suggests the repetitiveness of Parthia-loving Greek intellectuals on Alexander's chances against Rome" (*periculum erat, quod levissimi ex Graecis, qui Parthorum quoque contra nomen Romanum gloriae favent, dictitare solent, ne maiestatem nominis Alexandri, quem ne fama quidem illis notum arbitror fuisse, sustinere non potuerit populus Romanus;* 9.18.6-7); *extollunt ..., intellegunt* again refers to Livy's sources (*quam [magnitudo hominis] qui ... extollunt ... non intellegunt ...* 9.18.9). Livy was fond of counterfactuals: Seneca refers to him asking whether it would be better if Caesar had not been born (Sen. *QNat.* 3.18.4), and Suerbaum (1997: 42) identifies counterfactual speculation in Livy 2.1.36 (the effects of Brutus' actions if carried out earlier. Morello 66n24).

There is textual consistence, too. Livy's apologetic tone in 9.16.1 for leaving the annalistic ordering (*ab ordine declinarem, deverticula amoena*, 9.17.1) matches the preference for the pleasure of digressions announced in the Preface (1-3; Morello 67n26).

The digression also continues the debate with Sallust, documented in studies of Livy's preface (Morello 68n28). The importance of *ingenium* in war (Sall. *Cat.* 2.2), fortune (Sall. *Cat.* 8.1) and need for peace (Sall. *Cat.* 9.1) are marked as Sallustian by *pollere* in Livy 9.17.3 (Morello 68n29; Lebek 1970: 300). 9.16.19 goes with *Cat.* 7.1-7 (most fruitful period in virtuous men); 9.19.15-16 is reminiscent of *Cat.* 7.5 (Romans at their virtuous best); and Papirius embodies Sallust's both bright and strong soldier-general (9.16.12; 9.17.13; Sall. *Cat.* 1.7; 60.4). Moreover, Sallust's own synkritic digression (Sall. *Cat.* 53-54) shares the introduction with Livy's: the author's thought will not be concealed from the reader, and is connected to the narrative (Sall. *Cat.* 53.2; 53.4; 53.6; Liv. 9.17.2). Finally, the opposition between virtuous past (Papirius' time) and degenerate present is expressed by a metaphor of fertility in Livy (*feracior*, 9.17.1); in Sallust the present has lost its fertility (*sicuti effeta parente;* Sall. *Cat.* 53.5), until Cato and Caesar are produced (Morello 68).

A parallel with Cato's reluctance to name individual generals in the *Origines*, Morello finds in Livy's increasingly "corporate" qualities of the characters, culminating in the achievements of a single, anonymous soldier. Livy's *unus homo* motif (individual conqueror - Alexander - versus many commanders / *populus* - Rome) is reminiscent of Cato's opposition

between the "constitutional design by accretion through generations (Rome) and by single lawgiver (Greece)" (Morello 69; Cic. *Rep.* 2.2.1). Tension is created between these strategies of Livy's and both epic Roman heroism and the *elogia* of one commander, such as Ennius' eulogy of Fabius Maximus (Morello 69n38). In the digression, Morello identifies a movement from eulogy of one man, to that of a pageant of heroes and back to eulogy of a single, collective *miles* (9.19.17; Morello 70; 79).

Livy's 9.17-19 digression also connects with three earlier sections. One is 7.29.1-2, an authorial intervention which surveys Rome's increasing contact with foreigners culminating in the Carthaginian wars and returning to the present and to the preface: *ut in hanc magnitudinem quae vix sustinetur erigi imperium posset*; the digression alludes to all major wars listed at 7.29 (Samnite wars, Pyrrhus and Carthage).

Another section is in book 8 (Morello 70). The digression's position in book 9, rather than at Alexander's first appearance in 8.3.7, or second, 8.24.1, allows the reader to become acquainted with Papirius, whose anger, similar to Alexander's, and fear for military discipline are illustrated from 8.30. Also, we saw that the invasion and death of an Alexander who came to Italy feature already in book 8, and references to his nephew in book 8 are linked to that (8.3.6-7). Moreover, the two Alexanders' stories show parallels in relation to both fortune and counterfactuals: the uncle "would undoubtedly" (*haud dubie*) have attacked Rome if he had been successful in Lucania; and fortune killed off his nephew (8.3.6-7; Morello 71). In the digression of book 9, the first Alexander also voices the opposition between manly Italians and effeminate Asians (9.19.10-11).

The third connection is the metaphor of the road. The Preface (9) already represents progress through history as a journey, combined with the image of a falling building. Reading is represented as forward movement (9.18.12). A choice of roads was offered to the legions on their way to Luceria at 9.2: *duae ad Luceriam ferebant viae, altera praeter oram ... longior, altera per furculas Caudinas, brevior ...* (9.2.6); this is followed by more roads and journeys, until Livy's departure from the annalistic organization and an offer of diversions (*deverticula amoena* 9.17.1) is announced in the road metaphor (*declinarem*, 9.17.1).

Other relevant motifs include earlier counterfactuals of book 9, spoken by Postumius (9.9.5-6), Herennius (9.3.6-13) - a "warner", the figure Suerbaum (1997: 45) considers the personification of alternative history back to Homer - and Lentulus (9.4.8-10. Morello: 72-73); and the sense that by going the longer way, which the Romans do the second time (9.13.6), they could have won (Morello 73-74).

The *unus homo* theme begins by a *synkrisis* between Papirius and Alexander. Both are the man on whom the nation relies (9.16.19; 9.18.18) and both drink, run fast and get into rages (9.16.13; 8.30.10; 8.35.10; 8.35.12; Plut. *Alex.* 3.5 and more). The comparison moves on to Alexander and eleven Roman leaders (9.17.7-8; Morello 74-75). Roman military training is

handed down through the generations (9.17.10-11). The *unus homo* motif versus Roman history is repeated at 9.17.12-17. "The true *synkrisis*, of course, is between Alexander and Rome", with the *nomen Romanum* transcending all others (9.18.6), and Roman history outweighing Alexander's *magnitudo* (9.18.8-10). The digression, therefore, does not praise *unus homo* (Morello 76-77). The survival of the state across time depends on numbers and tradition, rather than on one irreplaceable individual.

Breitenbach (1969) made a parallel with Isocrates' praise of monarchy. But Livy does not share Isocrates' favouring of a single leader in war (Isoc. *Paneg.* 3.24; Liv. 9.18.18-19), rather retaining just one disadvantage of democracy: the danger of civil strife (9.19.17). Also, Isocrates presents rotating leaders as inefficient, whereas Livy's compensate for one another's weaknesses (Isoc. *Paneg.* 3.17-21; Liv. 9.18.13-16). Kings are less commendable because they do not face power-sharing difficulties (Morello 80).

In the *synkrisis*, then, Alexander is a "potentially negative" *exemplum* for Rome (Morello 80). Both were damaged by oriental luxury (*Praef.* 11; 39.6.7; Rome's mismanagement of wealth: Sall. *Iug.* 41.3), inability to sustain *magnitudo* (*Praef.* 4), loss of discipline (9.17.10; *Praef.* 9), change in character (Alexander: 9.18.2; both generals and soldiers lose their Romanness: 5.38.5) and anger (in the Roman army as well as Papirius: 9.1.7; 9.13.4; 9.14.13). The passage about kings (*domini rerum*, 9.18.16) suggests reference to *Aen.* 1.282 (*Romanos, rerum dominos*), thus 25-24 BC for composition of the digression; there was awareness of the *Aeneid* before 25 BC, as demonstrated by Propertius' allusion to Virgil's treatment of Actium and the opening of the *Aeneid* (Prop. 2.34.61-64; *Aen.* 8.675-713). But Livy's transference of the expression to non-Romans, Morello takes to underline the restrictions on those kings' powers. The Virgilian allusion is the more perplexing, in view of Augustus' reported approval of Virgil's line (Suet. *Aug.* 40.5). The contrast between Jupiter's celebration of the house of Caesar in the *Aeneid* (1.286-88) and Livy's celebration of the Roman people further emphasizes the "admonitory" role of Livy's Virgilian reference (Morello 81).

Did Livy oppose Augustus? That "old chestnut", Morello will not touch (Morello 81-82. Warrior (2006) argues he did). Moles (1993: 153) and Woodman (1988: 134-35) have supported, respectively, pre- and post-Actium composition of *Praef.* 9 (*haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus*); the later the dating, the more unflattering for Augustus (Luce 1965: 231). But the digression is definitely from the 20s (*modo sit perpetuus huius qua vivimus pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae.* 9.19.17), and does not endorse permanent one-man rule. The Roman *miles*, rather, has averted and will again avert many armies (*avertit avertetque*, 9.19.17; Morello 82). The digression, then, is "at least a manifestation of the qualities that made Livy a *Pompeianus*"; *unus homo* figures can only benefit the state intermittently (Morello: 83).

By contemplating a probable past, Alexander's invasion, on the pattern of his uncle's and

many others, Livy's digression moves away from accuracy and provides an example for the present and the future. Alexander's status as *unus homo* is factual, and relevant to the digression's 20s BC state of affairs (Morello 84).

Oakley's commentary (2005) adds some useful points. Like most ancient historians, Livy broke the annalistic pattern and made use of digressions (list: Oakley 2005: 184-85). These were normally accompanied by explanations (Oakley 2005: 185). The rhetorical form of the digression, *synkrisis* or *comparatio*, often judged one of the two compared subjects superior (Oakley 2005: 188-89).<sup>4</sup> Livy's *synkrisis* does not follow the recommended structure, as it compares Alexander to Rome as a whole; Alexander's uniqueness cannot compete (Oakley 2005: 189-92).

Concerning the speech attributed to Appius Claudius Caecus (280 BC), Oakley comments that Plutarch may have read Livy (Oakley 2005: 195). Possible allusions in the digression to Livy's Preface and to Sallust may suggest judgments on contemporary events. But these are hard to pin down: Augustus was a very different character from Alexander (Oakley 2005: 197-99). Whether the *levissimi* Greeks who opposed Rome and supported the Parthians were Timagenes and Metrodorus, Oakley is not certain (9.18.6-7; Oakley 2005: 202-03).

Livy's Alexander digression provides the longest extant discussion of Alexander in Latin literature of the Republic and early Principate apart from Curtius', and the most famous counterfactual: Livy clearly liked such conjectures (2.1.3-6; 6.40.3-41.12; 7.30.1-23), including the use of warners (3.1-13), who present alternative futures to those recorded by the narrative, and "the inverted *ni-* and *cum-*clauses" are among his favourite constructions (6.24.4-5; 7.15.1; Oakley 2005: 205-06); there are also elliptical *quid si* questions (9.18.5; 9.3.11; 36.19.12; 45.36.8; slightly different: 8.21.4; 38.59.7; 44.39.6; Oakley 2005: 228-29). As to Morello's suggestion that Livy (9.18.16) may have emulated Virgil's *Romanos rerum dominos* (*Aen.* 1.282), Oakley thinks it "would be easier to argue that Virgil recalls Livy" (Oakley 2005: 241n1; Morello: 81).

Zhang (2008: 133-35) also discusses Plutarch's report of Appius Claudius' 280 BC Alexander counterfactual (*Pyrrh.* 19; Zhang 135). Alexander was not universally admired. In a letter to Atticus, Cicero mentions "king" Alexander as *superbum, crudelem, immoderatum*, and says that Caesar, whom he compares to Alexander, would not appreciate a letter from him, Cicero (*Cic. Att.* 13.28.3; Zhang 141). Livy's counterfactual was clearly relevant to its time: it treated current conflicts such as relations between Greece and Rome, and which of two paths Rome should take: a return to the republic, or government by a single man (Zhang 142-43).

Zhang also finds resonances between the Alexander counterfactual and the rest of Livy's work. Having witnessed leaders' ambition and the unruliness of the plebs in the civil war, Livy

<sup>4</sup> Isocr. *Paneg.* 3.17-26: monarchy / tyranny and oligarchy; Cic. *Mur.* 22-30: jurist / soldier; Ov. *Am.* 1.9: war / love; *Fast.* 2.131-44: Augustus / Romulus; Sen. *Dial.* 2.12.2: children / the childish; 3.5.2: angry / non-angry; end of most of Plutarch's parallel lives; Sall. *Cat.* 53.6-54.6: Caesar / Cato.

presents the dangers inherent in an immature plebeian class when Brutus expelled Superbus, in two counterfactuals (2.1.4-6; Zhang 143-44). 2.23.10 states that mob violence would have ensued, had not the consuls (P. Servilius and Ap. Claudius) intervened. At 2.39.6-7, the *if-not* that saved the situation is the common enemy, and at 2.56.15 Quinctius; his speech to the plebs armed against the Senate contains a counterfactual (3.67.2). 6.20.14 expresses sympathy for the patrician Manlius, who had protected the Capitol and the plebs, but was sentenced to death for agitating them: *hunc exitum habuit vir, nisi in libera civitate natus esset, memorabilis*. Like the single ruler Alexander, Manlius has personal ambitions which are a hindrance to the republic. (Zhang 144-45).

Hannibal's personal ambition and corruption can also be assimilated to those of Alexander, in opposition to Scipio Africanus' republican *virtus*. While Scipio, who swears loyalty to the republic as a youth (21.53.5-13), succumbs to easy living in Syracuse (29.19.12; also in Cic. *Verr.* 4.117), but impresses the Roman *legati* with his efficiency (29.22.1; 29.22.4) and they bid him sail for Africa (29.22.6), Hannibal, who swore to his family to be an enemy of Rome in youth (21.1.4), behaves as if Italy were his own province (21.5.1-2; Zhang 147), and after luxuriating in Capua prepares a speech in self-defence rather than acting (29.22.1; Zhang 149). In Scipio's hortatory speech *virtus* is more heavily emphasized than *fortuna*, which appears only twice and belongs to the city (21.41.17), but the opposite is the case in Hannibal's (*fortuna vestra*) (21.40-44; Zhang 150). The *synkrisis* between Romans and non-Roman Hannibal and Alexander in Livy's third decade as well as in the Alexander counterfactual, highlights the superior *virtus* and lower vulnerability to *fortuna* of the Romans (Zhang 151-52).

The counterfactual Alexander digression (9.16-19), therefore, constitutes an integral part of Livy's *synkrisis* between Rome, which has shared responsibilities, and those constitutions which allow one man to decide. Setting up a counterfactual environment for comparison makes that job easier. Plutarch later continues the comparison of individuals in terms of virtue and fortune (Zhang 152-53).

### 6.3. Counterfactuals, Historiography and Cicero

This section, from Zhang 2008, gives a brief outline of the use of counterfactuals in rhetoric, and considers Sallust, not covered by Zhang. Rhetoric was closely connected to historiography in the Graeco-Roman world. Both disciplines were supposed to inspire the audience to take moral action (Cic. *De or.* 2.35-36; Zhang 174).

In Lysias' "On the Killing of Eratosthenes", the defendant argues that he killed his love rival out of anger rather than intentionally: "... if I had known beforehand, don't you think I would have had servants ready and sent word to my friends ...?" The speaker here constructs a



possibility and compares it with reality, and concludes that reality does not conform to deliberate intention (Lys. 1, 177; Carey 1997: 34; 37; Zhang 177-79).

Aristotle later wrote about the forensic and epideictic branches of rhetoric, which, as opposed to the deliberative, deal with the past and therefore resemble history (Zhang 179). Historians' conjectures about the past often take the shape *reductio ad impossibile*. This involves negating a possibility, so as to confirm the claimed fact that is the antecedent to it (*modus tollens*). Aristotle argues that in the *Medea* of Carcinus, the protagonist "pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other" (*Rh.* 1400b28). This is the enthymeme form of a *modus tollens* syllogism (i.e. one in which a premiss is missing), and an argument from probability (*Rh.* 1357a15).

Relevant to counterfactuals are Cicero's *coniectura*, *definitiva* and *qualitas*. The purpose of *coniectura* is to reconstruct something unknown from clues. These may be necessary signs, such as a fever indicating illness, or probable signs (Arist. *Rh.* 1357b16-18; Quint. 7.2; 5.9.8). Cicero divides *coniectura* into author, intention and action, all three potentially requiring counterfactual thinking about the past. Could a given act have been performed? Could it have been performed by anyone else? (Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 2.42). *Modus tollens* argumentation is needed to answer such questions. Concerning action, it has to be assessed whether a deed was planned, and whether *fortuna* was a contributory factor (*Inv. rhet.* 2.44).

Evidence of counterfactual thinking also features in Cicero's *comparatio* and *concessio*, parts of the so-called (unprovable) "assumptive" issues. *Comparatio* is the case where for lack of better options, some act is defended by reference to the end for which it was done. A commander who made an agreement with the enemy and saved his soldiers but lost arms and baggage, argues: "I did this because otherwise all the soldiers would have perished." The plaintiff then asks: "Would they have perished?" (*Inv. rhet.*, 2.73). A comparison is here carried out between the reality and an alternate possibility in the past, in order to establish intention. But support from signs is also necessary, in this case a description of the landscape that will convince the audience that the whole army had been endangered (Zhang 174).

*Concessio* (confession and avoidance) is the plea in which the defendant asks for pardon, and takes two forms, *purgatio* and *deprecatio*. *Purgatio* appeals to *imprudencia* (ignorance), *casus* (accident) or *necessitudo* (necessity): the question is asked whether the person would have done the same act except under those circumstances (*Inv. rhet.* 2.94-100). This involves comparing two stories, reality and hypothetical events uninfluenced by ignorance, accident or necessity, and drawing a conclusion. The prosecutor should provide a definition (*definitiva*) of these excuses, try to show that the defendant could have avoided the crime, and argue that he did it rather out of *inertia*, *negligentia*, or *fatuitas*. The judge has to decide, for instance, whether ignorance of local customs can disculpate sailors who have sacrificed a bull (*Inv. rhet.*

2.95-96).

Concerning the interpretation of written documents, Cicero uses the following imaginary case of ambiguity: a son says he is only obliged to give his mother what amount of silver plate he desires when she asks for it, because his father's will specified *heres meus uxori meae vasorum argenteorum pondo centu, quae volet, dato* (*Inv. rhet.* 2.116). Cicero suggests ways of proving the father's intention: for instance, considering that the father would not have used certain words (*Inv. rhet.* 2.120-21). That argument relies on the construction of a possibility in the past (Zhang 186-87).

Intention needs to be inferred from action, and Quintilian quotes Cicero's *pro Milone* on the subject: the audience is asked to consider "whether it is probable that the accused hoped that he would be able to carry such a crime into effect, or that it would escape detection when committed, ... whether he could have done the deed at some other time and in some other way ..." (Quint. 7.2.43; Zhang 186-87). Cicero claims that Milo acted in self-defense, and to that effect mentions the possible consequences of the victim's survival: "and finally, had the immortal gods not launched him [Clodius] upon the impulse of attempting ... to slay a very gallant gentleman [Milo], your free constitution would be to-day a thing of the past" (*Cic. Mil.* 33). The fall of the republic is envisaged in that counterfactual. Another "untaken option in the past" is Milo's killing of Clodius: "had anyone slain him [Clodius] then, there would be no deliberation about acquittal, but about reward" (*Mil.* 15). This counterfactual presents a possibility advantageous to Milo, which he passed over; the implication is that he did not intend to kill Clodius (Zhang 191).

*Against Verres* again involves counterfactual reasoning. The real Verres is compared with a hypothetical, ordinary tyrannical governor: "They [Sicilians] would, in fact, have endured even Verres in silence, if only his offences had been those of an ordinary man, ..." (*Cic. Verr.* 2.2.3; Zhang 192-93).

Sallust's use of rhetoric is extensive. It includes antithesis, brevity (ellipsis, asyndeton, lists), abrupt syntax and parataxis. This was done in imitation of Thucydides and of the Elder Cato, whose austere outlook Sallust shared, and in opposition to Cicero (Batstone 2010: xxxiii; Ramsey 2007: 10-11). Referring to what he found at his entrance into public life, Sallust says: *pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigeabant* (*Sall. Cat.* 3.3; Batstone 1988: 5). But typical of Sallust are "false antitheses" (Scanlon 1980: 75). The attribution of *pudor* and *abstinentia* to Cato, for instance (*Sall. Cat.* 54.6), given the earlier pairing they received with *audacia* and *largitia*, implies that the negative characteristics apply to his competitor Caesar (McGushin 1977: 272; Batstone 1988: 5). Similarly, the description of Cato at 54.3 (*nihil largiundo gloriam adeptus est*) refers to a *largitio* which implicitly belongs to Caesar (Batstone 1988: 6); but of Caesar, Sallust says *Caesar dando sublevando ignoscundo [gloria adeptus est]* (Batstone 1988: 6). As Batstone (1988) comments, "Sallust offers no

mutually exclusive antitheses". While narrative context, a debate, emphasizes competition, the only explicit statement about the relationship between Caesar and Cato is that they are different: *ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus* (53.6; Batstone 1988: 4).

False antitheses are one expression of the agonistic device *synkrisis*: "contrary but responsive" spheres of activity were declared, an exemplar set, and another character compared to it (Polybius 10.2-8-13: Scipio meets Lykurgus' standards; Cic. *Brut.* 41-43: Coriolanus meets Themistocles'; Batstone 1988: 3n9). Scholars disagree on the outcome of Sallust's Caesar/Cato juxtaposition, Syme (1964) probably representing the "cautious pro-Cato" interpretation; although he also argues for the fragmentation of virtues between the two (Sall. *Cat.* 53.6-54.6; Syme 1964: 120; 116; Batstone 1988: 1n1, 2). The virtues attributed to each rather "inhabit and reveal" each other: in (Caesar's) *beneficia ac munificentia* and (Cato's) *integritas vitae*, *integritas* is needed for *beneficia* to be such (Sall. *Cat.* 54.2). This makes readers suspicious: "[i]f Cato's *integritas* suggests something hiding behind Caesar's *beneficia*, it is natural to ask what hides behind Caesar's *mansuetudo* or Cato's *severitas*" (Batstone 1988: 7-8).

A rhetorical technique, then, was used by Sallust around 43-35 BC, which consisted in juxtaposing related worlds that challenge each other in complex ways (Scanlon 1980: 50). According to Cicero, Thucydides was popular in Rome around 50 BC, though unsuitable for orators (Ramsey 2007: 10; Cic. *Brut.* 287; *Orat.* 30: *Ecce autem aliqui se Thucydidios esse profitentur, novum quoddam imperitorum et inauditum genus*). Sallust found his predecessors wanting: the "brilliant minds" who recorded Greek events were just not available (Sall. *Cat.* 8. Cicero agrees: *De or.* 2.51; *Leg.* 1.5; *Brut.* 228). Therefore he left the annalistic format for the monograph, which dealt with a single topic (Ramsey 2007: 8). Scanlon (1980), still considered the definitive work on Thucydides' influence on Sallust by Pagán (2009: xxxvii), analyzes types of antithesis common to the two. These include antitheses between word and deed, "with an especial delight in orations designed to demolish the speaker" (Syme 1964: 255, said of Sallust), such as Thucydides 3.70.1 (Corcyrans claiming to be prisoners released by the Corinthians, but trying to give them Corcyra) and Sallust's *Cat.* 38.2-3 ("under pretence of the public welfare each [nobleman] in reality was working for his own advancement." Scanlon 1980: 80-82). Two elements are juxtaposed, one truer than the other (Scanlon 1980: 83). Oppositions could also feature between words, ideas, clauses, sentences, speeches and entire sections of the narrative. Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls this a "showy feature", derived from Gorgias (DH *de Thuc.* 24.363). False antithesis, also from Gorgias, was a type favoured by Thucydides, and disliked by Cicero (*De or.* 3.53.203): "Nicias, ... thinking ... that everything that had been done on their side was still incomplete, and what had been said by the generals was not yet adequate ..." (Thuc. 7.69.2; Scanlon 1980: 75-76); an instance from *Bellum Jugurthinum* is 51.5: *dignitas* and *libertas* are not necessarily in conflict (Batstone 2008: 7n29).

Sallust shows another similarity to Thucydides (and Herodotus) pertinent to Virgil's

counterfactuals: parataxis. Syme (1964: 257) comments: "[Sallust] can be characterized as anti-Ciceronian both in sentence structure and in vast tracts of his vocabulary." Sallust's paratactic style, all agree, was a reaction to Cicero's oratorical period, itself a reaction to "Asianism", "a showy and recherché style" (Pernot 2005: 81; Scanlon 1980: 77).

Sallust is also attributed early use of the *ni* "de rupture" (*Jug.* 53.7), much exploited by Livy (Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 602; discussed later, pages 95-96). This will resurface in the *Aeneid*, along with parataxis.

## 7. Greek conditionals. Wakker 1994

### 7.1. Propositional, Illocutionary, Predicational Conditionals

Wakker (1994) examines the syntactic, semantic and especially pragmatic aspects of Greek conditionals within the theoretical framework of Functional Grammar as formulated and developed by Dik (1978; 1989; 1990). In 1993, Wakker argues, van der Auwera's (1983: 243) view was still valid: "on the logical side, conditionals constitute a major research theme [...] . On the linguistic side, conditionals have not been in the forefront of investigation at all" (van der Auwera 1983: 244). These deficiencies continued into the 1990s in spite of 1980s works such as Traugott et al. (1986), and the *Journal of Pragmatics* 7 (1983), dedicated to conditionals (Wakker 1-2). Most grammars of Ancient Greek have no theoretical substructure; "at best", they mention other ways of expressing conditional relations and other semantic values expressed by  $\epsilon\iota/\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$  (Wakker 35).

Functional Logic distinguishes between semantic, pragmatic and syntactic functions (involving, respectively: Agent, Goal, Recipient, ...; Theme, Topic, Focus, ...; Subject, Object) and acknowledges three truth values for conditional sentences: True, False and Uncertain, the latter subdivided according to degrees of probability. Conditionals (antecedents) "are considered a means through which a speaker can create a *hypothetical picture* ... which differs ... from his current picture"; the addressee's and the "general" picture are also involved. Wakker describes different conditional types "in terms of different picture constellations" (Wakker 15; 32-33). She identifies three principal types: the **propositional**: "if I am not mistaken, Peter is at home"; the **illocutionary**: "if you are thirsty, there is some beer in the fridge", both relating to the higher levels of the main clause and constituting a comment on it by the speaker; and the **predicational** ("if it rains, I'll take the umbrella"), which defines a domain for the main clause (Wakker 34; 49; 59).<sup>5</sup> Other groupings are by time reference and type of discourse (interactive speech vs.

---

<sup>5</sup> See notes 2 and 3.

narrative, description and comment, with partial overlap with the three main types).

Cross-linguistically, conditionals tend to be marked according to higher or lower degrees of probability of realization, especially of the protasis, by (respectively) the indicative or the subjunctive (Wakker 111). Greek is unusual in marking four degrees of probability by mood in the protasis:

#### **neutral**

εἰ + indicative - the speaker does not express an opinion on the degree of likelihood of the fulfilment of the condition. εἰ (ἀληθῶς) τὴν πόλιν αἰρήσομεν, βοῦν τοῖς θεοῖς θύσομεν ("if (really) we take the city, we will offer a cow to the gods"); Homeric: εἰ + indicative

#### **very well possible**

ἐάν + subjunctive - the speaker thinks the future fulfilment of the condition is very well possible. ἐάν τὴν πόλιν ἔλωμεν βοῦν τοῖς θεοῖς θύσομεν ("if - and I consider this very well possible - we have taken the city, we will offer a cow to the gods"); Homeric: εἴ κε + subjunctive (also ἦν, ἐάν, αἶ κε; or κε / ἄν absent)

#### **potential**

εἰ + optative - the speaker thinks the future fulfilment of the condition is possible and no more than that. εἰ τὴν πόλιν ἔλοιμεν, βοῦν τοῖς θεοῖς θύοιμεν ἄν ("if we were to take the city, we would offer a cow to the gods"); Homeric: εἰ (κε) + optative (ἄν, *Il.* 2.597)

#### **counterfactual (present / past)**

εἰ + ind. II (imperfect for present, aorist for past) (the main clause containing ind. II + ἄν) - the speaker thinks the fulfilment of the condition is no longer possible. εἰ τὴν πόλιν εἶλομεν, βοῦν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐθύσαμεν ἄν ("if we had taken the city, we would have offered a cow to the gods"); Homeric: present εἰ + optative; past: εἰ + ind. II (Wakker 6-7; 112; 205).

**Iterative States of Affairs** are marked by the subjunctive with ἄν when referring to the non-past (ἐάν μὲν τις πόλιν μεγάλην ἦλη, ἡκατόμβην τοῖς θεοῖς θύει, ἐάν δέ τις πόλιν μικρὰν ἦλη, βοῦν μόνον. "[They have this custom]: if someone has taken a big city, he offers a hecatomb to the gods; if one has taken a small one, only a cow") and by the optative when referring to the past (ἐάν μὲν τις πόλιν μεγάλην ἦλοι, ἡκατόμβην τοῖς θεοῖς ἔθυε, ἐάν δέ τις πόλιν μικρὰν ἦλοι, βοῦν μόνον. "[They had this custom]: if someone had taken a big

city, he offered a hecatomb to the gods; if one had taken a small one, only a cow". Wakker 8). εἰ also introduces purpose clauses ("in the hope that"), indirect questions and wishes (more often, εἴθε and εἰ γάρ) (Wakker 7-10).

Most recent studies adopt this description of Greek conditionals, reflecting the speaker's choice of mood based on his judgment of the fulfilment of the condition (Brunel 1980; Greenberg 1986; Rijksbaron 1980; 1986).

## 7.2. Position and Function of Conditionals

Wakker does not entirely agree with the general view that *if*-clauses are "naturally" placed before their main clauses, as stated in Greenberg's "Universal of Word Order" 14 (Greenberg 1966: 84). There is some cross-linguistic evidence in favour of that view (Comrie 1986: 83-86): the *if*-clause temporally and logically precedes the main clause (*iconicity*); interlocutors must agree on common ground (the *if*-clause) before proceeding with argumentation (Lehmann 1974); *given* information (*if*-clauses) precedes new information (Haiman 1980: 528); except in Greek counterfactuals, which have an apodosis marked as non-factual (by secondary indicative with ἄν), it is the *if*-clause that is marked as non-factual, and its initial position prevents the main clause from being interpreted as factual (Comrie 1986: 84-85; Wakker 51n13); in paratactic conditionals, such as "Do that and I'll punish you", the condition comes first (Hodot 1981: 46; Wakker 50-52). Pragmatically speaking, *if*-clauses have a Theme function or a Topic function, which is similar. This function would explain why a subordinate clause occupies an initial position, thus infringing the "Language-Independent Preferred Order of Constituents", or "Principle of Increasing Complexity", according to which more complex constituents appear on the right.<sup>6</sup> Themes precede the main clause, and are not sensitive to the clause-internal grammatical rules; thus, the subsequent clause can have any illocutionary values (declarative, directive, interrogative), on a pattern parallel to "My brother, I haven't seen him for years".

Wakker, however, finds some Greek *if*-clauses to be extra-clausal constituents which may precede, follow or interrupt their main clause, on a pattern parallel to "Ladies and gentlemen, shall we start the game?" (Dik 1989: 264-65; Wakker 53-54; 54n16, 17); as in Xenophon's: ἐὼν οὖν ἴης νῦν, πότε ἔσει οἴκοι; ("If you start now, when will you reach home?", *Cyr.* 5.3.27). Here the illocutionary value of the interrogative main clause (as of directive ones, the types to which this applies in particular) is not shared by the *if*-clause; πότε does not dominate the protasis (Wakker 55-56).

Predicational *if*-clauses in Greek are initial in 50% of cases (the highest in Herodotus,

---

<sup>6</sup> Dik 1978: 192; 1983: 273; 1989: 345; 351-52.

60.5%), and final in 33% (with the highest in Homer, 45.5%, partly accounted for by εἰ μή-clauses, discussed shortly, but 46.5% are initial). Propositional and illocutionary protases, are final in 44% of cases (particularly in tragedy, 64%), interrupt in 34% and initial in 22% of cases. Universal 14 therefore does not apply to Ancient Greek (Wakker 58-60; 58n29). Also, some initial predicational *if*-clauses are whole sentences with Focus function, though some are replies and complete a sentence interrupted by the questioner: - οἶμαί ποτε Λυσιμάχας ἡμᾶς ... καλεῖσθαι. - τί ποιησάσας; - ἦν παύσωμεν ... ξὺν ὄπλοισιν ἀγοράζοντας καὶ μαινομένους. (Ar., *Lys.* 554-56. "One day, I think, we shall be called 'Women who end the battle' - By which means? - If we stop soldiers in arms marketing and raging") (Wakker 68-69). Some final protases are extra-clausal and have Tail function (afterthought): τὰ δ' ὀπισθεν ἀρεσσόμεθ', αἳ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς δώη ... κρητῆρα στήσασθαι ἐλεύθερον ἐν μεγάροισιν (*Il.* 6.526-28. "These things we will make good hereafter, if ever Zeus grants us to set up a bowl of freedom" (Wakker 74-75). Some predicational conditionals are restrictive, which means they are bound up with the main clause, and can occupy a number of positions: ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια; "Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life?" (Pl. *Ap.* 32e2-3; Wakker 95).

### 7.3. Conditionals Come from Wishes

Ludwig Lange (1872-73) is credited the idea that conditionals developed out of wishes and suppositions; Tabachovitz (1951: 16-18) discussed the influence on it of Darwin's theory of evolution. The chronological precedence of parataxis over hypotaxis, i.e. simpler over more difficult syntax, Wakker rejects along with the absence of subordinators in Indo-European, which is assumed in the absence of evidence. All known human languages have subordination (Wakker 386). However, Wakker presents the reconstruction of the passage from wishes to conditionals as follows. *Ei* originally introduced wishes (*Il.* 10.111; 10.536-38), being either an interjection or a demonstrative adverb derived from the locative of the Indo-European demonstrative stem \**e-/o-* "then, so" (cf. εἶτα), thus referring to the previous sentence; a sentence later followed, explaining the consequences of the fulfilment of the wish (*Il.* 17.561-64). The two sentences then formed a new sentence (*Il.* 17.156-59), and at some later stage the contents of the protasis changed to possible non-wishes, and became expressible by means other than the optative (*Il.* 7.129-30; with optative). Wakker adds that the protasis may follow the apodosis (Wakker 387). She also questions the haziness of the alleged move toward the coalescence of protasis with apodosis, illustrated by the array of scholarly interpretations of:

αἶ γάρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον  
τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἶεν Ἀχαιῶν:  
τό κε τάχ' ἠμύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος

"Father Zeus, Athena and Apollo, may you give (or: if you were to give) me ten such counsellors among the Achaeans; (or: comma) then the city of king Priam would quickly fall" (*Il.* 2.371-73; Wakker 389-90).

The passage may be used as evidence for the view that wishes derive from conditionals. Similarly, the reading of the fixed expression εἰ δ' ἄγε, followed by an imperative or first person subjunctive or future indicative, as not an elided conditional such as εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις / βούλεις ἄγε, seems arbitrary (Wakker 390-91); *Od.* 15.180-1 and *Il.* 22.286-8 (wishes followed by consequence-sentences) also fail to prove that εἰ plus optative plus consequence-sentence occurred only as independent sentence and expressed only a wish (as argued in Kühner-Gerth 1904: 1,228; Chantraine 1963: 275), and εἰ / αἶ γάρ followed by an infinitive to express an unrealizable wish (*Od.* 7.311; 24.376) may have started as part of a conditional, rather than as an interjectional particle combination (as argued in Kühner-Gerth 1904: 2,21 f.; Wakker 391). As for Schwyzer and Debrunner's (1950: 682) assertion that conditionals only came into use with trade and justice, Wakker thinks it "can hardly be taken seriously" (Wakker 392). Wishes and conditional constructions in Homer exist side by side, some paratactic sequences having a more effective rhetorical effect than equivalent conditional sentences (*Il.* 3.52-53); also, Homeric texts are too artificial to be taken as proof of linguistic change. The role that intonation and word order may have had in establishing subordination before the existence of explicit means, Wakker considers dubious (Wakker 392-93; 393n58).

#### 7.4. Wishes Come from Conditionals

Aristarchus had already commented, in relation to *Iliad* 16.559 (εἰ αὐτὸν ... ἀεικισαίμεθα "if only we may dishonour him"), that the implied apodosis καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ("it would be well") must be inferred (Ludwich 1884). Monro (1891: 285), Goodwin (1889: 378-79) and Tabachovitz (1951: 49-91, 113-38) supported that idea, maintaining that wishes introduced by εἰ / αἶ or εἰ / αἶ γάρ are conditions without an apodosis, and rejected the possibility of an early phase of Greek without conditionals. Their arguments include: in modern languages, conditional subordinators occur in wishes (*if only*); the expression εἰ γάρ ἐγένετο τοῦτο, for an unrealizable wish, can only be explained as an elliptic conditional, since wishes never occur as ἐγένετο only: this Wakker attributes to the confusion with non-wishes that the secondary



indicative would generate; conditional protases often have the overtone of a wish (Wakker 394-95). The alternative theory has weak foundations, and the evolutionary hypothesis (parataxis preceded hypotaxis) cannot be proven (Wakker 394-96). Kühner-Stegmann on Latin (1914: 2,388, Anm. 2) also thought that conditional sentences derived from wishes (Wakker 394n60; Kühner-Stegmann 1955 retains that view).

## 7.5. Greek Counterfactuals with Present Reference

In present counterfactuals, the imperfect is normally used. The counterfactual conditional indicates that the speaker considers the state of affairs in question no longer realizable; but he still creates a hypothetical picture, in which the realization of  $p$  entails the realization of  $q$  (Wakker 132-33). These are typical examples, which include the factual situation presented afterwards and announced by  $\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$  δέ in (a) (sometimes ἀλλὰ  $\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ ) and τοιάδε in (b):

$\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$  εἰ φοβερὸν τι ἐνωρῶμεν, πᾶν ἂν σοὶ προεφράζομεν.  $\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$  δὲ ... αὐτοὶ τε θαρσέομεν καὶ σοὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα παρακελευόμεθα. ("if we saw any danger in the present situation we would tell you without reserve. But now we are confident ourselves and advise you to adopt a similar attitude". Hdt. 1.120.6)

πολλῶν δὲ ἐόντων ὁμοτρόφων τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι θηρίων πολλῶ ἂν ἔτι πλέω ἐγίνετο, εἰ μὴ κατελάμβανε τοὺς αἰελοῦρους τοιάδε ("whereas there are many domestic animals, there would be many more, if this didn't happen to cats". Hdt. 2.66.1).

Herodotus then explains that male cats kill kittens in order to gain access to the mother-cats, and the action therefore can be considered reiterative. (Wakker 133-34). Potential conditionals, taking the optative, can also be contrasted with the factual situation, often marked by  $\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$  δέ or ἀλλὰ  $\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ :

πόλλ' ἂν λέγειν ἔχοιμι πρὸς τὰ τοῦδ' ἔπη,  
εἴ μοι παρείκοι:  $\nu\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$  δ' ἐνὸς κρατῶ λόγου.  
("I could say much in reply to his words, if it were possible for me; but now I have the power to say one word only". Soph. *Phil.* 1047-48).

There is an area of overlap between present and future reference, and also between counterfactual and potential conditionals as both involve non-actuality and explicitly contrast

with reality (Wakker 133-35). Some contexts dictate counterfactuality, such as this inscription on a tomb:

‘εἰ μὴ ἄπληστός τε ἕας χρημάτων καὶ αἰσχροκερδῆς, οὐκ ἂν νεκρῶν θήκας ἀνέωγες.’ ("if you were not insatiate of wealth and basely desirous of gain, you wouldn't open the coffin of the dead". Hdt. 1.187.5).

This can only be read once the door has been opened (Wakker 136). Some contexts are made more dramatic by the use of counterfactuals:

εἰ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἡμέας μόνους ἐστρατηλάτее Ὁ Πέρσης ..., χρῆν αὐτὸν πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενον ἰέναι οὕτω ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ... νῦν δὲ ... τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐμποδῶν γινομένους ἡμεροῦται πάντας ("For if the Persian were marching against us alone, he would have to leave all others alone and make straight for us. But now he is taming all those that come in his way". Hdt. 4.118.4-5; Wakker 137).

Wakker concludes that "the use of counterfactual and potential conditionals is often determined by semantic-pragmatic factors" (Wakker 139). "Imperfective" counterfactuals usually refer to the present, and potential conditionals to the future, with some overlap in cases of general reference, and when an optative refers to the immediate future. The two constructions are not freely interchangeable (Wakker 141).

There are Greek counterfactuals with present reference but the aorist, Wakker identifies two possible explanations for this case: the supposition that the state of affairs in the apodosis would at once be completed if the condition were realized, or that the aorist expresses the pre-utterance completeness of the state of affairs:

ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὦν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος ("as, if he were to be a maker of shoes, he would answer you [before you ended speaking], I think, that he was a cobbler" Pl. *Grg.* 447d3-4).

Here, Socrates tells Gorgias what a shoemaker would say if asked who he is. The aorist conveys the immediacy of the shoemaker's reply (Wakker 149). The nature of the implications of counterfactuals is mainly pragmatic and contextual (Wakker 154).

## 7.6. Greek counterfactuals with past reference

A past counterfactual outlines an alternative course of events to reality in the past and it is characterized by an aorist indicative, but also imperfect, with ἄν in the apodosis, and is sometimes contrasted to actuality by νῦν δέ. The counterfactual alternative can be used to support or contradict an opinion (here with imperfect, mention of Agamemnon clearly indicating reference to the past):

οὐκ ἂν οὖν νήσων ... ἐκράτει, εἰ μή τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν

("he would not have ruled over the islands [as Homer says he does], if he had not had something of a fleet". Thuc. 1.9.4)

(here with aorist):

εἰ γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτω εἰρέθη ἐκ τοῦ κυβερνήτεω πρὸς Ξέρξην, ἐν μυρίησι γνώμησι μίαν οὐκ ἔχω ἀντίξοον μὴ οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι βασιλέα τοιόνδε ... ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ... ὁδῶ χρεώμενος ... ἀπενόστησε ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην.

([It is said that ...] "for if indeed the pilot has so spoken to Xerxes, I think that there is not one in thousand that will deny that the king would have done thus". Hdt. 8.119; Wakker 144-45; 148, 153).

Some past counterfactuals take the imperfect either in the protasis or the apodosis or both, because the state of affairs represented is not completed (rather than constituting an exception as all scholars think, except for Goodwin (1889: 147-48; 151). Wakker 146). The imperfect normally describes simultaneous or repeated states of affairs, and the aorist a state completed before the time of speaking or before another mentioned in the surrounding context (Wakker 146-47). The use of the imperfect in a counterfactual, therefore, indicates a state of affairs which continues at the time of speaking but the decision about whose non-realization was made in the past; the decision about the non-realization of a state of affairs in the past (past counterfactual with aorist) was made at some earlier time (Wakker 147; different explanation in Weinrich 1971; against: Fayen 1971).

Wakker explains the use of tense stems for counterfactuals by the semantic character of the present and aorist stems. Those semantic qualities also justify apparent exceptions, when the state of affairs involved takes place at a different time from that of speaking; that time is indicated by an aorist or some other means in the context:

εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέπρηξε μηδέν, ἐπ' ὃ δὲ ἐστάλη ἐποίηε, εἴλε ἂν τὴν Ἑρυσκίην χώραν  
("for if he had not done anything beyond, but had kept on doing that for which he set out, he  
would have taken the region" Hdt. 5.45.1).

The imperfect ἐποίηε has continuative value, and context (Doreius' death) shows that the  
conditional refers to the past (Wakker 147-48).

### 7.7. Homeric counterfactuals: Present

Non-actual states of affairs both present (no longer realizable) and future (realizable) in Homer  
are marked by the old optative. The possibility of immortality, an impossible condition in the  
real world, in Homer takes the optative:

... εἰ μὲν γὰρ ...  
αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγήρω τ' ἀθανάτω τε  
ἔσσεσθ', οὐτέ κεν αὐτὸς ... μαχοίμην  
οὐτέ κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἔς ...  
νῦν δ' ἔμπηγ γὰρ κήρες ἐφεστᾶσιν θανάτοιο  
μυρία ... / ἴομεν

if we had the perspective to be for ever ageless and immortal, neither should I myself fight amid  
the foremost, nor should I send thee into battle. But now - for in any case thousands of fates of  
death beset us - let us go forward (*Il.* 12.322-27).

As the opposition between potential conditional and present counterfactual does not exist in  
Homeric Greek, Wakker rejects the assumption that this is definitely a counterfactual. Some  
have argued that such constructions replace counterfactuals. Wakker notes the same lack of  
differentiation in Plautus (Wakker 211; 212n171; Harris 1986: 268).

### 7.8. Homeric Counterfactuals: Past

In Homer, the past counterfactual construction εἰ + indicative II (aorist), indicative II + ἄν is  
used, as in Attic. There are seventy instances of "fully developed" past counterfactuals in  
Homer, such as (without ἄν in the apodosis):

εἰ γὰρ τίς μ' ἄλλη γε γυναικῶν ...  
... ἦγγεϊλε καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἀνέγειρεν,  
τῷ κε τάχα στυγερώς μιν ἐγὼν ἀπέπεμψα νέεσθαι  
... σὲ δὲ τοῦτό γε γήρας ὀνήσει.

for if any other of the women had told me this, I would straightaway have sent her back in sorry wise to return; but to you old age will bring profit (*Od.* 23.21-24).

Out of seventy, however, forty-seven counterfactuals are "*if-not* situations", which involve a narrator interrupting the story and presenting an alternative to the actual course of events. The main clause in these cases describes the expected event which does not materialize, and the subordinate clause the unexpected but actual state of affairs:

καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιτο ... Αἰνείας,  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε ... Ἀφροδίτη

And now Aeneas would have lost his life there, if Aphrodite had not watched sharply (*Il.* 5.311-12)

ἔνθά κεν αὐτε Τρῶες ... ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν  
Ἴλιον εἰσανέβησαν ...  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' Αἰνεία τε καὶ Ἑκτορι εἶπε ...  
... Ἑλενος

Then the Trojans would have been driven again by the Achaeans up to Ilium, if Helenus had not said to Aeneas and Hector .. (*Il.* 6.73-76)

καί νύ κεν ἦια πάντα κατέφθιτο καὶ μένε' ἀνδρῶν,  
εἰ μὴ τίς με θεῶν ὀλοφύρατο καὶ μ' ἐλέησε [or: ἐσάωσε]

and now all my stores would have been spent and the strength of my men, if not one of the gods had taken pity on me and saved me (*Od.* 4.363-64; Wakker 212-13).

The εἰ-clause, in second position, introduces the surprising course of events, whereas the main clause refers to what preceding events led to expect. On some occasions, the εἰ μὴ construction is replaced by an ἄλλά coordinated clause (*Il.* 5.22-24, 17.319-25; *Od.* 9.79-80; de Jong 2004: 69 lists *Il.* 15.459-64, a regular counterfactual followed by a clause coordinated by ἄλλά): according to Ruijgh (1992: 82-83), the εἰ μὴ + indicative II did arise precisely from the construction with ἄλλά + indicative II, which relates a fact (Wakker 210n168). A non-negative εἰ μὴ counterfactual is *Od.* 11.317-20, followed by an explanation of what prevented the realization of the *if*-clause (de Jong spots *Il.* 15.459-64). There are also instances of both main clause and *if*-clause in the negative (*Il.* 11.504-05, 12.290-93; *Od.* 24.41-42). The particle ἄρα often follows εἰ μὴ (*Il.* 3.374, 5.312, 5.680, 8.91, 8.132, 20.291, 23.541, 24.715; *Od.* 23.242) or appears in a surrounding relative clause (*Il.* 15.461, 17.72, 17.532, 23.384; *Od.* 4.366). Near death or near defeat are described in this way, a god or a human in most cases intervening to rescue the situation. This narrative technique provides information relevant to the addressee, by

emphasizing the critical nature of the events, and creates a clash between what happens and what does not, so making the actual events stand out (Wakker 214).

## 8. More on Homeric *if-nots*

*If-not* counterfactuals have also been analyzed as instances of "presentation through negation". A common narrative pattern in Homer is the statement of an event by its opposite. In "He (Agamemnon) did not stop fighting" (*Il.* 11.255), the implication is that stopping would be expected (de Jong 2004: 61). The negative formulation points to likely but unrealized possibilities. Achilles' spear is said not to be picked up during the arming of Patroclus. This subverts audiences' expectations of arming scenes (*Il.* 16.140-42); that spear is also used later by Achilles to avenge Patroclus and kill Hector (de Jong 2004: 62).

*If-not* sentences express the factual in the negative. De Jong examines each *if-not* in the *Iliad* as a form of interaction between narrator and narratee. Earlier scholars had just commented on samples: Bassett (1938: 100-02) had remarked that the function of *if-nots* is to emphasize critical points for the audience; Kullman (1956: 42-48) and Reinhardt (1961: 107-10) saw them as ways to turn the course of events; Fenik called them "extreme situations" (Fenik 1968: 175; de Jong 2004: 69; 262n59). Philologists had written on the use of negatives before. In "L'expression négative", Marouzeau (1949: 185) commented "Dire 'non' n'est pas le simple pendant de dire 'oui'"; there is no need to specify that it is not raining, unless someone thinks it is.

Narrow escapes in the *Iliad*, such as last-minute rescues of heroes by a god or a human, or of one side in the war, plus some non-dramatic situations, are related in this way. The unreal but likely alternative is mentioned first, followed by the real event cast in an *if-not* clause (thirty-three cases in narrator-text, eleven per type, and five in character-text; de Jong 2004: 68-78). The moods are: thirty-five indicative apodoses with ἄν/κεν (thirtyone aorists, four imperfects), and three optatives with ἄν/κει; all protases are in the aorist (de Jong 2004: 69). Normal counterfactuals, as we saw in Wakker, exist in Homer:

εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέροισι,  
τὼ κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν

And if the course had been still longer for the two of them,  
then he would have passed him by, nor have made the outcome in doubt (*Il.* 23.526-27)

But these have the main clause second, so reflecting the order of events. *If-nots* reverse both chronological order and clause position. One important and much-discussed instance of this is Poseidon's rescue of Aeneas from Achilles:

ἔνθά κεν Αἰνεΐας μὲν ἐπεσσύμενον βάλε πέτρῳ  
ἢ κόρυθ' ἢ ἔσάκος, τό οἱ ἦρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον,  
τὸν δέ κε Πηλεΐδης σχεδὸν ἄορι θυμὸν ἀπηύρα,  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Ποσειδάων ἔνοσίχθων

Then would Aeneas have struck him with the stone as he rushed on him, either on the helmet or on the shield that had [or: would have] warded from him woeful destruction, and the son of Peleus from close at hand would with his sword have taken Aeneas' life, if Poseidon, the shaker of the earth, had not been quick to notice (*Il.* 20.288-91).

Leaf (1902, on 20.289) found the double apodosis, "with its long chain of unrealised possibilities, by no means in the Homeric manner" (de Jong 2004: 262); this is although there are at least six of them in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 3.373-75, 8.130-32, 11.310-12, 17.319-22, 18.165-68, 20.288-91). Bakker (2005: 90) talks of the "poetics of the *Iliad*", including *if-nots*, as the frequent "verbalization of what could have happened, but did not". On this occasion, Poseidon stops "the course of events from becoming anti-action ... The death of Aeneas would have been in conflict with known poetic tradition; it would have been ὑπὲρ μοῖραν". Poseidon himself warns Aeneas not to act ὑπὲρ μοῖραν (*Il.* 20.336. Bakker 1997: 178; 179n69). By the "reversal passage", the saviour rescues not only a hero, but also the whole epic tradition (Bakker 1997: 179). Other *if-nots* are less threatening, such as *Il.* 17.530-31; the two Aiantes stop a fight between Hektor and Automedon, but that does not challenge fate (also *Il.* 23.491, 24.713). As mini-battle scenes (de Jong 2004: 70), *if-nots* constitute the basic ingredients of epic.

## 9. "Beinahe-Episoden" in the *Aeneid* and before

Nesselrath (1992) examines narrative twists of the *if-not* type in Greek and Latin epic and ancient drama.<sup>7</sup>

The *Odyssey*, first systematically studied by Lang (1989), has fewer and shorter *if-nots* (twenty-seven) than the *Iliad* (forty-six), since it contains fewer battles. Like the *Iliad* and all epics, however, it includes large-scale, imminent but curtailed developments, such as Odysseus' early homecoming. Nesselrath disagrees with Lang's view (1989: 19) that "maintenance of suspense" in the *Odyssey* replaces premature contemplation of disasters in the *Iliad*; there is plenty of suspense in the *Iliad* (Nesselrath 28-29). The *Iliad* itself is a large *if-not*, Nesselrath argues, stating that Achilles' anger would have enabled the Trojans to win, if he had not timely returned to battle (Nesselrath 27); with its forty-six, nine-type *if-nots* of various lengths, the *Iliad* proved a "mine" for future epics (Nesselrath 10-27).

<sup>7</sup> Predecessors listed: von Nägelbasch (1861; *Iliad*), Arend (1933), Bassett (1938), Schadewaldt (1938; *Iliad*), Kullman (1956; *Iliad*); Reinhardt (1961; *Iliad*); Fenik (1968; *Iliad*); de Jong (1987; *Iliad*); Lang (1989).

Post-Homer, the Greeks' near-flight on ships in the *Cypria* parallels the same scene in *Iliad* 2 (Nesselrath 39). Hesiod's *Theogony* 836-9 has a double apodosis duel between Zeus and Typhoeus, Zeus at his most endangered (Nesselrath 41-42); we will see how this relates to *Aen.* 1.58-59 and 2.54-56. The *Hymn to Demeter* contains three *if-nots*; the *Hymn to Apollo* states that the foundation of Delphi as the temple to Apollo would not have happened, if the Boeotian spring Telphusa had behaved more hospitably to Apollo (Nesselrath 43). There are thirteen *if-nots* in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica*, evenly split between human and divine interventions, with one involving nature. They occur outside of battles, although these exist. Different formulas are used, the longest episode relying on 4.1305-08, an adversative (ἄλλά) scheme that introduces the Argo's stranding in the Libyan desert (Nesselrath 44-46).

Latin offers no true equivalents for the Greek καὶ νύ κε(v) / ἔνθα κε(v) ... εἰ μὴ / ἄλλά. *Aen.* 5.232-34 has *et fors* + pluperfect subjunctive, *ni* + pluperfect subjunctive; elsewhere, *ni* with subjunctive, following a main clause with subjunctive and sometimes indicative. Nesselrath comments on the pluperfect indicative of *Aen.* 2.55 (*impulerat*) that it shows how close the action was to its full realization, *si non* here replacing *ni*; but he overlooks the initial position of the *si*-clause, however, which annuls the effect of surprise (Nesselrath 74-75; 136, notes; 137). Counter-movement is also provided by the *cum-inversum* construction. The total number of *if-nots* in the *Aeneid*, twenty, is much lower than the forty-six of the *Iliad*, which is once and a half the length (Quintus Smyrnaeus' *Posthomerica*, roughly as long as the *Aeneid*, has thirty-eight); but they are longer and more elaborate. Writers influenced by Virgil produced similar numbers and types. The role of fate, positive and negative, Nesselrath finds stronger in Virgil and later Roman than in Greek epics. Concerning choice of events, although there are more battles in Roman epics, *if-nots* are scarcer there (as in the *Argonautica*. Nesselrath 75). A hero escapes death (and one side of the war defeat. 9.757-61) by the device only once in the *Aeneid* (10.324-28). Sporting competitions traditionally show *if-not* thinking in all epics. In the *Aeneid*, this happens in the games for Anchises (Nesselrath 76). One important *if-not* occurrence is Aeneas' near-saving of Turnus at the end (*Aen.* 12.930-52); this is interrupted by the sight of Pallas' belt in a *cum*-clause (12.941), which reminds him of his friend's slaughter and provokes him to revenge (Nesselrath 78). A mirror scene of this is perhaps Juno's triple rescuing of Turnus in *Aen.* 10.685-86 (Nesselrath 78).

The way Nesselrath understands "undone events" is clearly on a large scale. The repeated frustrations of the Trojans' project to find Italy in the first half, he considers *if-nots*: Anchises refuses to go (2.635-49) and Aeneas is tempted to find death in Troy (2.655-72), but, in a *cum*-clause, divine signs release the impasse (from 2.680); Dido provides another retarding mechanism, broken by Mercury's reminder to Aeneas to move on (4.265-76. Nesselrath 80); the women's burning of the ships threatens the narrative again (from 5.630), until Jupiter stops it (5.685-99). Soon Aeneas ponders whether to remain in Sicily (5.700-03); that is remedied by the



seer Nantes (5.704-18) and Anchises' apparition (5.722-39).

In the second half of the *Aeneid*, there is the threat of premature land-grab and association with the Latins (7.284: the Trojans return bringing peace), in contradiction with the announcement in the second proemium, of *horrida bella* (7.37-45; Nesselrath 81). A "but" sequence follows: Juno notices and takes action to bring about war (7.286-87; Nesselrath 82n148). The rest of the book derives from that counter-development. In book 12, the threat of an early end reoccurs, when Aeneas and Latinus agree to a duel between Aeneas and Turnus as resolution to the conflict. Another "but" counter-movement starts, with the Rutulians' objection; the war continues (12.216-76; Nesselrath 82-83). Book 11 reports that Turnus' plan would have been successful, if his allies had not been defeated elsewhere; the coming battle is postponed by a *ni*-clause announcing the sunset (11.912-94). In book 6, Anchises concludes his pageant of Roman heroes to Aeneas with the young Marcellus, who died in Virgil's time before he could ascend to power as expected. This is perhaps Virgil's "boldest" counterfactual; also grammatically, as we will see, and as Nesselrath outlines (Nesselrath 84; 84n152).

*If-not* mechanisms are clearly perceived by Nesselrath, as by Hornblower, as narrative techniques which are parallel to larger twists in storylines.

## 10. Latin Conditionals

### 10.1. Martín Puente 2009: Conditionals of the Predication, Proposition, Enunciation

Martín Puente, contributor to the 2009 anthology *Sintaxis del latín clásico*, which takes a functionalist approach, thus emphasizing communication and pragmatics, identifies three broad categories of Latin conditionals which use *si*: conditionals of the **predication**, **proposition** and **enunciation**; these match Wakker's (1994) **predicational** ("If it rains, I'll take the umbrella"), **propositional** ("If I'm not mistaken, Peter is at home") and **illocutionary** ("If you are thirsty, there is some beer in the fridge". Austin's biscuit conditionals).<sup>8</sup> The protases of the last two relate to the higher levels of the sentence rather than to their apparent apodoses, and to some aspect of the current communication, behaving like *profecto, quidem, ut vero tibi dicam* (MP 659). Some sentences have a conditional sense without *si*, such as *epistulae offendunt non loco redditae* (Cic. *Fam.* 11.16.1. "... if they come at the wrong time") and *dummodo sit dives, barbarus ipse placet* (Ov. *Ars Am.* 2.276. "Provided that ...". MP 658-59). Others, **completives**, behave like arguments of verbs, and show modal discordance between main and subordinate clause: *hoc vero tam inopinatum malum et paene inauditum non miror si sine metu fuit, cum*

---

<sup>8</sup> See notes 2, 3 and 5.

*esset sine exemplo* (Sen. *Ep.* 91.1. "I do not wonder, however, that he was free from apprehension ...". MP 662; Bodelot 2000).

**Enunciation / illocutionary** conditionals, which relate to the relevance of the main clause, are not biconditionals. MP identifies: polite use (*sis = si vis, si licet, si placet, si fas est*), for instance *si licet, inquit, consules, de re publica dicere, errare ego populum in hac causa non patiar* (Liv. 3.71.3. "If, consuls, I'm allowed to speak ..."); metalinguistic use: *nec Quirites vos sed milites videor appellaturus, si nomen hoc saltem ruborem incutere ... possit* (Liv. 45.37.14 "... if that title can at least call up a blush ..."); and "usos procesurales": *siquidem pol me queris, adsum praesens praesenti tibi* (Plaut. *Mostell.* 1075; MP 669-70).

**Propositional** conditionals have protases which often mean "if it is true that *p*": *si, quo die ista caedes Romae facta est, ego Athenis eo die fui, in caede interesse non potui* (Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.63. "If ... on that day I was in Athens, I could not ...") or "according to": *scorpiones maiores minoresque ad sexaginta captos scripserim si auctorem Graecum sequar Silenum, si Valerium Antiatem, maiorum scorpionum sex milia, minorum tredecim milia* (Liv. 26.49.3; MP 667-68).

**Predicational conditionals** split between prototypical conditionals and conditionals with other values. MP considers prototypical conditionals as biconditionals, the thinking behind *adsequar omnia si propero: si cunctor, amitto* (Cic. *Att.* 10.8.5). Of these there are three types, depending on whether the condition is presented as possible, indifferent or false (Nuñez 1996; MP 2009: 663). In the first case, Latin uses the indicative in both protasis and apodosis: *si di sunt, est diuinatio* (Cic. *Div.* 2.41). In a **potential conditional**, the higher degree of unreality is marked by the present subjunctive in both protasis and apodosis for the present: *possim illud probare, si velim, omnem te hanc pecuniam domum tuam avertisse* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.164. "I could prove, if I chose, that ..."); and by the perfect subjunctive in the apodosis for the past, generally with the present subjunctive in the protasis: *facturusne operae pretium sim, si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscripserim, nec satis scio nec, si sciam, dicere ausim* (Liv., *Praef.* 1. "Whether I am likely to ... , ... I neither know for certain, nor if I knew would I dare to avouch it"). A **counterfactual**, considered false by the speaker, takes the imperfect subjunctive in both components for the present: *is iam pridem est mortuus; si viveret, verba eius audiretis* (Cic. *Q. Rosc.* 42. "He has long since died; if he was alive, you would ..."); and the pluperfect subjunctive for the past: *si id scissem, numquam huc tetulisset pedem* (Ter. *An.* 808. "If I had known, I would not have set foot". MP 666).

Predicational conditionals can also acquire different senses from the context. The relevant protases can be concessive: *non possum disposite istum accusare, si cupiam* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.87. "... even if I wanted to"); and causal: *epistulam Caesaris misi, si minus legisses* (Cic. *Att.* 13.22.5. "... in case you did not read it"); or final: *omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet* (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.55.1. "...

in case Pompey wanted to decide matters by a fight"). These main sentences are true independently of protases (MP 2009: 666). There are "iterative conditionals": *si quis collegam appellasset, ab eo, ad quem venerat, ita discedebat, ut paeniteret non prioris decreto stetisse* (Liv. 3.36.8. "If anybody sought redress from another decemvir, he came away regretting that ..."). The moods and tenses in the apodoses and protases of these cases are asymmetrical (MP 666-67).

Other conjunctions than *si* are used in Latin conditionals. *Sive / seu* feature in disjunctive coordinated protases or apodoses; *facilem esse rem, seu maneant, seu proficiscantur* (Caes. *BGall.* 5.31.1). *Si modo* tends to be postponed and is restrictive: *in hac arte, si modo est haec ars, nullum est praeceptum, quo modo verum inveniatur* (Cic. *De or.* 2.157. "In this art, if indeed it be an art, ..."). *Sin* introduces a second protasis, opposed to the first: *si domi sum, foris est animus: sin foris sum, animus domi* (Plaut. *Merc.* 589) (MP 659-60).

*Ni*, originally not conditional, acquired the sense of *nisi* and was itself replaced by *si non*, initially to emphasize an opposition. The resulting conditional always has a restrictive value: *nemo enim fere saltat sobrius, nisi forte insanit* (Cic. *Mur.* 13. "... , unless of course out of his mind"). MP does not mention the indicative apodoses in the next two examples, listed to illustrate the distinction between line-initial and line-final protases using *ni* and *nisi*: (protasis first) *ac ni caedem eius Narcissus properavisset, verterat pernicies in accusatorem* (Tac. *Ann.* 11.37.1. "If Narcissus had not hastened her death, ruin would have ..."); (protasis second, expressing a condition to a related but "non-explicit" event) *trudabanturque in paludem ... ni Caesar productas legiones instruxisset* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.63.2. "They would have been pushed ..., if Caesar had not ...") (MP 660). Earlier scholars had commented on the discrepancy; Torrego (1999; mentioned in MP 660) treats the subject extensively, as discussed below.

Hypothetical comparisons are introduced by *quasi, tamquam, tamquam si, velut si, ut*, with the subjunctive: *tamquam si claudus sim, cum fustis ambulandum* (Plaut. *Asin.* 427. "As if I were lame, I have to ...". MP 2009: 660-61).

## 10.2. Origins of Latin Conditionals: Parataxis?

There is some agreement that the Latin conditional originated paratactically, rather than as a main clause (apodosis) to which another is subordinate (protasis). The etymology of *si* would seem to justify that view. Coming from the locative *\*sei* like *sic*, *si* has been read as "so" in early Latin texts: *meam rem non cures, si recte facias* (Plaut. *Capt.* 632) is translated "Do not worry about my affairs, so you will do well" (MP 659; Ernout-Thomas 1959: 374; Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,388). Palmer (1968: 331) translates *Si sapias, eas ac decumbas domi* (Plaut. *Merc.* 373) as "Thus you would be wise: go home and lie down". As evidence for that theory,

Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,388) quote the survival into classical Latin of the expression *si dis placet* as "so it pleases the gods": *in omnibus circulis atque etiam, si dis placet, in conviviis sunt, qui exercitus in Macedoniam ducant* (Liv. 44.22.8). A non-conditional reading is clear also in Alfred Cary Schlesinger's translation: "In all clubs and even - God save us! - at dinner-tables there are experts who ...".

Pinkster (1972: 168), however, while conceding that some subordinators may have been coordinators or adverbs first (like *dum*, "a while"), agrees with Lakoff that the hypothesized proto-language without subordination would be unique amongst known languages (Lakoff 1968: 4-6). Kühner-Stegmann's reference to elementary language Pinkster considers misguided (Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,1; Pinkster 1972: 168). Concerning the apparent lack of subordinators in Indo-European, Pinkster points to Meillet's 1915 warning (1948: 162-63) against arguments from silence: we would not know of *sed*, *nam*, *ut* and *cum* in Latin, just from looking at Romance languages (Pinkster 1972: 168-89; 1990: 139; 276n76). Subordination as deficiency of meaning (Szantyr 1965: 526; 85\*; Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,2) is particularly displeasing: how do we deal with *cum-inversum* sentences, for instance, which deliberately confuse main and secondary clauses? Szantyr considers them later constructions to be ignored, but provides no evidence for that view (Szantyr 1965: 85\*; Pinkster 1972: 169-170).

Pinkster rejects Scherer's (1975) speculations on how two independent Latin sentences may have merged: *ubi sim nescio* may come from *ubi sim? nescio* (Scherer 1975: 238). But a deliberative *ubi sim* is unlikely in Latin, and *nescio* needs a second argument; if that is *ubi sim*, then it is subordinated to *nescio* (Pinkster 1990: 139-40). Blatt's "reanalysis" as explanation for the evolution of the *Accusativus cum Infinitivo* again divides complex sentences into unlikely segments: *arguo: pecunias cepisse* would have the odd phrase *pecunias cepisse* by itself, and *arguo* without the arguments it requires (Blatt 1952: 252-53; Pinkster 1990: 140).

Also opposed to a "parataxe primitive" was Haudry (1973). Noticing the skepticism of Meillet (1948/1915) and Lakoff (1968), he proposed that subordination results from the correlative structure "normal diptych". Scholars most often think of the juxtaposition of independent sentences as the origin of hypotaxis. Regarding conditionals, to most a paratactic origin would seem evident: it is not only *si* that is a locative (*\*sey*), but the Greek and Baltic conditional particles are too (Haudry 1973: 151). However, Haudry points to the existence of other conditional particles in Baltic languages derived from *\*kwod*; in Latin, there is *quod sī*. The conditional meaning probably resided in *quod*, while *sī* was an anaphoric pronoun meaning "so, then" (Haudry 1973: 152n8: There is no parallel in Greek, though). A process of renovation led to *sī* conditionals without *quod* (Haudry 1973: 152).

Correlation comes between parataxis and hypotaxis: in *tel père, tel fils*, for instance, there is total parallelism between the two components (Haudry 1973: 153; 186). Haudry identifies three chronological levels of correlation in Latin: the most ancient, based on *\*kwod* ...

\*to (*cum ... tum, ...*); possibly more recent, *ut ... ita, ...*; and *qui ... is*. Minard (1936) calls the basic form of correlation "normal diptych": the relative clause precedes the clause introduced by a correlative or anaphoric, though a reversal of positions is most common (Haudry 1973: 154). Diptychs in Latin include: *quos ferro trucidari oportebat, eos nondum voce vulnero* (Cic. 1st oration *Cat.* 9. "men who ..., as yet I am not even wounding [them]") (Haudry 1973: 156). The passage from correlative to hypotactic status occurred in clauses such as: *Germani qui trans Rhenum incolunt* (Caes. *BGall.* 1.28.3), later *Germani, qui ....*

Lehmann (1973: 15n17), however, expressed doubts on grounds of rarity of examples and uncertain interchangeability between *si* and *sic*. Bodelot (2000) supports a paratactic origin of conditionals with the *si*-clause, containing a cataphoric *si* meaning "in the following situation" followed by the situation: *Si venias, laetus sim*. The debate concerns Virgil, in view of his own dislocation of apodoses from protases.

### 10.3. The Rise and Fall of the Latin Subjunctive

Latin optative forms, linguists largely agree, became subjunctive, and subjunctive forms became future indicative; and the subjunctive expanded in classical Latin, then shrank. Both optative and subjunctive were former past tenses or connected with the perfect aspect. Close links between past and non-indicative moods have been observed in many languages. Repeated past, for instance, is expressed in the optative in Homeric Greek subordinate clauses (*Il.* 12.268: "whenever they saw, ἴδοιεν, a man hang back from the fighting". Benveniste 1951: 17-18).

Calboli (2005) uses Hittite juridical language to support his thesis on how IE past indicative became past eventual. The passage accompanied that from a specific to a general case, with unreality marked by the particle *man*, or *mān* (comparable to *ǎv*, *κε(v)*, and *κα* in Greek). This is intended to show that moods started as modifications of indicative tenses. As moods expanded and specialized, they eventually contracted. The Greek optative was gradually replaced by the subjunctive after classical times and finally disappeared. The old Latin subjunctive specialized to express the future, and the optative which replaced it as subjunctive then expanded, only to give way to the indicative in vulgar and late Latin in consecutive, hypothetical and interrogative clauses (Calboli 2005: 516-17).

Regarding conditionals, other changes took place. The present subjunctive was used for both potential and unreal (counterfactual) present conditionals, until the imperfect subjunctive became the tense used to differentiate present counterfactuals in classical times; early Latin past counterfactuals were marked by the imperfect subjunctive: *deos credo voluisse; nam ni vellent, non fieret, scio* (Plaut. *Aul.* 742; Ernout-Thomas 1953: 377; Harris 1986: 268; 281n2). Calboli

(2005: 512) gives this example of present subjunctive expressing the present counterfactual of early Latin, Vahlen's reconstruction of three lines from Ennius' tragedy *Telamon* 316-18: *Ego deum genus semper dixi et dicam caelitum / sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus: / nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest*; "... for if they **did care**, it would go well with well-doers; but ...". Woodcock (1959: 153), reporting the same passage, comments that "It is left to the context to make clear whether future possibility is contemplated, or whether the thought is confined totally to the present". Homeric Greek, as we saw, was in a similar position, as both potential (realizable) and present counterfactual (unrealizable) conditionals took the optative (*Il.* 12.322-27; Wakker 1994: 211-12; 212n171: "The same vagueness between counterfactual and 'optative' is seen in Plautus").

Why did the distinction arise? In Latin, the expression of the unreal as a whole expanded in classical times. Examples are: *-urum fuisse*, an infinitive used in subordinate clauses with an unreal meaning (Cic. *Lig.* 23, *Africam ... tibi patrem suum traditurum fuisse*, "that his father would have given up to you that province"); the *cum-historicum* construction with the subjunctive, exemplified in Cicero's "correction" of Plautus' temporal *quom exibam dono* (*Aul.* 178) to *cum exirem domo* (Cic. *Div.* 1.65); and the expression *dixerit quispiam* also in Cicero (*Nat. D.* 2.133; *Leg. agr.* 2.32; *Phil.* 14.13; *Rep.* 1.71; 2.48), which did not exist in early Latin, although it does in the *Iliad* (καί ποτέ τις εἴπησιν, *Il.* 6.459. Calboli 2005: 512-14). Through these non-deictic forms, speakers express the unreal. They also "avoid responsibility in the verbal process" (Calboli 2005: 511).

#### 10.4. Orlandini 2005: Mitigators

Orlandini (2005) elaborates on the mechanisms Latin used to modify the factuality of sentences and to reduce speakers' commitment to utterances (Hare 1970; Lakoff 1973; Caffi 1999). "Bushes", "hedges" and "shields" achieve such mitigations. In Latin, "bushes" are *quasi*, *tamquam*, *velut*, *quidam*; "hedges" are types of conditionals, described below (Orlandini 621-22); "shields" resemble "bushes", distancing the speaker from deixis (*ego-hic-nunc*) and attributing the assertion to a different speaker: *Haec precatus, veluti si sensisset auditas preces ... Restitere Romani tamquam caelesti voce iussi* (Liv. 1.12.7. "After such prayers, as if feeling they had been granted ... they stopped as if commanded by a voice from heaven". Are *tamquam* and *velut* not bushes?). *Exempla ficta*, non-actualized possible worlds often cast as conditional sentences, fit into this category: *Si unus quisque ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque quod cuique possit emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est* (Cic. *Off.* 3.22; "If each one of us took the goods of others for himself and removed what he could from each, for his own advantage, human society and community would

..."). These are unverifiable possible worlds, and are used to "exert argumentative power" rather than pointing at any fact (Orlandini 624; Haverkate 1992).

The second group of mitigators involves tenses, moods and constructions which operate on the degree of speakers' commitment to the illocutionary act (Orlandini 622). The perfect subjunctive constitutes an example of extreme non-deixis: the expression *aliquis dixerit*, has no deictic reference in the past and no deictic perspective point; it expresses no "accomplissement" (Bertinetto 1994: 796; Orlandini 623). The perfect subjunctive can also express the speaker's opinion of improbability: CH *Nescit quid faciat auro*. NI *Mihi dederit velim* (Plaut. *Bacch.* 334. "NI: I wish he would give it to me"). It can express attenuation: LE *Praefiscini hoc nunc dixerim: nemo etiam me accusavit / merito meo* (Plaut. *Asin.* 491. "Without offence, I could say this now: ..." Orlandini 623-24).

"False conditionals" have non-deictic, indicative modal auxiliaries which signal a possibility (or obligation) but simultaneously its non-actualization: *at si ita esset, hac lege accusatum oportuit, qua accusatur Habitus* (Cic. *Clu.* 90. "But had it been so, he ought to have been prosecuted ..."). Past possible worlds are annihilated by reality: *Cato qui Sicilia tenere ... potuit et, si tenuisset, omnes boni ad eum se contulissent* (Cic. *Att.* 10.16.3. "Cato, who could have held Sicily without any trouble and, if he had held it, all loyalists ...") (Orlandini 625). The indicative enables a contrast: the high degree of probability of actualization of the utterance, and its lack of it; although cases of true ambiguity exist: *Nominare homines ... nonne possum?* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.14. "Could I not name persons ...?". Orlandini 626).

In this category, Orlandini lists Latin indicative *if-nots*. The predicated event *q* would have happened, if another circumstance *p* had not stopped it. The tense of *q* is the indicative, but is not deictic. The oldest have a perfect with *paene, prope* or *iam*: *paene inprudencia admissum (fuit) facinus miserabile, ni utrimque praemissi equites rem exploravissent* (Sall. *Iug.* 53.7) ("this mistake could have had deplorable consequences, if some knights detached on one side and the other had not recognised what was going on"); Virgil has (among others): *Paulatim adnabam terrae: iam tuta tenebam / ni gens crudelis [...] invasisset* (Verg. *Aen.* 6.358-360; Orlandini 627-28). All conditions were in place for *q*. But the high probability of realization is not carried through (Orlandini 628).

### 10.5. Latin *if-nots* with Indicative Apodoses

Torrego (1999) treats the Latin *ni/nisi* counterfactuals with indicative predicate most thoroughly. Romance scholars call these conditionals "de rupture", because of the break the unreal conditional in the subjunctive brings to the clause in the indicative; Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,404) already used that concept. These are typically set in the past and popular with historians:

the protasis conditions a non-explicit event related to that portrayed in the apparent apodosis.<sup>9</sup> Tacitus has many instances: *Caecina ... suffosso equo delapsus circumveniebatur, ni prima legio sese opposuisset* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.65. "... and was being surrounded, if the first legion had not interposed"). The continuation of the fact portrayed in the indicative is what the *ni/nisi* clause interrupts (Torrego 391-92), an argument again from Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,403-04). Sentences which include that continuation exist: *interficere conatus est; et fecisset, nisi ille clam noctu ex praesidiis eius effugisset* (Nep. *Eum.* 2.5.2. "He tried to kill him, and would have succeeded if the intended victim had not ..."). Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,404d) talk of "Brachylogie", a form of omission. Neither Torrego (393n4) nor Chausserie-Laprée (1969: 609n1), however, supports the concept of ellipse.

Unreal conditional sentences normally take unreal moods (imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive); they have the protasis before the apodosis; the protasis conditions and temporally precedes the apodosis. By contrast, the apodosis of conditionals "de rupture" presents a fact as real in the indicative and precedes the protasis; this interrupts it and is in an unreal mood (the subjunctive pluperfect or, less often, the imperfect). Chausserie-Laprée (1969: 598) and Mellet (1988: 231) group the following with the indicative cases: *cessissentque loco, ni consul ... rem inclinatam sustinuisset* (Liv. 2.47.3. "they would have yielded the position, had not the other consul ... succeeded in checking their retreat"). But this example involves no interruption of a real event, since the subjunctive makes the apodosis unreal (Torrego 395n7). The use of *si* and *si non* Torrego equally rejects: *Si per L. Metellum licitum esset matres ... veniebant* (Cic. *Verr.* 5.129. "If Metellus had allowed, the mothers ... would have come") (Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,404d); *Inclusam Danaën ... excubiae munierant satis ... si non Acrisium ... custodem Iuppiter et Venus risissent* (Hor. *Carm.* 3.16.3. "... the guards would have protected her enough, ... had not Jupiter and Venus laughed ..."); *et si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset, / impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras* (Verg. *Aen.* 2.54-55; Kühner-Stegmann 1955: 2,403c; Torrego 395n6).

Latin modality, Torrego concedes, is sometimes expressed non-morphologically; cross-linguistically, lack of marking of the apodosis occurs (Comrie 1986: 87-88). But other traits indicate the factual nature of the *if-not* apodoses. One is initial position (Torrego 395), which infringes Greenberg's (1963: 103) universal 14: protases generally precede apodoses. Comrie (1986: 84-85; 87-88) attributes it to the need to mark the protasis as unreal, which an apodosis, often unmarked, in initial position might prevent. Haiman (1980: 528) thinks it is because protases introduce known information, which has to precede the new (Torrego 396-97; 396n8). Also, putting the *ni/nisi* clause after an indicative apodosis proves that it is not intended as conditioning it: (situation under way and interrupted) *Iam fames quam pestilentia tristior erat,*

<sup>9</sup> Chausserie-Laprée (1969: 602) adds a subjunctive apodosis case, as *ni* "de rupture", to Sallust's indicative case *Iug.* 53.7, discussed by Orlandini (10.4): *Neque diutius Numidae resistere quivissent, ni pedites cum equitibus permixti magnam cladem in congressu facerent.* Sall. *Iug.* 59.3.



*ni dismissis circa omnes populos legatis ...ad frumentum mercandum annonae foret subventum* (Liv. 4.52.5. "Indeed the famine would have been more baneful ..., had they not supplemented the supply of corn ..."); (relation of conditionality) [*frumentum*] ... *quod ni tam in tempore subvenisset, victoribus victisque pariter perniciose famae instabat* (Liv. 25.31.15. "Had it not arrived so opportunely, a famine ... would have been impending". Torrego 397). Content can exclude factuality, as in: *ac ni caedem eius Narcissus properavisset, verterat perniciem in accusatorem* (Tac. Ann. 11.37); once we know that Messalina is dead, we cannot interpret the apodosis (which is final anyway) as factual. There is cohesion in this case (Torrego 398); Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,403-04) are wrong to list sentences with *ni*-clauses first amongst the "conditionnelles de rupture" (Torrego 399).

Torrego further notes that the perfect is never used in these apodoses, unless accompanied by *paene* or *prope*: *iurgia primum, mox rixa inter Batavos et legionarios ... prope in proelium exarsere, ni Valens animadversione paucorum oblitos iam Batavos imperii admonisset* (Tac. Hist. 1.64. "... they broke out almost into open battle ... had not Valens ... reminded the Batavians of the authority ...". Torrego 401). The ban on the perfect confirms the factuality of the apodosis (Torrego 1999: 399-400). By contrast, the imperfect is common. This makes the *ni/nisi* clause similar to *cum* and *donec* clauses "de rupture" (Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 575; Torrego 1999: 400). Ongoing action can be broken: *Ibaturque in caedes, nisi Afranius Burrus et Annaeus Seneca obviam issent* (Tac. Ann. 13.2. "The tendency was towards murder, had not Afranius ... intervened") or prevented from starting: *sperabaturque rursus pugna, ni Maroboduus castra in collis subduxisset* (Tac. Ann. 2.46. "A renewal of the conflict was expected, when Maroboduus shifted his camp ..."); *praesidere simul parabat nisi ceteris pavore defixis Seneca admonisset, venienti matri occurreret* (Tac. Ann. 13.5. "she was preparing to ascend the emperor's tribunal, had not Seneca admonished ..."). The imperfect indicatives *sperabatur* and *parabat* describe the preparations for the action which is interrupted by the *ni/nisi* clauses (Torrego 401).

Also used in the pluperfect indicative, although, as a perfect, it would seem unsuitable. The event that follows from it is shortened by the conditional: *Incubueratque sagitariis, illa rupturus, ni Raetorum ... et Gallicae cohortes signa obiecissent* (Tac. Ann. 2.17. "He had flung himself on the archers, and would have broken through at that point, had not the Raetian ... cohorts opposed their standards"); *Praeclare viceramus nisi ... Lepidus ... Antonium recepisset* (Cic. Fam. 12.10.3. "We would have achieved a brilliant victory, if Lepidus had not harbored Antony"). The tense of the apodosis has to be divisible ("morcelable"), for another event to interrupt it (Torrego 1999: 402). That explains the prevalence of the imperfect, the acceptability of the pluperfect and the need for a semi-negative adverb with the perfect (*paene, prope*). Concerning lexical choice, when the main verb depicts a process, the *ni/nisi* interruption acts upon its continuation, and when it does not, the interruption acts upon its consequences (Torrego

403).

Torrego then analyzes the relationship between main and *ni/nisi* clauses, as compared with that found in "normal" conditionals (not defined. Torrego 403).<sup>10</sup> The truth of the apodosis, she argues, normally depends on that of the protasis. Sequence of moods matters, but also continuity of actants and lexicon.

In *ni/nisi* sentences, there is a temporal jump between the two clauses. The anteriority of the pluperfect subjunctive of this *ni/nisi* clause does not refer to the imperfect of the apodosis: *Simul in amplexus occurrentis filiae ruebat, nisi interiecti lictores utrisque obstitissent* (Tac. *Ann.* 16.32. "... he rushed to the arms of his daughter, who went to meet him; but the lictors threw themselves ..."). If *obstitissent* preceded *ruebat*, the latter could not occur. It is the end of the process which is affected. This example, however, is not a "conditionnelle de rupture".

In "normal" conditionals, participants tend to be the same in the two parts. In *ni/nisi* sentences, they rarely are: "chains of co-reference" are lacking (Brown and Yule 1983: 194); also, apodoses have no negatives (Torrego 405). The following show continuity between protasis and apodosis: (same subject, mood and tense) *ceteri cederent Italia nisi certam ante diem profanos ritus exuissent* (Tac. *Ann.* 2.85. "The rest had orders to leave Italy, unless they had renounced ..."); (object in apodosis is subject in protasis) *Opposuerunt abeunti arma, minitantes, ni regrederetur* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.35. "They barred his way [him] with their weapons, threateningly, unless he returned"); (same object) *ac ni Agrippina inpositum Rheno pontem solvi prohibuisset, erant qui id flagitium formidine auderent* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.69. "... had not Agrippina prevented the demolition ..., there were those who ... would have braved that infamy"). These are not "conditionnelles de rupture". But this is: (different subjects) *inter se legiones octava et quinta decuma ferrum parabant, ..., ni miles nonanus preces et ... minas interiecisset* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.23. "... were on the point of turning their swords ..., had not the men of the ninth intervened") (Torrego 1999: 407). The subject can be the same in the two clauses if there is opposition elsewhere in the conditional "de rupture": *Quin labebat longius nisi me retinuissem* (Cic. *Leg.* 1.52. "I would not have been led on still further, if I had not forced myself to stop". Torrego 407-08).

Negation rarely figures in "conditionnelles de rupture". But we do not always know whether we are dealing with one: *Ipse ... nihil flagitii reliquerat quo corruptior ageret nisi paucos post dies uni ... in modum sollemnium coniugiorum denuptisset* (Tac. *Ann.* 15.37. "Nero himself ... had left no abomination in reserve ...; except that, a few days later, he became ..."). Negative declarative sentences have a special pragmatic character, as the speaker's intention is to change the receiver's assumptions (Torrego 408); and a contradiction (of the interlocutor's presupposition) is difficult to combine with the *ni/nisi* structure. But the presence of two negatives can also be read as correlation: there is then continuity between the two clauses, and a

---

<sup>10</sup> Torrego's inverted commas, used throughout.

"normal" conditional.

## 11. How Virgil fits in

Virgil was writing at a time of great enthusiasm for counterfactuals, both syntactic and structural, as used in historiography and legal argumentation, and reflected in rhetorical exercises such as the *suasoria*. These patterns of reasoning were inherited from Herodotus and Thucydides and the Athenian forensic debates, and from Homer and tragedy. The syntactic *if-not* was also a staple component of Homeric epic. The historians' practice of *synkrisis* in particular, is most obviously recognizable in the *Aeneid*. That rhetorical structure involves the juxtaposition of pairs of characters and other entities, one superior to the other; the higher degree of actualization matches that of the indicative towards the subjunctive. Livy's "Alexander digression" (9.16-19) is counterfactual, uses *synkrisis* and has been dated to 25-23 BC (Luce 1965: 228; Ligeti 2008: 250); or, on the basis of *Aen.* 1.282, 25-24 BC (Morello 2002: 81). The historian also makes extensive use of counterfactuals, many with indicative apodoses. By the time Virgil was writing, moreover, the Stoics' philosophical debates about connections between propositions had been brought to Rome. Concerning syntax, Virgil's counterfactuals illustrate questions still unresolved: the borderline between future and counterfactual conditionals, and between these and wishes; and more generally the exact nature of counterfactuals from the speaker's perspective. The hazy borders between coordination and subordination are also exploited in Virgil's counterfactuals, particularly with the use of indicative apodoses. Characters also make pragmatic use of counterfactual. And in counterfactuals, both syntactic and structural, narrators present partly actualized worlds which compete with the more visible and actualized story and challenge it.

## Chapter Two. *Counterfactuals and the Collapse of the Text*

This chapter will examine the three counterfactuals that point most radically to the potential collapse of order in the universe of the text, and therefore to the possibility that it and Rome, whose origin it narrates, may not exist. The first, 1.58-59, is spoken by the narrator, and features in a section which belongs to the narrative of chaos; the counterfactual refers to the possible escape of the winds restrained by Aeolus. The second, 2.54-56, spoken by Aeneas to Dido and the Carthaginians, comments on the conceivable survival of Troy. The third, 2.599-600, spoken by Venus to Aeneas as reported by Aeneas, relates the near loss of Aeneas' family in Troy. This is the first, within its unit of meaning:

*illi indignantes magno cum murmure montis  
circum claustra fremunt; celsa sedet Aeolus arce  
sceptra tenens mollitque animos et temperat iras;  
ni faciat, maria ac terras caelumque profundum  
quippe ferant rapidi secum verrantque per auras.  
sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris  
hoc metuens molemque et montis insuper altos  
imposuit, regemque dedit qui foedere certo  
et premere et laxas sciret dare iussus habenas (1.55-63).*

The counterfactual *ni faciat ... per auras* observes that things could be very different from what they are. It is conceivable, for this narrator, that the winds escape and chaos prevails. But that situation is unmaterialized, in the subjunctive (*faciat, ferant, verrant*) and the next sentence, expanding on the one previous to the counterfactual, explains why: the *pater omnipotens* has taken steps to prevent it. Virgil casts the image of the winds sweeping up land, sea and sky, closely based on Lucretius: *venti ... mare ... terras ... nubila caeli verrunt* (1.277-79; 6.189-203, 6.535-607; Wheeler 1995: 202) and partly on the *Odyssey* 10.1-27, as a present counterfactual sentence with present subjunctive verbs and initial *ni*-clause. The counterfactual illustrates the action of the preceding statement: *celsa sedet Aeolus arce / sceptra tenens mollitque animos et temperat iras* (1.56-57). The narrator puts forward a justification for that state of affairs by presenting a mini-story which does not happen (Aeolus not restraining the winds), and asserting a series of likely consequences to that story (the winds sweeping everything away). Jupiter is then introduced as the chief controller of those conceivable, but excluded, stories, in a coordinated main clause (*sed ... habenas*, 1.60-63). That narrates an alternative and reparatory course of events to the one envisaged in the counterfactual, which expands the material presented just before the counterfactual (*celsa ... iras*, 1.56-57).

Virgil's syntax at 1.58-59 shows some parallels with Lucretius' passages. Lucretius has two conditionals at comparable points to Virgil's, namely where the consequences of the winds' potential misbehaviour are considered; the winds in Lucretius, however, are underground ones.

The first conditional could be considered counterfactual:

*quod nisi respirent venti, vis nulla refrenet  
res neque ab exitio possit reprehendere euntis* (Lucretius 6.568-69).

The verbs are in the present subjunctive in both the initial protasis and the two final apodoses (*respirent, refrenet, possit*), and the situation described is clearly believed by the narrator not to be the case at the moment. The earth keeps its balance, the narrator continues, and buildings do not fall, because the winds alternately become heavy and abate (Lucretius 6.570-74). This situation matches that of *Aen.* 1.58-59; loss of the current balance of forces is only contemplated.

Lucretius continues with the observation that winds have caused chasms (6.577-90). A second conditional presents the alternative, winds not erupting and causing earthquakes instead:

*quod nisi prorumpit, tamen impetus ipse animai  
et fera vis venti per crebra foramine terrae  
dispertitur ut horror et incutit inde tremorem, ...* (Lucretius 6.591-93).

This does happen, as the verbs in the indicative in both the initial protasis (*prorumpit*) and the final apodoses (*dispertitur, incutit*) confirm, and leads people to fear the earth open (6.591-607). This conditional is not counterfactual. There is, then, in Lucretius at least one related counterfactual, both syntactically and semantically, to *Aen.* 1.58-59, and another which is a mere conditional. We will examine shortly some of the implications of the present subjunctives in the counterfactuals.

The passage concerning the winds in the *Odyssey* (10.1-27) offers a different type of parallel. At 10.19-24, Odysseus recounts how he was given a bag of winds by Aeolus, to be kept shut. But as his companions become suspicious and open the bag, a storm ensues and Odysseus' ships end up where they started, on Aeolus' island (*Od.* 10.34-55). That kind of mishap, differently generated but a storm nevertheless, is of course what drives Aeneas and his crew to the Libyan coast when they first appear in the poem (1.88-123). As we saw in chapter one, both action theorists and narratologists maintain that without an agent's interference, there is no movement (von Wright 1967: 124; 1983: 111; Herman 2005: 2). In the *Aeneid*, that agent is Juno, with Jupiter and the fates higher in the divine hierarchy frustrating her and ultimately in charge; while Aeneas makes repeated attempts to return to some version of the previous state of affairs, only to be forced to move on by the divine agents. The counterfactual at *Aen.* 1.58-59 points to that slightly paradoxical mechanism: chaos is both to be kept at bay and necessary. We find it reiterated in the verb *impulit* for Aeolus' action of piercing the mountain which holds the winds with his spear (1.80-82), so releasing them and causing the Trojans' shipwreck with which the poem starts. It is the same verb used by Aeneas in the apodosis of the counterfactual

that expresses regret that the Trojan horse was not pierced and Troy saved (*impulerat*, 2.54-56); that outcome would also result in the non-existence of Rome and of the *Aeneid*. The winds counterfactual (1.57-58) is also the one that reaches furthest back in time. Aeolus, it would seem, has been keeping the winds in check since Zeus' separation of the parts of the world. Aeolus' activity fulfils a condition for that successful separation; it is what enables the world to hold together.

But is *Aen.* 1.58-59 counterfactual? The present subjunctive in the protasis conveys vividness and potential catastrophe according to Conington (on 1.58) and Austin (1971, on 1.58), but more specifically marks potentiality rather than counterfactuality according to Claflin (1911: 307); that view she extends to 2.599-600, explored later in this chapter, 5.325-6 and 6.290-4 in the first six books. Potentiality means it is not inconceivable that Aeolus should stop his judicious handling of the winds (*mollit, temperat.* 1.57). The winds might erupt.

We have seen the difficulty of pinning down counterfactuals as examined by linguists, with extreme skepticism represented by Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 62-63), and by philosophers, with Dudman (1984) assimilating future conditionals to counterfactuals, and Bennett (2003) eventually rejecting that view; and that no clear distinction between present counterfactuality and potentiality exists in Homeric Greek, since both take the optative (*Il.* 12.322-27. Wakker 1994: 211) and often in Plautus, because of the ambiguity intrinsic in the present subjunctive (*Haud rogem te, si sciam*, Plaut. *Men.* 640; Woodcock 1959: 153; Harris 1986: 268). It would not be surprising, therefore, to find Virgil exploiting the haziness of that boundary too.

That implication of potential disaster, however, goes beyond the use of the present subjunctive: it includes the entire passage of the winds. Stégen (1975, on 1.51) comments on the imagery of incipient birth inherent in *feta*, the adjective applied to Aeolus' island Aeolia, visited by Juno: *loca feta furentibus Austris.* (1.51); *feta* is used by Aeneas later for the Trojan horse full of soldiers who long to come out, *machina ... / feta armis* (*Aen.* 2.237-8). Hardie's (1986) well-known study of Gigantomachy, the fight between order and disorder typical of Greek and Roman literature,<sup>11</sup> discusses Virgil's exploitation of the tradition that earthquakes and volcanoes were the result of underground winds (Lucretius 6.535-607), and his innovative assimilation of these to the winds above ground (Hardie 1986: 91). The critic, and others, also credit Virgil with reintroducing myth after Lucretius moved away from it: rather than testifying to the cosmos' tendency to decay, the winds of the *Aeneid* are subject to divine rulership (Lucretius).

---

11 Hardie gives these instances of Gigantomachy in an Augustan *recusatio* (the section of a poem in which the speaker professes inability to write what he originally intended), which is a place where such allusions were particularly frequent: Prop. 2.1.19 f. [in a counterfactual: *quod mihi si tantum, Maecenas, fata dedissent, / ut possem heroas ducere in arma manus, / non ego Titanas canerem, ...* 2.1.17 ff.], 39 ff., 3.9.47 f. [*sic*; 3.9.45-46]; Hor. *Carm.* 2.12.6 ff.; Ovid *Am.* 2.1.11 ff., *Tr.* 2.69 ff., 331 f.; complete list and discussion in Hardie (1986: 87n6). Lucretius, especially from 5.110, also treats the theme (Hardie 1986: 209-10).

1.273-9; 2.1173-4; Hardie 1986: 91; Wheeler 1995: 202). The question is whether that control is foolproof. Buchheit (1963), the best treatment of Virgil's use of earlier material for the winds according to Hardie (1986: 92n17), found similarities between Virgil's restless winds and the Titans expelled underground by Zeus in Hesiod's *Theogony* (729-34): the Titans now live jailed behind brazen doors fitted by Poseidon, and are watched over by Zeus' guards (729-34); the Hundred-Handers at Hesiod's *Theogony* 621-3 also fit that comparison (Hardie 1986: 92). The war Giants, Titans and the monster Typhoeus fought with the gods for rulership of the cosmos has not resulted in permanent stability.

Another aspect of Gigantomachy is its frequent application as political allegory. Hardie lists Pindar's *Pythian 1*, 13-6, which presents Zeus as the enemy of the defeated Typhoeus now lying in Tartarus, as an image for the Deinomenids' victory over Carthaginians and Etruscans, and some of the sculpture of Alexander's successors, which suggests they saw themselves in the role of Zeus in relation to barbarians (Hardie 1986: 86). In Augustan times, Gigantomachy was used to designate Augustan supremacy, most notably in Horace's *carmen* 3.4.42-44, dated to 23 BC (Hutchinson 2002: 528-29), and therefore contemporary with some of the *Aeneid*:

... .. *scimus, ut inpios*  
*Titanas immanemque turbam*  
*fulmine sustulerit caduco*

*qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat*  
*ventosum et urbis regnaque tristia*  
*divosque mortalisque turmas*  
*imperio regit unus aequo* (Hor. *Carm.* 3.4.42-48).

The opening of the invocation to Apollo in Tibullus 2.5 (5-10) also recalls the Titans' defeat, though less clearly the Augustan settlement: ... *nunc indue vestem / sepositam, longas nunc bene pectus comas, / qualem te memorant Saturno rege fugato / victori laudes concinuisse Iovi*; and Ovid's account of the creation of the world in the *Metamorphoses 1*, Buchheit (1966) argued, makes a parallel with Augustus' defeat of evil (Hardie 1986: 85-88). In later writers of historical epic (Lucan, Silius, Claudian), the Gigantomachy became a cliché. Hardie (1986: 99) concludes: "[I]t might be surprising if Virgil did not make a substantial use of Gigantomachic themes".

Virgil's Gigantomachy, then, is not unexpected. One principal aspect of that theme links the winds counterfactual to the whole poem: the often-discussed opposition between *furor* and *ratio* or *pietas*. Subjugated *furor*, which closes the storm scene (1.294-96), is described in similar terms to those which depict the compressed winds, and features in Jupiter's prophecy to Venus of the closing of the gates of war in times of peace, in Rome a rare occurrence, twice under Augustus (1.293-96; Hardie 1986: 93).<sup>12</sup> Aeolus, the doorkeeper of the winds, has been

<sup>12</sup> In 29 and 25 BC, and previously 235 BC; Augustus' *Res Gestae* 13 mentions a further closure

compared to the gaoler of the war, Janus (Hardie 1991: 50). In Ovid's *Fasti* (1.123-4), Aeolus-like Janus proclaims: *sanguine letifero tutus miscebitur orbis, / ni teneant rigidae condita bella serae* (Stégen 1975: 49). That particular counterfactual, of course, comes at least some twenty years after the *Aeneid*. It combines the sense of the Virgilian *ni faciat* (chaos unless control), and to some extent its syntax (*ni*-clause with present subjunctive), with the trappings of the Homeric *if-not*: final protasis, though not quite interrupted action. Putnam (1965: 60) referred to Virgil's "potentiality of violence, usually depicted through imagery of enclosure and release" (cf. Bartsch 1998: 323). The simile between Neptune suppressing the waters and the man of authority assuaging the mob, also fits that pattern (*Aen.* 1.148-54); so does the story of the monster Cacus eliminated by Hercules, told by Evander to Aeneas: Cacus lives in a sunless cave (8.193-95), which becomes a gap to reveal the Underworld in the simile that illustrates Hercules' irruption into it (8.241-46). Lastly, the activity of the roaring lion to which Turnus is compared in the opening lines of book 12, *fremet ore cruento* (12.8), brings to mind subdued *furor* of 1.296 at the forecast closing of the gates (*fremet horridus ore cruento*) (Putnam 1965: 156). Conditional 1.58-59 and its context (1.52-63) are one manifestation of the most visible pattern of oppositions in the poem.

Virgil also provides a direct path from the winds scene to similarly crucial points in Hesiod's *Theogony* and in the *Iliad*. Reference to the winds' line of descent (1.132) combined with the *ni* conditional lead to Hesiod's own *ni / εἰ μή* foundational counterfactual; and from there to the related scene in Homer. In Hesiod's *Theogony*, Eos and the Titan Astraeus are the parents of the winds Zephyrus, Boreas and Notus (*Theog.* 378-80), and Typhoeus is the father of the ill winds, the ones which cause havoc (*Theog.* 869-80. Hardie 1986: 94).<sup>13</sup> Typhoeus is interesting in a number of ways. He is widely acknowledged as "the serpent-adversary slain by the Storm God" which Greece inherited from the Anatolian Hittites (Watkins 1995: 448; 448-59). The serpent is about to win in the Hittite version and in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* (353-74); that is considered an Indo-European motif (Watkins 1995: 449-50). There are differences of treatment: while in Hesiod each triumph of Zeus "is one more manifestation of his invincible power", Aeschylus' intention is "to arouse our sympathy with the victims of Zeus' brutality and to show that the 'fire' of rebellion is still smoldering. Zeus' victory has not secured real peace for the world" (Solmsen 1949: 132). The reversal of fortune in itself, however, raises a number of questions. Dramatically more interesting than a straight victory, it proclaims at least the possibility that Zeus might lose; and this is expressed in Hesiod by the only Homeric-style *if-not* in the *Theogony*:

καὶ νύ κεν ἔπλετο ἔργον ἀμήχανον ἧματι κείνῳ

before his birth and a third during his reign (Austin 1971, on 1.293 f.; Austin omits Augustus' reference to the closure between 235 and 29 BC).

13 Zephyrus in *Aen.* 1.131 is one of the misbehaving winds, to whose parentage Neptune refers.



καί κεν ὄ γε θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀναξεν,  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.  
σκληρὸν δ' ἔβρόντησε καὶ ὄβριμον, ἀμφὶ δὲ γαῖα  
σμερδαλέον κονάβησε καὶ οὐρανὸς εὐρύς ὑπερθε  
πόντος τ' Ὀκεανοῦ τε ῥοαὶ καὶ Τάρταρα γαίης (*Theog.* 836-41).

This is a typical Homeric *if-not*, as scholars have observed, which relates interrupted action after two counterfactual apodoses. It represents the possibility of what in relation to the *Iliad* Bakker, as mentioned in chapter one, calls "epic anti-action" (Bakker 1997: 179). Typhoeus might win: the *Theogony* as a poem, and the universe as it came to be, namely ruled by the Olympians, then would not exist. Typhoeus appears once in Homer, in a simile between the earth moaning beneath the Argives who are marching to Troy (*Il.* 2.780-85), and beneath Zeus' lashing it around Typhoeus "in the land of the Arimoi", where he is said to lie prostrate (Watkins 1995: 451-52). One scholion on this is remarkable, as we will see shortly. But it is elsewhere that a comparable scene to Hesiod's can be found in Homer: this is at *Iliad* 20.288-91, where Aeneas and Achilles fight a duel:

ἐνθά κεν Αἰνείας μὲν ἐπεσσύμενον βάλε πέτρῳ  
ἢ κόρυθ' ἠὲ σάκος, τό οἱ ἤρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον,  
τὸν δέ κε Πηλεΐδης σχεδὸν ἄορι θυμὸν ἀπήύρα,  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων:  
αὐτίκα δ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖς μετὰ μῦθον ἔειπεν: (*Il.* 20.288-92).

Besides the obvious syntactic similarity between the two passages, the two display a close structural and lexical resemblance. In Hesiod, Zeus takes notice (εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε), and in Homer, Poseidon does; both agents take action to prevent the conceivable, but undesirable course of action. The reason the excluded story (Typhoeus defeating Zeus; Achilles killing Aeneas) is mentioned but stamped out, is that its materialization would invalidate the existence of the poem and the kind of universe it portrays. A dead Aeneas in the *Iliad* would oppose fate and known poetic tradition; we saw that Poseidon himself, one of the agents, warns Aeneas not to act ὑπὲρ μοῖραν (*Il.* 20.336; Bakker 1997: 178; 179n69). An unsuccessful Zeus in Hesiod is impossible for the same reasons.

One further aspect of the three conditionals and their respective scenes (*Aen.* 1.55-63; *Theog.* 836-41; *Il.* 20.288-92) that needs considering is the chronological relation between them. Of the three, the first to take place is clearly Zeus' aristeia with Typhoeus (Hesiod's *Theogony*); the second involves Aeolus starting to repress the winds (*Aeneid*); and the third the duel between Achilles and Aeneas (*Iliad*). *Aen.* 1.58-59, as a non-*if-not* despite some similarities with that construction, and as using the present subjunctive, is ongoing, but the sentences before and after state facts (Aeolus controls the winds; Jupiter hid the winds under mountains and gave Aeolus power over them), and indicate, as we noted above, that Aeolus began his guardianship of the unruly winds at the time of Zeus' separation of the parts of the world. This order of events

is not fast truth, since there are other accounts of Zeus' victory over Typhoeus; Epimenides, for instance, has Typhoeus' near-victory when Zeus lives in a palace.<sup>14</sup> Aeolus' caretaking, in that case, could conceivably precede Zeus' final success. But we will keep to the sequence suggested by the three counterfactuals: Typhoeus nearly defeats Zeus, Aeolus begins to keep down the winds, Achilles nearly kills Aeneas.

All three clearly mark important points both in the history of the world and in their respective poems. *Aen.* 1.58-59 refers to the beginning of the equilibrium among the separated parts of the world; it also marks the first major episode in the poem, Juno's interference with that equilibrium so as to throw Aeneas and the Trojans off course and generate at least four of the twelve books of the *Aeneid*. Hesiod's *if-not* marks an apparent truce among the warring deities. This requires elaboration.

Glenn Most (2006: xxxiii) asks why a new enemy for Zeus had to be generated by Earth, when "the divine structure of the world seems complete: the Olympians have won; the Titans ... have been consigned to Tartarus. ... The *Theogony* could have ended here". One proffered reason is to give Zeus the chance of showing individual prowess, which crowd scenes cannot do; the Hundred-Handers had helped Zeus gain victory, and martial epics must culminate in a single duel which proves the hero's superiority, as in the *Iliad* (and the *Aeneid*). For that purpose, counterfactual configurations come in handy. Zeus' greatness gains emphasis by being described as a close shave; Typhoeus, the father of the unruly winds of the counterfactual *Aen.* 1.58-59 (*Aen.* 1.131-32; described as father at *Theog.* 869-80), nearly defeats him, with the dreadful consequences sketched in the double apodoses interrupted by the *if-not* protasis. Zeus then wins in the "splendid climax" of the *Theogony*. The *if-not* marks that important success. But can Zeus relax afterwards? Glenn Most underlines his subsequent move to justice and order: newly enthroned Zeus distributes honours to the other Olympians, marries Themis, and fathers Lawfulness, Justice and Peace (*Theog.* 881-903; Most 2006: xlvii; xxxiv). Another marriage, however, precedes that one. The first of Zeus' seven marriages is to Metis, and that brings the threat of new Typhoeus-like children. Zeus, warned by Gaia and Ouranos, then swallows her (*Theog.* 888-900). Marriage to Metis presents the risk of renewed dynastic struggles and potential for chaos. Defeating Typhoeus was not the end of the story for Zeus.

"In Greek myth, the son stronger than Zeus is a threat that does not materialize" (West 1966, on *Theog.* 886-900). Zeus remains in charge. But there are three versions of that motif, each part-actualization of the danger. In the least affirmed case, Zeus renounces the risky marriage, which would be to Thetis;<sup>15</sup> in Hesiod, Zeus swallows the relevant wife, Metis; in the most materialized case, the child, called Typhoeus, is born and Zeus kills him before he grows strong.<sup>16</sup> Scholia *b* to *Il.* 2.783, listed with the most actualized cases by West, provides a unique

14 *FGrH* 457 F8 = DK 3 B 8; Ogden 2013: 74; 69-79; Detienne & Vernant 1991: 80, 118.

15 Aesch. *PV* 755-70; 907-15; Pind. *Isthm.* 8.27-40; Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.800-04.

16 *Hym. Hom. Ap.* 338-69 according to West (1966, on 886-900), although Sowa's view (1984: 156)

variant: Kronos, prompted by an angry Gaia, fertilizes two eggs and entrusts them to Hera to bury, in order to produce Typhoeus; he is born, but after Hera informs Zeus, he strikes Typhoeus with a thunderbolt to Aetna (ὁ δὲ κεραυνώσας Αἴτην).<sup>17</sup> While in no variant is the threat materialized, the son under Aetna sounds far from sedate.

The twin counterfactual to Hesiod's Zeus/Typhoeus one (*Theog.* 836-41) and *Aen.* 1.58-60, *Il.* 20.288-92, marks another important point. We saw that fate and poetic tradition are at stake (Bakker 1997: 178; 179n69). Three features of that *if-not* need to be examined: the reason for the narrator asserting the second apodosis; the narrator's offer of locations for the hypothetical blow to Achilles to land; and the mood and tense of the verb in the relative clause. Why the narrator envisages Aeneas hitting Achilles is obvious, since Aeneas, instigated by Apollo (*Il.* 20.79-85), is fighting with him and has picked up a large stone. How that conjecture generates the next about Achilles killing Aeneas, is less clear. As we saw in chapter one, the sequence of apodoses has been questioned before. And, as Erbse asks, could Achilles just shake off the stone, without Aeneas looking ridiculous? Could the stone hit an uncovered part of Achilles' body (Erbse 1967: 20)? The questions are many. The justification for the second apodosis as consequence of the first, if we see such a line of causality, may relate to the interpretation of the relative clause (ἢ κόρυθ' ἢ ἔσάκος,) τό οἱ ἦρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον (*Il.* 20.289). The narrator speculates on what precisely the stone would hit. According to Edwards (1991, on 20.288-91), ἢ ... ἢ ἔ (20.289) shows that the poet can only speculate about unreal events. That is a tentative position on the narrator's part. Further uncertainty comes with ἦρκεσε: the verb could have either a past indicative or a future hypothetical reference. Dihle (1970), Edwards (1991 on 20.288-91) and Lattimore (2011 [1951]) read the clause as hypothetical: "(the helmet or shield,) which would have fended the bitter death from him" (Lattimore's translation). The other reading, "that had warded from him woeful destruction" (Murray 1946), is also correct (Dihle 1970: 76-80). The reading of ἦρκεσε as hypothetical conveys a sense of higher safety for Achilles, as it reports the efficiency of his protective gear as factual within the counterfactuality of the total situation. The second apodosis, on the other hand, makes the difference redundant, as it presents Aeneas as the definite victim of the conjectured sequence of events. Achilles obviously cannot be killed, and his temporary plight, some have argued, shows the section to be an interpolated story in honour of Aeneas' family (Dihle 1970: 76-80; Edwards 1991: 299-300). But however we explain the origin of the sequence and treat Achilles' invincibility, the fact remains that the text as we have it displays a clash in the narrator's position not seen in other double-apodosis *if-nots* in the *Iliad* (3.373-5, 8.130-2, 11.310-2 (triple apodosis), 17.319-22 (the most complex), 18.165-8; 23.382-84 offers a choice of apodoses): the forking of possibilities in the narrator's conjecture which delivers

---

that "we do not learn his fate in this poem" may seem more accurate.

<sup>17</sup> West 1966, on *Theog.* 886-900; Mondì 1984: 33n24; Kirk 1985, on *Il.* 2.781-84.

"helmet or shield", and, differently, "would have / had fended", constructs a tentative narrator; the linking of two apodoses which are not obviously connected does the opposite. Besides presenting a state of affairs which cannot possibly be actualized because it runs contrary to epic tradition, therefore, *if-not Il. 20.288-91* questions the very nature of that narratological tool. The narrator is successively hesitant and resolute. And since neither of the two protagonists involved can die at this stage, the entire episode would seem redundant.

The second counterfactual of the *Aeneid* to be examined in this chapter, 2.54-56, shares a lot with the three just analyzed (Aeneas/Achilles *if-not, Il. 20.288-302*; the *ni faciat* passage, *Aen. 1.58-60*; Hesiod's Zeus/Typhoeus *if-not, Theog. 836-41*). This is because its materialization would result in the destruction of the poem:

*et, si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset,  
impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras,  
Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres* (2.54-56).

An unburnt Troy means no mission to Italy, no Rome and no Aeneas uttering the counterfactual to Dido and the Carthaginians. The apostrophe to a defunct Troy has a precedent in Poseidon's soliloquy at the opening of Euripides' *Trojan Women*:

ἀλλ', ὦ ποτ' εὐτυχοῦσα, χαίρέ μοι, πόλις  
ξεστόν τε πύργωμ': εἴ σε μὴ διώλεσεν  
Παλλὰς Διὸς παῖς, ἦσθ' ἄν ἐν βάθροισι ἔτι (Eur., *Tro. 45-47*).

Largely ignored in this role except by Ussani (1952, on 2.55-56), Fernandelli (1996: 108-09) and Horsfall (2008, on 2.54), Poseidon's counterfactual has a negative protasis preceding the apodosis just like Aeneas'; the latter, however, has probably two protases and certainly three apodoses. Horsfall, following Page, reads *non laeva fuisset* applied to both *si*-clauses (Horsfall 2008, on 2.54); *deum* he also allocates to both members, although *mens* referring to humans, as held by Austin (in view also of *Ecl. 1.16-17*), he does not exclude (Horsfall 2008, on 2.54). One aspect of the syntax that separates the passage from the three examined above, and from Poseidon's, is the first apodosis: if we were to read only *impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras*, what would we understand? An agent "had driven us to defile the Argive hiding-places with a weapon"; Aeneas' words appear to relate a fact. It is the preceding protases and subsequent imperfect subjunctive apodoses that tell us they do not. The full attack on the Trojan horse is only a non-actualized alternative to the actualized course of events. Aeneas moves from the technically factual though clearly hypothetical past (*impulerat*), to the fully hypothetical present. That movement, past to present, also occurs between the pluperfect subjunctive *fuisset* to the two imperfect subjunctive apodoses (*staret, maneres*). The consequence of a past course

of action which did not materialize is conjectured by Aeneas as the possible, current survival of Troy; the *impulerat* apodosis encroaches into that, but ultimately joins the counterfactual past.

Another important difference is that Aeneas speaks 2.54-56 as an interruption of his own story of the fall of Troy to Dido and her court. As we will see in more detail in the analysis of the two counterfactuals he uses to defend his flight from Troy (2.291-92, 2.431-34 in chapter seven), it is vital for Aeneas to reassure his audiences, internal (at Carthage) and external (in Virgil's Rome), of the blamelessness of his behaviour. Stories of Aeneas' betrayal of Troy circulated in antiquity, as discussed by Powell (2011: 189-95); the Carthaginians addressed by Aeneas may have been aware of them too, and so could Virgil's contemporaries. Aeneas, moreover, expresses regret that the Trojans did not destroy the wooden horse. This is an upward counterfactual, one which portrays a better alternative to a past event, and therefore a negative comment on current reality by its speaker. It conveys the thought "things could have been better", and, like the majority of its real-life counterparts, expresses regret for inaction (cf. Dannenberg 2008: 113). It is the opposite of, for instance, Robinson Crusoe's optimistic assessment of the shipwreck that stranded him; that conveys the concept "things could have been worse". One reason for the difference is the circumstance of utterance: Robinson Crusoe is speaking through a journal, whereas Aeneas is addressing potentially helpful interlocutors. When witnessing upward counterfactuals, Dido and the Carthaginians will feel dissatisfied with the actual world, and may try to improve it. That is exactly what they do: Aeneas receives assistance from his interlocutors. And one of the verbal ploys Aeneas has used is the description of a key event as both real and unreal: with *impulerat*, "the mood of fact is put for the mood of hypothesis to mark how near Laocoon was to success" (Austin 1964, on 2.55). Aeneas has presented the beginning of an unmaterialized, better alternative world as partly materialized, and has used that ambiguity to his own advantage.

Concerning similarity with Homer, two features exclude the *si fata deum* counterfactual from the *if-not* category. The main one is the initial position of the protasis, which follows Greenberg's (1963: 103) universal 14. This protasis does not erase the action reported in an initial, factual apodosis. *If-nots* that do are 6.358-61 and, with subjunctive apodosis, 10.324-30.

The second feature that makes *Aen.* 2.54-56 not an *if-not* is probably the use of *si non* as the conditional conjunction rather than *ni*. Chapter one looked at scholarly disagreements on the distinction, or otherwise, between Latin *if-nots* with indicative and those with subjunctive apodoses, and between *si non* and *ni / nisi*. We saw (page 96) that Chausserie-Laprée (1969: 598) and Mellet (1988: 231) classify the following example with the indicative cases (such as *cedebatque inde Romanus, cum ... consul ...: "Hoc iurastis, inquit, milites ...?" Liv. 2.46.5): cessissentque loco, ni consul ... rem inclinatum sustinuisset (Liv. 2.47.3). Torrego (1999: 395n7) finds that the subjunctive makes the apodosis *cessissent* unreal, and therefore different from an indicative apodosis which reports a fact. Kühner-Stegmann (1955: 2,403c) lists*

Horace's *Inclusam Danaën ... excubiae munierant satis ... si non Acrisium ... custodem Iuppiter et Venus risissent* (Hor. *Carm.* 3.16.3) with *et, si fata deum ....* (*Aen.* 2.54-56). Horace's *carmen* 3.16.3 is dated to 23 BC (Hutchinson 2002: 528-29), and therefore contemporaneous with some of the *Aeneid*.

Orlandini's (2005) discussion of mitigators might shed a different light on the question. Mitigators, as seen earlier, convey a speaker's distance from deixis (*ego-hic-nunc*). These include the perfect subjunctive in *aliquis dixerit*, an extreme case of mitigation, *quasi, tamquam* and *velut*; and "false conditionals", such as *Cato qui Sicilia tenere ... potuit et, si tenuisset, omnes boni ad eum se contulissent* (Cic. *Att.* 10.16.3; Orlandini 2005: 625). In Orlandini's analysis, *potuit*, although indicative, here refers to a past possible world which reality denies. And *if-nots* with indicative apodosis belong to the same type: her example is *Aen.* 6.358-60: *iam tuta tenebam / ni gens crudelis ... invasisset* (Orlandini 2005: 627-28). In these conditionals, there is a move towards the realization of the predication which is not carried through, despite the high probability of realization (Orlandini 2005: 628). By this logic, *et, si fata deum ...* probably qualifies as an *if-not*. There is certainly a move towards the realization of the first apodosis, *impulerat ... latebras*, due to the use of the indicative. But what about the initial position of the protasis? We must ask perhaps where precisely the apodosis starts. While we know for sure where the protasis begins (*si fata ...*), the start of the apodosis seems somewhat diffuse. By the time we reach *si fata ...*, we are already equipped with knowledge of an event that belongs to the apodosis. We know that Laocoon has thrown a spear at the wooden horse, and, crucially, that it made a noise: *validis ingentem viribus hastam / in latus inque feri curvam compagibus alvum / contorsit. stetit illa tremens, uteroque recusso / insonuere cavae gemitumque dedere cavernae* (2.50-53). The action of destroying the horse has very noticeably started. The protasis *et si ...* follows, and interrupts the continuation of the action. There is, therefore, a certain similarity between this and *if-nots*. With *impulerat foedare* next, there is a partial repetition of the act of destroying the horse: the predicates *hastam / in latus inque feri ... alvum / contorsit* (preceding the protasis, 2.50-53) partly replicates *impulerat foedare latebras* (following the protasis, 2.54). A similar semantic overlap is absent, for instance, from Horace's *if-not* in *carmen* 2.17.27-30, with second-position *ni*-clause and initial indicative apodosis, to which Austin (1964, on 2.55) draws attention, dated to 25-24 BC (Hutchinson 2002: 524-25). What precedes these lines is not an earlier statement of any part of the counterfactual:

... .. *te Iovis inpio  
tutela Saturno refulgens  
eripuit volucrisque Fati*

*tardavit alas, cum populus frequens  
laetum theatri ter crepuit sonum;  
me truncus inlapsus cerebro,*

*sustulerat, nisi Faunus ictum*

*dextra levasset, Mercurialium  
custos virorum. ... (Hor. Carm. 2.17.22-30).*

The *impulerat* counterfactual, then, perhaps qualifies as a Homeric *if-not*. In Virgil, moreover, the duplication of immediately pre- and immediately post-protasis material (Laocoon's attack on the wooden horse with a javelin), is the opposite counterpart of the splitting of Trojan responses to the arrival of the horse: Aeneas says that some favour bringing the horse in (*pars ... / ... Thymoetes / ... 2.31-34*), and others its destruction (*at Capys ... 2.35-38*). One line summarizes that split: *scinditur incertum studia in contraria vulgus (2.39)*. Two paths are open to the Trojans, and the first (allowing the wooden horse in), becomes actualized, in the poem and Rome, whereas the second (destroying the horse), becomes counterfactual.

The third counterfactual in this chapter is spoken by Venus on the last night of Troy as reported by Aeneas to the Carthaginians, and is part of Venus' reminder to Aeneas of the danger his family is in:

*non prius aspicias ubi fessum aetate parentem  
liqueris Anchisen, superet coniunxne Creusa  
Ascaniusque puer? quos omnis undique Graiae  
circum errant acies et, ni mea cura resistat,  
iam flammae tulerint inimicus et hauserit ensis (2.596-600).*

The verb forms are the most noticeable aspect of the counterfactual. The protasis is initial, as in 1.58-59 (*ni faciat ...*) and 2.54-56 (*et, si fata deum ... fuisset*), and in Poseidon's apostrophe to Troy in *Trojan Women* 46-47 (εἴ σε μὴ διώλεσεν ...), and differently from *Il.* 20.288-91 and *Theog.* 836-38 (... / εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε ...); this counterfactual, therefore, is not quite a Homeric *if-not*, or a "ni de rupture" type. The verb of the protasis is in the present subjunctive (*resistat*), as at 1.58-59. The apodoses of 1.58-59, however, have two more present subjunctives in the apodoses (*ferant verrantque*), and the whole sentence thus constructs a state of affairs which is counterfactual at the time of speaking, but liable to change. Venus' claimed intervention to protect Aeneas' and her own family in the protasis in the vivid present, on the other hand, clashes with the apodoses. When does Venus' protection take place? This is yet another way for the narrator to underline the near-non-existence of the text. Woodcock (1959: 154-45) finds the sentence a combination of present and perfect subjunctives, which leaves open the possibility of fulfillment: as in Livy's *ad sexaginta captos scripserim, si auctorem Graecum sequar* (Liv. 26.49.3). Austin (1964, on *Aen.* 2.600) disagrees with Woodcock's view that the present subjunctive replaces the imperfect, and the perfect subjunctive replaces the pluperfect. He reads Venus' claim rather as a *si sit ... erit* type. Nutting (1926), ignored by Austin, divided

*si sit ... erit* conditionals into groups, and found that two frequent senses of the future indicative apodosis are the announcement of the inevitable and that of what "will prove to be" (Nutting 1926: 205-09). Those two categories would probably cover the current future indicatives, as Venus foresees the dreadful outcome of her hypothesized neglect. Being perfects (*tulerint*, *hauserit*) rather than just futures adds to the narrator's certainty according to Austin (1964, on 2.600): "you will soon find that the flames have swept them off - if it were not for my care." Horsfall (2008, on 2.600) remains neutral, but comes to a reading which resembles Nutting's and Austin's: the flames "will prove, when you look [which you have not yet done], to have carried off ... were I not defending your interests"; both Horsfall and Austin, we may note, have inverted the positions of the clauses, so their renditions are closer to Homeric *if-nots*; Horsfall maintains the correct order of protasis and apodoses in his translation of book 2.

Clafin (1911: 305), ignored by all the scholars mentioned, draws an interesting parallel between Venus' protasis and Lucretius' at 5.206-07:

*quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi  
sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat* (Lucretius 5.206-07).

This present subjunctive, she argues, indicates that the encroachment of the brambles on the fields is a contingency that may well happen; that is confirmed by Lucretius' view that the world will inevitably decline (Lucretius 2.1173-74). Concerning *tulerint* and *hauserit* in Venus' apodoses (*Aen.* 2.599-600), Clafin (1911: 306) sides with Blase's support for the future perfect indicative (Blase 1905). That is the reading that emphasizes the near-certainty of disaster. We are thus reminded of the narrator's observation regarding Aeolus and the tumultuous underground winds at 1.58-59. That also draws heavily from Lucretius, and Clafin brings the two together because of the present subjunctive in the protasis. But there is a crucial distinction: the Aeolus conditional is spoken by the primary narrator, and Venus' counterfactual by Aeneas as he tries to ingratiate himself with the Carthaginians. Reference to Lucretius' own *ni vis humana resistat* in Venus' *ni mea cura resistat*, then, could be taken to depict Venus as if her efforts are doomed. Aeneas echoed Poseidon's apostrophe to Troy, also in counterfactual form, from Euripides' *Trojan Women* (46-47), and added his own particular embellishment with the pluperfect indicative *impulerat* in the first apodosis. On this occasion, it would not be out of character if his Venus echoed Lucretius' view that the world inevitably moves towards decline. Troy had been destroyed by the time of Aeneas' speech to the Carthaginians, and Creusa had got lost during the destruction. Two passages from the *Georgics* quoted by Clafin show Lucretius' words from his counterfactual 5.206-07 (*ni vis humana, obducat sentibus*) in other contexts of decay, the first in a conditional with *ni*-clause in the same position as both Venus' and Lucretius' *ni ... resistat*:



*vidi lecta diu et multo spectata labore  
degenerare tamen, ni vis humana quot annis  
maxima quaeque manu legeret* (Geo. 1.197-99)

*bis segetem densis obducunt sentibus herbae* (Geo. 2.411).

It is possible to interpret Venus' counterfactual, therefore, as one more attempt on Aeneas' part to exculpate himself from possible blame for not saving Troy and his wife. The words, syntax and metrical features from both Lucretius and Virgil's own *Georgics*, clearly point to the pointlessness of resisting destruction. The connection of the two present subjunctive protasis counterfactuals (1.58-59; 2.599-600) with Horace's *carmen* 3.4.42-48, *Theogony* 836-38, *Iliad* 20.288-91 and Lucretius' 6.568-74, on the other hand, rather presents chaos as only threatened.

### Chapter Three. *How If-Nots Keep the Poem Going*

Nesselrath, as indicated, counted twenty *if-nots* in the *Aeneid*, and forty-six in the *Iliad*, which is half as long again (Nesselrath 1992: 44-46), and a hero escaping death and one side avoiding defeat in only one *if-not* each (10.324-28 and 9.757-61 respectively; Nesselrath 1992: 76). Has the *Aeneid* moved away from the use of *if-nots* in battles?

If we go by statistics, the answer is probably "yes". But, if we follow Nesselrath's own way of identifying *if-nots*, it is possibly "no". Virgil exploits the typical *if-not* situation, but often without *if-not* syntax and phraseology, or with partial reference to both. As Nesselrath argues, 10.324-28 qualifies as a typical Homeric *if-not*. The following extract includes it and the next counter-move, an attack on the attacker:

*tu quoque, flaventem prima lanugine malas  
dum sequeris Clytium infelix, nova gaudia, Cydon,  
Dardania stratus dextra, securus amorum  
qui iuvenum tibi semper erant, miserande iaceres,  
ni fratrum stipata cohors foret obvia, Phorci  
progenies, septem numero, septenaque tela  
coniciunt; partim galea clipeoque resultant  
inrita, deflexit partim stringentia corpus  
alma Venus* (10.324-32).

This is an apostrophe by the narrator to a potential victim who escapes death, spoken during a catalogue of Aeneas' killings, followed by retaliation against Aeneas. The apostrophe (*tu ... coniciunt*, 10.324-30) consists of a counterfactual apodosis followed by a *ni*-clause which narrates the actualized course of events, and qualifies, therefore, as a Homeric *if-not*; the apostrophe format also has a parallel in the *Iliad* (7.104-08). The sentence (*tu quoque, ... / ... Cydon, / Dardania stratus dextra, ... / ... miserande iaceres, / ni fratrum stipata cohors foret obvia*, 10.324-28), is fully hypothetical, with both verbs (*iaceres, foret*) in the imperfect subjunctive, referring to the present as the time of the apostrophe.

But is this unique in the *Aeneid*? It is Nesselrath himself who provides the tools for discovering more: he remarks that Virgil's renditions of the Homeric model are long and complex (Nesselrath 1992: 75). That is certainly true of the current block, wrapped as it is in at least four levels of typical *if-not* material: 10.324-28, the literal *if-not* (*Tu quoque ... / Cydon, / ... iaceres, / ni ... cohors foret obvia*); 10.328-30, an expansion of the *ni*-clause (*Phorci / progenies ... septenaque tela / coniciunt*); 10.330-32, Aeneas' narrow escape from that retaliatory attack, through two forms of javelin deflection (*partim ... partim ...*); and, surrounding that, 10.308-44, a wider pattern coincidental with Aeneas' first show of strength at his return (the second being 10.510-605, following Pallas' death). All of this follows the large-scale reversal identified by Rossi (1997: 41-42) that stretches between the Trojans' lack of hope

as the Rutulians surround them at 10.121 (*nec spes ulla fugae*), and renewed hope at 10.263 (*spes addita suscitatur iras*) as Aeneas returns.

These embeddings are not in themselves dissimilar from Homeric ones. The "sole survivor" motif exists in Homer, for instance (Kirk 1990: 25), the most obvious of those survivors being Odysseus, and so do multiple-phase battles, particularly in the *Iliad*, as analyzed by Fenik (1968) and many others. But that does not affect the current argument. The *if-not* apostrophe comes in the larger pattern (10.308-44) that contains a catalogue of Aeneas' killings, and explicitly mentions the survivor following many named dead fighters (and one wounded, 10.315): it signals Cydon's expected death, in the first-position subjunctive apodosis, and presents his survival in the *ni*-clause. The narrator thus underlines the remarkable nature of Cydon's escape, by contrasting it with the list of the dead. That departure from the predictability of the catalogue mirrors that which occurs between the apodosis and the protasis within the *if-not* sentence; in both cases, one course of events seems the obvious one, but another materializes. And this is the structure to be taken into consideration when we look for parallels to hero-saving *if-nots* in different syntax. The verb in the subjunctive, of course, makes the apodosis hypothetical, so we know that Cydon is not lying dead before we reach the apparent protasis. But the reversal occurs.

The next structure within the list of Aeneas' victims and one survivor (10.308-44), includes the *if-not* (10.324-28) and the three lines (10.328-32) that relate retaliation against Aeneas and his survival, started as apposition to the subject of the protasis (*cohors ... Phorci / progenies ... tela coniciunt*): some of the javelins bounce back from Aeneas' helmet and shield (*partim galea clipeoque resultant / inrita*), and some are diverted by Venus (*deflexit partim stringentia corpus / alma Venus*). It is in these lines (10.328-32), that we can find a clear link between 10.324-32, the *if-not* followed by retaliation and rescue of a second hero, and the large number of *if-nots* that are scattered in the text, though encased in different syntax. We need to analyze the *ni*-clause extension more closely.

The expression *galea clipeoque* (10.330) lexically matches Homer's ἡ κόρυθ' ἧε σάκος (*Il.* 20.289), the expression found once in the *Iliad* in the key *if-not* examined in chapter two involving the duel between Achilles and Aeneas, cut short by Poseidon.<sup>18</sup> But there are three crucial differences. In Homer, the weapon in question, a stone, belongs to the first counterfactual apodosis ("Then would Aeneas have smitten him with the stone..."); a choice of locations for the blow is offered ("... either on helm or on the shield ..."); and the qualification of the second of those locations, which announces the failure of the hypothetical blow, is a relative clause possibly also hypothetical ("... that had *or* would have warded from him woeful destruction ..." *Il.* 20.288-9). In Virgil, the falling weapons (javelins) belong to the retaliatory

---

18 Versions are found of κόρυς (τε) καὶ ἀπίς: *Od.* 19.32, *Il.* 5.4, 7.62, 12.160-1, 15.125, 16.214, 21.50; and one of κόρυς ... καὶ σάκος: *Il.* 15.125.

sequence which chronologically, and in the text, follows the *ni*-clause but is expressed independently as fact (*ni ... cohors foret obvia, ... / ... septenaque tela coniciunt; partim galea clipeoque resultant / inrita, deflexit partim ... / ... Venus*); there is no doubt about the location of the bouncing, which is both helmet and shield, and about the factuality of the protective role of the shield, which in Homer may be speculative.<sup>19</sup> That treatment of such crucial events in the *Iliad* as the endangering of Achilles and the preservation of Aeneas, whose death would contradict fate (*Il.* 20.288-91; 20.302-5), suggests that Virgil is highlighting the game narrators play in keeping heroes alive or killing them off, within a structure which is at constant risk of collapse; the current narrator displays higher self-confidence than Homer's, by providing two certain landing places for the weapons. The rather problematic ἢ κόρυθ' ἢ ἔσάκος (*Il.* 20.289) of the *Iliad* has become *galea clipeoque* (10.330) in the *Aeneid*; it has happened outside the *if-not* and is clearly factual.

The second crucial feature of the two explanatory lines attached to the *if-not* proper is the narrator's mention of how the javelins fail: some fall off Aeneas' protective gear, and some are diverted by Venus (10.331-33). These two ways for a hero not to die are staple retardatory devices in both Homer and Virgil. Variants of them figure among *if-nots*: in *Il.* 20.288-308, the *if-not* which contains "helmet or shield", Poseidon intervenes to prevent Aeneas' untimely killing by Achilles; he temporarily blinds Achilles with mist, and hurls Aeneas to the edge of the field (*Il.* 20.321-29). The use of mist and removal of the hero are common devices in Homeric *if-not* divine interventions, and feature in four out of seven cases of them in the *Iliad*: (*Il.* 3.373-82; 5.22-25; 5.311-46; 20.321-52); and two of the four human intervention *if-nots* also involve the removal of the hero, but by chariot (*Il.* 8.90-91; 17.613-14). In all of these cases, hero and tool of injury must be kept apart, or the hero must only be slightly injured, or seriously injured and subsequently healed. At *Aen.* 10.324-32 Aeneas' helmet and shield do part of the job, while Venus deals with the rest. Zeus causes deflection of an arrow at *Il.* 15.458-65. Virgil's rendition of these cases, therefore, makes clear reference to the game which consists in keeping heroes alive, or killing them off. Virgil's juxtaposition of the syntactically *if-not* sequence (10.324-30) to the syntactically not-*if-not* sequence (10.330-32), in particular, is a link to the instances of divine intervention outside of *if-nots*.

These are far more numerous than the syntactic kind, because gods, in both Homer and Virgil govern the plots. Poseidon's attacks on Odysseus, and Athena's help to him, in the *Odyssey*, like Juno's attacks on Aeneas, counteracted by Venus' defence of him in the *Aeneid*, are perhaps the clearest and largest-scale instances of this. Kirk's (1990) summary of typical Homeric themes includes: "a deity inspires hero/army with might/ confidence" (*Il.* 5.1-3); "wounded man prays for, and gets, relief from wound, then rallies troops" (*Il.* 5.115-20); "deity

---

19 De Jong 2004: 80 compares *Il.* 20.288-89 to 23.382: "Diomedes would have *either* overtaken Eumelus *or* have made the victory disputed".

cures/inspires /lightens a warrior's limb" (*Il.* 5.121-22); there is "removal of mist" (*Il.* 5.127-30); then, "deity fills favourite with might" or "deity/physician rapidly assuages wound" (*Il.* 5.135-36); later, a deity "guides a weapon" (*Il.* 5.290-93; Kirk 1990: 17; 24). A god turning aside an arrow, an analogous event to Venus' activity in *Aen.* 10.331-32, features in Pandaros' attempted explanation to Aeneas of his failure to hit Diomedes (*Il.* 5.184-87). Aeneas shortly experiences the benefits of divine assistance himself (*Il.* 5.311-46). As we saw in chapter two in relation to *Aen.* 2.54-56 (*et si fata deum, ...*), Virgil's contemporary Horace uses the theme of divine deflection of a blow in *carm.* 2.17.27-30 too, dated to 25-24 BC.

A possibly conservative list of divine rescues of heroes in the *Aeneid* includes an instance each in books 2, 9, 10 and 11 and seven in book 12; some of these are specified absences of rescue. The later books, then, contain most of these cases. That is perhaps not surprising, as the two sides face each other just before a resolution, and the process also has to be prolonged to guarantee sufficient length and changes of fortune. The last book itself exists as an elaboration of the *ni*-clause of an *if-not* placed at the end on book 11: *continuoque ineant pugnas et proelia temptent, / ni roseus fessos iam gurgite Phoebus Hiberno / tinguat equos noctemque die labente reducat* (11.912-14).

In book 2, Venus saves Aeneas from the Greeks at the sack of Troy. This rescue plays two main functions: narrated by Aeneas to Dido, thus set further back in time than most episodes in the poem, it shows how closely the Trojans' enterprise under Aeneas' leadership came to not even starting; and it provides a useful topic to a hero who gains from depicting his own survival as narrowly achieved, while also divinely assisted. The sequence is long (2.588-667), as Aeneas reports his mother's speech to him (2.594-619): itself replete with the present subjunctive and not quite an *if-not*, as explored in the last chapter (2.599-600); this portrays the risk of narrative collapse. Venus' presence and saving action are particularly evident in three places: at 2.588-93, where Aeneas narrates his first spotting her; at 2.619-20, the end of her speech to him and promise to lead him safely to his father's home; and at 2.664-67, where Aeneas comments to Venus on the pointlessness of her intervention if he then has to witness the death of his wife and father. The first of these three places itself resembles an *if-not* both in sense and construction: it includes an inverted *cum*-clause in the perfect: *cum mihi se ... videndam / obtulit ... et ... refulsit / alma parens ... / ...dextraque prehensum / continuit ...-que haec insuper addidit* interrupting *talia iactabam et furiata mente ferebat* in the imperfect (2.589-93). Scholarly debates on the legitimacy of the preceding "Helen episode" (2.567-88) do not concern us here. It is worth noting, however, that the possibility of the *cum*-clause 2.589-93 belonging to 2.564, the nearest acceptable main clause before the Helen episode, has been examined and rejected; that would give *respicio et ... lustrō*, in the present, preceding *cum mihi se ... videndam / obtulit ...* in the perfect, a rare combination of tenses, as well as a meaningless story (Horsfall 2008: 557; Austin 1964, on 2.589). Venus' appearance to Aeneas in the *cum*-

clause, with main sentence *talia iactabam et furiata mente ferebat* (2.588), makes more sense both grammatically and in narrative terms; Austin (1964, on 2.588) would prefer *talia iactanti*, in parallel with *Aen.* 1.102, which would probably remove the *if-not / cum-inversum* construction. The theory that a large chunk of the text treated here as an extensive *if-not* may have been an interpolation and that 2.566 could satisfactorily join 2.632 (or 2.624), thus showing Aeneas coming down from the palace roof after witnessing Priam's death (*Descendo ...* 2.632; if we join 2.566 to 2.624-32, we have two lines for Aeneas' watching Troy fall, and six of simile), has also been proposed (Horsfall 2008: 558); that would leave out Venus' appearance to Aeneas in the *cum-inversum* (2.588-93), her claim to have saved Aeneas' father, wife and son in *ni mea cura resistat, ...* (2.599-601) and her commitment to save Aeneas (2.619-20). Current scholarship allows us to take the lines 2.588-667, the large-scale *if-not* which relates Venus' deliverance of Aeneas from death by the Greeks, as acceptable.

The next relevant sequence shows Venus committing to save Aeneas: *eripe, nate, fugam finemque impone labori; / nusquam abero et tutum patrio te limine sistam* (2.619-20). Venus has just shown Aeneas four gods united destroying Troy (2.604-18), and has made use of mist too, but lifted to reveal the angry gods (2.604-6). In the third clear reference to Venus' saving action, Aeneas comments on the futility of her rescue if his family is not also saved: *hoc erat, alma parens, quod me per tela, per ignis / eripis, ut ... / Ascanium patremque meum iuxtaque Creusam / alterum in alterius mactatos sanguine cernam?* (2.664-67). He then asks for weapons to rejoin the fight (2.668-70), but the screaming Creusa and two omens dissuade him, and Anchises, from staying in Troy (2.673-79; 2.680-86; 2.692-98). This is the first large-scale hero-rescue in the *Aeneid* (2.588-667), which ends with Aeneas' decision to flee Troy (2.673-98). One question, amongst many since much of the relevant text is considered faulty, is: what is Venus restraining Aeneas from in the first of the three points of contact with him (*continuit*, 2.593; Horsfall 2008: 559)? Whatever the reply, and even with the least text envisaged by scholars (without 2.567-631), the overall situation is a rescue of a hero by a deity: Aeneas goes from despair on Priam's palace roof (2.564-66) to safety thanks to his mother Venus (2.664-98).

We can note that book 4 contains reference to the episode just discussed. To Mercury, who is being instructed to dislodge Aeneas from Carthage, Jupiter comments on the pointlessness of Venus' twice-repeated rescue of Aeneas from the Greeks, if he then remains in Carthage: *non illum nobis genetrix pulcherrima talem / promisit Graiumque ideo bis vindicat armis* (4.227-28). Jupiter mentions two rescues. Scholars agree that one is from Diomedes in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 5.311-46), and the other from the Greeks at the sack of Troy in the *Aeneid* (2.589; 2.620; 2.665) (Conington on 4.228; Austin 1966, on 4.228); and Conington raises an interesting question on this, which leads us again to the *if-not* duel between Achilles and Aeneas at *Il.* 20.288-90: is a parallel to Aeneas' rescue from Diomedes not closer to that from Achilles than to that from the Greeks in the *Aeneid*? It is mention of a *genetrix* that rules this out, despite the

clear similarity between *Il.* 5.311-46 and *Il.* 20.288-52; in the latter episode, it is Poseidon rather than Aphrodite who saves Aeneas.

In book 9, Pandarus throws a spear at Turnus, and Juno diverts it:

*ille rudem nodis et cortice crudo  
intorquet summis adnixus viribus hastam:  
excepere aurae; vulnus Saturnia Iuno  
detorsit veniens, portaeque infigitur hasta (9.743-46).*

Turnus retaliates, and kills Pandarus (9.747-51). As Hardie remarks: "The pattern of unsuccessful spear-cast by A followed by successful throw or blow by B is Homeric". This happens at *Il.* 8.309-11, where Teucer's arrow is deviated by Apollo from Hector, and the intended victim then kills Teucer with a stone, and at *Il.* 20.438-41, Hector's spear here being diverted from Achilles by Athene (Hardie 1994, on 9.743-51); Achilles on this occasion temporarily relinquishes killing Hector, whom Apollo has hidden in mist (*Il.* 20.449-54). Another kind of counterfactual shortly follows the exchanges between Pandarus and Turnus, a narratorial reflection on the near-failure of the Trojan settlement in Latium; like 2.54-56 (*et, si fata deum ...*), it underlines the closeness the narrative came to collapsing (9.756-61). This will be discussed in chapter seven.

Juno is a key manipulator of the action of the poem, and her spear-deflecting just manifests that role; she throws the Trojans off course at the beginning of the poem, and later orders a Fury to cause conflict between the Latins and the Trojans when an alliance through marriage is planned (from 7.286). Book 9 starts with Juno sending down Iris, who then advises Turnus to attack the Trojans while Aeneas is visiting Evander (9.1-15; same technique as 5.605-43, where Juno's orders are unspecified); Juno later diverts Pandarus' spear from Turnus (9.743-46) and shortly gives him strength (9.764); but she dares not do that again when Jupiter sends Iris to stop her (9.802-05). Apollo and Mars also manipulate events in book 9. Apollo restrains Ascanius' eagerness to fight (9.639-63), whereas Mars gives strength to the Latins and inspires flight in the Trojans (9.717-21). Juno's activity at 9.743-46 (quoted above), however, is not just one more instance of divine intervention in the poem. Her action sufficiently approaches that of an *if-not* to justify its being listed here: the course of events appears set one way just before her intervention (Turnus is hit) and then comes to a sudden reversal because of it (Turnus is not hit).

In book 10, during the council of the gods which opens it (10.1-117) we find reference again to hero-snatching from death in Juno's rant at Venus for her rescuing Aeneas in clouds, followed by her own claim to the same right:

*tu potes Aenean manibus subducere Graium  
proque viro nebulam et ventos obtendere inanis,  
et potes in totidem classem convertere nymphas:  
nos aliquid Rutulos contra iuvisse nefandum est? (10.81-84).*

The episode referred to, *Il.* 5.311-46, is also adumbrated in Venus' plea to be able to save at least her grandson, if not Aeneas (10.50). That instance of hero rescue in the *Iliad*, of Aeneas by Aphrodite though completed by Apollo, which is in *if-not* form, clearly has a long life in the *Aeneid*.

This book contains the literal *if-not* which Nesselrath regards as the only one to relate an episode of hero-rescue in the poem, 10.324-28. We saw that its complete version (10.324-32) is articulated in two stages: humans diverting weapons (10.324-28, with a literal *if-not*), followed by a god (Venus) doing the same upon retaliation by the first saviours against the attacker Aeneas (10.328-32); the two parts together we have taken as further legitimation for the claim of similarity between *if-nots* and the other instances of weapon-deviation expressed in different syntax. Book 10, then, contains a complex *if-not*, the first half of which is a literal one, and the second of which approximates one in content though not in grammar; the divinity rescues a hero in that second half. Aeneas has just returned to war action after seeking allies (10.260-75), and Turnus has attempted a siege of Aeneas' camp during his absence in the previous book. As Hardie observes, it is in books 10 and 12 that the key fighting which leads to the end takes place, because both Aeneas and Turnus are present then on the battlefield (Hardie 1994: 2); Drances' proposal that Turnus resolves the conflict by duel with Aeneas is made in book 11 (11.368-75), but Turnus only accepts it in book 12 (12.13; 12.75-80; though he answers Drances and possibly agrees at 11.434-42. Gransden 1991: 7). Aeneas' survival at 10.328-31, part of his first *aristeia* (10.308-44), therefore, is rather crucial, or he will not be there to defeat Turnus in book 12; his second display of strength (10.510-605) also relates to the final outcome insofar as both are caused by Turnus' killing of Pallas.

Book 11 (like book 9, where we find, concerning Turnus: *nec contra vires audet Saturnia Iuno / sufficere*. 9.802-03) contains one specified abandonment of hero-saving. Apollo decides to let Camilla be killed by Arruns, although he refuses the section of his prayer which asks for survival:

*Audiit et voti Phoebus succedere partem  
mente dedit, partem volucris dispersit in auras:  
sterneret ut subita turbatum morte Camillam  
adnuit oranti; reducem ut patria alta videret,  
non dedit, inque Notos vocem vertere procellae* (11.794-98).

There is here no sudden narrative reversal, and neither was there one at 9.802-03, where Juno simply withdrew her support. Divine intervention happens before the weapon starts, and the spear just hits:

*ergo ut missa manu sonitum dedit hasta per auras,*



*convertere animos acris oculosque tulere  
cuncti ad reginam Volsci. nihil ipsa nec aurae  
nec sonitus memor aut venientis ab aethere teli,  
hasta sub exsertam donec perlata papillam  
haesit virgineumque alte bibit acta cruorem* (11.799-804).

We find the complementary and retaliatory scene, instigated by Diana, who attributes Camilla's impending death to the fates (*fatis urgetur* 11.587; 11.532-3; 11.587-96), when the nymph Opis kills Camilla's slayer Arruns towards the end of the book:

*extemplo teli stridorem aurasque sonantis  
audiit una Arruns haesitque in corpore ferrum* (11.863-64).

There is here, therefore, divine intervention of the type associated with *if-not* structures, but neither large-scale manipulation by gods as in earlier books, nor weapon-deviation; we find Jupiter inciting the Tyrrhenean Tarchon at 11.725-31 and Mezentius at 10.689-90, having proclaimed aloofness in the council of the gods early in book 10 (10.107-13; whole council 10.1-117).

In book 12, references to hero rescues become more numerous and diverse. The book, as mentioned earlier, is itself due to the veering off of the narrative from a likely demise at the end of book 11 (11.913-14). Book 12 itself contains repeated delays, although both heroes express the desire to find a speedy resolution (Turnus: 12.11, 12.74; Aeneas: 12.431, 12.565, 12.699, 12.889); and some of these delays take the shape of hero saving.

The first reference to divine saving of heroes occurs when Turnus professes trust in Venus' ineffectiveness at the time of his duel with Aeneas:

*longe illi dea mater erit, quae nube fugacem  
feminea tegat et vanis sese occulat umbris* (12.52-53).

*Il.* 5.311-453 is again the model, the properly phrased *if-not* which portrays Aphrodite's snatching of Aeneas, completed by Apollo when she drops him (*Il.* 5.344-46); and Aphrodite's enveloping of Paris in mist, another *if-not*, as listed above (*Il.* 3.373-82). Turnus, however, as Tarrant (2012, on 12.52-53) observes, appears to ignore Apollo's contribution to that Homeric rescue, by the expression *nube feminea*; it was Apollo who hid Aeneas in a cloud (*Il.* 5.344-46). Virgil may be conflating different episodes of divine hero-obscuring, including his own, such as Venus' enveloping of Aeneas and Achates in a cloud at their landing in Libya (*Aen.* 1.411-12). Further rearranging of *Il.* 5.311-453 occurs at the next hero-rescue, where Venus saves Aeneas and Apollo fails to (12.311-23; 12.383-429). Another peculiarity of Turnus' observation, noticed by commentators though not as often by translators, is his expression *longe illi dea mater erit*: Tarrant (2012), Traina (2001) and Maguiness (1992) support Henry's sense "Venus will be of no use to him" (Henry on 12.52; Tarrant 2012, on 52-53). Whatever the meaning of *longe sum*,

Turnus is clearly not in a position to forecast Venus' behaviour.

More divine intervention takes place early in book 12 when the disguised Juturna, sent by Juno (12.134-160), encourages the Rutulians to break the truce (12.216-310). This probably does not qualify as variant of *if-not* hero rescues, but in the present context in particular, book 12, the borderline is perhaps unclear.

Next we find Juno's counterpart, Venus, intervening to save Aeneas (12.311-23; 12.383-429). This time catastrophe is particularly close, as Aeneas is wounded (12.319) following his failure to stem his own side's response to the Rutulians (12.311-17) and the duel with Turnus, arranged in a pact subsequently violated (12.315), is again postponed. Four clear sections can be identified to the scene: the wounding of Aeneas by an unknown Rutulian (12.318-23); Turnus' killings during Aeneas' absence (12.346-82); Iapyx' vain attempt to save Aeneas (12.383-410); Venus' successful saving of Aeneas and Iapyx' acknowledgement of divine help (12.411-29). As compared with the other divine rescues examined in this chapter, this is a different type of rescue, one that involves not diverting weapons, but reversing the effects of one that has struck.

Early in the third section just outlined, Aeneas asks for the arrow to be removed (12.387-90); that job is done by humans at *Il.* 4.210-19 and *Il.* 11.843-48, whereas Apollo heals the praying hero, without specified weapon removal, at *Il.* 16.508-31 (Tarrant 2012, on 12.383-440). The use of medicines, vain when Iapyx tries it although learned from Apollo, also features in the first two instances in the *Iliad*, in the former case having been taught by Cheiron (*Il.* 4.219), and in the latter involving a healing root (*Il.* 11.846-48). The learning of medical skills is interesting for two reasons. The first is its link to divinities, whose role in attempting to govern events is thus shown in one more light. Venus' remote application of the healing herb (*dictamnus*), to the water used by Iapyx rather than to Aeneas directly, and while she is hiding in mist, also matches the frequent interventions by gods via emissaries rather than directly (12.416-24). The second is the bifurcation we find in the list of Apollo's gifts between what he offered (12.391-94) and what Iapyx chose in alternative (12.395-97); as the verb *malo* suggests (*scire potestates herbarum usumque medendi / maluit*, 12.396-97), Iapyx made his choice in opposition to Apollo's offers. We could, of course, interpret *maluit* as referring to the choice of medicine as part of the arts Apollo proposed (*sua artis, sua dona ...*, 12.393). If we take the enumeration of offers and Iapyx's choice to stand in mutual opposition, we have an antithetical construction which could be read as yet another instance of Virgil's many unequal doubles; one of which remains less developed or is a worse exemplar than the other. This would be all the more apt in book 12, a book of "Delay and Pairings" (Tarrant 2012: 3-4), and particularly when Aeneas might prove the weaker in relation to Turnus. But maybe we are asking too much of *maluit* (12.397), and Iapyx picked one of the arts Apollo offered (12.393).

Whereas it is Aphrodite who starts saving Aeneas in the *Iliad* 5.311-453 and Apollo who finishes the job, it is Apollo's herbs that Iapyx vainly tries on Aeneas in the *Aeneid*

(12.400-10) and Venus' herb that accomplishes the job (12.411-24; Tarrant 2012, on 12.391-97). It may be relevant to our argument that the Homeric model starts with a syntactic *if-not* (*Il.* 5.311-13) that has Aphrodite as the agent who intervenes to prevent Aeneas' untimely demise, and it is she again, as Venus and without a syntactic *if-not*, who does so in the closing book of the *Aeneid*.

Divine manipulation on both sides continues. Juturna, in disguise, continues to assist Turnus (12.468-99); Venus advises Aeneas to attack Latinus' city (12.559), which he does (12.560-92). Turnus then rejects Juturna's help (12.614-49; 12.676-80) and goes to fight Aeneas, at long last, in a duel (12.710). We soon find a flurry of interesting *if-not* material, worthy of the end of the poem.

Tarrant (2012: 2) divides book 12 into these narrative units: Aeneas and Turnus fight, and when Turnus' sword breaks he flees, pursued by Aeneas (12.697-765). Aeneas' sword is stuck in a sacred tree, and Juturna and Venus rearm their respective protégés (12.766-90). Jupiter persuades Juno to renounce her opposition to the Trojans in exchange for the Latins' preservation of their language and culture (12.791-842). Jupiter sends a Dira to frighten Turnus, and then Juturna withdraws (12.843-86). Aeneas kills Turnus (12.887-952).

It is clear from this summary that the one-to-one fight that brings the poem to an end (12.697-952) involves divinities repeatedly changing the direction of the narrative, just as they do when rescuing heroes in *if-nots*. The entire poem depends on that mechanism, as Juno and Venus in particular push in contrary directions. There is, therefore, repeated delay, and most evidently in the last book. As Tarrant remarks, delay in this book "is a microcosm of its place in the poem as a whole"; a movement *A B A B ...*, *A* marking forward motion towards the goal and *B* an obstacle, operates in book 12, ending with *A* when Turnus dies (Tarrant 2012: 4). An analysis of two *if-nots* in this last part of the poem, a literal one which marks the end of first round of the duel (12.731-34) and a jocular one located at the very end (12.947-48), will illustrate the close connection between divine interventions, delays and *if-nots*.

The following passage can be taken as a whole. It relates the snapping of Turnus' sword and his subsequent flight, in *if-not* format, and then the background to the event:

*at perfidus ensis*  
*frangitur in medioque ardentem deserit ictu,*  
*ni fuga subsidio subeat. fugit ocior Euro*  
*ut capulum ignotum dextramque aspexit inermem.*  
*fama est praecipitem, cum prima in proelia iunctos*  
*conscendebat equos, patrio mucrone relicto,*  
*dum trepidat, ferrum aurigae rapuisse Metisci:*  
*idque diu, dum terga dabant palantia Teucri,*  
*suffecit; postquam arma dei ad Vulcania ventum est,*  
*mortalis mucro, glacies ceu futilis ictu*  
*dissiluit, fulva resplendent fragmina harena (12.731-41).*

The *if-not* is possibly the clearest instance of separation between protasis and apodosis in the poem (12.731-33). It twins nicely with the punning reference to the theme of divine rescues at the end (12.947-48); and the relative independence of its apodosis from the protasis can be taken as a reminder of the hierarchical nature of the *synkrisis* which operates quite candidly in book 12. The *if-not* consists of two main indicative sentences: *perfidus ensis / frangitur* (12.731-32), the sword being that used by Turnus as we know from earlier text (12.728-30), and *in medioque ardentem deserit ictu* (12.732); followed by a protasis in the present subjunctive, *ni fuga subsidio subeat* (12.732). The *ni*-clause attempts the reversal of events which are factual, in the indicative present: *ensis frangitur ... ardentem deserit ... ni fuga subsidio subeat*. But even stranger than the grammar is the sense of the sentence: what would happen if flight did not bring help? Neither the sword breaking nor it leaving the fiery hero can be the development that the *ni*-clause manages to thwart. An event has clearly been omitted. For comparison, we can look at what is possibly the nearest case in the poem: *nec veni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent* (11.112). This *if-not*, one with negative and therefore factual (since ultimately hypothetical) apodosis, contains the same discrepancy between indicative apodosis and subjunctive protasis. The two clauses of *nec veni*, however, are semantically consistent ("I came, the fates sent me"), whereas the two apodoses taken together and the protasis of *ensis ... subeat* are not, unless we read them as reporting a succession of events: "the sword breaks and hits him, flight brings help"; the *ni*-clause in that case would have to lose its conditional status. It would seem, therefore, that the resemblance is only grammatical, but that each of the two *if-nots* is a case unto itself.

If we add an apodosis, what should it be? Tarrant follows scholarly consensus in proposing one implied by *deserit*: "[he would have been helpless] if flight had not come to his aid"; he sees no need for a lacuna, finding that "the condensed expression reflects the speed with which Turnus responds to his imminent danger." The narrator leaps ahead, so breathless is the action. Traina offers "rimarrebbe indifeso" (Traina 1997, on 12.733). Maguiness (1992, on 12.731-33) presents no suggestion but finds the conditional "an extreme and barely rational instance", and does support the lacuna hypothesis. The agent of rescue, *fuga*, is noteworthy too: as Tarrant comments, it appears human (Tarrant 2012, on 12.733). Homer's *if-not* agents are never inanimate. The act of fleeing itself is not odd: Hector flees at *Il.* 22.136-38 (not a conditional).

If we accept the text as it is, perhaps reading speed in the lack of apodosis, we have an *if-not* which challenges any notion of conditionality as well as the *if-not* pattern. Virgil is indulging his passion for parataxis in the extreme.

That *if-not* can now be analyzed in its wider context, with a view to pinning some of its features to the principal theme of book 12: which is itself an intensification of the mechanism

that moves the narrative forward throughout the poem. The presence at this point of two alternatives in the development of the narrative is most obvious: two armies are facing each other, from 12.697 represented by their respective leaders only; their duel is compared to a fight between two bulls, held while their respective herds are silent (12.715-24); Jupiter follows, holding two scales and putting the two leaders' respective fates on them (12.725-27). In each of these cases, one of two has to be eliminated. And the rival gods who have been pushing the narrative in opposite directions all along carry on doing so, until one of them gives up (Juno at 12.808-28).

Three aspects of this can be brought together. The first is one peculiarity in Jupiter's weighing of the two competitors' respective destinies (12.725-27). The indirect question which is the object of *Iuppiter ... / ... fata imponit diversa duorum* retains the balance of the parallel indirect question which is the object of *mussantque iuvencae* in the bulls simile which precedes it: respectively, *quem damnet labor et quo vergat pondere letum* (12.727) and *quis nemori imperitet, quem tota armenta sequantur* (12.719). Why should the two be related? The answer is perhaps that expressions of uncertainty are not surprising in descriptions of contests. But the two relate to each other in another way: whereas in the simile of the two bulls, it is the victor that the watching heifers wonder about, in the portrait of Jupiter weighing the two destinies it is the loser who is the object of speculation; there is a reversal, necessary for symmetry according to Tarrant (2012, on 12.727). Even more interesting, however, and an addition to the mirror effect created by the two complementary lines, is the lack of antithesis in the bifurcated speculations which are framed as if there is one: *mussantque iuvencae, / quis ... quem ...* (12.718-19) twice refers to the winner, and *fata imponit diversa duorum / quem ... quo ....* (12.726-27) twice refers to the loser. The courses of events contemplated by the two *qu*-questions in both cases are no alternatives at all. The opposition between the two *qu*-questions we would expect to operate within each of the two cases, qualifies the relationship between one case and the other. That creates a pattern of corresponding doubles which is not in the sources (*Il.* 8.68-72; 22.208-13).

The second aspect is the identity of the sword that shatters and then abandons Turnus in the apparent apodosis *perfidus ensis / frangitur ...-que ardentem deserit* (12.731-32). Left with the hilt, Turnus discovers his sword was not his own: he had snatched his charioteer's sword accidentally (12.734-37). That background information, on the other hand, is introduced by *fama est*, which makes the story, and perhaps the ownership of the sword, uncertain; although the narrative resumes the indicative, so marking the career of the sword as fact: *idque diu ... / suffecit* (12.738-39). We know, then, that the sword which may have been Turnus' charioteer's did its job in Turnus' hand, but when faced by Vulcan's armour, broke. Why would the sword be rumoured not to belong to Turnus? It is to avoid having both heroes using weapons made by Vulcan, according to West (1974: 28-29). Reference to Aeneas' armour by its manufacturer's

name is made twice in the poem in the heightened form *Volcania arma* (8.535) and here: *postquam arma dei ad Volcania ventum est* (12.739); that Turnus' sword was by the same smith is specified at 12.90-91 (*Volcania*: Tarrant 2012, on 12.739). That weapon, West explains, "is never engaged in a losing battle" (West 1974: 29); in due course, Turnus attacks Aeneas with a stone, although his sword was returned to him (12.896-907). Two comments are due here. The first concerns that return. Which sword is being restored to Turnus? Juturna gives him his original sword (12.783-85), Maguiness explains (1992, on 12.785), the one made by Vulcan, and Venus retaliates by returning the spear Aeneas had thrown early in the duel (12.711), which had got stuck in the sacred tree (12.772), to her own hero (12.786-87); the first of the two actions being rather pointless, besides providing a parallel to Venus'. Neither Traina (1997) nor Tarrant (2012) comment on the identity of the sword returned to Turnus at 12.783-85, although that may be because Juturna is disguised as the charioteer Metiscus, whose own sword Turnus had supposedly picked up by mistake (12.734-37; *fama est ... rapuisse*, 12.735-37); there is only one sword to be returned. Still, confusion remains surrounding Turnus' retrieved sword. The second comment is about the stone Turnus attempts to throw. It is one of those twelve modern men would find hard to lift; that is more than Homer's two and Apollonius' four, critics have noticed (*Il.* 5.302-05, 12.445-50, 20.285-87; *Arg.* 3.1365-67; *Aen.* 12.899-902; Tarrant 2012, on 12.899-900). Turnus' failure to hit his opponent here matches Aeneas' in the *Iliad* when Aeneas fails to hit Achilles, whose retaliation the *if-not* at *Il.* 20.285-91 predicts would be fatal to the stone-thrower. On this occasion, however, the hero appears to lack the strength to throw far enough (12.906-07). The stone, moreover, is a rather non-heroic boundary marker (12.897-98), though in the *Iliad* Athena throws one at Ares (*Il.* 21.403-05. Tarrant 2012, on 12.897-98); as men of old (ἄνδρες πρότεροι) had left it there, Athena's weapon perhaps contains a further element of the stone modern mortals could not lift, despite its utilitarian sound. The qualifier *antiquum* for *saxum* captures some of these connotations (12.897). These stones, we must add, twice feature in Homeric *if-not* contexts (*Il.* 5.302-05; 20.285-87), and Virgil maintains that connection. What are we to make of this catalogue of identities? Mainly, that the complex identity of Turnus' sword further shows the two heroes as deeply intertwined, Turnus the less good alternative. Whereas Aeneas' access to a prestigious supplier of weapons, Vulcan, receives wide publicity, Turnus' only gains a brief mention, and he loses use of the weapon anyway; upon retrieval, he does not use it, and his attempt to retaliate by throwing a stone which would confer Homeric status to him, also fails due to lack of strength. The two heroes are again presented as unequal members of a couplet.

The third aspect of 12.731-41 is the relationship between apodosis and protasis, already mentioned. We have just seen that scholars have conjectured a lacuna in the text, or attributed the disconnection between the two elements to deliberate emphasis on the speed of the action. If we accept the current textual arrangement, another position is possible: we can question the

status of the *ni*-clause as secondary. Rather than presenting a fact dressed as condition following discardable apodoses, *ni fuga subsidio subeat* (12.733) appears to designate the third stage of a factual sequence: the sword breaks, it deserts its user Turnus, and he runs off. That type of relationship between apodoses and protasis could perhaps be said to match that between the alternatives typical of *synkrisis*: the couplets in such comparisons are unequal. The apparent protasis *ni fuga subsidio subeat* (12.733) cannot be independent, but since in the text as available it clearly is, one conclusion is that by comparison with *at perfidus ensis / frangitur in medioque ardentem deserit ictu* (12.731-32), it is differently actualized.

Rather different is the *if-not* that features just before the end of the poem (12.947-48). Aeneas wavers, but at the sight of Pallas' belt on Turnus, strikes (12.939-52). It is in this last section that he speaks the last *if-not* of the poem:

*tunc hinc spoliis indute meorum  
eripiare mihi?* (12.947-48).

The key to the *if-not* is *eripiare* (12.948). In the present subjunctive passive, the verb hovers between potential and future, a *subiunctivus indignantis*, or of protest, according to Traina (1997, on 12.945-48). Aeneas is challenging his opponent to get away yet again. Not much is made of this verb by critics; except for Tarrant, who comments on its illogicality: should Aeneas not go ahead with the killing, Turnus would not be quite snatched from death. Jupiter recently stopped Juno's delaying operations, and the lesser deities manipulated by her are now out of action too (Allecto, Iris, Juturna). So, there is no deity to snatch Turnus away. It is hard, however, not to connect Aeneas' address with the recurrent divine rescues of heroes. Aeneas is reflecting on the machinery that has allowed him and his double Turnus to get this far, and more generally, the poem to exist at all. Tarrant shows awareness of this, by listing three instances of *eripio* in hero-saving contexts: 10.624, 12.157 and 12.917-18. In the first case, Jupiter grants Turnus a reprieve in his address to Juno: "*Si mora ... / oratur ... / tolle fuga Turnum atque instantibus eripe fati*" (10.622-24); with the understanding, in the second half of his concession, that this is only a delay (*sin altior ... / ... venia ulla latet ... / ... spes pascis inanis*" 10.625-27). The second occurs in Juno's exhortation to Juturna to either save Turnus or provoke a war: "*adcelera et fratrem, si quis modus, eripe morti, / aut tu bella cie ...*" (12.157-58). Both have *eripio* in the imperative, in fifth-foot metrical position and in a construction that gives two alternatives, of which the *eripio* branch is one. The third is the narrator's depiction of Turnus' despair after his supporters' withdrawal: *nec quo se eripiat ... / ... videt* (12.917-18). Turnus does not know how to snatch himself from death. All three cases make clear reference to saving heroes from sticky positions. But there are thirteen more cases of *eripio* which denote rescue from death or from an intolerable experience, certain or potential, out of thirty-one instances altogether (thus seventeen: 6.341-42; 7.385; 2.134; 2.289; 2.619; 2.664-67; 5.461-64; 5.690;

6.110-11; 6.365; 9.128-29; 9.399-400; 10.622-24; 12.157; 12.538-39; 12.917; 12.947-48). Over half the instances of *eripio* in the *Aeneid*, therefore, provide abundant material for the last one to make sense as reference to the mechanism that alternately promotes and hinders the forward movement of the poem. That divine rescues and abandonments of heroes do not have to inhabit the *if-not* casing is repeated down to the end.



## Chapter Four. *How many Troys?*

Aeneas' counterfactual *et, si fata deum, ...* (2.54-56) raises many questions. One of these is the status of Troy: as Troy in the poem is always obliterated, is one which is standing imaginable? The argument in this chapter is that, by positing a Troy (in *Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres*, 2.56) which denies the principal condition for the poem (that Troy is erased), Aeneas' counterfactual announces the existence of the many partly accomplished Troys that feature in the *Aeneid*. The *Aeneid* openly portrays a number of Troys which display varying amounts of properties, i.e. are at varying degrees of actualization. Between a Troy which does not exist and one which fully functions, there are many stages of completeness. We saw that Pavel (1986: 31) talks about existents which do not exist, such as "unfinanced architectural monuments". The many semi-accomplished Troys in the *Aeneid* occupy a similar space.

There are many partial Troys in the poem either encountered or built by Aeneas on his journey, and there are some partial Romes. The as-yet nonexistent Rome only features as a projection into the future; but it is also present in the poem as the current-day world of the Augustan audience, against which fictional events are defined. Carthage is the most obvious counterpart to both Troy and Rome. As a city under construction, it mirrors both. It first appears in the plot, and possibly in the chronology of events, as the city beloved of Juno, which literally faces Rome (*Italiam contra Tiberinaque longe / ostia*; 1.13), and is the future victim of Trojan-descended Roman power (1.19-22). Carthage, therefore, occupies a place as the weaker member of one of the many conflicting dyads (such as Turnus and Aeneas) which form the skeleton of the poem, from the start; audiences know that Juno will relent and Carthage will be defeated. We next see Carthage as perceived by Aeneas when he comes to the Libyan shore (1.419-519). This perception includes the temple decorations Aeneas recognizes as the story of the Trojan war (1.455-93), which depict him too (1.488). That motif, namely observing oneself in another world, is a relatively popular one in fiction, exploited, for instance, in Henry James' *The Jolly Corner* (1909). The literal encounter between a character and his counterfactual self, as in James' story, certainly differs from a character's watching of his own representation in an *ecphrasis*, which is the depiction of scenes from either myth or past or future on a fictional object. But the Aeneas portrayed on Juno's temple is a partly actualized alternative to the hero we know from the poem, just as the ghostly counterpart of the protagonist in *The Jolly Corner* is in relation to the protagonist. Within Carthage as partly both Troy and Rome, there are clearly other sets of fictional objects which are part-materialization of one another.

In Carthage, Aeneas admires a city already functioning with gates and noisy streets but also still being built (1.421-29), with walls going up and what seem city boundaries being dug, in that order (1.423-5); he also witnesses the building of a port, theatre (1.426-27) and temple (1.446-50) and the choosing of laws, magistrates and senate by the Carthaginians, *iura*

*magistratusque legunt sanctumque senatum* (1.426), and again the giving of laws by Dido, *iura dabat legesque viris* (1.507). How can Aeneas see the law being instituted, critics have asked, and how does that square with building work? Bondurant (1925: 535-36) found the combination of intellectual and physical work acceptable, indeed consonant with the subsequent image of the bees' organized state (1.430-36); whereas Austin (1971, on 1.426) thought it incongruous, and supported moving the line to 1.429, to follow the construction scene and join the simile with the bees. Stégen (1975, on 1.426) thought different age groups were involved, the young doing the building, and the old the law-giving. What is implied, all agree, is the establishment of the social contract. That occurs again later in Sicily when Aeneas is building one of the new Troys (5.755-61; *dat iura*, 5.758). Even before that, we find that *iura dare* is a Roman activity forecast by Jupiter in book 1 just before his prophecy of the closure of the gates of war and the subjugation of *Furor: Remo cum fratre Quirinus / iura dabunt* (1.293). Conington (on 1.426) adds two further locations: "legislation (*iura dare*) is mentioned in nearly the same connexion [at] 3.137, 5.758. Virgil was probably thinking of the republican institutions of Rome and her colonies, without considering how this action of the people was to be reconciled with the authority of Dido (comp. v. 507)". There is indeed attribution of the Roman custom of instituting the law not only to the Carthaginians (1.426), Dido individually (1.507) and the future Quirinus and Remus (1.293), but also to Aeneas (3.137) and Acestes (5.758); *iura dare* as administering justice is attributed to Priam (7.246) and Cato (8.670), and *leges dare* to Hercules (8.322). In this respect, Carthage, Troy and Rome merge into one. *Iura dare*, of course, is only one instance of the "Roman coloring" found in the *Aeneid*. Marking the city boundaries by a furrow is another. Bondurant (1925: 539) adds the meal (1.700-55), the house (2.506-25), the marriage (4.165-8), and the funeral (4.635-40; 4.494-98). He also finds wall-building and law-giving as associated events which mark the establishment of a new city or, more widely, the emergence of civilization in Horace and Livy. Horace's *Satire 1*, dated to 35 BC, has those activities following the discovery of language: *donec verba quibus voces sensusque notarent / nominaque invenere; dehinc absistere bello, / oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges*, (Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.104-5; dating: Brown 1993: 3, on 1.3.104-5; Bondurant 1925: 538). We can add Lucretius, variously dated to mid-50s/48 BC (Volk 2010), as he matches the combination of language and the rise of civilization (Lucr. 5.1011-27; language: 5.1028-90; Brown 1993, on Horace's *Satire* 1.3.104-05), and has kings founding cities (Lucr. 5.1108-09); at the fall of kings, laws and magistrates are welcome by a population keen to avoid civil unrest: *inde magistratum partim docuere creare / iuraque constituere, ut vellent legibus uti* (Lucr. 5.1143-4; 5.1145-60). Livy, whose first Pentad is dated by most to 27-25 BC (Burton 2000: 430; Warrior 2006: viii-xi)<sup>20</sup> describes the founding of Rome thus: *Palatium primum, in quo ipse erat educatus, muniit*.

20 Burton (2000: 446) offers 33-32 BC as the starting date. Warrior (2006: ix) agrees an earlier starting date than 27 BC is possible, 25 BC being the terminal date due to silence on the closing of the temple of Janus of 25 BC. January 27 BC is the date Octavian became Augustus, the designation

(Liv. 1.7.3); also *Rebus divinis rite perpetratis vocataque ad concilium multitudine, quae coalescere in populi unius corpus nulla re praeter quam legibus poterat, iura dedit* (Livy 1.8.1. Bondurant 1925: 538). Building and instituting the law are, then, a consolidated way of signifying the establishment of a civilized settlement as meant by Virgil's contemporaries and immediate predecessors; *sanctum senatum* emphasizes that Romanness (Conway 1935, on 1.426). Moreover, since both Livy and Lucretius have kings giving the law, as Dido does in Virgil, Conington (on 1.426) has perhaps no reason to find her authority perplexing; Livy, whose subjects choose the king's successor, has senate and king from the start (1.17.1), again like Virgil's Carthaginians (*Aen.* 1.426). It is clear that Virgil was describing the standard combination of activities a Roman audience associated with the foundation of a city.

Carthage, then, is another Troy and both are another Rome as imagined by Virgil's contemporaries. Significant as Carthage is in the *Aeneid*, however, the principal kinds of Troys in the *Aeneid* are those that the Trojans, uncertain of their purpose, repeatedly attempt to build. We must observe that repeated Troys occur at the beginning of Livy too. In a characteristic comparison between two elements, one normally weaker than the other (such as Alexander in Livy's Alexander digression 9.16.19-19, versus Rome), though not necessarily on this occasion, Livy says that there are two reports of Aeneas' reception in Italy: one has Latinus defeated in a war (1.1.5), and the other no war and an alliance between Latinus and the Trojans, and a war with Turnus later (1.1.6. 1.2). The story of Aeneas' reception is itself one of another pair. Aeneas and Antenor, spared by the Greeks, led their respective groups to separate places, both called Troy (Liv. 1.1.2-5). Aeneas' career proceeds to take up the rest of the work, whereas Antenor's peters out. Livy, Ogilvie suggests, probably fancied associating his home-town Padua, founded by Antenor, with Rome, so included mention of its foundation, and placed it before that of Rome (Ogilvie 1965: 36). But regardless of authorial motivation, these bifurcations are clear evidence of the contemporary taste for comparable entities, and in particular doubles, materialized to different degrees. Virgil was working within a tradition both of *synkrisis* and of calling Aeneas' stopover (and final) places Troy.

Livy's repeated Troys, however, differ from Virgil's. The Virgilian Aeneas names his creations (3.18; 3.133; possibly 5.756), though not his Italian encampment, treated as a city though it is (7.157-9; 9.8; 9.48), and not his Sicilian Troy, which Nautes proposes to name *Acesta*, after the future ruler Acestes (5.718); whereas in Livy, the place-name *Troia* was used before Aeneas' arrival, and may have been a generic rather than proper name. *Troia* means "fortified place" according to some (Ogilvie 1965: 33; on Liv. 1.3), and any attribution of meaning is "a gratuitous speculation" according to others (Cornell 2013: 67. Ogilvie and Cornell use different research). In either case, Livy's Aeneas has no role in naming these Troys, and the Trojans' arrival there rather seems fortuitous, though undoubtedly imparting further Trojanness

---

used in Livy 1.19 and 4.20.

to regions which were already Trojan. Virgil's Troys would seem more closely Aeneas' responsibility than Livy's, because he names them himself.

One first manifestation of the city is probably the group of Trojans who gather to leave, mentioned by Aeneas to the Punic court at the end of book 3 (2.795-800); this is a minimal and loosely composed Troy, and includes Anchises carried by Aeneas, (2.804). A more defined Troy follows early in book 3, the nucleus that, with fewer *socii*, will make it to Italy: *feror exsul in altum / cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis* (3.11-12). Two related features of this Troy are remarkable, in view of the future transformation of Troy into Rome. One is Anchises' absence from it, although he has just ordered to set sail; his presence may be considered implicit, since he is clearly included later. The other is the presence of the *magni di*, the gods often identified with the Greek *μεγάλοι θεοί*, who are generally the Samothracian gods, and in Dionysius and others also the *penates* and the Dioscuri (DH 1.67-9; Horsfall 2006, on 3.12; Gabba 1991: 134). If the *magni di* duplicate the *penates*, their position will be the opposite of Anchises': one of redundancy, while his is one of lack; both sets of figures are at the scene, but one is reported twice and one not at all. The *magni di* also disturb the usual metrical pattern by contributing to a spondaic 5th foot; that imposes a slower reading, perhaps adding weight to the already ponderous, duplicated gods. And when we consider the repetition of *penatibus et magnis dis* on Aeneas' shield (8.679), as noted by Cova (1998, on 3.12), we can see the group acquiring a movement from past and private to future and public: the first hemistich, *cum patribus populoque* (8.679), replaces *cum sociis natoque* (3.12), and Augustus at Actium as guide replaces Aeneas; that to some extent justifies Anchises' absence from the earlier episode, since he directs the group but will not participate in its future. The Troy in transit at 3.11-12, then, is according to that interpretation already on its way towards a Rome with senators, a Roman people and Augustus; that movement is perhaps underlined by the weight of the *penates*, combined with the lightness of Anchises.

Four lines on, that still minimal Troy acquires walls and a name, *Aeneadae*, and Aeneas is holding sacrifices in it (3.16-21). This is Aeneas' first attempt at re-establishing Troy. It is fruitless, one of the many "false starts" of book 3 (Horsfall 1989: 11), or the poem would be too short, and tradition infringed. The first of a string of supernatural agents who move Aeneas on, here makes its appearance. It is Polydorus' shade, which differs from the equivalent figures that come later by providing no directions (3.44). Twenty lines on Aeneas is on Delos, begging Apollo to give him a home and walls: *da propriam, Thymbraee, domum; da moenia fessis / et genus et mansuram urbem; serva altera Troiae / Pergama, reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli* (3.85-7). Here again walls are mentioned as an intrinsic part of the city. Aeneas, as reported by the narrator rather than himself, exclaims at the sight of Carthage: *o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt!* (1.437). Defensive physical structures are clearly important for the new city. An interesting light on this is shed by some of the critical responses to *altera*

*Pergama* (3.85-87): Conington and Williams (1962) consider *Pergama* to indicate the Trojan survivors, in alternative to the other *Pergama*, the citadel which has crumbled; Horsfall (2006) finds that definition "minimal", and expects Troy and the sacred objects to be included in the notion. The abundance of the *penates*, or in the *penates* and the *magni di* if different from one another (3.11-12) perhaps supports that view; the Trojans by themselves, without *penates* and walls, are not Troy. Williams' reference to Nicias' statement in Thucydides that men rather than walls are the city (ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί. Thuc. 7.77.7) adds a different twist. Nicias does not equate walls and inhabitants, as Aeneas seems to (*altera Pergama*), but rather identifies the seat of strength away from physical defenses; the spirit of the argument is similar, particularly in view of Nicias' preceding sentence about the Athenians now defeated, but soon rising again. What makes up a city is clearly no easy matter.

Still on Delos, walls feature again in the Trojans' wonderings about Phoebus' directions: *et cuncti quae sint ea moenia quaerunt* (3.100). Another type of counterfactual to the partly realized cities here comes into play. This is the counterfactual reasoning needed to interpret oracles: the revelations from which the Trojans have to glean the way forward follow the Greek oracular manner (Horsfall 1989: 10-12). Phoebus reveals: *quae vos a stirpe parentum / prima tulit tellus, eadem vos ubere laeto / accipiet reduces. antiquam exquirite matrem* (3.94-96). The Trojans make conjectures in the way oracles are interpreted, and revisited when necessary, as in Herodotus (Hdt. 4.150-61). Anchises concludes that the wanted land is Crete (3.104); from it Teucus sailed to the Rhoetean beach. Another very low-actualization Troy, based on *Il.* 20.216-8, then comes into view: *nondum Ilium et arces / Pergameae steterant* (3.109-10). This was a time before the physical structures of Troy existed. But Anchises is soon proved wrong. Virgil, Horsfall speculates (1989: 12), may have deliberately rejected the clearer model of supernatural guidance used by others, such as Varro and Naevius (discussed in Servius 1.382), and chosen to have his Trojans use their wits to find their destination. He invented the stop in Crete (Horsfall 1981: 141-42; Casali 2010: 49), thus adding two Troys (with the pre-walls one, 3.109-10).

The Troy started on Crete is fairly solid:

*ergo avidus muros optatae molior urbis,  
Pergameamque voco, et laetam cognomine gentem  
hortor amare focos arcemque attollere tectis.  
Iamque fere sicco subductae litore puppes;  
conubiis arvisque novis operata iuventus;  
iura domosque dabam* (3.132-7).

Aeneas calls this Troy *Pergamea*, an alternative to *Aeneadae*, *Troia* and *Ilium*. Besides laws and walls, this incipient Troy has marriages and farming, and seems therefore on its way to functioning as a city. Carthage, for all its activities, has neither visible agrarian economy nor weddings; when its workers slacken, it is walls, ports and military exercises that are neglected

(4.86-90), although farm and prestigious animals are offered to Aeneas (1.633-36), and victuals abound (1.701-56).

Construction is no job for a hero, says Horsfall, and *molior* in the Cretan Troy therefore suggests Aeneas is becoming a citizen (Horsfall 2006, on 3.132); it is true that he merely lays walls in Jupiter's prophecy (*moenia ponet*. 1.264), and founds citadels and new houses in Carthage when perceived by Mercury (*Aenean fundantem arces ac tecta novantem / conspicit*. 4.260-61). The transition from hero to citizen also fits the giving of the law (3.137), which, as seen above in relation to Carthage (1.426; 1.507) and to Jupiter's prophecy (1.293), was considered a standard part of the foundation of cities, and more generally of the beginning of civilization, in Virgil's time. But Aeneas more specifically behaves as a Greek settler and administrator, Horsfall (1989) thought, and so do Dido, Acestes and Teucus/Teucer (Horsfall 1989: 8). Most importantly, Aeneas carries the cult-objects from home to the colony (Horsfall 1989: 17). Aeneas, then, and his Troys, and the other settlers, are part Trojan, part Roman and part Greek.

A sudden pestilence strikes *Pergamea* (3.137-42), and the *penates* speak to Aeneas in a dream. We find then another bifurcation and concomitant pair of disparately actualized worlds: the desired paternal land is Hesperia, they reveal, home of another ancestor than the one identified by Anchises (3.147-71). That revelation, which is not traditional (Casali 2010: 49), is itself cast as a kind of counterfactual: "*Quod tibi delato Ortygiam dicturus Apollo est, / hic canit ...* (3.154-55). The second line of this message, Williams (1962, on 3.154-55) observes, removes the assumption of the first, which is that Aeneas goes to Ortygia to interrogate Apollo; Aeneas will not go once he knows the oracle's reply, and *dicturus est* then becomes inappropriate. The *penates* here act as messengers of a time-saving kind, Horsfall (2006, on 3.154) suggests. But, quite aside from the short-cut divine message, the bifurcation is that between the two possible lands for settling, Crete, Teucus' land, and Hesperia, Dardanus'. The Troy built on Crete upon advice from Anchises, which has to be abandoned, though with a few people left behind (3.190-91), is the undeveloped alternative to the Trojans' settlement in Italy; and ultimately Rome, for whose audience the poem is written. It is also Virgil's addition; in view of Virgil's reduction of Aeneas' attested stops, seventeen (Horsfall 1981: 143; 1991: 35), that is all the more remarkable.

The next stop, on the Strophades, presents a very minimalist Troy (3.209-69). Here the Trojans do not start any physical city, but only kill and eat cattle (based on *Od.* 12.131-402). Another puzzling revelation is made here, one which leads to yet another pair of alternatives: the harpy Celaeno forecasts that the destined city in Italy, including walls (3.255), will not be built before the Trojans eat their tables (3.253-57); but when Aeneas later identifies the destined place, in Italy, from Ascanius' joke about eating tables (7.116-27), he attributes the prophecy to Anchises (7.123-27). That leaves us with two versions of events. It is the wealth of sources,

Horsfall argues, that accounts for Virgil's clashing stories. In Hellenistic fashion, Virgil displays awareness of the different versions (Horsfall 2000, on 7.107-47(v); 1991: 35-36). But not all agree that Virgil deliberately showed clashing sources. Günther (1996) sees Virgil's inconsistencies rather as attempts to reconcile incompatible passages (Horsfall 1997: 468). Anchises' role as oracle, on the other hand, regardless of Celaeno's contribution, has been shown to be quite apt: he mediates between Jupiter, who is behind the revelations, and the Trojans; as demonstrated, for instance, by his presentation in the Underworld of future Roman heroes to Aeneas (Harrison 1985: 161). Whether the inconsistency between 3.253-57 (Celaeno revealing) and 7.123-27 (Anchises revealing) originates in Virgil's incomplete revision or whether it is planted as evidence of multiple sources, then, Anchises' suitability as prophet constitutes an independent reason for it. Virgil, rather than contradicting himself, "simply duplicates the oracular activity" (Harrison 1985: 143). It was common in ancient epic, Harrison argues, to mention something retrospectively, which was ignored at the time of occurrence. Venus' prophecy that she would send a sign when war approached, for instance, is remembered by Aeneas at 8.534-36 following the weapons in the sky prodigy (8.520-9; an *if-not*), but not narrated earlier; like Anchises' alleged prediction (7.123-27), moreover, that prophecy reveals a parent's concern for a son, and has a crucial impact on future developments (Harrison 1985: 159-60). It would seem, then, that on this occasion the pair of alternatives neither clash nor achieve different degrees of actualization, but rather reinforce each other. Celaeno and Anchises both prophesied the table-eating incident as preliminary to the construction of a new city.

Actium makes a brief appearance, following the Trojans' escape from the Strophades and the Harpies and following avoidance of Zacynthos and Ithaca. The appearance is brief in number of lines (3.274-90), with games and sacrifices as the only activities (3.278-83) and neither walls being built, or mentioned, nor revelations delivered. The Actium episode therefore does not further the action (Miller 1993: 445). The Trojans, however, stay there for a year (3.284); and, more importantly, that stay has a clear propagandistic function (Casali 2010: 49): eleven centuries before the battle of Actium of 31 BC, we find that Aeneas leaves the enemy trophy on the temple to Apollo (3.288), just as in Virgil's time Octavian dedicated the spoils from the battle; and that the Trojans hold games just as Octavian did (Miller 1993: 445). If we look for degrees of actualization in this particular Troy, then, we find that it contains a lot of Rome; "vistas of contemporary, patriotic ... pomp and circumstance" (Horsfall 2006, on 3.270-93). Actium and, by obvious implication, the unmentioned Octavian, are clearly intended for epic status. Successful circumvention of Greek enemies, also a reason for Aeneas' pride (3.282-83), is perhaps less impressive, as a fleeing ancestor hardly flatters; although the relief experienced by the Trojans perhaps matched that of post-civil war Romans, as argued by Horsfall (2006, on 3.282).

The voyage continues, and Aeneas adds Phaeacia to the Homeric places which remain

unvisited. These are potential Troys left unstated since the relevant sites are hostile, already occupied or do not fit the revelations; mention of the by-passed Homeric locations, of course, roots the journey in an epic landscape (3.270-73; 3.290). Walls and revelations then reappear, when the Trojans reach Buthrotum. This is a new type of setting which is unique in the poem, exemplifying a unique type of counterfactuality, and rare in ancient literature (Bettini 1997: 18-19; Horsfall 2006, on 3.294-505): the Trojans find a replica of their city, from which Priam's son Helenus and his sister-in-law, now his wife and former wife of Achilles' son Neoptolemus, Andromache, rule Greek cities (3.292-505). The multiplicity of identities in this Troy is staggering. As with Actium and the Strophades, the last two landings after the attempted *Aeneadae* and *Pergama*, the itinerant Trojans do not treat this location as their potential destination, and no building occurs in it by any party. The city is complete. But it is a reduced and fake version of the original: the river Simois, seemingly identified by Aeneas by its position next to Hector's grave (location of Hector's burial *Il.* 24.778-804. Bettini 1997: 14), is false (3.302), and the burial-mound where Andromache makes offerings to Hector empty (*inanis*, 3.304). This Troy is a finished but attenuated copy of the other, rather than a partly developed substitute; the new Troy as envisaged by Aeneas is intended as vigorous, and probably not identical to the original. As scholars have noticed, this Troy rather connects with the Underworld (Bettini 1997: 14n29). We find this already demonstrated in the first scene encountered by Aeneas: Andromache and the dead (and physically absent) Hector belong to the past.

And within that scene, the word *inanis* provides a particularly interesting link with the world of death. It is worth dwelling on that adjective. *Inanis* features most frequently in books 6 and 10, in the latter mainly in the sense of "vain" (10.465; 10.627; 10.648; 10.758), and in the former more clearly denoting absence of life. In book 10, we find *inanis* meaning "lifeless" once: Aeneas' phantom is granted *inania verba* by the plot-handler Juno (10.639), who is acting to delay Aeneas' success. This counterfeit Aeneas, modelled on the phantom-Aeneas devised by Apollo in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 5.449-50), is also a kind of counterfactual, a depleted version of the real Aeneas.

In book 6 we find more widespread use of *inanis* in the sense of "lifeless" as dead. That is for certain once: the Underworld, or at least its entrance, is deemed *inania regna* (6.269). Anything contained in that environment, apart from Aeneas and the Sibyl (and possibly the yet-unborn Roman heroes) will, presumably, be dead.

In the Underworld, we find the counterpart of Hector's empty tomb in the false Troy (3.304): the *tumulus inanis* of Deiphobus, recollected by Aeneas in his address to that shade (6.505). Although the two differ insofar as Aeneas' lack of access to the body explains the emptiness, rather than the tomb being a replica and therefore empty (6.505-8), identical metrical position reinforces the similarity (... .. / ... *tumu/lum* ... / ... .. / ... ..*i/nanem*). There would seem



to be a link, therefore, between the two uninhabited graves. But does this *inanis* denote death? It does not. The kingdom of the dead, rather, hosts Aeneas while he mentions the empty grave he built to its intended dweller. This may be an instance of "transfusion of terms":<sup>21</sup> the concept has been used to describe the moving of a term which fits a portion of the narrative to another, as in the case of *immensam per urbem* (7.377) acquiring its qualifier from a neighbouring simile which includes *magno in gyro* (7.379); Laurentum, the city in question, is in fact not particularly large (West 1969: 48-49). In our case, a term which fits the overall setting appears in a very localized part of it.

Two roads shortly present themselves (6.540-43), and the destination of one, Tartarus, is described by the Sibyl (6.562-627), whereas that of the other, the realm of the happy shades, is the reality visited by Aeneas, described by the narrator (6.628-68). In the latter, a cluster of Underworld versions of heroic material comes into view, followed by Anchises and his explanation of the workings of Elysium (6.669-751) and parade of future Roman heroes (6.752-901). We have again a pair of differently materialized comparable entities. The Sibyl's story is only listened to by Aeneas rather than experienced.

The epic paraphernalia which comes into view among the Trojan ancestors includes empty chariots (*inanis currus*), spears fixed in the ground (*defixae hastae*) and loose horses (*soluti equi*) (6.651-52). Servius extends the effect of *inanis* to the spears and horses of the next sentence, in spite of the grammar (on 6.652): *currus ... miratur inanis; / stant terra defixae astae ... soluti / ... pascuntur equi*. That view is not absurd, since neither spears nor horses perform any function in that location. But it does not help us choose a reading for *inanis* as applied to *currus*, "ghostly" or "unoccupied", as Horsfall phrases the alternatives (Horsfall 2013, on 6.652). In view of *inania regna* 30 lines previously, we can perhaps conclude that this *inanis* refers to ghostliness, or, as Horsfall sees it, to both ghostliness and absence of occupant; the latter is supported by 1.476 (*curruque inani*, as Troilus is being dragged by the chariot) and *Geo.* 3.170 (*rotae inanes*, empty carts. Horsfall 2013, on 6.652).

The three remaining instances of *inanis* in book 6 are worth mentioning. The adjective in the context of souls stretched out in the winds to be freed of sin, *aliae ... inanes / suspensae ad ventos, aliis sub gurgite vasto / ...* (6.740-41), may qualify either souls or winds; scholars favour *inanes ventos*, as parallel to *gurgite vasto*, although that would entail the spelling *inanis* (Austin 1977, on 6.740; Horsfall agrees) and as typical of Virgil's winds (*inanis ventos*, 10.82) and generally of his "insistence on the insubstantial" (Horsfall 2013, on 6.740) (*auras inanis*, 7.593; *inania nubila*, *Geo.* 4.196). Any connection between this *inanis* and death, therefore, may rest on the element of insubstantiality. Later, after Anchises' conditional *si qua fata aspera rumpas, / tu Marcellus eris* (6.882-83), nowadays no longer considered a conditional, his third wish is *et fungar inani / munere* (6.885-86). What is the "empty task" (Horsfall's 2013

---

21 Prof. Jonathan Powell's suggestion to me.

translation) Anchises wants to perform? Ahl's (2007) translation is more specific, calling that task "hollow oblation". *Munus* is standard usage for "offerings to the dead" (*Geo.* 4.520), Horsfall comments (while translating it as "task"). The pointlessness of Anchises' intended offering, he explains, belongs to the theme of the uselessness of mourning (Horsfall 2013, on 6.886; 6.213, *cineri ingrato*). Again, it is only indirectly that this particular instance of *inanis* comes close to the concept of death; although futility, in a sense, relates to death. And even less close is *inanis* at 6.568, *furto laetatus inani*, indicating rather the thoughtlessness of those now undergoing punishment. The number of times (six) *inanis* is used in the book which happens to deal with the Underworld is striking. As a consequence, Hector's grave at 3.304 becomes further associated with the Underworld, although its qualifier *inanis* does not denote death either at 3.304 or in most instances in the Underworld: it is the interaction between that term and the surrounding environment that generates the meaning.

The sense of the lifelessness of the false Troy in book 3 continues after Andromache's informative speech and Helenus' entrance, with Aeneas' disparaging description of the city:

*procedo et parvam Troiam simulataque magnis  
Pergama et arentem Xanthi cognomine rivum  
adgnosco Scaevaeque amplector limina portae* (3.349-51).

The adjectives Aeneas applies to Troy (*parva*), the citadel Pergama (*simulata*) and the river Xanthus (*arens*) are clearly demeaning. King Helenus, on the other hand, receives the visiting Trojans under large colonnades, and the group, inside a palace, pour wine into cups and put food onto golden trays. Magnificent surroundings, victuals and food vessels suggest the beginning of a Homeric banquet, with concomitant story-telling, perhaps, the dramatic situation Aeneas himself inhabits while telling the story of the fake Troy. Helenus' luxury and prestigious gifts for the departing Trojans reinforce that suggestion (3.463-71). A banquet, however, does not fully materialize. This Troy, therefore, hovers between fadedness and the conspicuous display required by the hospitality code; the latter is materialized in the Carthaginian court where Aeneas is speaking. King Helenus' Troy is an abbreviated version of Priam's but also of Dido's .

Many other counterparts populate this Troy. Bettini (1997) analyzes a number of them. Theban Andromache, married to Achilles' son (Greek) and Hector (Trojan) seems to become Trojan by marriage (*patrio ... marito*, 3.297. Bettini 1997: 9-11). She is inhabited by multiple and disparately actualized identities. Married to her husband's brother, a double, Andromache takes Aeneas for a ghost and asks him about Hector (3.310-12), then about Ascanius and Creusa, respectively nephew (*avunculus ... Hector*, 3.343) and sister of Hector. Both her current husband and Aeneas, Bettini argues, seem from her perspective degraded copies of her first husband. The gifts she gives to the departing Trojans are presented as *monumenta* of her as

Hector's wife (*coniunx Hectorea*) for Ascanius, the *imago* of her dead son (and Ascanius' cousin) Astyanax (3.486-91; Bettini 1997: 22). And there is another major double in this Troy: whereas Helenus has achieved the reconstruction of Troy, Aeneas, as he says himself, has not (3.493-98. Bettini 1997: 16; 26); he never will, as the Trojans in Italy will be forced to become Latins, only the Penates eventually preserving a Trojan identity (Bettini 1997: 30; Horsfall 1989: 24). The false Troy, therefore, is also a distant double for current (Augustan) Rome, the world of Virgil's audience, who, if we follow the poem, consists of the descendants of the amalgamation of Trojans and Latins who will largely leave their Trojan identity behind. It is revealing that Virgil did not invent the stop, but he invented the Troy identical to the perished one (Bettini 1997: 18). As Musti (1988) has shown, some Greek colonies were indeed modeled on Troy, when two rivers, a hill and a citadel were available (Bettini 1997: 19). But building the simulacrum of a destroyed city differs both from that and from the custom of building colonies modeled on their existing mother-city, remarked upon by Servius (on 10.60, referring to 3.497; Bettini 1997: 18-19). Virgil displays a dazzling array of differently actualized doubles and counterparts in his fake Troy.

We must recall the practical reasons for Aeneas' successive stops: either to settle or to obtain directions for finding the destined place of settlement; and the latter occasionally come in duplicate. In the imitation-Troy, it is Helenus who delivers the prophecy (3.373-462). This involves reference to Celaeno's table-eating prediction (3.394), known to Helenus although Aeneas does not provide details (3.365-67), and therefore also to the apparent clash between Celaeno (3.253-57) and Anchises (7.123-27) as deliverer of the prophecy. Helenus' prophecy of the sow giving birth to thirty piglets as the sign that Aeneas has arrived (3.390-92) is a related case: it is repeated, word for word, in book 8 by the river-god Tiber (8.43-45). The first refers to the foundation of Lavinium, and the second to that of Alba Longa (*ex quo ter denis urbem redeuntibus annis / Ascanius ... condet Albam*. Spoken by the Tiber. 8.47-48); although Helenus' version also contains *alba ... albi ... / is locus urbis erit* (3.392; Horsfall 2006: xxiv). By using both, Harrison argues in his study of foundation prodigies, Virgil duplicates oracular activity, and connects the first half of the poem to the second, when prophecies are fulfilled (Harrison 1985: 142-43). The Lavinium alternative, mentioned also at the opening of the poem, *Lavinaque venit / litora* (1.2-3), clashes with the Trojans' landing at the mouth of the Tiber (7.29-36). Narrative advantages to that arrangement are that the Tiber flows from the site of the future Rome, and that as a god he advises Aeneas to seek an alliance with the Greek king Evander who lives upstream (8.43-45. Casali 2010: 37; Nisbet 1990: 384). This is yet another pair of competing stories, on this occasion one of them less materialized (whereas the duplicated table-eating prophecies are reconcilable). The last line of Helenus' prophecy (*is locus urbis erit, requies ea certa laborum*, 3.393), is generally bracketed in Tiber's version at 8.46 as spurious: while some have read the hardships (*labores*) as the completed journey (Cova 1998, on 3.393),

others have judged Aeneas' new city far from trouble-free (Harrison 1985: 143. Virgil's sources: Horsfall 1981: 146). Is there a phantom, relaxed Lavinium in the text? At 12.193-94 Aeneas plans to name his city after Lavinia. Virgil clearly had a lot of chaos to conquer, and that resulted in complex pairs of differently materialized alternatives.

Another type of Troy is the one Aeneas builds in Sicily in book 5. This one is meant for those who refuse to continue the voyage, a motif already touched in the Cretan episode (3.190-91). The narrator, we must note, is no longer Aeneas, so the need to impress an internal audience is removed. The use of a phantom and the handling of city-building are the principal features of interest in this Troy. In a sudden break from the funeral games, we find Iris as the counterfeit of Beroe sent by Juno, causing trouble among the discontented Trojan women; the apposition to Juno, *necdum antiquum saturata dolorem* (5.608), being the only hint at her unspecified orders to Iris, and a reminder of the reason for her delaying action throughout the poem. Retardatory phantoms, such as the Aeneas seen above being granted *inania verba* in book 10 (10.636-43), Allecto/Calybe (7.419-20) and the Dira/bird (12.861-66), are counterfactual insofar as they are said to only assume a given semblance, as *inania verba* suggests, and play an important role in diverting and extending the course of the narrative. One interesting aspect of Iris/Beroe's intervention, as with Allecto/Calybe (7.445-57) is that the intended effect only occurs after their divinity is revealed (Horsfall 1995: 139). In the style of a Homeric deliberative question, the Trojan women, warned about the divinity of Beroe, wonder whether to stay or continue the journey (5.654-56); of the two routes, they take the first, but only after Iris' sudden flight. They then burn down the ships (5.657-663). These dilatory phantoms, then, come in two groups, those who affect the course of events as phantoms, and those who betray their disguise before that happens. The deliberative question adds another instance of parallel course, one underdeveloped.

Besides Iris' intervention, responsible for the way this Troy materializes, the operations typical of a colonizer are the most noticeable feature of this Troy; these are not dissimilar from Aeneas' earlier efforts and the Carthaginians'. Aeneas, like the women, is torn in a Homeric deliberative question (5.700-04), and in the same order (stay / go), and like them is inspired to a decision by a heavenly sign, in his case Anchises' ghost (5.722-48). After a human (Nautes) advises Aeneas to continue the journey but leave a group behind (5.704-18), Anchises' ghost settles the decision and also delivers revelations: the dead Anchises, here and elsewhere (particularly in book 6) operates as an oracle. Aeneas then marks out the city boundaries with the plough, as he will do at the mouth of the Tiber (*humili designat moenia fossa*, 7.157) and as the Carthaginians do (*concludere sulco*, 1.425), in the fashion of Greek colonists distributes homes by lot (Horsfall 1989: 18) and contributes to name the city, but it is not he who gives the law to the senators and orders the forum:

*interea Aeneas urbem designat aratro  
 sortiturque domos; hoc Ilium et haec loca Troiam  
 esse iubet. gaudet regno Troianus Acestes  
 indicitque forum et patribus dat iura vocatis.  
 tum vicina astris, Erycino in vertice sedes  
 fundatur Veneri Idaliae, tumuloque sacerdos  
 ac lucus late sacer additur Anchiseo (5.755-61).*

The jobs involved in establishing the new city, physical and intellectual, are thus shared, without, however, any construction work occurring; walls are wished for by Iris/Beroe (5.631), but not explicitly built. A temple is founded, unusually in these replacement Troys, although we have seen Juno's being built in Carthage, where Aeneas sees himself represented (1.446-93); religious continuity was paramount to Greek colonists (Horsfall 1989: 17), and Anchises' tumulus with a dedicated priest contributes to that theme. But there is a shortage of temples. Perhaps to avoid the artistically boring, as Horsfall (1989: 12) comments in relation to the unsteadiness of revelations to Aeneas in Virgil as compared with other writers, Virgil distributes the activities considered typical of city-founding, Greek and Roman, amongst the different Troys: an amalgamation, as Horsfall provides (1989: 26-27), displays the complete set. Naming the city, one of those typical activities, as the attempted *Aeneadae* and *Pergama* demonstrate, here happens, but takes a peculiar form: Nautes suggests *Acesta*, after the proposed Trojan ruler Acestes, if Aeneas agrees (*permisso nomine*, 5.718), and Aeneas, not commenting on that proposal, orders two apparently different parts of the settlement (*hoc ... haec loca*) to be, respectively, *Ilium* and *Troia* (5.756-57). That may indeed just designate two districts (Williams 1960, on 5.756), but one critic at least has seen something more in that command: for Winterbottom (1993: 18), Aeneas' attempt to found a Troy in Sicily for the tired travellers compares with Andromache's; he is founding "a mimic Troy". On that view, the Trojan element of this particular new Troy would predominate, perhaps including the connection with death that we saw earlier; whereas the naming *Acesta*, while also Trojan-related, is out of Aeneas' control, in consonance with the establishment of the forum and the law-giving to the senators by the new ruler, Acestes.

The last Troy to be examined is the one Aeneas establishes in Italy upon landing at the mouth of the Tiber. The Trojans have just recognized the suitability of the place from Ascanius' joke on eating their tables, namely the bread on which they served their meals (7.116). Aeneas' contribution to this Troy is again physical (*designat, molitur, cingit*), and he is, therefore, once again the citizen rather than the hero (Horsfall 2006, 3.132):

*ipse humili designat moenia fossa  
 moliturque locum, primasque in litore sedes  
 castrorum in morem pinnis atque aggere cingit (7.157-59).*

Aeneas establishes a military camp, but marks out the walls with the ritual *primigenius sulcus* as

if it is a Roman city; the verb *designat* is correct for drawing the *sulcus*, and the camp is later referred to as *urbs* (9.8; 9.48 and later), with *muri* and *moenia* (9.37; 9.39; and later) (Horsfall 2000, on 7.157). This is a strongly Roman Troy. But this Troy/Rome is not named by its founder, and receives no law. In the chronological sequence of events, *iura dare* does not specifically happen until Romulus and Remus, as forecast by Jupiter (1.292-93). We find, on the other hand, that activity mentioned shortly after Aeneas' foundation of the Italian encampment in Ilioneus' offerings to king Latinus: *hoc Priami gestamen erat cum iura vocatis / more daret populis* (7.246-47). Priam's *iura dare*, however, has been taken as administration of justice, rather than institution of the rule of law: we see Priam "as Roman magistrate" (Horsfall 2000, on 7.246). His *iura*, metrically matching Acestes' (5.758) though Priam addresses assembled peoples and Acestes senators, therefore differs from the other instances in the *Aeneid* examined so far, which refer to the institution of the rule of law in colonial settings and, more broadly, as the foundation of civilization. Conington (on 7.246-48) remarks: "Perhaps we ought not to separate so sharply ... between giving laws and giving judgment, functions which in the heroic age would run very much into each other". We can add here the next two instances of *iura / leges dare*, Hercules' following extermination of Cacus and upon establishment of the golden age (*legesque dedit*, 8.322), and Cato the Younger's in the Underworld represented on Aeneas' shield (*dantem iura Catonem*, 8.670). Cato's *iura* could designate administration of justice (Gransden, on 8.670, mentioning Augustus' *iura dare* at *Geo.* 4.562 with no sense specified), or a hazy activity which includes both senses (Conington on 8.670, quoting the Homeric  $\theta\epsilon\mu\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\iota\nu$ ).

To summarize: one aspect of Virgil's use of counterfactuals in the *Aeneid* involves Aeneas' repeated attempts to reconstruct the Troy which has been annihilated by the Greeks, and his encounter with two counterpart Troys, one of which is the doublet for Rome (Carthage), and the other a toned-down replica of Troy (Buthrotum) which reveals similarities with the world of the dead. Each attempted Troy contains elements of both Greek and Roman colonial activities as known to Virgil's contemporaries. At 12.190-94, Aeneas will plan to give equal laws for Trojans and Italians (*paribus legibus*) and gods (*sacra deosque*), and to build walls (*moenia constituent*), naming this particular city after Lavinia. The final new Troy will be Virgil's Rome, not built by Aeneas.

## Chapter Five. *Indicative Apodosis Counterfactuals and Similar Subjunctive Ones*

This chapter returns to syntactic counterfactuals. It will examine three types of *if-nots* in the *Aeneid*: those with initial indicative apodoses, thus beginning a story which the second-place protasis then truncates: 6.358-61, *tenebam, ni ... invasisset ... putasset* and 8.520-23, *tenebant, ... putabant, ni ... dedisset*; the two *if-not* conglomerates which resemble 8.520-26 in sense, but feature regular apodoses in the subjunctive rather than imperfect indicative: 6.30-36 and 6.290-94; and variants of the first two, which have indicative apodoses but protases which do something other than stop the action of the main sentence: 11.112 (*nec veni, nisi ... dedissent*), already discussed in chapter three, with perfect initial negative apodosis and no veering off of narrative, and 11.116-17 which follows it (*si ... finire ... si pellere ... apparat, ... decuit concurrere*); 4.15-19 (*si ... non ... sederet ... si non ... fuisset, ... potui succumbere*), with final apodosis; 12.731-33 (*frangitur ... deserit ..., ni ... subeat*), also discussed in chapter three, with initial apodoses unrelated to protasis. The last is 6.882-83 (*si ... rumpas, tu ... eris*), considered a conditional until recently, with future indicative final apodosis; the reasons for inclusion are: its reference to two differently actualized counterpart figures, the scholarly debates it has generated on the relationship between protasis and apodosis, the closeness it illustrates between conditionals and wishes, and the two counterfactuals 6.870-71 and 6.879-81 nearby.

Closest to the historians' style, because of its content as well as syntax, is 6.358-61:

*paulatim adnabam terrae; iam tuta tenebam,  
ni gens crudelis madida cum veste gravatum  
prensantemque uncis manibus capita aspera montis  
ferro invasisset praedamque ignara putasset* (6.358-61).

The apodosis in the imperfect indicative, *iam tuta tenebam* (6.358), clashes with the protases in the pluperfect subjunctive (*invasisset, putasset*, 6.361), which are factual and re-direct the narrative. Chausserie-Laprée identifies fourteen indicative apodosis *if-nots* in Livy, three of which perfect (2.10.2, 2.65.4, 22.60.17), one pluperfect (34.29.10) and ten imperfect (2.50.10, 3.1.4, 3.43.7, 4.52.5, 5.26.10, 7.14.5, 23.40.8, 28.33.5, 40.32.5, 45.19.7); plus three infinitive and seventy-six subjunctive (seven of the subjunctives have *nisi*. Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 637). Palinurus speaks 6.358-61 in the Underworld, where Aeneas asks his shade how he came to die. The military language is appropriate: in a conflictual situation, as in Livy, one course of events is related as factual (*tenebam*), and another interrupts it in a *ni*-clause which reverses that factuality (*ni invasisset et putasset*). There is, in Orlandini's language (2005: 628), a step towards the realization of the predication, but that realization does not happen. Palinurus is not

safe. The imperfect is fitting too, as the most widely used tense for this effect by Livy. Also the use of *iam* is typical of these constructions (Liv. 4.52.5, 7.14.5, 40.32.5).

A second important feature is the lack of a clear connection between *iam tuta tenebam* (6.358) and *ni gens crudelis ... /ferro invasisset praedamque ignara putasset* (6.359-61). For the apodosis, Austin (1977, on 6.358) suggests "I held safety in my grasp (and would have reached it) had not ...". Tarrant (2012, on 12.733) finds a disconnection between main and secondary clauses which is less audacious than that of *ensis /frangitur ... deserit ... /ni fuga subsidio subeat* (12.731-33). Horsfall (2013, on 6.358) suggests an infill similar to Austin's. He also observes that in view of 6.360, *tenebam* has to be either inceptive or conative; Palinurus' reference to himself in the *ni*-clause as grabbing the cliffs, signals his movement towards safety, rather than the actual state. The unfinished quality of the imperfect indicative, on the other hand, also allows an unsupplemented apodosis. In that case, the *ni*-clause would have to be read as a *cum*-clause; this presents a one-off action which redirects the narrative against the background of an ongoing process.

How does Virgil's *iam tuta tenebam* relate to Livy's similar constructions? Some of Livy's indicative *if-not* apodoses suggest a similar truncation to *Aen.* 6.358-61. How an apodosis can be extracted from a component of the grammatical protasis in a way which is also possible in *iam tuta tenebam* is shown by Foster's translation of this instance with the perfect indicative apodosis: *sic prope oneratum est sinistrum Romanis cornu, ni referentibus iam gradum consul increpando simul temeritatem, simul ignaviam, pudore metum excussisset* (Liv. 2.65.4); "the left wing of the Romans was nearly overwhelmed, and had already begun to retreat, when the consul, reproaching them at once with rashness and with cowardice, succeeded in shaming them out of their fear" (Benjamin Oliver Foster). Foster transfers *referentibus iam gradum* into a second apodosis, *ni* becoming *cum* and the apodoses merely main clauses. We can see the retroactive effect of an object from the protasis, which comes to modify the apodosis: *referentibus iam gradum* describes *sinistrum cornu*, just as *prensantemque uncis manibus capita aspera montis* describes the subject of *tenebam*. Whether Livy's sentence needs an added apodosis had the one added by Foster been left in the protasis, remains a question.

An apodosis is definitely suppressed in this instance from a speech, again with perfect indicative apodosis: *... obsistere ac retinere conati sunt, ni strictis gladiis viri fortissimi inertes summovissent* (22.60.17). Foster translates: "... they tried to thwart and hinder him; and those heroic men were forced to draw their swords and thrust the cowards from their path". There is clearly a missing apodosis after *obsistere ac retinere conati sunt*, "and they would have succeeded", to provide a state of affairs which the *ni*-clause can interrupt; Foster rather changes the construction.

Many of Livy's indicative apodoses, however, make sense without additions. The following is an attempt to rank Livy's indicative apodoses featuring in *if-nots* in order of



completeness (translators in brackets). Then we will be in a position to appreciate the audacity of those of the *Aeneid*. The least in need of addition is perhaps this instance:

*[Hasdrubal ...] profectus Carales perventurus erat, ni Manlius obvio exercitu ab effusa eum populatione continuisset (23.40.8)*

"And he would have reached Carales, had not Manlius by confronting him with an army restrained him from his widespread devastation" (Frank Gardener Moore).

The apodosis in the periphrastic form with active future (*perventurus erat*) reaches the point when the *ni*-clause takes effect. A similar extension into the future, with imperfect, makes the following two reasonably complete:

*videbaturque aequae diuturnus futurus labor ac Veii fuisset, ni fortuna imperatori Romano simul et cognitae rebus bellicis virtutis specimen [et] maturam victoriam dedisset (5.26.10)*

"and it began to seem as though the struggle would be as long drawn out as at Veii, had not Fortune, at one stroke, given the Roman general an opportunity to display the magnanimity already familiar from his exploits in war, and an early victory" (Foster)

*atrox certamen aderat, ni Fabius consilio neutri parti acerbo rem expedisset (3.1.4)*

"There was every prospect of a serious contest, had Fabius not smoothed matters by a suggestion acceptable to both sides" (Rev. Canon Roberts).

Next in completeness are possibly the following three, the apodosis being a continuous state of affairs which extends to the time of *ni*-clause :

*iam fames quam pestilentia tristior erat, ni, dismissis circa omnes populos legatis ... ad frumentum mercandum, annonae foret subventum (4.52.5)*

"Indeed the famine would have been more baneful than the disease, had they not supplemented the supply of corn by dispatching emissaries to all the people round about ... to purchase it" (Foster)

*ancepsque pedestre certamen erat ni equites supervenissent (28.33.5)*

"And the infantry battle would have remained doubtful, if the cavalry had not arrived" (Moore)

*iam prope erat ut sinistrum cornu pelleretur Romanis, ni septima legio successisset (40.32.5)*

"... it would have been repulsed had not the seventh legion come up in support" (Roberts).

We have already seen (page 144) that 2.65.4 (*sic ... excussisset*) is also fairly complete, although Foster manipulates the construction.

The next batch is less seamless:

*invidiaeque plena castra erant, et Romam ferri protinus Siccium placebat, ni decemviri funus*

*militare ei publica impensa facere maturassent* (3.43.7)

"The camp was ablaze with indignation, and it was resolved that Siccius should be carried to Rome forthwith; but the decemvirs made haste to give him a military funeral at public cost" (Foster).

The second apodosis, with *placebat*, brings the narrative closer to the appropriate moment for the *ni*-clause, but not without a gap; the *ni*-clause interrupts a missing "and he would have been taken to Rome". A similar absence features in:

*iamque haud procul iusto proelio res erat, ni celeriter diremptum certamen per centurionem esset* (7.14.5)

"And now the mellay was likely to end in a regular battle, had not the centurions speedily parted the combatants" (Foster).

The apodosis states the direction the narrative is taking, but falls short of pinpointing the state of affairs prevented by the *ni*-clause. The following, which differs from most in not dealing directly with a battle situation, definitely needs an extra apodosis:

*eorum hominum, ut res docuit, Attalus erat qui, quantum spes spoondisset, cuperent, ni unius amici prudens monitio velut frenos animo eius gestienti secundis rebus imposuisset* (45.19.7)

"Attalus was, as the facts showed, one of those men who would desire whatever hope may promise; but the wise advice of one friend tightened the reins, as it were, on his spirit elated by success" (Alfred. C. Schlesinger).

No clear state of affairs is opposed by *ni ... prudens monitio ... imposuisset*. Livy's remaining imperfect indicative *if-not* has a gap between apodosis and protasis:

*vincebatque auxilio loci paucitas, ni iugo circummissus Veiens in verticem collis evasisset* (2.50.10)

"and through the advantage of position the little band was beginning to win the day, when some Veientes who had been sent round the hill emerged on the summit" (Roberts).

The Veientes' arrival again reverses a situation which is not quite there. The following, discussed above, has a perfect indicative apodosis which needs expansion:

*... obsistere ac retinere conati sunt, ni strictis gladiis viri fortissimi inerte summovissent* (22.60.17)

"... they tried to thwart and hinder him; and those heroic men were forced to draw their swords and thrust the cowards from their path" (Foster).

The following two, with the pluperfect and perfect apodosis respectively, are possibly complete:

*et difficilior facta oppugnatio erat, ni T. Quinctius cum quattuor milibus delectorum militum supervenissent* (34.29.10)

"The assault would have become much more difficult had not Quinctius appeared with a body of 4000 picked troops" (Roberts. But Evan T. Sage translates: "And the continuance of the siege would have ...")

*pons sublicius iter paene hostibus dedit, ni unus vir fuisset, Horatius Cocles* (2.10.2);

"The bridge of piles almost afforded an entrance to the enemy, had it not been for one man, Horatius Cocles" (Foster).

On the whole, except for those apodoses with future sense (23.40.8, 5.26.10; 3.1.4), Livy's *if-not* indicative apodoses almost invariably require supplementation; and particularly those with the imperfect. Out of fourteen cases, however, seven are probably in no desperate need. Those in the *Aeneid* which need expansion are a higher percentage of the total number (of indicative apodoses *if-nots*), and some are more extreme.

The third feature to consider, which also illustrates Virgil's adventurousness by comparison with Livy, concerns the relationship of the apodosis *iam tuta tenebam* with that of *nec veni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent* (11.112); the reason for the comparison is that *nec veni* is a statement in the perfect indicative, therefore clearly separated from the protasis in the pluperfect subjunctive (*dedissent*) like *iam tuta tenebam*. The two share a particular feature: in neither apodoses could the speaker be reporting a correct account of himself. Palinurus states that he was safe, when it turns out he was merely grasping the cliffs that would have saved him; and Aeneas states he did not come to Italy, when that is precisely where he is.

A fourth aspect to note is the absence in Livy's indicative apodoses *if-nots* of first-person speakers. This is partly because most of the text is in third-person narrative, only 22.60.17 featuring in a speech (in third person). Palinurus' *iam tuta tenebam* shares more in that respect with this counterfactual, from Horace's *carmen* 2.17 (25-24 BC. Hutchinson 2002: 524-25):

*me truncus inlapsus cerebro,  
sustulerat, nisi Faunus ictum  
dextra levasset, Mercurialium  
custos virorum* (Hor. *Carm.* 2.17.27-9).

We saw that this is a Latin *if-not* with initial pluperfect indicative apodosis, with emphasis therefore on the closeness the event came to realization, but without the ongoing sense of the imperfect. It is contemporaneous with at least some of the *Aeneid*.

The second instance of *if-not* with imperfect indicative apodosis is similar to the first, but more elaborate and not set in a context of struggle. Its two apodoses are both in the imperfect and their verbs occupy the same final position on the line, the first again *teneo*. The

following quotation includes three subsequent, explanatory verses:

*defixique ora tenebant*  
*Aeneas Anchisiades et fidus Achates*  
*multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant,*  
*ni signum caelo Cytherea dedisset aperto.*  
*Namque improviso vibratus ab aethere fulgor*  
*cum sonitu venit et ruere omnia visa repente*  
*Tyrrhenusque tubae mugire per aethera clangor* (8.520-26).

This is spoken by the narrator, and reports the final part of Aeneas' farewell to Evander in book 8 (8.454-540). It seems gratuitously military in style by comparison with *iam tuta tenebam*, ... (6.358-61). What precisely awaits Aeneas and Achates if they continue to stare and brood? In Livy, only two out of fourteen indicative apodosis *if-nots* describe situations which present no imminent and radical change of fortune for one side in a conflict (3.43.7; 45.19.7). Virgil's 8.520-26, then, belongs to a type which is in a minority in the writer who used the same construction and treated the same subject (war), although in a different genre, closest to Virgil's time. If we also consider the Homeric root of the *if-not* construction, we may conclude that the *if-not* as a whole makes a promise which goes unfulfilled. Instead of an averted near-disaster, we have a sign from heaven which is important in the narrative, but does not thwart an imminent development derived from either the activities or the circumstances of the relevant characters, the staring and brooding Aeneas and Achates. It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars have talked of a change in construction, such as Conington (on 8.520), or treated the *ni*-clause as a *cum-inversum*: such as Gransden, who adds that "though syntactically subordinate it in fact forms the climax of a series of simultaneous events" (Gransden 1976, on 8.520); and Fordyce (1977, on 8.520), who considers the two apodoses *defixique ora tenebant* and *multaque dura ... putabant* "semi-parenthetical", and the appearance of Venus' heavenly sign the "sudden phenomenon" which often follows *vix ea fatus erat* in the *Aeneid* (1.586; 2.692; 6.190; 11.296) as either a *cum*-clause or a coordinate sentence in a paratactic configuration.

What follows *vix ea ...* generally in these cases? Out of the ten similar announcements we find: four *cum*-clauses (1.586-87, 2.323, 3.655-58, 6.190-92); one instance of two coordinate clauses (2.692-94); one main clause coordinated to the formula (11.296-97); three independent clauses, made acceptable by punctuation (3.90-92, 8.337-38, 12.650-51), and one *ni*-clause (8.520). The two *dixerat haec* cases have one *cum*-clause (5.84-86) and one coordinate (11.132). The *if-not* in question, 8.520-23, evidently belongs to a batch of *cum-inversum* cases that vary in syntactic form, attached to the speaking formula *vix ea* or its variants. 8.520-23, moreover, is coordinated to the formula (like 11.296-97 only), and reproduces a Homeric technique for shortening a scene. On the first point, we can observe that all three coordinated sentences *vix ea ...*, *defixique ora tenebant / Aeneas ... et fidus Achates / multaque dura ...*

*putabant* clearly function as unimportant background against which *ni signum caelo Cytherea dedisset aperto* looks more astounding. The near miss typical of *if-nots* is not there, but there is a missing apodosis, to the effect that Aeneas and Achates would have prolonged their behaviour, if Venus had not sent a sign from heaven. The time-cutting role of the *ni*-clause has interesting implications.

Two Homeric *if-not* truncations of time (*Il.* 23.154-55 and 24.713) involve a shortening of mourning. De Jong (2004: 77) summarizes: "(verbal) interventions of Achilles and Priam, respectively, put an end to the mourning of their men, which otherwise would have continued until sunset, i.e. endlessly. Both Achilles and Priam motivate their interventions with the argument that there is a point of saturation as regards weeping". It is not the lamenting itself that Achilles and Priam describe as undesirable, but its continuation. The bT-scholiasts on another such shortening (*Il.* 7.273-76), cited by de Jong, points to narrative need as justification: "for reasons of economy, viz. wanting to save Hector for his poem, the poet puts an end to the duel"; Hector is not destined to die at this point in the poem, as we know from Helenus (*Il.* 7.52). A process again shortened by an *εἰ μὴ* clause is *Il.* 23.733-37: on this occasion, Achilles stops a wrestling-game and allocates equal prizes to the two contenders. Two other "Less dramatic situations" are *Il.* 17.530-32, which involves the Aiantes stopping a duel between Hector and Automedon, and 23.490-91, Achilles preventing Aias and Idomeneus from attacking each other this time verbally (de Jong 2004: 77). In the *Odyssey*, time is cut short during lamentations in *if-nots* 16.220 (evening would have come, had Telemachus not spoken), 23.241 (dawn would have shone, had Athena not thought ...) and 21.226 (evening would have come, had Odysseus not stopped the two men crying): as Nesselrath (1992: 30) remarks concerning the latter, delay during preparations to take revenge against Penelope's suitors would be catastrophic; all that crying would attract attention too, as Odysseus points out (*Od.* 21.228-29). The point in all of these cases is that a formula marks forward steps in the narrative.

Three important aspects of *Aeneid* 8.520-26 examined so far, are: its formal similarities to *iam tuta teneabm, ni ...* at 6.358-61; its closeness to the standard configuration of the *cum-inversum* which accompanies a variant of the formula *vix ea fatus erat*; and, as the only *if-not* combined with *vix ea fatus erat*, its closeness to the Homeric *if-not* formulas for shortening activities. Two more features need to be explored: the importance of the contents of the *ni*-clause, and the similarity of this *if-not* with two others in the *Aeneid*, which have subjunctive apodoses (6.30-36, which also contains a non-*if-not*, and 6.290-94).

Prodigies following *vix ea fatus erat* and its variants are 2.692-94, 3.90-92, 6.190-92 and the *if-not* under consideration, 8.520-26. Those prodigies cause, or accompany, major reversals or forward moves. Anchises' determination to die with Troy, the expression of which also includes a counterfactual (*me si caelicolae voluissent ducere vitam, / has mihi servassent sedes.* 2.641-42), is reversed when he witnesses flames on Iulus' head, followed by thunder with

a falling star in the sky, both encased in *cum-inversum* sentences: *Talia vociferans gemitu tectum omne replebat, / cum subitum dictuque oritur mirabile monstrum* (2.679-80); and, without the actual *cum*, *Vix ea fatus erat senior, subitoque fragore / intonuit laevum et de caelo lapsa per umbras / stella facem ducens multa cum luce cucurrit* (2.692-94). He then decides to leave Troy along with the other survivors (2.699-704). The second instance depicts the preliminaries to Apollo's advice to the Trojans on their next move: *vix ea fatus eram: tremere omnia visa repente, / liminaque laurusque dei, totusque moveri / mons circum et mugire adytis cortina reclusis* (3.90-92). Anchises shortly interprets the divine forecast to refer to Crete as the intended land, and leads the Trojans there (3.102-46). At 6.190-92, Aeneas witnesses two doves landing on the grass: *vix ea fatus erat, geminae cum forte columbae / ipsa sub ora viri caelo venere volantes, / et viridi sedere solo*. This is not quite a large-scale portent, but one nevertheless. The two doves he recognizes as his mother's sign to lead him to the Golden Bough, which they do (6.192-211). The Golden Bough, as he learned earlier from the Sibyl, was needed for entering the Underworld (6.140-48). This particular *cum*-clause attached to *vix ea ...*, then, enables the progression of Aeneas' journey, rather than causing any major change. The way Aeneas interprets the omen, it is worth noting, is by guess-work based on conditional thinking: if the Sibyl was correct about him finding his companion Misenuis dead, she must be correct about him finding a Golden Bough too (6.187-89). This is yet another way in which Virgil exploits the resources offered by conditionals.

At 8.520-26, lastly, a *ni*-clause follows three relatively unimportant apodoses to report Venus' prodigy to Aeneas. The nature of the portent then gradually unravels: the three explanatory lines to *ni signum caelo Cytherea dedisset aperto* (8.523) report a flash, thunder and a war-trumpet (8.524-26); three more lines, presented from the spectators' viewpoint including Aeneas (*suspiciunt*), add the appearance of arms in a serene area of the sky (8.527-29); and finally, Aeneas remembers his mother's earlier announcement that in the imminence of war (*si bellum ingrueret*) such weapons would be delivered to him (8.530-35); that, as indicated, is another instance of retrospective citation. Aeneas acquires his armour with a *ni*-construction to mark the transition to war and a resolution to the poem which is absent in the original. Achilles comes to obtain his mother's weapons with no portent and no *if-not*, in spite of the abundance of such constructions in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 19.12-13. Eden notices the lack of portent; 1975, on 8.522, 1). A *ni*-construction presides over Aeneas' transformation into Achilles.

We can now compare 8.520-26 with the two *if-not* conglomerates which also include time-cutting, but have subjunctive apodoses. These are 6.30-36 and 6.290-94. The first of these consists of two parts: a narratorial counterfactual set in the present and with neither *si* nor *ni* (6.30-31, expanded in 6.32-33), and a subsequent *if-not* with a final-position *ni*-clause which shortens time:

*tu quoque magnam  
partem opere in tanto, sineret dolor, Icare, haberes.  
bis conatus erat casus effingere in auro,  
bis patriae cecidere manus. quin protinus omnia  
perlegerent oculis, ni iam praemissus Achaes  
adforet atque una Phoebi Triviaeque sacerdos,  
Deiphobe Glauci, fatur quae talia regi (6.30-36).*

The context for the block is the tail end of the *ekphrasis* which is the narrator's description of the images on the doors of the temple Aeneas finds upon arrival at Cumae, where he is to discover his future from the Sibyl, as told by Helenus (6.20-33; Helenus 3.441-62); the second counterfactual (6.33-36) breaks that *ekphrasis* and resumes the action. Signs of counterfactuality, by the time of the passage, have already appeared. The narrator provides antecedents with the information that Daedalus fled from Minos and built a temple to Apollo, but attenuates allegiance to the story with *ut fama est* (6.14-19). That phrase and its variants *fertur*, *ferunt*, *ut perhibent* and others, are all present in the *Aeneid*, and the distancing in question, therefore, is not unique. But it is worth considering that *ut fama est* itself probably absorbs counterfactuality from its context, as mutual reinforcement operates between the literal counterfactual sentences (6.30-36), and the narrator's uncertainty intrinsic in *ut fama est*; the subject-matter, an unfinished artwork, adds to the mix. Commentators have interpreted this *ut fama est* in different ways. Servius (on 6.14) describes it as doubt, whereas Austin (1977, on 6.14) mentions a possible variant tradition, and Horsfall (2013, on 6.14) refers to "a learned, Alexandrianising element in the narrative", the story of Daedalus' flight to the West as foundation-legend of that temple; Heinze (2000: 240-43) sees attribution of the story to *fama* as a way for Virgil to avoid responsibility for its truth and also accusations that he made it up. Whichever reading we take, there is an obvious implication of multiple stories, one of which makes it into the text in a more developed form than the rest. Taking distance from the utterance is also what narrators do when using subjunctives; that can lead to complex results, as we have seen, when the borderline between indicative and subjunctive is crossed in counterfactuals. There is also a parallel, therefore, between the narratorial distancing intrinsic in *ut fama est* and that manifested syntactically in counterfactuals. Horsfall's reading, finally, hints at a further counterfactual aspect of this instance of *ut fama est*: while Casali (1995: 4n4) objects to a parallel between Daedalus and Aeneas, it would seem plausible to think of the artist's westwards flight as a miniaturized counterpart to Aeneas' in relation to Rome; motivation (the need for the protagonist to flee), direction (West) and role as foundation myth coincide. Quite a number of counterfactuals have been found even before we come to the two literal counterfactuals.

The images on the doors, obviously reminiscent of those the Trojans watch in Carthage while waiting for Dido (1.453-93), represent scenes from the Cretan and Athenian mythological

past; this is in contrast with the Carthaginian ones, which deal with recent events (the Trojan war), and involve Aeneas himself. The current images, therefore, lack the set of counterparts which in the Carthaginian episode are the two versions of Aeneas, one depicted and another watching the depiction; unless we emphasize the similarities between Aeneas and Daedalus. There is on the present doors, though, another comparable couple: Daedalus the artist and Daedalus the figure depicted, in scholars' view a major innovation in *ekphrases* (Horsfall 2013: 87.8). Virgil appears to have invented yet another pair of differently materialized entities.

The images of 6.20-30 do not easily divide into panels (Horsfall 2013: 87, 10), but clearly mention: the killing of Androgeus, which causes the drawing of lots for the victims to be sacrificed to his father Minos; the Minotaur born from Minos' wife Pasiphae and the bull; and Daedalus advising Ariadne on how to help Theseus leave the labyrinth. At the end of the *ekphrasis*, the first counterfactual addresses Icarus with reference to the expected but unachieved presence of his image (*tu quoque magnam / partem opere in tanto ... Icare haberes*), and two additional lines report the artist's attempt and failure to produce it (*bis conatus erat casus effingere in auro, / bis patriae cecidere manus.*); the unfulfilled condition for that image to exist is *sineret dolor*, embedded in the second line of the apodosis and therefore very much not an *if-not* type of protasis, meaning that the artist's pain at his son's death prevented his ability to paint the scene (6.30-33).

This layout of counterfactual material is remarkable. One immediately noticeable trait is the parallel between the stated expectation of Icarus' presence, and the expected developments which in *if-nots* are curtailed by *ni*-clauses. We saw that one typical feature of *if-nots* with imperfect indicative apodoses (8.520-26; 6.358-61) is the conative and inceptive use of the imperfect; the action it depicts has not quite been accomplished. We find a similar incompleteness described at 6.32-33: the artist Daedalus, and father of the unrepresented Icarus, twice tried to paint him, and twice failed. The narrator comments not only on the absence of a part of the picture which on the basis of the rest would be expected to be present (since audiences know that Icarus flew from Crete too), but also on the beginning of a movement towards that presence. There is one clear difference: Icarus does not make it into the pictures at all, except as an addressee in Virgil's text, whereas the apodoses in question begin to materialize. Palinurus starts being safe (6.358); Aeneas and Achates definitely hold their gaze and muse (8.520-22) when they were interrupted.

What comes next, following the *caesura* after the expansion of the first counterfactual, is an *if-not*:

*quin protinus omnia  
perlegerent oculis, ni iam praemissus Achates  
adforet atque una Phoebi Triviaeque sacerdos,  
Deiphobe Glauci, fatur quae talia regi* (6.33-36).



We find out now, rather than being told at the beginning as at the Carthaginian *ekphrasis* (1.453), that Daedalus' illustrations of the Cretan myths were being watched by Aeneas and the Trojans. There is, therefore, a slight surprise for the audience as *perlegerent oculis*, line-initial and a first-position apodosis, retroactively reveals that the *ekphrasis* was presented through the Trojans' eyes. That kind of redefinition is comparable to the effect *ni*-clauses in final position have on those *if-nots* with indicative apodoses which up to *ni* present a course of events subsequently proved different; the line-initial position of *perlegerent* adds to the similarity, as most *ni*-clauses in *if-nots* occupy the same slot.

Does the current *ni*-clause have the same effect on its own apodosis? It does not, because *perlegerent*, in the imperfect subjunctive, is already known as non-factual before the advent of the *ni*-clause. The narrator does not in these cases present a factual state of affairs and then retrospectively correct it. There is, however, similarity between 6.34-35, with subjunctive apodosis (*omnia perlegerent oculis, ni ...*) and 8.520-23, with indicative apodosis (*defixique ora tenebant ... multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant, ni ...*), in another respect, which is the shortening of a scene.

A further peculiarity of this *if-not*, which leads to more manifestations of counterfactuality, derives from *omnia*. In 8.520-23, the amount of perils mused upon (*multa dura putabant*) is reduced by *ni signum Cytherea dedisset*. Something similar happens in 6.30-36: Aeneas' eyes are prevented from seeing all of the Cretan images, *omnia perlegerent oculis*, by the arrival of Achates and the Sibyl, *ni Achates adforet atque una sacerdos*. The situation, however, differs slightly, as the amount of unexplored material in this case is finite and the story well-known; that allows us to ask what images Aeneas does not see. We know from the first counterfactual that Icarus' image is missing altogether from the *ekphrasis*; Aeneas certainly cannot see that (6.30-33). But there is more, which led Casali (1995: 2) to ask: "What would Aeneas have seen, if he had not been interrupted by the arrival of Achates and the Sibyl?". Aeneas, Casali argues, does not miss scenes from Daedalus' subsequent life, such as his journey to Sicily, since the text says Daedalus' first landing was at Cumae (6.18) (Casali 1995: 3). What the hero does not see, Casali thinks, is the scene of Theseus abandoning Ariadne; a parallel with the Dido episode would be too painful for Aeneas to see. Verbal similarities between Virgil's description of the labyrinth and Catullus' tale of Theseus and Ariadne in 64.112-15, embroidered on the blanket of Peleus and Thetis, underline the parallel: *inextricabilis error, tecti, regens filo vestigia* in *Aen.* 6.25-30; *regens tenui vestigia filo, tecti, inobservabilis error* in Catullus 64.113-15). Reference to Ariadne's love as *magnum reginae amorem* in 6.28, part of Virgil's *ekphrasis*, also clearly identifies her with Dido, who is *regina* twenty-one times out of twenty-four instances of *regina* in the *Aeneid* (Casali 1995: 5-6). Casali also identifies Theseus as a counterpart for Aeneas: both leave women behind and both go to the Underworld (Casali

1995: 8). Also relevant is pain as reason for not completing a work of art. The narrator of the *Aeneid*, who keeps Theseus' abandonment of Ariadne out of the text, is another Daedalus, who keeps Icarus out of the images (Casali 1995: 7-8). 6.30-36 is a multi-layered assemblage of counterfactual elements.

The next counterfactual to be analyzed is quoted here with two preliminary lines which explain the context:

*corripit hic subita trepidus formidine ferrum  
Aeneas strictamque aciem venientibus offert,  
et ni docta comes tenuis sine corpore vitas  
admoneat volitare cava sub imagine formae,  
inruat et frustra ferro diverberet umbras* (6.290-94).

Aeneas and the Sibyl are now at the entrance of the Underworld, where personifications of human ills, a tree of false dreams and then various monsters flutter about (6.268-81; 6.282-84; 6.285-89). The *ni*-clause is initial, and therefore provides no surprise; we know that an interruption is imminent. That, combined with the subjunctive apodosis, makes this *if-not* tamer than 8.520-23, and slightly tamer than the also related 6.33-36.

What are we to make of the tamest *if-not* of the group of four counterfactuals which otherwise share so much? We have seen that shortening an episode by an *if-not* is not uncommon in Homer. Yet the Sibyl's intervention remains perplexing, encased in that particular syntactic form. All three subjunctives are in the present (*admoneat, inruat, diverberet*). As Austin (1977, on 6.293) observes, this imparts vividness but also suggests that Aeneas may still take action. That brings to mind *ni faciat, maria ac terras caelumque profundum / quippe ferant rapidi secum verrantque per auras* (1.58-59); this, as discussed in chapter two, implies the omnipresent risk that the winds elude Aeolus' control and cause the collapse of the ordered world. Austin also makes a parallel with *spatia et si plura supersint, / transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat* (5.325-26), a counterfactual featuring in the games for Anchises, and the *if-not* which ends book 11 by postponing the duel between Aeneas and Turnus, *continuoque ineant pugnas et proelia temptent, / ni roseus fessos iam gurgite Phoebus Hiberno / tinguat equos noctemque die labente reducat* (11.912-14). All of these also share a double apodosis. While the first (*spatia ...*, 5.325-26), however, possibly exudes the sense of potentiality observable in the apodoses of *ni faciat ... ferant ... verrantque* (1.58-59) and *et ni docta comes ... admoneat ... inruat ... diverberet* (6.292-24), the second (11.912-14) probably does not. Vividness perhaps justifies those particular present tenses, rather than potential actualization: it is easy to imagine Aeolus distracted and the winds escaping and causing chaos, but could night avoid coming when Aeneas and Turnus are about to fight? Time stands still in a Homeric *if-not*, when Athena stops dawn to give newly-returned Odysseus extra time with Penelope (*Od.* 23.241-46). But the Virgilian narrator refers to the opposite, time running out.

The battle is cut short by nightfall at *Il.* 8.485-88, and with light falling into the ocean, in parallel with the horses bathed in the Iberian flood by Phoebus at *Aen.* 11.913-14 (Gransden 1991, on 11.912-14). This particular postponed battle, however, is not announced through an *if-not*. So, on the basis of the time-stretching in the *Odyssey*, we may choose to read a tiny implication of potentiality in the present subjunctives *ineant* and *temptent* of *Aen.* 11.912-14; as we do with the other present subjunctives cases listed here (1.58-59; 5.325-26; 6.292-94; 11.912-14). One other comparable *if-not* with present subjunctive protasis occurs in Venus' reminder to Aeneas of her rescue of his (and her) family from the Greeks: *et, ni mea cura resistat, / iam flammae tulerint inimicus et hauserit ensis* (2.599-600). The implications of *resistat* combined with *tulerint* and *hauserit* were discussed in chapter two. It is not clear when precisely Venus' action takes place.

We said that the Sibyl's prevention of Aeneas' fight with the bodiless monsters at the entrance to the Underworld seems perplexing. With the syntactically related *ni faciat*, ... (1.58-59), it is clear why Aeolus would want to repress the winds underground; but why would the Sibyl want to stop Aeneas from a pointless act? The word *umbras* underlines the emptiness of the figures (Austin 1977, on 6.294), and while Aeneas may think them dangerous, the Sibyl must know they are not. Horsfall (2013, on 6.291) finds that "The motif of the katabatic hero who draws his sword against the monsters of the Underworld has a complex history". That includes Hercules drawing his sword against the Gorgon, and learning from Hermes that she is a phantom (Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.5.123), Circe telling Odysseus to draw his sword against the shades to protect the sacrificial animal blood which Tiresias has to drink before the others so he can speak (*Od.* 10.535-37) and Odysseus saying he did precisely that (*Od.* 11.48-50). The sequence continues with Odysseus putting away his sword as told by Tiresias and the seer drinking the blood (*Od.* 11.95-99), and shortly telling Odysseus that this is the way to get the shades to talk (*Od.* 11.147-49). There are clearly lots of parallels here with the Virgilian scene.

But there is one interesting contradiction which may be the key to the *if-not*. The Sibyl's objection to Aeneas' sword (6.292) clashes with her earlier instigation to Aeneas to use it (matching Circe's to Odysseus at *Od.* 10.535-37), *tuque invade viam vaginaque eripe ferrum* (6.260). The Virgilian Underworld is well-known for its wealth of contradictions. This is considered one of them, attributed to Virgil's use of multiple sources, which results in "plurality of voices" and "competing perspectives", nowadays, rather than "inconsistencies" (O'Hara 2007: 90-94). Virgil would include clashing stories deliberately, since he does it in the *Georgics* too, when he was, presumably, not short of time (O'Hara 2007: 84-85; 98); or to show off his erudition, and because of the technical difficulties involved in correcting texts on papyri or wooden or wax tablets (Horsfall 1991: 91-102; 2013, on 6.291; 1981)

Continuing from *Od.* 11.147-49, we find: after Tiresias, Odysseus' mother drinks the blood and begins to speak (*Od.* 11.152-54); Odysseus uses his sword to keep the eager shades at

bay so they do not drink the blood all at once and he can question them (*Od.* 11.228-34); when Agamemnon drinks the blood and speaks, Odysseus notices he has little strength (*Od.* 11.390-94); no more blood-drinking is mentioned after that, although some of the shades talk to Odysseus and therefore must have drunk it beforehand. On the basis of this model, the reason for Aeneas being asked by the Sibyl to draw his sword would seem to derive from the need for Odysseus to keep the shades off the blood, or it will not be apportioned correctly (*Od.* 11.228-34); if the blood is wasted, the hero cannot learn the truths spoken by the shades, most crucially by Tiresias (*Od.* 11.96; 11.137; 11.148). Prevention of the collapse of order, then, seems to be involved once more: by juxtaposition with its source, 6.290-94 would seem to be a reminder that the hero may fail to learn his future course of action. The epic would then collapse. The Sibyl's behaviour (stopping Aeneas from brandishing the sword) would seem to cause just that; although she also acts like Tiresias at *Od.* 11.95-99, who tells Odysseus to draw back his sword and let him drink.

One undisputed role of the current *if-not* is that of ending the parade of figures perceived by Aeneas, a type of *ekphrasis* like the one truncated by the double counterfactual at 6.30-36 concerning Daedalus and Icarus, with the resumption of action starting from his brandishing the sword (6.291; Horsfall 2013, on 6.264-94). The two displays of figures are of similar length too, sixteen and a half lines at 6.14-30, or nineteen and a half if we include the counterfactual image of Icarus and the non-counterfactual one of his father trying to draw it (6.30-33), and seventeen at 6.273-89; the counterfactual areas occupy six and a half lines, or three and a half if we put Icarus in the *ekphrasis* at 6.30-36, and three at 6.292-94, with two intermediary lines indicating the return to action (6.291-92). The two cases, then, are structurally similar, although the *ni*-clause is in final position at 6.33-36, following another counterfactual, and in initial position at 6.292-94. The effect of the interruption will be potentially more startling at 6.33-36, although the subjunctive of the apodosis counters that, by revealing from the start that the situation is not factual.

Both *if-nots* shorten an episode which involves Aeneas (and other Trojans in 6.30-36) watching mesmerising figures. At 8.520-26, of the same group, there is no disruption of intense watching, although both sight (*defixique ora tenebant*) and the consideration of hardship (*multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant*) feature in the two apodoses (8.520-22). The entrancing images here come afterwards rather than before, as part of the *ni*-clause: *ni signum caelo Cytherea dedisset aperto* (8.523); this is followed by the depiction of the sound and noise which interrupt Aeneas' and Achates' musings. The *ni*-clause has maximum impact, because of its final position and preceding indicative apodosis.

More extreme instances of clash between indicative apodosis and subjunctive protasis, as already indicated, are at 11.112-18 (*nec veni*) and 12.731-34 (*ensis frangitur*). These are treated

next with 4.18-19, which also has an indicative apodosis. Focus earlier was on weapon-deflecting as a delaying mechanism encased in and out of *if-nots*; it is now on *if-nots* with indicative apodoses and those which resemble them in sense but use the subjunctive.

Aeneas says in mid-speech to the Latin envoys:

*nec veni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent,  
nec bellum cum gente gero; rex nostra reliquit  
hospitia et Turni potius se credidit armis.  
aequius huic Turnum fuerat se opponere morti.  
si bellum finire manu, si pellere Teucros  
apparat, his mecum decuit concurrere telis:  
vixet cui vitam deus aut sua dextra dedisset* (11.112-18).

The clash of not only moods but in particular the tenses of those moods is probably the most striking aspect of the one-line counterfactual *nec veni ... dedissent* (11.112). Other important features in the excerpt are the negative apodosis and the indicatives in Aeneas' suggested alternative to the war, a duel with Turnus (*fuerat*, 11.115; *decuit*, 11.117). The context for the utterance is the truce arranged by the Italians for recovering the bodies (11.100-138). The model is *Il.* 7.381-420, which however has no counterfactual, and no warrior attempting self-justification. The Trojans have just made a trophy for Mezentius, whose death the day before is the climax of book 10, and the funeral procession for Pallas has started. Book 11 is "a splendid intermezzo between the unrelievedly sombre and war-dominated tenth and twelfth books" (Gransden 1991: 7). The key fighting in the poem occurs in those books, when the two chief heroes are both on the battlefield (Hardie 1994: 2). But there are important developments in book 11 towards the final resolution of the conflict; Drances proposes a duel between Turnus and Aeneas at the Latin war council (11.368-75), as Aeneas also suggests (in the current counterfactual, 11.115-18) and Drances heard Latin women suggest (11.215-19). There is also other *if-not* material than *nec veni*, as we saw in chapter three, such as Phoebus' abandonment of Camilla to die (11.794-98).

The clash between *veni*, perfect indicative, and *dedissent*, pluperfect subjunctive, is startling. Precedents in Plautus and Livy use adverbs to remove factuality: *paene in foveam decidi, ni hic adesses* (Plaut. *Pers.* 594-95); *pons sublicius iter paene hostibus dedit, ni unus vir fuisset, Horatius Cocles* (Liv. 2.10.2); *sic prope oneratum est sinistrum Romanis cornu, ni referentibus iam gradum consul increpando simul temeritatem simul ignaviam pudore metum excussisset* (Liv. 2.65.4); the verb in this instance indicates only an attempted action (*conati sunt*): ... *sed obsistere ac retinere conati sunt, ni strictis gladiis viri fortissimi inertes summovissent* (Liv. 22.60.17, in a speech). Virgil's version, therefore, with no softening of the factuality of *veni* (except for the negative, discussed shortly), is radically different from those cases. Plautus has instances of perfect indicative apodoses in conditionals with various types of

time reference: *perii, si me aspexerit* (Plaut. *Amph.* 320) and *interii, si non invenio ego illas viginti minas* (Plaut. *Asin.* 243). These two perfects Lindsay (1936: 61) considers "used of Future time in Conditional sentences". Mugler (1980: 130) adds *provenisti futile, si neque adest neque subvenit* (Plaut. *St.* 398); *si incipies, ... actumst, ilicet, peristi* (Plaut. [actually Ter.] *Eun.* 51); *Quid deliqui, si tecum fui?* (Plaut. *Amph.* 817). All these instances, including Virgil's, are spoken, so rapid thinking may justify the apparent irregularities. Only Virgil's case, however, displays the combination of perfect indicative apodosis without removal of factuality, and pluperfect subjunctive protasis.

Another question is whether Virgil's construction warrants the conjecture of a missing apodosis. Not according to Williams (1973, on 11.112), who compares the current case to 2.54-56, with *impulerat* in the apodosis ("where however the more natural pluperfect is used"). Other critics are silent, perhaps because the perfect applied to *venio* designates a completed state which cannot be extended, or because the sense of the counterfactual is not that of a Homeric *if-not*. Virgil produces no other perfect indicative *if-not* apodosis, and none of Livy's indicative *if-not* apodoses, as shown above, uses a perfect without de-actualizing it. Virgil, therefore, appears to be experimenting with the *if-not* format more daringly than Livy, although only once; Tacitus offers five imperfects, two pluperfects, and one perfect with *prope* (*prope in proelium exarsere, ni Valens ... admonuisset*. Tac. *H.* 1.64; Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 637).

The perfect, however, could be viewed differently. As a statement by Aeneas about his current circumstances, *nec veni* conveys a sense of present. Aspect is generally acknowledged as less important in Latin than in Greek, *memini* as a fossilized perfect used as a present being a rarity, along with *novi* (Pinkster 1990: 231); others ("perfecto de resultado") are *odi, consuevi, percepi, didici, decrevi, consedi, constitui* (Ruiz de Elvira y Serra 1989: 131). Conington (on 11.112) comments that Aeneas, "to show the sincerity of his plea, says that he has not come, as if the present could be annulled by the absence of a condition operating in the past". Aeneas' statement is definitely about the time of speaking, a denial of his current presence; that is subsequently modified by the *ni*-clause which describes the past.

Aeneas' *nec veni* is interesting also for other reasons. Livy's indicative *if-not* apodoses have no negatives (Chausserie-Laprée 1969: 637). Homer has comparable cases (*Il.* 11.504-07; 12.290-93; *Od.* 5.177-79; 10.342-44; 19.343-47). *Aen.* 11.112 conceivably resembles these Homeric instances, particularly the character's ones. The marked use of the indicative, however, does not apply to Homer. The adventurousness of Aeneas' utterance perhaps underlines his reluctance to participate in the events forced upon him by fate. That is one of the clearest motifs in the poem.

Worth exploring is also the relationship of *nec veni* with the indicatives used hypothetically that follow, *fuerat* and *decurt* in the next five lines:

*aequius huic Turnum fuerat se opponere morti.  
 si bellum finire manu, si pellere Teucros  
 apparat, his mecum decuit concurrere telis:  
 vixet cui vitam deus aut sua dextra dedisset* (11.115-18).

In a sentence which resembles a counterfactual without protasis (11.115), followed by a conditional with two protases and one final apodosis (11.116-17), and by either another apodosis or a wish (11.118), Aeneas proposes an alternative to war. The expressions *aequum / difficile / longum / melius / satius est* and verbs that indicate power, convenience and obligation (*possum, debeo, oportet, decet, necesse est*) are commonly expressed in the indicative also when portraying hypothetical situations (Ernout-Thomas 1953: § 264; § 375c). In the first case (*aequius ... morti*), *fuerat* is in the pluperfect indicative. One critic at least, appears to have taken that literally: Conington (on 11.115), while acknowledging one instance of *aequius fuerat* as hypothetical in Plautus (*Trin.* 119), argues that "*fuerat* here is hardly for *fuisset*, but refers to the combat of the day before". As *huic morti* is acknowledged to denote the dead bodies from the battle, that temporal reference is correct. The more widespread opinion, however, is that *fuerat* is hypothetical. That sense of *fuerat* is also supported by the similar use in Latinus' wish for an earlier decision in the forthcoming Latin council (*fuerat melius*, 11.303). In both, an alternative and preferable course of action, as estimated by the speaker, to what has happened is presented. In these constructions, the content of a protasis is in the complement framed in the infinitive: *huic Turnum se opponere morti*. Latinus' version is more clearly hypothetical, because of *ante* and the subjunctive of *vellem*, which underlines that the wished-for events did not happen: *Ante equidem summa de re statuisset, Latini, / et vellem et fuerat melius, ...* (11.302-03). If Latinus wishes something, it means it is not there now. That is also the logic of the indicatives *aequum / melius est, possum* etc., and as used in the next conditional (*decuit concurrere*): a judgment on what is desired, possible, or better generally implies that there are at least two states or courses of action, one materialized and one not. That also applies to *volo*, of course, but whereas for *volo* the subjunctive is clearly perceived as necessary, it is not for the other expressions; the speaker's estimation that there is an alternative is enough to make sense in the indicative.

Following his wish that Turnus alone rather than his whole army had faced death, Aeneas expands that thought with more conditional material: *si bellum finire manu, si pellere Teucros / apparat, his mecum decuit concurrere telis* (11.116-17). The present indicative *apparat* in the initial protasis suggests that the speaker considers the materialization of *apparo* possible. The perfect indicative *decuit* in the apodosis, however, refers to the past, a temporal reference confirmed by mention of the weapons from the earlier battle (*his telis*). Aeneas judges that fighting with him would have been the right thing for Turnus to do on the day before, in alternative to what fight did take place.

He then goes on to express a further counterfactual estimation in a pluperfect subjunctive line which extends the apodosis: *vixet cui vitam deus aut sua dextra dedisset* (11.118). This wish for a different past is interesting. Conington (on 11.118) finds that *vixet* "has a potential or quasiimperative [sic] sense, '*vivere debuerat*'". He also finds the alternative, divine favour and human prowess, perplexing, as Aeneas would know that both are needed for success. That, and the fiction that either contender may have won, construct Aeneas as rather disingenuous. While he occupies an ontological sphere which prevents him from seeing the entire poem, for the narrator to present the privileged hero talk as if the outcome is undecided, is slightly mischievous.

Aeneas' complex counterfactual plays a significant role, which is that of announcing the mechanism that will lead to the resolution: a duel. A syntactic aspect underlines that connection, and that is the preponderance of indicatives in the largely counterfactual region. The end is gradually materializing. The influence of the verbs that have a hypothetical sense though indicative, has been identified by Gransden (1991, on 11.112): the perfect indicative of *veni* "may perhaps be seen as an extension of the common use of the indicative of *sum, possum*, etc. in an apodosis implying possibility". Gransden gives 4.18-19 as another instance of that. The indicative used in a counterfactual apodosis there also coincides with the beginning of actualization. We turn next to that counterfactual.

Dido tells her sister of her qualms about her attraction to Aeneas:

*si mihi non animo fixum immotumque sederet  
ne cui me vinclo vellem sociare iugali,  
postquam primus amor deceptam morte fefellit;  
si non pertaesum thalami taedaeque fuisset,  
huic uni forsitan potui succumbere culpae* (4.15-19).

This expands the topic introduced by the narrator in the first five lines of the book (Dido's interest in Aeneas), and consists of two initial protases and one final apodosis. The double protasis is emphatic, like *si bellum finire manu, si pellere Teucros / apparat* in the case just analyzed (11.116-17), but does not share the single verb, is longer and in the negative. Like 2.54, which is also a double protasis in the negative (but with a single verb), it forms part of an *if-not* of sorts despite initial position; neither of them redirects the narrative. The apodosis has the perfect indicative *potui*, and it is its status which is of most interest in relation to the context of the counterfactual: the love between Dido and Aeneas, which fills book 4. In the long run, of course, this particular instance of hypothetical indicative matters less than those analyzed above (*veni, fuerat, decuit*), because book 4 has no lasting impact on the final outcome; whereas the proposal of a duel between the two main heroes does.

The first protasis has an imperfect subjunctive verb, *sederet*; the second protasis, with impersonal construction, has the pluperfect subjunctive, (*pertaesum*) *fuisset*. The first protasis,



therefore, refers to the present, and the second to the past. That is not strange, as the first protasis clearly describes a current state of affairs (Dido's reluctance to enter marriage), and begins to root that state in the past, by referring to her first husband's death; and the second protasis retains Dido's viewpoint focussed on the past, when she became wary of marriage. There are, then, five parts to Dido's counterfactual, each coinciding with one line. The sequence starts with the first clause (and line) and the second as its subject: *si mihi non ... sederet* requires *ne ... me .. vellem sociare* to make sense; and the resulting combination resembles a double negative: *si mihi ne me vellem sociare non sederet* (4.15-16); we know that Virgil was keen on multiple negatives (*Geo.* 1.83; 1.118-21). The third clause and line (4.17), *postquam primus amor deceptam morte fefellit*, comments on the event that caused Dido's aversion to marriage, and the tense of its verb, the perfect (*fefellit*) remains as time reference for the tense of the verb of the second protasis (the pluperfect subjunctive *fuisset*) on the fourth line: *si non pertaesum thalami taedaeque fuisset* (4.18). Both protases, then, are counterfactual, but the second half of the group moves back in time; the last word of the protasis area is *fuisset*. When we come to the apodosis on the fifth line (4.19), what are we to make of *potui*?

One interesting aspects to this *potui* is its juxtaposition to *forsan*. Use of *forsan*, a poetic version of *forsitan*, with the indicative started with Virgil, and was adopted by later poets, according to Austin (1979, on 4.19); this was done by analogy with *fortasse*. The more common mood with *forsan* and *forsitan* is the subjunctive.

Another is the feature it shares with *fuerat* (11.115) and *decuīt* (11.118), as mentioned, which is the later actualization of the alternatives the speaker presents as possible but unreal at the time. These clauses are of the type analyzed by Orlandini (2005: 625-26) as non-deictic, signalling a possibility, or obligation, and its non-actualization. But in the cases in question, the events envisaged by the indicatives are not unreal forever. Dido estimates that she could marry Aeneas, and a version of that happens; Aeneas estimates that Turnus could fight with him, and they do. The potentiality for realization contained in those indicatives becomes activated. The results, of course, are different in the two cases. The materialized possibility of Dido's *potui* in book 4 is truncated by Jupiter because contrary to Aeneas' mission, whereas that of Aeneas' *fuerat* and *decuīt* in book 11 is the duel that ends the poem. We can add 12.731-33 (*frangitur ... deserit ... ni ... subeat*), occurring within the duel, as also announcing the impending end. The confusing identity of the sword that breaks adds to that motif. As *nec veni, nisi ... dedissent* (11.112-18) presents the possibility of a duel between the two principal heroes, actualized at the time of 12.731-33, there is continuity between the two, and the move towards a resolution is accompanied by an increase in the discrepancy between apodosis and protasis; *frangitur ... deserit ... ni subeat* is more extreme than *nec veni, nisi dedissent*. Aeneas will refer to the *if-not* game at the very end: *tunc hinc spoliis indute meorum eripiare mihi?* (12.947-48).

A totally different case is that involving Marcellus. The words between *heu* and *eris* in

lines 6.882-883 used to be taken as a conditional, here quoted with the end of the section:

*heu, miserande puer, si qua fata aspera rumpas,  
tu Marcellus eris. manibus date lilia plenis,  
purpureos spargam flores animamque nepoti  
his saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani  
munere. ... ... (6.882-86).*

This is spoken by Anchises to Aeneas and the Sibyl at the end of his parade of future Romans (6.752-892). Scholars have debated whether it is a conditional, given the clash between the verb in the supposed protasis, present subjunctive *rumpas*, and that in the supposed apodosis which follows, future indicative *eris*. Another relevant aspect of the line and a half is that the Marcellus being addressed is one of a pair, and an implicit comparison between the two figures is therefore implied. We will treat this first, as it may shed light on the other question.

The two figures called Marcellus appear in succession at the end of Anchises' presentation of Roman heroes to Aeneas and the Sibyl (6.854-59 and 6.860-86, out of 6.752-892); the second Marcellus is not named until the possible apodosis. Anchises has just forecast another pair of opposing elements: statuary, rhetoric and astrology as the specialities of Greece (6.847-50), and peace and law those of Rome (6.851-53). Aeneas, of course, will never see the embodied versions of any of the figures, or Greece and Rome either, but all four entities will be familiar to Virgil's contemporaries. After the Marcelli, advice to Aeneas on the wars he is to fight is dispatched in just three lines of reported speech (6.890-92).

The first, clearest difference between the two Marcelli is in the number of lines devoted to each: six to the earlier hero, and twenty-six and one foot to the later one, including the respective speaking formulas and narratorial description of the second Marcellus. The more recent Marcellus, therefore, whose identity is not made clear until the end of the sequence, is in that respect the more actualized. The two appear together (*quis, pater, ille, virum qui sic comitatur euntem?* 6.863), an unremarkable occurrence in Virgil's Underworld, as Silvius and Procas, for instance, belonging to different times, also feature next to each other (6.767). That vicinity is reminiscent of Roman anachronistic comparisons between historical figures, such as that between Alexander and Papirius in Livy's counterfactual digression (Liv. 9.16.19-19). There are also two Alexanders in Livy's account, one the uncle of the other, who actually landed in Italy, and could have easily turned against Rome (Liv. 8.3.6-7; also 8.17; 8.24).

There is, then, an obvious aspect of *synkrisis* in the juxtaposition of the two Marcelli. But, differently from Alexander and the Roman generals in Livy, or Aeneas and Turnus in the *Aeneid*, the two Marcelli are not quite competing. They are nevertheless a variant of each other. In Anchises' description, Marcellus One towers above the rest: *aspice, ut ... Marcellus ... / ingreditur victorque viros supereminet omnis* (6.855-56). Marcellus Two, as portrayed by the

narrator and perhaps through Aeneas' eyes, also sticks out, but rather for his looks: *atque hic Aeneas (una namque ire videbat / egregium forma iuvenem ... ) ...* (6.860-61); in Aeneas' words, *quantum instar in ipso!* (6.865). Anchises reports that Marcellus One will support Rome in times of commotion: *hic rem Romanam magno turbante tumulto / sistet eques* (6.857-58). And Aeneas remarks on the noise which surrounds Marcellus Two: *qui strepitus circa comitum!* (6.865). Two different types of uproar are intended, but we can assume that both involve noise. Both Marcelli carry arms. Marcellus One dedicates those of the defeated enemy general (*spolia opima*) to Quirinus, this being the third occurrence in Roman history (after Romulus and Cossus): *ut insignis spoliis ... opimis, / .... tertiaque arma patri suspendet capta Quirino* (6.855; 6.859). As perceived by the narrator and possibly Aeneas, Marcellus Two has shining weapons, *fulgentibus armis* (6.861), and as portrayed by Anchises is invincible in war: *invictaque bello / dextera!* (6.878-79).

As we can see from this comparison, some of the defining traits of the first Marcellus are repeated in the second. But not all are, and the ones that are replicated fail to reach completion. We know that the historical character was intended as Augustus' successor, but died at nineteen in 23 BC. In Anchises' forecast, this Marcellus lacks Marcellus One's principal achievement: *sternet Poenos Gallumque rebellem* (6.858); the *spolia opima*, which he carries on the first line of his description (6.855), come from the Gaul general Virdomarus defeated at Clastidium in 222 BC (Horsfall 2013, on 6.855, 6.858). The second Marcellus will never get round to an equivalent accomplishment. His shiny weapons (6.861), perceived by Aeneas, are just that, and his invincibility in war, along with piety and ancient honour (*heu pietas, heu prisca fides, invictaque bello / dextera* 6.878-79), remain at their potential stage. Saving the country (*hic rem Romanam, magno turbante tumulto / sistet eques*, 6.858-59) is also more important than merely attracting a murmuring crowd, as Aeneas sees Marcellus Two doing (*qui strepitus circa comitum!* 6.865).

Marcellus Two, as said above, occupies more lines in the text than the other. He has traits unrepeated in the more successful Marcellus: sadness and downcast eyes (*frons laeta parum et deiecto lumina voltu*, 6.862), and darkness around his head (*nox atra caput tristi circumvolat umbra*, 6.866). This is how Aeneas sees him, when he asks Anchises about the unidentified young man; and Anchises' reply contains more death-related material (*ingentem luctum, gemitus, funera, tumulum recentem*, 6.867-874). Marcellus One's succinctly described successes (6.854-59), then, are replaced in Marcellus Two by a longer account of both attenuated versions of those successes and absence of success (6.860-886). The first Marcellus was clearly established as the model against which to measure the second.

Until the audience reaches the possible conditional (6.882-83), however, the identity of the second Marcellus is unknown; except, that is, by Anchises' piling up of details which would have probably revealed that identity to Virgil's target audience. Before we tackle that

conditional, we must discuss a counterfactual which is slightly hidden in Anchises' praise of the young Marcellus. Anchises makes an interesting comment on the fates' behaviour towards the young man Aeneas inquires after, and expands on the consequences of a different sequence of events:

*ostendent terris hunc tantum fata neque ultra  
esse sinent. nimium vobis Romana propago  
visa potens, superi, propria haec si dona fuissent* (6.869-71).

The second sentence is a counterfactual, with protasis last. Its meaning is considered conventional, the gods' jealousy of excessively successful mortals, but its grammar is interesting. It has a pluperfect deponent/passive subjunctive apodosis, *visa (esset)*, and a pluperfect subjunctive protasis, *fuissent*. The addition of *esset* is proposed by Horsfall (2013, on 6.870-71); scholarly suggestions vary. The previous sentence is a forecast: *ostendent ... sinent* (6.869-70). Anchises comments in the second on the effect of the materialization of that future, captured in the protasis *propria haec si dona fuissent* (6.871). The forecast then continues for six lines as Anchises contemplates Marcellus' funeral (*aget, videbis*; 6.872-74) and praises his potential (*tollet, iactabit*; 6.875-77). After *heu pietas, heu prisca fides, ...* (6.878-79), which has no obvious time reference, we return to a counterfactual past as perceived from a present which has Marcellus actualized:

*non illi se quisquam impune tulisset  
obvius armato, seu cum pedes iret in hostem  
seu spumantis equi foderet calcaribus armos* (6.879-81).

The pluperfect subjunctive *tulisset* roots the counterfactual apodosis in the past. Marcellus has already existed and is now dead (Horsfall 2013, on 6.879-80). He is not just prophesied and still unreal, and not alive either. The imperfect subjunctives *iret* and *foderet* in two subordinate clauses which follow, however, refer to the present. One possible reason for the mismatch is that another protasis closer to *non illi se quisquam impune tulisset* is implied, and *seu cum pedes iret ... seu ... equi foderet* act rather as clauses which depict Marcellus' typical activities; and, given he is attributed stock Roman values such as *pietas* etc., that is the case whether he ever carried them out or not. The grammar here, Horsfall (2013, on 6.880-81) argues, is that of a temporal clause (*seu cum*) followed by a protasis (*seu*); "either when ... or if", as also considered by Butler (1920, on 6.881). The temporal clause suggests repetition (of infantry pursuits), whereas the protasis does not (of cavalry). Concerning the theory of the missing protasis, it was perhaps the slight irregularity of these clauses that suggested it to Butler: for *tulisset*, he imagines "had it been written in the fates that he should come to full manhood" (Butler 1920, on 6.879). We can read, then, at least two legitimate viewpoints for *non illi se quisquam impune tulisset*: either Marcellus has lived and is now dead, and Anchises is reflecting on his prowess,

which is no longer repeatable; or Marcellus is also dead, but Anchises' comment refers to that stage of prowess never having come. The difference between the two probably depends on whether Marcellus had shown prowess before death or not. As Virgil's audience knew he participated in battles, the Cantabrian campaign led by Augustus in 26 BC (Austin 1977, on 6.879-81; Traina 1997, on 6.878-79), Butler may be supplying an apodosis which is not quite accurate: Marcellus did the things contemplated in the apodosis *non ... tulisset / obuius armato* (6.879-80). The cavalry activity, incidentally, which would emphasize the similarity of this Marcellus to the one who defeated Carthaginians and Gauls as a knight (*eques*, 6.858), features in the non-temporal clause: *seu spumantis equi foderet calcaribus armos* (6.881). That removes a potentially closer match between ancestor and descendant.

After that, the contested conditional comes; here quoted again, with the end of Anchises' prophecy and in pre-Wagner's punctuation:

*heu, miserande puer, si qua fata aspera rumpas,  
tu Marcellus eris. manibus date lilia plenis,  
purpureos spargam flores animamque nepoti  
his saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani  
munere* (6.882-86).

Of *tu Marcellus eris*, the supposed apodosis following the protasis *si qua fata aspera rumpas*, Servius (on 6.883) says: *talis qualis est Marcellus*. In a 1986 article which nearly put the matter to rest according to Horsfall (2013, on 6.882), Shackleton Bailey asked: how could everyone believe, with Servius, that *tu Marcellus eris* (6.883) meant he was like his ancestor? Quite easily, since the two share many traits. But let us follow Shackleton Bailey's argument. The future (*eris*) is an obstacle. Both Anchises and Virgil's audience knew that Marcellus would never become like his ancestor. Wagner, in his revision of Heyne's 1830-35 edition of Virgil, proposed *utinam* as the meaning of *si qua*, and an exclamation mark at the end of the line. That would make *si qua ... rumpas* a wish, which was a reading welcome by many, including Page, also because of the emphasis it gives to *tu Marcellus eris* on the next line (Shackleton Bailey 1986: 202). There was clearly no chance, however, of that wish being fulfilled: therefore, "*Si qua ... rumpas* is the protasis of a condition like *si qua fata sinant* in 1.18, not a prayer; but *tu Marcellus eris* is not its apodosis". The apodosis in question is rather silence, and the figure of speech thus generated aposiopesis. Instances of that silence, not in a conditional setting, are found in books 1 (Neptune rebuking the winds: *quos ego - ! sed motos praestat componere ...* 1.135), 2 (Sinon: *... donec Calchante ministro - / sed quid ego haec ... revolve?* 2.100-101) and 5 (Mnestheus: *quamquam o - sed superent, ... Neptune;* 5.195) (Shackleton Bailey 1986: 203). One translation, Rolfe Humphries' published in 1951, got it right:

Poor boy,

If you should break the cruel fates, if only -  
You are to be Marcellus. (6.882-886. Shackleton Bailey 1986: 204).

So, we have reached *si qua fata aspera rumpas! / tu Marcellus eris*, with exclamation mark.

The account is interesting and instructive. As Goold (1992: 121) objects, however, all instances of aposiopesis quoted in support have *sed*, and this one does not. The subjunctive *rumpas* would then be better read as an unfulfilled wish, like the Greek construction εἰ γάρ with the optative, and similarly to Aeneas' exclamation earlier in book 6, *si nunc se nobis ille aureus ramus / ostendat nemore in tanto!* (6.187-88); and, added by Horsfall (2013, on 882), who supports Goold's view, Evander's *o mihi praeteritos referat si Iuppiter annos* (8.560). Goold also supplies parallel instances of subjunctive used as optative in later texts (Goold 1992: 244n31). In wishes expressed with *utinam*, moreover, we do not think there is a silent apodosis (Goold 1992: 121).

Goold's arguments may be sound. If we accept that *si qua fata aspera rumpas* is a hopeless wish, though, in what sense is the future indicative *eris* understood to happen? Goold sees *tu Marcellus eris* as the revelation at long last of the identity of "the young man who, when born, is to be Marcellus" (Goold 1992: 121). It is hard to disagree that the name comes at the end of a lengthy description of the figure of the young man spotted by Aeneas. Anchises appears to have resumed his prophecy after taking a present viewpoint and bemoaning what Marcellus could have been (*non illi ... tulisset / ... seu ... / seu ...* 6.879-81). Cavazza (1988: *Rumpo*), on the other hand, notices that most read the two lines in question as a wish mixed with a conditional, and considers that interpretation to justify the indicative apodosis; that it because it declares certainty, as in Horace's (possibly early 23 BC. Hutchinson 2002: 528) *si fractus illabatur orbis, / impavidum ferient ruinae* (Hor. *Carm.* 3.3.7-8; "if the firmament were to split and crash down upon him, he will still be unafraid when hit by the wreckage") and *quodsi meis inaequet praecordiis / libera bilis, ... / ... / desinet imparibus certare summotus pudor* (Hor. *Epod.* 11.15-18; "But if a liberating rage boiled in my heart, ... my shame would [= will] be banished and I would no longer compete with people who are not my equals"), as well as Plautus' *si te di ament, linguam comprimes* (Plaut. *Mil.* 571; "if the gods love you, you'll keep your tongue in check"). Whatever precedes, the clause in the future indicative states a future fact.

We can leave the matter unresolved. Virgil may be playing, again, with combinations of moods and tenses which create a break between protasis and apodosis. The subsequent lines continue the game. After *tu Marcellus eris*, which constructs a narrator (Anchises) speaking from the present of the Underworld and still showing future Romans to Aeneas, the last of whom is the Marcellus who will die young, speech turns to the near present of Virgil's contemporaries. Anchises is now not only at Marcellus' funeral talking to other attendees,

*manibus date lilia plenis*, but also actively participating in it: either in a forecast of what he will be doing, or in hypothetical participation. One of the verbs used is exclusively present subjunctive: *animamque nepotis / his saltem accumulem donis*; but the other two could be also future indicative: *purpureos spargam flores* and *fungar inani / munere* (6.883-86). So, in two of these cases Anchises may be foreseeing himself. The subjunctive of the third, however, possibly eliminates that possibility. Horsfall (2013, on 6.884) comments that "*accumulem* appears decisive, because it can only be subjunctive, and in that case, it is hard to argue that any of the 'ambiguous' verbs should be taken as future". He also translates: "I shall scatter bright, red flowers. I shall at least heap the soul of my descendant with these gifts and perform this empty task" (6.883-86). Virgil is clearly not the only one to make creative use of moods and tenses.

## Chapter Six. *The Counterfactuals of the Games for Anchises*

An aspect of counterfactuality that we saw addressed by Timberlake (2007: 321-22), is that alternative stories are always implicit in speech. In Virgil's time and earlier, one manifestation of this was the literary technique of *synkrisis*. This chapter will examine how Virgil dramatizes the competition between the alternatives that are present in speech in the funeral games for Anchises. The games will be read as parallels to the narrative developments which are possible and which come to materialization to different degrees, and some not at all. Focus will be on the relation of these possibilities to *if-not* constructions.

The role of the games for Anchises (5.104-544, or 5.603), based on those for Patroclus (*Il.* 23.257-897), has been widely debated. The games offered Virgil the opportunity "for the most sustained rivalry with Homer" (Quinn 1968: 151). There are obvious similarities with the Trojans' journey at large: in book 1, for instance, as the Trojans set out from the coast of Sicily, Aeneas addresses his crew; that is mentioned in Mnesteus' speech to his crew in the boat race, which also refers to the Trojans' bravery in the earlier episode, when tackling the sandbanks off the coast of Libya (5.192; 1.108-12; Feldherr 1995: 260-61). On a wider scale, the turn around the *meta* which the competing ships have to make, has been seen to correspond to the Trojans' voyage from Troy to Latium via Sicily and Carthage; and to the Argonauts' journey to Colchis and back, Apollonius providing more source material, including vocabulary, to Virgil (Nelis 2001: 210; Fratantuono & Smith 2015: 14-17). The many similarities unify the different parts of the poem, with emphasis on the change from past to future (Galinsky 1968: 166). Just by looking at these few points, we can identify at least two forms of implicit *synkrisis* present in the games: that between Homer and Virgil, with Virgil the acknowledged winner (Farrell 2007: 232), and that between the games and the *Aeneid*, the games possibly "an imperfect mirror" of elements of the rest of the poem (Feldherr 1995: 260). We can add that the Virgilian competitors are Trojan and Sicilian, which is another form of comparison.

Virgil modified the Homeric games. He reduced the number of games from eight to four, and of lines from 640 (*Il.* 23.257-897) to 440 (5.104-544). He also added the *lusus Troiae* after the games (5.545-603), not quite a game but rather a display with mock battle (5.585-87); which the games, of course, are too. Heinze's 1902 summary of differences is still regarded as valid, and is used here for what follows (Heinze 2000: 121-25). Homer's first contest, a chariot race, takes up more lines (389) than the rest put together, each becoming progressively shorter; the last is 14 lines long. Virgil's first game is also longer than any of the other three, but the third is long too; so the pattern is long-short-long-short (boat races 5.114-285, 171 lines; foot races 5.286-561, 75 lines; boxing 5.362-484, 122 lines; archery 5.485-544, 59 lines). The last game does not happen in Homer, and all go home; Agamemnon is given the prize, rather than Meriones, because he is known for his superior javelin skills. In Virgil, a prodigy settles the last



game, and the *lusus Troiae* follows. Each contest starts with a formula in Homer, whereas there is variation both in the introduction and in the rest of the events in Virgil. There are difficulties in Homer's contests, but five go smoothly. Virgil uses Homer's difficulties in the middle games: in the second, a dispute follows Nisus' trick, as in Homer's chariot-race; in the third, two competitors are separated, as in Homer's wrestling match and armed combat. So, more problems beset Virgil's competitions than Homer's. Also, Virgil's competitors were not already familiar to the audience, as Homer's were, and therefore had to be built up to become interesting; Virgil does that in the boat race by making them ancestors of current-day illustrious Roman families. And as Aeneas holds the games at a memorial service rather than a funeral, it had to be at least at the relevant grave; which Aeneas conveniently happened to be at a year after the funeral. We can add that there is no pre-existing rift among the Virgilian competitors, whereas there is the obvious one between Achilles, the supervisor of the games, and Agamemnon, one of the competitors, in the *Iliad*. But Virgil's competitors are Trojan and Sicilian, so the potential for discord is there too. Virgil's replacement of Homer's chariot race with a boat race is important too, as it is his own invention apparently unprecedented in epic (Williams 1960, on 5.114; Willcock 1988: 1-2).

Counterfactual sentences are two each in the boat race, though this first case is complex (consecutively, 5.229-34), and boxing match (5.397-400, 5.410-12) and three in the foot race (5.323-26, 5.343-47, 5.353-56); the last race and the *lusus Troiae* have none. We will explore first the more evident features concerning counterfactuality shared by all games and then how each counterfactual behaves in the given game, including in the episodes without any, and how that relates to key aspects of the whole poem.

One remarkable feature shared by all games, is emphasis on initial fairness; another is the narrator's frequent observation of couples of competitors sharing the same position. In the first game, prizes are laid out, and described (5.109-12). The four boats of the first game are well matched, *pares* (5.114), and their starting position is drawn by lot, *tum loca sorte legunt* (5.132); at the signal they set off together, *omnes prosiluere* (5.139-40), and for a while continue that way, *infindunt pariter sulcos* (5.142). Immediately obvious in this are two things: as the boats have to turn round a post to win, those on the inside will be advantaged (Williams 1960, on 5.132); and their sailing abreast seems gratuitous. The placement by lot is Homeric (*Il.* 23.352-57), indeed reference to the chariot race comes right after the image of the boats sailing in parallel in a jocular claim to superiority (5.144-47); Homer, however, presents no equivalent stress on equality. That emphasis resurfaces at 5.154-55, where two of the boats are described as equidistant from the one in front: Gyas is first, closely followed by Cloanthus, and then come Mnestheus and Sergestus, *aequo discrimine* (5.154). The initial parity is gradually dissipating. But after alternately taking the lead, the last two boats become parallel again: *nunc una ambae iunctisque feruntur / frontibus* (5.157-58). The next movements, shed of complications,

are as follows: Cloanthus, in second place earlier, overtakes Gyas (5.167-71); Sergestus and Mnestheus hope to overtake (5.183-84), and Sergestus overtakes Mnestheus by part of a boat (5.185-86). All this action, which includes Gyas replacing his pilot Menoetes after pushing him into the water for disobeying, occurs near to the turning-point. Then Mnestheus, after reference to the Trojans' courageous negotiation of the sandbanks off Libya in the real voyage with his counterpart Aeneas at the head (1.108-12), makes a claim about the agonistic situation: his aim is neither to be first nor last, and Neptune's chosen one should win (5.194-97). Next, the narrator attributes the glory of Mnestheus' rowers to chance: *attulit ipse viris optatum casus honorem* (5.201); that is because Sergestus gets stuck on a rock (5.202-04). Mnestheus and Cloanthus are left to fight it out (5.218-19). As Willcock (1988: 9) observes, two incidents around the *meta* mirror each other. The boat that takes the inside is advantaged in the first (Cloanthus; the angry Gyas throws his own pilot into the water), and disadvantaged in the second (Sergestus, who is overtaken by Mnestheus). This symmetry constitutes yet another form of pairing in what is evidently a carefully organized pattern; this can be contrasted with Homer's chariot races, which have two pairs of competitors who act as if in two separate races, and a fifth, Meriones, who is incompetent (Heinze 2000: 130, §161). Cloanthus alone is at the front (5.225). At this point two counterfactuals are spoken by the narrator, discussed later because we are now focusing on manifestations of parity. Cloanthus then prays to the gods and wins when pushed forward by the god Portunus (5.235-43). Aeneas gives Sergestus, the most humiliated of the competitors, a prize too, which was promised (*promisso munere*) although not in the text (5.282-85); this particular feature, differently from the explicit stress on parity of various sorts, is also in Homer (*Il.* 23.534-650).

The much shorter second game, a foot race, contains similar but also very different material. Aeneas opens the race to anyone, and sets out the prizes (5.291-92). He states he will give all competitors identical presents, *omnibus hic erit unus honos* (5.308); the first three to reach the end, will have prizes as well as olive crowns on their heads (5.308-14). This is a version of fairness. On this occasion, however, at the signal the contenders separate immediately: Nisus is in front, followed by Salius, Euryalus, Helymus and last Diores (5.318-26). No two run abreast, as some of the boats did. The first counterfactual comes at 5.325-26. There are complications towards the end: near the goal, Nisus falls and trips up Salius so Euryalus can win; the others follow in the order in which they started (5.334-39). Other athletes, listed at the beginning, disappear from the story, along with the many unnamed (*multi praeterea*, 5.302). The named competitors' places of origin are reported, and include Acarnia, Tegea (Arcadia) and Sicily, besides Troy (5.296-300); in the boat race, the Roman families descended from the contenders were mentioned (5.116-23). Prizes are allocated: while Salius remonstrates (5.340-42), the spectators back Euryalus' victory (5.343-44), because of his looks, and so does Diores, for fear of losing his own prize (5.345-47). Aeneas then creates another

prize for Salius, which triggers Nisus to claim one too; his argument includes a counterfactual, which again will be discussed later (5.348-58). Yet another prize is then instituted by Aeneas for Nisus (5.358-61).

The boxing match, open to anyone but involving only two contenders, again emphasizes fairness of chance. Two prizes are offered by Aeneas, a more valuable one for the winner, a horse, and a less valuable one for the loser, a sword and helmet (5.365-67). A new situation arises this time: one competitor is too strong, so no suitable opponent can be found. This is the Trojan Dares, who used to fight with Paris and killed the champion Butes; unopposed, he claims the first prize, supported by the spectators (5.368-82). In the absence of a second contender, it is perhaps fair that the other takes the prize. But an opponent is found, when Acestes chides Entellus for not coming forward (5.387-93). Entellus then bemoans old age, partly in a counterfactual, to be examined later (5.397-400), and throws the heavy boxing gloves that Eryx had used against Heracles into the ring (5.400-05; 5.410-16, including another counterfactual, the last in the games). As Feldherr (2002: 67) observes, Entellus' ethnicity is unclear: Virgil makes him Sicilian (5.392-93), and Hyginus, according to Servius (on 5.389) makes him Trojan. The ethnic identities associated with the boxing gloves are also mixed. At the sight of Eryx's gloves, Dares is dismayed and refuses to fight (5.406-07). Having started too strong, he now sees himself at a disadvantage. Entellus then offers to make the fight even, *aequemus pugnas*, by his own use of different gloves than Eryx's, if Dares also gives up his Trojan ones; Aeneas provides the egalitarian gloves (*caestus aequos, paribus armis*) (5.417-25). Entellus mentions that the owner of the frightening gloves, Eryx, was Aeneas' brother (*germanus ... tuus*. 5.412). He (of unclear ethnicity) had offered, therefore, to fight with Trojan Dares by means of Trojan gloves. This situation is not dissimilar from that which involves Turnus at risk of fighting Aeneas with a sword made by the maker of Aeneas' armour, Vulcan (12.88-91). This time round, the potential awkwardness is resolved by the use of neutral gloves. Virgil may be attempting to merge ethnicities in preparation for the eventual outcome of the poem; the purpose of the *Aeneid* is after all to provide its Augustan audience with an account of their origins.

The fight between Entellus and Dares goes ahead (5.426-45), the narrator underlining the contenders' respective advantages: *ille pedum melior motu fretusque iuventa, / hic membris et mole valens; sed tarda trementi / genua labant ...* (5.430-31). Entellus falls, which prompts Acestes to lift him up; both Trojan and Sicilian spectators, also two sides which are in potential competition, rise and shout (5.446-52), concurrent action (*consurgunt*, 5.450) perhaps underlining the blending of the two groups. Entellus then regains the upper hand, but Aeneas intervenes to end the fight, so preventing excessive damage to Dares; he quotes the gods as arbiters (5.453-67). This entire episode would seem to consist of repeated attempts at restoring various types of evenness; remarkable in this context is the word *aequales* for Dares' mates,

who carry him to the ship (5.468-70). The final episode clinches that search for equity: as Dares is removed, Entellus kills an available substitute, the ox he has won as a prize (5.477-81). He comments on the substitution, too: *meliozem animam pro morte Daretis / persolvo* (5.482-84); *meliozem* would seem to indicate a comparison with Dares, variously explained by commentators. The killing of the ox is also a more actualized variant of the same in a simile in Apollonius' own boxing match, in which Amycus is said to hit Polydeuces as he would an ox (Apoll. *Arg.* 2.90-92; Feldherr 2002: 76); the end differs, we may note, as Polydeuces kills Amycus instead (*Arg.* 2.94-98).

In the last game, fairness first materializes in Aeneas' invitation to all to join, and then in the drawing of lots to determine the order in which the four competitors will throw their arrows (5.490-91). The target is a dove tied to a mast. Aeneas sets out the prizes, with no details given (5.486). One peculiarity of this game is that only the first successful attempt matters. The third throw is successful: Hippocoon strikes the mast, Mnestheus the rope, and Eurytion the liberated dove (5.500-18). Acestes, therefore, has nothing to strike and no hope of winning (*amissa palma*, 5.519). Also, the target is temporarily missing, because the second archer has freed it by cutting the rope (5.512-15). Those two events work against the egalitarian streak that traverses the games. There is more parity, as collective behaviour, in the *pariter* which qualifies the spectators' gazes fixed on the fleeing dove once Mnestheus has freed her (5.508); the adverb reinforces *omnia*, which refers to the whole audience applauding (5.506).

Acestes, then, would seem to be disqualified from the contest, and the spectators unanimously watch the target fly off and being hit. But Acestes shoots the arrow anyway, the arrow catches fire in the sky and vanishes (5.520-27). The audience's reaction again shows collective action, ethnic identities underlined: *superosque precati / Trinacrii Teucrique viri* (5.529-30). Trojans and Sicilians are blending. Then, on account of the prodigy which accompanied Acestes' shot, Aeneas gives him a bowl that was Anchises' as first prize. The bowl has the quality of a mini-*ekphrasis*, being deemed by Aeneas a present from Cisseus of Thrace to Anchises as token of friendship, and also being engraved with figures, *impressum signis* (5.530-38). We are not told what the figures are, which is reminiscent of another part-*ekphrasis*: that is the more developed but doubly truncated portrayal of the figures on the doors of the temple to Phoebus in Cumae (6.20-33). In both cases, the incompleteness of the stories is mentioned. In the current case, there is no indication of what the images may be, although we are told the precedents of the bowl. The allocation of prizes continues. Eurytion, who shot the bird, does not mind losing the first prize, and we are not told whether he receives one; Mnestheus, who shot the rope, receives his, and last does Hippocoon, who hit the mast (5.541-44). It would seem that divine intervention is prized in this game. There are no syntactic counterfactuals in this game, and in the *lusus Troiae* which follows either. Is it perhaps because neither is quite a game?

We can now analyze the syntactic counterfactuals. The first two, in the boat race, follow each other, with a small amount of material in between:

*hi proprium decus et partum indignantur honorem  
ni teneant, vitamque volunt pro laude pacisci;  
hos successus alit: possunt, quia posse videntur.  
et fors aequatis cepissent praemia rostris,  
ni palmas ponto tendens utrasque Cloanthus  
fudisset preces divosque in vota vocasset (5.229-34).*

The second counterfactual is clearly an *if-not*, with narrowly avoided event (*et fors ... cepissent ... / ni ... Cloanthus / fudissetque ... vocasset*. 5.232-34), whereas the first (*hi ... indignantur ... / ni teneant*. 5.229-30) is not, because the *ni*-clause, although in final position, does not reverse a likely outcome. The *if-not* (5.232-34) has regular pluperfect subjunctive verbs in all clauses (*cepissent, fudisset, vocasset*), and thus refers to the past. The counterfactual (5.229-30) has an initial indicative apodosis (*indignantur*) and a present subjunctive protasis (*teneant*), so referring to the present; the two clauses clash. We will start the analysis from that sentence.

One first peculiarity of *hi ... teneant* (5.229-30) is that it starts at the same distance from the beginning of the games as Homer's first *if-not* does in the corresponding games; that is 125 lines from the place generally acknowledged as the beginning (*Il.* 23.382-84, within 23.257-897; *Aen.* 5.229-30, within 5.104-544). Is that deliberate? What is certain is that Virgil doubled and diversified the counterfactual material into two types in the same location he found it in his principal source. As Virgil's games are shorter, the counterfactual area in Virgil (5.229-34) is also closer to the end of the first game than the equivalent is in the *Iliad* (23.382-84).

But the main characteristics of *hi ... teneant* are the incompatibility of its indicative, factual apodosis and its subjunctive, non-factual protasis, and the confusion of subjects. Two competitors are left at this stage, Mnesteus and Cloanthus (5.218-19). Which of the two teams is the subject of *indignantur* and *ni teneant*? It must be the owners of honour and glory (*decus, honorem*). Two lines down from *hi*, there is *hos*, which denotes the opposite team. Both pronouns are line-initial, thus prominently positioned. But that merely reveals that there are two sides; and it is not too clear whether these are spectators or sailors either. Page (1970, on 5.229) translates "The one ... the others". Williams (1960, on 5.229) is more specific: "The leading crew think it shame ..." and (5.231) "the others are given new strength by success". Reading *hi* as "the leading crew" makes sense if glory and triumph belong to Cloanthus' rowers, who are in front at the time of speaking; *partum honorem*, the triumph already won, reinforces that view. The word *successus* said to nourish the other team, then, perhaps also indicates coming up close, as the boat in second place is catching up fast (5.231). Page (1970, on 5.229) comments that *proprium* and *partum* imply "in anticipation". No team has won yet. The narrator, however,

may be speaking as if certain that Cloanthus will be first, or may see Cloanthus' leading position in itself as a triumph. In all these cases, *hi proprium decus et partum indignantur honorem / ni teneant* (5.229-30) would seem to be a counterfactual. After appreciation of the *hi / hos* opposition, moreover, which takes us after the sentence coordinated to the assumed counterfactual, one interpretation can be discarded: that the groups involved are spectators; those would be unlikely to want to give their life for victory (5.230).

The solution to which side does what perhaps lies in resolving the switch of narratorial position from apodosis to protasis. One team is said to feel ashamed as a fact (*indignantur*), and the reason for that shame is subsequently expressed counterfactually, *ni teneant*. Which team is more likely to feel shame? The intertwining of part of the protasis with the apodosis does not help. There are occasional parallels to the modal clash in Latin: *numeros memini, si verba tenerem* (Virg. *Buc.* 9.45), *memini* working as a present indicative (*memini*: Ernout-Thomas 1953: § 243) and the protasis having the imperfect subjunctive *tenerem*; and *non ego cuncta meis amplecti versibus opto, / non, mihi si linguae centum sint oraque centum, / ferrea vox* (Virg. *Geo.* 2.42-44). The latter, a reproduction of Plautus' *si decem habeas linguas, mutum esse addecet* (Plau. *Ba.* 128), also grammatically (present subjunctive *si habeas* and present indicative *addecet* in Plautus; *decet* is one of the verbs which remains indicative when hypothetical. Ernout-Thomas 1953: § 264), probably comes closer to the current instance, on two accounts: both *opto* and *indignantur* include the idea of making a judgment; and both protases follow their apodoses. These similarities, however, are probably weak. The protasis *ni teneant* is integral to *hi proprium decus et partum indignantur honorem*, also literally since the objects of *teneant* are interspersed on the line which relates the apodosis, in a way that *non, ni mihi si lingua ...* is not in relation to its own apodosis. A variant of *non, mihi si linguae ...* is *Aen.* 6.625-27 (with regular present subjunctives), to be discussed in chapter seven.

The *if-not* follows:

*et fors aequatis cepissent praemia rostris,  
ni palmas ponto tendens utrasque Cloanthus  
fudissetque preces divosque in vota vocasset* (5.232-34).

With all verbs in the pluperfect subjunctive, the narrator here comments on a possible but narrowly-avoided development in the past: things were in place for a tie between the competitors (*aequatis rostris*), a logical consequence of the action just passed, but Cloanthus took steps and prayed to the gods; that, it turns out shortly, is what averted the inconclusive result. Or, if we follow Williams' minority reading, the subject of *possunt* (5.231) is the same as that of *cepissent* (5.232), to give: "and perhaps Mnestheus' crew, as they came up level, would have gone on to win the prize ..." (Williams 1960, on 5.232); whereas Fratantuono & Smith (2015, on 5.232) offers "Mnestheus might have been able to tie the Pristis for the first place",

thus taking the majority view, though translating "Now, with their prows pulled up parallel to each other, perhaps they would have taken the prize, ...", which must be an attempt to say that Mnesteus might have won. We have two different but equally possible counterfactual stories enshrined in *aequatis cepissent praemia rostris*. The next four lines report the prayer (5.235-38), and five more the Nereids hearing the prayer and the god Portunus speeding up Cloanthus' ship, which then wins (5.239-43). On what basis does the narrator say that in the absence of the events narrated in the *ni*-clause either there might have been a tie, or Mnesteus could have won? We know that Cloanthus is close to the goal (*ipso superest in fine*. 5.225) when Mnesteus speeds up (5.218-24), but that does not indicate the most likely next step. It is in the relationship of this *if-not* with the corresponding Homeric one, the one in the chariot races which most resembles Virgil's (*Il.* 23.382-84), that we may find some elucidation. The starting point for the comparison has to be *fors*. The noun, used adverbially, constructs a narrator uncertain about the plausibility of the counterfactual; it acknowledges that many outcomes are possible. We know that with two remaining competitors and victory consisting in arriving first, the possibilities are three. All kinds of endings are possible, of course, and we see one of them (the tool of the game catching fire), elsewhere. But here Virgil has clearly chosen to reuse the material he found at the equivalent point in Homer's chariot race; the fact that the first Homeric *if-not* in the games occurs at the same distance (125 lines) from the beginning of the games as Virgil's two *ni*-clause conditionals, strengthens the similarity.

Of the three possible outcomes, Homer's narrator at the first counterfactual voices two: Diomedes overtaking Eumelus, and a tie (*Il.* 23.382-84). Virgil conflates the two possibilities made explicit in Homer into a single expression, *aequatis cepissent praemia rostris* (5.232), and adds the third under *fors*; less important, perhaps, is the eventual allocation of victory in Homer to the pursuing competitor, who soon benefits from help from Athena (*Il.* 23.388-400), whereas in Virgil it is the leading competitor who wins. The tentativeness of Homer's narrator is increased in Virgil by *fors*. Of all Homeric *if-nots*, including those in the *Odyssey*, only *Il.* 20.288-91 (Achilles and Aeneas) and 23.382-84 (Diomedes and Eumelus) offer alternatives, as if the narrator is not certain of the hypothesized development. But the narrator is also self-confident, at *Il.* 20.288-91 attaching one apodosis to the other as if the second were inevitable, and at 23.382-84 offering two mutually exclusive alternatives, but keeping silent about the third (Eumelus' victory) as inconceivable. Virgil's narrator is also wavering, but differently.

The use of *fors* as preface to the *if-not* makes the sentence a matter of doubt. Something else than the conjecture might have happened. Given that every other possibility is covered by *aequatis cepissent praemia rostris*, the non-contemplated outcome could be Cloanthus' victory; the *ni*-clause would then be invalidated, seeing that it reports Cloanthus' prayer which then leads to his victory. The Homeric narrator does not consider that the third possibility may happen.

Another difference with the Homeric *if-not* is its impact. Coming at the end of the race,

Virgil's relates more closely to the final results. The two counterfactuals occupy 5.229-34, and Aeneas gives Cloanthus his prizes from ten lines on, at 5.244-57. In Homer, Diomedes eventually speeds up, overtakes all and receives the first prize at *Il.* 23.499-513; but that sequence starts 115 lines after the *if-not* which reports his near-win over Eumelus (*Il.* 23.382-84). And the race continues afterwards.

It is indeed remarkable, at least in view of Virgil's shortened and reshaped version with the *if-not* close to the end, that the Homeric race continues after Diomedes receives his prize. That second part has two more counterfactuals, and these will be analysed next. It turns out that the first shares a lot with Virgil's *et fors ... vocasset* (5.232-34) too.

The second counterfactual in Homer's chariot races is not an *if-not*, as its protasis is line-initial and not in the negative; it is included here for its similarity in sense to *if-nots*, and particularly to the one in the chariot race: "And if the course had been longer, he would have passed him by and not left the issue in doubt" (*Il.* 23.526-27); it is Menelaus this time who nearly overtakes Antilochus. Crucially, the narrator's stance in the apodosis reverses that of *Il.* 23.382-84: "... or left the issue in doubt" (*Il.* 23.382) here changes to "... not left the issue in doubt" (*Il.* 23.526-27):

καί νύ κεν ἦ παρέλασσ' ἢ ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν (*Il.* 23.382)  
 τῷ κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν (*Il.* 23.527).

At *Il.* 23.527, the narrator does not offer a choice of two possible apodoses, but confidently specifies that what is the first one at *Il.* 23.382, and not the second, was the outcome lined up for materialization. It can be argued that the change of ἦ ... ἦ ... to ... οὐδ' ... is nothing more than an instance of normal Homeric part-repetition, and not much importance should be attached to the change in narrator's position. Since this counterfactual must count as a model for Virgil no less than the *if-not* at *Il.* 23.382, however, we may safely assume that it is equally relevant to *et fors aequatis cepissent praemia rostris* (5.232). These, then, are the two Homeric statements under comparison: either he would have overtaken or there would have been a tie (*Il.* 23.382); he would have overtaken and there would have been no tie (*Il.* 23.527). In the *Aeneid*, one single statement, made doubtful by *fors*, appears to include the two mutually exclusive possibilities presented in the first of those (*Il.* 23.382), "he would have overtaken" (Williams' reading; 1960, on 5.232) and "there would have been a tie" (most translations); Frantantuono and Smith (2015), as seen above, confuse the meanings in their translation, and take the majority view in their commentary. The other version of events (*Il.* 23.527), with the narrator confident that the pursuer would have overtaken the leading competitor, and exclusion of a tie, does not make it into Virgil's rendition; though it may be implied by *fors*. The second counterfactual of Homer's chariot race differs from the first and from Virgil's corresponding one



also in its absence of divine intervention. The end of the track, expressed in the initial protasis (which also makes this not an *if-not*, the obstacle to the apodosis coming first) is rather the reason for Menelaus not overtaking (*Il.* 23.526).

Shortly after Menelaus' failure to overtake Antilochus, Achilles offers the second prize to Eumelus, the competitor who came last, out of pity, and because he is normally the best; the first prize, as we saw, has already gone to Diomedes (*Il.* 23.534-39). "And he would have given him the mare, since all the Achaeans approved, had not Antilochus ... stood up ... and argued" (*Il.* 23.540-42). The nearly materialized event here is the award of a prize to a competitor who seems unworthy to some, but not to Achilles and the audience of the game. That triggers the reactions of the other participants who then feel short-changed, starting from Antilochus, the rightful winner, in the protasis. Prizes, it turns out, are allocated not necessarily on the basis of current performance. Achilles is also happy to swap them: he allocates the mare to Antilochus, the agent in the protasis, and following his advice gives other goods to Eumelus. Menelaus, the near-winner in the previous counterfactual (*Il.* 23.526-27), then complains that Antilochus threw his horses in the way (*Il.* 23.571-72); Antilochus eventually returns the mare (*Il.* 23.591-96), Menelaus takes it and then also returns it and accepts the third prize, a cauldron (*Il.* 23.609-13). These prolonged squabbles obviously mirror the larger-scale ones that account for a good proportion of the poem; with the difference that, besides the games having no serious repercussions and the top prize already having gone to Diomedes unchallenged, replacement prizes appear to be freely available, which leads to heroes calming down with relative ease. This quality is shared by Virgil's boat races, which also reproduce themes and incidents from the larger-scale events of the poem, as described earlier, and also involve replacement prizes.

The configuration of matters becomes even more exciting at the first counterfactual in the foot race (5.286-361). Just after the start (5.315) and a report of the competitors' respective positions, the narrator says of the last two runners (Helymus and then Diore):

*Euryalumque Helymus sequitur; quo deinde sub ipso  
ecce volat calcemque terit iam calce Diore  
incumbens umero, spatia et si plura supersint  
transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat* (5.323-26).

Lines 5.325-26, *spatia et si plura supersint ... relinquat*, are not an *if-not*, as the protasis is initial and not in the negative; the present subjunctive of itself does not rule out that status. Both syntax and lexicon match the Homeric counterfactual of the chariot race we saw above:

εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέροισι,  
τό κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν (*Il.* 23.526-27).

We need to explore how 5.325-26 relates to *Il.* 23.526-27 and how the apodosis *transeat*

*elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat* (5.326) relates to *et fors aequatis cepissent praemia rostris* (5.232).

All manuscripts have *ambiguumque*, but Williams (1960, on 5.326) prefers *ambiguumve*, like Page (1970, on 5.325) and Conington (on 5.326; Conington also approves of *-que*). In his 1972 *Aeneid 1-6*, Williams prints that variant. His main reason is that Homer has a disjunctive link between the two conjectured possibilities: καί νύ κεν ἢ παρέλασσ' ἢ ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν (*if-not* at *Il.* 23.382) and τῷ κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν (counterfactual at *Il.* 23.527) (Williams 1960, on 5.326). Scholarly views are reviewed in Fratantuono and Smith (2015, on 5.326); the question is whether *ambiguum* refers to a contestant or the race. Their own translation is "and should there have been more distance to the race, having slipped in front he [Diores] would have passed him [Helymus], and left him behind and in wonder"; which, again, clashes with their own comment (on 5.326) "... either Diores would beat Helymus, or it would have been a dead heat in need of an umpire". We saw how *et fors aequatis cepissent praemia rostris* (5.232) includes three possible outcomes (the speeding pursuer winning, a tie, and, due to *fors*, perhaps the leading competitor winning regardless of the protasis). The next question then concerns the relationship between that apodosis and the current one: *transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat* (5.326).

One first observation regards the position of the two competitors. The subject of *cepissent* in the *if-not* (5.232), who may be the pursuing crew or the crews of both teams (Mnestheus' and Cloanthus'), is at the front of the boat race, and close to the finishing point. That is also the case in the Homeric counterfactual which is most similar to the current one (*Il.* 23.526-27); Diomedes having already won and obtained his prize, Menelaus nearly overtakes Antilochus, and Meriones and Eumelus follow. Similarly, Diomedes nearly defeats Eumelus at the very start of the chariot race in the *if-not* at *Il.* 23.382-84, with no rivals in front. But Diores and Helymus are last in the Virgilian foot race, behind Nisus and, a long way back (*longo intervallo*, 5.320), Salius. Where would the extra space be, for Diores' successful overtaking of Helymus? Maybe the racetrack is extremely short and in no time at all the last two competitors come at least level with the other two. That interpretation is probably supported by the use of the present subjunctive, used by the narrator in parallel with the present indicative throughout the scene for vividness; in the context of a race, the present emphasizes speed. But it may be plausible that Virgil reverses the logical position for the remark quite deliberately, as a provocative reuse of Homer. Which answer applies must depend on what follows.

This is the counterfactual in its narrative unit:

*Euryalumque Helymus sequitur; quo deinde sub ipso  
ecce volat calcemque terit iam calce Diores  
incumbens umero, spatia et si plura supersint  
transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat.*

*Iamque fere spatio extremo fessique sub ipsam  
finem adventabant, levi cum sanguine Nisus  
labitur infelix* (5.323-29).

After the counterfactual comment on Dioces nearly overtaking Helymus, the narrator reports Nisus' fall on slippery blood close to the goal. Who is the subject of *adventabant* (5.328) in the main clause that provides the context for the *cum*-clause and Nisus' fall? If all competitors are the subject, we must conclude that the racetrack is very short, and that those at the back quickly move to the front. That is possible. But it makes the counterfactual even more puzzling. We saw that 5.232-34 (*et fors ...*) operated very close to the end of the boat race, and right after it divine help led Cloanthus to victory. Following the current counterfactual, by contrast, conflict moves elsewhere and the two relevant protagonists become irrelevant. This is unique in the four counterfactuals under study. We saw that Diomedes nearly overtakes Eumelus in an *if-not* (*Il.* 23.382-84) which ends 115 lines before the start of the sequence which relates Diomedes' victory; the separation between the two events is considerable, but one of the two rivals involved wins in the end. At *Il.* 23.526-27, the closest to counterfactual 5.325-26 because of their common reference to a hypothetical longer track, Menelaus nearly overtakes Antilochus, and the squabbling for prizes starts soon after when Achilles decides to reward the last competitor; Antilochus, however, remains the actual winner, and features in the protasis of the next *if-not* (*Il.* 23.540-42), which concerns the near-award of his own prize to the last contestant. What is different at *Aen.* 5.325-26 is that the focus of the action changes immediately after it, and the two competitors at risk of role reversal are overtaken by others. The Homeric machinery seems wasted.

Once we take the defeat of both protagonists of the counterfactual into consideration, the precise meaning of *transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat* (5.326) may well lose some importance. The struggle which matters becomes almost instantly that between Nisus, who falls, Salius, whom he trips up in order to stop him defeating Euryalus, and Euryalus, who goes on to win (5.327-38). This could argue for interpreting *ambiguum* as a confused competitor, rather than an unclear outcome; Fratantuono and Smith (2015) are probably the latest to adopt that reading, at least in their translation, but it is a popular one. Concerning *-ve* or *-que* attached to *ambiguum*, it is possible that *-que* is preferable if we read the adjective to refer to the mental state of the overtaken runner; and vice versa for *-ve*. The *-que* option, if referring to an unclear result, matches neither of the Homeric originals, whereas the *-ve* reading matches the *if-not* with a different protasis (*Il.* 23.382):

*spatia et si plura supersint  
transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque/ve relinquat.* (5.325-26)

(*-que*: he would have overtaken and left the race unresolved

-*ve*: either he would have overtaken or left the race unresolved; this matches *Il.* 23.382)

καί νύ κεν ἢ παρέλασσ' ἢ ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν,  
εἰ μὴ Τυδέος υἱὶ κοτέσσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,  
ὅς ῥά οἱ ἐκ χειρῶν ἔβαλεν μάστιγα φαεινὴν. (*Il.* 23.382-84)

(either he would have overtaken or there would have been a tie; this matches the -*ve* reading, 5.326)

εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέροισι,  
τῶ κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν. (*Il.* 23.526-27)

(he would have overtaken and there would not have been a tie).

One important difference between *spatia et si plura supersint / transeat elapsus prior ambiguumque relinquat* (5.325-26) and its Homeric original εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέροισι, / τῶ κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν (*Il.* 23.526-27), although the two apodoses do not quite match, regards the subsequent fight over prizes. In Virgil, Aeneas awards the pre-established three prizes to Euryalus, Helymus and Diores. When Salius claims his own, because he was tripped up by Nisus, Diores supports Euryalus or he himself would no longer have one. Aeneas then creates another prize, the skin of a Gaetolian lion for the disgruntled Salius. The next counterfactual in the games for Anchises is the *if-not* which Nisus includes in his complaint about the injustice of such a proceeding (5.353-56); this is examined shortly. In Homer, the equivalent next counterfactual is also an *if-not* and also about unjust awards. Achilles decides to give the second prize in the chariot races won by Diomedes to the last but usually best competitor, Eumelus; the *if-not* in question reports the near-award and the complaint which stops it. The complainant, however, is Antilochus, who has just participated in the earlier *if-not* (*Il.* 23.526-27) and won:

καί νύ κέ οἱ πόρεν ἵππον, ἐπήνησαν γὰρ Ἀχαιοί,  
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' Ἀντίλοχος μεγαθύμου Νέστορος υἱὸς  
Πηλεΐδην Ἀχιλῆα δίκη ἡμίψατ' ἀναστάς; (*Il.* 23.540-42).

Achilles, like Aeneas, then also suggests more prizes. Two points are important about this parallel. The first is that Virgil has adopted Aias' fall in the footrace at *Il.* 23.774-83, caused by Athena, and allocated it to Nisus, who falls due to a slippery floor from sacrificial blood, but then appears to take revenge by tripping up Salius in order to favour Euryalus; Nisus' behaviour after the fall is not from Homer (Williams 1960; 1972, on 5.327. Fratantuono and Smith 2015, on 5.328 discuss sacrificial blood and the Jovian world displacing the Saturnian). And, as mentioned above, the entire Nisus episode to some extent invalidates the importance of the counterfactual *spatia et si plura ... relinquat* (5.325-26); the struggle between the two racers becomes irrelevant once others come and one of them wins. For Antilochus to feature in both

the counterfactual εἰ δὲ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ... ἔθηκεν (*Il.* 23.526-27) and the later *if-not* which announces his remonstrations (*Il.* 23.540-42) makes more sense.

We can now examine Nisus' *if-not*:

*hic Nisus, "si tanta," inquit, "sunt praemia victis,  
et te lapsorum miseret, quae munera Niso  
digna dabis, primam merui qui laude coronam  
ni me, quae Salium, fortuna inimica tulisset?"* (5.353-56).

This is the first counterfactual in the games spoken by a character, the next two featuring in the boxing match (5.397-400; 5.410-12). Characters' counterfactuals, like any other component of speeches, exist for pragmatic reasons. In this case, Nisus' objective is obvious: a prize he thinks he deserved. It is important to note, therefore, that whereas the equivalent *if-not* in Homer (*Il.* 23.540-42) is the announcement of a competitor's claim to a missed prize, in Virgil it is part of the claimant's actual words.

The *if-not* which is part of those words features in a relative clause that qualifies a complement (*Niso*), in a question which is the apodosis of a conditional. Of the six counterfactuals of the games, this is the only one not to be a main clause. The outer conditional has two line-initial protases in the present indicative (*sunt, miseret*), the second humorous as referring to Nisus' own accidental fall as well as the one he caused to Salius, which earned Salius the lion's skin (*et te lapsorum miseret*, 5.354), and a correlated question in the indicative future (*dabis*). Nisus describes his own near-victory in the relative clause which describes himself, *primam merui qui ... / ni me ... fortuna ... tulisset* (5.355-56).

Line-initial *ni me* provides a strange approximation of Homer's standard beginning of the *if-not* protasis, εἰ μή; the nearest elsewhere in the *Aeneid* being the beginning of *ni mea cura resistat, / iam flammae tulerint inimicus et hauserit ensis*. (2.599-600), spoken by Venus, not however line-initial and with a short *me*. How deliberate Virgil's choice was to put *me* in the position of μή (5.356) with the negative meaning residing in the preceding word, *ni*, is obviously hard to ascertain.

Another more routine feature is that this *if-not* has a missing apodosis: *qui merui primam coronam / ni me fortuna inimica tulisset* is clearly incomplete; Nisus considers himself worthy of a valuable prize, but it is clearly his reception of the prize that he deems hindered by fortune. This has been noticed by Williams (1960; 1972, on 5.355-56) and Page (1970, on 5.355), who have drawn parallels with *iam tuta tenebam / ni gens ... invasisset* (6.358-61), and offered an extra apodosis; Fratantuono and Smith (2015, on 5.355) comment on the clash between the indicative *merui* and the subjunctive *tulisset*, and their translation has no added apodosis; Conington is silent.

Differently from what is the case in other *if-not* indicative apodoses, *merui* is indicative

because Nisus perceives it as fact, and his view is endorsed by the narrative voice (*fere spatio extremo fessique sub ipsam / finem adventabant, levi cum sanguine Nisus / labitur infelix*. 5.327-29). This *if-not* reveals a split between apodosis and protasis of a different kind: the evidence piles up before the *ni*-clause that a suitable apodosis for that clause to counteract is missing. We found accurately factual apodoses at 8.520-23 (*defixique ora tenebant ... multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant*) and 12.731-33 (*at perfidus ensis frangitur in medioque ardentem deserit ictu*). With *merui* we have a third (3.535).

The last two counterfactuals of the games are spoken by Entellus in the boxing match. Strangely given the suitability of counterfactuals to conjure up certain aspects of races such as fierce competition and the risk of dead heat, these last two are used in a different context than the fight:

*si mihi quae quondam fuerat quaque improbus iste  
exsultat fidens, si nunc foret illa iuventus,  
haud equidem pretio inductus pulchroque iuvenco  
venissem, nec dona moror* (5.397-400)

*quid, si quis caestus ipsius et Herculis arma  
vidisset tristemque hoc ipso in litore pugnam?  
haec germanus Eryx quondam tuus arma gerebat* (5.410-12).

Entellus speaks his first counterfactual in response to being pushed to join the boxing match, when a competitor for Dares cannot be found. He explains why he cannot enter the fight either. The sentence has two line-initial protases, with the verb *foret* possibly shared between them; that is an imperfect subjunctive and therefore, as emphasized by *nunc*, refers to the present. Entellus is building his justification for declining the match, and in the first protasis refers twice to his youth in complements which only hint at that state (*quae quondam fuerat quaque improbus iste / exsultat fidens*), whereas in the second he names it (*illa iuventus*). The second protasis, then, is a summary and a clarification of the first. The apodosis follows, in the pluperfect subjunctive (*venissem*), thus placing the unachieved event in the past. But what is that event? Through the negative *haud equidem venissem*, Entellus lists what incentives were unnecessary for him to join. His willingness to fight, therefore, is implied as a premise to that list rather than stated. And the excluded incentives are those which have attracted Dares (*continuo*, 5.365-69; 5.380-85): *equidem pretio ... pulchroque iuvenco* (5.399); *nec dona moror* restates the case. In this most obviously binary type of game, a boxing match between two contestants rather than a competition among many, Entellus' counterfactual is a response to Dares' behaviour as well as an explanation of Entellus' reason for not fighting.

Entellus speaks the other counterfactual ten lines on. Something important has happened between them: Dares' withdrawal from the match at the sight of Entellus' gloves

(5.406). The two turn out to share more qualities, and to swap positions; the stronger now feels inferior. But the dismay is general: *obstipuere animi*, 5.404; Entellus' counterfactual question is a response to that. He asks all present to consider even scarier gloves, those of Hercules himself: that is the material of the protasis, *si quis caestus ipsius et Herculis arma / vidisset* (5.410-11), referring to the past. The narrator has just described in exaggerated terms the gloves Eryx used to fight Hercules: *tantorum septem / terga boum plumbo insuto ferroque rigebant* (5.404-05). These other ones must be worse, Entellus implies, and as he also mentions the fight between Eryx and Hercules happening on those same shores (*tristemque hoc ipso in litore pugnam*), the comparison acquires even more heroic proportions. Whatever fight happens here, is a counterpart of a much grander one; although there is also continuity between the two worlds, since Entellus himself used the scary gloves before, and Eryx is Aeneas' brother. Through a counterfactual question, Entellus has invited a comparison between present events and their heroic past counterpart.

Yet another aspect of counterfactuality is treated subsequently, though without the help of a literal counterfactual. Entellus proposes the use of more average gloves for both him and Dares so the fight can go ahead; Aeneas provides them (5.419-20; 5.424-25). The move illustrates the difficulty involved in pinning down counterfactuals. At 5.397-400, Entellus expresses low confidence in having the strength he had in youth, which leads him to decline the fight. But as Dares becomes intimidated, he comes round to the idea of fighting. So either he is bluffing, or his counterfactual is only contrary to fact for a while. He soon goes on to do exactly what his apodosis at 5.399-400 strongly suggests he will not do. A similar mismatch between the contents of a character's counterfactual and the turn of events to which that character contributes occurs at 2.641-42, when Anchises states refusal to leave Troy, in relation to his agreement to leave at 2.702-04. That will be explored in the next chapter.

**Chapter Seven. *The Rest: End of the Story, Time-Cutting, Regrets, Materialized Counterfactuals, Dido and Aeneas, Aeneas' Self-Defence, Ethnic Identity, Evander to Pallas***

We have come to the counterfactuals which are either grammatically less adventurous than the ones already explored, or relatively undramatic, though there will be the occasional surprises. They are divided here into eight groups, according to their role rather than grammatical configuration. Some of the categories are the same as in previous chapters. The first announces the potential end to the story, and therefore the premature ending and collapse of the text (like 1.58-59 and 2.54-56): 9.756-59, 11.285-87 and 8.395-97. Regrets are a related group: 1.96-101, 4.657-58, 9.337-38, 10.59-60, 10.630-32 and 11.302-04. More counterfactuals used to express the shortening of time (than 6.33-36, 6.290-94, 11.912-14) are 6.535-38 and 6.625-27. A fourth group consists of counterfactual observations which materialize later. As we saw regarding Entellus' claim of old age as impediment to his fighting (5.397-400) and Dido's objections to a relationship with Aeneas (4.15-19), this can be read as a comment on the difficulty of defining counterfactuals. A counterfactual involves the speaker's judgment, which may be accurate (or wrong) only temporarily; or the speaker may be lying. With varying degrees of distance between the counterfactual and the occurrence of the excluded event, this happens at 1.372-74 (a doubtful counterfactual), 2.641-42, and to some extent 10.613-16; one more counterfactual will be discussed with the latter, 11.173-75 (because both involve Turnus, and the counterfactual event materializes in some form). The fifth group is in book 4: 4.311-14, 4.327-30, and 4.340-44. Reflections on what could not be helped, from a character's viewpoint, also take counterfactual form. This happens at 2.291-92 and 2.431-34. The important question of ethnic identity arises in 8.510-11. Finally, two counterfactuals, one of them adventurous, are spoken by Evander to his son Pallas: 8.560-71 and 11.161-63.

While Aeneas is absent and Turnus takes Juno's advice and attacks the Trojan camp, the narrator observes how close he came to victory:

*Diffugiunt versi trepida formidine Troes.  
et si continuo victorem ea cura subisset,  
rumpere claustra manu sociosque immittere portis,  
ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset.  
sed furor ardentem caedisque insana cupido  
egit in adversos* (unfinished line. 9.756-61).

Inside the Trojan camp, left open against Aeneas' advice (9.672-82), Turnus has just killed Pandarus (9.750-51), having himself been saved by Juno's diverting of Pandarus' spear (9.745-46). The Trojans flee. The narrator then makes the kind of comment generally encased in an *if-not* followed by an adversative clause in Homer, but does so in a conventional counterfactual:



the protasis is initial, and the apodosis final; the pluperfect subjunctive verbs (*subisset, fuisset*) construct a regular counterfactual which refers to the past; that non-actualized past involves the end of the conflict, as Turnus lets his allies into the Trojan camp. In the *Iliad*, the Trojans are nearly defeated prematurely in a narrator's *if-not* seven times (*Il.* 6.73-76, 8.130-32, 13.723-25, 16.698-701; with ἄλλᾶ, 17.319-25; 21.544-46) and once in a character's *if-not* (*Il.* 18.454-56); the Greeks in a narrator's *if-not* twice (*Il.* 2.155-56, 8.217-18) (de Jong 2004: 72-75); there is no parallel in the *Odyssey*, except perhaps for Athena's prevention of Odysseus' slaughter of his subjects, which however does not happen in a war context (*Od.* 24.528-30).

Divine intervention is replaced by Turnus' own lust for slaughter, *dira cupido* (9.760), according to Hardie (1994, on 9.757-61) and Rossi (1997: 35n11). We saw an abstract entity replace a god or human as the agent of an *if-not* at 12.729-31: *at perfidus ensis / frangitur in medioque ardentem deserit ictu, / ni fuga subsidio subeat*. In the current counterfactual, the equivalent of *fuga* at 12.729-31 is the subject of the protasis, the equally abstract *ea cura*. Hardie and Rossi treat *sed furor ardentem caedisque insana cupido / egit in adversos* instead as the *ni*-clause introduced by an adversative conjunction. One near-defeat *if-not* in the *Iliad* indeed uses ἄλλᾶ rather than εἰ μὴ, as listed above (*Il.* 17.319-23). Virgil's counterfactual, however, clearly consists of an initial protasis, *et si ... portis*, and a final apodosis, *ultimus ... fuisset* (9.757-59); the relevant verbs are consistent (*subisset, fuisset*). It is the next sentence, *sed furor ... adversos*, that presents a reversal. Hardie and Rossi concentrate exclusively on that. We could certainly read an equivalent of the *if-not* at *Il.* 17.319-25: that would have been the last day ..., if Turnus' anger and lust for slaughter had not driven him to attack the enemy. The protasis in that reading disappears.

Attention must be drawn to the similarity between 9.756-59 and 2.54-56; noticed, but not discussed by Hardie (1994, on 9.757-61). As we saw in chapter two, Aeneas' counterfactual also points to the possibility that an alternative course of events could have replaced the rise of Rome. Aeneas' counterfactual has an initial double protasis with one verb (*et, si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset*, 2.54) and three final apodoses (*impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras, / Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres*, 2.55-56). The first apodosis in the pluperfect indicative (*impulerat*), as discussed in chapter two, constructs the beginning of the unactualized story as actual. In that respect, it differs from the apodosis of the current counterfactual, which has the pluperfect subjunctive *fuisset*. Another main difference is the use of *si non* in Aeneas' counterfactual, which despite the initial position of its clause and the separation between *si* and *non*, comes nearer to the Homeric εἰ μὴ. But there is also a surprising similarity between the two Virgilian counterfactuals: one element is the reference in the protasis to a thought that fails to occur (*mens laeva*, 2.54; *ea cura*, 9.756), and another is the repercussion that has on the existence of a city. In the earlier case, a city is destroyed, and in the later it is preserved. The physical structures involved, and emphasis on breaking into them, also

appear in both cases: *impulerat ferro argolicas foedare latebras, / Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres.* (apodosis, 2.55-56) and *rumpere claustra manu sociosque immittere portis* (protasis, 9.758); the wooden horse contains soldiers, and that type of filling is what Turnus fails to cause at 9.757-58.

The other counterfactual to mention the conceivable branching off of the narrative that would invalidate the present refers to a much earlier time:

*si duo praeterea talis Idaea tulisset  
terra viros, ultro Inachias venisset ad urbes  
Dardanus, et versis lugeret Graecia fatis* (11.285-87).

This is spoken by Diomedes towards the end of his speech as reported by Venulus, Turnus' messenger, to the Latins during the council of war (Diomedes' whole speech 11.252-93). That layering of reporting is important: Diomedes is a Greek hero observing not only that the Trojan war could have been won by the Trojans, but even that they would have attacked Greece. The speech as a whole describes the dreadful effects of the Trojan war for both sides, as well as Aeneas' strength; both are reasons for his refusal to join the Italians in the current war (11.278). It impresses Latinus, who then proposes peace (11.302-35).

The Diomedes/Venulus' counterfactual has an initial pluperfect subjunctive protasis (*tulisset*), and the equally conjugated final apodosis (*venisset*); the next apodosis is in the imperfect subjunctive (*lugeret*). A counterfactual past constructed by *tulisset* and *venisset*, is followed by a counterfactual present constructed by *lugeret*. The Greeks would be grieving now, as a consequence of events then. The unit, with the subsequent lines that complete it (11.288-92, about Hector, slightly less admirable than Aeneas - *ambo animis, ambo insignes praestantibus armis, / hic pietate prior.* 11.291-92 - helping keep the Greeks out of Troy) could not easily fit into an *if-not*, as the previous one could (9.756-59); there is no *sed*-clause to revert the conjectured course of events. Mention of the physical structures of cities, however, occurs just as in 9.756-59 and 2.54-56: *Inachias urbes*, which could be either Argos (Horsfall 2003, on 11.286) or Greek cities generally (Gransden 1991, on 11.285-87), and *moenia durae Troiae* in the subsequent expansion (11.288); also, Diomedes is building his city when approached, according to Venulus (11.246-47). The emphasis on cities and walls is not surprising, given the war involves sieges; also, building walls is of paramount importance to all refugees in the poem.

Diomedes' purpose may be to present Aeneas as powerful and superior to Turnus, both to the Italian and to Virgil's audience, thus preparing for the end of the poem and flattering Aeneas' descendant Augustus. The more Aeneas is excused for not saving Troy, the better. Virgil's desire to emulate Homer may also have contributed, a similar trope featuring in the *Iliad* (Gransden 1991, on 11.285-87. Horsfall 2003, on 11.286), though as a wish (by Agamemnon to Nestor):

αἶ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίῃ καὶ Ἀπολλῶν  
τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἶεν Ἀχαιῶν:  
τῷ κε τάχ' ἠμύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος  
χερσὶν ὑφ' ἡμετέρησιν ἀλοῦσά τε περθομένη τε. (*Il.* 2.371-74).

Walls feature here too, those of Troy. The adversative clause here follows the wish for ten advisers like Nestor for storming Troy, ἀλλά μοι ... Ζεὺς ἄλγε' ἔδωκεν (*Il.* 2.375). An *if-not* structure can thus be identified, not replicated by Diomedes.

A minor alteration to materialized history concerns the length of the Trojan war and is spoken by Vulcan to Venus in book 8:

*fiducia cessit*  
*quo tibi, diva, mei? similis si cura fuisset,*  
*tum quoque fas nobis Teucros armare fuisset;*  
*nec pater omnipotens Troiam nec fata vetabant*  
*stare decemque alios Priamum superesse per annos* (8.395-99).

Venus has just asked Vulcan to make weapons for Aeneas (8.382-86) and then seduced him (8.387-93). In a reference to the epic concept that destiny is fixed but can be delayed (Fordyce 1977, on 7.313; 8.396; and others, though not Gransden 1976 on 8.395-400) Jupiter replies by hypothesizing Venus' request in the Trojan war; he answers her claim that she did not ask him for help back then (8.374-80). Vulcan declares himself prepared to arm the Trojans now, as he would have in the Trojan war.

One peculiarity is the repetition of *fuisset*, regular pluperfect subjunctive, one instance in the (initial) protasis and one in the (final) apodosis last on consecutive lines. Gransden conjectures an echo between Vulcan's two *fuisset* and Venus' earlier *labores* (Vulcan's) and *laborem* (Aeneas') (8.378-80; Gransden 1976, on 395-400); that groups together four references to the times of the Trojan war. Fordyce (1977, on 8.396) suggests that the repetition emphasizes "the correspondence between the desire of Venus and Vulcan's ability to comply"; he thus focuses on the relevance of the two *fuisset* to the present and leaves out the past. Fordyce (1977: 234n1) also lists nine similar repetitions in the *Aeneid*, the most extreme *quae maxima semper* (8.271-72), and two in the *Georgics*. This one guarantees complete coordination between the verbs of protasis and apodosis, the opposite of *nec veni, ni ... dedissent* and the rest.

The next two lines (8.398-99) expand on the reason it would have been possible to prolong the Trojan war by ten years: there was no divine order against it (*vetabant*). Besides positing a longer Trojan war as thinkable, Vulcan's counterfactual mentions precisely the mechanism that spins out the poem, which is delay, as summarized by delayer Juno: *at trahere atque moras tantis licet addere rebus* (7.315).

The next category involves regrets. In the initial hurricane of the poem, triggered by Aeolus

upon orders from Juno, Aeneas wishes he had died at Troy, indeed at Diomedes' hand:

*o Danaum fortissime gentis  
Tydide! mene Iliacis occumbere campis  
non potuisse tuaque animam hanc effundere dextra,  
saevus ubi Aeacidae telo iacet Hector, ubi ingens  
Sarpedon, ....* (1.96-100).

Aeneas uses no finite verb, but rather the negative infinitive past *non potuisse* (*occumbere ... effundere*). His wish has been included in order to illustrate the closeness between the desired or bemoaned non-actualised states of affairs and syntactic counterfactuals of the *Aeneid*. It is hard, for instance, not to read a similarity between Aeneas' regret that he was not killed at Troy, with Anchises' refusal to leave the city, expressed counterfactually: *me si caelicolae voluissent ducere vitam, / has mihi servassent sedes*. (2.641-42). In both, the past seems preferable to the future, and the speaker is reluctant to move forward. Two expressions of regret in the poem take the shape *felix, si ...*:

*felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum  
numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae* (4.657-58)

*felix, si protinus illum  
aequasset nocti ludum in lucemque tulisset* (9.337-38).

The word *felix* here is a shortened, sentence-initial apodosis; all verbs are in the pluperfect subjunctive, the normal verb for past counterfactuals (*tetigissent, aequasset, tulisset*). Addressing Aeneas' clothing and (as we know from 4.508) effigy after his departure, Dido wishes the Trojan fleet had never touched her shores (4.657-58). She will shortly kill herself on Aeneas' sword (4. 663-65). And at the end of the list of Nisus' victims in the first killings in the war (Quinn 1968: 203), the narrator reflects that Serranus would have survived if he had played games until dawn (9.337-38). This particular comment, applying as it does to an unimportant figure in the first "unfocused background of killing" that becomes a regular feature in subsequent battle scenes (Quinn 1968: 204), demonstrates yet again Virgil's sprinkling of rhetorical devices regardless of any wider significance; although one "conditional 'makarismos'" (blessing) in Virgil (Hardie 1994, on 9.337-78) is relevant to the larger plot: *O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint, / agricolas!* (*Geo.* 2.458-59). The farmers are key protagonists in that poem.

Variants of *melius est/fuit/fuerat* are another type of expression of regret in the *Aeneid*. Most of the instances involving *potius* (3.654, 4.99-100, 10.676, 11.443-44, 12.38-39, 12.187-91) will not be discussed; we will only include 10.631-32, because of its reference to the main movement in the poem (from Troy to Italy), and already have *rex nostra reliquit / hospitia et*

*Turni potius se credidit armis* (11.113-15), analyzed as part of the *nec veni* conglomerate. An instance with *satius fuit* is by Venus to Jupiter in the council of the gods (the other is in *Bucolicon* 2.14-15). At the end of her speech, she asks whether the Trojans would have been better off remaining in the destroyed Troy:

*non satius cineres patriae insedissem supremos  
atque solum quo Troia fuit?* (10.59-60).

In sense, this approaches the group that comments on the potential stalling of the narrative; Aeneas, when leaving Dido also expresses a preference for returning to Troy (4.340-44). Put in its immediate context, it proves part of Venus' complaint about the Trojans' current suffering in Italy: they could have stayed in Troy, or fought a second Trojan war (10.55-62). Venus' speech, analyzed by Hightet (1972: 65-69. 10.17-62), is intended to obtain help for the Trojans, now threatened by Turnus, and includes the question to Jupiter whether he actually intended the Trojans to settle in Italy, and why Juno was allowed to interfere (10.31-35). Juno's speech follows and attempts to rebut Venus' (Hightet 1972: 69-72. 10.63-95).

The next *melius fuerat* counterfactual is at the end of a later debate between Juno and Jupiter. Between the first phase of the battle (10.362-605), in which Turnus kills Pallas (10.439-509) and Aeneas' two *aristeiai* occur (10.308-44, 10.510-605), and the second phase of the battle (10.689-908), in which Aeneas kills Lausus and Mezentius, Juno asks Jupiter to preserve Turnus. As Jupiter only concedes a reprieve, Juno insists:

*quid si, quae voce gravaris,  
mente dares atque haec Turno rata vita maneret?  
nunc manet insontem gravis exitus, aut ego veri  
vana feror. quod ut o potius formidine falsa  
ludar, et in melius tua, qui potes, orsa reflectas!* (10.628-32)

Her question (10.628-29) is a regular potential conditional, with imperfect subjunctive verbs (*dares, maneret*) in the protasis, and no apodosis. Its sense is clearly that of a wish: Williams (1973, on 10.628) suggests that *quid si* is equivalent to *utinam*. After a disjunctive statement (10.632-33), the second part (*aut ...*) supporting the first by being an unlikely alternative (Harrison 1991, on 10.628-29), two wishes follow with present subjunctive verbs (*ludar, reflectas*). The transition between them is interesting: the first wish repeats the second part of the statement, *ego veri / vana feror. quod ut o potius formidine falsa / ludar; vana feror* and *ludar* are both line-initial. That layout provides continuity between disjuncted and impossibly true conjecture and wish. Jupiter next offers a reprieve, useless to Turnus in the long run (10.633-688). That episode, another postponement of the resolution, also involves a counterfactual, though of a different type: Juno creates a copy of Aeneas, which attracts Turnus onto a boat which she then unties (10.636-60).

The last *melius fuerat* counterfactual actually contains that phrase, and starts Latinus' speech in the war council (11.225-444):

*Ante equidem summa de re statuisse, Latini,  
et vellem et fuerat melius, non tempore tali  
cogere concilium, cum muros adsidet hosti* (11.302-04).

Latinus' speech (11.302-35) follows Venulus' (11.243-95), which reported Diomedes' observation that two more of Aeneas would have won the Trojan war (11.285-87). Latinus responds by first regretting not convening a war council earlier; he then portrays Aeneas as unbeatable, and makes two suggestions: offering the Trojans either land (11.316-23; *et moenia condant*) or equipment for sailing away if they prefer (11.324-29); he invites the assembly to decide, in which Drances (11.343-75) and Turnus (11.378-444) present arguments, respectively, against and for war. The first line of the *melius fuerat* counterfactual begins with the subject of Latinus' wish, and object of the verbs (*ante summa de re statuisse*); part of the second contains the rest of the predicate, with verb in the imperfect subjunctive *vellem*, referring therefore to the present, and another in the pluperfect indicative, *fuerat melius*, referring therefore to a counterfactual past. The succession of verbs shows a transition in Latinus' thinking: *ante statuisse vellem* represents Latinus' personal will, set in the present, whereas *ante statuisse fuerat melius* implies an attempt at objectivity. There is, therefore, a widening movement from the immediate to the more general. The rest of the lines in the counterfactual unit (11.302-04) explain the reason for that opinion, with walls again playing a role (*cum muros adsidet hostis*, 11.304).

Time-shortening counterfactuals have already been discussed. This is the remaining one, with preceding material:

*Hac vice sermonum roseis Aurora quadrigis  
iam medium aethero cursu traiecerat axem;  
et fors omne datum traherent per talia tempus,  
sed comes admonuit breviterque adfata Sibylla est* (6.535-38).

The *if-not* part of these four lines relates a narrowly avoided event, followed by the intervention that cuts it short; but it lacks the *if-not* syntax, the two clauses being rather joined by *sed*. This occurs in Homer (*Il.* 5.22-24; 15.459-64; 17.319-25), as discussed. The imperfect subjunctive *traherent* does not clash with the perfect indicative *admonuit* because the sentence is not technically a conditional.

It plays a structural role. As Quinn (1968: 172) suggests, the Sibyl's reminder of the time in the world above, incidentally not easy to interpret (Conington; Horsfall 2013, on 6.535), may help justify the absence of a tour of Tartarus, which the Sibyl then just describes in her own

voice (6.562-627); following that description, the very different world of Elysium follows, spoken by the narrator again and by Anchises, and perceived directly by Aeneas. The *if-not*, then, also has the function of marking a series of transitions in the narrative. And so do 6.33-36, where the Sibyl interrupts Aeneas and Achates watching the figures, and 6.290-94, where she interrupts Aeneas' attempt to fight the monstrosities who are at the entrance of the Underworld; that interruption ends the descriptive section and resumes the action, before the description of the next landscape (the road to Acheron and the spirits crossing it, 6.295-336). By contrast, 11.912-14, which shares reference to the time of day with the current *if-not*, 6.535-38 (*ni roseus fessos iam gurgite Phoebus Hiberno / tingat equos noctemque die labente reducat*. 11.913-14), presents a reason for postponing the final duel between Aeneas and Turnus.

One aspect of the material immediately following the paratactic *if-not* must be discussed. There are, two further places for Aeneas to become acquainted with:

*nox ruit, Aenea; nos flendo ducimus horas.  
hic locus est partis ubi se via findit in ambas:  
dextera quae Ditis magni sub moenia tendit,  
hac iter Elysium nobis; at laeva malorum  
exercet poenas et ad impia Tartara mittit* (6.539-543).

The Sibyl mentions walls to be walked around in order to reach Elysium. Tartarus is evidently a walled structure, which is what all refugees in the poem try to build, and do with varying degrees of success. But more important are the two roads, one leading to Tartarus and the other to Elysium. The two respective worlds differ in one fundamental way: they not only accommodate different kinds of dwellers, but also materialize to different degrees. Tartarus, where the damned go, is only described to Aeneas, as Austin comments, almost as if from a painting (Austin 1977, on 6.548-61); whereas Elysium, destination of the righteous and repository of the spirits of future Roman heroes, is explored by Aeneas. There is an element of the *ekphrasis* about the portrayal of Tartarus (Austin 1977, on 6.548-61), as the Sibyl emphasizes by drawing attention to the lack of progress in the short section after her description and before they walk to Elysium: *sed iam age, carpe viam et susceptum perface munus; / acceleremus* (6.629-30). That situation is similar to that of Aeneas and his audience at the end of book 3 in relation to the beginning of book 2. On that occasion, the immobility of the participants was more obvious. It also suggests that Aeneas' description of the last night of Troy (books 2-3), and therefore its predecessors, most notably Odysseus' stories to the Phaeacian court (*Od.* 9-12), are also potential *ekphrases*. A present counterfactual spoken by the Sibyl at the end of her portrayal of Tartarus to Aeneas further emphasizes the quality of *ekphrasis* of that description:

*non, mihi si linguae centum sint oraque centum,*

*ferrea vox, omnis scelerum comprehendere formas,  
omnia poenarum percurrere nomina possim* (6.625-27).

First appearing in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 2.488-90), also in conditional form, and frequently used before and after Virgil (Horsfall 2013, on 6.625-27), the comment performs a similar function to the narratorial observation *quin protinus omnia / perlegerent oculis, ni iam ...* (6.33-36) in relation to Daedalus' figures watched by Aeneas. Both say that a large amount of material available for description and being mused upon at the time by the relevant agent, has to be left unspoken. The narrator of the *Georgics* uses the same protasis as *Aen.* 6.625-26, but in final position, to declare the narrowing of his theme:

*non ego cuncta meis amplecti versibus opto,  
non, mihi si linguae centum sint oraue centum,  
ferrea vox* (Geo. 2.42-44).

The expression is a "statement of selectivity" (Horsfall 2013, on 6.625-27). The artist needs to select what to include in a work of art, and Virgil's narrator repeatedly comments on that need.<sup>22</sup>

The next group of counterfactuals becomes materialized reality at a later stage. This category emphasizes how the passage of time affects counterfactuals: the relevant speaker may estimate correctly at the time of speaking, but the situation may change. To Venus disguised as a virgin huntress and inquiring how the stranger came to be in Phoenician Libya, Aeneas says:

*O dea, si prima repetens ab origine pergam  
et vacet annalis nostrorum audire laborum,  
ante diem clauso componet Vesper Olympo* (1.372-74).

This "familiar commonplace of rhetoric" has many predecessors (Cic. *Cael.* 29; *Tusc.* 5.35.102; *Od.* 11.328-30; Austin 1971, on 1.374; Page 1970, on 1.372). The central idea is related to that operating at 6.33-36 and 6.625-27: the amount of material available for description is vast. Another of Aeneas' comments (to Dido) is not dissimilar in sense, and with protasis in the same (initial) position:

---

<sup>22</sup> Also *Geo.* 4.116-48:

*Atque equidem,extremo ni iam sub fine laborum  
vela traham et terris festinem advertere proram,  
forsitan et pinguis hortos quae cura colendi  
ornaret canerem biferique rosaria Paesti, ...* (*Geo.* 4.116-19; whole 4.119-24)

The *sed*-clause concludes the episode: *verum haec ipse equidem spatiis exclusus iniquis / praeterito atque aliis post me memoranda relinquo* (*Geo.* 4.147-48); as well as commenting on the potential non-existence of a text, this also comments on the counterfactual by mention of the rhetorical figure it is, *praeteritio* (*praeterito*, 4.148).



*sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros  
et breviter Troiae supremum audire laborem,  
quamquam animus meminisse horret luctuque refugit,  
incipiam* (2.10-13).

This is not a counterfactual, and the abundance of material is not the reason for the speaker's recalcitrance either. But two elements bring this conditional close to 1.372-74: *breviter* and *incipiam*. The adverb comments precisely on the need to select when telling a story; Aeneas cannot possibly cover the whole of his experience. The future indicative *incipiam*, moreover, announces that the feared recounting will take place; and it does, occupying the rest of book 2 and most of book 3. At 1.372-74 (*O dea, ...*), Aeneas also goes on to sketch the events he has declared reluctance to tell (1.375-85). This is one reason for questioning whether 1.372-74 is a counterfactual.

The verb forms also suggest non-counterfactuality. The debate over *componet* or *componat* has largely been settled, though not entirely (Conington; Conway 1935; Williams 1972, on 1.374), in favour of *componet*. On that reading, the sentence probably belongs to the sub-category "will prove to be" of the *si sit ...erit* type, i.e. a present subjunctive protasis with a future indicative apodosis, as discussed by Nutting (1926: 205; Austin 1971, on 1.374). Nutting does not place *Aen.* 1.372-74 in that category, or any of the other seven, having started his article with a defence of *componet*. He does, however, list *Geo* 1.427-29: *luna, revertentis cum primum colligit ignis, / si nigrum obscuro comprehenderit aëra cornu, / maximus agricolis pelagoque parabitur imber*. In both cases, the speaker's attitude is one of increased certainty in the apodosis as compared with the protasis. Since Aeneas does not take the whole day to tell his story to the disguised Venus, of course, at *Aen.* 1.372-74 that certainty proves unwarranted.

Scholars opted for *componet* because of *ferient* in *si fractus inlabatur orbis / impavidum ferient ruinae* (Hor. *Carm.* 3.3.7-8; Williams 1972, on 1.374). Conington (on *Aen.* 1.374), argues that *vacet annalis nostrorum audire laborum* implies it will not happen, and Horace's *si fractus inlabatur orbis* that it will; he supports *componat*. We can only observe that the publication of Horace's third book of *Odes* is tentatively dated to early 23 BC (Hutchinson 2002: 528), and therefore within Virgil's assumed dates of composition of the *Aeneid*.

Another and more glaring contradiction between counterfactual and subsequent fact, similar in gravity to Entellus' invocation of old age as reason not to fight (5.397-400), is Anchises' resignation to die in Troy::

*"vos o, quibus integer aevi  
sanguis," ait, "solidaeque suo stant robore vires,  
vos agitate fugam. [unfinished line]  
me si caelicolae voluissent ducere vitam,  
has mihi servassent sedes"* (2.638-42).

The comment, reported by Aeneas to the Carthaginian court, ends with a past counterfactual with regular pluperfect subjunctive verbs (*voluissent, servassent*). As Austin (1964, on 2.641) and others observe, *me* balances *vos* in Anchises' previous sentence; the second *vos* is line-initial, so that also contains a metrical element. That opposition contributes to the link of adversative asyndeton (Austin 1964, on 2.641) between the command and the counterfactual, as Anchises recommends one course of action for his family and friends, and an opposite one for himself; the second is the less successful of the two members, portraying an Anchises remaining and perishing, in contrast with his family, younger and stronger, leaving and surviving. We find the line-initial *me*, with much of the same lexicon, syntax and metre, repeated in the protasis which starts Aeneas' more complex counterfactual argument to Dido about his wish to return to Troy:

*me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam  
auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas,  
urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum  
reliquias colerem* (4.340-44).

This will be examined in the section on Dido and Aeneas. What matters in relation to Anchises' counterfactual, is that in spite of the similarities between the two initial protases, including an appeal to divine will (*me si caelicolae*, 2.641; *me si fata* 4.340), Aeneas' is never verified, whereas Anchises' is. Within fifty-eight lines and following the heavenly sign Anchises has solicited, he changes his mind and declares his readiness to leave Troy:

*iam iam nulla mora est; sequor et qua dicitis adsum,  
di patrii; servate domum, servate nepotem.  
vestrum hoc augurium, in numine Troia est.  
cedo equidem nec, nate, tibi comes ire recuso* (2. 701-04).

He now sees the gods as favourable to his departure. We have to note the close link between the interpretation of heavenly signs as guidance for earthly life and conditionals: with *me si caelicolae voluissent* (2.641-42), Anchises frames the gods' will as a counterfactual based on the reality he sees around him. On the second occasion, Anchises interprets the signs as favouring his as well as the Trojans' migration. That is the first embodiment of the many Troys that are not the original one (Horsfall 2008, on 2.704).

One last counterfactual contradicted by subsequent events, though in complicated ways, can be identified in Juno's plea to Jupiter:

*si mihi, quae quondam fuerat quamque esse decebat,  
vis in amore foret, non hoc mihi namque negares,  
omnipotens, quin et pugnae subducere Turnum*

*et Dauno possem incolumem servare parenti* (10.613-16).

Juno's counterfactual belongs to a bargaining section with Jupiter in which she begs for Turnus' safety while being prepared to let him die (10.611-20), and Jupiter claims readiness to save him while pointing out that the rescue is only temporary (10.621-27). Whether the counterfactual event materializes later, therefore, is debatable. In the short term, Turnus is rescued; in the long term, he is killed by Aeneas.

One first interesting aspect is the echo, in *pugnae subducere Turnum* (10.615), of Venus' request to Jupiter for Ascanius' safety, if Aeneas' is not allowed (10.44-49), in the council of the gods earlier on: *hunc tegere et dirae valeam subducere pugnae* (10.50) (Harrison 1991, on 10.615-16). The two goddesses pull the narrative in opposite directions throughout the poem, and clearly also use some of the same language.

Part of the protasis matches that of another mentioned in chapter six which also later materializes, Entellus' claim to loss of youth as a reason not to fight:

*si mihi quae quondam fuerat quaque improbus iste  
exultat fidens, si nunc foret illa iuventas,  
haud equidem pretio inductus pulchroque iuvenco  
venissem, nec dona moror* (5.397-400).

The repetition of the first four feet of an initial protasis (*quamque* replacing *quaque*), and of its verb (*foret*) in two counterfactuals of the same rather particular type is quite remarkable. Both speakers invoke a previous state of affairs (*quae quondam fuerat*) as the condition for the desired outcome in the present; in Juno's speech, *quae quondam fuerat* is a relative clause qualifying *vis* in the next line, as is *quamque esse decebat* (10.613-14); in Entellus' speech, it qualifies *illa iuventas*, which is also qualified by *quaque improbus iste / exultat fidens* (5.397-98). The verbal concordance between protasis and apodosis is regular in Juno's counterfactual and with imperfect subjunctives refers to the present (*foret, negares*); whereas a present-oriented protasis in Entellus' counterfactual, with imperfect subjunctive (*foret*), precedes an apodosis with pluperfect subjunctive (*venissem*), thus referring to an unachieved action in the past. Juno's apodosis asserts her interlocutor's behaviour (*non hoc mihi negares*), whereas Entellus' asserts his own (*haud inductus venissem*).

In view of Entellus' claim about himself, it is perhaps surprising that he immediately acts in the opposite way to what that claim entails. If we ignore the six lines that relate Entellus' rejection of Acestes' instigation to fight, including the counterfactual (5.394-400), we find that the boxing episode runs smoothly as if Entellus never objected. In Juno's case, the materialization of the counterfactual apodosis (10.614-15) takes a more complex form. In reply to Jupiter's concession of a reprieve, Juno persists with a wish in the present subjunctive (*quid si, quae voce gravaris, / mente dares atque haec Turno rata vita maneret?* 10.628-32), then

reaches the battlefield and spirits Turnus away by means of a phantom Aeneas onto an Etruscan ship which, removed from the others by Juno, takes him to his father Daunus; she rescues Turnus again from the three suicide attempts following discovery of the trick (10.633-88). But that leads nowhere. Juno's counterfactual works as a bargaining tool, but its materialization is not conducive to Turnus' safety.

Still on the subject of Turnus as the less successful counterpart of Aeneas, one inspiring thought in Juno's counterfactual (10.613-16) and subsequent rescue of Turnus (10.633-88), we can examine a counterfactual involving Turnus as himself the counterpart of someone less successful: Pallas. It is an apostrophe to the absent Turnus spoken by Evander over Pallas, killed by Turnus:

*tu quoque nunc stares immanis truncus in armis,  
 esset par aetas et idem si robur ab annis,  
 Turne* (11.173-75).

Debates on *armis* or *arvis* aside (Horsfall 2003, on 11.173), most important in Evander's counterfactual is its emphasis on the dissimilarity between Turnus and Pallas. The verbs, imperfect subjunctives (*stares*, *esset*), construct a reference to the counterfactual present. The dissimilarity between Turnus and Pallas is stated in the protasis, which is the second line of a sentence called by Horsfall (2003, on 11.173) "a prodigious hyperbaton", leading to *Turne* in the third line; Evander's protasis in particular certainly displays a remarkable word order, with the postponed *si* and *esset* line-initial. In the protasis, *par* and *idem* are the required qualities for the ages of Pallas and Turnus not to be matched; *aetas* is repeated in *robur ab annis*, thus providing another couple of comparable members. As we found in the games for Anchises concerning the sizes of boats and strength of boxers, this attention to comparability of forces is typical of Virgilian competitions. But to whose age does Evander refer? Some read the sense "if age was matched": Conington, Page (1970), Fratantuono (2009), Canali's Italian translation (1991), Sermoni's Italian translation (2007); others, "if Pallas was older": Williams (1973), Grandsen (1991); and others, "if Turnus was younger": Fairclough's (1930) and Horsfall's (2003) translations. Alessio (1993: 64) is silent. Virgil clearly left the possibilities open.

The apostrophe *tu quoque* is a favourite of Virgil's, and we have seen it in counterfactuals twice (6.30-31; 10.324-32). All three use the imperfect subjunctive, referring to the present, consistently perhaps with the immediacy conveyed by the apostrophe. The protases, however, differ quite substantially. The current one is a final *si*-clause, with convoluted word-order as mentioned (*tu quoque ... stares ... / esset par aetas ... si ...* 11.173-75), followed by the emphatic *Turne*, which logically belongs to the apodosis (*tu quoque ... Turne*); one has no conjunction and is embedded in the apodosis (*tu quoque magnam / partem opere in tanto, sineret dolor, Icare, haberes*. 6.30-31); the third is a final *ni*-clause (*tu quoque ... / ... Cydon, / ...*

*iaceres, / ni fratrum stipata cohors foret obvia.* 10.324-28). The category of entities to which *tu* is added also varies substantially. Turnus' trophy is conjectured as added to those of the other victims of Pallas; or to Mezentius' trophy, erected early in the book (11.5-16), according to Fratantuono, who also prefers *arvis* to *armis*, as the field where the trophies are (11.173; Fratantuono 2009, on 11.174). Icarus is apostrophized by the narrator as a subject for representation to be expected on Daedalus' sculpture (6.30-31). In both of these, it is the representations of the relevant figures that are envisaged as added to other representations. In the third, *tu quoque* is literal: Cydon by all expectations should have been killed, but his seven brothers saved him (10.324-28).

On the subject of Turnus as the less successful version of Aeneas, whom Juno desperately tries to save, we can observe a near-equivalent to her counterfactual examined above (*si mihi ... / vis in amore foret, non hoc mihi namque negares, / omnipotens, quin et pugnae subducere Turnum / ...* 10.613-16) in her wish spoken to Jupiter during the same negotiations, and just before she flies off to Turnus' rescue, as granted on a temporary basis by Jupiter (discussed above for use of *potius*):

*quid si, quae voce gravaris,  
mente dares atque haec Turno rata vita maneret?  
nunc manet insontem gravis exitus, aut ego veri  
vana feror. quod ut o potius formidine falsa  
ludar, et in melius tua, qui potes, orsa reflectas!* (10.628-32).

The first two lines of this other wish of Juno's resemble her counterfactual at 10.613-16 not just in content, but also in the verb forms, which are imperfect subjunctives (*dares, maneret*); that changes to the present subjunctive, which introduces potentiality, so manifesting more hope on Juno's part, in the second section of the wish (*ludar, reflectas*). The last verb in the sequence, *reflectas*, even sounds appropriate to describe the working of an *if-not*, which is to take the narrative in a new direction; as Jupiter will not resign his determination to let Turnus die, that turn remains unactualized, a mere part of Juno's wish. In spite of the many shared features, this is not a counterfactual.

Four counterfactuals are spoken in conjunction with the relationship between Dido and Aeneas. The first (4.15-19) is one of those which materialize at a later point. The other three occur in quick succession and after Dido's discovery of Aeneas' attempt to flee. One of her many questions to the fugitive Aeneas is cast as a counterfactual:

*quid, si non arva aliena domosque  
ignotas peteres, et Troia antiqua maneret,  
Troia per undosum peteretur classibus aequor?* (4.311-13).

Aeneas' reply slightly later is also in counterfactual form:

*me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam  
auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas,  
urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum  
reliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent,  
et recidiva manu posuisset Pergama victis. [sed ...] (4.340-44).*

In between, Dido expresses her wish for a child from him (4.327-30). We can take Dido's question and Aeneas' reply together first. All verbs are in the imperfect subjunctive, except for the last (pluperfect subjunctive *posuisset*), thus constructing a reference to the present with *posuisset* denoting an earlier time. Dido is asking Aeneas about his preferred course of action at the moment, and he replies accordingly. Both protases are initial, and Dido's has *si non*, without however the possibility of the counterfactual being an *if-not*; being a question is one reason. Dido's question echoes 2.54-6: besides the use of *si non* in the protases, the closest resemblance is that between *ignotas peteres, et Troia antiqua maneret* (4.312) and *Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres* (2.56). Troy (4.312) includes Priam's citadel (2.56). Dido's line, however, features in the protasis, and Aeneas' in the apodosis.

Aeneas replies with a more complex counterfactual than either of the other two, still replete with the same units (4.340-44). He invokes the fates as responsible for the current situation, as at 2.54: *me si fata meis* (4.340); *et, si fata deum* (2.54). To *et Troia antiqua maneret* (4.312) and *Priamique arx alta maneres* (2.56) we can now add *Priami tecta alta manerent* (4.343) as metrically and lexically similar. Like 2.56, it belongs to the apodosis, but with an interesting difference: *Priami tecta alta manerent* (4.343) is impossible, because Priam's palace no longer stands. Scholars have suggested the general sense that Aeneas wishes to reconstruct Troy, rather than literally preserve it (Conington, Austin 1966, Williams 1972, on 4.343). The verb *manerent* is interesting, though, because it elides the time between the factual destruction of Troy and its counterfactual reappearance. In this world, Priam's palace has never been destroyed. A third apodosis follows (4.344). The pluperfect subjunctive *posuisset* adds an earlier temporal level to the series of imperfect subjunctives. The earlier course of action sounds like the basis for the hypothetical materialization of others. Bearing in mind also that Priam could not be revived, his palace is described as already standing, and Aeneas is reusing his own earlier phrases, the resulting city is reminiscent of the fake Troy Buthrotum (3.294-505). The obligation to leave that behind is specified in the εἰ μὴ (as ἄλλά) part of the counterfactual in the next sentence:

*sed nunc Italiam magnam Gryneus Apollo,  
Italiam Lyciae iussere capessere sortes;  
hic amor, haec patria est (4.345-47).*

Lines 4.340-44 and 4.345-47 form an *if-not*.

Before Aeneas' reply, Dido expresses her wish for a child:

*saltem si qua mihi de te suscepta fuisset  
ante fugam suboles, si quis mihi parvulus aula  
luderet Aeneas, qui te tamen ora referret,  
non equidem omnino capta ac deserta viderer* (4.327-30).

The first protasis is a *si qua* type, generally excluded from this study. It has a pluperfect subjunctive verb with a participle, *suscepta fuisset*; the second protasis and the apodosis have imperfect subjunctives (*luderet, viderer*), and so does the relative clause *qui ... referret*, which expands the hypothetical behaviour of the child. The present, counterfactual state of affairs, *non ... capta ac deserta viderer* (4.330), is thus depicted as due to the succession of (also counterfactual) events which are the past birth of a child from Aeneas (4.327-28), and then his current playing (4.328-29). That movement between past and present counterfactuality occurs in four of the five counterfactuals examined in this section (except for 4.311-13). The verb *fuisset* at the end of the first line and protasis also recalls the same at 2.54; the second protasis of 4.15-19, which relates Dido's aversion to marriage, also ends in *fuisset* (4.18). The apodosis also has its verb line-final, *viderer* (4.330), just as *maneres* (2.56) and *manerent* (4.343). These counterfactuals include repeated units proper to themselves. Virgil has scattered similar units of meaning in counterfactuals spoken by Aeneas first and then Dido on the subject of preserving or regenerating the old Troy. How does Dido's counterfactual motherhood fit in?

Dido's nonexistent son adds to the backward motion that runs counter Aeneas' obligatory continuation of his journey. He compares with Aeneas' many unbuilt Troys, but is even less materialized. He is also a Punic Aeneas: *parvulus ... / ... Aeneas, qui te tamen ora referret* (4.329). That particular Aeneas is not allowed by the fates. The Trojan Aeneas can share certain traits of Dido's behaviour, most obviously the building of walls, which is not unique to the two characters. What he cannot do is approach a fuller status as Punic by building walls for Dido, by wearing the colourful clothes she made for him (4.259-67), and evidently by producing a Punic son.

On the theme of backward and forward movement, we may add *si qua* as a further link with representations of that fundamental conflict. It features in Juno's thinking as voiced by the narrator concerning the role of Carthage as capital of all peoples: *hoc regnum dea gentibus esse, / si qua fata sinant, iam tum tenditque fovetque* (1.17-18). The verb *sinant* in the present subjunctive denotes potentiality. It seems conceivable to Juno at this stage that the fates will allow Carthage, her beloved city, to become capital. But that does not happen either in the poem, its forecasts of future history, or the history known to Virgil's Roman audience. The potentiality of *si qua fata sinant* is subsequently denied by materialized reality; and ruled out by Juno's next thought: *progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci / audierat Tyrias olim quae*

*verteret arces; / ... sic volvere Parcas* (1.19-22). In particular, the audience knows while registering Juno's thought *si qua fata sinant* that the fates would not allow success to Carthage. It is possible, therefore, to consider *si qua fata sinant* counterfactual. That is a status comparable to that of Dido's Punic/Carthaginian boy in the counterfactual which uses the same expression, *si qua* (4.327-30).

The next group involves characters' reflections on a past ill considered unavoidable: 2.291-92 and 2.431-34. Each of these displays its own syntactic peculiarity, but they also share an important aspect, which is their pragmatic function. The first is spoken by Hector's ghost to Aeneas in Aeneas' story to the Carthaginian court:

*sat patriae Priamoque datum: si Pergama dextra  
defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent* (2.291-92).

The second is an apostrophe by Aeneas in the same story:

*Iliaci cineres et flamma extrema meorum,  
testor, in occasu vestro nec tela nec ullas  
vitavisse vices, Danaum et, si fata fuissent  
ut caderem, meruisse manu* (2.431-34).

Hector's counterfactual has an initial imperfect subjunctive protasis with a passive infinitive (*defendi possent*), and a final pluperfect subjunctive apodosis with a participle (*defensa fuissent*). The protasis therefore, referring to a later time than the apodosis, must cover an indefinite period, rather than just the present. It also provides cohesion with the topic of the previous line: *hostis habet muros; ruit alto a culmine Troia. / sat patriae Priamoque datum: si Pergama dextra ...* (2.290-92); walls and Troy are repeated in *Pergama*. Horsfall (2008, on 2.292) suggests "perhaps ... Hector would have defended Troy when he was alive (past), but the city can (pres.) no longer be defended". We have seen an adversative clause (here, Horsfall's "but the city ...") correspond to an *if-not* protasis: *et fors omne datum traherent per talia tempus, / sed comes admonuit breviterque adfata Sibylla est* (6.537-38). But there is no *if-not* pattern in Hector's counterfactual. Horsfall's reading, on the other hand, captures the relative timelessness of the indefensibility of Troy. Horsfall also proposes metrical convenience for *defensa fuissent*. As Aeneas' counterfactual comes soon after and shares its function with Hector's, that convenience would seem confirmed by the repetition of *fuissent* at the beginning of Aeneas' own protasis; also, Hector's *hac defensa fuissent* (2.292) and Aeneas' *et si fata fuissent* (2.433) are metrically identical and both line-final.

Aeneas' counterfactual differs starkly in syntax. It has pluperfect subjunctive protasis (*fuissent*), and no apodosis. That protasis rather acts as "Circumstantial Qualification" in an oath which calls to witness the ashes of Ilium and the flames of Aeneas' people: *Iliaci cineres et flamma extrema meorum, / testor ... nec tela nec ullas / vitavisse vices, Danaum et ... / meruisse*



*manu* (2.431-34; Callaway 1994: 39; Goold 1992: 115); or, the same without the comma between *vices* and *Danaum*, to produce *vices Danaum* rather than *manu Danaum* (Horsfall 2008, on 2.433). The protasis (*si fata fuissent ut caderem*), then, is situated between the two states of affairs Aeneas is calling the apostrophees to witness, operating on the second clause: *meruisse manu* (2.433-34); that *ut caderem* might depend on *meruisse* has been considered (Conington, on 4.434), but that has no bearing on the argument. A parallel Circumstantial Qualification is the protasis in Latinus' oath not to allow war in book 12: *non si tellurem effundat in undas / diluvio miscens caelumque in Tartara solvat* (1.204-05); that comes after its main clause, and is potential rather than counterfactual. It is worth noting that an oath with some of the same constituents is asked by Odysseus of Circe in the *Odyssey*. Its "Tenor" or "Promise", the requirement for the oath, is contained in an εἰ μή clause, though not one on the model used for last-minute rescues:

οὐδ' ἂν ἐγὼ γ' ἐθέλοιμι τῆς ἐπιβήμεναι εὐνής,  
εἰ μή μοι τλαίης γε, θεά, μέγαν ὄρκον ὁμόσσαι  
μή τί μοι αὐτῷ πῆμα κακὸν βουλευσέμεν ἄλλο (*Od.* 10.342-44).

The third line, μή τί μοι αὐτῷ πῆμα κακὸν βουλευσέμεν ἄλλο, corresponds to Aeneas' *nec tela nec ullas / vitavisse vices ... et ... meruisse manu* (2.432-34; Callaway 1994: 37-39). The protasis εἰ μή ... ὁμόσσαι, however, is not a Circumstantial Qualification, as *si fata fuissent / ut caderem* is in *Aen.* 2.433-34.

Hector's and Aeneas' counterfactuals have a clear pragmatic role. This is not entirely unknown: Aeneas' very long speech, books 2 and 3, has to explain to the Carthaginians and to Virgil's Roman audience how he came to leave Troy during the Greeks' attack. Jonathan Powell's "Aeneas the Spin-Doctor" (2011) well dissects Aeneas' quandary. The hero has to exonerate himself from blame. As observed concerning *et, si fata deum ...* (2.54-56) in chapter two, there were stories that Aeneas left Troy in less than honourable circumstances: he fled either before the destruction of Troy with his family and went to Mt Ida (Arctinus, *Iliou Persis*), or during it with Antenor under Greek protection (Liv. 1.1); he even handed over Troy to the Greeks (Menecrates of Xanthus, possibly 4th cent. BC, the much later romances named after Dictys of Crete and Dares of Phrygia and then medieval literature) (Powell 2011: 189-90). Dido may well doubt Aeneas' story too, just as her counterpart in Ovid does not believe that Aeneas carried the Penates or his father, and thinks he abandoned his wife Creusa (Ov. *Her.* 7.79-86). That what was known to the Carthaginians could be alarming to Aeneas is suggested by Servius' comments on 1.242 and 1.488, which refer to the mural watched by Aeneas at 1.456-93. Of *Aen.* 1.242-43 (*Antenor potuit mediis elapsus Achivis / Illyricos penetrare sinus ...*), Servius says: *hi enim duo Troiam prodidisse dicuntur secundum Livium, quod et Vergilius per transitum tangit, ubi ait "se quoque principibus permixtum agnovit Achivis" [1.488], et excusat*

Horatius dicens “ardentem sine fraude Troiam”, hoc est sine prodicione: quae quidem excusatio non vacat; nemo enim excusat nisi rem plenam suspicionis; and of *Aen.* 1.488 (se quoque principibus permixtum agnovit Achivis), he says: aut latenter prodicionem tangit, ut supra diximus: ut excusatur ab ipso in secundo “Iliaci cineres” et cetera: aut virtutem eius vult ostendere. Servius refers to line 41 in Horace's *Carmen Saeculare*, the poem commissioned by Augustus for the celebration of the turning of a *saeculum* in 17 BC:

Roma si vestrum [Apollo's] est opus Iliaequae  
 litus Etruscum tenuere turmae,  
 iussa pars mutare lares et urbem  
 sospite cursu, 40  
 cui per ardentem sine fraude Troiam  
 castus Aeneas patriae superstes  
 liberum munivit iter, daturus  
 plura relictis

(The main clause, an apodosis to *Roma si vestrum ...*, follows: *di, ... / date ...*). Aeneas is *castus* and *sine fraude* (lines 41-42); as Servius comments, there is no need for that unless there is suspicion. While watching the mural in book 1, Aeneas may realize that the Carthaginians represented him betraying Troy; in book 2, spoken by him, he would then use his best rhetoric to exculpate himself. And two ways of doing that include the two counterfactuals: Hector's speech, reported in Aeneas' own long speech to the Carthaginians, begins with an exhortation to Aeneas to leave: “*heu fuge, nate dea, ...*”, continues with the thought expressed in the counterfactual, which is that Troy cannot be saved, and ends with the advice to take the Penates from Troy to the city Aeneas will found (2.289-95); Aeneas later invokes the ashes of Troy and the flames that burned his family to testify that he did not flee from enemy weapons and that he was prepared to die if the fates so decreed. The two counterfactuals play a key role in Aeneas' self-defence.

The identical line-final *fuissent* examined above (2.292; 2.433), we can add, leads us to 2.54-56:

*defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent* (Hector, 2.292)

*vitavisse vices, Danaum et, si fata fuissent* (Aeneas, 2.433) [or: ... *vices Danaum ...*]

*et, si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset* (Aeneas, 2.54).

A version of *si fata fuisset* is repeated in both of Aeneas' lines (2.433, 2.54), thus showing an Aeneas keen on allying himself with the will of the fates at different points in his speech. That strategy, as Powell (2011: 196) remarks, is one of Aeneas' ways to shift blame. The first counterfactual and the second are also linked in another way: Hector advises Aeneas not to attempt a defence of the city (2.291-92), but Aeneas goes ahead as if Hector has not spoken

(Powell 2011: 191), and soon invokes witnesses of his bravery in the second counterfactual (2.431-34). That is again intended to illustrate his courage. Aeneas, moreover, himself reports Hector's advice. Hector's impossible knowledge of earthly affairs as a ghost also suggests that Aeneas made it up (Horsfall 2008, on 2.291). Another important and more general consideration is that Aeneas was not asked to describe his own personal behaviour on the night Troy fell. To recount it is his own choice (Powell 2011: 194-95).

The next counterfactual touches one of the principal topics of the *Aeneid*, that of ethnic identity. It is spoken by Evander to Aeneas, here quoted with the two following lines:

*natum exhortarer, ni mixtus matre Sabella  
hinc partem patriae traheret. tu, cuius et annis  
et generi fatum indulget, quem numina poscunt,  
ingredere, o Teucrum atque Italum fortissime ductor* (8.510-13).

The syntax is that of an *if-not*, with final, factual *ni*-clause and subjunctive verb in the protasis, but without the abrupt change of narrative direction typical of Homeric *if-nots*. The verbs in both clauses are in the imperfect subjunctive, thus referring to the present. The context is Evander's agreement to the alliance asked for by Aeneas, with Etruscan troops because his own are scant, and because following their deposition of the cruel king Mezentius, the Etruscans are seeking a new leader (8.470-507). Evander cannot be himself the leader because too old (8.508), and Pallas, the counterfactual explains, is not foreign as the oracles have advised (*externos optate duces*, 8.503). The theme of ethnic identity and mixing, one of the key aspects of the poem as explanation of how Rome came to be, is thus again treated, and again in a counterfactual. We saw that both the foot-racers and the spectators of the boxing match are a mixture of Trojans and Sicilians (5. 293-302, 5.450), the boxer Entellus is Sicilian in Virgil (5.392-93), and Trojan in Servius' report of Hyginus (Servius on 5.389), and the gloves Entellus throws belonged to Aeneas' half-brother Eryx (5.400-06; 5.412), also Trojan; for a while, the two antagonists (Entellus and Dares) risk using gloves with the same ethnic denotation. Also, Turnus' sword was made by Vulcan (12.88-91), maker of Aeneas' weapons (8.400-53, 8.608-731). Ethnic identity is clearly a subject connected with syntactic counterfactuals.

In the current case, Evander's use of different epithets for the same ethnicity, *Etrusca ... acies* (8.503-04) and *Tyrrhenaque regna* (8.507) shows Virgil's inventiveness but also his emphasis on racial variety simultaneous with unity; Aeneas is offered the role of *Italum ... ductor* (8.513), Italians including the Etruscans. He thus faces playing the foreign saviour twice: he is already the foreigner Latinus was expecting as his future son-in-law (7.96-101; 7.253-273). The word *generi*, the word used in the oracle's forecast to Latinus, *externi venient generi* (7.98), and now with a different meaning in Evander's *et generi fata indulgent* 8.512), attracts attention to that dual role; while it is Aeneas' foreignness that matters in the present situation, it

is in his other qualifying property as foreign son-in-law of Latinus that he is mentioned.

But Aeneas is also local (3.167-71; 7.195-211). Nakata (2012) talks of "genealogical opportunism" at work throughout the *Aeneid*, as one or other ethnic affiliation is alternatively emphasized or played down. That manipulation is particularly evident at this point (Nakata 2012: 357). Differently from Latinus (7.195-211), Evander has no knowledge of the Italian origin of Aeneas' ancestor Dardanus. Aeneas talks about him to Evander, but omits to mention Dardanus' origin (Nakata 2012: 358). The ancestor Atlas, Dardanus' maternal grandfather and also Evander's forebear, he mentions, even as a reason for approaching Evander without ambassadors (8.134-44). Given their respective ethnicities, Aeneas' Trojan, and Evander's Greek, that common ancestor is clearly handy. A large portion of the Trojans' experiences since they left Troy has thus disappeared from view: that is their search for the land that generated Dardanus, advised by Apollo (*antiquam exquirite matrem*, 3.94-98). Aeneas is a mixture of foreigner and local, just like Pallas. That was no obstacle with Latinus, Nakata argues, because Latinus interprets Aeneas' arrival as that of a man from foreign shores, rather than a foreigner: *generos externis adfore ab oris, / hoc Latio restare canunt, qui sanguine nostrum / nomen in astra ferant* (7.270-72). Latinus modifies the terms of Faunus' prophecy (*externi venient generi*, 7.98), so there is no contradiction (Nakata 2012: 358).

Pallas and Aeneas, then, are not that dissimilar concerning suitability to lead the Etruscans. Are they in that respect counterparts of each other? After his counterfactual observation and exhortation to Aeneas to consider leadership, Evander entrusts Pallas to him to learn the art of war (8.514-17). The younger warrior thus acquires a further trait as a version of Aeneas. He is a less actualized, and short-lived, counterpart of the more experienced hero. Aeneas, on the other hand, is less actualized as an Italian. While descent from Dardanus draws the Trojans to Italy, Aeneas is definitely more foreigner than Pallas, whose mother is Italian (*mixtus matre Sabella*, 8.510). Virgil is clearly playing with the ethnic complexities legend attributed to the making of current Rome. That mix will not contain visible Trojanness, Jupiter promises later (12.834-37). Turnus, we may note, Aeneas' double and impossible son-in-law to Latinus because local, is himself foreign. This is revealed by Amata, who argues to Latinus that the oracle's *externus* refers to separation and independence from Latium; thus making the Rutulians and their chief *externi*. That view depends on the reading of *externus*. But she also mentions Turnus' ancestors as the Mycenaean Inachus and Acrisius (7.367-72). Latinus, and the narrator, ignore those comments (7.373-74). Evander's counterfactual on the nativeness of Pallas and foreignness of Aeneas, has long-reaching echoes.

Finally, we have the two counterfactuals spoken by Evander to his son Pallas. The first, addressed to the living boy, is of the type we saw uttered by Entellus on lost youth (5.397-400), this time however a genuine obstacle to the speaker's action:

*o mihi praeteritos referat si Iuppiter annos,  
qualis eram cum primam aciem Praeneste sub ipsa  
stravi scutorumque incendi victor acervos  
et regem hac Erulum dextra sub Tartara misi,  
nascenti cui tris animas Feronia mater  
(horrendum dictu) dederat, terna arma movenda -  
ter leto sternendus erat; cui tunc tamen omnis  
abstulit haec animas dextra et totidem exuit armis:  
non ego nunc dulci amplexu divellerer usquam,  
nate, tuo, neque finitimo Mezentius umquam  
huic capiti insultans tot ferro saeva dedisset  
funera, tam multis viduasset civibus urbem (8.560-71).*

The initial protasis and final apodoses of this counterfactual are far apart. The conditional without the extra material is: *o mihi praeteritos referat si Iuppiter annos, / ... non ego ... divellerer ... / neque ... Mezentius ... / ... dedisset / ... viduasset ...* (8.560; 8.568-71). As the model is Nestor's wish for vanished youth in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 7.132-35; 11.670-76; Gransden 1976, on 8.560), the seven intervening lines would seem to be condensed equivalents of the stories that follow Nestor's wish. Like Nestor, Evander expresses a wish followed by reminiscences of his youthful exploits. But Virgil turns that pattern into a counterfactual by the addition of two apodoses. Of Evander's first line, Gransden comments that "*si* with the present subjunctive expresses a wish that something should happen now" (Gransden 1976, on 8.560). A parallel is spoken by Aeneas when searching for the golden bough: *si nunc se nobis ille aureus arbore ramus / ostendat nemore in tanto!* (6.187-88).

Two of Evander's three apodoses have tenses which refer to an earlier time than the protasis. The first negative apodosis, with the (passive) imperfect subjunctive *divellerer* (8.568), refers to the present, and the second and third the pluperfect subjunctives *dedisset* (8.570) and *viduasset* (8.571), to the past. The present subjunctive of the protasis, *referat*, by contrast, refers to a still changeable present. The effect of the combination is that of a wish to which related consequents are added; distance may help disguise the disconnection. Gransden (1976, on 8.568-71) reads a protasis *si forem iuvenis* in parallel with Juno's *si mihi, quae quondam fuerat quamque esse decebat, / vis in amore foret, non hoc mihi namque negares* (10.613-14). But Evander expresses his displeasure as a succession of thoughts, rather than as a planned counterfactual; Juno, who is grammatically correct, is clearly acting duplicitously when begging Jupiter to save Turnus. The imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in two subsequent apodoses, we have seen before: *me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam / auspiciis ... / urbem Troianam .../ colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent,/ et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis* (4.340-44; Gransden 1976, on 8.568-71). The speaker's emotion may be involved in that case too.

The second, and adventurous, counterfactual is spoken by Evander to Pallas now dead:

*Troum socia arma secutum  
obruerent Rutuli telis! animam ipse dedissem  
atque haec pompa domum me, non Pallanta, referret!* (11.161-63).

On the first line, Evander portrays himself going to war, as in the first apodosis of 8.568-69. Old age, blamed for his inability to do so at 8.560, also reoccurs shortly: *sors ista senectae / debita erat nostrae*. (11.165-66). The two utterances are clearly related. Also syntactically? Gransden (1991, on 11.161-63) and Williams (1973, on 11.162) consider *obruerent*, *dedissem* and *referret* jussive subjunctives, or unfulfilled wishes. Fratantuono (2009, on 11.162) reads the wish "if only the Rutulians were *now* killing me, an ally of the Trojans ..., (implied) rather than that I should *now* be standing over your body"; he also takes *socia arma secutum* as Evander's alliance with the Trojans, rather than his literal following them. Page (1970, on 11.162) offers the alternatives *obruere debebant*, meaning "(t'is me) the Rutuli should have overwhelmed ..." and the wish *utinam obruerent*; and also comments "The explanation of this rare subjunctive is doubtful". But at least two people have read *Troum socia arma secutum* as a protasis: "Avevsi seguito gli alleati troiani, i Rutuli / mi avrebbero subissato di dardi, ..." (11.161-62. Sermoniti 2007); "Se avevsi seguito da alleato / le armi dei Teuceri, i Rutuli ..." (Canali 1985).

The resulting counterfactual has three apodoses. The verbs are: imperfect subjunctive (*obruerent*), pluperfect subjunctive (*dedissem*) and again imperfect subjunctive (*referret*); thus referring to the present, past and again present. The anteriority of *dedissem* to *referret* coincides with death preceding removal of the body. But *obruerent* does not quite fit in: the Rutulians hitting Evander with weapons in the present is inconsistent with his death in the past. That would support the view that Evander's utterance is not a counterfactual, but rather two separate wishes. Whatever the grammar, Evander's jumbling of time references probably constructs him as emotionally aroused, because of grief.

This chapter has analyzed the counterfactuals that did not fit in the earlier chapters. The themes, however, are the same: potential end of the main story prematurely, regrets, time shortening, counterfactual state or event subsequently actualized, ethnic identity and the hazy limits of counterfactuality.

## Chapter Eight. *Fate versus Counterfactuals*

This chapter will bring together the results of the analysis. Virgil repeatedly presents alternatives to the main story which come to various degrees of materialization. The main story underlines the predetermination of the point of arrival, i.e. current Rome with Augustus as ruler. The achievement of that point is obvious from the fact that Rome, Augustus and Virgil exist. But the *Aeneid* also shows it as accidental. We will examine how that happens, by juxtaposing two types of evidence: that intended to show that Rome and Augustus' rule were settled by fate, and that which shows otherwise by means of counterfactuals.

The predetermined coming of the Rome of Virgil's time, and beyond, is widely reiterated by the authoritative voices in the text: the primary narrator, the gods, Cassandra, Anchises in the Underworld and various oracles. The following are the most obvious manifestations of that destiny.

Juno hears that the fates decided that a Trojan family would conquer the Carthaginians (1.20-22). She wants to deviate the Trojans from Italy: *quippe vetor fatis* (1.39). Venus reminds Jupiter that he promised the Romans would come from the Trojans (1.234-37), and Jupiter reassures her (1.257-60). He continues: *fatorum arcana movebo* (1.262), and foresees Aeneas fighting in Italy (1.263) and his ruling in Latium, Ascanius and Alba Longa, the twins from Ilia and Mars, Romulus, Roman rule over Greece, Julius Caesar as heir of *Iulus*, and Romulus and Remus giving the rule of law (1.263-96). He pronounces *imperium sine fine dedi* (1.279), and *sic placitum* (1.283).

Apollo gives directions to the wanted country (3.94-98) and the Penates confirm (3.154-71); so do Anchises, citing Cassandra (3.180-87), and the harpy Celaeno (3.250-57). Helenus prophesies to Aeneas (3.374-462; and to Anchises, 3.475-81), mentioning the fates (3.374-76), and giving instructions on how to reach Italy.

Jupiter sends Mercury to nudge Aeneas from Carthage (4.222-37); he describes an Augustus-like version of Aeneas: *totum sub leges mitteret orbem* (4.231). Mercury reminds Aeneas of his duty, referring to Ascanius and the Roman citadel (4.265-76).

The rebellious women are divided between the fated kingdom and Sicily (5.654-56). Anchises, claiming orders from Jupiter, advises Aeneas to take some of the people to Italy, and arranges a meeting in the Underworld to show him his descendants and his walls (5.724-56). Venus reminds Neptune not to cause storms, as Aeneas' walls are allocated by the *Parcae* (5.796-98).

The Sibyl prophesies: the Trojans will reach Lavinium, but there will be wars (*horrida bella*); Aeneas will find a foreign bride and a Greek city will help (6.83-97); the golden bough will break easily if Aeneas is called by the fates (6.146-47). Anchises tells Aeneas he will show him the glory destined for Dardanus' children (6.756), and: *et te tua fata docebo* (6.759); then

indicates and describes the figures of future Roman heroes from Silvius to Romulus, Augustus and Marcellus, younger and older (6.756-86), and briefly the wars Aeneas will fight (6. 892); Rome is *incluta Roma* (6.781).

A seer forecasts a foreigner's arrival to Latinus (7.68-70), and Faunus that of a foreign son-in-law (7.81-106). Aeneas recognizes the land fated for him as mentioned by Anchises (7.120-27), and Jupiter thunders (7.141-43). Dardanus, recognized by Latinus as the Trojans' ancestor originating from Italy (7.195-211), is described by Ilioneus as Jupiter's descendant (7.219-20): that makes Augustus one too. Ilioneus continues: ... *nos fata deum vestras exquirere terras / imperiis egere suis*. (7.239-40). Latinus agrees to meet Aeneas if he marries his daughter as forecast to bring the family to the stars (7.259-73). Juno reflects that she cannot stop the fates, but can cause delay (7.313-16). Following Iulus' arrow, directed by a god (7.498-99), hitting Silvia's stag, Juno rejects Allecto's further help: *frangimur heu fatis* (7.594).

The god Tiber prophesies Aeneas' finding of the white sow (8.42-45) and Ascanius' building of Alba Longa on that spot, and advises Aeneas to form an alliance with Evander against the Latins (8.51-58). Venus asks Vulcanus to make weapons for Aeneas, now that, by Jupiter's orders, he is settled on Rutulian land (8.381-83). Evander comments to Aeneas: *fatis huc te poscentibus adfers* (8.477). Aeneas recognizes the weapons which appear in the sky as a call from heaven (8.524-36).

Jupiter tells his mother that the fates cannot be opposed, and the Trojans' fleet must be turned into goddesses once they have arrived to their destination (9.94-103); he nods, and Olympus shakes (9.106). The day determined by the *Parcae* for the transformation of the ships has come (9.107-09), and they turn into nymphs (9.117-22).

Jupiter contradicts his statement of 1.263 concerning Aeneas' war in Italy, now claiming to have forbidden it, but forecasts Rome's war with Carthage correctly (10.6-15). Venus remarks that Aeneas came to Italy by heaven's orders, and that Juno stopped him (10.31-35). Juno confirms the role of fate, but asks for the Rutulians to be saved too (10.63-84). The gods are divided on the matter, and Jupiter declares his impartiality and deference to the fates (10.107-13).

Aeneas makes his counterfactual observation to the Latin envoys with the perfect indicative apodosis: *nec veni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent* (11.112). The narrator observes that Aeneas is governed by the fates and guided by heaven (11.232-33).

Latinus insists with Turnus that the oracle does not allow Turnus' marriage to Lavinia (12.25-28). Juno tells Juturna that the fates are turning against Turnus and the day decreed by them, *Parcarum dies*, has come (12.147-50). In the narrator's description of the kings arriving at the battlefield, Aeneas is *Romanae stirpis origo* (12.166); Ascanius near him is *magnae spes altera Romae* (12.168). After Venus' healing of Aeneas wound. Iapyx comments on the divine origin of the healing, and Aeneas' divinely intended glorious future (12.427-29). Turnus tells



Juturna the fates are against them, and he has to fight a duel with Aeneas (12.674-78). Jupiter weighs the souls (12.723-25). In heaven, Jupiter underlines to Juno that Aeneas is intended by fate (12.791-93), and forbids her from helping Turnus further (12.801-04). Juno states her resignation and asks for something not decreed by fate: that the Latins do not change name and language (12.816-25). Jupiter agrees, and sends one of the furies to frighten off Juturna (12.842-58). Turnus expresses worry at Jupiter's hostility (12.892-93). He is killed shortly by Aeneas (12.948-50).

So, we are told in no uncertain terms that Augustan Rome was intended all along. A related category is the presentation of typical features of modern Rome in the time of the *Aeneid*, and the wider juxtaposition of myth and present-day reality. The following are some of the main instances of those encounters.

Evander walks with Aeneas to Evander's house on the Palatine; this includes a commentary on his city, Pallanteum, the site of the future Rome (8.337-69). We see the forest that Romulus will make into the Asylum (the place of refuge intended to increase the population). Romulus, another founding figure besides Aeneas and Evander, appears in Jupiter's prophecy (1.275-77) and in Anchises' parade of Roman heroes in Elysium (6.777-87), in both cases placed next to Augustus. He is also on the shield of Aeneas (8.630-34), which begins with him and ends with Augustus; the parallel between Jupiter's *imperium oceano, famam qui terminet astris* (1.287), said of Augustus, and Anchises' *imperium terris, animos aequabit Olympo*, said of Romulus' Rome (6.782), emphasizes the connection (Gransden 1976: 16-17). As the walk continues, we see the Lupercal (8.343-44), the cave that was the centre of the *Lupercalia* still in Virgil's time (8.343), and the Tarpeian rock and the Capitol, possibly the same thing (Gransden 1977, on 8.347), described in a way which underlines the contrast between the splendid present and the more modest past: *et Capitolia ... / aurea nunc, olim silvestribus horrida dumis* (8.347-48). Jupiter himself was seen walking there, an admittedly cautious Evander recounts: *Arcades ipsum / credunt se vidisse Iovem* (8.352-53). The past of the past then comes into view with the two derelict citadels founded, respectively, by Janus, the *Ianiculum*, and by Saturn, the *Saturnia* (8.355-358); the statues of the two deities stand together in Latinus' temple (7.180-01). The clash between humble past and splendid present resurfaces as Evander and Aeneas come up to Evander's house; the Forum and the *Carinae* occupied by cattle contrast with the present state of both, captured for the fashionable district in *lautis Carinis* (8.359-61). Hercules, whom we saw earlier defeat Cacus, who was ravaging the area (8.190-267), had walked through Evander's entrance and stayed in his house, the king tells Aeneas who is entering now (8.362-63). He then exhorts Aeneas: *aude, hospes, contemnere opes, ...* (8.364-65). That is addressed straight to Virgil's audience, according to Gransden; the "anti-types" who represent luxury including Dido and Antony and Cleopatra, the latter represented in the shield of Aeneas later in the book (8.685-713; Gransden: 1976, on 8.364-65).

Roman history, as is well-known, is again illustrated on Aeneas' shield. It shows Augustus' triple triumph in the centre of the 98 lines (8.678-81), following the battle of Actium (8.675-77). Augustus' helmet emits flames, *geminas ... tempora flammas / laeta vomunt* (8.680-81), like the one delivered by Venus to Aeneas, *galeam flammasque vomentem* (8.620), which is also fiery on Aeneas' return by boat from meeting Tarchon, *ardet apex capiti cristisque a vertice flamma / funditur* (10.270-71); Augustus' posture in the shield, *stans celsa in puppi* (8.680), matches Aeneas' on the boat with his blazing helmet (10.261). Or, the flames come from Augustus' head without helmet, as in Iulus' case at the fall of Troy (2.682-84). Either way, the star that appears on Augustus' head (*patriumque aperitur vertice sidus*. 8.681) is associated with the Julian family: a comet had appeared shortly after Julius Caesar's death, during Octavian/Augustus' funeral games for him. Romulus, moreover, is indicated by Anchises to Aeneas in the Underworld as the son of Mars (6.777-80), and wearing a double-crested helmet, *geminæ stant vertice cristæ* (6.779); that brings Romulus close to the other flame-emitting figures, and also makes Julius Caesar the equivalent of Mars (Gransden 1976, on 8.680-81). We must add that Evander describes Cacus, a monster from the uncivilized past (8.193-279), as also emitting flames (8.199). His, however, are dark and come from the mouth (*atros / ore vomens ignis*; 8.198-99), and become dense smoke which darkens his lair when Hercules uncovers it (*faucibus ingentem fumum ... / evomit involvitque domum caligine caeca*; 8.251-52). Hercules kills him, and people then gaze on the flames now extinct (*tuendo ... extinctos faucibus ignis*; 8.265-67).<sup>23</sup> There is, then, a difference between the flames emanating from a positive character and those emanating from a villain. Specific mention of Vulcan, the god who makes Aeneas' weaponry, as Cacus' father (8.198) perhaps adds to the unwanted parallels.

Like Evander's city Pallanteum, other places encountered by Aeneas point to later Roman history. Most obvious is Carthage, which provides a precedent for the Punic wars of the third century BC. Actium (3.276-90) is another, where the exiled Trojans briefly stop and engage in wrestling on their way to Italy, and Aeneas sets up a trophy to Abas: whose identity is unclear, but whose mention provides a chance to "anchor" Octavius' victory in destiny. Abas' trophy refers to the Campsite Memorial built by Octavian as celebration of his victory at Actium outside the new town Nicopolis (3.274-88), and Abas' size (*magni Abantis*, 3.286) makes Aeneas' success against the mysterious enemy all the more remarkable, thus reflecting positively on the courage of his descendants (Stahl 1998: 67-69). The border between enemy and friendly territory was the same for Aeneas' Trojans as for Octavian: Greek in the *Aeneid*, and held by Antony in the war against Octavian; for the Trojans to wrestle there was provoking, and indeed Aeneas' winter camp was established at a distance (Stahl 1998: 57; 66). The games set in Aeneas' time, which were also held by Octavian, precede the Greek ones that were

---

23 What is left to see of the flames is not specified. The passage of time is perhaps implied by the conflation of two time references.

customary in the area before the Romans (Stahl 1998: 60-61). Buthrotum (3.291-505) is even Trojan at the Trojans' arrival, Priam's son and Aeneas' brother-in-law Helenus and his wife Andromache, Hector's widow, being its rulers (over Greeks, 3.295); it is also a replica of Troy. Stahl discerns the presence of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was married to Octavian's sister's daughter Octavia, in Buthrotum during Virgil's lifetime: Aeneas' close kinship to Helenus and Andromache is a remake of current events (Stahl 1998: 45-46).

Names and customs are another important way of showing the present as already there in the past. Iulus, most obviously, confers his name to Julius Caesar, as also stated by Jupiter (1.286-88), and the ships that compete in the games for Anchises are run by the ancestors of Roman families (5.116-23); Clausus, one of the Italian leaders, is ancestor of the Claudii family (7.706-09). Apollo, who gives directions to Aeneas without intermediary on Crete, is addressed by the hero as *Thymbraee* (3.85), after his temple of Thymbra near Troy. That makes the god into "the guardian of the Trojan-Julian line" (Stahl 1998: 47). His direct communication with Aeneas was unsurprising to Virgil's contemporaries, Stahl argues, as Augustus' residence and Apollo's temple were next to each other on the Palatine, and connected by a ramp (Stahl 1998: 47). Typically Roman customs transposed into the mythical past include the *lusus Troiae*, the military parade led by Ascanius after the games for Anchises (5.545-604), the opening of the gates of war at the start of conflicts, which Juno performs when Latinus declines (7.601-22), and the closing of them after Furor is subjugated (as in 29 and 25 BC; 1.294-96), the various episodes of *iura / leges dare* (1.293, 1.426, 1.507, 1.293, 3.137, 5.758, 7.246, 8.670, 8.322) and references to the meal (1.700-55), the house (2.506-25), marriage (4.165-68), and funerals (4.635-40; 4.494-98), as already mentioned.

The message of predetermination by fate, therefore, is heavily emphasized. But it clashes with the alternative stories presented by counterfactuals. Non-actualized states in fiction, we saw in chapter one ("The Disnarrated"), are considered to underline how things could have been different, but were not (Prince 1992: 35; 2005: 118). There is also an authority in the *Aeneid*, the fates, intended to eliminate the competing and variously actualized possibilities that exist all along in the narrative. But the *Aeneid* presents those alternatives as challenges that weaken, rather than underline the authoritative story. That is because some are already actualized. Those possibilities are arranged next as far as possible in chronological order.

The alternative story that reaches furthest back in time is presented by the narrator concerning the risk of Aeolus losing his grip on the winds: *ni faciat, maria ac terras caelumque profundum / quippe ferant rapidi secum verrantque per auras* (1.58-59). We examined how this relates to the danger of chaos that was a fruitful theme in much ancient literature and myth. The actualized counterfactual involves that chaos materializing, a state of affairs comparable to that portrayed in Hesiod's *Theogony* 837-38. Both encase the risk of chaos and failure of the current universe. The narratorial *if-not* at *Il.* 20.288-91 shares its syntactic structure (an apodosis

followed by an εἰ μή clause) with Hesiod's, and actualized produces Aeneas' death at the hand of Achilles. That also constitutes a form of chaos, principally because it opposes fate, as stated by Poseidon (*Il.* 20.302-05), and because the characters involved are too important to die at this stage. The syntax of the winds counterfactual differs from the others in respect of position of protasis and apodosis, and time reference; it is to some extent a potential conditional, therefore a possibility its speaker does not view as barred from actualization. That makes it alarming for the story of Rome as the product of destiny. Hesiod's *if-not*, closely linked and set at an earlier time than the other two, materialized entails Jupiter's defeat by Typhoeus, therefore the failure of the current universe to develop at all. Concerning the Homeric *if-not*, Aeneas' death would accidentally result in the lack of a protagonist for the *Aeneid*.

Next comes the conglomerate which revolves around Troy not falling. These counterfactuals are 2.54-56, 2.291-92, 8.396-99, 11.285-87. All, however, are spoken by characters rather than the primary narrator, so may lose some authority. The starting point must be 11.285-87, 2.54-56 and *Trojan Women* 45-47, because they depict the survival of Troy. Aeneas' 2.54-56 gains some factuality from its indicative in the first apodosis, *impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras*, 2.55: its actualization consists in Laocoon pushing the Trojans to open the wooden horse, and Troy surviving (*Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres*. 2.56); Poseidon's corresponding counterfactual, ... εἴ σε μὴ διώλεσεν / Παλλὰς Διὸς παῖς, ἦσθ' ἄν ἐν βάθοις ἔτι. (*Eur. Tro.* 45-47) comes close, without the Laocoon scene and without the marked indicative that makes the apodosis factual. A different formulation of Troy's continued existence is Diomedes' counterfactual, which, materialized, has the Trojans win the war: ... *ultra Inachias venisset ad urbes / Dardanus et versis lugeret Graecia fatis* (11.285-87). As a character's report of a speech, however, it is also less authoritative. Doubly detached is also Hector's ghost's claim *si Pergama dextra / defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent*. (2.291-92). The Trojan war merely lasts ten years longer if we actualize Vulcan's comment following his counterfactual *similis si cura fuisset, / tum quoque fas nobis Teucros armare fuisset*; the extra length is spelled out in *nec pater omnipotens Troiam nec fata vetabant / stare decemque alios Priamum superesse per annos* (8.396-99).

Following Troy surviving, we can group the counterfactuals which relate Aeneas' and his family's shortened journey. Aeneas is killed at Troy: *Iliacis cineres ... testor ... si fata fuissent / ut caderem, meruisse manu* (2.431-34); although this is spoken by Aeneas and most clearly in self-defence. Venus does not rescue Anchises, Creusa and Ascanius on the night of Troy's fall: *ni mea cura resistat, / iam flammae tulerint inimicus et hauserit ensis* (2.599-600); Venus' speech is also twice removed. Aeneas does not go to Libya: *felix ... si litora tantum / numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae* (4.657-58); nor to Italy: *nec veni, nisi fata ...* (11.112-14), and returns to Troy after stopping in Carthage: ... *urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum / reliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent, et recidiva manu posuissem*

*Pergama victis* (4.340-44). Priam's palace never fell (*manerent*).

Dido has a son by Aeneas: *si qua mihi de te suscepta fuisset / ante fugam suboles, si quis mihi parvulus aula / luderet Aeneas ...* (4.327-30).

Palinurus survives his fall into the sea: *paulatim adnabam terrae; iam tuta tenebam, / ni gens crudelis / ... ferro invasisset ...* (6.358-61). He does that in the indicative (*tenebam*), so along with Laocoon's persuasion of the Trojans to break into the wooden horse rather than letting it into Troy (*impulerat*, 2.54-56) and Aeneas not coming to Italy (*nec veni*, 11.112-14), is one of the counterfactuals so far closest to actualization. On the other hand, it is spoken by Palinurus; and he hardly matters in the story as a whole; the other two counterfactuals once materialized invalidate the *Aeneid*.

Failing to move forward prevents the achievement of the goal. This happens on four occasions in book 6 involving Aeneas, and the Sibyl moving him on. Aeneas views the whole of the golden reliefs on Apollo's temple doors at the entrance of the Underworld: *quin protinus omnia / perlegerent oculis, ni ...* (6.34-36). And once the counterfactual immediately preceding is actualized, *tu quoque magnam / partem opere in tanto, ..., Icare, haberes* (6.31-32), there is possibly more for Aeneas to watch; although the space is presumably finite. Aeneas fights the shades in the Underworld: *admoneat volitare cava sub imagine formae, / inruat et frustra ferro diverberet umbras* (6.293-94); he spends a long time talking to Deiphobus: *et fors omne datum traherent per talia tempus, ...* (6.537-38); and the Sibyl illustrates all the crimes and punishments dealt with in the Underworld: *non ... / omnia poenarum percurrere nomina possim* (6.625-27). Aeneas then misses his visit to Anchises, and therefore the parade of future Romans; *nox ruit, Aenea*, says the Sibyl (6.539).

Another delay of the unwanted kind occurs at 8.520-23. Aeneas and Achates carry on musing on what expects them: *defixique ora tenebant / Aeneas ... et ... Achates multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant, / ni ...* (8.520-23). Aeneas does not leave Evander and join the Etruscans at that particular time. The imperfect indicatives of the apodoses (*tenebant, putabant*) mark factuality, so we now have four indicative counterfactuals, three in a speech: *impulerat* (2.54-56), *nec veni* (11.112-14), *adnabam ... tenebam* (6.358-61); and one narratorial: *tenebant ... putabant* (8.520-23).

Pallas is urged by Evander to be the leader of the Italian troops himself, rather than Aeneas: *natum exhortarer, ni mixtus matre Sabella* (8.510-11). Evander rather than Pallas joins the Trojans, and is himself rather than Pallas killed by Turnus: *Troum socia arma secutum / obruerent Rutuli telis! animam ipse dedissem / atque haec pompa domum me, non Pallanta, referret!* (11.161-63); and (with, separately, Mezentius not attacking his city Pallanteum): *... non ego nunc dulci amplexu divellerer usquam, / nate, tuo, neque finitimo Mezentius umquam / huic capiti insultans tot ferro saeva dedisset / funera, tam multis viduasset civibus urbem* (8.560-71). Turnus is killed by Pallas: *tu quoque nunc stares immanis truncus in arvis, / ... /*

*Turne*. (11.173-75). All of these, however, are uttered by a character (Evander).

Not terribly important for the outcome of the poem are Serranus' continued playing, rather than sleep, and consequent survival, *felix, si protinus illum / aequasset nocti ludum in lucemque tulisset* (9.337-38), and Cydon's death by Aeneas' javelin, *tu quoque, ... / ... Cydon, / ... miserande iaceres, / ni ...* (10.324-42).

Crucial, on the other hand, is Turnus' opening of the gate to let his army into the Trojan camp: *et si continuo victorem ea cura subisset, / rumpere claustra manu sociosque immittere portis, / ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset* (9. 757-59). The voice is that of the primary narrator, and states the end of both war and Trojans. Turnus also does well when rescued by Jupiter for good, as asked by Juno: *nunc manet insontem gravis exitus, aut ego veri / vana feror. quod ut o potius formidine falsa / ludar, et in melius tua, qui potes, orsa reflectas!* (10.630-32). A possibly unique configuration of events occurs when Turnus' sword breaks during his duel with Aeneas: *at perfidus ensis / frangitur in medioque ardentem deserit ictu, ni ...* (12.731-33). The apodosis in this case is definitely factual: there is no doubt that Turnus' sword breaks.

A decision concerning Aeneas' position in Latium is made before things deteriorate between him and Latinus: *Ante equidem summa de re statuisse, Latini, / et vellem et fuerat melius, non tempore tali / cogere concilium, cum muros adsidet hostis* (11.302-04). The verb *fuerat*, as discussed, is indicative but as a voice of *melius est* is habitually considered hypothetical in Latin; but indicative it is. A resolution comes earlier also with the duel between the protagonists at the end of book 11: *continuoque ineant pugnas et proelia temptent, ni ...* (11.912-14).

Young Marcellus, the promising nephew of Augustus who died at nineteen, grows up in the materialized counterfactuals spoken by Anchises in the Underworld: *ostendent terris hunc tantum fata nec ultra / esse sinent. nimius vobis Romana propago / visa potens, superi, propria haec si dona fuissent* (6.869-71). He is a good soldier: *non illi se quisquam impune tulisset / obuius armato, seu cum sedes iret in hostem / seu spumantis equi foderet calcaribus armos* (6.879-81). Marcellus fulfills his potential: *heu, miserande puer, si qua fata aspera rumpas, [or: !] / tu Marcellus eris* (6.882-83). Anchises' version of events can be trusted; and *eris* is in the future indicative.

So far we have listed the main evidence in the text that Rome was predetermined by fate, and then the alternatives to that view provided by syntactic counterfactuals in a mixture of chronological order as they would have occurred from the beginning of the universe to Virgil's own day, and by type. Now we have to consider that those alternatives are not all equally actualized. In order to appreciate how much of a challenge they pose to the main story, therefore, they have to be grouped in order of liability to becoming actualized. The features that make a counterfactual closest to factuality are the indicative mood and the present subjunctive in the apodosis, and its being spoken by the primary narrator.

The most threatening counterfactual to the widely trumpeted message that Rome and Augustus came by destiny is probably the one which comments on Aeolus and the winds: *ni faciat, maria ac terras caelumque profundum / quippe ferant rapidi secum verrantque per auras* (1.58-59). This is on three grounds. The first is grammatical: the present subjunctive, in both components, leaves the option open to materialization. Secondly, the source of the counterfactual is the chief narrator. Thirdly, the analogy, both syntactic and thematic, with Hesiod's *if-not* in the *Theogony* (837-38), which portrays Typhoeus' near victory against Jupiter, and to a lesser extent with that of the *Iliad* 20.302-05, which relates the near killing of Aeneas by Achilles; that suggests that the current rulership is the product of accident, and may well collapse. We explored Gigantomachy, the genre of Hesiod's *if-not*. It was often used as political allegory, as in Horace's *carmen*. 3.4.42-48, dated to 23 BC (Hutchinson 2002: 528-59), thus contemporary with the *Aeneid*, which mentions Augustus disbanding the army and as patron of literature (3.4.37-42), and then dispatching Titans. Here is the relevant section again:

.... *scimus, ut inpios  
Titanas immanemque turbam  
fulmine sustulerit caduco*

*qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat  
ventosum et urbis regnaque tristia  
divosque mortalisque turmas  
imperio regit unus aequo*

This Augustus behaves like Zeus towards the giant Typhoeus, who in Hesiod's *if-not* comes close to defeating him. That danger is never stamped out. Zeus' enemies, like the winds of 1.58-59, can be buried, but have not stopped existing.

Closest to realization, because already realized, is *at perfidus ensis / frangitur in medioque ardentem deserit ictu, ni fuga subsidio subeat* (12.731-33). This has present indicatives in the two apodoses and a *ni*-clause which does not alter those apodoses; and is spoken by the narrator. This counterfactual does not challenge the main story, since the event it definitely narrates agrees with the principal message of the text: Turnus fails to kill Aeneas. But its apodosis area is the most dislocated from the protasis, both syntactically and semantically. That makes it into three successive and independent actions, rather than a counterfactual. This is a factual counterfactual. Another is *primam merui qui laude coronam, / ni me, quae Salium, fortuna inimica tulisset* (5.354-56). The *ni*-clause this time has no effect on the apodosis, *merui*. It does in *hi proprium decus et partum indignantur honorem / ni teneant* (5.229-31); the relevant team is only indignant once the *ni*-clause materializes. 12.731-33 and 5.354-56 are the most factual counterfactuals in the poem.

Also indicative, and completed as a perfect, is the verb in the apodosis of *nec veni, nisi fata locum sedemque dedissent* (11.112-14). This counterfactual, however, is spoken by a

character, and consequently less potentially truthful than 12.731-33 (*frangitur*); which also happens to be factual anyway. Its amount of possible factuality is further eroded by the evident falsity of Aeneas' claim in two ways: he is saying *nec veni* while in Italy; and his *ni*-clause, though syntactically dissonant, is clearly linked to the apodosis, thus removing factuality from it.

Aeneas also speaks *et, si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset, / impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras, / Troiaque nunc staret, Priamique arx alta maneres* (2.54-56). The pluperfect indicative of the apodosis is factual, but again not in the narratorial voice. Laocoon's persuasion of the Trojans to open up the wooden horse is not narratorial truth. Within Aeneas' long speech, however, as we saw in chapter two, the action narrated as materialized continues a movement just started (Laocoon's attack on the horse), and thus acquires possible plausibility as the continuation of a development already under way. Aeneas may be here expressing a wish, a view supported by the lexical similarity with another counterfactual of his: *me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam / auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas, / urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum / reliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent, / et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis* (4.340-44). Aeneas here plainly describes what he would do given the chance, repeating *si fata* and *Priamique arx alta maneres*, the latter in *Priami tecta alta manerent*.

There are two remaining, uncontested counterfactuals with indicative apodoses: the narrator's *Vix ea fatus erat, defixique ora tenebant / Aeneas Anchisiades et fidus Achates, / multaue dura suo tristi cum corde putabant, / ni signum caelo Cytherea dedisset aperto*. (8.520-23); and Palinurus' *iam tuta tenebam, / ni gens crudelis madida cum veste gravatum / prensantemque uncis manibus capita aspera montis / ferro invasisset praedamque ignara putasset*. (6.358-61). The narrator's announcement of a portent through an *if-not* treats *ni* as *cum*. The truncated activities are harmless enough (*defixi ora tenebant, multaue dura putabant*), and just undergo interruption; and the use of the indicative is perhaps irrelevant, since many counterfactuals also relate the cutting of time but have apodoses with subjunctives: 6.34-36, 6.293-94, 6.537-38, 6.625-27. But time-shortening counterfactuals represent a risk intrinsic to the overall project: that of action stalling. The indicative, therefore, perhaps matters. What about Palinurus' counterfactual (6.358-61)? No danger of excessive delay is implied in this case, or any important consequence. Palinurus, however, still adds to the number of indicative apodoses which start being actualized and then stop. His counterfactual illustrates the mechanism as well as the more momentous cases.

One last possible counterfactual with an indicative verb in the apodosis is the *tu Marcellus eris* one (6.882-83). Anchises, Aeneas and the narrator portray two counterpart Marcelli. The younger one is the impossible subject of a future indicative that can only be part of a wish of some sort, whether in the apodosis of a counterfactual or not. In the current



argument, the complexities surrounding *si qua fata aspera rumpas, tu Marcellus eris* (6.882-83), particularly in view of being spoken by the oracular Anchises, probably add to the uncertain nature of the construct repeatedly emphasized as inevitable. The properties of Marcellus' future to the date of his death, which indicate existence as an adult, occur partly in the subjunctive and partly in the indicative. It is not only *eris* that projects a world of unclear status, but also the auxiliary of *visa* in the apodosis of the earlier counterfactual, *nimum vobis Romana propago / visa potens, superi, propria haec si dona fuissent* (6.870-71); both *est* or *esset* could play that role.

To summarize, we have ten counterfactuals which because of their verbal moods challenge the overall message of the poem, which is that Rome and Augustus came by fate (1.58-59, 2.54-56, 5.229-31, 5.354-56, 6.358-61, 6.870-71, 6.882-83, 8.520-23, 11.112-14, 12.731-33). The core of that challenge is the potential for realization of the state or action contemplated in the respective apodoses. In *frangitur ... deserit* (12.731) that potential is already materialized, and in *ni faciam, ... ferrant ... verrantque* (1.58-59), which also has ruinous implications because of content, it is live. We can now add the other counterfactuals which also materialize, but later in the text. These are, as discussed in chapter six, 1.372-74, 2.641-42, 4.15-19, 5.397-400, 10.613-16. At 1.372, Aeneas claims his story would take too long to tell, then he immediately tells it. At 2.641-42, Anchises expresses certainty the gods do not want him to leave the burning Troy, and shortly afterwards he does; and also proceeds to lead the Trojans. Dido tells her sister at 4.15-19 that the memory of her husband prevents her from having a relationship with Aeneas, and shortly she does. At 5.397-400 Entellus alleges old age as reason not to fight with Dares, then he fights. 10.613-16 materializes, although only temporarily, as Jupiter allows a reprieve to Turnus; that illustrates further gradation within actualization. The text, therefore, provides ample evidence that counterfactuals materialize. We can add to those the string of indicatives in the counterfactual area 11.112-118: *nec veni, fuerat, decuit*. As the resolution approaches, there is further encroachment between indicative and subjunctive. The actualized and the non-actualized are quite close.

To the presentation of counterfactuals already materialized or in progress towards that state, which work against the notion of Rome's predetermined success, we can add Aeneas' self-defence ones (other than the *impulerat* one, 2.54-56, already included): *si Pergama dextra / defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent* (Hector, reported by Aeneas. 2.291-92), and *Iliaci cineres ... / testor, in occasu vestro nec tela ... / vitavisse ... et si fata fuissent / ut caderem, meruisse manu* (Aeneas, reported by himself. 2.431-34). These point to a different kind of alternative stories, those that portray Augustus' ancestor Aeneas as a villain. Servius and possibly Virgil's contemporary Horace, to whom Servius refers, commented on them, as we saw at the end of chapter seven.

There are clearly in the *Aeneid* counterfactuals in the process of materialization, others

already materialized, and some that refer to stories better suppressed. This dynamic view of how current reality came to be works against that of predetermined fate. The text portrays the Augustan project not as the culmination of destiny, but rather the product of contingency. There is no necessity to the rule of Augustus. He may be ruling at the moment, but it is a close run thing.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Texts

#### Aristotle

Cooke, H.P., *On Interpretation*. [with *The Categories* & Hugh Tredennick, *Prior Analytics*]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press - London: Heinemann, 1938

#### Cicero

Sharples, R.W., *Cicero. De Fato*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1991

#### Homer

Leaf, Walter, *Homer. The Iliad*. London: Macmillan, 1902

Murray A.T., *Homer. The Iliad*. 2 Vols. London: Heinemann - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1946

Murray A.T., *Homer. The Odyssey*. 2 Vols. London: Heinemann - New York: Putnam, 1930

#### Horace

Brown, P. Michael, *Horace. Satires I*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1993

Rudd, Niall, *Horace. Odes and Epodes*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2004

#### Livy

Foster, B.O., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. I, Books I-II. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1967 [1919]

Foster, B.O., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. II, Books III- IV. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1967 [1922]

Foster, B.O., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. III, Books V-VII. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1967 [1924]

Foster, B.O., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. IV, Books VIII-X. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1963 [1926]

Foster, B.O., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. V, Books XXI-XXII. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1969 [1929]

Moore, F.G., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. VI, Books XXIII-XXV. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1951 [1940]

Moore, F.G., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. VII, Books XXVI-XXVII. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1963 [1943; revised 1950]

Moore, F.G., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. VIII, Books XXVIII-XXX. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1949

Sage, Evan T., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. X, Books XXXV-XXXVII. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1949 [1935]

Sage, Evan T., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. XI, Books XXXVIII-XXXIX. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1958 [1936]

Sage, Evan T. and Alfred Cary Schlesinger, *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. XII, Books XXX-XXXII. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1948 [1938]

Schlesinger, Alfred Cary, *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. XIII, Books XXXIII-XXXV. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1951

Yardley, J.C., *Livy. History of Rome*. Vol. IX, Books XXXI-XXXIV. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard - London: Heinemann, 1953

### **Sextus Empiricus**

Bury, R.G., *Sextus Empiricus*. 3 Vols. London: Heinemann - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard: 1933-49

### **Virgil**

Canali, Luigi, *Virgilio. Eneide*. Milano: Mondadori, 1991

Fairclough, H. Rushton, *Virgil*. London: Heinemann, 1930

Henry, James, *Aeneidea*. London: Williams and Norgate, 1873-1889

Mynors, R. A. B., *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968

Sermonti Vittorio, *L'Eneide di Virgilio*. Milano: BUR, 2007

Various Loeb editions

### **Commentaries on the *Aeneid***

### **Whole poem and multiple books**

Fordyce, C. J., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Libri VII-VIII*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977

- Page, T. E., *The Aeneid of Virgil I-VI*. London - New York: Macmillan, 1970 [1894]
- Page, T. E., *The Aeneid of Virgil VII-XII*. London - New York: Macmillan, 1970 [1900]
- Williams, R. D., *The Aeneid of Virgil. Books 1-6*. London: Macmillan, 1972
- Williams, R. D., *The Aeneid of Virgil. Books 7-12*. London: Macmillan, 1973
- Williams, R. D., *The Aeneid of Virgil. A Commentary Based on the Translation of C. Day Lewis, with Introduction and Commentary*. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2004 [1985]

### **Individual books**

- Austin, R. G., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Liber Primus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971
- Austin, R. G., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Liber Secundus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964
- Austin, R. G., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Liber Quartus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 1966, 1955
- Austin, R. G., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Liber Sextus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977
- Butler, H. E., *The Sixth Book of the Aeneid*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1920
- Conington, John, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*. London: Whittaker & Co.: G. Bell, 1876-98
- Conway, Robert Seymour, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Liber Primus*. Cambridge: CUP, 1935
- Cova, P. V., *Il libro terzo dell' Eneide*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1998 [1994]
- Eden, P. T., *A Commentary on Virgil: Aeneid VIII*. Leiden: Brill, 1975
- Fratantuono, Lee M., *Virgil. Aeneid 11*. Bruxelles: Latomus, 2009
- Fratantuono, Lee M., and R. Alden Smith, *Virgil. Aeneid 5*. Leiden - Boston: Brill 2015
- Gransden, K. W., *Virgil. Aeneid Book VIII*. Cambridge: CUP 1976
- Gransden, K. W., *Virgil. Aeneid Book XI*. Cambridge: CUP 1991
- Hardie, Philip, *Aeneid. Book IX*. Cambridge, CUP 1994
- Harrison, S. J., *Vergil. Aeneid 10*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991
- Horsfall, Nicholas, *Virgil, Aeneid 2. A Commentary*. Leiden - Boston: Brill 2008
- Horsfall, Nicholas, *Virgil, Aeneid 3. A Commentary*. Leiden - Boston: Brill 2006
- Horsfall, Nicholas, *Virgil, Aeneid 6. A Commentary*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013
- Horsfall, Nicholas, *Virgil, Aeneid 7. A Commentary*. Leiden - Boston: Brill 2000

- Horsfall, Nicholas, *Virgil, Aeneid 11. A Commentary*. Leiden - Boston: Brill 2003
- Maguinness, W. S., *Aeneid Book XII*. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1992 [1953]
- Pease, Arthur Stanley, *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos. Liber Quartus*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935
- Servius, *Commentary on the Aeneid of Virgil*. Georgius Thilo & Hermann Hagen eds. Leipzig: Teubner, 1878-1902
- Stégen, Guillaume, *Le livre [premier] de l' Enéide*. Namur: Maison d' éditions ad. Wesmael-Charlier, 1975
- Tarrant, Richard, *Virgil. Aeneid XII*. Cambridge: CUP, 2012
- Traina, Alfonso, *L'utopia e la storia: il libro XII dell' Eneide e antologia delle opere*. Torino: Loescher, 1997
- Williams, R. D., *Aeneidos Liber Tertius*. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1962
- Williams, R. D., *Aeneidos Liber Quintus*. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1960

### **Other Texts**

- Ackermann, Wilhelm, "Begründung einer strengen Implikation", *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 1956, 21 (2), 113-28
- Adams, Ernest W., *The Logic of Conditionals*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975
- Adler, E., "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control", *International Organization*, 1993, 46 (1), 101-45
- Alessio, Maria, *Studies in Vergil: Aeneid Eleven. An Allegorical Approach*. Laval, Québec: Montfort & Villeroy, 1993
- Algra, Keimpe, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld & Malcolm Schofield eds., *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge: CUP, 1999
- Alkon, Paul, "Alternate History and Postmodern Temporality", in Cleary ed. 1994
- Allen, S. ed., *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences: Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989
- Anderson, Alan Ross & Belnap, Nuel D. , *Entailment: The Logic of Entailment and Necessity*. Princeton - London : Princeton University Press, Vol. I 1976, Vol. II 1992
- Anderson, W. B., "Contributions to the Study of the Ninth Book of Livy", *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1908, 39, 89-103
- Arend, W., *Die typischen Szenen bei Homer*. Berlin: Weidmann, 1933

- Austin, J.L., "Ifs and Cans", *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1956, 42, reprinted in Austin 1970, 205-32
- Austin, J. L., *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge: CUP, 1962
- Austin, J.L., *Philosophical Papers*, Oxford: OUP, 1970
- Auwers, J. van der, "Introduction – Tasks for Conditionalists?", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 1983, 7, 243-45
- Bailey, Alan, *Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonian Scepticism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002
- Bakker, Egbert, *Linguistic Formulas in Homer: Scalarity and the Description of the Particle "per"*. Amsterdam: Benjamin, 1988
- Bakker, Egbert, *Poetry in Speech: Orality and Homeric Discourse*. Ithaca, NY - London: Cornell University Press, 1997
- Bakker, Egbert, *Pointing at the Past: From Formula to Performance in Homeric Discourse*. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2005
- Ball, L. J., E. J. Lucas, J. N. V. Miles, & A. G. Gale, "Inspection Times and the Selection Task: What Do Eye-Movements Reveal about Relevance Effects?", *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 2003, 56A, 1053-77
- Baños Baños, José Miguel ed., *Sintaxis del latín clásico*. Madrid: Liceus, 2009
- Baratin, Marc, "Remarques sur l'emploi des temps et des modes dans le système conditionnel latin", *Bulletin de la Société Linguistique de Paris*, 1981, 76 (2), 249-73
- Barber, Daniel, "Presence and the Future Tense in Horace's *Odes* ", *The Classical Journal*, 2014, 109 (3), 333-61
- Barker, Stephen, *Counterfactuals*, in Keith Brown ed. 2006
- Barker, Stephen, "Are Counterfactuals Really about Possible Worlds?", 2011, *Nous*, 45 (1), 557-76
- Barkow, J. H., L. Cosmides & J. Tooby, eds., *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*. Oxford: OUP, 1992
- Barnes, Jonathan, "The Peripatetics", in Algra et al. eds. 1999, 77-83
- Barnes, Jonathan, *Terms and Sentences: Theophrastus on Hypothetical Syllogisms*. Oxford: OUP, 1984
- Baron, J. "Nonconsequentialist Decisions", *Behavioural and Brain Science*, 1994, 17, 1-42
- Baron, J., *Thinking and Deciding* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Cambridge: CUP, 2000 [1988]
- Barrouillet, P. & J.-F. Lecas, "How Can Mental Models Theory Account for Content Effects in Conditional Reasoning? A Developmental Perspective", *Cognition*, 1998, 67, 209-53
- Barrouillet, P., N. Grosset & J.-F. Lecas, "Conditional Reasoning by Mental Models: Chronometric and Developmental Evidence", *Cognition*, 2000, 75, 237-66

- Bartsch, Shadi, "Ars and the Man: The Politics of Art in Virgil's *Aeneid*", *Classical Philology* 1998, 93, 322-42
- Bassett, Samuel Eliot, *The Poetry of Homer*. Berkeley,: California University Press, 1938
- Batstone, William W., "The Antithesis of Virtue: *Synkrisis* and the Crisis of the Late Republic", *Classical Antiquity*, 1988, 7 (1), 1-29
- Batstone, William W., "Introduction", *Sallust: Catiline's Conspiracy, The Jugurthine War, Histories*. Oxford: OUP, 2010
- Beckett, Francis ed., *The Prime Ministers Who Never Were. A Collection of Political Counterfactuals*. London: Biteback Publishing, 2011
- Beckett, Francis, "John Smith", in Beckett ed. 2011: 223-30
- Belzer, M., "Kvart's *A Theory of Counterfactuals*", *Noûs*, 27, 1993, 113-18
- Bennett, Jonathan, *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003
- Benveniste, Émile, "Préterit et optatif en indo-européen", *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, 1951, 47, 11-20
- Bertinetto, P.M., "Ormai", in Cipriano et al. eds. 1994, 789-810
- Bettini, M., "Doubles and Nostalgia in Vergil's 'Parva Troia'" (*Aeneid* 3.294), *Classical Antiquity*, 1997, 16, 8-33
- Birke, Dorothee, Michael Butter & Tilmann Köppe eds., *Counterfactual Thinking, Counterfactual Writing*. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, 2011
- Blase, Heinrich, *Gymnasialprogramm. Studien und Kritiken zur lateinischen Syntax von Dr. Heinrich Blase, II. Teil, Beilage zum Programm des Grossherzoglichen Herbstgymnasiums zu Mainz*. Mainz, 1905
- Blatt, Franz, *Précis de syntaxe latine*. Lyon: IAC, 1952
- Bodelot, Colette, *Espaces fonctionnels de la subordination complétive en latin: étude morpho-syntaxique et sémantico-énonciative*. Louvain - Paris: Peeters, 2000
- Bondurant, Alexander L., "A Disputed Line in the *Aeneid* - 1.426", *Classical Journal*, 1925, 20 (9), 534-40
- Braccesi, Lorenzo. *Grecita' di frontiera: i percorsi occidentali della leggenda*. Padova: Esedra 1994
- Braine, M. D. S., "On the Relation between the Natural Logic of Reasoning and Standard Logic", *Psychological Review*, 1978, 85, 1-21
- Breslauer, George W., "Counterfactual Reasoning in Western Studies of Soviet Politics and Foreign Relations", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 69-94
- Breitenbach, H. R., "Der Alexanderexcurs bei Livius", *Museum Helveticum*, 1969, 26, 146-52



- Bremond, Claude, *Logique du récit*. Paris: Seuil, 1973
- Brisson, Luc, "Les Socratiques", in Canto-Sperber ed. 1997, 145-47
- Brown, Keith ed., *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*. Oxford: Elsevier, 2006
- Brown, Gillian, & George Yule, *Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge: CUP, 1983
- Brunel, J., "Les périodes conditionnelles du grec et le problème de l'optatif", *Bulletin de la Société Linguistique de Paris*, 1980, 75, 227-66
- Brunschwig, Jacques, "Les Stoïciens", in Canto-Sperber ed. 1997
- Buchheit, Vinzent, *Vergil über die Sendung Roms. Untersuchungen zum Bellum Poenicum und zur Aeneis*. Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1963
- Buchheit, Vinzent, "Mythos und Geschichte in Ovids *Metamorphosen I*", *Hermes*, 1966, 94 (1), 80-108
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, "Counterfactuals and International Affairs: Some Insight from Game Theory", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 211-29
- Burton, Paul J., "The Last Republican Historian: A New Date for the Composition of Livy's First Pentad", *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, 2000, 49 (4), 429-446
- Byrne, R.M.J., *The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 2005
- Caffi, Claudia, "On Mitigation", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 1999, 31 (7), 881-909
- Calboli, Gualtiero, "Again on the *cum* + subjunctive construction", in García-Hernández ed. 1998, 235-49
- Calboli, Gualtiero ed., *Papers on Grammar IX 2. Latina Lingua!*. Roma: Herder, 2005
- Calboli, Gualtiero, "Enrichment and Simplification in Latin Syntax: The Development of the Optative and the Subjunctive", in Calboli ed. 2005, 509-19
- Caldwell, Richard S., *The Origin of the Gods: A Psychoanalytic Study of Greek Theogonic Myth*. Oxford: OUP 1993
- Callaway, Cathy, "The Typical Oath-Scene in Vergil", *Vergilius*, 1994, 40, 37-48
- Canto-Sperber, Monique ed., *Philosophie Grecque*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997
- Carey, Christopher ed., *Trials from classical Athens*. London & New York: Routledge, 1997
- Carnap, R., *Meaning and Necessity*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947
- Carroll, Susanne, review of Givón 1984, *Canadian Journal of Linguistics*, 1985, 30, 343-47
- Casali, Sergio, "Aeneas and the doors of the of the temple of Apollo", *Classical Journal*, 1995, 91, 1-9

- Casali, Sergio, "The Development of the Aeneas Legend", in Farrell & Putnam eds. 2010, 38-51
- Castaneda, Hector-Neri, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections", *Poetics*, 1979, 8, 31-62
- Cavazza, Franco, *Rumpo*, in Cozzoli ed. 1988, 601
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, "Rerunning History: Counterfactual Simulation in World Politics", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 247-67
- Chantraine, Pierre, *Grammaire homérique. II*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1963 [1953]
- Chausserie-Laprée, *L'expression narrative chez les historiens latins. Histoire d'un style*. Paris: Boccard, 1969
- Cheng, P. W. & K. J. Holyoak, "Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas", *Cognitive Psychology*, 1985, 17, 391-416
- Chisholm, R.M., "The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional", *Mind*, 1946, 55, 289-307
- Chomsky, *Language and Mind*. NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968
- Christensen, T.J., & J. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", *International Organization*, 1990, 44 (2), 137-68
- Churchill, Winston S., "If Lee Had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg", in Squire ed. 1972
- Cipriano, P., P. Di Giovine, & M. Mancini eds., *Miscellanea di studi linguistici in onore di Walter Belardi*. Roma: Il Calamo, 1994
- Claflin, E. Francis, "'Ni mea cura resistat'. Virgil *Aen.* 2.599-600", *Classical Journal*, 1911, 305-07
- Cleary, Thomas R. ed., *Time, Literature and the Arts: Essays in Honor of Samuel S. Macey*. Victoria, BC: University of Victoria Press, 1994
- Cohen, Michael, *Conditionals*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- Cole, P. & J.L. Morgan eds., *Studies in Syntax*. Vol. 3: *Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, 1975
- Comrie, B., "Conditionals: A typology", in Traugott et al. eds. 1986, 77-99
- Cornell. T.J. ed., *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*. Vol. III. Oxford: OUP, 2013
- Cornell, T. J., "M. Porcius Cato", in Cornell ed. 2013
- Cosmides, L. & J. Tooby, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange", in Barkow et al. eds. 1992, 163-228
- Cosmides, L., "The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason?", *Cognition*, 1989, 31, 187-276
- Cova, Pier Vincenzo, *Virgilio. Il libro terzo dell'Eneide*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1998 [1994]

- Cowley, Robert ed., *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been*. London: Macmillan, 2000 [New York: Putnam, 1999]
- Cozzoli, Umberto ed., *Enciclopedia Virgiliana*. Vol. IV. Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988
- Dannenberg, Hilary P., *Counterfactual History*, in Herman et al. eds. 2005, 85
- Dannenberg, Hilary P., *Coincidence and Counterfactuality: Plotting Time and Space in Narrative Fiction*. Lincoln NB - London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008
- Davidson, Donald, & Gilbert Harman eds., *Semantics of natural language*. Dordrecht - Boston: Reidel, 1972
- Davidson, Donald, *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford: OUP, 1980
- De Finetti, B., *Philosophical Lectures on Probability Collected, Edited and Annotated by Albert Mura*, Vol. 340. Berlin: Springer, 2008
- De Finetti, B., "Sur quelques conventions qui semblent utiles", *Revue Romaine de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées*, 1967, 1227-34
- de Jong, Irene, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2004 [1987]
- Declerck, R., and S. Reed, "The semantics and pragmatics of *unless*", *English Language and Linguistics*, 4, 2000 (2), 205-41
- Declerck, R., & S. Reed, *Conditionals: A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis*. Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2001
- Demand, Nancy, "Herodotus' Encomium of Athens: Science or Rhetoric?", *The American Journal of Philology*, 1987, 108 (4), 746-58
- Demandt, Alexander, *Ungeschehene Geschichte*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011 [1984]
- Denyer, N.C., *Philo the Dialectician*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- DeRose, Keith, & Richard E. Grandy "Conditional Assertions and 'Biscuit' Conditionals", *Noûs*, Sep. 1999, 33 (3), 405-420
- Detienne, Marcel & Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*. Trans. Janet Lloyd. Chicago - London: University of Chicago Press, 1991 [*Les ruses d'intelligence: la Metis des grecs*. Paris: Flammarion, 1974]
- Devine, Andrew M. & Laurence D. Stephens, *Discontinuous Syntax: Hyperbaton in Greek*. New York and Oxford: OUP, 2000
- Dihle, Albrecht, *Homer-Probleme*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970
- Dik, S. C., *Functional Grammar*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1978
- Dik, S. C. ed., *Advances in Functional Grammar*. Dordrecht: Foris, 1983

- Dik, S.C., *The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part I: The Simple Predication*. Dordrecht: Foris, 1989
- Doležel, Lubomir, "Truth and Authenticity in Narrative", *Poetics Today*, 1980, 1 (3), 7-25
- Doležel, Lubomir, "Mimesis and Possible Worlds", *Poetics Today*, 1988, 9 (3), 475-96
- Doležel, Lubomir, "Possible Worlds and Literary Fiction", in S. Allen ed. 1989, 221-42
- Doležel, Lubomir, *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998
- Donnellan, Keith, "Reference and Definite Descriptions", *Philosophical Review*, 1966, 75, 281-304
- Dover, K.J., *The Greeks and Their Legacy*. Oxford - New York: Blackwell, 1988
- Dowe, P. and P. Noordhof eds., *Causation and Counterfactuals*. London: Routledge, 2003
- Dudman, V. W., "Tense and Time in English Verb Clusters of the Primary Pattern", *Australasian Journal of Linguistics*, 1983, 3, 25-44
- Dudman, V. W., "Parsing 'If-Sentences'", *Analysis*, 1984, 44, 145-53
- Dudman, V. W., "Indicative and Subjunctive", *Analysis*, 1988, 48, 113-22
- Dudman, V. W., "On conditionals", *Journal of Philosophy*, 1994, 91, 113-28
- Dudman, V. W., "Classifying Conditionals: The Traditional Way is Wrong", *Analysis*, 2000, 60, 147
- Dunn, Jeffrey, "Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics and the Special Sciences", *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science*, 2011, 62, 71-98
- Eco, Umberto, "Report on Session 3: Literature and Arts", in Allen ed. 1989, 343-56
- Eckstein, Arthur M., *Moral Vision in The Histories of Polybius*. Berkeley - Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995
- Edgington, Dorothy, "On Conditionals", *Mind*, 1995, 104 (414), 235-329
- Edgington, Dorothy, "What if? Questions about Conditionals", *Mind & Language*, 2003, 380-401
- Edgington, Dorothy, "On Conditionals", *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, 2007, 127-221
- Edwards, Mark W., *The Iliad: A Commentary, V: Books 17-20*. Cambridge: CUP, 1991
- Eikmeyer, J & H. Riesner eds., *Words, Worlds, and Contexts*. Berlin - New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981
- Elga, A., "Statistical mechanics and the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence", *Philosophy of Science*, 2000, suppl. 68, 313-24

- Erbse, Hartmut, "Über die sogenannte Aineis, 20 Buch der *Ilias*", *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 1967, 110, 1-25
- Ernout, A. & F. Thomas, *Syntaxe latine*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1953
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Interpretation and Matching Bias in a Reasoning Task", *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1972, 24, 193-99
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1984, 75, 451-68
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., *Bias in Human Reasoning: Causes & Consequences*. Hove: Erlbaum, 1989
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Relevance and Reasoning", in Newstead & Evans 1995, 147-72
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Deciding Before You Think: Relevance and Reasoning in the Selection Task", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1996, 87, 223-40
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand it after 25 Years?", *Thinking & Reasoning*, 1998, 4, 45-48
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Matching Bias and Set Sizes: A Discussion of Yama (2001)", *Thinking & Reasoning*, 2002, 8, 153-63
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., "Do People Reason on the Wason Selection Task? A New Look at the Data of the Data of Ball et al. (2003)", *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 2010, 63, 3, 434-441
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., & J.S. Lynch, "Matching Bias in the Selection Task", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1973, 64, 391-97
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T. & S.E. Newstead, "Language and Reasoning: A Study of Temporal Factors", *Cognition*, 1977, 5 (3), 265-83
- Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. and D.E. Over, *If*. Oxford: OUP, 2004
- Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., S.H. Handley, & D.E. Over, "Conditional and Conditional Probability", *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 2003, 29, 321-55
- Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., S.E. Newstead & R.M.J. Byrne, *Human Reasoning: The Psychology of Deduction*. Hove: Psychology Press, 1993
- Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., S.H. Handley, H. Neilens, & D.E. Over, "Thinking about Conditionals: A Study of Individual Differences", *Memory & Cognition*, 2007, 35, 1722-84
- Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., S.H. Handley, H. Neilens, & D.E. Over, "Understanding Causal Conditionals: A Study of Individual Differences", *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 2008, 61, 1291-97
- Farrell, Joseph, "The Virgilian intertext", in Martindale ed. 2007 [1997], 222-38
- Farrell, Joseph & Michael C.J. Putnam eds., *A Companion to Virgil's Aeneid and its Tradition*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010

- Fauconnier, G., *Mental Spaces* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Cambridge: CUP, 1994 [1985]
- Fauconnier, Gilles, "Analogical Counterfactuals", in Fauconnier & Sweetser eds. 1996, 1-28
- Fauconnier, Gilles, *Mappings in Thought and Language*. Cambridge: CUP, 1997
- Fauconnier, Gilles & Eve Sweetser eds., *Spaces, Worlds and Grammar*. London: University of Chicago Press, 1996
- Fauconnier, Gilles, & Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*. New York: Basic Books, 2002
- Fayen, F., "Der 'Irrealis' im Griechischen", *Gymnasium*, 1971, 78, 442-46
- Fearon, James D., "Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes", in Tetlock & Belkin 1996, 39-67
- Feldherr, Andrew, "Ships of State: *Aeneid* 5 and Augustan Circus Spectacle", *Classical Antiquity*, Oct. 1995, 14 (2), 245-65
- Fenik, B., "Typical Battle Scenes in the *Iliad*", *Hermes Einzelschriften*, 1968, 21, 1-256
- Ferguson, Niall ed., *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals*. London: Picador, 1997
- Fernandelli, M., "Il prologo divino dell'*Eneide*", *Lexis*, 1996, 14, 99-115
- Fillmore, C., "Epistemic stance and grammatical form in English conditional sentences", *Chicago Linguistic Society*, 1990, 26, 137-62
- Fine, Kit, "The Problem of Non-Existents", *Topoi*, 1982, 1, 97-140
- Fisher, D. H., *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*. New York: Harper and Row, 1970
- Fleischman, S., "Temporal distance: A basic linguistic metaphor", *Studies in Language*, 1989, 13 (1), 1-50
- Flory, Stewart, "Thucydides' Hypotheses about the Peloponnesian War", *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1988, 118, 43-56
- Fogel, R., *Railroad and American Economic Growth. Essays in Econometric History*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1964
- Ford, Cecilia E., *Grammar in Interaction: Adverbial Clauses in American English Conversations*. Cambridge: CUP, 1993
- Foss, B. M., *New Horizons in Psychology I*. Harmandsworth: Penguin, 1966
- Gabba, Emilio, *Dionysius and The History of Archaic Rome*. Berkeley - Los Angeles - Oxford: University of California Press, 1991
- Galinsky, K., "*Aeneid V* and the *Aeneid*", *American Journal of Philology*, 1968, 89 (2), 157-85
- García-Hernández, Benjamín ed., *Estudios de Lingüística Latina*. Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas,

1998

García-Madruga, Juan A., Sergio Moreno-Rios, Ana Cristina Quelhas & Csongor Juhos, "Reasoning with 'Unless' counterfactual conditionals", *Psicológica*, 2009, 33, 217-243

Geis, Michael L. & William G. Lycan, Nonconditional conditionals. *Philosophical Topics*, 1993, 21 (2), 35-56

Gernsbacher, M.A. & Givón, T. eds., *Coherence in Spontaneous Text*, TSL 31. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1995

Gibbard, A., "Two Recent Theories of conditionals", in Harper et al. eds. 1981, 211-47

Gill, Mary Louise & Pierre Pellegrin eds., *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006

Gilovich, T. & V. Medvec, "Some Counterfactual Determinants of Satisfaction and Regret", in Roese & Olson eds. 1995, 259-82

Gilovich, T., D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman eds., *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*. Cambridge: CUP, 2002

Gilpin, R., *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: CUP, 1981

Ginzburg, C., *The Judge and the Historian*. London - New York: Verso, 1999

Givón, T., *Syntax*, 2 Vols. Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001 [Vol. 1, 1984. Vol. 2, 1990]

Goffman, Erving, *Frame Analysis*, New York: Harper & Row, 1986 [1974]

Goodman, Nelson, "The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals", 1947, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1947, 5, 113-128; reprinted in Frank Jackson ed. 1991, 9-27

Goodman, Nelson, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*. Cambridge, Massachusetts - London: Harvard University Press, 1983

Goodwin, W. W., *The Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*. London: Macmillan, 1889

Goold, G. P., "The voice of Virgil", in Woodman & Powell eds. 1992, 110-23

Greenberg, J., "The Realis-Irrealis Continuum in the Classical Greek Conditional", in Traugott et al. eds. 1986, 247-64

Greenberg, Joseph H. ed., *Universals of Language: Report of a Conference held at Dobbs Ferry, New York, April 13-15 1961*. Cambridge, Massachusetts - London: MIT, 1966 [1963]

Grethlein, J., *The Greeks and their Past*. New York: CUP 2010

Grice, H. P., "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole and J. Morgan eds., *Speech Acts, Syntax and Semantics* Vol. 3. New York: Academic Press, 1975, 41-58

Grice, H. P., *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989

- Griggs, R. A., & J. R. Cox, "The "Elusive Thematic Materials Effect in the Wason Selection Task", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1982, 73, 407-20
- Günther, Hans-Christian, *Überlegungen zur Entstehung von Vergils Aeneis*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996
- Hadjichristidis, C., R.J. Stevenson, D.E. Over, S.A. Sloman, J.St.B.T. Evans, & A. Finney, "On the evaluation of *If p then q conditionals*", *Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society*, 2001, Edinburgh
- Haiman, John, "Conditionals are Topics", *Language*, 1978, 54, 564-89
- Haiman, John, "Paratactic *if*-clauses", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 1983, 7, 263-81
- Haiman, John, & Sandra Thompson eds., *Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse*. Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1988
- Halpern, J.Y., *Reasoning about Uncertainty*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003
- Handford, S.A., *The Latin Subjunctive*. London: Methuen, 1947
- Handley, S. J., A. Feeney, & C. Harper, "Alternative Antecedents, Probabilities and the Suppression of Fallacies on Wason's Selection Task", *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 2002, 55A, 799-813
- Hardie, Philip, *Virgil's Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986
- Hardie, Philip, "The Janus Episode in Ovid's *Fasti*", *Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici*, 1991, 26, 47-64
- Hardman, D. & L. Maachi eds., *Psychological Perspectives on Reasoning, Judgment and Decision Making*. Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2003
- Hare, R.M., "Meaning and Speech Acts", *Philosophical Review*, 1970, 79, 74-93
- Harper, William L., Glenn Pearce & Robert Stalnaker eds., *Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decisions, Chance, and Time*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981
- Harris, M. B., "The Historical Development of *si*-clauses in Romance", in Traugott et al. eds. 1986, 265-84
- Harrison, E. L., "Foundation Prodigies in the *Aeneid*", *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar*, 1985, 5, 131-64
- Harrison, S.J. ed., *Oxford Readings in Vergil's Aeneid*. Oxford & New York: OUP, 1990
- Harrison-Barbet, Anthony, *Mastering Philosophy* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001 [1990]
- Harvey, N. & D. J. Koehler eds., *Blackwell Handbook on Judgment and Decision Making*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004
- Haudry, Jean, "Parataxe, hypotaxe et corrélation dans la phrase latine", *Bulletin de la Société Linguistique de Paris*, 1973, 68 (1), 147-86



- Haverkate, Henk, "Deictic Categories as Mitigating Devices", *Pragmatics*, 1992, 2 (4), 505-22
- Hawthorn, G., *Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences*. New York: CUP, 1991
- Heinze, R., *Virgil's Epic Technique*. London: Bristol Classical, 2000 printing, 1999 [1902]
- Helbig, Jorg, *Der parahistorische Roman*. Frankfurt: Lang, 1988
- Herman, David, *Story Logic. Problems and Possibilities of Narrative*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002
- Herman, David, *Action Theory*, Herman et al. eds. 2005, 2-3
- Herman, David, Manfred Jahn & Marie-Laure Ryan eds., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory*. London: Routledge, 2005
- Herman, David ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*. Cambridge: CUP, 2007
- Hodges, Wilfrid, *Logic: An Introduction to Elementary Logic*. London: Penguin, 1977
- Hodot, R., "Le 'conditionnel' en grec ancien", *Lalies*, 1981, 46-47
- Hofmann, Johann Baptist & Anton Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik*. München: Beck, 1965
- Hofmann, Johann Baptist & Anton Szantyr, *Stilistica latina*. Bologna: Patron, 2002 [Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik. München: Beck, 1965]
- Holsti, K. J., *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985
- Honderich, Ted, ed., *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: OUP, 1995
- Hornblower, Simon, *Thucydides*. London: Duckworth, 1987
- Hornblower, Simon, "Narratology and Narrative Techniques in Thucydides", in Hornblower ed. 1994
- Hornblower, Simon, ed., *Greek Historiography*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994
- Hornblower, Simon, *Thucydides and Pindar: Historical Narrative and the World of Epinikian Poetry*. Oxford: OUP, 2004
- Hornblower, Simon, *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Vol. 3, Books 5.25-8.109. Oxford: OUP, 2008
- Hornblower, Simon, *The Greek World, 479-323 BC* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.). London: Routledge, 2011 [1983]
- Horsfall, Nicholas, "Virgil and the Conquest of Chaos", *Antichthon*, 1981, 15, 141-50
- Horsfall, Nicholas, "Aeneas the Colonist", *Vergilius*, 1989, 35, 8-27
- Horsfall, Nicholas, *Virgilio: l'epopea in alambicco*. Napoli: Liguori, 1991
- Horsfall, Nicholas, review of Günther 1996, *Rivista di filologia*, 1997, 125, 468-72

- Howell, Robert, "Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't", *Poetics*, 1979, 8, 129-78
- Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, *Formal Logic: A Philosophical Approach*. Trans. Alex Levine. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004 [*Formale Logik: Eine philosophische Einführung*. Stuttgart: Philipp Reklam jun., 1998]
- Humbert, Jean, *Syntaxe Grecque*. (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.) Paris: Klincksieck, 1960 [1954; 1945]
- Hutchinson, G., "The Publication and Individuality of Horace's *Odes* Books 1-3", *Classical Quarterly*, 2002, 52, 517-37
- Ierodakonou, Katerina, "Stoic Logic", in Gill & Pellegrin eds. 2006, 505-30
- Ingarden, Roman, *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and the Theory of Literature*. Trans. George Grabowicz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1931; 1926]
- Inwagen, Peter van, "Creatures of Fiction", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1977, 14, 299-308
- Jackson, Frank, 1977, "A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 1977, 55, 3-21
- Jackson, Frank, "On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals", 1979, in Jackson ed. 1991: 111-35
- Jackson, Frank ed., *Conditionals*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987
- Jackson, Frank, *Conditionals*. Oxford: OUP, 1991
- Jackson, Frank & R. Pargetter, "Confirmation and the nomological", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 10, 1980: 415-28
- James, D., "Past tense and the hypothetical: A cross-linguistic study", *Studies in Language*, 1982, 6 (3), 375-403
- Jameson, Fredric, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke UP, 1991
- Johnson-Laird, P.N., "Inference and Mental Models", in Newstead & Evans eds. 1995, 115-46
- Johnson-Laird, P.N., *How We Reason*. New York: OUP, 2006
- Johnson-Laird, P.N., & R.M.J. Byrne, *Deduction*. Hove: Erlbaum, 1991
- Johnson-Laird, P.N., & R.M.J. Byrne, "Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics and Inference", *Psychological Review*, 2002, 109, 646-78
- Johnson-Laird, P.N. & J. Tagart, "How Implication is Understood", *American Journal of Psychology*, 1969, 2, 367-73
- Johnson-Laird, P.N., R.M.J. Byrne & W.S. Schaeken, "Propositional Reading by Model", *Psychological Review*, 1992, 99, 418-39

- Johnson-Laird, P.N., P. Legrenzi, & M.S. Legrenzi, "Reasoning and a Sense of Reality", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1972, 63, 395-400
- Just, M.A. & P.A. Carpenter eds., *Cognitive Processes in Comprehension*. New York: Wiley, 1977
- Kahnemann, D., "Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking", in Roese & Olson eds. 1995, 375-96
- Kahnemann, D. & A. Tversky, "The Simulation Heuristic", in Kahnemann et al. 1982, 201-10
- Kahnemann, D., P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds., *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*. New York: CUP 1982
- Kaufmann, S., *Conditionals*, in Keith Brown ed. 2006
- Kennedy, G.A., *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World: A History of Rhetoric*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972
- Khong, Yuen Foong, "Confronting Hitler and Its Consequences", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 95-118
- King, M.L, "I've been to the Mountaintop", speech delivered in Memphis, Tennessee, 3 April 1968. <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkivebeentothemountaintop.htm> retrieved 25/9/2016
- Kirk, Geoffrey S., *The Iliad: A Commentary, II: Books 5-8*. Cambridge: CUP, 1990
- Kirwan, Christopher, *Entailment*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- Kiser, Edgar, & Margareta Levi, "Using Counterfactuals in Historical Analysis: Theories of Revolution", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 187-207
- Klauk, Tobias, "Thought Experiments and Literature", in Birke et al. 2011, 30-44
- Kleinknecht, H., "Herodot und Athen, VII 139 / VIII 140-144", *Hermes*, 1940, 75 (H3), 241-64
- Kneale, William Calvert, & Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962
- Köhler, Erich, *Der literarische Zufall, das Mögliche und die Notwendigkeit*. Munich: Fink, 1973
- Kratzer, A., "The notional category of modality", in Eikmeyer & Riesner eds. 1981, 38-74
- Kratzer, A., *Modals and Conditionals*. Oxford: OUP, 2012
- Kraus, C.S., "No second Troy", *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1994, 124, 267-89
- Kripke, Saul, "Identity and necessity", in Munitz ed. 1971, 135-64
- Kripke, Saul, "Naming and necessity", in Davidson & Harman eds. 1972, 253-355.
- Kripke, Saul, *Naming and Necessity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980
- Kühner, Raphael, & Gerth, Bernard, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*. 2 Vols.

- Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1890-1904
- Kühner, Raphael, & Carl Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*. 2 Vols. Leverkusen: Gottschalksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1955 [1914]
- Kulikov, Leonid, review of Givón, T. (2001), *Journal of Linguistics*, 2004, 40 (2), 419-25
- Kullman, W., *Das Wirken der Götter in der Ilias*. Berlin: Akademie, 1956
- Labov, William, *Language in the Inner City*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972
- Lakoff, George, "Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 1973, 2 (4), 458-508
- Lakoff, R. T., *Abstract Syntax and Latin Complementation*. Cambridge, Mass., MIT 1968
- Lang, Mabel, "Unreal Conditions in Homeric Narrative", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 1989, 30, 5-26
- Langacker, R. W., "The form and meaning of the English auxiliary", *Language*, 1978, 54, 853-82
- Lange, Ludwig, *Der homerische Gebrauch der Partikel ei* Vol. 16. Hirzel, 1872-73.
- Lebek, W. D., *Verba Prisca*. Göttingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, 1970
- Lebow, Richard Ned & Janice Gross Stein, "Back to the Past: Counterfactuals and the Cuban Missile Crisis", in Tetlock & Belkin eds., 1996, 119-48
- Lehmann, Christian, *Latein mit abstrakten Strukturen*. Munich: Fink, 1973
- Lehmann, Christian, "Prinzipien für 'Universal 14'", in Seiler ed. 1974, 69-97
- Lehmann, Christian, "Towards a typology of clause linkage", in Haiman & Thompson eds. 1988, 181-225
- Lemmon, E.J., *Beginning Logic* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London: Chapman & Hall, 1990 [1965; 1987]
- Lemon, Lee T. & Marion J. Reis eds., *Russian Formalist Criticism*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965
- Létoublon, F. ed., *La langue et les textes en grec ancien. Actes du Colloque P. Chantraine* (Grenoble 5-8 Sep. 1989). Amsterdam: Gieben, 1992
- Levy, J. S., "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield", *International Organization*, 1994, 48 (2), 279-312
- Levy, Pierre, *Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age*. Trans. Robert Bononno. New York: Plenum Trade, 1998 [*Qu'est-ce que le virtuel?* Paris: La Découverte Poche 49, 1998]
- Lewis, C. I., *Survey of Symbolic Logic*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918
- Lewis, C. I., & Harold Langford, *Symbolic Logic*. New York: Century, 1932

- Lewis, David, "Probability of Conditionals and Conditional Probability", *Philosophical Review*, 1976, 95, 581-89; repr. in David Lewis 1986, 133-52
- Lewis, David, *Counterfactuals*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973
- Lewis, David, *Counterfactuals*. Oxford: Blackwell: 1973
- Lewis, David, "Causation", *Journal of Philology*, 1973b, 556-67
- Lewis, David, "Truth in Fiction", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1978, 1, 37-46
- Lewis, David, *Philosophical Papers*. Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986
- Ligeti, Dávid Ádám, "The Role of Alexander the Great in Livy's Historiography", *Acta Antiqua Hungarica*, 2008, 48, 247-51
- Lindsay, Wallace Martin, *Syntax of Plautus*. New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1936 [1907]
- Lloyd, G. E. R., *Adversaries and Authorities*. Cambridge: CUP, 1996
- Loewer, Barry, "The emergence of time's arrows and special science laws from physics", *Interface Focus*, 2, 2012, 13-19 rsfs20110072  
<http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2011/11/21/rsfs.2011.0072.short> retrieved 25/9/2016
- Long, A.A. & D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. 2 Vols. Cambridge: CUP, 1987
- Loux, Michael J. ed., *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1979
- Lowe, E.J., *Analytic and Synthetic Statements*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- Lowe, Nick, *The Classical Plot and the Invention of Western Narrative*. Cambridge: CUP, 2000
- Luce, T.J., "The Dating of Livy's First Decade", *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1965, 96, 209-240
- Ludwich, A., *Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik nach den Fragmenten des Didymos I*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884
- Lycan, William G., *Real Conditionals*. Oxford: OUP, 2001
- MacColl, Hugh, *Symbolic Logic and its Applications*. London: Longmans Green, 1906
- Maitre, Doreen, *Literature and Possible Worlds*. London: Middlesex Polytechnic Press, 1983
- Manktelow, K. I. & Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, "Facilitation of Reasoning by Realism: Effect or Non-Effect?", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1979, 70, 477-488
- Mares, Edwin D., *Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Cambridge: CUP, 2004
- Mares, Edwin D., "General Information in Relevant Logic", *Synthèse*, 2009, 167, 343-362
- Mares, Edwin, "Relevance Logic", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/logic->

relevance/ retrieved 14/9/2016

Marouzeau, Jules, *Quelques aspects de la formation du latin littéraire*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1949

Martín Puente, Cristina, "Condicionales y concesivas", in Baños Baños ed., *Sintaxis del latín clásico*. Madrid: Liceus, 2009, 657-78

Martindale, Charles ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Virgil*. Cambridge: CUP 2007 [1997]

McGushin, P., *Bellum Catilinae: A Commentary*. Leiden: Brill, 1977

McHale, Brian, *Postmodernist Fiction*. New York: Methuen, 1987

McMullen, Matthew N., Keith D. Markman and Igor Gavanski, "Living in neither the Best nor Worst of All Possible Worlds: Antecedents and Consequences of Upward and Downward Counterfactual Thinking", in Roese and Olson eds., 1995: 133-67

Meillet, Antoine, *Linguistique historique et linguistique générale I*. Paris: Champion, 1948

Meillet, Antoine & Joseph Vendryes, *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques*. Paris: Champion, 1948

Mellet, Sylvie, *L'imparfait de l'indicatif en latin classique*. Paris: Société pour l'Information Grammaticale, 1988

Mellor, D.H. ed., *Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics*. London: Routledge, 1978

Miller, J. F., "The Shield of Argive Abas at *Aeneid* 3.286", *Classical Quarterly*, 1993, 43 (ii), 445-450

Minard, Armand, *La subordination dans la prose védique*. Lyon: Les Belles Lettres, 1936

Moles, J. L., "Livy's Preface", *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 1993, 39, 141-68

Mondi, Robert, "The Ascension of Zeus and the Composition of Hesiod's *Theogony*", *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies*, 1984, 25 (4), 325-44

Monro, D. B., *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891 [1882]

Montague, R. "Pragmatics and intensional logic", *Synthese*, 1970, 22

Morello, Ruth, "Livy's Alexander Digression", *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 2002, 92, 62-85

Most, Glenn, Introduction, *Hesiod. Theogony*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006 (Loeb)

Mugler, France, "Concerning the Usage and Evolution of the Conditional Sentence in Latin", *Glotta*, 1980, 58 (1), 119-32

Musti, D., "Una citta' simile a Troia: Citta' troiane da Siri a Lavinio", in *Strabone e la Magna Grecia*. Padova: Programma, 95-122

- Munitz, M.K. ed., *Identity and Individuation*, New York: New York University Press, 1971
- Nägelsbach, Karl Friedrich von, *Homerische Theologie*. Nürnberg: Geiger, 1861
- Nagy, G., *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1990
- Nakata, Sharilyn, "egredere o quicumque es: Genealogical Opportunism and Trojan Identity in the *Aeneid*", *Phoenix*, 2012, 66 (3-4), 335-63
- Nelis, D., *Vergil's Aeneid and the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius*. Leeds: Francis Cairns, 2001
- Nesselrath, Heinz-Günther, *Ungeschehenes Geschehen: Beinahe Episoden im griechischen und römischen Epos von Homer bis zur Spätantike*. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1992
- Newstead, S. E. & Jonathan St. B. T. Evans eds., *Perspectives on Thinking and Reasoning*. Hove: Erlbaum, 1995
- Nisbet, R.G.M., "Aeneas Imperator", in Harrison ed. 1990, 378-89
- Nutting, Herbert C., "The Form *si sit .... erit*", *University Publications in Classical Philology*, 1926, 187-217
- Oakley, S. P., *A Commentary on Livy. Books VI-X*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005
- Oaksford, M., "Contrast Classes and Matching Bias as Explanations of the Effects of Negation on Conditional Reasoning", *Thinking & Reasoning*, 2002, 8, 135-51
- Oaksford, M., & N. Chater, "A Rational Analysis of the Selection Task as Optimal Data Selection", *Psychological Review*, 1994, 101, 608-31
- Ober, Josiah, "Conquest Denied: The Premature Death of Alexander the Great", in Cowley ed. 2000 [1999]
- Oberauer, K. & Wilhelm, O., "The Meaning(s) of Conditionals: Conditional Probabilities, Mental Models and Personal Utilities", *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 2003, 29, 680-93
- Ogden, Daniel, *Drakōn: Dragon Myth and Serpent Cult in the Greek and Roman Worlds*. Oxford: OUP, 2013.
- Ogilvie, Robert Maxwell, *A Commentary on Livy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965
- O'Hara, James, *Inconsistency in Roman Epic: Studies in Catullus, Lucretius, Vergil, Ovid and Lucan*. Cambridge: CUP 2007
- Olson, James M., Neal J. Roese, & Ronald J. Deibert, "Psychological Biases in Counterfactual Thought Experiments", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 296-300
- Orlandini, Anna, "Vers la construction de mondes possibles en latin: la non-actualisation", in Calboli ed. 2005, 622-29
- Pagán, Victoria E., *A Sallust Reader*. Mundelein, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2009

- Palmer, F.R., *Mood and Modality*. Cambridge: CUP, 1986
- Palmer, Leonard R., *The Latin Language*. London: Faber & Faber, 1954
- Parry, W.T., "The Logic of C.I. Lewis", in Schilpp 1968, 115-154
- Parsons, Terence, *Nonexistent Objects*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980
- Pavel, Thomas G., "Fiction and the Causal Theory of Names", *Poetics*, 1979, 8, 179-91
- Pavel, Thomas G., *Fictional Worlds*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986
- Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers*. Vol. V. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1934
- Peirce, C.S., *The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings*. Ed. J. Buchler. New York: Harcourt, Brace & co., 1940
- Perle, R., *Hard Line*. New York: Random House, 1992
- Pernot, Laurent, *Rhetoric in Antiquity*. Trans. W.E. Higgins. Washington DC: Catholic University, 2005 [*La Rhétorique dans l'Antiquité*. Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2000].
- Pinkster, *On Latin Adverbs*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1972
- Pinkster, Harm, *Latin Syntax and Semantics*. London & New York: Routledge, 1990
- Plantiga, Alvin, *The Nature of Necessity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974
- Plantiga, Alvin, "Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals", in Loux ed. 1979, 146-65
- Pollock, John, "Indicative conditionals and conditional probability", in Harper et al. eds. 1981
- Pollock, John, "A Refined Theory of Counterfactuals", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 1981, 10, 239-66
- Pollock, John, *Subjunctive Reasoning*. Boston: Reidel, 1986
- Powell, Jonathan, "Aeneas the Spin-Doctor". *Proceedings of the Virgil Society*, 2011, 27, 184-202
- Pratt, Mary Louise, *Towards a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977
- Prince, Gerald, *Narrative as Theme*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992
- Prince, Gerald, *The disnarrated*, in Herman et al. eds. 2005
- Putnam, M.C.J., *The Poetry of the Aeneid*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965
- Quelhas, Ana Cristina, Mick J. Power, Csongor Juhos & Jorge Senos, "Counterfactual thinking and functional differences in depression." *Clinical psychology & psychotherapy*, 2008, 15 (5), 352-365



- Quine, W.V.O., "Notes on existence and necessity", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1943, 40 (5), 113-127
- Quinn, Kenneth, *Virgil's Aeneid: A Critical Description*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1968
- Quinn, Kenneth, *Horace: The Odes*. London: Bristol Classical Press, 2002 [1980]
- Ramsay, V., "The functional distribution of pre-posed and post-posed 'if' and 'when' clauses in written discourse", in Tomlin ed. 1987, 383-408
- Ramsey, Frank, "Law and Causality", 1929, reprinted in Mellor ed. 1978, 128-51
- Ramsey, J. T., "Introduction", *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae*. Oxford: OUP, 2007
- Ravenscroft, Ian, *Minds, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010
- Read, Stephen, *Relevant Logic*. Oxford: Blackwell 1988
- Read, Stephen, *Relevance logic*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- Reinhardt, Karl, *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961
- Rescher, Nicholas ed., *The Logic of Decision and Action*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967
- Rescher, Nicholas, "Aspects of Action", in Rescher ed. 1967, 215-20
- Rescher, Nicholas, "The Ontology of the Possible", in Loux ed. 1979
- Rescher, Nicholas, *Conditionals*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: MIT 2007
- Rijksbaron, A., "De semantiek van de griekse hypothetische bijzinnen", *Lampas*, 1980, 13, 130-42
- Rijksbaron, A., "The Pragmatics and Semantics of Conditional and Temporal Clauses. Some Evidence from Dutch and Classical Greek", *Working Papers in Functional Grammar*, 1986, 13, 1-50
- Rips, L.J. & S.L. Marcus, "Supposition and the Analysis of Conditional Sentences", in Just & Carpenter eds. 1977, 185-219
- Rodiek, Christoph, "Prolegomena zu einer Poetik des Kontrafaktischen", *Poetica*, 1993, 25, 262-81
- Roese, Neal J., "Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and Hindsight Bias", in Harvey & Koehler eds. 2004, 258-73
- Roese, Neal J., & James M. Olson, "Self-Esteem and Counterfactual Thinking", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1993, 65 (1), 199-206
- Roese, Neal J., & James M. Olson eds., *What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum, 1995

- Ronen, Ruth, *Possible Worlds in Literary Theory*. Cambridge: CUP, 1994
- Rossi, Andreola, "Reversal of Fortune and Change in Genre in *Aeneid* 10", *Vergilius*, 1997, 93, 31-44
- Ruijgh, C. J., "L'emploi le plus ancien et les emplois plus récents de la particule κε/ὄν", in Létoublon ed., 1992, 197-217
- Ruiz de Elvira y Serra, M. R., "El Perfecto latino: ¿valor aspectual?", *Cuadernos de filología clásica*. 22, 1989, 115-32
- Russett, Bruce, "Counterfactuals about War and its Absence", in Tetlock & Belkin eds., 1996, 187-207
- Ryan, Marie-Laure, "Embedded Narratives and Tellability", *Style*, 1986, 20, 319-40
- Ryan, Marie-Laure, *Possible Worlds. Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991
- Ryan, Marie-Laure, *Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001
- Ryan, Marie-Laure, *Virtuality*, Herman et al. eds. 2005, 627-9
- Ryan, Marie-Laure, "From Parallel Universes to Possible Worlds: Ontological Pluralism in Physics, Narratology, and Narrative", *Poetics Today*, 2006, 27 (4), 633-74
- Ryan, Marie-Laure, "Toward a Definition of Narrative", in Herman ed. 2007: 22-35
- Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability", *International Security*, 1986, 11 (2), 151-75
- Scanlon, Thomas Francis, *The Influence of Thucydides on Sallust*. Heidelberg: Winter, 1980
- Schadewaldt, Wolfgang, *Iliasstudien*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1938
- Scherer, Anton, *Handbuch der Lateinischen Syntax*. Heidelberg: Winter, 1975
- Schilpp, Paul Arthur, *The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis*. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1968
- Schwarz, N., & Vaughn, L. A., "The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources", in Gilovich et al. eds. 2002, 103-119
- Schwyzler, Eduard, & Albert Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik*. Munich: Beck, 1950
- Searle, John, *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: CUP, 1969
- Searle, John, "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse", *New Literary History*, 1975, 6, 319-32
- Seiler, H. J. ed., *Linguistic Workshop II*. Munich: Fink, 1974
- Sevenants, Aline, Kristien Dieussaert, & Walter Schaeken, "Truth Table Tasks: Irrelevance and Cognitive Ability", *Thinking & Reasoning*, 2011, 17 (3), 213-46

- Shackleton Bailey, D.R., "Tu Marcellus eris", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 1986, 90, 199-205
- Shafir, E., I. Simenson, & A. Tversky, "Reason-Based Choice", *Cognition*, 1993, 49, 11-36
- Shklovsky, Victor, "Art and Technique" [1917], in Lemon & Reis eds. 1965, 3-24
- Shopen, T. ed., *Language Typology and Syntactic Description*. 3 vols. Cambridge: CUP, 2007 [1985]
- Slings, Simon Roelof, "Symposion and Interpretation", *Acta Antiqua*, 2000, 40, 423-34
- Soames, Scott, *Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of 'Naming and Necessity'*. Oxford: OUP, 2002
- Sober, E., "Confirmation and lawlikeness", *Philosophical Review*, 1988 97, 93-8
- Solmsen, Friedrich, *Hesiod and Aeschylus*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949
- Sowa, Cora Angier, *Traditional Themes and the Homeric Hymns*. Chicago: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1984
- Spence, S., "The Boat-race as Turning Point in *Aeneid* 5", *New England Classical Journal*, 2002, 29, 69-81
- Sperber, Dan, & Vittorio Girotto, "Use or Misuse of the Selection Task? Rejoinder to Fiddick, Cosmides and Tooby", *Cognition*, 2002, 85, 277-90
- Sperber, Dan & Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995 [1986]
- Sperber, Dan, Francesco Cara & Vittorio Girotto, "Relevance Theory Explains the Selection Task", *Cognition*, 1995, 57, 31-95
- Squire, J.C. ed., *If It Had Happened Otherwise: Lapses into Imaginary History*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1972 [1932, 1931]
- Stahl, Hans-Peter, "Political Stop-overs on a Mythological Travel Route: From Battling Harpies to the Battle of Actium (*Aen.* 3.268-93)", in Stahl ed. 1998, 37-84
- Stahl, Hans-Peter ed., *Vergil's Aeneid: Augustan Epic and Political Context*. London: Duckworth, 1998
- Stahl, Hans-Peter, *Thucydides: Man's Place in History*. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2003
- Stalnaker, Robert, "A Theory of Conditionals", *American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series*, 1968, 2, 98-112
- Stalnaker, Robert, "A Defense of the Conditional Excluded Middle" (1978), in Harper et al. eds. 1981, 87-104
- Stalnaker, Robert, *Inquiry*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1984
- Stanovich, Keith E., *Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning*. Mahwah,

- New Jersey: Erlbaum, 1999
- Suerbaum, W., "Am Scheideweg zur Zukunft: Alternative Geschehensverläufe bei römischen Historikern", *Gymnasium*, 1997, 104, 36-54
- Sweetser, E.E., *From Etymology to Pragmatics*. Cambridge: CUP, 1990
- Syme, Ronald, *Sallust*. London: University of California Press, 1964
- Tabachovitz, H., *Homerische ei-Sätze*. Lund: Gleerup, 1951
- Taylor, A.J.P., *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954
- Taylor, S.E., "Asymmetrical Effects of Positive and Negative Events: The Mobilization-Minimization Hypothesis", *Psychological Bulletin*, 1991, 110 (1), 67-85
- Teigen, K.H., "When the Unreal is more Likely than the Real: Post Hoc Probability Judgments and Counterfactual Closeness", *Thinking & Reasoning*, 1998, 4, 147-77
- Tetlock, Philip E., & Aaron Belkin eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996
- Tetlock, Philip E. & Aaron Belkin, "Counterfactual World Experiment in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 1-38
- Tetlock, Philip E., "Theory-driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics", in Gilovitch et al. eds. 2002, 582-600
- Thompson, E.P. ed., *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays*. London: Merlin Press, 1978
- Thompson, E.P., "The Poverty of Theory", in Thompson ed. 1978, 1-210
- Thompson, Sandra A., Robert E. Longacre, & Shin Ja Hwang, "Adverbial Clauses", in Shopen ed. 2007 Vol. 2, 171-234
- Thompson, V. A., & M. J. Byrne, "Reasoning Counterfactually: Making Inferences about Things that Didn't Happen", *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 2002, 28, 1-18
- Timberlake, Alan, "Aspect, tense, mood", in Shopen ed. 2007 Vol. 3, 280-333
- Todd, William, "Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction", *Philosophy of Science*, 1964, 31, 101-10
- Todorov, Tzvetan, *Grammaire du Décameron*. The Hague: Mouton, 1969
- Tomlin, R. S. ed., *Coherence and Grounding in Discourse*. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1987
- Torrego Salcedo, M. Esperanza, "Cohésion et rupture dans les propositions irréelles latines en *ni-nisi*", *Les Études Classiques*, 1999, 67, 391-411
- Torrego Salcedo, M. Esperanza & Jesús de la Villa Polo, "Contenido de la sintaxis latina. Evolución y métodos de análisis", in Baños Baños ed. 2009, 25-54

- Toulmin, S., *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. New York: Free Press, 1990
- Traugott, E. C., A. ter Meulen, J. Snitzer Reilly & C. A. Ferguson eds., *On conditionals*. Cambridge: CUP, 1986
- Trubetzkoy, N. *Gedanken über den lateinischen a-Konjunktiv. Festschrift Kretschmer*. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1926, 267-74
- Turner, M., *The Literary Mind*. New York: OUP, 1996
- Tverski, A., & D. Kahneman, "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability", *Cognitive Psychology*, 1973, 5, 207-32
- Ussani, Vincenzo, Introduzione e commento, *Eneide*. Roma: Bonacci, 1952
- Vaina, Lucia, "Les Mondes Possibles du Texte", *Versus*, 17, 1977, 3-13
- Volk, Katharina, "Lucretius' Prayer for Peace and the Date of *De Rerum Natura*", *Classical Quarterly*, 60 (1), 2010, 127-31
- von Wright, Georg Henrik, "The Logic of Action – A Sketch" (1966), in Rescher ed. 1967, 121-36
- von Wright, Georg Henrik, *Practical Reason*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983
- Wackernagel, Jacob, *Lectures on Syntax: With Special Reference to Greek, Latin and Germanic*. Oxford: OUP, 2009
- Wakker, G.C., *Conditions and Conditionals: An Investigation of Ancient Greek*. Amsterdam: Gleben, 1994
- Walbank, F.W., *Historical Commentary on Polybius*. Oxford: OUP, 1957
- Walton, Kendall, *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990
- Waltz, K. N., *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959
- Warrior, V. M., Introduction and trans., *Livy, The History of Rome*. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 2006
- Wason, P.C., "Reasoning", & B.M. Foss eds., *New Horizons in Psychology I*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966
- Wason, P.C., & D. Shapiro, "Natural and Contrived Experience in a Reasoning Problem", *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1971, 23, 63-71
- Wason, P.C., "In Real Life Negatives are False", *Logique et Analyse*, 1972, 15, 17-35
- Watkins, C., *How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics*. Oxford: OUP, 1995
- Watkiss, Leslie ed., *Sallust: Bellum Iugurthinum*. London: University Tutorial Press, 1971

- Weber, M., *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949,
- Weber, M., "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation" (1905), in Weber 1949, 164-88
- Weingast, Barry R., "Off-the-Path Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Counterfactuals and Its Implications for Political and Historical Analysis", in Tetlock & Belkin eds. 1996, 230-43
- Weinrich, H., *Tempus. Besprochene und erzählte Welt* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971 [1964]
- Weippert, O., *Alexander-Imitatio und römische Politik in Republikanischer Zeit* (diss.). Augsburg, 1972
- West, David, "Multiple-Correspondence Similes in the *Aeneid*", *Journal of Roman Studies*, 1969, 59 (1/2), 40-49
- West, David, "The Deaths of Hector and Turnus", *Greece & Rome*, 1974, 21, 21-31
- West, Martin, *Hesiod. Theogony, with Prolegomena and Commentary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978
- Wheeler, S.M., "Ovid's Use of Lucretius in *Metamorphoses* 1.67-8", *Classical Quarterly*, 1995, 45 (i) 200-03
- Willcock, M.M., "Homer's Chariot Race and Virgil's Boat Race", *Proceedings of the Vergil Society*, 1988, 19, 1-13
- Williams, G.W., *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid*. New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 1983
- Williamson, Colwyn, *Proposition*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- Winterbottom, Michael, "The Idea of Troy", *Proceedings of the Virgil Society*, 1993, 21, 17-34
- Wolfram, Sybil, *Philosophical Logic: An Introduction*. London & New York: Routledge, 1989
- Wolfram, Sybil, *Material equivalence*, in Honderich ed. 1995
- Wolsterstorff, Nicholas, *Worlds and Works of Art*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980
- Woodcock, E.C., *A New Latin Syntax*. London: Methuen, 1959
- Woodman, A.,J., *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*. London: Croom Helm, 1988
- Woodman, Tony & Jonathan Powell eds., *Author and audience in Latin literature*. CUP: 1992
- Woods, Michael, *Conditionals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997
- Yama, H., "Matching Versus Optimal Data Selection in the Wason Selection Task", *Thinking & Reasoning*, 2001, 7, 295-311
- Zhang, Yongle, *Imagining Alternate Possibilities: Counterfactual Reasoning and Writing in*

