ESSAYS ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE UK

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Abstract

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Essays on political integration of ethnic minorities in the UK

In light of the growing criticism of multicultural policies of integration, there has been an increased interest in the questions surrounding political integration of immigrant-origin minorities. In particular, public and policy debates have focused on the importance of a shared sense of Britishness, the incompatibility of certain cultural values and practices, as well as the role of grievances and discrimination in determining the successful integration of the growing population of ethnic minorities.

The work presented in this thesis consists of three separate studies that look at different aspects of political integration. The first study examines determinants of the strength of attachment to Britain among immigrant-origin individuals. Specifically, it looks at the role of: (1) indicators of integration and assimilation, (2) immigrants' conservative ideological beliefs, (3) the 'desirable' characteristics of immigrants, and (4) immigrants' placement on the individualism-collectivism scale. Empirical analyses are conducted using three datasets: Understanding Society, Citizenship Survey and Ethnic Minority British Election Study. The findings from individual and multi-level regression models show that collectivist orientation, determined by both individual differences as well as cultural differences of immigrants' countries of origin, is an important predictor of self-reported strength of British identity. In consequence, it is argued that the subjective importance of Britishness among immigrants is perhaps associated with integration/assimilation outcomes to a lesser extent than it is commonly believed.

The second study presented in the thesis examines the applicability of the arguments derived from group consciousness and assimilation theories for explaining the patterns of political participation among British ethnic minorities. The chosen indicators of assimilation and group consciousness include: (1) measures of attachment to national and ethnic community, (2) perceptions of ethnic grievances, and (3) embeddedness in national versus ethnic civic community. The statistical analysis based on EMBES data shows that group consciousness indicators have a mobilising effect on non-electoral activities, and influence political party as well as ethnic-specific policy preferences. On the other hand, greater embeddedness in the national rather than ethnic community has a positive effect on electoral participation. Therefore, it is argued that both theoretical approaches are relevant for understanding political involvement. However, the effects of group consciousness and assimilation indicators operate in more nuanced ways than the classical formulations of these theories would predict.

The final study examines the role of ethnic organisations for political mobilisation of two distinct communities: Bangladeshis and Caribbeans based on the data from forty qualitative interviews with community activists located in Birmingham and Oldham. The comparative qualitative enquiry aimed to (a) explore whether the existing differences of political integration outcomes between the selected communities can be partially attributed to the character of their co-ethnic organisational networks; and (b) to explore *how* and *why* co-ethnic associations might affect the political mobilisation of local communities. The findings from the interview data indicate that activists from these two communities have very different attitudes towards political agency and the role of co-ethnic organisations. In general, most of Bangladeshi organisations can be described as having instrumental goals and pro-mainstream orientation, whereas most Caribbean organisations could be characterised as having expressive goals and anti-mainstream orientation. In consequence, it is argued that the different character of ethnic civic organisations has an important impact on the ways these communities engage in politics, both as individuals and as groups.

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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Rationale for Alternative Format

The main goal of this thesis was to examine psycho-sociological explanations of political integration of immigrant-origin minorities. In particular, the empirical analyses presented focused on the themes frequently discussed in public and policy debates on integration, such as: ethnic and British identity, socio-economic integration, grievances and ethnic social capital. The alternative thesis format of the thesis allowed undertaking three stand-alone empirical studies that concentrated on different aspects of political integration. The manuscripts based on the empirical chapters presented in the thesis are intended to be published as separate journal articles.

The first study (referred to throughout the thesis as Study 1) examined predictors of the strength of British identity among immigrant-origin populations. Based on the existing theoretical and empirical evidence, the study tested four sets of factors that could potentially account for the variation of the strength of British identity among immigrant-origin individuals, namely: (a) the immigrant's individual-level integration/assimilation; (b) the immigrant's desirability; (c) the immigrant's conservative ideological orientation; and (d) the immigrant's individual- and group-level collectivism. The empirical analyses were conducted based on data from three, large-scale surveys: Understanding Society, Citizenship Survey and Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

The second study (referred to throughout the thesis as Study 2) focused on predictors of political participation and political party preferences among the main ethnic minority groups in the UK. It aimed to test arguments derived from two competing theoretical approaches to ethnic political participation, namely (a) group consciousness and (b) assimilation. The empirical analysis was based on the data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

The last study presented in the thesis (Study 3) aimed to compare the role of co-ethnic organisations for political mobilisation in two distinct communities: Bangladeshi and Caribbean. It focused on comparing how local activists perceive the role of their co-ethnic organisations, and on examining activists' attitudes towards mainstream politics. The empirical data for the study contained forty in-depth interviews conducted in two locations with high concentrations of the groups studied.

The titles of the three studies, together with the names of the journals that particular manuscripts have been/or are intended to be submitted, are summarised in below:

Overview of the studies presented in the thesis.

Study title	**Journal**
Study 1 *“Who feels British? Collectivist Orientation as an Alternative Explanation of British Identity Acquisition among Immigrant-origin Population”*	Manuscript based on Chapter 4 is intended to be submitted to the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*
Study 2 *“Do Grievances Make British Ethnic Minorities More Politically Active or More Alienated? Group Consciousness and Assimilation Approaches Re-examined”*	Manuscript based on Chapter 5 is prepared for re-submission (after revisions based on initial review) to the *Ethnic and Racial Studies*
Study 3 *“Do Ethnic Organisations Promote Mainstream Political Participation? Evidence from two UK-based case studies”*	Manuscript based on Chapter 6 is intended to be submitted to the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*

1. Introduction

1.1. Motivation and thesis rationale

What makes immigrant-origin individuals feel British? What makes them politically active citizens? In light of the ever-intense pledge for a tougher approach to integration and criticism of multicultural policies, questions about the meaning of Britishness and the role of politicised minority identities have become some of the most frequently recurring themes in the public political discourse in Britain. As an example, the recent 'Casey Review' report on the equality of opportunity and integration in Britain (Casey 2016) called for a 'more robust' implementation of the so called 'British values' into integration strategies. Furthermore, it criticised public institutions for excessive accommodation of cultural diversity and freedom of expression which, according to the author, might undermine national unity and fuel radical Islamic and far-right ideologies. This arguably sets up a dialogue of a hegemonic culture that aims to integrate and neuter immigrant-origin communities, something which is potentially in conflict with true multicultural respect.

The work presented in this thesis contributes to answering the questions of what makes minorities feel British and wish to politically participate by focusing on the role of distinctive minority groups' motivations and their underlying psychological mechanisms. Providing a fresh understanding of what psychological mechanisms might operate to motivate both minority groups' political behaviour and their levels of attachment to Britain was the primary motivation for conducting the empirical studies included in this thesis. The empirical analyses presented in Chapter 5 (Study 2) and Chapter 6 (Study 3), focus on non-white ethnic minority groups from the Commonwealth countries, who were historically the primary source of immigration to the UK. Chapter 4 (Study 1), which explores the factors explaining the development of positive British identity among immigrant-origin populations, examines both non-white as well as white immigrant groups. Until recently, British public and academic debates on integration have been almost exclusively focused on non-white ethnic minority groups. In consequence, the existing, large-scale survey data usually does not include sufficient numbers of white immigrant-origin groups to allow meaningful analysis. There is also a lack of universal

consensus on the use of terms ‘immigrants’ and ‘ethnic minorities’, which is further discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3).

Why is it important to look at the motivational and psychological factors?

Many critics of the current condition of the ethnically diverse Britain expressed concerns that various immigrant-origin groups do not have the motivation to become part of mainstream British society (e.g., Cameron 2011), prefer to live separate lives (e.g., Phillips 2005), and constitute a ‘nation within a nation’ (e.g., Phillips 2016). The perceived lack of integration has been partially attributed to the dysfunctional role of multicultural policies, which have been accused of failing to promote a common sense of British identity and British liberal democratic values. In light of the aforementioned concerns appearing in the British multiculturalism debate, it would be helpful to understand what drives the motivations to feel British and to take active part in the British democratic process. Are minority identities, group-based solidarity, or ethnic cultural associations in conflict with feeling British or being part of mainstream civic and political life? This thesis aims to shed light on these questions through three empirical studies, which separately examine (1) determinants of British identity; (2) ethnic-specific factors affecting different modes of political participation and political sympathies; (3) the role of ethnic associations for political mobilisation and the role of agency in community and individual perceptions. It also provides a broader reflexion on theoretical implications drawn from the presented empirical findings and suggests that future studies would benefit from taking a more interdisciplinary approach that takes into account theoretical and empirical developments from different social science subfields.

1.2. Public and academic discourse on multiculturalism and integration

The critics of multiculturalism argue that the existing policies based on cultural recognition might have a range of negative consequences for social cohesion, and even supporters of multiculturalism often address it with a recognition that issues of integration of British communities has been problematic (Koopmans & Statham 1999; Joppke 2004; Abbas 2004; Brighton 2007). Most importantly, it has been argued that an excessive focus on cultural differences can encourage the development of separate identities, lead to the alienation of minority communities, and create a greater danger of conflicts based on ‘identity politics’. Over the past 15 years, many major politicians and public figures have

claimed that the current approach to integration in Britain has failed. The perception that British multiculturalist approach is dysfunctional has been associated with the existing ethnic segregation, the economic disadvantage of ethnic minority 'enclaves', racial riots in 2001 and 2011, and terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremist groups. In contrast, scholars of ethnicity in Britain have usually reported the relative success of multiculturalism. The arguments supporting this view have emphasised that ethnic minorities express a high attachment to Britain, trust in the British government, and generally engage in civic and political life Demireva and Heath (2014). Furthermore, empirical analysis of residential patterns has suggested that the overall ethnic segregation has decreased, and instead, there is an on-going increase of ethnically diverse areas. Empirical studies have also pointed out that, although ethnic minorities are less well off than white British, they have made significant progress, both educationally and economically, over time (Stokes et al. 2015; Clark & Drinkwater 2007). The primary source of ethnic grievances as well as a substantial obstacle for economic achievements has been associated by many with the existing ethnic discrimination and lack of equality of opportunity.

One of the main themes resurfacing in the public debate on integration and multiculturalism is the perceived need for promoting a shared sense of Britishness. There is a widely acknowledged normative assumption that a common British identity is something desirable, which, presumably, integration policies should encourage. The shared sense of Britishness has often been linked to many positive social outcomes. For instance, it has been portrayed as a source of social solidarity and cohesion, as a commitment to British liberal democratic values, and as one of the strategies for avoiding conflicts between different ethno-religious groups. In practical terms, such diagnosis has led to shifts in integration policies – from 'cultural recognition' towards promoting greater assimilation and the 'British way of life' (e.g. Community Cohesion Panel 2004, Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007, Home Office 2008, but also to some extent more recently 'Casey Review Report' 2016). The implicit assumption behind the need for a tougher approach to integration seems to be that there is some sort of tension between the British way of life and the cultivation of ethnic minority ways of life. Jacobson (1997) makes this argument explicitly, but somewhat of a political drumbeat exists regarding this matter that arguably bleeds into xenophobia and Islamophobia. This thesis examines some of that sense of identity and the relationship to the British hegemonic identity and political system, but the narrative is present in both anti-racist and racist debate. Given that this predates

2001's events massively (Poynting & Mason 2007), this thesis does not focus only on discourse related to security issues, but places it within the wider debate detailed above.

1.3. Predictors of the strength of British identity among immigrant-origin populations

The aim of the first empirical study presented in this thesis is to examine predictors of positive British identification among the immigrant-origin population. Previous studies have pointed out various factors that might increase or decrease immigrants' likelihood to express a strong attachment to their new country. The first and most intuitive factor is the time spent in the country. As one would expect, with time, immigrants become more acculturated and are more likely to develop a stronger British identification (Manning & Roy 2010; Casey & Dustmann 2010; Nandi & Platt 2013). In line with traditional assimilation perspective (Gordon 1964), other aspects of greater integration and assimilation have been also frequently linked by researchers to a higher likelihood of having a positive attachment to the new country (Walters et al. 2008). Furthermore, a number of studies have reported that the perception of discrimination is one of the major negative predictors of British identity (Maxwell 2009; Nandi & Platt 2013). This is hardly surprising given that the established theories of social identity clearly predict that a positive identification with a particular social group (in this case a national group) requires that one feels accepted by its members. Such a perception of being accepted is likely to depend on the welcoming (or unwelcoming) attitudes of the majority population (Abouguendia & Noels 2001). Studies on public attitudes towards immigrants have indicated that people are generally more welcoming towards immigrants who are culturally similar to them and who possess the potential to make an economic contribution to their country (e.g. Montreuil et al. 2004, Ford 2011). In a somewhat related manner, existing cross-national evidence suggests that there are certain cultural values that might contribute to the perceived 'identity threat' imposed by culturally distant immigrants (particularly Muslims) and resultant 'othering' of members of the group (Montreuil et al. 2004, Norris and Inglehart 2012). For example, Norris and Inglehart (2012) showed that the most divisive values between Western countries and Muslim majority countries are related to conservative beliefs about gender roles and homosexuality. In consequence, particular ideological beliefs should also be expected to influence how close one feels to the 'host' society.

Furthermore, some studies have suggested that immigrants' country of origin might be an important factor for understanding the differences in the levels of immigrants' host country identity. In particular, Manning and Roy (2010) argued that immigrants from 'poorer' countries gain more from giving up their old attachments and identifying with their new country than immigrants from 'rich' countries[1]. In consequence, the rational choice argument expects that differences in the levels of host country identity between immigrants from different countries depend on individual cost-benefit calculations. The obvious shortcoming of this argument is that the economic conditions of immigrants' countries of origin are also associated with important cultural differences.

Surprisingly, despite the fact that host country identity is undoubtedly an example of a particular type of collective identity, empirical research has rarely looked at psychological theories that attempt to explain the reasons for individual and cross-cultural variation in the perceived importance of collective identities. Most importantly, the individualism-collectivism dimension of national cultures is one of the key factors likely to influence how people understand their different group loyalties. The first empirical study presented in Chapter 4 aims to address this omission and empirically test the relative importance of a 'collectivist tendency' in explaining immigrants' attachment to Britain, using different ethnic groups to attempt to illustrate the impact of cultural and socioeconomic factors. By testing arguments derived from the existing sociological literature, alongside the psychological explanations, the current study aims to contribute to the existing immigrants' identity literature in two ways. First, it aims at generating a better understanding of what influences the declared importance of a British identity among immigrant-origin individuals, and second, it attempts to encourage a more critical approach towards the interpretation of the existing survey measures of identity.

[1] According to the authors' post-hoc explanation 'those who come from cultures identical to Britain – these immigrants are under no pressure to change their behaviour so have no incentive to increase the weight on the British component of the loss function and will only suffer a loss by betraying their roots if they become British.' (Manning and Roy 2010, p. F96)

1.4. Group consciousness, assimilation, and ethnic political participation

The second aim of the thesis is to assess the extent to which motivations based on ethnic solidarity are helpful for promoting active engagement in a democratic process. The anxieties that politicise minority identities can become a source of political violence and inter-ethnic conflict often resurface in the public debate on multiculturalism (in particular in public announcements made by political and public opinion leaders, e.g. Cameron 2011; May 2015,2016; Phillips 2005,2016). However, ethnic-based solidarity can be also an important psychological resource for marginalised groups to create political pressure and gain political representation using democratic forms of action. In the second empirical study presented in the thesis, the role of ethnic group consciousness is assessed in relation to democratically legitimate forms of electoral and non-electoral political engagement.

Empirical studies suggest that minority groups do not generally lag behind their white British counterparts in terms of electoral turnout, and those born in Britain show similar patterns of engagement in non-electoral activities. Furthermore, ethnic minorities report relatively high satisfaction with the British democracy and trust British political institutions. This is especially true for the first generation, who are usually highly optimistic; however, even second-generation ethnic minority individuals do not fall below the average trust and satisfaction levels of white British (Heath et al. 2013).

Existing studies have pointed out that many of the factors conventionally attributed to a higher likelihood of being politically active, such as higher socio-economic status and older age, work in a similar manner for both the majority and minority populations (Heath et al. 2013). Nonetheless, they have also identified certain factors that work in a distinctive way for ethnic minorities. In particular, it has been noted that the perception of sociotropic discrimination and ethnic social resources are important for understanding different modes of political participation, political party allegiance, and the capacity for creating political mobilisation (Heath et al. 2013, Maxwell 2012). For instance, an analysis based on the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (which is also used in this thesis) showed that grievances related to group-level (sociotropic) discrimination, disillusion with mainstream political parties, and embeddedness in ethnic associations are positively related to non-electoral forms of political engagement. These findings suggest that ethnic solidarity, enhanced by the perception of grievances, might motivate individuals to engage in various forms of extra-electoral political activities. Examples of such activities include non-violent political protest, writing a petition, contacting local officials, and so forth, and they might

serve as important ways of creating political pressure and trying to address ethnic-specific concerns. Another important aspect associated with political integration is the capacity for group political mobilisation, often attributed to the levels of ethnic social capital. A number of studies have pointed out that the effectiveness of ethnic political mobilisation is likely to depend on the size of the group, its residential concentration, and the existence of strong formal and informal social networks (Garbaye 2005; Fieldhouse & Cutts 2008; Akhtar 2013). There are different formulations of the argument linking various sources of ethnic social capital to greater political integration. The underlying assumption, however, is that strong co-ethnic social ties increase the capacity for collective political mobilisation.

This thesis extensively draws on the aforementioned literature, but with the focus on a somewhat different question. Instead of testing all the potential factors that might be helpful for predicting the likelihood of political engagement, it aims to compare the substantive arguments derived from two competing theoretical approaches, namely group consciousness and assimilation. In particular, it examines the role of British and ethnic identities, bridging and bonding associational involvement, and group-based grievances in an attempt to answer the question of the extent to which group-based sentiments as opposed to greater assimilation are helpful for understanding who participates in different forms of political actions. The presented empirical study intentionally focuses on the existing tension between the two approaches to tease out the extent to which each of the ideal models is useful for explaining the political behaviour of ethnic minorities in Britain.

The group consciousness approach is the particular interest of the second empirical study discussed in this thesis. This approach has been developed in a particular historical and cultural context in the United States and has been largely absent in British based studies, which is quite surprising given the fact that it attempts to explain the mechanism of ethnic-specific motivations for political mobilisation.

By testing the arguments of the two distinctive approaches to ethnic political integration, the study aims to contribute to answering some practical and theoretical questions:

1. To what extent are the mechanisms proposed by theoretical approaches developed in a particular national context useful for understanding the political behaviour of ethnic minorities in different contexts, and;
2. Is there a need for more tailored theories of ethnic minorities' political behaviour in Britain as opposed to the US models that are often applied?

3. Does individual and community perception of possible agency have any impact on behaviour and attitudes, and might this be a differentiating factor from the US models?

1.5. The role of ethnic associational resources

The last empirical study examines in more depth the role of ethnic associations for political mobilisation based on qualitative interviews with activists from two distinctive communities – Bangladeshi and Caribbean. Through qualitative inquiry, it aims to better understand 'whether' and 'how' involvement in ethnic associations might foster political involvement.

There are generally two competing views about the role of co-ethnic associations for political integration. The first one puts forth that ethnic associations help to bridge ethnic and mainstream communities and might help minority individuals to politically organise as a group. For instance, Fennema and Tillie (2001) argued that ethnic associations help to develop civic skills and teach how to solve collective problems, just like any other type of civic association. Furthermore, supporters of the 'mobilisation hypothesis' see ethnic associations as another source of ethnic social capital, which makes collective political action easier and increases psychological resources, such as group consciousness. In contrast, in line with the assimilation perspective, the 'marginalisation hypothesis' perceives co-ethnic associations as a potential obstacle to political integration. The arguments posed by the 'marginalisation hypothesis' mirror the concerns expressed by critiques of multicultural policies. For instance, the fact that co-ethnic associations are based on a particular ethnic identity might slow down assimilation and limit the opportunities to mix with the majority group. In consequence, the motivation for participating in mainstream politics might be hindered, and instead, there might be increased interest in the politics of the origin country (Uslaner & Conley 2003; Wong et al. 2005).

Empirical studies that have tried to examine more systematically whether co-ethnic organisations are linked to increased political involvement have provided inconsistent results. The pioneers of the ethnic civic community model, Fennema and Tillie (1999), argued that certain structural characteristics of co-ethnic organisational networks, such as density and interconnectedness, might help to explain why some ethnic communities are more politically engaged than others. Although these characteristics are likely to be important, such a quantitative approach offers a very deterministic explanation. It does not

help to explain why co-ethnic organisations have evolved differently in different communities, and indeed explicitly generalises to the point that it is effectively impossible to do so. In particular, it fails to consider the fact that each link may be of more importance in some communities than others; as an example, the kin-based politics of some South Asian communities might be expected to be more binding than a more informal link in, for example, a feminist group due to the importance of family ties socially and economically. It also fails to consider the patterns of authority that may exist, and the cultural attitudes that validate different forms and modes of authority in different communities. Moreover, it does not take into account the agency of those who are actively involved in associations and shape their agendas.

The qualitative inquiry aims to shed light on this area, examining the processes that lead to development of particular types of co-ethnic organisations and the ways their goals and activities might influence political mobilisation. The focus on Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities is also beneficial in that these communities represent very different patterns of both political involvement and social integration. Bangladeshis are more 'visible' in British mainstream politics than Caribbeans, especially in terms of political representation on the local level. They also tend to display more positive attitudes towards British democracy and have higher levels of trust in mainstream political institutions. The existing literature provided two main explanations of such differences. First, the 'trade-off' argument proposed by Maxwell (2012) asserts that the greater social integration of Caribbeans (indicated by higher rates of inter-marriage and higher residential dispersal) negatively affects their capacity for collective political mobilisation. The second argument highlights the importance of strong kinship networks among South Asian communities (particularly Bangladeshis and Pakistanis), which highly influence the vote choice and create pressure within the community to support particular candidates, selected by influential elderly leaders (e.g., Garbaye 2005).

These explanations are certainly very convincing as a response to Fennema and Tillie's (1999) emphasis on non-cultural issues; however, they seem still form an incomplete model. First, Caribbeans are more integrated socially according to some commonly used indicators, but they are also significantly residentially clustered in certain areas. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that they have a higher perception of group-based grievances, which, according to group consciousness arguments, should stimulate their collective political action. Second, the kinship network argument is more relevant for explaining the political behaviour patterns of the first generation, but

according to some studies, it is less useful for British-born individuals (Akhtar 2012). Significant gap therefore exists within the models, and this thesis is an attempt to provide an original evaluation of the differences in the observed political behaviour patterns. This is done partly through in-depth interviews with community activists from Bangladeshi and Caribbean backgrounds, allowing for a qualitative inquiry to illustrate and examine existing inter-ethnic differences in political behaviour and political attitude patterns that are not accounted for in the above models.

1.6. Overview of the thesis

This section provides a brief overview of the forthcoming thesis chapters. Chapter 2 discusses theoretical framework that provided the foundation for the analyses presented in the three empirical studies that constitute the main body of the thesis. In particular, it presents a review of the main assumptions of social identity theories, cultural and social psychological theories of collectivism, different understandings of group consciousness, and finally, the review of the integration trade-offs argument.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach adopted in the thesis. It explains the assumptions of methodological pragmatism, rationale for the choice of the mixed method approach, and the general research design.

The three substantive empirical studies are presented in Chapters 4-6. Chapter 4 investigates the predictors of the strength of British identity among immigrant origin populations. It presents evidence that individual and group levels of collectivism are important and undervalued predictors of the strength of British national identity. Chapter 5 addresses the questions about ethnic specific factors that contribute to the understanding of political behaviour of ethnic minority groups in the UK. It shows that group consciousness and assimilation approaches can be viewed as complementary explanations of different modes of political participation. Chapter 6 explores the role of ethnic organisations in Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities. It develops an argument that political agency and attitudes of ethnic activists are an important and largely overlooked factor that helps to understand the role of ethnic social capital in promoting mainstream political mobilisation

Finally, Chapter 7, summarises the main findings from the empirical studies, alongside their main empirical and theoretical contributions. It also discusses the main limitations of the undertaken research, and points out potential areas that future research should focus on.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will lay out the main theories, concepts and models that constitute the foundation for the empirical studies presented in Chapters 4-6. It is not meant to be a comprehensive literature review of all the empirical and theoretical arguments relevant for each of the examined topics. Each of the studies presented in this thesis was conducted in light of the multiple theoretical and empirical insights, which are discussed in more detail in the relevant empirical chapters. However, the primary approach taken to examine the empirical questions and the proposed interpretation of the results draw most heavily on three broad theoretical frameworks: social identity theory, group consciousness theory, and segmented assimilation theory, with the particular focus on the integration trade-offs argument. The main assumptions of these theories as well as some of the other, inter-related concepts will be discussed here from more general to more specific ones.

First, a brief overview of the social identity approach will allow for an outline of the general mechanisms of social identity formation and will provide the theoretical basis to explain the consequences of social identity for individual and group behaviour. Different elements and assumptions of the social identity approach provide the central foundations for all the empirical studies presented in this thesis.

Next, the concept of collectivism, which can be viewed as a part of a broader social identity perspective, will be discussed with a focus on its consequences for the representation of individual and social concept of the self. The theoretical developments of the individual and cross-cultural nature of the collectivist tendency set up the basis for the main argument presented in Chapter 4 (Study 1).

The subsequent section will discuss the main assumptions of group consciousness theory, which concentrates on the consequences of politicised minority identities for political behaviour outcomes. Compared to psychological theories of social identity, group consciousness provides a more sociological understanding of the potential consequences of belonging to a subordinate social group for individual and group behaviour. Some of the

main arguments derived from the group consciousness theory are empirically examined in Chapter 5 (Study 2).

The assumptions of group consciousness are also closely related to the idea of assimilation into the subordinate segments of a society, which provide the basis for the trade-off argument outlined in more detail in the final section. The 'trade-off argument' is discussed in order to shed a light on how different dimensions of integration interact with each other in a particular British context. The formulations of the trade-off argument are helpful for developing more specific hypotheses about the impact of historical immigration patterns and cultural heritage on the expected inter-ethnic differences in integration outcomes. This argument is primarily applied in order to interpret the results of the qualitative study (Study 3) presented in Chapter 6.

2.2. Social Identity Approach

The social identity approach is a commonly used overarching term for the numerous theoretical developments based on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT). This large body of thought discusses psychological cognitive processes affecting the formation and consequences of group identities that are useful for the study of minority political behaviour and the dynamics of minority identity in particular. The social identity approach is used throughout the thesis as the basis for understanding more specific arguments and hypothesis derived from theoretical explanations of the role of ethnic identity and perceived discrimination on political integration outcomes. First, it is helpful to consider the historical context associated with the development of SIT. The early conceptualisation of SIT was formulated after WWII as an attempt to understand the success of Nazi ideology and the cognitive processes individuals use for rationalising irrational behaviours. It was introduced soon after Arendt's concept of the 'banality of evil' (Arendt, 1963, 1971) and Milgram experiments, which both highlighted that irrational and cruel actions can be committed simply based on the obedience to authority rather than ideological hatred (Arendt 1963; Milgram 1963). Tajfel's and Turner's approach to social identity stood in opposition to individualist psychology prevalent in the early 20th century, which increasingly became regarded as too reductionist (Tajfel & Turner 1979). The fundamental principle of SIT is an understanding of social identity as a <u>relational</u> concept of the self, meaning that one's group identity always exists in relation to other groups, and, that social identities are products of people's

past and present experiences of social reality. The relational nature of social identity is particularly helpful for understanding the role of host society attitudes towards ‘newcomers’ on identificational assimilation of immigrant-origin groups. The consequences of perceived hostile attitudes towards one’s ethnic group on a sense of British identity are further discussed in Study 1 (Chapter 4). Social identity approach accentuates that social context affects the appearance of particular psychological processes, which have major effects on human behaviour, inter-group relations, and social change.

The first formulation of SIT, introduced by Henri Tajfel in 1970s was a result of his “minimal group experiments”. Tajfel’s experiments revealed that even minimal and meaningless differences between ad-hoc groups (e.g. boys assigned to different groups based on their preferences for various painters) are sufficient for the development of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Despite the limitations of translating the implications of the results from laboratory experiments to the real social world, the minimal group studies shifted the attention of social psychology researchers from examining how individuals define themselves in relation to other individuals to the ways they define themselves through the groups to which they belong. In later developments of SIT, Tajfel claimed that people have an internalised notion of how the social world is structured, that they construct their perceptions of social ‘self’ based on own ideas about which social groups they ‘fit in’, and which are particularly important for their life chances. The classic examples include: class, gender, race, ethnicity and religion. According to the first definition proposed by (Tajfel 1978, p.63), social identity is *“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership.”* According to SIT, the central components of social identity are the **subjective sense of belonging**, **positive attachment** to a group and the **salience** of the group membership to the individual’s concept of the self. These components of salient group identity provide the basis for understanding the politicised group consciousness arguments, discussed in a later section. It is important to stress that pure membership in a social group is not a sufficient condition for development of social identity until it is subjectively meaningful for an individual. Given this, it is important to examine the intensity of identification with a particular group when evaluating how important it might be for individual behaviour and political attitudes.

The first principle of SIT is that social identity is always defined in relational terms. The second principle is that individuals strive for **positive differentiation** of their own

group **in comparison** to other groups. Such positive in-group bias serves to satisfy one of the basic human motivations, which, according to Tajfel, is the need to maintain a positive image of one's self (this is commonly referred to as a 'self-esteem hypothesis').[2] In a comparison process, *"a group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate mainly because other groups are present in the environment"* (Tajfel 1978, p. 66-67). In consequence, the meaning of social identity is strongly dependent on social context and is partially defined by 'what the group is not' and 'how it is different from other groups'. Some of the most important implications of SIT, especially from the point of view of research questions examined in this thesis, relate to the possible ways that a positive group self-image can be achieved when one's group is consensually regarded as inferior. In such a situation, the social identity approach outlines three possible strategies: **individual mobility**, **social creativity** and **social change/social competition** (Tajfel & Turner 1979, p. 35). The choice of strategy depends on *"individuals' belief systems about the nature and the structure of the relations between social groups in their society"*. In particular, the 'individual mobility' strategy is possible only if an individual believes that group boundaries are **permeable** and that he or she can exit the current inferior group and move to a more desired, higher status group. For example, if an individual believes that the British majority group has a relatively higher status than immigrant-origin minorities, he or she might want to 'leave' own ethnic group and begin to identify with the majority group. On the other hand, if the group boundaries are perceived as **impermeable**, which means that is it impossible or very difficult to change the group (e.g. no matter how much an individual want to be perceived as part of the majority group, he or she might not be able to escape their immigrant or ethnic minority status), one might either re-evaluate a group's position through 'social creativity' or become involved in direct competition with a higher status group in order to change the position of one's own group.[3] The social creativity strategy can involve: a) changing the focus or dimension of evaluation (e.g., you're physically stronger but we are smarter); b) changing the initial evaluation of a particular quality (e.g., black is beautiful), and c) changing the out-group to which the in-group compares itself (e.g., we are poorer than

[2] It is important to note, however, that some scholars do not agree that the desire to achieve positive self-esteem motivates social identification. Instead, it has been sometimes argued that increased self-esteem might be rather a consequence of positively distinct social identity (see e.g.: Rubin & Hewstone 1998)

[3] Other conditions that affect the choice of individual strategy to preserve positive group image include *stability* and *legitimacy* of the existing social reality (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Jost et al. 2004)

group ‘A’ but we are not as poor as group ‘C’.). The consequences of being a member of the subordinate group in society (and possible strategies individuals can apply to improve the group self-image) indirectly bring up questions about power, which are highly important from the point of view of political behaviour studies.

Social Categorization Theory (Turner 1982; Turner et al. 1987) expands Tajfel’s developments, with a focus on cognitive processes involved in the construction of social identity. SCT pays particular attention to the importance of the salience of social identity. For example, it postulates that a higher salience of group identity in a given context makes individuals more likely to think of themselves in terms of collective identity (‘we’ vs. ‘they’) rather than individual identity (‘I’ vs. ‘you’). Salient social identity is assumed to be associated with greater obedience to group norms and greater willingness to participate in collective action. In the context of political behaviour, salient social identity should make individuals more likely to make their political choices based on the perceived benefits for their group as a whole rather than based on the perceived personal benefits. Furthermore, SCT specifies some of the basic cognitive processes underlying the social identity construction, namely: **depersonalisation** and **self-stereotyping**. The depersonalisation process involves a perception of particular group members as similar to each other, and, at the extreme end, as inter-changeable. According to Michael Hogg and colleagues “*Depersonalization of self is the basic process underlying group phenomena- for example, social stereotyping, group cohesion and ethnocentrism, cooperation and altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective behavior, shared norms, and the mutual influence process*.”(Hogg et al. 1995, p.261) The self-stereotyping process refers to the perception of one’s self through **prototypes** (**prototypical** characteristics of the group members). The concept of prototypes is defined as *“context specific, multidimensional fuzzy sets of attributes that define and prescribe attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that characterize one group and distinguish it from other groups”* (Hogg 2001, p.186). Importantly, SCT assumes that not every member of the group has equal power to define what characteristics and behaviours are expected from the group, which in consequence, lays the foundations for understanding **social influence**. Individuals consensually perceived as the most prototypical, are usually highly regarded by fellow in-group members, and those who are the least prototypical are often marginalised. Some of the consequences of prototypicality are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Ordinary members of the group frequently seek guidance for how they are expected to act in particular situations from those who are considered prototypical. This is especially

important when a situation is perceived as threatening for the group. According Turner and Oakes (1986, p. 247), *"people tend to conform to the social norms which define their salient in-group category and that any response stereotypically associated with such a category (consensually shared by members) with respect to some situation tends to be perceived as* ***normative/informationally valid****. Further, the more representative (prototypical) of the in-group consensus, the better some individual (or argument or response) expresses the agreement of in-group members, the more correct, valued and persuasive will that particular person be."*

Group processes will therefore lead to a 'social reality check', which validates individual beliefs and turns them into social facts. Self-categorization processes are thought to be driven by both the need for maintaining positive self-esteem and **uncertainty reduction**. Prototypes are an effective tool for reducing uncertainty because they prescribe how an individual 'ought to' behave according to consensual group norms. With this, they make human behaviour more predictable (people have expectations about how their in-group members should and should not behave, and how the relevant out-group members are also expected to behave). For instance, in the context of political party choice, there might be an expectation that if you are a member of particular social group, you should vote for the political party that is consensually perceived as the best choice.

A related concept to prototype – **self-schema** – was extensively discussed by Conover (1984) in relation to political information processing. Self-schemas can be simply described as cognitive short-cuts that contain beliefs about one's self and guide the processing of new information (Fiske & Linville 1980; Conover 1984; 1988). Certain self-schemas are related to a person's group identifications and, when activated, influence information processing linked to specific group schema (or prototype in social identity terminology). According to Conover, the political environment (e.g., issues raised during a campaign) plays an important role in determining which of many group self-schemas become activated in a particular situation.

SCT (Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1994) further points out the importance of **relative accessibility** (later further developed under the name "perceiver readiness"[4]) on what kind of self-categorization becomes activated. Relative accessibility can be interpreted as a type of individual pre-programming that is determined by previous experience. Such pre-programming is thought to affect activation of particular self-categorization in a given

[4]For a discussion on 'perceiver readiness' see: Oakes (2002)

context. For example, if a Pakistani person was asked a number of times to choose one of the pre-determined ethnicity categories (e.g., to choose between White, Asian, Black, and Other) when filling out a questionnaire, they will more likely think of themselves as 'Asian' when asked about their origin in a similar context in the future. Therefore, relative accessibility assumes that an individual has certain expectations and theories of how the social world is structured, and how they fit into a given social structure.

Another closely related theoretical model – **Optimal Distinctiveness Theory** – was proposed by Marilynn Brewer (1991) in order to further explain the motivational background of social identity development. According to Brewer (1991, p.477), *"social identity derives from a fundamental tension between human needs for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation (on the other)"*. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory draws attention to two main facts: (1) not all social groups equally fulfil these two competing needs; and (2) different individuals have varying levels of the need for belonging and to feel distinct or unique. For example, identifying with a group with unique characteristics (e.g., being a supporter of particular football team) can fulfil both needs to a larger degree than identifying with a larger, less coherent group (e.g., being a member of particular nationality). Differences in the extent of the need for being 'unique' and to 'belong' are likely to be influenced by three factors: (1) personality predispositions; (2) cultural differences related to the emphasis placed on the group-level concept of the self; and (3) situational context.

2.3. Strengths and Limitations of the Social Identity Framework

Probably the most important strength and contribution of the social identity framework is that it offers an interactionist, meta-theoretical approach to study social groups[5]. Thanks to accounting not only for psychological (cognitive) mechanisms but also the interplay between social, political, and contextual forces, it provides an anti-reductionist and anti-individualist approach to understanding social behaviour. The key empirical advantage of the social identity approach is that it supplies many easily testable ideas with respect to the way social groups operate. The main postulates of SIT, derived from minimal group experiments, have been evaluated and confirmed over the years in different national contexts and a broad range of situational settings.

[5] For a discussion on how social identity approach differs from individualist approaches to social psychology see e.g., Turner et al. 1987; Turner et al. 1994

Despite its popularity, the social identity approach was also heavily criticised both within and outside of the social psychology field. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss how particular postulates of the theory were rebuked and/or defended, however, it is worth pointing out the key potential limitations of the social identity approach for the topics examined in this thesis.

Firstly, as pointed out by Rubin & Hewstone (2004), the social identity approach does not include a detailed analysis of the role of power in a political sense, and refers to power only as a synonym of group/individual status. Therefore, the interaction between power dynamics (understood beyond status relationships) and identity processes needs more cautious theoretical developments.[6]

In the early 2000s, Leonie Huddy (2001) and Penelope Oakes (2002) published two polemical papers on the applicability of SIT to political psychology research. On purely theoretical grounds, most of the Huddy's critique of the social identity approach was convincingly fended off by Oakes. However, Huddy's appraisal is useful for thinking about 'common faults' in quantifying and interpreting social identity concepts in applied quantitative research (which does not necessarily diminish the usefulness of the theoretical framework itself). For example, Huddy argues that the social identity approach paid too much attention to simple group membership and not enough to the subjective meaning and salience of group identity, which Oakes (correctly) dismisses. However, Huddy is right in terms of empirical, especially quantitative, studies too frequently using group membership as a proxy of social identity, mainly because of the limited availability of survey measures. Furthermore, Huddy suggests that researchers should look more carefully into external conditions when examining social identity development. Such conditions, which can potentially affect development of social identities, include identity threat, direct competition for resources, and external labelling (e.g., based on race). Once more, Oakes is correct in that the social identity approach does acknowledge that these conditions matter, however, this is often not adequately mirrored in an applied social research context.

Finally, an important point raised by Huddy is that social identity researchers often pay 'too much' attention to the importance of situational context in the development of social identities, and not enough to individual differences, largely determined by various personality traits. Although Oakes is accurate regarding SIT acknowledging that 'shades of social identity' vary between individuals, potential explanatory factors are not laid out in

[6] For a discussion about political power and social identity approach see: Sindic & Condor (2014)

great detail. Again, it should be underscored that this does not make the theory weaker, however, it highlights that there is large amount of room for additional developments.

Study 1 presented in Chapter 4, attempts to explore the relationship between individual and cross-cultural differences and representations of social identities by focusing on the role of individual and national levels of 'collectivism' with respect to the strength of British identity (which is an illustrative example of social identity).

2.4. Collectivism

The collectivism-individualism continuum is the most established dimension of national cultures, and the one most frequently researched by cross cultural psychologists. The concept of collectivism heavily draws from the ideas developed within social identity framework, such as salience of social identity and optimal distinctiveness. However, instead of focusing on individual and situational determinants of social identity, the theoretical formulations of collectivism deal with the question of cross-cultural determinants of social identity. Therefore, collectivism can be regarded as a part of the broader family of social identity studies, but is not usually treated as a part of social identity approach (this term is usually reserved for individual-level theoretical explanations of social identity). In this thesis, the concept of collectivism will be understood in line with the main principles outlined by Geert Hofstede (1984; 2002) and Harry Triandis (1995; 2001), whose work provided the foundations for the contemporary cross-cultural psychology.

The most influential conceptualisation of cultural collectivism has been proposed by Hofstede, based on his analysis of IBM survey data from over 50 countries. It is important to note, however, that the content of collectivism dimension is highly debated among scholars of cultural psychology[7], and the theoretical understandings of the distinctive characteristics of collectivistic and individualistic societies have significantly developed since Hofstede first published the results from his pioneering study (Hofstede 1980). Nevertheless, Hofstede's original scale of individualism-collectivism dimension (which classifieds over 100 countries on a scale from 0 to 100) as well as his proposed principles of collectivism are still the most commonly applied in comparative, cross-national research. Although the nuances of conceptual understandings of collectivism

[7] For a critical discussion on the usefulness of the concept of collectivism as a cultural dimension see e.g.: Yuki 2003; Yuki & Takemura 2014; Brewer & Chen 2007

developed by cultural psychology researchers are undoubtedly important, the understanding of the collectivism concept used in this thesis will be necessarily oversimplified. This is dictated by the constraints of available datasets, which do not allow to measure diverse aspects of collectivism due to the lack of specific research in the area rather than somewhat related research areas thus limiting the scope of conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical analysis presented in Study 1. However, the main purpose of applying the concept of collectivism in Study 1 (see: Chapter 3, Table 3.2) is to examine to what extent individual and cross-national differences among immigrant origin groups are helpful for predicting their responses to the British identity question. It is not the aim of this thesis to determine which aspects of collectivism dimension are the most relevant for understanding the differences in perceptions of British identity question. Thus, the concept of collectivism will be discussed here only in relation to the general principles that affect the differences in the construction of individual self-concept, and many of the important nuances will be omitted.

The understanding of the cultural-level of collectivism in Hofstede's work refers to the extent to which social groups constitute the primary point of reference in representations of social relationships in a society, and, to which they are important for the perception of individual "self". He defines the individualism-collectivism continuum as follows: *"**Individualism** on the one side versus its opposite, **Collectivism**, as a societal, not an individual characteristic, is the degree to which people in a society are integrated into groups"* (Hofstede 2011, p.11). The primary differences in social norms and values prevalent in collectivistic and individualistic societies proposed by Hofstede are summarised in the Table 2.1 below:

Table 2.1. Ten Differences Between Collectivist and Individualist Societies (Hofstede, 2011, p.11)

Individualism	Collectivism
Everyone is supposed to take care of him- or herself and his immediate family only	People are born into extended families or clans which protect them in exchange for loyalty
"I"- consciousness	"We" consciousness
Right of privacy	Stress on belonging
Speaking one's mind is healthy	Harmony should always be maintained
Others classified as individuals	Others classified as in-group or out-group
Transgression of norms leads to guilt feelings	Transgression of norms leads to shame feelings
Languages in which the word "I" is indispensable	Languages in which the word "I" is avoided
Purpose of education is learning how to learn	Purpose of education is learning how to do
Task prevail over relationship	Relationship prevails over task

The second influential conceptualisation of collectivism by Harry Triandis represents a somewhat more refined approach. First, Triandis differentiates between cultural and individual level of analysis. He uses the terms collectivism and individualism 'syndromes' when referring to the cultural characteristics, and the corresponding terms 'allocentrism' and 'idiocentrism' when referring to personality traits. Triaindis also makes more fine-grained classification of national cultures by differentiating between vertical and horizontal types of collectivism and individualism.[8] However, a general understanding of the main differences between collectivist and individualist societies is very similar to Hofstede's classification. According to Triandis, *"A cultural syndrome is a set of elements of subjective culture organized around a theme. In the case of individualism, the organizing theme is the centrality of the autonomous individual; in the case of collectivism, it is the centrality of the collective-family, tribe, work organization, consumer group, state, ethnic group, or religious group. The most important cognitions of individualists use sentences that include I, me, and mine; of collectivists, sentences that include us, we, and ours, contrasting with they and them"* (Triandis 1993, p.156). Therefore, the central characteristic of collectivism is a stronger tendency to describe the 'self' in **relational** terms rather than in terms of personal attributes. In Study 1 (Chapter 4), the concept of collectivism is measured both on individual and country-level. The individual measure of

[8] For a detailed discussion on the differences between vertical and horizontal nature of collectivism vs. individualism see: Chen et al. (1997)

collectivism (referred to throughout Study 1 as 'collective tendency') is based on the survey items measuring the 'relational' aspects of the self. Therefore, the 'collective tendency' measure corresponds to Triandis's concept of 'allocentrism'. The country-level measure of collectivism used in Study 1, utilises Hofstede's Collectvism-Individualism Index, which, to date, has been the only measure of the concept that allows for quantifiable, cross-national comparisons.

Based on the cross-national comparative study, Triandis et al. (1990) reported that self-definitions of individuals from different cultures significantly vary – those from collectivist cultures include references to social self between 30 and 50 per cent of the time, whereas self-definitions of those from individualist cultures include references to social self only between 0 and 20 per cent of the time. The attributes of collectivist individuals (allocentrics) include greater internalisation of (and obedience to) social norms. They are also traditionally considered to be more ethnocentric and have stronger in-group bias, however, these findings have not been consistent across more recent cross-national studies (Spielberger 2004). Importantly, allocentrics and idiocentrics were also reported to differ with regards to 'optimal distinctiveness' needs- the former showing greater need for feeling accepted and lower need for being unique (Brewer 1991). However, the author of Optimal Distinctiveness Theory – Marillyn Brewer -criticises such generalisation as too simplistic. She argues that *"cultures do not differ in **whether** social identities are important aspects of the self-concept but in **what type** of social identity is more salient"* (Brewer & Yuki 2007, p.313). According to this view, traditional classification of collectivistic and individualistic societies captures the differences in the 'nature and structure' of social identities rather than a difference between the needs for social identification itself. Brewer postulates a distinction between 'individual', 'relational', and 'collective' identity. According to her, societies traditionally classified as collectivistic put greater emphasis on relational representation of social identities (which is based on **personalised** relationships with other members of in-group), whereas societies traditionally classified as individualistic put greater emphasis on collective types of social identities (which is based on **depersonalised** and more **abstract** understanding of social group). Typical examples of relational groups include family or group of friends, whereas typical examples of collective (depersonalised) group include those based on professional membership or similar interests (e.g. hobby or political groups). In this thesis, however, the concept of collective identity is referred to in a more traditional sense, which encompasses both 'relational' and 'collective' type of identity according to Brewer's terminology. More

detailed implications of collectivism dimension for investigating determinants of the declared importance of British identity are discussed in Chapter 4, but it is apparent that the literature does suggest that an ethnic identity may provide the type of social identity that offers support and esteem for community members. This can also be provided by patriotism to the nation state, and an interesting interplay may therefore exist in the groups that are identified with. Given this, Chapter 6 partially attempts to identify the extent to which the political beliefs are determined by the strength of identification with the ethnic groups of the interviewees and the institutions that they interact with (both within the ethnic community and those of the nation state). This strikes at the heart of Tebbit's 'cricket' test, and in effect seeks to determine the extent to which group members see themselves as fully integrated and empowered citizens of the British nation state and governmental bodies.

2.5. Group Consciousness

Most of the identity research which has been conducted in the field of political science has primarily focused on the political mobilisation based on collective identity among traditionally marginalised social groups (e.g.: Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1981). It is important to note here that there is a substantive conceptual difference between *group identification* and *group consciousness*. *Group identification* is the combination of objective group membership and subjective (psychological) sense of attachment to a group (Miller et al. 1981; Tajfel 1978; Conover 1988). *Group consciousness* is an "*in-group identification* ***politicized*** *by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing*" (McClain et al. 2009, p.476, but see also: Gurin et al. 1989; Miller et al. 1981; Conover 1988). Therefore, *group identification* is regarded as being a first step to "group consciousness". The emphasis on the salience of group identity among group consciousness theorists, is clearly informed by the developments of social identity theories discussed in the earlier sections.

Group consciousness has been one of the most popular theoretical approaches used for explaining political participation among racial minorities in the US, but is less applied in other national contexts. This is arguably due to the genesis of the theory as a way to explain exceptionally high voting rates amongst Black Americans during the 1960s and 1970s. According to the dominant theories of political behaviour (especially the individualistic explanations proposed by Michigan school - e.g.: Campbell et al. 1954;

1960) a low socio-economic status should have had a demobilising effect on political involvement. Therefore, high electoral mobilisation of disadvantaged African-American groups required a different, non-economic explanation. Group consciousness - interpreted as being a combination of a strong racial identity, solidarity, and belief in pervasive racial discrimination, was found to serve as an additional motivational resource which mobilised Blacks to engage in politics despite their lack of economic resources (e.g. Verba & Nie 1972; Conover 1984; 1985; Miller et al. 2012).

Although there have been multiple conceptualisations of group consciousness, it is possible to distinguish three core elements that constitute the basis for the majority of the existing theoretical models. These core elements are: 1) Group identification; 2) Recognition of the shared life circumstances of minority group members; and 3) Perception of relative deprivation/discrimination. As was previously noted, individuals must first identify themselves as members of the group before they can be politically mobilised by collective solidarity to act on the group's behalf.

Secondly, individuals have to believe that their life chances are linked to the fate of the group, and that the prevalent discrimination within the mainstream society prevents them from achieving success in their lives. This last element reflects the group's perception towards unjust power relations in society, while it is crucial for understanding the motivational basis for political mobilisation based on collective identity. This is arguably the most US-based factor; if the perception of societal discrimination is less profound (and, given the UK's history, it would be surprising if it was the same when compared to the presence of Jim Crow laws in the 1960s South) then one might expect less perceived need for co-ordinated group action.

Group consciousness theories always refer to 'subordinate' groups which are held back in a society by the existing barriers. A heightened sense of group consciousness is thought to mobilise members of a disadvantaged group to engage in politics in order to change the existing status quo. The expected political consequences of group consciousness may include one or more of the following: enhanced mobilisation in electoral and/or non-electoral politics, development of certain political views, particular party identifications, and/or policy preferences. The majority of the current theoretical conceptualisations of group consciousness strongly rely on the three classical models created by Miller and his colleagues (1981), Shingles (1981), and Dawson (1994). Their main assumptions are outlined in the following sections.

According to Miller et al. (1981, p. 495), group consciousness is an *"identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests "*. The first assumption of their model states that individuals with a sense of group consciousness must attribute their lower status to **systemic**, not individualistic, causes (which they refer to as 'systemic blame'). This means that members of the disadvantaged group must perceive their relative deprivation as illegitimate and somewhat independent from their individual efforts. In consequence, systemic blame shifts the responsibility for the socio-economic disadvantage from personal abilities and efforts to external forces. In a sense, systemic blame combines in fact two elements: recognition that individual life chances are linked to the fate of the group (recognition of the shared circumstances) and that individual efforts are not sufficient to overcome the existing social barriers.

The third element in my classification (perception of relative deprivation) corresponds to what Miller et al. (1981, p. 496) refer to as call 'polar power', defined as *"expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group's current status, power, or material resources in relation to that of the outgroup"*. In addition, they introduced a fourth element known as the 'polar affect', which can be summarised as the preference for members of the in-group and a relative antipathy towards the out-group. Such in-group bias (or 'polar affect' according to Miller's terminology) is a natural consequence of salient group identity according to social identity (discussed in the earlier section of this chapter). According to this model, the greatest predictive power of both electoral and non-electoral political participation is achieved when individuals have a combination of all of the identified group consciousness elements: group identification, polar power, polar affect and system blame. Therefore, it is an **interactive**, not an **additive** model.

The authors acknowledge that group consciousness may vary across individuals, groups, and time, depending on the current social and political circumstances. Despite the fact that their research has been restricted to the subject of Black Americans, they claim that the group consciousness model can be employed to analyse the political behaviour of other minority groups (after the appropriate adjustments have been made).

The second classical conceptualisation of group consciousness was introduced by Shingles (1981) in his widely cited article ''Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link". Shingles (1981), after Verba and Nie (1972, p. 160-161), define group consciousness as *"the awareness among blacks of their shared status as an unjustly deprived and oppressed group"*. Similar to Miller, his definition of group

consciousness encompasses a common group identity, and recognition of a shared, disadvantaged position in society. However, his primary contribution towards this field of research was the analysis of the psychological workings of individual group members, providing an insight into how black consciousness operates. According to Shingles, individuals blame the system for their lower socio-economic achievements; in turn, this makes them feel more positive about their own personal competencies. In other words, acknowledging the impact of social barriers on one's life chances is thought to increase a perception of personal efficacy. At the same time, 'group conscious' individuals are expected to be more pessimistic towards political elites who are either not capable of or not willing to solve the problem of racial inequalities and discrimination. Consequently, they are expected to have low levels of *political trust*. Shingles' empirical analysis demonstrates that a combination of low political trust and high personal efficacy increases the chances of high initiative political involvement (e.g. protest activity). He concludes that high initiative political activities are more likely to be motivated by group solidarity and group sentiments as opposed to low initiative activities (such as voting).

The third classical model of identity-based political mobilisation proposed by Dawson takes a 'communal' approach towards politics, focusing on the shared experience of group members. Dawson coined the term 'linked fate', defining it as the belief that "individual life chances are linked to the fate of the race" (Dawson, 1994, p.75). According to Dawson, a sense of linked fate grows as a consequence of interactions within formal (institutional/organisational) and informal (personal) African-American networks. The experience from these interactions is thought to shape both the individual's political views as well as their interpretations of black history. This, again, is naturally partly dependent on the history of the individual and the community they live within; it is perhaps an unusual situation within the US because of the degree and formality of discrimination and violent repression that existed relatively recently. Given this, the predictions made by the model regarding African-American communities may well be less useful within the UK context.

Dawson's analysis also primarily focuses on the second element in my classification: recognition of the shared circumstances. However, he also indirectly refers to group identification and deprivation as the basis for the development of 'linked fate', proposing the theory that linked fate is based on 'black utility heuristic', derived from the

racialised self-schemas[9]. According to him, Blacks' political choices (throughout the 1970s and 1980s) were most importantly shaped by **racial utility heuristic**, determined by a belief in **linked fate**[10]**.** In other words, an individual's political leanings were mostly determined by what they perceived as being the most beneficial for the Blacks as a group. In particular, individual and racial group interests were operationalised in terms of two functional relationships. Individual utility of a particular political option was defined as a function of: (a) perception of group interests, (b) personal socio-economic status, and (c) past experience of the same policy, candidate or political party. Racial group interests were defined as a function of: (a) membership in black community institutions, (b) exposure to black media, (c) influence of black elite opinion, and (d) individual socio-economic status. Interestingly, linked fate was not originally used by Dawson to predict group political mobilisation but only to predict Blacks' political preferences. However, Dawson's empirical analyses, aimed to represent supporting evidence for the 'linked fate' argument are not unproblematic. Firstly, Dawson's measures of racial group interests and their determinants, as well as the measure of linked fate, often do not achieve statistical significance in the models or have small effects and borderline statistical significance. The effect of linked fate measure appears to be the strongest predictor in only one of the several tested models. Unsurprisingly, it is the strongest predictor of opposition to racial politics. Furthermore, the choice of the explanatory variables in Dawson's analysis is not consistent across the models, and appears to be quite arbitrary. Finally, racial group interests are treated very broadly and measured by different variables in different models, e.g. by opinions about the economic position of the group, affective preferences for members of one's own racial group, opinions about power relations between Blacks and Whites in the society. The critical assessment of the empirical evidence presented by Dawson shows that the 'linked fate' argument may have a more modest effect than the author suggests.

2.6. Strengths and Limitations of Group Consciousness Approach

Group consciousness approach offers a useful way of thinking about the identity-based political mobilisation and political choices among traditionally marginalised groups. However, the fact that the assumptions of group consciousness are highly specific to a

[9] The concept of self-schemas is understood in line with Conover's definition discussed in the earlier section
[10]Linked fate is measured by a question: "Do you think that what happens generally to the black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"

particular racial group and historical context raises the question about its applicability to other contemporary contexts (and different groups).

A long history of power struggle between ‘hegemonic’ whites and ‘subordinate’ blacks certainly makes African-Americans’ political mobilisation exceptional. Firstly, unlike other visible minorities, the majority of today’s African-Americans are descendants of involuntary immigrants who lived under the slavery system, and later, under the Jim Crow segregation laws. The African-American Civil Rights Movement during the 1950s and 1960s was also crucial to the formation of the contemporary United States. Furthermore, the ‘Black Power’ movement during the 1960s and 1970s that took place in the US and throughout the world was a prototype for all kinds of New Social Movements, which constructed their ideology around the issues of identity, culture and human rights. A prominent characteristic of black movements was the explicit appeal for the promotion of black identity and culture, as well as for the promotion of black collective interests.

Despite the fact that British ethnic minorities do not have a comparable history of oppression, there are good reasons to think that some of the group processes that are associated with similar concerns to those of black Americans, take place in Britain as well. Ethnic minorities are usually first or second generation immigrants, which makes them likely to experience group-specific barriers (e.g. language difficulties, lower social and economic capital, racial discrimination) that affect their political integration. Secondly, they often have strong social ties with their co-ethnics and express high levels of group solidarity, which makes them likely to vote as a block. Thirdly, it has been often found that the classical socio-economic status model, which usually explains political behaviour amongst the general population reasonably well, is much less useful when applied to ethnic minority groups. On the other hand, due to a different social and historical context, it is not clear whether group consciousness can play a similar mobilising role in contemporary Britain in the same way it did 50 years ago in America.

Another concern associated with applying group consciousness is a widely acknowledged problem with adequate operationalisation and measurement of the concept, as well as the difficulty of testing the underlying mechanism. Many of the early research operationalise group consciousness by utilising group identification as a proxy. Such an approach has been heavily criticised (see e.g. Sanchez 2006) as theoretically unfounded; however, it is often the only available solution in quantitative survey research due to the lack of more sophisticated measures. Some scholars propose to use either multiple indicators or indexes constructed based on identity, discrimination, linked fate, and other

inter-related measures (e.g. Junn & Masuoka 2008; Austin et al. 2012), which can reflect the concept of group consciousness more adequately. Furthermore, Dawson (2001) recommends an investigation of group - and context -specific aspects of group consciousness, which might may become either more or less important in a particular socio-political context (e.g. he gives an example that different aspects of group consciousness may be considered important for middle-class and working-class Blacks). Taking into account the caveats and potential limitations of extrapolating American-based models into the British context, the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 5 (Study 2) will test the core argument of group consciousness but it will not attempt to test the nuanced differences proposed by different theoretical models.

2.7. Segmented Assimilation and the Integration Trade-off Argument

Straight-line assimilation theory (Gordon 1964), which depicts immigrants adaptation to the new society as a linear process, during which immigrant-origin individuals become increasingly similar to the mainstream society, has been increasingly replaced by the ‘segmented assimilation' theory, originally proposed by Portes and Zhou(1993). The idea of segmented assimilation developed largely as a response to the observed differences in the outcomes, conditions, and characteristics of the ‘new' immigrants, who started arriving in the US after 1965. According to Portes and Zhou (1993), immigrants in the contemporary American society face significantly different conditions and challenges that affect their assimilation (or integration) trajectories. In particular, these differences refer to three factors: skin colour, the structure of the contemporary economy, and the challenges of common immigrant settlement areas. Firstly, compared to the European immigrants in the early twentieth century US, majority of ‘new immigrants' are non-white, therefore apart from the challenges related to their foreign status, they are also subjected to racial discrimination. Secondly, the transformation from the industrial to post-industrial economy results in a fewer opportunities for semi-skilled and skilled labourers, and makes it harder for immigrants to achieve economic progress in highly competitive, and increasingly polarised post-industrial societies. Finally, the traditional immigrant gateways – central, big city areas, have become associated with post-industrial societies' underclass.

To capture the consequences of these major changes of the contemporary, post-immigration reality, Portes and Zhou (1993), introduced a simple typology of pathways

towards acculturation and integration into different 'segments' of the host society. The three typical pathways include assimilation into white middle class (Path 1); assimilation into urban underclass (Path 2); and 'selective acculturation', typically understood as a mixture of preserving own culture and economic advancement (Path 3). The segmented assimilation theorists (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; 2001) also point out some important factors that affect which pathway to incorporation immigrants will end up on. Some of the most important factors include: family and human capital, receiving society context (e.g. existence or lack of prejudice), government policy and the strength and economic resources of own ethnic community. Despite the usefulness of segmented assimilation theory for describing immigrant incorporation, it has often been criticised for its' lack of testable assumptions, and, therefore, lack of falsifiability. For example, Xie and Greenman (2005) point out that segmented assimilation theory can be interpreted in many ways, and that its' main components often refer both to the process and outcomes of integration, which makes it difficult to formulate clear, testable hypotheses.

Regarding the usefulness of segmented assimilation theory for predicting political integration outcomes, some authors point out the importance of the perceived self-identification with different segments of the society and its' associated collective interests (e.g. Samson 2013). However, most of the empirical attempts to formulate and empirically test hypotheses derived from the assimilation theory have been limited to the US context. In the European context, a useful theoretical argument of 'integration trade-offs,' derived from the segmented assimilation tradition, has been recently proposed by Rahsaan Maxwell (2012).

The idea of integration trade-offs offers a theoretical framework for explaining **how** (what mechanisms) and **why** (under what conditions) positive outcomes on one dimension of integration might have negative consequences for the performance on other dimensions. This argument stands in opposition to the classical, linear assimilation approach to integration (Gordon 1964) as it rejects the assumption that different aspects of integration go 'hand in hand'. By highlighting the fact that integration options are restrained by existing discrimination, it directly draws on the idea of different pathways to integration proposed by Portes and Zhou (1993).

Arguably, the most important point of Maxwell's explanation is the expected **trade-off** between social assimilation and political integration caused by a negative spill-over effect of social integration on group-level mobilisation capacity (understood *as 'the ability to work together towards common goals'*, (Maxwell 2012, p. 22). Analogously,

greater social assimilation can potentially bring negative consequences for group-level economic outcomes because it decreases the incentives for working together with co-ethnics. According to this reasoning, group mobilisation is the most important mechanism of generating **political and economic leverage** for ethnic minority groups. However, there are two (or in some instances three) variables that condition the role of group mobilisation. First, members of the minority group are assumed to suffer from some type of disadvantage and/or discriminatory treatment in the mainstream society. If they did not suffer from discrimination/disadvantage, they would not need group mobilisation to achieve their (individual) goals. However, if they do not have equal opportunities as members of the majority then aggregate, group- level resources can help them with overcoming individual-level barriers. The second important intervening variable is the level of independent financial resources possessed by the group. If, on aggregate, group members do not have significant financial resources, then their ability to generate either self-help structures (in economic sense) or create political pressure is significantly limited. Finally, the third variable, which is especially relevant for understanding political integration outcomes, is the size of the minority group. Intuitively, a small minority, even a very cohesive and organised one, is not likely to achieve great political power (under the assumption that it is a disadvantaged minority).

Maxwell convincingly illustrates the trade-off argument through comparison of integration outcomes between: a) South Asian and Caribbeans in Britain; and b) Maghrebians and Caribbeans in France (for the purpose of this thesis the discussion here will be limited to the British case).

He begins his analysis with the focus on explaining why different ethnic groups with broadly similar immigration histories (such as Caribbeans, Indians, and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis in the UK) end up on different integration pathways. In the British context, Caribbeans are usually regarded as relatively well integrated in terms of social indicators (e.g. rates of inter-marriage and residential clustering) but significantly less integrated in terms of economic and political indicators. On the other hand, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis do best politically but are least socially integrated, whereas Indians are the most successful in terms of economic integration outcomes. This puzzling picture of distinct pathways to integration provides the empirical basis for developing the trade-off argument.

Similarly to other integration researchers, Maxwell acknowledges both the importance of immigrant group resources and the host country conditions. In the British

case, one of the most striking differences between Caribbeans and South Asians upon arrival was the level of familiarity with the British culture and language. The longer colonization of the Caribbean Islands compared to the Indian subcontinent made Caribbean migrants better equipped to adapt to the British society. Unlike South Asians, Caribbean settlers did not need English language assistance. In most cases, they spoke English fluently, and did not need to work together to build appropriate places of worship (unlike South Asians most of the Caribbeans were Christians). Easier cultural adaptation meant that Caribbeans were able to survive independently from co-ethnic networks, and were more likely than South Asians to mix socially with white British. However, according to trade-off argument, greater social mixing and ability to survive without relying on co-ethnic networks, resulted in lower capacity (and lower incentives) for co-ethnic cooperation. In consequence, Caribbeans, who similarly to other minorities faced significant discrimination in the mainstream society, underperformed economically and politically as a group. Conversely, South Asians were initially forced to rely on co-ethnic networks because of language and cultural difficulties. This made them more socially segregated but, at the same time, facilitated their group-level political and economic performance. According to the trade-off logic, low social integration and strong co-ethnic networks helped South Asians to achieve better political and economic outcomes[11] for two main reasons. First, to overcome discrimination in the mainstream job market, ethnic enclaves could create opportunities for self-employment and 'recycling' their own economic resources. Secondly, strong bonding social capital was helpful for creating group pressure on local political parties and local authorities. As highly concentrated and cohesive communities, South Asians were able to create incentives for political parties to try engaging with them to gain their votes. Furthermore, because of strong co-ethnic networks, it was easier for them to effectively promote co-ethnic political candidates.

Similar ideas (which in a sense can be treated as an extension of the trade-off argument) were developed to explain **the role of expectations** for a number of important attitudinal outcomes, such as perception of discrimination (Heath et al. 2013) and political attitudes (Maxwell 2008). For example, in a number of his studies Maxwell lay out an argument that greater cultural and social assimilation of Caribbeans (compared to South Asians) create high expectations of incorporation, which are likely to be unfullfield

[11]According to Maxwell's analysis Caribbeans underperform economically, whereas Indians as well as Pakistanis/Bangladeshis overperform. This interpretation is questionable, which I return to while discussing limitations of Maxwell's argument

(mainly because of existing discrimination). In consequence, such unfullfield expectations result in greater pessimism of Caribbeans (compared to South Asians) which translates to: a) lower political trust, b) higher expectations of discrimination, and c) lower likelihood of positive identification with Britain. In a similar manner, Heath et al. (2013) explain the inter-generational differences in positive/negative evaluation of British democracy and perception of ethnic discrimination. They assert that second generation ethnic minorities are likely to have higher expectations of equal treatment than their foreign-born parents (because of different 'frames of reference'), and in consequence, be more critical when evaluating the British reality.

2.8. Strengths and Limitations of the Trade-off Argument

The trade-off argument provides a coherent and neatly organized explanation, which allows for a dynamic analysis of the integration process. The proposed mechanisms and conditions that explain how integration trade-offs operate are convincing and empirically sound. By focusing on the diversity of possible integration pathways and not defining integration in terms of failure or success it provides a useful, non-reductionist analytical tool.

The main limitations of Maxwell's analysis are related to the small number of indicators of different dimensions of integration. For example, political integration is primarily approximated by political representation in local councils, whereas social integration is measured only by rates of inter-marriage and residential clustering. These indicators are of course important, but including other aspects of political and social integration could offer a more comprehensive picture, and, potentially, could alter some of the conclusions. For example, non-electoral and civic engagement is arguably also a part of political integration, and, on these indicators, Caribbeans perform better than in terms of political representation. Regarding social integration and residential patterns, the picture is also not unambiguous. Caribbeans might be slightly more dispersed than South Asians, however, they also tend to cluster in deprived areas and are not proportionally represented in all types of neighbourhoods.

Secondly, the argument that Caribbeans were initially better off compared to Pakistanis/Bangladeshis, and that they are now (relatively) less well-off because of lack of social mobilisation is also disputable. At the time of arrival, Caribbean women had relatively good job opportunities because many of them were employed as nurses, and they

are still relatively well-off today. It is mainly Caribbean men who have some of the worst economic outcomes. However, they did not have the same job opportunities as Caribbean women to begin with.

Finally, the trade-off logic does not really explain how particular trade-offs are expected to be transmitted across generations. For example, lower levels of cultural and social integration of first generation South Asians should become less of a problem for the second generation, who grew up in Britain. The question then becomes how this can be said affect the integration dynamic; in Maxwell's analysis, the inter-generational differences are largely overlooked, or at least, not explicitly integrated into the trade-off model.

2.9. Implications

The main implications of the discussed theories for the empirical studies presented in this thesis concern the role of social identity, identity-based grievances, and the dynamic and multidimensional nature of integration outcomes. A social identity approach has been used both as the basis for understanding the attachment to British identity among immigrant-origin minorities (Study 1), as well as the interplay between identity-based grievances and political participation (Study 2 and Study 3). The implications of individualism-collectivism dimension for the perceived importance of group identities have been primarily applied in Study 1 to develop an argument asserting that the observed variation in the reported strength of attachment to British identity might be partially explained by cultural differences. Mechanisms proposed by the group consciousness theories have been utilized as an analytical framework for examining how ethnic grievances and group solidarity might affect different modes of political participation and political preferences in Study 2 and, to a lesser extent, in Study 3. Finally, the trade-off argument served as a starting point for understanding different levels of political integration outcomes between South Asian and Caribbean minority groups, and influenced the choice of Caribbean and Bangladeshi case studies presented in Study 3.

3. Methodology and Research Design

This chapter discusses the rationale and philosophical stances of the methodology used in the presented empirical research. This thesis consists of three separate studies,

which investigate different research questions within the broad topic of political integration. The decisions about the data and methods of analysis for each of the studies were made individually based on their usefulness for investigating specific research questions. The choice to conduct separate quantitative and qualitative empirical research that focus on different aspects of political integration was made based on the principle of *methodological pragmatism*. In the discussion that follows the advantages and challenges of combining quantitative and qualitative methods within one research project are outlined together with an overview of the implemented research design. The data and methods used in each of the studies are discussed separately in the relevant empirical chapters (Chapters 4-6).

3.1. Methodological Pragmatism Assumptions

It is difficult to discuss social science methodology without acknowledging that both the way in which research is carried out, and its' results, are affected by underpinning philosophical beliefs about the world. These basic presuppositions or beliefs are called paradigms by Kuhn (1962) and worldviews by Creswell (2003). When it comes to considering the gathering of knowledge, two major worldviews dominate the field: the post-positivist and the constructivist. It was once thought that these differing approaches to comprehending the world were mutually exclusive. Cherryholmes (1992) asserts that this arose from their opposing ideas on the nature of truth and how to reach and come to know it. Olsen (2004, p.5) notes a traditional bias in favour of empiricism in the field of social sciences, resulting in quantitative methods being viewed as superior to qualitative ones. Ungar (2006, p.269) maintains that this view has endured to the present day, and is reflected in both academics and bodies which fund research showing a preference for quantitative research.

Academics list five elements which are common to social research: ontology, epistemology, axiology, methodology and rhetoric. The relative emphasis paid to each element is determined by the researcher's worldview and hence approach. As Creswell & Plano Clark (2007) assert, each of the elements necessarily has to be included when research is being formulated and undertaken, since they establish precisely what is accepted in the pursuit of research. Table 3.1, below, illustrates the four most common

worldviews and how they impact on the practise of social research across five philosophical elements.

Table 3.1. Elements of Worldviews and Implications For Practice (adopted from Creswell and Plano Clark 2011, p. 42).

Worldview element	Post-positivism	Constructivism	Participatory	Pragmatism
Ontology (What is the nature of reality?)	Singular reality (e.g., researchers reject or fail to reject hypotheses)	Multiple realities (e.g., researchers provide quotes to illustrate different perspectives)	Political reality (e.g., findings are negotiated with participants)	Singular and multiple realities (e.g., researchers test hypotheses and provide multiple perspectives)
Epistemology (What is the nature between the researcher and that being researched?)	Distance and impartiality (e.g., researchers objectively collect data on instruments)	Closeness (e.g. researchers visit participants at their sites to collect data)	Collaboration (e.g. researchers actively involve participants as collaborators)	Practicality (e.g. researchers collect data by "what works" to address research question)
Axiology (What is the role of values?)	Unbiased (e.g. researchers use checks to eliminate bias)	Biased (e.g. researchers actively talk about their biases and interpretations)	Negotiated (e.g. researchers negotiate their biases with participants)	Multiple stances (e.g., researchers include both biased and unbiased perspectives)
Methodology (What is the process of research?)	Deductive (e.g., researchers test a priori theory)	Inductive (e.g., researchers start with participants' views and build "up" to patterns, theories, and generalizations)	Participatory (e.g., researchers involve participants in all stages of the research and engage in cyclical reviews of results)	Combining (e.g., researchers collect both quantitative and qualitative data and mix them)
Rhetoric (what is the language of research?)	Formal style (e.g., researchers use agreed-on definitions of variables)	Informal style (e.g., researchers write in a literary, informal style)	Advocacy and change (e.g., researchers use language that will help bring about change and advocate for participants)	Formal or informal (e.g., researchers may employ both formal and informal styles of writing)

As summarised in the above table, methodological pragmatism is pluralistic in its assumptions and rejects "methodological purity". It sets to one side both ontological and epistemological arguments about what we can know about the social world, and how we can gain that knowledge. As a result, a practical researcher accepts that there is much to be said for using separate but compatible strategies to respond to research questions.

Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 713) define methodological pragmatism as:

'[...] a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as "truth" and "reality" and focuses instead on "what works" as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation. Pragmatism rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that the values of the researcher play a large role in interpretation of results'.

Methodological pragmatism's approach to ontology –which attempts to define the inherent features of reality – is to acknowledge the existence of subjective as well as objective reality. Thus, it accepts objectivism's assertion that an independent and external reality exists, and this can be uncovered by the testing of various hypotheses. However, as noted by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) and Cherryholmes (1992), it also accepts the constructivist perspective, which maintains that social phenomena can be viewed from a number of perspectives, through the subjective experience of individuals placed in society. Methodological pragmatism does not accept the epistemological division between the objective, post-positivist approach to research and the subjective, explanatory constructivist system. As Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) point out, having rejected the above dualism, methodological pragmatism favours collecting, evaluating and elucidating data on the basis of the principle of practicality. Turning now to axiology, the role of values, methodological pragmatism acknowledges that values cannot be removed from research and inevitably affect its results, while recognising the importance of striving for objectivity. It does not see the values as intrinsically controversial, but adds that they should be reflexively noted and made explicit in the research. In methodological pragmatism, the problem is the core and point of the research and, as Olsen (2004) points out, a range of different methods can be used to examine it. As a result, the traditional division between the qualitative and the quantitative and the inductive -deductive approaches is put aside, in order to focus on the topic of the research. Last of all, methodological pragmatism does not distinguish between rhetoric - the formal use of language - and informal language. Both are acceptable when researchers are summing up their work and any conclusions they may have drawn from the results.

3.2. Mixed Methods Approach

In line with the assumptions of methodological pragmatism, this thesis has been situated within an increasingly popular mixed methods research (MMR). The MMR is understood here in agreement with Creswell and Plank's (2007, p.5) definition as:

"a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases of the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone."

The MMR tradition rejects the incompatibility thesis (Howe 1988), which states that different types of data and their associated methods of analysis are incompatible and should not be used within the same study. Instead, this project takes up the view that combining quantitative and qualitative methods can increase the depth of understanding a complex nature of the studied social phenomena. The mixed methods approach is useful, in that it avoids the difficulties and complications attendant on a purely qualitative or quantitative methodology. Many writers feel that quantitative methods ignore the human, the individual; in contrast, qualitative methods are seen as too specific for creating generalised rules. As Creswell (2003), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) and Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) all point out, using mixed methods removes the restrictions of the qualitative-quantitative paradigms and challenges the notion that they are mutually incompatible.

Of course, the mixed methods approach has, like all methods, come in for some degree of criticism. Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) argue that the literature has not made it clear what does and does not fall into this category, and thus it is difficult to pinpoint valid methodology, particularly when researchers do not agree among themselves. The main areas of dispute are: accepted nomenclature and fundamental definitions; the usefulness of mixed methods and the paradigm which underpins the methodology and, as noted by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003), precisely how to draw up and take conclusions from the research. In addition, one of the disadvantages of using mixed methods research is

that it is logistically complicated to carry out, in particular if it is being undertaken by an individual researcher.

Despite the existing disagreements over the nomenclature and paradigmatic assumptions of mixed methods, the research designs are not just the arbitrary samples of both qualitative and quantitative data, collected to see what each of them tells us about the social world. According to Creswell et al. (2003), effective mixed methods research involves making purposeful decisions about what types of data and analysis techniques are most appropriate for answering the research questions. The following sections of this chapter discuss the logic of methodological decisions behind the research design adopted in this project.

3.3. Aims and Motivations of the Research Design

As outlined in Chapter 1, an overarching research question examined in this thesis can be formulated thus: what are the minority-specific drivers that motivate individuals to feel British and to take an active part in a democratic process? To investigate this, three separate studies that focused on specific sub-questions were conducted.

In keeping with the principles of methodological pragmatism, these sub-questions were placed centre-stage. In order to investigate both the general patterns of political participation and British identity acquisition as well as to shed a light on a broader range of group-specific motivational factors affecting modes of political participation, mixed methods design was chosen as the most appropriate.

The quantitative analyses focused on the following questions: (1) What are the immigrant-specific factors that affect acquisition of British identity? (Study 1); and (2) What are the identity-based motivations that influence political participation of minority groups? (Study 2)

The quantitative statistical analysis of the secondary data aimed to test the general theoretical arguments derived from the existing literature. The qualitative, in-depth analysis of interview data (Study 3), on the other hand, focused on investigating what mechanisms influence the politicizing role of co-ethnic associations (co-ethnic associations were treated here as an example of identity-based social networks). The qualitative study, in contrast to quantitative hypotheses testing, aimed to place individual experiences and narratives in the centre of the research outcomes' interpretation. This part involved

collection of primary data that consisted of face to face interviews with ethnic activists from two case study communities: Bangladeshi and Caribbean. The decision to investigate co-ethnic organisations, as well as the choice of case studies was informed by the results from quantitative analysis conducted for Study 2. An overview of the research sub-questions together with the main focus of each study and the description of data and methods of analysis are summarised in Table 3.2. The column 'Data and methods of analysis' includes information on the sample used in each study (whether the study looks at immigrants, ethnic minorities or a sub-sample of ethnic minorities). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is a general lack of consensus on the use of terms 'immigrants' and 'ethnic minorities'. In this thesis, the terms 'immigrant-origin' and 'minority groups' are used to refer to both non-white and white first-generation immigrants as well as to non-white, British-born minority population. The term 'ethnic minorities' is used throughout the thesis to refer tonon-white groups (both foreign- and UK-born).

Table 3.2. Aims and Methods of Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3.

Research question	Main phenomena investigated	Data and methods of analysis
RQ1 (Study 1): What are the primary determinants of British identification among immigrant origin populations?	British identity acquisition Comparison of the effects of different explanatory factors, including: (1) assimilation/integration outcomes, (2) desirability arguments, (3) incompatibility arguments, and (4) characteristics of the country of origin Focus on: Cross-cultural psychological theories	Data: Understanding Society (2010), Citizenship Survey (2011), Ethnic Minority British Election Study (2010) Sample: First generation immigrants Units of analysis: individuals (level one), country of origin (level two) Methods of analysis: OLS regression, Logistic regression, Multilevel logistic regression
RQ2 (Study 2): To what extent is group consciousness as opposed to assimilation useful for understanding the political participation of ethnic minorities in Britain?	Identity-based motivations for political participation and their associated covariates Focus on: Group consciousness vs. assimilation arguments	Data: Ethnic Minority British Election Study (2010) Sample: Five main ethnic minority groups Units of analysis: individuals Methods: Logistic regression
RQ3a (Study 3): How and why co-ethnic organisations might be associated with rates and modes of political involvement?	Comparison of the types and function of co-ethnic associations[12] in Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities	Data: semi-structured interviews with community activists from Bangladeshi and Caribbean organisations in Birmingham and Oldham Sample: 35 individuals from Bangladeshi background, 15 individuals from Caribbean background Units of analysis: individuals Methods: Content analysis supported by exploratory Semantic Network Analysis with Leximancer
RQ3b (Study 3): What mechanisms determine the politicizing role of co-ethnic organisations?	Factors associated with development of different types of associations Focus on: Narratives of immigration and integration experiences, identity frames, and perception of ethnic community needs and concerns	

[12] Co-ethnic associations has been treated in Study 3 as an identity-based social capital

3.4. Classification of the Research Design

This section summarises the rationale and key elements of the adopted research design. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), the typology of the MMR can be established according to four principal dimensions: (1) the level of interaction between the quantitative and qualitative strands, (2) the relative priority of the strands, (3) the timing of the strands, and (4) the procedures for mixing the strands. The level of interaction refers to the extent to which the qualitative and quantitative strands interact in the study. According to the authors' classification these can be generally divided into two types: *independent* and *interactive*. The independent mixed methods research occurs when different types of data are collected and analysed separately, and mixed only when drawing the final conclusions. The second, interactive type occurs when there is a direct interaction between two strands during the research process. In this project, the quantitative and qualitative strands have been largely independent because the data for each of the studies has been analysed separately and can be interpreted without making references to the results from other studies. However, the collection of qualitative data for Study 3 has been informed by the results from Study 2. Specifically, the choice to investigate the role of co-ethnic organisations and to compare an exemplary South Asian community (Bangladeshis) with a Black Caribbean community was informed by the quantitative results from Study 2. In line with Creswell and Plank's classification, this means that this research should be classified as an interactive type.

In terms of the relative priority of the strands, the authors' distinguish three types: *quantitative priority*, *qualitative priority* or *equal priority*. In this thesis, both quantitative and qualitative strands have equal priority in terms of their usefulness for answering specific research questions addressed in each of the studies. However, because two of the studies have been conducted using quantitative data, and only one using qualitative data, it leans towards having a quantitative priority.

Timing of the strands refers to collection and analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data, which can be done either during the same phase of the study (*concurrent timing*), or during two distinct phases (*sequential timing*). This research has been conducted in two (sequential) phases: quantitative analysis of secondary data has been followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative interviews.

The final element of the research design describes the procedures of mixing different strands of data, which might involve one or more of the following: *mixing at the level of*

design, *mixing during data analysis, mixing during final interpretation*, *connecting during data collection*, and/or *mixing within a theoretical framework*. This project involved the last two strategies. Connection of the data occurred between quantitative and qualitative phases of the project because the results obtained from quantitative analysis influenced the decision to collect particular type of qualitative data (interviews with ethnic community activists), and the choice of case studies (Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities). It can be also regarded as mixed within theoretical framework because all of the studies were largely influenced by psychological theories of social identity, despite the fact that they also referred to other theoretical perspectives, relevant for specific research questions.

Table 3.3 provides a summary of the discussed key elements of research design process, and the relevant characteristics of the current research are highlighted in bold.

Table 3.3. Key elements of the Research Design Process.

Level of interaction between strands	Independent Mixed at the interpretations state **Interactive** Direct interaction exists. This interaction can occur at different points in the research process and in many different ways. E.g., **the design and conduct of one stand may depend on the results from other strand**.
The relative priority of the strands	**Quantitative priority** Qualitative priority Equal priority
The timing of the strands	Concurrent Data collection and analysis of different strands occur in the same time **Sequential** **Data collection and analysis occur in different times** Multiphase combination timing
The procedures of mixing the strands	Merging two data sets **Connecting from the analysis of one set of data to the collection of a second set of data** Embedding of one form of data within a larger design or procedure **Using a framework (theoretical or program) to bind together two strands**

Based on position of the above four dimensions, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) proposed one of the most widely used taxonomies of MMR designs, which distinguishes six major types. The names, definitions, and prototypical characteristics of each of the designs are summarised in Table 3.4. The research design implemented in this project, according to this taxonomy, can be best described as Explanatory Mixed Methods Design. Of course, the description of the main types of MMR designs provides only a guideline for designing and implementing an appropriate model. The exact design needs to be amended to best fit the investigated research questions. The amended version of the Explanatory Design that has been implemented in this project is visually presented in Figure 3-1.

Table 3.4. Prototypical Characteristics of the Major Mixed Methods Types of Designs (Adopted from Creswell and Plano-Clark 2011, p. 72).

Prototypical Characteristics	Convergent Design	Explanatory Design	Exploratory Design	Embedded Design	Transformative Design	Multiphase Design
Definition	Concurrent quantitative and qualitative data collection, separate quantitative and qualitative analyses, and the margining of the two data sets	Methods implemented sequentially, starting with quantitative data collection and analysis in Phase 1 followed by qualitative data collection and analysis in Phase 2, which builds on Phase 1	Methods implemented sequentially, starting with qualitative data collection and analysis in Phase 1 followed by quantitative data collection and analysis in Phase 2, which builds on Phase 1	Either concurrent or sequential collection of supporting data with separate data analysis and the use of the supporting data before, during, or after the major data collection procedures	Framing the concurrent or sequential data analysis of quantitative and qualitative data sets within a transformative, theoretical framework that guides the methods decisions	Combining the concurrent and/or sequential of quantitative and qualitative data sets over multiple phases of a program of study
Design Purpose	Need a more complete understanding of a topic Need to validate or corroborate quantitative scales	Need to explain quantitative results	Need to test or measure qualitative exploratory findings	Need preliminary explanation before an experimental trial (sequential/before) Need a more complete understanding of an experimental trial, such as the process and outcomes (concurrent/during) Need follow up explanations after an experimental trial (sequential/after)	Need to conduct research that identifies and challenges social injustices	Need to implement multiple phases to address a program objective, such as for program development or evaluation

Figure 3-1. Overview of the Research Design.



4. Study 1: Who feels British? Collectivist Orientation as an Alternative Explanation of British Identity Acquisition among Immigrant-origin Population

Abstract

When immigrant-origin individuals express greater attachment to their host society, this is generally believed to be a sign of greater cultural assimilation. Existing studies that examine the determinants of the strength of host-country identity usually concentrate on the importance of factors related to immigrants' integration and assimilation outcomes. However, little is known about other factors that are unrelated to immigrants' experiences in the host society and how those factors might affect the self-reported strength of the host-country identity. It is argued here that one of the determinants of the strength of self-reported British identity might be the general psychological tendency to identify with groups, which is largely independent of integration outcomes.

The presented analyses, which are based on three nationally representative surveys (the Citizenship Survey, Understanding Society and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study), examine the relative importance of four types of factors that are expected to influence the self-reported strength of British national identity among the immigrant-origin populations: (1) indicators of integration and assimilation; (2) the perceived desirability of the immigrant; (3) attachment to conservative values that are potentially incompatible with the British culture; and (4) both individual and cross-cultural differences in levels of collectivism.

It is concluded that the individual style of the responses, as determined by the tendency to attach greater importance to collective identities in general (i.e., the level of collectivism), is at least as important for predicting the self-reported strength of British national identity as are the widely utilised indicators of successful integration.

Key words: British identity, integration, collectivism, cross-cultural psychology

4.1. Introduction: British Identity in a Public and Policy Debate

Concerns about weakening national identity often come to the surface of public debate at times of increased immigration or fear of the exploitation by (Chauhan & Foster, 2014) or the threat of the Other in general (Grove & Zwi, 2006), which triggers fears of the dilution of one's own culture by foreign customs, values and religious practices and justification for acting against that threat on a policy and social level. (Jamieson & McEvoy, 2005)

Announcements of national identity crisis are by no means new. For instance, in a letter to Clement Attlee in 1948, eleven Labour MPs state that 'An influx of coloured people domiciled here is likely to impair the harmony, strength and cohesion of our public and social life and to cause discord and unhappiness among all concerned'. [13]

This example shows that arguments about the threats to British society posed by strangers have not changed that much over the past 60 years. Most researchers agree that public attitudes to immigration cannot be explained by economic arguments simply because the economic impact of immigration is disproportionally small (see for example: Coleman & Rowthorn 2004; House of Lords Evidence Report 2008). As Dustmann and Preston (2007) show, the common concerns are usually cultural. Part of society perceives aspects of the newcomers' cultures as threatening to national cohesion, national culture and a national "way of life". When the familiar social order is changing because of immigrants, some groups, especially those from less well-educated, more disadvantaged backgrounds, turn to authoritarian and defensive political ideologies. This is illustrated in various studies on the recent growth of support for the far-right political parties across Europe (Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2007).

Since the early 2000s, debates about the need to promote Britishness and British values among ethno-religious minorities, particularly Muslims, have become especially vivid after a number of violent terrorist events and riots that took place in British and other European cities.

At the heart of current debates about a culture clash in the UK is the concern that among some groups (especially of non-white, non-Christian, non-Western origin) a growing

[13] Letter to Clement Attlee, 22 June 1948, published after the Empire Windrush brought 417 Caribbean migrants to the UK, cited in Atkinson, J.J. 2003. 'British immigration policy, race relations, and national identity crisis'

fraction do not think of themselves as British. British identity came to the centre of the dispute about the supposed failure of multiculturalism and the source of problems with social unrest.

There are a few themes emerging in the public and political discourse around Britishness. The first is the perceived link between **policies of multiculturalism and the British identity crisis**. Policies promoting multiculturalism have been blamed for accepting and therefore deepening the development of separate ethnic and religious identities, leading to minorities living 'parallel lives' and not integrating with the mainstream British society. The Cantle report, published soon after the 2001 riots, suggested that the past multicultural, 'equal opportunity' race relations priorities overly emphasised the different needs of each ethnic community rather than common goals and cross-ethnic alliances. According to some, multiculturalist policies contributed to the rise of separate minority identities and weakened the sense of a common British identity (for discussion see: Kundani 2007). Despite the public and policy concerns about the failure of the British multicultural project, many academics argue that multiculturalism in Britain has been fairly successful in terms of integrating ethnic minorities (A. Heath & Demireva, 2014). In an international comparison, Britain appears to be in many respects (such as educational attainment and political integration) more successful in integrating newcomers than other, more assimilationist Western democracies (OECD/European Union, 2015).

The second theme coming up in the context of British identity is **ethnic residential segregation.** Many critiques of multiculturalist policies have expressed concerns about the supposed increase of ethnic segregation and highlighted it as one of the main reasons for the emergence of separate ethno-religious identities. In 2005, after the terrorist attacks in London, the chairman of race relations at the time – Trevor Philips – in his controversial and highly publicised speech (Phillips, 2005) 'warned' the Brits of 'sleep-walking to segregation'. One of the central claims of his speech was that Britain was becoming more ghettoised and that inner-city ethnic ghettos are a hatchery of home-grown terrorists. The narrative of self-segregation and ghettoisation assumes that spatial clustering is inevitably accompanied by the development of separate identities and the distancing of ethno-religious communities from mainstream British society (Ouseley, 2001).

The ghettoisation arguments have been highly contested by many scholars. Most notably, Finney and Simpson (Finney & Simpson 2009; but also Flint & Robinson 2008) show that, in fact, ethnic segregation is decreasing and there is only a small percentage of areas where only one ethnic minority group dominates. The authors also provide evidence

that a growing number of ethnic minorities are moving into more affluent, historically white areas. Some researchers also point out positive aspects of living together with co-ethnics, such as increased social support (Stafford, Bécares, & Nazroo, 2010), and highlight that the main problem of the so called 'ethnic ghettoes' lies in deprivation, not in the fact that they consist of certain ethnic or religious groups alienated from mainstream society (Hickman, Crowley, & Mai, 2008; Kalra & Kapoor, 2008).

The third emerging theme has been around the perceived **incompatibility of Muslim religious identities with British values**. Much of the political and media discourse over the challenges of cohesion and violent political extremism has contained an undertow that Islam inevitably puts British Muslims in conflict with 'British values' and British national interests. The second controversial message sent by the former race relations chairman via his documentary entitled 'What Muslims really think' (released on the 13th of April 2016) alarmed the public about the danger of a growing 'nation within a nation' of British Muslims. The methodology of the survey conducted for the purpose of the documentary has been widely criticised by scholars of ethnicity in Britain (e.g. Byrne & Nazroo 2016; Mustafa 2016). A number of academic studies have shown that most people do not see a conflict between their religious beliefs (including Muslim minorities) and British values. Moreover, some research found that 'strong identifications with both nation and ethnic group are not merely compatible but may even be mutually reinforcing' (Citrin & Sears 2009, p.152; but also e.g. Phinney et a.1997, Nandi and Platt 2014).

Recently, many European governments have been responding to these concerns by distancing themselves from policies of multiculturalism and introducing policies encouraging greater assimilation. The examples include more demanding citizenship tests (Germany, Denmark, Britain, Netherlands)[14], the promotion of national values (e.g. in Britain, 2014, former education secretary Michael Gove urged schools to include the promotion of British values in their curricula) and, most recently, after the terrorist attack in Brussels (March 2016), a new requirement that all non-European Union migrants entering Belgium need to sign a declaration stating that they accept 'European values' (Francken, 2016).

Despite public concerns about ethnic minorities not feeling British enough, academic studies seem to suggest quite the opposite (Manning & Roy, 2010; Demireva &

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[14] For a review on changing strategies and policies of integration across European countries see: Vasta, E. 2007. Accommodating diversity, Working Paper No. 53, COMPAS, University of Oxford

Heath 2014; Nandi & Platt 2014; Maxwell 2009). Ethnic minorities often declare the highest levels of attachment to Britain, as shown in the next section. However, can it be said that this means that they are successfully integrated? What are the actual determinants of the declared strength of attachment to Britain?

This paper attempts to answer both questions in two ways. First, the main explanations of what makes newcomers express strong attachment to Britain on an individual level are assessed. Secondly, an alternative explanation for the observed inter-group differences in levels of attachment to Britain is suggested. The proposed argument builds on the social and cross-cultural psychology literature, especially on the individualism-collectivism dimension of culture, arguing that the current, widely used measures of attachment or identification with the host country are more related to culturally and psychologically determined inter-group and inter-personal differences rather than to differences in levels of integration.

4.2. Overview of the Existing Evidence about the Strength of British Identity among the Immigrant-origin Population

Empirical evidence shows that, among the adult population, ethnic minorities (particularly South-Asians), declare an equally (or even more) strong attachment to Britain as the white British population (Maxwell, 2006; Nandi & Platt, 2014)[15]. Heath et al. (2013), based on the 2010 EMBES data also provide evidence that, on average, ethnic minorities declare their commitment to democratic principles (particularly to the duty to vote) more strongly than white British and express higher levels of trust in British democratic institutions (with the important exception of low trust in the police among Black Caribbeans).

The authors note that initial enthusiasm about British democracy among first-generation immigrants significantly diminishes among their off-spring; the second generation becomes more sceptical about British democracy, although still less sceptical than their white British counterparts. The convergence patterns also emerge in terms of

[15] Recently, Heath and Jacob (forthcoming), based on the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey, have shown that this pattern is very different for the children of immigrants. Across the four studied countries (England, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden), the level of national belonging appeared to be much lower among children from minority groups than among children from the majority group.

cultural and social practices and views. For example, second-generation ethnic minorities are significantly more likely to mix socially with white British people, have more liberal opinions about gender roles and are less likely to support very conservative cultural practices such as Sharia courts (Heath & Demireva, 2014). Unlike their portrayal in various media reports, ethnic minorities are not any more likely to support violent protest than white British (although slight increase exists among the second-generation minorities, which is likely to be associated with their younger age profile) (Sanders et al. 2013).

This evidence suggests that the alarming concerns about the alienation of second-generation British minorities, particularly Muslims, might be exaggerated. Most of the academic studies suggest that second-generation minorities become very similar to their white British counterparts in terms of their attitudes and behaviours. Interestingly, there has been very little published (either in academic literature or in public discourse) about the development of British (or other European) national identities among white immigrants, suggesting that this topic does not spark off a comparable heated interest. Most of the academic literature on national identity acquisition among white immigrants is still based on American studies from the early twentieth century on Polish, Italian and Irish waves of immigration to the US.

4.2.1. Social Identity Approach

In this paper, the term social identity approach is used to refer to a large body of theoretical and empirical research related to Social Identity Theory (introduced by Tajfel, 1978) and its numerous later developments. Social identity approach provides a theoretical basis both for explaining why common national identity might be beneficial for social relationships and for predicting why some individuals might be more likely than others to display strong national attachments. It also sheds light on the possible negative consequences of a strong national identity for relationships with out-groups and marginalised group members. It is not intended to use social identity approach as an alternative framework to the existing sociological explanations, but instead to treat it as a complementary approach that contributes to the interpretation of social phenomena by identifying and describing cognitive processes affecting human behaviour.

The first conceptualisation of Social Identity Theory (SIT) was developed after WWII as an attempt to understand the success of Nazi ideology and the cognitive processes individuals use in rationalising irrational behaviours. Tajfel introduced the

concept of social identity in the 1970s after completing a series of "minimal group experiments" which investigated the minimal conditions for between-group discrimination. Tajfel's experiments revealed that even minimal and meaningless differences between ad-hoc groups (such as different colours of shirts) are sufficient for the development of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination (H. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to SIT, in-group favouritism is a consequence of the natural human motivation to enhance *self-esteem and preserve a positive concept of one's self*. Individuals extend the positive view of the self onto the group by creating a positively biased perception of their own group in comparison to other groups. In the case of national identity, when one thinks that one's country is better than others in some important domain of life, it boosts one's self-esteem. Similarly, people can enhance their self-esteem by helping their country or other group to excel.

This is arguably of significant importance when considering the formation of co-ethnic support and social networks amongst oppressed or disadvantaged communities, as the opportunities for the development of higher group esteem may be lower within the mainstream of that society; as noted by Jost & Thompson (2000), group-based dominance and opposition to equality function as independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social policy attitudes amongst both African Americans and European Americans. This suggests that this may be an esteem issue rather than one of a history of systemic oppression (given that this would not apply to European Americans), and that the perception of possibilities of oppression *or mere lower status as a minority* may influence UK minorities also.

Furthermore, in a comparison process, people tend to underestimate in-group differences and exaggerate inter-group ones (Trepte, 2006), which in turn creates a perception of in-group homogeneity and in-group cohesion. In order to help with revealing similarities and differences between in-group and out-group members, people use **prototypes**, which are the basis for social comparison. **Prototypes** can be defined as a *fuzzy* set of related attributes, such as attitudes and feelings that represent a group's identity and distinguish one's own group from others (Hogg et al. 2004). For example, British people have a prototype of how a typical British person should look and behave that best fits the collective identity. This allows a person to distinguish what it means to be British from what it means to be German, American, etc. Prototypes are important for **uncertainty reduction**, especially in challenging, atypical situations in which individuals seek clear rules of how to behave. For example, times of increased immigration are inevitably

accompanied by a more dynamic social change, which might be seen as a threat to the established social order and collective identity. Jackson & Smith (1999) differentiate between **secure and insecure identity situation**, which is determined by the level of the subjectively perceived identity threat. In a situation of high between-group competition, people tend to express more negative attitudes towards out-groups than in a situation where the perceived threat to the collective identity is low.

Social identity approach pays particular attention to the importance of situational context and the dynamic nature of group identities. It acknowledges that different prototypes might become more or less relevant depending on what out-group is salient in a particular context. For instance, Catholics might see themselves as very different to Protestants in one context but relatively similar to them when the more relevant comparative out-group are, for example, Muslims. Similarly, second-generation British Pakistanis might see themselves as being 'more' British compared to first-generation immigrants but 'less' British when they compare themselves to prototypical, white British people.

In a situation where one's own group has a lower status (disadvantaged position), social identity approach predicts that individuals can apply two strategies to preserve positive self-esteem: **individual mobility** and **social creativity** (Jackson et al., 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When the group boundaries are permeable, people might use individual mobility in order to dissociate themselves from the in-group and join the higher status group. However, when group boundaries are seen as stable (impermeable), people can turn to social creativity in order to improve the perceived standing of their own group. This can mean either changing the basis for comparison, e.g. 'we might be poor but we're honest', or changing the evaluation of social comparison e.g. 'black is beautiful'. In the case of stigmatised minorities, one could either dissociate oneself from the stigmatised group and identify exclusively with the majority group, or, if one does not feel accepted by the dominant group, one could develop a reactive (ethnic) identity (Rumbaut, 2005).

The range of behavioural, emotional and cognitive consequences of social identity depends on how strongly someone identifies with the group. If people objectively belong to a social group but this membership is meaningless for them, they will not internalise the collective (group) identity. On the other hand, when the group identity is important to one's self, it makes the person more likely to behave according to the normative group prototype, have strong emotional attachment to fellow group members and be more sensitive to criticism of the collective self. A situation where one thinks in terms of the

collective - rather than the individual - self is known in social identity approach as the *'depersonalisation process*'. According to Hogg et al. (1995, p. 261), 'Depersonalization of self is the basic process underlying group phenomena - for example, social stereotyping, group cohesion and ethnocentrism, cooperation and altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective behavior, shared norms, and the mutual influence process'.

Research evidence shows that strong group identifiers are more likely to discriminate against out-group members and highly value in-group members who are prototypical (Hogg, 2001). Individuals who are more similar to the group prototype tend to have a more central position in the group (be more influential) and those who deviate from the group prototype tend to be marginalised. Having a strong group identity is expected to increase solidarity and cooperation but only among prototypical members of the group (Abrams et al., 2005). Members of the group who are not prototypical tend to be excluded because they are seen as a threat to group cohesion and to the collective self. According to this logic, a strong British identity should be positively correlated with a tendency to set hard (exclusionary) boundaries of Britishness. In turn, it can increase hostility towards people who are not perceived as prototypical members of national community, e.g. towards ethnic minorities, immigrants, asylum seekers etc. Outsiders similar to the group prototype should be more likely to receive a positive welcome and should find it easier to enter the group.

In short, the psychological mechanisms postulated by social identity approach provide a basis for explaining: a) why non-prototypical group members might be marginalised, particularly in times of increased identity threat; b) the possible consequences of such marginalisation, i.e. either individual mobility and identification with the dominant group or the development of a reactive identity; and c) why similarity to a group prototype should make it easier for minority group members to feel accepted by the dominant group. These general postulates have important implications for predicting identificational assimilation among different groups of immigrants, which is used as a basis for building my hypotheses.

4.2.2. Limitations of Social Identity Framework

Social identity approach focuses on cognitive processes that explain how group identities operate and stresses their comparative and situational character. The first limitation of this approach, in the context of my research questions, is that it does not

provide a framework for explaining how socio-political, historical and cultural contexts influence the acquisition of group identities. Secondly, despite the fact that social identity approach focuses on relationships between groups, the main unit of analysis here is an individual. The central interest of social identity approach is the effect of collective identity on individuals' behaviour and its consequences for the members of the in-group and out-groups. The main implications for social relationships are derived from the behavioural, emotional and cognitive consequences of having a strong group identity. According to this reasoning, the direction of causation is from the strength of group identity to social relationships. In other words, most of the postulates of social identity approach explain what happens when individuals belong to a certain social group and internalise group identity. It pays little attention to explaining how collective identities are formed in the first place.

The proposed collectivism argument made here puts a stronger emphasis on group-level determinants and broader contextual factors influencing the strength of group identity. In consequence, it reverses the direction of analysis and changes the place of strong group identity in the casual chain. In this case, the strength of group identity is a dependent variable and the collectivist orientation is an explanatory factor. The main added value of the collectivism explanation is that it provides a framework for explaining how a broader cultural and historical context, as opposed to a situational context, shapes group identities and their meaning for social relationships.

In the next section, existing explanations and predictors of strong national identity are reviewed before outlining the argument regarding the importance of collectivist orientation for understanding how people perceive the importance of collective identities.

4.3. Predictors of Strong National Identity

4.3.1. Integration or assimilation argument

The notion that different aspects of immigrant integration (or assimilation) are positively correlated and influence each other is an undertow of various streams of assimilation theories. Greater overall assimilation is probably the most commonly used explanation of immigrants' identification with the 'host' country.

Classic, straight-line assimilation (Gordon, 1964) assumes that individuals assimilate into the new society in stages that are generally the same for everyone.

Intermarriage and identificational assimilation are thought to follow cultural and structural assimilation. The end of the assimilation process should be marked by the absence of barriers, prejudice, or conflicts of values or power between the minority and the majority groups. The process of the minority conforming to the host society's values and ways of life until they become indistinguishable is portrayed as a natural consequence of time spent in the country and of generational change. Straight-line assimilation implicitly assumes that the adaptation process is inevitably related to the upward mobility and socio-economic advancement of the minority group. It has often been criticised for not taking into account persisting barriers (e.g. prejudice) and social markers (e.g. race or religion) that do not necessarily diminish over time. As outlined in the earlier section, psychological theories of social identity predict that there are a number of factors that could potentially prevent stigmatised minority groups from developing positive host country identity over time. Most importantly, as non-prototypical members of national group, they are less likely to be accepted as equal members, and in consequence, might develop strong ethnic identity in order to preserve positive self-esteem.

The straight-line assimilation explanation has been largely rejected by scholars and replaced by theories of segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou, 1993). Segmented assimilation explanations acknowledge that immigrants' paths to incorporation depend on many factors; most importantly, on immigrants' socio-economic resources and on receiving society context. Those who arrive with greater economic and human capital should find it easier to achieve parity on different dimensions of social, economic and political life with their counterparts in the host society. It has been argued that socio-economic success should, in turn, make immigrants more likely to positively identify with their new country (Hou, Schellenberg, & Berry, 2016).

One of the arguments for the positive relationship between socio-economic and cultural integration is that differences in terms of values and attitudes, consumption patterns as well as lack of social capital might prevent immigrants and their off-spring from achieving their full economic potential. Consequently, as immigrants progress up the socio-economic ladder, they should become more culturally assimilated in order to remove all of the barriers and to successfully compete with the natives (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Some researchers argue that successful labour market integration is a necessary first step for cultural integration (e.g. Baglioni 1964). Others disagree, and, in line with segmented assimilation theories, argue that economic success occurs to a large extent independently of cultural, or more specifically, identificational assimilation (e.g. Reitz & Sklar 1997). In

many studies on immigrants' earnings, however, as pointed out by Walters et al. (2008), all three dimensions of integration (economic, social and cultural) are usually thrown to the models as potential predictors, implicitly assuming that they all positively contribute to the higher earnings of immigrants.

Whichever way the causation runs, assimilation or integration explanations follow similar logic to the social capital argument. Both explanations have an underlying assumption about the positive, reciprocal relationship between different types of capital/different areas of integration. A higher level of one type of capital should make it easier to acquire the other type of capital (Putnam, 2000). For example, higher economic capital should be positively associated with having more influential social networks. Similarly, higher economic resources should make it easier for immigrants or ethnic minorities to develop more social relationships with the dominant group; economic success should make them more likely to have positive feelings towards the new country; and knowledge of cultural practices should make it easier to achieve economic success, and so on. Therefore, one should expect that different aspects of integration and assimilation should be positively associated with identificational assimilation among immigrants and their off-spring.

The empirical evidence from the UK studies that look into the relationship between different aspects of integration and strength of identification with Britain is rather inconclusive. On the one hand, numerous studies (Citrin & Sears, 2009; Heath & Demireva, 2014; Manning & Roy, 2010; Maxwell, 2006; Nandi & Platt, 2014) show that, in line with assimilation arguments, the strength of British identity increases with time spent in the country and with generational change. Less intuitively, socio-economic success or disadvantage does not seem to affect strength of attachment to British identity (at least as long as the persistent disadvantage is not attributed to the discriminatory treatment of one's own ethnic group) (Maxwell, 2006). It is suggested in the general literature (e.g., Alba & Nee, 2003) that prejudice and discrimination slow down assimilation, especially by blocking opportunities for social mobility. Maxwell (2009) shows that perceived discrimination and unmet expectations are the main drivers of lower levels of positive identification with Britain among the second generation of Black Caribbeans. The importance of perceived discrimination shifts some of the focus in the national identity debate from immigrants' efforts to the receiving society context. Again, the expectation that the non-prototypical markers of immigrant-origin individuals (such as

skin colour or different religion) will make them less welcomed by the members of the majority group is in line with the assumptions of SIT.

The empirical evidence on whether living in the so called 'ethnic enclaves' has detrimental effect on the strength of British identity is also quite mixed. Some researchers (Maxwell, 2006; Nandi & Platt, 2014) argue that ethnic concentration does not have a negative effect on identifying with the mainstream society as long as people maintain contacts outside their ethnic group. However, other studies show that ethnic minorities who live in a close proximity to co-ethnics are less likely to identify with the broader national community (Cantle, 2001; Ousley, 2001). Greater political engagement is generally seen as a positive step towards identificational assimilation (Nandi & Platt, 2014) . However, there are also voices expressing concerns about the character of the ways ethnic minorities engage in host country politics, which focuses exclusively on issues related to one's own ethnic community, and forms a patron-client model of political engagement (Dickson, Scheve, Dickson, & Scheve, 2006).

The discussed empirical evidence appears to partially support the assimilation argument. On the one hand, it looks like, together with time spent in the country, minorities develop a stronger attachment to Britain just as might be predicted based on the traditional assimilation argument. The negative effect of discrimination also seems to fit this explanation. Both assimilation and social psychology literature recognises discrimination as an important barrier to group identity acquisition. On the other hand, it seems that greater integration – measured by 'hard' indicators of integration success such as employment, education and occupational attainment – does not make the more 'successful' individuals feel more attached to British society. Despite the inconclusive and complex empirical evidence on the relationship between different aspects of integration and British identity acquisition, it is argued that better overall integration/assimilation as the first possible explanation of who would be more likely to develop strong British identity. The following hypothesis can therefore be identified:

H1: More successfully integrated individuals in different areas of life will have stronger British identity.

4.3.2. Desirability Argument

In their report on ‘The impacts of migration on social cohesion and integration’, Saggar et al. (2012) argue that there are three main questions that people are most concerned about while thinking of the impact of immigrants: “Are they like us?”; “Could they be made to be more like us?”; and “Can we live together?”. These questions can be interpreted as an acid test of a desirable immigrant profile. The most desired immigrants are those who are similar to the native population and do not need to make much effort in order to ‘fit in’. On the contrary, the least desired are those who are the most different and do not live according to the host society lifestyle. A fourth question is proposed here: “Do they care about fitting in?” This question is intended to measure immigrants’ attitude towards acculturation. According to the most commonly used classification developed by Berry (1997), the acculturation strategy can be one of the following four: a) assimilation; b) integration; c) separation; or d) marginalisation. Of course, the least preferred ones are separation and marginalisation. Looking at the public discourse, one might get a feeling that immigrants and their offspring are often accused of not being willing enough to integrate and choosing to live separate lives.

A significant body of research on attitudes towards immigrants shows that immigrants who come from similar cultural backgrounds and are more similar in terms of their physicality are more ‘desired’ and, in consequence, are more likely to be ‘accepted’ by the native population (Nesdale & Mak, 2000). The similarity argument is in line with the social identity approach, which also expects that outsiders similar to a group prototype would be more welcomed in the group. In a British context, Ford (2011) shows that the most desirable immigrants are those who are highly skilled and come from more developed countries. They also find that the importance of origin decreases when immigrants are highly skilled or come to study in the UK, which indicates that they can make a significant contribution to the country’s economy. The hostility towards immigrants from poor countries increases when their skill level is low or when they come to the UK for family reunion purposes. A recent research by Sobolewska et al. (2017) indicates, however, that the initial ‘benefit’ that immigrants from the ‘preferred’ backgrounds tend to receive does not guarantee that they will be unconditionally regarded as more integrated. Nevertheless, even if the ‘warm’ welcome is not unconditionally granted in the long run, it should have a positive effect on the initial perception of being accepted.

Social-psychology research on immigrant acculturation (e.g. Padilla & Perez 2003) shows that physicality is particularly important in creating social stigma. Skin colour, accent, and certain religious apparel are impossible to hide and, most of the time, newcomers are aware of the stigma that their ethnic group has in the host country. For example, Muslims in Britain and Mexicans in the US are aware of the negative stereotypes associated with their ethnic or religious group that exist among the native population. Stigma is usually related to the powerlessness of the group in the society and has negative consequences for psychological adaptation. Individuals adopt different strategies to cope with the stigma in order to preserve their positive self-esteem. As discussed in the earlier section, social identity approach distinguishes two main types of strategies that help to deal with the stigmatised group identity: *individual mobility*, which effectively equates to abandoning the stigmatised group and exclusive identification with the dominant group; and *social creativity* (changing the basis for comparison), which often leads to the exclusive affirmation of the stigmatised group and the development of reactive identity (L. A. Jackson et al., 1996).

Based on the empirical evidence to date, it is expected that cultural and physical similarity, as well as high levels of skills, should make it easier for immigrants to feel included. In consequence, immigrants who are more desired by the native population should find it easier to develop positive identification with the host country because they should feel more accepted. This generates the second hypothesis:

H2: Immigrants who are considered more desirable by the majority population will find it easier to identify with Britain.

4.3.3. Conservative Ideological Orientation as a Potential Obstacle to Identification with Britain

Rhetoric of the culture clash and perceived incompatibility of Muslim and Western values and ways of life has been very strongly present in public and scholarly discourse at least since the early 2000s. In particular, the traditional views on gender roles and sexuality of the Islamic societies are often contrasted with the increasingly egalitarian and liberal values of the West. Whether shared values are necessary for maintaining the national identity is highly disputed (see e.g. Henderson 2005 for discussion) and depends on

whether one believes in a 'thick' or 'thin' concept of nationhood. According to Inglehart and Norris (2003), the most important values that separate the West and Islam do not concern democratic principles but gender equality and sexual liberalisation. Based on the pulled data from WVS (1981-2007), the authors show that Muslim societies are significantly more supportive of traditional gender roles and less permissive towards homosexual relationships. Most importantly, however, they show that immigrants from Muslim countries gradually become more similar in their attitudes to their Western host societies, as one might expect, based on assimilation theories. On the other hand, there are many sceptical voices (e.g. Bisin 2008; Huntington 1993) that express concerns about Muslims not being able to integrate because of their commitment to the norms imposed by Islamic teaching. Many scholars have argued that both *perceived* and *actual* value differences, especially on the conservative-liberal dimension, constitute the main boundary between Muslim immigrants and West European majority members (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

Political psychology literature suggests that conservative ideologies, understood as a cluster of attitudes orientated towards maintaining the status quo (including the maintenance of traditional norms regarding gender and sexuality), are significantly determined by certain personality predispositions. Determinants of conservative orientation include uncertainty avoidance (Wilson, 1973), the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) and authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). These personality predispositions have important implications for how individuals function in society, build social relationships and react to new situations. For example, Kruglanski and Webster (1996) show that immigrants with a high need for cognitive closure have more difficulties assimilating to the new culture and are more likely to stick to their culture of origin (in Berry's terms, to choose a separation strategy of acculturation). Separating oneself from the new and unknown culture and surrounding oneself with a companion of co-ethnics helps individuals with a high need for cognitive closure to preserve their prior belief system and avoid the uncertainty imposed by the unknown environment.

On the other hand, among the majority group, the same personality predispositions have been found to be associated with an essentialist view of national identity and a tendency to be more sceptical towards ethnic and racial minorities. Political psychology research suggests that authoritarian people tend to combine strong patriotic beliefs with hostility towards out-groups that aim to preserve the homogeneity (according to exclusive

criteria such as place of birth or ancestors' nationality) of the national group (Radkiewicz, 2016). The postulated positive association between strong conservative attitudes and the strong, 'essentialist' concept of group identity suggested by political psychology literature is also in line with social identity theory. Tajfel (1978) points out that strong group identifiers are more likely to set exclusionary boundaries because, in their view, it helps to preserve groups' strength, cohesion and solidarity. A number of studies have shown that people who hold conservative, right-wing political views are the most likely to report a strong attachment to the national identity (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009; Nandi & Platt 2014). They are also more likely to hold traditional views about gender roles and sexual minorities. Therefore, somewhat ironically, the strongest flag-waving conservatives, who often claim to defend British values, are likely to share similar ideological beliefs to those who, according to them, pose a threat to British culture.

The general implication of political psychology research for conservative ideological orientation is that conservative attitudes are associated with lower levels of flexibility and an essentialist view of group identities. In the case of national identity among the native population this has been found to be correlated with reporting a strong, ethnocentric type of identity (Heath & Roberts, 2008). In the case of immigrants and ethnic minorities, conservative orientation should therefore be associated with preserving one's own traditions and customs, and higher scepticism towards the new society. In consequence, it would follow that immigrants who hold more conservative and traditionalist ideological beliefs should be less likely to identify with the more liberal British society. This generates the following hypothesis:

H3: Individuals of immigrant background, who hold conservative views, will be more likely to preserve their 'ethnic' identities and less likely to develop strong British identity than the more liberal ones.

4.3.4. Importance of Collectivist Orientation

The impact of collectivism/individualism on the attributes of individuals.

Among cross-cultural psychologists, individualism and collectivism are often regarded as the most important and undisputed dimensions of culture. According to Harry

Triandis, culture encompasses ‘shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, expectations, norms, roles, self-definitions, values, and other such elements of subjective culture found among individuals whose interactions were facilitated by shared language, historical periods, and geographic region’ (Triandis 1993, p.156). Culture helps individuals to act in accordance with socially acceptable prototypical practices and values (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012), which decreases uncertainty and increases predictability (Hogg, 2003). According to Triandis, practices and values then aggregate into cultural syndromes, which are more static within than between groups. The first systematic and probably the most widely used theory of cultural dimensions was developed by Hofstede (1984), who conducted a survey among IBM employees in over 50 countries in the 1980s. Hofstede proposed probably the most widely used quantitative measure of the individualism/collectivism dimension, which ranks the surveyed countries from the most collectivist to the most individualist ones. Placement on the individualism-collectivism continuum significantly affects individuals’ cognitions on different levels of identity. People in collectivist cultures see environment as more or less fixed (stable norms, obligations, duties), and themselves as changeable, ready to ‘fit in’. People in individualist cultures see themselves as more or less stable (stable attitudes, personality, rights) and the environment as changeable (e.g. if they do not like their job, they change jobs). The primary focus of individualist cultures is on the **independent** self, whereas in collectivist cultures it is on the **interdependent** (relational) self. This means that individuals from collectivist societies tend to describe themselves in terms of their relationships with others (e.g. I’m a daughter of …; I’m Anna’s best friend), whereas in individualist cultures they tend to see themselves in terms of personal traits and characteristics (e.g. I’m a kind and funny person) (see: Typical differences in the representations of the self-concept between individualists (Left) and collectivists (Right). This different cognitive tendency has major consequences for the functioning of both individuals and societies. For example, Choi and Nisbett (2000) suggest that the logical thinking of Westerners has an advantage in the development of science, whereas the more holistic thinking of Asian cultures has advantages for the maintenance of interpersonal order and harmony within groups (sensitivity in interpersonal relations, saving face and so on). On the national level, collectivism-individualism correlates with a number of important measures, such as the Human Development Index and GDP. It has been argued that because individualist culture gives social status rewards to people who stand out, it may give a special, culturally motivated incentive for competition and innovation. On the other hand, individualism can make collective action more difficult because individuals

pursue their own interest without internalising collective interests. Collectivism, in contrast, makes collective action easier because individuals internalise group interests to a greater degree. However, it also encourages conformity and discourages individuals from standing out (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2012). It has been observed that people from collectivist cultures are more responsive to the preferences of others and more sensitive to social pressure, whereas people from individualist cultures are more assertive and independent (e.g. Hofstede 1984; Triandis 2001). These observations have been confirmed in experimental research which showed that individuals from collectivist cultures are more likely to conform to group pressures even if the group demands are irrational (Bond & Smith, 1996). Collectivism/individualism correlates with other cultural syndromes (or dimensions), such as cultural tightness and complexity. Triandis (1994; 1995) found that collectivism is high in cultures that are simple and tight (do not tolerate deviation from norms).

Characteristics of the culture in which someone is raised play a major role in terms of their self-concepts, values and attitudes towards dominant norms. Triandis et al. (1985) found that in collectivist countries there are still both individualist and collectivist individuals but in different proportions. To differentiate an individual from a cultural level of analysis he introduced the terms idiocentrism and allocentrism, which correspond to cultural-level individualism and collectivism. It is believed that both individual- and cultural-level collectivism have the same core (Triandis, 1995), which is a focus on an interdependent (relational) rather than independent (autonomous) construction of the self. Experimental studies (e.g. Chatman & Barsade 1995) have shown that individual (personal)-level individualism/collectivism is more fluid and situation-specific than the cultural individualism/collectivism dimension. For example, highly individualist people who are put in a situation that requires cooperation will be somewhat cooperative and vice versa – collectivist people who are put in a situation that requires individualist behaviour (e.g. in a leadership role) will behave in a more individualist way.

Figure 4-1 Typical differences in the representations of the self-concept between individualists (Left) and collectivists (Right), adapted from: Torelli (2013, p.66)



What are the potential consequences of individualism/collectivism for immigrants' identification with the host society?

The majority of the literature on the identificational assimilation/integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities looked at explanations related to cultural and socio-economic integration, grievances and discrimination, or attitudinal acculturation strategies. Surprisingly, despite the fact that identification with the host country is usually used as a measure of cultural integration, theories of culture have been rarely applied to explain identity formation among immigrant populations. This suggests that differences related to individualist versus collectivist tendency, both on the cultural and individual levels, can help us to understand the variation of the declared strength of British identity (especially among the immigrant and ethnic minority population) in two important ways.

Firstly, it is argued that the declared importance (or strength) of British national identity is related to a general tendency to express oneself in terms of 'we' rather than 'I' and attach greater importance to all kinds of collective identities (including national identity). Therefore, one should expect that among an immigrant-origin population, those who come from collectivist countries should perceive British national identity as more important than those who come from individualist countries. Furthermore, it is predicted that the more collectivist (allocentric) individuals (regardless of their country of origin) will report stronger British identity than the more individualist (idiocentric) ones.

Secondly, it is expected that the declared importance of British identity, among immigrant and ethnic minority populations, is also related to individuals' level of

conformity. Immigrants from collectivist countries should be more likely to feel obliged to express their attachment to the host society. This might be particularly true when individuals feel social pressure to express their commitment to the national community. For example, because of the public debate around Muslims living separate lives, individuals of Muslim heritage might feel more inclined to give socially desirable answers and declare a strong attachment to Britain.

The collectivism explanation generates the final two hypotheses:

H4a: Immigrants from more traditional (collectivist) countries will be more likely to report stronger British identity.

H4b: Individuals who have a tendency to describe themselves in collective/interdependent terms will be more likely to report stronger British identity regardless of their country of origin.

The collectivism argument is of notable importance when considering the public and policy debates on integration, which often emphasise the importance of the sense of belonging and attachment to British identity. It provides a framework for explaining inter-group variation in reporting strong British identity among immigrant-origin populations beyond the integration rhetoric. From the individualism-collectivism perspective, important determinants of reporting strong collective identities include the culturally imprinted, subjective importance of the interdependent self as well as high levels of social conformity, which is very different from public perceptions about the importance of immigrants' agency in determining their loyalty to Britain. In comparison, the desirability (H2) and conservative orientation (H3) hypotheses put greater emphasis on the individual and situational factors that influence social identity development, such as the role of individual characteristics (e.g. prototypicality) and situational context (existence of prejudice, perceived identity threat), which is more in line with the arguments made within the acculturation literature (e.g. Berry, 1997).

4.4. Data, Measures and Methods

The presented analysis is based on the three UK-based large scale surveys: Understanding Society (Wave 1), Citizenship Survey (2010/2011) and Ethnic Minority British Election Study (2010). The choice of these data sources was dictated by two reasons: first, all of these studies include relatively large samples of immigrants and/or ethnic minority individuals; and second, they contain extensive sets of questions on identity, ethnicity, integration, and political attitudes which are of the main interest in this paper.

The Citizenship Survey is a cross-sectional (biennial) household study that contains about 10,000 individuals from the main sample and additional 5,000 from the ethnic minority boost sample. The combined samples include approximately 2,000 non-UK born respondents. Understanding Society is the longitudinal household study that comprises around 10,000 individuals from the main sample (including around 2,000 non-UK born respondents), and approximately 1,000 individuals from each of the five main ethnic minority groups (Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Caribbean, and African). Although Understanding Society is a longitudinal survey, the analysis presented here is based only on the first wave of the survey and thus it can be effectively treated as cross-sectional data. The Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) is a one off study that was carried out in parallel with the 2010 British Election Study (BES). The sample includes relatively large number of respondents from the five main ethnic minority groups (the total sample size comprised 2,787 individuals).

The dependent variable (British identity) is measured by different questions across datasets. In the Citizenenship Survey it is measured on a 5 point Likert scale by the question '*How strongly do you belong to Britain?*'(it was recoded into a binary measure, where 0 indicates weak and moderate strength of belonging and 1 indicates a strong sense of belonging). In Understanding Society the dependent variable is measured on a 10 point Likert scale by the question about the perceived importance of British identity; and Ethnic Minority British Election Study includes a 4 point measure of the feeling of commonality with British people (recoded into a binary measure, where 0 indicates a weak sense of commonality and 1 – a strong sense of commonality). The fact that different data sets measure the dependent variable in a slightly different way can be considered both a strength and weakness of the conducted analysis. On the one hand, the results cannot be considered as directly comparable across data sets since the dependent variable in each

data set captures a slightly different aspect of British identity (sense of belonging, importance and commonality with British people). However, on the other hand, it allows to explore whether the main explanatory variables have consistent effects for different aspects of the strength of British identity.

The explanatory variables include: measures of socio-economic success (integration) such as education, social class, and labour market participation; measures of social integration (mainly social mixing and residential segregation); measures of attachment to own ethnic group and/or country of origin; measures of political integration (such as different modes of political involvement and political interest); measures of discrimination (both experienced and perceived); measures of conservative ideological orientation (such as attitudes towards gender roles and homosexual relationships); and measures of individual- and country-levels of collectivism. The country-level collectivism has been measured using the Hofstede's individualism-collectivism score (currently available for over 120 countries), which has been imputed to the Understanding Society (USoc) data set based on the immigrants' country of origin. In total, non-UK born respondents included in USoc originated from 23 different countries, for which appropriate individualism-collectivism scores were ascribed. The individual level measure of 'collectivist tendency' was constructed based on six items measuring the importance of group belonging for the individual self-concept (this measure was primarily constructed in Citizenship Survey, however, a proxy estimate was also included in Understanding Society). The detailed description and coding of all the explanatory variables is available in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The construction of the individual level collectivism scale is further discussed in the results section.

Statistical analysis consisted of a series of individual level logit models (conducted on Citizenship Survey and Understanding Society data); and a series of individual- and (random intercept) multi-level OLS models[16] (conducted on Understanding Society data). The aim of conducting multilevel regression models was to test the relationship between immigrants' country of origin and the self-reported strength of British identity, and, by utilising the country-level collectivism measure, to explore the hypothesised effect of cross-cultural differences on the way respondents answer the British identity question. The reported results from the regression models were conducted on unweighted data, whereas

[16] The 10-point Likert measure of the importance of British identity in Understanding Society was normally distributed, therefore, conducting OLS regression was considered acceptable.

the reported univariate (descriptive) statistics were conducted with application of survey design weights. Since the interest here was in estimating the substantive effects of the explanatory variables (and not the true value of the dependent variable), the model-based approach was considered more appropriate. This approach is usually considered preferable if substantive (causal) effect is of main interest as regression models conducted on unweighted data tend to produce unbiased coefficents, with smaller standard errors (Winship and Radbill 1994). Additionally, the sensitivity analysis was conducted for each of the models by comparing the results from weighted and unweighted data, and, for all of the tested models, both weighted and unweighted data produced nearly identical results.

4.5. Results

Table 4.1 provides a quick overview of the distribution of dependent variables for selected subsamples across three data sets (EMBES, CS and USoc). As expected, strength of British identity increases in the second generation and together with older age. Among immigrants, ethnic minorities declare stronger attachment to British identity than white groups (see columns for Citizenship Survey and Understanding Society), whereas among ethnic minority sample, South Asians show a higher increase in their feelings of commonality with British people in the second generation than Black Caribbeans (see EMBES column). Table 4.2Table 4.4Table 4.4 present the individual-level logit and OLS regression models conducted across the three data sets. The highlighted effects are visually presented in Figure 4-2 - Figure 4-4 below each of the corresponding tables. The findings are discussed in order of the presented hypotheses.

Table 4.1 Distribution of the dependent variable by generation, ethnic group and age across three data sets

EMBES ***Dependent variable: Amount common with British people***				**Citizenship Survey** ***Dependent variable: Importance of being British***				**Understanding Society** ***Dependent variable: Strength of belonging to Britain***	
BY generation				*BY generation (BME and immigrant sample)*				*BY generation (BME and immigrant sample)*	
	A fair amount	A great deal	Sum of positive resp.		Fairly strongly	Very strongly	Sum of positive resp.		Average (1-10 scale)
non-UK born	49.5%	31.9%	81.4%	non-UK born	45.6%	42.1%	87.7%	Non-UK born	7.12
UK born	54.9%	29.4%	84.3%	UK born	45.3%	44.0%	89.3%	UK-born	7.39
Base	2787			Base	8055			Base	8058
BY ethnicity (immigrant sample)				*BY BME/non-BME grouping (immigrant sample)*				*BY BME/non-BME grouping (BME and immigrant sample)*	
	A fair amount	A great deal	Sum of positive resp.		Fairly strongly	Very strongly	Sum of positive resp.		Average (1-10 scale)
Indian	58.9%	23.4%	82.3%	Non-BME	43.0%	45.9%	88.9%	Non-BME	5.67
Pakistani	48.3%	31.2%	79.5%	BME	41.2%	42.3%	83.5%	BME	7.34
Bangladeshi	52.8%	30.3%	83.1%	Base	5706			Base	5742
Caribbean	52.0%	36.7%	88.7%						
African	47.7%	34.9%	82.6%						
Base	1678								
BY ethnicity (UK-born sample)				*UK-born BME sample*					
	A fair amount	A great deal	Sum of positive resp.		Fairly strongly	Very strongly	Sum of positive resp.		
Indian	61.7%	31.4%	93.1%	BME	45.3%	44.0%	89.3%		
Pakistani	57.4%	31.6%	89.0%	Base	2349				
Bangladeshi	*	*							
Caribbean	53.8%	36.0%	89.8%						
African	*	*							
Base	903								

Table 4.1. Continued

BY age (immigrant sample)				*BY age (immigrant sample)*				*BY age (immigrant sample)*	
	A fair amount	A great deal	Sum of positive resp.		Fairly strongly	Very strongly	Sum of positive resp.		Average (1-10 scale)
25 and under	46.1%	29.4%	75.5%	16-29	49.1%	31.0%	80.1%	25 and under	6.41
26-35	54.4%	26.5%	80.9%	30-39	51.6%	35.0%	86.6%	26-35	6.60
36-50	52.7%	31.2%	83.9%	40-49	45.3%	44.6%	89.9%	36-50	7.33
51+	49.5%	36.0%	85.5%	50-64	39.1%	52.1%	91.2%	51+	7.82
Base				65+	35.0%	59.8%	94.8%		
				Base	5706			Base	8058

BY age (UK born sample)				*BY age (UK-born BME sample)*				*BY age (UK-born BME sample)*	
	A fair amount	A great deal	Sum of positive resp.		Fairly strongly	Very strongly	Sum of positive resp.		Average (1-10 scale)
25 and under	57.9%	32.0%	89.9%	16-29	44.9%	44.4%	89.3%	25 and under	7.28
26-35	60.3%	29.5%	89.8%	30-39	49.5%	41.8%	91.3%	26-35	7.64
36-50	52.2%	36.7%	88.9%	40-49	42.4%	44.3%	86.7%	36-50	7.33
51+	59.1%	40.9%	100.0%	50-64	39.7%	49.2%	88.9%	51+	7.26
Base				65+	38.0%	52.0%	90.0%	Base	2315
				Base	2349				

				BY age (UK-born non-BME sample)				*BY age (UK-born non-BME sample)*	
					Fairly strongly	Very strongly	Sum of positive resp.		Average (1-10 scale)
				16-29	44.4%	43.4%	87.8%	25 and under	6.33
				30-39	43.1%	43.0%	86.1%	26-35	6.46
				40-49	40.0%	45.9%	85.9%	36-50	6.83
				50-64	32.4%	55.9%	88.3%	51+	7.97
				65+	25.2%	67.1%	92.3%		
				Base	8709			Base	9412

Notes: each dataset was weighted using design weights
***For UK-born Bangladeshis and Africans percentages not reported because of very small sample sizes**

Table 4.2 Logit models, Data source: 2010 EMBES, Immigrant and ethnic minority subsample, Dependent variable: Commonality with British people.

	m1	m2	m3	m4
Controls				
Demographics				
Age_ln	0.39*	0.36	0.33	-0.05
	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.28)
Gender	-0.08	-0.38	-0.11	-0.06
	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.19)
UKborn	0.61***	1.01***	0.57***	0.41*
	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Belonging on local level				
Strength of belonging to neighbourhood		0.23 (0.14)		
Talks to neighbours		0.35**		
		(0.13)		
Attachment to minority identity				
Commonality with ethnic g.	0.92***	0.91***	0.96***	0.77***
	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Commonality with rel. g.	1.53***	1.39***	1.54***	1.65***
	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Attitudes towards integration/maintaining own values				
Maintaining own values important (ref-no)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Mix and Integrate important (ref-no)	0.39*** (0.09)	0.19 (0.16)	0.39*** (0.09)	0.56*** (0.14)
Discrimination				
Government treats own group fair	-0.20**	-0.14	-0.19**	-0.36***
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Group relative deprivation	0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Experienced discrimination	0.01	0.15	-0.01	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Cultural, political, social, economic integration (H1)				
English Proficiency (ref- no)	0.89***	1.16*	0.85***	0.71**
	(0.22)	(0.51)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Employed or in education (ref-no))	-0.17	-0.32	-0.19	-0.39
	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Voted in 2010 GE (ref- no)	0.06	0.38	0.03	0.04
	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Interested in politics (ref-no)	-0.09*	-0.05	-0.08	-0.16*
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Non-electoral activity	-0.06	-0.12	-0.09	-0.02
	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.19)
Only ethnic friends	-0.72***	-0.90*	-0.66**	-0.36
	(0.21)	(0.42)	(0.21)	(0.28)
Lives in ethnic neighbourhood	-0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.05

	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Table 4.2 Continued				
Wears a poppy			0.34**	
			(0.12)	
Desirable/undesirable characteristics (H2)				
Identifies as a Muslim	0.25	-0.13	0.30*	
	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.13)	
Higher Edu (ref-no)	-0.20	-0.24	-0.16	0.16
	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Conservative views (H3)				
Supports Sharia Law (ref-no)				-0.34*
				(0.17)
Constant	-5.61***	-7.17***	-5.54***	-3.53**
	(0.93)	(1.76)	(0.93)	(1.32)
Pseudo R2	0.18	0.20	0.18	0.20
-2 log likelihood	2027.24	673.96	2018.72	924.82
Observations	1,997	681	1,996	933
Not included in the final models (non-significant)				
Social class				
Recent immigrant (< 7 years in the UK)				
Minorities should adopt majority way of life				
Political party ID (Identify with any pol party, Identify with the Labour, Identify with the Conservatives)				
Ideological beliefs (Support for violent protest, traditional gender roles, believes gay relationships are wrong)				
Cultural practices (sets Christmas tree, Gives Christmas cards, Gives Mothers'/Father's day cards)				

Unweighted, Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 4-2 Selected effect sizes across logit models, Data: 2010 EMBES.



Table 4.3 Logit models, Data source: 2011 Citizenship Survey, immigrant and ethnic minority subsample, Dependent variable: Strength of belonging to Britain.

	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5
Controls					
Demographics					
Gender	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.14* (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)
Age	0.21*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
UK-born (ref. cat. no)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.21** (0.07)	0.16** (0.06)	0.15* (0.06)
Belonging on local level					
Strength of belonging to neighbourhood			0.31*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.04)
Strength of belonging to local area			0.80*** (0.05)	0.81*** (0.05)	0.81*** (0.05)
Area deprivation					
Lives in deprived area	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.29*** (0.08)	-0.26** (0.08)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.22** (0.08)
Discrimination					
High perception of institutional discrimination (ref. cat. no)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-0.25*** (0.07)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)
Cultural, political, social, economic integration/success (H1)					
Fluent in English (ref. cat. no)	0.53*** (0.11)	0.54*** (0.11)	0.49*** (0.11)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.44*** (0.11)
In paid employment (ref. cat. no)	0.07 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	
Class (ref.cat- working class)					
Lower middle class					0.18* (0.08)
Middle class					0.24** (0.08)
Mix socially with outside own group (ref. cat. no)	0.15* (0.06)	0.17* (0.06)	0.13 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)
Lives in high ethnic density area	0.00 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.14)
Civic participation	0.16** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)
Formal volunteering	0.13* (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)
Political efficacy/Can influence local decisions (ref. cat. no)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Trust in parliament	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)		
Perceives that voting is a civic duty	0.26** (0.08)	0.25** (0.08)	0.21* (0.09)		

Table 4.3. Continued

Desirable/undesirable characteristics (H2)					
Ethnic Minority (ref. cat. no)	0.12 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.05 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Higher Education (ref. cat. no)	-0.34*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.28*** (0.06)
Minority religion (ref. cat. no)	0.07 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Collectivism (H4b)					
Collective identity tendency (individual-level measure)		0.57*** (0.13)	0.27 (0.14)	0.34* (0.14)	0.33* (0.14)
Constant	-1.91*** (0.25)	-3.46*** (0.45)	-5.70*** (0.49)	-5.31*** (0.46)	-5.32*** (0.46)
-2 Log likelihood	8941.78	8911.98	8053.4	9347.1	8339.06
Pseudo R2	0.09	0.1	0.201	0.196	0.209
Observations	6,782	6,773	6,715	6,956	6,955
Not included in the final models (non-significant)					
Recent immigrant (<5 years in the UK)					

Unweighted, Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 4-3 Selected effect sizes across logit models, Dataset 2010/11 Citizenship Survey.



Table 4.4 OLS regression models, Data source: 2010 Understanding Society, immigrant and ethnic minority subsample, Dependent variable: Strength of attachment to Britain.

	m1	**m2**	**m3**	**m4**
Controls				
Demographics				
Gender	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.08)
Age_ln	0.82*** (0.11)	0.76*** (0.11)	0.95*** (0.19)	0.92*** (0.11)
UK-born (ref. cat. no)	0.65*** (0.11)	0.64*** (0.11)	0.80*** (0.14)	0.69*** (0.11)
Belonging on local level				
Belongs to neighbourhood	0.34*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.34*** (0.05)
Talks to neighbours	0.14** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.14* (0.06)	0.14** (0.04)
Attachment to minority identity				
Closeness to parental ethnic group				0.27*** (0.01)
Discrimination				
Experienced discrimination	0.19 (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)	0.29 (0.19)	0.18 (0.14)
Cultural, political, social, economic integration/success (H1)				
English first language (ref. cat. no)	0.23* (0.10)	0.22* (0.10)	0.31* (0.13)	0.25* (0.10)
Has a paid job (ref. cat. no)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)		-0.20* (0.08)
Higher Social Class			-0.10 (0.12)	
Interest in politics	0.10* (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.09* (0.04)
Desirable/undesirable characteristics (H2)				
Belongs to minority religion (ref. cat. no)	0.63*** (0.09)	0.62*** (0.09)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.66*** (0.09)
Has University Degree (ref. cat. no)	-0.38*** (0.09)	-0.38*** (0.09)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.49*** (0.09)
Conservative/non-conservative political party ID (H3)				
Political party ID (ref.cat-right-wing party ID)				
No political party ID		-0.36* (0.17)	-0.59** (0.21)	
Left-wing political party ID		-0.04 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.22)	
Other political party ID		-0.12 (0.24)	-0.39 (0.31)	

Table 4.4 Continued

Collectivism (H4b)

Collectivist tendency (individual level proxy)	0.31*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.02)	
Constant	-4.28*** (0.51)	-3.65*** (0.55)	-4.71*** (0.85)	-0.36 (0.44)
Observations	5,224	5,199	2,826	5,231
R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16
Not included in the final models (non-significant)				
Lives in high ethnic density area				

Unweighted, Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 4-4 Selected effect sizes from OLS regression models, Dataset: Understanding Society, BME and immigrant sample.



To test the first hypothesis (H1) regarding the impact of individual level indicators of socio-economic success - English proficiency, social and political integration, perception of discrimination and residential segregation were added to a series of regression models across data sets. In all models, a control was introduced for a time factor (time spent in the UK and/or generation), age and gender. A control for belonging on local level and attachment to neighbourhood is also introduced, as these factors are widely established predictors of attachment to a country. In the social cohesion literature, belonging on local level is commonly regarded important determinant of belonging on national level; and, in line with social cohesion arguments, the data suggests that that people who feel strongly attached to their neighbourhood and local area also express stronger attachment to their national community. The results presented in Table 4.2-Table 4.4 show that out of 'hard measures' of integration, only English fluency has a consistent, positive effect on strong attachment to Britain across different data sets. Higher educational attainment is a consistent, negative predictor of strong identification, although in ethnic minority only sample (EMBES) it loses statistical significance when other covariates are added to the regression model. The negative effect of immigrants' higher education on British identity is likely to be associated with generational differences, and although younger people tend to be more educated and thus skew the sample, it is clear in other literature that younger age is a negative predictor of having strong national identity and/or patriotism (Smith, 1991; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Heath & Roberts, 2008; Owen, 2013). Convergence between certain age and educational groups is therefore likely to be a confounding factor rather than a sign that higher education decreases immigrants' attachment to the host country. This explanation was further explored by comparing the strength of British identity between foreign and native born subsamples across different age and educational groups. When the simple inter-group comparison was applied, the only statistically significant factor associated with different levels of British identity was respondents' age. It is therefore concluded that the more likely predictor of a self-reported British identity is age and, implicitly, the generation in which one has grown up. It is hard to separate age as a factor from the amount of time spent within UK culture as a family, and it is to be hoped that a longitudinal study[17] can allow for the examination of attitude changes over time in a fixed sample.

[17] Although Understanding Society used for the analysis presented in this chapter is a longitudinal study, only the first wave provides a sufficient sample size of immigrant-origin respondents to make meaningful, inter-group comparisons.

Surprisingly, given the prevalence of the SES model when explaining social attitudes, economic success as measured by being in paid employment and belonging to managerial social class does not have a consistent, positive effect on declaring stronger identification with Britain in the analysed datasets. Although in the Citizenship Survey models, being in managerial and intermediate occupational class (see Table 4.3, model m5) has a positive impact on strength of British identity (compared to having semi-routine and routine occupations), this variable is available only for the smaller subsample and does not demonstrate a significant effect of higher social (or occupational) class in models conducted on EMBES or Understanding Society data. Economic success therefore apparently does not play a major role in predicting strong British identity among immigrant origin population. It seems that more successful immigrants in terms of labour market participation and social position are not necessarily the ones who express the strongest attachment to British society. This results are very much in line with earlier research by Maxwell (2009) and Nandi and Platt (2014, 2015).

Examining social integration, it is clear on this data that people who do not mix with other ethnic groups and do not have social contacts with their neighbours are less likely to report strong attachment to Britain than those who have more mixed social networks (while controlling for other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors). At the same time, both positive attitude towards mixing and integrating and positive identification with own ethnic and religious group (measured by the feeling of commonality with own ethnic and religious group – EMBES; and feeling that parental ethnicity is important to ones' self – Understanding Society) increase the likelihood of positive identification with British society (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). In fact, commonality with own ethnic and religious group is one of the strongest individual level predictors of feeling strong commonality with British people (see: Figure 4-2). This offers considerable support for Berry's argument that the most adaptive strategy combines elements of own heritage culture and positive orientation towards the new culture. Somewhat surprisingly, neither of the other two measures of attitudinal integration strategy available in EMBES significantly predicted the strength of commonality with British people. Given that these measures consist of the self-reported feeling that minorities should adopt majority way of life (indicator of assimilation strategy) and feeling that they should maintain their own values (indicator of separation strategy), it is perhaps surprising that those that who desire separation do not see themselves as less British merely because they wish to reject the

hegemonic attitudes and values of the society they are part of.[18] The positive relationship demonstrated between different types of minority loyalties provides an argument against widespread concerns about the incompatibility of minority (especially Muslim) religious identities and British national identity. In addition, the presence of minority religious affiliation does not decrease positive identification with British people. If anything, ethnic and religious minorities are more likely than white immigrants to have strong attachment to Britain, although the sample indicates that this may be insignificant when controlling for a range of other attitudinal factors. At the very least, the lack of difference produced indicates that ethnic and religious minorities do not present a threat greater than that of the white poplulation when considering attitudes to the validity and desirability of the British state.

Turning to exploring whether living among co-ethnics have a significant effect on British identification each dataset features a binary measure of high ethnic density neighbourhood added to the regressions models. Unfortunately, available ethnic density measures are not strictly comparable across data sets, therefore the findings must be approached with caution. In EMBES and Understanding Society models, where available measures contain less detailed information about ethnic makeup of the area, a significant relationship does not appear to exist between British identification and living among co-ethnics. In Citizenship Survey models, where the density measures are more detailed, individual level regression models suggest that people living in high (versus low) ethnic density areas are slightly less likely to declare strong British identification. However, when adding another measure associated with high ethnic density neighbourhoods – high area deprivation, negative effect of ethnic density is no longer statistically significant. A likely interpretation of these results is that high co-ethnic concentration might have a negative effect on British identity but it is most likely interlinked with other factors such as area deprivation that restricts one’s opportunities to build more diverse social networks and might fuel grievances associated with persisting inequalities. To draw more definite conclusions about whether or not residential segregation has a significant net effect, it would be necessary to conduct a detailed spatial analysis while controlling for a range of area level characteristics, something beyond the scope of this paper.

Next, turning to examining whether indicators of political integration (measured by political involvement, political trust and pro-democratic attitudes), increase the likelihood

[18] As the measure of assimilation strategy (conforming to the majority way of life) significantly reduces sample size, it is not included in the final models

of having positive national identity, the results of the regression models provide a quite complex picture. Participating within and trusting the mainstream politics as measured by voting in elections, a self-reported trust in British parliament and believing that voting in elections is every citizen's duty have a significant, positive effect in Citizenship Survey but not in EMBES models (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). EMBES dataset, however, allows for the results to control for a wider range of behavioural and attitudinal factors, and these decrease the magnitude of political involvement measures. It is also likely that the observed differences between Citizenship Survey and EMBES models are due to different measures of the dependent variable. Feeling strong commonality with fellow citizens (EMBES measure) is probably less linked to the political dimension of British identity than the Citizenship Survey measure of the strength of attachment to Britain. Furthermore, in terms of pro-democratic attitudes, it is quite problematic to interpret the direction of their relationship with national identity. Some of the attitudinal measures, such as political trust and perception that voting is a civic duty are often considered as a result of having strong national identity, not as a condition that increases attachment to the nation (However, some researchers, e.g. Nandi and Platt (2014) recommend including political integration indicators as potential explanatory factors of the strength of British identity). Interestingly, high political interest and perception that one can affect local decisions have a negative effect on strength of British identity. These results can be interpreted as a sign of non-conformist political involvement and possibly as an indicator of a critical form of patriotism. The distinction between critical and non-critical form of patriotism and its possible consequences for the reported strength of national identity is discussed in more detail a later section.

To determine the effects of cultural assimilation, the models look at the range of Christian and 'western' cultural practices such as setting a Christmas tree, giving Christmas and Valentines cards, giving Mother's/Father's Day cards and wearing a poppy on Remembrance Day. These measures are available only in EMBES data, and of course, it only makes sense to examine the effects of Christian practices for the non-Christian minority sample. Surprisingly, almost none of the selected measures of Christian/Western cultural practices significantly affects the strength of commonality with Britain (see: Table 4.2). The only cultural practice indicating greater assimilation to the British society that significantly increases the likelihood of reporting strong British identification is 'wearing a poppy on Remembrance Day'. This is, however, a secular symbol that can be more

effectively evaluated as manifestation of one's attitude to the national history of the UK rather than as a 'pure' indication of cultural assimilation.

Finally, the models examine the effect of discrimination measured by perceived unfair treatment by government and other institutions (EMBES and Citizenship Survey), perceived underachievement of own ethnic group due to discrimination (EMBES), and personal experience of discrimination (EMBES and Understanding Society). In line with previous research (e.g. Maxwell (2009), perception of discrimination, especially the feeling that one is treated unfairly by the government or other institutions appears to undermine positive identification with Britain. This confirms the postulates of many of the existing research discussed earlier in this paper. The presented analysis consistently show that ethnic grievances based on the perception of discriminatory treatment are likely to make minority groups feel alienated from the mainstream British society.

Overall, the obtained findings indicate that British minorities develop hybrid rather than exclusive types of identities. Identification with ones' local community, social interactions across ethnic lines, positive attitudes towards mixing and integrating, as well as positive identification with own origin and religious group seem to facilitate development of strong (British) national identity. In addition to this, the lack of any significant effect when subjects have adopted Christian cultural practices suggests that a somewhat flexible and pluralistic conception of identity applies here; when a bond exists, it is not necessary to completely conform to the majority culture to feel part of the mainstream society. It might indirectly suggest that many immigrant origin minorities do share a belief in a multicultural concept of national community. The main obstacle to positive identification with the host society, in line with previous literature, seems to be perception of unfair, discriminatory treatment. This is particularly true in terms of expectations of institutional racism and seems to be less related to personal experience, as the measures of personal experience of discrimination are not statistically significant. Given this, the presence of a civic nationalism and acceptance appears important to identity, but appears to be commonly present.

To formally test the desirability hypothesis (H2), a dummy variable of a 'desirable immigrant' is constructed and a simple inter-group comparison of the strength of identification with Britain between more and less desired immigrant groups is conducted. The desirable immigrant profile was constructed based on the findings from the UK-based study by Ford (2011) and included four characteristics: having higher education, coming from a rich, non-USA western country, being from the same ethnic group and having

Christian or no religion (similarity argument). Contrary to expectations, the results suggest that the desired immigrants are slightly less likely to report strong attachment to Britain and tend think that British identity is less important to them (however this difference was on the borderline of statistical significance) (see Figure D-1 and Figure D-2 in the Appendix). This is true despite the fact that, according to expectation, white, Western immigrants were less likely to feel discriminated against than non-western ones.[19] One possible explanation, proposed by Manning and Roy (2009), is that similarity of the origin culture to the destination culture make immigrants feel less pressurised to change their behaviour and national loyalties in the cost of 'betraying' their own country of origin. For EU immigrants, lower incentives around the adoption of British nationality are also likely to be associated with lack of legal barriers of living in the UK while enjoying nearly the same rights as British citizens (at least whilst Britain is still formally a EU member state).

The third hypothesis (H3) predicting negative relationship between holding conservative ideological beliefs and identifying with a rather liberal British society is only partially supported. The two measures of traditional, conservative views on gender roles and homosexual relationships do not have a statistically significant effect on strong attachment to British society (see Table 4.2). The only significant and negative predictor of host country identification is the declared support for introducing Sharia courts in Britain (Table 4.2, model m3). These results suggest that only the most conservative supporters of Islamic teaching might find it more difficult to fully preserve their religious practices and strongly commit to their new national community. In general, as discussed in the previous section, positive identification with own religious group increases the likelihood of positive identification with both origin and host society, which suggest that most people do not perceive the incompatibility between their different loyalties.

To further explore the effect of conservative orientation, the models look at the indicators of political conservatism, using the right-left differentiation of political parties. Models displayed in Table 4.2 and Table 4.4 show that, unlike for the native population, identification with the right-wing political parties does not have a distinctive effect on reporting strong national identity (compared to identification with left-wing political parties) among immigrant and ethnic minority population. In EMBES models, neither identifying with the left-wing nor right-wing political parties has a statistically significant

[19] The differences in the levels of perceived discrimination between more and less desirable immigrants were statistically significant

effect on the dependent variable. The likely explanation of the lack of statistically significant effect of political party identification in EMBES models is perhaps the same as the reasons for the lack of statistical significance of electoral participation, which were discussed in the previous section. In Understanding Society, however, identification with any mainstream political party (both left-wing and right-wing) had a positive effect on identification with Britain (compared to no-party identification). The results from Understanding Society models might suggest that identification with two main British political parties does not have the same meaning for minorities and immigrants as for the white British. It is possible that the Conservative party allegiance does not necessarily mean that ethnic minority individuals have more traditional or more ethnic views of national identity than those who identify with other parties as it was hypothesised based on the findings from the general population research. Based on the existing literature, it is clear that ethnic minorities and immigrants tend to support the Labour party in greater numbers than it would be expected based on their socio-economic status. However, this is rather not because they are more liberal than the general population but rather because in the common wisdom, left-wing parties are more supportive and less prejudiced towards minority groups. Therefore, for ethnic minorities, identifying with the Conservatives might not be the best indicator of having more traditional views but more likely to be a sign of pro-mainstream political involvement.

In the final step, the proposed collectivism hypothesis (H4) is examined. To investigate the impact of group-level characteristics, the immigrant sample from Understanding Society is used as it is the only data set (among those analysed here) that includes sufficient information about immigrants' country of origin. Figure 4-5 (below) presents an overview of the relationship between immigrant's country of origin collectivism score and immigrant's strength of attachment to Britain. The final table (Table 4.6) presents a summary of findings from both individual and multi-level regression models across the three datasets, indicating whether each covariate has a substantial and statistically significant effect.

Figure 4-5 Correlation between country-level collectivism score and average (country-level) importance of being British (Pearson's R=0.7)



Table 4.5 displays the results from a series of multilevel regression models. It appears that country-level differences explain about 15% of the total variance of the dependent variable, out of which over 30% can be attributed to the country level collectivism score[20]. This provides quite strong evidence that levels of immigrants' attachment to Britain heavily depend on the characteristics of their country of origin. However, as discussed in earlier sections, collectivism index is highly correlated with other country-level measures such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [21] Therefore, it would be fraudulent to claim that level of collectivism is a more plausible explanation for the observed variation than the level of economic development without providing further evidence and theoretical justification.

Firstly, using GDP as a primary explanation of country-level effects is highly problematic from the theoretical point of view. There is no theoretical explanation of why

[20] Country-level collectivism score was imputed to the Understanding Society data set based on the Hofstede's individualism-collectivism index

[21] The Pearson's R between Hofstede's Collectivism-Individualism Index and GDP for the 23 countries included in the Understanding Society dataset equals R= 0.8 ($p<0.05$).

GDP should have an independent effect on the strength of national identity or other social identities. Country-level GDP highly correlates with the collectivism index (as well as many other, commonly used international indices such as HDI or Corruption Index) for the reasons outlined earlier in the chapter. For instance, in highly competitive societies, there is a higher prevalence of individualist values (which explains the correlation between Collectivism and GDP). Furthermore, economically prosperous countries also tend to be doing better with regards to other, non-economic dimensions of development, and, to be less corrupted (which explains the correlation between GDP, HDI, and the Corruption Index).

In order to assess whether collectivist tendency is indeed the likely explanation of the country of origin effect, the individual level indicator of collectivist tendency has been constructed and included to the regression model in the Citizenship Survey data (it was the only data set that included appropriate measures). The collectivist tendency indicator has been constructed based on a series of questions that ask about the importance of individual attributes (such as interests, education, occupation, income) and group belonging (ethnic, national and religious identity, social class, country of origin and gender) to the sense of one's self. The principal component analysis (for details see Table C.1 in the Appendix) indicated that these two sets of attributes represent two distinctive components of individual self-concept. The items measuring the importance of personal attributes represent an 'individualistic' dimension of the self, whereas the items measuring the importance of belonging to different social groups represent the 'collective' dimension of the self. The sum of items measuring the importance of 'collective' dimension of the self-concept, have been then utilised to construct a scale of individual 'collectivist tendency'. The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient of 0.77 was considered acceptable to treat the constructed scale as a measure of a single concept. Results in Table 4.3 (models m2-m5) show that individual level collectivist orientation is a highly significant predictor of strong attachment to Britain. The magnitude of the effect of individual level collectivist tendency significantly decreases in the models that control for the strength of attachment to neighbourhood and local area. However, this increase is rather expected to occur for at least two reasons. First, the feeling of belonging on local and national level are highly correlated, therefore, when the measures of local-level strength of attachment are included in the model, the magnitude of other effects is expected to appear smaller. Secondly, the collectivist tendency and the strength of belonging to local area are not completely independent (as one might expect they are moderately, positively correlated); therefore, the

observed decrease of magnitude of the coefficient is partially caused by the some level of multicollinearity of the two predictors. Nevertheless, the presented models indicate that the constructed measure of collectivist tendency is a rather strong predictor of the reported level of attachment to Britain.

Having established the positive relationship between these two variables, I turn to exploratory analysis of the relationship between the individual – and country-level collectivism, and the declared strength of British identity.

As discussed in the section 4.3., collectivist tendency is expected to be a function of two factors: individual differences and the culture that one grew up in. In consequence, the individual level collectivist tendency should be expected to have a mediating effect as well as moderating effect on the relationship between country-level collectivism score and importance of British identity. People from highly collectivist cultures are expected to have, on average, higher collectivist tendency (mediating effect) but, at the same time, the country level effect might be larger or smaller due to individual level differences (moderating effect). Unfortunately, individual level measures of the importance of the 'collective' self (that were used to construct the individual level collectivist tendency in the Citizenship Survey) are not available in the Understanding Society data, which is the only data set that contains the sufficient information about immigrants' country of origin. This means that it is not possible to add both individual and country level indicators of collectivist tendency to the same model in order to formally test the potential moderating and mediating effect of the individual level measure. It is possible however, using a less rigorous approach, to provide an indication of the relationship between individual and country-level collectivism measures.

In order to this, I try to overcome the lack of appropriate individual-level indicators of collectivism in Understanding Society data by using a simple 'exploratory' imputation method. To compute a proxy of individual level collectivism, I use predicted values from a simple regression model of the individual level collectivist orientation based on covariates available in both surveys (Details of the imputation method are available in the Table B.1 in the Appendix).

The proxy variable is constructed using 5 indicators: gender, age, ethnicity, education, and importance of ethnic identity. The conducted regression model explains about 60% of the variation of the original collectivist orientation indicator, which gives a high 0.8 Pearson's correlation between the proxy and the original variable. In the following step, I compute a proxy of individual level collectivist tendency in the

Understanding Society data, based on the coefficients from the regression model used to compute a proxy in the Citizenship Survey data.

In order to explore the interplay between imputed proxy measure of individual level collectivism and country-level collectivism, as well as between the proxy measure and the strength of British identity, I add the predicted individual level collectivism measure to the existing multilevel model. The results in Table 4.5 confirm that after adding a proxy of individual level collectivism, the group level coefficient decreases (although it still remains statistically significant), which indicates that there is likely to be some mediating effect between individual and country-level collectivism. Most importantly, however, the proxy measure is also a highly significant predictor of the dependent variable.

The important objections that might be raised against using this method are: 1) the use of not matched samples; 2) the use of single and not multiple imputation method, and 3) the fact that the constructed proxy variable heavily relay on one predictor (strength of attachment to one's ethnic group). However, given a high correlation between the original and proxy variable it is reasonable to think that it is still a satisfactory exploratory measure.

Based on the effects sizes illustrated in

Figure 4-3and Figure 4-4, it is quite clear that both the initially constructed collectivist tendency measure as well as the proxy variable (predicted collectivist tendency) have strong positive effects on the self-reported attachment to British identity (although, it is important to note that the standard error of the original variable is quite large). Interestingly, the effect of individual collectivist measure in the Citizenship Survey models, and the effect of the strength of attachment to one's ethnic group in the EMBES models appear very similar. This rather strengthen the conclusion that the general tendency to perceive the 'collective' group belonging as important, increases the likelihood of reporting strong British identity among immigrant-origin individuals.

Table 4.5 Multilevel OLS regression models for immigrant sample, Data source: 2010 Understanding Society.

	M0	M1		M2		M3		M4		M5		M6	
Country level variables													
Collectivism score (country-level) (H4a)		4.19	(0.59)	3.42	(0.54)	2.64	(0.50)					1.58	(0.56)
Individual level variables													
Collectivism tendency (individual-level proxy) (H4b)				0.27	(0.02)	0.25	(0.02)	0.25	(0.02)	0.26	(0.03)	0.26	(0.03)
Controls													
Demographics													
Gender (female-ref)						0.00	(0.10)	0.00	(0.10)	0.06	(0.12)	0.06	(0.12)
Age_ln						0.49	(0.18)	0.46	(0.18)	0.16	(0.22)	0.18	(0.22)
Time spent in the UK						0.17	(0.03)	0.17	(0.03)	0.20	(0.04)	0.20	(0.04)
Belonging on local level													
Belongs to neigbourhood										0.35	(0.08)	0.34	(0.08)
Talks to neighbours										0.15	(0.07)	0.15	(0.07)
Discrimination													
Experienced Discrimination						0.05	(0.14)	0.06	(0.14)	0.21	(0.17)	0.20	(0.17)
Cultural, political, economic integration/success (H1)													
Fluent in English (ref.cat. no)						-0.24	(0.12)	-0.26	(0.13)	-0.29	(0.18)	-0.27	(0.18)
In paid employment (ref.cat. no)						-0.04	(0.10)	-0.05	(0.10)	-0.14	(0.13)	-0.14	(0.13)
Political interest						0.05	(0.06)	0.04	(0.06)	0.08	(0.07)	0.08	(0.07)
Desirable/undesirable characteristics (H2)													
Ethnic Minority (ref.cat. no)						0.29	(0.25)	0.76	(0.24)	1.06	(0.23)	0.53	(0.30)
Minority religion (ref.cat. no)						0.26	(0.13)	0.27	(0.14)	0.39	(0.15)	0.33	(0.16)
University degree (ref.cat. no)						-0.51	(0.11)	-0.51	(0.11)	-0.40	(0.14)	-0.40	(0.14)
Conservative/non-conservative political party ID (H3)													
Political party ID (ref.cat – no political party ID)													
Left-wing political party ID						0.21	(0.12)	0.22	(0.12)	0.27	(0.15)	0.24	(0.15)

Table 4.5. Continued

Right-wing political party ID							0.45	(0.22)	0.44	(0.22)	0.39	(0.26)	0.38	(0.26)
Other political party ID							0.21	(0.25)	0.22	(0.25)	0.09	(0.31)	0.08	(0.31)
Fixed Part														
cons	6.43	(0.27)	4.25	(0.36)	-0.58	(0.46)	-2.19	(0.74)	-0.99	(0.73)	-2.33	(0.89)	-2.84	(0.92)
Random Part														
Level: country of birth														
cons/cons	1.47	(0.48)	0.35	(0.14)	0.23	(0.10)	0.08	(0.04)	0.23	(0.10)	0.04	(0.04)	0.07	(0.05)
Level: ind														
cons/cons	8.42	(0.19)	8.42	(0.19)	7.96	(0.19)	7.62	(0.18)	7.65	(0.18)	7.93	(0.23)	7.89	(0.23)
-2*loglikelihood:	19676		19648		18350.76		17796.86		17823.31		11327.28		11319.51	
N	3,671													

*Standard errors in parentheses

Table 4.6 Summary of the substantive results of multivariate, logit and multilevel regression models across three data sets

EMBES		**Citizenship Survey**		**Understanding Society**	
Measure	Sig for most tested subsamples?	Measure	Sig for most tested subsamples?	Measure	Sig for most tested subsamples?
Socio-economic integration/success					
Higher education	Y (-)	*Higher education*	Y (-)	*Has university degree*	Y (-)
Employed or in education	N	*Being in employment*	N	*Being in employment*	Y/N (-)
Social class	N	*Social class*	Y	*Social class*	N
Discrimination					
Institutional discrimination (perception)	Y(-)	*Institution discrimination (perception)*	Y(-)	*Was attacked/insulted because of ethnicity/race/religion*	Y(-)
Relative deprivation (perception)	Y (-)				
Experienced discrimination	N				
English fluency					
English proficiency	Y (+)	*English proficiency*	Y(+)	*English first language*	Y(+)
Social integration					
Have ethnic friends only	Y (-)	*Mixes socially with other ethnicities*	Y (+)	*Talks to neighbours*	Y (+)
Residential segregation					
Most neighbours from the same ethnic group	N	*Lives in high ethnic density area*	Y (-)	*Lives in high ethnic density*	N
		Lives in a deprived area	Y (-)		

Table 4.6 Continued.

Political integration and political attitudes					
Voted in general elections	Y/N	*Political efficacy (local level)*	Y (-)		
Participated in non-elect pol activity	N	**Takes part in civic or voluntary activities*	Y (+)		
Interest in politics	Y (-)			*Political interest*	Y(-)
Political knowledge	N				
Trust in parliament	N	*Trust in parliament*	Y(+)		
Thinks that voting is a civic duty	N	*Thinks that voting is a civic duty*	Y(+)		
Belonging on local level					
Belongs to neighbourhood	Y (+)	*Belongs to neighbourhood*	Y(+)	*Belonging to neighbourhood*	Y(+)
Talks to neighbours	Y (+)	*Belongs to local area*	Y(+)	*Talks to neighbours*	Y(+)
Attachment to the religious and origin group					
Has a lot in common with own ethnic group	Y (+)			Importance of father's ethnicity	Y (+)
Has a lot in common with own religious group	Y(+)				
Attitudes towards integration					
Own group should maintain its values	N				
Own group should mix and integrate	Y (+)				
Minorities Should Adopt Majority Way of Life	N				

Table 4.6 Continued.

Ideological beliefs					
Identify with any pol party	N			*Supports (mainstream) left-wing party*	Y (+)
Identify with the Labour	N			*Supports (mainstream) right-wing party*	Y (+)
Identify with the Conservatives	N			*Supports other parties*	N
Supports sharia law	Y (-)				
Support for violent protests	N				
Support for traditional gender roles	N				
Thinks that gay relationships are wrong	N				
Cultural practices					
Wears a poppy	Y (+)				
Sets Christmas tree	N				
Gives Christmas cards	N				
Gives valentines cards	N				
Gives Mothers'/Father's day cards	N				
Collectivist orientation					
		Individual level collectivist tendency	Y(+)	*Individual level collectivist tendency (predicted values)*	Y (+)
				Country level collectivism score	Y (+)

Table 4.6. Continued.

Demographic variables					
Gender	N	*Gender*	N	*Gender*	N
Age	Y (+)	*Age*	Y(+)	*Age*	Y(+)
UK born	Y (+)	*UK born*	Y (+)	*UK born*	Y(+)
Ethnicity	Y	*From ethnic minority group*	Y(+)		
Being a Muslim	Y (+)	*Having minority religion*	Y/N	*Having minority religion*	Y(+)
Recent immigrant (<7years in the UK)	Y(-)	*Recent immigrant (<5 yrs in UK)*	Y(-)		

Notes: Y: yes, N: no; Direction of the effect in parentheses (+) positive (-) negative

4.6. Discussion

This study aimed to assess the main determinants of the declared strength of attachment to Britain among the immigrant-origin population. Many of the findings related to individual-level predictors of strong British identity are in line with those of Maxwell (2009) and Nandi & Platt (2014). The presented models indicate that socio-economic success is not an important determinant of positive identification with Britain. Instead, higher levels of social integration, positive attitudes towards mixing and integrating, positive identification with one’s own religious and ethnic groups, and, most importantly, feeling accepted by the majority population significantly increase the likelihood of strong identification with the host society.

Somewhat surprisingly, different political integration indicators appeared to have opposite effects on the strength of British national identity. On the one hand, political trust, perception that voting is one’s civic duty and identifying with any of the mainstream political parties had a positive effect on the strength of British identity. On the other hand, political efficacy, political interest and non-electoral participation had either negative or no effect. These results are likely to be associated with different understandings of national identity and patriotism. The indicators of more conventional political engagement might be associated with what Schatz et al. (1999) call ‘uncritical’ forms of patriotism, whereas the indicators of cognitive and high-initiative engagement might be associated with more

‘critical’ forms of patriotism. According to Schatz et al. (1999), these two forms of patriotism are differentially linked to cognitive and behavioural indicators of political involvement. Uncritical patriotism has been found to be negatively related to levels of political information gathering (e.g. from the media) and political knowledge, whereas this relationship was positive for critical patriotism. Uncritical patriotism is also negatively related to political activism because such activism is normally related to the acknowledgment of some problems with the country.

The findings related to the proposed argument about the importance of collectivist orientation found a good support in the presented models. The results show that group-level differences, related to immigrants’ countries of origin, account for the largest part of variation in the declared strength of attachment to Britain. The paper applies psychological theories that explain cognitive factors influencing the strength of host country identification beyond the integration and assimilation rhetoric. According to cultural and social psychology literature, individuals from collectivist cultures tend to express themselves in terms of the relational rather than independent self and are more prone to interviewer (social desirability) bias. It is argued here that these cognitive tendencies are likely to be associated with reporting strong national identity for two reasons. Firstly, immigrants from collectivist cultures might declare that the national identity is very important to them because, according to their imprinted cultural norms, one should take pride in the country in which one lives. Secondly, this tendency is likely to be accelerated by the fact that respondents from collectivist countries are more likely to filter their answers to questions that can (potentially) be negatively evaluated by the interviewer. In the current political climate, immigrants from collectivist countries, who are predominantly non-white and likely to belong to minority religions, might feel especially pressurised to ‘declare’ their loyalty to Britain and avoid the potential risk of negative judgement. The presented findings related to the country-level differences are in line with earlier studies conducted by Manning and Roy (2010), which show that immigrants from poorer countries tend to develop the host country’s national identity quicker than immigrants from highly developed countries. Manning and Roy, however, do not link the observed country-level differences to cultural factors. They interpret them in purely rational, cost-benefit terms. According to them, immigrants from poorer countries have higher incentives to ‘betray’ their country of origin because of higher tensions between the old and new cultures and more potential gains from becoming British. Although this interpretation cannot be ruled out, Manning and Roy provide exclusively post-hoc explanation to interpret the observed

differences and do not test their explanation using any individual-level indicators. The analyses presented in this paper provide a direct test of the collectivism argument by introducing individual-level as well as country-level indicators of collectivist orientation. The fact that both individual- and country-level predictors are highly significant in the presented models strengthens the evidence in favour of the proposed collectivism interpretation.

The country-level differences in the acquisition of British national identity also shed light on the interpretation of the findings related to immigrants' desirability and conservative ideological orientation. Based on the literature on public opinions towards immigrants, it has been hypothesised that the more desired immigrants should find it easier to develop positive identification with Britain. Contrary to our expectations, it was the less desired immigrant group that reported stronger attachment to British society. It should be noted, however, that the criteria of immigrants' desirability consist of cultural and physical similarity as well as high levels of skills, which means that they highly overlap with the individualist-collectivism dimension (the desired immigrants originate from highly developed, individualist western societies). I also expected that individuals with more liberal views towards gender, sexuality and strict religious rules would be more likely to identify with Britain because of the lower levels of perceived 'culture clash' and higher flexibility to adapt to the new society. This expectation did not find a strong support in the presented models either. Support for traditional gender roles and negative attitudes towards homosexual relationships appeared to be unrelated to the identification with mainstream British society. The only sign of a possible clash of values and an incompatibility between Muslim and British ways of life was associated with the expression of support for introducing Sharia law in Britain. In most respects, minorities do not perceive incompatibility between their religious and national identities, except for very specific issues, which are also controversial within their own religious communities.

4.7. Conclusions

Firstly, echoing recent research, it has been found that arguments about the lack of a sense of belonging among ethnic minority groups and incompatibility between ethno-religious and British loyalties are largely unfounded. Most people do not seem to perceive a culture clash between their ethnic, religious and national loyalties as long as they feel accepted and treated in a non-discriminatory way. However, this does not mean that the

problem of a culture clash between certain beliefs, values and ways of life does not exist. Although such incompatibility might primarily exist in the minds of the majority population, it poses an important challenge for integration policies. On the one hand, stricter assimilation policies are likely to result in higher levels of hostility towards marginalised groups, in turn making them more likely to develop separate, 'reactive' types of identities. On the other hand, ignoring the anxieties expressed by some parts of the majority population, who do not accept certain ethno-religious practices, is likely to weaken their sense of belonging to 'their' country, and make them feel more alienated.

The most important and novel finding, however, is the demonstrated effect of collectivist orientation (measured by both individual-level 'collectivist tendency' and by a country-level Collectivism-Individualism Index) on predicting survey responses to the questions about the strength of British identity. The relatively strong effect of the collectivism factor (compared to indicators of socio-economic success and cultural assimilation) in explaining individual- and group-level variation of the dependent variables indicates that 'feeling British' might be associated with successful integration to a lesser extent than it is commonly believed.

The strong effect of the collectivism factor also suggests that we ought to be careful not to over-interpret the meaning of survey measures of British identity. The typical survey measures of British identity are perception measures and depend on pre-existing cognitive models of self-identification. More moderate responses (indicating a lower strength of identity) might be associated with a more critical approach to the question or stronger emphasis on personal rather than collective identities. People with more 'individualistic' cognitive models of self- identification are more likely to attribute lesser importance to traditional group identities (including national identity), which does not automatically imply that they are less loyal to their country.

5. Study 2: Do Grievances Make British Ethnic Minorities More Politically Active or More Alienated? Group Consciousness and Assimilation Approaches Re-examined.

Abstract

Group consciousness theories predict that when members of an ethnic minority identify with their ethnic group, participate in ethnic associations, and view their group as unfairly treated, they will be more politically active. Assimilation theories, on the other hand, argue that more assimilated minorities will be more politically active; thus, in the case of Britain, if minorities identify with their new country, participate in mainstream British associations, and have positive views of British institutions, they will be more politically active. These two theories seem to make opposite predictions, but this paper argues that they are in fact both correct. The presented analysis, based on the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study, shows that the group consciousness approach is useful for predicting who participates in non-electoral politics, while voting, as a more elite-supporting type of participation, is better explained by the assimilationist approach.

Key words: Ethnic identity, British identity, ethnic discrimination, political participation, group consciousness

5.1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore the motivations for political participation among ethnic minority groups. It is expected that many of the influences on political participation to be identical to those found in more general studies on participation. However, previous research has suggested that patterns of participation, and their drivers, might differ in some respects for minorities. Historically, electoral participation among British ethnic minorities has been lower than among the general population. However, the evidence from more recent elections based on the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study has shown that the actual turnout among registered ethnic minority voters was no different from the turnout of the registered white-British voters (Heath et al. 2011; 2013). Nevertheless, registration rates among eligible minorities remained significantly lower. The existing studies based on EMBES suggest that while electoral registration can be satisfactorily explained by individual-level demographic factors in the same manner as for white British populations, the standard explanations of electoral participation (based on socio-economic individual-level resources) and ideological explanations of political party preferences (based on one's position on the liberal/authoritarian scale) are less applicable to ethnic minorities. Instead, it has been shown that ethnic sentiments, in particular, the perception of sociotropic (group-level) discrimination are an important predictor of political party allegiance. In particular, the more embedded individuals are in their ethnic community, the more likely they are to identify with the particular political party, and, in turn, stronger party identification positively influence their likelihood to vote (Heath et al. 2013; Sanders et al. 2014).

Arguably, the factors affecting motivations for political participation of ethnic minorities can be divided into two categories: those based on the membership in the British national community, and those based on the membership in one's ethnic community. The useful theoretical framework that can help to understand to what extent ethnic minorities' political behaviour is driven by group-specific concerns as opposed to greater assimilation to the majority population provides group consciousness theory. The paper discusses and empirically tests the applicability of substantively different approaches to political participation based on assimilation theories on the one hand, and group consciousness theories on the other hand. The applicability of theoretical arguments is empirically evaluated for different modes of political participation, with a distinction being made

between conventional (or ‘elite-supporting’) forms, such as voting in general elections, and unconventional (or ‘elite-challenging’) forms, such as protest activity, as well as for political party preferences.

The concept of assimilation is usually used with a reference to the process of convergence between individuals or groups from different cultural backgrounds (Berry 1992), typically between immigrants and the dominant society. Classic assimilation theory sees minority groups’ adaptation as a ‘straight-line’ process, during which they become more similar to the majority group in terms of norms, values and behaviour (Gordon 1964; Alba & Nee 1997). According to this view, when the process of assimilation is complete, there would be far less need for a distinction between minority and majority groups in terms of their motivations for political participation as their needs become similar in turn. As Alba and Nee (1997, p. 142) succinctly ask: “To what extent has an ethnic distinction lost its relevance for processes of socioeconomic attainment, except for initial conditions?” Intuitively, more assimilated individuals should be more interested in the ‘host’ country’s politics and be closer to their majority group peers in terms of their orientation towards, and participation in, the political process. This can be contrasted to the political transnationalism identified in new immigrants (Itzigsohn 2000), and the process of adaptation can therefore be seen to have three major stages in these models. Firstly, the new immigrant may retain a transnational interest in politics across both their old and new nation states, before identifying more with the politics of their new state in a way that is not yet assimilated before moving to the Alba and Nee (1997) position of assimilation and more and more politically resembling the majority population at a similar level of socio-economic status.

The opposite view regarding motivations for political participation takes a group consciousness approach. It emphasizes the desire of lower status groups, especially racial and ethnic minorities, to improve their position in society and drive social change through political mobilisation. The main assumption of the ‘group consciousness’ approach is that, in order to gain access to political resources, individuals need to recognize their shared marginalized social status, which is based on their race and/or ethnicity.[22]

As discussed hitherto within this paper, Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides a useful theoretical framework for the evaluation of the logic behind the assimilation and group consciousness arguments. SIT was developed most prominently by Tajfel and

[22] For discussion about different conceptualisations of group consciousness see: McClain et al. (2009)

Turner in their two complementary theories—Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1978) and Social Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner et al. 1987). SIT has often been adopted by political scientists to explain the basis for the expected relationship between group identity, group norms, and political participation. The central components of social identity, such as the **subjective sense of belonging**, **positive attachment** to the group and **salience of the group identity** in one's concept of self, are assumed to be associated with greater **obedience to group norms** and greater willingness to participate in collective action.

The empirical analysis presented in this paper focus on assessing three group-based explanatory factors: group identity, social embeddedness, and perceived group discrimination (ethnic grievances). These factors have been chosen as the most helpful for comparing the somewhat contradictory claims proposed by assimilation and group consciousness advocates regarding the drivers of ethnic minorities' political engagement.

5.2. Social Identity: National Versus Ethnic

From the assimilation perspective, identification with the host country is a sign of greater integration into its society, and more integrated individuals are more likely to participate actively in the political life of the 'host' society. Identificational assimilation is often perceived as the last stage of the assimilation process (Gordon 1964), and the general idea that there exists a link between national identity, social solidarity and commitment to civic duty can be found in the work of many political scientists (e.g. Hirschman 2005; Miller 1995). Among liberal theorists (e.g. Conover 1988), national identity and citizenship are usually understood through the lens of the political principles of democracy. In this view, national identity is linked with the norms and responsibilities associated with citizenship.

The evidence from cross-national studies suggests that participation in the civic and political life of most Western democracies is widely *considered* an essential element of being a good citizen. This is indicated in both the US and UK survey work (Conover et al. 2004), meaning that the US models being compared have a clear point of linkage to the UK attitudes evaluated here. Crewe also found that an overall majority of US nationals identified voting more often as something that would make themselves "better citizens" *(*Ibid.). This normative assumption is often used as a basis for arguing that national identity should be positively linked with political participation (see: Huddy & Khatib 2007). This

reasoning is in line with social identity approach, which assumes that salient group identity contains particular "image" of the group's members, which include shared values, norms and attitudes.[23] Therefore, assuming that political participation is part of the prescriptive group norms, it is reasonable to expect that people for whom national identity is more salient should be more likely to be politically active.

However, studies examining the association between national identity and actual political involvement are scarce, although the existing evidence seems to support the view that this relationship is positive, at least, with certain qualifications. For example, De Rooij et al. (2012), based on the analysis of the European Value Study, show that the affective component of national identity (national pride) has a positive effect on conventional (electoral) forms of political engagement, mediated by the increased political trust. Conversely, high levels of national pride decrease the likelihood of engaging in extra-electoral (elite-challenging) political actions, such as boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, etc. The authors argue that extra-institutional political engagement is likely to be perceived as less legitimate and, in consequence, might not be a part of the existing norms of a "good citizen". This has a particular consequence when considering minority communities, as the potential for the lack of consideration of minority issues in a winner-takes-all political system may mean that the most effective forms of elite-challenging protest also tend to de-legitimise the protesters asking for progress.

Other scholars highlight the importance of making a distinction between strong national identity and other, related measures of patriotism and nationalism. For instance, Huddy and Khatib (2007) argue that political involvement (at least in the US) is associated with the civic, non-ideological component of national identity. In their study, Huddy and Khatib examine the 'pure' measure of national identity (understood as the importance of American national identity as a relevant self-categorization) and its relationship with measures of symbolic, constructive and uncritical patriotism. Based on the conducted structural equation models, the authors argue that national identity, unlike other measures national attachments, is not related to any political ideology or partisanship. Furthermore, their findings support the argument that strong national identity (unlike other, related concepts) is positively associated with political interest and electoral turnout. They conclude that strong identifiers indeed seem to be more committed to group norms (the

[23] Consequences of salient social identity are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2

norms of 'good citizens'), which makes them more motivated to invest in gathering political information and to vote in elections.

If it is accepted that the sense of civic duty regarding voting and involvement in political life are important prescriptive norms of a member of a national community, then according to the social identity approach it should be expected that people who identify more strongly with the nation will be more likely to obey these norms and participate in politics than those who only weakly identify with the nation. Therefore, based on the assimilation and social identity approaches, it should be expected that:

H1a: Individuals with stronger British identity will be more likely to participate in politics, especially in terms of voting in national and local elections.

H1b: Stronger national identity will be related to higher political trust and the norms of being a 'good citizen,' such as the perception that voting is a civic duty.

In line with the above arguments, maintaining identification with one's ethnic group might be expected to hinder participation rates by slowing down assimilation and thereby reducing interest and participation in the political affairs of the host country (Greeley 1974). However, an opposite claim about the impact of strong racial and/or ethnic identities can be formulated based on the assumptions of the 'group consciousness' approach. In particular, a combination of **strong racial identity**, **solidarity** and **belief in pervasive racial discrimination** has been argued to serve as a motivational resource for political mobilisation of disadvantaged minority communities (Verba & Nie 1972; Conover 1984; 1988; Miller et al. 1981). These arguments were successfully applied to explain high voting rates among black American communities in the 1960s and 1970s but they have been rarely utilized in the studies of minority political participation in the European context.

Of course, there are important contextual factors that do not make the application of group consciousness arguments to other minority groups and national contexts straight forward. Before discussing whether the logic of group consciousness might or might not be applicable to the British case, it useful to consider the existing empirical evidence on the formation of group consciousness among 'new' minorities in the US.

Contemporary US-based studies conducted on non-Black minorities (mainly Asian and Latino populations) report mixed findings about the usefulness of group consciousness

as an analytical tool. First, the scholars note that discussing Asian or Latino group consciousness is problematic because members of these groups often prefer to identify themselves in national, not pan-ethnic, terms (Schmidt et al. 2010). Secondly, different ethnic/national groups of Latino and Asian origin are geographically separated from each other, which, in consequence makes them less likely to develop strong feelings of commonality and group solidarity (Min 2010). Finally, Asians, who have relatively high socio-economic status and are regarded as a model minority, might not feel the need to unify around common issues. Nonetheless, despite the differences between various national groups, Latinos and Asians have been shown to display a sense of solidarity based on the perception of the shared life experience. This shared experience usually refers to the feeling of being discriminated against based on ethnicity, common experience as 'strangers', and often, to socio-economic disadvantage (Austin et al. 2011; Junn & Masuoka 2008; Stokes 2003; Rogers & Chong 2004; Sanchez 2006). However, it is not clear whether the group consciousness of new minorities has a significant impact on their political behaviour. On the other hand, there is a body of research suggesting that group consciousness is either non-significant or offers limited added value to socio-economic status explanations of political participation (Leighley 2001; Leighley & Vedlitz 1999). Other researchers argue that motivations based on group consciousness are important, particularly for predicting non-electoral forms of participation or political actions directly related to ethnic community issues (e.g.: Sanchez 2006; Rogers & Chong 2004). One reason for the inconclusiveness of the empirical findings seems to be the diversity of approaches applied to measuring the group consciousness concept. Those who argue that group consciousness is a largely insignificant predictor of political mobilisation among new American minorities usually take a more restricted approach to this concept than the advocates of group consciousness arguments. Specifically, they apply narrower definition of group consciousness and treat many ethnic-specific factors (such as ethnic social capital or experienced discrimination) as independent covariates (e.g. Segura and Rodriguez 2006; Junn & Masuoka, 2008). Despite the disagreement over the measurement of the concept, different approaches consistently report that group consciousness is at least a useful predictor of partisanship. Most notably, perception of discrimination and unfair treatment of one's ethnic group was found to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of Democratic partisanship among most of the Latino and Asian groups (Cain et al. 2013; Barreto & Pedraza 2009; Urbano 2011).

In sum, the existing evidence from the US-based studies indicates that some indicators of group consciousness have a significant impact on the Asian and Latino political behaviour, but, at the same time, it seems that group consciousness does not have the same magnitude as it had for Black Americans in the past. This is not surprising since the experience of new American minorities is not directly comparable to the experience of Blacks involved in the civic rights activism. Recent black immigrants also have been reported to display lower sense of linked fate and a different understanding of blackness (Rogers & Chong 2004).

Undoubtedly, the circumstances as well as the characteristics of non-white minorities in the UK are significantly different than those in the US, particularly, in comparison to Afro-Caribbean communities in the 1970s. A long history of power struggle between 'hegemonic' whites and 'subordinate' blacks makes African-Americans' political mobilization exceptional. First of all, unlike other visible minorities, most of today's African-Americans are descendants of involuntary immigrants, who lived under the slavery system, and later, under the Jim Crow segregation laws. The African-American Civil Rights Movement during the 1950s and 1960s was crucial to the formation of the contemporary United States. The 'Black Power' movement during the 1960s and 1970s in the US and throughout the world was a prototype for all kinds of New Social Movements, which constructed their ideology around the issues of identity, culture and human rights. A prominent characteristic of these black movements was the explicit appeal for the promotion of black identity and culture, and for the promotion of black collective interests.

However, despite the fact that British minorities do not have a comparable history of oppression to Black Americans, there are good reasons to believe that some group processes mobilising ethnic minorities and politicizing their group identity occur in Britain as well. First, ethnic minorities are often first- or second- generation immigrants, which makes them likely to experience certain types of difficulties such as language and economic barriers, as well as open or systemic racial discrimination that affect their political integration. Second, they often have strong social ties with their co-ethnics and express high levels of group solidarity, which makes them likely to vote as a bloc. This appears to be particularly the case where solidarity leads to ethnic organisations driving the vote (Hechter et al. 1982) or where a strong experience or fear of oppression creates a perceived need to act together (Mozaffar et al. 2003). They also often live in proximity to their co-ethnics, which should have a positive effect on developing a sense of group commonality. Before turning to formulating a hypothesis, it is useful to further unpack the

logic behind the relationship between ethnic/racial identity and group consciousness arguments. Based on the social identity theories, group consciousness can be understood as a set of cognitive short-cuts, which guide processing and interpretation of new information (e.g. Conover 1984, 1988). One of the prominent examples of cognitive short-cuts related to group consciousness is the notion of a 'common fate'. According to Dawson (1994), common fate functions as a 'black utility heuristic', which influences information processing linked to one's racial/ethnic identity. Stronger identifiers, for whom ethnic group identity is an important part of their concept of 'self,' should be more likely to use the fate of the group as a proxy for assessing the likely prospects of their own lives. In turn, individuals who have a stronger group identity are expected to be more mobilised to engage in politics and act on behalf of the group. Base on this reasoning, it is possible to formulate the following hypotheses:

H2a: Stronger ethnic identity will be linked with a higher likelihood of political involvement.

H2b: Stronger ethnic identity will have an impact on shaping political preferences (measured here by identification with the Labour party and by support of policies that serve group interests, such as affirmative action)

5.3. Social Embeddedness: Membership in Mainstream and Ethnic Organisations

Being active in associations is often thought to be the essence of civic life and a prelude to political involvement. In the Tocquevillian view, voluntary associations are seen as 'schools of democracy,' where individuals are exposed to participatory norms and learn how to solve collective dilemmas. However, the frequently recurring question is: Are all associations equally beneficial? In the case of ethnic minorities, one might ask whether membership in exclusively ethnic, as opposed to mainstream, associations has the same impact on political involvement. The distinction between membership in mainstream and ethnic organisations can be also seen as a parallel to the distinction between national and ethnic identity. Assuming that membership in a particular organisation is at least somewhat important for one's self-perception and is a part of one's social identity, one should expect

to observe a normative influence of other members of the same organisation as well as some level of homogenization (Turner et al. 1987).

From the assimilation perspective, a helpful way of thinking about the impact of membership in voluntary organisations on political attitudes and behaviour offers social capital approach, particularly, the conventional understanding based on the work of Putnam and Granovetter. Since the publication of *Bowling Alone* by Robert Putnam (1995), the idea that engagement in voluntary associations generates social trust, which 'spills over' into political trust and consequently has a positive impact on broader political participation, has been increasingly popular in political science.[24] However, social capital theorists often differentiate between the role of particularised and generalised trust. According to this view ethnic organisations are considered rather harmful for the larger community. Unlike in the pluralist theories of democracy, it is not because such groups have conflicting interests, but because they do not feel that they have much in common with people outside their ethnic group. In consequence, ethnic organisations are expected to have a positive effect only on particularized trust (trust towards in-group members). Conversely, membership in diverse, cross-ethnic organisations is expected to have a positive effect on generalized trust (trust in people in general). In Granovetter's words, it is the 'strength of weak ties' that generates social trust (Granovetter 1973). Similarly, Uslaner (1999) asserts that people who primarily maintain close relationships with co-ethnics are more inclined to think in categories of social divisions - "us" and "them". This type of argumentation mirrors the logic of the linear assimilation approach, which predicts positive consequences of strengthening the ties outside own ethnic circle and, at the same time, loosening the ties with co-ethnics. Therefore, from the straight-line assimilation and social capital perspectives, especially based on Putnam's work, the next hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H3: Only involvement in mainstream organisations, whose members are not primarily from one's own ethnic group, will have a positive impact on political involvement.

Classic formulations of group consciousness theory do not directly address the question of the role of ethnic organisations in political participation. However, many

[24] Putnam calls this type of close networking 'bonding' as opposed to 'bridging,' and Granovetter (1973) calls them strong (as opposed to weak) ties.

empirical studies have looked into the role of ethnic organisations, especially religious ones. There is quite strong evidence from early group consciousness studies that ethnic organisations, especially black churches, played a politicizing role by fostering the feeling of a shared collective identity and experience, therefore increasing political awareness (Calhoun-Brown 1996). For example, Verba and Nie (1972) found that African-Americans who were members of black organisations participated at higher levels than non-members and at higher rates than would be expected based on their socio-economic resources.[25]

More recent studies tend to focus solely on the role of ethnic organisations, without examining the identificational aspect or the role of discrimination. The popular concept of the ethnic civic community, developed by Fennema and Tillie (1999), is in many ways very similar to the Putnamian understanding of the role of civic associations in creating social trust. The key difference lies in the fact that, according to their view, it does not matter whether individuals get involved in ethnic or cross-ethnic organisations. The authors argue that "even in authoritarian organisations people learn to solve the dilemmas inherent in collective action" (1999, p. 723). Fennema and Tillie support their argument by showing that the higher the social capital at the ethnic community level (measured by the density and interconnectedness of ethnic organisations), the higher the degree of political participation at the individual level. Furthermore, the authors assert that political trust (unlike social trust) does not determine the level of political involvement, because the individuals who do not trust political elites are also likely to actively engage in politics in order to express their dissatisfaction. Empirical evidence seems to generally confirm this line of reasoning. For example, Togeby (2004) found that organisational participation in ethnic minority associations has a very strong impact on informal political participation but does not increase trust. Similarly, Morales et al. (2011) in the study of immigrant population in 10 European cities found that involvement in ethnic associations does not increase political efficacy and trust in political institutions but it does increase political interest. This approach to social embeddedness has somewhat different implications than the Toquevillian understanding of the civic community, and is more in line with the resource mobilisation approach (Jenkins 1983; Leighley 2001; Rogers & Chong 2004). In particular, both ethnic civic community and resource mobilisation approach highlight that organisations give individuals the opportunities to learn necessary skills to be effective in

[25] Recently, empirical evidence of the positive effect of the church attendance on higher level of political participation has been also found among British ethnic minorities, based on the EMBES 2010 data (Sobolewska et al. 2015).

interacting with governmental institutions (Knocke 1986; Truman 1951). They are considered to positively affect political involvement for two reasons. First, organisations are able to express and advocate individual interests because they have resources, and second, they expose individuals to the norms of participation and contribute to development of meaningful group identity.

However, if it is accepted that membership in ethnic organisations increases political mobilisation but does not increase political trust, then it should expected that ethnic organisations should be more likely to increase non-electoral (i.e. 'elite-challenging') activities. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis to H3 is as follows:

H4: Involvement in ethnic associations will have a positive impact on political participation, especially non-electoral.

5.4. The Role of Ethnic Grievances

Apart from self-identification, ethnic minorities need to be recognized as equal members of a national community by the dominant (white) group, as group identities are always relational according to social identity theories. Individuals can only validate their collective beliefs in collaboration with others who they categorize as similar to themselves. The lack of such recognition, or in other words, a sense of discrimination due to their different ethnicity, would make minorities less likely to strongly identify with the national community and less likely to trust in the country's political institutions. The evidence from Britain strongly supports this argument. Empirical studies report that ethnic minority individuals who feel discriminated against have lower sense of British national identity and do not trust the parliament or the police (Heath & Demireva 2014; Maxwell 2006). The negative effect of discrimination is especially prominent among the British-born individuals, who have higher expectations of being treated as equal members of the national community. Assimilation theories also recognize discrimination as a serious social barrier that can potentially lead to downward mobilization (assimilation towards marginalized groups of society), resulting in higher apathy and lack of political interest (Zhou 1997; Diehl & Blohm 2001; Gibson 2001). This leads to the following hypotheses:

H5a: Perception of being discriminated against based on ethnicity will be associated with weaker national identity and lower levels of political trust.

H5b: Perception of discrimination will decrease the likelihood of political involvement, especially in conventional forms such as voting in elections.

In contrast, the group consciousness approach sees discrimination as a potential driver of political mobilization. Individuals who feel discriminated against should be more likely to act on behalf of their ethnic group and to follow their group norms of political behaviour. For example, Miller et al (1981) emphasize the importance that members of the subordinate group attribute their relative deprivation to systemic, not individualized, causes. From the social identity perspective, the mechanism of enhanced mobilization due to a higher sense of persisting discrimination is linked to the idea of a common fate and redefining the meaning of one's existing (lower) position in society. The hypothesised psychological mechanism shifts the responsibility of one's lower status from the individual to the system (system-blame). This in turn enables individuals to preserve positive self-esteem and a sense of competence (personal efficacy) (Shingles, 1981). Similar to assimilation theories, group consciousness predicts a negative link between discrimination and political trust; however, unlike assimilation theories, it associates lower levels of political trust with greater inclination to 'take matters into one's own hands' and to use political means to challenge the status quo. This kind of mobilization based on ethnic or racial grievances should be more visible in elite-challenging forms of participation due to the perceived lack of responsiveness of the political system. This leads to final two hypotheses:

H6a: Perception of ethnic discrimination will be associated with heightened ethnic identity and lower political trust.

H6b: Perception of ethnic discrimination will have a positive impact on political participation, especially non-electoral.

5.5. Data and measures

Data

The data used in this paper are taken from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), which was the first representative study on the political behaviour of ethnic minorities. The study consists of 2,787 respondents from the five biggest ethnic minority groups in the UK: Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, black Africans and black Caribbeans. The sample design included cluster-based stratification across the UK, and reached over 90% coverage of the relevant population. The Residential Postal Address File (PAF) was used as the sample frame of addresses. The Lower Leyer Super Output Area (LSOA), which, on average, consists of 1,500 residents and 650 households, was used as the primary sampling unit (PSU). The main topics in the survey included attitudes towards political issues in elections; ethnic and religious identity and group consciousness; attitudes towards integration, integration policies and multiculturalism; discrimination and prejudice; and social capital and mobilisation. Many of the questions in the survey were designed to be directly comparable with the main British study on political behaviour (British Election Study) to allow comparisons with the white British majority population.

Measures

The formulated hypotheses are tested by examination of two types of outcomes: behavioural and attitudinal. Behavioural outcomes include 1) two measures of electoral participation—self-reported voting in the 2010 general and local elections[26]; and 2) non-electoral participation—declared involvement in at least one of the following activities:

[26] The EMBES data also include a 'validated' measure of voting, which links the data from the survey with the publicly available electoral register. However, the validated vote was not included for two reasons: first, the non-electoral participation (the second dependent variable) was only measured by self-declaration, therefore, using two self-reported measures can be arguably considered more appropriate; and second, the validated vote inevitably contains slightly more missing values (due to inability to validate all the responses). In order to partially account for over-reporting, the self-reported measure was applied only for those eligible to vote, and only those who declared that were registered to vote (either at the current or different address)

protest/rally/demonstration, boycott, and giving money to a political cause (in the last 12 months)[27]. Both are coded as binary variables.

Measures of attitudinal political outcomes include 1) Labour party identification (as opposed to identification with any other party or with no political party); and 2) Support for 'affirmative action' policies, measured on a 10-point scale.

The choice of Labour party membership as one of the attitudinal outcomes was dictated by the historically high levels of the Labour party support among British ethnic minorities. The Labour party has often been seen as an obvious choice among ethnic minorities and has been 'accused' of heavily relying on the 'ethnic bloc vote'.[28],[29]

To assess the levels of ethnic and British identity, two parallel questions are used: 1) How much do you feel you have in common with (ETHNIC GROUP) people in general?; and 2) How much do you feel you have in common with other British people in general?; measured on a four-point Likert scale.[30]

Ethnic grievances are measured using three items: 1) perception of fair/unfair treatment of one's own ethnic group by the government (institutional discrimination); 2) perception of relative deprivation in one's group; and 3) the belief that non-whites do not have the same life opportunities as white people and are held back by prejudice (which treated as an indicator of 'linked fate').

The indicators of different types of trust include 1) social trust (formulated as follows: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or do you think you can't be too careful in dealing with people?'); and 2) trust in political institutions ('How much do you trust parliament at Westminster?'). The first item is measured on a five-point Likert scale and the second is measured on a ten-point scale. Questions about

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[27] The non-electoral participation is referred throughout the paper as 'elite-challenging' form of political involvement. It can be argued, however, that giving money to a political cause is likely to be a sign of 'elite-supporting' participation since such donations can be made in order to support mainstream political parties. However, other items included in this category clearly represent 'elite-challenging' forms of participation, and including or excluding the financial donations from the constructed measure did not substantially change the results. Therefore, due to inability to establish the actual cause of the declared financial donation, this item was included in the final measure, together with other forms of 'elite-challenging' political participation

[28] For discussion on partisan attachments among British minorities see Heath et al. (2013).

[29] The Respect party is another 'ethnic minority party' which should also be taken into consideration. However, only 12 respondents in the sample (of 2,787 total respondents) identified with the Respect party and only 15 respondents voted for Respect candidates. Therefore, it was decided to exclude it from further analysis.

[30] EMBES also contains a binary measure of British and ethnic identities, which asks respondents to choose whether their feel more British or more Bangladeshi/Pakistani/Caribbean/African. However, this type of binary measure tends to skew the results in a way that most of the respondents place themselves in the middle of the scale. Therefore, the use of the two parallel questions was chosen as a more adequate measure of group identity/closeness, and allowed to avoid a somewhat 'forced' choice between the two identities.

organizational involvement include two binary measures of membership in 1) at least one non-ethnic voluntary association and 2) at least one ethnicity-specific association.

5.6. Results

5.6.1. Descriptive statistics

Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 present the relative frequencies of electoral and non-electoral participation for different categories of the main explanatory variables. For ease of reading in the figure, some of the categories of the variables of interest have been collapsed. It can be seen that people who declared themselves to have a lot in common with British people (i.e. strong British ID) participated more often in both electoral and non-electoral activities than those who declared themselves to have little in common with British people. In comparison, those who declared that they have a lot in common with people from their own ethnic group participated almost at the same level in both types of activities (electoral and non-electoral) as those who declared that they have little in common with their own ethic group (there is a small, roughly 2-percentage-point difference between the two categories, but it is not statistically significant). Interestingly, frequencies of participation in electoral and non-electoral activities are very much the same among strong British and strong ethnic identifiers. People who perceived their ethnic group to be treated unfairly by the government participated less often in elections but more often in non-electoral activities, compared to those who felt their group is treated fairly. Individuals involved in mainstream as well as ethnic organisations participated in non-electoral political activities much more often than those who were not involved at all (32-percentage-point difference between those involved and not involved in mainstream organisations and 22-percentage-point difference between those involved and not involved in ethnic organisations). Those who were involved in either ethnic or non-ethnic organisations participated in elections at slightly higher rates (compared to those who were not involved), but the difference was much less pronounced.

Table 5.1 displays the correlations between strength of attachment to British people (British ID), strength of attachment to ethnic group (Ethnic ID), involvement in ethnic and mainstream associations, measures of grievances, and political trust. Somewhat contrary to

intuition, especially from the straight-line assimilation perspective, correlation between ethnic and British identification is moderately positive (R^2=.223). Similarly, the correlation between involvement in ethnic and mainstream associations is significant and positive (R^2=.446). Political trust, as expected, is significantly and negatively correlated with all three measures of ethnic grievances, which is in line with findings from previous studies (e.g. Klandermans et al. 2008). Contrary to predictions, political trust is not related to associational involvement, which does not support the social capital idea that being active in voluntary organisations and higher levels of social and political trust go 'hand in hand.'

Figure 5-1. Participation in non-electoral politics, by institutional discrimination, strength of British identity, strength of ethnic identity, and involvement in mainstream and ethnic organisations.



Source: EMBES Note: Weighted using survey design weights

Figure 5-2. Electoral participation, by institutional discrimination, strength of British identity, strength of ethnic identity, and involvement in mainstream and ethnic organisations.



Source: EMBES Note: Weighted using survey design weights

Table 5.1. Correlations between involvement in ethnic and mainstream organisations, ethnic identity, British identity, perception that government treats own ethnic group unfair (institutional discrimination), relative deprivation, perception that non-whites are held back by discrimination and trust in British parliament

	Involvement in ethnic org	Involvement in mainstream org	Ethnic ID	British ID	Government unfair treatment	Relative deprivation	Non-Whites held back
Involvement in mainstream org	.446**		-0.018	-.043*	-.071**		
Ethnic ID	.111**	N.S.		.222**	.073**	.086**	.094**
British ID	.068**	.043*	.222**		-.044*	-0.024	-.113**
Government unfair treatment	0.034	.071**	.073**	-.044*		.275**	.294**
Relative deprivation	.038*	N.S.	.086**	N.S.	.275**		.325**
Non-Whites held back	N.S.	N.S.	.094**	-.113**	.294**	.325**	
Trust in Parliament	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	-.318**	-.188**	-.173**
N	2552						

*** p < .01(2-tailed), ** p < .05 (2-tailed). Source: EMBES; Note: For missing data the weighted predictive mean matching (PMM) was applied

5.6.2. Assimilation, ethnic mobilisation or both?

To evaluate the main effects based on the formulated hypotheses, Table 5.2 presents the results from the logistic regression models estimating the likelihood of electoral and non-electoral participation and Labour party allegiance, as well as the OLS regression model for predicting higher support for affirmative action.

The results generally support H1a, showing that stronger national identity (measured by the feeling of commonality with British people) has a statistically significant positive effect on electoral participation ($\alpha \leq .05$).[31] These results are generally in line with the previous studies by Khatib (2007) and De Rooij et al. (2012), which suggest that national identity and political trust are likely to have a positive impact on more 'legitimate' forms of participation only. However, the results do not support the mechanism proposed by De Rooij et al. (2012), whereby national identity should have a positive effect on electoral participation through higher levels of political trust and a sense of civic duty. Somewhat surprisingly, no relationship has been found between national identity and political trust or between national identity and civic duty; therefore it is possible to reject H1b. However, there is a positive relationship between political trust, civic duty and the perception of one's own ethnic group as being treated **fairly** by the government, which is in line with the argument that it might be mainly discrimination that causes negative attitudes towards mainstream politics among ethnic minority groups (Heath et al. 2013).

Across the tested models, there is no direct relationship between ethnic identity and political participation. Therefore, H2a about the positive effect of heightened ethnic identity on political mobilisation should be rejected. In terms of attitudinal outcomes, stronger ethnic identity significantly predicts support for 'affirmative action' policies but does not have an effect on political party preferences.[32] It seems that among people who feel closely connected to their ethnic community, there is some degree of political homogenisation (as expected based on the social identity approach), but only when it directly relates to ethnic issues, partially supporting H2b.

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[31] The statistically significant ($\alpha \leq .05$) positive effect of stronger British identity and weaker ethnic identity on non-electoral participation holds only for the second generation, British-born BME population.

[32] Models with the Labour party identification as an outcome variable as well as voting for the Labour party in the 2010 general elections as an outcome variable were assessed.

In terms of the role of social embeddedness, both cross-ethnic and ethnicity-specific forms of formal social capital play an important role in political mobilisation. In fact, associational involvement is the strongest predictor of political participation among all the tested variables and explains about 14 % of the variance. Involvement in ethnic associations has a strong positive effect on both electoral and non-electoral participation, and involvement in mainstream associations is more important for the latter.[33] These findings are in line with the prepositions of ethnic civic community model, suggesting that both mainstream and ethnic associations facilitate political involvement. For predicting attitudinal outcomes (Labour partisanship and support for affirmative action), neither ethnicity-specific nor cross-ethnic associational involvement has a consistent, significant effect.[34] Given the literature on civic involvement, it is not very surprising that being active in organisations is more important for predicting behaviour (political mobilisation) than attitudes. Therefore, in light of these findings, both the assimilation hypothesis (H3) and the group consciousness hypothesis (H4) are partially supported.

Similarly, across the models, ethnic grievances (measured by different types of perceived discrimination) appear to have both positive and negative effects, depending on whether mobilisation or attitudes are considered, and depending on the mode of political involvement (electoral or non-electoral). In line with the assimilation hypotheses (H5a and H5b), different types of perceived group discrimination are, generally speaking, negatively related to British identity and political trust (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). In terms of political participation, institutional discrimination (unfair treatment by the government) has a significant, negative effect on voting in national and local elections. On the other hand, institutional discrimination is a significant predictor of a higher likelihood of participating in non-electoral political activities. Other measures of grievances are also useful for predicting greater support for 'affirmative action' policies and Labour party identification, which is in line with the group consciousness hypothesis (H6b). Unsurprisingly, political trust has a positive effect on electoral participation and negative effect on non-electoral ('elite challenging') participation. There is also a small, positive relationship between a

[33] The effect of associational involvement also varies across ethnic groups. For example, involvement in ethnic associations seems to be more strongly associated with political mobilisation among South Asian than Afro-Caribbean groups. In line with previous findings (Galandini, 2014), membership in ethnic organisations was not significant for electoral mobilisation among Afro-Caribbean groups.

[34] There is some evidence that ethnic associational involvement is a significant predictor of Labour party allegiance among Afro-Caribbean groups and among second generation ethnic minorities.

feeling of commonality with one's own ethnic group and a stronger sense of ethnic grievance. This suggests that strong identifiers are more sensitive to the signs of ethnic discrimination, which is a natural psychological consequence of salient group identity according to social identity theories and in line with the subsequent group consciousness hypothesis (H6a).

Based on the existing empirical evidence and the theoretical assumptions of group consciousness, it can be expected that for the second, British-born generation, ethnic grievances should be more politically relevant. First generation minorities are more likely to accept signs of discrimination as part of their immigration experience and compare their economic situation with their counterparts in the country of origin, whereas subsequent generations are more likely to compare themselves with the white-British population (Heath et al. 2013). There is quite strong empirical evidence from American studies showing that politicized group consciousness is present more strongly among the second generation individuals, who are better acculturated than minority newcomers (Smith 2014)[35]. Potential inter-generational differences of the effect of ethnic grievances on electoral and non-electoral participation were assessed using a likelihood ratio test (L-ratio), implemented by *complogit* procedure in Stata. This procedure, developed by Hoetker's (2004;2007), tests for subgroup variability of the effect sizes of selected coefficients in nonlinear models, while accounting for residual variance (unobserved heterogeneity). Table 5.3 shows the models with significant inter-generational differences in the effect of selected measures of ethnic grievances on non-electoral (m1) and electoral participation (m2). In line with expectations, the effects of grievances seem to be stronger for British-born generation. In the model for non-electoral ('elite-challenging') participation, the perception of linked fate (belief that non-whites are held back in a society by prejudice and discrimination) has a positive effect only for the second, British born generation. In the model for electoral participation, the negative effect of institutional discrimination is significantly stronger for the second generation (although the direction of the effect is the same for both foreign- and British- born respondents).

[35] In the literature on immigrant integration, the phenomenon of better integrated individuals having stronger perception of discrimination and more negative attitudes towards the 'host society' has been known as an 'integration paradox' (de Vroome et al. 2014).

Table 5.2. Logistic regression models for electoral participation, non-electoral participation, Labour partisanship and OLS regression model for support for 'affirmative action'.

	Electoral participation (general election)	Electoral Participation (local election)	Non-electoral participation	Labour partisanship	Support for 'affirmative action'
Controls					
BritishCitizen (ref: not citizen)	1.04**	1.119**	0.487**	-0.157	-0.184**
Gender (ref: male)	0.108	.072	-0.059	0.127	0.095**
Age_ln	1.109**	.138**	-0.058	0.345**	-0.089
HigherEducation (ref: no HE)	0.154	.059	0.654**	-0.345**	-0.144**
Explanatory variables					
Ethnic ID (H1) vs. National ID (H2)					
Commonality with Ethnic	-0.095	-.021	*-0.13**	0.048	**0.147****
Commonality with British	0.182**	.138**	*0.14**	**0.266****	
					-0.171**
Involvement in ethnic association **(H3)**	0.454**	.407**	0.587**	0.161	-0.005
Involvement in mainstream association **H4)**	*0.201**	.195*	**1.219****	0.173	
					-0.065
No grievances (H5) vs. strong grievances (H6)					
Government unfair treatment	-0.187**	-.097*	0.145**	0.006	**0.06****
Relative deprivation	0.042	.0043	-0.056	**0.1****	0.039**
Non-Whites held back	0.038	.03	0.046	**0.128****	0.235**
Trust in parliament **(H5a vs. H6a)**	0.125**	.15**	-0.038**	0.06**	0.025
Constant	-5.092**	-.514**	-1.284**	.360	**5.396**
Likelihood	2834.321	2575.043	2767.654	3213.588	
F statistic					22.176
R^2 or pseudo R^2	.148	.154	0.20	.046	0.98
N	2787	2552	2787	2787	2787

**p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .1 Unstandardised parameters estimates. Source: EMBES 2010 Note: For missing data the weighted predictive mean matching (PMM) was applied

Table 5.3 Testing the effect of ethnic grievances amongst foreign- and British- born generation (complogit)

	Non-electoral Participation (m1)		Equality of underlying coefficients L-ratio		Electoral participation (general election) (m2)		Equality of underlying coefficients L-ratio	
	Foreign-born	British-born	X2	(df)	Foreign-born	British-born	X2	(df)
Controls								
BritishCitizen (ref: not citizen)	0.52** (0.17)				0.50** (0.17)			
Gender (ref: male)	-0.31* (0.13)	0.28 (0.16)			0.04 (0.13)	0.40* (0.16)		
Age_ln	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.26)			1.37*** (0.18)	1.06*** (0.27)		
HigherEducation (ref: no HE)	0.44** (0.14)	0.96*** (0.17)			-0.31* (0.14)	0.38* (0.18)		
Commonality with Ethnic	0.05 (0.10)	0.29** (0.11)			0.10 (0.10)	0.16 (0.11)		
Commonality with British	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.13)			-0.34*** (0.09)	0.09 (0.13)		
Trust in parliament	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)			0.07** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)		
Involvement in ethnic association	0.49*** (0.15)	0.79*** (0.17)			0.41* (0.16)	0.39* (0.19)		
Involvement in mainstream association	1.38*** (0.14)	0.98*** (0.17)			0.16 (0.15)	0.33* (0.16)		
Grievances								
Government unfair treatment					**-0.11* (0.06)**	**-0.17** (0.06)**	**3.82***	**(1)**
Non-Whites held back	**-0.04 (0.06)**	**0.17* (0.07)**	**3.9***	**(1)**				
Constant	-1.66* (0.78)	-1.11 (0.99)			-3.60*** (0.77)	-3.94*** (1.03)		
N	1781	1006			1700	1006		

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Tests for equality of coefficients between generations performed using Stata command complogit, Hoetker (2004,2007), Note: For missing data the weighted predictive mean matching (PMM) was applied

5.7. Discussion

This paper offers new insights into the role of ethnic cultural assimilation and ethnic group consciousness in the political incorporation of ethnic minorities. All of the main, group-related explanatory factors (collective identity, perception of group grievances, and membership in associations) are relevant to political involvement, but interact in a more nuanced way than classic formulations of group consciousness and assimilation theories would predict.

First of all, it is important to make a distinction between different types of political outcomes while considering the role of factors related to ethnic and national loyalties. In particular, it is helpful to distinguish between the consequences of political *attitudes* and political *participation*; and between *electoral* and *non-electoral* forms of participation. As the nature of non-electoral participation is more linked with group-specific concerns, factors such as ethnic grievances and involvement in ethnic associations are more useful for predicting this type of political activity than for predicting more individualistic forms, such as voting in elections. Electoral participation, on the other hand, is better predicted by factors associated with greater assimilation into mainstream society, such as identification with the national community, political trust and a sense of civic duty.

Furthermore, ethnic-specific attitudinal outcomes, measured here by identification with the Labour party and support for affirmative action, are positively associated with ethnic grievances and ethnic identification but not with involvement in ethnic associations. Therefore, it seems that certain political preferences are shaped by ethnic group consciousness but are not related to involvement in ethnicity-specific organisations.

Interestingly, the analysis of the data shows that ethnic and national identities are positively correlated and so is membership in ethnic and mainstream associations, which leads to the conclusion that greater embeddedness in ethnic and national community is complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. This view is more in line with the communitarian philosophy of national community, which stresses the importance of equal rights for culturally distinct groups rather than national unity as associated with the more ethnic conception of nationality.

The big, positive effect of membership in ethnic associations on political participation (especially in elite-challenging forms) supports the ethnic civic community model proposed by Fennema and Tillie (1999). The argument here is that a strong ethnic civic community is often a prerequisite for political integration and can act as a gateway to

participation in mainstream politics. One of the possible explanations might be that being grounded in one's own ethnic/cultural community facilitates, rather than slows down, integration into the national community.

In sum, this paper contributes to the understanding of ethnic-specific motivations for political participation both theoretically and empirically. First, it shows that group consciousness theoretical models developed in the US need to be somewhat refined in order to be applicable to the contemporary British context. The fact that the perception of ethnic grievances increases the likelihood of non-electoral participation and decreases the likelihood of voting, needs to be taken into account while assessing the effect of politicized ethnic group consciousness. This finding is likely to reflect both the differences of historical trajectories between American and British ethnic minorities as well as the more general changes in the nature of political participation. Secondly, the theoretical models of group consciousness need to take into account generational differences, which affect the strength and politicizing effect of ethnic group grievances.

The results from this paper are also relevant to the current policy debates on political integration of established ethnic minority groups. The presented findings clearly show that it is ethnic grievances, not ethnic identity or a strong ethnic community, that hinders conventional (electoral) political involvement. Moreover, ethnic discrimination is not only negatively associated with voter turnout but also with political trust, including trust in democratic institutions, which might have the further consequence of deepening the social alienation of certain minority groups. These findings shift the focus from concerns about weakening British national identity (which tends to dominate political and public debate) towards the role of ethnic grievances, which have a much more profound effect on political integration. This has a considerable potential impact on policy; one need merely consider the attitudes around, say, the Prevent program to indicate that the lack of trust indicated by Prevent might well create ethnic grievances that push the people outside of the mainstream of British politics. Whether that results in extremism or merely self-exclusion from political involvement, the possibility clearly exists for considerable democratic loss.

6. Study 3: Do Ethnic Organisations Promote Mainstream Political Participation? Evidence from the two UK-based case studies.

Abstract

By examining the role of co-ethnic organisations, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of existing differences in mainstream political mobilisation among South Asian and Black Caribbean communities in Britain. The presented analysis is based on the case study of Bangladeshi and Caribbean organisations in Birmingham and Oldham.

Empirical studies often reach inconsistent conclusions about whether or not co-ethnic organisations facilitate political integration. Certain characteristics of organisational networks, such as density and interconnectedness of organisations, have been pointed out as possible explanations of why some ethnic organisations create greater opportunities for mainstream political involvement than others.

This paper investigated the potential role of co-ethnic organisations for political mobilisations via qualitative interviews with activists from the selected case study communities. The results from the interviews were then subjected to exploratory semantic network analysis with Leximancer, employed to identify the shared and different areas of discussion across the interviews from the two samples. These results were then used as the basis for a targeted investigation of the themes identified when evaluating the interviews on a qualitative basis.

This paper argues that somewhat of a lacuna exists within the purely quantitative research regarding substantive nature of ethnic activism. The results from the comparative case study demonstrate both that Bangladeshi and Caribbean individuals within organisations often have very different goals as groups and that this has an impact on the way they engage in politics as both individuals and groups. Bangladeshi community organisations are predominantly characterised by instrumental goals and pro-mainstream orientation, whereas Caribbean organisations are characterised by expressive goals and anti-mainstream orientation. Further, the paper argues that the existing differences can be primarily attributed to: the historical legacy of the diaspora, initial conditions and expectations of early immigrants, interpretation of the existing group's disadvantage, and the role and meaning of group identity. The study provides evidence that agency of the actors is equally important for explaining the role of ethnic civic activism as a structural characteristic of organisational networks.

Key words: ethnic organisations, political integration, political agency, Bangladeshis, Caribbeans

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it aims to contribute to the understanding of differences in political integration outcomes between South Asians and Caribbeans in Britain by examining the role of ethnic organisations in the two case study communities. According to some, ethnic organisations are one of the key factors affecting political integration outcomes. For example, advocates of civic community model argue that ethnic organisations are "the cradle of civic engagement" for immigrant-origin groups (Fennema and Tillie 1999, p. 31). In this view, the vibrancy of ethnic civic community is one of the major predictors of overall political engagement. Secondly, the paper intends to draw attention to the importance of political agency of ethnic activists – the factor that has been largely omitted in the theoretical conceptualisations of ethnic civic community. In particular, the dominant, quantitative tradition of research investigating the link between ethnic organisations and political participation, has focused on structural characteristics of organisational networks, and largely ignored the 'human factor', that is the agency of the actors who form such organisations.

Empirical evidence from Britain shows that among established ethnic minorities, South Asians are considerably more 'visible' in British politics compared to Black Caribbeans. Most notably, they have higher descriptive representation in local councils, higher electoral turnout (especially in local elections) (Dancygier 2010; Laurence & Maxwell 2012; Maxwell 2012), and more trust in British democratic institutions (Heath et al. 2013).

Empirical studies examining ethnic organisations in different minority communities suggest that Caribbeans tend to have more dispersed and less cohesive networks compared to South Asians(Campbell & McLean 2002). Some qualitative studies reported the perceived lack of group 'solidarity' or group 'unity' among Afro-Caribbean communities, contrasting them with South Asians, who were portrayed as having "vastly superior mobilising skills, and to be better organised and assertive in protecting their group rights" (Campbell & McLean 2002, p. 652). A number of political scientists recognized the apparent lack of effective organizational structures among Caribbean (or Afro-Caribbean) communities as one of the reasons for their lower levels of political representation. It has been argued that lack of efficient organizational structures undermines the capacity of Caribbean communities to access public resources, create political pressure, and in consequence, leads to lower political influence (Garbaye 2005, Laurence and Maxwell

2012). In contrast, Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups have been regarded as those with high mobilisation capacity, often attributed to the cohesive social networks (formal and informal), and influential ethnic leaders capable of mobilising their community and promote ethnic candidates in local elections (Dancygier 2010, Givens and Maxwell 2012). Furthermore, the evidence based on 2010 EMBES data presented in the Chapter 5, shows that membership in ethnic organisations has positive effect on both electoral and non-electoral participation among South Asian groups but only on non-electoral among Black Caribbean and Black Africans.

Based on the aforementioned empirical evidence, there are good reasons to presume that inter-ethnic differences in political integration outcomes are associated with the differences in ethnic social capital. However, the nature of the relationship between formal ethnic organisational networks and political integration outcomes is still not well understood. As noted by Jacobs and Tillie (2004, p.422) "*the issue should be addressed as to why—if this is the case—there is a link between social capital (participation in associational life), political trust and political participation and whether this link is always unequivocal.* It has to be discovered what exactly in associations is responsible for this effect. In doing this, not only do the types of organisation and their activities have to be taken into account, but there should equally be attention paid to different kinds of networks in which associations are potentially embedded". This study attempts to contribute to further the understanding of the 'why' question posed by Jacobs and Tillie. The comparative case study conducted in the two communities, who represent distinctive styles of political involvement, and, at the same time, who function within the same national and local political structure, provides a good opportunity to compare and hypothesise whether and why ethnic organisations might influence the political integration outcomes.

6.2. Existing Explanations

Two main streams of literature provide a theoretical background that is helpful for explaining the role of ethnic organisational networks for political mobilisation. The first focuses on the reasons why ethnic organisations in general can increase political mobilisation. The second concentrates on existing differences between broadly understood

ethnic networks that could provide rationale for why South Asians are more visible in British politics than Black Caribbeans.

Much of the existing literature appears to support the hypothesis that ethnic organisations have positive effects on political participation. Theoretical arguments usually focus on group level resources generated through organisational networks that compensate for the lower individual level resources possessed by members of minority groups. In particular, it is claimed that resources generated through involvement in ethnic organisations can generate civic skills, social, economic, and human capital (Klandermans et al. 2008). Human capital is regarded not only as an individual but also a community-level resource here. Fennema and Tillie (1999) identify the potential for ethnic organisations to build not only on aggregated level of skills and to gain power by the sheer number of participants but also through a snowball effect of social capital The ethnic civic community model draws upon Putnam's argument asserting that ethnic associational networks generate social trust, which spills over into political trust and, in turn, increases the likelihood of political engagement (Putnam 2000). Unlike Putnam, however, Fennema and Tillie do not differentiate the effects of bonding (co-ethnic) and bridging (inter-ethnic) social capital. In their view, either type of associations is beneficial for awakening civic spirit and facilitating political involvement.

Political mobilisation capacity is often explained by the "strength in numbers" argument that is the hypothesis that the size of ethnic networks and spatial concentration of co-ethnics should play a positive role for political mobilisation, and in consequence, lead to greater political representation (Leighley 2001; Maxwell 2012). In particular, according to Maxwell (2012), high mobilisation capacity is the main factor that explains the high political representation of South Asian minorities in local councils in Britain. I discuss Maxwell's argument in more detail in the next section, which explicitly focuses on the existing explanations of inter-ethnic differences in political integration.

Finally, co-ethnic networks can generate psychological resources, such as sense of group solidarity, political efficacy, and group consciousness. Theoretical formulations of group consciousness vary considerably across the literature, however they usually focus on three main elements: sense of commonality (group identity), recognition of the disadvantaged position of own group, and a belief that own fate is linked to the fate of the group. Given this, the research being undertaken here offers the ability to judge that type of communality via both the qualitative interpretation of the interviews and the formal evaluation of word frequency through automated semantic network analysis.

The classic formulation of group consciousness by Miller et al. (1981) emphasized the necessity for members of the group to attribute their lower status to systemic, not individualistic, causes. This means that disadvantaged minorities must perceive their relative deprivation as illegitimate and somewhat independent from their individual efforts. The group consciousness argument gained particular popularity in American literature and has been often applied to explain exceptionally high voting turnout among Afro-Americans after the Civil Rights Movement.

In the UK context, group consciousness has been largely absent from the subject literature, with the exception of recent work by Sobolewska et al. (2015) that has found some support for the group consciousness claims. Based on the analysis of 2010 EMBES[36], the authors found the supporting evidence for the mobilising effect of ethnic places of worship through increased levels of personal efficacy and heightened perception of discrimination. Interestingly, however, this effect was significant only for the South Asian and not for Black Caribbean groups. These results suggest that, in the UK context, group consciousness might operate differently for different ethnic groups, and might represent a somewhat different phenomenon to the one identified in the American literature. In this paper, it is therefore suggested that differences in types of group consciousness among Bangladeshi and Caribbean community activists help foster understanding of political mobilisation capacity of their co-ethnic organisations It is also suggested that the differences and the reasons for those differences represent an important lacuna within the existing research, and that the investigation of this area is both original and of considerable theoretical importance.

It is important to stress here that the positive impact of ethnic organizational networks on political involvement is not undisputed. Arguments with the view that only mainstream organisations have a positive effect on political involvement usually treat ‘contact’ (with mainstream society versus co-ethnics) as a moderator of the relationship between resources and political engagement. Resources generated through mainstream organisations are, from this perspective, more relevant for participating in mainstream politics than resources generated through involvement in ethnic organisations (e.g. Uslaner & Conley 2003). Furthermore, ethnic associations can potentially reinforce separate ethnic identities and slow down acculturation (Lien et al. 2003; Huntington 2004), and, as a consequence, decrease interest in mainstream politics. According to some, involvement in

[36] 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study

ethnic associations is more likely to have positive impact on increased interest in immigrant-related political issues or politics of the country of origin rather than in the mainstream politics of the host society (Morales & Pilati 2011; Wong 2005).

Structuralist approaches recognise political opportunity structure as another potential intervening variable. For example, Pilati and Morales (2016) observed that ethnic organisations have a stronger effect on political mobilisation in closed, rather than, open political systems. However, political opportunity structure does not aid in understanding the differences between South Asian and Black Caribbean political mobilisation capacity in the UK because both groups function within the same political system. In particular, it is argued in this paper that the research being undertaken avoids this pitfall largely because of the tightly knit group of subjects; setting aside the nationwide differences of the UK, the differences in the council concerned are extremely minor. This, again, is relatively unusual in the research literature and appears somewhat of a strength when compared to much of the existing theoretical work.

The second branch of literature, which focuses on the differences between South Asian and Black Caribbean political mobilisation, generally points out two main explanations**:** **trade-offs** between different types of integration (Maxwell 2012; 2013; 2008) and the importance of pre-existing **kinship networks** (e.g.Garbaye 2005; Dancygier 2010, 2014; Anwar 1979,1991)[37]. The trade-off explanation, most influentially developed by Maxwell (2012) explains the potential 'costs' of better social and economic integration, which might be lower capacity for political mobilisation and more negative political attitudes. Maxwell stressed the importance of the dynamic relationship between different areas of integration. Accordingly, greater social integration can lead to aggregate-level trade-offs in political and economic outcomes if minority groups face significant levels of discrimination in mainstream society. The primary reason for the negative effect of social integration on political and economic outcomes is **limited group mobilisation capacity**. Caribbeans are typically perceived as more socially integrated (higher rates of intermarriage) and more dispersed (lower spatial segregation) than South Asians. However, similar to South Asians (particularly Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), they also suffer significant levels of discrimination. In fact, they report higher levels of perceived discrimination than South Asians (Heath et al. 2013; Maxwell 2014). On the other hand, South Asians are less socially integrated and more clustered together (e.g. over 80% of

[37]For a comprehensive review see: Tatari 2012

Bangladeshis live in areas of high concentration of their co-nationals, see: Maxwell 2012). This is believed to increase their political group mobilization capacity and, as a result, begets higher representation in local councils. As such, social segregation, or more precisely, co-ethnic concentration, enables individuals to use their co-ethnic networks both for economic survival and for creating political pressure. For example, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) show that living among co-ethnic groups increases voter turnout among South Asians. Given this, some level of social pressure appears to apply that can be at least correlated with co-ethnic concentration and the ensuring organisations that tend to exist around the UK's South Asian communities.

According to the trade-off argument, the main intervening variables that moderate the negative effect of social integration are discrimination and economic resources. If the socially-integrated group does not suffer from discrimination and economic disadvantage, social integration should not lead to political (and economic) trade-offs. A similar rationale has been proposed to explain more negative political attitudes, especially lower trust in parliament and higher scepticism on the condition of British democracy. A number of authors (Waters 1999; Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Heath et al. 2013; Maxwell 2008) identified two potential mechanisms through which assimilation (especially cultural assimilation) can culminate in negative political attitudes. First, higher assimilation creates higher expectations, which when unfulfilled generate more negative attitudes. Secondly, greater assimilation leads to higher awareness and sensitivity to discrimination, and, in turn, to more negative evaluation of political institutions and, ultimately, lower political trust. The second frequently cited reason for the relative advantage of South Asians is the existence of strong kin networks that have helped the constituent individuals gain local political power and effectively lobby for state-controlled resources (Anwar 1979; Peace & Akhtar 2015; Akhtar 2009; Garbaye 2005; Dancygier 2010b). The pre-existing links of kin- and patronage-style politics, 'transplanted' to Britain through chain migration, have been often employed to support the basis for the phenomena of bloc voting among South Asian communities.

In sum, both the trade-off argument and the argument for the importance of the strong kin networks offer helpful insights into the dynamic between different aspects of integration among disadvantaged and stigmatized minorities. However, these explanations also have significant limitations. For one, the differences between Caribbean and Bangladeshi/Pakistani economic outcomes are not very large. Both groups face

comparable disadvantages in the labour market[38]. Secondly, despite notably higher rates of intermarriage among Caribbeans, they tend to live in highly-deprived areas, just like Bangladeshis and Pakistanis (see for example: Jivraj & Khan 2013). Therefore, they are discernibly more socially integrated in terms of intermarriage but not necessarily in terms of residential patterns and economic outcomes. Moreover, the fact that they do not face language barriers, are more familiar with British culture and come from more democratic countries should play a positive role in their political integration. The second argument, highlighting the importance of kinship networks, is beneficial mostly for comprehending the political involvement among first generation South Asians, though does not necessarily account for higher participation rates among the second generation. According to Akhtar (2012), young people born and raised in the UK largely reject patronage-style politics based on patriarchal kin relationships because it does not engage with their needs and concerns; given that the rates of participation do not hugely fall, it appears that a community-wide attitude to participation is perhaps more central to the rates in both generations than the form of organisation formed.

The explanations based purely around co-ethnic concentration, ethnic networks and resultant local mobilisation do not appear to be entirely satisfactory in the UK context; differences in behaviour between groups are not wholly explained by constituency level factors such as level of concentration when some patterns of behaviour also differ outside the constituencies where the ethnic group is most heavily represented. As such, the behaviour must somewhat be explained through community attitudes on the individual level given the lack of incentive to vote as a member of a bloc.

In addition, several recent studies have shown that there is no consistent, significant association between ethnic density and civic engagement or between ethnic density and volunteering (Stafford et al. 2010). Given this, it would appear that high co-ethnic concentration does not always promote participation in co-ethnic, nor inter-ethnic organisations. Finally, the effect of quantity and interconnectedness of ethnic organisations on political participation (ethnic civic community argument) is not consistent across different political contexts and various ethnic groups (Jacobs et al. 2004; Togeby 2004; Morales & Giugni 2011), and so, given the differences, it would appear that the shared

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[38] In terms of the commonly used measures of the labour market 'success', such as levels of economic activity, full-time (rather than part-time) employment, levels of unemployment, over-qualification, and average weekly income, Caribbean men tend to be significantly more disadvantaged than Caribbean women, whereas, for Bangladeshi/Pakistanis, the opposite is true. Overall, however, the levels of disadvantage of both groups are similar. See for example: (Nazroo & Kapadia 2013; Rafferty 2012; Cheung 2014; Dustmann et al. 2003)

attitudes of the community as individuals are more of a driver of engagement than the structural characteristics of co-ethnic networks.

My argument

The explanations offered by the literature on co-ethnic organisations as well as that which exists on inter-ethnic differences between Afro-Caribbeans and South Asians do not consider differences in ethnic community activism among different groups. The proposed arguments concentrate on structural factors, such as number of co-ethnic organisations, size of ethnic community, spatial clustering of co-ethnics, and kinship structure. This type of approach has two major limitations. Firstly, the empirical evidence for the positive relationship between these structural features of ethnic organisations is not uniform across all ethnic groups and political contexts. Second, these explanations feature rather deterministic perspectives on ethnic community activism and do not leave much room for political agency. It is argued here that an important factor largely omitted by quantitative research is the nature of ethnic community activism. The qualitative case study approach adopted in this research, allows to look inside the 'black box', that is to examine how ethnic activists (the actors) perceive the role of ethnic organisations for their local communities, and to understand *what*, *how*, and *why* they try to achieve. The presented results suggest that Bangladeshi organisations predominantly developed pro-mainstream and instrumental types of activism, whereas Caribbean organisations are predominantly characterised by anti-mainstream and expressive goals. Further, it is suggested that the existing differences in the role of ethnic community activism are shaped by the dominant narratives of collective identity and interpretation of the existing group's disadvantage. Given this, the paper will theorize how the research findings fit within the existing literature on ethnic political participation. In particular, it will evaluate how the Bangladeshi and Caribbean ethnic community activism fits into the theories of ethnic civic community and group consciousness.

6.3. Methodology

6.3.1. Case study approach

The adopted research strategy was guided by the methodological pragmatism assumptions (for discussion see: Chapter 3). The research design as well as data collection

procedures were selected based on their usefulness for answering research questions. The comparative case study approach was chosen as the best strategy to aid the understanding of:

(1) the ways co-ethnic organisations might contribute to political mobilisation of the studied communities; and
(2) what mechanisms determine the character of ethnic community activism and its politicizing role.

The understanding of the term "comparative case study" adopted here followed the definition proposed by Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) as *" a method of obtaining a 'case' or a number of 'cases' through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context. The comparative case study is the systematic comparison of two or more data points ('cases') obtained through the use of the case study method".* The primary purpose of the qualitative investigation was to explore how local activists perceive the role of their ethnic organisations, and how the activities of these organisations might be related to political mobilisation of local minority communities. According to Brady (2004), a case study, which aims to get inside the 'black box' (in this case co-ethnic organisations), and explore the perceptions of the actors (in this case community activists) in order to contribute to understanding the causal mechanisms can be described as "causal-process observation". The primary focus of such study is on the 'cases' themselves (descriptive character) with an intention to provide 'feedback' to the existing theoretical explanations (in this case to the theoretical propositions of 'ethnic civic community model' and 'group consciousness theory'), as well as to generate new hypotheses. In the widely used classification proposed by Lijphart (1971), the presented case study can be classified as a combination of 'interpretative' and hypothesis-generating ('heuristic') types[39].

According to Gerring (2006), all descriptive and explanatory studies need to translate research questions into prepositions (or 'speculations') based on the existing literature about what the expected findings might be. The prepositions that served to anchor the empirical investigation and interpretation of this study were based on social identity and group consciousness theories (for discussion see: Chapter 2), and ethnic

[39] After a number of prominent publications in 1970s (Lijphart 1971; Eckstein 1975; George 1979) there was an outbreak of publications on qualitative methodology, which resulted in a number of different taxonomies of (qualitative) case studies. For a comprehensive overview of different typologies, see for example: (Stoecker 1991).

organisations were treated here as identity-based social networks. These theoretical presuppositions certainly affected both *how* the research was conducted and *what* has been found, however, such epistemological subjectivity is regarded as an inevitable part of qualitative research.

6.3.2. The choice of case studies and data collection procedures

The choice to focus on Caribbean and Bangladeshi organisations has been dictated by the rule of case selection based on the variation in the values of the dependent variable (in this case the dependent variable was a broadly understood political integration). Bangladeshi and Caribbean groups represent quite extreme cases in terms of their patterns of political (and socio-economic) integration.[40] The choice to focus on Bangladeshi rather than Indian or Pakistani communities was dictated by two reasons: (1) the Bangladeshi group, despite being the most disadvantaged, has arguably achieved the most significant inter-generational progress (especially in terms of their educational attainment and levels of women's labour market participation) among all ethnic minorities (see for example: Lymperopoulou & Parameshwaran 2013; Potter-Collins 2014); and (2) they are more similar in size to the Caribbean group, which (in theory) means that they have more similar opportunities to achieve political representation of Caribbeans than much larger Pakistani and Indian communities.[41]

The main phase of qualitative fieldwork was conducted in Birmingham, and the follow-up phase (which involved only Bangladeshi group), was carried out in Oldham. The choice of the main fieldwork location– Birmingham – was mainly driven by practical reasons. Birmingham city has the largest population of both Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities outside of London (Harris et al. 2014), which provided a good opportunity to examine a large variety of local ethnic organisations. Furthermore, both communities have had a long history of settlement in this city, and managed to achieve a significant level of recognition and influence in the local city council, however, at different points in time (Garbaye 2005; Solomos & Back 1995; Eade 1994; Saggar 2000). The follow-up phase was conducted in Oldham, which represents another exemplary location of high

[40]As pointed out in the earlier sections, Bangladeshis, similarly to Pakistanis, have some of the highest levels of both electoral turnout and trust in British democratic institutions. Caribbeans, on the other hand, are situated on the opposite end of the political integration continuum – they have the lowest levels of trust in police and British parliament; and are less likely to turn up to vote than South Asian minorities (Maxwell 2012).

[41]African minority (the fifth main ethnic group in the UK) was not considered here due to their much higher internal diversity and more recent arrival in the UK.

concentration of Bangladeshi community (DCLG 2009). The follow-up phase was carried out with an intention to seek “analytical generalization”[42], that is to check whether the patterns of findings were similar to those from the main phase of the study. Initially, the follow-up stage aimed to include Caribbean group, however, due to the time constraints, and difficulties of finding appropriate participants from Caribbean background, the second phase had been limited to Bangladeshis only. Issues around this did exist, and are discussed in the discussion section in detail.

The data collection procedure consisted of semi-structured interviews[43] with activists from the local Bangladeshi and Caribbean organisations. The duration of interviews varied between 30 minutes and 2 hours. The fieldwork used a purposeful sampling strategy of ethnic activists because, as noted by Creswell (2007, p. 125), this strategy provides an opportunity to select participants who “can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study”; in short, the sample is designed to produce informed opinion rather than a cross-section of the whole community. The interviewed activists held key positions in the selected organisations, which meant that they had extensive knowledge about all the activities of their organisations as well as about local ethnic community. Particular ethnic organisations were chosen following the preliminary screening, which aimed to identify the most active and visible local ethnic organisations. This preliminary research was based on the UK Charity Commission website, local newspapers, ethnic minority internet forums, social media groups, and conversations with ethnic communities’ members in the fieldwork locations. In total, 40 interviews were conducted during the two phases of the fieldwork. This included 15 interviews with Caribbean activists and 15 interviews with Bangladeshi activists from Birmingham, and additional 10 interviews with Bangladeshi activists from Oldham (for the list of all the interviews and demographic characteristics of participants see: Appendix F). All the interviews were transcribed and anonymised by removing all the information that could enable to identify either the interviewed individuals or the particular organisations they worked in. Due to the fact that local community activists constitute a relatively small circle of people, they are referred to in very broad terms (usually indicating the type of organisation they work in) throughout the paper in order to ensure anonymity.

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[42] Unlike statistical generalisation, the multi-case qualitative study seeks ‘analytical generalisation’, which can be defined as *‘the extent to which the findings in one study can be generalized to another under similar theoretical, and the proximal similarity model, where generalizability of one study to another is judged by similarities between the time, place, people and other social contexts’* Leung 2015, p. 325)

[43] For the general topic guide as and participant information sheet see: Appendices H and I

6.3.3. Methods of analysis

The interview data has been analysed using the conceptual and relational content analysis approach. Conceptual analysis is usually considered as the first step of relational analysis, and can be simply defined as a process of coding the textual data into meaningful categories that are informative in the context of the research questions. (Colorado State University 2006). After achieving the manageable number of coded concepts, the relational (semantic) analysis was conducted in order to examine the relationships between the extracted concepts. According to Colorado State University (2006), relational analysis serves to identify the groups of interrelated concepts that are believed to 'reflect conscious or subconscious perceptions of reality'. To reflect the structure of relationships between the most frequently occurring concepts in the interview data, the computer-assisted semantic maps were produced separately for the two samples of interviews. Both the coding and semantic (relational) analysis was performed in the Leximancer software. The technical details of the procedures used are discussed in the following sections.

6.3.4. Rationale for using Leximancer

Leximancer software is usually applied to identify the main concepts from the text whilst providing robust statistical data around the links between words, which allows to avoid conscious and unconscious bias on the part of the researcher. This is a major advantage in a field of textual data analysis as it allows for the generation of reproducible results. This alsoenables for the use of the same methodology across datasets, and a considerable opportunity for further research for any researcher that can obtain further interview transcripts to analyse. The program generates both visual concept maps and statistical outputs, allowing for the identification of correlations between terms that may not be immediately obvious when reading through each interview individually (Wu et al., 2014). Leximancer's analysis is highly stable and reproducible, which is equivalent to inter-coder reliability (see Smith & Humphreys, 2006, for a detailed discussion). Within the context of this research, Leximancer has been used to identify the conceptual structure of the data (the main themes, concepts and relationships between them) whilst providing links to larger text extracts in the input data where the extracted concepts and themes appear. This enabled an in-depth analysis and contextualised interpretation of the automatically extracted concepts and themes.

6.3.5. Technical details

Leximancer employs proximity values for text mining (Smith & Humphreys 2006) to automatically identify the concepts in textual data. Words that frequently occur in the text are treated as concepts and are coded automatically. The clusters of words that frequently occur together in the text are treated as themes. The software includes an interactive mapping tool, which provides a visual overview of the main concepts, themes and the relationships between them. In the semantic map, clusters of concepts grouped by colour-coded bubbles constitute themes. Each theme is named after the most prominent concept in that group, which is also indicated by its' most central position in the theme cluster. The software enables to manually rename themes when appropriate (some of the automatically extracted themes were renamed here to better reflect their meaning). The map visually represents the strength of association between frequently occurring concepts (words) and provides an overview of the semantic structure of the data. A few technical operations were applied here in order to obtain meaningful semantic maps from the transcripts of the interviews: (1) interviewer's questions and comments were excluded from the text of the transcripts in order to solely analyse the content of interviewees' speech; (1) the meaningless words such as "I'm", "the", "of", "on" were excluded; (2) the number of extracted concepts was customised in order to minimize the noise and achieve interpretable results. This then enabled the identification of the semantic structure of the interviews before qualitative investigation and interpretation of the identified themes was conducted.

6.2. Results

6.2.1. Overview of the automated semantic network analysis with Leximancer

Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 display the semantic concept maps generated from the interview data, consisting of 17 main themes from the interviews with Caribbeans and 15 main themes from the interviews with Bangladeshis. These results have been listed in order of relative importance as determined by the frequency of occurrence and interconnectedness with other themes. The most frequently occurring words (referred to as 'concepts') are represented by smaller grey nodes, and frequently co-occurring concepts (referred to as 'themes') are marked by the coloured bubbles. The extracted themes

represent focal points of the interviewees' narratives about their organizational work, their co-ethnic community, and political engagement. The most important themes – which in both samples were 'people' and 'community' – were assigned the red bubbles, and then in descending order of importance the remaining themes were assigned orange, yellow, green, blue, and purple bubbles. The more the concepts were connected *within* a particular theme, the richer the meaning the theme expressed. The more common the theme or concept was, the more central the position on the map. In total, 100 key concepts were identified by Leximancer in the interviews with Caribbeans and 89 concepts in the interviews with Bangladeshis. These results were then used to generate topics for investigation, focussing in particular on areas where the greatest difference in frequency of discussion existed.

Figure 6-1. Semantic Network Map (SNM) conducted in Leximancer based on the interview data from the Caribbean sample



Main themes: **people (1190), community (785), black identity (783)**, school (554), art (297), white (167), council (161), experience (160), police (111), prison (71), job (49), cases (28), street (23), respect (19), position (19), concerned (15), structure (14)*

*Numbers in parentheses indicate the frequency of occurrence

Figure 6-2. Semantic Network Map (SNM) conducted in Leximancer based on the interview data from the Bangladeshi sample.

Main themes:* ***community (1342), people (1232), education (588),*** *women (298), politics (291), culture (281), council (267), events (181), language (148), students (117), problem (102), voting (97), learning (61), charity (57), funding (39)*

*Numbers in parentheses indicate the frequency of occurrence

These figures show a difference in emphasis between the two groups, with both different themes and a different emphasis in the themes addressed by them. As an example, the two central themes– 'people' and 'community' - were correlated with different sets of concepts in the two samples. In the interviews with Caribbeans, the theme 'people'

contained concepts that referred to the racial struggle (e.g. ‘face’, ‘angry’, ‘riots’, ‘discrimination’, ‘justice’), whereas in the interviews with Bangladeshis, the same theme contained references to either initial immigration experience (e.g. ‘barrier’, ‘restaurant’, ‘young’, ‘business’) or to the community progress (e.g. ‘opportunity’, ‘knowledge’, ‘successful’). This first order data was then used to generate subject areas to consider. This was done by using Leximancer to connect each of the extracted concepts with larger text extracts from the original data input (in this case to the interviews’ transcripts), giving an opportunity to examine all the contexts in which the concepts were appearing in the interviews in order to make meaningful interpretations.

Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4 show alternative visual representations of the main themes and concepts derived from the interviews. The ‘theme heat maps’ (Figure 6-3) represent a direct parallel to the semantic network maps. Each of the themes has an assigned colour bar, which corresponds to the colour of the SNM bubbles. Additionally, the numbers in parentheses indicate how many times each of the themes was mentioned by Caribbean and Bangladeshi interviewees. The clustered graph of the selected popular concepts depicted in Figure 6-4, provides an overview of some of the striking differences of the terms frequently used by Caribbean and Bangladeshi interviewees. Particularly, it shows that the terms *black*, *African*, *racism,* and *identity* were frequently used by Caribbean interviewees, whereas the terms *education*, *development*, *city council*, *change*, *English*, *improvement*, *women* were more common among Bangladeshi interviewees.

The difference in emphasis based on the ethnicity of the respondent here is, in and of itself, an interesting result given that the interviewees come from the same area and might be expected to have many inherently intersectional concerns. A primary focus thus became the comparison of the two sets of interviews to identify the areas of difference as much as similarity.

Figure 6-3 Theme 'heat maps'.



Figure 6-4 Popularity of the selected terms by ethnic groups.



* Lighter colour indicates higher frequency
** Words are grouped by their co-occurrence

In the discussion that follows, the results from the SNM are contextualised by connecting the automatically extracted terms with the full text of the interviews. The

Leximancer features enable to connect each of the extracted concepts with larger text extracts from the original data input (interviews' transcripts). This gives an opportunity to examine broader context associated with the extracted concepts in order to make meaningful interpretations.

The qualitative examination of the large text extracts, allowed to separate all the automatically extracted themes into four broad analytical categories: **group identity**, **community needs and concerns**, **organisational activity**, and **politics**.[44] A number of the themes were classified into more than one category. Such themes contained a large number of highly interconnected concepts, which occurred in multiple contexts (in the SNM they were usually placed in the overlapping area of two or more themes). For instance, in the interviews with Caribbeans, the theme black identity contained concepts that were highly relevant both for the construction of ethnic identity as well as for the content of the main community needs and concerns. In the interviews with Bangladeshis, the theme education was included in three out of four main categories (group identity, community needs and concerns, and organisational activity) because of its centrality in the content of activists' narratives and high interconnectedness with multiple themes.

In the subsequent sections, the substantive discussion of the results has been organised by the distinguished analytical categories, with the focus on a comparison between the two case studies. Figure 6-5 (below) provides a schematic 'roadmap' of the main findings.

[44]The classification of the themes and concepts into the four main analytical categories is available in Table F.1

Figure 6-5. Key identified elements that influenced the ways activists perceived the role of ethnic organisations.



6.2.2. Construction of collective identity

The analytical category 'ethnic identity' deals with activists' narratives about their co-ethnic community and the factors shaping their group identity. The main concepts reflecting the construction of group identity among both Caribbean and Bangladeshi interviews were clustered around the theme, 'people'. The associated text extracts showed that interviewees frequently used the word 'people' in reference to their co-ethnics, e.g. by using expressions such as 'our people' or 'Bangladeshi/Caribbean/black people'. In the Caribbean sample, other themes primarily associated with this category were *black identity*, *white*, and *police*. In the Bangladeshi sample, apart from the theme, *people*, other themes that were clustered around group identity were *students*, *education*, *culture*, and *language*. Further analysis of the text extracts associated with these themes enabled to identify key elements/reference points that influenced how activists constructed their narratives about their group identity. These primary reference points were: (1) memories of key historical events that influenced the trajectories of co-ethnic community; (2) influential role models; (3) initial experience of the first settlers; (4) cultural and political regime of the country of origin; and (5) reflections on the current form and role of one's ethnic identity. The subsequent sections discuss how these elements differed among Caribbean and Bangladeshi activists

6.2.2.1. Caribbeans: reactive identity

Among Caribbean interviewees, the themes central to group identity - 'people', 'black identity', 'white', and 'police' - were strongly rooted in the discourse on race, African culture and history, experience of discrimination, and negative stereotypes of black people. For the Caribbeans, ethnic identity was apparently concerned with the role of race and power relations in Western societies.

This appeared to indicate an essentially adversarial relationship where the British state was viewed as the oppressor of the community as a whole to the extent that the 'trauma' described still formed an essential origin story that contextualised the ongoing relationship between the hegemonic white culture and the arguably structurally oppressed community.

Historical trajectories of people of African heritage are noted across the literature as having played an important role in the construction of collective black identity, and these claims appear supported by the way that the history of colonialism and slavery frequently resonated in the activists' narratives. A number of Black Caribbeans, and especially those involved in pan-Africanist organisations, used an expression 'historical trauma of slavery' to reflect its prominence in the construction of black identity. Caribbean activists were generally highly critical of the way black history has been taught in British schools and reflected on its detrimental consequences for the perception of black identity among younger generations.

The following example presents a typical view on the importance of black history for understanding black communities and black identity as expressed by one of the interviewees working around human and race rights issues:

"Whilst Europe was being built and growing, Africa was being deprived of its wealth and then we were dispersed through the diaspora. Therefore, that's why one writer says we were on the same ship but not the same deck. Because of that historical legacy – the Atlantic slave trade. It still impacts our community today. We need to know, our young people need to know, not only about the slave master's whip across the Atlantic. We need to know what was prior to that, when we were kings and queens and princesses and merchants. That history has not been taught. We need to know where we're going before. It's not easy, some people say, "Well, forget it." No, it's still impacting our social and economic situation today. That enslavement has not been addressed." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

Caribbeans also talked about the need to place 'blackness' in a broader historical, social, and political context, especially its meaning for understanding power relationships in Western societies and its influence on the current situation of Black Caribbeans in Britain. This was especially evident in the narratives of those who were involved in current academic and art discourses. One of the activists described his reflections after visiting the Chicago Holocaust Museum in the following words:

"I remember being in Chicago when they had the Holocaust Museum and they actually included slavery – they included multiple oppressions. It was very interesting…the fact that

in Chicago we felt that we were part of a historical continuum of people who've been wiped out. The African-Americans in Chicago were arguing 10 times more Africans died in slavery than the Jewish community. In the black community, it's not really referred to as slavery, it's called the black Holocaust."

It is particularly notable here that the state is portrayed as the active oppressor of the community rather than merely a passive observer. This might be argued to be of central importance to attitudes to the British state, as the claim that the actions of slavery still has a major impact on the status of the community within the UK is inherently a fundamental challenge to the neoliberal image of the state identified by Tronto (2013) as a caring democracy where markets, equality, and justice create a society where all participants are equal and have the opportunity to succeed. In particular, the view expressed here arguably de-emphasises the agency of the individual in favour of a narrative that is centred around the oppression of the community as a whole. Given that this is a substantial challenge to the claims underpinning the legitimacy of a pluralistic democracy where the community can participate and have the influence expected of it as an equal partner, it might be expected to lessen participation in mainstream politics.

The second point of reference, closely related to the history of slavery and racial struggle that influenced the perception of black Caribbean identity, is the legacy of prominent activists associated with the Civil Rights Movement and Pan-Africanism Movement. Figures such as Marcus Garvey, W.E.B De Bois, and Malcolm X were often cited by respondents as the inspiration and role models for contemporary black activists and black organisations. A few of the older generation activists specifically noted memories of Malcolm X's visit to Smethwick (one of Birmingham's neighbourhoods) in 1965, noting this as an important and motivational event for them at the time. A few interviewees also referred to contemporary black academics, and especially Stuart Hall, who was closely associated with Birmingham. Interviewed activists were often involved in the organisation of the events associated with the Black History Month (e.g., youth conferences, film screenings, lectures), which aimed to foster discussions about the intellectual legacy of prominent black activists. Interestingly, not only pan-Africanist supporters, but also its sceptics also discussed the importance of understanding the motivations and journeys of the fathers of black radical movement.

One of the activists involved in an art organisation, despite his critical attitudes towards current pan-Africanist organisations, said:

"If you understand people like Marcus Garvey, Angela Davis, Michael X, Malcolm X and all those kind of people, and then the African nations and Ghana. If you understand the history of those nations and where those people are coming from, it should then be able to give you a better world view."

Besides the general history of black struggle, the memories and experiences of early post-war Caribbean immigration to the UK apparently provide another point of reference in the narratives of black Caribbean identity. The inflow of Caribbean immigrants to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s was justified in politics of the time by the high demand for labour in various sectors of the post-war British economy. Interviewees often referred to this motivation, noting the fact that Caribbeans immigrants were initially encouraged to settle in Britain in order to 'do the jobs that nobody else wanted to do'. Given the fact that as Commonwealth citizens, they were granted British citizenship and full rights by the British Nationality Act 1948, the prospects of a better life in the UK were very attractive for many young people. The long period of colonisation (Caribbeans had been subjects to British rule since the 17th century) also meant that their political and educational system was highly anglicized, they were familiar with British culture, and spoke English fluently. Many Caribbeans strongly identified with Britain as their 'motherland' and were expecting to be welcomed by British people. The reality after arrival – the experience of racial discrimination in almost all areas of life – was in sharp contrast with their expectations and ideals of equality, and several respondents noted the importance of the community experience (and, often, their personal experience) of being refused housing, jobs, and entrance to public places and facilities based on their race.
An older female activist, involved in a multi-purpose Caribbean organisation, stated:

"If you had a job you didn't like and it wasn't right for you, it wasn't easy. You'd go knocking on the doors and eventually you'd be successful somewhere but…It was hard because there was a lot of racism in my day and people would tell you "Oh we're not having you because you're black..." Even not too far from here, some factories would have signs saying, "No Irish, no Blacks, no dogs" (…) If you went to the bank to borrow money for business, it wouldn't happen. That's why you see there is not so many of us in business...In the past, we could save money in the bank but we couldn't get loans... People

used to join together, put their own money together to start a business… so in those days there was more racism...it's a bit better now...”

Older activists frequently expressed their grievances about the fact that despite black people's contributions to the nation (through the experience of slavery, colonisation, and participation in re-building the country after the WWII), they were still not fully recognised as equal members of British society. One activist illustrated this on-going struggle in the following words:

“We've paid our taxes, our foreparents have paid our taxes. And in fact, we as black people have built this country twice. We've built it through enslavement, 500 years of colonial enslavement, and we have also built it from the Second World War when we were invited back here to do the minimal jobs. So we got more rights than ever to be in this country and to be a part of it. And the very fact that we have to set up organisations to see equality tells you something.”

The grievances over the past, enhanced by the perception of on-going racial discrimination, made blackness a central element to how Caribbean activists defined and talked about their ethnic identity. The primary factors that reinforced the importance of blackness for their self-image concerned the issues of institutional racism (with the most prominent example being unfair treatment by the criminal justice system and police), negative stereotypes of black people in public discourse (especially in the media), and the perceived pressure to conform to and compare themselves to ‘white’ standards. An illustrative example of the perceived pressure experienced by black people to follow the hegemonic white culture, frequently mentioned by female activists, referred to the pressure to conform to ‘white beauty standards’.

One of the pan-Africanist female activists expressed her concerns for negative images of African people in the media and its destructive impact on self-image and self-esteem among young black people:

“Media has a big influence on people's mindset. What do you think of Africa when you see images of starving children, diseases, children with big bellies? When you keep those images out there and when African people believe that their history started with slavery, who wants to associate with that?”

The comparative nature of social identities, especially the black-white dichotomy, was particularly pronounced at the times when the interviewees tried to directly define their ethnic identity. They were often coming to the conclusion that despite their British nationality, they could not escape their blackness. One of the activists reflected on the impossibility of escaping blackness and racial differentiation in the following way:

"Black people are people of African descent so we have about a dozen labels to contend with. All of them are inaccurate. What you realize is, is that a Jewish person, give me a Jewish man and he'll say, I'm a Jewish man. If you asked the question, what's a black man? It's socially constructed. I suppose what I mean is, there's a book called "Invisible Man" by a writer called Ralph Ellison and he opens it up by saying, "I'm invisible. Not because I'm a ghost in an Edgar Allan Poe story, but because society refuses to see me," and when does a black man just become a man?"

The perception of the prominent effect of racial differentiation in western societies and the perceived importance of understanding and embracing the history of racial struggle resulted in the tendency to define their ethnic identity in opposition and contrast to their British identity. (For examples see: Appendix G) A described common desire to celebrate positive black identity expressed by Caribbean activists is in line with the assumptions of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner 1979). According to SIT, reinforcement of positive ethnic identity is one of the common reactions of low status group members, hoping to challenge the status hierarchy in order to preserve their positive self-image and esteem (for discussion: see Chapter 2). In sociological literature, it is most often referred to as an example of reactive ethnicity or reactive identity. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) put forth that reactive ethnicity occurs when immigrant minorities confront an adverse native mainstream and develop defensive identities to counter it. In their pioneering study of second-generation immigrants in the US, they demonstrated that there was a tendency to reaffirm the collective worth of the in-group by identifying even more strongly with ethnic traditions and separating them from the host society (Portes and Rumaut, 2001). The term 'reactive' stresses the fact that this type of identity is a situational phenomenon that emerges in a hostile environment in order to reinforce the collective worth of 'us'.

The De Bois school of thought is that true unification is impossible when enough repression is perceived as having come from the state in question, and as noted by (Edles

& Appelrouth 2009, p. 351-252) “American blacks have lived in a society that has historically repressed and devalued them that it has become difficult for them to unify their black identity with their American identity”. Double consciousness forces blacks to not only view themselves from their own unique perspective, but to also view themselves as they might be perceived by the outside, white world. This has a major impact, in that the social construction of blackness that one interviewee identified is not one that can be simply disregarded by the person in question without the acquiescence of the rest of society; it is an imposed archetype as much as a community-driven one.

6.2.2.2. Bangladeshis: symbolic identity

Bangladeshi activists linked ‘people’ with strikingly different statements, frequently linking the term into a narrative of socioeconomic and educational progress. Many of the statements made focused on the positive changes in their community and compared their current educational, social, and economic position with the conditions faced by the initial Bangladeshi immigrants. The main reference point for them was the socio-economic position of initial Bangladeshi settlers, and not of the white majority. The activists particularly focussed on concepts clustered around themes *students* and *education*, often mentioning educational improvement, successful professional careers among many second- and third-generation Bangladeshis, improvement of the position of women within the community, and regarding labour market participation. Although interviewees recognised their community as disadvantaged, they importantly leavened this by highlighting the areas of improvement. Crucially, this is a fundamentally different narrative to that presented by many of the Caribbean interviewees in that the broad narrative is one of progress rather than disadvantage. It is interesting to consider the likely impacts of this, but it must first be noted that the point of comparison is primarily internal (within one’s ethnic community) rather than external (white majority), which dominated in the Caribbean interviews.

The historical struggles of Bengali people were also an important part of their narratives, especially among the older generation. These struggles, however, primarily referred to the fight for the country’s independence during the Bangladesh Liberation Movement in the 1960s and the nine month Liberation war with West Pakistan in 1971. In contrast to Caribbeans, Bangladeshi interviewees did not tend to mention the experience British colonialism as a central pillar of identity. A number of the first generation

Bangladeshi activists, who came to Britain before Bangladesh was recognised as an independent state in 1971, were heavily involved in campaigning and helping to raise money to support those fighting back home. Several of the interviewees shared dramatic memories of participating in hunger strikes and being imprisoned at that time. Those who participated in those battles and emigrated to the UK to either seek political asylum or later for personal reasons were highly regarded in the community, and are often described as role models and community leaders. Many activists participated in organising annual events to celebrate critical events that helped their country emerge on the world's political stage and pay tribute to their 'founding fathers'. One such important historical moment prior to the liberation war was associated with the Bangla Language Movement – a forerunner of Bangladesh Liberation Movement, which catalysed affirmation of linguistic and national Bangladeshi identity in East Bengal. The 21st of February is annually celebrated by the Bengali community in memory of the heroic protests and deaths of Bangladeshi students in 1951 in Dhaka, who sacrificed their lives to make Bangla recognised as the state language of Pakistan. Some of the prominent British Bengali activists took part in a successful campaign that resulted in proclaiming the 21st of February an International Mother Language Day (officially recognised by UNESCO in 1999). Moreover, community activists often organised events to offer special awards to the successful British Bengali in areas such as politics, business, sport, adventure, women in business, and many others. These events usually aim to inspire the younger generation by exhibiting positive role models and provide networking opportunities.

Apart from different historical references, character, and role of influential role models, Bangladeshi narratives supply a different picture of the experiences and expectations of early Bangladeshi immigrants. Although similar to Caribbeans, Bangladeshis began settling in the UK in 1950, the majority of them arrived in Britain in the late 1960s and 1970s. The motivations to emigrate to the UK were primarily associated with the situation in their home country. Although the pull factor - filling the shortage of labour after the war - was the same for both groups, Bangladeshis also had important push factors, such as political instability, economic hardship, and fights for independence. These push factors seemed to dominate in the narratives of Bangladeshi interviewees when they talked about the context of early immigration of their co-ethnics. Although analogous to black immigrants, South Asians also experienced racial discrimination upon their arrival, and they had more 'objective' barriers to integration within British society. As British rule over Bengal was much shorter than over the Caribbean, Bangladeshis were not very

familiar with the British culture and system. The lack of knowledge of the English language as well as different religious beliefs (over 90% of Bangladeshis are Muslim) were dominant reasons identified by interviewees as responsible for difficulties experienced by first-generation immigrants. Low levels of formal qualifications combined with the lack of language knowledge[45] meant that their expectations at the time of arrival were quite low and they were rather prepared to accept unequal treatment. A typical profile of early Bangladeshi immigrants, presented by many first-generation activists, is embodied by young single males 'who jumped from the ship' with little or no formal education and a complete lack of English language skills. In contrast to Caribbeans, Bangladeshi immigrants did not feel that they were arriving to the motherland, but rather to a strange, culturally distant, foreign country.

One of the first generation interviewees summarised the journey of the Bangladeshi community in the UK as follows:

"If you look at the first generation that came [to the UK], they had no money, no language skills, strange country, cold country - lots of rain, no jobs. They got jobs and worked hard in factories, doing the night shifts that nobody wanted to do, they established themselves, brought families or if they were single, they got married, raised their children. Its taken them that generation to get to more respectable professions. Now, every profession you look at - they're Bangladeshis."

The present flows of Bangladeshi democracy, on-going political unrest and widespread corruption make Bangladeshi activists regard the British democratic system very positively. For example, one of the religious activists said:

"I think Britain is very welcoming. I think it's probably much better than most of the countries across the world. I think people may say differently, but I think Great Britain is wonderful country to live in. I really appreciate the fact that I live in the UK".

[45] According to the 1974 Survey on Ethnic Minorities, among South Asians, 15 per cent did not speak English at all and only 30 per cent spoke English fluently. The corresponding figures for the Caribbeans were 0 per cent (no English at all) and 58 per cent (fluent) (1974 Survey on Ethnic Minorities, available at: https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=427)

The typical reflections on the current situation of their own ethnic community are usually concentrated on community progress. The central element of that progress is attributed to educational advancement, sometimes perceived as a kind of on-going community project. The educational boom, which allowed many British-born Bangladeshi to enter more prestigious occupations, provided an important element of positive group self-esteem. This also creates a sense of positive identification with the British system, as it, when compared to the Bangladeshi system, is perceived as open and meritocratic. Bangladeshi activists also talk about the change of mentality among both the older and younger generations, both having become more aware of the importance of self-development.

One of the first-generation activists summarised the current and future prospects of the Bengali community with the following:

"I'm very optimistic about Bangladeshi peoples' prosperity not only in the economic sense but also the generic sense…in the politics and culturally they made the tremendous progress. There are many rich people of Bangladeshi origin, many professional people, many senior lecturers, professors, doctors, consultants, chartered accountants, good barristers, good solicitors, etc. (…) More and more people, the parents in particular, realised that education is very important and I think there has been a campaign, within the community…There is the impetus from the children themselves as well as from the parents. In the past, parents were not all that aware that it was important for them and all wanted perhaps, was that the children would just follow the ordinary work or would instruct themselves."

Contrary to Caribbeans, for the majority of Bangladeshi activists, their ethno-cultural heritage was much less central both to their organisational activity and to their self-definition. Many of them recognised and accepted that their ethnic identity was fading together with time spent in the UK and became a type of "symbolic" identity, especially for the British-born generation. In sociological literature, the term symbolic identity, introduced by Gans (1979), is typically used to refer to a type of ethnic identity that does not carry political meaning or any real social costs to the person identifying with a certain ethnic group. The term 'symbolic' identity used to refer to the Bangladeshi type of ethnic identity is not strictly understood according to the definition proposed by Gans. It would be an exaggeration to claim that Bangladeshi identity does not carry *any* political meaning.

The use of the term 'symbolic' is intended to reflect the 'non-reactive' or 'pro-mainstream' character of Bangladeshi identity.

Young Bangladeshi students often stated that they joined Bangladeshi societies to learn more about their parents' country, to socialise with other people from a similar background, and to participate in cultural events, such as Bangla New Year. Many first-generation interviewees talk about the need to accept that their offspring were becoming British and do not think of themselves in terms of their ethnicity. Frequently mentioned examples include changes of cultural consumption and the need to communicate with their children in English. However, these changes are perceived as natural and are not considered reasons for concern. Attitudes towards the importance of ethnic identity among Bangladeshi activists are in a sharp contrast to the highly-regarded importance of rediscovering one's own roots and ancestral heritage that appears in Caribbean narratives.

6.2.3. Perception of Community Needs and Concerns

The perceived ethnic community needs, identified by both Caribbean and Bangladeshi interviewees, were predominantly associated with socio-economic disadvantage and the related impacts of higher levels of poverty and career/academic attainment. However, both the identified reasons for the existing disadvantage, as well as the primary content of activists' concerns about the prospects of their communities, appeared very different. Dominant historical narratives, the context of initial immigration to the UK, expectations at the time of arrival, and cultural distance from British society, have undoubtedly shaped how Caribbean and Bangladeshi activists perceived and framed their narratives.

6.2.3.1. Caribbeans

The needs and concerns expressed by Caribbean interviewees can be classified into two sub-categories: (1) identity- related; and (2) discrimination-related. In the semantic network map (Fig. 1), the concepts associated with identity- related concerns were clustered around the theme *black identity*. The discrimination- related concerns, were in the SNM situated within the themes *school, police, prison, job, cases, street, respect, position* and *concerned* (for the description of all concepts associated with these themes and frequency of their occurrence see: Table F.1). It is worth noting that all the themes classified as 'needs and concerns' had direct or indirect connections with the theme

‘people’, indicating that they were closely associated with the activists’ narratives on group identity.

The first issue associated with the theme *black identity* was a need to learn and teach younger generation African history beyond slavery, which, according to many interviewees, has been unfairly excluded from the mainstream educational curriculum. Interestingly, such need for rediscovering African roots was commonly mentioned by both younger and older interviewees. Unsurprisingly, the Africa-centrism, especially a desire to raise awareness about African history beyond slavery was especially prominent in the interviews with pan-African activists. On a few occasions, the ‘need to learn African history’ was portrayed as a driver for establishing specific ethnic organisations (For relevant examples see: Appendix G). Furthermore, for pan-Africanists, the awareness of the journey of African people was often a way of dealing with a difficult past and was depicted as the driving force of a sense of solidarity and group consciousness. The following example illustrates the meaning of setting up a pan-Africanist organisation expressed by one of the interviewees:

“The awareness came from quite a few of us that stood against the system, those who formed this group, male and female. Through the discussion you raise that level of consciousness, that consciousness becomes clearer.”

Apart from learning African history, activists frequently mentioned the need to create safe spaces and platforms for discussion, where people from a similar background, facing similar problems, could get together and exchange their ideas. At times, political and ideological movements were viewed as a consequence of the need for rebuilding a sense of valid group identity. One of the interviewees, involved in cultural and criminal justice work, reflected:

“I think when we established our ideology, we didn't think it through. I don't really think we were revolutionary. We went through Rasta, pan-Africanism, black nationalism. We went through them to search for identity that was it. We called it all these names, but it was a search for identity and I went through all of that.”

He later added:

“For me, in today's society, I don't think it's about black nationalism even when we might be talking about Malcolm X (...), it's about having a space where we can sit down and talk first and say, what is it that we need?”

Embracing ‘blackness’ was sometimes perceived as a means to create a sense of empowerment and positive self-esteem. Some activists discussed regaining a sense of control over one’s life through establishing a valid, positive black identity. According to many, there was an apparent need among black communities to create a sense of agency and autonomy in order to facilitate an ability to address their own issues. (For examples see: Appendix G)

Acknowledging and appreciating one’s Afro-Caribbean heritage was also mentioned as a facilitator of successful integration. It was commonly viewed as a way of gaining a sense of self-confidence and self-worth, which, in turn, could render the process of embracing other cultures and defining one’s own place in society much easier. One of the activists working with Caribbean school children said:

“It's easier to take on another culture, adapt another culture, to add another culture to yours, if you're more firm in yours.
(...) I would say, one of the things I would like to see is more African history within school, generally, and also particularly around these children, whose parents don't understand that it's important, and don't instruct their children in that way. Then [they] wonder why the children don't do well and don't achieve, and don't have a high regard for self.” (For more examples see: Appendix G)

Another frequently mentioned ‘need’ referred to an urge to provide positive role models for the black youth, especially for those growing up in disadvantaged areas. Activists involved in the youth work pointed out the importance of connecting vulnerable young people with ‘positive role models’, who could show them alternative routes and, at the same time, who could relate to their experiences. The mentions of the need for providing positive role models often emerged in the context of academic under-achievement of black students. Some interviewees referred to need to promote black successful individuals in order to change the negative stereotypes and motivate black youth to have higher expectations of their career paths. Those supporting radical black movements in particular, expressed their concerns about not having own (black people’s)

voice heard in academic discourses, even in the field of black studies. One of the political activists expressed his thoughts about the lack of appropriate support and role models with the following:

"*Because youngsters who are doing well need to be supported to ensure that they excel. Then the benchmarks are set to the others, who can also see that there are alternatives. And that's important. Right now, a lot of young people can only see that by getting in trouble they're going to get some help."*

The identified 'needs' associated with black identity primary considered ideological and quite abstract issues. The second sub-group of the community 'needs', focused on the problem of discrimination, and was framed around more practical issues and examples of everyday experience. The majority of interviewed activists agreed that racism was the biggest issue facing their community. They considered it as a primary concern that needs to be addressed, and some of them perceived it as the primary reason behind their group socio-economic disadvantage. Institutional racism was believed to be particularly destructive for individuals, as it was considered a factor generating an overall sense of disempowerment. According to one of the political activists:

"The biggest issue faced by African-Caribbean community is, one of them, is the massive institutional racial discrimination that it faces. It affects them because it disempowers. It disempowers the community totally. Discrimination in this country is no longer blatant. It's very sophisticated, if you look at things like, the prime example, stop and search. I believe it's systemic."

The Caribbean interviewees usually talked about discrimination unprompted, and all of them agreed that forms of unequal treatment, based on skin colour, still existed in contemporary society. Only two out of 15 interviewees shared the opinion that racial discrimination in the UK was visibly decreasing. The rest shared an opinion that there was not much improvement over time. Activists frequently pointed out the changing nature of racism, from open to covert, but they maintained that the problem remained the same. A frequently expressed opinion was that "things have moved on, but they haven't changed". Many interviewees, referred to sociological conceptualisations of power and theories of race relations. One of the activists involved in art and criminal justice work explained:

"If you are young, white, working class male, the race differential means that working class white guy in sociological terms is positioned in a more superior role, privileged role than that black man. Where does it play out? In criminal justice. Where does it play out? In public health. Where does it play out? In education." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

Similar views on the prominent role of race, which transcend other markers of social stratification, were shared by approximately 50 per cent of the interviewees (at times, this was mentioned in a less explicit way). There was a strong perception of marginalisation and social exclusion, sometimes referred to as *denied access,* to the structures and positions occupied by the privileged. A prominent example of racism, mentioned by virtually all of the interviewees was the "stop and search" programme and criminalisation of young, black men. One of the major concerns was a widespread tolerance towards the fact that the "stop and search" programme targets ethnic minorities. Many male interviewees personally experienced being targeted on various occasions. There was a clear sense of grievance that young black men had to accept this kind of practice as 'normal'. It was also considered as having a prominent effect on how young black men perceive themselves and their place in society. An activist working with youth offenders stated:

"You can see the way they [young black men-ed.] are dealt with from the streets, within the court system, within probation, within youth offending, and then also when they reach the prisoner state whether that's youth offending whether that's an adult prison, you see all forms of discrimination."

Interviewees hold different views on the reasons for the persisting discrimination within the police force. The two most frequently mentioned reasons were related either to the flows in procedures and regulations or to a type of culture within the police force. The examples below illustrate typical reflections shared by two activists involved in criminal justice work:

“They are very good at selling themselves, but there are two problems: One is that there is this culture, canteen culture which exists within the police force; and the second one is that they fail to promote black people within the ranks how they should.”

“Some people say ‘All police officers are racist’. The reality is we know that not every police officer is racist. Impossible. However, if they are following a particular policy and procedure which means they need to target specific groups, whether or not they're a racist police officer they're holding something that is covertly racist. And that's the problem.”

Somewhat similar opinions were expressed with regards to the academic underachievement of black children and the problem with school exclusion. Some interviewees mentioned the culture of the school as an institution, which perpetuates class and racial inequalities. (For examples: see Appendix G) The Caribbean interviewees also frequently raised the issue of discrimination towards other minority groups, especially Muslims. They often criticised the government’s ‘extremism’ agenda, which, in their view, unfairly stigmatised Muslim minorities. Interestingly, they mentioned the problem of Islamophobia more frequently than the Bangladeshi interviewees, who were directly affected by it. One of the interviewees noticed:

“*So the shift has been towards, more towards, extremism as opposed to black youth. I mean, they [black young men-ed.] are still getting beaten and battered and being targeted and stopped and searched, however this whole thing around extremism just stigmatize people”.*

Finally, the activist also recognised (and criticised) the hypocritical behaviour of some members of the Afro-Caribbean community, who were behaving in discriminatory way towards new immigrant communities. (For examples see: Appendix G)

6.2.3.2. Bangladeshis

From the SNM based on the Bangladeshi interview data, the following themes were classified as primarily containing reflections about the community ‘needs and concerns’:

education, culture, language, problem (for the details of all concepts associated with these themes see: Table F.1).

The qualitative analysis of the relevant interview extracts revealed a very different story about the primary community needs and concerns identified by Bangladeshi activists than the previously discussed analysis of Caribbean interviews. In contrast to the Caribbean case, the search for and expression of ethnic identity was not mentioned by any of the Bangladeshi interviewees. Similarly, a need to tackle racial discrimination – the second important motivation discussed by Caribbean activists – did not appear as a major concern for them. Despite the fact that Bangladeshi activists discussed the significant socio-economic deprivation of their community, they almost never explicitly linked it with discriminatory treatment in the labour market or any other areas of life. On the one hand, this is quite surprising, given the evidence of the persistent 'ethnic penalty' in the labour market (Heath & Cheung 2007; Catney & Sabater 2015), and evidence of particular hostility towards Muslims that has been growing in recent years (Modood 1994; Modood & Berthoud 1997; Ford 2008). On the other hand, it confirms survey evidence about the low levels of perceived discrimination among South Asian communities (compared to Black Caribbean communities) and their positive attitudes towards British democracy (Heath et al. 2013). The vast majority of Bangladeshi interviewees perceived discrimination as a rather minor issue, and did not tend to raise this topic unprompted. Most of them shared an opinion that Britain was a 'welcoming country' for people from various backgrounds, including people of colour. Only 3 out of 25 interviewed activists agreed that some forms of racial discrimination were still a considerable barrier for achieving one's full potential in contemporary British society.[46] When explicitly asked about instances of discrimination in the labour market, Bangladeshi interviewees often expressed an opinion that the preference for hiring people from similar backgrounds was somewhat natural, and that this type of discrimination was common in every community. The extracts of the interviews discussed below illustrate typical opinions about the problem of discrimination expressed by Bangladeshi activists.

The opinion that that British labour market is highly meritocratic, and that its anti-discriminatory laws ensure that there is no space for discrimination, was shared by around

[46] It is important to note that the interviewees were conducted before the recent increase of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments related to the incidents of ISIL terrorist attacks in Belgium and France, refugee crisis and British EU referendum. It is possible that the views related to the perception of discrimination might have shifted within two years after the first wave of interviews was conducted.

50 per cent of the interviewees. One of the female activists involved in charity work summarised it as follows:

"If people have the right skills, if they show the competence, then obviously they will get the job based on their competence and skills. People who are professional... We have to just try hard. And it's the same for everybody. Whether this is someone from the white communities, black communities, brown communities, Asian, whatever you want to name… Whatever community you come from, if you're going to apply for a job, you're going to be assessed based on your skills level. If you come from abroad, then it might be a little bit tougher for you, but if you could prove that you're competent, then surely you can get the right job."

A number of activists shared an opinion that the preference for hiring people from one's own community is a natural human predilection, and that it is debatable whether such cases should be classified as discrimination. In particular, first generation immigrants seemed to be ready to accept that as foreigners, they had to try harder than the natives 'to prove themselves'. They often came to the conclusion that this form of discrimination is sometimes inescapable. Interestingly, a few interviewees referred to an example of ethnic restaurants, which normally hires co-ethnic workers as an example of discriminatory behaviour towards the white majority.

"I don't think discrimination is a big issue now… and discrimination works both ways. Bengali people discriminate British people as well. If for example, a white person wanted to work for an Indian restaurant, I don't think they would give them a job because this person wouldn't fit in there." (For more examples: see Appendix G):

One of the recurrently discussed reasons for the Bangladeshi difficulties in the labour market was the fact that they lacked appropriate social networks, and were regarded as not yet 'established' in the professional job market. One of the interviewees reflected:

"Bangladeshi people they are a new people in the professional job market, whereas for example Indians, their grandparents or their parents are already working in professional jobs. We are probably the first generation of professionals but my children will ... When they grow up it will be easier for them... You know those hints and facts. If, for example,

there is a company that my sister works in and if my son applies and she knows the person who is recruiting she can say "Oh I've got my nephew who is applying for the job ..."

The small number of interviewees, who agreed that discrimination significantly affected their community, also believed that the scale of the problem was decreasing. The instances of discrimination or prejudice usually referred to anti-Muslim sentiments. One of the first generation activists commented on the improvement with respect to social prejudice and discrimination, comparing his past and present experience:

"Jessie Jackson was the one who came to Britain and said that the black people in this country need to generate black solidarity and organisation. If you were a black person, you had to work twice as much to prove that you are equal to the white person. You had to be twice as good. These things did exist, but the things are improving. There is a lot of respect now, lot of understanding, lot of acceptance, lot of so called tolerance... I don't like the word tolerance but there is a lot of respect for other cultures, other customs other people. And people generally want to know the other peoples' cultures, customs, respecting them and so on. And it is more and more so. People's horizon of knowledge has extended and they become more sort of international than nationals."

The most important community issues identified by Bangladeshi activists referred to low levels of formal qualifications and high levels of unemployment. As previously noted, *education* was one of the main recurring themes in Bangladeshi narratives. Educational attainment was perceived as the main driver of positive changes in the Bangladeshi community, but at the same time as the main area that both community activists as well as other individuals should be focusing on. Low level of formal education, especially among the older generation, was regarded as the primary reason for the existing group disadvantage. There was a common belief that tackling the education disadvantage would ensure the prosperity of the whole community. The following example illustrates a common attitude of Bangladeshi interviewees towards the importance of education:

"What are the main problems within the Bengali community? Education, education, education… All the community problems come from a lack of education. The fact that there is high unemployment, health issues, etc. (...) Who are the least powerful people in the

world - Muslims. Why? Because they're not educated and traditionally come from the regions, where education wasn't so highly regarded and that's why they're struggling."

Other frequently identified community concerns were the lack of sufficient language skills among first generation Bangladeshis, and problems with cultural adaptation. Although these problems were primarily affecting the immigrant generation, Bangladeshi activists frequently referred to examples illustrating how they spilled over on to the younger population. The 'spill over' effect was regarded as one of the reasons for wider range of problems that affected a large part of the Bangladeshi community. For example, one of the interviewees working with local schools commented on the inability of parents to support and monitor the educational progress of their children:

"Many kids are struggling because their parents work at nights, they don't have time and skills to support their kids. For example, if father works at night as a taxi driver and mother doesn't have good knowledge of English, they are not able to help their kids."

The problem of cultural adaptation or even alienation of older generation, especially women was frequently mentioned by female activists. For example:

"The biggest problem in the community at the moment is older ladies, who are closed at home, very alienated. They don't have language skills, they face cultural issues as well, together with ageing health issues."

Most of the issues related to economic disadvantage were believed to be transitional, and primarily attributable to the initial circumstances of Bangladeshi immigrants. Apart from the lack of education and language skills, Bangladeshi interviewees mentioned the initial mind-set of first generation immigrants as another factor responsible for the 'slow' progress of the Bangladeshi community. Such mind-set referred to the fact that early Bangladeshi immigrants were often focused on short-term economic gains driven by the illusion that they were going to return to Bangladesh. This was considered as one of the factors that slowed down the integration process because of the missed opportunities to invest in building better life in Britain. Although the problems with economic quality of life were considered serious, Bangladeshi activists appeared rather

optimistic about the future prospects of younger generations. One of the religious activists explained:

"Some of the problems still remain. For example the overcrowded housing, low skill level, but that is changing slowly, though. The more affluent they become the better jobs their children get. That is changing, because initially, when Bangladeshi people came here they thought they were *going to go back to Bangladesh.* (…) So when that mind-set changes, I also think the prosperity of the community will change in this country as well."

The 'old' mindset was also mentioned in the context of highly patriarchal and kin-based style of leadership among the first generation Bangladeshis. A number of interviewees perceived it as a serious problem, because the older leaders had great influence in the community, but were often considered as lacking the adequate skills. Young Bangladeshi activists often stated that they shared a very different vision of how to address social and political issues in the community, but sometimes they felt that without the support of the older leaders, their opportunities to create a change were limited. (For illustrative examples see: Appendix G)

The increasing assimilation towards the "Western" way of life was generally associated with positive changes occurring in the community (by both younger and older activists). However, it was also sometimes mentioned in the context of new problems which had previously not affected traditional, Muslim communities. Some of the primary examples (discussed primarily by the first generation activists) included higher divorce rates and the increase in substance abuse by youngsters.

6.2.4. Organisational activity

Both Bangladeshi and Caribbean activists frequently described the ultimate goal of their organisational activity as 'community empowerment'. However, they presented different understandings of what community empowerment meant and how it should be achieved. The following sections discuss how Caribbean and Bangladeshi activists perceived the role and meaning of their organisations.

6.2.4.1. Caribbeans: 'Expressive' goals and anti-mainstream orientation

In the interviews with Caribbeans, concepts associated with the goals of organisations were primarily clustered within the themes *community* and *experience*, whereas the description of *how* activists worked towards achieving their goals, were

clustered within themes: *art*, *council* and *structure*. These themes, however, do not provide an exhaustive list of all mentions of organisational activities. In this section, other relevant concepts, classified in either ‘ethnic identity’ or ‘needs and concerns’ categories (in the SNP, these concepts were usually situated in an overlapping area between different themes), are also referred to.

The examination of relevant text extracts indicated that the majority of Caribbean community activism was focused on ‘expressive’ goals. The distinction between ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’ goals of activism has been most notably developed in the social movements’ literature (for example, Jenkins 1983; Tilly 1978; Touraine 1985). ‘Expressive’ groups (or movements) are focused on identity development and the *process* of sharing the experience. They usually aim to achieve social change through cultural and value transformation. Contrastingly, ‘instrumental’ groups are focused on pursuing concrete goals and are considered more strategically-oriented. ‘Expressive’ groups are also more inward-looking, whereby their activism concentrates on members of their own group. ‘Instrumental’ groups, on the other hand, are more ‘outward-looking’, meaning that their efforts are more concentrated on ‘external’ goals. The primary goals described by Caribbean activists clearly contained references to their group identity and shared experience, and were oriented towards members of their own community rather than the outside system. For many Caribbean interviewees, ‘community empowerment’ meant the ability to proudly accept and talk about their African heritage, and to develop self-help structures to counteract various forms of discrimination.

As indicated in a previous section, the main identity-related needs expressed by Caribbean interviewees referred to African history, the need for promoting positive role models, and to the need of creating ‘safe-spaces’ for discussion and self-expression. Many of these needs were fulfilled through activities that are focused on art and Afro-Caribbean culture. Art was often described as a way of dealing with racism, and creating a space for expression which is not constrained by social barriers. It provided a universal language, which enabled the individual to vent difficult emotions in a creative way. One of the interviewees summarised the prominent role of art in his life in the following way:

“*Art and culture and expression give a platform which relieves some of that tension, and that suffering but I also think it creates a universal language that transcends everybody else's oppression. (...) I need to feel safe. I work in dangerous situations but when you find*

that safety, that thing you have in common, that song, that poem, a picture, a word, that's not the language of power. That's not the language of power."

Art was sometimes considered as a way of raising political awareness and creating a platform for political discussion, related to both immediate and broader political issues. According to an activist working within art and culture:

"When the riots took place back in the 1980s, [name of the organisation], and other art organisations came out of that because there wasn't anywhere for black people and the Asian people to express themselves (...) They weren't just talking about what was happening in South Africa, they were talking about China, India and Mozambique. They were talking about global politics, and you'd have thought that because they were fighting this real intense, close thing that they wouldn't be regarding world politics, they wouldn't be looking at other things, other instances, but they were because it really informed what they were doing."

Cultivating and sharing Afro-Caribbean culture (such as through music, food, and language) was also portrayed as a way of integrating with other groups and with mainstream society (For examples: see: Appendix G). Apart from cultural organisations, Saturday schools associated with local black churches were also strongly emphasising the importance of maintaining and teaching Afro-Caribbean culture. The cultural element was often regarded as more valuable for children's development and school achievement than the supplementary education that they offered. It is perhaps indicative that some of the same social influences that were identified in the US theories apply here; church is arguably forming a social glue, although the incidence of religiosity in the UK compared to the US black communities suggests that this link should not be overstated. Culture and/or art constituted the primary focus of six (together with pan-Africanist ones) out of the 16 organisations included in this study.[47] This reflects the prominent role of 'expressive' goals for the interviewed Caribbean activists.

'Mentoring' was another frequently mentioned form of community work. Some of the interviewees were involved in mentoring school children, who were facing so-called

[47] For the classification of all the organisations included in this study see Table F.2 and Table F.3

behavioural problems. The majority of activities described as mentoring, however, were focused on dealing with police discrimination and crime prevention, especially among youths. One of the common goals mentioned by activists involved in this form of community work was inspiring and motivating young people 'to do better' by connecting them with those who are credible in their eyes, and who can relate to their experience. A female activist working within an organisation focused on Caribbean culture, summarised the importance of providing mentoring to young people as follows:

"If you look at the sort of discrimination against black youths, it's important to be able to connect them with people who they can identify with as mentors to inspire them to do better. That's one of the things that we're working on, hence the youth conference."

Two male activists, involved in work associated with youth crime and police discrimination, highlighted the importance of mentoring for making people aware of their rights and to increase the reporting of police misconduct, a form of very direct political action that nonetheless exists outside of official statistics of participation in politics. Even disregarding the specific example, various forms of advocacy were another type of frequently mentioned activities aimed at counter-acting discrimination. Examples of advocacy activities included direct involvement in court cases (to support victims of discrimination by the police), writing letters and complaints to appropriate officials, lobbying, organising protests and campaigns. One of the political activists gave the following example of his efforts to challenge the injustice within various institutions (including courts and local councils):

"The first letter I wrote, I was told to go away, honestly, I was told to get lost. And I said- really? So I slammed another letter on and then we started to use the mechanisms and they stopped saying go away, they may not reply, because don't get me wrong I haven't had so many replies but you're not told to go away any more. The important thing is to use the mechanisms that are there. 'Jamming the system' (in this case by writing letters or complains) is another way of protesting."

People involved in advocacy work within the criminal justice system are often well-known in the community. One of the interviewees, involved in a religious organisation, illustrated a common example of such activities:

"Mike [name changed] would meet with the police all the time. He goes to a court as well. He's not a judge or a barrister, but he's just a normal human being who's got passion and feelings. If, for example, you've got a member that died in police custody, he'll come and help you, will form a committee and so on."

The concerns about existing racial discrimination make many Caribbean activists very sceptical towards local authorities and initiatives led by outsiders. Being 'credible' in the eyes of the local community (which often means being involved in grass-root organisations) is certainly important for gaining trust in the community. Most of the interviewed activists put a strong emphasis on the importance of being independent and self-reliant. For many Caribbean activists, tackling racial inequalities means being able to challenge racialised institutions ("challenge the system"), address one's own problems and follow one's own agenda. Most of the organisations included in this study can be described as **anti-mainstream**. Only two out of 16 organisations were officially cooperating with local authorities, and their primary activism was focused on providing services to local black communities; one of the organisations focused on health-related issues and the second one was serving as a local multi-purpose centre. Apart from institutional racism, Caribbean activists also discussed other important reasons for their preference to work independently from the mainstream system and institutions. One of these reasons is a thorough understanding of the problems that affect them. As one of the interviewees noted:

"*And at the end of the day, no-one is gonna have as much convictions in our problems as ourselves... let's not deny the kind of system that we live in."*

There is also a strong need for being valued and recognised as actors, rather than as subjects or victims, and indeed this feeling of agency is arguably central to the concepts of black liberation even when it was not expressed in that form. The ideas of self-help and self-sufficiency are particularly important for radical, pan-Africanist organisations. Their primary inspiration is the legacy of Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and the golden age of radical black movements active in the US in the 1960s. The examples below illustrate a popular rhetoric of pan-Africanists:

“You know, society is fundamentally racist, it’s never going to be not fundamentally racist. There is absolutely nothing we can do to stop breeding in racism. The only thing we can do is create our own institutions, our own places where we can hide in, be sheltered from racism.” (For further examples see: Appendix G)

However, not only supporters of radical black ideologies were critical of being dependent on the public sector, especially on public funding. Activists, who tried to work independently but also influence public policy, often faced significant moral dilemmas. On the one hand, they aimed to create an impact; on the other hand, they tried to stick to their own agenda and be loyal to their community. Relying on public funding is commonly believed to restrict an ability to pursue one’s own goals in order to tick the boxes of the funding criteria. Many interviewees were concerned about following external agenda set up by funding bodies, instead of addressing real community needs. The below example illustrates commonly expressed views on the disadvantage of relying on public funding:

“We don't want to be caught into any kind of funding restriction because we want to be able to determine what we need, talk like we want to talk, use the language that we think it's appropriate for us and we want to be sustainable...a lot of organisations have failed because they were not able to sustain themselves.”

Another off-putting reason that makes Caribbean activists reluctant to co-operate with local authorities is their reactionary approach to local problems. Many of the interviewees shared an opinion that local authorities, instead of understanding the problems and tackling the causes, treat the symptoms only when the problems are no longer possible to ignore. The following examples illustrate opinions shared by two activists working with difficult youths:

“There's no point doing a knife carrying program if you're not interested in seeing why young people carry knives. (...) Don't wait until something happens. Recent example, when young people start catching planes to Syria, then they talk about wanting to do programs within the schools (...) That's the problem with local authorities. They're too reactionary, they're not proactive, they all focus on funding and making targets but they should get the essence of engaging with young people. They forget the essence of education and raising

the engagement of young people and getting them to be inquisitive and to think about the reality that they're living in." (For further examples see: Appendix G)

6.2.4.2. Bangladeshis: "instrumental" goals and pro-mainstream orientation

For Bangladeshi activists, 'empowering the community' is usually understood as giving members of the community skills and education to ensure that they can integrate into the mainstream British society and successfully compete in the mainstream labour market . The goals of organisations are described by concepts clustered within the themes *community* and *women*, whereas descriptions of the organisational activities are usually associated with the themes: *education*, *events* and *charity.*

The example below illustrates a typical understanding of empowerment as the ability to pursue one's personal ambitions and career goals:

"I've been heavily involved in community development, community activism in order to ensure that individuals in the community are made aware of what's available to them, and enabling them to access services, empowering them to achieve whatever goals they wanted to achieve- whether it's going into education or going into jobs, helping them with job search, CV preparation, interviewing techniques. If they're interested in arts, then helping them to go into theatre or perform music, and in this way help them to pursue their interests."

In contrast to Caribbeans, Bangladeshi activism is primarily focused on achieving **"instrumental"** rather than **"expressive"** goals, which can be noticed in the classification of organisations included in this study (See: Table F.3). Bangladeshi organisations classified in categories such as: youth, consultancy, education, housing, service, women, multi-purpose, religious, and community development, concentrate their work on providing various services for their local community. The main services offered by community organisations include: English language support (usually in the form of ESOL classes, interpreting and translation services), Bengali classes, job advice (including help with job search, CV and interview skills courses), qualification training courses (either carried out in-house or elsewhere), educational support for children (help with homework, supplementary classes), and volunteering programmes. Most of the organisations are also involved in other activities, such as Bangladeshi cultural celebrations and events or charity

work related to Bangladesh. However, unlike in the Caribbean case, none of Bangladeshi organisations included in this study was primarily concentrated on cultural activities or other expressive goals such as art. A typical view about the importance of maintain Bangladeshi culture through ethnic organisations can be illustrated by the opinion expressed by one of the first generation interviewees: "Cultivating and promoting Bangladeshi culture is important, yes, but that should come later, first we have to solve more urgent problems."

A lot of Bangladeshi organisations, especially those providing services and advice for members of their community, often act as a middleman between ethnic community and the mainstream society. This function is especially valuable for the first generation immigrants, for whom community organisations are often the first stepping stone into the new society. In the next paragraph some examples of this form of organisational activities are discussed.

The importance of having local, ethnic organisation which serves as a bridge between ethnic community and mainstream society was frequently highlighted by female activists working in women-specific organisations. As pointed out earlier, cultural differences were markedly affecting first generation Bangladeshi women, who were traditionally expected to focus on carrying for their family, and did not have many opportunities to develop their professional careers or engage in social activities outside their family networks. One of the women's organisation activists explained:

"We bring in partners and mainstream organisations, purely because we want to break down barriers for our women. They're not used to accessing mainstream organisations, hence why they come to us rather than go to them. We break down those barriers and get them engaged onto mainstream services and say to them, "Look, it's okay to go there as well."

A lot of work of women's organisations was focused on organizing career-related events and workshops aimed at promoting successful local women and motivating young girls to enter more ambitious, non- traditional career paths (For examples of such activities are see: Appendix G)

This type of 'middleman' support was also frequently mentioned by activists involved in organisations established by early Bangladeshi immigrants in 1970s. Although they often reflected that the demand for assistance with basic, everyday issues has

decreased, there was a significant number of first generation Bangladeshis who still needed it. A member of one of the early Bangladeshi organisations stated:

"One of the main issues associated with the birth of the organisation, was the fact that a lot of people who migrated to this country didn't have much English language. In general, a lot of the people looked around, and they needed somewhere they could start, they could come and meet as a focal point. This was one of the reasons why the community leaders decided that we need to start something where we can all get together. It was primarily during the weekend because those days, people worked in factories and restaurants so the only time they could get together was either Saturday afternoon or Sunday afternoon. By setting up a community organisation, ethnic people felt a sense of belonging to a community centre where they could come, they could get their forms filled, they could have their telephone bill sorted out, gas bill, benefits, et cetera."

The above example illustrates a typical start of early Bangladeshi organisations, which served as 'focal points' for newly arrived immigrants. As the interviewee noted, organisations were not only helping people to deal with basic day to day issues, such as paying council tax or filling appropriate forms, but were also providing opportunities for socialising and creating a sense of belonging. The wide-spread problem of lack of English language skills meant that interpreters were in great demand both in own ethnic community as well as in the public sector. Those who served as interpreters often acted as community representatives, and some of them, later progressed into local politics. Interviewees frequently highlighted the importance of cooperation with organisations outside their ethnic community, especially with the local public sector. Unlike Caribbeans, virtually all of the interviewed Bangladeshi activists had positive attitudes towards working with local authorities and other public sector institutions.

There seem to be two main reasons behind the **pro-mainstream** orientation of Bangladeshi activists. First of all, the existing language barriers and economic deprivation created incentives to seek external resources in order to address the most basic community needs. Furthermore, building partnerships with local authorities created an opportunity to sensitize public institutions to specific cultural needs, e.g. ensuring that children are able to get halal meals at schools or making teachers aware of Islamic holidays. This kind of partnership also suited local authorities because they could delegate provision of certain services to ethnic organisations, which in the long run, created a kind of symbiotic

relationship between the two. Secondly, for many community representatives, it also created an opportunity to progress in their personal careers, either by getting employment in the local public sector or by entering local politics. The interviewees also discussed the existing links between Bangladeshi community organisations and local public sector.

One of the first generation activists, heavily involved in numerous Bangladeshi organisations throughout his career, gave the following example of the cooperation between community representatives and local authorities:

"When there is a problem or something like that, they…the government or local authority…they actually create a task force in order to deal with that problem. So we actually sent representatives to a city council in 2001-2002, and we said that Bangladeshis have a lot of problems in terms of deprivation, they're marginalised on all fronts, for example in terms of housing, employment, education, security, everything. So we sit down with the council to see what can be done, and how to address it. We formed a task force that was working between 2002 and 2007. We had resources given to us, for example, in terms of employment, we had relevant person assigned, and we organised meetings with different departments, for example, with a head of housing department, social services, and so on. The city council, because of the pressure we put on it, actually organised that committee. The responsibility of the committee was to make recommendations to the city council what could be done in order to ameliorate the situation of the Bangladeshi community."

Another interviewee, also involved in multiple community organisations over the years, illustrated the character of cooperation with local authorities and the role of community organisations in providing opportunities for individuals to pursue their careers in public sector or local politics:

"As a new community in the early nineties, it was important for individuals to be personally involved in an organisation like [list of names of organisations], because that was the first stepping stone for people to use their skills to be able to get jobs in the council and other mainstream institutions, and in the political arena here. We were working with the police at that time as well. Obviously there was an element of racism back then, and we used to work with the police ensuring that the police was made aware of the community and the culture. We worked together with them when there were any issues related to the

community. We used to work with five to eleven agencies that were mainstream service providers to this community to ensure that A: they were aware of the culture; they were aware of the needs of this community; and B: they were able to provide appropriate services."

Connections with the local public sector developed by the first generation Bangladeshis, paved the way for a wider part of ethnic community to get involved in various local initiatives. Some interviewees talked about the skills gained through their work experience and trainings provided by local authorities, and a desire to pass the skills to other members of their ethnic community. This was sometimes described as a 'learning circle', which aimed at empowering individuals to 'take matters in their own hands' and be able to pursue their ideas. There was a widely spread idea of 'giving back' to the community, which was mentioned by many Bangladeshi interviewees as a motivation for their community involvement. One example of a typical community activism path and the motivation behind it was stated thus:

"I have had that training by the main city council and the [name of another public institution-removed for confidentiality reasons]. Those trainings, those skills I am passing to community organisations and community people. For example, some people tag onto me and say, "I want to do this and that". A lot of them are the people you live together in the same community, and you work with them and they become empowered, and then you let them carry on." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

The involvement and initiatives of local authorities were generally perceived by Bangladeshi interviewees as positive for the local community and for organisations themselves. For example, a young man commented:

"To be honest, the councillors in this area are really, really helpful and very supportive...if we have any issues, we go to them."

The restrictive criteria of public funding that could potentially restrain the ability of local organisations to purse their goals have not been mentioned by any of the Bangladeshi activists. The problem of funding was usually brought up in the context of recent funding cuts in the public sector, and the necessity for the organisations to reach out for alternative

funding sources. Many of them responded to the cuts by looking for partnerships with other third sector organisations or by trying to generate own income through social enterprise initiatives. Interestingly, many activists seemed to adopt the current government rhetoric, and adjust the scope of their organisational activities in order to fit into the current public policy agenda. The ideological shift in public policy from ‘multiculturalism’ towards integration and assimilation had practical implications for community organisations. Majority of the available funding has been directed to mixed-ethnic and locality-based organisations rather than to those who focus on particular ethnic community. Many Bangladeshi organisations decided to re-target the goals of their organisations to reflect the current policy priorities, and to be able to apply for the available funding. Some of them changed the names from “Bangladeshi organisation” to more inclusive ones, and started targeting their services to broader immigrant and ethnic minority population living in their local area. In practice, it usually did not change much because the majority of the local service users were still Bangladeshis, and even before the policy shift, Bangladeshi organisations were also helping members of other local communities. The examples below illustrate some of shifts in organisations, and the type of language used by Bangladeshi interviewees, which clearly reflects particular policy priorities, such a shift from the focus on the needs of particular ethnic communities towards locality-based organisations, and prioritising ‘social cohesion’ in the neighbourhoods:

“We just went from one thing to another and we're a bigger organisation now. We're officially classed as a key service provider in the area. (...) Our organisation is area-based now, but obviously because of the demographics of this community it is predominantly Bangladeshi women.”

A few activists mentioned that they participated in creating programmes related to the government ‘counter-terrorism’ agenda, carried out in partnership with local police. This provides another illustration of their generally positive attitude towards government initiatives. (For more examples see: Appendix G)

As mentioned in earlier sections, the problem of discrimination was rarely discussed by the Bangladeshi activists. However, even the activists who talked about anti-Muslim discrimination also stated that they try to tackle it by approaching local authorities and local police. This clearly shows that, among Bangladeshi activists, there is much more

trust in the ability of public institutions to address and respond to their particular concerns than among Caribbean activists.

Bangladeshi organisations working with young people also seem to follow a very different 'philosophy' of youth work than the Caribbean ones. They primarily try to provide educational and training support, and, in the case of 'difficult' youth, focus their efforts on 'bringing them back to the mainstream'. One of the youth workers said:

"We go out into certain areas and talk to young people and tell them about the things that we can offer. Those things are: help with finding employment, helping them with the CVs, interview skills, doing the literacy numeracy level 1 if the ain't got no education..." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

Finally, some of the organisations led by younger people try to act as a bridge between older and younger generations. This often means approaching the established community leaders, or mosque leaders, in order to raise awareness of sensitive topics (such as homosexuality, gender-related violence, drug abuse, contraception). They try to persuade them to talk about the problems traditionally considered as taboo, and widely ignored in the Muslim communities. These kinds of initiatives were often led by youth workers, who were particularly exposed to the problems faced by young Muslims. For example:

"I would go to the mosques and say to them, "You need to wake up, because I'm from the Muslim community as well and I'm a youth worker". You'd be shocked how many girls and boys come and ask me for contraception and for support."

6.2.5. Links to politics

Different character of ethnic organisations as well as activists' attitudes towards mainstream system already provide a clear indication that political mobilisation (especially electoral) via ethnic organisations is more likely to take place in the Bangladeshi than in the Caribbean community. This section discusses explicit references to politics and political participation made by interviewees. In particular, it will focus on whether or not interviewees: (1) personally perceived political participation as important; (2) believed that co-ethnic politicians represent their interests better; (3) perceived any benefits from

involvement in mainstream politics; (4) made any explicit efforts to mobilise their ethnic community to participate in politics (e.g. encouraged to vote, stand in elections, etc.). The potential factors that have influenced the existing attitudes towards mainstream politics are also discussed.

6.2.5.1. Caribbeans

None of the themes from the SNM based on the interviews with the Caribbeans was classified in the 'politics' category. This reflects the fact that references to politics made by Caribbean interviewees were quite scattered throughout the interviews and were less prominent compared to other topics. The vast majority of the interviewed activists were quite sceptical about the mainstream politics. Only four interviewees explicitly indicated that participating in politics, especially through voting, was something their considered as important. Two of them (including one political activist) indicated that they would personally try to mobilise their community to engage in politics and believed that black politicians represented their interests better (than politicians from other ethnic groups). This is not to say that the majority of interviewed activists were not following current political debates. The reluctance to talk about politics was rather a reflection of their overall dissatisfaction and disillusion with political parties and the political elite. The interviewees mentioned a few reasons why black communities felt particularly disillusioned with mainstream politics. First of all, there was a common perception that political parties were not speaking to black people's interests, and were not interested in addressing their concerns. In consequence, many activists concluded that Caribbeans generally did not see any major benefits from engaging in politics. The following examples illustrate the frequently expressed opinions:

"It's like… how can things change if it doesn't seem that any of the MPs or Councillors are really taking on the issues that they're faced with."

"Ideologically speaking, I know with the conservatives getting in, black people's needs aren't addressed. I've read the manifesto, not one of the black issues is surfacing." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

Secondly, the notion of unfulfilled expectations, particularly with regards to racial inequalities and discrimination, was appearing to lead to a growing sense of powerlessness.

Some activists stated that political mobilisation was more noticeable within black communities in the 1990s, when, after the 1981 and 1985 Brixton riots, black people had higher 'hopes' to tackle racial inequalities by using political mechanisms and group mobilisation. It has been widely noted within the literature that the 1981 riots have had a prominent role for race relations in Britain. The Scarman Report[48], which was officially commissioned by the Government following the riots, drew public attention to the existing institutional racism and economic deprivation of black communities. It made strong recommendations to the Government to investigate and tackle 'racial prejudice' within the police workforce. According to Green et al. (2000), it was the Scarman report that made the UK Government openly discuss the issues of institutional racism for the first time. According to the majority of the interviewed activists, the hopes that sparked after the 1980s riots, faded away over the years and resulted in a wide-spread political apathy. The following statements illustrate some of the typical reflections made by the interviewees:

"I think back in the day (after the 1980s riots- ed.) there was a more push towards becoming political activists and leaders in that respect. But I think, again… it faded over the years. (…) Because community wise, people have moved ... there isn't a really kind of strong hold of African-Caribbean people any more"

"If you go back to- we probably had more black politicians at the turn of the 1990s than we do now."

The notion that race relations (particularly with regards to the lack of trust between black communities and the police) have not changed since the 1981 riots, has been raised not only by the interviewed activists but also by notable black intellectuals. For example, Stuart Hall, in his article commenting on the highly publicised death of black teenager Stephen Lawrence[49], stated: "Very little seems to have changed. Relations between black communities and police have continued to be a catalogue of disasters, marked by mistrust, prejudice and disrespect, often leading to tragedy" (Hall 1999, p. 188). Hall also made an important argument for why racial discrimination within the criminal justice system has a prominent effect on race relations in general. He contended that the relationships between

[48] Scarman (1982), but see also Behrens (1982).

[49] The racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence resulted in a heated debate on race relations in Britian both among policy makers and scholars, see for example: Foster et al. (2005), Solomons (1999), Yuval-Davis (1999), Macpherson & William (1999).

black communities and police have a symptomatic value because: “The basis of the constitutional state is that the citizen, whatever his/her race, colour or creed, has the right to full protection of the law – if necessary from ‘the law’ itself (…) Consequently, how the police treat the citizen has become a litmus test of liberty in all free societies; and the question ‘Who guards the guards?’ one which cuts to the very heart of fundamental civic liberties and human rights” (Hall 1999, p. 188).

The prevailing perception of the lack of significant improvement in terms of racial inequalities seemingly led not only to disillusion with politics but also to the lack of trust in institutions and anti-systemic attitudes. Unsurprisingly, those supporting the ideas of radical black movements appeared particularly sceptical about the possibility to improve the position of black communities through engaging in mainstream politics. The political system was often perceived as oppressive and too powerful to be challenged. Since racial discrimination was commonly believed to be systemic, trying to drive a change using the mechanisms of the racialized system was commonly believed as not ‘the right way forward’. Many activists, similarly to those quoted below, preferred to either engage in the civic type of activism or take part in protest activities to express their dissatisfaction with the current situation:

“I think the enemy, the political issue, the political establishment, those aren't real to people these days, so people kind of shy away from politics. They tend involve in more social civic types of organisations.”

“I generally don't think that the community feels that there is real benefit from going to mainstream politics. I think people really feel that it is about each one teach one, at a local, at a community level, at a face-to-face level, and that the agenda is more build in a unity, build in a culture, which orientate itself to Africa and to the business and social, and cultural issues, and so on. Not to say that people are going to give up everything in England, but maybe politics is not the way to generate that leverage in the society.”

Both political parties and local politicians were regarded as not very connected with the community they were supposed to represent. Furthermore, interviewees were sceptical about the ability of black politicians to represent their interests. Some interviewees stated that even if a black councillor or MP wanted to address the specific issues of black community, they would not have enough political leverage to do so.

“*As I said before as a minority few are in the system in politics. That structure will just swallow you. You won't be able to say anything because they're just stronger and more important than you. I don't think many black people identify themselves with their politicians.”*

“I think people understand that it really doesn't make any difference, and faces alone, don't really mean anything. (...) There was an expression, certainly in a rasta community, of ‘politricks’, and it just really feels like the whole thing is just a waste of time, so a lot of people don't vote.”

Finally, a few interviewees pointed out the instances of discrimination on the political party level, especially in the process of candidates’ selection, as another off-putting factor:

“If we look at what's going on in London, London at the moment has deselected very good African- Caribbean councillors, and replaced them with white candidates, who…some of them.. are relatives of seasoned politicians.”

6.2.5.2. Bangladeshis

From the SNM based on the interviews with Bangladeshi activists, the following themes were classified as primarily concerned with the links between organisational activism and politics: *politics, council, voting, funding*. The first striking difference between the two groups was that Bangladeshi activists appeared to hold significantly more positive attitudes towards local government, and many of them had personal connections with local political candidates and councillors. They also more frequently talked about the ways politicians mobilise local ethnic community using their broad social networks or personal connections with community leaders. It is important to stress here that because of the non-political character of all third sector organisations, they could not officially support any political party or particular political candidates. This fact was strongly highlighted by many interviewees. Therefore, all the activities related to partisan politics mentioned in this section refer to private initiatives of individuals involved in organisations, and not to their organisational activity per se.

The majority of interviewees shared the opinion that Bangladeshi community was generally enthusiastic about engaging in British politics. Interestingly, the commonly identified reasons for the relatively high political interest of their co-ethnics were usually associated it with two factors: first, the recent fight for country independence, which made many people politically awake and motivated to use their political rights; a second (closely related reason) was the believe that one should take an advantage of living in a democratic country and use their rights to engage in a democratic decision making. In line with the well-known general tendency, older generation was depicted as more politically engaged. However, at the same time, they were portrayed as somewhat 'backward looking' because of their high interest in Bangladeshi politics, which they could not actively do anything about, while living in the UK. A tendency of older generation to be highly involved in the politics of Bangladesh was highly criticised by many of the activists, especially those from the second generation. The following interview samples illustrate some of the points discussed above:

"Bangladeshis are very interested in politics. You see it during the local elections because turn out when you have the elections is usually big....Because we went through a phase of military dictatorship when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, and people were denied voting rights for 20-30 years, so when they get those rights they want to use them. I see a lot of people who have joined and support local parties and who are standing in elections."

"I think people our age are more involved in the politics than our children. Because of Bangladeshi history... the independence war in 1971, when for nine months Bangladeshi people fought. So many bad things happened. We can never forget the things that happened. It is very important for us to keep ourselves involved in politics. Very, very important."

Among the younger generation (18-34), about half of the respondents stated that they were personally interested in politics, and a few considered engaging in partisan politics at some point of their lives. Activists also highlighted the observed shift in political engagement of their co-ethnics – from the focus on home-country politics, towards the focus on British politics, especially towards the engagement in local political parties. The following examples present some of the typical statements:

"The younger people are the next generation…you know…and we need to be involved, the young people. I mean, I'm 33 years old at the moment and I'm hoping that I've still got a good few years…and I want my children to be involved in politics and I want them to have their say, because it's a democratic country, everybody should have their say."

"Bangladeshi people are very proactive when it comes to local politics. They are no longer laid back. They are very much interested in politics, they observe the local trend, and how local money is spent. They watch very carefully."

All of the interviewees agreed that it was important for their community to have political representatives because a) they were believed to understand community problems easier; b) could communicate with the older generation of Bangladeshi who often experience a language barrier; c) could lobby for the public resources to help their community. The last reason can be regarded as somewhat inter-related with the notion of patronage style of politics ', which has been extensively discussed in the subject literature.

"Having Bangladeshi representatives does help. It's the culture… and the language barrier, too. When you have a councillor who understands your language, and they come from the same background, it's easier to make them understand the problems. In our community, there are a lot of elders who can't speak English. They prefer someone who they know, and who is from their own country. They feel more comfortable talking to that person. If they go to someone who is British or… white British, it's very hard for them to explain the situation they're in or what kind of help they need. Yet, I think they feel more comfortable talking to Bangladeshi person, and hopefully, this person might be able to help." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

Some activists, particularly those personally involved in local politics, discussed their efforts to mobilise their local community to get involved in British politics. The aim of their efforts was usually twofold: first, to increase electoral participation and political party membership; and second, to re-direct the immigrant generation focus from home country politics to British politics. One of the political and community activists provided an illustrative example of such efforts:

"Two weeks ago I met with about 17 Bangladeshi leaders, and I told them, 'Please get involved in mainstream politics now, or encourage your child, or encourage your

grandchildren to go into the mainstream politics, to become a councillor, become an MP, why not?' We should get some proportionate representation. (...) Wherever I go I say: participate in politics, find out more about it. Why don't you sit down at home and find out more? Get involved in politics, fight for your right, go to the city council meeting. As a citizen you have every right to sit down in a meeting, and nobody will say, 'Why did you come here?' You can ask questions. Nobody can tell you not to ask questions."

Personal links with local authorities and local councillors were certainly one of the factors affecting the overall attitude of community activists towards mainstream politics (especially electoral). The main reason that fostered development of such networks seemed to be associated with the initial 'bridging' role of Bangladeshi organisations between their community and mainstream society. This often resulted in an extensive, long-term collaboration with local service providers and local authorities. Some of the important consequences of such cooperation were the opportunity to access financial resources (which enabled local organisations to deliver appropriate services for their community), and the opportunity to lobby for certain amendments that were required by Muslim communities (e.g. halal meals for children in local schools). These links were resurfacing in the interviews when activists talked about their experiences with local authorities. For example:

" We were working with the community and the local council to ensure that they access better services, so like housing is a big issue in terms of overcrowding, so as part of the [name of the organisation], we used to have regular meetings with the housing department of the council"

"We have a very good relationship with the city council, the leader of the city council is the friend of ours. Personal friend. And previously other leaders as well." (For more examples see: Appendix G)

This type of close collaboration created a somewhat 'natural' opportunities for community representatives (especially interpreters) to progress into local politics. Some regarded this type of career paths as a way to improve one's social status, whereas others considered it as a type of 'service' for their community. For example:

"They [first generation Bangladeshis-ed.] were able to go into the political arena and contest elections and become representatives of their community, so yeah, the [names of local organisations-removed] platform gives people an opportunity to go to other things."

"I started [being involved in politics-ed.] as a result of my community work, because the people wanted me to go into politics, which I was not very interested in myself in the beginning, but the people made me to."

Interestingly, even the activists who were personally not interested in politics, perceived networking with local politicians as a 'necessity'. This attitude seemed to be based on a belief that community organisations must stay close to the political arena in order to lobby for resources. One of the young activists stated:

"*Personally, I've never been much interested in politics, but being part of any launch organization or any third-sector organization, you will have to delve into politics. I think we're just looking… from our perspective… we're looking at who's going to be able to help us. We're sitting on the fence in terms of politics."*

This kind of expectations that personal connections with politicians would 'pay off' in the future are probably linked to the perpetuated culture of the 'politics of favours'. As discussed in the introductory section, the role of Bangladeshi style of doing politics, often associated with exchange of favours and voting in line with the 'clan' will has been pointed out in much of the previous literature. The influence of Bangladeshi style of politics was certainly noticeable in the interviews conducted in this study (For illustrative examples see: Appendix G). However, the dominant view shared by the interviewed activists was that the way Bangladeshi community understands politics is moving away from the clan based politics towards party line politics. The 'old' way was unanimously perceived as a transitional stage by both the immigrant as well as British-born generation. The following interview extract illustrates the discussed shifts:

"We're making strides into politics, but it's not enough. It should be easier now because the Bangladeshi community is getting more engaged in politics. It's able to follow the procedures and take advantage of the procedural rules which allow people to stand and take part in politics. A lot of people are getting engaged in politics. Traditionally it would be more so in areas that are highly populated with Bangladeshi but now people have gone

beyond that. They're a lot more interested in getting elected anywhere. They're playing the party line now whereas before they were thinking "If I stay in this area, which is populated by Bangladeshi, I've got a chance of getting a large number of votes." But nowadays, because it's more like party politics, it's changing some of that. The reason why in the beginning they may not have stood in other areas is because they may have felt that they were discriminated against, and people wouldn't vote for them, but I think quite a lot of that has changed now."

The fact that despite the falling interest (especially among the younger generation) in politics based on kinship networks, the attitudes towards the benefits of political involvement as well as towards local authorities were generally positive, suggests a rather optimistic scenario for the future political integration of the Bangladeshi community. Another optimistic prospect was related to the increased visibility of Bangladeshi women in local politics. Some of the interviewed activists (from both genders) pointed out the visibly growing political ambitions among women from their community. This optimistic perspective, however, needs to be taken with a pinch of salt since along with the increased interest of women in local politics, a few female activists also highlighted the struggles of Muslim women, who are trying to enter the traditionally male-orientated political field. (For illustrative samples from the interviews see: Appendix G)

6.3. Discussion and conclusions

This paper discussed the ways ethnic activists, as socially situated actors, conceptualise the meaning of their community work and the goals they try to achieve via co-ethnic organisations. It is argued here that the substantive differences between the types, goals, and primary role of organisations between Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities contribute to an understanding of why the former are more engaged in mainstream politics. Based on the computer-assisted semantic network analysis as well as qualitative analysis of the interview data, it has been suggested that the nature of ethnic community activism is shaped by several inter-related factors such as: dominant narratives of collective identity, history of immigration, cultural differences, and the primary reasons attributed to persistent socio-economic disadvantage of co-ethnic community.

Based on the evidence gathered, it is argued that Bangladeshi organisations primarily focus on instrumental goals, such as: job-related training, education, lobbying for appropriate amendments and services for their community, lobbying for government controlled financial resources to fund their projects, and so forth. These activities create a platform for building appropriate social networks and gaining civic skills which facilitate both access to the mainstream job market and the local political arena.

In contrast, Caribbean organisations focus on expressive goals such as art and culture, as well as providing advocacy services for members of their community who are subject to discriminatory treatment, especially in the criminal justice system. The majority of Caribbean activists are highly sceptical about cooperating with public institutions and relying on public funding, therefore the character of their community activism can be generally described as anti-mainstream. This is often justified on the grounds of seeking to stay independent, to have an ability to pursue one's own agenda, and to shelter from racial discrimination. These ideological stances translate into attitudes towards mainstream politics - Caribbean activists distance themselves from mainstream party politics, and often engage in protest type political activities.

On the contrary, activities of Bangladeshi organisations are orientated towards cooperation with public institutions and other, non-ethnic organisations (pro-mainstream orientation), and most of them perceive engagement in mainstream politics as a way to achieve greater community empowerment. The nature of activism that evolved amongst these two communities is undoubtedly linked to the initial conditions of early immigrants. The fact that majority of Caribbeans did not experience language barrier and were highly familiar with British culture contributed to their relatively high expectations compared to Bangladeshis, who faced both language and cultural barriers.

High hopes of early Caribbean immigrants for a new life in their 'motherland' were contrasted with racial discrimination faced upon arrival, which in turn, created a sense of grievance, disappointment, and scepticism towards the British political system. Memories of initial racial discrimination appeared to be accompanied by grievances associated with contemporary incidents of racism, which, according to many, have been largely ignored by the government and mainstream political parties. The second factor that contributes to understanding the differences in type of ethnic activism is the way Caribbean and Bangladeshi activists interpreted the primary reasons responsible for the socio-economic disadvantage of their community.

Caribbean activists often attributed existing disadvantage to racial discrimination, which fuelled the sense of mistrust in the political system, and scepticism about the possibility to improve their situation using political mechanisms. The narratives of Bangladeshi activists provided a very different picture. Due to initial language barriers and low levels of formal qualifications, many Bengali organisations were set up to provide language and employment support, and served as a bridge between their community and mainstream British institutions. Due to limited community resources, Bangladeshi activists were often seeking collaboration with local authorities and mainstream service providers to lobby for better services and financial resources, mainly in order to improve English language skills and employability of their co-ethnics. Collaboration between community organisations and local authorities has been recognised by scholars of British Bangla diaspora as one of the factors that facilitated successful integration of Bangladeshi communities (Alexander et al. 2015). The positive experiences of partnerships with public institutions, and the educational and economic improvement of the second generation, translated into relative optimism of Bangladeshi activists about the future prospects of their community. As a result, they tended to perceive the existing group disadvantage as transitional, and primarily attributable to the low socio-economic capital of early immigrants. Instances of discrimination, especially with regards to the equality of opportunity, were considered rare, and the British labour market was commonly regarded as transparent and meritocratic. The positive attitudes towards the British system and the perceived benefits from engaging in mainstream politics appeared to create incentives for the activists to both engage in local politics themselves and to mobilise their co-ethnics.

Another factor associated with the different character of community activism seemed to be associated with the role and meaning attached to ethnic identity. The prevalent perception of on-going racial discrimination, the unique history of racial struggle (especially through the experience of slavery) and influential ideology of black movements made black identity a strong focus of Caribbean activism. In contrast, for the majority of Bangladeshi activists, ethnic identity did not emerge as an important and burning need, especially in comparison to the urgency of providing the educational and job-related support. To highlight the difference in importance attached to ethnic identity prevalent in these communities, Caribbean group identity has been regarded here as a type of reactive ethnicity, whereas Bangladeshi type group identity - as a variation of what in sociological literature is known under the term symbolic ethnicity.

The findings from this study contribute to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, they facilitate the understanding of inconsistencies in the quantitative evidence on the effect of co-ethnic organisations on political participation. It is argued here that the character of community activism (in this case the differences between instrumental and expressive function) as well attitudes of ethnic activists towards mainstream institutions (in this case pro-mainstream versus anti-mainstream orientation) help to understand under what conditions ethnic organisations are more likely to promote political mobilisation. In consequence, it is hypothesised that the current theoretical explanations of the role of ethnic organisations on political integration have overlooked the 'human' factor that is the political agency of individuals who decide about and execute the goals and the actions of ethnic organisations. Taking into account the agency of ethnic activists by examining their attitudes and perceptions of the meaning of ethnic community activism would lead to a more nuanced and more realistic theoretical explanations about the potential of ethnic organisations for creating political mobilisation. Therefore, the qualitative features of ethnic activism can be considered as another element determining the relationship between ethnic organisations and political participation, beyond the structural factors, which are usually the focus of quantitative research.

Secondly, bringing the attention to the nature of co-ethnic organisations also adds a more fine-grained understanding of the trade-off argument and the role of kinship networks, which have been put forth as the main explanations of the existing differences in political mobilisation between South Asian and black Caribbean groups. The pre-existing kinship networks that helped to 'transplant' patronage style politics, characteristic to many South Asian countries, are certainly an important mechanism that make co-ethnic political mobilisation easier. However, the qualitative evidence from the presented case study suggested that kinship politics was regarded as a transitional stage, and was primarily attributed to the style of political engagement among the first generation Bangladeshis. Furthermore, the prevalent enthusiastic attitudes towards mainstream politics expressed by both younger and older Bangladeshi activists are likely to have a 'spill-over' effect – that is are likely to facilitate political engagement of younger generation Bangladeshis, and to encourage involvement that is not limited to ethnic enclaves and clan-based politics.

The presented findings are generally in line with the trade-off argument put forth by Maxwell, who highlighted the importance of expectations and initial conditions in explaining both the negative attitudes towards mainstream political institutions and the high perception of discrimination among black Caribbeans. It is argued, however, that the

trade-off arguments overlooked the importance of black identity, which was appearing as a crucial factor for understanding why Caribbeans were particularly sensitive to the signs of discrimination, and why they were highly sceptical towards the mainstream system. The evidence from the conducted interviews provides some degree of support for the argument on black exceptionalism, developed primarily by American scholars. The black exceptionalism thesis claims that the prominent importance of racial struggle and black movements in the US created a unique type of politicised black identity and group consciousness, different from group solidarity present among other, non-white, immigrant communities (Sears et al. 2003). As Rogers & Chong (2004) argue, there are multiple forms of group solidarity, and various ideological stands influence individual political behaviour in different directions. Classic studies of group consciousness linked group solidarity with an enhanced sense of political efficacy, which together with political mistrust was believed to create motivation for political action (Miller et al. 1981). However, more recent theoretical developments stressed the necessity to look at how different aspects of group consciousness influence various modes of political engagement. A number of scholars argued that a sense of solidarity based on perceived group discrimination is primarily linked with increased protest participation, but not necessarily with voting in elections (Wong 2005; Junn & Masuoka 2008). The results from this case study generally support the group consciousness argument, however in a somewhat modified version. It seems that the feeling of commonality (or collective identity) and recognition of the disadvantaged position of one's own community creates a sense of solidarity and group consciousness among both Caribbean and Bangladeshi activists. However, the primary reasons attributed to the group socio-economic disadvantage and the meaning attached to ethnic identity moderate their attitudes towards mainstream politics. In the Caribbean case, it has been shown that the reasons for existing group disadvantage tended to be attributed to external factors, and ethnic identity was conceptualised in reactive, politicised terms. In consequence, it appeared to increase political mistrust and preference for a protest-type rather than electoral participation. On the other hand, Bangladeshi activists tended to highlight 'objective' reasons for their group disadvantage, and perceived their group identity as a type of symbolic, cultural commonality. These factors, together with positive evaluations of British institutions, seemed to promote political trust and create higher motivation for electoral participation.

Therefore, it can be argued that Caribbean activism best fits into theoretical models of racial-based group consciousness and reactive ethnicity whereas Bangladeshi type of

activism combines elements of solidarity-based group consciousness and the ethnic civic community model. The former is likely to promote a protest type of participation, whereas the latter is likely to increase political mobilisation more generally. This theoretical speculation is graphically presented in Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7.

In sum, the main contribution of this study is made by the finding that perceptions of political agency appear to have a fundamental influence on attitudes towards mainstream political participation. Given this, it is perhaps time for the theoretical explanations of the role of ethnic civic organisations for mainstream political participation to consider the impact and the nature of perceived political agency of the activists, who often act as community leaders and opinion shapers.

Figure 6-6. Caribbean model of 'community activism'.



Figure 6-7. Bangladeshi model of 'community activism'



7. Discussion and conclusions

7.1. Introduction

This thesis examined different aspects of political integration of immigrant origin minorities in the UK, with the main focus being on visible minority groups. The three studies presented in chapters 4-6, examined a set of questions about political integration in light of the current public and academic debates on identity, political participation and the role of ethnic associational networks.

The work presented here primarily concentrated on psychological factors and mechanisms that contribute to understanding political integration and the political behaviour of immigrant-origin groups. It aimed to incorporate insights from psychological theories into political sociology research by evaluating the role of social identity, cognitive processes and narratives in explaining individuals' behaviour and motivations. Psychological theories have rarely been a focus of the previous empirical inquiry within the field, which has predominantly favoured sociological and political science explanations. By incorporating the insights from social and cross-cultural psychology literature, this thesis sought to add another dimension to the existing interpretations of political integration outcomes. This is however important due to the implicit acceptance of them in other work.

For example, Miller et al. (1981, p. 495) define group consciousness as an "identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests". This definition not only encompasses sociological understanding of inter-group power dynamic, but also the role of cognitive mechanisms affecting individuals within the group. This work has shown that many of the assumptions of the group consciousness theory are rooted in a sense of collective agency that does not extend to some of the groups in the UK, as noted by many of the Carribean interviewees. Given this, it is apparent that the psychological questions raised were always extremely important, and indeed the work here not only suggests the need for further development of theory within the UK context but somewhat of a critical reevaluation of the extent to which group consciousness theory can be universalised and applied in an unchanged form to non-African American contexts.

The studied aspects of political integration as well as the chosen theoretical perspectives have been influenced by a number of the controversies in the current public and policy discourse. Although it was not the goal of this research to test the claims regarding the failure of multiculturalism, many of the analysed dependent and independent variables, such as strength and attachment to British and ethnic identities, ethnic grievances, indicators of assimilation and the role ethnic organisations, were selected in light of the issues raised in the debates on multiculturalism and integration.

The first study presented in Chapter 4 focused on British identity acquisition among immigrant origin populations. In the aftermath of the 2001 and 2011 racial riots in England, the number of terrorist attacks across European cities and the increased discontentedness with the levels of immigration, the questions about integration of immigrants became a number one focus of the British public, resulting in a growing body of academic research. One of the most frequently raised concerns has been the perceived lack of a shared sense of Britishness among certain minority groups, who have been portrayed as segregated and alienated from mainstream British society. Multicultural policies on integration have often been blamed as responsible for rewarding cultural differences and not sufficiently promoting a common British identity and British values. Contrary to popular belief, academic studies have generally suggested that ethnic minorities report a relatively strong attachment to Britain and do not feel alienated from mainstream British society.

The existing literature has indicated a number of factors that contribute to the development of host country identity. For example, it has been demonstrated that the perception of discrimination significantly decreases positive identification with Britain (Maxwell 2009). Certain studies have pointed out the importance of cultural distance between immigrants' country of origin and destination country, which has been associated with heightened motivation and efforts to assimilate (Manning and Roy 2010) Other conditions conventionally believed to facilitate shared sense of Britishness have been linked to different aspects of integration and assimilation, as well as to the commitment to certain 'national' values and 'national' ways of life (Walters et al., 2008). Despite the rich body of literature on immigrants' identity, relatively little attention has been paid to the social and cross-cultural psychology rationale that could contribute to understanding individual- and group-level variation. The first study presented in this thesis attempted to address this omission by assessing the role of general collectivist tendencies in predicting the strength of British identity, alongside integration, assimilation and immigrants'

desirability indicators. The main research question asked was: "What are the main determinants of British identification among immigrant origin populations?" (RQ1)

The second study presented in Chapter 5 concentrated exclusively on ethnic minority groups. The choice not to include other white immigrant-origin minorities has been dictated by substantial and practical reasons. Firstly, established ethnic minority groups often originate from the Commonwealth countries, which makes them eligible to take part in British national and local elections. Secondly, white immigrants usually belong to more recent and transient communities, rendering them less likely to have citizenship and actively participate in British politics. Finally, there is currently no large-scale data on political involvement of white minority groups, and so therefore it would not be possible to carry out generalizable, quantitative analysis.

The literature on the political participation of racial and ethnic minority groups has often addressed questions on the factors that motivate the political participation of ethnic minorities in a distinctive way from the majority group. British-based studies have shown that ethnic minorities tend to support the Labour Party at higher levels than would be expected based on their socio-economic status. The literature has highlighted factors that include group solidarity, perception of fraternal relative deprivation (or linked fate) and grievances as potential predictors of group-specific political behaviour and political party preferences (Heath et al., 2013). On the other hand, the literature on assimilation has notoriously asked, "To what extent are these factors relevant for well-integrated and assimilated individuals?" According to the traditional assimilationist approach, completely assimilated individuals should be indistinguishable from the native population, and in consequence, ethnic sentiments would not play a role in their political choices. Arguably, group consciousness has been the most influential theoretical approach used to describe ethnic specific political behaviour. The group consciousness framework, however, has been predominantly applied in the American-based studies, mainly because of the historical circumstances that led to its development. The classical formulations of group consciousness theory were largely a response to the phenomenon of the extraordinary electoral mobilisation of African Americans after the civil rights movement. More recently, a number of empirical studies have attempted to test the relevance of group consciousness arguments for clarifying the current patterns of political behaviour of African Americans as well as other minority groups (e.g. Latinos). The findings from more recent American studies generally suggest that group consciousness might nowadays be more relevant for explaining high-intensity political participation, such as protesting, rather

than voting. The second study presented in this thesis intended to shed a light on the question: “To what extent is group consciousness, as opposed to assimilation, useful for understanding the political participation of ethnic minorities in Britain?” (RQ2) Specifically, the study looked at British and ethnic identity, bridging and bonding associational involvement and the perception of ethnic discrimination as the main comparative indicators of ethnic-specific and politically important factors to assess the group consciousness and assimilation arguments.

The final empirical study presented in Chapter 6 examined the role of co-ethnic organisations in promoting mainstream political participation among Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities in Britain. It sought to add to the current knowledge of the various political participation patterns among South Asian and Black Caribbean communities.

South Asian communities have generally been perceived as more active and visible in British politics than Caribbeans and Africans. For example, they tend to have more co-ethnic political representatives (especially at the local level) as well as higher electoral turnout and registration rates. The literature on inter-ethnic differences underscored the greater social integration of Caribbeans and the existence of strong kinship networks among South Asians as important features fostering the explanation of the existing inter-ethnic differences in political mobilisation. Quantitative empirical studies have usually treated co-ethnic associational networks as either an obstacle or facilitator of political integration. Most notably, Fennema & Tillie (1999; 2001) have argued that ethnic associations constitute the heart of the ethnic civic community, helping pave the way to mainstream politics. The authors argued that certain structural features of co-ethnic organisations, such as high density and inter-connectedness, usually characterise more politically active communities. Quantitative studies, however, have paid little attention to the ‘why’ questions, such as: “Why co-ethnic organisations in different communities evolved in different ways?” and “Why some ethnic organisations seem to have more links with local politics than others?” The qualitative study of Bangladeshi and Caribbean community organisations intended to address this omission by focusing on the agency of the actors rather than structural characteristics of organisational networks. The study focused on two main research questions: “Are co-ethnic organisations associated with rates and modes of political involvement?” (RQ3a); and “What are the mechanisms that determine the politicising role of co-ethnic organisations” (RQ3b)

7.2. Summary of the key findings and contributions from all studies

7.2.1. Study 1

Key findings

Study 1 sought to answer the first research question (RQ1). It assessed the determinants of feeling of commonality with fellow British citizens as well as the importance and strength of British identity among immigrant population. The analysis was based on three nationally representative, large-scale surveys (Citizenship Survey, Understanding Society and Ethnic Minority British Election Study) conducted largely during 2010. Drawing on the literature on integration as well as social and cross-cultural psychology theories, five hypotheses were put forth with respect to the predictors of British identity acquisition among immigrant-origin populations.

The literature on immigrant integration has generally suggested that different aspects of integration and assimilation go hand in hand. Specifically, more successful individuals in terms of socio-economic outcomes and those who are more culturally assimilated should be more likely to develop positive attachment to the host country. This argument was analysed with a range of individual-level indicators of integration and assimilation (H1), seeking to account for the different dimensions of integration.

The presented statistical models did not find very much support for the importance of socio-economic success and cultural assimilation on a greater sense of British identity. In line with the previous studies by (Maxwell, 2009a; Nandi & Platt, 2014), it was shown that economic success is either unrelated (in models conducted on Understanding Society and EMBES data), or only weakly related (in models conducted on Citizenship Survey data) to the strength of British identity. It also confirmed the negative effect of perceived discrimination reported by a number of previous empirical studies (Heath & Demireva, 2014; Maxwell, 2006). Interestingly, the results suggested that even behavioural indicators of cultural assimilation (measured by a range of typically British cultural practices) do not increase the reported attachment to British identity, apart from a symbolic manifestation of patriotism (wearing a poppy).

According to the presented models, the most important aspect of integration that significantly increased a shared sense of Britishness is associated with the social dimension, specifically, informal social mixing. Having friends outside one’s own ethnic

group had a consistent, positive effect on reporting stronger British identity. However, the second measure of social integration – co-ethnic residential concentration – provided more ambiguous and inconsistent results across the analysed datasets. The reasons for the inconsistency of the ethnic concentration measure were discussed in Chapter 5. It had been concluded that although ethnic concentration is not a major predictor of British identity, it might have a statistically significant negative effect based on the many confounding factors, in particular, because of the negative consequences of multiple deprivations that high ethnic concentration areas tend to experience.

The study also took into account measures of attitudes towards integration and assimilation (the perceived need to mix and integrate and to maintain one's own values and traditions) along with attachments to ethnic and (minority) religious identities. Considering these measures was intended to assess whether attachment to one's own minority culture and identity might be an obstacle for developing British identity. The results indicated that positive attitudes towards mixing and integrating indeed increased reported senses of Britishness, however, this was not an indicator that identification with the ethnic traditions, and identities decreased. In fact, attachment to one's own ethnic and (minority) religious group was positively related to stronger attachment to Britain. These findings are largely in agreement with the cross-cultural psychology research (e.g. Berry 1997; Berry 2001), which has suggested that bi-cultural acculturation strategy leads to the most desirable outcomes and is usually the most common strategy of adaptation (Brown et al. 2013). The positive effect of minority group identities on stronger attachment to Britishness also provides indirect support for the collectivism argument, discussed in more detail in the later section.

The second hypothesis (H2) tested whether 'more desirable' immigrants were more likely to report stronger British identity. Several studies on public attitudes towards immigration have described that people generally prefer immigrants that are similar to the native population and with greater potential for creating significant contributions to national economy (Ford, 2011b). According to the logic of the 'desirability argument', more desirable immigrants should feel more welcomed, and in turn, it would be easier for them to develop positive attachment to the host society. Contrary to this expectation, the results showed that the less desirable immigrants were the ones who tended to report stronger attachments to Britain. The potential inter-related factors leading to such outcomes were also discussed.

The next hypothesis addressed the effect of conservative ideological orientation on declared strength of British identity (H3). The rhetoric of culture clash and perceived incompatibility of Muslim and Western values, and, in particular, the traditional views on gender roles and homosexuality among Muslim majority societies, have been often portrayed as incompatible with the increasingly egalitarian and liberal Western societies. The cross-national research conducted by Inglehart and Norris (2003) observed that the most important values that separate the West and Islam are those concerning gender equality and sexual liberalisation. Furthermore, the psychological literature has found that certain personality traits, commonly occurring together with ideological conservatism, might result in a stronger desire to maintain the old, familiar way of life and to distance oneself from the new culture. Therefore, it has been hypothesised that immigrants who share more conservative ideological orientation will be less likely to develop strong identification with liberal British society.

The findings indicated that conservative beliefs on gender roles and homosexual relationships did not decrease perceived attachment to British identity. The only ideological aspect that appeared significantly and negatively related to the perception of commonality with Britain was a declared support for introducing Sharia law in Britain (among Muslim populations). These results suggest that a number of individuals might perceive their different group loyalties incompatible, however, such a perception was relatively uncommon and cannot be generalised to an entire religious minority. The analysis also included a political indicator of conservative ideological orientation, measured by the identification and support for the Conservative Party, however, this did not have a consistent effect on the strength of British identity. It was concluded that identification with the Conservative Party did not capture the same ideological dimensions among minority and majority populations. It is likely that for immigrants, identification with any political party is rather an indicator of general political interest, whereas among the native population, it can be capturing a broader spectrum of ideological beliefs.

The final two, inter-related hypotheses (H4a and H4b) sought to examine the proposed argument on the role of general collectivist tendencies in providing a foundation for the reported strength and importance of British identity. Based on the social and cross-cultural psychology literature, the study addressed the question of whether a general predisposition to identify with groups (level of collectivism) contributed to explaining the declared strength of British identity. According to a variety of psychological studies, placement on the individualism-collectivism scale significantly affects individuals'

cognitions of different levels of identity. Empirical work has shown that collectivism levels vary both between individuals and different national cultures. Evidence from cross-national studies (e.g. Hofstede 1984; Triandis 1993; Triandis & Gelfand 2012) indicated that people from collectivist countries attach greater importance to collective identities and describe themselves in terms of their social, rather than individual, self. However, people from more individualist countries tended to attach greater importance to their individual identity and described themselves in terms of their personal traits. Therefore, it has been hypothesised that immigrants from more traditional (collectivist) countries will be more likely to report stronger British identity (H4a), and that individuals who display more collectivist, as opposed to individualist, orientations will be more inclined to possess a stronger British identity regardless of their national origin (H4b). The cross-cultural literature suggests that the level of cultural collectivism affects individual collectivist tendency, however, individual predispositions considerably vary. Therefore, the individual-level outcome is a mixture of cultural influence and individual predispositions. In light of the collectivism body of research, individual levels of collectivism have been thought to act as a potential mediator as well as moderator of country level effects.

The two-level regression analysis showed that country-level differences accounted for approximately 15% of the total variance of the strength of British identity, out of which over a third was attributed to the country level collectivism score. Therefore, it was been concluded that levels of immigrants' attachment to Britain heavily depended on the characteristics of their country of origin. The constructed individual-level collectivist tendency measure was also a highly significant (positive) predictor. Here, other country-level indices that highly correlate with the collectivism-individualism dimension were discussed, like the Human Development Index (HDI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It has been argued that although the previously proposed explanation that a higher cost of return (associated with lower HDI and GDP indices of the origin country) cannot be ruled out as an alternative interpretation, the direct test of individual- and country-level effects of collectivism provides evidence in favour of the collectivist tendency argument.

Main contribution, strengths and limitations

The presented findings provided evidence that the declared strength of British identity partially depends on general psychological predispositions, which vary both

between individuals as well as between national cultures. The study attempted to contribute to the existing literature by pointing out that psychological factors, which account for the perceived importance of collective identities are more generally likely to have a significant effect on how respondents answer British identity questions. This is an important contribution to the interpretations of the survey measures of immigrant identity. It provides an illustration that the commonly used survey questions are likely to be capturing both the differences in the style of responses as well as the differences in the perceived attachment to Britain. This was the first study conducted on British data that considered the effect of the collectivist tendency as a potential explanatory factor. Previously, Theiss-Morse (2009), based on the analysis of a representative sample of the American population, demonstrated that individual 'tendency to identify with groups' (which can be interpreted as the individual level of collectivism) is an important predictor of the strength of American national identity. The study by Theiss–Morse, however, did not focus on the foreign-born population and did not examine the possible effects of cross-national differences that may be attributable to the country of origin of the immigrants.

The findings presented in Chapter 4 were based on three nationally representative surveys, which contained different formulations of British identity questions. The fact that the models were conducted on different datasets and led to similar results strengthens the general conclusions driven from the presented analysis. The second strength of this study is that it provided a test of country-level and individual-level measures of collectivism tendency, alongside individual-level measures of integration, assimilation, and ideological orientation. This provided an opportunity to assess the relative importance of different predictors of the British identity variables. An advantage of this analysis compared to the previous research by Manning and Roy (2010), which also showed that the country of origin of the immigrants significantly affects the level of identification with the host country, is that it offered a direct test of the proposed interpretation using individual-level and country-level measures.

The three main limitations of the presented analysis are the 1) lack of equivalent collectivist tendency measures across the surveys, 2) limitations of the imputation method of the collectivist tendency proxy variable, and 3) individual approach applied to test the effect of ethnic concentration. The lack of equivalent measures of the collectivist tendency question in different datasets is a serious caveat for the proposed interpretation of the individual-level and country-level differences. Unfortunately, it was not possible to overcome this limitation using another existing dataset because measures of collectivism

and individualism are rarely available in existing, large-scale surveys. To overcome the lack of possibility to test the inter-relationship between individual-level and country-level effects of collectivist tendency in a single dataset, the study used a proxy variable of individual-level collectivist tendency. The proxy variable, constructed based on the regression model conducted on the Citizenship Survey data, was imputed to the Understanding Society dataset with the use of an equivalent set of variables. The fact that the two datasets were not matched and that the proxy variable heavily relied on a single measure certainly undermines its construct validity. The imputation of the proxy variable, however, was treated as an additional, exploratory step of the analysis, which intended to provide an additional test of the proposed interpretation. The second methodological limitation was the choice to include individual-level measures of ethnic concentration. Conducting a multilevel model with geographical units as the second level or including a clustering effect would provide a more robust test of the ethnic concentration effect. There were two reasons that only individual-level measures of co-ethnic concentration were applied. First, ethnic concentration measures and geographical units were not directly comparable across different surveys, and second, the examination of the effects of ethnic density was not the primary focus of the presented analysis.

Future directions

The findings presented in Chapter 4 generate several suggestions for future research that could improve the understanding of both country-level and individual-level factors that affect the declared strength of the host country identity among immigrants. First, it would be especially beneficial to test the effect of the collectivist tendency using a dataset that includes both individual-level and country-level measures of collectivism. Although the existing British-based surveys do not currently include appropriate measures, it might be possible to conduct such an analysis in other national contexts. The proposed interpretation of the role of the collectivist tendency is assumed to be a general psychological mechanism, which should have the same effect on the responses to the collective identity questions regardless of the national context.

Second, it would be worthwhile to test the ideological conservatism hypothesis using a wider set of indicators. This study primarily focused on the attitudes towards gender roles and homosexuality due to the limited number of measures available in the

chosen datasets. However, other indicators of conservative ideological beliefs (e.g., measures of dogmatism, social dominance, and right-wing authoritarianism) could potentially have significant effects on how individuals perceive the importance of their different group loyalties. According to the influential *motivational cognition framework* developed by Jost et al. (2003), the three ideological measures are particularly useful for predicting resistance to change and preference for traditional hierarchies.

Third, future research should also focus on the role of perceived conflict of certain values and ideological beliefs to better understand the relationship between minority and majority identities. This would help to examine whether the perception of the conflict itself moderates the relationship between different group identities. Such an approach would allow us to go beyond testing the relationship between assumingly incompatible identities and to discover whether individuals themselves believe that there is incompatibility between certain values or group loyalties.

The forth suggestion for further research is to test the desirability hypotheses using both perception measures as well as 'objective' measures. This study assessed immigrant desirability by looking at whether or not they meet objective 'desirability' criteria. It would be interesting to test whether the perception of feeling desirable (or welcomed) might provide different results than the test based on the objective 'desirability' criteria. This type of measures are currently not included in British and American large scale surveys, however, the measures of 'feeling accepted' or 'welcomed' are commonly included in Canadian datasets.

7.2.2. Study 2

Key findings

The second study presented in Chapter 5 explored ethnic specific factors that affect political behaviour and political preferences of minority groups. Its objective was to compare assimilation and ethnic group consciousness arguments, which put forth different rationales for the levels of political engagement among immigrant-origin groups. The study compared these two theoretical perspectives by focusing on three main elements: identity, grievances and organisational involvement. It examined both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation as well as support for affirmative action and Labour party allegiance.

From the assimilation perspective, individuals who are more similar to the majority group and see themselves primarily as members of mainstream society should be more likely to engage in the political life of the receiving country. Therefore, it has been hypothesised that people that perceive they share much in common with fellow British citizens will be more inclined to participate in mainstream politics (H1a). In keeping with the general literature, strong national identification has been treated not only as a sign of greater assimilation but also as a predictor of the shared norms and responsibilities of a 'good citizen', such as a believing that voting is every citizen's duty (H1b). Based on assimilation and social capital research, it has been also expected that individuals who engage in cross-ethnic associations (H3a), and do not feel discriminated against based on their ethnic origin (H5), should be more active in mainstream politics. Both stronger feelings of commonality with British people as well as involvement in mainstream civic organisations were expected to increase the levels of political trust and perception that voting is every citizen's duty.

Yet, group consciousness arguments have proposed a rather opposing mechanism with regards to what is expected to motivate political involvement. According to the group consciousness perspective, individuals that feel strongly attached to their ethnic group, and at the same time, perceive that their group is not treated fairly within mainstream society, are anticipated to have greater motivation for expressing their discontent via political involvement. Classical formulations of group consciousness have contended that elevated perceptions of group-based grievances should decrease political trust, though simultaneously increase levels of political efficacy. To assess this argument, it was hypothesised that higher levels of perceived commonality with one's own ethnic group (H2a) and greater perceptions of ethnic grievances (H3b) should increase political participation. Individuals who were more embedded in ethnic civic community were also envisaged to share stronger group-based norms, therefore being more likely to participate in politics on behalf of their group (H6). The results of the statistical analysis supplied partial support for both the assimilation and group consciousness arguments. Strong British identity had a positive effect on the likelihood of both electoral and non-electoral participation, but was not related to enhanced political trust or duty to vote, although both of these factors had independent positive effects on voting. Strength of ethnic identity itself did not have a statistically significant effect, however, on perception of ethnic grievances that played a major role in predicting the mode of political involvement. Most importantly, perception of institutional discrimination had a significant negative effect on political trust

and voting but was positively related to non-electoral participation. This finding is in agreement with several American studies which put forth that group consciousness might be effective motivation for less conventional, protest-type participation. This interpretation seems plausible as non-electoral activities often require more intense involvement and organised collective efforts. Interestingly, involvement in ethnic organisations had a positive effect on all types of political participation. It also appeared to have a moderating effect on the relationship between grievances and participation. People who felt treated unfairly and, at the same time, were involved in ethnic organisations were more likely to be politically active than those who were not involved. This finding provides evidence for the notion that ethnic organisations might increase opportunities for marginalised groups to create social change through existing political mechanisms. The study also confirmed an observation from previous research that group consciousness seems more strongly pronounced among British-born ethnic minorities. The likely explanation of this generational difference is that the people who were born and raised in Britain are likely to be both more sensitive to signs of racial discrimination and have stronger reactions to it than their foreign-born parents. In line with the conclusions from Study 1, the results showed that there is a positive correlation between feelings of commonality with one's own ethnic group and with the British people. Furthermore, there was also a positive relationship between involvement in ethnic and mainstream organisations. It was determined that people involved in issues related to their ethnic community are likely to be civically and politically active in general. In sum, partial support was supplied by the study for both the assimilation and group consciousness arguments, which seemed to provide complimentary, more nuanced explanations of political involvement than the classical formulations of both theories would predict.

Main contribution, strengths and limitations

The main contribution of this study was a comparative test of the arguments derived from group consciousness and assimilation theories, which represents a novel approach to the interpretation of ethnic specific factors affecting political behaviour of ethnic minorities in Britain. The presented findings provided evidence that indicators of both greater assimilation and greater group consciousness further the understanding of electoral and non-electoral participation, as well as ethnic-specific political leanings. This was the first study conducted on British data, which attempted to test whether the

arguments proposed by group consciousness theories can be useful for predicting political behaviour of ethnic minorities beyond the American context. The study also provided some insights into the possible mechanisms of how group consciousness operates. For instance, it showed that perception of ethnic grievances has generally negative effect on mainstream political participation, however, not when individuals engage in ethnic associations. This finding suggests that involvement in co-ethnic associations might provide a useful platform for ethnic minorities to actively seek to address their concerns through the existing political mechanisms. Furthermore, it also provided some evidence that ethnic grievances might be more important for better acculturated, second generation individuals, whose expectations of equality of treatment are not met. This finding is in line with some of the previous research conducted in the American context, and suggests that discrimination might have more politically relevant consequences for those, who despite their native-born status do not feel treated equally with their white counterparts. In other words, the negative consequences of grievances are more pronounced among people, who have higher expectations for equal treatment. The main strength of the presented results lies in the fact that the analysis was conducted on the large, representative sample of the main British ethnic minority groups. However, the limited measures of group consciousness, especially with regards to the associational involvement and group identity, constituted a serious constraint for the ability to provide a thorough examination of different aspects of group consciousness. For example, ethnic associational involvement was measured only by a generic question about membership in ethnic-related organisations. It was not possible to examine what kind of organisation the respondent was involved in. It is quite likely that involvement in cultural or hobby associations does not carry the same weight in terms of facilitating political awareness as involvement in organisations dealing with local community issues. Furthermore, importance of ethnic identity was measured by a single question about how much the respondent felt that he/she had in common with people from own ethnic group. The choice to include the commonality question rather than the bipolar question available in EMBES dataset about the feeling either more British or more ethnic was dictated by two reasons. First, unipolar scales are commonly regarded as more accurate than bi-polar ones (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Kaplan & J., 1972). In the case of the bipolar identity measure, most of the respondents chose the safe 'middle' point of the scale, which did not force them to decide which group loyalty was more important for them. Secondly, the bipolar measure did not allow respondents to assess how important was either identity for them, and forcefully

imposed the opposition between British and ethnic identities. In light of the limitations of the available bipolar identity measure, the ethnic commonality measure was chosen as more accurate measure of the sense of attachment to own ethnic group. Nevertheless, the lack of more in-depth measures of the importance of ethnic and British identities is a considerable limitation of the conducted analysis.

Future directions

The presented findings provided evidence that group consciousness might have important consequences for non-electoral political participation however more research is needed to understand how it affects different forms of political mobilisation. First, the future research should seek to better understand the role of ethnic identity and ethnic associational networks for different forms of political involvement. For example, looking at the perceived importance of ethnic identity for the sense of self or for the individual life chances might provide different results than the measure of commonality used in this study. Furthermore, a systematic investigation of the effects of involvement in different types of ethnic associations would help to understand why some ethnic associations might increase the sense of politicized group consciousness. The second recommendation for future investigations is to focus on exploring the mechanism of group consciousness. This could be achieved by conducting experimental research testing when group-based motivation becomes more politically relevant (e.g. by manipulating the contextual importance of ethnic identity through priming) as well as by testing a range of possible mediating factors (e.g. group solidarity, political interest, or the sense of group-based political efficacy).

7.2.3. Study 3

Key findings

The major goal of the qualitative study presented in Chapter 6 was to investigate whether differences in the types of co-ethnic organisations contribute to understanding political participation patterns among Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities. The data in the study was garnered from 40 in-depth interviews with Bangladeshi and Caribbean activists from Birmingham and Oldham. The analytical strategy involved content analysis

of the interviews' transcripts, conducted with the support of automated semantic network analysis in Leximancer.

The study has asserted that there are two substantive differences between co-ethnic organisations in the examined communities. First, it showed that Caribbean organisations primarily focus on **expressive** goals, whereas most Bangladeshi organisations are characterised by **instrumental** goals. This difference was manifested by the dominant types of activities carried out by the studied organisations. Caribbean organisations were often focused on art, culture, history, counter-acting discrimination in the criminal justice system and mentoring youth. In contrast, Bangladeshi organisations mainly concentrated on providing services and practical support for their community, like job-related trainings, education, support for the youth and elderly and lobbying for public resources for their community. Secondly, the analysis highlighted the very different attitudes of community organisations towards cooperating with local authorities and public institutions. Caribbean activists were usually sceptical towards developing partnerships with 'outsiders' and relying on public funding. Such attitudes were motivated by the perceived importance of remaining independent and 'grass roots', as well as by the perceived necessity to be sheltered from institutional racism and able to pursue one's own agenda. On the contrary, Bangladeshi activists were often very enthusiastic about cooperating with local authorities and other public institutions. Reaching out to mainstream partners was often regarded both as an opportunity to create greater impact as well as a way to obtain assistance with practical issues, especially those related to accessing appropriate services and financial resources. The study established that Caribbean organisations generally display more **anti-mainstream** orientation, whereas those that were Bangladeshi were of a more **pro-mainstream** orientation.

The past experiences of community activists had an important impact on the priorities set by their organisations and affected their attitudes towards mainstream politics. In the case of Bangladeshis, the positive experiences of partnerships with local authorities, initially developed by many co-ethnic interpreters, resulted in a long-term cooperation between community representatives and mainstream institutions. Successful collaboration between Bangladeshi organisations and local authorities has been recognised by the scholars of the British Bangla diaspora as one of the factors that facilitated integration of their community (Alexander et al. 2015). Various Bangladeshi activists have moved from civic activism into the local political arena, which has been commonly viewed as an opportunity to represent and empower their community. Positive evaluations of local

authorities and the perceived importance of having one's own political representatives seemed to make possible political engagement and mobilising the local ethnic diaspora to engage in politics, especially during election times. On the other hand, many Caribbean activists felt that the problems of black communities have been ignored by local authorities and political parties. A wide-spread disappointment together with on-going discrimination in the criminal justice system fostered a sense of distrust in the mainstream political system. The prevalent lack of trust in the police and scepticism towards local authorities (often portrayed as too 'reactive') seemed to yield both disillusionment with mainstream politics as well as greater incentives to engage in protest participation.

The study pointed out three main elements that contributed to development of different types of activism in these two communities, namely: (1) historical legacy and initial expectations of early immigrants; (2) interpretation of existing disadvantage; and (3) the role and meaning of group identity. Early Caribbean immigrants, who were very familiar with British culture as a consequence of the long period of colonisation, often regarded their new destination as the motherland. Their high expectations for a better life were confronted with the reality of wide-spread racial discrimination in post-war Britain. Racial discrimination experienced by well-acculturated Caribbean immigrants certainly contributed to the development of strong grievances. The argument that higher acculturation led to greater awareness and sensitivity to racial discrimination among Caribbeans has already been noted by previous studies (e.g., Maxwell 2008). A different historical narrative was outlined by the interviewed Bangladeshi activists. Early Bangladeshi settlers usually had little knowledge of British culture and language, and many were trying to escape the politically and economically unstable conditions of East Bengal. The lack of English skills and often low formal qualifications meant there was a necessity to focus on securing the basic needs of the community, perhaps making Bangladeshi immigrants more prepared to accept certain forms of discriminatory treatment. The large economic, cultural and linguistic needs often led community leaders to seek assistance and partnerships with local service providers and authorities. Furthermore, the recent enhancements in educational attainment and career perspectives of the second generation appeared to produce a general sense of optimism among the Bangladeshi community. The different framings of immigration experience influenced how the interviewed activists portrayed the current prospects of their communities and how they interpreted the existing community disadvantage. Caribbean activists often pointed to the role of discrimination, whereas Bangladeshi activists usually referred to the initial lack of

language knowledge and few formal qualifications. Finally, different historical legacies of Caribbean and Bangladeshi diasporas were reflected in the narratives and perceptions of group identity. The experience of slavery and racial struggle of people of African origin, as well as the influential legacy of black movements, made black identity a central feature and important point of reference for many Caribbean activists. However, the main point of historical reference for the majority of Bangladeshi activists was the fight for independence with West Pakistan and the legacy of the founding fathers of Bangladesh. This created a sentimental appreciation of Bengali history and identity but was not central to organisational activity.

Main contribution, strengths and limitations

The study offered important insights into two areas of research. First, it showed that the character of ethnic activism is influenced by different historical trajectories of different ethnic communities and that this plays an important role in understanding the potential effects of ethnic organisations on political mobilisation.

The substantial differences within the goals and values of ethnic organisations provide potential explanation why quantitative studies often reached inconsistent conclusions with regards to the role of ethnic organisations in political mobilisation; even within this data, it is clear that the community organisations served different roles in each community to the point that even their political techniques and conception of the role of lobbying versus protest were fundamentally different. Secondly, both the character of ethnic organisations as well as understandings of community empowerment and **agency** prevalent among Bangladeshi and Caribbean activists contribute to explaining different political participation patterns among these two communities.

The qualitative inquiry generated insight into the mechanisms that could potentially lead to either political mobilisation or political withdrawal of individuals involved in ethnic organisations, and the ways in which different types of political conceptions of ethnic civic activism and agency produce distinctively different outcomes. This is an important advantage in comparison to the existing quantitative studies, which could only examine the structural characteristics of ethnic associational networks. The automated coding of the most important themes and concepts occurring in the qualitative interviews applied during the initial exploration of the data also ensured higher reliability compared to traditional, manual techniques and ensured that the same methodology can be applied to other datasets.

The main methodological limitation of this study is related to the sampling issues. First, the interviews with Bangladeshi activists were conducted in two locations, whereas interviews with Caribbean activists were conducted only in one location due to the experienced difficulty of accessing appropriate respondents. However, since the location was not of the main interest in the study, it is unlikely that this significantly affected the reported findings. The second limitation is that the acquired sample consisted largely of the first-generation, male respondents (especially in the Bangladeshi sample). However, the make-up of the sample reflects the characteristics of the organisations identified as the most visible in the studied communities.

Future directions

Future work could explore intergenerational differences in a more systematic way. This would help to shed a light on: (1) whether the role of patriarchal, kinship based leadership is really diminishing among the second generation Bangladeshis, (2) whether, as mentioned by a few interviewees, the role of pan-Africanist ideas is more relevant for the first generation of Caribbeans, who experienced the most racial discrimination after arrival, (3) what are the ideological perspectives of young Caribbean activists. This paper has not explored the intergenerational differences in much detail, as the focus of the work was on the most visible and most prominent organisations. However, that is a potentially important factor, especially in terms of getting better understanding of the future prospects of political engagement among younger generations.

7.3. Conclusions

The work presented in this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of political integration outcomes both empirically and theoretically. Firstly, the presented empirical studies provide strong evidence on the detrimental consequences of grievances and perceived discrimination on different aspects of political integration. As shown throughout the thesis, the perception of discrimination appears to be one of the most important determinants of (1) a lack of positive sense of British identity (Study 1); and (2) the choice to ‘stay away’ from mainstream politics as demonstrated by the lower likelihood of voting on an individual level (Study 2) and the higher likelihood of ethnic civic organisations developing more ‘anti-mainstream’ agendas, potentially discouraging

conventional political participation at the group level (Study 3). Notably, the political attitudes associated with perceived discrimination are primarily linked to the 'sociotropic' rather than 'individual' type of discrimination. This finding is in line with both group consciousness American theorists (e.g., Shingles, 1981) and British empirical studies by Heath et al. (2013), which stress that it is primarily beliefs about the systemic racial disadvantage rather than individual experience that shape political attitudes of ethnic minorities. Such beliefs about systemic ethnic disadvantage resemble Samson's (2014) concept of the 'perception of racialized opportunities', which have been shown to shape the political party preferences of Latinos in the US. According to Samson (2014), political party identification of racialized minorities as well as their particular policy preferences (e.g., support for affirmative action) largely depend on the type of 'perceived racialized opportunities' associated with the type of identity into which immigrant-origin individuals assimilate (e.g., racialized 'underclass', white middle class or a 'new' minority identity). The findings presented in Study 2 (and to some extent in Study 3) support Samson's argument that, in order to understand group-specific political attitudes, we need to take into account different types of perceived, racialized opportunities. In consequence, this thesis argues that the classic formulation of the 'group consciousness' hypothesis, explaining electoral mobilisation of African-Americans after the civil rights movement, needs to be adjusted to the contemporary British context in order to reflect that, at present, ethnic grievances seem to have very different effects on electoral and non-electoral forms of political action.

Secondly, as demonstrated in Study 2 and Study 3, the fact that immigrant-origin individuals strongly identify with their own ethnic group does not automatically mean that they are less likely to be involved in mainstream politics or to have distinctive, ethnic-based political preferences (as measured by political party identification and support for affirmative action). The presented empirical analysis suggests that it is a unique combination of strong ethnic identity and ethnic grievances that lead to a lower likelihood of participating in electoral politics and to the perception of one's inability to address specific, ethnic group interests through existing mainstream political mechanisms. As demonstrated in Study 1, strong attachment to minority identities (either ethnic or religious) is positively associated with having a strong sense of British identity as long as individuals do not feel discriminated against because of their origin. Furthermore, the findings from Study 1 demonstrate that the self-reported strength of British identity seems to be largely dependent on individual and cross-cultural differences attributable to the

general style of responses (collectivist tendency) rather than to the conflict or incompatibility of different group loyalties. This result highlights the need to incorporate insights from psychological theories of identity when assessing and interpreting the meaning of the self-reported, perception-based survey questions. It has been argued that a need exists for a more critical assessment of the extent to which British identity questions can be treated as indicators of identificational assimilation.

Finally, the thesis highlights the significance of taking into account the political agency of ethnic activists when examining the relationship between ethnic organisations and political mobilisation (Study 3). In the existing literature, there is a general lack of agreement on whether ethnic civic organisations increase or decrease motivation to participate in the 'host' country's politics. The existing literature points out two main factors that can potentially moderate the effect of ethnic civic organisations on political integration. Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) highlight the importance of the structural characteristics of organisations themselves (such as the level of interconnectedness, size, and density), whereas Maxwell (2013) argues that it is in fact a higher social segregation of ethnic communities (higher clustering of co-ethnics) that might provide political leverage for disadvantaged ethnic communities and subsequently result in better political integration. The empirical observation that South Asian communities are more likely to be politically integrated in mainstream British politics made by Maxwell (2013) is in line with the findings presented in Study 3; however, the analysis of the qualitative interviews suggests that the driving mechanism might be somewhat different. The evidence presented in Study 3 suggests that the main driver of higher involvement in British politics of ethnic minority communities is not the level of concentration of co-ethnics but the attribution of the existing ethnic disadvantage and the character of ethnic minority identity. It has been shown that Caribbean organisational activists develop more 'anti-mainstream' attitudes and more 'reactive' types of identity due to the racialized sense of grievance and the perception that specific ethnic group interests cannot be achieved using mainstream political mechanisms. On the other hand, Bangladeshi organisational activists tend to attribute their ethnic community disadvantage to the objective barriers (such as lack of language skills and low qualifications), which in turn make them more likely to develop 'pro-mainstream attitudes' and the type of ethnic identity that functions in parallel, not in opposition, to their sense of British identity. This finding suggests a need for theoretical explanations of the role of ethnic civic organisations on political integration to take into

account the role of ethnic grievances and the type of ethnic identity, instead of focusing on structural characteristics of organisational and co-ethnic networks.

In sum, political integration as understood by feeling British, participating in electoral processes, and promoting it via one's own ethnic organisational networks seems to be largely dependent on the attribution of one's own community disadvantage, as well as on the way ethnic group identity is conceptualised in relation to the sense of British identity. In consequence, it can be argued that some of the current public policy efforts to promote integration, such as the citizenship ceremonies or the suggestions to teach 'British values' made by the recent 'Casey Review' report (Casey 2016), might be somewhat misplaced. The discussed findings strongly suggest that the focus of policy initiatives should be on promoting equality of opportunity and 'counter-stigmatisation' in order to make ethnic minorities feel a part of British society. The recent "All Parliamentary Party Group (APPG) Report on Social Integration" (Kere et al. 2017) highlights the need for public policy to avoid stigmatisation and making connections between integration and counter-terrorism policies; however, both the APPG report and the recent debates on integration seem to 'forget' to address the equally important and on-going stigmatisation and grievances of black British minorities.

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Appendices

A. Chapter 4 – Variable Coding

Table A.1. Table Coding of Independent Variables, Dataset: EMBES.

Measure (EMBES)	Variable/Question	Coding
Socio-economic integration/success		
Higher education	[zq95_3] Highest Qualification	Binary coding: 0-do not have a Uni degree, 1- has a Uni degree
Employed or in education	[eq65_1] R's employment status	Binary coding: 0-not in employment or full-time education, 1-in paid work or in full-time education
Social class	[eq65_1, zq98_1] Constructed based on R's employment status and type	Binary coding (0- not managerial or professional, 1-managerial or professional)
Discrimination		
Institutional discrimination (own group)	[eq18_1a] Gov Treats R's Ethnic Group fairly	5 point Likert scale (1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-neither agree nor disagree, 4-disagree, 5-strongly disagree)
Relative deprivation (own group)	[eq18_2a] Big Gap-R's Ethnic Group Expect and Receive	5 point Likert scale (1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-neither agree nor disagree, 4-disagree, 5-strongly disagree)
Non-whites held back	[eq14_3] Non-White Held Back by Prejudice	5 point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neither agree nor disagree, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree)
Experienced discrimination	[eq37] Experienced Discrimination in Last 5 Years	Binary coding: 0-no, 1-yes
English fluency		
English proficiency	[eq61_1, eq61_3] English main language and how good at English	Binary coding: 0-Poor, below average 1- fairly good, very good, English main language
Social integration		
Have ethnic friends only	[eq46_1] Most R's friends from the same ethnicity or religion	Binary coding: 0-no, 1-yes
Residential segregation		
Most neighbours from the same ethnic group	[eq46_3] Members Same Ethnicity Religion: Neighbourhood	Binary coding: 0-no, 1- yes

Table A.1 Continued.

Political integration and political attitudes		
Voted in general elections	[bq12_1] Voted in 2010 General Election	0-no 1-yes
Participated in non-elect pol activity	[bq54_2, eq13_1, eq13_2, eq13_3] Involved in Politics, Common Affairs, participated in protest, boycott (Last 12 Months), signed a petition (Last 12 Months)	Binary coding: 0 - didn't participate in any of the listed activities, 1-participated in at least one activity
Interest in politics	[bq1] Interest in Politics	5 point Likert scale (1- a great deal, quite a lot, 3-some, 4-not very much, 5-not at all)
Political knowledge	[bq79_1, bq79_3, bq79_5, bq79_8 eq79_9] Pol Know-Polling Stations Close 10 PM, Pol Know-Min Voting Age 16, Pol Know-Chancellor Exchequer Sets Int Rates, Pol	Binary: 0 little knowledge (0-3 correct answers); 1good knowledge (4-5 correct answers)

Table A.2 Coding of Independent Variables, Dataset: Citizenship Survey

Measure (CS)	Variable/Question	Coding
Socio-economic integration/success		
Higher education	[zquals1] Highest qualification	Binary coding (0- no higher edu, 1-higher edu)
Being in employment	[ES2001] Employment status	Binary coding (0-not employed or in edu, 1-employed or in edu)
Social class	[SEG2] Socio-economic Group (old scheme) for respondent	Binary coding (0-not managerial or professional, 1-managerial or professional)
Discrimination		
Institution discrimination	[zorgwor] Thinks that one of eight (listed)organisations would treat them in discriminatory way	Binary coding (0-no, 1-yes)
English fluency		
English first language	[SGood, Reading, Writing]	Binary coding (0-not fluent, 1-fluent)
Social integration		
Mixes socially with other ethnicities	[MxOft1, MxOft4, MxOft5] Mix with different ethnic and religious groups: At your home or their home/ At a pub, club, cafe or restaurant/ At a group, club or organisation you belong to	Binary variable 0- never mix in any listed places, 1-mix at least some times in at least one of the listed places (home, organisations, pubs, cafes, etc.)
Residential segregation		
Lives in high ethnic density area	Percentiles recoded into 10 categories from the least to the most concentrated wards	0-not minority majority ward 1-'minority' majority ward
Political integration and political attitudes		
Political efficacy (local level)	[PAffLoc] Can you influence decisions affecting local area	Collapsed categories, 0-definitely/tend to disagree, 1-definitely/tend to agree
Takes part in civic or voluntary activities	[zcivpar] Civic participation in last 12 months [zforvol] Formal volunteering in last 12 months	Binary coding (0-no, 1-yes)
Belonging on local level		
Belongs to neighbourhood	[SBeNeigh] How strongly do you belong to neighbourhood	4 point Likert scale, Where: 1- Not strongly at all 4-very strongly
Belongs to local area	[SBeLoc] How strongly do you belong to your local area?	4 point Likert scale, Where: 1- Not strongly at all 4-very strongly

Table A.2 Continued.

Collectivism		
Individual level collectivist tendency	[ImpEthR, ImpRelR, ImpNatR, ImpSCR, ImpFOR, ImpGenR] Scale=∑ (Importance of ethnic or racial background to sense of who you are, Importance of religion to sense of who you are, Importance of national identity to sense of who you are, Importance of social class to sense of who you are, Importance of country your family came from originally to sense of who you are, Importance of gender to sense of who you are) Cronbach's alpha=0.77, N of items=6 (Factor analysis in the appendix)	
Controls		
Gender	[rsex] Gender	1-male, 2-female
Age	[rage9_Ln]	Ln(age)
UK born	[rcob2] UK-born	0-no, 1-yes
From ethnic minority group	[ethnic5] Five main ethnic groups	0-not an ethnic minority 1-ethnci minority
Having minority religion	[RelBI] R's religion binary grouping all minority religions vs Christian and no religion	0-Does not belong to minority religion; 1-Does belong to minority religion
Recent immigrant (<5 yrs in UK)	[xcamyr5] whether came to country in past 5 years	0-no, 1-yes

Table A.3 Coding of Independent Variables, Dataset: Understanding Society

Measure (USoc)	**Variable/Question**	**Coding**
Socio-economic integration/success		
Higher education	[a_qfhigh] Highest qualification	Binary: 0- below University degree 1 – University 'Degree'
In paid employment	[a_jbhas] Did paid work last week [a_jboff] No work last week but has paid job	Binary: 0 – not in paid employment; 1- in paid employment
Social class	[a_jbnssec3_dv] Current job: Three Class NS-SEC	Binary: 0- intermediate, routine and other; 2- managerial and professional
Discrimination		
Experienced discrimination	[a_resinsultedw] Insulted or attacked based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, language or accent	Binary: 0- no 1- yes (was attacked or insulted based on origin)
English fluency		
English first language/fluency	[a_englang] English is first language [a_engspk] Difficulty speaking day to day English [a_engtel] Difficulty speaking English on the phone [a_engread] Difficulty reading English [a_engform] Difficulty completing forms in English	Binary: 0- not fluent, 1- fluent or native
Residential segregation		
Lives in high/low ethnic density area	[a_lda] Low ethnic density area	Binary: 0-low ethnic density area, 1-high ethnic density area
Political integration and political attitudes		
Political party ID	[a_vote1] Supports a particular political party [a_vote2] Closer to one political party than others	Recoded into dummy: NoParty, PartyLeft, PartyRight, OtherParty
Political interest	[a_vote6] Level of interest in politics	4 point scale: from 1- not at all interested to 4- very interested
Belonging on local level		
Belonging to a neighbourhood	[a_scopngbha] Belong to neighbourhood	5 point scale: from 1- strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree
Talks to neighbours	[a_scopngbhh] Talks to neighbours	5 point scale: from 1- strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree

Table A.3 Continued.

Belonging on local level		
Belonging to a neighbourhood	[a_scopngbha] Belong to neighbourhood	5 point scale: from 1-strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree
Talks to neighbours	[a_scopngbhh] Talks to neighbours	5 point scale: from 1-strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree
Attachment to the origin group		
Identification with father's ethnic group	[a_spaid] Strength of identification with father's ethnicity	10 point scale, where 0 (do not identify at all), and 10 (strongly identifies)
Collectivism		
Individual level collectivist tendency (proxy)	coll_tend_pred=16.327 +(0.424 * sex_rec2) +(0.085*age8cat) +(1.009*BME_01)+(0.212*Edu0)+ (-0.307 * Edu2)+ (5.249*ImpFathEth1) +(-2.787*ImpFathEth2)+(3.222*ImpFathEth4)	
Controls		
Gender	[a_sex_cr] Gender (corrected)	1-male, 2-female
Age	[LnAge] Linear logarithm of age	Ln(a_age_corr)
UK born	[a_ukborn] Born in the UK	0-Not born in the UK, 1- born in the UK
Belongs to ethnic minority group	[a_race] Ethnic group	0-Not ethnic minority, 1- ethnic minority
Having minority religion	[a_oprlg1] Religion	Binary 0-Christian or no religion, 1-non-Christian (minority religion)

B. Chapter 4 – Details of Imputation Method

Table B.1. Imputation of collectivist tendency proxy.

Coll_tend_scale= ∑(ImpEthR, ImpRelR, ImpNatR, ImpSCR, ImpFOR, ImpGenR) Cronbach's alpha=0.77

Step 1. (Citizenship Survey)
OLS regression coeffcients, DV: Coll_tend_scale, Dataset: Citizenship Survey

	B
Constant	16.327 (0.088)
Gender	0.424 (0.038)
Age	0.085 (0.013)
BME01	1.009 (0.043)
GSCE edu	0.212 0.053)
Higher edu	-0.307 (0.047)
Ethnic ID not very important	-5.249 (0.088)
Ethnic ID quite important	-2.787 (0.057)
Ethnic ID important	3.222 (0.044)

R^2= 0.598

Step 2. (Citizenship Survey)
Imputation of the coll_tend_scale based on regression coefficients

Corr. Between Coll_tend_scale and Predicted Coll_tend_scale =0.8

Step 3. (Understanding Society)
Imputation of the Coll_tend_scale proxy into Understanding Society Data

coll_tend_pred=16.327 +(0.424 * sex_rec2) +(0.085*age8cat) +(1.009*BME_01)+(0.212*Edu0)+ (-0.307 * Edu2)+ (5.249*ImpFathEth1) + (-2.787*ImpFathEth2)+(3.222*ImpFathEth4)

C. Chapter 4 – Factor Analysis

Table C.1. Factor Analysis (PCA) Collectivist/individualist tendency (unrotated). Source: Citizenship Survey

Component Matrix

	1	2
Importance of occupation to sense of who you are	.377	0.512
Importance of ethnic or racial background to sense of who you are	0.674	**-0.413**
Importance of religion to sense of who you are	0.523	**-0.460**
Importance of national identity to sense of who you are	0.678	**-0.326**
Importance of interests to sense of who you are	0.532	0.332
Importance of social class to sense of who you are	0.622	**0.158**
Importance of country your family came from originally to sense of who you are	0.660	**-0.323**
Importance of gender to sense of who you are	0.632	**0.008**
Importance of level of income to sense of who you are	0.597	0.393
Importance of level of education to sense of who you are	0.595	0.414

Note: To construct the 'tendency to identify with groups' scale, 6 items that positively load on factor 1 were included (Cronbach's alpha=0.77, N of items=6)

D. Chapter 4 – Comparison of the Dependent Variables between Different Groups

Figure D-1. Importance of being British among desired and less desired immigrants, Data: Undertanding Society 2010.



Figure D-2. Strength of belonging to Brtain among desired and less desired immigrants.



Figure D-3. Collectivist tendency score across different subgroups. Source: Citizenship Survey



E. Chapter 5 –Distribution of the Dependent Variables across Ethnic Groups

Table E.1 Distribution of the Dependent Variables across ethnic groups

Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Black Caribbean	Black African
Self-reported vote (2010 GE) among registered and non-registered voters				
76.00%	76.30%	78.20%	68.60%	63.80%
Self-reported vote (2010 GE) among registered voters				
82.50%	82.00%	81.10%	76.20%	76.40%
Non-electoral political participation				
29.20%	32.70%	31.20%	31.40%	31.20%
Labour Party ID				
59.10%	56.50%	64.30%	75.40%	76.30%

Source: 2010 EMBES, weighted data

F. Chapter 6 – Tables

Table F.1. Classification of the themes and concepts extracted in Leximancer into broad analytical categories

<table>
<tr><td>Caribbeans</td><td>Bangladeshis</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Identity</td></tr>
<tr><td>Theme: people Concepts: people, young, difference, politics, able, discrimination, become, speaking, impact, angry, create, justice, riots (Hits: 1190)

Theme: black identity Concepts: black, racism, important, problem, system, education, society, change, history, power, cause, movement, access, identity, nationalism, free, raise (Hits: 783)

Theme: white Concepts: white, everybody, stop, race, challenge (Hits: 167)

Theme: police Concepts: police, face, rights, slavery, dealing (Hits: 111)</td><td>Theme: people Concepts: people, young, involved, centre, important, everybody, businesses, restaurant, making, knowledge, background, opportunity, program, successful (Hits: 1232)

Theme: students Concepts: students, classes, university (Hits: 117)

Theme: education Concepts: education, children, problem, jobs, school, parents, benefit, advice, experience, professional (Hits: 588)

Theme: culture Concepts: culture, understanding, religion, celebrate, fair (Hits: 281)

Theme: language Concepts: language, mosques, barrier, educated (Hits: 148)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Community needs and concerns</td></tr>
<tr><td>Theme: black identity Concepts: black, racism, important, problem, system, education, society, change, history, power, cause, movement, access, identity, nationalism, free, raise (Hits: 783)</td><td>Theme: education Concepts: education, children, problem, jobs, school, parents, benefit, advice, experience, professional (Hits: 588)</td></tr>
</table>

Theme: school **Concepts:** school, children, understanding, culture, control, radical, curriculum, population, boys, ourselves, discussion (Hits: **554)** Theme: police **Concepts:** police, face, rights, slavery, dealing (Hits: **111)** Theme: prison **Concepts:** prison, protest, key, serious, voice (Hits: **71)** Theme: job **Concepts:** job, opportunity (Hits: **49**) **Theme:** cases **Concepts:** cases (Hits: **28)** Theme: street **Concepts:** street, advice (Hits: **28**) **Theme:** respect **Concepts:** respect (Hits: 23) **Theme:** position **Concepts:** position (Hits: 19) Theme: **concerned Concepts:** concerned (Hits: 15)	Theme: culture **Concepts:** culture, understanding, religion, celebrate, fair (Hits: **281)** Theme: language **Concepts:** language, mosques, barrier, educated (Hits: **148)** Theme: problem **Concepts:** health, employment, college, immigration (Hits: **102)**
Organisational activity	
Theme: community **Concepts:** community, needs, organisation, issue, support, involved, agenda, service, provide, specific, national,	Theme: community Concepts: community, work, organisation, issues, support, became, housing, services, able, better, activities,

<table>
<tr><td>active, influence (Hits: 785)

Theme: art Concepts: church, political, art, difficult, changed, space, centre activities, majority (Hits: 297)

Theme: council Concepts: council, health, mental, funding, outside, address, anymore (Hits: 161)

Theme: experience Concepts: example, focus, speak, experience, independent, spirituality (Hits: 160)

Theme: structure Concepts: structure (Hits: 14)</td><td>helping, mainstream, skills, aware, information, access, forward, improve, address (Hits: 1342)

Theme: education Concepts: education, children, problem, jobs, school, parents, benefit, advice, experience, professional (Hits: 588)

Theme: women Concepts: women, courses, majority, police, system (Hits: 298)

Theme: events Concepts: events, society, event (Hits: 181)

Theme: charity Concepts: charity, active (Hits: 57)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Politics</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Theme: politics Concepts: politics, leaders, government, reason, development, create (Hits: 291)

Theme: council Concepts: councilor, change, authorities, deliver, key, elected, income (Hits: 267)

Theme: voting Concepts: voting, election, candidate (Hits: 97)

Theme: funding Concepts: funding (Hits: 39)</td></tr>
</table>

Table F.2 Classification of Caribbean organisations included in the study.

Discrimination and advocacy	2
Religious	1
Youth work	2
Civic, political	1
Health	1
Cultural	2
Education, supplementary schools	2
Pan-Africanist	2
Art	2
Multipurpose	1
Total	16

Table F.3. Classification of Bangladeshi organisations included in the study.

Advocacy, culture, civic, political	2
Community development	2
Student organisations	2
Business	3
Multipurpose	6
Women	2
Service, advice, charity work	5
housing	2
Education	1
Religious	2
Consultancy	2
Youth	1
Ethnic media	2
Total	32

Table F.4. List of Caribbean interviewees.

C1	Female, age group: 18-30
C2	Male, age group: 60+
C3	Male, age group: 41-60
C4	Male, age group: 31-40
C5	Male, age group: 41-60
C6	Male, age group: 41-60
C7	Male, age group: 41-60
C8	Female, age group: 41-60
C9	Male, age group: 41-60
C10	Male, age group: 60+
C11	Male, age group: 31-40
C12	Female, age group: 31-40
C13	Female, age group: 60+
C14	Female, age group: 18-30
C15	Male, age group: 31-40

Table F.5. List of Bangladeshi interviewees.

B1	Male, age group: 60+
B2	Male, age group: 31-40
B3	Male, age group: 31-40
B4	Male, age group: 41-60
B5	Male, age group: 31-40
B6	Male, age group: 31-40
B7	Female, age group: 41-60
B8	Female, age group: 31-40
B9	Male, age group: 31-40
B10	Male, age group: 60+
B11	Female, age group: 41-60
B12	Male, age group: 41-60
B13	Male, age group: 18-30
B14	Male, age group: 31-40
B15	Male, age group: 41-60
B16	Female, age group: 31-40
B17	Female, age group: 60+
B18	Female, age group: 18-30
B19	Male, age group: 18-30
B20	Male, age group: 41-60
B21	Male, age group: 60+
B22	Male, age group: 60+
B23	Female, age group: 31-40
B24	Male, age group: 31-40
B25	Male, age group: 60+

G. Chapter 6 – Interview Quotes

This appendix contains quotes from the interviews that aim to further illustrate some of the points discussed in the main body of the paper.

Selected quotes from the interviews with Caribbean activists

- **Importance of addressing the historical 'trauma' of slavery**

"African people are too psychologically traumatized with the kind of brainwashing from the 500 years of slavery, generation after generation."

- **Examples illustrating how activists understood "mentoring" role of their organisations**

"You've got to remember that the young people that tend to be targeted, they might live volatile lifestyles, and they're not going to report to the police. They're not going to write complaints. And because they don't report, it's very difficult to bring people to justice, to discipline people if individual young people are not reporting."

"How about going on this course just to learn how we can do things better? To learn what your rights are, to learn, if you face discrimination, this is how you can do it, these people will help you."

- **The need for recognition and the value of self-help structures**

"It's important to be able to recognise that African-Caribbean communities need to be valued...ideally you'd like to think that we didn't need to exist because the public sector acknowledge our needs and respond appropriately to our needs."

"We must become self-sufficient so we are not dependent on the status quo for our survival."

“We as black people, in order to grow, we must become economically viable.”

- **Perceived importance for the ethnic organisations to stay independent (especially from the government influence and agenda)**

“One of the important things is to stay independent. I'm very critical of this but I think we've become too system based, in terms of procedures, processes, the way we work. We were talking about this on the weekend, even with young people. But there are some practicalities that are difficult to overcome…”

- **Concerns about the elitism of the past and present schooling system**

“There is a major problem in the school system. School should teach people the idea of equality, but that's not the actual purpose of the school. (…) The first walk-in University education had a different finer school, grammar schools with the intention people to set the qualities of London. That was principally part of resisting, we had the right people and they were not worried, that is still part of the system today.”

- **Importance of African heritage to the construction of the ‘self’, expressed by one of the female interviewees**

“Some people are happy to be called black, some Caribbean, but for me, I’m very happy to call myself African, without denying my Jamaican roots.(…) African is more like your spiritual identity, and then its your nationality, wherever your passport is from, wherever your parents are from.”

- **Observation of growing interest in learning African history among young people made by a young female**

“I think people are becoming more and more aware of African History. People are maybe getting tired of the same narratives, the same things, slavery, slavery, colonialism, and then, civil rights and there is so much more that happened before all those things, and we want to know, so I think, people are getting together to know more about their history because it’s not even that we want to challenge, and say, “University, you should teach us these things.” We genuinely want to know, so sometimes, it’s not even through the university that we try to find out more, we just do our research.”

- **Africa-centrism, desire to raise awareness about African history beyond slavery**

"When this group started, we could not use the word Afro-Caribbean, we had to use the word West-Indians (…). We studied African history and so on. We didn't learn all this from British education, this was us doing our own research to know who we are as African people, because if you understand who you are then you will start looking beyond any other information at last."

- **Importance of identity-based organisations/ empowerment**

"I think it's important for the Black community to get together because we have a lot of problems based on the skin colour: discrimination racism et cetera, so when we say, "I am Black." in a proud way, it empowers other Black people (…)We have the same skin colour regardless of our backgrounds, and because of that skin colour, we have similar experiences, so saying Black is a huge umbrella that puts many people under it, and it's easier to discuss issues that we face."

- **Personal journey of embracing black and European identities:**

"Now, I am in this process where I'm trying to acknowledge and to accept, and to like, and love my Africaness. There are many issues when you are a Black African and you were born in Europe. It's almost that you're schizophrenic that you have two different identities, and you don't know which one is right for you, so I'm still working to appreciate both".

- **Embracing African heritage as a facilitator of integration**

"I think that movement to re-establish a central focus of Africa, for folks here, is a strong one. I just think it will make a more grounded of a whole individual, who can embrace all the opportunities that exist in mainstream."

"I think that is very important for me to allow African and Caribbean students to have an appreciation of their culture within the society. As well as that, it's important to engage other people from different cultures to embrace ours as well."

"We put a stamp on it, a Caribbean stamp on it, by familiarizing the children with the culture. In an atmosphere, which was supportive, which was also supportive of elders, where some cultural reorientation and appreciation would take place, and the children do

understand, raising their self-esteem, raising their nationality esteem. Having a great understanding of the culture of their background, and their parents, and so forth, they could integrate easier in the society."

- **Reflection on racism among Caribbean community towards new immigrants**

"I've heard from African-Caribbean people that I know or the black people that I know, that have been racist towards Eastern Europeans say, "Why are they all coming here?" That just froze me and I think, "But they were saying that about black people back in the day, so why are we taking on that?" That's why I said it's messed up that we haven't learned from the past."

- **Race differential as an important determinant of one's life chances**

"There's a difference between wealth and being rich. There's a lot of rich black people but there's not a lot of wealthy black people and unfortunately when you look at the economy, Fortune 500,, when you look at politics, we don't run it so we don't have the means, as Karl Marx said, we don't have the means of production and distribution".

"(…)The problem is, is where they're located or where they're not located. Because of the history of racism and denied access, most people like me, we operate away from standing for public office, we don't become big time journalists."

- **Criticism of local authorities for adopting a "reactive" strategy to tackle local problems**

"Nowadays, they tend to wait for a problem to occur, and then they say, "Oh, we need to address it." When there were the summer riots, suddenly people wanted to address things, but people didn't see that there were still issues around the youth."

- **Disillusion and scepticism towards mainstream politics**

"Black people, African-Caribbeans are notorious for not being interested in any kind of politics and getting involved at all. I think if it doesn't speak to their interests, and then it's harder to get them on board when they don't see any benefits from it."

"Sometimes there are needs in the black community, which the politicians don't do anything about. The councillors don't do anything."

"There's certain European countries where politics means something. In our country, black people always feel that they are 5 or 6 steps behind. People like me, it's not that we tell people not to vote, it's not about that, but you have to remember that when the community has no leadership ideologically then there's micro-leadership where certain people become opinion shapers that people seek their advice on. The question is not, why should you vote? The question is that, what is the most effective way to leverage change?"

"Many politicians in this city are not accountable, you know we've got a leadership that believes that they are just there to rule how they want to rule, and that's it as far as they're concerned ."

- **Preference for protest-type of involvement**

"These demonstrations paid off more than some of the things people do in politics. In 1970s… do you see how long we've been protesting about police brutality? And is still going on these days...The Police didn't have cameras in the stations...we fought for that and got them...These demonstrations paid off more than some of the things people do in politics."

- **Racism in mainstream political parties**

"I believe that all parties are or have been racist somehow in their history."

Selected quotes from the interviews with Bangladeshi activists

- **Examples of how successful role models try to pass their skills to younger generations**

"They look at the skills and experiences, and it becomes a learning circle, and a learning mechanism for the new generation of Bangladeshis."

- **Examples of women's organisations being a bridge between local community and mainstream society**

“The biggest impact of our organisation is that it's only woman-based. It's a training centre, where they can come and achieve their goals. We're a stepping stone for them. We help them all the way through, as much as we can. If we can't help them, we'll do a referral. We have a nursery crèche here, so they can leave their children downstairs with a qualified nursery worker, and go upstairs to study with piece of mind instead of looking after their kids.”

“We set up the youth club to get them engaged because what happens is - they go to school, they come home. That's it. There's no middle ground for them. There's no ground for them to engage in hobbies, or extracurricular activities or just do something fun, so we provide that avenue. Again, that's been going really well. Through the youth group we set up a project called [Name-removed]. We did a lot of careers-based workshops, so we brought in women, local women, business women, professional women, to talk about their careers. For example, we had a chef talking about how she became a professional chef, a graphic designer who set up her own business. These are all local women. It was a way of inspiring them, again to make them understand that they don't have to go down the traditional nurse-teacher or whatever route. There are very many career options for them.”

- **Example of personal links between activists and local government**

“My fist involvement with the community was through working with the [name of the government department-removed for confidentiality reasons], doing community research. (…) I was looking at what could be the best way to deal with people’s concerns related to [name of research area-removed for confidentiality reasons]. My role was project management, I used to manage different projects. (…) After working with [the name of the government programme-removed for confidentiality reasons] for 3 years I resigned because I wanted to commit myself to the development of the Bengali community, because there was nobody who would do that, and the community had been neglected for a long time. (…) If you want to improve a particular area, you need to build up the right skills, find people who have the knowledge, experience and education. At the same time, you need to build up voluntary sector organisations, give them the right resources, create programmes for them, secure money for them, so they are able to drive the change and are able to deliver services for the local communities.”

- **Examples illustrating how Bangladeshi activists embraced the rhetoric of the changing government agenda**

"I think you've got to be able to demonstrate that you are working with the other organisations now, because that's the only way you can progress."

"We are more working around cohesion now. We really want organisations of people from different ethnic backgrounds to work together" (find better example)

"We had around 40 mentors working on [the name of the programme-removed for confidentiality reasons], who were going to the community and were speaking to them directly, mostly to women, police was helping with this."

"We look at the kind of things that might cause them to leave education or the kind of problems they have, but we're focussing more around some of the, if you like, the issues that are around faith and religion. For example, there are people out there who may, sort of tap into... radical, even an ISIS mentality because they feel like no one is helping them to sort of… get back into the mainstream society."

- **Perception of discrimination as a two-way mechanism**

"It's a difficult world that we live in, and on top of that we're living in a foreign country...and we have to understand and accept that we are living in a foreign land and when it comes to giving jobs, it's natural for the people who are appointing to go for their own people...it doesn't matter if the law says it's discrimination...but it's natural to have that...which is not right, but it's natural.... I have worked with different groups of people and I've seen their attitude towards their own people

(…) If you go to Indian restaurants, do you ever see white people serving there? In terms of equality to jobs, shouldn't white people be working in Indian restaurants? They can learn, be taught and trained...and we should give the same equality of opportunities within the sectors that we're working. If most of the people that are working in the restaurants are Bengali then we are not giving other people the opportunity to work...if there was a job available in a Bengali restaurant, would they promote it in the job centre?"

- **Reflection on the role of elderly leaders**

"When you get the leaders, when the leaders support you, everyone else is going to say, "Okay, that's fine." Any place you go to now, when you go to the Muslim thing, you see a community place, you have a leader who's not a young person, who's older."

- **Example illustrating how organisations support women's efforts to play active part in politics**

"A couple of years ago, we had a volunteer doing admin work and she was saying that she was really frustrated at the lack of women in politics. I said to her, "Well, why don't we put something together? Let's do something about that. Because, obviously, it's something that's important to you, and, why not?" I contacted our partner at [name of the mainstream, third sector organisation-removed], we sat down and said, okay, let's put a project together. That volunteer actually led on that. She did the research, did the strategic plan, held meetings and so on. The project was called [name removed] and we did a workshop. We had almost 30 women who attended that workshop. We invited [names of female councillors and MPs- removed]. They were talking about their experiences and the barriers that they had to overcome to get into politics. (…)It was a big eye-opener for the ladies that attended. (…) We discussed whether they would like to become involved in politics, and the majority of them said yes, they want to. They want to see more women in politics representing them, representing their issues. Some said that they will take the steps to look at joining a local party and putting plans together to get more involved. (Details about the follow-up projects related to getting more women into politics-removed) That project to me sums up in how we supported that particular volunteer and pushed her in the direction that she wouldn't think that she's capable of going. That volunteer was just thinking for a long time, "Something needs to be done," and we said to her, "You do it. Why are you relying on somebody else? You do it," and we supported her. She then did join the local political party actually, went out campaigning and so on. She has moved into a different town now, but again, she's involved in politics in that town. That's just 1 outcome, 1 success that we saw. It just brings a smile to my face because we encouraged and supported her, and look how far she's got."

- **Example illustrating the perception of the barriers that women face in male-orientated political arena**

"I don't think any women attend the [political –ed.] meetings. (…) I've never been invited to one. We've had the odd invitations to the big parties, like the Eid celebration parties and so on…but still, it's very, very male-orientated… (…) I think the younger ladies like myself and younger…they would go into politics. If they had the chance, if they had the

opportunity, I think they would go. But because it's historically been very male-orientated…it's going to take a long time for us to break these barriers. It's not going happen overnight. And it's something that I really want to get involved in my later life. Hopefully when my children are a bit older…because I know there's commitment involved…there's obviously going to be evening work involved, and so on..."

- **Perception that assimilating into the British society leads to both positive and negative changes**

"That has changed for the positive but we're also seeing, among ethnic minorities, a lot more divorces, a lot more extramarital affairs, a lot more dabbling into drugs and things which are more prevalent now as opposed to what it used to be before. Even the number of girls smoking increased so it's become more like any normal other community really."

- **Perceived shift from Bangladesh-focused towards UK-focus political activity**

"People are involved in Bangladeshi politics because many of them came straight from Bangladesh, so they are the ones that are connected with Bangladesh. People, who have been living in this country for some time, 10, 15, 20 years; they are more or less inclined to be involved in mainstream politics in this country. I think there is a general awareness that there should be more people involved with the local politics. I think it's coming up, and I think together with time, you will find that more and more people are interested in the mainstream politics in this country."

"Traditionally, Bengali people have involved themselves in the politics of Bangladesh rather than in the politics of this country...and that is wrong, because getting involved in the Bangladeshi politics here doesn't give you anything at all...you can't make any policy changes, you can't contribute to anything...but Bengali are starting to get involved in the politics of this country..."

- **Importance of having co-ethnic political representatives**

"I think for any community it is important to have a representative voice on the decision making bodies."

“Having political representatives is definitely important, because they can understand our needs. For example, if we have Eid celebration, which is our religious holiday festival day. So the school is open that day and our children don't go. So their attendance level at the school goes down. So I've been able to go and speak to the school and say “Why don't you make a training day which coincide with the Eid day so then the attendance will not go down.” So these are the things that if we have representation, we can try to negotiate with the local schools and local authorities as well.”

“They understand the problem easier. If there are housing issues they can write a letter to the council if there's injustice, subtle injustice in the services being delivered, then they can write a letter. The councillors then put an inquiry into the officers and then the officers will then look at it quickly. That's the difference.”

- **Example of personal efforts of mobilising co-ethnic community to engage in mainstream British politics**

“So we had a campaign, saying, that people should be members of the political party, whichever, conservative, labour, liberal, doesn't really matter, but they should be in the mainstream politics. I believe that, instead of having this kind of fictional politics of Bangladeshi government party or the opposition parties, people should concentrate on mainstream politics in this country. And they should join political parties. And once you become a member, then you can go to these meetings, to the selection meetings, and then see what’s happening. And then you fight. “

“We have ladies that we say to, "Oh it's voting day on that day. Would you go and vote?" They look at me and they say, "Oh," "You should, you should go and vote. You need to select who you want to rule the country, rule the area," So we do talk about it. A lot of people are coming out of the shell and going out to vote, I think. I vote myself, and I do tell them to go and vote. If there's anything happening in the community around the area, I do tell them “ this is happening, do you want to join?” It's up to them whether to do it or not.”

- **Example of personal connections between activists and local political parties**

“I'm a member of a party and I do pay a lot of attention to politics. I'm not that heavily involved in politics in the sense that, other than election time, I really don't get that

involved that much unless there's some sort of a dinner or something like that, a social gathering, but during the election time, I do help out.”

“They find this group thing, which gives them a sense of identity, place in the community, better profile. (…)I don’t know if you know Sheikh Hasina who is the prime minister. Her niece is now a parliamentary candidate in London. You’re getting this cross … a little fertilization happening. Bengali are very active, politically very active in this country. That’s their willpower. (…)Sometimes it’s perceived as some kind of resource for their families, like wealth. All the NPs [members of Bangladeshi Nationalist Party-ed.) before the election, you see them shimmying in this country saying, ‘Make sure your relatives are worthy.’”

- **Examples of patron-client relationships between local politicians and ethnic community**

“I can only talk about [name of the area]. If you look at the statistics going back 3 or 4 years, Labour has been winning...and that’s because the person that stood for Labour was a person respected in the community. He would get the key people in the area and say “Look I'm standing for Labour, make sure you vote for me” So because of that person, they didn't vote for the party he was from, they voted for that person...Because of who he was and because they knew him, they supported him...This person would go around saying to people who are respected in the community “Tell your family to vote for me”. So for example, if I've got a big family in [name of the area], I've got 50 votes in my house, and because I'm the head of that family, the councillor would approach me and say “You know what? Tell your family to vote for me and if there is anything I can do for you, I will do it for you”.

(…)

Because the love and respect that they have for that person, they would take his word and vote for me. It doesn't matter who I am. They would vote, because a lot of these people, like I said, they are newly arrived in the community...because when you are back in your country and something happens in your village, you'd go to the person who's in charge, and well respected. This culture has come into this country. When it comes to voting, there is a lot of older people here, now these are the people from the old generation...so that's how it works…”

“There are some councillors that are Bangladeshi. So sometimes we expect them to put out a useful word for us and things like that. For example, in this organisation we've been involved with the local authority right from the beginning.”

“If you come to the community level now, with the Bengali, the way they govern the community and the organisations, it's similar to the way that the people in Bangladesh govern.”

H. Chapter 6 – Interview Guide

This appendix presents the topic guide that was used for the conducted interviews with Caribbean and Bangladeshi activists from local ethnic organisations. This guide was treated only as a point of reference and was not intended to provide the exact list of question to be asked. The actual questions were adapted to the main topics that emerged during the interviews.

Opening questions

- Aims of the interview
- Basic demographic questions: length of living in the UK, occupation, family

Personal experience and work

- Can you give a brief summary of the kind of community work you have been doing:
- **When** did you start**, why,** what other orgs have you been active in

Bengali/Caribbean organisations locally and nationally

- What are the main organisations in Birmingham/Oldham
- What do they do for the community
- What is the umbrella organisation?
- Do different organisations work together? (in Birmingham/Oldham and nationally)
- How much do community organisations cooperate with local authorities?
- What about the funding of the organisations?
- Are the same people often involved in different organisations?

Politics

- Are the members of organisations politically active as well? E.g. in party politics/which parties
- Do they often stand as candidates?
- Do political parties seek help of the organisations, e.g. in campaigning?
- Do organisations try to mobilise the Bangladeshi/Caribbean community to participate in politics, e.g. to vote in elections?

- Do you think that having Bengali/Caribbean political representatives is important for the community? (why?)
- Do you personally have a preference for political candidates from your ethnic background?
- How active are you in politics?

Identity

- Do Bangladeshi organisations try to promote Bangladeshi/Caribbean culture?
- How important is Bengali/Caribbean/black identity to you?

Discrimination/main problems in the community

- What are the main problems facing the Bengali/Caribbean community today?
- What is the main success?
- Is there a problem of discrimination that causes difficulties for ethnic minorities (e.g. in the labour market/political arena?)

I. Chapter 6 – Participant Information Sheet

School of Social Sciences

Participant Information Sheet

What is the title of the research?

The role of ethnic and religious organisations in Caribbean and Bangladeshi communities in Birmingham and Oldham

Who will conduct the research?

Magda Borkowska, PhD researcher at the Cathie Marsh Institute for Social Research (University of Manchester)

What is the aim of the research?

The main goal of this research is to investigate the role of ethnic and religious organisations for local communities, to get to know about their work and their members, and to see whether involvement in ethnic and religious organisations might promote involvement in a broader range of civic and/or political activities.

Why have I been chosen?

This research focuses on the Bangladeshi and Caribbean communities in Birmingham. I aim to interview from 40 to 60 individuals, who are familiar with the work of local organisations and local ethnic communities. I am particularly interested in interviewing the leaders of organisations (e.g. board members or religious leaders), community workers, members of ethnic and religious organisations as well as members of local authorities.

What would I be asked to do if I took part?

You will participate in an informal interview in which you will be asked questions mainly about the organisation you are a member of. The duration of the interview will depend on how much time you can commit but it should not take longer than one hour.

What happens to the data collected?

The data collected in this study will be used in my PhD thesis. The findings from the study might be also used in articles published in academic journals or presented at academic conferences and seminars.

In all cases, confidentiality and anonymity will be guaranteed.

How is confidentiality maintained?

All the information about you will be kept strictly confidential. All details that could potentially identify you will be removed or modified. Every interview will be anonymised and your name will not be cited in any published documents, presentations or interview transcripts.

Your personal details will not be disclosed to anyone besides me (the researcher). Anything you tell me will not be discussed with other participants. My academic supervisor, Prof. Anthony Heath, can only access the anonymised transcripts.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?

Participation in the study is entirely voluntary. Therefore, you can decide to withdraw at any point, for any reason.

Will the outcomes of the research be published?

Yes, the results of the research will be published in my PhD thesis. They might also be published in academic journals or presented at academic conferences.

Contact for further information

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Academic supervisor:

Prof. Anthony Heath: anthony.heath@manchester.ac.uk