4   Words, Phrases and Argumentational Structures in the German Debate on Europe in the Early Post-War Period

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Introduction

'Habt ihr Sehnsucht nach Europen? Vor euch liegt es in den Tropen; denn Europa ist Begriff'. [Do you long for Europe? It is all around you in the tropics; for Europe is of the mind.] (Klemperer, 1987, p. 169).[1] These are the words with which Victor Klemperer attempted to comfort those of his friends who, having emigrated, found themselves filled with nostalgia for the Europe they had left behind them. By 'Europe is of the mind' he meant to say Europe is more than just the name of a particular geographical area, it is an idea. An idea we could also call the occident or the West. For the distinction is no longer made between the originally more religious concept of the occident and the more secular one of Europe. Europe and the occident, European and occidental are almost always used as synonyms of one another, although it should be noted that unlike occident, Europe is also the name of a set of political ideas with a long tradition.

The idea of community has underpinned these ideas since the seventeenth century finding expression, for instance, in the phrase '*europäisches Gleichgewicht*' ['European balance of power']. The notion of a balance is entirely compatible with the idea of a leading power and in German eyes, Germany has played precisely this role of leader since the late seventeenth century - a role legitimised by the incontrovertible argument that Germany is at the geographical heart of Europe. In 1670 Leibniz reasoned that 'the Roman Empire is a country sufficient unto itself, which has only to desire its happiness for it to come about. Europe is the body, Germany the heart of Europe'.[2] In this sense, Germany determined the condition of Europe as a whole. If it were to regain its status as a 'civil

entity, clearly delineated', then 'Europe as a whole would return to peaceful ways, its internal discourse would cease' (Brunner, vol. V, 1984, p. 473).[3] In this way, 'Germany would blossom again and equilibrium return to Europe' (Brunner, vol. II, 1975, p. 969).[4]

Novalis took up Leibniz's ideas again in the sense that they involve the cultural dominance of Germany:

> Deutschland geht einen langsamen aber sicheren Gang vor den übrigen europäischen Ländern voraus [...] der Deutsche [bildet sich] mit allem Fleiß zum Genossen einer höheren Epoche der Cultur, und dieser Vorschritt muß ihm ein großes Uebergewicht über die Andere[n] im Lauf der Zeit geben. (Novalis, 1983, p. 519)
> [Slowly but surely Germany proceeds ahead of the other European countries. The sheer application of the German enables him to achieve a higher level of civilisation and through this greater elevation generally to gain dominance over the others.]

In 1801 an unknown author opined that 'peace and security in Germany served at the same time to ensure these conditions in a large part of Europe' (Brunner, vol. V, 1984, p. 481).[5]

The idea of a German leadership sees its apotheosis after the wars of liberation when the argument appeared concerning God's chosen people:

> [...] dieses Volk [ist] von Gott dazu ausersehen [...], der Führer und Vorkämpfer Europas auf der Bahn echt christlicher Bildung zu werden und die Geschichte des ganzen Erdteils in sich selbst vorzubilden. (Brunner, vol. I, 1972, p. 793)
> [[...]this people is predestined by God to be the leaders, to be the vanguard of Europe in its progress towards a truly Christian education and to prefigure in itself the history of the whole hemisphere.]

The legacy of these radical nationalistic ideas was embraced as we now know by the ideology of National Socialism. One phrase will serve to illustrate this in the 1942 edition of what has become known as the 'brown' Meyer, Meyer being a popular German encyclopaedia and the epithet 'brown' referring to the National Socialist bias in the work. The entry under '*Reich*' informs the reader of the 'schicksalhafte Sendungsaufgabe der Deutschen in Europa' ['divine destiny of the Germans in Europe'].

As well as informing the concept of a European balance under German leadership, the idea of community appears from the early years of the eighteenth century onwards in various federalist constructs. A few fixed expressions will serve to illustrate the phases in this process. In 1732,

Johann Jacob Moser laid 'the foundation for the study of the current constitution in Europe' (Brunner, vol. VII, 1992, pp. 119, 120).[6] In 1800 Gentz spoke of the 'natural federal constitution of Europe' (Brunner, vol. I, 1972, p. 639).[7] In 1814 K. C. Krause presented the draft for a European Federation of States. In his 1821 piece entitled *Der Europäische Bund* [The European Federation] Conrad Friedrich von Schmidt-Phiseldeck used alongside of one another expressions such as the *Federal Association of European Peoples, European Federation, European Federal State, European Confederation, European Bund, European Union* (Schumacher, 1976, p. 187).[8] In 1832 Wirth exhorted those taking part in the Hambacher festival with the words: 'Dreimal hoch das konföderierte republikanische Europa!'.['Three cheers for the Republican European Confederation'] (Brunner, vol. V, 1984, p. 628). Friedrich Nietzsche prophesied that: 'Die wirtschaftliche Einigung Europas kommt mit Notwendigkeit'. ['the economic unification of Europe is bound to come about'] (Schlechta, vol. 3, 1960, p. 660) and in his *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* [Beyond Good and Evil] of 1885 he discerned 'signs of Europe's desire to become one' (ibid, vol. 2, p. 724).[9] Finally in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi developed the idea of the 'Vereinigten Staaten von Europa' ['United States of Europe'].

No changes in the developments we are describing seem to have been brought about by the hiatus between 1933 and 1945. 'European unity' continued to be the common aim behind many political projects, however differently the concept may have been elaborated. Party political allegiance appeared to be irrelevant in this respect. Europe developed:

> zu einem zentralen politischen Programm und schließlich zu einer Realität, die zunehmend die internationale Politik und den Alltag des einzelnen bestimmt. (Jung/Wengeler, 1995, p. 93)
> [a central political platform and in due course a reality which increasingly determines both international politics and the everyday life of the individual]

Integration of Europe, a phrase already in use in 1943 for instance by Alfred Weber, before Schumacher used it in 1948, became a key political principle. It was variously represented in expressions which had been established usage since the eighteenth century, such as *federation*[10], *bund*[11], *unity*[12], *unification*[13], *United States of Europe*[14] and finally *'community'*[15] which Jung and Wengeler (ibid, p.105) described as a 'willkommene Kompromißbegriff' ['useful compromise expression'] and the aim of the community was to promote economic activity, the 'economic unity of Europe' (Adenauer speech 21/09/1949).[16] Here we get a sense of the

German self-confidence that resulted, at least in part, from the permanent stereotype of Germany as lying at the heart of Europe, in the middle of Europe, as being the heart of Europe. From the German point of view, the logic of the economic reintegration of Europe necessarily involved the proposition 'without Germany, no Europe'. This idea had been expounded by Alfred Weber already in 1943, less forcefully perhaps, but nevertheless quite clearly:

> [für] die produktionswirtschaftliche Integration Europas, das Abhängen der Prosperität des einen Teils vom anderen [...] [ist] das in der Mitte liegende Deutschland, seine große Bevölkerung und Produktivkraft ein un-entbehrlicher Teil. [...]Ohne deutsche Lieferkraft und Kaufkraft keine gesunde volle Lieferfähigkeit und Kaufkraft der anderen Teile von Europa, der rings umliegenden, aus ökonomischen und klimatischen Notwendigkeiten wirtschaftlich mit ihm integrierten Gebiete und Bevölkerungen. (Weber, 1946, p. 246)
> [[for] the economic integration of Europe and the interdependence of the prosperity of its parts, the central position of Germany in Europe, its huge population and the level of its productive output, are indispensable. Without Germany and without German output and without its buying power, there can be no strong supply or buying power in the other parts of Europe, of those peoples and regions which surround Germany and which are closely integrated with her economically by virtue of climatic conditions and modes of production.]

Kurt Schumacher used the economic potential of the industrial Ruhr area of Germany to put forward the argument for Europe as follows:

> Das Ruhrgebiet ist [...] das stärkste industrielle Kraftzentrum Europas. Und mit und durch das Ruhrgebiet hat ja auch in früheren besseren Zeiten Europa allein leben können. Wir Sozialdemokraten erkennen ausdrücklich an, daß die wirtschaftlichen Kräfte des Ruhrgebietes zur Wiedergutmachung der Zerstörung Europas herangezogen werden müssen [...]. So wie Europa das Ruhrgebiet braucht, so braucht Deutschland als ein Teil Europas die Mitbeteiligung an diesem Ruhrgebiet. (Schumacher, 9.5.1946)
> [The Ruhr is the strongest industrial centre in Europe and it was by and through the Ruhr that Europe could remain autonomous in the past. As Social Democrats we state unequivocally that the economic strength of the Ruhr must be harnessed in the task in making good the destruction wrought in Europe. Just as Europe needs the Ruhr, so Germany as a part of Europe, needs to be closely involved in the development of this area.]

In the pan-European perspective, we may instance the 1948 essay by the economist Ernst Brödner, entitled 'Europe and the German Future' the

argument was made that Germany was best kept in check by integration. Brödner writes:

> Sicherheit gibt es nur, wenn Deutschlands Industrie ein Teil der europäischen ist. Nur die engste wirtschaftliche Verflechtung durch Arbeitsteilung ist eine wirksame Kontrolle gegen heimliche Wiederaufrüstung und eine Sicherheit, daß europäische Bruderkriege in Zukunft ausgeschlossen sind. (Brödner, S. 429).
>
> [There will only be security if German industry is part of European industry. Only close economic co-operation in the form of shared production will be an efficient brake on secret rearmament and will ensure that in future there will be no more civil wars in Europe.]

So far we have shown that the political, pragmatic, idea of Europe was taken up again after 1945 in the context of the desired restructuring of Europe.

Expressions in European Discourse and their Political Contexts

Most of the concepts of Europe of the early post-war years are deeply rooted in the history of European thought. Thus in texts from this period there is a plethora of references to a European cultural community and a community of values. Political ideas are elaborated which urgently invoke Germany's western tradition, often in a more or less formulaic form. We encounter 'the spiritual and moral values and principles of European culture' (Das demokratische Deutschland, 1945, p. 9):[17] 'the central Christian western values' (Programmentwurf der CDU, 17/06/1945);[18] 'European consciousness [...] western culture [...] preservation of western culture' (Mayer, 1947, p. 232);[19] 'the spirit of the West' (Weber, 1946, p. 221);[20] 'for the sake of the spiritual values and the culture of the West' (Adenauer speech, 24/03/1946);[21] 'the mind of western man' (Künneth, 1947, p. 66);[22] 'the western culture of Christianity' (ibid, p. 254);[23] 'all western values and societal structures which came down to us from the Greeks, the Romans and the Jews, were refashioned by the Germanic tribes' (Niekisch, 1953, p. 266).[24]

Germany and the Germans were given clear prominence as a part of this western history as inheritors of the occidental values and the appearance, for instance, of the possessive pronoun in extracts such as the following:

[das] Grundgesetz unseres Werdens .. heißt: Abendland, Einheit der Romanen, Germanen und Slawen, vor allem aber der Romanen und Germanen im Zeichen von Antike und Christentum. (Dirks, 1990, pp. 192)
[The underlying factors shaping our development are the occident and the unity of the Germanic, Gallic and Slav tribes. Above all of the Gallic and Germanic peoples in the context of the classical period on the one hand, and Christianity on the other.]

Ursprung unserer abendländischen Kultur [sind] die jonischen Griechen, die Männer der Stoa, Cicero. (Röpke, 1947, p. 12)
[The origins of our western culture lie with the Ionian Greeks, the Stoics, Cicero.]

Quellen unserer europäischen Kultur, die aus dem Christentum entspringen. (Adenauer speech, 21/9/1949).
[The wellsprings of our European culture which are fed by Christianity.]

These concepts were clearly influenced by the political conditions of the early post-war period. Post-war Germany was rooted in the experience of liberation from without, National Socialism defeated by the Allies, a war lost by Germany, the lack of a sovereign state, German guilt. No other society had to examine its immediate past, present and future as intensely as German society after 1945. No other society had the opportunity of choosing a new way forward so clearly based on a critique of the immediate past:

Während alle übrigen europäischen Völker [...] ein festes, bestimmtes Verhältnis zu der Wirklichkeit haben, in die sie gestellt sind [...], sind die Deutschen ein Volk der Möglichkeiten, nicht der Tatsachen. (Kogon, 1946,. p.414)
[Whilst all the other European peoples have a clear unambiguous relationship to the reality surrounding them, Germany is a nation of possibilities, not facts.]

One of the possible reasons adduced by Kogon in 1946 for Germany's lack of direction after the war, was the palpable rejection of National Socialism. This had been ordained by the victors, occupiers and liberators. For the moment, Germany was excluded from Europe, indeed, from the world. The Germans stood accused in the eyes of the world, challenged by the Allies to prove the sincerity of what they were saying. These conditions determined post-war reality in Germany, including the German language and therefore also the way in which such key terms as Europe and the West were used:

'Das Abendland'. Das Wort ist, formal gesehen, eine gute Parole: es ist mit Wert und Sinn gesättigt, zugleich aber anschaulich und konkret, man kann es seelisch, man kann es geistig, man kann es politisch nehmen. [...] Der Begriff entspricht offenbar einem geistigen Bedürfnis, er scheint als Antwort auf eine oft gestellte Frage empfunden zu werden. [...] Wie sind wir dahin gekommen, wo wir jetzt stehen? [...] Und wenn wir das zu wissen glauben: wie kommen wir wieder heraus, zurück zu einer echten Ordnung, zu Sinn und Wert? (Dirks, 1990, pp. 192)

[The West'. From a formal point of view, the word is a useful slogan, profoundly meaningful yet solid: it can be taken spiritually or intellectually or politically [...] The concept clearly meets an intellectual need. It seems to be regarded as the answer to a frequent question: How did we get to where we are now? [...] and if we think that we can answer that: How do we find our way out and back to order, to a set of meaningful values?]

This was Walter Dirks' observation on the European discourse of the early post-war period.

The challenge then to 'show you mean what you say' is the subject of the following discussion. The post-war years were characterised in this sense by the instrumentalisation of ideas of Europe in support of certain lines of argumentation.

Argumentational Structures in European Discourse and their Temporal References

The task then was to adduce plausible arguments and to demonstrate the credibility of stated aims. It is in this context that Europe began to be used differently in the early years in the sense that it was made to function as an argument in favour of reintegration. Europe and the West represented a kind of collective super argument at the time. Both terms are components of what Klein has called 'kollektive Argumentationen' ['collective arguments'] (Klein, 1985, p. 217). Toulmin described the main function of argumentational structures as being to justify assertions (Toulmin, 1975, p. 18). The assertion, or in other words, the claim, of the Germans after 1945 could be summed up as follows: 'The Germans stand in the main tradition of western Humanism'. The claim is a reaction, a response, to the difficulty raised by the rest of the world, the Allies, victors and liberators. The problem briefly is 'All the Germans are Nazis, have become culpable, have foregone any claims to integration in the community of nations'.

The quality of arguments may be judged by their acceptability, which is in turn predicated on what is considered to be true, incontrovertible, at the very least, plausible. So, arguments may be more or less acceptable according to how far they fulfil these three conditions.

The most common collective arguments in the political discourse of the early post-war years were therefore, like any arguments, attempts to establish the plausibility of given aims. What the Germans had to do was to use a given positive component of the collective consciousness, here Germany's place in the European cultural community, to transform the collectively problematical, the accusation of moral deprivation, into another collectively acceptable state of affairs, Germany's reintegration into the family of nations. See Klein (1985, p. 213) for the terminology used here such as the concept of 'collective'.

Two temporal frames of reference both encountered frequently in early post war texts bear upon the basic claim asserted in the idea of integration - they are the past and the future. On the one hand the past is explained and assessed, National Socialism and its causes are repeatedly explicated and evaluated. On the other, a version of the future is projected, social and political reconstruction are called into being through a language which declares that which is desirable to be in existence already. Concepts of Europe are introduced into the argumentational structures in a variety of ways. We need to establish the agents in this process and the identity of the participants in the European debate in early post-war Germany. These include not only politicians but also cultural commentators, intellectuals, philosophers, theologians, an intellectual elite, therefore a heterogeneous group holding very different views as to how the recent past might be explained and with different ideas about the future shape of German society. The reflections of this intellectual elite on past and future, centred on a number of key ideas including Europe, or the West. These two concepts are tokens of the very many expressions for an idea which had informed political discourse since the beginning of the modern period, appearing as an ideal, a structural principle and a guide to possible action. Two factors were common to all of the variants of this basic idea, community and unity. The following discussion aims to describe the process whereby concepts of Europe were instrumentalised in a variety of ways according both to the different philosophical outlooks of those taking part in the discourse and to the relationship of the argument in question to the past or the future. Arguments dealing with the causes of historical

phenomena draw on the past, those attempting the task of laying these phenomena to rest are future orientated.

Arguments Concerning Causes

When the aim was to identify the causes of a line of development which culminated in National Socialism, historical processes from European or western history were adduced:

> Wir stehen mit der Katastrophe, die wir durchlebt haben und noch durchleben, für jeden, der etwas Blick hat, deutlich am Ende der bisherigen Art der Geschichte, der Geschichte nämlich, die wesentlich vom Abendland her bestimmt war. (Weber, 1946, p. 10)
>
> [To those with any insight, it must be clear that the cataclysmic period we have experienced and are still going through heralds the end of history as we have known it up until now. A history in other words which was fundamentally shaped by the West.]

Alfred Weber wrote this during the war in 1943, his End of History - *Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte* - appeared in 1946. Weber claimed to have identified a caesura brought about primarily by scientific discoveries and technological innovations which interrupted the progress of western history and took control of 'unsere abendländischen Masen' ['the western masses'] (ibid, p. 233). Historically this upheaval was reflected in western thought in the form of nihilism, the final formative stage in the progress toward National Socialism:

> Nie wäre es zu diesem [heutigen] Nullpunkt gekommen, wäre nicht seit etwa 1880 [...] jene dem bisherigen Geist des Abendlandes entgegengesetzte Welle in die Höhe gekommen, jene Absage an die frühere Tiefe des Abendlandes, dessen angeblich den Nihilismus überwindender, in Wahrheit vornehmster nihilistischer Höhepunkt der späte Popular-Nietzsche wurde, - jenes in Wahrheit Antigeistige, das sich neben der vornehmen Libertinage des Geistigen und jener brutalen Libertinage der Macht in den immer höhere Wellen schlagenden Naturalismen, in jenen Imperialismen und Nationalismen austobte. (ibid, p. 221)
>
> [We would never have arrived at our nadir if we had not been gradually overtaken since 1880 by nihilism. Nihilism is a mode of thought profoundly inimical to the western values that had held sway until then. It involved a rejection of our most profoundly held principles. The movement brought forth the popularised figure of the late Nietzsche allegedly overcoming nihilism but in fact representing its most distinguished nihilistic apostle. Nihilism united those anti-intellectual forces which,

taking their place alongside an intellectual abandonment of values and the exercise of violence in the name of uncontrolled freedom, ran their violent course in various ever more alarming naturalistic artistic representations, or inspired imperialist and nationalistic enterprises.]

Nihilism came to be the dominant force 'in people's conduct of their everyday affairs' (ibid, p. 12).[25] Although it was undoubtedly founded by the German Nietzsche, it came to be regarded as a European, western phenomenon. It was 'the underlying cause of the historical cataclysm which we Westerners and the Europeans in particular brought upon the rest of the world' (ibid).[26]

One conclusion which emerges from this way of thinking, had it that it was not, to quote Karl Jaspers, the Germans 'who were responsible for committing the most dreadful atrocities, but Europeans' (Jaspers, 1986, p. 264).[27]

Theological historians such as Künneth, declared these developments to be occidental and European rather than German. Thus in his 'Theological History of the Encounter Between National Socialism and Christianity' published in 1947 under the title 'The Fall' (*Der grosse Abfall*), Künneth similarly set about reconstructing historical movement whose inner logic had led inevitably to National Socialism. He wrote: 'The disaster and the fall of the Titans suddenly illuminated not only the situation of the West as a whole, but of mankind itself' (Künneth, 1947, p. 91).[28] He argued that the 'National Socialist catastrophe' was a symptom of the deterioration of modern western society:

Unter diesem notwendigen geschichtstheologischen Aspekt wird der enge Rahmen des deutschen Schicksals im mitteleuropäischen Raum gesprengt und damit klar, daß der katastrophale Sturz nicht bloß eine Angelegenheit des deutschen Menschen, sondern ein Weltereignis darstellt, daß hier an einem Teil der Menschheit prinzipiell die Sache aller Völker zur Debatte steht. (ibid, p. 15)

[From the point of view of theology the limited question of the fate of Germany in Central Europe must be abandoned in view of the fact that the catastrophe concerns not merely the Germans, but the whole world, and that although it may appear that only part of mankind is directly affected, the fate of all peoples is in fact at issue.]

From the theological point of view, the onset of the modern period signified a movement away from Christianity common to the whole of the West. Künneth's description of the pathology of the world ran as follows:

Der abendländische Mensch hatte seit langem die Mitte seines Lebens verloren und seine Seele war darüber krank geworden. Diese geheime moderne Weltkrankheit hatte das geistige Dasein aller Völker mehr oder weniger stark vergiftet, sie ballte sich aber im Herzen Europas zusammen und kam im nationalsozialistischen Denken und Wollen zum gewaltsamen Ausbruch. (ibid, p. 66)

[Western man, having lost the core of his being a long time ago, his soul had become sick. As a result of this hidden but ubiquitous modern affliction, the spiritual well-being of all the peoples had become poisoned. This poison was at its most potent in the heart of Europe and finally found violent expression in National Socialist thought and actions.]

Like Alfred Weber, Künneth set out to reconstruct historical tendencies beyond national - perhaps we should read this as German - boundaries, in an attempt as it were, to internationalise the National Socialist phenomenon: 'There is no doubt that this sickness of the western soul could have broken-out elsewhere, possibly differently. The symptoms of the abnormal conditions were in evidence everywhere' (ibid).[29] By internationalising the National Socialist phenomenon in this way, Künneth was able to reject the charge of an ethnically based collective German guilt: 'Grounding the attempt to establish the guilt of the German people for this disaster on the basis that Germans had been worse or more godless than other peoples, betrays a simplistic understanding of history' (ibid).[30] At the same time as he acknowledged a German guilt, he denied that it was amenable to explanation of itself:

Daß die latente Krankheit sich gerade hier in so furchtbarer Eruption offenbarte, ist geschichtstheologisch beurteilt, nicht in einem 'mehr' an Schuld begründet, sondern trägt die Qualität einer jenseits unserer Kategorien liegenden Schicksalsetzung, vor der die Warumfrage verstummen muß. (ibid)

[From the theological historical point of view, the fact that a latent illness could erupt so dreadfully at this place at this point in history cannot be explained by positing a greater degree of guilt. It was a blow of fate, the reasons for which lie beyond human understanding, closed to the question of why.]

This response amounts to an extraordinary refusal to identify causal relationships between National Socialism and particular - possibly German - conditions. The response offered the theologian a scheme of denial. Equating the empirical question with the question of ultimate causes, removed it from possible explanation.

The construction of historical tendencies in the way we have described above, consisting typically of nihilism combined with the rejection of God,

invoked the notion of a European destiny leading necessarily to National Socialism, the inevitable endpoint of European history. Under this interpretation, National Socialism is not a German phenomenon, its causes lie rather in the course of western history. This interpretative scheme runs through texts of the early post-war years. The fundamental idea is one of European destiny. This appears in a host of variations, such as 'Geflecht des europäischen Schicksals' ['the destinies of all the European peoples are interwoven'] (Dirks, 1990, p. 195), 'abendländische Tragödie; abendländische Krise' ['western tragedy; the crisis of the West'] (ibid, p. 198), 'dieser unserer geistigen Krise Europas' ['this material and spiritual crisis of our Europe'] (ibid, p. 194); 'europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft' ['common European destiny'] (Kaiser speech, 16/06/1946); 'Aus dem Europa der letzten Jahrhunderte ist das Verhängnis der gegenwärtigen Weltlage erwachsen' ['the present plight of the world stems from centuries of European development'.] (Jaspers, 1986, p. 262); 'das katastrophale Schicksal, das über die Mitte Europas hereingebrochen ist' ['the catastrophic fate which befell Central Europe'] (Künneth, 1947, p. 9).

Such stereotyped formulations are not solely German. In his famous 'speech of hope' of 6 September 1946, the American Foreign Minister Byrnes used expressions which were translated as 'Germany and Europe's recovery from illness' (Hohlfeld, p. 132).[31] But in written originals in German these phrases seemed to assume a legitimising function. Europe was used as an argument to relativise Germany's guilt. Germany's desire for integration was anticipated linguistically as the precondition for the emergence of National Socialism. A shift of values and the rejection of God and the intellectual decline of Germany were projected onto the whole of the European continent, a wider community of values and culture. The destiny of Germany was identified with that of Europe, the German crisis was identified as a European crisis and in this way via exculpation, Germany established its right to a place in the family of nations. In this way of thinking, the idea of a collective German guilt - subscribed to above all by the Americans - was rejected as unacceptable as the idea that guilt might relate to one country; a possibility articulated as follows by the American Foreign Minister Byrnes in his Stuttgart speech: 'der deutsche Militarismus und der Nazismus [haben] die Gebiete von Deutschlands Nachbarn verwüstet' ['German militarism and Nazism have laid waste the lands of Germany's neighbours'] (Hohlfeld, p. 132).

Europe, or the West, played a key role in early arguments that took the past as a frame of reference. In the context of attempts to internationalise

the National Socialist phenomenon, Europe functioned as a key argument in establishing the German claim to reintegration by facilitating the obfuscation, indeed the denial, of the German origins of Fascism and its particular extreme German form. German guilt was relativised and glossed over by means of its Europeanisation. This strategy, incidentally, was not limited to the immediate post-war years. In 1954, six years after Künneth and Weber, a piece appeared by Joachim Moras entitled 'The Middle of Europe'. In it Moras reflected on 'typically German matters' recommending the use of a 'European lens' for any such consideration:

> [...]damit ein plastisches, ein stereoskopisches Bild des Ganzen entstünde -
> demgegenüber sich dann plötzlich die Frage aufdrängen würde: was ist an
> alledem ausschließlich deutsches, was allgemeines Symptom dieser Zeit?
> (Moras, 1954, p. 445)
> [[...] so that a three-dimensional stereoscopic view of the whole be achieved. In this
> setting an inevitable question would suddenly present itself: what is exclusively
> German about all of this? What should be regarded as generally symptomatic of the
> period?']

Almost ten years after the end of the National Socialist era in other words, a way of thinking persisted which involved the Europeanisation of German history.

The argumentational structures we have described so far were, of course, not the only ones which were current. Those critical of events rejected the internationalisation of recent German or Austrian history, preferring a national version which might be instrumentalised for party political purposes. Interpretative schemes were advanced which supported particular socio-political programmes. The position taken by the KPD (Communist Party of Germany), and Kurt Schumacher may be cited as relevant examples. In such cases, notions of Europe were as irrelevant as ideas of decline.

In the modern version of history, arguments like those of Weber and Künneth according to which western civilisations were in their late dying stages, took the place of the typical nineteenth and twentieth century accounts which had seen in the West the highest level of human development. Oswald Spenglers' 'Decline of the West' with its notion of a 'Faustian culture' exemplified this theory of decline.

Arguments which Lay Problems to Rest

Never before had a nation had the kind of opportunity to determine its future course of development such as that given to German society after 1945. We have observed so far that a historical version of Europe which allowed recent German history to be relativised served to internationalise the intellectual movements which led to National Socialism. In European constructs fashioned to account for future developments, we can discern two techniques of legitimisation, the one intellectual, the other programmatic.

The first of these involved elaborating abstract possibilities by mobilising arguments based on historical legacy, cultural community, and shared values. Depending on the philosophy of those concerned, these arguments were couched in theological, philosophical or - if they served political ends - conservative terms.

Having described the structure of the SS-State in four hundred pages, Eugen Kogon called on the Germans to fulfil their true destiny:

> [...] ist es nicht besser, die größte Niederlage seiner [des deutschen Volkes] Geschichte zum Anlaß zu nehmen, um in die eigenen verschütteten Tiefen hinabzusteigen, wo das Gold der hohen deutschen Qualitäten - jawohl: das Gold! begraben liegt, den geschichtlichen und gesamtseelischen Wurzeln der Schuld nachzuspüren und nach Generationen der Geduld gewandelt zur Erfüllung der wahren deutschen Aufgabe in Europa und der Welt, zur Leistung des Beitrags, der seinem gereinigten Wesen entspricht, hervorzutreten? (Kogon, 1946, p. 408)
> [[...] is it not better to use the greatest defeat ever of our people as a reason to descend again into depths which have too long concealed the gold of true German qualities: there we may uncover the historical and spiritual roots of our guilt and then, in due time, re-emerge cleansed and purified to fulfil the true task allotted to the Germans in Europe and the world and make our fitting contribution?]

The theologian, Walter Künneth, was to continue to apply the logic of this interpretation by demanding - once he had construed National Socialism as a western fall from grace - a European return to belief in God: 'die Wendung zur Heimkehr zu Gott, das heißt aber die Rückkehr zur Offenbarungswirklichkeit Gottes in Jesus Christus' ['the return to God is no less than a return to the God revealed in the real Jesus Christ'.] (Künneth, 1947, p. 308). He received support in this from Romano Guardini: 'Europa wird christlich, oder es wird überhaupt nicht mehr sein'

['Europe will either become Christian, or it will simply cease to exist'] (ibid).

The European tradition ended for Karl Jaspers in the final - entirely depoliticised - consequence of the human condition:

> Auch Europa ist nicht das letzte für uns. Wir werden Europäer unter der Bedingung, daß wir eigentlich Menschen werden - das heißt Menschen aus der Tiefe des Ursprungs und des Zieles, welche beide in Gott liegen. (Jaspers, 1986, p. 274).
>
> [Nor is Europe the end for us. In becoming Europeans we become true human beings whose true origins and ultimate goal are in God.]

In the same way, Alfred Weber construed freedom and democracy as historically grounded goals for a future Europe:

> Europa und insbesondere seine deutsche Mitte hat sich .. auf einer die Menschenwürde und Menschlichkeit vertretenden freien demokratischen Basis zu organisieren, sobald man ihm die freie Bewegung dazu läßt. (Weber, 1946, p. 251).
>
> [Europe especially its German centre, must be built on free democratic foundations which represent true humanity and human dignity as soon as it is given the leeway for this to happen.]

Such utterances suggest that the contention of Jung and Wengeler that historical philosophical ideas ceased to exert influence after 1945, is mistaken. Indeed the arguments embedding German in European history continued to play a key role in the debate about the future of Germany. Such arguments were adduced not only by theologian and philosophers, but also by party politicians of a conservative persuasion.

The philosophical and intellectual tradition was assimilated into the conservative party political programme which used Europe and the Christian West as synonyms of one another. Five weeks after the end of the war, the authors of the draft CDU programme invoked Germany's erstwhile greatness which it further described as 'the Christian western values which once held sway among the German people who therefore were held in high regard by the other European nations'. (Programmentwurf der CDU, 17/06/1945).[32]

Konrad Adenauer was convinced that Europe could only become a reality:

[...] wenn eine Gemeinschaft der europäischen Völker wiederhergestellt wird, in der jedes Volk seinen unersetzlichen, unvertretbaren Beitrag zur europäischen Wirtschaft und Kultur, zum abendländischen Denken, Dichten und Gestalten liefert. (Adenauer speech, 24/03/1946)

[[...]if a community of all the other peoples of Europe were recreated, which would allow each nation to make its essential and unique contribution to European culture and commerce and to bring its influence to bear on western literature, thought and the plastic arts.]

And even Jacob Kaiser, the Christian Democrat's declaration to the delegates attending the 1946 CDU Party Conference that 'true democrats are the best Europeans' (Kaiser speech, 16/06/1946)[33] made the connection with the western tradition through his inclusion of the highly positive but usefully vague term 'democracy'. The aim of conservative policies in the post-war period was absolute separation from the communist eastern bloc, an aim served by the construct of a western, Christian Europe.

The liberal version of Europe also subscribed to the same philosophical tradition which we have described. The idea was developed of a relationship between the liberal and the wider western history, indeed they were seen as one and the same tradition. Liberals sought to remove the implications of National Socialist propaganda by redefining liberalism:

[...] in dem ganz breiten und allgemeinen Sinne einer Idee, die im Grunde das Wesen abendländischer Kultur schlechthin ausmacht.[...] In [diesem] Sinne sind wir alle Liberale, soweit wir die uns unersetzlich scheinenden Werte und Einrichtungen gegen jene zerstörenden Kräfte verteidigen, die wir als Kollektivismus, Totalitarismus oder Nationalsozialismus bezeichnen können. [...] Der Liberalismus ist [...] ein machtvoller Stamm, der ein ehrwürdiges Alter aufweist und unter dessen Laubdach wir uns alle heute in dem sicheren Gefühl zusammenfinden, daß wir etwas Gemeinsames zu verteidigen haben, mögen wir uns sonst auch Konservative oder Sozialisten, Demokraten oder Liberale, Protestanten oder Katholiken nennen. (Röpke, 1947, p. 11)

[Liberalism forms] in its most general sense the very bedrock of western civilisation in so far as we defend what we consider to be crucial values and institutions against the destructive forces known as collectivism, totalitarianism or National Socialism. We are all liberals, liberalism is an ancient and mighty tree in whose shade we come together united by our common feeling that we have something to defend together, whatever we may call ourselves - conservative or socialist, democrat or pacifist, Protestant or catholic.]

The liberal world view - reviled by the Nazis as liberalist - was therefore reinterpreted and inherent from the beginning in European

culture. In this way, the non-partisan Wilhelm Röpke who was later to become an adviser to the Adenauer government, prepared the foundation on which liberal ideas could be established across party political lines.

Socialists and social democrats politicised their version of Europe so that it could serve as a legitimating function in their own programmatic designs. Whilst they too had recourse to the western history argument, they used it to argue the necessity for particular, quite concrete political measures. In 1945 a phrase appeared which linked 'western democrats and socialists' (Das demokratische Deutschland, 1945, p. 21)[34] and which clearly indicated the sense of their political programmes. Variants of this formulation appeared constantly in the socialist version of society.

In the first issue of the *Frankfurter Hefte* sharp distinctions were drawn not only between socialist Europe on the one hand and Russian bolshevism and a gargantuan American fascism on the other, but between the former and Germany itself, with talk of 'the creation of a new Europe, united in socialism [...] not Russian bolshevism or American fascism, but Europe, not Germany but Europe' (*Frankfurter Hefte* 1/1946).[35]

Walter Dirks one of the editors of the *Frankfurter Hefte* produced a piece entitled 'Socialism and the West' in which he - having interpreted National Socialism as the result of a departure from the western tradition - urged the necessity of re-engaging with the European western legacy, albeit now with a certain critical caution. He described the results of this rediscovery as follows: 'The West will be socialist or it will cease to be. If Europe divides into 'West' and 'socialism', it will collapse' (Dirks, 1990, p. 201).[36] Dirks saw 'socialism as the enterprise which could bring about the painful recovery of the West, the attempt to breathe new life into the legacy of Europe and thus make it viable once more' (ibid, p. 200).[37]

This version of events was rooted in the concept of a European destiny - a key formula in the discourse we have described as using the past - which reveals clearly the inner logic of the argumentation. Projections for the future involved Europe, not Germany. At the same time the European argument served to render the socialistic view of the desirable society acceptable. There is a clear attempt to give socialism a human face, to make it seem familiar by adding some western traits as it were:

> Abendland und Sozialismus müssen einander durchdringen. In einer sozialistischen Ordnung muß sich die abendländische Grundsubstanz die aktuelle, realistische, faktische, moderne Gestalt geben und zugleich das gute Gewissen im Sinn der sozialen Gerechtigkeit wiedergewinnen, das nicht in der Sehnsucht nach dem intakten Abendland (dem mittelalterlichen 'Ordo'

vor dem bürgerlich-kapitalistischen Sündenfall) zu suchen und zu finden ist, sondern nur durch den opfervollen Umbau der modernen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft wiedererrungen werden kann. Anderseits muß der Sozialismus in der positiven kritischen Aneignung unseres abendländischen Erbes geistige und menschliche Fülle, Maß und Demut suchen und finden. (ibid, p. 201)

[Socialism and the West must inter-penetrate one another. In a socialist order the basic socialist values must take on a modern realistic form. At the same time socialism must rediscover its true sense of social justice, which lies not in some innocent intact version of the West but will be recreated only through selfless devotion to the reconstruction of the economic and social structure here and now. At the same time however, socialism must espouse moderation and humility, must seek to create conditions which will allow all citizens to achieve human and intellectual fulfilment.]

Finally we may turn to Kurt Schumacher who said the following on the subject of the contemporary European debate: 'The debate on Europe is in reality the search for life's deeper meaning after a period of senseless stasis' (Schumacher speech, 29/06/1947).[38] For Schumacher this 'deeper meaning' was in fact a 'united Germany in a socialist Europe' (Schumacher speech, 'Aufgaben und Ziele der deutschen Sozialdemokratie'):

Wir wissen, worum es in Deutschland geht: das ist der gerechte soziale Ausgleich, der sozialistische Neubau der Wirtschaft, der Aufbau der Demokratie und die Erhaltung des deutschen Reiches in einem internationalen europäischen Rahmen. (Schumacher speech, 27/01/1946)

[We know what is at issue in Germany, social justice through a fairer distribution of resources, the socialist reconstruction of the economy, the creation of true democracy and the preservation of the German Empire in an international European framework.]

Schumacher seeks legitimisation of a socialist Europe in the connection between socialism and the West in the form of a surprising causal relationship: 'The West is not dead because socialism and democracy are alive' (Schumacher speech, 29/06/1947).[39]

This is reminiscent in the way that the European idea was updated through the attribution of Christian and western which amounted to a kind of linguistic appropriation, something vehemently rejected by Kurt Schumacher on the grounds that it constituted an exclusive claim to the Christian past of Europe on the part of the Christian Democratic Union. But Schumacher's projection of the coming shape of Europe actually equated the western tradition with a socialist societal order. Schumacher's invocation of the 'western idea' turned out to be based every bit as much on the preservation of conservative values as the philosophy of his opponent Adenauer.

Conclusion

Our findings may be summarised thus: the connotations we associate with the key terms Europe and the West, spell security and order. They are the linguistic expressions of inestimable qualities in an era when people are typically confused, desperate, haunted by apocalyptic fears. The frequency of such references in the early post-war years documents the mental condition of a whole generation. Political circumstances forced the Germans to establish that their desires for re-integration are legitimate. Herein lies the attempt to recover 'a lost unity and security in the idea of the western tradition' (Dirks, 1990, p. 193). This idea is instrumentalised as a political argument after 1945. Such instrumentalisation is part of the history of German political discourse and the German mentality in the early post-war years. Distinguishing between past and future orientations has enabled us to identify two opposite, indeed contradictory attitudes.

The former are explications, that is they seek to explain the way that recent historical developments led to National Socialism. The arguments which follow logically from this explanatory scheme are supported by the notion of the decline of the West, which necessarily culminated in National Socialism. The version of the West is stigmatised as one of death and decay. Concepts in the language of the future orientated schemes of explanation express wishes rather than actuality, serving to give linguistic expression to, and therefore at the same time, be constitutive of, a desired future form of society. This desired state of affairs is based on an argument containing a highly positive version of Europe. The argumentational strategy is based on the arguments of the cultural unity and the community of values which underpin the western tradition.

Various versions of Europe in the early post-war years are revealed as the linguistic documents of an albeit instrumentalised and selective historical consciousness which attempts to correct people's real experience of what they are actually experiencing. This puts a question mark against the idea of a loss of German identity post-1945. The German identity seems indeed not to be lost, the Germans seem to be in no doubt about who they are.

Notes

1. All translations for this chapter have been produced by the editors of this volume. References given in the text refer to original German sources. Unless indicated otherwise all original German quotations are provided in subsequent endnotes.
2. 'Das Römische Reich ist ein Land, so vor sich selbst bestehet und in deßen Macht ist, glückselig zu seyn, wenn es will [...] . Das Reich ist das Haupt-Glied, Teutschland das mittel von Europa'.
3. Erhalte es wieder 'eine civil person und Form', werde 'ganz Europa [...] sich zur Ruhe begeben, in sich selbst zu wüten aufhören'.
4. So werde 'Teutschland in sein flor, Europa in die balance [...] wieder kommen'.
5. '[...] durch Deutschlands Ruhe und Sicherheit wird immer die von einem großen Teil Europens zugleich mitgesichert'.
6. 'Anfangsgründe von der Wissenschaft von der heutigen Staatsverfassung von Europa'.
7. 'natürliche Föderativverfassung von Europa'.
8. 'Föderalvereinigung der europäischen Völkerschaften, Europäische Föderation, Europäischer Bundesstaat, Europäische Konföderation, Europäischer Bund, Europäische Union'.
9. Anzeichen, 'in denen sich ausspricht, daß Europa eins werden will'.
10. 'The federation of European states', Das demokratische Deutschland, 1945, p. 5.
11. 'The desirable European Federation', (ibid, p. 15); 'our moral contribution to thisfederation should be the fact that there is no longer a German state' (Brödner, 1948, p. 429; 'a really viable European federation' (Adenauer, 21/09/1949).
12. European unity (Frankfurter Hefte 1/1946).
13. 'In the process of European unification' (Brödner, 1948, p. 429).
14. 'The will to create the United States of Europe ... the willingness to cooperate closely in a European community, born out of a healthy, cleansed self-confidence' (Kaiser, 16/06/1946); 'A new Germany would regard being part of the United States of Europe as its highest responsibility'' (Schumacher, Aufgaben und Ziele der deutschen Sozialdemokratie); 'the United States of Europe' (Adenauer, 21/09/1949).
15. 'The community of European nations' (Adenauer, 24/03/1946); 'the will to create a European community' (ibid).
16. 'wirtschaftliche Einheit Europas'.
17. 'geistige und sittliche Werte und Güter der europäischen Kultur'.
18. 'die christlichen und abendländischen Lebenswerte'.
19. 'europäische[s] Bewußtsein [...] abendländische Kultur [...] Rettung der abend-ländischen Kultur'.
20. 'Geist des Abendlandes'.
21. 'um der geistigen Werte, um der Kultur des Abendlandes willen'.
22. 'abendländische[s] Seelentum'.
23. 'die abendländische Kultur der Christenheit'.
24. 'alle abendländischen Werte und menschlichen Grundordnungen[...], welche Hellas, Rom, Judäa überliefert haben und die das Germanentum mitgeschaffen haben'.
25. 'für die Alltags- und die allgemeine Aufgabenorientierung weitgehend herrschende[..] Nihilismus'.

26   'die tiefere Ursache [...] für den katastrophalen geschichtlichen Zusammenbruch [...], den wir Abendländer, insbesondere wir Europäer, über die Welt gebracht haben'.
27   'Europäer haben sich der größten Schandtaten schuldig gemacht'.
28   'Die nationalsozialistische Katastrophe und der Titanensturz haben blitzartig die gesamte abendländische Situation, ja zuletzt die Lage der Menschheit beleuchtet'.
29   'Fraglos hätte dieses Durchbrechen der Krankheit des abendländischen Seelentums auch an anderer Stelle und in anderer Weise erfolgen können, denn die Symptome dieses anormalen Zustandes sind überall in Erscheinung getreten'.
30   'Es zeugt daher von großer Oberflächlichkeit und mangelndem geistesgeschichtlichen Verständnis, wenn man die Schuld des deutschen Volkes an dieser Katastrophe mit dem Urteil begründen zu können meint, das deutsche Volk sei schlechter, sei gottloser als andere Völker gewesen'.
31   'Gesundung Deutschlands und Europas'.
32   'die christlichen und abendländischen Lebenswerte, die einst das deutsche Volk beherrschten und es groß und angesehen machten unter den Völkern Europas'.
33   'die echten Demokraten[...]sind [...]die besten Europäer'.
34   'abendländische Demokraten und Sozialisten'.
35   'ein neu zu bildendes Europa in einer sozialistischen Ordnung zusammengefaßt [...] nicht russischen Bolschewismus oder amerikanischen Mammutfaschismus, sondern Europa, nicht Deutschland, sondern Europa'.
36   'Das Abendland wird sozialistisch sein, oder es wird nicht sein. Zerfällt Europa in das "Abendland" und in den "Sozialismus", so zerfällt es in sich selbst'.
37   'Sozialismus [...][ist] die Aufgabe [...] an der das Abendland unter Schmerzen gesunden kann [...] das europäische Erbe in gewandelter Form neu lebensfähig zu machen'.
38   'Die Diskussion über Europa ist doch in Wahrheit das Suchen nach einer Sinngebung des Lebens, nachdem wir jetzt eine Periode sinnlosen Vegetierens durchgemacht haben'.
39   'Das Abendland ist nicht tot. Denn Sozialismus und Demokratie leben'.

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