

## **Political discourses for global audiences: the media framing of the “clash of civilizations” debate**

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One of the distinguishing features of twenty-first century society is the tension that has arisen between different cultural worlds, particularly between the Christian and Islamic spheres. The recent attack on the Danish embassy in Pakistan, which follows on the crisis sparked by the publication of cartoons about Mohammed in a Danish magazine, is evidence of a latent conflict which is long lasting, and which will make its presence felt in different ways. In recent years, the reaction to the Pope's Regensburg speech, Ahmadinejad's declarations trivializing the Holocaust, the debate on Turkey's entry to the European Union, and the public use of the veil in France, all serve as examples of the different forms that this controversy can take.

To a great extent, cultural confrontation has replaced the ideological battles of the Cold War. During the 1990s, and particularly since 11 September 2001, Islamic fundamentalist groups have attacked the political and cultural control exercised by the West, engendering a climate of constant conflict which feeds on reasons that are both old and new: old bones of contention, like the conflict between Jews and Palestinians; and new ones, like those arising out of the “war on terror” or the so-called “cartoon crisis”. Although violent actions are mainly rejected by international public opinion, there is no doubt that potential confrontations are brewing on the level of values and ways of understanding society.

Samuel Huntington coined the term of “clash of civilizations” for this confrontation, emphasizing the most conflictive aspect of the relationship between different cultures, which was to a great extent confirmed on 9-11. This expression is far from innocent. A “clash of civilizations” presupposes an interpretation of the problem that resonates with general connotations of a looming threat, an inevitable conflict, and faint chances of reconciliation. The very words used define this controversial issue from the most alarming perspective.

Although this author's views have met with substantial criticism, the concept has flourished, and has come to be accepted as a recurring iconic expression in political and media discourse. The media have contributed significantly to the dissemination and consolidation of this term, with all that it implies. For example, Al-Jazeera uses this expression as the title for its section dealing with news about this issue.

The most interesting point in all of this is not so much how the expression itself has prospered, but rather what type of issue it is associated with in the public arena. What does “clash of civilizations” mean today? How is this defined or described? What kinds of conflict are grouped under this heading? What consequences do these different interpretations have?

Political and media discourses are the main sources which feed and shape what goes on in the public sphere. Particularly in the global context, far from local realities,

politicians and the media interact to compose a message which citizens are rarely able to influence. In this context, the media reinforce their function as intermediaries, spreading the declarations of political leaders for an audience who have no direct access to them. Alongside these political messages, they also transmit their own interpretation of events.

The aim of the present study is precisely to review the foci, symbols and interpretations that the global media use to formulate and spread the political message about the “clash of civilizations”. This means observing how this cultural clash is articulated in political discourse and how this is then reflected in the most widely-used international media. This analysis will enable us to answer the questions set out above: How is the “clash of civilizations” interpreted? What elements are present in the way this idea is expressed? What public issues are seen in relation to it?

## **I. Global reality, national logic**

According to the arguments of Leonard et al. (2005), the new world order that has emerged since 9-11 is shaped by six points of tension which can be grouped in three dimensions: politics, economics and religion. The political dimension is determined by the controversy about the basis for international order (power versus principles or rules) and the aims of foreign policy (Realpolitik or internationalism); the economic dimension is shaped by the effects of globalization and the differences between developed and developing countries; and finally, the religious dimension is conditioned by the tension between religion and the State (confessional approaches and secularism) and concerning the model of society that is preferred (traditional or liberal).

These debates are being conducted in a public space which has superseded the physical frontiers of the nation. In other words, all the citizens of the world can participate in them, since everyone can be seen to be affected by any decision in any of the areas mentioned. World affairs are penetrating and connecting the traditional levels of political action, be they local, national or international, in a way that will have major consequences. Nations are not disappearing, but they are no longer being understood as socially independent geographical units, and are coming to be seen as a “logic” which organizes a given social space and structures the global streams which flow through it (Sassen, 2003). According to the ideas suggested by Reese (2007), the most important of these flows, of course, are the media, which provide new cultural spaces where national logics are articulated.

For the purposes of the present study we assume that the political discourse reflects this coexistence of the new approaches deriving from globalization, and the interests and rhetoric typical of nations. In the discourse of an international leader, we can therefore find topics which affect the world population as a whole, but adapted to the needs and concerns of that leader’s own home audience.

In this context, where global contents and “national logics” interact, cultural resonance has particular importance. This will be discussed at a later stage in this paper. Here, let it suffice to indicate that cultural resonance is the evocative effect produced by some concepts, values, symbols or expressions, which, if encountered in an unfamiliar environment, conjure up experiences or values of our own culture. Global phenomena

which make reference to a national culture, or which are expressed in terms of “national logic”, will be more likely to be understood and assimilated by the audience.

The idea of the “clash of civilizations” belongs, in principle, to the contents of the global message. As we stated at the outset, one of the coordinates that defines the current international order is the tension generated between communities that live according to opposing values. Any citizen of the twenty-first century, from any cultural background, can understand and explain this expression. Recent events in which this “clash” has been apparent have gone down in history, and bear witness to the difficulty of living together with citizens from cultures other than one’s own.

None the less, according to Leonard, this “clash of civilizations” admits of widely differing interpretations, as well as a range of diverse solutions: this is a global issue which is modulated through different “national logics”. It would seem evident that this is perceived in the political discourses. What we need to investigate is to what extent this is also apparent in the way the media cover these two dimensions.

## **II. Representation of reality in the media.**

If we consider the media as a whole process, this study examines the phase in which the contents of an item are put together. In concrete, it evaluates the way in which political sources affect the production of the final message that reaches the citizen. This perspective was adopted because we consider that examination of the elements that are involved in the creation of a news item may provide a very accurate explanation of the subsequent effect that the contents of these items will have on the audience (De Vreese et al., 2001).

### **Framing as a theory for the analysis of media interpretation.**

Of all the possible theories of mediation (which explain how the media represent and reconstruct reality), framing is particularly useful if we want to find out the vision that the media have of events and the interpretation which they convey to the audience. In contrast to agenda-setting or priming, which stress the effects of the news on public opinion, the theory of framing also takes in the previous stage, analyzing the factors that have an effect on the way the news is written (choice of sources, cultural references, influence of external agents, professional routines). Keeping in mind the social impact of the media, framing also takes into account the environment in which the news is produced, and the professional process through which a news produce is generated. It thus makes it possible to conduct a more rounded analysis of the news (Sádaba, 2008)

Following the tradition of social constructivism (McQuail, 2005), framing studies the focus or frames through which social agents and interest groups (sources and broadcasting companies), journalists (mediators) and the audience (receivers) assimilate, interpret and communicate the reality around them. In short, framing is the process through which the media interpret real phenomena and transmit them to an audience with a particular focus.

This media effect acts on two different levels: it shapes the way that public affairs are presented, and it also molds the knowledge of each of the individuals who is exposed to

its influence. In this study we are concerned mainly with its ability to moderate public debates on political affairs (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986; Schudson, 1983).

The different ways in which the theory of framing can be applied depend on the concept of frame that is adopted. The concept of frame is open to a wide variety of definitions, and opinions abound on the elements which go to make up these special types of focus. The most traditional ones in research on framing are as follows. In the views of Tuchman (1978) and Tankard (1991), the frame is the result of certain professional routines or strategies which enable us to “delimit” reality: this is the view of the professional from the “window” through which he sees the world. The frame of this window is defined by journalists’ resources, by the different ways of organizing information within a particular medium, or by the formats used to cover similar events (Hans-Bernd and Peter, 1995). Other authors, like Gamson (1992), consider that the frame acts as a map or guidebook offering key information that helps us know, understand and analyze a given public matter. Finally, a third definition of frame identifies it with an interpretation of reality which is not confined to stressing certain issues, but which also argues and interprets the facts in a new context, or by establishing a new relationship with a previous fact (Cohen and Wolfsfeld, 1993). This interpretation is ontologically different from the subject of the piece of news or information in itself (Pan & Kosicky, 1993).

Except for those who understand the frame as nothing more than the result of certain professional practices, these authors admit that the frames or foci used in the media are the consequence of the interaction of different factors. Gamson (1992), and Cohen and Wolfsfeld (1993) assert that the frames also depend on elements that are external to the medium, like the views of the broadcasting company, the attitude of the person receiving the message, and the cultural context in which the message is devised and broadcast.

How does this frame come into being? Just as there are differing definitions of the frame as a map or interpretation, there are also various ways of understanding how it comes about. In the view of Entman (1993, 2007), this is the result of elements in the contents that stand out among the others (words, ideas, relations) as the result of a process of selection, emphasis and exclusion of some types of information. The visibility of these elements enables us to construct a specific interpretation of the matter. Entman asserts that these outstanding or noteworthy features establish a definition of the problem, determine the reasons that lie behind it, its consequences, and guide the measures that are used to resolve it (2007). This way of distinguishing frames is particularly useful to identify the strategies of the political elites in their relations with the media. These frames are established in response to fixed, short-term interests, and are the result of a political initiative or the work of a pressure group.

Other authors consider that the focus or interpretation in the frame is derived from a central organizing idea which is shared socially, and which works symbolically to structure and give meaning to a given issue (Reese, 2001, 2007). It is understood as a process in constant activity, which relates ideas with each other and includes or excludes different interpretations as time goes by (Reese, 2007). This way of describing the generation of the frame is more useful for analyzing the dynamics of public debates on issues over time, and makes it easier to follow the development of political discourses and their presence in the media.

The frame as the central organizing idea acts to fuse political interests together with concepts or ideas that have been previously acquired by the audience (interpretive schemata, according to Goffman's cognitive perspective (1974), or by associating frames that have been previously established in the social or political environment. This phenomenon has also been termed "associative framing" (Ruigrok, van Atteveldt, 2007, p.72).

The study reported below takes frames to be the result of both kinds of process. In part, there is a process involving the selection and visibility of certain concepts or words, and these are partly the result of interpretations devised from central ideas which develop over time, and which are the product of the way various factors interact.

None the less, for the analysis of social situations like the tension deriving from cultural diversity, which is constantly modified by the addition of new elements to the public discourses surrounding it, it is useful to take an approach to framing that understands the frame as a central organizing idea.

### **The relationship between political source, media and audience**

According to the division established by D'Angelo concerning the paradigms of framing research, the present study belongs to the constructionist tradition. We understand that journalists act as processors of the information that comes from the sources (international political leaders), and that they interpret the ideas in the leaders' declarations, writing and broadcasting products that are different from the source content (while undoubtedly influenced by them) (Gamson & Mogdiliansi, 1987, 1989). In some sense, a shared decision is made between politicians and media professionals about the message that will be broadcast to the audience (D'Angelo, 2002).

Following the classification that D'Angelo proposed for the four empirical objectives that should guide framing research in the media (identifying thematic units, researching the conditions in which they are produced, examining how they are activated and how they interact as individual frames, and how they shape public opinion and debate), the present paper seeks to carry out the first two of these: to identify issues related to the "clash of civilizations" present in the media, and to study to what extent they reflect the international political discourse (D'Angelo, 2002). This research is therefore situated in the field of *media framing* and not that of *audience framing* (Capella and Jamielson, 1997; Scheufele, 1999).

Scheufele's (1999) vision of framing as a continuous feedback process describes precisely, in our view, the dynamics that operates between politicians and the media in the international arena. Of the different phases which are part of this process, our study focuses on the first, that is, the moment in which the frame is constructed (frame building) which takes in the factors that contribute to forming the professional view of matters, paying special attention to external agents (see also Gans, 1979).

Regarding the typology that is established, we propose completing the classification proposed by Scheufele (1999), who establishes three kinds of frame: those used by social agents acting as sources of information (*source frame*), those created by the media (*media frame*) and those applied by the audience (*audience or individual frame*).

The interest of the present study lies chiefly in the relationship that is established between the *source frame* and the *media frame* (Neuman, Just & Crigler, 1992).

Regarding the impact of *frames* on the audience, there are certain conditions that make them more effective: there are situations and circumstances which make it easier for the public to assimilate them. We chose the debate on the “clash of civilizations” as the subject of this study because of our interest in exploring the coverage of an issue which, at least hypothetically, fulfils the conditions for effectiveness.

The first of these criteria is that the subject should be a new social phenomenon. As Beck states, on some occasions, reality goes beyond the established social concepts, which are suddenly outdated and incapable of explaining a new turn of affairs (Beck, 2003). In this situation, the media acquire the power to make meanings, because they name these new phenomena before others can, and coin expressions and terms which are taken up by the public at large, since they need to communicate and dialogue about these realities. According to Rojecky, when people experience some of the unexpected consequences of globalization in their own lives, they look to the media for points of reference that can help them to understand their surroundings and act accordingly (Rojecky, 2005; Giddens, 1990)

A second condition that makes the media more effective is the outbreak of a crisis, or at least of situations that give people the impression that there is a crisis. It has been proven that in such circumstances, people’s confidence in media discourse, and in the interpretations that take hold of public opinion, is greater than people’s confidence in their own knowledge or opinions (Lang & Lang, 1981)

Finally, the media frame or interpretation is more readily accepted when it is transmitted through expressions, metaphors, values and ideas that have cultural resonance. “Cultural resonance” is an area of significance that is shared between politicians, the media and the audience, which stimulates ideas, principles and values belonging to the cultural context, communicating much more than the literal meaning of the text (La Porte, 2008)

Cultural resonance does not interpret or frame a given issue in the same way as the frame itself does. It is a reference to the culture itself, or the system of principles, which makes the frame easier to understand and more likely to succeed. As Gamson (1988) states, resonances which evoke a cultural context make the frame more effective. The allusion to cultural values that define the identity of a society, and which are generally shared, helps the audience to understand and remember the interpretation of reality that is projected by the media.

Cultural resonance can be understood as a reaction of empathy on the part of the audience when they recognize that the message contains an element from their cultural tradition (Schudson, 1989). It can also be viewed as an element of the text itself (“condensed symbols”, in the words of Sapir, 1934 and Edelman, 1964), which evokes images or memories that form part of the audience’s cultural identity. The study we present here takes the second of these definitions, and in the content analysis we have tried to identify the expressions or symbols which might possess cultural resonance of this kind.

### **III. Methodology**

To carry out this study, we compared the frames or specific interpretations found in several significant political discourses and those encountered in the coverage of these same discourses in the international media.

In the choice of politicians to form part of the sample, we followed the criterion of relevance in the “clash of civilizations” debate. We thus analyzed some speeches by George W. Bush and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, insofar as they represent the two extremes of the controversy between the western and Islamic worlds, and Benedict XVI, since he is a highly significant figure, both as a world religious leader and because of his proposals about faith and the dialogue between cultures. So as not to limit the analysis to the context of the “war on terror”, we also included two more representatives: the Turkish foreign minister, Ali Babacan, and French president Nicolas Sarkozy. Ali Babacan stands out because of his support, alongside Spain, for an “Alliance of Civilizations”, as a possible solution to the conflict of the “clash of civilizations”, while Nicolas Sarkozy is notable for his views on “positive laicism” as a solution to the problems of religious coexistence which France is experiencing within its own borders.

As far as the specific discourses of each leader are concerned, two selection criteria were applied: the interest which they aroused in the international audience, and the extent to which they reflected the problem of the “clash of civilizations”.

In the case of George W. Bush, we chose four State of the Nation speeches, which take in the period from just after 9-11 to the present day: those of 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. The two-year lapses between speeches allow us to observe the development in his interpretation of the “clash of civilizations”.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s declarations in October 2005, made during his “The World Without Zionism” conference in Teheran, had great resonance because of the attacks he made on Israel. Also considered to be of relevance were his appearances in September 2007 at the University of Columbia and before the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which he again attacked the United States and Israel. Lastly, we included an analysis of a speech made in May 2008 in which he explicitly threatened the United States.

In the case of Benedict XVI, we examined the address he gave at the University of Regensburg in September 2006, which sparked serious reactions in the Muslim world, and the speech he made in April 2008 to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the occasion of his visit to the USA.

To assess the figure of Ali Babacan, we selected the following speeches: those made to the United Nations (September 2007), to the annual meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (October 2007), to the first Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, held in Madrid (January 2008), and to the conference on the challenges facing the relationship between the USA and the Islamic world (February 2008). We consider that these speeches are relevant because of their emphasis on the need to resolve the “clash of civilizations” and one of its consequences, “Islamophobia”, through an innovative approach, namely the Alliance of Civilizations.

Sarkozy's references to French laicism and the need to include morality in politics were already present during his election campaign speeches. We therefore complement our sample of Sarkozy's speeches as French president with his declarations as candidate to the presidency made in Bercy less than one month before he took office (29/04/2007). We also include his inaugural speech, on the grounds of its importance in the international sphere (16/05/2007), his famous speech to the European Parliament (13/11/2007), in which he speaks of "spiritual politics" and "lay morality", and his declarations in the Roman basilica of St John Lateran (20/12/2007), in which he coined the term "positive laicism".

Regarding our sample from the international media, we selected those which can be supposed to have a global audience: some of these have deliberately adopted strategies to reach a world audience (Sklair, 2001), while others just have a large international circulation or audience, even though they are mainly intended for a national one. With the exception of *Le Monde*, the Internet version was used for the study in all cases. The selection includes two US media: the news channel CNN and *The New York Times* newspaper; two European media: the BBC news channel and the French newspaper *Le Monde*; and one Arabic news channel, Al Jazeera. Except on a few occasions, all these channels and newspapers covered all the speeches by all the politicians in the sample.

In accord with the theoretical framework described above, the content analysis was performed paying particular attention to: quotations relevant to the "clash of civilizations"; the main object of the quotation (denunciation, threat, reinforcement of a political argument); identification of key words, authoritative arguments (of a religious, political or cultural nature), authoritative sources (religious, political), historical or cultural references and use of significant narrative resources (metaphors, examples and expressions). For the analysis, a similar code was used, which was completed through examination of the links associated with the news story and the photographs.

The dates of publication were always either the day of the speech or the two or three following days, depending on the extent to which the story was covered.

Examination of the influence which external actors (speeches by political and religious leaders) have on the creation or modification of journalists' frames turns the media themselves into a dependent variable (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). As the object of this study was to identify the presence of the leaders' frames in the media, and to observe the way that the media frame the issue (Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1995, 1996), the analysis concludes with a comparison between the two types of content, which make it possible to evaluate the conditions in which the frames used by the sources tend to prosper, and are conveyed to an international audience.

#### **IV. Analysis of the political speeches**

In what follows, we report only the conclusions that are most relevant to the aims of this study.

##### ***George W. Bush***



Over the six-year period of the study, we can observe a modification in the emphasis of the speeches from the rhetoric of war to a more pacifistic focus in which values are upheld. However, there is also a set of ideas that are repeated throughout the speeches, which help us to identify a framework which imposes a specific interpretation.

First, Bush's speeches reflect a rejection of the idea of a "clash of civilizations" understood as a conflict between values or as the imposition of one set of principles on another. In this context, there are two frames or interpretations which are constantly repeated in his words: firstly, the "war" is a "war on terror", and therefore against terrorists, rather than against the Muslim world, and secondly, the USA does not want to impose its culture, but rather to defend the universal value of freedom and democracy. In accord with this approach, he often puts up a defense against accusations of imperialism that have been leveled from various quarters, mainly from within the Muslim world: "*We have no intention of imposing our culture*" (2002). This same focus is observed in the declarations which he makes directly to the Islamic population: "*We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom*" (2006). In another allusion to the people of Iran, he repeats: "*Our message to the people of Iran is clear: We have no quarrel with you*" (2008).

A second frame that is easy to detect is his moral analysis of the situation. This is not a "clash of civilizations", but it is a "clash between good and evil". From this moral rather than political viewpoint, he tries to find a basis for his condemnation of the Islamists' deeds, and the actions of their supporters. The well-known expressions such as "enemies of freedom", "axis of evil" and "evil empire" simply encapsulate this particular approach.

In connection with this vision of the moral need to struggle against evil, other frames can be identified which can be distinguished from each other in terms of the audience to which he is speaking at particular times. It is well known that the State of the Nation speeches, though primarily aimed at the American population, are widely reported abroad, and the President is evidently addressing both audiences at different times.

Speaking to American citizens, his moral frame takes on a directly religious form. His eloquence has religious overtones, as he tells us that "Even in tragedy, God is near", and refers to this "Time of testing" or "Time of adversity".

Addressing both the US and the international audience, the President draws on explanations that justify his foreign policy, with a twofold aim: to explain the effort which he is asking of the American people, and to convince his potential allies of the nobility of his venture. Along these lines, he stresses his denunciation of the terrorists' acts which "sow terror, coerce liberty and subject the people" in its immediate and indirect consequences, which are perverse for their own people as well as for the west. Secondly, he emphasizes that the aim of American politics is not to defend the USA's own interests, but to safeguard basic, universal human rights such as freedom, democracy and economic development. Thus, for example, in 2006 he states: "*The only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change*". He also quite frequently refers to this battle using nominal forms, such as "freedom's fight" or "freedom's power".

Alongside these arguments, Bush defends the need for American leadership to respond to the call of history. This focus coincides with another characteristic trait in American political culture, which has been a constant since the times of the Founding Fathers: the duty to respond to a historic destiny by defending and extending democratic principles to all nations (ideas that are set out in the Declaration of Independence). His speeches therefore contain expressions that have a significant cultural resonance for the American population: “history has called America”, “historic goal”, “tasks of history”.

To summarize, we can state that Bush’s speeches can be seen to include several frames or interpretations. He does not take the position that there is a “clash of civilizations”, replacing this notion with that of the “war on terror” aimed at the terrorists alone. Along the same lines, he stresses that the actions of the USA are not intended to impose a specific culture, but rather to defend the universal value of freedom. Secondly, in connection with the earlier interpretation, the struggle that the USA is envisaging is moral rather than cultural: the confrontation is between “good and evil”. This moral analysis takes on a religious frame when it is directed at a national audience. Finally, we may note a vision of American leadership as obliged to respond to the “call of history” to fulfill its mission to defend and spread democratic principles to all nations.

### ***Mahmoud Ahmadinejad***

The President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is well known for his controversial comments openly criticizing the United States and Israel. In the context of the “clash of civilizations”, he might in some way be considered to be George W. Bush’s antagonist.

In Ahmadinejad’s speeches, we can observe four main frames of interpretation.

First, we can detect the coexistence of a cultural vision of the tension between east and west, expressed in a general and somewhat vague way, with a political vision that is very forcefully manifested.

This cultural view is noticeable in the Iranian President’s proposal for solving the conflict arising from the “clash of civilizations”: a “Coalition for Peace”, which he himself defines as a “fraternal front (...) based on monotheism and justice (...) to prevent incursions and arrogance, and to spread the culture of cordiality and justice.” This “fraternity” is understood mainly to group together the Islamic nations.

In the political aspect of his view, the confrontation is with particular countries, that is, the USA and Israel. Although these could also be representatives of two cultures, the reason given for antagonism is that they hold political aims that are opposed to Iran and other Islamic governments. US imperialism is to blame for the problems of the Middle East, because the USA is trying to prevent the development of these peoples in order to maintain its world hegemony. He accuses the USA of putting pressure on other powers (Europe) to follow in its footsteps. In his address to the United Nations, he compares the position of “*certain great powers*” with “*the condescending attitude (...) of the feudal lords towards the peasants in the Middle Ages*”. Ahmadinejad rejects the concept of a “religious war”, replacing it with “Bush’s expansionism”. Moreover, he uses highly significant expressions to refer to the USA: “Oppressor World”, “Global Arrogance”, “World Arrogance”, “Global dominant system” and “Bullying powers”.

The image of Israel is as a “bridgehead” created by the USA to extend its dominion over the Muslim world in a way that is far from legitimate. The “Islamic nation” must unite against this “conspiracy”. In his 2005 speech, the Iranian President makes his position very clear: “Israel should be wiped off the map”, “I warn all the leaders in the Islamic world to beware of this conspiracy. If any of them takes a step towards the recognition of this regime, then he will burn in the fire of the Islamic Umma (...)”.

The third and fourth frame identified in this analysis bring to light an interesting parallelism with the frames used in Bush’s speeches. In concrete, in his use of the religious frame and his way of understanding the role that destiny (or history) has assigned to him in person, and to his country.

For the President of Iran, references to God and the Islamic faith are always present when it comes to taking decisions and making judgments. Justice belongs to God. This is reflected, for example, in the declarations he made in 2008 in reference to the USA: “*You can be sure that the hand of God and the wrath of the peoples will grab you by the throat*”. The oppressor powers form an “*Infidel front*” which the Islamic Umma must defeat, with God’s aid.

Ahmadinejad again shows parallels with Bush when he draws on history to explain his ideas. In his view, the Islamic Umma is going through an “era of darkness” which “will come to an end”. “The customs and traditions based on oppression and injustice will be destroyed.” Meanwhile, it has to fight against a “historical enemy”, namely Israel. The conflict with the USA and Israel is a “battle of destiny”.

We may thus conclude that Ahmadinejad’s discourse can be seen to contain four frames of interpretation regarding the “clash of civilizations”. First, an ill-defined cultural vision coexists with a more political interpretation of the conflict between cultures. The second frame, which is more explicit, sees that USA as preventing the development of the Middle East in order to maintain its own world hegemony. Third, he draws on a religious argument to justify the duty to intervene, situating this within the framework of the Holy War and reproducing the most literal meaning of the “clash of civilizations”. The fourth frame is a continuation of this, expressing the historical significance of his mission.

### ***Benedict XVI***

Benedict XVI is obviously not a political figure; but there is no doubt that his speeches are relevant in the context of the “clash of civilizations”. He is a significant figure in this debate, not only because of his position as head of the Catholic Church, but also because he has become, through a process of simplification that is characteristic of international debate, the spokesperson for Christianity as a whole, and the representative of a conservative stance in the defense of values. His speeches have had, and continue to have, an influence on other leaders, institutions, international organizations and the general public.

In the first place, we can identify an initial interpretative frame that emphasizes the need to keep a close relationship between faith and reason. The Pope asserts that “*the religious sphere should be kept separate from political action*”, but he expresses his conviction as to the need for a religious dimension to underpin the life of society. This

is patent in his speech to the United Nations: “(...) *a vision of life rooted firmly in the religious dimension can help us to achieve these ends*” (a social order that respects the dignity and rights of the human being).

In his Regensburg speech, he explains how faith and reason must go hand in hand in the intellectual world, and asks for this to be taken into account in scientific and academic circles. He uses this binomial to condemn violence, which he states to be contrary to God’s nature and to human reason. In spite of the Islamic world’s interpretation of his quotation from the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel II Palaeologus,<sup>1</sup> Benedict XVI rejects all types of imposition, whether in Christianity or in Islam. For this reason, even though this speech has been interpreted as an example of the confrontation between Christian and Muslim civilization, this seems not to have been the Pope’s intention.

In addition to these consequences for religion and the intellectual world, Benedict XVI extrapolates the need for the faith-reason binomial to be applied to the world of politics, to achieve “*an absolute and essential freedom*”. In this sphere, the moral authority is represented by the United Nations Organization, which should function as a “family of nations”. To defend this position, the Pope quotes John Paul II’s speech to the UN in 1995: “*The Organization should be the moral center, where all the nations of the world feel at home, developing a shared awareness of their existence as a ‘family of nations’.*” Benedict XVI identifies the founding principles of the UN as “*the just aspirations of the human spirit*” and “*the ideals which should underlie international relations*”.

On the other hand, the “responsibility to protect” is part of the role of reason in this binomial. On this occasion, Benedict XVI bases his ideas on the words of the Dominican friar Francisco de Vitoria, who defined the “responsibility to protect” as “*an aspect of the natural reason shared by all nations, and as the result of an international order whose task is to regulate the relations between peoples*”.

The second frame which the Pope uses to focus the potential confrontation between cultures is that of the need for dialogue. Benedict XVI insists on the “*urgent need*” to “*promote genuine dialogue between cultures and religions*”. This dialogue is presented as the best way to resolve possible conflicts between cultures. In his speech to the UN, the Pope expressed this idea in these words: “*Dialogue should be recognized as the means by which different sectors of society can express their own point of view and construct consensus about what is true in relation to specific values and objectives*”.

Finally, Benedict XVI stresses that beyond the different cultures and beliefs, human rights must be taken seriously as an international point of reference, an “expression of justice” for all nations and cultures. As he states to the UN, human rights “*are increasingly presented as the common language and ethical substrate of international relations. At the same time, the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights serve as a guarantee to safeguard human dignity.*”

By way of conclusion, we can state that three frames are present in the speeches by Benedict XVI that represent and evaluate the situation of the “culture clash”: faith and reason must go together, in both religion and politics. Although politics and religion are two separate spheres, politics can benefit from the existence of a religious dimension.

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<sup>1</sup> “*Show me what Mohammed brought that was new, and you will only find bad, inhuman things like his tendency to spread by the sword the faith that he preached*”.

To resolve world conflicts, dialogue between cultures and religions is needed, and this must always take human rights as an international point of reference, since these are an “expression of justice” and a “guarantee to safeguard human dignity”.

### ***Ali Babacan***

The Turkish foreign minister, Ali Babacan, concentrated his labors on promoting diplomatic relations between Turkey and the rest of the world, particularly within the “Alliance of Civilizations” project proposed as an alternative to the “culture clash”.

In the speeches analyzed, we can conclude that Ali Babacan interprets the “clash of civilizations” as caused by a lack of communication between the western and Muslim world, which has led to “Islamophobia” in western countries. The term “Islamophobia” here refers to the association that western countries have made between Islam or Muslim people and terrorism and extremist groups: *“One sees visible and unmistakable signs around the world of growing perception that Islam and the Muslim are inextricably associated with terror”*.

To overcome this rejection and restore a more accurate view of Islam, Ali Babacan makes a clear distinction between Islam and the “holy war” fomented by terrorists: *“Islam is the religion of peace. Peace is the object of Islam and the purpose of Muslims”*, *“Violence in the name of any religion should not be tolerated”*. The Alliance of Civilizations will struggle to put an end to this problem: *“We need to overcome the misrepresentations of Islam through dialogue, understanding, tolerance, mutual respect and cooperation among different religions and cultures”*.

To encourage communication between east and west, he backs the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, which is not just a political project but an interpretation as to how to approach and resolve the clash of civilizations: *“We need to overcome the misrepresentations of Islam through dialogue, understanding, tolerance, mutual respect and cooperation among different religions and cultures”*. The aim of the Alliance of Civilizations coincides with the frame that this politician tries to promote: international cooperation to combat extremism in many countries, break down social and cultural barriers between the west and the Islamic world, and reduce the tensions between societies with different religious and social values: *“The international community has to display solidarity and cooperation in order to be able to deal effectively with artificial divisions and extremist tendencies”*.

Finally, within the frame of the Alliance of Civilizations, Babacan puts Turkey forward as an example of how democracy and Islamic culture can live side by side, as a crossroads where continents and cultures meet. The solution can be found by promoting common, universal values: *“(…)Turkey believes that the common values of humanity form a stronger center of attraction than existing differences in cultural and religious traditions”*.

The Turkish foreign minister interprets the “clash of civilizations” by referring in his speeches to three different frames. He maintains the idea that the cause of the “clash” is the lack of communication between the western and Muslim worlds, which has led to “Islamophobia” in western countries. His interpretation includes a clear perception of what Islam is: a “religion of peace”, quite unlike the “holy war” preached by terrorists.

In accord with his vision of the “clash of civilizations”, he creates an interpretation as to how to approach and resolve this conflict: the Alliance of Civilizations, whose aim is to achieve international cooperation against extremism and reduce the tensions between societies with different religious and cultural values. Finally, in his speeches Ali Babacan projects a vision of Turkey as an example of democracy and Islamic culture living side by side, at a crossroads where continents and cultures meet.

### *Nicolas Sarkozy*

Nicolas Sarkozy’s references to French laicism and the need for morality to be part of politics appear as early as his election campaign speeches.

Regarding the interpretative frame of the clash of civilizations, the French President can be said to identify religion as a cause of conflict, and to propose a solution to this by creating a “civil religion” characterized by “spiritual politics” and “lay morality” which take politics, freedom and democracy as their cornerstone.

Secondly, in close harmony with the first interpretation of the “clash of civilizations”, we can identify the idea of “positive laicism”. This term was coined by Sarkozy in his speech at the basilica of St. John Lateran, in Rome, and has taken on resonance all over the world because of the implicit meaning that it contains. As Sarkozy himself explained, “positive laicism” is an approach which “*always concerned with the freedom to think, to believe or not believe, does not see religions as a danger, but as a value*”(…) “*The aim is to seek dialogue with the great religions of France, and to obey the principle of making the everyday life of the great spiritual movements easier, instead of more complicated*”.

Finally, we can deduce that, as far as the culture clash goes, Sarkozy interprets the construction of Europe as something that has to be reinforced and promoted, as a “great ideal”. He credits the idea of “European identity” with great importance: Europe is made up of a set of peoples with common values who form a civilization. In his speech to the European parliament, he expressed his ideas thus: *The construction of Europe is the expression of the common will of the peoples of Europe, who recognize common values, acknowledge a common civilization, and want those values and that civilization to stay alive.*”

From our study of Sarkozy’s speeches, we can deduce that he establishes various frames of interpretation for analysis of the international political situation and the clash of cultures. His main idea is that it is important to defend a “civil religion” characterized by “spiritual politics” and “lay morality”. Thus although he removes religion from the public sphere, he does not obliterate it, but advocates “positive laicism” characterized by religious freedom and dialogue between different beliefs. Finally, we may note his idea of Europe as a civilization that shares a set of values and an identity of its own that must be strengthened.

## **V. Analysis of the media presence of these speeches**

Now that we have established the interpretative frames for the “clash of civilizations” that these politicians use in their speeches, the next step is to see how these frames are

reflected or ignored by the media, and what new approaches the media create through their reports.

### ***George W. Bush***

In the State of the Union speeches by George W. Bush from 2002 to 2008 we can see how his foreign policy changes, especially in relationship to the “*War on Terror*”: a change is perceived from a context that is more belligerent to one where values are stressed, but he always follows the same idea of “*goodies versus baddies*” within a “*clash of civilizations*”.

Bush first builds a first clear frame of interpretation in relation to the “*culture conflict*”: he does not mention it but, he speaks of fighting against terrorism. Secondly, we find another very clear frame: Bush rejects the idea of American imperialism: he does not seek to impose his values. The third vision, which is appreciated in the speeches of Bush in relation to “*civilization wars*”, is a concept of “*the struggle between good and evil*”, that derives from a moral analysis of the situation. Fourthly, we observe in Bush’s speeches constant references to destiny or a historical mission, which easily fits into the traditional culture and politics of the American people.

The idea of a war that is only directed against terrorists is reflected in CNN and Al Jazeera: “*(...) some may deny the surge is working, but among the terrorists there is no doubt: Al Qaeda is on the run in Iraq, and this enemy will be defeated*” (CNN, January 29, 2008; Al Jazeera, January 28, 2008). The motive that guides that action is the defense of universal values such as democracy or freedom, which must not be confused with imperialist ambitions on the part of the United States. This focus is also observed in the US newspaper The New York Times, which includes the following quotation: “*We have no intention of imposing our culture. (...) But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity*” (The New York Times, January 30, 2002).

The concept of “*war between good and evil*” is represented in The New York Times, which states that Bush describes the world as his “*battlefield*”, and highlights the point that the President “*filled the spectator seats with heroes and widows of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath, symbols of an America that he asserted was already prevailing over its enemies*” (The New York Times, January 30, 2002). In relationship to other countries, the American President underlines the “*nobility*” of the American mission against terrorism. CNN picks up these international justifications, and informs us that, in his 2004 speech, Bush “*stood by his actions in Iraq, saying the United States was right to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who is now in US custody*” (CNN, January 21, 2004). In contrast, Al Jazeera includes the other point of view, a “*critical vision*” that places doubts on the “*nobility*” of Bush’s actions. The Arab network includes opinions of the retired American general Wesley Clark, that confirm that the President of the United States has created his own “*axis of evil*”. They also pick up the opinion of the democrat leader Nancy Pelosi, who said that Bush “*embraced a radical doctrine of pre-emptive war unprecedented in our history; and he failed to build a true international coalition*” (Al Jazeera, January 18, 2004).

Lastly, the analyzed news networks give voice to the influential idea that the American people are answering a “*historic call*”. For example, CNN and The New York Times,

underline the declarations of Bush from 2004: “*Americans are rising to the tasks of history and they expect the same of us*” (CNN, January 21, 2004; The New York Times, January 21, 2004). In the same fashion, Le Monde reflects the focus of the “historic call” that the President of the United States creates in relationship to the “clash of civilizations”: “*Les Etats-Unis doivent accepter “l’appel de l’histoire” et “agir hardiment en faveur de la liberté”*” (Le Monde, February 2, 2006).

Apart from finding out how the news networks reflect the frames of interpretation created by Bush in relation to the “clash of civilizations”, we may observe that some of them are very critical, and accordingly create a new vision on the ideas of the President by their coverage of his speeches and news. CNN underlines the fact that Bush forgets “key matters” in his speech, like Osama Bin Laden, who becomes a “symbol” of what is incomplete in his campaign; or the dispute in Guantanamo on how to treat Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners. For its part, The New York Times offered in 2004 a sarcastic vision of the arguments of “nobility” and the “spread of universal values” that Bush expresses in the context of “the war on terror”: “*Mr. Bush cast himself as the steady commander in chief of what he portrayed as a nation at war, seeming to suggest that changing the leader mid-battle was risky*” (The New York Times, January 21, 2004).

### ***Mahmoud Ahmadinejad***

The perspectives that the Iranian President creates with regard to the “conflict of civilizations” meet with ample repercussions and responses among politicians, as well as in the international media and other organizations.

Ahmadinejad frames the “clash between cultures” from two viewpoints: a cultural vision and a political vision. In his cultural view, he accuses the USA of imperialism, of being “arrogant” and an “oppressor”. He also blames Israel, which is an extension of the USA at the heart of Muslim territory in the Middle East. The second frame he uses is the “clash of cultures” seen from a political point of view: the idea that the USA is trying to hinder the development of the Middle East in order to maintain its world hegemony, and that it is using the “illegitimate” regime in Israel as a “bridgehead” to extend its dominion over the Islamic world. Thirdly, we find the concept of religion as a basis for action. God will help the Islamic Umma to defeat the oppressors and ensure that justice is done. Finally, we can observe the idea of a “historic call” to Iran in the face of the “struggle of civilizations”.

Regarding the cultural vision of the “clash of civilizations”, the BBC includes this when it broadcasts Ahmadinejad’s warning given in 2005: “*The leaders of Muslim nations who recognized the state of Israel will face the wrath of their own people*”. Later declarations are also added: “*My words were the Iranian nation’s words*” (BBC, October 27, 2005). On the other hand, the media include the American response to this frame created by Ahmadinejad, as well as quotations from figures who oppose him, such as the President of Columbia University Lee Bollinger, who described the Iranian President as “*a cruel dictator who denied the Holocaust*” (Al Jazeera, September 24, 2007; CNN, September 24, 2007; BBC, September 25, 2007; Le Monde, September 28, 2007), and declared that the decision to invite him to the university had been “*consistent with the idea that one should know thine enemy...to confront with the mind of evil*” (BBC, September 25, 2007).



Regarding the vision of the “conflict between civilizations” from a political point of view, that is, the accusation that the US is imperialist, and is trying to extend its power to the Middle East via Israel, all the media include reactions from western political leaders to the declaration which Ahmadinejad made in 2005: *“Israel should be wiped off the map”*. The New York Times, for example, makes this clear in a headline: *“Western leaders condemn the Iranian president’s threat to Israel”* (The New York Times, October 28, 2005). The Iranian President’s comments to the United Nations are also quoted, in which he again calls the “Zionist regime” “illegal”, and asserts that the General Council of the United Nations *“has been influenced by some bullying powers and failed to uphold justice and protect the rights of the Iranian people”*, according to CNN and the BBC (CNN, September 25, 2007, BBC, September 25, 2007). The media also report Ahmadinejad’s declaration that *“Human rights are being extensively violated by certain powers”*(CNN, September 25, 2007; Al Jazeera, September 25, 2007).

Religious references made by the Iranian President are reported in the media, which dwell on the words he pronounced during the conference “The World without Zionism”: *“And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism”*, *“Anyone who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury”*(CNN, October 27, 2005; BBC, October 27, 2005; The New York Times, October 27, 2005). Regarding his speech to the United Nations, we are told that Ahmadinejad alluded to *“selfish and incompetent powers that have obedience to Satan”*, which he accused of being responsible for *“division and moral decline across the world”* (CNN, September 25, 2007).

Finally, we can see that the idea of a “historic call” to Iran on the issue of the “struggle of civilizations” is reflected scarcely at all in the media which we analyzed. The US newspaper New York Times reports Ahmadinejad’s declarations in 2005: *“The skirmishes in the occupied land are part of the war of destiny. The outcome of hundreds of years of war will be defined in Palestinian land”* (The New York Times, October 27, 2005). Al Jazeera reports that in his speech to the United Nations, he warned that those in power were *“in the sunset of their times”*” (Al Jazeera, September 25, 2007).

After analyzing the media reporting of Ahmadinejad’s speeches, we may conclude that the frame with the greatest resonance in the world media is that which the Iranian President uses to define the current political situation: the USA is a hegemonic power, and Israel is the tool it uses to increase its power over the Islamic world. Ahmadinejad’s cultural vision on the “culture clash” is also present. In both cases, ample space is given to opinions that run counter to those of the Iranian leader. As in the case of Bush, the media reflect the religious references that impregnate Ahmadinejad’s speeches. The concept of “culture clash” interpreted in a particular historical context, and the “call of destiny”, are only rarely reflected in the world media.

## ***Benedict XVI***

The three ideas which best frame the Pope's vision of the "clash of civilizations", which we identified above, are: the importance of maintaining the binomial of faith and reason in order to resolve correctly the difficulties of present-day society, the defense of dialogue with all religious groups, and the priority of defending human rights in international politics, over and above other interests.

Benedict XVI insists again and again that violence is contrary to faith as well as to reason. This is the purpose of his Regensburg speech, and this is how it is reported in the *New York Times*: "He said that violence embodied in the Muslim idea of jihad, or holy war, is contrary to reason and to God's plan (...)"(The New York Times, September 12, 2006).

In general, the media behave similarly to the New York Times, reporting the Pope's declarations faithfully in their coverage of the crisis that followed the Regensburg speech, publishing his apology and his statement of openness to the Muslim religion. In one way or another, they include the statement that religion can never be a cause of bloodshed: the "clash of civilizations" is not the result of faith, but of its absence. God is contrary to hatred and fanaticism: God is dialogue.

However, all the media also reproduce the direct quotation which sparked the crisis, that from the fourteenth-century Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus, and they have no qualms in taking it out of context. In general, the coverage of the incident centers more on the reactions that it provoked than on what the Pope said, or what his intentions were. Without mentioning it explicitly, the western media recreate the "clash of civilizations" precisely, by reporting the condemnations and violent reactions from Muslim governments and groups, and explanations, justifications and defenses of Benedict XVI's words on the part of Catholic authorities and western politicians.

Al Jazeera's focus on this issue is particularly interesting. It does not hesitate to situate this speech explicitly within the frame of the "clash of civilizations", reporting the opposing comments of the different parties involved, and emphasizing the remarks of politicians who seize on this meaning for their own ends. But it imposes its own frame on that offered by the politicians, attributing the cause of the clash of civilizations not to the civilizations themselves, but to an imprudent attitude on the part of the Pope, and what it calls the "Clash of Ignorance", that is, insufficient knowledge of the Muslim religion.

We may conclude that in this case, the media impose their own frame on top of the Pope's frame (not clash, dialogue), because they are more interested in the newsworthiness of the event. They stress the disagreement over the interpretation of what the Pope said: his words were regarded as a provocation by the Muslim world, but as a simple misunderstanding by the West.

In the same context, they forget the concern expressed in the Pope's speech about the secularism of Europe (the West), which is emphasized more heavily than his condemnation of violence and of Jihad. This parallel reference to the binomial faith-

reason, which attacks the dominance of rationalism that erodes faith, goes unnoticed in most of the newspapers and channels analyzed here.

In the coverage before and after his visit to the USA, all the media stress that the Pope's attitude had developed: as a cardinal, he had been strict and inflexible, while now as Pope he was open to sincere dialogue. Even though no explicit reference is made to the cultural conflict, it is interesting to observe the importance given to this aspect, which is particularly emphasized by the BBC. This is the frame which predominates when the Pope's speech to the United Nations is reported. His words to the General Assembly are reported almost literally by all the media (most give access to the text itself), without comments. Benedict XVI's idea that the defense of human rights should underpin international politics is reproduced practically word for word.

### *Ali Babacan*

Regarding the image the media convey of Ali Babacan's interpretations, we may conclude with an initial observation: there are very few references to the speeches which we listed in the first part of this study. On the rare occasions that Ali Babacan is quoted in the media, it is in connection with other issues: his statements are not newsworthy.

Only the BBC once mentions Babacan's declarations, at the end of the summit held in Madrid on the occasion of the First Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations (BBC, January 17, 2008). In this case, their reference underlines the two frames that Ali Babacan uses most frequently: the Alliance is a union to struggle against radical groups, and the Alliance must respect all the different values and principles held by the cultures which belong to it.

The other instances in which he appears are concerned with other issues. On the dates included in this study, the media cover four types of news: the incursions of the PKK on Turkish territory, the disturbances caused by the approval of the use of the headscarf in Turkish universities, the negotiations with Cyprus and Turkey's entry into the European Union.

The absence of quotations from Babacan's speeches in the media on the occasion of different types of conflict projects a rather confused message on the peaceful focus that Ali Babacan wishes to take on the "clash of civilizations", which in part modifies the image that this politician is trying to give.

On the one hand, we see an intransigent and rather aggressive view of him personally and of his politics. Most of his entries are related to the PKK incursions into Turkish territory. Although attacks by Kurdish rebels cannot really be situated within the framework of the conflict of civilizations, Ali Babacan's reactions express aggression and a firm resolution to resort to armed force if the Iraqi army or regular Kurdish forces do not intervene. It is the USA that urges Turkey to seek a solution through diplomacy. It is obvious that Babacan's declarations are more a matter of State than his own decision, but the BBC emphasizes every time that he insists on the need to send in the army, in spite of the recommendations from the USA and the UN.

On the other hand, his attitude as a man in favor of dialogue is also stressed, which is more in accord with his bid to resolve the conflict between civilizations peacefully. Al Jazeera is the medium which shows him in the most positive light. It covers the PKK's actions as acts of terrorism, putting Ali Babacan in a position that is similar to that of Bush: hard on violent groups, but open to dialogue with other cultures. Al Jazeera also underlines the effective diplomatic action in the conflict between Israel and Syria, reporting his visits to these two countries and his declaration of intent: "We always urge the parties to a conflict to find solutions through dialogue and peaceful means."

The negotiations between Turkey and the European Union are covered in the same way. Whether they quote him directly or describe his attitude, the media fix on the function that Turkey has assigned itself in the heart of Europe, as a bridge between East and West.

The attitude of dialogue and openness preached by Ali Babacan is also reported, in the media accounts of his reaction to the internal conflict caused by the wearing of headscarves at Turkish universities. The minister here redirects an issue which could be interpreted as a backward step, presenting it as an achievement on the road to freedom: "the measure was intended to expand freedom, to help turn Turkey into a first-class democracy where freedoms in all fields are enjoyed fully (New York Times, February 3, 2008).

### *Nicolas Sarkozy*

In Sarkozy's discourse we were able to identify three interpretative frames. The first, that of the "conflict between cultures", is the idea that religion should be confined to the private sphere, and that a "civil religion" should be sought which is identified with "lay morality". Secondly, we find the frame associated with "positive laicism". "Civil religion" removes religion from public life, but does not eliminate it. Instead, it offers a possibility of dialogue between creeds, of religious freedom, and of appreciation of the value of different religions. The third view that Sarkozy projects in the context of the "culture clash" is a perception of Europe as a civilization with common values and an identity of its own that has to be strengthened. He sees the construction of Europe as a great ideal. This last frame is the one which is most readily reported in the media analyzed here. In general, except the French newspaper *Le Monde*, the media offer little coverage of Sarkozy's speeches in comparison with other politicians.

The cultural environment that Sarkozy wishes to promote is a balance between tradition and modernity. The US news channel CNN picks up on this in the context of the investiture of the French President: "*While he is appealing to traditional values of morality, hard work and law and order, Sarkozy is trying to reconcile those things with progress and change in an effort to convince the country his reforms are the way forward*" (CNN, May 16, 2007). It is also reflected by the BBC, which reports that Sarkozy spoke of the need for France to "*revive the values of work, effort, merit and respect*" (BBC, May 17, 2007).

The BBC stresses the idea of "positive laicism" in its news reports on Sarkozy's inaugural address, where it reports that he called for people to "*defeat intolerance*" (BBC, May 16, 2007). The French newspaper *Le Monde* quotes the same declarations, but raises the alarm about their possible consequences: eliminating religion from public

life might rouse the ire of radical Islamic groups. None the less, this newspaper gives voice to the opposite opinion, shedding doubt on the efficacy of the kind of dialogue proposed by the French President. It includes the Socialist Party's view that the President's speech is: "*l'éternel discours de haine et de division*" (Le Monde, April 29, 2007).

The media report Sarkozy's understanding of Europe as a "civilization" with "common values". The New York Times includes a new vision of the "culture clash", by including the perception that Sarkozy rejected Turkey's entry to the European Union because he considered that this country does not share this European "identity" or "civilization". This newspaper also asserts that Sarkozy "*vehemently*" opposes Turkey's admission to the European Union, because "*it is not culturally part of Europe*" and "*most of its territory is in Asia*". It includes the opinion of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on this issue: "*This approach of Mr. Sarkozy comes from prejudices*", "*Mr. Sarkozy has to overcome these prejudices*" (The New York Times, May 16, 2007). Le Monde gives the same evaluation: Sarkozy insists on the idea of a "civilization" with "common values" in order to keep Turkey out of the European Union (Le Monde, November, 15, 2007).

We can conclude that the media analyzed report, though not very profoundly, the interpretative frames created by Sarkozy around the "clash of civilizations". Although the concept of "civil religion" and "positive laicism" find little echo in the media, it is significant that the latter also contribute their own frames in this area. Le Monde perceives that "positive laicism" might spark the anger of radical Islamic groups, while Al Jazeera gives the floor to Sarkozy's opponents, the Socialist Party, which accuses his speech of being full of "*hatred and division*". The interpretative frame which situates Europe as a "civilization" with "common values" and an "identity of its own" is amply reflected in the media. But The New York Times and Le Monde make their own interpretation of Sarkozy's concept of what Europe is: for them, Sarkozy is taking refuge in the idea of Europe as a civilization and an identity in order to prevent Turkey from joining the European Union.

We can thus state that, although Sarkozy does not speak directly about the "clash of civilizations" in his speeches, but confines himself to defending European civilization, some media interpret his declarations as proof that such a "clash" exists.

## **VI. Conclusions**

The aim of the present study is, as we stated at the outset, to review the foci, symbols and interpretations that the world media use to reflect and spread the political message concerning the "clash of civilizations". Our purpose is to observe how this cultural conflict is expressed in the political discourse, and how this is then reflected in the major world media. In short, in what form is the notion of the "clash of civilizations" being presented in the public debate? What does it mean today? How is it defined or described? What conflicts are brought into association with this expression? What resources are used to heighten the impact on the audience?

The study presented here is still at an early stage. The conclusions are therefore confined to a description of the observed phenomena. Some of the causes that could

condition the relationship between political source and media in the world context are noted, since this issue is also of considerable importance. However, these would require more detailed analysis at a later date. Our aim is to continue analyzing media behavior and the processes which explain the generation of media frames in the circumstances described.

At present, our main conclusions are the following:

1. The frame of the “clash of civilizations” is perceived more clearly in the media than in political discourse. Politicians scarcely ever quote this phrase literally, and tend to adapt it to their own interests. The media, on the other hand, are very explicit in their references, or in their application of a format which reproduces confrontation without mentioning it explicitly. Some major examples are: the specific section entitled “clash of civilization” on Al Jazeera, the media coverage of the Pope’s Regensburg speech, and the visibility of the two politicians who represent the extremes of this debate: Bush and Ahmadinejad.
2. Politicians interpret the concept of a “clash of civilizations” in accord with their own interests. Thus Bush distances himself from the schema of a confrontation between civilizations in order to establish another interpretation: he is fighting a war on “those who spread terror”, and not against Islamic civilization. American imperialism does not exist: the values being spread by the US administration are universal values. The clash is happening for reasons of security, and it is not a cultural battle. In the case of Iran, political interpretations also take precedence over cultural ones: the cause of the conflict is the US aggression in the Middle East and its action through its “bridgehead”, that is, Israel.

Benedict XVI has developed from a more conservative position, and now shows an open attitude, ready for dialogue on the basis of the faith which each partner professes.

Ali Babacan acknowledges the existence of a tension between cultures, but he minimizes the possibility of a “clash” and, in his words and actions, he backs the chances of an understanding like that which has come about in Turkey, which is the hinge between east and west, between Islamic radicalism and moderate Muslims: this is why Turkey can be integrated in the European Union and the Alliance of Civilizations; moreover, the use of the veil in Turkish universities is a sign of pluralism.

Sarkozy’s stance is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, he does not hesitate to preach “positive laicism” in which all religions have to be able to live side by side, as a way of resolving the problems of multiculturalism in his own country. On the other hand, he sees Europe as a “fortress” with a definite cultural identity, with some values currently in crisis, which has to be consolidated and defended from outside forces. This is why he is so radically opposed to Turkey’s entry to the European Union, and to the increase in the number of immigrants.

3. In spite of the differences in the way the problem is framed, there is a certain overlap in the values which all of these leaders express.

3.1. Despite their opposing stances, there is a certain parallelism between the terms used by Bush and Ahmadinejad in their speeches, which reflects a certain similarity in the way they frame the “clash of civilizations”. We could conclude that they use similar frames with different (opposing) meanings.

|                            |                      |                 |                     |                   |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <b>GEORGE W. BUSH</b>      | “Enemies of freedom” | “Evil regime”   | “Tasks of history”  | “War on terror”   |
| <b>MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD</b> | “Bullying powers”    | “Infidel Front” | “Battle of destiny” | “Era of darkness” |

3.2. As far as political discourse is concerned, we can state that regarding the “clash of civilizations”, the figures analyzed allude to the crisis of values which the world is going through at present: all of them encourage their audiences to keep and foster what they claim as needed values. Each politician places a special emphasis on a particular set of values, depending on his own interpretation of the “clash of civilizations”.

|                          | <b>GEORGE W. BUSH</b>  | <b>MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD</b>   | <b>BENEDICTO XVI</b>                   | <b>ALI BABACAN</b>                               | <b>NICOLÁS SARKOZY</b>                          |
|--------------------------|--|--|--|--|---|
| <b>VALUES EMPHASIZED</b> | Faith (Christian)<br>Freedom<br>Compromise<br>Courage<br>Active action | Faith (Islamic)<br>Liberation<br>Resistance<br>Courage<br>Active defense | Faith-Reason<br>Solidarity<br>Dialogue | Religion co-existence<br>Cooperation<br>Dialogue | Laicism<br>'Europeanism'<br>Effort<br>Tolerance |

3.3. Religious arguments and values have a presence. As we know, this is partly due to the specific rhetoric used by President Bush, secondly to the lack of separation between politics and religion in Islamic circles, and finally to the nature of the conflicts that have flared up within this framework. In the speeches we have analyzed, references to religion are frequent, as they are in the media. In the case of the USA and Iran, these are used to encourage the civilian population and justify the efforts that are being asked of them. Such arguments are also employed to justify aggressive actions before the international community.

Bush’s allusion to “Good and Evil” is intended to refer to universal moral values rather than cultural values, but in some of his other statements it is obvious that he is referring to the Christian God. However, Ahmadinejad reproduces a religious universe which only corresponds to Islamic beliefs and is therefore rooted in this specific civilization.

Turkey and France, in accord with the traditions of their countries, separate the religious sphere from politics, and refer only to values that the whole of humanity holds in common.

4. Media routines affect the *media frame*. Regarding the handling of the “clash of civilizations” in the media, we observed a greater presence of Huntington’s model than in the political speeches. The reasons for this seem to lie in the routines and criteria that are characteristic of the profession.

- The expression is valuable as a resource for journalists. The concept of the “clash of civilizations” makes it possible to refer synthetically to a complex situation, and it makes the task of synthesis easier.
- It provides a simple structure to order content matter. The schema of “A versus B” makes it possible to choose sources rapidly and organize the declarations in the text in a straightforward manner.
- It fulfils the criterion of *newsworthiness*. The alarm or perception of threat which is one of the connotations of this concept will capture the audience’s attention at once. This is why certain politicians and certain frames are given more coverage than others. In concrete, George W. Bush and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are paid more attention as the main opponents in the “clash of cultures”.

These behaviors are similar in all the media: for some stories, the choice of sources is practically identical.

5. As a result of the similarity in newsroom routines, the media “homogenize” the way in which politicians handle global affairs. Although common elements can be observed in the political speeches, different foci, references and elements that relate to the home political and cultural environment are clearly used. However, the media tend to make these different approaches appear more uniform, because they interpret them from a single viewpoint.

6. Although the cultural resonance must be measured in relation to the impact that speeches make on the audience, we can observe that in the media we find most of the expressions, metaphors or symbols that politicians may have used to that end. The table set out below shows the principal expressions present on media regarding different cultural contexts:

|                            |  |   |  |  |
|----------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| <b>GEORGE W. BUSH</b>      | <b>American principles</b><br>Freedom’s fight<br>Cause of freedom<br>Freedom’s price<br>Freedom’s power<br>Freedom’s victory | <b>American mission</b><br>Call of history<br>Tasks of history<br>Time of destiny<br>Time of testing<br>Historic goal | <b>Moral reference</b><br>Axis of evil<br>Evil regime<br>Evil empire   | <b>Cause of conflict</b><br>War on terror<br>Allies of terror  |
| <b>MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD</b> | <b>Islamic Union</b><br>God will help it<br>Islamic fraternity   | <b>Islamic mission</b><br>Battle of destiny<br>Historical enemy<br>Era of darkness                                    | <b>Moral reference</b><br>Mind of evil<br>Infidel powers<br>Related to Satan<br>Corrupt regime<br>Cause of moral decline | <b>Cause of conflict</b><br>Global arrogance<br>Oppressor World<br>Bullying Powers<br>Arrogant powers<br>Monopolistic powers |



|                        |   |   |   |  |
|------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| <b>BENEDICT XVI</b>    | <b>Faith</b><br>God is dialogue,<br>not violence  | <b>Reason</b><br>Irrationality of<br>“holy” war<br>Clash of ignorance                                 | <b>Catholic prnples:</b><br><b>Charity/ love</b><br>Family of nations<br>Solidarity<br>Dialogue |  |
| <b>ALI BABACAN</b>     | <b>Turkey’s historical experience</b><br>Cross-cultural dialogue<br>Crossroads of continents and cultures | <b>Turkey’s values</b><br>Tolerance<br>Dialogue<br>Alliance of Civilizations                          |   | <b>Cause of conflict: irrationality</b><br><br>Islamophobia<br>Ignorance |
| <b>NICOLAS SARKOZY</b> | <b>French tradition</b><br>Positive laicism<br>Civil peace<br>Civil religion                              | <b>French current crisis</b><br>Crisis of values<br>Moral crisis<br>Spiritual values<br>Moral demands | <b>Moral reference</b><br>European identity<br>European spirit                                  |  |

7. The media do not provide new frames or foci. The last observation deriving from our analysis of the media is that their contribution to the debate is confined to their criticism of the frames or interpretations expressed by the politicians, questioning and even ridiculing them. They are particularly skeptical of the declarations of the most extremist politicians: Bush and Ahmadinejad. On occasions, this criticism is not voiced directly, but in the mouth of the opposition or by reporting protests in public opinion. This practice is frequently encountered in the coverage of the two leaders in question.

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