THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIVE LANGUAGE USE*

ENIKŐ NÉMETH T.

The paper aims to overview some typical principles of communicative language use in a cognitive pragmatic approach applying a reductionist method in order to demonstrate that the well-known principles can be reduced to a very general rationality (economy) principle. After briefly reviewing the principles the paper re-evaluates them and provides a new classification of them relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential communication. The principles which can be divided into rationality and interpersonality principles are really principles of effective information transmission on objects and selves. They refer to two kinds of language use: informative and communicative ones. The only principles valid for only communicative language use are the communicative principle of relevance and the principle of communicative intention suggested in the present article. Finally, the paper reduces all rationality and interpersonality principles to a very general rationality principle, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance.

1. Introduction

1.1. Aims

The present paper aims to explore some of the typical principles of communicative language use. As a starting-point for the investigation, I will define communicative language use within the scope of pragmatic competence. Then I will give a brief overview of the possibilities raised in the linguistics literature of how to interpret the term *principle*, as well as select the relevant interpretations fitting in with the aims of this paper. After completing these tasks, I will have three main goals: (i) to choose, briefly characterize and evaluate some typical communicative principles treated by the pragmatics literature; (ii) to re-evaluate the chosen principles and provide a new classification of them relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential communication, and (iii) to demonstrate that all

principles can be reduced to a very general rationality (economy) principle, i.e., to the cognitive principle of relevance. It should be emphasized that I will not aim to deal with all principles assumed for verbal communication in the literature. I will choose only some typical well-known principles which I consider a necessary and sufficient basis for achieving the third goal of the present paper. On the basis of the definition of ostensive-inferential communication I also want to emphasize that the principles considered communicative ones in the pragmatics literature are really principles of effective information transmission either on objects or on selves, i.e., they play a considerable role in verbal information transmission without communicative intention. The only principles which refer solely to communicative language use are Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance and the principle of communicative intention suggested in the present article. At this point, it should be noted that I take the notion of principle very strictly in the present paper. I consider only those constraints, prescriptions or generalizations which are called principles in the literature. However, if one looks at the content of the principles, and not just their labels, one can find other "principles" working in communicative language use. For example, Bach and Harnish (1979, 7) propose a communicative presumption not labelled "principle" which is similar to the principle of communicative intention in some respect.[1]

According to the way of thinking sketched out above, the paper is organized as follows. Section **2** briefly characterizes the notions of pragmatic competence and communicative language use, while section **3** enumerates the possible interpretations of the term *principle*. Section **4** overviews some typical principles of communicative language use. In section **5** I evaluate the principles treated in section **4** independently of any particular pragmatics theory, then, relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential communication in relevance theory, I re-evaluate them, and further I suggest an old-new principle,[2] namely the principle of communicative intention. In the remainder of this section, I demonstrate that all principles can be reduced to a general rationality principle, i.e., to the cognitive principle of relevance. Section **6** summarizes the results.

[1] For more details see section **5.3.**

[2] The adjective *old-new* means that the principle of communicative intention is an old one as to the main part of its content (see e.g., Grice 1975/1989; Bach–Harnish 1979; Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995), and at the same time, it is a new one as to its formulation as a principle.

1.2. A cognitive pragmatic approach and reductionist method

In the paper, I will study some typical principles of communicative language use in a cognitive pragmatic approach applying a reductionist method. One of the cognitive pragmatic approaches closely related to the generative linguistics paradigm, modular pragmatics (cf. Kasher 1986; 1991), intends to describe pragmatic competence as the faculty of language use, which contains the knowledge of ideal native speakers of a language about how to use their language in various situations to reach various goals. Pragmatic competence is one of the modules of the human mind which enables a native speaker to use sentences in accordance with his/her intentions to achieve goals (e.g., to complete various speech acts) in different contexts. The main question for generative modular pragmatics is how native speakers can apply their pragmatic abilities adequately in the course of constructing utterances.

Another cognitive pragmatic theory, namely relevance theory (cf. e.g., Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995; Kempson 1996; Sperber 2000; Carston 2000), also studies communication from the point of view of the activities of the human mind.[3] But in contrast to generative modular pragmatics, relevance theory mostly deals with the comprehension processes and discusses what principles, constraints and restrictions are taken into account by the communicative partners to retrieve the information effectively and successfully from the sequences of words uttered or written. Therefore, the main question for relevance theory is how communicative partners interpret the communicators' ostensive communicative behaviour.[4]

However, if one focuses on the dynamism of communication, it is not sufficient to concentrate either on the communicator's actions, as modular pragmatics does, or on the partner's comprehension processes as relevance theory does. One should consider both the communicator's and the interlocutor's sides to describe and explain their communication.[5]

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[3] Relevance theory also supposes that the human mind has a modular organization, but the modularity hypothesis of relevance theorists has changed from the first summary of the theory published in 1986. See also fn. 8.

[4] Ostensive behaviour is a kind of behaviour which makes manifest an intention to make something manifest (Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995, 49). The ostension will be discussed in more detail in section **4**.

[5] The definition of ostensive-inferential communication in relevance theory includes dynamism of communication (see (9) in section **4**). This definition has served as one of the starting points for the elaboration of relevance theory. Therefore, it is very surprising that relevance theory restricts pragmatics to the investigation

To fulfil this requirement, I suggest an approach which unifies the main aims of the above-mentioned two cognitive pragmatics theories, i.e., I will discuss how native speakers of a language are able to use their language adequately to achieve various goals in different contexts, as well as what principles, restrictions or constraints play a role in comprehension processes.

In addition to the cognitive pragmatic approach, I will apply a reductionist method in the course of the investigation of the principles of communicative language use. The application of the reductionist method places my work in a line of pragmatic research that aims to reduce the categories and principles describing and explaining the rational behaviour of language users to more general categories and principles. Of course, a reduction can be successful only if the resulting categories or principles are able to describe and explain everything as well as, and even better than, the original categories and principles did (cf. e.g., Kasher 1976; Horn 1984/1998; Levinson 2000). In section **5**, I will characterize principles belonging to various theories in a unified way on the basis of the definition of ostensive-inferential communication. This unified characterization makes it possible to have generalizations by means of which all principles can be reduced to a very general cognitive rationality principle.

2. Pragmatic competence and communicative language use

Chomsky (1977, 3) develops his competence–performance distinction, established in the early stage of generative linguistics (Chomsky 1965, 4), and states that, in the course of language acquisition, children acquire not only their native language but also the ways of using it. So children reach a cognitive state by the end of the language acquisition and language use acquisition processes that consists of two main components. One is the knowledge of language, i.e., grammatical competence, the other one is the knowledge of language use, i.e., pragmatic competence. Pragmatic competence enables people to use their knowledge of language to reach various general goals, e.g., to communicate, to think and to memorize in various situations. Pragmatic competence as a module of the human mind must be modelled by a pragmatic theory abstracting away from the

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of comprehension processes and does not deal with the communicators' ostensive behaviour to a sufficient extent, in reality not taking into consideration the dynamism of communication.

particular realizations of language use in particular situations. Pragmatic competence cooperates with other cognitive structures and mechanisms (e.g., memory, perception, the social-interactive system) in the course of real language use. To describe this cooperation is a task of a performance theory (cf. Németh T. 1996, 6–7).

This Chomskyan (1977) perspective provides the approach of modular pragmatics to pragmatic competence as its basis. As we have seen in **1.2**, in modular pragmatics Kasher (1986, 139–41; 1991, 386–92) characterizes the notion of pragmatic competence from the point of view of an ideal native speaker. Pragmatic abilities of native speakers include, among other things, the system of constitutive rules of speech acts; rules and principles governing basic aspects of conversation; principles and strategies governing rational intentional actions such as generating conversational implicatures; politeness considerations; as well as interface pragmatic knowledge to integrate data from a linguistic channel with data from other channels.[6] In Kasher's (1991, 382) opinion—similarly to Chomsky's approach—, the scope of pragmatic competence includes not only the knowledge governing language use in communication. Pragmatics cannot be identified with the study of verbal communication exclusively. Bierwisch (1980; 1983) also comes to the same conclusion but from a different starting point: he sharply criticizes speech act theory because of the identification of language use and communication and he emphasizes that the use of language to communicate is not the unique form of language use. There are several other kinds of language use such as the use of language to think, to memorize or to learn; the use of language in taking notes, in playing, in singing for fun or in psycholinguistic experiments, etc.[7]

However, there is an important difference between Chomsky's and Kasher's approaches concerning pragmatic abilities. Kasher (1991, 386–96) does not situate pragmatic knowledge in one module. He considers the abilities responsible for the linguistic government of language use modular, while the not purely linguistic factors governing language use are considered to be central. This interpretation of the notion of pragmatic competence has a wider scope than in Chomsky's definition. It also

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[6] In the present paper I do not deal with the inherent organization of pragmatic competence supposed by Kasher (1986; 1991).

[7] Consequently, communicative competence as defined by Hymes (1972) cannot be identified with pragmatic competence, either: it is only a part of pragmatic competence. Another argument for this can be found in Németh T. (1996, 8–10).

contains a part of the knowledge and processes that Chomsky refers to as part of performance. Further, Kasher's pragmatic competence cannot be characterized in terms of the classical modularity hypothesis (Fodor 1983) either, because pragmatic competence is not a unique, informationally encapsulated system, so it cannot be considered a module in the classical Fodorian sense.

The other cognitive pragmatic theory, relevance theory, differs from Chomsky's approach to a greater extent than Kasher's modular pragmatics does. Relevance theorists (cf. e.g., Reboul–Moeschler 1998; Sperber 2000; Sperber–Wilson 2002) use an extended interpretation of modularity.[8] The extended modularity hypothesis supposes that in addition to peripheral systems there is not only one central system in the human mind. Instead, peripheral systems can be connected with more than one conceptual module, and furthermore, the conceptual modules themselves are not independent of each other. In this new version of the modularity hypothesis, pragmatic competence is a metacognitive domain, the core ability of which is a metarepresentational ability. Pragmatic competence can be divided into three subsystems: 1. a metapsychology module which is responsible for thought attribution; 2. a comprehension module containing abilities by means of which one can find out the interlocutor's communicative intentions, and 3. a logical module which checks arguments. These three subsystems operate together when one applies pragmatic competence in the course of language use.[9] The idea to situate pragmatic abilities in several modules is similar to Kasher's (1991) solution, and it differs from Fodor's (1983) classical modularity theory in the same way, i.e., it does not consider pragmatic competence to be a unique, informationally encapsulated system. However, I should note that the other non-communicative forms of language use mentioned above are not included in the definition of pragmatic competence formulated by relevance theorists. Relevance theory refers pragmatics only to communication; furthermore, it concentrates on the partners' comprehension tasks in ostensive-inferential communication. In this respect, pragmatic competence in relevance theory has a narrower scope than it does in Kasher's modular pragmatics. From another point of view, pragmatic competence

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[8] The earlier versions of relevance theory (cf. Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995) mostly rely on Fodor's (1983) classical modularity hypothesis. For a critical discussion of classical modularity see also Fodor (2000).

[9] For more detailed discussion of the extended modularity hypothesis and changes of the modularity hypothesis in relevance theory see Pléh (2000b).

in relevance theory has a wider scope than it does in modular pragmatics, because pragmatic abilities are used not only in verbal communication but in all kinds of communication. Consequently, for relevance theory, pragmatics is not a linguistic subdiscipline.

The real existence of pragmatic competence seems to be supported by the latest neurolinguistic research (Paradis 1998). It differentiates damage in grammatical competence in the left hemisphere of the brain from damage in pragmatic competence in the right hemisphere of the brain very convincingly. This differentiation provides neurolinguistic evidence for the existence of pragmatic competence already hypothesized in pragmatic theories. In contrast with damage in the left hemisphere, lesions in the right hemisphere do not lead to grammatical (i.e., phonological, morphological, syntactic) deficits, that is, to one or another kind of aphasia, but they result in considerable systematic disfunctions in the course of the production and interpretation of indirect speech acts, conversational implicatures, metaphors, humour, discourse coherence etc. Evaluations of the neurological status of patients with damage in pragmatic competence demonstrate that pragmatic abilities are not restricted to a specific domain, but they are located in several sites in the right hemisphere of the brain.

Summarizing the relevant results of pragmatic theories and neurolinguistic research, as well as considering her own results, Ivaskó (2002) concludes that pragmatic competence cannot be considered a unique module in the mind. Rather, it can be characterized as an ability which organizes and governs the operations and cooperation of various systems, especially in the use of signs to communicate.

Relying on the results of pragmatic theory and neurolinguistics (cf. Kasher 1991; Paradis 1998; Sperber 2000; Ivaskó 2002), I define pragmatic competence as the faculty of the human mind not restricted to one module but containing and organizing procedural and declarative knowledge concerning not only communicative but all possible forms of language use. Abilities governing the production and interpretation mechanisms in verbal communication, i.e., abilities responsible for successful communicative language use, are subparts of pragmatic competence.

One of the central tasks of the disciplines investigating language use — e.g., pragmatics, discourse analysis,[10] sociolinguistics, social psy-

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[10] The term *discourse analysis* covers all disciplines which deal with discourses or texts, e.g., conversation analysis, text analysis, text linguistics, discourse grammar.

chology — is to study what principles, constraints, restrictions govern or regulate language use (Levinson 1983). However, because of the fact that these disciplines analyse language use only in communicative interactions, principles supposed by them are really principles of communicative language use.

Before starting to discuss principles of communicative language use, I should make it clear in section **3** what interpretations of the term *principle* will be used in the following parts of the paper.

3. Interpretations of the term *principle* in linguistics

3.1. Rules and principles

Generative linguistics theories[11] model the knowledge of language, i.e., grammatical competence, by means of a formal rule system and also provide particular grammatical principles and constraints on the operation of rules. All these together are subsumed under the notion of grammar. The latest versions of Chomsky's generative grammar (see e.g., Chomsky 1995; Radford 1997) use the term *rule* less than earlier versions did, and sometimes they do not use it at all. Instead, rules are replaced by operations, constraints and principles.[12] Particular grammatical sentences of a language can be derived by means of the application of the operations taking into account the relevant principles and constraints. However, it is not quite clear what the essential difference is between rules and operations. Operations work very similarly to how rules were applied: that is the reason why operations can still be considered rules.[13] One of the most important and distinctive features of grammatical rules is their predictivity. Word sequences constructed by grammatical rules, i.e., sentences, are always well-formed, they are not results of any choices, they are idealized and invariant in comparison with empirically observable utterances (Taylor–Cameron 1987; Németh T. 1994, 69; 1996, 22–8).

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[11] By generative linguistics I mean not only the Chomskyan framework, but also each theory which operates by means of explicit rule application.

[12] The changes of generative grammar concerning the status of rules in the theory and the motivation for the changes are summarized and evaluated in Smith (1999). Generative grammatical and pragmatic (relevance theoretical) principles, their similarities and differences are discussed in Carston (2000).

[13] Both terms, i.e., *operation* and *rule* are used e.g., in Smith (1999); É. Kiss (1998, 17 vs. 2003, 205).

Unlike grammatical competence, the ability to use language, i.e., pragmatic competence cannot be described by means of a strict formal rule system.[14] The pragmatics literature supposes that the adequate use of language is governed by principles, strategies, restrictions and heuristics instead of rules in the above sense (Leech 1983; Mey 1995; Levinson 2000). However, it is worth noting that one can also meet the term *rule* in the literature on language use. A rule as a synonym for principle is not a constitutive, creative, inviolable inner rule like a grammatical rule. Such rules applied in the description of language use are regulative, contingent, not creative, they are social constructs similarly to Wittgensteinian rules (Pléh 2000a; Lerch 2002). However, there is another interpretation of the term *rule* in pragmatics, namely in speech act theory. Searle (1969) establishes constitutive rules for speech acts relying on conditions of success. The constitutive rules for speech acts are very similar to grammatical rules in their nature. If one fails to conform to a constitutive rule (at least one which states a condition of success for an act), then one will not have performed the act. Similarly, if one fails to conform to a rule of the grammar of a particular language, i.e., violates it, then one will not have generated a sentence of the given language.[15] The formal and social interpretations of the concept of rule are not inconsistent, as is demonstrated by Kertész (2001) when he compares the theses of generative grammar and late Wittgensteinian philosophy from the points of view of the theory of science and the sociology of knowledge. The two interpretations of the term *rule* are not inconsistent not only in the study of language and language use, but they both can also be verified in the operation of the mind and even of the brain (Pléh 2001, 420–1).

The normative, prescriptive principles and restrictions of communicative language use that will be studied in section **4** belong to the second interpretation of *rule*. Since not all principles relating to communicative language use treated in the literature are prescriptive in nature, it seems reasonable to give an overview of the other possibilities of the interpretation of the term *principle* as well.

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[14] In the last decades, some researchers became sceptical in connection with rule application in modelling the knowledge of language (cf. e.g., Rumelhart et al. 1986) and proposed a special "double" model (cf. e.g., Pinker 1994). In these models, both rule based behaviour and associative organization are accepted. For the application of these models to Hungarian data see Lukács (2001); Pléh–Lukács (2002).

[15] It is worth mentioning at the same time that one can speak ungrammatically, i.e., using non-sentences and still fulfil communicative goals and also be understood.

3.2. Interpretations of the term *principle*

The term *principle* has been widely used in the linguistics literature for a long time.[16]   It has at least four different interpretations.   According to the first interpretation of the term, principles are considered to be means of description and explanation in particular grammars, both in synchronic and diachronic ones.   In this sense, principles are concrete constraints, restrictions on the rules of a particular grammar, of a particular linguistic theory.   The first modern use of the term, attributable to the neogrammarian Hermann Paul (1874), regards the principle of analogy as the main explanatory principle of diachronic grammar.   The leading theoretician of Copenhagen structuralism, Louis Hjelmslev (1929; 1953) proposes principles in the synchronic, structural description of language and takes the principle of analysis to be the most important one.   In Chomsky's (1995) minimalist program, the important principle of economy, which makes it possible to choose from alternative derivations of a sentence taking into account economic considerations, is also based on the first sense of *principle*.

The second interpretation of the term can be formulated as follows: principles are very general constraints on scientific descriptions of languages, i.e., they are not principles of particular synchronic or diachronic, descriptive or explanatory grammars but are imposed on grammars in general.   The second interpretation of *principle* can also be recovered in Hjelmslev's (1929; 1953) works in linguistics.   In this sense, principles are meta-meta principles such as criteria of simplicity, logical consistency, economy, exhaustive description etc.   These general science theoretical and methodological constraints on the description of language are also valid for any kind of scientific theories.[17]

With the study of language use gaining increasing momentum from the 1970s on, a third, new interpretation of the term *principle* has appeared in the pragmatic literature.   In this sense, principles operate in real language use, they are empirical, normative prescriptions followed by the language users consciously or unconsciously in order to communicate with each other successfully.   These principles—e.g., Grice's (1975/1989) cooperative principle, Leech's (1983) politeness principle—can also be considered strategies or heuristics.   This third interpretation of *principle*

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[16] The first use of the term *principle* can be attributed to Aristotle.

[17] These general requirements come from the philosophy of science and theory of science at the beginning of the 20th century.

is identical with the second sense of *rule,* as was already mentioned in section **3.1**.

And finally, there is a fourth interpretation of *principle* in the pragmatics literature, which has a growing importance in pragmatic studies. The fourth interpretation is similar to the third one in the sense that it treats principles as empirical, operating in real communicative situations, but it differs from the third interpretation in that it does not consider principles normative, prescriptive constraints. Principles in the fourth sense are empirical generalizations on the communicative behaviour of language users such as Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance and a later extension of it to the whole of human cognition, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance (Sperber–Wilson 1995).[18] Sperber and Wilson do not assume an explicit knowledge and observation of the principles of relevance. The principles of relevance cannot be violated or flouted, the intention to behave relevantly and the presumption of relevance are innate properties of the human mind.

The term *principle* is widely used in the pragmatics literature in the above-mentioned third and fourth interpretations. So, on the one hand, principles of communicative language use are constraints, prescriptions and strategies that must be followed by language users in verbal communication in their negotiating behaviour, and, on the other hand, principles are statements that can be formulated as empirical generalizations about the language users' behaviour. Since one of the goals of the present paper is to overview and evaluate some typical principles of communicative language use, I will henceforward use the term *principle* in the third and fourth interpretations in accordance with the pragmatics tradition. Furthermore, in section **5**, I will evaluate which particular principles are used in the third and which in the fourth sense of the term.

After completing the necessary preliminary tasks—i.e., defining communicative language use and the term *principle*—indicated in section **1**, I will start to discuss principles of communicative language use in the next section.[19]

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[18] Sperber and Wilson propose only one principle of relevance, namely the communicative one in the first edition of their book in 1986. In the second, 1995 edition they take into account the latest developments of relevance theory and extend the presumption of relevance to the whole of human cognition, proposing two principles of relevance, communicative and cognitive principles.

[19] As a starting-point for the study of principles of communicative language use, see Németh T. (2003).

4. Principles of communicative language use

4.1. Two classic principles

4.1.1. Grice's cooperative principle

Grice (1975/1989) investigates the conditions of the organization and operation of everyday language use irrespective of its subject matter and formulates the cooperative principle in order to explain the logic of conversations. The cooperative principle (Grice *ibid.*, 26) expresses the communicative partners' expectations as how to behave in conversations:[20]

(1) COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE:

   Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Grice distinguishes four categories under the cooperative principle and, echoing Kant, he calls them the categories of quantity, quality, relation and manner. Without going into the details of these well known maxims, I want to note only that these categories govern not only information processing in everyday conversations, but also all kinds of rational social behaviour as it was emphasized by Grice (*ibid.*, 28) himself.

Since the meaning of utterances in everyday conversations cannot be identified with the meaning of sentences uttered, first of all, Grice intends to uncover the meaning of the utterances (cf. also Grice 1957/1989; 1968/1989).[21] In addition to the explicit (in other words: literal, conventional) meaning of utterances, speakers convey implicit inferences, that is, in Gricean terms, conversational implicatures by means of flouting one—or more—of the above maxims relying on the cooperative principle.[22] Conversational implicatures must be capable of being worked out on the basis of (i) the conventional meaning of the utterance, (ii) the

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[20] The page numbers cited refer to the 1989 edition.

[21] Grice (1957/1989; 1968/1989) distinguishes sentence meaning, utterer's/speaker's meaning and utterance meaning. (In the present paper, I will use *speaker's meaning* rather than *utterer's meaning*.) Speaker's meaning and utterance meaning are closely related, the latter is derivative of the former. Because of the close relationship between the two terms, *speaker's meaning* and *utterance meaning* are normally used as synonyms in the pragmatics literature.

[22] Grice (1975/1989, 30) enumerates four cases of failing to fulfil a maxim in a talk exchange. Only the fourth case, i.e., flouting a maxim, gives rise to a conversational implicature. In this case a maxim is being exploited.

cooperative principle and its maxims, (iii) the context of the utterance, (iv) background knowledge and (v) by means of the assumption that information on the first four points are mutually available to participants.[23] According to Grice, the most general and important purpose of conversations is effective information exchange between participants. The cooperative principle and the four maxims provide rational tools for it. If an utterance is intended to be processed only in its literal meaning, then rationality, or more exactly, the fulfilling of the cooperative principle and its maxims is self-evident. But one can ask whether it is rational to convey information to be inferred, i.e., conversational implicatures in addition to the literal meaning of an utterance. In the course of working out a conversational implicature, the hearer starts out from the presumption that the speaker behaves cooperatively and observes the cooperative principle. If a conversational maxim seems not to be fulfilled, then this does not automatically count as the violation of a maxim. Instead, not fulfilling a maxim attracts the hearer's attention to infer a further meaning intended by the speaker, i.e., not fulfilling a maxim really is its exploitation in order to convey a conversational implicature. To transfer a covered, additional meaning by means of the literal meaning of an utterance explicitly expressed in a context, as well as relying on conversational presumptions, is a very economic—but unfortunately not very safe[24]—way of information transmission. Consequently, a conversational exchange fulfilling the cooperative principle and, at the same time, exploiting a maxim can also be considered a kind of rational behaviour.

Establishing the cooperative principle and the maxims under it, as well as demonstrating how they operate in conversations, Grice (1975/ 1989) has started a research programme in pragmatics which has the primary aim of finding and describing the rational tools and manners of effective information transfer in human cooperative verbal and nonverbal behaviour.[25] However, one cannot forget about the fact that Grice

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[23] Implicatures which can be intuitively grasped but cannot be worked out in the above-mentioned way do not count as conversational implicatures, they are conventional implicatures (Grice 1975/1989, 31).

[24] This kind of information transmission can be unsafe, or, in other words, not successful. It can happen that the communicative partner does not infer any conversational implicatures, or he/she infers conversational implicatures not intended by the speaker.

[25] At this point of the paper I do not differentiate between communication and information conveying. If we study Grice's theory from the point of view of

(*ibid.*, 28) supposes all sorts of other maxims such as e.g., be polite. Aesthetic, social or moral maxims are also fulfilled in the conversations and they may also induce implicit inferences, i.e., they may generate conversational implicatures. Grice's maxims are proposed to guide maximally effective exchange of information,[26] therefore he (*ibid.*, 28) admits that his maxims need to be generalized to allow for more general purposes such as influencing others' actions.

4.1.2. Leech's politeness principle

The other classic principle of the pragmatics literature, namely the politeness principle (Leech 1983), focuses on the social aspects of verbal communication and prescribes for the communicative partners how to communicate in order to maintain and care for the polite interpersonal relation between them. Leech (*ibid.*, 81) formulates the politeness principle both in a negative and a positive form, prescribing what not to say as well as what to say in order to be polite.[27]

(2) (a) POLITENESS PRINCIPLE IN THE NEGATIVE FORM:
      Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs.

    (b) POLITENESS PRINCIPLE IN THE POSITIVE FORM:
      Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs.

Leech (*ibid.*, 131–51) introduces seven specific maxims (tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, sympathy and phatic maxims)[28] in order to make explicit what it exactly means to be adequately polite in a Gricean cooperative conversation. Politeness maxims concern the relationship between two participants in conversation whom Leech calls *self* (normally identified with the speaker) and *other* (normally identified

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explanatory adequacy, we can meet with several problems. For these problems, see e.g., Kempson (1975) and Kiefer (1979).

[26] Effective exchange of information means the exchange of information on objects in Gricean theory.

[27] The verb *say* is not used here as a Gricean term but in its everyday meaning.

[28] The phatic maxim is not included in the enumeration of politeness maxims at the beginning of the chapter cited here (cf. Leech 1983, 132), but it is not surprising that after the elaboration of maxims it appears in the table summarizing principles and maxims which are important in the interpersonal rhetoric at the end of the chapter (cf. Leech *ibid.*, 149).

with the hearer).[29] Not going into the details of the characterization of maxims, it is worth noting that Leech does not evaluate all of the maxims as equally important. The importance of maxims is influenced by general considerations and expectations that (i) politeness focuses more strongly on other than on self, (ii) negative politeness is a more weighty constraint than positive politeness, and, furthermore, (iii) politeness towards the hearer is more important than politeness towards a third party. Taking into account these general considerations and fulfilling maxims result in a polite conversation.

In addition to the politeness and cooperative principles, Leech (1983) proposes other principles as well. The irony principle makes it possible to avoid open conflicts in social relations by using irony, the banter principle marks a playful relatedness between participants, the interest principle prescribes to be unpredictable, and, finally, the Pollyanna principle postulates that participants in a conversation prefer pleasant topics to unpleasant ones.

There are interesting theoretical questions with regard to what relations the above-mentioned principles and maxims have to each other and whether they have identical and equal theoretical status in the description of the operation of polite conversations. The seven maxims established by Leech are ordered under the politeness principle in the same way as the four Gricean maxims are supervised by the cooperative principle. The politeness and cooperative principles are situated at the same level in the course of language use together with the interest principle and the Pollyanna principle. These first-order principles govern polite language use in communication directly. The irony and banter principles cannot influence language use directly, they rely upon the implicatures of the first-order principles, consequently they can be considered higher-order principles. The higher-order principles involve more indirectness in the working out of the utterance meaning. In spite of the difference between the first-order and the higher-order principles from the empirical point of view, all these principles have the same theoretical status in the description: they are not subordinated to each other (cf. Leech 1983, 149).

The principles and maxims mentioned above direct interpersonal rhetoric.[30] Interpersonal rhetoric focuses on goal-oriented speech situa-

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[29] Of course, speakers also show politeness to third parties who are not necessarily present in the speech situation (Leech 1983, 131).

[30] The other component of classic rhetoric, i.e., textual rhetoric, has no importance for the present argumentation.

tions, in which the participants use language in order to reach particular effects in the partners' mind. Notice that this interpretation of interpersonal rhetoric is not far from the Gricean notion of rationality. I will return to this observation in subsection **4.1.3** and section **5**.

In summary: Leech has started another important research programme in pragmatics by studying the role of politeness in interpersonal rhetoric. This research programme has the primary purpose to describe the norms of politeness in everyday communication in addition to the rationality considerations emphasized by Grice.

4.1.3. Problems with Grice's and Leech's theories

There are at least two serious problems from the point of view of the present paper with Grice's (1975/1989) and Leech's (1983) theories which have to be mentioned: 1. neither the cooperative principle and its maxims nor the politeness principle and its maxims are defined exactly, and 2. neither Grice nor Leech give an explicit, complete model of communication (cf. Kiefer 1979; Németh T. 1996, 11–2; Sperber–Wilson 1986/ 1995, 28–38).[31] The Gricean model concentrates on the hearer's side, how a hearer infers the intended speaker's meaning by recovering conversational implicatures, and it does not deal with the question of how the linguistic meaning of a sentence can serve as a basis for conversational implicatures to be inferred. The politeness model emphasizes the interpersonal character of the communicative interaction, it investigates the tools of maintaining a polite communicative relation. The tools of politeness and manners of behaving politely in communication provide information on the persons participating in conversations and on the relationships between them. Although both Grice and Leech appreciate the other's principles, Grice is interested in characterizing effective information transmission on objects in communicative interactions, while Leech is interested in the interpersonal characteristics of conversations. Consequently, their models do not sufficiently describe communication.

The problems that emerge in connection with the cooperative and politeness principles were partly solved in the pragmatics literature by modifying them, and partly by introducing new principles.

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[31] As one of the reviewers of the present paper has noted, these two points are not problems with just Grice's and Leech's theories, they are commonly shared problems in pragmatics: there are no exact definitions of pragmatic terms and no complete theory of communication. One of the tasks of future pragmatics research is to solve these problems in order to become a more exact, formalizable discipline.

4.2. Further principles

4.2.1. Principles related to the Gricean theory

One of the developments of the Gricean theory can be found in Kasher's (1976) approach to everyday conversations. Kasher generalizes the Gricean categories from a philosophical point of view. He reduces the cooperative principle and its maxims to a unique rationality principle. This general rationality principle can be extended to explain not only cooperative communication but also all kinds of human intentional activity. However, it is worth noting that the reduction of the cooperative principle to a very general rationality principle is in full accordance with Grice's original idea. Grice (1975/1989, 29) himself assumes that the cooperative principle can be generalized to all forms of human social behaviour. Kasher's (*ibid.*, 205) rationality principle is formulated as (3).

(3)   RATIONALITY PRINCIPLE:

Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, other things being equal.

The major presumption behind the rationality principle is that human beings are rational agents whose intentional actions aim to reach particular goals well-defined within a certain context. Goals, beliefs and attitudes in a given context are assumed to offer sufficient grounds for a satisfactory justification of the agents' rational behaviour. The presumption of rationality plays a very important role in the understanding of everyday human intentional activity, as well as in its theoretical description and explanation.[32]

Another modification of the Gricean theory can be found in Horn's (1984/1998) theory of pragmatic inferences. Horn envisages a partial reductionist program by formulating his well-known Q(uantity)- and R(elation)-principles. Horn intends to define communication by means of necessary and sufficient conditions, taking into account the dynamism of communication, i.e., both the speaker's side and the hearer's side of the communication. He boils down the four Gricean maxims to the above two fundamental principles. Horn starts out from Zipf's (1949) and Martinet's (1962) functional economy considerations, from the principle of

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[32] The description of the operation of Kasher's (1976) extended rationality principle is very similar to the characterization of the relevance principles given by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). I will return to the similarities of the rationality principles and the relevance principles later.

least effort originally applied in historical linguistics to explain language change.[33] The speaker-based and the hearer-based formulations of the principle of least effort can conflict, i.e., be antinomic. For example, the interpretation of a linguistic expression the production of which needs less effort from the speaker may require more effort from the hearer. Or the opposite of this can also happen, and the use of a linguistic expression the interpretation of which costs less effort from the hearer's point of view may require more effort from the speaker's side. Horn (1984/1998, 384–8)[34] argues that these two antinomic forces and the interaction between them are responsible for generating Gricean conversational maxims, as well as for generating the schema and manners for pragmatic inferences, i.e., conversational implicatures. Applying a partly reductionist approach and taking into account the speaker-based and the hearer-based economy principles, Horn (*ibid.*, 385) proposes the following two principles instead of the Gricean four maxims:[35]

(4) (a) Q-PRINCIPLE (HEARER-BASED):

        Make your contribution sufficient (cf. Quantity$_1$). Say as much as you can (given R).

    (b) R-PRINCIPLE (SPEAKER-BASED):

        Make your contribution necessary (cf. Relation, Quantity$_2$, Manner).

Horn (1984/1998, 396–414) illustrates that the Q-principle and the R-principle only apparently conflict with each other by explaining several various synchronic and diachronic, grammatical and pragmatic phenomena. In Horn's opinion, there is a division of pragmatic labour between his two principles. This division of pragmatic labour helps to maintain an economic balance between the speaker and the hearer in the course of communication.

Levinson (1987/1998) also criticizes the Gricean theory, analysing the Q(uantity)- and I(nformativeness)-implicatures both resulting from the Gricean quantity maxim. Studying the role played by Q- and I-implicatures in establishing the scope of negation and in the interpretation of scalar expressions, Levinson convincingly argues for the claim

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[33] The principle of least effort concerns not only linguistic phenomena but also all kinds of human behaviour.

[34] The page numbers cited here refer to the 1998 edition.

[35] Horn indicates in brackets what Gricean maxims are reduced in the given principle.

that there is an anomaly between the two types of implicatures.[36] The
anomaly between the Q- and I-implicatures can be solved by developing
a more exact definition of informativeness in communication. Levinson
(*ibid.*, 562) proposes the minimization principle, which can be considered
a little controversial or even paradoxical at first glance. This principle
regulates the economy of information processing in communication. The
minimization principle is formed as in (5):

(5)   MINIMIZATION PRINCIPLE:
      Minimized forms get maximized interpretation. The less you say, the more you
      mean.

The minimization principle concerns the connection between the explicit
linguistic expression and the pragmatic inferences derivable from its use
in a given context. Levinson demonstrates and illustrates how the mini-
mization principle works in three distinct research areas: in the Gricean
inferential model, in conversation analysis and in syntax. The appli-
cability of the minimization principle in syntax proves that principles
originally used in the explanation of pragmatic phenomena can be used
with considerable explanatory power in grammar as well.

In his latest grandscale, inspiring book, Levinson (2000) gives a syn-
thesis of the results of neo-Gricean pragmatics and develops a theory of
generalized conversational implicatures. The concept of generalized con-
versational implicature is one of the Gricean notions, but only minimal
attention was devoted to it in pragmatics. Levinson (*ibid.*, 21–7) assumes
three levels of meaning: 1. sentence meaning, 2. utterance-token mean-
ing and 3. a level of meaning between the first two, i.e., utterance-type
meaning. Sentence meaning must be explicated by a grammar, utterance-
token meaning, or, in Gricean terms, speaker's meaning can be recovered
by means of inferring particular conversational implicatures in accordance
with the speaker's intentions in a given context. Gricean pragmatics with
its cooperative principle and maxims explains how particular conversa-
tional implicatures can be inferred in a given context. At the level of
meaning between sentence meaning and utterance-token meaning, i.e., in
utterance-type meaning, systematic pragmatic inferences independent of
particular contexts can be captured. These systematic pragmatic infer-
ences are based on our general presumptions about how normal, usual,

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[36] Q- and I-implicatures are widely studied in the post-Gricean literature. For the
relevant works, see Levinson (1987/1998).

everyday communication works. Speech acts, Gricean conventional implicatures, felicity conditions, preference organizations of conversations, as well as generalized conversational implicatures discussed by Levinson in detail can be analysed at the level of utterance-type meaning. Levinson (*ibid.*, 73–164) considers generalized conversational implicatures to be default, stereotypical inferences generated by the operation of the following three principles:[37]

(6) (a) Q(UANTITY)-PRINCIPLE:

   Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger statement would contravene the I-principle.

   (b) I(NFORMATIVENESS)-PRINCIPLE:

   Say as little as necessary, i.e., produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends (bearing Q in mind).

   (c) M(ANNER)-PRINCIPLE:

   Indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situation.

In order to illustrate what kind of generalized conversational implicatures can be induced by the principles in (6), consider the examples in (7):

(7) (a) *Some of the girls came.* (Scalar) generalized conversational implicature induced by the Q-principle: 'Not all of the girls came.'

   (b) *Peter and Mary bought a house.* Generalized conversational implicature induced by the I-principle: 'Peter and Mary bought the house together.'

   (c) *Charles had enough money to travel to London.* Generalized conversational implicature induced by the M-principle: 'Charles didn't travel to London.'

Levinson (2000) also demonstrates that generalized conversational implicatures can be cancelled by once inferences, i.e., particular conversational implicatures, as well as by information explicitly expressed in the utterance. The deletion processes are governed by the same principles that induce generalized conversational implicatures. Consequently, Q-, I- and M-principles express, on the one hand, relations between generalized conversational implicatures (utterance-type meanings) and particular con-

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[37] Levinson formulates his Q-, I- and M-principles in greater detail. He takes into account both the speaker's and hearer's interests. The speaker-based formulation of the principles in (6) is also part of Levinson's definition, and it is enough to cite only them for the purposes of the present paper.

versational implicatures (utterance-token meanings), and, on the other
hand, relations between generalized conversational implicatures and the
explicit linguistic meaning (sentence meaning) as well.

It is Gricean pragmatics that also serves as a starting-point for an-
other current pragmatic theory, namely for relevance theory as developed
by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). However, relevance theory differs
from the above-mentioned neo-Gricean pragmatic theories, which can be
easily related to each other. Sperber and Wilson do not only modify or re-
duce the Gricean cooperative principle and the maxims under it, but they
also introduce a new principle which is a non-prescriptive generalization
about communication instead of the normative principles.[38] Sperber and
Wilson's (*ibid.*, 158) communicative principle of relevance is given in (8):

(8) COMMUNICATIVE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE:

    Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own
    optimal relevance.

Before generally characterizing the way the communicative principle of
relevance operates, the terms used in the definition must be explained.
First, let us see the term *ostensive communication*. Sperber and Wilson
(1986/1995, 63) define it as follows:

(9) OSTENSIVE-INFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION:

    The communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to com-
    municator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimu-
    lus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions $\{I\}$.

Two kinds of intentions are hidden in the definition in (9). The first
one concerns the information $\{I\}$ itself to be transferred in communica-
tion (cf. (10a)), and the second one concerns the intention to inform the
communicative partner on $\{I\}$ (cf. (10b)).

(10) (a) INFORMATIVE INTENTION:

        to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions $\{I\}$
        (Sperber – Wilson 1986/1995, 58).

    (b) COMMUNICATIVE INTENTION:

        to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the com-
        municator has this informative intention (Sperber – Wilson *ibid.*, 61).

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[38] For empirical tests of relevance theory, see Happé (1993) and Noveck–Sperber
(2004).

The information the communicator wants to convey is a set of assumptions $\{I\}$. By assumptions, Sperber and Wilson mean thoughts treated by an individual as representations of the actual world. The facts of the actual world—represented by assumptions—are manifest to an individual at a given time if the individual is capable at that time of representing them mentally and accepting their representations as true or probably true (Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995, 2, 39). In ostensive-inferential communication communicators fulfil their intentions by means of some kind of ostensive behaviour. Communicators behave in such a way that their partners could observe their intention to transfer information. Observing communicators' ostensive behaviour, communicative partners make inferences with regard to the communicators' intentions and process the intended information.

The term *presumption of optimal relevance* in the formulation of the communicative principle of relevance has not been defined yet. The optimal relevance of an ostensive stimulus refers to the economy balance between the effects reached by it and the efforts needed to process it. More exactly, an ostensive stimulus is relevant optimally, on the one hand, if it is relevant enough for it to be worth the adressee's effort to process it. And on the other hand, an ostensive stimulus is relevant optimally if it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences (Sperber–Wilson 1995, 270).[39] An ostensive stimulus is always presumed to be relevant, otherwise participants of the communicative interaction do not bother to process it.

Sperber and Wilson apply the communicative principle of relevance not only to explain ways of inferring information implicitly transmitted in the communication but also to recover the complete communicated meaning, as well as to define the linguistic meaning as part of the complete communicated information. With this approach Sperber and Wilson, first, eliminate the one-sidedness of previous models of communication, which either focused only on the linguistic meaning as code-models (e.g., the Jakobsonian model) did, or concentrated on the implicit information inferred by communicative partners as the Gricean model did. And second, they demonstrate that inferential processes are also indispensable

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[39] It can be seen that the term *relevance* used by Sperber and Wilson differs from the Gricean maxim of relation to a great extent.

for constructing the linguistic (in a relevance theoretical term, explicit) meaning.[40]

Sperber and Wilson have considered communication an important sub-case of human cognition since the very first formulation of relevance theory. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the authors apply a reduction to the communicative principle of relevance and refer the presumption of relevance to all human cognition. Accordingly, in the second summary of the theory they formulate the cognitive principle of relevance, as in (11).

(11) COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE:

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance (Sperber – Wilson 1995, 260).

The cognitive principle of relevance states that the human mind tends to be organized not only to seek for relevance or to prove it, but human cognitive mechanisms are geared to maximize relevance. Maximizing relevance means that cognitive mechanisms try to process the most relevant information in the most relevant manner, i.e., they intend to achieve the greatest cognitive effect with the least processing effort.[41]

To summarize, both relevance principles are a kind of economy principle. The relevance principle cited in (8) refers to a particular form of human cognition, i.e., to communication. The other relevance principle cited in (11) is a very general principle which characterizes all human cognition. In contrast with the principles discussed above, neither the communicative principle of relevance, nor the cognitive principle of relevance are prescriptive in nature. Neither one is a norm to be observed, instead, they are generalizations about communication and cognition.

Because of restrictions on the scope of this paper, I will not investigate other principles which can also be connected to Gricean pragmatics. Therefore, I will now turn to the approaches related to the other classic principle, i.e., the politeness principle.

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[40] The relation between the inferential processes and the explicit meaning of utterances are analysed and illustrated in Bibok (2003).

[41] For a discussion of the biological and cognitive motivation of the cognitive principle of relevance, see Sperber – Wilson (1995, 261–3).

4.2.2. Principles related to the politeness principle

Studying the role played by politeness in communicative language use, and, furthermore, in all kinds of social human behaviour, is one of the important and preferred research areas not only in linguistic pragmatics but also in social psychology.

Goffman (1955; 1959), one of the leading theoreticians in early social psychology, relates politeness to the concept of face. Goffman (1955, 5) defines face as the positive value a person effectively claims for himself/herself by the line others assume he/she has taken during a particular interaction. Face is an image of the self. Since face includes positive social attributes and values, politeness can be understood as the mutual intention to maintain these positive social values, i.e., to save each other's face in communication. Although Goffman has not formulated face saving briefly and explicitly similarly to principles analysed in the previous sections, the main content of face saving can be summarized as follows:

(12) PRINCIPLE OF FACE SAVING:
    Save your own and your partner's face in communication.

It is a universally accepted aspiration that participants in communication save not only their own faces but also their partners'. Communicators try to avoid performing speech acts endangering faces of their partners, such as e.g., requests, or even threatening partners' faces, such as commands.[42] If communicators still have to perform face endangering or threatening speech acts, they necessarily try to reduce the extent of endangering or threatening by using various politeness formulas, indirect speech acts, as well as by enlarging options of how partners can react.

Similarly to the maxims of Gricean pragmatics, Lakoff (1973; 1979) defines the norms of politeness before the formulation of Leech's (1983) politeness theory.[43] Lakoff proposes a main principle to guide polite verbal behaviour in the same way as Grice proposes a main principle—the

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[42] If the communicator asks his/her partner to do something, he/she assumes that the partner would not perform the requested action in the normal circumstances, in the normal flow of events. The communicator assumes that an intention to perform the requested action is not included in the partner's face. That is why requests (and their strongest forms, commands) can be considered face endangering or threatening speech acts.

[43] Lakoff's politeness theory has not become known so widely as Leech's theory has, therefore I have labelled Leech's politeness principle as a classic principle and discussed it earlier, before Lakoff's norms.

cooperative principle—to govern rational cooperative behaviour. Lakoff considers politeness a device used in order to reduce frictions and conflicts in personal interactions. She characterizes her politeness principle by means of three maxims ordered under it (Lakoff 1973), given in (13).

(13) POLITENESS PRINCIPLE: Be polite.
      Maxims: 1. Do not impose (used when formal/impersonal politeness is required).
              2. Give options (used when informal politeness is required).
              3. Make a partner feel good (used when intimate politeness is required).

The maxims in (13) are applicable more or less depending on the context and politeness situation as understood by the communicator. The first maxim assumes a more formal relation between the participants than the second and the third maxims. There is a more personal relation between the participants under the second, and, further, the third maxim. While the Gricean cooperative principle and the four maxims under it have to be observed all together at the same time, Lakoff's maxims originally refer to different situations.

    Schlenker (1980) further develops Goffman's line of research in social psychology, investigating what principles govern human social behaviour. One of the central categories of his theory is impression management. Schlenker (*ibid.*, 6) defines impression management as the conscious or unconscious attempt of participants to control images projected in real or imagined social interactions. According to this notion of impression management, Schlenker (*ibid.*, 105–10) supposes an association principle to regulate human social behaviour in interactions:

(14) ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLE:
      People claim desirable images and avoid claiming undesirable ones.

In other words: people want to establish their personal association with desirable images and disestablish their personal association with undesirable ones. The association principle is followed by communicative partners in the way that they try to maximize the attractiveness of their acquired properties, relations etc., and, at the same time, they try to minimize antipathy towards them (Nemesi 2000, 420). The association principle regulates, on the one hand, self-expression and self-projection, and, on the other hand, solidarity with the partners in social interactions.

    Another theory of interpersonal relations, namely Brown and Levinson's (1978; 1987) politeness theory also relies on social psychology, especially on Goffman's approach, but it is much more of a linguistic prag-

matic theory than merely a social psychological one. Brown and Levinson
aim to reveal, first, what strategies are applied by communicative part-
ners in their conversations, and, second, what linguistic forms can be
used to perform politeness strategies.[44] Politeness strategies originate in
Goffman's face, but Brown and Levinson divide it into two parts. The
first component of the face, i.e., the negative face, refers to people's de-
sire that other people do not prevent them in their actions, whereas the
other component, i.e., positive face, includes people's desire that their
wishes, aims, attitudes etc. would be desirable for others as well. Polite-
ness strategies help to construct and save negative and positive face in
social interactions. Similarly to the formulation of Goffman's principle of
face saving given in (12), the underlying principle of politeness strategies
proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978; 1987) can be summarized and
generalized as follows:[45]

(15) UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF POLITENESS STRATEGIES:
    Save your own and your partner's negative and positive face in communication.

Similarly to the above-mentioned theories based on social psychologi-
cal considerations, Nemesi (1997/1998; 2000) also intends to unify ap-
proaches to self expression and linguistic pragmatic principles in the
course of analysing linguistic aspects of impression management. He
assumes a more specific version of the association principle (cf. (14))
concentrating on verbal communication, the relevant form of social inter-
actions from the linguistic point of view (Nemesi 2000, 426).

(16) PRINCIPLE OF LINGUISTIC IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT:
    In verbal interactions people try to present themselves linguistically in such a way
    that they would like to be seen in.

The principle of linguistic impression management makes a generaliza-
tion that people consciously or unconsciously try to influence their part-
ners' opinion about them in accordance with their desires in conversa-
tions. Participants in conversations want to achieve this aim by means
of choosing particular linguistic forms or by using particular linguis-

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[44] It must be admitted that Brown and Levinson (1978; 1987) do not differentiate
politeness strategies and the linguistic forms by which politeness strategies are
performed consequently.

[45] For an application to Hungarian data of Brown and Levinson's politeness theory,
see e.g., Síklaki (1994, 151–72).

tic forms according to their desires. Although impression management is a universal phenomenon, strategies performing linguistic impression management can be considered language- and culture-specific, and even context-dependent in the same way as politeness strategies in Brown and Levinson's (1978; 1987) theory. Nemesi (2000, 426–33) establishes various sub-strategies of linguistic impression management and illustrates them by data from Hungarian communicative language use. He mentions, for example, identifying oneself emotionally with the partner, maintaining partner's interest, focusing on highly accepted social values, and avoiding or at least reducing undesirable consequences of faults and mistakes.

The literature on politeness and related phenomena could be treated further. Kasper's (1996) paper provides an excellent summary of the latest developments in the study of the field. However, it can be seen from the brief synopsis of the theories given in the present article that two distinct approaches can be differentiated with respect to how politeness operates in social interactions. The first approach prescribes how to behave politely in communication by means of maxims, and the second one generalizes strategies of how people behave in order to be polite in communication.

After the above brief and very general overview of principles of communicative language use, the next section is intended, first, to evaluate the principles independently of any particular pragmatic theory, and, second, to re-evaluate them relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential communication.

5. An evaluation and re-evaluation of the principles of communicative language use

5.1. A theory-independent evaluation of principles

The principles mentioned in section **4** can be divided into two main groups in a natural manner inspired by their character and important empirical generalizations that can be made about them. The first group includes rationality principles, and the second group contains interpersonality principles. Let us evaluate rationality principles first.

5.1.1. Rationality principles

The rationality principles in the first group concern the economy of communicative interactions. Some of them, namely the Gricean (1975/ 1989) cooperative principle, Kasher's (1976) rationality principle, Horn's (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles, Levinson's (1987/1998) minimization principle are pragmatic principles governing information transmission in communication. They play a crucial role mostly in recovering information implicitly conveyed by communicators, i.e., conversational implicatures. Kasher's (1976) rationality principle can be considered more general than the other principles because it is intended to explain all kinds of rational and intentional human activity.[46] However, Kasher (*ibid.*) demonstrates how the rationality principle works by analysing information transmission in communication.

The rationality principles also intrude into the domain of grammar, consequently, they start becoming both pragmatic and grammatical principles. The intrusion of rationality principles into grammar can be illustrated, for example, by applying Horn's (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles in the syntax and the historical linguistic explanation of language change; Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance in the construction of utterance meaning, and Levinson's (2000) Q-, I- and M-principles in the syntax, at the semantics-pragmatics interface and in historical linguistics. It has to be emphasized that the Q-, I- and M-principles are indispensable for explaining generalized conversational implicatures at the semantics-pragmatics interface at the new level of meaning between sentence meaning and utterance-token meaning as suggested by Levinson (2000).

With regard to the rationality principles concerning the economy of communication, it is worth noting once again that Kasher's (1976) rationality principle, as well as Sperber and Wilson's (1995) cognitive principle of relevance are valid not only for verbal communication but also for all forms of language use. And furthermore, Kasher's principle refers to all kinds of intentional human activity — as was mentioned above —, while the cognitive principle of relevance refers to all human cognition.

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[46] The economy principle of least effort proposed by Zipf (1949) which serves as a basis for Horn's and Levinson's principles also has a wider scope, referring to the whole of the human universe.

The Gricean (1975/1989) cooperative principle, Kasher's (1976) rationality principle, Horn's (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles, Levinson's (1987/1998) minimization principle and Levinson's (2000) Q-, I- and M-principles form norms to be observed in communication according to the third interpretation of the term *principle*, so they have a prescriptive power. The remaining rationality principles treated here, i.e., Sperber and Wilson's (1995) communicative and cognitive principles of relevance do not have a normative character, they are descriptive generalizations according to the fourth interpretation of the term *principle* demonstrated in section **3.2**.

5.1.2. Interpersonality principles

The other group contains principles which concern interpersonal relations in communication and various forms of polite social behaviour, as well as the self-projection of the communicative partners. Some interpersonality principles, such as Lakoff's (1973; 1979) politeness principle and Leech's (1983) politeness principle, can be closely connected to Gricean maxim-based pragmatics, they are prescriptions for how to behave politely. The other interpersonality principles have completely—like Goffman's (1955; 1959) principle of face saving and Schlenker's (1980) association principle—or partly—like Brown and Levinson's (1978; 1987) politeness strategies and Nemesi's (1997/1998; 2000) principle of linguistic impression management—a social psychological origin. The politeness principles and maxims related to Gricean pragmatics, i.e., Lakoff's and Leech's principles, as well as Goffman's principle of face saving and Schlenker's association principle from the social psychological approaches, operate as normative, prescriptive constraints, so they belong to the third interpretation of the term *principle*. Unlike these principles, Brown and Levinson's (1978; 1987) politeness strategies and Nemesi's (1997/1998; 2000) strategies of linguistic impression management can be evaluated as empirical generalizations about how people behave in verbal social interactions, consequently one can see the fourth interpretation possibility of *principle* in these latter works.

Criticizing the two classic principles, I have already emphasized in section **4.1.3** that one cannot find an explicit definition of communication underlying them. In the rest of the present paper, I will take an explicit definition, namely Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) definition of ostensive-inferential communication, apply it to verbal communication, and, relying on it, re-evaluate principles of communicative language

use. Finally, in the course of re-evaluating the principles surveyed, I will demonstrate how they can be reduced to a very general rationality principle, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance.

5.2. Application of the definition of ostensive-inferential communication

I have already cited the definition of ostensive-inferential communication in section **4.2.1** in (9), but in order to make my argumentation easier to follow I repeat it here as (17):

(17) OSTENSIVE-INFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION:

> The communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions $\{I\}$.

Verbal communication is the most important form of ostensive-inferential communication for a linguist. In verbal communication the communicator, i.e., the speaker/writer produces a linguistic stimulus consisting of either acoustic or graphic signs (verbal ostension) in order to attract the partner's, i.e., hearer's/reader's, attention and to provide him/her with some kind of information. The communicator fulfils both ostension and encoding. The communicative partner must process the linguistic stimulus and recover the implicit information and the communicator's informative intention. The partner must apply both decoding and inferential procedures to fulfil these tasks. Applying this approach to verbal communication, one can easily conclude why the previous models of verbal communication were not adequate to explain it: code-models (e.g., the Jakobsonian model) and inferential models (e.g., the Gricean model) treated only one or the other side or procedure of verbal communication (cf. Németh T. 1990; 1996).

The majority of principles assumed by the pragmatics and social psychology literature refer to communicative language use, i.e., to verbal communication. Let us re-evaluate these principles relying on the characterization of verbal communication provided in the previous paragraph.

5.3. A re-evaluation of the rationality and interpersonality principles on the basis of verbal ostensive-inferential communication

Notice that with the help of the definition of ostensive-inferential communication information transmission and communication can and must be distinguished. As we have seen in (10a–b) in section **4.2.1**, there are two intentions hidden in the definition of ostensive-inferential communication. One is informative intention according to which a person wants to inform another person about something. One can have informative intention without having an intention to make it manifest to the other person. The other intention, included in the definition, is communicative intention, i.e., the communicator's intention to make his/her informative intention mutually manifest to the partner and himself/herself. Communicative intention presupposes having informative intention. One cannot have communicative intention without having informative intention. Consequently, communication always includes information transmission, but not all kinds of information transmission can be considered communication. Information transmission can operate without communicative intention.[47]

Starting out from the definition of ostensive-inferential communication, it can be stated that most of the rationality principles—Grice's (1975/1989) cooperative principle, Kasher's (1976) rationality principle, Horn's (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles, Levinson's (1987/1998) minimization principle, Levinson's (2000) Q-, I- and M-principles—and all interpersonality principles—Leech's (1983) politeness principle, Goffman's (1955; 1959) principle of face saving, Lakoff's (1973; 1979) politeness principle, Schlenker's (1980) association principle, Brown and Levinson's (1978; 1987) politeness strategies, Nemesi's (1997/1998; 2000) principle of linguistic impression management—refer to the content of the informative intention, i.e., to the set of assumptions $\{I\}$. The only exceptions to

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[47] For a detailed analysis of distinguishing between communication and information transmission, see Németh T. (1996, 14); Ivaskó–Németh T. (2002). It would be important to investigate the relationship between information transmission and the other forms of language use. There are several important questions in this respect: 1. Are there any forms of language use without information transmission? 2. Is there any kind of hierarchy between various forms of language use? 3. What forms of language use can be derived from what forms of language use, for instance, can communicative language use be derived from verbal information transmission? However, to answer these questions further research would be necessary.

this generalization are the communicative (Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995) and cognitive (Sperber–Wilson 1995) principles of relevance.

The above-mentioned rationality principles, except the communicative and cognitive principles of relevance, guide information transmission (meaning construction) and processing (interpretation) with reference to the object. This kind of information, expressed explicitly or implicitly, is basically propositional in nature. Interpersonality principles concern the information transmission and processing on selves including the communicative partners' desires, wishes, intentions, aims, etc. This kind of information does not necessarily have a propositional form, sometimes it can hardly be propositionalized. To summarize: both rationality and interpersonality principles refer to information transmission and processing. It has to be emphasized, again, that it is not necessary to have a communicative intention in order that these principles could operate, they can work both in information transmission without any communicative intention and in communication.

In the definition of ostensive-inferential communication, communicative intention must still be dealt with further. The characterization of communicative intention given by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 61) (cf. (10b) in section **4.2.1**) makes it possible to refer to the content of communicative intention by means of a principle operating in communication. Since in communication the communicator always has communicative intention according to the definition of ostensive-inferential communication, the principle referring to the communicative intention must be formulated in accordance with the fourth interpretation of the term *principle*. Let us call this principle the principle of communicative intention and formulate it as follows:

(18) PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNICATIVE INTENTION:
In communication, communicators intend to make their informative intentions mutually manifest.

As I have noted in section **1**, Bach and Harnish (1979, 7) propose a communicative presumption not labelled "principle" which is similar to the principle of communicative intention in some respect.

(19) COMMUNICATIVE PRESUMPTION:
The mutual belief in C_L that whenever a member says something in L to another member H, he is doing so with some recognizable illocutionary content.[48]

[48] C_L: linguistic community; L: language; H: hearer.

However, there is a great difference between Bach and Harnish's communicative presumption and the principle of communicative intention. Communicative presumption refers only to one kind of information, to illocutionary intention belonging to the content of the informative intention. The principle of communicative intention has a wider scope than communicative presumption, it refers to all kinds of information, to all possible content of the informative intention.

At the re-evaluation of interpersonality principles, we have considered people's intentions, desires, aims, attitudes, etc. which these principles concern as one kind of information. Therefore, conveying informative intention belongs to self-expression, and, consequently, the principle of communicative intention is an interpersonality principle. From this point of view, the principle of communicative intention is a higher-order principle, it must be ordered above rationality principles concerning information transfer on objects and interpersonality principles concerning information transmission on selves in the content of informative intention. The principle of communicative intention serves to make the intention to transfer both kinds of information—i.e., about objects and selves— mutually manifest. From another point of view, the principle of communicative intention can also be evaluated as a rationality principle because it refers to the transmission of informative intention which itself is a kind of information. Realize that the information conveyed by the principle of communicative intention forms a higher-level, additional range to the content of informative intention, and having his/her communicative intention the communicator makes all this information mutually manifest in ostensive-inferential communication.

A cognitive approach always studies information transmission form the point of view of effectiveness. Effectiveness in information transmission refers to whether the spent energy results in enough benefit. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) apply this approach to ostensive-inferential communication and formulate the communicative principle of relevance. The communicative principle of relevance states that every act of ostensive-inferential communication operates according to the effectiveness requirement (cf. (8) in section **4.2.1**). It requires establishing a balance between the processing efforts and contextual effects achieved. Since (i) the communicative principle of relevance guarantees the effectiveness of information transmission in communication and (ii) most of the rationality principles (exceptions are the communicative and cognitive principles of relevance) and all interpersonality principles referring to informative in-

tention are tools of effective information exchange on objects and selves, one can conclude that the communicative principle of relevance makes a generalization about the result of the operation of these principles, i.e., communication. Rationality and interpersonality principles can be considered particular, partial manifestations of the communicative principle of relevance—which itself is a rationality principle—, they can be reduced to it.

Continuing this line of thinking, we can say that since communication usually is considered one of the most important particular forms of human cognition, generalizations about cognition—e.g., the cognitive principle of relevance—must be valid for it as well. The cognitive principle of relevance is a very general rationality principle. It is a generalization about how the human mind works: it tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance. This means that human cognition operates in the way that it could achieve the most cognitive effects (benefit) with the least processing effort (energy cost). Since (i) communication is a very frequent particular form of human cognition about which the communicative principle of relevance makes an important generalization and (ii) the cognitive principle of relevance makes a generalization about how human cognition operates, it can be concluded that the communicative principle of relevance is a particular, partial manifestation of the cognitive principle of relevance: the communicative principle of relevance can be reduced to the cognitive principle of relevance. Notice that two reductions have been made: 1. most of the rationality principles (Grice's cooperative principle, Kasher's rationality principle, Horn's Q- and R-principles, Levinson's minimization principle, Levinson's Q-, I-, M-principles, and the principle of communicative intention suggested in (18)) and all interpersonality principles (Leech's politeness principle, Goffman's principle of face saving, Lakoff's politeness principle, Schlenker's association principle, Brown and Levinson's politeness principles, Nemesi's principle of linguistic impression management, and the principle of communicative intention suggested in (18)) working in communicative language use have been reduced to the communicative principle of relevance, and 2. the communicative principle of relevance has been reduced to the cognitive principle of relevance. Thus, to summarize, we can claim that all the principles treated above can be reduced to a very general rationality principle, i.e., to the cognitive principle of relevance.

Finally, two remarks seem to be in order with respect to Kasher's (1976) rationality principle (cf. (3): Given a desired end, one is to choose

that action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, other things being equal). Extending it to all kinds of intentional human activity results in a principle which is more general than the communicative principle of relevance, because it concerns not only communication but also all forms of language use and other intentional activity. Consequently, the communicative principle of relevance—together with all principles reduced to it—can be reduced to the Kasher's extended rationality principle. At the same time, this extended principle is less general than Sperber and Wilson's (1995) cognitive principle of relevance because the latter refers to all procedures and operations of cognition, while Kasher's extended rationality principle concerns only intentional actions. So, Kasher's extended rationality principle—together with all principles reduced to it—can be reduced to the cognitive principle of relevance.

6. Summary

In the present paper I have studied principles of communicative language use. After completing the preliminary tasks described in section **1.1**, first, I have characterized and evaluated some typical principles of communicative language use treated by the relevant literature in their own theoretical frameworks. Then, I have demonstrated that principles can be separated into two groups, into rationality principles and interpersonality principles, in a natural manner, independently of the particular theoretical framework.

Second, I have re-evaluated the principles and I provided a new classification for them, relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential communication. I have demonstrated that rationality principles (which concern information transmission on objects) and interpersonality principles (which refer to information transmission on selves) can be considered tools of effective information transmission. On the basis of the definition of ostensive-inferential communication, I have also formulated the principle of communicative intention, which can be understood both as an interpersonality principle and as a rationality principle.

Third, I have supported the plausibility of the fact that all principles can be reduced to a very general rationality (economy) principle, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance.

Finally, I have also emphasized that the principles considered communicative ones in the pragmatics literature are really principles of effective information transmission either on objects or on selves, i.e., they play

a considerable role in verbal information transmission without a communicative intention. So they are valid at least in two forms of language use: in the informative and the communicative ones. The only principles which refer only to communicative language use are Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance and the principle of communicative intention suggested in the present article.

The detailed analysis and the demonstration of whether the cognitive principle of relevance has the same descriptive and explanatory power or an even greater one than the reduced principles have will be the task of further research.

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Address of the author: Enikő Németh T.
                         Department of General Linguistics
                         University of Szeged
                         Egyetem utca 2.
                         H–6722 Szeged
                         Hungary
                         nemethen@hung.u-szeged.hu