

IS LOVE BASED ON REASONS?*

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the paper is to understand what is involved in the claim that a mental state in general and love in particular, is based on reasons. Love, like many other mental states, can be evaluated in various ways: it can be considered appropriate, deserved, enriching, perverse, destructive etc. but this does not mean that love is based on reasons. In this paper I present and defend a test that a mental state has to satisfy if it is to count as based on reasons. This test will be used to construct a new argument in favour of Frankfurt's position that love is not based on reasons.

Keywords: *love, reasons, Frankfurt, Kolodny*

1. Introduction

Frankfurt (Frankfurt, 1999) claims that love has no reasons; others object and find reasons for love in the qualities of the beloved (Parfit 1992:295, Abramson and Leite, 2011), or in her humanity (Velleman, 1999) or in the relationship between the lover and the beloved (Kolodny, 2003). Whether love is based on reasons depends of course on what is love and on what is reason. I have no intention of adding to the eternal discussion of what is love. On the other hand I will try to say something new about the classification of mental states into those that are based on reasons and those that are not.

It is important to stress from the start that I am not going to suggest a new conception of reason; on the contrary I am staying with the widely used conception expressed recently in Bagely: "It can be natural to think that justifying reasons must be capable of guiding prospective deliberation, or otherwise be grounded in facts that are prior to and independent of the

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responses they are to justify."¹(Bagely 2015:491). This notion of reason requires that a reason will be able to play a role in the formation, persistence, and revision of an attitude.² This explains why I treat the claim that an attitude has reasons and the claim that an attitude is based on reasons as equivalent. It is evident that an attitude cannot be based on reasons without having reasons. Conversely, a mental state cannot have reasons (in the sense assumed here) if it is not a state that can be based on them.

It is generally agreed that beliefs and actions are based on reasons. Many extend the group of mental states that are based on reasons to anger, pride and fear. However, no one who accepts the guidance-conception of reasons will want to extend this group to hunger, tiredness or perception. I am aware of important differences between perception and hunger; perceptions are intentional in the sense that they are about the world – and hunger is not. Still, both attitudes are not (and cannot be) guided by prospective deliberation. The facts that cause them do not justify them. The fact that there is a tree in front of me causes me to perceive it, but this fact does not justify the perception. The fact that I haven't eaten for a few hours causes me to be hungry, but it doesn't justify my hunger. A causal explanation is all that we need in order to understand these mental states. We do not think of an episode of hunger or perception as needing justification and in this respect, both hunger and perception are different from beliefs and actions. The line that passes between hunger and perception on the one hand and beliefs and actions on the other is the focus of my paper. One might want to draw the line between hunger on the one hand and perception and belief on the other; and say that every intentional state is based on reasons. However this line will not respect the guidance-conception. Elaborating on the guidance-conception of reason will lead to a test that will help to decide whether a mental state is based on reasons.

In section 2 I will show that Kolodny's examples establish only that love can be evaluated as appropriate but not that it is based on reasons. Since appropriateness is not enough to guarantee that a mental state is based on reasons, I suggest (section 3) a more demanding test. I defend this test by showing that beliefs (4.1) and actions (4.2) pass it, while perception (4.3) and hunger (4.4) do not. Furthermore, I show that my test can be derived from constraints on our conception of reason (4.5). Finally (section 5) I show that love does not pass the test.

¹ Bagely does not endorse this conception; he believes that "The reasons of love and art are very different from those of morality and science". (2015:491) In contrast, I am interested in whether love can be based on reasons in the same sense that actions and beliefs are.

² I believe that Frankfurt Kolodny and other participants in the debate about love share this conception; I just make it more explicit. This is why what I conclude from this conception of reasons is relevant to the debate.

Two terminological remarks: The term mental state will be used in the widest sense, including propositional attitudes, perceptions, sensations, emotions, intentions and actions. A mental state can be described as a personal state in contrast to a sub-personal state. A mental state is a state about which we can ask: "what is it like to be in that state?" Similarly, it is a state which has a first person perspective that is different from the third person perspective. A belief, for example, is a state of the person and not of a part of him. Although it seems a bit strange to ask: "what is it like to believe that the sky is blue?" there is no doubt that the believer has a first person perspective on this belief. He has a privileged, though not infallible, access to the fact that he believes that the sky is blue. These features of beliefs are shared by the state of hunger. Hunger is a state of the whole person and not only of his digestive system. Hunger is something the agent experiences so that the question: "what is it like to be hungry?" is in place. Moreover the agent has a first person perspective on his own hunger that another person does not have. I will use the term mental state as referring to all the states that share these features.

We tend to evaluate our mental states, as well as those of others, in a variety of ways. Some of the normative/evaluative terms that we use are specific to a kind of state, for example "true" is specific to beliefs. Other terms are more general in that they apply to a variety of states; for example justified, crazy, healthy, natural, destructive etc. At this stage, it is important to note that there are evaluative judgments about a mental state which do not refer explicitly to reasons for this state; "justified by good or adequate reasons" is one appraisal among many. Moreover, some states are praised³ or criticized in ways that never relate to reasons; for example it can be said about someone that he is always hungry at the right moment and in the right amount, and hence praise specific episodes of his hunger or lack of hunger. However those evaluations have nothing to do with reasons for hunger, since hunger is not based on reasons. The same is true of fantasies; a fantasy can be criticized for being violent and vulgar. However these evaluations do not imply that (spontaneous) fantasies are based on reasons.^{4 5}

³ It is important to note that praise and criticism are used as synonyms to positive and negative evaluations, ignoring the connotations of guilt. The notion of guilt is almost irrelevant to the concerns of this paper.

⁴ D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) discuss this plurality of evaluations and warn us against moralism which is "the imperialistic tendency of moral evaluation to take over the variety of evaluative space". My point in this section is a similar warning against the imperialistic tendency of reason-evaluation (i.e. related to reasons) to take over the variety of evaluative space.

⁵ Admittedly, this is a very liberal notion of criticism and it is not intended to capture the ordinary meaning of this notion. The role of these examples is to bring into focus the need to say more about the differences between evaluating perceptions and moods on the one hand and the criticism involved in "reason evaluation".

In light of these observations the following terminology will be used: the judgments that form the wide range of appraisal and criticism will be called "evaluative-judgments". The evaluative judgments that relate to reasons will be called "reason-implying judgments".

2. Kolodny's Argument

Kolodny (Kolodny, 2003:137) discusses three kinds of considerations that suggest that love is based on reasons. First, from the first person perspective, the lover experiences his love as appropriate and fitting and when he does not experience his love as such, he thinks that something is wrong with him. Second, from the third-person perspective of an advisor or critic, we might find the love or the absence of love inappropriate, misplaced or even wrong. Third, love is connected to many other mental states that are arguably based on reasons, like motivations, desires or emotions. I will discuss here the first and second considerations since in them Kolodny uses the assumption that our practice of criticism and evaluation of a state is highly relevant to the question of whether that state is based on reasons. I share this assumption, however, I will claim that it is relevant in a less straightforward way than Kolodny assumes. The fact that a state can be criticized only shows that evaluative judgments can be applied to it, but as was shown in the previous section, evaluative judgments can be applied to states that are not based on reasons. One can criticize one's friend for being hungry every time that he is bored no matter what he ate an hour ago; but this does not imply that hunger is based on reasons. One's criticism might include various evaluative judgments like: your hunger is misplaced, confused or pathological. But the criticism will not include reason-implying judgments like: being bored is not a reason for hunger. As it stands Kolodny's argument is invalid, the fact that love can be criticized does not imply that love is based on reasons. However, one can try to improve Kolodny's argument by looking more carefully at the content of the criticisms of certain cases of love or the absence of love. One might claim that unlike the criticism against hunger, in these cases the criticism does include reason-implying judgments. Here are the three examples discussed by Kolodny:

1. We criticize the abused wife for continuing to love her husband.
2. We criticize the indifferent parent for not loving his child.
3. We criticize the fickle friend for suddenly stopping loving his friend.

I do not deny that the agents in these examples can be criticized; but it is important to examine more carefully what is involved in the criticism. When one tells the abused wife that her love for her husband is inappropriate, what exactly is one saying? Kolodny states clearly that one

is not *blaming* the abused wife since "These attitudes are not under one's direct voluntary control" (Kolodny, 2003:163). I am not sure that Kolodny is right in assuming that control is necessary for blame, but I accept his conclusion that "Whatever kind of criticism the charge of inappropriateness amounts to, it is not blame" (ibid). Kolodny does not elaborate further the question of what is involved in this charge, he only claims that the charge is similar to the one leveled against pathological fear. But this analogy does not advance the discussion at this stage since the analogy to fear is not developed enough by Kolodny, and there is nothing that Kolodny says about pathological fear that cannot be said about pathological hunger. But if the charge raised against the abused wife is similar to the charge raised against the pathologically hungry, then again the conclusion that love is based on reasons is unwarranted. Kolodny has to show that although the critic does not blame the abused wife, he thinks about her love as unjustified in the sense that she does not have a strong enough reason to continue to love her husband. Of course the critic can formulate his criticism using the term reason. But the critic of the pathologically hungry friend can do the same, he can say: "I do not blame you for being hungry, but you have no reason to be hungry now, you had a good meal an hour ago." Kolodny's argument will be valid only if it can be shown that although the criticism of the abused wife does not involve blame; it involves an appeal to reasons for love. The criticism must involve the claim that to love in these circumstances is not grounded on good reasons.

Kolodny might try to exploit the conceptual connection that arguably exists between the notion of reasons and the notion of ought or should. The critical friend can say (gently) to the abused wife that she *should* stop loving her husband, but it is absurd to tell the friend that is pathologically hungry that he should stop being hungry. For the sake of argument, I will accept that the first criticism seems a bit more natural than the second. But this difference should not be over-rated. The critic does not mean that the abused wife should stop loving her husband in the sense that reasons for loving the husband are outweighed by the reasons against loving him. It is more correct to construe the critic as saying: "It is not good for you to love him; you should do something about it". Now the analogy with the case of hunger is completely in place. The critical friend can say to his hungry friend: "this hunger is not good for you; you should *do* something about it". Alternatively, in both cases the critic can be construed as saying: "You should not base your actions on pathological love or on pathological hunger". This criticism and advice are natural and reasonable; one should not base one's eating behavior on pathological hunger and one should not base one's relationships on pathological love. But this does not mean that one should not feel hunger and love; criticisms of those states in terms of "should" make no sense.

In the second example we criticize the indifferent parent for the absence

of love. Parents have a moral duty to take the well-being of their child into consideration. In not loving his child the parent is not as a parent should be. This is correct, and indeed involves reasons, but, the reasons it involves are not reasons *for love*. The critic might be construed as blaming the parent for having kids. Alternatively the critic might be construed as advising, or even demanding that now the parent should behave as if he loves his child, or that he should go to therapy, or that he should give the child up for adoption. The critic is indeed pointing to reasons to pretend, or to go to therapy, or to give the child up for adoption, but he is not pointing to reasons to love the child. The analogy to hunger is still in place. If Arnie arrived not hungry to a special meal that Ben has prepared for him, we can blame him. But we are not blaming him for not being hungry but for example, for having eaten an hour before. Alternatively, we might advise him to eat without being hungry or to find some other solution. We are giving Arnie reasons to behave in certain ways, but we are not giving him reasons to be hungry.

In the third example, the fickle friend is rightly criticized by us. But, again this criticism does not amount to the charge that he should (or has reasons to) start caring for his friend. Our charge is more related to a flaw that we find in his character than to reasons that he has to care for his friend. This is not to say that this sort of evaluation of character has nothing to do with considerations about reasons. The fickle friend might have good reasons to improve his character and learn to be less fickle, and if he succeeds then such episodes of suddenly ceasing to love will not happen to him. The claim that the fickle friend has reasons to improve his character is not the same as the claim that he has reasons to love. Apart from that, the fickle friend has reasons to *behave* in a caring way; but here again, the crucial question is whether he has reasons to *feel* love and care. Such reason-implying judgments are not necessarily part of the criticism of the fickle friend.⁶

Notice that while Kolodny uses his interpretation of the examples as supporting his claim that love is based on reasons, I do not use my interpretation to support my claim that love is not based on reasons. Hence, my discussion and interpretation of Kolodny's examples is not designed to show that my specific interpretations of the examples are right; it is only supposed to show that Kolodny's interpretation is not the only natural reading of them. In light of the above discussion, there is nothing in the content of the criticism in Kolodny's examples that compels a distinction between the way we criticize love and the way we criticize hunger. Hence even the more elaborated version of Kolodny's argument fails. The analogy between hunger and love that was developed

⁶ Aaron Smutts (2013) explains away those examples and interprets our criticisms as pointing to reasons *to act* differently in order to promote one's well being. I sympathize with the need to explain away these examples but I disagree with the idea that there is a uniform way to do it.

in this section points in the direction of the no-reason view of love, but it is not intended as a positive argument for this view of love (which will come later).

The aim of this section was to undermine the natural move from the thought that love is a mental state that can be evaluated to the claim that love is based on reasons. Though reasons and values are deeply connected, the notion of a reason-based attitude and an attitude that can be evaluated are different. The difference between these two notions is underestimated both by defenders and by opponents of the no-reason view of love, hence, a considerable part of this paper is dedicated to elaborating the difference between these two notions. This elaboration will be done by presenting and defending a test that an attitude that can be criticized must pass in order to count as reason-based.

3. Presentation of the test

In this section I suggest a test that will distinguish between hunger and other states that we all agree are not based on reasons; and beliefs and actions or intentions, states that we all agree are based on reasons. As many have pointed out, the fact that a mental state is based on reasons does not mean that it is under our voluntary control.⁷ For example, although beliefs are based on reasons they are not voluntary; one cannot come to have a belief just because one wants to. It is also important to note that (*pace* Moran, 2001: 195-196) having a subject matter does not guarantee that the state is based on reasons. Perception is arguably a state with subject matter; but is not based on reasons. Fantasies and dreams also have very rich content without being based on reasons. As was shown in the previous section an attitude's capacity to be evaluated does not guarantee that it is based on reasons. The thought that motivates my test is that reasons are deeply connected to normative guidance. Reasons are supposed to guide us and guidance involves responsiveness or sensitivity to reasons. In this I will follow Scanlon's insight that what makes a state reason-based is its sensitivity to certain judgments.⁸ However, the specific way in which Scanlon characterizes this sensitivity and these judgments faces some difficulties. Addressing these difficulties will bring me to the characterization of reason-based states offered in this paper. Scanlon characterizes these states "...as the class of 'judgment-sensitive attitudes'. These are attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person judged there to be sufficient reasons for them and that would, in an ideally rational person, 'extinguish'

⁷ See for example (Moran, 2001), (Scanlon, 1998).

⁸ I follow Scanlon only in attaching importance to sensitivity to judgments. I do not follow his cognitivism about desire and love.

when that person judged them not to be supported by reasons of the appropriate kind" (Scanlon, 1998:20) .

There is some circularity in Scanlon's characterization since the judgment to which the attitude has to be sensitive is a judgment about reasons for the attitude; but if the attitude is not based on reasons, there are no such judgments. This renders Scanlon's characterization useless in controversial cases. In order to avoid Scanlon's circularity, I will start with the following small correction: the judgment to which a reason-based state is sensitive will not be a judgment about reasons but any evaluative judgment. Hence the first approximation to the characterization of reason-based states is the following: *A mental state is reason-based if there are evaluative judgments such that in an ideally rational person the state is sensitive to them.*

The main problem with this new characterization lies in the role that it assigns to rationality. It is not part of the concept of rationality that an ideally rational person adopts every mental state that he evaluates positively. Suppose that Jack is hungry now, but evaluates his hunger negatively, he ate enough today, he is going to sleep soon, and the food available is not good. The fact that Jack is hungry in spite of his negative evaluative judgment has nothing to do with Jack's rationality. Even if Jack was ideally rational and the conditions were "ideal" he would be hungry. Hence, the right lesson to draw from this example has nothing to do with Jack's rationality. Instead, we should learn from this example that the fact that hunger is insensitive to evaluation is intimately connected to the claim that hunger is not a reason-based state. One might object that to infer from this example that hunger is not reason-based is premature by insisting that an appeal to Jack's rationality is relevant even in this case. If Jack judges his hunger as inappropriate he should do something about it, for example if he has a pill against hunger in his pocket he should take it. If Jack doesn't take the pill or other available means against his hunger, he is being irrational. My answer to this objection is that hunger is not reason-based exactly because even an ideally rational person needs a pill in order to stop being hungry. By contrast, the forming of a reason-based state can happen directly, a pill is not needed. Of course, 'pill' is used as a code for any manipulation that one has to do on oneself in order to be in a certain state.

Therefore Scanlon's understanding of the idea of sensitivity to judgments needs the following refinement: a mental state is sensitive to a judgment if the mere judgment can cause the appearance or disappearance of this state. Two ideas are involved in the claim that the mere judgment causes the mental state. First, from first person perspective, it seems that one didn't do anything except evaluate the state for the state to appear/disappear, no 'pill' was needed. Second, from a third person perspective, the explanation of a subject's being in this mental state focuses on his evaluative judgments and not on his doing anything. I will call this kind

of sensitivity 'direct sensitivity' or non-manipulative sensitivity.⁹

This notion of direct sensitivity will play a crucial role in the characterization of reason-based states; by contrast, the notion of rationality will play none. Of course, there is a conceptual connection between reason-based states and rationality; the question of rationality can arise only about reason-based states. We can ask about beliefs and actions whether they are rational and we cannot ask this question about hunger. Whether we can ask this question about love is exactly the subject of this paper. But the question whether the notion of rationality is applicable to love brings us to an impasse: Kolodny assumes a positive answer and Frankfurt assumes a negative one. I bypass this impasse by suggesting a test that will not refer to rationality.

THE TEST

A mental state is reason-based only if in standard cases it is directly sensitive to some evaluative judgment about it.

The test is not an analysis of the concept of reason-based; it is a necessary condition for being a reason-based state. The main idea expressed in the test is Scanlon's idea that if a state is reason-based it is sensitive to reflection and criticism. What one thinks about one's reason-based mental states matters, and can have a direct impact on whether one is in this state or not. Reason-based states are sensitive to reflective judgments, i.e. judgments about themselves. My test adds to Scanlon's characterization the demand that the impact of one's evaluative judgments on one's reason-based attitudes should be direct. This is not because one cannot be normatively guided indirectly. One can admire a character trait like courage and try to develop this character trait. In doing so one is normatively guided by a positive evaluation of the virtue of courage and if one succeeds one is courageous. The actions that one takes in order to develop courage are directly caused by the evaluation and thus the actions are reason-based. However the courage is only indirectly caused by the evaluation,¹⁰ so being courageous is not reason-based.

Before I argue for the adequacy of the test, a few points need clarification:

1) The test requires sensitivity 'some judgment' and not 'all judgments'.

⁹ This distinction is similar to Moran's distinction between internal responsibility and external responsibility (Moran 2001: 198-202), and to Hieronymi's distinction between evaluative control and manipulative control (Hieronymi 2006:153). Hieronymi uses this distinction in arguing why one cannot believe at will. Using her terms the conclusion of this paper can be formulated as follows: a mental state over which we have only manipulative control is not reason-based.

¹⁰ In this sense it can be said that the agent manipulated himself. I am using the expression self-manipulation with no negative connotations. We should be wary of carrying the negative connotations of manipulating others to self-manipulating. Self-criticism is not as bad as criticizing others; and self-control generally is good while controlling others is not.

This is due to the fact that even beliefs, which are paradigmatic reason-based states, are not directly sensitive to all evaluative judgments. For example, one can judge that a certain belief will be good to have because one was offered a prize for believing it. But as a matter of empirical (or conceptual) fact one cannot do it without a pill.¹¹

2) It is not enough that a mental state is sensitive to first order judgments about the world, whether these judgments are descriptive or evaluative. The judgment to which the reason-based state is sensitive must be a second order judgment; it is a judgment about the state itself. This demand raises the following objection. My belief that it is going to be sunny tomorrow is based on the reason that the weather forecast says so. I might justifiably form this belief without forming any reflective judgment about it being justified by the weather forecast. According to this objection it is sufficient that the first order recognition of the fact that the forecast says it will be sunny, played a role in the formation of a belief for that belief to be justified, thus rendering the second order superfluous. My response to this objection starts with noting that it is not sufficient that my recognition of the fact about the weather forecast caused my belief that it will be sunny. My belief has to be caused in the right way. The weather forecast might cause me to fall asleep and dream about a sunny day. This dream in turn might cause me to believe that it will be sunny tomorrow. In this case it will not be correct to say that my belief is based on the reason that the weather forecast said so. We need to say more about the role the first order judgment played in the formation of the attitude. In the following section (4.5) I will show that in explaining this causal role we need to appeal to second order judgements.

3) The test does not imply that a reason is a second order judgment. It implies only that if A is based on the reason R , then a second order judgment that connects R to A plays a causal role in the formation of A . The first order belief (or fact) that the weather forecast said that it will be sunny tomorrow is a reason to believe that it will be sunny tomorrow. There is nothing in my test against this claim. This claim and my test imply that a second order judgment relating this reason and my belief plays some minimal causal role in the formation of this belief.

4) This second order judgment is not necessarily a second order belief. My belief that it will be sunny tomorrow is based on the weather forecast even if I did not form an explicit belief that the forecast is a reason to believe that it will be sunny. It is enough that I see the forecast as a reason to believe what it says whether this attitude of "seeing as" is a belief or not. If the judgment is not an explicit belief, the test is less intellectualistic than might seem. It also does not add an unnecessary

¹¹ It might turn out that the judgments to which a reason-based state is directly sensitive are those that relate to reasons of the right kind, but the test does not presuppose an account of the distinction between the right kind of reasons and the wrong kind of reasons (for a presentation of this distinction see: Olson 2004: 295-300).

layer to the causal process of forming a belief or other attitudes.

5) According to the test, the question of whether a mental state is reason-based depends on the causal mechanism involved in the appearance or disappearance of that state. This appeal to causal mechanisms might raise the objection that the question of whether a mental state is reason-based is conceptual, while questions about causal mechanisms are empirical. The answer lies in the appeal in the test to standard or typical cases. There are almost no conceptual limitations on what can cause what,¹² weird and idiosyncratic causal connections can exist, but they are irrelevant to my test, since they are not typical. As will be shown in the next section, what happens in the typical cases is not wholly empirical.

4. Justification of the test

4.1. Beliefs pass the test

There are many kinds of evaluative judgments about beliefs, and belief is directly sensitive only to some of them. It is an advantage of the test that it does not matter to which kinds of evaluative judgments belief is directly sensitive. As long as there are some judgments to which the mental state is sensitive in this direct way, the state is reason-based.

Here is an example of such an evaluative judgment: John evaluates positively the belief that p because p is a logical conclusion of q and $q \rightarrow p$ which (he believes) are true. This is a judgment to which beliefs are directly sensitive. The sensitivity of belief to these evaluative judgments is manifested in two ways. The first is actual manifestation and the second is counterfactual manifestation. John might believe that q and that $q \rightarrow p$ and because he is not concentrated enough or not interested enough he does not believe that p . In cases like this, as soon as John realizes the appropriateness of the belief that p as an immediate logical consequence of q and $q \rightarrow p$ he will believe that p with no need for any pill or other manipulation. This is an actual manifestation of direct sensitivity in that the evaluative judgment was part of the actual cause of the belief that p . However, often John's evaluative judgment is causally idle: his belief that p , was formed and is sustained, unreflectively. In cases like this the sensitivity of the belief to the evaluative judgment has a counterfactual manifestation.¹³

¹² The impossibility of backward causation might be an exception.

¹³ I call this a counterfactual manifestation because in order to appreciate it we need to think about counterfactual scenarios. However I do not think that we can reduce the sensitivity to evaluative judgment to counterfactuals. Sensitivity to judgment is a tendency or a disposition. It is connected to counterfactuals but not reduced to them. A certain glass is fragile even if in the counterfactual situation that it is thrown on the floor someone will catch it. See Fara (2005) for a thorough defense of the claim that dispositions resist analysis in terms of counterfactuals.

The belief has a tendency to disappear in the counterfactual situation where John denies this evaluative judgment (for example he thinks that modus ponens is a fallacy, or that it is not applicable in this specific context), he will not believe that p . Note that the claim is not the normative claim that in a case like this one should not believe that p ; but the empirical claim that in such cases the belief tends to disappear. Here too sensitivity is direct, since in these counterfactual situations John doesn't need any pill in order to reject the belief that p . What I showed is that John's belief is not only sensitive to his belief that q and to his belief that $q \rightarrow p$; but also to John's evaluation of this belief as appropriate in those circumstances; so beliefs are sensitive to second order judgments.

Not only beliefs that are formed through reasoning exhibit sensitivity to evaluative judgments; perceptual beliefs, the paradigmatic non-inferential beliefs, are also directly sensitive to evaluative judgments. Again, one generally does not need an evaluative judgment in order to move from perception to belief. But sometimes one does, for example, Sarah sees a broken stick in a glass cup and suspends judgment because she suspects that she is having an optical illusion (she suspects that there is water in the glass). If Sarah understands that she is not under an optical illusion and judges that it is appropriate to base her belief on her perceptual experience, then she will believe that the stick is broken. This is an actual manifestation of the sensitivity of belief to an evaluative judgment.

The counterfactual manifestation of the sensitivity of perceptual beliefs is more common. When one has a perceptual belief, the following counterfactual tends to be true: if one had judged that in these specific circumstances the perception (or alleged perception), does not make the belief appropriate, one would not believe that p . Realizing that one is under an optical illusion is one example, but there are others: one might discover some problem with one's eyesight or with the lighting conditions, and as a result evaluate one's belief negatively. In all these cases the belief simply disappears as a result of the denial of the evaluative judgment. It is not that one realizes that the belief is inappropriate and then looks for means or pills to extinguish it, the sensitivity is direct.

My discussion in this subsection is both empirical and conceptual. It is a partial description of the causal mechanisms that govern belief formation and extinction, and in this sense it is empirical. The discussion is also conceptual. If a belief would never disappear in the face of the evaluative judgments discussed above we would say that it is irrational, but if all beliefs behaved like this irrational belief, we would hesitate to call them beliefs. The conceptual connection between belief and sensitivity is even stronger. For instance, if one comes to think that one has strong reasons to give up one's religious belief but does not do it, we will say that one's belief is irrational. But if one's religious belief lost its sensitivity completely so that no evaluative judgment has the slightest chance to

shake it; we would hesitate to call it a belief; we might call it dogma. This is not a mere terminological point; there is a conceptual place for a recalcitrant belief; but there is a minimal degree of sensitivity that a mental state has to have in order to count as belief.¹⁴

4.2. Actions and intentions pass the test

The evaluative judgment that swimming will be fun often causes one to swim. The action is not formed by manipulation on oneself; it is caused directly by the judgment.¹⁵ It was assumed in this example that the judgment that swimming will be fun is evaluative. If this assumption is rejected and the judgment is treated as merely descriptive then we should look at other judgments. For example, if one is mourning and evaluates having fun as inappropriate, one will not swim. Again, one does not need to manipulate oneself in order to avoid swimming. This sensitivity to the evaluative judgment is direct and it shows that actions also pass the test.

Intentions are sensitive to evaluative judgments about actions, but this does not imply that intentions pass my test. I need to show that intentions are sensitive to evaluative judgments about themselves. Intentions like beliefs are not sensitive to every evaluative judgment about themselves. Belief is not (directly) sensitive to the judgment that one will get a prize if one believes that one has exactly 3000 hairs. Similarly, intention is not sensitive to the judgment that if one intends to drink the toxin one will get a prize whether one drinks the toxin or not.¹⁶ In order to show that intentions pass the test all I have to show is that there are some second order judgments to which intentions are sensitive. I submit that my intention to swim is sensitive to the following evaluative judgment: intending to swim now is appropriate since it will lead me to swim. Although this evaluative judgment is derived from an evaluative judgment about the swimming, it is a judgment about the intention to swim. Hence intentions pass my test.

¹⁴ It might be suggested that religious beliefs are hybrid in the following sense, they are formed for reasons but after they are formed they lose their sensitivity to evaluative judgments. I am afraid that doing justice to the possibility of "mixed" states will take us too far from the main concerns of this paper.

¹⁵ Notice that no version of internalism is assumed here. Even if extreme externalism is correct and judgments without desire never cause action; when an evaluative judgment with the corresponding desire causes action, it generally happens without manipulation. In marginal cases one is weak-willed and uses, more or less successfully, manipulation to cause oneself to swim.

¹⁶ See Kavka (1983)

4.3. Perception does not pass test

If one knows that one is under an optical illusion and evaluates one's perception as inadequate, one's perception is completely insensitive to this evaluation. This, of course, is not enough to establish that perception does not pass my test; it has to be shown that perception is not directly sensitive to any evaluative judgment. Notice that the fact that perception is not under our voluntary control will not help us here, since as already mentioned, voluntary control is not a necessary condition for being a reason-based state. The thesis of belief independence might help to convince us that perception is never sensitive to belief. In cases of optical illusions, perception is completely isolated from one's beliefs; whatever one knows about the situation, one's perception will not change.

However, in normal cases perception is not completely independent, and here is a simple example: I look at my armchair and I see (or have a visual impression of) my black cat sleeping there. When I realize that I've just opened the door and the cat left, and I remember that I left my black coat on the armchair last night, my perception alters. I see (or have a visual impression of) my coat thrown on the armchair.¹⁷ It is crucial to explain why this example does not threaten the adequacy of my test. The beliefs that caused my perceiving the cat to disappear and my perceiving the coat to appear are not evaluative beliefs. They are factual beliefs: the cat went out and I left the coat on the armchair. No evaluative judgment was involved in the process; it is not that I thought something like: it is crazy to perceive a cat on the armchair when there is a coat there, and then as a result of this thought my perception altered. Whether I hold this judgment or not, it plays no role in the explanation of the change in my perception.

In some cases, perception can change as a result of one's first order evaluative judgments; think about how your perception of a facial expression changes if you discover that the person you are looking at is not kind as you thought but manipulative and mean. But even in such cases it is a first order evaluative belief (about the person in front of you) that affects your perception and not a second order belief (about your perception). In sum, the extreme version of the belief-independence thesis is wrong; perception can be causally influenced by beliefs; but only by first order beliefs. What if X perceives a cow in front of him whenever he believes that the perception of a cow will represent what is in front of him? Such idiosyncratic causal mechanisms might exist, but they cannot be typical. This is because the function of perception is to guide one in one's beliefs about objects in one's surroundings. It cannot fulfill this role

¹⁷ Of course there are different accounts of perception and some theorists of perception will conceptualize the familiar phenomena that I described, differently. For the discussion that follows it suffices that my conceptualization is plausible.

if it is too sensitive to what one believes about one's surroundings independently of perception. Otherwise, perception will be like a movie guide that recommends that one goes to the movie that one was planning to go to anyway.

4.4. Hunger does not pass the test

As already seen in previous sections we can evaluate an episode of hunger in various ways. Our pathologically hungry friend is hungry whenever he is bored and we criticize him for that: his hunger is inappropriate since it is not related to his body's need for food or to the pleasure of eating. Our friend accepts this criticism, he judges his hunger as inappropriate, but this judgment is causally impotent in regard to his hunger. Of course, this does not show that all evaluative judgments are causally impotent. As in the case of perception, we cannot rely on a general thesis that hunger is never sensitive to beliefs. Hunger is sometimes caused by one's realization that one did not eat all day, one might become hungry when one comes to know about a wonderful meal that is waiting, and one can lose one's appetite and become less hungry if one believes the meal that is waiting will be horrible. These examples are personal, but not idiosyncratic in that we all recognize and understand them. Notice that in all these examples the beliefs that had causal impact on the hunger or its disappearance were first order beliefs. They were factual beliefs (that one did not eat all day) or evaluative beliefs about the food. But no second order beliefs about the value of being hungry in those circumstances played a causal role in the (dis)appearance of hunger. Still, there might be strange cases where X's belief that it will be good to be hungry now causes him to be hungry, and this might happen without manipulation. The fact that I cannot find such an example is not an argument to the effect that such strange causal mechanisms never exist. However, such causal mechanisms, if they exist, are not typical. This is because the function of hunger is to guide us to eat. If all works well we are hungry when eating is the right thing to do, or at least when there are good reasons to eat. In this sense hunger functions as data for the decision whether to eat. If hunger were often sensitive to evaluative judgments that have nothing to do with the need to eat, it would be poor data and hence could not function as a guide. On the other hand, if hunger were typically sensitive to evaluative judgments like: "it will be good to be hungry now, since it is time to eat" hunger would be superfluous as a guide.

4.5. An outline for a general justification of the test

That my test fits the paradigmatic cases speaks in favor of it, but it does not guarantee that the test fits the less paradigmatic cases. Maybe my test

points to a feature that distinguishes between hunger and perception on one hand, and beliefs and actions on the other hand, but this feature is not the one we are interested in. To fill part of this gap, I conclude this section with an argument that shows that reason-based states must pass the test.

Premise 1- If a state is reason-based; it can be normatively guided in the sense that one can be in that state for a reason.

This premise expresses a very moderate form of internalism. It is internalist in that it demands that reason and motivation will be conceptually connected. It is moderate in that it is not claimed here that a (perceived) reason must motivate, only that it can motivate.¹⁸

Actually, my premise is even weaker, I do not claim that every reason can motivate, I only claim that every mental state that is based on reasons can be motivated by some reason. The premise is a generalization about states and not about reasons. In the next two premises I elaborate on the notion of being in a state for a reason.

Premise 2- If S is in the mental state M for the reason R, then S's judgment that R plays a role in the causal explanation of S being in the state M. This causal explanation cannot be too idiosyncratic; otherwise, it tells us more about S than about the mental state.

Premise 3- The causal role of the judgment that R must be of the right kind.

These premises are not uncontroversial, but still they are well motivated independently of the question of this paper. One can reject even the moderate internalism expressed in the first premise and deny any conceptual connection between reasons for a mental state and the question of why a subject is in that state. I object to this extreme externalism since it leads to a notion of reason which is irrelevant to reasons' central theoretical role, which is to account for the idea of normative guidance. We are normatively guided beings because we have the capacity to be moved by reasons. A notion of reason that is conceptually detached from this capacity cannot fulfill this theoretical role.

Regarding the second premise, one can reject the causal interpretation of normative guidance. One can agree with Anscombe that being in a mental state M for the reason R is connected to the fact that in answering the question "Why are you in state M?" you point to R; but neither the question nor the answer is about causes. My discussion of reasons in this

¹⁸ This moderate claim is accepted even by some externalists. For ex. Parfit writes "Reasons are things to which at least some people might respond," (2011;51). Notice also that if this moderate claim is accepted it is true for warranting reasons as well. Reasons for which we respond are not necessarily motivationally sufficient, but they are always part of the causal explanation of our response.

paper is in causal terms; this is partly for dialectical reasons, the discussion is often couched in these terms (Kolodny 2003:162), and partly because I agree with Davidson that reasons (or appreciation of them) are (or can be) causes.

The main objection to the third premise is that unless we give an account of the right kind of causation, the premise is uninformative. I cannot offer such an account, but I want to suggest two constraints that will substantiate the third premise.

The first constraint is that when a judgment causes an attitude in the right way, the causation is non-manipulative. If the judgment in favor of M causes one to bring it about that one will be in the state M, it is not the right kind of causation.

The second constraint is that R causes A in the right way only if the judgment that R is a reason for M has a place in the causal explanation of the state M. This constraint expresses a reflective conception of reasons in the sense that when we are in a mental state for a reason we are not just "reason-trackers", but reason-followers. (Jones, 2003:190) In being hungry when our body needs food we are reason-trackers; since our hunger causes us to eat when our body needs it. In perceiving a tree when there is a tree in front of us we are reason-trackers since our perception causes us to believe that there is a tree in front of us when there is a tree in front of us. However when we eat or believe that there is a tree in front of us we are also reason-followers; eating and believing are not only reliably correlated with reasons, they are normatively guided by them. Reason-followers respond to reasons as reasons; their recognition of a reason as a reason plays a part in the explanation of their beliefs and actions. Recognizing a reason as a reason for A is an evaluative judgment about A. This judgment that does not have to be an explicit belief and its role in the causal story may be only potential. But if the causal story has no place for the agent's relation to R as a reason, then R does not cause M in the right way. That is why A cannot be reason-based without being sensitive to second order judgments.

The argument:

If M is based on reasons then there is some R such that S is in the state M for the reason R (first premise). In typical cases the fact that S judges that R causes M (second premise). The causation is of the right kind, hence by the second constraint the reflective judgment that R is a reason for M, needs to play a role in the causal story. Hence M is sensitive to the judgment that R is a reason for M. The sensitivity is direct since according to the second constraint, the transition from the judgment that R to M does not involve manipulation. The judgment that R is a reason for M is an evaluative judgment about M and M is sensitive to it. Therefore M passes the test.

The argument does not prove that the test is an adequate characterization of reason-based states; it only proves that the test is a necessary condition for being reason-based, this is all that is needed for the argument in the next section.

5. Application of the test: what about love?

In order to show that love does not pass the test, it has to be shown that in standard cases love is not directly sensitive to any evaluative judgment about itself. Let's go back to the examples discussed in section 2.

The love of the abused wife is usually evaluated negatively, and one might assume that the abused wife shares this evaluation and judges that it will be for the best if she stops loving her husband. Unfortunately, this judgment alone will not cause her to stop loving him even if this judgment is her final evaluation in the sense that she took into account all the other considerations against stopping loving her husband.¹⁹ This final judgment can give rise to various adequate responses: she can decide to leave him; she can complain to the police, she can go to therapy etc. All these actions might finally cause her to stop loving, but only indirectly. This case is analogous to the case where one believes that it will be for the best if one will not be hungry now. This judgment by itself does not extinguish the hunger, but it can give rise to direct responses that in the end will extinguish the hunger, like drinking water, taking a pill or going for a walk. The abused wife can say: "He was cruel to me and that is why I left him, unfortunately I still love him and miss him; I hope that it will pass with time or when I meet someone new." This is a perfectly sensible response to the cruelty of the husband. If the cruelty of the husband were a reason to stop loving him this response would have struck us as completely irrational.

The plausibility of the above scenario is not enough in order to establish the general claim that the love of the abused wife is never sensitive to evaluative judgments. The following scenario seems to threaten this general claim: The abused wife might say: "When I realized how cruel he is, I stopped loving him". In this case the evaluative judgment that he is cruel did cause the disappearance of love. Although this scenario is unfortunately less frequent, I do not want to deny that this is a possible scenario as well. What I will argue is that in spite of the important differences between love and hunger, this scenario is very similar to the case when one stops being hungry because one realizes that the food that is going to be served soon is horrible. In both cases a belief caused a change in the mental state; the belief that the husband is cruel causes the

¹⁹ The judgment that she should stop loving him might cause her to desire to stop loving him, but not to stop loving him; at least not directly.

wife to stop loving him, and in a similar way the belief that the food will be horrible causes one to stop being hungry. In both cases the belief is evaluative, "horrible food" and "cruel husband" are evaluative terms.²⁰

Both of the above cases, although not frequent, are not idiosyncratic. The reason why the sensitivity of hunger to the evaluative belief about the food does not show that hunger passes my test, is that the evaluative belief is not about the state of hunger, but about the food. Analogously, the evaluative belief that caused the wife to stop loving her husband was not about the state of love, but about the husband. The causal explanation of the fact that the abused wife stopped loving her husband does not contain a further evaluative belief about the state such as: "it is sick to love a cruel husband". It is easy to imagine a case where the abused wife stops loving her husband while believing that a good wife should continue to love her husband in such circumstances. In the cases where the abused wife does believe that it is horrible to love a cruel husband, this belief does not play a role in the explanation of her stopping loving him. To conclude, the example of the abused wife suggests that love does not pass my test.

The indifferent parent might evaluate his lack of love for his children as horrible, but again this evaluative judgment will not by itself create love. This is not because love is involuntary; we cannot love at will as we cannot believe at will. Still, one often believes a proposition because one recognizes an absurdity in not believing it, but there is no such psychological mechanism that moves one from the recognition that one's lack of love is horrible, directly to the emergence of love. A positive evaluation of parental love plays no direct causal role in one's love for one's children.

The friend who suddenly stops caring about his best friend is probably exhibiting a negative character trait. He might recognize this negative trait and criticize himself for not caring for his friend and this criticism might lead him to take various courses of action. He might pretend, confess, avoid or... find a pill that brings love again. Caring and loving again is not one of the options that are open to him without manipulation.

All these examples show that love and absence of love can be evaluated positively or negatively in various ways; but love is not directly sensitive to any of these evaluations. Love does not pass the test; hence it is not a mental state that is based on reasons. The understanding that love is not based on reasons does not imply that we are impotent and that all we can do is fall in and out of love. We can control many of our emotions and attitudes by manipulation just as we sometimes control by manipulation

²⁰ Some will say that he does not deserve her love but no one will say that the food does not deserve one's hunger. I believe that this linguistic consideration is far from conclusive, since we also do not say that this proposition deserves to be believed. Apart from that, I do not believe that love is a matter of desert, but this is another subject.

the attitudes of our children.²¹ We are not impotent since we can give them, and ourselves, a good emotional education.

6. Summary

Schematically, we can divide our mental states into three groups.²² The first group includes mainly bodily sensations; mental states in this group are the least sensitive to beliefs. They are caused by conditions of our body and our environment and not by our beliefs about these conditions. The second group includes mainly emotions (some emotions might belong to the third group), and they are often caused by our beliefs about the world. The mental states in this group are causally sensitive to descriptive as well as evaluative beliefs about the world; but they are not sensitive to reflective evaluation. The states that are sensitive to reflective evaluation belong to the third group. One's beliefs and actions are caused (partly) by what we think about how we should believe and act. That is why beliefs and actions are the paradigmatic mental states in the third group.

This schematic classification might clarify the general picture emerging from my paper. The distinction between the first group and the second group is a matter of degree. First, even bodily sensations are not completely isolated from beliefs. Second, emotions are not caused only by beliefs, one loves because of the interaction with one's beloved and not only because what one believes about this interaction. It is true that love is much more sensitive to beliefs than hunger, that is why love belongs to the second group and hunger belongs to the first group. This difference in degree is significant partly because it explains why one's love life is more important to one's identity than one's "hunger life". However, for the concerns of this paper this difference is less significant than the difference between the second group and the third one. Only the mental states in the third group are based on reasons in the sense that they appear or disappear because (we believe) they should. Only in regard to them we are reason-followers and not just reason-trackers.²³

²¹ I disagree with Moran that manipulating ourselves is alienating; sometimes in such manipulations we take responsibility about ourselves in a way that takes into account who we are better than when we are spontaneous.

²² I am not suggesting anything new in this division, something roughly along these lines dates back to Plato's partition of the soul to appetite, spirit and reason.

²³ Actions and beliefs belong to the third group. I have intentionally left the question about anger, pride and fear open. Arguably they belong to the third group as well, and my intuition is that if they do it is because they involve judgments. Love is different from anger and pride in that it does not judge.

This sense is central to the notion of a reason-based state since it shows how such states are normatively guided. Whether these states obtain or not depends on our norms about them. Hence if I have succeeded in showing that love does not pass the line between the second group and the third group, the conclusion that love is not based on reasons is established.

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