

## **A Thawing in the Cold War? Examining Nikita Khrushchev's Visit to the USA, 15-27 September 1959**

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The visit of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), to the United States of America was depicted by the Soviet press as 'the thirteen days that stirred the world', a 'mission of good hope' that had 'no precedent in history'.<sup>i</sup> Similarly, the American media frequently referred to it as representing a 'peace effort',<sup>ii</sup> a source of new hope. To be sure, Premier Khrushchev's trip to the USA, which began on 15 September and ended on 27 September 1959, was a significant affair. Not only was the visit the first by a Soviet leader, but it occurred at a time when relations between the USSR and the US were under intense strain. Indeed, Khrushchev's visit to the United States, advertised under the banner of 'peace and friendship',<sup>iii</sup> was widely regarded as a historic venture that had the potential to mitigate the climate of fear that the Cold War had created. Considering the visit in greater detail, Khrushchev's trip to America can be interpreted as a promising step toward easing world tensions as it fostered expectations of improving the hostile US-Soviet relationship.

In order to obtain a thorough perspective of public and official outlooks regarding Khrushchev's visit to the US, and to determine the expectations and atmosphere at the time, the following paper seeks to examine the attitudes of both the American and Soviet people, as well as Khrushchev's own views toward his trip to the United States in September 1959. By evaluating the American and Soviet perspectives during his visit, one can not only attain a comprehensive image of Khrushchev in the US and demonstrate that the Soviet Premier's trip affected US-Soviet relations, but one can also achieve a clear image of the political and social climate of both the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1950s.

## **Introduction**

Nikita Khrushchev set off to America at a time when the world was involved in a most dangerous ideological conflict. Although the United States and the Soviet Union had been allies against Nazi Germany, with the end of World War Two, their relationship quickly disintegrated and descended into a Cold War that saw the globe divided into two hostile camps, with Soviet communism at one end and American democracy at the other. Under the guidance of their respective government officials, both the Soviet Union and the US claimed to ‘represent the aspiration of humanity; regarded the other as the devil’s disciple; and allowed no room for compromise with its rival’.<sup>iv</sup> Most frightening of all was that nuclear weapons were developed by both countries as a means of strategic superiority.<sup>v</sup> In consequence, the optimistic mood that followed World War Two changed dramatically into one that was marked with periods of intense distrust and anxiety. Specifically, the hostile atmosphere experienced as a result of the Cold War fundamentally affected Russian views of America and vice versa. Leaders and ordinary citizens from the two opposing states were frightfully aware and suspicious of each other. On one side, most Americans believed that Russia was a backward, yet aggressive, country oppressed by a one-party dictatorship; on the other, many Russians viewed America as a greedy nation ruled by a privileged minority.<sup>vi</sup> At the time Khrushchev visited the United States, the Cold War was arguably in its most dangerous phase.

Premier Khrushchev’s trip to the US certainly marked a new chapter in international relations. According to the Soviet press, his visit intended to create an atmosphere of ‘good will’ and ‘mutual understanding’ based on his principle of ‘peaceful coexistence’ that did not see a war between capitalism and communism as inevitable.<sup>vii</sup> Unlike his predecessor Joseph Stalin, who up until his death in 1953 had prepared for military conflict with America, Premier Khrushchev was more interested in having an economic and political ‘competition’ with its rival rather than a war.<sup>viii</sup> Consequently, Khrushchev’s official intention for the visit was to build the US-Soviet relationship, and in doing so deflate the tense mood existing between the two superpowers and their respective allies. For the Soviet public, their Premier’s visit offered a glimpse at the nation that they had come to regard as their nemesis. Many Russians watched or read about Premier Khrushchev as he toured Washington, DC; spoke at the United Nations in New York; was cordially welcomed by San Francisco;

visited corn farms in Iowa; and discussed the future of the Soviet people with President Eisenhower at Camp David.<sup>ix</sup> Despite the propagandist nature of the Soviet news coverage received, most Russians were able to form a more detailed picture of their adversary. Likewise, the American people were able to familiarize themselves with the Soviet Union through its representative, Premier Khrushchev. They got at least some insights into the Soviet leader whose political ideology had affected their country so profoundly. Furthermore, American officials, while sceptical about the visit and its possible outcomes, looked forward to showing the head of the USSR their country and people.<sup>x</sup> Most significantly however, Americans and Russians alike were interested in the potential such a visit would have on curbing the Cold War tensions affecting their lives. Indeed, in a world plagued by the prospect of war, Premier Khrushchev's visit to the USA offered the opportunity in establishing a mutual rapport between the American and Soviet leaders and their peoples.

It should be mentioned that while numerous scholarly contributions have been dedicated to the Cold War and to US-Soviet relations, few concern themselves with Khrushchev's visit to the USA, and even fewer examine both the American and Soviet views towards it.<sup>xi</sup> To some extent, the visit's placement in the timeframe of the Cold War explains the lack of attention that it has received. Khrushchev's 1959 trip to America occurred between such significant events like Stalin's death, his 1956 denunciation by Khrushchev, the U-2 incident of 1960 and Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Nevertheless, to wholly understand the general dynamics in US-Soviet relations and international affairs during the Cold War, one must look at Khrushchev's visit through American and Russian eyes. Furthermore, since Khrushchev's visit to the US generated a lot of media coverage in America as well as the Soviet Union, the present paper has greatly drawn upon articles prior, during and after Khrushchev's visit that could be found in prominent American and Soviet newspapers and periodicals like *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Moscow News*, the Soviet *New Times* as well as the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*.<sup>xii</sup> Such sources were employed as they best reflect the climate at the time and because they provide an insightful snapshot of attitudes expressed in both official and public opinion.

### **The American view**

At the time of Stalin's death, the Western world was not familiar with Nikita Khrushchev. In fact, unlike the better known Soviet officials Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov and Lavrenty Beria, Khrushchev was largely an unknown figure outside the Soviet Union. The only limited public picture that he presented to foreign observers was anything but impressive. From all appearances he was 'an impetuous, obtuse, rough-looking man, with something of the buffoon and a good deal of toss pot in him'.<sup>xiii</sup> Not until Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953 did the West pay more attention to him. Unlike Stalin, who had left Soviet Russia only twice while in power, Khrushchev gradually exposed himself to the world to become one of the most widely travelled and most-frequently met leaders of his time.<sup>xiv</sup> Westerners who saw him were impressed by his 'shrewd native intelligence, agile mind, ambition and spontaneity'.<sup>xv</sup> They were also taken with his stance on deflating tensions between the Soviet Union and America. Khrushchev had 'embarked on a more cooperative, less confronting foreign policy' in which the USSR gave the impression that it was seeking to 'peacefully coexist' with the West, and particularly with the United States, by respecting and recognizing the other's concerns and by being a 'more flexible regime, one less menacing, less hostile, and more open to the outside world'.<sup>xvi</sup> Indeed, Khrushchev's visit to the US was intended to further promote 'peaceful coexistence' and to create a safer, less threatening world.

In the lead up to the Soviet Premier's 15 September arrival, the American public showed mixed opinions regarding his impending tour of the United States. There were those like Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who were of the impression that Khrushchev really wanted to reduce tensions between the two countries.<sup>xvii</sup> Similarly, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who acted as Eisenhower's personal representative throughout the Premier's visit, was of the belief that Khrushchev 'wants peace and thinks that Russia needs peace in order to do what he wants to do'.<sup>xviii</sup> Such views could also be found in the American press. Before Khrushchev's arrival in the US, a series of eight articles appeared in *The New York Times* authored by Harrison Salisbury enlightening the public on how Soviet Russia had changed for the better under Khrushchev's leadership. In one article printed on 9 September 1959, Khrushchev was depicted as a liberal ruler, one that 'likes to talk things over [and]

likes to hear what others have to say'.<sup>xxix</sup> In another, Salisbury argued that 'Mr. Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, was trying to run the Soviet Union without the employment of terror as a political weapon' and that he was 'making a sincere attempt' at improving East-West relations.<sup>xxx</sup> Salisbury's articles resonated with the American public and many, while sceptical, were eager to get a first hand account of Premier Khrushchev and see for themselves whether he was genuine in his plan of a 'peaceful coexistence' between the US and USSR.

Nevertheless, while many Americans believed that a thaw in the Cold War could result from the impending visit, more were suspicious of the USSR's willingness to improve the US-Soviet relationship. Indeed, the motives of the visit were thoroughly questioned. For example, prior to Khrushchev's arrival, retired US Colonel Augustus Rudd wrote to *The New York Times* opposing Khrushchev's visit and suggesting that Americans and the world should be alert for 'there is real danger in regarding this visit as a simple gesture of goodwill'.<sup>xxxi</sup> Colonel Rudd added that the Soviets had 'everything to gain and nothing to lose' by the visit and that Americans must keep in mind that, as past actions showed, the communists wanted to take over the world by any means possible even if that meant visiting and sizing up its major Western antagonist'.<sup>xxii</sup> Such sentiments were felt by many Americans who regarded Khrushchev's impending visit of 'peace and friendship' only as a pretext, not a genial attempt at curbing the Cold War danger.

Some of the censure against the visit was also targeted at President Eisenhower. In an address before the Polish American Congress, Chicago Senator Paul Douglas criticized that the invitation to Khrushchev was 'comparable to inviting Adolf Hitler to this country' and while he did not want Khrushchev and his party to come to any harm, he did not see that the American public owed either him or President Eisenhower 'anything more'.<sup>xxiii</sup> Similarly, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson viewed any attempts to negotiate with Khrushchev as futile. He felt that 'Eisenhower was turning US foreign policy into a pageant of congeniality' and that any talks would 'come to nothing'.<sup>xxiv</sup> Clearly, the animosity towards the visit was so intense that criticism was not only aimed at Khrushchev but also at President Eisenhower. The general opinion in America toward Premier Khrushchev's impending visit was not favourable in that while many were supportive of the trip, others were plainly set

against it. It seemed that most Americans were cautious lest they were misled or deceived into a false sense of security through the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

### **President Eisenhower's view of the visit**

Like the American public, President Eisenhower was sceptical of Khrushchev's visit and whether anything substantial could result from it. Indeed, when it came to dealing with the Soviets, Eisenhower was greatly cynical of their agenda. Having been elected President in 1953 following a shift to the right in the public mood, Eisenhower regularly pledged to 'win the Cold War'.<sup>xxv</sup> When he was re-elected in 1956, Soviet officials viewed Eisenhower as significantly increasing the dangers of the Cold War.<sup>xxvi</sup> In return, he saw the Soviet Union as a threat to America and the free world. For instance, he regarded the Soviet ultimatum concerning the removal of the West from Berlin as a menacing threat that had the potential to intensify tensions between the Western world and the Soviet Union.<sup>xxvii</sup> Despite his mistrust of the USSR however, Eisenhower desired to see some improvements in US-Soviet relations before he left office in 1961 and as early as March 1959 had contemplated inviting the Soviet leader to the United States to discuss the Berlin situation.<sup>xxviii</sup>

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Eisenhower's eventual invitation to Premier Khrushchev to visit America had resulted from a misunderstanding. An invitation was only conditioned on whether concrete progress concerning issues such as Berlin were to have taken place between the foreign ministers of the US, Britain, France and the USSR at the May 1959 Geneva Convention and, at Eisenhower's request, Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy was to have communicated that message to Soviet Deputy Premier Frol R. Kozlov.<sup>xxix</sup> Despite Eisenhower's proposed invitation to Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier failed to keep his end of the bargain and have a productive Geneva Conference. More regrettably, as Eisenhower learned when Khrushchev accepted it on 21 July, Murphy had transmitted an 'unqualified' invitation through Kozlov.<sup>xxx</sup> The President, it seemed, had no choice but to go through with an unwanted meeting with an unwanted visitor. Since there had been no progress at Geneva to substantiate the invitation, Eisenhower focused the visit on attempting to discuss 'nuclear tests, the wider aspects of disarmament, and the broadcasting of contacts between the United States and the USSR'.<sup>xxxi</sup> President

Eisenhower stressed that while Premier Khrushchev was to have an ‘official’ visit, any talks between himself and the Soviet Premier would be informal negotiations of the basic problems between the West and the East.<sup>xxxii</sup> Although the unsavoury circumstances of the invitation had greatly ‘annoyed’ him, Eisenhower was ‘determined to be courteous and correct’ while the Soviet Premier was touring America.<sup>xxxiii</sup> The President felt that at least an attempt had to be made in curbing the Cold War tensions experienced, even if that meant being cordial towards his adversary.

### **Khrushchev in the USA**

When Soviet Premier Khrushchev arrived at Andrews Air Force Base several miles outside Washington DC, he was greeted by President Eisenhower and 200,000 curious and excited Americans.<sup>xxxiv</sup> According to a police statement, the crowd was ‘one of the largest for an out-of-towner’.<sup>xxxv</sup> Interestingly, out of the thousands present only a few who saw Premier Khrushchev were openly hostile to him. For example, while the Committee for National Mourning distributed around 1,000 black arm-bands among the crowd in objection to the visit, only a couple of them were reportedly seen along Khrushchev’s parade route.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Other protests against the visit included a cross of smoke a mile and a half long in the sky over Washington, special masses in all Catholic churches in the Washington area and special services in some Protestant churches.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Even so, there were few overt manifestations of antagonism.

Many of those present were under the impression that the visit was of the most delicate nature and that ‘one wrong move could undo a thousand good ones’.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Consequently, as George Dixon of *The Washington Post* expressed, many ‘didn’t cheer too highly, they didn’t grovel too low’.<sup>xxxix</sup> Indeed, Americans were not eager to display too much. The reserved reception towards Khrushchev, according to reporter Lloyd Buchanan, was partially due to a banner that had been displayed along the line of march as Khrushchev arrived into Washington and that urged people to “be courteous but silent, not to cheer or applaud.”<sup>xl</sup> On the whole however, many of those present at Khrushchev’s arrival were eager to see the Premier. When asked by *The Washington Post* reporter Phil Casey why they were there, most people responded ‘out of curiosity’, while others wanted ‘to be part of history’.<sup>xli</sup> Whatever their reason, Americans greeted Soviet Premier Khrushchev in a civil and subdued manner.

As in Washington, in New York Premier Khrushchev was greeted by a restrained reception marked by curiosity rather than disruptiveness or hostility. The police estimated that around 170,000 New Yorkers came out to see Khrushchev on just the first of his two-day stay there.<sup>xliii</sup> While the Premier met with some opposition, including cat-calls and boos from anti-red protestors, the public atmosphere in New York was relatively subdued. In fact, tensions regarding the visit were created by newsmen who wanted to get a reaction out of Khrushchev. During the Premier's speech at the Economic Club of New York, Khrushchev was hassled when he avoided replying to a question about Soviet censorship, which provoked him to blurt: 'Surely you must show enough hospitality not to interrupt...if you don't want to listen, all right!'<sup>xliiii</sup> Apart from that disparaging incident, the general public was of the impression that Premier Khrushchev should be treated with the same respect he had shown to Vice President Richard Nixon and his delegation when they had visited Russia a few months earlier.<sup>xliiv</sup> Following his address to the United Nations in New York, Khrushchev also gained support from Americans seeking peace. His proposal of 'peaceful coexistence' was viewed by some as a rational means of ceasing Cold War tensions. Many Americans were of the opinion that 'however much they disliked communism and what it stood for, they had to live in a world in which it existed' and snubbing Khrushchev would 'not improve matters'.<sup>xliv</sup> Khrushchev's trip around the US was therefore regraded as providing an unprecedented opportunity in building the broken relationship that existed between their country and the USSR.

On 19 September, Khrushchev and his entourage left New York for Los Angeles. There, the Soviet Premier's trip hit rock-bottom. To begin with, Premier Khrushchev was greatly angered by Los Angeles Mayor Norris Poulson's cool reception. At the dinner given by the Mayor in honour of Khrushchev, Poulson, an anti-communist, mentioned in his introductory speech the Premier's infamous phrase 'We will bury you' and warned him that, "You can't bury us, Mr. Khrushchev, so don't even try it...if challenged we shall fight to the death", which greatly offended Khrushchev who retaliated: "It took me twelve hours to get here and it will take me ten and a half to get home".<sup>xlvi</sup> The Premier's threat to end his visit short was viewed by those present as 'all too real'<sup>xlvii</sup> and if executed could have resulted in drastic consequences. Somewhat happily, Khrushchev later confessed to Ambassador Lodge



that Mayor Poulson had ‘tried to let a fart and instead shit in his pants’.<sup>xlvi</sup> The Premier’s ‘sweet and sour’ temperament challenged people’s perceptions of him. In fact, Ambassador Lodge, who until that incident had considered Khrushchev an astute and decent man, revealed to Eisenhower that the Premier had a most ‘vulgar’ personality.<sup>xlix</sup> Interestingly, his outbursts both bewildered and fascinated those present and those who heard about the incident via the extensive media coverage. It seemed that Khrushchev’s volatile, impulsive nature made him more accessible to the American people. While his uncomely public manners and his somewhat stocky comic figure often invited jokes from the American press, via the media coverage of his trip, Khrushchev engaged with millions of Americans as a ‘personality measurable in familiar terms’.<sup>1</sup> In fact, as the trip progressed, the attitudes reflected in the American press regarding the Soviet Premier and the USSR changed for the better. The initial reports of opposition and even contempt that appeared in both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were replaced by reports of hope for better US-Soviet relations.

Unlike Los Angeles, Khrushchev’s next stop in San Francisco was more enjoyable. There, Khrushchev was welcomed with ‘the most enthusiastic cheers of his American visit’.<sup>li</sup> Over ten thousand people crowded the streets when he arrived and cheered so warmly that Khrushchev broke away from his security guard and rushed towards the crowd, waving his hands around and shouting ‘spasibo’.<sup>lii</sup> When questioned about the apparent cordiality of the reception, members of the crowd said that they had heard that Khrushchev had gotten ‘a rough deal in Los Angeles’ and had turned out ‘to show him traditional American hospitality’.<sup>liii</sup> Some San Francisco residents also mentioned that their welcome had been motivated by ‘a spirit of fair play’, adding that after all the Soviet Premier was a guest to their country.<sup>liv</sup> The friendly welcome Khrushchev experienced in San Francisco made up for the poor performance in Los Angeles. Most Americans, it seemed, with the progression of the Premier’s trip, became principally focused on getting Khrushchev to learn more than expected about their country and their customs and by so doing they hoped that he would see the importance in improving the strained US-Soviet relationship.

### **Khrushchev at Camp David**

In the last leg of the Premier's trip, President Eisenhower took his visitor to his retreat at Camp David where they had informal talks concerning some of the pressing matters facing their countries and the world. While no 'breakthrough' negotiations were accomplished by the talks, Khrushchev did remove the time limit within which he had threatened to sign a Soviet-East German peace treaty forcing the Western powers out of Berlin.<sup>lv</sup> In return, Eisenhower agreed to attend a summit conference, which Khrushchev was eager to have, and settled in reciprocating Khrushchev's visit with his own trip to Russia.<sup>lvi</sup> Among the other issues discussed were the expanding of information between the East and the West and the overall improvement in US-Soviet relations.<sup>lvii</sup> However, the talks at Camp David were not without frustrations. According to US General A.J. Goodpaster, the President had been irritated by Khrushchev's unacceptable decisions concerning Berlin and at one point even threatened that he would 'not return the visit to Russia' or attend a summit if some progressive understanding was not achieved.<sup>lviii</sup> While still sceptical on whether or not the visit had actually helped US-Soviet relations, Eisenhower, like many Americans, felt that the trip had generated a thawing in the Cold War. In particular, the lifting of the USSR's Berlin time limit, as Eisenhower suggested, somewhat relaxed the atmosphere of crisis and opened the way for further negotiations between the US and the USSR'.<sup>lix</sup>

Aside from the diplomatic development that had resulted from the visit, a most valuable part of Khrushchev's thirteen-day trip was that Americans got to see the Soviet Premier first hand. Prior to his visit, Khrushchev, like his predecessor Stalin, had been regarded by the American public as 'the epitome of evil'.<sup>lx</sup> After his visit however, Khrushchev was no longer viewed as personifying the sinister force of communism. In fact, he seemed to be just 'a grandfatherly, round, short man'.<sup>lxi</sup> His wife and children, who had accompanied him on his trip, had further helped soften Khrushchev's image. The very act that he had brought his family along made Khrushchev more accessible and appealing to the general public. A nation-wide Gallup Poll surveying the public's reaction to the visit found that when asked the question: 'All things considered, do you think Khrushchev's visit to the United States had been a good thing or a bad thing?' the ratio of approval to disapproval was 3-to-1.<sup>lxii</sup> Furthermore, in regard to Eisenhower's expected trip to Russia, the majority of

the general public expected the President's reception would be 'friendlier' than that experienced by Khrushchev.<sup>lxiii</sup> So, while initially sceptical about the visit, in many ways Khrushchev's trip to the US was viewed as a success by the American public. The hopeful feelings associated with the visit were greatly intensified by seeing the Soviet leader in their country and by the diplomatic headway made at Camp David. Indeed, on the whole, Americans were left hopeful that his visit had brought about a promising tone in the US-Soviet dialogue.

### **The Soviet view**

For the USSR, Premier Khrushchev's visit ushered in a new stage in US-Soviet relations; one that was significantly different from the mistrust propagated during the Stalinist era. Indeed, even before his trip to the US, Nikita Khrushchev had embarked on a more flexible and realistic foreign policy, one that improved the unfavourable and distorted image of America within the USSR. Khrushchev's revised strategy toward the West took several forms that entailed a substantial increase in the importation of Western books, exhibitions and newsreels, the temporary cessation in the jamming of some Western broadcasts, and a greater exchange of foreign delegations and tourists.<sup>lxiv</sup> Under the 'peaceful coexistence' strategy he implemented, Khrushchev certainly altered the view of the world for the average Soviet citizen. With an increase in foreign contacts, the US became less feared and better understood.<sup>lxv</sup> That is not to say that the legacy of the Stalinist past, with its suspicions and one-sided truths, was no longer present. Indeed, it should be emphasised that throughout Khrushchev's time in power, anti-American propaganda changed direction on several occasions. At times, Soviet foreign policy moved toward dangerous confrontations with the West, at others it moved toward establishing a thawing in the Cold War.<sup>lxvi</sup> Consequently, on the one hand America was still regarded as a nation ruled by a minority of 'right-winged extremists and Pentagon militants'; on the other, there was a conception that the majority of 'real' Americans were 'fine people'.<sup>lxvii</sup> Thus, despite a steady increase in US-Soviet contacts, the general Soviet view of the United States in early 1959 more or less remained as before, mainly influenced by a mixture of stereotypes and misconceptions.

Regardless of their preconceived views of America, the Soviet people looked forward to Khrushchev's impending visit to the US. When they were told of their Premier's

invitation to America at a press conference on 5 August 1959, thousands voiced their support by sending their best wishes through letters and telegrams.<sup>lxviii</sup> In fact, the hopes and expectations that the Soviet people associated with Khrushchev's visit were extensively expressed throughout the Soviet press. E.A. Moiseyev, a biologist from Leningrad, wrote to the Soviet *New Times* revealing that 'the exchange of visits between the leaders of our two countries is a heartening and long-awaited development' that would be 'an advantage to all'.<sup>lxix</sup> Similarly, Vladimir Matskevich, USSR's Minister of Agriculture, hoped that the visit 'would facilitate [both] peaceful co-operation...and the extension of scientific, cultural and agricultural contacts between the two countries'.<sup>lxx</sup> Indeed, according to a somewhat overzealous *New Times* article, 'no one in the Soviet Union, either individual or group, [had] any interest in preventing closer understanding and closer confidence between Moscow and Washington'<sup>lxxi</sup> as a means of ending the Cold War. From factories, villages and universities, 'thousands [of] good wishes' had been received concerning the Soviet leader's 'mission of good will'.<sup>lxxii</sup> Prior to Khrushchev's trip to the US, there was certainly an apparent excitement in the air, a hopeful atmosphere mingled with apprehension. It seemed that the Russian people sincerely wished to see practical steps being taken in building the hostile relationship that existed between their country and the US. For many Russians the visit was looked upon as being a favourable reflection of their country, their leader and themselves. Naturally, many wanted it to succeed. They wanted to show America and the world that the Soviet Union was a mighty peace-promoting nation that aspired to reduce international tensions.

A substantial support toward the visit was largely directed at Premier Khrushchev. As implied in *Face to Face with America*, a Soviet sponsored book documenting the Premier's visit, it was 'the Soviet Union, the Soviet people with all its heroic deeds—its space rockets and its atomic power stations, its new factories and its agricultural achievements—that flew to America in the person of Khrushchev'.<sup>lxxiii</sup> So, while the Soviet people were greatly enthused at the prospects of a successful visit, they were especially approving of their Premier for embarking upon his historic trip. They were of the belief, or at least that was how it was expressed throughout the Soviet press at the time, that Khrushchev had done a noble service for them and for

communism. The Soviet Premier was looked upon by many Russians as a leading statesman set on ‘enhance[ing] the prestige of [their] socialist homeland’<sup>lxxiv</sup> and achieving a new stage in relations between the worlds’ mightiest powers. According to *The Washington Post*, ‘a flood of praises flowed into the Kremlin, newspaper offices and radio stations for Premier Khrushchev’.<sup>lxxv</sup> Academician K. Skyyabin wrote to *Moscow News* claiming that the ‘Soviet people, welcome with joy the meeting between N.S. Khrushchev, this most active chairman of peace, and President Eisenhower’.<sup>lxxvi</sup> Similarly, E. Bordashov, a Soviet engineer, stressed that ‘the international atmosphere has become warmer [because] we know N.S. Khrushchev to be an ardent and consistent champion of peace and man’s happiness’.<sup>lxxvii</sup> For the Soviet people, Khrushchev’s visit to America emphasised that his policy of a ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the US and the Soviet Union was being implemented and therefore his trip benefited the USSR as well as the world.

Khrushchev’s impending visit to the United States certainly occupied a firm place in Soviet life. After so many years of censorship, Russians were eager to finally find out more about their adversary. Unfortunately, despite their enthusiasm, most of the coverage they received concerning the US and its people was limited. Unlike their American counterparts, the Soviet people were provided, on the whole, with an air brushed version of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. Although around thirty Soviet correspondents accompanied Premier Khrushchev to the US, their dispatches lacked in information and often duplicated one another.<sup>lxxviii</sup> Instead of covering all the news related to Khrushchev’s tour of the United States, the Soviet press was set on censoring any positive impressions of America that had the potential to disfavour the Soviet government. Interestingly, the United States Information Agency (USIA) reported that although not devoid of criticism, compared with previous media coverage, Soviet radio commentary on the United States, at least at the beginning of Khrushchev’s visit, had been generally ‘light and sweet in tone and substance’.<sup>lxxix</sup> Even so, such relaxations were temporary. By the end of Khrushchev’s visit, the Soviet government were not only jamming some of the special announcements made by Khrushchev himself, but they were highly selective in what they aired of President Eisenhower’s speeches.<sup>lxxx</sup> It seemed that while Khrushchev frequently professed his encouragement of East-West contacts, the Soviet press continued to hold information from its public. In other words, the Stalinist totalitarian control remained, and

anything provocative was usually overlooked. In true communist style, the state-controlled Soviet press primarily focused on the more favourable aspects of Khrushchev's trip, thus greatly limiting the Soviet people's view of his visit and America and consequently limiting a genuine attempt at achieving a thawing in the Cold War.

Furthermore, a great portion of the news coverage received in the USSR was mostly focused on the enthusiastic receptions Americans showed the Premier and how he, in turn, was able to demonstrate to the US public that the Soviet communists about whom they had been told so many 'incredible' stories were normal people like themselves. For instance, Khrushchev's visit was portrayed in the USSR as giving a 'crushing blow to anti-Soviet propaganda and misconceptions' and, in that respect, it was 'doubly and triply useful by drawing a vivid and convincing picture of the Soviet Union'.<sup>lxxxix</sup> Instead of enlightening the Russian public on America and subsequently dispelling misconceptions about the US, the Soviet press was more concerned with chronicling Khrushchev's personal successes. As a result of the one-sided nature of the media, the Soviet people were made to believe that not only was their Premier wholly 'embraced by the US public', but that his visit was 'shaping up to be a massive success'.<sup>lxxxii</sup> To be fair, some news coverage revealed that Khrushchev was met with hostility from 'unnamed circles', but such reports were quick to dismiss that any opposition was in the minority.<sup>lxxxiii</sup> For instance, the Disneyland 'incident' that saw an upset Khrushchev being refused entry to the theme-park due to security reasons was skimmed over and reported as a 'ludicrous incident', that was 'not worth mentioning'.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> As a result, the Soviet people were, on the most part, kept from getting a real idea of Khrushchev's visit and the American way of life, which greatly restricted the sincerity of establishing an interchange between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The news coverage that the Russian people received about the US during Khrushchev's visit was a vivid example of a government that still misinformed its public. Despite Khrushchev's 'attempt' at expanding contacts with the US, the lack and distortion of information distributed by the state-controlled Soviet press was well calculated to assure the Russian people that 'they were better off than the "alleged victims of capitalism"'.<sup>lxxxv</sup> Any opposition that Premier Khrushchev encountered

throughout his visit and that the Soviet press reported, was attributed to the ‘serious illness of America politicians, which Mr. Khrushchev was doing his best to “cure”’.<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Overall, as previously mentioned, the Soviet press did not dwell on any cool receptions that Khrushchev received. Indeed, the Russian people were made to believe that ‘Khrushchev’s visit had rocked America’.<sup>lxxxvii</sup> The Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks at Camp David were especially portrayed by the Soviet press as a stepping stone toward peace and disarmament and therefore ‘a better life, ever so much faster’.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> If anything went wrong, it was suggested, it would not be the doing of the Soviet government, but ‘the businessmen and profiteers of armaments’, who would ‘stand in the way of peace despite the equally hopeful dreams of American workers’.<sup>lxxxix</sup> Referring to the Camp David talks, the Soviet people were said to have been ‘gratified to learn that this exchange of views took place’, and that on all the issues discussed ‘there was a common understanding of improving Soviet-American relations’.<sup>xc</sup>

Despite the limited information made available to the Soviet people, or because of it, the majority of Russians were of the opinion that their Premier’s trip had been a great success. Like their American counterparts, they too believed that the visit signified ‘the consolidation of the peace and security of peoples.’<sup>xc</sup> For the Soviet populace, the very act that Khrushchev had gone to America indicated a softening in US-Soviet affairs and a win for the USSR. According to the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, the warm reception accorded to their Premier in the US was enough ‘graphic evidence that there [was] no unsurmountable obstacles to the establishment of good-neighbour relations between the two greatest powers of the world’.<sup>xcii</sup> At a meeting held upon his return at the Lenin Central Stadium in honour of the Premier’s visit to the US, V. Ustinov, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party, captured the general Soviet mood by saying that the “people are justly proud that they and their homeland [had] an outstanding role to play in the great fight for peace”.<sup>xciii</sup> For the Soviet people, a new favourable stage in US-Soviet relations, as well as a new phase in the USSR’s history, had been achieved by Premier Khrushchev’s visit to America.

### **Khrushchev's view**

Given the hostile world that the USSR found itself in following Stalin's death, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to improve the tense East-West relationship and alter the unfavourable image of the Soviet Union abroad. In fact, Khrushchev, considered as the main 'de-Stalinizer,' took several measures in detangling the Soviet Union 'from the international isolation that Stalin's heavy handed tactics had created'.<sup>xciv</sup> Although the USSR's foreign policy manifested more flexible tactics than under Stalin's rigid leadership, it would be a mistake to think that Nikita Khrushchev was 'soft' on the West. On the contrary, while he may have been seeking America's cooperation, Khrushchev retained Stalin's mistrust toward the US and still regarded America as the Soviet Union's main rival. Despite his suspicion of America, or rather because of it, Premier Khrushchev had been fascinated with the United States for some time before his eventual visit in September 1959. The Soviet leader was most taken with the US because he regarded it as the 'strongest opponent among the capitalist countries; the leader that called the tune of anti-Sovietism for the rest'.<sup>xcv</sup> Khrushchev's courtship of the West intensified with his appointment as Premier of the USSR and his pursuit of an American invitation can be dated back to the mid-1950s. It was during an interview with Western journalists on 13 May 1957, that Khrushchev first hinted that he wanted to see the United States: 'I cannot go as a tourist', but a meeting with Eisenhower concerning summit-level talks on issues facing their countries would be useful as 'I greatly respect President Eisenhower and I have told this to him personally'.<sup>xcvi</sup> While his various subtle attempts at securing an invitation were not answered for some time, by early August 1959, due in part to the unstable situation facing the world, Khrushchev was asked to visit the US.

When Khrushchev received the invitation he had been wanting, he was stunned. As he remembered it, Eisenhower's request had 'come out of the blue', making him find it 'hard to believe'.<sup>xcvii</sup> His son Sergei Khrushchev recalled that despite the shock his father was feeling, the Soviet leader also received the news of his impending visit 'with immense satisfaction...even with joy'.<sup>xcviii</sup> For Premier Khrushchev, the invitation was a personal achievement. Being the first head of the Soviet government to travel to America was certainly appealing. To describe Khrushchev as proud and overzealous would probably be an understatement. For some time Khrushchev had wanted to step out of the shadows of his more famous predecessors and such a visit



certainly provided the needed coverage and prominence in boosting his public figure at home as well as abroad.<sup>xcix</sup> Furthermore, Premier Khrushchev took the invitation as a sign that the US had finally acknowledged Soviet Russia as an equal.<sup>c</sup> The Premier also believed that ‘public opinion in the United States had begun more and more to favour an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union ... [and] which Eisenhower was forced to listen to’.<sup>ci</sup> Whatever his reasoning for the invitation, Khrushchev certainly looked forward to his impending visit and what that entailed for him personally as well as for his country.

Nevertheless, while he was more than excited to finally be going to the US, Khrushchev was also apprehensive about the trip. To begin with, due to his general mistrust of America and the tense relationship that existed between the US and the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was most afraid that he would be not be given the privilege and respect befitting his visit. According to the Premier, ‘there was some concern that we might encounter discrimination...that our reception might not correspond to the requirements of protocol in keeping our rank’.<sup>cii</sup> The Soviet leader also feared that American ‘capitalists and aristocrats’ viewed him, a former worker, as ‘a poor relation’ coming to beg.<sup>ciii</sup> Consequently, Khrushchev was greatly worried about the planned negotiations he was to have with Eisenhower. While he wanted to ‘go beyond minimal peaceful coexistence’ and to resolve more pressing matters like nuclear disarmament, he was determined on refusing ‘anyone that push[ed] us around or sat on our necks’.<sup>civ</sup> Even so, despite his anxieties concerning the developments that could ensue from his visit, the Soviet Premier was perhaps most eager to finally ‘be face to face with America...[so] I’d be able to see it with my own eyes, to touch it with my own fingers’.<sup>cv</sup>

While he may have been overly impressed by the welcome he received upon his arrival in Washington, in that it made him ‘immensely proud’ and ‘dispelled [the] apprehension’ he had had toward the visit,<sup>cvi</sup> Khrushchev retained his suspicions of any opposition he encountered. Throughout his tour of the US, Khrushchev felt that any hostility directed towards him came primarily from arrogant government officials and signified that America was not willing to curb the Cold War tensions. Premier Khrushchev thought that prominent figures like Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon and even the American Secretary of State, Christian Herter, were rather cold

toward him and his entourage and, because of their anti-Communist stance, set out to sabotage his trip. According to Khrushchev, the former was ‘very hostile’ and ‘couldn’t stand us’, while the latter ‘wasn’t much better than [Dean] Acheson’, the former Secretary of State who was an avid anti-red protestor.<sup>cvi</sup> As mentioned earlier, an official that Khrushchev did not warm to during his visit was LA Mayor Norris Poulson. In fact, Khrushchev’s tense meeting with Poulson was a most notable part of his trip, one that the Premier remembered well. According to the Soviet leader, the Mayor held an ‘extremely anti-Soviet position...that [Khrushchev] had no intention of tolerating’,<sup>cvi</sup> particularly if that interfered with his ‘mission of good will.’ After Poulson ‘stuck all kinds of pins in the Soviet Union and [its] system’, Khrushchev later reflected that ‘it was always the representatives of certain political circles, and not the American people themselves, who expressed the hostility that existed between our country systems’.<sup>cix</sup>

Aside from a few hostile encounters usually involving government officials, the Soviet Premier was of the opinion that the American public, on the whole, was genuinely supportive of his peace promoting visit. For example, as Khrushchev remembered, wherever he went ‘whole families were out to greet him’ and ‘there were no angry shouts’.<sup>cx</sup> It should be pointed out that from the onset of his trip Khrushchev set out to gain the support of the American people. Indeed, the decision to take the whole Khrushchev family to the US was influenced by the possibility that it would generate a favourable impression of the Soviet Union and its leader among the general public. Furthermore, throughout his trip, Khrushchev tried to reduce American misconceptions of the USSR and attempted to dispel any suspicions towards him by making an effort to meet the people. At any opportunity, he mingled with ordinary Americans and tried to win them over with his charismatic character. When he did receive attention, he was greatly flattered and believed that the public took a liking to him and to the ‘peaceful coexistence’ he was preaching.<sup>cx</sup> While Khrushchev was met with some criticism, for the greater part of his visit he was too sheltered and too preoccupied with being in America to fully attain a realistic perspective of the public’s attitude towards him. Nevertheless, he left the US thinking ‘that the plain people of American liked [him]’.<sup>cxii</sup>

On 25 September, two days before departing, Premier Khrushchev finally got his chance to talk to President Eisenhower when he joined him at Camp David. Although Khrushchev recalled in his memoir that he had no high hopes of resolving the more serious problems facing their countries, according to historian William Tompson, the Soviet Premier had gone to Camp David ‘expecting some dramatic results’.<sup>cxiii</sup> It would certainly be fair to imply that Khrushchev had gone to America confident that US-Soviet relations, not merely communications, but trade, cultural exchanges and everything else that went with it, were going to expand. Khrushchev wanted to come away from the visit and the talks in a way that allowed him ‘to pass into history as a man who secured a long-term détente in the cold war, a lengthy period of peace for the development of his people’s economy and well-being’.<sup>cxiv</sup> After some deliberations and suspicions on both parts, Khrushchev and Eisenhower issued a joint communiqué, which, according to the Soviet Premier, would be received favourably by all in the world ‘who were working for peace’.<sup>cxv</sup> Despite the negotiations at Camp David, no concrete problems facing the US and the Soviet Union were resolved. However, just the fact that his visit had occurred and that a summit for further talks had been scheduled was something that Khrushchev was most proud of and that ‘even Stalin [would] have been interested in’.<sup>cxvi</sup>

Following his visit to the US, Premier Khrushchev was full of optimism ‘that his personal diplomacy could bear fruit’.<sup>cxvii</sup> Indeed, it goes without saying that aside from the diplomatic headway made at Camp David, Khrushchev had been part of a historic event. He himself was quite aware that the Soviet Union had taken necessary steps in deflating the Cold War. More importantly, Premier Khrushchev believed that he had altered the biased American perceptions of himself and Soviet Russia, and that he had gained the support of the American masses. Although he claimed that the visit had not changed his own perceptions of capitalist America, his speech given in Moscow the day of his arrival revealed that not only did he firmly believe a thawing in the Cold War had occurred, but that President Eisenhower was willing to cooperate with the USSR.<sup>cxviii</sup> So sure was Khrushchev of the success of his American trip that during his visit to Peiping, China less than forty-eight hours after leaving the US, he told his hosts wholeheartedly that his trip ‘will undoubtedly improve relations between the US and the Soviet Union and ease international tensions’.<sup>cxix</sup>

## Epilogue

The visit to the USA of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev can be regarded as representing a thawing in the Cold War and subsequently an improvement in US-Soviet relations. Indeed, regardless of past mutual suspicions of each other, in general, the Soviet and American public alike welcomed Khrushchev's visit, believing that it had marked a promising turn in the hostile international arena. The Camp David talks and the subsequent scheduling of a summit between the US and the Soviet Union and their allies were especially regarded as bringing the two countries closer together at a most dangerous time in world history. Khrushchev's trip certainly set the tone for international peace, which was eagerly desired by both the populations of the US and the USSR. The visit paved the way toward ending the Cold War and removing the war danger by replacing it with hopes of peace and agreement between the world's two opposing superpowers. Premier Khrushchev was also of the opinion that his visit signified the beginning of a gradual increase in contacts and peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the visit, according to the Soviet *New Times*, 'in the Soviet-American dialogue, you [could] hear notes of mutual trust, respect and even cordiality'.<sup>cxx</sup>

Despite the hopes and prospects that both the American and Soviet public as well as Khrushchev associated with his trip, just six months after his promising mission of 'peace and friendship,' US-Soviet relations received a devastating setback when on 1 May 1960, only weeks before the scheduled East-West summit in Paris, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down in Soviet territory.<sup>cxxi</sup> The confidence, optimism and trust acquired from the visit diminished. As a result, the promising dialogue that had been fostered during the trip was wiped away, essentially burning the bridges toward improved US-Soviet relations and the warming of the Cold War. The U-2 incident radically affected the psychological mindset of both the American and the Soviet public. As Sergei Khrushchev noted, 'everything was back in its familiar [order] and newspapers were filled with harsh calls for vigilance and readiness to rebuff the aggressor'.<sup>cxxii</sup>

Even so, the U-2 incident and the setback that it had on the development of East-West relations should not take away from the historic significance of Khrushchev's visit to the US. While any political achievements may have faded into the background, the

Soviet Premier's trip to the United States enabled the American and Soviet public to better acquaint themselves with each other. As Sergei Khrushchev suggested, the Soviet Premier's visit was a 'successful first attempt' at making the Americans and the Russians move away from viewing each other as 'the enemy'.<sup>cxxiii</sup> For that matter, the visit improved the unfavourable Russian views of America and vice versa that had been a symptom of the Cold War, and allowed the United States and the USSR as well as the world to breathe easier. If only for a short period of time, Premier Khrushchev's visit to the US certainly relaxed the international climate and brought the American and Soviet people closer together, a feat that had not been achieved at any other time throughout the Cold War and that eventually boded well for the future.

## Notes

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<sup>i</sup> Taubman, William, *Khrushchev-The Man and His Era*, United States: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005, p.425. For a detailed account of the Soviet Premier, see Taubman's biography which is of valuable historical contribution as it gives a thorough description of Nikita Khrushchev's personal and political life.

<sup>ii</sup> *The New York Times*, 17 September 1959, p.1, p.11. Such sentiments can be found in both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*; at times the newspapers portray the visit as easing the Cold War tensions, at others, as will be discussed in the article, the visit's potential in curbing tensions is scrutinized.

<sup>iii</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Joint Committee of Slavic Studies [Bradford, Conn: Micro Media], Vol. XI, 28 October 1959, p. 13.

<sup>iv</sup> Gorman, Lyn and McLean, David, *Media and Society in Twentieth Century- A Historical Introduction*, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 105.

<sup>v</sup> Briggs, Justin, *Contested Spaces-The Cold War*, Australia: The McGraw Hill Companies, 2006, p.14.

<sup>vi</sup> Ashbolt, Allan, *An American Experience*, Sydney: Alpha Books, 1969, p.235.

<sup>vii</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28 October 1959, p. 4.

<sup>viii</sup> Briggs, *Contested Spaces*, p. 43.

<sup>ix</sup> *The New York Times*, 13 September 1959, p. E1.

<sup>x</sup> Eisenhower, Dwight D., *The White House Years-Waging Peace 1956-1961*, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1966, p. 415.

<sup>xi</sup> Some works that look at Khrushchev's visit are William Taubman's Pulitzer winning biography, *Khrushchev-The Man and His Era* (2005), the Soviet sponsored manual *Face to Face with America* (1960), as well as Khrushchev's and Eisenhower's own memoirs, *Khrushchev Remembers-The Last Testament* (1974) and *The White House Years-Waging Peace* (1966). Nevertheless they do not provide a complete picture of how the Soviet Premier's visit to the US was viewed by both the American and Soviet people, as well as Khrushchev himself.

<sup>xii</sup> *The New York Times*, 1-30 September 1959; *The Washington Post*, 1-30 September 1959; *New Times*, Moscow: TRUD, No. 37-53, August-October 1959; *Moscow News*, USSR: The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, August-October 1959; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Joint Committee of Slavic Studies [Bradford, Conn: Micro Media], Vol. XI, September-October, 1959.

<sup>xiii</sup> Kesaris, Paul (ed), *Central Intelligence Agency Research Reports-The Soviet Union, 1946-1976* [Hereafter referred to as CIA Research Reports], USA: Frederick, MD-University Publications of America, c1982, "Khrushchev –A Personality Sketch", Declassified: 20 May 1976, p. 2.

<sup>xiv</sup> *Central Intelligence Agency Research Reports*, "Khrushchev –A Personality Sketch", p. 11.

<sup>xv</sup> *Central Intelligence Agency Research Reports*, "Khrushchev –A Personality Sketch", p. 3.

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- <sup>xvi</sup> Osgood, Kenneth, *Total Cold War-Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, USA: University Press of Kansas, 2006, p. 68.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Lester, Robert (ed), *The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1969*, USA: Frederick, MD-University Publications of America, 1987, 15 September, 1959.
- <sup>xviii</sup> *The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 11 September 1959.
- <sup>xix</sup> *The New York Times*, 9 September 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>xx</sup> *The New York Times*, 10 September 1959, p. 1 and p. 10.
- <sup>xxi</sup> *The New York Times*, 4 September 1959, p. 20.
- <sup>xxii</sup> *The New York Times*, 4 September 1959, p. 20.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> *The Washington Post*, 15 September 1959, p. A11.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Brinkley, Douglas, *Dean Acheson-The Cold War Years 1953-71*, NY: Yale University Press, 1992. p. 100.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, p. 56.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, p. 56.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Briggs. *Contested Spaces*, p. 50.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 432.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 415.
- <sup>xxx</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 416.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 422.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 435.
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 432.
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A1.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A7.
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A7.
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> *The New York Times*, 16 September 1959, p. 18.
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A17.
- <sup>xxxix</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A17.
- <sup>xl</sup> *The New York Times*, 16 September 1959, p. 30.
- <sup>xli</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A7.
- <sup>xlii</sup> *The New York Times*, 18 September 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>xliii</sup> *The Washington Post*, 18 September 1959, p. A1.
- <sup>xliv</sup> *The New York Times*, 19 September 1959, p. 38.
- <sup>xliv</sup> *The New York Times*, 19 September 1959, p. 38.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. 40.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 432.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 434.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> *The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1969*. 28 September, 1959.
- <sup>l</sup> *The Washington Post*, 29 September 1959, p. A16.
- <sup>li</sup> *The New York Times*, 21 September 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>lii</sup> *The New York Times*, 21 September 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>liii</sup> *The New York Times*, 21 September 1959, p. 16.
- <sup>liv</sup> *The New York Times*, 21 September 1959, p. 16.
- <sup>lv</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 438.
- <sup>lvi</sup> Washington Historical Office Bureau of Public Affairs, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1959*, Document 318, p. 933.
- <sup>lvii</sup> Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 449.
- <sup>lviii</sup> *The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 28 September, 1959.
- <sup>lix</sup> *The New York Times*, 29 September 1959, p. 18.
- <sup>lx</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A17.
- <sup>lxi</sup> *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1959, p. A17.
- <sup>lxii</sup> *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1959, p. A5.
- <sup>lxiii</sup> *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1959, p. A5.
- <sup>lxiv</sup> *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1959, p. 7.
- <sup>lxv</sup> *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1959, p. 7.
- <sup>lxvi</sup> Shiraev Eric, and Zubok, Vladislav, *Anti-Americanism in Russia-From Stalin to Putin*, New York: Palgrave, 200, pp. 10-11.
- <sup>lxvii</sup> Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, pp. 14-15.
- <sup>lxviii</sup> Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, p. 43.
- <sup>lxix</sup> *New Times*, No. 37, August 1959, p. 7.

- <sup>lxx</sup> *New Times*, No. 37, August 1959, p. 4.
- <sup>lxxi</sup> *New Times*, No. 37, August 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>lxxii</sup> *New Times*, No. 37, August 1959, pp. 1-2.
- <sup>lxxiii</sup> Kharlamov, Mikhail, and Ajubei, A., *Face to Face with America-the Story of N.S. Khrushchev's Visit to the U.S.A. September 15-27, 1959*, Moscow: Foreign Language Press, 1960, p. 25. This Soviet sponsored manual, which is solely concerned with Khrushchev's trip to the U.S., offers an extensive perspective of the Soviet hopes and expectations towards their Premier's visit. Despite its detailed narrative of the visit, it cannot be regarded as a comprehensive analysis of Khrushchev's trip, as it offers a propagandist Soviet interpretation of the visit.
- <sup>lxxiv</sup> Kharlamov and Ajubei, *Face to Face with America*, p. 25.
- <sup>lxxv</sup> *The Washington Post*, 15 September 1959, p. A11.
- <sup>lxxvi</sup> *Moscow News*, 8 August 1959, p. 5.
- <sup>lxxvii</sup> *Moscow News*, 8 August 1959, p. 5.
- <sup>lxxviii</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. E3
- <sup>lxxix</sup> *The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 18 September 1959.
- <sup>lxxx</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. 6.
- <sup>lxxx1</sup> *New Times*, No. 43, October 1959, p. 5.
- <sup>lxxxii</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. E3.
- <sup>lxxxiii</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 21 October 1959, p. 11.
- <sup>lxxxiv</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 21 October 1959, p. 9.
- <sup>lxxxv</sup> Barghoorn, Frederick, "America in 1959-As Seen From Moscow," *The Review Of Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1960, pp. 245-252, 246.
- <sup>lxxxvi</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>lxxxvii</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 21 October 1959, p. 9.
- <sup>lxxxviii</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. 11.
- <sup>lxxxix</sup> *The New York Times*, 20 September 1959, p. 11.
- <sup>xc</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28 October 1959, p. 13.
- <sup>xc1</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28 October 1959, p. 13.
- <sup>xcii</sup> *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28 October 1959, p. 1.
- <sup>xciii</sup> *Moscow News*, 7 October 1959, p. 5.
- <sup>xciv</sup> Osgood, *Total Cold War*, p. 356.
- <sup>xcv</sup> Ulam, Adam, *Expansion and Coexistence-The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967*, England: Martin Secker & Warburg Limited, 1968, p. 369.
- <sup>xcvi</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 400.
- <sup>xcvii</sup> Khrushchev, Nikita, *Khrushchev Remembers-The Last Testament* [Henceforth *KR II*], London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974, p. 369. Nikita Khrushchev's second memoir, which was questioned on its authenticity when it first appeared, provides a detailed insight into his attitudes toward America and his trip in 1959. Nevertheless, the memoir does not give a full account of the visit, scarcely touching on the U.S. views and those of the Soviet public.
- <sup>xcviii</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 416.
- <sup>xcix</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, p. 624.
- <sup>c</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 416.
- <sup>ci</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 369.
- <sup>cii</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 370.
- <sup>ciii</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 410.
- <sup>civ</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 420.
- <sup>cv</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 375.
- <sup>cvi</sup> Khrushchev, Sergei, *Nikita Khrushchev And The Creation of a Superpower*, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, p. 330.
- <sup>cvi1</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 378
- <sup>cvi2</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 387
- <sup>cix</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 393 and p. 388.
- <sup>cx</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 401.
- <sup>cx1</sup> *The New York Times*, 23 September 1959, p. 38.
- <sup>cxii</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 433.
- <sup>cxiii</sup> William Tompson, *Khrushchev-A Political Life*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995, p. 210.
- <sup>cxiv</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, p. 629.
- <sup>cxv</sup> *The New York Times*, 29 September 1959, p. 21,
- <sup>cxvi</sup> Khrushchev, *KR II*, p. 375.

<sup>cxvii</sup> Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 440.

<sup>cxviii</sup> *The New York Times*, 29 September 1959, p. 21.

<sup>cxix</sup> *The New York Times*, 30 September 1959, p. 1.

<sup>cxx</sup> *New Times*, No. 43, October 1959, p. 3.

<sup>cxxi</sup> Briggs, *Contested Spaces*, p. 51.

<sup>cxxii</sup> Khrushchev, *Creation of a Superpower*, p. 391.

<sup>cxxiii</sup> Khrushchev, *Creation of a Superpower*, p. 345.