

Review Essays

Kenneth Joel Shapiro, Animal models of human psychology: critique of science, ethics, and policy, 328pp., Hogrefe & Huber Publishers, Seattle, 1998.

'I intend the present work as a polite and respectful but strong and objectively founded call to action'. Thus Kenneth Shapiro concludes his Introduction (p.14) to this powerful and pathbreaking treatise. A clinical psychologist himself, and at the time of writing Executive Director of Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Shapiro has been publishing on the topic of his colleagues' utilisation of animal models for a decade and a half. With its comprehensive coverage and careful analysis of facts and issues, this latest book provides a unique combination of consideration of and examination of ethical systems in terms of their implications for the policies regulating animal research, and of a particular area of animal research in terms of its success as a scientific enterprise.

Also in the Introduction, Shapiro outlines his plan to address both sets of major beliefs about animal research - the one that views it as senseless and wrong, and the other that sees it as a necessary basis of science. He ends up censuring the protagonists of both, for partisan support without a solid critical base. A sample of conceptual flavours to come is given in the 'preliminary landmarks' of the respective positions. While both hold that animals in the laboratory are transformed from their actual state of being, on the one hand the critics of animal research regard them as being **reduced** to a lesser status by virtue of becoming just part of the laboratory scene, whereas its proponents construct them as **transcendent** objects serving the cause of the expansion of knowledge. A fine sample of the author's personal style is provided in his pithy policy statement on matters linguistic.

Psychology, Shapiro points out, is for two reasons of particular significance in any consideration of the use of animals in laboratory research. Firstly, courses in the discipline are taken by such huge

numbers of students that it must needs figure largely in the formation of attitudes towards this controversial issue. Secondly, for whatever reason, psychology has been one of the prime targets of the contemporary animal rights movement. The fact that psychologists were caught unprepared by this unwelcome attention certainly highlights the need for an examination of its whys and wherefores such as is here offered.

The treatise is clearly structured, and presented in such a way as to enlighten and instruct both newcomers to and those already acquainted with the discipline and practices of psychology. The first chapter, dealing with current practices and attitudes in psychology's use of animals, is an absolute treasure house of information. Reviewing a range of previous studies on the topic, Shapiro comes to cautious conclusions on matters such as the numbers of animals used annually in United States psychology laboratories (one and a quarter to two and a half million!) and elsewhere, on changing rates of such usage, on relative proportions of species of animals used and in what fields. He identifies his focus as being on that research approach which situates animals as models of particular aspects of the human condition, in contrast to that which studies animals for their own sake, or even that which conceives of psychological processes as being universal across species. Animal model research is distinguished by its targeting disorders and dysfunctions, and attempting their induction in animals in the laboratory. An amazing list of eighty-one conditions for which animals have been used as models is presented on p.29 – 'it is evident that psychologists have attempted to develop an animal model for virtually every known problem in the human condition that has even a remotely psychological cast'. (p.30)

Ensuing chapters discuss how animals have come to be conceptualised in psychological laboratory-based research. Adopting a constructionist perspective on the sociology of knowledge, Shapiro examines the strategy of creating animal models of human disorders via examples from the field of eating disorders. He argues that such models are in point of fact decidedly distanced from actual clinical knowledge and treatment of these disorders. This is because the development of models is heavily constrained by the laboratory situation, 'a place away from the buzzing confusion, the

uncontrollable flow of events of the ordinary world'.(p.63) The so-called lab animal itself is a product of social construction, with its interplay of human and institutional processes and attitudes. In turn, the technologizing of the laboratory means that the behaviours studied are elicited rather than occurring naturally, and are recorded, in mathematical format, rather than observed.

Chapter 3 tackles head-on the all too often evaded theoretical issue of the formal status of the model. A model is an analogy, it is not itself the phenomenon of interest its creator allegedly wishes to illuminate. At best, Shapiro asserts, animal models in psychology may provide weak analogies to human behavioural disorders, heavily embedded as are the latter in exclusively human social structures and influences. But in fact these models fail to function even as heuristic devices, and to generate ideas that are then tested on that which they claim to resemble. In consequence not only of the disparity between the laboratory and the clinical settings, but also of that between the professional worlds of animal experimenters and clinicians, the work has had almost no impact on treatment practices. The latter claim is substantiated by a most impressive array of empirical data, presented in the next chapter.

This central chapter commences with a description of the two primary eating disorders, bulimia nervosa and anorexia nervosa, and the stress induction animal models of them, respectively the over-eating elicited by sham feeding and tail pinching, and the self-starvation consequent on forced hyperactivity. Analysis of these models reveals two primary limitations - the restricted number and simplistic character of those features modelled, and the focus on symptoms at the expense of causation. Shapiro argues that their use is actually counter-productive, beginning from what are for the most part arbitrary starting points, and shaping up a research enterprise that is in-grown in nature, concentrating on the comparison with each other of various laboratory models and variables. Their bias is towards physiological explanation at the expense of culture and personal dynamics; one consequence of this is a preoccupation with technology and procedures for their own sake. The author then reports on a survey he has conducted on thirty clinicians specializing in the treatment of eating disorders. Sixty per cent of the respondents were unaware of the existence of animal models in their field, and

no-one displayed any detailed knowledge or understanding of any such. Eighty-seven per cent denied any influence of such models on their treatment approach. A citation analysis instigated by Shapiro, targeting nine investigators in the field of relevant animal modelling, demonstrated a low overall frequency of citation of this work in the psychological literature. More significantly, in the present context, no citations at all occurred in the journals named as being helpful in their work by the clinicians in the aforesaid survey!

The final two chapters deal with the ethical and policy issues raised by the foregoing material. Current practice in psychology is found woefully lacking in respect of both sets of discourse. It would be hard to find a more comprehensive and balanced review of the literature in either category than is provided here. On the basis of this review the author arrives at his own personal position. He condemns 'official psychology' for its global defence of animal research as such, independent of a consideration of the merits of particular studies, and for its convenient line that the benefits of any one investigation cannot be determined in advance, and may in any case be much delayed. No more than lipservice is paid by it to utilitarianism - 'official psychology exploits certain openings in a utilitarian philosophy to override the provision of any meaningful limitation on animal suffering in research'. (p.280) Shapiro himself decides that the use of Peter Singer's utilitarian ethic is limited, favouring instead a combination of this with Tom Regan's case for individual rights wherein priority is given to rights over a cost-benefit analysis. Thus certain procedures with a severe degree of invasiveness should be banned in principle, regardless of any possible benefits of their use.

Shapiro's hope for the impact of his present contribution is that it will lead to increased public and professional awareness of the state of play regarding the enterprise of animal model research in psychology, and that ending its closed shop status will in turn lead to a demand for the radical curtailment of such research.

Where then will this 'strong and objectively founded call to action' be heard? The animal rights movement will of course find in it an expansion of their artillery with regard to the use of animals in psychology. In Australia, for instance, the line taken by Shapiro ties in very closely with that taken by the Australian Association for

Humane Research, which emphasizes the scientific inappropriateness of using animal models and data for research on humans, though mainly instancing medical practice. It will be intriguing to see the frequency and location of citations of this book itself in the psychological literature over, say, the first decade after its publication. Shapiro is a first class theoretician, and one would hope to find references to specific aspects of his analysis of theoretical issues such as the formal status of the model in journals such as *Theory and Psychology*. I have not mentioned his brief but insightful forays into the historical realm; researchers into the history of behaviourism and the development of laboratory procedures and ideologies for instance may well refer to him. Whether clinicians in the field of eating disorders will take notice of the book is a moot point; after all if, as Shapiro demonstrates, they are already uninterested in animal research purporting to model these disorders, they may or may not make time to peruse a monograph whose views reinforce or elaborate on those they already hold. The book clearly provides ample ammunition for those (regrettably few) psychologists actively concerned with questions of animal rights; it will hopefully also become a source book for courses and committees dealing with laboratory codes of practice. The hundred dollar question remains as to the extent to which the animal researchers themselves will take notice of Shapiro's evaluation of their activities and position. My prediction is that many of them will in fact respond; the quality of argument, extent of coverage of issues and skilful employment of empirical backup, make this critical foray into their field too substantial to be easily ignored. Entrenched positions however are not readily abandoned; the incidence of citations need not correlate with actual changes of viewpoint. Nonetheless, once it is referenced in the literature, this treatise will be accessed by students, that group still in the process of taking up positions on ethical matters and determining career paths; here Shapiro should indeed make a mark.

Alison M.Turtle

Georges Chapouthier and Jean-Claude Nouët, eds. *The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights: Comments and Intentions*, 93pp., *Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal*, Paris 1998.

The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights is an expression of some of the theoretical concerns emanating from France and in particular from the French Animal Rights League (*Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal*) including criticisms of the two main currents of thought regarding animals in English-speaking countries, ie. the views of Regan and Singer.

The book has seven contributors with the discussion framed by the two editors, Nouët beginning and Chapouthier completing the volume. The authors have a range of backgrounds in philosophy, medicine, law and art history but philosophy dominates.

Nouët, a professor of medicine explains that the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights was proclaimed in Paris in 1978 and presented to the United Nations. The Declaration recognises

the equal rights for all living non-human beings to exist on earth. The intention of the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights is to establish an egalitarian right to life, no matter what the species be and...in the context of and with respect to the balance of nature (p.9).

Nouët cites the following authors as important influences leading to this declaration: Thomas Young, Jeremy Bentham, Henry Salt and André Géraud. Various charters which have been proposed to protect animals from 1950s on, also formed the background to the 1978 Charter. It has subsequently been refined and presented to UNESCO in 1989 by the International League. The text is remarkable for its scope and succinctness and is therefore produced below in full:

Universal Declaration of Animal Rights

Preamble

-Considering that Life is one, all living beings having common origin and having diversified in the course of the evolution of the species,

-Considering that all living beings possess natural rights, and that any animal with a nervous system has specific rights,

-Considering that the contempt for, and even the simple ignorance of, these natural rights, cause serious damage to Nature and lead men to commit crimes against animals,

-Considering that the coexistence of species implies a recognition by the human species of the right of other animal species to live,

-Considering that the respect of animals by humans is inseparable from the respect of men for each other, it is hereby proclaimed

ARTICLE 1

All animals have equal rights to exist within the context of biological equilibrium.

This equality of rights does not overshadow the diversity of species and of individuals.

ARTICLE 2

All animal life has the right to be respected.

ARTICLE 3

1. Animals must not be subjected to bad treatments or to cruel acts.

2. If it is necessary to kill an animal, it must be instantaneous, painless and cause no apprehension.

3. A dead animal must be treated with decency.

ARTICLE 4

1. Wild animals have the right to live and to reproduce in freedom in their own natural environment.

2. The prolonged deprivation of the freedom of wild animals, hunting and fishing practised as a pastime, as well as any use of wild animals for reasons that are not vital, are contrary to this fundamental right.

ARTICLE 5

1. *Any animal which is dependent on man has the right to proper maintenance and care.*
2. *It must under no circumstances be abandoned or killed unjustifiably.*
3. *All forms of breeding and uses of the animal must respect the physiology and behaviour specific to the species.*
4. *Exhibitions, shows and films involving animals must also respect their dignity and must not include any violence whatsoever.*

ARTICLE 6

1. *Experiments on animals entailing physical or psychological suffering violate the rights of animals.*
2. *Replacement methods must be developed and systematically implemented.*

ARTICLE 7

Any act unnecessarily involving the death of an animal, and any decision leading to such an act, constitute a crime against life.

ARTICLE 8

1. *Any act compromising the survival of a wild species and any decision leading to such an act are tantamount to genocide, that is to say, a crime against the species.*
2. *The massacre of wild animals, and the pollution and destruction of biotopes are acts of genocide.*

ARTICLE 9

1. *The specific legal status of animals and their rights must be recognised in law.*
2. *The protection and safety of animals must be represented at the level of Governmental organizations.*

ARTICLE 10

Educational and school authorities must ensure that citizens learn from childhood to observe, understand and respect animals.

The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights was solemnly proclaimed in Paris on 15 October 1978 at the UNESCO headquarters. The text, revised by the

International League of Animal Rights in 1989, was submitted to the UNESCO Director General in 1990 and made public that same year. (pp.80-81)

Nouët stresses the need to abolish the hierarchy between humans and animals arguing that humans and animals may have different features but these differences do not mean that humans have some special status or privilege.

The position of animals in French law is discussed by Suzanne Antoine, a Judge at the Court of Appeal in Paris. Animal rights are not included in French law. However there is some protection for domestic animals and 'wild animals tamed or kept in captivity' (p. 18). This protection is limited and not consistent between the various legal codes, though animals are usually considered as objects similar to other items of property. French criminal law since 1992 does prohibit physical abuse and acts of cruelty to animals. This includes the abandonment of animals and the use of animals for scientific experiments not complying with official regulations. It is interesting that the latter is brought under the criminal code, rather than a breach of a more loosely defined animal welfare regulation as is common in many countries.

Bull fights and cock fights are exempted from the French anti-cruelty law if there is proof of an uninterrupted local tradition, a feature which Antoine deplors. In a separate chapter Elisabeth Hardouin-Fugier examines Spanish bullfighting in France pointing out the powerful interests supporting this cruel practice and the difficulty that opponents have in even getting heard.

Antoine points out that no protection is given to individual wild animals in French law. However conservation of the species is covered by legislation. Antoine argues that this is a weak law and that the application is made problematic by hunting interests. She regards hunting as a practice which should no longer be tolerated in any civilized country and notes the absurd example of the hunting of migratory birds. Species which are protected in neighbouring countries may be legally shot when they fly over France.

The French legal situation stands in sharp contrast to the Declaration of Animal Rights. However Antoine mentions a promising move from some French lawyers to recognize animals as 'subjects' with a certain number of rights.

The philosopher Florence Burgat draws on Rousseau in an attempt to work out whether there is a basis in natural law to oblige humans not to harm animals. She concludes that it is the capacity of animals to suffer which draws them into the same moral domain as humans and promotes the recognition of animal rights. (Bentham and Singer should be acknowledged here but are not.) Burgat claims that this should lead to different legislation than for instance the anti-cruelty codes which only serve to re-enforce the dominant position of humans who may act charitably to inferior beings.

Goffi, another philosopher, directly engages with Singer's utilitarianism. He presents a novel logical argument against Singer's view and supports the extension of the moral domain beyond sentient beings. In fact Goffi believes that 'the moral community is the same as the community of living organisms' (p.67), while there is a hierarchy of different forms of individual good.

Goffi also evaluates Regan's position, granting that he presents a very strong case in defence of animal rights which questioning Regan's view on inherent value. Curiously, I take the opposite of this stand. Regan's notion of inherent value seems to me to be on the right track even though flawed. (His definition of inherent value draws too heavily on what is of value to humans). Regan's view on rights strikes me as an unnecessary 'add-on'.

Chapouthier discusses animal rights in relation to human rights, ranking them on different levels but arguing that human rights take precedence over animal rights only when the human rights to life and health are under threat. Charpouthier argues perhaps surprisingly that animal rights and human rights usually operate in the same direction.

The articles in this volume engage with debates appearing in English on animal rights but they offer new perspectives both in terms of

critique and positive theory. Hopefully this translation into English will mean that reverse engagement will occur.

Readers interested in obtaining a copy of *The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights: Comments and Intentions* should contact Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal, 39 Rue Claude Bernard, 75005 Paris, France.

Denise Russell

Mark A. Michael, editor, Preserving Nature: An International Perspective, 307pp., Humanity Books, New York, 2000.

Mark Michael's anthology on wildlife preservation offers an enlightening and disturbing introduction to some of the most important questions facing conservationists. According to Michael, the contributors all share the assumption that 'wildlife should be preserved (p.8). Perhaps because of its status as an assumption, this sentiment escapes any significant analysis, leaving poorly explored a range of issues, including the definition of nature, of wildlife and of preservation. The book highlights a startling disjunction between conservation and animal rights perspectives on wild animals, and this too, could have been explored more fully.

The first section contains three articles which debate moral issues around human intervention into the lives of wild animals. A case against assisting injured wild animals is made, and a survey of the impact of the tagging and studying of endangered species is offered. Also included is a rather frustrating criticism of sport hunting by Roger J. H. King, which depends heavily on eco-feminist arguments. Most frustrating about the critique is its failure to question the meaning of 'nature'. The article makes clear that many of those who oppose hunting see humans as distinct from nature; as a danger to its delicate balance and even its survival. However, some proponents of hunting argue that the desire to prey upon other species is itself

natural in humans. As such, hunting is inevitable and perhaps even desirable. Where anti-hunting arguments appeal to unanalysed notions of nature in this way, they must expect to be met with opposing arguments equally invested in the easy authority wielded by the term, 'nature'.

The second section takes a close look at approaches to habitat conservation and the treatment of exotic species that threaten the well-being of endangered native animals. The wisdom of attempting to save individual species through captive breeding programmes is explored, as is the culling of introduced species thought to be a danger to other flora and fauna. It is perhaps in this section that the gulf between animal rights advocates and conservationists emerges most clearly. The US National Parks Service's decision to destroy a population of goats is debated in an exchange that overtly addresses some of the issues behind this gulf, while other articles hint at them. Andrew Cohen's article, 'Weeding the Garden' expresses strong dissatisfaction with a gull culling programme he participated in, and reveals some very disturbing attitudes towards non-native species. Any approach which labels overabundant species 'garbage animals' (as does one ecologist with the Environmental Defense Fund that Cohen quotes) has no chance of meaningfully reversing the negative effects humans have already had on other species or of building a future that safeguards the diversity of animal species and their welfare.

It is at this point that questions raised by the book's inadequately defined title assert themselves. What is wildlife? Why preserve it? Can what is preserved remain 'wild'? Should some animals suffer to preserve human understandings of the wild? For whose benefit is endangered wildlife preserved? Where the preservation of some animals appears to necessitate brutal poisoning regimes for others (the gulls in Cohen's article take up to two days to die (p.85)), it is clear that animal welfare is not at stake. Nor is it at stake in captive breeding programmes involving the release of bred animals and the subsequent death of most of these animals (17 out of 20 in the case of the tamarins in Robert Loftins' 'Captive breeding of endangered species (p.113).). Unless one wishes to argue that animals care whether their species persists, captive breeding projects do not serve individual members of endangered species well.

Perhaps it is possible to argue that these interventions have an animal welfare component because if individual species die out, the ecological system in which they function will be damaged and many other animals will die as a consequence. This is an important consideration. However, another issue that must be confronted is whether in some cases, the animals subjected to intensive breeding programmes in captivity are those whose numbers have become so depleted that their role in their traditional ecosystems is minimal. If such cases occur, the preservation of these species appears to be motivated mainly by the desire to maintain a diverse environment for human benefit. Are captive breeding programmes and culling justified in such cases?

Section three mainly examines the role game hunting and harvesting can play in conservation in developing nations. The history of conservation as bound up with imperialism is highlighted here, and negative perceptions of conservation among Tanzanian pastoralists and Zambian villagers are shown to be the result of inequitable practices around land appropriation and profit-sharing from sport hunting and tourism. The articles in this section make clear that poor rural people often bear the brunt of conservation programmes initiated elsewhere, at the behest of foreigners.

It is unsurprising then, that economic incentives in the form of employment associated with sport hunting and the harvesting of meat, horn and ivory are required to secure the participation of impoverished peoples in conservation. In light of this, it would have been valuable to include an examination of the ways in which Western nations and individuals might be exhorted to systematically bear some of the cost of conservation in poorer countries. After all, it is the West that so strongly demands conservation, and it is the West that is more able to afford it.

The last section takes a similar tack in looking at several ways in which conservation of animals, such as elephants in Graeme Caughley's 'Elephants and Economics', and land in Gordon Grigg's 'Kangaroo Harvesting and the Conservation of Arid and Semi-Arid Rangelands' can be effected through the development of new markets for animal produce. Martha Groom, et al. take a slightly

different approach by examining a tourism market in Peru that revolves around watching animals rather than farming or hunting them, but they indicate that this kind of marketing, if poorly regulated, can also have a negative impact on wild animals. This section contains some valuable discussion of economic issues around conservation. Does classical economic theory warrant application to conservation? Do economic incentives really encourage the protection of endangered species?

Preserving Wildlife is an interesting if rather limited look at some of the issues surrounding conservation today. Animal rights advocates may be disturbed by some of the conservation practices documented here. These are particularly difficult to accept because the book fails to offer any detailed or convincing exposition on the foundations of conservation, its specific rationale, and perhaps most importantly, the limits of its legitimacy. This is not to say, of course, that conservation is wrong or pointless. However, important questions need to remain on the agenda. If conservation seeks to protect the natural world, what is nature? What is the status of human behaviour in nature? What is the status of those non-native species that 'naturally' thrive in habitat required for survival by other, native, species? Whose idea of nature is being protected? In short, what is being conserved, how, and at whose cost?

Suzanne Fraser