

Religion, Ethnic Intolerance and Homophobia in Europe
– A Multilevel Analysis Across 47 Countries

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Abstract

The University of Manchester, Stefanie Doebler, Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD); Title: Religion, Ethnic Intolerance and Homophobia in Europe – A Multilevel Analysis Across 47 Countries; Manchester, 3 September 2013:

This thesis is a multilevel analysis of relationships between religion, intolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homophobia across 47 European countries based on European Values Study data (EVS 2010, wave 4).

The analysis accounts for associations between the religiosity of individuals and their likelihood of being disinclined to accept people of a different race, immigrants and homosexuals as neighbours, or to accept homosexual behaviour as justifiable. Secondly, relationships between religious and socio-economic national contexts on the two forms of intolerance are studied.

Religion is conceptualised as a three-dimensional phenomenon, thus a distinction is made between believing, belonging and religious practice.

The main research question motivating the individual-level analysis is: To what extent is religion in Europe associated with intolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals? The research question of the contextual analysis is: How do the national religious, socio-economic and political contexts citizens live in matter for their tolerance towards out-groups?

The key results of the analyses can be summarised as follows: religion is significantly related to both ethnic intolerance and homophobia. Believing in a Higher Power was found to be strongly negatively and fundamentalism strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance in most countries. Religious devoutness and observance, on the other hand, are positively related to ethnic intolerance only in a minority of mostly South-Eastern European countries. All of them have legacies of ethno-religious conflict, poverty and political instability. High religiosity, alongside poverty, nationalism and right-wing authoritarianism are strong predictors of ethnic prejudice in these contexts. In most of Europe, however, neither religious belonging nor religious practice is statistically significantly related to ethnic intolerance.

Regarding homophobia, strong positive relationships with all three dimensions of religiosity were found. Contrary to the author's expectation, religion matters most for the citizens' dislike of homosexuals in Western European countries where the overall levels of homophobia are comparatively low. In large parts of post-communist Eastern Europe homophobia appears to have a secular face. The finding surprises, given the frequent utilisations of Orthodox and Catholic Christian symbolism that could be observed at public protests against eastern European gay pride parades of the last couple of years. Plausible explanations are explored alongside modernisation- and identity theory: religion has less impact on homophobic attitudes in societies where homophobia is generally more socially acceptable, while in highly modernised Western societies, where liberal values and a general acceptance of homosexuality are prevalent, religious fundamentalism appears to be strongly associated with anti-modern and traditionalistic identities that are exclusive towards out-groups.

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I. Theory Part

1. Introduction: Tolerance Towards others as a Civic Virtue

Tolerance towards people who are different from the societal majority, whether they are ethnic out-groups, homosexuals or political dissenters is regarded as a fundamental civic virtue of modern democracies, without which pluralistic societies could not exist. Research on tolerance towards ethnic and cultural minorities is thus of interest to social scientists as well as policy makers and the general public.

Europe's societies are in a constant process of pluralisation and change. Since the 1970s, Western Europe's increasing levels of wealth and modernisation and the demand for workforce have attracted constant flows of immigrants from less wealthy countries. A second generation of immigrants is now fully established as citizens in most Western European countries, contributing to Europe's ethnic and social diversity. In Eastern Europe, the breakdown of communism and socio-economic instability in its aftermath have led to opposite migration flows. At the same time, democratisation and an increase in freedom from the censorship of past authoritarian rule have enabled a pluralisation of individualised lifestyles. One expression of this is the growing visibility of homosexuals and transgender people across Eastern Europe.

1.1 The Problem of Ethnic Intolerance and Homophobia in Europe

As European societies are becoming increasingly diverse, a culture of toleration is vital to maintain the peaceful coexistence of the different social strata. Yet, persistent xenophobic discourses and conflicts over the acceptability of ethnic and cultural minorities are prevalent in the European public and show that toleration is not at all a matter of course.

There are numerous examples. The ongoing political disputes over the status of immigrants, the legal prohibition of the Muslim veil in France and Belgium (Ismail 2010; Werbner 2007), the recent violent attacks on women wearing the Hijab in France and the UK (MacGuill 2013; Chrisafis 2013; Elgot 2013), persistent and aggressive campaigns of the far-right across Western Europe against immigration and the presence of Mosques (Elgot 2013; Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger 2009), the recent increase in Anti-Muslim violence in Britain in the aftermath of the Woolwich killing of a British soldier in June 2013 (Taylor and Siddique 2013; Elgot 2013), all facilitate a climate of intolerance, mistrust and resentment. But ethnic intolerance is not just a Western European phenomenon in response to immigration. The ethno-religious conflicts throughout the 1990s in South-Eastern European countries of the Balkans, former Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Turkey (Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Aydinli and Ozcan 2011; Waal 2004; Iveković 2002) demonstrate that conflicts over ethnic and religious identities have long been a part of Eastern- and South-Eastern European national histories. Regarding homosexuals, there are numerous examples of incidents signifying widespread intolerance, particularly in Eastern Europe. The angry and often violent protests that follow every gay pride parade that has taken place in an

Eastern European country since the 1990s (Greenwood 2007; Anonymous 2005; Gera 2012; Vytautas 2013) demonstrate that differing lifestyles are not equally socially accepted everywhere in Europe.

While Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender -rights (LGBT-rights) like same-sex legal partnerships are a matter of fact in most of Western Europe since the late 1990s and gay marriage is accepted in many Western European countries (ILGA 2012; ILGA 2009), the same cannot be said for Eastern Europe (Ibd.). In much of Eastern Europe homosexuals still face discrimination, prejudice and in some cases outright persecution, as the recent criminalisation of homosexuality in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine shows (ILGA 2012).

1.2 The Role of Religion

The examples above have something in common in that religion plays an important part as a rationale legitimising intolerance. References to Christian moral values and collective ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ identities are frequently utilised to delineate majority in-groups from not accepted (ethnic or homosexual) out-groups, the ‘us’ from the ‘them’.

What is often forgotten in the heat of public arguments over Christian values and sexual morals, over immigration and the legitimacy of the religious and cultural ‘other’ is that religion is not necessarily detrimental to tolerance. Europe’s religious denominations, through their moral teachings of neighbourly love and care, have the potential to foster tolerance. The Bible (Mark 12:31)¹, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vaticana 2011) and the famous open letter to Pope Benedict

¹ The English Standard Version Bible: Containing the Old and New Testaments with Apocrypha. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.

XVI that was signed by 138 Islamic leaders in answer to his Regensburg lecture in 2006 (Anonymous 2007), demonstrate that to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ is an essential teaching of both Christianity and Islam — the two major religions that have sizeable populations in Europe. Religion can thus have both negative as well as positive effects on tolerance.

This PhD thesis examines relationships between religion and intolerance towards ethnic minorities and homosexuals across 47 European countries using survey data from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS) (EVS 2010).

The main research question of the thesis is: how is religion in Europe related to the citizens’ likelihood of being intolerant towards ethnic out-groups and towards homosexuals?

Congruent with the arguments of some theorists (Davie 1990; Glendinning and Bruce 2006; Huber 2007), religion is operationalised as a three-dimensional phenomenon, comprising a believing-, a belonging- and a practice dimension. Because religious beliefs, belonging to a denomination, and attending church as a form of religious practice can affect people’s propensity to dislike out-groups in different ways, the analysis is interested in differential effects of measures of the three dimensions of religion. The question is: are religious believing, belonging and practice differently related to ethnic intolerance and homophobia?

1.3 The Role of National Contexts

Because the aim of this thesis is to compare relationships between religion, ethnic intolerance and homophobia across 47 countries, it is vital to allow for contextual differences.

Therefore, the second research question refers to the influence of national religious and socio-economic contexts: How do contexts of wealth (GDP), political stability and good governance, ethnic and religious diversity influence the populations' likelihood of being intolerant towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals? How do these contexts moderate relationships between religion and intolerance?

Proceeding from theory and prior empirical studies in the field, the analysis will test the effects of country-level wealth, political stability, levels of perceived government corruption, levels of democratic freedom, the religious country-majority, the average religiosity of the countries' populations, and degrees of religious pluralism.

Although multilevel modelling has been around for a while and a number of authors have tested effects of selected context variables, there is still a lack of cross-national multilevel studies that systematically compare relationships between socio-economic and political national contexts, religion, and intolerance towards out-groups.

Context effects that have been theorised and tested so far are the countries' mean education-levels (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Borgonovi 2012), GDP per capita (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Strabac and

Listhaug 2008; Schneider 2007), levels and duration of democracy (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2001), levels of religious pluralism (Borgonovi 2012) and ethnic diversity (McLaren 2003; Hooghe et al. 2006; Schneider 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010).

However, context effects have been tested selectively in the literature so far. Also, the choice of controls used in the literature seems arbitrary, and their usage varies between studies. There is still much work to do when it comes to systematic comparisons of these context effects.

Religion as a context in particular has not received enough attention in the literature on Europe so far, despite Stark and Glock's (1968) and Stark and Bainbridge's (1996) groundbreaking empirical work on the effects of belonging to a religious community. Kelley and de Graaf (1997) and Scheepers, Grotenhuis and van der Slik (2002) have done some pioneering work on religious context effects on volunteering, social capital and moral values in Europe. However, there is to date to the author's knowledge no systematic examination of the influence of religious contexts on ethnic intolerance in Europe.

1.4 Research Strategy and Thesis Structure

This PhD thesis intends to add to the existing knowledge on the relationship between religion and intolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals by carrying out multilevel analyses of the relationships across Europe using data from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS) (EVS 2010). The models include indicators of religious believing, belonging and behaviour in order to examine the effect of all three dimensions of religiosity. The EVS covers attitudes and values in 47 European countries including Russia, the Caucasian countries and the four Muslim majority countries Albania, Azerbaijan, Kosovo and Turkey.

The thesis is structured as follows: The theory part, chapter 1 to chapter 6, presents a review of the literature relevant to the research questions. Chapter 7 gives a detailed account of the data and methods and deals with limitations of the data and issues of measurement.

Chapters 8 and 9 in the second part of the thesis present the empirical analysis of individual-level relationships between religion and two forms of civic intolerance across Europe as a whole. The third part on context (chapters 10 to 12) examines the impact of religious, political, and socio-economic national contexts on ethnic intolerance and homophobia and tests to what extent relationships between religion and intolerance are influenced by national contexts.

2. Ethnic Intolerance and Homophobia –Terminology and Working Definitions

There are different terms referring to and measuring similar, related phenomena in the literature. The two sections of this brief chapter clarify the terminology and working definitions used for the outcome variables of this thesis.

2.1 Intolerance towards Immigrants, Racial Intolerance and Prejudice

A bulk of social science literature deals with negative attitudes towards ethnic out-groups, such as immigrants and people of a different race. Different terms are used to denote and measure strongly related, and in some cases even identical concepts. Some of the most commonly used terms in the literature are ‘prejudice’ (Allport 1966; Glock and Stark 1969; Billiet 1995; Strabac and Listhaug 2008), ‘ethnic intolerance’ (Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson 2006; Unnever and Cullen 2010; Doebler 2013), ‘racial intolerance’, and ‘racism’ (Dunbar and Simonova 2003; Billiet and de Witte 2008; Ford 2008; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011). The distinction between these different terms is far from clear. Indeed, numerous authors use the terms ‘intolerance’ and ‘prejudice’ interchangeably (Batson and Burris 1994). It is therefore no surprise that measures of intolerance towards immigrants, intolerance towards people of a different race, sexual prejudice and intolerance towards religious out-groups were found to be highly correlated (Aosved, Long, and Voller 2009).

Even so, psychological studies in the field of measurement testing suggest that the concept ‘prejudice’ is qualitatively different from ‘intolerance’ (Godfrey,

Richman, and Withers 2000; Figgou and Condor 2006; Augoustinos and Reynolds 2001). Prejudice measures a broad set of generalised negative attitudes towards, and opinions about out-groups, whereas intolerance is more related to a rejection of members of out-groups on a personal level. Thus, the term 'intolerance' is conceptually closer to social distance (Bogardus 1933; Parrillo and Donoghue 2005), another renowned concept in social psychology. Bogardus' (1933) original social distance scale is a cumulative battery of seven items measuring how much closeness to a member of an out-group the respondents would be willing to tolerate.

In this thesis, intolerance towards immigrants and intolerance towards members of a different race are seen as measures of an overarching concept of ethnic intolerance. Unfortunately, the European Values Study data (EVS 2010), which are employed here, do not contain a full social distance scale. It is therefore not possible to distinguish between different degrees of intolerance. Nonetheless, the EVS-intolerance measures 'I would not like as neighbours: immigrants' and 'I would not like as neighbours: members of a different race' express a relatively strong social distance. A respondent, who would not even live next door to a person of a different race, or next to an immigrant, can safely be called ethnically intolerant.

2.2 Homophobia

The question, how negative attitudes and behaviour towards homosexuals are best defined and measured has been discussed in the literature since the 1980s (Hudson and Ricketts 1980; Herek 1984; Cecco 1984; Herek 1994; Mayfield 2001; Adolfsen, Iedema, and Keuzenkamp 2010). The most frequent and popular term used by social scientists and the public is homophobia. However, the term homophobia was criticised by psychologists for referring too much to irrational fears and not emphasising the hate dimension of anti-homosexual prejudice enough (Herek 1994; Shidlo 1994; Mayfield 2001; Rye and Meaney 2010). Mayfield and others thus proposed the term ‘homonegativity’, to describe negative attitudes towards homosexuals that are related to exclusionism and hate. The term ‘homonegativity’ has gained popularity among social scientists in recent years.

In this thesis, the term homophobia is used nonetheless, because apart from still being the most popular term, it is also more appropriate given the variables that are used here for measurement. Items in the EVS that refer to negative attitudes towards homosexuals are the statement ‘I would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ and ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ (EVS 2010). Both variables will be used as outcomes of the analysis. The two statements clearly denote negative attitudes towards homosexuality, but we do not know whether and to what extent they are related to hate.

The two outcome variables measuring homophobia in this thesis are well suited to capture another distinction that was made in the literature: the distinction between moralistic homophobia, a moral rejection of homosexuality as a behaviour

(‘homosexuality is never justifiable’), and homophobia as a form of intolerance towards homosexuals as a group of persons (‘would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’) (Loftus 2001; Griffiths et al. 2001, 15).

This distinction is particularly important with regard to the influence of religion. Because it is a common assumption that the Bible condemns homosexuality, yet at the same time teaches the believer to ‘hate the sin, but love the sinner’ (Griffiths et al. 2001), religious practice and devoutness can reasonably be expected to be positively related to homosexuality as a behaviour, but not necessarily to negative attitudes towards homosexual persons. However, both Loftus, and Griffith et al. emphasise that different religious orientations (Allport and Ross 1967) might be differently related to the two forms of homophobia. Thus, highly devout believers with a deeply intrinsic orientation can be expected to be more intolerant towards homosexuals than casual believers with a more extrinsic orientation (Griffiths et al. 2001). Theories on intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations and theories on different dimensions of religiosity will be introduced in more detail in later sections of this literature review.

3. Religious Teachings as a Basis for Tolerance and Intolerance

Religious teachings, like any other ideology, can exert an important influence on the believers' social attitudes and values. Religiously devout people, who are socialised in a religious tradition, have internalised the moral values of their religion and these values spill over into the person's everyday decisions and judgements. This brief chapter outlines the potential role that religious teachings can play for the relationship between religion and tolerance.

3.1 Moral Foundations of Tolerance in Christian and Islamic Teachings

Some examples of religious teachings that promote tolerance, the Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vaticana 2011, ch. 2), and the open letter of 138 Islamic leaders in reaction to Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg lecture in 2006 (Anonymous 2007; Ferguson 2011), were already mentioned in the introduction. Both texts strongly emphasise the moral desirability of neighbourly love and care.

Appeals to love one's neighbour and tolerate others can be found in the scriptures of Christianity and Islam. The Bible says the following about good neighbourliness:

'The second is this: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself." There is no other commandment greater than these.' (The Bible, Mark 12:31),

The following passage can be found in the Quran²:

'[...] and to parents do good, and to relatives, orphans and the needy, the near neighbour, the neighbour farther away, the companion at your side, the traveller, and those whom your right hands possess'. (The Q'uran, Surah An-Nisa, 4:36)

Thus, toleration and peaceful coexistence are strongly encouraged in both religions. Furthermore, both have concepts of basic human dignity, signifying the equal worth of every human being independent of ethnicity, sex, kinship-, or other forms of belonging (Lee 2008; Novak 2011; Ferguson 2011). A lot has already been written on the concept of human dignity in Judaism and Christianity. The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam by the member states of the Islamic conference in 1990 (Lee 2008, 21–23) reminds us that human dignity is not just a Judeo-Christian concept, but Islam, too, affirms this fundamental value.

The emphasis of both Christian and Islamic teachings on values of care and neighbourly love, and the fact that both religions acknowledge human dignity make it plausible to hypothesize that religious belief is positively related to tolerance towards others in both faiths.

² Khalifa, Rashad. 2001. *Quran: The Final Testament : Authorized English Version, with the Arabic Text*. Quran.

3.2 Traditional Religion and Homophobia

The case is different for tolerance towards homosexuals. It is common knowledge that the scriptures of all three Abrahamic religions in Europe contain passages that explicitly condemn homosexuality (Griffiths et al. 2001, 15; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009; Hooghe et al. 2010, 387). Although it is currently debated among progressive Christians, whether homosexuality is condemned not just in the Old Testament, but also in the New Testament (Griffiths et al. 2001, 13), mass attitudes among the religious in Europe are likely to be strongly influenced by the common belief that homosexuality is a sin (Schwartz 2010). Moreover, such beliefs are likely to shape attitudes towards homosexuality as behaviour, as well as towards homosexuals as a group of persons.

Traditional believers and fundamentalists in particular — those who believe that only their religion has any valid truth claim — were repeatedly found to be more homophobic than believers who are less traditionalist, and non-believers (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Eisenstein 2006a; Schwartz and Lindley 2009; Whitehead 2010).

However, public attitudes about homosexuality have liberalized at least in Western Europe. Gay priest, homosexual partnerships and gay marriage are increasingly accepted within Reformed Protestant churches across Europe, and throughout the last couple of years an increase in public discussions of gay-rights among moderate Catholics and in the Catholic Youth was observable. As social attitudes in Western Europe have become more liberal over time, a liberalisation and individualisation of religious beliefs was also observed within Europe's churches and within Islam (Cesari 2004, 85–87; Pace 2006, 44–45; Pollack and Pickel 2007; Hepp and Kroenert 2010, 267–268).

Therefore, we can expect those who hold more modern, liberal and individualised religious beliefs to be less likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals and homosexual lifestyles and behaviours. A comparison of effects of these different kinds of religious beliefs on homophobia will be carried out in chapter 9, in the empirical part of this thesis.

4. Religion as a Three-Dimensional Phenomenon: Believing, Belonging and Practice

Religion can be understood as a three-dimensional phenomenon. The literature so far distinguishes a believing – (beliefs in God, religious beliefs in general), a belonging- (denominational affiliation, belonging to a church, congregation, moral community), and a practice dimension of religion (attending church, participation in religious organizations) (Stark and Glock 1968; Davie 1990). This short chapter introduces an understanding of religion as a three-dimensional phenomenon that will be used to operationalise individual-level religiosity later in this thesis.

Multidimensional conceptualisations of religion have been around since the early days of the scientific study of religion and social attitudes (Stark and Glock 1968; King 1967; Davie 1990).

The literature on relationships between religion and intolerance dates back to American researchers of the mid-1960s (Allport 1966; Glock and Stark 1966; Stouffer 1966; Allport and Ross 1967; Glock and Stark 1969; Herek 1987). Some of these early studies have already outlined multidimensional concepts of religion: Stark and Glock distinguished between religious belief, practice, experience and knowledge (Stark and Glock 1968), and found religious practice to be positively related to intolerance towards various out-groups. King even found nine empirical dimensions using a data driven cluster analyses approach (King 1967).

Allport and Ross found extrinsic, but not intrinsic forms of religious practice and belief to be positively related to racial intolerance (Allport and Ross 1967).

More recent concepts of religion as a multidimensional phenomenon are Grace Davie's 'believing without belonging' (1990) and the works of Fontaine (2005), Glendinning and Bruce (2006) and Huber (2007).

Surprisingly, the theories of multidimensional religion have only seldom translated into comparative empirical research. In cross-national studies, religion is mostly operationalised via church attendance, importance of religion or denominational affiliation. The believing dimension is rarely taken into account, and there is a lack of studies comparing differential effects of measures of all three religiosity-dimensions. There exist to date, to the author's knowledge only two cross-national studies of ethnic intolerance in Europe that systematically compare relationships with religious believing, belonging and attendance (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Doebler 2013). In this thesis, religion is understood as a three-dimensional phenomenon and differential effects of variables of the three religion-dimensions are tested.

4.1 The Believing Dimension

The believing dimension of religion comprises beliefs in and about God, beliefs in a higher, transcendental Being, as well as beliefs in religious doctrines and religious truth-claims. Relationships between religious believing and tolerance have been analysed since the 1960s (Glock and Stark 1966; Glock and Stark 1969; Allport and Ross 1967). The sections below review the most prominent theories on believing and tolerance that are relevant for this thesis.

4.1.1 Allport and Ross' Theory of Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Religiosity

One of the most renowned theories of relationships between religion and tolerance is Allport and Ross' (1967) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations. Allport and Ross defined intrinsic religiosity as being religious for the sake of religion itself, while extrinsically religious people utilise religion for worldly rewards like recognition and prestige, thus exhibiting a degree of hypocrisy: 'the extrinsically motivated person uses his [sic] religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his [sic] religion' (Allport and Ross 1967, 434). The intrinsically religious are devout and contemplate their beliefs. The extrinsically religious, on the other hand, are described by Allport and Ross as casual, non-regular church attenders, who engage with their religion on a more superficial, less committed basis.

Using samples of churchgoers and students, Allport and Ross found the extrinsically motivated religious to be more likely to be racially prejudiced and prejudiced towards Jews and people suffering from mental illness (Ibd., 437-440), while the intrinsically motivated, who contemplate and internalize the moral teachings of their religion tend to be more tolerant (Ibd.). It should be noted that Allport and Ross' explicitly conceptualise fundamentalist beliefs (the claim that only one's own religion has any valid truth, and biblical literacy) as distinct from the intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity dimensions (Ibd., 435). Other beliefs, such as attaching ultimate meaning to one's religion are included in their intrinsic versus extrinsic religiosity-scale (I/E-scale). Allport and Ross do not treat believing as a religiosity dimension in its own right.

Since religious believing is inwardly oriented and achieved through contemplation, it can be seen as a form of intrinsic religiosity. This thesis follows Allport and Ross in that non-fundamentalist God-beliefs are treated as compliant with intrinsic religiosity, while fundamentalism is treated as a distinct form of believing.

Following Allport's and Ross' classical theory, non-fundamentalist beliefs can be expected to be negatively related to ethnic intolerance.

Allport and Ross did not examine prejudice towards homosexuals. They do, however, note that the intrinsically religious are not only more tolerant towards ethnic out-groups, but also towards mentally ill people and people with dissenting opinions.

Allport and Ross' concept has been used by a number of psychological studies of ethnic intolerance. Most of them found negative relationships with intrinsic religiosity, and positive relationships with extrinsic religiosity (Donahue 1985; Kirkpatrick 1993; Hunsberger and Jackson 2005), while McFarland (McFarland 1989) found extrinsic religiosity to be positively related to racial prejudice for men but not for women.

An exception is Eisenstein's work (2006a). Using survey data from Indiana she finds intrinsically religious people to be more likely to be fundamentalist and racially intolerant, while the extrinsically religious, whose motives to go to church are meeting peers rather than religious devoutness, tended to be more tolerant.

The majority of studies in Allport and Ross' tradition, however, find intrinsic religiosity to be negatively related to ethnic intolerance.

The case may be different for tolerance towards homosexuals. As mentioned above, the teachings of all three Abrahamic religions present in Europe

unanimously condemn homosexuality as a sin. It is therefore plausible to expect intrinsic religiosity to be positively related to homophobia.

There are a number of studies that apply Allport and Ross' intrinsic- versus - extrinsic religiosity-scale (IE-scale) to tolerance towards homosexuals. The majority find that intrinsic religiosity is positively related to homophobic attitudes (Herek 1987; McFarland 1989; Duck and Hunsberger 1999; Hunsberger and Jackson 2005; Eisenstein 2006a; Eisenstein 2006b; Marsh and Brown 2009). One study found no significant relationship between intrinsic religiosity and homophobia when controlling for fundamentalism (Kirkpatrick 1993).

Allport and Ross I/E –Religiosity scale has been widely used in psychological studies of ethnic intolerance and homophobia. However, most of these studies used student samples, and a few used regional or national surveys, mostly in the American context. There is still a decided lack of cross-national comparisons incorporating Allport and Ross' theory, or considering the believing-dimension of religion at all.

4.1.2 Different God-Beliefs and Doctrinal Believing

Some researchers have examined relationships between different God-beliefs and tolerance. This research departs from classical social theory alluding to the import of (religious) ideas for human action. Glock and Stark (1966) have analysed relationships between traditional beliefs in God and the devil, religious orthodoxy and anti-Semitism in America as early as 1966. They found that religious orthodoxy and interpretations of God as strict and harsh are positively related to anti-Semitism.

In 'Images of God, images of Man' (1972). Glock fully developed his theory of images of God, by drawing upon Max Weber's 'The Protestant Ethic' (Weber 1905 /2000) and Émile Durkheim's 'The Elementary Forms of the religious life' (Durkheim 1912/1995). Glock emphasised the power of religious ideas to justify inequalities and social hierarchy throughout history. Glock claimed that the image of God that is predominant in a society justifies and legitimises its social order.

In more recent studies Bader and Froese (2005), Froese, Bader and Smith (2008), Mencken, Bader and Embry (2009) and Unnever, Cullen and Bartkoswki (2006) have examined the effects of different images of God on the social attitudes of populations using new measures in survey data.

Bader and Froese (2005), Froese, Bader and Smith (2008) and Mencken, Bader and Embry (Mencken, Bader, and Embry 2009) find that whether people believe in a wrathful, punishing God or in a loving, forgiving God is related to their levels of ethnic and political tolerance and generalised trust. These authors present evidence from American and international surveys showing that believers in a punishing God are less trusting and more likely to be intolerant towards members of ethnic minorities and towards political dissenters, while believers in a loving and forgiving God tend to be more trusting and more tolerant. Unnever, Cullen and Bartkoswki (2006) find that believers in a loving God are on average less supportive of the death penalty than believers in a punishing God.

These findings are not surprising given that the two God-images are essentially a distinction between punitive-authoritarian, and benign-empathic authority figures.

A person's image of God can be seen as their highest possible authority figure.

Since it is well-known from the literature that authoritarianism is positively related to intolerance towards ethnic and other out-groups (Altemeyer and

Hunsberger 1992; Wylie and Forest 1992; Bouchard 2009), one can expect believers in a harsh, punitive-authoritarian God to be more intolerant.

Some God-beliefs can be interpreted as measures of doctrinal believing: Surveys like the European Values Study (EVS 2010) and the International Social Survey Programme's Religion surveys (ISSP) (GESIS 2012) contain a question asking the respondents whether they believe in a Personal God, a Spirit or Life Force, whether they are agnostic, or do not believe in God at all. The phrasing of the question forces the respondent to choose one of these options. The Christian doctrine stipulates a personal God, therefore, a personal God would be the doctrinally correct answer for a Christian (Torrance 1996, 10–11).

Beliefs in sin, Heaven, Hell, Angels are also examples of doctrinal believing, while beliefs in horoscopes, faith healers and lucky charms are examples of beliefs that contradict the traditional doctrines of Christianity, Islam and Judaism. A related but distinct aspect of believing is the degree of adherence to religious doctrine. Doctrinal belief in the teachings of one's religion is both a measure of orthodoxy and of religious knowledge (Stark and Glock 1968). Belief in the doctrines of one's religion presupposes that the individual is informed about their content (Stark and Glock 1968, 141–142).

Furthermore, individuals can choose to what extent their beliefs are in accordance with the doctrinal teachings of their religion and whether to endorse beliefs that depart from these doctrines. Strict adherence to the doctrines of one's teaching indicates religious orthodoxy.

The findings in the empirical literature are not fully consistent. Furthermore, relationships vary between target groups of intolerance: Eisenstein (2006a) finds doctrinal orthodoxy and fundamentalism to be positively related to perceptions of

ethnic threat, Wilcox (1990) reports positive relationships between strict doctrinal beliefs and intolerance towards various out-groups including homosexuals, and Plugge-Faust and Strickland (2000) find positive links with homophobia.

On the other hand, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) find no relationship between doctrinal orthodoxy and prejudice towards minority groups, while Eisinga Felling and Peters (Eisinga, Felling, and Peters 1990b), and Scheepers (Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Hello 2002) find doctrinal believing of core church members to be negatively related to ethnic intolerance.

A majority of researchers on religion and homophobia find positive relationships, though most of them use church attendance and denominational belonging as proxies for religion and do not distinguish different beliefs.

Regarding ethnic intolerance, the majority of studies find doctrinal believing to be negatively related to intolerance towards ethnic out-groups.

4.1.3 Traditional versus Modern Individualised Beliefs

An important distinction regarding doctrinal believing and different God-beliefs is that between traditional and modern individualised beliefs. While belief in a personal God accords with the traditional doctrines of Christianity and Islam, belief in a Spirit/ Life Force (instead of a personal God) and beliefs in other forms of Divinity already depart from these traditions. These deviating beliefs can be classified as modern and individualised (Pollack and Picke1 2007, 604–605).

Sociologists of religion have observed an increase of such modern individualised beliefs and alternative forms of spirituality in Europe throughout the last decade, while traditional religiosity (church attendance and traditional beliefs and

practices) has been declining (Bruce 2002; Pollack 2003; Pollack and Pickel 2007; Voas 2009; Müller 2011).

Modernisation and individualisation theories state that the spread of alternative beliefs and practices that deviate from traditional religious doctrines signifies a process of pluralisation inside the traditional churches (Pollack 2008, 171; Van der Ven and Beauregard 1997, 21–22; Cesari 2004, 85–87). This pluralisation of values, beliefs, and lifestyles is seen as a product of modernisation (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 135–138). According to the theory, modernisation entails a decline of traditional religion and the spread of liberal and self-expressive values such as tolerance towards minorities and homosexuals (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 248). Tolerance towards homosexuals in particular is highlighted by modernisation theorists as a key self-expressive, liberal value of modern societies (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Modernisation theory conceptualises traditional religion as being on one end of a scale reaching from traditionalism to rational-secularism and self-expressive liberalism (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 49–55). The decline of traditional religion and the spread of tolerance are thus seen as part of the same process.

Modernisation theory is a top-down theory that largely focuses on the effects of macro-level processes on individual-level values and beliefs. The theory will thus be dealt with in more detail in chapter 5. For now, it suffices to note that in this thesis, a distinction is made between traditional belief in a personal God and modern, individualised and fuzzy beliefs. The latter are belief in a Spirit/Life Force and individualised forms of spirituality, like expressing an abstract sense of connecting with ‘the Divine’.

Links between the distribution of these beliefs across Europe, their relationship with tolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals and assumptions taken from modernisation theory will be analysed.

From the perspective of modernisation theory, one would expect the relationship between traditional religious beliefs and intolerance of ethnic out-groups and homosexuals to be positive, and the relationship between modern individualised beliefs and intolerance to be negative.

4.1.4 Religious Truth Claims and Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is one of the most frequently mentioned predictors of ethnic intolerance (Glock and Stark 1966; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Wylie and Forest 1992; Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2002), and homophobia (Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2002; Froese, Bader, and Smith 2008; Schwartz and Lindley 2009; Whitehead 2010; Eisenstein 2006a) in the literature. The findings reported in the literature are unanimously positive: fundamentalists are more intolerant of both ethnic out-groups and homosexuals than other people.

It is important to distinguish fundamentalism from doctrinal orthodoxy, as the two are very different concepts and show different relationships with tolerance in empirical studies. Doctrinal orthodoxy is defined as compliance of a person's beliefs with the traditional doctrines of their religion. However, belief in religious doctrines does not necessarily have to deny that other religions may also have some valid truths to offer. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, is exclusive.

Fundamentalism is defined in the literature as an exclusive truth-claim of one

religion over others (Kirkpatrick 1993; Leeming, Madden, and Stanton 2010). Fundamentalists are convinced that only their (religious) worldview is valid and legitimate. Fundamentalism has been operationalised in different ways in the literature. The most common operationalisations in survey research use statements emphasising the absoluteness and exclusiveness of the truth claim of the respondent's religion over other religions and worldviews. Some authors operationalize fundamentalism as biblical literacy (Kirkpatrick 1993; Woodberry 1998). Here again, an absolute and exclusive religious truth claim is made through the bible as the only valid spoken word of God. In this thesis fundamentalism is defined as an exclusive truth- and legitimacy claim of one religion over others, expressed as the statement 'there is only one true religion'³.

4.2 Religious Practice: Church Attendance and Social Capital

The second dimension of religiosity that is addressed in this thesis is the practice dimension. The most common measure of religious practice in the literature is church attendance. Regular church attendance is an indicator of both devoutness and exposure to an environment of religious peers and religious preaching.

Regular church attendance entails personal costs - the individual has to invest time

³ The statement 'there is only one true religion' is dummy-coded against the reference 'other religions have some basic truths as well' and 'all great world religions have some truths to offer'. The choice to operationalise the fundamentalist truth-claim via the statement 'there is only one true religion' was made for two reasons: firstly, the direct statement is expected to discriminate better than the indirect measure biblical literacy. People, who say they do not accept that other religions may also have some truths to offer, can plausibly be expected to have a general tendency towards intolerance. It is this aspect of fundamentalism that the analysis is interested in. Secondly, the EVS data do not contain a measure of biblical literacy.

and effort to go to church. People, who attend church regularly, are thus likely to be more devout than the average non-regular-and non-attender.

The second important aspect to church attendance has been emphasised by communitarian approaches: regular exposure to a religious environment and interacting with religious peers through church has been found to influence people's social attitudes. Most believers are not exposed to religious teachings in isolation. Beliefs are reinforced through the moral community of likeminded peers.

The notion of the church as a moral community was first developed by Émile Durkheim:

‘A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them’ (Durkheim 1912/1995, 44).

Durkheim emphasised the role religion plays for social cohesion by reaffirming societal rules, morals and hierarchies. The gathering of individuals as a moral community through church is an essential means to this: ‘A church is not simply a priestly brotherhood; it is a moral community made up of all the faithful, both laity and priests’ (Durkheim 1912/1995, 42).

Durkheim's notion of the church as a moral community was later picked up by Bainbridge (1989), Welch Welch, Tittle, and Petee (1991) and Stark and Bainbridge (1996) in their work on religion and social deviance, and followed up by a school of communitarians (Regnerus 2003; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Traunmüller 2011), most notably social capital theory.

Social capital theory is one of the most prominent paradigms in the social sciences. The theory emphasises that participation in churches and other religious

organisations, secular organisations and networks reinforces communal values like trust, tolerance, honesty and charity, which foster communal life and democracy (Putnam 2000, 65, 115).

According to Putnam, the social ties and values that are created through such social interactions make up the 'civic community' which is the basis of modern democracies (Putnam 1994, 120). In his earlier work, Putnam has already emphasised the importance of religious participation: 'Faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America' (Putnam 2000, 66). In their latest book, *American Grace*, Putnam and Campbell present an empirical analysis of relationships between religion and civic values like tolerance, good neighbourliness, trustworthiness, reciprocity, altruism in America (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 21, 38-40).

Putnam and Campbell report, based on American survey data, that although religious attendance is positively associated with good neighbourliness, generalised trust and charity (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 443–462), the relationship with tolerance is negative: Religious people in general and regular church attenders in particular, are less tolerant of dissent (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 444, 479) and decidedly less tolerant of homosexuality (Ibd., 459), and homosexuals (Ibd., 486) than people, who do not attend church. Nonetheless, Putnam and Campbell also found that tolerance has increased over the last couple of decades among both the religious and the non-religious, albeit more slowly among the religious (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 480).

The empirical literature on church attendance and intolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals so far shows mixed results:

Regarding ethnic intolerance, a number of earlier studies (Glock and Stark 1966; Stouffer 1966; Glock and Stark 1969; Beatty and Walter 1984) and some contemporary studies (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello 2002, Guiso et al. 2003) find that church attendance is positively related to racial exclusionism and intolerance of ethnic minorities. However, Strabac and Listhaug find church attendance to be positively related to ethnic intolerance only in Eastern Europe but not in the West (Strabac and Listhaug 2008, 280), Billiet and de Witte (2008) observe that non-religious Belgians are more likely than religious Belgians to express racist attitudes and to vote for the extreme right, and Coenders and Scheepers (2003, 332-333) report that regular churchgoers across Europe are less prejudiced towards ethnic minorities than non-churchgoers. Meulemann and Billiet (2011), too, find in their study on 25 European countries that church attendance has a negative effect on ethnic threat perceptions in most countries. The results are thus inconsistent, and more analysis is needed.

The findings are clearer for homophobia. The studies found in the literature unanimously report positive relationships with church attendance. Regular churchgoers are more likely than non-regular, and non-churchgoers to be homophobic (Plugge-Foust and Strickland 2000; Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Marsh and Brown 2009; J. P. Schwartz and Lindley 2009; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009; Whitehead 2010).

The statistical analysis presented in the empirical part of this thesis will examine how church attendance is related to intolerance towards ethnic out-groups (immigrants and people of a different race) and homosexuals across Europe. Furthermore, the models will compare the effect of church attendance compared

to measures of believing and religious belonging. If there is an independent religious social capital effect in Europe, this should show up in the analysis.

4.3 Religious Belonging, Collective Identities and Intolerance

The third dimension of religiosity relevant for tolerance is religious belonging. Religious belonging is most often operationalised via denominational affiliation. Membership in a religious denomination creates a collective group identity. According to identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Turner 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Seul 1999) group identities influence attitudes and behaviour towards out-group members. It has been argued that identification of an individual with a group takes place by delimiting the in-group from not accepted out-groups. Social experiments (Brewer 1979; Otten and Wentura 2001) have shown that group-membership creates a bias towards in-group members, who are favored as a result. Members of religious denominations, independent of their religious teachings, can thus be expected to be less tolerant towards homosexuals than non-members, since homosexuals are an obvious out-group for all major denominations in Europe. Indeed, empirical studies have repeatedly shown that members of religious denominations have less liberal moral attitudes than non-members (Hayes 1995b; Scheepers, Grotenhuis, and Slik 2002; Crocket and Voas 2003). Hayes finds that religious affiliation as such is related to more conservative and less tolerant attitudes, but Protestants do not differ significantly from Catholics when other variables are controlled for (Hayes 1995a; Hayes 1995b). With regard to denominational affiliation, two additional aspects need to be considered: in many European regions denominational membership is highly

clustered by ethnicity and region: obvious examples are Muslims in Western Europe, and Protestants and Catholics in the Orthodox majority countries of Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish clearly denominational from ethnic differences. The clustering has to be accounted for in the comparisons. Other related factors, such as legacies of ethnic- and religious conflict, religious diversity, group contact, and minority-status of a denomination are likely to influence tolerance towards out-groups. In order to get a net effect of denominational membership, contextual factors need to be controlled for. However, these contexts and their interactions with religious belonging are also of interest in their own right.

The analysis of this thesis is interested in exploring how religious and non-religious national contexts interact with the three dimensions of individual-level religiosity in their effects on ethnic intolerance and homophobia. This has not sufficiently been studied yet.

Secondly, differences in the moral cultures and religious doctrines of the different denominations could influence their members' propensity to tolerate out-groups. This has been theorized by most notably in Samuel Huntington's contested clash-of-civilisations-hypothesis (Huntington 1993). Huntington claimed that there is something culturally inherent in Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam that makes these religions incompatible with democracy (Ibd.). He thus concluded not only that the populations of Muslim and Orthodox countries do not endorse democratic values (tolerance being among these values), but also that Muslims and Orthodox are less tolerant on the individual-level.

The findings in the empirical literature on denominational effects on tolerance thus far are not consistent. A bulk of American studies find Evangelical

Protestants to be more intolerant towards homosexuals and other out-groups than Mainline Protestants, Catholics and Jews (Beatty and Walter 1984; Wilcox and Jelen 1990; Wylie and Forest 1992; Kirkpatrick 1993; Woodberry 1998; Loftus 2001; Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005).

However, Evangelicals may have quite different values in Europe than in the US, and comparisons between Protestants and Catholics may very well yield different results depending on the context. Scheepers, Grotenhuis and Slik (2002) and Hayes (Hayes 1995b) found no significant difference between Catholics and Protestants, rather having a religious affiliation per se mattered for tolerant attitudes (Ibd.), and Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello (2002) also found Catholics to be no more prejudiced towards immigrants than members of other denominations. A number of studies on Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Gerhards 2010; Akker, Ploeg, and Scheepers 2013) found Muslims to be more conservative and less tolerant than Catholics and Protestants (including Evangelicals), especially towards homosexuals. The question is, however, whether the supposed higher intolerance levels of Muslims are really due to religion or other factors, such as lower average levels of education and higher levels of poverty.

The statistical models presented in the empirical part of this thesis take denominational differences in the levels of ethnic intolerance and homophobia into account and also contextualise them. Since the empirical findings in the literature thus far are not consistent, it is difficult to speculate whether members of different denominations differ in their likelihood of being intolerant towards (a) ethnic out-groups, (b) homosexuals, and (c) which denominations are the least tolerant.

Since no specific denomination has been found to be more fundamentalist or closed-minded in their teachings than others, it seems the most plausible to hypothesize that across Europe as a whole, the four denominations we have data on (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Muslim) do not differ significantly in their members' likelihood of being intolerant towards both out-groups. However, denominational differences may occur in regions that have a legacy of ethnic and religious conflict.

4.4 Authoritarianism as a Moderator or a Mediator

Some of the literature, particularly in social psychology, suggests that authoritarianism moderates, or even mediates relationships between religion and political intolerance (Canetti-Nisim 2004; Bouchard 2009). Moderation and mediation are statistical terms that address the question of statistical effect and causality. The methodological literature defines a moderator as a third variable that changes the strength or direction of the effect of a predictor variable (Baron and Kenny 1986):

'In general terms, a moderator is a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable. Specifically within a correlational analysis framework, a moderator is a third variable that affects the zero-order correlation between two other variables.' (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1174).

A mediator, on the other hand, is a third variable that accounts for, or 'causes' the effect of a predictor variable (Ibd.):

'In general, a given variable may be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the criterion. Mediators explain how external physical events take on internal psychological significance. Whereas moderator variables specify when certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur.' (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1176).

In order to address the question whether authoritarianism has been found in the literature to be a moderator or a mediator, it is necessary to first define briefly what is meant by authoritarianism. The literature on authoritarianism is huge and dates back to Theodor W. Adorno's controversial study 'The authoritarian personality' (Adorno 1950/1995). Adorno's definition of authoritarianism as a personality trait and his measure, the F-scale, were contested since the book was published (Owen, Wald, and Hill 1991; Feldman 2003, 41–42). More recent approaches in social psychology use the same term, but its definition has moved away from Freudian interpretations of authoritarianism as a personality trait, towards social attitudes that favour authority over independence (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; Duckitt et al. 2010). However, definitions and measurement vary between studies and there is controversy over how the social construct 'authoritarianism' should be operationalised (Feldman 2003; Duckitt et al. 2010).

Based on current literature, authoritarianism is here defined as a combination of social attitudes that favour authority over independence (Duckitt et al. 2010, 688–692; Asbrock, Sibley, and Duckitt 2011, 331). Right-wing authoritarianism is defined as an attitude that favours an authoritarian form of government (e.g. 'a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament' or 'having the military in charge of the government') over a democracy.

Authoritarianism was found to be strongly positively related to closed-mindedness (Onraet et al. 2011), intolerance of dissent and intolerance of social out-groups (Wylie and Forest 1992; Canetti-Nisim 2004; Duckitt et al. 2010), and was also found to be related to religious fundamentalism (Wylie and Forest 1992; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001, 2002). The positive link between authoritarianism and fundamentalism is not surprising,

given that fundamentalism has been defined as an exclusive religious truth-claim based on an absolute epistemological authority of one religion. Nonetheless, religious authority-claims do not necessarily translate into authoritarianism in a worldly sense. There are studies that found different effects of fundamentalism and authoritarianism on prejudice (Canetti-Nisim 2004). It thus makes sense to keep these two concepts separate.

The literature on authoritarianism as a moderator or mediator of religion effects on ethnic intolerance and homophobia yields mixed findings:

Smidt and Penning (Smidt and Penning 1982) found a moderation between religiosity and conservatism: religious conservatives were less likely to be intolerant towards communists and atheists than non-religious conservatives.

Duck and Hunsberger (Duck and Hunsberger 1999, 166–167) found effects of intrinsic religiosity on racial prejudice to be mediated by authoritarianism, while the effect of extrinsic religiosity remained positive when controlling for authoritarianism (Ibd.). Canetti-Nisim (Canetti-Nisim 2004) finds, using an Israeli sample, that negative effects of religiosity on democratic values are mediated by authoritarianism.

Tsang and Rowatt (Tsang and Rowatt 2007) found positive effects of religiosity on self-reported sexual prejudice to be mediated by right-wing authoritarianism. Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick (2001) find religious fundamentalists less likely than non-fundamentalists to be racially intolerant, when authoritarianism is controlled for. However, this finding was not replicated elsewhere in the literature.

An analysis of relationships between religion and intolerance needs to take these mixed prior findings into account, particularly with regards to authoritarianism. The models presented in the empirical part of this thesis control for being right-wing and for a measure of authoritarianism. Possible moderation- and mediation effects between authoritarianism and religion will be taken into account where appropriate.

4.5 Other Known Predictors of Intolerance

An analysis of relationships between religion and intolerance needs to control for other variables that are known to be influential, in order to make sure that the effects found are not spurious. Known predictors of intolerant attitudes are low education (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Borgonovi 2012), unemployment (Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and feelings of anomy (Billiet 1995). Research on intolerance found women to be more tolerant than men (Hoxter and Lester 1994; Johnson, Brems, and Alford-Keating 1997) and older people to be more intolerant than the young (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002). The statistical analysis of the next chapters will control for these variables.

5. The Import of National Contexts

When carrying out comparisons across 47 countries, the import of national contexts has to be taken into account. Population-levels of ethnic intolerance and homophobia vary between countries and so do levels of religiosity. Contextual factors such as levels of wealth and political stability, average levels of religiosity of populations, religious country majorities, levels of ethnic and religious pluralism are all likely to influence not only the outcome variables of the analysis, but also relationships between religion and the outcomes. This chapter outlines the literature on the import of national contexts for intolerance and its relationship with religion.

While there is a small comparative literature on ethnic intolerance and homophobia that takes some contextual factors into account, there is still a lack of systematic comparisons of effects of socio-economic, political and religious contexts on individual-level relationships between religion and tolerance.

5.1 Moral Communities – Religion as a Context

Religion is not only a three-dimensional, but also a multi-level phenomenon. Religion can influence the citizen's attitudes and behaviour on the individual level, as personal religiosity, but also as a context.

The literature on religion as a context dates back to Émile Durkheim's classic notion of the church as a moral community that provides a shared set of common beliefs and values for its members (Durkheim, 1988/1912). The moral community

approach was developed further by Stark and Glock (1968), Bainbridge (1989), Welch, Tittle, and Petee (1991), and most notably Stark and Bainbridge (1996).

Studies in the moral communities tradition assume that being surrounded by religious others, living in a community of morally likeminded, through mechanisms of moral learning and social control influences citizen's attitudes and behaviour (Stark and Bainbridge 1996). Stark and Bainbridge (1996, 53–80) found that religious contexts have the potential to integrate individuals into society, and to curb deviant behaviour and crime. This finding was replicated by Regnerus (Regnerus 2003).

Social capital theory, a closely related concept, stresses that religious communities, by supplying pro-social moral values can encourage individuals to be more generous, helpful, more trusting (Traunmüller 2011), and altogether better neighbours (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Yet, in Europe it is just as plausible to expect the moral community to show its dark side. Religious communitarianism, by the same mechanisms of moral indoctrination and social control that has been argued to foster pro-social values has historically often led to prejudice, bigotry, social exclusion (Miller 1988) and even to violence against those who are not accepted members (Silberman 2005). The witch-hunts in early modern Europe and more recently in Africa and Asia, and the ethno-religious conflicts of the Balkan countries throughout the 1990s are obvious historical examples of the oftentimes violent potential of dysfunctional moral communities. In fact, Putnam and Campbell admit that although they found religion to have many beneficial effects on citizen's pro-social attitudes, increased tolerance was not one of them (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 58-62).

As a context, religion therefore has both the potential to foster tolerance and the potential to do just the opposite. The empirical analysis of the context part (part III) of this thesis explores how contextual level religiosity is related to intolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals in Europe.

5.2 The Religious Heritage of Countries – Huntington’s Clash-of-Civilisations Theory

A second theory on the influence of religious contexts on individual-level attitudes and behaviour refers to religious country majorities. Some argue that a country’s majority-denomination influences its citizen’s propensity to tolerate outsiders.

The religious-cultural heritage of countries as a contextual effect on individual attitudes has been emphasised notably by Samuel P. Huntington (1993). With his clash-of-civilisations hypothesis, Huntington suggested that citizens of eastern Orthodox-, and Islamic societies in particular were more authoritarian, less supportive of democracy, and less tolerant than citizens of Western societies. According to Huntington (1993), Islam, and to an extent also Orthodoxy is inherently authoritarian and undemocratic, and this quality impacts negatively on the citizen’s civic attitudes. Huntington’s thesis of a cultural clash along the lines of Islamic-Orthodox-versus-Western societies was empirically refuted by Norris and Inglehart (2002) who find that the cultural contradiction between Western liberal- and Islamic societies is about gender roles and homosexuality rather than other democratic values (Norris and Inglehart 2002, 260). In addition, Breznau et al. (2011) find no evidence of citizens in Muslim countries being more supportive of authoritarian rule. The finding that Muslim majority countries tend to have

more homophobic populations was confirmed by Adamczyk and Pitt (2009).

Štulhofer and Rimac (2009) report countries with Orthodox populations to have more homophobic populations than Protestant and Catholic countries.

We can summarise that there is some evidence in the literature suggesting that controlling for other variables, people living in Muslim and Orthodox majority countries are on average more homophobic. The findings for ethnic intolerance are less clear. Nonetheless, the many political conflicts involving references to Islam and Western Christianity that have been featured across the European mass media throughout the last decade seem to give Huntington some credit.

Furthermore, the history of ethnic conflicts in South-Eastern Europe, where ethnic and religious (particularly Orthodox and Muslim) group identities often overlap, lends some support to those arguing that ethnic intolerance appears to be particularly prevalent in Muslim and Orthodox majority countries. The question then is, whether there is a net-effect of religion that contributes to the problem and whether the analysis can find clues, as to drivers of intolerance in these regions. The empirical analysis of this thesis attempts to find clues, as to how much the religious denominational composition of Europe's countries contributes to the problem and how the effect of the religious context compares to effects of other variables.

Given the contemporaneousness of the data used, the limited number of countries that can be allocated to each religious majority and the complexity of the problem, it has to be noted that any attempt to establish causality would be a near impossible challenge. The aim of the analysis can thus only be to find evidence of patterns of intolerance across Europe, and to determine which contextual and individual-level factors most plausibly contribute to an explanation.

5.3 Modernisation Theory: the Import of Wealth and Security

Modernisation theory is one of the most influential theories of contextual effects on individual attitudes. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) state that by creating more secure and wealthy contexts, and thus improving the life circumstances of populations on the macro level, modernisation leads to a change of human values on the individual level. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2–5, 94–96) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) find that populations of more modernised, wealthier countries with higher levels of human development tend to endorse more self-expressive, emancipative and secular-rational values while populations of less modernised countries tend to favour traditional, religious and survival values. The more countries modernise over time, the less religious and traditionalistic, and the more liberal the values of their populations become (2005, 124–134).

Religion is operationalised by Inglehart and Welzel as part of a conglomerate of traditional- and survival values (2005, 49–55). These authors show that the more modernised a country is, the less religious is its population. Secularisation is seen by modernisation theory as an important indicator of social change (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 290).

As a key explanation for the values-change towards liberalism, self-expression and tolerance, Inglehart and Welzel mention the fact that democratisation, greater wealth and security result in people having more choice over their lives; consequently they favour values that promote choice and freedom (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2, 31).

Following modernisation theory, the key indicators promoting social change are country-level wealth (GDP), human development and human security (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 3, 4, 33).

In this thesis, political stability is used as an indirect measure of security. The World Bank has developed an index of political stability and absence of political violence measuring perceptions based on expert interviews and household surveys (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 26) ‘of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 6).

The models in part III of the thesis compare the effects of country-level wealth and political stability on ethnic intolerance and homophobia with the effect of other contextual measures.

In the literature thus far, a negative relationship between country-level wealth and ethnic intolerance was confirmed by Schneider (2007, 61–62) and Doebler (2013). A negative relationship between wealth and human development and homophobia was confirmed by Gerhards (2010, 20). However, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2001) find the stability and duration of democracy more influential for political tolerance than wealth, and Strabac and Listhaug (2008, 279–280) find a country’s GDP not to be influential for ethnic intolerance⁴.

⁴ However, Strabac and Listhaug analyse Eastern Europe and Western Europe in separate models. They thus end up with a very limited number of countries, hence a limited country variation of GDP in their models, which precludes a significant effect of GDP. There is thus reason to suspect their result to be a false negative.

5.4 Governance Matters: Democracy, Political Stability, Anti-Corruption and LGBT-Rights

Similar to modernisation theory, some approaches emphasise the import of good governance. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) found political stability, wealth, democratic freedom and absence of corruption to be positively related to generalized trust. Uslaner (2003, 2008) and Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) emphasise the importance of income inequality and government corruption for trust and tolerance. Peffley and Rohrschneider (2001) and Coenders and Scheepers (2003) find that being exposed to democratic rule is key to pro-social values like tolerance of ethnic minorities.

With regard to attitudes towards homosexuals, the degree of implementation of LGBT-rights of countries is likely to be a key variable. Not much research has been carried out looking at relationships between LGBT-rights implementation and tolerance towards homosexuals. In fact, to the author's knowledge there is to date only one study that includes an index of laws discriminating against homosexuals in a cross-country comparison with homophobia as the outcome (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009).

Chapter 12 of this thesis examines relationships between country-level contexts, such as the degree of implementation of gay-rights⁵ per country, country-level wealth (GDP), corruption and political stability and attitudes towards homosexuals.

⁵ Because the index used here only measures the extent to which gay partnerships are legalised and the degree of implementation of the civil right to gay partnerships and gay marriages, but not specific civil rights of bisexual- and transgender people, the authors refer to 'gay-rights' in the empirical analysis, rather than 'LGBT'-rights.

5.5 Contact Theory, Group Competition and Threat Perceptions

The last two contextual theories to be considered are contact theory and group-competition theory. The two approaches are treated next to each other because they are related and are competing in an ongoing academic discourse. Both focus on the impact of religious- and ethnic diversity on people's tolerance towards ethnic out-groups.

Group competition theory holds that with increasing numbers of immigrants, members of the ethnic majority tend to perceive minority-members as a competition and a threat (Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Hello 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). Putnam (2007, 149) and Hooghe, Reeskens and Stolle (2009, 213–217) report similar findings for generalized trust in that people tend to 'hunker down' and trust others less under conditions of increased ethnic diversity.

Contact-theorists (Pettigrew 1995, Pettigrew 1998, Schneider, 2011), on the other hand, stress that greater numbers of immigrants in a society, and a greater ethnic diversity in general enhance chances of intergroup contact and thus may reduce ethnic prejudice. The idea is that with increased contact to members of the out-group individuals form inter- group friendships, and thus develop 'bridging social capital', which crosses cultural group-divides (Putnam 2000, 22–24; Schneider 2007, 60–61).

The contextual part of this thesis analyses whether higher proportions of foreign-born among the populations of countries and their net-migration rates are related to lower levels of ethnic intolerance. Unfortunately, the survey data used in this thesis do not contain a measure of inter-group contact to members of different

ethnic groups, so that it is not possible to operationalise inter-group contact on the individual level.

However, the contact-versus group competition discourse is not at the centre of the analyses of this thesis. Rather, the models aim to control for high numbers of immigrants (and thus a higher chance of inter-group contact) because these two theories are influential.

Another source of threat perceptions lies in the political contexts of the countries under study. As mentioned in 5.3 and 5.4, a country's perceived security and stability are likely to influence its citizen's social attitudes. Furthermore, social attitudes develop over long periods of time and are likely influenced by the countries' histories. Many countries in the EVS - particularly the South-Eastern European countries have histories of ethno-religious conflict and violence.

Regions such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Chechnya and Turkey suffer from such histories and in many cases ethnic conflicts are part of the country's recent history. Religious identities are often tied to ethnic identities in these regions and ethnic-religious conceptions of national identity are often prevalent. Theories of ethnic versus civic conceptions of national identities (Smith 1991; Greenfeld and Chirot 1994; Janmaat 2006) may help explain why ethnic intolerance tends to be high in such regions. Previous research (Hjerm 1998; Heath and Tilley 2005; Janmaat 2006) has shown that a strong identification with ethnic conceptions of national identities are positively related to xenophobia and intolerance towards ethnic out-groups.

Section 10.2 in chapter 10 gives an in-depth account of the historical literature on ethnic conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and discusses theories how they may influence social attitudes like tolerance. The most prominent theory approach

equipped to help understand such relationships is identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Brewer and Pierce 2005) and theories of ethnic versus civic national identity (Smith 1991; Greenfeld and Chirof 1994; Janmaat 2006).

Summary and Conclusion

This literature review summarised the state of the art of research on the significance of religion for the European citizen's tolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals. In the theory part, ethnic intolerance and homophobia were defined, and empirical operationalisations discussed.

Classical and contemporary theories and definitions of religion were presented, and a three-dimensional concept of religiosity that distinguishes a believing-, a belonging- and a practice dimension was proposed for the empirical analysis, which follows in the remainder of this thesis.

The review of the literature demonstrated the necessity to distinguish between individual-level and contextual effects when carrying out large-scale cross-national comparisons. An analysis strategy was outlined and the following research questions were formulated:

How is religion in Europe related to the citizens' likelihood of being intolerant towards ethnic out-groups and towards homosexuals? Are religious believing, belonging and practice differently related to ethnic intolerance and homophobia?

Secondly, how do national contexts of wealth (GDP), political stability and good governance, religious contexts, and ethnic diversity influence the European populations' likelihood of being of intolerant towards ethnic out-groups and

homosexuals? Are between-country differences explained by specific country-level traits? Do these national contexts moderate relationships between religion and intolerance on the individual level?

The empirical part of this thesis outlines working hypothesis of expected relationships based on the reviewed literature and presents statistical analyses of relationships between religion and intolerance in Europe, mainly based on multilevel modelling techniques.

II. Empirical Analysis: Individual-Level Relationships

6. Data, Methods, Operationalisation

In this chapter, the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are developed based on the literature review of the previous chapter. The data and methods used to test the hypotheses are specified and the operationalisations of the dependent and independent variables are described.

6.1 Research Strategy and Hypotheses

The empirical part of the thesis is divided into two main parts: chapters 9 to 11 examine individual-level relationships between religion and intolerance across Europe as a whole, using the pooled EVS-data. To this end two-level random intercept models are carried out. A binary logistic model was chosen for the three binary outcome variables of the analysis ('would not like as neighbours: immigrants', 'would not like as neighbours: people of a different race', 'would not like as neighbours: homosexuals') and a hierarchical linear model was chosen for the continuous outcome variable ('homosexuality is never justifiable', 10-point scale).

Apart from examining relationships across Europe, the analyses will also test to what extent the relationships vary between countries. To this end, random slopes of the religion-effects that are found to be significant in the random intercept models are introduced as a second stage of the statistical modelling.

The second part of the thesis, chapters 10 to 13, focuses on the effects of national religious, economic and political contexts on ethnic tolerance and homophobia. To this end, country-level explanatory variables are included in the multilevel models. Furthermore, cross-level interactions between the country-level variables and individual-level religiosity are fitted, to tease out to what extent individual-level relationships between religion and intolerance are moderated by country-level traits.

The final step of the analyses takes a closer look at a South-Eastern European cluster of countries that are found to be outliers in the models on ethnic intolerance: chapter 11 presents in-depth analyses trying to tease out why the relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance are different in these countries than in the rest of Europe.

6.1.1 Individual-Level Hypotheses for Ethnic Intolerance as the Outcome

In this section, hypotheses regarding relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance are developed based on the review of the literature.

With regard to ethnic intolerance the following individual level hypotheses are derived from the literature:

H1: *Church Attendance is negatively related to intolerance of ethnic out-groups.*

People who go to church regularly are less likely to be intolerant towards immigrants and racially intolerant than non-regular and non-churchgoers.

The reasoning behind H1 is that people, who go to church regularly, are exposed to the moral teachings they hear in mass. Because the teachings of all major religions contain pro-social values such as tolerance, love, neighbourliness and human dignity, regular exposure to these teachings consequently encourages tolerance of others. People who attend religious services regularly are exposed to these teachings more than people who do not.

In addition to church attendance, the importance of religion for the respondents' personal lives is included as a measure of religious devoutness. It can be assumed that people who find religion 'very important' or 'quite important' reflect the moral teachings of their religion more than people who do not. One important reason for including importance of religion alongside church attendance is that not all religions require regular attendance. For example, Meulemann and Billiet have pointed out that Muslim women attend mosque less than men without necessarily being less religious (Meulemann and Billiet 2011, 16). These authors found that on the contrary, women tend to be more religious than men in most countries (Ibd.).

It is thus necessary to include a second measure of religious devoutness alongside church attendance in order to also capture religiosity effects for people who for various reasons do not attend church. Like church attendance, importance of religion is a measure of religious devoutness. Therefore, it makes sense to expect the same relationship, as for church attendance.

H2: People who find religion important are less likely than people who do not find religion important, to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups.

Regarding possible effects of religious believing, it is hypothesized here that:

H3a: Belief in a 'Personal God' and belief in a 'Spirit/Life Force' are both negatively related to ethnic intolerance.

As mentioned in the literature review, religious believing can be interpreted as a form of intrinsic, inwardly oriented religiosity. Following Allport and Ross's theory one would expect religious believers to identify with the moral teachings of their religion. Allport and Ross (1967, 434) note that religious believers internalize the teachings of their religion. Since all major religions in Europe promote moral values of neighbourly love, care and tolerance (Eisenstein, 2006b, Vaticana, 2011, Anonymous, 2007), non-fundamentalist religious believing is expected to be negatively related to intolerance.

The analyses of this thesis include two measures of a modern, individualised, fuzzy belief in a Spirit/Life Force, alongside traditional belief in a personal God in order to capture differential effects of traditional and modern beliefs. The author muses in line with modernisation theory that believers in a Spirit/Life force and individualised believers ('I have my own way of connecting with the Divine') are more modernised and open-minded, and therefore more tolerant than traditional believers.

H3b: Modern, individualised belief in God as a 'Spirit or Life Force' and expressions of individualised religiosity are expected to be more strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance than belief in a personal God.

The last hypothesis referring to the believing dimension of religion concerns fundamentalism:

H4: Religious fundamentalism is positively related to ethnic intolerance.

Regarding the belonging dimension of religion, this research is interested in differences between members of Christian denominations, Muslims and non-members. Unfortunately, the European Values Study-data used for the analysis (EVS 2010) do only contain 83 Jewish participants, not enough to enable meaningful comparisons across all three major Abrahamic religions.

As to the statistical relationships between religious belonging and ethnic intolerance, the review of the literature showed inconsistent results. Also, no convincing account was found, as to whether denominations differ in the degree of conservatism and authoritarianism of their teachings. The author does therefore not expect to find statistically significant differences between denominations across Europe as a whole:

H5: Members of different religious denominations do not differ significantly in their levels of ethnic intolerance.

It was argued above that religious people are exposed to teachings of neighbourly love and tolerance, and are therefore less likely to be intolerant than non-religious people. It is, however, plausible that the so-called nominal Christians, - people who are not devout but strongly identify with a denomination (Voas and Day 2010) may be more intolerant than their devout peers, because they seek religious

membership as a group identifier, rather than for the sake of religion itself. This musing concurs with identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Seul 1999). If positive relationships between denominational belonging and ethnic intolerance are found, it is thus of interest whether devoutness is a moderator. If devout members are found to be more intolerant than non-devout and non-members, there is reason to assume that this is a true religiosity effect. If, however, belonging to a denomination is related to intolerance only for the non-devout, but not for the devout, then this would point towards an association with religious belonging as an identity-marker, not a true religiosity effect. This can be explored via interaction terms between denominational membership and church attendance⁶.

6.1.2 Individual-Level Hypotheses for Homophobia as the Outcome

Based on the discussion of the literature in the previous chapter, the following hypotheses are posed with regard to the relationship between religion and homophobia:

***H6a:** Church attendance, importance of religion, belief in a personal God and fundamentalism are positively related to both moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.*

⁶ Church attendance is used as a measure of religious devoutness because going to church regularly requires individual effort. Thus frequent churchgoers are assumed to be more devout than non-regular and non-churchgoers. Arguably, strong religious believing can also be a measure of devoutness. However, our measure of believing, 'Personal God' versus 'Spirit/Life Force' and non-belief is not a Likert-scale, hence it does not measure the intensity of belief. Thus church attendance is the best measure for devoutness in our data.

Since church attendance, importance of religion, belief in a personal God and fundamentalism do not contradict traditionalistic religiosity, but rather accord with it (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 50–53), it is plausible to expect these religiosity measures to be positively related to both moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group of people.

The literature review has shown that this also accords with findings by other authors (Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Whitehead 2010; Gerhards 2010, 15, 19–22; Crocket and Voas 2003).

However, it was also discussed above that traditional religiosity is likely more strongly related to moralistic homophobia than to intolerance towards homosexuals as a group. It was mentioned above that all three Abrahamic religions regard homosexual behaviour as a sin. However, at the same time there are teachings to ‘hate the sin but not the sinner’, which encourage believers to welcome homosexuals in church. Therefore it is hypothesized here, that:

H6b: *Church attendance, importance of religion, belief in a personal God and fundamentalism are more strongly positively related to moralistic homophobia than to intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.*

The literature distinguishes between traditional and fuzzy, modern, individualised religiosity. The two forms of religiosity have been found to be differently related to values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 31). Therefore, modern individualised believers and believers in a Spirit or Life Force are expected to be more tolerant towards homosexuals than traditional believers.

H7: Belief in a 'Spirit/Life Force' and individualised religiosity are expected to be negatively related to both moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.

Recent events in the Western public arena, the growing acceptance of gay priests and legitimacy of gay-marriage in Protestant churches of many European countries, and increasingly positive reactions among the Catholic youth signify a social change that reaches inside the churches. The first group of believers that can be expected to become more tolerant towards homosexuals are the progressive, modern and individualised believers: believers in a Spirit/Life force and individualised believers. It is thus plausible to hypothesize that this group is more likely to tolerate gay people and to support LGBT- rights than traditional believers and the average non-believer.

Last but not least, denominational influences on tolerance towards homosexuals are tested. It is a common stereotype among the European public that Muslims are more homophobic than members of other religious groups. Much of this is surely based on Islamophobia, fed by mass media and exploited by the extreme right across Europe. Nonetheless, there are some valid reasons to expect Muslims to be more intolerant towards homosexuals: academic research repeatedly found the populations of Muslim majority countries to be more homophobic than the populations of non-Muslim majority countries (Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Gerhards 2010). Islamic societies tend to have stricter gender roles, gender segregation and more rigid sexual morals. Moreover, the legal systems of many Islamic countries still include laws that criminalise and punish

homosexuality. The presence of such legislations has great normative power and is likely to translate to the individual level and to aggravate public resentment against homosexuals.

In Eastern Europe, too, public resentment against homosexuals across the population is greater than in Western Europe and in several Eastern European countries (Russia and Belarus being prominent examples) anti-gay laws exist. The civic protests following every gay pride parade that was held in an Eastern European country in the last decade were covered extensively in the European mass media. Religious symbolism and imagery was frequently seen on protest demonstrations against gay pride parades. Our prior knowledge thus suggests that Orthodox, too, are more homophobic than others. One can therefore hypothesize:

H8: Muslims and Orthodox are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexual behaviour and towards homosexuals than Catholics, Protestants and unchurched people.

6.1.3 Context Hypotheses for Ethnic Intolerance as the Outcome

Comparisons of relationships between religion and attitudes across 47 European countries can only be meaningful if the influence of national contexts is taken into account. Levels of overall religiosity, wealth, political stability and corruption differ substantially across European countries. As mentioned earlier, the different cultural histories of Europe are likely to have an impact on the citizens' attitudes. Some countries are characterized by histories of ethnic and religious tensions and violence, roughly half the respondents in the sample live in countries that still

struggle with the long-term effects of their communist past, and last but not least, the religious composition of countries differs. It is crucial to take these substantial contextual differences into account not only to enable generalizations across the pooled data, but also in order to get the bigger picture.

The analysis of this thesis is interested not only in making general claims but also in examining, how tolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals differs across countries and under what circumstances religion is an influential factor.

The set of hypotheses presented in this section refers to the effect of religious, socio-economic and political national contexts, which are at the centre of part III of this thesis.

Hypotheses referring to Socio-Political and Economic Contexts:

Two important related theories are to be tested regarding the effect of socio-political and economic context: modernisation theory and approaches that emphasise the import of political stability, good governance and absence of corruption. As discussed earlier, some approaches (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008, Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007, Coenders and Scheepers, 2003) emphasise the import of good governance, political stability, wealth, democratic freedom and absence of corruption for the citizens' social attitudes. The following hypothesis can be derived concerning the direct effects of socio-political contexts on ethnic intolerance:

H9: *People are more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups if they live in countries with low levels of political stability, low levels of democratic freedom, and high levels of corruption.*

The second contextual hypothesis concerns the indirect effect of socio-political contexts on relationships between individual-level religiosity and ethnic intolerance. Modernisation-theory and related top-down approaches view religion and its effect on social attitudes as dependent on context. Hence, in less democratic, politically unstable countries, religion often substitutes social security and is therefore more traditionalistic, authoritarian and absolutistic than in modernised, politically stable settings (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 31, 45; Norris and Inglehart 2004, 14–16, 62, 217–220). From this perspective one would consequently hypothesise:

H10: *In countries with low levels of political stability and democratic freedom and high levels of corruption individual religiosity is positively related to ethnic intolerance.*

This remains to be tested in the empirical part. Furthermore, in order to test modernisation theory's assumptions regarding the effect of country wealth on tolerance:

H11: *People living in wealthier countries with high levels of per capita GDP are less likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people living in poorer countries.*

Inglehart and Welzel theorise furthermore that religion has more influence on people's social attitudes in poorer than in wealthier countries.

The mechanism is again that poor countries are less economically safe, hence religion in poorer settings often substitutes security and safety. People in poorer countries thus tend to rely on religion for values of safety, stability and authority (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 31, 45). In wealthier contexts, on the other hand, religion loses its authority, but still serves other social functions as a supplier of meaning (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 31). Thus religion in economically poor contexts is likely to be positively related to intolerance.

***H12:** Religious people are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than non-religious people in poorer countries, but not in wealthier countries.*

Hypotheses Referring to Contexts of Ethnic Diversity and Migration:

As discussed in the literature review, a country's ethnic diversity can also affect its citizen's propensity to tolerate ethnic out-groups. While group-competition and group-threat theorists claim that citizens of countries with high migration rates are more likely to be intolerant, contact theorists make the opposite claim.

***H13:** Citizens living in countries with high numbers of immigrants and high percentages of foreign-born are less likely to express ethnic intolerance than citizens of countries with low numbers of immigrants and citizens of sending-countries of migrants.*

Hypotheses Referring to Religious National Contexts:

Religion as a context could work in two different ways: Most of the scientific literature so far emphasises the civic benefits of the moral community: Studies in the Durkheimian tradition suggest that the moral community of religious others encourages conformity and pro-social values in individuals (Stark and Bainbridge 1996, Putnam and Campbell 2010, Traunmüller 2011).

However, the literature review has shown that the moral community also has its dark side. It was argued that religious communities by the same mechanisms of moral indoctrination and social control that are said to foster good neighbourliness (Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Putnam and Campbell 2010) have historically often generated prejudice, social exclusion, and violence against those who are not accepted members.

For the European context with its histories of ethno-religious wars, especially in the Balkan and Caucasian countries, where religion is often still tied to ethnic identities, it is plausible to expect highly religious contexts to be linked with a climate of ethnic intolerance. One can therefore hypothesize that:

H14: *Citizens living in countries with high levels of average religiosity are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than citizens living in less religious countries.*

The second religious context examined in this thesis is the denominational composition of countries. Samuel P. Huntington's (1993) clash-of-civilisations-hypothesis was discussed in the literature review. In order to test, whether the

populations of Muslim and Orthodox countries are indeed more intolerant and whether the religious majority denomination of countries influences attitudes on the individual level, the percentage of members of each religious denomination per country was included in the multilevel models in the contextual part of this thesis:

***H15:** People living in countries with Muslim and Orthodox majorities are more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people in countries with Christian and unchurched majorities.*

Because religious and ethnic identities in Europe are often tied together, the same competition-versus group-contact argument that accompanies H 13 can be made regarding the impact of religious pluralism. High levels of religious pluralism of countries can lead to individuals feeling threatened by the presence of substantial numbers of culturally different others and can thus lead to more prejudice (Borgonovi 2012). On the other hand, contact theory would argue that more religious pluralism could have just the opposite effect: by opening up opportunities of exchange between people of different beliefs and ethnic identities religious pluralism could lead to more tolerance (Putnam and Campbell 2010). However, it can be hypothesized for now that:

***H16:** Citizens of countries with high levels of religious pluralism are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than citizens living in countries with lower levels of religious pluralism.*

6.1.4 Context Hypotheses for Homophobia as the Outcome

For homophobia, the same contextual mechanisms are expected as for ethnic intolerance. In addition, the degree to which gay rights are implemented in each country's legal code was also modelled as a predictor variable of homophobia.

For the analysis of contextual effects

***H17a:** People are more likely to be homophobic if they live in poor countries, and countries with low levels of political stability and high levels of corruption.*

***H17b:** The more advanced a country is in its implementation of gay rights, the less intolerant are its citizens towards homosexuals.*

***H18:** Individual religiosity is positively related to homophobia predominantly in poor countries and countries with low levels of political stability and high levels of corruption.*

Hypotheses Referring to Religious National Contexts:

***H19:** Citizens living in countries with higher levels of overall religiosity are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals than citizens living in less religious countries.*

***H20:** People living in countries with Muslim and Orthodox majorities are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals than people in countries with Christian and unchurched majorities.*

6.2 Data

The analysis is carried out using data from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS 2010). The EVS includes 67786 respondents living in 47 European countries and is therefore the survey with the most comprehensive coverage of Europe to date.

The analysis of this thesis covers all 47 countries that took part in the survey and thus spans the whole geographical territory that is commonly understood as Europe. The author is aware that definitions of what constitutes Europe as an economic and political construct are often based on narratives and normative interpretations (Eder 2006). Europe is here understood merely in a geographical sense. The range of countries used in this thesis is listed in Table B in Appendix F. Table B also groups the countries into seven geographic regions to facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the results: South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, East Central Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe and Scandinavia. In addition, the table indicates, which countries have a communist past.

Later in the empirical part, in Chapters 9 and 11, geographical maps are presented visualising relationships found in the analyses and thus facilitating a contextualisation of the results. These maps are based on the same understanding of European regions the grouping of Table B is based on.

Because of Eastern Germany's communist past and the resulting cultural differences between the two parts of Germany, Eastern and Western Germany are treated as separate entities throughout the analysis.

Sampling

The data are representative samples of the countries' adult populations of 18 years and older, and were collected in each country via representative multi-stage or stratified random sampling. The EVS methods report states that multi-stage or stratified random sampling was used in all countries (GESIS 2010, 19). Table A in Appendix F lists all countries that took part in the survey with their sample sizes, response rates and the sampling procedure that was applied in each country. The net sample size is 1000-1500 respondents per country, except Northern Cyprus (500 respondents), Northern Ireland (500 respondents), and Iceland (808 respondents) (EVS 2013). Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) was used in most countries. However, it can be seen from Table A (Appendix F), that Finland is an exception, as the Finnish EVS-data are based on an internet panel that was carried out in addition to a CAPI survey. According to the EVS extended study description and the Finnish Method Report (EVS 2013), the individuals were recruited from random CATI and CAPI samples, and no self-recruitment or online recruitment of respondents was pursued. Although a method of random probability sampling was pursued in the Finnish case as well (see Table A in Appendix F, and the EVS method report for further detail), the fact that the Finnish data are based on an online panel does affect their comparability to the other country samples. Nonetheless, Finland does not show up as an outlier in the models presented in this thesis. Also, the numbers for Finland for racial intolerance in the EVS are similar to the numbers in the European Social Survey (ESS).

Another exceptional country in terms of the sampling method applied is France. In France, in addition to the random probability sample that constitutes the main

survey, quota samples were also taken. The French sample used in this thesis is the main sample only, which is based exclusively on random sampling. The additional quota samples are not part of the integrated data file and are not used in this thesis. For two countries, Poland and Turkey, no detailed information was available about the sampling procedure at the time of writing. However, the EVS survey documentation states explicitly that random probability sampling was carried out in all participating countries (GESIS 2010, 19).

One problem of social surveys, which could lead to non-response bias, is a low response rate. Table A (in appendix F) shows that in France, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Greece and Malta the response rate was less than 40%. Since it is known from survey methodology (Lyberg and Stukel 2010, 248; Blom, Jaeckle, and Lynn 2010, 335–336) that survey non-response is very likely not random, this may have led to some degree of non-response bias in these countries.

6.3 Dependent and Independent Variables of the Analysis

This section explains how the dependent and independent variables are operationalised.

6.3.1 Ethnic Intolerance and Homophobia

There are various operationalisations of intolerance and prejudice in the literature. The most established and widely used operationalisations are Bogardus' classical social distance scale (Parrillo and Donoghue, 2005, Lee et al., 1996) and several versions of least liked scales asking the respondents to what extent they would grant their least liked social group the same civil rights as the majority population (Gibson and Bingham 1982, 76). In this thesis ethnic intolerance is measured by two binary indicators 'I would not like as neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers' and 'I would not like as neighbours: members of a different race'. The two items are part of a battery of questions that identify fifteen groups of people⁷ (Table 1). The respondents were shown a list of groups and asked to identify each group that they would not like to have as neighbours.

The choice of measures is based on two considerations: firstly, the two variables were chosen over other EVS-variables that capture more general attitudes towards immigrants. The aim is to ensure that the models capture ethnic intolerance across all 47 countries, rather than just xenophobia, a general resentment towards immigration based on anxiety. If respondents express unwillingness to accept a

⁷ The wording of the question is 'On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours: - 'people with a criminal record', - 'people of a different race', - 'left wing extremists', - 'heavy drinkers', -right-wing extremists', -'people with large families', - 'emotionally unstable people, - 'Muslims', - 'immigrants/foreign workers', 'people who have AIDS', - 'drug addicts', - 'homosexuals', - 'Jews', - 'Gypsies', - 'Christians''.

particular group of people as neighbours then this is a clear and unambiguous expression of intolerance. When the group in question is ‘people of a different race’, rejecting them as neighbours can be seen as an expression of blatant racism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995).

Table 1: The Intolerance Items, as they appear in the EVS- 2008- Questionnaire

| Item | ‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?’ | mentioned | Not mentioned |
|------|---|-----------|---------------|
| V46 | People with a criminal record | 1 | 0 |
| V47 | People of a different race | 1 | 0 |
| V48 | Left wing extremists | 1 | 0 |
| V49 | Heavy Drinkers | 1 | 0 |
| V50 | Right Wing Extremists | 1 | 0 |
| V51 | People with large families | 1 | 0 |
| V52 | Emotionally unstable people | 1 | 0 |
| V53 | Muslims | 1 | 0 |
| V54 | Immigrants/Foreign workers | 1 | 0 |
| V55 | People who have AIDS | 1 | 0 |
| V56 | Drug Addicts | 1 | 0 |
| V57 | Homosexuals | 1 | 0 |
| V58 | Jews | 1 | 0 |
| V59 | Gypsies | 1 | 0 |
| V60 | Christians | 1 | 0 |

Note: The item ‘Christians’ (V60) was not asked in most countries and was therefore excluded from the analysis.

The second reason for choosing these two items lies in a limitation of the data: the EVS does not contain a full social distance scale, a feeling-thermometer (Kalkan et al. 2009), or a least-liked measure (Moore and Ovadia 2006). Both would have been preferable to the ‘would not like as neighbours’-items because they are well-

known, validated measures of intolerance that allow for more differentiation in degrees of intolerance. After carrying out careful scale reliability, dimensionality and measurement invariance tests⁸ it was apparent that the two items chosen are the best variables the EVS 2008 has to offer to measure ethnic intolerance across the 47 countries under study.

Based on the review of the literature, two forms of homophobia are distinguished in the analysis: Moralistic homophobia based on the attitude that homosexuality as a sexual behaviour is morally wrong, is measured via the statement 'homosexuality is never justifiable' (1-10 scale). Intolerance towards homosexuals as a group is operationalised via the statement 'would not like as neighbours: homosexuals' (binary, 1- yes, 0 - no).

We learned from the literature review that religion can be differently related to the two forms of homophobia. A religious conservative may refer to Bible-, or Qur'an- passages that condemn homosexuality and thus strongly agree with the statement 'homosexuality is never justifiable' on moral grounds, but s/he might at the same time be tolerant towards homosexuals as a group and be quite happy accepting them as neighbours. The two forms of homophobia are qualitatively different. Therefore, it is preferable to capture both forms in order to get a fuller picture.

Authoritarianism is measured via the statements 'a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament would be a good thing', and 'obedience is important for a child to learn at home'.

⁸ These tests are presented in section 7.4.1.

6.3.2 Independent Variables

Five indicators of individual-level religiosity are included in the analyses:

Religious practice is measured by frequency of church attendance. This ensures comparability with prior research as church attendance has been a standard measure of religious practice throughout the literature. Moreover, church attendance is an important indicator of religious devoutness and active involvement in a moral community (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). In addition to church attendance, the importance of religion for the respondents is included in the analysis as an additional measure of devoutness. This indicator has also frequently been used in the literature.

Religious believing is operationalised via three different types of belief in God: belief in a personal God, as a traditional religious belief that is in accordance with the doctrines of all major monotheistic religions, belief in a Spirit/Life Force, as a more fuzzy modernised form of belief (Voas 2009), and expressions of religious individualisation⁹.

In addition to the two beliefs in God, the statement ‘I have my own way of connecting with the divine’ is included in the models as a measure of individualised religiosity that, according to individualisation- and secularisation theorists, is typical for a new generation of increasingly religiously unattached,

⁹ Both beliefs in God are categories of V125: ‘Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?’ - ‘there is a personal God’, - ‘there is some sort of Spirit or Life Force’, - ‘I don’t know what to think’, - ‘I don’t really think there is any sort of God, Spirit or Life/Force’. The respondents could only choose one answer. Unfortunately, the atheist answer could not be included in the models because in various countries, particularly in South-Eastern Europe, the number of respondents that chose this answer was too small to make meaningful comparisons possible: in Armenia 35 respondents, in Azerbaijan no respondents, in Cyprus 6 respondents, in Northern Cyprus 20 respondents, in Georgia 6 respondents, in Romania 21 respondents, and in Turkey 21 respondents made the atheist statement. The agnostic answers ‘I don’t know what to think’ and the atheist answer ‘I don’t really believe there is any sort of God, Spirit or Life Force’ were thus collapsed to form the reference category of the analysis.

yet still spiritual people (Pollack and Pickel, 2007, Voas, 2009). Proponents of modernisation theory would expect the two latter beliefs to be associated with a lower probability of being intolerant as these forms of belief are seen as a phenomenon accompanying modernisation and a value change towards more liberal and emancipative values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

As measures of religious belonging four dummy variables for the respondent's denominational affiliation, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Muslim are included in the models and unchurched (having no affiliation) is left out of the models as the reference category. This choice of reference category makes sense, in order to avoid the problem of empty cells, as for all denominations except unchurched there are several countries, in which less than 5% of the population are members. In fact in much of Western Europe the majority of the population is unchurched. As to other denominations, the EVS does not contain enough Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and members of other religious minorities to enable meaningful comparisons. Therefore, members of these denominations were summarized into a category 'other denomination' and included in the models. The EVS does distinguish non-Lutheran Evangelicals from other Protestants. However, as their number across European countries is tiny (only 258 of the 67786 respondents of the EVS are categorised as 'Evangelicals'), they were included in the broader Protestant category for the analyses of this thesis.

6.3.3 Context Variables

The following measures of religious contexts were included in the analyses: The country-percentages of respondents belonging to each of the four denominations, the mean importance of religion per country, and a Herfindahl index of religious fractionalisation (religious pluralism) (Alesina et al., 2003). The mean importance of religion per country is an indicator to test the moral community-hypothesis (Stark and Bainbridge 1996), while the country-percentages of members of the four religious denominations are included in the analyses to test Huntington's clash-of-cultures-hypothesis (H15, H20). The mean importance of religion per country was aggregated from the EVS- data (EVS, 2010). The Herfindahl index of religious fractionalisation measures the extent of pluralism of religious denominations of a country, (higher values indicate more pluralism).

The following socio-economic and political context measures were included in the analyses: the countries' GDP per capita (IMF 2011), the countries' freedom house scores of 2008 (Freedom House 2008), the World Bank index of political stability (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009), Transparency International's corruption perceptions index (Transparency International 2011), a dummy variable for the countries' communist heritage (respondent lives in a post-communist country).

Furthermore, the countries' net migration rates, taken from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2011) and the percentage of foreign-born per country (aggregated from the EVS-data, variable v306) are included as measures of ethnic diversity and presence of immigrants.

Lastly, for the analysis of homophobia, a gay-rights index was computed ranging from 0 to 3 (0 - homosexual acts are illegal, 1 - homosexual acts are legal but

homosexual partnerships are not officially recognized, 2 - homosexual partnerships are officially recognized, 3 - gay marriages are legal). This index is based on data taken from the 2009-report on LGBT-rights in Europe, published by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA 2009).

A limitation of this index is that it is restricted to the legal recognition of homosexual acts, the degree of official legal recognition of gay partnerships, and whether the state grants gay people the civil right to adopt children. Other civic rights and areas in which gays and lesbians are often discriminated against, like work-place discrimination are not included in this index. The reason for this limitation is a lack of reliable data on degrees of discrimination against homosexuals per country for 2008. ILGA has recently published a more refined index that includes country-ratings on various fields in which homosexuals and transgender people are often discriminated against (including among other things the prevalence of work-place discrimination and the right to donate blood) (ILGA 2012). However, these data are not available for 2008.

The country percentages of members of each denomination, and the scales of the countries' GDP and Herfindahl index of religious fractionalisation (religious pluralism) were log-transformed in order to adjust for the skewness of their distributions. Tables 2 and 3 contain the summary statistics of the independent variables of the multilevel analyses. Table 3 also contains information on transformations of variables that are not normally distributed.

In addition, Tables C –P in Appendix F provide the summary statistics of the variables used in the analyses for each of the seven geographical country groups

(South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, Baltic States, East Central Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe and Scandinavia) separately.

6.3.4 Controls

The following controls were included in the models: education (respondent has tertiary education), whether the respondent has experienced long-term unemployment of three months or more, the respondent's age¹⁰, sex (male as the reference category), anomie, expressed through the feeling of having no or little control over one's life, and being right wing on a political left-right scale (1-10). In order to include a measure of social capital outside church, a dummy variable that measures if the respondent volunteers in voluntary organizations was included.

¹⁰ Because age does not have a linear distribution, age squared was also included, together with age in order to adjust for the non-linearity.

Table 2: Individual-Level Variables, Summary Statistics

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|--|-------------|-------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 66540 | 0.196 | 0.397 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 66544 | 0.163 | 0.396 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 66796 | 0.392 | 0.488 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 62847 | 7.299 | 3.328 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 67786 | 0.277 | 0.447 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 67786 | 0.113 | 0.317 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 67786 | 0.230 | 0.421 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 67786 | 0.113 | 0.317 | 0 | 1 |
| Unchurched | 67786 | 0.233 | 0.423 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 66960 | 3.418 | 1.928 | 1 | 7 |
| Church Attendance age 12 | 65105 | 3.954 | 2.143 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 66793 | 2.689 | 1.042 | 1 | 4 |
| Belief: Personal God | 66909 | 0.319 | 0.466 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 66909 | 0.426 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Individualised Religiosity | 61972 | 3.094 | 1.497 | 1 | 5 |
| Fundamentalism | 66603 | 0.236 | 0.425 | 0 | 1 |
| Volunteering | 67786 | 0.197 | 0.398 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary Education | 67171 | 0.235 | 0.424 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 67774 | 0.554 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 67786 | 0.255 | 0.436 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 67495 | 46.35 | 17.793 | 14 | 108 |
| Anomy | 66099 | 4.297 | 2.366 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 62533 | 0.149 | 0.356 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 66792 | 0.346 | 0.475 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 63895 | 0.293 | 0.455 | 0 | 1 |

Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Country Level Variables of the Analysis

| Variable | Description | Countries/ Regions | Mean | St. Dv. | Min. | Max. |
|----------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| GDP | GDP per Capita in Mill. USD, log-transformed | 48 | 0 | 1 | -1.2 | 3.63 |
| Freedom House | Freedom House Democracy Score | 48 | 2.026 | 1.501 | 1.0 | 6.5 |
| Political Stability ³ | Worldbank Political Stability Index | 48 | 0 | 1 | -2.18 | 1.86 |
| Corruption (CPI) ⁴ | Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index | 48 | 0 | 1 | -1.61 | 1.78 |
| Net Migration Rate ⁵ | Number of migrants/ 1000 population (CIA World Factbook (2011)) | 48 | 0.08 | 2.5 | -5.42 | 8.07 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | Aggregated from the EVS-Data, Item v306, log-transformed | 48 | 1.5 | 1.2 | -2.7 | 3.81 |
| Religious Pluralism ⁶ | Index of Religious Fractionalisation | 48 | 0.39 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.72 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 'Religion is important', aggregated country mean | 48 | 2.6 | 0.25 | 1.5 | 3.7 |
| Gay Rights | Degree of Implementation | 48 | 1.6 | 0.83 | 0 | 3 |
| % Catholics per Country | Aggregated from EVS-2010-data | 48 | 27.7 | 31.9 | 0 | 96.1 |
| % Protestants per Country | Aggregated from EVS-2010-data | 48 | 11.3 | 22.0 | 0 | 87 |
| % Orthodox per Country | Aggregated from EVS-2010-data | 48 | 23.0 | 33.0 | 0 | 96.8 |
| % Muslims per Country | Aggregated from EVS-2010-data | 48 | 11.3 | 25.4 | 0 | 98.0 |

Note: The Data Sources of the Country-Level Variables are listed on the next page.

Note:³The Political Stability Index (Index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence) was taken from Kaufmann and Mastruzzi (Kaufmann and Mastruzzi 2009). It is based on survey data and expert interviews.

⁴Note: For Kosovo the corruption perceptions index (CPI) of the year 2010 was used, while the EVS-fieldwork period for Kosovo was in 2008 and ended in 2009. The reason for this is that at the time of writing, there is no corruption-data for Kosovo for 2008 available. Kosovo has only gained international recognition as an independent state in 2008 and was included for the first time in Transparency International's data in 2010. Since one can reasonably assume that the levels of corruption in this region are similar between 2008 and 2010, the author decided to use the 2010-data rather than excluding the country from the contextual level analysis altogether. Kosovo's level of corruption is likely to be lower in 2010, than it was in 2008, the year of the countries' formal independence. By 2010, the country has experienced a two-year phase of relative consolidation, under Eurolex- and OECD guidance. Thus, the corruption levels for Kosovo are likely to be slightly underestimated.

⁵Note: The net-migration rate 2008 was taken from the CIA world factbook (CIA 2011) and equals the number of migrants/ 1000 population (2008); Missing: Kosovo, Montenegro. For Montenegro the value for 'Serbia and Montenegro' of the year 2005 was allocated. Because there is no immigration data for Kosovo and available, Kosovo was allocated the value of Serbia. A second reason for this decision is that Kosovo's declared independence in 2008 has not been accepted by Serbia, which grants Kosovo Autonomy as a region within its territory but still regards it as part of Serbia. Montenegro became an autonomous state in 2006. Before that, the country was part of Serbia. Therefore, the author assumes that the values of Serbia come closest to the actual values for these two countries. This approach is preferable to excluding the two countries altogether. However, the migration rates of Kosovo and Montenegro need to be interpreted with caution.

⁶Note: The religious fractionalisation index is taken from Alesina et al (Alesina et al. 2003). The Data are from the year 2001. For some countries, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, the Index is not provided by Alesina et al. as these countries are younger than Alesina's data. Therefore an inverse Herfindahl-Index for these countries was calculated using country-data from the Encyclopedia Britannica. This data-source is the same that Alesina et al. themselves have used seven years earlier.

Note: Northern Cyprus was allocated the values of the Republic of Cyprus for GDP, Freedom House, Political Stability, and CPI. This decision has three reasons: These data are not available for Northern Cyprus. Thus, one could decide to drop the country from the contextual level analysis altogether, or allocate Northern Cyprus the value of either Turkey or the Republic of Cyprus. Northern Cyprus is not recognized as a sovereign country by the international community. It is plausible to assume that the true values of these country level indicators for Northern Cyprus are more similar to those of the Republic of Cyprus than Turkey. Because at the time of writing no political stability, Freedom House and CPI-data were available for Northern Ireland, the country/region was allocated the values for Great Britain.

6.4 Problems and Limitations using the European Values Survey Data

Research dealing with large scale survey data has to deal with numerous limitations due to the nature of the data and the methods available for the analysis. The following section accounts for problems of measurement and missing data and how they were handled.

6.4.1 Measuring Intolerance – The Question of Measurement Invariance across Cultures

In order to be allowed to carry out cross-national comparisons, the scale-reliability, dimensionality and cross-cultural measurement invariance of the theorized constructs ‘ethnic intolerance’ and ‘homophobia’ need to be tested (Davidov et al., 2008: 588-589, Meulemann and Billiet, 2011: 9).

The decision to operationalise ethnic intolerance and homophobia via the abovementioned variables and to model each outcome separately is based on limitations of the data, and on a careful evaluation of the suitability of the variables for the type of analysis that is attempted in this dissertation. Alternative strategies of measurement did not pass the statistical scale-reliability, dimensionality and cross-cultural measurement invariance tests.

As mentioned above, the measures of ethnic intolerance were taken from a battery of 15 items. Five of them name ethnic out-groups: immigrants, people of a

different race, Muslims/Christians¹¹, Jews and Gypsies. Since these items are highly correlated and psychological research suggests that prejudices towards different ethnic groups can form a single syndrome of overall prejudice (Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner 2008), it seems plausible to capture ethnic intolerance through a composite measure, rather than using single variables. Furthermore, using composite measures of latent concepts is advertised in the literature as superior to single items, because multi-item scales are likely to have greater validity than single items (Liu 2003). Thus, an additive index of all five ethnic out-groups on the list was tested for cross-cultural measurement invariance using multiple group confirmatory factor analysis across all 48 countries/regions¹² (Brown 2006).

The same procedure was followed for the three variables measuring homophobia ('homosexuals should not be able to adopt children', 'homosexuality is never justifiable' and 'would not like as neighbours: homosexuals').

These tests are necessary, as it cannot reasonably be assumed that all items that are meant to capture ethnic intolerance do indeed measure the same underlying concept with the same degree of precision across 48 different countries/regions. The same can be said for homophobia.

As a first step, Cronbach's alpha was calculated for an index of the five ethnic intolerance measures (dislike of 'people of a different race', 'immigrants/foreign workers', 'Muslims/Christians', 'Jews' and 'Gypsies') and for an index of EVS-variables that seem to capture homophobia ('homosexuals should not be able to

¹¹ 'Muslims' (v53) was only asked in Christian majority countries, and 'Christian' was only asked in Muslim majority countries, thus the two items were combined into a variable measuring intolerance towards the Muslim/Christian country-minority.

¹² Eastern- and Western Germany were treated as two separate entities. Therefore, all multilevel models have 48 level-2 units.

adopt children’, ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ and ‘would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’). Cronbach’s alpha for the ethnic intolerance index was 0.703, which is borderline acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha for the three-item index ‘homophobia’, however, was an unacceptable 0.469, which indicates that the items do not form a reliable scale. It thus has to be concluded that homophobia cannot be measured with an additive index of these variables, because the scale cannot be assumed to be internally consistent. There is consequently no point in further cross-cultural measurement invariance tests of a homophobia-scale.

In a second step, a confirmatory one-factor-model of ‘ethnic intolerance’, consisting of the five items mentioned above was fitted across the pooled data. Table 4 shows that the factor model yields a good fit across Europe as a whole, not taking between-country differences into account. The Chi-Square, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) all lie within the thresholds of acceptability suggested in the literature (Brown 2006, 84–87).

Table 5 contains the item factor loadings and thresholds of the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). One can see from Table 5 that the variables measuring ethnic intolerance are quite different. The factor scores differ across items and from the thresholds one can see that a much higher score on the latent variable ‘ethnic intolerance’ is needed for a respondent to say they would not like people of a different race or Jews as neighbours, than would be needed in order to say they would not like to live next to a ‘gypsy’. Intolerance of Roma (‘gypsies’) is much more common than racial intolerance and intolerance towards Jews.

One circumstance that might complicate the analysis regarding ‘would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ as a measure of ethnic intolerance is that

the term ‘race’ may be understood differently in different cultures and may also have been translated differently into different languages. In the French, English and Polish questionnaire the term race was used, and in the German questionnaire the term ‘people of a different skin colour’ was used. It is possible that different translations and different cultural understanding of the term ‘race’ may also have impaired the measurement. However, the fact that the confirmatory factor analysis showed ‘would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ to be one of the best discriminating measures of the item battery across countries, indicates that an impairment of this instrument due to translation- and cultural understanding problems could only have been minor.

Table 4: Model-Fit Statistics and Chi-Squared Difference Tests for the One-Factor Model across Groups

| Model | X^2 | df | CFI | TLI | RMSEA |
|--|-----------|----|------|------|-------|
| One-Factor Solution Ethnic Intolerance | 95115.674 | 6 | .990 | .989 | .052 |

The model was run using WLSMV estimation in Mplus.

Table 5: Factor Loadings of the One-Factor Model ‘Ethnic Intolerance’

| ‘Would not like as neighbours:...’ | One-Factor Model: Ethnic Intolerance | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Threshold | S.E. |
| ‘Immigrants’ (v54) | 0.846 | 0.004 | 0.836 | 0.006 |
| ‘People of a different race’ (v47) | 0.822 | 0.004 | 0.967 | 0.006 |
| ‘Jews’ (v58) | 0.860 | 0.004 | 0.969 | 0.006 |
| ‘Gypsies’ (v59) | 0.680 | 0.004 | 0.294 | 0.005 |
| ‘Muslims/Christians’ (v53/v61) | 0.834 | 0.003 | 0.735 | 0.006 |

Data: EVS 2010.

The third and final step is to carry out a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MCFA) of the one-factor-model ‘ethnic intolerance’ across all the 47 countries plus Eastern Germany (thus the mode has 48 groups). The aim is to test the measurement invariance of the factor –items for each country.

Three forms of measurement invariance are distinguished in the literature: configural invariance is found, when the same latent construct/ the same combination of items and factors can be assumed in all countries. Metric invariance is found, when the factor loadings are equal across all countries. Scalar invariance is defined by the factor loadings and item-thresholds/intercepts being equal across countries, allowing for meaningful comparisons of the latent means across countries (Meuleman et al. 2009, 357, Meulemann and Billiet 2011, 9-10). Meulemann and Billiet note, following Steenkamp and Baumgartner (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998), that in order to use a latent construct in multilevel comparisons across groups, at least partial scalar invariance is needed because the comparison of latent means across groups is based on the assumption that the scale used across groups is near equal (Meuleman et al. 2009, 357, Meulemann and Billiet 2011, 10). Steenkamp and Baumgartner point out that to allow for cross-national comparisons of the latent means, it suffices if two items of each factor, including the identifier item are scalar invariant across groups (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998, 81).

The test for scalar invariance (Table 6) does not yield an acceptable model fit, as the RMSEA of .131 is much too high. One can thus not assume equality of the factor loadings and item-thresholds across countries (scalar invariance).

Table 6: Model Fit of the Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MCFA)

| Model | | X^2 | df | Diff. in X^2 | CFI | TLI | RMSEA |
|--|--|-----------|-----|----------------|------|------|-------|
| One-Factor Model Ethnic Intolerance | Scalar Invariance | 11500.258 | 449 | 219.974 | .931 | .958 | .131 |
| | Partial Scalar Invariance ^a | 2065.327 | 165 | P<0.001 | .966 | .977 | .091 |
| | Partial Scalar Invariance ^b | 1431.519 | 161 | . | .976 | .983 | .076 |

^a The Model only includes ‘would not like: people of a different race’ (v47), ‘would not like: immigrants’ (v54), ‘would not like: Jews’ (v58), v59 and v61 have been excluded from the model after inspection of model modification indices and thresholds across countries.

^b Partial scalar invariance when excluding Turkey.

The factor loadings, thresholds and the model modification indices show that in many countries v59 (dislike of gypsies as neighbours) and v61 (dislike of the Muslim/Christian minority) cause problems. In some countries, v58 does not load as well on the factor as the other items. The two items that were found to measure ethnic intolerance roughly equally well across most countries are v54 (dislike immigrants/foreign workers) and v47 (dislike people of a different race). Interestingly, the factor loadings suggest that ‘would not like immigrants’ works better in the Western European receiving countries of migrants, while ‘would not like people of a different race’ has stronger factor loadings in Eastern European sending countries of migrants.

The next step tests for partial scalar invariance, the necessary condition to be able to carry out multilevel comparisons of the latent means across Europe (Meulemann and Billiet 2011, 10, Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998, 81). In order to reach an acceptable model fit the model was run again, this time excluding v59 and v61. Also, the thresholds had to be freed for some of the items in some countries.

As can be seen from Table 6, the RMSEA (.091) has improved but is still too high, the model fit is still not satisfactory. The model output shows that the model does not fit at all in Turkey. In Turkey, the thresholds/item difficulties for v54, v58, v59 and v61 are strikingly low compared to other countries. This means that the overall level of intolerance needed for a person to tick these boxes is lower in Turkey than in other countries. The mean of an index that is computed out of these variables is therefore not comparable between Turkey and the rest of Europe.

As a last step of the analysis the model was run again, this time excluding Turkey. As Table 6 shows, the model fit has improved significantly. All model fit indices are now satisfactory (according to the methodological literature). However, many model modifications were necessary in order to achieve an acceptable model fit and the model only fits the data when Turkey is excluded from the analyses. Since Turkey is one of the five Muslim majority countries of the survey and an important country for the comparisons that are carried out here, the author decided not to use this scale for the analyses.

It can be summarised that of the two models tested, the single factor 'ethnic intolerance' would be a possibility for some cross-national comparisons, while the two-factor model 'ethnic intolerance' and 'homophobia' has to be dismissed. Moreover, if the factor scores of ethnic intolerance are to be used for multilevel analyses, Turkey cannot remain in the dataset.

If Turkey is to remain in the analysis then the models need to measure ethnic intolerance and homophobia separately, using single items. The items that appear to be best suited for the purpose are v47 (racial intolerance), v54 (intolerance

towards immigrants) and v57 (homophobia) because according to all factor models, these items seem to be the most comparable ones across countries.

Since nothing is lost when analysing the ethnic intolerance variables as separate outcomes, but important information would be lost when excluding one of the five Muslim countries, the latter approach is preferred.

As a consequence of the test results, ethnic intolerance is modelled using ‘would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ (v47) ‘would not like as neighbours: immigrants’ (v54) as single variables. Homophobia is operationalised via two single variables: ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ (v240, 1-10 scale) and ‘would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ (v57, 1-yes, 0-no).

6.4.2 Measurement Effects and the Consequences for the Analysis

It was reported recently that the items used in this thesis exhibit implausibly low figures for Belgium in 2008 compared to the previous wave and compared to similar variables from different surveys (Billiet, and Matsuo 2012, chp. 10.3). Billiet and Matsuo argue that this might be due to a measurement effect, which could affect the cross-wave and cross-national comparability of the items (Ibd.). A comparison of the country questionnaires of Belgium and other countries suggests that the EVS- item-battery (v46 to v60) was possibly not treated identically by the interviewers in all countries. In Belgium at least, the wording of the interviewer instruction on the questionnaire is ‘indicate all that apply’ rather than ‘code one answer for each’, as it says in the master questionnaire (GESIS 2008, 3). Furthermore, a comparison of the missing data patterns on the variables in question (Doebler, Billiet, and Voas 2013)

yielded that the number of missing values is identical across the items in the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Spain, Switzerland. The findings suggest that while in most countries the questions seemed to have been read out each separately to the respondents by the interviewers, in the ten abovementioned countries the items were treated as a block. A comparison of the frequencies of the items across two waves of the EVS (1999 and 2008) and across two different surveys, the EVS and the World Values Survey (WVS), where the same items were asked in 2005 (Doebler, Billiet, and Voas 2013), indicated that the intolerance-levels of the respondents indeed tend to be slightly lower in countries where the items were treated as a block than in countries where they were read out each separately. The suspected change in the question format could have led to a measurement effect, both due to social desirability effects, as the items are sensitive, and due to cognitive effects of satisficing in case of block treatment (Ibd.). Thus, the differing question format across countries could have biased the results of the models presented here. Therefore, it is necessary to test for each model whether the country-difference in the treatment of the items has a significant effect on the coefficients of the models presented in this thesis.

This was done firstly by computing a dummy variable for the measurement effect with the value 1 for countries in which the items were most likely treated as a block and the value 0 for all other countries¹³. Then, chi-squared Chow-tests of the coefficients of the model without the measurement-effect dummy compared with the coefficients of the same model including the dummy were carried out for

¹³ It is assumed here that countries in which the number of missing values is identical across all items have followed the block-approach (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Spain, Switzerland) and countries in which the number of missing values varies across items have followed the separate-treatment approach.

the three outcome variables of the analysis that were taken from the affected item battery ('would not like as neighbours: immigrants', 'would not like as neighbours: people of a different race', 'would not like as neighbours: homosexuals'). This was done for all models that could have been affected by the measurement effect.

The Chow test has a chi-squared distribution and allows to test the hypothesis that the suspected change in the question-format makes a significant difference to the coefficients of the model. This was done using the seemingly unrelated estimation procedure 'suest' in STATA, by simultaneously fitting the model without the measurement-effect-dummy and the same model with the measurement-effect-dummy and then comparing if any of the coefficients differ significantly (Weesie 1999). Suest does not allow to fit multilevel models but it allows to adjust the Standard errors for the country-level clustering. Thus the models were run as single-level binary logistic regression models with cluster adjusted standard errors (country as the cluster variable). The results of the comparison of the model coefficients in STATA suest is provided in the appendix (appendix C).

The results of the suest-Chow tests suggest that the measurement effect has only little significant impact on the models carried out in this thesis. The effect was tested jointly for all coefficients of each model taken together and also for each coefficient of each model separately. The measurement effect made a statistically significant difference only for Orthodox denomination when 'would not like as neighbours: immigrants' and 'would not like as neighbours: people of a different race' are the outcomes, and for church attendance, when 'would not like as neighbours: people of a different race' is the outcome. However, as will be shown later in the analysis, the coefficient of church attendance is non-significant in the

main model and does not gain significance by controlling for the suspected measurement effect. Also, the change due to the measurement-effect-dummy is only very small and does not change the interpretation of the coefficients of church attendance in any of the models presented here. The change in the coefficients of Orthodox denomination (see appendix C) when including the measurement-effect dummy is likely due to the fact that the ten countries included in this dummy are all non-Orthodox and are known to have lower average levels of intolerance of their populations. Unsurprisingly, when the dummy is controlled for, the effect of Orthodox denomination decreases substantially. However, the change in the coefficient of Orthodox denomination is not large enough to change the overall model result. Nonetheless it has to be kept in mind, when interpreting the results that controlling for the suspected measurement error did change the effect of Orthodox denomination and this might be due to a question format effect, as discussed above.

6.4.3 Missing Values and the Consequences for the Analysis

Every statistical analysis of survey data that includes sensitive items, such as ethnic intolerance, homophobia, authoritarian attitudes, anonymity or questions on income and health has to deal with missing values. Respondents are more likely to refuse the answer, when the questions asked are sensitive. Causes for concern are the amount and patterns of missing data. The higher the percentage of data that are missing, the more likely is the ‘missingness’ to cause bias of the estimates of a statistical model. Furthermore, it is important to establish whether the data are missing at random. Missing at random (MAR) is defined in the literature as follows:

‘Data are missing at random (MAR) when the probability of missing data on a variable Y is related to some other measured variable (or variables) in the analysis model but not to the values of Y itself. Said differently, there is no relationship between the propensity for missing data on Y and the values of Y after partialling out other variables’
(Enders 2010, 6).

The methodological literature assumes that when data are missing at random (MAR), the missing data patterns do not lead to biased estimates and the ‘missingness’ is therefore ignorable (Enders 2010, 13; McKnight et al. 2007, 50). However, the term ignorable refers to the missing data mechanism, not to the amount of missing data and not to the model of interest (Graham 2009, 553). Without statistical adjustments, e.g. via multiple imputation, the MAR-missing data can still cause biased estimates, since the missing values can entail a loss of representativeness of groups within the population. Listwise deletion is therefore likely to lead to biased estimates. The common procedure when dealing with missing values is to assess the amount of ‘missingness’, examine missing data patterns, establish whether the data can be assumed to be MAR and, if this is the case, to carry out multiple imputation.

For each multilevel model of the following chapters a careful missing data analysis was carried out and multiple imputations were performed where appropriate.

6.4.4 Normality Checks, Residual-Analyses and Weighting

Multilevel weighting was applied to all models, as described in Chantala, Blanchette and Suchindran (2011). On the individual-level, the sampling weight adjusting for the unequal distribution of men and women and educational levels on some countries was applied as suggested by the organizers of the EVS in the data documentation (EVS 2013). On the country-level, a second sampling – weight, which adjusts for the clustering of individuals within countries was calculated following Chantala, Blanchette and Suchindran as follows:

$$\text{Level 1 – Weight} = psu_{wtj} * fsu_{wti|j} , \text{Level 2 – Weight} = fsu_{wti|j} * psu_{wtj}$$

However, the models were run once with the weights and once without the weights, the difference is minuscule.

All models were tested for outliers through careful normality- and residual-checks and multicollinearity diagnostics were carried out for all variables that were included in each model.

7. Religion and Ethnic Intolerance

The aim of this chapter is to analyse relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance across Europe¹⁴ and to test the individual-level hypotheses that were derived from the literature. As discussed above, ethnic intolerance is measured by two binary outcome variables ‘I would not like as neighbours: – immigrants/foreign workers’, and ‘I would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’. Section 8.1 starts off with a first glance at frequency-distributions and bivariate relationships of religiosity and ethnic intolerance before proceeding to the multilevel models.

The Hypotheses tested in this Chapter:

This chapter focuses on individual-level relationships in cross-national comparison. The following hypotheses are tested:

***H1:** Church Attendance is negatively related to intolerance of ethnic out-groups. People who go to church regularly are less likely to be intolerant towards immigrants and racially intolerant than non-regular and non-churchgoers.*

***H2:** People who find religion important are less likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than people who do not find religion important.*

***H3a:** Belief in a ‘Personal God’ and belief in a ‘Spirit/Life Force’ are both negatively related to ethnic intolerance.*

¹⁴ Parts of this chapter are published in Review of Religious Research (Doebler 2013).

H3b: Modern, individualised beliefs in God as a 'Spirit/Life Force' and expressions of individualised religiosity are expected to be more strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance than belief in a personal God.

H4: Religious fundamentalism is positively related to ethnic intolerance.

H5: Members of different religious denominations do not differ significantly in their levels of ethnic intolerance.

7.1 Frequency Distributions and Bivariate Relationships

As a first step we look at the frequency distributions of intolerance among the religious and non-religious across Europe.

Table 7 shows the percentages of religious compared to non-religious people across Europe who say they would not like immigrants as their neighbours, and Table 8 shows the percentages of people saying they would not like people of a different race as neighbours. The tables are ordered by the percentage of monthly churchgoers who dislike ethnic out-groups. The countries with the lowest percentages of intolerant appear at the top and the countries with the highest percentages at the bottom of each table.

A first glance at the two tables reveals that the levels of ethnic intolerance across European countries are relatively low. In the majority of countries less than 20% of the religious and non-religious population are intolerant of immigrants or are racist. Only a few countries have intolerance levels of around 30% of the population and a small group of South-Eastern European countries has

percentages of 40% and more ethnically intolerant among their populations.

Generally, the levels of intolerance in Europe are higher towards immigrants than towards people of a different race.

The countries with the highest percentages of ethnically intolerant among the religious and the non-religious respondents are Northern Cyprus, Turkey, Kosovo, Armenia, Russia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Malta.

All are Southern-, and South-Eastern European countries. Quite strikingly, the three countries at the top end of both measures of ethnic intolerance all have Muslim majorities. All five Muslim majority countries that are in the survey (Northern Cyprus, Turkey, Kosovo, Albania and Azerbaijan) are located within the top third of the graphs among the most intolerant, on average in Europe. The group of countries with the lowest percentage of intolerant among their populations, on the other hand, are the wealthy Scandinavian- and Western European countries Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, France, Great Britain, Western Germany, Belgium, and Portugal as the Southern European exception. Two East-Central European countries, Croatia and Latvia are among the third of countries with the lowest ethnic intolerance-levels.

Looking at these country groups it seems plausible that on the country-level, wealth (GDP), levels of political stability and good governance might have an impact on the average ethnic intolerance of the populations of Europe's populations. This will be tested in chapter 11.

As to the hypothesized relationships between religion and intolerance, in a majority of countries the percentage of ethnically intolerant is not higher among regular churchgoers than it is among non-regular and non-churchgoers, and the same can be said for finding religion important.

Nonetheless, a number of countries exhibit considerable differences in intolerance between the religious and the non-religious. In Sweden, Great Britain, East Germany, Finland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Belarus, people who attend church less frequently seem to be more likely to be intolerant of immigrants than the devout churchgoers. The reverse relationship is found in Kosovo, Turkey, Russia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Moldova, Greece, and Western Germany. In these countries, frequent churchgoers seem to be more likely to be intolerant of immigrants than non-frequent- and non-churchgoers.

Regarding importance of religion, the percentages show considerably more intolerant people among those who find religion important in life than among those who do not find religion important in life in South-Eastern Europe, especially the Muslim majority countries Azerbaijan, Northern Cyprus, Turkey, Kosovo, Macedonia and Lithuania. The reverse relationship is found in the Republic of Cyprus, Austria, Great Britain, Hungary, Finland and Sweden. In these countries, the group of people who do not find religion important has a higher percentage of ethnically intolerant than the group of people who do find religion important. In the latter two countries the difference is only small: less than five percent of the religious and of the non-religious Fins and Swedes are intolerant of immigrants at all.

The cross-country frequency distributions of racial intolerance and intolerance towards immigrants are very similar, as one would expect. Both variables are highly correlated. Like intolerance of immigrants, racial intolerance, too, shows a noticeable positive relationship with religiosity in Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Turkey, Armenia, Macedonia, Lithuania, Greece, Ukraine and Germany. A negative association was found in Sweden, Belgium, Albania and Northern Cyprus.

For the multilevel regression models that are presented in the next section, one can therefore expect to find a considerable positive relationship between religiosity and intolerance in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Albania and Armenia, and also in Lithuania, Ukraine and Macedonia.

In addition to the analyses based on the EVS-2008-dara, the same cross-tabulations were carried out using similar variables from another European survey, the European Social Survey (ESS wave 4, 2008) (European Social Survey 2008), which was also carried out in 2008. The ESS 2008 contains 30 of the 47 countries of the EVS and thus for some comparison and validation of results.

The items in the ESS most similar to the outcome variables in the EVS (2008) are the statement 'allow no persons of a different race/ethnic group from most of [country's] people to come and live here' and 'the country is a worse place to live by people coming to live here from other countries'. The former makes direct reference to the term 'race' and could therefore be compared to 'would not like as neighbours: people of a different race' and the latter is comparable to 'would not like as neighbours: immigrants'. Both variables were dummy-recoded from the 4-point and 10-point scales of their original variables. As measures of religiosity the ESS offers church attendance and 'how religious are you?' The ESS does not contain a measure of importance of religion. Tables with the results based on the ESS-data are supplied in Appendix F (Tables Q and R).

The ranking of countries and the associations of the outcome variables with religion in the ESS 2008 largely resemble the results of the EVS in most countries. As in the EVS, it is again the Scandinavian and Western European countries showing the lowest levels of ethnic intolerance, while Turkey, South-Eastern and Eastern European countries can be found at the top-end. However, the

percentages of those who are intolerant towards ethnic out-groups tend to be significantly higher in the ESS, than in the EVS. This is known and may in part be explained by the measurement effect that was found in the EVS 2008 (Doebler, Billiet and Voas 2013), as discussed in chapter 6. The different question format used in the EVS has likely resulted in a smaller likelihood of positive answers to the intolerance-questions. Also, the percentage of non-religious people making the intolerant statement in the ESS is significantly higher in some countries than in the EVS. This is the case in Great Britain, Ukraine and Cyprus. It has to be noted that neither the outcome variables, nor the independent variables allow for exact comparisons, the question wording and scaling of the variables differ between the surveys, one would thus expect results to differ somewhat. It is known from the literature on survey methods that even a minimally different question wording can yield very different results (Sullivan, Voas, and Brown 2012). Nonetheless, the general trend across Europe could be replicated using the ESS-data.

Table 7: Frequencies of Intolerance of Immigrants by Country

| ‘Would not like as neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers’ | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| | attends church at least once a month | attends church less often | religion is important | religion is not important |
| Sweden | 1.1 | 6.9 | 4.5 | 6.9 |
| Iceland | 2.2 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 2.9 |
| Norway | 3.9 | 6.3 | 5 | 6.6 |
| Spain | 4.7 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 3.4 |
| France | 5.4 | 4.2 | 5.3 | 3.7 |
| Denmark | 5.9 | 6.1 | 7 | 5.6 |
| Belgium | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.1 |
| Switzerland | 6.4 | 3 | 3.4 | 3.9 |
| Great Britain | 7 | 16.6 | 11.9 | 16.8 |
| Germany East | 8.2 | 14.9 | 11.2 | 14.8 |
| Portugal | 8.3 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 8.3 |
| Finland | 11.4 | 15.8 | 13 | 16.3 |
| Germany West | 11.7 | 5.8 | 7.4 | 7 |
| Croatia | 12 | 13.8 | 13 | 13.2 |
| Montenegro | 12.5 | 10.7 | 11.6 | 8.9 |
| Ireland | 14.8 | 12 | 13.5 | 13.7 |
| Bosnia Herz. | 15.7 | 13.3 | 13.8 | 16.6 |
| Netherlands | 16 | 14.9 | 15.6 | 14.9 |
| Slovak Republic | 16.6 | 14.9 | 17.4 | 13 |
| Italy | 16.7 | 14.8 | 16 | 14.9 |
| Ukraine | 17 | 17.7 | 16.3 | 19.8 |
| Bulgaria | 17.3 | 17.1 | 17.6 | 16.6 |
| Hungary | 17.3 | 14.8 | 12.6 | 16.9 |
| Poland | 17.3 | 16.6 | 17.4 | 16.2 |
| Greece | 17.6 | 13.6 | 16.2 | 9.9 |
| Northern Ireland | 17.6 | 24 | 20.1 | 21.2 |
| Luxembourg | 17.8 | 12.1 | 15.4 | 11.9 |
| Romania | 19.8 | 20.1 | 19.8 | 21.1 |
| Serbia | 20.1 | 22.4 | 22.3 | 21 |
| Austria | 20.5 | 23.4 | 19.3 | 25.4 |
| Latvia | 21.5 | 20.1 | 18.4 | 21.3 |
| Moldova | 22.3 | 17.5 | 17.7 | 23.5 |
| Macedonia | 22.4 | 19.6 | 19.6 | 23 |
| Czech Republic | 24.8 | 30.2 | 27.9 | 29.9 |
| Belarus | 25.1 | 26.5 | 26.1 | 26.4 |
| Cyprus | 26 | 21.4 | 23.1 | 34.8 |
| Estonia | 26.4 | 31.8 | 30.6 | 31.4 |
| Georgia | 27 | 26.3 | 27.1 | 18.9 |
| Slovenia | 28 | 27.9 | 27.6 | 28.1 |
| Albania | 32.7 | 29.1 | 29.6 | 29.6 |
| Malta | 32.7 | 33.8 | 32.3 | 37.7 |
| Azerbaijan | 33.2 | 27.7 | 30.3 | 24.4 |
| Lithuania | 34 | 26.4 | 31 | 26.4 |
| Armenia | 34.8 | 36.3 | 36.5 | 31.2 |
| Russia | 35.8 | 30.4 | 30.1 | 32.2 |
| Kosovo | 45.7 | 24.6 | 36.8 | 19 |
| Turkey | 51.9 | 45.3 | 48.5 | 29.7 |
| Northern Cyprus | 52.6 | 53 | 55.2 | 43.3 |
| Total | 22.2 | 18.7 | 21.5 | 17.2 |


Table 8: Frequencies of Racial Intolerance by Country

| ‘Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ | | | | |
|--|---|--|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | attends church at least once a month | attends church less than once a month | Religion is important | Religion is not important |
| Sweden | 0 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 5.3 |
| Iceland | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.3 |
| Belgium | 3.2 | 6.2 | 4.8 | 5.8 |
| Denmark | 3.9 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 3.7 |
| France | 4.2 | 3.3 | 4.9 | 2.6 |
| Switzerland | 4.5 | 2.5 | 3 | 2.9 |
| Great Britain | 4.8 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 6.7 |
| Spain | 5.2 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 3.2 |
| Northern Ireland | 6.2 | 9.1 | 7.7 | 7.6 |
| Germany East | 6.5 | 4.4 | 2.8 | 4.6 |
| Germany West | 6.5 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 3.9 |
| Norway | 7.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 4.8 |
| Finland | 8.6 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 9.1 |
| Netherlands | 10 | 9.7 | 11.9 | 10.2 |
| Portugal | 10.1 | 10.3 | 12.5 | 11.3 |
| Hungary | 11.8 | 8.7 | 8.9 | 9.0 |
| Poland | 12.3 | 12.1 | 11.5 | 13.6 |
| Croatia | 12.4 | 12.7 | 12.5 | 12.4 |
| Ireland | 12.5 | 9.8 | 11.3 | 8.7 |
| Greece | 13.1 | 7.5 | 10.8 | 6.1 |
| Montenegro | 13.3 | 12.5 | 13.6 | 9.5 |
| Luxembourg | 13.4 | 12.2 | 14.4 | 10.9 |
| Bosnia Herzegovina | 14.6 | 13.6 | 12.7 | 19.6 |
| Ukraine | 14.8 | 7.70 | 8.6 | 11.5 |
| Slovak Republic | 15.3 | 12.9 | 15.7 | 13.0 |
| Italy | 15.6 | 16.0 | 15.4 | 15.3 |
| Latvia | 15.7 | 13.5 | 15.0 | 13.0 |
| Russian Federation | 15.9 | 15.5 | 14.4 | 16.5 |
| Austria | 16.9 | 17.7 | 14.4 | 19.6 |
| Belarus | 17.5 | 18.0 | 17.9 | 17.3 |
| Cyprus | 17.9 | 15.3 | 16.3 | 18.8 |
| Bulgaria | 18.4 | 19.9 | 20.8 | 19.7 |
| Lithuania | 18.5 | 12.8 | 18.8 | 11.1 |
| Serbia | 19.7 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 17.4 |
| Romania | 20.4 | 19.9 | 19.9 | 20.5 |
| Czech Republic | 21.1 | 21.8 | 25.1 | 21.2 |
| Moldova | 21.5 | 17.6 | 18.9 | 19.6 |
| Georgia | 22.9 | 22.0 | 22.5 | 17.9 |
| Estonia | 23.7 | 23.0 | 24.9 | 23.5 |
| Macedonia | 24.1 | 19.5 | 20.2 | 24.6 |
| Malta | 25.2 | 22.6 | 24.7 | 26.4 |
| Slovenia | 27.3 | 28.6 | 28.1 | 28.5 |
| Albania | 31.9 | 36.4 | 41.3 | 28.8 |
| Kosovo | 34.1 | 22.1 | 29.1 | 20.4 |
| Azerbaijan | 36.3 | 26.3 | 30.9 | 21.0 |
| Turkey | 45.1 | 40.6 | 42.6 | 30.8 |
| Armenia | 45.2 | 39.9 | 42.9 | 34.6 |
| Northern Cyprus | 54.0 | 59.0 | 54.7 | 56.7 |
| Total | 19.1 | 15.2 | 18.9 | 12.9 |

The analysis continues with a closer look at the EVS-2008-data.

Since four of the five Muslim majority countries in the EVS are among the groups of countries with the highest levels of intolerance, one might expect denominational differences, particularly Muslims to be more intolerant than others. However, although Muslims have been found in some of the literature to be more homophobic than unchurched people and members of Christian denominations (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Akker, Ploeg, and Scheepers 2013), no such finding is reported in the empirical literature with regard to ethnic intolerance/ethnic prejudice.

Figure 1: Percent Intolerant across Denominations



A simple crosstabulation across the pooled data (Figure 1) reveals that Islam is the denomination with the highest percentage of ethnically intolerant and homophobic individuals, followed by Orthodox and Catholic. However, the differences

between denominations are more pronounced for homophobia than for ethnic intolerance.

The findings so far do not allow for conclusions yet. It is plausible and likely that the denominational differences found in the bivariate analysis so far are not due to cultural differences between religious groups, but instead driven by other underlying causes such as poverty, unemployment, lack of education, regional deprivation and political instability. The question is whether we still find these differences between denominations when controlling for these possible mediators.

Thus far we have looked at the frequencies of ethnic intolerance by church attendance, finding religion important and denominational affiliation. Table 9 shows the frequency distributions of ethnic intolerance of people who hold different beliefs about God in the pooled data. As outlined above, the analysis distinguishes traditional belief in a personal God, which is canonical in both Christian and Islam, from a more modern, fuzzy belief in a Spirit or Life Force which is typical for modernised, highly individualised Western societies.

Table 9: Intolerance among Types of Believers, row- percentages

| Beliefs about God | Immigrants | People of a different Race | Homosexuals |
|------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| Personal God | 23.1 | 20.2 | 48.0 |
| Spirit or Life Force | 16.2 | 12.6 | 33.0 |
| Don't know what to think | 19.1 | 15.3 | 35.4 |
| No spirit, God or life Force | 17.1 | 13.3 | 26.1 |
| Total | 19.6 | 16.3 | 39.0 |

Table 9 suggests a negative relationship between belief in a Spirit/Life Force and ethnic intolerance. Across the pooled data, believers in a Spirit/Life Force are less intolerant than traditional believers in a personal God and slightly less intolerant

than agnostics. Traditional believers in a personal God, however, seem to be a little more likely than non-believers to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups, and clearly more intolerant towards homosexuals.

The picture is different for intolerance towards homosexuals: believers in a Spirit Life Force are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals than non-believers, but less likely to be intolerant than traditional believers in a personal God.

The relationships need to be analysed further, controlling for other variables and taking country variations into account.

Thus far, apart from the clear findings for the South-Eastern European countries at the top end of the latent ethnic intolerance scale, the picture of the relationship between religion and intolerance towards ethnic out-groups in Europe is not yet clear. In some countries the association between religion and intolerance is positive, in others it is negative and from the frequency distributions alone one cannot infer an obvious trait that the abovementioned countries have in common. Further multivariate analyses are therefore necessary.

7.2 Results of the Multilevel Models: Individual-Level Relationships

Two sets of binary logistic multilevel models, one for each indicator of ethnic intolerance, are discussed in this section starting with intolerance towards immigrants (v54: 'would not like as neighbours: immigrants'). The multilevel models were carried out using the procedure `xtmelogit` in the software package STATA. For each dependent variable, the analysis starts with a random intercepts model, assuming that the strength of the relationships is the same across countries.

In a second step, the effects of religion variables that are found to make a difference to the respondent's levels of intolerance are allowed to vary randomly across countries. This is performed to determine if there are indeed statistically significant between-country-differences in the relationships between religion and intolerance that are worth investigating further, in chapter 10, on context effects.

7.2.1 Intolerance of Immigrants

Before presenting the findings of the models a brief report on outliers, influential cases and missing data is necessary: A residual analysis was carried out for all models, checking for non-normality and outliers.

The full model with 'would not like as neighbours: immigrants' as the outcome loses 12,224 cases (18% of cases) due to missing values. Therefore, an analysis of the missing value patterns was carried out in order to ensure that the 'missingness' can be assumed to be at random (MAR). The regression models of the 'missingness' on the outcome-variables and on the independent variables in the model of interest (see appendix D) show no evidence of a not at random missing-data mechanism.

Thus, multiple imputation models were estimated and the random intercept model run across 40 imputed datasets, using STATA's function `mi`. Tables with the results of the missing data analysis and the coefficients of the fully imputed random intercept models are supplied in the appendix (appendix D).

As expected, the difference in the coefficients and standard errors between the imputed models and the not imputed models are only tiny. Since it is

computationally very intensive to carry out random slope models and cross-level interactions using imputed data, often leading to convergence problems, all models presented in this chapter are the not imputed complete case models.

As a first step of the multilevel analysis, a Null Model is run that does not include explanatory variables. Table 10 shows that the between-country variance ($\sigma^2_{u_0}$) of the null model is 0.633. The intra-class correlation coefficient (VPC)¹⁵ is therefore 0.161, which means that 16% of the overall variability in intolerance towards immigrants is explained by attributes of the country level that are yet unobserved. The Null-Hypothesis that the between-country variance is zero is therefore rejected. A multilevel approach is the appropriate way to proceed with the analysis, because just fitting a single-level regression, not taking into account the between-country variation would likely lead to biased results.

In a second step, individual-level religiosity, denominational belonging and a dummy variable measuring whether the respondent volunteers in a voluntary organization are included in the random intercept model (model 1, Table 9). The first model (modell) was run without the controls, in order to determine religion effects that might later be hidden away by the controls. It is already known from the bivariate analyses that religion is not a main explainer of ethnic intolerance, as intolerance towards immigrants and people of a different race are more strongly correlated with other variables.

Of interest here is, to what extent religion has statistical effects on ethnic intolerance on its own, and how the relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance differ across Europe.

¹⁵ The intra-class correlation is calculated as the between-country variance ($\sigma^2_{u_0}$) divided by (the between-country variance + 3.29).

Model 2 includes religious fundamentalism ('there is only one true religion'). This was performed in a separate step, in order to see if religious devoutness and non-fundamentalist believing still have independent effects when fundamentalism is controlled for. Fundamentalism was found in the literature to be strongly correlated with authoritarianism and closed-mindedness (Wylie and Forest 1992; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001, 2002). A fairly large literature to date on fundamentalism reports a strong relationship with ethnic intolerance (Glock and Stark 1966; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Wylie and Forest 1992; Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2002).

Thus the question is whether non-fundamentalist believing and religious devoutness still have statistically significant independent effects when the models control for fundamentalism. One could argue at this point that fundamentalism and non-fundamentalist believing were just two sides of a 'religious-belief' scale, that they thus measured the same construct (which would suggest high collinearity). If that was the case, including these variables in the same model would be highly problematic. Bivariate correlations between fundamentalism and the other religion measures as well as the multicollinearity diagnostics (Appendix A) show, however, that this is not the case. Fundamentalism is modestly but not highly correlated with belief in a personal God (the biserial correlation is 0.375) and importance of religion (Pearson's $r = 0.341$). Of the 23 per cent of respondents who ticked the box 'there is only one true religion', less than half (47 per cent) say they go to church fairly regularly (at least once a month) and only 34 per cent of those who go to church once a month or more often also expressed the fundamentalist attitude. Moreover, Cronbach's alpha for a scale of belief in God,

belief in a Spirit/Life Force, church attendance, importance of religion and fundamentalism is only 0.491, considerably less than the minimum cut-off point of 0.7 that is suggested in the literature (Gliem and Gliem 2003, 87) to be allowed to accept scale reliability. Fundamentalism, believing in a Higher Being and religious devoutness are distinct and very different aspects of religion.

In the analyses presented here, fundamentalism is more than just a control, because the author is also interested in how relationships between (non-fundamentalist and fundamentalist) believing and ethnic intolerance vary across European countries.

Model 3 includes the controls with the exception of two more possible mediators of religion: self-placement as right-wing on a political left-right-scale and authoritarianism ('a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament would be good way of governing this country'). These right-wing authoritarian controls are included in model 4. As was mentioned above, both right-wing orientation and authoritarianism have been found in some of the literature to be positively related to religion.

The stepwise procedure tests for possible mediation with these variables, and thus tries to ensure as best as possible that the findings of relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance are indeed valid.

Table 10: Religion and Intolerance towards Immigrants, Binary Logistic Random Intercept Models

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.006 | 0.042 | -0.005 | 0.042 | -0.023 | 0.043 | -0.017 | 0.045 |
| Protestant | 0.130* | 0.055 | 0.137* | 0.055 | 0.145** | 0.056 | 0.135* | 0.058 |
| Orthodox | 0.075 | 0.044 | 0.058 | 0.044 | 0.058 | 0.046 | 0.054 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | 0.143* | 0.065 | 0.145* | 0.066 | 0.138* | 0.069 | 0.096 | 0.073 |
| Other Denomination | -0.156 | 0.096 | -0.184 | 0.096 | -0.175 | 0.099 | -0.137 | 0.104 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.029* | .014 | 0.019 | .015 | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.015 |
| Church Attendance | 0.024*** | 0.007 | 0.015* | 0.007 | 0.015* | 0.007 | 0.010 | 0.008 |
| Volunteering | -0.138*** | 0.029 | -0.132*** | 0.029 | -0.081** | 0.030 | -0.085** | 0.031 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.083* | 0.033 | -0.151*** | 0.034 | -0.156*** | 0.035 | -0.148*** | 0.036 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.225*** | 0.031 | -0.225*** | 0.032 | -0.201*** | 0.032 | -0.199*** | 0.034 |
| Belief: Individualised Religiosity | -0.067** | 0.022 | -0.075*** | 0.023 | -0.078*** | 0.023 | -0.067** | 0.024 |
| Fundamentalism | | | 0.308*** | 0.027 | 0.289*** | 0.028 | 0.275*** | 0.029 |
| Tertiary Education | | | | | -0.174*** | 0.028 | -0.158*** | 0.029 |
| Sex: Female | | | | | -0.097*** | 0.022 | -0.093*** | 0.023 |
| Long -Term Unemployment | | | | | 0.011 | 0.027 | 0.019 | 0.028 |
| Age | | | | | -0.004 | 0.003 | -0.003 | 0.003 |
| Age squared | | | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | | | | | 0.039*** | 0.005 | 0.043*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | | | | | | | 0.181*** | 0.031 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | | | | | | | -0.053 | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | | | | | | | 0.123*** | 0.026 |
| Leader Don't Know | | | | | | | 0.098* | 0.043 |
| Constant | -1.569*** | 0.116 | -1.579*** | 0.114 | -1.857*** | 0.135 | -1.958*** | 0.139 |

Note: * p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001

Table 10, Continued, Random Part of the Models

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| <i>Random Part</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.596* | 0.125 | 0.577** | 0.121 | 0.533** | 0.112 | 0.547** | 0.116 |
| Intraclass Correlation | 0.153 | | 0.149 | | 0.139 | | 0.142 | |
| N | 62822 | | 62256 | | 59807 | | 55562 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | 57818.422 | | 57166.074 | | 54343.398 | | 50168.746 | |
| AIC | 57842.423 | | 57192.075 | | 54383.398 | | 50216.745 | |
| BIC | 57950.999 | | 57309.582 | | 54563.376 | | 50430.951 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 10 demonstrates that at least two of the three dimensions of religiosity (believing, belonging and practice) are statistically significantly related to ethnic intolerance.

Contrary to H1, people who attend church regularly are slightly more likely than less devout people to be intolerant of immigrants but the coefficient is only weak.

The weak positive finding does not contradict social capital theory. Indeed, Putnam and Campbell (2010: 32) found that active involvement in church does not promote tolerance, which they explain with the fact that, at least in the US, churches and religious communities are still largely ethnically homogenous and segregated. Religion can therefore not easily bridge across ethnic divides (Ibd.).

Secular volunteering, on the other hand, as social capital theory predicts, is negatively related to ethnic intolerance. However, one might argue that church attendance alone is not the best way to try and capture religious civic involvement. It is possible that despite the modestly positive finding for church attendance, active religious involvement beyond church might have beneficial effects on ethnic tolerance. Religious volunteers are possibly more exposed to ethnically diverse others than they would be by just going to church.

The data at hand put some limitations on how this can be operationalised. The EVS contains one item asking respondents whether they are active in religious organisations. However, the number of religious volunteers across Europe is minimal, only 4% of all respondents volunteer in a religious organisation and the numbers per country are too small for meaningful comparisons.

What could be done is to test the effects of an interaction term between finding religion important and volunteering in any kind of voluntary organisation, in order to distinguish between religious- and non-religious volunteers. Thus an interaction

between these two variables was included in the full model. However, the interaction was not statistically significant and is therefore not presented here, but instead supplied in Appendix E, Table D. Active religious involvement does not seem to foster ethnic tolerance in Europe, at least the EVS-data do not suggest that.

It has been argued in the literature that the relationship between church attendance and various forms of intolerance might be curvilinear, that marginal and occasional churchgoers were more prejudiced towards ethnic minorities than the highly devout and non-churchgoers (Allport and Ross 1967; Eisinga, Felling, and Peters 1990a). This was tested in a separate model (see Appendix E, Table A), including church attendance as an ordered categorical variable via dummies for ‘attendance weekly and more often’, ‘monthly attendance’, and ‘attendance only on special holidays or one a year’. ‘Attendance less than once a year/never’ was omitted as the reference category. The coefficients of this model make clear that if anything, the relationship is linear, not curvilinear. Highly devout churchgoers are slightly more likely than all others, and monthly churchgoers are more likely than non-regular and non-churchgoers to be intolerant towards immigrants, but as said above, the effect is only weak. This additional model is supplied in Appendix E, Table A, while the models presented in this chapter include church attendance as a continuous variable. The reason for this choice of modelling is that including church attendance as ordered categories would lead to a greater number of binary variables in the model, thus jeopardising the model stability without gaining any new knowledge.

The second indicator of religious devoutness, finding religion important in life shows the same, positive relationship with ethnic intolerance when fundamentalism is not controlled for. People who say they find religion important are slightly more likely to be intolerant towards immigrants than people who do not find religion important. When fundamentalism is included in the model, however, the coefficient of importance of religion is rendered non-significant. The result so far signifies that, contrary to H1 and H2, religious practice and devoutness as such are not statistically significantly related to intolerance of immigrants. If anything, the relationship is weakly positive, but only if not controlling for fundamentalism. It is the religiously closed-minded and not necessarily the religious who are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups.

The most interesting finding of the random intercept model concerns religious believing. A look at Table 10 demonstrates that, in contrast to importance of religion and church attendance, believing in a higher Power is inversely related to intolerance of immigrants.

Both traditional belief in a personal God and the two modern, fuzzy, individualised forms of religious believing (i.e. belief in a Spirit/Life Force and the statement ‘I have my own way of connecting with the divine’) are strongly negatively related to intolerance of immigrants. Both traditional believers and people who express fuzzy, modern beliefs are less likely to be intolerant towards immigrants than non-believers, who are the reference category of the model.

The fundamentalist belief that there is only one true religion, on the other hand, is one of the strongest positive predictors of intolerance towards immigrants in the model. The coefficients of believing are the strongest religion-effects in

magnitude. In fact, the random intercept model indicates quite clearly that, of the religion variables that were tested here, it is believing, rather than religious belonging or churchgoing that matters for the respondent's likelihood of being intolerant towards immigrants.

The result tells us two things: Firstly, different dimensions of religiosity are indeed related differently to ethnic tolerance in Europe. The result suggests that using a composite measure of religiosity as is often found in the literature, would obscure these differences. Secondly, the result supports the Allport-school of thought: it indicates that it is intrinsic, inwardly oriented, private contemplation of religious beliefs rather than the extrinsic, public demonstration of religious attendance that seems to have beneficial effects on ethnic tolerance. A plausible explanation is that religious believers tend to contemplate and internalise the moral teachings of care, tolerance and neighbourliness of their religion and this in turn fosters tolerance. Believing by definition is inwardly oriented, in Allport's and Ross' (Allport and Ross 1967) terminology – intrinsic. People who express a religious belief are likely to also accept the moral teachings of their religion. As stated above, the moral teachings of all major religions that are present in Europe emphasise tolerance towards others.

Just going to church, on the other hand, has no beneficial effect on ethnic tolerance. However, it could be argued that the relationship is more complicated for churchgoing. Church-going can be both – extrinsic or intrinsic – depending on the individual. Since most people who go to church once a month or more often also believe in a Personal God (68%) and 23% of them believe in a Spirit/Life Force, one might wonder why the same relationship with ethnic intolerance was not observed for church attendance as was observed for believing. However,

the bivariate correlations and collinearity diagnostics show clearly that church attendance and believing are not to be confused. 53% of those who believe in a personal God and 78% of believers in a Spirit/Life Force do not go to church regularly. Church attendance is largely insignificant in the vast majority of European countries. It can thus be said that whatever it is that makes believers more likely to be tolerant of ethnic out-groups, it seems to be unrelated to church involvement. Even when church attendance is included in the random intercept model on its own without control variables, the coefficient is only very weak (Coef.: 0.018, SE: 0.005).

However, based on cross-sectional data, assumptions about whether or not beliefs and attitudes are transmitted through church are not permitted. Longitudinal data would be necessary to address this question more thoroughly. Some further evidence to suggest that the traditional church in Europe is not important for the citizen's tolerance towards immigrants is nonetheless provided by the finding that having attended church in childhood (church attendance at age 12) is non-significant as well. This variable was included in a first run of the models and was dropped from the further analyses, because it was non-significant in all models. People who went to church as children are not more intolerant towards immigrants or people of a different race than people without a religious upbringing.

Regarding religious belonging, two denominations show a statistically significant and quite strong coefficient: Muslims and Protestants are more likely than unchurched people (unchurched is the reference category), Catholics and Orthodox to be intolerant of immigrants. However, the Muslim effect is mediated by the right-wing authoritarian controls: When being right-wing and a preference

for a strong leader are included in the model (M4) the coefficient of Muslim denomination ceases to be significant. Thus, it is not being Muslim per se, that increases the likelihood of being intolerant towards immigrants, but authoritarian attitudes. Later analyses in chapter 10 will contextualise the findings and explore, whether this relationship is dependent on socio-economic national contexts.

The finding that Protestants are more likely to be intolerant towards immigrants than members of the other religious groups is surprising. In order to examine if the Protestant finding is a true religiosity effect, interactions between being Protestant and church attendance, and being Protestant and importance of religion were included in separate models. The results are reported in an extra Table in appendix E. The interactions with church attendance and importance of religion are strongly significantly negative. This indicates that it is the non-religious Protestants who are more intolerant. The more religious they are the less likely are Protestants to be intolerant towards immigrants. The result shows that the positive coefficient of being Protestant in the random intercepts model is not a religion effect. It is the secular, not the religious Protestants who are more likely to be intolerant than others.

The finding makes sense in the light of identity theory: people who, without actually being religious, strongly identify themselves as Protestant — thus delineating themselves from the ethnic and religious out-groups ‘immigrant’ and ‘Muslim’ — tend to be more intolerant towards foreigners than other people. Denominational affiliation can be utilised as a group-identity marker that can function as a means of excluding out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

It is, however, interesting that the relationship was found for Protestants in particular, but not for Catholics, Muslims or Orthodox. The effect might be explained by country-level traits. The majority of Protestants in the survey live in Protestant majority countries. These countries happen to be also mostly wealthy, secularised Western European countries (Scandinavia, Great Britain, the Netherlands). It is thus necessary to test in the later analysis on context in chapter 10, whether the Protestant effect is indeed genuine, or merely due to wealth (GDP), political stability and other country-level traits.

As to the control variables, the coefficients of most of them are statistically significant and point in the expected directions. People with tertiary education and women are less likely to be intolerant towards immigrants than the lower educated and men. Anomy, being right-wing, and the authoritarian attitude ('strong leader') on the other hand, are strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance. The stepwise inclusion of these variables shows that being right-wing and 'strong leader' slightly reduce the effect of church attendance (which is weak to begin with) and completely mediate the effect of being Muslim. The coefficients of religious believing are not affected by including these controls.

Random Slopes

The next step of the analysis tests whether the coefficients of church attendance, importance of religion and religious believing vary across European countries. It is possible that the relationships found are spurious and are valid only in a handful of countries. Random slopes models are a good robustness test of the results so far. Furthermore, this research has a substantial interest in patterns of variation

between European countries. Relationships that are found to vary significantly across countries are worth exploring further in the later chapters 10 and 12 on context. Allowing for random slopes is a first step to find out whether the national contexts matter at all. If they do, the later analyses will explore, which country-level traits drive the relationships.

Table 11 contains random slope models of the effects of individual-level religiosity on intolerance towards immigrants. All models include the full set of control-variables as seen in model 4. Each model allows the slope of one religion-variable to vary randomly across the 47 countries plus Eastern Germany. Thus 48 random slopes are fitted by each model. For reasons of space economy, and because they do not contribute any new knowledge, the coefficients of the control variables are not shown in Table 11.

It is apparent from Table 11 that the random effect of church attendance is only weak, albeit statistically significant. The likelihood-ratio test compared with the random intercepts-model indicates, however, that allowing for the random slope of church attendance significantly improves the overall model fit. The random slope of importance of religion is the strongest of the slopes tested here judging by (a) the size of its variance, (b) the percentage of unexplained country-level variance that is left after including the random slope and (c) the likelihood-ratio test of the overall model-fit improvement. The random slope variances of the two believing-variables are slightly stronger than the random slope of church attendance but they yield a less satisfactory overall model fit improvement than the random slopes of church attendance and importance of religion. None of the random slopes that were tested here have a significant intercept-slope covariance, which tells us that there is no obvious pattern of fanning-in or fanning out.

Table 11: Intolerance towards Immigrants, Random Slope Models

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Random Slope Church Attendance | | Random Slope Fundamentalism | | Random Slope Belief: Personal God | | Random Slope Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | Random Slope Indiv. Religiosity | |
|--|--------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|--|-------|---------------------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Fixed Part | | | | | | | | | | |
| Catholic | 0.033 | 0.047 | -0.000 | 0.046 | 0.004 | 0.046 | 0.006 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.046 |
| Protestant | 0.199*** | 0.060 | 0.166** | 0.058 | 0.167** | 0.059 | 0.154** | 0.058 | 0.154** | 0.059 |
| Orthodox | 0.076 | 0.049 | 0.073 | 0.048 | 0.065 | 0.049 | 0.065 | 0.048 | 0.062 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | -0.146* | 0.068 | -0.097 | 0.067 | -0.099 | 0.067 | -0.104 | 0.066 | -0.106 | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | -0.002 | 0.100 | -0.044 | 0.099 | -0.032 | 0.100 | -0.046 | 0.099 | -0.046 | 0.099 |
| Church Attendance | -0.001 | 0.013 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.009 | 0.016 | -0.003 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.135*** | 0.037 | -0.151*** | 0.037 | -0.141** | 0.048 | -0.149*** | 0.038 | -0.148*** | 0.037 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.188*** | 0.034 | -0.197*** | 0.034 | -0.201*** | 0.034 | -0.220*** | 0.046 | -0.200*** | 0.034 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.071** | 0.024 | -0.067** | 0.024 | -0.070** | 0.024 | -0.070** | 0.024 | -0.074* | 0.034 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.269*** | 0.029 | 0.341*** | 0.056 | 0.263*** | 0.029 | 0.266*** | 0.029 | 0.266*** | 0.029 |
| Volunteering | -0.081** | 0.031 | -0.091** | 0.031 | -0.092** | 0.031 | -0.096** | 0.031 | -0.093** | 0.031 |
| Constant | -1.992*** | 0.147 | -1.966*** | 0.149 | -1.972*** | 0.147 | -1.948*** | 0.144 | -1.957*** | 0.145 |
| Random Part | | | | | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.619*** | 0.136 | 0.657*** | 0.139 | 0.625*** | 0.134 | 0.581*** | 0.123 | 0.592*** | 0.127 |
| Intra-class Correlation | 0.158 | 0.029 | 0.166 | 0.029 | 0.159 | 0.028 | 0.150 | 0.027 | 0.152 | 0.027 |
| Random Slope Variance σ^2_{u1} | 0.005* | 0.001 | 0.087* | 0.030 | 0.033* | 0.014 | 0.037* | 0.014 | 0.019 | 0.010 |
| Intercept-Slope Covariance | -0.008 | 0.011 | -0.162*** | 0.054 | -0.041 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 0.036 | 0.011 | 0.028 |
| N | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -24969.834 | | -24971.757 | | -24983.988 | | -24981.122 | | -24988.366 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 40.52 | | 36.67 | | 12.21 | | 17.94 | | 3.45 | |
| AIC | 49993.669 | | 49997.513 | | 50021.975 | | 50016.244 | | 50030.731 | |
| BIC | 50234.664 | | 50238.508 | | 50262.970 | | 50257.239 | | 50271.726 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

In order to see what patterns are hidden beneath the numbers, visualisations of the random slopes (Figures 2-5) are necessary

Figures 2 to 5 show the random intercept and random slope for each country.

Country-Abbreviations (the ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 country codes) are provided next to the slopes that show a noteworthy relationship.

Figure 2 reveals that the positive effect of church attendance is almost entirely driven by one outlier, Kosovo, and a handful of mostly South-Eastern European countries. Namely Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Moldova, Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Luxemburg exhibit a weak positive-, while Great Britain and Finland show a weak negative relationship with intolerance towards immigrants. In the rest of Europe, however, church attendance has no effect on intolerance towards immigrants at all. The slopes show no significant between country variance.

Moreover, when the models are run excluding Kosovo from the dataset, the effect of church attendance becomes non-significant. Church attendance in Europe is related to ethnic intolerance only in the few abovementioned exceptions. In order to control for the effect of the outlier without losing statistical power, the random intercept models were run again, but this time setting the intercept for Kosovo to zero and including a dummy variable for Kosovo in the fixed part of the models. This is done following recommendations of Van der Meer, Grotenhuis and Pelzer (2010) on handling influential cases in multilevel modelling.

For importance of religion (Figure 3), again only eight countries stand out by showing a significant positive relationship with intolerance of immigrants:

Kosovo, Turkey, Northern Cyprus, Armenia, Slovak Republic, Azerbaijan, Albania and Montenegro. All of these countries are located in South-Eastern Europe and all five Muslim majority countries of the survey are in this group. In

Great Britain, Norway, Moldova, Hungary and Austria, on the other hand, the relationship is significantly negative. As stated above, no significant effect of outliers/influential cases on the model estimates could be detected in the prior residual-analysis for this model. A comparison of the full model with a model including the same variables plus three dummies for the three obvious outliers Iceland, Switzerland and Northern Cyprus shows that these outliers do not significantly affect the estimates of the model. The comparison was carried out using the ‘seemingly unrelated estimation’ procedure `suest` in STATA (Weesie 1999) (see Appendix B).

Figure 2: Intolerance of Immigrants, Random Slope of Church Attendance




Figure 3: Intolerance of Immigrants, Random Slope of Importance of Religion




Figure 4: Intolerance of Immigrants, Random Coefficients of Believing





Figure 5: Intolerance towards Immigrants, Random Coefficient of Fundamentalism



The most robust relationship across countries was found between religious believing and ethnic intolerance. Not only are the coefficients of believing the strongest across Europe as a whole, but when allowing for random slopes (Figure 4, Figure 5), it becomes clear that these coefficients vary in magnitude rather than in the direction of the effects. In a large majority of countries, the coefficients of both belief in a personal God and belief in a Spirit/Life Force are negative. Although the relationship is often only weak, the finding is nonetheless robust across Europe as a whole. No matter whether they are traditional monotheistic believers or favour more modern, fuzzy forms of believing, and no matter where they live, people who believe in some form of Higher Being are less likely than non-believers to be intolerant of immigrants.

Fundamentalist truth-claims (Figure 5), on the other hand, are strongly positively related to intolerance of immigrants in most countries. Figure 5 shows that the relationship appears to be strongest in the countries that have the lowest proportions of fundamentalists among their populations.

The next two pages (Tables 12 and 13) contain the same random intercept models and random slope models that were already shown above, but this time the random effect of Kosovo is eliminated by setting the constant for Kosovo to zero and including a dummy variable for this country. A comparison between the two sets of models makes clear that the estimates of the models adjusting for the outlier show only little difference to the original estimates shown above. There are no substantial changes to the interpretations of any of the findings.

Table 12: Religion and Intolerance towards Immigrants, Binary Logistic Random Intercept Models after eliminating the Effect of Kosovo

| DV: 'Would not like as neighbours: Immigrants' | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.003 | 0.043 | 0.007 | 0.043 | -0.009 | 0.044 | 0.001 | 0.046 |
| Protestant | 0.131* | 0.055 | 0.145** | 0.055 | 0.165** | 0.057 | 0.157** | 0.058 |
| Orthodox | 0.083 | 0.044 | 0.070 | 0.045 | 0.059 | 0.046 | 0.063 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | -0.066 | 0.060 | -0.066 | 0.060 | -0.074 | 0.063 | -0.109 | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | -0.107 | 0.091 | -0.126 | 0.092 | -0.096 | 0.094 | -0.046 | 0.099 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.016* | 0.007 | 0.011 | 0.007 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Church Attendance | 0.027 | 0.014 | 0.009 | 0.014 | 0.005 | 0.015 | -0.002 | 0.016 |
| Volunteering | -0.099** | 0.034 | -0.158*** | 0.034 | -0.159*** | 0.036 | -0.149*** | 0.037 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.234*** | 0.032 | -0.231*** | 0.032 | -0.204*** | 0.033 | -0.200*** | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.071** | 0.022 | -0.077*** | 0.023 | -0.079*** | 0.023 | -0.069** | 0.024 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.071** | 0.022 | -0.078** | 0.022 | -0.090** | 0.030 | -0.093** | 0.031 |
| Fundamentalism | | | 0.302*** | 0.027 | 0.281*** | 0.028 | 0.267*** | 0.029 |
| Tertiary Education | | | | | -0.165*** | 0.028 | -0.151*** | 0.029 |
| Sex: Female | | | | | -0.097*** | 0.022 | -0.092*** | 0.023 |
| Long -Term Unemployment | | | | | 0.014 | 0.027 | 0.021 | 0.028 |
| Age | | | | | -0.004 | 0.003 | -0.003 | 0.003 |
| Age squared | | | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | | | | | 0.039*** | 0.005 | 0.043*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | | | | | | | 0.178*** | 0.031 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | | | | | | | -0.061 | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | | | | | | | 0.120*** | 0.026 |
| Leader Don't Know | | | | | | | 0.097* | 0.043 |
| Kosovo | -0.633 | 0.799 | -0.567 | 0.786 | -0.908 | 0.760 | -0.904 | 0.771 |
| Constant minus Kosovo | -1.642*** | 0.122 | -1.623*** | 0.120 | -1.884*** | 0.140 | -1.976*** | 0.144 |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 12 Continued, Random Part of the Model

| <i>Random Part</i> | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.631* | 0.132 | 0.611* | 0.128 | 0.564 ** | 0.119 | 0.579 ** | 0.122 |
| Intraclass Correlation | 0.160 | 0.028 | 0.156 | 0.027 | 0.146 | 0.026 | 0.149 | 0.026 |
| N | 62792 | | 62241 | | 59806 | | 55589 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -28772.212 | | -28459.489 | | -27054.484 | | -24989.148 | |
| AIC | 57570.424 | | 56946.977 | | 54152.968 | | 50030.296 | |
| BIC | 57688.043 | | 57073.520 | | 54350.943 | | 50262.366 | |

Note: * p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001

Table 13: Religion and Intolerance towards Immigrants, Random Slopes Models after eliminating the Effect of Kosovo

| DV: 'Would not like as neighbours: Immigrants' | Random Slope: Church Attendance | | Random Slope: Fundamentalism | | Random Slope: Belief: Personal God | | Random Slope: Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | Random Slope: Individualised Relig. | |
|--|---------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|---|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.032 | 0.047 | 0.000 | 0.046 | 0.005 | 0.046 | 0.006 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.046 |
| Protestant | 0.197*** | 0.060 | 0.166** | 0.058 | 0.168** | 0.059 | 0.154** | 0.058 | 0.154** | 0.058 |
| Orthodox | 0.077 | 0.049 | 0.073 | 0.048 | 0.064 | 0.049 | 0.065 | 0.048 | 0.062 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | -0.145* | 0.068 | -0.099 | 0.067 | -0.104 | 0.067 | -0.108 | 0.066 | -0.109 | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | -0.003 | 0.100 | -0.044 | 0.099 | -0.032 | 0.100 | -0.045 | 0.099 | -0.046 | 0.099 |
| Church Attendance | 0.001 | 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.009 | 0.016 | -0.003 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.136*** | 0.037 | -0.150*** | 0.037 | -0.145** | 0.048 | -0.149*** | 0.038 | -0.149*** | 0.037 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.188*** | 0.034 | -0.197*** | 0.034 | -0.201*** | 0.034 | -0.220*** | 0.046 | -0.201*** | 0.034 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.071** | 0.024 | -0.067** | 0.024 | -0.070** | 0.024 | -0.070** | 0.024 | -0.072* | 0.034 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.270*** | 0.029 | 0.340*** | 0.056 | 0.264*** | 0.029 | 0.267*** | 0.029 | 0.266*** | 0.029 |
| Volunteering | -0.081** | 0.031 | -0.091** | 0.031 | -0.092** | 0.031 | -0.096** | 0.031 | -0.093** | 0.031 |
| Kosovo | -1.183 | 1.069 | -1.354* | 0.658 | -0.925 | 0.795 | -0.929 | 0.752 | -0.951 | 0.780 |
| Constant minus Kosovo | -2.013*** | 0.152 | -1.979*** | 0.148 | -1.995*** | 0.145 | -1.969*** | 0.143 | -1.978*** | 0.144 |
| Random Part | | | | | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.653*** | 0.156 | 0.636*** | 0.135 | 0.587*** | 0.127 | 0.558*** | 0.119 | 0.574*** | 0.123 |
| Intra-class Correlation | 0.165 | 0.033 | 0.162 | 0.028 | 0.151 | 0.027 | 0.148 | 0.027 | 0.148 | 0.027 |
| Random Slope Variance σ^2_{u1} | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.087* | 0.030 | 0.034* | 0.014 | 0.037** | 0.014 | 0.019 | 0.010 |
| Intercept-Slope Covariance | -0.015 | 0.014 | -0.157*** | 0.054 | -0.028 | 0.036 | 0.031 | 0.035 | 0.005 | 0.028 |
| N | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -24969.556 | | -24971.302 | | -24983.094 | | -24980.187 | | -24987.515 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 39.18 | | 35.69 | | 12.11 | | 17.92 | | 3.27 | |
| AIC | 49995.112 | | 49998.603 | | 50022.189 | | 50016.373 | | 50031.031 | |
| BIC | 50245.032 | | 50248.524 | | 50272.110 | | 50266.294 | | 50280.952 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

7.2.2 Racial Intolerance

The results for racial intolerance are very similar to those for intolerance of immigrants. As with intolerance of immigrants, the stepwise random intercept models are presented first, starting with the Null-model and followed by random slope models for the religion effects. The between-country variance (σ^2_{u0}) of racial intolerance of the Null-Model is 0.795. It follows that the VPC is 0.190, thus 19% of the total variability of racial intolerance in Europe is explained by the country-level. Therefore, a multilevel model is clearly the appropriate approach to the research question. Fitting just a single-level model without accounting for the country-level variance would lead to biased results and including 48 country/region-dummies is not a feasible option.

The models were tested thoroughly for influential cases and outliers using residual plots. The influence of three outliers, Northern Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Iceland, on the models was tested by comparing the coefficients of the full model including dummies for the outliers with the full model without the dummies. Chi-squared Chow-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients differ significantly between the models were performed. As in the previous model with intolerance of immigrants as the outcome, this was done using STATA's seemingly unrelated estimation procedure (suest). The tests yield that the outliers do not have a significant influence on the model coefficients.

Furthermore, because the models lose a 12,887 cases (18 % of cases) due to missing values, an analysis of the missing value patterns was carried out in order to make sure that the 'missingness' can be assumed to be at random (MAR). As for the previous model with intolerance towards immigrants as the outcome,

multiple imputation models were estimated and the random intercept model run across 40 imputed datasets, using STATA's function `mi`. Fortunately, the difference in the coefficients and standard errors between the imputed models and the not imputed models are again only very small. Therefore the author decided to present the complete case analysis. The imputed model can be found in Appendix D, Table G.

Table 14 contains the coefficients of the random intercept models. The models were carried out in the same way as the models for intolerance towards immigrants as the outcome. Model 1 contains the individual-level religion variables without fundamentalism and without controls. Fundamentalism is included in Model 2, in order to make sure that no potential effect of the other religion variables is hidden away by fundamentalism. Model 3 includes the individual-level controls, excepting self-positioning as right-wing on a political left-right-scale and the authoritarian attitudes 'a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament would be a good way to govern this country'. This was performed, because right-wing authoritarianism has been found in some of the literature to be a mediator of religion effects on tolerance (Duck and Hunsberger 1999; Canetti-Nisim 2004; Tsang and Rowatt 2007). The stepwise procedure tries to capture these effects. Table 14 demonstrates that it is again religious believing that stands out. The relationships between traditional and modern, fuzzy beliefs in God and racial intolerance are strongly negative and the coefficients of believing are the largest in magnitude of the religion measures tested. The result is the same as with intolerance of immigrants as the outcome: When it comes to religion, what seems to matter for ethnic intolerance in Europe as a whole is believing and not attendance or denominational belonging.

Table 14: Religion and Racial Intolerance, Binary Logistic Random Intercept Models

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.050 | 0.047 | 0.061 | 0.047 | 0.037 | 0.049 | 0.018 | 0.051 |
| Protestant | 0.061 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.067 | 0.047 | 0.068 | 0.032 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.088 | 0.048 | 0.080 | 0.049 | 0.074 | 0.050 | 0.055 | 0.053 |
| Muslim | 0.124* | 0.061 | 0.130* | 0.062 | 0.115 | 0.064 | 0.107 | 0.068 |
| Other Denomination | 0.002 | 0.099 | -0.022 | 0.100 | -0.007 | 0.102 | -0.012 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.017* | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Volunteering | -0.112*** | 0.031 | -0.102** | 0.032 | -0.034 | 0.033 | -0.028 | 0.034 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.069*** | 0.015 | 0.049** | 0.016 | 0.030* | 0.015 | 0.029 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.110** | 0.036 | -0.173*** | 0.037 | -0.169*** | 0.038 | -0.177*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.346*** | 0.035 | -0.344*** | 0.035 | -0.311*** | 0.036 | -0.315*** | 0.038 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.098*** | 0.024 | -0.104*** | 0.024 | -0.101*** | 0.025 | -0.093*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | | | 0.330*** | 0.028 | 0.301*** | 0.029 | 0.286*** | 0.031 |
| Tertiary Education | | | | | -0.238*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.033 |
| Sex: Female | | | | | -0.103*** | 0.024 | -0.101*** | 0.025 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | | | | | 0.065* | 0.029 | 0.066* | 0.030 |
| Age | | | | | -0.015*** | 0.004 | -0.014*** | 0.004 |
| Age squared | | | | | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Anomy | | | | | 0.053*** | 0.005 | 0.058*** | 0.005 |
| Right Wing | | | | | | | 0.248*** | 0.033 |
| Right Wing Don't know | | | | | | | -0.102** | 0.034 |
| Strong Leader | | | | | | | 0.136*** | 0.028 |
| Leader Don't Know | | | | | | | 0.171*** | 0.046 |
| Constant | -1.997*** | 0.129 | -1.977*** | 0.127 | -2.029*** | 0.150 | -2.133*** | 0.153 |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 13 Continued, Random Part of the Model

| <i>Random Part</i> | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.713 | 0.151 | 0.685 | 0.146 | 0.648* | 0.138 | 0.648* | 0.139 |
| Intraclass Correlation | 0.178 | 0.031 | 0.172 | 0.030 | 0.164 | 0.029 | 0.164 | 0.029 |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -25387.729 | | -25084.781 | | -23801.286 | | -21918.742 | |
| N | 62792 | | 62247 | | 59814 | | 55599 | |
| AIC | 50801.459 | | 50197.563 | | 47644.573 | | 43887.484 | |
| BIC | 50919.077 | | 50324.107 | | 47833.552 | | 44110.632 | |

Note: * p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001

Indeed, the coefficient for belief in a Spirit/Life Force is even larger than the coefficient of education. People who believe in some form of Higher Being are 27% less likely than agnostics ('I don't know what to think') and atheists ('there is no Spirit, God or Life Force'), who together form the reference group of the analysis, to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups.

Church attendance is only weakly significant, and only when not controlling for being right-wing, and the relationship between racial intolerance and finding religion important is positive.

It may seem surprising that importance of religion is related differently to ethnic intolerance than believing is. However, bearing Allport's and Ross' (1967) theory of intrinsic versus extrinsic religiosity in mind, believing is clearly intrinsic, inwardly oriented, while endorsing the statement 'religion is important' can be both a measure of intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity, depending on how the respondent interprets the question. Saying that religion is important, e.g. in order to identify oneself with a religious in-group, is not the same as contemplating one's religion.

Indeed the EVS-data show that the relationship between finding religion important and the two ethnic intolerance variables is positive, while the relationship between the different beliefs in God and ethnic intolerance is negative. The inverse finding for believing suggests that contemplating one's belief, and likely also the moral teachings that come with one's belief, has positive effects for ethnic tolerance. One could, of course argue that believing is not a strong measure of devout religiosity. Saying that one believes in God does not come at a personal cost. It is clear that not all respondents who say they believe in a personal God or in a Spirit/Life Force spend much time and energy

contemplating their belief. Yet the results show that believing matters more than any of the other religion measures tested here.

Following Allport and Ross' tradition, a plausible interpretation of the finding is that people who express a religious belief identify with a moral that is commonly associated with being religious. Most Christians know that Christianity teaches to 'love thy neighbour as thyself', and to tolerate and care for others. The same can be said for Muslims. According to the well-known open letter to the pope (Anonymous 2007) that was signed by 138 world-Islamic leaders and sent in response to Pope Benedict XVI's lecture at the University of Regensburg on 12. September 2006, the Islamic Holy scriptures emphasise explicitly the importance of neighbourly love and tolerance.

Highly devout religiosity (weekly church attendance and finding religion important or very important) on the other hand, is insignificant for ethnic tolerance in most of Europe and in some exceptional contexts it has adverse effects. This was already the case with intolerance of immigrants as the outcome and the same is found from the random slope model for racial intolerance, which is shown below.

Denominational belonging is only weakly related to racial intolerance and only for Muslims. At an equal level of religious devoutness, Muslims are significantly more likely to be racially intolerant than unchurched people and members of other denominations, but only when the socio-economic controls are not included in the model. As soon as the model controls for education and unemployment, the coefficient of Muslim denomination ceases to be statistically significant.

This raises some doubts regarding Huntington's (1993) hypothesis of a clash-of-cultures. The Huntington-hypothesis not only believes the religious cultural

heritage of countries to be related to the citizen's civic values, but also that the religious affiliation on the individual level influences civic values. Following Huntington's logic one would expect Muslims to be more intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than Christians and Non-Believers. The models show, however, that the true reason for Muslims being slightly more intolerant lies in lower levels of education (in Europe's Muslim majority countries, as we shall see later), and work-deprivation. It is therefore incorrect to assume Muslims to be more intolerant per se.

Random Slopes:

In order to ascertain to what extent the religion effects on racial intolerance vary across countries, it is necessary to fit random slope models, as was done for intolerance of immigrants as the outcome. Also, to make sure that the religion coefficients are not spurious and that the findings are not driven by just a few previously undetected outliers, plots of the random slopes need to be inspected. Table 15 contains the random slope models for racial intolerance as the outcome. Since church attendance was not statistically significant in the prior random intercepts model, a random slope does not make sense for that variable.

Table 15: Religion and Racial intolerance, Random Slope Models

| DV: 'Would not like...: Members of a different race' | Random Slope: Importance of Religion | | Random Slope: Fundamentalism | | Random Slope: Belief: Personal God | | Random Slope: Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | Random Slope: Individualised Relig. | |
|--|--------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|---|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Fixed Part | | | | | | | | | | |
| Catholic | 0.049 | 0.052 | 0.017 | 0.051 | 0.020 | 0.051 | 0.021 | 0.051 | 0.020 | 0.051 |
| Protestant | 0.059 | 0.071 | 0.037 | 0.070 | 0.047 | 0.071 | 0.033 | 0.070 | 0.029 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.069 | 0.053 | 0.059 | 0.053 | 0.047 | 0.053 | 0.057 | 0.053 | 0.055 | 0.053 |
| Muslim | 0.097 | 0.069 | 0.113 | 0.068 | 0.111 | 0.069 | 0.102 | 0.068 | 0.110 | 0.068 |
| Other Denomination | 0.019 | 0.110 | -0.015 | 0.110 | -0.007 | 0.110 | -0.014 | 0.110 | -0.015 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.014 | 0.009 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Volunteering | -0.021 | 0.034 | -0.028 | 0.034 | -0.029 | 0.034 | -0.035 | 0.034 | -0.029 | 0.034 |
| Importance of Religion | -0.001 | 0.029 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.030 | 0.017 | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.029 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.161*** | 0.040 | -0.177*** | 0.040 | -0.202*** | 0.052 | -0.180*** | 0.041 | -0.181*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.304*** | 0.038 | -0.311*** | 0.038 | -0.312*** | 0.038 | -0.328*** | 0.058 | -0.320*** | 0.038 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.093*** | 0.026 | -0.089*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.093*** | 0.026 | -0.098* | 0.044 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.282*** | 0.031 | 0.313*** | 0.051 | 0.285*** | 0.031 | 0.289*** | 0.031 | 0.287*** | 0.031 |
| Constant | -2.119*** | 0.148 | -2.133*** | 0.156 | -2.137*** | 0.153 | -2.120*** | 0.153 | -2.129*** | 0.152 |
| Random Part | | | | | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.549*** | 0.139 | 0.679*** | 0.146 | 0.646*** | 0.141 | 0.635*** | 0.137 | 0.633*** | 0.138 |
| Intra-class Correlation | 0.143 | 0.031 | 0.171 | 0.030 | 0.164 | 0.030 | 0.161 | 0.029 | 0.161 | 0.029 |
| Random Slope Variance σ^2_{u1} | 0.022* | 0.006 | 0.048* | 0.020 | 0.036* | 0.015 | 0.074* | 0.026 | 0.042* | 0.015 |
| Intercept-Slope Covariance | -0.011 | 0.023 | -0.088 | 0.048 | 0.003 | 0.040 | 0.037 | 0.048 | 0.014 | 0.037 |
| N | 55599 | | 55599 | | 55599 | | 55599 | | 55599 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -21887.449 | | -21908.614 | | -21910.351 | | -21898.947 | | -21905.573 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 62.59 | | 20.26 | | 16.78 | | 39.59 | | 26.34 | |
| AIC | 43828.898 | | 43871.228 | | 43874.701 | | 43851.893 | | 43865.146 | |
| BIC | 44069.898 | | 44112.227 | | 44115.701 | | 44092.893 | | 44106.146 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 6: Racial intolerance, Random Slope of Importance of Religion




Figure 7: Racial intolerance, Random Coefficients of Beliefs in God





Figure 8: Racial intolerance, Random Coefficient of Fundamentalism



Importance of religion has a strongly statistically significant random slope. Figure 6 demonstrates that, similar to the previous model with intolerance towards immigrants as the outcome, the random effect of finding religion important on racial intolerance is mostly driven by a small group of six countries that show strong positive relationships with racial intolerance: Armenia, Turkey, Albania, Azerbaijan, Kosovo and Lithuania. Almost all of them are in South-Eastern Europe. As with intolerance towards immigrants as the outcome, four of the five Muslim majority countries of the survey are in this group.

Overall, fourteen of the 47 countries of the survey show a significant relationship between finding religion important and racial intolerance. The countries in which the relationship is significantly negative are almost all located in Western Europe: Iceland, Germany, Great Britain, Austria and Bosnia Herzegovina, as the exception.

In the vast majority of countries, however, neither church attendance nor finding religion important is statistically significantly related to ethnic intolerance. The result demonstrated that it is important to not only look at coefficients of random intercept models, but to check for outliers carefully and to visualize the random slope effects. It is the random slope models that show the variation of the relationship across countries and thus give us clues as to where religion matters differently for ethnic intolerance. Regrettably, the majority of publications in this field present only random intercept models and largely neglect the variation of effects across countries.

As for intolerance towards immigrants as the outcome, the relationships between religious believing and racial intolerance, too, vary in magnitude, but (apart from a few exceptions) not in the direction of the effect. Figure 7 demonstrates that the relationship is clearly negative almost everywhere in Europe. Unsurprisingly, in most countries, modern, fuzzy religious believing is more strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance than traditional believing, as modernisation- (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004) and individualisation theories would predict. Interestingly, the relationship is negative for both forms of belief. Traditional doctrinal belief in a personal God is negatively related to ethnic intolerance in most European countries.

Yet, in many countries the relationship is only weak. Other variables, such as education, being right-wing or the feeling of having little or no control over one's life are clearly better candidates in explaining intolerance of immigrants and racial intolerance. Be that as it may, the analysis presented here does not set out to explain the phenomenon ethnic intolerance. The aim here is to ask whether, where

and to what extent religion is related to ethnic intolerance. If there is an effect of religion on ethnic intolerance in Europe, then it is believing that seems to matter, - not denominational belonging or church attendance. Of all religion measures tested here, believing exhibits the strongest relationship with ethnic intolerance, and the finding is robust across two different outcomes and across 47 European countries.

7.3 Summary and Conclusions

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that across Europe as a whole believing matters more for people's tolerance towards ethnic out-groups than religious belonging or church attendance. The results confirm H3a: Non-fundamentalist believing is strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance. Moreover, in the models presented here modern, fuzzy, individualised beliefs in God exhibited stronger negative relationships with ethnic intolerance than traditional belief in a personal God. Thus, H3b is also confirmed by the analysis. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, is strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance, as expected. Therefore, H4 is confirmed by the results.

The finding that individualised, modern believing is more strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance than traditional believing lends support to modernisation- and individualisation theory. The relationships are robust across two different measures of ethnic intolerance and across most of Europe.

However, modernisation theory also highlights the import of secularisation on the spread of liberal values and conceptualises religion as tied to traditionalism and

intolerance. Thus from this theoretical perspective, it may be surprising that across Europe traditional believers in God are not more, but less likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than non-believers. Moreover, a negative effect of non-fundamentalist believing was found in the vast majority of countries, independent of their degree of modernisation. The between-country slope variance was non-significant.

One has to bear in mind, however, that intolerance towards ethnic out-groups is qualitatively different from intolerance of dissent and intolerance of behaviour that deviates from religious morals. To the author's knowledge the theologies of the major Abrahamic religions present in Europe do not teach to exclude immigrants, foreigners, or people of a different race. On the contrary, the Christian and Islamic teaching to 'love your neighbour as yourself' explicitly extends to foreigners. Being tolerant towards immigrants does therefore not contradict traditionalism. It is plausible that religious believers contemplate teachings of good neighbourliness more, and are therefore more tolerant. The case is different for homosexuality, which is condemned as a sin in Christian and Islamic doctrines. Homophobia will be analysed in the next chapter.

The unsolved puzzle remaining for now is: what is it about non-fundamentalist religious believing that averts ethnic intolerance? More in-depth psychological data and different items are needed to approach this question in future studies. For now we can conclude that non-fundamentalist religious believing matters in a beneficial way: it seems to encourage ethnic tolerance.

With regards to differences between religious denominations, H5 can partly be confirmed. The analysis found non-devout Protestants to be more likely to be

intolerant towards immigrants than members of other denominations and unchurched people. Religiously devout Protestants are no more likely than everybody else to be ethnically intolerant. Muslims were found to be more likely to be racially intolerant than members of the other religious groups only when not controlling for education, and slightly more likely to be intolerant towards immigrants, only when not controlling for right-wing authoritarianism. Also, the effect of Muslim denomination was found to be strongly dependent on the national context: when Kosovo (a Muslim majority country) is controlled for, the Muslim effect vanishes altogether. Thus the Muslim-finding is spurious. The denominational differences that were found in the models are not true religion effects, but driven by other variables like low education, authoritarian attitudes, and likely effects of national contexts, which will be explored in chapters 10 and 11.

H1 and H2 are not supported by the EVS-data. People who go to church regularly and who find religion important are no less likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people who do not.

If anything, importance of religion and church attendance are positively related to ethnic intolerance but only in a few specific national contexts:

In Kosovo, Turkey, Northern Cyprus, Armenia, Slovak Republic, Azerbaijan, Albania and Montenegro Lithuania and to some extent also Georgia, a strongly positive relationship between importance of religion and ethnic intolerance was found.

It can be summarised that believing matters for ethnic intolerance across Europe as a whole: in most countries, believers in some form of Higher Being are

significantly less likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than non-believers. Religious devoutness (finding religion important), on the other hand matters only in South-Eastern Europe, where the relationship is positive, and in a handful of exceptional Western European countries, Great Britain, Austria, Western Germany, and Bosnia Herzegovina, where the relationship is negative. In the rest of Europe, no significant random effect was found.

The results of the random slopes models make clear that context matters for the effect of religious devoutness. Chapter 10 on context presents in-depth analyses of the question, which socio-economic, political and religious national contexts influence individual-level ethnic intolerance. Secondly, the models will evaluate to what extent country-level traits interact with religion. Chapter 11 will take a closer look at the cluster of South-Eastern European outliers, where importance of religion is strongly related to ethnic intolerance.

For now the analysis turns to individual-level relationships between religion and homophobia.

8. Religion and Homophobia

Homophobia is often associated with religious bigotry in the contemporary European media landscape. The last decade brought media attention to numerous public protests against Gay Pride Parades predominantly in Eastern European countries (Anonymous 2005; Greenwood 2007; Gera 2012; Vytautas 2013).

Images of protesters waving a Christian Cross or banners claiming that homosexuality was immoral, and banners on occasions in Lithuania and Poland claiming a Catholic reference to the value of the (heterosexual) family have gone around the world.

Recent aggravations in the proposals and/or passing of anti-gay laws in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia demonstrate that when it comes to tolerating Homosexuals, Europe is torn, although the European commission condemns these discriminating laws (Gray 2012).

At the same time, new discussions within the Catholic and Protestant Churches on their position towards gay rights such as the issue of gay marriage are taking place in Western European countries. All these events and discourses show that although anti-discrimination laws exist in the European Union, toleration of Homosexuals and their way of life is not at all a matter of course.

Since the churches and religious leaders across Europe have been involved in the discourses on the extent of acceptance and equal treatment of LGTB people, it is plausible to expect strong relationships between individual religiosity and homophobia in Europe. This is also the case because, as stated in the literature review, the religious scriptures of Christianity as well as Islam contain passages

that condemn homosexuality, and in places, even condemn homosexuals as a group.

It is plausible to expect great differences between different groups of countries.

Western Europe with its longer tradition of political liberalism has been found to have populations that are on average more tolerant towards homosexuals than for example the populations of post-communist countries or Muslim majority countries (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Gerhards 2010).

This chapter looks at the relationships between religion and homophobia in European cross-national comparison. The chapter is structured like the previous chapter on ethnic tolerance. The analysis starts with a look at bivariate distributions of homophobia among religious and non-religious people in cross-national European comparison followed by multilevel analyses.

As stated in chapter 7 the analyses distinguishes two forms of homophobia: a moral disapproval of homosexuality as a behaviour ('homosexuality is never justifiable', 1-10 scale)¹⁶, and homophobia as intolerance towards homosexuals as a group: 'would not like as neighbours: homosexuals' (1-0).

Religion can be differently related to the two forms of homophobia. A religious conservative may refer to Bible-, or Quran- passages that condemn homosexuality and show a large degree of agreement with the statement 'homosexuality is never justifiable', but at the same time be tolerant towards homosexuals as a group of people and be quite happy having them as neighbours. The two statements are qualitatively different and capture different shades of homophobia. Intolerance towards homosexuals as a group homophobia is the stronger form of homophobia as it is a measure of social distance.

¹⁶ When 'Homophobia is never justifiable' is the outcome, Italy is excluded from the analyses, because the question was not asked in Italy.

Hypotheses tested in this Chapter:

H6a: Church attendance, importance of religion, belief in a personal God and fundamentalism are positively related to both moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.

The only exception is (post)modern individualised belief and belief in a Spirit or Life Force.

H6b: Church attendance, importance of religion, belief in a personal God and fundamentalism are more strongly positively related to moralistic homophobia than to intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.

H7: Belief in a 'Spirit/Life Force' and individualised religiosity are expected to be negatively related to both moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.

H8: Muslims and Orthodox are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexual behaviour and homosexuals than Catholics, Protestants and unchurched.

8.1 Frequency Distributions and Bivariate Relationships

The preliminary measurement analysis has shown that the two forms of homophobia are highly correlated. A majority of 67% of those who say that homosexuality is never justifiable also say they would not like to have a homosexual as their neighbour. However, 'homosexuality is never justifiable' is a

scale from 1 to 10 and when looking at the second strongest category of disapproval of homosexuality, one can see that a mere 48% of those who ticked the second strongest disapproval also say they would not like homosexuals as their neighbours.

Table 16: Tetrachoric and Point-Biserial Correlations: Homophobia and Ethnic Intolerance

| ‘Would not like as Neighbours:..’ | ‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’ | ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’ |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| ‘...People of a different Race’ | .169* | .436* |
| ‘...Immigrants/Foreign Workers’ | .165* | .458* |

A crosstab by monthly church attendance (Table 17) reveals that of those who go to church once a month or more often, 64% also say that homosexuality is never justifiable, but less of them (45%) say they would not like them as their neighbour.

The finding supports the assumption that intolerance towards homosexuals as a group is a stronger form of homophobia than moralistic disapproval of homosexuality. Religion is related to both but more strongly related to the latter. The finding lends some first support to H6b.

We proceed with a look at the country percentages of respondents expressing moralistic homophobia and the cross-country percentages of respondents who would not like a homosexual person as their neighbour across religious and non-religious people (Tables 18 and 19). It can be seen from the two tables that homophobia is much more prevalent in Europe than ethnic intolerance. The percentages of those who are homophobic are much higher than the percentages of ethnically intolerant people almost everywhere in Europe. Exceptions are the

countries at the lowest end, where all three forms of intolerance are not at all prevalent among the population. Secondly, it is the same Scandinavian and Western European countries that have the lowest shares of ethnically intolerant that are also at the lowest end of both homophobia measures in European comparison. Likewise, it is the same countries that have the highest levels of ethnic intolerance that also have the highest levels of homophobia. As the section on measurement invariance has shown, the two forms of intolerance are strongly correlated.

Unsurprisingly, people who are intolerant towards ethnic out-groups are also more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals. The finding reflects that different forms of intolerance are often part of a closed-minded personality (Zick et al. 2008; Streib and Klein 2013). Nonetheless, intolerance is more than just a personality trait, homophobia is different from ethnic intolerance, and different relationships with religion are expected.

Looking at the country percentages for 'homosexuality is never justifiable' it seems that the difference between the religious and the non-religious is greater in the Western European countries with lower levels of overall homophobia. The higher one moves up the intolerance scale, along Eastern, and Southern Europe, the less difference does religion seem to make.

The picture is slightly different for intolerance towards homosexuals as a group. First of all, not wanting them as neighbours is less prevalent than just disapproving of homosexual behaviour. Secondly, the relationships differ across countries and from the frequencies alone it is hard to distinguish a pattern: in many countries across Eastern and Western Europe alike, religion does not seem to make a big difference.

In order to get a clearer picture of East-West differences, separate cross-tabulations were carried out between religion and the two forms of homophobia for the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe (plus Turkey and Northern Cyprus) and Western Europe (Table 17).

Table 17: Percent of Members of Religious Groups expressing Homophobia in East and West

| | 'Homosexuality is not justifiable' ¹ | | | 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|----------------|-------|---|----------------|-------|
| | Eastern Europe | Western Europe | Total | Eastern Europe | Western Europe | Total |
| Catholic | 65 | 29 | 45 | 48 | 17 | 30 |
| Protestant | 62 | 20 | 26 | 37 | 9 | 13 |
| Muslim | 88 | 84 | 86 | 68 | 74 | 71 |
| Orthodox | 80 | 61 | 77 | 62 | 34 | 58 |
| Other Denom. | 81 | 40 | 60 | 53 | 12 | 32 |
| Unchurched | 60 | 16 | 43 | 42 | 10 | 30 |
| Attends Church Regularly ² | 79 | 48 | 64 | 58 | 30 | 45 |
| Does not Attend Church Regularly | 70 | 27 | 51 | 52 | 17 | 37 |
| 'Religion is important' | 79 | 46 | 65 | 59 | 30 | 47 |
| Religion is not important | 61 | 18 | 40 | 45 | 10 | 28 |

¹ The highest three categories of 'homosexuality is never justifiable' were collapsed and dummy-coded. Note that when 'Homophobia is never justifiable' is the outcome, Italy is excluded from the analyses, because the question was not asked in Italy. ² Dummy: Church attendance once a month or more often.

The crosstabs by religious affiliation show that across Europe and for both types of homophobia Muslims are the most intolerant, followed by Orthodox, small sects (other denomination) and Catholics, while unchurched people are the least intolerant.

When looking at regular church attendance and importance of religion, we again see the East-West divide for both types of homophobia that already showed up in the comparison of separate countries: among both the religious and the non-religious Eastern Europeans are much more likely to be intolerant than Western

Europeans. Also, in Eastern and Western Europe the religious are far more likely to be homophobic than the non-religious. However, when comparing the differences in the percentages between the religious and the non-religious across East and West, it becomes apparent that religion makes a much greater difference in Western Europe: For both measures of homophobia, the difference between the religious and the non-religious in their percentages of homophobes is greater in the West. The associations need to be examined further using multilevel regressions that take more variables into account and also account for the large between-country differences that we see here.

In addition to the cross-tabulations of homophobia by religion in the EVS-2008, the same cross-tabulations were also carried out using ESS-2008 and International Social Survey's Programme (Religion III, 2008) –data (European Social Survey 2008; ISSP Research Group 2009) using variables that are as similar as possible to the variables analysed above. These additional cross-tabulations are added in Tables S and T in Appendix F.

Neither the ESS nor the ISSP data distinguish between moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group. The two available measures ('Gays and lesbians should not be free to live as they wish' in the ESS, and 'Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are always wrong') both refer to general normative judgements of homosexuality and therefore capture what was operationalised here as moralistic homophobia.

The frequencies of moralistic homophobia by religiosity are comparable between the three surveys. The ranking of countries is largely the same for all three surveys (however the ESS has only 30 countries and the ISSP 26 European countries), in all three surveys the religious are clearly more homophobic than the

non-religious. Furthermore, in all three surveys the difference between the religious and the non-religious is considerably greater in Western European countries, than in countries of the South, South-East and East of Europe.

Interestingly, the percentages of homophobes tend to be lower in the ESS- and higher in the ISSP-data than in the EVS-data. This is likely due to the different wording of the question regarding homophobia in the three surveys. The general trend across Europe found in the EVS-2008 could be replicated using the two additional surveys.

Table 18: Moralistic Homophobia by Individual Religiosity

| | Attends church once a month or more often | Attends church less than once a month | religion is important | Religion is not important |
|--------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Armenia | 95.7 | 96.0 | 96.1 | 94.9 |
| Georgia | 95.6 | 94.8 | 95.4 | 91.7 |
| Azerbaijan | 95.4 | 88.9 | 91.9 | 85.2 |
| Kosovo | 94.8 | 93.5 | 94.9 | 87.7 |
| Turkey | 91.3 | 87.4 | 89.7 | 68.1 |
| Bosnia | 91.2 | 80.5 | 86.3 | 81.2 |
| Northern Cyprus | 88.8 | 70.6 | 79.7 | 54.6 |
| Serbia | 85.6 | 82.8 | 85.3 | 78.5 |
| Lithuania | 85.5 | 73.2 | 81.5 | 72.3 |
| Macedonia | 85.4 | 76.0 | 82.2 | 64.0 |
| Montenegro | 84.4 | 85.1 | 87.2 | 78.3 |
| Ukraine | 83.4 | 78.5 | 82.0 | 75.6 |
| Moldova | 82.5 | 81.5 | 82.9 | 78.0 |
| Croatia | 82.4 | 68.2 | 78.7 | 63.3 |
| Estonia | 81.1 | 72.1 | 77.6 | 71.6 |
| Hungary | 77.8 | 56.3 | 68.0 | 53.6 |
| Cyprus | 77.7 | 68.8 | 75.1 | 55.1 |
| Romania | 77.3 | 75.4 | 77.0 | 71.6 |
| Latvia | 76.7 | 67.7 | 76.7 | 65.8 |
| Russian Federation | 74.3 | 73.2 | 72.3 | 74.4 |
| Belarus | 71.8 | 64.8 | 69.3 | 62.6 |
| Albania | 70.1 | 74.8 | 76.6 | 71.7 |
| Greece | 68.4 | 40.8 | 57.4 | 25.1 |
| Poland | 67.8 | 58.6 | 68.4 | 55.5 |
| Slovenia | 66.9 | 51.6 | 66.2 | 48.3 |
| Bulgaria | 55.2 | 60.1 | 61.2 | 57.3 |
| Czech Republic | 54.7 | 36.4 | 47.4 | 36.7 |
| Portugal | 53.9 | 42.0 | 54.0 | 34.5 |
| Germany East | 52.9 | 24.5 | 39.2 | 24.9 |
| Finland | 50.9 | 20.7 | 36.3 | 18.7 |
| Malta | 46.8 | 34.6 | 46.6 | 30.0 |
| Austria | 46.1 | 25.1 | 42.0 | 21.4 |
| Germany West | 45.5 | 22.2 | 36.9 | 21.7 |
| Slovak Republic | 44.2 | 27.2 | 42.2 | 24.6 |
| Switzerland | 43.7 | 17.4 | 35.1 | 13.4 |
| Belgium | 42.9 | 19.6 | 35.5 | 16.2 |
| Northern Ireland | 42.4 | 29.0 | 40.8 | 28.9 |
| Spain | 41.8 | 18.9 | 40.0 | 15.0 |
| Luxembourg | 39.7 | 19.2 | 34.6 | 16.3 |
| Ireland | 38.9 | 22.8 | 36.3 | 23.5 |
| Great Britain | 38.5 | 28.9 | 36.0 | 26.8 |
| France | 38.0 | 24.6 | 33.8 | 21.8 |
| Norway | 36.7 | 13.8 | 23.9 | 12.5 |
| Sweden | 31.6 | 12.8 | 24.8 | 11.3 |
| Denmark | 25.3 | 14.4 | 22.1 | 12.7 |
| Netherlands | 23.7 | 7.9 | 17.7 | 7.4 |
| Iceland | 11.3 | 6.8 | 9.8 | 4.6 |
| Total | 64.4 | 50.8 | 65.3 | 40.2 |

Table 19: Religion and Intolerance towards Homosexuals as a Group

| | Attends church once a month or more often | Attends church less than once a month | religion is important | Religion is not important |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Turkey | 94 | 86.8 | 90.2 | 71.4 |
| Azerbaijan | 89.7 | 91.8 | 92.5 | 88.8 |
| Georgia | 87.1 | 84.2 | 85.3 | 85.3 |
| Moldova | 74.9 | 76.4 | 77.1 | 71.7 |
| Kosovo | 73.1 | 50.1 | 62.3 | 53.8 |
| Lithuania | 71.3 | 65.4 | 70.3 | 64.2 |
| Bosnia Herzeg. | 70.4 | 54.6 | 63 | 56.4 |
| Montenegro | 67 | 63.7 | 66.9 | 56.1 |
| Belarus | 63.1 | 61.6 | 64.2 | 59.3 |
| Macedonia | 60.4 | 56.9 | 56.2 | 63.6 |
| Ukraine | 58.7 | 58.4 | 58.3 | 58.8 |
| Romania | 58 | 57 | 57.6 | 56.5 |
| Croatia | 57.7 | 45.7 | 53.5 | 44.2 |
| Russia | 56.9 | 61.1 | 59 | 62 |
| Serbia | 56.4 | 54.3 | 56.9 | 49.3 |
| Albania | 55.1 | 54.8 | 56.4 | 53.1 |
| Estonia | 54.7 | 46.9 | 50.8 | 46.8 |
| Poland | 53.9 | 46.6 | 52.5 | 49.4 |
| Latvia | 48.8 | 40.9 | 48.3 | 39.5 |
| Bulgaria | 47.8 | 52.9 | 54.9 | 48.9 |
| Cyprus | 42.6 | 36.7 | 40.3 | 36.2 |
| Armenia | 41.7 | 45.7 | 43 | 50 |
| Greece | 41 | 23.8 | 33.1 | 19.8 |
| Slovak Rep. | 39.3 | 26.9 | 38.1 | 24.6 |
| Slovenia | 38.8 | 32 | 37.3 | 31.3 |
| Hungary | 35 | 28.4 | 31.2 | 28.2 |
| Portugal | 32.2 | 22.4 | 30.1 | 20.7 |
| Northern Cyprus | 31 | 33.9 | 32.1 | 38.1 |
| Austria | 28.6 | 21.4 | 26.1 | 21 |
| Luxembourg | 26.6 | 15.9 | 23.7 | 14.6 |
| Germany West | 25.1 | 12 | 19.5 | 12.1 |
| Italy | 24.4 | 18.5 | 23 | 16.6 |
| Northern Ireland | 24.2 | 18.7 | 25.1 | 16 |
| Czech Republic | 22.3 | 22.9 | 27.2 | 21.8 |
| Malta | 21.3 | 17.7 | 21.3 | 16.5 |
| Finland | 21.1 | 10.3 | 14.9 | 10 |
| Ireland | 20.6 | 14.6 | 18 | 18.1 |
| Germany East | 16.5 | 16.4 | 16.8 | 16.3 |
| Netherlands | 14.8 | 9.2 | 11.5 | 10.1 |
| Switzerland | 13.5 | 5.9 | 11.2 | 4.7 |
| Belgium | 11.3 | 5.7 | 10.4 | 4.4 |
| Denmark | 11 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 3.7 |
| Great Britain | 10.5 | 10.8 | 11.6 | 10 |
| Spain | 8.7 | 4.1 | 8.5 | 3.3 |
| Sweden | 8.4 | 6.1 | 11.3 | 4.9 |
| France | 5.9 | 5.7 | 8.6 | 4.1 |
| Norway | 4.7 | 5.7 | 6.8 | 5 |
| Iceland | 0 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 0.5 |
| Total | 45.4 | 36.7 | 47 | 28.6 |

8.2 Results of the Multilevel Models: Individual-Level Relationships

Two sets of multilevel models are presented in this chapter. First, stepwise hierarchical linear models of moralistic homophobia ('homosexuality is never justifiable') on religion are presented in section 9.2.1. Secondly, stepwise binary logistic multilevel models of intolerance towards homosexuals as a group are presented in section 9.2.2.

As with the previous models of ethnic intolerance, the models for both homophobia-outcomes suffer from missing data. The full random intercept model with moralistic homophobia as the outcome has 15,492 (23%) missing values, and the model with intolerance towards homosexuals as a group has 12,767 (19%) missing values. Unfortunately, the analysis of missing data patterns, regression models of the effect of 'missingness' on the outcome variables on 'missingness' on the independent variables showed the missing data mechanism likely to be not missing at random (MNAR). In particular, 'missingness' on one measure of homophobia is related to both 'missingness' on the other measure of homophobia, and positive answers to the homophobia measure. Furthermore, 'missingness' on both is related to anomy. This means that the missingness mechanism on Y is correlated with values of Y, which likely leads to some bias of the estimates, since people who are homophobic are also more likely to refuse the answer. We can therefore not assume that the data are missing at random. Consequently, multiple imputation does not make sense, as it would violate important assumptions and could thus lead to more bias. The missing data analyses for the two models are supplemented in the appendix.

8.2.1 Moralistic Homophobia

The multilevel analysis starts with an empty model (the null model) of moralistic homophobia on religion. The null model is not presented in Table 20 for reasons of space economy. It yields substantial residual- (6.827) and between-country variances (4.371), which means that the levels of homophobia differ greatly between respondents and between countries. The Intra-class correlation (VPC) is 0.390, which means that 39% of the overall variance in moralistic homophobia is explained by the country level.

Table 20 displays the stepwise random intercepts models. As with ethnic intolerance, here again, the religion variables are included on their own in the first step, in order to make sure that relationships between religion and homophobia are not hidden away by the control variables. Also, each religion variable was included in the model on its own in a separate step, in order to ensure that no religion effect is obscured by the others. A table with the separate coefficients is supplied in Appendix E (Table G). They are not presented here, as they do not add to the knowledge and would disrupt the reading process.

Then, the controls and possible mediators anomy, being right-wing, and authoritarianism (strong leader) are included in Model 4, 5 and 6. The models include a dummy for Northern Cyprus and Iceland, two outliers that have been found in the residual diagnostics to be influential cases, and the constant (intercept) is set to zero for these two countries in order to control for the effect without losing statistical power. Not accounting for the effect of the two influential cases would artificially pull the regression line away from the data points and thus lead to biased results.

Table 20: Moralistic Homophobia, Random Intercept Models

| DV: 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | Model 1 | | Model3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | | Model 6 | |
|--|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| <i>Fixed Part</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Catholic | 0.223*** | 0.039 | 0.141*** | 0.038 | 0.120*** | 0.038 | 0.121*** | 0.039 | 0.136** | 0.041 |
| Protestant | 0.173*** | 0.048 | 0.070 | 0.047 | 0.066 | 0.047 | 0.072 | 0.048 | 0.098* | 0.048 |
| Orthodox | 0.081 | 0.045 | 0.059 | 0.044 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.059 | 0.047 | 0.045 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | 0.550*** | 0.062 | 0.518*** | 0.060 | 0.513*** | 0.061 | 0.499*** | 0.064 | 0.483*** | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | 0.641*** | 0.081 | 0.592*** | 0.078 | 0.600*** | 0.080 | 0.579*** | 0.082 | 0.588*** | 0.084 |
| Church Attendance | 0.117*** | 0.007 | 0.117*** | 0.007 | 0.121*** | 0.007 | 0.121*** | 0.007 | 0.120*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.375*** | 0.014 | 0.300*** | 0.013 | 0.294*** | 0.014 | 0.291*** | 0.014 | 0.286*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | 0.216*** | 0.033 | 0.249*** | 0.032 | 0.257*** | 0.033 | 0.250*** | 0.034 | 0.253*** | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.439*** | 0.030 | -0.323*** | 0.029 | -0.314*** | 0.029 | -0.297*** | 0.030 | -0.290*** | 0.030 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.252*** | 0.022 | -0.226*** | 0.021 | -0.216*** | 0.021 | -0.218*** | 0.022 | -0.212*** | 0.022 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.650*** | 0.028 | 0.551*** | 0.027 | 0.558*** | 0.028 | 0.545*** | 0.029 | 0.514*** | 0.029 |
| Volunteering | -0.340*** | 0.027 | -0.245*** | 0.026 | -0.202*** | 0.026 | -0.180*** | 0.027 | -0.168*** | 0.027 |
| Age | | | 0.027*** | 0.000 | 0.027*** | 0.001 | 0.026*** | 0.000 | 0.026*** | 0.006 |
| Ethnic Minority | | | 0.288*** | 0.036 | 0.277*** | 0.037 | 0.284*** | 0.038 | 0.290*** | 0.039 |
| Tertiary Education | | | -0.723*** | 0.025 | -0.663*** | 0.026 | -0.643*** | 0.025 | -0.602*** | 0.026 |
| Sex: Female | | | -0.622*** | 0.020 | -0.638*** | 0.021 | -0.662*** | 0.021 | -0.668*** | 0.022 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | | | -0.062* | 0.025 | -0.087*** | 0.025 | -0.111*** | 0.026 | -0.108*** | 0.027 |
| Anomy | | | | | 0.036*** | 0.004 | 0.039*** | 0.004 | 0.036*** | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | | | | | | | 0.408*** | 0.030 | 0.398*** | 0.031 |
| Right-Wing Don't know | | | | | | | 0.366 | 0.030 | 0.370*** | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | | | | | | | | | 0.463*** | 0.024 |
| Leader Don't know | | | | | | | | | 0.440*** | 0.043 |
| Northern Cyprus, Iceland ¹ | 4.085** | 1.293 | 3.631** | 1.332 | 3.100* | 1.285 | 2.995* | 1.270 | 2.809* | 1.270 |
| Constant ² | 5.851 | 0.275 | 5.286 | 0.284 | 4.750 | 0.275 | 4.620 | 0.273 | 4.462 | 0.267 |

¹Dummies for the two outliers Northern Cyprus and Iceland are included in the models. ²The constant is set to zero for Northern Cyprus and Iceland.

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Italy is excluded from the analyses, because the question was not asked in Italy.

Table 20, Continuing, Random Part of the Models

| <i>Random Part</i> | Model 1 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | | Model 6 | |
|----------------------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 3.325 | 0.104 | 3.530 | 0.731 | 3.305 | 0.685 | 3.283 | 0.680 | 3.215 | 0.666 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.339 | 0.046 | 0.371 | 0.048 | 0.356 | 0.047 | 0.351 | 0.057 | 0.342 | 0.046 |
| Residual Variance | 6.473 | 0.038 | 6.041 | 0.003 | 5.988 | 0.035 | 6.002 | 0.035 | 6.005 | 0.037 |
| N | 57744 | | 57140 | | 56653 | | 55701 | | 52294 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | 272018 | | 265238 | | 262472 | | 258204 | | 242446 | |
| AIC | 272051 | | 265280 | | 262517 | | 258251 | | 242496 | |
| BIC | 272195 | | 265468 | | 262714 | | 258456 | | 242717 | |

Note: * p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001

The random intercept models demonstrate what the bivariate analysis has already shown: religion is strongly related to homophobia. People who go to church, who find religion important and who believe in a personal God tend to be more inclined towards condemning homosexual behaviour than non-religious people.

The finding supports H6a.

Interestingly, while traditional monotheistic belief, as one would expect, is positively related to moralistic homophobia, the relationship with modern, fuzzy belief in a Spirit/Life Force and with individualised religiosity ('I have my own way of connecting with the divine') is strongly negative. The finding accords with modernisation theory (Inglehart 2002) and individualisation theory (Luckmann 1993; Cesari 2004; Pace 2006; Beck 2010), which both emphasise that these alternative beliefs are themselves part of the modernisation process by which a general shift of value priorities towards more tolerance and open mindedness takes place in post-industrial, modernised societies.

From this standpoint the finding that alternative forms of religious belief, that challenge the churches' authoritative truth claim, are negatively related to intolerance is no great surprise. But just as in the previous chapter one could ask why fuzzy individualised believers are less likely to be intolerant than non-believers. If modernisation is the answer, shouldn't then atheists ('there is no God, Spirit or Life Force') and agnostics ('don't know what to think') be more tolerant, or at least be equally as tolerant? The author's guess is that individualised believers are more concerned about questions of social morals than the average non-believer.

Individualised, modern believers choose beliefs that deviate from traditional doctrine. It is plausible that they may also be more sympathetic towards behaviour that deviates from traditional morals, than the average non-believer, who is oftentimes not bothered with questions of religion, or social and sexual morals at all.

As regards religious belonging, members of all denominations are more likely than non-members to say that homosexuality is never justifiable. Surprisingly, Orthodox members are not significantly more homophobic than unchurched people when other religion variables are controlled for. When only denominational affiliation is included in the random intercept model with unchurched as the reference category (see Appendix E, Table H) and without including any controls, we see that Orthodox are significantly more intolerant of homosexual behaviour than unchurched people. Thus, the Orthodox effect is due to the devout members. We also have to keep in mind that the prior tests for a measurement effect were positive for Orthodox denomination: the coefficient of Orthodox could be influenced by the question format effect that was discussed earlier.

The coefficients of all denominations are statistically significant and positive. Members of small sects and Muslims are the least tolerant of homosexual behaviour while Protestants are less intolerant than the other religious groups, but still more intolerant than unchurched. Interestingly, in the controlled stepwise models, the coefficient of Protestant affiliation is statistically significantly positive, when controlling for authoritarianism (strong leader). This is due to the fact that Protestants tend to be on average less authoritarian than unchurched and

members of other denominations. The share of people saying they would prefer a strong leader governing the country is 19.4% among Protestant members while it is 31.4% among the unchurched, 28.7% among Catholics, 43.3 % among Orthodox and 48% among Muslims. When holding authoritarianism, religiosity and the socio-structural controls constant, members of all denominations except Orthodox are more likely than non-members to express the homophobic attitude.

The data show that Muslims and members of the mixed group 'other denomination' are the most dismissive of homosexual behaviour. The group 'other denomination' comprises of 83 Jews, 33 Hindus, 39 Buddhists and 1,197 members of small sects that did not identify with either of the major denominations on the questionnaire.

The finding makes sense: it is known from prior literature in the sociology of religion that members of small sects tend to have more rigid morals than members of the major churches because of tighter mechanisms of social control in their communities (Bainbridge and Stark 1980; Iannaccone 1988). It is therefore plausible that they are more strongly opposed to a behaviour their religion considers sinful. As for the Muslim finding, the finding supports prior literature as well (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003)

It is left to say that most of the controls point in the expected directions. People who volunteer, people with tertiary education and women are more tolerant, while members of ethnic minorities and people who suffer from anomy are less tolerant. People, who have experienced long-term unemployment, are not left-wing (right-wing and 'don't know') and who do not oppose the idea of a strong leader governing the country, are also more intolerant. The positive finding for members

of ethnic minorities is due to the (on average) more traditional outlook of ethnic minority members in the Western, receiving countries of migrants.

This group consists mostly of people who came from more traditional societies in which the acceptance of homosexuality is generally lower than in the West. The relationship is known from prior literature (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2002; Hooghe et al. 2010).

Across Europe as a whole most of the findings presented here confirm the findings from prior literature (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Crocket and Voas 2003; Meerendonk and Scheepers 2004): religiously devout people, and traditional believers are more intolerant towards homosexual behaviour than non-religious people, and traditional believers are more intolerant than non-believers and modern individualised believers.

Random Slopes

Table 21 contains random slopes of church attendance, importance of religion and religious believing. For reasons of space economy, and because they do not add new knowledge, the tables do not contain the coefficients of the control variables (the models were run with all controls).

All coefficients of individual level religiosity vary significantly between countries but religious believing exhibits by far the largest between country variance in the

random slope effects. Figures 9 and 10 visualise the random slopes and intercepts of finding religion important¹⁷ and the two forms of belief in God.

The two figures give a consistent picture of the relationships across Europe.

Finding religion important is most strongly positively related to homophobia in the Scandinavian and Western European countries that have the lowest levels of overall homophobia of their populations while in the South-Eastern and Eastern European countries that are at the upper end of the overall homophobia scale (they are the countries with the highest intercepts), a person's subjective religiosity has no significant influence on their probability of being homophobic.

A similar pattern is observed for religious believing: In the Scandinavian and Western European countries, where homophobia is the least prevalent believers in a personal God are on average more homophobic than non-believers, while believers in a Spirit/Life Force are less homophobic. In the South-Eastern and Eastern European countries, on the other hand, the reverse relationship is found: here it is the non-believers and believers in a Spirit/Life Force who tend to be more homophobic, the relationships between traditional believing and homophobia are weakly negative. Figure 10 shows that the two forms of believing have opposite relationships with moralistic homophobia.

The findings confirm Adamczyk and Pitt, who found the same country pattern using World Values Survey data (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009). Religiosity is indeed more strongly related to moralistic homophobia in Western European countries with low overall levels of homophobic intolerance. In countries with high levels of moralistic homophobia, religiosity does not have an additional effect.

¹⁷ Because the random slope variance of church attendance is very similar to that of importance of religion, I do not supply a visualisation for church attendance here.

Table 21: Moralistic Homophobia, Random Slope Models

| DV: 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | Random Slope: Church Attendance | | Random Slope: Importance of Religion | | Random Slope: Belief: Personal God | | Random Slope: Belief: Spirit/Life Force | |
|--|---------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Fixed Part | | | | | | | | |
| Catholic | 0.031 | 0.041 | 0.093* | 0.041 | 0.132*** | 0.041 | 0.142*** | 0.041 |
| Protestant | 0.001 | 0.050 | 0.034 | 0.049 | 0.044 | 0.049 | 0.071 | 0.049 |
| Orthodox | 0.155** | 0.049 | 0.152** | 0.048 | 0.129** | 0.048 | 0.053 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | 0.594*** | 0.066 | 0.592*** | 0.066 | 0.577*** | 0.066 | 0.510*** | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | 0.546*** | 0.083 | 0.590*** | 0.089 | 0.586*** | 0.083 | 0.591*** | 0.083 |
| Church Attendance | 0.126*** | 0.023 | 0.115*** | 0.008 | 0.121*** | 0.008 | 0.123*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.258*** | 0.014 | 0.280*** | 0.041 | 0.267*** | 0.014 | 0.298*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | 0.237*** | 0.034 | 0.223*** | 0.034 | 0.266*** | 0.078 | 0.307*** | 0.035 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.303*** | 0.031 | -0.311*** | 0.031 | -0.237*** | 0.022 | -0.230*** | 0.058 |
| Individualised Spirituality | -0.226*** | 0.023 | -0.237*** | 0.022 | -0.185*** | 0.027 | -0.221*** | 0.023 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.525*** | 0.029 | 0.527*** | 0.029 | 0.532*** | 0.029 | 0.514*** | 0.029 |
| Volunteering | -0.208*** | 0.028 | -0.188*** | 0.028 | -0.176*** | 0.028 | -0.181*** | 0.027 |
| Dummy: Northern Cyprus, Iceland | -2.721 | 0.903 | -2.195 | 0.902 | -2.890 | 0.799 | -2.236 | 1.063 |
| Constant ¹ | 4.814 | 0.322 | 4.799 | 0.350 | 5.207 | 0.299 | 4.643 | 0.260 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 4.655 | 0.974 | 5.532 | 1.150 | 3.895 | 0.820 | 2.946 | 0.614 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.447 | 0.051 | 0.493 | 0.052 | 0.337 | 0.046 | 0.337 | 0.046 |
| Random Slope Variance σ^2_{u1} | 0.021 | 0.005 | 0.071 | 0.016 | 0.232 | 0.055 | 0.107 | 0.028 |
| IS covariance | -0.270 | 0.063 | -0.553 | 0.128 | -0.864 | 0.199 | 0.422 | 0.113 |
| Residual Variance | 5.945 | 0.036 | 5.9478 | 0.036 | 5.965 | 0.036 | 5.984 | 0.037 |
| N | 52294 | | 52294 | | 52294 | | 52294 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | 248442.2 | | 248436.2 | | 24873.7 | | 24873.7 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 455.24 | | 461.15 | | 160.40 | | 160.40 | |
| AIC | 242060.3 | | 242073.3 | | 242201.5 | | 242361.7 | |
| BIC | 242299.7 | | 242312.6 | | 242440.9 | | 242601.0 | |

¹The constant excludes Northern Cyprus and Iceland. It is set to zero for these two countries and set to one for all others. When 'Homophobia is never justifiable' is the outcome, Italy is excluded from the analyses, because the question was not asked in Italy.

Figure 9: Moralistic Homophobia, Random Slopes of Importance of Religion





Figure 10: Moralistic Homophobia, Random Slopes of Believing



8.2.2 Prejudice against Homosexuals as a Group

The strongest form of homophobia examined here is intolerance towards homosexuals as a group, measured by the statement ‘would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’. While ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ refers to homosexual behaviour¹⁸, not wanting homosexuals as neighbours is directed against them as a group. The item is part of the ‘would not like as neighbours’-battery that was introduced in chapter 7 and is a measure of social distance. It is possible that religiosity is related to moralistic homophobia but not necessarily to intolerance of homosexuals as a group.

It is quite plausible for a conservative religious person to have a negative attitude towards homosexuality as a behaviour that is seen as morally wrong and at the same time to be quite happy having homosexuals as friends and neighbours. Both, Christian and Islamic teachings make a distinction between having homosexual desires and practicing homosexual behaviour. It is perfectly reasonable for a religious person to ‘condemn the sin but not the sinner’. It can thus be expected that religious people are less homophobic when it comes to accepting homosexuals as persons than accepting homosexuality as behaviour. Indeed the uncontrolled bivariate relationships presented above already pointed in this direction.

As in the previous section, the analysis starts with an empty model, which is not presented in the tables because of space restrictions.

¹⁸ As stated above, ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ is part of a 20-item battery asking the respondents whether they would justify various kinds of behaviour like cheating on a tax, lying, divorce, abortion and others. This association of homosexuality with other behavioural items strengthens the assumption that the respondents are likely to refer to homosexuality as behaviour when they answer this question.

Because the analysis of residuals showed a cluster of three outliers, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to be influential cases¹⁹, the constant was set to zero for these three countries and a dummy variable for the three included in the model in order to eliminate the bias due to the influential cases without losing statistical power, the approach follows Van der Meer et al (Van der Meer, Grotenhuis, and Pelzer 2010).

The between-country variance of the empty model is 1.721, thus the intra-class correlation is 0.340. As with moralistic homophobia as the outcome, here again more than 30% of the overall variability in homophobia is explained by country level traits. When looking at the random intercept model in Table 22, it is apparent that the coefficients of the religion variables are clearly smaller when intolerance towards homosexuals as a group is the outcome. The relationships are still positive for church attendance and importance of religion, and negative for religious believing. Interestingly, not only individualised religiosity and belief in a Spirit/Life Force, but also traditional belief in a personal God are negatively related to intolerance towards homosexuals. Traditionally religious people tend to find homosexuality morally wrong, but they do not necessarily also have a problem accepting them as their neighbours. Moralistic disapproval of homosexual behaviour does not necessarily also result in blatant intolerance (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) towards them as persons. This finding gives some strong supporting evidence for H6b.

¹⁹ Chi-squared based Chow-testing of all model coefficients using STATA `suest`, between the full model including a dummy for the outliers Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and the same model without the dummy showed that this group significantly influences the model coefficients.

Further random slopes, as are presented in the next step of the analysis, will shed some light on how these relationships differ across countries. As to the controls, they mostly point in the expected directions: women are more tolerant than men, the highly educated more tolerant than the less educated. People who experienced long-term unemployment and suffer from anomie (feeling of no control over their life) are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals than others. Members of ethnic minorities and Muslims in particular, however, although they tend to disapprove of homosexuality as a practice, do not generally have a problem accepting homosexuals as their neighbours. This is consistent with other findings in the literature. Ethnic minority members might well disapprove of liberal Western lifestyles and morals but have no problem accepting cultural and moral diversity in their neighbourhood.

Table 22: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’, Stepwise Random Intercept Model

| DV: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’ | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.013 | 0.040 | 0.000 | 0.040 | -0.009 | 0.040 | -0.015 | 0.041 | -0.020 | 0.043 |
| Protestant | -0.008 | 0.053 | -0.042 | 0.054 | -0.042 | 0.054 | -0.042 | 0.055 | -0.053 | 0.056 |
| Orthodox | 0.106** | 0.039 | 0.112** | 0.040 | 0.110** | 0.040 | 0.106** | 0.041 | 0.135** | 0.043 |
| Muslim | 0.059 | 0.055 | 0.041 | 0.056 | 0.045 | 0.057 | 0.050 | 0.058 | 0.045 | 0.061 |
| Other Denomination | -0.024 | 0.079 | -0.038 | 0.080 | -0.040 | 0.081 | -0.047 | 0.082 | -0.040 | 0.087 |
| Church Attendance | 0.057*** | 0.008 | 0.067*** | 0.008 | 0.069*** | 0.008 | 0.070*** | 0.008 | 0.069*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.115*** | 0.013 | 0.089*** | 0.014 | 0.083*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.015 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.067* | 0.032 | -0.041 | 0.032 | -0.035 | 0.032 | -0.028 | 0.033 | -0.041 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.318*** | 0.029 | -0.266*** | 0.030 | -0.264*** | 0.030 | -0.257*** | 0.031 | -0.250*** | 0.032 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.099*** | 0.021 | -0.087*** | 0.021 | -0.089*** | 0.022 | -0.081*** | 0.022 | -0.083*** | 0.023 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.239*** | 0.025 | 0.204*** | 0.025 | 0.208*** | 0.025 | 0.208*** | 0.025 | 0.192*** | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.113*** | 0.027 | -0.071** | 0.027 | -0.054* | 0.028 | -0.047 | 0.028 | -0.039 | 0.029 |
| Tertiary Education | | | -0.295*** | 0.026 | -0.266*** | 0.026 | -0.266*** | 0.026 | -0.265*** | 0.027 |
| Sex: Female | | | -0.306*** | 0.021 | -0.309*** | 0.021 | -0.316*** | 0.021 | -0.323*** | 0.022 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | | | 0.157*** | 0.025 | 0.146*** | 0.025 | 0.145*** | 0.025 | 0.143*** | 0.026 |
| Age | | | -0.007* | 0.003 | -0.008* | 0.003 | -0.009** | 0.003 | -0.007* | 0.003 |
| Age squared | | | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Ethnic Minority | | | -0.017 | 0.037 | -0.019 | 0.037 | -0.020 | 0.037 | -0.020 | 0.039 |
| Anomy | | | | | | | 0.022*** | 0.004 | 0.023*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | | | | | | | | | 0.270*** | 0.030 |
| Right-Wing Don't know | | | | | | | | | 0.065* | 0.029 |
| Strong Leader | | | | | | | | | 0.109*** | 0.024 |
| Leader Don't know | | | | | | | | | 0.018 | 0.044 |
| Dummy: Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey | 1.635* | 0.668 | 1.887** | 0.677 | 1.622* | 0.661 | 1.572* | 0.664 | 1.507* | 0.667 |
| Constant ¹ | -1.319*** | 0.176 | -1.182*** | 0.190 | -1.441*** | 0.187 | -1.503*** | 0.189 | -1.610*** | 0.191 |

¹The constant has been set to zero for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and set to 1 for all other countries.

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 22 Continuing, Random Part of the Model, Random Part of the Models

| <i>Random Part</i> | Model 1 | | Model2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 1.346 | 0.279 | 1.281 | | 0.266 | | 1.289 | 0.268 | 1.297 | 0.270 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.284 | 0.042 | 0.290 | 0.042 | 0.290 | 0.042 | 0.291 | 0.042 | 0.288 | 0.042 |
| N | 61116 | | 60439 | | 59929 | | 58781 | | 55019 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -31098.288 | | -30379.980 | | -29955.245 | | -29234.669 | | -26969.639 | |
| AIC | 62226.576 | | 60801.960 | | 59954.489 | | 58515.339 | | 53989.278 | |
| BIC | 62361.884 | | 60991.157 | | 60152.509 | | 58721.915 | | 54212.164 | |

Note: * p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001

Table 23: Intolerance towards Homosexuals as a Group: Random Slopes Models

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | Random Slope Church Attendance | | Random Slope Importance of Religion | | Random Slope Belief: Personal God | | Random Slope Belief: Spirit/Life Force | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------|--|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | SE. | Coef. | SE | Coef. | SE | Coef. | SE |
| Catholic | -0.028 | 0.044 | -0.034 | 0.043 | -0.028 | 0.043 | -0.022 | 0.043 |
| Protestant | -0.043 | 0.058 | -0.052 | 0.058 | -0.055 | 0.057 | -0.053 | 0.057 |
| Orthodox | 0.164*** | 0.043 | 0.158*** | 0.043 | 0.141** | 0.043 | 0.126** | 0.043 |
| Muslim | 0.048 | 0.062 | 0.044 | 0.061 | 0.065 | 0.062 | 0.052 | 0.062 |
| Other Denomination | -0.028 | 0.087 | -0.033 | 0.087 | -0.039 | 0.087 | -0.040 | 0.087 |
| Church Attendance | 0.070*** | 0.014 | 0.065*** | 0.008 | 0.068*** | 0.008 | 0.068*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.077*** | 0.015 | 0.117*** | 0.032 | 0.071*** | 0.015 | 0.076*** | 0.015 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.035 | 0.034 | -0.045 | 0.034 | 0.009 | 0.057 | -0.024 | 0.035 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.243*** | 0.032 | -0.250*** | 0.032 | -0.253*** | 0.032 | -0.268*** | 0.056 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.087*** | 0.023 | -0.088*** | 0.023 | -0.086*** | 0.023 | -0.080*** | 0.023 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.244*** | 0.025 | 0.210*** | 0.027 | 0.216*** | 0.027 | 0.212*** | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.036 | 0.029 | -0.034 | 0.029 | -0.038 | 0.029 | -0.041 | 0.029 |
| Dummy: Azerbaijan Turkey Georgia | 1.524* | 0.652 | 1.685** | 0.629 | 1.477* | 0.627 | 1.380* | 0.651 |
| constant | -1.633*** | 0.201 | -1.739*** | 0.235 | -1.614*** | 0.199 | -1.598*** | 0.188 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 1.474 | 0.314 | 2.169 | 0.481 | 1.441 | 0.302 | 1.248 | 0.261 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.399 | 0.050 | 0.398 | 0.053 | 0.305 | 0.044 | 0.276 | 0.041 |
| Random Slope Variance σ^2_{u1} | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.037 | 0.009 | 0.084 | 0.024 | 0.084 | 0.025 |
| Intercept Slope Covariance | -0.038 | 0.018 | -0.212 | 0.062 | -0.179 | 0.071 | 0.093 | 0.063 |
| N | 55019 | | 55019 | | 55019 | | 55019 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -26939.188 | | -26909.495 | | -26928.443 | | -26931.455 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 60.90 | | 120.28 | | 82.39 | | 76.37 | |
| AIC | 53932.375 | | 53872.989 | | 53910.886 | | 53916.911 | |
| BIC | 54173.092 | | 54113.706 | | 54151.603 | | 54157.627 | |

Note: The Constant has been set to zero for three influential cases and a dummy for these countries included: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

Note: p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Random Slopes:

The last step of the multilevel analysis takes a closer look at random slopes (Table 23), in order to ascertain whether the religion effects are robust across countries.

As with the previous model, the random slope variance is stronger for importance of religion and beliefs in God than for church attendance. With regard to importance of religion the same is observed as in the previous model with moralistic homophobia as the outcome. Finding religion important is positively related to homophobia mostly in the Western countries that have relatively low overall levels of homophobia (as can be seen from the intercepts and slopes in Figures 11 and 12). This tendency already showed up, when looking at the frequencies. Macedonia and Armenia are exceptions, as they exhibit a negative relationship, but in most of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe religious devoutness is not a predictor of homophobia.

As already stated in the previous section, the most plausible explanation for this finding is that in Eastern Europe the overall levels of intolerance towards homosexuality and homosexuals are already so high that religion does not significantly add to the problem. This concurs with prior findings by Adamczyk and Pitt (2009, 348). Homophobic discourses, policies and legislations are prevalent in many Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, despite several appeals by the European commission (European Commission 2011), and homophobia is widespread across the population as a whole. Thus religious people do not stand out.

The finding will be contextualised further in chapter 12.

When looking at the believing dimension across Europe as a whole, the relationship between traditional believing (Personal God) and intolerance towards

homosexuals is not clear. There are different relationships in different countries, but no obvious pattern. It seems that in Western Europe there is a weak positive relationship but weaker than was observed for moralistic homophobia. In a few South-Eastern European countries the relationship is reversed: traditional believers in Azerbaijan, Macedonia and Kosovo tend to be less likely to be homophobic than other people. This is puzzling and counter-intuitive. The finding might be due to the overall high levels of homophobia among the non-religious population. We saw from the country-percentages that in European comparison, the three countries are among the most homophobic, among both the religious and the non-religious.

With regards to belief in a Spirit/Life Force the same relationships are found as for moralistic homophobia as the outcome: in most countries believers in a Spirit/Life Force are less likely to be homophobic than non-believers and traditional believers. However, in a number of countries there is no significant relationship and some Eastern European outliers show a positive relationship.

All in all, religion clearly matters more for homophobic attitudes in Western European countries with low average levels of homophobia. In Eastern- and South Eastern Europe religion is clearly not a main predictor of homophobia. Other factors are more important in these contexts.

Chapter 12 takes a closer look at how homophobia varies across European countries, and which country-level variables have greater influence on the citizens' inclination to be intolerant towards homosexuals. Also, the analyses will look at how the relationships between individual religiosity and homophobia might be influenced by the context: Greater wealth, a more advanced implementation of gay-rights in the countries' legal codes, or the generally more

emancipative, liberal values of Western societies (modernisation theory) are all plausible candidates.

Figure 11: Homophobia, Random Slope of Importance of Religion





Figure 12: Homophobia, Random Slope of Believing



8.3 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter tried to analyse to what extent religion is related to moralistic homophobia and to intolerance towards homosexuals as a group. Two sets of multilevel models were carried out for the two outcomes. The findings partly confirm prior literature but also shed new light on old assumptions:

H6a is partly confirmed. Church attendance, finding religion important, and traditional believing are indeed positively related to both forms of homophobia.

The finding is consistent with prior literature. However, this needs to be differentiated further: Belief in a personal God is positively related to moralistic homophobia, but not to intolerance towards homosexuals as a group. Traditional religious believers, although they are opposed to homosexual behaviour, are indeed not necessarily intolerant towards homosexuals as a group. The finding makes sense given that the doctrines of Europe's Abrahamic religions condemn homosexual behaviour as sinful, but nonetheless teach believers to love their neighbours and not to judge them, but to welcome them in church. The finding of sizeable between-country differences in the effect of believing that show no obvious joint pattern necessitates a closer analysis in the following chapters on context.

H6b is confirmed by the data. A look at the percentages and model coefficients of the religion variables across the two outcomes tells us that traditional religiosity is indeed more strongly positively related to moralistic homophobia than to intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.

H7 is confirmed for both measures of homophobia. Both belief in a Spirit/Life Force and individualised religiosity are strongly negatively related to homophobia. The finding supports both modernisation theory and individualisation theory. Tolerance towards homosexuals is generally high in modernised societies that are characterized by liberal and emancipative values. The two alternative forms of religious believing, by questioning traditional beliefs and providing the believer with a new theological autonomy, are in themselves expressions of a liberalization, and individualisation of religion. It is thus plausible that these two forms of believing are negatively related to homophobia. The general pattern found so far: religion is more positively related to homophobia in Western European countries that have low levels of overall homophobia and high levels of support for liberal, emancipative values. The findings support modernisation theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009).

Chapter 12 examines the influence of national contexts on homophobia in more detail. The leading question is: to what extent do the contextual factors that were hypothesized in chapter 7 explain differences in the citizens' levels of homophobia and to what extent do contextual factors moderate relationships between religion and homophobia?

As regards the import of denominational belonging, H8 can only partly be confirmed. Orthodox are more likely to be homophobic in terms of disliking homosexuals as a group. Muslims are more inclined than other people to condemn homosexual behaviour, but they are no more likely than unchurched, people and members of other religious denominations to dislike homosexuals as their neighbours.

Considering the numerous contributions in the homophobia literature that report that Muslims are more homophobic than other people (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Gerhards 2010; Akker, Ploeg, and Scheepers 2013), this finding is interesting and it allows for some optimism. It shows that having rigid religious and sexual morals does not automatically make a person more intolerant towards others who do not share the same morals. Furthermore, differences in the rigidity of sexual morals do not necessarily hinder peaceful neighbourly life in open societies. The fact that Muslim majority countries have high levels of homophobia should not lead to the ecological fallacy of assuming that Muslims, on the individual level must therefore also be intolerant towards homosexuals. At least with regard to homosexuals as a group of persons, this is not the case.

II. Empirical Analysis: Context-Effects

9. The Importance of National Contexts for Ethnic Intolerance

When analysing relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance across 47 countries it is vital to take the national contexts into account. The analyses in chapter 8 and 9 demonstrated that even after including all control variables there is still 16% of unexplained variance due to country-level traits in intolerance towards immigrants and 17% unexplained variance in racial intolerance. This chapter analyses to what extent national, religious, socio-economic, and political contexts influence and explain relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance in Europe.


9.1 Mapping the Random Effects of Religiosity

A good way to facilitate an understanding, where in Europe religiosity matters for ethnic intolerance and why, is to visualise the random slopes of the religion variables that were modelled in chapter 8. Geographic choropleth maps of the random effects are more easily accessible than line charts, because common patterns across countries become easier to detect. The maps assign a colour to each country based on the size of its random slope. Because Eastern and Western Germany, and Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus were treated as separate entities throughout the analyses, the maps show these distinctions by displaying the boundaries of the NUTS-2-regions for these countries. Also, a

white tag was added to the countries, in which the effect is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

Figure 13 is a choropleth map of the countries' slopes of importance of religion on racial intolerance, based on the random slope model (Model 1 in section 8.2.2, Table 15, first column). Importance of religion is the only measure of religious devoutness that has a significant random slope across both measures of ethnic intolerance while church attendance, on the other hand, does not have a significant effect on ethnic intolerance in most countries.

Figure 13: Choropleth Map of the Random Slope of Importance of Religion



The map displays the countries in which a strong, statistically significant positive relationship between finding religion important in life and intolerance towards people of a different race was found in deep red. Countries in which the effect is

close to zero are coloured in light blue and countries exhibiting a strong, negative relationship are shown in darker shades of blue.

Apart from visualizing what was already said, the overall statistically significant positive effect of importance of religion is due to only a few South-Eastern European countries and Lithuania, the map also reveals that a number of countries, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary and Georgia exhibit a positive slope as well, albeit the effect is smaller and not statistically significant. The clustering of these countries in the Balkan and Caucasian region surrounding the abovementioned core of countries that have strongly significant positive slopes makes it seem unlikely that their non-significant slopes are just an artefact merely produced by statistical chance. Interestingly, there are other countries, France, Denmark, and Spain in the West and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, and Ukraine in the East, in which a non-significant positive slope is found. It will be interesting, as a next step, to test via cross-level interaction terms whether these countries have contextual traits in common that might help explain the relationship.

The result so far demonstrates that statistical significance is not the only thing worth paying attention to. The statistically non-significant country-slopes can give substantial clues to geographical patterns of relationships, as the South-Eastern European cluster of countries demonstrates. One also has to bear in mind that in all statistical models there is a 5% chance of a false rejection of a result as non-significant. Nonetheless the non-significant effects have to be interpreted with caution.

Figure 14: Racial Intolerance: Random Coefficient of Belief in a Personal God





Figure 14 shows the random slopes of belief in a personal God when racial intolerance is the outcome and Figure 15 the same random slope when intolerance towards immigrants is the outcome. Maps of the random slope of belief in a Spirit/Life Force are not displayed here, as the random effect and its distribution across countries is very similar to that of belief in a personal God.

As was to be expected based on the results of the random slope models, the maps for the two outcomes look very similar. Believing in God or a higher Power is strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance almost everywhere in Europe. The maps do not indicate an obvious pattern across countries regarding the strength of the relationships. For example, it is not the wealthiest or most politically stable countries that exhibit the largest negative coefficients, nor do we see a divide between Western Europe and the post-communist East.

Figure 15: Intolerance of Immigrants: Random Coefficient of Belief in a Personal God



There might be a divide along denominational lines: many of the countries with Protestant majorities are in the group with the largest negative effect.

Unsurprisingly, in some of the South-Eastern European countries, where devoutness (importance of religion) was shown to be positively related to ethnic intolerance, we find a positive relationship for belief in God as well. This is the case in Ukraine, Armenia and Macedonia and, when the outcome is intolerance of immigrants, also Greece. In Turkey, Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kosovo, however, belief in God is clearly negatively related to ethnic intolerance although the effect of religious devoutness, as seen above, is positive. The finding somewhat confirms our initial hypothesis that different forms of religiosity are differently related to intolerance. Furthermore, the finding suggests that importance of religion, in South-Eastern Europe is not just a measure of devoutness but also functions as a cultural identity marker.

This region is marked by histories of ethno-religious conflict. It is plausible that in national contexts that are characterised by such legacies of ethno-religious conflicts, a strong identification with a religion is statistically linked to ethnic intolerance. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that in these countries, in contrast to finding religion important, church attendance does not have an effect on ethnic intolerance at all. Cross-level interaction terms testing for the influence of country level traits, religious national contexts and contexts of political stability and absence of violence should bring more clarity.

Finally, the random coefficient of fundamentalism is displayed in Figures 16 and 17.

Figure 16: Racial Intolerance: Random Coefficient of Fundamentalism





Figure 17: Intolerance of Immigrants: Random Coefficient of Belief in a Personal God



We know already from chapter 8 that the relationship between fundamentalism and ethnic intolerance is positive everywhere in Europe. Fundamentalists are more closed-minded and thus more likely to be intolerant of out-groups. In addition, the maps show that fundamentalism tends to matter more in Western-, and in South-Eastern Europe than in the post-soviet countries of Eastern Europe. When intolerance towards immigrants is the outcome, the coefficient of fundamentalism in Russia, Latvia, Belarus and Georgia is even weakly negative albeit by no means statistically significant. It might seem surprising, at first glance, that religious fundamentalism, operationalised as the statement ‘there is only one true religion’, is more strongly connected to ethnic intolerance in precisely the countries that also show the lowest levels of ethnic intolerance in Europe.

However, there is a plausible explanation for this relationship: Western Europe consists mostly of wealthy, receiving countries of immigrants. The fact that fundamentalism is most strongly related to ethnic intolerance in these countries reflects the role religious affiliation can play as an identity marker that divides the majority group from the (mostly Muslim) immigrant out-groups. By claiming that ‘there is only one true religion’ — namely Christianity — the less tolerant respondents can identify themselves in opposition to Islam, the religion of the vast majority of immigrants in Western Europe. The claim functions as a demarcation from the cultural ‘other’ (Tajfel 1974; Turner 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Seul 1999). Interestingly, the multivariate analysis has demonstrated that the effect of fundamentalism is independent of personal religiosity. A fundamentalist is more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups no matter whether s/he is devout or not. The same mechanism holds for South-Eastern Europe, where religious identities are strongly connected with ethnicity. However, in the South-Eastern European context the out-groups are not immigrants, but the ethnic-religious ‘other’. The statement ‘there is only one true religion’, in this context hints towards animosities between ethnic-religious groups who have lived in the area for centuries. The special case of South-Eastern Europe will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 11.

The visual inspection of the random slopes of this section has revealed that context does indeed matter for the relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance. The following sections analyse the effects of the context variables theorised above on (a) ethnic intolerance and (b) the relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance. The aim is to understand under what circumstances religiosity matters for ethnic intolerance.

9.2 The Import of Democracy, Anti-Corruption and Political Stability

The two hypotheses to be tested in this section are as follows:

H9: People are more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups if they live in countries with low levels of political stability, low levels of democratic freedom, and high levels of corruption.

H10: In countries with low levels of political stability and democratic freedom and high levels of corruption individual-level religiosity is positively related to ethnic intolerance.

When looking at the maps depicting the relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance across countries, it seems that levels of democratic freedom, political stability, and corruption levels are influential contexts. The South-Eastern European countries in which there is a significant relationship between religious devoutness and ethnic intolerance are all in the group of countries that have the highest overall levels of ethnic intolerance and also the lowest scores of political stability and democratic freedom in Europe and they are all high in corruption. Scatter plots are a good visualization of these bivariate macro-level relationships. Because the relationships are the same for both indicators of ethnic intolerance, only the scatterplots for racial intolerance as the outcome are displayed here.

Figure 18: Scatterplot – Macro-Relationship between Political Stability and the Proportion of Racially Intolerant





Figure 19: Scatterplot – Macro-Relationship between Corruption and the Proportion of Racially Intolerant



Note: High values indicate low corruption.

The scatterplots in Figures 18 and 19 show that there is indeed a negative relationship between high levels of political stability and low corruption-levels on the one hand, and racial intolerance on the other. The higher a country’s level of political stability and the lower its level of corruption, the smaller is the percentage of racially intolerant among its population.

However, the scatterplots also show large variation. Northern Cyprus is an outlier in all models with racial intolerance as the outcome. Therefore its intercept has been set to zero in the multilevel models to ensure that the regression line is not artificially pulled away by this influential case.

For the freedom house measure, no scatterplot is provided. The relationships between ethnic intolerance and democratic freedom are visible to the naked eye as the freedom house index has only three categories (free, partly free, and not free) and again, the (mostly South-Eastern European) countries with high percentages of ethnically intolerant are all in the ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’ categories.

Table 24: Countries that were categorised as ‘Partly Free’ and ‘Not free’ in 2008 by Freedom House

| Freedom House Score | Partly Free | Not free |
|---------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| Country | Albania, Armenia Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Russia Turkey | Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Belarus |

Multilevel Models with Context-Effects

To test the direct effect of the countries' levels of political stability and corruption controlling for other national contexts, the full random intercept model (as presented in chapter 8) was run stepwise, this time including political stability and including each country-level control separately. The same stepwise model was run for the corruption perceptions index. The models also include the individual-level controls that were used throughout all previous models (see chapter 8). Due to space limitations the individual-level controls are not presented in the tables. Some caution is necessary when including the country-level controls. First of all, it is not possible to include all hypothesized controls in one model because the sample size at level 2 does not allow for that due to lack of statistical power (Maas and Hox 2005; Snijders 2005; Newman and Newman 2012). With 48 level-2 units no more than four country-level variables should be included in one step in order to ensure reliable estimates and standard errors (Newman and Newman 2012, 30). Furthermore, there is multicollinearity of concern between two variable-pairs: GDP and Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI), and between the net migration rate and the percentage of foreign-born per country. Therefore, each country-level variable was included in a separate step, and the last model in each table was run including all three controls that had a statistically significant effect on their own: GDP, the net migration rate per country and post-communism. The percentage of foreign-born is left out in the last step, as this variable does not have a statistically significant effect on racial intolerance.

Table 25: The Direct Effect of Political Stability on Racial Intolerance and Country-Level Controls I

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: including Political Stability | | M2: including Political Stability and % Foreign-Born | | M3: including Political Stability and Net Migration Rate | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------|--|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | SE | Coef. | SE | Coef. | SE |
| Catholic | 0.022 | 0.050 | 0.022 | 0.050 | 0.024 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.038 | 0.070 | 0.037 | 0.070 | 0.035 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.051 | 0.052 | 0.050 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.100 | 0.067 | 0.100 | 0.067 | 0.102 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.015 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.029 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.181*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.038 | 0.034 | -0.038 | 0.034 | -0.038 | 0.034 |
| Political Stability (mean centred) | -0.499** | 0.183 | -0.469* | 0.186 | -0.267 | 0.196 |
| % Foreign-Born (log-transformed) | | | -0.066 | 0.094 | | |
| Net Migration Rate (mean centred) | | | | | -0.113* | 0.047 |
| Constant | -2.039*** | 0.148 | -1.932*** | 0.211 | -2.034*** | 0.143 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.759** | 0.080 | 0.755** | 0.080 | 0.714** | 0.076 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.117 | 0.022 | 0.147 | 0.026 | 0.134 | 0.024 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22097.866 | | -22097.618 | | -22095.116 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 7.03 | | 7.53 | | 12.53 | |
| AIC | 44243.733 | | 44245.237 | | 44240.233 | |
| BIC | 44458.104 | | 44468.540 | | 44463.536 | |

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 26: The Direct Effect of Political Stability on Racial Intolerance and Country-Level Controls II

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M4: Political Stability controlling for Post-communism | | M5: Interaction Political Stability, controlling for GDP | | M6: Political Stability and all controls | |
|--|--|-------|--|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.022 | 0.050 | 0.022 | 0.050 | 0.022 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.040 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.049 | 0.052 | 0.049 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.106 | 0.067 | 0.106 | 0.067 | 0.107 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.015 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.179*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.038 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 |
| Political Stability (mean centred) | -0.266 | 0.202 | 0.310 | 0.263 | 0.322 | 0.264 |
| Net Migration Rate (mean centred) | | | | | -0.042 | 0.049 |
| Post-communism (Dummy) | 0.555* | 0.246 | | | -0.166 | 0.321 |
| GDP per Capita (mean centred, log-transf.) | | | -0.589*** | 0.154 | -0.594*** | 0.228 |
| Constant | -2.339*** | 0.196 | 3.721* | 1.510 | 3.864* | 1.548 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.721** | 0.070 | 0.661*** | 0.071 | 0.660*** | 0.070 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.136 | 0.025 | 0.117 | 0.022 | 0.117 | 0.022 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22095.447 | | -22091.449 | | -22091.365 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 11.87 | | 19.87 | | 20.03 | |
| AIC | 44240.893 | | 44232.898 | | 44234.730 | |
| BIC | 44464.197 | | 44456.201 | | 44466.966 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 27: The Direct Effect of Corruption-Levels on Racial Intolerance and Country-Level Controls

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: including CPI | | M2: CPI, controlling for % Foreign-Born | | M3: CPI, controlling for Migration rate | | M4: CPI, controlling for Post-communism | | M5: CPI, controlling for Migration rate and Post-communism | |
|--|-------------------|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.021 | 0.050 | 0.021 | 0.050 | 0.023 | 0.050 | 0.021 | 0.050 | 0.024 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.048 | 0.070 | 0.048 | 0.070 | 0.045 | 0.070 | 0.048 | 0.070 | 0.046 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.048 | 0.052 | 0.048 | 0.052 | 0.047 | 0.052 | 0.048 | 0.052 | 0.046 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.103 | 0.067 | 0.103 | 0.067 | 0.103 | 0.067 | 0.104 | 0.067 | 0.102 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.181*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.181*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 |
| Corruption (CPI, mean centred) | -0.211*** | 0.045 | -0.210*** | 0.048 | -0.169** | 0.052 | -0.202** | 0.068 | -0.183** | 0.068 |
| % Foreign-Born (log-transformed) | | | -0.005 | 0.086 | | | | | | |
| Net Migration Rate (mean centred) | | | | | -0.067 | 0.044 | | | -0.071 | 0.047 |
| Post-communism (Dummy) | | | | | | | 0.051 | 0.300 | -0.095 | 0.308 |
| Constant | -2.015*** | 0.139 | -2.007*** | 0.195 | -2.014*** | 0.137 | -2.043*** | 0.218 | -1.961*** | 0.220 |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 27, Continued, Random Part of the Models

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: including CPI | | M2: CPI, controlling for % Foreign-Born | | M3: CPI, controlling for Migration rate | | M4: CPI, controlling for Post-communism | | M5: CPI, controlling for Migration rate and Post-communism | |
|--|-------------------|-------|---|-------|---|-------|---|-------|--|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.676*** | 0.076 | 0.677*** | 0.076 | 0.658*** | 0.070 | 0.675*** | 0.071 | 0.658*** | 0.070 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.121 | 0.022 | 0.121 | 0.022 | 0.116 | 0.022 | 0.121 | 0.022 | 0.116 | 0.021 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22092.236 | | -22092.235 | | -22091.136 | | -22092.222 | | -22091.088 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 18.29 | | 18.30 | | 20.49 | | 18.32 | | 20.59 | |
| AIC | 44232.472 | | 44234.469 | | 44232.271 | | 44234.443 | | 44234.176 | |
| BIC | 44446.844 | | 44457.773 | | 44455.575 | | 44457.747 | | 44466.412 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Tables 25 and 26 demonstrate that a country's level of political stability is negatively related to the probability of its citizen's to be racially intolerant, as hypothesized in H9. However, when controlling for the countries' net migration rate, wealth (GDP) and post-communism, the effect loses its statistical significance.

People living in countries with low levels of political stability, we already saw that many South-Eastern European countries are in this group, are indeed more likely to be racially intolerant than people living in politically stable countries. Yet, a large share of the racially intolerant respondents also lives in poor countries and sending-countries of migrants. Poverty is clearly the stronger context effect. Nonetheless, when including these country-level controls in a sample as small as 48 cases, one has to bear in mind that true effects will to some extent cancel each other out due to the abovementioned problems of statistical power and multicollinearity. The countries with low levels of political stability are all located in post-communist Eastern Europe. Hence collinearity between these indicators is likely to inflate their standard errors when including them together. This may have lead to a false negative in the case of political stability. The multicollinearity problem is dealt with by including each macro-level indicator on its own in addition to including them next to each other in controlled models.

We already saw from the scatterplot that the countries that are among the lowest third on the political stability scale are also high in racial intolerance. However, some of the (according to the World bank) more politically stable post-communist countries like Russia, Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are high in ethnic intolerance too. Hence when post-communism is included in the model, the effect of political stability is hidden away. We can therefore not conclude from looking

at these coefficients that political stability and corruption are not important predictors of ethnic intolerance.

What can be said is that wealth matters the most. The full model including three controls simultaneously shows that political stability, the net migration rate, and the post-communist control all turn non-significant when including GDP.

Table 26 contains the same stepwise model testing for the direct effect of corruption (Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI). The models cannot control for the effect of GDP as this variable is highly collinear with corruption. The countries that are low in wealth are also high in corruption. One can see from the table that, as expected, corruption matters greatly. Its effect cancels out even the effect of post-communism and the net migration rate. People living in countries that are high in corruption are more likely to be racially intolerant than people living in countries with low corruption levels.

From the result so far it can be concluded that both the governance approach (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2001; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) and modernisation theory are right. National contexts of corruption, low wealth and also political instability are negatively related to the population's inclination to accept people of a different race as neighbours. H9 is therefore supported by the data.

As a next step, cross-level interactions between political stability, corruption levels and importance of religion will test whether the individual-level relationships between religious devoutness and racial intolerance are influenced by these national contexts.

The question is: Can the strong positive relationship between religious devoutness and racial intolerance that was found in the previous multilevel models for the abovementioned cluster of mostly South-Eastern European countries at least partly be explained by contexts of corruption and political instability?

Table 28 contains models including an interaction term between Political Stability and importance of religion (M1), and an interaction term between the corruption Perception index and importance of religion (M2). Both models include the individual-level controls and the main country-level controls.

Both interaction terms are indeed statistically significant and point in the expected direction. Religious devoutness matters for racial intolerance in politically unstable countries with high levels of governmental corruption. The finding supports H10.

In order to illustrate the relationships, the two continuous country-level variables political stability and corruption perceptions index (CPI) were dichotomised and the marginal effects of their interaction with importance of religion was plotted. Figures 20 and 21 contain the plotted lines with confidence intervals.

The interaction plots in Figures 20 and 21 illustrate clearly that religion matters for racial intolerance in politically unstable countries with high levels of corruption but plays no role in politically stable countries. Hypotheses H9 and H10 are confirmed by the results of the analyses.

Table 28: Cross-Level Interactions – Religiosity, Political Stability and Corruption

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: Interaction: Importance of Religion * Political Stability | | M2: Interaction: Importance of Religion * Corruption (CPI) | |
|--|---|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.041 | 0.051 | 0.037 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.052 | 0.070 | 0.072 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.040 | 0.052 | 0.037 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.096 | 0.068 | 0.093 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.010 | 0.109 | -0.003 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.013 | 0.008 | 0.014 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.016 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.170*** | 0.040 | -0.171*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.316*** | 0.037 | -0.316*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.092*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.296*** | 0.031 | 0.296*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.036 | 0.034 | -0.035 | 0.034 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.236*** | 0.032 | -0.235*** | 0.032 |
| Sex: Female | -0.095*** | 0.025 | -0.096*** | 0.025 |
| Unemployed | 0.053 | 0.030 | 0.053 | 0.030 |
| Age | -0.015*** | 0.004 | -0.015*** | 0.004 |
| Age squared | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.250*** | 0.033 | 0.249*** | 0.033 |
| Right-Wing don't know | -0.088** | 0.033 | -0.089** | 0.033 |
| Political Stability | 0.533 | 0.281 | | |
| Net Migration Rate | -0.043 | 0.050 | -0.071 | 0.047 |
| Post-communism | -0.174 | 0.323 | -0.119 | 0.311 |
| GDP (log transformed) | -0.599** | 0.230 | | |
| Importance of Religion * Political Stability | -0.073** | 0.023 | | |
| Corruption (CPI) | | | -0.128 | 0.070 |
| Importance of Religion * Corruption (CPI) | | | -0.024*** | 0.007 |
| Constant | 3.897 | 2.365 | -1.948*** | 0.222 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.675*** | 0.070 | 0.664*** | 0.071 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.116 | 0.022 | 0.118 | 0.022 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22086.067 | | -22084.668 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (3df) | 30.63 | | 33.43 | |
| AIC | 44228.133 | | 44223.336 | |
| BIC | 44478.233 | | 44464.504 | |

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 20: Margins- Political Stability and Importance of Religion





Figure 21: Margins – Corruption Perception (CPI) and Importance of Religion



9.3 Country-Wealth, Presence of Migrants and Fundamentalism

This section takes a closer look at context effects of wealth and the presence of immigrants. The hypotheses to be tested are:

***H11:** People living in wealthier countries with high levels of per capita GDP are less likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people living in poorer countries.*

***H12:** Religious people are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than non-religious people in poorer countries, but not in wealthier countries.*


***H13:** Citizens living in countries with high numbers of immigrants and high percentages of foreign-born are less likely to express ethnic intolerance than citizens of countries with low numbers of immigrants and citizens of sending-countries of migrants.*

The results of the previous model when including the countries' GDP as a control already showed that wealth is strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance.

People in wealthier countries are on average less intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people living in poor countries. The data support H11. The bivariate macro-

level relationship is illustrated in Figure 22, a scatterplot of the GDP per capita and the countries' proportion of racially intolerant among their populations²⁰.

Figure 22: Scatterplot – Macro-Relationship between GDP and the Proportion of Racially Intolerant



What remains to be tested is whether the effect of religion on ethnic intolerance on the individual level depends on a country's wealth and thus its level of modernisation. Following Inglehart and Welzel (2005; 2010) and Norris and Inglehart (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 13–17, 106–110), less modernised countries are more traditional and religion is a stronger social force in such contexts, exercising a deep influence on the citizen's value orientations and social attitudes. According to modernisation theory one would thus expect religiosity to be more strongly related to intolerant attitudes in less developed countries with low per capita GDP.

²⁰ The outlier Northern Cyprus is controlled for in the multilevel models by setting its intercept to zero.

Multilevel Models with Context-Effects

The following models test whether the effect of religious devoutness (importance of religion) on racial intolerance is influenced by country-level wealth, as hypothesized in H12. Secondly the models test whether a country's net migration rate is statistically negatively related to ethnic intolerance, as contact theory would predict. Since the wealthy countries of Europe are also mostly receiving countries of immigrants, one would expect similar results for both indicators. However, the two indicators are moderately (Pearson's r 0.444), not highly correlated and they measure very different contextual effects. From a modernisation theory perspective we would expect to find a link between religion and intolerant attitudes in the poorer countries while in the wealthier countries no such link should be found.

From a contact- theory perspective we would expect people to be less intolerant towards ethnic out-groups the higher the number of immigrants in their countries of residence is. According to contact theory, people are less intolerant of an out-group the more opportunities of contact they have. Higher numbers of immigrants and a high percentage of foreign-born among the population mean more opportunities for members of the majority population to get into contact with immigrants and people of a different race and should thus be related to less intolerance.

Thirdly, the models examine cross-level interactions between country-level wealth, levels of migration and fundamentalism. From the maps of the random slope of fundamentalism across countries we already saw that fundamentalism matters more for ethnic intolerance in the wealthy Western-European immigration

countries and in the South-East. However, this wasn't properly tested in a multilevel model, yet.

The following models present the coefficients of the interactions.

The analysis makes use of two different country-level indicators that refer to the presence of migrants. The net migration rate measures the difference between the number of emigrants and immigrants of a country and is thus a good comparative indicator of sending- and receiving countries of migrants. The higher the value of a country is on this measure, the more immigrants are coming in, which theoretically enhances the chances of the majority population to get into contact. The second measure is the aggregated percentage of foreign-born per country. In theory this indicator refers more to the group-size and may give some clues concerning competition and group-threat theory.

However, both measures are quite crude, ideally one would prefer group-size data to be on the regional level as the variation between different groups would likely yield more meaningful results on a sub-national level, due to the regional clustering of migrants. This was not possible for this analysis because NUTS-2 region codes (European Parliament 2003) were not assigned for all countries.

Thus, there is no consistent and comparable regional-level measure currently in the data. Furthermore, neither the number of immigrants, nor the percentage of foreign-born in a country or region can account for the contact opportunities individual respondents de facto had. Despite these limitations, the net migration rate and percentage of foreign-born on the county-level are nonetheless the best available indicators of the concept given the data currently available.

Table 29 contains the random intercept model including the net migration rate on its own (M1), including both the net migration rate and GDP (M2), and lastly, including the net migration rate, GDP and the other country level controls (M3). The countries' percentage of foreign born is no longer included in these models because Tables 24 and 26 in the previous section have already shown that its effect is not statistically significant, even when no other country-level controls are included.

Table 29 demonstrates that although the net migration rate is negatively related to racial intolerance when no controls are included, its effect vanishes when controlling for GDP. Thus H13 cannot be confirmed by the results of the analysis. If anything, the effect is negative, which would support contact theory rather than group competition and conflict theory, but the result is not robust. Different measures of group-size and group-contact opportunities on a lower level (region or individual-level) will likely yield much clearer results in later analyses.

What can be said for now, is that GDP is the strongest of the country-level predictors of ethnic intolerance. Model M3, the model containing all country-level controls demonstrates that the effect of GDP even cancels out the effect of post-communism. Therefore, modernisation theory is the most suitable of the country-level theories to explain variation in ethnic intolerance. H1 1 is confirmed by the analysis.

Table 29: Effects of Country-Wealth and Migration

| DV: 'Would not like : ...people of a different race' | M1: Net Migration Rate | | M2: controlled for GDP | | M3: Country-Level controls | |
|--|---------------------------|-------|---------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.021 | 0.050 | 0.025 | 0.050 | 0.023 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.030 | 0.070 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.038 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.054 | 0.052 | 0.047 | 0.052 | 0.048 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.106 | 0.067 | 0.103 | 0.067 | 0.105 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.015 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 | -0.180*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.300*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.038 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.235*** | 0.032 | -0.235*** | 0.032 | -0.235*** | 0.032 |
| Sex: Female | -0.097*** | 0.025 | -0.096*** | 0.025 | -0.096*** | 0.025 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.055 | 0.030 | 0.053 | 0.030 | 0.054 | 0.030 |
| Age | -0.014*** | 0.004 | -0.014*** | 0.004 | -0.014*** | 0.004 |
| Age Squared | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.250*** | 0.033 | 0.249*** | 0.033 | 0.249*** | 0.033 |
| Right-Wing Don't know | -0.088** | 0.033 | -0.090** | 0.033 | -0.090** | 0.033 |
| Net Migraton Rate (mean centred) | -0.143*** | 0.041 | -0.044 | 0.050 | -0.042 | 0.050 |
| GDP (log transformed) | | | -0.376** | 0.124 | -0.594** | 0.229 |
| Political Stability (mean centred) | | | | | 0.334 | 0.272 |
| Post-communism | | | | | -0.166 | 0.322 |
| Constant | -2.043*** | 0.144 | 1.640 | 1.221 | 3.857 | 2.354 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.726** | 0.078 | 0.665*** | 0.071 | 0.654*** | 0.070 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.138 | 0.025 | 0.118 | 0.022 | 0.115 | 0.021 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22096.027 | | -22091.757 | | -22091.003 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 10.71 | | 19.25 | | 20.76 | |
| AIC | 44240.055 | | 44233.514 | | 44236.006 | |
| BIC | 44454.426 | | 44456.817 | | 44477.174 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 30: Country - Wealth and Migration, Cross-Level Interactions

| ‘Would not like as neighbours: People of a different Race’ | M4: GDP * Importance of Religion | | M5: GDP * Fundamentalism | | M6: Post- Communism * Fundamentalism | |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.041 | 0.050 | 0.021 | 0.050 | 0.026 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.059 | 0.070 | 0.036 | 0.070 | 0.039 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.042 | 0.052 | 0.050 | 0.052 | 0.055 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.097 | 0.068 | 0.107 | 0.067 | 0.111 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.006 | 0.109 | -0.018 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.520*** | 0.135 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.169*** | 0.040 | -0.183*** | 0.040 | -0.179*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.316*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.318*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.092*** | 0.026 | -0.094*** | 0.026 | -0.093*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.296*** | 0.031 | -0.176 | 0.278 | 0.230*** | 0.037 |
| Volunteering | -0.036 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 |
| GDP (log transformed) | -0.459 | 0.235 | -0.607** | 0.228 | -0.590** | 0.226 |
| Net Migration Rate (mean centred) | -0.043 | 0.051 | -0.043 | 0.050 | -0.043 | 0.049 |
| Political Stability (mean centred) | 0.331 | 0.276 | 0.335 | 0.271 | 0.334 | 0.269 |
| Post-communism | -0.173 | 0.327 | -0.166 | 0.320 | -0.108 | 0.318 |
| GDP * Importance of Religion | -0.052*** | 0.014 | | | | |
| GDP (log)* Fundamentalism | | | 0.051 | 0.030 | | |
| Net Migration Rate * Fundamentalism | | | | | | |
| Post-communism * Fundamentalism | | | | | 0.206*** | 0.061 |
| Constant | 2.543 | 2.416 | 3.984 | 2.344 | 3.785 | 2.326 |

Note: p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 30, Continuing, Random Part of the Models

| ‘Would not like as neighbours: People of a different Race’ | M4: GDP * Importance of Religion | | M5: GDP * Fundamentalism | | M6: Post- Communism * Fundamentalism | |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|--|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.664*** | 0.071 | 0.650*** | 0.070 | 0.646*** | 0.069 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.118 | 0.022 | 0.114 | 0.021 | 0.125 | 0.021 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22084.219 | | -22089.537 | | -22085.319 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 34.33 | | 23.69 | | 32.13 | |
| AIC | 44224.439 | | 44235.074 | | 44226.638 | |
| BIC | 44474.539 | | 44485.174 | | 44476.738 | |

Note: p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 30 contains cross-level interactions. The models all include the individual-level controls (not displayed here due to space restrictions). On the context level the models control for the net migration rate, political stability and post-communism.

Model M4 tests hypothesis H12. The interaction between the country's GDP and importance of religion is negative and statistically significant. Not only political stability and corruption but also the wealth of a country does significantly impact on the association between finding religion important and racial intolerance.

Hypothesis H12 is therefore supported by the data.

It can thus be summarized that modernisation theory is the most suitable of the theories presented here, to explain variation in these relationships. Of all contextual variables tested here, GDP has the strongest and most robust effect across the controlled models. Poverty as a context has adverse effects on the population's average levels of ethnic tolerance. So do contexts of political instability and corruption, albeit the relationships were slightly weaker and less robust for political stability. Moreover, religiously devout people are more likely than non-religious people to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups in contexts of poverty, corruption and instability. The finding supports modernisation theory as well as adjacent theories emphasising the import of good governance.

The analysis did not yield new insights regarding the contact theory versus group-competition/group-threat/group-identity theories debate. If anything, the relationships between high levels of migration, a large percentage of foreign-born of countries and levels of ethnic intolerance of their populations is negative. The finding lends some weak support to contact theory. However, the country-level

measures that are available for the 48 countries/regions are too crude and more fine-tuned indicators would be necessary to properly test these theories. In-depth batteries of questions asking the respondents with how many members of different ethnic groups they have contact would also be desirable. Perhaps they could be included in future waves of the EVS. At present, H13 cannot be confirmed by the results of the models presented here.

9.4 Fundamentalism, the West versus Post-communist Eastern Europe

The finding from chapter 8 that fundamentalism is more strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance in Western than in Eastern Europe is surprising. The visualised random slopes (Figures 16 and 17 in the introductory section of this chapter) showed a clear division between the post-soviet states, where fundamentalism does not matter for ethnic intolerance, and the West and South-East of Europe.

Two possible interpretations were advanced: First of all in Western Europe fundamentalism seems to be part of an intolerant, exclusionary mindset, which, independent of religious devoutness, fosters the exclusion of unwanted out-groups, particularly immigrants and Muslims. Similarly, in Europe's South-East with its histories of ethnic and religious conflicts, fundamentalism may function as an expression of strong self identification with the religious in-group and delineation from traditional out-groups.

In the historically more secular part of the post-soviet East, however, where religion has been successfully suppressed for decades under communism, neither

religiosity, nor fundamentalist truth-claims seem to have the normative power to function as a counter-identity against out-groups. In Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary ethnic intolerance clearly has a secular face.

In order to get some more clarity, cross-level interactions with possible explanatory contextual variables were carried out: Based on a visual inspection of the mapped random slopes (Figures 16 and 17), country-level wealth, levels of migration and living in (non-post-communist) Western Europe appear to be the contexts most likely to influence whether fundamentalism is related to ethnic intolerance or not.

Models M5 and M6 in Table 30 present the coefficients of the cross-level interaction terms. Since neither the net migration rate nor the country's percentage of foreign-born have a statistically significant effect on their own when controlling for wealth and post-communism, cross-level interactions do not make sense for these two variables.

Table 30 makes clear that a country's communist past, rather than its wealth, helps explain the variation in the effect of fundamentalism that could be seen from the maps (Figures 16 and 17). Fundamentalism is positively related to ethnic intolerance everywhere, except in the post-soviet countries, where ethnic intolerance is not statistically linked to religion at all. The relationships between fundamentalism and ethnic intolerance are strongest in the West and South-East of Europe - a finding that can be understood in line with identity theory.

9.5 Religious Contexts and Ethnic Intolerance

As stated in the literature review, there are numerous contributions emphasising the import of religious contexts for social attitudes like trust and tolerance. This section explores the main religious context effects on ethnic intolerance that are suggested in the literature. The hypotheses posed in chapter 7 are tested.

H14: Citizens living in countries with high levels of average religiosity are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than citizens living in less religious countries.

H15: People living in countries with Muslim and Orthodox majorities are more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people living in countries with Christian and unchurched majorities.

H16: Citizens of countries with high levels of religious pluralism are more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than citizens living in countries with lower levels of religious pluralism.

From the country percentages of religious and non-religious people who are intolerant towards ethnic out-groups, we learned that most of the countries in the upper European third with the highest percentages of intolerant among their populations are also among the most religious on average.

Most of these countries are located in South-Eastern Europe. We also know from the random slope models presented in chapter 8 that it is precisely this South-Eastern European group of countries, where religious devoutness is positively related to ethnic intolerance. What we do not know, however, is whether highly religious contexts in and of themselves are linked to ethnic intolerance, or if the effect is merely mediated by other contexts that were found in the previous models to be statistically significant: for example poverty, political instability and corruption.

9.5.1 The Moral Community – Aggregated Religiosity as a Context


Section 5.1 of the theory part introduced the literature on religion as a context, most notably the moral-communities-literature (Bainbridge 1989; Welch, Tittle, and Petee 1991; Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Regnerus 2003; Graham and Haidt 2010; Putnam and Campbell 2010). It was mentioned earlier that this literature assumes a contextual effect of religion on individual behaviour (deviance, crime) and attitudes (morals, values, tolerance). This contextual effect of aggregate levels of religiosity of countries can be positively related to tolerance by creating a moral community based on values of neighbourly love and care. However, it was mentioned above that the moral community also has a dark side: It is just as plausible to hypothesize high levels of aggregate religiosity to be positively related to intolerance, bigotry and the exclusion of outsiders from the moral community. In the following section, relationships between aggregated country-level religiosity and intolerance towards ethnic out-groups are examined.

For the European context with its histories of ethno-religious wars, especially in the Balkan and Caucasian countries, where religion is often still tied to ethnic identities it is plausible to expect that strongly religious contexts, high overall levels of religiosity, are associated with racial intolerance. The question is, whether country-level religiosity is a statistically significant social force in and of itself, when controlling for macro-level variables that were already found to be influential. Political instability, corruption, low levels of wealth, a communist past, the countries' levels of ethnic and religious diversity (the countries' net migration rates and degrees of religious fractionalisation) are all plausible candidates.

If religious contexts are associated with low levels of tolerance, is this a true religion-effect, or merely mediated by the abovementioned contexts of poverty and instability?

The analysis starts with a first look at the aggregate relationships between country-level religiosity (the mean importance of religion per country) and ethnic intolerance. Figure 23 exemplifies this relationship with a simple scatterplot. The scatterplot does indeed show a linear relationship between a country's level of religiosity and the proportion of ethnic intolerant among its population. Countries with more religious populations tend to also have high percentages of racially intolerant of their populations.

Figure 23: Country-Religiosity and Racial Intolerance, Aggregate Relationship



However, the finding has to be interpreted with caution. Aggregate-level relationships are not the same as individual-level relationships, and also not to be confused with relationships between the aggregate-, and the individual level. The multilevel approach is suitable to avoid ecological fallacies — the false conclusion from aggregate relationships to the individual level, and to ascertain whether the religiosity of a country’s population is indeed related to its citizen’s propensity to dislike ethnic minorities.

Multilevel Models with Contextual Effects:

To test hypothesis H14, the full random intercept model was run with intolerance towards people of a different race as the outcome, including the mean importance of religion per country (Table 31). This procedure measures the direct contextual

effects of the countries' levels of religiosity of their populations on the respondent's likelihood of being racially intolerant. Each step of the model then includes one control variable and the last step of the model includes three relevant control variables that had a statistically significant effect on their own (Table 32, last two columns). Country-level corruption, the fourth macro-level variable that shows a statistically significant effect was not included in the last step, as this variable is collinear with GDP.

The models show that the more religious a country's population is on average, the more likely are its citizens to be intolerant towards people of a different race. The coefficient of the mean importance of religion per country is strongly significantly positive and remains significant when controlling for the effect of political stability, corruption, a country's net migration rate, and its level of religious pluralism (fractionalisation). The mean religiosity per country remains statistically significant, even when controlling for post-communism. However, when controlling for GDP, country-level religiosity loses its statistical significance. Wealth — a country's level of modernisation remains the most important context effect on ethnic intolerance throughout the models presented in this chapter.

It can therefore be concluded that H14 is supported by the data. Highly religious contexts do indeed seem to make individuals more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups. This is the case particularly in South-Eastern European countries that also have histories of ethno-religious conflict. Even when political stability is controlled for, the relationship between contextual religion and ethnic intolerance remains positive.

The main contextual force, however, that ‘makes democracy work’ (Putnam 1994) by fostering tolerant attitudes appears to be wealth. The data show strong evidence across all statistical models tested here, that a country’s wealth is the most influential of the tested contextual variables, and its effect on ethnic intolerance is strongly negative. The finding supports modernisation theory. However, longitudinal comparisons of effects of wealth and other contexts on ethnic tolerance would be necessary to validate this assumption. The models presented here give some first evidence in this direction.

One finding that was not discussed yet is that a country’s level of religious pluralism (index of fractionalisation) does not have a statistically significant effect on ethnic intolerance. Even when no other country-level controls are included, its coefficient remains non-significant. Hypothesis H16 is therefore not supported by the data. It does not necessarily follow that religious pluralism does not matter at all. Analyses on the regional level might yield a different result. But as a country-level measure, the degree of religious pluralism and diversity of a country has no statistically significant effect on its population’s level of intolerance towards ethnic out-groups.

Table 31: Religiosity as a Context I

| DV: 'Would not want as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: Mean Importance of Religion included | | M2: Religious Fractionalisation included | | M3: GDP included | | M5: Net Migration Rate included | |
|---|--|-------|--|-------|------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.017 | 0.050 | 0.019 | 0.050 | 0.024 | 0.050 | 0.023 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.037 | 0.070 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.044 | 0.070 | 0.037 | 0.070 |
| Othodox | 0.051 | 0.052 | 0.049 | 0.052 | 0.043 | 0.052 | 0.045 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.101 | 0.067 | 0.100 | 0.067 | 0.099 | 0.067 | 0.100 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.015 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 |
| Volunteering | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 |
| Country-Level Variables: | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Importance of Religion per Country | 0.760*** | 0.204 | 0.796*** | 0.203 | 0.409 | 0.213 | 0.640*** | 0.190 |
| High Religious Fractionalisation | | | 0.267 | 0.213 | | | | |
| GDP (log-transformed) | | | | | -0.344** | 0.106 | | |
| % Foreign-Born, (log-transformed) | | | | | | | | |
| Net Migration Rate (Mean centred) | | | | | | | -0.117** | 0.038 |
| Constant | -4.086*** | 0.561 | -4.343*** | 0.590 | 0.236 | 1.416 | -3.680*** | 0.529 |

Note: p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 31, Continuing, Random Part of the Models

| DV: 'Would not want as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: Mean Importance of Religion included | M2: Religious Fractionalisation included | M3: controlling for GDP | M5: Net Migration Rate included | | | | |
|---|---|--|----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | S.E. | S.E. | S.E. | S.E. | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.716** | 0.076 | 0.705** | 0.075 | 0.605*** | 0.064 | 0.651*** | 0.070 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.134 | 0.025 | 0.131 | 0.024 | 0.100 | 0.019 | 0.114 | 0.021 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 12.36 | | 13.90 | | 22.04 | | 20.99 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22095.204 | | -22094.431 | | -22090.360 | | -22090.890 | |
| AIC | 44238.409 | | 44238.863 | | 44230.721 | | 44231.779 | |
| BIC | 44452.780 | | 44462.166 | | 44454.024 | | 44455.083 | |

Note: p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 32: Religiosity as a Context II

| DV: 'Would not want as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M6: Controlling for Political Stability | | M7: Controlling for Corruption (CPI) | | M8: Controlling for Post-communism | | M9: Three Controls | |
|--|---|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.020 | 0.050 | 0.023 | 0.050 | 0.022 | 0.050 | 0.023 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.038 | 0.070 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.046 | 0.070 | 0.044 | 0.070 |
| Othodox | 0.048 | 0.052 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.044 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.098 | 0.067 | 0.099 | 0.067 | 0.104 | 0.067 | 0.101 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.017 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.015 | 0.109 | -0.015 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.181*** | 0.040 | -0.181*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.321*** | 0.037 | -0.322*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 |
| Volunteering | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 |
| Country-Level Variables: | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Importance of Religion per Country | 0.626** | 0.224 | 0.589** | 0.213 | 0.713*** | 0.182 | 0.418 | 0.228 |
| GDP (log-transformed) | | | | | | | -0.449** | 0.154 |
| Net Migration Rate (Mean centred) | | | | | | | 0.038 | 0.088 |
| High Political Stability | 0.341 | 0.254 | | | | | -0.260 | 0.306 |
| High Corruption (CPI) | | | 0.479* | 0.238 | | | | |
| Post-communism | | | | | 0.666*** | 0.188 | | |
| Constant | -3.826*** | 0.584 | -3.777*** | 0.561 | -4.306*** | 0.507 | 1.296 | 1.920 |

Note: p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 32, Continuing, Random Part of the Models

| DV:: 'Would not want as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M6: Controlling for Political Stability | M7: Controlling for Corruption (CPI) | M8: Controlling for Post-communism | M9: Three Controls | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | S.E. | S.E. | S.E. | S.E. | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.703** | 0.175 | 0.687*** | 0.073 | 0.636*** | 0.068 | 0.640*** | 0.068 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.130 | 0.024 | 0.125 | 0.023 | 0.109 | 0.020 | 0.110 | 0.021 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 14.13 | | 16.25 | | 23.57 | | 23.02 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -22094.319 | | -22093.256 | | -22089.596 | | -22089.870 | |
| AIC | 44238.638 | | 44236.512 | | 44229.192 | | 44235.741 | |
| BIC | 44461.942 | | 44459.815 | | 44452.495 | | 44485.841 | |

Note: p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

9.5. 2 Effects of Religious Country-Majorities – A Clash of Civilisations?

The last religious context that was hypothesized to have an impact on civic attitudes is the majority denomination per country. As discussed above, Huntington's clash of civilisations hypothesis states that the Islamic and Orthodox cultures are opposed to Western liberalism and democratic values. Huntington does not directly allude to ethnic tolerance but tolerance of ethnic diversity and tolerance towards people that are different from ones-self is an important liberal value of modern democracies.

It is thus plausible to take Huntington's approach one step further and test if the data give evidence of people living in Muslim and Orthodox countries being less tolerant towards ethnic out-groups than those living in Christian and unchurched majority countries:

H15: People living in countries with Muslim and Orthodox majorities are more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people in countries with Christian and unchurched majorities.

To test the hypothesis, the percentage of Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and Muslims was included in the model plus one country-level control in each step. A model containing all controls in one step cannot be carried out as the number of allowed country-level variables given the 48 level-2-units is already reached with the four denominations plus one control.

Looking back at the country percentages of ethnically intolerant, it is interesting that the five Muslim majority countries are all among the countries at the highest end of both religiosity and ethnic intolerance of their populations.

Based on the individual-level findings presented in the previous chapter, we already know that Muslims are not more intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than members of other religious denominations. Nevertheless, Orthodox were found to be more likely to be racially intolerant than unchurched and members of other denominations. What we are now interested in, is whether religious affiliation as a context has adverse effects on ethnic tolerance. The moral communities-hypothesis (Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Traunmüller 2011) claims that people living in a specific religious context are influenced by that context no matter whether they are themselves religious or not.

Tables 33 and 34 contain random intercept models including the country percentages of the four denominations. Percent unchurched is left out as the reference category.

Models 1 to 6 in Tables 33 and 34 demonstrate that only the Protestant context has a statistically significant effect on the respondent's likelihood of being intolerant towards members of a different race. The relationship is strongly negative. Respondents living in Protestant majority countries are less likely than respondents living in Unchurched, Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim majority countries to be racially intolerant. Since most Protestant majority countries are also among the wealthiest countries in Europe, have low levels of corruption and high net migration rates, it is important to control for socio-economic contexts, particularly GDP, government-corruption and net migration rate. Models M2 to M5 demonstrate that the Protestant majority effect remains strongly negative and statistically significant when controlling for these socio-economic contexts and for political stability.

Table 33: Majority Denomination of Countries

| DV: 'Would not want as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1: including Country Denominations | | M2: Country Denominations and GDP | | M3: Country Denominations and Corruption (CPI) | |
|--|-------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| eq1 | | | | | | |
| Catholic | 0.025 | 0.050 | 0.025 | 0.050 | 0.025 | 0.050 |
| Protestant | 0.056 | 0.070 | 0.056 | 0.070 | 0.056 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.043 | 0.052 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.044 | 0.052 |
| Muslim | 0.089 | 0.067 | 0.088 | 0.067 | 0.088 | 0.067 |
| Other Denomination | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | -0.015 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life | -0.320*** | 0.037 | -0.320*** | 0.037 | -0.320*** | 0.037 |
| Force | | | | | | |
| Individualised | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 |
| Religiosity | | | | | | |
| Fundamentalism | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.036 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.235*** | 0.032 | -0.236*** | 0.032 | -0.235*** | 0.032 |
| Sex: Female | -0.096*** | 0.025 | -0.096*** | 0.025 | -0.096*** | 0.025 |
| Long-Term | 0.054 | 0.030 | 0.053 | 0.030 | 0.053 | 0.030 |
| Unemployment | | | | | | |
| Age | -0.014*** | 0.004 | -0.014*** | 0.004 | -0.014*** | 0.004 |
| Age Squared | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.250*** | 0.033 | 0.250*** | 0.033 | 0.250*** | 0.033 |
| Right-Wing Don't know | -0.088** | 0.033 | -0.088** | 0.033 | -0.088** | 0.033 |
| % Catholic (Log) | -0.128 | 0.084 | -0.119 | 0.081 | -0.129 | 0.083 |
| % Protestant (Log) | -0.317*** | 0.087 | -0.260** | 0.090 | -0.248* | 0.104 |
| % Orthodox (Log) | -0.015 | 0.078 | -0.089 | 0.085 | -0.062 | 0.086 |
| % Muslim (Log) | 0.037 | 0.090 | 0.016 | 0.088 | 0.032 | 0.089 |
| GDP (Log) | | | -0.246 | 0.136 | | |
| Corruption (CPI mean centred) | | | | | -0.087 | 0.074 |
| Constant | -1.322** | 0.478 | 1.145 | 1.439 | -1.315** | 0.472 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | | | | | | |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.103 | 0.019 | 0.097 | 0.018 | 0.101 | 0.019 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | 22087.973 | | 22086.390 | | 22087.296 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (2df) | 26.82 | | 29.98 | | 28.17 | |
| AIC | 44229.946 | | 44228.780 | | 44230.593 | |
| BIC | 44471.113 | | 44478.880 | | 44480.693 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 34: Majority Denomination of Countries

| DV: 'Would not want as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M4: Country Denominations and Political Stability | | M5: Country Denominations and Net Migration Rate | | M6: Country Denomination and Interaction Term | |
|--|---|-------|--|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.024 | 0.050 | 0.024 | 0.050 | 0.031 | 0.051 |
| Protestant | 0.055 | 0.070 | 0.056 | 0.070 | 0.086 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.043 | 0.052 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.043 | 0.053 |
| Muslim | 0.090 | 0.067 | 0.089 | 0.067 | 0.083 | 0.068 |
| Other Denomination | -0.015 | 0.109 | -0.016 | 0.109 | 0.003 | 0.109 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.013 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.063** | 0.021 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.182*** | 0.040 | -0.173*** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.320*** | 0.037 | -0.320*** | 0.037 | -0.313*** | 0.037 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.095*** | 0.026 | -0.092*** | 0.026 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.298*** | 0.031 | 0.295*** | 0.031 |
| Volunteering | -0.038 | 0.034 | -0.037 | 0.034 | -0.035 | 0.034 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.235*** | 0.032 | -0.236*** | 0.032 | -0.233*** | 0.032 |
| Sex: Female | -0.096*** | 0.025 | -0.096*** | 0.025 | -0.095*** | 0.025 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.055 | 0.030 | 0.053 | 0.030 | 0.053 | 0.030 |
| Age | -0.014*** | 0.004 | -0.014*** | 0.004 | -0.015*** | 0.004 |
| Age Squared | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 | 0.059*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.250*** | 0.033 | 0.250*** | 0.033 | 0.247*** | 0.033 |
| Right-Wing Don't know | -0.088** | 0.033 | -0.088** | 0.033 | -0.088** | 0.033 |
| % Catholic (Log) | -0.138 | 0.082 | -0.080 | 0.085 | -0.118 | 0.084 |
| % Protestant (Log) | -0.346*** | 0.088 | -0.284*** | 0.086 | -0.232* | 0.092 |
| % Orthodox (Log) | 0.034 | 0.085 | -0.039 | 0.076 | -0.011 | 0.078 |
| % Muslim (Log) | 0.077 | 0.094 | 0.053 | 0.087 | 0.040 | 0.091 |
| GDP (Log) | | | | | | |
| Corruption (CPI mean centred) | | | | | | |
| Political Stability (mean centred) | 0.308 | 0.237 | | | | |
| Net Migration Rate (mean centred) | | | -0.077 | 0.042 | | |
| Interaction % Protestant* Importance of Religion | | | | | -0.035** | 0.011 |
| Constant | -1.402** | 0.474 | -1.446** | 0.466 | -1.472** | 0.482 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.605** | 0.064 | 0.593*** | 0.063 | 0.383*** | 0.083 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.100 | 0.019 | 0.096 | 0.018 | 0.104 | 0.019 |
| N | 55946 | | 55946 | | 55946 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood | 28.48 | | 30.11 | | 36.29 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | 22087.143 | | 22086.330 | | 22083.240 | |
| AIC | 44230.287 | | 44228.659 | | 44222.479 | |
| BIC | 44480.387 | | 44478.759 | | 44472.579 | |


p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Muslim and Orthodox contexts are not statistically significantly related to the respondent's likelihood of being racially intolerant. Therefore, H 15 is not supported by the data. A clash of cultures cannot be observed with regard to ethnic intolerance.

Interestingly, the Protestant effect is not mediated by wealth or socio-political contexts. The finding is surprising and hints towards a specific cultural quality of Protestant majority countries that is beneficial for ethnic tolerance. In order to see if this is different for religious than non-religious people, a cross-level interaction between % Protestant and importance of religion was included in model M6. The interaction is weak but statistically significant. In order to visualise the interaction effect, importance of religion was dichotomized and the predictive margins calculated and plotted. Figure 24 shows the interaction effect. It can be seen that the interaction is indeed only weak. Religious people in Protestant majority countries are slightly less intolerant towards people of a different race than non-religious people in Protestant majority countries.

The statistical analyses carried out here could not determine what cultural quality the Protestant majority countries have in common that leads to their citizens being less inclined towards racial intolerance than people elsewhere. The countries with the highest percentages of Protestants are the Scandinavian countries and they are generally known to have exceptionally high levels of trust and tolerance in Europe. It is not clear that the Protestant effect measured here is indeed a pure religious context effect, or simply a Scandinavian effect.

Figure 24: Cross-Level Interaction, %Protestant * Importance of Religion



As a summary of the contextual results, it can be said that socio-economic, political and religious contexts do indeed matter greatly for the citizen's propensity to tolerate ethnic out-groups as well as for the question under what circumstances religion is a relevant social force influencing people's ethnic tolerance. The most important context with regard to ethnic tolerance is wealth. Thus, modernisation theory finds some strong support in the findings presented here. But corruption and political stability also have strong significant effects, as predicted. Country-Level religiosity is certainly a factor that needs to be acknowledged when talking about covariates of ethnic intolerance in South-Eastern Europe. However, a country's wealth has a stronger impact on people's tolerance than religion. Contrary to Huntington's thesis, Muslims are not more likely to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups than members of other religious

denominations or unchurched people, nor do Muslim contexts foster ethnic intolerance.

The following chapter will take a closer look at the exceptional South-eastern European cluster of countries, where religion was found to be most strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance. The question is, what individual-level factors help explain the fact that religion is such a strong force in this particular group of countries.

10. South-Eastern Europe – A Special Case

The findings on context demonstrate that South Eastern Europe stands out as a special case. While religion in most of Europe was shown to be (if anything) negatively related to intolerance towards immigrants and towards people of a different race, in large parts of South-Eastern Europe the reverse was found:

Regular church attendance and finding religion important are statistically significantly positively related to ethnic intolerance in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Kosovo, Lithuania, Macedonia, Northern Cyprus, Turkey and the Slovak Republic. Belief in God is positively related to racial intolerance in Macedonia and Georgia.

This striking finding merits taking a closer look at this particular European region.

The question is how does the South-East differ from the rest of Europe? Do the abovementioned countries have certain traits in common that help explain why the South shows a divergent pattern? Are there individual-level moderators at work in this particular region that may throw light on the exceptional relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance that was found in this region?

In order to examine South-Eastern Europe more closely, two steps are taken:

Firstly, a review of literature on the specific historical context of the region, its history of poverty, nationalisms, regionalisms and ethnic and religious violence was carried out to help interpret the findings. Secondly, a subset of the EVS 2008 was analysed consisting of the countries that were found to have positive links between religion and ethnic intolerance: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Kosovo, Lithuania, Macedonia, Northern Cyprus, Turkey and the Slovak Republic. The subset has N 16,196 respondents. The quantitative analysis

explores explanatory factors that might shed light on the exceptional relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance in this region.

10.1 Poverty and Instability as Explanations for Intolerance

The analyses of the previous sections on context demonstrated that the countries of South-Eastern Europe have several contextual factors in common, which influence (a) the population's levels of ethnic intolerance and (b) the relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance. The South-Eastern European countries are all among the poorest, least politically stable, and are among the Third of countries with the highest corruption-levels in Europe. The analyses presented in prior sections have shown that people living in such contexts are more likely to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups than people living in wealthier and more stable countries. Moreover, it is the poor, politically unstable countries with high corruption levels where religion was found to be positively related to intolerance towards ethnic out-groups.

The adverse effects of contexts of poverty, corruption and instability on civic attitudes have often been mentioned in the literature (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Andersen and Fetner 2008; Kim 2008; Uslaner 2003; Rothstein and Stolle 2008), but only few contributions, all from a modernisation-theory perspective investigate the link between these contexts, individual-level religiosity and intolerance. Modernisation theory suggests that a mixture of poverty, instability, low security, and low education lie at the heart of the interrelation between religion and ethnic intolerance. The argument is that in poor, unstable and unsafe environments people turn to religion for emotional and moral

security, which they cannot find in the outside world. Religion offers moral orientation, ready-made explanations for human misery and a common identity, individuals can rely upon. In poor and unstable countries individuals are more likely to seek moral authority, a fixed, traditional world view and protection from the outside world in their churches (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). If such a mindset is reinforced by the local church, this may well result in authoritarianism, exclusionism and intolerance. Inglehart and Welzel have briefly referred to this in 'Modernisation, Cultural Change and Democracy' (2005, 45) but have not in-depth examined the link between context, religion and intolerant attitudes and how these might be reinforced by local churches and parishes.

Bearing these plausible mechanisms in mind, it has to be said that poverty and instability explain only in part why Europe's South-East is different. Other countries in Eastern-, East-Central and Southern Europe are affected by the same problems but do not exhibit the link between religion and ethnic intolerance that was found in South-Eastern Europe. Inglehart, Welzel and Norris' modernisation approach thus needs further qualification, as the theory does not fully account for the special case of South Eastern Europe. There have to be additional characteristics specific to South-Eastern Europe that explain the strong link between religion and intolerance that was found in this region.

10.2 Histories of Ethnic- and Religious Conflict and Nationalism

In order to understand the exceptional relationship between religion and intolerance in the South-Eastern European countries, their histories need to be taken into account. Culturalist approaches (Huntington 1993; Hunter 1991) point out that the attitudes of populations are informed not only by socio-economic and social structural forces but also by the countries' historical heritage. The nine countries that show a positive relationship between religiosity and ethnic intolerance all have certain cultural characteristics in common. They all have a history of ethnic and religious conflict, all have strong nationalist movements, and all have experienced periods of authoritarian rule.

Greece, Northern Cyprus and Turkey have experienced various authoritarian regimes in their recent histories: Greece was occupied by Nazi Germany throughout the 1940s and from 1967 to 1974 the country was governed by a military junta (Anderson 2002, 9) that allowed the Orthodox church vast privileges over religious minorities. The Orthodox church has historically been a strong force since the nineteenth century and is strongly linked to the notion of a Greek Orthodox national identity (Anderson 2002; Mavrogordatos 2003). The country underwent long phases of instability and political conflicts between left- and right wing authoritarians, and between the Orthodox majority and the Muslim minority. Through these conflicts the Orthodox Church could manifest itself as a national symbol and haven of stability and was granted the status of a state church with vast privileges over religious minorities (Mavrogordatos 2003, 124, 127–130). The church was successful in marginalising and suppressing religious

minorities. Thus the Greek Orthodox Church has a history of acting against religious and ethnic tolerance.

Northern Cyprus, too, has a history of ethnic tensions. The region comprises the Northern half of the Island and is inhabited to over 90 % by the Turkish Muslim minority while the Southern part is inhabited mainly by Greek Cypriots.

Animosities and attempts of annexation by both sides lead to armed conflict in 1974 costing hundreds of lives, followed by a one-sided declaration of independence of the North in 1983. Since then, Northern Cyprus was never recognized as a sovereign state by the international community (Richmond 1999). Today, the two parts of Cyprus coexist in peace but the animosities have never been resolved. The Muslim and Greek Orthodox religious identities play an important part as cultural demarcation lines between the two sides. Given the history, it is not surprising that strong identification with a religion is positively related to intolerance in this region.

Turkey has a decade old history of conflict with the Kurdish minority and its terrorist branch, the PKK (Aydinli and Ozcan 2011; Bozarslan 2000; Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999). Here, too, the cultural demarcation between 'us' and 'them' follows along the lines of religious identities: the Kurdish Alevi have been struggling to be acknowledged as Muslims by the Turkish Sunni majority (Erman and Göker 2000, 102). On a different level, the policy of secularism, Turkish governments have pursued since the establishment of the republic under Kemal Atatürk, has contributed to the rise of an ultra-conservative political Islam advertising a radical traditionalist Muslim counter-identity that has been popular among the less educated and rural population (Yesilada and Noordijk 2010). Such political and religious identity struggles are hardly conducive to tolerance. It is

thus not surprising that the relationship between religion and tolerance is difficult in Turkey.

Eight of the eleven South-Eastern European countries under study have experienced communist rule: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and the Slovak Republic. In most of these countries communism was experienced largely as imposed, alien and oppressive and religion often took the form of nationalist counter identities. Religion was suppressed and persecuted in all soviet states, especially in the early years 1917 to the 1930s: church property and monasteries were confiscated, churches destroyed and public religious practice and display of religious symbols censured (Anderson 2002). However, in South-Eastern Europe, the traditional churches did not disappear as a result of the persecution. Religion has a long historical tradition in these regions (Anderson 2002), and is deeply embedded in the cultural fabric. Especially in rural areas far away from Moscow and from the countries' capitals, the communist elites had difficulty replacing local cultural habits and controlling the citizen's everyday lives. The churches could thus successfully operate in the underground and become harbours of subversion and dissent and suppliers of religious national counter identities against the soviet rule.

In the former Yugoslav states, and in Georgia, Lithuania, Armenia, strong Orthodox national churches exist that have played an important role as civil religion and supplier of national myths and –identities throughout communism and beyond.

It is plausible to muse in line with identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Brewer and Pierce 2005; Donskis 2004) that strong self-identification with such exclusive religious national identities involves a strong likelihood of exclusionary attitudes towards

out-groups. A link between nationalist religious identities and intolerance in this region is even more plausible because these identities have been perceived by the public as threatened under decades of communist rule, hence sharp distinctions between in-groups and out-groups become more prominent. Tismaneanu mentions the Orthodox churches of Russia, Romania and Serbia as examples of how the strong links between religious identities, national myths and nationalism could over long periods of time create a climate of exclusion and xenophobia in this region:

‘Indeed, the interpretation of post-communist ideological landscape has to keep in mind that old adage *ex nihilo nihil*: much of the nationalist pathos is not just the resurrection of interwar right-wing trends, but the prolongation of a xenophobic subculture that lingered under communism (both within and outside the party). The predestined role of the nation state has in the Orthodox religion its supporter: Mother Russia, Mother Romania, and Mother Serbia appear as the ultimate value, and anybody who falters in the full support for it is declared a traitor, including those priests who call for a reassessment of the relationship between secular and religious authorities.’ (Tismaneanu 2009).

The historical formation of highly exclusive national and ethnic religious identities under communist rule can, especially in combination with other factors like poverty, instability and crisis, aid an understanding why religion is linked to intolerance and violent conflict in these countries.

Religious identities play a key role in nationalist movements not just in the post-communist Orthodox countries. Mavrogordatos emphasises the important integral role that religion has played for such movements in Southern Europe:

‘This intrinsic and enduring superiority of religion as a primordial line of national demarcation deserves a far more central place in theories of nationalism. Nationalism has often been compared to a ‘secular’ or ‘civil’ religion. The implication has been that it supersedes religion as such. The reverse side of the same coin, however, is that religion has often provided a ready-made initial core of national identity, which has proved remarkably resilient over the centuries.’ (Mavrogordatos 2003, 118).

Religious national and ethnic identities are particularly important in the Yugoslav successor states and the Balkans, - a region that is known for its history of war

and ethnic violence. The ethnic conflicts of the 1990s in Serbia (Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey 1994; Perica 2004), Croatia (Kunovich and Hodson 1999), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003), Kosovo (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003) and between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Waal 2004) are causally linked to persistent animosities between Orthodox and Muslims and have created a climate of ethnic intolerance.

In Yugoslavia's successor states and the Balkans, religious leaders are known to have actively promoted nationalist and separatist movements, openly advocated discriminatory sanctions against religious and ethnic minorities and in some rare cases even legitimised genocide (Anzulovic 1999, 6–7; Iveković 2002; Perica 2004, 18, 21, 23). Close ties between religious, ethnic and national or local identities and intolerant attitudes towards the ethnic-religious other are characteristic of the region as a whole.

That said, one has to acknowledge that the relationship between individual-level attitudes and historical contexts is reciprocal. The argument could easily run into a chicken-and-egg-problem. One could argue that the macro-level contexts described here are themselves driven by intolerant attitudes of populations on the individual-level. The same could be argued regarding the abovementioned behaviour of religious leaders who actively promoted a climate of intolerance in the region. After all, religious leaders can only be successful in preaching intolerance if a majority in their parish are susceptible to such demagogy.

However, this thesis does not set out to generate a final answer to the question of causality. Relationships between attitudes and cultural contexts are not one-directional but reciprocal. It is argued here that individual-level attitudes are influenced by decades- and in some cases centuries-old histories of nationalism,

conflict, and violence. Long-term exposure of populations to this is likely to create a culture of intolerance that imprints on the citizen's attitudes, thus further reinforcing intolerance. It makes sense to assume that micro-macro- relationships reinforce each other, rather than assuming a one-directional causal link.

In summary, the review of the history of South-Eastern Europe teaches us that an interplay of multiple historical and contextual causes are likely to create the strong links between religion and ethnic intolerance that was detected in this region:

1. Histories of various forms of authoritarian rule
2. Histories of war and ethno-religious conflict
3. Strong national, regional and ethnic identities that are tied to religion, reinforced by nationalist myths that are promoted by religious and political leaders.

The combination of the abovementioned factors may help explain the empirical finding of strong links between religion and ethnic intolerance in this region of Europe.

10.3 Individual-Level Relationships Revisited

This section revisits the individual-level relationships between religion and racial intolerance in the South-Eastern European context and explores whether nationalism, local and regional identities, authoritarian attitudes, education and a status as an ethnic minority moderate the relationship. The review of the history of the region suggests that the abovementioned factors help explain the link, therefore their influence will be tested in this chapter. We return to the main

statistical model as presented in chapter 8, but this time the model is run only for the particular group of South-Eastern European countries that did show a positive link between religion and ethnic intolerance. The model is thus fitted not as a multilevel, but as a single level binary logistic regression across the South-Eastern region as a whole²¹.

It must be noted that the data poses some limitations on operationalisation and measurement. Although the EVS is the most comprehensive source on attitudes and values across Europe, analyses at the sub-national level are limited. For South-Eastern Europe there is no standardised regional identifier comparable to the European NUTS-classification (European Parliament 2003). Furthermore, no questions were asked as to the respondent's ethnic identity, or whether they regard themselves as members of an ethnic minority. Considering the historical context of ethnic tensions in this region, and the known clustering of ethnic groups on the sub-national regional level, this is a serious limitation. Moreover, the concepts nationalism, regionalism and localism are restricted to existing variables on national pride and sense of geographical belonging. To some extent, these measures may suffer from a lack of precision. Notwithstanding these limitations the analysis was able to generate interesting results.

²¹ All models were run twice, once including fixed effects for each country and once without including these fixed effects. The models including the country dummies are not presented here. This is because including the country dummies results in considerable multicollinearity problems. The religious denominations under study are highly clustered in countries and are therefore highly correlated with several of the country dummies. This is a problem particularly with Muslim and Orthodox denomination. For instance, Turkey, Northern Cyprus and Kosovo are basically proxies for being Muslim. The same can be said for Armenia, Georgia and Greece and Orthodox denomination. Including the country dummies leads to multicollinearity, affecting the standard errors of several of the interaction effects, thus resulting in Type II errors. The collinearity diagnostics for the main model is provided in the appendix. Anyhow, presenting the models fitted across the pooled data entails no loss of information, as the fixed and random effects for each country were already presented in the multilevel models of previous chapters and the main interest of this chapter lies in finding clues to relationships across the South-Eastern European region as a whole.

10.3.1 Authoritarianism as a Moderator?

This section explores, whether authoritarian attitudes moderate, or perhaps even mediate the positive relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance that was found in South-Eastern Europe. A bulk of literature found positive links between religiosity and authoritarian attitudes (Zick et al. 2008; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Canetti-Nisim and Beit-Hallahmi 2007; Canetti-Nisim 2004) and numerous contributions found such attitudes to be moderators of relationships between religion and intolerance. The historical analyses of the region in the last section found complex relationships between histories of authoritarian rule and the role of the churches either as beneficiaries (Greece, Serbia) of authoritarian communist rule, or as moral, nationalist counter-authorities (Armenia, Lithuania, Georgia) against perceived foreign communist oppressors. The historical heritage has likely led to more authoritarian attitudes among the populations of the region.

Furthermore, the societies of South-Eastern Europe have been found to be more traditional than the rest of Europe (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Dogan 1998; Huntington 1993), modernisation approaches thus theorise a link between traditionalism, authoritarianism and intolerance.

The question for now is whether the relationship between religion and intolerance is influenced by authoritarian attitudes. Are religious people in South-Eastern Europe more likely to be racially intolerant if they are more authoritarian? Or does religion in South-Eastern Europe foster an authoritarian mindset, thus leading to a tendency to also be more intolerant, as modernisation theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) would suggest?

Two indicators of authoritarian attitudes are examined in this section: a preference for a strong leader over a democracy (‘having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament would be a good way to govern the country’), and a preference for an authoritarian upbringing in children (‘Obedience is an important thing for a child to learn at home’). Table 35 displays the percentages of South-Eastern Europeans who find religion important and of those who find religion less important of being politically right-wing and having authoritarian attitudes.

Table 35: Frequencies of Authoritarian Attitudes by Religiosity in Percent

| | Right-Wing | Strong Leader | ‘Obedience is Important’ |
|--------------------------------------|------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Religion is Important/Very Important | 19.0 | 39.0 | 27.4 |
| Religion is not important | 12.0 | 33.0 | 25.0 |

As expected, religious South-Eastern Europeans are slightly more likely to be right-wing and to express authoritarian attitudes than their non-religious counterparts, but the differences in the percentages are surprisingly small.

Table 36 contains the main model (M1). It contains the same variables as the multilevel models of ethnic intolerance shown in the previous chapters. The only two differences are that it is run as a single-level model focussing on South-Eastern Europe only, and that the size of the city/town/village the respondents live in was added as an additional independent variable. M2 and M3 introduce the two authoritarian attitudes into the model.

A look at the main model (M1) tells us that the relationships with religion are roughly the same as were already found across Europe as a whole. As was expected, the effect of finding religion important on ethnic intolerance is stronger in this region than was found for the rest of Europe. Strikingly, in South-Eastern

Europe Muslims are much more likely than people with no religious affiliation and also more likely than members of the other three denominations to be racially intolerant. When all other variables are held constant, the odds of Muslims of being racially intolerant are 58% higher than those of people with no religious affiliation. The opposite is true for Catholics, whose odds of being racially intolerant are 27% higher than those of non-affiliated people. When Muslim denomination is left out as the reference category, unchurched people and all other denominations are significantly less likely than Muslims to be racially intolerant. This result was found only for South-Eastern Europe, not in the analyses of Europe as a whole. The differences between denominations will be explored further in sections 11.5.3.3 and 11.5.3.4.

For now the analysis concentrates on links between religion and authoritarian attitudes. As can be seen from Table 36, the religion effects that are significant in the main model (M1) are not (fully) mediated by authoritarian attitudes. When including 'strong leader' (M2) and 'obedience is important' (M3), the religion effects remain unchanged. Table 36 thus makes clear that no religion effect is completely mediated by authoritarian attitudes. When including these variables, the significant effects of finding religion important, belief in a Spirit/Life Force and denominational affiliation remain statistically significant and almost unchanged in magnitude. However, both authoritarian attitudes (strong leader and finding obedience important in children) are strongly significantly positively related to racial intolerance as the literature suggests.

In order to make sure the analysis does not omit a potential partial mediation of the effect of individual religiosity by authoritarian attitudes, two additional path models were run in STATA. These models are not part of the core findings of this

thesis and are thus supplied in Appendix E (Figures A and B at the end of the Appendix). The two additional path models show that there is some small amount of mediation: the effect of finding religion important on racial intolerance (‘would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’) is partly mediated by ‘strong leader’ and ‘obedience is important’. However, these modest part-mediations do clearly not explain the effect of religion on ethnic intolerance in South-Eastern Europe.

The next step of the analysis tests for moderation. Table 37 shows interactions between importance of religion and the two authoritarian attitudes, testing for moderation. The table demonstrates that preferring a strong leader over a democracy does not statistically significantly interact with religion. Right-wing authoritarians, religious or not, are decidedly more likely than other people to be racially intolerant. This supports the direct link between intolerance and authoritarianism that has been put forward in the psychological literature (Zick et al. 2008). However, if we look at the last two columns of the table, we see that the interaction between finding obedience important in children and finding religion important is positive and statistically significant. Figure 25 is a plot of the predicted margins of the interaction effect. It can be seen quite clearly that although both become more intolerant the more religious they are, those, who express the authoritarian child-rearing value show a steeper slope of the relationship. Nevertheless, the effect is only modest, indeed, the likelihood ratio test does not indicate a significant model improvement when including the interaction.

Figure 25: Plotted Interaction – Religiosity and Authoritarian Attitude




Table 36: Direct Effects of Being Right-Wing and Authoritarian Attitudes

| ‘Would not like...: People of a Different Race’ | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.317** | 0.104 | -0.319** | 0.104 | -0.307** | 0.107 |
| Protestant | -0.501 | 0.287 | -0.460 | 0.288 | -0.359 | 0.292 |
| Orthodox | 0.035 | 0.091 | 0.018 | 0.092 | 0.038 | 0.095 |
| Muslim | 0.458*** | 0.090 | 0.438*** | 0.091 | 0.451*** | 0.093 |
| Church Attendance | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.010 | 0.014 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.218*** | 0.028 | 0.218*** | 0.029 | 0.238*** | 0.030 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.067 | 0.076 | -0.069 | 0.076 | -0.093 | 0.080 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.219* | 0.085 | -0.227** | 0.086 | -0.200* | 0.090 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.004 | 0.043 | 0.010 | 0.044 | -0.003 | 0.045 |
| Volunteering | -0.226*** | 0.063 | -0.216*** | 0.064 | -0.290*** | 0.068 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.133** | 0.051 | -0.137** | 0.052 | -0.123* | 0.053 |
| Sex: Female | -0.131** | 0.043 | -0.131** | 0.043 | -0.109* | 0.044 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.193*** | 0.044 | 0.193*** | 0.044 | 0.171*** | 0.046 |
| Age | -0.032*** | 0.007 | -0.031*** | 0.007 | -0.034*** | 0.007 |
| Anomy | 0.060*** | 0.008 | 0.062*** | 0.008 | 0.062*** | 0.008 |
| Size of Town/City | -0.052*** | 0.009 | -0.053*** | 0.009 | -0.049*** | 0.009 |
| Right-Wing | 0.140* | 0.056 | 0.135* | 0.057 | 0.077 | 0.059 |
| Strong Leader | | | 0.134** | 0.046 | 0.131** | 0.047 |
| ‘Obedience is important’ | | | | | 0.199*** | 0.050 |
| Cons | -1.065*** | 0.186 | -1.134*** | 0.188 | -1.204*** | 0.193 |
| N | 12372 | | 12261 | | 11598 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6795.052 | | -6721.247 | | -6362.338 | |
| AIC | 13630.104 | | 13486.495 | | 12770.675 | |
| BIC | 13778.568 | | 13649.606 | | 12939.923 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 37: Religion and Authoritarian Attitudes

| 'Would not like...: People of a Different Race' | Interaction: Importance of Religion * Strong Leader | | Interaction: Importance of Religion* Obedience | |
|---|---|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.318** | 0.104 | -0.306** | 0.107 |
| Protestant | -0.460 | 0.288 | -0.356 | 0.292 |
| Orthodox | 0.018 | 0.092 | 0.038 | 0.095 |
| Muslim | 0.438*** | 0.091 | 0.449*** | 0.093 |
| Church Attendance | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.009 | 0.014 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.214*** | 0.035 | 0.225*** | 0.030 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.069 | 0.076 | -0.091 | 0.080 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.227** | 0.086 | -0.199* | 0.090 |
| Individualised Religiosity | 0.010 | 0.044 | -0.004 | 0.045 |
| Volunteering | -0.216*** | 0.064 | -0.290*** | 0.068 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.137** | 0.052 | -0.124* | 0.053 |
| Sex: Female | -0.131** | 0.043 | -0.109* | 0.044 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.193*** | 0.044 | 0.173*** | 0.046 |
| Age | -0.031*** | 0.007 | -0.034*** | 0.007 |
| Anomy | 0.062*** | 0.008 | 0.062*** | 0.008 |
| Size of Village/Town/City | -0.053*** | 0.009 | -0.049*** | 0.009 |
| Right-Wing | 0.135* | 0.057 | 0.077 | 0.059 |
| Strong Leader | 0.103 | 0.173 | 0.135** | 0.047 |
| Strong Leader * Importance of Religion | 0.010 | 0.051 | | |
| 'Obedience is Important' * Importance of Religion | | | 0.053*** | 0.015 |
| Constant | -1.123*** | 0.197 | -1.159*** | 0.193 |
| N | 12261 | | 11598 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6721.230 | | -6363.830 | |
| Likelihood Ratio Test | 0.04 | | 1.00 | |
| AIC | 13488.459 | | 12773.660 | |
| BIC | 13658.985 | | 12942.908 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

It can be summarised that we find some weak evidence for moderation and also for a modest partial mediation of the effect of religious devoutness by authoritarian attitudes, but the effects are only weak. Although the effect of finding religion important is partly mediated by 'strong leader', and by 'obedience is important', this part-mediation does still not explain why religion in South-Eastern Europe, but not in other parts of Europe, is strongly linked to ethnic intolerance. Authoritarianism is one contributing factor and it does reinforce the positive relationship between religion and racial intolerance. But

authoritarianism is not the missing link that explains the exceptionally strong link between religion and ethnic intolerance in South-Eastern Europe.

10.3.2 Nationalism, Regional and Local Belonging as Moderators

The analysis of historical accounts showed that nationalism and regionalism, a strong sense of regional and religious collective identities are important motifs that help explain the increased levels of intolerance in South-Eastern Europe. In order to determine to what extent a sense of national and regional belonging help explain the puzzling relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance, the binary logistic regression model was run including interaction terms between importance of religion and the question ‘which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?’ (1= ‘locality or town where you live’, 2= ‘region where you live’ 3= ‘country where you live’, 4= ‘Europe/the World’ was left out as the reference category). The idea is that in South-Eastern Europe a strong identification with one’s own nation, region or local area reinforces highly exclusive religious identities, thus leading to more intolerance towards ethnic out-groups. If a strong sense of national, regional or local belonging moderates the relationship between religion and ethnic intolerance, the models should yield statistically significant interactions with importance of religion. Unfortunately, the data do not contain stronger measures of nationalism, regionalism and localism, like for example a sense of superiority of the respondent’s own nation/region/town over others. The data do contain national pride (‘How proud are you to be a [country] citizen?’, 4-point scale), which is also tested as an interaction with importance of religion in a second model (Table 41). National

pride is used here as an indicator that might pick up on nationalism and may thus give clues about a possible link between religion, nationalism and intolerance. Table 38 contains the percentages of religious and non-religious respondents for national pride and for each category of geographical belonging. Religious people tend to be more proud of their nation and also have a stronger sense of belonging to their country than non-religious people. Across denominations, large majorities of more than 70 % say they are proud of their nation. The second largest group across denominations is the group of those saying they belong primarily to their locality/town. Across denominations considerably fewer people say they primarily belong to their region and a small consistent 5% minority feel they belong to the EU/World as a whole. Although there are considerable differences between categories of sense of belonging, the answer-patterns do not seem to differ much across denominations. However, chi-square tests of the bivariate relationships indicated that the differences between religious and non-religious people and between members of the different belonging are statistically significant.

Table 38: Frequencies of National Pride and Sense of Belonging by Religion

| | National Pride | Belong: Locality/Town | Belong: Region | Belong: Nation | Belong: EU/World |
|--|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Religion is Important/Very Important | 85.0 | 37.3 | 12.3 | 44.7 | 5.0 |
| Religion is not important | 75.0 | 41.1 | 11.3 | 38.5 | 7.6 |
| Catholic | 76.0 | 51.3 | 6.5 | 36.3 | 5.0 |
| Protestant | 85.0 | 60.9 | 5.8 | 28.1 | 5.0 |
| Orthodox | 84.6 | 33.0 | 10.4 | 50.0 | 5.0 |
| Muslim | 86.0 | 37.5 | 16.0 | 40.8 | 5.0 |
| Unchurched | 71.4 | 40.5 | 11.2 | 39.5 | 7.5 |
| Total | 82.5 | 38.1 | 12.4 | 30.6 | 5.4 |

Note: The percentages of sense of belonging do not add up to 100 because a small number of respondents have answered 'I don't know'.

Table 39 shows the main binary logistic regression model (M1), and the second model in the table includes the three dummy-coded variables measuring the respondents' sense of national, regional and local belonging. M2 shows that South-Eastern Europeans feeling they belong to their Nation or local town rather than Europe or the World are significantly more likely than others to be racially intolerant. We can thus conclude that a strong sense of national or local belonging in the South-Eastern European context is indeed linked to ethnic intolerance. However, a look models M3 to M6 in Table 40 tells us that none of the interaction terms between importance of religion and measures of geographical belonging are statistically significant. We must thus conclude that a sense of national, regional or local belonging, although in and by itself strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance, does not explain why religion is tied to ethnic intolerance in this region. It neither mediates the effect of religiosity, which can be seen from the fact that none of the religion-coefficients is altered when including sense of geographical belonging, nor does sense of belonging moderate the effect of finding religion important. The effect is unrelated to religiosity.

Table 39: The Main Binary Logistic Regressions Model (M1) and the Model including National, Regional and Local Belonging (M2)

| | M1 | | M2 | |
|----------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.317** | 0.104 | -0.327** | 0.104 |
| Protestant | -0.501 | 0.287 | -0.511 | 0.287 |
| Orthodox | 0.035 | 0.091 | 0.032 | 0.091 |
| Muslim | 0.458*** | 0.090 | 0.473*** | 0.091 |
| Church Attendance | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.008 | 0.013 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.218*** | 0.028 | 0.212*** | 0.029 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.067 | 0.076 | -0.068 | 0.076 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.219* | 0.085 | -0.212* | 0.085 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.004 | 0.043 | -0.010 | 0.043 |
| Volunteering | -0.226*** | 0.063 | -0.216*** | 0.064 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.133** | 0.051 | -0.123* | 0.052 |
| Sex: Female | -0.131** | 0.043 | -0.134** | 0.043 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.193*** | 0.044 | 0.196*** | 0.044 |
| Age | -0.032*** | 0.007 | -0.032*** | 0.007 |
| Anomy | 0.060*** | 0.008 | 0.061*** | 0.008 |
| Right-Wing | -0.052*** | 0.009 | 0.139* | 0.056 |
| Size of Village/Town/City | 0.140* | 0.056 | -0.051*** | 0.009 |
| National Belonging | | | 0.219*** | 0.063 |
| Regional Belonging | | | 0.082 | 0.078 |
| Local Belonging | | | 0.202** | 0.062 |
| Constant | -1.065*** | 0.186 | -1.208*** | 0.192 |
| N | 12372 | | 12372 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6792.965 | | -6787.259 | |
| AIC | 13627.930 | | 13620.517 | |
| BIC | 13783.817 | | 13791.251 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

In addition, interaction-terms between Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant denominational affiliation and sense of geographical belonging were also tested.

None of the interactions were statistically significant. They are therefore not presented here.

The third set of models includes national pride ('How proud are you to be a [country] citizen?', 4-point scale) as an indicator of nationalism. The first column of Table 40 shows the model including national pride (M7) and the third column the model including an interaction between national pride and importance of religion (M8).

Both national pride when included on its own and the interaction term are strongly statistically significant. Nationalism is indeed linked to ethnic intolerance in South-Eastern Europe, as the literature suggests.

Figure 26 visualises the interaction. We see that both people who are proud of their nation and people who are not show an increase in racial intolerance, the more religious they are. However, people who are proud of their nation exhibit a steeper increase in racial intolerance along the categories of finding religion important. National pride thus aggravates the existing positive relationship between religiosity and racial intolerance in South-Eastern Europe.

It can thus be summarised that in the South-Eastern and Eastern European countries that exhibit positive relationships between religiosity and ethnic intolerance, a strong sense of local and national belonging and strong feelings of national pride are strongly positively related to racial intolerance. Nationalism and religion interact in creating an atmosphere of intolerance towards ethnic out-groups. As suggested by a large body of historical literature, nationalism and localism do explain part of the problem. The analysis found no significant differences between religious denominations regarding the effects of nationalism and sense of belonging. Thus the relationships analysed in this section hold across religious identities in the region.

The next sections will take a closer look at denominational differences in the link between individual religiosity and intolerance and explore denominational differences in the effects of other explanatory variables on ethnic intolerance.

Figure 26: Interaction – National Pride with Importance of Religion




Table 40: Binary Logistic Regressions with Interactions - National, Regional and Local Belonging and Importance of Religion

| Outcome: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M3 | | M4 | | M5 | | M6 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.330** | 0.105 | -0.331** | 0.105 | -0.334** | 0.105 | -0.331** | 0.105 |
| Protestant | -0.452 | 0.289 | -0.452 | 0.289 | -0.458 | 0.289 | -0.455 | 0.289 |
| Orthodox | 0.034 | 0.092 | 0.032 | 0.092 | 0.029 | 0.092 | 0.031 | 0.092 |
| Muslim | 0.463*** | 0.091 | 0.464*** | 0.091 | 0.458*** | 0.091 | 0.460*** | 0.091 |
| Church Attendance | 0.009 | 0.013 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.010 | 0.013 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.206*** | 0.029 | 0.183*** | 0.033 | 0.222*** | 0.030 | 0.189*** | 0.035 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.071 | 0.077 | -0.074 | 0.077 | -0.070 | 0.077 | -0.070 | 0.077 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.223** | 0.086 | -0.224** | 0.086 | -0.220* | 0.086 | -0.222* | 0.086 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.009 | 0.044 | -0.008 | 0.044 | -0.008 | 0.044 | -0.009 | 0.044 |
| Volunteering | -0.209** | 0.064 | -0.206** | 0.064 | -0.208** | 0.064 | -0.210** | 0.064 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.116* | 0.052 | -0.117* | 0.052 | -0.117* | 0.052 | -0.116* | 0.052 |
| Sex: Female | -0.138** | 0.043 | -0.138** | 0.043 | -0.138** | 0.043 | -0.138** | 0.043 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.184*** | 0.044 | 0.184*** | 0.044 | 0.182*** | 0.044 | 0.185*** | 0.044 |
| Age | -0.032*** | 0.007 | -0.032*** | 0.007 | -0.032*** | 0.007 | -0.032*** | 0.007 |
| Anomy | 0.061*** | 0.008 | 0.061*** | 0.008 | 0.061*** | 0.008 | 0.061*** | 0.008 |
| Right-Wing | 0.123* | 0.057 | 0.121* | 0.057 | 0.124* | 0.057 | 0.124* | 0.057 |
| Size of Village/Town/City | -0.051*** | 0.009 | -0.051*** | 0.009 | -0.051*** | 0.009 | -0.051*** | 0.009 |
| Sense of National Belonging | 0.220*** | 0.063 | -0.023 | 0.187 | 0.218*** | 0.063 | 0.222*** | 0.063 |
| Sense of Regional Belonging | 0.081 | 0.078 | 0.081 | 0.078 | 0.526* | 0.257 | 0.081 | 0.078 |
| Sense of Local Belonging | 0.199** | 0.062 | 0.201** | 0.062 | 0.197** | 0.062 | 0.056 | 0.175 |
| National Belonging * Importance of Religion | | | 0.075 | 0.054 | | | | |
| Regional Belonging * Importance of Religion | | | | | -0.140 | 0.078 | | |
| Local Belonging * Importance of Religion | | | | | | | 0.044 | 0.051 |
| Constant | -1.248*** | 0.196 | -1.169*** | 0.203 | -1.295*** | 0.198 | -1.199*** | 0.203 |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 40, Continuing: Random Part of the Models

| Outcome: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| N | 12203 | 12203 | 12203 | 12203 |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6712.769 | -6711.807 | -6711.158 | -6712.391 |
| Likelihood Ratio Test | | 1.71 (1df) | 3.40 (1df) | 1.00 (1df) |
| AIC | 13473.537 | 13473.613 | 13472.315 | 13474.781 |
| BIC | 13651.364 | 13658.849 | 13657.551 | 13660.017 |

p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 41: Binary Logistic Regressions with Interactions – National Pride and Importance of Religion

| Outcome: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M7 | | M8 | |
|--|-------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.326** | 0.104 | -0.328** | 0.104 |
| Protestant | -0.495 | 0.287 | -0.500 | 0.287 |
| Orthodox | 0.040 | 0.091 | 0.036 | 0.091 |
| Muslim | 0.461*** | 0.090 | 0.454*** | 0.090 |
| Church Attendance | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.008 | 0.013 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.221*** | 0.029 | 0.351*** | 0.060 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.054 | 0.076 | -0.056 | 0.076 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.212* | 0.085 | -0.218* | 0.085 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.006 | 0.043 | -0.005 | 0.043 |
| Volunteering | -0.227*** | 0.064 | -0.229*** | 0.064 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.136** | 0.051 | -0.138** | 0.051 |
| Sex: Female | -0.129** | 0.043 | -0.127** | 0.043 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.188*** | 0.044 | 0.192*** | 0.044 |
| Age | -0.032*** | 0.007 | -0.031*** | 0.007 |
| Anomy | 0.059*** | 0.008 | 0.059*** | 0.008 |
| Right-Wing | 0.140* | 0.056 | 0.140* | 0.056 |
| Size of Village/Town/City | -0.051*** | 0.009 | -0.051*** | 0.009 |
| National Pride | -0.135* | 0.058 | 0.360 | 0.208 |
| National Pride * Importance of Religion | | | -0.161* | 0.064 |
| Constant | -0.980*** | 0.190 | -1.377*** | 0.250 |
| N | 12372 | | 12372 | |
| Likelihood-Ratio Test | 4.17 (1 df) | | 6.31 (1df) | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6792.314 | | -6789.159 | |
| AIC | 13626.628 | | 13622.317 | |
| BIC | 13782.515 | | 13785.628 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

10.3.3 Denominational Differences in Religiosity and Racial Intolerance

The following two sections explore differences between religious denominations, particularly the question why Muslims in the region are more likely than unchurched people and members of other denominations to be racially intolerant. The analyses presented here are purely exploratory, trying to find some clues to the peculiar findings in South-Eastern Europe. As a first step, denominational differences in the effect of religiosity on racial intolerance are explored. Does religiosity matter more for racial intolerance for some denominations in the region than for others?

Table 42 contains the percentages of intolerant and of religious by denomination. It shows that the percentage of intolerant is much higher among Muslims than among the other groups. Also, Muslims and Orthodox are the two most religious denominations in the South-Eastern European sample.

Table 42: Percent Intolerant, Percent Religious and Immigration Background by Denomination

| | ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race ’ | ‘Religion is important/very important’ | % who are foreign-born or have at least one foreign-born parent |
|------------|---|--|---|
| Catholic | 16.2 | 62.0 | 3.5 |
| Protestant | 17.1 | 58.0 | 7.1 |
| Orthodox | 23.4 | 86.3 | 8.1 |
| Muslim | 37.4 | 85.0 | 6.0 |
| Unchurched | 19.0 | 31.1 | 7.1 |
| Total | 27.4 | 76.2 | 6.6 |

The next step is a multivariate analysis of moderations between religiosity (‘religion is important’), denominational affiliation and racial intolerance.

Religiosity matters differently for members of different denominations for their likelihood of being racially intolerant. Including interaction terms between denominational membership and importance of religion (Table 43) yields that Muslims are not only the most intolerant denomination on average in this region (albeit closely followed by Orthodox), they are also the only religious group for which religiosity is significantly positively related to racial intolerance.

The personal religiosity of Catholics on the other hand is unrelated to their propensity to dislike members of a different race²². The interaction term of Orthodox denomination is negative. However, the visualisation of the effect makes clear that this is mainly due to the fact that the (highly religious) Muslims now form the reference category for the interaction term.

Figure 27 shows that finding religion important is unrelated to racial intolerance for Orthodox and Catholics. Although non-religious Orthodox are on average more intolerant than non-religious Muslims, it is the Muslims who become more likely to be intolerant the more religious they are. In the group of highly religious, it is the Muslims who tend to be the most intolerant towards ethnic out-groups. For Protestants, religiosity seems to be negatively related to racial intolerance — a finding that accords with our findings for Protestants across Europe as a whole. However, in South-Easter Europe, the relationship is not statistically significant. Also, the group size of 136 Protestant persons is too small to allow meaningful conclusions for this group.

²² Note that the number of Protestants in this region is too small to allow for meaningful comparisons.


For now we can conclude that the strong relationships found between religion and ethnic intolerance in South-Eastern Europe applies mainly to the Muslims. The question is do factors such as having been raised in poverty influence levels of racial intolerance differently for Muslims than for other denominations?

Table 43: Binary Logistic Regression with Interactions – Denominational Affiliation and Importance of Religion

| Outcome: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | |
|--|------------|-------|-------------|-------|------------|-------|-------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.282** | 0.104 | -0.359*** | 0.105 | -0.037 | 0.243 | -0.319** | 0.104 |
| Protestant | -0.460 | 0.287 | -0.552 | 0.288 | -0.518 | 0.287 | 0.323 | 0.954 |
| Orthodox | 0.102 | 0.094 | 0.786*** | 0.195 | 0.018 | 0.092 | 0.032 | 0.091 |
| Muslim | -0.033 | 0.186 | 0.384*** | 0.092 | 0.443*** | 0.091 | 0.456*** | 0.090 |
| Church Attendance | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.004 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.006 | 0.013 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.146*** | 0.037 | 0.295*** | 0.034 | 0.230*** | 0.030 | 0.220*** | 0.029 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.041 | 0.077 | -0.066 | 0.076 | -0.064 | 0.076 | -0.067 | 0.076 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.205* | 0.085 | -0.238** | 0.085 | -0.218* | 0.085 | -0.219* | 0.085 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.008 | 0.043 | -0.009 | 0.043 | -0.006 | 0.043 | -0.004 | 0.043 |
| Muslim * Importance of Religion | 0.165** | 0.054 | | | | | | |
| Orthodox * Importance of Religion | | | -0.243*** | 0.056 | | | | |
| Catholic* Importance of Religion | | | | | -0.099 | 0.078 | | |
| Protestant * Importance of Religion | | | | | | | -0.274 | 0.310 |
| Constant | -0.913*** | 0.192 | -1.242*** | 0.192 | -1.096*** | 0.188 | -1.069*** | 0.186 |
| N | 12372 | | 12372 | | 12372 | | 12372 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6790.443 | | -6785.812 | | -6794.254 | | -6794.670 | |
| | 7.75 (1df) | | 17.01 (1df) | | 0.12 (1df) | | -0.71 (1df) | |
| AIC | 13622.885 | | 13613.623 | | 13630.508 | | 13631.339 | |
| BIC | 13778.772 | | 13769.510 | | 13786.395 | | 13787.226 | |

Note: The model was run including all control variables as shown in Table 1. For reasons of space limitations and because they do not differ from the already presented main model (Table 1), the coefficients of the control variables are not shown here
p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 27: Interactions – Denominational Affiliation with Importance of Religion



10.3.4 Religious Belonging, Poverty, Education and Immigrant Status

Apart from nationalism, the main factors that have been put forward in the literature are experiences of poverty and low education (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Coenders and Scheepers 2003). In addition, the particular case of South-Eastern Europe also points towards ethnic minority status as a possible candidate explaining increased levels of ethnic intolerance as well as its link to religiosity. Group-threat theory argues that intolerance towards out-groups increases when in-group members perceive their group status as endangered (Quillian 1995; Schneider 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). It is possible that members of different denominations are differently exposed to these

factors. The models of this section include interaction terms between denominational memberships and having experienced poverty in childhood, education, and immigrant status of the respondents. The aim is to see differences in the relationships between these variables and racial intolerance across denominations in the region.

Having experienced poverty in childhood was chosen as an explanatory variable because the literature on attitudes and values suggests that exposure to poverty over longer periods, particularly in childhood imprint on people's social attitudes more strongly than short-term-, and more recent exposure. Poverty was operationalised via the statement 'my parents had problems making ends meet' (4-point scale, 4 =yes, 3= to some extent, 2=a little bit 1=no). The education variable has been grouped into tertiary education, intermediate education (secondary/post-secondary but non-tertiary), and primary to lower education.

Unfortunately the data do not have a measure of ethnic minority status, and trying to measure ethnic density (Alesina et al. 2003) on the sub-national level would require additional regional-level data that are not available to the author at the time of writing. The analysis presented here operationalises being an immigrant or having at least one parent who is foreign-born as a proxy for having immigration background. The reason for including immigration background as an explanatory variable is that people with immigration background are most likely members of minority groups and are therefore likely to feel more threatened in their group identity than other people. People with immigration background in South-Eastern Europe might thus be more intolerant towards other ethnic groups.

It is known that the recent history of this region is characterised by ethnic conflicts and wars, re-locations, expulsions and flights of large populations from

their homes. Muslims living in the Balkan countries are a group most affected by this forced migration. In such contexts, having immigration background is likely related to ethnic intolerance. However, the author is aware that the measure ‘immigration background’ via ‘foreign-born/foreign-born parent’ is not ideal. It is a rather crude attempt, owing to limitations of the data. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile exploring if positive relationships between immigrant background, religious affiliation and ethnic intolerance are found as it might shed additional light on the group differences that were found so far.

Table 44 contains the percentages of the explanatory variables by denomination.

Table 44: Percentages of the Explanatory Variables by Denomination

| | ‘My Parents had problems making ends meet’ | Education: Primary or less | Education: Secondary, Upper Secondary | Education: Tertiary |
|------------|--|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Catholic | 44.0 | 5.3 | 64.1 | 26.4 |
| Protestant | 35.3 | 0 | 85.0 | 12.0 |
| Orthodox | 42.0 | 10.0 | 50.4 | 29.1 |
| Muslim | 48.0 | 31.0 | 47.0 | 19.1 |
| Unchurched | 45.0 | 7.0 | 63.0 | 27.0 |
| Total | 45.0 | 17.0 | 53.0 | 24.5 |

The between-group differences in parental poverty are only small. The exception is Protestant denomination, with a significantly lower percentage of respondents, whose parents were poor, and Muslim with a slightly above average percentage. Looking at education there are significant differences. Muslims have by far the highest percentage (31%) of respondents with primary or lower education and Orthodox and unchurched have the highest education levels among their members. The above-average poverty-level and below-average education-levels of Muslims compared with the other religious groups suggest that these variables might help explain the high level of racial intolerance among Muslims.


We continue with the multivariate logistic regression analysis including interaction terms. Table 45 shows models with interactions between denominational affiliation and having been raised in poverty. The table shows that having been raised in poverty is positively related to ethnic intolerance and it differs significantly by denomination. Orthodox become significantly more intolerant with higher levels of parental poverty, while for Catholics the opposite appears to be the case: with rising levels of parental poverty, they appear to become less racially intolerant. The Catholic result remains a puzzle and should be replicated with different data. Figure 28 visualises the effect. Contrary to expectations, having experienced poverty in childhood matters less for Muslims than Orthodox. Although, as can be seen from Figure 28, Muslim denomination shows the same rise in intolerance with increasing levels of parental poverty as Orthodox denomination, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Table 45: Binary Logistic Regression – Denominational Membership with Parental Poverty

| ‘Would not like...: People of a different Race’ | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | |
|---|------------|-------|------------|-------|-------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.354** | 0.108 | -0.354** | 0.108 | 0.322 | 0.182 | -0.357*** | 0.108 |
| Protestant | -0.633* | 0.314 | -0.623* | 0.313 | -0.639* | 0.314 | 0.314 | 0.699 |
| Orthodox | 0.067 | 0.094 | -0.249 | 0.138 | 0.067 | 0.094 | 0.064 | 0.094 |
| Muslim | 0.533*** | 0.136 | 0.473*** | 0.094 | 0.487*** | 0.094 | 0.484*** | 0.094 |
| Church Attendance | 0.002 | 0.014 | 0.001 | 0.014 | 0.003 | 0.014 | 0.002 | 0.014 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.213*** | 0.029 | 0.216*** | 0.029 | 0.213*** | 0.029 | 0.213*** | 0.029 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.013 | 0.079 | -0.005 | 0.080 | -0.009 | 0.080 | -0.011 | 0.079 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.169 | 0.089 | -0.166 | 0.089 | -0.172 | 0.089 | -0.168 | 0.089 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.038 | 0.045 | -0.040 | 0.045 | -0.044 | 0.045 | -0.038 | 0.045 |
| Parental Poverty | 0.163*** | 0.025 | 0.109*** | 0.024 | 0.183*** | 0.020 | 0.156*** | 0.019 |
| Muslim * Parental Poverty | -0.019 | 0.038 | | | | | | |
| Orthodox * Parental Poverty | | | 0.122** | 0.039 | | | | |
| Catholic * Parental Poverty | | | | | -0.271*** | 0.061 | | |
| Protestant * Parental Poverty | | | | | | | -0.380 | 0.268 |
| Constant | -1.465*** | 0.206 | -1.367*** | 0.201 | -1.528*** | 0.201 | -1.444*** | 0.200 |
| N | 11601 | | 11601 | | 11601 | | 11601 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6350.750 | | -6345.938 | | -6340.891 | | -6349.859 | |
| Likelihood ratio Test | 0.00 (1df) | | 9.87 (1df) | | 19.96 (1df) | | 2.02 | |
| AIC | 12745.501 | | 12735.875 | | 12725.782 | | 12743.718 | |
| BIC | 12907.395 | | 12897.770 | | 12887.676 | | 12905.612 | |

Note: For reasons of space economy and because their coefficients have not changed compared to the main model (Table 1), the coefficients of the control variables, although they were included in the model, are not presented in this table. p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 28: Interactions – Denominational Affiliation with Parental Poverty



The next model explores, whether the effect of education differs by denomination (Table 46). The Models include the two highest educational categories and primary education has been left out. Protestant denomination had to be left out as there are not enough cases in each cell for meaningful comparisons.

The table shows that that the effect of education differs significantly between denominations. In order to visualize the relationships, the marginal effects were again plotted for each interaction (Figure 29).

Figure 29 demonstrates that education matters especially for Muslims, as they are the religious group with the largest differences in intolerance between levels of education. Catholics, too show some substantial, but not statistically significant differences in the marginal effects of educational levels. For Orthodox education does not make a significant difference for their likelihood of being racially intolerant. Although the interaction-term does show statistical significance in the

model, the marginal effects clearly show that this is driven by the effects of other denominations: Contrary to Muslim and Catholic denominations, Orthodox, do not differ across education levels in their likelihood of being racially intolerant. The striking exception are Muslims, for whom education matters greatly. Muslims who have only primary education are decidedly more likely to be intolerant than educated Muslims. In fact, the higher levels of racial intolerance of Muslims compared to other denominations are almost entirely explained by education. Table 46 demonstrates that the direct effect of being Muslim vanishes when including the interaction term with education.

Figure 29 shows that the predicted probabilities of being intolerant of Muslims with secondary or tertiary education are not much different from Orthodox and primary educated Catholics. It is the lowly educated Muslims who are strikingly more intolerant than everybody else.

Figure 29: The Marginal Effects of Each Denomination by Education




Table 46: Binary Logistic Regression with Interactions - Denominational Affiliation and Education

| Outcome: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.279** | 0.104 | -0.282** | 0.104 | -0.412 | 0.260 |
| Protestant | -0.428 | 0.287 | -0.448 | 0.288 | -0.424 | 0.287 |
| Orthodox | 0.050 | 0.091 | 0.501** | 0.158 | 0.031 | 0.091 |
| Muslim | 0.020 | 0.157 | 0.419*** | 0.091 | 0.435*** | 0.091 |
| Church Attendance | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.005 | 0.013 | 0.005 | 0.013 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.199*** | 0.029 | 0.200*** | 0.029 | 0.204*** | 0.029 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.081 | 0.076 | -0.084 | 0.076 | -0.082 | 0.076 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.225** | 0.085 | -0.225** | 0.085 | -0.216* | 0.085 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.013 | 0.044 | -0.009 | 0.044 | -0.013 | 0.044 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.136 | 0.087 | -0.520*** | 0.083 | -0.309*** | 0.067 |
| Intermediate Education | -0.130 | 0.077 | -0.342*** | 0.068 | -0.253*** | 0.057 |
| Tertiary Education * Muslim | 0.403** | 0.126 | | | | |
| Intermediate Education * Muslim | 0.239* | 0.106 | | | | |
| Tertiary Education * Orthodox | | | -0.410*** | 0.124 | | |
| Intermediate Education * Orthodox | | | -0.227* | 0.109 | | |
| Tertiary Education * Catholic | | | | | 0.145 | 0.235 |
| Intermediate Education * Catholic | | | | | 0.065 | 0.203 |
| _cons | -0.832*** | 0.201 | -0.613** | 0.203 | -0.759*** | 0.199 |
| N | 12372 | | 12372 | | 12372 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6779.124 | | -6776.742 | | -6784.225 | |
| AIC | 13604.247 | | 13599.483 | | 13614.450 | |
| BIC | 13774.981 | | 13770.217 | | 13785.183 | |

Note: The model was run including all control variables as shown in Table 1. For reasons of space limitations and because they do not differ from the already presented main model (Table 1), the coefficients of the control variables are not shown here. p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 47: Binary Logistic Regression with Interactions - Denominational Affiliation and Immigration Background


| Outcome: 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.322** | 0.104 | -0.311** | 0.104 | -0.305** | 0.105 | -0.312** | 0.104 |
| Protestant | -0.507 | 0.287 | -0.513 | 0.287 | -0.503 | 0.287 | -0.556 | 0.304 |
| Orthodox | 0.039 | 0.091 | 0.064 | 0.092 | 0.033 | 0.091 | 0.034 | 0.091 |
| Muslim | 0.426*** | 0.091 | 0.458*** | 0.090 | 0.456*** | 0.090 | 0.456*** | 0.090 |
| Church Attendance | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.006 | 0.013 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.216*** | 0.029 | 0.216*** | 0.029 | 0.218*** | 0.029 | 0.218*** | 0.029 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.070 | 0.076 | -0.072 | 0.076 | -0.066 | 0.076 | -0.067 | 0.076 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.215* | 0.085 | -0.218* | 0.085 | -0.217* | 0.085 | -0.218* | 0.085 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.017 | 0.044 | -0.015 | 0.044 | -0.015 | 0.044 | -0.014 | 0.044 |
| Immigration Background | 0.451*** | 0.123 | -0.040 | 0.131 | 0.022 | 0.340 | 0.720 | 0.873 |
| Muslim * Immigration Background | 0.477** | 0.167 | | | | | | |
| Orthodox Immigration Background | | | -0.386* | 0.168 | | | | |
| Catholic* Immigration Background | | | | | 0.176 | 0.350 | | |
| Protestant * Immigration Background | | | | | | | -0.538 | 0.877 |
| Constant | -1.046*** | 0.187 | -1.070*** | 0.186 | -1.073*** | 0.186 | -1.070*** | 0.186 |
| N | 12372 | | 12372 | | 12372 | | 12372 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -6788.373 | | -6789.828 | | -6792.373 | | -6792.328 | |
| LR Test | 3.91 | | 4.36 | | 0.53 | | 1.42 | |
| AIC | 13620.747 | | 13623.656 | | 13628.747 | | 13628.656 | |
| BIC | 13784.057 | | 13786.967 | | 13792.057 | | 13791.967 | |

Note: The model was run including all control variables as shown in Table 1. For reasons of space limitations and because they do not differ from the already presented main model (Table 1), the coefficients of the control variables are not shown here. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

The last model of this chapter (Table 47) explores whether having immigrant background makes a difference for the different denominations' levels of racial intolerance.

Table 47 demonstrates that having immigration background, thus likely being a member of an ethnic minority, does indeed have the expected effect on racial intolerance: South-Eastern European Muslims who have immigration background are considerably more likely than Muslims without immigration background and more likely than Orthodox and Catholic to be racially intolerant. Figure 30 visualises the effect.

Figure 30: Plotted Interaction – Denominational Membership with Immigration Background



Orthodox and Catholic, on the other hand do not show a substantial difference in racial intolerance between those who have immigration background and those who do not. As regards the Muslim group, the finding accords with identity- and group-threat theory. A large part of their increased level of ethnic intolerance is explained by low education and threatened religious, local and national group

identities. The case is different for Orthodox members, for whom racial intolerance is a broader phenomenon that is more related to economic deprivation.

10.4 Summary

We can summarise that a combination of contextual and individual factors help explain the high levels of racial intolerance and its strong link with religion in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. On the contextual level, the region's histories of ethno-religious conflict, authoritarian rule, and historically strong ethnic- and national identities, combined with nationalism play an important part in explaining the phenomenon. We saw that in former Yugoslavia, the Balkans, Greece and Lithuania strong national churches exist that have throughout the countries' histories actively promoted nationalistic and ethnocentric myths, as well as reinforced highly exclusive religious-national, or religious-ethnic identities. In some cases church-leaders have even actively promoted bigotry and ethnic violence in their regions. Next to poverty, corruption and general political instability, these context factors are important to understand the tense, prejudicial climate that is widespread in the region.

Important factors on the individual-level are nationalism, strong feelings of national and local belonging, deep and prolonged experiences of poverty and, - for the Muslim group, lack of education and a status as ethnic minority reflected in personal immigration experiences. The multilevel models across the pooled data have already shown that education has a strong influence on all forms of intolerance under study, for all religious groups. For South-Eastern European Muslims, however, low education appears to be the main reason why they are (on average) more racially intolerant than unchurched people and members of the

other religious groups. It is the low educated Muslims that are more intolerant, not Muslims in general. This finding is crucial, as it demonstrates that not Muslim membership, or Islamic belief as such are drivers of ethnic intolerance, but low education. The finding strongly accords with modernisation theory.

The second finding regarding Muslims, that immigration background and ethnic minority status strongly positively influence their likelihood of being racially intolerant supports group-threat theory. South-Eastern European Muslims who are members of an ethnic minority tend to perceive their identity under threat and are therefore less tolerant.

Authoritarian attitudes play some (albeit only minor) part in boosting the link between religion and ethnic intolerance but are far less influential than the literature on religion and authoritarianism suggests. All these factors stimulate perceptions of group-threat and fear and contribute to a climate of resentment and ethnic intolerance in this region.

We can conclude that a combination of contextual and individual-level factors contribute to the high levels of ethnic intolerance that were found in the region, particularly among Muslims. On the individual level education appears to be the most important key to tolerance. Thus education programs and ease of access to higher education is a key area policymakers in the region should focus on in order to strengthen civic tolerance and the peaceful coexistence of ethnic communities.

11. The Importance of National Contexts for Homophobia

This chapter examines to what extent homophobia in Europe might be influenced by national contexts and how these contexts link to the relationships between individual religiosity and homophobia that were described in chapter 9. Since moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group showed largely the same patterns of relationships with religion, it makes sense to focus on one dependent variable, rather than analyse two. Intolerance towards homosexuals as a group is the stronger form of homophobia, as it indicates a strong social distance towards homosexuals as a group of persons (Parrillo and Donoghue 2005), rather than a mere moral resentment. The analyses presented in this chapter therefore concentrate on intolerance towards homosexuals as a group ('would not like as neighbours: homosexuals'). However, the same models were also carried out for moralistic homophobia ('homosexuality is never justifiable') as the outcome. These models yield largely the same results as the models for 'would not like as neighbours: homosexuals' as the outcome and are not presented here for reasons of space economy.

Based on the literature review the following hypotheses were posed in chapter 7:

H17a: *People are more likely to be homophobic if they live in poor countries, and countries with low levels of political stability and high levels of corruption.*

H17b: *The more advanced a country is in its implementation of gay rights, the less intolerant are its citizens of homosexuals.*

***H18:** Individual religiosity is positively related to homophobia predominantly in poor countries and countries with low levels of political stability and high levels of corruption.*

Hypotheses Referring to Religious National Contexts:

***H19:** Citizens living in countries with higher levels of overall religiosity are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals than citizens living in less religious countries.*

***H20:** People living in countries with Muslim and Orthodox majorities are more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals than people in countries with Christian and unchurched majorities.*


We already saw from chapter 9 that there is an East-West-Divide in the citizen's attitudes towards homosexuality and homosexuals. The populations of post-communist Eastern Europe are considerably more homophobic on average than the populations of Western Europe.

Furthermore, we saw from the random slope models in chapter 9 that religiosity - traditional believing in particular tends to be more strongly positively related to homophobia in the West than in Eastern Europe. The maps (Figures 31 and 32) visualize this East-West divide.

One can see clearly that the stronger positive relationships between belief in a personal God and homophobia are found in Western European countries, Ireland and the Netherlands being exceptions, while in large parts of Eastern Europe the


relationship is even negative, albeit in most countries only weak and not statistically significant. When looking at the random coefficient of belief in a Spirit/Life Force, on the other hand, it is striking that, although the relationship with homophobia is decidedly negative in most of Europe, it is again a few Eastern European countries, Russia, Lithuania, Georgia, Kosovo and Moldova that show the opposite relationship. Generally there are large differences in the size of the effects for both believing variables. This chapter tries to pin-point, which of the hypothesized country-level traits might help explain these differences.

Figure 31: The random coefficient of belief in a personal God per country, Outcome: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’



Note: Both maps depict the random coefficient of beliefs when ‘Would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals’ is the outcome. The models include all control variables.

Figure 32: The random coefficient of belief in a Spirit/Life Force per country, Outcome: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’



Note: Both maps depict the random coefficient of beliefs when ‘would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals’ is the outcome. The multilevel models include all control variables.

11.1 Socio-economic Contexts: Wealth, Democracy and Political Stability

The analysis starts with direct relationships between national contexts of wealth, political stability, government corruption, the degree of gay rights implementation in the countries’ legal codes, and post-communism. These are the country-level variables, which according to modernisation theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Andersen and Fetner 2008; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009) and theories that emphasise the import of governance on social attitudes (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Uslaner 2003; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Gerhards 2010), are most likely to influence the populations’

attitudes towards homosexuals and the relationship between religion and homophobic attitudes.

Table 48 contains the direct effects of the hypothesized country-level variables on intolerance towards homosexuals. The country-level variables were included in the full random intercepts model as presented in chapter 9.22, Table 22. The individual-level controls were included but are not shown in Table 48 for reasons of space economy.

One can see from the table that all of them are statistically significant when included on their own. People who live in wealthy countries, countries with high levels of political stability and low levels of corruption and people living in countries where gay partnerships and marriages are legally recognized are less likely to be homophobic.

Figures 33 and 34 visualise the relationships on the macro-level at the example of political stability (Worldbank Index) and government corruption (corruption perceptions index, Transparency International, high values mean low corruption). The relationships are clear: the higher a country's political stability and wealth and the better its governance against corruption, the less homophobic is its population. However, we have not yet tested the country-level variables against each other in a fully controlled model, in order to establish which country-level traits have the strongest influence on homophobia. This is the next step in the following section, after taking a look also at gay rights implementation.

Note, however, that the inclusion of country-level controls is limited by issues of sample size and statistical power. As outlined in chapter 10, the number of level-2 units of this analysis is limited to 48 countries/regions. Although, according to methodological literature on multilevel modelling, the level-2-sample size of 48

countries/regions is fully adequate for the type of models used, the analysis is nonetheless sensitive to power issues (Maas and Hox 2005; Snijders 2005; Newman and Newman 2012). A common rule of thumb in the methodological literature states that at least 10 to 20 level-2 units are necessary per one included level-2 variable, in order to avoid running into problems of statistical power (Newman and Newman 2012, 30). Therefore, it is not possible in the contextual analyses presented here, to include more than 4 country-level controls in one step. This limitation is addressed here by including combinations of maximal 4 plausible controls (those that have a significant effect when included on their own) in separate steps. This will be presented in the following sections. For now it can be concluded that H17a is supported by the data. The result strengthens modernisation theory. As predicted by modernisation theorists (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Andersen and Fetner 2008; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009), people living in safe, secure and wealthy contexts are indeed on average more tolerant towards homosexuals.

Table 48: Multilevel Model - Direct Effects of Socio-Political and Economic Contexts on Homophobia

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | | M5 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.005 | 0.041 | -0.007 | 0.041 | -0.008 | 0.041 | -0.010 | 0.041 | -0.009 | 0.041 |
| Protestant | -0.052 | 0.056 | -0.052 | 0.056 | -0.043 | 0.056 | -0.057 | 0.056 | -0.048 | 0.056 |
| Orthodox | 0.113** | 0.042 | 0.116** | 0.042 | 0.113** | 0.042 | 0.122** | 0.042 | 0.116** | 0.042 |
| Muslim | 0.011 | 0.060 | 0.010 | 0.060 | 0.010 | 0.060 | 0.023 | 0.060 | 0.005 | 0.060 |
| Other Denomination | -0.075 | 0.086 | -0.074 | 0.086 | -0.075 | 0.086 | -0.072 | 0.086 | -0.070 | 0.086 |
| Church Attendance | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.067*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.067*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.078*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.025 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.023 | 0.034 | -0.027 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.226*** | 0.031 | -0.226*** | 0.031 | -0.226*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 |
| Belief: Individualised Religiosity | -0.091*** | 0.022 | -0.092*** | 0.022 | -0.091*** | 0.022 | -0.090*** | 0.022 | -0.092*** | 0.022 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.192*** | 0.027 | 0.192*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 | 0.192*** | 0.027 | 0.192*** | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.021 | 0.029 | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.021 | 0.029 | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.022 | 0.029 |
| GDP (log-transformed) | -0.894*** | 0.099 | | | | | | | | |
| Political Stability | | | -1.127*** | 0.242 | | | | | | |
| Corruption (CPI) | | | | | -0.435*** | 0.043 | | | | |
| Post-communism | | | | | | | 1.750*** | 0.205 | | |
| Gay Rights | | | | | | | | | -0.993*** | 0.128 |
| Constant | 7.160*** | 0.986 | -1.578*** | 0.165 | -1.542*** | 0.127 | -2.594*** | 0.171 | 0.027 | 0.263 |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 48, continuing: Random Part of the Models

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | | M5 |
|---|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.672 | 0.071 | 0.932 | 0.097 | 0.622 | 0.066 | 0.699 | 0.074 | 0.744 |
| Intra-class Correlation | 0.120 | 0.022 | 0.209 | 0.034 | 0.105 | 0.020 | 0.129 | 0.024 | 0.144 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27623.520 | | -27638.589 | | -27619.755 | | -27625.395 | | -27627.953 |
| | 48.08 | | 17.94 | | 55.61 | | 44.33 | | 39.21 |
| AIC | 55301.040 | | 55331.178 | | 55293.510 | | 55304.790 | | 55309.907 |
| BIC | 55542.304 | | 55572.442 | | 55534.774 | | 55546.054 | | 55551.171 |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 33: Scatterplot Mean Homophobia per Country by Political Stability





Figure 34: Scatterplot - Mean Homophobia per Country by Corruption (CPI)




11.2 Gay-Rights Implementation of Countries and Homophobia

The degree to which gay rights have been implemented in the legal code of countries is an important variable when trying to understand the population's attitudes towards homosexuals.

The index used throughout the analysis is based on the ILGA-classification of LGBT-rights (ILGA 2009). Model M5 in Table 47 showed that the status of gay rights implementation of countries is indeed as important a predictor of attitudes towards homosexuals, as country-level wealth: the more gay rights are implemented in a country, the less homophobic is its population. Figure 35 is a three-way scatterplot of homophobia by GDP per capita and gay rights. We see a strong linear relationship between wealth and homophobia. Also, as the coloured markers indicate, the countries where homosexuality is illegal are all at the upper end of the latent homophobia scale, whereas the countries in which gay marriage is fully legally recognised are at the lowest end, as was to be expected. GDP and gay rights are of course highly correlated as gay rights are accepted foremost in the wealthy West, but they are not as highly correlated as to make multicollinearity an issue (Pearson's r for the two variables is 0.698) (Myers 1990; Field 2009)²³.

²³ All variables in the models were tested for multicollinearity. As expected the macro-level indicators are strongly to moderately correlated. However their Pearson's r does not exceed the cut-off values of 0.8 (Field 2009), neither do the VIF and tolerance values exceed the cut-off values of .VIF 10 or fall below a tolerance value of 0.1 as given in the literature (Myers 1990).

Figure 35: Scatterplot- Mean Homophobia by GDP per Capita and Gay Rights Status



Models M1 and M2 in Table 49 include the ‘implementation-of-gay-rights’-measure, controlling for GDP, political stability, corruption and post-communism. The models in Table 49 show that the coefficient of gay-rights implementation does not lose its statistical significance when the controls are included. The effect is partly mediated by the controls, as one would expect.

Table 49: Direct Effects of Socio-Political and Economic Contexts on Homophobia, Controlled Multilevel Model

| DV: 'Would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | |
|---|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.005 | 0.041 | -0.007 | 0.041 |
| Protestant | -0.048 | 0.056 | -0.043 | 0.056 |
| Orthodox | 0.113** | 0.042 | 0.114** | 0.042 |
| Muslim | 0.011 | 0.060 | 0.013 | 0.060 |
| Other Denomination | -0.071 | 0.086 | -0.072 | 0.086 |
| Church Attendance | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.025 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.226*** | 0.031 | -0.226*** | 0.031 |
| Belief: Individualised | -0.090*** | 0.022 | -0.090*** | 0.022 |
| Religiosity | | | | |
| Volunteering | -0.021 | 0.029 | -0.021 | 0.029 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.258*** | 0.027 | -0.258*** | 0.027 |
| Sex: Female | -0.328*** | 0.022 | -0.328*** | 0.022 |
| Unemployment | 0.137*** | 0.026 | 0.138*** | 0.026 |
| Age | -0.006 | 0.003 | -0.006 | 0.003 |
| Age Squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Ethnic Minority | -0.016 | 0.039 | -0.016 | 0.039 |
| Anomy | 0.023*** | 0.005 | 0.023*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.266*** | 0.030 | 0.267*** | 0.030 |
| Right-wing don't know | 0.073* | 0.028 | 0.074** | 0.028 |
| Strong Leader | 0.117*** | 0.024 | 0.117*** | 0.024 |
| Leader don't know | 0.030 | 0.041 | 0.030 | 0.041 |
| GDP (log transformed) | -0.304 | 0.189 | | |
| Gay rights | -0.508*** | 0.120 | -0.409** | 0.133 |
| Political Stability | 0.055 | 0.223 | 0.102 | 0.207 |
| Post-communism | 0.834** | 0.259 | 0.816*** | 0.231 |
| CPI | | | -0.191* | 0.085 |
| Constant | 1.746 | 1.811 | -1.394*** | 0.303 |
| Level 2 Variance $\sigma^2 u_0$ | 0.519 | 0.056 | 0.507 | 0.055 |
| Intra-class Correlation | 0.075 | 0.015 | 0.072 | 0.014 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27611.638 | | -27610.493 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (4df) | 71.85 | | 74.14 | |
| AIC | 55283.277 | | 55280.986 | |
| BIC | 55551.348 | | 55549.057 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

The finding that the legal acceptance of gay rights in a country is associated with its population being less homophobic is probably not surprising. Indeed one may argue that there is a certain degree of endogeneity: Are people becoming more tolerant as a result of changes in legislation or are changes in legislation the result of a society becoming more tolerant on average? As with most micro-macro relationships, it would be problematic to assume causality one way or the other. The most plausible interpretation of the relationship between gay-rights and attitudes towards homosexuals is that the causality goes both ways: societies in which public opinion has become more tolerant are more open for legal changes that establish gay rights. Democratically elected governments tend to implement laws that are already supported by the public and struggle to implement laws that are unpopular. One can thus assume that gay rights are the most likely to become law in countries whose public is already ripe for them. However, there is also a top-down effect: laws and policies have the normative power to reinforce their own support. If gay rights are the law, then this signals to the subjects that homosexuality is socially acceptable, which in turn decreases homophobic attitudes.

Eastern Europe is a special case: in most Eastern European countries that are not EU-members, gay partnerships are not legally recognised and in some new EU-member states (Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia) gay rights were established only recently in the wake of the EU-accession. Since subscription to non-discrimination policies and gay-rights is a necessary condition for a country's admittance to the EU, the implementation of gay-rights is not necessarily based on a positive attitudinal climate towards gay-rights in these countries, but was advanced in many cases in order to achieve the EU criteria.

These new laws might thus well be perceived by considerable parts of Eastern European populations as a foreign EU-imposition. It is therefore not at all self-evident that the populations of these countries should be more accepting of homosexuality just because gay-relationships are legally protected by the countries' legislations.

The evidence presented here suggests, however, that gay-rights implementation reinforces more tolerant attitudes. A look at Figure 35 shows that the countries that are the most advanced in their implementation of gay rights, also have the least intolerant populations. One can also see that the Scandinavian countries with the longest legacy of gay rights implementation are all at the lowest end of homophobia (among the least homophobic) in Europe²⁴. Furthermore, the new Eastern European EU-member states that have legalised gay partnerships in the wake of their EU accession all have more tolerant populations than the rest of Eastern Europe and they lie well within the European middle-field when it comes to neighbourly acceptance of homosexuals.

As a first summary, it can be asserted that the data support macro-level theories emphasising the import of wealth and good governance. Modernisation theory in particular is supported: people living in secure and politically stable countries that are free of corruption and have accepted gay rights are less likely to be homophobic. H17a and H17b are therefore confirmed by the analysis. The large gap between post-communist Eastern Europe and the West in homophobic attitudes is in large parts explained by low levels of wealth, high corruption, and legal codes that exclude gay-rights. Although the post-communist dummy hides away some of the effects of the other macro-level variables, the final model (M2)

²⁴ However, the results presented here have to be interpreted with some caution. Causality assumptions are not unproblematic, because the results are based on cross-sectional data, not on longitudinal change over time.

in Table 49 shows clearly that deficiencies in governance and security play important parts in explaining Eastern Europe's lower levels of tolerance towards homosexuals.

The next section will take a closer look at the link between individual religiosity and the three national contexts that showed a robust, statistically significant effect in the controlled models (gay rights implementation, post-communism and corruption-levels), and see how the national contexts that were just discussed influence relationships between religion and homophobia.

11.3 The link between National Contexts and Religiosity – Cross-Level Interactions

This section tries to answer the question, which of the hypothesised country-level traits best help explain the large between-country variation that was found for the relationships between religion and homophobia. The random slope models of chapter 9 found striking differences particularly between East and West. In order to answer this question, cross-level interactions between individual religiosity and the three contextual variables, post-communism, status of gay rights implementation and corruption (CPI) were inserted in the controlled random intercepts model as presented in chapter 9 (section 9.2.2). Cross-level interactions were not included for GDP and political stability, because the two variables were no longer statistically significant, when the models controlled for gay-rights, corruption (CPI) and post-communism.

Since believing showed the strongest between-country variance, the analysis focuses mostly on belief in a personal God and belief in a Spirit/Life Force. Importance of religion is also included as a measure of religious devoutness that showed a fairly strong random effect in the prior models. For reasons of space economy only the meaningful main effects and interaction terms are displayed in the following tables.

From the interaction terms with post-communism in Table 50 one can see that, as expected religion matters more for homophobia in Western Europe than in the post-communist East. The more important Western Europeans find religion, the more likely they are to be homophobic. The relationship is less easy to grasp from the Table for belief in a personal God. Figures 36, to 39 visualise the interactions and thus help clarify the interpretation of the results.

Figure 36 shows that the populations of post-communist countries are more intolerant on average than the populations of countries that have not experienced communist rule, as we already know. However, believers in a personal God are more homophobic than non-believers in Western Europe, but not in the post-communist East. Similarly, believers in a Spirit/Life Force are less likely to be intolerant of homosexuals in Western Europe but not in post-communist Eastern Europe. These relationships could already be seen from the maps at the beginning of this chapter, but the result is now confirmed by a fully controlled multilevel model that also takes confounding macro-level variables into account.

Table 50: Cross-Level Interactions: Post-Communism and Individual

Religiosity

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | Interaction: Post-Communism* Importance of Religion | | Interaction: Post-Communism * Belief: Personal God | | Interaction: Post-Communism * Belief: Spirit/Life Force | |
|--|---|-------|--|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| eq1 | | | | | | |
| Importance of Religion | 0.161*** | 0.023 | 0.074*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.030 | 0.034 | -0.080* | 0.037 | -0.025 | 0.033 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.225*** | 0.031 | -0.224*** | 0.031 | -0.377*** | 0.050 |
| Post-communism | 2.073*** | 0.214 | 1.838*** | 0.204 | 1.901*** | 0.208 |
| Post-communism * Importance of Religion | -0.119*** | 0.026 | | | | |
| Post-communism * belief: Personal God | | | 0.193*** | 0.051 | | |
| Post-communism * belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | -0.209*** | 0.053 |
| Constant | -2.817*** | 0.176 | -2.651*** | 0.170 | -2.552*** | 0.171 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.688 | 0.073 | 0.689 | 0.073 | 0.695 | 0.074 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.125 | 0.023 | 0.125 | 0.023 | 0.128 | 0.023 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27614.384 | | -27618.325 | | -27617.652 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood | 66.35 | | 58.47 | | 59.82 | |
| AIC | 55284.767 | | 55292.651 | | 55291.304 | |
| BIC | 55534.967 | | 55542.851 | | 55541.504 | |

Table 51: Cross-Level Interactions: Status of Gay Rights Implementation and Individual Religiosity

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | Interaction: Gay-Rights * Importance of Religion | | Interaction: Gay-Rights * Belief: Personal God | | Interaction: Gay-Rights * Belief: Spirit/Life Force | |
|--|--|-------|--|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Importance of Religion | -0.010 | 0.028 | 0.073*** | 0.014 | 0.075*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.032 | 0.034 | -0.188** | 0.059 | -0.016 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.230*** | 0.031 | -0.229*** | 0.031 | -0.024 | 0.061 |
| Gay Rights | -1.140*** | 0.134 | -1.038*** | 0.128 | -0.957*** | 0.128 |
| Gay rights * Importance of Religion | 0.059*** | 0.016 | | | | |
| Gay rights * belief: Personal God | | | 0.112*** | 0.034 | | |
| Gay rights * belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | -0.135*** | 0.035 |
| Constant | 0.261 | 0.269 | 0.108 | 0.262 | -0.028 | 0.262 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.737 | 0.077 | 0.689 | 0.073 | 0.740 | 0.077 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.141 | 0.025 | 0.126 | 0.023 | 0.142 | 0.025 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27621.311 | | -27622.417 | | -27620.342 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood | 52.50 | | 50.29 | | 54.44 | |
| AIC | 55298.623 | | 55300.834 | | 55296.683 | |
| BIC | 55548.823 | | 55551.034 | | 55546.883 | |

Table 52: Cross-Level Interactions: Corruption and Individual Religiosity

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | Interaction: CPI * | | Interaction: CPI * | | Interaction: CPI * | |
|---|------------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|---------------------------|-------|
| | Importance of Religion | | Belief: personal God | | Belief: Spirit/Life Force | |
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Importance of Religion | 0.085*** | 0.015 | 0.070*** | 0.014 | 0.074*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.031 | 0.034 | 0.008 | 0.034 | -0.014 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.228*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.244*** | 0.032 |
| CPI | -0.458*** | 0.043 | -0.453*** | 0.043 | -0.419*** | 0.043 |
| CPI * importance of religion | 0.048*** | 0.012 | | | | |
| CPI * belief: Personal God | | | 0.053*** | 0.012 | | |
| CPI * belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | -0.053*** | 0.012 |
| Dummy: Azerbaijan Turkey Georgia | 0.598 | 0.384 | 0.632 | 0.383 | 0.620 | 0.384 |
| constant | -1.549*** | 0.127 | -1.535*** | 0.127 | -1.540*** | 0.127 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.623 | 0.066 | 0.622 | 0.066 | 0.623 | 0.066 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.105 | 0.020 | 0.105 | 0.020 | 0.106 | 0.020 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27611.412 | | -27609.808 | | -27609.985 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood | 72.16 | | 75.51 | | 75.15 | |
| AIC | 55278.823 | | 55275.616 | | 55275.971 | |
| BIC | 55529.023 | | 55525.816 | | 55526.171 | |

Note: High values of the corruption perceptions index (CPI) indicate low corruption-levels.
 p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 36: Cross-Level Interaction – Post-Communism * Importance of Religion




Figure 37: Cross-Level Interactions - Post-Communism * Belief in a Personal God




Figure 38: Cross-Level Interaction – Post-Communism * Belief in a Spirit/Life Force





Table 51 contains interaction terms between religiosity and degree of gay rights implementation per country. All interactions are statistically significant and point in the expected direction. Religion matters more for homophobia in countries that have implemented gay-rights. While the general populations in these predominantly Western European countries are significantly less homophobic than in the rest of Europe, the traditionally religious still remain more homophobic than their non-religious counterparts. This finding confirms prior findings by Adamczyk and Pitt (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009), who also found that religion does not have an additional homophobic effect in Eastern Europe as the populations there are already considerably less tolerant than in the rest of Europe, independent of their religiosity.

The findings for corruption are as expected very similar, as for gay-rights and post-communism. The lower the level of corruption in a country, the less likely is the population in general to be homophobic. However, the traditionally religious in low-corruption countries are more likely than the non-religious to be intolerant towards homosexuals. Figure 40 visualises the relationship. When modelling a cross-level interaction between GDP and religiosity (importance of religion) the result is very similar, which was expected given that Corruption and low wealth are highly collinear.

Figure 39: Cross-Level Interaction – Corruption Perception Index (CPI) * Importance of Religion



Note: High values of the corruption perceptions index (CPI) indicate low corruption-levels.

We can conclude that H19 is not confirmed by the data. It is the non-post-communist politically stable countries with low corruption-, and high levels of

wealth and gay rights implementation where the traditionally religious are more homophobic than the non-religious.

How can these findings be interpreted? We saw in this section that religion is differently related to homophobia than to ethnic intolerance. The patterns across Europe differ for the two forms of intolerance. Religion is strongly positively related to ethnic intolerance in politically unstable, insecure and corrupt settings. Positive relationships with homophobic attitudes on the other hand were found not in the poor, unstable East, but in the wealthy, stable Western countries.

The findings make more sense when one takes into account that religion might serve a different function depending on their different national and regional contexts. We saw from the last chapter on ethnic intolerance that in South-Eastern-, and parts of Eastern Europe religion is closely tied to ethnic identities and links between religion and ethnic intolerance are strongly influenced by political instability, insecurity and corruption.

In Western Europe, however, religion appears to be less of an identity marker against out-groups, but much more a moral resource: in the case of individualised spirituality this moral resource is a colourful potpourri of religious truths and worldviews, that may serve to ease the problems and contradictions of modern life (Luckmann 1993, 121–122, 127; Hervieu-Leger 1998; Beck 2010, 125, 134–157).

In the case of traditional religion in the West, the moral resource may take the form of a conservative fortress against the individualisation, insecurity and moral relativism of Western late modernity (Hervieu-Leger 1998).

Viewed in this light, it makes sense that traditional religion in Western Europe is much more related to rigid sexual morals and homophobia than in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where religion likely serves a different social purpose.

We saw from the analyses presented here firstly that the populations of Eastern and South Eastern Europe are more intolerant towards homosexuals than Western Europeans. Our second finding is that homophobia in this region of Europe has a secular face. The moral resentment against homosexuals, and indeed their social exclusion is already so dominant in the mainstream societies that religion does not add up to the problem. This finding accords with Adamczyk's and Pitt's (2009, 348–349) earlier findings on homophobia in Eastern Europe.

Demonstrators on anti-gay parades in Lithuania, Latvia, Russia and Serbia may well have been seen holding crosses and banners showing references to 'Christian family values', but it is not the traditional religious believers, the truly religious, who dominate the anti-gay discourse in these countries but secular- and religiously undecided people who utilise religion as an identity marker against unwanted out-groups. Real religious engagement and believing is not necessary to make use of this identity marker.

When interpreting the findings one also has to take the specific histories of countries into account. In most post-communist countries religion had been repressed under communist rule for decades. Thus in countries like Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, the populations are less religious on average than anywhere else in Europe, although some authors have described a religious revival in Eastern Europe (Tomka 2011; Müller 2011).

The fact that religion in these countries does not play an important role for tolerance may thus at least partly be explained by the fact that due to the communist legacy, religion in this region is simply not a strong social force. It may thus not come as a surprise that in large parts of Eastern Europe, religion is not a predictor of homophobia. Indeed, for ethnic intolerance, too, the previous chapter showed that strong relationships with religion were found not in post-soviet Eastern Europe, but in the unstable South-East with its histories of ethnic/religious conflict.

11.4 The Moral Community: Religious Contexts and Homophobia

This section looks at religion as a context. Religion might work differently on the contextual-, than on the individual level. The analysis of previous chapters already found with respect to ethnic out-groups that religious contexts matter for the citizen's tolerance towards out-groups. We have dealt with the moral community hypothesis in detail in chapter 5 in the literature review and in chapter 10.5.1. The moral community hypothesis states that the social behaviour and attitudes of individuals are influenced by the community that surrounds them, particularly by their church. Living in a country that has a high proportion of devout individuals increases the probability for an individual of interacting with religious peers. This is discussed by Stark, Bainbridge (1996) and others (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Chapter 10 of this thesis concluded that ethnic intolerance can be a problem particularly in highly religious contexts. The focus of this section is whether religious contexts are not only positively related to ethnic intolerance, but also to homophobia. Are, for example, citizens of the more religious countries (Poland, Turkey, Georgia, Italy, Republic of Ireland, and Malta) more intolerant towards homosexuals than citizens of less religious countries?


11.4.1 Aggregated Religiosity and Homophobia

In order to test moral community assumptions, importance of religion, our strongest measure of religious devoutness was aggregated to the country-level. The new variable measures the proportion of religious among the population of

each country. A first look at the bivariate relationship between religious context and homophobia might help to get an overview.

Figure 40 is a scatterplot of the bivariate relationship between the mean importance of religion per country and homophobia. Because country-level corruption is also strong predictor of homophobia, corruption (CPI) was added as a third dimension to the plot.

Figure 40: Scatterplot – Homophobia by Importance of Religion and Corruption



The scatterplot shows a linear relationship between mean importance of religion and homophobia. However, one can see that the standard deviation is quite large. Thus it is questionable whether the relationship holds when controlling for other contexts. Indeed, looking at the red marks that stand for countries with high corruption levels, we see that the countries with the largest proportions of deeply religious are also the countries with the highest levels of corruption (as measured by Transparency International).

Table 53 contains the controlled random intercept model including the mean importance of religion per country and stepwise the controls. Table 52 makes clear that although importance of religion as a context (a high proportion of religiously devout among the population) is statistically significantly positively related to homophobia, the effect vanishes when including any of the other context measures that were hypothesised. The relationship is thus not robust. Other context-factors are more helpful in explaining homophobia in Europe. H20 can thereof not be confirmed by the analysis.

Table 53: Multilevel Model - Aggregated Religiosity as a Context

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.011 | 0.041 | -0.005 | 0.041 | -0.007 | 0.041 | -0.008 | 0.041 |
| Protestant | -0.053 | 0.056 | -0.052 | 0.056 | -0.051 | 0.056 | -0.044 | 0.056 |
| Orthodox | 0.118** | 0.042 | 0.112** | 0.042 | 0.115** | 0.042 | 0.113** | 0.042 |
| Muslim | 0.011 | 0.060 | 0.011 | 0.060 | 0.009 | 0.060 | 0.011 | 0.060 |
| Other Denomination | -0.072 | 0.086 | -0.075 | 0.086 | -0.073 | 0.086 | -0.075 | 0.086 |
| Church Attendance | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.076*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.226*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.226*** | 0.031 |
| Belief: Individualised Religiosity | -0.092*** | 0.022 | -0.091*** | 0.022 | -0.092*** | 0.022 | -0.091*** | 0.022 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.192*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.021 | 0.029 | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.021 | 0.029 |
| Mean Importance of Religion | 0.875** | 0.316 | 0.044 | 0.229 | 0.419 | 0.301 | -0.050 | 0.215 |
| GDP (log) | | | -0.884*** | 0.110 | | | | |
| Political Stability | | | | | -0.984*** | 0.259 | | |
| Corruption (CPI) | | | | | | | -0.440*** | 0.048 |
| Constant | -3.993*** | 0.846 | 6.951*** | 1.464 | -2.691*** | 0.816 | -1.409* | 0.583 |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 53 Continued, Random Part of the Models

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | |
|---|------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|
| | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. | | S.E. |
| <i>Random Part</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.044 | 0.104 | -0.397*** | 0.107 | -0.090 | 0.105 | -0.474*** | 0.106 |
| Intra-class Correlation | 0.249 | 0.039 | 0.120 | 0.022 | 0.202 | 0.033 | 0.105 | 0.020 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27643.989 | | -27623.501 | | -27637.640 | | -27619.727 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood | 7.14 (1df) | | 48.12 (2df) | | 19.84 (2df) | | 55.67 (2df) | |
| AIC | 55341.978 | | 55303.003 | | 55331.281 | | 55295.455 | |
| BIC | 55583.242 | | 55553.203 | | 55581.481 | | 55545.655 | |

p <0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001

11.4.2 Effects of Religious Country-Majorities – A Clash of Cultures?

Samuel P. Huntington claims with his clash-of-civilisations theory that citizens of eastern Orthodox-, and Islamic societies in particular were more authoritarian, less supportive of liberal Western values, and less tolerant than citizens of Western societies. Huntington attributes this claimed difference between individuals to the religious cultural heritage of the countries they live in. Norris and Inglehart (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003), although they refute Huntington's theory in general, also found Muslims in Muslim majority countries to be less supportive of gender equality and gay rights than the populations of Western Europe. This section will test to what extent the religious cultural heritage of countries influence the propensity of their populations of being intolerant towards homosexuals. To this end the proportions of Muslims, Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox among the population of each country were included in the controlled random intercepts model with 'would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals' as the outcome. From the findings so far and the mapped random coefficients on pages 3 and 4 it appears that people living in Muslim and Orthodox majority countries are indeed more intolerant towards homosexuals.

However, the analyses so far have not controlled for other socio-economic contextual variables that are already known from the literature to influence people's attitudes towards homosexuals.

Table 6 presents the coefficients of the religious country-majorities controlling for GDP, the degree of gay rights implementation of countries, and levels of political stability and corruption. Table 53 makes clear that the effects of religious country majorities on homophobia are mediated by GDP and corruption. According to the first model, when no country-level controls are included, people living in Protestant majority countries are less likely and people living in Orthodox majority countries more likely to be intolerant towards homosexuals. When controlling for wealth (GDP) and levels of corruption, both coefficients cease to be statistically significant. Interestingly, Muslim country majority has no statistically significant effect on homophobia to begin with.

It can thus be said that the context-level findings do not support Huntington's theory. Following his line of thought one would have expected the religious culture of countries to have a strong, robust effect on homophobia (and other forms of cultural intolerance). However, country-level wealth and corruption mediate the effect of country-level denomination. Therefore, interpretations of the relationships alongside modernisation theory seem to be more plausible than Huntington's clash-of-cultures thesis. Huntington is probably right on the individual level: Muslims are indeed on average more intolerant towards homosexuals than non-Muslims, and their individual-level religiosity likely plays a part informing such attitudes. However, on the contextual level, their attitudes towards homosexuals seem to be more influenced by socio-economic contexts of deprivation and insecurity, than by the religious-cultural heritage of their countries. Even if denominational belonging on the individual-level is not controlled for (Appendix E, Table E), the coefficient of Muslim denomination remains statistically non-significant.

Nonetheless, the findings have to be interpreted with some caution, as they are based on cross-sectional data. Longitudinal studies of trajectories of attitudinal change and their contextual covariates will be better equipped for causal analyses and may thus shed more light on this debate in the future.

For now it can be concluded that the analyses carried out here do not support Huntington's context-level assumptions. H20 can therefore not be confirmed.

Table 54: Testing the Effect of Religious Country-Majorities

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | | M5 | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | -0.007 | 0.041 | -0.006 | 0.041 | -0.008 | 0.041 | -0.007 | 0.041 | -0.006 | 0.041 |
| Protestant | -0.042 | 0.056 | -0.043 | 0.056 | -0.041 | 0.056 | -0.042 | 0.056 | -0.043 | 0.056 |
| Orthodox | 0.109** | 0.042 | 0.110** | 0.042 | 0.109** | 0.042 | 0.109** | 0.042 | 0.110** | 0.042 |
| Muslim | 0.013 | 0.060 | 0.012 | 0.060 | 0.009 | 0.060 | 0.013 | 0.060 | 0.011 | 0.060 |
| Other Denomination | -0.074 | 0.086 | -0.076 | 0.086 | -0.072 | 0.086 | -0.074 | 0.086 | -0.076 | 0.086 |
| Church Attendance | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 | 0.066*** | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.076*** | 0.014 | 0.075*** | 0.014 | 0.075*** | 0.014 | 0.075*** | 0.014 | 0.075*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 | -0.026 | 0.034 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 | -0.227*** | 0.031 |
| Belief: Individualised Religiosity | -0.092*** | 0.022 | -0.091*** | 0.022 | -0.092*** | 0.022 | -0.092*** | 0.022 | -0.091*** | 0.022 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.192*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 | 0.191*** | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.021 | 0.029 | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.022 | 0.029 | -0.021 | 0.029 |
| % Catholic per country | 0.108 | 0.106 | 0.100 | 0.089 | 0.133 | 0.094 | 0.108 | 0.106 | 0.079 | 0.085 |
| % Protestant per country | -0.227* | 0.108 | -0.095 | 0.095 | -0.051 | 0.107 | -0.221* | 0.110 | 0.060 | 0.103 |
| % Orthodox per country | 0.367*** | 0.097 | 0.147 | 0.095 | 0.259** | 0.091 | 0.350** | 0.113 | 0.144 | 0.089 |
| % Muslim per country | 0.082 | 0.112 | 0.046 | 0.094 | 0.054 | 0.100 | 0.072 | 0.117 | 0.075 | 0.090 |
| GDP (log transformed) | | | -0.659*** | 0.148 | | | | | | |
| Gay Rights | | | | | -0.640*** | 0.175 | | | | |
| Political Stability | | | | | | | -0.091 | 0.309 | | |
| Corruption (CPI) | | | | | | | | | -0.383*** | 0.075 |
| Azerbaijan Turkey Georgia Dummy | 0.372 | 0.697 | 6.625*** | 1.521 | 1.331* | 0.670 | 0.358 | 0.698 | 0.114 | 0.562 |
| Constant | -2.318*** | 0.597 | 4.440** | 1.598 | -1.327* | 0.594 | -2.280*** | 0.610 | -2.163*** | 0.480 |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 54 Continued, Random Part of the Models

| DV: 'Would not like...: Homosexuals' | M1 | | M2 | | M3 | | M4 | | M5 | |
|--------------------------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| <i>Random Part</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | 0.759 | 0.079 | 0.633 | 0.067 | 0.669 | 0.070 | 0.758 | 0.079 | 0.604 | 0.064 |
| Intraclass Correlation | 0.149 | 0.026 | 0.108 | 0.020 | .119 | 0.021 | 0.148 | 0.026 | 0.148 | 0.026 |
| N | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | | 56146 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27628.784 | | -27620.549 | | -27622.901 | | -27628.741 | | -27618.364 | |
| | 37.55 | | 54.02 | | 49.32 | | 37.64 | | 58.39 | |
| AIC | 55317.567 | | 55303.098 | | 55307.802 | | 55319.482 | | 55298.728 | |
| BIC | 55585.639 | | 55580.105 | | 55584.809 | | 55596.489 | | 55575.735 | |

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

11.5 Summary and Conclusions

The analyses presented in this chapter tried to shed light on how different national contexts in Europe influence (a) the population's inclination towards homophobia, and (b) relationships between religion and homophobia.

The models showed that contrary to the initial expectations, religion is more influential for homophobic attitudes in non-post-communist, mostly Western European countries with low levels of corruption and high levels of gay rights implementation. Religious contexts, be it aggregated levels of devoutness, or the religious country majority, explain only little of the cross-country variation in homophobia. Neither moral community assumptions, nor Huntington's clash-of-civilisations hypothesis offer plausible explanations of the variation in homophobia across Europe.

The approach that was best supported by the data is modernisation theory. However, the analysis detected several shortcomings of this theory. First, modernisation theory tends to neglect historical explanations that surpass mere political economy. The specific history of post-communism and its devastating impact on the religious landscape of much of Eastern Europe is vital to understand why religion is not a strong social force in the post-soviet region. Secondly, modernisation theory tends to subsume religion under an index of traditionalist, survivalist, archaic and anti-liberal values. Religion thus stands almost exclusively on one side of Inglehart's well-known value dichotomy: materialist-survivalist-traditionalist versus liberal-Western-self-expressive-progressive (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 49). The result is a mishmash of religious and non-religious attitudes, values and practices that is unlikely to claim cross-cultural invariance and validity.

Religion is more than just a relic of traditionalist, under-developed societies.

Religion is a source both of group identities (Tajfel 1974), morality and meaning.

Modernisation theorists tend to underestimate this quality of religion as a supplier of meaning and identities (Hervieu-Leger 1998; Beck 2010) that can counter modernity, or compensate for the hardships modernity often entails.

But these various social functions religion can serve help explain, why religion is differently related to homophobia in Western Europe, than in Eastern-, and South-Eastern Europe, and why religion still plays an important role for many people's identities, even if they are not religious. Depending on societal and historical context, religion takes on various forms and functions. It is therefore not surprising that in highly developed, Western contexts religion can be both a traditional fortress against the moral uncertainties of late modernity, and a highly individualised source of spirituality, values and meanings. The former comes at the cost of increased homophobia and moralistic intolerance, the latter at the cost of moral relativism. In other contexts, South-Eastern Europe is an interesting case, religion takes the form of an ethnic identity marker. This context-dependent functional flexibility of religion may help explain why different forms of religion are differently related to homophobia in different regions of Europe.

The analyses of this chapter showed that modernisation plays an important part in explaining homophobic attitudes. However, the findings presented here could inspire a new twist to modernisation theory regarding the role of religion: the way modernisation theory conceptualises religion needs to be adapted to include assumptions from identity theory, and individualisation approaches in order to accommodate and interpret its various functions in the different context of European modernity.

12. Summary and Discussion

This dissertation tried to answer the question, how religion in Europe is related to the citizens' likelihood of being intolerant towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals. To this end, a cross-national comparison of relationships between religion, ethnic intolerance and homophobia was carried out across 47 European countries by applying multilevel modelling to European Values Study data (EVS 2010). The analysis tried to capture differential effects of indicators of religious believing, belonging and church attendance (religious practice) on the two forms of intolerance.

Relationships with four dependent variables were analysed: intolerance towards immigrants, intolerance towards people of a different race and two homophobic attitudes, moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group.

The analysis was interested firstly in individual-level relationships between religion and intolerance, secondly, in the influence of religious, socio-economic and political contexts on the dependent variables, and thirdly in the interplay between these national contexts and the established individual-level relationships.

12.1 Summary of the Key Findings

The results of the multilevel analyses can be summarised as follows:

Concerning individual-level relationships between religion and ethnic intolerance, the three dimensions of individual religiosity were found to be differently related to ethnic intolerance. The most striking finding is that believing matters for ethnic

intolerance and it matters more than church attendance and denominational belonging.

Across two different outcome measures (disliking immigrants as neighbours and disliking people of a different race as neighbours) both traditional belief in a personal God and modern, individualised beliefs were found to be strongly negatively related to ethnic intolerance, while the effect of fundamentalist truth-claims is strongly positive. The findings are robust across the vast majority of countries.

Regarding relationships between denominational belonging and ethnic intolerance, only two denominations stood out: Protestants and Muslims are more likely to be ethnically intolerant than unchurched people and members of the other two denominations, but only under specific circumstances: When intolerance towards immigrants is the outcome, non-devout Protestants, who do not attend church regularly and who do not find religion important, are more likely than unchurched people and members of the other denominations to be disinclined towards immigrants as neighbours. Devout Protestants, however, are no more likely than other people to be intolerant towards immigrants. The findings are further illuminated when contextualising them: 84% of the Protestants in the survey live in Western Europe. The finding therefore applies first and foremost to non-religious Western European Protestants, who utilise their denominational affiliation as an identity marker against unwelcome out-groups (immigrants). Muslims were found to be more intolerant than others when racial intolerance is the outcome, but only when not controlling for low education and unemployment. When holding these two social-structural variables constant, the Muslim-effect

loses its statistical significance. The finding was further confirmed by examining contextual differences: denominational belonging is associated with ethnic intolerance for Muslims living in a cluster of relatively poor, politically unstable South-Eastern European countries with histories of ethno-religious conflict. Both the contextual and the individual level analyses have shown that the effect is largely driven by low education and contexts of deprivation, insecurity and poverty. The analyses thus present further evidence supporting modernisation theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Assumptions based on Huntington's clash-of-civilisations-hypothesis, on the other hand, could not be confirmed by the analysis with regard to ethnic intolerance. When controlling for education and work deprivation on the individual level, and for wealth and corruption on the country-level, a country's religious majority has no effect on ethnic intolerance.

Consistent with the findings for Muslim religious belonging, the analysis found that only in the abovementioned cluster of deprived and politically unstable, mostly South-Eastern European countries regular church attendance and finding religion important have a statistically significant positive effect on the respondent's likelihood of being ethnically intolerant. In the rest of Europe no significant relationship between church attendance, importance of religion and ethnic intolerance was found. This finding applies to the sample as a whole, independent of the respondent's denominational affiliation.

National contexts of wealth, corruption and political stability, and levels of democratic freedom are all influential: people living in poor countries with high

corruption levels and low levels of political stability are more likely than the citizen's of wealthier, more stable and more secularised countries to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups. Moreover, in the abovementioned national contexts, the religious are more likely than the non-religious to be ethnically intolerant. Again, the findings accord with modernisation theory.

Interestingly, country-level religiosity (the percentage of religious among a country's population) was also found to be positively related to ethnic intolerance: People living in highly religious countries are more likely than people living in less religious countries to be intolerant towards ethnic out-groups. This finding demonstrates that the moral community which is praised by communitarian theorists for its ability to ensure conformity and social cohesion also has its dark side. The literature so far largely focuses on the positive aspects of the moral community, but there is still a lack of research exploring its dark, dysfunctional side.

However, it has to be stressed that the countries' wealth (GDP) and corruption-levels are by far the strongest country-level predictors of the analysis, and more influential than country-level religiosity. It would be interesting to explore to what extent effects of context-level religiosity are mediated or moderated by poverty, but the limited number of level-2 units of this study does not allow for that.

Interactions between contexts of poverty and religious contexts (aggregate religiosity) of the sub-national level and their combined effect on social attitudes would be interesting to explore in later studies. The countries' net migration rates, percentages of foreign-born among their populations, and degrees of religious fractionalisation (pluralism) do not have a significant effect on the citizen's likelihood of being intolerant towards ethnic out-groups.

For homophobia as the outcome the multilevel analyses found quite different contextual results.

Although homophobia is most prevalent among the populations of relatively poor, unstable countries, particularly the post-communist Eastern European countries and the Muslim majority countries in the South-East, it is the West, where individual-level religiosity is most strongly positively related to homophobia. Fundamentalism in particular is strongly related to homophobia in Western Europe, but is irrelevant in Eastern Europe. The finding can at least partly be understood in the light of historical events: in the post-communist countries religion was suppressed for decades, thus it is not a significant social force for moral socialisation in these countries. Secondly, the cross-country percentages of homophobes have shown that homophobia is a huge social problem in many post-communist countries.

The overall levels of homophobia across the population of Eastern Europe are so high, that religion does not significantly add to the problem. This accords with prior findings in the literature (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009, 348–349).

On the individual level, religious practice (church attendance), devoutness and traditional believing were found to be positively related to both, moralistic homophobia, expressed as the statement ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group (expressed as a disinclination towards homosexuals as neighbours). These relationships are valid in Eastern and Western Europe, but the difference between the religious and the non-religious in their propensity to express homophobic attitudes is much greater in the West.

As to denominational differences in homophobic attitudes, the analyses unsurprisingly found Muslims and Orthodox to be on average more homophobic than others, which accords with other findings in the literature (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009). However, the effect is unrelated to religiosity. Also, when controlling for country-level wealth, the coefficient of Muslim country majority loses its statistical significance. Therefore, for both ethnic intolerance and homophobia as the outcome of the analyses, Huntington's hypothesis could not be confirmed by the data.

12.2 Theoretical Implications

In terms of social theory, the analyses found ample evidence supporting modernisation theory. Wealth, security and human development are clearly important variables impacting on the citizen's tolerance towards others. Also, assumptions from classical identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979) found support in the data and could yield new insights, when seen in combination with modernisation theory assumptions: in contexts of insecurity, low wealth and existential struggle, strong and persistent ethnic identities that are tied to religion seem to be powerful drivers of intolerance and mistrust. Seen in the light of identity theory, the fact that in South-Eastern Europe ethnic intolerance is strongly related to finding religion important, but unrelated to religious believing, and actual religious practice (church attendance), could indicate the instrumental role, religion can play as an identity- marker delineating a person's in-group from unwanted out-groups. The fact that this was found

primarily in countries that are not only poor, deprived and politically unstable, but also have histories of nationalism and ethno-religious conflict, illustrates how helpful a combination of identity-and modernisation theory could be for future studies in this area. Group identities do not form in isolation from the wider contexts surrounding them. Future studies could benefit from analysing ethnic and religious identities and their relation to social attitudes in the light of different regional socio-economic and political contexts. Combining assumptions from modernisation theory with the analytical framework of identity theory seems to be a good way forward.

In the light of the results of the analyses presented in this thesis, it was found that individualisation theory could also be an interesting additional source to enrich future studies of religion, modernisation and social attitudes. Modernisation theory tends to neglect the social function religion can serve in secular settings as a supplier of meanings, worldviews and counter-‘modernities’ (Hervieu-Leger 1998; Cesari 2004; Beck 2010). The analyses found individualised fuzzy religious believing to be a strong positive influence on both ethnic tolerance and tolerance towards homosexuals. Fundamentalist truth-claims, on the other hand, were found to be a strong predictor of ethnic intolerance and homophobia, particularly in highly modernised contexts. In Western Europe, fundamentalist truth-claims seem to function for many people as a form of traditionalist moral bulwark against the threat of modernity and its liberal sexual morals. Thus future studies could profit from taking into account that religion can serve a multitude of social functions depending on socio-economic and political contexts.

Additional studies in this area that analyse trajectories of changing religious beliefs identities and attitudes and their relation to socio-economic and political contexts, ideally based on panel data could benefit from a combination of these three theories.

12.3 Limitations

The author has to acknowledge a number of limitations of this analysis:

First of all, when working with secondary data, the choice of available variables suitable to operationalise the theoretical concepts under study is limited. Large-scale cross-national surveys like the EVS are designed to cover a broad range of social attitudes and values across a large number of countries. The EVS is not designed for an in-depth coverage of one single theoretical concept, like intrinsic religiosity or intolerance. This puts some limitations to what can be achieved with the analysis.

It would have been desirable to have a full Bogardus social distance scale for each dependent variable, allowing for varying degrees of tolerance, instead of single binary items. Also, this study would have benefitted from in-depth item-batteries for each dimension of individual-level religiosity (believing, belonging and practice), to get a fuller picture of relationships between each of the religion dimensions and intolerance. The measures used to operationalise intolerance and the three religion-dimensions are not perfect and the gain in capturing relationships across 47 countries comes at the price of working with somewhat superficial measures of intolerance and religious believing.

Despite this limitation, the analysis presented in this thesis was able to come to clear and new insights regarding relationships between religion, ethnic intolerance and homophobia in Europe.

A second limitation of this thesis lies in the quality of the data. The dependent variables of the analysis are likely to suffer from a measurement effect due to the fact that the question format was not the same in all countries. A change of the question-format between 1999 and 2008 was detected in Belgium and there is reason to suspect that also in ten other countries, a different question-format was used, than in the rest of Europe. The author dealt with the problem by carrying out a careful statistical comparisons of the models of interest between the group of countries in which the deviating question-format was used and the rest of Europe. Suest Chow-tests were applied to ascertain whether the model coefficients differ significantly between the two groups.

The results of the tests gave the author some reassurance that if indeed a different question format was used, it did not significantly influence the model coefficients of the models presented here. Nonetheless, it cannot be determined with certainty that the models do not suffer from some degree of bias due to a question format effect.

Thirdly, the variables used for the analysis suffer from missing data. Between 18% and 23% of data points in the multilevel models are missing due to non-response, which, if ignored, may lead to biased estimates. This was dealt with by carrying out careful analyses of missing data patterns, by modelling potential missing data mechanisms via OLS- and logistic regression and by fitting imputation models for both ethnic-intolerance outcomes. The multilevel models

were run across 40 imputed datasets and the estimates compared between the imputed and the non-imputed models. Unfortunately, the models for moralistic homophobia and intolerance of homosexuals as a group could not be imputed, because the missing-data mechanism is likely not at random. Imputation in this case would have led to additional bias. Therefore these models likely suffer from some degree of bias due to non-response.

A fourth limitation is put on the assumptions that are possible, based on the data and models presented here, particularly the question of causality. The analyses of this thesis study relationships between individual-level religiosity, country-level traits and intolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals. By including social structural controls, and controls that tap a political right-wing orientation and authoritarian attitudes, the author tried to ensure that the relationships found are not spurious and mediated by other variables that are known to be influential. In addition, moderation between religion and hypothesized variables was tested in the models. However, relationships between attitudes and beliefs are complex and causality is hard to establish. It is plausible that religious people tend to also be more authoritarian and therefore less tolerant.

However, survey research on attitudes tends to suffer from a certain degree of endogeneity and based on cross-sectional data alone, one cannot finally establish causality. In order to establish causal paths between religiosity and intolerance, panel data would be needed, allowing for more refined modelling and enabling the researcher to establish relationships over time.

A similar problem evolves when working with country-level data: although the limited number of 48 countries/regions in the EVS, wave 4, is satisfactory for multilevel modelling, it still reduces statistical power and hence the scope of assumptions that can be made. The contextual analysis of this dissertation tried to test whether the hypothesized country-level traits affect ethnic intolerance and homophobia. To this end, country-level indicators, such as the per capita GDP, indices of perceived corruption and political stability, the net migration rate for each country, the aggregated percentages of highly religious ('religion is important') were included in the multilevel models. The findings were unambiguous for GDP and corruption levels, which both showed the strongest and most robust effects. But the situation is less clear for country-level religiosity, religious pluralism and percent foreign-born. The countries with a high percentage of religious among their populations are also among the poorest and least politically stable. South Eastern Europe is affected by a multitude of contextual problems, and also has populations that are above average religious. It is therefore difficult to ascertain to what extent country-level religiosity contributes to an environment that fosters intolerance. The evidence from the historical literature on the region, reporting strong religious contributions to ethnic conflicts in the area throughout their history, suggests that the relationships found in the multilevel models are not spurious.

Secondly, since ethnic- and religious groups tend to cluster in sub-national regions, rather than countries, measuring the percentage of foreign-born and the degree of religious pluralism on the country-level is not ideal and might have led to false negatives. Ideally one would collect more data on the regional (NUTS-2) level as a next step and integrate sub-national regions as a level in the models. The

findings concerning the contribution of religious contexts and ethnic diversity to the problem of ethnic intolerance in this region will likely be more refined and less affected by noise.

The analyses presented here can therefore only be a first step in the direction of understanding relationships between religion, ethnic intolerance and homophobia in contemporary Europe and there is still a lot of work to do in trying to understand what drives them. Nonetheless the analyses presented here give a good first overview of relationships between religion and intolerance across Europe and constitutes a solid basis for future work on the topic.

13. Conclusion

This doctoral dissertation analysed relationships between religion, ethnic intolerance and homophobia across 47 European countries. Based on the results of the analyses, it can be concluded that although secularisation theorists find that the traditional churches are on the decline in most of Europe, religion, in the form of private, intrinsic believing, is still an important social force influencing social attitudes like tolerance.

This dissertation contributes to the existing knowledge in a threefold way: Firstly, a theoretically improved framework is proposed for the scientific study of religion and social attitudes. The vast majority of past contributions employ either church attendance, importance of religion or denominational belonging, or a combination of both as proxies for individual-level religiosity, thus largely neglecting the believing dimension. This thesis offers an improved framework by applying a three-dimensional concept of religiosity to the study of relationships between religion and intolerance. As shown in the literature review of this thesis, three-dimensional concepts of religion have been around for a while in social theory, but they have largely been neglected in the field of applied empirical research on religion and social attitudes. The author's findings of differential effects of believing, belonging and practice, and strong negative relationships between non-fundamentalist believing and ethnic intolerance, confirm the necessity to distinguish all three dimensions of religion.

The second central contribution of this thesis lies in a careful contextualisation of the results in a multilevel framework. Although the number of articles applying multilevel analysis to the cross-national study of religion and social attitudes is increasing, most of them still treat random effects as a nuisance, rather than appreciating their potential to aid an understanding of cross-cultural differences. Thus, the vast majority of studies in this field restrict themselves to just presenting random intercept models that control for the between-country variation, while the explanatory power of the random slope model is largely neglected.

This thesis offers an improved analysis of cross-national differences in the relationships between religion, ethnic intolerance and homophobia by explicitly modelling, visualising and interpreting random slopes. The author hopes that mapping the random effects across Europe facilitates an understanding of the complex relationships and helps to detect common, cross-national patterns.

Lastly, the models presented in this thesis give a detailed analysis of the impact of socio-economic, socio-political, historical and religious contexts on the European citizen's likelihood of being intolerant towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals.

The multilevel models presented in this dissertation demonstrated that national socio-economic and political contexts matter greatly for the citizen's tolerance towards ethnic out-groups and homosexuals. Poverty, corruption and political instability in particular have strong adverse effects on the population's tolerance towards both out-groups. These results are potentially interesting to European policymakers, as they may help evaluate how, and where, improving governance

and socio-economic contexts could matter for the European citizen's tolerance towards others and for other democratic attitudes.

This thesis is a first step in the direction of in-depth analyses and contextualisation of relationships between religion and pro-social, democratic values across Europe.

Further studies in this field could add to the existing knowledge in two ways:

firstly by exploring sub-national religious and socio-economic contexts (NUTS-2 regions) and their relationship with religious and ethnic identities in South-Eastern Europe. Secondly, by exploring trajectories of religious and attitudinal change and its contextual covariates across Europe, using longitudinal data.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Bivariate Relationships and Multicollinearity Diagnostics

Table A: Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Multilevel Models for the Outcome Variables ‘Would not like as neighbours: immigrants’, ‘Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’, ‘Would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ and ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’:

| Multicollinearity Diagnostics | | | |
|---|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| Variable | VIF | Tolerance | R-Squared |
| Catholic | 2.22 | 0.4508 | 0.5492 |
| Protestant | 1.5 | 0.668 | 0.332 |
| orthodox | 2.18 | 0.459 | 0.541 |
| Muslim | 1.82 | 0.551 | 0.449 |
| Other Denomination | 1.13 | 0.8884 | 0.1116 |
| Church Attendance | 1.78 | 0.5619 | 0.4381 |
| Importance of Religion | 1.9 | 0.5271 | 0.4729 |
| Belief: Personal God | 2.48 | 0.4037 | 0.5963 |
| Belief: Spirit/Lif Force | 1.81 | 0.5539 | 0.4461 |
| ‘I have my own way of connecting with the Divine’ | 1.06 | 0.946 | 0.054 |
| Fundamentalism | 1.29 | 0.7751 | 0.2249 |
| Voluntering | 1.07 | 0.9339 | 0.0661 |
| Tertiary Education | 1.07 | 0.9384 | 0.0616 |
| Sex: Female | 1.04 | 0.959 | 0.041 |
| Long Term Unemployment | 1.09 | 0.917 | 0.083 |
| Age | 29.95 | 0.0334 | 0.9666 |
| Age Squared | 30.11 | 0.0332 | 0.9668 |
| Anomy | 1.04 | 0.962 | 0.038 |
| Right-Wing | 1.07 | 0.9372 | 0.0628 |
| Right-Wing Don’t Know | 1.14 | 0.8808 | 0.1192 |
| Strong Leader | 1.13 | 0.888 | 0.112 |
| Leader Don’t Know | 1.13 | 0.8884 | 0.1116 |
| Mean VIF | 4.04 | | |

Note: Age and Age squared are expected to yield high multicollinearity, since age squared is derived from Age. The collinearity between these two variables is not a cause of concern. A table showing the multicollinearity diagnostics without age squared is supplied below.

Table B: Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Multilevel Models with Ethnic Intolerance as the Outcome and for Homophobia as the Outcome:

| Multicollinearity Diagnostics | | | |
|---|------|-----------|-----------|
| Variable | VIF | Tolerance | R-Squared |
| Catholic | 2.22 | 0.4508 | 0.5492 |
| Protestant | 1.5 | 0.668 | 0.332 |
| orthodox | 2.18 | 0.4592 | 0.5408 |
| Muslim | 1.81 | 0.5512 | 0.4488 |
| Other Denomination | 1.13 | 0.8884 | 0.1116 |
| Church Attendance | 1.78 | 0.5619 | 0.4381 |
| Importance of Religion | 1.9 | 0.5275 | 0.4725 |
| Belief: Personal God | 2.48 | 0.4037 | 0.5963 |
| Belief: Spirit/Lif Force | 1.8 | 0.5542 | 0.4458 |
| ‘I have my own way of connecting with the Divine’ | 1.06 | 0.946 | 0.054 |
| Fundamentalism | 1.29 | 0.7759 | 0.2241 |
| Voluntering | 1.07 | 0.935 | 0.065 |
| Tertiary Education | 1.06 | 0.9448 | 0.0552 |
| Sex: Female | 1.04 | 0.9591 | 0.0409 |
| Long Term Unemployment | 1.09 | 0.9176 | 0.0824 |
| age | 1.11 | 0.9036 | 0.0964 |
| Anomy | 1.04 | 0.962 | 0.038 |
| Right-Wing | 1.07 | 0.9374 | 0.0626 |
| Right-Wing Don’t Know | 1.13 | 0.8816 | 0.1184 |
| Strong Leader | 1.13 | 0.8881 | 0.1119 |
| Leader Don’t Know | 1.12 | 0.8896 | 0.1104 |
| Mean VIF | 1.43 | | |

Table C: Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Contextual Models with Ethnic Intolerance as the Outcome, Including Macro -Level Predictors:

| Multicollinearity Diagnostics | | | |
|---|--------------|---------------|-----------|
| Variable | VIF | Tolerance | R-Squared |
| Catholic | 2.72 | 0.3679 | 0.6321 |
| Protestant | 2.06 | 0.4858 | 0.5142 |
| orthodox | 3.39 | 0.295 | 0.705 |
| Muslim | 3.21 | 0.3115 | 0.6885 |
| Other Denomination | 1.14 | 0.8761 | 0.1239 |
| Church Attendance | 1.85 | 0.5418 | 0.4582 |
| Importance of Religion | 2.02 | 0.4951 | 0.5049 |
| Belief: Personal God | 2.52 | 0.3969 | 0.6031 |
| Belief: Spirit/Lif Force | 1.83 | 0.5463 | 0.4537 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 1.07 | 0.9363 | 0.0637 |
| Fundamentalism | 1.31 | 0.7621 | 0.2379 |
| Voluntering | 1.1 | 0.9059 | 0.0941 |
| Tertiary Education | 1.08 | 0.9251 | 0.0749 |
| Sex: Female | 1.05 | 0.9541 | 0.0459 |
| Long Term Unemployment | 1.16 | 0.8626 | 0.1374 |
| age | 1.13 | 0.8853 | 0.1147 |
| Anomy | 1.07 | 0.9336 | 0.0664 |
| Right-Wing | 1.07 | 0.9317 | 0.0683 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | 1.18 | 0.8493 | 0.1507 |
| Strong Leader | 1.15 | 0.87 | 0.13 |
| Leader Don't Know | 1.13 | 0.8877 | 0.1123 |
| % Catholics per country | 4.04 | 0.2474 | 0.7526 |
| % Protestant per country | 4.7 | 0.2129 | 0.7871 |
| % Orthodox per country | 5.03 | 0.1989 | 0.8011 |
| % Muslims per Country | 3.43 | 0.2913 | 0.7087 |
| GDP per Capita 2008, in USD | 6.62 | 0.1511 | 0.8489 |
| Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) | 12.72 | 0.0786 | 0.9214 |
| Political Stability Index 2008 | 4.76 | 0.2099 | 0.7901 |
| Post-communism | 4.64 | 0.2155 | 0.7845 |
| Freedom House Score 2008 | 4.27 | 0.2343 | 0.7657 |
| Net Migration Rate 2008 | 2.64 | 0.3784 | 0.6216 |
| % Foreign-Born per Country | 1.52 | 0.6598 | 0.3402 |
| Mean Importance of Religion per Country | 3.74 | 0.2675 | 0.7325 |
| Religious Fractionalisation | 1.85 | 0.5407 | 0.4593 |
| Mean VIF | 2.77 | | |

Table D: Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Contextual Models with Homophobia as the Outcome, Including Macro-Level Predictors:

| Multicollinearity Diagnostics | | | | |
|---|-------------|------|---------------|-----------|
| Variable | VIF | VIF | Tolerance | R-Squared |
| Catholic | 2.69 | 1.64 | 0.372 | 0.628 |
| Protestant | 2.05 | 1.43 | 0.4869 | 0.5131 |
| orthodox | 3.38 | 1.84 | 0.2959 | 0.7041 |
| Muslim | 3.21 | 1.79 | 0.3116 | 0.6884 |
| Other Denomination | 1.14 | 1.07 | 0.8758 | 0.1242 |
| Church Attendance | 1.83 | 1.35 | 0.5459 | 0.4541 |
| Importance of Religion | 2.02 | 1.42 | 0.4952 | 0.5048 |
| Belief: Personal God | 2.51 | 1.58 | 0.3989 | 0.6011 |
| Belief: Spirit/Lif Force | 1.83 | 1.35 | 0.5476 | 0.4524 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 1.07 | 1.03 | 0.9385 | 0.0615 |
| Fundamentalis m | 1.31 | 1.14 | 0.7638 | 0.2362 |
| Voluntering | 1.1 | 1.05 | 0.9086 | 0.0914 |
| Tertiary Education | 1.07 | 1.04 | 0.9325 | 0.0675 |
| Sex: Female | 1.05 | 1.02 | 0.954 | 0.046 |
| Long Term Unemployment | 1.15 | 1.07 | 0.8675 | 0.1325 |
| age | 1.13 | 1.06 | 0.8872 | 0.1128 |
| Anomy | 1.07 | 1.03 | 0.9385 | 0.0615 |
| Right-Wing | 1.07 | 1.04 | 0.9305 | 0.0695 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | 1.17 | 1.08 | 0.8557 | 0.1443 |
| Strong Leader | 1.15 | 1.07 | 0.8699 | 0.1301 |
| Leader Don't Know | 1.13 | 1.06 | 0.8871 | 0.1129 |
| % Catholics per country | 3.29 | 1.81 | 0.3043 | 0.6957 |
| % Protestant per country | 4.43 | 2.1 | 0.2259 | 0.7741 |
| % Orthodox per country | 5.29 | 2.3 | 0.1889 | 0.8111 |
| % Muslims per Country | 3.35 | 1.83 | 0.2984 | 0.7016 |
| GDP per Capita 2008, in USD | 4.55 | 2.13 | 0.2196 | 0.7804 |
| Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) | 9.8 | 3.13 | 0.102 | 0.898 |
| Politcal Stability Index 2008 | 5.16 | 2.27 | 0.1936 | 0.8064 |
| Post-communism | 4.47 | 2.11 | 0.2236 | 0.7764 |
| Mean Importance of Religion per Country | 3.43 | 1.85 | 0.2912 | 0.7088 |
| Gay Rights (Degree of Implementation) | 4.13 | 2.03 | 0.2422 | 0.7578 |
| Mean VIF | 2.65 | | | |

Table E: Bivariate Spearman Correlations of the Macro-Level Indicators of the Multilevel Models:

| | % Catholic per country | % Protestant per country | % Orthodox per country | % Muslim per country | GDP 2008 | Corruption (CPI) | Political Stability |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|------------------|---------------------|
| % Catholic per country | 1 | | | | | | |
| % Protestant per country | 0.2618* | 1 | | | | | |
| % Orthodox per country | -0.4295* | -0.3995* | 1 | | | | |
| % Muslim per country | -0.3451* | -0.4691* | 0.1080* | 1 | | | |
| GDP per capita, in USD 2008 | 0.3898* | 0.6737* | -0.5952* | -0.1514* | 1 | | |
| Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) | 0.3215* | 0.7269* | -0.5863* | -0.1799* | 0.9291* | 1 | |
| Political Stability Index 2008 | 0.5065* | 0.6780* | -0.5374* | -0.3739* | 0.8007* | 0.8039* | 1 |
| Post-communism | -0.1830* | -0.3362* | 0.5253* | -0.1051* | -0.7742* | -0.7258* | -0.4886* |
| Freedom House Score 2008 | -0.5810* | -0.6622* | 0.5963* | 0.3888* | -0.8317* | -0.8671* | -0.8293* |
| Net Migration Rate 2008 | 0.4764* | 0.4461* | -0.5730* | -0.0579* | 0.7540* | 0.6487* | 0.5622* |
| % Foreign-Born per country | 0.1622* | 0.3260* | 0.0172* | -0.0378* | 0.3585* | 0.2668* | 0.1873* |
| Mean Importance of Religion per Country | -0.2422* | -0.7008* | 0.3156* | 0.2526* | -0.5855* | -0.5941* | -0.5167* |
| Religious Fractionalisation | -0.1614* | 0.0858* | 0.2238* | -0.0036 | -0.2310* | -0.1560* | -0.2841* |
| Gay Rights (Degree of Implementation) | 0.3383* | 0.6477* | -0.6068* | -0.1134* | 0.7574* | 0.7751* | 0.5649* |

Table F: Bivariate Spearman Correlations of the Macro-Level Indicators of the Multilevel Models:

| | Post-communism | Freedom House Score | Net Migration Rate | % Foreign-Born per Country | Mean Importance of Religion per country | Religious Fractionalisation |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Freedom House | 0.5661* | 1 | | | | |
| Net Migration Rate | -0.6927* | -0.5690* | 1 | | | |
| % Foreign-Born | -0.2541* | -0.1671* | 0.2506* | 1 | | |
| Mean Importance of Religion | 0.1432* | 0.5673* | -0.2824* | -0.3509* | 1 | |
| Religious Fractionalisation | 0.3525* | 0.1961* | -0.1201* | 0.0551* | -0.2397* | 1 |
| Gay Rights | -0.5628* | -0.6353* | 0.6635* | 0.2707* | -0.6370* | 0.0433* |

Table G: Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Binary Logistic Regression**Models of Chapter 11 ('South-Eastern Europe- A Special Case'):**

| Variable | VIF | Sqrt VIF | Tolerance | R-Squared |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|
| Catholic | 4.32 | 2.08 | 0.2314 | 0.7686 |
| Protestant | 1.25 | 1.12 | 0.7986 | 0.2014 |
| Muslim | 5.18 | 2.27 | 0.1932 | 0.8068 |
| Orthodox | 6.11 | 2.47 | 0.1636 | 0.8364 |
| Church Attendance | 1.35 | 1.16 | 0.7414 | 0.2586 |
| Importance of Religion | 1.58 | 1.26 | 0.6325 | 0.3675 |
| Belief: Personal God | 2.86 | 1.69 | 0.35 | 0.65 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 2.31 | 1.52 | 0.4325 | 0.5675 |
| Individualised Religiosity | 1.14 | 1.07 | 0.8758 | 0.1242 |
| Volunteering | 1.08 | 1.04 | 0.9295 | 0.0705 |
| Tertiary Education | 1.16 | 1.08 | 0.8605 | 0.1395 |
| Sex: Female | 1.05 | 1.02 | 0.9544 | 0.0456 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 1.23 | 1.11 | 0.8135 | 0.1865 |
| Age | 1.16 | 1.08 | 0.8591 | 0.1409 |
| Anomy | 1.14 | 1.07 | 0.876 | 0.124 |
| Right-Wing | 1.11 | 1.05 | 0.9033 | 0.0967 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | 1.25 | 1.12 | 0.7992 | 0.2008 |
| Size of Town | 1.22 | 1.10 | 0.8209 | 0.1791 |
| Albania | 2.74 | 1.66 | 0.3644 | 0.6356 |
| Armenia | 5.07 | 2.25 | 0.1972 | 0.8028 |
| Azerbaijan | 5.00 | 2.24 | 0.2002 | 0.7998 |
| Georgia | 5.70 | 2.39 | 0.1756 | 0.8244 |
| Greece | 4.95 | 2.22 | 0.2021 | 0.7979 |
| Kosovo | 4.36 | 2.09 | 0.2292 | 0.7708 |
| Lithuania | 2.02 | 1.42 | 0.4941 | 0.5059 |
| Macedonia | 4.13 | 2.03 | 0.2422 | 0.7578 |
| Norcypr | 2.31 | 1.52 | 0.4322 | 0.5678 |
| Turkey | 5.25 | 2.29 | 0.1904 | 0.8096 |
| Mean VIF | 2.79 | | | |

Appendix B: Residual Diagnostics and Influential Cases:

Testing for Influential Cases on Level 2 (Countries):

Procedure:

1. Plot the standardized level-2-residuals in stata, see below. Visual inspection for outliers.
2. For each outlier: Suest-comparison of two models: model 1 (logit y x1 x2 x3 outlier-dummy), and model2 (logit y x1 x2 x3)
3. inspection of differences between the coefficients of both models, then chi-squared Chow test in Suest.
4. the clustering of the data was accounted for by calculating adjusted standard errors in the suest models (stata option, cluster(country))

Plotted Level-2-Residuals:

The Country-Abbreviations follow the internationally recognised ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 standard.

Figure A: Plotted Level-2 Residuals for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’ as the Outcome




Figure B: Plotted Level-2 Residuals for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a Different Race’ as the Outcome




Figure C: Plotted Level-2 Residuals for ‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’ as the Outcome





Figure D: Plotted Level-1 Residuals for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’ as the Outcome



Tests, whether the countries that are outliers, are influential cases:

Table A: Suest Chi-Squared Chow-test of the Hypothesis that not all coefficients between the model including and the model not including each country-dummy are equal:

| DV: | ‘Would not like Immigrants...’ | | ‘Would not like people of a different Race...;’ | | ‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’ | | ‘Would not like homosexuals...’ | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|----|---|----|--------------------------------------|----|---------------------------------|----|
| Dummy Variable: | X ² | df | X ² | df | X ² | df | X ² | df |
| Azerbaijan | | | | | | | 27.43 | 26 |
| Georgia | | | | | | | 7.18 | 26 |
| Iceland | 1.87 | 26 | 1.70 | 26 | 335.15 | 26 | 2.11 | 26 |
| Northern Ireland | 1.26 | 26 | 1.07 | 26 | 0.40 | 25 | | |
| Northern Cyprus | 1.67 | 26 | 2.03 | 26 | 39.99 | 26 | | |
| Switzerland | 1.15 | 26 | | | | | | |
| Turkey | | | | | | | 12.13 | 26 |

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries that are potential influential cases (Iceland, Northern Ireland, Northern Cyprus), Simultaneous Regression Models:

Is Iceland an influential case?

Table A: SUEST Model Part 1:

| M1: not including Dummy Iceland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.199 | 0.154 | 0.197 |
| Protestant | -0.357 | 0.169 | 0.035 |
| Orthodox | 0.119 | 0.144 | 0.406 |
| Muslim | 0.592 | 0.178 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.444 | 0.185 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.100 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.771 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.069 | 0.075 | 0.351 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.190 | 0.072 | 0.009 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.095 | 0.035 | 0.007 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.130 | 0.059 | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.113 | 0.067 | 0.092 |
| Sex: Female | -0.080 | 0.035 | 0.024 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.010 | 0.063 | 0.871 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.417 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.266 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.241 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.084 | 0.114 | 0.459 |
| Strong Leader | 0.181 | 0.086 | 0.037 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.129 | 0.103 | 0.210 |
| Constant | -2.010 | 0.202 | 0.000 |

Table B: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Iceland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.199 | 0.154 | 0.197 |
| Protestant | -0.357 | 0.169 | 0.035 |
| Orthodox | 0.119 | 0.144 | 0.406 |
| Muslim | 0.592 | 0.178 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.444 | 0.185 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.100 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.771 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.069 | 0.075 | 0.351 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.190 | 0.072 | 0.009 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.095 | 0.035 | 0.007 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.130 | 0.059 | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.113 | 0.067 | 0.092 |
| Sex: Female | -0.080 | 0.035 | 0.024 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.010 | 0.063 | 0.871 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.417 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.266 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.241 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.084 | 0.114 | 0.459 |
| Strong Leader | 0.181 | 0.086 | 0.037 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.129 | 0.103 | 0.210 |
| Iceland | -1.383 | 0.139 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -2.003 | 0.203 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2:

```

test [M1 = M2 ], common
( 1) [M1] Catholic - [M2] Catholic = 0
( 2) [M1] Protestant - [M2] Protestant = 0
( 3) [M1] Orthodox - [M2] Orthodox = 0
( 4) [M1] Muslim - [M2] Muslim = 0
( 5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
( 6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2] Church Attendance = 0
( 7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2] Importance of Religion = 0
( 8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
( 9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
(10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
(11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
(12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
(13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
(14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female = 0
(15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
(16) [M1] age - [M2] age = 0
(17) [M1] age squared - [M2] age squared = 0
(18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
(19) [M1] right-wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
(20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
(21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
(22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0
      chi2( 26) =  1.87
      Prob > chi2 =  1.0000

```

Chi-squared Chow-test for equality of the coefficients of Protestant and Orthodox denomination separately, between M1 and M2 (after visual inspection):

(1) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0

chi2(1) = 1.01
 Prob > chi2 = 0.3142

(1) [M1]orthodox - [M2]orthodox = 0

chi2(1) = 0.98
 Prob > chi2 = 0.3234

Conclusion: Iceland does not significantly impact the model coefficients and is therefore not an influential case.

Is Switzerland an influential case?

Table C: SUEST Model Part 1:

| M1: Model not including Dummy Switzerland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.199 | 0.154 | 0.197 |
| Protestant | -0.357 | 0.169 | 0.035 |
| Orthodox | 0.119 | 0.144 | 0.406 |
| Muslim | 0.592 | 0.178 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.444 | 0.185 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.100 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.771 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.069 | 0.075 | 0.351 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.190 | 0.072 | 0.009 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.095 | 0.035 | 0.007 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.130 | 0.059 | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.113 | 0.067 | 0.092 |
| Sex: Female | -0.080 | 0.035 | 0.024 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.010 | 0.063 | 0.871 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.417 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.266 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.241 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.084 | 0.114 | 0.459 |
| Strong Leader | 0.181 | 0.086 | 0.037 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.129 | 0.103 | 0.210 |
| Constant | -2.015 | 0.202 | 0.000 |

Table D: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Switzerland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.196 | 0.153 | 0.203 |
| Protestant | -0.334 | 0.172 | 0.052 |
| Orthodox | 0.112 | 0.143 | 0.436 |
| Muslim | 0.589 | 0.177 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.427 | 0.187 | 0.022 |
| Church attendance | 0.026 | 0.017 | 0.128 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.770 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.067 | 0.075 | 0.372 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.183 | 0.072 | 0.012 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.089 | 0.035 | 0.011 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.265 | 0.054 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.134 | 0.058 | 0.023 |
| Volunteering | -0.103 | 0.066 | 0.121 |
| Sex: Female | -0.081 | 0.035 | 0.022 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.005 | 0.063 | 0.926 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.381 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.230 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.236 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.080 | 0.113 | 0.478 |
| Strong Leader | 0.178 | 0.087 | 0.040 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.130 | 0.104 | 0.210 |
| Switzerland | -1.489 | 0.104 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -1.978 | 0.201 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common

- (1) [M1] Catholic - [M2] Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1] Protestant - [M2] Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1] Orthodox - [M2] Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1] Muslim - [M2] Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2] Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2] Importance of Religion = 0
- (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female = 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2] age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared - [M2] age squared = 0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 1.15
 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000

Conclusion: Switzerland does not significantly impact the model coefficients and is therefore not an influential case.

Is Northern Ireland an influential case?

Table E: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI: Model not including Dummy Northern Ireland | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|---|--------------|--------------------|---------------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | | | |
| Catholic | -0.199 | 0.154 | 0.197 |
| Protestant | -0.357 | 0.169 | 0.035 |
| Orthodox | 0.119 | 0.144 | 0.406 |
| Muslim | 0.592 | 0.178 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.444 | 0.185 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.100 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.771 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.069 | 0.070 | 0.351 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.190 | 0.072 | 0.009 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.095 | 0.035 | 0.007 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.130 | 0.059 | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.113 | 0.067 | 0.092 |
| Sex: Female | -0.080 | 0.035 | 0.024 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.010 | 0.063 | 0.871 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.417 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.266 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.241 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.084 | 0.114 | 0.459 |
| Strong Leader | 0.181 | 0.086 | 0.037 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.129 | 0.103 | 0.210 |
| Constant | -2.015 | 0.202 | 0.000 |

Table F: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Northern Ireland | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | | | |
| Catholic | -.0196 | 0.154 | 0.203 |
| Protestant | -0.365 | 0.168 | 0.030 |
| Orthodox | 0.125 | 0.144 | 0.386 |
| Muslim | 0.598 | 0.179 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.445 | 0.184 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.109 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.768 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.072 | 0.074 | 0.334 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.191 | 0.072 | 0.009 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.097 | 0.035 | 0.006 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.129 | 0.059 | 0.028 |
| Volunteering | -0.112 | 0.067 | 0.097 |
| Sex: Female | -0.080 | 0.035 | 0.024 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.009 | 0.063 | 0.882 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.411 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.262 |
| Anomy | 0.043 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.243 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.084 | 0.114 | 0.458 |
| Strong Leader | 0.180 | 0.086 | 0.038 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.124 | 0.102 | 0.226 |
| Northern Ireland | 0.370 | 0.110 | 0.001 |
| Constant | -2.014 | 0.202 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 = M2], common

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion = 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female = 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared - [M2] age squared = 0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right-wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 1.26
 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000

Conclusion: Northern Ireland does not significantly impact my coefficients and is therefore not an influential case.

Is Northern Cyprus an influential case?

Table G: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : Model not including Dummy Northern Cyprus | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|---|--------------|--------------------|---------------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | | | |
| Catholic | -0.199 | 0.154 | 0.197 |
| Protestant | -0.357 | 0.169 | 0.035 |
| Orthodox | 0.119 | 0.144 | 0.406 |
| Muslim | 0.592 | 0.178 | 0.001 |
| Other Denomination | -0.444 | 0.185 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.100 |
| Importance of religion | 0.012 | 0.043 | 0.771 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.069 | 0.075 | 0.351 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.190 | 0.072 | 0.009 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.095 | 0.035 | 0.007 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.130 | 0.059 | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.113 | 0.067 | 0.092 |
| Sex: Female | -0.080 | 0.035 | 0.024 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.010 | 0.063 | 0.871 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.417 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.266 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.241 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.084 | 0.114 | 0.459 |
| Strong Leader | 0.181 | 0.086 | 0.037 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.129 | 0.103 | 0.210 |
| Constant | -2.015 | 0.202 | 0.000 |

Table H: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Northern Cyprus | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | | | |
| Catholic | -0.202 | 0.155 | 0.191 |
| Protestant | -0.360 | 0.170 | 0.034 |
| Orthodox | 0.121 | 0.144 | 0.401 |
| Muslim | 0.533 | 0.189 | 0.005 |
| Other Denomination | -0.446 | 0.185 | 0.016 |
| Church attendance | 0.033 | 0.018 | 0.065 |
| Importance of religion | 0.013 | 0.044 | 0.772 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.078 | 0.073 | 0.286 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.188 | 0.073 | 0.010 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.105 | 0.034 | 0.002 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.275 | 0.057 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.131 | 0.060 | 0.028 |
| Volunteering | -0.115 | 0.068 | 0.090 |
| Sex: Female | -0.077 | 0.036 | 0.031 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.008 | 0.064 | 0.897 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.004 | 0.475 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.310 |
| Anomy | 0.044 | 0.015 | 0.003 |
| Right-Wing | 0.237 | 0.062 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.086 | 0.112 | 0.445 |
| Strong Leader | 0.171 | 0.087 | 0.050 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.126 | 0.103 | 0.220 |
| Northern Cyprus | 0.968 | 0.195 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -2.025 | 0.204 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2] Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2] Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2] Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2] Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2] Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2] Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared= 0

- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 1.67
 Prob > chi2 = 1.000

Chi-squared Chow-test for equality of the coefficients of Protestant and Orthodox denomination separately, between M1 and M2 (after visual inspection):

. test [M1]leader2 - [M2]leader2 = 0

(1) [M1]leader2 - [M2]leader2 = 0

chi2(1) = 0.94
 Prob > chi2 = 0.3319

Conclusion: Northern Cyprus does not make a difference for the model coefficients and is therefore not an influential case. None of the outliers make a statistically significant difference to the model coefficients. They are not influential cases.

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries that are potential influential cases (Iceland, Northern Ireland, Northern Cyprus), Simultaneous Regression Models:

Is Iceland an influential case?

Table I: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : Model not including Dummy Iceland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| ‘Would not like as neighbours: people of a different Race’ | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.109 | 0.146 | 0.454 |
| Protestant | -0.578 | 0.153 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.275 | 0.190 | 0.150 |
| Muslim | 0.821 | 0.175 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | -0.352 | 0.239 | 0.140 |
| Church attendance | 0.030 | 0.016 | 0.057 |
| Importance of religion | 0.073 | 0.041 | 0.076 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.113 | 0.080 | 0.159 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.245 | 0.075 | 0.001 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.084 | 0.057 | 0.138 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.312 | 0.064 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.254 | 0.058 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.014 | 0.067 | 0.826 |
| Sex: Female | -0.103 | 0.036 | 0.005 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.079 | 0.057 | 0.164 |
| Age | -0.013 | 0.005 | 0.015 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Anomy | 0.057 | 0.013 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.296 | 0.079 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don’t know | -0.022 | 0.122 | 0.854 |
| Strong Leader | 0.207 | 0.085 | 0.016 |
| Leader Don’t Know | 0.206 | 0.093 | 0.028 |
| Constant | -2.355 | 0.196 | 0.000 |

Table J: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Iceland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Would not like as neighbours: people of a different Race' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.112 | 0.146 | 0.440 |
| Protestant | -0.506 | 0.135 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.270 | 0.190 | 0.157 |
| Muslim | 0.813 | 0.175 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | -0.350 | 0.239 | 0.144 |
| Church attendance | 0.029 | 0.016 | 0.070 |
| Importance of religion | 0.075 | 0.041 | 0.066 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.109 | 0.080 | 0.173 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.245 | 0.075 | 0.001 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.082 | 0.057 | 0.151 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.309 | 0.064 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.254 | 0.058 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.017 | 0.067 | 0.794 |
| Sex: Female | -0.105 | 0.036 | 0.004 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.079 | 0.057 | 0.164 |
| Age | -0.013 | 0.005 | 0.014 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Anomy | 0.056 | 0.013 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.296 | 0.080 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | -0.025 | 0.122 | 0.838 |
| Strong Leader | 0.203 | 0.085 | 0.017 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.201 | 0.093 | 0.030 |
| Iceland | -1.798 | 0.122 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -2.344 | 0.196 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common

- (1) [M1] Catholic - [M2] Catholic = 0
 - (2) [M1] Protestant - [M2] Protestant = 0
 - (3) [M1] Orthodox - [M2] Orthodox = 0
 - (4) [M1] Muslim - [M2] Muslim = 0
 - (5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
 - (6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2] Church Attendance = 0
 - (7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2] Importance of Religion= 0
 - (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
 - (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
 - (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
 - (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
 - (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
 - (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
 - (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
 - (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
 - (16) [M1] age - [M2] age = 0
 - (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared= 0
 - (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy= 0
 - (19) [M1] right-wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
 - (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
 - (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
 - (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.
- test [M1 = M2], common

chi2(26)= 1.70

Prob > chi2 = 1.000

Conclusion:

Iceland does not make a significant difference to the model coefficients. It can therefore be concluded that Iceland is not an influential case.

Is Northern Ireland an influential case?

Table K: SUEST Model Part 1:

| M2: Model not including Dummy Northern Ireland | Coef. | Robust S. E. | P>z |
|--|--------------|---------------------|---------------|
| 'Would not like as neighbours: people of a different Race' | | | |
| Catholic | -.109 | .146 | .454 |
| Protestant | -.578 | .153 | .000 |
| Orthodox | .275 | .190 | .150 |
| Muslim | .821 | .175 | .000 |
| Other Denomination | -.352 | .239 | .140 |
| Church attendance | .030 | .016 | .057 |
| Importance of religion | .073 | .041 | .076 |
| Belief: personal God | -.113 | .080 | .159 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -.245 | .075 | .001 |
| Individualised religiosity | -.084 | .057 | .138 |
| Fundamentalism | .312 | .064 | .000 |
| Tertiary Education | -.254 | .058 | .000 |
| Volunteering | -.014 | .067 | .826 |
| Sex: Female | -.103 | .036 | .005 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | .079 | .057 | .164 |
| Age | -.013 | .005 | .015 |
| Age squared | .000 | .000 | .002 |
| Anomy | .057 | .013 | .000 |
| Right-Wing | .296 | .079 | .000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | -.022 | .122 | .854 |
| Strong Leader | .206 | .085 | .016 |
| Leader Don't Know | .206 | .093 | .028 |
| Constant | -2.35 | .196 | .000 |

Table L: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Northern Ireland | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|--|--------|-------------|------|
| 'Would not like as neighbours: people of a different Race' | | | |
| Catholic | -.111 | .145 | .445 |
| Protestant | -.570 | .154 | .000 |
| Orthodox | .269 | .190 | .158 |
| Muslim | .815 | .175 | .000 |
| Other Denomination | -.350 | .239 | .143 |
| Church attendance | .031 | .016 | .052 |
| Importance of religion | .073 | .041 | .076 |
| Belief: personal God | -.111 | .080 | .167 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -.246 | .075 | .001 |
| Individualised religiosity | -.082 | .057 | .148 |
| Fundamentalism | .312 | .064 | .000 |
| Tertiary Education | -.255 | .058 | .000 |
| Volunteering | -.016 | .067 | .810 |
| Sex: Female | -.103 | .036 | .005 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | .080 | .057 | .159 |
| Age | -.013 | .005 | .015 |
| Age squared | .000 | .000 | .002 |
| Anomy | .057 | .013 | .000 |
| Right-Wing | .295 | .080 | .000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | -.022 | .122 | .852 |
| Strong Leader | .207 | .085 | .015 |
| Leader Don't Know | .210 | .094 | .025 |
| Northern Ireland | -.512 | .100 | .000 |
| Constant | -2.356 | .196 | .000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion = 0
- (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female = 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2] age squared = 0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 1.07
 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000

Conclusion: Northern Ireland does not make a significant difference for the model coefficients. Thus, Northern Ireland is not an influential case.

Is Northern Cyprus an influential case?

Table M: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : Model not including Dummy Northern Cyprus | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|--|--------|-------------|------|
| 'Would not like as neighbours: people of a different Race' | | | |
| Catholic | -.109 | .146 | .454 |
| Protestant | -.578 | .154 | .000 |
| Orthodox | .275 | .191 | .150 |
| Muslim | .821 | .176 | .000 |
| Other Denomination | -.352 | .239 | .140 |
| Church attendance | .031 | .016 | .057 |
| Importance of religion | .074 | .041 | .076 |
| Belief: personal God | -.113 | .080 | .159 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -.246 | .076 | .001 |
| Individualised religiosity | -.085 | .057 | .138 |
| Fundamentalism | .313 | .064 | .000 |
| Tertiary Education | -.254 | .059 | .000 |
| Volunteering | -.015 | .068 | .826 |
| Sex: Female | -.104 | .037 | .005 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | .080 | .057 | .164 |
| Age | -.013 | .006 | .015 |
| Age squared | .000 | .000 | .002 |
| Anomy | .058 | .013 | .000 |
| Right-Wing | .297 | .080 | .000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | -.023 | .123 | .854 |
| Strong Leader | .207 | .086 | .016 |
| Leader Don't Know | .206 | .094 | .028 |
| Constant | -2.356 | .197 | .000 |

Table N: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Northern Cyprus | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|--|--------|-------------|------|
| 'Would not like as neighbours: people of a different Race' | | | |
| Catholic | -.113 | .146 | .439 |
| Protestant | -.581 | .154 | .000 |
| Orthodox | .277 | .191 | .148 |
| Muslim | .755 | .175 | .000 |
| Other Denomination | -.355 | .239 | .137 |
| Church attendance | .035 | .016 | .030 |
| Importance of religion | .074 | .042 | .079 |
| Belief: personal God | -.124 | .078 | .113 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -.243 | .076 | .001 |
| Individualised religiosity | -.097 | .055 | .077 |
| Fundamentalism | .318 | .065 | .000 |
| Tertiary Education | -.255 | .059 | .000 |
| Volunteering | -.016 | .068 | .814 |
| Sex: Female | -.099 | .038 | .009 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | .077 | .059 | .187 |
| Age | -.013 | .006 | .021 |
| Age squared | .000 | .000 | .003 |
| Anomy | .058 | .013 | .000 |
| Right-Wing | .293 | .080 | .000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | -.022 | .119 | .856 |
| Strong Leader | .193 | .085 | .023 |
| Leader Don't Know | .202 | .092 | .029 |
| Northern Cyprus | .069 | .153 | .000 |
| Constant | -2.368 | .199 | .000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common.

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1]tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1]volunteering - [M2]volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1]sex female - [M2]sex female= 0
- (15) [M1]unemployment - [M2]unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1]age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1]age squared- [M2]age squared= 0

- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right-wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 2.03
Prob > chi2 = 1.0000

. test [M1]leader2 - [M2]leader2 = 0

(1) [M1]leader2 - [M2]leader2 = 0

chi2(1) = 0.94
Prob > chi2 = 0.3319

Conclusion: Northern Cyprus has no significant impact on the model coefficients and is therefore not an influential case.

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries that are potential influential cases (Iceland, Northern Ireland, Northern Cyprus), Simultaneous Regression Models:

Is Iceland an influential case?

Table O: SUEST Model Part 1:

| M1 : Model not including Dummy Iceland | | | |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.429 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
| Protestant | -1.491 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 1.133 | 0.042 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.469 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | 0.107 | 0.095 | 0.261 |
| Church attendance | 0.159 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.302 | 0.016 | 0.000 |
| Belief: personal God | 0.207 | 0.040 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.150 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.314 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.646 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.401 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.477 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Sex: Female | -0.706 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.340 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.830 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.068 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.454 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.647 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Strong Leader | 0.723 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.475 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| Constant | 3.831 | 0.111 | 0.000 |

Table P: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Iceland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.442 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
| Protestant | -1.296 | 0.050 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 1.113 | 0.042 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.438 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | 0.113 | 0.095 | 0.236 |
| Church attendance | 0.152 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.314 | 0.016 | 0.000 |
| Belief: personal God | 0.222 | 0.039 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.149 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.301 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.631 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.400 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.488 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Sex: Female | -0.714 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.339 | 0.027 | 0.000 |
| Age | 0.000 | 0.004 | 0.926 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.064 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.453 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.632 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Strong Leader | 0.712 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.458 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| Iceland | -2.341 | 0.099 | 0.000 |
| Constant | 3.869 | 0.111 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common.

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1]tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2]volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared= 0

- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
 (19) [M1] right-wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
 (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
 (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
 (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 335.15
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Conclusion: Including Iceland does make a statistically significant difference to the model coefficients. Therefore, Iceland is an influential case when 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' is the outcome.

Is Northern Ireland an influential case?

Table Q: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : Model not including Dummy Northern Ireland | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.429 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
| Protestant | -1.491 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 1.133 | 0.042 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.469 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | 0.107 | 0.095 | 0.261 |
| Church attendance | 0.159 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.302 | 0.016 | 0.000 |
| Belief: personal God | 0.207 | 0.040 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.150 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.314 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.646 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.401 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.477 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Sex: Female | -0.706 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.340 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.830 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.068 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.454 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.647 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Strong Leader | 0.723 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.475 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| _cons | 3.831 | 0.111 | 0.000 |
| | | | |

Table R: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Northern Ireland | | | |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.428 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
| Protestant | -1.492 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 1.134 | 0.042 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.470 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | 0.107 | 0.095 | 0.262 |
| Church attendance | 0.159 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.302 | 0.016 | 0.000 |
| Belief: personal God | 0.207 | 0.040 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.150 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.314 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.646 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.401 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.477 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Sex: Female | -0.706 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.339 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.830 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.068 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.454 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.647 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Strong Leader | 0.723 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.474 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| Norirl | 0.078 | 0.143 | 0.586 |
| _cons | 3.831 | 0.111 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common.

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1]tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2]volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared=0

- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
 (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
 (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
 (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
 (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 0.40

Prob > chi2 = 1.0000

(=> this means that Northern Ireland does not affect my fixed effects estimates).

Is Northern Cyprus an influential case?

Table S: SUEST Model Part 1:

| M1 : Model not including Dummy Northern Cyprus | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | | | |
| Catholic | -0.429 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
| Protestant | -1.491 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 1.133 | 0.042 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.469 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | 0.107 | 0.095 | 0.261 |
| Church attendance | 0.159 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.302 | 0.016 | 0.000 |
| Belief: personal God | 0.207 | 0.040 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.150 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.314 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.646 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.401 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.477 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Sex: Female | -0.706 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.340 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.830 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.068 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.454 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.647 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Strong Leader | 0.723 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.475 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| Constant | 3.831 | 0.111 | 0.000 |

Table T: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Northern Cyprus | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | | | |
| Catholic | -0.428 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
| Protestant | -1.490 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 1.132 | 0.042 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.509 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Other Denomination | 0.108 | 0.095 | 0.256 |
| Church attendance | 0.158 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.302 | 0.016 | 0.000 |
| Belief: personal God | 0.211 | 0.040 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.151 | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.309 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.644 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.401 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.476 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Sex: Female | -0.708 | 0.025 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.341 | 0.028 | 0.000 |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.865 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.068 | 0.005 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.456 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.646 | 0.032 | 0.000 |
| Strong Leader | 0.729 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.477 | 0.046 | 0.000 |
| Northern Cyprus | -0.709 | 0.115 | 0.000 |
| Constant | 3.836 | 0.111 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common.

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1]tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2]volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared=0

- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
 (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
 (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
 (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
 (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(26) = 39.99

Prob > chi2 = 0.0391

Conclusion: Northern Cyprus does make a significant difference to the model coefficients and is therefore an influential case, when 'homosexuality is nevr justifiable' is the outcome.

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries that are potential influential cases (Iceland, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey), Simultaneous Regression Models:

Table U: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : Model not including Dummy Iceland | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| ‘Would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ | | | |
| Catholic | -0.288 | 0.198 | 0.146 |
| Protestant | -0.967 | 0.207 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.716 | 0.200 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.256 | 0.395 | 0.001 |
| Church attendance | 0.064 | 0.021 | 0.002 |
| Importance of religion | 0.103 | 0.050 | 0.041 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.019 | 0.091 | 0.837 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.139 | 0.054 | 0.011 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.158 | 0.073 | 0.030 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.360 | 0.097 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.044 | 0.088 | 0.619 |
| Volunteering | -0.197 | 0.065 | 0.003 |
| Sex: Female | -0.291 | 0.050 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.325 | 0.088 | 0.000 |
| Age | -0.005 | 0.006 | 0.396 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.049 |
| Anomy | 0.045 | 0.023 | 0.054 |
| Right-Wing | 0.289 | 0.059 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.288 | 0.133 | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | 0.344 | 0.120 | 0.004 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.234 | 0.098 | 0.016 |
| Constant | -1.651 | 0.296 | 0.000 |

Table V: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Iceland | Coef. | Robust SE | P>z |
|---|--------|-----------|-------|
| ‘Would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ | | | |
| Catholic | -0.294 | 0.198 | 0.138 |
| Protestant | -0.878 | 0.192 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.708 | 0.201 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.244 | 0.395 | 0.002 |
| Church attendance | 0.062 | 0.020 | 0.003 |
| Importance of religion | 0.106 | 0.050 | 0.034 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.013 | 0.092 | 0.884 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.139 | 0.054 | 0.011 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.154 | 0.073 | 0.034 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.355 | 0.096 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.044 | 0.088 | 0.622 |
| Volunteering | -0.201 | 0.065 | 0.002 |
| Sex: Female | -0.295 | 0.050 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.325 | 0.088 | 0.000 |
| Age | -0.005 | 0.006 | 0.381 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.050 |
| Anomy | 0.044 | 0.023 | 0.060 |
| Right-Wing | 0.290 | 0.060 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.283 | 0.133 | 0.033 |
| Strong Leader | 0.341 | 0.120 | 0.004 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.229 | 0.098 | 0.019 |
| Iceland | -2.688 | 0.155 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -1.635 | 0.297 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 = M2], common.

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion = 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female = 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared= 0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

$$\chi^2(25) = 2.11$$

$$\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 1.000$$

Conclusion: Including Iceland does not significantly change the model coefficients. Thus, Iceland is not an influential case.

Are Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey influential cases?

Table W: SUEST Model Part 1:

| M1 : Model not including Dummy Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| 'Would not like as neighbours: homosexuals' | | | |
| Catholic | -0.288 | 0.198 | 0.146 |
| Protestant | -0.967 | 0.207 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.716 | 0.200 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.256 | 0.395 | 0.001 |
| Church attendance | 0.064 | 0.021 | 0.002 |
| Importance of religion | 0.103 | 0.050 | 0.041 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.019 | 0.091 | 0.837 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.139 | 0.054 | 0.011 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.158 | 0.073 | 0.030 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.360 | 0.097 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.044 | 0.088 | 0.619 |
| Volunteering | -0.197 | 0.065 | 0.003 |
| Sex: Female | -0.291 | 0.050 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.325 | 0.088 | 0.000 |
| Age | -0.005 | 0.006 | 0.396 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.049 |
| Anomy | 0.045 | 0.023 | 0.054 |
| Right-Wing | 0.289 | 0.059 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.288 | 0.133 | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | 0.344 | 0.120 | 0.004 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.234 | 0.098 | 0.016 |
| Constant | -1.651 | 0.296 | 0.000 |

Table X: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: Model including Dummy Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| ‘Would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ | | | |
| Catholic | -0.230 | 0.194 | 0.235 |
| Protestant | -0.913 | 0.202 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.682 | 0.172 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 0.501 | 0.174 | 0.004 |
| Church attendance | 0.091 | 0.022 | 0.000 |
| Importance of religion | 0.065 | 0.044 | 0.137 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.095 | 0.079 | 0.228 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.116 | 0.054 | 0.031 |
| Individualised religiosity | -0.160 | 0.057 | 0.005 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.176 | 0.079 | 0.026 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.145 | 0.070 | 0.039 |
| Volunteering | -0.178 | 0.068 | 0.009 |
| Sex: Female | -0.308 | 0.049 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.311 | 0.074 | 0.000 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.508 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.035 |
| Anomy | 0.028 | 0.018 | 0.129 |
| Right-Wing | 0.310 | 0.052 | 0.000 |
| Right Wing Don't know | 0.371 | 0.112 | 0.001 |
| Strong Leader | 0.387 | 0.108 | 0.000 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.191 | 0.097 | 0.048 |
| Dummy Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey | 2.344 | 0.348 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -1.704 | 0.221 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common.

- (1) [M1] Catholic - [M2] Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1] Protestant - [M2] Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1] Orthodox - [M2] Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1] Muslim - [M2] Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2] Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2] Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2] age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared=0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy= 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0

- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(25) = 229.76
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Conclusion: The Cluster Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey does have a statistically significant effect on the model coefficients. Therefore, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have to be treated as influential cases.

Appendix C: Tests for Question Format Effect Bias of the Outcome Variables

Tests for potential bias of model estimates for the outcome variables ‘would not like as neighbours: immigrants’ ‘would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’, ‘would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ due to a possible Measurement Effect/ Question Format Effect in the Outcome Variables:

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries with a suspected change in the question format of the Item-Battery v46 to v60 in the EVS -2010-data. The countries with the suspected measurement effect are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Spain, Switzerland.
Simultaneous Regression Models:

Table A: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI: not including Dummy of Group with Question-Format Change | | | |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV ‘Would not like as neighbours: Immigrants’ | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.145 | 0.149 | 0.331 |
| Protestant | -0.313 | 0.171 | 0.067 |
| Orthodox | 0.176 | 0.136 | 0.196 |
| Muslim | 0.652 | 0.182 | 0.000 |
| Church Attendance | 0.026 | 0.017 | 0.132 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.007 | 0.044 | 0.868 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.080 | 0.076 | 0.290 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.198 | 0.073 | 0.007 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.099 | 0.036 | 0.006 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.269 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.131 | 0.059 | 0.028 |
| Volunteering | -0.116 | 0.068 | 0.087 |
| Sex: Female | -0.079 | 0.036 | 0.027 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.010 | 0.064 | 0.874 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.004 | 0.438 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.283 |
| Anomy | 0.043 | 0.015 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.244 | 0.063 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing Don’t Know | 0.083 | 0.115 | 0.470 |
| Strong Leader | 0.181 | 0.087 | 0.038 |
| Leader Don’t Know | 0.128 | 0.103 | 0.216 |
| Constant | -2.034 | 0.209 | 0.000 |

Table B: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: including Dummy of Group with Question-Format Change | | | |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV 'Would not like as neighbours: Immigrants' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.101 | 0.154 | 0.513 |
| Protestant | -0.143 | 0.139 | 0.303 |
| Orthodox | 0.067 | 0.130 | 0.603 |
| Muslim | 0.560 | 0.179 | 0.002 |
| Church Attendance | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.411 |
| Importance of Religion | -0.007 | 0.042 | 0.866 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.107 | 0.074 | 0.153 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.240 | 0.071 | 0.001 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.091 | 0.034 | 0.008 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.259 | 0.055 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.118 | 0.063 | 0.061 |
| Volunteering | -0.116 | 0.064 | 0.070 |
| Sex: Female | -0.077 | 0.034 | 0.022 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.002 | 0.064 | 0.966 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.448 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.236 |
| Anomy | 0.042 | 0.014 | 0.004 |
| Right-Wing | 0.223 | 0.059 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | 0.028 | 0.105 | 0.783 |
| Strong Leader | 0.161 | 0.091 | 0.077 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.095 | 0.108 | 0.382 |
| Dummy: Groups of Countries with suspected change in Question Format | -0.786 | 0.293 | 0.007 |
| Constant | -1.759 | 0.194 | 0.000 |

Stata Chow-Test Output: Chi-squared test for equality of the models coefficients between M1 and M2: Test [M1 =M2], common.

- (1) [M1] Catholic - [M2] Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1] Protestant - [M2] Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1] Orthodox - [M2] Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1] Muslim - [M2] Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2] Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2] Importance of Religion = 0
- (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female = 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2] age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared - [M2] age squared = 0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

chi2(25) = 18.23
Prob > chi2 = 0.8323

Chow Tests of between-model differences of single coefficients:

- (1) [M 1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
chi2(1) = 2.22
Prob > chi2 = 0.1365
- (1) [M 1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
chi2(1) = 4.30
Prob > chi2 = 0.0381
- (1) [M 1]church attendance - [M2]church attendance = 0
chi2(1) = 2.98
Prob > chi2 = 0.0845
- (1) [M 1]importance of religion - [M2]importance of religion = 0
chi2(1) = 2.75
Prob > chi2 = 0.0972
- (1) [M 1]belief: personal God- [M2]belief: personal God= 0
chi2(1) = 1.48
Prob > chi2 = 0.2243
- (1) [M 1]belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
chi2(1) = 4.03
Prob > chi2 = 0.0447
- (1) [M 1_b]tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
chi2(1) = 0.51
Prob > chi2 = 0.4760
- . test [M 1] strong leader - [M2]strong leader2 = 0
- (1) [M 1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
chi2(1) = 0.80
Prob > chi2 = 0.3715

Conclusion: Including the Dummy for the Question-Format Change does not significantly change the overall model. However, including the dummy decreases the effect of orthodox affiliation significantly and the effect of belief in a spirit/life force is increased slightly by the error-term (Outcome: v54). This result might be due to the fact that the error-dummy captures ten non-Orthodox countries, of which eight lie in Western Europe. When looking at the coefficients for Orthodox in both Suest models, it is clear that Orthodox does not have a statistically significant effect on intolerance towards immigrants. This does not

change when including the ‘measurement effect/format change’ dummy. As to belief in a Spirit/Life Force, although the measurement effect dummy does affect the coefficient, its effect remains strongly statistically significantly positive in both models.

Thus, although there likely is a significant measurement effect, it does not change the results of the analysis.

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries with a suspected change in the Question Format of the Item- Battery v46 to v60 in the EVS -2010-data, Simultaneous Regression Models

Table C: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : not including Dummy of Group with Question-Format Change | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV ‘Would not like as neighbours: People of a different Race’ | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.065 | 0.143 | 0.651 |
| Protestant | -0.542 | 0.155 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.321 | 0.176 | 0.068 |
| Muslim | 0.870 | 0.179 | 0.000 |
| Church Attendance | 0.029 | 0.016 | 0.073 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.069 | 0.042 | 0.101 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.121 | 0.081 | 0.133 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.252 | 0.075 | 0.001 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.087 | 0.058 | 0.130 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.311 | 0.064 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.255 | 0.059 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.017 | 0.068 | 0.803 |
| Sex: Female | -0.103 | 0.037 | 0.006 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.079 | 0.057 | 0.166 |
| Age | -0.013 | 0.006 | 0.016 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Anomy | 0.058 | 0.013 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.299 | 0.081 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing Don’t Know | -0.024 | 0.123 | 0.846 |
| Strong Leader | 0.206 | 0.086 | 0.016 |
| Leader Don’t Know | 0.204 | 0.093 | 0.029 |
| Constant | -2.372 | 0.202 | 0.000 |

Both models are Binary Logistic Regression Models with robust standard errors.

Table D: SUEST Model Part 2:

| M2: including Dummy of Group with Question-Format Change | | | |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV 'Would not like as neighbours: People of a different Race' | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.012 | 0.140 | 0.932 |
| Protestant | -0.329 | 0.131 | 0.012 |
| Orthodox | 0.188 | 0.165 | 0.255 |
| Muslim | 0.758 | 0.171 | 0.000 |
| Church Attendance | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.351 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.051 | 0.041 | 0.214 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.155 | 0.080 | 0.051 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.305 | 0.073 | 0.000 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.078 | 0.057 | 0.170 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.300 | 0.063 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.240 | 0.060 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.016 | 0.064 | 0.806 |
| Sex: Female | -0.101 | 0.035 | 0.004 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.071 | 0.057 | 0.209 |
| Age | -0.014 | 0.006 | 0.014 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Anomy | 0.057 | 0.013 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.277 | 0.078 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | -0.085 | 0.115 | 0.463 |
| Strong Leader | 0.185 | 0.087 | 0.034 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.167 | 0.095 | 0.079 |
| Dummy: Groups of Countries with suspected change in Question Format | -1.057 | 0.214 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -2.036 | 0.171 | 0.000 |

SUEST Chow-Tests for significant differences in the Model Coefficients between M1 and M2: Test of Differences between the two Models as a whole:

test [M1=M2] , common

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1]Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1]other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1]Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1]Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1]Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1]Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1]tertiaryeducation - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2]volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0

- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared= 0
- (18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy= 0
- (19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
- (20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
- (21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
- (22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.

$$\text{chi2}(25) = 18.70$$

$$\text{Prob} > \text{chi2} = 0.8115$$

Chow-Tests of coefficients separately (those that are different in the model upon visual inspection):

- (1) [M1]Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
 $\text{chi2}(1) = 0.81$
 $\text{Prob} > \text{chi2} = 0.3677$
- (1) [M1]Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
 $\text{chi2}(1) = 2.63$
 $\text{Prob} > \text{chi2} = 0.1050$
- (1) [M1]Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0**
 $\text{chi2}(1) = 5.65$
 $\text{Prob} > \text{chi2} = 0.0174$
- (1) [M1]church attendance - [M2]church attendance= 0**
 $\text{chi2}(1) = 4.43$
 $\text{Prob} > \text{chi2} = 0.0354$
- (1) [M1]belief: personal God - [M2]belief: personal God = 0
 $\text{chi2}(1) = 1.77$
 $\text{Prob} > \text{chi2} = 0.1836$

Conclusion: Including the measurement-effect-dummy does not significantly influence the overall model. However, the coefficients of Orthodox denomination and church attendance change significantly. But when looking at the coefficients it becomes clear that only for Orthodox denomination is this change large enough to possibly change the model interpretation. The coefficient of church attendance is not statistically significant in the main model and it does not gain statistical significance by including the measurement-effect dummy. The result for Orthodox is not surprising given that the measurement-effect-dummy contains ten non-Orthodox countries, eight of which are Western European. It is possible that the effect of Orthodox denomination is slightly enhanced by the measurement effect. In any case, this effect is relatively small and does not affect the overall interpretation of the model.

SUEST – Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of the Random Intercept Model for ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’ as the Outcome and the same model including a Dummy capturing the Group of Countries with a suspected change in the Question Format of the Item-Battery v46 to v60 in the EVS -2010-data, Simultaneous Regression Models

Table E: SUEST Model Part 1:

| MI : not including Dummy of Group with Question-Format Change | | | |
|--|--------|-------------|-------|
| DV ‘Would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals | Coef. | Robust S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.288 | 0.198 | 0.146 |
| Protestant | -0.967 | 0.207 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.716 | 0.200 | 0.000 |
| Muslim | 1.256 | 0.395 | 0.001 |
| Church Attendance | 0.064 | 0.021 | 0.002 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.103 | 0.050 | 0.041 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.019 | 0.091 | 0.837 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.139 | 0.054 | 0.011 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.158 | 0.073 | 0.030 |
| Fundamentalis m | 0.360 | 0.097 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.044 | 0.088 | 0.619 |
| Volunteering | -0.197 | 0.065 | 0.003 |
| Sex: Female | -0.291 | 0.050 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.325 | 0.088 | 0.000 |
| Age | -0.005 | 0.006 | 0.396 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.049 |
| Anomy | 0.045 | 0.023 | 0.054 |
| Right-Wing | 0.289 | 0.059 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing Don’t Know | 0.288 | 0.133 | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | 0.344 | 0.120 | 0.004 |
| Leader Don’t Know | 0.234 | 0.098 | 0.016 |
| Constant | -1.651 | 0.296 | 0.000 |

Both models are Binary Logistic Regression Models with robust standard errors.

Table F: Model Part 2:

| M2: including Dummy of Group with Question-Format Change | | | |
|---|--------|-------|-------|
| DV 'Would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals | Coef. | S.E. | P>z |
| Catholic | -0.239 | 0.200 | 0.232 |
| Protestant | -0.823 | 0.184 | 0.000 |
| Orthodox | 0.608 | 0.207 | 0.003 |
| Muslim | 1.166 | 0.393 | 0.003 |
| Church Attendance | 0.049 | 0.020 | 0.012 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.087 | 0.048 | 0.071 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.040 | 0.090 | 0.659 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.178 | 0.053 | 0.001 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.150 | 0.073 | 0.040 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.350 | 0.095 | 0.000 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.027 | 0.091 | 0.771 |
| Volunteering | -0.195 | 0.063 | 0.002 |
| Sex: Female | -0.290 | 0.048 | 0.000 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.320 | 0.086 | 0.000 |
| Age | -0.005 | 0.006 | 0.373 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.038 |
| Anomy | 0.045 | 0.023 | 0.051 |
| Right-Wing | 0.271 | 0.060 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | 0.234 | 0.141 | 0.098 |
| Strong Leader | 0.331 | 0.125 | 0.008 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.208 | 0.111 | 0.060 |
| Dummy: Groups of Countries with suspected change in Question Format | -0.726 | 0.463 | 0.117 |
| constant | -1.379 | 0.305 | 0.000 |

SUEST Chow-Tests for significant differences in the Model Coefficients between M1 and M2:

Test of Differences between the two Models as a whole:

test [M1=M2] , common

- (1) [M1] Catholic - [M2]Catholic = 0
- (2) [M1] Protestant - [M2]Protestant = 0
- (3) [M1] Orthodox - [M2]Orthodox = 0
- (4) [M1] Muslim - [M2]Muslim = 0
- (5) [M1] other Denomination - [M2] other Denomination = 0
- (6) [M1] Church attendance - [M2]Church Attendance = 0
- (7) [M1] Importance of Religion - [M2]Importance of Religion= 0
- (8) [M1] Belief: Personal God - [M2] Belief: Personal God = 0
- (9) [M1] Belief: Spirit/Life Force - [M2] Belief: Spirit/Life Force = 0
- (10) [M1] individualised religiosity - [M2] individualised religiosity = 0
- (11) [M1] fundamentalism - [M2] fundamentalism = 0
- (12) [M1] tertiary education - [M2] tertiary education = 0
- (13) [M1] volunteering - [M2] volunteering = 0
- (14) [M1] sex female - [M2] sex female= 0
- (15) [M1] unemployment - [M2] unemployment = 0
- (16) [M1] age - [M2]age = 0
- (17) [M1] age squared- [M2]age squared= 0

```

(18) [M1] anomy - [M2] anomy = 0
(19) [M1] right -wing - [M2] right-wing = 0
(20) [M1] right-wing don't know - [M2] right-wing don't know = 0
(21) [M1] strong leader - [M2] strong leader = 0
(22) [M1] leader don't know - [M2] leader don't know = 0.
      chi2( 25) = 15.09
      Prob > chi2 = 0.9393

```

Test of coefficients separately (those that are different in the model upon visual inspection):

```

. test [M1]v109_a - [M2]v109_a = 0
( 1) [M1]v109_a - [M2]v109_a = 0
      chi2( 1) = 1.86
      Prob > chi2 = 0.1727

```

```

. test [M1]v6_a - [M2]v6_a = 0
( 1) [M1]v6_a - [M2]v6_a = 0
      chi2( 1) = 2.42
      Prob > chi2 = 0.1199

```

```

. test [M1]v132_b - [M2]v132_b = 0
( 1) [M1]v132_b - [M2]v132_b = 0
      chi2( 1) = 0.85
      Prob > chi2 = 0.3564

```

```

. test [M1]v125_a - [M2]v125_a = 0
( 1) [M1]v125_a - [M2]v125_a = 0
      chi2( 1) = 1.85
      Prob > chi2 = 0.1741

```

```

. test [M1]v126_a - [M2]v126_a = 0
( 1) [M1]v126_a - [M2]v126_a = 0
      chi2( 1) = 0.47
      Prob > chi2 = 0.4951

```

```

( 1) [M1]edu_high - [M2]edu_high = 0
      chi2( 1) = 1.00
      Prob > chi2 = 0.3181

```

```

( 1) [M1]v65_a - [M2]v65_a = 0
      chi2( 1) = 0.00
      Prob > chi2 = 0.9841

```

Conclusion: The dummy capturing the potential measurement effect does neither affect the model as a whole, nor does it affect separate coefficients within the model. It can therefore be concluded that the results of the analysis are not biased by the suspected change in question format.

Appendix D: Missing Data Analyses and Multiple Imputation Models

As a first step of the missing data analysis, binary logistic regression models are run with ‘missingness’ on the four outcome-variables (dependent variables) of the thesis as the outcomes of the missing data analysis. The models test for obvious patterns: whether the ‘missingness’ on the outcome variables is related to values of the independent variables.

Additional models also test, which variables in the models of interest (the main models of the analysis of this thesis) are related to ‘missingness’ on other variables in the models. Thirdly, binary logistic models are run to test to what extent the ‘missingness’ on the outcome variables is dependent on ‘missingness’ on variables measuring being right-wing and authoritarian attitudes in the models of interest. This is done because there is a known link between authoritarian attitudes and intolerance. If missingness on one explains the other, then this knowledge is helpful for the computation of auxiliary variables for the imputation models.

Table A contains the missing data models for the ethnic intolerance measures.

Table A: Missing data analysis for a) Moralistic Homophobia and b) intolerance towards homosexuals as a group as the outcomes (DV’s)

| | DV: ‘Missingness’ on ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’ | | DV: Missingness on ‘Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ | |
|---|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| ‘Would not like as neighbours:...’ ‘immigrants’ | | | -0.002 | 0.286 |
| ‘: people of a different race’ | 0.763 | 0.564 | | |
| ‘criminals’ | 0.335 | 0.495 | 0.419 | 0.213 |
| ‘heavy drinkers’ | -0.290 | 0.661 | 0.363 | 0.250 |
| ‘right-wing extremists’ | 0.548 | 0.615 | 0.463 | 0.190 |
| ‘people with large families’ | -0.794 | 0.790 | 0.673 | 0.222 |
| ‘Muslims/Christians’ | -0.586 | 0.566 | -0.449 | 0.248 |
| ‘Homosexuals’ | 1.065 | 0.496 | 0.179 | 0.242 |
| Other independent variables: | | | | |
| Right-wing | -1.429 | 1.026 | -0.101 | 0.223 |
| Strong Leader | -0.588 | 0.483 | -0.062 | 0.172 |
| ‘more respect for authority would be a good thing’ | -0.818 | 0.426 | -0.060 | 0.165 |
| ‘obedience is important’ | -0.491 | 0.510 | -0.273 | 0.192 |
| Low life satisfaction | -0.102 | 0.105 | -0.297 | 0.269 |
| Low income | 0.353 | 0.490 | -0.070 | 0.189 |
| Low health | -0.136 | 0.759 | 0.236 | 0.237 |
| Tertiary education | 0.346 | 0.463 | 0.412 | 0.223 |
| Generalised Distrust | 0.594 | 0.528 | 0.089 | 0.199 |
| Anomy | -0.014 | 0.092 | -0.020 | 0.035 |
| Church attendance | 0.199 | 0.122 | 0.144 | 0.049 |
| Belief: personal God | -0.493 | 0.467 | 0.080 | 0.185 |
| Sex: female | | | 0.012 | 0.016 |

| | | | | |
|----------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Constant | -8.610 | 0.928 | -6.947 | 0.355 |
| N | 56606 | | 56606 | |

The missing data analysis of table A shows that the ‘missingness’ on the outcome variables is unrelated to values on similar variables: ‘missingness’ on ‘would not like...: immigrants’ is unrelated to ‘would not like...: people of a different race’ and vice versa. If racial intolerance had been a predictor of ‘missingness’ on intolerance towards immigrants, then this would have been a strong reason to doubt that MAR can be assumed. Also, missingness on the two outcomes is unrelated to other variables of the same battery of items. Therefore, multiple imputation of the missing values can be carried out. Note that ‘would not like: left-wing extremists’ was left out, because of multicollinearity with ‘would not like: right-wing extremists’.

When fewer variables are included in the models, traditional religiosity, being right-wing, authoritarian attitudes are predictors of the ‘missingness’ on the outcome. Furthermore, anomy, low income and generalised distrust in other people are predictors of ‘missingness’ on the outcomes and are thus included in the imputation models as auxiliary variables.

Table B: Missing data analysis for ethnic intolerance as the outcome

| | DV: ‘missingness’ on ‘Would not like as neighbours: immigrants’ | | DV: ‘missingness on ‘Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ | |
|---------------------------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Right-wing | -0.054 | 0.069 | -0.057 | 0.072 |
| Strong Leader | -0.252*** | 0.054 | -0.224*** | 0.056 |
| ‘Obedience is important’ | 0.205*** | 0.053 | 0.191*** | 0.055 |
| Church attendance | 0.049*** | 0.014 | 0.041** | 0.015 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.171** | 0.056 | -0.154** | 0.058 |
| Anomy | -0.012 | 0.011 | -0.014 | 0.012 |
| Dissatisfaction with Life | -0.000 | 0.089 | 0.061 | 0.091 |
| Low income | 0.030 | 0.054 | -0.086 | 0.059 |
| Low health | 0.217** | 0.079 | 0.065 | 0.086 |
| Sex: female | 0.058 | 0.049 | 0.048 | 0.051 |
| Tertiary education | -0.209*** | 0.060 | -0.199** | 0.062 |
| Generalised Distrust | -0.195*** | 0.052 | -0.240*** | 0.054 |
| Constant | -3.270*** | 0.080 | -3.257*** | 0.084 |
| N | 56606 | | 56606 | |

Table C: Missing data analysis for ethnic intolerance as the outcome, does ‘missingness’ on right-wing and authoritarian attitudes explain ‘missingness’ on the outcomes?

| | ‘Would not like as neighbours: Immigrants’ | | Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ | |
|---|--|-------|---|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| ‘Missingness’ on strong leader | 1.140 | 0.139 | 0.876 | 0.130 |
| ‘Missingness’ on ‘obedience is important’ | 1.419 | 0.074 | 1.535 | 0.067 |
| ‘Missingness’ on Right-wing | 0.584 | 0.088 | 0.423 | 0.170 |
| Dissatisfaction with life | -0.150 | 0.110 | 0.105 | 0.077 |
| Low income | -0.261 | 0.079 | -0.284 | 0.050 |
| Low health | -0.119 | 0.108 | 0.054 | 0.074 |
| Tertiary education | 0.083 | 0.070 | -0.123 | 0.053 |
| Generalised Distrust | -0.019 | 0.065 | -0.182 | 0.046 |
| Constant | -4.225 | 0.061 | -3.196 | 0.063 |

Table C demonstrates that ‘missingness’ on the outcome variables is not explained by ‘missingness’ on being right-wing and authoritarian attitudes.

Table D contains the missing data analysis for moralistic homophobia and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group as the outcomes. The table demonstrates clearly that MAR cannot be assumed, as ‘missingness’ on the both homophobia outcomes is related to values of the other homophobia variable. Also, missingness on ‘would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ is related to values of ‘homosexuals should not be allowed to adopt children’. If missingness on an outcome is related to values on a similar variable (homophobia), then it is very likely that the ‘missingness’- mechanism is driven by the outcome, thus MAR is violated.

Missingness on the two homophobia outcomes is also related to church attendance, and when ‘would not like... homosexuals’ is the outcome, to being right-wing, authoritarian attitudes (strong leader, ‘more respect for authority would be a good thing’) and several items of the intolerance-battery.

Table E contains additional tests of ‘missingness’ on the outcome and ‘missingness’ on ethnic intolerance measures and measures of being right-wing and authoritarian attitudes. Missingness on homophobia is related to missingness on ethnic intolerance and missingness on being right-wing and authoritarian attitudes. There is thus a strong pattern of related missingness within and between models. Thus, again, it can be concluded that it does not make sense to assume MAR for homophobia as the outcome.

Table D: Missing data analysis for a) Moralistic Homophobia and b) intolerance towards homosexuals as a group as the outcomes (DV's)

| | DV: 'Missingness' on 'Would not like as neighbours: Homosexuals' | | DV: 'Missingness' on 'Homosexualit y is never justifiable' | |
|---|---|--------------|---|--------------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| 'homosexuality is never justifiable' | -0.221* | 0.106 | | |
| 'homosexuals should not be allowed to adopt children' | -0.030 | 0.223 | 0.071*** | 0.020 |
| 'Would not like. As neighbours...' | | | | |
| 'homosexuals' | | | -0.646*** | 0.075 |
| 'criminals' | 0.724 | 0.869 | -0.014 | 0.060 |
| 'people of a different race' | -1.340 | 1.488 | -0.067 | 0.091 |
| 'heavy drinkers' | -0.146 | 0.808 | 0.230*** | 0.061 |
| 'right-wing extremists' | -1.021 | 0.889 | -0.097 | 0.059 |
| 'people with large families' | 0.556 | 1.060 | -0.356*** | 0.100 |
| 'immigrants' | 0.516 | 0.845 | 0.184* | 0.085 |
| 'drug addicts' | 0.471 | 0.688 | 0.026 | 0.067 |
| 'Jews' | 2.147*** | 0.540 | -0.107 | 0.096 |
| 'Gypsies' | -1.719 | 0.920 | 0.169** | 0.059 |
| 'Muslims/Christians' | 0.941* | 0.373 | 0.100 | 0.075 |
| Other independent variables: | | | | |
| Right-wing | -0.071 | 0.904 | -0.269*** | 0.081 |
| Strong Leader | 0.220 | 0.628 | -0.291*** | 0.060 |
| Church attendance | 0.433* | 0.204 | 0.043** | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.397 | 0.623 | 0.002 | 0.061 |
| 'Obedience is important' | 0.845 | 0.657 | -0.004 | 0.061 |
| Anomy | -0.237 | 0.153 | -0.001 | 0.012 |
| 'more respect for authority would be a good thing' | -1.151 | 0.611 | -0.202*** | 0.052 |
| Low income | 0.718 | 0.705 | 0.086 | 0.066 |
| Low health | 0.643 | 1.030 | 0.322*** | 0.083 |
| Sex: female | -0.212 | 0.649 | 0.013 | 0.053 |
| Tertiary education | 0.867 | 0.636 | -0.038 | 0.062 |
| Generalised Distrust | 1.374 | 1.168 | -0.142* | 0.058 |
| Constant | -9.753*** | 1.556 | -3.469*** | 0.114 |
| N | 43301 | | 50469 | |

Numbers in bold are statistically significant relationships between 'missingness' on an outcome variable (homophobia) and values of similar variables (also capturing homophobia) in the 'missingness'-model. These relationships are cause for concern. MAR cannot be assumed.

Table E: Missing data analysis for homophobia as the outcome, does ‘missingness’ on right-wing and authoritarian attitudes explain ‘missingness’ on the outcomes?

| | DV: ‘missingness’ on ‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’ | | DV: ‘missingness’ on ‘Would not like as neighbours: homosexuals’ | |
|--|---|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| ‘missingness on ‘Would not like as neighbours: immigrants’ | 0.638*** | 0.148 | 3.387*** | 0.095 |
| ‘missingness’ on ‘Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race’ | 0.335* | 0.158 | 2.643*** | 0.098 |
| ‘missingness’ on strong leader | 1.144*** | 0.107 | 0.308 | 0.315 |
| ‘missingness’ on right- wing | 0.583*** | 0.064 | 0.390** | 0.120 |
| Anomy | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.005 | 0.015 |
| Dissatisfaction with life | 0.127 | 0.067 | 0.152 | 0.133 |
| Low income | -0.083 | 0.044 | -0.297*** | 0.083 |
| Low health | 0.388*** | 0.060 | 0.358** | 0.117 |
| Sex: female | 0.103* | 0.041 | 0.268*** | 0.069 |
| Tertiary education | -0.051 | 0.049 | -0.201* | 0.079 |
| distrust | -0.163*** | 0.044 | -0.227*** | 0.069 |
| Constant | -3.161*** | 0.058 | -4.784*** | 0.094 |
| N | 64644 | | 64644 | |

Multiply Imputed Random Intercept Models:

For both ethnic intolerance variables, imputed models (across 40 imputed datasets) were computed using STATA's procedure mi (ice). Low income, low health, anomy, generalised distrust were included in the imputation models that simulate the imputed values as auxiliary variables. The auxiliary variables were of course not included in the imputed models. The imputed models are identical with the models of interest in chapter 8.

Table F: Imputed Model (40 Imputations) for 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' as the Outcome:

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| Multiple-imputation estimates | Imputations = | 40 |
| Mixed-effects logistic regression | Number of obs = | 67495 |
| Group variable: country1 | Number of groups = | 48 |
| | Obs per group: min = | 495 |
| | avg = | 1406.1 |
| Integration points = 7 | max = | 2327 |
| | Average RVI = | 0.0341 |
| | Largest FMI = | 0.1140 |
| DF adjustment: Large sample | DF: min = | 3032.78 |
| | avg = | 552238.11 |
| | max = | 1.15e+07 |
| Model F test: Equal FMI. | F(22,665213.2) = | 31.01, Prob > F = 0.0000 |

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | Coef. | S.E. | P>t |
|--|--------|----------|-----------|
| Catholic | -0.019 | 0.042 | 0.649 |
| Protestant | 0.146 | 0.054 | 0.007 |
| Orthodox | 0.038 | 0.042 | 0.364 |
| Muslim | -0.092 | 0.056 | 0.105 |
| Other Denomination | -0.148 | 0.090 | 0.099 |
| Church Attendance | 0.006 | 0.014 | 0.664 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.018 | 0.007 | 0.019 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.129 | 0.033 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.195 | 0.031 | 0.000 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.069 | 0.022 | 0.002 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.271 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.089 | 0.028 | 0.002 |
| Tertiary education | -0.162 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Sex: female | -0.072 | 0.021 | 0.001 |
| Long-term unemployment | 0.002 | 0.025 | 0.910 |
| Age | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.670 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.347 |
| Anomy | 0.041 | 0.004 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.181 | 0.029 | 0.000 |
| Strong leader | 0.109 | 0.022 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -1.967 | 0.135 | 0.000 |
| Random-effects Parameters | | Estimate | Std. Err. |
| Country: Identity | | | |
| Standard deviation (Constant) | | 0.734 | 0.077 |

Table G: Imputed Model (40 imputations), outcome: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race’

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|---|--------------------------|
| Multiple-imputation estimates | Imputations | = | 40 |
| Mixed-effects logistic regression | Number of obs | = | 67495 |
| Group variable: country1 | Number of groups | = | 48 |
| | Obs per group: min | = | 495 |
| | avg | = | 1406.1 |
| Integration points = 7 | max | = | 2327 |
| | Average RVI | = | 0.0374 |
| | Largest FMI | = | 0.1028 |
| DF adjustment: Large sample | DF: min | = | 3725.72 |
| | avg | = | 164712.04 |
| | max | = | 1.58e+06 |
| Model F test: Equal FMI | F(22,561315.5) | = | 39.49, Prob > F = 0.0000 |

| DV: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race’ | Coef. | S.E. | P>t |
|--|--------|----------|-----------|
| Catholic | 0.008 | 0.046 | 0.849 |
| Protestant | 0.017 | 0.065 | 0.791 |
| Orthodox | 0.069 | 0.045 | 0.131 |
| Muslim | 0.120 | 0.057 | 0.037 |
| Other Denomination | -0.051 | 0.097 | 0.601 |
| Church Attendance | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.324 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.043 | 0.015 | 0.005 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.160 | 0.036 | 0.000 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.306 | 0.034 | 0.000 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.091 | 0.024 | 0.000 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.297 | 0.027 | 0.000 |
| Volunteering | -0.034 | 0.030 | 0.264 |
| Tertiary education | -0.251 | 0.029 | 0.000 |
| Sex: female | -0.084 | 0.022 | 0.000 |
| Long-term unemployment | 0.072 | 0.026 | 0.007 |
| Age | -0.013 | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.055 | 0.004 | 0.000 |
| Right-Wing | 0.266 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Strong leader | 0.115 | 0.024 | 0.000 |
| Constant | -2.163 | 0.143 | 0.000 |
| Random-effects Parameters | | Estimate | Std. Err. |
| country1: Identity | | | |
| sd(_cons) | | 0.772 | 0.082 |

Appendix E: Additional Models

Chapter 8:

Table A: Random Intercepts Models for Intolerance of Immigrants and Racial intolerance, Church Attendance included as ordered categories

| | DV: 'Would not like as neighbours: immigrants' | | DV: 'Would not like as neighbours: people of a different race' | |
|---|--|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.005 | 0.047 | 0.005 | 0.051 |
| Protestant | 0.170** | 0.059 | 0.045 | 0.070 |
| Orthodox | 0.107* | 0.049 | 0.106* | 0.054 |
| Muslim | -0.109 | 0.067 | 0.105 | 0.068 |
| Other Denomination | -0.015 | 0.099 | 0.016 | 0.110 |
| Religious Upbringing | -0.003 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.008 |
| Attends church at least once a week | 0.086* | 0.043 | 0.081 | 0.046 |
| Attends church once a month | 0.076 | 0.045 | -0.035 | 0.049 |
| Attends church only on special holidays | -0.030 | 0.032 | -0.058 | 0.035 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.011 | 0.016 | 0.045** | 0.017 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.090* | 0.037 | -0.127** | 0.040 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.205*** | 0.034 | -0.315*** | 0.038 |
| Individualized Spirituality | -0.061* | 0.024 | -0.089*** | 0.026 |
| Volunteering | -0.103*** | 0.031 | -0.046 | 0.034 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.176*** | 0.029 | -0.258*** | 0.033 |
| Sex: Female | -0.084*** | 0.023 | -0.093*** | 0.025 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.023 | 0.028 | 0.062* | 0.030 |
| Age | -0.004 | 0.003 | -0.015*** | 0.004 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000 |
| Distrust | 0.339*** | 0.027 | 0.218*** | 0.030 |
| Anomy | 0.044*** | 0.005 | 0.060*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.181*** | 0.032 | 0.260*** | 0.034 |
| Right-wing Don't know | -0.051 | 0.031 | -0.056 | 0.034 |
| Constant | -1.877*** | 0.148 | -2.061*** | 0.157 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | -0.239* | 0.106 | -0.185 | 0.107 |
| N | 55075 | | 55080 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -24715.697 | | -21696.966 | |
| AIC | 49481.394 | | 43443.933 | |
| BIC | 49704.305 | | 43666.846 | |

Church attendance: 'less than once a year' and 'never' serve as the reference category.

Table B: Random Intercept Model: Intolerance of Immigrants - Model including Interactions between Protestant Identity and Religiosity

| “Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants” | Interaction Protestant * Fundamentalism | | Interaction Protestant * Church Attendance | | Interaction Protestant * Importance of Religion | |
|---|---|-------|---|-------|--|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.003 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.046 | -0.018 | 0.046 |
| Protestant | 0.142* | 0.061 | 0.213*** | 0.064 | 0.457*** | 0.122 |
| Orthodox | 0.065 | 0.048 | 0.071 | 0.049 | 0.050 | 0.049 |
| Muslim | -0.105 | 0.066 | -0.104 | 0.066 | -0.121 | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | -0.044 | 0.099 | -0.051 | 0.099 | -0.067 | 0.100 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 | -0.009 | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.008 |
| Volunteering | -0.093** | 0.031 | -0.091** | 0.031 | -0.091** | 0.031 |
| Importance of Religion | -0.002 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.016 | 0.011 | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.149*** | 0.037 | -0.146*** | 0.037 | -0.142*** | 0.037 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.200*** | 0.034 | -0.196*** | 0.034 | -0.198*** | 0.034 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.070** | 0.024 | -0.068** | 0.024 | -0.069** | 0.024 |
| Belief: “there is only one true religion” | 0.355** | 0.114 | 0.265*** | 0.029 | 0.265*** | 0.029 |
| Protestant * Fundamentalism | -0.094 | 0.116 | | | | |
| Protestant * Church Attendance | | | -0.72*** | 0.002 | | |
| Protestant * Importance of Religion | | | | | -0.122** | 0.044 |
| Constant | -1.952*** | 0.145 | -1.928*** | 0.146 | -1.982*** | 0.146 |
| <i>Random Part</i> | | | | | | |
| Level 2 Variance $\sigma^2 u_0$ | 0.601* | 0.127 | 0.609* | 0.128 | 0.603* | 0.127 |
| Intra-Class Correlation | 0.154 | 0.027 | 0.156 | 0.027 | 0.155 | 0.027 |
| N | 55589 | | 55589 | | 55589 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -24989.768 | | -24985.318 | | -24986.218 | |
| Δ -2-Log-Likelihood (1df) | 0.65 | | 9.55 | | 7.75 | |
| AIC | 50031.536 | | 50024.636 | | 50024.435 | |
| BIC | 50263.605 | | 50265.631 | | 50256.504 | |

Table C: Outcome: ‘Would not like as neighbours: People of a different Race’, Test, whether the Muslim coefficient remains statistically significant when including tertiary education:

| DV: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race’ | M1: not controlling for education | | M2: Controlling for Education | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.063 | 0.047 | 0.058 | 0.048 |
| Protestant | 0.061 | 0.067 | 0.056 | 0.067 |
| Orthodox | 0.086 | 0.049 | 0.095 | 0.049 |
| Muslim | 0.138* | 0.062 | 0.118 | 0.062 |
| Other Denomination | -0.028 | 0.100 | -0.033 | 0.100 |
| Church Attendance | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.048** | 0.016 | 0.043** | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.173*** | 0.037 | -0.170*** | 0.037 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.344*** | 0.035 | -0.328*** | 0.035 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.104*** | 0.024 | -0.101*** | 0.025 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.333*** | 0.028 | 0.316*** | 0.028 |
| Tertiary Education | | | -0.312*** | 0.030 |
| Constant | -1.989*** | 0.127 | -1.917*** | 0.127 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | -0.186 | 0.107 | -0.193 | 0.107 |
| N | 62247 | | 61764 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -25090.067 | | -24842.615 | |
| AIC | 50206.133 | | 49713.230 | |
| BIC | 50323.639 | | 49839.665 | |

**Table D: Outcome: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’,
Interaction between Volunteering and Importance of Religion**

| DV: : ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’ | | Interaction Volunteering * Importance of Religion |
|---|------------|--|
| | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.009 | 0.046 |
| Protestant | 0.150** | 0.058 |
| Orthodox | 0.063 | 0.048 |
| Muslim | -0.102 | 0.066 |
| Other Denomination | -0.049 | 0.099 |
| Church Attendance | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.007 | 0.016 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.149*** | 0.037 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.200*** | 0.034 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.066** | 0.024 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.265*** | 0.029 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.177*** | 0.029 |
| Volunteering | 0.033 | 0.081 |
| Sex: Female | -0.087*** | 0.023 |
| Long-Term Unemployment | 0.024 | 0.028 |
| Age | -0.003 | 0.003 |
| Age squared | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Anomy | 0.047*** | 0.005 |
| Right-Wing | 0.182*** | 0.031 |
| Right-Wing Don't Know | -0.060 | 0.031 |
| Strong Leader | 0.129*** | 0.026 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.099* | 0.043 |
| Interaction: Volunteering * Importance of Religion | -0.051 | 0.028 |
| Constant | -1.768*** | 0.147 |
| Level 2 Variance σ^2_{u0} | -0.224* | 0.106 |
| N | 55985 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -25251.278 | |
| AIC | 50552.555 | |
| BIC | 50775.876 | |

Chapters 8 and 9: Including the Religion Variables separately in the Random Intercept Models

Table E: DV ‘Would not like as Neighbours: immigrants’, Including the Religion Variables separately

| DV: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants’ | Denominations | | Church Attendance | | Importance of Religion | | Beliefs in God | | Individualised Religiosity | | Fundamentalism | |
|--|---------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.013 | 0.037 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Protestant | 0.144** | 0.052 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Orthodox | 0.076 | 0.040 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Muslim | -0.047 | 0.055 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other Denomination | -0.116 | 0.087 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Church attendance | | | 0.019** | 0.006 | | | | | | | | |
| Importance of Religion | | | | | 0.031** | 0.012 | | | | | | |
| Belief: Personal God | | | | | | | -0.036 | 0.029 | | | | |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | | | -0.196*** | 0.029 | | | | |
| Individualised Religiosity | | | | | | | | | -0.088*** | 0.022 | | |
| Fundamentalism | | | | | | | | | | | 0.299*** | 0.025 |
| Constant | -1.643*** | 0.120 | -1.673*** | 0.117 | -1.693*** | 0.119 | -1.534*** | 0.116 | -1.574*** | 0.116 | -1.681*** | 0.112 |
| N | 66540 | | 65763 | | 65589 | | 65734 | | 64624 | | 65435 | |

Only the fixed part of the model is displayed here. The five denominations, belief in a personal God and belief in a Spirit/Life Force are categories of the same variables. They are thus included together in one step.

Table F: DV ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a Different Race’, Including the Religion Variables separately

| DV: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race’ | Denominations | | Church Attendance | | Importance of Religion | | Beliefs in God | | Individualised Religiosity | | Fundamentalism | |
|--|---------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.097* | 0.041 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Protestant | 0.064 | 0.063 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Orthodox | 0.128** | 0.043 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Muslim | 0.208*** | 0.055 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other Denomination | 0.035 | 0.094 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Church attendance | | | 0.030*** | 0.006 | | | | | | | | |
| Importance of Religion | | | | | 0.083*** | 0.013 | | | | | | |
| Belief: Personal God | | | | | | | 0.001 | 0.031 | | | | |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | | | -0.290*** | 0.032 | | | | |
| Individualised Religiosity | | | | | | | | | -0.112*** | 0.023 | | |
| Fundamentalism | | | | | | | | | | | 0.376*** | 0.026 |
| Constant | -1.994*** | 0.128 | -2.011*** | 0.130 | -2.130*** | 0.131 | -1.822*** | 0.130 | -1.860*** | 0.130 | -1.999*** | 0.124 |
| N | 66544 | | 65763 | | 65594 | | 65735 | | 64630 | | 65449 | |

Table G: DV ‘Homosexuality is never Justifiable’, Including the Religion Variables separately

| DV: ‘Homosexuality is never Justifiable’ | Deno- minations | | Church Attendance | | Importance of Religion | | Beliefs in God | | Individua- lised Religiosity | | Fundamen- talis m | |
|--|--------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|---------------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.827*** | 0.035 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Protestant | 0.587*** | 0.046 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Orthodox | 0.528*** | 0.043 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Muslim | 1.135*** | 0.058 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other Denomination | 1.307*** | 0.078 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Church attendance | | | 0.239*** | 0.006 | | | | | | | | |
| Importance of Religion | | | | | 0.538*** | 0.011 | | | | | | |
| Belief: Personal God | | | | | | | 0.807*** | 0.029 | | | | |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | | | -0.169*** | 0.028 | | | | |
| Individualised Religiosity | | | | | | | | | -0.173*** | 0.022 | | |
| Fundamentalis m | | | | | | | | | | | 1.021*** | 0.027 |
| Constant | 6.590*** | 0.299 | 6.349*** | 0.292 | 5.725*** | 0.283 | 6.872*** | 0.293 | 7.233*** | 0.305 | 6.923*** | 0.288 |
| N | 62847.000 | | 62164.000 | | 62014.000 | | 62121.000 | | 61113.000 | | 61861.000 | |


Table H: DV ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’, Including the Religion Variables separately

| DV: ‘Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals’ | Deno-minations | | Church Attendance | | Importance of Religion | | Beliefs in God | | Individua-lised Religiosity | | Fundamen-talis m | |
|---|----------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|------------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. | Coef. | S.E. |
| Catholic | 0.224*** | 0.033 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Protestant | 0.131** | 0.049 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Orthodox | 0.254*** | 0.034 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Muslim | 0.259*** | 0.049 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other Denomination | 0.173* | 0.074 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Church attendance | | | 0.084*** | 0.005 | | | | | | | | |
| Importance of Religion | | | | | 0.170*** | 0.011 | | | | | | |
| Belief: Personal God | | | | | | | 0.150*** | 0.026 | | | | |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | | | | | | | -0.204*** | 0.026 | | | | |
| Individualised Religiosity | | | | | | | | | -0.100*** | 0.020 | | |
| Fundamentalism | | | | | | | | | | | 0.357*** | 0.023 |
| Constant | -0.921*** | 0.200 | -1.043*** | 0.201 | -1.208*** | 0.201 | -0.755*** | 0.202 | -0.708*** | 0.205 | -0.832*** | 0.200 |
| N | 66796.000 | | 66011.000 | | 65841.000 | | 65978.000 | | 64866.000 | | 65677.000 | |

Table I: Chapter 12.4.2, Binary Logistic Multilevel Model including country - Level denomination without controlling for individual-level denomination

| DV: 'Would not like as Neighbours:Homosexuals' | | |
|--|------------|-------|
| | Coef. | S.E. |
| Church Attendance | 0.061*** | 0.007 |
| Importance of Religion | 0.076*** | 0.014 |
| Belief: Personal God | -0.062 | 0.033 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | -0.230*** | 0.031 |
| Individualised Religiosity | -0.097*** | 0.022 |
| Fundamentalism | 0.193*** | 0.027 |
| Volunteering | -0.045 | 0.028 |
| Tertiary Education | -0.285*** | 0.027 |
| Sex: female | -0.325*** | 0.022 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 0.143*** | 0.026 |
| Age | 0.010*** | 0.001 |
| Ethnic Minority | -0.021 | 0.038 |
| Anomy | 0.028*** | 0.005 |
| Right-wing | 0.272*** | 0.030 |
| Right-Wing Don't know | 0.071* | 0.028 |
| Strong Leader | 0.113*** | 0.024 |
| Leader Don't Know | 0.028 | 0.041 |
| % Catholic per Country | 0.113 | 0.107 |
| % Protestant per Country | -0.257* | 0.109 |
| % Orthodox per Country | 0.384*** | 0.098 |
| % Muslims per Country | 0.084 | 0.113 |
| Constant | -2.365*** | 0.598 |
| Sigma u | -0.266* | 0.105 |
| N | 56182 | |
| -2-Log-Likelihood | -27759.391 | |
| AIC | 55566.783 | |
| BIC | 55781.255 | |

(Appendix E) Figure A: Path-Model , South-Eastern Europe - Test for Mediation of the Effect of Importance of Religion on Racial Intolerance ('would not like as neighbours: people of a different race' by 'strong leader':




Note: The numbers next to the Paths are the path coefficients and their p-values.

Model Fit:

| Fit statistic | Value | Description |
|------------------|---------|------------------------|
| Likelihood ratio | | |
| chi2_ms(0) | 0 | model vs. saturated |
| p > chi2 | . | |
| chi2_bs(3) | 237.428 | baseline vs. saturated |
| p > chi2 | 0 | |

(Appendix E) Figure B: Path-Model, South-Eastern Europe - Test for Mediation of the Effect of Importance of Religion on Racial Intolerance ('would not like as neighbours: people of a different race' by 'obedience is important for a child to learn':



Note: The numbers next to the Paths are the path coefficients and their p-values.

Model Fit:

| Fit statistic | Value | Description |
|------------------|---------|------------------------|
| Likelihood ratio | | |
| chi2_ms(0) | 0.000 | model vs. saturated |
| p > chi2 | . | |
| chi2_bs(3) | 252.554 | baseline vs. saturated |
| p > chi2 | 0.000 | |

Appendix F: Additional Tables

Table A: Sampling Method, Sample Size and Response Rate for each participating Country in the European Values Study 2008

| Country | Sampling Method | Sample Size | Response Rate |
|-----------------|---|-------------|---------------|
| Albania | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1534 | 88% |
| Armenia | Random sample | 1500 | 62% |
| Austria | Stratified random sample | 1510 | 67% |
| Azerbaijan | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1505 | 87% |
| Belarus | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1500 | 71% |
| Belgium | Stratified random sample (multi-stage, PPR-samples) | 1509 | 50% |
| Bosnia-Herzeg. | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1512 | 82% |
| Bulgaria | Stratified random two-stage cluster sample | 1500 | 73% |
| Croatia | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1523 | 60% |
| Cyprus | Stratified random sample | 1000 | 71% |
| Northern Cyprus | Stratified random sample | 500 | 88% |
| Czech Rep. | Stratified probability sample | 1821 | 61% |
| Denmark | Simple random sample | 1507 | 51% |
| Estonia | Random sample | 1518 | 66% |
| Finland | <p>Internet panel, Gallup; Original text in the EVS-documentation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1300 individuals recruited from random CATI and CAPI samples. - No selfrecruitment or online recruitment. - Recruitment criterias are gender, age, region, income level and occupation. - Recruitment is based on figures from Statistics Finland. - Individuals are asked to join panel members at the end of CATI and CAPI survey. - Willingness to join join is not leading to panel member automatically unless recruitment criterias are not fulfilled. - Panel represents population from 18-74 years'. (EVS, 2010). | 1134 | 87% |
| France | <p>Original text in the EVS-documentation:</p> <p>'The French survey includes different samples: a random (main) sample, a quota sample and an over-sample of people 18 to 29 for the quota sample (see variables split_1 and split_2). To make the French survey a random sample comparable to the other national samples of EVS 2008 users can exclude the quota sample (including oversample) when using variable "split_1" as sample filter. The Integrated Dataset includes the random sample only'. (EVS 2010).</p> <p><i>Note: In this Thesis, the integrated dataset is used. Therefore this Thesis uses the French random sample only, and not the quota sample.</i></p> | 1501 | 38% |

Table A, Continued: Sampling Method, Sample Size and Response Rate for each participating Country in the European Values Study 2008

| Country | Sampling Method | Sample Size | Response Rate |
|------------------|--|-------------|---------------|
| Georgia | five-stage random cluster sampling | 1500 | 53% |
| Germany | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 2075 | 40% |
| Great Britain | Multistage cluster sample | 1561 | 23% |
| Greece | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1500 | 33% |
| Hungary | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1513 | 51% |
| Iceland | Original text in the EVS-documentation: 'A random sample of 1500 inhabitants 18 years and older, chosen from the national registry of Iceland. Iceland is one region.' (CITATION) | 807 | 54% |
| Ireland | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1012 | 47% |
| Italy | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1519 | 61% |
| Kosovo | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1601 | 74% |
| Latvia | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1506 | 72% |
| Lithuania | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1500 | 65% |
| Luxemburg | Stratified random sample | 1610 | 31% |
| Macedonia | Multistage cluster sample | 1500 | 72% |
| Malta | Random sample | 1500 | 34% |
| Moldova | Random sample | 1551 | 47% |
| Montenegro | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1516 | 88% |
| Netherlands | Stratified random sample | 1554 | 49% |
| Northern Ireland | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 500 | 29% |
| Norway | Random sample | 1090 | 56% |
| Poland | No information available ^a | 1510 | 83% |
| Portugal | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1553 | 70% |
| Romania | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1489 | 53% |
| Russia | Stratified random sample (multi-stage) | 1504 | 36% |
| Serbia | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1512 | 68% |
| Slovak Rep. | Stratified random sample (three-stage) | 1523 | 57% |
| Slovenia | Stratified random sample (two-stage) | 1366 | 61% |
| Spain | Stratified random sample | 1500 | 51% |
| Sweden | Unrestricted random sample | 1187 | 56% |
| Switzerland | Stratified random sample | 1230 | 45% |
| Turkey | No information available ^a | 2384 | 55% |
| Ukraine | Random sample | 1507 | 53% |

Note: The EVS Methods Report states that representative multi-stage or stratified random probability sampling of the adult population of the country 18 years old and older was performed *in all countries* of the study (GESIS 2010: 19).

^a Both the extended study description of the EVS dataset and the method reports for Poland and Turkey state that for Poland and Turkey no information about the sampling method is available. The author emailed the EVS data service on the 28th October 2013, requesting the information and received the answer that no information on sampling method in these two countries is available at the EVS-data service.

Table B: The EVS-Participating Countries Grouped into Seven Geographical Country Groups

| South Eastern Europe | N | Percent | Cum. | Communist Past |
|-----------------------------|---------------|------------|-------|----------------|
| Albania | 1,534 | 7.77 | 7.77 | Yes |
| Azerbaijan | 1,505 | 7.62 | 15.39 | Yes |
| Armenia | 1,500 | 7.6 | 22.99 | Yes |
| Bosnia Herzegovina | 1,512 | 7.66 | 30.65 | Yes |
| Bulgaria | 1,500 | 7.6 | 38.24 | Yes |
| Croatia | 1,525 | 7.72 | 45.97 | Yes |
| Georgia | 1,500 | 7.6 | 53.56 | Yes |
| Moldova | 1,551 | 7.86 | 61.42 | Yes |
| Montenegro | 1,516 | 7.68 | 69.1 | Yes |
| Romania | 1,489 | 7.54 | 76.64 | Yes |
| Serbia | 1,512 | 7.66 | 84.29 | Yes |
| Macedonia | 1,500 | 7.6 | 91.89 | Yes |
| Kosovo | 1,601 | 8.11 | 100 | Yes |
| Total | 19,745 | 100 | | |
| East Central Europe | N | Percent | Cum. | |
| Czech Republic | 1,821 | 20.88 | 20.88 | Yes |
| Hungary | 1,513 | 17.34 | 38.22 | Yes |
| Poland | 1,510 | 17.31 | 55.53 | Yes |
| Slovak Republic | 1,509 | 17.3 | 72.83 | Yes |
| Slovenia | 1,366 | 15.66 | 88.49 | Yes |
| Germany East | 1,004 | 11.51 | 100 | Yes |
| Total | 8,723 | 100 | | |
| Eastern Europe | N | Percent | Cum. | |
| Belarus | 1,500 | 33.25 | 33.25 | Yes |
| Russian Federation | 1,504 | 33.34 | 66.59 | Yes |
| Ukraine | 1,507 | 33.41 | 100 | Yes |
| Total | 4,511 | 100 | | |
| Baltic States | N | Percent | Cum. | |
| Estonia | 1,518 | 33.55 | 33.55 | Yes |
| Latvia | 1,506 | 33.29 | 66.84 | Yes |
| Lithuania | 1,500 | 33.16 | 100 | Yes |
| Total | 4,524 | 100 | | |

Table B, Continued: The EVS-Participating Countries Grouped into Seven Geographical Country Groups

| Southern Europe | | N | Percent | Cum. | Communist Past |
|------------------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Cyprus | | 1,000 | 8.73 | 8.73 | No |
| Northern Cyprus | | 500 | 4.36 | 13.09 | No |
| Greece | | 1,500 | 13.09 | 26.19 | No |
| Italy | | 1,519 | 13.26 | 39.45 | No |
| Malta | | 1,500 | 13.09 | 52.54 | No |
| Portugal | | 1,553 | 13.56 | 66.1 | No |
| Spain | | 1,500 | 13.09 | 79.19 | No |
| Turkey | | 2,384 | 20.81 | 100 | No |
| Total | | 11,456 | 100 | | |
| Western Europe | | N | Percent | Cum. | |
| Austria | | 1,510 | 11.53 | 11.53 | No |
| Belgium | | 1,509 | 11.52 | 23.04 | No |
| France | | 1,501 | 11.46 | 34.5 | No |
| Ireland | | 1,013 | 7.73 | 42.23 | No |
| Luxembourg | | 1,610 | 12.29 | 54.52 | No |
| Netherlands | | 1,554 | 11.86 | 66.38 | No |
| Switzerland | | 1,272 | 9.71 | 76.09 | No |
| Great Britain | | 1,561 | 11.92 | 88.01 | No |
| Germany West | | 1,071 | 8.17 | 96.18 | No |
| Northern Ireland | | 500 | 3.82 | 100 | No |
| Total | 13,101 | N | 100 | | |
| Scandinavia | | | Percent | Cum. | |
| Denmark | | 1,507 | 26.32 | 26.32 | No |
| Finland | | 1,134 | 19.8 | 46.12 | No |
| Iceland | | 808 | 14.11 | 60.23 | No |
| Norway | | 1,090 | 19.04 | 79.27 | No |
| Sweden | | 1,187 | 20.73 | 100 | No |
| Total | | 5,726 | 100 | | |

Table C: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| South-Eastern Europe | | | | | |
|--|-------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 19123 | 0.225 | 0.418 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 19134 | 0.226 | 0.418 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 19360 | 0.625 | 0.484 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 18916 | 9.185 | 1.903 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 19745 | 0.089 | 0.285 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 19745 | 0.003 | 0.059 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 19745 | 0.499 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 19745 | 0.223 | 0.416 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 19745 | 0.013 | 0.116 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 19394 | 3.799 | 1.698 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 19323 | 3.063 | 0.874 | 1 | 4 |
| Belief: Personal God | 19344 | 0.483 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 19344 | 0.337 | 0.473 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 18925 | 0.377 | 0.484 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 19256 | 0.354 | 0.478 | 0 | 1 |
| Volunteering | 19745 | 0.134 | 0.341 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 19534 | 0.233 | 0.423 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 19745 | 0.543 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 19745 | 0.447 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 19687 | 43.406 | 16.99 | 14 | 95 |
| Anomy | 19044 | 4.460 | 2.652 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 17679 | 0.159 | 0.366 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 19323 | 0.477 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 18378 | 0.299 | 0.458 | 0 | 1 |

Table D: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| East Central Europe | | | | | |
|--|------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 8611 | 0.204 | 0.403 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 8622 | 0.156 | 0.363 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 8619 | 0.316 | 0.465 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 8191 | 6.866 | 3.233 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 8723 | 0.508 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 8723 | 0.062 | 0.242 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 8723 | 0.005 | 0.075 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 8723 | 0.002 | 0.053 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 8723 | 0.010 | 0.101 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 8589 | 3.196 | 2.104 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 8600 | 2.296 | 1.088 | 1 | 4 |
| Belief: Personal God | 8521 | 0.354 | 0.478 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 8521 | 0.264 | 0.441 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 8297 | 0.330 | 0.470 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 8493 | 0.148 | 0.355 | 0 | 1 |
| Volunteering | 8723 | 0.192 | 0.393 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 8698 | 0.165 | 0.371 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 8723 | 0.549 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 8723 | 0.178 | 0.382 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 8663 | 48.260 | 17.821 | 18 | 103 |
| Anomy | 8570 | 4.315 | 2.223 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 8147 | 0.137 | 0.344 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 8595 | 0.207 | 0.405 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 8319 | 0.285 | 0.451 | 0 | 1 |

Table E: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Eastern Europe | | | | | |
|--|------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 4496 | 0.249 | 0.432 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 4500 | 0.142 | 0.349 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 4502 | 0.603 | 0.489 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 4155 | 8.799 | 2.151 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 4511 | 0.059 | 0.237 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 4511 | 0.010 | 0.103 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 4511 | 0.561 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 4511 | 0.017 | 0.131 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 4511 | 0.048 | 0.214 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 4442 | 3.232 | 1.659 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 4347 | 2.621 | 0.953 | 1 | 4 |
| Volunteering | 4511 | 0.099 | 0.298 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Personal God | 4468 | 0.416 | 0.493 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 4468 | 0.286 | 0.452 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 4315 | 0.384 | 0.486 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 4435 | 0.217 | 0.412 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 4495 | 0.340 | 0.473 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 4511 | 0.626 | 0.483 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 4511 | 0.260 | 0.438 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 4497 | 45.455 | 17.705 | 18 | 93 |
| Anomy | 4320 | 4.770 | 2.361 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 4212 | 0.110 | 0.313 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 4466 | 0.570 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 4503 | 0.357 | 0.479 | 0 | 1 |

Table F: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Baltic States | | | | | |
|--|------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 4507 | 0.266 | 0.442 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 4507 | 0.173 | 0.379 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 4517 | 0.522 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 4224 | 8.777 | 2.11 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 4524 | 0.331 | 0.470 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 4524 | 0.116 | 0.321 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 4524 | 0.149 | 0.356 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 4524 | 0.000 | 0.014 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 4524 | 0.012 | 0.109 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 4487 | 3.055 | 1.661 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 4463 | 2.187 | 0.896 | 1 | 4 |
| Belief: Personal God | 4491 | 0.235 | 0.424 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 4491 | 0.462 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 4394 | 0.402 | 0.490 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 4444 | 0.124 | 0.330 | 0 | 1 |
| Volunteering | 4524 | 0.208 | 0.406 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 4505 | 0.284 | 0.451 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 4524 | 0.607 | 0.488 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 4524 | 0.210 | 0.407 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 4523 | 47.854 | 18.316 | 18 | 98 |
| Anomy | 4397 | 4.459 | 2.205 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 4248 | 0.145 | 0.352 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 4476 | 0.412 | 0.492 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 4490 | 0.256 | 0.436 | 0 | 1 |

Table G: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Southern Europe | | | | | |
|--|-------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 11355 | 0.244 | 0.429 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 11360 | 0.214 | 0.410 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 11345 | 0.376 | 0.484 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 9298 | 7.705 | 2.987 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 11456 | 0.418 | 0.493 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 11456 | 0.004 | 0.063 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 11456 | 0.209 | 0.407 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 11456 | 0.250 | 0.433 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 11456 | 0.026 | 0.160 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 11349 | 4.168 | 2.040 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 11400 | 3.193 | 0.946 | 1 | 4 |
| Belief: Personal God | 11381 | 0.717 | 0.450 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 11381 | 0.175 | 0.380 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 11302 | 0.468 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 11344 | 0.406 | 0.491 | 0 | 1 |
| Volunteering | 11456 | 0.133 | 0.340 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 11393 | 0.142 | 0.349 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 11456 | 0.563 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 11456 | 0.191 | 0.393 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 11385 | 47.273 | 18.493 | 15 | 98 |
| Anomy | 11156 | 4.383 | 2.456 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 10110 | 0.171 | 0.376 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 11304 | 0.285 | 0.451 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 11445 | 0.311 | 0.463 | 0 | 1 |

Table H: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Western Europe | | | | | |
|--|-------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 12834 | 0.117 | 0.321 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 12807 | 0.081 | 0.274 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 12839 | 0.129 | 0.336 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 12624 | 5.053 | 3.311 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 13101 | 0.453 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 13101 | 0.163 | 0.370 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 13101 | 0.005 | 0.076 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 13101 | 0.020 | 0.142 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 13101 | 0.025 | 0.158 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 13032 | 2.918 | 1.983 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 13006 | 2.372 | 1.029 | 1 | 4 |
| Volunteering | 13101 | 0.313 | 0.464 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Personal God | 13007 | 0.279 | 0.448 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 13007 | 0.390 | 0.487 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 12867 | 0.454 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 12955 | 0.096 | 0.295 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 12904 | 0.243 | 0.429 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 13100 | 0.547 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 13101 | 0.140 | 0.347 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 13027 | 48.220 | 18.243 | 15 | 108 |
| Anomy | 12978 | 4.184 | 2.094 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 12480 | 0.115 | 0.320 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 12971 | 0.283 | 0.450 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 12596 | 0.287 | 0.452 | 0 | 1 |

Table I: Summary Statistics of the Individual-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Scandinavia | | | | | |
|--|------|--------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Immigrants' | 5614 | 0.076 | 0.265 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: People of a different Race' | 5614 | 0.051 | 0.220 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Would not like as Neighbours: Homosexuals' | 5614 | 0.061 | 0.241 | 0 | 1 |
| 'Homosexuality is never justifiable' | 5439 | 3.620 | 3.218 | 1 | 10 |
| Catholic | 5726 | 0.012 | 0.111 | 0 | 1 |
| Protestant | 5726 | 0.755 | 0.429 | 0 | 1 |
| Orthodox | 5726 | 0.005 | 0.074 | 0 | 1 |
| Muslim | 5726 | 0.004 | 0.067 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Denomination | 5726 | 0.012 | 0.112 | 0 | 1 |
| Church Attendance | 5667 | 2.532 | 1.561 | 1 | 7 |
| Importance of Religion | 5654 | 2.173 | 0.957 | 1 | 4 |
| Volunteering | 5726 | 0.353 | 0.478 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Personal God | 5697 | 0.251 | 0.434 | 0 | 1 |
| Belief: Spirit/Life Force | 5697 | 0.374 | 0.484 | 0 | 1 |
| 'I have my own way of connecting with the Divine' | 5663 | 0.418 | 0.493 | 0 | 1 |
| Fundamentalism | 5676 | 0.053 | 0.224 | 0 | 1 |
| Tertiary education | 5642 | 0.400 | 0.490 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex: Female | 5715 | 0.507 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Long-term Unemployment | 5726 | 0.136 | 0.343 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 5713 | 47.068 | 16.205 | 17 | 98 |
| Anomy | 5634 | 3.319 | 1.735 | 1 | 10 |
| Right-Wing | 5657 | 0.206 | 0.404 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong Leader | 5657 | 0.146 | 0.354 | 0 | 1 |
| Child: Obedience | 5721 | 0.165 | 0.371 | 0 | 1 |

Table J: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| South-Eastern Europe | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 19745 | 8.517 | 0.544 | 7.435 | 9.657 |
| Freedom House | 19745 | 0.695 | 0.461 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Political Stability | 19745 | -0.150 | 0.460 | -0.880 | 0.574 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 19745 | 3.320 | 0.592 | 1.900 | 4.400 |
| Net Migration Rate | 19745 | -1.295 | 2.855 | -4.950 | 6.380 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 19745 | 0.891 | 1.485 | -2.700 | 2.454 |
| Religious Pluralism | 19745 | 0.465 | 0.152 | 0.183 | 0.685 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 19745 | 3.061 | 0.308 | 2.494 | 3.624 |
| % Catholic per country | 19745 | 8.985 | 20.839 | 0.000 | 80.000 |
| % Protestant per Country | 19745 | 0.350 | 0.660 | 0.000 | 2.400 |
| % Orthodox per country | 19745 | 50.000 | 33.656 | 0.000 | 90.800 |
| % Muslim per country | 19745 | 22.335 | 27.631 | 0.000 | 83.654 |
| Post-communism | 19745 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |

Table K: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| East Central Europe | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 8723 | 9.921 | 0.354 | 9.539 | 10.704 |
| Freedom House | 8723 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Political Stability | 8723 | 0.957 | 0.115 | 0.748 | 1.084 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 8723 | 5.569 | 1.062 | 4.600 | 7.900 |
| Net Migration Rate | 8723 | 0.676 | 0.732 | -0.460 | 2.190 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 8723 | 0.937 | 0.685 | -0.228 | 2.039 |
| Religious Pluralism | 8723 | 0.379 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 0.659 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 8723 | 2.295 | 0.518 | 1.534 | 3.013 |
| % Catholic per country | 8723 | 50.937 | 28.461 | 3.100 | 91.500 |
| % Protestant per Country | 8723 | 6.250 | 6.369 | 0.300 | 18.700 |
| % Orthodox per country | 8723 | 0.581 | 0.565 | 0.100 | 1.800 |
| % Muslim per country | 8723 | 0.391 | 0.616 | 0.000 | 1.464 |
| Post-communism | 8723 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |

Table L: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Eastern Europe | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 4511 | 8.803 | 0.449 | 8.274 | 9.371 |
| Freedom House | 4511 | 0.666 | 0.472 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Political Stability | 4511 | -0.050 | 0.412 | -0.610 | 0.368 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 4511 | 2.200 | 0.216 | 2.000 | 2.500 |
| Net Migration Rate | 4511 | 0.180 | 0.216 | -0.120 | 0.380 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 4511 | 2.234 | 0.384 | 1.696 | 2.571 |
| Religious Pluralism | 4511 | 0.556 | 0.082 | 0.440 | 0.616 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 4511 | 2.621 | 0.137 | 2.512 | 2.814 |
| % Catholic per country | 4511 | 5.966 | 4.011 | 0.300 | 9.000 |
| % Protestant per Country | 4511 | 1.101 | 0.749 | 0.300 | 2.100 |
| % Orthodox per country | 4511 | 56.158 | 4.910 | 49.600 | 61.400 |
| % Muslim per country | 4511 | 1.773 | 1.827 | 0.133 | 4.322 |
| Post-communism | 4511 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |

Table M: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Baltic States | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 4524 | 9.647 | 0.097 | 9.550 | 9.779 |
| Freedom House | 4524 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Political Stability | 4524 | 0.586 | 0.164 | 0.376 | 0.778 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 4524 | 5.404 | 0.865 | 4.600 | 6.600 |
| Net Migration Rate | 4524 | -2.088 | 1.039 | -3.240 | -0.720 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 4524 | 2.380 | 0.595 | 1.540 | 2.879 |
| Religious Pluralism | 4524 | 0.490 | 0.058 | 0.414 | 0.556 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 4524 | 2.188 | 0.185 | 1.992 | 2.437 |
| % Catholic per country | 4524 | 33.188 | 33.075 | 1.300 | 78.900 |
| % Protestant per Country | 4524 | 11.684 | 8.712 | 0.500 | 21.800 |
| % Orthodox per country | 4524 | 15.021 | 7.982 | 4.200 | 23.300 |
| % Muslim per country | 4524 | 0.022 | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.066 |
| Post-communism | 4524 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |

Table N: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Southern Europe | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 11456 | 10.081 | 0.467 | 9.258 | 10.568 |
| Freedom House | 11456 | 0.208 | 0.406 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Political Stability | 11456 | 0.473 | 0.468 | -0.080 | 1.251 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 11456 | 5.485 | 0.784 | 4.600 | 6.500 |
| Net Migration Rate | 11456 | 1.467 | 1.108 | 0.000 | 3.230 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 11456 | 1.495 | 0.958 | 0.124 | 3.811 |
| Religious Pluralism | 11456 | 0.188 | 0.170 | 0.000 | 0.451 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 11456 | 3.193 | 0.484 | 2.237 | 3.751 |
| % Catholic per country | 11456 | 41.862 | 40.268 | 0.000 | 96.100 |
| % Protestant per Country | 11456 | 0.417 | 0.544 | 0.000 | 1.400 |
| % Orthodox per country | 11456 | 20.967 | 39.218 | 0.000 | 96.800 |
| % Muslim per country | 11456 | 25.079 | 42.078 | 0.066 | 98.070 |
| Post-communism | 11456 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Table O: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Western Europe | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 13101 | 10.926 | 0.308 | 10.684 | 11.678 |
| Freedom House | 13101 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Political Stability | 13101 | 0.949 | 0.346 | 0.498 | 1.523 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 13101 | 7.967 | 0.649 | 6.900 | 9.000 |
| Net Migration Rate | 13101 | 3.081 | 2.262 | 1.220 | 8.540 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 13101 | 2.429 | 0.640 | 1.778 | 3.806 |
| Religious Pluralism | 13101 | 0.449 | 0.231 | 0.091 | 0.722 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 13101 | 2.373 | 0.194 | 2.212 | 2.865 |
| % Catholic per country | 13101 | 45.377 | 20.737 | 10.800 | 81.600 |
| % Protestant per Country | 13101 | 16.380 | 15.502 | 1.300 | 40.800 |
| % Orthodox per country | 13101 | 0.590 | 0.581 | 0.000 | 1.900 |
| % Muslim per country | 13101 | 2.007 | 1.100 | 0.000 | 3.247 |
| Post-communism | 13101 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Table P: Summary Statistics of the Context-Level Variables used in the Analyses by Country Group

| Scandinavia | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| GDP | 5726 | 11.020 | 0.218 | 10.840 | 11.443 |
| Freedom House | 5726 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Political Stability | 5726 | 1.191 | 0.120 | 1.035 | 1.378 |
| Corruption (CPI) | 5726 | 8.918 | 0.517 | 7.900 | 9.300 |
| Net Migration Rate | 5726 | 1.629 | 0.626 | 0.730 | 2.490 |
| Percent Foreign Born per Country | 5726 | 1.598 | 0.962 | -0.228 | 2.596 |
| Religious Pluralis m | 5726 | 0.226 | 0.021 | 0.191 | 0.253 |
| Mean Religiosity per country | 5726 | 2.172 | 0.219 | 1.913 | 2.608 |
| % Catholic per country | 5726 | 1.261 | 0.900 | 0.100 | 2.400 |
| % Protestant per Country | 5726 | 75.582 | 9.887 | 60.200 | 86.900 |
| % Orthodox per country | 5726 | 0.539 | 0.474 | 0.000 | 1.100 |
| % Muslim per country | 5726 | 0.454 | 0.401 | 0.000 | 1.193 |
| Post-communism | 5726 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Table Q: Religion and Racial Intolerance as measured in the European Social Survey (ESS 4, 2008)

| DV: 'Allow no persons of a different race/ethnic group from most of [country's] people to come and live here' ^a | | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------|-----------|------------------|
| | attends church once a month or more | attends church less often | religious | not religious |
| Sweden | 1.3 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.3 |
| Norway | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.5 |
| Switzerland | 4.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.5 |
| Germany | 4.2 | 8.3 | 5.2 | 8.5 |
| Denmark | 4.3 | 6.3 | 6.0 | 6.2 |
| Poland | 7.0 | 4.5 | 7.0 | 6.0 |
| Netherlands | 7.0 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| France | 7.2 | 8.4 | 8.0 | 8.3 |
| Great Britain | 8.2 | 15.0 | 11.1 | 14.1 |
| Austria | 8.5 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 10.5 |
| Finland | 9.0 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 7.3 |
| Belgium | 10.0 | 13.4 | 15.0 | 12.0 |
| Ukraine | 11.3 | 15.0 | 16.0 | 13.5 |
| Ireland | 13.0 | 9.0 | 11.2 | 11.2 |
| Croatia | 15.0 | 14.1 | 15.0 | 13.0 |
| Slovenia | 15.0 | 7.3 | 11.0 | 8.3 |
| Lithuania | 15.3 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 13.1 |
| Romania | 16.0 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 13.3 |
| Bulgaria | 16.2 | 14.5 | 16.3 | 14.3 |
| Czech Rep. | 17.0 | 20.1 | 17.2 | 20.0 |
| Spain | 17.0 | 15.0 | 17.0 | 15.0 |
| Slovakia | 18.4 | 12.5 | 17.3 | 13.0 |
| Estonia | 20.0 | 20.0 | 15.0 | 20.4 |
| Russia | 20.1 | 21.1 | 21.5 | 20.2 |
| Cyprus | 26.5 | 26.0 | 26.0 | 27.0 |
| Portugal | 27.0 | 23.0 | 24.1 | 25.0 |
| Latvia | 31.4 | 35.0 | 32.0 | 35.1 |
| Greece | 32.0 | 25.0 | 30.3 | 25.0 |
| Hungary | 32.2 | 33.2 | 32.0 | 33.0 |
| Turkey | 37.0 | 36.2 | 40.2 | 26.2 |
| Total | 17.0 | 16.0 | 19.0 | 14.4 |

Data Source: European Social Survey (ESS), w4, 2008.

^aThe wording of the question on the ESS-questionnaire is as follows: 'How about people of a different race/ethnic group from most [country's] people? (1=allow many to come and live here, 2=allow some, 3=allow a few, 4= allow none'. (The variable was dummy -recoded: 4=1, all other categories =0).

Table R: Religion and intolerance towards immigrants as measured in the European Social Survey (ESS 4, 2008)

DV: 'The country is a worse place to live by people coming to live here from other countries'^a

| | attends church once a month or more | attends church less often | religious | not religious |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Sweden | 2.5 | 5.0 | 3.4 | 5.0 |
| Switzerland | 3.0 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 4.5 |
| Poland | 5.4 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 6.0 |
| Germany | 6.0 | 11.2 | 8.1 | 11.0 |
| Denmark | 6.5 | 8.5 | 7.0 | 9.0 |
| Finland | 7.0 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 7.0 |
| Norway | 8.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 8.0 |
| Bulgaria | 9.0 | 10.0 | 11.5 | 9.0 |
| Netherlands | 9.3 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.1 |
| Belgium | 10.0 | 13.0 | 12.0 | 13.0 |
| Czech Rep. | 10.3 | 19.3 | 12.1 | 19.0 |
| Estonia | 11.1 | 19.0 | 19.0 | 19.0 |
| Spain | 12.0 | 13.1 | 13.0 | 13.0 |
| Ireland | 12.2 | 9.5 | 12.0 | 11.0 |
| Great Britain | 12.3 | 24.0 | 16.0 | 23.5 |
| Romania | 13.2 | 12.5 | 12.4 | 13.0 |
| Lithuania | 14.3 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 13.0 |
| France | 15.2 | 14.3 | 15.0 | 14.4 |
| Slovakia | 17.0 | 12.1 | 17.3 | 11.0 |
| Latvia | 17.1 | 22.2 | 21.4 | 21.1 |
| Portugal | 18.0 | 17.4 | 17.0 | 18.2 |
| Austria | 20.0 | 17.2 | 18.0 | 18.0 |
| Croatia | 21.0 | 17.0 | 19.5 | 17.0 |
| Cyprus | 21.2 | 22.0 | 25.0 | 17.2 |
| Ukraine | 22.0 | 22.1 | 25.0 | 20.4 |
| Slovenia | 23.4 | 17.1 | 19.1 | 20.0 |
| Hungary | 25.3 | 27.0 | 25.2 | 27.2 |
| Russia | 27.4 | 32.5 | 32.0 | 31.0 |
| Turkey | 36.0 | 31.0 | 34.4 | 28.2 |
| Greece | 42.0 | 41.0 | 45.0 | 37.3 |
| Total | 18.0 | 20.1 | 20.3 | 19.1 |

Data Source: European Social Survey (ESS), w4, 2008.

^aThe original question on the ESS-questionnaire is as follows: 'Is the country made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?' (10-scale: 1 = worse place ... 10 = better place, the variable was dummy –recoded: 1,2,3=1; all other categories=0)

Table S: Religion and Homophobia as Measured in the European Social Survey (ESS 4, 2008)

DV: 'Gays and lesbians should not be free to live as they wish'^a

| | attends church once a month or more often | attends church less often | religious | not religious |
|---------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------|------------------|
| Ireland | 6.2 | 2.2 | 9.1 | 2.0 |
| Sweden | 12.8 | 3.8 | 9.0 | 4.0 |
| Denmark | 13.3 | 4.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 |
| Germany | 14.1 | 6.6 | 12.4 | 6.4 |
| France | 15.6 | 5.0 | 15.3 | 4.3 |
| Netherlands | 15.7 | 1.7 | 9.4 | 2.0 |
| Spain | 17.5 | 6.4 | 20.0 | 5.1 |
| Great Britain | 20.0 | 5.2 | 18.0 | 5.0 |
| Switzerland | 20.3 | 6.4 | 16.0 | 5.3 |
| Belgium | 20.4 | 6.2 | 14.4 | 5.3 |
| Portugal | 20.8 | 12.2 | 20.5 | 13.0 |
| Norway | 26.3 | 6.7 | 18.0 | 7.0 |
| Austria | 26.7 | 13.6 | 24.0 | 14.0 |
| Bulgaria | 29.5 | 31.0 | 41.0 | 28.2 |
| Greece | 32.7 | 20.5 | 32.0 | 19.0 |
| Finland | 33.3 | 10.0 | 19.4 | 9.2 |
| Czech Rep. | 33.7 | 12.2 | 28.0 | 13.0 |
| Poland | 34.7 | 19.5 | 38.1 | 21.4 |
| Slovenia | 36.4 | 19.5 | 33.0 | 21.4 |
| Cyprus | 38.7 | 22.6 | 36.4 | 24.1 |
| Croatia | 40.6 | 34.2 | 44.0 | 29.5 |
| Ukraine | 40.8 | 45.3 | 47.1 | 43.1 |
| Slovakia | 42.2 | 26.8 | 42.0 | 25.0 |
| Turkey | 45.2 | 47.4 | 48.0 | 42.0 |
| Hungary | 47.7 | 28.2 | 41.0 | 28.0 |
| Latvia | 48.5 | 34.5 | 49.0 | 34.0 |
| Romania | 49.3 | 41.3 | 47.0 | 40.4 |
| Estonia | 50.0 | 30.3 | 37.0 | 31.0 |
| Russia | 53.7 | 48.5 | 52.2 | 48.3 |
| Lithuania | 63.6 | 47.1 | 63.0 | 45.1 |
| Total | 33.0 | 22.0 | 33.2 | 21.0 |

Data Source: European Social Survey (ESS), w4, 2008.

^a The text of the original question in the ESS-questionnaire is as follows: 'Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.' (5-scale 1=agree strongly – 5=disagree strongly; the variables was dummy recoded: 1-2=1 3-4= 0)

Table T: Religion and Homophobia ad measured in the International Social Surveys Programme (ISSP, Religion III, 2008)

| DV: 'Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are always wrong.' | | | | |
|---|---|---------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| | attends church once a month or more often | attends church less often | religious | not religious |
| Belgium | 43.00 | 15.10 | 27.3 | 10.4 |
| Netherlands | 48.10 | 7.80 | 27.0 | 4.4 |
| Switzerland | 49.00 | 17.80 | 36.3 | 14.5 |
| Germany | 53.30 | 35.50 | 50.0 | 31.4 |
| Ireland | 54.70 | 25.10 | 50.2 | 26.2 |
| Austria | 55.90 | 27.50 | 43.0 | 28.1 |
| Spain | 58.00 | 24.90 | 53.2 | 19.0 |
| Denmark | 58.10 | 21.70 | 44.4 | 20.0 |
| Norway | | | 46.0 | 19.0 |
| Italy | 62.50 | 45.70 | 63.1 | 39.0 |
| Sweden | 68.40 | 33.40 | 54.0 | 30.0 |
| Portugal | 69.30 | 45.60 | 61.1 | 40.5 |
| Great Britain | 70.60 | 37.60 | 62.2 | 34.1 |
| Czech Republic | 73.60 | 50.90 | 75.2 | 49.3 |
| France | 73.70 | 33.60 | 64.0 | 30.3 |
| Hungary | 78.00 | 70.30 | 73.0 | 70.1 |
| Slovenia | 78.60 | 53.90 | 75.0 | 52.0 |
| Slovak Republic | 80.70 | 58.70 | 78.0 | 53.5 |
| Poland | 81.30 | 56.70 | 80.2 | 48.0 |
| Finland | 81.40 | 30.30 | 48.0 | 25.0 |
| Croatia | 86.30 | 67.00 | 80.0 | 58.2 |
| Russia | 90.90 | 86.00 | 88.0 | 85.3 |
| Latvia | 91.50 | 83.30 | 89.1 | 82.0 |
| Ukraine | 92.30 | 90.30 | 93.0 | 87.5 |
| Cyprus | 93.40 | 79.50 | 89.4 | 76.5 |
| Turkey | 97.00 | 94.40 | 97.0 | 91.3 |
| Total | 78.20 | 49.50 | 72.1 | 44 |