Neoliberal Extractivism and Rural Resistance:
The Anti-Mining Movement in the Peruvian Northern Highlands, Cajamarca (2011-2013)

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by

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This PhD dissertation is dedicated to my parents who have taught me how to live in this world, keeping 易地思之 and 木鷄之德 in mind.

With endless 恭敬.

Abstract

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By Ji-Hyun Seo

This dissertation examines the political prospects of rural subaltern groups in the era of neoliberal globalisation by engaging with the ‘death of the peasantry’ debates. To achieve this, it concentrates on rural resistance in the northern highlands of Peru, Cajamarca, against ‘new mineral extraction’ by multinational capital in the form of *Minera Yanacocha S.A.* (MYSA), with a theoretical framework of critical geography on transnational activism. In particular, the dissertation devotes attention to the massive mobilisations against MYSA’s Conga mining project between 2011 and 2013.

The dispossession and disempowerment of the peasantry have been highlighted as the accumulation of global capital has intensified alongside the implementation of market-led development models around the globe. In the 1990s, the extraction and export of abundant natural resources was promoted as a ‘new development alternative’. In tandem with the unprecedented width and depth of resource extraction, the continent has become witness to increasing incidences of struggles led by local communities, particularly in the countryside. Recent Peruvian economic growth has been boosted by a ‘new mining boom’. Simultaneously, many Peruvians are protesting against mining activities, particularly due to their negative social and environmental impact. Cajamarca is one obvious example where neoliberal mineral extraction has generated a series of local struggles since the arrival of MYSA in 1993. The asymmetrical power of multinational capital vis-à-vis *campesinos* stands out in the context of the emphasis of the central government on ‘national development’ based on natural resource extraction.

Against this backdrop, this dissertation examines the re-articulation of rural subjectivities and the political possibilities in their ‘networked form of resistance’, instead of focusing on the fragmentation, powerlessness and passivity of subaltern groups in the face of global capital power. Economic reductionism restricts our understanding of neoliberal globalisation to the exploitation of global capital vs. dispossession of local communities. Following Doreen Massey’s relational geographical approach, the dissertation maintains that it is relevant to understand the ‘relational content’ of global capital mobility and complex dynamics of resistance. In addition, the dualistic framework of geography and power which is based on an essentialist geographical understanding of the spatial (i.e. space/place; powerful global and powerless local) tends to regard local resistance as ‘reactionary’ place-based struggle. Instead, the dissertation focuses on the ‘interconnectedness’ of subaltern groups. It argues that diverse social groups shape what Featherstone terms ‘prefigurative solidarity’ around ‘maps of grievance’, via political resistance. In this process, a political identity is constructed in order to bring neoliberal globalisation into contestation.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABD	Accumulation by Dispossession
ALAC	Asciación Los Andes de Cajamarca
AMD	Acid Mine Drainage
AP	Popular Action (*Acción Popular*)
APRA	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*)
APRODEV	Association of World Council of Churches Related Development Organisations in Europe
AS	Socialist Accord (*Acuerdo Socialista*)
ASARCO	American Smelting and Refining Company
ATDR	Technical Administration of Irrigation District of Cajamarca (*Administración Técnica del Distrito del Riego de Cajamarca*)
BHP	Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd.
BRGM	Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minieres
C-90/N-M	Change 90/New Majority (*Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría*)
CAEM	Centre for High Military Studies (*Centro de Altos Estudios Militares*)
CAPs	Agrarian Production Cooperatives (*Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción*)
CCD	Democratic Constituent Congress (*Congreso Constituyente Democrático*)
CCL	Lima Chamber of Commerce (*Cámara de Comercio de Lima*)
CCP	Peasant Confederation of Peru (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*)

CEAS	Bishops’ Commission on Social Action (*Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social*)
CEJIL	Centre for Justice and International Law
CELAM	Latin American Episcopal Council (*Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano*)
CENs	Counter-Extractive Networks
CGTP	General Confederation of the Peruvian Workers (*Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú*)
CIDH	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (*Comisión Internacional de Derechos Humanos*)
CIDSE	Coopération Internationale pour le Dédeoppment et la Solidarité
CMA	Compañía Minera Antamina
CNA	National Agrarian Confederation (*Confederación Nacional Agraria*)
CNDDHH	National Coordinator of Human Rights (*Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos*)
CNT	National Central of Workers (*Central Nacional de Trabajadores*)
CONACAMI	National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (*Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería*)
CONAIE	Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador*)
CONAMAQ	National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (*Consejo Nacional De Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu*)
CONFIEP	Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas

COPRI	Commission for the Promotion of Private Investment (*Comisión de Promoción de la Inversión Privada*)
CORECAMI	Regional Confederation of Affected Communities by Mining (*Coordinadora Regional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería*)
CPs	Centros Poblados
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CTAR	Transitory Committee of Regional Administration (*Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional*)
CTP	Confederation of the Peruvian Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos*)
CTRP	Central of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (*Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana*)
CUL	Unified Committee of Struggle (*Comité Unitario de Lucha*)
CVR	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación*)
DFID	Department for International Development
DINOES	National Direction of Special Operations (*Dirección de Operaciones Especiales*)
DIRCOTE	Counter-Terrorist Directorate (*Dirección contra el Terrorismo*)
EAP	Economically Active Population
ECUARUNARI	Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa Nationality (*Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador*)
EI	Extractive Industry

EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment (*Estudio de Impacto Ambiental*)
EIR	Extractive Industries Review
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EJ	Environmental Justice
ELN	Army of National Liberation (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDIEMAC	Frente de Defensa de los Intereses, Ecología, y Medio Ambiente de Cajamarca
FDTG	Frente de Defensa de Tambogrande
FEDECC	Departmental Federation of Peasants of Cajamarca (*Federación Departamental de Campesinos de Cajamarca*)
FEDEPAZ	Ecumenic Foundation for Development and Peace (*Fundación Ecuménica para el Desarrollo y la Paz*)
FEROCAFENOP	Women’s Federation of Peasant Rondas of Cajamarca (*Federación de Rondas Campesinas Femeninas de Cajamarca*)
FIR	Regional Independent Front (*Frente Independiente Regional*)
FLD	Front Line Defenders
FNTMMSP	Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos y Sinderúrgico del Perú
FOCEP	Frente Obrero, Campesino y Popular
FOCOMI	Mining Consolidation Fund (*Fondo de Consolidación Minera*)
FONCODES	National Fund for Development and Social Compensation (*Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social*)

GCS	Global Civil Society
GM	Genetically Modified
GMI	Global Mining Initiative
GRUFIDES	Group of Training and Intervention for Sustainable Development (*Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible*)
IACHR	Inter-American Court on Human Rights
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICC	Inter-Continental Caravan
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICMM	International Council for Mining and Metals
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDL	Institute of Legal Defence (*Instituto de Defensa Legal*)
IFC	International Financial Corporation
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IIRSA	Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IPSS	Social Security Institute (*Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social*)
IR	International Relations
IS	Socialist Left (*Izquerda Socialista*)
IU	United Left (*Izquierda Unida*)

JNE	National Electoral Tribunal (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*)
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
MAS (Bolivia)	Movement for Socialism *(Movimiento al Socialismo)*
MAS (Cajamarca)	Movement for Social Affirmation *(Movimiento de Afirmación Social)*
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MIDIS	Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MINAM	Ministry of Environment
MINEM	Ministry of Energy and Mining
MINPECO	Minero Perú Comercial
MIR	Movement of Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*)
MMC	Manhattan Minerals Corporation
MMSD	Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development
MNCs	Multinational Companies
MRTA	Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*)
MST	Movement of Rural Landless Workers (*Movimiento Sem Terra*)
MTT	Mesa Técnica de Tambogrande
MYSA	Yanacocha Mining Company (*Minera Yanacocha S.A.*)
NSM	New Social Movement
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCMAL	Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina

ODA	Official Development Assistance
ONAMIAP	National Organisation of Andean and Amazonian Women of Peru
ONDS	National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (*Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad*)
PAMA	Programme of Adaptation and Environmental Management (*Programa de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental*)
PCM	Premier’s Office (*Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros*)
PCP	Peruvian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista del Perú*)
PCP-BR	Peruvian Communist Party - Red Flag (*Partido Comunista del Perú - Bandera Roja*)
PCP-PR	Peruvian Communist Party – Red Homeland (*Partido Comunists del Perú – Partria Roja*)
PCP-SL	Peruvian Communist Party-Shining Path (*Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso*)
PCP-U	Peruvian Communist Party-Unity (*Partido Comunista del Perú-Unidad*)
PCR	Revolutionary Communist Party *(Partido Comunista Revolucionario*)
PERULAC	Compañía Peruana de Alimentos Lácteos, Nestlé Perú S.A.
PIC	Plataforma Inter-Institucional Celendina
PMSP	Popular Solidarity Mining Programme (*Programa Minero de Solidaridad con el Pueblo*)
PPC	Christian Popular Party (*Partido Popular Cristiano*)
PRA	Poverty, Reduction and Alleviation

PRONAA	National Fund of Alimentation (*Fondo Nacional de Alimentación*)
PSG	Peru Support Group
PSR	Revolutionary Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Revolucionario*)
PT	Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)
PUM	Unified Mariateguist Party (*Partido Unificado Mariateguista*)
RGAF	Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces
SAIS	Agricultural Societies of Social Interest (*Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social*)
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SENACE	National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investment (*Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles*)
SEDACAJ	(Empresa Prestadora de) Servicios de Saneamineto, S.A., Cajamarca
SIE	Army Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército*)
SIN	National Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional*)
SINAMOS	National Support System for Social Mobilisation (*Sistema National de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*)
SMOs	Social Movement Organisations
SOEs	State-owned Enterprises
SPCC	Southern Peru Copper Corporation
SPDA	Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental
SUNAT	**N**ational Tax Collection Agency (*Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria*)

SUTEP	Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú
TANs	Transnational Advocacy Networks
TUO	El Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley General de Minería
TSMOs	Transnational Social Movement Organisations
UDP	Unidad Democrática Popular
UNCSD	UN Conference on Sustainable Development
UNIR	Unity of Revolutionary Left (*Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria*)
UNSCH	National University of San Cristóbal of Huamanga
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VR	Revolutionary Vanguard (*Vanguardia Revolucionaria*)
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report
WDR08	World Development Report 2008 (: Agriculture for Development?)
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1

Introduction

Contemporary Rural Social Movements in Latin America

Research Background

On the first day of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)'s fifth ministerial conference (10-14 September 2003) in Cancún, Mexico, a South Korean peasant leader committed suicide amidst the protest against the liberalisation of agricultural markets, just weeks before his daughter's wedding ceremony. The first question that came to my mind was what made him take this drastic action? Whenever there were protests against neoliberal globalisation in and outside the country, the conservative Korean media, as well as politicians, criticised protesters as obstacles to the expansion of market opportunity, shaming the 'national' image.[1] Their justification is based on the assumption that opening up and liberalising the market is the only possible solution to overcome the financial crisis and promote the country's economic growth. Since Korea's financial crisis in the late 1990s, International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy recommendations have become accepted among economic and political elites. Consequently, the agrarian sector was liberalised as the state reduced subsidies and support, exposing most peasants to the pressure of asymmetrical global market forces. This story formed part of my academic interests over the following years: neoliberal globalisation, peasants, and social movements. Living in a 'globalising' world, it is not hard to realise that what are seemingly someone else's problems, or events in another country, cannot be regarded as 'foreign' or disconnected issues, such as climate change. Likewise, it was not difficult to discover that the predicament of South Korean farmers was repeated in other parts of the world, despite the different settings. In this context, this chapter will elucidate how I came to choose my research focus, develop my argument and research questions, by contextualising the main issues (i.e. development, rural transformation and contemporary rural social movements in Latin America) and locating the dissertation within the literature.

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[1] I am highly sceptical about the claim that there are non-conservative media in South Korea. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the economic development process went hand-in-hand with state formation and the construction of a 'highly modernist national identity' under successive authoritarian regimes. This atmosphere preserved the Cold War environment, which did not allow debates on labour rights or criticism against the 'national' government.

In relation to the research questions, I will also elaborate on the methodology I used to conduct this research. Finally, I will lay out the structure of the dissertation. Although the anecdote about the South Korean farmer ended in tragedy, the growing incidences of rural social movements in recent decades demonstrate that peasants around the globe are not ‘powerless’ and fated to ‘disappear’ vis-à-vis asymmetrical global capital power, a debate this dissertation will engage with.

‘Development’ and Transformation in the Countryside

Capitalist industrialisation has disproportionately influenced populations in the countryside around the globe. Accordingly, peasants have been depicted as ‘victims’ of capitalist exploitation and their political power to produce social change was highly underestimated. Although they became prominent political actors in revolutionary struggles and demands for structural change in the post-war period, the peasantry was only regarded as playing a ‘secondary’ role in supporting vanguard parties and leftist intellectuals or receivers of state subsidies for agricultural production. This tendency was intensified as the market-led development model became predominant in the early 1970s. As states reduced their intervention in the economy, and revolutionary and reformist political agendas receded from political priorities, the exposure of rural producers to the power of global capital and their ‘dispossession’ and ‘powerlessness’ were underlined by many commentators. In this section, I introduce some observations on the changing rural landscape and its impact on peasants around the world in order to contextualise the objective conditions which rural subaltern groups face in the era of neoliberal globalisation.

Araghi explains peasant dispossession over three periods through a ‘world-historical framing’: (1) ‘colonial-liberal globalism’ (before the late nineteenth century); (2) ‘long national developmentalism’ (1917-1973); and (3) ‘postcolonial neoliberal globalism’, or globalisation (since 1973) (2009: 113). He maintains that the current phase of globalisation comes after colonial-liberal globalism, while the second period represented an exceptional reformist period which found its origin in the 1917 October Revolution in Russia. From the ‘world-historical’ perspective, the period since 1973 follows colonial-liberal globalism patterns: ‘economic liberalism, antiwelfarism, free-market fetishism, and designs for constructing a truly global division of labour’, in contrast to the reformist interregnum between 1917 and 1973 (Araghi, 2009: 114). The latter phase ‘witnessed colonial liberalism’s retreat from globalism, in response to the challenges posed by variant forms of socialism and anticolonial nationalism' (Araghi, 2009: 113). During this reformist period, dispossession was not completely dominant and some groups of peasants were included in the 'national development projects', albeit in an 'exclusionary' or 'discriminatory' manner. For the purposes of national development in the postcolonial countries, various agrarian policies were implemented, particularly in the Cold War context: state subsidies were granted to peasants; the US government promoted a food aid policy, supported by mass domestic grain production; and invested in the 'Green Revolution'. Most importantly, US-style agrarian reform was implemented in Third World countries in the 1950s and 1960s (Araghi, 2009: 126-128). However, 'the postwar food order depressed world prices of grain and encouraged third world food imports and food import dependency', creating a condition for another global 'depeasantisation' in the following years (Araghi, 2009: 128). Although peasants played a particular role in the agrarian reform process, they were not the principal beneficiaries of the reforms (Teubal, 2009b: 152). However, there were 'different types or degrees of exclusion as even the most excluded persons have some sort of relationship with either the economic, social or political system' (Kay, 2006: 462).

Since 1973, '[t]he states and economies within which peasants are subordinated have become increasingly integrated into global circuits of production, trade and finance, a phenomenon universally known as *globalisation*' (Akram-Lohdi and Kay, 2009: 4, emphasis in the original). As Araghi points out, this is not a new phenomenon, but the width and depth of globalisation are unprecedented. Against this backdrop, there is what McMichael (2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2009) has called the 'global food regime' developed, with most peasants becoming 'little more than contracted petty commodity-producing pieceworkers subsumed within the buyer-driven commodity chains of corporate agro-food transnational corporations' (Akram-Lohdi and Kay, 2009: 5). With the implementation of neoliberal reforms, the global rural landscape saw a rather bifurcated production structure as Deere and Royce observe: '[T]he most dynamics growth sectors – non-traditional exports such as oil seeds, livestock, vegetables, and fruit – are largely produced by the most modern and capitalized farmers with links to agro-industry and by multinational agribusinesses. Those in decline include traditional exports…generally produced by small farmers' (2009: 6). Faced with the asymmetrical competition with global agribusiness, peasants were forcibly displaced to cities or became a global 'massive reserve army of migratory labour' (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009: 23). In this sense, Araghi argues:

> [T]he privatization of the agrarian welfare state created in the national developmentalist era, to the advantage of Northern agribusiness transnational corporations and capitalist farms, forms the context in which the relative depeasantization and displacement of the postwar period gave way to absolute depeasantization and displacement under postcolonial neoliberal globalism (2009: 133).

These debates surrounding the 'new agrarian question' arose in publications by various scholars working in the field of the agrarian political economy (see Akram-Lodhi and Kay (eds), 2009; Bernstein, 2006; McMichael, 1997; Kautsky, 1988).[2] A detailed discussion on the 'new agrarian question' is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, debates on the fate of the peasantry within the agrarian question are of considerable importance in the contemporary setting. Hobsbawm argued that 'the death of the peasantry' is 'the most dramatic and far-reaching social change' in the twentieth century (1994: 289). When criticising the position adopted by structuralist and modernist commentators who stress the insignificance of the peasantry as a political force, Petras and Veltmeyer argue:

> Essentially the peasantry is viewed as a pre-modern social category or class that has been unable to adapt to the forces of change, and has consequently lost the struggle with modernity. (…) Hobsbawm, and modernists in general, see the peasantry as a relatively insignificant political factor in the wider process of change and development, a numerically reduced and political impotent and spent social force, fated to disappear into the slums, squatter, settlements and informal economies of the region's burgeoning centres (2001: 88).

In a similar vein, they claimed that Kay also saw the peasantry as a 'victim, buffeted by the economic and political forces acting on it' and a 'permanent semiproletariat caught up in a stalled historical process' (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001: 87). From the structuralist point of view, Kay (2001, 2006) attributed the main cause of violence and poverty as well as a lack of development in the countryside in postwar Latin American countries to the lost promises of agrarian reform. Likewise, faced with social transformations intensified by the opening of economies, rural households forcibly diversified their sources of income and relied on multiple non-farm activities for subsistence, a change which has recently been termed the

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[2] This new debate over the 'agrarian question' is associated with the following question: is it still relevant to talk about agriculture and the peasantry in this era of globalised capitalist development? Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2009) point to the ongoing relevance of the issue in their edited book. They argue that the debate revolves around: 'whether the meaning of the agrarian question in the contemporary period has fundamentally challenged'; or 'whether the agrarian question is now fundamentally a concept that can be relegated to the footnotes of history, as suggested by Hobsbawm' (2009: 6).

‘new rurality’ (‘*nueva ruralidad*’) (see Kay, 2006, 2007, 2008). So, is the peasantry fated to disappear?

Contemporary Rural Social Movements

If the peasantry is disappearing or fated to disappear, how can we explain the rise of contemporary agrarian and other rural social movements across the globe over the last three decades, in which peasants have demonstrated significant political agency? Is their political activism only the last reactionary gasp of impoverished and powerless rural producers? There has been a growing incidence of rural social movements throughout Latin America, such as the Landless Rural Labours’ Movement (MST) in Brazil and the Zapatista movement in Chiapas. Moreover, as Teubal points out: ‘[I]n Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico and Ecuador, important parts of these movements have reaffirmed the centrality of indigenous, ethnic and communitarian identities’ (2009b: 159). There is also a connection with other movements in the countryside, particularly those concerned with gender equality and environmental degradation, which are often associated with hydroelectric dam construction, mining projects, logging, and agro-industry, stimulated by the current export-led economic growth model (Teubal, 2009b: 159, see also Deere and Joyce, 2009: 7). Despite the literature being heavily concerned with the contemporary ‘agrarian’ movements and debates regarding the fate of the peasantry, there has been an increasing focus on explaining the origins of ‘rural’ social movements. This literature examines: (1) the objective political-economic conditions for the ‘emergence’; (2) the ‘newness’ of movements; and (3) their organisational capacity and effectiveness. However, none of these categories are exclusionary. First, neoliberal globalisation and its impact on rural livelihoods are highlighted as an important cause of the birth of these movements. Deere and Royce note: ‘[I]n this generally unfavourable macro situation, rural men and women – indigenous, white, black, and mestizo – have increasingly mobilized in defense of livelihoods, to contest their social exclusion, and redefine the terms and content of citizenship’ (2009: 7). Second, those who postulate a new social movement (NSM) or ‘postmodernist’ approach tend to emphasise the ‘newness’ of contemporary mobilisations. Poststructuralists and postmodernists moved their research focus from materialist or structuralist to postmaterialist meanings. According to Petras and Velmeyer, their studies were ‘embodied in an exclusively grassroots analysis of social issues such as gender, race and ethnicity, political identity, hegemony and power’ (2001: 89). Finally, certain scholars concentrate on organisational capacity – both national and transnational – in relation to changing political (circumstances) opportunities and their impact on the political dynamics of particular mobilisations. As Deere and Royce explain, a favourable political context has opened for organising efforts as a result of recent social and technological change: ‘the growing rural literacy and schooling, the supportive role of transcommunity and transnational advocacy networks, and the impact of the telecommunications revolution’ (2009: 8). In a similar vein, Kay explains the success of the MST through its leadership’s awareness of ‘the need to forge linkages and make alliances with urban organisations in order to extend public support for their goals’ (2001: 756).[3] Emphasising the role of peasants and indigenous peoples in promoting ‘political and social change’, Petras and Veltmeyer highlight that rural social movements, such as MST and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador*, CONAIE), had a significant impact on national policies, as well as challenging ‘state power’ (2001: 98). Given the upsurge in grassroots mobilisations, Borras, Edelman and Kay (2008) edited a book on the complex trajectories of ‘transnational’ rural-based social movements, which have confronted neoliberal globalisation. Additionally, Borras (2010) focuses on the impact of ‘transnational’ agrarian movements on international rural development policies, with a particular focus on *Vía Campesina*. Analysis of rural mobilisation in Latin America has, therefore, been an area of increasing scholarly concern over the past two decades.

Main Argument and Research Questions

Based on the literature on contemporary rural social movements in Latin America, this section develops my main argument, engaging with debates on ‘the death of the peasantry’ and the political prospects of subaltern actors such as peasants. Under both national-developmentalism and neoliberal globalisation, capitalist development has engendered combined and unequal development. It has produced ‘subaltern fragmentation within and across borders’: ‘as a narrow minority of the popular classes are inserted into globalized commodity chains, whereas other sections are increasingly marginalized from global accumulation and subjected to intensifying immiseration' (Motta and Nilsen, 2011: 17). In the global countryside, peasant groups who engage in multiple forms of rural and non-rural economic activities in connection with transnational capital, such as agri-business, are included in the former. Country people who are forcibly displaced from their land comprise the impoverished labour reserve in urban shantytowns or migrate (legally or illegally) to other countries, form the latter element. Indeed, this analysis based on materialist objective conditions gives us a critical perspective on the unequal way in which capitalist 'development' impacts on rural livelihoods, which for the majority results in exploitation, marginalisation, exclusion and dispossession. However, Chalcraft has pointed out the limitations of materialistic perspectives:

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[3] In this sense, the MST ‘developed connections with the urban left and the Workers Party (PT), which have not been without tensions, thereby being part of a wider project of social and political transformation’ (Kay, 2001: 756). Likewise, Petras and Veltmeyer point out that ‘today many of the leading cadres, militants and activists in the rural workers/peasant movements are educated, have a definite understanding of national politics, and have been exposed to and engaged in national and international debates about rural alternatives’ (2001: 102).

> [A] materialistic reading (…), far from being mobilizing, seems to demobilize and encourage passivity among those outside the authentic proletariat; it understates the role of ideas in articulating diverse interests and thus in forging oppositional blocs; it defines exploitation itself too narrowly; and it is too scornful of the possibilities for and achievements of opposition that nonetheless falls short of socialist Armageddon (2011: 53-54).

To put it differently, subaltern groups are understood as only being marginalised from global capitalist development and left increasingly fragmented. Likewise, neoclassical economists share a similar position regarding the 'impotence' or 'passivity' of subaltern groups. As Motta and Nilsen note, 'the assumptions of neoclassical economics colonize the political, the social and the subjective in an attempt to create docile subjectivities and commodified social relationships' (2011: 15). According to this approach, subaltern groups tend to be regarded as individual producers who at best have to improve their competitiveness in a globalised market and are disarticulated from 'political' decisions which 'professional' politicians and technocrats make. Accordingly, the only alternatives left for them are to improve their individual capability through multi-form survival activities (a modernist World Bank-style 'recommendation' for rural poverty reduction) to gain material support from the government or international development agencies, if not promoting agrarian reform (a more 'structuralist' solution).

Although an analysis based on objective conditions is still relevant, within the framework of materialist reductionism subaltern groups remain in the status quo, if not getting worse. However, power does not only reside in global capital. A varying degree of experiences of grievances resulting from neoliberal globalisation tend to provide diverse subaltern groups at different spatialities with motives to act collectively. It is not hard to find 'power in resistance' if you look at the dynamics of social movements in present-day Latin America. The following observation on the political power of peasants in the global South by Motta and Nilsen merits attention:

> In the rural sector, it is typically small and marginal peasants and indigenous subsistence peasants that have borne the brunt of accumulation by dispossession… Exposed to the onslaught of global market forces they are poorly equipped to withstand, they are slowly being forced off their land … [However, rather than ‘the death of the peasantry’] peasant groups across the global South have challenged their dispossession vigorously through movements and networks that seek to reclaim land rights and reorient agriculture towards the imperatives of food security and ecological sustainability… this has involved the construction of new subjectivities and social relationships that reinvent a development beyond developmentalism and against neoliberalism (2011:16).

The unprecedented onslaught of neoliberal ‘development’ on natural resources, such as land, water, biodiversity, minerals, and its exclusionary nature, have emerged as important motives underpinning contemporary rural social movements in Latin America. It ‘forges the grounds for unity (among diverse subaltern groups) due to the intensification of experiences of disempowerment and exclusion’ (Motta and Nilsen, 2011: 15-16). Organised groups during the national developmentalist phase (e.g., beneficiaries from agrarian reform and peasant unionists) have allied with those dispossessed through neoliberal globalisation, as well as with other actors in civil society (such as grassroots organisations, NGOs etc.) to reformulate new subjectivities for contemporary rural social movements. Despite frequent tensions, these actors forge collective action based on common goals, i.e. opposition to neoliberal globalisation. Accordingly, within these rearticulated subaltern rural subjectivities, it is possible to voice various demands – both ‘materialist’ and ‘postmaterialist’. For instance, former peasant unionists (the ‘included’ subaltern) reclaim the right to access land or state subsidies, once viable under nationalist developmentalism, while simultaneously marginalised groups (the ‘peripherised’ subaltern), such as indigenous people, argue for the recognition of their ethnic identity or their way of life, in addition to formulating socio-economic demands (Motta and Nilsen, 2011: 13). In this way, connections and coalitions between seemingly ‘unlike’ actors (both ‘included’ and ‘peripherised’ subaltern groups) can be forged in opposition to neoliberal globalisation. This common dispossession across different or ‘fragmented’ subaltern sectors (possessing both materialist and postmaterialist concerns) provides them with an opportunity to coalesce political activism. On this point, Motta and Nilsen maintain:

> novel articulations of popular protest had also emerged, both from subaltern groups that had been peripheral to developmentalism as a hegemonic project, and from subaltern groups that had benefited from its compromises and concessions… It was during the 1990s – the era of neoliberal triumphalism par excellence – that these two strands of popular protest seemed to be increasingly converging in social movements that were simultaneously critical of state-led capitalist development and neoliberalism (2011: 13-14).

Through this re-articulation of subaltern groups in the countryside, Latin America has become one of the world's most politically and socially dynamic regions in terms of grassroots mobilisations over the last three decades: as witnessed by the rise of various peasants and indigenous movements; protests against neoliberal extractivism; as well as the election of so-called 'pink tide' governments across the region. As Motta and Nilsen note, neoliberal globalisation has created 'the conditions for a radical recomposition and reimagining of social emancipation and political change, which is arguably most clearly present in Latin America, where the oppositional projects of subaltern groups move both beyond and below the nation-state by politicizing localities and everyday life, and constructing alternative forms of transnationalization such as the World Social Forum or the solidarity economy movement' (2011: 17).

Against this backdrop, the main purpose of this dissertation is to argue against 'the death of the peasantry' perspective by examining the re-composition of subaltern agencies in contemporary rural social movements in opposition to neoliberal globalisation. My research focuses on both the objective and subjective conditions of neoliberal globalisation and rural resistance, which revolves around neoliberal extractivism in Peru. Although the extraction and export of natural resources is not a new phenomenon in Latin America, its depth and width have become unprecedented in the current neoliberal phase. Particularly in Peru, a series of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were implemented in the aftermath of political and economic crisis during the 1980s. In line with recommendations promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) as a new 'development' strategy, the mining sector has become a priority for national economic policy. However, the macroeconomic stability and fiscal bonanza generated by mineral extraction saw a growing incidence of socio-environmental protests across the country, particularly in rural areas. This research pays particular attention to these dynamics in Peru's northern highlands, the department of Cajamarca, which experienced the arrival of *Minera Yanacocha S.A.* (MYSA) (a Denver-based multinational). Its activities have engendered multifarious social protests by local populations over the last twenty years as the ‘new mineral extraction’ of multinational capital has advanced by ‘dispossessing’ local *campesinos* and affecting the environment. However, I will argue that diverse social groups that operate within different spatialities have experienced a negative impact (altough to a varying degree) and these common grievances have motivated them to create ‘linkages and connections’ to forge collective actions against mining activities. In order to examine the re-articulation of subaltern groups, I focus on this ‘interconnectedness’ of subaltern groups constructed around causes of grievance resulting from neoliberal mineral extraction and their ‘networked forms of resistance’, based on my theoretical framework using a relational geographical approach. Despite tensions and contradictions within complex power relations, I demonstrate that actors at different spatialities contest grievances resulting from neoliberal extractivism while simultaneously constructing their political identity. The recent massive mobilisations against MYSA’s Conga mining project are a particular focus to answer the following questions:

- Are *campesinos* in the rural highlands of Peru, specifically Cajamarca, ‘disappearing’ or fated to disappear given the advance of neoliberal extraction?
- Are their protests against mining activities a last ‘reactionary’ gasp when faced with the seemingly unstoppable advance of global capital?
- If not, how did *campesinos* reformulate new subaltern subjectivities in opposition to neoliberal mineral extraction?
- How did they forge networks, develop political activism and construct a political identity when contesting neoliberal globalisation?

Research Methodology: Reflexivity and Flexibility

Ontological and Epistemological Reflexivity

The research questions above took a clearer shape particularly during and after the fieldwork I conducted in Cajamarca between July 2011 and July 2012. Initially, my intention was to examine the political dynamics of local *campesino* organisations in relation to the possibility of building Peruvian leftist politics. Soon after my arrival in Cajamarca, the massive mobilisations against the MYSA’s Conga mining project caught my attention and I decided to focus on the anti-Conga movement. In this section, I show how I developed my research focus, via epistemological and ontological reflexivity, and collected data in a flexible way during and after fieldwork. The department of Cajamarca is located in Peru’s northern Andes, bordering with Ecuador. Administratively, thirteen provinces and 127 districts form the department, of which the latitude and altitude show a variety of ecology, including the Amazonian rainforest and Andean highlands. Approximately 1.38 million people live in Cajamarca, comprising 5.1 per cent of the national population, of whom 68 per cent reside in rural areas (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 17). Cajamarca is one of the poorest departments in the country, and nearly 75 per cent experience poor living condition in Celendín, the poorest province. Most *cajamarquinos* were dedicated to agriculture and livestock-raising before 1993 when MYSA arrived in the region. In contrast to central and southern departments, large-scale mining represented a new experience for most *cajamarquinos*, since historically only small-scale extraction had been undertaken in Hualgayoc province during the republican period (see Chapter 4 and 5). In the aftermath of the multinational’s arrival, Cajamarca has become a zone with a long list of potential mining projects over the last two decades: some 47.32 per cent of the departmental territory is now under mining concessions, concentrated in the southern and central provinces (see Chapter 5). Alongside the increasing presence of mining activities, the department witnessed a growing number of protests against mineral extraction by local populations. One of the most recent expressions of discontent are the massive mobilisations against MYSA’s Conga mining project: the anti-Conga movement (2011-2013).

In comparison to the central and southern Andes, Cajamarca has little ethnic identity and a weak community tradition. Almost all of the population is Spanish-speaking. Taylor explains the reasons for weak community tradition in Cajamarca. First, the Inca Empire conquered the region shortly before the arrival of the Spaniards, in approximately 1475. This relatively brief period of Inca domination meant that the *ayllu* tradition was not deeply embedded in the region. Second, the relatively lower economic importance of the region compared to the central and southern highlands (where most mines were located) during colonial times signified that there was little need for a strict implementation of *reducción* (1979: 55-56). Due to the weaker influence of ethnic and community tradition and its distance from Lima, this part of the highlands received comparatively less academic attention than its southern and central counterparts. Before the 2000s, the academic literature in English on Cajamarca was concentrated on: 1) capitalist development of agriculture (Gitlitz, 1975; Taylor 1979; and Deere, 1990 with a gender focus) and 2) socio-political dynamics in the countryside, particularly the rise and fall of the nightwatch patrols (*rondas campesinas*) (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983; Gitlitz, 1998; Starn, 1999; and Gitlitz, 2013). Since the 2000s, more research has been conducted on the 'why' and 'how' of local protests against MYSA's mining activities, particularly examining the negative impacts on rural livelihoods and the organisational limitations of local protests (Arana, 2002; Leyva and Jahncke, 2002; Seifert, 2003; Bury, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2011; Bebbington et al., 2008b; Lingán, 2008; Meléndez, 2009).

Regarding social protests, most authors have commented on organisational constraints due to a lack of community tradition compared to the southern highlands, and vulnerability to movement fragmentation because of the pressing material needs of the *minifundista* peasants. Previous analyses have concentrated on the adverse relationship between MYSA's mineral extraction and the deteriorating living conditions of most country people, exacerbated by environmental degradation, which have been flagged as one of the main causes behind increasing mobilisations against the mining multinational. However, peasants have tended to be regarded as powerless political actors, or receivers of NGOs' paternalist support (Lingán, 2008). In addition, it had been argued that their organisations are vulnerable to fragmentation (Meléndez, 2009). From this analytical perspective, objective conditions, such as the advance of global capital and weak traditions of political and social organisation, make it harder for local peasants to contest mineral extraction and to forge an alternative. Against this backdrop, I adopt epistemological and ontological reflexivity in finding rural subjectivities within the anti-Conga movement. In her explanation of methodological reflexivity, Raven argues that reflexivity 'involves a critical exploration of not only what we know, but also more centrally what we *do not know* (i.e., our unawareness) and *why and how* we have come to know and not to know' (2006: 560).

Epistemologically, the academic privilege of knowledge production should be critically reviewed. Here, it is fruitful to look at Motta's criticism vis-à-vis the epistemological constraints inherent in the traditional theoretical framework of social movements, both from a social democratic and an orthodox Marxist perspective. When interpreting the rise of new social movements, social-democrats tend to regard them 'either as prepolitical or politically impotent, concerned merely with particular issues, or dangerous for political stability and democratic deepening' (Motta, 2009: 33). From a social-democratic viewpoint, popular organisations should form part of a wide 'development consensus' which emphasises 'the compatibility between (capitalist) accumulation and participation and redistribution', i.e. the conciliatory relationship between economic development and socio-economic rights (Motta, 2009: 37). The role of political parties is highlighted in this process. As she points out, within this theoretical framework, the political is understood only within liberal representative democracy based on elite politicians, political parties, and the market economy, as 'a capital-centric understanding of economic development' (2009: 38). Consequently, the disarticulation between social movements and the mainstream political arena, including political parties, is perceived as being negative for the consolidation of democratic development. It only results in the marginalisation of local movements (Motta, 2009: 39). For their part, orthodox Marxists argue that the organisation of the working class should be led by the vanguard party with a goal of the seizure of state power and structural transformation. Within this perspective, contemporary social movements are doomed to fail, or become marginalised at best, due to their 'lack of strategic relationship with the state, the lack of institutionalization into a party form… and the lack of concrete ideology to guide political action' (Motta, 2009: 42).

Accordingly, this epistemological limit of the traditional theories on contemporary social movements could make academics 'run the risk of becoming gatekeepers of the status quo, as opposed to providing intellectual illumination to new forms of progressive politics' (Motta, 2009: 32). Therefore, it is necessary to transcend 'conceptualizations of the subaltern as merely a passive victim of domination and exclusion and redirecting our theoretical focus toward the subaltern's actual activity' (Motta, 2009: 51). This epistemological reflexivity helped sharpen my research focus on the subjectivity of rural political actors and their political practices in the anti-Conga movement, engaging in the debate over the fate of the peasantry. Echoing this epistemological viewpoint, I will approach the movement to examine the political activism of rural subjectivities in contesting neoliberal extractivism, which is further developed in my theoretical framework based on critical geography in Chapter 2. In the following exchanges, I will show how I introduced 'ontological reflexivity' in developing my theoretical approach of the research.

> #1.
>
> Señorita, ¿de dónde viene? Trabaja por una ONG? Usted viene del extranjero, tiene que divulgar 'la verdad' sobre nuestra lucha, no como los medios de Lima. Nosotros no somos radicales. Somos campesinos humildes. Luchamos por una causa justa, para defender nuestra agua (one *campesina* in the Cajamarca city, 9 April 2012).[4]

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[4] # 1. 'Señorita, where are you from? Do you work for an NGO? Coming from a foreign country, you should disseminate 'the real facts' about our movement, not like the mainstream media in Lima. We are not radicals. We are humble peasants. We only protest for one just cause: in defence of our water.' During the regional march, one *campesina* approached me in the main square and made this comment. Looking foreign with a camera,

> # 2.
>
> ¿Porqué estás tomando fotos? ¿Qué estás apuntando? Trabajas por la mina? Vas a vender la información a la mina? (One *campesino* in Cajamarca, 31 May 2012).[5]

‘Foreignness’ is not limited to geographical distance, particularly living in this ‘globalising’ world. Calculating only transport time, it took me almost the same amount of time to travel from Liverpool to Lima (approximately 15 hours by flight) as from Lima to Cajamarca (nearly 16 hours by coach).[6] Despite the risk of simplified generalisation, the aforementioned vignettes suggest two contrasting views on what ‘foreignness’ is, or should be, within the ‘local’ context. On the one hand, being ‘foreign’ indicated those with the potential to undertake a ‘rights’ advocacy on behalf of local peasants or who sympathised with the latter, in contrast to the national government and media in Lima. Since independence, the Peruvian rural highlands (*sierra rural*) have been unequally incorporated, or marginalised, in political, economic, and social terms. The geographical distance between the coast (particularly Lima) and Andean regions also reflects the developmental gap within the national discourse, similar to the difference between developed countries and Peru. Consequently, the *sierra rural* has become a ‘retarded and stable’ place in the majority mind set, which needs to be ‘modernised’ and ‘developed’ as has occurred on the coast. During the fieldwork, I had a chance to stay in Lima, and asked *limeños* what they thought about protests against the Conga project. Although several casual conversations cannot represent what every *limeño* opines, I gained a perception that they did not care or regarded it as one of many social conflicts led by ‘ignorant’ highlanders or radical politicians who manipulated the *campesinos*. Therefore, ‘law and order’ should be imposed to defend foreign investors as well as national economic growth, a position reminiscent of the *limeño* government and most media. In line with this development discourse, foreigners could be perceived among local denizens as ‘exploiters’ of the local population and natural resources, or supporters of this exploitation. From this

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recorder and notebook in hand, she could have thought that I worked for an NGO or ‘foreign’ media. Frustrated with the conservative media in Lima and Cajamarca, which described local protesters as radicals, presumably she thought that she should say something whenever she met foreigners. After saying this to me, she moved to other foreign-looking persons, making the same comments.

[5] # 2. ‘Why are you taking photos? What are you noting down? Are you working for the mining company? Are you going to sell the information to the mining company?’ This episode happened in the middle of one of the tensest local environments when the second indefinite strike was initiated. I was standing in front of the San Francisco church in the main square of Cajamarca city after having talked with *campesinos* from other provinces who were having lunch, organised by nuns and local women in the Church’s front yard.

[6] There is a flight between Lima and Cajamarca, but I took a road trip due to economic constraints.

perspective, these kinds of foreigners take a similar position to those in Lima.

Thinking reflexively about the comments on ‘foreignness’, the geographical understanding of local *campesinos* is based on relational, not essentialist ontology. Rather than essentialist geographical distance, locals understand ‘foreignness’ as being more associated with development and its related social relationships. While *limeños* live within the national boundary, they were perceived as being at a further distance than those foreigners who worked for an NGO or who were in favour of the movement’s cause: the defence of water. Sometimes, those who are working for the mining company could be regarded as ‘exploiters’ of humble peasants, regardless of nationality. This ontological reflexivity helps us gain a better understanding of a reformulated subjectivity. Rather than describing local peasants as ‘ignorant’, ‘powerless’ or ‘passive’ agents bounded to underdeveloped or retarded local tradition, they could be seen as active political actors in contesting global capital. I will develop my theoretical argument based on this relational geographical ontology in Chapter 2.

Flexibility in Data Collection

Before leaving for Cajamarca, I stayed in Lima for a week, recovering from jet lag and meeting several contacts I had arranged beforehand. All-in-all, they gave me a strong perception that living in Cajamarca would not be easy since the region is highly rural and not ‘modern’. Furthermore, my research focus would not really be relevant because mining has become the norm in Cajamarca. One of the comments I got was: are there any rural social movements in the contemporary world? So it would be better to travel and visit the hot spring, Baños del Inca, (a tourist site in Cajamarca), and return to Lima with another research focus. Thinking retrospectively, this was the reason for conducting fieldwork, by immersing myself in the daily life of people, using my eyes and ears to gain a better understanding of what was happening in the local context. In addition, it is necessary for a researcher to be sensitive to a local situation, not only when observing, but also learning from and reflecting on what she or he has ‘observed’ or ‘lived’ during fieldwork. In this vein, my approach to the research is not only limited to my engagement with academic debates but was also a learning process. This position was influenced by what Zapatistas called *la Otra Campaña* (the Other Campaign), declared in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle in 2005. According to the Zapatistas, *La Campaña* ‘explicitly encouraged Northern (solidarity) organizations that had been focusing their resources on Chiapas to shift their attention to struggles against neoliberal globalization in their own homes' (Andrews, 2011: 142). In this sense, I regarded my research object not only as something to be 'observed' but also to be learned from, a position different from postwar area studies or early anthropology.[7] Although the researcher may acquire a general idea of the research location and develop a rather detailed and fixed research design, the world we are living in is invariably unpredictable and more complex than we expect. For this reason, the research focus and questions tend to take a clearer form during and after fieldwork. This was what happened to me during my fieldwork in Peru. After receiving rather pessimistic comments in Lima, I arrived in Cajamarca in late July 2011. Luckily, as one of my supervisors has researched the region for many decades, he had a long list of contacts in Cajamarca. Futhermore, his initial presence in Cajamarca enabled me to make important contacts. In addition, his partner (a *cajamarquina*), her family and friends enabled me to make invaluable contacts as I stayed with her for the first months. Several weeks after arriving in Cajamarca, I was informed that there was a regional meeting of the nightwatch patrols (*rondas campesinas*) in the neighbouring province of Hualgayoc. Experiencing nearly three-hour of precarious road journey, I arrived in Bambamarca, the capital of Hualgayoc province, for a two-day event. Participation in this event proved a turning point, as it allowed me to contact important informants for forthcoming interviews. During the meeting, when participants divided into several groups to discuss their local issues and problems in more detail, I happened to join a group containing *ronderos* from Celendín, a province which is one of the main loci of MYSA's Conga project. This was in mid-August 2011 when mobilisations against the Conga project remained at the local level. During casual conversations with *shilicos* (a colloquial term for people from Celendín), I gained a vague idea of the impact and explosive potential of the project. Several months later, mobilisations against the project became massive, particularly after November 2011. In this fashion, my research focus was determined.

My data collection methods included participant observations, (semi-structure or open-ended) interviewing, casual conversations, collection of the media coverage and documents (on-line and off-line), and observation of events in public spaces (see Appendix II and Photo 1). Researching the social movement in an extremely tense environment, where police and military forces were present in large numbers (particularly after a confrontation with protesters in late November 2011 and the consequent declaration of a state of emergency), was not an easy task (see Photo 2 and 6).[8] First, doubts and distrust abounded in a conflictive atmosphere as seen in #2 above. Sometimes this made it difficult to gain access to interviewees. To overcome this, support from my contacts was invaluable as ‘gatekeepers’ or ‘key informants’ (Creswell, 2007: 71). For example, an interview with the lawyer of the prominent NGO GRUFIDE was made possible because she was a good friend of my supervisor’s partner’s niece. Another instance involved obtaining an interview with a MYSA worker, which was facilitated through one of my *cajamarquino* friends. In Celendín, one important contact kept informing me of successive events concerning the movement and he facilitated interviews with movement leaders and activities. Another issue related to sources of information that often contained conflicting viewpoints or propagandistic in nature. This characterises much of the literature which denounced the protesters’ violence, views emanating from the central government and the Lima-based conservative media. To handle this problem I was able to utilise ‘participant observations’ in protests and marches to confirm or deny the veracity of the information. Additionally, the process of verifying information was undertaken via ‘data triangulation’, i.e. through employing various sources (such as reliable newspapers, online blogs, conversations with informants, and personal observation) (Robson, 2002: 174). Using a variety of sources enabled me to attain a clearer understanding of unpredictable situations.

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[7] 'Both anthropologist and colonial civil servant seem to have perceived the foreigner as someone who was outside and different from the white middle class. So the 'foreign' becomes something they can discover, research and understand … So the early anthropologist may have shared with modern 'upmarket' tourists a belief in the irreplaceable intrinsic value of every culture still not affected by Western influence' (Silverman, 2011: 120).

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[8] For the implementation of the state’s authoritarian measures vis-à-vis social movements, see Chapter 6.

Photo 1.

Photo taken by the author’s friend during the March in Celendín (28 March 2012).

Photo 2.

VIDRIOS
VIDRIOS Y ALUMINIOS
PINILLOS
Plazuela Bolognesi
VIDRIE
PINILL
INSTALACION A DOM
09.04.2012

Photo taken by the author in the Plazuela Bolognesi, the Cajamarca city (9 April 2012).

Third, my fieldwork process was based on openness and consent when considering ethical issues. Research ethics are relevant both for the researcher and the researched in this conflictive situation. When a young foreign single woman appeared in highly rural and male-oriented local contexts, both my presence and the research subjects sometimes faced unexpected situations. For instance, especially during the initial stage, when I was building contacts, I became an object to be 'observed', an object of curiosity or doubt. Sometimes, guys approached me with undesirable intentions, saying that they would provide me with information. Over time, I realised that it was occasionally necessary for me to pretend not to understand Spanish in order to protect my own security. In addition, I tried to keep a low profile and acted with discretion when living in Cajamarca and conducting interviews. This was important for my own security as a researcher, especially given the highly charged political atmosphere and the government's keenness to 'discover' foreign 'agitators' in order to discredit the movement.

More importantly, I made efforts to ensure the transparency of the research process and security of the informants. Consequently, every time an interview was conducted, from the start the focus, purpose and possible outcomes of my research were made as clear as possible to the informants, i.e. by gaining 'informed consent'. Through this procedure, informants could make a decision as to their participation, and understood that they would be under no pressure to participate. This was important given the potential risks of state repression. Although not every problem that might arise could be anticipated, it was appropriate for me to think through potential scenarios given the tense and conflictive situation. Importantly, when dealing with any confidential/potentially sensitive data and personal information relating to the interviewees, their names and all markers were removed. Interviews were indicated alphabetically (see the list of interviews), and any place names/references to written documentation which could potentially identify a source were removed. This policy was followed by one of my supervisors in a recent book on the civil war in Peru's northern highlands (Taylor, 2006), and in a similar monograph analysing the antecedents of the armed conflict in Ayacucho department (Heilman, 2010). This will be especially significant when I publish the research. Therefore, participants were told that the information they provide would be kept confidential and that I would need to ask permission of informants in case of disclosure.

Structure of the Dissertation

Considering the limitations of traditional theoretical frameworks on contemporary social movements, Chapter 2 examines both the objectivity and subjectivity revolving around neoliberal extractivism and the creative re-articulation of subaltern subjectivities and their political activities in contemporary transnational activism. To this aim, the first part of the chapter will introduce theoretical debates on place-based struggles vis-à-vis global capital power. Instead of focusing on the 'powerlessness' of 'reactionary' local subjectivities and their 'political ineffectiveness' based on economic materialism and an essentialist geographical perspective, I will highlight the importance of understanding the 'relational content' of neoliberal globalisation by drawing on Doreen Massey's 'power-geometry of time-space compression'. The second part will concentrate on the local-global nexus of contemporary transnational activism. Beyond the bifurcated framework of power and geography, I will elucidate the complex trajectories of 'networked forms of resistance', echoing Featherstone's conceptualisation of 'prefigurative solidarity' and his reflection on political identity construction.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine the historical background of marginalisation of subaltern groups in Peru. These historical chapters demonstrate the condition of political and socio-economic marginalisation of subaltern groups, with an aim to contextualise the marginalisation of rural highlanders from both state-led developmentalism and market-led development initiatives. Chapter 3 explores the political and economic origins of neoliberalism, in order to show the roots of political and economic marginalisation of rural highlanders. Additionally, it intends to illuminate how this marginalisation was intensified under rampant neoliberalism in the 1990s. Chapter 4 will examine one of the most representative sectors of market-led development, the mining sector, and the complex relationship between this 'new extraction' and social struggles. Rather than focusing on bifurcated power relations, the chapter concentrates on the diverse dynamics related to mineral extraction and socio-environmental protests in Peru.

Chapters 5 and 6 are case study chapters which examine the relationship between the multinational mining company (MYSA)'s mineral extraction and resistance of rural communities in the northern highlands. Chapter 5 examines local political dynamics, as well as the complex power-geometry and increasing political activism resulting from the presence of MYSA since 1993. Chapter 6 focuses on one of the largest mobilisations against MYSA's mining project (Conga) on the basis of my fieldwork. The chapter elucidates the networked forms of resistance of new rural subjectivities and their construction of environmental justice as a political identity. Finally, Chapter 7 will summarise the argument and main findings of the dissertation, by reflecting on theoretical debates and the case study.

Chapter 2

Critical Geography of Transnational Activism against Neoliberal Globalisation: Place, Interconnectedness and Political Identity

The recent stage of capitalist globalisation and free market mantra for ‘development’ has taken precedence across the world. Spatial barriers across borders have diminished and thus previously exotic fruits, vegetables, crops and other produce have become more accessible in transnational supermarket chains. When you go shopping to buy clothes, shoes, electronics, cars and other merchandise, prices are even more affordable and varieties are so diverse as to sometimes make you hesitate regarding which to choose. People plan to go on a holiday to foreign countries by availing of cheaper flight tickets. We can watch World Cup football matches which take place on the other side of the globe via television, the Internet, or you can even travel to the host country to enjoy matches in person. You can hear news accounts of what is happening in other countries via global news media or social networking sites, sometimes even faster than people who live in those very locations. What a beautiful globalisation! These are positive images which proponents of neoliberal globalisation have promoted over the last three decades. In order to achieve this market-oriented ‘development’, countries are obsessed with improving their investment environment and are attentive to credit ratings awarded by Moody’s and S&P. Therefore, deregulation, privatisation of SOEs (State-owned Enterprises) and trade liberalisation have become main concerns for macroeconomic growth and stability in each nation-state, both in the South and the North.

However, the abovementioned dimensions are testament to a one-sided aspect of globalisation. While more prawns and salmon are on the table in one country, the biodiversity of mangroves on the Pacific coast of Ecuador, as well as people living in local communities, have been affected due to large-scale industrial aquatic farming. Cheaper T-shirts in a shopping mall in one location are the result of those who work in precarious labour conditions, including child labour, in sweatshops in Bangladesh. High-tech electronic devices are made by female casual workers in the *maquila* factories on the Mexican border with the US. While some people plan for holidays across borders, immigration regulations have tightened for other people and illegal latino immigrants in search of work across the border see their lives end in the desert. While people in one place watch and enjoy football matches, shanty town dwellers are forcibly displaced to construct football stadia. These gloomy episodes of globalisation are in stark contrast to what neoliberal adherents have depicted in their market-led development mantras.

As Krishna points out, neoliberal globalisation has become ‘the rational commonsense’ and made plausible ‘the triumph of the economy over politics, with the latter invariably seen as something that interferes with or corrupts the functionality of the “natural” and national logic of the economy’ (2009: 13). Thus, this form of globalisation has become equated with ‘progress’ or ‘development’. Countries that are left behind are recommended to follow the way ‘developed’ countries have developed, namely by opening up their markets. In this way, ‘economic’ and ‘technological’ advances are no longer subject to debate and ‘[C]apitalist globalisation is equated with globalisation *tout court*, a discursive manoeuvre which at a stroke obscures the possibility of seeing alternative forms’ (Massey, 2005: 83). However, various forms of resistance to neoliberal globalisation have emerged around the world. These acts of resistance, located in various spatialities, became involved in different political experiences, demonstrating that there are alternatives to a monolithic globalisation. As Doreen Massey underlines, multiple spatialities have been ignored in the grand narrative of neoliberal globalisation. By recognising that globalisation is ‘a making of space(s), an active reconfiguration and meeting-up through practices and relations of a multitude of trajectories’, it is possible to open up a space for ‘the politics’ (Massey, 2005: 83).

Against the backdrop of globalisation and resistance, there has been a growing attention to transnational activism against neoliberal globalisation. Part of the literature has focused on place-based resistance, while other authors have devoted more attention to the connections made by activists between the local and the global. After laying out the objective conditions of neoliberal extractivism, this chapter will engage with theoretical debates on transnational activism. Following Massey’s relational geographical approach to the spatial, i.e. space and place, the first section examines critically essentialist geographical understandings of place-based resistance. In addition, I will point out the binary understanding of power (as domination over the dominated) evident in the dualistic geographical framework and introduce Massey’ concept of ‘power-geometry’ of time-space compression as an alternative. Then, in order to look into the dynamics and progressive political possibilities of place-based resistance to neoliberal globalisation, the following section will be devoted to interconnectedness and political identity construction, which has been influenced by David Featherstone's theoretical reflections on critical geography.

2.1. Confronting Neoliberal Globalisation: Geographies of Neoliberal Extractivism and Resistance

'Time-Space Compression' and Neoliberal Extractivism

David Harvey once argued that '[T]he drive for capital accumulation is the central motif in the narrative of historical-geographical transformation of the Western world in recent times and seems set to engulf the whole world into the twenty-first century' (2001: 121). Based on Marx's theory of accumulation, Harvey notes that crisis is inherent in the capitalist accumulation process but, at the same time, this crisis can generate a new condition for increasing productivity and accumulation (2001: 239-241). In other words, Marx's analysis of capitalist accumulation suggests that contradictions are generated in the capitalist accumulation process, which in turn produce a regular crisis within the capitalist production system and consequently requires rationalisation (Harvey, 2001: 79-80).[9] One of these contradictions is found 'within the capitalist class', where each capitalist pursues his or her own profit in a competitive way and at the expense of their own class interests. This contradiction tends to cause the 'overaccumulation' problem, 'a condition in which too much capital is produced relative to the opportunities to find profitable employment for that capital', leading to a regular crisis with 'falling profits, idle production capacity, over-production of commodities, unemployment, idle money capital, and the like' (Harvey, 2001: 79-80). To put it differently, the 'overaccumulation' problem implies the lack of profitable investment opportunities for capitalists at low input costs. In this sense, as Harvey maintains, 'capital accumulation is bound to be geographically expansionary and to be so by progressive reduction in the cost of communication and transportation' (2001: 244). For capitalist accumulation to be constant, it is necessary to lower or eliminate spatial barriers as well as to speed up capital mobility by reducing the circulation costs, i.e. 'the annihilation of space by time' to use Marx's term (Harvey, 2001: 245-6). In Harvey's spatio-temporal understanding, 'time-space compression' is based on Marx's analysis of capitalist accumulation and its contradictory nature.[10] Using this 'time-space compression' framework, globalisation since the late twentieth century can be understood in the following terms: 'spatial barriers… have fallen away to a considerable degree [and] time has also changed from being a reflection of natural processes to become instantaneous' (Munck, 2007: 5). Namely, Harvey claims that 'a stronger phase' of time-space compression has emerged in the context that technological development enhanced the speeding-up of capital mobility and the reduction or disappearance of spatial barriers given advances in communications and transport since the 1970s (2001: 123). However, in reality, globalisation has engaged in 'more heterogeneous, differentiated and fragmented' spatialities (Munck, 2007: 5).

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[9] To rationalise the capitalist production system in the face of crisis includes 'driving out inefficient enterprises, reducing the power of labor to resist technological change or to command a high wage, bringing non- or pre-capitalist sectors to heel (often through political force)' (Harvey, 2001: 80).

Harvey revisits Marx's concept of 'primitive' or 'original' accumulation and emphasises its persistence as a form of capital accumulation under neoliberal globalisation. He terms this persistent mode of capitalist accumulation as 'accumulation by dispossession' (ABD). ABD has become a new *modus operandi* of capitalist accumulation in search of a new field of investment for 'overaccumulated' capital at low input costs, i.e. the 'profitable use' of overaccumulated assets (Harvey, 2005: 149). In the aftermath of the 1973 crisis, capitalism has suffered 'a chronic difficulty of overaccumulation' and found new profitable areas for investment with the neoliberal privatisation process (Harvey, 2005: 149-150). In addition, the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the move towards a flexible exchange rate system and the opening up financial markets facilitated free capital mobility. That is to say, the capitalist crisis in the early 1970s and the subsequent liberalisation of financial markets provided overaccumulated capital with profitable investment opportunities. In particular, this ABD has been intensified with the advance of neoliberal forms of global capitalism which became dominant during the Thatcher and Reagan era in the 1980s. Harvey points out:

> [S]ince privatization and liberalization of the market was the mantra of the neo-liberal movement, the effect was to make a new round of 'enclosure of the commons' into an objective of state policies. Assets held by the state or in common were released into the market where overaccumulating capital could invest in them, upgrade them, and speculate in them. New terrains for profitable activity were opened up, and helped stave of the overaccumulation problem, at least for a while. Once in motion, however, this movement created incredible pressures to find more and more arenas, either at home or abroad, where privatization might be achieved

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[10] For more on his theoretical reflection on capitalist development and its contradictory nature, see Harvey (1975. 1982, 1990).

(2005: 158).

Alongside the liberalisation of financial markets and technological development, policies designed by international financial institutions (IFIs) with the support of hegemonic states facilitated ABD. As Harvey asserts, ‘hegemony gets constructed through financial mechanisms in such a way as to benefit the hegemon while leading the subaltern states on the supposedly golden path of capitalist development’ (2005: 152). This ABD, Harvey contends, has taken the form of ‘the wholesale commodification of the nature in all forms’; ‘capital-intensive modes of agricultural production’ and consequent ‘escalating depletion of global environmental commons (land, air, water) and proliferating habitat degradations’; ‘the commodification of cultural forms, histories, and intellectual creativity’; and ‘a new wave of enclosing the commons’ (universities and public utilities of all kinds, including public water services), accompanied by what he labels neoliberal ‘policies of dispossession’ such as liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation (2005: 148).

This mode of capitalist accumulation is worth noting when it comes to natural resource extraction. For instance, debt-stricken Latin American countries were forced to implement structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in exchange for new foreign loans in the 1980s, which included the opening up of domestic markets and the privatisation of SOEs (Harvey, 2005: 151). While natural resources have been extracted ever since the colonial era in Latin America, this has been intensified in the form of ABD, with the SAPs implementation since the 1980s (see Galeano, 1997). One of the recommendations of a new development model on the part of IFIs, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), was to promote investment in the extractive industries including mining, hydrocarbons, logging, etc. Consequently, the extraction and export of natural resources gained a new relevance as a development strategy in developing countries. This not only emphasised its importance in promoting economic growth and macroeconomic stability but also its role in poverty reduction. In line with the IFIs’ economic reform initiatives, national regulations were revised or newly written to attract more foreign investment in extractive industries. The goal for this deregulation or new regulation is to provide national and global capital under favourable investment conditions, opening up domestic markets, privatising state-owned companies and permitting free flow of capital. Consequently, South America has received a large amount of investment in the extractive industries from global capital over the last two decades (Veltmeyer, 2013: 82). In the mining industry, for instance, mining codes or regulations have been newly made or revised in more than 90 countries since the mid-1980s

(Bridge, 2004: 407). In this vein, taxes for investors as well as barriers against capital mobility were lowered. Additional regulations were implemented in order to protect investors' property rights (see Hogenboom and Jilberto, 2009: 95). Consequently, global capital increasingly flowed into developing countries' extractive industries during the 1990s. In the case of Latin America, the proportion of global investment in the mining sector more than doubled in the mid-1990s, from 12 per cent in the early 1990s to 28 per cent in 1995, to almost 33 per cent by the early 2000s (de Echave, 2009b: 105).

There are several factors to explain this new global extraction boom. As mentioned, IFIs have played an important role, not just in promoting the implementation of policy reform in developing countries but also by engaging in different investment projects. In particular, the role played by the WB requires attention as it uses the extractive industry as a recommended development strategy. For instance, the WB has adopted direct or indirect participation in mining investment. While the Bank has granted credit loans for private mining corporations, it has become directly involved in mining projects by participating as a shareholder via International Financial Corporation (IFC).[11] In this way, the WB financed 27 mining projects in Latin America during 1993-2001 (de Echave, 2009b: 106). In addition, the Bank attempts to get involved in poverty reduction projects as its main priority. As part of these projects, the IBRD lends credits to middle- or low- income countries for public investment in infrastructure as well as social programmes (Holt-Giménez, 2011: 118).[12] The Inter-American Bank, on the other hand, participates in the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). The IIRSA plans to construct 'a network of inter-oceanic roads, ports, waterways, hydroelectric plants, pipelines and other major pieces of infrastructure' in order to 'integrate and open up the continent' (Bebbington, 2012: 9). With the IIRSA plan, 'entire geographic regions such as the Amazon, the Andes or the Orinoco river basin' are expected to become a target for global capital investors via massive infrastructure projects as well as natural resource extraction (Renfrew, 2011: 587). If the plan materialises, it is likely that the continent could be integrated into the global market at an unprecedented speed and at the same time experience a devastating impact on its environment as well as its inhabitants. Renfrew has noted this ‘may create or intensify trans-border resource conflict’ (2011: 587; see also Castro, 2008).

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[11] The IFC, one of five institutions in the WB group, is 'the largest global development institution' which finances exclusively the private sector with an aim to 'achieve sustainable growth by financing investment, mobilizing capital in international financial markets, and providing advisory services to business and governments' (available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/about, last accessed 5 July 2014).

[12] The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 'aims to reduce poverty in middle-income countries and creditworthy poorer countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, guarantees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory services' (available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/about, accessed 5 July2014).

Another factor in the recent global extraction boom is the high price of natural resources in international commodity markets and rising demand for minerals, oil and other resources in developing countries. Emerging economies have been integrated in the global market and made resource extraction economically profitable. As Veltmeyer notes, ‘the rise of China as a global industrial power fuelled by a demand for energy and non-renewable natural resources … on the world market resulted in the emergence of a primary commodities boom as well as a wave of large-scale foreign investments in land, water and resources’ (2013: 79). According to an International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) report, international mineral prices have increased at an average annual rate of 13.7 per cent during the period 2000-2009 (2013: 23). Since 2003, a partial contribution to the rise in mineral prices was due to the development of international financial markets, particularly the involvement of hedge funds and derivative products in commodity markets before the financial crisis in 2009 (Bebbington et al., 2008a: 898). In addition to high commodity prices in the international market as well as the development of financial technology that facilitates free capital mobility, previously unviable extractive projects have now been made possible with the development of new technologies in ‘mineral exploration, production and environmental management’ (Bebbington et al., 2008a: 898). Consequently, the extractive industries have expanded into territories with little or no record of mineral extraction. In a brief overview of mineral extraction in the Andean regions, Bebbington argues:

> Since 2004… the proportion of the Peruvian Amazon that has been concessioned has increased from 14 per cent to over 75 per cent. Eleven hydrocarbon blocks overlay protected areas, 17 overlap reserves for indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation and 58 overlap lands titled to indigenous peoples... In Ecuador, some two-thirds of the Amazon has been divided into blocks for oil exploration, some of which also overlap protected areas and regions with people living in voluntary isolation… While the area so far contracted in Bolivia is lower, it is still the case that over 50 per cent of the national territory has been identified by the government as available for hydrocarbon exploration (2012: 13).

This mode of capitalist accumulation is not exclusive to mineral extraction. The list of examples of extraction in the form of ABD is never ending. I will just mention a few of them. ‘A new wave of agrarian capitalist expansion’ within the wider global food regime was promoted by ‘technological and managerial innovation as well as political economic context’ (Cáceres, 2014: 11). The development of multinational agribusiness integrated small-scale farmers in developing countries into global market from production to the marketing process by promoting the use of GM (Genetically Modified) seeds and chemical fertilisers and by engaging farmers with global supermarket chains. This was further facilitated by the WB’s plan for rural development and poverty reduction, which is reflected in the World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (WDR08). Many commentators have argued that the report focuses on small-scale farmers and their integration into the global market as a way of escaping poverty, rather than considering the capitalist power relations behind ‘new agriculture for development’ as the main cause of poverty. As Oya argues, ‘[T]he WDR08 has uncharacteristically stressed the importance of rural labour markets for poverty reduction, as aspect hitherto clouded by the WB’s obsession with smallholder productivity and market integration of small farmers’ (2009: 232). In his critical reading of the World Bank’s market-based approach to rural poverty, McMichael points out the importance of considering the capitalist power relations behind the Bank’s policy suggestions: ‘The *new agriculture for development* is governed by market intensification, via agribusiness, aided by the state’ (2009: 236, emphasis in the original)[13]. In other words, from the World Bank’s point of view, small-scale farmers need to be integrated into the global capitalist system and to be competitive and efficient producers in order to build their assets and thus overcome their poverty. This market-led neoclassical economic approach sees peasants only powerless rural producers who should be integrated into global market for their survival and never expects their subjective political power.[14] Similarly, McMichael criticises this approach, arguing that bringing smallholders into the global market by promoting their productivity would dispossess farmers and increase their dependence on capitalist power, rather than solving the problem of poverty. He claims:

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[13] Under capitalist power relations, ‘corporate markets are the creation of the multilateral framework epitomized in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, by which heavily subsidized agribusiness has gained access to the liberalizing markets of the global South, in addition to accessing agricultural resources through the agro-export dictates of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment regime. Agro-exporting has accelerated differentiation among smallholders, where those capable of meeting quality and delivery standards have benefited as local contract farming has expanded the foundation of supply chains for new corporate retailing operations … Meanwhile, Northern subsidies have allowed traders to artificially cheapen commodities at the expense of local farmers, driving many off the land’ (McMichael, 2009: 237).

[14] Beyond this materialist approach, which highlights the impotence and passivity of rural subaltern groups if not being integrated into global market system, I will examine the political imaginaries of rural subjectivities in Cajamarca (see Chapter 5 and 6).

> With the Bank's leadership, the development industry is gearing up to 'modernize' small-scale farmer agriculture in the name of a productivity increase that will further eliminate smallholders, further subordinate agriculture to reductionist technologies, and deepen the reproduction of poverty and hunger… This form of improving productivity (delivering GM seeds, along with networks of fertilizer dealers, thereby deepening petro-farming and the control of the chemical and seed companies) is premised on dispossession and market monopoly, rather than supporting farmers' markets geared to feeding the poor (2009: 239-240).

While the WDR08 emphasised the significance of improving the competitiveness of small-scale farmers and their entry into the global market as a strategy to reduce poverty, it did not deal with underlying power relations, including agribusiness and the related issue of supermarket chains. Small-scale farmers are considered to be heterogeneous 'producers' who adapt to a changing rural landscape by making rational livelihood choices, becoming competitive producers, non-farm workers or migrants, rather than ending up being dispossessed and impoverished under growing capitalist power. As Amanor suggests, '[T]he main objectives of policy are to enhance the competitiveness of smallholders to assets including land, entrepreneurial skills and market information' (2009: 257).

Apart from GM crop production, ABD has expanded to other areas such as 'plantation forestry, mainly of Eucalyptus and pine varieties' as well as 'large-scale industrial shrimp and salmon farming along South America's Pacific Coast' (Renfrew, 2011: 586; see also Miller, 2014). Positive results from the extractive industry, such as an increase in foreign investment as well as a certain degree of macro-economic stability, have been gained at the expense of the concentration of benefits and the further marginalisation and dispossession of a majority of the poor in developing countries, including Latin America. As a consequence of this, leftist or progressive governments have been elected to power across the region, raising expectations of a 'fairer' or more 'inclusive' development agenda along with policies that can recognise difference. Greater state intervention in the economy, more social redistribution, as well as the exercising of national sovereignty over resources, figure among the population's demands (see Hogenboom and Jilberto, 2009; Kohl and Farthing, 2012; Simarro and Antolín, 2012; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). However, these so-called post-neoliberal states demonstrate continued emphasis on the extractive industries as 'national' development strategy, leading some commentators have termed these approaches as 'neo-extractivism' or 'new developmentalism' (see Gudynas, 2009; Svampa, 2012). These governments, particularly in Andean countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru, have seemingly obvious justifications for this mode of resource-export development. Although Peru, under consecutive governments, is not necessarily included in the list of ‘post-neoliberal’ governments, its political discourse and development model (‘new extraction’ in Bebbington’s (2009) terms) are in parallel with those of leftist governments in the Andean region. The incumbent Humala government was elected on the basis of seemingly leftist electoral promises, but once in power his government has turned out to be more in line with conservative forces. This is why the country’s poor, a majority of who gave their electoral support to Humala, call him a ‘traitor’ (see Chapter 4). It is argued that securing more national sovereignty over natural resource extraction ensures a country’s economic growth and thereby more fiscal resources for social distribution. This new extraction or neo-extractivism stands out in political discourse and is best illustrated by the comments of different presidents (see Chapter 4). Bebbington et al. (2013) point out that this new extractivism has been carried out by means of three political discourse strategies: to take control of debates over ‘development’ by defining the extractive industry as the only and best way of achieving this development and poverty reduction; to regard mineral extraction as a ‘natural’ economic activities (e.g., *Perú, un país minero*) and to treat all opponents of this extractivism as either naïve or romantic leftists or environmentalists, or even extremists, anti-developmentalists or neo-communists.[15]

Regardless of their ideological position, development coincides with economic growth and poverty reduction (in material terms) for these governments. In parallel to this, the extractive industry is one of their development priorities since it brings economic growth as well as fiscal revenues for social programmes.[16] From this perspective, those who are against neoliberal or neo-extractivism can be regarded as obstacles for the country’s development (Bebbington et al., 2013: 329-333). It still needs to be seen if this reclamation of the state’s role in the country’s economy and development could bring benefits to the region’s population, overcoming the ‘resource curse’ and thus moving towards post-neoliberalism, e.g., the twenty-first century socialism that several leftist leaders have argued for. In their analysis of the newly enhanced role of the state in terms of development in Bolivia, Ecuador and

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[15] For the complexity of social struggles against neoliberal mineral extraction in Peru, see Chapter 4. This justification of new extraction will be highlighted in Chapter 6 as the Peruvian government used it as a basis for ‘policing’ those activists and protesters who opposed the Conga project.

[16] This limited definition of development related to mineral extraction was one of the main causes for socio-environmental protests (see Chapter 4 and 6).

Argentina, Grugel and Riggirozzi point out that 'post-neoliberalism' is still emerging while displaying all the weaknesses that plague 'market-oriented, export-led growth' (2012: 16).[17] Meanwhile, rather than focusing on the novelty of neo-extractivist policies under so-called post-neoliberal governments, Veltmeyer is critical of the new dimension of resource extraction, arguing the 'new extractive imperialism' (2013; see also Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014; Gudynas, 2009). While this newness refers to the unprecedented scope and speed of extraction backed by a 'regulatory regime', he argues that accumulation practices have a long history insofar as they concentrate wealth from extraction in the hands of foreign capital and leave little benefit in the host countries, in this way generating unequal forms of development (2013: 87-88). Moreover, local communities are left with the negative impacts of extraction rather than benefitting from it (2013: 88).

In terms of neoliberal forms of mineral extraction, the socio-ecological impacts of mining activities are highlighted as unprecedented, particularly due to the extent of extraction, as well as the amount of resources such as land and water used. As Holden et al. explain, the technological advance of neoliberal mining extraction in the Philippines has led to the detection of 'an economically viable concentration of ore, [and] the mining industry requires as much access to land as possible' as a result (2011: 143). They also point out the 'overlapping' of mining concessions in the inhabited area, e.g., indigenous communities living near the mining sites. Mining concessions sometimes 'overlap' with residential areas; they are also located in ecologically sensitive locations, e.g., the headwater of extensive river systems.[18] Bebbington and his colleagues point out how the presence of multinational capital and the extraction of natural resources influenced on local populations in the form of 'accumulation by dispossession' (ABD) and show how this ABD caused grievances and produced diverse forms of local responses:[19]

> [D]ispossession is a question of loss in both the *quantity* of people's assets (land,

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[17] Grugel and Riggirozzi argue that post-neoliberalism is 'the set of *political aspirations* centred on "reclaiming" the authority of the state to oversee the construction of a new social consensus and approach to welfare, and the body of economic policies that seeks to enhance or "rebuild" the capacity of the state to manage the market and the export economy in ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social need and citizenship demands' (2012: 2-3).

[18] For more social and ecological impacts of mineral extraction, see Chapter 4.

[19] Considering the scope and nature of MYSA's mineral extraction in Cajamarca over the last twenty years, its operation has become the main terrain for contestation among local populations, thereby generating a long list of social conflicts which will be examined in Chapter 5.

> water courses, grazing, minerals) and the *quality* of these assets (water and air pollution). Dispossession might also be understood as loss of a way of life, and a certain set of taken-for-granted assumptions about livelihood and development (2008b: 2891).

> [T]he shifting and expanding geographies of mineral investment… have elicited different forms of protest that articulate a range of concerns about environment, human rights, identity, territory, livelihood and nationalism (2008a: 901, see also Renfrew, 2011). [20]

The ABD produced by resource extraction has been experienced by many local communities and their grievances caused by social and ecological impacts vary: precarious labour conditions; displacement or migration of rural populations; obstacles to accessing resources such as land or water by indigenous or peasant communities; threats to biodiversity; environmental contamination of soil, water, as well as mangroves, among other issues. These negative experiences have become one of main causes for recent acts of resistance against neoliberal globalisation in Latin America.

Criticism of Place-Based Resistance

Much of this resistance derivs from grievances generated by different forms of neoliberal capital accumulation and have been experienced, perceived and contested in a local place. Drawing on Arif Dirik, Sheppard points out the importance of focusing on place-based local experiences of, and responses to, social change. He refers to Dirik's view that:

> negative local experiences of globalization stimulate people to question the universal and placeless narrative of globalization that dominates discourse and to recover the importance of distinctive local understandings, norms, and narratives of social change (Sheppard, 2002: 312).

In a similar vein, Escobar has noted that there are two approaches in the current literature on 'place':

> the production of place by capital and global forces, following a political economy approach; and the 'senses' or, more generally cultural construction of place – how

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[20] For more on land struggles and land reform in Latin America, see Moyo and Yeros (2005), Vergara-Camus (2009), Teubal (2009a), Wolford (2010), Bottazzi and Rist (2012); for more on 'resource wars' see Crabtree (2005), Spronk and Webber (2007), Romano (2012); on struggle over 'new extraction', see Kuecker (2007), Bebbington et al. (2008a, 2008b), Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington (2010a, 2010b), Dougherty (2011), Sepúlveda and Villarroel (2012).

> places are endowed with meaning and the constitution of identities, subjectivities, difference and antagonism, following phenomenological, interpretivist, and constructivist paradigms (2001: 152-153).

These arguments suggest that ‘place’ is not just material space, but also a ‘lived’ area where the local population experiences the consequences of the political economy as well as relating to power relations, meanings and identities. Therefore, placed-based political activism implies that local grievances do not just exist as a state but can be politicised in an intricate way to involve meaning and power relations. As Leitner et al. (2008) put it:

> [P]laces are imbued with meaning as well as power, which is also of critical importance in contentious politics. Social movements often seek to strategically manipulate, subvert and resignify places that symbolise priorities and imaginaries they are contesting; to defend places that stand for their priorities and imaginaries; and to produce new spaces where such visions can be practices, within that place and beyond (161-162).

On the other hand, Hardt and Negri, in their most influential book, *Empire*, have been critical of localised or place-based movements. They argue that place-bound local struggles, as well as nationalist movements which are based on ‘the long traditions of Leftist nationalism’ are reactionary responses which intend to ‘defend the local and construct barriers’ to the advances of global capital (2000: 44). This is premised on a ‘false dichotomy between the global and the local’, which suggests that ‘local differences pre-exist the present scene and must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 44). They criticise this false global/local dichotomy and the tendency to defend a local identity or territory from the intrusion of global capital, since this place-bounded activism is ‘damaging’ in terms of carrying out ‘the potential for liberation that exists *within* Empire’ rather than inhibiting ‘the development of the capitalist imperial machine’ (2000: 45-46). For resistance against the global capital power of ‘Empire’ to be effective, as Gibson-Graham points out, ‘the local networks of place-based politics must be developed at the same (global) scale’ (2002: 34). Consequently, one of the political strategies of the *multitude* in terms of potential liberation is that ‘each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the global level and attack the imperial constitution in its generality’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 56). Rather than making the ‘horizontal articulation of struggles, […] each (struggle) leaps vertically, directly to the virtual center of Empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 57-58).

In a similar vein, Harvey notes that although struggles against ABD constitute an important part of the recent ‘anti- or alternative globalisation movement’, they are ‘a volatile mix of protest movements’ with little or no inter-linkages (2005: 162-167). He regards these mobilisations as based on a ‘postmodern’ way of thinking and appreciates them when it comes to their openness to ‘heterogeneity, diversity, multiple overlapping concern of gender, class, ecology’ (2001: 121). However, in his view, these ‘postmodern’ movements prefer difference at the expense of ‘coherence’. Although they can locate a ‘coherence’ in terms of resistance when they have a similar experience in the process of capitalist accumulation, it is their tendency to reject unified organisation with a common target and to pursue differences, fragmentation, and heterogeneity (i.e. ‘the worship of fragments’) that prohibit the pursuit of a ‘more generalised political goal’ (i.e. a unified political dynamic for ‘anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-globalization struggles’) (Harvey, 2001: 121-122; Harvey, 2005: 174, 179). He argues that a flexible and fragmented organisational structure with its own distinct dynamics can make movements lose sight of ‘the macro-politics of what accumulation by dispossession was and is all about’, as it is being left to particular localised acts of resistance (2005: 168-169). As a result, these struggles are often repressed with ‘ferocious violence, for the most part by, state powers acting in the name of *order and stability*’ (2005: 167, emphasis in the original).[21]

Harvey notes the danger of these ‘postmodern’ struggles by reminding us of Raymond Williams’s concept of ‘militant particularism’. According to Harvey, ‘militant particularism’ is based on those ‘[I]deals forged out of the affirmative experience of solidarities in one place generalized and universalized as a working model of a new form of society that will benefit all of humanity’ (2001: 172). He is also cautious about the fact that not all struggles which arise from a particular place are progressive. Sometimes they demonstrate a conservative tendency and a reactionary response to external forces by sticking to the existing order or putting up barriers to progressive political possibilities (2001: 190-191). In this sense, Harvey suggests political movements should not be reactionary but based on generality. It is necessary to distinguish ‘the progressive and regressive aspect of accumulation by dispossession’ and to ‘seek to guide the former towards a more generalized political goal’ (2005: 179). To put it differently, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist political activism should target global capital powers rather than pursue a particularity in defence of a place-bounded territory or identity, i.e. what he called ‘the head-in-the-sand politics’ (Harvey, 2001: 126). This does not imply that political movements should pursue the homogenising ‘multitude’ against global capital power, instead it should attempt to connect individual acts of resistance to more generalised capitalist accumulation by ‘time-space compression’ in the way that the ‘militant particularist movement’ plays as a mediator between local resistance and capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 2001: 193).

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[21] In Chapter 6, I will show that despite the use of *mano dura* (authoritarian measures) by the neoliberal state in order to guarantee private investment and to maintain public order, this laid the ground for unity in the anti-Conga movement rather causing further fragmentation among subaltern actors.

Explanations of local resistance against globalisation have concentrated largely on the reactions of local communities in defence of tradition and territory, as well as identity bounded with a particular place. In most cases, these ‘places’ belong to rural areas which are inhabited by poor peasant communities or indigenous people. It is argued that these long-marginalised local communities tend to identify with a *place*. They resist the advances of global capital in order to defend the sources of their livelihoods, culture and territory, as well as biodiversity and environment as bounded within a *place*. In line with Harvey’s assumption that global (capital) has an asymmetrical power in comparison to the local, Escobar criticises the time-space compression of erasing the politics of place and of imposing ‘the ideology of a *pensamiento único* (single thought)’ without permitting a political space for the economic, cultural and ecological differences constructed in place (2008: 18). For him, place is ‘an important source of culture and identity’ which has been threatened or erased with the ‘time-space compression’ of globalisation (2008: 7). While Escobar notes the interactions between the local and global, i.e. ‘glocality’, when it comes to subaltern resistance, he points out the importance of defending these differences contained in place and its political implications for progressive politics, i.e. ‘the deepening of democracy’ by ‘questioning the very principles of liberal democracy’ (2008: 15). This understanding of place is based on a *territorial* approach. Nicholls explains two conceptualisations of ‘place’: territorial and relational (the latter will be elaborated on in the next section). While territorial conceptualisation focuses on cohesive social relations in a particular place, a relational understanding underlines its contingency (Nicholls, 2009: 79). Explaining the territorial conceptualisation of place, Miller draws on Agnew’s (1987: 28) definition of place:

> Interwoven in the concept of place…are three major elements: *locale,* the settings in which social relations are constituted (these can be informal or institutional); *location,* the geographical area encompassing the settings for social interaction as defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale; and *sense of place,* the local “structure of feeling.” Or, by way of example, home, work, school, church, and so on form nodes around which human activities circulate and which *in*

> *toto* can create a sense of place, both geographically and socially. Place, therefore, refers to discrete if "elastic" areas in which settings for the constitution of social relations are located and with which people can identify (cited in Miller, 2000: 16).

Similarly, based on this bounded geographical understanding of place, some social movement theorists from the rational choice theoretical tradition point out that place plays a role in generating movement resources by providing strong territorial ties as constructed among groups, at the same time as they act as contact points for making frequent interactions and new alliances. To put it differently, while territorial place functions as a location for forging the strong ties constructed in social networks, it can also be a contact point for making new alliances. As Nicholls argues:

> [P]lace provides diverse activists with multiple 'contact points' where they can come into interaction with others in their milieu. While these complex interactions can spawn new alliances, they also play a role in lowering cognitive barriers, freeing the flow of information between different organisations, and spurring innovation. When these two relational dynamics complement one another in a place, activist networks become strong enough to maximise local mobilisation capacities and open enough to spur the innovative capacities of the local activist community (2009: 85).

People construct mutual trust, solidarity and share meanings through frequent contacts and interactions within the social networks constructed in a place. In this sense, the existence of social networks is often necessary to motivate participants to overcome the collective action problem and to get involved in these actions. In addition, pre-existing networks are useful for the recruitment of participants in social mobilisations. This is what Melucci has called 'submerged networks' whereby social groups are embedded in their daily activities and become a resource for collective action when faced with specific issues (see Melucci, 1989).

The Power-Geometry of 'Time-Space Compression'

Globalisation has become a dominant term over recent decades and Harvey's noteworthy geographical and historical understanding of it is based on the speeding-up of capital mobility with lower spatial barriers, i.e. 'time-space compression'. As Massey mentions, '[W]hether through an unthinking technological determinism or through a submission to the inevitability of market expansion, this version of globalisation comes to have almost the ineluctability of a grand narrative' (Massey, 2005: 82). However, she criticises this understanding of globalisation for several reasons. First, Harvey's 'time-space compression', or 'the annihilation of space by time', is a biased understanding of globalisation since it is mainly based on capitalism and its accumulation process (Massey, 1994: 147; 1995: 48). Although economic forces have become more important for impinging on people's lives around the world, it is not the only factor which has influence on our understanding of space/place. Rather, global capital's mobility, according to Massey, should be understood as 'the stretching out of different kinds of social relationships over space', as well as 'the stretching out over space of relations of power, and of relations imbued with meaning and symbolism' (1994: 158-159). She notes:

> It is certainly the case that 'time' (for which read an increase in the speed of transport and communications) reduces, and indeed on occasions even annihilates, some of the effect of distance… It is worth noting the irony that what is really being reduced here is time, and what is being expanded (in the sense of the formation of social relations/interactions, including those of transport and communication) is space (as distance) (2005: 90-91).

Second, Massey points out the limitations of an essentialist understanding of 'place' as well as of criticism of place-based resistances against advances of global capital. In other words, she argues that Harvey doubts the effectiveness of place-based local resistance since he interprets them as reactionary responses to ABD in defence of local territory or identity. Through this criticism of Harvey's spatio-temporal conception based on capitalist accumulation, Massey highlights two critical points: 1) a binary understanding of space/place; and 2) the relationship between geography and power. Based on a binary geographical understanding of space and place, the latter is regarded as 'a source of stability and an unproblematic identity', thus the spatial mobility of global capital for accumulation tends to generate reactions due to the former's 'unsettling impact' in different locations (Massey, 1993: 63).[22] In this framework, Harvey suggests that place-based resistance is understandable in the face of ABD threats to a community or set of traditions, but he is still wary of the effectiveness of this 'postmodern' politics. That 'they are easily dominated by the power of capital to co-ordinate accumulation across universal fragmented space' makes him argue for anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation movements at a global level, a point that concurs with

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[22] In explaining this geographical framework, as Harvey states:

> There seems to be a widespread acceptance of Heidegger's claim that the authenticity of dwelling and of rootedness is being destroyed by the modern spread of technology, rationalism, mass production and mass values… Place is becoming more important to the degree that the authenticity of dwelling is being undermined by political-economic processes of spatial transformation and place construction (1993: 12).

Hardt and Negri in their *multitude*'s political strategy (Harvey, 1993: 24). In the meantime, Massey disagrees with this binary understanding of space and place, arguing that Harvey associates 'a sense of place' with 'memory, stasis and nostalgia' fixed or bounded to a place, i.e. place-boundedness (1994: 119). This essentialist geographical conceptualisation forecloses 'the possibility of alternative forms of social order' originating from a place, and only regarded as a limited or fragmented resistance which could be easily subordinated or co-opted to global capital power without being articulated by scaling up to the same level (Massey, 1994: 256). Similarly, Featherstone notes the limitations for progressive political possibilities by this binary geographical understanding. As he puts it, an essentialist geography 'obscures the ways in which subaltern politics generates multiple spatialities, which construct agency precisely through their distinctive and productive negotiations of cross-cutting relations of power' (Featherstone, 2003: 408).

Apart from this place-boundedness, Massey points out another problematic: power relations are fitted into this dualistic geographical framework. In this regard, it is worth noting Gibson-Grahams' point:

> Globalism is synonymous with abstract space, frictionless movement of money and commodities, the expansiveness and inventiveness of capitalism and the market. But its Other, localism, is coded as place, community, defensiveness, bounded identity, *in situ* labor, noncapitalism, the traditional… [This is] the vision that power inheres in greater size and spatial extensiveness… [Therefore, there is a dualistic formula of geography and power, i.e.] the boundless power of the global and the relative impotence of the local (2002: 27-28).

This dualistic geography-power formula – space/place, global/local and the powerful/powerless – is influenced by 'modernist political thinking' (Gibson-Graham, 2002: 50).[23] Moreover, it does not reflect the geographical reality. A seemingly all-encompassing capitalist power is not 'consolidated' nor 'concentrated', rather 'diffuse', 'partial' and 'constitutive' and this 'constitutive nature of power brings us to the power of subjection and its role in our thinking beyond the global/local binary… for cultivating the capacity of local subjects – as agents rather than victims in a diverse economy' (Gibson-Graham, 2002: 51).

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[23] Under traditional socialism, 'oppositional strength is gained through convening the masses – breaking down spatial barriers, overcoming single-issue fragmentation, creating identification with one liberatory cause… [In this way], separateness, disarray, ambivalence, personalized actions, limited horizons, and local loyalties all signal a diminution of power in face of the enemy. In light of this vision, local initiatives… are embarrassingly inadequate and definitely uncompelling' (Gibson-Graham, 2002: 50).

For instance, while the 1994 uprisings in Chiapas could be understood as local indigenous people's resistance against neoliberal ABD, the development of communication technology partially helped in making transnational alliances in support of the cause of indigenous people who have been suffering from state repression in Mexico. At the same time, the Zapatistas also became a motive for other people with similar causes to mobilise both within and outside Chiapas and Mexico, reflecting the limitation for the binary formula of geography and power. Therefore, a seemingly ubiquitous neoliberal capitalist development has faced various spatialities to resist. For instance, in the face of many rural resistances around the world, the WB's pro-poor participatory turn demonstrated that the apparently all-powerful and unitary institutional representation of neoliberal globalisation could be a myth. Arguably, the Bank was very eager to take a pro-poor stance and to generate various policies for poverty reduction after having led SAPs as part of its recommended solution to debt crises in the developing countries during the 1980s. One of the Bank's recent efforts on this score has been published as the *World Development Report (WDR 2000/2001): Attacking Poverty*, which reflects the institution's understanding of poverty and policy proposals for its reduction. In its definition of poverty, the WB emphasised that poverty has a 'multidimensional' character. Although many critics (Green and Hulme, 2005; Hickey and Bracking, 2005; Kay 2006; Bebbington 2007) demonstrate that this policy shift is only designed to facilitate continuous capitalist accumulation at best, this change reflects that global capital power is porous and sometimes vulnerable to resistance.

In this sense, resistance should not be understood as the 'otherness' of power: as Sharp et al. suggest, based on a Foucauldian understanding of power, 'power should not be viewed solely as an attribute of the dominant, expressed as coercion or political control, since it is also present in the ability to resist' (2000:3). In consequence, power is 'entangled' with social relations at every geographical level. In addition, 'no moment of domination, in whatever form, is completely free of relations of resistance, and likewise, no moment of resistance, in whatever form, is entirely segregated from relations of domination' (Sharp et al., 2000: 20). In other words, it is possible to locate 'domination in resistance' and 'resistance in domination' as constituting power becoming 'entangled bundle of exchange dispersed *everywhere* through society' (Sharp et al., 2000: 20-21, emphasis in the original).

In overcoming the abovementioned limitations relating to the *aspatial* understanding of 'time-space compression', Massey suggests a 'relational' geographical understanding. As discussed, Massey understands the spatial as 'social relations stretched out over space', rather than being limited to economic determinism. In other words, space is conceptualised as 'constructed out of interrelations, as the simultaneous coexistence of social relations at all spatial scales' and as being 'full of power and symbolism', i.e. 'a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation' (Massey, 1994: 264).[24] In this relational approach, place can be understood as being 'formed out of the particular set of social relations which interact at a particular location' (Massey, 1994: 168). Base on this, what Massey terms 'a progressive sense of place' differs from an essentialist place-boundedness which associates a given place with a fixed identity or bounded territory. Rather, it is a place which is not fixed or static, but associated with the dynamic process of social relations (Massey, 1993: 67-68). What distinguishes one place from another is that a place is produced through a particular articulation of links and interconnections of social relations of different scales and thus contains multiple identities since these relations are not static. Additionally, 'all these relations interact with and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place with that history itself conceptualized as the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages both local to the wider world' (Massey, 1993: 68). Accordingly, the global becomes an integral part of the construction of the local via complex social relations 'stretching out' over networks (Massey, 1994: 5, 120). Since social relations are dynamic, imbued with different degrees of power and meaning, it can be argued that diverse social groups are differently placed in relation to the 'time-space compression' via the speeding-up of global capital's mobility. This is what Massey calls the 'power-geometry' of 'time-space compression' within a relational geographical framework. As she puts it, 'there are differences in the degree of movement and communication, but also in the degree of control and of initiation. The ways in which people are placed within 'time-space compression' are highly complicated and extremely varied' (1994: 149-150). In sum, progressive and relational understandings or conceptualisations of the spatial are 'not a kind of denuded spatial form in itself (distance; the degree of openness; the numbers of interconnections; proximity, etc. etc.), but the relational content of that spatial form and in particular the nature of the embedded power-relations' (Massey, 2005: 93).

Based on Massey's relational geographical understanding, the next section will examine how the relations of various social groups are articulated in a place in order to resist neoliberal forms of extractivism. Rather than arguing that acts of resistances are place-bounded local reactions, I will suggest that they are instead imbued with complex power relations, contradictions and ongoing negotiations. Instead of forming a smooth internationalisation via a shift in scale, I will also maintain that, in the process, networked forms of resistances are constructed as are political identities.

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[24] 'All spatial scales' include 'the global reach of finance and telecommunications, through the geography of tentacles of national political power, to the social relations within the town, the settlement, the household and the workplace' (Massey, 1994: 4).

2.2. Dynamics of Place-Based Resistance: The Critical Geography of Transnational Activism

Geographies of Grievances

Apart from localised acts of resistance against ABD, the literature on transnational activism is based on the local-global connections and interactions between activists and organisations, as well as interpretive frames regarding neoliberal globalisation. This section focuses initially on the latter, which have been given substantial attention from social movement theorists when it comes to movements' ideational strategies. This will then be questioned via a critical geographical reflection. In explaining the success of the Battle in Seattle in 1999, an emblematic example of the global justice movement, Murphy points out that the development of 'diagnostic frames', which made the World Trade Organisation (WTO) a common target for resistance among various social groups, both within and across borders, was critical for coordinated collective actions (2004: 37-38). As she puts it, '[B]y helping local activists identify with distant actors and helping them understand the parallels between local and foreign issues, social movement organisations foster a feeling of mutual fate while suggesting specific action to address social and environmental ills that complements the idea of global citizenship' (2004: 40).

Framing analysis has been introduced to add an ideational dimension to social movement theory (see Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1992). Snow et al. (1994) explain the 'collective action frames', following Goffman's (1974) concept of frame.[25] Snow and his colleagues point out that social movement organisations (SMOs) pursue three framing processes – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational – in order to mobilise and maintain social movements. SMOs ‘diagnose’ who and what are to be blamed (diagnostic framing), come up with strategies to get problematic situations right (prognostic framing) and ‘motivate’ collective action in order to put strategies into action (motivational framing). As Murphy notes, these framing process work when local resistances share similar grievances with activists or SMOs in other places. It is argued that this facilitates making alliances and collective actions among activists at different levels.

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[25] According to Goffman, frame is 'an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment' (cited in Snow et al., 1994: 190).

When developing this analytic framework based on the local and global nexus of global activism, Tarrow and McAdam posit that while the domestic context is still relevant for collective action, ‘internalisation’ or ‘global framing’ are constitutive of ‘global’ activism (2005: 122).[26] For Tarrow and McAdam, global activism is better understood as a ‘transnational contention’ among actors who are rooted in a domestic political environment at the same time as they make alliances, articulate collective actions targeting common targets and share framing (2005: 123). Tarrow claims that local activists ‘strategically’ use ‘*external symbols to orient local or national claims*’ (sic) about grievances (Tarrow, 2005: 60). Taking the example of global justice movements, activists who make domestic claims within a national political structure make strategic use of the ‘global justice’ frame which has produced an ‘effective’ result for mobilisations (Tarrow, 2005: 73-74). Tarrow argues for its function: ‘[Global framing] can dignify, generate, and energize activists whose claims are predominantly local, linking them symbolically to people they have never met and to causes that are distantly related to their own (2005: 60). Through such process, local people frame their movements in line with broader transnational mobilisations. On this question, Nicholls maintains that:

> As locals come to identify with (these) distant battles, they may realign with these distant battles, they realign their discourses, claims, targets and repertoires to reflect those of the general movement. Cognitive *identification* with this general movement therefore precipitates locals to transform what had been a highly localised battle into one particular front in the general struggle for Environmental Justice. Thus, the identification of locals with allies elsewhere provides sufficient levels of solidarity to realign local struggles with general social movements, transforming a particularistic battle into a new front in this loosely constituted movement (2009: 87).

While focusing on the ‘effectiveness’ of global framing for activists’ mobilisation efforts,

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[26] Internalisation here means ‘domestic claims-making against international or foreign targets’, while global framing is ‘the mounting of domestic disputes in the language of globalization’ (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 122).

Tarrow also notes its limitations in that activists occasionally lose sight of specific local demands:

> [Global framing] signals to overworked and isolated activists that there are people beyond the horizon who share their grievances and support their causes. But by turning attention to distant targets, it holds the danger of detaching activism from the real-life needs of the people they want to represent (2005: 76).

Meanwhile, in terms of a critical geographical approach to global resistance, Featherstone introduces the term, ‘maps of grievance’. The term is defined as something which ‘bears on the (spatial) practices through which power relations become known, generated and brought into contestation through political activity’ (Featherstone, 2003: 405). In other words, they demonstrate that the power relations which cause grievances at the same time can be brought into contestation via political practices. By locating spatialities of grievance with the power-geometry of neoliberal globalisation, it opens up political possibilities for the geographical construction of power in an antagonistic manner, rather than by making strategic alliances between the local and the global (Featherstone, 2008: 51, 53). To put it differently, it is possible to overcome the bifurcated structure between domination of global capital flows, its accumulation, on the one hand, and local resistance, on the other, thereby demonstrating the various spatialities of power relations. Resistances are not merely domination’s *otherness* but are ‘products of multiple interrelations’, i.e. the interactions among differently placed social relations within the power-geometry (Featherstone, 2008: 51). From this perspective, Featherstone maintains that the process of constructing ‘maps of grievances produces diverse forms of political activities in diverse geographies as being placed differently and make different forms of solidarities as well as political identities’ (2008: 51).

Scale Shift and Place-Boundedness

A scalar approach to transnational activism – particularly from social movement theorists and political geographers – has a number of different focuses: the systemic mechanism of scale shift (Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow and McAdam, 2005; Tilly and Tarrow, 2006); direction of scale jumping (Escobar, 2001; Glassman, 2002); and the political implications of scale shift (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Olesen, 2005; Haarstad and Fløysand, 2007), among others. Tarrow and McAdam emphasise the mobilisational mechanisms from the local to the global, arguing that ‘transnational movements do not automatically emerge from global consciousness or economic integration: they have to be built up through agentic processes like coalition-building, identity formation, and a shift in scale from the local/national to the international level' (2005: 145). They underline two different processes of scale shift between national and international levels: 'relational diffusion' and 'brokerage'.[27] The former route is that activists move across borders and exchange information based on pre-existing ties and identities. Meanwhile, the transfer of information via brokerage happens among 'two or more previously unconnected social sites' (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 146). By noting that the mechanism could be more complex, they argue that 'the major strength of the current campaign against neoliberal globalization is that it retains local, regional, and national roots' (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 146). They also maintain that transnational activism is limited to the 'transposition of part of the movement activities' with 'partial commitments, verbal compromises, and organisational drift' (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 146). In a similar vein, Tarrow explains his political process of transnational activism as 'a short cycle of internationally oriented domestic contention or a fusion between international and domestic contentious politics' (2005: 12). Emphasising the persistent relevance of national political dynamics, Tarrow uses the term 'rooted cosmopolitans' for those activists who are involved in transnational activism but also retain national roots (2005: xiii, 29).[28] This position seems to be focused on the effectiveness of social movements. In other words, if collective actions against neoliberal globalisation do not produce impacts on policy changes at global level, they tend to be interpreted as being limited to local or national movements. This view is based on place-boundedness and thus the systemic mechanism between different scales is limited to the interactions among activists who are 'rooted' in national political dynamics and make alliances when necessary for mobilisations. This essentialist geographical understanding arguably draws a line between rooted cosmopolitans and domestic activists, especially considering the mobilisation and networking ability and their involvement in domestic and transnational politics. On the other hand, rather than focusing on the directionality of scale shift – upward or downward – some scholars point out multi-scalar strategies for mobilisations. While Escobar retains the importance of politics based on place, he also draws on the term ‘glocal’, illustrating the interactions among actors at different scales. By the glocal, he means ‘moving towards giving equal attention to the localization of the global and the globalisation of the local’ (2001: 156). In terms of a balanced approach to the local and the global, although Escobar places extra attention on the re-evaluation of the politics of place, he does not ignore the importance of the political engagement of multiple scales within transnational networks. As he puts it:

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[27] Tarrow (2005) develops this systemic mechanism further in his book, *The New Transnational Activism*, by explaining two local processes (global framing and internalising contention), two transitional ones (diffusion and scale shifts) and two global processes (externalising contention and building transnational coalition). Detailing the political mechanism of the local and global nexus, Tarrow differentiates three forms of diffusion – relational, non-relational and mediated via brokerage – and scale shifts. He explains 'diffusion' as 'the emulation of local forms of collective action in other places', which 'contribute(s) to the spread of contentious politics across the globes' (2005: 104). Scale shifts were understood not only as a reproduction of repertoire in different places, but also as making 'new alliances, new targets and change in the foci of claims and perhaps even new identities' (2005: 121).

[28] According to Tarrow, 'rooted cosmopolitans' are 'people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts' (2005: 29). Their ability – which differs from domestic activists – is that they can 'shift their activities among levels, taking advantage of the expanded nodes of opportunity of a complex international society' (Tarrow, 2005: 29).

> [S]ocial movements and local communities are not just trapped in places, awaiting for liberating hand of capital, technology or development to join the networks of transnational flow of commodities, images, and the like. In constructing networks and glocalities of their own, […] social movements might contribute to democratize social relations, contest visions of nature, […] challenge current technoscientific hype […] and even suggest that economies can be organized differently from current neo-liberal dogmas (2001: 166).

Apart from scale shift mechanisms, other authors have concentrated on the implications of scalar politics in both domestic and transnational politics. When explaining the political implications of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) activities, Keck and Sikkink point out their ‘boomerang effects’ on domestic politics.[29] TANs are constructed largely around ‘value-laden’ issues – human rights, environment, ethnicity or gender. Moreover, actors within networks ‘exchange information and services’ as well as sharing similar norms and values (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 9). Through activists’ interactions within TANs, boomerang effects are produced, especially when the domestic opportunity structure is unfavourable for domestic actors to make their claims. Keck and Sikkink argue that:

> [W]hen channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to

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[29] TANs can be understood as a ‘fluid and open’ organisational form of networks across borders among ‘committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas’ in order to ‘promote causes, principles ideas, and norms’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 8).

> pressure on their states from outside… [Therefore,] for the less powerful third world actors, networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they could not expect to have on their own…On (other) issues where governments are inaccessible or deaf to groups whose claims may nonetheless resonate elsewhere, international contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the domestic arena (1998: 12-13).

Social movements theorists explain that although these TANs do not tend to mobilise themselves to promote direct actions, they provide domestic activists with resources such as information and sometime financial or organisational support. Importantly, the informational role played by TANs promotes citizens into action by offering ‘dramatic testimony’, e.g. regarding human rights abuse, as well as ‘statistical’ and ‘technical’ information (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 20-21). As these resources and alliances are made available, domestic activists can mobilise them to garner political leverage when making claims on their own governments. As Nolan posits:

> [T]he potential to publicize information about rights violations outside the state is an important resource for local groups because it helps them get around a domestic blockage, thus creating a political opportunity at the transnational or international level to garner solidarity, create pressure on state to stop violation, and publicize the violation more widely… Transnational allies can provide other types of resources, including material resources that allow domestic groups to function as organizations or political resources that increase their legitimacy and influence as social movements in their home states (2013: 109).

When developing the ‘boomerang effect’ of TANs further, Spalding stresses its impact on the domestic political dynamic in her analysis of the anti-mining movement in El Salvador. Rather than waiting for international allies for help, she argues that domestic activists use these transnational allies strategically as mobilisation resources to push for national policy reforms. Spalding terms this as ‘the domestic loop variation in the boomerang pattern’: ‘domestic groups use information, material resources, frames, and symbols, some of which were constructed through participation in transnational networks, to pressure their own states for reform’ (2013: 26). Likewise, Haarstad and Fløysand, in their analysis of the political implications of scalar politics for anti-mining resistance in Peru, point out the importance of ‘the ability to jump scale’, or ‘rescaling’, as ‘a source of power’, for marginalised local actors. They suggest that, ‘grassroots organizations and marginalized actors can gain empowerment by pressing claims and engaging in social relations at higher spatial scales’ (2007: 292). In other words, local groups who have been marginalised in terms of the domestic power structure could resist the mining project successfully when they made alliances and their claims at a higher scale, i.e. rescaling ‘from below’.

Apart from the implications for domestic political dynamics, the impact of transnational activism on international relations is also highlighted. Theorists from the international relations field focus on international actors, particularly non-state actors such as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), who facilitate the scale shift between the local and the global and their transnational networks (della Porta et al., 1999; Keck and Sikkik, 1998; Welch, 2001; Doherty and Doyle, 2013). These scholars have further developed the relationship between the emergence of non-state actors and their impact on international politics, e.g. the rise of global civil society (GCS) (Taylor, P. 2004; Taylor, R. 2004). Despite many arguments and criticisms regarding GCS, liberal IR (international relations) theorists point out the positive role of international non-state actors in deepening global democracy. In the context of the growing activities of multinational companies and the advances of global capital, there were increasing instances of international cooperation and efforts to create networks across borders by the late 1970s, particularly concerning issues like human rights, the environment and gender (Batliwala, 2004: 76; see also Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Since the 1990s this transnational activism has intensified. Especially in the context of the retreating of nation-states, non-state actors increased their involvement in international and domestic politics. By this time, the power of the IFIs has become increasingly influential and development policies across the globe have been determined by the powerful few who were not accountable for their decisions despite their unprecedented impact, particularly in the Global South. Increasing transnational activism led by non-state actors questions this ‘democratic deficit’. This is also prompted by the technological development of communication and transport, which facilitated interactions and coalitions among non-state actors such as INGOs and Transnational Social Movement Organisations (TSMOs) which, it is argued, help the emergence of global civil society. In this sense, Kriesberg argues:

> For a legitimate, egalitarian, and democratic international system to exist, underlying pluralistic social groupings must develop. Alexis de Tocqueville … stressed the importance of the many public associations in America for the maintenance of freedom against tyrannies by the government or by the majority of the people (1997: 18).

On the other hand, Tarrow focuses on better conditions for the generation of mobilising resources, political opportunities and framing, particularly relating to increased international interactions among intergovernmental, international non-governmental organisations, as well as transnational networks. For Tarrow, globalisation has provided threats as well as opportunities in political arenas at different scales. He describes an ‘internationalism’, which ‘makes the threats of globalization more visible and offers resources, opportunities, and alternative targets for transnational activists and their allies to make claims against other domestic and external actors’ (2005: 8-9). International political arenas, it is argued, are not in the form of harmonious global civil society (GCS), but rather a field where various actors of different positions and levels make interactions (Tarrow, 2005: 28).

Solidarities: Critical Geography and the Politics of Scale

Despite its systemic explanations and political implications at different levels, the scalar approach to political activities across borders has a limited geographical comprehension. As Herod and Wright note, scale was conceptualised as ‘a device for bounding space’ (2002: 6). Describing this conceptualisation of scale, they use a ladder as a metaphor:

> [a] ladder, where one climbs up the scalar rungs from the local through the regional and national to the global, or down these rungs from the global through the national and regional to the local. In such a metaphor, the rungs (scales) are connected together by the sidepieces of the ladder yet are quite distinct, the one from another – each rung is a separate entity, even as each is intimately connected to the other rungs to give the whole its structure (2002: 6).

To put it differently, given this essentialist understanding, scale is a geographically bounded concept and thus local acts of resistance are *bounded* to happen in a local place and sometimes establish contacts by jumping scales, upwards or downwards (Featherstone, 2003: 408). Within this framework, local social groups, particularly indigenous people or peasants, are understood as ‘backward’ or ‘powerless’ and thus they should be ‘rescaled’ in order to be ‘empowered’ and make their claims heard on both a local and global scale.[30] This geographical understanding associates power relations ‘bounded’ to a certain spatiality and sometimes makes transnational connections lose sight of inherent disparity of power. For instance, criticising paternalistic forms of solidarity between activists from the global North and South, Sundberg points out that activists in the North tend to regard people in the South as victims and to advocate on their behalf.[31] In this way, existing power asymmetry between North and South is bounded in order to be repeated within transnational networks and thus subaltern actors in the South are described as passive recipients of support and solidarity (Sundberg, 2007: 160). The outcome, Sundberg holds, is in that: '[T]he geometries of power and geopolitical identities stemming from conventional models of solidarity naturalize divisions between North and South and, ultimately work to sustain empire as a way of life' (2007:161; see also Featherstone, 2012: 232-233). Furthermore, the limitation of this geographical understanding is that histories of social relations hidden in a place tend to be ignored. Organisational forms of collective actions in the past are regarded as differing from those in the present by emphasising the newness of today's organisations as small, local, diverse and fragmented. In consequence, it becomes difficult to imagine or explain the interconnectedness between unlike actors. For instance, the relatively recent emergence of environmental or identity politics tends to be interpreted as 'post-materialist' movements which are mainly associated with INGOs in the Global North.

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[30] However, as I will argue in Chapter 5 and 6, *campesinos* and local denizens have played a leading role in forging mobilisations in opposition to MYSA’s mineral extraction.

Within a relational geographical framework, however, what distinguishes one place from another is the 'accumulated history of a place' (Massey, 1993: 68). For Massey, as mentioned above, history in a place is not something relegated as a forgotten past, rather it has been produced by a complex articulation of social interactions at different levels. In other words, a particular location contains a history of social relations being 'stretched out' over time and becomes an integral part of present acts of resistance by means of subaltern agency in the place.[32] When analysing the Salvadoran anti-mining movement that occurred at the apex of post-civil war neoliberal globalisation across Central America, it is useful to demonstrate historical experience's contribution to contemporary local resistance. In explaining the transnational networks constructed for this local anti-mining struggle, Spalding argues that international alliances ‘built on and expanded beyond an earlier phase of struggle and activism during the revolutionary conflict in the 1980s’ (2013: 28). Central American countries share histories such as the civil wars of the 1980s and the spilling over of violence into neighbouring countries, as well as a peace-building process. This facilitated the networking of human rights groups across and beyond the region (Spalding, 2013: 31-32). In addition, Salvadoran wartime refugees, according to Spalding, ‘built grassroots, binational ties’ with communities in neighbouring Honduras, which ‘left behind a layer of cross-border connections on which future alliances could be built’ (2013: 30). These previous trans-local, trans-regional and trans-national ties became an integral part of the Salvadoran anti-mining resistance. In particular, cross-border wartime ties created a space for the exchange of information and experiences when Salvadoran anti-mining activists visited a Honduran community which had already experienced negative impacts from mining activities. These bilateral interactions against mineral extraction expanded to Guatemala via networks and alliances. As Spalding explains, ‘these links were reinforced by the cross-border migration of gold mine and of mine waste flowing through interconnected water systems passing inexorably across national borders’ (2013: 31). Apart from these networks, the previous existence of environmentalists organised around water rights in the place helped the identification of water issues in terms of their quantity and quality (Spalding, 2013: 29). Furthermore, despite the weakened influence of the Catholic Church, and of liberation theology in particular, during the civil war period, church leaders played an important role in the anti-mining mobilisation.[33] The case of the Salvadoran anti-mining protest therefore demonstrates how the history of the articulation of social relations at different spatialities generated subaltern agency for networked local resistance.[34] As Featherstone notes, ‘subaltern spaces of politics… have been closed down by pervasive tendencies to counterpose a dynamic networked present to a more settled past’ and ‘to define the dynamism of neo-liberal globalization against settled and bounded forms of subaltern political activity’ (2008: 178).

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[31] As will be seen in the anti-Conga movement, the networked forms of resistance in Cajamarca were not synonymous to making alliances between powerless local *campesinos*, who were negatively affected by the multinational capital (MYSA), and NGOs in the North, which have resource abundance. Instead, this connection, which I have termed counter-extractive networks (CENs), was built around various actors in order to contest grievances caused by the MYSA's neoliberal form of mineral extraction, thereby reformulating new rural subjectivities (see Chapter 6).

[32] Echoing Massey's position, in Chapter 5 I will demonstrate that the main participants in the anti-Conga movement were an integral part of the rural political dynamics in Cajamarca in the past. In particular, the nightwatch patrol (*rondas campesinas*) and the loosely formed trans-local networks accumulated in protest against the multinational mining company have laid the ground for the emergence of the anti-Conga movement. From this relational geographical understanding, the connections between seemingly dissimilar actors, (*campesinos* and urban-based NGOs) can be explained and consequently their mobilisations cannot be defined as a post-materialist environmental movement.

Political activities via scale shift are also understood as a strategic aggregation of common interests at a different scale. A critical geographical approach understands it as ‘the productive relations between space and political activity, through bringing into contestation different geographies of power' (Featherstone, 2008: 158). Featherstone introduces 'networked forms of resistance' and suggests a progressive concept of *solidarity* in any understanding of transnational political activities, rather than being reduced to the 'rigidities of scalar accounts' (2008: 157). Local acts of resistance could form a loose form of network around 'maps of grievance', instead of constructing a transnational movement by jumping scales and drawing on global framing grievances strategically. In his relational understanding of 'militant particularisms', Featherstone explains the political possibilities of this networked form of resistance which can open subaltern political spaces. He adopts a critical stance on Harvey's interpretation of Williams's 'militant particularisms' as 'essentially bounded forms of political activity', which are 'formed and *then* networked', as understood from the perspective of scalar politics (2005: 252). Instead, he positions them as 'the ongoing products of the diverse routes and connections that make up subaltern space of politics' (2005: 252). In order to conceptualise 'prefigurative solidarity', Featherstone grounds his interpretation on Gramsci's political analysis. According to Featherstone, Gramsci did not regard subaltern actors as bounded to a certain spatiality and thus left powerless. Rather, he used a relational geographical understanding and noted the generative linkages constructed among subaltern agencies across different places (Featherstone, 2012: 26). In this way, Gramsci theorised relational spatial articulations and thus 'solidarity as part of the conduct of political activity and struggle' (Featherstone, 2012: 28). This position differs from Lenin's explanation of class-based alliance making, e.g., between the proletariat and the peasantry. Since each subaltern group has 'fixed and static interests' and is distinctively placed, connections and solidarities tend to be made by a third party such as the 'vanguard party', which was 'envisioned simply as a strategic means to the greater end of the revolution' (Featherstone, 2012: 27). However, subaltern actors do not have a unitary political identity bounded to a given spatiality and tend to make more creative geographical linkages forged for the purposes of progressive political projects.

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[33] For more on networked forms of resistance, including the role of Catholic Church, against mineral extraction, see ‘counter-extractive networks’ in Chapter 6.

[34] For more on the interconnectedness accumulated from previous experiences, see Chapters 5 and 6.

Based on a Gramscian theoretical perspective, Featherstone suggests prefigurative conceptualisation of solidarity as a networked form of resistances, which is not based on 'common ideology' but on linkages among different struggles constructed around 'common target' (2012). It is a creative geographical generation of relations, i.e. 'unruly flows of social relations', through political activities against the transnational power relations of neoliberal globalisation. Featherstone claims this solidarity making is progressive political practices, i.e.

the creation of ‘geographies of power in antagonistic ways’, by bringing neoliberal globalisation into ‘contestation and political debate’ (2003: 405, 409). Here solidarity is not merely limited to ‘the coming together of actors with common interests or understanding’ or to alliances between actors with altruistic intentions mostly in the Global North and marginalised masses in the South (Featherstone, 2008: 157). Rather than unilateral empathy flowing from North to South, often based on resource-abundant NGOs’ goodwill by providing information of the affected in the South to sympathetic listeners in the North, alliances are constructed among actors with diverse political trajectories in different places, both in the North and South, around ‘common enemies’ (Featherstone, 2003: 406). As a result, it becomes possible to make solidarities between unlike actors, moving beyond divisions between rural and urban and between labour unions and environmental NGOs, in order to contest neoliberal globalisation in a progressive way. In sum, ‘[S]olidarities are not produced on a smooth surface between discretely bounded struggles, but rather are part of ongoing connections, relations and articulations between places’ (Featherstone, 2008: 44).

Solidarities between different struggles are constructed through political activities. As Featherstone points out, solidarities are generated ‘through a politics of identification on the basis of shared *practices* of resistance against common enemies’ (Featherstone, 2008: 162, emphasis on the original). To put it differently, the construction of solidarities are constantly made by collective political practices which distinctively placed activists and groups in transnational power-geometry articulated by locating ‘sites of grievance’ (Featherstone, 2003: 410). Rather than collective actions being articulated by pre-existing organisations or networks possessing a unitary political will and solidarities based on common interests, political practices are articulated in a place where different social relations converge as an on-going process (Featherstone, 2008: 174). Routledge et al. explain that the meeting up of diverse social relations in place-based political activities ‘provide performative spaces that play a vital role in face-to-face communication and exchange of experience, strategies and ideas’ (2006: 846).[35] Solidarities are consequently forged via collective political activities, ‘constituted through *unruly patterns of flow and alliances* and formed through antagonistic relations to dominant ways of generating *globalization*’ (Featherstone, 2008: 22, emphasis in the original). From this perspective, the network is not prefigured, rather it is a product of ongoing interactions of social relations. Networked forms of opposition are constructed through political activities converged in a place, through which participants share collective experiences and forge solidarities. This accumulation of interactions can facilitate activists coordinating further collective actions. In addition, providing a space for the connections and interactions of different social groups can both 'reconfigure local political identities' and 'change on the terms on which maps of grievance […] are constructed' (Featherstone, 2008: 35, 55).[36] Rather than positing that transnational movements are generated through coordination between SMOs in different places by sharing strategic frames around similar grievances and targeting common enemies, Featherstone highlights geographical connections among different resistances depending on how grievances are experienced and demonstrates diverse forms of political activities in 'sites of grievances'. Through this networked form of politics, it is possible 'to make visible and contestable' the power relations of neoliberal globalisation and 'opened up political spaces for the possibility of generating globalization in other ways' (Featherstone, 2008: 134-135).

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[35] Routledge explains that ‘these places become [different] articulated moments in the activity of grassroots globalization networks where opposition to neoliberalism as well as alternative visions are articulated’ (2003: 342).

Political Identity Construction

Political identities of resistance can be constructed depending on how solidarities are articulated within trans-local networks around 'maps of grievance'. Identity construction is made possible via networked subaltern politics, by bringing geographies of power relations into contestation. In explaining the political identity construction of a working-class community in South Wales and adopting a critical approach to essentialist 'militant particularism', Featherstone argues:

> Rather than being the already constituted building blocks of wider struggles, place-based political identities can be reconfigured and intensified through these political activities. The formation of militant working-class communities in South Wales was not […] something emerged out of bounded communities, but was something that was the product of connections which brought together different experiences of activity and assertive political identities. The formation of subaltern political agency and identity through place-based struggles was directly related to the ongoing and

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[36] I will develop the 'networked forms of resistance' of the anti-Conga movement in Chapters 5 and 6, which I term 'counter-extractive networks' (CENs). Following the Featherstone's reflection on 'prefigurative solidarity', I will demonstrate that the CENs were in the ongoing process of construction of solidarities among various actors around the 'maps of grievance', which also played an important role in forging more political activities (see Chapter 6).

> productive negotiation of such connections (2008: 34).

In a political space opened up through political activities, social groups with different histories and identities make continuous interactions, enabling previously unexpected solidarities are constructed between unlike actors. This dynamic interaction and connection is associated with the construction of political identities. For example, contemporary transnational agrarian movements, such as *Vía Campesina*, connected previously disparate subaltern actors, e.g. peasants and environmentalists, by calling into question the global food regime. In explaining an 'agrarian question of food', McMichael points out that contemporary peasant movements are not limited to 'a conservative back-up role in the class politics of capitalist modernity', rather they are 'against the accumulation imperative' (2008: 210). The transnational solidarities between peasants and other social justice activists were made via transnational political activities against the global food regime. These include resistance against biotechnology (and its use for the production of agro-fuels and GM food), export-led agriculture, as well as its devastating social and ecological impacts – exodus and the de-peasantisation of rural populations, declining access to resources, monoculture and its impact on biodiversity, and environmental contamination, among others.[37] Such interactions and connections forged via political practice, resulted in the process of constructing 'food sovereignty' against 'food security', which called into question neoliberal policies that '*encloses* questions of social reproduction within a legitimating rhetoric of *feeding the world*' (McMichael, 2008: 216, emphasis in original).[38] Building networked geographies of opposition opened up 'a political space' for the construction of 'food sovereignty', 'an emerging ontology' which is 'grounded in a process of revaluing agriculture, rurality and food as essential to general social and ecological sustainability' (McMichael, 2008: 213). The emergence of food sovereignty as a political identity occurred in a space opened for 'dialectical negotiation between agriculture, state, and society' (Wittman, 2013: 179). As McMichael argues, '[T]his is a politics that, in rejecting the uniform vision of capitalist modernity and the singular liberal subject, articulates distinct social, cultural and ecological realities as part of a complex movement in process' (2008: 224).

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[37] This global corporate food regime produces policies like 'market-led land reforms and WTO trade rules that facilitated targeting Southern markets with artificially cheapened food surplus from the North' (McMichael, 2008: 209). Movements against this regime argued that this policy reform has been promoted by IFIs, and the WTO in particular, 'dictated by the interests of large traditional companies and superpowers', including agro-industry multinationals (McMichael, 2008: 211).

[38] Similarly, the environmental justice political identity of the anti-Conga movement was constructed in the process of oppositional political activism within CENs contesting neoliberal forms of mineral extraction (see Chapter 6).

This is not to say that the smooth construction of political identity happens at a higher scale. Political alliances among diverse social groups sometimes generate tensions and contradictions as they are distinctively located in the power-geometry of globalisation. As Featherstone suggests, 'transnational organizing practices have brought activists from markedly different political traditions and trajectories. Such trajectories have not produced smooth articulations, but rather have often been articulated on profoundly unequal terms' (2012: 202). In explaining the existence of multiple identities within the resistance contesting for regional autonomy in the Bolivian lowlands, Tarija, Bebbington and Humphreys argue that it is erroneous to regard regional conflict as being solely 'orchestrated by racist regional elites' (2010b: 140). Rather, there exist multiple identities embedded in the power-geometry of hydrocarbon extraction. In this sense, the construction of political identity is an ongoing process of negotiation and contradiction among social groups of different geographies and histories (Featherstone, 2008: 135-139).

Despite tensions and contradictions, geographies of connections and interactions and the process of political identity construction have some political implications. In accounting for the significance of the ICC (Inter-Continental Caravan)[39], Featherstone points out:

> [T]he bringing together of different activists cultures was a process that was generative of debate, negotiation and contestation rather than a simple coming together of homogeneous action or pre-existing political wills… [In this way], intersections and alliances can be integral to kinds of political identities and alternative political imaginaries they articulate. These connections rather than just generating a larger movement can also produce the unsettling and transformation of identities which Laclau and Mouffe envisioned by the term equivalences. To this extent counter-globalization movements can usefully be thought of as engaging in forms of 'collective experimentation' that are antagonistic to the collective experiments orchestrated by neo-liberalism (Featherstone, 2003: 416-417).

In this way, what Fraser termed 'subaltern counter-publics' can be created in which solidarities are articulated and political identities are constructed. These spaces are where 'parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, so as to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs' (Fraser, 1990: 67). By engaging in various political acts of resistance, different social groups problematise the dominant meanings of neoliberal globalisation and articulate political identities with negotiations and tensions. This is significant in terms of deepening democracy in Latin America. Rather than being reduced to a limited practice of liberal democracy which is mainly concentrated on the institutionalisation of politics, it extends the scope of the political by bringing pre-determined and naturalised dominant meanings of development and politics into contestation.

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[39] The Inter-Continental Caravan (ICC) is 'an ambitious project which united activists from the Indian New Farmers Movements with West European green activists in contesting neo-liberal institutions and biotechnology' (Featherstone, 2008: 150).

2.3. Conclusion

'Time-space compression' is a term coined by David Harvey, whose spatio-temporal understanding is based on Marx's notions of capitalist accumulation and its inherent crisis. According to Harvey, the 1970s capitalist crisis introduced a new form of accumulation, i.e. accumulation by dispossession (ABD), with policy designs supported by IFIs and global capital. In particular, neoliberal extractivism has taken the form of ABD. In the case of Latin America, the implementation of SAPs in the 1980s and a market-oriented development model introduced foreign investors – particularly in extractive industries – at an unprecedented pace. This neoliberal extractivism across various sectors had strong support from governments in Latin America, regardless of their political orientation, and has produced various acts of local resistance across the continent.

Against this backdrop, there has been growing academic attention to transnational activism against neoliberal globalisation and the focus has been largely devoted to local resistances or to the local-global nexus. Theorists like Harvey, as well as Hardt and Negri, emphasise the limitations of place-based resistance as reactionary responses to the advances of time-space compression. Within essentialist geographical frameworks, they interpret local resistance based on a place as bounded within identity or tradition. Harvey regards them as 'post-modern' acts of resistance against ABD, which should be scaled up to the level of global capital in order not to be co-opted or marginalised into fragmented local struggles. This geographical understanding also tends to foreclose political possibilities, as power is considered as equated with domination within a dualistic geographical framework rather than 'entangled' with social relations. Instead, Massey suggests a relational understanding of the spatial in which social ties are 'stretched out', and imbued with power relations and meanings. From this perspective, she understands 'place' as constructed through the interactions of various social relations articulated in a particular location. In a similar way, the global can be understood as an integral part of constructing the local.

Other scholars have given more attention to the dynamics of place-based resistance, by focusing on connections and interactions among activists both in terms of the local and the global. In particular, social movement theorists analyse the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of transnational social movements based on interpretive frames, mobilisation resources and political opportunity structures, both locally and globally. When it comes to the dynamics of activists’ interactions and connections, these scholars adopt a scalar approach which focuses on the systemic mechanism of scale shift and its domestic and international political implications, such as ‘boomerang effects’ and empowerment. In order to overcome the limitations of place-boundedness, I draw on David Featherstone’s theoretical reflection derived from critical geography’s analysis of transnational activism. Rather than understanding transnational activism as a product of an accumulated aggregation of strategic interests and as scale-jumping of local resistance, he focuses on ‘networked forms of opposition’ against neoliberal globalisation, which are constructed though political activities converged in a place, through which activists share collective experiences and forge solidarities. Through this process, political identities are constructed depending on how solidarities are articulated in trans-local networks around ‘maps of grievance’. In this way, these networked forms of opposition can bring neoliberal globalization to the terrain of contestation by opening up various spatialities of subaltern agency.

Based on this theoretical framework, the following two chapters will elucidate political and economic conditions of marginalisation and exploitation of subaltern groups in Peru under state-led developmentalism and its intensification and dispossession under market-led developmental model. However, rather than resting with the uneven patterns of development and pessimism of ‘fragmented’ subaltern actors, the latter two case study chapters will examine the re-articulation of new subaltern subjectivities and their political dynamics of resistance in the rural highlands of northern Peru, which has long been marginalised in the country’s history. Accordingly, Chapter 3 will examine political and economic origins of neoliberalism and ‘democratic deficit’ since the second half of twentieth century. It will also explore the implementation of market-led development reform under authoritarian regime.

Chapter 3

Contemporary Political and Economic Roots of Marginalisation and Dispossession in Peru

A recently published book on Peruvian democracy by Crabtree et al. (2011), titled *Fractured Politics: Peruvian Democracy Past and Present*, examines the historical roots of the Peruvian 'democratic deficit' and the limitations of reform efforts in the post-Fujimori period. After a decade-long authoritarian rule under Fujimori, efforts have been made to establish a more responsive and participatory democracy, such as the Law of Decentralisation (*Ley de Bases de la Decentralización* (Law No. 27783), enacted in 2002) and the Law of Political Parties (*Ley de Partidos Políticos* (Law No. 28094), enacted in 2003). However, democratic institutions, including political parties and Congress, as well as politicians, seem to fail to gain trust both at the ballot box and in society in general. The post-2000s electoral results continued to show a stark contrast between affluent coastal areas, on the one hand, and (politically, economically and socially) marginalised highlands and jungle regions, on the other, particularly regarding a dissimilar position on neoliberal policies, which had produced unequal distribution of benefits among the population (Crabtree, 2010: 380). However, rather than strengthening the political party system or developing grassroots organisations to represent the latter part of the population, the general electoral tendency continues to demonstrate dependency on prominent political figures. These candidates emphasise social inclusion and a sustainable model of national development, favourable to a majority of the population. In contrast, Peruvian macro-economic policies in the post-2000s have not shown a great difference from those under the Fujimori regime. One of the consequences is the low level of popular trust of democratic institutions, as well as high electoral volatility and subsequent political instability (see *Latinobarómetro* Report, 2010). Despite the institutional reform for developing the political party system, 'most parties are little more than personal groupings with scant institutional life except at times of elections. They have virtually no structured existence over much of the country [… and] therefore fail to act as a channel for public participation in the decision-making processes of the state' (Crabtree, 2010: 359). Regarding the decentralisation, a slow pace and the lack of political will to institutionalise sub-national administrative agencies obstructes opening up participatory political channels. Against this backdrop, the gap between the state and society has widened.

Faced with the unprecedented impact of neoliberal globalisation, the last three decades have seen increasing socio-political responses across Latin America. In Peru, neoliberal restructuring programmes were implemented with little opposition during the 1990s. Moreover, the Peruvian case was exceptional in that political and social activism was comparatively less visible in the following decades, despite the orthodox form of neoliberal reform. There was no Peruvian PT (Workers' Party) or MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*) which led or developed from social movements. Neither did indigenous people gain prominence as important political actors as in the case of *Zapatista*' uprising and CONAIE. This does not mean that there were no social responses to neoliberal globalisation. Rather, there was little political coordination so as to develop a political party or grassroots organisations to represent the marginalised population. Additionally, while dealing with socio-economic inequality and poverty, one of the main demands of the majority of the population, has become a priority for politicians during election campaigns, it did not seem to find a solution within democratic institutions. Consequently, the last decade saw increasing social protests across the country concerning 'such issues as privatisation, coca eradication, mining development, the defence of local interests, the land rights of indigenous peoples in the Amazon, and so on' (Crabtree, 2010: 376). Sometimes, they turned violent with little possibility to find a politically mediated answer.

In this context, this chapter aims to examine the political and economic origins of marginalisation of subaltern groups in the second half of the twentieth century and its intensification and dispossession in the context of neoliberal reform and 'democratic deficit' in the 1990s. For this purpose, three main issues will be examined first: the mixed results of state capitalism; the limitations of the Peruvian Left; and the mismanagement of democratic governments in the 1980s. The last section will be dedicated to the implementation and impact of economic reform under authoritarian rule in the 1990s.

3.1. From Mobilisation to Transition

Rural Change and the Leftist Activism

Uneven capitalist development and import-substitution industrialisation endorsed in 1959 and its adverse impacts on agriculture resulted in increasing demands for social change in the late 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the rural highlands.[40] State policies (domestic currency devaluation; price control on food products and subsidy for food imports, measures that were unfavourable for rural producers) were intended to provide cheap food for the industrial labour force and to increase the purchasing power of the middle class (Kay, 1982: 147). In particular, the new encroachment of the landed oligarchy into peasant communities, as well as population growth, led to more demand for land in the countryside. Consequently, the mid-twentieth century saw an escalating rural unrest in the highlands, raising concerns for the ruling class, including rural landowners. Pressure for land reform could not be ignored any longer and the military junta responded to peasant mobilisations in the La Convención and Lares valley by applying agrarian reform to this limited zone in 1962 (Petras and La Porte, 1971; Blanco, 1972).

In the face of social transformation and growing social unrest, the ruling oligarchy ended a long acrimonious relationship with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,* APRA) and permitted a partial incorporation of the party into the political system in exchange for support for the government in 1956, a period called *convivencia*. APRA, Peru's oldest political party, has been an important player in the country's political scene since its foundation by Víctor Haya de la Torre in March 1931.[41] During the 1930s, it entered into fierce competition with the Peruvian Socialist Party, led by José Carlos Mariátegui, and emerged as the main organisation following Mariátegui's death at the age of 36. It had long been a hegemonic party among popular sectors with its anti-oligarchy and nationalist rhetoric. However, its political activities had been declared illegal and obstructed by the military and the oligarchy since the Trujillo uprising in 1932, stimulated by claim of electoral fraud, with the exception of several years under the Bustamente y Rivero regime (1945-1948). Consequently, its incorporation into the main political system had become APRA's foremost objective over more than twenty years of clandestine activities, while suffering official repression. However, its adoption of a conservative stance in the mid-1950s lost a significant opportunity to gain mass support and to consolidate itself as a genuine hegemonic party among the popular classes, thus overcoming its northern and urban bias.[42]

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[40] Due to the space constraints, rural migration, urbanisation and subsequent *cholificación* will not be treated here (see Matos Mar 2004; Albó, 2004; Burt 2006; and Paredes 2011).

[41] For more on APRA, see Klarén (1976).

The domestic context was changing in line with international events – the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 – which influenced the rise of a variety of leftist groups in Peru in the 1960s, including Maoists, Trotskyists, and Guevarists. First, dissatisfied with the party leadership's accommodation with the oligarchy, APRA's youth wing created the *APRA Rebelde* led by Luis de la Puente at the party's sixth national convention in 1959, after which the Movement of Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*, MIR) was founded in 1961 (González, 2011: 21). On 5 June 1965, MIR and the Army of National Liberation (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, ELN), influenced by the Cuban experience and its *foco* tactics, launched guerrilla movements in the central and southern highlands, only being defeated by state repression within six months. Alongside the Belaunde government's (1963-1968) suppression, these *guerrilleros,* who were largely of urban middle class origin, lacked an appropriate understanding of rural conditions. More importantly, peasants had already become an important subjectivity on the political scene during their successful and organised demands for land during the period 1956 to 1964. However, the MIR and ELN did not fully appreciate their political power and regarded them as playing only a secondary role in the revolutionary struggle against state power. As a result, the gap between the peasantry and *guerrilleros* in terms of political objectives as well as tactics did not facilitate a repetition of the Cuban experience in Peru. With this failure, many leftist groups were seriously weakened as their leaders were imprisoned or killed. As Giesecke explains, the Shining Path's armed struggle in the 1980s and 1990s is partially reminiscent of the failure of the earlier guerrilla movements with little understanding of rural conditions and disrespect for the peasants as political actors (2008: 142).

In the meantime, international communism's division between Moscow and Beijing in the 1960s had influenced local fragmentation – either pro-China or pro-Soviet – and the decade saw the rising influence of Maoism within the Peruvian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista del Perú*, PCP). One of the main reasons for the PCP division was ideological dogmatism, particularly concerning the pace of revolution. Differing with the central committee's revisionist stance and sympathising with Maoist emphasis on the role of the peasantry, a pro-China faction led by José Sotomayor, Santurnino Paredes and Manuel Soria split from the PCP (the rest of the PCP, the pro-Soviet faction, will be called *PCP-Unidad* or PCP-U) and created the PCP-Red Flag (*PCP-Bandera Roja*, PCP-BR) in alliance with the secretary general of the PCP's youth group (*Juventud Comunista*) in 1964 (Navarro, 2010: 156-7). However, a fissure within the leadership was made public in the midst of open conflict between the secretary general, Santurnino Paredes, and the Ching Kang group supporters who opposed Paredes' Maoist dogmatism in 1967. The latter created the PCP-Red Homeland (*PCP-Patria Roja*, PCP-PR) in 1969 (Navarro, 2010: 162-3). Finally, Abimael Guzmán split the PCP-BR again and founded the PCP-Shining Path (*PCP-Sendero Luminoso*, PCP-SL) in 1970, before its launch of the 'prolonged people's war' in 1980.

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[42] As will be seen in Chapter 5, APRA maintained a strong support base in Cajamarca due to the department's connectedness with the northern coast, where the party had originated.

Alongside the Maoist groups, Hugo Blanco, a Trotskyist peasant leader, became one of the left's leading protagonists when he ranked in third place in the Constituent Assembly elections in 1978, despite the faction's relative weakness in Peru. His role in peasant struggles in the La Convención valley led to this electoral success. During the 1960s, so-called New Left groups, neither aligned to the Soviet Union or to China, came to the fore, starting with the MIR in 1961. The Revolutionary Vanguard (*Vanguardia Revolucionaria*, VR), founded in 1965, is one prominent example and it was led by Ricardo Letts (originally from *Acción Popular*), Edmundo Murrugarra (from PCP) and Ricardo Napurí (Trotskyist and from MIR) (González, 2011: 23-4).[43] VR became an important component of the Unified Mariateguist Party (*Partido Unificado Mariateguista*, PUM). As it will be seen later, the PUM was founded in 1984 and grew to become an intergral part of the United Left (*Izquierda Unida*, IU). Despite the increasing political activism of various leftist groups, the fragmentation of the PCP represented an important characteristic of the Peruvian Left: i.e., orthodox dogmatism and factionalism, which laid ground for a division between party leaders, as well as between the leadership and the rank-and-file. This influenced the misunderstanding of rural reality, causing the party leaders' differing revolutionary goals and tactics vis-à-vis the peasantry, a reason for the failure of both the intellectual-led guerrilla movement in the mid-1960s and the PCP-SL's two decades later.

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[43] VR had its root in 'intellectual study circles and the university student movement' and included ideologically diverse groups (Roberts, 1998: 207).

Military Reformism and Transition to Democracy

Scholars have offered various explanations for the rise of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RGAF) (1968-1980) (Cotler, 1978; McClintock and Lowenthal, 1983; Booth and Sorj, 1983; Gorman, 1982; Kay, 1985). Long-term and short-term accounts can be given for the 'Peruvian Revolution' in the late 1960s and 1970s. Over the first half of the twentieth century, the Peruvian economy was dominated by export-led growth, particularly agricultural produce (sugar, cotton) – and natural resources (copper and oil) – which foreign capital and the landed oligarchy dominated. By the 1960s, however, exports of commodities declined due to the lack of new investment and partially due to resource constraints (Cotler, 1983: 41; see also Thorp and Bertram, 1978). In the meantime, import-substitution industrialisation started comparatively late in Peru and thus the domestic industrial bourgeoisie was weak. While traditional exports were in decline, chipping away at the oligarchical power base, newly emerging bourgeois groups did not have enough power to undertake the reform needed for industrialisation (Kay, 1985: 153). At this juncture of structural crisis, 'the crisis of hegemony' among the ruling class became obvious in face of increasing social pressure (Kay, 1985: 153; see also Quijano, 1971). The 1963 election of Belaunde, with his reformist Popular Action party (*Acción Popular,* AP), and his, reformist efforts, such as agrarian reform and the nationalisation of the International Petroleum Company, were only obstructed by the conservative APRA-Odría coalition in Congress, leading to the military's intervention. In the meantime, the short-term explanation is largely based on officers' class, their ethnic, geographical and educational background; and their previous experiences. While the Peruvian military had been a firm guarantor of ruling class interests, signs of change appeared in the 1960s. Their participation in controlling rural unrest in the highlands raised awareness of the urgent need for agrarian reform as well as other changes. Additionally, the poverty and marginalisation of 'deep Peru' ('*Perú profundo*') were reminiscent of their own humble socio-economic and provincial backgrounds. The education provided to officers in the Centre for High Military Studies (*Centro de Altos Estudios Militares*, CAEM) played an important role in providing them with 'the critical analysis of Peru's social and political problems' (McClintock, 1999: 322-3).

Against this backdrop, the RGAF pursued 'the broader goals of national development' by implementing nationalist and anti-oligarchy reform, hoping to promote 'political stability' by incorporating the popular sectors 'from above' and establishing a support base for the regime (Gorman, 1982: 2). Due to constraints of space, here it suffices to mention briefly one of the major reform programmes and its limited results: the agrarian reform.[44] The Velasco government proclaimed the Agrarian Reform Law in 1969. Its principal political and economic objectives were: 'increas[ing] the agricultural marketable surplus for the rapidly growing urban centres as well as expanding the internal market for the incipient local industry [and incorporating] the peasantry into the political system under the tutelage of the State' (Kay, 1982: 149). Reform was mainly applied to two different geographical areas: the coast and the highlands. The reformed sector was organised into cooperative enterprises: Agrarian Production Cooperatives (*Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción*, CAPs), Agricultural Societies of Social Interest (*Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social*, SAIS), and Peasant Groups (*Grupos Campesinos*) or Communal Cooperatives (*Cooperativas Comunales*) (Kay, 1982; McClintock, 1982). Although this agrarian reform was considered to be one of the most radical in the region, ending the existing oligarchic order, it had rather mixed consequences.[45] In contrast to a small minority of ex-hacienda workers, the majority of poor peasants were largely marginalised from reform benefits due to the persistence of government policies favourable to capital-intensive export agriculture and the relatively slow pace of the reform process in the highlands, among others (although the result varies from region to region). Better access to pasture and 'the end of some feudalistic services to *hacendados* [landowners]' were partial benefits for poor peasants from communities or landless temporary workers (McClintock, 1982: 140). In addition, state control over decision-making within the cooperative enterprises concerning 'land use, employment, wages and managerial nominations' did not produce positive results to agricultural development and quelling rural unrest (Kay, 1982: 155). Accordingly, Kay considers the Peruvian agrarian reform as taking the 'State capitalist road' in that, despite the organisation of collective nature and the government's rhetoric, these enterprises were actually controlled by 'the State' (1982: 165-166). When economic conditions became increasingly negative during the second phase of the RGAF, poor peasants started organising in response to the slow reform pace and the government authorities' control. They actively participated in land invasions and also engaged in anti-government mobilisations in the late 1970s in an alliance with trade unions and other popular organisations.[46] As Paredes notes, '[T]he unresolved struggle over land…

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[44] For more on various reform programmes, see Schydlowsky and Wicht (1983). More details on the agrarian reform can be also found in Kay (1982) and Mayer (2009).

[45] Nearly 39 per cent of the land (8.6 million hectares) and about 8 per cent of livestock (2.2 million head) were distributed to almost 390,684 peasants by 1980 (Hunefeldt, 1997: 110).

[46] For more on land invasions, see Sánchez (1979) and García-Sayán (1982).

led peasants in the southern highlands to strengthen their ties with parties of the left', particularly VR which had sent their militants in order to work with peasants since 1970s (2011: 138-139). In organising the peasantry, party affiliates introduced traditional party structure led by cadres, which was 'adopted willingly by peasants in the context of increasing confrontation with the state… Moreover, land seizures were tactically demanding operations, involving the sort of vertical, semi-military organisation introduced by left-wing militants' (Paredes, 2011: 140-141).

Another aspect of the 'Peruvian experiment' included corporatist social mobilisation which was intended to allay social unrest by providing state benefits. In fact, the implementation of mobilisation policies was less coherent than that of economic reform due to the lack of consensus over its ultimate goal within the military government (Mauceri, 1997: 17). The government created the National Support System for Social Mobilisation (*Sistema National de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*, SINAMOS) in 1971. Before the mid-1960s, labour unions were predominantly controlled by the APRA-led Confederation of the Peruvian Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos*, CTP). The Velasco government implemented several legal measures favourable to workers: the legalisation of trade unions and passing an employment security law. Consequently, the rate of unionisation of workers doubled. The military's lingering hostility toward APRA led to them officially recognising the General Confederation of the Peruvian Workers (*Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú*, CGTP) under the influence of the Communist Party, and the Christian-Democrat dominated National Central of Workers (*Central Nacional de Trabajadores*, CNT) in 1971. By 1977 the number of unions affiliated to the CGTP rose to 44 per cent, while 27 per cent were aligned with the CTP (Mauceri, 1996: 22). In 1972, the government created its own union organisation, the Central of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (*Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana*, CTRP), in order to weaken independent labour organisations and to take control of them, although to no avail. In 1972, the government formulated the National Agrarian Confederation (*Confederación Nacional Agraria*, CNA) in order to organise rural producers in a corporatist manner (CNA came into de facto existence in 1974). However, these state attempts to incorporate the popular sectors and to gain their support were not successful, only helping further mobilisation of society. Given the economic crisis and more orthodox policies initiated after 1975, these sectors led mobilisations and protests in alliance with other leftist groups against the military government and contributed to a transition to democracy.

By 1973, the military-led reforms faced challenges as the national coffers were running low, traditional exports were falling and industrialisation lagged with little investment motivation and poor economic management. Alongside economic crisis, the government increasingly depended on external borrowing with the exaggerated expectation of a commodity boom and favourable Eurodollar market (Thorp, 1983: 51). Consequently, external debt and a crisis in the balance of payments forced the Bermúdez government to adopt a series of austerity programmes in the midst of rising pressure both from international creditors and popular sector protests during the second half of the 1970s (Mauceri, 1995: 17). After the initial general strike led by the CGTP on 19 July 1977, an alliance of various popular organisations and leftist groups protesting against the austerity package, the Bermúdez regime announced a schedule for the Constituent Assembly elections in 1978 and a transition to democracy (Balbi, 1989: 113-114). Two major general strikes took place in 1977 and 1978, and to a large degree rising labour militancy and popular mobilisations were influenced by many leftist groups. In face of the PCP and CGTP's relatively moderate stance towards the military government, most adopted a *clasista* position, radicalising their rhetoric and tactics, which raised their level of influence over various popular sectors alienated by government repression of popular mobilisations as well as the firing of labour leaders after their participation in protests against economic austerity. For example, the Peasant Confederation of Peru (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*, CCP) became reorganised under the leadership of VR in 1974, while Maoist parties exerted control over the teachers' as well as the miners' unions. Additionally, the government's own corporatist organisations, such as CNA, took a more independent and anti-government stance. In the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections these alliances between leftist parties and popular sectors helped generate positive results for the Left for the first time in Peru's history: five groups gained a combined 29.4 per cent of the vote, an impressive increase from less than 5 per cent.[47] In sum, state capitalism was implemented under a reformist military regime in response to a structural crisis in the country's economic development, only producing mixed results. Moreover, state-led industrialisation was unfavourable to rural producers and increased peasant struggles in the southern highlands. In the aftermath of agrarian reform, the traditional oligarchy lost power, leaving a political vacuum in the countryside where many leftist parties and unions attempted to control. While the military regime mobilised society in a corporatist manner with an aim to gain legitimacy from the popular sector and quell social unrest, this effort only encouraged social protests in late 1970s, leading to democratic transition.

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[47] The five leftist groups included FOCEP (*Frente Obrero, Campesino y Popular*), Pro-Velasco PSR (*Partido Socialista Revolucionario*), PCP, UDP (*Unidad Democrática Popular*), the *Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos* (Roberts, 1998: 320). Maoist groups abstained from participation.

3.2. The 1980s Democracy: Electoral and Radical Left

Democratic Experiences: from Belaunde to García

The 1980 general elections took place with a larger and younger electorate as suffrage was extended to the illiterate, as well as to those older than eighteen years old under the 1979 Constitution. APRA's infighting and the Left's failure to unify created a favourable context for AP's candidacy (see Woy-Hazleton, 1982; Letts, 1981). Belaunde was elected with 45.39 per cent of the vote and was inaugurated into a second term, twelve years after he had been ousted by the military coup in 1968. He and his AP did not participate in the elections for the 1978 Constituent Assembly, questioning the impartiality of the voting conditions. AP's reformist rhetoric helped ensure it a majority in the Congress when it made an alliance with the Christian Popular Party (*Partido Popular Cristiano*, PPC). In order to deal with the economic crisis, the Belaunde government adopted austerity programmes, reducing state spending and promoting trade liberalisation. However, in practice, these orthodox economic policies were carried out incoherently due to internal discord within the government, structural conditions, and inefficiencies. As Mauceri explains, privatisation was only limited to small state firms and the resources saved became vulnerable to clientelism and corruption. State investment was concentrated on national defence as well as the colonisation of Amazonian jungle regions. An export boom boosted by traditional products was soon hit by climatic disasters and a decline in commodity prices (1996: 47-8). Consequently, the economy went into recession and became more dependent on external financing, leading to a debt crisis during the period 1983-1985 (Mauceri, 1996: 47-48). According to Strokes, GDP contracted by 12.3 per cent in 1983, while inflation soared from 60 per cent in 1980 to 125 per cent in 1983, with real wages dropping by almost 35 per cent between 1982 and 1985 (1996: 546). With the backdrop of poor economic performance and the inability of the government to deal with revolutionary insurrection, AP's share of votes fell during the 1983 municipal elections and APRA won the presidential election in 1985 by a large margin.

After a period of internal strife around the succession, APRA reorganised under the leadership of a charismatic young leader, Alan García (Mauceri, 1996: 60). In the face of economic and political difficulties, APRA's populist and nationalist rhetoric appealed not only to the country's poor but also to the middle class who were concerned with the armed struggles being waged by the radical Left (PCP-SL) (Mauceri, 1996: 61). García won the election without the need for a run-off (53.1 per cent of the vote), while Barrantes from the leftist electoral coalition, the United Left (*Izquierda Unidad*, IU), gained 24.7 per cent and the AP's electoral tally fell to a mere 7.3 per cent. However, when García announced that the country would put limits on the debt service to 10 per cent of exports, which he intended to renegotiate with international creditors to secure better conditions, with the expectation of cementing popular support, it backfired as the IMF declared Peru to be an 'ineligible borrower' in August 1986 (Mauceri, 1996: 62; Strokes, 1996: 547). Although the García government enjoyed economic growth for the first two years, prompted by the state's expansionary policies, thus achieving political popularity, it became more isolated from the international financial community and attracted less private investment. To make things worse, the announcement of the nationalisation of the financial system in 1987 further alienated international creditors and also encouraged the unification of the country's conservative forces against the government under the leadership of Mario Vargas Llosa. By mid-August 1987, anti-nationalisation protests gained support from 'all business groups as well as AP and the PPC' (Mauceri, 1996: 67). The implementation of an austerity package resulted in an unprecedented economic crisis leading to a recession, rising foreign debt and four-digit hyper-inflation after 1988. According to Poole and Rénique, inflation per year soared from 665.9 per cent in 1988 to 3,400 per cent in 1989 and finally to 8,000 per cent in 1990 and consequently the living standards of the Peruvians fell back to 1960s levels (1992: 4). In addition, corruption scandals were rampant within his cabinet and party members, and involved García himself (Mauceri, 1997: 31).[48]

The Electoral Left: the IU

For leftist parties, underperformance in the 1980 general elections increased the necessity of unification and this resulted in the creation of the IU, a loose electoral alliance, in September the same year (see Taylor, 1990; Roberts, 1998; and Woy-Hazleton, 1982). After their unification, the IU produced good results from general and municipal elections during the 1980s. At its apex in the early and mid-1980s, the IU won 28.8 per cent of the national vote in the 1983 municipal elections and Alfonso Barrantes was elected mayor of Lima. Although Barrantes lost the 1985 presidential election to APRA's García, the IU's electoral performance at a sub-national level was still impressive, gaining a third of the national vote in the 1986 municipal elections. However, the inherent disunity within the IU became more obvious by the mid-1980s. Both internal and external factors can explain the limitation of the electoral Left.

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[48] For more on García's first government, see Crabtree (1992).

First, its ideological dogmatism and factionalism within the coalition made it vulnerable to fragmentation. With little tradition of intra-party democracy and the personalised nature of parties – a characteristic not limited to leftist parties – factions within the party tended to split and create a new party when facing ideological or tactical differences with others. As a result, the IU, an amalgamation of different leftist groups of diverse ideological positions, maintained its coherence initially since Barrantes, a relatively moderate leader, played a coordinating role and offered a certain electoral appeal as a prominent leftist leader. However, when Barrantes took an ambiguous stance toward the APRA and even attempted to make an alliance with the APRA government, IU's radical elements – including the PUM, FOCEP and the Maoist Unity of Revolutionary Left (*Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria*, UNIR) – criticised him for his increasingly exclusive focus on elections. Moreover, the IU's response to the Shining Path (the PCP-SL) was initially ambiguous. The rhetoric and tactics of this radical revolutionary Maoist party did not differ from radical forces within the IU given their emphasis on the necessity of armed struggle for socialist revolution. For the latter, 'democracy was associated with political marginalization and the maintenance of an oligarchic status quo, rather than a popular conquest leading to social or economic reform' (Roberts, 1998: 214). In this way, popular organisations became strategic and competitive arenas for both the IU and the PCP-SL.

Second, the IU could not channel diverse popular demands into formal democratic politics through its organisational structure. Similar to other political parties (the AP, PPC and APRA), many leftist parties were dependent on their political leaders and increasingly alienated from their organisational and popular roots. Third, structural change weakened the social base of leftist parties. Increasingly, more of the population became employed in informal sectors and suffered from precarious labour conditions and employment insecurity.

This reduced incentives for workers to be affiliated with trade unions and raised the socio-economic costs of their involvement in collective actions. Rather, people preferred individualised survival strategies in order to meet their basic needs such as health and education. However, many radical parties could not adapt to structural changes nor could they come up with alternatives to satisfy an impoverished population (see Cameron, 1994). In contrast to the late 1970s, the gap between the party leaders and the rank-and-file had been widening in the context of one of the worst economic crisis. In the end, the IU split in two in 1989 when Barrantes founded his own electoral party, the Socialist Accord (*Acuerdo Socialist*, AS), later renamed as the Socialist Left (*Izquerda Socialista*, IS).

The Radical Left: the PCP-SL

One of the principal outcomes produced by the 1969 agrarian reform was the elimination of the oligarchy's rule. The country's highlands had long been under the control of *gamonales* (local political bosses), many of whom were made up of the landed elite instead of the central administration. Agrarian reform undermined the material base of elite groups, producing a political vacuum given the increasingly heterogeneous rural landscape. By filling this power vacuum in the countryside, a revolutionary Maoist PCP-SL started to consolidate its social base in the southern highlands of Ayacucho.[49] Abimael Guzmán (known as 'President Gonzalo'), the party's leader and a professor of philosophy at the National University of San Cristóbal of Huamanga (UNSCH), split from the PCP-BR in 1970 and established his party base in the university. During the 1970s he limited the party's activity to the Andean region of Ayacucho, by consolidating the party's ideology as well as its structure in preparation for the 'prolonged people's war'.[50] It launched an armed insurrection on the same day as the presidential election was held on 18 May 1980 by burning the electoral register and ballot box in the village of Chusqui, Ayacucho. Initially, the PCP-SL's armed attacks did not gain national attention, being regarded as another outbreak of peasant violence in the marginalised rural highlands. However, the magnitude and intensity of attacks made it increasingly hard for the government to ignore the reality. Indeed, this revolutionary armed struggle and the government's anti-subversive responses militarised most parts of the country, spiralling into a

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[49] For more on the Shining Path, see Degregori (1990) and Stern (ed.) (1998).

[50] The party's ideology and structure and its limitation will be examined later.

de facto civil war during 1980s and 1990s and producing a terrible epoch of human right abuses.

After early indifference to the PCP-SL, the anti-subversive policies of two democratic governments turned out to be inefficient and incoherent, leading to the country's militarisation. Belaunde did not respond appropriately for the first two years, thus only increasing the intensity of subversive attacks. In December 1982, the government dispatched the military to Ayacucho and declared a state of emergency in eight provinces. The subsequent submission to military rule in affected areas stripped away the basic rights of citizens and bypassed democratically elected authorities. This led to 'massacres, extrajudicial executions and disappearances' as well as military forces acting with impunity (Poole and Rénique, 1992: 5; Burt, 2006: 39-47). In the face of increasing criticism of massive human rights abuses, the García government attempted to take a different approach to the PCP-SL insurgency, focusing on social programmes and promising to deal with human right issues more seriously, rather than pursuing dirty-war style 'draining the sea to catch the fish' tactics (Poole and Rénique, 1992: 7). Problems were pointed out in the government's anti-subversive tactics. The military forces did not differentiate between the PCP-SL's insurgents and ordinary citizens. Some of military officers argued that one of the main reasons for the revolutionary insurgency was the precarious socio-economic conditions in the rural highlands. They postulated the urgent need to improve living conditions for the poor *campesinos*. However, an economic downturn and empty state coffers constrained the roll-out of this developmentalist approach, increasing the dependence on private 'solutions' such as paramilitary death squads, e.g. *the Comando Rodrigo Franco* (Rodrigo Franco Command), which was created in July 1988 (Kenney, 2004: 32-33). By the late 1980s, demand for public order and return to normality was on the rise. As Burt points out, 'while institutions such as the police and judiciary have rarely been seen as acting on behalf of ordinary citizens, these institutions' lack of responsiveness to the growing violence and the resulting breakdown in civil order further eroded their credibility' (2006: 40). At the same time, leftist party leaders, popular organisations, elected authorities, as well as human rights organisations, became victims at the crossfire between the military and the PCP-SL, undermining social solidarity and trust within Peruvian society (Burt, 2006: 40). Consequently, commitment to democratic norms and the legitimacy of democratic institutions waned to the extent that many Peruvians conceded 'citizenship and other rights' for 'public order' and 'stability' (Burt, 2006: 41).

On the other hand, the PCP-SL had its own limitations: its ideological dogmatism and structural closeness. A cell-based party structure did not permit contacts between members of different cells and the party's hierarchy. Decisions were made largely by the party's central committee and Guzmán himself. Therefore, when faced with efficient and stronger government responses based on a strengthened intelligence capacity and resources in the early 1990s, the party turned out to be vulnerable. The capture of its leader and central committee members dealt a death blow to the party and violent attacks had reduced remarkably by the mid-1990s. At the centre of the PCP-SL's ideology was 'Gonzalo thought'. Guzmán, as 'the fourth sword of communism' after Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, argued that the party needed to apply Marxism to Peruvian reality, which was reminiscent of Mariátegui's 'Peruvianisation of Marxism' (Starn, 1995). He also emphasised the role of the peasantry in an armed struggle against state power in line with the Maoist stance. Rather than stressing the political role of the peasantry, however, the PCP-SL emphasised the important role of a vanguard party in the revolutionary armed struggle. In addition, Gonzalo thought reflected Guzman's 'blindness to Peruvian history and disinterest in Peru's indigenous roots' and 'the bland economism of a prefabricated narrative about class struggle and capitalism' (Starn, 1995: 413).

In this sense, the PCP-SL's armed insurrection was a revolutionary armed struggle led by an intellectual-based vanguard party rather than a peasants' rebellion based on a 'subsistence crisis' (McClintock, 1989). Initially, the party gained peasant support as its activities were considered as 'benevolent *gamonales*' by punishing corrupt and abusive local authorities and brining public order (Taylor, 2006: 24). Major adherents of the party, however, were intellectuals and high school and university students of provincial origin. Increasingly, the party's dogmatism and authoritarian measures alienated the population. Peasants organised self-defence peasant militias with the support of the government, particularly under Fujimori's administration.[51] The party's interpretation was that a majority of Peruvians lived in a semi-feudal rural society. However, it misinterpreted the social change which occurred in the second half of the twentieth century (Taylor, 2006: 21). Moreover, as the PCP-SL lacked an understanding of the importance of the market in the countryside, the party's 'authoritarian interventions into their systems of production and marketing' as well as traditional and religious rituals frustrated the local population (Poole and Rénique, 1992: 62). In sum, as Starn correctly points out, ‘even as it fought in the name of the peasantry, the Shining Path reinscribed the old insensibility of privileged Peruvian society towards mountain villagers, and the elevation of the European over the Andean’ (1995: 414).

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[51] This self-defence peasant organisation had its origin in the grassroots organisation of *rondas campesinas* in the northern highlands in dealing with cattle rustling problem. For the origin of *rondas campesinas* and its role in Cajamarca, see Chapter 5.

The Rise of Fujimori

Despite active political involvement of many leftist parties in the countryside after agrarian reform, the inherent limitations of the Left increasingly made it vulnerable to the fragmentation, and ideological radicalisation. By the late 1980s most Peruvians suffered from a double crisis: four-digit hyper-inflation and a Maoist armed struggle and government’s counter-insurgency operations. These economic and political crises eroded the living conditions of a majority of Peruvians, debilitating the social base of political parties and labour unions and mobilising and organisational ability of civil society (Cameron, 1994, 1997; Roberts, 1996). Alongside the underperformance of democratic regimes, the country’s weak political party system also explains why democratic institutions as well as politics lost legitimacy among citizens (Tanaka, 1998; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003; Roberts, 2006; Taylor, 2007; Crabtree, 2010).[52] Namely, political parties did not come up with viable solutions for the country’s problems. In addition, the lack of internal democracy and the widening gap between the party leadership and the rank-and-file account for rising support for independent candidates who appeared disassociated from traditional parties. Accordingly, the legislature did not represent popular demands by producing viable policies. Simultaneously, it could not carry out checks and balance functions vis-à-vis strong executive power. Fujimori’s candidacy as a political outsider was successful in this regard. As Mauceri points out, ‘the parties remained highly personalist, fragmented, and authoritarian structures’ (1997: 32). Rather than intra-party democracy, they are dependent on party leaders (*caudillos*) and thus prone to fragment when there is internal discord, as shown in the case of the IU. In the 1980s, four political parties –AP, PPC, APRA, and IU – comprised the Peruvian party system at a national level. Despite high levels of electoral volatility, this four-party system was maintained during the 1980s. Although Belaunde's AP won the presidential elections in 1980, it garnered less than 10 per cent of the vote in the 1985 elections. Similarly, García's impressive electoral performance in 1985 was not reserved in the 1990 elections. In other words, while electoral backing changed from one party to another, it was still within the political party system and support for extra-systemic, or independent, candidates remained less than 10 per cent. This tendency began to change in the late 1980s when the share of votes for anti-systemic outsiders became bigger than for partisan candidates. When an independent television show host, Ricardo Belmont, won the 1989 municipal elections in Lima with 44 per cent of the vote with his electoral movement *Obras* (Works), this was a sign of significant change at the ballot box. The share of independent votes rose to 29 per cent, compared to less than 8 per cent in the 1986 municipal elections (Kenney, 2004: 43). The rise of independents became more obvious in the 1990 presidential elections when two political outsiders contended in the runoff: Mario Vargas Llosa, a candidate from the conservative electoral coalition FREDEMO, and Alberto Fujimori, an agronomist professor and anti-systemic candidate from a loose electoral coalition, *Cambio 90* (Change 90). To the surprise of many, Fujimori won the election with 56.5 per cent of the vote, defeating Vargas Llosa (33.9 per cent) in the second round.

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[52] As will be examined later, the reason for Peruvians’ distrust in the political party system was also attributed to the Fujimori regime which denounced political parties as the main reason for the country’s crises. Although the *de facto* demise of the Peruvian political party system was in 1995, traditional parties had already lost their legitimacy among the electorate by the late 1980s.

Another reason for the election of Fujimori was that there was little alternative for a majority of the poor electorate. García's government and his APRA party were blamed as the main culprit for political and economic crises in the late 1980s. The FREDEMO, which included Vargas Llosa's Democratic Front (*Frente Democrático*) in association with AP and PPC, could not garner popular support due to its ethnic and class bias. In particular, Vargas Llosa's electoral promises, such as economic shock therapy, alienated much of the electorate who had already suffered from a series of austerity programmes. Additionally, division within the IU in 1989 encouraged the perception that politicians were more interested in personal interests and thus votes for the Left were considered as wasted votes. Under these circumstances, Fujimori emerged as an attractive alternative, being a political newcomer not associated with traditional parties. Fujimori's social background and apolitical stance helped his election. A majority of the electorate could sympathise more with Fujimori, of Japanese immigrant origin, than with the renowned white novelist who epitomised privileged and wealthy *limeños*. Moreover, Fujimori apparently differed from Vargas Llosa in economic policies by promising that he would implement economic reform gradually. Furthermore, as his electoral catch phrase – 'honesty, technology, and work' – demonstrated, his apolitical stance distanced him from traditional politicians. Instead, he emphasised hard and efficient work in order to solve the challenges the country faced. In addition, Fujimori gained support from ‘small and informal entrepreneurs, protestant evangelicals, and entourage from the Agrarian University where he was rector’ (Cameron, 1997: 46). Alongside García’s tacit support for the Fujimori candidacy, Montesinos, who became Fujimori’s secret advisor for the next decade, eliminated the final obstacle for his election. During the runoff campaign, Fujimori was accused of irregular real-estate dealings and Montesinos solved this scandal using his informal contacts within the judiciary.[53] After that, the Fujimori-Montesinos duo ruled the country at their discretion.[54]

3.3. Authoritarianism and Economic Reform under Fujimori

Fujimori encountered tremendous challenges when he assumed the presidency in July 1990. First, Peru had been undergoing a multifaceted crisis to the extent that the country was on the brink of ruin. The population had been afflicted by unprecedented hyperinflation, reaching 7,649 per cent in 1990. In addition, 3,708 people died or were injured and 302 people disappeared in the crossfire of the revolutionary insurrection and the military’s counter-attacks in the same year (Mauceri, 1996: 140).[55] Second, although his outsider status was a favourable trait during the electoral campaign, Fujimori did not have a firm social base rooted in a political party. While his own party, *Cambio 90*, was only a loose coalition of diverse independents with little partisan loyalty, Fujimori did not hold a legislative majority to support his administration, in contrast to his predecessors in the 1980s. Third, he was well informed of the military’s coup plans by his intelligence advisor, Montesinos. The plan called, *Plan Verde* (Green Book), had been devised within the military in order to deal with catastrophic political and economic situation in the late 1980s and promote market reforms under a ‘guided democracy’ (see Rospigliosi, 2000). Confronting these challenges, Fujimori attempted to stabilise the economy by implementing a series of shock programmes and reducing the state’s role in the economy. The regime also undertook authoritarian measures aimed at imposing public order and discouraging popular mobilisations. In an attempt to overcome his lack of political legitimacy Fujimori relied on personal networks rather than consolidating his political party, accusing politicians and political parties of being the main culprits behind the country’s ills (see Crabtree and Thomas, 1998).

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[53] The role of Montesinos for the Fujimori regime will be examined later in the chapter.

[54] For more on the rise of Fujimori, see Crabtree and Thomas (1998); Bowen (2000); Cotler and Grompone (2000); Degregori (2000); Wiener (2001).

[55] According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Comisión de la verdad y Reconciliación*, CVR) report, ‘the number of those who died in Peru’s internal armed conflict reached about 70,000 people… Moreover, of the total number reported, 79 per cent lived in rural areas, and about 85 per cent came from the most impoverished departments with the largest Indigenous populations in the country (Ayacucho, Apurimac, Huancavelica, and Huánuco)’ (Munarriz, 2008: 432).

The Self-Coup (Autogolpe)

On 5 April 1992, Fujimori staged a bloodless coup against his government and suspended democratic institutions and the rule of law by dissolving the legislature and closing down the judiciary. The main purpose of the self-proclaimed ‘emergency government of national reconstruction’ was to reform the legislature and judiciary, to make the bureaucracy more efficient, to guarantee public security and to deepen the process of economic reform (Costa, 1993: 28). Although the legislative obstruction of Fujimori’s plan can directly explain the self-coup, as Kenney (2004) has argued, this is not enough to account for its origin. Responses to the *autogolpe* were rather mixed. While the majority of politicians (with the exception of the members of *Cambio 90*), intellectuals and the international community were opposed, the government’s authoritarian decision was given approval by a majority of the population, as well as the military, security forces and business sector. In particular, popular support for the 1992 *autogolpe* and the Fujimori regime itself was an obvious expression of strong popular discontent with democratic institutions, including the political parties. Capitalising on popular distrust of political parties, Fujimori denounced traditional parties as causing the country’s crises by calling them the *partidocracia*. This anti-*partidocracia* discourse helped to establish legitimacy or tacit acquiescence among the population for the *autogolpe*. In addition, the regime’s initial effectiveness in dealing with the country’s problems helped many Peruvians to endorse this undemocratic measure in exchange for public order and economic recovery. Despite the implementation of serious shock programmes with little consideration for their social costs, the economy showed signs of a slow recovery by late 1991 and, more importantly, the hyperinflation that had afflicted the country dropped significantly. Moreover, the checks and balances attempts made by the

Congress backfired as many Peruvians perceived them as legislative sabotage by self-interested politicians to undermine executive efficiency (Weyland, 2006: 22).

In contrast to its popular support, the *autogolpe* was not welcomed by the international community, including almost all Latin American countries and the US government. Under pressure from important foreign countries and international organisations, such as the OAS (Organisation of American States), Fujimori promised a schedule for Constituent Assembly elections and the reopening of Congress at the second foreign ministers' meeting of OAS held in the Bahamas on 18 May 1992. While APRA, AP and other parties did not participate in the November election, Fujimori's electoral alliance, *Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría* (Change 90/New Majority, C-90/N-M), garnered an absolute majority (44 seats of the 80 member unicameral body) in the Democratic Constituent Congress (*Congreso Constituyente Democrático*, CCD). Alongside the abstention of traditional parties, agents of the Counter-terrorist Directorate (*Dirección contra el Terrorismo*, DIRCOTE) succeeded in arresting the head of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmán, together with the majority of members of the party's central committee on 12 September 1992 after the intensification in intelligence activities. Due to this successful operation, the President's popularity soared to 75 per cent from a previous high of 61 per cent in August, confirming the government's ability to confront terrorist forces which had afflicted most parts of the country for more than a decade (Costa, 1993: 39).

Strong Executive and Authoritarianism

After the *autogolpe*, the government concentrated executive power by attacking democratic institutions and taking more authoritarian measures. In order to legitimise the new constitution enacted in the Fujimori-controlled CCD, the government managed to authorise it via a plebiscite in October 1993, winning by a small margin of less than 5 per cent (52.23 per cent of approval and 47.67 per cent disapproving). Under the new constitution, the size of Congress was reduced to an 80 member single legislative body and control over the legislature and the judiciary increased. The capacity of Congress to make laws and to hold the executive in check diminished. According to Cameron, of those laws passed, only 39 per cent were introduced by Congress after the coup, while Congress remained as a rubber stamp for executive initiatives (1998: 129). In addition, the legislature could not proceed with investigation commissions, particularly regarding executive power abuses over security issues (Cameron, 1998: 130). The control over the judiciary increased in the name of the efficiency and transparency of the legal system. In November 1995, the Administrative Commission of the Judiciary (*Comisión Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial*) was created by law 26546. Thereby central government took control of the judiciary's administration (Belaúnde, 1998: 180). In this way, the judiciary's independence was undermined as the executive exerted more influence over personnel management, budget administration, as well as decision-making within the judiciary (Belaúnde, 1998: 184). Alongside the control over the legislative and judicial bodies, the decentralisation process initiated during the García government was reversed and the government returned control to the executive. In this vein, the Transitory Committee of Regional Administration (*Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional*, CTAR) was created in the aftermath of the *autogolpe*, replacing regional assemblies. This committee was controlled by the Ministry of the Presidency, with reduced autonomy for subnational governing bodies.[56] In addition, the Fujimori regime attempted to concentrate power in the executive and to reduce the influence of municipal government over popular organisations and local self-help and participatory initiatives such as the Glass of Milk programme (Mauceri, 2006: 52).

Fujimori also opted to bypass democratic institutions rather than consolidating his own political party when striving to establish his political legitimacy. During the 1990s, rather than building a political party, Fujimori created several political movements in preparation for each election.[57] Instead of political parties, Fujimori also used personal networks based on civilian technocrats, the military, the national intelligence service (*Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional*, SIN), familial contacts, ex-colleagues from La Molina Agrarian University, as well as evangelical Christians, among others. Fujimori's appointment of highly globalised professional technocrats, particularly in his economic team, was significant in accomplishing the country's economic restructuring, as well as in making contacts with the international financial community. Fujimori's informal advisor, Hernando de Soto, was the director of Peru's leading free-market think tank, the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (*Instituto Libertad y Democracia*), and he played a role as an intermediary between the Peruvian government and international creditors in terms of negotiations concerning rescheduling foreign debt and agreeing conditions for new loans (Mauceri, 1995: 18). The appointment of a pro-market minister of the economy, Carlos Boloña, helped to gain trust from domestic business groups, while professional technocrats took charge of increasing the efficiency of administrative functions, e.g., the national tax collection agency (*Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria,* SUNAT) and the Commission for the Promotion of Private Investment (*Comisión de Promoción de la Inversión Privada*, COPRI).[58] Competent professionals, such as 'lawyers, accountants, economists' who studied in foreign countries, were employed in these agencies (Mauceri, 2006: 56). One of the most obvious examples of government efforts to improve administrative efficiency was the restructuring of SUNAT. With the appointment of Manuel Estela as director in May 1991, SUNAT produced positive results in extending the tax base, increasing fiscal revenues, as well as simplifying the tax system in the first half of the 1990s. With executive backing and a professional reform team, tax revenue increased to 11 per cent of GDP in 1993 and 14 per cent in 1995, from a mere 4.9 in the first half of 1991 (Kay, 1996: 70; Durand and Thorp, 1998: 212-221).[59]

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[56] The 1979 constitution promised regionalisation for the first time in Peruvian history; the García government created 12 administrative regions and devolved legislative and financial authority to a certain extent. However, CTAR was created as part of 'transitional bodies leading to the creation of permanent and local elected councils' under the Fujimori regime, an aspect of power concentration in the executive (Mauceri, 2006: 51).

[57] C-90/N-M was designed for the Constituent Assembly election. *Vamos Perú* (Let's go Peru) was an inchoate electoral movement for the 1998 municipal elections and *Perú 2000* (Peru 2000) was improvised for the 2000 presidential elections.

Fujimori's secret intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, was one of his most important personal contacts. A former army captain who was accused of national betrayal and lawyer for drug-traffickers, Montesinos gained the trust of Fujimori during the runoff in 1990, as mentioned above.[60] On taking office, Fujimori appointed Montesinos as director of the SIN. Well-acquainted with the military, the head of the SIN was an important contact point between Fujimori and the armed forces. In the initial years, Fujimori, advised by Montesinos, dedicated himself to the internal reorganisation of the military by putting pro-Fujimori generals and officials in key positions, thus taking control of the security forces (Mauceri, 1995: 20). In this vein, General Nicolás Hermoza Ríos was designated as commander of the armed forces in 1991. Control over the military and a recalibrating of intelligence activities not only served to guarantee national security against terrorist attacks, but also helped in repressing and discouraging opponent politicians, journalists and the leaders of popular organisations. The military were used everywhere, from the enforcement of tax collection to food distribution to shantytown dwellers (Mauceri, 1995: 20).

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[58] The role of COPRI will be examined later in the chapter.

[59] However, since the mid-1990s, efficient tax enforcement was not maintained due to bureaucratic inertia and corruption, as well as lobbying efforts by large business groups led by CONFIEP (*Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas*, created in 1984) (Arce, 2006: 41; Durand and Thorp, 1998: 222-223).

[60] For more on Montesinos and the armed forces, see Rospigliosi (2000).

In the meantime, Montesinos used the strengthened intelligence capacity of the SIN and a paramilitary death squad, the Colinas Group, in order to raid presumed subversive forces and to intimidate and repress critics of the regime.[61] Assaults were made on those assumed to be terrorists, but turned out to be innocent civilians, as in the case of the Barrios Altos massacre in November 1991 and the killing of students and a professor at Cantuta University in July 1992. Alongside the increasing influence of Montesinos and the SIN, more authoritarian measures were introduced, leading to abuses of power by the security forces and a damning human rights record. After the *autogolpe*, the government passed anti-terrorist legislation. Under this law, civilians who were accused of terrorism or treason were not guaranteed basic legal process and could be tried in military courts using unidentified or 'faceless' judges (Cameron, 1998; Burt, 2006). These measures were often overused to control government critics and discourage civil society activities, 'by equating opposition activity with terrorism' (Burt, 2006: 51; see also Munarriz, 2008: 434). Similarly, the issue of impunity was raised when the Amnesty Law passed in June 1995 and shortly after 'assassins who had been convicted of crimes committed between 1980 and 1995 went free' (Cameron, 1998: 129).

Economic Reform: State vis-à-vis Civil Society

Whilst austerity programmes had been implemented since the late 1970s and into the 1980s, economic liberalisation had not been predominant due to opposition from domestic capital and leftist parties, as well as popular organisations. The intensity and extent of economic reform in the 1990s, however, was considered one of the most radical on the continent. In addition, the Fujimori regime did not face serious opposition to economic reform and instead he maintained a high level of popularity during most periods of his rule (Solfrini, 2001: 44). While power was increasingly concentrated in the executive and more authoritarian measures were implemented under Fujimori's regime, political parties and civil society organisations were too weak to ensure executive accountability. This created favourable conditions for centralised decision-making by the president, his technocrats and the intensification of authoritarian rule. At the same time, the Fujimori regime adopted neopopulist policies in order to co-opt a disorganised population, thus avoiding engaging with intermediary organisations between the state and civil society.

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[61] The Colinas Group was 'a paramilitary group that operated out of the SIN and the Army Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército*, SIE)' and was used to intimidate and silence opponents through violence (Burt, 2006: 47).

Still, traditional parties could garner nearly 40 per cent of the vote in the 1993 municipal elections. But electoral backing for them dropped to less than ten per cent in the 1995 presidential elections, leading to the demise of the political party system.[62] Since the mid-1990s, politicians themselves who pursued electoral success appealed to a disarticulated electorate without strong partisan ties. They also conducted apolitical and pragmatic electoral campaigns with a loose electoral coalition. One obvious example was Alberto Andrade, a two-time mayor of Lima elected in 1995 and 1998 respectively. He improvised *Somos Perú* (We are Peru) for elections but the party was not intended to consolidate partisan loyalties. Apart from Andrade, another independent who rose to the top and was thus attacked by the government in the lead-up to the 2000 presidential elections was Luis Castañeda Lossio, head of the social security institute (*Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social*, IPSS) from 1990-1996 and a founder of the National Solidarity party (*Solidaridad Nacional*).[63] Although the public preference for a democratic regime was consistent, democratic institutions constantly lost their legitimacy among many Peruvians, thereby creating an electoral opportunity for political outsiders with little democratic commitment, as in the case of Fujimori (Kay, 1996: 86).

Parallel to the collapse of the party system, unions, peasant federations, and popular organisations – once strong parts of civil society – lost their importance as political actors. By 1990, afflicted by hyperinflation and prolonged economic recession as well as militarisation and violent attacks from both subversive forces and the state, most grassroots organisations were incapable of defending their collective interests and became easily disarticulated. Already debilitated, civil society organisations became further weakened with the implementation of economic structural reform. Despite initial success in retaining inflation and achieving economic stabilisation, serious problems such as poverty and unemployment remained unresolved. As demonstrated in the 1993 referendum when the new Constitution passed by less than a 5 per cent margin, an increasing number of Peruvians started to feel the impact of economic reform on their livelihoods. In particular, economic shock therapy before the *autogolpe* was implemented with little consideration for social emergency programmes required to alleviate its social impact. In preparation for the 1995 presidential elections, the Fujimori government intensified spending on social relief programmes, particularly those targeting disarticulated and poor Peruvians in both urban shanty towns and the impoverished countryside.

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[62] In 1995 four parties could not meet the National Electoral Board’s (*Jurado Nacional Electoral*, JNE) requirement for legal status (5 per cent of the valid vote) (Kay, 1996: 89).

[63] Later he was elected as the mayor of Metropolitan Lima in 2002 and retained the post until 2010, when he resigned to run for the 2011 presidential elections.

When confronting the economic crisis, priority was given to stabilisation and the country's re-entry into the international financial community. Regarding these aims, just two weeks after his inauguration, Fujimori reversed his promises and introduced shock programmes which were largely similar to those proposed by Vargas Llosa. With the appointment of a pro-market liberal, Carlos Boloña, as Minister of Economy and Finance in February 1991, the Fujimori government intensified economic reform. In June 1991, the Congress gave the executive the authority to implement legislative decrees via Law 25327 (Kenney, 2004: 151). Fujimori made use of this legislative prerogative to enact a series of laws which were intended to reform the economy and to give more authority to the military in terms of its anti-subversive operations (Mauceri, 1995: 23). Initial shock therapy saw positive outcomes: the monthly inflation rate on average fell from 14.5 per cent in 1991 to less than 5 per cent in 1992 (Kay, 1996: 63). In addition, new loans from international creditors were now viable and capital inflows reinitiated, the economy started to show signs of recovery. After a short interruption due to *autogolpe*, the government resumed negotiations with international lenders regarding debt scheduling as Fujimori's promise to hold Constituent Assembly elections and reconvene Congress. By 1993, the Peruvian economy started to recover and GDP increased by 12.8 per cent in 1994 (Solfrini, 2001: 60).

With the intensification of economic restructuring, the country adopted a market-oriented development model different from the state-led one of the 1970s. In addition to its administrative efficiency improvement, the Fujimori government reduced its intervention in the economy through spending cutbacks and eliminating state subsidies. In a similar vein, it started to sell state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By 1990, the financial status of SOEs was already in the red due to inefficient and poor management, corruption and lack of investment during the 1980s. During the period 1985-1990, SOEs lost $1.6 billion, an average annual loss of US$330 million (Kay, 1996: 61). In the context of fiscal deficits and the economic crisis, the necessity for increasing state revenues from the privatisation of SOEs rose. Against this backdrop, a new decree created COPRI which oversaw the privatisation process from September 1991. COPRI's strategy for privatisation was to first sell small firms and to restructure SOEs in order to make them more attractive to investors. In addition, the selling of larger SOEs proceeded at a gradual pace. Initially investors showed little interest in buying small firms. After the *autogolpe*, the privatisation process developed momentum. In particular, 'mining, manufacturing, telecommunications and the energy sectors' attracted more foreign capital (Kisic, 1998: 50). Between 1991 and 2000 almost 80 per cent of state companies were privatised, with priority being given to sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and mining (see Carrión, 2006; Abugattas, 1998).[64] The state also sought to open up the economy by lowering trade obstacles and promoting the free movement of foreign capital. The introduction of unitary exchange rates, reductions in import tariffs, and the withdrawal of labour protections figured among those measures introduced to encourage trade liberalisation and promote foreign investment.

Due to the prolonged economic crisis, wage levels declined and more Peruvians faced difficulties finding a stable waged job in the formal sector. In addition, workers in the informal sector increased in number as the state-led industrialisation strategy was abandoned. As a result of changing economic structures and recession, the amount of workers who were affiliated with unions diminished, weakening the social base of labour unions. Indeed, the insistence on a confrontational strategy by union leaders did not produce positive outcomes for workers in the context of decreasing real wages and precarious working conditions. As labour organisations lost legitimacy, many workers preferred individual strategies, such as developing one's own working performance rather than collective alternatives in order to improve their livelihoods. Consequently, unions kept losing their organising capacity for collective action, as demonstrated in successive failures of the CGTP to call national strikes from the 1980s onwards (see Balbi, 1997). Economic reform under Fujimori enhanced this tendency by making the labour market more flexible, arguably a precondition for the competitiveness of Peruvian enterprises in the international market. The deregulation of the law on employment security enacted under the Velasco government increased the number of contract labourers. After the *autogolpe*, the government issued the Law of Collective Relations of Labour (*Ley de Relaciones Colectivas de Trabajo*), deregulating basic labour rights – 'unionization, collective bargaining and strikes' – a development more favourable to private companies rather than guaranteeing these rights for workers (Solfrini, 2001: 64).

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[64] For the privatisation of SOEs in the mining sector, see Chapter 4. Of revenues from privatisation, '48.2% was spent on assistance policies, 22.85% on military defense, and 24.2% on external debt payments' (Solfrini, 2001: 71).

Similarly, the reform process in the agricultural sector was designed to increase agricultural production and bring about favourable conditions for small-scale producers as well as poor peasants. Indeed, it turned out that it made the rural landscape more heterogeneous, providing little long-term solutions for rural poverty. Financial and trade policies promoting a more open economy, albeit with an increase in agricultural exports, were more favourable to the importation of agricultural produce, an average of US$ 1,035 million during the period 1996-99 from US$488 million in 1986-90 (Crabtree, 2002: 143). The reduction in state spending caused by eliminating subsidies and development banks, such as the Agrarian Bank (*Banco Agrario*), was also an adverse development for small-scale producers. Under reform initiatives, peasants had less access to technology, inputs, credit and markets in comparison to large-scale capital-intensive producers who exported tradable produce. Importantly, previous collective initiatives under the Velasco government began to change as members could dissolve cooperative enterprises and sell land parcels individually. The Land Law (*Ley de Tierra*) enacted in 1995 was intended to make peasants use the land as collateral by guaranteeing property rights.[65] This land-titling process was in line with the initiatives of IFIs (such as WB and IDB) in terms of promoting rural development (Crabtree, 2002: 142). The land-titling initiative benefited those who could afford land and capitalise on it most: ‘larger-scale producers oriented primarily towards agro-industry and foreign markets (Crabtree, 2002: 143). In the context of the debilitation of once strong peasant organisations such as the CCP and CNA, small-scale producers and the landless rural poor had to supplement their income with non-agricultural employment or migration to cities or other countries in order to make ends meet.

Faced with increasing rate of unemployment and poverty, the Fujimori government adopted short-term ‘solutions’ via targeted social programmes. The government created the National Fund for Development and Social Compensation (*Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social*, FONCODES) in August 1991 with the aim of buffering the social impact of economic reform and supporting social projects to meet the basic needs of an impoverished population. This had an earmarked fund of US$425 million from the IDB (Kay, 1996: 78).[66] Most of the social programmes were project-specific with little longer-

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[65] For the role of this law for increasing mining investment, see Chapter 4.

[66] It is said that the government spent $542 million on FONCODES during the first half of the 1990s (Solfrini, 2001: 63). IFIs emphasised the necessity of safety net programmes in order to mitigate the impact of economic reform. Targeted social programmes under the Fujimori government were largely financed by the support of these IFIs as well as state revenues gained from selling SOEs.

term development potential. Sometimes they lasted only for several months. With centralised decision-making under the control of the Ministry of the Presidency, an estimated 60 per cent of the projects which were implemented via FONCODES were associated with infrastructure construction (Solfrini, 2001: 62). To a certain degree, while this increase in projects was the state's response to the resilient unemployment problem, the temporary employment of many contract workers on public works did not represent a fundamental solution.[67] Moreover, social programmes targeted mainly the unorganised and disarticulated poor both in countryside and in urban shantytowns. This comprised an integral part of the political strategy of the Fujimori government, which attempted to make direct ties with 'the masses' by bypassing already moribund political parties and popular organisations.[68] The government's food assistance programme, the National Fund of Alimentation (*Fondo Nacional de Alimentación*, PRONAA), was controlled by the Ministry of the Presidency and implemented with a bias toward pro-government groups, sometimes in competition with autonomous social organisations which were active in the 1980s (Kay, 1996: 80). This *asistencialista* nature of social emergency programmes tended to keep impoverished segments of the population dependent. Moreover, the government used these programmes according to the political cycle in order to garner more electoral support from a disarticulated electorate (Arce, 2006: 43). Through these mechanisms, Fujimori won the 1995 election by a landslide (66 per cent of the vote) against ex-UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (22 per cent), while the former's C-90/N-M won a legislative majority (67 seats of the 120 member unicameral Congress). This politically targeted funding was repeated before the 2000 presidential elections.

The Demise of Fujimorato

Successful treatment of the country's immediate problems, such as hyper-inflation, laid the support base for the *autogolpe* and the government itself, in parallel with the implementation of authoritarian and populist policies. Consequently, Fujimori was re-elected by a landslide in

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[67] According to Kay, nearly 2,500 projects related to infrastructure construction by mid-1994 employed 23,000 contract workers each month (1996: 79-80).

[68] Many scholars point out the continuity of populist policies alongside neoliberal economic reform, terming it 'neopopulism'. For more on this concept in a Latin American context, see Demmers, Jiberto and Hogenboom (2001); Weyland (1996; 2001; 2003). On neopopulism under Fujimori, see Roberts (1995); Crabtree (1998; 2000).

1995 and enjoyed high levels of popularity for over a decade. After maintaining expansionary policies in preparation for the election, an economic recession followed, putting a strain on the already impoverished majority. As a result, the level of support for the regime fell to 35-45 per cent after mid-1997 from a high of 75 per cent in January 1996 (Weyland, 2006: 27-8). In explaining the dilemma of the authoritarian regime, Weyland (2006) points out the shifting attentions of the population which affected their support for the government: two seemingly unresolvable issues the country faced in 1990 turned out to be a favourable asset for the regime as the economy stabilised and political violence diminished during the first term. However, this success brought to the fore greater challenges, particularly unemployment and poverty. In the face of these more intractable problems which were hard to solve within a short-term period, the government did not develop political organisations of its own, so could not help but to resort to authoritarian measures and expansionary spending in order to maintain its rule. Weyland (2000; 2006) has called this dilemma 'a paradox of success'.

Authoritarian measures and the concentration of power emboldened Fujimori to exert a firm grip on the military and SIN, both of which were used to eviscerate political opponents and popular organisations. At the same time, the regime did not promote the rise of its own political organisation or any potential successor to the personalist leader. Rather Fujimori attempted to perpetuate his rule by all possible measures, legal or illegal. After being elected twice in 1995 under the new Constitution, the regime started to prepare for his third term election. By mid-1996, the C-90/N-M-dominated Congress passed 'the law of authentic interpretation' (Law 26657). According to this law, Fujimori's first term (1990-95) was kept out of consideration since the 1993 Constitution was not applied retroactively. Therefore, Fujimori was deemed to be eligible to run for the 2000 elections, which was to be interpreted as his second term once he was elected. Controversy over the constitutionality of this law followed. When faced with the opposition of three members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the government dismissed them and abolished the function of this highest judicial authority. Civil society opposition led by *Foro Democrático* attempted to garner signatures to call for a referendum on the law. However, the government modified electoral regulations on the referendum by adding a provision which required 48 votes out of the 120-member Congress together with a certain number citizens' signatures. In the end, the referendum efforts, which succeeded in gathering 1,441,535 signatures, failed being short of three Congressional votes in 1998. In this way, the legal groundwork was laid for Fujimori's second re-election.

Alongside this legal measure, the Fujimori government, in alliance with the military and SIN masterminded by Montesinos, used authoritarian or illegal measures in order to intimidate and debilitate political opponents and critical media. In the runoff elections on May 2000 Fujimori became the only candidate after Alejandro Toledo decided to abstain. Despite accusations of electoral irregularity, Fujimori was sworn in on 28 July 2000 after supposedly having garnered 51 per cent of the vote while Toledo's *Perú Posible* won 18 per cent.[69] Four months after Fujimori managed to start his third term, he was to fax his resignation in a rather disgraceful manner.[70] The direct reason was the release of a videotape via Channel N in September 2000, in which Montesinos was caught bribing an opposition congressman, Alberto Kouri, giving him US$15,000 in compensation for changing to the government party. The revelation of this and other videos, widely known as *Vladivideos*, revealed to what extent Montesinos had abused his power in order to maintain Fujimori's authoritarian government. Although the *Vladivideos* were not the sole reason for the demise of the regime, it was directly related to it.

Montesinos co-opted and collaborated with politicians, judges and the media via material rewards, i.e. bribery, and non-material compensation in exchange for their cooperation with the government.[71] Simultaneously, the head of SIN used his intelligence networks and death squads in order to debilitate and punish opposition politicians, as well as critical media. When *Perú 2000* lacked a majority in the Congress, occupying only 51 seats, Montesinos bought opposition congressmen. The Kouri video was a case in point. In the same way, he corrupted many judges and newspapers, including tabloids and television channels in the run-up to the elections, by providing cash as well as favours such as tax exemptions or promotions. However, when faced with opponents, Montesinos did not hesitate to use his well-developed intelligence activities, such as wiretapping, installing hidden cameras and dispatching infiltration agents. Sometimes, if necessary, he sent his death squads with the aim of intimidating, torturing, kidnapping and even killing opponents. The case of Baruch Ivcher, the owner of Channel 2 (*Frecuencia Latina*), is a representative example. After the television channel broadcast programmes on Montesinos' extravagant salary and on the torture and murder of ex-SIN agents, Ivcher, of Israeli origin, was stripped of Peruvian citizenship (and thus of his company) in 1997. All this was possible under Fujimori's personalist and authoritarian regime given the near absence of congressional checks and balances and effective opposition from political parties or popular organisations. Although there were student-led mobilisations against Fujimori's run for a third term in the second half of the 1990s, they were not capable of coalescing and becoming a serious opposition force. The resignation of Fujimori led to a swift decision of Congress to call for presidential elections in 2001 arguing the moral incapacity of Fujimori regime. During the next nine months, the transition government of Valentín Paniagua took charge of returning the government to a newly elected democratic regime. Alejandro Toledo won the 2001 presidential election by taking advantage of his political leadership during the 'March for *Cuatro de Suyos*' held in opposition to Fujimori's third term.

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[69] The national newspaper, *El Comercio*, revealed the irregularity in the party registration process of Fujimori's Perú 2000 in February 2000. It turned out more than million signatures for the party membership were falsified and this raised doubts over the transparency and legitimacy of the elections (McClintock, 2006: 258). In the end, the 2000 elections were carried on with the opposing contender abstaining, which international electoral observers such as OAS also did.

[70] For more on the demise of Fujimori, see Crabtree (2001); Taylor (2001); Cameron (2006).

[71] After Montesinos was arrested in Venezuela in the aftermath of the regime's demise, he had to face more than 50 charges in court. Consecutive investigative commissions later revealed that nearly US $200 million had been lodged in his foreign accounts (McMillan and Zoido, 2004: 72).

3.4. Conclusion

In the face of decreasing opportunities for exporting traditional primary goods, Peruvian economic development encountered a structural crisis in the 1960s. While international financiers were reluctant to invest, domestic capital – which had been mostly dependent on foreign capital – was less prepared to lead investment initiatives. Against this backdrop, Peruvian society underwent a profound transformation, involving industrialisation, migration, and urbanisation. In addition, while peasants in the southern *sierra* mobilised with demands for land during the late 1950s and 1960s. To deal with the structural crisis of development in the context of increasing social pressure, General Velasco undertook a series of reformist policies in pursuit of state-led development. The military regime also attempted to organise the population in a corporatist manner with an aim to quell social unrest and to gain social support for state-led reformism. However, state capitalism in the 1970s had limitations: its dependency on 'external borrowing'; inefficient and corrupt management of SOEs; its failure to attract domestic investors; and a lack of social programmes (Wise, 1994: 115). Consequently, the 'Peruvian experiment' produced an economic recession and debt crisis after the mid-1970s. Organised Peruvians responded with a series of mobilisations and general strikes in alliance with radicalised leftist parties, demanding a transition to democracy. Particularly in the rural highlands, the ambitious agrarian reform did not benefit most poor peasants, leaving a political vacuum as the material base of the oligarchy disintegrated, a space which many leftist groups, including a Maoist radical party, attempted to fill.

After twelve years of military rule, in 1980 Peru enjoyed at least procedural democracy until the *autogolpe* of 1992. During this period, four political parties – AP, PPC, APRA and IU – were maintained within the democratic system. Despite substantial electoral volatility, the inter-party system remained stable during most of the 1980s. In the face of economic recession and debt problems, austerity programmes were adopted under the Belaunde government. However, their implementation was rather incoherent and short-sighted in the midst of pressure from domestic capital and democratic opposition. In contrast to his predecessor, García followed a heterodox economic policy during the first half of the regime. Despite initial economic successes and consequential levels of popularity, the late 1980s saw one of the worst economic crises in the country's history due to a series of policy failures (e.g. the decision to nationalise the banking system). Moreover, despite the important role played by leftist parties in the democratic transition, ideological dogmatism and factionalism turned out to be an intractable obstacle and led to IU's internal divisions in 1989. Similar to other major political parties, IU was composed of leftist parties which were highly personalised and lacked intra-party democracy. The weakness of political parties was one of the causes of democratic underperformance in the 1980s, widening the gap between state and society. In addition, the PCP-SL, a radical leftist group, maintained its ideological dogmatism and structural closeness. With unprecedented hyperinflation, the revolutionary violence launched by the PCP-SL in 1980 placed Peru at the crossroads of economic crisis and political violence, impacting on a majority of Peruvians already in a state of predicament. By the late 1980s, democratic institutions, including political parties, lost credibility among the population. Popular demands for economic recovery and public security were the principal motives behind the election of Fujimori in the 1990 presidential elections.

Faced with multifaceted challenges, Fujimori's regime adopted a series of economic restructuring programmes and strengthened its intelligence capacity in order to respond to subversive attacks. Consequently, a sign of economic recovery and public order earned the regime a certain degree of legitimacy. This credibility gained from his government's performance laid the ground for the *autogolpe* in April 1992. Despite a high rate of popular support and the backing of the military and business groups, Fujimori's government called for a Constituent Assembly election in November 1992 when faced with international pressure for a return to democracy. Over a decade of authoritarian government, the regime enjoyed high levels of popularity. However, the neoliberal economic reform increasingly degraded the already precarious living conditions of many impoverished Peruvians. In order to rebuild popularity, especially in the run-up to elections, the government increased social spending by targeting the country's many poor. But it simultaneously implemented a series of legal and illegal measures masterminded by the director of SIN, Montesinos, with the intention of ensuring Fujimori's third term election in 2000. Despite a number of mobilisations, particularly led by students, and critical comments by opposition politicians and a few relatively independent parts of the media, it was the revelation of one videotape which caused Fujimori's collapse after a decade of authoritarian rule. The exposure of the *Vladivideo* demonstrated the wide extent of the abuse of power over practically every sector of society under Fujimori's regime. Despite promises of economic growth, by the late 1990s the result was not impressive. The economy grew by 1.2 per cent on average during the last two years (McMillan and Zoido, 2004: 90). The gap between the rich minority and poor majority increased while the record of human rights abuses worsened. In the end, Fujimori had to flee the country and sent his resignation via fax. Shortly after the re-democratisation process started as Paniagua oversaw a transition government until Toledo's election in 2001.

A decade of authoritarian rule and the implementation of neoliberal reforms provide a direct explanation for the deepening marginalisation of the majority of the population. However, alongside the backing of military and business group, a majority of population granted rather a high degree of acceptance for economic reform and anti-democratic measures on behalf of economic stability and public order, particularly during the first half of the regime. This high approval rate requires political and economic explanations regarding the previous decades: structural crisis of economic development and mixed result of subsequent state capitalism; ideological dogmatism and factionalism of the Peruvian Left and the consequent IU's fragmentation and PCP-SL's radicalisation; and the mismanagement of economic and security policy and the weak party system under the democratic regimes of the 1980s. When faced with deteriorating living conditions caused by neoliberal economic policies and human rights abuses, a majority of afflicted Peruvians were left with little recourse (i.e. neither political parties nor social organisations) to address their problems, such as unemployment and poverty. The most marginalised sectors only became a target for social relief which the government provided them dependent on the electoral cycle. Given this contextualisation, the next chapter will examine one of the most prominent sectors in which a neoliberal form of development has been implemented, i.e. the mining sector, and the complex relationship between neoliberal mineral extraction and socio-environmental protests across the nation, particularly since the late 1990s.

Chapter 4

Mining and Social Protests in Neoliberal Peru

According to Lima Chamber of Commerce (*Cámara de Comercio de Lima*, CCL), boosted by the mining and hydrocarbon sectors, the country's economy is expected to increase by 5.2 to 5.7 per cent in 2014.[72] In particular, important mining projects are being initiated, including *Toromocho*, *Las Bambas* and *Constancia*. Neoliberal economic reform has attracted substantial foreign investment in the mining sector, which has become a crucial element in the country's export and fiscal bonanza. Despite the economic growth based on mineral extraction, wealth and resultant benefits have been unequally distributed. Recently released statistics (Poverty Indicator Report 2012, *Informe Cifras del Pobreza 2012*) show that (financial) poverty has been reduced in a majority of Peruvian departments, while poverty continues to be prevalent in the departments of Apurímac, Cajamarca, Ayacucho and Huancavelica.[73] According to the report, Cajamarca, one of the most important departments for the recent mining boom, was ranked the second poorest: 54.2 per cent of the department's population are categorised as poor. To a certain degree, this adverse relationship between mining, economic growth and poverty suggests why the country has witnessed growing socio-environmental conflict during the past two decades.

In addition, social protests have increased with the post-2000 re-democratisation process. Under the authoritarian Fujimori regime, collective actions were infrequent compared to the post-*Fujimorato* era. According to an analysis of social protests between 1995 and 2006, their total number was 5,443 and of these 36.3 per cent occurred in the period between 1995 and 2000, while 63.7 per cent took place over the next six years (Garay and Tanaka, 2009: 59). The number of social protests started to rise after the mid-1990s when students led mobilisations against Fujimori's second re-election attempt and soared in the wake of the regime's fall. Not only did the political environment become more favourable for collective actions, the implementation of more than a decade harsh austerity economic policies impacted negatively on the population, particularly those marginalised from the benefits generated by economic growth. IFIs started to devote more attention to the impact of neoliberal economic reform on local communities and their policy focus moved towards poverty reduction and promoted the participation of local people through engagement by international and domestic civil organisations, with a consideration of 'sustainable development'.[74] Against this backdrop, the rise of socio-environmental protests in Peru has taken place in parallel to increasing mineral extraction and high international prices.

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[72] '*Economía del Perú crecerá hasta 5.7 % en el 2014, estima la CCL*', *La República*, 7 May 2013.

[73] '*Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Apurímac y Huancavelica son los más pobres del país*', *La República*, 9 May 2013.

Alongside growing socio-environmental mobilisations, large-scale extractive projects and their impact on local development has become a significant issue at the ballot box, as well as affecting the stability of successive governments. Humala, once denounced as a radical ally of Hugo Chávez and defeated by Alan García in the 2006 presidential poll by a small margin, moderated his campaign in the 2011 elections.[75] In the second round, Humala and his allies argued that he was a candidate who could govern the country responsibly, announcing his electoral promises under the banner of the so-called '*la Hoja de Ruta*' ('The Roadmap'). This plan advocated a strategy comprised of more equitable and inclusive development in parallel with macroeconomic growth and stability. His electoral promises for change gained the support of many Peruvians. After decades of economic liberalisation, the socio-economic and political marginalisation of the poor had not improved substantially, even in the context of relatively stable economic growth. Initially, the new government enjoyed comparatively high popularity ratings. Within three months of his rule, support for the Humala administration rose to 63 per cent, as compared to his predecessors, Toledo (42 per cent in 2001) and García (62 per cent in 2006) at a comparable stage during their term in office.[76] The government's outlook looked favourable until internal tension within the cabinet surfaced following a number of social conflicts, particularly in Cajamarca and Espinar (Cusco). Many left-wing politicians had joined the government, while the economic team was composed mainly of orthodox economic liberals. The supposedly well-balanced composition of Humala's first cabinet could not resolve its different stances regarding how to deal with particular social conflicts. Against this backdrop, mobilisations against the Conga project put an end to Lerner's so-called *Concertación* cabinet in December 2011.

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[74] 'In 2006, the World Bank Peru Country Management Unit published a report providing recommendations to the Peruvian Government on the management of large-medium-scale mining operations… It recommended that both the government and industry assume their respective responsibilities in contributing to the promotion of environmentally and socially responsible mining in Peru' (Triscritti, 2013: 441).

[75] For more on 'un unlikely comeback' of García in 2006 and his campaign strategy, see McClintock (2006).

[76] Figures taken from the IPSO-APOYO polling organisation, the most respected in Peru, available at http://www.revistargumentos.org.pe/desde_la_aprobacion_publica.html.

Rising opposition to mineral extraction influenced the electoral landscape during the campaign period, polarising the already divided electorate along socio-economic and geographical lines. However, this tendency explained that elections were highly dependent on personalist or outsider politicians, suggesting a precarious democracy with no organic party system. In this context of 'fragmented' political and civil society, it is rather difficult to expect the implementation of coherent policy reform for the construction of a just and equal society as protesters demanded. Rather, the country's political and economic elites criticised opponents of mineral extraction as 'anti-miners' or 'anti-developers', emphasising an urgent need of mining activities for the country's 'development'. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to contextualise neoliberal mineral extraction in Peru which was promoted as a new development strategy. It also analyses the complex dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts in the 'power-geometry' of neoliberal mineral extraction and the related 'entanglements' of power, overcoming a binary perspective on them: i.e. mineral-based 'development' vs. 'under-development' of anti-mining protests.

4.1. Mining Industry in the Twentieth Century: Historical Review

The extraction of precious metals was a principal attraction for the Spanish colonisers during their rule. In 1545, silver mines were discovered in Potosí (part of the Viceroyalty of Peru and present-day Bolivia) (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 73). Alongside the Potosí mines, the development of the Santa Barbara mine in Huancavelica was also significant since mercury was an essential element in refining silver ore (Dore, 1988: 76). After this, Potosí and Huancavelica become two pillars of the colonial economy. Tax revenues from mineral extraction proved vital for the colonial administration.[77] The accumulation of wealth by Spanish colonisers and the prosperity of the booming mining town of Potosí contrasted with the precarious working conditions of indigenous people who were forced to labour in the mines. The viceroyalty introduced the Inca *mita* system (labour obligation) for mines in order to respond to the labour shortage problem.[78] This exploitation of indigenous labour became one of the main issues shaping the relationship between the colonial administration and local communities.[79]

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[77] 'Under Spanish law all minerals within the Empire belonged to the Crown... In exchange for royal concession [for exploitation] the Spanish mine owners... paid a royalty of one-fifth of the silver they produced', which was called the *quinto real* (Dore, 1988: 65-66). Viceroy Toledo introduced a twenty per cent tax on mineral extraction in 1504, the *quinto real*, reduced to ten per cent in 1723.

Cerro de Pasco: Industrial Mining and Foreign Capital in the Central Highlands

Since independence, mining was not economically relevant until the 1880s and 1890s, when obstacles to mineral extraction were gradually overcome. While the export of natural fertiliser, *guano*, drove the country's economic boom between the 1840s and 1870s, mining was depressed partly due to the destruction of infrastructure during the post-independence civil wars (Long and Roberts, 1984: 31-32). The discovery of new deposits and technological advances resulted in a temporary increase in silver and gold production in the late 1800s (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 73-75), while copper production became concentrated in the country's central highlands, as well as the southern regions to a lesser degree. In the 1890s, a number of problems impeding copper production in the central highlands were overcome, including: transport bottlenecks; production and refining facilities; and lack of finance. The central railway, which connected the capital to La Oroya, was completed in 1893, while several new smelters were opened and started to buy metal from local miners. In addition, a drainage tunnel began to be constructed after the creation of the *Empresa Socavonera del Cerro del Pasco* in 1900, which was financed by Lima capitalists (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 77-78).

During the twentieth century, the Peruvian mining industry was largely dominated by copper production upon the arrival of US capital in the Cerro de Pasco region, the central highlands. The introduction of the Mining Code of 1901 provided favourable legal conditions for the investment of foreign capital in the sector. The Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation (the Cerro) started operations in 1902 and continued until 1974, when the company was expropriated by the military government. The long-term presence of foreign capital and its large-scale production in the central *sierra* had a significant influence on the regional economy and people’s livelihoods. With the takeover of locally-owned smaller mines and the opening of the processing complex in La Oroya in 1922, the company took control of nearly 80 per cent of mineral production in the central highlands (Dore, 1988: 102). The Cerro dominated not only mines and smelters, including the Cerro de Pasco, Morococha, Casapalca, Yauricocha and Cobriza mines, but also became the largest landowner in the central highlands. When the Cerro was faced with accusations over environmental contamination in the mid-1920s, it bought nearly 200,000 hectares of land in the affected areas and created the *División Ganadera de Cerro de Pasco* (Scurrah et al., 2008: 74). From the company’s perspective, this decision was appropriate in order to deal with environmental accusations as well as to reduce labour costs by providing food to miners directly from its *latifundio*.

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[78] In 1573, the *mita* system was introduced in mines under the decree of Viceroy Toledo and was abolished *de jure* in 1812 despite the persistent use of the system in practice (Dore, 1988: 68).

[79] Indigenous people died from the harsh working environment or mercury poisoning. By the 1600s, African slaves were imported, thereby providing a labour force for the mines.

While some literature has emphasised the predominance of foreign capital, dependency and minimal impact on national development (Becker, 1983), other scholars have concentrated on the labour-capital relationship and capitalist development within the mining industry (Dore, 1988; Mallon, 1983; DeWind, 1977). It has been noted that peasants’ access to land made it difficult to turn them into fully proletarianised wage workers for the labour-intensive mining industry, separating them completely from pre-capitalist relations. In addition, as DeWind (1977) noted in his study of the Mantaro valley in the central highlands, local peasants did not oppose working in the mines. Rather, as the wage level was low, peasants could not make ends meet, thus maintaining peasant-miner status was their most appropriate survival strategy (DeWind, 1977: 15). In this way the initial process of ‘primitive accumulation’ did not prelude the development of capitalist production relations in the Peruvian central highlands. The mining company sometimes had to depend on a debt labour system (*enganche*) in order to respond to labour demands.

In the meantime, Peruvian domestic capital played a minor role in the development of the mining sector. Several small-scale operations were established, particularly where the presence of foreign capital was low or absent. Between 1930 and 1948, foreign investment stagnated as did copper production, due to protectionism in the United States, Britain and France introduced after the onset of the economic depression (Dore, 1988: 124). Against this backdrop, in the 1930s domestic mining firms reactivated mineral extraction, including silver, gold, lead and zinc (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 160-162). Moving into the 1940s, the mining sector experienced a crisis due to low productivity, wage inflation, and increasing labour militancy (Dore, 1988: 135; DeWind, 1977: 68).

Capital Intensive Mining and National Sovereignty

A new Mining Code was introduced in 1950 when the Odría government adopted *laissez-faire* economic policies. Under this Code fiscal incentives as well as a guarantee for long-term rights to mining concessions were provided in an effort to promote investment in the sector. Companies were to pay taxes on ‘profits’, not on ‘total production’, and ‘the depletion allowance’ was taken into consideration before tax was levied (Dore, 1988: 141-142). Given that a company could gain profits from the depletion of mines while the state lost its natural resource reserves, compensation for the depletion of mines should have been made to the state rather than the company (DeWind, 1977: 76 -77). In addition, businesses could hold the right to mining concessions for as long as they wanted if they paid a low tax rate (DeWind, 1977: 73). Given this favourable environment, US capital invested in two important large-scale projects: the Toquepala copper mine (the Southern Peru Copper Corporation, SPCC) and the Marcona iron mine (Marcona Mining Company). The Marcona Mining Company signed a 21-year contract with the Peruvian government in 1952 and conducted the first large-scale open-pit operations (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 212). This open-pit method of mineral extraction is suitable for extracting evenly distributed large ores and can reduce production costs (DeWind, 1977: 79). The SPCC was founded in 1952 after ASARCO’s victory in legal disputes with the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation and it signed a favourable contract with the Peruvian government (Dore, 1988: 144).[80]

In comparison to previous labour-intensive mining operations, capital-intensive open-pit operations were criticised in the 1960s for having little local economic impact given that large profits were enjoyed exclusively by the companies. In face of demands for reforms, the Belaunde government renegotiated a previous tax preference with the SPCC and agreed to increase tax rates from 30 to 51 per cent on the Toquepala operation’s net profits (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 218). In the context of stagnant investment in new mines in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation limited its expenditure to ‘smelting and refining facilities’ (Dore, 1988: 169). Moreover, expropriation of the Cerro’s *hacienda* in 1969 led to a closure of the *División Ganadera*, resulting in rising labour costs in the midst of increasing labour militancy (Dore, 1988: 170). Facing the crisis in the mining sector and the resultant social instability, the reformist military regime expropriated Cerro and created a state-owned company, *Centromín Perú*, in 1974. In a similar vein, decisions were made in order to increase the state's role in the development of the mining industry, including: the creation of *Hierro Perú* (from Marcona Mining) and *Minero Perú*, as well as MINPECO (*Minero Perú Comercial*), which was in charge of the marketing and commercialisation of minerals. Although the government's objective was to 'develop new mineral deposits' and to 'expand refining capacities' by establishing *Minero Perú*, the outcome was very limited. Developments included the establishment of the *Cerro Verde* mine in 1976, the *Tintaya* mine in the 1980s, the construction of a copper refinery at Ilo in 1976 and one for zinc at Cajamarquilla in 1980 (Dore, 1988: 174-175). The only exception from the nationalisation process was the SPCC. The company invested US$649 million in the *Cuajone* project between 1972 and 1976 (Campodónico, 1999: 7).

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[80] ASARCO (American Smelting and Refining Company) was the main stakeholder in SPCC, with the participation of Cerro de Pasco, Newmont Mining and the Phelps Dodge Corporation (Dore, 1988: 144). Starting with exploration and production in the *Toquepala* mine, SPCC continued its mining operations into the 1960s, such as the *Cuajone* project.

State-led mining development was not successful, however. State investment was dependent on the level of external debt and mineral exports did not increase (Dore, 1988: 176). The Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation had already started to reduce its investment in new deposits by the 1950s. In the midst of increasing production costs and labour struggles, the company had intended to sell its mines to the Peruvian state. On balance, state expropriation was carried out for rhetorical reasons rather than by rational calculation. Consequently, the state increased its role in the sector but only took charge of already debilitated mineral operations. Moreover, the mining sector faced a crisis in the 1980s as international mineral prices declined. Due to low investment, small mines were sometimes closed or over-exploited. Mining SOEs (State-owned Enterprises) became bankrupt or de-capitalised. In response, the state created the Mining Consolidation Fund (*Fondo de Consolidación Minera*, FOCOMI), although with little impact (Glave and Kuramoto, 2007: 138).

4.2. New Mineral Extraction

Neoliberal State: Deregulating Mineral Extraction

Promotion of Investment and Privatisation

Alongside generalised political and economic crises, the 1980s saw stagnation in Peru's mining sector partly due to lack of investment and inefficient management of mining SOEs. However, since the 1990s the sector has been revitalised. The recent increase in international capital inflows and a parallel mining boom requires an explanation in terms of both the international and domestic environment.[81] In line with three World Bank pillars for a new development strategy, the Peruvian government promoted foreign capital investment in extractive industries (particularly mining) in the country: to create favourable conditions in order to attract investment in mining; to reform the state as a regulator; and to privatise State-owned enterprises (Urteaga, 2011: 24). The Fujimori regime adopted policy reform geared to attract foreign investors and to privatise mining SOEs, making the sector the promoter of economic growth.[82] During 1991 and 1992, Fujimori introduced a raft of new legal regulations with the aim to provide judicial protection for investment and tax incentives for foreign investors.[83] In early 1991, the Law for Promotion for Foreign Investment (*la Ley de Promoción de la Inversión Extranjera*, Legislative Decree No. 662) came into force, a piece of legislation intended to encourage foreign direct investment in all economic sectors (Bury, 2011: 82). Another legislative decree for the Promotion for Private Investment (*Ley Marco para el Crecimiento de la Inversión Privada*, Legislative Decree No. 757) was approved on 13 November 1991. With this decree, the government eliminated obstacles which could generate additional costs for companies' economic activities and resource extraction, including a modification of the 1990 Environmental Code (de Echave, 2009a: 297). The regime introduced the Law of Promotion for Investment in the Mining Sector (*la Ley de Promoción de Inversiones en el Sector Minero*, Legislative Decree No. 708) on 14 November 1991, which was designed to attract investors. The Fujimori administration identified the status of the mining sector as a national priority and modified the process of mining investment, including simplification of the mining concession process (de Echave, 2009a: 297-298). In June 1992, the government approved the TUO (*el Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley General de Minería*), via Supreme Decree No. 014-92-EM. This regulation combined a series of modifications to the 1981 Mining Law (*Ley General de la Minería*, D.S. No. 109) and reaffirmed the emphasis on private investment and the smaller role of the state in the sector, while also providing tax stability contracts and incentives (Campodónico, 1999: 17-19).[84] The state signed a fiscal stability contract (*contratos de estabilidad tributaria*) with 20 companies which were involved in 30 mining projects according to Article 80 of the TUO (de Echave, 2009a: 298-299).[85] In line with legal reforms, the government attempted to provide foreign corporations with another form of investment guarantees by making bilateral or multilateral agreements (Bury, 2011: 82). For example, the country ratified the convention of MIGA and entered into a bilateral agreement with 28 countries before 2000 (Bury, 2011: 82-83). In this way, the Fujimori administration made legal changes favourable to foreign investors in the mining sector, which has become a priority of new development strategy.

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[81] For the international context, see Chapter 2.

[82] Starting from August 1990, the Fujimori government implemented the stabilisation programmes, called *Fujishock*, in order to make the country's re-entry into the international financial community by confronting hyperinflation and serving external debts. The following decade saw a series of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) dictated by orthodox neoliberals: trade and financial liberalisation; deregulation of every sectors including the labour market and the land market under the banner of improving market efficiency; privatisation; fiscal reform involving the reorganisation of the SUNAT. For more on the process of SAPs, see Gonzales (1998). For the political and economic context of the neoliberal reform during the 1990s, see Chapter 3.

[83] The Fujimori government promulgated 923 decree laws between March 1991 and December 1992 with an aim to implement neoliberal economic reform under the leadership of then minister of Economy and Finance, Carlos Boloña (Gonzales, 1998: 43).

As a backdrop of the privatisation policies introduced under COPRI, the Fujimori regime initially sold the state's shares in medium-scale private mining companies, such as the *Buenaventura* and *Condestable* mines in the 1991 and 1992, respectively (Campodónico, 1999: 25).[86] From late 1992 onwards, mining SOEs were officially put up for public bidding and sold to multinational corporations: *Hierro Perú* to *Shougang* in November 1992; during 1993 and 1994, *Cerro Verde* to *Cyprus Amas* and *Tintaya* to BHP, as well as refineries at *Cajamarquilla* (to *Cominco/Marubeni*) and *Ilo* (to SPCC); and finally *Centromín Perú* to *Doe Run Perú* in 1997 (Campodónico, 1999: 25-27). Multinational companies were actively involved in the privatisation of already existing mines rather than new exploration activities, in which junior companies were the main participants (Campodónico, 1999: 28).[87] As a result, 'more than 200 mining operations were privatised in the period 1992-2000, generating US$ 1200 million (of) direct income', and by 1999 nearly 95 per cent of mining operations in Peru were conducted by private corporations, particularly foreign capital (Bury, 2011: 90; de Echave, 2009a: 294).

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[84] The TUO is composed of 15 titles, 54 chapters, 226 articles, 15 transitory regulations and 8 final regulations.

[85] Of 30 projects, the contract for 15 projects was for 15 years, with 14 others lasting for 10 years and with one until the company – the Santa María mining company – recovers its investment (de Echave, 2009a: 298-299).

[86] Since June 1991 the government started to sell SOEs (mainly primary resources and service sectors, including gas, electricity and telecommunications) and transfer administrative functions and services to private sectors (Gonzales, 1998: 55-56). As a consequence, 132 SOEs were privatised by 1997 (Gonzales, 1998: 55).

As a consequence of the mining boom stimulated by international involvement in mining investment and domestic economic reform, Peru has enjoyed economic growth and macroeconomic stability over the 1990s and 2000s. While the mining sector has only contributed between 4 and 6 per cent to national production over the last two decades, its share in the nation's export and FDI has an important significance.[88] Mining exports occupied 45.5 per cent of total exports in 1997, increasing to 61.8 per cent in 2006 and to 61.1 per cent in 2010 (ICMM, 2013: 26). During the period 2001-2003, foreign investment in the mining sector made up 37 per cent of total FDI (Bebbington, et al. 2007: 5). In addition, the proportion of FDI in the mining industry increased 65 per cent between 2002 and 2007 (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 620). Moreover, the expansion in mineral exports has contributed to the national coffers. In 2010 alone fiscal revenues from the hydrocarbon and mining sectors were 20 per cent of total revenues, of which 60 per cent originated from mining (ICMM, 2013: 24). In the meantime, the country's economic structure, being dependent on the export of primary resources, has not been diversified to a significant degree, leading to a structural vulnerability to the international price of minerals. In addition, while profits were unequally distributed, the impact on employment and the local economy turned out to be weaker than expected.[89]

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[87] Several MNCs became involved in large-scale mining projects either as part of consortiums with other domestic or foreign mining companies: e.g *Yanacocha* in Cajamarca and *Antaminas* in Ancash. Junior mining companies of Canada in particular were actively involved in the exploration of new mines: Canadian capital invested in Peru amounted to approximately US$ 8 billion, of which the mining and financing sectors are the most important: there are 90 Canadian mining companies working in Peru, most of them are junior (i.e. at anexploration stage). See '*Inversiones canadienses en Perú suman casi US$ 8,000 millones*', *Gestión*, 28 September 2013.

[88] The proportion of mining revenues as part of GDP was 4.4 per cent in 1990, 6.6 per cent in 2005 and 4.9 per cent in 2011 (ICMM, 2013: 26).

[89] On the impact of mining activities on local the population and development, see Chapter 5: the case of Cajamarca.

Deregulation of Territory/Land

Against the backdrop of a favourable investment environment, Peru has seen a mining boom since the 1990s. Peru is an important contributor to the production of various mineral resources such as copper, zinc, gold, tin and silver ('the Map of the Mining Project', a Ministry of Energy and Mining's publication on the mining projects, both in exploration and production, MINEM 2013).[90] Mining operations can be divided into three categories: large-, medium- and small-scales.[91] Large-scale mining projects in Peru mainly concentrate on two metals – copper and gold. The Swiss-based multinational company Glencore Xstrata has been involved in several large-scale copper projects in central and southern Peru, including: *Las Bambas* (a US$ 4.23 billion project in Apurímac department); an important shareholder of the *Antamina* mines of the *Compañía Minera Antamina* (CMA) (the current portfolio comprised of BHP-Billiton (33.75 per cent), Xstrata (33.75 per cent), Teck Corporation (22.5 per cent), Mitsubishi (10 per cent) in district of San Marcos, Ancash) and *Antapaccay* (a US$ 1.5 billion invested in Espinar province, Cusco).[92] Another important copper investment is the Toromocho project (a US$ 4,832 million operation dominated by Chinese capital, *Minera Chinalco Perú S.A.*) in the department of Junín (district of Morococha, Yauli province).[93]

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[90] In Latin American terms, Peruvian production by volume of gold, zinc and tin ranked first and copper and silver second. At the international level, gold occupied sixth place and zinc, tin, copper and silver each ranked third (see 'the Map of the Mining Project' [MINEM, 2013], available at http://www.minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Mineria/PUBLICACIONES/MAPAS/2013/MP2013%20-%20BR.pdf).

[91] There are also artisanal and small-scale mining operations conducted using low-level technology and capital investment. While this activity provides important employment opportunities for poor miners, it has become a serious challenge for the government due to its negative impact on the environment and precarious labour conditions. The issue of small-scale mining is beyond the focus of this dissertation, but increasing numbers of policymakers and academics have devoted attention to it recently, particularly the use of mercury in gold extraction and its impacts on health and environment (Gardner, 2012; Ashe, 2012). The incumbent Humala government made an effort to regulate small-scale gold mining activities in the Peruvian Amazon, particularly in Madre de Dios department, by ordering the registration of artisanal mining operation in February 2012, which caused a clash between small-scale miners and police, leaving three people dead in March the same year (Gardner, 2012).

[92] On 13 April 2014, Glencore Xstrata announced that it had sold the Las Bambas mines to a Chinese consortium (Minmetal Corp. Ltd. (62.5 per cent); GuoXin International Investment Corp. Ltd. (22.5 per cent); Citic Metal Co., Ltd. (15 per cent)) for US$ 5.85 billion. See '*Glencore Xstrata vende Mina de Cobre Las Bambas en US$ 5,850 millones*', *Gestión*, 13 April 2014.

[93] Increasing demands for minerals in China created its search for mineral investments around the world. Four Chinese mining companies – *Chinalco*, *Minmetals*, *Shougang* and *Zijin* – are expected to invest more than US$ 7.4 billion in various projects between 2013 and 2017 (Els, 2012, 'Chinese miners to pour $7.4bn into Peru', mining.com). Chinese capital has invested in other mining projects in Peru, such as *Shougang Hierro Perú*'s investment in the *Marcona* iron mine in Ica (US$ 1,480 million for the project's expansion), a US$2.5

The *Cerro Verde* copper project entered into its second phase of operation ($US 4.4 billion) in Arequipa (construction for expansion started in 2013 and its full production is expected to initiated from 2016),[94] while *Yanacocha*'s expansion plan of the gold mining project Conga (US$ 4.8 billion) is temporarily suspended due to the opposition of local residents since 2011.[95]

As a consequence, more than 20 per cent of national territory is currently under mining concessions (*CooperAcción*, 2013).[96] Nearly a third of departments have more than 40 per cent of their territory under mining concessions. In Moquegua more than two thirds of its territory is affected in this way (75.68 per cent), in Apurímac (66.45 per cent) and La Libertad (63.92 per cent).[97] Alongside decree laws and tax incentives designed to promote mining investment, other reforms have been carried out with an aim to reduce barriers which were considered as unfavourable to investment conditions. Regarding mineral extraction, the state has the right to exploit natural resources and it is the state which concedes the authority for mineral extraction to a third party. However, while the mining concession contains the right to explore and exploit the subterranean minerals, it does not include the right to the land where mineral deposits are located.[98] In 1995, the Land Law (*Ley de Promoción de la Inversión en las Actividades Económicas en la Tierras del Territorio Nacional y de las Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas*, or simply *Ley de Tierra*, Law No. 26505) was passed and facilitated a subordination of communal land property to mining or energy projects (Pinto,

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billion *El Galeno* project by Lumina Copper S.A.C. (a consortium of *Minmetals* Corporation [60 per cent] and *Jiangxi* Copper [40 per cent]) in Cajamarca. In addition, *Rio Blanco* copper project (US$ 1.5 billion) is invested by *Zijin* mining consortium (*Zijin* Mining Group [45 per cent], *Tongling* Nonferrous Metals Group [35 per cent] and *Xiamen* Construction and Development [20 per cent]) in Piura, despite a temporary suspension of its development. See '*Empresas chinas son los nuevos actores de la minería peruana*', *El Comercio*, 15 April, 2014.

[94] See 'Cerro Verde Copper-Molybdenum Mine, Peru', available at http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/cerro-verde-copper-molybdenum-mine/ (accessed 10 August 2014).

[95] Cajamarca is one of the leading departments for gold production due to the presence of the MYSA (*Minera Yanacocha S. A.*) mining complex. For the implication of MYSA's mineral extraction in Cajamarca, see Chapter 5. The mobilisations against MYSA's recent Conga project will be treated in detail in Chapter 6.

[96] By June 2013, there were 60,647 mining concessions at national level, occupying 21.02 per cent (26,752,220.08 hectares) of national territory (*CooperAcción*, 2013, '*Concesiones Mineras y Conflictos*', available at http://www.cooperaccion.org.pe/Descargas-Infografias/13-12-12_Infografia13OCM.pdf).

[97] Some 57.79 per cent of the territory in the department of Ancash is under mining concession, 57. 04 per cent in Tacna, 53.83 per cent in Lima, 53.28 per cent in Arequipa, 52.33 per cent in Huancavelica and 45.17 per cent in Cajamarca (*CooperAcción*, 2013,'*Concesiones Mineras y Conflictos*').

[98] 'The mining concession transfers the right to the exploration and exploitation of conceded natural resources to the title holder… The mining concession is a property distinct from the land where minerals are located' (*Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley General de Minería*, Article 9: my translation).

2009: 89). Article 11 of the law requires two thirds of votes in agreement at a general assembly in which community members participate when a mining company intends to access communal land. In 1996, the regulation of the Land Law officially recognised the process required for access to communal lands and stipulated that a mining company should make adequate compensation for land use in the case of its failure to strike a direct agreement with the community (de Echave, 2009a: 314).

Mining and Sustainability in Peru

Sustainable Mining

Since the 1970s increasing attention has been devoted to the relationship between development and the environment. Within the international development community, 'sustainable development' has become a dominant catch-all term since the 1990s, despite its vagueness.[99] Regarding the mining sector, the scope of mineral extraction and its use of advanced technology have raised many concerns over its impact on human health and the environment.[100] In the meantime, decision making regarding mineral extraction has been highly concentrated on the central government since rights to exploit minerals legally belong to the state.[101] However, increasing pressure from international institutions and multinational capital to reduce state intervention in resource extraction multiplied the activities of various non-state actors in terms of becoming involved in decision-making processes, alongside 'the growing relevance of transnational legal regimes for investment, such as IFC and MIGA, decision-making in the mining sector' (Himley, 2010: 3272). Simultaneously, an increased demand and pressure for accountability on the part of mining operations came from 'national and international NGOs, legal agencies, and individual lawyers, a globalizing media' who were committed to sustainable development (Ballard and Bank, 2003: 289). There are several international and national NGOs which are concerned with the negative impact of mining activities on the environment and local communities: the U.S.-based Earthworks, OXFAM America, Mining Watch Canada, Mineral Policy Institute (Australia), the region-wide OCMAL (the *Obersevatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina*) and the Lima-based CooperAcción, Red Muqui, and Cajamarca-based GRUFIDES, and so on.[102] Some of these organisations became involved in a campaign designed to promote sustainable mining operations and to protect the environment and communities affected by mineral extraction: e.g. the Earthworks's 'No dirty gold campaign' and Mining Watch Canada's involvement in the 'Open for Justice' campaign.[103] As Ballard and Bank elucidate, '[A] loose international alliance of environmental, human rights, and indigenous rights NGOs have been able to direct attention to particular mining projects through a series of campaigns' (2003: 304). The activities of these NGOs played a certain role in promoting policy changes in mining companies concerning social responsibility and environmental sustainability, despite the former's personnel and financial resources limitations (Ballard and Bank, 2003: 304).

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[99] By the term international development community, I mean international development institutions, organisations, including IFIs, development banks, national and international development NGOs, national development agencies, academics, etc.

[100] The development of modern technology and its various impacts will be examined later in the chapter.

[101] 'Natural resources, renewable or non-renewable, are patrimony of the Nation. The state is sovereign authority in their utilization. The Act determines the conditions of their use and granting to private individuals. Such concession grants the title-holders a real right subject to those legal regulations' (See Article 66, Chapter II Environment and Natural Resources, 1993 Constitution, available at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/_ingles/CONSTITUTION_29_08_08.pdf).

Faced with pressure and the opposition to mineral extraction from civil society, the international mining industry sector has devoted increasing attention to sustainable mining operations and its partnership with local communities. For example, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), a representative entity of leading mining companies, was created in 2001 in line with the industry's stated commitment to sustainable development.[104] Its origin dates back to 1999 when representatives of the nine largest mining companies (Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Codelco, Newmont, Noranda, Phelps Dodge, Placer Dome, Rio Tinto, and WMC Resources) gathered at the World Economic Forum at Davos and created the Global Mining Initiative (GMI), which initiated a two-year project, Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development (MMSD), carried out by the International Institute for Environment and Development in 2000 (Himley, 2010: 3273-4). The MMSD conducted research and analysis on the industry's role in sustainable development and laid the foundation for the creation of ICMM.[105] In a similar vein, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created by the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) in 2003 against the backdrop of growing attention to the resource curse thesis. EITI is mainly concerned with the more transparent and accountable management of revenues generated by natural resource extraction and has developed into a 'global rules-based transparency standard'.[106] Since 2005 the World Bank has also started to publish an annual report, Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which is 'a multi-stakeholder review of its support for extractive industries in the fight against poverty'.[107] In this sense, the World Bank has set a goal for the extractive industry (EI): 'to help developing countries provide their people with access to clean, affordable, and sustainable sources of energy and to ensure that extractive industries contribute to economic growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction' (World Bank, 2004: iv). According to Triscritti, national governments and international organisations have also made investment with a commitment to sustainable development: a four-year project which aimed to develop headwaters governance system initiated by the Netherlands government in 2004; another four-year conflict mediation project for Peru was supported by the European Union in 2006; and USAID (the United State Agency for International Development) has sponsored the Poverty, Reduction and Alleviation (PRA) project with mining companies since 2008, contributing to reducing social tensions in mining communities (Triscritti, 2013: 441).

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[102] Earthworks is 'a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting communities and the environment from the adverse impacts of mineral and energy development while promoting sustainable solutions' and is comprised of two organisations which were integrated in 2005: Mineral Policy Center (created in 1988) and the Oil and Gas Accountability Project (founded in 1999) (see http://www.earthworksaction.org/about). Mining Watch Canada is 'a pan-Canadian initiative supported by environmental, social justice, Aboriginal and labour organisations from across the country' and created in 1999 with an aim to 'address the need for a co-ordinated public interest response to the threats to public health, water and air quality, fish and wildlife habitat and community interests posed by irresponsible mineral policies and practices in Canada and around the world' (see http://www.miningwatch.ca/about-us-1). Mineral Policy Institute was founded in 1995 'in response to a recognised lack of capacity and expertise to engage in mining issues, particularly where Australian mining companies were working overseas without adequate legislation, regulation and monitoring' (see http://www.mpi.org.au/about/). OCMAL was a product of an increasing concern about mining activities across Latin America since 1990s and more directly concerning the meeting of various organisations in Oruro, Bolivia in 2007. The goal of the OCMAL is to protect communities and population who are affected mining activities in the region. For more on the Observatorio, see http://www.conflictosmineros.net/?view=featured. For Peruvian NGOs, see Chapter 6.

[103] The 'No dirty gold' campaign was launched by the Earthworks, 'an international campaign working to ensure that gold mining operations respect human rights and the environment. The No Dirty Gold campaign seeks to educate consumers, retailers, manufacturers about the impacts of irresponsible gold mining, and to enlist their support to persuade the mining industry to clean up its act' (see the Earthworks website, available at http://nodirtygold.earthworksaction.org/about_us). The 'Open for Justice' campaign aims 'to allow those who have been harmed by the international activities of Canadian mining companies to come to seek justice in Canada', in which Mining Watch Canada participated (see the Mining Watch Canada website, available at http://www.miningwatch.ca/get-involved/canada-must-be-open-justice-organizations-call-action-overseas-victims-canadian-compani).

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[104] ICMM 'brings together 22 mining and metals companies (Barrick, Mitsubishi Materials, Rio Tinto, Teck, BHP-Billton, Gold Fields, Newmont, Vale, etc.) and 32 national and regional mining associations and global commodity associations', available at http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us.

[105] 'The MMSD project recognized the industry's potential contributions to society, identified core challenges and established an agenda for implementing change which would become the foundation of ICMM's mandate' available at http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us

[106] With the growing interest of academics in resource curse as well as pressure from civil society organisations, Tony Blair, then British prime minister, initiated an idea of the EITI at a speech for the 2002 UNCSD in Johannesburg. Subsequently, in June 2003, DFID 'convened a meeting of civil society, company, and government representatives in London' and 'a statement of Principles (12 EITI Principles) to increase transparency of payments and revenues in the extractive sector was agreed'. 'Over 40 institutional investors signed on to a State of support for the EITI'. Showing an agreement with the initiative, the G8 urged the IMF and the WB to provide governments committed to the EITI with technical and financial support and the WB established the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for the EITI in 2004. While the EITI was mainly administered by the DFID initiative between 2002 and 2006, the EITI was more institutionalised with the creation of the International Secretariat in 2007 (cited in the EITI website, available at http://eiti.org/eiti/history).

[107] Cited in http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Industry_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Industries/Oil%2C+Gas+and+Mining/Development_Impact/Development_Impact_Extractive_Industries_Review/

Sustainable Environmental 'Management'

Against this backdrop and faced with increasing opposition to neoliberal mineral extraction, the Peruvian government started to take an ambiguous and rather contradictory position, by integrating a certain 'sustainability' component into policy-making considerations which was designed to promote environmental sustainability and social responsibility.[108] One of the WB's policy guidelines and recommendations for governments, mining companies and IFIs – including the IFC – is to mitigate environmental and social risks: 'social and environmental assessments, community participation in monitoring of projects, as well as other more technical guidelines that related specifically to EI including the use of cyanide, mine closure, tailings disposal and waste management, and acid rock drainage' (World Bank, 2004: 7). In this vein, while the Fujimori government promoted mining investment, it was obliged to adopt an environmental management model in accordance with World Bank criteria in order to receive its financial support (de Echave, 2009a: 301). The *Reglamento para la Protección Ambiental en la Actividad Minero-Metalúrgica* (D.S. N. 016-93-EM) was approved in May 1993, namely a regulation on the environment which was included in the 15th Title of the TUO of the Mining Law. This legal norm recognised the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM) as the exclusive authority for environmental administration in the mining sector.

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[108] When it comes to social responsibility, debates closely related to the literature on participatory, grassroots democracy and community-led development across the region have taken place(discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation): e.g., participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, participation in community councils in Venezuela, etc. For more information on the subject, see Cameron et al. (2012); Cannon and Kirby (2012).

As a result, MINEM played a role both as the promoter of mining investment while acting as environmental regulator, representing the limitation of environmental regulations in the sector, which has become an important cause of social conflict.[109] Since environmental management, including the control and mitigation of environmental contamination generated by mining activities, was important only within a potential range which does not include discouraging investment in the sector. In addition, it introduced mechanisms for the environmental supervision of mining activities, including the Programme for Adaptation and Environmental Management (*Programa de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental,* PAMA) and the Environmental Impact Assessment (*Estudio de Impacto Ambiental*, EIA). Mining operations in progress before 1993 were obliged to submit a plan, the PAMA, to mitigate or eliminate the contamination generated by their mining or metallurgic activities prior to commencing operations. The EIA is a legal obligation with which companies with mining concessions should comply in order to initiate any exploitation. Despite these efforts, Peru has not developed integral institutional monitoring and regulations for environmental management. Rather, Peruvian regulations for environmental management have been subordinated to each industrial sector.

In the face of accusations regarding legal limitations, the *Ley Marco del Sistema Nacional de Gestión Ambiental* (Law No. 28245) was approved in 2004 in an effort to promote integral environmental regulations. In October 2005, the Toledo government promulgated the Environmental Law (*Ley General del Ambiente*, Law No. 28661). However, the law still has limitations, including: ‘the necessity of preventive measures are depreciated’; ‘a claimant has the responsibility to submit the evidence of environmental damage’; ‘there is no unitary authority to control environmental issues and to impose sanctions over environmental damage’; and ‘the international standards for environmental management were only used as a reference point while domestic standard were not definitively established’ (Pinto, 2009: 96). Finally, the Ministry of the Environment (*Ministerio del Medio Ambiente*, MINAM) was created (Decree Law No. 1013) in 2008. MINAM was only given limited authority to provide technical advice and plays a subsidiary role in terms of environmental issues related to mining activities. As Pinto points out, ‘the environmental system was created in an undemocratic context and established unfavourable environmental criteria in exchange for promoting investment in the extractive industry’ (2009: 97). As a result, the decision-making process lacks transparency and remains centralised in the executive, while regulation remains fragmented along sectoral lines, bureaucratic procedures favour multinationals while marginalising local communities (Pinto, 2009: 97). While environmental consideration can not be ignored in the context of increasing international and national concerns on sustainable mineral extraction, it has only been left to oversee a very limited environmental criteria, i.e. environmental management of mitigation and control. As will be examined later, this restricted aspect regarding the environment and its relation with mineral extraction has become a significant arena for contestation, representing the limitation of the Peruvian development model and democracy.

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[109] On the correlation between lax environmental regulation and socio-environmental conflict, see Chapter 6 on resistance to the Conga mining project in Cajamarca.

'Canon Minero': Decentralisation and Social Distribution

Alongside environmental management, another component of sustainable mining has much to do with the social aspect, i.e. participation of local communities in the distribution of benefits generated by mineral extraction. This participatory element of sustainability is closely related to democratic reform, particularly after the demise of Fujimori regime. One of the democratic reform initiatives in the post-Fujimori era included decentralisation.[110]The main cause for the *canon minero* is that local communities might benefit through the distribution of tax revenues paid by mining enterprises.[111] As mentioned above, subterranean natural resources legally belong to the state. Their exploitation is possible as companies gain concession rights for extraction which are administered by the state. Local communities do not have a direct right to these resources and can only benefit via the *canon*. Between 1996 and 2013, approximately S/. 33 billion (nearly US$ 1,357 million, at an exchange rate, US$ 1 = S/. 2.8) were distributed to regional and local governments in the name of *canon minero*

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[110] Under the Toledo regime (2001-2006) major constitutional changes were introduced for the decentralisation process in 2002 and 2003: notably the *Ley de Bases de la Decentralización* (Law No. 27783); *Leyes Orgánicas de Gobiernos Regionales y de Municipalidades* (Laws No. 27867 and No. 27972). For more on the decentralisation, see McNulty (2011); Ballón (2011); Bland and Chirinos (2014); Crabtree (2014).

[111] There are six types of *canon* – forestry, hydro-energy, fishing, mining, oil and gas – and each has a distinct system of calculation. The *canon minero* is 'part of the regular corporate tax revenue paid by mining companies to government' (Bebbington, et al. 2007: 34). It is 'the special arrangements for the geographical redistribution of the corporate tax that is paid on income generated by mineral extraction' (Bebbington, et al. 2007: 34-35). Since the *canon* depends on corporate income, the amount of tax varies depending on international prices of minerals, the management of mining companies and their profits. In an extreme case, if the mineral price is low and the company cannot make high profits from extraction, the *canon* cannot be levied (de Echave and Diez, 2013; Barrantes, 2005).

(‘*Reporte Canon Minero*’, SNMPE, 2013). However, the transfer of the *canon* concentrated on a few departments. If you look at the proportion of the distributed *canon* in July 2013, only six departments have received more than 70 per cent: Ancash (S/. 935 million, 25 per cent); La Libertad (S/. 519 million, 14 per cent); Cajamarca (S/. 502 million, 13 per cent); Arequipa (S/. 424 million, 11 per cent); Moquegua (S/. 282 million, 7 per cent); and Tacna (S/. 239 million, 6 per cent). This unequal distribution has intensified compared to 2007, when six departments which composed 16 per cent of the total population obtained more than 50 per cent of the fiscal resources (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 623).[112]

The distribution regime of fiscal resources to regional and local governments has changed several times and each modification has been ad hoc in nature in order to quell social protests against mining projects (see Table 1). In parallel to the decentralisation reform process, changing the allocation of fiscal bonanzas from central to sub-national governments was underlined. In 2001, the distribution of the *canon minero* from central government to production regions rose from 20 to 50 per cent with the passage of the *Ley de Canon Minero* (Law No. 27506). This increase was achieved against a backdrop of decentralisation initiatives and rising socio-environmental conflicts across the country. The distribution of the *canon* was mainly oriented to quell social unrest related to mining operations, instead of reversing the fiscal regime favourable to global capitals. However, as Arellano-Yanguas (2011) has observed, this law could not satisfy both local communities and the state. On the one hand, devolution of the *canon* was biased in favour of the cities rather than to those rural municipalities where resources are mostly extracted. On the other hand, rather than meeting local needs, the government is more concerned that this legal change might undermine investment stability. After much discussion, a new *Ley de Canon* (Law No. 28077) was introduced in 2004, whereby the central state ensured the maintenance of tax exemptions for companies under tax stability contracts, while the destination of the revenues distribution was changed by prioritising localities where minerals are extracted. This modification was the government’s ad hoc response to increasing social protests of local communities against mineral extraction, rather than providing a fundamental answer to the problem of unequal distribution. Later, this new law was modified in order to prioritise the municipalities of ‘districts’ where minerals are extracted (Law No. 28332). As a result, the *canon* regime favoured communities directly affected by extraction rather than considering the wider picture of poverty, or the state of social provision, such as health, education or local facilities. In this sense, social distribution of economic windfall, an integral part of sustainable mining, did not materialise, the *canon* becoming a contested arena for different power and social relations.

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[112] Those six departments include Ancash, Tacna, Cusco, Cajamarca, Moquegua and Pasco.

Alongside the *canon minero*, successive governments have introduced policy changes rather than implementing tax regime reform. The second García administration (2006-2011) introduced the Popular Solidarity Mining Programme (*Programa Minero de Solidaridad con el Pueblo*, PMSP) in 2006. This represented a voluntary donation (better known as the *óbolo minero*) by the mining companies.[113] The *óbolo minero* was criticised for being the result of non-transparent negotiations between a 'captured' state and mining corporations since the measure did not address the controversial issues of taxing extraordinary profits and tax exemption contracts. It allowed mining corporations to make a 'voluntary' contribution to invest in social or community development programmes in production regions over the following five years.[114] The Humala administration also faced political and social pressure to reform the tax regime. Within two months, the government promulgated several legal changes (D.S. 173-2011-EF): a modification of the mining royalty law (*Ley de la Regalía Minera*, Law No. 29788); the introduction of a special tax on mining (*Ley del Impuesto Especial a la Minería*, Law No. 29789) and the *gravamen minero* (*Ley del Gravamen Especial a la Minería*, Law, No. 29790). When it comes to the royalty, the Law on Mining Royalty (*Ley de la Regalía Minera*, Law No. 28258) was first introduced in 2004 (see Table 1). According to this law, mining companies were obliged to pay tax at a fixed rate (between one and three per cent), while those companies with a tax stability contract were exempted. With the modification, royalties were levied at a flexible rate (one to twelve per cent) based on operating income (*las utilidades operativas*) rather than total sales profits (*la venta*). In contrast to the first two, the *gravamen minero* is applied to companies holding a tax exemption, even in a voluntary manner.[115] In sum, the implementation of the *canon minero* and royalty did not produce impressive results due to its unequal distribution, lack of coordination between different levels of government and inefficient administration. As Arellano-Yanguas points out, *canon* and royalty were transferred to sub-national governments without consideration of 'real needs', resulting in 'the implementation of a myriad of tiny projects with little impact in terms of structural development' (2008: 33-34). In addition, successive administrations introduced short-term social programmes or community development schemes at the discretion of mining companies, instead of reforming fiscal regulations in a fundamental way. In this way, despite legal changes in the post-Fujimori period, the Peruvian state turned out to be 'decentralising' social conflicts to sub-national governments, which will be examined later more in detail.

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[113] This policy was synchronised with mining industry's interests within the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which will be examined in the next section.

[114] As Manrique points out, the outcome of the implementation of the *óbolo minero* is limited considering the total amount involved, unenthusiastic participation levels and slow and inefficient investment. Mining companies deposited more than S/. 1.7 billion in the name of the *óbolo* between January 2007 and January 2011, short of the estimated amount (S/. 2.5 billion). Moreover, 15 mining companies out of the 39 who made an agreement with the government, contributed more than 90 per cent of the *óbolo*. In total, 62 per cent of the deposited contribution has been used for investment, showing the inefficient management of the fund (Manrique, '*Impuesto a las sobreganacias debe reemplazar al óbolo minero*', *La República*, 6 March 2011).

Table 1. Distribution of the *Canon Minero* and Royalties to Sub-National Governments

Jurisdiction **Year and Law**	**Regional Government**	**Municipalities of the Department with Mineral Extraction**	**Municipalities of the Province with Mineral Extraction**	**Municipalities of the District with Mineral Extraction**
Pre-2002 **_Canon minero_ law, 1992**		60%	40%	
2002 **Law on _Canon_ (Law No. 27506), 2001**	20%	60%	20%	
2004 **New Law on _Canon_ (Law 28077)**	25% (5% to National University in the region)	40%	25%	10%
2004 **Law on Mining 'Royalty' (Law 28258)**	20% (5% to National University in the region)	40%	20%	20%

Source: de Echave and Diez (2013)

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[115] The government was expected to make an agreement with mining companies in order to apply the *gravamen minero*. However, the main concern for the government was that its implementation should not be to a level that discourages investment incentives in the sector. 15 mining companies which are inscribed to 18 stability contracts would be the object of this new regulation. According to MINEM, an important fiscal resource was expected to be gained since these companies have contributed nearly 60 per cent of mining income tax ('*Gobierno promulgó reglamento del gravamen especial al sector minero*', *La República*, 29 September 2011).

CSR: Community-Based Development and Social License

The third dimension of sustainable mining is closely associated with the industry's move toward sustainable development and its investment in community development by incorporating the participation of local denizens in the management of local natural resources and the design of community development programmes. Alongside its growing emphasis on clean and modern mining technology, this focus on a 'participatory' component has a particular implication under the frameworks of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Against the backdrop of increasing opposition to mineral extraction, mining companies have started to recognise the necessity to gain social legitimacy in order to continue their operations. The concept of CSR originated in the World Bank's regulatory regime on 'public sector infrastructure projects' and its negative impacts on local communities and later expanded to the private sector (Szablowski, 2002: 248).[116] Those mining projects to which IFC and MIGA provide financing should comply with Operational Directive 4.30 (Szablowski, 2002: 248). As Szablowski puts it, '[O]ver the last ten years, an increasing number of mining transnationals have adopted and publicized Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies dealing with social, environmental, and ethical issues' (2002: 249). In line with measures, such as *óbolo minero* or *gravamen minero,* mining companies invested in social or development programmes with the increasing participation of local communities.

Some authors have argued for rise of 'good governance' or 'public-private partnership' among various actors in the context of the decreasing role of the state in public service provision (Triscritti, 2013; Sagebien and Lindsay, 2011). Pointing out the necessity of good governance for sustainable mining, Triscritti emphasises the 'increased consultation and participation of local communities in the management of natural resources was needed in order to ensure sustainable mining practices' (2013: 438). On the other hand, it is argued that mining companies become involved in these programmes as another regulating form of accumulation in the context of the decreasing regulating power of the state. Himley argues, 'institutional arrangements… serve[s] to stabilize accumulation in the extractive economy…

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[116] The WB's Operational Directive 4.30 (on Involuntary Resettlement) well represented the concept. The objective of the Directive is 'to ensure that the population displaced by a project receives benefits from it' (Operative Directive 4.30. Para. 3). It suggests that while cash compensation is not sufficient, 'land-based resettlement strategies' are recommended (Para 4). When they are not available, 'non-land based strategies built around opportunities for employment or self-employment may be used' (Para. 4).

as having a governing effect on a variety of populations and environments' (2013: 399). In explaining the local employment programme of the Barrick mining corporation as part of CSR in communities at the nearby Pierina mine (Ancash department), Himley argues that it can be 'viewed as an effort to (at least temporarily) *regularize* large-scale mining and ensure continued accumulation' (2013: 395, emphasis in the original).[117] In other words, the programmes were created as a way to 'address the potential for social opposition' and gain social license for mineral extraction by distributing economic, though temporary, opportunity created by mining activities among local communities (Himley, 2013: 395).[118] As with the distribution of the *canon*, the social provisions or community development programmes resulted in 'privatising' disputes by directing demands by local communities at the mining companies. As will be examined later, this engagement of the mining company as an important regulator provided a converging space for contention among various actors.

4.3. Socio-Environmental Protests in Contemporary Peru

Mining and Associated Struggles: Past and Present

Before the late 1990s disputes related to the mining industry were connected more to labour issues, such as struggles for better working conditions and wage increases, particularly in the central highlands. As mentioned above, major copper mines were labour-intensive in the first half of the twentieth century. As a consequence, mining unions and leftist parties were involved in this type of struggle. Under the influence of APRA, in the period between 1945 and 1969 miners' activism was motivated largely by economistic concerns and party political interests. Following the legalisation of the CGTP in 1969, one of the most important miners' federations, the FNTMMSP (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos y Sinderúrgico del Perú*), was created. By the late 1970s some unions took a radical *clasista* stance in line with radical leftist parties.[119] However, the advent of 'new extraction', political re-democratisation and the rise of civil society organisations changed the dynamic of mining conflicts from the late 1990s.[120] Taking the La Oroya case as an example, since the Cerro de Pasco Corporation opened the metallurgic complex in 1922, the district of La Oroya (province of Yauli, Junín department) has depended heavily on mining activities, attracting migrant workers from nearby regions and stimulating local commercial activities (Scurrah et al., 2008: 70-71). From its inception, locals expressed their concerns about the air pollution generated by smelting activities and its effect on their health, such as lead-poisoning, in addition to the impact on agricultural produce and livestock. The initial reaction of the company to environmental accusations was limited to short-term solutions rather than solving the root of the problem. As mentioned previously, Cerro bought the affected land and established a livestock raising division (*División Ganadera*). In the meantime, the presence of the metallurgic complex and its negative environmental consequences discouraged peasants from accessing land for agricultural production and the raising of livestock, facilitating their proletarianisation in comparison to other mining sites where access to land proved viable (Scurrah, 2008: 77). Unions and the local populations were more concerned with socio-economic issues, such as wages and working conditions and considered contamination as a secondary problem (Scurrah, 2008: 84). In the late 1990s, however, the question of contamination and disquiet about local citizens' health conditions gained the attention of national as well as international NGOs committed to sustainable development and the environment. In late 2002, the health issue became a priority in the relationship between the newly privatised company, the *Doe Run Perú S.R.L.*, and local communities (Scurrah, 2008: 85-88).[121]

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[117] For more on Barrick's CSR programme, see the next section.

[118] For conditions to gain social license, see Prno (2013).

[119] For more on miners' struggles in the central highlands before the 1990s, see DeWind (1977); Dore (1988); Laite (1980); Balbi (1989).

Regarding the increasing incidences which are closely related to the rise in international mining prices, the democratic socio-political environment in the post-Fujimori era and the different dynamics behind disputes related to mining activities, it is possible to refer to the Peruvian Ombudsman's office (*Defensoría del Pueblo*), which has published a monthly report on social conflicts since May 2004. The purpose of its publication is 'to provide the state, companies, leaders of social organisations, the media and the population in general with information on actors, problems and unfolding of social conflicts registered by the *Defensoría*' (*Defensoría* Report No. 119, my translation).[122] A recent report registered 214 cases in June 2014 ('*Reporte de Conflictos Sociales*' No. 124).[123] Of these, 63.1 per cent (135 cases) relate to socio-environmental issues. According to the Office, socio-environmental protests are caused not only by disputes over 'the control, use and access to environment and natural resources', but also related to 'political, economic, social and cultural questions' (*Defensoría* Report No. 124).[124] While conflicts related to socio-environmental matters occupied 15-20 per cent of the total by 2006, the proportion has risen, making up more than 40 per cent in the second half of 2007, nearly 50 per cent since 2008 and more than 60 per cent since mid-2012 (see Appendix 1). In particular, the mining sector was the main cause of socio-environmental grievances, totalling 98 cases in June 2014 (72.6 per cent), followed by the hydrocarbon industry (17 cases). As mentioned already, mining activities became one of the most important promoters for the country's economic growth since the early 1990s. However, at the same time it has become one of the principal reasons for social conflicts, particularly since the late 1990s.[125]

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[120] The rest of the chapter will be dedicated to socio-environmental conflicts related to large-scale mining projects in Peru. The re-democratisation process began after the fall of the authoritarian Fujimori government in 2000. Although there have been various attempts at democratic reform, the market-oriented economic policies based on the export of primary goods have not changed under successive governments: Toledo (2001-2006); García (2006-2011); and the incumbent Humala (2011-).

[121] One of the central points for dispute between local residents and the company was the latter's various attempts to extend the PAMA deadline, an obligation for mining projects which have already been conducting mineral extraction before 1993. The company had to submit a plan for the mitigation of environmental contamination generated by its activities. *Doe Run Perú* intended to delay this obligation, arguing that contamination was caused by previous activities from the Cerro and the *Centromín Perú* era prior to privatisation. Given fierce polarisation over the issue, the company also claimed that the contamination was generated by traffic as well as the lack of sanitary awareness among the local population. In the end, the government made a decision favourable to the company, leading to an escalation of the dispute. For more on this conflict in La Oroya, see Scurrah (2008).

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[122] The *Defensoría* prepares its monthly report based on 'the information provided by the actors involved via its 28 regional branches and other complementary information sources' (*Defensoría* Report, No. 119, my translation). By distributing its publications, the institution intends to 'prevent' social conflicts, to play an 'intermediary role' between the actors involved (rather than addressing disputes directly) and sometimes provides a legal advisory or defence service in the case of human rights abuses.

[123] Since 2009 reported disputes have totalled more than 200 cases monthly. The number peaked in September 2009 (288 cases), and the period between June and November 2009 was recorded as the most serious in numerical terms.

[124] The *Defensoría* categorised 10 types of disputes: those related to national/regional/local government; socio-environmental; territorial demarcation; illegal cultivation of coca leaves; labour; communal; electoral and others.

[125] According to a *Defensoría*'s special report, titled 'The Extractive Activities and Socio-Environmental Conflicts in Peru', a total of 30 cases of socio-environmental conflicts have been registered between May 2004 and February 2007, and 77 per cent of those (23 cases) were caused by mining activities (*Defensoría*, 2007). During this period, socio-environmental conflicts were concentrated in 13 departments and Cajamarca turned out to be the department with the highest frequency of conflicts (eight cases), followed by Ancash, Cusco and Pasco with three cases each respectively (*Defensoría*, 2007).

New Mineral Extraction: An Arena for Contention

The now famous comment '*el síndrome del perro del hortelano*' ('the dog in the manger syndrome'), uttered by ex-president Alan García, one of the most enthusiastic proponents for neoliberal extractivism, is often repeated by other leftist presidents in the region. García argued for the necessity of the extractive industry for the country's 'development' and 'poverty reduction' and criticised indigenous peoples' opposition to extraction in the country's Amazonian regions due to their having 'the dog in the manger syndrome'. In his justification of the expansion of hydrocarbon extraction and in his criticising of NGOs' 'naivety' in opposing this expansion, the Bolivian president Evo Morales said: 'What, then, is Bolivia going to live off if some NGOs say "Amazonia without oil"? They are saying, in other words, that the Bolivian people ought not to have money, that there should be neither IDH [a direct tax on hydrocarbons used to fund government investments] nor royalties, and also that there should be no *Juancito Pinto*, *Renta Dignidad* nor *Juana Azuerduy* [cash-transfer and social programs]' (cited in Bebbington, 2009: 16). In an interview the Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, fiercely criticised opponents of natural resource extraction and argued for the rationale of development based on extractive industries. Correa said: 'It is madness to say no to natural resources, which is what part of the left is proposing – no to oil, no to mining, no to gas, no to hydroelectric power, no to roads. This is an infantile left, which can only legitimate the right…We cannot lose sight of the fact that the main objective of a country such as Ecuador is to eliminate poverty. And for that we need our natural resources…What we need to do is exploit those resources in the right way… the proper exploitation of natural resources can help to conserve nature rather than destroying it' (Interview with Rafael Correa, in *New Left Review*, 2012: 95-96). Regardless of political positions, new mineral extraction has become important for 'national development'. In this sense, opposition to this extractivism underwent fierce criticism from government and mining interests, opponents being denounced as anti-mining, anti-development, naïve leftists or radical environmentalists. This part of the chapter intends to show that this bifurcated perspective on mining vs. anti-mining, or development vs. under-development, makes it hard to understand the complex dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts that are imbued with diverse social and power relations.

As intensive forms of mineral extraction, i.e. 'new extraction', expanded across the country from the 1990s, socio-environmental conflicts followed suit (Bebbington, 2009). A substantial academic literature has attempted to account for the relationship between large-scale mining projects and the nature of these disputes in Peru (Bebbington, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2013; Arellano-Yanguas, 2008, 2011; de Echave, 2009a; *Defensoría*, 2007). Among the explanations advanced figure the following: opposition against the mining project itself; mobilisations demand a greater distribution of benefits or socio-economic opportunities; and concerns surrounding the state's obvious regulatory deficiency regarding environmental, socio-economic and human rights (Bebbington, 2007). Based on a political-ecological approach, Bebbington et al. (2008b; 2011) also point out other roots of socio-environmental conflicts: 'accumulation by exploitation'; 'accumulation by dispossession'; and 'colonisation of lifeworld'. In the meantime, de Echave et al. (2009a) examined the 'why' and 'how' of socio-environmental grassroots activism based on social movement theory. They categorised four types of conflicts with two variables: perception of impacts caused by mining operations on local communities, and the existing level of social organisation (2009a: 196-198). Additionally, the *Defensoría* (2007) detailed the origins of conflicts, including concern regarding possible environmental contamination, the hitherto negative record of mining activities, lack of respect for the fundamental rights of local citizens, insensitive corporate behaviour, and popular distrust of state institutions vis-à-vis environmental management. Overall, neoliberal forms of mineral extraction have become an area for contention among various actors. Alongside the lack of appropriate state regulations, additional attention to sustainable development and participatory democracy complicated protest dynamics further, and embraced diverse interests among different agencies (the state, mining company, regional and local government, and local communities), as well as different interpretations on the relationship between mineral extraction, 'development' and 'democracy'. Consequently, in order to understand the nature and dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts, it is necessary to examine the diverse social and power relations surrounding mineral extraction. In this sense, the following sections will analyse four characteristics of contemporary disputes.

'*Decentralising*' *Conflicts*

First, socio-environmental conflicts have much to do with neoliberal structural reforms. As mentioned, the Fujimori government (1990-2000) carried out economic reform policies with the aim to attract foreign investors in the mining sector. A favourable tax regime was introduced so that multinational mining companies benefited from stability of contracts with ridiculously low rates of tax and royalty obligations. Increasing corporate profits caused by the rise in international mineral prices after the early 2000s made a stark contrast with the impoverished population who live in mineral extraction communities. As a consequence, reform of the fiscal regime has become a central issue for public debate, with some protagonists calling for the modification or cancellation of fiscal incentives for transnational mining companies via tax stability contracts. The state came under increasingly intense pressure to implement legal changes given the rising number of socio-environmental conflicts. Rather than introducing tax reform, successive governments in the post-Fujimori era changed the regulations on the distribution of the *canon minero*, placing them under subnational jurisdictions, hand-in-hand with a decentralisation process. This matched increasing public attention about sustainable mining with more concerns relating to the social distribution of economic gains. However, rather than quelling social conflicts related to mining activities, the transfer of the *canon* fuelled more disputes among various actors as the abundant fiscal revenues became an arena for contention. Focusing more on the correlation between distribution of fiscal resources and the rise of social tensions in a decentralisation context, Arellano-Yanguas argues that increases in tax revenues generated by the mining boom between 2004 and 2009 tended to generate more conflict (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; 2011). He explains that the distribution of the *canon minero* to sub-national governments motivated additional conflict among various actors, including: disputes between local residents and local/regional governments regarding the former’s accusation of the latter’s administrative incapacity; among different levels of government over distribution of the *canon minero*; territorial demarcation; and labour conflicts (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; 2011).

First, despite the large amount of fiscal resources transferred to regional and local governments, they were not well prepared to administer the *canon* effectively against the backdrop of high expectations among local communities. As Arellano-Yanguas elucidates, ‘the lack of implementation of initiative and the quality of projects’ made people living in local mineral-producing communities accuse local authorities of its inefficient administration’ (2011: 632). This also enabled the Lima government to denounce local or regional authorities for their administrative incapacity to invest the *canon minero* effectively. In particular, conflicts became more frequent in communities located in departments, such as Ancash and Tacna, where a large quantity of the *canon* was transferred (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 632). Second, the asymmetrical or ad hoc nature of the *canon* distribution further complicated the local dynamics. Since changes in legal regulations on its transfer were made in particular as a response to rising opposition to mineral extraction, they have prioritised communities where mining activities are in process. As a consequence, territorial demarcation between different departments, provinces or districts has become an important and contested point since it can make a big difference in terms of the amount of the transferred *canon*. In the case of Moquegua, the regional government had 23 territorial conflicts with the neighbouring departments of Tacna, Puno and Arequipa, while municipalities are also in conflict within the department for the same reason (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 632). Thirdly, against the backdrop of an incomplete decentralisation process, resource abundance also became an object of power struggles. For example, local politicians often led protests against mining activities in order to gain political legitimacy among the local electorate, presenting themselves as a defender of the latter in gaining more socio-economic benefits. At the same time, they contested the proposed mineral extraction as ‘a pre-emptive move against the pressure of citizens (on municipal mayors) or mayors (on regional presidents)’ (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 632). In this way, devolution of the *canon* multiplied the actors involved, complicating social and power relations, as well as opening up possibilities for contention.

‘*Privatising*’ *Conflicts*

Alongside the decentralisation of fiscal revenues, the reformed tax regime also left mining companies with a space to participate in local development by creating social funds and implementing community development programmes, a measure suitable for mining companies’ CSR framework. For example, the Minera Barrick Misquichilca, S.A. (herafter Barrick), a Peruvian subsidiary of the Toronto-based Barrick Gold Corporation, invested in a diversity of development programmes in 18 communities which are located in the area of influence of the Pierina gold mine, located to the north of Huaraz city, Ancash department.[126] According to Himley, Barrick has become an indispensable agent in promoting local development, particularly in the neighbourhood of the mine site (2010: 3283). Its implementation of community development programmes, such as a local employment programme, health, education and infrastructure investment, have helped it establish authority in the relationship between the mining company and local population, by providing an opportunity for the social distribution of mining extraction (Himley, 2013: 396). While this has permitted the company to gain social legitimacy to continue with its operations, it has created a public image of socially responsible mining committed to sustainable development (Himley, 2013: 405-406). Moreover, these programmes have helped establish favourable conditions for the company. As Himley argues, ‘the local employment initiative at Pierina … [was] to establish the terms of debate regarding mining’s development contributions, to limit the scope of residents’ demands, and to foreclose the possibility of more radical or systemic change’ (2013: 396). As a consequence, local people’s demands to Barrick centred on the distribution of additional material benefits, i.e. ‘privatising’ social conflicts (Himley, 2010: 3284). In this fashion, the private sector has become a target for local claim-making, particularly around the distribution of material benefits, while maintaining considerable leeway to set the terms of debates on local development. While Barrick can define ‘what is possible in regards to community residents’ involvement with the mining economy’, it has opened up a socio-political space for contention targeting the mining company itself (Himley, 2013: 410). In similar vein, local communities have sometimes opposed a new mining project or expansion of a pre-existing project, as they intended to utilise the protest as a negotiating strategy vis-à-vis mining companies and thus gain more material benefits (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 630). They have often demanded the delivery of previously unfulfilled promises from an enterprise in the context of rising mineral prices and fair compensation for land sales undertaken in the initial mine construction stage (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 630).

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[126] Apart from the Pierina mine, Barrick gold conducts another gold mining operation in the department of La Libertad, the Laguna Norte mine, located 140 kilometres east of the city of Trujillo.

Territory, Indigenous Rights and Participation (ILO Convention 169)

High mineral prices and thus large multinational profits stand in stark contrast to the marginalisation of most local populations where mining is prevalent. Public awareness regarding company profitability helps explain why many local communities protesting against mining activities mainly demand extra participation in the distribution of socio-economic benefits, rather than opposing mining itself. The following two sections will examine other aspects of mining-related disputes. Most mining activities are conducted in the already-marginalised rural highlands, inhabited by poor peasants or indigenous people long neglected by the state policies. As mentioned, the granting of mining concessions has therefore complicated the nature of social conflicts as they have become entangled with longstanding problems around question of ethnicity, poverty and political exclusion. The division between the surface and the subterranean has become a key area of dispute. If deposits are located in peasant communities, things turn particularly complicated for mining companies since they need grassroots consent for access. To compound matters, in the highlands much land has no or imprecise land-titling. Increasingly, mining concessions are granted to mining companies to explore and exploit mineral deposits which are located within peasant communities. By 2013, the proportion of overlapping between mineral deposits and peasant communities rose to 48.6 per cent, becoming an important cause of conflicts.[127] As noted, changes in land regulation represent different perspectives between the state and local communities on land/territory. To the state and mining interests, it is important to guarantee property rights in order to ensure that companies with concessions can access land and proceed in mining deposits. In contrast, to peasants or indigenous people land is an integral part of their livelihood and more than material significance.

The violent confrontation between the police and indigenous people in Bagua, the '*Baguazo*', in June 2009 illustrates this dimension of the conflicts in an explicit way. One of the main reasons for the '*Baguazo*' was associated with the indigenous collective right to territory. Against the backdrop of a growing international recognition of indigenous people's rights – promoted by NGOs and indigenous movements – free, prior and informed consultation, included in Article 6 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention), has become an important reference point for those who defend the right to territory from the advances of neoliberal extractivism.[128] The Peruvian government ratified the ILO Convention on 2 February 1994. However, the implementation of this Convention has largely been ignored, lagging behind particularly with regards to 'communal property and the continued exploitation of natural resources' (Salmón, 2013: 373). As mining concessions have increased across the nation, social conflicts have followed suit in the context of a lack of consultation, as well as different perspectives regarding territory.[129] In addition, decision-making to grant concessions is highly concentrated within central government and local populations are barely consulted. As a consequence, conflicts tend to be generated from the initial stage, i.e. when a company attempts to buy land for exploration. Such a lack of information and consultation at the grassroots level stimulates disagreement over land sales, sometimes accompanied by company intimidation, or the conducting of land transactions at an unfair price.[130] This scenario has shaped local residents' negative perceptions of multinationals, as well as of the state, which is seen as colluding in their exploitation. To address the resulting grievance, local communities made claims dependent on differing understandings of territory, as well as participation, in deciding the development model.

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[127] See '*CooperAcción: Superposición de la minería en territorio de comunidades campesinas llegó al 49%*', *Gestión*, 21 July 2013; and '*45% de territorios campesinos en Perú está concesionado a empresas mineras*', *La República*, 18 November 2013.

[128] Article 6 (ILO Convention 169) states:

1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall:

(a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly;

(b) establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them;

(c) establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose.

2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.

Environment, Sustainability and Development

Technological innovations in recent decades have made possible new exploration and exploitation of hitherto untouched areas, thus raising environmental concerns. In the case of gold extraction, most large-scale gold mines use the cyanide heap leaching method.[131] Despite its technological advantages, the process has raised widespread controversy, since it causes negative impacts on human bodies and the environment through the deployment of toxic materials like cyanide. Another main environmental concern related to large-scale mining operations is that it leaves large non-economic piles of gangue minerals on site after separating them from the commodifiable mineral-containing ore. Tailing piles can contaminate surface and groundwater via acid mine drainage (AMD), which 'occurs because of the exposure of sulphide-bearing minerals (such as pyrite) to air and water, forming sulphuric acid. This acid dissolves metal such as lead, zinc, copper, arsenic, selenium, mercury and cadmium, into ground and surface water. Acid mine drainage can poison ground and drinking water and destroy aquatic life and habitat' (Bebbington et al., 2007: 4). In addition, gold extraction requires a large quantity of natural resources, such as land, water and energy, generating asymmetrical competition over resources between multinational capital and local community. Finally, the location of extraction has generated increasing concerns about accessibility and the preservation of natural resources, particularly water. Mining deposits are sometimes located in ecologically vulnerable areas such as headwaters of rivers or glaciers, affecting downstream communities as well as threatening biodiversity and the provision of clean and sufficient water. Given these problems, as Himley argues, 'while the adoption of mega-mining techniques may be a sound *economic* strategy for firms, the value of this method of extraction as a socially inclusive and ecologically friendly *development* strategy is more questionable' (Himley, 2010: 3275, emphasis in the original). As shown in conflicts concerning the negative impact of mineral extraction on the environment and local people's health, e.g., the Rio Blanco (or Majaz) project in Piura or Cerro Quilish and Conga project in Cajamarca, protesters decried a lack of consultation in the decision-making process despite the negative impact on the environment, as well as on people's livelihoods. Opponents claimed the right of local people to decide on their own development model. Rather than the present extractive based development, they argued for 'sustainable development', the meaning of which became an arena for considerable debate, involving both the government and mining companies, on the one hand, and local communities, on the other.[132]

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[129] On September 2011, the Humala government 'enacted a law (Law No. 29785, *Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios*) mandating free, prior, and informed consultation in efforts to recognize the needs of indigenous peoples' (Salmón, 2013: 354). The law took effect in April 2012. However, *de facto* legal effectiveness is still under scrutiny.

[130] An example of this is referred to in Chapter 5: the case of Cajamarca.

[131] The cyanide heap leaching is the dominant extraction method in present-day gold mining due to its economic efficiency. According to Bury, the way gold is extracted is: 'once the ore has been removed from large open pits and placed on lined leach pads in terraced piles, cyanide leach solution is applied to the ore through drippers. The gold-pregnant solution then flows to large ponds, where it is separated' (2005: 230). It is a method to extract gold from low-grade ore, which was created in late nineteenth century Scotland. Since the 1970s, it became generalised in gold extraction. Compared to the previous mercury amalgamation process which recovers no more than 60 per cent of gold from the ore, the use of cyanide is a more advanced technology in that more than 97 per cent of gold is recovered (see 'Cyanide Leach Mining Packet' [Mineral Policy Center, 2000], available at http://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/Cyanide_Leach_Packet.pdf).

4.4. Conclusion

In the twentieth century the mining industry has been an important issue for policymakers and academics, as well as the Peruvian population and this continues to be the case. Since the country is endowed with mineral abundance, it has been argued that it has a comparative advantage in the exploitation and export of subterranean wealth, which could be a significant source of foreign currency, thus leading to economic development. Based on this assumption, legal mining codes have been created and altered with the intention of promoting foreign investments in the sector, such as the 1901 Mining Code and the 1950 New Mining Code. For most of the twentieth century, mineral extraction has been concentrated in the central and southern highlands, with the investment of US capital focusing on copper mines. In particular, the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation became the main owner of mines and smelters, as well as a large landowner in the central *sierra*, influencing the livelihoods of local citizens to a significant degree. Although domestic mining companies invested in silver, gold and zinc mines on a smaller scale, they played only a complementary role when foreign capital investment and mineral prices stood at a low level.

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[132] This dimension of conflicts will be examined in the next two chapters.

Foreign capital was reluctant to conduct new explorations given the backdrop of decreasing international mineral prices. In addition, the 1960s witnessed a wave of reformist demands and miners' protesting for better working conditions and wage rises. Moreover, the minimal impact of mineral extraction on regional development contrasted with the profits mining companies generated, bringing criticism regarding the benefits of mineral extraction. This included the creation of mining enclaves, Peru's dependence on the mining industry, as well as the exploitation of miners labouring under precarious working conditions. In the face of such criticism the Velasco government introduced policy changes intended to revitalise mineral extraction by increasing state participation in the production, refining and marketing of minerals. As part of the process of nationalisation, the military regime expropriated the Cerro and created *Centromin Perú* in 1974, after more than 70 years of its activity in the Peruvian highlands. However, the state turned out to be inefficient and incapable of improving on already debilitated mineral production and many mining SOEs were in crisis or bankrupt by the 1980s.

The 1980s witnessed one of the worst political and economic crises in Peruvian history. Subsequently, the Fujimori government implemented neoliberal economic reforms in order to overcome four-digit hyperinflation and thereby re-enter the international financial community. In line with policy recommendations and the support of IFIs as a new development strategy, the Peruvian government reformed regulations vis-à-vis the mining sector in order to promote foreign investment. It also reduced state intervention in the sector and privatised SOEs. However, at the same time it had to introduce environmental regulations in light of sustainable development initiatives, despite loopholes and limitations. Favourable legal changes and fiscal incentives have attracted many foreign investors in large-scale projects across the country since the 1990s, and the sector has become one of the principal promoters of the country's economic growth. While mineral-based development has brought macro-economic stability and a fiscal bonanza, the sector has also become a main arena for social struggles, particularly after the late 1990s.

Compared to miners' demands for better wages and working conditions in the 1940s and 1960s, contemporary struggles against mining activities have been led mainly by local communities where minerals were extracted. Sometimes the state and mining companies have criticised these struggles as 'anti-mining', even as 'anti-development', claiming that they were led by radical leftists or naïve environmentalists. In other words, the resistances of local communities tend to be viewed as reactionary responses, which are claimed to be unfavourable in terms of 'national development', i.e. macro-economic growth. However, this dichotomous view on socio-environmental protests does not help explain their multifaceted dynamics. Alongside the policy reform implemented by the neoliberal state, increasing international and national attention regarding 'socially responsible' and 'environmentally sustainable' mining operations complicate the nature of social protests, multiplying actors who are distinctively located with regard to mining activities. With the aim to quell social unrest and make little change to the fiscal regime which was favourable to foreign capital, successive governments in the post-*Fujimorato* introduced several legal changes that impacted the distribution of fiscal bonanza to regional and local governments, the *canon minero*, with little consideration regarding the institutionalisation of decentralised administrative agencies. The ad hoc nature of the *canon* devolution turned out to fuel more protests at sub-national level, by way of 'decentralising' conflicts. This is mainly due to the mismanagement of fiscal resources, blurry territorial demarcation, as well as power struggles among various actors (including local politicians, local and regional authorities, and local communities). Struggles have also been 'privatised' since mining companies have become a local authority via their social or community development programmes. While socio-economic benefits have been partly distributed among local populations via social programmes, companies have turned out to be a main target for claim-makers particularly in the context of mine sites. Still, these conflicts have concentrated on more participation in the socio-economic distribution of benefits. However, there are other protests which bring the neoliberal form of mining operations into contestation, demanding more participation in the decision-making process and a respect for different interpretations of territory, and development *per se*. Meanwhile these resistances have uncovered the limitations of a new development model based on mineral extraction as well as deficits in Peruvian democracy, from which a majority of poor and marginalised populations suffer different 'grievance' simultaneously opening up 'political possibilities' to contest these. The ensuing two case chapters will examine this variegated dynamics of socio-environmental struggles in the department of Cajamarca, one of the most representative regions for 'new mineral extraction' and which has a high level of related social protests.

Chapter 5

MYSA's Gold Extraction: 'Power-Geometry' and Rural Activism in Cajamarca

In the public imaginary, the *sierra peruana* (Peruvian Andes) has been perceived as a 'retarded' and 'static' place. This temporal and spatial illusion has also shaped socio-economic, political and cultural norms of the *sierra*. Namely, the Peruvian highlands have been considered as a place 'bounded' to the past and resistant to change, different to the 'modern' and 'developed' coast. Although the *sierra* could represent an 'exotic' culture to outsiders' eyes, it remained 'inferior' to the coast and thus would be excluded from 'rational' political decision-making. As a consequence, political and economic forces are concentrated on the coast, particularly in Lima. In this view, the *sierra peruana* should be 'modernised' and 'assimilated' to the way in which the coast has developed. The highlands exist to be exploited, or 'developed'. Additionally, when highlanders resist 'development' or 'modernisation', they tend to be criticised as 'retarded' and 'violent' ignorant people (see Vich, 2009). As seen in Chapter 3, however, misunderstandings of rural reality by urban intellectuals was one of the main reasons for the failure of guerrilla movements in the mid-1960s and the Shining Path in the 1980s and 1990s.

Cajamarca has become one of the most representative departments of Peru's 'new mining boom' since the Yanacocha mining company (*Minera Yanacocha S.A.*, MYSA) started its operation in 1993. To the disappointment of many, however, nearly two decades of MYSA's mining operations in the department have not produced the 'development' promised. Cajamarca is still one of the poorest regions in the country. To compound matters, accusations have been levelled over unfair treatment and environmental degradation caused by the presence of one of the biggest gold mining companies, only resulting in dissatisfaction and distrust among local *campesinos*. But at the same time, this accumulation of social discontent and the perceptions of 'injustice' has laid the ground for complex trajectories of rural activism, creating layers of social relations and becoming an integral part of the massive mobilisations against MYSA's Conga mining project since late 2011. In other words, despite the marginalisation from capitalist development and state formation and neoliberal mineral extraction, there have been complex socio-economic and political dynamics in this part of the northern highlands. Rather than a bifurcated power structure – dominance vs. the dominated or exploitation vs. the exploited – the chapter shows that there has been a complexity of power relations and political dynamics accumulated in the rural highlands of Cajamarca.

Considering this, the aim of this chapter is to contextualise the anti-Conga movement by examining the long-term historical trajectories of rural politics in Cajamarca. If the movement is interpreted within the traditional theoretical framework, we come to understand it within a limited perspective: 1) the 'why' of the movement would be 'grievances' of local communities caused by the multinational's neoliberal mineral extraction unless they were motivated by anti-mining or anti-development radicals or naïve environmentalists as the government and mining company would argue; 2) the 'how' would be focused on lower visibility of the mobilisations after temporary suspension of the mining project (due to the lack of organisation or fragmentation of the leadership); and a lack of political impact despite its massive scope and victims; or particular attention to the 'newness' of the movement (due to its cause of environmental justice, i.e. the defence of water, and the 'new' element of urban and foreign based-environmental organisations 'helping' poor peasants). From this perspective based on essentialist geography, the possible conclusion is that local communities, with the support of or in alliance with 'benevolent' NGOs at a higher scale, protested firmly in opposition to the power of global capital and the emphasis on national 'development' by the neoliberal state. However, the impotence and passivity of local *campesinos* and their lack of organisation only resulted in smaller scale protests and did not have enough power to produce political and economic changes, i.e. to achieve an alternative development model and the consolidation of a democratic system by creating links with political parties. While a long list of the movement's limitations and policy reform proposals could be suggested, this conclusion tends to maintain the status quo of the bifurcated power relations, if not its deterioration. As I argued in Chapter 2, this approach adopts the dualistic geography-power formula based on an essentialist geographical understanding and does not tend to see the political imaginaries of subaltern subjectivity. In order to examine the reformulation of rural subjectivities within the anti-Conga movement and its complex dynamics of 'networked forms of resistance', I will focus on how diverse social relations were historically articulated in this part of the rural highlands and how they laid the ground for the re-formulation of rural subjectivities in contesting the neoliberal mineral extraction, on the basis of relational geography. At the same time, noting that this 'networked form of resistance' is not a smooth articulation of actors, I will also elucidate the complex power-geometry of MYSA's new extraction in Cajamarca.

5.1. Rural Highlands of Cajamarca: Historical Review

Capitalist Development of Agriculture and Rural Politics

The purpose of this section is to explain that the marginalisation of the *cajamarquinos* originated not only from MYSA's new mineral extraction but has long historical roots in the process of capitalist development and there was a certain degree of resistance of *campesinos* in response to capitalist exploitation.

Timing and Nature

Wool manufacturing, centred on *obrajes* (textile plants), along with silver mining (mainly in Hualgayoc province) comprised major economic activities during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Regarding the capitalist development of agriculture in Cajamarca, some disagreement exists in the literature. Gitliz argues that 'no great boom affected agriculture in the department until the development of the milk industry in the late 1950s' (Gitlitz, 1975: 425). On the other hand, Taylor (1979) notes two stages of the region's capitalist development. In the initial stage (1880 to 1930), a significant expansion in the cultivation of export crops on the northern coast increased demand for the region's labour, livestock and food crops, accelerating integration into the national market (see also Cristiansen, 2000). The dairying industry had an important role in consolidating this trend (between 1930 and 1960). In 1947, the multinational Nestlé opened its subsidiary, PERULAC (Nestlé Perú S.A., *Compañía Peruana de Alimentos Lácteos*) in Cajamarca. This multinational company had a factory in Chiclayo in the neighbouring northern coast department from 1937, but the milk supply was not sufficient locally (Indacochea et al., 2001: 57). In 1949, PERULAC consequently opened its processing factory in Cajamarca. This was possible since the company's need to secure the supply of local fresh milk was supported by local and national efforts. The departmental elite pressured the government for the consolidation of a profitable dairy industry via its trade association, the Association of Agriculturalists and Cattlemen of Cajamarca (the *Asociación de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Cajamarca*).

As a consequence, the capitalist development of agriculture in the region has followed the ‘Junker’ path, with the landowners being the prime promoter by subdividing, selling lands and promoting investments.[133] Even before the agrarian reform in the 1960s and 1970s, landlords started to subdivided haciendas by selling unproductive lands to peasants at high prices. By doing this, *hacendados* could secure capital to finance the introduction of advanced technology and concentrate their investment in fertile lands for commercial dairy production. Additionally, selling unproductive lands to small holders helped mitigate rural unrest. Although this process of agricultural advancement did not proceed in a uniform way, it produced more stratification among the peasantry, widening the gap between richer and more pauperised peasants or proletarianised landless families. Between 1920 and 1960, ‘households belonging to all strata of the peasantry found themselves more deeply integrated into labour and commodity markets and evolved ever more intricate survival strategies in the pursuit of capital accumulation or mere subsistence’ (Taylor, 2006: 54).

Politics in the Countryside

During the nineteenth century, the haciendas were the dominant land tenure institution, leading to concentration of land in the hands of the few and thus power, particularly due to mining and livestock activities in the central and southern regions. Following independence, communities lost their legal status as individual property rights were favoured over communal land holding until official recognition was recovered in the 1920s. In Cajamarca, however, land concentration in large estates had begun during colonial times (Deere, 1990: 29).[134] In consequence, smallholding peasants had to lease plots from landowners, paying rents in labour, cash or kind (Deere, 1990: 31). Highland landowners could exert political and economic power over their tenants and neighbouring communal peasants (*comuneros*) in the context of unequal land distribution and enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy from government interference. *Hacendados* occupied important posts in regional administrative and political institutions themselves or supported those who were in charge (Cristiansen, 2000: 28). While land of free peasant smallholders was forcibly fragmented with population pressure, the economic situation of tenants was often better (Cristiansen, 2000: 28).

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[133] Woods (2011: 57) summarises two ‘paths’ to the capitalist development of agriculture: ‘from above’ or ‘from below’, often referred to as the ‘Junker/Prussian’ or ‘North America/French’ paths. See also Kay (1974; 1980; 2000; 2007). For more on capitalist development of agriculture in Cajamarca, see Taylor (1979) and Deere (1990).

[134] While the proportion of privately owned large estates was close to two-thirds of the provincial land of Cajamarca, almost 70 per cent of the rural population lived in areas outside haciendas (Christiansen, 2000: 28; Indacochea et al, 2001: 56).

Regarding changes in social relations associated with capitalist development, Chritiansen compares two positions. Deere emphasises labour exploitation of landowners over tenants to extract more profits, 'under the threat of expulsion from the estate' (Crititistiansen, 2000: 27). In contrast, Taylor notes that peasants could partially resist the proletarianisation process due to the economic interconnectedness between Cajamarca and northern coast, as well as local political context. On the one hand, free peasant smallholders could migrate for temporary labour opportunities in monoculture plantations on the neighbouring coast. On the other hand, local political tradition – factional rivalry among landlords and banditry - provided them an opportunity not only to be exploited by landowners. As Taylor notes, prior to the 1930s, there were usually at least two or three rival factions at the provincial level. Each faction consisted of a landowner as a patron, who presided over a hierarchical network of clients. Factions were usually in fierce competition for the exclusive control of political power and economic gains (Taylor, 2006: 55). In addition, '*hacendados* assisted fleeing criminals and peasants resisting taxation and conscription by hiding them on their estates, where their state officials were not allowed' (Cristiansen, 2000: 30-31). Simultaneously, a lack of effective control over the *serrano* (highland) population by the central government, continued with a 'fragmented power structure' based on landlords, facilitated peasant involvement in rural criminality, such as banditry (see Taylor, 1986). Peasants participated in a bandit gang 'as a means of attaining better pay for less work' and sometimes as a form of labour (Taylor, 2006: 58-60). In this way, tenants and free peasant smallholders sometimes used local *hacendados* or appealed to central state institutions in order to escape from exploitation and to resist power abuses (Cristiansen, 2000: 31).

Structural Reform and Rural Political Dynamics

The presence of multinational capital only intensified the dispossession of local *campesinos*, most of whom did not benefit from state-led reform under the military regime. Rather than remaining marginalised, however, *campesinos* were engaged in peasant unions and also created grassroots organisations. The articulation of these social relations and political activities has accumulated over time, forming an integral part of the anti-Conga movement, on which this section will focus.

Agrarian Reform and Peasants Response

Growing rural unrest in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged the first Belaunde government to introduce an agrarian reform law in 1964, although its implementation proved ineffective. In the case of Cajamarca, peasant struggles were comparatively less visible, although smaller scale protests, such as those in Llucho community and Cospán did occur (García-Sayán, 1982: 53). Literature on peasant mobilisations in Cajamarca at this juncture has emphasised its marginal impact. Peasant protests were 'limited in scope to one hacienda, one community or a community-hacienda complex… with a partial success' (Gitlitz, 1975: 5). In a similar vein, Taylor notes: 'although conflicts between landlords and peasants were constantly recurring, they were never generalized enough to pose any meaningful threat to established social relationships' (1979: 179). When explaining the reasons for less visibility of peasant struggles in the 1960s compared to other highland regions, Taylor points out weak community tradition, the embedded APRA influence, and land parcelisation (1979: 324). Cajamarca has little apparent ethnic identity and weak community tradition in comparison to the central and southern Andes. In addition, as the process of capitalist development was closely related to the cultivation of export crops, such as sugar cane and rice, on the northern coast, social relations were 'stretched out' beyond regional borders. Since the party's foundation in 1931, the department of Cajamarca formed an important part of the APRA's '*sólido norte*' (strong support base in the north). It managed to establish deep roots among the peasantry, workers and artisans living in highlands towns, in addition to strategic middle class groups such as lawyers and teachers (see Taylor, 2000). Backing for APRA in Cajamarca's rural districts remained strong, being reinforced by the ever increasing movements of migrants on coastal sugar, rice and cotton estates. On these properties the trade unions were dominated by APRA activists with the result that migrants took a pro-APRA stance back to the highlands once they had fulfilled their labour contracts.

Following Belaunde's unsuccessful attempt at agrarian reform, it fell to the Velasco government to push a thorough-going land distribution. It aimed to modernise the country's agricultural sector as well as mitigate rural unrest. Despite its ambitious reform initiatives based on collective production, it had a limited impact on the structure of land tenure and the quality of living conditions for a majority of the peasantry. Most households received no land and it failed to halt the process of fragmentation. Indeed, parcelisation intensified as landowners needed to subdivide their properties and carried out decapitalisation due to a fear of expropriation. The slow progress of land reform in the department enhanced this process. Furthermore, since peasant mobilisations during the 1960s were not intense in Cajamarca, the region was not designated a priority for the government's reform effort. The reform process also encountered other obstacles, such as opposition within the local administrative structure, limited resource allocation from central government, anti-reform propaganda promoted by the Association of Agriculturalists and Cattlemen of Cajamarca with a tacit support of PERULAC (Taylor, 1979: 344-8). Finally, land was distributed unequally, benefiting 'primarily labourers and tenants settled on expropriated properties' or 'more prosperous smallholders', intensifying stratification among the peasantry (Taylor, 2006: 73). This fragmentation of the peasantry and the predicament of their living conditions made it difficult for many peasants to organise. As seen in social protests in the 1990s, this is one of the reasons why the peasants' response was weak and limited.

With APRA's turn to the right and its anti-agrarian reform position, the party lost much legitimacy in the region.[135] Other leftist parties and organisations attempted to fill this political vacuum and got involved in peasant politics. One of the region's important peasant organisations at this juncture was FEDECC (Departmental Federation of Peasants of Cajamarca, *Federación Departamental de Campesinos de Cajamarca*). The Federation was founded in 1961 with the initiative of APRA. However, given that the party did not play an important role in peasant mobilisations, the federation was split in 1969. Some leaders remained loyal to, while others sympathised with the PCP-U (García-Sayán, 1982: 54). Against this backdrop, at the fourth Peasant Convention of FEDECC held in 1974 in the community of Huacataz, more than 17 peasant committees (*comités de campesinos*) participated and declared their affiliation to the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP, *Confederación Campesina del Peru*), which illustrated the federation's more radicalised strategy for land occupations such as in Huacataz (1973) and Pomabamba (1974) (García-Sayán, 1982: 56-69). As a consequence of the limited results of land reform and the continuous tendency of parcelisation in the 1970s, the rural landscape in Cajamarca demonstrated a complex composition: comprised of kulaks, cooperative leaders, small-holding peasants, landless wage labourers as well as sharecroppers (Taylor, 2006: 79). In this context, peasants organised the nightwatch patrols in order to address direct problems, which demonstrated political activities of rural subaltern groups rather than being unilaterally exploited, ‘fragmented’ and ‘fated to disappear’.

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[135] Although the party continued to be the main political force in Cajamarca until the 1980s, during the 1970s it faced increased competition as a consequence of its pro-oligarchic stance and opposition to land reform during the 1960s (Taylor, 1979: 323).

Rondas Campesinas (the Nightwatch Patrols)

Against the backdrop of economic difficulties and unmet expectations of reformist efforts, the 1970s saw an increasing coordination between the peasantry and leftist parties as well social organisations. Simultaneously, *hacendados* lost the legitimacy of their presence in the wake of agrarian reform, leaving a political vacuum in the countryside. Filling this power gap, radical Maoists in the central rural highlands started to prepare for revolutionary armed struggle and soon controlled rural populations in the central and southern *sierra* and extended their influence to Lima, plunging the country into a spiral of political violence. In the case of Cajamarca, however, the influence of Shining Path was relatively limited to the southern part of the department: the province of Cajabamca and San Marcos (see Taylor 2006). Starn notes that the relatively weak inroads made by the Maoist group could be explained by the presence of *rondas campesinas* (1992: 109). Rather, Cajamarca is the origin of the nightwatch patrols. *Rondas campesinas* were born out of the urgent needs of the rural population due to increasing economic difficulties by the mid-1970s: deepening proletarianisation, rising urban migration and a decline in employment opportunities. In December 1976, the first *ronda* composed of local peasants started its patrol at the village of Cuyumalca, in the province of Chota. The *ronda* was organised to deal with the specific problem of cattle rustling and petty thievery, in addition to the lack of political legitimacy of the state and corruption of local judicial authorities.[136] According to Gitlitz and Rojas, cattle were important within the peasant economy, not just as a means of subsistence but as a significant source of financial security, especially in times of emergency (1983: 169-170). Moreover, when the living conditions for peasants were in decline due to unfavourable terms of exchange between peasant produce and consumer goods, livestock came to play a greater role in peasant survival strategies (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983: 170-171). Accordingly, cattle rustling became a severe problem for peasants, who could expect little support from corrupt authorities, who frequently allowed criminals to act with impunity. An increase in livestock smuggling perpetuated by organised or informal networks was driven by economic crisis and increasing demands for meat in cities during the 1970s (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983: 175).

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[136] For more on the history of *rondas campesinas* in the Peruvian highlands, see Gitlitz and Rojas (1983); Gitlitz (1998); Starn (1999); and Gitlitz (2013).

The activities of the *rondas* proved highly successful in countering the problem of cattle rustling. This effectiveness not only stimulated their geographical expansion, they also widened the range of functions. In other words, *rondas* were organised not only in the Cajamarca region but over most of the northern highlands by the mid-1980s, and they had even spread to the central and southern *sierra* by the end of the decade (Gitlitz, 1998). The success of *rondas* in dealing with the problems peasants faced heightened their legitimacy among the rural population. Moreover, given the corrupt local judicial system and the discriminatory treatment against peasants common among officials, *rondas* attempted to implement an alternative and transparent legal system. They also got involved in small local public projects. By the mid-1980s, however, their activities were in decline. Although their organising capacity at village level was alive, *rondas* faced difficulties to coordinate and maintain federations at regional and national level: due to a lack of financial resources; geographical barriers for communication; and diverse and divisive interests among the peasantry (Starn, 1999: 247-8). Furthermore, political factions generated divisions among *rondas*, while the state tried to co-opt these grassroots organisations for their own political purpose. One prominent example of party factionalism inside the *rondas* concerned the rivalry between Daniel Idrogo of Patria Roja and Pedro Risco of APRA in Chota province, the birthplace of the nightwatch patrols. The political rivalry of *rondas* between APRA and various leftist groups also resulted in four federations being established only within the province of Cajamarca. This division, actively promoted in Alan García’s first administration (1985-1990), resulted in many local bodies becoming moribund. However, as will be seen later, this peasant organisation became a leading part of the social protests against the MYSA’s mining activities since the 1990s.

The Church of 'Poncho and Sombrero'

The role of the Roman Catholic Church cannot be omitted in explaining the peasants' political activism in Cajamarca and this experience also became an integral part of the networked forms of resistance against MYSA's Conga project. The close relationship between the Church and local peasants in Cajamarca dates back to 1962 when the bishop (*monseñor*), José Dammert Bellido, was appointed to the diocese of Cajamarca, coinciding with a changing context of the Church across the continent with the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and the Latin American Episcopal Council (*Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano*, CELAM) in Medellín in 1968. In the aftermath, the Church played an important role in conducting social works and raising political consciousness of the marginalised in the countryside and urban shanty towns across Latin America. According to Klaiber, these two events were 'deeply influenced by the new idea of inculturation, liberation theology and conscientisation (of Paulo Freire)' (2009: 410). In Cajamarca, the concept of inculturation and conscientisation (*concientización*) was an important element in raising political consciousness among the peasantry under bishop Dammert. In explaining 'inculturation', Klaiber drew on the example of the bishop of Chiapas, Samuel Ruiz, (1960-1999). Impressed with the concept of inculturation after his attendance at the Second Vatican Council, he dedicated himself to 'the formation of native catechists (*catequistas*) to teach the people in their own language and in cultural terms', contributing to generating political consciousness (2009: 410). According to Klaiber, 'many Zapatistas were catechists trained by Samuel Ruiz' (2009: 411). Regarding *concientización*, Anderson explains the influence of Paolo Freire, a Brazilian educator and philosopher who developed a critical approach to pedagogy: Freire's two pedagogical methods – the 'banking method of education' and 'dialogical problem solving'. The former concerned the division between teacher and student, a passive receiver of information. The dialogical approach, to which Freire gave more attention, is to overcome dichotomous separation between the educator and the educated and to involve the latter in the process of problem solving in a continuous way (Anderson, 1988: 102). In particular, '[F]or Freire, the key to *concienización* is the uprooting of the oppressor's image of the oppressed (as lazy, stupid, deserving of their lot) that the oppressed have internalized. [In this sense], Christian evangelization is one vehicle for transforming the self-image of the oppressed' (Anderson, 1988: 103).

Before the arrival of bishop Dammert in Cajamarca, the Church was poised to maintain the status quo of elite rule rather than to protect the interests of marginalised peasants. Poor people wearing *ponchos*, *llanques* and *sombreros* were not often allowed to enter the church, and if so, only to occupy the back seats.[137] Peasants even feared facing priests directly and were almost always discriminated against. The divine words, the Bible, were read exclusively by the minority literate and urban rich. In the experience of poor peasants, the Church existed for administering official ceremonies, such as baptisms or weddings. Bishop Dammert, a professor of canon law, was named as the assistant bishop (*Obispo auxiliar*) of Lima in 1958. One example of his involvement with the poor and social problems was the creation of the *Semana Social* (Social Week) in Lima in 1959, which was the church's response to massive social change within the country (Knecht, 2005: 40). Around this time, he criticised the Church's insulation from social issues and argued for its role in promoting social justice in order to practice God's words, i.e. every individual is equal to God. On arrival in Cajamarca, structural injustice was at the root of his historical understanding of rural conditions. To put it another way, peasants who comprised a majority of the population were discriminated against in favour of the urban, rich minority. In addition, the Church existed in order to maintain the latter's privileges or to share in them, exploiting and marginalising the former.

Based on this interpretation and the concept of *concientización* and inculturation, Dammert's plan in Cajamarca prioritised 'evangelisation, in the form of the Church incarnated in Christian communities, through the poor, and in the formation of pastoral lay people' (Knecht, 2005: 51). During the thirty years of his term as bishop (1962-1992), the peasantry's consciousness and social position changed relative to the past. Part of the reason is due to 're-evangelisation' and the activities of *catequistas*. Re-evangelisation signifies 'a re-education of faith', by raising the 'religious and social consciousness of the peasantry', (Knecht, 2005: 52). In other words, rather than leaving them in a state of 'oppression, marginalisation and discrimination', it promotes the consciousness of the peasantry on their own capacity to change the unjust status quo, not remaining as inferior social position (Knecht, 2005: 52). In order to carry out these religious as well as social functions, bishop Dammert emphasised the importance of the role of lay people, i.e. to educate and specialise '*catequistas*'. After taking short religious courses organised by priests, local peasants were titled as *catequistas* with a mission to disseminate what they learned from the courses to neighbours in their village in order to construct a 'Christian community' and to conduct religious ceremonies. These *catequistas* also came to take up leadership roles in organising poor peasants. Many *catequistas* later assumed important responsibilities in *rondas campesinas*, although the relationship between *rondas* and *catequistas* varied (Gitlitz, 1986 cited in Anon.: 28-29). Bishop Dammert supported the nightwatch patrols since he considered this peasant organisation capable of sowing the seed of grassroots democracy and playing a role in protecting the region from the spread of the Shining Path (Gitliz 1986 cited in Anon.: 28-29). Obviously, these socially-oriented peasant-based evangelical activities brought an onslaught of criticism from the urban population, sometimes denouncing priests and *catequistas* as communists, which has been repeated in comments about the involvement of priests in mobilisations against mining activities since the 1990s.

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[137] *Poncho*, an outer clothing, *llanques*, rustic sandals, and *sombreros*, wide-brimmed traditional hat, represent a typical appearance of local peasants.

As will be seen later, this historical layer of social relations in rural Cajamarca constitutes a fundamental part of socio-environmental struggles against MYSA's mineral extraction since the 1990s. As argued in Chapter 2, the local/place is not the 'other' of global/ space. Based on a relational geographical understanding, 'a progressive sense of place' is a particular articulation of diverse social relations at different scales. In addition, what distinguishes a place from another is 'the accumulated history of a place' over which the tissue of social texture has thickened through 'different sets of linkages both local to the wider world' (Massey, 1993: 68). If you look at the history of this part of the rural highlands from an essentialist geographical approach, *campesinos* would be regarded as the victims of the powers of capital and the highly centralised government in Lima. Their protests tend to be interpreted as 'fragmented' or 'the last gasp of reactions' for their mere subsistence. However, there has been a constant political activism by rural subjectivities: sometimes by taking advantage of the rural political vacuum left by the central administration, patron-client relationships, banditry; by being engaged with political parties and peasant unions; organising grassroots nightwatch patrols; and raising political consciousness promoted by progressive pastoral activities. This accumulation of social relations of political activism has sometimes been imbued with complex power relations, such as political factionalism and rivalry, and gained political legitimacy among the peasantry. However, this particular articulation of social texture has made Cajamarca distinguishable and these social relations *per se* has formed an integral part of the re-formulated subjectivity of the current activism against mining operations in the region. Accordingly, rather than reactionary anti-mining protests of ignorant *serranos* (highlanders), in the view from successive Peruvian governments, or 'new' peasant environmentalism, as many NSM theorists would argue, the nature and dynamics of the opposition to mining activities can be better interpreted by understanding this particularity of rural Cajamarca built up through historical social texture. However, it is noteworthy that the social relations are not smoothly articulated without contradictions and negotiations. Indeed, the arrival of multinational capital in the region has further complicated the power relations among the local authorities and the population, which the time-space compression of neoliberal globalisation based on materialism and essentialist geographical approach has omitted, as argued in Chapter 2. In this sense, before looking at 'the relational content' of the networked resistance of social protests against mining activities since the 1990s, the next section will examine the 'power-geometry' of MYSA's new mineral extraction in Cajamarca (Massey, 2005: 93).

5.2. MYSA and Changing Landscape of Cajamarca

Minera Yanacocha S.A. (MYSA) since 1993

The city of Cajamarca has a historical significance, in which conquistador Francisco Pizarro invaded and captured Inca Atahualpa in 1532. After receiving a large amount of gold and silver as ransom, the Spanish colonisers did not liberate the Inca but instead executed him (Indacochea et al., 2001: 55). It forms a constant reminder of gold exploitation by external colonisers. Historically, mining in Peru was centred predominantly in the country's central highlands and the south, while there has been no history of large-scale mining exploitation in Cajamarca; the main centre of activity since colonial times being small-scale gold and silver mines in Hualgayoc province.[138] However, over recent decades Peruvian mineral extraction has expanded to previously un- and under-developed areas, such as the northern coast and the Amazonian jungle, the result of policies promoting investments in mega-mining projects throughout the country since the 1990s. In Cajamarca, *Minera Yanacocha S.A.* (MYSA), as part of the 'new extraction', commenced exploitation in 1993, with finance emanating from the International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank (5 per cent); the US-based Newmont Mining (32.3 per cent); the Peruvian Compañía Minera Buenaventura (32.3 per cent); Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minieres (BRGM, 24.7 per cent, a French government–owned company).[139] Today the shares are controlled by the Newmont mining corporation (51.35 per cent), Buenaventura (43.65 per cent) and IFC (5 per cent). Behind this changing composition of the company's portfolio, there has been a long process of legal conflicts between two companies – Newmont and the BRGM – including accusations of corruption and diplomatic lobbying by the US and French governments.[140]

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[138] For more on silver mines in Hualgayoc, see O'Phelan (2013).

The contribution of Cajamarca to national mineral production is largely due to gold extraction. According to de Echave and Diez, Cajamarca represents 31.62 per cent of national gold production and MYSA produces 79.6 per cent of the nation's gold, followed by Gold Fields (10.28 per cent) and Minera La Zanja (8.43 per cent) (2013: 26). In 2000, MYSA became a 'leading gold producer' in Latin America (an annual production of 1.8 million ounces) at the lowest cost (Bury, 2004: 81). MYSA has developed a series of open pit mega mining projects since the 1990s: Carachugo (1993), Maqui Maqui (1994), San José (1996), Yanacocha (1997) and La Quinua (2001). The area directly affected by these sites includes 32 hamlets where local peasants are dedicated to livestock rearing and small-scale agriculture, such as potato, wheat and corn (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 82). MYSA operations are largely located in three districts of Cajamarca province: La Encañada, Baños de Inca and Cajamarca. Alongside the Yanacocha complex, there are other mining projects. For example, La Encañada included Michiquillay project by Anglo American mining company and the Galeno project involving Chinese capital (Lumina Cooper). In Chota province, there is a US$100 million La Granja copper project by Río Tinto Minera Perú. The Tantahuatay (Coimolache S.A. mining company: Buenaventura [40.1. per cent]; Southern [44.2 per cent]; Espro S.A.C. [15.7 per cent]), Cerro Corona (Gold Fields La Cima) and La Zanja projects (Buenaventura [53.06 per cent] and Newmont mining [46.94 per cent]) are located in Santa Cruz province. The province of Cajabamba is the site of the Shahuindo operation (Sulliden Shahuindo S.A.C.), among others. As a result, mining concessions in Cajamarca have increased progressively (despite a few years of decreasing rates in the early 2000s) to occupy 1,576,489.4 ha. (47.32 per cent of the departmental territory) in 2011, largely concentrated in the department's central and southern provinces (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 29-30).[141] Due to these mining concessions, the economic structure has changed in Cajamarca: the proportion of the EAP (economically active population) employed in agriculture, hunting and forestry has declined from 42 per cent in 1990 to 20.1 per cent in 2010, while that of mining has increased from 5.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent during the same period, when it became the main economic activity (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 24-5).

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[139] As Bury noted: 'the Yanacocha project was the first large foreign investment in Peruvian mining since 1976' (Bury, 2004: 80).

[140] Legal disputes started in 1994 when the French government decided to sell its shares in a series of privatisation plans, arguably without consent from other shareholders. The BRGM and Newmont mining entered into legal conflicts and the Peruvian Supreme Court adjudicated in favour of the latter in 1998. It has been argued that there was pressure from the Peruvian spymaster, Vladimiro Montesinos, in the final decision. It was exposed in the so-called '*Vladivideos*', which were secretly recorded in Montesinos's SIN office. After having dragged on for seven years in Peruvian lower and supreme courts, as well as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), this was finally concluded in October 2000 with an additional compensation of US$80 million to the BRGM. For additional information on these issues, see Seifert (2003).

'Power-Geometry' of MYSA's Mineral Extraction

Over the last two decades varying segments of *cajamarquinos* both in the city and the countryside have had distinct experiences with the presence of a 'new neighbour', generating different responses by diverse local actors. This section will examine this 'power-geometry' of MYSA's mining activities in arguing for the 'messiness' of the relationship rather than a bifurcated power-geographical framework. First, the mining sector has been criticised for creating an 'enclave' economy with no (or fewer) forward and backward linkages to other economic sectors and thus without exercising a great influence on local development. In this sense, linkage effects are crucial in determining if a mining operation has had a positive impact on local socio-economic conditions or alternatively have produced an 'enclave' (see Hirschman, 1958). Advocates for mineral extraction argue that such investments can generate a backward linkage by employing local people, in addition to purchasing local supplies and services. While high standards are required for formal employment in the 'modern' mining industry, local employment opportunities are normally limited to a qualified labour stock with unskilled workers being temporarily hired at the initial stage, e.g., in the construction of road infrastructure. Also, most local labourers tend to be employed indirectly via sub-contracting ('*contratista*') companies.[142] Moreover, working conditions here tend to be precarious, especially since being temporarily and indirectly employed means that it is hard to organise trade unions. Precarious working conditions have been continuously denounced. In particular, ex-workers of MYSA have complained of health problems and have demanded appropriate compensation. For example, in October 2009, more than 30 ex-workers for MYSA went to Lima, demanding legal justice, which they argued was hard to find in Cajamarca. They claimed that they were fired from the company without notice as they had been found ill. Their illness, according to them, was a product of precarious working condition and abuses from MYSA. In addition, the mining company did not report labour accidents in working place. [143] While mining companies purchased almost 66 per cent of goods and services from other regions, mainly in Lima, only 7 per cent – particularly services - was obtained locally (Avila et al., 2011: 175). Consequently, while a minority of local people benefited from MYSA's linkage effects via employment and providing products and services to MYSA, many *cajamarquinos* were dissatisfied with mining activities: after initial high expectations of better living conditions, once a concession in operation their hopes frequently became frustrated. In other words, this disproportionate distribution of benefits was obvious inside the city as well as different ecological zones of rural areas and generated different responses among the local population, depending on how they were located within the power-geometry of MYSA's mineral extraction, despite mostly having expressed discontents. This is a relevant aspect for a better understanding of the complex dynamics of rural activism by overcoming the simplified framework of exploitation of global capital and resistance of local communities. Simultaneously, understanding this power-geometry is important in that while it generates different experiences with neoliberal mineral extraction, it also provids a ground for unity among diverse actors.[144]

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[141] The proportion of mining concessions in some provinces (such as San Pablo and Hualgayoc) have reached more than 90 per cent of their territory while other provinces (such as Jaén and San Ignacio in the department's north) have less than 30 per cent of their territory under concession. For additional data on the proportion of mining concessions of each province, see de Echave and Diez (2013: 32-46).

[142] According to Avila et al., less than one per cent of employees were directly contracted by the mining companies; almost 45 per cent of employed workers were from other regions, while only 20 per cent were locally employed in 2008 (2011: 176).

Its geographical closeness to the MYSA open pit mines has caused changing living conditions in the city of Cajamarca. While there has been a rise in criminal rates and prostitution, increasing housing rents, along with the cost of living, certain segments of the urban population, such as those involved in commercial activities, including hotels, restaurants or shops, benefited due to the immigration of mine workers from other regions or from outside the country. Furthermore, as Steel (2013) demonstrates, the inflow of national and international professionals into the city represents a stark contrast of living conditions, representing rising inequality. For example, international experts who occupy high positions in a mining company mostly inhabit a residential zone of Baños del Inca, where property prices have risen to the extent that local people find it difficult to afford them (Steel, 2013: 242). Alongside this affluent residential area, the children of these 'new mining elites' have better access to high quality education, e.g., the Davy College, in which classes are provided in English and the fee amounts to approximately US$ 500 a month (Steel, 2013: 242). In the meantime, as Meléndez points out, gains from MYSA activity are also unequally distributed in the rural areas. Peasants who live in the higher ecological zone (*jalca*) benefited from mining activities to a certain degree.[145] While prior to the arrival of the company they could barely make ends meet and operated a precarious small-scale agriculture, the social programmes and micro-finance projects launched by the mining company sometimes benefit them, alongside the possibility to sell their small parcel of land. Accordingly, this section of *campesinos* is in favour of MYSA's presence and takes a pro-Conga position as will be demonstrated later. Meanwhile, agriculturalists inhabiting lower ecological zones are more likely to oppose mining activities due to their concerns about the quality and quantity of water in particular (Meléndez, 2009: 329). In addition, the rise in circulation of mining machinery and trucks is not welcomed by nearby communities, since sometimes their animals are hit and killed or their communal pastures damaged (Meléndez, 2009: 328).

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[143] See '*Ex trabajadores de Minera Yanacocha denuncian que mina los botó enfermos*', *La República*, 27 October 2009.

[144] I will pick up this latter point in the next chapter in explaining the 'maps of grievance' and the construction of political identity in the anti-Conga movement.

In his study on the transformation of local landscape by MYSA's mineral extraction, Bury adopts a 'livelihood' approach and analyses how transnational capital has transformed the availability of resources – produced, human, natural and social capital – which peasant households use to create their livelihood, and often has led to peasant collective actions against mining operations (see also Bebbington, 2004). According to his study, while peasants can get increased 'produced' and 'human' capitals, the availability of natural and social capital has been reduced in the affected areas. Although the impact is not uniform, the access of local communities to produced and human capital has improved via advances in infrastructure (road construction) and MYSA's social programmes (health and education programmes). Meanwhile, in terms of natural resources, such as land and water, competition over access has heightened between multinational capital and local peasants. When it comes to land, for example, MYSA has faced protests during the process of land sales. Bury argues, '[N]ew "mega" mining projects have become some of the largest and most influential landowners and agents of change in the region' (2002: 4). MYSA's operation has transformed access to land resources in three areas: prices; tenure structure; and the pattern of use (Bury, 2005). The company's purchase of large areas of land has not only raised prices, but also changed the value of land-use by favouring or prioritising the function of land for mining over other activities, i.e. the 'revalorization' of land-use (Bury, 2005: 231). The presence of transnational capital has also initiated the land-titling process, resulting in a change in the tenure structure. As seen in the previous chapter, Peru entered into the land-titling process under Fujimori. When MYSA intended to purchase land in rural Cajamarca, the tenure structure, particularly in the countryside, was not well institutionalised and it was MYSA which took the initiative of demarcating private land ownership for its operations. As Bury puts it, 'in rural Cajamarca, where the neoliberal land-titling initiatives of the state were virtually nonexistent in the early 1990s, MYSA became the *de facto* agent of land-tenure change because the mine needed to clarify the legal ownership of lands where it planned to commence operations' (2005:231). However, the land-titling process has been slow, similar to the agrarian reform period in Cajamarca. As mentioned, the mining operation largely occupies the '*jalca*' ecological zone. Consequently, local peasants are forced to move to lower ecological zones or the city after selling their land (Bury, 2005: 234). After land sales, these people have often joined the informal sector on the outskirts of the city, becoming street vendors or day labourers (Steel, 2013: 241). Simultaneously, MYSA's operation via cyanide heap leaching methods requires large quantity of water and its use of toxic chemicals (such as cyanide) has raised concerns for water contamination.[146] As will be shown later, in various episodes of collective actions in the region, water provision and security have become a principal concern among local population related to mining activities.

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[145] Bury explains that economic activities are vertically distributed according to ecological zones in the affected areas: '*quechua* – 2400 – 2700 m' (above the sea level); '*lader*a – 2700 – 3500 m'; and '*jalca* -3500 – 4200 m'. He continues to illustrate that 'generally, *jalca* zone of production, where mineral extraction is normally conducted, is utilized by households for seasonal grazing activities' (2005: 233).

In addition to insufficient linkage effects and unequal impacts of mineral extraction on the local population, the distribution of *canon minero* generated from MYSA's mineral extraction has contributed to more complex dynamics of local social and power relations. According to research conducted by de Echave and Diez, the transfer of *canon minero* and royalty to Cajamarca has increased by 736 per cent from almost S/. 66.4 million (2003) to S/.

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[146] MYSA's mines are open-pit where cyanide heap leaching method is used. MYSA's operations resulted in changes in water diversions and land configuration in the region (see Deza, 2002).

555 million (2011) (2013: 55).[147] Despite the distribution of an impressive fiscal bonanza, several limitations in its allocation and use are evident vis-à-vis sustainable regional and local development in the longer term. First, *canon* and royalty is unequally distributed with a preference for the provinces and districts where extraction takes place (See Table 2 and Chart 1). Almost half of the transfer is concentrated in the province of Cajamarca, with most of these fiscal reserves (73.4 per cent) being distributed in three districts (Cajamarca, Baños del Inca and La Encañada). This unequal allocation of fiscal reserves does not match the map of poverty in the region. For example, the province of Celendín has the highest incidence of absolute poverty in the region, with a low level of human development, but it received only 3.8 per cent of the *canon* and royalty transferred between 2003 and 2011. Celendín is not the province where mining extraction is mainly located. Second, the distributed *canon* and royalty is exclusively used to invest in limited range of projects, such as infrastructure construction. Between 2004 and 2011 regional government invested more than 97 per cent of the *canon* and royalty in health, sanitation, energy and transportation (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 63-64).[148] However, as de Echave and Diez note, the proportion of investment in sectors such as agriculture, livestock, as well as environmental administration, was relatively small: during the same period, investment in the former two occupied 7.4 per cent on average and in the latter 2.7 per cent (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 64-65). Considering that agriculture and livestock rearing are important in terms of regional production and employment and environmental issues are the main concern of local population, the effectiveness of the implementation of fiscal bonanza can be limited to reduce regional poverty and to quell social conflicts, which is the main argument of the regime in Lima for mineral extraction and the distribution of fiscal revenues to sub-national governments.

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[147] While the *canon* was composed of 94 per cent of the transferred amount, only 6 per cent was distributed via mining royalty in Cajamarca (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 55).

[148] With an asymmetrical focus on building up infrastructures, investments have been made exclusively in projects such as the construction of regional hospital, of urban potable water and sewage system, of infrastructure of rural electricity, road construction, as well as building of education centres (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 64).

Table 2. Distribution of *Canon* and Royalty to the Provincial Governments and the Conditions of Poverty in Provinces of Cajamarca

Province	**Transfer of Canon and Royalty (2003 – 2011) (millions of soles)**	**(%)**	**Incidence of Absolute Poverty (%) in 2007**	**Human Development Indicator (2007)**	**Ranking (2007)**
Cajamarca	1,068.414	46.5	47.5	0.58	84
Hualgayoc	158.457	9.0	70.3	0.53	165
Chota	165.125	7.4	64.5	0.55	138
Jaén	156.291	7.1	47.8	0.59	72
Cutervo	144.269	6.5	70.7	0.56	130
San Ignacio	116.556	5.3	62.9	0.56	113
Celendín	79.698	3.8	75.1	0.53	169
Santa Cruz	58.723	3.1	61.3	0.57	105
San Miguel	58.162	3.0	64.9	0.56	110
Cajabamba	59.818	2.7	66.8	0.56	128
San Marcos	44.405	2.0	70.2	0.52	178
San Pablo	44.405	1.8	71.3	0.53	174
Contunmazá	39.632	1.8	48.1	0.59	77
The Department	**2,193.953**	**100**		**0.56**	**20**

Source: de Echave and Diez (2013)

Chart 1. The Transfer of Canon and Royalty in Districts of Cajamarca Province



Source: de Echave and Diez (2013)

As a consequence, rather than contributing to regional or local development, monetary transfers or investment projects have become an arena for power struggle among different actors – national government, mining company, as well as local authorities – to gain political legitimacy. The quantity of *canon minero* and royalty have become more important than its administration after being transferred. Faced with the incidence of socio-environmental conflicts increasing to an unprecedented level, the distribution of *canon* and royalty has left the central government some room for lessening social pressure and an opportunity to gain political legitimacy by investing in social programmes and introducing an institution favourable to partial participation. While it can provide a seemingly fair justification for 'development with social inclusion', a responsible management of those fiscal reserves only falls on regional and local authorities, while blaming the latter's administrative inability and inefficiency when faced with criticism on mismanagement.

Alongside the government's distribution of *canon,* MYSA has become an important local power through its engagement in social provision, as well as relations among the local population. For these aims, the company has adopted two tactics: distribution and division. The former is associated with MYSA's CSR programmes.[149] MYSA has invested considerable sums in community development programmes in coordination with the company-supported NGO, ALAC (*Asociación Los Andes de Cajamarca*).[150] In 2008, the Conga Project Team (organised by Newmont Mining Company) devised a 'sustainable local development' in collaboration with ALAC and set up a '2015 Community Vision' after identifying problems and demands from 32 communities within the project's area of influence. This focused on fixed targets in four specific areas: 'community-wide empowerment'; 'health and education'; 'productivity and earning power of farmers'; and 'critical infrastructure'.[151] To complement this original plan, Newmont has set out details for the additional provision of funds for local communities within the Conga project's direct and indirect area of influence. Another company tactic is to deepen divisions between the proponents and opponents of mining activities. In a similar vein, MYSA's limited approach to the 'area of influence' has generated fissures within nearby communities and others. This 'divide and rule' approach is carried out by constructing a so-called '*cordón social de seguridad*' ('social belt of security'). According to Vásquez, this strategy was designed by the North Group (*Grupo Norte*) several years ago and aims to support sections of the population who back mining activities, thus ensuring that these communities become defenders of the mining company.[152] This is advantageous to the corporation since it is likely to avoid direct confrontation with opponents by generating conflicts among local populations.[153] Through these measures, the mining company can argue that the mining project is supported by local communities, ensuring a 'social licence' for carrying it out. During my fieldwork in Cajamarca, I observed this 'social belt of security' strategy via my participant observation. Efforts to attend a march to the lakes (a local collective action against MYSA's Conga mining project) with a group of members of SUTEP on World Water Day, 22 March 2012, failed when members of the pro-Conga community blocked our access to the road to the lake sites. We tried other accesses, but in vain (see Photo 3).[154]

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[149] According to Triscritti, 'Newmont is signatory to several Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, such as the UN Global Compact (2004), International Council of Mining and Metals (2001), the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2002)' (2013: 446-7).

[150] ALAC is 'a corporate organization that emerges as part of social responsibility to promote Yanacocha sustainable human development' (Social Development sheet of Conga, Newmont Mining Corporation), available at http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/u87/Conga%20Project%20Social%20Development%20Fact%20Sheet-010512.pdf. According to Gilfford and Kestler, ALAC 'supported primarily small business development projects' in the region, and 'its administration and financing were almost completely reliant on Yanacocha' (2008: 348).

[151] For more details, see the Newmont Mining Corporation's fact sheet of on the social development of Conga. Available at http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/u87/Conga%20Project%20Social%20Development%20Fact%20Sheet-010512.pdf.

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[152] *Grupo Norte* is a corporate-sponsored NGO led by Peruvian Buenaventura mining corporation.

[153] Mirtha Vásquez , '*Vista Alegre y las estrategias de las empresas mineras*' (*Voces* No. 23 October 2009).

[154] I took the photo inside the *combi*, a local minibus which was rented by the SUTEP organisers in the city of Cajamarca. It was quite hard to take more pictures due to the tension between the two sides afterwards. When my informant called me that he and his *compañeros* from Celendín had already arrived at the lake site, I did not expect this obstacle. My conversation with people who were in the *combi*, suggested that those who blocked the passage were probably not community *campesinos* since their clothing was not representative of local *comuneros*. According to them, they were '*personas vendidas o compradas*' ('sold or paid people'), meaning that *comuneros* who supported MYSA due to the company's provision of material benefits or simply people who were paid by MYSA to block access to the mine sites. Despite the credibility of this information, it was obvious that there were a lot of tensions every time people mobilised and attempted their march to lake sites, implying different interests and power relations over MYSA's mineral extraction. After several more attempts, we only turned on local radio on the road back to the city and listened to what participants said in the march.

Photo 3.



Photo: taken by the author in Cajamarca, 22 March 2012.

Meanwhile, since the arrival of MYSA in Cajamarca, the local political landscape has been closely related to mining operations and fiscal resources generated from them. The investment opportunities offered by the transferred *canon* and royalty, as well as those provided by MYSA, are also indispensable for local authorities, as it has proved to accumulate political stock among the local electorate within a 'fractured' political context. One of the main local politicians is Luis Guerrero, a political outsider, who was elected as a provincial mayor of Cajamarca twice (1993-1995 and 1996-1998) with his local political party FIR (*Frente Independiente Regional*, Regional Independent Front).[155] He was also member of Congress (2000-2001 and 2001-2006). He maintained a cooperative position with the Fujimori administration in promoting MYSA's mineral extraction in Cajamarca and became a prominent figure for pro-mining investment. In the meantime, some of local authorities took a rather ambiguous or critical position depending on the dynamics of the political environment or electoral calculations. Faced with rising criticism around MYSA's exploration of Cerro Quilish, Hoyos Rubio, then provincial mayor (FIR), issued the municipal ordinance 012 in 2000, declaring the Cerro Quilish as an intangible zone.[156] In 2002 when regional and local elections were carried out in the decentralisation process, *apristas* won the elections in Cajamarca, having a provincial mayor, Emilio Horna, and regional president, Luis Pita. Although APRA kept a friendly relationship with MYSA, local authorities sometimes took an ambiguous position. When faced with a strong opposition against Cerro Quilish in 2004, Emilio Horna himself called a provincial strike on 15 September 2004 against the exploration of Cerro Quilish (Meléndez, 2009: 361- 362).

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[155] Before the decentralisation in 2002, the electoral post of regional president did not exist and mayors of provincial municipalities were important local administrative position.

Cajamarquinos have experienced a varying degree of impacts from MYSA's mining activities. While some people have benefited from social programmes implemented by MYSA or via *canon* distribution, most have been left with unfulfilled expectations of employment opportunities and little impact on local economic dynamism. Additionally, those limitations surrounding the allocation and management of *canon* and royalty help fuel dissatisfaction among local communities vis-à-vis mining activities, a scenario that is particularly the case with MYSA in Cajamarca. Furthermore, it has become a complex terrain for power struggles among different social and political actors, a local dynamism which is very different from what proponents of mineral extraction argue for: i.e. 'development with social inclusion'. Echoing the national political landscape, local electoral campaigns, as well as political discourse, have become increasingly dominated by mineral extraction, as political and social leaders compete to gain political legitimacy among local electorates. Simultaneously, Cajamarca has become one of the most conflictive regions with protests against MYSA's mining operations, with particular concerns about their social and environmental impacts, to which the next section turns.

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[156] Mobilisations in defence of Cerro Quilish will be examined in the next section.

5.3. MYSA's Mineral Extraction: an Area for Contention

Conflict over Land: MYSA's Initial Contact with Local Communities

MYSA began its activities by purchasing land from 41 local peasant families (covering 4,068.95 hectares) in the province of Cajamarca between 1992 and 1996 (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 22). These initial contacts manifested an outstanding power asymmetry between the local population and multinational capital, in the context of national regulations on land which favour mining capital, a problem compounded by the lack of state capacity in coordinating different interests. Land which the mining company purchased was used mainly as pasture by local smallholders. They were initially sold at price between S/. 100 and s/. 140 per hectare, although some families received a slightly better price. Many households in the affected area were illiterate and not well aware of the land titling process. When peasants proved reluctant to sell their lands, the mining company sometimes engaged in intimidation, using Peruvian law to pressure those resistant to selling.[157] Although local families appealed to various local authorities protecting them from the unjust process of land sales and denouncing intimidation made from the mining company, they received no redress.

Alongside the power asymmetry unfavourable for peasant families, it was evident that they lacked organisation in order to articulate effectively their own demands before the state, particularly due to the intensified stratification and fragmentation of the peasantry after the agrarian reform. Despite the successful experience of nightwatch patrols in the region, they went through a period of crisis in the late 1980s and 1990s as internal divisions undermined their cohesion. In some cases, local irrigation committees (*las juntas de regantes*) played a role as base organisations in the areas affected by mining activities, but also lacked articulation with other social actors (de Echave et al., 2009a: 81). In parallel with weak organisations, local peasants possessed different interests and demands when faced with precarious living conditions: some were attracted by rosy promises from the mining company relating to permanent job offers, free education for their children, social security, and road construction, among others (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 25).

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[157] With regard to land sales, '*Ley de Tierra*' (Law No. 26505) states that when surface land is private property, mining investors have two alternatives: to reach an agreement with the landholder or to demand an acquisition process, an option favourable to the mining company (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 32).

Against this backdrop, the Catholic Church finally intervened in the dispute. This intervention resulted in promises of additional compensation and the creation of a development fund for affected families from the part of MYSA. Conflicts over land thus appeared to be settled due to the mediation of the Church, assisted by local NGOs, although the underlying causes of the problem remained unresolved.[158] In consequence, the initial encounter between villagers and the mining company generated social conflicts over land in which demands of the rural population were rather limited to pressing for fairer treatment and more benefits from the company. However, this settlement of disputes over land did not mean the end of the problem. Rather, it represented the start of an accumulation of discontent fuelled by the spread of a negative perception of mining activities among many smallholders. This growing sentiment, when allied with the fact that the transnational did not establish a good initial relationship with local denizens, signified that it had to proceed with its mining activities in an increasingly tense social atmosphere, a situation exacerbated by the near absence of state regulations on mineral extraction, including land sales, a fair justice system, a dispute settlement system and environmental consequences, which have become the main points of ‘grievance’ for local populations.

Mercury Spill: Raised Awareness of Environmental Issues

On 2 June 2000, a truck which was transporting mercury turned over near the small settlement of Choropampa, spilling 151kg of mercury on the highway between Cajamarca-Pacasmayo (leading to Lima). MYSA initially rejected any responsibility for the incident, attributing the blame on the subcontractor, the transportation company RANSA. This stance and delay in responding adequately by both the company and government only deepened the damage to their reputation by intoxicating more local people. The problem was that the state had little safety control over the transportation of risky chemicals, nor the capacity of supervision and meaningful prosecution to ensure that the company adopted responsibility for the accident. Rather, both government and company avoided their duty for investigating the spillage, a position that acted to markedly intensify distrust and concern among local people.

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[158] Additional data on the conflict mediation process and the role of the Church and the National Coordinator for Human Rights (*Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos*, CNDDHH) can be found in Arana (2002); Leyva and Jahncke (2002); Lingán (2008).

In the eye of the population involved, instead of defending the rights of its own citizens, the state appeared to take sides with the transnational. The population in the affected districts and beyond also lost confidence in the viability of socially and environmentally responsible mining, a message the company had always been keen to promote. Rather the accident confirmed a belief that the pursuit of economic benefits was strongly prioritised over environmental questions. The MYSA initially arrived in the region arguing that its activities would not affect the environment because they would employ modern technology to manage risky materials and wastes. However, this accident raised an environmental awareness among the populace both in rural and urban areas, to the extent that many questioned the company's presence *per se* in the region. Environmentalists and local NGOs, such as Ecovida and Adea, played an important role in raising environmental awareness. Since the late 1990s, NGOs and civil society organisations which work on human rights and environmental issues have gained an important presence in the political arena, establishing national and international networks. Meléndez (2009) has called the rise of active environmentalist organisations an 'informative boom' as they worked to provide information to the public as well as proffering legal and technical advice. Popular awareness was also significantly enhanced with the release of a powerful documentary that was shown in town and villages across the region and beyond.[159] Particularly in the face of asymmetrical power and lack of organisations, negotiation between MYSA and the affected communities was only limited to debates over how much the compensation should be or how to distribute it; questions surrounding the necessity of an investigation into the impact on the health of the population in the affected area were largely ignored. This unsatisfactory situation contributed to recurrent protests in the affected communities: more than a decade since the accident, when protests against the Conga project were at their highest, inhabitants of Choropampa and adjacent communities actively sympathised with the mobilisation. Memories of the environmental and health damage, along with the unfair treatment at the hands of MYSA and the Peruvian state remain strong.

Accusations over Water Contamination in Bambamarca and Cajamarca

Negative perceptions and direct experiences caused by the mining activities have sometimes prompted panic and overreacted responses from local populations vis-à-vis environmental issues, particularly controversy relating to water contamination. In March 2001, *rondas campesinas* from the town of Bambamarca initiated protests and a road blockage, cutting communication between Cajamarca and Bambamarca for one week. *Campesinos* accused MYSA of causing the death of numerous trout which groups of women raised in the local fishery. In the mediation process, the mining company left the dialogue roundtable when faced with a long list of demands from local people, even though MYSA argued that no ‘scientific’ evidence attributed its mining operation to the accident. To the company and some specialists, the death of trout can have many reasons, such as climate change, or the application of agrochemicals, since fish are highly sensible even to minor changes. They argued that no verifiable evidence existed to relate the trout death to mining. To local peasants in Bambamarca (a province where many accusations over contamination from mining have emanated in the past), however, environmental damage is a very sensitive issue. MYSA’s insinuation of innocence was not believed.

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[159] For detailed information, see the documentary, 'Choropampa: The price of gold' (Guarango, 2002).

Similarly, in the city of Cajamarca, rumours about the existence of solid mercury in the domestic water pipeline of several houses circulated around the city on 25 September, 2001. This soon terrified citizens, who took to the streets in large numbers. Violent protests erupted including an attempt to set fire to the MYSA office in the city and that of the public water company of Cajamarca (SEDACAJ). This protest was initiated by rumours which lacked concrete evidence, but blame was attached the mining company, even though some scientists argued that in most circumstances mercury cannot be found in the pipeline due to the principle of gravity. The episode illustrates the high level of public concern about possible environmental contamination, concerns that could quickly prompt spontaneous and massive responses protesting against the very presence of MYSA. Street disorders were also encouraged due to a widespread lack of trust in the state and a perception that it always acted in favour of the extractive multinationals.

Cerro Quilish: the Massive Mobilisations in Defence of Water

On 5 October 2000, the municipal ordinance 012-2000 was published with the support of the mayor of Cajamarca, Jorge Hoyos Rubio. The ordinance declared the Cerro Quilish (Quilish mountain) a protected area. In response, MYSA entered into a process of legal proceedings aimed at gaining access to exploit this site, which also happened to be a key source of domestic water for the city. Although the mining company could not win the law suits against this ordinance in the regional court, the constitutional tribunal in Lima made a rather ambiguous adjudication: while it recognised the legality of the municipal government to establish a protected natural area, it prioritised the right of the concession given to the company by the central government before the ordinance was proclaimed, and simultaneously recommended that MYSA conduct an evaluation of environmental impacts. The situation tensed when the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM) announced the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) results and gave the company authorisation for exploration on 16 July 2004 (via resolution 361-2004-MEM). MYSA consequently attempted to proceed with exploration in the Quilish mountain area against a backdrop of rising popular discontent at the decision. During August, local peasants in the affected area (organised around irrigation base groups) urged the public authorities to intervene to stop drilling and demanded the removal of excavation machinery from the area. However, attempts at dialogue initiated by a local authority (*prefecto de Cajamarca*) proved frustrated when the authorities did not attend the second meeting scheduled on 26 August. In response, peasant leaders in the Quilish areas agreed to implement collective action measures, scheduled for 2 September.

On the first day of the protest, almost two thousands smallholders from the affected areas occupied the MYSA's exploration site and instigated a road blockage of Cajamarca-Bambamarca in defence of Cerro Quilish and clean water provision.[160] Tens of protestors were left injured and detained in a confrontation with the police and private security forces hired by the company. On the second day, the protests extended to the city of Cajamarca as urban residents took to the streets, including students. On 8 September, a regional strike occurred against the exploration on Cerro Quilish. Shortly afterwards, the Civil Unitary Committee in Defence of Life and Environment in Cajamarca (*el Comité Cívico Unitario para la Defensa de la Vida y del Medio Ambiente en Cajamarca*) were formed, representing many civil organisations involved in the protests. Although dialogue and negotiations were attempted by leaders of the *frente de defensa* (front of defence) and of GRUFIDES, including Marco Arana, between 10-15 September, an agreement proved difficult to strike. The conflict consequently extended to a regional level, the central demand being the cancellation of exploration at Cerro Quilish. The '*Comando de Lucha*' (Movement Command) was established to coordinate activities between the Civil Unity committee, student federations, Teachers' and labour unions, calling for another regional strike scheduled for 15 September.

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[160] For a detailed chronology of the conflicts over Cerro Quillish, see Lingán (2008); de Echave et al. (2009a); Meléndez (2009).

It is estimated that almost 40,000 people participated in this mobilisation from all 13 provinces of Cajamarca, making it one of the largest demonstrations in the history of the department. In the end, these protests in defence of Cerro Quilish halted the exploration plan, as the MINEM released another resolution (427-2004-MEM/AAM) on 16 September, which invalidated the previous resolution (de Echave et al., 2009a: 90-92).

The main issue behind the protest was that local people perceived the Cerro Quilish as the origin of their water supply and that it would be contaminated by MYSA's operation. As Grompone explains, those who opposed mining on Cerro Quilish considered it a *'colchón acuífero'* ('water cushion area'), i.e. a special location for absorbing precipitation and storing water resources, indispensible for the well-being of the local population (2009: 24). Additionally, a severe drought in that year raised concerns of water shortage among peasants living adjacent to Cerro Quilish. The mining company, on the other hand, had a strong incentive for continuing with its exploration plan since the gold price on the international market had soared. According to MYSA's calculations, the costs of social conflicts could be offset by enhanced economic profits, which would also strengthen the Peruvian government's support for mining investors. However, after having accumulated a list of accusations over social and environmental impacts of mineral extraction, as well as unfair treatment by both political authorities and multinational capital, protests of large scale, at a departmental level, could achieve to put an end to the exploration plan. This was one of the largest expressions of the local population against MYSA's mining operations.

Combayo in La Encañada: Unfulfilled Promises and Ad-hoc Agreement

La Encañada, one of twelve districts in the province of Cajamarca where Yanacocha's mining complex is located, is composed of 105 villages (*centros poblados*, *CPs*). As expected, there is a long list of social conflicts in this district and La Encañada comprises one of three districts where the Conga mining project is sited (see Chapter 6). The protests during August and September 2006 are one example. In June 2005, when denizens of CP Combayo became aware that the Technical Administration of Irrigation District of Cajamarca (the *Administración Técnica del Distrito del Riego de Cajamarca,* ATDR) had given permission for the construction of El Azufre dam (part of the extension plan of MYSA's Carachugo II project, via resolutions No. 087 and 098–2005–GR–CAJ / DRA–ATDRC), they mobilised for the cancellation of those resolutions and of the construction of the dam, voicing key concerns regarding the quantity and quality of water to be affected by the mining operation.[161] Issues raised by the protests appeared to have been negotiated when the company agreed to invest US$ 1.5 million in development projects and the creation a commission to monitor the quantity and quality of water. In addition, demands for employment and infrastructure work for the community were considered (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 85). Through these promises, the conflict seemed to subside for a time. However, more than 500 denizens from the hamlets of Bellavista Alta, Bellavista Baja, El Triunfo, El Porvenir, Pabellón de Combayo, Apalín y San Luis marched to the area where the Carachugo II project was planned on 2 August 2006. In the ensuing confrontation with the police, one local peasant, Isidro Llanos Echevarría, was shot dead and many left wounded. In response, the inhabitants of Combayo undertook a road blockage and captured the installations of MYSA, accusing the company of not meeting the agreements negotiated in 2005. In this action they attained support from some university students and people from nearby communities. Faced with increased protests, MYSA had to announce the suspension of its operation plan, with the excuse of the lack of security for its workers. In the end, the PCM (Premier's Office) in Lima intervened to reconcile the two parties and managed to negotiate a signed agreement (*acta de entendimiento*) on 3 September. According to de Echave and Diez, the agreement included the implementation of a water study conducted by the University of Texas at Austin and a technical team of the Inter-American Development Bank; the employment of local people; priority contracts for local companies; along with infrastructure works for the benefit of local communities, among others (2013: 85).

In sum, the absence of appropriate regulations for mineral extraction and the government's unilateral decision-making favourable to global capital, and the asymmetrical power of global capital turned out to be the main reason for a series of local protests against MYSA's mineral extraction. In line with Harvey's argument, MYSA's neoliberal form of mineral extraction caused ABD among many *cajamarquinos*, particularly with concerns about unfair treatment and socio-environmental impacts. Additionally, the lack of articulation and organisation of the 'fragmented' rural population was highlighted with regards to the limited impact of their protests. In other words, the description above can be a representative case of Harvey's explanation of a ‘post-modern movement’ and what Hardt and Negri criticised as place-based local ‘reactionary’ responses: i.e. local resistance of the dispossessed and fragmented subaltern groups vs. the power of global capital. Although this depicts the status quo well, this understanding tends to be limited to economic reductionism and a dualistic framework of geography and power, not opening up space for political imaginaries of subaltern subjectivities, as I argued in Chapter 2. In order to uncover the political possibilities of rural subaltern groups, the next section will examine the ‘relational content’ of the resistance against mining-related grievances articulated in Cajamarca, by looking at a loose form of trans-local networks which was constructed through these collective actions, not only by local peasants but also other social groups, such as NGOs and the Church (Massey, 2005: 93). This is also relevant since this loose form of networks became an integral part of the anti-Conga movement, which will be examined more in detail in Chapter 6.

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[161] See Ombudsman's Office monthly report No. 30 and 31; '*Informe especial sobre Combayo: Crónica de un Enfrentamiento Anunciado*', *Voces Cajamarquinas*, No. 3 (September, 2006).

5.4. Contesting Mineral Extraction in Trans-Local Networks

Over more than a decade, actors at local, national, regional or global levels formed local resistance. In other words, social relations at a different scale were articulated through oppositional political activities and created a loose form of trans-local networks. As argued in Chapter 2, when viewing the local-global nexus of resistance as a smooth shift in scale, place-based protests can be understood as being supported by paternalist support of organisations at a greater level due to the powerlessness and fragmentation of local organisations. However, examining the ‘relational content’ of struggles can provide us with a plausible explanation of progressive political acts of resistance and re-articulation of unlike actors around grievances generated by global capital. This aspect will be examined in this section focusing on the network of peasants, Church and NGOs. Since these networks were still in the process of construction, they only maintained a loose form with contradictions and tensions before they were further developed in the anti-Conga movement.

Catholic Church Networks

Although the organisation of ‘fragmented’ peasants was not well developed, the previous pastoral activities under the bishop Dammert left a legacy of raising political consciousness among the peasantry and *catequistas*' activities and in activists and priests defending human rights, which played an important role in mobilisations against MYSA's mining operations.[162] The departure of bishop Dammert in 1992 coincided with the arrival of MYSA in Cajamarca.[163] The principal discourse changed, although some local parishes and their priests maintained the position of the previous bishop.[164] One of the main protagonists is Marco Arana Zegarra, ex-priest of the parish of Cristo Ramos of Porcón. He has been actively involved in mining-related problems in favour of the local population and has sometimes attempted to facilitate a dialogue between local communities and the mining company.[165] He also created an important local human rights and environmental NGO, GRUFIDES (Group of Formation and Intervention for Sustainable Development, *Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible*), with several graduates from the National University of Cajamarca in 2002. Later, he became further involved in mining-related conflicts and took the initiative to create his own political movement, Tierra y Libertad (Land and Freedom) in 2009.[166]

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[162] This represents a general influence of the progressive part of the Church in Latin America. Although there were religious groups who gave tacit consent to repressive regimes, those bishops and priests committed to the cause of social justice worked to defend human rights under military dictatorships and internal political violence in the 1970s and 1980s: e.g. Cardinal Raúl Silva Enrique and his Vicariate of Solidarity under the Pinochet dictatorship; the archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas and his *Tutela Legal* (Legal Advice) in El Salvador (Klaiber, 2009: 412-413). While democratisation subsequently transferred the Church's role as human right defender to non-church organisations, political and social groups, there was a lasting influence as many religious social workers became involved in activities of progressive parties and human rights organisations (Klaiber, 2009: 414).

[163] Under the papacy of John Paul II (1978-2005), conservative bishops, who were critical of liberation theology, were appointed across the region, sometimes resulting in fragmentation and tension within the Church (Klaiber, 2009: 414). Similarly, Luis Cipriani, the Cardinal and Archbishop of Lima since 1999 and a member of Opus Dei, brought a conservative turn in Peru. For example, he took a critical position of the CVR activities to investigate human rights abuses after two decades of unprecedented political violence (Klaiber, 2009: 418).

[164] According to ex-priest Marco Arana, one of the reasons for the failure of the Church's facilitating role in the negotiation process after the mobilisations of the Bambamarca peasants in March 2001 was the different position adopted by local priests and the bishop, which was intensified with the appointment of many Opus Dei bishops after Dammert. In addition, MYSA attempted to control the Church's influence by providing material donations. For example, the *Vicaría de Solidaridad* lost credibility as a facilitator of dialogue among local peasants after its decision to receive funds from MYSA since 2000 (2002: 116-7).

[165] In the case of Combayo in 2006, while the government asked the ex-priest to intervene in the meditation, MYSA did not accept him as a facilitator. When the conflict intensified, an improvised dialogue roundtable was established and finally the Premier's office had to intervene to calm the situation.

[166] Tierra y Libertad presented candidates in regional elections and Arana himself ran for the 2011 presidential elections. Both results were poor. Recently, it was inscribed by the National Electoral Tribunal (JNE, *Jurado*

In the early 1990s, the response of local peasants to MYSA's mining activities was rather unorganised. In the context of weak local representation and organisation of peasant interests, combined with the indifference of local and political authorities, the Church became the main facilitator between the mining company and local families in the process of settling disputes regarding land sales in affected areas.[167] MYSA's pressure for land purchase worried peasants in the area of Cerro Quilish, who expressed their discontent to the parish priest of Porcón, after failing to gain support from various authorities. Through the coordination of the parish and the *Vicaría de Solidaridad del Obispado de Cajamarca*, they accused the company of 'land usurpation and attempted fraud' ('*por usurpación de tierras y tentativa de estafa*') in front of the Regional Prosecutor (*Fiscalía Superior Decana de Cajamarca*) in December 1993. In this process, local peasants were provided with legal advice and support via the parish's trans-local network. Lawyers from the CEAS offered them legal advice. In addition, the Porcón parish has a solidarity pact with its German counterpart, Saint Gallus de Tettnang, and this German alliance sent letters to the World Bank, the President of Peru, Newmont's US office and the German ambassador in Peru with the intention of informing them of events in Cajamarca (Bebbington et al, 2011: 212). In the end, MYSA attempted to negotiate with peasants in an extra-judicial way in 1994, but the offer was declined.[168]

Rondas Campesinas and NGOs in Trans-Local Networks

Alongside the linkages of the Church, peasant organisation and NGOs constituted a significant part of the networked forms of resistance via collective action against MYSA. Despite a general decline in *rondas*' activity, their legitimacy, based on their capacity to solve problems, was maintained among the peasantry. When peasants were faced with another

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Nacional de Elecciones) in March 2012 (via Resolution 0023-2012-ROP/JNE). The official name for inscription was *Tierra y Dignidad* (Land and Dignity) at the request of Marco Antonio Zevallo Bueno in March 2011. See '*Tierra y Dignidad logró su inscripción como partido político ante el JNE*', *El Comercio,* 28 April 2012.

[167] In the early 1990s, the Vicariate of Solidarity of Cajamarca, with support of CNDDHH pressured MYSA and Newmont into creating a fund of $US 500,000 - with the aim of providing micro-credits to 41families in land conflicts (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 30). The CNDDHH is a national human right organisation, created in 1985. In 1994, it was composed of 44 distinct groups and seven permanent observers, including the Bishops' Commission on Social Action (CEAS, *Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social*) which was created in 1965 after the Second Vatican Council and emphasised the Church's role in the consolidation of justice, democracy, development and peace in Peru (Klaiber, 2009: 413). The CNDDHH, now with 81 member organisations, has 'a Special Consultative Status before the Organisation of American State (OAS)'. For more information, see http://derechoshumanos.pe/english/.

[168] Peasants finally ceded to MYSA in the midst of intimidation and the provision of financial incentives, and the Cerro Quilish area became the company's private property during 1995 and 1996.

problem or crisis, as in the past, they could easily organise themselves again in order to solve their problems. In this way, *rondas* provided a good resource for mobilisation and recruitment for participants, playing a role as what Melucci would call 'submerged networks'. As Taylor points out, the legacy of *rondas*' activities facilitated the organisation of the rural population particularly at village-level (2011: 424, see also Starn, 1999).[169] By the 1990s, the main threat to peasant livelihoods became mining activity and its social and environmental impact. In order to defend their livelihoods and the environment and mobilise against mining activities, *rondas campesinas* played an important role as demonstrated in the various protests in Cajamarca and other regions. Assessing the *rondas*' persistent mobilising capacity, Chacón (2002) argues that they have embraced another function of environmentalism since the late 1990s, via mobilisations against MYSA's mining activities. The principal contextual difference is that the nature of socio-environmental issues is more difficult and complicated to address, in comparison to cattle rustling. They also include more diverse social actors, not just limited to local dimensions, but also tend to embrace national and international involvement.[170]

Regarding rural base organisations, Cajamarca is not a region where the peasant community is traditionally strong, which has historically been one of the main factors in peasant mobilisations. According to de Echave and his colleagues, mobilisations in Cajamarca stood out in the sense that peasant communities did not play an important role (2009a: 237). In the central or southern highlands, peasant communities led protests against mining activities, as well as got involved in negotiation process: e.g. Huaripampa and Carhuayoc communities inhabited in the nearby Antamina mines (San Marcos district, Áncash department); and Huisa, Huisa Collana, Huarca, Antaccollama and Suirocama, excluded from previous agreement led protests against Xstrata (located in Espinar province, department of Cusco) (de Echave et al., 2009a: 238). In contrast, irrigation committees (*juntas de regantes*) or hamlet mayors were important actors in mobilisation at village level in Cajamarca (de Echave et al., 2009a: 239). However, as the social and environmental impact generated by mining activities became felt more strongly, *rondas campesinas* started to become more involved in the issue, as seen in protests over the water contamination problem in Bambamarca, as well as protests in defence of Cerro Quilish. The first regional-level attempt to deal with problems related to MYSA in Cajamarca was the Regional Congress of *Rondas Campesinas* held in June 1999 and this raised issues such as contamination and the lack of water provision caused by mining activities (Lingán, 2008: 56-57).

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[169] In his analysis of rural voting results in the 2006 presidential and general elections in Cajamarca, Taylor (2008) also points out the reactivation of the *rondas* particularly in regions where there were mining activities. Taylor (2011) goes deeper in his analysis of the role of the *rondas campesinas* in the mobilisation of anti-mining peasant protests in the southern province of San Marcos, Cajamarca.

[170] In recent years, *rondas* have attempted to expand their agenda to discuss and develop an alternative legal system in the context of the re-democratisation process (although this is not the focus of this thesis, it will be an interesting topic for future research, especially given the backdrop of constitutional changes undertaken by several progressive governments in Latin America). Gilitz (2013) has recently published a book on this issue. See also Picolli (2008).

Nevertheless, this base organisation is rather heterogeneous and vulnerable to fragmentation as in the previous decade. According to Chacón (2002), *rondas campesinas* in Cajamarca were divided into two factions: the *Federación Departamental de Rondas Campesinas y Urbanas de Cajamarca* (Departmental Federation of Peasant and Urban Rondas of Cajamarca) and the *Federación de Rondas Campesinas Femeninas de Cajamarca* (Women's Federation Peasant Rondas of Cajamarca, FEROCAFENOP).[171] The former has been under the influence of the PCP-PR since 1985 when the first Departmental Congress of Rondas Campesinas took place (Chacón, 2002). The latter is composed of mainly independent members. FEROCAFENOP and its leadership have been actively involved in mining related issues and by the late-1990s had made useful national and international contacts. For example, this federation has collaborated with international NGOs, e.g., Project Underground.[172] In addition, the federation participated in the creation of CONACAMI (National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining, *Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Afectadades por la Minería*) in 1999, its president being elected as secretary of Institutional Development as well as leading the environment council (Lingán, 2008: 57).[173] However, when CONACAMI attempted to create a regional counterpart in

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[171] FENOCAFENOP was founded in 1986 in response to the male oriented-character of the nightwatch patrols, with a particular interest in gender-related issues and the organisation's unequal internal gender roles.

[172] Project Underground became the FEROCAFENOP's major international contact, utilising its technical and financial advice. According to Bebbington et al., this North American NGO facilitated the federation president's travel to the Newmont shareholders' meeting in Denver, as well as attempting to impede the federation's radicalisation, preventing the federation's taking violent measures, such as the invasion of the MYSA's installations by force (2011: 213). In addition, FEROCAFENOP submitted a complaint to IFC's ombudsman office, working closely with Project Underground in March 2001 (Lingán, 2008: 57).

[173] CONACAMI was created in October 1999, with the support of civil society organisations, such as Lima-based NGO, CooperAcción. It aims to respond to an increasing demand of the communities affected by mining activities when traditional peasant organisations, such as CNA and CCP, did not represent the interests of these communities (Padilla, 2009: 158). Main concern for the Confederation was environmental impacts generated by

Cajamarca, CORECAMI-Cajamarca (*Confederación Regional de Comunidades Afectadades por la Minería*) in 2001, the organisation never took root, particularly due to FEROCAFENOP's conflict with other regional organisations (Lingán, 2008: 57).[174] To compound matters, the leader of FEROCAFENOP struck an agreement to receive funds from MYSA, and this dealt a death blow to the federation, generating criticisms of its closeness with the mining company and diminishing its legitimacy in the region.[175]

While CONACAMI did not have influence in Cajamarca, the *Frente de Defensa de los Intereses, Ecología y Medio Ambiente de Cajamarca* (Cajamarca's Front of Defence of Interests, Ecology and Environment, FDIEMAC), officially founded in August 2001, was another attempt to organise around local environmental issues related to mining activities. In FDIEMAC's congress in Bambamarca, *rondas campesinas* from almost all provinces participated, together with members of the teachers' union, SUTEP-Cajamarca, and *Juventud Popular-Cajamarca* (Cajamarca's Popular Youth organisation), as well as local NGOs and environmental activists (Chacón, 2002).[176] Although participants in the FDIEMAC congress could agree on the environmental importance and necessity of sustainable development in the face of mining activities, as Chacón (2002) points out, there were several limitations, including: the limited capacity of the organisation; distrust of its politicised leadership; and, more importantly, the subsistence issue among poor peasants.[177] Despite organisational

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mining activities, as well as communities' right to land (Vittor, 2009: 198). In the process of institutionalisation (from 'Coordinator' status to 'Confederation'), the gap between the leadership and bases widened as the latter was alienated gradually (Padilla, 2009: 160-161). Meanwhile, in the aftermath of an exchange of experiences with indigenous organisations in neighbouring Ecuador and Bolivia such as ECUARUNARI (*Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador*) and CONAMAQ (*Consejo Nacional De Ayllus y Markas del Qullasusyu*), during the first half of 2000s, the Confederation self-defined as an indigenous organisation at its second National Congress in 2003 by incorporating ethnic identity (Vittor, 2009: 199-202).

[174] When CONACAMI attempted to organise CORECAMI-Cajamarca, it chose two local leaders for the task: the president of FEROCAFENOP, Segunda Castrejón, and Reinhard Seifert, a civil engineer and environmental activist of German origin. The clash between two local leaders frustrated CONACAMI's plan. In addition, CONACAMI's relationship with FEROCAFEP closed down the possibility of forging links with another *Rondas Campesinas* federation, the *Federación Departamental de Rondas Campesinas y Urbanas de Cajamarca,* due to its rivalry with FEROCAFEP (Chacón, 2002; Lingán, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2011).

[175] According to Bebbington et al., FENOCAFENOP agreed to receive funds from MYSA in 2001, which amounts to US$ 10,000 with an aim to contribute to microfinance programmes (2011: 216).

[176] Organisations which participated in the congress, such as SUTEP-Cajamarca, *Juventud Popular* as well as the *rondas campesinas*, were under the influence of the Red Homeland party and this factional link raised concerns. Peruvian political parties, including this communist party, lost their legitimacy among many Peruvians due to their lack of effectiveness since the 1980s, and the electorate has preferred to support outsider or anti-systemic candidates, as illustrated by the elections of Fujimori, Toledo and Humala.

[177] For poor peasants who lived on subsistence agriculture, socio-economic issues were more important than

difficulties at regional level, *rondas campesinas* still have a substantial role to play as a base organisation, which has been demonstrated in their high visibility at regional protests in defence of the environment and water, particularly since the late 1990s, including mobilisations in December 1999, March 2001, Cerro Quilish in 2004 and those against the Conga project since 2011.

Alongside the *rondas campesinas*, several NGOs have constituted the trans-local networks over time. Not only local NGOs but also other organisations at a different scale became an integral part of this network in Cajamarca by exchanging their accumulated experiences and making connections. Initially the role of these NGOs within the network was concentrated on: providing technical information and legal advice; facilitating contacts with other actors; helping to raise environmental awareness among the population; and pressuring the mining company and coordinating dialogue. ECOVIDA, for example, conducted a technical study on water quality in Cajamarca several times and disseminated the information in a way that was accessible to the local population. The involvement of these urban-based environmental NGOs constructed a wider network that in turn facilitated information, the exchange of experiences, as well as making multiple contacts. One of the incidents which set off an environmental alarm relating to mining activities among the local population was the mercury spill at Choropampa. The production of a documentary on the accident – produced by Guarango with financial support of Oxfam America – contributed to raising popular awareness.[178] Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Project Underground became involved in the region's mining issues in various ways. Before its coordination with FEROCAFENOP, in 1998, this NGO had access to the MYSA report submitted to MINEM, in which the company admitted that it had been discharging acid water and heavy metals since initiating its operation in 1993 (Arana, 2002: 106-7). The organisation's disclosure of this report raised concerns about water quality among the local population. In 2001 when peasants and local denizens mobilised due to concerns about water security, Project

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environmental contamination. They sometimes tended to favour improvised material compensation granted by the mining company (see de Echave 2009a). In this sense, it can be noted that the construction of trans-local networks was imbued with tensions and contradiction among diverse interests.

[178] Guarango is a Peruvian NGO which was founded in Lima in 1994. The organisation is dedicated to the production and dissemination of documentaries in order to stimulate public opinion, with a particular interest in the excluded and themes like development. Its other documentaries relating to mining problems include: '*Tambogrande: Mangos, Muerte, Minería*' (2007), which documents the chronology of social conflicts between local communities and Manhattan Minerals Corporation (a medium-size Canadian mining company) over the Tambogrande mining project; '*Operación Diablo*' (2010), another documentary which dealt conflicts around the Majaz project (Piura) highlighting the state and a private security company's (FORZA) repression of local peasants and members of GRUFIDES, including the ex-priest and environmental activist Marco Arana.

Underground informed US senators about the issue, questioning the IFC (a shareholder of MYSA)'s loan for an investment project of an unsustainable nature (see CAO 2007).

In sum, during the first decade of MYSA's presence in Cajamarca, there were a series of social protests against mining activities. MYSA's mineral extraction accumulated perceptions of 'injustice' and social and environmental grievances among local populations, particularly in the context of the near absence of state regulations and an institutional system for dispute conciliation. Through collective actions, various social actors, including *rondas campesinas*, progressive priests and parishes with their contacts, as well as local and international NGOs, began to work together and create a loose web of trans-local networks. However, this formulation of the network was not a smooth and strategic nexus between actors at different scales. Instead, the process was full of tensions among diverse interests. But at the same time, they have become an integral part of the massive mobilisation against the Conga project.

5.5. Conclusion

The capitalist development of export crops in the northern coast started to impact on the socio-economic structure of Cajamarca from the 1880s. The expansion of the dairy industry intensified commercial agriculture post-1940. In this process, landlords took a 'Junker' path of capitalist development by subdividing their lands and increasing investment on more fertile soils, a process that also led to more differentiation among the peasantry. In Cajamarca, as in other parts of *sierra*, local peasants were historically marginalised from the state and local power structures dominated by *hacendados*. Provincial society was hierarchically structured around patron-client relationships between landlords and peasants. Rather than unilaterally being exploited, however, local peasants responded to political and economic powers by using local power structures or central government. Additionally, immigration to the northern coast provided an opportunity to resist proletarianisation. APRA, originating in Trujillo, has exercised a strong influence on Cajamarca's rural and urban population since the 1930s. The party's anti-imperialistic and reformist stance gained legitimacy among the peasantry in Cajamarca. However, when it turned to the right by the mid-1950s and opposed agrarian reform, APRA's dominance in the countryside came under challenge.

One of the most important peasant organisations in the region, FEDECC, reflected this change of influence. It was founded by APRA in 1961 and later the PCP-U and VR took control of the organisation. Its association with CCP radicalised its activities to a certain degree and led to land occupations in locations such as Huacataz (1973) and Pomabamba (1974). The slow and inappropriate implementation of agrarian reform in Cajamarca did not solve the problem of *minifundización*, one factor that helps explain the creation of the nightwatch patrols (*rondas campesinas*) in the face of economic crisis during the 1970s and 1980s. This grassroots peasant organisation successfully dealt with direct problems (i.e. cattle rustling) and extended its functions into areas such as constructing an alternative peasant legal system. The efficiency of *rondas* gained legitimacy among the rural populace and their experience became repeated across the country. Alongside activities of peasant organisations and *rondas campesinas*, the role of bishop Dammert Bellido, with his commitment to social justice, helped raise political consciousness among the peasantry. The aftermath of agrarian reform saw a highly fragmented rural landscape as it left a small number of 'included' and a majority of 'peripherised' *campesinos*, leading to the stratification of rural producers in Cajamarca. However, a historical accumulation of social relations via political activism thickened the social texture and constituted a particularity of this part of the rural highlands, becoming an important element of socio-environmental protests against MYSA's mineral extraction since 1990.

Peru went through a significant structural reform process under the Fujimori regime. With a series of investment preferential policies and deregulations, mineral extraction has expanded exponentially across the country since the 1990s. Against this backdrop, MYSA arrived in the region, bringing expectations and promises for progress. To the disappointment of many local denizens, benefits from mining activities have been unequally distributed, inciting different responses. Rather than addressing local poverty and quelling social unrest, mineral extraction became an arena for power struggles among national and local authorities, as well as MYSA. In addition, the power-geometry of MYSA's mineral extraction laid a ground for unity among various social actors' political activism. During the 1990s, protesters demanded fairer treatment and a better distribution of benefits, with conflicts being largely limited to the countryside. However, a series of environmental accidents, including a major mercury spill in 2000, raised environmental awareness among the local denizens not only in the countryside, but also in urban areas. In particular, accusations regarding the negative impact on water resources raised concerns, with the 2004 massive mobilisation in defence of

Cerro Quilish representing an obvious expression of many *cajamarquinos*' fears over water quantity and quality. Accumulations of struggles helped the creation of trans-local networks among various social actors. Despite the inherent tensions, these networks were based on previously constructed social relations in the countryside, laying ground for the anti-Conga movement, which is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 6

The Anti-Conga Movement:

Constructing Political Identity of ‘Environmental Justice’

> It seems a bit weird to me. People protest against the Conga project in defence of the environment, particularly arguing that water is as important as the life of people. But you can easily see people throwing rubbish on the streets on their way back home after the protests. They seemingly have no idea about recycling. This is one of the reasons why I decided to start an environmental education campaign in the nursery which I worked for.[179]

The Conga project comprises part of MYSA’s extension plan and is designed to develop two mineral deposits, Perol and Chaihuagón, in order to exploit gold and copper over the next nineteen years in the provinces of Celendín (districts of Huasmín and Sorochuco) and Cajamarca (district of La Encañada). Its opponents’ main criticism is that the project is located in an ecologically vulnerable area and, once started, would generate an irreversible environmental impact on the region. In particular, concerns over the quality and quantity of water have been a principal motivation for mobilisation since 2011 and now the project has been temporarily suspended after two years of massive protests.

The excerpt above is an interview conducted with a South Korean volunteer who was dispatched to a local nursery in Cajamarca from KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency), part of the South Korean government’s programmes for official development assistance (ODA).[180] This observation suggests that although the defence of the environment and water is one of the main arguments of the anti-Conga movement, local denizens in general, including movement participants, seem to lack awareness of environmental protection, a position which many environmentalists of a post-materialist stance or ‘conservationist’ would take. Moreover, what ‘environment’ signifies for movement participants is distinguished from a rhetorical criticism posited by many proponents of the Conga project: the ‘*anti-mineros*’ (opponents to Conga, particularly supported by ‘foreign’ NGOs), proponents argued, are ‘naïve environmentalists’ and their position is ‘anti-development’. In contrast to these interpretations, protesters’ understanding of the ‘environment’ exhibits a broader or distinct connotation. In explaining the nature of socio-environmental movements, Bebbington categorised five strands: ‘conservationist environmentalism’; ‘deep ecology’; ‘environmental justice’; ‘environmentalism of the poor’; and ‘resource-nationalist environmentalism’ (2009: 19, see also Martínez-Alier, 2002). The former two are more associated with arguments of post-materialist environmentalists based in Western Europe and North America. The latter three are primarily concerned with social justice claims, i.e. the social distribution of environmental impacts, socio-economic benefits and the sovereignty of natural resources. The last point is where many leftist governments in Latin America are involved as seen in Chapter 2.

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[179] ‘물은 생명이라며 콩가 광산 반대를 외치던 사람들이 집회 후 집으로 돌아가던 길에 쓰레기를 아무렇게나 버리는 것을 보며 충격을 받았다. 그들이 사실은 환경보호 (예를 들면, 재활용)에 무관심하다는 것을 깨닫고, 봉사하고 있는 유치원에서 환경관련 교육을 하기로 마음을 먹게 되었다.’ Interview, Informant F, via Email, 1 June 2014. I was aware of the educational campaign during my fieldwork, at a time when the anti-Conga movement was at its zenith. The interviewee initiated an environmental campaign in the nursery where she was volunteering. When she came to know the recycling campaign, ‘*Yo Reciclo*’ (‘I Recycle’), promoted by the environmental department of Cajamarca city, she contacted the department and also participated in the city’s recycling capacity-building programmes. After six months of education activities on recycling, she coordinated with the environment department of the municipality of Baños del Inca district a ‘recycling concert’ around Christmas time in 2012. In order to gain more detailed information, I conducted an interview via email.

[180] KOICA was created in April 1991 with the aim to carry out programmes to support socio-economic

Rather than seeing the ‘environment’ *per se* as an object for protection or inclusive development, this chapter aims to elucidate the complex trajectories of constructing a political identity of ‘environmental justice’ via political activism. While the local population has been distinctively influenced by the ‘power-geography’ of MYSA’s mineral extraction, a source for fragmentation of subaltern groups, this also provides them with a ground for unity as they go through similar grievances. With particular regard to the Conga project, protesters have created ‘maps of grievance’ with a series of resistance activities. In this way, it is plausible to examine the political potential of rural subjectivities rather than focusing on their fragmentation. The accumulation of political activities has enabled locating causes for grievance and in this process ‘networked forms of resistance’ have been constructed against MYSA’s Conga mining project, which I term ‘counter-extractive networks (CENs)’. The CENs are composed of diverse social groups at different spatialities, thereby creating ‘prefigurative solidarity’ and constructing political identity, which can be understood as the

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development in developing countries and thus improve diplomatic relationship with those countries. One of the Agency’s activities is to dispatch national volunteers to support programmes of development and cultural exchange in less developed countries. During my fieldwork in Cajamarca, there were three Korean volunteers working in the city of Baños del Inca, Cajamarca province.

process of contesting causes of grievance generated by the Conga mining project and neoliberal extractivism more broadly. In this way, the chapter examines the complex trajectories of resistance acts through the interconnectedness among subaltern groups in the rural highlands.

6.1. Mobilisations against the Conga Mining Project

Conga Project

According to a fact sheet issued by the Newmont Mining Corporation, 'the Conga project is a copper-gold porphyry deposit located 75 km northeast of the city of Cajamarca, Peru' and 24 kilometres from Newmont's Yanacocha mining complex (see Map 1).[181] Over 19 years, MYSA is expected to exploit two open pit deposits: Chailhuagón and Perol.[182] The company intended to construct four artificial reservoirs (Chaihuagón, Perol, Superior and Inferior) to substitute four lakes (Chailhuagón, Perol, Azul and Mala) at the mine site (see Map 2). The exploitation was programmed to start by late 2014 and 2015 according to the original plan, but has been suspended after massive mobilisations by the local population beginning in 2011. As Gilfford and Kestler note, '[M]ost families in the Conga Area earned a livelihood in subsistence agriculture and dairy' (2008: 349). Residents fear the mine could undermine their livelihood.

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[181] Available at http://www.newmont.com/node/4937. The fact sheet was updated in June 2013.

[182] According to de Echave and Diez, two mineral deposits of the Conga project, Perol and Chailhuagon, were discovered in the early 1990s and then incorporated into MYSA. Exploration activities were conducted from 2004 onwards and the environmental baseline study was carried out during 2005 and 2007 (2013: 73).

Map 1. Large-Scale Mining Projects in Department of Cajamarca


Tantahuatay
Cerro Corona
Las Astillas
La Zanja
Amaro
Conga
Maqui Maqui
Chaquicocha
Yanacocha
La Quinua
NWT
Tapado
Perol
Chailhuagon
La Carpa
Hilo Rico
Galeno
Cerro Negro
Quilish
Michiquillay
Huayquishongo
Yanacocha Sulfides
Legend
Au/Cu Porphyry Deposits
Gold Deposits
Exploration Areas
La Zanja Claims
Minera Yanacocha JV Claims
Yanacocha Gold District
San Marcos Block
NORTH
Cajamarca
20 Kilometers
10 Miles

Source: Newmont Mining Corporation

Map 2. The Conga Project


PROYECTO CONGA BUSCA REUBICAR LAS LAGUNAS DE CAJAMARCA
El traslado afectaría el caudal de los ríos de la provincia.
Reservorio Superior
Capacidad: 7'600.000 m³
Laguna reubicada: Azul y Chica.
Reservorio superior
30 km
N
CELENDÍN
CAJAMARCA
San Marcos
Cajabamba
Laguna Azul
Laguna Chica
Reservorio Perol
Capacidad: 800,000 m³
Laguna reubicada: Perol.
Reservorio Inferior
Capacidad: 1'000,000 m³
Será llenada con los embalses de la escorrentía y el agua de lluvia.
Laguna Perol
Lag. Mamacocha
Lag. Mala
Lag. Chailhuagon
CAPACIDAD DE ALMACENAMIENTO DE LOS RESERVORIOS
Capacidad de la cuatro lagunas que serían trasvasadas: 1,4 Mm3
Capacidad de tres de los reservorios a ser construidos: 3,2 Mm3
Laguna Mala
Laguna Chica
Laguna Azul
Laguna Perol
1,4 Mm³
3.2 Mm³
Reservorio Perol
Reservorio Inferior
Reservorio Chailhuagón
Río Grande
Reservorio Chailhuagón
Capacidad: 2'600.000 m³
Laguna reubicada: Mala
Fuente: Proyecto Conga.
LA REPÚBLICA

Source: *La República* (6 November 2011).

Chronology of the Anti-Conga Mobilisations in Defence of Water[183]

One of the main concerns of the local population with regard to the Conga project is water. Opponents have argued that it will be located in the ‘ecologically vulnerable’ headwaters of five watersheds (Jadibamba, Chailhuagon, Chirimayo, Chugurmayo and Toromacho), and the operation will be conducted in *jalca* areas. They argue that it is highly likely that the excavation will generate irreversible environmental damage, particularly to the region’s water, and this worries local peasants as well as the urban population in terms of their access to sufficient and clean water. Considering the location of the project, the area of influence is not limited to nearby communities, but extends to downstream areas and to the city. Based on this main argument, a majority of *cajamarquinos* have opposed the Conga project and conducted a series of mobilisations in defence of water. While most local residents show their disapproval of the project, *ronderos* and *campesinos* in Celendín and Bambamarca are most visible in the streets via their collective activism. In addition, members of SUTEP, the University student union, civil construction union, as well as NGOs (most visibly GRUFIDES) members, local politicians (such as Jorge Rimarachín) and the regional government (led by its president Gregorio Santos) and local authorities from three provinces have demonstrated their opposition to the scheme.[184] As will be examined later, these actors constitute the main component of the ‘networked form’ of resistance against MYSA’s Conga project. This section will contextualise the anti-Conga movement by looking at the chronology of mobilisation between 2010 and 2013, before engaging in a deeper analysis in the following sections.

According to Peruvian law, the mining company should meet stipulated EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) requirements prior to initiating the exploitation process with an aim to prevent or mitigate negative environmental impacts. MYSA submitted its EIA for the Conga project on 9 February 2010 and received authorisation from the MINEM on 27 October the same year. During this period small protests occurring around the project area demanded revision of the EIA. On 5 April 2010, the municipality of the district of Sorochuco organised a forum, ‘Sorochuco, Environment and Mining’ (*Sorochuco, Medio Ambiente y*

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[183] See Appendix II.

[184] According to a poll conducted by Ipso Apoyo, 78 per cent of the population in Cajamarca oppose the Conga project; in the countryside the percentage rises to 83 per cent (‘El *78 % de cajamarquinos rechza el proyecto minero Conga*’, *El Comercio,* 22 August 2012).

Minería), in which an agreement was reached to oppose the Conga project.[185] After constant small-scale protests, authorities from the regional government of Cajamarca visited the Perol and Chailhuagón lakes on 11 July 2011, when opponents of the project asked the regional government to revise the EIA (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 93).[186] For the protesters, the process of how the MINEM authorised MYSA's EIA was inappropriate since the person in charge did not seem to be impartial.[187] In addition, they argued that the company failed to provide the local population with any proper information and explanation about the project.

The EIA's lack of credibility undermined the viability of the Conga project in the eyes of the local residents. As will be seen later, the democratic deficit of the process and different understandings of the 'environment' have become the movement's main focus of contention since they were perceived as the causes of 'grievance' through acts of resistance. For the Humala government and the mining company, there is sufficient reason to defend the project. It is one of the largest foreign investments in Peru, at US$ 4.8 billion. For the government, this considerable investment is necessary for sustaining economic growth and generating a fiscal bonanza. For MYSA, the project is indispensable since it furthers its extension plan; the sheer quantity of deposits available is also an important factor in its calculations.[188] Therefore, facing massive mobilisations against the project in November, the government started to react. After MYSA's announcement of its investment plan in July 2011, social tensions began to rise via protests, marches and road blockages. On 24 October 2011, more than 2,000 peasants from the district of Huasmín mobilised and marched to the lakes, giving the company an ultimatum of eight days for them to withdraw from the site. Then the premier, Salomón Lerner, attempted to negotiate and set up a roundtable dialogue on 28 October. In response to demands from local authorities, a government delegation composed of the ministers of the Environment (Ricardo Giesecke), Agriculture (Miguel Calliux) and Energy and Mining (Carlos Herrera) travelled to the Azul and Perol lakes on 2 November. However, this visit generated controversy when two ministers flew to the area in a helicopter provided by MYSA. After this visit, the minister of Environment suggested a revision of the EIA, which the mining company denounced as endangering an important investment for the country's development, a point which suggests that the 'dominating power' of the neoliberal state and MYSA is porous rather unitary and consolidated, opening up possibilities for contestation. Accordingly, it is relevant to examine the complex trajectories of social relations and 'entangled' power at different spatialities beyond the binary geography-power framework.[189]

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[185] Four important points from the forum were: to protect water resources and lakes in Sorochuco (lakes Perol, Mala, Empredrada, Chailhuagón and Azul); to uphold the municipal ordinance of Celendín 020, which protects water resources in Huasmín and Sorochuco; to press for a free, prior and informed consultation process on authorising a new mining project; and to call for public hearings in Sorochuco, Huasmín and Celendín (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 92-93).

[186] From late November 2011 when mobilisations started to intensify, the presence of the president of regional government, Gregorio Santos, stood out. However, according to one informant, it was not clear whether he had an enthusiastic intention to defend water against the Conga project and, if so, when he decided to support or lead the anti-Conga movement (Interview informant A, Celendín, 28 March 2012). Despite his initial indecision, he stated that Santos was persuaded to support the movement's cause and has become an important leader (alongside Marco Arana and Wilfredo Saavedra), and in the process becoming a main target of criticism from pro-Conga side.

[187] Approval of the EIA is supposed to be signed by the General Director of Mining Environmental Issues (*Director General de Asuntos Ambientales Mineros*) within the MINEM. But the Conga project's EIA was signed by an advisor of the Ministerial branch (*asesora del Despacho Ministerial*) since the general director, Felipe Ramírez, worked for MYSA as an executive shortly before he took up the government position (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 74).

[188] According to the company fact sheet (published in June 2013, see footnote 3), it is estimated that there are 6.5 million ounces of gold reserves and 1.7 billion pounds of copper available for mining (as of 31 December 2012).

After this improvised attempt at conciliation, the first indefinite strike was called mainly by local *campesinos* and *ronderos* on 24 November. Loosely constituted trans-local networks that emerged through protests against MYSA's mining activities in previous years have facilitated this collective action, becoming an integral part of 'networked resistance'. On 29 November, a confrontation occurred between protesters and the police that left many injured; two people suffered gunshots and were detained. This repressive government reaction elicited criticism from across the country. At this stage of the conflict, mobilisations against the Conga project moved beyond a local and regional level and started to gain national and international attention. As will be seen in the next section, this aspect formed an important part of the 'maps of grievance' and 'CENs' of the anti-Conga movement. The escalating confrontation obliged the government to negotiate with local authorities and grassroots leaders. The movement's insistent argument for the cancellation of the project dragged out the negotiations. An impatient executive consequently declared a state of emergency in four provinces of Cajamarca (Cajamarca, Celendín, Hualgayoc and Contunmazá) on 4 December in the midst of an attempted dialogue led by Premier Salomón Lerner's delegation in Cajamarca. After the first state of emergency was imposed in Cajamarca, Oscar Valdés was appointed as the second premier of the Humala administration after the resignation of his predecessor, Lerner. Following the lifting of the state of emergency on 16 December, the new premier proposed inviting international experts to examine the EIA. In addition, he held meetings with local authorities without inviting the president of the regional government and prominent movement leaders, one in Lima and another in Cajamarca, an example of a 'divide and rule' strategy. After the second dialogue roundtable in Cajamarca on 13 January 2012, the government announced a development plan that would invest more than S/. 5 billion in the region.[190]

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[189] A technical team from the Ministry of Environment examined the Conga EIA and submitted a report to the government on 21 November 2011. This was later denied by the government.

During February-April 2012, the movement and the government entered into a series of disputes concerning the project's water issue: this involved the 'National March for Water' ('*Marcha Nacional del Agua 2012*'); the '*peritaje internacional*' and '*peritaje alternativo*'; and the constitutionality of the regional ordinance 036.[191] The movement organised the 'National March for Water' over ten days (1-10 February 2012) from Cajamarca to Lima. The march was one of various efforts to raise public awareness of the movement and its defence of water supply and quality across the country. The considerable support and solidarity gained on the road to Lima, suggested that the movement possessed a broad base and was not restricted to politically-minded radicals or anti-development and mining environmentalists, as the Lima media and official spokespeople tried to label it. In addition to the coordinating act of 'trans-local' networks of *rondas campesinas*, *frentes de defensa* and NGOs, those who shared similar experiences with neoliberal extractivisim in other Peruvian departments became an integral part of the March for Water. In response to the government's plan to invite international experts to review the EIA (a '*peritaje internacional*'), the movement came up with their alternative version, the '*peritaje alternativo*'. The movement's idea of an alternative *peritaje* (expert's revision) was intended to deflect the government's criticism, which argued that its opponents did not understand the project due to a lack of 'scientifically-grounded' information and were being mobilised by politically-minded extremists. In addition, protesters voiced their defence of regional ordinance 036, which had been declared by the regional council of Cajamarca on 5 December 2011 and had been waiting for the Constitutional Tribunal adjudication as its legality was put into question by the National Prosecutor. The ordinance proclaims that for the regional public interest it is indispensable to protect the headwaters and thus it is necessary to halt the Conga project.

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[190] '*Ministro ofreció a Cajamarca obras por 5,000 millones de soles*', *La República*, 13 January 2012.

[191] On December 2011, the regional government of Cajamarca approved Regional Ordinance 036, which declared the protection of the basin headwaters and the cancellation of the Conga mining project.

Approaching the announcement of the *peritaje internacional* report and the ruling by the highest court, the movement reinforced its protests and mobilisations, pressuring the government. On 22 March 2012, the movement organised a popular march to the threatened lake areas, marking World Water Day. On 28 and 29 March, 'the Unitary Assembly of Fronts of Defence and Social Organisations in the region of Cajamarca' took place in Celendín. The meeting included hundreds of peasants, *rondas campesinas*, Fronts of Defence (*Frentes de Defensa*), members of the teachers' union (SUTEP) and other trade unionists, environmental activists – national and international – and local authorities, including the president of the regional government. At this event, participants debated collective action strategies, as well as underlining their unity and continued commitment to the movement. On 30 and 31 March, the first 'National Assembly of the Peruvian People' was held in the city of Cajamarca and chaired by Wilfredo Saavedra, president of the Environmental Defence Front of Cajamarca. The event was accused as generating fissures within the movement by those who participated in the previous meeting in Celendín, in particular, and a majority of the participants came from other departments. However, these two assemblies coincided in claiming 'no to Conga'. In parallel, several regional protests were mounted during this period. On 21 April, the government finally announced the approval of the project subject to several conditions, referring to recommendations by the *peritaje internacional*.[192] At the same time, the Constitutional Tribunal adjudicated that the regional government had exceeded its administrative authority in announcing regional ordinance 036 on 17 April when three international experts submitted their report on the EIA.

For the movement, the state's position of 'yes to Conga' and the Constitutional Tribunal's adjudication made it clear that the government had taken sides with multinational capital, triggering a series of collective actions. Between 21 and 29 May, movement leaders coordinated the 'March for Caxamarca', aimed at gaining public solidarity with the protest as they marched across the department's thirteen provinces. On the same day as the delegation of this march was expected to arrive in the city of Cajamarca, local proponents of the project also gathered in the main square under the banner of 'The March for Peace and Development for Cajamarca'. This event was organised by a '*Colectivo por Cajamarca*' (Group for Cajamarca), with strong backing from protagonists such as the ex-mayor of Cajamarca's municipal government, Luis Guerrero, ex-mayor and *aprista* Emilio Horna, and the president of the Cajamarca Chamber of Commerce, Jorge Vergara, among others.[193] Against the backdrop of this tense atmosphere, the second indefinite strike started on 31 May. The polarisation of positions on the project ('Yes' vs. 'No' to Conga) further radicalised the movement. With the drafting in of police reinforcements and militarisation of the restive regions, another confrontation occurred between police and protesters in Celendín and Bambamarca. On 3 July, three people were killed in a clash, more than 27 were injured and 15 arrested in Celendín. In an attempt to control the situation, Lima imposed a second state of emergency in the three provinces of Cajamarca, Celendín, and Bambamarca. The following day, another protester died in a confrontation in Bambamarca, and one of the injured from the Celendín confrontation lost his life on 5 July. On 3 August the government extended the state of emergency for another month, despite the efforts of dialogue facilitators and the movement's requests not to.

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[192] These requirements include: to protect two lakes, Azul and Chica (out of the four lakes in the original plan); to quadruple the water supply volume via the construction of reservoirs; to create social funds; and to guarantee the generation of 10,000 jobs for local people.

This repressive state response provoked much criticism from inside and outside Peru, raising concerns about the human rights of protesters (see the next section). The government was therefore pressured to adopt a more conciliatory stance. On 9 July, Father Gastón Garetea and Miguel Cabrejo, the bishop of Trujillo, arrived in Cajamarca in order to facilitate a dialogue between the movement and the state. With the appointment of a new Premier, Juan Jiménez, the government attempted to moderate its position. On 23August 2012, Jiménez confirmed a temporary suspension of the Conga project until a number of conditions would be met for the exploitation to go ahead, i.e. along the lines of 'water first and then mining'. In parallel, the government created new institutional entities aimed to prevent or pacify social conflict and to improve the system of overseeing any environmental impact: the National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (*Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad*, ONDS) and SENACE (*Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles*, National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investment).[194] In the face of this moderation of the government's position, the movement lost its 'visibility' from the Lima media in particular. However, peasants from Bambamarca and Celendín maintained their protests, demanding a complete cancellation of the project. They accused the company of continuing preparatory operations despite announcing their suspension. The focal point became the construction of reservoirs. To its opponents, this indicated that MYSA intended to continue with the project, which they will not allow. In the meantime, for the government and company, it meant to secure water provision for the local population, one of the recommendations made by international experts and the government for the project's viability. In other words, the situation reached an impasse. Despite the tension, the construction of the first reservoir Chailhuagón was completed in May 2013.[195] The mining company has attempted to continue with the second reservoir, Perol. In response, local peasants, so-called '*guardianes de lagunas*' (guardians of the lakes) have grouped together in nearby areas in order to impede its construction, which produces regular confrontations with police stationed in the locality.

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[193] The event was denounced by many critics for its supposed connection with MYSA, despite the strong denial by the *Colectivo*. The list of accusations was never short. According to the magazine *Hilderbrandt,* many MYSA workers or its subcontracting companies were pressured to participate in the meeting. In addition, tickets for a free lunch were supposedly distributed to participants, a point that matched with the author's collection of local testimony. At the same time, there were accusations that the pressure on local authorities to participate was very high. The governor of Baños del Inca district attested that representatives of the government demanded his resignation due to his refusal to participate ('*Cajamarca en su hora cero*', *Hilderbrandt*, 1 and 7 June 2012). Although these accusations regarding the Pro-Conga mobilisations are not easy to verify, it was evident that social tension between proponents and opponents was high during the period, particularly in the context of the government taking sides with the mining company.

Based on the accumulation of previous negative experiences caused by the presence of MYSA's mining operation, these political activities against the Conga project have helped create what Featherstone called 'maps of grievance', suggesting that the movement is not limited to an anti-mining protest. The first source of grievance was the government's concentration of decision-making on the mining project and its use of authoritarian measures against the movement, which raise questions about the 'democratic deficit' of Peruvian democracy. The second is associated with the limitations of the present development model based on natural resource extraction. With particular regard to the Conga project, the limited interpretation of ‘sustainable mining’, with an emphasis on ‘efficient’ management of the environment via ‘modern’ technology, has become a main contention point, insinuating different understandings of ‘sustainability’ and ‘development’. These two dimensions of ‘grievance’ will be examined in the next section.

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[194] By late July, the government came up with the idea of establishing ONDS and designated Valdimiro Huaroc as High Commissioner for Dialogue and Sustainability. The Office is expected to substitute the role of '*Oficina de Gestión de Conflictos Sociales*' (Office for Social Conflict Management) under the supervision of the Premier's office. According to Huaroc, this new entity intends to create a permanent institution for preventing and managing social conflicts across the country. This goal is expected to be carried out in coordination with regional governments, thus creating regional counterparts. The Humala government promulgated the law which created the SENACE on 19 December 2012. It is a specialised technical organisation under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment (MINAM) with an aim to approve the EIAs of private and public investment projects. The President argued that the government's goal was to transfer responsibility for approving EIAs to MINAM in order to recover the population's trust in the EIAs' reliability, which, it is hoped, will reduce environmental conflicts (media communication of the MINAM, 19 December 2012. More information available at http://www.minam.gob.pe/el-ministerio/organismos-adscritos/senace/).

[195] For more information, see http://www.yanacocha.com.pe/reservorio-chailhuagon/.

6.2. ‘Mapping the Grievance’ of MYSA’s Conga Project

Policing of the State: ‘Public Order’ for Neoliberal Extractivism

A report published by various international organisations concerned with human rights issues in Latin America stated, ‘[I]n recent years we have observed with greater concern a sharp increase in tendency to persecute, punish and criminalize social protest activities and the legitimate claims of those who promote and defend human rights, especially in cases related to large-scale economic investment’ (APRODEV et al. 2012: 1). The Peruvian case represents an obvious example given the backdrop of rising socio-environmental conflicts related to extractive industries. When the local population started to mobilise in defence of their water, environment and lives, the response of the Humala government was reminiscent of its predecessors. During the 2011 election campaign, Humala gained strong electoral support from the long-term marginalised, one section of whom are those who have suffered both socially and environmentally from mining activities.[196] Once in power, however, Humala had to decide between economic growth (largely based on mining) and socio-environmental issues (such as the protection of water resources). Facing this dilemma, Humala now argues that ‘*el oro*’ (gold) and ‘*el agua*’ (water) can go hand-in-hand.[197] For the government, the Conga project is viable if sufficient water provision is guaranteed for human consumption and economic activities, such as agriculture and mining.[198] In this view, demands for policy change are acceptable only if they do not endanger the interests of private investors and, more generally, the present economic model based on the extraction and export of natural resources. Otherwise, the central government can take all possible measures in order to maintain the neoliberal path of development. This attitude underpinned a move toward the authoritarian and unilateral position (*mano dura*) which the Humala administration adopted, especially with the appointment of the regime's second premier, an ex-military official Oscar Valdés, in December 2011. The government took *mano dura* measures to protect the interests of private investors, e.g., multinational mining companies, and increasingly used a 'law and order' rhetoric to punish opponents of the country's 'development', i.e. economic growth based on exporting natural resources. Consequently, during the first year of his administration, 15 people died and more than 800 were injured, of whom 52 per cent were wounded by firearms due to their participation in social protests (IDL, 2012: 10).[199] This number of victims demonstrates continuity with previous governments, including the highly modernist García's second regime (2006-2011), with its '*perro del hortelano*' stance.[200]

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[196] In a meeting in the city of Bambamarca during the electoral campaign in May 2011, then candidate of Gana Perú, Ollanta Humala, argued that the protection of water resources was more important than gold extraction. See the video clip of the meeting, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EP22MjFfEec.

[197] *‘Ollanta Humala sobre Conga: Queremos el agua y el oro’*, *La República*, 16 November 2011. In a press conference on arriving from an APEC meeting in Hawaii, Humala distanced himself from those who opposed the Conga project, arguing that he rejected their extreme position: ‘water or gold’.

One of the *mano dura* measures is to declare a state of emergency. According to Article 137 of the 1993 Constitution, 'the president of the republic, in accordance with the committee of ministers, can decree a state of emergency for a certain period of time (no more than 60 days) across the nation or in a specific region and should notify it to the permanent commission of the Congress'. The 'Regime of Exception' can be adopted 'in case of disturbance of peace or public order, of catastrophe or serious circumstances which can endanger the population's life'. Although this delegation of extraordinary power to the executive was intended to protect the citizens' security, its imposition should be a last resort considering that it restrains basic constitutional rights of citizens, such as the right to liberty and personal security, the right to domestic privacy, right to liberty of association, and the right of liberty of movement. In this sense, abusive use of this measure can highly restrict the basic rights of citizens or facilitate human rights violations, as occurred during the period of political violence in the 1980s and 1990s. Faced with rising social conflicts against extractive industries, the Humala administration resorted to this measure in an excessively frequent manner, even before all possible conciliatory alternatives were pursued.

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[198] In order to carry out what it called 'development with social inclusion', the use of the fiscal bonanza generated by extractive industries in social investments was one of the government's principal arguments. To meet the high expectations of many Peruvians, the government created a new Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion (MIDIS) and implemented a series of social programmes such as *Pensión 65, Cuna Más, Juntos, Quli Warma, Beca 18,* among others (For more information, see MIDIS website: www.midis.gob.pe). Once the Conga project was suspended, the government came up with an additional investment plan, which is estimated to be S/. 200 million in potable water and sanitation systems, S/. 756 million in road construction and S/. 230 million in rural electrification ('*Región Cajamarca recibirá menos recursos repliegue de algunos proyectos mineros*', *La República*, 16 January 2013).

[199] By March 2013, the number of citizen deaths rose to 24 and 649 civilians were injured, according to Rocío Silva Santisteban, president of the CNDDHH, available at http://minacorrupta.wordpress.com/tag/grufides/page/2/.

[200] During the second presidency of García, 191 people died, including 153 civilians and 38 police and military forces. Approximately 600 citizens were arrested or prosecuted for their involvement in social protests (IDL, 2012: 10). See also '*Conflictos sociales: 191 muertos durante último gobierno de Alan García*', *La República*, 29 August 2011.

During the protests in Cajamarca, the first state of emergency was imposed in four provinces (Cajamarca, Celendín, Hualgayoc and Contunmazá) on 4 December 2011 (D.S. No. 093-2011-PCM) and generated widespread criticism of how the government dealt with the movement. When faced with violent confrontations between demonstrators and the police, the Humala government declared another state of emergency in Cajamarca on 4 July 2012 (D.S. No. 070-2012-PCM) and extended it for another month.[201] An abusive act under the state of emergency became apparent when constitutional rights were restricted before the measure took effect. One example was the violent detention of ex-priest and environmental activist Marco Arana on 4 July 2012 when he was sitting with a placard ('*Conga No Va*', 'No to Conga') in the main square of Cajamarca city.[202] This police repression took place before the government's measure was due to take effect, which was to be the next day, 5 July 2012 (IDL, 2012: 17).

Parallel to this particular coercive measure, the government criminalised leaders and participants in social protests, a result being a plethora of legal charges inflicted against them: the number of local authorities and social leaders who were accused amounted to more than 94 by May 2012.[203] On December 2011, several movement leaders were detained without clear reason after attending a meeting (the Commission for Indigenous People National Congress) in Lima. Wilfredo Saavedra (an ex-member of MRTA and president of the Front of Environmental Defence of Cajamarca) and Milton Sánchez (president of the PIC) were arrested and transferred to DIRCOTE (the Counter-Terrorist Directorate) along with other leaders. After more than eight hours in custody, they were released.[204] In terms of the criminalisation of the movement, it is worthwhile listening to Mirtha Vásquez, a lawyer and administrative manager of the local environmental NGO, GRUFIDES, who argues that:

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[201] See '*Ollanta Humala declara Estado de Emergencia en provincias de Cajamarca*', *La República*, 4 December 2011; and '*El Gobierno declare Estado de Emergencia en tres provincias de Cajamarca*', *La República*, 4 July 2012. In the face of growing tensions in the province of Espinar (Cusco department) due to social protests against the Xstrata Tintaya mining company, the Humala government decreed a state of emergency on 29 May 2012 (D.S. No. 056-2012-PCM). See '*Estado de Emergencia en Espinar fue oficializado hoy en diario 'El Peruano'*', *La República*, 29 May 2012.

[202] See a video clip of this detention, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Bw8FCelp8w.

[203] '*CUL: Denunciaremos a la fiscalía'*, *El Mercurio*, 8 May 2012. According to a recent Front Line Defenders

> The Humala government detained people who were associated with protests against the Conga project, a policy implemented to criminalise social movement leaders and participants, many of whom have already been accused. In other words, this is a total persecution against those who are engaged in the anti-Conga protests. Now the government's response has strengthened in order to ensure its pro-Conga position. Measures taken against social movement leaders, participants, and local people are really abusive, representing an alliance between the mining company and the military (suggesting the president and then prime minister, Oscar Valdés, who are former military officer).[205]

Although a number of legal charges were closed due to a lack of evidence, legal proceedings hampered activists by 'interrupting their work', 'restricting travel', 'imposing upon them the pressure of high legal costs' as well as 'psychological pressure', measures aimed at undermining their commitment (CIDSE, 2011: 3).

Simultaneously, the Humala government introduced the administrative resolution 096-2012-CE-PJ on 1 June 2012 with the aim to change legal jurisdiction to other departments. This targeted Cajamarca and Cusco, with prosecution being transferred to Lambayeque and Ica respectively (IDL, 2012: 35).[206] It was argued by opponents that this measure was unjust

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(FLD)'s report, leaders had had at least 30 legal proceedings opened against them, although they have never been convicted: Milton Sánchez under approximately 50 lawsuits, Ydelso Hernández with more than 45 and Edy Benavídes with 30 cases more or less. The FLD was 'founded in Dublin in 2001 with the specific aim of protecting human rights defenders at risk, people who work, non-violently, for any or all of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'. Its report, titled 'Environmental Rights Defenders at Risk in Peru', is available at http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/peru-reportonhumanrightsdefenders.

[204] '*Dirigentes de Cajamarca sufrieron absurda detención de diez horas*', *La República*, 7 December 2011.

[205] 'Justamente están deteniendo la gente que está en contra del Conga. Esto es una política que es para criminalizar todas las protestas. Han hecho varias denuncias. Hay una total persecución hacia la protesta por el tema de Conga. Ahora es durísimo porque el gobierno no quiere dar una marcha atrás. Lo que está haciendo es una actitud sumamente abusiva contra los movimientos sociales, contra la población misma, una alianza entre la empresa minera y los militares'. Interview with Mirtha Vázquez: Cajamarca, 13 March 2012.

[206] 'The resolution found bases on the Article 24 of new criminal code which the Justice is delegated with power to establish a special system of judgement on the criminals who committed a serious crime' (IDL, 2012:

because it 'creates obstacles to legal access for *campesinos* and local authorities' (IDL, 2012: 37). The state's hostility to the protesters involved other measures. As the regional government and its president have actively supported the movement, pressure from the central government became intense. Lima obstructed the transfer of revenue to sub-national governments via the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) (IDL, 2012 15). In addition, according to one national newspaper, official spokespeople accused the regional president, Gregorio Santos, of diverting public resources to support the movement.[207] In response to a National Audit Office inspection, Santos argued that this action was part of the central government's strategy of intimidation with the intention of destabilising and dividing the movement. The list of denunciations against Santos and the regional government is endless.[208] As part of this destabilising strategy, the Lima government also tried to erode the influence of Santos by negotiating with mayors of districts in the Cajamarca region.[209]

Alongside the criminalisation of social protest, the government also militarised the region. This measure was accompanied by legal regulations that facilitated human rights abuses, while granting impunity to the military and police. When the announcement of the *peritaje internacional* report on the EIA was imminent, movement leaders (including Milton Sánchez, Idelso Hernández and Edy Benavídez) made public their plan to carry out a series of mobilisations and regional strikes. In response, Lima sent nearly one thousand police and

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35). In this way, the Public Prosecutor's Office emitted two resolutions: No.1343-2012-MP-FN for the transfer of jurisdiction from Cusco to Ica and No. 1344-2012-MP-FN, from Cajamarca to Lambayeque, on 31 May 2012 (IDL, 2012: 36). Additionally, the Executive Committee of the Justice and the Public Prosecutor's Office announced another administrative resolution No. 136-2012-CE-PJ, dictating that legal proceedings would be moved to Lima (IDL, 2012: 36).

[207] According to one conservative national newspaper, it was argued that Gregorio Santos not only diverted resources of infant nutrition programmes by financially supporting the consulting fees and costs of the movement, but also ordered local schools to participate in anti-mining marches, ('*Santos oblige a los colegios a marchar contra Conga*', *Perú 21*, 11 March 2012). In the case of Espinar, the mayor, Óscar Mollohuanca, was arrested by the police after his leadership in social protests against Xstrata Tintaya. '*Alcalde de Espinar fue detenido por policías tras dejar la clandestinidad*', *El Comercio,* 30 May 2012.

[208] Faced with allegations over his supposed involvement in corruption on granting public works contracts, Gregorio Santos recently faced a preventative detention on 25 June 2014. Despite this, Santos was inscribed in the JNE as a candidate for MAS (the *Movimiento de Afirmación Social*) in his attempt for re-election. '*Confirman detención preventiva contra Gregorio Santos*', *La República*, 14 July 2014. 'He is the third regional president detained in this way in recent months as part of the government's crampdown on corruption' (Peru Support Group (PSG) News, 31 July 2014).

[209] According to the magazine *Hilderbrandt*, 'The government attempts to weaken the influence of Santos in the region, in direct coordination with lower ranking local authorities ... There are 16 legal charges instigated by the public prosecutor against Santos. The National Attorney Office accused him of disturbing the public peace and not respecting his obligation of public service' ('*Conga sabe que ya ganó y Cajamarca espera*', 16-22 March 2012).

military to the provinces of Cajamarca, Bambamarca and Celendín. The president of the regional government denounced the measure as constituting ‘militarisation’ and an attempt to intimidate the population. According to local leaders, a recent legislative bill on ‘the use of the state’s lethal power in cases of protests’ was approved in Congress.[210] Unsurprisingly, this approach by the security forces caused many injuries and five deaths in Celendín and Bambamarca, with impunity for those responsible. In an interview with a *rondero* from Celendín, one of 17 people injured in a mobilisation in November 2011, he described how he was shot by the police during their peaceful march: ‘The police shot me. We were in a peaceful march in defence of our water and environment and the police were shooting at us. I went to help my injured *compañero* (friend) who was shot by the police and it was then that I was shot. I lost the vision in my right eye’.[211] Violent reactions from the military and police also extended to non-threatening activities: e.g. when local women opened an *olla comun* in the Plaza Bolognesi (Cajamarca), the police attacked the activity, beating women and a local journalist.[212]

Regarding the militarisation of social protests, several legal regulations are noteworthy. García’s second administration (2006-2011) announced a series of decrees: in late July 2007, 11 legislative decrees, including Decree Laws 982, 983, 988, and 989, were introduced with an aim to strengthen sentences for social disturbances for up to 25 years and guaranteed immunity for the police and military forces from prosecution when they used their arms in order to control protests.[213] Of these decree laws, ‘Article 1 of Decree Law 982 amends Article 20 of the Penal Code, declaring that members of the armed forces and national police are not subject to criminal liability for causing injury or death *in the line of duty and when using their weapons in accordance with regulations* (emphasis in the original)’ (APRODEV, 2012: 5). One notorious case of the militarisation of social protests related to natural resource extraction under the García regime involved the resistance of indigenous people in the department of Amazonas (the 'Baguazo'). On September 2010, these measures were reinforced with yet more emergency decrees, including the legal provisions 1095 and 1097, which legitimised the use of lethal arms to control social conflicts and attempted to place protesters on trial as a preventive measure.[214] In particular, Decree Law 1095 facilitated the militarisation and criminalisation of social protests, securing impunity for military and police forces.[215] This decree under the previous regime facilitated military intervention in the protest against the Conga project. In addition, a draft legal bill was submitted to the legislature (*proyecto de Ley*, No. 81/2011-CR) which intends to extend the application of Decree Law 1095 to the national police.[216]

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[210] ‘CUL: Denunciaremos a la fiscalía’, *El Mercurio,* 8 May 2012. A recently proclaimed Law No. 30151 ‘granted members of the armed forces and the national police *exemption from criminal responsibility* if they cause injury or death, including through the use of guns or other weapons while on duty’ (FLD report, June 2014, emphasis in the original). According to the report, the law was initially suggested by the Fujimori bloc in Congress in September 2011, which received approval in June 2013 amid a lot of controversy.

[211] ‘A mí me baleó la policía. Estabamos en la marcha pacífica, en defensa de nuestra agua y nuestro medio ambiente. La policía nos disparaba. Fui a recoger a un compañero herido de bala y allí me dieron balazo. Perdí la vista de ojo derecho’ (Interview, informant B, Celendín, 28 March 2012).

[212] See a video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfTRyO5qWuQ.

[213] Mirtha Vasquez, ‘*Un gobierno pro minero hasta el final*’, available at http://www.noticiasser.pe/25/07/2011/cavilando/un-gobierno-pro-minero-hasta-el-final

Against this backdrop, privatisation of the public security system has contributed to the vulnerability of rights for activists and the local population. Following changes in the work system of police officers (working every other day) under the first García administration (1985-1990), they were allowed to provide security services for a third party other than the Peruvian state on their off-duty days by the Fujimori government, called 'individualised (security) services' ('*servicios individualizados*') (Costa and Romero, 2011: 88; see also Kamphuis, 2012). One prominent private security company working for mining multinationals, is FORZA. A notorious example of its operations was found in the media exposure of photos in January 2009, when 29 *comuneros* of Yanta and Segunda y Cajas (provinces of Ayabaca and Huamcabamba in the northern department of Piura) were captured and tortured by members of the police and FORZA guarding the Majaz mining site.[217] On 1 August 2005, a group of community members (including two women) were kidnapped after demonstrating against the project and were tortured by members of DINOES and FORZA for three days, causing the death of one *campesino*. Despite accusations of torture and mistreatment, as well as sexual harassment against two women, the prosecutor, whose presence at the incident was confirmed in photos, accused the victims of inciting violence. While legal complaints were submitted by the Peruvian NGO, FEDEPAZ (*Fundación Ecuménica para el Desarrollo y la Paz*, Ecumenic Foundation for Development and Peace) in 2008, no charges were brought against those who were responsible for the incident (Kamphuis, 2012: 545). Concurrently, legal proceedings against Moterrico Metals and its Peruvian subsidiary were initiated in the English High Court in early 2009 and on 20 July 2011, 'the company settled the case out of court by compensation payments and without admitting liability'.[218]

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[214] See footnote 209.

[215] The decree 1095 permits: 'the intervention of armed forces during social protest without prior declaration of a state of emergency'; 'the implementation of exclusive military actions to counteract the activities of "hostile groups" (whose definition is ambiguous enough to encompass peaceful social protest movements)'; 'giving military and police forces jurisdiction to judge "unlawful conduct attributable to military personnel as a result of actions taken in the application of this Decree" (APRODEV, 2012: 5).

[216] See http://comisedh.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/preocupante-situacion-de-riesgo-para.html.

[217] '*En Majaz sí se torturó el año 2005*', *La República*, 9 January 2009; '*Barbariedad en Majaz*', *La República,* 10 January 2009. Minera Majaz, then owned by British mining company Monterrico Metals, acquired concessions for the Río Blanco copper mining project in 2003. In April 2009, almost 90 per cent of the stake was acquired by the Chinese Zijin mining consortium (Zijin Mining Group (45%), Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group (35%) and Xiamen Construction and Development (20%)) from Monterrico Metals (see Bebbington et al., 2007). '*En Majaz sí se torturó el año 2005*', *La República*, 9 January 2009; '*Barbariedad en Majaz*', *La República*, 10 January 2009.

In Cajamarca, FORZA has provided MYSA with a private security service since 1993, while the police had a 'confidential contract' with the mining company for the same purpose (Kamphuis, 2012: 548). This private security company conducted a 'systemic program of digital surveillance, intimidation, death threats, and defamation – which primarily targeted GRUFIDES personnel, but also spanned approximately 30 other related local environmentalists and *campesino* leaders in 2006, which was called the 'Operation Devil' ('*Operación Diablo*') (Kamphuis, 2012: 550). The Operation has been conducted at the request of FORZA when conflicts arose between the *comuneros* of Combayo and MYSA in 2006.[219] According to Kamphuis, 'in 2009, GRUFIDES lawyers filed a petition with the Inter-American Court on Human Rights ("IACHR"), alleging that the Peruvian State violated its obligation under the American Convention on Human Rights to prevent and sanction these crimes', although a decision has been delayed for many years (2012: 550-551). Recently, Marco Arana, one of the main targets of the spying, argued that the Operation Devil continued in relation to the Conga project.[220] Persecution and threats also occurred against members of GRUFIDES during the Conga conflict.[221]

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[218] Available at http://business-humanrights.org/en/monterrico-metals-lawsuit-re-peru-0#c18018.

[219] For documentation of the persecution against members of the environmental NGO, GRUFIDES, see the documentary, The 'Operation Devil' (Guarango, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tWPE0I2KesE . Afterwards, GRUFIDES had to move their office to another location, and the distrust displayed towards anyone outside the NGO or the movement seemed especially high, which was noted when I visited for an interview with its members.

In explaining strategies of policing transnational protests, della Porta et al. note:

> at stake are not only personal freedoms but also citizens' rights to political participation, and thus the very essence of the democratic system. The public order strategies employed by the police reflect the respect the state shows for the rights and freedoms of citizens. In this sense, policemen acting to control protest demonstrations is perceived not just as a representative of political power but also as an indicator of the quality of democracy in the political system (2006: 150).

Echoing her reflection, the *mano dura* measures, such as the state of emergency, criminalisation of activists, militarisation and impunity for those responsible, point to the limitations of Peruvian democracy. They restrict freedom of association, demonstration, and highlight a lack of access to justice, alongside limits to people's participation in decision-making processes. Through acts of resistance, movement participants located one of the main causes of 'grievance', instead of adopting strategically 'global justice frames' to use it for their local protests within the structure of domination and resistance. Locating this grievance generated by the neoliberal state's authoritarian measures was made possible in the process of political practices by diverse social groups at different spatialities, which facilitated the construction of CENs and brought this lack of democracy into contestation, as will be examined later.

Sustainable Mining: 'Modern' and 'Efficient' Management of Environment

As mentioned in Chapter 4, 'sustainable mining' is a concept that comprises two components: 'social inclusion' and 'environmental sustainability'. The former involves the distribution of *canon minero* to local or regional governments, as well as CSR programmes, while the latter focuses on efficient management of the environment. MYSA has argued that it undertakes 'socially and environmentally responsible' mining and stated that the Conga project should be carried out in order to further regional development. The main controversy surrounding the investment is MYSA's plan to construct four reservoirs which, it posits, are more 'efficient' than the existing natural lakes in guaranteeing water provision. In an interview with an employee of the company's environmental office of the Conga project, it was argued that:

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[220] http://www.rpp.com.pe/2013-01-16-cajamarca-marco-arana-sostiene-que-operacion-diablo-continua-noticia_558427.html

[221] http://www.noticiasser.pe/19/12/2012/cajamarca/mirtha-vasquez-y-sergio-sanchez-de-grufides-denuncian-agresion

> Minerals are located close to lakes Chailhuagón and Perol. Therefore, these lakes could be affected and this is why the company intends to construct reservoirs that will have a better capacity of water provision than the lakes since they will be used for mineral extraction as well as for local communities.[222]

According to this source, environmental impacts could be addressed through advanced 'modern' technology, while securing water provision to local populations is considered as 'the best possible' solution. However, on 29 March 2012 a local congressman, Jorge Rimarachín, confirmed after his visit to the reservoir San José – which was completed and inaugurated in the presence of ex-president Alan García on 28 April 2008, by MYSA – that it was practically empty.[223] In other words, the reservoir was not functioning as the mining company had been arguing. In response, MYSA demonstrated that the reservoir was undergoing maintenance work, a position that did little to alleviate the concerns of the local population.[224] Securing sufficient water provision was argued to be favourable both to local communities and the company's mineral extraction. MYSA emphasised this element of 'environmental sustainability' with an aim to enable gold extraction to proceed. Indicatively, beyond this limited meaning of sustainability (i.e. securing sufficient water provision via efficient management) demands or debates were viewed by officials as something 'political'. Indeed, for both MYSA and the government, the 'political' should be separated from 'economic' considerations. Consequently, arguments made by opponents of the project are considered to conceal political interests or a lack of information, which can be inferred from the following interview:

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[222] 'Los minerales están bien cerquitas a la laguna Chaihuagón y la laguna Perol. Entonces de todas maneras se van a impactar las lagunas. Lo que propone la minera Yanacocha es construir reservorios. Estos reservorios tendrán mucho más capacidad que las lagunas porque reservorios van a servir tanto para las minera también para poder dar agua para las comunidades', Interview, informant C, Cajamarca, 18 March 2012.

[223] This reservoir was constructed in the district of Baños del Inca and its storage capacity is expected to be six million cubic metres with promises of sufficient water provision for Cajamarca. The congressman argued that the reservoir has been empty since late 2011. See '*Cajamarca: Reservorio San José enciende la polémica entre Yanacocha, Rimarachín y Santos*', *La República*, 29 March 2012.

[224] '*Reservorio San José de Yanacocha está vacío desde el año pasado*', *La República*, 6 July 2012.

> People here think that MYSA's plan to construct artificial reservoirs will not be materialised as planned. They consider the idea is practically unviable. According to our estimation, they will be assimilated to the natural ecosystem over time. In this sense, criticisms over the construction of reservoirs are technically groundless. Rather, opponents seem to be politically-minded radicals and distort people's perception with wrong information. The regional president wants to improve his popularity rating among sectors C and D (mainly from the economically vulnerable population) via his involvement in the movement. In other words, Santos wants to be president of Peru in the future. Poor people are tired of the fact that the mining company earn more, while they are left nearly empty-handed. In the past, 'irresponsible' mining caused environmental damages. Therefore, people equate the mining company with contamination. However, MYSA is one of the companies which are concerned with environmental management and thus invest in high-end technology.[225]

This stance suggests that there is a clear line drawn between 'economy' and 'politics'. Accordingly, 'sustainable mining' should be distinctively separated from any 'political' debates. 'Sustainability' is acceptable when it comes to technological and managerial questions. From this perspective, social or community development programmes are designed and monitored by a 'professional' team while environmental issues should be 'managed' through advanced 'modern' technology. By holding this attitude and adopting this 'technocratic' approach, MYSA could claim it engaged in 'responsible mining, different from the 'irresponsible' mining conducted in the previous decades.[226] Based on this understanding of 'sustainability', fundamental environmental problems (such as regulations on the use of toxic materials, mitigation of contamination, ecological and geological impacts of mining activities) fall into the 'political' arena, which generates unnecessary and inefficient obstacles to mineral extraction. Accordingly, as Bridge and McManus point out: '[B]y redefining the nexus of environment/development discourse in terms of resource efficiency, professionalism, and best-practice standards –rather than pollution, degradation, and waste – corporate discourses concerning mining and the environment create a basis for common ground between stakeholder groups that, individually or collectively, could oppose corporate interests' (2000: 36). In this way, differing understandings of sustainable mining and the environment was signalled as another cause for creating grievances in the process of resistance against the Conga project. The next section examines how opponents contest these 'maps of grievance', i.e. the '*mano dura*' of the neoliberal state and limited understandings of 'sustainable mining', within what I term 'counter-extractive networks' (CENs). How they construct a political identity of 'environmental justice (EJ)' in the process of contesting neoliberal extractivism will also explored.

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[225] 'Las personas aquí no creen que el plan va a pasar como se ha planteado. Tienen la idea de que un reservorio no puede sustituir una laguna. Pero con los años, estos reservorios también forman sus propios ecosistemas. Así que eso no es un problema de tecnología, sino de política. Los protestantes son radicales que están desinformando a la gente. El presidente regional está buscando más popularidad y aceptación del sector C y D… porque tal vez quiere ser el presidente de la nación en el futuro. Están cansados de que las empresas mineras transnacionales ganan mucho, pero las personas de abajo no ganan, casi nada. También ha habido minerías irresponsables en el pasado. Antes, había mucha contaminación. Las personas piensan que lo único que la empresa minera hace es contaminar. Ahora a las minerías grandes les exigen mucho más controles. Yanacocha invierte más dinero en el tema ambiental, la última technología', Interview, Informant C, Cajamarca, 18 March 2012.

[226] In explaining the sustainable development narrative of US mining companies, Bridge and McManus expounded, 'the technological processes involved in mining are recast as "enhancements" that add value to nature. […]Wetland creation, the planting of native shrubs and grasses and the mitigation of endangered habitats are frequently paraded as evidence of mining's ability to improve environmental quality and contribute to the goals of sustainable development', position similar to MYSA's reservoir construction (2000: 35-36).

6.3. 'Counter-Extractive Networks' and Constructing Political Identity of 'Environmental Justice'

Constructing Counter-Extractive Networks for Sustainable Development

The term, 'counter-extractive networks' (CENs), is borrowed from Featherstone's 'counter-global networks' in his account of networked forms of subaltern politics which contest the dominant ways of globalisation and wherein 'prefigurative solidarity' is constructed among subjectivities located at different spatialites. This is based on a relational geographical ontology, beyond 'place-boundedness'. The concept is grounded in 'Gramsci's notion of counter-hegemony which signalled forms of resistance constituted through connections and articulations between unlike actors' (Featherstone, 2008: 22). Featherstone attempts to elucidate 'the diverse forms of geographies of connection', or 'unruly patterns of flow and alliances', rather than 'a smooth space of flows' posited by Hardt and Negri (2008: 22, 34). By doing this, Featherstone highlights 'forms of agency and identity constituted through spatially stretched forms of resistance' and thus sees political imaginaries of social groups that bring into contestation neoliberal globalisation in an antagonistic way (2008: 34). I find the term useful in the sense that it can illuminate the political possibility of trans-local networks which have been created among various actors in opposition to neoliberal extractivism. Rather than viewing place-based local resistance as a reactionary response to the advance of global capital, I understand that struggles against new mineral extraction created the CENs around the ‘maps of grievance’ above, which played as a ‘converging space’ where local, national and global actors make connections and interactions: i.e. ‘prefigurative solidarity’. Within the CENs, subaltern actors can locate ‘maps of grievance’ via political activism and construct political identity by bringing into contestation neoliberal forms of mineral extraction. This is important since the local-global geographical binary tends to be understood within a bifurcated power structure: the powerless vs. the powerful, only viewing the former as a passive receiver of the latter’s benevolent actions and being deprived of political power. In contrast, actors can create solidarity in a ‘prefigurative’ way and the CENs created via political activities. Accordingly, they also construct a political identity, being ‘entangled’ with negotiations and contentions. Based on this conceptualisation, I will develop how opponents of the Conga project created the movement CENs via mobilisations around ‘maps of grievance’ (i.e. authoritarian neoliberal state in defence of mineral extraction and the limited understanding of ‘sustainable’ mining). Equally, this networked form of resistance questioned the quality of Peruvian democracy as well as the present development model and this is where a EJ political identity was constructed.

Many national and international NGOs started to get involved in mining-related issues from the late 1990s, alongside base organisations such as peasant communities and the *rondas campesinas*. They were largely committed to sustainable development and promoting the well-being of marginalised people. There has been an increasing coordination between these NGOs and base organisations which have been constructing the loose form of the CENs in order to address various problems caused by mining activities. For example, five peasant communities in the province of Espinar (Cusco) in the neighbourhood of the Tintaya mine were concerned with an unfair land sale process and environmental impacts, and decided to create CORECAMI Cusco in 1998 (Aroca, 2008: 150-151). Simultaneously, peasants began to receive technical advice from a Peruvian NGO, CooperAcción.[227] In November 2000, CONACAMI, on behalf of CORECAMI Cusco and local peasant communities, asked the mining Ombudsman office of Oxfam Australia to address problems with the then owner of Tintaya mine, BHP Billiton (Aroca, 2008: 151).[228] CooperAcción supported this effort with a legal and environmental report, describing problems which local communities faced (Aroca, 2008: 152). On 10 December 2001, Oxfam Australia called all the actors concerned, including BHP Billiton, CONACAMI, CORECAMI Cusco, Oxfam America, CooperAcción and the mayor of Espinar province, Óscar Mollohuanca, to convene a meeting, which constituted an initial process of dialogue (Aroca, 2008: 153). An important decision to open a round table (*mesa del diálogo*) rose from this gathering and subsequently committees examining four themes (land, environment, human rights, and sustainable development) were established (Aroca, 2008: 153-156). Finally, a series of agreements were reached in December 2004. This articulation of diverse concerned actors and the creation of a dialogue roundtable were partially successful within a loosely created network.[229]

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[227] This national NGO was founded in July 1997, with an aim to promote consciousness of social, environmental, political, cultural and economic rights and to materialise them in reality, as well as to develop sustainable territorial administration with a gender and multicultural emphasis. The director of this organisation, José de Echave, took a position of the deputy minister of environment under Humala’s first cabinet. However, he resigned from the post amid mobilisations against Conga project in late November 2011. See ‘*Viceministro de Gestión Ambiental José de Echave presentó su carta de renuncia*’, *La República*, 28 November 2011.

Another example of the impact of CENs involves the case of conflict between Manhattan Minerals Corporation (MMC), a Canadian junior mining company, and the local population of Tambogrande (Piura department, located on the northern coast) in the exploration process of a gold mine. This is considered to be one of the most successful cases, leading to the cancellation of a project via local mobilisation between 1999 and 2003 and a subsequent referendum. The main concern for local denizens was its possible impact on agriculture, despite the MMC's argument for its compatibility with mining activities. Faced with this problem, local organisations, including *la Junta Administrativa de Regantes del Valle de San Lorenzo, la Asociación de Colonos, la Asociación de Agricultores de Mango y Limón*, three nearby peasant communities, as well as urban organisations and political associations, created the *Frente de Defensa de Tambogrande* (FDTG) in August 1999 (Paredes, 2008: 273, 285). In April 2000, a trans-local network, *Mesa Técnica de Tambogrande* (MTT) was created, consisting of various local and national groups, mainly NGOs: including the 'local deaconry of Catholic Church, *Propuesta Regional*, CEAS (*Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social*), CooperAcción, civil association Labor, ECO (now Andes) and SPDA (*Sociedad Peruana de*

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[228] The ownership of Tintaya mine changed various times in the aftermath of its privatisation. In 1994, concessions were acquired by the US Magma Copper Company, which was integrated into the Australian corporation, the Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd. (BHP), in 1996. BHP was merged with the UK enterprise Billiton Plc., i.e. BHP-Billiton (Aroca, 2008: 140). The Swiss-based Xstrata acquired the mine from BHP-Billiton in 2006.

[229] However, protests ensued in the following years partly due to unfulfilled promises, as well as by communities excluded from the distribution of material benefits from this agreement.

Derecho Ambiental)', as well as FEDEPAZ (Paredes, 2008: 287). The MTT played an important complementary role, by providing the FDTG with legal assistance, along with communicating expertise (Paredes, 2008: 288-289). In the face of increasing conflicts, the MTT planned a local referendum (*consulta vecinal* or *popular*) in coordination with the FDTG and district municipality, in an attempt to find a peaceful solution (Paredes, 2008: 293).[230] On 2 June 2002, the referendum took place with US$ 20,000 of funding supported by Oxfam UK. Some 98.6 per cent of participants showed their opposition to mining (Paredes, 2008: 295-297). In the end, the MINEM in Lima announced that the MMC was not qualified to maintain the mining concession in Tambogrande on 12 December 2003 (Paredes, 2008: 298). This cancellation of the mining project represented a successful example of 'counter-extractive networks', comprised of networks of local organisations and national and international NGOs. In the process of creating trans-local networks, a national organisation, RED MUQUI, was created in 2004 (Bebbington et al. 2007: 12). Subsequently, these CENs played an important role in mobilisations against the Rio Blanco project (also in Piura department).

CENs for the Opposition to Conga: From Social to Environmental Justice

A long list of social protests by *cajamarquinos* against MYSA's mining activities over the past two decades created a loose form of CENs, which became an integral part of the anti-Conga movement. During the initial mobilisation stage, representatives of *rondas campesinas* from each village, district and province actively participated in regional assemblies, sharing their experience of local problems generated by mining activities and debating possible strategies to counteract them. For example, the regional meeting of 'the fronts of defence, municipal environmental commission, *rondas campesinas* and social organisation' took place in the SUTEP offices in Bambamarca, 18 and 19 August 2011, even before mobilisations against the Conga project commenced. Many *ronderos* from different provinces expressed their concerns about the Conga project and emphasised the necessity of unity in the proposed action plans. These *rondas* assemblies laid the basis for alliances with their counterparts and other grassroots social organisations. Coordination occurred with activists from different regions who shared similar problems or who sympathised with their cause. NGOs and other social organisations, not only departmental but from across Peru, often coordinate workshops which provide an opportunity for grassroots activists to exchange their experiences and propose alternatives. I had an opportunity to participate in one of these workshops via my informant, a meeting that took place in Cajamarca in September 2011, before the anti-Conga movement gained visibility. It concerned a workshop organised by a network of NGOs, including GRUFIDES and Red Muqui, environmental activists and educators, among others. Participants presented their experiences and the methods employed to mount successful collective actions, the aim being to share information and views on various issues (see Photo 4). This kind of public space was coordinated through the initiative of NGOs and their networks, and went in tandem with the peasants' regional meetings in preparation for collective action. Importantly, the contribution of these urban actors to peasant mobilisations provided an opportunity to exchange opinions about issues such as the environment, human rights and sustainable development. From these beginnings, in March 2012, hundreds of delegates from every province of Cajamarca gathered in Celendín in order to elaborate their movement's collective action strategy (See Photo 5).[231] They also held macro regional assemblies in coordination with other social organisations, including the Fronts of Defence (*Frentes de Defensa*), SUTEP, the CGTP (the national labour union), university students, NGOs (including local environmental NGOs, GRUFIDES and Red Muqui), and even the regional government. In one such event, held in Cajamarca (February 2012), representatives from Amazonian and Northern coastal regions also attended the assembly in the city's SUTEP building. During the day-long meeting, participants raised their voice in accord, arguing that it was impossible to allow the Conga project to proceed in an ecologically vulnerable area; in consequence, it was stressed, participants needed to be united in order to confront the asymmetrical power relations. Moreover, many grassroots entities in Celendín formed an umbrella group, the PIC (Inter-institutional Platform Celendina, with Milton Sánchez as its leader), with the aim to act cohesively and pursue a unified strategy. According to one member, the PIC was composed of more than 35 base groups, including the *rondas campesinas*, Fronts of Defence and SUTEP; more organisations joined as the resistance gained momentum. As the movement needed to become more coordinated and strategically unified in the face of government repression, participants established the CUL (*Comité Unitario de Lucha*, Unified Committee of Struggle), with Idelso Hernández as its leader.

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[230] Local populations who expressed their firm opposition to various mining projects via the '*consulta vicinal* or *ciudadana*' (local referendum) include Tambogrande (2002); Majaz (2007); and Islay (2009) (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 145). The Tambogrande case was followed by other anti-mining movements in Latin America: e.g. Esquel (Patagonia, Argentina) in March 2003 and Sipacapa case (San Marcos, Guatemala) in June 2005. Regarding the anti-Conga movement, there were a lot of talks about proceeding with a *consulta popular*, particularly among the movement leaders by the time their protests reached their zenith during the first half of 2012. But the plan did not materialise (my fieldnote).

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[231] Hundreds of *ronderos* (composing a majority), union members, activists and NGOs at the event showed how much concern the project had generated (My participation on 28 and 29 March).

Photo 4.

Photo: taken by the author, Cajamarca (2 September 2011).

Photo 5.

Photo: taken by the author at SUTEP heaquarters in Celendín (28 March 2012).

Within the CENs, the *rondas campesinas* play a prominent role in the preparation and coordination of collective action. This base organisation's function is grounded in their previous experience and has earned legitimacy among the rural population. Through the *ronda* experience, peasants have come to believe they have the ability to be an agent in determining their own destiny. Despite the ebb and flow of *ronda* activities, their legitimacy, based on their capacity to solve problems, has been maintained among the population. As Muños et al. (2007) argue, this legitimacy has even become a source of collective identity among the local population. In other words, people are not hesitant to identify themselves as *ronderos*. Muños et al. have explained that:

> … in a region where ethnicity is not likely to be the mobilizing factor, since indigenous language and traditions have for the most part not endured, another powerful identity has created itself – the *ronda*. This identity is focused on a feeling of "efficiency", and on the recognition of their important role in the community a number of *ronderos* who were interviewed said that they were proud that the *ronda* effectively sorted out problems of rustling, boundary disputes and even domestic conflicts, rapidly and with almost no additional costs (2007: 1933).

Facing the enormous power asymmetry created by multinational capital, the local population recognises the legitimacy of the *rondas campesinas* based on the effectiveness of previous activities and the promotion of social justice for peasants. When peasants are faced with a new challenge or crisis, they possess a vehicle to organise themselves – even if this is mostly at village level – in order to solve their problems. In the anti-Conga movement, participants associate this *rondero* identity with their cause for social justice. As one informant argued, being a *rondero* was the reason for engagement since their protests against the project are well grounded in technical, legal, social and environmental justice.[232] Another informant stated: ‘We as *ronderos*, all the population of Celendín, and almost the whole region of Cajamarca, participated in the march. We are fighting against the mining company and the state. As *rondas campesinas*, we organise ourselves because we do not have any support from the authorities. The law is not for us and that is why we organise ourselves’.[233] Idelso Hernández, a movement leader, argued in a speech delivered at a regional march, ‘Our *rondas campesinas* are an example of justice and dignity…We are organised here to demand before the President, Ollanta Humala, premier, Oscar Valdés, and the mining company Yanacocha, that we, *cajamarquinos*, do not want to be fooled again with more marginalisation. We are people who have courage and require respect and dignity for which Cajamarca is united here.’[234]

In addition, the Catholic Church forms part of the CENs of the anti-Conga movement. In particular, the San Francisco Church and now deceased priest, Issac Shahuano, showed a great deal of solidarity with the movement.[235] The Church offered accommodation and food for peasants coming from other provinces to participate in mobilisations.[236] Moreover, the gate and wall around the San Francisco church became filled with posters and placards placed there by movement participants (see Photo 6). Many of them expressed firm opposition to the Conga project in defence of water, proclaiming that the mining company has not brought ‘progress’ but ‘contamination’.[237] Some posters provided technical information and critical comments on the proposed scheme. Demonstrators also congregated around the church whenever protests occurred and sometimes movement leaders gave speeches in front of the church gate.

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[232] ‘Siendo rondero, estoy participando en esta lucha. Nuestra lucha es técnicamente, legalmente, socialmente y ecológicamente justa’ (a conversation with Informant D, in a march in Cajamarca, 9 April 2012).

[233] ‘Nosotros como ronderos, el pueblo de Celendín y casi toda Cajamarca, participamos en la marcha. Estamos luchando contra la Empresa y el Estado. Nos organizamos porque no contamos con el apoyo de las autoridades. A nosotros la ley no nos apoya, por eso, nos organizamos para luchar por nuestros derechos’, Interview, Informant E, Celendín, 28 March 2012.

[234] ‘Nuestra rondas campesinas son ejemplo de justicia y dignidad... Estamos aquí para decirles al presidente Humala, al premier Valdés, a la empresa Yanacocha, que nosotros, los cajamarquinos no vamos a permitir más burla, más marginación, y estamos aquí todo el pueblo para hacer respetar la dignidad y el coraje que nosotros cajamarquinos nos merecemos. Para decirle al Gobierno central que Cajamarca está unido’. From my notes during a regional march, 9 March 2012.

[235] The main square of the city of Cajamarca has two Catholic churches. Sited opposite the cathedral and the bishop’s residence, the San Francisco Church has historically been orientated toward the poor and has become an important place for their mobilisation.

[236] During regional strikes and mobilisations, nuns prepared an *olla común* (communal kitchens) in collaboration with local women’s groups.

Photo 6



Photo: taken by the author in front of the San Francisco Church, Cajamarca (29 May 2012).

National March for Water: towards ‘Environmental Justice’

The National March for Water (*Marcha Nacional del Agua*), in which participants travelled from the lakes of Cajamarca to the country’s capital, Lima, over ten days (1-10 February 2012), gained significant support across the country. The event was organised by the CENs, composed of the *rondas campesinas*, Fronts of Defence, NGOs from Cajamarca, as well as elsewhere in Peru. The march was well received because many people shared similar problems and grievances, generating sympathy with the protesters' search for 'environmental justice', i.e. a right to address the environmental impacts generated by neoliberal mineral extraction and a right to secure clean and adequate water provision. There is more than one '*Conga*' in Peru. It is not only *cajamarquinos* who have suffered from contamination, land loss, and lack of access to natural resources through mining. Moreover, there are many Peruvians who are concerned about the quality and quantity of water as a consequence of extractive activities by multinational capital, not only mining companies but including companies in agro-industry. One weekly magazine points out that the problems relating to Conga is repeated across Latin America:

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[237] They include: ‘*Agua sí, Oro no*’ (‘Yes to Water, No to Gold’), one of the movement’s emblematic slogans; ‘*El agua es vida, Minera asesina, Conga no va*’ (‘Water is life, Mining the killer, No to Conga’); ‘*¿Progreso es contaminación? No*’ (‘Progress is contamination? No’); ‘*No a la represión, Conga no va*’ (‘No to repression, no to Conga’), among others.

> If we look at the mining map across the continent, it is easy to observe a well-planned international strategy: the criminalisation of social protests, defamation of environmental, rural, or indigenous leaders, the repression of police and military forces, the imposition of states of emergency, illegal arrests, improvised environmental impact assessments, the media taking sides with the government and capital, tax privileges favouring the multinational mining companies. In other words, neither *cajamarquino*s nor the Humala regime is an exception to this strategy ('*Conga no está sola*', *Hilderbrandt*, 24 February – 1 March 2012).

As the magazine mentions, Latin America has been witnessing a multitude of socio-environmental movements reacting to extractive industries. In Peru, many people are affected by mining activities and have mobilised, voicing various demands.[238] Given this situation, when participants in the anti-Conga movement marched from Cajamarca to Lima to raise popular awareness of their cause, support was high. Milton Sánchez, president of PIC and a prominent movement leader, argues: 'on the road to Lima, we had a lot of support from local people. This is because there are many people sharing similar experiences across the nation. Their support mirrors [the impact of] many mining projects across the country'.[239]

Through this national march, protesters intended to raise public awareness about their cause. They stressed that they are not 'anti-mining' *per se*, 'anti-development' or 'extremist', but that their argument against the Conga project is based on their pursuit of justice, i.e. the defence of water, environment and life. In this process of political activity, solidarities were created and a political identity (i.e. 'environmental justice') constructed within the CENs. The *ronderos* and their organisations played a fundamental role in this process, becoming a crucial vehicle for grassroots education and debate. 'Conga' did not only mean one mining project in Cajamarca, but tapped into wider feelings of 'injustice' when participants marched to the capital. 'No to Conga' not only involved opposition to a particular project, but became a synonym for environmental justice.

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[238] These demands include more benefits for the local population; guaranteed access to basic resources like land and water; and the appropriate regulation of mining activities and the environment, among others.

[239] 'Camino a Lima, recibimos mucho apoyo de pueblos locales. Eso fue porque la gente estaba compartiendo las experiencias similares por todo el país. También porque muchos proyectos mineros están impactando a todo el país', (My field note, Celendín, 28 February 2012).

At the end of the March for Water, movement leaders handed over several draft legislative bills in the hope that there would be substantial debates over mining and water regulation in Congress. The bills included: demands to protect water access as a basic human right; prohibiting mining activities in the headwaters of lakes and glacier areas; and halting the use of chemicals (such as cyanide or mercury) in mining activities. In tandem, the movement coordinated peaceful marches in lake areas which became a symbol of the movement, and also fixed march dates to coincide with international events, such as World Water Day, thus associating their cause with trans-local awareness-raising activities. Based on this process of constructing an environmental justice political identity, the next section will examine how opponents of the Conga project within the CENs develop EJ political identity via political activities, as well as how these political practices call into question the quality of the Peruvian democracy and the present development model.

Developing 'Environmental Justice': Questioning the Quality of Democracy and Development

The EIA (*Environmental Impact Assessment*)

After declaring the first state of emergency in December 2011, the Lima government announced that it would invite international experts to examine the EIA of the Conga project. From the outset, local activists questioned the EIA's impartiality and veracity, since for them it is unfair for the MINEM to be both a promoter of foreign investment in the mining sector and judge on the awarding of environmental permissions. In addition, it was argued that the process *per se* contained many deficiencies: the MINEM did not possess the competence necessary to examine an EIA report containing thousands of pages full of technical terms in such a short period of time. Apart from a lack of professional expertise, it did not have the financial resources. To compound matters, the report was conducted by private companies, albeit from an approved list developed by the MINEM, but contracted by the company.[240] For the movement, the EIA represents a completely biased process, one giving preference to investors in order to maintain the dominant development model around extractivism. Against this backdrop, the government's idea of assessing the EIA ('*peritaje internacional*') was interpreted by opponents as another mechanism to mitigate criticism of the EIA, in addition to providing legitimacy for the continuation of the project. For the Humala administration, the plan seemed fairly plausible since 'international experts' should be impartial because they are from foreign countries, and are technical and scientific professionals, who are not 'politically-minded'. [241] The main objective of *peritaje internacional* is supposedly limited to the 'technical' aspect.

To official disappointment, many local people doubted the real intentions of the government, arguing that this examination of the EIA would only serve to allow the Conga project to proceed. For protesters, the *peritaje internacional* would not reveal the true impact of the operation because the project is planned for an ecologically vulnerable area. In addition, they are concerned that water resources could be irreversibly affected since the mining project involves a large-scale open-pit and the use of cyanide heap leaching methods. The potential effect on the wider interrelated ecosystem would not be taken into consideration by the EIA. As one local magazine points out, 'the purpose of this examination of the EIA is to identify and propose several measures which could better mitigate the environmental impacts caused by the Conga project, with the aim to generate social peace and build trust among local population… It does not allow any discussion over the viability of the project from a point of view which respects the environment'.[242] To compound matters, the process of designating three international experts was not likely to demonstrate official sincerity about the issue. The government delayed the announcement of these experts several times and when they were finally made public, their career history only confirmed public distrust, casting doubts over their impartiality.[243]

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[240] MYSA made a contract with a consulting company, Knight Piésold S.A. which has been providing environmental and technical advisory services in Peru since 1994 (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 73).

[241] Examinations of a similar nature had already been conducted by the National Water Authority (*Autoridad Nacional del Agua*, ANA) in August 2010 and by a technical team of the MINAM in November 2011. Both entities noted that the Conga project would have a serious environmental impact.

[242] '*Peritos Pillados*', *Hilderbrandt*, 13-19 April 2012.

The lack of public confidence in environmental regulations and procedures related to mineral extraction led to the movement's coordination of an 'alternative' *peritaje* (*peritaje* '*alternativo*'). The government's argument concerning the technical and professional impartiality of the *peritaje internacional* prompted the movement to enter into a 'technical' debate. Its alternative *peritaje* was intended to demonstrate that opponents do not protest against the Conga project due to 'politically minded' opposition, as many from the 'yes to Conga' side argue; they hoped to demonstrate that the cause of 'no to Conga' was technically sound. A local environmental NGO, GRUFIDES, collaborating within the CENs, coordinated and facilitated the publication of an alternative version of the EIA revision, an initiative that received the support of the regional government.[244] Dr Robert Moran drafted the alternative *peritaje* and emphasised the fact that the movement's position is based on technical evidence; the Conga project is technically unviable, confirming the 'no to Conga' position.[245] Other local 'experts' also backed the movement's arguments by producing their own technical reports.[246]

Alongside technical studies presented in the official political realm, the regional government and local NGOs attempted to disseminate a simpler version of the alternative report, in order to enable the public to understand the technical information more easily.

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[243] One of these three 'experts' once criticised people in Islay who were opposed to the *Tía María* (Arequipa department) mining project as 'uncivilised' radicals. For more on the illegitimacy of these international experts, see http://celendinlibre.wordpress.com/tag/rafael-fernandez-rubio/ .

[244] '*El Proyecto Minero Conga, Perú: Comentarios al Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) y Temas Relacionados*' (The Conga Mining Project, Peru: Comments on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Related Issues), prepared by the Environmental Defender Law Center. (The author has this document).

[245] Dr Moran is an internationally renowned 'expert', having worked for many years in the field and was also involved in the Tambogrande conflict (Piura). According to Spalding, Dr. Moran 'worked six years in the Water Resources Division of the US Geological Survey, followed by twenty years as a hydrogeologist for private clients, including mining companies. After he shifted to community contracts, his curriculum vitae notes projects in Hoduras, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Colombia, as well as other regions of the world and the United States' (2013: 49). Organisations, such as 'Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, Christian Aid, Greenpeace, the International Development Research Center', were among his clients for 'consulting and research reports on Latin America cases' (2013: 49).

[246] For example, '*Conga es un crimen planeado contra el medio ambiente*' (The Conga project is a criminal plan against the environment) by Wilder A. Sánchez, a sociologist from the National University of Cajamarca (*Hilderbrandt*, 9-15 March 2012). Also see a study conducted by a civil expert on the issue, Peralta Quiroz, 'Peralta: '*Más barato saldrá regar plantas con Coca Cola que con agua tradada*', *El Mercurio*, 10 April 2012.

Making a contract with a national newspaper with a fairly neutral position, GRUFIDES came up with a 'popular' version of the alternative report, which was widely distributed among the local population.[247] Movement leaders accused the mining company of impeding the distribution of the newspaper supplement by purchasing massive quantities of *La República* on the date it featured the alternative report.[248] Before this, the company had already circulated their own version via the same newspaper, surprisingly arguing that it considered water a priority before gold extraction.[249] The movement's efforts to disseminate technical information among the local population also included a presentation conducted by a NGO expert in a regional meeting of *rondas campesinas* held in Celendín.[250]

In addition to contesting official accounts at the technical level, pursuing a sophisticated media campaign and engaging in a 'popular' education exercise, other comments were expressed on the walls of the San Francisco church and main square in Cajamarca. Local university students put up posters in the city's main square disseminating information on the MYSA's mining activities and their impact. This developed into an open public space where people could leave their messages and comments on posters (see Photo 7).[251] A documentary, entitled '*En el Corazón de Conga*' ('In the Heart of Conga') was shown at the Ollanta convention centre in Cajamarca city during the regional march on 11 April 2012. It aimed to illustrate the environmental impact of mineral extraction in Cajamarca and was presented alongside other cultural events.

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[247] '*Una verdad incómoda: El EIA del Proyecto Conga*' ('Uncomfortable truth: the EIA of the Conga project'), published as a supplement to the national newspaper, *La República*,18 March 2012. The regional government also published their own newspaper supplement: '*Por qué Conga No Va*' ('Why no to the Conga project'), *La República*, 4 March 2012.

[248] This accusation is difficult to verify, but I could gain access to the publication during my participation in a regional meeting of *rondas campesinas* in March 2012, where large numbers of this supplement were distributed among the participants.

[249] '*El agua primero, la mina después: Lo que no se habla del proyecto Conga*'(Water first and then Mining: more complete information about the Conga project'), *La República*, 19 February 2012.

[250] The Unitary Assembly of Fronts of Defence and Social Organisations of the Region of Cajamarca took place in Celendín on 28 and 29 March 2012. The expert from GRUFIDES gave a presentation on the Conga project and its possible environmental impact by using visual materials. The way he presented the information was fairly straightforward and clear to understand for the author, who is not familiar with ecological and technical terms.

[251] When the regional government and other movement leaders called for regional marches and protests during early April 2012, proponents of the Conga project criticised the mobilisations as completely motivated by radical movement leaders with personal political interests. During this time, the city's main square was occupied with cultural activities, such as posters displayed on the ground, largely created by young people. The movement's songs were sung during events and local artists also joined in. Several people grouped together in order to ask for solidarity for the injured during the confrontation with the police. On some nights, sympathisers held candlelight vigils in front of the Cathedral.

Photo 7.

Photo: taken by the author, in Cajamarca, 14 April 2012.

NGOs active within the CENs through providing technical advice and a wide range of contacts contributed to the development of an environmental justice political identity inside the anti-Conga movement. Via this apparent technical controversy vis-à-vis the government in Lima, they not only advanced competing views on the environment, but also advocated an alternative development model. Constructed around this cause of grievance, actors within the CENs questioned national environmental regulations which, they argued, were biased in favour of the extractive industry and emphasised the necessity to forge an alternative or sustainable model of development not restricted to the 'efficient' management of environment. For the government and MYSA, natural resources exist only to be commodified and this is based on economic reductionism and a limited modernist development perspective. From this perspective, mineral extraction is economically viable once sufficient water provision is guaranteed, a main argument for advocating the construction of artificial reservoirs to replace the natural lakes. On the other hand, the CENs consider water as part of an interrelated and complex ecosystem and underline the necessity to develop an integral development plan through the demarcation of an Economic and Ecological Zone via Territorial Ordinance. This need has been debated over recent years with little progress. At this stage, EJ political identity was developed within the CENs so as to contest environmental regulations related to mining operations and the development model *per se* based on national resource extraction.

Based on Moran's alternative EIA which was forged within the CENs, opponents were reassured that it is impossible to proceed with any project in basin headwaters. Since the area belongs to an interconnected ecosystem, it was argued, once started, the mining operation would inevitably generate environmental problems and this would result in an irreversible negative impact on the local population. It would violate their basic rights to water. In response, the government held that the alternative report was not 'technically' based but 'politically' motivated. The then Minister of Environment, Manuel Pulgar Vidal, insisted that the report presented by the Cajamarca regional government was essentially 'political' and failed to present any convincing technical evidence.[252] According to the national government, MYSA will ensure that environmental damage would be mitigated and the provision of more water guaranteed according to the recommendations of international experts in response to the concerns of *cajamarquinos*. In others words, the Conga project can – or should – go ahead ('yes to Conga') if several conditions are satisfied.

It became obvious that the Humala administration did not have any intention to overturn the decision on the Conga project or discuss environmental issues seriously. On this question, one local newspaper pointed out that, regarding 'Conga va' ('yes to Conga'), 'the contract has been made between the government and three international experts. This is why the government needed to militarise the whole city of Cajamarca. In the contract, it was only water provision which would be examined, and issues concerning land and the impact on biodiversity have not been considered. The *peritaje internacional* was not about the viability of the Conga project'.[253] In contrast, *campesinos* and activists within the CENs suggested that environmental regulations should be reformed in a more ecologically integrated way to address mining-related ecological degradations. Furthermore, if the MINEM continued to act as both a promoter of mining investment and a judge of EIAs, local people would not recover trust in the EIA procedure. This alternative perspective on the dominant development model was expressed in a series of technical debates, coordinated by the CENs (involving the official political arena, media and documentaries, regional meetings and public spaces, such as the main square of the city and the walls of the church), as did EJ political identity develop.

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[252] See '*Peritaje alternativo sobre Conga es de índole político*', *El Clarín*, 13 March 2012.

[253] See'*Conga va... así lo establece el contrato de los peritos*', *El Mercurio*, 16 April 2012.

Another critical point regarding the EIA was associated with the quality of democracy, with a particular regard to the ‘participatory’ element of the EIA process. When considering the scope of MYSA’s mining activities in the region and their influence on local people’s livelihoods and environment, it was argued that the process of decision-making should include the participation of local people. However, policy-making is highly concentrated in Lima. Particularly when it comes to mineral extraction, the project depends predominantly on the MINEM. The only official channel for the participation of the local population is via the ‘*audiencia pública*’ (‘public hearing’), a formal element which the mining company is required to include during the EIA approval process. This public hearing process is supposed to disseminate information about a mining project among the local population. In practice, however, the process itself is not likely to elicit participation of the local populace. Given usually a short notice, it frequently gets ‘captured’ by company mine workers or people who receive money for their participation. Moreover, the process is unilateral, not communicative, in the sense that it only allows the provision of information, but not the consideration of local opinions if these are in opposition or have suggestions to modify a project. Consequently, many communities opposing mining projects have devised another channel for expressing their opposition, e.g. a local referendum, as the case of Tambogrande. Pointing out the limited nature of the consultation law (*consulta previa*), de Echave and Diez argue that ‘although the law could facilitate the implementation of ILO Convention 169 and widen popular participation in the decision-making process… it is to be applied exclusively for indigenous people, who do not compose a majority of the population in Cajamarca’ (2013: 146). This lack of participation within democratic institutions helps explain why it is difficult to strike a consensus through case by case roundtables, particularly involving mining-related conflicts.

Regarding the centralisation of decision-making in relation to local development, there is another point to note. In response to Regional Ordinance 036, the public prosecutor appealed to the Constitutional Court, arguing the unconstitutional nature of the ordinance. Faced with this, the CENs of the anti-Conga movement, including the regional government, responded by turning to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH, *Comisión Internacional de Derechos Humanos*). The legal debate over Regional Ordinance 036 resulted in much controversy between the movement and national government. A first point of disagreement concerned competing legal jurisdictions between the central and regional government, particularly when it comes to who has the authority to make a decision on local development issues. Although decentralisation was initiated by the Toledo administration (2001-2006) with the aim of deepening democracy, decision-making powers are still highly concentrated in Lima.

The commodification of natural resources such as water and land puts local populations at risk through reducing opportunities to access these essential resources. On this question, actors within CENs argue that decisions over these basic resources, as well as the local development model, should be made with the participation of the grassroots population via acts of resistance and legal procedures. Second, guaranteeing the local communities' access to clean and sufficient water and land inevitably comprises a constituent part of their basic human rights. Therefore, it is argued that priority over the right to natural resources should be given to the local population rather than private investors. In the end, however, the Constitutional Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of the regional ordinance on the same day as three international experts announced their favourable report on the Conga project's EIA: i.e. 'Yes to Conga' was decided despite all obstacles and opposition.

Human Rights: An Integral Part of Environmental Justice Political Identity

Activists within the CENs could develop a broader meaning of human rights as a consequence of their accumulated experiences in local communities, which were affected by the extractive industry over many years. This led to a questioning of the authoritarian nature of Peruvian government vis-à-vis social movement. A first issue concerned 'the right' to make decisions on their way of life, access to natural resources, as well as forms of local development, alongside the elemental rights to have access to clean and sufficient water. Debates around these questions highlighted the centralisation of decision-making and the lack of participatory mechanisms available to ordinary citizens, as seen in debates related to the EIA and regional ordinance. Second, concerns and criticism relating to the nature of the contemporary Peruvian state and democracy arose in the face of government repression of movement leaders and activists of the CENs. The imposition of a state of emergency infringes on basic human rights, which became particularly critical when police and military forces were dispatched from Lima in order to impede people's right to demonstrate. More seriously, lethal arms were allowed to be used in the name of upholding 'law and order', with impunity guaranteed for those responsible for the injured or fatalities. As a consequence of these events, local and national human rights NGOs today constitute an important component of the counter-extractive networks.[254] The CENs of the anti-Conga movement, which comprise CNDDHH, CEJIL, FEDEPAZ and GRUFIDES, denounced the Peruvian government for its 'military-extractive' character at a hearing titled 'Human Rights and Social Protests in Peru' which took place at the CIDH, Washington on 11 March 2013.[255] Many social and environmental organisations, including the AIDESEP, the CCP, the CNA, the CONACAMI and the ONAMIAP (the National Organisation of Andean and Amazonian Women of Peru), submitted a petition to the CIDH on 12 April 2012, demanding measures protect activities, local authorities, local communities and ancestral territory.[256]

Social networks form another integral part of the counter-extractive networks, who question the quality of democracy. The Humala government, like its predecessors, has attempted to discredit activists and protesters, arguing that they were anti-developmentalists, radical environmental protectionists, egoists, and the like.[257] 'Terms, such as "terrorism" or "hostile groups", gave the impression that human rights defenders are synonymous with 'criminals', their activities being portrayed as crimes and their organisations being criminal associations' (CIDSE, 2011:2). The media has played an important role in promoting an image that protesters instigate violence at the cost of the 'national interest' and public order.

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[254] NGOs include GRUFIDES, CNDDHH, FEDEPAZ, CEJIL (Centre for Justice and International Law), *Defensoría del Pueblo*). National and international academic centres, International NGOs and Human Rights institutions (PSG, Amnesty International, Human Right Watch, CIDH, IACHR) are also involved.

[255] See http://minacorrupta.wordpress.com/2013/04/03/denuncian-ante-la-cidh-al-regimen-minero-militar-de-ollanta-humala/.

[256] On 5 May 2014, the CIDH rejected support for the movement's claim: the government took precautionary measures, announced the cancellation of the Conga project and withdrew police forces, but social organisations argued that the CIDH decision suggested the necessity of guaranteeing the security of social and environmental activists. See http://www.cooperaccion.org.pe/opina/43-cooperaccion-opina/2050-la-verdad-sobre-lo-resuelto-por-la-cidh-en-el-caso-conga; and also http://www.noticiasser.pe/09/05/2014/cajamarca/cajamarca-resolucion-de-la-cidh-sobre-caso-conga-es-recibida-como-un-triunfo-pa.

[257] This suggests that García's discourse on 'the dog in the manger syndrome' is not exclusive to the central government. Proponents of mineral extraction also deploy these tropes and this has fuelled many verbal and media disputes. For an account of recent exchanges over development based on the extractive industries in the Peruvian media, see Marco Arana, '*De izquierdas, derechas y ecologismo libertario*', *El Comercio,* 27 March 2013; Alfredo Ballard, '*Los neocomunistas*', *El Comercio,* 30 March 2013; and Roger Merino, '*¿Por qué algunos acusan a los ambientalistas de comunistas?*', *Servindi,* 31 March 2013 (available at http://servindi.org/actualidad/84867).

The Lima-based mainstream media has been overwhelmingly hostile, describing the movement as a social disturbance, and as part of many ongoing police cases.[258]

In an attempt to discredit them, the main stream media has also stressed divisions among movement leaders, and described their intentions as purely political in order to gain popular support for personal ends and engaged in character manipulation.[259] Opponents have been described as being manipulated by anti-mining and anti-development radicals, extremists, terrorists and naïve environmentalists, particularly financed by foreign NGOs while the base has been portrayed as 'ignorant Indians'.[260] Despite the success of the March for Water in early February 2012, the majority of the media gave far more attention to the capture of 'Camarada Artemio', a leader of Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), and the arrival of the three designated international experts hired to examine the EIA.[261] Milton Sánchez, the president of PIC, made the point that popular support all along the road to Lima boosted participants and leaders' determination to continue their protests.[262] In response to a largely hostile national and local media, the movement has generated alternative information networks, such as blogs and social media (Facebook and twitter accounts) and put video clips filmed by mobile phone or camera on YouTube.[263] In an interview with a young environmental journalist in Celendín, he argued:

> [the alternative media can provide graphic testimonies.] When people listen to testimonies, they change their opinion. When there are testimonies, such as pictures , people are more impressed. The images are more convincing. People in Lima, university students, and people from other countries sympathise with the cause of the movement. One image can be worth more than a thousand words. Social networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have contributed a lot to the distribution [of information] about what is really happening as well.[264]

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[258] See '*Antimineros siembran el terror en Conga*', *el Diario Correo*, 17 January 2014.

[259] See '*Santos, Saavedra y Arana quieren ser candidatos en las presidenciales del 2016*', *Los Andes*, 16 April 2012.

[260] See '*Conozca a las ONGs y políticas de UE que apoya a los radicales anticonga*', *Expreso*, 23 January 2014.

[261] '*Congresista oficialista dudó sobre la detención de Artemio*', *El Comercio*, 20 February 2012.

[262] Interview (Celendín 28 February 2012).

[263] There are many blogs focused on the conflict: http://celendinlibre.wordpress.com/; http://aguamina.blogspot.co.uk/; http://caballeroredverde.blogspot.co.uk/; http://congaconflict.wordpress.com/ among others. The last provides information and news in English.

[264] 'Cuando la gente escucha testimonio, ellos cambian de opinión. Cuando hay testimonio, como fotografías, la gente se queda más impactada. Los imágenes convencen más. La gente de Lima está realmente impactada. Los estudiantes universitarios y la gente de otros países se solidarizan con el movimiento. Una imagen vale más que

One example of the CENs's utilisation of non-mainstream media is the case of the Chaupe family. In November 2012, a video clip linked to YouTube circulated via various accounts of social network, asking for solidarity with the Chaupe family given the police repression they had endured. The clip was filmed by a daughter of the family via her mobile phone when family property was invaded by the police. The household's land is located in the Tragadero Grande zone, Sorochuco district, and falls within the Conga project's designated area of operation. Given their refusal to sell their land, the family suffered from intimidation and legal disputes launched by the mining company for nearly two years. According to the Chaupe family, their property, animals and persons were physically attacked by the police in August 2011. However, in October, the judge of Celendín accused them of usurpation of the land and sentenced them to three years in prison. A fine of S/. 200 was also imposed as civil reparations. The local court did not consider the land title submitted by the family. An appeal was lodged to the court in Cajamarca, backed by legal advice from GRUFIDES, with support from other national and international solidarity organisations. The legal team for the Chaupes argued they held valid property rights and the initial ruling was declared void in August 2013.[265]

Tensions in 'Environmental Justice' Construction

Before concluding the chapter, it is worth mentioning that the constraints of mineral extraction's *realpolitik* remain an important issue. In other words, the movement could not bring about direct improvements in the local population's livelihoods. As activists have argued, it takes time to carry out integral and alternative development. As a consequence, it has proved to be difficult to avoid criticism from proponents of mining activities, especially given the weight of a largely hostile media. According to information provided by the Chamber of Commerce of Cajamarca, the economic loss incurred by abandoning Conga

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mil palabras. Redes sociales como Facebook, Twitter y YouTube han contribuido mucho para difundir la información de lo que está pasando realmente'. Interview, Informant E, in Celendín, 28 March 2012. This informant continued to emphasise the necessity to recover his local radio programme since radio is one of the most important channels for country people to get information. At the same time, he strongly denounced the pressure exerted by MYSA's anti-movement campaign.

[265] However, the Court in Celendín adjudicated against the Chaupe family once against on August 2014, delivering a sentence of two years and eight months in prison and US$ 1,900 compensation be paid to MYSA. Family lawyer criticised the decision and announced their intention to appeal. See '*Cajamarca: Yanacocha ganó juicio por tierras a familia Chaupe*', *El Comercio*, 5 August 2014.

investment (including other mining projects, such as the suspension of Galeno and the reduction of the Michiquillay projects) is estimated to be S/. 600 million. The president of the Chamber argues that thousands of job opportunities have been lost due to the project's suspension.[266]

Additionally, the CENs were created among various actors with distinct demands. Initially, the factor uniting these disparate elements was opposition to Conga, but now that the project has been suspended, and faced with regional elections in October 2014, internal fissures have surfaced.[267] This suggests that the constructing process of the CENs is also imbued with power relations, tensions and contradictions. Even so, and despite the fact that the movement has largely disappeared from the national media and slipped down the Lima government's list of priorities, groups of peasant continue to protest around lake areas and sustain their demand that the project be cancelled. As is in common with rural social movements, a period of intense activism has been followed by one of relative calm. But the underlying causes of grievance persist, signifying that the potential for heightened social tension and a resurgence of protest activity is ever present.

6.4. Conclusion

The anti-Conga movement represents the most high profile political expression of rural population who have suffered from mining activities for nearly two decades in the absence of effective state regulation in Peru. Expectations of change were high among many country people when the Humala government assumed office. However, once in power, it became obvious that the president's economic policies and response to social movements were similar to his predecessors. After nearly two years of massive mobilisations, the Conga project remains temporarily suspended, while some groups of peasants continue to be mobilised, demanding its cancellation. The main concern of protesters is that the location and process of extraction could negatively impact on water resources across a wide area, adding to pre-existing worries fuelled by an accumulated distrust of MYSA's mining operations.

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[266] '*Región Cajamarca recibirá menos recursos por repliegue de algunos proyectos mineros*', *La República*, 16 January, 2013.

[267] A number of authors have emphasised the prevalence of weak social organisation in Cajamarca department, focusing on an inability to embrace and effectively promote different demands, leading to internal fragmentation and an erosion of cohesion (Bury 2002, 2004, 2005; Bebbington et al. 2008b; Lingán 2008; de Echave et al., 2009a; Meléndez 2009; and de Echave and Diez 2013). This perspective, however, underestimates the crucial unifying and facilitator role played by the *rondas campesinas* in mobilisation (see Taylor, 2011).

In contrast to positions adopted by proponents of mineral extraction (who criticised the movement as being led by naïve environmentalists and thus taking an anti-development stance), the chapter has intended to examine the complex trajectories of networked forms of resistance against the Conga mining project and the construction of an 'environmental justice' political identity around the 'maps of grievance' caused by MYSA's mineral extraction. Through oppositional political activities, there has been increasing coordination between the *rondas campesinas* and NGOs, local and trans-local, committed to sustainable development and human rights. These diverse actors have created networked resistance, i.e. the counter-extractive networks (CENs). The understanding of 'sustainable mining' by the government and MYSA is restricted to 'efficient' management of the environment via 'modern' technology, which is, they argue, very different from 'irresponsible' mining as conducted in the past. Based on this limited interpretation, the Conga project is viewed as viable, once water provision is secured by constructing artificial reservoirs. Beyond this definition of 'sustainability', other demands, such as the enactment of appropriate regulations regarding the use of toxic materials, the formulation of an environmental mitigation plan and effective participation mechanisms in decision-making processes, are considered as 'political'. This highly modernist stance interprets the movement's 'political' demands as generating obstacles to mineral extraction and thus the country's development. Moreover, the 'need' (or desire) to secure private investments and guarantee 'public order' has led the government to introduce authoritarian measures, such as a state of emergency, pursuing the criminalisation of protesters, the militarisation of the conflict zone, as well as enacting legal changes which permit the use of lethal arms, hand-in-hand with guaranteed impunity of security forces. This economic reductionist stance on 'sustainability' and the state's *mano dura* measures have generated considerable anxiety as a main concern among the local population, fuelling longstanding grievances. These 'maps of grievance' point out the shortcomings of Peruvian democracy and the present development model.

By flagging the main causes of grievance, activists have made 'prefigurative solidarity' within the CENs and coordinated various collective actions. Rather than forging unilateral solidarity provided by abundant NGOs in the global North, various actors at different spatialities have made linkages and connections around grievances of neoliberal extractivitism. One of the aims of the National March for Water was to gain support and sympathy for the movement across the country. During the march, the opposition to ‘Conga’ came to signify not just one anti-mining protest but also started to construct a political identity of ‘environmental justice’, which included demands for the ‘right to address environmental impacts’, the ‘right to secure clean and sufficient water provision’ and ultimately ‘water as a basic human right’. In elaborating this identity, activists within the CENs have promoted ‘technical’ debates around the revision of the EIA, the *peritaje internacional*. Countering the government’s focus on efficiency, (‘foreign’) professionalism and technology regarding the environment, the CENs have contested existing environmental regulations as only favouring mineral extraction. This, they have posited, occurred at the expense of a broad meaning of the ‘environment’ and integrated development, via the *peritaje alternativo*. To disseminate this message, information regarding ‘technical’ information about the project has been distributed via public meetings, public places, and the media. These events highlight and criticise the limited mechanisms of participation. The only official channel for local people’s participation in the EIA process was a ‘public hearing’, through which information of the project was delivered unilaterally to a limited number of citizens with no space for the latter’s opinion to be voiced effectively.

Alongside this centralised decision-making process, many activists committed to human rights within the CENs have questioned the quality of present-day democracy, in response to the government’s authoritarian measures. Furthermore, they have used alternative media in the face of an onslaught of hostile media attacks on opponents of the project. Therefore, political activism against Conga via the CENs has brought both neoliberal extractivism and the nature of Peruvian polity into contention. In this process of networked resistance, subaltern groups have constructed a political identity of ‘environmental justice’. Despite internal contradictions and tensions, this re-formulation of subjectivities demonstrates the political imaginaries of subaltern groups in the rural highlands, suggesting the importance of ‘the political’ with regard to their marginalised and precarious living conditions.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The 'Relational Content' of Neoliberal Extractivism and Rural Resistance

The purpose of this dissertation is to question the 'death of the peasantry' by examining the re-articulation of rural subjectivities in opposition to neoliberal globalisation. Rather than focusing on the fragmentation, powerlessness and passivity of rural subaltern groups faced with the asymmetrical power of global capital, I have argued that the intensification of dispossession and disempowerment has become 'grounds for unity' among various actors, which we have been witnessing in the political and social dynamics of many contemporary rural social movements in Latin America. In particular, this dissertation has concentrated on the Peruvian northern highlands to examine how impoverished and marginalised *campesinos* have forged connections and solidarities in order to contest neoliberal extractivism, i.e. the mineral extraction of the multinational mining company, *Mineral Yanacocha S.A.* (MYSA). In doing this, I have paid particular attention to the construction of counter-extractive networks (CENs) around 'maps of grievances' and of an environmental justice political identity in the process of bringing the current model of development and democracy into contestation.

As seen in Chapter 2, David Harvey's term, 'time-space compression', represents his spatio-temporal understanding of the current phase of neoliberal globalisation based on capitalism and its accumulation process. This historical and geographical depiction highlights the importance of the economic forces which have a predominant influence on people's lives around the world. Since the 1973 crisis when capitalism faced a chronic overaccumulation, capitalists found new investment opportunities in the neoliberal privatisation process. With the demise of the Bretton Woods system, policy recommendations promoted by IFIs had a great influence on debt-stricken countries in Latin America, guiding the latter to implement SAPs: opening up domestic markets; privatisation of SOEs; and reduced intervention of the state and deregulation. One new development model recommended by the IFIs in Latin America was the extraction and export of natural resources which were abundant in most countries. Although natural resource extraction is not a new phenomenon, the years following the implementation of neoliberal reform have witnessed its unprecedented intensification.

Several factors explain this boom in natural resource extraction: IFIs' policy recommendations to create favourable investment conditions in the extractive sectors; IFIs' direct and indirect involvement in large-scale investment plans, such as mining, energy and infrastructure projects; the high prices of primary commodities in international markets, sometimes boosted by increasing demand in developing countries such as China; and the development of new technology. Eduardo Galeano (1997) has commented that the continent and its inhabitants have become witnesses to 'open veins' ('*venas abiertas*') in an increasingly extreme way through multinational capital's exploitation of minerals, hydrocarbon, oil, monocultural plantations (eucalyptus and pine) and logging, the production of agro-fuels (soya and maize), as well as large-scale industrial shrimp and salmon farming, among others (i.e. neoliberal extractivism), as seen in Chapter 2.

In Peru, minerals were a key motive for Spanish colonisers and have continued to be an important export earner since the late nineteenth century, eliciting debates over national 'development'. The central and southern regions witnessed intensive copper extraction by foreign mining companies over the last century (Thorp and Bertram, 1978; DeWind, 1981; Dore, 1988). The US-owned Cerro de Pasco corporation was the main owner of minerals, smelters and land in the central highlands during most of the twentieth century before its nationalisation by the Velasco government. Faced with increasing labour militancy and reformist demands, the military regime gained control of the mining sector in the mid-1970s, only to show its inefficiency and incapacity to improve the already declining mineral production. Many mining SOEs entered into crisis or became bankrupt during the 1980s. In the aftermath of the 1980s crisis, the Fujimori regime implemented SAPs and Peruvian neoliberalism took an orthodox form as seen in Chapter 3. The 'new mining boom' was boosted by both international and national factors during the 1990s. Chapter 4 elucidated that the WB promoted extractive industries, including the mining sector, as a new development strategy, and the Peruvian government introduced policy reforms such as the creation of favourable conditions for foreign investors; the privatisation of SOEs; and deregulation in relation to the environment and land. Accordingly, the mining sector emerged as the 'motor' of the country's recent economic growth.

When it comes to this neoliberal extractivism, Harvey's explanation clarifies the nature of capitalist accumulation of multinational capital in extractive industries: accumulation by dispossession (ABD). In other words, capitalist accumulation advanced by dispossessing countless communities around the world, especially where mostly marginalised and impoverished peasants, indigenous people and the urban poor live. It is hard to deny that ABD resulting from neoliberal extractivism is one main cause behind the increasing incidences of contemporary rural social movements led by the affected local communities in Latin America, including the case study in this dissertation. However, this observation tends to highlight asymmetrical power relations of capital mobility: the domination of multinational capital vs. dispossession and disempowerment of local communities, which has omitted other significant components of the 'spatial', i.e. the 'relational content' (Massey, 2005: 93). As Massey notes, global capital mobility involves 'the stretching out of different kinds of social relationship over space', as well as 'the stretching out over space of relations of power, and of relations imbued with meaning and symbolism' (1994: 158-159). Beyond economic reductionism, this relational geographical perspective observes that diverse social groups are differently placed in relation to the 'time-space compression' of neoliberal extractivism, depending on their degree of mobility and power, i.e. the 'power-geometry of time-space compression' (Massey, 1994: 149). In other words, the advance of neoliberal extractivism and its implications can be understood as 'a highly complex social differentiation' unless it is limited to economic reductionism (Massey, 1994: 150).

In Peru, while booming mining activities have brought macroeconomic stability and fiscal wealth, they have become the main arena for a long list of socio-environmental protests since the late 1990s, particularly in the impoverished countryside. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the reformist military government led by general Velasco promoted state-led development with an aim to overcome the structural crisis of capitalist development and to respond to rural unrest and increasing social pressure. The agrarian reform intended to increase agricultural productivity and quell rural unrest. However, the beneficiaries of the reform were mostly limited to ex-hacienda workers and by-passed most poor peasants. Namely, although the some peasant groups benefited from Velasco's agrarian reform, most poor *campesinos* remained marginalised. Their living conditions further deteriorated with the implementation of neoliberal reform. In this complex rural landscape where 'stratified' and 'fragmented' subaltern groups reside, neoliberal mineral extraction gained momentum across the country. Accordingly, rural inhabitants were differently located with regard to the advance of multinational capital and thus the 'power-geometry' of mineral extraction is observed in the complex nature of socio-environmental protests. Moreover, faced with increasing social protests, more countries and mining companies introduced 'socially responsible' and 'environmentally sustainable' components in their policies. Along with concerns about sustainable development, legal changes were introduced to the distribution regime relating to the fiscal bonanza generated from mineral extraction (i.e. *canon minero*) by successive post-Fujimori governments. This devolution of *canon* to regional and local government, however, did not produce the expected results and complicated the nature of socio-environmental struggles in the decentralised local context. The devolution of *canon* occurred before decentralised administrative agencies were institutionalised to properly administer it. This lack of administrative capacity fuelled more protests at a sub-national level, i.e. 'decentralising' conflicts due to the mismanagement of distributed fiscal resources. In addition, blurry territorial demarcation also increased competition for and conflict over receiving additional *canon* between neighbouring districts. Power struggles among various actors (including local politicians, local and regional authorities, and local communities) also proliferated. Meanwhile, mining companies incorporated community development or social programmes within the CSR framework: as they became more involved in distributing socio-economic benefits, they became a target for local claim-makers. Apart from such materialist demands, other communities protested against neoliberal forms of mineral extraction owing to their lack of participation in decision-making processes. Differing understandings of territory and development further fuelled mobilisation, questioning the hegemonic development model and the quality of Peruvian democracy. This complex dynamic of socio-environmental struggles against the new mineral extraction is better understood through considering the multiplicity of actors who are distinctively located in relation to mining activities: i.e. the 'power-geometry' of new mineral extraction.

Similarly, in Cajamarca MYSA's mineral extraction has shown a complex 'power-geometry' as socio-economic benefits and environmental impacts have been unequally distributed among local populations. Despite the initial high expectations of an acceleration of local 'development', the multinational's capital-intensive mineral operation did not generate many employment opportunities, nor contributed to the purchase of products and services in Cajamarca to the expected degree. Both urban and rural populations have undergone a significant transformation over the last twenty decades, depending on how their livelihoods are located in relation to MYSA's activities. While small numbers of residents in the city of Cajamarca have benefited from increasing commercial opportunities due to the proximity of the mining complex, most urban population have not been beneficiaries, while experiencing a rise in criminal acts, prostitution, living costs, as well as house rents. Moreover, the influx of national and international professionals into the region and their affluent lifestyle, presents a stark contrast to the deteriorating living conditions of the majority. In rural areas, the unequal impacts of MYSA's presence are more obvious and become a main cause of grievance for most *campesinos*, stimulating their resistance against mining activities. Poor peasants in the *jalca* area could benefit from the MYSA's social or micro-finance programmes to a certain degree, since this ecological zone have been the least favoured for agricultural pursuit. In the meantime, most *campesinos* residing at lower ecological levels were adversely affected in various respects. Access to land has been put in jeopardy due to increasing prices; a revaluation of land-use; and an absence of land-titling. Furthermore, both the quality and quantity of water supply concern rural inhabitants in this ecological zone.

While MYSA's mineral extraction has enabled an unprecedented distribution of fiscal resources to regional and local governments via the *canon minero*, its unequal distribution (which did not match the region's poverty landscape) and inadequate administrative management have not contributed much to poverty reduction. Neither has it quelled social unrest. Instead, the *canon* has become an arena for power struggles among various actors, including government authorities from Lima, Cajamarca, local municipalities and the mining company, as they endeavour to gain political legitimacy. MYSA has also become an important local power broker, being both a provider of wealth and a source of division among *cajamarquinos*, who adopt different positions vis-à-vis mining activities. During the two decades of MYSA's presence, there has been a long list of social protests. By examining the relations among various social groups which are located in different spatialities and power relations with regard to MYSA's mining activities, I argue that resistance acts of *cajamarquinos* are not simply anti-mining or anti-development local struggles vis-à-vis multinational capital.

Alongside the limitation of economic reductionism in examining the political potential of rural subjectivities, another aspect I point out in the dissertation is the essentialist geographical perspective. While recognising the causes of local struggles vis-à-vis multinational capital, scholars like Harvey and Hardt and Negri underline the political ineffectiveness of 'place-based' struggles. They argue that these local forms of resistance have limitations since they are 'fragmented', 'postmodern' or 'reactionary' local struggles which defend values 'bounded to a place', such as identity, tradition and territory. They maintained that if place-based resistances remained at a local level, 'dispossessed' and 'disempowered' subaltern groups will only find themselves co-opted or controlled by 'powerful' global capital, unless they are 'rescaled' for empowerment. Similarly, in the context of national political discourses which depict the *sierra peruana* as a static and backward area where it is necessary to 'modernise', 'civilise' or 'develop' *campesinos serranos,* the political potential of these rural subaltern groups has been highly underestimated. Place-based socio-environmental struggles by local communities against 'new mineral extraction' are often understood for their fragmentation and minimal political, economic and social impacts, alongside low levels of organisation and links to political parties (if any). In addition, their empowerment is made possible only once they are 'rescaled' by making alliances at a higher level. In a similar vein, the official discourse maintains that place-based struggles represent local reactionary responses, which are mostly led by radical leftists or naïve environmentalists, thereby forming an obstacle to 'national development', i.e. macro-economic growth. As argued in the dissertation, this interpretation of socio-environmental protests is based on the dichotomous structure of geography and power: development led by 'powerful' global capital vs. 'reactionary' responses generated by 'powerless' local communities, mostly living in the rural areas. National economic growth is interpreted as a synonym to 'development', which can be attained only by attracting additional foreign investors in extractive industries. Therefore, protests against multinational companies' large-scale mining projects, are criticised as a reactionary response that only defend locally-bounded identity, tradition or culture without consideration of the country's development, as demonstrated in the discourse of '*perro del hortelano*'. Additionally, 'politically-minded' activists and foreign NGOs are viewed as the national government's main headache, since their ill-advised 'propaganda' has promoted political activism among 'ignorant', 'innocent' *campesinos* or indigenous people. However, the power of global capital is not 'consolidated' and 'concentrated' but 'diffuse', 'partial' and 'constitutive', thereby opening up possibilities to be contested. As Sharp and her colleagues argue, 'no moment of domination, in whatever form, is completely free of relations of resistance, and likewise, no moment of resistance, in whatever form, is entirely segregated from relations of domination' (2000: 20). Namely, power is 'entangled' with social relations at different spatialities.

Echoing Massey's geographical approach, Chapter 2 took a critical approach to this binary framework of power and geography: i.e. space/place, global/local, and powerful/powerless. As Featherstone notes, this essentialist geography 'obscures the ways in which subaltern politics generates multiple spatialities, which construct agency precisely through their distinctive and productive negotiations of cross-cutting relations of power' (2003: 408).

Based on this theoretical approach, this dissertation highlights the ‘relational content’ of MYSA’s mineral extraction and rural resistance in the Peruvian highlands in order to examine the re-formulation of rural subjectivities in the anti-Conga movement, instead of concentrating on the dispossession, fragmentation, powerlessness and passivity of local *campesinos* vis-à-vis multinational mining capital (Massey, 2005: 93). To this aim, it is relevant to understand Massey’s conceptualisation of ‘a progressive sense of place’, which is different from an essentialist place-boundedness which associates a given place with a fixed identity or bounded territory. It is ‘formed out of the particular set of social relations which interact at a particular location’ (1994: 168). Accordingly, a particular articulation of links and interconnections of social relations of different scales gives a particularity to a place. In addition, ‘all these relations interact with and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place with that history itself conceptualized as the product of layer of different sets of linkages both local to the wider world’ (Massey, 1993: 68).

Based on this ‘progressive’ understanding of a place, in Chapter 5 I examine historical and geographical components of social relations which have been articulated in rural Cajamarca and consequently became an integral part of the networked resistance of subaltern subjectivities against MYSA’s mining operation. Based on this, I underline the political potential of the ‘networked forms of resistance’ by subaltern groups in opposition to MYSA’s Conga project in Chapter 6. MYSA’s mineral extraction over the last two decades resulted in a further fragmentation of *campesinos*, who had already gone through social differentiation in the aftermath of Velasco’s agrarian reform via minifundisation. However, I argue that it has also provided common ‘ground for unity’ among various actors as they share common experiences of dispossession from mineral extraction. In other words, based on connections and linkages constructed between diverse subaltern groups at different spatialities (local, national and international), such peasants and urban-based NGOs committed to human rights protection and sustainable development are enabled as they found similar grievances resulting from neoliberal mineral extraction. While the scalar approach sees the local-global nexus as a strategic aggregation of common interest at a different scale, I introduce the CENs as ‘networked forms of resistance’, echoing Featherstone’s explanation. Moreover, forming a ‘progressive sense’ of this part of the rural highlands, prior organisational and political experiences, notably the *rondas campesinas* and the Catholic church, and a loose form of ‘trans-local’ networks constructed during the previous protests against MYSA mining activities, have also become an integral part of the CENs. Despite the comparatively weak role of community and ethnicity in highland Cajamarca, *rondas campesinas* and other grassroots *campesino* organisations have filled the political vacuum left in the aftermath of agrarian reform. In particular, the *rondas*' efficiency in dealing with cattle rustling have gained them political legitimacy throughout the countryside. Despite the rise and decline of the *rondas'* activities during the 1980s and co-optation attempts by the national government and political parties, these grassroots organisations have played an important role in protests against mining activities since the 1990s.

Constructing the CENs of the anti-Conga movement, local *campesinos*, grassroots organisations and NGOs committed to sustainable development and human rights protection and other social groups at different spatialities have shared common experiences and created what Featherstone calls 'prefigurative' solidarities through oppositional political activities. They contest the main causes of grievance (i.e. the 'maps of grievance'), such as authoritarian policies of the neoliberal state and different understandings of sustainable development. Accordingly, opposition to the 'Conga' project is not limited to the anti-mining project. It developed a political identity of 'environmental justice' during the national march for water encapsulated in: 'the right to address environmental impacts'; the 'right to secure clean and sufficient water provision'; and 'water as basic human rights'. Contesting the limited focus on efficiency, an uncritical acceptance of the opinion of international experts, and the 'infallibility' of modern technology, arguments advanced by the government, the CENs have become engaged in technical debates regarding *peritaje internacional*. Activists within the CENs argue for the broader meaning of environment and integral development via various political activities (the *peritaje alternativo* and the dissemination of technical information in diverse forms that question the official and company version). In addition, they contest the mechanism of participation in the EIA, i.e. the unilateral flow of information via a 'public hearing' that eventually ignored consideration of local people's opinion. Alongside this centralised decision-making process, many activists committed to human rights within the CENs question the quality of Peruvian democracy regarding the government's authoritarian measures vis-à-vis the movement. They also use alternative media to respond to hostile media attacks on opponents of the project. In sum, these oppositional political activities via the CENs brought neoliberal extractivism and the quality of Peruvian democracy into contention. Through this networked resistance, subaltern groups construct a political identity of 'environmental justice', which can be understood both as the process of construction and a collective expression of contestation (involving both material and postmaterial demands) by the CENs. Despite internal contradictions and tensions, the newly formulated rural subjectivities constructed among ‘unlike’ actors (urban-based NGOs and social organisations, working with the rural populations and their organisations) have attempted to demonstrate the importance of ‘the political’ with regard to their marginalised and unsatisfactory living conditions. In this way, I argue against ‘the death of the peasantry’ argument, which was strongly based on a materialist understanding, by examining the ‘relational components’ of neoliberal extractivism and their complex trajectories of networked forms of resistance among rural subaltern groups.

List of Interviews:

Mirtha Vázquez (GRUFIDES): Cajamarca, 13 March 2012.

Milton Sánchez (PIC): Celendín, 28 February 2012.

Informant A: Celendín, 28 March 2012.

Informant B: Celendín, 28 March 2012.

Informant C: Cajamarca, 18 March 2012.

Informant D: Cajamarca, 9 April 2012.

Informant E: Celendín, 28 March 2012.

Informant F: via email, 1 June 2014.

Appendix I

Socio-Environmental Conflicts in Peru and Cajamarca

		Social Conflicts (National Level)		**Cajamarca**	
		Total	**Socio-Environmental[1]**		
2006	Jan	75	13 (17%)	From January to July, six social conflicts have been recorded as latent. During July and August, one active case was added, the conflict in Combayo. When the conflict in Combayo became latent, another active case was added in Hualgayoc.	
	Feb	75	13 (17%)		
	Mar	77	13 (17 %)		
	Apr	76	13 (17%)		
	May	77	13 (17%)		
	June	80	14 (18%)		
	July	84	14 (17%)		
	Aug	91	19 (21%)		
	Sep	95	22 (23%)		
	Oct	100	22 (22%)		
	Nov	98	20 (20%)		
	Dec	97	20 (21%)		
2007				**Latent**	**Active**
	Jan	97	21 (22%)	5	2
	Feb	86	23 (27%)	5	3
	Mar	79	21 (31%)	5	3
	Apr	76	27 (36%)	5	4
	May	77	30 (39%)	5	4
	Jun	75	32 (43%)	5	4
	Jul	74	33(45%)	6	3
	Aug	76	35 (46%)	6	4
	Sep	76	36 (47%)	6	4
	Oct	80	38 (48%)	6	4
	Nov	79	37 (47%)	7	2
	Dec	78	37 (47%)	7	2

2008	Jan	83	41 (49%)	7		2
	Feb	88	43 (49%)	8		1
	Mar	93	45 (48%)	8		0
				Socio-Environmental		**Others[2]**
				Active	**Latent**	
	Apr	104	51 ()	1		2
	May	116	31 (48%)	2		2
	Jun	132	65 (49%)	6	2	6
	Jul	147	75 (51%)	5	3	6
	Aug	161	78 (49%)	5	3	6
	Sep	177	83 (48%)	5	4	7
	Oct	189	88 (47%)	3	7	8
	Nov	195	91 (49%)	3	7	8
	Dec	197	93 (47%)	3	7	8
2009	Jan	211	100 (49%)	6	5	8
	Feb	218	105 (48%)	6	5	7
	Mar	238	116 (49%)	6	4	8
	Apr	250	125 (50%)	8	3	8
	May	268	133 (50%)	10	2	8
	Jun	273	128 (47%)	10	2	8
	Jul	272	125 (46%)	10	3	8
	Aug	284	135 (48%)	10	3	8
	Sep	288	132 (46%)	12	2	8
	Oct	286	132 (46%)	11	3	9
	Nov	284	129 (46%)	12	2	8
	Dec	267	124 (46%)	9	3	6
2010	Jan	260	121 (47%)	10	0	5
	Feb	252	121 (48%)	11	0	5
	Mar	255	126(49%)	9	2	3
	Apr	260	132 (50%)	11	2	4
	May	255	132 (51.8%)	11	2	5
	Jun	250	126 (50.4%)	11	2	5

	Jul	248	125 (50.4%)	11	2	5
	Aug	246	125 (50.8%)	11	3	4
	Sep	250	121 (48.4%)	11	3	4
	Oct	250	120 (48%)	11	3	4
	Nov	250	120 (48%)	9	5	3
	Dec	246	117 (47.6%)	8	5	3
2011	Jan	239	116 (48.5%)	8	5	4
	Feb	234	113 (48.3%)	8	5	4
	Mar	236	116 (49.2%)	8	5	4
	Apr	233	117 (50.2%)	9	5	5
	May	227	117 (51.5%)	9	4	4
	Jun	217	118 (55.4%)	10	4	5
	Jul	214	118 (55.1%)	11	2	4
	Aug	214	119 (55.6%)	10	2	3
	Sep	215	119 (55.3%)	8	3	5
	Oct	217	124 (57.1%)	9	3	5
	Nov	220	125 (56.8%)	9	3	5
	Dec	223	126 (56.5%)	7	5	5
2012	Jan	228	129 (56.5%)	6	6	5
	Feb	229	133 (58.1%)	6	6	5
	Mar	237	139()			
	Apr	243	145 (59.7%)	6	6	5
	May	245	149 (60.8%)	8	4	5
	Jun	247	150 (60.7%)	8	4	5
	Jul	243	148 (60.9%)	8	3	5
	Aug	243	148 (60.9%)	8	3	5
	Sep	238	149 (62.6%)	9	0	4
	Oct	233	149 (63.9%)	8	1	4
	Nov	230	150 (65.2%)	10	1	3
	Dec	227	148 (65.2%)	10	1	3
2013	Jan	220	147 (66.8%)	9	1	3
	Feb	222	147 (66.2%)	9	1	2
	Mar	224	149 (66.5%)	9	1	2

	Apr	229	154 (67.2%)	10	1	2
	May	225	149 (66.2%)	10	1	2
	Jun	223	145 (65.0%)	10	1	2
	Jul	225	148			
	Aug	223	147			
	Sep	223	148			
	Oct	220	145			
	Nov	221	143			
	Dec	216	139			

Source: *Defensoría del Pueblo* Reports

[1] From May 2008, the category was changed from ‘environmental’ to ‘socio-environmental’.

[2] Other than socio-environmental characters, there are conflicts related to problems with local government, regional government, national government as well as issues of elections and of territorial demarcation.

Appendix II

The Anti-Conga Movement (2011-2013)

Date	Activities/Actors	Location	Notes
9 February **2010**	MYSA's submission of the EIA on the Conga project.		Authorised on October 27 2010.
5 April	Forum on 'Sorochuco, Environment and Mining' by the municipality of the district of Sorochuco.	Sorochuco	
11 July **2011**	Visit to the Parol and Chaihuagón lakes /Authorities from regional government		
27 July	MYSA's official announcement of investment plan		
18-19 August	Ecuentro Regional de Frentes de Defensa, Comisión ambientales, Municipales, Rondas Campesinas y Organizaciones Sociales de la región Cajamarca /Rondas Campesinas from various provinces, NGOs, SUTEP	SUTEP Building in Bambamarca	I became aware of the criticism over Conga project and made contacts with *rondero*s from Celendín.
21 September	March /About thousands local populations called by SUTEP	The city of Cajamarca	More regional level
14 October	Road Blockage /Local denizens from La Encañada, called by its mayor, Jorge Vásquez	Road between Bambamarca and Cajamarca	
24 October	March to the lakes /About 2,000 *campesinos* from Huasmín		8-day ultimatum , granted to MYSA
2 November	Visit to lakes (Azul and Perol) /Government's authorities		Controversy over the use of MYSA's helicopter
9 November	Paro (strike) /called by the president of the regional government	The city of Cajamarca	
21 November	Submission of the EIA revision by MINAM's environmental technical team		
24 November	1st indefinite strike, march and road blockage		
29 November	Confrontation between protestors and the police, as well as MYSA's security forces		Many injuries and detentions; gaining national and international attention
4 December	1st state of emergency (lifted on 16 December) in 4 provinces (Bambamarca, Cajamarca, Celendín, and Contunmazá)		Subsequent cabinet change
1 – 10 February **2012**	National March for Water	From Cajamarca to Lima	Raising public awareness across the nation
25 February	La Asamblea Extraordinaria de la Federación Provincial de Rondas Campesinas, Urbanas e Indígenas de Cajamarca by SUTEP, Rondas Campesinas from Cajamarca, other departments	SUTEP building in Cajamarca	

28 February	Meeting by Rondas campesinas, SUTEP	SUTEP building in Celendín	
9 March	Regional mobilisation	The city of Cajamarca	
17 March	Asamblea de Frente de Defensa, Organizaciones Nativas, Campesinas, Roderiles, Populares, Sindicales y Políticas de la Macro-Región Norte y Oriente del Perú		Sudden change of the meeting location
22 March	March to the lake Azul by SUTEP, Rondas Campesinas from Cajamarca, Bambamarca and Celendín		Not gained the access
28-29 March	Gran encuentro Unitario de Frentes de Defensa y Origanizaciones Sociales de la Región Cajamarca	SUTEP building in Celendín	
30-31 March	La primera Asamblea Nacional de los Pueblos del Perú en Cajamarca /Various organisations led by Wilfredo Saavedra	Ollanta convention house in the city of Cajamarca	
9 April	Regional mobilisation	The city of Cajamarca	
11 April	Regional strike	The city of Cajamarca	
17 April	Submission of revision of international experts (*peritaje internacional*); Adjudication of Tribunal Constitutional over Regional Ordinance 036		
18 April	March by about a thousand local denizens	In the streets of Cajamarca city	
21 April	Government's announcement on Conga project		
21-29 May	La Marcha de los Caxamarcas	13 provinces of Cajamarca	
29 May	Pro-Conga mobilisation		
31 May	2nd indefinite strike		
3 July	2nd state of emergency; confrontation		5 deaths on 3-5 July
9 July	Arrival of two dialogue conciliators in Cajamarca		
23 August	Announcement of the project's temporary suspension and subsequent activities of '*guardianes de lagunas*'		

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