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# A Case Study Analysis of Dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur

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A Case Study Analysis of Dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur

by

Carlyn Jorgensen

A Dissertation Presented to the  
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
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
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April 2016


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**College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences**

This dissertation was submitted by Carlyn Jorgensen under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

**Approved:**


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## Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my Aunt Brigitte Eileen Kelly, who passed away from cancer in September 2015. She was a brilliant, funny, compassionate, and vivacious woman who is sorely missed.

This dissertation is also dedicated to my family: to my parents, James and Kathleen Jorgensen; my sisters, Sarah-Enid and Kaiti-Anne Jorgensen; and my brother-in-law Michael Proulx. Thank you for all your love and support throughout this entire process. I would not be here without you all.

Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to my four-legged “ugly brother” Finn MacCool, whose enthusiastic howling and slobbery kisses every time I come home make me feel so loved. Thanks, buddy.

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## Abstract

From April-July 1994, over 800,000 people were killed in a genocide in Rwanda. Since 2004, over 450,000 people have been killed in a genocide in Darfur, Sudan. In both instances, physical and sexual dehumanization were used against the targeted groups. While dehumanization in genocide has been studied, most literature on dehumanization looks at it from a psychological viewpoint, and does not include the socio-economic factors that can lead to a population being dehumanized and targeted for genocide. In addition, research on the different types of dehumanization, especially sexual dehumanization, is needed in order to fully understand the role that dehumanization plays in encouraging and facilitating genocide. The purpose of this dissertation was to compare how dehumanization was/is used in the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Thus, in this study, I analyzed the literature on Rwanda and Darfur and explain how dehumanization was spread from the top down by both governments, the role structural violence played in the genocides, and the types of dehumanization, both physical and sexual, used in each genocide. This dissertation is a qualitative study that used case study methodology in order to review the existing literature on Rwanda and Darfur, as well as the literature on dehumanization. I argued that rape in Rwanda and Sudan was an act of genocide, done to inflict severe physical and mental harm upon the groups, as well as a measure intended to prevent births within the targeted group. I concluded with some policy recommendations, including mental health care for the survivors, steps to recognize and stop the spread of dehumanization of a targeted group, and the need to rehumanize not only the victims, but also the perpetrators, in order to build a lasting peace.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Chapter Introduction

During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered in 100 days. Those who took part in the killings included doctors, teachers, farmers, and members of the clergy. According to Gourevitch (1998), neighbors killed neighbors in their homes, doctors killed patients, and teachers killed students (p. 115). The killings were highly organized: members of the *Interahamwe* prepared small groups in neighborhoods, as well as drawing up lists of Tutsis to be executed and organizing retreats where members practiced burning houses and hacking up dummies with machetes, while local leaders referred to Tutsis as devils, and ordered people to kill them (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 94-95). Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in their homes, as well as gathering places such as churches, schools, and hospitals.

The genocide was the culmination of events that had taken place since independence. During the colonial era, the Belgians favored the Tutsi over the Hutu, even though the Tutsi make up a minority of the population. The Belgians denied education and job opportunities to the Hutu, and issued identity cards based on the father's ethnicity. After independence, periodic massacres of Tutsis occurred until Juvenal Habyarimana came to power in the 1970s. Although the Tutsis were still denied political power, they were grateful that the killings had stopped, and did not protest their ill treatment. However, the uneasy peace that existed in Rwanda was shattered when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Tutsis who grew up in exile in Uganda, invaded Rwanda in 1990. The RPF demanded an open political system, and power sharing between Hutus and Tutsis. A peace agreement known as the Arusha Accords was

signed in 1993, but it was unpopular with the Hutu extremists in the government. Just as the Arusha Accords were about to be implemented, President Habyarimana was assassinated when his plane was shot down as he flew into Kigali on April 6, 1994. Although it is still not known who shot the plane down, the Hutu extremists immediately blamed the RPF, and the massacre of Tutsis began that very night. Around 800,000 people were killed between April-July 1994, and the genocide only ended when the RPF overthrew the extremist government in Kigali.

Since 2004, there has been a genocide in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. An estimated 450,000 people have been killed, with millions displaced within Sudan and in neighboring Chad. Those being targeted are the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, the three largest “African” ethnic groups in Darfur. The genocide is a result of a civil war started in 2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the airport in Al-Fasher, the capital of Darfur. The rebels demanded equal access to resources, government spending on infrastructure, and equal treatment by the government.

The government responded by arming “Arab” militias, known as the *Janjaweed*, to carry out the genocide. The *Janjaweed* attack villages, usually at dawn, killing the men and boys, raping girls and women, burning down the homes, destroying food sources, and stealing livestock (Flint & de Waal, 2005). Although the government of Sudan denies arming and supporting the *Janjaweed*, there is strong evidence to show that the government is not only arming and supplying the militias, it is also taking part in the killings (Steidle, 2007). A peace agreement was signed in 2005, but it was broken almost immediately, and the civil war and genocide are still occurring.

In both Rwanda and Darfur, dehumanization played a large part in facilitating the genocides. In Rwanda, the media, including Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), disseminated anti-Tutsi propaganda, such as calling Tutsis “cockroach” and reminding listeners not to take pity on women and children and to kill every Tutsi in Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115). The media also routinized the work, comparing it to everyday, ordinary tasks such as weeding (Gourevitch, 1998). In Darfur, the government sees the “Arab” groups as racially superior to the “African” groups, whom they call dogs, monkeys, and slaves. In both cases, physical and sexual dehumanization have occurred. Physical dehumanization is done via depicting the victims as animals or non-humans, while sexual dehumanization has manifested in the mass rape of women and girls.

As mentioned above, mass rape has occurred in both genocides. Hundreds of thousands of women and girls were raped in Rwanda and Darfur, albeit for different reasons. In Rwanda, rape was an act of humiliation, of putting Tutsi women “in their place,” as it was rumored that Tutsi women saw themselves as superior to Hutu men. Thus, the primary goal of rape was to inflict physical and mental harm on members of the group. In Darfur, while rape did cause physical and mental harm, rape was a measure intended to prevent births within the group. In Rwanda, women were often gang raped or repeatedly raped, which caused significant, and sometimes permanent, damage to their reproductive organs. Pregnancy was not an intended consequence of the rapes, but rather a byproduct. In Darfur, pregnancy with a so-called “Arab” baby is what the *Janjaweed* wants to have happen.

It is important to note that genocide does not occur in a vacuum; individuals do not decide to try to eliminate an entire group of people overnight. Dehumanizing a whole

group of people takes time and effort. In Rwanda, RTLM introduced dehumanizing language, such as calling Tutsis “cockroaches” slowly, so as not to shock or disgust their listeners. Jokes and comments were used to condition people to hearing derogatory terms and phrases. The use of the word “cockroach” to mean Tutsi seeped slowly into the public’s consciousness, and by the time the genocide started, a majority of the population no longer saw the Tutsis as human and were prepared to eliminate them, or at the very least, not protest against those who took part in the killings.

In Darfur, dehumanization began after independence and was continued by successive governments. Racism against the black population of Sudan is systemic, and non-Arabs are treated with contempt. The government used the so-called “African” groups in Darfur as soldiers against the people in the south, as most Darfuris are Muslim, and they were persuaded to kill the non-believers, a.k.a. Christians and Animists, in the south. When the government no longer saw the African groups as useful, they openly supported the so-called “Arab” groups in the conflict over shrinking arable land and grazing sources. When armed groups attacked government planes at the airport in Al-Fasher, Darfur’s capital, the government responded by arming Arab groups to remove the African groups from the land permanently. The contempt for the African groups was so intense that the government did not even consider listening to their complaints and negotiating with them, but instead, decided to get rid of them once and for all. Darfuris are often derided as “dogs”, “monkeys”, and “slaves.” This systemic racism and hatred made it easier for the Arab groups to agree to participate in the genocide.

Along with dehumanization, structural violence was a key component of the genocides. In both cases, only a small part of the population was, and is, benefitting from



the resources of the country. In Rwanda, land and money were controlled by the *Akazu*, meaning “little house”, a group of Hutu extremists that supported the Habyarimana regime. Most of the population worked in agriculture, but overpopulation meant smaller plots of land for subsequent generations, and the fluctuating world markets for crops kept people in poverty. Most of the aid being sent to Rwanda only helped the small group of elites. In Sudan, the oil revenues are spent in Khartoum, which is the base of support for Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF). Very little of the money reached the south or Darfur. New hotels are being built in Khartoum, but Darfur lacks proper roads, schools, and hospitals.

With very little of the money and resources trickling down to the populations of Rwanda and Darfur, frustration increased among the people, leading to anger about their situation. The respective governments knew that they would have to redirect that anger away from them, so they chose to scapegoat the Tutsis and the “African” groups.

Although most of the Tutsis were just as poor as the Hutu, the government convinced the population that the Tutsi were to blame for their problems, that they were controlling resources and land that should go to the Hutu instead. Part of this belief was tied to the fact that the Belgians had promoted the Tutsi over the Hutu by putting them into power during colonialism, but by the time of the genocide, the Tutsi had lost almost all power and prestige. However, the successful invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forced the government to negotiate a peace agreement whereby they would have shared power, something the *Akazu* violently opposed. Thus, by blaming the Tutsi for Rwanda’s problems, the government was able to convince the population that by killing the Tutsi, their problems would be solved.

In Darfur, the African groups own most of the land, as they are farmers, while the Arabs are mostly nomadic. There had been sharing of resources, as the farmers would allow the nomads to water and graze their animals on their land. However, when desertification increased, and the amount of arable land shrank, the farmers began blocking access to their land. Instead of trying to negotiate a settlement, the government publicly backed the Arab groups, and argued that the land should belong to them. Darfuris report being told by the *Janjaweed* that "...Sudan is for the Arabs. It is not for black dogs and slaves" (Bashir, 2008, p. 218). The government is providing money and arms for the *Janjaweed*, so they can drive the African population out of Darfur and take over the land. Although desertification is causing problems for both the farmers and the nomads, the nomads see the farmers as being selfish for cutting off access to the land, a belief encouraged by the government, who sees the Arabs as superior and thus the rightful owners of the land.

### **Statement of the Problem**

While dehumanization in genocide has been studied, most literature on dehumanization looks at it from a psychological viewpoint, and does not include the socio-economic factors that can lead to a population being dehumanized and targeted for genocide. In addition, research on the different types of dehumanization, especially sexual dehumanization, is needed in order to fully understand the role that dehumanization plays in encouraging and facilitating genocide

The purpose of this dissertation is to compare how dehumanization was/is used in the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Although dehumanization has been studied, how it is spread is still being discussed and debated, and very few studies discuss more than one

type of dehumanization found in genocide. Thus, in this study, I will analyze the literature on Rwanda and Darfur and explain how dehumanization was/is spread from the top down by both governments; the various types of dehumanization, including physical and sexual); and how both victims and perpetrators need to be re-humanized after the genocide in order to stop the cycle of violence. The main goal of this study is to look at dehumanization in genocide in great detail, in order to understand how it is spread and what types of dehumanization are found during genocide. This dissertation is a qualitative study using case study methodology in order to review the existing literature on Rwanda and Darfur, as well as the literature on dehumanization.

### **Research Questions**

The research questions are the following: how was/is dehumanization spread in these countries? What was/is the impact of physical and sexual dehumanization on each genocide? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-humanize both the victims and killers? Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation between the two groups in order to prevent a new or continuing cycle of violence?

### **Research Method**

The research method that will be used for this study is case study. For my dissertation, I used multiple case design. The reason for this is that I wanted to compare and contrast two cases of genocide where both physical and sexual dehumanization were present, to understand how dehumanization is used to facilitate genocide. I chose Rwanda and Darfur as my cases because while there are many similarities between the two genocides, the spread of dehumanization varied, and sexual dehumanization carried out via mass rape had a different intentionality in each case.

I collected data on both genocides, including books, articles, and websites, to help explain the dehumanization process in both countries, as well as how physical and sexual dehumanization manifested in both conflicts. I spent a year gathering, analyzing, and interpreting my data. I tried to limit my data to reliable sources, such as respected NGOs, journals, and scholars. I collected data from a variety of areas, including: histories of each genocide; dehumanization in general; dehumanization in genocide; rape in general; rape as an act of genocide; and reconciliation and re-humanization efforts after genocide ends.

### **Delimitations of Study**

The biggest limitation of this study is that it relies on literature to provide the framework of analysis for the cases. While I tried to ensure that the sources I used come from respected sources, the problem remains that I could not independently verify the claims made in the sources. This would have required fieldwork, which was not possible. Nonetheless, I believe that the literature used clearly demonstrates how dehumanization, especially physical and sexual dehumanization, played a significant role in both Rwanda and Darfur.

Another limitation is my own bias. I have been studying genocide for 12 years now, and I had some ideas in mind for what the literature would tell me about dehumanization. However, as a researcher, I had to be careful not to let my pre-existing knowledge influence the direction this study took, or how I interpreted the literature. In order to do this, I read each source at least 2 times, to verify that my analysis of the source was correct. I also kept an open mind as I read, and did not automatically disqualify any literature from an author I disagreed with. For example, some scholars

argue that what is happening in Darfur is not genocide; while I firmly believe that it *is* genocide, I nonetheless included their research because it provided valuable insight into what has been happening in Darfur.

### **Definitions of Terms**

There are four terms used throughout this dissertation that are important to explain, and are defined below:

**Genocide.** I used the formal, international definition decided upon in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), which is the following: “The attempt to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group (Article II).

**Dehumanization.** The Oxford Dictionary defines dehumanization as “The Process of depriving a person or group of positive human qualities” (oxforddictionaries.com).

**Physical Dehumanization.** I define this as the practice of reducing human beings to non-human entities, such as animals or plants.

**Sexual Dehumanization.** I define this as the reduction of a group of people, usually women, to an object for personal gratification or reproductive humiliation.

### **Commonly Used Acronyms**

There are many groups and organizations referenced in this dissertation, so a list of the commonly used acronyms is important.

UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front

RTL: Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines

SLA: Sudanese Liberation Army

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders

NIF: National Islamic Front

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

AU: African Union

IDP: Internally Displaced Person(s)

### **Outline of Dissertation**

This dissertation is divided into six chapters plus appendices. The first chapter provided a brief background on Rwanda and Darfur and the circumstances that led to the genocides, the research methodology, the problem statement and the research questions. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the existing literature on the topic, as well as the gaps in the current research. It will also provide the theoretical framework for the dissertation by discussing theories that provide insight into how dehumanization occurs. Chapter 3 explains the research method, including detailed information on how to conduct a case study, how the data will be collected and analyzed, and the ethical concerns arising from the study. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the first case study, the Rwandan genocide. Chapter 5 presents the findings from the second case study, the Darfur genocide. Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the study, the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and policy implications.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

### **Introduction**

Much has been written about the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. Books, articles, and dissertations explore various aspects of the genocides, including the history of Rwanda and Darfur, accounting for participation in genocide, the role dehumanization has played, and the search for justice in post-genocide Rwanda. In this chapter, I will explore the current works on these various topics, and underline the gaps in the literature. In addition, I will explain the theoretical lens through which dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur is analyzed.

### **History of the Rwandan Genocide**

One of the key books on the history of the genocide is by Philip Gourevitch (1998). Gourevitch was one of the first journalists to write about the genocide in Rwanda, and he conducted his research from 1995 to 1998. Gourevitch (1998) interviewed genocide survivors and perpetrators, government officials, and aid workers to explore the history of Rwanda and the causes of the genocide. Gourevitch (1998) was critical of the international response to the genocide, particularly the US response, and points out the absurdity of the international response after the genocide when he argues that the genocide had been tolerated by the international community, but dogs who ate corpses were shot by UN soldiers (pp. 148-149). Gourevitch's (1998) book covers pre-genocide Rwandan history, the genocide, and post-genocide events, including the issues of refugees returning to Rwanda and the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Gourevitch (1998) wrote a clear, concise book that is intended for a general audience and written in a way that makes the book easy to read. Gourevitch (1998) has

been criticized for certain aspects of the book, such as appearing to support the RPF and its government, but it should be kept in mind that he wrote the book right after the genocide, when the international community in general was uncritical and supportive of the new government. Overall, Gourevitch (1998) is a good introductory text for anyone unfamiliar with the genocide.

Another useful source on Rwandan history is Linda Melvern's (2004) book *Conspiracy to Murder*. In the book, Melvern (2004) traces the campaign to exterminate the Tutsi, and argues that plans began in 1990, right after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda (p. 20). Melvern (2004) describes the peace agreement brokered between the government and the RPF, and the UN intervention force that was sent to monitor the peace agreement. She asserts that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a failure due to the limited mandate of monitoring a peace agreement, non-intervention rules, and lack of interest in expanding and changing the UN mission by the Security Council (Melvern, 2004, pp. 65-84).

Melvern (2004) explains Rwandan history during the genocide in great detail, from the government officials who were in charge during the genocide to the failed UN mission to the use of the *Interahamwe* and other groups to carry out the genocide. Melvern is very critical of the international community for its failure to respond adequately to the genocide, especially the refusal of the U.S. to call what was happening genocide and for demanding the withdrawal of the UN troops (p. 234). Melvern provides figures for the genocide, including that 93.7% of those killed were killed because they were identified as Tutsi; 53.7% of the victims were between the ages of 0 and 24; and that while most victims were killed with machetes, other methods of killing included



using screwdrivers, clubs with nails and hammers, forcing victims to commit suicide, drowning victims in rivers or lakes, burning victims alive, and throwing babies and infants against walls (p. 253). Melvern's (2004) meticulously researched and documented book provides a clear understanding of Rwanda right before and during the genocide, as well as how the genocide was carried out and the lack of international response to the genocide.

### **History of Darfur**

Many books have been written about the Sudan, but only a few focus specifically on Darfur or have chapters on the current events in Darfur. One useful book that helps explain Darfur in the context of Sudanese history overall is Richard Cockett's (2010) *Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State*. Cockett explored how Darfur was neglected even before Sudan became independent, and how the government in Khartoum chose to ignore the needs of Darfur because it was seen as a periphery area, and therefore unimportant to the successive governments. Cockett talked to government officials who downplayed the crisis, UN staff in Darfur, refugees, and former *Janjaweed* militias. One of the most interesting comments in the book is when Cockett (2010) recounts the UN Chief in Sudan being told by a government official that the government wanted "...a final solution in Darfur" (p. 170). Cockett also analyzed the international response to the crisis, and the events in Darfur up to 2010.

Another good book that provides a historical context for the civil war and genocide in Darfur is Julie Flint and Alex de Waal's (2005) *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*. In this book, Flint and de Waal discuss the various parties in Darfur on a chapter by chapter basis. They start with the people of Darfur-the ethnic groups-then

move on to the government, the *Janjaweed*, and the rebel groups in Darfur, ending with a detailed account of the war in Darfur. Flint and de Waal's book is an excellent guide for people just learning about the genocide in Darfur.

Like Flint and de Waal (2005), Gérard Prunier's (2008) *Darfur: A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Genocide* analyzes the history of Darfur to help explain why the war and genocide are occurring in Darfur. Prunier describes the differences between the so-called "Arab" and "African" groups in Darfur, and the systemic racism and discrimination against the "African" groups. Prunier examines the lack of democracy in Darfur, the government's refusal to alleviate the famine of the 1980s, the use of Darfur as a back-door entry for Libya to invade Chad, and finally, the genocide in Darfur and the international response. Prunier's book is meticulously detailed and lays out the problems of Darfur in a clear, concise way.

A different perspective on the genocide is found in Brian Steidle's (2007) autobiographical book *The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur*. Steidle was a U.S. Marine Corps Captain who signed on to serve as part of the African Union Mission in Darfur. Steidle documented many atrocities in Darfur, which he describes in great and painful detail. After Steidle's contract ended, he returned to the U.S. to educate politicians and the public about what he saw in Darfur. Steidle's book will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.

In addition to the aforementioned books, there are a number of articles written on identity in Sudan, although I will only mention two here. The first one is by Alex de Waal (2005), who describes the creation of the Darfur state, the major ethnic groups, and how identity has been constructed by the government within Darfur. de Waal (2005)

points out that identity has been simplified in Darfur by the government, in order to pit the Arabs against the “Africans” (p. 197).

The other article that analyzes identity in Sudan is by Heather Sharkey (2008), who outlines the Arabization of Sudan in the post-colonial era, which led to discrimination and wars in the South as well as Darfur. Sharkey (2008) sees the institutionalized racism and discrimination as a top-down process, one that has ties to the historical slave trade in Sudan (p. 29). Sharkey does an excellent job of explaining the historical roots of discrimination that fostered the anger and resentment of the “African” groups in Darfur, which in turn led to the civil war and genocide. Sharkey’s (2008) article will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.

### **Rape in Genocide**

It is important to discuss literature on the topic of rape in genocide generally, before outlining specific materials on rape in Rwanda and Darfur. An edited volume by Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (2012) analyzes rape in the Holocaust, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Guatemala, as well as rape in international law, rape as a weapon of war, and rape in film. A beneficial chapter in the book is by James Waller (2012), who looks at rape as a way of “othering” the targeted group during genocide. Waller points out that Tutsi women were dehumanized during the genocide; an example of this is a survivor recounting that Interahamwe members threw a bottle of milk at her and said Tutsis were like cats because they like milk (p. 83). Waller argues that putting the Tutsis into a separate, non-human category facilitated the mass rape of women, and uses the example of Interahamwe referring to rape as “...getting a taste of Tutsi women” (p. 91). Waller’s chapter will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.

Unlike Waller, Sherrie Russell-Brown (2003) examines rape in genocide through a gender lens, as well as a legal one. Russell-Brown recounts specific examples of rape in Rwanda as acts of genocide, and asserts that the aim of genocidal rape in Rwanda was to kill Tutsi women via the transmission of AIDS, raping women with sharp objects, or raping women multiple times (p. 356). Russell-Brown points out that genocidal rape is not just about women's identity, but also their identity in a particular group and how rape can impact this (p. 365). Russell-Brown concludes with a discussion of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) acknowledgment that rape is an act of genocide, and that Tutsi women were targeted on the basis of both their ethnicity and their gender.

Similar to Russell-Brown (2003), Jennifer Green (2004) investigates genocidal rape, although she refers to it as collective rape. According to Green, collective rape is "...a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a state, political group, and/or politicized ethnic group" (p. 101). Green looks at the acts of violence, the magnitude of the violence, the perpetrators, the victims, and the victims' silence. Green sums up her article by stating that collective rape is usually an indiscriminate crime perpetrated on a distinct group, for a variety of reasons that include reducing women to their reproductive capabilities, thus making it okay to attack them (pp. 109-112).

Finally, Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham (2008) studies genocidal rape through the lens of its impact on the targeted community. Reid-Cunningham asserts that rape carries a message to the men of the community that they cannot protect their women, which causes harm to the community (p. 282). Reid-Cunningham discusses the various consequences of rape, including bodily injuries, forced impregnation, psychological problems, PTSD, and the reactions of the community to rape. Reid-Cunningham provides

a comprehensive explanation of the way genocidal rape impacts not only the survivors, but also their communities, and how mass rape can destroy a community.

### **Rape and Sexual Violence in Rwanda and Darfur**

In both Rwanda and Darfur, rape and sexual violence against women was/is rampant during the genocides. All the literature mentioned here will be discussed in greater detail in chapters four and five. One of the best resources on sexual violence in Rwanda is a Human Rights Watch (1996) report done only two years after the genocide. Human Rights Watch meticulously documented, via interviews with survivors, the anti-Tutsi women propaganda before the genocide, the acts of violence carried out against the women during the genocide, and the health problems the survivors face, both physically and mentally. The Human Rights Watch report is difficult to read, as it contains graphic descriptions of acts of sexual violence against Tutsi women, but it is critical reading for understanding this violence.

Another good source on sexual violence in Rwanda is an article by Christopher Mullins (2009), who discusses genocidal rape in general and specifically within Rwanda. Mullins reviews the different types of genocidal rape, such as sexual enslavement, sexual mutilation, and mass rapes of women. Mullins rightly points out that genocidal rape is done to generate fear within the targeted population and humiliate both men and women within the targeted group (pp. 721-722). Mullins's article provides a significant context for understanding the impact of rape during genocide.

Like Human Rights Watch (1996), Nicole Fox (2011) interviewed survivors of the Rwandan genocide-both men and women-about their experiences with gender-based violence during the genocide. Fox describes the social status of women before the

genocide, how rape was used in Rwanda, and the problems survivors have with discussing their experiences of rape and sexual violence. Fox provides an important insight into the survivors' ability to process what happened and their attempts to reconcile what happened to them with their inability to speak about it to their families and friends.

Like Rwanda, rape and sexual violence have occurred frequently in Darfur. Several human rights organizations have written reports on the violence, one of the most important being the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF; a.k.a Doctors Without Borders) (2005) report on rape in Darfur. MSF doctors and staff documented the treatment of rape victims, with over 500 survivors being treated between October 2004 and February 2005 (p. 2). The MSF report outlines the brutal nature of the rapes and sexual violence carried out against women in Darfur, which led to the government of Sudan responding to the publication of the report by arresting the head of MSF Holland (Moszynski, 2005). The MSF report was one of the first to document the extensive use of rape and sexual violence in Darfur.

Another helpful report on rape in Darfur was written by Amnesty International (2004). This report contains interviews with rape survivors in Chad and illustrates the brutal nature of the attacks, pregnancy that resulted from rape, the stigmatization of the survivors by their communities and families, and the health issues the survivors face. The Amnesty International report is well organized and detailed, and provides important information on the impact of rape on the survivors, their families, and the communities.

Like MSF and Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed survivors in Chad and Darfur on the mass rape and sexual violence occurring there.

Human Rights Watch describes the attacks on women, the verbal abuse during the rapes, and the social and psychological ramifications of being raped and impregnated. Human Rights Watch ends their report with recommendations for the international community, which include ensuring confidentiality for reporting rape, taking measures to prevent sexual violence, and protecting women and girls in the refugee camps.

The last source that I will discuss in this section is an article by Justin Wagner (2005-2006) on rape as a tool of genocide and the legal procedures for prosecuting individuals for acts of rape. Wagner points out that the government, both on the local and national levels, has done little or nothing to investigate acts of sexual violence in Sudan. Wagner describes acts of sexual violence carried out against women, and argues that individuals who carried out or authorized acts of sexual violence should be prosecuted for genocide, as rape in Darfur is legally an act of genocide. Wagner's article provides useful information on the legal ramifications for rape and sexual violence during genocide.

### **Explanations for Participation in the Genocide**

Many books and articles have explored the question of why individuals participate in genocide. Ravi Bhavnani's (2006) article examines the various explanations for why individuals participated in the Rwandan genocide. Bhavnani (2006) starts by critiquing conventional explanations for participation, such as Rwandan culture being one of unquestioned obedience to authority figures, structural violence, deviant individuals being predisposed to violence, and the institutional structures facilitating mass participation (pp. 653-654).

Bhavnani (2006) dismisses the common explanations, and argues that the factor that motivated participation was punishment, or the threat of punishment (p. 656). Hutu

who sheltered Tutsi were punished in various ways, including fines, beatings, rapes, and being killed by their fellow Hutu (Bhavnani, 2006, p. 656). Bhavnani (2006) argues that the use of punishment created a set of norms whereby Hutus knew that certain behaviors were expected of them, and those who were reluctant to participate in the killings were punished so severely that most Hutu chose to cooperate with the orders given to them (p. 666). Bhavnani (2006) also asserts that the norms created in Rwanda were ethnic norms, which resemble intragroup mechanisms such as in-group policing of members (p. 657).

Bhavnani (2006) created a model to explain ethnic norms, which includes a finite population of agents from the same ethnic group with a level of animosity toward another ethnic group and tolerance for fellow group members who do not share the same animosity (p. 658). Bhavnani (2006) claims that violence-promoting norms (such as the call to exterminate the Tutsi in Rwanda) can be found in these ethnic groups, but it is not limited to groups dominated by extremists; in fact, they can emerge in groups dominated by moderates (p. 663). Bhavnani (2006) contends that strong punishments are a requirement for the emergence of norms promoting interethnic violence (pp. 663-664). In sum, Bhavnani (2006) believes that the usual explanations for participation in the Rwandan genocide are not accurate; instead, a set of ethnic norms that promoted interethnic violence in groups and used punishment to enforce the norms are what led to mass participation. Bhavnani's (2006) article is useful for understanding the punishment factor in participation, and presents an alternative view for looking at why many individuals took part in the genocide.

Lee Ann Fujii's (2004) article examines the transformation of norms in Rwanda so that actions that were barred, such as murder, could be viewed as not only appropriate,



but also necessary (pp. 99-100). Fujii (2004) outlines the steps needed to transform the norms. The first step was to disseminate the genocidal message throughout the country and monopolize the public space so no other message could get through; the second step was to give concreteness to the message, which was done via practice massacres; and the final step was to intensify the immediacy of the message to a level that would persuade any doubters to become true believers (pp. 100-101). According to Fujii (2004), this message was that Tutsi were fundamentally different from Hutu, Hutu and Tutsi should not mix, and all Tutsi were evil (p. 102). This message was spread primarily using radio: nearly 60% of residents in urban areas owned radios, and around 30% in rural areas did (Fujii, 2006, p. 104). Using a mixture of music, banter, and editorials, stations like RTLM reinforced the genocidal message on a constant basis, and many compared RTLM's style to having discussions over beer with friends (Fujii, 2006, p. 104).

Fujii (2004) claims that RTLM's influence over Rwandans grew during the genocide, as travel and communication became difficult and people relied on their radios to get news and information; this reliance allowed RTLM to interpret news for the population and reinforce the genocidal message (p. 105). Before the genocide occurred, practice massacres were carried out in a few communes, killing a few hundred people to help prepare individuals for the main event; people were trained when to start killing, when to stop killing, who to target, and who to spare (Fujii, 2004, p. 107). In addition, Rwandan authorities disseminated false information regarding the civil war, including spreading rumors and fabricating Tutsi attacks on Hutu (Fujii, 2004, p. 108). The use of radio to broadcast propaganda helped create a new set of norms that removed the moral imperatives against murder and facilitated the participation of individuals in the genocide

(Fujii, 2004, p. 113). Fujii's (2006) article provides valuable information about the use of propaganda in Rwanda and the way in which morals and norms in Rwandan society were changed to enable participation in the genocide.

One of the most useful works for my dissertation is a book by Jean Hatzfeld (2003). Hatzfeld interviewed ten prisoners who killed in three communities, Kibungo, Ntarama, and Kanzenze (p. 9). Hatzfeld (2003) starts off with a discussion of how the killing was organized; the killers told him that the organizers included members of the *Interahamwe*, a municipal judge, and area leaders (pp. 10-11). Hatzfeld's (2003) interviews with the killers covered many areas, including overcoming the reluctance to kill, working in a group during the killings, punishments for not following orders, looting, and remorse and forgiveness. Hatzfeld (2003) got the killers to share detailed information about their participation, such as how they viewed the genocide; many of the killers described the killings as work, with one killer stating "We had work to do" (p. 15). The killers also described participation in the genocide as less tiring than farming, and as "...a demanding but more gratifying activity" (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 62-63).

With regards to remorse, one killer told Hatzfeld (2003) that he was not sorry for a single killing he committed (p. 51), while others talked about having nightmares (pp. 157-158). Some of the killers have apologized to the families of their victims, and claim that when they are released from prison, they will bring gifts of food and drink to the families, or assist the Tutsis in the fields (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 190-192). The killers are torn on the issue of forgiveness: one stated that the killings were out of their hands, and therefore, so is forgiveness, while another argues that forgiveness is necessary, otherwise, the killings might start again (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 202-204). Overall, Hatzfeld's (2003)

book provides valuable information about the killers in Rwanda, and helps others to understand that the killers are not a homogenized group.

Nicole Hogg (2010) conducted interviews in Rwanda in 2001 with 71 incarcerated female genocide suspects, in order to gain a better understanding of the extent to which they participated, the nature of their participation, the legal consequences for women who participated, and how gender influenced women's participation (p. 70). Hogg (2010) starts off her article with a discussion of typical roles for women in Rwandan society, which include educating the children, managing the household, advising their husbands, and maintaining tradition (p. 72). In addition, women in Rwanda are taught to be subordinate to men and not to argue with their husbands (Hogg, 2010, p. 71). Because of these traditions, women accused of participating in the genocide are rarely accused of being leaders of the genocide; they are normally accused of offenses such as looting Tutsi property and reporting Tutsi hiding places to the killers (Hogg, 2010, pp. 76-78). A female genocide suspect told Hogg (2010) that she believed women who participated in the genocide can be divided into three action categories: refusing to hide Tutsis, assisting the killers by preparing meals, bringing drinks, and encouraging the men in their work, and exposing the hiding places of Tutsi (p. 79).

Hogg (2010) then examines the way female genocide suspects are viewed by the law and Rwandan authorities. Hogg (2010) argues that investigators, lawyers, and prosecutors so strongly believe the gender stereotypes about Rwandan women that they cannot recognize them as criminals (p. 81). This may help explain why far fewer women have been prosecuted for genocide than men. Lastly, Hogg (2010) looks at the various motivations for female participation in the genocide. The first motivation is fear; many

women told Hogg (2010) that they were forced by the militia to participate in the genocide, while others claimed they were afraid of what would happen to them if they refused to participate (pp. 84-85). One woman whose children were Tutsi because their father was Tutsi poisoned her children to give them a “kinder” death than being killed with a machete (Hogg, 2010, p. 85). Another motivation was the genocidal propaganda; women also listened to RTLM, and some women who were teachers and radio announcers helped spread the propaganda (Hogg, 2010, pp. 86-87).

In addition, the propaganda pitted Tutsi women against Hutu women, and told Hutu women that Tutsi women would steal their jobs and their husbands (Hogg, 2010, p. 87). The final motivation was that women got caught up in the melee and simply followed the crowd, or women trusted the wrong neighbor or friend with information about people they were trying to protect, which led to the deaths of those people (Hogg, 2010, p. 88). In sum, Hogg (2010) does a very good job of looking at a neglected group in research done on the Rwandan genocide: female participants. Hogg (2010) dissects the various roles women played as well as the motivating factors, to help others gain a better understanding of why women took part in the genocide.

Smeulers and Hoex (2010) studied literature on the Rwandan genocide and conducted 29 interviews with prisoners in Kigali Central Prison in April and May 2009, arriving at the conclusion that although ethnicity played a role in the genocide, social interaction among perpetrators and group dynamics provide better explanations of the genocide (p. 436). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) asked prison authorities for Interahamwe and other prisoners convicted of serious crimes who had confessed at least partially to their crimes; the interviews were semi-structured, lasted about an hour, and were assisted

by an interpreter who translated from Kinyarwanda to English (pp. 436-437). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) address the concerns about whether the stories the perpetrators told them were reliable, as the interviewees were discussing events from 15 years prior, and memory is subjective (p. 438). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) found that the stories told by their interviewees matched the general picture that emerged from studying the Rwandan genocide, and the stories showed clear and overlapping patterns not only within their group of perpetrators, but also with other studies done with interviews of perpetrators (p. 438).

Smeulers and Hoex (2010) examine how the killer groups were formed and why people participated; they argue that groups were not formed randomly or spontaneously, but at the initiative of groups like the Interahamwe, who then took charge of the groups (p. 441). Members of the Interahamwe and other groups recruited participants by offering them incentives such as food, alcohol, and cash, whereas members of the military took part in the killings because they believed all Tutsi were dangerous and part of the RPF (Smeulers & Hoex, 2010, p. 442). Other people were forced to join groups and participate; for example, older people had to man the roadblocks during the day, while young people had to guard the roadblocks at night, and the Interahamwe often checked to make sure people were doing as they were ordered (Smeulers & Hoex, 2010, p. 443).

Smeulers and Hoex (2010) found many motivating factors for participation, such as greed: individuals who participated could gain their neighbors' property and material goods by looting houses (p. 444). Other factors included a desire to settle scores, the ability to find food, safety, and shelter with others, and individuals being forced to participate, such as Hutu with Tutsi wives, family members, or friends (pp. 444-445).

Smeulers and Hoex (2010) assert that in Rwanda, killer groups were organized from the top-down rather than bottom-up, and the violence was "...instigated, ordered, and condoned by the authorities rather than...committed in deviance" (p. 446). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) claim that ordinary checks and balances in Rwandan society disappeared during the genocide, making it easier for individuals to participate in the genocide, and many group members felt the need to prove they were the best group members by being particularly tough and killing lots of Tutsi (p. 449). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) provide good insight into the group dynamics of the perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide.

Timothy Longman (2001) looked at the links between the church and the state in Rwanda, as well as the nature of the churches as institutions, in order to provide an explanation for why many churches took part in the genocide (p. 164). While some church officials were directly involved in the genocide, most have been criticized for their failure to halt the violence (Longman, 2001, p. 166). Longman (2001) asserts that churches helped make the genocide possible by making genocidal violence understandable and acceptable to the population, as well as teaching obedience to authority (p. 166). According to Longman (2001), the churches in Rwanda have a long political history. Christian churches set up during the colonial period helped support Tutsi domination over the majority Hutu, although this changed following World War II and during the transition to independence; the churches began supporting Hutu leaders and Hutu began to fill the leadership posts (pp. 168-170). In the early 1990s, calls for reform of the churches came from both Hutu and Tutsi, which led to many church leaders being sympathetic during the genocide, because it could help reinforce their power and preserve their hold on their offices (Longman, 2001, p. 175). In addition, many church leaders

supported President Habyarimana, and thus saw the RPF invasion as a threat to their power in terms of ethnicity, because they gained benefits from the elected leaders, benefits that would disappear if the elected officials had to share power with Tutsis (Longman, 2001, p. 179).

Longman (2001) points out that none of the churches specifically denounced the practice massacres that occurred between 1990 and 1993, and many church leaders showed their own anti-Tutsi prejudices, which was interpreted by the public as an endorsement of the regime's anti-Tutsi message (p. 180). During the genocide, church officials did not invoke the principle of sanctuary, nor did they speak out against the desecration of the churches, and many church workers justified the killing as a defensive measure against the RPF invasion, one that necessitated the unfortunate killing of Tutsi civilians (Longman, 2001, p. 181). Longman (2001) concludes by stating that while the churches did not specifically preach ethnic hatred and murder, they did not promote messages of charity and love for human beings, and supporting the genocide was in the long run consistent with the theology taught in the churches (p. 182). Longman's (2001) article provides good insight into the role of the churches in the genocide, and a detailed explanation for why so many church leaders did nothing to prevent the massacres of Tutsis hiding in the churches.

Paul Magnarella (2000) looks at the Rwandan genocide through a human materialism paradigm, which was designed to bridge the gap between scientific and humanistic approaches to understanding human behavior and characterizes humans as rational, emotional, social creatures who are indoctrinated in ideological, ritual and symbolic systems (p. 23). Magnarella (2000) starts his explanation of the Rwandan

genocide by looking at the pre-colonial period; he claims that the Tutsi conquered central Rwanda and established their rule, thereby making the Hutu subordinate and creating a caste system with limited social mobility (pp. 25-28). During colonialism, the Belgians put the Tutsi in positions of power over the Hutu, and instituted agricultural and infrastructure projects that required a huge amount of labor; this led to a system of forced labor by the Hutus and brutal punishments such as whippings and beatings for anyone who did not meet the government's work quotas (Magnarella, 2000, pp. 30-31).

According to Magnarella (2000), the work demands consumed 50-60% of the Hutus' time, which took away from agricultural production and led to food shortages and famines (p. 31). The distribution of identity cards also happened during colonialism and rigidly divided Rwandans into ethnic categories (Magnarella, 2000, p. 31). Magnarella (2000) claims that the causes of genocide include political and economic factors (p. 38). Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s faced a major population and land imbalance: there were too many people on too small plots of land, which drove food production down and resulted in famines (Magnarella, 2000, p. 38). Tutsi were primarily pastoralists, and wanted open ranges to graze their cattle, which put them into conflict with Hutus who needed the land for farming (Magnarella, 2000, p. 39).

Moreover, by the late 1980s, the youth population faced a situation where they had no land, jobs, or education (Magnarella, 2000, p. 39). According to Magnarella (2000), there were very few economic alternatives to farming other than working for the government, and eliminating the Tutsi would open up more jobs for Hutus (p. 39). Magnarella (2000) argues that the Arusha Accords, which would have forced Habyarimana's government to share power with the Tutsis, helped contribute to the



genocide because Hutus in the government would have lost economic resources; these leaders then began manipulating the Hutu population into believing the elimination of the Tutsi was necessary (pp. 39-40). Overall, Magnarella's (2000) approach to understanding the genocide focuses mostly on the economic factors, including overpopulation, unemployment, starvation, and lack of economic opportunities for young people. Magnarella's (2000) article provides an alternative explanation for the genocide that helps expand our understanding of why it happened.

In his article, Charles Mironko (2004) interviewed confessed genocide perpetrators and concluded that while state actions in Rwanda may have sped up the process of genocide, the people of Rwanda, acting in mobs, assumed a degree of initiative in the violence and went beyond the state's mandates (p. 47). Mironko (2004) asserts that until insight is gained into how and why the perpetrators participated in the genocide, it will be difficult to detect and prevent future genocides (p. 48). Mironko (2004) conducted interviews in six major prisons in Rwanda, and interviewed 100 men, 45 women, and 24 children over three weeks in the year 2000 (pp. 48-50). Mironko (2004) went to the prisons without making an appointment and had the Prison Directors randomly call at least 20 genocide suspects who had pleaded guilty; he made it clear to his participants that he would only tape the interviews with their permission and that he would not share any information provided with the government (p. 49). Mironko (2004) found that his participants had believed the Tutsi were spies and accomplices of the RPF, and many used terms that dehumanized or stereotyped Tutsis, such as cockroaches, enemy, and forest dwellers (p. 51). During the interviews, Mironko (2004) realized that

many of his participants used the term *igitero*, (group attack) to describe how they killed; many participants said they had taken part in group attacks (p. 51).

Mironko (2004) explains that *igitero* has two meanings in the context of the genocide: the first is a group of words associated with hunting, and the second is the social and political organization that facilitated the attacks on the Tutsi (pp. 52-53). Regarding the first context, during the interviews, many participants used terms like yell, to hide, to flush out of hiding, to herd, or to hunt/chase (Mironko, 2004, p. 52). Mironko (2004) states that psychologically, the individuals called to participate in the genocide transformed themselves into hunters of dangerous animals, which was part of the dehumanization process and made it easier for people to take part in the killings (pp. 52-53). Regarding the second context, the interview participants discussed the mobilization of the mobs by the local leaders; the first leader they interacted with was the *Nyumba kumi*, a person appointed by the government to control everything taking place within 10 households (Mironko, 2004, p. 54). In addition, people had to respond to shouts or whistles calling them to join in the killings, to show their support for the government; some individuals were forced to participate in the killings directly or indirectly (for example, burying bodies), thus making everyone equally complicit in the genocide (Mironko, 2004, p. 54). Mironko (2004) concludes his article by calling for a forum for frank dialogue between survivors and perpetrators to facilitate a truthful settlement, otherwise there can be no peaceful co-existence between the groups (p. 58). Mironko's (2004) article provides useful information about why individuals participated in the genocide, and helps explain the mob mentality that helped facilitate the killings.

Scott Straus (2004) spent seven months in Rwanda researching the genocide's local-level dynamics, and wanted to come up with a fairly accurate assessment of the number of individuals who participated in the genocide (pp. 85-86). Straus (2004) defined a perpetrator as any person who participated in an attack against a civilian in order to kill or seriously injure that person, and he limited the time period for participation in the genocide from April 6, 1994 to July 19, 1994 (p. 87). In order to collect data to come up with a number, Straus interviewed perpetrators using four criteria: 1. Detainees had to be sentenced, as they had less incentive to lie than those awaiting sentencing; 2. The sample had to be randomly chosen, where possible; 3. Those interviewed had to have already pled guilty; and 4. The sample had to be national (p. 90). Straus (2004) interviewed 210 prisoners in 15 central prisons, and found his participants by asking for a list of prisoners who had pled guilty and been sentenced, and then by using random, computer-generated numbers to select prisoners from the list; in some cases, the lists were too small to use random numbers, so he interviewed every person on the list (p. 90).

After conducting interviews and collecting data, Straus (2004) estimated that there were between 175,000 and 210,000 active participants in the genocide (p. 93). Straus (2004) asserts that while this figure supports the claim that there was mass participation in the Rwandan genocide, it does not support the Rwandan government's assertion that it is governing a "criminal population" (p. 94). Straus's (2004) article is important because it shows that while there was popular participation in the Rwandan genocide, it was not to the extent that other scholars claim. It also indicates that

categorizing all Hutu as killers is inaccurate and damages the prospects for reconciliation within Rwanda.

One common argument used to explain participation in the genocide is that individuals were persuaded by the media to take part. *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* is an edited volume of essays on the role of the media in the Rwandan genocide. The book is divided into four parts: hate media in Rwanda, international media coverage of the genocide, the media trial, and after the genocide and moving forward (Thompson, 2007). The essays are written by a variety of scholars, journalists, and activists, including Alison Des Forges, Roméo Dallaire, Mark Doyle, and Linda Melvern (Thompson, 2007). There are essays by Rwandan journalists, such as Thomas Kamilindi (2007), an independent journalist who was targeted for execution during the genocide for refusing to support RTLM's message; he and his family hid in the Mille Collines hotel and survived the genocide (as cited in Thompson, 2007). The edited volume covers both sides of the media story in Rwanda: the media inside Rwanda, and the international media's response-or lack thereof-to the genocide (Thompson, 2007). The book provides strong, detailed information on the role of the media in Rwanda, and how it was responsible in perpetrating the genocide.

In his book, James Waller (2002) examines why people participate in genocide and argues that it is ordinary individuals who commit extraordinary evil (p. 18). Waller (2002) admits that this is a difficult argument to understand, as humans prefer to see extraordinary evil as something monstrous or observable from a great distance (p. 18). However, Waller asserts that people must focus on the ways in which ordinary individuals become perpetrators of genocide, in order to understand why it occurs (pp.

18-19). Waller looks at the arguments made for seeing perpetrators such as the Nazis as psychologically different from ordinary people, by seeing them as “mad” or having abnormal brains (pp. 58-59). However, while some Nazis did have psychological issues, most were normal, rational individuals (p. 66).

In addition to looking at psychological arguments, Waller (2002) explores biological arguments for understanding human nature, such as whether or not people are born inherently good, and if humans are prone to committing evil acts (p. 136). Waller argues that there are some biological traits, but people participate in genocide for a variety of reasons, including: intergroup competition, being oriented toward obeying authorities, moral justifications for violence, dehumanization, conformity to peer pressure, and blaming the victims. Waller’s (2002) book provides an in-depth exploration of why individuals participate in evil acts such as genocide, and is very useful for my research. Waller will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

Like Waller, Steven Baum (2008) explores the psychological reasons for why genocide occurs, as well as the psychology of perpetrators and bystanders. Baum (2008) lists eight stages of genocide: 1. classification of people into “us and them”; 2. Symbolization, for example, forcing Jews to wear yellow stars; 3. Dehumanization of the target group; 4. Organization of genocide by the state or groups; 5. Polarization to drive groups apart; 6. Identification of victims; 7. Extermination of victims; and 8. Denial of genocide by the perpetrators (pp. 33-35). When looking at perpetrators, Baum (2008) lists traits shown in perpetrators, including conformity to social conventions, submission to authority, and an aggressive law and order culture (pp. 124-130).

Baum argues that leaders of genocide do not subscribe to the same mindset as the followers, and they are often brighter and more manipulative than their followers, as well as being more charismatic (pp. 135-136). In terms of bystanders, Baum claims that they are concerned with safety and having a place in the world, are more insecure and are less emotionally developed (pp. 154-155). In addition, bystanders will attempt to justify their passivity and reduce their guilt over not intervening by distancing themselves from the victims and by devaluing the victims; this behavior may lead some bystanders to join the perpetrators (Baum, 2008, p. 156). This was seen in Rwanda, when individuals who did not participate were coerced or persuaded to take part in the killings. Baum's (2008) work provides good information on the psychological traits of perpetrators and how these traits lead to individuals taking part in genocide.

Philip Zimbardo (2007) is the social psychologist who carried out the famous Stanford Prison Experiment, which showed how certain situations can lead to the abuse of power and the abuse of individuals. Zimbardo (2007) describes the Stanford Prison Experiment in detail, providing a clear picture of how the experiment devolved to the point where the participants were no longer playing a part, but had become fully immersed in their roles. Zimbardo (2011) admits that he became so caught up in the experiment that it took his girlfriend pointing out to him that the treatment of the participants was wrong to get him to end the experiment early (p. 170). Zimbardo (2007) discusses how he morphed into his role as the Prison Authority Figure, and became an authority figure he disliked, one who is authoritarian (p. 180). Zimbardo (2007) uses his description and analysis of the Stanford Prison Experiment to explain how people can become caught up in evil acts, for example, the prison guards at Abu Ghraib who carried

out acts of torture and humiliation such as kicking, beating, dragging prisoners around on leashes, and keeping the prisoners naked (p. 416). Zimbardo (2007) concludes the book by providing accounts of individuals who have resisted social, situational, and psychological influences to participate in terrible acts, and claims that heroic individuals should be celebrated, because they help counter evil influences and remind us of our humanity (p. 488). Zimbardo's (2007) book is beneficial for anyone who wants to understand how certain situations can lead individuals to carry out acts they might never do otherwise.

### **Explanations for why genocide occurs**

Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley (2006) attempt to explain why genocide occurs, incorporating history, politics, and psychology into their work. Chirot and McCauley (2006) assert that mass killing is not irrational, but is the result human beings thinking of competing groups in stereotypical ways, which can lead to demonization and dehumanization; in addition, our emotions, such as anger, fear, and resentment, predispose us to violence when we feel threatened, which can then lead to mass murder (p. 7).

Chirot and McCauley (2006) claim there are four main motives for mass murder:

1. Convenience: when two parties are in conflict, the stronger party may believe that mass murder and expulsion is the cheapest solution for ending the conflict, such as the forced removal of Native Americans from their lands;
2. Revenge: impressing upon the enemy that attacking "us" will lead to an avenging of hurt pride, for example the mass murder of the Herero by the Germans in the early 1900s;
3. Simple Fear: failure to enforce vengeance will allow the enemy to regain their strength and retaliate, for example

Stalin's killing and forced starvations of various groups such as Kulaks, Chechens, and Jews; 4. Fear of Pollution: mass murders that are ethnically, religiously, or ideologically based; for example, the massacre of communists in Indonesia (pp. 20-38). Chirot and McCauley (2006) then discuss the psychological foundations of mass murder, including organization of participants, emotional appeals from leaders, fear of the other group and fear of extinction, anger, and hate (pp. 57-71).

Chirot and McCauley (2006) end their work with a discussion of strategies to decrease mass murder; these include international interventions to end violence, using international pressure to bring the perpetrators to justice, limiting the demands for justice and revenge: using truth and reconciliation commissions that allow for perpetrators to confess to guilt, but also limit punishments, building friendships between communities, and building civil society from the ground up (pp. 170-190). Chirot and McCauley's (2006) book is helpful for understanding the various motivating factors for mass murder and genocide, and it provides practical solutions for attempting to end episodes of mass murder.

Barbara Coloroso (2007) looks at why genocide occurs through a different lens, that of bullying. Coloroso (2007) argues that genocide is a form of extreme bullying, in which a bully rises to power, espouses a murderous ideology, creates a group wherein brutality becomes the norm, and leads to ordinary people performing murderous tasks that become normalized and routinized (pp. 52-53). Coloroso argues that children learn racial slurs and the rules of bigoted behavior through stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (p. 67). Coloroso provides an example of this when she discusses a math problem in a Rwandan worksheet from the 1960s: "If you have ten cockroaches in your



town and you kill four of them, how many do you have left to kill?” (p. 58).

Reinforcement of racist ideologies and the use of dehumanizing language makes participation easier.

Coloroso (2007) also explores obedience and routinization in genocide. Coloroso states that there are two types of obedience: obedience because of the rule, and obedience because of the role (p. 107). The poor participants in the genocide took part because they had learned to obey any rule handed down by the authority, and those of the higher economic status obeyed because of the role they played in the government (p. 107). Coloroso argues that once people agree to totally obey orders, those who participate in genocidal actions will aggressively try to get others to take part, so no one will have clean hands, and the attitude will be one of “we are all in this mess together” (p. 108). In addition, those in charge will routinize and normalize cruelty, because this will make it easier for communities to participate in the genocide (p. 108). According to Coloroso, routinization involves the sanitizing of language. For example, killing becomes the final solution, cutting the tall trees, clearing the brush, etc., and those participating in the Rwandan genocide used terms like “collecting cabbage” when delivering the severed heads of Tutsis to their commander in order to cover up the reality of having killed another human being (pp. 108-109). Coloroso’s book provides a different angle of looking at why genocide occurs, and her discussion of the routinization of genocide is important for understanding why people participate in genocide.

David Livingstone Smith (2011) explores why human beings dehumanize one another, and how dehumanization has been used throughout history. Smith (2011) starts with an analysis of dehumanization in wars, especially World War 2. Smith (2011)

reminds us that it was not just the Nazis who dehumanized the enemy; Russian propagandists described the Germans as having animal breath, and called on Russian soldiers to kill every German they could (pp. 16-17). During the capture of Nanjing by the Japanese, soldiers raped, mutilated, and tortured thousands of Chinese civilians, while viewing them as bugs or pigs, and American publications portrayed the Japanese as cockroaches and rats (Smith, 2011, pp. 17-19). Smith (2011) then discusses how dehumanization was viewed historically; medieval Muslims believed that humans could be transformed into subhuman creatures such as pigs, apes, and rats as punishment by God (p. 43). A seventh-century poet described women as subhuman creatures created from sows, vixens, donkeys, and monkeys (Smith, 2011, p. 30).

Smith (2011) also explores the psychological aspects of dehumanization through an outgroup bias: people have a tendency to favor members of their own group while discriminating against outsiders, seeing our group as more industrious, intelligent, and so forth; people also tend to care more for certain people than others (pp. 49-51). Smith (2011) then looks at the use of dehumanization in wars, genocide, and racial beliefs, and concludes by calling for more time, money, and talent to be devoted to figuring out how exactly dehumanization works, so it can be dealt with effectively, and perhaps prevented (pp. 272-273). Smith's (2011) book is very helpful for understanding the historical roots of dehumanization, and why human beings dehumanize each other. Smith will be discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.

Ervin Staub (2000) provides a brief description of the influences leading to genocide and mass killing, such as difficult life conditions and group conflict (pp. 368-369). Difficult life conditions include economic problems, political conflict, and intense

and rapid social change that frustrate basic human needs (Staub, 2000, pp. 369-370).

Staub (2000) claims that in order to satisfy their needs for identity and connection, people turn to a group and then elevate their group by psychologically or physically diminishing the other group; they scapegoat another group for their problems, and engage in harmful actions against the other group (p. 370). Another factor contributing to genocide is past victimization of a group and the unhealed wounds; without healing, the group will feel diminished and vulnerable (Staub, 2000, p. 370). Staub (2000) believes a good example of past victimization can be found in the Bosnian genocide, when Serbs felt like they were being attacked by Croatia (p. 371).

Staub (2000) argues that in order to heal past victimization, members of victimized groups need to re-experience their pain, sorrow, and loss under safe conditions, as well as receive empathy, support, and affirmation from people outside the group (p. 376). Staub (2000) led a project in Rwanda that promoted reconciliation in the community; the project had several positive impacts, including reaffirming the humanity of the participants, shifting attitudes about the perpetrators so they are no longer seen as simply being evil, and helping individuals understand the factors that led to the genocide so they can try and prevent the recurrence of violence (p. 378). Staub's (2000) article provides a good outline of some of the major factors that contribute to genocide, and how understanding these factors might help facilitate genocide prevention in the future.

Another good source that examines why genocide happens is Daniel Goldhagen's (2009) book *Worse than War*. Goldhagen argues that instead of studying the most familiar genocides together and then drawing conclusions, we should study each case of genocide individually because all instances of genocide vary from each other, and these

differences must be understood in order to know the phenomenon of genocide and each case of genocide (p. 30). Goldhagen makes a very good argument for how war and genocide intertwine, as was the case in Rwanda and Darfur:

...War makes people more likely to consider eliminationist initiatives. It encourages people to see violent and lethal measures as appropriate for dealing with real or imagined problems that had or would have been previously managed differently.... War also creates new practical opportunities to act on eliminationist desires, by giving perpetrators better access to the potential victims, and by lessening the perceived cost of committing mass murder (p. 40).

Goldhagen (2009) claims that in order for genocide to happen, at some point, one or a few people will consciously decide to slaughter thousands or millions of fellow human beings (p. 69). In addition, the worldviews, aspirations, prejudices and hatreds, and personalities of this group of people are crucial, because without their influence, genocide will not happen (p. 73). This can be seen in Rwanda, where the political leaders, in addition to media outlets like the RTLM radio station, influenced the general population's worldviews and beliefs about the Tutsis, and helped the population conclude that the Tutsis were a threat that must be eliminated. Goldhagen argues that the perpetrators' initiative to take action is not the result of blindly following orders or simply doing a job, but as the action of individuals who are influenced by their values and beliefs and choose to act (p. 170). Goldhagen will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

Peter Uvin (1998) explains why genocide occurs through a different lens, by using Galtung's (1969) structural violence theory to analyze the Rwandan genocide. Uvin

provides a detailed explanation of Rwandan political history from independence to the genocide, and how the elites created a system whereby the state controlled all factors of life, including jobs, education, and prescription of social behaviors (p. 22). Uvin (1998) raises a good point when he remarks that after independence, "...One monoethnic power system had been replaced with another..." (p. 20). Uvin discusses the role of the international community in supporting structural violence in Rwanda: many donors chose to ignore human rights violations and the suppression of the Tutsis in order to justify their aid work, and wrote reports that praised Rwanda for its economic growth and cultural and social cohesion (p. 44).

Uvin (1998) describes how Rwanda went from suffering from structural violence to experiencing acute violence. Uvin rightly points out that structural violence provokes anger and frustration, which significantly increases the potential for acute violence (p. 107). Uvin describes how lack of economic opportunities, corruption, immobility of the population and complete control by state actors created the perfect storm for physical violence to occur in the form of genocide. Uvin will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

### **Justice in post-genocide Rwanda**

Elizabeth Neuffer (2001) interviewed victims and perpetrators of the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, as well as the judges presiding over some of the trials, to explore how people in Bosnia and Rwanda came to terms with what happened in their country and attempted to move forward. Neuffer (2001) moves back and forth between Bosnia and Rwanda, and tells the stories of individuals who struggled to survive the genocides. Neuffer (2001) describes the problems the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

(ICTR) faced, including lack of funding, inability of witnesses to get permission to travel from Rwanda to Arusha, Tanzania (where the court is based), and the fact that the strongest punishment the ICTR could hand out was life imprisonment, whereas in Rwanda, people convicted of genocide could face the death penalty (pp. 256-257). The lack of death penalty for the ICTR trials was strongly criticized by Rwandans, who argued that the ICTR was sentencing the architects and organizers of the genocide to life in prison, while those who had followed orders were being executed (Neuffer, 2001, pp. 256-257).

One of the strongest chapters of Neuffer's (2001) book is "What a Tutsi Woman Tastes Like", the chapter in which she examines the role of rape in the Rwandan genocide and the conviction of mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu, the first man found guilty of genocide by an international tribunal, and the first case in which rape was held by a court to be an act of genocide and a crime against humanity (pp. 271-272). Neuffer (2001) discusses the role of rape in war throughout history, and how war and rape go hand in hand (pp. 272-274). Neuffer (2001) describes the testimony of a witness given the pseudonym JJ, whose testimony was critical for the conviction of Akayesu. According to JJ, Akayesu told Tutsi women to come to the cultural center, where he then turned them over to be raped by the militia (Neuffer, 2001, p. 288). During the second day of rapes, Akayesu told the killers, "Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like...tomorrow they will all be killed" (Neuffer, 2001, p. 289). Neuffer's (2001) discussion of the role of rape in the genocide is important, because rape has often been downplayed or even ignored in discussions of the genocide, but it can be an act of genocide. Neuffer (2001)

provides a strong account of the search for justice after genocide and how it has often failed, as well as how people affected by genocide try to rebuild their lives.

Rimé, Kanyangara, Yzerbyt, and Paez (2011) designed a quantitative study to examine the effectiveness of the Gacaca tribunals on the reintegration and coexistence in communities of perpetrators and victims (p. 698). Rimé et. al. (2011) had 8 hypotheses they tested: 1. Participation in Gacaca was expected to increase negative emotions in victims as well as perpetrators; 2. The exchange of power in the Gacaca process would increase antagonistic emotions (i.e. anger) among victims and reduce them among perpetrators as well as reducing shame for victims and increasing it for perpetrators; 3. Victims' and perpetrators' ingroup identification would be lower after participation in Gacaca; 4. Stereotypes about the outgroup would become more positive after Gacaca for both victims and perpetrators; 5. A more heterogeneous perception of the other group would be manifested for both victims and perpetrators after participation in Gacaca; 6. Indicators of positive emotional climate and social cohesion would be evaluated more positively by both groups; 7. The social integration effects of hypotheses 3-6 would be mediated by emotional changes elicited by participation in Gacaca; and 8. An assessment of the degree to which participants exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder before and after their participation in Gacaca (pp. 698-699). To test these hypotheses, Rimé et. al. (2011) conducted a study using 755 volunteers who could read and write in Kinyarwanda and were at least 18 years old; 395 were victims and 360 were participants (p. 699). Participants rated their responses on scales, some of which went from "not at all" to "a great deal", "not at all characteristic" to "very characteristic", and "very different" to "very similar" (Rimé et. al., 2011, pp. 699-700).

Rimé et. al. (2011) also used a control group in communities where Gacaca had not yet taken place (p. 699). For hypothesis 1, the results supported the prediction: negative emotions increased for victim and perpetrator participants, including fear, anxiety, and sadness; for hypothesis 2, victims reported much less shame after Gacaca than the control group, whereas perpetrators reported more shame after Gacaca than before (Rimé et. al., 2011, p. 701). For hypothesis 3, ingroup identification decreased for both victims and perpetrators after a Gacaca trial; for hypothesis 4, positive stereotypes of the other group increased for both victims and perpetrators after Gacaca, whereas there was a decrease in the control group; for hypothesis 5, there was a significant decrease in the perceived homogeneity of the outgroup after participation in Gacaca for both groups, while there was no change among the victims in the control group and a slight increase among the perpetrators (Rimé et. al., p. 701). For hypothesis 6, the hypothesis was supported for perpetrators, but not for victims; for hypothesis 7, participation in Gacaca both increased negative resignation emotions and improved social integration; and for hypothesis 8, PTSD decreased for the perpetrators after participating in Gacaca, but greatly increased for the victims (Rimé et. al., 2011, pp. 702-703). Overall, the Gacaca system has its strengths and weaknesses, but it seems to have a positive effect on reconciliation in Rwanda.

Dina Temple-Raston (2005) looked at the power and influence of the Rwandan press on the population, and how the press manipulated facts and events to convince people to take part in the genocide. The trial of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze was the first trial of journalists for genocide since the Nuremberg trials (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 102). Temple-Raston (2005) starts with a



discussion of Rwandan history, and how the three men became involved in Rwandan media; she then talks about the propaganda the journalists put out, and concludes by describing their trial. Temple-Raston (2005) talked to ordinary Rwandans, court prosecutors, and defense lawyers, to paint a picture of the trial and how it proceeded. Nahimana and Barayagwiza for journalists for the RTLM radio station, while Ngeze ran the newspaper *Kangura* (Temple-Raston, 2005, pp. 32-33).

Temple-Raston (2005) does a good job of explaining how the three journalists used their respective media outlets to promote anti-Tutsi propaganda. *Kangura* started off with cartoons spoofing Tutsis, but quickly went on to accuse the RPF of initiating a war, and Ngeze asserted that the war would begin with the assassination of President Habyarimana (Temple-Raston, 2005, pp. 40-41). *Kangura* later went on to publish a headline captioned “What weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?” with a drawing of a machete underneath it (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 29). RTLM was popular from the beginning, when it started off by playing Congolese music, and featured call-in shows and shock jocks; it also gave people the opportunity to express themselves: they could call in with complaints and local news and gossip (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 2). RTLM later introduced anti-Tutsi language, and warned citizens to be vigilant; it was also the first to report on the death of President Habyarimana, and accuse Tutsis of being behind the attack (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 4). Temple-Raston (2005) provides detailed information about the trial, including the flaws, problems with getting documents, and slowness of the trial. All three journalists were convicted, but the trial, and Temple-Raston’s (2005) book, raised important questions about the limits of free speech and the ethics of journalism.

## **Gaps in the Literature**

While the literature mentioned in this chapter is extremely useful, there are still some gaps in the literature. One of the biggest gaps is the lack of discussion on sexual dehumanization in genocide. Most books written on genocide will describe physical dehumanization in great detail, but will only briefly mention sexual dehumanization, or will talk about rape as something separate from genocide. However, we know that genocidal rape is in a category of its own. Genocidal rape is different from rape that occurs in war or in society, because the intentionality is different. I will discuss these ideas in greater detail in chapters four and five. The other major gap is the lack of discussion of dehumanization in general in books on genocide. Most books will mention dehumanization in passing, but do not usually go into great detail about the role that dehumanization plays in genocide. If a society is not properly prepared to take part in, or at the very least ignore the killings of, the targeted group via constant reinforcement of dehumanization, then genocide is not likely to happen. It is my contention that if we do not understand the impact dehumanization has on various aspects of genocide, such as participation, we cannot stop genocide from happening.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Structural Violence**

Structural violence is a theory introduced by Johan Galtung in the late 1960s, and it describes a type of systemic violence that is not necessarily physical, but is usually indirect and includes things like starvation and higher life expectancy in upper classes versus lower classes (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Rwanda had a highly organized structure, with a few individuals at the top controlling power, access and resources, and a majority

of the people living in poverty. According to Uvin (1998), about 15 percent of the farmers in Rwanda owned half of the land (p. 113), and in Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent of the region's income in 1992 (p. 115). President Habyarimana's wife Agathe ran a small influential group called the *akazu*, or little house. The *akazu* controlled the political, economic, and military muscle and the patronage that was eventually called "Hutu Power" (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 80-81). If anyone crossed Agathe or the *akazu*, they were assassinated or jailed (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 81).

In addition, Galtung (1969) claims that in structural violence, the power over the distribution of resources is unevenly spread, and the uneven distribution is exacerbated if individuals who are poor are also under educated, in poor health, and lacking power (p. 171). One of the factors that furthered systemic poverty was the lack of mobility for people. Residence permits were required to stay anywhere, and travel permits were needed to move, which meant that individuals who could not make a living in rural areas were not easily allowed to move to urban areas in search of opportunities (Uvin, 1998, p. 116). According to Uvin (1998), the justification for the permits was that the government wanted to fight urban poverty and prevent slum creation, which worked, although it kept most of the population trapped in rural areas (p. 116). Additionally, education, health care, and economic opportunities were highest in urban areas, which meant that the youth in the countryside were semi-educated and unable to build a future for themselves beyond trying to farm a tiny plot of land (p. 116). Uvin (1998) points out that 90 percent of the rural population lived below the poverty line, and the lack of mobility kept people trapped in poverty (p. 117).

This lack of mobility supports Galtung's (1969) assertion that structural violence includes violence that is objectively avoidable- for example, if people are starving- regardless of whether or not there is a clear relation between the person committing the act and the person being influenced by it (p. 171). By refusing to allow people to have the basic rights of being able to move from rural areas to urban ones or to get a job without having to be part of the patronage system, the *akazu* created a climate whereby individuals were stuck in poverty, with no hope of escape. Uvin (1998) rightly argues that structural violence provokes anger, frustration, ignorance, and despair, all of which increases the likelihood of acute violence (p. 107). Young men were hit especially hard by the structural violence in Rwanda: they had much less land than their fathers, which meant that they could not support their families or get married; hundreds of thousands of young men were forced to search for temporary jobs in lieu of permanent ones, and could not make a living in agriculture (Uvin, 1998, p. 118).

The lack of opportunities for the youth population meant that individuals were more easily manipulated by those in charge, and the loss of self-respect led to frustration and anger, as well as a desire to regain self-respect (Uvin, 1998, p. 136). Furthermore, the decline in the economy exacerbated the frustrations of the population. The Rwandan economy relied heavily on coffee exports, which declined from \$144 million in 1985 to \$30 million in 1993, and the GDP per capita fell from \$355 in 1983 to \$260 in 1990 (Uvin, 1998, p. 54). Additionally, the civil war that started in 1990 displaced populations in the major food-producing regions, which led to a decline in government revenue, and also led the government to spend more money on arms and military expenditures and less on social programs (Uvin, 1998, p. 56). In response, the elites in Rwanda manipulated

this frustration and anger and redirected it from themselves onto the Tutsis. According to Uvin (1998), "...The official, state-sponsored racism against Tutsi...provided a convenient, institutionalized scapegoat (and diverted attention away from the privileges enjoyed by a few in the name of the masses)" (p. 137).

As mentioned previously, Uvin (1998) argues that the international community supported structural violence in Rwanda. One of the ways it did so was by ignoring human rights abuses. For example, the government issued cards identifying individuals as Hutu or Tutsi, and a quota system was introduced wherein access to higher education and state jobs for Tutsi were limited to a number theoretically equal to the proportion of Tutsis in the population (Uvin, 1998, p. 35). According to Uvin, the international community knew about the quota system, and not one aid agency denounced the identity cards or quota system, even when they knew they were being used to prepare for mass killings (p. 44). As Gourevitch (1998) points out, "If you were a bureaucrat with a foreign aid budget to unload, and your professional success was...measured by your ability not to lie or gloss too much when you filed happy statistical reports at the end of each fiscal year, Rwanda was the ticket" (p. 76).

Rwanda was seen as a tranquil country, in contrast to many other African countries during the Cold War, so aid agencies poured money into Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 76). Uvin (1998) asserts that the international community knew that preparations for a genocide were underway: two major human rights reports from 1993 detailed substantial arms distributions to the population, increasing anti-Tutsi rhetoric, the existence of militia groups, and massacres of over 2,000 Tutsis (p. 84). Although it can be argued that the international community did not know that genocide was going to

occur, many human rights organizations, NGOs, and foreign agencies knew about the systemic repression, racism, and violence towards the Tutsi, and did nothing about it (Uvin, 1998, p. 86). This failure to hold the government and other parties accountable helped reinforce structural violence in Rwanda.

Galtung (1969) contends that when a structure is threatened, those who benefit from structural violence will try to protect the status quo (p. 179). This was seen in Rwanda, when the structure was threatened by the civil war and the peace agreement that would have created power sharing between the Hutus and Tutsis. As mentioned above, the state controlled all sectors of the economy and prescribed social behaviors; in addition, the Catholic Church was closely affiliated with the state, as many church leaders belonged to Habyarimana's political party (Uvin, 1998, p. 22). The lack of separation between the church and the state meant that there was no large opposition movement, and the churches helped make the genocide possible by making genocidal violence understandable and acceptable to the population, as well as teaching obedience to authority (Longman, 2001, p. 166). As stated earlier in this chapter, in the early 1990s, calls for reform of the churches came from both Hutu and Tutsi, which led to many church leaders being sympathetic to the genocide because it could help reinforce their power and preserve their hold on their offices (Longman, 2001, p. 175). In addition, many church leaders supported President Habyarimana, and thus saw the RPF invasion as a threat to their power in terms of ethnicity, because they gained benefits from the elected leaders, benefits that would disappear if the elected officials had to share power with Tutsis (Longman, 2001, p. 179). The RPF was a threat to the present structure, and the Arusha Accords would have meant the end of the *akazu*, something the members wanted

to avoid at all costs. Therefore, the extremists within the government decided that the extermination of all Tutsis in Rwanda was the best method for preserving the existing structure.

In addition to his argument that those who benefit from the status quo will work to preserve it, Galtung (1969) states that structural violence is used to threaten people into subordination by informing them that if they do not behave, those in power will reintroduce previous disagreeable structures (p. 172). This can clearly be seen in the case of Rwanda. Before Habyarimana came to power, there were periodic massacres of Tutsis. When Habyarimana took power, he declared a moratorium on Tutsi attacks, and called for Rwandans to live in peace and work together for development (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 69). While Tutsis were repressed by being barred from the military, subjected to quota rules, and by only being given rubber-stamp positions in Parliament, they were no longer being harassed or killed (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 69-70).

This system was threatened in 1990, when Tutsi rebels invaded from Uganda and demanded rights and power. Habyarimana and the *akazu* did not want to share power, so they decided to reintroduce the disagreeable structure of allowing Tutsis to be massacred. The government successfully argued that it was the legitimate representation of the Hutu majority, and the sole defense against the Tutsi's attempts to enslave the population (Uvin, 1998, p. 26). By spreading propaganda that claimed the Tutsis wanted to rule Rwanda and subjugate the Hutu, the government was maintaining that the Tutsis wished to reintroduce the colonial system of forced labor for Hutus and the suppression of the Hutu majority. The government called on the Hutu majority to protect themselves from this fate by eliminating the Tutsis.

As discussed earlier, the population was frustrated and angry about their living situations and lack of opportunities. The government saw this, and successfully redirected this anger from the authorities to the Tutsis, using the Tutsis as a scapegoat for all the problems Rwanda was facing. This scapegoating, combined with the civil war, led many Hutus to see themselves as under attack by all Tutsis, which helped convince them that they needed to kill the Tutsis in order to protect themselves and their families. Uvin (1998) makes a strong argument for structural violence being a cause of the genocide in Rwanda when he states:

...Structural violence lowers the barriers against the use of violence. As the norms of society lose legitimacy, as people's knowledge based is reduced to slogans, as progress becomes a meaningless concept, as communities are riveted by conflict and jealousy, as people's sense of self-respect is reduced, and as segments of society show their contempt for the rules of decency as well as for farmers, people become increasingly unhampered by constraints on the use of violence to deal with problems (p. 138).

Uvin (1998) claims that the systemic racism toward the Tutsis that occurred for decades before the genocide helped persuade individuals to participate in the genocide (p. 216). The Tutsis were seen as having fixed differences in their history, character, and moral, intellectual, and social attributes and roles (Uvin, 1998, p. 216). State reinforced prejudice and discrimination against the Tutsis was revitalized in the early 1990s via hate speech and periodic violence against the Tutsis, and the ideology became radicalized (Uvin, 1998, p. 217). According to Uvin (1998), racist prejudice was a way for ordinary



people subjected to structural violence to make sense of their predicament and explain their misery by scapegoating the Tutsi (p. 217).

Uvin (1998) contends that without the RPF invasion, the Habyarimana regime would have slowly fallen due to external and internal pressures and there would not have been a genocide; however, the invasion was the ideal situation for the government to restore its legitimacy, unite the population around it, and increase the levels of violence, fear, and control in society (p. 220). The invasion by the RPF sparked fears in the population, supported by the government, that the Tutsis wanted to dismantle the existing structure and take Rwanda back to the previous disagreeable structure where the minority Tutsis dominated the majority Hutus and subjugated them. To prevent this from happening, the Hutu population had to kill all Tutsis in Rwanda; it was the duty of the Hutus to defend their country and eliminate the Tutsi threat.

Structural violence can also be used to explain why genocide is occurring in Darfur. When Sudan was a British colony, the British saw greater development potential in the northern areas, and did not see Darfur as being able to contribute to the Sudanese economy, with the exception of exporting cattle and gum (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 13). This led to the British government severely under developing and neglecting the Darfur region: in 1935, Darfur had one elementary school, one “tribal” elementary school and two “sub-grade” schools for a population of six million. Education was restricted to the sons of chiefs, so that British authority could not be undermined by better-educated Sudanese administrators or merchants. The British also neglected health care: there was no maternity clinic before the 1940s, and Darfur had the lowest number of hospital beds of any province-0.57 per thousand people (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 13). After

independence, the Sudanese government did not treat the population much better- the main complaint among Darfuris in the 1980s was that the government in Khartoum was not treating them as full citizens of the state, and that villages had scarcely better services than during colonialism (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 16).

As mentioned above, the situation did not improve after independence. The successive governments in Khartoum neglected Darfur: there are a lack of schools, hospitals, and paved roads in Darfur. According to Prunier (2008), in the 1980s, the water system in El-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, was so tainted that the people living there were becoming sick from the sewage in the water (p. 50). In addition to water supply problems, a major famine hit Darfur in the 1980s, and was at first ignored by the government. The Minister of Finance publicly dismissed the reports of famine, calling them an exaggeration, and when Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps started appearing near Khartoum, the government responded by claiming they were all refugees from Chad and forcibly deported them by truck back to Darfur (Prunier, 2008, p. 51). Omar al-Bashir also angered the various ethnic groups in Darfur when he made an agreement with Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, to allow Libya to use Darfur as a back-door entrance during Libya's war with Chad in exchange for weapons (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 25).

When Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in 1989, they made it clear that they favored the Arab groups over the African ones. When the amount of arable land began to decrease due to overgrazing and desertification, the African groups, largely farmers, began to restrict access to their land, which angered the Arabs, who needed the land to water their camels and other animals (Marlowe, Bain, &

Shapiro, 2006, p. 108). In response to the conflict, the government armed the Arab groups and encouraged them to take the land from the farmers by force (Marlowe et al., 2006, p.108).

This favoritism led to resentment among the African groups, which in turn led to the formation of rebel groups and a civil war beginning in 2003. The rebel groups demanded equal sharing of resources and development in Darfur (Marlowe et al., 2006, p. 113). Marlowe et al. (2006) sum up the government's position perfectly:

Omar Bashir's government is drawn from a small number of elite tribes from the Khartoum area in northern Sudan. The regime is largely unpopular with the vast majority of Sudanese citizens, no matter the ethnicity. As with many small governments resting on a small power base and trying to retain control, it relies on chaos in order to survive, certainly in order to justify its oppressive measures (pp. 68-69).

In order to fight the rebels, the government armed Arab tribes, giving them a monthly payment of 150,000 Sudanese pounds a day, plus 20,000 pounds a day for a horse or camel, and promised them they could keep any loot they could carry (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 40). These armed militias became known as the *Janjaweed* or *Janjawid*, roughly translated as "devils on horseback" (Prunier, 2008, p. 65). The government in Khartoum has no desire to change the social, political, and economic structures of Sudan, which heavily favor the Arabs and an elite group in Khartoum, so it has resorted to violence, slavery, and genocide in order to stay in power.

### **Dehumanization**

It has been argued that perpetrators of genocide are evil, “monsters”, sadistic, mentally ill, etc. However, as mentioned previously, Waller (2002) argues that it was ordinary individuals who commit extraordinary evil (p. 18). After the Holocaust, some psychiatrists studied the brains of top Nazis awaiting trial, to see if it could be proved that the Nazis were insane (Waller, 2002, p. 58). Psychiatrists administered IQ tests and the Rorschachs test to test sanity and for mental illnesses; the results showed that with the exception of one individual, the Rorschachs tests showed all Nazi defendants were sane, and most fell into the superior to very superior range on the IQ tests (Waller, 2002, pp. 58-61). Thus, the argument that perpetrators are insane, evil, or mentally deficient has been disproved.

Although the argument that perpetrators are mentally unstable is not a valid one, there are some psychological adaptations human beings make that can lead to participation in genocide (Waller, 2002, p. 152). For example, humans can be taught xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and desire for social dominance for the group they belong to (Waller, 2002, pp. 152-153). In addition, Waller argues that perpetrators have to rationalize the extreme acts they are carrying out, and can do so by placing individuals and groups outside the border in which moral rules and values apply (p. 186). By justifying their actions, perpetrators can remove their own moral imperative against killing, and can even defend their actions as moral (Waller, 2002, p. 186). Waller claims that there are three binding factors on groups that apply to perpetrator groups: 1. Diffusion of responsibility so each person is only responsible for a small part of the act; 2. Deindividuation, or the state in which a person cannot be identified as a specific

individual, but only as a member of the group (for example, seeing a Tutsi not as individual X, but only as a Tutsi); and 3. Conformity to pressure, which is when an individual will conform so he/she is liked and accepted by other people and will not be subjected to punishment or ridicule (pp. 212-219).

Waller (2002) also examines dehumanization and its impact on the killers. He claims that victims are first deprived of their identity via defining them by a category such as ethnic group, and then they are excluded from the community of the human family (pp. 244-245). Perpetrators regard victims as beings outside the moral universe of humans, and use linguistic dehumanization on the victims, such as calling Jews “vermin”, and “parasites” and calling Tutsis “cockroaches” (Waller, 2002, pp. 246-247). Waller argues that dehumanization is also carried out by reducing victims to statistics, such as stating how many people were killed, tortured, etc.; individuals go from having separate identities and stories to being lumped into the category of victims and having their lives reduced to facts and figures (p. 247). An interesting assertion made by Waller is that people—not just perpetrators, but also individuals inside and outside the community—will blame the victim for what happens to them (p. 250). Waller argues that we do this because although we know bad things happen to good people, we do not wish to relinquish our belief that the world is a fair and just place; therefore, we blame the victims by asking why they did not leave or fight back, or by casting aspersions on their character (p. 250). This can be seen in Darfur, where rape victims have been blamed for their attack or cast out by their families and communities. Blaming the victim is a form of dehumanization, albeit one that we do not recognize we are doing.

Like Waller, Moshman (2005) claims that it is "...crucial to our self-conceptions to see ourselves as fundamentally different from the perpetrators. Thus we are reassured by simplistic theories that present the perpetrators as evil beings in the grip of genocidal hatred" (p. 192). Moshman (2005) defined genocidal hatred as a murderous hate directed at a racial, ethnic, national, cultural, political, or other abstract group based on a person's affiliation with the hated group rather than their individual characteristics (pp. 186-187). In his short article, Moshman (2005) explored the genocide in Rwanda and the Nazi death camp Treblinka to see how hatred played a role in each genocidal act. Hatred has been emphasized in Rwanda; western accounts of the genocide called up an image of ancient tribal hatreds, and Simon Bikindi's song "I Hate Hutus", a song attacking moderate Hutus in Rwanda, has been used as an example to support the argument that hatred played a role in the killings (Moshman, 2005, pp. 188-190).

Moshman (2005) claims that the emphasis on hatred in Rwanda deflects attention away from other bases for genocide and impedes the creation of more complex theories on why genocide occurs (p. 190). Instead of hatred, Moshman (2005) asserts that in Rwanda, the genocide was partially political due to Rwanda's history, as well as psychological elements (pp. 188-189). When Moshman (2005) examined Treblinka, he looked at what the camp commander Franz Stangl said in a series of interviews done in prison after the war (p. 192). Contrary to popular belief, Stangl claimed that he did not hate the Jews. Instead, he saw them as cargo or like a herd of cows: when he was on a train in Brazil, he saw cattle at a slaughterhouse looking trustingly at the people on the train; this reminded him of how the Jews looked in Poland just before they entered the transport trains (Moshman, 2005, p. 193). Moshman (2005) argues that dehumanization

is different from hate, because hatred makes it possible to kill those we see as people, whereas genocide makes it possible to kill without hating, as a farmer might kill a cow (p. 194).

Moshman (2005) concludes his article by contending that genocidal hatred is not a driving force for genocide; it does exist, but dehumanization may be a more important basis for genocide (p. 206). Hatred is an attitude towards a person or group, whereas dehumanization is a process of placing a person or group outside the realm of personhood and outside the universe of moral obligation (Moshman, 2005, p. 206). Moshman (2005) is correct when he points out that we (humans) tend to overemphasize the role of hatred in genocide because we want to see perpetrators as very different from ourselves, instead of as individuals who are the same as us but were convinced to take part in genocide (p. 207). According to Moshman (2005), what we need is a theory that explains how ordinary individuals can come to commit genocide (p. 207).

As mentioned previously in the chapter, David Livingstone Smith (2011) explores why human beings dehumanize one another, and how dehumanization has been used throughout history. Smith (2011) defines dehumanization as "...the act of conceiving of people as subhuman creatures rather than as human beings" (p. 26). Smith (2011) points out that committing violence against a person does not make the person subhuman, but perceiving people as subhuman often makes them the objects of violence and victims of degradation (p. 28). Smith (2011) makes a connection between outgroup bias and dehumanization when he states that outgroup bias is when individuals favor members of their own community and discriminate against outsiders, as well as seeing members of their own group as more industrious, diligent, etc. (p.49). Smith (2011) brings up the

point that dehumanization is used in war, because war cannot occur unless members of one group are willing to go out and kill members of another group, and, in order to be able to do so, the group needs to see the outsiders as subhuman (pp. 60-61). Smith (2011) argues that people are innately biased against outsiders, and this bias is used in propaganda to motivate individuals to kill each other; thus, while dehumanization is a cultural process and not a biological one, it rides on our innate biases in order to be effective (p. 71).

Smith (2011) describes the dehumanization process as a two-step process. The first step is for the target group to be seen as a distinct kind of persons, ones who are radically different from the other group; the second step is to attribute a subhuman essence to the group (Smith, 2011, p. 186). Smith claims that dehumanizers always identify their victims with animals associated with violence, for example, rats or cockroaches, animals that need to be exterminated (p. 223). This is seen in Darfur with the government's attitude that the African groups as savage and backwards, and by the constant referral to black Sudanese as "dogs, monkeys, and slaves" (Prunier, 2008). Seeing dehumanized individuals as animals that can contaminate other humans arouses feelings of disgust and repels an individual from the targeted group (Smith, 2011, p. 252). This is necessary for genocide to succeed, as individuals need to be convinced that the targeted group should be exterminated, and individuals who will not actively take part in the killings will at least passively stand by and not intervene.

Like Smith, Goldhagen (2009) examines the role of dehumanization in genocide, and the effect it has on the perpetrators. Goldhagen (2009) claims that if people want to understand and explain why the perpetrators killed, then they must first recognize that



perpetrators approve of what they are doing (p. 189). According to Goldhagen (2009), by their very actions, perpetrators imprint on their victims' bodies and psyches that they are worthless or vile beings who brought this fate upon themselves (p. 183). Goldhagen believes that one of the least understood aspects of participation in genocide is how people make the transition from the initial stage of dehumanizing language to one of actually eliminating the targeted group (p. 342). Tutsi survivors recounted that people would shout "look at that cockroach" or "look at that snake" when they passed by; calling the Tutsis a snake implied that they were dangerous, poisonous animals that needed to be killed (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 353). In Darfur, the *Janjaweed* refer to their victims as dogs, monkeys, slaves, etc. This casual use of dehumanizing language helped smooth the path to genocide.

Goldhagen (2009) states that the perpetrators' ease in convincing themselves that they are justified in doing to the victims what they believe the victims would have done to them demonstrates human beings' vulnerability to prejudices and hate ideologies (pp. 442-443). In the case of Rwanda, the anti-Tutsi propaganda spread by the government and news outlets such as RTLM repeatedly warned the Hutus that the Tutsis were planning to take over Rwanda and murder all Hutus; therefore, they must kill the Tutsis before they could kill them. This kill or be killed belief, combined with systemic dehumanization of the Tutsis, facilitated participation in the genocide. In Darfur, the government has convinced the *Janjaweed* that the African tribes need to be removed from the land because the Arabs are the rightful owners of Darfur.

The arguments made by Waller (2002), Moshman (2005), Smith (2011), and Goldhagen (2009) are supported by Hatzfeld's (2003) book on the perpetrators. Many of

the perpetrators described the killings as work or a job (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 15). Pio, one of the killers, described killing a neighbor and recalled that “In truth, it only came to me afterward: I had killed a neighbor. I mean, at the fatal instant I did not see in him what he had been before; I struck someone who was no longer close or strange to me, who wasn’t exactly ordinary anymore...” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 24). Some of the other participants stated that they struck people with their machetes without seeing their faces, that they were surprised by the speed of the death, and that they felt the strain of the effort of killing somebody with a machete, but no personal pain (Hatzfeld, 2003).

In addition, the killers described the Tutsis as animals, as something to throw away with no more meaning to them, and that the Tutsi were prey that they were hunting (Hatzfeld, 2003). Pancrace used hunting language when describing killing Tutsis in a marsh to Hatzfeld (2003): at first, it was easy because people were scared and not moving around a lot, but then the Tutsi were “...picking up all the tricks of the marsh game creatures.... Even the hunters grew discouraged” (p. 61). Aldabert told Hatzfeld (2003) that when the group spotted some Tutsis running away from the marshes, they would call them snakes because of the way they wriggled in the mud, or dogs, because many Rwandans did not like dogs (p. 152). Some of the perpetrators informed Hatzfeld (2003) that it was not possible to spare a friend or neighbor, as someone who came along after them would kill the person, and might do so in a slower or crueler manner (pp. 119-120).

## **Conclusion**

This first part of this chapter focused on the literature on Rwandan and Darfur history, why genocide occurs, explanations for participation in genocide, rape in genocide, and the search for justice in post-genocide Rwanda. I then explored two

theories that help facilitate our understanding of why genocide has occurred in both countries: structural violence and dehumanization. The literature, as well as the theories, will be woven throughout chapters four and five. In the next chapter, I will describe how the qualitative method of case study research will be used to explain the effects of physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan and Darfur genocides.

## Chapter 3: Methodology

### **Chapter Introduction**

In this chapter, I will explain the qualitative research methodology I used for this study, which is case study. I used Yin's (2009) book on case study to outline what case study is, and how a case study is conducted, including the steps done before starting the research and the collection of the evidence. I will end the chapter with a discussion of how I collected and analyzed the data and the steps taken to ensure rigor.

### **What is case study?**

According to Yin (2009), case study is a research method that allows researchers to look at the complete and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (p. 4). In this dissertation, the real-life events are the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. A more formal definition of case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009, p. 18). In both Rwanda and Darfur, dehumanization facilitated the genocide, and it is difficult to separate dehumanization from the events of each genocide.

### **Case Study Research Design**

Yin (2009) explains that there are five components of a research design for case study; these are a study's questions, its propositions, the unit of analysis, logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings (p. 27). The study's questions are the "how", "why", "where", etc., that are important to narrowing down the topic (Yin, 2009, p. 27). As mentioned in chapter one, the research questions for this study are: What are the various types of dehumanization found in both genocides, and

what was/is their impact on the genocide? How was/is dehumanization spread in these countries? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-humanize both the victims and killers? Thus, the scope of this dissertation is limited to the role dehumanization has played in both genocides, as well as the types, their dissemination, and what can be done after a genocide to rehumanize both sides.

According to Yin (2009), the units of analysis means that those included in the study must be distinguished from those outside the study (p. 32). In this study, the units of analysis are Rwanda and Darfur, which excludes other cases of genocide such as the Holocaust, and it focuses on dehumanization, therefore excluding other areas of study such as participation in genocide. The units of analysis focus on the dehumanized groups in both genocides, which necessarily excludes other populations within each country that were not subjected to this. The final step Yin (2009) discusses is reliability, which is conducting the case study so that a later researcher can follow the same procedures done by the researcher and arrive at the same conclusions (p. 45). Yin (2009) rightly points out that in order for the later researcher to do this, I must document each step of the process; this is also necessary for me to replicate my own study in the future (p. 45). Before I discuss my steps, I will briefly discuss the procedures that must be done before starting a case study.

### **What to do before starting a case study**

The first phase of the pre-case study protocol is to make sure the researcher is asking the right questions while evaluating the evidence, to make sure they understand why facts or events appear the way they do (Yin, 2009, p. 69). The second phase is “listening”, which means not only reading and interpreting what is in the text, but also

reading between the lines to see what significant information is not visible but is nonetheless important to the study (Yin, 2009, p. 70). The third phase is adapting procedures or plans if the research shifts or something unexpected happens; when a shift occurs, I must repeat and re-document any of the steps already done (Yin, 2009, p. 71). The fourth phase is making sure I have a firm grasp of the issues being studied, or I could miss some deviations, such as contradictory information (Yin, 2009, pp. 71-72). I have been studying both Rwanda and Darfur for over ten years now, and I studied both cases in my Master's Thesis, so I met this criterion. Finally, Yin (2009) points out that the researcher must avoid bias: because I selected two cases I am familiar with, I could have made the mistake of collecting research that supports my pre-conceived notions of what has happened in both cases (p. 72). This issue will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter.

### **Type of case study used**

There are many different types of case study that can be used. For my dissertation, I used multiple case design. The reason for this is that I wanted to compare and contrast two cases of genocide where both physical and sexual dehumanization were strongly used, to understand how dehumanization is used to facilitate genocide. Yin (2009) states that multiple case study is seen as more robust, but each case needs to be selected so they either predict similar results or predict contrasting results that are anticipated (pp. 53-54). Both Rwanda and Darfur should predict similar results. Multiple case study must contain literal replication, which is the conditions where the phenomenon is likely to be found, and theoretical replication, which is the conditions where the phenomenon is not likely to be found (Yin, 2009, p. 54).

In addition, each case study is considered a whole case study, with each case's conclusions being the information needing replication in the other cases (Yin, 2009, p. 56). In this study, the results from Rwanda regarding physical and sexual dehumanization needed to be replicated in the Darfur case study. I only utilized two case studies, as the theories I used are straightforward and do not need an excessive degree of certainty (Yin, 2009, p. 58). In other words, there is enough evidence that using Rwanda and Darfur will lead to replication between the two cases, thus another case is not necessary.

Yin (2009) created a very useful chart explaining the steps of a multiple case study project. The first step is to develop a theory you want the cases to explore; next, you have to choose the cases (p. 57). I tested the theory of dehumanization and its impact on genocide, and I chose Rwanda and Darfur because they are similar cases, yet there are enough differences to warrant exploring how physical and sexual dehumanization played a role in both genocides. After you have selected the cases, you must conduct the first case study, write the individual case report, and then repeat these steps with the second case study and any subsequent cases (Yin, 2009, p. 57).

After the case reports have been written, the researcher has to draw cross-case conclusions, modify the theory as necessary, develop the policy implications, and write the cross-case report (Yin, 2009, p. 57). Yin (2009) explains that the simplest form of multiple-case study is one with literal replication; that is, cases where you know the outcomes and you are focusing on how and why these outcomes occurred (p. 59). I know the outcome of the Rwandan genocide, but the Darfur genocide is still ongoing. However, since most of the violence occurred between 2004-2006, I believed that I could use this

case despite its uncertain future, by focusing on this three-year time span and including policy recommendations for ending the genocide.

### **Collecting Case Study Evidence**

After selecting the cases and doing the pre-case study steps outlined by Yin (2009), I started collecting the evidence I needed for this dissertation. According to Yin (2009), the sources of evidence for case study include: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (p. 102). Due to the fact that I did a content analysis study, I did not conduct interviews or observe the populations. I did collect documentation, archival records, and interviews done with survivors and perpetrators by other scholars and journalists. However, as Yin (2009) points out, documents may not always be accurate or unbiased (p. 103). Therefore, he recommends corroborating any documents with other sources that verify spellings, titles, and names of organizations mentioned in a document, provide specific details that validate the evidence in another document, and provide information you can make an inference from (p. 103). In addition, Yin (2009) recommends the use of multiple sources in order to address a broader range of issues, as well as assisting with triangulation (pp. 115-116). Triangulation occurs when the events or facts of the case study have been supported by more than one source of data (Yin, 2009, p. 116). I collected evidence from various sources, including books, journal articles, NGOs, and news articles. I used reputable news sources, such as the BBC, and internationally recognized NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders, and Amnesty International, to ensure reliability and validity.



### **Analyzing the evidence**

Yin (2009) outlines four general strategies for analyzing the case study evidence; the first is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the case study, the second is to develop a descriptive framework for organizing the case study, the third is to use both qualitative and quantitative data, and the fourth is to look at rival explanations (pp. 130-134). I spent several months collecting data for this dissertation. I looked for sources on genocide in general; information specifically on Rwanda and Darfur; general explanations of dehumanization; broad information on dehumanization in genocide; and specific information on dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur. While I collected the evidence, I followed Yin's advice in step 1, to follow my theoretical proposition. I theorized that physical and sexual dehumanization were/are widely spread throughout the populations in both genocides, and that the various types used facilitated support for, or participation in, each genocide. I have also theorized that rape in both cases was/is an act of genocide. Keeping this in mind, I read and re-read each source with my theoretical framework in mind, looking for phrases or words that supported my theory.

In terms of the second step, I had an initial set of research questions that I kept in the back of my head as I collected and read my sources. I looked for certain keywords, such as dehumanization, rape, and genocide. When I did a search for "physical dehumanization", I was able to find sources, but when I sought information on "sexual dehumanization", the results were surprisingly limited. Almost no sources mention sexual dehumanization specifically, although many sources did include elements of sexual dehumanization in their writings. This may be the case because sexual dehumanization is a relatively new term, or there may not be much literature on it. The term rape was found

in many sources, but I made sure to read each one thoroughly to ensure that rape was mentioned multiple times, not just once or twice. I also included the words “racism” and “race” in my search for literature on Sudan, as systemic racism against the so-called African groups in Darfur and other parts of Sudan has existed for many decades and contributes to the physical dehumanization of the targeted groups. This yielded some useful sources. As I read and marked up each source, I began to formulate a descriptive framework for how to structure my case studies. I made the decision to start each case with physical dehumanization, and then transition into discussing sexual dehumanization. The reason for this is because there is a fair amount of research done on physical dehumanization, but very little on sexual dehumanization, so I wanted to focus more attention on this aspect of genocide.

For step 3, using both qualitative and quantitative data, I did include some quantitative sources, but the majority of my research was qualitative. The reason for this is that while the quantitative studies I used provided helpful information, they lacked the ability to fully explain the “how” and “why” of physical and sexual dehumanization. Quantitative studies have been done on dehumanization using experiments that prove that humans in general dehumanize each other, depending on the circumstances. However, in terms of genocide, while quantitative research can provide a breakdown of numbers on topics such as how many people participated in a genocide, the number of people killed in an area, etc., they do not provide an explanation for why people participated or why people were killed in one area, but not another. Qualitative research that included interviews with perpetrators and survivors provided the best insight for me into how dehumanization was/is used in both cases. Qualitative research done on rape in general

and rape in genocide specifically helped bolster my analysis of sexual dehumanization and how rape is an act of genocide. While a quantitative study on physical and sexual dehumanization can be done, I chose to do a qualitative study because I believe it provided me with a more robust, well rounded dissertation.

As mentioned above, Yin's (2009) final step for analyzing case study evidence is to look at rival explanations for the phenomenon in question (p. 133). Some of the literature I used in this dissertation argued that what is happening in Darfur is not genocide, because it does not meet the criterion of intentionality. While I disagree, I did not let that affect my analysis of the literature, as the authors made several good points about an aspect of the events in Darfur that I found useful for this study. I also kept in mind that the labeling of Darfur as "genocide" has been contentious; while the U.S. and several other countries have used this term, many others, including most Middle East countries, do not. Thus, I could not ignore or refuse to include literature on Darfur that did not call the events genocide. Another rival explanation is that rape in genocide is not different from rape in war or rape in general, and therefore, does not merit special attention. While I understand this argument to some extent, I respectfully disagree. I believe that rape in genocide is different, because the intentionality is different; I will expand on this point in chapters four and five.

As I was analyzing the evidence, I had to determine what type of analytic technique I wanted to use. After reading about the different types in Yin's (2009) book, I decided to use explanation building (p. 141). In explanation building, "... the case study evidence is examined, the theoretical positions are revised and the evidence is once again examined from a new perspective..." (Yin, 2009, p. 143). Explanation building wants to

explain how or why something has happened, using a significant theoretical proposition; in other words, the explanation might provide insights into social science theory, which in turn can lead to recommendations for future policy actions (Yin, 2009, p. 141).

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain how physical and sexual dehumanization are used in genocide, and my hope was to offer some recommendations for how to stop the spread of physical and sexual dehumanization in a country that is on the brink of genocide or where a genocide has just begun, as well as ideas on how to rehumanize not just the victims, but also the perpetrators. Therefore, explanation building was the best analytic technique to use for this study. However, as Yin (2009) points out, the danger of using explanation building is that the researcher may begin to drift away from the original topic; to counter this, I followed his advice to constantly refer to the purpose of this study (p. 144).

To ensure that my analysis is rigorous and of a high quality, I followed the four steps Yin (2009) outlined. Step 1 is that you show that you exhaustively covered your main research questions; the analysis should show how the study used as much evidence as possible, while leaving no loose ends (p. 160). I did this by conducting an extensive literature review on my topic, using variations of keywords and phrases in order to find as much literature as possible to support my study. The evidence was analyzed and then reanalyzed in order to ensure that important information was not missed. I also made sure to look for any inferred information in each document. Step 2 is to address, if possible, all the major rival explanations (pp. 160-161). As mentioned above, I did include sources that argued Darfur is not genocide, and that rape in genocide should not be treated

differently from rape in war or in general. These rival explanations will be explored in more detail in the following chapters.

Step 3 is to make sure that your analysis addresses the most significant aspect of your case study (p. 161). The most important aspects of my case study are physical and sexual dehumanization, and my analysis covered these aspects in great detail. I made sure to keep in mind what the purpose of this study was, so that my analysis would not meander or leave the reader confused as to what the study was about. Step 4 is to use your own prior knowledge in your case study (p. 161). As mentioned earlier, I have been studying the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur for over ten years now, and I used both genocides as cases in my Master's Thesis. I have written papers on different aspects of the genocides, such as the role of the media in the Rwandan genocide. This prior knowledge has been very beneficial, as it allowed me to focus my literature searches on specific aspects of each genocide, due to the fact that I already had literature on the history of each genocide. Being familiar with both cases also meant that I would not get bogged down in attempting to understand the intricacies of both cases, which can be time consuming. When I was first learning about both genocides, I had to spend a large amount of time ensuring that I knew both cases in detail, including how the genocides started, who participated in the genocide, what the international response was/is, and how the genocide ended in the case of Rwanda. Having this knowledge already made finding the most useful sources much easier, as it meant that I could discard sources with inaccurate information, which would have been detrimental to my study.

## **Chapter Conclusion**

This chapter explored the methodology used in the dissertation. I explained what case study is, how it is conducted, and the type of case study I used. I outlined how my case study was carried out, including the collection and analyzing of literature. Having explained the methodology, I will now describe both cases in great detail in chapter four and five. Chapter four will look at physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan genocide, while chapter five will explore physical and sexual dehumanization in Darfur.

## Chapter 4: Case Study Rwanda

### Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine the physical and sexual dehumanization that occurred in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I will start the chapter off with a brief overview of the genocide, in order to provide the reader with a context. Next, I will look at the various types of physical dehumanization used in Rwanda and how structural violence facilitated the dehumanization. After that, I will explore sexual dehumanization, including the mass rape and torture of women during the genocide. Lastly, I will conclude the chapter with a summation of the previous sections and final thoughts on dehumanization in general in Rwanda.

### Overview of Rwandan Genocide

During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered in 100 days. This equated to around 8,000 a day, which meant around 333 lives lost per hour, or around 5 lives per minute (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 133). Those who took part in the killings included doctors, teachers, farmers, and members of the clergy. According to Gourevitch (1998), neighbors killed neighbors in their homes, doctors killed patients, and teachers killed students in hospitals and schools all across Rwanda (p. 115). As mentioned in chapter 1, the killings were highly organized: members of the *Interahamwe* prepared small groups in neighborhoods, as well as drawing up lists of Tutsis to be executed and organizing retreats where members practiced burning houses and hacking up dummies with machetes (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 94-95). The media, including Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), disseminated anti-Tutsi

propaganda, such as calling Tutsis “cockroach” and reminding listeners not to take pity on women and children and kill every Tutsi in Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).

The reasons for why the genocide occurred are complex, and the genocide cannot be described as the result of ancient tribal hatred. However, there are historical aspects to the genocide, including the legacy of colonialism. The Belgians were the colonial rulers in Rwanda after World War 1, and the Belgians saw the Tutsi as “racially superior”, based on the idea of race science and the supposedly superior features of the Tutsis, including being taller and having longer, thinner noses (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 52). The colonizers put the Tutsis into positions of power over the majority ethnic Hutus. The Belgians issued identity cards based on ethnicity and used them for job and school placements (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 56-57). The Hutus were denied education and job opportunities, forced to do communal work, and taught that they were racially “inferior” to the Tutsis.

When Rwanda gained its independence in 1959, the Tutsis were removed from power, and Hutu leaders were elected. Massacres against the Tutsis began in 1959, as Rwanda was taking steps towards becoming an independent country. The killings often happened without any government intervention to stop the killings or punish those responsible, which helped lay the foundations for the 1994 genocide. In 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew the government and formed a dictatorship, with a small group of Hutus close to his family running the country. During his dictatorship, attacks against the Tutsi decreased, although the Tutsis had little rights under the regime, and were banned from the military. Most Tutsi were willing to live with the restrictions, though, in exchange for some security and peace (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 69).



The fragile security in Rwanda was shattered when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. The RPF called for the right of the Tutsis living outside Rwanda, including refugees from previous killings, to be allowed to return to the country. In addition, the RPF wanted a power-sharing government between the Hutus and Tutsis. President Habyarimana agreed to negotiate with the RPF in 1993, and the Arusha Accords were signed in Tanzania to end the war and set up a multi-party system in Rwanda; the Arusha Accords also led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to monitor and enforce the peace agreement. President Habyarimana's acquiescence to the Arusha Accords was seen as a traitorous act by Hutu extremists, who began calling for his death. On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi were assassinated when the plane they were in was shot down over Kigali (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 110). Almost immediately, the killings began.

Despite the presence of UN soldiers, the international community did little to respond to the killings. The UN left a force of only 300 soldiers to mandate the peace agreement, which meant that the peacekeepers were not allowed to intervene in killings. The UN withdrew most of the troops after 10 Belgian peacekeepers were tortured and killed by Hutu militias. This led to Belgium withdrawing all of its troops, and the US, still haunted by the death of its soldiers in Mogadishu, calling for a complete withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force, despite the fact that Romeo Dallaire's call for an expanded peacekeeping force would not have required American troops (Gourevitch, 1994, p. 150). The US government also refused to categorize the killings as genocide, because it believed that doing so would force the US to take military action (Gourevitch,

1998, p. 153). The violence ended only after the RPF was successfully able to overthrow the government in July 1994 (Gourevitch, 1994, p. 162).

### **Facilitation of Physical Dehumanization**

While some have argued that the genocide in Rwanda was the result of chaos and anarchy, Gourevitch (1998) rightly points out that the genocide was the outcome of an authoritarian, organized, and meticulously ruled state (p. 95). Gourevitch (1998) further argues that genocide requires great ambition and needs to be conceived as the means to achieving a new order (p. 17). In addition, Gourevitch (1998) claims that the organizers and perpetrators of genocide do not need to enjoy killing, but above everything else, want their victims dead so badly that they consider it a necessity (p. 18). Mob rule may work temporarily in genocide, but there needs to be some factor that motivates people to participate day after day, to keep killing after the first victim (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 17).

Another common argument made is that genocide is a result of hatred, that the perpetrators kill because they hate the victims. While this may be true in some cases, Moshman (2005) points out that hatred can be manipulated for political reasons, and that dehumanization is more likely to affect participation (p. 194). Moshman (2005) argues that dehumanization makes it possible to kill a person without hating them; using the analogy of killing a cow, he argues that it is possible to do so because you no longer see the individual as human (p. 194).

Dehumanization played a large role in facilitating participation in the Rwandan genocide. Dehumanizing rhetoric and language was spread by the media and the government to persuade people to kill the Tutsis. The 1990 invasion by the RPF and subsequent peace talks led the government to fear that their domination of the Rwandan

economy and society would end when they would be forced to share power with the Tutsis. As mentioned in chapter 2, about 15 percent of the farmers in Rwanda owned half of the land (Uvin, 1998, p. 113), and in Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent of the region's income in 1992 (Uvin, 1998, p. 115). President Habyarimana's wife Agathe ran a small influential group called the *akazu*, or little house. The *akazu* controlled the political, economic, and military muscle and the patronage that was eventually called "Hutu Power" (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 80-81). If anyone crossed Agathe or the *akazu*, they were assassinated or jailed (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 81). Thus, this group was determined to prevent the power and resource sharing, and began planning to eliminate the Tutsi.

One of the first steps taken toward dehumanization by the government was to place the Tutsis in a different group from the Hutus, to make the Tutsis the "outgroup" (Smith, 2011, p. 49). The Tutsis were seen as the "other," creating an "us and them" mentality (Smith, 2011, p. 49). When one group sees the other as separate, they begin to discriminate against the outgroup, seeing them as deserving of their suffering, as less hardworking, honest, etc. (Smith, 2011, p. 49). Moshman (2007) explains that identity in Rwanda changed to the point where people were identified first and foremost as Hutu or Tutsi, with all other identifiers being a distant second (p. 119). Moreover, Moshman (2007) points out that if the outgroup is seen as something other than human, "...then they cannot share interests, values, or commitments with 'us'" (p. 123). The RPF invasion in 1990 allowed the government to claim that all the Tutsis living in Rwanda were RPF sympathizers and spies, and that, unlike the Hutus, they were traitors to their country (Gourevitch, 1998). By labeling the Tutsis as traitors, the government was

making it clear that any actions taken against them would not be punished, and might even be rewarded.

Another common tactic used in dehumanization is fear; that is, creating a fear that the other group is out to eliminate the ingroup. The Rwandan government used the mirroring method, whereby the outgroup is accused of wanting to take actions that the ingroup are actually preparing to do (Chrétien, 2007, p. 55). In other words, the Tutsis were accused of wanting to kill all of the Hutus, when in fact the government was preparing to slaughter all of the Tutsis. The 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the RPF led to fears that the Tutsis planned to take back over the country and return the system to what it was during the colonial era, when the Hutus were a repressed majority (Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM and newspapers like *Kangura* called on Hutus to take up arms to defend themselves against the RPF and Tutsis living inside Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998). Gourevitch (1998) recounts that the government declared all Tutsis to be RPF accomplices and stated that any Hutus who did not support this view would be viewed as “Tutsi-loving traitors” (p. 83). In addition, Hassan Ngeze, the editor of *Kangura*, argued that all Tutsi women were RPF agents and that all Tutsis were dishonest, and the Minister of Justice during that time period argued that 99% of the Tutsis were pro-RPF (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 88; 98). The use of fear led many to see the situation as “kill or be killed”, and many perpetrators justified their actions on the grounds of self-defense.

After establishing that the Tutsis were spies and traitors determined to take over the country, the government began using dehumanizing language and rhetoric to instill in the population a belief that the Tutsis were not like them, that they were not even human. As Smith (2011) rightly points out,

We are innately biased against outsiders. This bias is seized upon and manipulated by propaganda to motivate men and women to slaughter one another. This is done by inducing men to regard their enemies as subhuman creature, which overrides their natural, biological inhibitions against killing (p. 71).

The popular radio station RTLM started the dehumanization process in a slow and subtle manner. RTLM was popular because its announcers were quick witted, humorous, and at times irreverent toward the government (Des Forges, 2007, p. 44). The station would make funny jokes about the Tutsis, such as a suggestion to air mail Tutsis to Uganda (Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM used the word *inyenzi* (cockroach) casually, which at first shocked people but then led to them becoming accustomed to hearing, and even using, the term to describe Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM increased their hateful rhetoric as the government and RPF began negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. According to Des Forges (2007), RTLM announcers used the terms *inyenzi* and Tutsi interchangeably, also using the term RPF, which lead the listeners to conclude that all the Tutsis were RPF supporters; in addition, RTLM warned listeners that RPF soldiers would be dressed in civilian clothes and encouraged listeners to look for any refugees who looked like they might be disguised RPF members-essentially, anyone who was Tutsi (p. 48).

Unlike RTLM, *Kangura* immediately used anti-Tutsi rhetoric and language. Hassan Ngeze, the newspaper's editor, was hired by the government to write a newspaper that supported the government and attacked the RPF and Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 85). Ngeze published documents that he claimed showed that the RPF was part of a Tutsi supremacist campaign to subjugate the Hutus and ran lists of names of Tutsis and Hutu accomplices that were traitors to the government (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 86). Ngeze

published the infamous “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which commanded Hutu men to avoid marrying, befriending, or employing Tutsi women, prohibited Hutus from having business dealings with Tutsis, and the most famous and oft-quoted commandment, commandment 8, which declared that “Hutus must stop having mercy on the Tutsis” (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 88). Ngeze promoted Hutu supremacy and used his critics’ attacks to his advantage: Gourevitch (1998) describes an instance where a rival newspaper ran a cartoon with Ngeze on a psychiatrist’s couch complaining that his sickness was the Tutsis; Ngeze then ran the cartoon in *Kangura* (p. 87). Ngeze’s inflammatory rhetoric made *Kangura* one of the most widely read newspapers, and certainly the one Rwandans remember the most from that time period (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 87).

Both RTLM and *Kangura* used stereotypes of Tutsi features and mannerisms to mark them as the outgroup. According to Gourevitch (1998), Tutsis were seen as “...lanky and long-faced, not so dark-skinned, narrow-nosed, thin-lipped, and narrow-chinned” (p. 50). Tutsis were also described as not eating often, preferring to drink milk (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 209). While some Tutsis fit these stereotypical descriptions, such as Rwandan President Paul Kagame who is very tall and thin, most Tutsis did not. After generations of intermarriage between Hutus and Tutsis, neither group could accurately be called distinct ethnic groups (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 45-46). Most distinction of Hutu vs. Tutsi came from their roles in society: Tutsis were herders of cattle, and Hutus farmed the land (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48). However, the Belgians issued identity cards labeling people as Hutu or Tutsi based on the attributed features of both groups, and after independence, the government continued this practice, with the ethnicity of the father determining the ethnicity of the children (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 57). While some

individuals could change their identity via bribery or absence/death of the father, most Rwandans were forced to keep the ethnicity assigned to them at birth (Gourevitch, 1998).

The Rwandan government facilitated the dehumanization of Tutsis for a variety of reasons. First, the global prices of coffee and tea, Rwanda's main exports, dropped drastically in the late 1980s, causing major economic problems in the country (Uvin, 1998, p. 54). This meant that Rwanda had to increasingly rely on foreign aid, which came with strings attached: the United States and many European countries demanded an opening of the political system to include multiple political parties and open democracy (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 82). President Habyarimana had no choice but to play along; he allowed for the creation of opposition parties and newspapers, but often cracked down on the opposition by arresting or killing politicians and editors (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 86). Habyarimana knew that if he allowed for free and open elections, he would lose power, along with the *Akazu*. According to Uvin (1998), before the genocide, in the province of Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent of that region's income; about 90 percent of the rural population lived below the poverty line, and the country was unable to feed itself due to overpopulation and unequal land distribution (pp. 115-117).

The lack of economic opportunities for young people led to vast frustration, and it did not help that the government limited the population's mobility: residency and travel permits were required to stay or move anywhere, to prevent slums in and around Kigali, the capital (Uvin, 1998, pp. 115-116). Young men were trapped on plots of land that were incapable of providing for a family, which meant that they could not get married, nor could they seek an education or a better job (Uvin, 1998, p. 118). A young, frustrated and

angry population could have spelled major trouble for the Habyarimana regime, but he was saved when the RPF invaded in 1990.

The RPF invasion gave Habyarimana a convenient scapegoat for Rwanda's problems: the Tutsis that he claimed wanted to take back over the country and subjugate the Hutus. Although many Tutsis in Rwanda were no better off than their Hutu counterparts, the government was successfully able to convince Rwandans that the Tutsis were dominating the economic sectors and preventing Hutus from improving their situation. As Uvin (1998) points out,

When people are denied the realization of their full human and intellectual potential, when they are deprived of choices and information, they are more easily manipulated. When people are treated in a humiliating and prejudicial manner, when they are made to lose their self-respect, the result is frustration and anger, as well as a strong need to regain self-respect and dignity (p. 136).

Habyarimana and the *Akazu* knew that they would need to channel that anger and frustration in another direction, away from them. Thus, they convinced the population that the Tutsis were to blame for their problems, and that the RPF invasion meant that the Tutsis planned to return Rwanda to the policies of the colonial times. The government did not want to lose the structure they had built and sustained post-independence, so they decided to remove the biggest threat to the structure, the Tutsis. As Uvin (1998) explains, racism was a means for ordinary Rwandans to make sense of their predicament, of their misery via projection and scapegoating (p. 217). Uvin (1998) also claims that

...Structural violence lowers the barriers against the use of violence. As the norms of society lose legitimacy, as people's knowledge base is reduced to slogans, as



progress becomes a meaningless concept, as communities are riveted by conflict and jealousy, as people's sense of self-respect is reduced, and as segments of society show their contempt for the rules of decency as well as for farmers, people become increasingly unhampered by constraints on the use of violence to deal with problems (p. 138).

The government of Rwanda prepared people for the use of violence by importing and distributing machetes, creating the *Interahamwe*, drawing up lists of Tutsis to target, and organizing retreats where militia members would practice burning houses, tossing grenades, and hacking up dummies with machetes (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 93). Over the course of at least two years, the government prepared its citizens to slaughter Tutsis without mercy.

## **Physical Dehumanization**

### **Tutsis as Animals**

Arguably, the most famous dehumanizing term used against the Tutsi was *inyenzi*, or “cockroach.” As Gourevitch (1998) explains, the Tutsi rebels were the first to be called cockroaches, and they used the term themselves to “...describe their stealth and their belief that they were uncrushable” (p. 64). However, as Higiroy (2007) points out, “cockroaches are annoying insects that disappear when somebody turns on the light. The only way to get rid of them is to kill all of them” (p. 85). Having dealt with cockroaches in my apartment, I agree with Higiroy (2007). Most people see cockroaches as annoying, ugly insects who must be wiped out.

The use of a repulsive creature to describe Tutsis made it easier to convince people that all Tutsis, and not just the RPF, needed to be eliminated. Most people would

not think twice about stomping on a cockroach to kill it; thus, reducing the Tutsis to cockroaches helped remove the moral imperative against killing a fellow human being by turning them into a creature that must be stamped out. Moreover, in order to get rid of a cockroach infestation, you have to kill the eggs and larvae as well as the adult cockroaches; RTLM reminded listeners of this fact when they informed them that “A cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly, a cockroach gives birth to a cockroach...” (Melvern, 2004, p. 50).

By using this analogy, RTLM was reminding the *Interahamwe* and perpetrators not to leave any Tutsi children alive; in fact, RTLM went so far as to remind its listeners to disembowel pregnant victims (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 98). The fact that use of the term cockroach was widespread is demonstrated in Gourevitch (1998): Paul Rusesabagina, the manager of the Hotel des Mille Collines told Gourevitch in an interview that a priest he knew, Father Wenceslas, brought his elderly Tutsi mother to the hotel for safekeeping and told him, “Paul, I bring you my cockroach” (p. 140-141).

In addition to calling Tutsis cockroaches, RTLM and newspapers like *Kangura* referred to Tutsis as snakes and hyenas (Higiro, 2007, p. 87). According to Higiro (2007), in Rwandan culture, a hyena is the worst animal, and calling someone a hyena labels them a very bad person, one worthy of death (p. 85). Although dehumanization was used by oppositional newspapers to depict Habyarimana’s supporters, its use was more common in the pro-regime media (Higiro, 2007, p. 84). *Kangura* likened the RPF and its supporters to “...a snake ready to devour Rwanda and oblivious Rwandans” (Kabanda, 2007, p. 68). Thomas Kamilindi (2007), a journalist who quit Radio Rwanda a few months before the genocide because of its promotion of hatred, describes an encounter

with the *Interahamwe* during the genocide: “I have a daughter. She’s twelve now but she was very small at the time. One day, somebody said, ‘That one is a snake. They have to kill her.’ She wasn’t even two years old. My daughter asked me, ‘Am I a snake? Am I a snake?’” (p. 138). Depicting Tutsis as snakes reduced them to dangerous creatures that had to be eliminated before they could harm anyone.

Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo (2011) conducted in-depth interviews with ten Tutsi survivors about their experiences. One participant, Umulisa, remembered being frightened by what she was reading in *Kangura* about Tutsis. She rightly points out that by calling Tutsis animals that they had no connection to- instead of being called a lion, which implies bravery-calling Tutsis snakes labeled them an animal that is very dangerous and one people refuse to live with (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). Being called a cockroach bothered her because “

...everyone hates them in Rwanda because they get in our cupboards, and you try to do everything you can to get rid of them” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). Another participant, Emmanuel, shared a disturbing story about the killing of Tutsis in a school. The killers tortured women and girls by slashing them with machetes and beating them with weapons (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). The prefect of the community brought in Caterpillar tractors to push piles of corpses into mass graves; some people were still alive, and they had their limbs ripped off by the tractors (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87). Most disturbingly, while the tractors were operating, babies could be heard crying, and older children were begging and crying out “Please forgive me! I will never again be a Tutsi!” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87). A third participant, also named Emmanuel, was hiding in a church when the *Interahamwe* arrived (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 118).

Emmanuel managed to hide outside the church, but he watched as the killers threw grenades into the church and shot bullets into it; the killers then checked to see who was still alive and began killing them (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119). A pregnant woman was discovered and when she did not have enough money to satisfy the *Interahamwe*, one of the militias said “...they wanted to see how Tutsi children looked when they are still in the mother” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119). The woman was sliced open and the fetus fell out; the mother screamed until she died (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119).

### **Routinization of Killing**

In addition to the constant reinforcement of the idea that Tutsis were not human, RTLM used language to assure the *Interahamwe* and others participating in the genocide that what they were doing was akin to working. Li (2007) explains that RTLM would direct listeners to specific targets and hiding places, interviewed individuals working the roadblocks, and included informational updates and operational details to help frame work schedules and turn the killing into a routine (pp. 99-101). In addition, the killings were carried out by individuals working in rotating shifts, with crew leaders at times being elected (Li, 2007, p. 91). To incentivize this “work”, individuals were allowed to loot Tutsi belongings and livestock, and a councilwoman in Kigali offered fifty Rwandan francs for what was called “selling cabbages”, or bringing in severed Tutsi heads (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).

French journalist Jean Hatzfeld (2003) interviewed perpetrators in Rwanda, and they confirmed the routinization of killing. Several of his participants said “we had work to do” (p. 15) when talking about the slaughter. Léopold, one of the participants, oversaw his killing unit. He told Hatzfeld (2003) that he would whistle the men for assembly,

hurry people up, count the missing, check on any reasons for absence, and pass along instructions (p. 14). In many ways, Léopold's job was similar to a manager or foreperson at any regular job. Two other participants, Élie and Jean-Baptiste, told Hatzfeld (2003) that they got no time off, not even on Sundays, and the local leaders lectured them on their duties, threatened in advance anyone who ruined the job, and were told they had to work all the way until the end, keep up a satisfactory pace, spare no one, and loot what they found (p. 15).

As the genocide became routine, the participants began to kill without seeing who they were striking, and if they killed someone they knew, for example a neighbor, they "...did not see in him what he had been before; I struck someone who was no longer either close or strange to me, who wasn't exactly ordinary anymore..." (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 21-24). The perpetrators also became desensitized to the killing over time, with Élie telling Hatzfeld (2003) "In the end, a man is like an animal: you give him a whack on the head or neck, and down he goes" (p. 37). The participants in Hatzfeld's (2003) book also used the term hunting when describing the tracking down of Tutsis to kill. They told Hatzfeld (2003) that the perpetrators changed colors from hunting and that the hunt, hunters and hunted were savage (p. 47). As Pancrace explains,

In the beginning the Tutsis were many and frightened and not very active-that made our work easier. When we could not catch the most agile of them, we fell back on the puny ones. But at the end only the strong and sly ones were left, and it got too hard. They gathered in little groups, very well hidden. They were picking up all the tricks of the marsh game creatures (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 61).

The routinization of the killing, combined with seeing the Tutsis as creatures to be hunted down and killed, made it easier for the perpetrators to kill them. Léopold informed Hatzfeld (2003) that the killers no longer looked at the Tutsis on a one-on-one basis, but as a collective group that represented a large threat to Rwanda, a threat that must be eliminated (p.121). Although a killer might be able to avoid killing a neighbor or friend, they could not save them from being killed by another member of their group; if they avoided them, the next killer might kill them more slowly, and/or the perpetrator who avoided killing them could be fined, thus the perpetrators did not even try to spare a neighbor's life (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 120-121). Adalbert told Hatzfeld (2003) that a group member who wanted to save their Tutsi wife had to show great enthusiasm for the killing, or she would be killed (p. 122). Adalbert also explained to Hatzfeld (2003) that if they spotted a group of Tutsis trying to escape by crawling through the mud, they would call them snakes; before the killings, they called the Tutsis cockroaches, but during, they called them snakes or dogs (p. 132). Insulting their victims made it easier for some perpetrators to kill, and when Tutsis were killed in marshes, their dirty appearance made them seem completely different from the Hutus, which also made killing them easier (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 132).

In this section, I have explored physical dehumanization in Rwanda, including its facilitation, the type of language used, and the routinization of killing. However, in addition to the physical dehumanization, Tutsi women were subjected to sexual dehumanization, which will be explained in great detail in the next section.

## **Sexual Dehumanization**

### **Overview of Rape as Genocide**

During the Rwandan genocide, between 250,000-500,000 women and girls were raped; the exact number is unknown, as many victims did not report their rape (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 24). Before I discuss rape and sexual violence against women in Rwanda, however, I feel it is important to provide a background on the idea of rape as an act of genocide. Although rape is mentioned in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, it was not legally codified as such until the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Fox, 2011, p. 287). Under the Geneva Conventions, rape was considered a crime against a woman's honor and was thus distinct from other crimes against humanity, like torture and murder (Green, 2004, p. 99). It was not until the international tribunals that rape was seen as an act of genocide. Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham (2008) sums up rape as an act of genocide perfectly when she argues that mass rape prevents births within the targeted group via damage to the reproductive capabilities or the social fitness of women (p. 281). Reid-Cunningham (2008) also rightly points out that rapes committed against women in the target group in a widespread and systematic fashion represents an assault on the community as a whole (p. 281).

As well as symbolizing an assault on an entire community, mass rape also tells the men of that community that they are unable to protect their women, thus adding to the shame of the community (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, p. 282). Christopher Mullins (2009) points out that Rwanda was a very patriarchal society, one in which women were often seen as the property of men (p. 720). Women were often raped in front of their husbands, fathers, and sons, and in some cases, their fathers or sons were forced to rape them, which

destroyed the men's ability to enforce the society's gender norms of protecting their women (Mullins, 2009, p. 722).

Moreover, the Rwanda tribunal's decision regarding rape as genocide acknowledged that the rapes were not sexual in nature, but a tool of war used to destroy the Tutsis (Russell-Brown, 2003, p. 352). It is important to note this because although many of the perpetrators in Rwanda used sexual terms when raping women, their overall goal was to destroy the Tutsis via sexual violence against the women. Many societal norms were destroyed during the genocide, and left women with a heavy burden to carry in the post-genocide society.

### **Hypersexualization of Tutsi Women**

In addition to the physical stereotypes about Tutsis, Tutsi women were subjected to hypersexualization by the Hutu extremists. *Kangura* played up the myth that Tutsi women were far more beautiful than Hutu women, commanding Hutu men not to befriend or marry a Tutsi woman, nor hire her or keep her as a concubine (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 88). According to Human Rights Watch (1996), Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsi women as very sexual, willing to sleep with their Tutsi brothers; it also condemned Tutsi women as arrogant and looking down on Hutu men as ugly and inferior (p. 16). Thus, rape was used as a way to get revenge on these women for refusing to sleep with Hutu men. Another way Tutsi women were hypersexualized was when *Kangura* portrayed them as seductresses and spies for the RPF. Figure 1 below shows a cartoon from *Kangura* demonstrating this.





Figure 1. A 1994 cartoon in *Kangura* that says in Kinyarwanda: "General Dallaire and his army have fallen into the trap of Tutsi femme fatales." Note. Taken from Sai (2012).

The propaganda successfully rendered Tutsi women as hypersexual, willing to seduce the Hutu to help the RPF take over the country. RPF and *Kangura* encouraged the rape of Tutsi women, describing them as sexually special; many perpetrators told their victims they wanted to know if Tutsi women were like Hutu women, or how they tasted (Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 18-19). This hypersexualization fueled the mass rape of women all across Rwanda during the genocide.

### **Rape as an act of mental harm**

Article II of the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948) declares measures that cause serious bodily and mental harm to members of a group an act of genocide. As described in the previous paragraph, Tutsi women were hypersexualized, which facilitated the mass rape of women. The perpetrators subjected the Tutsis women to severe mental harm during the attacks. Many victims were told they were too proud and thus deserved to be attacked (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 19). Although the exact number of rape victims during the genocide is unknown, a survey conducted by UNAMIR of 304 survivors found that 28% of victims were under age 18; 43.75% between the ages of 19-26; 17.1% between 27-35; 8.55% between 36-45; and 1.6% over age 45 (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 24). The fact that most of the victims

were of an age to marry and reproduce is not coincidental, as women were generally targeted due to their reproductive capabilities.

In addition to being sexually assaulted, around 70 percent of rape survivors are HIV positive, with a number of the cases being the result of the Hutu extremists encouraging perpetrators with HIV/AIDS to rape women to deliberately infect them with the disease (Fox, 2011, pp. 289-290). The knowledge that they would die slowly from a debilitating disease added to the humiliation the survivors felt. Some victims told Human Rights Watch (1996) that their attackers said that rather than killing them on the spot, they would leave them to die from their grief (p. 35). Many women begged to be killed so their suffering would end; instead, they were spared from death so they could be humiliated by being repeatedly raped (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 39). Many women have to live with the knowledge that their families were killed and they were only saved from death due to being repeatedly raped and even gang-raped.

It is important to note that the mental harm caused by mass rape was not only inflicted upon the survivors, but also on their communities. As Fox (2011) points out, many of the women were raped in front of their husbands and sons in order to emasculate the men (p. 289). The inability of the men to prevent their wives and mothers from being raped caused mental anguish and humiliation. When Fox (2011) interviewed survivors of the genocide, she discovered that the men found it very difficult to talk with their surviving family members about their rape, as they did not know how to approach the subject (p. 297). More than one male genocide survivor recounted that their attempts to get a family member to talk about being raped were shut down by the survivor, who was too ashamed of their experience to discuss it (Fox, 2011, pp. 296-297). The inability of

rape survivors to talk about what happened to them increased their sense of isolation and led to a distancing of the survivor from her family. Being incapable of recounting their trauma to their community has caused the women to still feel humiliated and have nightmares, with a few telling Human Rights Watch (1996) that they have thought about committing suicide (p. 45).

Another source of mental anguish for the Tutsi communities is the presence of rape babies. A social worker told Human Rights Watch (1996) that the children born to rape survivors are called the children of an *Interahamwe* (p. 72). According to Human Rights Watch (1996), although abortion is illegal in Rwanda, many women tried self-inducing abortions or went to private clinics in Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of Congo if they had the money; the women who self-induced an abortion had to be treated for uterine infections, uterus rupturing, and hemorrhaging (pp. 77-78). In many cases, women who did give birth were unable to accept the child because they reminded them of the trauma inflicted upon them, and some women call their children “unwanted children”, “children of bad memories”, or “children of hate”, with some women abandoning their babies if they resembled their attacker too much or allowing their babies to die once they got home (Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 79-81).

The mental harm done to the rape survivors as well as their communities was vast. Having discussed this aspect in detail, I will now discuss the other part of Article II of the UN Genocide Convention (1948), rape as an act that caused severe physical harm.

### **Rape as an act of physical harm**

Many of the women suffered major damage to their bodies, especially their reproductive organs, when they were subjected to gang rape and/or raped with a foreign object. Most of the women who were treated for rape after the genocide had vaginal infections, and some had HIV (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 25). Several of the victims were told by their attackers that they wanted to know what Tutsi women “tasted like” or “looked like” (Human Rights Watch, 1996). During the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR’s) trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the mayor of Taba, a witness identified only as JJ told the court that when she had fled to the Bureau Communale of Taba for safety but was raped, Akayesu told the *Interahamwe* as they finished raping the women, “Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like... Tomorrow they will all be killed” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 271). As mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, the hypersexualization of Tutsi women contributed to their mass rape, and this is clearly demonstrated via the use of the phrases “taste like” and “look like” by the attackers.

JJ was not subjected to rape for the first time in the Bureau Communale; in fact, she had been raped in a sorghum field and a forest prior to fleeing to Taba for safety (Neuffer, 2001, p. 271). While at the Bureau Communale, she was raped by three men, with the third attacker being so vicious during the assault that she could not put her legs together; she believed she would die from the assaults (Neuffer, 2001, pp. 288-289). As a leader, Akayesu had a responsibility to protect the people in his area; instead, he allowed Tutsis to be killed and encouraged mass rape, likening Tutsi women to “...a piece of melon, waiting to be carved, eaten, and thrown away” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 284). The testimony of JJ and other survivors helped link rape to genocide, and led to Akayesu and

others being convicted of rape as genocide for the first time under international law (Neuffer, 2001, p. 272).

Like JJ, many women were raped by more than one assailant. The rapes met two acts of genocide listed in the UN Genocide Convention (1948): “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” and “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 34). Human Rights Watch (1996) points out that rape and sexual violence can leave a woman physically unable to reproduce, or she may be denied the opportunity to do so by the community because of the assaults (p. 35). In the following paragraphs, I will discuss individual stories of sexual violence against the Tutsi collected by Human Rights Watch (1996) for their report to provide detailed information on the physical harm carried out against the women.

Bernadette was raped at a riverside by a group of six *Interahamwe* and thrown into the river to drown. When she did not die, the *Interahamwe* let her go, but she was raped by another group of *Interahamwe*, became pregnant, and miscarried the baby (pp. 42-43). Perpetue was taken to a river by a group of *Interahamwe*, with one member saying they knew the best method “to check that Tutsi women were like Hutu women” (p. 43). For two days, Perpetue was raped by as many as 20 *Interahamwe*, and on the third day one let her go when he saw she could not walk anymore. After seeking refuge in a church, another *Interahamwe* raped her; later on, two other members sharpened the end of a hoe and pushed the stick inside her three times until she bled everywhere. They let her go, but she was raped again by another *Interahamwe* and black, heavy blood kept

oozing out of her vagina. Perpetue received medical care in Kibuye, but she has not had her period since the genocide ended, and her stomach swells up sometimes (pp. 43-45).

Anne was raped by the *Interahamwe*, and while she was being raped, one of the men told her that "...they wanted to kill all Tutsi so that in the future all that would be left would be drawings to show that there were once a people called the Tutsi" (p. 52). Marie was kidnapped by the *Interahamwe* and marched to a neighboring commune, being threatened with rape along the journey. The *Interahamwe* came at night with torches to pick which women to rape; Marie was raped by three men and began urinating blood, but did receive medical treatment after the genocide (pp. 53-54). Constance was raped by four young men, some of whom were as young as 12; after they finished raping her, the *Interahamwe* told her to go because she probably had AIDS (pp. 55-56).

Mullins (2009) recounts that in addition to being raped, many victims were paraded around in public naked, something that is seen as very shameful in Rwanda, especially if the woman is a mother (p. 729). A female student at a secondary school was forced to stand naked and do gymnastics in front of a crowd of *Interahamwe* before Akayesu told the *Interahamwe* to be sure to have sex with the girl (p. 729). Mullins (2009) also describes the attackers as telling their victims that they hated the Tutsi and were going to take free advantage of them, since the women could no longer reject them (p. 729). This translated into mass rape of the women, with one victim having a tree branch thrust into her vagina, another one being raped with a policeman's truncheon, a third having a cigarette put out in her vagina, and a fourth being pierced with a spear in her sexual organs and having a breast cut off (Mullins, 2009, pp. 729-730).

In one of the interviews conducted by Totten and Ubaldo (2011) with Tutsi survivors about their experiences, one participant, Rose, recounted how the *Interahamwe* came into a compound where Tutsis were hiding and would grab the breasts of the women "...if they were still firm, not like older women, and if they [their breasts] were firm they would take them to rape them" (p. 29). Rose reunited with her children and was running toward the nearest roadblock when four of the *Interahamwe* raped her in front of her children (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 31).

One of the most extreme examples of sexual dehumanization in Rwanda is found in Denise's story: six militia men, including a neighbor she knew, came into her house looking for her husband. When she refused to tell them where he was, she was beaten and raped by one of the militias. After he had finished, he took her inside the house and held one of her legs open while another militia held the other one open. The first militia called the others inside to see what the inside of a Tutsi woman looked like; he then proceeded to cut out the inside of her vagina, put it on a small stick, and put the stick in the ground outside her house so "Everyone who comes past here will see how the Tutsikazi [Kinyarwanda word for Tutsi] look" (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 63). Denise was treated with traditional medicine by a Hutu neighbor but did not see a doctor, and has extreme pain during her menstrual period (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 64).

Survivors like Denise were severely harmed by the mass rape and rape with foreign objects, which caused damage, sometimes permanently, to their reproductive organs. This left the survivors incapable of giving birth, thus eliminating the possibility of future births among the Tutsi population. Many survivors also do not publicly disclose that they were raped, as they can be ostracized by their families and their communities.

Human Rights Watch (1996) states that many Rwandans assume that rape victims have an STD, most often AIDS, which leads rape victims to fear that they will never get married if they admit they were raped (p. 72). In Rwandan society, women are valued for their roles as wives and mothers, which makes the issue of marriageability very important.

In addition to women being valued for their suitability for marriage, marriage is the best option for many of the women to have economic stability and security, as well as protection (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 72). Many of the rape victims who lost family and do not, or cannot, marry, are unable to even farm their family's lands, as they need help to work the fields (p. 72). This has left many survivors trapped in poverty, with little hope for improvement. Moreover, several survivors did not seek medical care as they were afraid of being judged by their communities and society as a whole, and even though some women did seek medical treatment, they did not disclose to their doctors that they were raped, forcing the doctors to circumvent the issue and ask other questions in order to find out what happened and properly treat the women (Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 72-73).

### **Chapter Conclusion**

In this chapter, I explored both physical and sexual dehumanization in Rwanda in great detail. It was necessary to start off with a brief history of the genocide in order to provide the reader with a context. Next, I described how physical dehumanization was used in Rwanda, including the dehumanizing language used as well as its persuasiveness for the perpetrators of the genocide. I then briefly discussed rape as an act of genocide, and then delved into sexual dehumanization in Rwanda, including the hypersexualization



of Tutsi women as well as rape as an act of mental harm and rape as an act of physical harm.

Both physical and sexual dehumanization were used quite successfully in Rwanda in order to facilitate the killings of the Tutsis as well as the mass rape and sexual torture inflicted upon the Tutsi women. The sexual abuse in the genocide has had a lasting impact on the survivors, both in terms of physical issues and psychological ones. We may never know all the costs incurred from the genocide, but it is safe to assume that they were very high. Having explained physical and sexual dehumanization in great detail in this chapter, it is now time to turn my attention to the second case study: the ongoing genocide in Darfur, Sudan.

## Chapter 5: Case Study Darfur

### **Chapter Introduction**

Since 2004, a civil war and genocide has occurred in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. This chapter will follow the outline of chapter 4, in that I will examine both physical and sexual dehumanization that is occurring in Darfur. First, I will start the chapter off with a brief overview of the history of genocide, in order to provide the reader with a background. Next, I will look at the various types of physical dehumanization used in Darfur and how structural violence facilitated the dehumanization. After that, I will explore sexual dehumanization, including the mass rape and impregnation of women. Lastly, I will conclude the chapter with a summary of the previous sections and final thoughts on dehumanization in general in Darfur.

### **Brief History of Genocide in Darfur**

As mentioned above, a civil war and genocide are ongoing in Darfur. Over 400,000 people have been killed, with millions of Darfuris being internally displaced and several hundred thousand living as refugees in Chad and other neighboring countries (Marlowe et. al., 2006, pp. 3-4). Prior to the genocide, the so-called African tribes (consisting mainly of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit) and “Arab” (lighter skinned groups within Darfur) generally got along; the Africans were farmers, while the Arabs were herders, and the Africans would allow the Arabs to water and graze their livestock on their lands (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 7). This arrangement fell apart with the increasing desertification of the arable land in Darfur: farmers began enclosing their lands and denying the herders any use of their water and crops (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 7). A war between the Arabs and the Fur took place between 1987-1989, and just after the peace

agreement between the two sides was reached, the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in a coup and installed General Omar al Bashir as Sudan's leader (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 25).

The new government favored the Arab groups over the African ones, which angered the African tribes. This favoritism, combined with systemic racism and neglect, led to the formation of two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In February 2003, the SLA and JEM rebels destroyed government planes in the regional capital of El Fasher, catching the government off guard; they subsequently carried out other attacks on police stations, army barracks, and convoys throughout Darfur (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p.76).

Rather than negotiate with the rebel groups, the government responded by arming local militias that became known as the *Janjaweed*, or "devils on horseback" who then attacked villages (Steidle, 2007, p. 36). The *Janjaweed* travel on horses and camels and attack villages at dawn; they shoot anyone they come across, steal livestock and possessions, cut down fruit trees and destroy crops, rape women and girls, and burn down the village (Steidle, 2007, p. 36). The complete destruction of the village and all its supplies is deliberately done to drive the African groups off the land and to prevent them from coming back to rebuild, so the Arab groups can use the land for their own purposes (Steidle, 2007, pp. 36-37).

Although an African Union (AU) force is operating in Darfur, the soldiers' roles are largely limited to collecting information on attacks on villages and submitting reports to the AU and United Nations; the AU is also forced to work with the Sudanese army in many cases to even access attack sites (Steidle, 2007, pp. 73-75). Over 400,000 people

have died; roughly half of those deaths came from the original attacks on the villages, but now most Darfuris are dying from disease and starvation (Steidle, 2007). Although a peace agreement was signed between the government and some of the rebel groups in 2005, millions of people are still displaced and both the war and genocide are ongoing with no end in sight. In fact, in a recent *Bloomberg* article, El Wardany (2016) wrote that 73,000 Darfuris have fled their homes in the past month due to fighting between the government and the rebel groups.

### **Physical Dehumanization in Darfur**

#### **Systemic Racism and Structural Violence in Sudan**

The word Darfur means “Land of the Fur”, one of the major ethnic groups in the region (de Waal, 2005, p. 181). Although North Sudan is seen as Arab and South Sudan as African, the people of Darfur use multiple identities and saw their land as encompassing both Arabs and Africans (de Waal, 2005, pp. 185-187). Both Arab and African groups have intermarried in Darfur, which can make it difficult to distinguish between the two groups. I was at a conference in Washington, D.C. in 2005 on the war in Darfur, and two men were speaking on a panel about race in Darfur. They announced to the audience that in Sudan, one man is defined as Arab, while the other is labeled an African; they then asked if anyone in the audience knew which man was which. We could not tell just by looking at them, which is fairly common in Darfur. However, the government of Sudan has decided that those with lighter skin are Arab, while those with black skin are African (Sharkey, 2008, p. 27). Some Arabs even refer to Darfuris as *zurq*, or “blue [dark-skinned] people” (Sharkey, 2008, p. 27).

After determining ethnicity based on skin color, the succeeding Arab governments in Khartoum created and sustained a system of racial and religious discrimination against the rest of the Sudanese. The government made Arabic the official language, which was met with resistance in South Sudan by the rebel leaders, who wanted Arabic-English bilingualism officially recognized by the government in education and governmental matters (Sharkey, 2008, p. 25). However, if a Sudanese wanted to attend school beyond the small village schools, they were forced to learn Arabic. Halima Bashir (2008), a doctor from Darfur, recounts in her autobiography that when she was speaking Zaghawa with a classmate during lunch when she first started school, the headmistress cracked both girls on the head with a stick and told them they could only speak Arabic at her school (p. 70). Bashir (2008) would also be hit for stepping out of line, and was beaten severely by a teacher when she only cleaned one side of a blackboard because the other girl, who was Arab, had not shown up to clean the other side (p. 76). Most Darfuris, however, cannot afford to attend school beyond the primary level.

In addition to unequal access to education, the government of Sudan has spent the revenue from the oil refineries on projects in and around Khartoum, the capital. The government has built skyscrapers and hotels there, and the people in Khartoum are largely middle class or rich, which has led to the building of shopping malls, coffee houses, apartment blocks, and a large increase in the number of cars in the capital (Cockett, 2010, pp. 8-9). This confluence of wealth in the north means that Bashir and the NIF have the support of the people there, which keeps them in power. In addition, many of the people in Khartoum are unaware of the genocide in Darfur, and most do not want

to know what is happening: Cockett (2010) interviewed a Sudanese economist who, when told about the violence in Darfur, replied that the reports must be exaggerated and that the people in the refugee camps were "...enjoying the free food, watching television, chatting on their cell phones...relaxing and enjoying themselves, with nice clothes" (p. 36). Sadly, this is not an uncommon view in the capital.

The lack of government spending in Darfur is a clear example of structural violence. As mentioned in chapter 2, during British colonial rule, Darfur had ninety elementary schools, eleven intermediate schools, and one secondary school (Daly, 2007, p. 134). Railroads only reached Darfur after independence, the roads were simply tracks made by trucks that became impassable during the rainy season, and both drought and famine plagued the region (Daly, 2007, pp. 138-139). Things did not improve after independence: clean water was almost completely inaccessible, with the people in El-Fasher, the region's capital, getting sick from drinking water contaminated by sewage (Prunier, 2008, p. 50). When famine occurred in the early 1980s, the government dismissed reports as "exaggerated;" when they finally began distributing food aid, most of the food did not reach rural areas due to transportation problems, and the government provided significantly less aid than was needed (Prunier, 2008, p. 51; Daly, 2007, p. 232).

In general, the government saw Darfur as a region that provided no useful natural resources but one that would ally with the government due to most of the population of Darfur being Muslims. According to de Waal (2005), the NIF saw Darfur as a major constituency of devout Muslims who could be mobilized for their purposes (p. 191). Bashir (2008) recalls that government agents went to Zaghawa villages to recruit young men to fight for the government in the civil war in the south; they would tell the men that

they would be fighting in a *jihad*, and that it was their duty to kill the non-believers in the south (pp. 126-127). The political parties would also campaign in Darfur but when they would win the votes of the people, they failed to deliver on any promises and instead gave positions of power and privilege to the Arab groups (Jok, 2007, p.64). This clear favoritism of the Arab groups over the African groups angered the Africans, and contributed to the civil war and subsequent genocide.

To reiterate, the government of Sudan encouraged the young men in Darfur to fight for them in the civil war in the south, but it also discriminated against Darfuris. Bashir (2008) describes an incident in a marketplace where a black man and an Arab man got into a heated argument, with the Arab calling the black man a dog and a slave; when the black man began to beat up the Arab man, six Arab policemen intervened, savagely beat the black man, and dragged him away in their car without even asking who had started the fight or attempting to punish the Arab man as well (pp. 124-125). Bashir (2008) also recounted her anger at discovering that one of her teachers, an Arab, lived in a nice home with running water and electricity, a home that was reserved for Arabs only (p.99). As Bashir (2008) mentally compared this modern house with her uncle's mud and brick house, and the poverty of her village, she became enraged and threw a stone at one of the houses and broke a window (p. 100).

The government's neglect of Darfur's needs, combined with its systemic racism against the Africans and clear favoritism of the Arabs, contributed to the civil war that began in 2003. Both the SLM and JEM claim that they are representing the people in Darfur in their demands for equal treatment from the government. Flint and de Waal (2005) describe members of the SLM as devout Muslims who pray five times a day and

helped the villagers by fetching water, offering whatever meat they had, and walking for hours to the villages to get information about government attacks (pp. 66-67). Both rebel groups view the situation as one of self-defense: the government wants to ethnically cleanse them from the land so they can give it to the Arabs; therefore, they must fight back (Flint and de Waal, 2005, p. 71).

Marlowe et al. (2006) interviewed a man named Suleiman, who told them that the people of Darfur do not want to secede from Sudan, as there are not enough natural resources to make Darfur a sustainable independent country (p. 113). Suleiman also told Marlowe et al. (2006) that the true enemy of the people is not the Arabs, but the government; this is the case because if the fight was just between the Arabs and Africans, either the Africans would defeat them, or there would be a negotiated settlement. The government is using the Arabs to force the Africans off their lands and take it over (p. 109). The Darfuris want equal treatment by the government, as well as funds to improve the infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals. Darfur was neglected for so long that its people reached the point where they believed that a rebellion was the only way to get the government to pay attention to their needs.

Unfortunately, instead of responding to the rebels in a positive way such as negotiating with them, the government began a campaign of genocide against not just the rebels, but anyone from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups. As mentioned previously, the government armed Arabs who became known as the *Janjaweed*, or “Devils on Horseback.” As Marlowe, et al. (2006) pointed out, Omar al Bashir and the NIF are largely unpopular with most the Sudanese population, because only a small group of elite Sudanese in and around Khartoum benefit from the oil revenues and



government spending (pp. 68-69). The NIF knows that if it negotiates with the Darfuri rebels and diverts money away from the capital, it will lose the support of the elite and might be toppled in an uprising. Therefore, Bashir's response to any threat to his regime is to eliminate it.

As mentioned previously, the NIF government has actively discriminated against the African groups in Darfur. Common dehumanizing terms used in Darfur include black dog, monkey, and *Abeed*, or "slave" (Bashir, 2008, p. 124). *Abeed* has also been used in South Sudan, when the government forces would kidnap women and children and sell them into slavery in the north. According to de Waal (2005), *Abeed* is used by some Arab supremacists in Darfur about the African groups, as a reminder of their so-called "Arab superiority" (p. 199). Jok (2007) points out that members of the *Janjaweed* use the word *Abeed* during their attacks to distance themselves from their victims, to keep from feeling any remorse for their actions (p. 127). Seeing Darfuris as inferior and animal like has made it easier for the government to carry out attacks not only against the rebel groups, but also the civilians.

### **Attacks on Civilians in Darfur**

It is important to reiterate that Omar al-Bashir's government responds to any threats by attempting to eliminate the individual or group responsible for this threat. To that end, since 2003, the government has armed and supported the *Janjaweed* attacks in Darfur. A typical attack on a village in Darfur goes like this: first, the government helicopters will circle the village, firing on civilians and dropping bombs. Next, the *Janjaweed* enter the village before dawn, killing men, raping women, and abducting or killing children; then the militias burn down the homes and all the village's infrastructure,

destroy crops, steal livestock, cut down fruit trees, and destroy all sources of food and water (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 64). The *Janjaweed* recruits are paid 150,000 Sudanese pounds [roughly \$24,000] per month, plus 20,000 Sudanese pounds a day for a horse or camel; they can keep all the loot they can carry, except for cash and heavy weapons (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 40). This monetary incentive, combined with racism and systemic dehumanization, makes recruitment easy for the government.

Attacks on the civilians can be especially cruel, as Steidle (2007) saw firsthand: Several bloody corpses filled a shallow grave. They were lined up in a row and covered with grass mats. Images from the Holocaust and Rwanda filled my mind...Every single man in this countless row of African civilians had had his eyes plucked out and his ears cut off...Another photo revealed a man lying in the dirt, blood streaming away from his groin. He had been castrated and left to bleed to death (p. 88).

In another attack Steidle (2007) investigated, a witness told him that the *Janjaweed* had locked thirty-four people in their huts and burned them alive (p. 140). In the village of Hamada, 107 of the 450 villagers had been tortured and murdered; infants had been crushed, toddlers had their faces smashed in with rifle butts, and a message was left on a blackboard in the school, calling the civilians “Faggots” and “Donkeys” (Steidle, 2007, p. 214).

Although there has been some debate over whether or not what is happening in Darfur constitutes genocide, it is my belief that the government’s actions meet the UN (1948) definition of genocide. Steidle (2007) was given a document that outlined the government’s plan of action in Darfur; the document contains phrases like “Change the

demography in Darfur”, and orders of “Killings, burning of villages, farms and terrorize and rob properties from African tribes and force them to migrate outside of Darfur...” (p. 187). The International Criminal Court (ICC) (2008), based on a number of evidence, has indicted Omar al-Bashir on several counts, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (p. 3). The International Criminal Court’s (2008) indictment continually refers to “Forces and agents controlled by Al Bashir” (p. 5) when detailing the alleged crimes being committed in Darfur.

At the very least, if this is not indicative of genocide, it does show a government plan to ethnically cleanse Darfur of the African groups. Flint and de Waal (2005) describe a communique between a Sudanese army commander and a pilot wherein the commander tells the pilot there are people in an attacked village who say they will work with the government; the pilot’s response is to say not to trust any of the villagers and to kill them all (p. 107). Moreover, Flint and de Waal (2005) discuss an attack on a village where 66 villagers were hanged by their feet or decapitated, and schoolgirls were chained together and burnt alive; in a particularly vicious attack, the *Janjaweed* stopped a woman with a 21-day old baby boy named Ahmed at a roadblock and cut off Ahmed’s penis; Ahmed died shortly after the attack (pp. 108-109).

The deliberate destruction of the villages and forced migration of the people clearly demonstrate how systemic racism and physical dehumanization made genocide possible in Darfur. Civilians are supposed to be protected during a war, but the Sudanese government is instead deliberately targeting them for extermination. Those who are not killed in the initial attack on a village are left to die from disease and famine. Those who are lucky enough to cross into neighboring Chad have received aid from the international

community, but the aid has dried up as the war and genocide continue. The government's plan to rid all of Darfur of the African groups has been largely successful. Having described physical dehumanization in detail, I will now turn my attention to the sexual dehumanization of women in Darfur.

### **Sexual Dehumanization**

Like the first case study of Rwanda, the women in Darfur have been subjected to mass rape and sexual violence. Additionally, the rape in Darfur meets two of the criteria for genocide under the UN Genocide Convention (1948): "Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group." I will explain both criteria in detail in the following sections.

#### **Rape as Physical Harm**

The mass rape in Darfur has caused severe physical harm to the women and girls. One issue that increases the physical damage is the fact that most of the women in Darfur have undergone female circumcision. The type of female circumcision that is practiced in Darfur is known as infibulation. According to the World Health Organization (2016), infibulation is when the external genital organs are removed and the flesh is sewn together, leaving a small opening for urine and menstrual blood. Infibulation is the worst type of circumcision, and the results can include: girls dying during the procedure from blood loss and shock, death from a resulting infection due to unsterilized tools being used, and complications while giving birth (World Health Organization, 2016). As the World Health Organization (2016) points out, there are no medical or health benefits to the procedure, and it is often done in order to ensure that a girl remains "pure" before marriage, by taking away her ability to feel sexual desire.

The near universal practice of female circumcision in Darfur has made treating rape victims harder. With infibulation, the vaginal opening is widened on the girl's wedding night via penile penetration, or it can be widened with a knife (World Health Organization, 2016). The opening is very painful, and rape makes the pain more severe. Bashir (2008) recounts an incident in her autobiography when the *Janjaweed* attacked a primary school and raped the girls and women, with many of the girls being under the age of 10 (pp. 209-212). While treating a girl named Aisha, Bashir (2008) noticed that the girl had been ripped apart by the first attacker, leaving a red, bloodied rawness of flesh (p. 213). Bashir (2008) had to try to help many other girls who had the same injuries by sewing their wounds, binding their legs with rope, and giving them half a sleeping tablet so they would rest (pp. 213-216).

Evelyn Aswad (1996) argues that rape can be considered an act of torture if perpetrated by government officials or government backed groups and if done for political purposes (p. 1915). I believe that the rapes in Darfur constitute torture, as the *Janjaweed's* deliberate attack of young girls is designed to inflict maximum physical pain on the African groups in Darfur. Aswad (1996) also rightly points out that viewing rape as different from torture "...perpetuates the myth that rape is a private, sexual act rather than a political weapon and reinforces notions that a woman's dignity...is less worthy of protection than a man's" (p. 1916). Women in the IDP or refugee camps are usually sent to get firewood and water for their families, because they will "only" be raped. Women who try to work in their fields may be attacked by militias or government forces, and it is especially dangerous during the dry season for women to collect water: the river beds are dry, so women have to dig holes into the river bed and collect the water as it slowly

comes out, which means they may be by the river bed for hours, trying to collect enough water (Haroun, 2007). This leaves the woman more vulnerable to rape, but if the men or boys are sent to collect water or firewood, they are killed by the *Janjaweed*, so rape is seen as the lesser of two evils in this case. Too often, rape is not recognized as an act of genocide. The murder of men and young boys is clearly labeled genocide, but rape has been dismissed as a secondary issue. It is important to acknowledge that rape *is* an act of genocide, and that women and girls who experience rape should receive the same support and care as other genocide survivors.

### **Rape as Mental Harm**

The rape of women and young girls is not only an act of physical harm, but it is also an act of mental harm. Bashir (2008) describes a Zaghawa man who did not know how to help his daughter after she had been raped; in Darfur, men are supposed to protect their wives and children, but this man had been unable to do so (p. 212). Bashir (2008) helped the man pull himself together enough to comfort his daughter as she treated the child, but treating all the girls had a heavy emotional toll on her (pp. 212-213). Bashir (2008) also talked to one of the teachers who had been raped; the woman would not admit what happened because she did not want her husband to know, and she was feeling guilty because she did not fight off her attackers or die trying to do so, as the Masalit and Zaghawa believe it is better for a woman to die resisting rather than suffer rape (pp. 215-216).

Bashir (2008) herself was raped by the government forces. After the attack on the school, Bashir spoke to UN soldiers about what happened, on the condition that they did not use her name (p. 220). However, three soldiers came to the village clinic, grabbed

her, and took her to a military camp, where she was severely beaten and then left tied up in a hut (pp. 223-225). The next day, three different soldiers came into the hut and gang raped her while also burning her with cigarettes and cutting her with a knife (pp. 226-227). During the rapes, Bashir (2008) was repeatedly called a black dog and told prior to the initial assault to “Lie back and take it like the black slave you are” (p. 226). Bashir was also raped by two of the soldiers who brought her in originally, and the third one told her they were going to release her, because he knew she would prefer to die (pp. 227-228). The soldier also told Bashir that she would have to live with what happened for the rest of her life (p. 228).

In the case of Bashir (2008), she was gang raped as punishment for speaking out about the rape, and she was attacked to cause her severe physical and mental harm. Bashir states in her autobiography that she felt guilty for what happened, that she should have fought the men off or died trying (p. 230). This guilt is not uncommon among the rape survivors, and adds an emotional burden to the physical one they are already carrying. The *Janjaweed* also humiliate women by raping girls in town squares, in front of the villagers; in one case, a 17-year-old girl who resisted being raped was killed and left naked on the street for the whole village to see (Wagner, 2005-2006, p. 205). In addition, Wagner (2005-2006) reports that the *Janjaweed* will break the limbs of victims to keep them from escaping, as well as marking or branding them: refugee women have gunshot wounds to the ankle, gashes on their faces, and brands on their backs and arms (p. 207). This torture serves as a permanent reminder of their attack, which causes severe mental anguish for the victims.

In addition to branding or marking the women, the *Janjaweed* and government forces will often force a victim's husband, father, brother, or son witness the rapes before killing the men (Miller, 2009, p. 506). Miller (2009) makes an excellent point when she states that, "Morally injurious actions deny the equal moral worth of victims...Diminishment occurs when the victim is the recipient of behavior that represents her as not having equal moral standing to the perpetrator (p. 510). The mass rape of women, combined with the branding and racial slurs used during the attacks, serve to reinforce the belief that the Arabs are superior to the Africans. Moreover, Miller argues that rapes "...compromise victims' equal moral standing, and, by extension, the equal moral standing of their families and communities. In short, genocidal rape can obliterate the dignity of the group as a whole" (p. 512). By forcing men to watch the rapes, the *Janjaweed* and government forces are mocking them for being unable to carry out their cultural duty of protecting the women in their families and communities. This causes mental harm to the members of the group, and can make it harder for a rape victim to receive support from their community, as the feelings of shame and helplessness may block any discussions of the attacks. Miller (2009) states that Darfuri women and girls suffer additional hardships, both physical and mental, when they face alienation and banishment from their families and communities (p. 514). The deliberate attacks on women and girls are done to destroy their communities and the unity felt between members of the group.

### **Rape as a measure intended to prevent births**

As mentioned previously, the UN Genocide Convention (1948) lists "Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group" as an act of genocide. This has



manifested in several ways in Darfur. First, the deliberate killing of men and boys within the targeted groups. This is straightforward; the story in an above section about 21-day-old Ahmed being castrated by the *Janjaweed* (Flint & de Waal, 2005, pp. 108-109). shows their determination to keep the population from reproducing. Even if Ahmed had lived, he would have been unable to father children, and thus would be unlikely to get married. Second, the *Janjaweed* and government forces have disemboweled pregnant women and killed babies. Marlowe et al. (2006) were told by an interviewee that he saw a pregnant woman murdered by the *Janjaweed*, who then cut open her womb (p. 122). Askin (2006) describes attacks on children by the *Janjaweed*: the attackers cut out the stomachs of pregnant women, with male fetuses being hit against a tree and female ones dropped into the dirt; another attack involved a baby being removed from a woman's back and sliced through the stomach; one woman's baby girl was smashed against a tree and killed; and finally, government soldiers captured 16 women with babies, broke the baby boys' necks, and beat the mothers with their own babies like a whip until the babies died (p. 146). Askin (2006) recounts instances of sexual torture of women, including three girls having nails put in their vaginas, two having their vaginas sewn up, and others being gang raped, both vaginally and anally, or raped with foreign objects, as well as having their breasts and vaginas mutilated (pp. 146-148).

While the deliberate killing of men and babies are acts done to prevent births, the biggest act being undertaken by the *Janjaweed* and government soldiers is the mass rape and intentional impregnation of Darfuri women. Askin (2006) included testimony from survivors in her chapter, such as women being told they would be the wives of the militia members, and statements like "We rape you to make a free baby, not a slave like you"

and “We will take your women and make them ours. We will change the race” (p. 147). Amnesty International (2004) investigated on the atrocities in Darfur and interviewed 250 women who had been raped (Section 1.1). One victim told Amnesty International (2004) that the *Janjaweed* would sing while raping women and tell them that they are slaves, and that the militia can do whatever they want with them (Section 3.1). Women who attempt to flee their villages have been raped at roadblocks or checkpoints by the *Janjaweed*, as well as being raped while collecting water and firewood at IDP or refugee camps (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 3.3.). Amnesty International (2004) was told by Darfuris that while the community might accept a raped woman back into the community, the child they would bear from being raped would not be welcomed, as they are seen as a child of the enemy (Section 4.1).

Like Amnesty International (2004), Médecins Sans Frontières [Doctors Without Borders; hereafter abbreviated as MSF] (2005) has also conducted investigations into the violence in Darfur, and doctors from MSF has treated hundreds of rape victims (p. 2). Between October 2004-February 2005, MSF (2005) treated 297 rape victims between the ages of 12 and 45; most of the victims were raped while doing every day, ordinary activities (p. 3). 28% of women were raped by two or more men, and many women were held captive and repeatedly raped (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2005, p. 4). Women were also treated for injuries resulting from rape and sexually transmitted diseases, such as AIDS (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2005, p. 5). At the time they sought treatment from MSF (2005), 7% of women knew they were already pregnant from the rape, although with many others, it was too soon to tell (p. 5).

Women who do become pregnant from the rapes face ostracism from their families and communities, and can even be arrested by the government. MSF (2005) states that some women who report their rape to the police are arrested for an illegal pregnancy if they are not married; the police will lock the women up and beat them, as well as fining them (p. 6). Askin (2006) confirms this, explaining that survivors are charged with *zēna*, which is adultery or having sex outside of marriage, if they cannot prove that they were raped (p. 149). The government does not even attempt to investigate claims of rape, which results in most victims refusing to report their attack (Wagner, 2005-2006, p. 209).

MSF (2005) interviewed a 16-year-old woman who had been raped and became pregnant; when she told her family what had happened, they threw her out of the house, and her fiancé broke off their engagement, stating that he did not want to marry her because she was "...disgraced and spoilt" (p. 6). Amnesty International (2004) reported that a prevailing cultural belief in Darfur is that a nobody can get pregnant when raped, because it is unwanted sex, therefore, the woman is seen as having consented (Section 4.1). In addition, married women are abandoned by their husbands, which makes them socially and economically vulnerable (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 4.1). Amnesty International (2004) argues that women are targeted for violence because of their ethnicity, and that the militias are deliberately impregnating women from these ethnic groups (Section 7). Wagner (2005-2006) recounts the testimony of a survivor who said that after being attacked in a school by the *Janjaweed*, she was told that "...they would take care of all of us black people and clean Darfur for good" (p. 201).

As mentioned above, many rape victims are ostracized by their communities, and several are thrown out of their homes by their families. This makes women more vulnerable to repeated assaults, as they have no protection. Amnesty International (2004) reported that the *Janjaweed* often show up in the IDP camps, where they rape and kill the inhabitants (Section 1.2). A Human Rights Watch (2005) report documents the instances of women being raped in refugee camps in Chad, not only by soldiers, but by Chadian male civilians as well, when women go out in search of firewood and water (p. 7). One woman who was raped by a civilian was then abandoned by her husband when they were reunited in Chad and he discovered she'd become pregnant from the rape (pp. 7-8). Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed Sudanese women who had crossed into Chad, and they described being abused by the Chadian authorities: they are imprisoned by the authorities for trying to collect firewood outside the camps, and are then raped by Chadian inmates while in detention (p. 8).

Human Rights Watch (2005) documented the abuses women face in IDP camps and refugee camps in Chad when they are abandoned by their families. One sixteen-year-old Fur woman was raped by three men while gathering firewood near an IDP camp; when her family found out, she was thrown out of her home, her fiancé broke off their engagement because she was “disgraced”, and she was raped by the local police who came to her dwelling at night (p. 9). Women and girls who are on their own are also coerced by male residents of the camps and soldiers to provide sexual services in return for protection (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 9). Another problem is early marriages: Amnesty International (2004) was told by some refugees that the bride price in the camps has greatly decreased, and parents are marrying their daughters off at very young ages,

because they fear that they cannot “control” them in the refugee camps and want to protect their “honor” (Section 4.5.1). Moreover, women who are the heads of households are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, and many are forced into prostitution, or are forced to prostitute their daughters, in order to get essentials such as food, soap, water, etc. (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 4.5.2).

The rape of women can be seen as a measure intended to prevent births through a different lens, that of women being labeled “unmarriageable.” As one Fur woman told Human Rights Watch (2005), “No one would accept to marry a raped woman” (p. 10). Even victims who cannot become pregnant from the rapes, such as young girls, are sometimes abandoned by their families because they have “...disgraced their family” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 10). However, some women have received support from their families. For example, when Bashir’s (2008) father found out she had been raped, he did not blame her for what happened; he blamed the militias and refused to allow her to isolate herself from the family (p. 230). Moreover, her father actually arranged for her to marry a cousin who was living in England; when Bashir (2008) told her husband about the rapes, he was angry-but not at her-and he did not abandon her or hold her responsible for what happened (pp. 284-285). However, it should be noted that Bashir’s father and husband were both University educated men, so they had more knowledge than most men in Darfur, as well as a wider perspective.

When girls and young women are declared “spoiled” or “disgraced” by their families, this can prevent them from getting married, which in turns prevents them from reproducing and adding members to their ethnic group. The *Janjaweed* and government soldiers are familiar with Darfuri cultural beliefs, so they know that this will often be the

result of their attacks on girls and women (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 7). If they cannot, or do not, make one of the girls from a targeted group pregnant, they will settle for them being unable to marry. Honor is important to the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, and a woman being raped is seen as a loss of honor for the family and the community. The cultural belief that pregnancy can only result from consensual sex (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 10) makes it very difficult for a victim to receive any support or help for being raped. As Médecins Sans Frontières (2004) points out, they can provide emergency contraception and HIV antiretroviral drugs to try and prevent infection, but these must be taken within 72 hours of the attack (p. 8). Many women are unable to seek medical assistance that soon after an attack, or are afraid to report it out of shame or fear they will be disowned by their families, so these victims do not get the medical attention they desperately need. If a girl or woman is disowned, and forced to live apart from her family, she is extremely vulnerable to further sexual violence, and she will suffer economic consequences as well. The *Janjaweed* and government soldiers take advantage of the cultural beliefs of the targeted groups to prevent the population from reproducing, whether it is done via impregnating a woman with a so-called “Arab” baby, or having the women be declared “unmarriageable” and thus preventing their ability to reproduce via marriage within the group.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I described the physical and sexual dehumanization that is occurring in Darfur. The African groups are seen as inferior to the Arab groups, who insult their victims by calling them “donkeys”, “black dogs”, “faggots”, “black monkeys”, and “slaves.” The *Janjaweed* and Sudanese government are attempting to

cleanse Darfur of the African groups by killing the men and boys, as well as disemboweling pregnant women. They are also trying to change the ethnicity of the land by deliberately impregnating women with an Arab baby. As Askin (2006) pointed out, during and after the attacks, the victims are taunted with comments such as “We will kill all men and rape women. We want to change the color. Every woman will deliver red. Arabs are the husbands of these women” and “We will take your women and make them ours. We will change the race” (p. 147). Statements like these prove that the government’s plan is to rid Darfur of the African groups, one way or another.

Like Rwanda, women in Darfur have been subjected to mass rape. Unlike Rwanda, the attacks are done with the goal of impregnating women with a baby from a different ethnic group, and thus preventing births within the targeted ethnic groups. Having described physical and sexual dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur in great detail, in the next chapter, the conclusion, I will wrap up this dissertation with a summary of these two cases, describe efforts to rehumanize not only the victims, but also the perpetrators, and outline possible conflict resolution methods that can be used to create a lasting peace in both countries.

## Chapter 6: Conclusion

### **Chapter Introduction**

Throughout this dissertation, I have analyzed dehumanization in genocide, specifically looking at physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. In both cases, the targeted groups were subjected to severe acts of physical and mental harm, acts that were facilitated by the widespread, top-down dehumanizing language used to call for their extermination. In Rwanda and Darfur, the ethnic groups that were targeted had been neglected by the government; when they fought back against this discrimination, their respective governments decided that rather than negotiate with the groups, or share resources, they would massacre them instead. This decision led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, as well as the displacement of millions. Moreover, my discussion of sexual dehumanization is my original contribution to the field. There is no formal definition of the term, so I created my own. I hope this definition will be used in other research in this important area of genocide studies. In this final chapter, I will sum up both case studies, discuss the strengths and limitations of the dissertation, and make recommendations for future research and policies on dehumanization.

### **Summary of Both Case Studies**

Before I go into a detailed summary of both cases, I decided to create a table comparing the two cases, which is on the next page.



Table 1

*Summary of Case Studies*

Case	Date of Genocide	Number of People Killed	Physical Dehumanization Terms Used	Sexual Dehumanization as Act of Genocide
Rwanda	April-July 1994	800,000	Cockroach, Weed, Hyena, "Cut the tall trees," Snakes	Causing serious bodily or mental harm to the group
Darfur	March 2004-Present	Estimated at 450,000	Donkeys, Black Dog, Black Monkey, Slave	Causing serious bodily or mental harm to the group; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group

As can be seen from the table, the two cases are similar, yet different. The Tutsis in Rwanda and the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit in Darfur were dehumanized prior to the genocide, and the women in both genocides experienced sexual dehumanization.

However, in Darfur, sexual dehumanization included deliberately impregnating the women whereas in Rwanda, pregnancy was a byproduct of the rapes.

In both cases, physical dehumanization included reducing the targeted groups to animals, including cockroaches, hyenas, monkeys, snakes, and dogs. In Rwanda, this dehumanization occurred over a period of time, and was spread via the popular radio station RTLM and the newspaper *Kangura*. Paul Rusesabagina (2006), the manager of the Milles Collines hotel and inspiration for the film *Hotel Rwanda*, discussed this process of dehumanization in his autobiography. Rusesabagina (2006) correctly points out that “Stripping the humanity from an entire group takes time. It is an attitude that requires cultivation, a series of small steps, daily tending” (p. 64). RTLM did not immediately start out with calling Tutsis cockroaches, but built up to it over time; with their repeated, casual use of the term, Rwandans became desensitized to the word, and began to see Tutsis as cockroaches. Rusesabagina (2006) also states that the use of phrases like “cut the tall trees”, “clean your neighborhood of brush”, and “do your work” made killing sound like a responsibility and a normal thing to do (p. 82). Rusesabagina (2006) discusses the routinization of the killings, which made them boring in time (p. 193), a claim that is supported by Hatzfeld’s (2003) book wherein he interviewed the perpetrators of the genocide.

Like Rwanda, in Darfur, dehumanization occurred over time. However, it was done by the government and not via the media. The succeeding governments in the post-independence era saw the Arabs as superior to the Africans, although they also used the Darfuris as soldiers in their war against the groups in South Sudan. The people of Darfur were treated marginally better than their southern counterparts because they were also

Muslims, unlike the Christians and Animists in the south. Yet, when Omar al Bashir and the NIF came into power in the late 1980s, they openly supported the Arab groups in Darfur over the African groups in any disputes over land or grazing rights. They also refused to provide basic services, such as roads, schools, and hospitals. If an African Darfuri managed to get accepted to a school with proper classrooms, books, and teachers, they would be forced to speak Arabic and be punished for not doing so, and they often faced discrimination from the Arab teachers (Bashir, 2008). The NIF called Darfuris “black monkey”, “black dog”, and “slave.”

When the rebel groups in Darfur demanded equal treatment and better services from the government, the NIF responded by arming Arab groups and paying them to slaughter the African groups in Darfur. The government would support attacks by flying helicopters over the village being attacked. Like Rwanda, the attacks in Darfur have become routinized: early in the morning, while the village is still asleep, the government bombs the village, and then the *Janjaweed* ride into the village, killing men and boys, raping women and girls, stealing livestock, destroying crops, and poisoning wells while driving the survivors out of the village and into the desert (Flint & de Waal, 2005).

In both Rwanda and Darfur, mass rape occurred/is occurring. Moreover, the rapes are an act of sexual dehumanization. In Rwanda, the Tutsi women were hypersexualized by the media, who described them as “seductresses” and “spies” for the RPF. *Kangura* warned Hutu men not to become friendly with Tutsi women, or keep a Tutsi woman as a mistress or concubine (Gourevitch, 1998, p.88). RTLM and *Kangura* depicted Tutsi women as haughty and looking down on Hutu men, thus encouraging the militias to rape Tutsi women to “put them in their place.” The hypersexualization of Tutsi women also

contributed to the belief that they were sexually different from Hutu women; this can be seen through the comments rape survivors heard about wanting to know what Tutsi women “look like” and “taste like.” The brutal case of the woman who had part of her vagina removed by a member of the *Interahamwe*, who then put it on display outside her house (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 63), shows the extreme nature of sexual dehumanization during the genocide.

Rape was carried out to inflict physical and mental harm on the women: several women suffered permanent damage to their reproductive organs due to gang rape or rape with a foreign object; this serves as a constant reminder of their attacks. The women who became pregnant had to deal with having a baby of the “enemy,” which led some to abandon the baby or attempt to abort it. Women were often raped in front of their families, adding to the humiliation of the attacks, and causing mental anguish for the family members who were unable to stop the attack. Many women did not receive adequate medical care, or any medical care at all, for their injuries, which has prolonged their suffering. The women have been reluctant to talk about what happened, so there has been no mental health support provided, and no outlet for the women to discuss their thoughts and feelings about what happened to them. This perpetuates the trauma, with the women suffering in silence.

As was the case in Rwanda, in Darfur, the women have been subjected to sexual dehumanization. Like Rwanda, rapes were carried out to inflict physical and mental harm on the women: the women are circumcised, which makes the rape especially painful because the narrow opening created during the circumcision is forced open. When young girls are raped, the damage done to their bodies is significant. Bashir (2008) described

one rape victim's genitals as "...a raw, bloodied mess" and stated that when the first attacker forced himself inside her, "...He had ripped her apart" (p. 213). Treating the rape victims is extremely difficult, as they often have to be sewn back together to stop the bleeding. The *Janjaweed* know that the girls are circumcised, and the deliberate targeting of young girls is done to inflict maximum physical harm upon the group.

Unlike Rwanda, however, the *Janjaweed* purposely rape the women to impregnate them with a so-called Arab baby, and taunt the victims afterwards that they will give birth to a light-skinned baby. Investigations carried out by Médecins Sans Frontières (2005), Amnesty International (2004) and Human Rights Watch (2005) confirm that women are targeted for rape as an act of changing the ethnic makeup in Darfur via the impregnation of women with an Arab baby. In addition to this deliberate pregnancy tactic, the *Janjaweed* are attacking young, unmarried women knowing that they will be considered "damaged" after, and thus unmarriageable. If a girl cannot get married, she cannot contribute to her group's biological reproduction and growth. This violence does not only inflict physical damage; it also causes severe mental harm to the women and the community. Many rape survivors, like Bashir (2008), feel guilty that they did not fight off their attackers or die trying, which is the expected behavior in their community. Women also consider themselves spoiled or damaged, like Bashir (2008) did. This shame and guilt causes mental anguish in the survivors, which is exacerbated if their families reject or disown them.

Both cases help support my research questions, which were: how was/is dehumanization spread in these countries? What was/is the impact of physical and sexual dehumanization on each genocide? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-

humanize both the victims and killers? Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation between the two groups to prevent a new or continuing cycle of violence? We can clearly see that dehumanization was spread by the governments and elite groups in both countries via the media and the use of structural violence. Physical dehumanization allowed the participants to see the victims as less than human, as “cockroaches,” “snakes,” “dogs,” “monkeys,” and “hyenas.” By reducing the victims to something that is culturally reviled in both countries, this made it easier for the participants to kill without hesitation. Sexual dehumanization in Rwanda reduced Tutsi women to objects for sexual gratification, hypersexual beings who denied Hutu men the ability to have sex with them and thus deserved to be “put in their place” by the militias. Sexual dehumanization in Darfur reduced the women to their basic biological function of reproduction, a function that was to be controlled by the *Janjaweed* to propagate the Arab groups and prevent the birth of African groups. With regard to the last two questions, my recommendations for those can be found later in this chapter.

### **Strengths and Limitations of the Dissertation**

One of the biggest strengths of this dissertation is that it adds to the discussion of dehumanization in genocide. One of the questions that is often asked by people learning about genocide is “why did it happen?” By analyzing dehumanization in detail, including the routinization of genocide, this study can help individuals understand how people are convinced to take part in genocide, which in turn helps them understand why genocide happens. In Rwanda, most of the killings were done by people who knew their victims: they were neighbors, co-workers, even family members. The perpetrators went door-to-door and killed people in their houses, in schools, hospitals, and churches. This would not

have been possible without the systemic, widespread dehumanization of the Tutsis. In Darfur, the dehumanization of the African groups allows the *Janjaweed* to kill with impunity. When you no longer recognize someone as human, when you no longer see them as your equal, it is much easier to overlook the moral imperative against killing.

Another strength is the discussion of sexual dehumanization. This is a relatively new idea in the field of genocide studies, as most work on genocide focuses on the physical dehumanization, the act of reducing the victims from human beings to an animal or lifeform unworthy of protection. Sexual dehumanization is largely carried out against women, although men can be the targets as well. Sexual dehumanization degrades women, reducing them to their basic biological functions, as was the case in Darfur, or labeling them as sexually “different” or “special”, as was the case in Rwanda. Sexual dehumanization in Rwanda led to the mass rape of Tutsi women as a reward for the perpetrators, or as an act of humiliation against women who were described as looking down on the men. Sexual dehumanization also created a set of circumstances in which Tutsi women were raped so men could see how different they were from Hutu women, because Tutsi women supposedly looked and tasted different. This made Tutsi women a novelty to be experienced. Sexual dehumanization in Darfur demoted women from fully human to a carrier of human life, a womb. Women were attacked because of their reproductive necessity for the group. If a woman is impregnated with an Arab baby or made unmarriageable, then they cannot contribute to the group’s biological expansion. The goal of the *Janjaweed* is to ethnically cleanse Darfur by killing off the current generations and preventing the creation of future generations.

However, there are some limitations to this study. The first is that the study relied on literature to explain this phenomenon. The danger with this is that sometimes the literature is not completely accurate. To avoid this, I used sources that are reliable, such as reports from reputable organizations like Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. Still, I am unable to verify the accuracy of their information. In order to verify the information, I would have needed to do fieldwork, which was not possible. Nonetheless, I do believe that the information presented in this dissertation is as accurate as possible, and the overlap of information in multiple sources seems to suggest that this information is reliable.

The second limitation is that most of the literature on Darfur is from 2004-2006. With Rwanda, using literature from the mid-1990's to the early 2000's is acceptable, because there is a bounded time period for the genocide, which was 100 days. However, the Darfur genocide is still occurring. The reason that most of the literature on Darfur is from 2004-2006 is due to the fact that awareness about the events in Darfur reached their peak during these three years, and then sharply dropped off as people lost interest and news organizations moved on to other topics. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain current events in Darfur, to see if the mass rapes and murders are still being carried out. A *Bloomberg* report (2016) from February of this year stated that 73,000 people have had to flee Darfur due to recent fighting, but it was one of the few reports I could find on what is happening now in Darfur. Nonetheless, most of the literature states that the worst crimes in Darfur occurred between 2004-2005, which is why the research is heavily skewed toward that time period. The literature from these years provided a wealth of information,



and even if the attacks have decreased, there is enough evidence to show that the government of Sudan has committed genocide in Darfur.

### **Future Research and Policy Implications**

The goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the understanding of how dehumanization plays a role in facilitating genocide, and how physical and sexual dehumanization work in genocide. I chose two cases where both physical and sexual dehumanization can be clearly recognized, although neither have been studied in great detail in the existing literature on the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. The term sexual dehumanization is almost nonexistent in studies on rape in genocide. In fact, all too often, rape is not seen as an act of genocide, but an act that occurs during genocide. By conducting this study, I hope to pave the way for other researchers to study sexual dehumanization and rape as an act of genocide in greater detail.

As I was collecting research for this dissertation, I could not help but notice that in most of the books and articles on genocide, rape was not mentioned very often, and if it was, it was almost discussed as a separate issue. When the claim is made that women in Darfur are sent to collect the firewood and draw water because they will “only” get raped, this downplays the impact rape has on the women, and by extension, the community. When I discuss genocide with people, they usually think of murder or killing as acts of genocide, but not rape. More research needs to be done on rape as an act of genocide, so that it will be recognized as such. The Akayesu trial at the ICTR, when the mayor was found guilty of rape as an act of genocide, was especially significant, as he was the first person to be convicted by an international tribunal of rape as genocide (Neuffer, 2001, p. 272). However, the fact that it took until 1997 for rape to be recognized as an act of

genocide reflects our lack of acknowledgment that rape *can* be an act of genocide. Rape during genocide has a specific intentionality, whether it be to cause severe physical or mental harm to the group, or as a measure intended to prevent births within the group, and more work must be done to separate rape as an act of genocide from rape in general.

This dissertation can also serve as a reference for future research on rape in other genocides. For example, ISIS's sexual enslavement and rape of the Yazidi women is a case that will be studied in depth in the future, and it would be interesting to compare how sexual dehumanization has been used against the Yazidi women to how it was used against the Tutsis and Darfuri women. There can also be other cross-case comparisons, such as looking at sexual dehumanization and rape in the former Yugoslavia or Cambodia.

As I worked on this dissertation, I thought of some policy recommendations that could be made for scholars, activists, and politicians. There are many things that can be done to stop dehumanization before it leads to genocide. As was seen in Rwanda, the media played a significant role in the fostering and spreading of dehumanizing language and ideology. Many foreign governments knew about the language being used by the media, but they did little or nothing to stop it. According to Des Forges (2007), Human Rights Watch and other NGOs called for the RTLM signal to be jammed by the US and UN, but the US government refused to do so, claiming that it would be a violation of free speech (p. 51). Had the RTLM signal been jammed, many people could have been saved when the *Interahamwe* were not being directed to a house or gathering place to kill people. Currently, there is concern over the language being used by the media in Burundi; some of the language is reminiscent of that used in Rwanda. The monitoring of hate

language is critical to stopping genocide, as hate speech, including dehumanizing terms, is often indicative of a potential genocide.

I realize this is a difficult argument to make, as there could be concerns about limiting free speech. However, in most countries, including the United States, language that is used to incite killings or hate crimes is not protected speech. Furthermore, the longer the international community ignores the use of phrases that call for the extermination of a particular group, or the use of terms that reduce members of that group to non-humans, the easier it becomes to persuade people to take part in a genocide. Hatzfeld (2003) and others have demonstrated that perpetrators in Rwanda were convinced to take part in the killings because they no longer saw the Tutsis as humans, but as cockroaches, snakes, etc. Methods of countering dehumanization include jamming radio signals, punishing editors of newspapers or website that publish content that promotes hate or incites killing, and creating alternative media outlets to counter the hate speech. During the Burundian Civil War in the 1990s, international groups created a radio station where members of the various communities could come together to share their concerns, and also repudiate rumors of attacks in a certain community by having people living in those areas call in and make it clear that no attack was underway (Dahinden, 2007). This could be helpful in a country where a group is being accused of carrying out massacres in order to promote fear among the other groups and facilitate the killing of the targeted group.

Another policy recommendation is medical and psychological help for the victims of rape. Too many women in Rwanda and Darfur did not receive the medical care they desperately needed, which caused permanent damage in some cases. The government of

Sudan has blocked aid workers from entering the country, thus preventing much needed medical care in the aftermath of a rape such as an exam, emergency contraceptives, and HIV prophylaxis, as well as pregnancy support. Women and girls have been traumatized by rape, but they have been unable to talk about it due to cultural restrictions as well as personal shame and guilt. These women and girls need to be able to speak to someone about what happened, and to understand that what happened to them was not their fault.

The cultural norms in Darfur of seeing rape victims as spoiled goods makes victims extremely reluctant to come forward and report what happened, and the erroneous belief that a woman cannot get pregnant via rape stigmatizes the victims. While it is not the place of international aid workers to change cultural beliefs, it is important for them to meet with the communities and help them understand that the women need their support and help, instead of being shamed and disowned. If a woman is kicked out of her family home, then she needs to be given a safe place to establish a shelter, one where she is not vulnerable to rape or sexual coercion by soldiers or men in the camps. Mental health counseling should be provided for the victims, so they can heal mentally as well as physically.

Finally, my last recommendation is to ensure that not only do the victims of genocide be re-humanized, but also the perpetrators. This is a difficult concept to understand, as it is human nature to be disgusted by an individual who commits a heinous act, especially murder. All too often, the perpetrators of genocide are labeled “monsters,” “devils,” and “evil.” A 1994 edition of *Time* magazine quoted a missionary on its cover stating that “There are no devils left in Hell...They are all in Rwanda.” While this sentiment is understandable, it continues the cycle of dehumanization. People take

comfort in the idea that perpetrators are evil, and that they themselves would never do something like that. However, as uncomfortable as this might make us, the truth is anyone can commit an act of genocide, given the right set of circumstances. If we acknowledge that, then we can break the cycle of dehumanization. A study done by Ćehajić, Brown, and González (2009) measured empathy for victims, as felt by the perpetrators. The authors used students at a university in two experiments, and discovered that reminders of ingroup responsibility for their actions are a way for perpetrators to come to terms with what happened, and thus create empathy for their victims (p. 726). The best way to do this, according to Ćehajić et al. (2009), is to expose the perpetrators to stories of individual harm done, while also being aware of the collective violence done against the targeted group (p. 726).

This can be seen in Rwanda, through the *Gacaca* process. Due to the number of people accused of taking part in the genocide, the court system was unable to try every suspect. The Rwandan government then reinstated the local systems of justice in order to try suspects more quickly. A number of perpetrators confessed their guilt, and were sentenced to community service instead of jail. This has had the benefit of reintegrating the perpetrators into the communities, while making up for the loss a community suffered when many of its inhabitants were killed. While the *Gacaca* system is not without its flaws, including false confessions by people to get out of jail, the system has been effective overall in re-humanizing both the victims and the perpetrators.

Another recommendation is providing economic support for the victims of genocide. The participants in the Totten and Ubaldo (2011) study discussed life in post-genocide Rwanda and the difficulties they have encountered. Umulisa told the

researchers that the government has built houses some survivors, but not nearly enough, nor are they built well (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). In addition, health insurance is provided for the very poorest survivors, but other poor survivors receive no assistance; there is no mental health support (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). Education for orphans and survivors is lacking; many survivors were so traumatized that getting a formal education is extremely difficult, most people cannot afford university tuition, and the government has a hard time keeping teachers in the poor, rural areas (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). Rwanda is still a developing country, which means providing financial support for all of the survivors is not possible, but humanitarian aid could help alleviate some of the burden.

The outcome of the genocide in Darfur is uncertain, but I envision three possibilities: 1. The government forces can overtake the rebels, forcing a negotiated peace agreement on the government's terms; 2. The rebels can defeat the government forces, and negotiate a treaty that would benefit their groups; and 3. The government of Sudan is overthrown in a coup or possible uprising, and the new government ends the policy of genocide in Darfur. The third option is unlikely, although Bashir is losing support in the north, the long-held support base for the NIF. If a peace agreement is somehow negotiated in Darfur, a system of community-based justice will be needed to address the crimes. Marlowe, Bain, and Shapiro (2006) were told by one of their interviewees that if the government left Darfur, and the *Janjaweed* were defeated, then the two sides would negotiate an agreement and live together again (p. 109). As the African and Arab groups have co-existed in Darfur for centuries, a negotiated agreement may be the best outcome to this conflict. A local, grassroots system of justice could help

facilitate peace between the groups, but until the war and genocide end, there will be no peace in Darfur. After the war ends, economic support must be provided for the people of Darfur and their needs must be met to prevent a reoccurrence of war.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

In Rwanda and Darfur, physical and sexual dehumanization were extensive during the genocide. The physical dehumanization made it easier for the targeted groups to be massacred, and the sexual dehumanization led to the mass rape of women in both countries. Both genocides could have been stopped, but they were not. Rwanda and Darfur are important cases to study to understand why and how genocide occur. More research needs to be done, in order to create policies that could stop a future genocide from happening. As Gourevitch (1998) points out,

The West's post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be tolerated proved to be hollow, and for all the fine sentiments inspired by the memory of Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a far cry from doing good (p. 170).

It is my hope that this dissertation will inspire others to carry on this important research, and broaden our understanding of the nuances of genocide. While dehumanization is only one part of genocide, it is an important aspect that has been overlooked, one that can, and must, be included in future research on genocide.

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