

THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO 9/11

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It was politically and strategically unwise for the Bush administration to use the term “war on terror” after 9/11. It should rather have considered itself, and told the public, that the West was henceforward involved in a struggle against Islamic radicals, such as al Qaeda. By calling the struggle a war, the administration encouraged the pressure to increase the defense budget by forty-five percent or by twenty-two percent when inflation is taken into account. Yet, this is irrelevant or even counter-productive as far as the present struggle is concerned.¹ Above all, the administration shifted attention away from the essential battle for men’s hearts and minds, and particularly for the support of the Moslem world.

The United States administration built up the Islamists’ cause when it proclaimed a war on terror. Ironically, Bonnie Cordes of the Rand Corporation had used exactly these words in 1987 to illustrate what Western governments should not do when faced with terrorism, warning that “a war against international terrorism” would be welcomed by terrorists because it confirmed their fantasies that they were “at war” against the state, united the core terrorist group, and strengthened their prestige in the community from which they sprang.² Just as the Carter administration made the fatal mistake of focusing on the hostages held in Iran in the late 1970s and thereby built up the standing of the Iranian government, so has the Bush administration staked everything on the war on terror.³

What was novel about the tragedy on 9/11 was that terrorists were carrying their struggle into the Western heartland. In retrospect, what is surprising is that

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1. CHRISTOPHER LANGTON, *MILITARY BALANCE 2005–2006* 15, 37 (2005).

2. BONNIE CORDES, *Euroterrorists Talk About Themselves*, in *CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN TERRORISM* 326 (Paul Wilkinson et al. eds., 1987).

3. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, *POWER AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER* 516 (1983).

past guerrilla wars were almost entirely confined to the Third World;⁴ the Viet Minh did not attack metropolitan France directly and the Viet Cong did not attack the United States. Now, that has changed partly because Palestinians set the example at the Munich Olympics and beyond of conducting their struggle against the Israelis in Europe, and partly because so many Moslems live in the West and form a sea in which the Islamist fish can swim. This makes the conflict very different from the historic insurgencies after the Second World War, when the discomfited Western armed forces could withdraw from the battlefield as the French did in 1954 and the Americans in 1973.

The insurgents have chosen the field of the current struggle; and the United States efforts to shift this to the level where they have overwhelming advantage—the conventional level—have been only ambiguously successful so far in Afghanistan and an unmitigated calamity in Iraq. Yet, the increase in defense expenditure since 9/11 encourages the tendency to take this type of action. Given the overwhelming conventional superiority, which it already had over any other state, the US can easily attack small states—as in the case of the raid on Tripoli—or overthrow their governments as in Grenada in October 1983 and in Panama in December 1989. To undertake the much more ambitious project of both removing a government and subsequently constructing another may be possible when the will of the people has been broken in a prolonged and bloody campaign, when the previous government has been totally discredited, and when there is a large body of people waiting to take over the reins of power who are sympathetic to the invaders. Most of these circumstances prevailed in Germany, Italy, and Japan at the end of the Second World War. The allies sent tens of thousands of troops into Japan and Germany expecting that resistance might continue, but there was none whatsoever. Such conditions did not prevail in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the consequence of Western intervention is to expose weakness in the face of insurgency. The conventional wars had been very short, the will of the Iraqi and Afghan people had not been broken, and in the eyes of substantial minorities, previous regimes were not discredited. Prospects for successful reconstruction were, therefore, grim.

Given terrorism's intrinsic link to mass politics, which have been intensifying and spreading ever since 1789, destroying it, as the Bush administration has claimed to be doing, is no more realistic than the equally chiliastic notion of abolishing conventional warfare has been for the League of Nations and the UN. Unconventional warfare could only disappear if all great political issues had been settled. But, if the ideological divisions of the twentieth century have largely disappeared, other "causes" have appeared or reappeared

4. There were exceptions: Udham Singh assassinated Sir Michael O'Dwyer at a public meeting in March 1940 in revenge for the Amritsar massacre two decades earlier. See ALFRED DRAPER, *THE AMRITSAR MASSACRE: TWILIGHT OF THE RAJ* (Buchan & Enright 1985) (1981).

on the political screen. In Britain, animal rights groups have threatened to kill to achieve their ends, and in the United States anti-abortionists have done the same. Above all, religion, which was written out of politics at the start of the twentieth century, has become an ever greater cause of dissension and violence. Until the collapse of Yugoslavia, Western publics were religion-blind, they cannot be so today.

We can then dismiss the notion of a war on terror, while admitting that the United States and its allies are involved in what promises to be a very long struggle against al Qaeda and its affiliates involving spasmodic violence and continuous propaganda, while each side tries to break or bend the will of the other. We can also see that al Qaeda's center of gravity is the will of its leaders, and much more importantly in the long run, the sympathy that their aims evoke in a wide constituency within the Moslem world. The assumption must be that even if all current al Qaeda members were converted, captured, or killed, their places could be taken by others. Ominously, sixty percent of Jordanians and fifty-one percent of Pakistanis expressed "a lot" or "some" confidence in Osama bin Laden in Pew's July 2005 poll.⁵

Mass sympathy for terrorism and guerrilla warfare makes it far more difficult to compel such enemies to "do our will," using Clausewitzian terminology, because we are no longer just dealing with governments or armed forces, which might be said to have some collective will that can be coerced, but a plethora of individual wills. Historians have suggested that it was, for example, Eric Ludendorff's will which broke after the failure of the German offensive in the spring of 1918.⁶ Once his will had given way, the Kaiser's government made terms with the allies; it was, similarly, the Japanese Emperor's immediate entourage who decided that their country had to accept allied terms after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁷ In contrast, even when terrorist or guerrilla leaders negotiate terms, as the IRA or the Palestinian Liberation Organization may be said to have done in recent years, splinter groups of more extreme factions may continue the struggle and undermine the old leadership. This is most likely when the insurgents have the backing, tacit, or explicit, of large sections of the surrounding population. Thus, even when such a struggle ends or tails off for a period, after a compromise has been reached between the government and the insurgents, it is quite likely to break out again at a later stage, as indeed the IRA struggle has from time to time against the British and opposition by Hamas to the Israelis. This demonstrates

5. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics* (July 14, 2005), available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248.html> (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).

6. DAVID STEVENSON, *1914–1918: THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR* 468 (2004).

7. ROBERT C. BUTOW, *JAPAN'S DECISION TO SURRENDER* (1954).

only too clearly that the battle for hearts and minds of the wider public is the heart of the struggle. Unless the vast majority can be convinced that the compromise is fair, no peace will last.

While the fragmentation of willpower is in many ways an advantage to the guerrillas, it is a disadvantage to democracies. Democratic people usually rally around their government when a war or covert struggle begins, though there will always be hesitations, particularly amongst the older sections of the population, who have experience of previous conflicts, and the less educated, who prefer their government to concentrate its attention on home affairs.⁸ But, as the struggle continues, it becomes steadily more difficult to maintain any sort of democratic consensus because economic and human costs increase and propaganda battles confuse opinion.

While apocalyptic visions of a clash between multiple civilizations may seem to many people to be far-fetched, it is incontrovertible that the relationship between the West and the Islamic world is steadily deteriorating and that religion is becoming an ever more divisive issue.⁹ According to Pew, only twenty-one per cent of Turks and twenty-two per cent of Pakistanis have a favorable view of Christians, and no Lebanese or Jordanians were willing to express sympathetic views of the Jews.¹⁰ Moreover, because of the asymmetry between the conventional strength of the West and of the Islamic states, and because this is a conflict between peoples—or by some Moslems against the West, though not yet, vice versa—rather than countries, it manifests itself in guerrilla warfare and terrorism waged by the Islamists. In these respects, the new struggle contrasts with the Cold War, which was not a conflict between peoples; there was no personal antagonism between the mass of Russians and Americans, Britons and Poles. The confrontation in the northern hemisphere at least was between two societies, each trying to prove that it was superior both at producing weapons and at providing its people with the better standard of living. The Soviet challenge disintegrated when its people gradually realized how far their conditions had lagged behind the West. At the same time, Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues appreciated that the Soviet armed forces could no longer continue to compete with those fielded by the United States.

A closer parallel with the present confrontation between the West and the Islamists was that between the Western countries and the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s. In that case too, a non-Western people were encouraged by their leaders to become incensed by their victimization and humiliation at Western

8. JOHN E. MUELLER, *WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION* (1973). See generally Robert W. Oldendick & Barbara Ann Bardes, *Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions*, 46-3 *THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY* 368 (Autumn 1982).

9. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, *THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER* (Touchstone ed., 1997).

10. See Pew Global Attitudes Project, *supra* note 5.

hands. They had been forced by the United States to open their ports to Western trade and influence in the mid-nineteenth century; Western people had pushed their way into Japan but insisted on not being subject to Japanese courts; Japanese hopes of having a clause espousing racial equality in the League Covenant had been rejected by the Western countries led by Australia; the export of Japanese goods had been, to some extent, restricted in the 1930s by Western tariffs despite the fact that Japan could not live from its own resources because its expanding population depended upon trade to survive. All these grievances coalesced with general resentment about discrimination against Japan not to produce insurgency because the Japanese hoped to win in battle, but a conventional war to the death between Western soldiers and Japanese.¹¹ The Emperor's troops did not surrender, they fought indomitably and died where they stood in Burma, the Philippines, and Manchuria; and they tortured or killed many of the Western soldiers, who surrendered, and Chinese, Indonesians, and other Asian civilians whom they suspected of sympathizing with the enemy. The Japanese completely rejected the League of Nations as a Western construct designed to preserve the status quo to their disadvantage.

The present British Secretary of State for Defense, John Reid claimed in a speech on February 20, 2006 that the West confronts "an unprecedented enemy" today. We face, he said:

[A]n adversary which revels in mass murder; which sets out to cause the greatest pain it can to innocent people; which is entirely unconstrained by any law; which sees all civilians, including women and children not as non-combatants but as easy targets; which sees terror as a key part of its arsenal, and which both glorifies and operates suicide bombers. It is an enemy, unfettered by any sense of morality—indeed it is spurred on by a perverse perception of morality to achieve ever-greater extent of civilian carnage.¹²

In fact, every one of these characteristics applied to the Axis in the Second World War and particularly to the Japanese, though also (apart from suicide bombers) to Nazi Germany in its genocidal drive against the Jews, and East European peoples whom it planned to exterminate or enslave.

11. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOTA ISHIMARU, *JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRITAIN* (Capt. G.V. Rayment trans., 1936); HOSOYA CHIHIO, *Britain and the US in Japan's view of the international system: 1919-1937*, in *ANGLO-JAPANESE ALIENATION 1919-1952: PAPERS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 2* (Ian Nish ed., 1982).

12. Speech by John Reid MP, Secretary of State for Defense, to Kings College, London (Feb. 20, 2006), available at <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/Sofs/SpeechByJohnReidMpSecretaryOfStateForDefenceToKingsCollegeLondonOn20February2006.htm> (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).

The Islamists and their supporters today, and the German and Japanese Armies in the past, were fully aware of Western moral and judicial codes and did not argue against them; rather they bypassed them. The Nazis never admitted to murdering Jews and East Europeans, and the Japanese never admitted to torturing and killing prisoners. In fact, the Japanese government claimed to be operating in accord with international law. But, Tokyo in the 1930s and 1940s and the Islamists today have an interpretation of history, which to their way of thinking overrides the dictates of morality. The Islamist believes that the Umma has been persecuted for centuries by the West; that the attack on the Turkish Empire in the First World War, the colonization of the Middle East afterwards, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the recent wars in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are all the continuation of a premeditated and historic Western "Crusade" against Islam. Furthermore, the Moslems cannot fight back in a conventional fashion; their armies were defeated by Israel, Britain, and France in 1956, by Israel in 1967 and 1973, and by the United States, Britain, and their allies in 1991 and 2003. Therefore, they have to fight as guerrillas or terrorists against Israel in particular and the West in general; and this gives them the right to dismiss the principles of the Just War and the rules of international law.

Just as the Japanese militarists in the 1930s had both wide-ranging complaints against Western behavior over the previous eighty years, and the specific demand to set up a unipolar Asian international system centered on Tokyo, without Western interference, so the Islamists have both specific and general demands. Their general complaints are often against Western secularism and Christianity, hedonism and commercialism, and the spread of these values to their own societies through the media, commerce, and travel—the processes of globalization, which also first opened Japan to Western influence. As the Saudi Imam, Dr Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis preached in July 2005:

The most dangerous weapon which the enemy has raised against us—with which he tore to pieces our order, and with which he soiled our spiritual and social purity, is the terrible deluge of all manner of vice, which is considered a form of moral terrorism against the values, ideals, and virtues of the Islamic nation. [This war is waged] by means of licentious satellite channels and the vile spider webs of the Internet, whose gloom fills the sky with darkness and spreads its stench in all directions.¹³

13. Dr. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis, Friday Sermon on air Saudi Arabia's Channel 1 (July 15, 2005), available at <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP93905> (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).

Such attacks are often accompanied by paranoia about Western institutions and plans. The previous month, the Egyptian historian, Abd Al-Aziz claimed on Saudi television that the Second Vatican Council had decided in 1965 to impose Christianity on the whole world and that the World Council of Churches had followed this up by delegating the mission to the United States in January 2001.¹⁴ In response, the administration had itself carried out the attacks on 9/11 and pinned responsibility upon Moslems.¹⁵ But, if Islamists argue that the West is engaged in a general attack on Moslem values, Osama bin Laden and others have had specific demands, including justice for the Palestinians and the removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia, and now from other Islamic states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, concern about Western intervention in Moslem states has resonance amongst other Moslems; fifty-three percent of British Moslems said the July 2005 bombings on the London underground were connected with the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq.¹⁶

The war in Iraq was a major distraction for the United States administration from the covert struggle against al Qaeda. Worse still, the Iraq War solidified the support amongst Moslems for the idea that the West was bent on humiliating the Umma. Infractions of the law of war further increased the general anger after publicity about the mistreatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Camp Breadbasket, and British soldiers' beating of rioters in Basra. There were even more serious examples of torture, and even killing. Thus, Iraqi General Abed Hamed Mowhoush was savagely beaten by Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer and a number of assistants, probably from the CIA. Subsequently, he was asphyxiated in a sleeping bag. Welshofer and the defense witnesses claimed at his trial that he had been encouraged to torture prisoners by senior officers including General Robert Mixon.¹⁷ Whether this is true or not, such incidents expose the hypocrisy of Western claims to have outlawed torture and create the climate of opinion in Moslem countries which has, for example, led to the anti-US film, "Valley of the Wolves-Iraq" breaking box office records in Turkish cinemas within days of its release.¹⁸ Given that moderate Moslem opinion is the center of gravity in this struggle, this outcome is equivalent to a major defeat in a conventional war.

14. Professor Zaynab Abd Al-Aziz, Interview of Egyptian Historian on Saudi Iqra TV (May 26, 2005), available at <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP92005> (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).

15. See generally *id.*

16. Ipsos MORI, *Attitudes of British Muslims*, July 23, 2005, available at <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/2005/s050722.shtml> (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).

17. Marc Kusntez, *Diary*, *The London Review of Books* (Feb. 23, 2006).

18. Suna Erdem, *Turks swap sides as war film turns US into foe*, *THE TIMES* (London), Feb. 17, 2006, at 43.

Anglo-American actions since 9/11 have thus been largely counter-productive to the struggle against al Qaeda. The most significant writer on counter-insurgency to date is Sir Robert Thompson, who participated in the successful British struggle against communist insurgents in Malaya during the 1950s. Thompson formulated a number of principles which any government engaged in such a struggle should uphold. His first principle was that the government should have a clear political aim. The United States and Britain have confused their aims by invading Iraq and formulating Quixotic schemes for "democratizing the Middle East." Thompson's second principle was that the government should function in accordance with the law as "a government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law." Abu Ghraib, Camp Breadbasket, the death of General Mowhoush, and others, the conditions in Guantanamo speak for themselves. Thirdly, Thompson argued, the government must have an overall plan covering "all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency." Only thus would overlapping be avoided. Fourthly, "the government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas." In other words, in this case, it is far more important to erode sympathy for al Qaeda in the wider Moslem community than to hunt down Osama bin Laden; and this is linked to Thompson's fifth point that a government must secure its base area, in this case, the United States homeland before worrying about operations overseas. Thompson was writing about insurgency in the Third World but it is clear that the British and American governments have failed to heed his advice about how to wage a war against unconventional forces of any type. The penalties will be severe.¹⁹

The West has not effectively undermined the historical argument which underlies the Islamist case. It has failed to point out that it has often protected Moslems and Moslem societies. Britain spent most of the nineteenth century trying to protect the Turkish Empire, it was only when London discovered its isolation during the Boer war and its inability to protect Constantinople, that British policy changed.²⁰ This left Turkey free to join the German side in the First World War. If Western countries took over much of the Middle East after the First World War, they had to find some way of ruling this region following the collapse of the Turkish Empire. Nor did Britain plan the emergence of a Jewish state, what it promised was a Jewish "homeland" within Palestine. In 1991, the United States, Britain, and France fought to expel Iraq from the Moslem state of Kuwait; the United States forced the Serbs to compromise with

19. SIR ROBERT THOMPSON, 4 *DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY: EXPERIENCES FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM* (1966).

20. ZARA S. STEINER, *BRITAIN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR* 23 (1977).

the Moslem Bosniaks at Dayton in November 1995; and NATO expelled the Serb army from the predominantly Moslem province of Kosovo by attacking Serbia itself from March to June 1999. Until about this point the West was religion-blind. It is only gradually that attitudes have changed, but, even now, Westerners do not usually express hostility towards Moslems. Immediately after the Islamist bombings on the London Underground in July 2005, fifty-five percent of Americans expressed a favorable view of American Moslems and a majority denied that Islam encouraged violence.²¹ Sixty percent dismissed the claim that there was a clash of civilizations as opposed to a clash with a small Islamist group.²²

All this is particularly important because the struggle against al-Qaeda can only be won if Moslem groups in the West do not feel alienated and isolated. There is a consensus that good intelligence is the key to defeating terrorist groups. Such intelligence can come from electronic intercepts, from the wider Moslem community, or from terrorists who have been won over. Politicians often claim to want terrorists destroyed, but dead terrorists take their secrets to the grave, one who has been “turned” is invaluable to the government. This is unlikely to happen when captured terrorists are congregated together and physically mistreated. Weak, former drifters are much more likely to be affected by probing into their past, trying to make them feel there are others who sympathize with their former loneliness beyond the Islamist group, playing on their psychological weaknesses. Tough-minded terrorist leaders need to be challenged on their own theological ground by Moslems, who dispute the historical and theological justifications they have been using to defend random violence in the same way that communist interrogators turned the old Bolsheviks’ faith in communism against themselves during the Moscow show trials in the 1930s.²³

Attempts to bend captured terrorists to the will of Western governments must be attuned to their psychology. Jerrold Post, Professor of Psychiatry at George Washington University discerned, in terrorists in general, a

[T]endency to externalize, to seek outside sources to blame for personal inadequacies. Other prominent traits were a defensive grandiosity, an exaggerated self-absorption with little regard for the feelings of others . . . they had split off the devalued parts of themselves and projected them on to the establishment which then became the target of their violent aggression . . . troubled family

21. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *Views of Muslim-Americans hold steady after London bombings*, July 26, 2005, available at <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=982> (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).

22. *Id.*

23. ARTHUR KOESTLER, *DARKNESS AT NOON* (Daphne Hardy trans., Penguin Books 1964) (1940).

backgrounds [mean] many terrorists have an incomplete psychosocial identity and an exaggerated need to belong.²⁴

Post said the West German police had found that twenty-five percent of terrorists had lost one or both parents by age fourteen and a third had convictions before juvenile courts.²⁵ Many had failed in their jobs or schools; they were isolated failures who made the terrorist group the family they had never enjoyed.

This aptly describes many of the individuals who have become prominent amongst Islamist terrorists and particularly those living in the West; Osama bin Laden himself had a marginalized childhood in his wealthy family because of his mother's nationality and position as a concubine;²⁶ Asif Iqbal and Ruhul Ahmed, two of those Britons held by United States forces had been convicted earlier of attacking someone with a hammer; Moazzam Begg, another of the Guantanamo Britons had been educated in a Jewish school in the British Midlands, lost his mother when he was young and dropped out of university before joining a radical Moslem group;²⁷ Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber" led the life of a drifter and petty criminal in south London before being converted to Islam in Brixton jail; Abu Hamza, who preached murder for years at the Finsbury Mosque and is accused of helping to kidnap Westerners in Aden, was a nightclub bouncer, and as so often with Moslem extremists, a womanizer before he became an Islamist and went to Afghanistan where he lost his hands and one eye;²⁸ Omar Khayam, who pretended to be a suicide bomber at the protests in London in February 2006 against the publication of cartoons about Mohammed, was a convicted drug dealer on probation.²⁹ And so the litany continues.

But how do Western governments bend the will of those who have failed within their societies and want to kill or maim as many Western people as possible? Post argued that where possible, benign neglect was the best policy because; if a powerful Western government focused attention on the terrorists, it would inflate their prestige and encourage others to join the cause. Deterrence would not work because terrorists were not afraid of death and threats would confirm their paranoia and their belief that they were righteous warriors

24. J.M. POST, *Group and Organizational Dynamics of Political terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist policy*, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM 307 (Paul Wilkinson et al. eds., 1987).

25. *Id.*

26. Ben Macintyre, *The real Osama*, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 19, 2001, at 2.

27. Richard Wolffe, *What went wrong with my school friend?*, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 6, 2003.

28. Rajeev Syal, *Hooked on Hamza*, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 2006, at 4.

29. Richard Ford & Daniel McGrory, *Drug dealing 'suicide bomber' is jailed again for breach of parole*, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 2006 at 27.

engaged in a full-scale war against a hostile state. He believed that governments should concentrate on trying to dissuade new recruits from joining the terrorists not least by an extensive information policy, and that takes us back to the historical arguments outlined above.

In the case of the Islamists, benign neglect has failed; Abu Hamza and others like him were able for years to promote and plan murder. Discouraging recruits from joining the terrorists is crucial but there will always be some who fail and some Moslems who feel disorientated in the West. On the other hand, governments have made little effort to use this in the propaganda battle. There has been an utter failure to point out that the terrorists are united by their guilt about their youthful activities—bin Laden's period in the Beirut discotheques is archetypal. What the Islamists are doing is expiating their own feelings of guilt by threatening or killing Western people. Nor have Western governments pointed out that they are dealing with an abject bunch of social failures, petty drug smugglers, violent semi-deranged individuals who are no advertisement for the Moslem cause. Attacking them, as John Reid did, for not abiding by the values accepted by most of the international community is a waste of time because emotionally, they need to belong to the Islamist family, while on the rational level they argue that their history and situation gives them the right to override or reject these values.

The conclusion is obvious. The West's primary defenses are the police and the intelligence services which have the task of tracking down terrorists before they can attack and persuading them to divulge their secrets. The West's offensive capacity is not primarily made up of its armed forces, which are a weapon of last resort, but its "soft power," its ability to win over the mass of Moslem people. The West has become flabby during the years when the BBC, CNN, Hollywood, Reuters, and Associated Press dominated the media. That age has gone with the development of the internet and satellite television stations in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Saudi Imam quoted above shows that these developments have caused concern in the Moslem world as well as the West and many of the problems they cause are, indeed, common to all states and peoples. But Western governments need to make at least as much effort as they did during the Cold War to develop a coherent media policy. Every action they take must be judged by its impact around the world and particularly, on the Umma. The funds wasted on building up Western conventional forces and invading Iraq would have been incomparably more effective if they had been directed to winning hearts and minds. This is the "great struggle" ahead which will last throughout our lifetime and which we need to address with the same sort of intellectual focus and determination which was employed on the analysis of nuclear deterrence and arms control during the Cold War years.