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Super PAC Funding and its Impact on Voting Behavior in the U.S. House of
Representatives

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In light of the increasing levels of polarization in terms of voting behavior among members of the U.S. House of Representatives over the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses, coupled with the recent Supreme Court decision in <u>Citizens United v. Federal Election Commision</u> 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which authorized the use of unlimited fundraising and expenditure by outside groups in elections, the question was raised whether or not there was a correlation between these two occurrences. Specifically, this paper asks "what role does Super PAC funding play in the roll call vote choices of House Members of the 114th Congress?" To answer this, a chi-square test of independence is conducted between the dependent variable of vote choice and the independent variable of Super PAC funding across several different issue strata. I find that Super PAC funding is correlated strongly to House of Representatives members' roll call vote choice.

In 2013 a highly polarized Congress, voting along party lines, and unable to compromise on a plan to postpone budget sequestration, engaged in "chicken-style" negotiation strategies that ended up in a sixteen day government shutdown (Louk & Damage, 2015). The shutdown cost the United States' economy billions in gross domestic product and brought the U.S. Treasury within one week of defaulting on debt obligations, which would have had catastrophic consequences for the economy by endangering U.S. credit worthiness (Nippani & Smith, 2014). The "chicken style" of negotiation is at least partially a result of the 112th, 113[th,] and 114th Congresses status as being the most ideologically polarized Congresses in history, with the highest margins of voting along party lines (Lee et al., 2015). However, this paper seeks to analyze the contribution of another variable towards the unprecedented levels in voting along party lines, a variable only made salient in 2010 by the Supreme Court ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commision* 558 U.S. 310 (2010): outside groups with no fundraising or expenditure caps known as Super PACs. More specifically; this paper seeks to answer what role does Super PAC funding play in the roll call vote choices of House Members of the 114th Congress? In so doing, this paper hopes to contribute in part to answering the larger question at hand: what is the cause of historical levels of polarization and party line voting in the United States' Congress?

This paper seeks to answer the research question by analyzing the partisan nature of the 114th Congress and by determining the role that Super PAC funding (dollar amounts given by Super PAC entities to political campaigns) plays in roll call vote choices ("yes" or "no" vote choices by political representatives on a bill) while controlling for other variables traditionally held in the literature as important in

determining voting behavior: ideological polarization, and constituent considerations. This is an important question to consider as it has implications for the dynamics of how the American system of representative democracy functions: primarily whether or not it is beholden to the will of the people or to monetary interests. The answer to this question has larger implications in determining the role that money should play in elections, and to what extent it plays that role. In answering the research question and exploring its implications, first, a background will be given establishing the importance of Super PAC funding and arguments in the literature concerning its impact on voting behavior. Next, competing explanatory variables for voting behavior, constituent considerations and ideology will be defined and the literature surrounding those variables will be briefly explored. Afterwards, the theory and related hypotheses will be laid out, followed by the methods taken to conduct the content analysis. Afterwards, a results and discussion section will determine how well the hypotheses and theory fit the data.

Super PACs, Their Legal Structure and Practical Applications

Super PACs came into being in 2010 following the Supreme Court's decision in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* 558 U.S. 310. The case, whose background is unimportant for this paper's purposes, ruled that corporations and unions had the same First Amendment rights to political speech as individuals, i.e., they could make unlimited contributions to PACs. This paved the way for a new breed of Super PACs. By definition, a Super PACs is a political action committee legally entitled to raise donations in unlimited amounts. Super PACs differ from non-super PACs in several ways. Principally, ordinary PACs can contribute to political candidates directly whereas Super PACs can only make independent expenditures (expenditures not directly

authorized by a political campaign), but can still advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate so long as no collaboration takes place with the candidate the PAC supports (Briffault, 2012). Additionally, federal law prohibits individual contributions in excess of over $5,000 to PACs whereas there is no limit on individual contributions with Super PACs (Briffault, 2012). There are several other types of funding vehicles, such as 527s and 501(c)s but they are subject to different legal limitations in regards to the amount of the overall percentage of funds they may devote to electioneering and are so insignificant in terms of overall political contributions relative to Super PACs that they are of no concern to this research paper (Briffault, 2012).

Although Super PACs are not allowed to communicate with the candidate they support, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that such collaboration takes place, even if the legal limitations are technically followed (Krumholz, 2016). The primary way Super PACs get around this limitation is that many of the staff on the Super PAC used to be employed by the candidate the Super PAC supports, a practice known as pre-candidacy collaboration (Krumholz, 2016; Klepner, 2016). This practice is known as 'testing the waters' according to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations, and is when a potential candidate can directly collaborate with a Super PAC prior to filing an official statement of candidacy with the FEC (Ryan, 2015). A good case study that characterizes the strategy is Jeb Bush's 2016 presidential primary campaign, although he is far from the only presidential candidate to use the 'testing the waters' loophole (Ryan, 2015).

Jeb Bush did not officially file his statement of candidacy to the FEC until June 15, 2015, more than six months after announcing he was 'actively exploring the

possibility' of a presidential campaign (Ryan, 2015; Klepner, 2016). During those six months, Bush travelled the country, speaking in front of crowds, and headlining at least thirty-nine fundraising events as a 'featured guest' (Ryan, 2015; Klepner, 2016). Two weeks after Jeb Bush officially declared his candidacy, his campaign Super PAC, Right to Rise USA, had already raised over $103 million (Klepner, 2016). Mike Murphy, top adviser of Jeb Bush's 1998 and 2002 gubernatorial campaigns, headed Right to Rise USA and admitted to collaborating with the Bush campaign in the 'testing the waters' phase (Klepner, 2016). Although after Bush's official statement of candidacy he ceased communication with the Bush campaign, he stated 'he was well informed as of a week ago' and went on to describe what Bush's message would focus on as the presidential race continued (Kaczynski & Ben-Meir, 2015; Klepner, 2016). There is not a clear legal standing on this practice, and in this grey area Super PACs obtain a loophole around the collaboration restriction the Supreme Court gave (Klepner, 2016).

Armed with this loophole, Super PACs engage in spending that would have been unprecedented in the pre-*Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* era. Exact Super PAC funding numbers spent in elections are impossible to come by due to some political candidates possessing multiple fundraising entities which Super PACs can contribute, some of whom are not subject to the same disclosure regulations as Super PACs (Krumholz, 2016). For example, according to Title 11 of the Code of Federal Regulations governing Federal Elections, a Super PAC could give funding to a 501(c)(4) or 501(c)(6). While the Super PAC must disclose that it provided funding to either type of organization, 501(c)(4)s and 501(c)(6)s are not required to disclose in their annual reports to the IRS the amount of money spent on issue-specific ads, and the origin of the

money spent on those ads is not publically available (Krumholz, 2016). With this in mind, in the year of their inception Super PACs spent an estimated $65 million in independent expenditures, and were heavily involved in over a dozen House and Senate races (Briffault, 2012). In the 2008 presidential election cycle before the ruling in 558 U.S. 310 (2010), $144 million was spent; in the 2012 election over $1 billion was spent, a 594% increase (Hansen, Rocca, & Ortiz, 2015). It is clear, therefore, that the Supreme Court's decision had a tremendous impact in regards to the amount of money in the political system. The impact of this Super PAC money on American politics has been hotly debated; it was a cornerstone of Bernie Sanders' 2016 presidential primary attack on the Democratic establishment as a corrupt regime dominated by wealthy interests. However, the myriad of impacts that *Citizens United* has had on society and the dynamic of American politics is beyond the scope of this paper, which simply seeks to examine its impact on roll call voting behavior. It is sufficient to say that it has had a tremendous impact.

Previous Studies on the Influence of Money on Voting Behavior

Whenever money and politics mix there is always a question as to whether there is the potential for corruption to arise from such a relationship, in this paper's case, the potential corruption being examined is whether or not money can effectively "buy" vote choice. There is large disagreement over the influence of campaign contributions on voting behavior of political representatives. Some scholars prior to *Citizens United* contended that the limits placed on traditional PACs are narrow, and that money is a lesser contributor in shaping representatives' policy decisions to other factors such as lobbying (Wright, 1990). Wright's study was limited to the House Ways and Means and

Agricultural Committees, but found that although campaign funding from outside groups plays a role in shaping representatives' voting behavior in an indirect way, it was primarily lobbying that shaped representatives' voting choices (1990). However, Wright acknowledged that his study was limited to two Committees and very specific issues related to those Committees, and that money may play a larger or smaller role in other issues being considered (1990). This would seem to require any future studies on the impact of campaign contributions to stratify according to different issue types to draw meaningful conclusions.

Other studies focused on the impact of campaign contributions in regards to voting behavior by political representatives have found that, extremely wealthy campaign donors have been able to gain influence over legislators (Cook, Page, & Moskowitz, 2014). Compared to other contributors who gave lesser amounts, wealthy donors were more likely to hold the attention of political representatives and shape their vote outcome (Cook, Page, & Moskowitz, 2014). This line of reasoning is transferable to Super PAC funding, the only difference being that Super PAC donors are a collection individuals with of similar or identical interests rather than one single individual wealthy donor.

Still other studies claim that campaign contributions rarely matter because funding groups tend to give money to like-minded legislators (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2005). Still, Roscoe and Jenkins qualify their claim that in cases were excessively large amounts are given, or one-third of cases, campaign contributions can play a defining role in determining a political representative's vote choice (2005). Roscoe and Jenkins' study was published before the 2010 ruling in *Citizens United*, however, and the potential to give excessive amounts of money to political representatives has increased greatly due to

the advent of Super PACs. Therefore, being informed by these previous studies, the theory this paper develops can be seen as a test of whether these traditional theories still hold in the face of campaign funding vehicles with no fundraising or expenditure limits.

Theory
Control Variables

There are a number of factors in the literature explaining how representatives make decisions, and these factors comprise the control variables for this study. The first among these are Constituent Considerations. Constituent considerations are defined as the degree of responsiveness of political representatives to the opinions of the electorate and are the foundation of a representative democracy, in particular American democracy, going back to the work of John Locke and social contract theory (Riley, 1982). By this it is meant that political representatives' voting behavior should relate in a measurable way to the interests of their constituencies; political representatives are a medium through which the will of the people is channeled into policy outcomes (Riley, 1982). Most important for this paper's purposes however, is the rational actor theory of politics, which states that political representatives have their own set of identifiable interests, separate and identifiable from their constituents' interests (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). This creates the principal-agent problem, which put simply means that sometimes political representatives do not implement, or act contrary to their constituencies' interests because they are pursuing their personal interests (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). The electorate expresses their interests and viewpoints through vote choice (Hamlin & Jennings, 2011).

Therefore, constituent considerations are most salient in competitive congressional districts where an incumbent faces high risk of defeat, as the personal

interest of an incumbent staying in office will prompt an incumbent to vote in line with his constituency's interests in order to capture their vote choice on election day (Henderson & Brooks, 2016). A hard-fought election is generally accepted to be defined as a race in which the competitors have similar amounts of funding, engenders enough media coverage to allow the public to be aware of both candidates, and in which the margin of victory is narrow (Westlye, 1983; Jacobson, 1987). Under these circumstances, constituent considerations are most salient; in the absence of the aforementioned circumstances, they become less salient.

Since whether or not an election is hard fought cannot be determined prior to an election, there are two theories which this paper will be subscribing to in an attempt to ascertain whether or not political incumbents expect a hard fought election in 2016; the economic expectations/political punishment model and the political economy model. Simply put, the economic expectations and political punishment model states that voters use previous economic performance of a nation to form vote choices against the political party to which the electorate attributes poor economic performance (Rudolph, 2003). Conversely, if the economy has been performing well and the electorate attributes that success to a political party, they will vote for that party (Rudolph, 2003). The political economy model is a modification of the political punishment model, which at its simplest form states that whether or not a house seat changes party hands is a function of a political party's national popularity, the prevailing economic conditions, and whether or not the election under scrutiny is a midterm election (Alesina, Londregan, & Rosenthal, 1993). Using these models, reasonably accurate determinations can be made as to whether candidates anticipate hard-fought elections in upcoming elections.

Ideology. Ideology is of particular importance to the two party American political systems. The ideology of politically elite actors within the political arena has been proven to influence the ideology and predispositions of the electorate (Zaller, 1992). Ideology at the level of the politically elite has also become a driving force in voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives, particularly since the shifting of political debate from the New Deal Cleavage, characterized by economic cerebral issues, to an Authoritarian Cleavage characterized by more visceral, gut level reactions (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). This was done by the Republican party during the civil rights era in a successful bid to regain national political competitiveness (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Since that time polarization in American politics has reached record levels; a testament to the powerful influence of ideology in American politics.

This paper aims to describe the impact of Super PAC funding on a political landscape already defined by the other powerful formative phenomenon of constituency considerations and ideology. To further nuance the descriptive nature of this paper the examination of Super PAC's impact across the different issue strata of social, economic and foreign policy issues will be undertaken. In so doing, this paper will provide a foundation for further research to clarify the role of Super PAC's within American politics.

Before moving into the particulars of the theory it is important to define several concepts. The independent variable is "Super PAC funding" defined as the net dollar amount a politically elite actor receives from Super PACs with a vested interest in a vote for or against a bill. "Political elites" are defined in this paper as members of the House of Representatives. "Voting behavior" is defined as vote choice during a roll call vote.

Different issue strata were utilized to measure the influence of Super PAC funding on roll call vote choice because given the literature on constituency considerations and elite ideology, these considerations may be more relevant than Super PAC funding in determining vote choice by political elites due to issue context.

Hypotheses

There are four hypotheses this paper subscribes to. The first is <u>Super PAC Funding and the Economic Issue Strata.</u> It is expected that Super PAC funding influence is expected to determine the vote outcome of politically elite actors to a high degree in the economic strata. This expectation occurs for one primary reason: the rational actor theory of politics, which identifies as the central problem of any democratic political process the principal-agent issue (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). From this perspective, the main concern of democratic governments should be to have institutional arrangements so that politically elite actors, with their own identifiable interests, can be induced to act in the interest of their principals, or the electorate (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999).

However, recall earlier from the literature review the historical shift away from an economic, cerebral New-Deal Cleavage to a more visceral, social issue oriented Authoritarian cleavage in American politics (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). This shift in cleavage lines means that economic issues mean less to the American voter than visceral, social issues at the macro level than during previous Congresses, and are thus less salient at the electoral level. This cleavage shift, taken with the relatively recent Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United*, which opened the metaphorical floodgates for money to enter into the political arena, creates a unique phenomenon. Corporations can now inject unlimited amounts of funding into political campaigns, albeit only "independently;"

again, recall from the literature review the 594% increase in PAC spending from the 2008 presidential election to the 2012 presidential election (Hansen, Rocca, & Ortiz, 2015).

Such a massive funding increase has amplified the principal-agent problem associated with the rational actor theory. Evidence for this can be found in basic economic sociology, more specifically how economic outcomes depend on the structure of social networks, and most importantly for this paper, institutional configurations (Beckert, 2013). Money is the primary and most effective means that any actor, but especially corporations, uses to align institutional configurations in their favor to achieve desirable economic outcomes (Beckert, 2013). This fact, coupled with the reduced salience of economic issues to the average American voter, causes this paper to theorize that constituent concerns carry less relevance than Super PAC funding in vote choice on economic issues to the politically elite. The reception of Super PAC funds by a political candidate carries with it the implicit agreement that the donor's viewpoint on certain issues will receive extra consideration (Lee, 2015). This is a fundamental truth acknowledged extensively in U.S. legal practice going back to 1975 and the Supreme Court decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1.

This is an arrangement many politically elite actors are willing to make, as the increased funding allows more political advertisements to be put out. This is an especially important consideration since television attack ads have been proven extremely effective in determining voting choice of the American electorate, increasing the odds of selection of a particular candidate by as much as 10% for individuals who watch television every day (Krupnikov, 2012). This means that candidates can largely ignore their constituencies' viewpoint on issues not salient to the electorate, when a hard-fought

election is not anticipated, as Super PAC funded television ads can offset any negative backlash from a particular vote on an economic issue.

The next hypothesis is <u>Super PAC Funding and the Social Issue Strata.</u> It is also hypothesized that Super PAC funding will be least relevant among the social issue strata in terms of vote choice. Credit for this hypothesis goes to Heatherington & Weiler's 2009 book *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. The reasoning for this hypothesis is similar to the reasoning for why Super PAC funding is most relevant for economic issue vote choice. Drawing principally from the shift in political cleavages from cerebral, New-Deal to visceral, Authoritarian lines, this paper hypothesizes that since social issues are visceral in nature, funding from Super PACs will be of secondary importance compared to constituent considerations (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). This is due to the corresponding rise in salience of social issues in the minds of the electorate compared to economic issues, thus making constituent considerations the primary driver of the politically elites' voting choice.

Salience, or the level of information available to the public on particular issue and visibility of the same issue taken together, is the primary cause of political activism by the electorate, as it raises the amount of information available to the electorate (Iverson & Soskice, 2015). When an electorate has low levels of information regarding an issue, it generally takes a centrist attitude, making it susceptible to influence from information filtered by the politically elite (Iverson & Soskice, 2015). When this is not the case, and the electorate has high levels of information on an issue, polarization at the electorate level occurs, and their political representatives become responsive to their viewpoints, behaving as rational actors seeking to retain office (Iverson & Soskice, 2015; Brennan &

Hamlin, 1999). The primary reason for this behavior from political elites is because television ads, funded by Super PACs and other sources, may not be able to garner as much support from the electorate as was lost by an unpopular vote on a salient issue. Political elites will be unwilling to engage in behavior that might compromise their individual interests as an agent in the principal-agent framework, in this case retention of office (Brennan & Hamlin, 1999).

The third hypothesis is <u>Super PAC Funding and the Foreign Policy Issue Strata.</u> Next, it is hypothesized that Super PACs will have a moderate level of influence in regards to foreign policy issues because of the salience of foreign policy issues to the electorate, due to their close relation to national security matters, which are extremely visceral in nature (Goren, 1997). It is supported secondarily by the counterbalance to this salience, the inability of the electorate to attribute responsibility of a poor outcome on a foreign policy issue to the legislative or executive branch. Attribution of responsibility to a political branch directly affects the electorate's formation of opinions towards politically elite actors (Ruder, 2015). This phenomenon is largely driven by media coverage, and with most political media outlets controlled by political parties, or considered partisan enclaves, information inconsistencies arise and the electorate becomes susceptible to polarization that is engineered by the politically elite (Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016).

This information inconsistency becomes even more apparent when the legislative and executive branches are controlled by different parties, as there is greater incentive for partisan media outlets to portray the other party poorly. This is the case with the 114th Congress, a Democrat Barack Obama is president, and the House and Senate are

controlled by the Republicans by margins of 247-193 and 54-44 respectively (Manning, 2015). Therefore, this paper theorizes that any information advantage gained by the electorate due to increased salience is offset due to the fact that most of the information received is filtered by political interests.

Finally, Hard-Fought Elections. Lastly, the final hypothesis theorizes that the previous three hypotheses only hold true if a political representative does not anticipate a hard-fought general election. The reasoning behind this hypothesis lies in the literature. By the definition established earlier, a hard fought election is one which the competitors have similar amounts of funding, engenders enough media coverage to allow the public to be aware of both candidates, and in which the margin of victory is narrow (Westlye, 1983; Jacobson, 1987). If there is a similar amount of funding, then holding everything else equal, no advantage can be gained through advertisement spending. There is sufficient media coverage to make both candidates highly salient to the electorate, regardless of incumbency, and so the candidates are more highly scrutinized than a political representative who is not engaged in a hard-fought election. Most importantly, the margin of victory is expected to be narrow, so any political misstep on an issue not normally salient to the electorate can and will be exploited to gain marginal advantages in vote count (Westlye, 1983). Therefore, if and only if a candidate does not expect a hard-fought election will the other three hypotheses hold true.

It is hypothesized that the degree to which Super PAC funding levels affect voting behavior is issue category specific across the three issue strata this paper will focus on: social, economic, and foreign policy. It is theorized that different loyalties are primed to differing degrees according to issue type, and so Super PAC funding will play a greater

or lesser role according to issue type, controlling for issue salience. It is generally

theorized that Super PAC funding will have at least some level of influence across all

three issue strata. More specifically, this paper postulates that the highest level of Super

PAC funding influence will be in the economic issue strata, and the lowest in the social

issue strata, with a moderate amount of influence occurring in the foreign policy issue

strata. It is also hypothesized that the previously stated theory only holds true for

politically elite actors who do not anticipate hard-fought general elections, and only when

controlling for ideology and polarization.

Methodology

Before moving into the particulars of the methodology, it is important to reiterate

several definitions explicitly. First, "political elites" are defined in this paper as members

of the House of Representatives. Secondly, "voting behavior" is defined as vote choice

during a roll call vote. "Voting behavior" is also the dependent variable. The dependent

variable is measured a "yes" or "no" vote on a final roll call vote of passage, which was

coded in a binary fashion, 1 for a yes vote, and 0 for a no vote. If a political elite for some

reason is not present for a vote, or abstains, the dependent variable cannot be measured.

This study does not seek to model competing loyalties political elites have to their

ideologies, Super PACs, and constituencies when faced with a voting choice, but instead

controls for ideology and constituent considerations so that the role of Super PAC

funding in voting behavior can be understood most clearly.

The independent variable "Super PAC funding" is measured as the net dollar

amount a politically elite actor receives from Super PACs with a vested interest in a vote

for or against a bill. Super PAC funding is operationalized by a simple dollar count of

funds each political representative in the sample received from Super PACs which have a vested interest in a particular vote outcome, i.e. the Super PACs which publically stated what their position on an issue a particular bill concerned was, and therefore whose vote preference on a bill can be discerned. Each political representative in the sample has a separate dollar amount of funds received from Super PACs in favor of passage, and funds received from Super PACs against passage. All data regarding Super PAC funding levels was found on *https://www.opensecrets.org*, a website founded by a non-partisan, independent research organization dedicated to collecting data concerning the influence of money in politics. Only Super PAC funding originating from April 1, 2013-March 31, 2015 was used. This date range was selected because the 114th Congress was elected in 2014, and enables any analysis to incorporate the effects of both pre and post-election Super PAC influence, thus minimizing any distortion that may occur from unmeasured Super PAC funding. Additionally, according to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Super PACs are only required to report any disbursements that occurred for the purposes of electioneering communications on a semi-annual basis; so, cutting the range off at March 31, 2015 incorporates as much Super PAC money in the analysis as reasonably possible (Krumholz, 2016).

The first of the control variables is "Constituent Considerations" defined as constituent viewpoints and opinions on a particular issue. Constituent considerations are measured according to whether a political incumbent anticipated a hard fought election in the upcoming 2016 election. The ratings assigned to the individual members of the sample's Congressional districts by the University of Virginia's Center for Politics determined the status of the election as "hard fought". The methodology behind the

Center's rating system is an aggregate of ratings assigned by several independent researchers who attempt to forecast election outcomes using a variety of political economy and political punishment models with economic caveats, of the type described in the literature review ("Political Science Election Forecasts," 2016). The ratings were on a scale which rated districts as "Safe Republican", "Likely Republican", "Leans Republican", "Toss-Up", "Leans Democrat", "Likely Democrat", and "Safe Democrat" ("Political Science Election Forecasts," 2016). Due to the aggregation of many different variations of the political economy and political punishment models, the particular weaknesses of any one model are not likely to affect validity, and so the operationalization of this variable is considered valid. The reliability of this method of operationalization is also very high; the University of Virginia's Center for Politics has correctly predicted the election outcomes of House, Senate, Presidential, and Gubernatorial races at a rate of 98% in 2004, 100% in 2008, and 97% in 2012.

Only "Toss-Up" rated districts are considered likely to be hard-fought because only the "Toss-Up" classification indicates a Congressional district has a high chance of changing party hands. Since hard-fought primaries encourage political candidates to appeal more to their party's base, and thus do not have the effect of measuring the degree to which constituent considerations are applied across the Congressional district as a whole, they are not considered. Additionally, the primaries involve intraparty competition whereas this paper seeks to measure interparty competition and there is no danger of a House seat changing party hands within a primary election, while the possibility of a seat changing party hands is a common condition across all hard-fought general elections.

The second control variable is "Ideology": The degree to which a politically elite actor is conservative/liberal. The most ideologically polarized members of each party were chosen according to data from *govtrack.us*, which scores members according to their rates of bill co-sponsorship across party lines and within their own parties ("Ideology Analysis of Members of Congress," 2013). The methodology *govtrack.us* uses is proven to have high validity and reliability, producing nearly identical results to another, traditional operationalization of ideology and polarization; the use of voting records ("Ideology Analysis of Members of Congress," 2013).

Sample

The sample consists of two parts: the selected political representatives and the bills representing the economic, social, and foreign policy issue strata. Forty members of the United States' House of Representatives from the 114th Congress were selected, twenty from both the Republican and Democratic parties respectively. The forty were the most ideologically polarized members of their parties in the House selected using data from, excluding non-voting political representatives. By doing this, ideology and polarization are controlled for in the sample selection, and it becomes reasonable to utilize the median voter theorem to state that a political representative's vote choice can be explained by Super PAC funding as long as constituent considerations are not a factor (i.e. a representative was not in a "Toss-Up" district). The Median voter theorem states that simple models of public choice can be reasonably used in place of more complex models because simple models allow knowledge to be transmitted more efficiently from person to person, simple models provide us with a means of analysis that allow a myriad of hypotheses about more complex phenomena to be developed, and without the

framework provided by simple models, complex hypotheses would be next to meaningless (Rowley & Schneider, 2004). Not surprisingly, none of the House of Representative members included in the sample had a "Toss-Up" rating for their respective Congressional districts; since polarization was controlled for through sample selection of the most polarized members of each party. The most heavily ideologically polarized members of Congress typically come from districts which, primarily through gerrymandering, but also through other means, contain the most polarized portions of the electorate, therefore making their districts extremely safe (Kirkland, 2014). The data concerning hard-fought elections can be found below.

<center>(Insert Table 1)</center>

Representing the three different issue strata were three different bills, all of which were proposed during the 114th Congress. All data for the bills selected comes from *https://www.congress.gov*. The bills chosen to represent issues with similar levels of salience to the electorate across the economic, social, and foreign policy issue strata. Representing these issue strata are the issues of energy production, immigration originating from Mexico and Central America, and the Iranian nuclear deal, respectively. The bills epitomizing these three issues are, in order, Senate Bill 1 (2015), House Resolution 3009 (2015), and House Resolution 3461 (2015). All three of these bills, and the issues they represent and are directly tied to, engendered similar levels of national media coverage, and so have similar saliencies to the electorate (Barrett et al., 2015; Daveport, 2015; "Senate Dems block anti-sanctuary city bill", 2015). Limiting the scope of the sample to only members of the House of Representatives during the 114th Congress, and bills proposed during the 114th Congress controls for distortive influences.

Controlling for saliency eliminates any distorting effect that variable levels of saliency may have on the constituent considerations variable.

Senate Bill 1 (2015) was selected, as mentioned before, for its saliency. Other economic issues were too region specific to be considered to represent the economic issue strata; only the Keystone Oil XL Pipeline had a national economic nature with direct potential effects on national oil prices and dependence, and so this issue was chosen above others (Gravelle & Lachapelle, 2015). Titled the "Keystone XL Approval Act", the bill was brought to the floor in a Republican-led effort to reduce the United States' dependency on foreign oil by increasing the capability of the United States' to access shale oil reserves. Senate Bill 1 (2015) passed 270-152 in the House of Representatives before being vetoed by President Obama.

Representing the social issue strata, and the issue of immigration, is House Resolution 3009 (2015). Titled "Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act," the purpose of the bill was to withhold federal funding to states that prohibited state and local officials from gathering information on individual's citizenship and immigration status, by amending section 241(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It was a Republican-led effort to counter President Obama's executive actions regarding deferred action deportation. The bill passed 241-179 in the House of Representatives almost entirely along party lines.

The foreign policy issue stratum is represented by House Resolution 3461 (2015). The bill was a Democratic-led effort to legitimize President Obama's executive agreement to lift sanctions levied against Iran in exchange for scaling back its nuclear program. Although the House of Representatives has no constitutional power to

legitimize or delegitimize any issue related foreign policy, House Resolution 3461 (2015) was meant to be a powerful symbolic gesture. The bill failed by a 162-269 vote, and was not passed. The only other foreign policy issue of similar salience during the 114th Congress in the minds of the American electorate was the Ukrainian crisis, which was an occupation of Ukrainian Crimea by the Russian Federation. However, since no bills related to the Ukrainian crisis reached the House floor for a roll call vote, House Resolution 3461 (2015) is the most appropriate bill to represent this issue stratum.

Results

To test the hypotheses presented in theory section: that Super PAC funding will have its highest level of influence on the vote choice of political elites in the economic issue strata, a moderate level of influence in the foreign policy issue strata, and the lowest level of influence on the social issue strata, a chi-square test of independence was utilized. The chi squared test of independence is best suited to determine whether or not there is a statistically significant relationship between two nominal or categorical variables. In this case the categorical variables are Democrats and Republicans, and House of Representative members who voted in line with the dominant Super PAC funding frame or against it, a binary 0, 1 measure. Although the sample contains a base of forty representatives, the twenty most polarized from each political party in the House of Representatives; in each issue strata, some political representatives were excluded on the basis that they either did not vote, or had a zero dollar sum total of Super PAC funding on the particular issue stratum under consideration. The layout of the chi-square table for each issue strata is two rows and two columns; the rows consist of the Republican and Democrat categories, and the columns are made up of the voted consistently with

dominant Super PAC funding frame, and voted inconsistent with Super PAC funding frame.

There are no additional rows to include Republicans or Democrats with hard-fought elections, this is due to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, there are none included within the sample that are experiencing anticipation of a hard fought election in 2016. The development of a null hypothesis and an alternative is required for a chi-square test to be carried out. For all of the issue strata, the null hypothesis is a variation of "There is no association between Super PAC funding and vote choice of political representatives." The alternative hypothesis for all of the issue strata is a variation of "There is an association between Super PAC funding and vote choice of political representatives." The null hypothesis is disproven if a high enough chi-square value is obtained to declare a statistically significant relationship according to the degree of freedom and level of confidence that is being utilized. Chi-square tests of independence require a degree of freedom (DF) to be calculated in order to proceed with statistical analysis. The degree of freedom is calculated according to the formula: DF= (number of rows-1) x (number of columns-1). In the case of all the tables above, this formula produces a degree of freedom of one. All of these tables were analyzed utilizing a 95% confidence level. This confidence level, coupled with the degree of freedom value of one for each table requires a chi-square value of 3.84 or higher to declare statistical significance. The chi-square value for each table is obtained by first calculating the expected count for each value within a given table, the formula for which is: expected count= (row total x column total)/overall total. Once these values are calculated, the chi-square value for a table can be found by applying this formula: (observed count-expected count)^2/expected count to

each value within the table) and taking the sum of them all. Then, whether or not there is a statistically significant correlation present is determined by comparing whether or not the chi-square value is larger than the 3.84 requirement for declaring a statistically significant relationship, for any lesser chi squared value would indicate that p > 0.05.

Findings & Discussion
Hypothesis 1: Economic Issue Stratum

Republican-led Senate Bill 1 relating to the construction of the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline was chosen to represent the economic issue stratum. Per the methods described, all non-voting political representatives were excluded from the sample, as well as those representatives who had equal positive (for passage) and negative (against passage) Super PAC funding frames, for a zero sum of Super PAC dollars would indicate that their influence could not possibly be involved in the decision making process of those representatives where this condition is present. This is because when the Super PAC funding frames favoring yes and no votes are of equal dollar amounts, the effect is the same as if the Super PAC funding frames favoring yes and no votes were both zero, or nonexistent. The political representatives excluded on the basis of a non-vote were Barbara Lee from the Democratic Party, and David P. Roe from the Republican Party. Those political representatives excluded from the sample due to a dominant Super PAC funding frame being absent are Jose E. Serrano and Frederica S. Wilson from the Democratic Party and Kenny Marchant from the Republican Party. The complete data set for the economic issue stratum can be found in Table 2.

(Insert Table 2)

This data was then used to construct the chi-square table below to test for categorical independence. The null hypothesis accompanying this table is "Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to economic issues are independent" and the alternative hypothesis is "Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to economic issues are not independent."

(Insert Table 3)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy. The relation between these variables was significant, X^2 (2, $N=35$) = 21.052, $p < .05$. Republicans were more likely to vote with their dominant Super PAC funding frame. This was not a surprising find, as it was an expected result according to the theory that the strongest correlation would be present between Super PAC funding and voting behavior in the economic issue strata.

What is somewhat curious, however, is that the relationship between the dominant Super PAC funding frame and voting behavior is positively correlated among Republican representatives and negatively correlated among Democratic representatives. Clearly, as the table above demonstrates, the Republicans voted in line with their dominant Super PAC funding frame at a rate of 94.44%, whereas the Democrats voted in line with their dominant Super PAC funding frame at a rate of only 21.43%. In addition, as the raw data demonstrates, all the Democrats who voted against their dominant Super PAC funding frame voted against a positive (in favor of passage) frame, but they on average received lower levels of funding from the funding frame in favor of passage than their Republican counterparts. This additional information could possibly serve as an explanation as to the

different relationships between Super PAC funding and voting behavior among the two political parties; perhaps simply not enough money was given to the Democratic representatives to cause them to abandon their traditional ideological standpoint of holding environmental considerations in a higher regard than economic considerations. But it is also possible that the smaller dollar amounts offered to Democrats from Super PACs in favor of passage relative to their Republican counterparts was to influence their vote choice on other bills, and that a higher dollar amount was not given because those Super PACs were aware they could pass a bill for a cheaper amount by offering more money to the party more ideologically receptive to their preferred bill outcome (Republicans) and which also held a majority in the House of Representatives (Republicans).

Hypothesis 2: Social Issue Stratum

The bill chosen to represent the social issue stratum was Republican-led House Resolution 3009, which was entitled "Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act." There was only one non-voting political representative that had to be excluded from the sample for this bill, Democrat John Conyers, Jr. There were however, a number of political representatives that were excluded on the basis of not having a dominant Super PAC funding frame; the Democrats excluded were Sheila Jackson Lee and Jose E. Serrano. The Republicans that were excluded according to this criterion were Paul A. Gosar, Vicky Hartzler, Billy Long, Kenny Marchant, and Pete Olson. The raw data concerning the social issue stratum can be found below.

(Insert Table 4)

The above data was then used to construct a chi squared table identical to the one constructed for Senate Bill 1 and the economic issue stratum. In this instance, the null hypothesis for the chi squared table is "Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to social issues are independent," which necessitates that the alternative hypothesis is "Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to social issues are not independent." With these hypotheses in mind, the table below was constructed.

(Insert Table 5)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy. The relation between these variables was significant, X^2 (2, N=32) = 6.721, $p < .05$. Democrats were more likely to vote with their Super PAC funding frame. It was hypothesized in the theory that Super PAC funding would be least relevant to vote choice on bills within the social issue strata, and so far in this paper's analysis, this holds true. The p value for the chi squared table related to Senate Bill 1 and the economic issue stratum was 0.00001, far less than the p value for House Resolution 3009 and the social issue stratum, is 0.0095.

What is interesting to note, is that in contrast to the analysis conducted for Senate Bill 1, where the correlation to the dominant Super PAC funding frame was positive for Republican political representatives and negative for Democratic political representatives, the correlation is positive for both Democrat and Republican representatives for House Resolution 3009. Of all Republicans, 66.67% voted in line with their dominant Super PAC funding framework, and 100% of Democrats voted in line with their dominant Super PAC funding framework. Also notable is that the five Republicans who voted against their dominant Super PAC funding framework, 100% of

them had a dominant Super PAC funding framework which was in favor of a no vote on

House Resolution 3009. This seems to lend additional credence to the explanation posited

in the discussion of the findings of Senate Bill 1; that Super PACs fund those candidates

who are already ideologically predisposed to vote in line with the Super PACs interests,

likely in an attempt to spend the least amount of money to achieve a desirable vote

outcome. This would make sense as during the 114th Congress, Republican political

representatives, in pursuit of their ideological tenet of strong national security, have

favored stricter border control relative to their Democratic counterparts.

Hypothesis 3: Foreign Policy Issue Stratum

The final issue stratum to be analyzed is the foreign policy issue stratum,

represented by House Resolution 3461. Titled "To Approve the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action, Signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, Relating to the Nuclear Program of

Iran," it was a Democrat led effort to legitimize President Obama's unilateral

negotiations with Iran, that was voted on shortly after a successful Democratic filibuster

in the Senate to prevent the Iran deal from being challenged. As stated earlier, the House

of Representatives has no real procedural power to ratify or prevent ratification of

treaties; however the bill was intended to be a powerful symbolic gesture. Representative

of this, no political representatives within the sample were excluded on the basis of not

voting, but five Democrats and twelve Republicans, for a total of seventeen political

representatives were excluded on the basis of not having a dominant Super PAC funding

frame. This would seem to be indicative that Super PACs concerned with outcomes

related to foreign policy bills do not typically fund members of the House of

Representatives, but rather members of the Senate, where procedural power concerning

treaty ratification is constitutionally based. As just under half of the sample is excluded, rather than list the exclusions, they can be found in the raw data for House Resolution 3461 below.

(Insert Table 6)

The raw data above was used to construct a chi squared table similar to the ones used to analyze Senate Bill 1 and House Resolution 3009. In this instance, the null hypothesis format is "Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy issues are independent," whereas the alternative hypothesis format is "Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy issues are not independent." Using these hypotheses, the table below was constructed and scrutinized.

(Insert Table 7)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between Super PAC funding and vote choice on bills related to foreign policy. The relationship between these variables was significant, X^2 (2, N=23) = 22.996, $p < .05$. Republicans were more likely to vote with their Super PAC funding frame than were Democrats.While the numbers seem to disprove the hypothesis that Super PAC funding is most relevant to vote choice on bills related to economic issues, the fact that 42.50% of the sample was excluded due to not having a dominant Super PAC funding frame testifies otherwise. What is interesting to note is that the correlation anomaly between political parties that was present in the economic issue stratum and Senate Bill 1 has returned. Out of the Republicans, 100% voted with their dominant Super PAC funding frame, and of the Democrats, 100% voted against their dominant Super PAC funding frame. This indicates a positive correlation among Super PAC funding and vote choice among

Republicans and a negative correlation among Super PAC funding and vote choice among Democrats. However, this is likely due to a lack of a large amount of Super PAC donors to House of Representative members with a vested interest in an outcome related to a foreign policy issue. This is evidenced by the fact that not a single political representative received funding from a Super PAC with an interest in passage of the bill. Therefore, it would seem more likely, given that 100% of Democrats in the sample voted for the bill, and 100% of Republicans in the sample voted against the bill, that ideology and polarization is the driving factor in vote choice on House Resolution 3461.

Conclusion

While the theory was found to be true; the highest correlation among Super PAC funding and vote choice was in the economic issue strata, and the lowest correlation among Super PAC funding and vote choice was in the social issue strata, there is some uncertainty regarding the theory's prediction about the foreign policy issue strata. Senate Bill 1 and its chi squared value of 21.052, and House Resolution 3009 and its chi squared value of 6.721 confirm the first and second hypotheses, but the chi squared value of the foreign policy issue stratum, 22.996, and its sample exclusion rate of 42.5% mean that no definite conclusions can be drawn as to the validity of the hypothesis that a moderate level of correlation would be found between Super PAC funding and vote choice in the foreign policy issue stratum. Additionally, in controlling for ideology and polarization in sample selection, there was an incidental bias against selecting political representatives with hard-fought elections, and so the hypothesis that there Super PAC funding only influences voting behavior in the absence of the anticipation of a hard-fought election was unable to be tested.

The results of this paper's analysis are unable to be extended prior to any Congress before 2010, as *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commision* 558 U.S. 310 (2010) had not yet taken effect. Additionally, any findings concerning the different issue strata are limited somewhat in their extension to other cases, as only bills with similar levels of salience can be considered, and the analysis conducted in this paper needs to be undertaken in future Congresses to ensure it is valid and reliable. Sufficient numbers of bills in each issue strata were hard to come by that met salience requirements, or which were not somehow containing other issue strata simultaneously in addition to the ones intended to be analyzed. These considerations acknowledged, the analysis undertaken in this paper provides a useful case study of the impact of Super PAC funding on vote choice in the 114th Congress. At the very least, the results confirm Wright's 1990 study's suggestion that campaign contributions play a different role in determining political representatives' vote choice across different issue strata. The results can also be interpreted to mean that Super PAC campaign contributions play a moderate to sizeable role in contemporary politics in the sense that they are strongly correlated to vote choice. Future studies which include ideological independent political representatives in the sample would be needed to confirm such a conclusion in order to minimize the possibility that the competing explanation of ideological polarization is not to blame.

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Table 1

Representative	**Sabato Rating**	**District**
Blackburn, Marsha	Safe R	Tennessee 7th
Chu, Judy	Safe D	California 27th
Clarke, Yvette D.	Safe D	New York 9th
Cohen, Steve	Safe D	Tennessee 9th
Conyers, John, Jr.	Safe D	Michigan 13th
Duncan, Jeff	Safe R	South Carolina 3rd
Edwards, Donna F.	Safe D	Maryland 4th
Ellison, Keith	Safe D	Minnesota 5th
Flores, Bill	Safe R	Texas 17th
Franks, Trent	Safe R	Arizona 8th
Gohmert, Louie	Safe R	Texas 1st
Gosar, Paul A.	Safe R	Arizona 4th
Grijalva, Raul M.	Safe D	Arizona 3rd
Hartzler, Vicky	Safe R	Missouri 4th
Hastings, Alcee L.	Safe D	Florida 20th
Honda, Michael M.	Safe D	California 17th
Huelskamp, Tim	Safe R	Kansas 1st
Jackson Lee, Sheila	Safe D	Texas 18th
Lamborn, Doug	Safe R	Colorado 5th
Latta, Robert E.	Safe R	Ohio 5th
Lee, Barbara	Safe D	California 13th
Long, Billy	Safe R	Missouri 7th
Marchant, Kenny	Safe R	Texas 24th
McDermott, Jim	Safe D	Washington 7th
McGovern, James P.	Safe D	Massachusetts 2nd
Moore, Gwen	Safe D	Wisconsin 4th
Mulvaney, Mick	Safe R	South Carolina 5th
Olson, Pete	Safe R	Texas 22nd
Rangel, Charles B.	Safe D	New York 13th
Roe, David P.	Safe R	Tennessee 1st
Rokita, Todd	Safe R	Indiana 4th
Schakowsky, Janice D.	Safe D	Illinois 9th
Serrano, Jose E.	Safe D	New York 15th
Sessions, Pete	Safe R	Texas 32nd
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh	Safe D	New York 25th
Takano, Mark	Safe D	California 41st
Walberg, Tim	Lean R	Michigan 7th
Westmoreland, Lynn A.	Safe R	Georgia 3rd
Wilson, Frederica S.	Safe D	Florida 24th
Wilson, Joe	Safe R	South Carolina 2nd

Table 2

Representative	D/R	Vote	Total Funds	PAC Dollars (Y)	PAC Dollars (N)	PAC Total (%)
Blackburn, Marsha	R	Y	$ 931,659	$ 5,100	$ -	$ 584,914
Chu, Judy	D	N	$ 541,893	$ 3,250	$ -	$ 129,260
Clarke, Yvette D.	D	N	$ 228,754	$ 4,850	$ -	$ 166,008
Cohen, Steve	D	N	$ 268,740	$ 3,600	$ 1,250	$ 192,002
Conyers, John, Jr.	D	N	$ 282,049	$ 3,000	$ -	$ 205,350
Duncan, Jeff	R	Y	$ 280,525	$ 7,950	$ -	$ 141,250
Edwards, Donna F.	D	N	$ 2,166,226	$ 10,400	$ 5,550	$ 134,792
Ellison, Keith	D	N	$ 1,028,207	$ 1,250	$ 4,000	$ 153,500
Flores, Bill	R	Y	$ 934,347	$ 29,339	$ -	$ 546,770
Franks, Trent	R	Y	$ 140,907	$ 12,700	$ -	$ 90,250
Gohmert, Louie	R	Y	$ 381,240	$ 18,100	$ -	$ 50,500
Gosar, Paul A.	R	Y	$ 225,819	$ -	$ 500	$ 106,500
Grijalva, Raul M.	D	N	$ 280,119	$ 500	$ 3,000	$ 155,968
Hartzler, Vicky	R	Y	$ 474,296	$ 22,900	$ -	$ 176,900
Hastings, Alcee L.	D	N	$ 218,841	$ 1,000	$ -	$ 165,073
Honda, Michael M.	D	N	$ 1,281,719	$ 11,142	$ 6,600	$ 309,523
Huelskamp, Tim	R	Y	$ 390,976	$ 8,550	$ -	$ 66,200
Jackson Lee, Sheila	D	Y	$ 171,171	$ 2,000	$ -	$ 114,500
Lamborn, Doug	R	Y	$ 286,818	$ 1,250	$ -	$ 191,010
Latta, Robert E.	R	Y	$ 435,620	$ 24,025	$ -	$ 232,447
Lee, Barbara	D	N/A	$ 583,870	$ 500	$ 2,503	$ 151,700
Long, Billy	R	Y	$ 697,846	$ 22,000	$ -	$ 354,400
Marchant, Kenny	R	Y	$ 486,186	$ -	$ -	$ 342,504
McDermott, Jim	D	N	$ 277,655	$ 500	$ 1,500	$ 167,700
McGovern, James P.	D	N	$ 461,610	$ 4,350	$ 250	$ 232,841
Moore, Gwen	D	N	$ 461,858	$ 500	$ -	$ 353,325
Mulvaney, Mick	R	Y	$ 345,433	$ 6,900	$ -	$ 272,953
Olson, Pete	R	Y	$ 740,663	$ 28,950	$ -	$ 445,040
Rangel, Charles B.	D	N	$ 1,499,956	$ 2,750	$ -	$ 467,200
Roe, David P.	R	N/A	$ 522,428	$ 5,300	$ -	$ 2,000
Rokita, Todd	R	Y	$ 1,537,040	$ 35,750	$ -	$ 502,887
Schakowsky, Janice D.	D	N	$ 767,083	$ 10,350	$ -	$ 179,650
Serrano, Jose E.	D	N	$ 84,021	$ -	$ -	$ 70,750
Sessions, Pete	R	Y	$ 1,270,202	$ 21,300	$ -	$ 552,281
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh	D	N	$ 717,340	$ 6,500	$ 250	$ 383,150
Takano, Mark	D	N	$ 471,536	$ 5,350	$ 450	$ 140,300
Walberg, Tim	R	Y	$ 1,029,481	$ 41,280	$ -	$ 441,220
Westmoreland, Lynn A.	R	Y	$ 446,172	$ 13,800	$ -	$ 274,130
Wilson, Frederica S.	D	N	$ 257,092	$ -	$ -	$ 179,450
Wilson, Joe	R	Y	$ 427,508	$ 23,508	$ -	$ 274,750

Table 3

Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Vote Choice on S. 1and Super PAC Funding

Party Identification					
	Vote with PAC		Vote against PAC		Total
Republican	17	(85%)	1	(7%)	18
Democrat	3	(15%)	14	(93%)	17
Total	20	(100%)	15	(100%)	35

Note. x^2=21.052, df=1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

*p < .05

Table 4

Representative	D/R	Vote	Total Funds	PAC Dollars (Y)	PAC Dollars (N)	PAC Total (%)
Blackburn, Marsha	R	Y	$ 931,659	$ 6,300	$ -	$ 584,914
Chu, Judy	D	N	$ 541,893	$ -	$ 3,250	$ 129,260
Clarke, Yvette D.	D	N	$ 228,754	$ -	$ 5,110	$ 166,008
Cohen, Steve	D	N	$ 268,740	$ -	$ 5,200	$ 192,002
Conyers, John, Jr.	D	N/A	$ 282,049	$ -	$ 750	$ 205,350
Duncan, Jeff	R	Y	$ 280,525	$ 1,250	$ 5,100	$ 141,250
Edwards, Donna F.	D	N	$ 2,166,226	$ -	$ 9,700	$ 134,792
Ellison, Keith	D	N	$ 1,028,207	$ -	$ 26,680	$ 153,500
Flores, Bill	R	Y	$ 934,347	$ 6,500	$ 1,891	$ 546,770
Franks, Trent	R	Y	$ 140,907	$ 6,750	$ -	$ 90,250
Gohmert, Louie	R	Y	$ 381,240	$ 15,850	$ 1,000	$ 50,500
Gosar, Paul A.	R	Y	$ 225,819	$ -	$ -	$ 106,500
Grijalva, Raul M.	D	N	$ 280,119	$ -	$ 3,150	$ 155,968
Hartzler, Vicky	R	Y	$ 474,296	$ -	$ -	$ 176,900
Hastings, Alcee L.	D	N	$ 218,841	$ -	$ 1,500	$ 165,073
Honda, Michael M.	D	N	$ 1,281,719	$ -	$ 79,651	$ 309,523
Huelskamp, Tim	R	Y	$ 390,976	$ 11,550	$ -	$ 66,200
Jackson Lee, Sheila	D	N	$ 171,171	$ -	$ -	$ 114,500
Lamborn, Doug	R	Y	$ 286,818	$ 250	$ -	$ 191,010
Latta, Robert E.	R	Y	$ 435,620	$ -	$ 850	$ 232,447
Lee, Barbara	D	N	$ 583,870	$ -	$ 28,719	$ 151,700
Long, Billy	R	Y	$ 697,846	$ -	$ -	$ 354,400
Marchant, Kenny	R	Y	$ 486,186	$ -	$ -	$ 342,504
McDermott, Jim	D	N	$ 277,655	$ -	$ 5,543	$ 167,700
McGovern, James P.	D	N	$ 461,610	$ -	$ 6,500	$ 232,841
Moore, Gwen	D	N	$ 461,858	$ -	$ 4,500	$ 353,325
Mulvaney, Mick	R	Y	$ 345,433	$ 5,650	$ -	$ 272,953
Olson, Pete	R	Y	$ 740,663	$ -	$ -	$ 445,040
Rangel, Charles B.	D	N	$ 1,499,956	$ -	$ 19,525	$ 467,200
Roe, David P.	R	Y	$ 522,428	$ -	$ 1,000	$ 6,000
Rokita, Todd	R	Y	$ 35,750	$ 3,850	$ -	$ 502,887
Schakowsky, Janice D.	D	N	$ 767,083	$ -	$ 17,110	$ 179,650
Serrano, Jose E.	D	N	$ 84,021	$ -	$ -	$ 70,750
Sessions, Pete	R	Y	$ 1,270,202	$ -	$ 9,050	$ 552,281
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh	D	N	$ 717,340	$ -	$ 5,254	$ 383,150
Takano, Mark	D	N	$ 471,536	$ -	$ 47,750	$ 140,300
Walberg, Tim	R	Y	$ 1,029,481	$ 22,280	$ 6,400	$ 441,220
Westmoreland, Lynn A.	R	Y	$ 446,172	$ -	$ 500	$ 274,130
Wilson, Frederica S.	D	N	$ 257,092	$ -	$ 1,500	$ 179,450
Wilson, Joe	R	Y	$ 427,508	$ 2,835	$ -	$ 274,750

Table 5

Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Vote Choice on H.R. 3009 and Super PAC Funding

Party Identification					
	Vote with PAC		Vote against PAC		Total
Republican	10	(37%)	5	(100%)	15
Democrat	17	(63%)	0	(0%)	17
Total	27	(100%)	5	(100%)	33

Note. x^2=6.721, df=1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

*p < .05

Table 6

Representative	D/R	Vote	Total Funds	PAC Dollars (Y)	PAC Dollars (N)	PAC Total (%)
Blackburn, Marsha	R	N	$ 931,659	$ -	$ -	$ 584,914
Chu, Judy	D	Y	$ 541,893	$ -	$ 1,000	$ 129,260
Clarke, Yvette D.	D	Y	$ 228,754	$ -	$ -	$ 166,008
Cohen, Steve	D	Y	$ 268,740	$ -	$ 2,100	$ 192,002
Conyers, John, Jr.	D	Y	$ 282,049	$ -	$ 500	$ 205,350
Duncan, Jeff	R	N	$ 280,525	$ -	$ -	$ 141,250
Edwards, Donna F.	D	Y	$ 2,166,226	$ -	$ 4,350	$ 134,792
Ellison, Keith	D	Y	$ 1,028,207	$ -	$ 4,100	$ 153,500
Flores, Bill	R	N	$ 934,347	$ -	$ -	$ 546,770
Franks, Trent	R	N	$ 140,907	$ -	$ 11,500	$ 90,250
Gohmert, Louie	R	N	$ 381,240	$ -	$ 6,100	$ 50,500
Gosar, Paul A.	R	N	$ 225,819	$ -	$ 3,750	$ 106,500
Grijalva, Raul M.	D	Y	$ 280,119	$ -	$ 4,600	$ 155,968
Hartzler, Vicky	R	N	$ 474,296	$ -	$ -	$ 176,900
Hastings, Alcee L.	D	N	$ 218,841	$ -	$ -	$ 165,073
Honda, Michael M.	D	Y	$ 1,281,719	$ -	$ 17,200	$ 309,523
Huelskamp, Tim	R	N	$ 390,976	$ -	$ -	$ 66,200
Jackson Lee, Sheila	D	Y	$ 171,171	$ -	$ -	$ 114,500
Lamborn, Doug	R	N	$ 286,818	$ -	$ 30,853	$ 191,010
Latta, Robert E.	R	N	$ 435,620	$ -	$ -	$ 232,447
Lee, Barbara	D	Y	$ 583,870	$ -	$ 1,750	$ 151,700
Long, Billy	R	N	$ 697,846	$ -	$ 8,000	$ 354,400
Marchant, Kenny	R	N	$ 486,186	$ -	$ -	$ 342,504
McDermott, Jim	D	Y	$ 277,655	$ -	$ 1,000	$ 167,700
McGovern, James P.	D	Y	$ 461,610	$ -	$ 2,250	$ 232,841
Moore, Gwen	D	Y	$ 461,858	$ -	$ 10,450	$ 353,325
Mulvaney, Mick	R	N	$ 345,433	$ -	$ -	$ 272,953
Olson, Pete	R	N	$ 740,663	$ -	$ -	$ 445,040
Rangel, Charles B.	D	Y	$ 1,499,956	$ -	$ 12,700	$ 467,200
Roe, David P.	R	N	$ 522,428	$ -	$ -	$ 6,000
Rokita, Todd	R	N	$ 35,750	$ -	$ 13,800	$ 502,887
Schakowsky, Janice D.	D	Y	$ 767,083	$ -	$ 60,400	$ 179,650
Serrano, Jose E.	D	Y	$ 84,021	$ -	$ -	$ 70,750
Sessions, Pete	R	N	$ 1,270,202	$ -	$ 5,600	$ 552,281
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh	D	Y	$ 717,340	$ -	$ -	$ 383,150
Takano, Mark	D	Y	$ 471,536	$ -	$ 19,525	$ 140,300
Walberg, Tim	R	N	$ 1,029,481	$ -	$ -	$ 441,220
Westmoreland, Lynn A.	R	N	$ 446,172	$ -	$ -	$ 274,130
Wilson, Frederica S.	D	Y	$ 257,092	$ -	$ 1,000	$ 179,450
Wilson, Joe	R	N	$ 427,508	$ -	$ 1,000	$ 274,750

Table 7

Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Vote Choice on H.R. 3461 and Super PAC Funding

Party Identification					
	Vote with PAC		Vote against PAC		Total
Republican	8	(100%)	0	(0%)	8
Democrat	0	(0%)	15	(100%)	15
Total	8	(100%)	15	(100%)	23

Note. x^2=22.996, df=1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

*p < .05