

RESISTANCE TO THE EXPANSION OF PACHAKUTIQ'S INCA EMPIRE AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE SPANISH CONQUEST

A Senior Scholars Thesis

by

MIGUEL ALBERTO NOVOA

Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as

HONORS RESEARCH FELLOW

May 2012

Major: History
Economics

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Approved by:

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ABSTRACT

Resistance to the Expansion of Pachakuti's Inca Empire and its Effects on the Spanish
Conquest. (May 2012)

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This endeavor focuses on the formation and expansion of the Inca Empire and its effects on western South American societies in the fifteenth century. The research examines the Incan cultural, economic, and administrative methods of expansion under Pachakuti, the founder of the empire, and its impact on the empire's demise in the sixteenth century. Mainstream historical literature attributes the fall of the Incas to immediate causes such as superior Spanish technology, the Inca civil war, and a devastating smallpox epidemic; however, little is mentioned about the causes within the society itself. An increased focus on the social reactions towards Inca imperialism not only expands current information on Andean civilization, but also enhances scholarly understanding for the abrupt end of the Inca Empire. This study on the Inca Empire will improve the historical analysis on the rise and fall of the largest empire in pre-Columbian America.

DEDICATION

To Dr. Glenn A. Chambers, for his unconditional support in this thesis' development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been completed without the aid of various people throughout the writing process. First and foremost, my thanks go to Dr. Duncan Mackenzie and Ms. Tammi Sherman from the Texas A&M University Honors Department at College Station, Texas. During the development of this project, Dr. Mackenzie lectured a group of students, including myself, on research methods, writing suggestions, and project presentations. Meanwhile, Ms. Sherman took on the amazing task of reviewing the unfinished works at various points during the research and writing process. Their help proved invaluable to the completion of this project.

Additional help for this thesis came from Dr. David Carlson of the Anthropology Department at Texas A&M University. Dr. Carlson not only provided me with texts of archaeology and anthropology which proved invaluable to this investigation, but he has also taught me basic anthropological concepts and an advanced knowledge of early state development in world history. Without this information, it certainly would have been much more difficult for me to understand pre-Inca societies and the formation of the Inca state, both important topics of the research.

Also important to acknowledge is the indirect aid this investigation received from the History and Economics Departments of Texas A&M University. From the History Department, Dr. Philip Smith provided me with an understanding of European colonization in North America that allowed me to compare and contrast it with the Spanish colonization of South America. The ability to connect aspects of North American

colonization with the South American experience served a particularly important role in the last chapter of this thesis. Other valuable professors from the department which aided my understanding of the field and analysis of sources include Dr. Andrew Kirkendall and Dr. R.J.Q. Adams. From the Economics Department, Dr. Stephanie Houghton's course on antitrust regulations provided me with a better understanding of the complex aspects involving government regulation. The regulations chapter reflects this concept applied not only to the economy of the Inca Empire, but also to the social and administrative aspects of the state.

After countless hours of research, this list of acknowledgements would not be complete without a mention of the Texas A&M University Libraries system and staff. Most of this research would not have been possible to achieve without the valuable primary and secondary sources available in the library. Although its quantity of Latin American material is not abundant, it had a good quality of material that aided this research. The dedication of the staff in carefully maintaining and separation sections within the library is worthy of all praise.

Lastly, this research would not have even taken place was it not for my mentor and advisor, Dr. Glenn A. Chambers. His help throughout the development of this thesis, which started as a relatively small project in his Historian's Craft course, improved both the work's argument and my understanding of history (including how to analyze and implement secondary sources, the value of primary material, and the importance to provide a logical flow to my work rather than just a bombardment of information). With all sincerity, I dedicate this whole project to him.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Incas were a civilization of western South America which settled the central Andes Mountains, in the Cuzco valley of present-day southern Peru, *circa* 1200 AD. This valley, named after the Inca's capital of Cuzco which was founded at approximately the same time of their arrival in the region, originally housed a small Inca society of llama herders and terrace farmers.¹ Overtime, the Incas expanded their control over local ethnic groups and structured a complex social hierarchical pyramid. Tributes linked ethnic groups outside the city of Cuzco to the elite, led by Incas with close genealogical and geographical ties to the original founders of Cuzco. Other elites, such as the nobles and residents of the city of Cuzco, held fewer privileges than the ruling royalty. With the aid of this hierarchy, the Incas attained regional domination by the fifteenth century.² In 1438, nobles and military officials seeking to obtain greater political power helped Pachakutiq, the youngest son of king Wiraqocha, become ruler after he defeated his brother in combat and repelled the invasion of the Chanka, a rival Andean civilization west of Cuzco.³ Pachakutiq's accession to the throne marked the beginning of a massive Inca imperial expansion over western South America.

Through warfare and diplomacy, the Incas incorporated into their empire civilizations such as the Huanca and Huarochiri. The Huanca, a powerful society of dog-worshippers

This thesis follows the style of the *Latin American Research Review*.

from the central Peruvian Andes who prided their independence and terrorized nearby polities with cruel military tactics, fell to the Inca army in 1460. According to María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, a Peruvian historian of ancient Andean civilizations, the Incas used methods of “lightning conquests” to rapidly expand their empire. This tactic focused on quick battlefield victories and the creation of reciprocal agreements with the conquered peoples, and nothing else was done to establish authority before carrying out the next expedition.⁴ On the other hand, when the advancing Inca army met with friendly groups like the people of Huarochiri, a prosperous farming society neighboring the Huancas, the Incas formed a peaceful long-lasting alliance.⁵ Anthropologist Terence D’Altroy, an American researcher and expert of Inca archaeology, explains that the start of the Incan expansion was fueled from a variety of sources, including the personal determination of an ambitious leader and an efficient group of military officials.⁶ By the sixteenth century, the Inca Empire was the largest state in pre-Columbian America.

However, varying degrees of resistance and insurrections doomed Pachakuti's efforts of imperial unification. Rostworowski states that even though two great battles quickly ended the Huanca resistance, the “lightning conquests” not always succeeded. For example, the Guarco, an aggressive chiefdom of fishermen from the Pacific coast of Peru,⁷ made an organized effort through the use of their extensive fortifications to fiercely resist the Incas for several years.⁸ Once conquered, civilizations angry with their new overlords took whatever opportunities they found to rebel. The French economist and historian Louis Baudin describes one such uprising which took place in the Altiplano, a plateau encompassing areas of present-day Bolivia and southern Peru.

According to Baudin, the Collas, a pastoral and farming group of tribes south of Cuzco near Lake Titicaca, took advantage of Inca political infighting and geographic distance to unsuccessfully rebel against Pachakuti.⁹ By 1532, during the reign of Pachakuti's great-grandson Atawallpa, a Spanish expeditionary force led by Francisco Pizarro took advantage of continuing insurrections to defeat the Inca Empire.

The following thesis argues that Pachakuti's futile attempts at unifying his empire through increased administrative, economic, and cultural control ultimately allowed the Spaniards to ally with local insurgents in order to conquer the Inca Empire.

This thesis begins with a description of the methods used to obtain and evaluate the sources used in this research. The following chapter analyses the impact of the Wari and Tiwanaku civilizations in the development of western South American civilizations around the twelfth century AD. The fourth chapter focuses on the different reasons the Inca expansion took place during this time period and the various methods of diplomacy and warfare the Incas used to achieve their goals. In the next chapter, the thesis covers Pachakuti's different efforts at unifying the numerous societies within the Inca Empire by minimizing local independence through increasing government regulation in social, administrative, and economic spheres. The last two chapters prior to the summary and conclusions deal with the consequences of the Inca's actions. Chapter eight describes the constant resistance and revolts of civilizations which desired independence over Inca authority. Chapter nine explains how the Spaniards used the Inca Empire's lack of unification to their advantage and, with the aid of native peoples, defeated the Incas.

CHAPTER II

METHODS

Researching a subject concerning pre-Columbian western South American civilizations raises a series of constraints for the acquisition of historical information. One of the first problematic factors in the study of Andean history, as mentioned by Swiss archaeologist Frederic Engel, is the lack of writing. Engel argues that, due to the lack of written texts, “the basic material for the historians of the pre-Columbian past” falls on archaeological studies and discoveries.¹⁰ Nonetheless, archaeologists face an equally difficult position in their research. For instance, despite the existence of iconography, which is found on ceramic and textile designs, archaeologist Ran Boytner explains that “much is still missing from our understanding of the embedded messages” as the elements presented in the icons were probably meant for mnemonic usage.¹¹ Of course, material does exist which provides some information on the history of pre-Columbian cultures.

Yet, this brings up another challenging matter with regards to the existing sources’ reliability. One of them, the *quipu*, a recording device which used a system of strings and knots, was used by the Incas and other Andean civilizations to record a variety of topics including statistics, legislations, and history. However, according to Peruvian historian Raúl Porras Barrenechea, the historical record provided by the *quipus* is incomplete as a result of two major burnings: the first committed by Inca generals at the “great archives of Cuzco” and the second by the Spaniards due to “the enchantments and witchcraft

attributed to them.”¹² Another significant issue concerns the bias of chroniclers, people who recollected primary accounts from personal interviews. One such chronicler important to this research is “El Inca” Garcilaso de la Vega, the Peruvian son of a Spanish captain and an Inca noblewoman who spent most of his life living in Spain. Garcilaso openly denounced the bias in the accounts recollected by Spaniards. Still, albeit his information is considered “authoritative from the perspective of Incan events,” historian Hollis Micheal Tarver notes that Garcilaso de la Vega was also guilty of bias. A few of Garcilaso’s errors, as identified by social scientist Maruja Barrig, include his portrayal of the Incas as benevolent conquerors whom “did not repress the peoples [they] conquered,” his disdain towards the development of pre-Inca societies, and his dismissal of internal rebellions.¹³ Hence, when conducting a historical analysis of these sources, researchers hold a task complicated by the lack of completely reliable information.

These issues for the most part did not directly affect the development of this thesis, but it did have an indirect effect on the amount and type of information used throughout the research. For example, most of the pre-Inca analysis revolves around the work of anthropologists, and historians only start to play a greater role in this project once the research enters the realm of the Inca Empire. In the case of direct effects, due to location restrictions, the only primary sources available to the research came from chroniclers whom, as already mentioned, held a bias in their writing. As such, given the variety of sources detailing a specific part of the historical events, not one single author holds a dominant influence on this research.

The following sections detail the methods used in this project to gather and analyze sources, including the instruments used to achieve a successful investigation.

Materials

Since the research took place within the United States, gathering primary sources from Andean peoples or South American libraries was not possible. However, plenty of other resources were available including Evans Library at Texas A&M University in College Station, and Internet websites such as Google Books and Sabin Americana. All of the sources used in this research were primarily obtained through these academic resources.

Procedures and approach

The first step taken in the development of this thesis was the structuring of the argument. Once a tentative outline was set-up, the research aimed at justifying each premise so as to validate the conclusion. Typically, the usage of keywords was essential for the Internet searches which would lead to texts with the information. These texts would be carefully reviewed for reliability by researching the authors and comparing their arguments with other available literature on the subject. At times the sources provided different points of view on controversial subjects, and the approach taken during these cases was to investigate the controversy itself. In an effort to maintain objectivity, conflicting points of view are presented as such. Minor, outdated, or discredited points of view are not presented in this thesis. As more information became available to this research, the structure and conclusion both changed based on the sources.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the formation of the Inca Empire, the civilizations which held imperial prominence in western South America were the Wari and Tiwanaku. According to Gordon McEwan, an archaeologist of ancient Andean civilizations, the Tiwanaku Empire rose out of a small farming settlement in the Altiplano which was originally colonized around the tenth century BC. Despite the high altitude, the region held enough grass for the pasturing of llamas and the growth of crops such as potatoes and quinoa, and the nearby Lake Titicaca provided fish and waterfowl. McEwan argues that, starting from 100 AD, the Tiwanaku transformed their settlement into a regionally-powerful capital city, evidenced by the construction of monumental stone structures such as temples and protective walls.¹⁴ A series of reasons justify this shift in Tiwanaku's development, with the most relevant, as identified by anthropologist John Janusek, including changing trade networks and new political alliances. Janusek, whose research focuses on ancient Andean state development, explains that "Tiwanaku emerged as an incorporative phenomenon grounded in ideals of tolerance, diversity, consent, and reciprocity."¹⁵ This mixture of ideas in turn made Tiwanaku an important cultural center where religious rituals and activities politically unified its diverse society. By 400, the former farming settlement stood as a strong theocratic state of vast imperial domains.¹⁶ At around the same time, just north of Tiwanaku's borders, the Wari Empire flourished.

Similar to Tiwanaku, the Wari civilization originated as a small community to eventually become a powerful empire. Inhabited *circa* 200 BC, Wari could have originally been a colony of Tiwanaku, but consensus currently aligns with Wari's origin as independent of Tiwanaku. Gordon McEwan and William Isbell, a researcher of prehistoric complex societies in Peru and Bolivia, are among those who contend no Tiwanaku colony existed at Wari. They base their claim on the lack of substantial Tiwanaku influence in Wari aesthetic elements such as decorative stone heads, stonework cuts, and masonry styles.¹⁷ Nonetheless, as stated by historians Cheryl Martin and Mark Wasserman, evidence suggests "significant cultural contact" did exist between both Andean empires. Of particular interest is the similarity in Wari and Tiwanaku religious iconography which, according to art historian and archaeologist Margaret Young-Sánchez, experts debate as to whether it demonstrates the existence of a common cultural ancestor or Tiwanaku's religious influence over Wari culture.¹⁸ Ultimately, as Wari rapidly increased in size and power since 500 AD, its interactions with Tiwanaku continued in border regions such as the Moquegua Valley of southern Peru where Tiwanaku and Wari settlers peacefully coexisted. Wari's imperial acquisitions of vassals and territorial annexations increased its regional strength. As indicated by McEwan, to administer their vast terrain, the Wari used a complex system based on location, resources, population, and previous political organizations, to aid them determine how much power to exert on their conquered domains.¹⁹ At the end of the first millennia AD, Wari and Tiwanaku stood as the sole dominant states of western South America.

An analysis of the Wari and Tiwanaku interaction in the Cuzco region and the rise of

new powerful states as a result of their decline in 1100 AD improve the understanding of the Inca's development as an entity with imperial aspirations.

Cuzco under Wari and Tiwanaku

The Cuzco Valley, located within the Wari and Tiwanaku spheres of influence, served as a center of interaction between these two empires, but it was the Wari that took an active role in the region. According to anthropological archaeologist Brian Bauer, when the Wari first arrived into the scene at Cuzco *circa* 600 AD, the region was not much distinct from neighboring zones. Organized societies included scattered villages and chiefdoms with a small number of powerful elites. Maize farming was the primary economic output of the region, but the level of local social interaction and development stood below that of the Ayacucho region of the Wari. However, the region's diverse climate made Cuzco special from other places, and Bauer claims that the Wari desired to acquire it in order to benefit from its potentially massive agricultural output. Moreover, the region was extremely close to the heartland of the Tiwanaku Empire which, as maintained by anthropologist Charles Stanish, did not colonize the area but rather focused on trading their materials with the locals and even influenced local pottery styles.²⁰ Nevertheless, this seemingly perfect location had one problem, as the Wari Empire soon discovered, and that was the population's resilience to remain independent at all costs.

Since their arrival in the Cuzco region, the Wari served the role of a catalyst for change by improving land development and increasing the region's economic exchange with its

neighbors. For nearly 300 years the Wari Empire attempted to incorporate the Cuzco region within their empire. The Wari increased Cuzco's agricultural output through the building of canals and terrace farms, and even turned previously unused lands into centers of agricultural production. It was also during this time that the Wari built the administrative fortress of Pikillacta, described by Bauer as an "architectural marvel" and "enormous on any scale."²¹ Meanwhile, the Tiwanaku Empire took the Wari expansion as an opportunity to expand its own trade network with Cuzco and other border areas. Economist Edward Barbier explains that the "Wari-Tiwanaku trading network stimulated the development of many smaller trading centers throughout the Central Andes," and the Cuzco region became "the secondary core trading center" behind the ones located in the capitals of these two empires.²² Nevertheless, despite all of these improvements provided by the Wari Empire, the inhabitants of Cuzco never fully accepted them as their rulers.

Even after three centuries, the population of Cuzco continued to see the Wari as foreigners. The Wari initially managed to reach an understanding with the local elites through which they retained partial control of their territories, but overtime the relationship changed. Brian Bauer claims that the construction of Pikillacta was part of Wari's plan to attain total control of the southern highlands. In Bauer's view, the final blow on Wari's failed efforts of control was a fire that destroyed much of Pikillacta, effectively forcing the Wari to abandon their efforts of expansion into Cuzco by 900.²³

Figure 1 shows the furthest extent of Wari-Tiwanaku influences and their overlap, mostly Wari-administered territory with influences from Tiwanaku. The overlap includes places such as Moquegua and Cuzco, where the Inca civilization formed in later years.




Figure 1. Map of Wari and Tiwanaku civilizations.²⁴

Fall of Wari and Tiwanaku

As a result of internal and external problems, the mighty Wari and Tiwanaku imperial prominence declined simultaneously and at an accelerated rate. Gordon McEwan argues that the Wari Empire “suffered from severe overcentralization,” and he bases his claim on the large ethnic diversity within the empire’s borders and the overextended size of the capital. These issues diminished the effectiveness of imperial administration and maintenance. According to McEwan, by the first hundred years of the second millennium the Wari’s capital was “the largest city in pre-Columbian South America,” causing the necessity of ever-growing amounts of food to sustain the city.²⁵ Tiwanaku faced social and administrative problems as well, but their situation resulted from a long process of debilitation. As indicated by Brian Bauer and Charles Stanish, years of political infighting and the rupturing of vast trade networks caused the overtime disintegration of Tiwanaku’s influence in western South America. Rebellions and foreign invasions further plagued the final days of Tiwanaku.²⁶ However, the final blow against these empires came in the form of cataclysmic climatic changes.

In the Andean highlands, a long drought destroyed the Tiwanaku and Wari agricultural systems which sustained their city populations. Engineer Charles Ortloff contends that “the fate of Tiwanaku was tied to raised field systems” and that its decline “was inevitable due to limitations on its agricultural strategy suitable to highland zones.” Similarly, Ortloff explains that the Wari “rainfall-supplied terraces diminished due to the high vulnerability of these systems to drought.”²⁷ Essentially, the Wari and Tiwanaku empires ran out of food, and by 1100 both empires ceased to exist.

Restructure of western South America

The fall of Wari and Tiwanaku accelerated the ethnic and political diversification process present in western South America since the eleventh century. The region came under the control of small polities that engaged in trade and warfare.²⁸ Out of these new states two civilizations achieved a dominant status over the former Wari and Tiwanaku regions, the Chimor of northern Peru and the Aymara of the Altiplano.

The Aymara peoples gained control over the Altiplano region starting from the twelfth century, and formed small kingdoms throughout the Andean plateau. They focused on farming and pastoral herding, and had simple government structures. Several heavily-fortified *pucarás*, hill forts, found in the area indicate their constant fighting.²⁹

Meanwhile, at approximately the same time the Aymara rose to power, Wari's coastal domains in northern Peru came under control of the Chimor kingdom. With the use of mud-brick architecture, the Chimor made their capital of Chan-Chan a grandiose walled complex and built a series of other cities with similar infrastructure models. Amidst a heavily urbanized region, the Chimor established an effective system of control that regulated the actions of local elites through supervision, military force, and tributes.³⁰

Following the fall of Wari, the region of southern Peru lost its urban population in favor of increasing rural societies. Similar to the situation in the nearby Altiplano, the political entities in southern Peru thrived in a state of constant conflict. Alliances only served to support the dominant group. Nonetheless, these competing societies ultimately sought to recreate what they considered a glorious past under the Wari and Tiwanaku empires.³¹

Development of the Inca state

Under this political climate the Incas appeared in the Cuzco Valley. Small warring kingdoms also controlled this region which, as previously mentioned, had formerly served as a point of interaction between the Wari and Tiwanaku.³² According to Hubert Chanson, a hydraulic engineer whose research includes the development and effects of pre-Columbian South American irrigation systems, during the early thirteenth century the Incas were nothing more than “a small tribe in the southern highlands of Peru.”³³ Their early tactics focused on raiding and plundering rivals without establishing permanent control over them. This changed in the early fifteenth century with the accession of Wiraqocha Inka, whose conquest of the neighboring Ayamarca kingdom made the Incas “a political power in the Urubamba Valley.”³⁴ Nonetheless, this new position of power brought forth animosity from neighboring states.

In fact, the Inca government nearly ceased to exist after internal political turmoil and an invasion from the powerful Chanka, a rival group west of Cuzco, simultaneously struck in 1438. Historian Kenneth Andrien, a specialist of colonial Latin America, asserts that “factions of nobles and commoners” rallied in opposition to Wiraqocha and Inka Urqo, his favorite son and chosen successor, due to their policies of “political and religious consolidation.” Furthermore, Spanish chronicler and conquistador Pedro Cieza de León writes about the general disregard the people of Cuzco had for Urqo, whom they considered “cowardly, remiss, full of vices, and with few virtues.”³⁵ The Chanka, aware of this political infighting and desiring the wealth of Cuzco, took the Inca’s troublesome situation as an opportunity to conquer the region.³⁶

Rise of Pachakuti

In response to the Chanka invasion, Wiraqocha and Inka Urqo withdrew from Cuzco. Their departure from the city is depicted with minor differences by the Spanish chroniclers Juan de Betanzos and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa. In the account of Betanzos, a conquistador who compiled his information from interviews with native inhabitants, Wiraqocha feared the might of Uscovilca, the Chanka's leader, and after a conference with his high officials decided to escape along with his supporters to a hilltop fortress. Sarmiento de Gamboa's account, also gathered from native oral tradition, places Wiraqocha's decision as the result of a conspiracy by generals Vicaquirao and Apo Mayta, who were among those who suggested Wiraqocha to escape, in order to depose him and Urqo in favor of a more respectable ruler "who would treat them well and honourably." Nevertheless, both accounts agree that during these times of trouble rose to prominence Kusi Inka Yupanki, the youngest son of Wiraqocha, by boldly refusing to abandon Cuzco and promising to defend it with his life.³⁷ By accident or with purpose, Apo Mayta and Vicaquirao found in Kusi the man to place in power.

The events which followed ultimately saw the defenders of Cuzco succeed over the Chanka invaders, but exactly how they managed to emerge victorious remains unclear. Prior to the arrival of the Chankas, Juan de Betanzos describes the desperate attempts of Kusi to obtain military support from the chiefdoms surrounding Cuzco. The leaders of these polities expressed their support for him, but their provision of troops would only take place if Kusi first managed to assemble a strong army of his own. Despite he did not obtain the requested soldiers, Kusi gained the moral support of his neighbors and

managed to get his name and story spread to greater distances as his message got passed on to other states. This last deed may have been the decisive factor in the Inca's victory as, at exactly the same time the Chanka troops invaded Cuzco, both Betanzos and Sarmiento de Gamboa agree that a large force of foreign soldiers stormed down the hills and turned the tide of the battle against the Chankas. All that is known about these foreign soldiers is that they came from lands in the south, but neither chronicler really goes into much detail about them. During the battle, Uscovilca was captured and killed, and at the end of the conflict Cuzco remained under the control of the Incas. According to Sarmiento de Gamboa, the surprised inhabitants expressed their honor for the young Kusi by calling him a variety of names, but the one which stuck with him for the rest of his life was Pachakuti, "which means 'overturner of the earth,' alluding to the land and farms which they looked upon as lost."³⁸ However, celebrations aside, the rightful ruler of the Inca state remained in the fortress outside of Cuzco.

Even after Pachakuti achieved the impossible, Wiraqocha kept his preference for Inka Urqo. Yet, Pachakuti had no intention of giving up his newfound power to his brother. María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco explains that Urqo and Wiraqocha in an act of jealousy unsuccessfully attempted to ambush and murder Pachakuti, but their plans only ended up causing the death of Urqo. Wiraqocha eventually also died, but he never accepted Pachakuti as his successor.³⁹ Nonetheless, Kenneth Andrien affirms that by this time Pachakuti and his generals held "immense prestige and popularity," which they used to "eliminate" any opposition to the new regime.⁴⁰ Pachakuti's accession to the throne in 1438 marked a major change for western South America.

CHAPTER IV

EXPANSION AND IMPERIALISM

Upon achieving complete control over Cuzco and successfully establishing the Inca state as a major military power, Pachakutiq initiated another massive change for his people by expanding his kingdom's control over societies across the Andean world. As maintained by archaeologist Terence D'Altroy, Incan expansion became a continuous process due to factors such as hostile neighbors threatening their national security and a strong policy of militarism which "carried over into the imperial era." D'Altroy and archaeologist Alan Covey further add that climate continued to play an important role on Andean survival. Covey, an ethnohistorian of the Inca's formation and imperial strategies, specifically mentions how "a prolonged drought" in the thirteenth century caused an increased competition for agricultural resources.⁴¹ Based on these points, the Inca expansion can be explained as the consequence of a contest for survival.

Yet, under Pachakutiq the Inca expansion symbolized more than a necessity to survive. He began the tradition of a dual military leadership between the current emperor and his chosen successor as a means of providing him with experience and notability. Moreover, as will be described in later chapters, the Incas used their expansion as a means to expand their cultural practices over what they considered uncivilized societies.⁴² In order to provide a better understanding of the initial Inca interactions with their subjects and one of the primary reasons resistance and revolts against the Incas took place at different

stages, the following sections examine the reasons for the Inca expansion and the different tactics used by the Incas to obtain control over western South America.

Legacy of Wari and Tiwanaku

The demise of Wari and Tiwanaku at the start of the twelfth century AD did not erase their existence in the minds of Andean societies. Marks of their empires remained fresh not only as a result of their public works, but also due to their style of government. Thus, during this time civilizations such as the Chimor, according to international law expert and philosopher Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, “combined the organizational sense of the Wari with the taste for the spectacular of the Tiwanaku.”⁴³ The Incas were no exception.

Wari provided a strong foundation for the development of the Inca Empire. For example, Gordon McEwan, whose research presents one of the most detailed descriptions of the Wari’s influence on the Incas, mentions that the Incas adopted the Wari “tapestry tunics” for their nobility and Wari architecture for their capital. Moreover, as noted by Alan Covey, the road system left by the Wari proved particularly helpful once the Incas began administering their conquered territories. Ultimately, both anthropologists agree that Wari’s model of statecraft served as a springboard for the Inca state.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, much is still not known about the Wari’s legacy on the Inca Empire. While McEwan and cultural historian Juha Hiltunen propose that Wari and Tiwanaku impacted the Inca state equally, the Incas “for political reasons” provided “more precedence to Tiwanaku.”⁴⁵ Yet, even if the Inca’s claim unfairly diminishes Wari’s role, Tiwanaku certainly played a crucial part on Incan state development.

Indeed, the Incas adapted from Tiwanaku aspects similarly taken from Wari, but the Tiwanaku's ideological influence over the Incas marked a huge difference in both their politics and religion. As in the case with Wari, the Incas used the masonry techniques of the Tiwanaku to improve their architecture.⁴⁶ Ideologically, McEwan argues that the Incas had a fascination with Tiwanaku. For instance, the site at Tiwanaku "was revered as a holy place," and the Incas based their origin story in such a way so as to that they seemed to be a continuation to the Tiwanaku. Interesting to note is that McEwan claims the Incas claimed themselves as "the true inheritors of the prestigious Tiwanaku tradition," meaning that other civilizations also had a stake at this claim.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, another good point to mention at this time is the position of Latin American and Spanish literature expert James Wilson, who states that "the pre-existing Tiahuanaco empire was alien to both Aymara survivors and Inca conquerors." While Wilson does not contradict the idea that the Incas adapted Tiwanaku's ideology, he paints a much more aggressive tone on the picture by claiming that "the Incas wiped out [Tiwanaku] oral history and memory to replace it with their own."⁴⁸ Based on this research and the influence the Wari and Tiwanaku had over other contemporary Andean civilizations, it seems unlikely that the Inca's original goal was that of erasing the existence of Tiwanaku. However, Wilson's position gains better applicability with the passing of time in Andean history. As noted by anthropologist Katharina Schreiber, overtime the Wari and Tiwanaku civilizations vanished out of memory. This void in turn left the situation open for the Incas to receive attributions for inventions that did not belong to them.⁴⁹ As such, regardless of the original intentions of the Inca state, they ultimately attained recognition

for structures and concepts originally from Wari and Tiwanaku—a result which, as later chapters shall demonstrate, must have raised few complaints within the Inca elite.

Necessity and ambition

The grand expansion of the Inca Empire also represented a variety of goals and ideals driven both by necessity and ambition. The most immediate reason is the constant threats of invasion the Incas faced from hostile neighbors. According to anthropologist Terence D’Altroy, Incan expansionism made nearby civilizations such as the Chimor view them as aggressors. In turn, this caused unfriendly relations between both states.⁵⁰ Moreover, the climate of the Andean region also promoted the Incas into a search for lands with greater agricultural outputs. Archaeologist Alan Covey explains how earthquakes and *El Niño*, a climate pattern known for causing problems such as floods and droughts, can “reduce confidence in the political and religious systems in which affected groups participate.”⁵¹ D’Altroy relates this situation with Andean expansionism, mentioning that the Andean region of southern Peru had been the victim of “a prolonged drought.” Given the complicated case, Andean civilizations needed to expand their domains in order to obtain resources necessary for survival.⁵² In these cases of hostile neighbors and adverse climate of these cases, a necessity for peace and protection can be attributed as causes for the Incan expansion.

Nonetheless, the Incan expansion also grew out of ambition for greater wealth. Covey describes the Cuzco region as economically dependent on agriculture, specifically maize farming. Despite the productivity of Cuzco provided the Incas with “substantiated

surpluses of agricultural products” required for funding state projects, the Incas desired greater wealth. Nearby regions held a wider variety of resources. One particular example regards the Inca conquest of the Chachapoyas, a former Andean state in whose capital is in present-day northern Peru. Anthropologist Warren Church and archaeologist Adriana von Hagen argue that the Incas were willing to spend much time pacifying the constant revolts of the Chachapoyas because their location had exotic goods such as bird feathers and animal pelts, produced spices, cacao, coca leaves, honey, and cotton (among other things) which the Incas desired for use in things like decorative headdresses and textiles.⁵³ Evidence of Cuzco’s increased wealth during the Inca expansion is exemplified in the Temple of the Sun, the holiest religious structure in the empire. Susan Niles, an expert of Inca anthropology, states that during the reign of Pachakuti, the Temple of the Sun received large amounts of gold and silver which was used to adorn its walls, construct religious objects, and honor mummified ancestors housed at the sacred place. Other important buildings in Cuzco also benefited from these spoils of war, with descriptions of their grandeur mentioned in the narratives of both Incas and Spaniards.⁵⁴ However, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, that the Incas spent part of their conquered wealth in religious structures holds a much more relevant concept to their expansion rather than just that of adorning Cuzco.

The following section analyzes two contrasting methods of expansion effectively used by the Incas, diplomacy and warfare. **Figure 2** shows the vast expansion of the Inca Empire since the reign of Pachakuti until the reign of Wayna Qhapaq. Most of the conquests were carried out by Pachakuti and his son Tupaq Inka Yupanki.



Figure 2. Map of the Inca Empire's expansion since 1438 until 1527.⁵⁵

Diplomacy and warfare

Once Pachakuti took command, the Incas underwent a relatively repetitive process of expansion that proved quite effective. Anthropologist Gordon McEwan argues that the Incas knew that, in the long-run, “it was ultimately inefficient and impractical” to kill future subjects and risk losing imperial soldiers in the process.⁵⁶ McEwan’s argument is sustained by economist Louis Baudin, who claims that for the Incas “diplomacy took precedence over force.” They first sent emissaries to the places under their scope of conquest, and these emissaries in turn provided information on the benefits of peacefully joining the empire and the adversities of refusing to peacefully integrate. According to Baudin, benefits assured included the sharing of “civilization” with Cuzco and the incorporation of the local hierarchy into the imperial hierarchy. Otherwise, refusal meant war and their ultimate destruction by the Incan armies.⁵⁷ Still, emissaries were not the only tool of diplomacy with which the Incas attained their desired goals.

Intimidation also played a role in the diplomatic expansions of the Inca Empire. The large size of the Inca army alone caused fear among the populace. McEwan writes that the Incas first sent their troops “to the enemy’s doorstep,” and afterwards sent in the emissaries.⁵⁸ Social anthropologist Fernando Santos Granero explains how fear of the Inca military allowed them expansion into such places as Vilcabamba, whose leaders simply surrendered rather than face the massive Inca army.⁵⁹ Not surprisingly, weaker states opted to join the empire instead of facing imminent extermination. Nevertheless, in cases where these civilizations refused to peacefully join the Inca Empire, the Incas were equally prepared to use more aggressive tactics like sieges and open warfare.

Pachakutiq instituted a flexible system of warfare that attained its ends without the need of brute force. For instance, rather than making direct attacks, an alternative method used by the armies of Pachakutiq focused on laying siege to their enemies (preventing the entry of supplies and communications). Historian Burr Cartwright Brundage mentions one such siege, when the Soras peoples of the Altiplano refused to join the Incas and instead fortified their defenses in a massive rock called Challcomarca. Pachacuti's troops failed in their assault of Challcomarca, and so they instead laid siege to the place for two years. During the time of the siege most of the Soras starved to death, forcing the survivors to surrender.⁶⁰ This situation additionally demonstrates that time was not a problem as long as the objective was completed.

When direct attacks were used, the Incas also had the upper hand due to the large size of their army and the ingenuity of Pachakutiq. According to McEwan, warfare was won by whoever inflicted the largest amount of casualties. In his view, during the battle "Inca formations lost all cohesion" and officers were unable "to maneuver troops as a unit once they became engaged." In other words, the massive size of the imperial army made it practically unstoppable, albeit also uncontrollable. In spite of this, Baudin contends that Pachakutiq scouted the battlefield to find the opposing leader or central religious object, a method "which seems to have been new," and together with a small band of soldiers focused on capturing the aforementioned leader or object. This way he demoralized his opponents, paving the way for an even easier victory.⁶¹ Both of these explanations are perfectly plausible together, and provide a livelier picture of Andean warfare with success attributed to efficiency in both structure and agency.

From conqueror to statesman

After approximately thirty years as the commander of a rapid expansion across the varied terrains of western South America, Pachakutiq gave up his role in the Incan army in favor of his son Tupaq Inka Yupanki in 1463. Historian David Del Testa states that Pachakutiq retired because he sought to improve “the governance of the Incan Empire,” including developments in commerce and infrastructure.⁶² Anthropologist William Isbell adds another reason for Pachakutiq deciding to focus on imperial administration, this being his desire “to create a regal capital city and an illustrious dynasty of privileged emperors from a dusty village and a succession of grizzly war chiefs.” Isbell also claims that Tupaq was selected as Pachakutiq’s successor because he was “militarily brilliant” and more ambitious than his brother Amaru Inka.⁶³ Both of these explanations create a certain aura of grandeur around Pachakutiq, his decision to retire based on nothing more than his desire to improve the Inca Empire.

Nonetheless, when time is taken into account, a more humanistic reason can also be added to Pachakutiq’s decision to retire from the military. Chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega attributes the decision as Pachakutiq’s self-realization of his old age. David Del Testa approximates Pachakutiq’s birth to 1408, placing his age at around fifty-five when he retired from the armed forces.⁶⁴ It makes perfect sense that after thirty or so years of active military service Pachakutiq decided to retire, and this in no way contradicts his other reasons for deciding to focus on administering his vast empire. The following chapter shall focus on Pachakutiq’s role as a statesman and his creation of administrative concepts that remained in place until the fall of the Inca Empire.

CHAPTER V

REGULATIONS

The various cultures within the Inca Empire posed an obstacle to Pachakuti's imperial ambitions. In order to solve this problem and obtain full control of the state, he sought to unify the country. Richard Schaedel, a researcher of Latin American anthropology and ethnography, argues that Pachakuti thus executed a policy of standardization in "all of the provinces, despite their wide socio-cultural and economic differences."⁶⁵ In terms of area, anthropologist Bruce Trigger explains that the Incas placed greater emphasis on standardizing the Andean highlands than the coastal regions. Needless to say, the highlands were the home of the Incas; hence, their emphasis on what Trigger defines as the highland "core" is logical. However, coastal polities such as the Chimor were also affected by the Inca's imperial policies.⁶⁶ In this analysis, the standardizations established by the Inca government shall be referred to as regulations.

This chapter shall focus on the regulations imposed by Pachakuti on the ideological, social, political, and economic aspects of life in western South America. These domains were not arbitrarily chosen, but rather they are typical anthropological domains used to study early states. According to archaeological anthropologists Christopher Scarre and Brian Fagan, "the combination of economic productivity, the control over sources and distribution of food and wealth, the segregation and maintenance of the stratified social systems and its ideology, and the ability to maintain control by force where the vital

ingredients of early states.”⁶⁷ Given their similarities, and for the sake of maintaining the format established by Scarre and Fagan in their third edition of Ancient Civilizations, the ideological and social domains shall be combined into one section.

Political regulations

Inca supremacy functioned as the keystone to Pachakutiq’s complex imperial formation. As explained in Chapter III, prior to the formation of the Inca Empire the urban north and rural south areas of Ancient Peru engaged in constant fighting.⁶⁸ Under the empire, the different nations all responded to central Inca authority, and interaction between each of the provinces was limited. Historian Alfonso Klauer denotes that the Incas “subjected a heterogeneous group of nations, where each was only related with the imperial Inca nation, and disconnected with the rest even when they were in their proximities.”⁶⁹

Richard Schaedel attributes this state organization to Pachakutiq, who also devised an ingenious government structure which organized the Inca Empire into four regions: *Antisuyu* (northeast), *Kuntisuyu* (southwest), *Chinchaysuyu* (northwest), and *Qullasuyu* (southeast). Within each region the Incas established a meticulous division of power in a pyramidal structure where each level was in charge of the immediate level below it. For example, the head *curaca*, or chief, of a province would be in charge of 100 lower chiefs whom, in turn, were in charge of 100 households each, and so on. Thus, Pachakutiq created a system where every part of society was rigidly controlled.⁷⁰

Figure 3 shows the location of the four regions and Cuzco’s central position as imperial capital. In this map, Cuzco is separated from the four regions for the sake of perspective.



Figure 3. Imperial Divisions of the Inca Empire.⁷¹

Government control also included the creation and use of a secret surveillance system. The *tokoyrikoq* (“those who sees all”) investigated both subjects and administrators either publicly or in secrecy. Their duty included checking everyone’s job and reporting any mistakes or laziness.⁷² The internal espionage greatly restricted free will. No one could speak against the government or take individual actions outside of the established norm for fear of the *tokoyrikoq*’s accusation and consequent punishment under Inca law.⁷³ Although this research could not effectively conclude when this intelligence system began, its effect on Inca daily life are notable enough to require its mention.

Related to the *tokoyrikoq* is the Inca legal system, which functioned as another effective instrument of political control. Pachakutiq contributed twenty-seven laws to this system which, despite the existence of prior complex organizations, the Incas considered the first of its kind in the Andes. According to historian Sabine MacCormack, Pachakutiq’s laws dealt with the provinces and the imperial capital, and they included “regulations for the distribution of goods from Inca storehouses and for punishing theft from these storehouses and elsewhere.” One law even dealt with fire safety, which was important given that houses in Cuzco had thatched roofs. This law allowed neighbors of a burning house to take the house’s belongings, after putting down the fire, to punish the careless owner.⁷⁴ Unsurprisingly, under Inca law the emperor was supreme judge and decided on all cases involving the death penalty. If the emperor was absent, *curacas* served as judges and were punished if they disobeyed the rules.⁷⁵ All complexities aside, political scientist Joan Prats i Català claims that Inca law stood on three basic standards: “*Ama Suwa* (do not steal), *Ama Llulla* (do not lie), and *Ama Qhilla* (do not be lazy).”⁷⁶

Though harsh, punishment within this legal structure focused on teaching lessons to society. Historian John Malam depicts the Inca judicial process as a simple procedure where the accused went on trial and, if found guilty, faced either terrible death or severe public shame. Death sentences ranged from “beheading, stoning, being thrown off a cliff, or being tossed into a pit full of wild animals,” while lesser sentences included “whipping, losing an eye, a hand or foot, losing property, or being deported to another part of the empire and never [be] allowed to return home.” However, if the criminal was young or a first-time offender, the punishment was less severe and acted as a warning.⁷⁷ Gordon McEwan explains that the nobility received lighter penalties for their offences because the Incas believed that even the lightest of punishments brought them great humiliation. Nonetheless, if a person “stole food out of necessity,” then his castigation would be lessened and the *curaca* of his province received punishment “for not taking care of his people.” Thereupon, Malam argues that “people respected the law and knew what to expect should they do wrong,” a position backed by McEwan who writes that “the justice system was so efficient that the Spaniards frequently remarked on the very low crime rate in the Inca Empire.”⁷⁸

Economic regulations

Aside from a strong set of political regulations, Pachakutiq also set his sights on heavily controlling the economic structure of the Inca Empire. In this case, Pachakutiq had to deal with the situation that most Andean ethnic communities focused their economic activities on pastoral work and intensive farming.⁷⁹ One of the earliest actions taken by

Pachakutiq was the establishment of a road system that linked all provinces within the imperial economic structure. As explained in Chapter IV, the Inca roads used the Wari road system as their foundation. However, as noted by Gordon McEwan, the Incas not only expanded the road system but also “standardized highways” and “linked the various regions of the growing empire to Cusco.”⁸⁰ In terms of trade, as noted by historian Hernán Horna, the roads improved the exchange of goods and the movement of labor.⁸¹ Yet, the purpose of the roads went beyond that of improving trade.

While most authors mention the regulatory aspects of the road system, few emphasize its importance in Pachakutiq’s policy of standardization. Among the few is archaeologist John Hyslop, who writes that “to conquered populations throughout the Inka empire, the roads were an omnipresent symbol of the power and authority of the Inka state.”⁸² Horna and McEwan add support to Hyslop’s argument by explaining the important role the roads played for the army’s movement and population control. McEwan states that rest stops, called *tambos*, “were built to serve the army as it marched.” For his part, Horna mentions that “the roads also enabled the control of population movements.”⁸³ Thus, the Inca roads of Pachakutiq in essence were an arm of the state’s power which was used to ensure that everyone followed the law of the Inca and mobilize the army to rebel areas.

Figure 4 shows the road network of the Inca Empire. The map only depicts the major roads of the empire. During Pachakutiq’s reign, the system was incipient and did not have the massive size depicted in this map. Overtime it reached nearly every single region of the Inca Empire, serving as the veins to a powerful central government.




Figure 4: The Inca Road System.⁸⁴

In addition to the road system, Pachakuti founded the *chasqui* messenger system, which kept rapid communication alive across large distances. María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco explains that the *chasqui* messengers were selected among the men who were agile and good runners, but an Inca prince took charge as the supervisor of the rest stops along the road.⁸⁵ Chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega claims that the messengers followed a relay system, and that “every fourth of a league” a new messenger continued the trip in order to keep a constant flow of messages. The transfer of information took place either orally or with the use of *quipus*, a recording device which used a system of strings and knots. Moreover, with the use of smoke signals the *chasqui* could, “in two or three hours at the most,” notify the Inca of any uprising within the empire.⁸⁶ In other words, the effective communication network aside, the emphasis of this system was on regulation.

Inca policies of constant expansionism and regulation came at a cost in terms of manpower, but the Incas found a way to replenish such costs while also continuing to further regulate the economic aspects of society. Historian Patricia Temoche Cortez notes that the Incas used, as a method of “unification and domination,” the *mit'a* system. The *mit'a* permitted *curacas* the option of trading human workers in exchange for goods from the central government. Pachacutec did not invent the system, but knew about it and “generalized it across the state.”⁸⁷ Latin American historian David Rock claims the Incas used the *mit'a* mostly for construction. Nonetheless, Gordon McEwan argues that the Incas used the *mit'a* not only to improve the empire’s economic infrastructure, but also to keep people busy enough to prevent any revolts against the state.⁸⁸

Unsurprisingly, the Inca Empire's economy was under a pyramidal structure which positioned the Incas at the top. Anthropologist Katherine Newman considers that the Inca administered "a planned economy in which the administration of law through royal edict played an important role."⁸⁹ Nevertheless, interesting is that the Incas effectively used their economic planning to regulate both the upper and lower strata of their social pyramid. Their tool in this case was redistribution, which for the Incas constituted a noble work entrusted to them by the gods.⁹⁰ Chronicler Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas describes the redistribution as a simple process during which the Incas took the private property of conquered groups, "leaving no man any property," and then redistributed it as they saw fit.⁹¹ According to anthropologist H.W. Kaufmann and researcher J.E. Kaufmann, Inca redistribution focused on helping people in difficult economic times. However, Rostworowski points out that most goods served as gifts to the keep the *curacas*, military officials, and nobles loyal to the state.⁹² Thus, the Incas effectively used their economic control to keep those without power equally subordinate to them, and keep those with power loyal to the ruling class and central government.

Social and ideological regulations

Living within the Inca Empire meant living with a defined social status regulated by the authorities. Archaeologist Ann Kendall argues that "Inca social organization was strictly hierarchical and relationships in the family and civil life were very clearly defined, so that no individual, family, or large group failed to understand their role within their province or within the empire in any given circumstances."⁹³ The provinces were not the

only ones subject to this kind of social structure. As indicated by historians William Duiker and Jackson Spielgovel, “the social status and economic functions of the residents of [Cuzco] were rigidly defined.”⁹⁴ The Incas attained this social control through a mixture of impositions in education, language, and religion.

The Incas used education as a tool to control the masses, both the commoners and the nobility. Inka Roq’a, great-grandfather to Pachakutiq, founded the empire’s educational system in the late thirteenth century. For his part, Pachakutiq reformed the system, but also kept certain aspects of it in place. Based on Garcilaso de la Vega’s account that Tupaq Inka Yupanki supported Inka Roq’a’s restrictions which forbid commoners from entering the Inca schools, this research can logically conclude that Pachakutiq also kept these restrictions during his reign. This was apparently done for fear that, upon gaining knowledge, the commoners could challenge the state.⁹⁵ Anthropologist Terence D’Altroy states that commoners instead learned skills like farming, crafting, and hunting from their parents.⁹⁶ On the other hand, nobles received 4-year schooling from the *amautas* (the wise men) in areas such as language, warfare, religion, science, history, and mathematics. Students focused their third year of study on learning how to use the *quipu*.⁹⁷ This curriculum in a way is a form of regulation on the nobility, but the most obvious case of education control was on the provincial nobility. One of Pachakutiq’s reforms included taking the sons of provincial *curacas* as hostages to Cuzco in order to indoctrinate them into Inca culture. D’Altroy explains that they studied alongside the other nobles, and were later returned to their provinces as the new *curacas*.⁹⁸

A closely related concept to the educational regulations was the language standardization initiated by Pachakutiq. According to Gordon McEwan, Quechua (the language spoken by the Incas) originated in central Peru “more than a thousand years” prior to the development of Inca civilization.⁹⁹ At least 700 different languages existed in Peru by the time the Spaniards arrived to the Andes, which economist Louis Baudin considers “a major difficulty encountered by the [Inca] rulers.” Pachakutiq tried to resolve this problem by forcing all peoples within the empire to learn Quechua.¹⁰⁰

Language and education aside, another important aspect of Inca social regulation was religion. In fact, the Inca’s religion supported their expansionism by emanating a belief of their cultural superiority over neighboring nations. The Incas believed that *Inti*, their sun god, sent his children Manco Capac and Mama Oello with the duty of bringing civilization to the ancestors of the Inca peoples who lived in ignorance. The Incas took this concept along with their conquests in western South America, and viewed their expansion as a noble work with a holy purpose. Subsequent Inca rulers, including Pachakutiq, held this ideal throughout their interaction with neighboring cultures.¹⁰¹

Moreover, as noted by Gordon McEwan, “sometimes the Incas would actually take the god or its idol and priests to reside in Cuzco, where it could serve as a hostage for the good behavior of its worshippers.” Nonetheless, McEwan adds that the Incas held “a much more tolerant view” than the Spanish religion, and it allowed the worship of local deities “as long as they were willing to also revere and honor the Inca gods.”¹⁰² Religion thus played a vital role in the beginnings of the expansion of the Inca Empire and in the aspects of social regulation.

Of course, one important aspect which may seem to be missing from this analysis is whether the Inca's regulations were in due course successful in achieving the unity of the state. On that note, anthropologist Bruce Trigger provides a reference to Spanish Jesuit missionary Bernabé Cobo, whom "described the Inka kingdom as a 'single republic'."¹⁰³ Indeed, no reason exists to doubt that the Incas were successful in places where people respected their authority. Otherwise, in places where large groups rebelled against them, Pachakutiq used the *mitima*, which was the movement of rebellious groups to other regions of the empire. Philip Ainsworth Means, a historian and anthropologist of Ancient Peru, recollected accounts of chroniclers Pedro Sarmiento and Garcilaso de la Vega which attribute Pachakutiq as the inventor of the *mitima*.¹⁰⁴ Nonetheless, anthropologist Richard Schaedel argues that "generally speaking, the ethnic integrity of the conquered group was respected" by the Incas.¹⁰⁵

The following chapters shall address this issue of rebellions in detail and demonstrate that the regulations established by Pachakutiq ultimately failed to achieve the complete unity of the Inca state, and how that failure led to a series of events that caused the fall of the Inca Empire at the hands of Spain.

CHAPTER VI

RESISTANCE AND CIVIL WAR

Despite Pachakuti's several efforts at integration and centralization within the Inca Empire, Andean communities oftentimes took whatever opportunity they got to revolt against the empire or oppose Inca expansionism and regulation. Given these problems, historian Alfonso Klauer argues that the Inca's imperial expectations never achieved their desired results of a completely unified state.¹⁰⁶ This lack of unification not only proved problematic for Pachakuti during his reign, but even after his death the social matrix of the Andean world remained deeply fragmented. In one case, as told by Pedro Cieza de León, even the people of Cuzco revolted against Tupa Inca Yupanki, taking advantage that he was away in one of the imperial provinces.¹⁰⁷ Hence, it should come to no surprise that it took little over half a century after the death of Pachakuti for the Inca Empire to disintegrate into a state of civil war.

This chapter shall connect the insurrections from the time of Pachakuti, going through the reigns of his son Tupak Inca Yupanki and grandson Wayna Qhapaq, with the start of the Inca Civil War during the reign of his great-grandson Waskar Inka. At the root of this argument lies the premise of Andean autonomy, the desire of the conquered to determine their destiny. Therefore, prior to presenting the increasingly tumultuous situation of the Inca Empire, the chapter shall first focus on providing an analysis of Andean thought. Ultimately, all of this information shall be related with the Spanish Conquest.

Andean ideology

In 1988, Richard Schaedel, an anthropologist and archaeologist of Peruvian civilizations, argued in his work “Andean World View” that pre-Inca Andean societies lived in chiefdoms which did not have a complex hierarchical structure of power. Furthermore, he claimed that “the regulatory and controlling mechanisms of state society” did not apply to Andean societies such as the Lupaca (an Aymara chiefdom), whose government structure “rested on the support of the village headman, which could be withdrawn with little penalty.”¹⁰⁸ Schaedel based his argument not only on ethnohistorical studies about the Aymara, but also on the ancient Wari and Tiwanaku states and the later Inca civilization. He concluded that the Wari achieved nothing more than “an abortive effort at state formation by a conglomerate of ethnic groups” and that the Tiwanaku never attained “a great concentration of political power.” Regarding the Incas, Schaedel mentions how chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega provided information which showed that the Incas “converted the essentially reciprocal notion of duality [...] into one of superiority.”¹⁰⁹ Essentially, the Incas formed and later introduced this notion of a complex and clearly stratified central state into societies which had little to no experience with such governments.

This research for the most part agrees with Schaedel’s conclusions and, in a way, builds upon them by translating Andean social inexperience with authoritarian governments into opposition against Inca imperialism. Chapter III of this thesis even depicts how the inhabitants of Cuzco refused Wari imperialist ambitions on their region. Nonetheless, this investigation is much kinder to the Wari and Tiwanaku empires, and in Chapter IV

places their government structures as important foundations for the Inca Empire. That same chapter demonstrates that the Incas tried to claim a connection with the Tiwanaku. Additionally, going back to anthropologist Edward Lanning's argument in Chapter III, Andean societies in southern Peru wanted to hold imperial control over their neighbors in the region.¹¹⁰ Combining Schaedel's argument with the one from this thesis leads to the conclusion that while Andean societies sought to impose themselves as dominant imperial entities, in turn they did not want to be dominated by anyone else and none actually had an idea of how to govern an empire. Thus, Pachakuti and the Incas played an innovative role in the context of Andean history; a role later to be taken up by Spain.

With this complicated concept of Andean imperialism and ideology understood, the subsequent sections focus on the continuous resistance the Incas faced from Andean societies outside and within the borders of their empire. While the focus of this thesis remains Inca imperialism during Pachakuti's reign, in order to provide a complete connection between Pachakuti and the Spanish conquest it is necessary to briefly describe the development of the empire through the reigns of later emperors.

Rebellion and resistance under Pachakuti

The Incas faced resistance to their rule at least since the time of Pachakuti's father Wiraqocha. Archaeologist Thomas Athol Joyce, former president of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, claims that the Chanka invasion (which led to the rise of Pachakuti) was partially a response to the Inca's imposition of their sun-worshipping religion over the "low form of huaca-worship" that characterized

Andean civilizations such as the Chanka.¹¹¹ Thus, even before the start of the Inca expansion under Pachakutiq, civilizations already showed resistance to Inca domination.

As time passed, things went from bad to worse as Pachakutiq's empire faced insurrection from provinces that had supposedly been already conquered and pacified. Spanish chronicler Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa writes that the peoples conquered by Pachakutiq "obeyed so long as they felt the force compelling them, and, as soon as they were a little free from that fear, they presently rebelled and resumed their liberty."¹¹² In one particular case, chronicled by Juan de Betanzos, the provinces of *Qullasuyu* rebelled against the Incas when one of the provincial leaders declared himself "son of the Sun." Pachakutiq then sent a force to quell the rebellion.¹¹³ Therefore, uprisings were not unheard of even within those domains most proximate to the Inca heartland of Cuzco.

Lastly, according to the Andean legend of *Ollantay*, Pachakutiq ended his reign as emperor of the Incas amidst an ongoing revolt within his own army. Frederick Luciani, Latin American literature expert, explains that considerable debate exists as to how much indigenous elements remain in this tale which was turned into a play during the colonial era. The story deals with the character of Ollantay, a prominent warrior, who leads a rebellion against Pachakutiq because he will not let him marry an Inca princess. When Pachakutiq died in 1474, Ollantay was finally allowed to return to his loved one.¹¹⁴ H.W. Kaufmann and J.E. Kaufmann argue that Pachakutiq's son, Tupaq Inka Yupanki, more than likely took this decision in order to "end a rebellion that was getting out of hand."¹¹⁵ Two aspects can be concluded from this tale. If the work itself is nothing more than

fiction, it demonstrates that rebellions were a subject commonplace enough to be remembered in an oral story. However, if the work is based in truth, then it demonstrates that, during his lifetime, Pachakutiq never achieved the unification of his empire.

Tupaq Inka Yupanki

Tupaq succeeded Pachakutiq to the throne in 1474, and from then on the expert military man used his knowledge on tactics to further expand the Inca Empire. Historians William Hamblin and Jay Pascal Anglin claim that Tupaq “doubled the size of the empire by military conquests of parts of modern Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile.”¹¹⁶

Nonetheless, his actions were not without consequence. Archaeologist Stuart Fiedel attributes overextension as one of the possible reasons for the fall of the Inca Empire.¹¹⁷

Even though Fiedel does not specifically mention Tupaq Inka Yupanki as the culprit, based on the Hamblin and Anglin source it can be logically concluded that Tupaq caused the overextension problem for the empire.

Despite Tupaq Inka Yupanki fulfilled his role as emperor by using his skills as a military tactician and conqueror, his administrative skills proved insufficient and oftentimes even nonexistent. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa recorded from oral stories that, during the reign of Pachakutiq, Tupaq disappeared at least a couple of times while on his military expeditions and left people wondering whether he was dead or alive. One of these times he seems to have even made it as far away as Polynesia (located in the South Pacific Ocean).¹¹⁸ When he became emperor, Tupaq also faced problems of insurrection from his supposedly conquered subjects. John Hemming, an explorer and expert Inca

researcher, recounts of a rebellion during the reign of Tupaq which took place in the vital Lake Titicaca region. The emperor took care of the problem by defeating the rebels in two major battles.¹¹⁹ Although that is not different from the actions Pachakutiq took to quell rebellions, in other instances Tupaq's clear inability to efficiently administer problematic situations is quite evident. For example, María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco describes an "embarrassing situation" which Tupaq faced when rebels of Peru's central coast maintained their uprising for twelve years. His inability to stop the rebellion by normal means resulted in his decision to request his priests to use magic, but ultimately what came to his aid was a climatic disaster that forced the rebel's surrender.¹²⁰ In another situation, when a group of 300 people who came with gifts for the emperor had the bad luck to arrive at a time when crops were failing, Tupaq resolved to have them and their treasures buried.¹²¹ Thereupon, Tupaq Inka Yupanki, the great conqueror, was not a great governor.

Nonetheless, for the sake of providing a complete picture of this Inca emperor and not to dismiss him as completely incompetent, it is important to acknowledge some of the good deeds Tupaq Inka Yupanki achieved as emperor. According to Pedro Cieza de León, Tupaq managed to skillfully pacify a series of coastal insurrections through the use of gifts.¹²² If the account is true, then Tupaq's ability as a diplomat perhaps was not as lost as this research indicates. Additionally, Juan de Betanzos notes that, during his early reign as emperor, Tupaq left his elder brother as governor in Cuzco, and even set up a succession system in case his brother died while he was away conquering (or pacifying) territories.¹²³ The Betanzos account demonstrates that Tupaq knew his limitations as

administrator and, while away on his conquests, did not irresponsibly leave the empire without a governor. Yet, administrative problems followed Tupaqa until the end of his life.

In 1493, after a mere 22 years as emperor, Tupaqa Inka Yupanki died and left the Inca Empire in gubernatorial chaos. The emperor's passing away was unexpected, his death being the result either of an arrow wound, poisoning, or simply an illness. Rostworowski de Díez Canseco denotes that "he was said to be neither young nor old at the time of his death." A succession crisis ensued, leading to a fight "between the factions of the two candidates," one named Capac Guari and the other Tito Cusi Gualpa. However, even after Tito Cusi Gualpa's faction won, the boy was too young to rule and, thus, caused another minor struggle for the regency within his faction. The new ruler took the name Wayna Qhapaq, which Betanzos claims was given to him by his uncle and that it means "Young Great King."¹²⁴ Now it was up to Tupaqa's son to stabilize a massive empire.

Wayna Qhapaq and the Pax Incaica

The reign of Wayna Qhapaq is characterized in Inca history with the *Pax Incaica*, a period which contrasts between the relative peace among Andean civilizations within the Inca Empire and the ever-increasing problems faced by the Inca government. For instance, anthropologist Charles Stanish describes the *Pax Incaica* as a time when the states of the Altiplano reduced the amount of warfare among themselves.¹²⁵ In the area of economics, this period also saw the improvement in "the transport of goods over long distances."¹²⁶ This evidence of peace and prosperity in the one hand contrasts sharply with the evidence of war and incrementing government control over Andean peoples.

According to historian David Cahill, “the *pax incaica* was an agony for small kingdoms, [...] the glory of autonomy was in some cases a living memory, such that tribute in kind, labour and army levies, and the imposition of Incan satraps and bureaucrats served only to underscore what had been lost.”¹²⁷ Regarding the increasing warfare faced by the Inca government, archaeologist Thomas Patterson notes that “in its attempt to assert a *pax incaica* throughout its domain, the imperial state was almost continuously at war.”¹²⁸ Despite these problems, which at first hand may seem to exemplify instability, historian David Del Testa argues that Wayna Qhapaq “kept the Incan Empire strong in the face of growing internal divisions and external threats.” Similarly, anthropologist Kim MacQuarrie claims that, under Wayna Qhapaq, “the super-nova that was the Inca Empire had reached its zenith.”¹²⁹ Therefore, the *Pax Incaica* represents the apogee of the Inca state, with its regulations and display of strength at a peak.

Nonetheless, Wayna Qhapaq ruled the Inca Empire with an iron fist which, although effective, proved to further increase social unrest and enmity towards the government. Rostworowski de Díez Canseco writes that Wayna Qhapaq was possibly “the ruler who put down the greatest number of rebellions.”¹³⁰ Moreover, the animosity he obtained in exchange was quite large due to his aggressive tactics of pacifying uprisings. David Del Testa claims that the emperor “alienated many local leaders by using wholesale slaughter of local rebels.” He further adds that Wayna Qhapaq “did nothing to improve economic conditions, and increasingly assumed ceremonial and religious functions himself, depriving others of purpose and pride.”¹³¹ If that was not enough, the emperor also angered the Inca nobility. Drawing on events such as Wayna Qhapaq’s appropriation of

state property for personal use and a story which told how the emperor was forced to use gifts to regain support from the Inca elite, historian Karen Spalding argues that Wayna Qhapaq clashed with the Inca nobility for government control.¹³² As such, based on the evidence, this research sees in Wayna Qhapaq a person with a different and much more aggressive perspective on state unification than Pachakutiq and Tupaq Inka Yupanki. Not only that, but he also sought to consolidate state power in his position as emperor at the expense of the Inca elite.

Ultimately, Wayna Qhapaq died an unexpected death as a result of smallpox, a disease unknown to the Incas, leaving a politically fractured empire. The emperor died in 1527 while in a military campaign in the north, near present-day Colombia and Ecuador. Del Testa claims that the smallpox disease entered the Inca Empire from the Chiriguana peoples of present-day Paraguay. When the Incas retook areas taken by the Chiriguana, they also acquired the European disease from “renegade Spaniards” who accompanied the natives. However, historian Curt Lamar contends that the disease entered from the north along with the Spaniards.¹³³ Considering the speed with which the disease affected the Inca Empire, this research concludes both arguments as non-contradictory and perfectly logical. Making matters worse, the disease also killed Ninan Cuyochi, Wayna Qhapaq’s heir, leaving the Incas without a leader. In this context, Wayna Qhapaq further complicated the subsequent situation. Archaeologist Gordon McEwan explains that Wayna Qhapaq set up a headquarters in present-day Ecuador “that rivaled the official imperial court in Cuzco.” Upon his death, the new northern faction competed against Cuzco for imperial control.¹³⁴ The Inca Empire headed towards civil war.

Inca Civil War

Following the death of Wayna Qhapaq, a period of uncertainty took place as political factions within the Inca Empire focused their support on two of Wayna Qhapaq's sons, Waskar Inka and Atawallpa. The southern faction, based on the imperial capital of Cuzco, initially provided their support for Waskar. However, it seems that this initial support mainly came as a result of him being co-regent in Cuzco at the time of Wayna Qhapaq's death. McEwan explains that Wayna Qhapaq apparently wanted to remove Waskar from power in Cuzco, but never had the chance as a result of his unexpected death.¹³⁵ Meanwhile, in the north, the generals of Wayna Qhapaq influenced Atawallpa "to rebel against his brother." Rostworowski de Díez Canseco asserts that they took this decision for personal reasons, as they feared Waskar would diminish their power. Still, historian Burr Cartwright Brundage explains that Waskar's violent actions, including the imprisonment and starvation of one of their younger brothers, pushed Atawallpa into accepting the position of leadership from the northern faction.¹³⁶ So it was that the civil war developed as a result of both factions and agents looking out for their own interests.

The conflict also involved the non-Inca societies of the empire. For example, the Cañaris of present-day southern Ecuador allied with Waskar and managed to imprison Atawallpa. He later escaped and not only destroyed the southern Ecuadorian city of Tumipampa, but also the Chimor city of Tumbes (which had also allied with Waskar).¹³⁷ Rostworowski de Díez Canseco argues that Waskar's "continual blunders" eventually helped Atawallpa gain support for his campaign among the northern peoples of the empire.¹³⁸ Amidst this complicated situation arrived Spanish explorers and conquerors led by Francisco Pizarro.

CHAPTER VII

SPANISH CONQUEST

The arrival of Spain to western South America at a time when the Inca Empire stood socially and politically broken proved fortuitous to the European conquerors and a nightmare to the Incas. Indeed, not only was the Inca Empire during this time struggling with a civil war, but the deadly smallpox epidemic was in full bloom. Moreover, when taking into consideration the decades of internal turmoil described in this research, the Incas were possibly in the most vulnerable moment of their history.

Spanish explorations initially reached the northern regions of the Inca Empire in 1522, during the reign of Wayna Qhapaq. Francisco Pizarro, an adventurer and *hidalgo* (minor aristocrat) from the Extremadura province of Spain, afterwards led two unsuccessful expeditions to the Inca Empire in 1524 and 1527. Finally, after gaining approval for his third expedition directly from Spain, Pizarro gathered a force large enough to defeat an empire that had considerably weakened in the course of his three expeditions.¹³⁹ In a surprising sequence of events, Pizarro defeated the Incas and conquered their domains.

The following sections shall describe Pizarro's conquest of the Inca Empire, with particular emphasis on the effect of his alliances with local Amerindians and the often ignored black conquerors and slaves who accompanied the white Spaniards. In order to evaluate this impact, the chapter first begins with an analysis of the early Spanish expeditions to the Inca Empire, including that of Spanish conqueror and explorer Pascual

de Andagoya. Ultimately, this chapter brings to a close the analysis over the impact of Pachakutiq's regulations, and explains how local resistance transformed from insurrections against the Inca state into alliances with the Spanish conquerors.

Early hardships

Prior to his conquest of the Inca Empire, Francisco Pizarro carried out two unsuccessful expeditions into Inca territory. The first expedition had its roots in a prior journey led by Spanish explorer Pascual de Andagoya. The expedition of Andagoya started in 1522 as he traveled east of the Spanish Panama colony, located in Central America. He writes in his account of the expedition that, after capturing a fort in the area, local chiefs rendered their defeat and told him of the lands "as far as Cuzco." Andagoya continued his explorations, but faced a near-death experience when he almost drowned after falling from a canoe. In an event that would repeat itself throughout the exploration and conquest of western South America, the Spanish conqueror was saved from death by his Amerindian ally (in this case the chief). Nevertheless, Andagoya fell ill after the event as a result of staying "for two hours wet through" in addition to facing "cold air."¹⁴⁰

According to historian Curt Lamar, at this time is when "three men, informal partners, [...] Francisco Pizarro, Diego de Almagro, and the priest Hernando de Luque, acting on behalf of one Gaspar de Espinosa," approached Andagoya with the intentions of buying his ships. Andagoya claims that Panama's governor Pedro Arias de Avila encouraged him to let the three men lead the expedition claiming that "they would repay [him] what [he] had expended."¹⁴¹ Thus began the role of Francisco Pizarro in the conquest of Peru.

Francisco Pizarro's first expedition, lasting from 1524 to 1525, was a complete disaster. Lamar writes that the Spaniards "experienced numerous hardships," these including those described by historian Shane Mountjoy as "strong winds, fierce storms, and rough seas." Mountjoy further adds that Pizarro's troops, made up of 114 volunteers, "suffered in oppressive heat" and that many died from "disease, fatigue, and starvation." If that was not enough, Diego de Almagro lost an eye during one confrontation against the native inhabitants of present-day Colombia.¹⁴² Pascual de Andagoya excused himself from this expedition's failure by claiming that Pizarro "took a different direction" from what he had recommended as a result of mistrust. Needless to say, Pizarro's expedition returned to Panama, where Lamar notes that even Gaspar de Espinosa "withdrew his considerable financial support."¹⁴³ Despite the failure, Pizarro was not ready to give up.

Francisco Pizarro's second expedition, lasting from 1526 to 1528, still showed a lack of planning and organization albeit it turned out somewhat more successful than the first. For this expedition, Lamar notes that Pizarro "persuaded Almagro and Father Luque to join him on a formal partnership."¹⁴⁴ The expedition of 160 men made it south to the island of Gallo in Colombia. The climate of the island was the cause of the expedition's initial failure, with several of the men dying or falling ill. At this time Pedro de los Rios, the new governor of Panama, sent a ship to find the men and order their return to Panama. Nonetheless, Andagoya claims that the governor took this action "moved by avarice." The majority complied, but Pizarro and thirteen of his men continued the exploration. Their stubbornness paid off as they finally reached the Inca Empire, landing at the aforementioned city of Tumbez. Andagoya provides a valuable insight on the

response of the inhabitants, noting that “they did not fear them or desired to injure them, thinking that they were merchants.”¹⁴⁵ According to Mountjoy, “Pizarro was satisfied that he had finally found the empire he hoped to conquer,” but upon his return to Panama to report his findings, “the governor was not impressed with his ‘cheap display of gold and silver toys and a few Indian sheep.’” Undeterred, Almagro and Luque agreed to send Pizarro directly to Spain in order to get financing from the king. Mountjoy claims that they did not trust Pizarro, but they had only enough money for a one-person trip.¹⁴⁶ As such, disorganization, mistrust, and avarice continued to be a problem for the Spaniards.

The trip back to his homeland was a complete success for Francisco Pizarro. In 1529, the Spanish Crown agreed to help finance the third expedition, providing Pizarro with land titles and powers over the lands of the Incas that favored him above his associates. For example, out of a maximum of 1500 ducats that Pizarro could collect from taxation, only 500 went to Diego de Almagro. Afterwards, Pizarro went back to his native Extremadura in order to recruit people for his expedition, including several of his family members.¹⁴⁷ However, these were not the only preparations taken for the third expedition.

Black slaves and conquerors

Indeed, Francisco Pizarro not only gained the Spanish Crown’s approval to conquer the Inca Empire, but he also was allowed to take with him black slaves. The important aspect of this permission to take slaves is that it came directly from the Spanish Crown, but even in previous expeditions black slaves had taken an important role in helping the white Spaniards. Historian Frederick Bowser argues that “blacks figured in all

expeditions undertaken by the company between 1524 and 1528.” Furthermore, he mentions that at one point a black slave helped save Diego de Almagro’s life.¹⁴⁸ So, even though the early sections of this research did not explicitly mention the racial composition of the Spanish conquerors, it should be understood that there were indeed blacks participating in the early expeditions of Francisco Pizarro.

The participation of black conquerors continued well into the main stages of the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire. In his book *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest*, ethnohistorian Matthew Restall claims that “Spaniards expected to have several native or black auxiliaries,” and “they considered it a great hardship to go without them.” In fact, Restall states that during the Battle of Cajamarca, where Atawallpa was captured by Spanish forces, the only casualty from the Spanish side was a black slave.¹⁴⁹ Yet, the participation of black conquerors in Spanish expeditions throughout the Americas (not just western South America) is still relatively unknown. Restall argues that the reason for this situation is “because the majority of such Africans arrived as slaves, and because of their subordinate status in the increasingly ethnocentric Castilian worldview, the widespread and central role of blacks was consistently ignored by Spaniards writing about the Conquest.”¹⁵⁰ As such, although the remaining sections of this research will no longer make mention of the black conquerors, it is not because they are unimportant or nonexistent, but rather because much more is yet to be researched on this topic.

Spanish-Amerindian alliances

The focus of this research has so far been on the interactions between the Incas and their conquered Amerindian societies, but these societies also played a prominent role during the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire. The Spaniards were well-aware of the conflicting relations between the peoples of the Inca Empire and their rulers. For example, Hernando Pizarro, conquistador and brother of Francisco Pizarro, relates how he offered the Inca emperor Atawallpa his aid in subduing insurrections within the empire.¹⁵¹ This account demonstrates that the Spaniards knew of the social problems of the empire, but the offer to aid Atawallpa changed after they captured him in Cajamarca. Spanish conqueror Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa writes that “Don Francisco Pizarro knew of the disputes there had been between Atahualpa and Huascar,” and he requested that Waskar (who had previously been captured by Atawallpa) be brought to him. Atawallpa, fearing that Pizarro would ally with Waskar, ordered the execution of his brother. Sarmiento writes that Pizarro, based on this and “for other good and sufficient causes,” ordered the death of Atawallpa.¹⁵² The Spanish intervention on the Inca Civil War thus served to further agitate an already chaotic situation in western South America. Chaos was to the advantage of the Spaniards who soon enough received the aid of several Amerindian societies who had opposed Atawallpa. Historian Kenneth Andrien contends that “the defeated allies of Huascar, particularly the Cañari, the Chachapoyas, and the Huancas proved only too willing to side with the Spaniards against their Inca overlords.”¹⁵³ The Huancas proved particularly important to the Spaniards. According to historian Karen Spalding, “the Huancas provided Pizarro with warriors, provisions, and

services of all kinds.” Spalding further mentions that “over 3,000 Huanca warriors” accompanied the Spanish conquerors on their way to Cuzco. Nevertheless, the Inca army still proved dangerous. In two occasions “the Spaniards narrowly escaped defeat.”¹⁵⁴ Hence, with the aid of the Amerindians, Pizarro marched victoriously on to Cuzco.

Resurgence and aftermath

After nearly a century of rule, in 1533 the Inca Empire ceased to exist. However, the fall of the Inca government did not mean the immediate end of the Incas. Upon achieving the conquest of the Inca state, Francisco Pizarro did not simply destroy the Inca structure. In fact, he tried to return stability by appointing as new emperor Tupac Huallpa, a younger brother of Waskar. Of course, this new ruler was in reality nothing more than a puppet of the Spaniards. Thoroughly compliant, Tupac Huallpa died before actually accomplishing anything in favor of the Spaniards.¹⁵⁵ Pizarro subsequently chose a new emperor.

The next puppet emperor placed by Francisco Pizarro, Manqu Inka Yupanki, proved to be the last bulwark of the Incas. Archaeologist Gordon McEwan argues that Manqu initially “was eager to avenge the defeat of Huascar by cooperating with the Spaniards.” However, the new conquerors constantly belittled him, and so he decided to lead a major uprising against the Spaniards in 1536.¹⁵⁶ Manqu organized a number of loyal troops to lay siege to Cuzco and Lima, but the Amerindian allies of the Spaniards once again came to their rescue. According to historian Rafael Varon Gabai, this aid provided by the allies of the conquerors helped “secure Spanish control of Peru.”¹⁵⁷ Manqu Inka’s losses in Lima and Cuzco placed the last nail on the coffin that forever entombed the Inca state.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Inca Empire developed in the Andes Mountains of western South America during a period of interstate warfare caused by unstable climatic conditions and the political void left by the fall of the Wari and Tiwanaku empires. Cuzco, the place from where the Incas originated, was a valuable agricultural area which had the benefit of receiving both Wari and Tiwanaku technological and cultural influence while both empires blossomed. The Incas emerged with the mindset of recreating the glory of these past empires. When the ambitious Inca nobility found its match in the resourceful and determined Pachakuti, a young Inca prince, they embarked their civilization in a course of successful conquests.

Overtime, as the Incas increased the size of their domains, Pachakuti realized that his empire would be doomed unless he somehow unified the diverse cultures and societies of the Andes. In order to achieve his goal, Pachakuti implemented a variety of methods to control and standardize the population. These regulations included the implementation of a planned economy where everyone knew their role in society, increasing government control over the everyday lives of all individuals, and the institutionalization of social inequality where all societies were subservient to the Incan central administration.

Nonetheless, these plans never achieved their desired outcomes. Traditional Andean ideology did not accept the increasingly oppressive regulations imposed by the Incas. Regardless of the Inca's harsh punishment against rebels, which at times included the

total annihilation of societies, the peoples of the Inca Empire took any opportunity to rise against the Inca state. As such, the impressive changes that Pachakutiq implemented within his empire never gave fruit during his lifetime, and subsequent Inca emperors simply made the situation worse. Tupaq Inka Yupanki, Pachakutiq's son, kept expanding the empire without placing much consideration on its administrative control. Wayna Qhapaq, Pachakutiq's grandson, focused his reign on trying to consolidate the power of the imperial government on his own person and at the expense of the Inca nobility. Upon his unexpected death, a weakened Inca power structure fell into chaos as competing factions, formed around princes Waskar and Atawallpa, fought each other for power.

Disunity within the Inca Empire, which at the time was also struggling with a smallpox epidemic, gave Spanish conqueror Francisco Pizarro and his troops the ability to break the empire from within its borders. Although the Spaniards faced initial hardships, their acquisition of large numbers of black slaves and Amerindian allies provided them the power to topple the Inca government. These black conquerors and Amerindians, the unsung heroes of the Spanish conquest, proved invaluable to Pizarro's success.

However, even after the fall of their government, the Incas continued their fight against the Spaniards. Led by Manqu Inka Yupanki, the Incas took advantage of disputes among the Spaniards in order to regain their empire. Yet, the Amerindians whom the Incas had so arduously oppressed rescued the Spaniards and gave the final blow to the faltering Inca resistance. So it was that after nearly a century of power, internal disunity, along with a smallpox epidemic and a devastating civil war, ended the Inca Empire.

NOTES

¹ Rosemary Rees, *The Incas* (Chicago: Heinemann-Raintree Library, 2006), p. 4; for information on the early Inca society see also Anita Ganeri, *The Incas* (San Francisco: Compass Point Books, 2006), p. 6; and for more information on the foundation of Cuzco see also Luis Vitale, "Genesis y Desarrollo Del Modo De Produccion Comunal-Tributario De Las Formaciones Sociales Inca y Azteca," *Boletín Americanista* 33 (1983): p. 95.

² Kathleen Kuiper, ed., *Pre-Columbian America: Empires of the New World* (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2010), p. 147; and for different descriptions of how the Inca hierarchy aided their formation as the dominant regional power see also Brian Bauer, *Ancient Cuzco: Heartland of the Inca* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), pp. 15-22.

³ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 25-28; see also Kenneth Andrien, *Andean Worlds: Indigenous History, Culture, and Consciousness Under Spanish Rule, 1532-1825* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), p. 15.

⁴ William Foote Whyte, *Creative Problem Solving in the Field* (Walnut Creek, USA: AltaMira Press, 1997), pp. 77-78; for a description of Huanca culture and military see also Ana Maria Alfaro-Alexander, "De La Fortuna A Las Desventuras en Imagen de Jauja y Hombres, Paisajes, Ciudades De Edgardo Rivera Martinez," in *De Lo Andino A Lo Universal*, edited by César Ferreira and Ismael Márquez (Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP, 1999), pp. 257-258; and for an analysis of the Inca's lightning tactics of conquests see María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 72-73.

⁵ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 72-73; and for information on the people of Huarochiri see also Karen Spalding, *Huarochiri: An Andean Society Under Inca and Spanish Rule* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 20-21.

⁶ Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), pp. 83-85.

⁷ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 73-74.

⁸ Henri Beuchat, *Manual de Arqueología Americana* (Madrid: Daniel Jorro, 1818), p. 576; see also María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, "Las Sociedades Costeñas Centroandinas," in *Historia General de América Latina*, edited by Teresa Rojas, John Murra, and Germán Carrera (Paris: UNESCO, 1999), p. 426.

⁹ Louis Baudin, *Daily Life of the Incas* (Chelmsford, Mass.: Courier Dover Publications, 2003), pp. 59-60.

¹⁰ Frederic Engel, *Prehistoric Andean Ecology*, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Humanities Press, 1987), p. 7.

¹¹ Mnemonic devices, such as icons, help whoever sees them use their memory to remember events. This method would be used to maintain stories about the past. See Ran Boytner, "Clothing the Social World," in *Andean Archaeology*, edited by Helaine Silverman (Hoboken, N.J.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 136-137.

¹² The burnings by the Spaniards were ordered by the 1583 Council of Lima. Different classes of *quipus*

existed, meaning that a specific historical record was present in pre-Columbian western South America. See Raúl Porras Barrenechea, *Indagaciones Peruanas: El Legado Quechua* (Lima: UNMSM, 1999), pp. 160-161.

¹³ Nevertheless, as Tarver also explains, the chroniclers were not historians (not under the modern sense). The chroniclers simply recollected primary accounts with little understanding of how to conduct historical analysis. Yet, their information remains valuable despite the bias found in them. See Hollis Michael Tarver, "Garcilaso de la Vega 1539-1616," in *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, edited by Kelly Boyd (Binghamton, New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1999), p. 435. For a better explanation of the bias found in the work of Garcilaso see Maruja Barrig, "What is Justice? Indigenous Women in Andean Development Projects," in *Women and Gender Equity in Development Theory and Practice*, edited by Jane Jaquette and Gale Summerfield (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 111.

¹⁴ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2006), p. 37.

¹⁵ The diverse populations residing in the Altiplano helped flourish the development of Tiwanaku. See John Janusek, *Identity and Power in the Ancient Andes* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 280.

¹⁶ William Isbell, "City and state in Middle Horizon Huari," in *Peruvian Prehistory*, edited by Richard Keatinge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 177; for more information on the unification of Tiwanaku society see also John Janusek, "Household and City in Tiwanaku," in *Andean Archaeology*, edited by Helaine Silverman (Hoboken, N.J.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 206.

¹⁷ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 39; for more Wari-Tiwanaku contrasts see also William Isbell, "Emergence of City and State at Wari, Ayacucho, Peru, during the Middle Horizon," in *Andean Archaeology: Papers in Memory of Clifford Evans, Monograph 27*, edited by Ramiro Matos, Solveig Turpin, and Herbert Eling (Los Angeles: University of California, 1986), p. 196.

¹⁸ In the second case, archaeologists suggest that Wari ended up adapting the religion of Tiwanaku into their own artistic styles. See Margaret Young-Sánchez, *Tiwanaku: Ancestors of the Inca* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), pp. 159-161; see also Cheryl Martin and Mark Wasserman, *Latin America and its Peoples*, 2nd ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2007), p. 23.

¹⁹ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 39; for further information on the Wari administration system see also Gordon McEwan, *Pikillacta: The Wari Empire in Cuzco* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2005), pp. 3-7; for the Moquegua Valley interactions of Wari and Tiwanaku see also Kenny Sims, "After State Collapse: How Tumilaca Communities Developed in the Upper Moquegua Valley, Peru," in *After Collapse: The Regeneration of Complex Societies*, edited by Glenn Schwartz and John Nichols (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), pp. 123-130.

²⁰ Charles Stanish, *Ancient Titicaca* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 193; see also Brian Bauer, *Ancient Cuzco: Heartland of the Inca* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), pp. 67-68.

²¹ Brian Bauer, *Ancient Cuzco: Heartland of the Inca* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), pp. 67-68.

²² The central Wari-Tiwanaku network was the most important economic exchange system in the Central Andes, and Cuzco served as a midway point of exchange. See Edward Barbier, *Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed Through Natural Resource Exploitation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 116; for more on Wari-Tiwanaku relations see also Thomas Holloway, *A Companion to Latin American History* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 50-51.

²³ Brian Bauer, *Ancient Cuzco: Heartland of the Inca* (2004), pp. 68-69.

²⁴ Adapted from the maps found in Helaine Silverman and William Isbell, *The Handbook of South American Archaeology* (New York: Springer, 2008), p. 733; and Edward Lanning, *Peru Before The Incas* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 129.

²⁵ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 42.

²⁶ Brian Bauer and Charles Stanish, *Ritual and Pilgrimage in the Ancient Andes: The Islands of the Sun and the Moon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), pp. 42-43.

²⁷ Interestingly, Ortloff mentions that the nearby coastal settlements of the empires managed to survive the droughts due to their location, and some such as Chan-Chan (future capital of the Chimor) went on to consolidate their power in the region. See Charles Ortloff, *Water Engineering in the Ancient World* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2009), pp. 219-220.

²⁸ Alan Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 10; for more information on the sociopolitical situation after the fall of the Wari and Tiwanaku see also Edward Lanning, *Peru Before The Incas* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 141.

²⁹ Charles Stanish, *Ancient Titicaca* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 60; see also Bauer and Stanish, *Ritual and Pilgrimage in the Ancient Andes: The Islands of the Sun and the Moon* (2001), pp. 43-45.

³⁰ Barry Lewis, Robert Jurmain, and Lynn Kilgore, *Understanding Humans: Introduction to Physical Anthropology and Archaeology* (Stamford, Conn.: Cengage Learning, 2008), p. 422; for more information on Chimor cities and the levels of urbanization in Ancient Peru see also Edward Lanning, *Peru Before The Incas* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 153-154; and for an analysis of the Chimor system of control see also Brian Fagan, "The Lords of Chimor," *The Great Warming: Climate Change and the Rise and Fall of Civilizations* (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2009), chap. 9.

³¹ Edward Lanning, *Peru Before The Incas* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 155-157.

³² Edward Barbier, *Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed Through Natural Resource Exploitation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 116; see also McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 42.

³³ Hubert Chanson, *The Hydraulics of Open Channel Flow* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2004), p. 553.

³⁴ Kathleen Kuiper, ed., *Pre-Columbian America: Empires of the New World* (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2010), p. 147.

³⁵ Pedro Cieza de León claims that Wiraqocha wanted his son Kusi Inka Yupanki (Pachakutiq) as his successor, but most chroniclers and later historians disagree with his interpretation. See Kenneth Andrien, *Andean Worlds: Indigenous History, Culture, and Consciousness Under Spanish Rule, 1532-1825* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), pp. 14-15; for more on Inka Urqo and a different view of events see also Pedro Cieza de León, *The Second Part of the Chronicle of Peru*, translated by Clements Markham (London: Hakluyt Society, 1883), pp. 137-138.

³⁶ Louis Baudin, *Daily Life of the Incas* (2003), pp. 55-56.

³⁷ Sarmiento de Gamboa also claims that Apo Mayta and Vicaquirao had already set their sights on Kusi, the future Pachakutiq, not only for his “mild and affable” character but also due to his “high spirit and lofty ideas.” See Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas and the Execution of the Inca Tupac Amaru*, translated by Clements Markham (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), pp. 85-89. Betanzos is much more critical of Wiraqocha, to the point of claiming that he cared little about his fate and sure demise against the Chanka, and places greater importance on Kusi’s personal initiative rather than on a conspiracy by Wiraqocha’s generals. See Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, translated and edited by Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), pp. 19-22.

³⁸ Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas and the Execution of the Inca Tupac Amaru*, translated by Clements Markham (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), pp. 89-92; see also Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, translated and edited by Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), pp. 23-30.

³⁹ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), pp. 25-28; see also Kathleen Kuiper, ed., *Pre-Columbian America: Empires of the New World* (2010), pp. 149-150.

⁴⁰ Pachakutiq even disposed the faction which had opposed his father during the Chanka invasion. Kenneth Andrien, *Andean Worlds: Indigenous History, Culture, and Consciousness Under Spanish Rule, 1532-1825* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), p. 15.

⁴¹ Alan Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 137; for more information on the Inca expansion see also Terence D’Altroy, *The Incas* (2003), pp. 83-84.

⁴² Thomas Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), p. 197; for information on Pachakutiq’s son Tupa Inka Yupanki and his military experience see also David Del Testa, “Topa Inca Yupanqui: Inca Emperor,” in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (Westport, Conn.: Oryx Press, 2001), p. 184.

⁴³ Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, *What If Latin America Ruled the World?* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), p. 65.

⁴⁴ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 42; see also Alan Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 194-196.

⁴⁵ This work by McEwan and Hiltunen precedes later works by McEwan which present greater evidence for the Wari influence on the Incas. Nonetheless, it remains important due to its reminder that much is yet to be discovered and also due to the information on the Inca’s own perspective on the matter. See Juha Hiltunen and Gordon McEwan, “Knowing the Inca Past,” in *Andean Archaeology*, edited by Helaine Silverman (Hoboken, N.J.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 252.

⁴⁶ John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (Orlando, Fla.: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970), p. 58.

⁴⁷ McEwan’s explanation provides a better context to the Inca’s Lake Titicaca origin myth, as the lake itself is close to the city of Tiwanaku. Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 39.

⁴⁸ Jason Wilson, *The Andes: A Cultural History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 123.

⁴⁹ Schreiber specifically discusses Wari ruins which, already by 1586, were in the process of being

forgotten by the locals. However, Schreiber's point is that pre-Inca events have a tendency to be erroneously attributed to the Incas. Katharina Schreiber, "Metaphor, Monumentality, and Memory: The Imagery of Power on the Ancient Landscape," in *Politics and Power*, edited by Steven Falconer and Charles Redman (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2009), p. 78.

⁵⁰ Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas* (2003), p. 83.

⁵¹ Alan Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 55. For information on the El Niño-Southern Oscillation phenomenon see also Sam Lake, *Drought and Aquatic Ecosystems* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), chap. 1, section 1.4.

⁵² Climatic effects in western South America had terrible effects on the development of civilizations. See Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas* (2003), pp. 83-84.

⁵³ For the Cuzco farming see Alan Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 10; for more information on the plethora of Amazon resources see also Warren Church and Adriana von Hagen, "Chachapoyas: Cultural Development and Andean Cloud Forest Crossroads," in *The Handbook of South American Archaeology*, edited by Helaine Silverman and William Isbell (New York: Springer, 2008), p. 917.

⁵⁴ Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1999), pp. 70-72.

⁵⁵ Adapted from the map found in María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), p. 20; and the map found in John Howland Rowe, *Inca Culture at the Time of the Spanish Conquest* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 205.

⁵⁶ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 129.

⁵⁷ Louis Baudin, *Daily Life of the Incas* (2003), p. 127.

⁵⁸ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 130.

⁵⁹ Fernando Santos Granero, *Etnohistoria de la Alta Amazonia* (Quito: Editorial Abya-Yala, 1992), p. 44.

⁶⁰ Burr Cartwright Brundage, *Empire of the Incas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 103.

⁶¹ Baudin explains that Pachakuti used his clever method of capture against the Chanka of central Peru and the Collas of the Altiplano. See Louis Baudin, *Daily Life of the Incas* (2003), pp. 129-130; see also Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 130.

⁶² David Del Testa, "Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui: Founder of the Inca Empire," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (Westport, Conn.: Oryx Press, 2001), p. 141.

⁶³ William Isbell, *Mummies and Mortuary Monuments* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), p. 60.

⁶⁴ Garcilaso writes, "The Inca Pachacutec, seeing himself now old, decided to rest and make no more conquests." See Garcilaso de la Vega, *Historia General Del Perú o Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, Vol. 4 (Madrid: Imprenta del Villalpando, 1800), p. 66; see also David Del Testa, "Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui: Founder of the Inca Empire," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by

David Del Testa (2001), p. 141.

⁶⁵ Important to note is that Schaedel only mentioned the standardization instituted by Pachakutiq, but does not evaluate their ultimate success. See Richard Schaedel, "Early State of the Incas," in *The Early State*, edited by H.J.M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), p. 307.

⁶⁶ Bruce Trigger, *Understanding Early Civilizations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 106-107.

⁶⁷ Christopher Scarre and Brian Fagan, *Ancient Civilizations*, 3rd edition (Upper Saddle River, USA: Pearson Education, 2008), p. 42.

⁶⁸ Edward Lanning, *Peru Before The Incas* (1967), p. 155.

⁶⁹ Alfonso Klauer, *Tahuantinsuyo: El Cóndor Herido de Muerte* (Lima: Diselpesa, 2000), p. 48.

⁷⁰ Richard Schaedel, "Early State of the Incas," in *The Early State*, edited by H.J.M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik (1978), pp. 307-308; see also Wade Davis, *One River: Explorations and Discoveries in the Amazon Rain Forest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 430.

⁷¹ Based on the maps found in Alfonso Klauer, *Tahuantinsuyo: El Cóndor Herido de Muerte* (2000), p. 45; and John Hyslop, *The Inka Road System* (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984), p. 258.

⁷² Timothy Parsons, *The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2010), p. 137; see also Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), pp. 114-115.

⁷³ Lewis Spence, *The Myths of Mexico and Peru: Aztec, Maya and Inca* (Charleston: Forgotten Books, 2008), p. 189; see also Timothy Parsons, *The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2010), p. 137.

⁷⁴ MacCormack argues that the uniqueness of the Inca laws, particularly the ones concerning Cuzco, provide veracity to existence of Inca law. Sabine MacCormack, "History and Law in Sixteenth-Century Peru: The Impact of European Scholarly Traditions," in *Cultures of Scholarship*, edited by Sarah Humphreys (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 292-295.

⁷⁵ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 108.

⁷⁶ Joan Prats i Catalá, *A los príncipes republicanos: Gobernanza y desarrollo desde el republicanismo cívico* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2006), p. 678.

⁷⁷ John Malam, *Exploring the Incas* (London: Evans Brothers, 2006), p. 32.

⁷⁸ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), pp. 107-108; see also John Malam, *Exploring the Incas*, p. 33.

⁷⁹ José Luis Roca, *Ni con Lima ni con Buenos Aires: La Formación de un Estado Nacional en Charcas* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2007), p. 27.

⁸⁰ Flor Romero de Nohra, *Dos Mil Tres Lunas: Pachacútec el Rey Sol* (Bogota: Flor Romero Rueda, 2004), p. 22.

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- ⁸¹ Hernán Horna, *La Indianidad: The Indigenous World Before Latin Americans* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001), p. 68.
- ⁸² Hyslop further adds that “there were probably few individuals subject to the Inka state who had never seen an Inka road.” In other words, the roads symbolized the presence of the state. John Hyslop, *The Inka Road System* (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984), p. 2.
- ⁸³ Hernán Horna, *La Indianidad: The Indigenous World Before Latin Americans* (2001), p. 68; see also Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 44.
- ⁸⁴ Adapted from the map found in John Hyslop, *The Inka Road System* (1984), p. 258.
- ⁸⁵ Celso Enríquez, *Sports in Pre-Hispanic America*, translated by Maria Teresa Bernice de Guitán (Mexico City: Litográfica Machado, 1968), p. 117; see also María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *Pachacútec Inca Yupanqui* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2001), p. 209.
- ⁸⁶ Garcilaso de la Vega, *Historia General Del Perú o Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, Vol. 3 (Madrid: Imprenta del Villalpando, 1800), pp. 269-274.
- ⁸⁷ Patricia Temoche Cortez, *Breve Historia de Los Incas* (Madrid: Ediciones Nowtilus S.L., 2008), pp. 107-108.
- ⁸⁸ David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 18; see also McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 92.
- ⁸⁹ Katherine Newman, *Law and Economic Organization: A Comparative Study of Preindustrial Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 202.
- ⁹⁰ According to historian Ann Zulawski: “When territory was conquered, the Inca determined which lands should be worked by the local people for the benefit of the state and the gods, and which portions would be granted to local lords and ayllus.” See Ann Zulawski, *They Eat from Their Labor: Work and Social Change in Colonial Bolivia* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), p. 22.
- ⁹¹ Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia General De Los Hechos De Los Castellanos*, Vol. 4, translated by John Stevens (London: Jer. Batley, 1725), p. 336.
- ⁹² H.W. Kaufmann and J.E. Kaufmann, *Fortifications of the Incas* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006), p. 16; and see also María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), pp. 202-203.
- ⁹³ Ann Kendall, *Everyday Life of the Incas* (New York: Dorset Press, 1989), p. 54.
- ⁹⁴ William Duiker and Jackson Spielgovel, *World History: To 1800*. 5th ed. (Stamford, Conn.: Cengage Learning, 2006), p. 178.
- ⁹⁵ For information on the education system started by Inka Roq’a see Edward Myers, *Education in The Perspective of History* (London: Longmans, 1963), p. 297. For the Garcilaso account see Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, Vol. 2, edited by Carlos Aranibar (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1991), p. 513.
- ⁹⁶ Terence D’Altroy, *The Incas* (2003), p. 189.

⁹⁷ Angel Recto, *Foundations of Education*, Vol. 2 (Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Bookstore, Inc., 2005), p. 12; see also Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas* (2003), p. 189.

⁹⁸ Pedro Correa Rodríguez claims that “from the epoch of Pachacutec appears the figure of the yanacona or slave at the service of imperial power.” See Pedro Correa Rodríguez, *La Cultura Literaria de los Incas* (Spain: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 2006), p. 28; see also Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas* (2003), p. 189.

⁹⁹ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 180.

¹⁰⁰ For Pachakuti's decision to impose Quechua see Yosú de Lezama y Urrutia, *Apuntes de Lingüística Aborigen* (Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás, 1979), p. 79; for more on the language diversity of the Inca Empire see also Louis Baudin, *Daily Life of the Incas* (2003), p. 97.

¹⁰¹ The myth of Manco Capac and Mama Ocllo is one of several Andean origin tales which vary depending on region. See Bobbie Kalman and Tammy Everts, *Peru the People and Culture* (New York: Crabtree Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 4-5; for information on Pachakuti and the Inca's religious justification for their expansion see also Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History* (1999), pp. 72-73.

¹⁰² Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 137.

¹⁰³ Bruce Trigger, *Understanding Early Civilizations* (2003), p. 107.

¹⁰⁴ Fernando Arellano, *El Arte Hispanoamericano* (Caracas: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 1988), p. 51; see also Philip Ainsworth Means, *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes* (New York City: Gordian Press, 1973), pp. 343-344.

¹⁰⁵ Richard Schaedel, “Early State of the Incas,” in *The Early State*, edited by H.J.M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik (1978), p. 307.

¹⁰⁶ Alfonso Klauer, *Tahuantinsuyo: El Cóndor Herido de Muerte* (Lima: Diselpesa, 2000), p. 148.

¹⁰⁷ The revolt was eventually pacified by officials at Cuzco. See Pedro Cieza de León, *El Señorío de los Incas*, edited by Carlos Aranibar and Pierre Duviols (Lima: Editorial Universo, 1973), chap. 57.

¹⁰⁸ Richard Schaedel, “Andean World View: Hierarchy or Reciprocity, Regulation or Control?” in *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 29, No. 5 (USA: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 772.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 770, pp. 772-773.

¹¹⁰ Edward Lanning, *Peru Before The Incas* (1967), pp. 155-157.

¹¹¹ Thomas Athol Joyce, *South American Archaeology* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), p. 92.

¹¹² Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas and The Execution of the Inca Tupac Amaru* (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2007), p. 119.

¹¹³ Quillasuyu or Collasuyu is one of the four subdivisions of the Inca Empire, see page 28 in this thesis to find its map location. For more on the Betanzos event see Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History* (1999), p. 38.

¹¹⁴ Frederick Luciani, “Spanish American Theatre of the Eighteenth Century,” in *The Cambridge History*

of *Latin American Literature*, edited by Roberto González Echevarría and Enrique Pupo-Walker (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.406-407; for Pachacuti's date of death see David Del Testa, "Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui: Founder of the Inca Empire," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (2001), p. 141.

¹¹⁵ H.W. Kaufmann and J.E. Kaufmann, *Fortifications of the Incas* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006), p. 40.

¹¹⁶ Jay Pascal Anglin and William Hamblin, *World History to 1648*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1993), p. 370.

¹¹⁷ Stuart Fiedel, *Prehistory of the Americas* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 347.

¹¹⁸ The possibility that the Incas made it to Polynesia is currently nothing more than a hypothesis. Louis Baudin apparently agrees with the hypothesis, but English writer Clements Markham believes the islands Tupaq visited were the Galapagos. See Louis Baudin, *Daily Life of the Incas* (2003), p. 21; for Markham's opinion and more on Sarmiento's account see also Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas and the Execution of the Inca Tupac Amaru*, translated by Clements Markham (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), pp. 134-136.

¹¹⁹ John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (1970), p. 242.

¹²⁰ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), pp. 88-89.

¹²¹ Jesus Maria, "An Account of the Antiquities of Peru," in *Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the Incas*, translated by Clements Robert Markham (Charleston: Forgotten Books, 2008), p. 88.

¹²² Then again, Pedro Cieza de León adds that this interpretation of a peaceful resolution to conflict was disputed as false by other Amerindian peoples outside of Cuzco. See Pedro Cieza de León, *El Señorío de los Incas*, edited by Carlos Aranibar and Pierre Duviols (1973), chap. 60.

¹²³ Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, translated and edited by Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), pp. 140-143.

¹²⁴ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), pp. 104-105. Betanzos explains that "Capac" (or Qhapaq) means something greater than a king. He does not provide a specific word, so this research concludes that the term "Great King" is sufficient to describe someone who is greater than a king. See Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, translated and edited by Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan (1996), p. 123.

¹²⁵ For the Pax Incaica established by Wayna Qhapaq see Pedro Saad Herrería, *Ecuador: Un País en Imágenes* (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 2002), p. 22; for the Pax Incaica according to Stanish see also Charles Stanish, *Ancient Titicaca* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 15.

¹²⁶ Benjamin Orlove, "Stability and Change in Highland Andean Dietary Patterns," in *Food and Evolution*, edited by Marvin Harris and Eric Ross (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 483.

¹²⁷ David Cahill, "Native Andean Elites in the Colonial System, 1532-1825," in *Technology, Disease, and Colonial Conquests, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, edited by George Raudzens (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003), p. 96.

¹²⁸ Thomas Patterson, *The Inca Empire* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992), p. 8.

¹²⁹ Kim MacQuarrie, *The Last Days of the Inca* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 46; see also David Del Testa, "Huayna Capac: Incan Emperor," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (Westport, Conn.: Oryx Press, 2001), p. 85.

¹³⁰ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), p. 89.

¹³¹ David Del Testa, "Huayna Capac: Incan Emperor," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (Westport, Conn.: Oryx Press, 2001), p. 85.

¹³² The Inca elite were accustomed to receive resources from state property, and Wayna Qhapaq's appropriation of such property left them with fewer gains. Karen Spalding, *Huarochiri: An Andean Society Under Inca and Spanish Rule* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 104-105.

¹³³ Del Testa also claims that smallpox "quickly ravaged the Incan Empire." See David Del Testa, "Huayna Capac: Incan Emperor," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (2001), p. 85; see also Curt Lamar, "Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative," in *The Hernando de Soto Expedition*, edited by Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 186.

¹³⁴ Curt Lamar, "Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative," in *The Hernando de Soto Expedition*, edited by Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 186; see also Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), pp. 78-79.

¹³⁵ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), pp. 78-79.

¹³⁶ Burr Cartwright Brundage, *Empire of the Incas* (1963), pp. 272-275; see also María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), p. 113.

¹³⁷ For the Tumbez and Chimor incident see Kim MacQuarrie, *The Last Days of the Inca* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 55; for information on the Cañaris see also María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), p. 113.

¹³⁸ María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, translated by Harry B. Iceland (1999), pp. 113-114.

¹³⁹ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), pp. 28-30. For more on Pizarro see Florence Lemoine, "Pizarro, Francisco: Spanish Conqueror of Peru," in *Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists*, edited by David Del Testa (Westport, Conn.: Oryx Press, 2001), p. 147.

¹⁴⁰ Pascual de Andagoya, *Narrative of the proceedings of Pedrarias Davila in the provinces of Tierra Firme or Castilla del Oro, and of the discovery of the South Sea and the coasts of Peru and Nicaragua*, translated by Clements Robert Markham (London: Hakluyt Society, 1865), pp. 40-42.

¹⁴¹ Curt Lamar, "Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative," in *The Hernando de Soto Expedition*, edited by Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 184-185; see also Pascual de Andagoya, *Narrative of the proceedings of Pedrarias Davila in the provinces of Tierra Firme or Castilla del Oro, and of the discovery of the South Sea and the coasts of Peru and Nicaragua*, translated by Clements Robert Markham (1865), pp. 42-43.

¹⁴² Important to note here is that the raids and battles carried out by the Spaniards during their failed first expedition were against the inhabitants of Colombia. Had their disorganized expedition actually reached northern Inca lands, where the Incan army was stationed, the results could have been more catastrophic. See Curt Lamar, "Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative," in *The Hernando de Soto Expedition*, edited by Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 185; see also Shane Mountjoy, *Francisco Pizarro and the Conquest of the Inca* (New York: Chelsea House, 2006), pp. 55-57.

¹⁴³ Pascual de Andagoya, *Narrative of the proceedings of Pedrarias Davila in the provinces of Tierra Firme or Castilla del Oro, and of the discovery of the South Sea and the coasts of Peru and Nicaragua*, translated by Clements Robert Markham (1865), pp. 43-44.

¹⁴⁴ The partnership between the three men (Pizarro, Luque, and Almagro) can be deemed an adventurous tragedy, which shall be further described in later events. See Curt Lamar, "Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative," in *The Hernando de Soto Expedition*, edited by Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 185.

¹⁴⁵ James Henderson, Helen Delpar, and Maurice Brungardt, *A Reference Guide to Latin American History*, edited by Richard Weldon (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000), p. 69; see also Pascual de Andagoya, *Narrative of the proceedings of Pedrarias Davila in the provinces of Tierra Firme or Castilla del Oro, and of the discovery of the South Sea and the coasts of Peru and Nicaragua*, translated by Clements Robert Markham (1865), pp. 45-46.

¹⁴⁶ The group saw Pizarro's charisma as a double-edged sword. On the one hand he was the likeliest of the three to obtain funding from Spain, but he was also likely to betray them. See Shane Mountjoy, *Francisco Pizarro and the Conquest of the Inca* (New York: Chelsea House, 2006), pp. 63-64.

¹⁴⁷ For a more detailed account on the gains Pizarro obtained from the Spanish Crown, see Rafael Varón Gabai, *Francisco Pizarro and His Brothers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), pp. 38-39; see also Curt Lamar, "Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative," in *The Hernando de Soto Expedition*, edited by Patricia Galloway (2005), pp. 185-186.

¹⁴⁸ For the 50 slaves allowed by the Spanish Crown for Pizarro to take, see Hollis Micheal Tarver, "Almagro, Diego de (1475-1538)," in *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery*, Vol. 1, edited by Junius Rodriguez (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO Inc., 1997), p. 27; see also Frederick Bowser, *The African Slave in Colonial Peru* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 3-4.

¹⁴⁹ Matthew Restall, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 51, 58.

¹⁵⁰ Matthew Restall, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* (2003), p. 53.

¹⁵¹ Atawallpa disregarded the offer made by Pizarro. See Hernando Pizarro, "Letter from Hernando Pizarro to the Royal Audience of Santo Domingo," in *Reports on the Discovery of Peru*, translated by Clements Robert Markham (London: Hakluyt Society, 1872), pp. 113-127.

¹⁵² Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas and the Execution of the Inca Tupac Amaru*, translated by Clements Markham (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), pp. 188-190.

¹⁵³ Kenneth Andrien, *Andean Worlds: Indigenous History, Culture, and Consciousness Under Spanish Rule, 1532-1825* (2001), p. 38.

¹⁵⁴ Karen Spalding, *Huarochiri: An Andean Society Under Inca and Spanish Rule* (1988), pp. 116-117.

¹⁵⁵ John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (1970), pp. 86-87, 95-96.

¹⁵⁶ Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (2006), p. 80.

¹⁵⁷ For more information on the Siege of Lima see Rafael Varón Gabai, *Francisco Pizarro and His Brothers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), p. 185. For more on the Siege of Cuzco see Peter Gose, *Invaders as Ancestors* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 42.

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