

PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY  
RECONSIDERED

A Dissertation

by

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the understanding of democratic consolidation, and to address a debate within this topic: Is presidentialism harmful to democratic consolidation? I argue that presidentialism induces higher levels of political violence (attitudinally and behaviorally). Unlike parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, which offer mechanisms to alter the incumbent government through legislative responsibility, such as a vote of no confidence or a government reshuffle, when there exist mismatched policy expectations between the public and the government, or when the public dissatisfaction with the government is high, presidential systems do not have this mechanism to change the government composition and the president is empowered to govern until the next election. Even in the case that the public's discontent toward the president is high, there exist almost no mechanisms except for her own resignation and an impeachment to remove her from her office. However, a voluntary resignation and an impeachment are rarely occurred in the history, and thus, the expectation of the public regarding whether their grievances can be resolved and addressed is more difficult to be fulfilled in presidential democracies. Therefore, using and considering violence as a mean to address their political and social problems becomes a more viable option in presidential democracies. But by doing so, political stability will decrease and democratic consolidation will be hindered. I employ the World Value Survey and the Asian Barometer Survey to find support for this argument.

To further extend this argument and to address the debate, I argue that democratic breakdown must be considered a two-step process. For a democracy to break down, the presence of a democratic crisis that presents a significant likelihood of

overthrowing the current democratic regime is necessary. Specifically, I argue that presidentialism generates political instability through its institutions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis, but political instability does not further contribute from democratic crisis to democratic breakdown. Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated with a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the process.

## DEDICATION

To my family—Yu-Lin, Mu-Liang, and Rousi.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Introduction

According to Schedler, democratic consolidation is “meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual “reverse waves”” (1998: 91). This topic has long been an important subfield in comparative politics. Scholars are particularly interested in the conditions that sustain existing or new democracies. These conditions can be economical, institutional, cultural, or behavioral and attitudinal. For example, the modernization theory posits that economic development is the key factor explaining democratic transition and consolidation (e.g., Lipset 1959). In addition, scholars also argue that Islamism is not compatible with democracy and thus hinders the process of democratization (e.g., Fish 2002).

This dissertation combines two different approaches, behavior (attitude) and institution, and demonstrates that this combination is able to contribute greatly to the study of democratic consolidation. In particular, I investigate the relationship between political violence, political institution (presidentialism), and democratic consolidation. I first study the relationship between political institution (presidentialism) and violent attitude. Second, I research whether political institution (presidentialism) also explains violent behavior. Lastly, I investigate how political institution (presidentialism) affects domestic political violence (democratic crisis) and democratic breakdown, and intend to resolve a long-existing academic puzzle regarding whether presidentialism is associated with democratic breakdown.

I have developed an active research interest in the field of democratic consolida-

tion. The motivation behind this dissertation is an early inspiration by Juan Linz (1990a), who argues that presidential systems are harmful for democratic survival. However, decades of findings are contradictory and inconclusive. This dissertation intends to offer a tentative conclusion to this debate. To do so, I argue that, due to the rigidity of changing the government in presidential democracies, individuals and groups who are dissatisfied with their government, political system, and society are more likely to believe that using violence is justifiable. This argument is evident by the World Value Survey. To further extend this finding, I also argue that, again, due to the rigidity of changing the government in presidential democracies, individuals and groups who hold strong dissatisfactions with their government, political system, and society are more likely to use extreme violent strategies (hard protest behaviors, such as violent protests), that involve higher risks with legal and social consequences, compared to other strategies (soft protest behaviors, such as petitions) which are also capable of addressing their grievances without foreseeable consequences. This argument is evident by the Asian Barometer Survey.

Thus far, the findings suggest that presidentialism is associated with violent attitude and violent behavior, leading to a reconsideration of the process of democratic breakdown, which, as I will argue, is the key to address the puzzle of the relationship between presidentialism and democratic breakdown. The existing literature treats democratic survival as either the longevity of democracy, as measured by how many years a democracy has survived, or a dichotomous treatment of breakdown and survival in each regime year. But both treatments of democratic breakdown are incomplete because they do not consider a *precondition* for democratic breakdown, namely, a democratic crisis (political violence). I argue that democratic breakdown is best analyzed as a two-step process. For a democracy to break down, the presence of a democratic crisis that presents a significant likelihood of overthrowing the

current democratic regime is necessary, but not sufficient. By jointly analyzing the conditions that contribute to the emergence of a crisis and those that contribute to a breakdown (given the presence of a crisis), a better understanding of democratic survival will be achieved.

Specifically, I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through its institutions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis, but this political instability does not further contribute to the transition, if any, from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated with a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the process. This limited effect may be part of the reasons why many empirical studies find no statistical association between presidentialism and democratic breakdown.

## 1.2 Chapter Overview

### *1.2.1 Chapter Two: An Institutional Perspective of the Attitudinal Foundation of Political Violence in Democracies*

In the second chapter, I argue that political institutions play an important role in shaping violent political attitudes. People are encouraged to consider the adoption of violent behaviors to address their grievances because of a lack of political institutions to resolve mismatched policy expectations between the government and the public. In particular, the rigidity inherent in the government changes in presidential systems generates incentives for discontents and potential rebels to consider taking undemocratic (violent) means to either force a change or coerce the government to comply

with their demands. To examine this mechanism, I conduct hierarchical analyses using the World Value Survey (wave 3) to assess whether political institutions have a significant impact on attitudes regarding the use of violence for political goals. The evidence supports the theory and suggests that presidentialism enhances and triggers people's attitudes toward using violence.

*1.2.2 Chapter Three: Presidentialism, Democratic Attitude, and Protest Behaviors in East and Southeast Asian Democracies*

Following the findings from the previous chapter, in this chapter, I distinguish between two types of protest behaviors: soft and hard. Soft protest behaviors refer to activities that are legally and culturally accepted for addressing personal grievances in a given society, such as petitioning and social gathering. Hard protest behaviors are activities that are legally and culturally prohibited, such as violent protests and revolutionary undertakings. Political institutions have different effects on these two types of protest behaviors. In particular, presidentialism encourages citizens to use hard protest strategies because, as argued in chapter two, the rigidity of the government to change incentivizes discontented citizens to adopt more extreme strategies to present grievances that are less likely to be adequately addressed and resolved in presidential systems. To examine these mechanisms, I conduct a series of analyses using the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, which covers seven democracies. The results support my theory that presidentialism is positively associated with hard protest behaviors but has no relationship with soft protest behaviors. To further explore this finding, I also investigate the relationship between types of protest behaviors and democratic attitude. The results indicate that hard protest behaviors are negatively associated with democratic attitude, whereas soft protest strategies have a positive effect on democratic attitude.

1.2.3 *Chapter Four: Presidentialism, Democratic Crisis, and Democratic  
Breakdown*

Is presidentialism harmful to democratic consolidation? Despite two decades of investigation, the empirical results are mixed. In contributing to this debate, I propose that democratic breakdown is best understood as a two-step process, from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown. I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through its institutions, which are associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis, but that presidentialism does not lead a democracy from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than parliamentary or semi-presidential democracies. But once a crisis is present, presidentialism does not lead to a greater likelihood of breakdown. Therefore, the findings suggest that Juan Linz was correct about presidentialism generating unstable democracies, but this process does not occur in the way he theorized.

### 1.3 Conclusion

This dissertation demonstrates that presidentialism is harmful to democratic consolidation by inducing political violence (attitude, behavior, and crisis). Evidence from various sources, including public opinion surveys (the World Value Survey and the Asian Barometer Survey) and a panel dataset covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 with the regime year as the unit of analysis, suggests that presidentialism is linked with political violence which damages democratic consolidation. Though the results also conclude that presidentialism does not directly affect democratic breakdown, it has an indirect effect toward democratic breakdown through democratic crisis (political violence).

The policy implications of this paper are twofold. First, presidential systems generate political instability through the rigidity of altering incumbent government and complicate democratic consolidation by encouraging political violence. New democracies should generally avoid selecting presidentialism as their macro-institutional design. Instead, they should choose parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism. Existing presidential democracies with a long history of democratic crises (e.g., Ecuador, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Peru) should perhaps switch their macro-institutional design away from presidentialism through a substantial constitutional change. Institutional choice is an important factor affecting democratic consolidation.

Second, democratic breakdown needs to be understood as a two-step process, from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown. Policy makers, government officials, and democratic observers should realize that the factors affecting democratic crisis onset and democratic breakdown given a crisis are different. When a democratic crisis occurs, intuitive factors such as economic indicators or institutional features are not capable of predicting whether the existing crisis will lead to a regime change. The revised theory and results provide better indicators and improved guidelines for understanding the full nature of democratic breakdowns.

## 2. AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ATTITUDINAL FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN DEMOCRACIES

### 2.1 Introduction

Political violence, defined as any violent activity that is used to achieve political goals, is considered a serious threat to the stability of any society. It is a type of political participation and is commonly seen as a strategy to address grievances by discontents and people who are dissatisfied with society or the government. As a means to achieve a goal, political violence ranges from relatively non-violent behaviors, such as street protests and peaceful demonstrations, to activities resulting in casualties, such as revolutions, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist attacks.

The foundation of democracy suggests that political violence should be an extremely rare event. Democracy is designed to peacefully channel public discontent and provide broader political representation relative to its counterpart, dictatorship. Regular elections ensure that government alternatives are provided and that different voices can be heard. Thus, individuals who are dissatisfied with the status quo can seek representation through elected legislators or government officials to address their political concerns and demands. That is, if democracy functions perfectly, then violent political activity will rarely occur (see Eisinger 1973; Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983). However, political violence is not observed exclusively in authoritarian countries and transitional regimes. For example, coup attempts in the Philippines have occurred regularly from the latest democratization in 1986 to the present. Demonstrations and strikes are a regular feature among those pursuing labor rights in South Korea (see Koo 2000). Extreme right-wing movements, such as Nazism and anti-immigration activities, are



regularly observed in developed European democracies (see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; McLaren 2003; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Additionally, political assassinations and violent protests are commonly observed in Latin American democracies.

If democracy were designed for peaceful resolution between a government and its people, then *why would political violence constantly occur in democracies?* To address this question, I argue that a thorough understanding of the psychological/attitudinal foundation of political violence is needed. Studies of political violence are usually categorized by the type of violent behavior, such as civil war (e.g., Blattman and Miguel 2010), coups (e.g., Clark 2007; Londregan and Poole 1990; Zald and Berger 1978), revolutions (e.g., Goldstone 2001; Hale 2013; Stinchcombe 1999; Tilly 1978), protests (e.g., Morris and Mueller 1992; Robertson 2010; Della Porta et al. 2006), and terrorism (e.g., Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Schmid 2004). Nevertheless, the attitudinal foundation of why people living in democratic societies engage in violent activities for political purposes has not yet been thoroughly studied, and an empirical assessment of why people living in democratic societies choose to use violence as a means to achieve their political goals has not been conducted.

In this chapter, I argue that political institutions play an important role in shaping violent political attitudes. People are encouraged to consider the adoption of violent behaviors to address their grievances because there is a lack of political institutions that can resolve mismatched policy expectations between the government and the public. In particular, the rigid process of changing the government in presidential systems provides incentives for discontents and potential rebels to take undemocratic (violent) means to either force governmental change or coerce the government to comply with their demands. To further examine this theory, I conduct hierarchical analyses using the World Value Survey (wave 3) to assess whether political institu-

tions have a significant impact on attitudes regarding the use of violence for political goals. The evidence supports the theory and suggests that presidentialism enhances and triggers people's attitudes toward using violence.

## 2.2 The Causes of Political Violence

Studies of political violence have provided numerous theories explaining why people and groups, ordinary or not, engage in violent activities to address their political opinions. Four types of theories can be identified within the literature on political violence: grievance, state repression, political opportunity structures, and institutional strength. First, researchers have argued that the primary motivation for engaging in political violence, such as protests and insurgencies, is psychological grievances generated by economic inequality or deprivation (e.g., Buhaug and Cederman 2013; Dabalen and Paul 2014; Davies 1962; Muller 1985), ethnic exclusion (e.g., Bhavnani et al. 2014; Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000; Wimmer 2002), or any perceived frustration relating to social or economic factors (e.g., Gurr 1970; Schnytzer 1994).<sup>1</sup> As a key driving force, grievances encourage individuals to express their practical or perceived inequality through violent means. For example, in his study of demonstrations, strikes, riots and other forms of political protest and violence, Gurr (1968, 1970) found that the national economic conditions, such as inflation rates and growth rates for gross national product (GNP), are likely to produce feelings of relative deprivation. The influence of the economy is evident in the anti-immigration movements in developed European democracies, which are justified by the argument that foreign immigrants have taken job opportunities that native citizens deserved. These

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<sup>1</sup>Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that economic factors have stronger explanatory power for political violence than these social and political variables. Nevertheless, both sets of variables can be considered measurements of grievances.

theories are considered a psychological explanation for political violence and one of the fundamental arguments explaining the emergence of violent political behaviors.

Second, state repression has successfully explained the emergence and dissolution of political violence (e.g., Besley and Persson 2009, 2011; Davenport 1995, 2007b; Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991; Hoover 1992; Lichbach 1987; King 1998; Moore 1998, 2000; Muller 1985; Muller and Weede 1990; Pierskalla 2010; Rasler 1996; Regan and Henderson 2002; Ziegenhagen 1986). According to Goldstein (1978, xvi), “political repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political beliefs.”<sup>2</sup> Repression in the form of, e.g., media censorship or state suppression of an ongoing protest can simultaneously encourage and discourage civil violence. On the one hand, state repression may generate more public discontent, resulting in an irreversible revolution and additional public violence against the state (see Ziegenhagen 1986). On the other hand, state repression may impose a higher cost for individuals and groups who engage in political violence against the state, thus reducing observable violent activities. In addition, studies of state repression in democracies have found that democratic institutions are able to effectively reduce the level of state repression, which constitutes “domestic democratic peace” (a lower level of violent behavior within the state and society) (see Davenport 2007a; Russett 1993).

Political opportunity structures are the third type of theory explaining why people adopt violent behaviors (e.g., Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Kitschelt 1986; Lichbach 1995; McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004; Skocpol 1979; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). The theory argues that discontents are more likely to use violent strategies to achieve their political goals

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<sup>2</sup>For greater detail, see Goldstein (1978, 1983).

when they envision a higher likelihood of success. Assuming that potential rebels behave rationally and aim to achieve their political goals successfully (e.g., regime changes or forcing the government to change the status quo regarding particular public policies), rebels will wait and prepare until the likelihood of success is at its peak. For example, protests and revolutions are likely to be mobilized when the state's strength is declining (Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978) or when rebels perceive that there will be a critical change in the government that may result in political instability (McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1994). Studies of political opportunity structures also reveal that democracy may have mixed effects on political violence. On the one hand, democracy constrains state repression and ensures a certain level of tolerance regarding protests and other forms of violent behaviors, thus encouraging such behaviors to address social grievances (Tarrow 1994). On the other hand, democratic institutions allow political alternatives through regular elections and guarantee civil liberties, thereby reducing political violence (Kitschelt 1986). Within a similar line of studies, scholars note that resources are essential to sustain and mobilize violent activities (Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994). Organizational affiliations and personal wealth are important to form and mobilize such behaviors.

The last type of theory explaining political violence is institutional strength. The quality of political institutions is critical in the provision of public policies and legislation. A better institutionalized government can ensure that public demands will be made and that policy implementations will be adequate. Thus, scholars have argued that institutional strength, such as an effective and accountable legislature, is more likely to encourage discontents to address their political issues through regular non-violent channels (e.g., voting and contacting elected representatives), whereas political violence is more likely to be initiated when political institutions are incapable of

resolving and addressing existing social grievances (e.g., Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011). This phenomenon has been exemplified in some Latin American countries (Eckstein 2001; Jemio, Candia, and Evio 2009; Mejía Acosta et al. 2008).

The literature on political violence has explored various explanations for why discontents in different societies strategically employ violent activities to achieve their political goals. Nevertheless, researchers have not paid attention to the psychological foundation underlying why people fight against the government in democratic countries, given that democracy is designed to resolve and address public grievances.<sup>3</sup> Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2011) provide a possible explanation for the variation of political violence in various democracies by arguing that institutional strength plays a key role in shaping the likelihood of political violence. Based on this profound finding, I argue that not only does institutional strength have explanatory power over political violence, but the *types* of democratic institutions also matter.

### 2.3 Institutions and Violence

Democracy is designed to channel various social groups within a society and to provide equal political rights and opportunity for citizens to engage in politics. Regular elections and party competition provide “alternatives” to both the majority and minority.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, unlike authoritarian regimes in which governments do not rely on the consent of the people to rule and provide few or no political institutions

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<sup>3</sup>The literature on political opportunity structures only notes that political violence is more likely to emerge in transitional regimes, where the likelihood of success is higher (see Eisinger 1973; Muller and Weede 1990).

<sup>4</sup>Scholars have debated between the procedural and the substantive views of democracy. The procedural view of democracy classifies regimes by whether they provide sufficient democratic institutions and procedures for practicing democracy (e.g., elections), whereas the substantive view of democracy classifies regimes by the outcomes that they produce (e.g., quality of governance). Here, I employ the procedural view of democracy to avoid any possible confusion and lack of clarity caused by the conceptualization of the substantive view of democracy. For a summary of the debate, see Cohen (1997) and Dahl (1971).

to share their ruling powers with others, regular elections in democratic regimes guarantee that the rulers are replaceable through the choice of the people. That is, democracy is designed to maximize the opportunity for representation of its people by providing alternatives to ensure that most social groups can be heard.

Nevertheless, different political institutions result in different levels of representation. Although all democracies guarantee equal political participation and competition, they vary in how political power is exercised in the government. When a system allows executive and legislative institutions to incorporate and represent as many social groups as possible in policy decision-making processes, then this system acquires a higher level of political representation and ensures that most public interests will be heard and considered. When a system allows executive and legislative institutions to utilize majority or plurality support as the foundation of the policy decision-making process, then this system is likely to create issue divergence and social conflicts because some minority groups will be left out of political decisions. The first scenario refers to parliamentary systems, in which executive and legislative powers are combined, and the second scenario refers to presidential systems, in which executive and legislative powers are separated and compete with each other.

Within these two systems, the basic structures of power sharing differ (see Shugart and Carey 1992).<sup>5</sup> In presidentialism, the president holds the most political power in government and does not need to share her power with other political actors, such as other political parties, through coalitions. In parliamentary systems, the cabinet must share power in accordance with the composition of the parliament to operate and sustain majority support. Legislative responsibility, such as the right to initiate

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<sup>5</sup>Semi-presidential systems are variants of these two systems. Some look more like presidentialism if the president can remove the government or her party controls a legislative majority. Others are more similar to parliamentarism if the president is not empowered to remove the government or her party does not control a legislative majority (see Duverger 1980; Elgie 2011).

a vote of no confidence, plays a key role in shaping the decision-making process. The two systems are also distinct in their procedures for removing the incumbent government/executive. In presidential systems, the president serves a fixed term that is determined by the constitution, even if her policy preferences are unpopular with the legislature and the people.<sup>6</sup> In parliamentary systems, a legislative majority is empowered to remove the government by either passing a vote of no confidence or rejecting a vote of confidence initiated by the government.

Parliamentary systems, on the one hand, ensure that policy decisions and their implementation match public expectations because legislative responsibility forces the incumbent party or the government coalition to open negotiation with opposition parties to avoid a vote of no confidence or an early election, which can dramatically change the composition of the legislature. To avoid costs resulting from legislative responsibility, such as the uncertainty of reelection after the dissolution of the parliament, incumbent governments and opposition parties have incentives to update their policy preferences in accordance with the electorate and thus maximize the likelihood of reelection. On the other hand, presidential systems are known to create problems in democratic representation and consolidation (e.g., Boix 2003; Maeda 2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996, 2000; Sing 2010; Stephen and Skach 1993; Svobik 2008). For example, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, pp.450-451) summarize Linz's (1990) original argument regarding problems in presidential regimes and identify five general problems with presidentialism: "1) the executive and legislature advance competing claims to legitimacy; 2) the fixed terms of office make presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; 3) presidentialism encourages winner-take-all outcomes; 4) the style of presidential politics encourages

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<sup>6</sup>It is possible, in some constitutions, to impeach the president. However, the requirements for an impeachment are usually difficult to achieve; thus, few presidents have ever been impeached.

presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and 5) presidentialism encourages populist candidates.”<sup>7</sup> In particular, fixed terms of presidential office with practical difficulties for impeachment and the winner-take-all nature with all executive power held under elected presidents in presidential systems encourage presidents to disregard some popular demands and to ignore minority social groups, resulting in the *tyranny of the majority* (see Guinier 1994; Mill 1859[1913]; Sartori 1987). This situation creates mismatched policy expectations between the government and the public.

Both parliamentary and presidential systems can maintain their stability without obstruction from political violence as long as no conflict-prone disagreements exist among the various social groups. However, once such disagreements occur or potential rebels emerge, presidentialism encourages these discontents to consider violent strategies because presidential systems impede immediate change or reshuffling of the composition of the executive branches, which could incorporate these discontents into democratic representation. Unlike parliamentary democracies, in which a vote of no confidence with a cabinet reshuffle or a new election can spin the political opinions of rebels into the process of representation through the possibility of government alternation, there are no institutional means for the president to ease tension except for her own resignation. That is, when public dissatisfaction toward the president is high or demands from minority and under-represented groups cannot be fulfilled, fixed terms of presidential office and the winner-take-all nature result in an almost unchangeable president who retains all executive power. The structure provides no mechanisms for a government alternation to resolve such a crisis. For example, in 1996, President Kim Young-sam of South Korea attempted to implement a controversial labor law despite opposition from labor unions and opposition

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<sup>7</sup>Elgie (2005) also presents a comprehensive summary of the curse of presidentialism.



parties, resulting in strikes lasting for three months, with over three million people on the street (Koo 2000). This situation provided incentives for minority groups and the under-represented to consider undemocratic means to force the government to negotiate. In sum, mismatched policy expectations between the government and the public and institutional rigidity in changing the government composition in presidential democracies encourage individuals and social groups to consider violence as one possible strategy to achieve their political goals. According to the theory, a testable hypothesis can be derived from this argument:

*H<sub>21</sub>: People in presidential systems are more likely to consider political violence as a form of political participation.*

## 2.4 Research Design

### 2.4.1 Data

In this study, I seek evidence for my theory through cross-national public opinion surveys. The data being analyzed are the third wave (1994-1999) of the World Value Survey (WVS).<sup>8</sup> The WVS is a multi-wave cross-national survey investigating various political attitudes and behaviors across democracies and non-democracies. Because this study focuses exclusively on democratic countries and the theoretical argument is based on the procedural view of democracy, I employ Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) to classify democracies and non-democracies in the WVS (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). DD identifies a regime as a democracy when all four of the following criteria are met: “1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected. 2. The legislature must be popularly elected. 3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the

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<sup>8</sup>Only the third wave is adopted because this is the only wave that included the question regarding violent political attitudes.

incumbent to office must have taken place” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, p.69).<sup>9</sup> DD yields 37 democracies and 51,638 respondents in the third wave of the WVS, as shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Democracies in the third wave of WVS.

Country	Year	N	Violence	Country	Year	N	Violence
Albania	1998	999	1.41	Latvia	1996	1200	1.81
Argentina*	1995	1079	1.68	Lithuania	1997	1009	1.82
Armenia	1997	2000	1.85	Macedonia	1998	995	1.67
Australia	1995	2048	1.63	Moldova	1996	984	2.13
Bangladesh	1996	1525	1.13	New Zealand	1998	1201	1.60
Brazil*	1997	1149	1.34	Norway	1996	1127	1.28
Bulgaria	1997	1072	1.81	Philippines*	1996	1200	2.25
Chile*	1996	1000	1.82	Romania	1998	1239	1.90
Colombia*	1998	6025	1.99	Slovakia	1998	1095	1.95
Croatia	1996	1196	1.52	Slovenia	1995	1007	1.98
Czech R.	1998	1147	1.77	Spain	1995	1211	1.78
Dominican R.*	1996	417	2.50	Sweden	1996	1009	1.38
El Salvador*	1999	1254	1.97	Switzerland	1996	1212	1.44
Estonia	1996	1021	1.71	Turkey	1996	1907	1.74
Finland	1996	987	1.34	Ukraine	1996	2811	1.95
Germany	1996	2026	1.71	United States*	1995	1542	1.66
Hungary	1998	650	1.65	Uruguay*	1996	1000	1.77
India	1995	2040	1.67	Venezuela*	1996	1200	2.01
Japan	1995	1054	1.54				

*Source:* World Values Survey.

*Note:* Countries marked with asterisk are presidential democracies.

<sup>9</sup>Using DD to classify democracies and dictatorships offers advantages over alternative data sets because of its dichotomous measure of democracy. Other popular indicators of democracy, such as POLITY IV and Freedom House, evaluate the levels of democracy for each country based on continuous measures of democracy and thus pose difficulty in defining the critical threshold separating democracy from non-democracy. Moreover, Freedom House includes some substantive aspects of democracy, such as the quality of governance and corruption, which may not capture the core aspects indicated in the theory. Thus, it makes intuitive sense to adopt DD for this study.

### 2.4.2 *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable is *Political violence*, measured as the respondents' responses to a four-point scale (1-4) agree-or-disagree question (E198): 'Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.' Higher values indicate that respondents believe that using violence for political goals is justified. *Political violence* represents the extent to which respondents are willing to consider using violent strategies for political purposes attitudinally. Unlike most studies that focus on actual political violence, such as civil war (e.g., Blattman and Miguel 2010), protest (e.g., Morris and Mueller 1992; Robertson 2011; Della Porta et al. 2006), and terrorism (e.g., Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Schmid 2004), this study investigates the psychological foundation of political violence empirically. The average of *Political violence* for each country is also reported in Table 2.1.<sup>10</sup>

### 2.4.3 *Independent Variables*

I employ Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon's (2010) model, which explores the relationship between economic and political conditions and protest behavior with the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey, as the baseline model to investigate the relationship between presidentialism and violent political attitudes.<sup>11</sup> The variables included in the individual-level analysis are designed to incorporate various theoretical expectations in the study of political violence. First, to access the effect of grievances on violent political attitudes in the individual-level analysis, I include *Life satisfaction* and *Trust in parliament*.<sup>12</sup> Higher *Life satisfaction* and

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<sup>10</sup>Response weights are applied.

<sup>11</sup>The dependent variable in their study, protest behavior, is the number of those participating in the following activities: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. For details, see Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon (2010).

<sup>12</sup>*Life satisfaction*: 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer. (1) dissatisfied to (10) satisfied.' *Trust in*

*Trust in parliament* are expected to reduce psychological attachment to political violence. Furthermore, resources are expected to enhance the willingness to consider the adoption of violent strategies. *Education* and *Group membership* are employed to measure respondents' level of resources.<sup>13</sup> Lastly, variables assessing political values and cultures are included (Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010). These variables are *Left/Right ideology* and *Post-materialism*.<sup>14</sup>

To examine the hypothesis that presidentialism is positively associated with violent political attitudes, I also include variables assessing political institutions, economic development, and levels of democracy at the country level. The first set of variables is political institutions, including *Presidential dummy* and *PR system*. *Presidential dummy*, which is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if and only if the head of state is popularly elected and is not responsible to the legislature, is the key variable examining the hypothesis of my argument.<sup>15</sup> According to Saideman et al. (2002), *PR system* can effectively reduce political violence.<sup>16</sup> The second set of variables is economic development assessed by *GDP per capita* (1,000/ppp).<sup>17</sup> Lower

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*parliament*: 'I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament.' The responses are recoded as (4) a great deal to (1) not at all. *Trust in parliament* is employed to estimate political trust or government satisfaction, which is consistent with previous analyses (see Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Klingemann 1999).

<sup>13</sup>*Education*: 'What is the highest educational level that you have attained?' with categories ranging from (1) less than elementary education to (8) university degree or advanced degree. *Group membership* reflects the total number of active or inactive memberships in the following organizations: church or religious organization, sports or recreational organization, art, music, or educational organization, political party, environmental organization, professional organization, charitable or humanitarian organization, or any other organization. The variable ranges from (0) no organizations to (9) all nine types of organizations.

<sup>14</sup>*Left/Right ideology*: 'In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means the left and 10 means the right?' *Post-materialism*: the four-item values index provided by the World Value Survey: (1) materialist, (2) mixed, (3) post-materialist.

<sup>15</sup>Data are obtained from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).

<sup>16</sup>*PR system* is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a proportional representation system is used for national legislative elections and 0 otherwise. The data are obtained from Norris (2009).

<sup>17</sup>The variable ranges from 1.61 to 37.12. Data are obtained from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009).

levels of economic development are likely to enhance income inequality and relative deprivation, resulting in higher levels of political violence (see Alesina and Perotti 1996; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Piazza 2006; Weede 1987). The third set of variables is democratic levels, including *Polity score* and *Freedom score*.<sup>18</sup> According to the literature, higher levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of political violence (see Eisinger 1973; Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983). All country-level variables are measured with respect to the year when the survey was conducted in each country.

#### 2.4.4 *Missing Values*

To maximize the number of observations, the variables on the individual level are imputed.<sup>19</sup> To overcome potential biases created by missing values, I use multiple imputation with chained equations (MICE) including all individual-level variables (independent and dependent). MICE is capable of generating imputed values based on a distributional assumption with respect to each variable (see King et al. 2001; Lee and Carlin 2010; Royston and White 2011). For example, *Political violence* and *Trust in parliament* are imputed with the ordered logistic model, whereas *Group membership* is imputed with the linear regression model (normal distribution).

#### 2.4.5 *Estimation: Hierarchical Linear Modeling*

To assess whether attitudes toward political violence are higher in presidential democracies, I employ hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to account for cross-national variation resulting from institutional designs. HLM offers numerous advantages over other estimations, including correct estimation of standard errors, limited

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<sup>18</sup>*Polity score* is a continuous variable ranging between -10 and 10; higher values indicate more democratic levels (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). *Freedom score* is a continuous variable ranging between 1 and 7; higher values indicate more freedom.

<sup>19</sup>Without imputation, the empirical analysis loses 60% of the observations.

aggregation bias, and straightforward estimation regarding cross-level interactions between individuals and countries. (see Hox 2002; Park and Lake 2006; Raudenbush and Bryk 2001). Respondents weights are also incorporated into the construct of the standard errors. To ease the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, I assume that the dependent variable, *Political violence*, is an interval variable and apply the linear regression assumption (the normal distribution assumption).<sup>20</sup> The model is specified as

$$\begin{aligned}
 y &= X\beta + \varepsilon \\
 \beta_{0i} &= Z_i\gamma + \mu,
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{2.1}$$

where  $y$  is a vector of the dependent variable, *Political violence*,  $X$  is the matrix of individual-level independent variables,  $\beta$  is the vector of individual-level coefficients,  $\beta_{0i}$  is the coefficient of the constant at the individual level for each country,  $Z_i$  is the matrix of country-level independent variables,  $\gamma$  is the vector of country-level coefficients, and  $\varepsilon$  and  $\mu$  are error vectors at the individual and country levels, respectively.

As shown in Equation 2.1, all of the individual variables except intercepts are modeled as fixed parameters. Country-specific intercepts (random intercepts) are designed to account for cross-national differences in *Political violence* explained by country-level variables. When analyzing any HLM, multicollinearity can impose a significant difficulty in generating valid coefficients and standard errors. Thus, the individual-level variables are grand-mean centered to avoid collinearity and to provide intuitive interpretations for estimates (see Hofmann 1997; Hofmann and Gavin 1998; Kreft et al. 1995; Raudenbush and Bryk 2001). I also interact *Presidential dummy* with individual-level variables as a random-intercept random-slope model to examine

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<sup>20</sup>The dependent variable is an ordinal variable, implying that an ordered logistic or probit model is more appropriate. Nevertheless, the results from the ordered logistic HLM are identical to those from the linear regression HLM.

any possible interactive effect between the individual factors and presidentialism. The model then is re-specified as

$$\begin{aligned}y &= X\beta + \varepsilon \\ \beta &= Z_i\gamma + \mu.\end{aligned}\tag{2.2}$$

## 2.5 Empirical Results

Table 2.2 presents the empirical estimates for Equation 2.1. The total number of observations is 51,638 across 37 democracies.<sup>21</sup> The F test is significant at the 0.01 level, supporting the overall model performance for each model specification. Using the grand-mean centered method, the coefficients of *Intercept* at the individual level indicate the predicted value of *Political violence* holding all individual variables at their means.<sup>22</sup> An intuitive interpretation of the violent attitude of an ordinary respondent with average scores on all the variables can thus be made.

Model 1 in Table 2.2 represents the pooled data individual-level analysis without any country-level variable, whereas Model 2 in Table 2.2 represents the same estimation with country-fixed effects.<sup>23</sup> Using country-fixed effects in the analysis allows the estimation to incorporate unspecified “between country differences” and thus to enhance the validity of the estimates. Once the country-specific effects are taken into account, *Trust in parliament* and *Group membership*, which are significant in Model 1, become insignificant in Model 2. The negative and significant effects of *Life satisfaction* and *Post-materialism* remain. Based on the estimates from Model 2, increasing *Life satisfaction* from the minimum (1) to the maximum (10) will reduce *Political violence* by 0.1. *Post-materialism* has a similar impact (0.14) on *Political*

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<sup>21</sup>No missing observations exist after multiple imputations.

<sup>22</sup>The range of *Political violence* is between 1 and 4.

<sup>23</sup>This is equivalent to a random-intercept fixed-slope HLM.

Table 2.2: The HLM estimates of *Political violence*.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual level					
<i>Life satisfaction</i>	-0.012** (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)
<i>Trust in parliament</i>	-0.043** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
<i>Education</i>	0.002 (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
<i>Group membership</i>	-0.024** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
<i>L-R ideology</i>	0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
<i>Post-materialism</i>	-0.048** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.009)
<i>Intercept</i>	1.977** (0.024)	1.551** (0.036)	1.551** (0.036)	2.594** (0.146)	2.841** (0.196)
Country-level					
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	–	–	0.590** (0.041)	1.103** (0.102)	1.255** (0.131)
<i>PR system</i>	–	–	–	-0.431** (0.055)	-0.666** (0.088)
<i>GDP per capita</i>	–	–	–	-0.023** (0.003)	-0.029** (0.003)
<i>Polity score</i>	–	–	–	-0.110** (0.023)	–
<i>Freedom score</i>	–	–	–	–	-0.218** (0.046)
Number of groups			37		
Number of observations			51638		
F test	34.78**	81.61**	81.61**	81.61**	81.61**

*Source:* World Values Survey.

*Note:* Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.05, \*\*0.01.

*violence* when moving from materialist values (1) to post-materialist values (3). *Education* is negatively significant at the 0.05 level in Model 2, indicating that people are less likely to consider using violence for political goals if they have a higher level



of education. The initial results from Models 1 and 2 are consistent with the theoretical expectation, which argues that grievances are positively linked with political violence, although *Education* and *Post-materialism* have a reverse direction from Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon's (2010) findings. This difference may be due to the fact that considerations about the use of violence (attitudes) and the practical use of violence (behavior) involve distinct risk calculations. In particular, the formation of violent behavior requires resources such as organizational participation and various skills. However, considering using violence does not require those resources. Thus, factors measuring resources may have distinct effects for violent attitudes and violent behaviors.

Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 2.2 represent the HLM estimates of *Political violence* with country-level factors. Model 3 includes *Presidential dummy* only, whereas Models 4 and 5 incorporate other country-level variables with *Polity score* and *Freedom score*, respectively.<sup>24</sup> The estimates of these models indicate that *Presidential dummy* is positively significant at the 0.01 level, and the effect is substantial. According to Model 4, the mean estimate of *Political violence* for people in presidential democracies is 1.1 higher than it is for those in non-presidential systems. Because the dependent variable ranges between 1 and 4, the magnitude of the coefficient of *Presidential dummy* indicates a 25% increase in *Political violence*. Other country-level variables also coincide with the theoretical expectations. As found by Saideman et al. (2002), *PR system* is negatively linked to *Political violence*. In addition, grievances (*GDP per capita*) and democracy (*Polity score* and *Freedom score*) are negatively significant for explaining violent political attitudes. For example, adding 1,000 (ppp) to GDP per capita can reduce individual violent attitudes by 0.02 (0.03 in Model 5),

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<sup>24</sup>*Polity score* and *Freedom score* are highly collinear ( $r = 0.6$ ), which may result in incorrect estimates for standard errors. Thus, I estimate them separately.

and enhancing the level of democracy (*Polity score*) can reduce individual violent attitudes by 0.1 (0.2 for *Freedom score*). The estimates for Models 3 to 5 support  $H_{21}$  that presidentialism is associated with a higher level of violent political attitudes. Most factors explaining violent political behavior in the literature are also powerful predictors of violent political attitudes.

Table 2.3: The HLM estimates of *Political violence* with interactions.


	Coeff.	s.e.
Life satisfaction	-0.005*	(0.003)
Interaction with <i>Presidential dummy</i>	-0.001	(0.005)
<i>Trust in parliament</i>	0.000	(0.007)
Interaction with <i>Presidential dummy</i>	-0.019	(0.012)
<i>Education</i>	-0.009**	(0.003)
Interaction with <i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.006	(0.005)
<i>Group membership</i>	-0.012*	(0.006)
Interaction with <i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.028**	(0.010)
<i>L-R ideology</i>	-0.001	(0.003)
Interaction with <i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.004	(0.005)
<i>Post-materialism</i>	-0.026**	(0.009)
Interaction with <i>Presidential dummy</i>	-0.013	(0.018)
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.592**	(0.067)
<i>Constant</i>	1.542**	(0.040)
Number of groups		37
Number of observations		51638
F test		70.11**

*Source:* World Values Survey.

*Note:* Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.05, \*\*0.01.

Table 2.3 represents the empirical estimates of Equation 2.2. *Presidential dummy* remains significant, and the coefficient is identical to that in Model 3 of Table 2.2. The most significant deviation between Tables 2.2 and 2.3 is that *Group membership* and its interaction with *Presidential dummy* become significant. As presented

Figure 2.1: The interactive effect between *Presidential dummy* and *Group membership* on *Political violence*.



in Figure 2.1, where the horizontal axis represents *Group membership* and the vertical axis represents the dependent variable, *Political violence*, the total number of organizational memberships has a positive impact on *Political violence* in presidential democracies, whereas the effect becomes negative in non-presidential systems. Although the effect of *Group membership* is not as substantial as the effect of *Presidential dummy*, the results imply that, as a type of political and social resource, organizational membership triggers a higher level of violent attitudes in presidential systems. This result may be due to the fact that grievances are higher in presidential democracies; thus, participation in various organizations facilitates the spread of grievances among members.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup>Within the data, the average of *Trust in parliament* and *GDP per capita* in non-presidential

## 2.6 Presidentialism and Violent Behavior?

Research on political violence has focused almost exclusively on the practices of political violence or violent behaviors. However, it is important to understand the driving force behind violent behaviors, or the psychological foundation of political violence. In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between violent attitudes and political institutions in democracies. I argue that certain political institutions encourage the public to consider using violence to achieve their political goals when a mismatched policy expectation exists between the government and the public. In particular, I argue that presidentialism is positively associated with violent political attitudes because the rigidity of government changes in presidential systems generates political instability and provides incentives for discontents and potential rebels to take undemocratic (violent) means to force a governmental change or compliance with their demands. To assess this argument, I conduct a hierarchical analysis using the third wave of the World Value Survey and investigate the relationships between violent attitudes and various individual- and country-level variables, including variables measuring regime performance and political institutions. The result supports my theory that presidentialism contributes positively and significantly to violent political attitudes.

It is natural to ask a follow-up question: does presidentialism also have a positive effect on violent behavior? To investigate this relationship, I estimate two HLM models using Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon's (2010) model as the baseline model, with a country-level variable, *Presidential dummy*. The dependent variable is *Protest index*, which is a count of the number of activities performed by the respondent, ranging from 0 to 5.<sup>26</sup> These activities are signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending

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systems is 0.2 and 2,500 (ppp) higher than the averages in presidential systems, respectively.

<sup>26</sup>The *Protest index* is also imputed by MICE.

lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. Table 2.4 shows the results of this estimation. Model 1 represents the Poisson HLM estimates, and Model 2 represents the negative binomial HLM estimates. The negative binomial HLM is employed to identify whether a response of 0 in *Protest index* means that the respondent did not participate in any of these events or the respondent did not want to reveal his true experience.<sup>27</sup> As demonstrated in the significance of the over-dispersion parameter, a response of 0 in *Protest index* is likely to have multiple meanings. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates and standard errors are identical between Models 1 and 2.

Table 2.4: The HLM estimates of *Protest index*.

	Model 1		Model 1	
<i>Life satisfaction</i>	-0.012**	(0.003)	-0.012**	(0.003)
<i>Trust in parliament</i>	-0.003	(0.009)	-0.003	(0.009)
<i>Education</i>	0.106**	(0.003)	0.107**	(0.003)
<i>Group memberships</i>	0.149**	(0.005)	0.159**	(0.005)
<i>L-R ideology</i>	-0.050**	(0.004)	-0.048**	(0.004)
<i>Post-materialism</i>	0.265**	(0.012)	0.268**	(0.012)
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	-0.469**	(0.079)	-0.490**	(0.079)
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.198**	(0.066)	-1.204**	(0.066)
Over-dispersion parameter	–	–	0.284**	(0.014)
Number of groups			37	
Number of observations			51638	
F test		275.20**		264.14**

*Source:* World Values Survey.

*Note:* Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.05, \*\*0.01.

The estimates at the individual level are mostly identical to Dalton, Sickle, and

<sup>27</sup>A total of 60% of the respondents (after MICE) reported that they did not participate in any of these events.

Weldon's (2010) findings. However, *Presidential dummy* reveals a sharp difference for violent behavior and violent attitude. Instead of a positive effect for violent attitude, *Presidential dummy* is negatively associated with violent behavior (*Protest index*), indicating that people are less likely to fight against the state or the government in presidential democracies. Assuming that the willingness to consider using violence for political goals is the driving force of violent behavior, the results from Table 2.4 are inconsistent with my theoretical argument. However, as I argue in the next chapter, the existing indicators measuring violent behavior are imperfect. In particular, some behaviors may encompass different levels of risk between democracies and dictatorships. As shown in the activities constructing *Protest index*, these activities include signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. Signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending lawful demonstrations are legally allowed in democracies, whereas in dictatorships, these activities may imply some uncertainty and political consequences for participants and could be considered *violence*. Thus, when dictatorships are excluded in the theory and the analysis, a revised typology and an indicator of violent behavior is needed. Using the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), the next chapter separates violent behavior into two types, *soft* and *hard*, and finds that presidentialism has a positive and significant effect on hard violent behavior but not on the soft type.

### 3. PRESIDENTIALISM, DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDE, AND PROTEST BEHAVIORS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES

#### 3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter raises an interesting question: why does presidentialism have a positive impact on violent attitudes but a negative effect on violent behaviors? If psychological attitude is considered the driving force of behavior, then the mechanisms explaining violent attitudes and behaviors should show a consistent pattern. Previous psychological research has found that attitude and behavior are closely connected with one another (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1997; Bentler and Speckart 1979; Feldman and Lynch 1988). Thus, the deviation in the findings regarding the relationship between presidentialism and violent attitudes and behaviors requires further investigation.

To address this puzzle, I argue that violent behaviors or protest behaviors, such as those addressing both personal and group grievances with the government, have wide variation in terms of their intensity and their anticipated activities. In particular, I argue that there are two different types of protest behaviors, soft and hard, and that only hard protest behaviors are associated with presidentialism.<sup>1</sup> To examine these mechanisms, I conduct a series of analyses using the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, which covers seven democracies. The results support my theory that presidentialism is positively associated with hard protest behaviors but has no relationship with soft protest behaviors. Democratic attitude plays an additive role in explaining different types of protest behaviors. To expand this finding, I investigate the relationship between types of protest behaviors and democratic attitude. The

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<sup>1</sup>Protest behaviors and violent behaviors are used interchangeably.

results indicate that hard protest behaviors are negatively associated with democratic attitude, whereas soft protest strategies have a positive effect on democratic attitude.

### 3.2 Presidentialism and Types of Protest Behaviors

As noted in the previous chapter, studies of political violence are typically categorized by violent behaviors, such as civil war (e.g., see Blattman and Miguel 2010), coup d'etat (e.g., see Clark 2007; Londregan and Poole 1990; Zald and Berger 1978), revolution (e.g., Goldstone 2001; Hale 2013; Stinchcombe 1999; Tilly 1978), protest (e.g., see Morris and Mueller 1992; Robertson 2010; Della Porta et al. 2006), and terrorism (e.g., see Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Schmid 2004). When examining these different strategies as means to address individual and group grievances, there is wide variation in terms of the intensity and severity of consequences and the likelihood of succeeding in achieving a particular goal. Some protest behaviors, such as petitioning and social gathering, are legally and culturally allowed. Other behaviors are considered illegal and are discouraged by society, such as violent protests and terrorist activities. I argue that these different types of protest behaviors can be classified into two general types: soft and hard. When choosing between soft and hard protest behaviors, people choose the type that can successfully address their grievances at minimum cost. As socially accepted behavior, soft protest behaviors are less likely to be punished by the society or the government. However, individuals using hard protest behaviors experience a higher level of risk and are likely to be punished by the state. Thus, these behaviors are selected by people who want to address more serious grievances against the government and society.

Soft protest behaviors, such as attending a lawful demonstration, writing and/or endorsing a petition, and utilizing local connections to resolve social issues, are legally



allowed and culturally appropriate and lack noticeable consequences in democracies.<sup>2</sup> Because these actions do not severely threaten the government and society, they are likely to be employed for less serious personal or community problems that involve lower-level grievances. Individuals and groups who utilize this type of behavior do not anticipate violent confrontations with either government or society. There are two types of people who are likely to adopt soft protest strategies to address their grievances. The first type is dissatisfied with minor social and political issues and believes that soft protest behaviors can adequately and successfully resolve problems. The second type consists of those citizens who may have higher-level grievances against the government and society and who may want to use institutionalized channels first to resolve their issues. People of the second type are likely to adopt more extreme strategies to seek redress for their grievances if their demands are not satisfied by the government. Therefore, individuals and groups who engage in soft protest behaviors either have minor issues with the government and society or choose to begin with soft protest strategies to determine whether they will work.

Conversely, hard protest behaviors, such as violent protests, occupations of governmental buildings, and other forms of extreme political actions, are legally and culturally prohibited. These types of behaviors involve higher risks and legal consequences. Individuals and groups who utilize these strategies may not be welcomed by society and are likely to be punished by the legal system. With such high risks, people who employ hard violent strategies are those who bear high-level grievances against the state and society and are willing to face serious consequences, such as imprisonment, fines, and social alienation. Legal and cultural consequences serve as a brake to constrain people from using these strategies to address their grievances; most people are not willing to risk suffering such consequences. In studies of political

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<sup>2</sup>These lawful behaviors may still face unknown or unknowable consequences in dictatorships.

violence, hard protest behaviors are typically understood to be rare events in any given society, except for times in which collective grievances and social instability have reached a tipping point (see Eisinger 1973; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Kitschelt 1986; Lichbach 1995; McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983; Skocpol 1979; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). A recent student protest (known as the Sunflower Student Movement) against the cross-strait agreement on trade in services in Taiwan demonstrates the difference between soft and hard protest behaviors.

The Sunflower Student Movement began with a group of students and other citizens who believed that the cross-strait agreement on trade in services between China and Taiwan would damage the future of younger generations if ratified. Due to the legislative gridlock between the incumbent and opposition parties, the reviewing process of the cross-strait agreement on trade in services was bogged down in the legislature's Internal Administrative Committee for more than 90 days until March 18, 2014. According to Article 61 of the Legislative Yuan Functions Act, if the review process had extended beyond 90 days, then the proposal would have been considered reviewed and submitted to a plenary session for legislative voting. Thus, a practically unreviewed agreement would have been ratified if passed in legislative voting. This action infuriated some discontented citizens and resulted in the illegal occupation of the legislative chamber in the Legislative Yuan (the Taiwanese parliament) from March 18 to April 10, 2014, the occupation of the executive bureau on March 23 and 24 during that same year, and the eventual eviction of the aggrieved citizens by the police force. Both incidents—occupying the legislative chamber inside the Legislative Yuan and occupying the executive bureau—are illegal, and the participants are facing legal charges from the Taiwanese government. This type of resistance is

considered hard protest behavior because the legal consequences are clear. During the Sunflower Student Movement, the leaders of those individuals who occupied the legislative chamber inside the Legislative Yuan called for a rally against the cross-strait agreement on trade in services on Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei, which is located directly in front of the presidential office. The rally was legally approved by the government, and approximately 500,000 people appealed and participated. This rally is considered a soft protest behavior because there are no known legal or social consequences for such rallies. As demonstrated in this case, the line separating soft from hard protest behaviors is not based on the issue and type of grievances but by the presence of consequences for the participants.

Unlike dictatorships, which do not guarantee peaceful consequences for soft protest behaviors and typically punish hard protest behavior with extreme consequences (e.g., the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in China), democracies ensure that soft protest behaviors are considered to be squarely within an institutionalized channel that is meant to address social and political grievances. Thus, soft protest behaviors can be considered ‘regular’ and ‘normal’ methods of displaying social unrest without disturbing social harmony. However, the risks and consequences associated with hard protest strategies ensure that these behaviors will be adopted only when the grievance level is high. Democratic institutions play an important role in shaping the adoption of hard protest behaviors. Consider a scenario in which some citizens have high levels of social or political grievances against an incumbent government. These high levels of grievances, which may be the result of different policy preferences between the government and the public or macro environmental factors, such as economic depression, existing distributional injustice, or damages caused by natural disasters, stimulate and mobilize discontented citizens against the government. In a parliamentary system, potential conflicts between the incumbent government and

the public can be resolved by a government reshuffle and a call for a new election through the mechanism of legislative responsibility, such as a vote of no confidence.<sup>3</sup> Thus, within the functions of legislative responsibility, potential conflicts in the form of hard protest behaviors are less likely to occur because the government can be brought down and recomposed according to public preferences.

However, presidential systems do not have the same function of legislative responsibility. Research on democratic consolidation has condemned presidential systems for decades (see Boix, 2003; Maeda, 2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 1996, 2000; Sing, 2010; Stephen and Skach, 1993; Svobik, 2008).<sup>4</sup> An elected president is empowered to serve for a fixed term (e.g., four or six years) and is not required to share her executive power with other political actors, such as opposition parties. This situation applies to both majority and minority governments. When social or political grievances against the incumbent government are high, there is no institutional channel to alter the existing government composition.<sup>5</sup> Thus, discontented citizens in presidential democracies must wait until the next scheduled election to remove an incumbent president. Unlike the situation in parliamentary democracies, in which potential conflicts and societal pressures can be resolved by bringing down and reforming the government, possible conflicts and grievances in presidential systems are likely to accumulate because it is difficult to alter government composition that matches the public's preferences. Thus, hard protest behaviors are more

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<sup>3</sup>Legislative responsibility is also applied to semi-presidential systems. See Duverger (1980) and Elgie (2011).

<sup>4</sup>For example, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, pp.450-451) summarize Linz's (1990) original argument regarding problems in presidential regimes and identify five general problems of presidentialism: "1) the executive and legislature advance competing claims to legitimacy; 2) the fixed terms of office make presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; 3) presidentialism encourages winner-take-all outcomes; 4) the style of presidential politics encourages presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and, 5) presidentialism encourages populist candidates." Elgie (2005) also has a comprehensive summary of the curse of presidentialism.

<sup>5</sup>It is possible, in some constitutions, to impeach the president. However, the obstacles to an impeachment are typically difficult to overcome; thus, few presidents have ever been impeached.

likely to be adopted in presidential systems. According to this theory, a testable hypothesis can be derived from this argument:

*H<sub>31</sub>: Citizens in presidential systems are more likely to adopt hard protest behaviors.*

### 3.3 Research Design

#### 3.3.1 Data

In this study, I examine my theory through cross-national public opinion surveys. I employ the third wave (2010) of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS).<sup>6</sup> Because this study focuses exclusively on democratic countries and the theoretical argument is based on the procedural view of democracy, I employ the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) index to classify democracies and non-democracies in the ABS (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). DD identifies a regime as a democracy when all four of the following criteria are met: ‘1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected. 2. The legislature must be popularly elected. 3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place’ (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, p.69).<sup>7</sup> As a result, DD yields seven democracies and 10,151 respondents in

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<sup>6</sup>Data analyzed in this chapter were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2010-2012), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office ([www.asianbarometer.org](http://www.asianbarometer.org)) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned. The views expressed herein are the author’s own.

<sup>7</sup>Using DD to classify democracies and dictatorships offers advantages over alternative data sets because of its dichotomous measure of democracy. Other popular indicators of democracy, such as POLITY IV and Freedom House, evaluate levels of democracy in each country based on continuous measures of democracy and confront the difficulty of defining the critical threshold separating democracy from non-democracy. Moreover, Freedom House includes some substantive aspects of democracy, such as the quality of governance and corruption, which may not capture the core aspects indicated in my argument. Thus, it makes intuitive sense to adopt DD for this study.

the third wave of the ABS, as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Democracies in the third wave of ABS.

Country	Sample	No response	Soft	Hard
Indonesia*	1550	50.19	42.31	7.49
Japan	1880	52.98	44.57	2.45
Mongolia	1210	71.24	22.31	6.45
South Korea*	1207	77.83	16.67	5.50
Philippines*	1200	69.67	21.08	9.25
Taiwan	1512	75.55	18.73	5.72
Thailand	1550	40.29	52.77	6.94

*Source:* Asian Barometer Survey.

*Note:* Countries marked with asterisk are presidential democracies. Entries for ‘No response’, ‘Soft,’ and ‘Hard’ are percentages of respondents in each country.

Using the ABS to study soft and hard protests provides several advantages. First, it allows for the observation of differences between presidential democracies (Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea) and non-presidential democracies (Mongolia, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand). Second, it allows comparison between the economically developed East Asian democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and the economically developing Southeast Asian democracies (Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand).<sup>8</sup> Third, the third wave of the ABS provides a good battery of items measuring soft and hard protest behaviors that fit into the Asian context. Fourth, the ABS incorporates questions measuring respondents’ attitudes toward democracy and democratic systems. Finally, except for Japan, all democracies in this survey are new democracies with democratic systems that have been in place for periods

<sup>8</sup>Grievances are a key explanation for political violence (e.g., Buhaug and Cederman 2013; Dabalen and Paul 2014; Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Muller 1985; Schnytzer 1994).

ranging from eight years (Indonesia) to 22 years (the Philippines) as of 2010.

### 3.3.2 *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable is *Protest behavior*, which is a categorical index generated from four items: ‘Got together with others to try to resolve local problems,’ ‘Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition,’ ‘Attended a demonstration or protest march,’ and ‘Used force or violence for a political cause.’ Respondents who reported that they had never participated in any of these activities are coded as 0 (no response), those who had participated in either of the first two activities (gathering together or signing a petition) without participating in the remaining two (protesting and using violence) are coded as 1 (soft protest behaviors), and those who had participated in either of the last two activities (protesting or using violence) with or without engaging in soft protest behaviors (gathering together and signing a petition) are coded as 2 (hard protest behaviors). The framing of survey questions for soft protest behaviors demonstrates an Asian way of addressing and resolving individual and group grievances in a peaceful manner that is commonly accepted in these societies, whereas protests, demonstrations, and violence are considered illegal and culturally prohibited in Asian societies. Table 3.1 shows the percentages of respondents in each category (no response, soft protest behaviors, and hard protest behaviors).

### 3.3.3 *Independent Variables*

Following the approach used in chapter two, I again employ Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon’s (2010) model, which explores the relationship between economic and political conditions and protest behavior with the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey as the baseline model to investigate the relationship between pres-

identialism and protest behaviors.<sup>9</sup> As demonstrated, using their measurement of protest behavior resulted in the finding that presidentialism has a negative effect on political violence. I argue that protest behaviors must be separated into two types, soft and hard. Thus, the puzzle of why presidentialism has a positive effect on violent attitudes but a negative effect on violent behavior can be solved.

The ABS does not include the same items as the WVS. To approximate Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon's (2010) model, I use the following variables: *Income satisfaction*, *Trust in parliament*, *Education*, *Group membership*, and *Social status*. *Income satisfaction* is a replacement of life satisfaction and is measured on a four-point scale with higher values indicating higher satisfaction with respondents' household income.<sup>10</sup> *Trust in parliament* is a four-point scale with higher values indicating higher support for the government.<sup>11</sup> *Income satisfaction* and *Trust in parliament* are used to examine the influence of personal grievances on protest behaviors. *Education* is a continuous variable ranging from (1) indicating no formal education to (17) indicating post-graduate education, and *Group membership* is the total number of the top three most important organizations with which the respondents are affiliated.<sup>12</sup> These two variables are employed to explain the effect of personal resources on protest behaviors. The ABS does not include the self-reported measurement of left-

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<sup>9</sup>The dependent variable in their study, protest behavior, is the number of the following activities in which respondents participated: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. For detail, see Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon (2010).

<sup>10</sup>*Income satisfaction*: 'Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs?' The responses are: (4) 'Our income covers the needs well, we can save,' (3) 'Our income covers the needs all right, without much difficulty,' (2) 'Our income does not cover the needs, there are difficulties,' and (1) 'Our income does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties.'

<sup>11</sup>*Trust in parliament*: 'I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Trust in parliament.' The responses are: (4) 'A Great Deal,' (3) 'Quite a Lot of Trust,' (2) 'Not Very Much Trust,' and (1) 'None at all.'

<sup>12</sup>*Group membership*: 'Could you identify the three most important organizations or formal groups you belong to?' The variable is coded between (0) to (3) with respect to the number of responses to 'first organization,' 'second organization,' and 'third organization' affiliations.



right ideology or a measurement of post-materialism. Therefore, I use self-reported subjective social status (*Social status*) ranging from (1) indicating the lowest status to (10) indicating the highest status as a replacement for ideological left-right. Higher social status is a proxy for right-wing ideology, whereas lower social status is a proxy for left-wing ideology.

To examine the hypothesis that presidentialism is positively associated with violent political attitudes, I include variables assessing political institutions, economic development, and levels of democracy at the country level. The first set of variables consists of political institutions, including *Presidential dummy* and *PR system*. *Presidential dummy*, which is a dichotomous variable, is coded 1 if and only if the head of state is popularly elected and is not responsible to the legislature; this variable is the key to examining the hypothesis of my argument.<sup>13</sup> According to Saideman et al. (2002), *PR system* can effectively reduce political violence.<sup>14</sup> The second set of variables consists of economic development indicators assessed by *GDP per capita* (1,000/ppp).<sup>15</sup> A lower level of economic development is likely to enhance income inequality and relative deprivation, resulting in higher levels of political violence (i.e., hard protest behaviors) (see Alesina and Perotti 1996; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Piazza 2006; Weede 1987). The third set of variables is democratic levels, including *Polity score* and *Freedom score*.<sup>16</sup> According to the literature, higher levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of political violence (see Eisinger 1973; Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983). All country-level variables are measured with respect to the year (2010) when the

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<sup>13</sup>Data are obtained from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).

<sup>14</sup>*PR system* is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if proportional representation system is used for national legislative elections and 0 otherwise. The data were collected by the author.

<sup>15</sup>The variable ranges from 2.95 to 35.7. The data were collected by the author.

<sup>16</sup>*Polity score* is a continuous variable ranging from -10 to 10, where higher values indicate a more democratic system (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). *Freedom score* is a continuous variable ranging between 1 and 7; higher values indicate more freedom.

survey was conducted in each country.

### 3.3.4 *Missing Values*

To maximize the number of observations, the variables at the individual level are imputed.<sup>17</sup> To overcome potential biases created by missing values, I use multiple imputation with chained equations (MICE) with all individual-level variables (independent and dependent). MICE is capable of generating imputed values based on each variable's distributional assumption (see King et al. 2001; Lee and Carlin 2010; Royston and White 2011). For example, *Protest behavior* is imputed with respect to a multinomial logistic distribution, and *Trust in parliament* is imputed with an ordered logistic model.

### 3.3.5 *Estimation: Multinomial Logistic Regression*

To examine the impact of presidentialism on hard protest behaviors, I estimate a series of multinomial logistic regression models using no response (*Protest behavior* = 0) as the base. The multinomial logistic regression model is designed for categorically dependent variables, which apply to *Protest behavior*. Unlike the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) used in chapter two to account for cross-national variation, I do not employ a HLM strategy in analyzing Protest behavior because of the low number of countries (7), which limits cross-national variation. Therefore, I include those country-level variables as regular regressors without manipulating the variance-covariance estimates between the individual and country levels. Respondents' weights are also incorporated into the construct of the standard errors. The

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<sup>17</sup>Without imputation, the empirical analysis loses 60% of observations.

model can be specified as

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \left( \frac{P(\text{Protest behavior}=1)}{P(\text{Protest behavior}=0)} \right) &= \sum_{i=0}^k \beta_{1i} X_i + \sum_{j=0}^m \gamma_{1j} Z_j \\ \ln \left( \frac{P(\text{Protest behavior}=2)}{P(\text{Protest behavior}=0)} \right) &= \sum_{i=0}^k \beta_{2i} X_i + \sum_{j=0}^m \gamma_{2j} Z_j, \end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

where  $\ln \left( \frac{P(\text{Protest behavior}=1)}{P(\text{Protest behavior}=0)} \right)$  represents the likelihood of choosing soft protest behaviors compared to no response,  $\ln \left( \frac{P(\text{Protest behavior}=2)}{P(\text{Protest behavior}=0)} \right)$  is the likelihood of choosing hard protest behaviors compared to no response,  $\beta_{1i}$  and  $\beta_{2i}$  are coefficient estimates of individual-level regressors  $X_i$  regarding soft and hard protest behaviors, respectively, and  $\gamma_{1i}$  and  $\gamma_{2i}$  are coefficient estimates of country-level regressors  $Z_i$  regarding soft and hard protest behaviors, respectively.

### 3.4 Empirical Results

Table 3.2 represents the estimates of *Protest behavior* without country-level institutional and economic indicators. There are 10,151 observations across seven democracies in East and Southeast Asia. Model 1 explores the effects of those individual factors, whereas Model 2 includes country-fixed effects to eliminate possible country-specific confounding factors. The coefficient estimates of Model 2 show that there are consistent patterns explaining soft and hard protest behaviors. According to Model 2, *Education*, *Group memberships*, and *Social status* all have positive and significant effects on *Protest behavior*, whereas personal grievances (*Income satisfaction* and *Trust in parliament*) have no effect. These findings indicate that resources are important for explaining various protest behaviors. For intuitive interpretations of these coefficients, I calculate the marginal effects and present them in Figure 3.1.

As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, increasing one unit of *Education*, which ranges from 1 to 17, increases the likelihood of engaging in soft protest behaviors by 0.018


Table 3.2: The multinomial estimates of *Protest behavior*.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
<i>Income satisfaction</i>	0.091** (0.034)	-0.091 (0.063)	-0.022 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.066)
<i>Trust in parliament</i>	0.028 (0.033)	0.020 (0.065)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.041 (0.064)
<i>Education</i>	0.000 (0.011)	0.036 (0.021)	0.088** (0.013)	0.086** (0.024)
<i>Group memberships</i>	0.464** (0.023)	0.446** (0.038)	0.432** (0.025)	0.469** (0.041)
<i>Social status</i>	0.134** (0.015)	0.098** (0.031)	0.076** (0.016)	0.066** (0.030)
<i>Intercept</i>	-2.533** (0.139)	-3.570** (0.274)	-1.961** (0.163)	-4.847** (0.332)
Number of groups	7			
Number of observations	10151			

*Source:* Asian Barometer Survey.

*Note:* Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.05, \*\*0.01. No response is the baseline model.

Figure 3.1: Marginal effects from Model 2 in Table 3.2.



and the likelihood of engaging in hard protest behaviors by 0.004. One unit of change in *Group membership*, which ranges from 0 to 3, increases the likelihood of engaging in soft protest behaviors by 0.07 and hard protest behaviors by 0.017. In addition, the effect of *Social status*, which is measured from 1 to 10, is identical to that of Education. Evidence from Table 3.2 and from Figure 3.1 shows that individual-level regressors have identical effects on soft and hard protest behaviors, and the only difference between them is the magnitude of the effects (e.g., the effect of *Education* on soft and hard protest behaviors is 0.018 and 0.004, respectively). This phenomenon indicates that it is not empirically necessary to distinguish between soft and hard types of protest behaviors. Nevertheless, I will demonstrate how *Presidential dummy* can effectively distinguish these two types.

Table 3.3: The multinomial estimates of *Protest behavior* with country-level regressors.

	Soft			Hard		
	Coeff.	s.e.	dy/dx	Coeff.	s.e.	dy/dx
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	-0.023	(0.103)	-0.028	1.198**	(0.228)	0.071
<i>PR system</i>	0.014	(0.087)	0.006	0.007	(0.154)	0.001
<i>GDP per capita</i>	-0.014**	(0.002)	-0.002	-0.026**	(0.004)	-0.001
<i>Polity score</i>	-0.201**	(0.013)	-0.035	-0.146**	(0.023)	-0.004
<i>Freedom score</i>	-0.380**	(0.024)	-0.065	-0.363**	(0.042)	-0.013
Number of groups				7		
Number of observations				10151		

*Source:* Asian Barometer Survey.

*Note:* Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.05, \*\*0.01. Each country-level regressor is estimated separately with only one country-level variable included in each estimation. The baseline model is Model 2 in Table 3.2. Coefficients of individual-level variables are not reported and are identical to those of Model 2 in Table 3.2. No response is the baseline comparison.

Table 3.3 shows the estimates of country-level variables. Each country-level regressor is estimated separately, and only one country-level variable is included in each estimation. The baseline model is Model 2 in Table 3.2. The coefficients of individual-level variables are not reported and are identical to Model 2 in Table 3.2. Similar to the findings in Table 3.2, *GDP per capita*, *Polity score*, and *Freedom score* reveal a consistent pattern (negative and significant) to explain soft and hard protest behaviors. For example, increasing one unit of *Polity score* decreases the likelihood of experiencing soft protest behaviors by -0.002 and hard protest behaviors by -0.001. These findings suggest that grievances resulting from macroeconomic conditions and the quality of democracy (quality of political institutions) are important for reducing protest behaviors. Although most country-level variables are not able to identify the differences between soft and hard protest behaviors, *Presidential dummy* provides an important insight: this variable is positively significant in explaining hard protest behaviors but has no effect on soft protest behaviors. The margin of Presidential dummy indicates that the likelihood of experiencing hard protest behaviors in presidential democracies is 7% more than in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Thus, the evidence supports  $H_{31}$

### 3.5 Presidentialism, Democratic Attitude, and Political Violence?

This chapter elaborates and extends the argument and findings from chapter two. In particular, it aims to resolve the puzzle of why presidentialism has a positive impact on violent attitude but a negative impact on violent behavior (protest behavior). To address this puzzle, I argue that protest behaviors must be classified into two types: soft protest behaviors and hard protest behaviors. Soft protest behaviors are those that are legally and culturally allowed in a given society and are not subject to any observable consequences, such as petitioning and participating in

a lawful demonstration. Hard protest behaviors are legally and culturally prohibited in a given society and are often subject to severe legal consequences. I argue that presidentialism is linked to hard protest behaviors but not to soft protest behaviors because the rigidity to change of the incumbent president allows the grievances to accumulate and results in more people who are willing to take risks and bear the consequences of engaging in hard protest behaviors. I employ the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey to examine this mechanism, and the results support the theory.

Evidence from chapters two and three suggests that presidentialism has a positive impact on violent attitude and hard violence/protest behaviors. This evidence also indicates that individuals and groups who are citizens of presidential democracies are more likely to believe that using violence is justifiable and are more likely to select extreme strategies with higher risks and consequences when seeking redress for political and social grievances compared with those in non-presidential democracies. The findings in the previous section also suggest that common individual indicators (grievances, resources, and political ideology) show identical patterns in explaining hard and soft protest behaviors.

In studies of democratic consolidation, scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the psychological evaluation of democracy and the way this value can enhance the consolidation of new democracies (see Brantton and Mattes 2001; Catterberg 2004; Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1993, 1996; McCluskey et al. 2004; Mishler and Rose 2001; Putnam 1993; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; Weatherford 1992). Political violence, particularly by individuals who engage in activities that might damage the stability of society, is not welcome in any new democracy and makes democratic consolidation more difficult. Therefore, a follow-up question must be addressed: how do violent behaviors, both soft and hard, shape the

public's evaluation of democracy? In particular, does the experience of hard protest behaviors weaken democratic attitudes and thus slow and damage democratic consolidation?

To address this question, I include variables that measure democratic attitudes to examine how individual experiences of soft and hard protest behaviors affect perceptions of democracy. A series of studies has separated democratic attitudes into four indicators: satisfaction with democracy, preference for democracy, democratic efficacy, and detachment toward authoritarianism (see Chang, Chu, and Huang 2011; Chang, Chu, and Pak 2007; Chu, Chang, and Hu 2003; Park, Chu, and Chang 2010). *Satisfaction* is a four-point scale variable measuring whether respondents are satisfied with their democratic system.<sup>18</sup> *Preference* is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if respondents consider democracy always preferable to any other system and 0 otherwise.<sup>19</sup> *Efficacy* is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if respondents believe that their democracy is capable of solving social problems.<sup>20</sup> *DA* (detachment toward authoritarianism) is generated by a factor analysis of four relevant items, indicating respondents' rejection of authoritarian values.<sup>21</sup> Higher values indicate greater rejection of authoritarian values.

Table 3.4 represents the estimates of the effects of protest behaviors on demo-

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<sup>18</sup>*Satisfaction*: 'On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in?' The responses are: (1) 'Not at all satisfied' to (4) 'Very satisfied.'

<sup>19</sup>*Preference*: 'Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?' The responses are: (1) 'Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government,' (0) 'Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,' and (0) 'For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime.'

<sup>20</sup>*Efficacy*: 'Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?' The responses are: (1) 'Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society' and (0) 'Democracy can't solve our society's problems.'

<sup>21</sup>*DA*: 'There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? For each statement, would you say you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove? 1) We should get rid of parliament and election, 2) Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office, 3) The army (military) should come in to govern the country, and 4) We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.'



Table 3.4: *Protest behavior* and democratic attitude.

	<i>Satisfaction</i>	<i>Preference</i>	<i>Efficacy</i>	<i>DA</i>
<i>Soft protest behavior</i>	0.072 (0.053)	0.004 (0.060)	0.166** (0.062)	0.088** (0.023)
<i>Hard protest behavior</i>	-0.076 (0.107)	-0.186 (0.105)	0.115 (0.109)	-0.137** (0.040)
<i>Income satisfaction</i>	0.146** (0.031)	0.089** (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.011 (0.013)
<i>Trust in parliament</i>	0.671** (0.033)	0.037 (0.031)	0.241** (0.034)	-0.050** (0.013)
<i>Education</i>	-0.050** (0.010)	0.035** (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.036** (0.004)
<i>Group memberships</i>	-0.020 (0.026)	0.066 (0.036)	0.095* (0.035)	0.015 (0.014)
<i>Social status</i>	0.039** (0.015)	0.026 (0.015)	0.061** (0.016)	-0.001 (0.005)
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	-2.533** (0.139)	0.280* (0.116)	-0.154** (0.055)	-0.636** (0.035)
<i>Intercept</i>	–	-0.254 (0.158)	-0.254 (0.158)	0.127* (0.059)
<i>Intercept (1/2)</i>	-0.830** (0.144)	–	–	–
<i>Intercept (2/3)</i>	1.471** (0.142)	–	–	–
<i>Intercept (3/4)</i>	4.596** (0.154)	–	–	–
Number of groups		7		
Number of observations		10151		

*Source:* Asian Barometer Survey.

*Note:* Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.05, \*\*0.01. *Satisfaction* is estimated by an ordered logistic regression, *Preference* and *Efficacy* are estimated by logistic regressions, and *DA* is estimated by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. *Intercept (1/2)*, *Intercept (2/3)*, and *Intercept (3/4)* are intercepts between each response (e.g., between (1) and (2)) generated by the ordered logistic model.

cratic attitude. *Satisfaction* is estimated by an ordered logistic regression, *Preference* and *Efficacy* are estimated by logistic regressions, and *DA* is estimated by an ordi-

nary least squares (OLS) regression. Respondents' weights are incorporated into the construct of the standard errors, and MICE is performed. Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon's (2010) model is used as the baseline model, and I add *Presidential dummy* to determine whether presidentialism has an additive effect on democratic attitude.<sup>22</sup> In general, *Soft protest behavior* is positively and significantly associated with *Efficacy* and *DA*, whereas *Hard protest behavior* is positively and significantly associated with *DA*. That is, respondents who have engaged in soft protest behaviors (e.g., petitioning and gathering together for a particular cause) believe that their democracy is efficacious in resolving social problems and that particularly authoritarian values (e.g., abolishing parliament and elections and welcoming military rule) should be abandoned. This finding is expected because soft protest behaviors are considered a benign method that is regulated under democratic institutions for individuals and groups to address their grievances. Most importantly, respondents who have engaged in hard protest behaviors, such as violence against the government, are likely to embrace authoritarian values. In addition, presidentialism is negatively significant for explaining *Satisfaction*, *Efficacy*, and *DA*, which suggests that individuals' evaluations of democracy are lower in presidential democracies compared with parliamentary and semi-presidential systems.<sup>23</sup>

It is evident that hard protest behaviors—those that may severely damage the stability of any given society and that are legally and culturally prohibited by the state—are negatively associated with democratic attitudes, particularly detachment

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<sup>22</sup>I do not estimate an interaction model due to the limited variation of *Presidential dummy*.

<sup>23</sup>*Presidential dummy* is positively significant in accessing *Preference*, which may have resulted because two options, i.e., 'Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic government' and 'For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime,' are collapsed into one category (not preferred). When *Preference* is recoded into a three-response categorical variable ('Preferred,' 'No difference,' and 'Not preferred'), *Presidential dummy* becomes insignificant. However, the test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IAA) between 'No difference' and 'Not preferred' is rejected, which indicates that 'No difference' and 'Not preferred' are not independent.

toward authoritarianism. Once the public embraces these anti-democratic values, democratic consolidation is damaged, and authoritarian alternatives are considered acceptable. A consolidated democracy refers to a situation in which the democratic system becomes 'the only game in town' (Linz, 1990b, p.156). This situation requires people to use legal procedures and democratic institutions, such as voting and soft protest behaviors, to address their political concerns. Thus, hard protest behaviors are harmful to democratic consolidation because they reduce individual evaluations of the democratic system and may induce a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown. Thus far, I have demonstrated that presidentialism is linked to higher violent attitudes and hard protest behaviors and that hard protest behaviors are associated with lower attitudes toward democracy. Using political violence (democratic crisis) as a mediator, the next chapter will investigate the relationship between presidentialism and democratic breakdown.

## 4. PRESIDENTIALISM, DEMOCRATIC CRISIS, AND DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN

### 4.1 Introduction

Is presidentialism harmful to democratic consolidation? One of the most prevalent arguments regarding the relationship between institutional systems and democratic survival is Juan Linz's comment on the curse of presidentialism (Linz 1990a). Linz argues that presidentialism is harmful to democratic consolidation because of its generic institutional features. However, despite decades of investigation regarding this relationship with various data and statistical analyses, some studies have found no evidence supporting the curse of presidentialism (e.g., Alemán and Yang 2011; Cheibub 2007; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Reenock, Bernard, and Sobek 2007), whereas others have observed an empirical link between presidentialism and democratic breakdown (e.g., Boix 2003; Maeda 2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996, 2000; Sing 2010; Stephen and Skach 1993; Svoboda 2008). The contradictory evidence in published research indicates great interest but uncertainty about the question of whether institutional arrangements have any systematic effect on democratic survival.

In this chapter, I argue that there is an important omitted factor in the assessment of the determinants of democratic breakdown within the current literature. The existing literature treats democratic survival as either the longevity of democracy, as measured by how many years a democracy has survived, or a dichotomous treatment of breakdown and survival in each regime year. But both treatments of democratic breakdown are incomplete because they do not consider a *precondition* for democratic

breakdown, namely, a democratic crisis. I argue that democratic breakdown is best analyzed as a two-step process. For a democracy to break down, the presence of a democratic crisis that presents a significant likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime is necessary, but not sufficient. By jointly analyzing the conditions that contribute to the emergence of a crisis and those that contribute to a breakdown (given the presence of a crisis), a better understanding of democratic survival will be achieved.

Specifically, I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through its institutions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis, but this political instability does not further contribute to the transition, if any, from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 with the regime year as the unit of analysis and a Heckman probit selection model as the main statistical technique, I demonstrate that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated with a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the process. This limited effect may be part of the reasons why many empirical studies find no statistical association between presidentialism and democratic breakdown.

To analyze the robustness of my results, I consider a possible self-selection (or reverse causality) problem, whereby crisis-prone countries may choose presidentialism during democratization rather than presidentialism leading to crises, and alternative specifications. The robustness analyses support the finding that presidentialism significantly affects the emergence of democratic crises but is not associated with democratic breakdown given a crisis. Therefore, the findings suggest that Linz was

correct that presidentialism generates unstable democracies, but this process does not occur in the way he theorized; that is, presidentialism indirectly or only partially contributes to the likelihood of democratic breakdown.

#### 4.2 Institutional Determinants of Democratic Breakdown

There are two general subtypes within representative democracies: presidential and parliamentary systems.<sup>1</sup> The basic structures of power-sharing are essentially different. In presidentialism, the president holds the most political power in government and does not necessarily need to share her power with other political actors. In parliamentary systems, the cabinet has to share power in accordance with the composition of the parliament in order to operate and to sustain majority support, especially when no majority party exists in the legislature. The two systems also differ in their procedures for removing the current government/executive. In presidential systems, in most instances, the president serves a fixed term, determined by the constitution, even if her policy decisions are unpopular within the legislature.<sup>2</sup> In parliamentary systems, a legislative majority can remove the government by either passing a vote of no confidence or rejecting a vote of confidence initiated by the government.

Political scientists have spent decades studying the institutional differences between presidential and parliamentary systems. Scholars have analyzed these systems' inherent generic characteristics as well as their policy outputs. One of the most important topics is the debate about *which institutional arrangement helps a democratic regime survive without breaking down*, particularly in new democracies. That is, the

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<sup>1</sup>Semi-presidential systems are variants of these two types. Some systems more closely resemble presidentialism when the president can remove the government or when her party controls a legislative majority. Others are similar to parliamentarism when the president has no power to remove the government or her party does not control a legislative majority (see Duverger 1980; Elgie 2011).

<sup>2</sup>It is possible, in some constitutions, to impeach the president. However, the requirements for an impeachment are usually difficult to achieve; thus, few presidents have ever been impeached.

literature seeks to understand how new democracies should choose their institutions so as to minimize the chances of authoritarian reversals.

Scholars use two research approaches to try to answer this question (Elgie 2005). Linz's (1990a) seminal piece, "The Perils of Presidentialism," explores the generic differences between presidential and parliamentary systems and treats institutional arrangements as the *only* explanatory variable. Linz argues that presidentialism is harmful to democratic consolidation due to: 1) the "winner take all" nature of presidential systems; 2) the potential for divided government; 3) interbranch conflict resulting from the separation of powers; 4) the competing legitimacies produced by separate presidential and legislative elections; 5) the fixed term of the presidential office, which may transform governmental crises into systemic crises; and 6) direct elections, which give presidents an inflated sense of their mandate despite the condition that they lack legislative control, resulting in ineffective governments.<sup>3</sup>

The second category of institutional studies argues that the fundamental institutional features of presidentialism and parliamentarism should be analyzed in conjunction with other institutional variables. Prominent variables include the powers of the executive, the party system, and the electoral system. The most well-known explanation is that "the combination of presidentialism and a fractionalized multiparty system seems especially inimical to democracy" (Mainwaring 1990, p.168). Mainwaring (1990, 1993) argues that a presidential democracy with multipartism increases the likelihood of both executive/legislative deadlock and ideological polarization, which generates difficulty in forming inter-party coalitions. The argument

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<sup>3</sup>Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, pp.450-451) summarize Linz's argument and identify five general problems of presidentialism: "1) the executive and legislature advance competing claims to legitimacy; 2) the fixed terms of office make presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; 3) presidentialism encourages winner-take-all outcomes; 4) the style of presidential politics encourages presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and, 5) presidentialism encourages populist candidates."

and its supportive evidence lead to Mainwaring's well-known contribution that "the combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes stable democracy difficult to sustain" (Mainwaring 1993, p.199).<sup>4</sup> From an alternative perspective, Lijphart (1995) argues that the combination of parliamentarism and a proportional electoral system is the best condition for democratic consolidation. In addition, studies show that the survivability of presidential and parliamentary democracies is conditioned on economic performance, in which multiparty presidential democracy is especially prone to breakdowns during an economic contraction (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001). As Cheibub and Limongi (2002, pp.175-176) observe,

Parliamentary systems do not operate under a "majoritarian imperative"; deadlock is not as frequent as supposed under presidentialism and is not absent from parliamentarism; coalition governments are not foreign to presidential systems and emerge for the same reasons as they do in parliamentary systems; decision making is not always centralized under parliamentarism and is not always decentralized under presidentialism.

Despite two decades of institutional studies on democratic survival, many scholars do not find compelling evidence supporting the curse of presidentialism (e.g., Alemán and Yang 2011; Cheibub 2007; Gasiowoski and Power 1998; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Power and Gasiowoski 1997; Reenock, Bernard, and Sobek 2007). Thus, some scholars have shifted their attention from the generic institutional features of presidential and parliamentary systems or other institutional factors of the second group of studies, to other non-institutional factors and new methodological approaches to examine the question of the shorter life of presidential democracies. For example, given the observable fact that military regimes are frequently followed by presidential

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<sup>4</sup>Contrary to Mainwaring's view, Cheibub (2007) observes that legislative fragmentation in multiparty systems makes coalition governments more likely, and the effect is stronger in presidential than parliamentary democracies.



democracies, Cheibub (2007) concludes that the relatively higher breakdown rate of presidentialism is due to the military legacy preceding the democratic regimes rather than the factors suggested by Linz. Additionally, Sing (2010) demonstrates that a less effective legislature and unfavorable U.S. foreign policy are two additional factors in explaining presidential breakdowns.<sup>5</sup> Maeda (2010) distinguishes between two modes of democratic breakdown based on whether the breakdown is caused by a force outside of the government or by the suspension of the democratic process by a democratically elected leader. Maeda finds that the likelihood of democratic process termination by incumbent leaders is higher in presidential systems. Svobik (2008) employs a different methodological approach that distinguishes countries that survive because they are consolidated from democracies that survive but are not consolidated. He finds that presidentialism contributes slightly to the likelihood of being consolidated rather than to the likelihood of breakdown.

In sum, the question of whether presidentialism is harmful to democratic consolidation remains unanswered. The differences in the empirical findings can be attributed to several different factors, including sample selection, the statistical model used, possible omitted variable bias, or the lack of a thorough treatment of the process of democratic breakdown. Nevertheless, only Maeda (2010) and Svobik (2008) attempt to provide explanations for why presidentialism has a mixed effect on democratic survival.

#### 4.3 Presidentialism, Democratic Crisis, and Democratic Breakdown

Although the debate has received significant scholarly attention, little clear and concrete evidence regarding the theorized negative effect of presidentialism on democratic survival has been found. The existing literature has failed to resolve the debate

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<sup>5</sup>For greater detail, see Beliaev (2006), Clark and Wittrock (2005), Frye (2002), Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2009), and Shugart and Mainwaring (1997).

initiated by Linz about the likelihood of democratic survival in different institutional systems. However, despite the mixed empirical evidence, most of Linz's theory on presidentialism has not been directly challenged. For example, Pérez-Liñán (2005) finds that interbranch conflicts are intense in Latin American presidential democracies and encourages the emergence of congressional supremacy as an efficient resolution to these conflicts. More directly, fixed terms of presidential elections in conjunction with the practical difficulties of presidential impeachment have generated a hazardous environment for democratic consolidation (Maeda 2010; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008).<sup>6</sup> Thus, Linz's theoretical arguments about the negative effects of presidentialism may still be valid.

If these specific "presidential features" create problems for presidential regimes, then why would scholars find mixed evidence? Democracy does not collapse suddenly and without warning; there are "preconditions" of democratic breakdown. Consider the example of the implementation of martial law and the subsequent two decades of the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines between 1965 and 1986. In his second term as president, Marcos was confronted with multiple difficulties, including economic turmoil, opposition parties that blocked the necessary legislation needed to implement his policies, a massive leftist protest in Mendiola in 1970 (the First Quarter Storm), the Plaza Miranda bombing that occurred during a political campaign rally of the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in 1971, and the continuation of the Moro National Liberation Front's fighting for an independent Muslim nation in Mindanao. These conditions impeded Marcos's ability to achieve his policy goals, and thus, encouraged him to halt Philippine democracy. Additionally, consider the recent Thai democratic breakdown in 2006. The corruption and electoral fraud

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<sup>6</sup>In addition, some researchers argue that the effects of presidential interruptions caused by fixed terms of presidential elections are only minor (see Hochstetler and Samuels, 2011).

by the chief executive, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, caused mass demonstrations and protests on the street, ultimately resulting in a coup d'état.<sup>7</sup> These two cases illustrate the fact that there are “preconditions” of democratic breakdown, which I call *democratic crisis*.

A democratic crisis is defined as any event that yields a significant likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime. A democratic crisis is a precondition for democratic breakdown, but not all crises lead to authoritarian reversals. For example, in 1996-1997, strikes occurred in South Korea, with three million laborers protesting the new labor law that aimed to constrain labor rights (Koo 2000). If the incumbent government did not open conversations with the opposition parties and cease the implementation of the controversial labor law, an undemocratic resolution might have occurred that would have altered the current democratic government. In the case of South Korea, President Kim Young-sam peacefully resolved the crisis without escalating the strikes and without the use of any undemocratic means, such as violent suppression. Additionally, consider the example of the 1989 Philippine coup attempt. Military intervention by the United States successfully crushed the coup and maintained Philippine democracy. Without this intervention, the Philippines would likely have suffered democratic breakdown. Therefore, a democratic crisis is a necessary condition for a democratic breakdown but is not in itself a sufficient condition.

Democratic breakdown is a two-step process. It begins with a group of initiators who aim to change or replace the current government by undemocratic means. On the one hand, the crisis can begin as guerrilla resistance carried out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces. Alternatively, the crisis can begin in military form, as coups initiated by existing military forces and personnel. The main feature

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<sup>7</sup>Various protests in Thailand began in 2005 and lasted until 2006.

of a democratic crisis is the attempt to overthrow the current democratic regime by undemocratic methods. Democracy is designed to channel various social groups within a society and to provide equal political rights for its citizens to participate in politics. With regular elections and party politics, democracy is also designed to provide “alternatives.” That is, unlike authoritarian regimes, in which governments are controlled by dictators who do not rely on the consent of the people to rule and provide few or no political institutions to share their ruling powers with others, regular elections in democratic regimes ensure that the rulers are essentially replaceable through the choice of the people. Thus, when some civilian or military groups try to overthrow the current regime through undemocratic processes, it indicates that: 1) existing democratic institutions are not capable of addressing their grievances, such as the Free Aceh Movement, which demanded independence for the Aceh region of Sumatra from Indonesia from 1976 to 2005; 2) military groups have interests in and opportunities to replace the current democratic government, such as the 1989 Philippine coup attempt; or 3) due to an unstable political environment, the executive attempts to suspend democratic rule to restore order, as did Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Alberto Fujimori of Peru.

A democratic crisis emerges when there is political instability resulting from conflicts between the government and other political actors. I argue that presidentialism generates political instability because of its institutional features. When a potential or ongoing conflict exists between the government and other political actors, unlike parliamentary democracies in which the conflict can be resolved by a vote of no confidence with a cabinet reshuffle or a new election, there is no institutional means for the president to ease tension except for her own resignation. That is, when public dissatisfaction towards the president is high, or demands from minority and under-represented groups cannot be fulfilled, fixed terms of presidential office

along with their “winner take all” nature, result in an almost unchangeable president who retains all executive power. This situation provides incentives for the public or minority groups to try undemocratic means to force a change in the government.<sup>8</sup> Conflicts generated by the institutional difficulty of changing the government are a common and frequent problem in presidential democracies, whose theoretical roots can be found in Linz’s original condemnation of presidential systems (Linz, 1990a). In the presence of a potential or ongoing conflict, the military has an incentive to take over political power because the likelihood of a successful coup is higher in an unstable political environment, and the president may consider suspending democratic rules to restore order. Therefore, presidentialism generates political instability and makes itself crisis prone.

However, I argue that presidentialism does not affect the likelihood of an authoritarian reversal *given* a crisis because the mechanisms that lead a democratic crisis to democratic breakdown differ from the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of a democratic crisis. If the government is challenged by a coup attempt from civilian or military forces, the success of this attempt will lie in whether the initiators are powerful enough and whether the coup is well designed and well staged without opposing intervention from other political actors.<sup>9</sup> Thus, given the presence of a crisis, institutional variables have no explanatory power for whether a democratic crisis escalates to a democratic breakdown. For instance, the Philippines has suffered many coup attempts since its second democratization in 1986. Because of poor design or

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<sup>8</sup>In studying Latin American presidential systems, scholars note the problematic institutional crises caused by interbranch conflicts and the separation of power between the executive and legislative branches. Institutional crisis, or presidential crisis, is coded as successful or failed attempts to impeach or remove presidents or to dissolve or suspend national legislatures (see Helmke 2010; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2005, 2007).

<sup>9</sup>Similar arguments have been popularized in studies of inter-state and intra-state conflict. The literature argues that third-party intervention is crucial to maintaining credible commitments from the government to rebels (see Powell 2002; Walter 2009).

interventions from the United States, none of these attempts succeeded.

In sum, I argue that Linz was correct in suggesting that presidentialism generates unstable democracies, but the process does not occur in the way he theorized. By separating democratic breakdown into a two-step process, from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown, I argue that the institutional features of presidentialism only affect the emergence of a democratic crisis, and not whether a crisis will escalate into a breakdown. Two testable hypotheses can be derived from this argument:

*H<sub>41</sub>: Presidential systems are more likely to encounter a democratic crisis.*

*H<sub>42</sub>: Given a crisis, presidential systems are not more likely to suffer reversals.*

## 4.4 Research Design

### 4.4.1 Data

In this study, democracy is defined from a procedural perspective with a particular emphasis on “office” and “contestation” (see Dahl 1971; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). Specifically, this view of democracy entails three features proposed by Przeworski (1991): “1. *Ex ante* uncertainty: the outcome of the election is not known before it takes place. 2. *Ex post* irreversibility: the winner of the electoral contest actually takes office. 3. Repeatability: elections that meet the first two criteria occur at regular and known intervals” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, p.69). The data employed to measure democracy are Democracy-Dictatorship (DD), which identifies a regime as a democracy when all of the following four rules are achieved: “1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected. 2. The legislature must be popularly elected. 3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to

office must have taken place” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, p.69). The scope of the data is from 1946 to 2008, yielding 133 countries with 187 democratic episodes. The data on *Democratic breakdown*, measured as the year when a regime transitions from democracy to dictatorship, are also included in DD.

Using DD to study democratic breakdown offers advantages over alternative data sets because of its dichotomous measure of democracy. Other popular indicators of democracy, such as POLITY IV and Freedom House, code continuous measures of democracy, and thus pose the difficulty of defining the critical value separating democracy from non-democracy. Moreover, Freedom House includes some substantive aspects of democracy, such as the quality of governance and corruption, which may not capture the core aspects indicated above. Thus, it makes intuitive sense to adopt DD to study democratic breakdown.

#### 4.4.2 *Dependent Variable: Democratic Crisis-Breakdown*

*Democratic crisis* is defined as any event that yields a likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime. I operationalize democratic crisis as guerrilla warfare, revolution, and coups d’État, which produce a threat to the survivability of the current democratic regime due to their violent nature and potential for mass mobilization. The data employed to measure democratic crisis are the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) (Banks 2011). A regime experiences a democratic crisis when there is guerrilla warfare,<sup>10</sup> revolution,<sup>11</sup> or coup d’État.<sup>12</sup> *Democratic*

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<sup>10</sup>Guerrilla warfare is measured as the presence of “any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime” (see Banks 2011).

<sup>11</sup>Revolution is measured as the presence of “any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government” (see Banks 2011).

<sup>12</sup>Coup d’État refers to the presence of “extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year” (see Banks 2011).

*crisis* is a dichotomous measure coded as 1 when a regime suffers at least one of these incidents in a given year, and 0 when a regime does not experience any of them.<sup>13</sup>

The key dependent variable is *Democratic crisis-breakdown*. This is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if both a democratic crisis and breakdown are present in a given country-year, and 0 if there is a democratic crisis without breakdown.<sup>14</sup> The missing values represent the underlying selection process in which there is no democratic crisis or democratic breakdown. I also employ *Democratic crisis* and *Democratic breakdown* as two dichotomous variables, each coded as 1 if a democratic crisis or democratic breakdown, respectively, occurred in a given country-year. These two dependent variables allow me to observe the effect of presidentialism on democratic crisis and democratic breakdown *unconditioned* on democratic crisis as robustness checks.

#### 4.4.3 Independent Variables

Following the literature on democratic survival, I compiled a set of independent variables associated with democratic breakdown and democratic crisis. These variables can be placed in four categories: political institutions, economic development, historical and cultural factors, and demographic and geographic controls. Regarding

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<sup>13</sup>In CNTS, there is no variable directly measuring attempts at democratic suspensions by executives. Nevertheless, empirically speaking, all democratic suspensions experienced some types of domestic unrest before the executives decided to halt democratic rule.

<sup>14</sup>Most democratic crises and breakdowns occurred in the same year. There are only two cases that experienced democratic breakdown but are not coded as experiencing any democratic crisis in CNTS: Sri Lanka in 1977 and Bangladesh in 2007. However, in the case of Sri Lanka, Prime Minister Junius Richard Jayewardene amended the constitution after 1977, changing its system from a democracy to a dictatorship partially in response to long-standing pressure from groups demanding independence for the Tamil-populated areas of Sri Lanka, such as the Tamil United Liberation Front. In the case of Bangladesh, the president of the caretaker government, Iajuddin Ahmed, announced a state of emergency in response to a series of protests and violence led by the Awami League after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) stepped down in October 2006. Both democratic suspensions were preceded by some forms of domestic violence. Thus, I code these two events as democratic crises in the absence of guerrilla warfare, revolutions, and coups d'État. The empirical results with or without these two cases are identical.



political institutions, the key variable of this study is *Presidential dummy*, which is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if and only if the head of state is popularly elected and is not responsible to the legislature. The other democratic systems, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, are coded as 0 (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Following Sing (2010), *Legislative effectiveness* may play an important role in shaping the likelihood of democratic breakdown. According to Banks (2010), *Legislative effectiveness* is measured on a four-point descending scale: effective legislature,<sup>15</sup> partially effective legislature,<sup>16</sup> largely ineffective legislature,<sup>17</sup> and no legislature.<sup>18</sup> Because Mainwaring (1990, 1993) argues that presidentialism with multipartism harms democratic consolidation, the effective number of political/legislative parties (ENPP/ENLP) has been a common variable for assessing multipartism (see Cheibub, 2007; Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Sing 2010). However, the existing dataset measuring the ENPP/ENLP does not include some democratic countries and hence its use would lead to much missing data. Thus, I use *Legislative fractionalization* as an alternative. This variable is an approximation of the probability that two randomly drawn legislators from the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties (Henisz 2002).<sup>19</sup>

Economic development has long been considered a key explanation for democratic survival (Lipset 1959; Neubauer 1967). It has been argued that the level of economic development is positively associated with the likelihood of democratic sur-

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<sup>15</sup>Effective legislature refers to a legislature with a high level of autonomy and the power of taxation, disbursement, and overriding executive vetoes (see Banks 2011).

<sup>16</sup>Partially effective legislature refers to a situation in which the executive's power is much stronger than the legislature's. However, in this situation, the executive does not completely dominate the legislature (see Banks 2011).

<sup>17</sup>Largely ineffective legislature refers to a situation in which domestic turmoil makes the implementation of legislation impossible or the executive interrupts the legislative process (see Banks 2011).

<sup>18</sup>No legislature refers to the absence of a legislature (see Banks 2011).

<sup>19</sup>The empirical results when using ENPP/ENLP, and when replacing it with *Legislative fractionalization*, are largely identical.

vival (e.g., Boix 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000; Svobik 2008). I employ two indicators assessing economic development. The first variable is *Logged real GDP per capita*, which captures levels of economic development in each regime-year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009).<sup>20</sup> The second variable is *Real GDP growth rate*, which measures the overall economic performance in a given regime-year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009). Although *Logged real GDP per capita* is capable of summarizing the overall level of economic development for a given country-year, economic disparity or inequality is not captured by *Logged real GDP per capita*. I use *Life expectancy* (see Wilkinson 1992; Wilson and Daly 1997) at birth,<sup>21</sup> indicating the number of years a newborn infant would be expected to live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth remained the same throughout her lifetime, and *Neonatal mortality rate* (see Gortmaker and Wise 1997; Macinko, Shi, and Starfield 2004; Mayer and Sarin 2005),<sup>22</sup> measuring the probability of death from birth to age one month, expressed as deaths per 1,000, as explanatory variables. These variables assess overall health inequality, which is closely associated with economic disparity.<sup>23</sup>

Historical and cultural factors are believed to have strong effects on democratic consolidation. To capture such factors, I include *Military legacy*, which is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the military previously held power (Cheibub 2007). As Cheibub (2007) notes, previous military regimes lead to greater chances of military interruptions and result in more democratic breakdowns. The second variable is

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<sup>20</sup>The variable is logged to avoid strong leverage from outliers.

<sup>21</sup>Data are obtained from United Nations Statistics Division, Economic Statistics Branch (2009).

<sup>22</sup>Data are obtained from Rajaratnam et al. (2010).

<sup>23</sup>I do not employ direct measures of income inequality, such as the Gini index, because they generate too many missing values (more than 50% of the total observations) and thus result in questionable empirical validity. Nevertheless, even with the great number of missing observations, the empirical results are nearly identical between the model with the Gini index and the models with alternative measures (*Life expectancy* or *Neonatal mortality rate*).

*Ethnolinguistic fractionalization*, which measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (Alesina et al. 2003). Societies with high ethnolinguistic diversity experience more conflicts, such as civil wars (see Easterly and Levine 1997; Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2004; Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). The third variable is *Age of democracy*, which codes the total number of years a country has been democratic in a given country-year. Democracy is not usually an institution that can be established overnight; it takes time for democratic norms to become consolidated and for people to learn how to practice democratic rules. Thus, a long-lived democracy is more likely to be consolidated and less likely to suffer a democratic crisis and breakdown (Power and Gasiorowski 1997). Finally, demographic and geographic controls are included. These variables include *Logged population* and *Logged territorial size* in square kilometers (Banks 2011).<sup>24</sup> A *Constant* is included in all estimations. Except for variables that are constant across years (*Ethnolinguistic fractionalization*, *Logged population*, and *Logged territorial size*) or that represent current historical or institutional conditions (*Presidential dummy* and *Military legacy*), all variables are lagged by one year to avoid the possibility of reverse causality.

#### 4.4.4 Heckman Probit Selection Model

I employ the Heckman probit selection model (HPSM), clustered on each regime, to fully account for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable and the two-step process of entering into a democratic crisis (the selection process) and democratic breakdown given a crisis.<sup>25</sup> The independent variables are the same for both stages.

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<sup>24</sup>The variables are logged to avoid strong leverage from outliers.

<sup>25</sup>Clustered standard errors are designed to remove heterogeneity across countries. In other words, clustered standard errors take across-country correlation into account while allowing for within-country correlation (see William 2000; Wooldridge 2002; Wooldridge 2003).

As discussed by Heckman, the HPSM starts with

$$U_{1i} = \gamma'x_i + u_{1i} \tag{4.1}$$

and

$$U_{2i} = \beta'x_i + u_{2i}, \tag{4.2}$$

where  $U_{1i}$  and  $U_{2i}$  represent underlying unobserved (latent) continuous dependent variables;  $x_i$  refers to the matrix of independent variables (the same covariates for entering into a democratic crisis and for transitioning from a crisis to a breakdown);  $\gamma'$  and  $\beta'$  are coefficients capturing the impact of  $x_i$  on  $U_{1i}$  and  $U_{2i}$  respectively; and  $u_{1i}$  and  $u_{2i}$  refer to (possibly correlated) error terms, which are assumed to come from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and correlation  $\rho$  (see Heckman 1997; Sartori 2003). The *observable* dichotomous variables representing the realizations of these underlying unobserved continuous variables are  $Y_{1i}$  and  $Y_{2i}$ , where  $Y_{1i}$  is an indicator for whether a country experiences a democratic crisis and  $Y_{2i}$  is an indicator for whether a country experiences a democratic breakdown.  $Y_{1i}$  or  $Y_{2i}$  is 1 when  $U_{1i}$  or  $U_{2i}$  is greater than or equal to 0, and 0 when  $U_{1i}$  or  $U_{2i}$  is below 0. This can be summarized as:

$$Y_{1i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } U_{1i} < 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } U_{1i} \geq 0; \end{cases} \tag{4.3}$$

$$Y_{2i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } U_{2i} < 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } U_{2i} \geq 0. \end{cases} \tag{4.4}$$

There are three possible outcomes in the HPSM. The first outcome is when no democratic crisis nor democratic breakdown occurs ( $Y_{1i} = 0$ ). The second outcome is when a democratic crisis is present without a democratic breakdown ( $Y_{1i} = 1$  and

$Y_{2i} = 0$ ). The third outcome is when a democratic crisis and breakdown are both present ( $Y_{1i} = 1$  and  $Y_{2i} = 1$ ). Thus, their bivariate probit probabilities can be written as

$$\Pr(Y_{1i} = 0) = \Phi(-\gamma'x_i); \quad (4.5)$$

$$\Pr(Y_{1i} = 1, Y_{2i} = 0) = \Phi_2(\gamma'x_i, -\beta'x_i, -\rho); \quad (4.6)$$

$$\Pr(Y_{1i} = 1, Y_{2i} = 1) = \Phi_2(\gamma'x_i, \beta'x_i, \rho), \quad (4.7)$$

where  $\Phi$  is the cumulative normal distribution function and  $\Phi_2$  is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function. Combing equations 4.5-4.7, the log likelihood function of the HPSM is

$$\ln L(\gamma, \beta, \rho) = \sum \ln \Phi(-\gamma'x_i) + \sum \Phi_2(\gamma'x_i, -\beta'x_i, -\rho) + \sum \Phi_2(\gamma'x_i, \beta'x_i, \rho). \quad (4.8)$$

Using the HPSM provides significant methodological advances in analyzing democratic breakdown. Most importantly, by considering democratic breakdown as a two-step process, from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown, it allows us to examine whether different factors (explanatory variables) affect the two stages of this process, while also allowing for the possibility that the unobserved factors that affect one stage also affect the other stage (through the correlation factor  $\rho$ ). In general, estimating the two stages separately using separate logit or probit regressions, without accounting for the selection process and without allowing for the possibility that the disturbance terms are correlated, will lead to inaccurate inferences about the determinants of democratic crisis and democratic breakdown.

## 4.5 Empirical Results

### 4.5.1 *Presidentialism, Democratic Crisis, and Democratic Breakdown*

In general, the estimates from the HPSM show support for  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$ , as *Presidential dummy* is positively associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis but has no effect on democratic breakdown conditional on a crisis having occurred. Table 4.1 shows the HPSM estimates of the general model specification of *Democratic crisis-breakdown* with 3,130 observations. The values in the first and third columns are the coefficient estimates and their associated clustered standard errors of the selection model (whether a country experienced a democratic crisis in that year) and the main model of interest (whether a country experienced a democratic breakdown in that year given a crisis). The values in the second and fourth columns are the marginal effects of the covariates on democratic crisis and democratic breakdown given a crisis, respectively. The Wald chi-square test (56.65) indicates the significance of the overall model performance at the 0.01 level.

Regarding democratic crisis, *Presidential dummy*, *Military legacy*, and *Logged population* are positively associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis and are significant at the 0.05 (*Presidential dummy*) and 0.01 levels (*Military legacy* and *Logged population*), whereas *Logged real GDP per capita* and *Age of democracy* are negatively associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis and are significant at the 0.01 level. The estimates of democratic breakdown given a crisis show that only *Military legacy* is significant in affecting the likelihood of a democratic breakdown given a crisis. The second and fourth columns in Table 4.1 are marginal effects that provide the substantive effect of these covariates. First, if *Presidential dummy* is 1, indicating that the current political institution is presidentialism, the likelihood of suffering a democratic crisis will increase by 7.3 percent when holding all other

Table 4.1: The HPSM estimates of democratic crisis and breakdown.

DV:	<i>Crisis</i>		<i>Breakdown</i>	
	Estimates	dy/dx	Estimates	dy/dx
<b>Political institutions</b>				
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.356** (0.154)	0.073** (0.031)	-0.410 (0.286)	-0.038 (0.024)
<i>Legislative effect.</i>	0.070 (0.123)	0.014 (0.025)	-0.273 (0.181)	-0.026 (0.017)
<i>Legislative fract.</i>	-0.063 (0.375)	-0.013 (0.077)	-0.269 (0.518)	-0.025 (0.048)
<b>Economic development</b>				
<i>Logged real GDP pc</i>	-0.287*** (0.105)	-0.059*** (0.021)	-0.156 (0.181)	-0.015 (0.014)
<i>Real GDP growth rate</i>	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.027 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.002)
<b>Historical/Cultural factors</b>				
<i>Military legacy</i>	0.503*** (0.188)	0.103*** (0.039)	1.274*** (0.318)	0.120*** (0.034)
<i>Ethnolinguistic fract.</i>	-0.069 (0.359)	-0.014 (0.074)	0.131 (0.498)	0.012 (0.048)
<i>Age of democracy</i>	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)
<b>Demographic/Geographic controls</b>				
<i>Logged population</i>	0.227*** (0.062)	0.047*** (0.014)	-0.209 (0.131)	-0.020* (0.011)
<i>Logged territorial size</i>	-0.006 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.097 (0.092)	0.009 (0.008)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.445 (1.021)	—	1.475 (1.455)	—
Wald chi-square	56.65***			
Number of observations	3130			

*Note:* Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.1, \*\*0.05, \*\*\*0.01. dy/dx are estimated marginal effects holding all other variables at their means.

variables at their means. The marginal effect of *Logged real GDP per capita* on democratic crisis shows that moving from the poorest country (*Logged real GDP per*

*capita*=5.91) to the richest country (*Logged real GDP per capita*=11.26) reduces the likelihood of a democratic crisis by 32 percent while holding all other variables at their means. The likelihood of a democratic crisis increases by 10.3 percent when countries have a *Military legacy*, and longevity (*Age of democracy*) helps a country escape the emergence of a democratic crisis; each additional year of experience with democracy reduces the likelihood of a democratic crisis by 0.2 percent.

In terms of democratic breakdown, the coefficient for *Presidential dummy* shows that the relationship between *Presidential dummy* and democratic breakdown given a crisis is negative. However, the estimate is not statistically significant. *Military legacy* is a strong predictor of democratic breakdown given a crisis, increasing the probability of democratic breakdown given a crisis by 12 percent.<sup>26</sup>


Figure 4.1 shows the marginal effects of *Presidential dummy* and *Logged real GDP per capita*, which are the most important explanations of democratic survival in the literature (Svolik 2008). The figures in the top row show the predicted probability of democratic crisis and democratic breakdown given a crisis, as a function of *Presidential dummy*, and the black dashed lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. The figures in the bottom row show the predicted probabilities as a function of *Logged real GDP per capita* for both presidential regimes and non-presidential regimes. The black and gray solid lines show the predicted probability for presidential regimes and non-presidential regimes, respectively, and the corresponding black and gray dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. On the one hand, political institution (*Presidential dummy*) has a strong impact on democratic crisis for poor countries. The effect of political institution is mitigated when the overall economy is in better condition. On the other hand, political institution (*Presidential dummy*) and economic development (*Logged real GDP per capita*) only have a small insignificant

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<sup>26</sup>The marginal effect of *Logged population* is statistically significant.



Figure 4.1: Marginal effects from Table 4.1.



impact on democratic breakdown given a crisis.

Table 4.2 shows the HPSM estimates when measures of inequality are included. Model 1 and model 2 show the results including *Life expectancy* and *Neonatal mortality rate*, respectively. Both models support  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$ , and the results for *Military legacy*, *Age of democracy*, and *Logged population* are consistent with those shown in Table 4.1, except for a statistically insignificant estimate for *Military legacy* in the selection model of model 2 (column three). The overall model performances are significant at the 0.01 level for both models, with the Wald chi-square tests scoring 55.99 and 33.56 for model 1 and model 2, respectively. The numbers of observations (2602 and 2488) decrease due to missing values imposed by *Life expectancy* and *Neonatal*

Table 4.2: The HPSM estimates of democratic crisis and breakdown controlling for inequality.

DV:	Model 1		Model 2	
	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Breakdown</i>	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Breakdown</i>
<b>Political institutions</b>				
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.333* (0.176)	-0.329 (0.271)	0.394** (0.190)	-0.468 (0.290)
<i>Legislative effect.</i>	0.049 (0.132)	-0.214 (0.199)	0.043 (0.144)	0.008 (0.214)
<i>Legislative fract.</i>	-0.007 (0.400)	-0.122 (0.587)	0.139 (0.454)	0.085 (0.596)
<b>Economic development</b>				
<i>Logged real GDP pc</i>	-0.023 (0.172)	-0.101 (0.222)	-0.162 (0.168)	0.007 (0.211)
<i>Real GDP growth rate</i>	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.030* (0.017)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.035* (0.019)
<i>Life expectancy</i>	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.020)	— —	— —
<i>Neonatal mortality rate</i>	— —	— —	0.012 (0.008)	0.013 (0.010)
<b>Historical/Cultural factors</b>				
<i>Military legacy</i>	0.452** (0.221)	1.251*** (0.298)	0.347 (0.274)	1.089*** (0.383)
<i>Ethnolinguistic fract.</i>	-0.197 (0.388)	0.020 (0.548)	-0.306 (0.420)	1.085* (0.647)
<i>Age of democracy</i>	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.009 (0.012)
<b>Demographic/Geographic controls</b>				
<i>Logged population</i>	0.245*** (0.067)	-0.191 (0.132)	0.229*** (0.072)	-0.164 (0.119)
<i>Logged territorial size</i>	-0.041 (0.061)	0.089 (0.106)	-0.026 (0.064)	-0.059 (0.122)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.237 (1.153)	1.406 (1.510)	-1.612 (1.521)	0.043 (2.018)
Wald chi-square	55.99***		33.56***	
Number of observations	2602		2488	

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.1, \*\*0.05, \*\*\*0.01.

*mortality rate*. However, by comparing Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, some differences emerge in the estimates of economic development. First, *Logged real GDP per capita* is no longer significant in affecting the likelihood of a democratic crisis in model 1 or model 2. Second, *Life expectancy* has a negative effect on democratic crisis and is significant at the 0.05 level, whereas *Neonatal mortality rate* is not statistically significant. Third, when controlling for *Life expectancy* or *Neonatal mortality rate*, *Real GDP growth rate* has a statistically significant negative effect on democratic breakdown given a crisis.

To summarize, the HPSM estimates from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 provide the following inferences. First, presidentialism is associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis but not with democratic breakdown given a crisis. Thus, the evidence supports  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$ . Second, economic development is a strong predictor of democratic crisis but not of democratic breakdown given a crisis. Moreover, it is likely that, rather than overall economic performance, inequality is key to explaining why some democracies suffer regime instability. Third, as argued by Cheibub, *Military legacy* is a strong predictor of both democratic crisis and democratic breakdown given a crisis (Cheibub 2007). Fourth, the longevity of democracy has a strong impact on democratic crisis but not on democratic breakdown given a crisis. Fifth, when the presence of a democratic crisis is conditioned on, only *military legacy* is significant in explaining democratic breakdown.

#### 4.5.2 Robustness Checks

##### 4.5.2.1 Self Selection

Although there is strong evidence from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 that presidentialism is associated with a higher likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis, it is possible that the causal direction is in the other direction. That is, instead of

presidential systems entailing greater instability because of the institutional rigidity in changing the government, it could be argued that crisis prone countries select presidentialism, because presidents have greater executive power and policy flexibility, which are essential to resolving domestic conflicts.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the positive effect of *Presidential dummy* on democratic crisis may be due to reverse causality. That is, it is not that presidentialism generates democratic crises but, rather, that countries that are prone to crises choose presidentialism (self-select into presidentialism) to solve these crises.

One of the most effective methods for solving self-selection (endogeneity) problems or simultaneous causality bias is instrumental variable estimation (Green 2008; Heckman and Sedlacek 1985). When endogeneity exists in a regression model  $Y = X\beta + \varepsilon$ , where  $X$  causes  $Y$  and  $Y$  causes  $X$ , the estimate  $\beta$  is biased because it captures not only the direct effect of  $X$  on  $Y$  but also the endogenous effect of  $Y$  on  $X$  ( $cov(X, \varepsilon) \neq 0$ ). The purpose of instrumental variable analysis is to “purge” the endogenous estimate  $X$  and leave only the effect that is uncorrelated with  $\varepsilon$ . Instrumental variable estimation is conducted in a two-stage process:

$$X = Z\gamma_1 + \delta\gamma_2 + v \tag{4.9}$$

$$Y = \hat{X}\beta_1 + \delta\beta_2 + \varepsilon, \tag{4.10}$$

where  $Y$  is the dependent variable,  $X$  is the matrix of endogenous independent variables,  $\hat{X}$  is the predicted values of the endogenous independent variables from equation (4.9),  $Z$  is the matrix of instrumental variables,  $\delta$  is the matrix of control variables for  $Y$ ,  $\gamma_i$  and  $\beta_i$  are coefficient estimates, and  $v$  and  $\varepsilon$  are the error terms.

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<sup>27</sup>This is hinted at by the negative estimate of *Presidential dummy* on democratic breakdown given a crisis, although it is statistically insignificant.

That is, instead of regressing the original  $X$  on  $Y$ , the predicted values of  $X$  obtained in the first-stage equation (equation 4.9) are regressed on  $Y$ , where the  $cov(X, \varepsilon)$  has been removed by  $Z$ . In addition, for  $Z$  to be an efficient instrumental variable, the following two conditions need to hold. First, the instrumental variables must be exogenous ( $cov(Z, \varepsilon) = 0$ ). Second, the instrumental variables must be correlated with the endogenous variable ( $cov(Z, X) \neq 0$ ).

Thus, to check whether the statistical significance of *Presidential dummy* in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 is not due to simultaneous causality bias from self-selection, I identify two instrumental variables and estimate two-stage instrumental variable probit models clustered on each regime with the specified instrumental variables entering both independently and jointly.<sup>28</sup> The instrumental variables for *Presidential dummy* are *Latin America* and *Catholic proportion*. The first instrumental variable, *Latin America*, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the country is located in Latin America and 0 otherwise (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2011). As Przeworski et al. (1996, p.46) argue, “countries in which monarchy was abolished (France in 1848 and again in 1875, Germany in 1919) and colonies that rebelled against monarchical powers (the United States and Latin America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) replaced monarchs with presidents.” Thus, empirically, most Latin American countries are presidential. The second instrumental variable, *Catholic proportion*, is the proportion of the country’s population that was Catholic in 1980 (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2011). Empirical speaking, *Catholic proportion* is highly correlated with *Latin America* and thus is correlated with *Presidential dummy*. Both *Latin America* and *Catholic proportion* fulfill the second requirement, as they are both strongly correlated with *Presidential*

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<sup>28</sup>The probit transformation applies to both stages because presidentialism and democratic crisis are both measured dichotomously.

*dummy*. The first requirement of exogeneity will be assessed in the model estimation, in which the effects of the instruments on the dependent variable (democratic crisis) occur via the endogenous *Presidential dummy*.

Table 4.3 shows two-stage instrumental variable probit estimates of democratic crisis clustered on each regime. The covariates employed in Table 4.1 are included in both stages but are not reported. There is no substantial difference between these non-reported estimates and the estimates in Table 4.1. Model 1 and model 2 use *Latin America* and *Catholic proportion* as the instrument independently, and model 3 uses both variables jointly. The results from model 1 to model 3 indicate that, despite the possible endogeneity between presidentialism and democratic crisis, presidentialism has a strong and positive independent impact on the likelihood of a democratic crisis. Estimates for *Presidential dummy* are significant at the 0.05 level across model 1 to model 3. Examining the results from the first-stage estimation, *Latin America* and *Catholic proportion* are good instruments independently, whereas model 3 indicates that *Latin America* is a much stronger instrument than *Catholic proportion* when they are jointly included in the estimation. Tests of relevance further indicate that the second requirement of instrumental variables ( $cov(Z, X) \neq 0$ ) is achieved. The first requirement of instrumental variables (exogeneity of instruments from the dependent variable) is assessed by testing overidentifying restrictions (the Sargan test), which is an F-test assessing whether the selected instrumental variables are not strictly exogenous to the dependent variable. The test results show that *Latin America* and *Catholic proportion* are strictly exogenous to democratic crisis independently and jointly. Once the requirements of instrumental variables are achieved, then the remaining question is whether it is statistically better to estimate an instrumental variable model or a simple probit model in which the latter is statistically more efficient. Tests of endogeneity indicate that estimates from an instrumental

Table 4.3: Two-stage instrumental variables probit estimates of democratic crisis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	First stage: DV= <i>Presidential dummy</i>		
<i>Latin America</i>	4.652*** (0.528)	—	4.387*** (0.623)
<i>Catholic population</i>	—	0.026*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)
Pseudo $R^2$	0.645	0.447	0.671
Wald chi-square	113.33***	72.26***	110.19***
	Second stage: DV= <i>Democratic crisis</i>		
<i>Presidential dummy</i> *	0.410** (0.189)	0.712** (0.291)	0.404** (0.188)
Pseudo $R^2$	0.190	0.193	0.188
Wald chi-square	122.76***	31.58***	69.12***
Test of relevance	77.60***	31.58***	69.12***
Test of endogeneity	0.16	1.57	0.01
Test of overidentifying restrictions	0.73	0.26	0.94
Number of observations	3130	3117	3117

*Note:* Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.1, \*\*0.05, \*\*\*0.01. *Presidential dummy*\*, used as a regressor in the second stage, is the predicted probability generated from the first-stage estimations. I include the same covariates from Table 4.1 in both stages without reporting their estimates in the table, to save space. These variables include: *Legislative effectiveness*, *Legislative fractionalization*, *Logged real GDP per capita*, *Real GDP growth rate*, *Military legacy*, *Ethnolinguistic fractionalization*, *Age of democracy*, *Logged population*, *Logged territorial size*, and *Constant*. There is no substantial difference between these non-reported estimates and the estimates in Table 4.1. The test of relevance is a chi-square test examining whether the instrumental variables are significantly relevant to (correlated with) the endogenous variable (*Presidential dummy*). The test of endogeneity is a chi-square test examining whether the instrumental variable probit models generate different estimates compared to single probit models excluding instrumental variables. The test of overidentifying restrictions is an F-test assessing whether the selected instrumental variables are not strictly exogenous to the dependent variable.

variables model are not substantially different from those of a simple probit model; thus, a probit model without considering endogeneity is preferred. In sum, the two-stage instrumental variable probit estimation shows that, even when considering the possible endogeneity between presidentialism and democratic crisis, presidentialism remains a significant factor in explaining the emergence of a democratic crisis.

#### 4.5.2.2 *Alternative Specifications*

It is natural to wonder whether the HPSM generates substantially different estimates from those obtained by running two independent probit models with democratic crisis and democratic breakdown unconditioned on a democratic crisis, as the two dependent variables. To answer this question, I estimate two independent probit models with clustered standard errors and regress the same covariates specified in Table 4.1 on *Democratic crisis* and *Democratic breakdown* unconditioned on a democratic crisis, respectively. In addition, it is possible that the significance of *Presidential dummy* in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 is simply due to: 1) the empirical results being biased due to the possibility of temporal dependency; or 2) some important independent variables being ignored, resulting in omitted variable bias. To address the first potential problem, I employ Carter and Signorino's suggestion to include cubic polynomial variables ( $t$ ,  $t^2$ , and  $t^3$ ) in modeling time dependence for binary dependent variables (Carter and Signorino, 2010). *Age of democracy* is the time indicator  $t$  in the model, and thus, I include *Age of democracy*, *Age of democracy*<sup>2</sup>, and *Age of democracy*<sup>3</sup>. For the second potential problem, I control for the level of democracy using the same covariates from Table 4.1 and the HPSM with clustered standard errors as the estimation technique.

Intuitively, countries with higher levels of democracy are more resistant to both democratic crisis and democratic breakdown because the practice of democratic rules



has already been internalized and has become “the only game in town” (Linz 1990b, p.156). I employ two sets of variables that measure procedural and substantive views of democracy.<sup>29</sup> The first set of variables is Dahl’s (1971) dimensions of polyarchies, namely, contestation and inclusiveness. According to Dahl, contestation and inclusiveness are the key attributes of polyarchies, the ideal forms of democracy.<sup>30</sup> To assess these attributes, I employ Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado’s (2008) estimates (factor scores) of *Contestation* and *Inclusiveness* generated by the factor analysis of various democratic indicators.<sup>31</sup> The second set of variables is the Freedom House scores (*Freedom score*), which are average scores of political rights (e.g., corruption and minority autonomy) and civil rights (e.g., media freedom and equality of opportunity). *Freedom score* is a seven-point descending measure of the level of democracy, with higher scores indicating greater freedom.

Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 present estimates from alternative specifications. In Table 4.4, model 1 and model 2 are the probit estimates of *Democratic crisis* and *Democratic breakdown* unconditioned on a democratic crisis, respectively, and model 3 is the HPSM estimate of *Democratic crisis-breakdown* when controlling for time dependence. In Table 4.5, model 4 and model 5 are the HPSM estimates of *Democratic crisis-breakdown* when controlling for the procedural view of democracy (*Contestation* and *Inclusiveness*) and the substantive view of democracy (*Freedom score*), respectively. The probit estimates of *Democratic crisis* and *Democratic breakdown* show consistent support for  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$ , in that *Presidential dummy* is positively associated with democratic crisis but not with democratic breakdown. However,

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<sup>29</sup>The procedural view of democracy classifies regimes by whether they provide sufficient democratic institutions and procedures for practicing democracy (e.g., elections), whereas the substantive view of democracy classifies regimes by the outcomes that they produce (e.g., quality of governance).

<sup>30</sup>Contestation refers to the quality of democratic competition, and inclusiveness refers to the quality of political participation.

<sup>31</sup>For detailed information regarding the variables they use in the factor analysis, see Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008).

Table 4.4: Empirical results of alternative specifications.

DV:	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Breakdown</i>	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Breakdown</i>
<b>Political institutions</b>				
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.356** (0.154)	-0.145 (0.160)	0.441*** (0.161)	-0.487 (0.303)
<i>Legislative effect.</i>	-0.063 (0.123)	-0.270* (0.159)	0.870 (0.134)	0.356* (0.196)
<i>Legislative fract.</i>	0.070 (0.375)	0.100 (0.355)	-0.077 (0.370)	-0.622 (0.584)
<b>Economic development</b>				
<i>Logged real GDP pc</i>	-0.287*** (0.105)	-0.189 (0.119)	-0.301*** (0.109)	-0.061 (0.192)
<i>Real GDP growth rate</i>	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.022* (0.013)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.029* (0.017)
<b>Historical/Cultural factors</b>				
<i>Military legacy</i>	0.503*** (0.188)	1.259*** (0.199)	0.540*** (0.185)	1.406*** (0.349)
<i>Ethnolinguistic fract.</i>	-0.069 (0.359)	-0.220 (0.380)	-0.063 (0.369)	0.505 (0.582)
<i>Age of democracy</i>	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.040* (0.022)	0.001 (0.079)
<i>Age of democracy<sup>2</sup></i>	—	—	0.001* (0.001)	0.003 (0.004)
<i>Age of democracy<sup>3</sup></i>	—	—	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<b>Demographic/Geographic controls</b>				
<i>Logged population</i>	0.227*** (0.062)	-0.074 (0.063)	0.236*** (0.064)	-0.227* (0.135)
<i>Logged territorial size</i>	-0.006 (0.054)	0.095 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.056)	0.083 (0.104)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.445 (1.019)	-0.270 (1.052)	-0.208 (1.037)	1.060 (1.496)
Pseudo $R^2$	0.191	0.288		
Wald chi-square	121.36***	82.68***		57.97***
Number of observations			3130	

*Note:* Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.1, \*\*0.05, \*\*\*0.01.

Table 4.5: Empirical results of alternative specifications (continued).

DV:	Model 4		Model 5	
	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Breakdown</i>	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Breakdown</i>
<b>Level of democracy</b>				
<i>Contestation</i>	-0.802*** (0.172)	-0.857** (0.409)	— —	— —
<i>Inclusiveness</i>	-0.167 (0.138)	-0.906*** (0.234)	— —	— —
<i>Freedom score</i>	— —	— —	-0.418*** (0.092)	-0.131 (0.118)
<b>Political institutions</b>				
<i>Presidential dummy</i>	0.399*** (0.138)	-0.240 (0.293)	0.309* (0.187)	-0.218 (0.202)
<i>Legislative effect.</i>	0.215 (0.144)	0.559 (0.404)	0.295* (0.151)	-0.015 (0.215)
<i>Legislative fract.</i>	0.094 (0.389)	0.125 (0.931)	-0.015 (0.433)	0.232 (0.520)
<b>Economic development</b>				
<i>Logged real GDP pc</i>	-0.184* (0.104)	0.138 (0.359)	-0.162 (0.132)	-0.178 (0.146)
<i>Real GDP growth rate</i>	0.000 (0.007)	-0.030 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.035* (0.014)
<b>Historical/Cultural factors</b>				
<i>Military legacy</i>	0.031 (0.213)	-0.383 (0.392)	0.270 (0.262)	0.960*** (0.323)
<i>Ethnolinguistic fract.</i>	-0.009 (0.368)	0.544 (0.779)	-0.386 (0.426)	0.769* (0.465)
<i>Age of democracy</i>	-0.005 (0.003)	0.017 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.012 (0.009)
<b>Demographic/Geographic controls</b>				
<i>Logged population</i>	0.267*** (0.666)	-0.205 (0.199)	0.195*** (0.075)	-0.023 (0.094)
<i>Logged territorial size</i>	-0.016 (0.049)	-0.093 (0.175)	0.006 (0.068)	-0.042 (0.117)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.031 (1.037)	1.168 (2.887)	-0.046 (1.264)	0.234 (1.259)
Wald chi-square	93.84***		50.35***	
Number of observations	2423		2404	

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: \*0.1, \*\*0.05, \*\*\*0.01.

without taking into account the selection process and the possible correlation between the error terms of the two probit equations, *Legislative effectiveness*, *Real GDP growth rate*, and *Age of democracy* become significant predictors of *Democratic breakdown*. Thus, taking into account the selection process and the possible correlation between the disturbances is crucial for making appropriate inferences about the effects of many of the control variables, although not the main variable of interest. Model 3 shows that after taking temporal dependency into account through cubic polynomial time variables, support for  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$  remains robust, with almost identical estimates as those in Table 4.1. Model 4 and model 5 also provide support for  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$ . *Contestation* significantly lowers the likelihood of democratic crisis and breakdown given a crisis, and *Inclusiveness* only affects the likelihood of democratic breakdown (also in a negative direction), whereas *Freedom score* is negatively associated only with democratic crisis. In sum, using independent probit regressions and controlling for temporal dependency and the level of democracy do not affect the significant impact of presidentialism on democratic crisis, and do not significantly associate presidentialism with democratic breakdown given a crisis. Thus, the findings robustly support both  $H_{41}$  and  $H_{42}$ .

#### 4.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Is presidentialism harmful for democratic consolidation? Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 with the Heckman probit selection model to assess a two-step process from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown, my empirical findings suggest that presidentialism is indeed harmful for democratic consolidation, but not in a direct way. Instead, presidentialism contributes to democratic breakdown only through its effect on democratic crisis onset, and does not make democratic crises more prone to democratic breakdown. The

findings are robust even when I take into account the possible self-selection problem, in which countries might choose presidentialism because they are crisis prone for other reasons, and to alternative specifications. Democratic breakdown is not an overnight transition from democracy to dictatorship. The presence of domestic conflict is necessary for a democratic regime to revert to authoritarianism. I have argued and shown that the intervening factor of a democratic crisis is crucial for understanding the full nature of democratic breakdowns, and in particular the effect of political institutions such as presidentialism.

When this necessary condition of democratic crisis is incorporated into the statistical analysis, several novel empirical findings emerge. First, presidentialism is the only institutional variable that significantly affects democratic crisis onset. Other institutional variables, such as *Legislative effectiveness* (Sing 2010) and *Legislative fractionalization*, are not associated with democratic crisis onset or democratic breakdown given a crisis. Second, economic development is no longer a strong explanatory variable for democratic breakdown. Instead, it becomes a strong predictor just of democratic crisis onset. This indicates that once a crisis occurs, rich countries are not less prone to authoritarian reversals and are not more capable of resolving the domestic crisis democratically. Third, history matters. *Military legacy* (Cheibub 2007) appears to be a strong predictor of both democratic crisis onset and democratic breakdown given a crisis. Democracies that have experienced military rule have a greater potential for democratic reversal, at both stages of the process. Fourth, democratic longevity is an important factor affecting democratic crisis onset but not democratic breakdown given a crisis. A longer experience with democracy can entail a more likely resolution of domestic discontent and thus may prevent the emergence of a democratic crisis.

Although this study improves our understanding of how different factors affect

democratic crisis onset and democratic breakdown given a crisis, the theoretical explanations for how a democratic crisis escalates to democratic breakdown have not been tested. According to the revised theory, once a democratic crisis is present, the determinants of whether this crisis will end in a breakdown are the strength of the rebels and the presence of third-party intervention. Therefore, an empirical examination of the factors that affect whether a democratic crisis escalates to a democratic breakdown will be the next step of this research.

## 5. CONCLUSION

### 5.1 Introduction

In conclusion, this dissertation finds evidence supporting the curse of presidentialism on democratic consolidation. Presidentialism encourages the public to consider and use political violence to address their grievances because of the rigidity of changing the government (president) when there exist mismatched policy expectations between the government and the public. When the government is not capable of resolving public discontents and of recomposing the executive internally through institutionalized mechanisms such as a vote of no confidence and government reshuffle, these grievances are likely to be accumulated and individuals who hold these grievances are more likely to consider and engage in political violence, which is featured with risks and consequences. Using the World Value Survey and the Asian Barometer Survey, I demonstrate that people who reside in presidential democracies have a higher tendency to believe that using violence for their political goals are justifiable and to adopt violent protest strategies to address their grievances.

Following this finding, I intend to provide a tentative conclusion to a debate regarding whether presidentialism is associated with democratic breakdown by arguing that democratic breakdown is best analyzed as a two-step process. For a democracy to break down, the presence of a democratic crisis (political violence) that presents a significant likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime is necessary, but not sufficient. By jointly analyzing the conditions that contribute to the emergence of a crisis and those that contribute to a breakdown (given the presence of a crisis), a better understanding of democratic survival will be achieved. Specifically, I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through its institu-

tions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis, but this political instability does not further contribute to the transition, if any, from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated with a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the process. This limited effect may be part of the reasons why many empirical studies find no statistical association between presidentialism and democratic breakdown.

## 5.2 Contributions

This study provides two major contributions to the field of comparative politics and studies of democratic consolidation. First, it draws attention to the relationship between democratic institution and political violence. Studies of political violence have not paid enough attention to the effect of the domestic institutional structure. Some democracies are more likely to experience high level of political violence while others are not. This is not thoroughly due to the variation of economic development, social disparity, and political opportunity structures as suggested by the literature (see Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1995; Schnytzer 199; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). As evident, presidentialism is a factor contributing to the formation of political violence in existing democracies, and this mechanism requires more attentions from scholars and policy makers.

The second contribution of this dissertation is to provide a tentative conclusion toward a decade-long puzzle in the study of democratic consolidation: are presidential democracies more likely to break down? The evidence of this dissertation



suggests that presidentialism is indeed harmful to democratic consolidation. However, the relationship between presidentialism and democratic consolidation is not direct, as those scholars have suggested (Boix 2003; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996, 2000; Sing 2010; Stephen and Skach 1993). There is an indirect relationship between presidentialism and democratic breakdown, through the mediator of political violence (democratic crisis). That is, presidentialism contributes to political violence (democratic crisis) directly, and political violence is served as the precondition of democratic breakdown. Thus, presidentialism affects democratic breakdown indirectly through political violence. The findings conclude that new democracies should select other macro institutional designs which may result in the lower possibility of authoritarian reversals and prolonging its democratic system.

In sum, this dissertation broadens the study of democratic consolidation by bridging theories of political institution (presidentialism) and political behavior (political violence). Existing research has not constructed a synthetic theory which is capable of explaining the curse of presidentialism on democratic consolidation and providing consistent evidence. This dissertation offers a successful combination between these theories with evidence suggesting a consistent interpretation: presidentialism is associated with political violence (democratic crisis) which is a necessary condition of democratic breakdown, and thus, presidentialism affects democratic breakdown through its effect on political violence (democratic crisis).

### 5.3 Limitations and Extensions

Though the findings of this dissertation provide important contributions to studies of democratic consolidation, there is one major limitation in this study: measurement. The issue of measurement is a consistent problem across chapter two, three, and four. In chapter two, violent attitude is operationalized as respondents' responses

to a four-point scale (1-4) agree-or-disagree question—‘using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.’ This is a direct question regarding whether respondents believe violent behaviors are justifiable for their political goals. However, given the fact that most cultures do not encourage political violence as a mean to achieve their goals, respondents are likely to conceal their true attitudes, and thus, analyses on violent attitudes may be underestimated. A better alternative for anchoring violent attitude is to design a set of survey questions that indirectly measures respondents’ approval or support of political violence. These questions would involve a set of well-designed wordings that are capable of extracting the underlying unobservable traits of political violence. Questions such as “Do you support the statement that the end justifies the means?” or “Do you support the statement that harmony of the society is the most important goal for each individual” are possible candidates for a better measurement of violent attitude.

In chapter three, protest behaviors are separated into two types: soft and hard. Soft protest behaviors are measured as respondents’ experiences of ‘Got together with others to try to resolve local problems,’ or ‘Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition,’ while hard protest behaviors are past participation of ‘Attended a demonstration or protest march,’ or ‘Used force or violence for a political cause.’ The concern of the validity of the measurement lies in the first item of hard protest behaviors: ‘Attended a demonstration or protest march.’ It is assumed that any demonstration or protest march is considered illegal and violent in the selected Asian democracies. This assumption may hold its validity under the content of East and Southeast Asia since traditionalism, or so called *Asian values* prevail in these countries, and thus, participating in any demonstration or protest is likely to be considered as illegal or culturally unwelcomed. However, there exists some possibility that some demonstrations are legally approved by the government and

no violence has occurred during the movement. Therefore, a better alternative is to separate ‘Attended a demonstration or protest march’ into two items as ‘Attended a *legal* demonstration or protest march,’ and ‘Attended an *illegal* demonstration or protest march.’

The measurement is also an issue in chapter four. The measurement of democratic crisis, which is defined as any event that yields a likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime, and is operationalized as guerrilla warfare, revolution, and coups d’État, is not the perfect realization of democratic crisis. It is arguable that other events, such as mass protests, demonstrations, or domestic terrorist activities, may also threaten the stability of democratic regimes. Nonetheless, within the existing cross-national-time-series data (panel data), my measurement of democratic crisis is a treatment that maximizes the number of observations and to capture the critical conjuncture of democratic breakdown. In addition, since it is impossible to identify whether mass protests and demonstrations coded in the existing data are soft or hard protest behaviors, only those events that threaten the regime stability greatly are taken into account. A cross-national events dataset with a clear coding scheme regarding the severity of political violence (soft or hard violent behaviors) will be able to clarify this measurement issue.

This dissertation leads to three research venues worthy the exploration. First, I plan to investigate the relationship between violent attitude and violent behavior. It is assumed in this dissertation that violent attitude transfers unobstructedly to violent behavior. That is, individuals who believe using violence for political goals is justifiable will be more likely to engage in violent behaviors. Nevertheless, thinking of using violence and practically using violence involve different risk calculations. Violent behavior needs to take a much more profound and deeper consideration regarding the likelihood of success and the severity of backlash from the state,

whereas violent attitude requires no such consideration given the fact that there is no risk of thinking before action. Thus, the mechanisms explaining violent behavior and violent attitude may vary. To further address this issue, I intend to conduct an experiment to investigate: 1) the measurement that are capable of extracting the underlying unobservable trait of political violence; and 2) the triggers or the intensions (conditions) directing violent attitude to violent behaviors.

In this dissertation, I argue that it is essential to separate soft and hard protest behaviors theoretically and empirically. However, except for the key explanatory factor in this dissertation, presidentialism, I have not demonstrated any other factors that are capable of offering different explanations to soft and hard protest behaviors, respectively. Thus, the second project I envision to do is to identify different mechanisms explaining soft and hard protest behaviors. I believe that the key to explain soft and hard protest behaviors lies in the section 3.5, where I investigated the relationship between democratic attitude and political violence. A revised theory with sufficient empirical analyses would be able to discover these mechanisms. This project will also contribute to the understanding of democratic consolidation.

One of the most important contributions of my dissertation is to theorize democratic breakdown as a two-step process, from democratic crisis to democratic breakdown. Democratic crisis is defined as any event that yields a significant likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime. I employ the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) by Arthur S. Banks with regime-year as the unit of analysis in my dissertation. However, by doing so, I can only assess how macro independent variables, such as economic indicators and existing political institutions, affect the likelihood of suffering democratic crises. The micro-mechanism of democratic crises thus has not been systematically analyzed. The last project I envision involves collecting a cross-national events dataset covering all democratic countries

from 1946 to present. I will document and profile in detail each democratic crisis, including the identity of initiators, the background situation of the event, and the interactions between the government and the rebels. With this information in hand, I can systematically examine the micro mechanism of my dissertation regarding how political institutions (e.g. presidentialism) incentivize civilian or military forces to take actions aiming to overthrow the current democratic government. Furthermore, this information provides a good opportunity to understand why some crises led to a non-reversible breakdown while other did not.

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