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The Armed Forces and the Fate of Emerging Democracies

Coups, Credible Commitments, and Electoral Violence

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to show that the fate of emerging democracies is largely dependent upon the strategic behaviors of political militaries and their coup potential. Given the known issue of democratization's temporarily destabilizing effects, it first examines if such effects makes states vulnerable to coups. It finds clear evidence on democratization's destabilizing effects on coup risk. Such evidence is used to shed new light on the literature about the armed forces and coups in emerging democracies. To explain variation in the military's responses to democratization and consolidation against coup threats, it argues that how the armed forces were organized and controlled during the authoritarian periods influences whether emerging democracies are able to consolidate against coup risk. Second, it explores the declining coup risk and the trilateral relationship between Western democracy promotion, coup risk, and election violence in recently emerging electoral regimes, the so-called "illiberal democracies." It argues that vulnerability to Western leverage, coupled with an emphasis on multiparty elections, creates a political moral hazard problem for incumbents, permitting them to commit electoral violence during the emergence of mass electoral politics.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

Throughout history, democratizing states have been susceptible to military coups. In 1961, a military coup occurred in South Korea within one year after the country's first transition to democracy. Democratization took place as a result of massive civilian and students protests against a rigged vice-presidential election in 1960. Even though the country quickly embraced democratic institutions and procedures, serious political struggles and instability continuously unfolded (Huntington 1968). Political elites heavily fought over positions and policies, and the society continuously suffered from economic hardships. While the newly emerging political leadership had to fight for power against still-dominant political groups from the departed authoritarian regime, it was also prone to intra-elite divides and partisan infighting (Khil 2005). President Yoon and Prime Minister Chang had serious disagreements over important political and economic agendas and visions. The regime appeared to be politically weak and lack a decisive political leadership. Not long after the transition to democracy, a group of military officers overthrew the emerging democratic regime in a coup d'état.

Recently, Egypt experienced a similar event. After massive public protests for political reforms in 2011, democratization took place. Yet, during the democratization processes, serious ideological, political, and social struggles persistently erupted (Kirkpatrick 2013). The fall of the Mubarak regime led to the rise of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that was in charge of overseeing the processes of the country's transition to democracy. The SCAF and emerging political forces and parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party fought each

other over various political and institutional issues including the timetable and procedures of elections, electoral rules, and institutional limits of presidential power. The presidential election in June 2012 elected Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seriously divided the nation. Non-Islamic secular elites, their followers, and the SCAF held fears of the rise of Islamic power (Frisch 2013). The SCAF even tried to curtail the executive branch's power before the president-elect came into office. In addition, after President Morsi came into power, the standoff between the armed forces and the President backed by the Brotherhood continued. The secular side supported the reduced power of the presidency, which the Muslim Brotherhood opposed. In the incessant wake of serious political deadlock and conflict, the democratically elected regime governed by President Mohamed Morsi was toppled in a military coup in 2013.

The 1961 coup of South Korea and the 2013 coup of Egypt illustrate democratizing states' vulnerability to coups. Recently, Harkness (2012) reported that of the 40 democratic transitions in Africa during the post-Cold War era, 20 were quickly followed by military coups. In fact, the susceptibility of fledgling democracies to coups is a well-known issue and concern in the field of Comparative Politics and International Relations (e.g., Huntington 1968; 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). One scholar even called the risk of coups in emerging democracies "the omnipresent specter" (Karl 1990, 13).

To the extent that it may seem intuitive that democratization helps states consolidate against coup threats by improving the legitimacy of the government and ushering in institutional and political developments, the vulnerability of democratizing states to coups may seem puzzling. Why are democratizing states susceptible to coups?

Is their vulnerability due to other factors that are by-products of democratization? Given that democratization's temporarily destabilizing effects on domestic and international stability are a well-known problem (e.g., Huntington 1968; Mansfield and Snyder 2007), it seems natural to explore whether such destabilizing effects invite opportunistic or discontented officers to intervene in politics. In addition, although the literature has overlooked this topic, it is worth exploring for a number of reasons. If democratization makes states vulnerable to coups, the danger of democracy promotion that scholars have warned due to democratization's association with international and civil wars should be also warned because of democratization's destabilizing effects on coup risk. When emerging democratic regimes are likely to be threatened by a coup, they cannot focus on democratic consolidation. The need to secure their rule would likely trump the need to develop and abide by democratic institutions and procedures, making democratic consolidation unlikely. Their security concern would likely take priority over other concerns and matters. Moreover, if democratization renders states prone to coups, we can develop a new explanation for why emerging democracies are prone to conflict. As Belkin and Schofer (2005) correctly observe, rising coup risk can lead rulers to initiate conflict. Similarly, newly elected leaders can trigger unnecessary conflict to prevent a coup, making emerging democracies prone to conflict. Therefore, the second chapter of the dissertation explores this relationship and seeks to explain why democratization can make states vulnerable to coup attempts.

This knowledge can help us better understand the fate of emerging democracies. In particular, it can shed new light on the extant literature about coups and the proliferation of illiberal democracies by leading us to question how the post-Cold War

environment, coupled with Western democracy promotion, is associated with coup risk in fledgling democracies. The existing literature suggests that military coups and military rule have become hard to survive during the post-Cold War period and the new global wave of democratization (e.g., Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Diamond 2011). It is true that military coups have declined in this era (e.g., Powell and Thyne 2011; Marinov and Goemans 2014), and that fledgling democracies' vulnerability to coups has greatly decreased (e.g., Huntington 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2008). The literature also generally agrees that Western pressure and democracy assistance have played a significant role in such improvements (e.g., Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Shannon et al. 2014). However, emerging democracies are still vulnerable to coup attempts. Recall that 20 transitions out of the 40 democratizations in Africa were followed by military coups within the first four years of transition (Harkness 2012). This suggests that even the post-Cold War environment is far from immune to coups, and that we need an explanation that can account for the variation in emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats.

In addition, even declining coup risk may not necessarily mean democratic consolidation; this declining coup risk is in fact associated with the proliferation of illiberal democracies. While the declining coup risk in fledgling democracies and the recent wave of democratization are often attributed to Western pressure and assistance for democratization, many of those emerging democracies quickly degenerated into electoral autocracies or illiberal electoral regimes that used illicit and repressive measures to maintain power (e.g., Zakaria 1997; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2002; Hyde and

Marinov 2014). Why the reduction in coup risk is associated with the proliferation of illiberal democracies is puzzling, but the literature has overlooked it.

The third chapter of the dissertation explains the variation in coup propensities across emerging democracies. Although democratization is destabilizing at least in the short run, emerging democracies are not equally susceptible to coups. Not all fledgling democracies experience a coup attempt or are overthrown. Take South Korea as an example again. The armed forces in South Korea reversed a transition to democracy twice, in 1960 and 1980, but did not do it in 1987 – why? To the extent that the immediate fate of emerging democracies may hinge on how the armed forces transitioning from the previous regime respond during democratization, there is need for more attention on the main conspirators of coups – the military – and less attention needed on socio-economic and political conditions (e.g., Huntington 1991; Luckham 1994; Diamond and Platter 1996; Cheibub 2007; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Svolik 2012). How the armed forces were organized and controlled during authoritarian rule can lie at the core of understanding various responses of the armed forces to democratization, including their commitment to the emerging democratic rule.

Recently, some studies have focused on the implications of coup-proofing legacies for the fate of fledgling democracies (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2010; Harkness 2012; Svolik 2012). Given that coup-proofing is the key to authoritarian political-military relations and a central factor for the organization and operation of the armed forces (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Roessler 2011; Powell 2012), it might be the key to unpacking the puzzle. The recent 2013

Egyptian coup seems to support the hypothesis that coup-proofing legacies can have critical implications for the consolidation of emerging democracies against coup threats.

Since 1981, Hosni Mubarak ruled Egypt until he was forced by his military to step down in 2011. According to various studies (e.g., Hashim 2011; Firsch 2013; Makara 2013), Mubarak heavily relied on manipulating spoils and perks to prevent challenges from the armed forces. In exchange for their loyalty to the ruler, Mubarak provided the Egyptian military with large material and financial benefits and prerogatives. The armed forces eventually became the country's major economic player accounting for up to 40 percent of Egypt's entire economy (Masoud 2011). Despite significant preferential treatments, his military abandoned him at the height of massive public protests for political reforms. His measures to maintain the loyalty of armed forces paradoxically brought ruin to his regime (Firsch 2013; Makara 2013), and even appears to have had consequences for making the newly elected government prone to a military takeover. The large military that Mubarak created refused to commit to the emerging regime and eventually deposed the democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

However, the implications of diverse coup-proofing measures in authoritarian regimes for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats have remained under-theorized and under-examined. In particular, since the extant literature focuses on negative role of coup-proofing legacies, little is known about whether there are positive implications of the legacy of coup-proofing during authoritarian rule for fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats. As coups pose a main threat to the survival of the ruling regime in non-democracies, coup-fearing autocrats accordingly

pursue serious efforts towards their armed forces to prevent coups and prolong their tenure, such as buying off the loyalty of the armed forces, organizing the armed forces along communal and ethnic lines (ascriptive manipulation), and dividing the military and creating parallel armed forces (the so-called counterbalancing) (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012). As suggested in the Egyptian example, such coup-proofing can play a significant role in emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats because it can leave coup-inducing conditions to emerging democracies, such as a large military (Acemoglu et al. 2010; Svolik 2012) and an ethnically organized military loyal to the previous regime (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkness 2012).[1] On the other hand, the heavy implementation of structural coup-proofing like counterbalancing to create and exploit intra-military divides and rivalries can make autocracies vulnerable to intra-military splits for democratization and thus regime transition, which may have critical bearing for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk (e.g., O'Donnell et al. 1986; Geddes 1999; 2004; Cook 2006; Kim 2008; Lee 2009). Chapter 3, therefore, explores the relationship between coup-proofing legacies and fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats. It contributes to the literature by showing that while diverse policies and strategies are suggested in order for emerging democratic regimes to promptly secure the civilian control of the armed forces and deter challenges from the armed forces (e.g., Huntington 1991), their success and thereby consolidation against coup threats are dependent largely upon conditions and dynamics of the armed forces that fledgling democracies inherit.

[1] Svolik (2013, 789), for instance, writes: "military interventions will most likely occur in new democracies that inherited militaries with substantial autonomy and resources."

Chapter 4 delves into the issue of the recent proliferation of "illiberal democracies" with a specific focus on government-led pre-electoral violence. During the post-Cold War era, while numerous new electoral regimes are less vulnerable to coups, the failure of democratic consolidations and authoritarian reversals are prevalent. Many emerging democracies whose democratization was driven largely by Western democracy promotion transitioned to illiberal electoral regimes. Those fledgling democracies' failures and reversals have been caused less by military coups and more by incumbents who abuse power and violate democratic rules and principles (Kapstein and Converse 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). The nominal presence of democratic institutions has not stopped the abusive use of power. Multiparty elections – a minimal but necessary condition for democracy – are not free from the abuse of the ruling regime. The leaders in those regimes often used "tactics of electoral manipulation including overt election fraud, violence and intimidation" to safeguard their election victory (Schedler 2002; Hafner-Burton et al. 2014, 44). In addition, we know that the abuse of executive power is more common in Africa, where the ruling regime is vulnerable to the leverage of Western democracy promoters (Kapstein and Converse 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). These abuses of power and illegitimate rulers have rarely resulted in military takeovers, however. This is surprising given the record that in various emerging electoral regimes during the Cold War (particularly in the1950s and 1960s), when elections were rigged and violent, coups often erupted to overthrow illegitimate rulers (e.g., Payne 1965; Huntington 1968; Fisher 1969).

Kenya vividly demonstrates the above point. On paper, Kenya has been a multiparty democracy since 1991. After several decades of single-party rule under

former presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), Kenya embraced "multipartism" in late 1991 following the rise of serious demands and pressures for democratization. As the Cold War ended, the Moi regime faced serious protests and calls for multiparty rule from opposition groups and churches. Its Western donors, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, also pressured the Moi regime to hold multiparty elections and embrace democratic rules of governance. But the Moi administration suppressed opposition politicians, domestic activists, and civilian protestors calling for democratization, which consequently invited an unprecedented level of pressure and aid suspension from its Western donors. In November 1991, these donors suspended $350 million in development aid and tied future aid disbursement to Kenya to progress toward democracy (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 84). Immediately after the implementation of the donors' heavy pressure and aid cut, the Moi regime legalized opposition parties in December 1991 and scheduled simultaneous general and presidential elections in December 1992 (Clinkenbeard 2004, 22–3). Certainly, Kenya's transition to multipartism was "in large part because of the donors' suspension of financial assistance" (Brown 2001, 731). Nevertheless, this transition did not bring free and fair elections to the state. Although the Moi regime liberalized political systems, his government continuously abused executive power and implemented illiberal and illicit measures to rule the state. Moi hand-picked "the members of the electoral commission and constituencies had been designed to maximize KANU representation in parliament" (Brown 2001, 726). KANU also abused state resources and illegally obtained funds to offer bribes to secure voter support (Brown 2001; Clinkenbeard 2004; Long 2012). Right before the scheduled presidential election in

1992, the Moi government "engaged in heavy repression, including sponsorship of paramilitary 'ethnic warriors' that attacked Kikuyu, Luo, and other potential opponents in KANU strongholds," resulting in at least 1,000 people dead and 250,000 displaced (Human Rights Watch 2002, 20).

To explore the idea that reduction in coup risk during the era of international democracy promotion is associated with the rise of these illiberal behaviors, this chapter examines the relationship between Western democracy promotion and government-led pre-electoral violence, a clear indicator of illiberal behaviors. In particular, it focuses on the trilateral relationship between Western democracy promotion, coup risk, and the government-led pre-electoral violence. This research contributes to disentangling the frequent emergence of illiberal electoral regimes in recent decades by suggesting the new account that the recent proliferation of illiberal behaviors in emerging electoral regimes is an unintended consequence of Western democracy promoters' stronger commitments to multiparty elections and anti-coup stance than to democratic consolidation. This would also contribute to the literature by explaining why government-led pre-electoral violence is more likely in states vulnerable to the leverage of Western democracy promoters.

The dissertation therefore explores the following three issues related to the fate of emerging democracies.

1. Does democratization increase the risk of coups?
2. Do coup-proofing legacies in emerging democracies increase the risk of coups?
3. Does Western democracy promotion increase the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence?

Overview of Chapters: The Arguments

Drawing on the democratization-conflict literature (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995;2007; Snyder 2000; Kalyvas 2000; Hagre et al. 2001), the second chapter presents a theoretical account of democratization's destabilizing effect on coup risk. It contends that, since democratization is often coupled with institutional vulnerability and fragility, at least in the short run, the elites face a commitment problem in their political struggle for power and control of the armed forces, which triggers the army to assume power.[2] Democratization brings about mass electoral politics, which is often accompanied by fragile and ineffective institutions.[3] Amid political competition over mass allies for power and institutional weakness that comes with democratization, the basic rules of the political competition and game are uncertain and unstable. In turn, contending political entrepreneurs have difficulty committing to democratic principles and rules as well as trusting each other's promises and concessions (Huntington 1968; Karl 1990; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). The commitment problems between political rivals can bring about the politicization and polarization of the armed forces. To secure public support in their struggle against their rivals, political contenders even call for courting the armed forces (e.g., Croissant et al. 2012). Some elite factions may even side with officers in the armed forces to win political battles for power. In these unstable circumstances, the incoming civilian regime and political militaries often fail to commit to each other and to a new civil-military status quo, leading to a higher risk of coups.

[2] The commitment problems-conflict literature underscores that conflicts are consequences of commitment problems between contending groups who fail to find some form of compromise that both parties can credibly promise not to renege on (Fearon 1995; Walter 1999; Kalyvas 2000; Powell 2002; 2006; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Acemoglu et al 2010).

[3] In line with the research on democratization's association with conflict (e.g., Huntington 1968; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007), this study also considers that elite competition over newly enfranchised mass electorates' support is at the crux of emerging mass electoral politics.

While the elite commitment problem can spill over into emerging civil-military relations, democratization also makes states vulnerable to commitment problems between the ruling regime and political militaries. While the incoming leadership seeks to stabilize new civil-military relations by offering some serious concessions, it also needs to secure public support for the consolidation of power, which often makes it difficult to commit to its pact with the armed forces (e.g., Diamond and Platter 1997; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Croissant et al. 2012). On the other hand, elite competition for power and resultant political instability would likely provide an opportunity for military interventions and coups. Not to mention, discontented elites might instigate ambitious officers to oust the sitting government. The incumbent's fear of the military's defection and need to bolster public support can shorten the time horizons of the civilian leadership and push them to pursue policies that directly go against the pact between the armed forces and the transitional regime. The military's anticipation of this undesirable consequence can bring about coup attempts.

The third chapter suggests that coup-proofing legacies can have critical impacts on coup risk in emerging democracies by influencing elite commitment problems. Given the role of coup-proofing in the organization and operation of the armed forces, such coup-proofing can have serious effects on the response of the armed forces during regime transition to the new civil-military relations. In particular, while heavy coup-proofing measures, such as the ethnic stacking and military spoils, are unlikely to result in intra-military splits over regime change that can lead to successful civilian control of the armed forces, it can exacerbate commitment problems among elites in emerging democracies. In effect, the inheritance of a large military (Acemoglu et al. 2010; Svolik 2013) and an

ethnically organized military (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkness 2012) are considered an inherent source of coups in fledgling democracies, but they are largely consequences of coup-proofing during the authoritarian periods. Autocratic coup-proofing measures, such as financial and ascriptive manipulations, eventually generate a large military and an ethnically organized military. Under the influence of these coup-proofing legacies, emerging regimes and the armed forces would likely have difficulty committing to each other. The emerging political regime and the armed forces can easily get into conflicts over the control and reform of the armed forces, since they cannot trust each other's concessions and promises. Facing a large armed force full of disloyal officers, the incoming regime is likely to feel threatened and see a greater need for military reforms. The armed forces, on the other hand, are likely to mistrust concessions from the ruling regime and resist attempts to cut their wealth and reform their power. Both parties are therefore likely to face a commitment problem, which will be exacerbated as a result of public discontent against a large army and changes in the ethnic leadership. Therefore, coup risk is likely to be higher under such coup-proofing legacies.

On the other hand, structural coup-proofing measures like counterbalancing can ameliorate the commitment problems and help protect emerging democracies against coup risk. These coup-proofing measures are designed to permit the authoritarian regime to create and exploit intra-military competitions and checks by dividing the armed forces into rival organizations and generating parallel, independent forces. Yet, such coup-proofing measures tend to render the regime susceptible to severe intra-military grievances and the rise of discontented forces from within the military—the losers in the armed forces (e.g., Cook 2006; Kim 2008; Lee 2009). Such intra-military grievances and

conflicts, in turn, bring about the emergence of those in the armed forces willing to support regime change; such intra-military divides in military regimes over regime change have been long believed to have critical impacts on democratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski, 1991; Lee 2009). The emergence of those forces would likely provide a new regime with the opportunity to purge disloyal officers and units and to develop stable relations with the forces. When the risk of challenges from the armed forces declines, the incoming regime is unlikely to threaten the institutional interests and power of the armed forces. In turn, the armed forces are more likely to commit to the new order.

This chapter also argues that when multiple coup-proofing measures are simultaneously pursued, emerging democracies are likely to consolidate against coup risk, for such collective coup-proofing is likely to be often centered around structural coup-proofing focusing on creating and exploiting intra-military divides and balancing. Coup-fearing autocrats pursue various measures to prevent a coup, but they put counterbracing at the center of their coup-proofing strategy (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Quinlivan 1999; Powell 2012; Makara 2013). Even when they organize their armed forces along groups loyal to them, they cannot neglect pursuing internal balancing mechanisms in the armed forces, for it is too dangerous to have their armed forces without checks (Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Lemarchand 1994). Like counterbalancing, such coup-proofing would likely contribute to emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats. It would likely bring about intra-military splits over regime change and thereby stabilize new civil-military relations, helping fledgling democracies consolidate against coup threats.

The fourth chapter proposes a new explanation for why some nations are more prone to government-led pre-electoral violence than others. It argues that national dependence on Western democracy promoters, combined with the focus of the democracy promoters on multiparty elections, creates a moral hazard problem for incumbents, permitting them to commit electoral violence in competitive elections. Western leverage makes it difficult for incumbents to ignore Western pressure and support for democratization. In emerging mass electoral politics, elections become more competitive, which increases the incentive for the incumbent to use violence to win an election.

Yet, it is too risky to resort to violence because it could result in the loss of power in a coup following public resentment, protests, and the declining legitimacy of the government. Such instability and conflict provide an opportunity for military takeovers. Power-seeking officers in the armed forces would likely pursue a coup by capitalizing the declining legitimacy of the ruling regime and resultant political instability and crisis in the aftermath of electoral violence. Paradoxically, the regime's dependence on the democracy promoters permits rulers to resort to electoral violence, since such dependence marginalizes potential coup actors' incentives to overthrow an elected regime. Despite the interest of Western powers in democratization, the effectiveness of democracy promotion is controversial, since the focus is often more on multiparty elections than on democratic consolidation (e.g., Burnell 1998; 2000; Ethier 2003; Ottaway 2003; Levitsky and Way 2010). In contrast, the democracy promoters punish coups heavily (Crawford 2001; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2014). With the rise of the global anti-coup norm during the post-Cold War era, the anti-coup stance of Western democracy

sponsors would likely lead potential coup-precipitators to perceive a higher risk of serious external sanctions, which reduces their ability to maintain power after the success of their coup and reduces their interest in overthrowing even ruthless rulers (Marinov and Goemans 2014). In addition, as national dependence on Western powers increases, the expected benefits of pursuing a popular coup decrease. As such vulnerability increases, Western democracy powers' sanctions and resource retraction as well as the resultant lack of resources make it increasingly difficult for the coup leaders to maintain public support and thereby stay in power, disincentivizing the coup in the first place. Consequently, the declining risk of coups can alleviate the incumbent's fear of a coup after using electoral violence, which, in turn, permits their use of electoral violence in competitive elections.

To be clear, this research does not argue that Western democracy promotion is consistent and worldwide, or that everywhere Western powers display more commitment to coup prevention than to the consolidation of democracy. Rather, the point is that coups are far more likely to be punished than electoral violence. It might be practically difficult for Western democracy promoters to punish subtle violations or even substantial threats to democratic rules and institutions in emerging democracies, such as electoral violence, because those incumbents can simply deny their involvement in any violence or underscore that they legitimately used the lawful authorities to maintain political order. Such events were unfortunate consequences during their law enforcement of violent protests.

Chapter 2. Democratization and Coups

Empirical studies on interstate conflict have found that democracies rarely fight each other (e.g., Doyle 1983; Russet 1993; Oneal and Russet 1999). This "democratic peace" theory gained nearly law-like status and served as a core theoretical foundation for the international community's efforts at promoting democracy around the globe (e.g., Diamond 1995; Carothers 1999). For instance, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have openly argued that aiding democratization would promote peace in the world (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). The spread of democracies, they argued, would likely make the world safer and more prosperous. However, some scholars questioned whether the idea of "democratic peace" is applicable to all types of democracy, or only to fully consolidated democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2007; Thompson and Tucker 1995; Snyder 2000; Hagre et al. 2001; Cederman et al. 2010; Siroky and Aprasidze 2011). This challenge to democratic peace theory that arguably dampened the excitement about the "democratic peace" underscored the fact that terrifying violence along ethnic, communal, or national lines has frequently broken out in emerging democracies.[4] In addition, some empirical studies have shown that democratization – the process through which states become more consolidated democracies – serves to make both interstate and

[4] In this chapter, democratizing states, emerging democracies, and fledgling democracies are interchangeably used. While some studies consider emerging democracies as regimes right after a complete transition to democracy (in this view, fledgling democracies are institutionally not much different from mature democracies) (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 1997), other studies view emerging democracies as regimes transiting to democracy by embracing main features of democracies, such as multiparty elections (e.g., Karl 1990; Kalyvas 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Kapstein and Converse 2008). In the perspective of the latter, emerging democracies and democratizing states are used interchangeably. This study follows the tradition of the latter.

civil wars more likely, highlighting the dark side of democratization (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2007; Cederman et al. 2010).

However, the literature has overlooked democratization's destabilizing effects on coups. While whether democratization makes states vulnerable to coups remains an open question in the empirical literature on the perils of democratization, many have rather considered democratization being conducive to states' consolidation against coups (Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2007). Some even argue for 'coups for democratization'; coups facilitate a transition to democracy (Thyne and Powell 2014). This is surprising. In effect, there are good reasons to consider democratization's destabilizing effects on coups. For instance, in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, a seminal work on the democratization-conflict literature, Samuel Huntington (1968, 4) argued that domestic violence, including coups in transitional countries, was "in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics, coupled with the slow development of political institutions." In this light, it might not be mere coincidence that democratizing states undergoing inter-communal conflicts also experience military coups and vice versa, as happened in nations like Algeria, Argentina, Burundi, Colombia, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, and Sierra Leon. Even during the post-Cold War period witnessing the worldwide spread of democratization and the decline of military dictatorships, the road to democracy still seems susceptible to military revolts. Harkness (2012) shows that military coups threatened twenty emerging democracies in Africa alone during the post-Cold War periods. Nevertheless, despite the known issue of emerging democracies' susceptibility to coups, the existing literature has barely considered the possibility that coups in emerging democracies can be driven by

democratization's destabilizing effects. Rather, coups in fledgling democracies are commonly viewed as events driven by exogenous factors such as poverty, corruption, and institutional weakness (e.g., Decalo 1990; Onwumechili 1998; Lindberg and Clark 2007; Maeda 2010)

Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to systematically examine democratization's association with coup risk. This study is important not only because it examines the overlooked question, but also because it can provide new insight for the recent emphasis on the perils of democratization and the danger of democracy promotion. Perhaps the danger of democracy promotion should be warned not merely because democratization can make states vulnerable to inter-state and intra-state conflicts but also because it can make countries susceptible to military coups. In addition, even if the recent international promotion might work to lower coup risk, studying democratization's association with coups still can lead to developing a new explanation for why democratizing states are vulnerable to conflict. Although various studies have warned about democratization's association with domestic and international conflict, they have not told us that emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups is a potential cause of such conflict. However, as the scholars of the divisionary war suggest (e.g., Levy 1988; Belkin and Shofer 2005), when emerging political leaderships are fearful of a coup, they might try to prevent a coup by diverting the armed forces to external conflict.

This study contends that as democratization makes states susceptible to institutional weakness and disarray at least in the short run, states also become vulnerable to elite commitment problems in emerging electoral politics over competition for power and control of the armed forces, increasing coup risk. As suggested in the

democratization-conflict literature (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995;2007; Thompson and Tucker 1995; Snyder 2000; Kalyvas 2000; Hagre et al. 2001; Berman 2007), the potential perils of democratization lie in elite competition for power in emerging mass electoral politics combined with fragile and ineffective institutions. As democratization unfolds, elite groups left over from the departing regime vie "for power and survival with each other and with new elites representing rising democratic forces" (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 7). While the beginning of democratization takes place before the popular election of the top political leaderships, democratization ultimately brings about that election.[5] Political elites fight for the support of the newly enfranchised mass electorates in emerging mass electoral politics in order for them to assume power. However, the elite competition for power often takes place without effective administrative and regulating institutions (e.g., Huntington 1968; Rustow 1970; Berman 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Their struggle for power is still "about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion" (Horowitz 1993, 18). Amid such struggles for power, combined with institutional vulnerability, contending elite groups tend to resort to non-democratic means, including exclusionary and polarizing appeals and means in order for them to

[5] The overall process of democratization involves the end of the non-democratic regime, holding multiparty elections to select the top governmental officials, the inauguration of the newly elected democratic regime, and the consolidation of the democratic system (e.g., Huntington 1991). Yet, much of the research on democratization's association with conflict focuses on elite competition for power in emerging electoral politics revolving around the elections. For their empirical tests on the effect of democratization on conflict, they mostly use a positive change in a democratic direction as a measure of democratization. As a result, some cases before multiparty elections can be coded as democratization, and when multiparty elections (even if they are not free and fair) to select the executive and legislative officials in non-democratic regimes, including hegemonic or competitive electoral autocracies, it also can be coded as democratization. This means that the theoretical focus of the elite competition for the support of mass allies may be always applicable to these cases of democratization. However, it is a common problem in the democratization-conflict literature focusing on statistical tests, including this study.

mobilize their potential mass electorates. They thus face difficulty committing to democratic principles and rules, as well as trusting each other's intentions and promises (Huntington 1968; Karl 1992 Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Their commitment problems can result in serious political instability before and after the elections; such things as government-led election violence, civil strife against election results, and protests on reneging on the promises after the election can be the sources of the instability. In turn, it would likely provide an appealing pretext for military interventions in politics and coups.

In addition, the politicization of the armed forces and the risk of military defection are likely under the serious competition of power, leading to severe commitment problems between the ruling regime and political militaries, thereby increasing coup risk. Also, to the extent that democratization results in mobilizing and empowering various groups demanding political and socio-economic reforms and improvements in living conditions, the incoming regime is likely to face an array of political and socio-economic challenges. In turn, the regime's efforts to resolve those problems can instigate going against the interests of the armed forces and threaten the pact with the military, making the state susceptible to military revolts.

To test the effect of democratization on coup risk, this study employs binary time-series cross-sectional data of the period 1950-2007. The analysis shows that democratization makes states susceptible to coups. It also finds that the positive effect of democratization on coup risk consistently appears in various models with different estimation methods and measures of democratization. Additionally, this research finds that first multiparty elections and the positive increase in the competitiveness of political

participation make states vulnerable to coups, suggesting that democratizing states are prone to coups during emerging mass electoral politics. Since a core mechanism linking democratization to coups is elites' unregulated and non-democratic competition over mass allies in emerging electoral politics, testing whether conditions facilitating such elite competition increase coup risk is conducive to strengthening democratization's destabilizing effects on coups.

The next section reviews the coup onset literature and what the extant literature tells us about coups in emerging democracies. The third section presents the theoretical arguments. The fourth section discusses the research design and the main results of the analysis. It also discusses the 2008 coup in Mauritania to illustrate how democratization and emerging mass electoral politics can make states vulnerable to coups by causing serious elite commitment problems.

Literature Review

Coup Onset: Coup d'états have broken out in numerous countries. Between 1950 and 2009, 95 countries were exposed to at least one coup event (Powell and Thyne 2011). In much of the developing world, a coup has been the prevalent form of regime change (e.g., McGowan 2003; Powell and Thyne 2011). Successful coups often result in an irregular and illicit transfer of the state's chief executive. According to Goemans et al. (2009-b), coups explain 75 percent of "irregular exits" from power in the 1945-2004 period.[6] Successful coup leaders often rule the state by repression after they come to

[6] Irregular removal from office is "the result of the threat or use of force as exemplified in coups, (popular) revolts and assassinations" (Goemans et al. 2009-b, 2).

power.[7] These rulers and their cliques dictate the state apparatus, budgets, and policies. They often attribute their coups to political crises and paralyses, or economic degradation and crises (e.g., Nordlinger 1977; McGowan and Johnson 1984; Londregan and Poole 1990; McGowan 2005; Roessler 2010). Yet even coups whose main justification was to rescue the state from political and economic turmoil tend to further exacerbate pre-existing problems (Londregan and Poole 1990), leading to violent armed conflicts and severe humanitarian crises (Decalo 1990; Onwumechili 1998; Snyder 2000). For example, a coup in Burundi in 1993 followed the country's first transition to democracy in 1992 and evolved into a terrifying civil war. This military coup resulted in the death of President Ndadaye and eventually triggered waves of ethnic violence (Lemarchand 1994). This civil war lasted for several years, resulting in several hundred thousand deaths. Similar events occurred in countries such as Algeria, Georgia, Haiti and Sierra Leon.

Given the significant impact of coups, they have naturally attracted much attention. Why and under what conditions coups are likely to be staged have been focal questions in the coup literature (e.g., Finer 1962; Huntington 1968; Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977; Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Decalo 1990; Londregan and Poole 1990; McGowan 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Powell 2012b). In general, the literature perceives coups as reactions to political, economic, social problems and the decline in regime legitimacy. For instance, Huntington (1968, 194), who examined the prevalence of political decay and violence in modernizing societies, claims "the most

[7] For instance, numerous countries were ruled by dictators who came into power through coups like Park and Jeon in South Korea, Hussein in Iraq, Kaddafi in Libya, Mobutu in Zaire, Amin in Uganda, and Pinochet in Chile to name a few (See Decalo 1991; Huntington 1991).

important causes of military intervention in politics are not military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society." He particularly stresses political decay as a critical determinant of coups. Others similarly underscored that when there is a legitimacy vacuum or chronic systemic disequilibrium in the state, the military intervenes either to fill the vacuum or to maintain political order (e.g., Welch 1976; Thompson 1976; Nordlinger 1977; Onwumechil 1998). In this literature, political and economic grievances in the society and political instability are largely considered a critical motive for military coups (the so-called guardian motivation).

To the extent that saving the state from political or economic crises is a motive for nearly all military interventions, some studies have probed further. For instance, Biru (1992) groups coup motivation into three camps. In addition to public interest (e.g., rescuing the state), the other two motivations include group interest (e.g., protecting the corporal interest of the military) and private interest (e.g., greed and fear). While personal greed or grievance are important, the actions of coups are constrained by structural conditions (e.g., Horowitz 1980; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Londregan and Poole 1990; O'kane 1993; McGowan 2003). Accordingly, many scholars have shown skepticism about focusing on coup motivations (e.g., Horowitz 1980).

The literature has identified important structural factors and indicators for coups,[8] and these seem to revolve around the four sets of approaches: economic, political, societal, and military. Poverty and institutional vulnerability increase the risk of coups

[8] Thompson (1973) divides the coup onset literature into the following four analytical frameworks: 1) weak legitimacy of civilian regimes, 2) the internal dynamics of the military; 3) international diffusion and demonstrations effects, and 4) grievances.

(e.g., Huntington 1968; Thompson 1973; Jackman 1978; O'kane 1981; Johnson el al. 1984; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Londregan and Poole 1990; McGowan 2003). Coups are likely to erupt in economically poor and/or institutionally instable countries.[9] This seems to explain why most coups occur outside rich and democratic Western countries. In addition, societal characteristics, such as ethnic diversity and social mobilization, are considered an important coup-facilitating condition (Huntington 1968; Jackman 1978; Lunde 1991; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; McGowan 2003;5). Others have focused on the structural conditions of the military and the social background of the military officials, such as expenditure, size, fragmentation, and ethnic make-up, are considered critical factors for coup onset (e.g., Finer 1962; Decalo 1973; 1992; Bratton and Van de Wall 1997; McGowan 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Harkness 2012). For instance, a popular perspective is that coups are executed to protect coup-plotters' organizational or factional interests.

As seen above, the coup literature has found diverse coup-causing factors, but the role of democratization in making states vulnerable to coups has been overlooked. The next review discusses how coups have been studied in connection with democratization.

What We Know about Democratization and Coups: This section begins with the democratization literature, which has generally perceived coups as events following from common structural causes, such as institutional weakness, economic degradation, and corruption in fledgling democracies (e.g., O'Donnelll et a1. 1986; Karl 1990; Huntington

[9] For instance, although his observation is not accurate, Huntington (1996, 15) supports this view by arguing: "[t]here is a coup-attempt ceiling and there is a coup-success ceiling, both of which can be defined more or less in terms of per-capita GNP. Countries with per-capita GNPs of $1,000 or more do not have successful coups; countries with per-capita GNPs of $3,000 or more do not have coup attempts. The area between $1,000 and $3,000 per-capita GNP is where unsuccessful coups occur, while successful coups in Nigeria, Sudan, and Haiti were in countries with per-capita GNPs under $500."

1991; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Harkness 2012; Lindberg and Clark 2007). Similarly, previous studies on democratic consolidation have commonly treated coups as a threat to emerging democracies (e.g., Luckham 1996; Linz and Stephan 1996; Diamond and Platter 1996; Onwumechili 1998; Svolik 2012). For example, Karl (1990, 12) contends that in emerging democracies, there is "the omnipresent specter of a military coup, a coup which may be provoked by intense partisan political disagreements, by the inability of political parties to manage the current profound economic crisis of the region, by the actions of antisystem elites, by a mass mobilization of labor, peasants, or the urban poor that escapes the control of traditional dominant classes, by the actions of a foreign power, or by threats to the vital corporate interests of the military itself."

In the literature on civil-military relations, coups in emerging democracies are often treated as a product of the failure of governmental policies and strategies to control the armed forces and consolidate civilian control of the forces. Since the subservience of the military to civilian leadership is essential for the fate of emerging democracies (e.g., Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Diamond and Platter 1996; Feaver 1999; Desch 1999; Houngnikpo 2013), how to achieve civilian control of the military, which nearly monopolizes the means of violence and was part of the ruling coalition in the ancient regime, is the key issue. Implementing proper institutional designs and launching appropriate policies to control and curb the power of the military are key tasks for emerging democracies to consolidate against coup threats. However, when their policies such as military professionalism fail and their objective of civilian control is not achieved, rebellion from the armed forces is likely.

When it comes to the effect of democratization on coup risk, the democratization literature purports that a transition to democracy helps states consolidate against coup risk (e.g., Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Clark 2007). In their perspective, democratization assures that newly emerging institutions, such as multiparty systems and transparent electoral systems, make politicians accountable and responsive to the political voices of general public and civil society. General voters choose public officials in free and fair elections. Constitutional provisions and commitments to political rights and civil liberties are also guaranteed, while constraining the actions of ruling elites. Also, political processes are governed by the rule of law. As a result, democratization theoretically enhances the legitimacy of the ruling regime so that overthrowing the legitimate regime is unlikely to gain public approval. Clark (2007) and Lindberg and Clark (2007) provide some quantitative evidence based on cross-tabulation analyses that as democratization takes place, coup risk declines in emerging electoral regimes in Africa.

The literature on self-enforcing democracy also suggests that as holding fair and free elections regularly is essential to generating self-enforcing democracy, democratization and following multiparty elections can help states consolidate against the risk of rebellion (Przeworski 1991; Fearon 2011; Hyde and Marinov 2014). In this literature, constitutional provisions and the implementation of democratic institutions, such as free and regular elections, lower the probability of contenders' defection to authoritarianism and provide them with the chance to win the next election, leading them to commit to democratic principles and institutions.

On the other hand, there are studies offering reasonable mechanisms to link democratization and coups. The argument that recurs frequently in the modernization-violence literature, a foundation for the democratization-violence research program, is that political order in transitional states tends to be unstable, and thus these states are prone to violence and rebellion. The seminal work of this approach is done by Huntington (1968). In the process of modernization, social mobilization occurs and expands politically relevant groups, resulting in the upsurge in mass participation. Social mobilization itself may not necessarily be destabilizing (Deutsch 1961), but Huntington claims that if the capacity of political institutions to cope with mass participation is deficient, the increase in political participation tends to result in political instability and decay, causing states to become vulnerable to various types of violence and resistance.[10] Since the capacity of political institutions to manage increased mass participation is generally deficient in many modernizing countries, the increase in mass participation makes states susceptible to coups. Various empirical studies actually examined whether the increase in social mobilization and political participation exacerbates coup risk (Jackman 1978; Lunde 1991; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; O'kane 1993; Siroky and Aprasidze 2011). They generally found evidence supporting the vulnerability of institutionally weak or transitional regimes to coups.

Some studies on the vulnerability of fledgling democracies to ethnic conflict offer useful insights for studying the relationship between democratization and coup risk (e.g., Horowtiz 1985; 1993; Bratton and van de Wall 1997; Harkness 2012). Democratization leads political entrepreneurs to manipulate ethnicity and create ethnic foes to win in mass

[10] Huntington (1968; 79) writes: "The stability of any given polity depends upon the relationship between the level of participation and the level of political institutionalization."

electoral politics, and use it as a means to organize political and military offices and resources. Given the legacy of the ethnically-organized politics, a newly emerging civilian leadership tends to be accountable not to general public but to its own ethnic groups and others loyal to the incoming regime. Accordingly, radical measures like purges and "wholesale ethnic turnover" in the armed forces can be pursued to secure the control of the political army and consolidate regime transition (Horowitz 1985, 528–529; Makara 2012, 13). In turn, the security dilemma of the extant military officers compels them to overthrow the regime.

In sum, the perils of democratization – particularly the link between democratization and coups – have not been adequately theorized and have not been tested through cross-national empirical data. While some previous studies have suggested potential mechanisms linking democratization to coups, this relationship still needs to be theorized further, and its empirical validity also needs to be tested through systematic analyses.

Democratization, Commitment Problems, and Coups

As discussed shortly, much of the research on democratization underscores democratization's association with institutional vulnerability. Given such susceptibility, the mechanism linking democratization to coups boils down to severe commitment problems between core political contenders for the reins of government. In the midst of elite competition for power with institutional weakness and disarray, political contenders often fail to commit to each other. Such elite commitment problems lead states to become embroiled in serious political instability, which offers a pretext for military

coups. In addition, this political environment is likely to make the commitment problem between incoming regimes and political militaries worse. The regime's efforts to strengthen political legitimacy and consolidate the support of mass electorates can result in credibility problems and threaten the pact with the armed forces, making the state susceptible to military coups.

Institutional Vulnerability: In the democratization literature, democratizing states have a tendency to have institutions too fragile to cope with turbulent changes and fail to advance the political institutions of democratic accountability, which are essential to make democracy work, such as strong administrative and moderating institutions, mature party systems, independent judiciary bodies, and professional media outlets (e.g., Huntington 1968; Rustow 1970; Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Siroky and Aprasidze 2011). In studies on the perils of democratization, the institutional weakness of emerging democracies stands at the center of understanding why the road to democracy is vulnerable to conflict. In particular, institutional weakness in democratizing states lies in the nature of democratization. During the process of democratization, states are semi-democratic regarding the level of democracy; institutions are relatively weak compared to consolidated autocracy and mature democracy. While administrative and security organizations wane in transitional regimes, newly emerging democratic institutions, such as accountable, electoral, and regulating institutions, are not yet consolidated. In addition, since the regime is in transition, extant and emerging institutions may be unable to cope with turbulent changes associated with emerging mass electoral politics (e.g., Dahl 1971; Karl 1990; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Rapid changes in the political system and the explosion of political mobilization that come with

democratization tend to outpace the degree of political institutionalization. Moreover, the sequence of democratization, which is often noted as being critical for democratization to survive, is inappropriate in many democratizing states (e.g., Berman 2007).[11] Rustow (1970, 34-5) for instance argued "ingredients [of democracy] must be assembled, one at a time, in a manageable sequence of tasks. The hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of political community."

In democratizing states combined with institutional vulnerability, as contending parties seriously fight over mass allies to vie for power, such struggles for power and subsequent instability can result in political crisis and instability and thereby military coups. Serious political uncertainty about the election, coupled with a massive increase in political mobilization and participation, often leads political actors to resort to polarizing appeals by manipulating national, ethnic, or revolutionary sentiments and even by creating enmity and fear toward other groups. Because emerging democratic institutions are still immature to cope with this, political instability and crisis often unfold, and thus such instability can serve as exploitable pretexts for military interventions (Huntington 1968; Nordlinger 1977; Decalo 1990). When this account is tied to the effect of democratization on elite commitment problems, we have a new explanation for why democratization makes states vulnerable to coups at the individual level.

Elite Commitment Problems: Democratization brings about intensive political competition over mass allies for power. Since emerging political institutions are still

[11] While underscoring the sequence of the democratic transition, this literature thus warned that obtaining the prerequisites for the survival of democracies (e.g., wealth, a large middle class, and a free press) prior to mass participation and the adaptations of democratic institutions are critical to making democracy survive.

ineffective and are in the process of developing through negotiations and compromises, such competition often takes place in environments in which the basic rules of the political competition and game are uncertain and in constant flux (Karl 1990; Burton et al. 1992; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). In addition, democratization often leads states to rapidly jump into multiparty elections before the strengthening of democratic intuitions and norms. In this environment, political contenders are uncertain about whether their rivals will commit to the democratic rules of game and to what they promised during the processes of democratization after assuming power (Fearon 1998; Snyder 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2010). As Burton et al. (1992, 31) correctly observes, contending groups in this environment tend to perceive each other as "equivocal in their commitment to democratic rules of the game" and tend to be entrapped by political uncertainties and fear.

While democratization brings in new rules and principles, emerging electoral politics is still largely about elite battles about inclusion and exclusion, and about power and wealth that accompany inclusion and the penalties that come with exclusion (Horowitz 1993). Political groups that lose in the founding election or are cheated after the election can face a significant loss to their political power and their role within their own group. In particular, for those elites and candidates who were associated with the departing ruling regime, it is terrifying to be uncertain about whether the winner of the election will renege on accommodative policies and pursue programs and policies that may even threaten their survival (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Snyder 2000; Kalyvas 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Acemoglu et al. 2010). In addition, it is also possible that the winners resort to violence to eliminate potential rival groups.

In this political environment, political rivals face difficulty trusting each other's promises and intentions, which deters making and accepting compromises and concessions. While conciliatory promises and accommodative policies by the incumbent or potential winners on such things as fraud-free elections, economic reforms, forgiveness about past wrongs and human rights violations, or power-sharing arrangements are critical to pave a road for democratic consolidation, they are unlikely to be considered credible (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Snyder 2000; Fearon 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Acemoglu et al. 2010). Instead, incentives to defect from the democratic rules of the game rise. As Hyde and Marinov (2014, 335) correctly observe, in the absence of "self-enforcing democracy, incumbent politicians and political parties have few reasons to hold clean elections." It is normal that contending political elites and groups that are likely to lose power or feel threatened resort to diverse non-democratic means, including exclusionary and polarizing appeals to compete for power.

Simultaneously, with such uncertainty and doubt, the sense of insecurity haunts political elites. In the process of democratization, contending political entrepreneurs, "find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents" (Karl 1990; 6). As political elites and factions look for stable and reliable allies to vie for power, they tap into the grievances of their potential mass allies and even manipulate the interests and historical animosity of their mass allies to secure the loyalty of their mass allies and maintain power. Elite competitions for power can result in dividing the society, and instrumentalizing and manipulating existing and potential lines of political and social cleavages, such as ethnicity, religion, and region. Where diverse ethnic groups dwell in the state, ethnic

cleavages can be politicized and instrumentalized on the path to democracy (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Snyder 2000). When political contenders resort to such antagonistic and polarizing appeals, the masses feel threatened, develop serious grievances and enmity toward their out-groups, and cling to their elites and groups for their security and survival (e.g., Lake and Rothchild 1998; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). In emerging multiparty elections that can put the survival of groups at stake, voters end up supporting even violent measures that their leaders employ against their rival groups. As a result, during the processes of democratization, defection from the democratic rules of the game among political contenders is likely, and their bid for power can quickly spiral out of control and turn violent (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Savun and Tirone 2011; Brancati and Snyder 2013; Cederman el al. 2013).

Under these circumstances, the politicization of the armed forces is likely, making states vulnerable to coups (e.g., Huntington 1968; 1991; Horowitz 1985; Lee 2009). In particular, the (potentially) losing groups have strong incentives to call for military interventions by their affiliates in the armed forces to reverse their loss of power or oust the ruthless incumbent who seriously violated the democratic rules of the game. As the modernization-violence literature has already found, such political instability that accompanies democratization can be followed by various types of violence including uprisings and coups. The resultant political crisis can trigger paralyzing strikes and violence. Desperate groups might call even for military interventions to topple the government and pursue the ouster of the ruling regime by siding with their associates in the military. Such political deadlock and disorder also provides an opportunity for ambitious military officers to intervene. Those power-seeking officers would not be

hesitant to capitalize on such crises to assume power. For instance, coup plotters like Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt portrayed themselves as protectors of the state. Army chief Gen al-Sisi removed President Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's first freely elected president, from power in July 2013 and said in his public speech that President Morsi had "failed to meet the demands of the Egyptian people," so "the armed forces could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses" (BBC 2013).

In addition, this elite commitment problem can spill over into emerging civil-military relations. For a young democracy to thrive, its military must be subject to civilian control (e.g., Huntington 1957). However, determining policies and strategies to control and curb the power of the armed forces is not an easy task (Huntington 1957; 1968; 1991; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Croissant el al 2012; Houngnikpo 2013). While resorting to radical measures, such as purging most military leaders from the ancient regime, entirely rearranging the composition of military officers (e.g., ethnic military), and cutting military expenditures and prerogatives, is sometimes necessary to achieve the control of the armed forces, it can also put the survival of the regime at risk. The military is known for responding quickly to reforms that threaten its organizational interest and status (e.g., Huntington1968; Decalo 1990; Onwumechili 1998; Harkness 2012). The incoming leadership therefore needs to reach a bargain with the military by offering some serious concessions in exchange for loyalty to the regime. For instance, in Chile, the military was permitted to have its political privileges and power until 10 years after its democratization (e.g., appointing their chief officer and senators) (Stepan 2009).[12] In Indonesia, 38 seats in parliament were reserved

[12] This may thus have fundamental implications for the consolidation of democracy.

for the military even after the 1998 transition to democracy, which lasted until 2004 (Honna 2013). However, as democratization makes states vulnerable to institutional weakness and disarray, this kind of pact between the incoming regime and the military often fails because of their difficulty trusting each other.

While the critical source of the mistrust and fear between the military leaders and the incumbent lies in the nature of democratization that requires civilian control of the armed forces and military reforms (e.g., Kalyvas 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2010), rising political instability and incessant struggles among political contenders for power exacerbate their commitment problems. In a political environment full of political uncertainties fueled by institutional disarray, they can worsen incumbents' fear of the military's defection and result in the regime's incredible commitment to promises of current payoffs and future rewards to the armed forces. Since political instability and crisis can serve as an opportunity for military coups, the incoming regime is anxious about the risk of military's defection. In addition, it is threatening that their rivals might even opt for co-conspiring a coup with the armed forces loyal to the previous regime (e.g., Huntington 1968). In turn, the rising risk of political army's defection to their rivals can shorten the time horizons of the civilian leadership and hasten reforms to achieve the complete control over the military. For instance, the new regime might be bent on purging military elites with their close associates and controlling the armed forces. As radical measures to reform and the control the armed forces and policies that go against the pact with the armed forces are likely to be pursued, the risk of conflict between them and that of coup rise.

Moreover, in democratizing states, it is inherently difficult to maintain concessions to the armed forces, for political elites need to earn loyalty from mass electorates (particularly from potentially disloyal but large groups) by promising and providing various public goods and services. As the proliferation of groups demanding political and socio-economic reforms takes place in democratizing states, elite competition for power results in the flood of promises to win the fight for the support of mass allies (e.g., Karl 1990). In a politically uncertain and instable environment combined with institutional weakness, serious competitions over mass allies often result in unrealistic and populism-oriented promises. Political contenders often fought popular elections on the military budget and wrongdoings to secure public support that directly go against the pact between the armed forces and the transitional regime (e.g., Diamond and Platter 1996; Acemoglu et al 2010;Croissant et al. 2012). This often means cutting the size of the pie allocated to the armed forces, which have generally consumed a large portion of state resources during the authoritarian periods. In addition, as political competition for power divides the society and triggers violence, the emerging regime needs to bolster its legitimacy and public support for the consolidation of power, threatening the pact with the armed forces. The military's anticipation of these undesirable outcomes can cause its serious commitment problem with the political leadership and result in efforts to protect its institutional interests and power. Since both parties have difficulty guaranteeing their credible commitment to the pact, it can result in a coup attempt.

The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Democratization increases the risk of a coup d'état.

Research Design and Methods

To test the hypothesis, this research uses a dataset on coup onset and democratization. The unit of the analysis is country-year for 151 countries from 1950 to 2007. Given that the focus of this research is cross-national variation in coup risk, this chapter seeks to include as many countries and periods as possible. Given the discrete nature of the dependent variable, it is common to employ a logit approach (e.g., Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Harkness 2012; Powell 2012). However, due to the probability of time dependence of coup risk (the risk of coups can be dependent upon the duration of coup-free years), this study employs a logit model with three some splines and constructs the dataset according to the binary time-series cross-sectional (BTSCS) method.[13] As Beck, Katz, and Tucker suggest (1998), a logit model has difficulty taking into account temporal dependence. The independence assumption of the ordinary logit model tends to be violated if the dataset has a temporal dimension. What Beck, Katz, and Tucker suggest to handle the temporal dependence issue is a BTSCS model that incorporates natural cubic splines (or time dummies) and a temporal dependence control variable.[14] These cubic splines "fit cubic polynomials to a predetermined number of subintervals of

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[13] Although logit models have been commonly used, there are other estimation approaches. While a BTSCS and a conditional logit with fixed effects, which this study employed, are common for event history analyses, survival models are alternatives particularly for dealing with time effects. In particular, Cox proportional hazard models are known for effectively handling both time effects and the effects of covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). Regarding the phenomenon that coups are recurring events, we can still simply treat each coup episode independently. Alternatively, we can use a conditional risk set (time gap) model of the Cox approach with stratification.

[14] Using time dummies is less preferred because these variables significantly lower degree of freedom and cause estimation problems due to separation (Carter and Signorino 2010)

a variable. These polynomials are joined at "knots" (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1270). To smooth time, they thus advise researchers to force the splines to agree at the knots. Yet, Carter and Signorino (2010) offer an alternative to model temporal dependence instead of cubic splines. Given the complexity of splines, they recommend researchers to smooth time by using a cubic polynomial approximation (t, t^2, and t^3), which is, they argue, easy to interpret and avoid complex problems. Consequently, this study employs a BTSCS approach by modeling time dependence. Specifically, it creates a count variable of coup-free year, employs cubic splines, and checks results with a cubic polynomial approximation. Additionally, this research employs a conditional logit with country fixed effects for further estimation checks. Moreover, this research lags all covariates one year to prevent potential endogenous relations.

Dependent Variable: The dependent variable of the study is the onset of coup d'état.[15] In general, the conceptualization of a coup is not vastly different across previous studies in the sense that a coup is frequently viewed as an event to overthrow the government by some segments of state apparatus (Luttwak 1968; Nordinger 1977; Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Marshall and Marshall 2009; Powell and Thyne 2011). Yet, when delving into how each study defines a coup in terms of such things as what is targeted, who stages a coup (whether or not the military has to be involved), whether violence should be involved, and what makes coups successful, it is not difficult to find considerable differences in the working definition of coups.

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[15] Many previous studies on African coups use military intervention index (continuous variable) as their dependent variable (e.g., Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; McGowan 2003). Yet, this continuous variable is obviously not suitable for coup onset literature. Also, this approach faces diverse problems as a result of adding all coup events with arbitrarily assigned weights. For instance, their variable can be a continuous measure of political instability (O'kane 1993).

Nevertheless, the studies providing extensive large-N coup dataset seem to converge into one working definition (O'Kane 1993; Marshall and Marshall 2009; Powell and Thyne 2011). That is, a coup is conceptualized as an illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to overthrow the government. For instance, Marshall and Marshall (2009, 1) define a coup as "a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime." In line with these quantitative studies, this research also uses this common conceptualization.

To collect coup onset data for this study, I review the two most extensive coup datasets: Marshall and Marshall (2009) and Powell and Thyne (2011). Then, I compare them and check other sources through case-specific literature and popular news articles if there is a discrepancy between them. I also weed out any coup plots, which often explain the differences between the datasets. In other words, only successful and attempted-but-failed coups are included in my dataset. This is due to the popular notion that coup plots are hard to identify and often fabricated or overstated by the ruling regime to crackdown the regime's opposition groups or justify their repression (e.g., O'Kane 1981; 1993; Kebschull 1994; McGowon 2003; Tusalem 2010). For instance, McGowon (2003, 344) contends that researchers face "the question whether the various reported plots did in fact exist, or whether they were manufactured by the regime as a justification for eliminating political opponents." I assign a 1 to coup onset variable if a successful or failed coup

occurs given a year; otherwise, a 0 is assigned.[16] Accordingly, the dependent variable of this study is a dichotomous measure of coup onset coded 1 in the year that the state is exposed either to a failed coup, or to a successful coup.

Independent Variables: The main independent variable of this chapter is democratization. Like other quantitative studies on democratization (e.g., Enterline 1996; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Marshall and Jaggers 2002; Wright 2009; Cederman et al. 2010; Savun and Tirone 2011), this study uses a commonly used measure of democratization as a significant positive shift in a democratic direction. To the extent that the focus of this study is to explore how an upward movement toward democracy affects coup risk, this conventional way of measuring democratization fits my study. Specifically, this research uses a positive change in 6-points or more in Polity IV Index for the past three years as a measure of democratization, which is consistent with Marshall and Jaggers (2002) and Converse and Kapstein (2008). *Democratization* is coded 1 if a six point or higher positive change in Polity IV Index for the past three years occurs. Alternatively, it employs a three point positive change in Polity IV Index for the past two years. A transition to democracy is coded 1 if there is a positive change of 3 or more in Polity IV Index during the past two years. This measure of democratization is also used in some previous studies (e.g., Morrison 2009; Wright 2009).

Additionally, given that democratization's association with coup risk lies greatly in the problem of elite competition for power in emerging mass electoral politics, examining if conditions that come with democratization and give rise to such competition increase coup risk is important for further unpacking democratization's destabilizing

[16] If more than one coup occurs given a year, I still assign a 1 in that the focus of this study is to explore coup onset like the previous studies (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990; O'Kane 1993, Powell 2012-b).

effects on coups. For the purpose of capturing elite competition in democratizing states, this study employs first multiparty elections and the positive increase in the competitiveness of political participation. Although the process of democratization occurs without founding multiparty elections for the top political leaderships, democratization eventually brings about such elections. Similarly, when states undergo democratization, the level of political competition rises. The greater the competitiveness of political participation is, the more democratic the regime is; moving toward greater political competiveness is the process of democratization. These measures help this study to test whether democratization and subsequent political competition in emerging mass electoral politics in non-democratic electoral regimes, such as diverse variants of electoral autocracies, make states vulnerable to coups. If emerging mass electoral politics and elite competition for power are coup-inducing factors that accompany democratization, they would likely increase coup risk regardless of regime types.

In this study, for the measure of the increase in political competition, the Polity IV's PARCOMP – The Competitiveness of Participation – is utilized. PARCOMP refers to "extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena" (Marshall et al. 2014, 26). It ranges from 1 to 5. The higher the number is, the more competitive the polity is. *Political Competition* is coded 1 if there is a positive increase of 2 or higher in the measure of PARCOMP during the past two years. Regarding the data of first multiparty elections, Hyde and Marinov's (2012-a) data of first multiparty elections are largely used. They coded a first multiparty election "when a country holds the first multiparty elections after a significant period of non-democratic rule, or when a country transitions from single-party elections to multiparty elections"

(Hyde and Marinov 2012-b, 4). As noted previously, this measure of first multiparty can also include founding multiparty elections taking place in electoral autocracies. Yet, first multiparty elections in electoral authoritarian regimes can be still considered an event in a democratic direction, and such elections still leads the states to face reasonably serious elite competition over mass electorates. This measure is useful for examining how incipient multiparty elections that often come with democratization influence coup risk. For the purpose of capturing more data on elite competition in various democratizing states, we also need to include multiparty elections taking place during democratic transition. This research thus adds more cases of multiparty elections to the dataset by coding any multiparty elections taking place during the Polity's IV's measure of democratization (an increase in the six points of the Index).

As to the correlation among the three variables, they are not highly correlated. *First multiparty election* is correlated with *Democratization* and their correlation coefficient is 0.6496. While the correlation between *Democratization* and *Political Competition* is 0.3552, that between *First multiparty election* and *Political Competition* is 0.3849. As they are not highly correlated with each other, this provides an empirical validation for the examination.

Control Variables: As discussed in the literature review section, previous structural explanations for coup onset focus on economic, political, societal, and military explanations. Because of this, this chapter controls for factors pertinent to these four aspects. First of all, economic backwardness and poor economic performance are oft-cited factors for coups (Finer 1692; Luttwak 1969; Londregan and Poole, 1990; O'Kane 1993; Wang 1998). The notion is typically that the poorer national wealth is, the higher

coup risk is. For instance, Londregan and Poole (1990; 151) write "economic backwardness is close to being a necessary condition for coups." In general, when economic hardship and poverty are severe, the ruling regimes are vulnerable to grievances from the public. In addition, poor countries are more vulnerable to economic crises and shocks. These problems keep the loyalty of the masses away from the ruling regime. They can also increase the likelihood that the public approves leadership change. Disgruntled masses would likely support a new leadership with the hope for some improvements. In addition, when the short-run performance of the economy is terribly bad, it can certainly provide a pretext for coup-conspirators to intervene. In this light, it is not surprising that the world's poorest region – Sub-Saharan Africa – is the most coup-prone area in the globe (McGowan 2003; Clark 2007). Consequently, it is important to control for the level of economic backwardness. It is also critical to account for the case in which economic conditions are sharply deteriorated. In this study, I, therefore, use the natural log of GDP per capita to control for the effect of poverty on coup risk. I also employ the change in GDP per capita to deal with the effect of sudden economic hardship on coup risk. The GDP data are taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.

The second set of control variables is about the political aspects of coup risk. It is widely argued that regime vulnerability derived either from elite instability or from mass protests and uprisings tends to attract military coups (Huntington 1968; Thompson 1975; McGowan and Johnson 1984; Clark 2007; Lindberg and Clark 2008). In this vein, as democracy is associated with a higher level of legitimacy, the higher the level of democracy is, the lower coup risk is. Not to mention, the presence of strong democratic

institutions and norms help deter coups. Similarly, as mass protests against the ruling regime are tied to declining legitimacy of the ruling regime and political instability, they are a known coup-inducing factor (Huntington 1968; Thompson 1975; Welch 1976; McGowan and Johnson 1984). In addition, military regimes are prone to coups (e.g., Belkin and Shofer 2003; Svolik 2012; Thyne 2010; Powell 2012-b). In military regimes, the involvement of the armed forces in politics tends to be extensive. Consequently, the internal conflict within the armed forces is higher, thereby making states vulnerable to coups (Belkin and Shofer 2003; Thyne 2010; Svolik 2012). In addition, this study controlled for the effect of the post-Cold War environment on coup risk. After the collapse of Cold War, the international environment combined with global anti-coup stance makes military rules difficult to survive (Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Stepan 2009; Diamond 2011; Shannon et al. 2014).

To measure the level of democracy, this paper employed the Polity IV Index and then transformed the Index to range from 1 to 21, meaning the higher the Index is, the more democratic the regime is. It also added a square term of the Index to check an inverted-U shaped relationship between democracy level and coup risk: while coup risk is lower in mature democracies, it can be also lower in autocracies in that dictators have significant repressive capabilities and have a tendency to hold firm control over repressive apparatus (e.g., Svolik 2012). The protest data are taken from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive. This study also employed a dummy variable of the military regime type of which data are taken from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). In addition, this chapter included a dummy variable for the post-Cold War environment.

To control for societal aspects, this study includes ethnic diversity. It is well-known that ethnically divided countries are prone to ethnic competition and rivalry, thereby increasing the risk of intra-ethnic coups (Jackman1976; 1978; 1986; Horowitz 1980; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Roessler 2011). Ethnicity is often used or manipulated to mobilize groups and organize political relations (e.g., Huntington 1968; Horowitz 1985). The path to modernization and democracy is particularly prone to the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. When social and political mobilization is organized along ethnic lines, ethnic conflicts including inter-ethnic coups are likely to erupt (e.g., Huntington 1968; Horowitz 1985). To control for this, this study uses ethnic fractionalization data by Fearon and Laitin (2003). It also includes a square-term of this measure to check the possibility to an inverted-U shaped relationship between ethnic diversity and coup risk: in societies of no ethnic diversity or of too many ethnic groups, the propensity of ethnic conflicts is lower compared to societies in which some major ethnic groups compete for power (e.g. Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992).

The fourth set of control variables is pertinent to military dynamics. Many studies have emphasized that the characteristics of the military are the key to unpacking coup risk. For example, military fractionalization and polarization are known-structural conditions for making regimes susceptible to coups (e.g, Nordinger 1979; Decalo 1990; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkeness 2012). For highly fragmented armed forces, severe conflicts among different factions tend to be pervasive, increasing coup risk. To control for the risk of military fragmentation, like previous studies, this study also uses the size of the military. Although it does not directly capture the degree of military fragmentation, it is a reasonable alternative in the sense that as the military size increases,

the likelihood that the armed forces have more factions rises. In addition, adding this control variable might be necessary for another reason. That is, the larger military size is, the more difficult it is for the regime to satisfy demands and grievances arising from the armed forces (Acemoglu el al. 2010). This research also controls for the size of military spending. The military spending is often viewed as a coup-deterring factor in that large benefits can reduce grievances in the military. In effect, military generals and officers in developing countries are found to use military expenditure for personal benefits and purposes (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Powell and Thyne 2011). It can also improve the level of military professionalism (Huntington 1957; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). The data for military size and spending are taken from the COW dataset. In addition, this study controls for the size of government spending to further examine military elites' rent-seeking behaviors. Several studies claimed that large government spending invites coups by greedy military leaders and their associates to pursue rents (Grossman 1991; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Government spending as a percentage of GDP is used as the measure of government consumption. The data of government consumption come from the WDI. In addition to these four sets of the control variables, I also control for temporal dependence of coup risk by adding cubic splines and the number of coup-free years since last coup.

Results

This chapter finds robust evidence that democratization increases coup risk. As shown in table 1, it appears that democratization has statistically significant impacts on coup risk across all of the regression models. *Democratization* in Model 1 is closely

associated with coup risk. When the covariates of coup risk are included to Model 2, *Democratization* still increases coup risk. It also appears that the effect of democracy on coup risk is non-linear, also supporting the hypothesis. Model 3 presents that while the sign of *Democracy* is positive, its square term has a negative sign, and that both variables are statistically significant. This evidence may explain why *Democracy* also has insignificant impacts across models in Table 1. This nonlinear impact of democracy on coup risk also supports the common notion that coup risk is lower mostly in highly repressive regimes and mature democracies, underscoring that regimes moving towards democracy are vulnerable to coups. In addition, as shown in Model 4, the significant effect of *Democratization* on coup risk is still present after controlling for the relationship between the nature of regime type and coup risk. When other estimation methods are used, the effect of democratization on coup risk is still positive and significant. Model 5 with a cubic polynomial approximation also presents democratization's significant destabilizing effects on coup risk. Model 6 with country-fixed effects also shows that democratization increases coup risk.[17][18]

Table 1. Democratization (Polity Index Change > 5) and Coup Risk

VARIABLES[a]	(1) Model[b]	(2) Model[b]	(3) Model[b]	(4) Model[b]	(5) Model[c]	(6) Model[d]
Democracy (1-21)		-0.013	0.303***	0.276***	-0.013	0.022
		(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Democracy (1-21)^2			-0.014***	-0.013***		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		

[17] Ethnic fractionalization and its square terms are dropped because of their no within-group variance.
[18] This study checked a multicollinearity problem for the model. It found that none of the covariates are highly related to each other. These variables have numbers close to 1 in both tolerance and VIF (variance inflation factor), meaning they are not correlated. For instance, democratization, the tolerance value is 1.08 and the VIF value is 0.9270.

Democratization (>5)	1.123***	0.768***		0.622**	0.783***	0.593**
	(0.162)	(0.240)		(0.245)	(0.242)	(0.239)
Protests		0.055**	0.053*	0.043*	0.058**	0.063
		(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.052)
Military Regime		0.574***	0.438**	0.457**	0.601***	0.629***
		(0.191)	(0.184)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.228)
GDP per Capita (ln)		-0.144*	-0.105	-0.071	-0.136	-0.817***
		(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.298)
Change in GDP		-1.565	-1.706*	-1.590*	-1.567*	-1.147*
		(0.977)	(0.961)	(0.973)	(0.956)	(0.823)
Govt. Consumption		-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.022)
Military Expenditure		-0.102*	-0.060	-0.076	-0.104*	-0.107
		(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.097)
Military personal		-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Ethnic Fractionalization		1.544*	1.290	1.321*	1.564*	
		(1.000)	(1.026)	(1.020)	(1.001)	
Ethnic Fractionalization^2		-1.439	-1.122	-1.173	-1.463*	
		(1.135)	(1.190)	(1.178)	(1.136)	
Post-Cold War		-0.300*	-0.431**	-0.415**	-0.285*	-0.731***
		(0.161)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.161)	(0.196)
Coup-Free Years		-0.284***	-0.289***	-0.273***	-0.208***	0.008
		(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.012)
Constant	-3.106***	-0.510	-1.905**	-2.088**	-0.706	
	(0.059)	(0.907)	(0.964)	(0.952)	(0.918)	
Observations	7,387	5,508	5,508	5,508	5,508	2,988
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1387	-898.3	-887.7	-884.1	-900.6	-692.9

Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] all independent variables are lagged one year except for Post-Cold War and Coup-Free Years

[b] indicates a model with splines

[c] indicates a model with a cubic polynomial approximation (t, t^2, and t^3)

[d] presents a conditional logit model with country fixed effects

All splines and cubic polynomial terms are not reported.

Given the difficulty of discrete models in presenting substantive interpretations of coefficients, I employ CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). By using CLARIFY, this study generates a percentage change in the predicted probability of coups

depending on democratization by setting model 3 as a basis. Other things being equal, if democratization occurs in countries whose democracy score is a 6 out of 21 in the Polity IV Index, the probability of coup onset increases by 113 percent. In other words, if all other things are equal, in authoritarian regimes of which Polity IV score is a 6, democratization increases coup risk by 113 percent. In addition, this study also finds that if democratization takes place in a partial democracy (13 out of 21 in the Polity IV Index), it increases coup risk by 87 percent.

While Table 1 shows that the impacts of democratization on coup risk are consistently present across different models, this study also further examines this relationship by checking if the results vary depending on different measures of the dependent variable and of the independent variable, this research conducted more tests by using different measures.[19] The results are reported in this chapter's Appendix. In a nutshell, those results are barely different from what Table 1 presented us. Democratization also appears to increase coup risk across various model specifications. For instance, when democratization is measured as a positive change of 3 or more on Polity IV index within two years, it also significantly increases coup risk. When a different dataset of coups is used, democratization also serves as a critical coup-inducing factor.

Before turning to the effect of first multiparty elections, this chapter briefly addresses the effects of control variables. In general, while some variables have statistically insignificant impacts on coup risk in some models, their association with coup risk is largely consistent with what the literature suggested. As expected, *Protests,*

[19] I also check if the results vary depending on different estimation techniques such as random and fixed effect model. I find that the results are robust.

Military Regimes, Change in GDP, Post-Cold War, and Coup-Free Years increase coup risk. They appear to be critical causes of coups. On the other hand, variables like *GDP per Capita, Military Expenditure, Ethnic Fractionalization,* and its squared term present their weak impacts on the probability of coup onset in some models. Yet, the signs of their effects still consistently support the hypotheses. For instance, the non-linear effect of ethnicity in coup risk appears weak in some models, which may call for further examinations. Yet, Model 5 clearly presents strong evidence that coup risk is a non-linear function of ethnic diversity. In addition, regardless of their significance levels, their signs steadily support the non-linear impacts.

Finally, this chapter examined whether emerging mass electoral politics and subsequent elite competition for power that accompany democratization make states vulnerable to coups. This test is also helpful for understanding whether an increase in the level of political competition in non-democratic electoral regimes increases coup risk. Table 2 reports the results based on the logit estimation. As expected, Models 1 and 2 present supportive evidence that *First Multiparty Elections* has statistically significant positive impacts on coup risk. After controlling for the effect of regime types including partial democracies, this study still finds that *First Multiparty Elections* increases coup risk. Model 2 suggests that coup risk is higher in transitional regimes or semi-democratic regimes and that countries holding first popular elections are vulnerable to coups. Using Model 1, this study finds that if a transitional state of which Polity IV regime score is a 6 out of 21 holds its first multiparty election, that election increases coup risk by 103 percent. If all other things are being equal, in states transitioning from that type of autocracy, their first popular election does not contribute to consolidation against coup

risk. Rather, their coup risk increases by 103 percent as a result of the election. This study also finds that a first multiparty election in states transitioning from a semi-democratic regime (13 out of 21 in the Polity IV Index) increases coup risk by 100 percent.

Table 2. First Multiparty Elections, Political Competition, and Coup Risk[20]

	(1)	(3)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES[a]	Model[b]	Model[b]	Model[b]	Model[b]
Democracy (1-21)	-0.004	0.264***	0.003	0.282***
	(0.014)	(0.053)	(0.013)	(0.052)
Democracy^2		-0.012***		-0.013***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
First Multiparty Elections	0.709***	0.628***		
	(0.207)	(0.211)		
Political Competition			0.304*8	0.295**
			(0.185)	(0.174)
Protests	0.057**	0.045	0.066**	0.053*
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Military Regime	0.508***	0.425**	0.468**	0.388**
	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.185)
GDP per Capita	-0.203	-0.149	-0.212*	-0.152
	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.125)
Change in GDP	-1.425	-1.359	-1.392	-1.337
	(0.926)	(0.944)	(0.924)	(0.940)
Govt. consumption	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ethnic Frac.	2.269**	1.998*	-0.109	-0.068
	(1.015)	(1.035)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Ethnic Frac.^2	-2.167*	-1.878	-0.001**	-0.001*
	(1.173)	(1.214)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Expenditure	-0.103	-0.066	2.380**	2.113**
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(1.027)	(1.046)
Military personal	-0.001**	-0.001*	-2.266*	-1.991
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(1.189)	(1.232)
Post-Cold War	-0.256	-0.384**	-0.251	-0.393**
	(0.158)	(0.173)	(0.161)	(0.176)
Could-free Years	-0.237***	-0.227***	-0.248***	-0.236***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Constant	-0.259	-1.642*	-0.164	-1.647*
	(0.939)	(0.952)	(0.936)	(0.942)

[20] This study also carried out further tests by using different estimation methods, including conditional logit with country fixed effects. It found that both *First Multiparty Elections* and *Political Competition* have statistically significant impacts on coup risk across various models with different estimation methods.

Observations	5,508	5,508	5,508	5,508
Log Likelihood	-891.0	-878.8	-896.3	-882.8

Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] all independent variables are lagged one year except for Post-Cold War and Coup-Free Years

[b] indicates an model with splines

All splines are not reported.

Turning to the effect of *Political Competition*, this study also finds evidence that an increase in political competition makes states vulnerable to coups. Models 3 and 4 shows its statistically significant effects on coup risk. As shown in Model 4, its impact is significant even after controlling for the relationship between regime types and coup risk. Using Model 3, this study finds that if the level of political competition increases in a state of which Polity IV regime score is a 6 out of 21 increases coup risk by 37 percent. In a state of Polity IV regime score is a 13, it increases coup risk by 35 percent. In short, both *First Multiparty Elections* and *Political Competition* appear to have statistically significant impacts on coup risk, suggesting that they are also the factors that lead democratization to trigger serious elite competition for power and their commitment problem, thereby increasing coup risk.

As a result of the above systematic examinations, this study confirms democratization's destabilizing effects on coup risk. It is clear that democratization tends to make states vulnerable to coups, and that elite competition for power in emerging mass electoral politics is a critical mechanism linking democratization to coups. Below, this research discusses the coup in Mauritania in August 2008. This brief case study will

illustrate how democratization can make states susceptible to coups by causing serious elite commitment problems.

Mauritania is located at the western edge of the Sahara and is a developing nation. Since its independence from France in 1960, there have been fifteen coup attempts to topple sitting governments. In 2005, a military junta overthrew the authoritarian President – Maaoya Sid'Ahmed Ould Taya – and led to the fall of the 21-year rule of the authoritarian regime. This time the Military Council for Justice and Democracy (MCJD), the military junta, pledged to resume a civilian rule and even promised their complete withdrawal from politics after overseeing the transition processes (N'Diaye 2009). Although those decisions were made under the pressure of the international community and calls from political opposition groups, they seemed to guarantee their commitment to the nation's transition to democracy. The national referendum on constitutional amendments in June 2006 paved the road for Mauritania's transition to democracy. Since the referendum, a series of multiparty elections, including municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections, took place. In April 2007, Mauritania democratically elected president – Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. The regional and international community welcomed Mauritania's transition to democracy, and many observers even dubbed it 'a model for political reform' in Arab North Africa (Zisenwine 2007).

However, this seemingly successful democratic transition did not last long. President Abdallahi was overthrown by his chief military leader - Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz – and his associates in August 2008. General Aziz was a key member of the MCJD who had strongly backed Abdallahi's candidacy in the 2007 presidential election. The MCJD was also the very junta that had pledged not to intervene in politics just over a

year ago. Their coup accordingly ended the first freely elected government in this nation in more than 20 years. Why did this nation once again fail to consolidate against coup risk? What happened to the relationship between the emerging civilian leadership and the armed forces? Given that this coup occurred after President Abdallahi fired General Aziz and other chief generals, one might consider personal grievances as the cause of the coup. However, this was a typical coup driven by elite commitment problems in democratizing states with weak institutions.

Mauritania's transition to democracy was not smooth. Democratization led to the explosion of political contenders without commitment to democratic rules of the game, leading the states to undergo turbulent changes and political stalemates (Stiftung 2009). Prior to democratization, the nation was dominated by Arab-Berbers, who account for only one-third of the population but control nearly all political and security institutions and economic activities. During the 2006 parliamentary election, sixteen parties and 'independents,' who claimed no political affiliation, competed for the popular vote. Many of them were seeking to represent various groups who hold grievances toward the dominant political group. The parliamentary election divided the electorates largely along ethnic, regional, and religious lines and ended without a clear majority. The independents won forty-one seats out of ninety-five, and many of them were part of the departed Taya regime and were under the influence of the military. On the other hand, the opposition group, the Coalition of Forces for Democratic Change (CFDC), also won a large portion of the seats in the election (thirty-nine seats). They became a dominant power in the legislative institution for the first time in the history of Mauritania. In addition to the relative success of the CFDC in the parliamentary election, it appeared

that the CFDC could win the incoming presidential election. The long-time opposition leader, Ahmed Ould Daddah, was successfully rallying the voters to his cause and reform agenda.

When the opposition victory in the presidential election loomed, the dominant elite block began to fear losing their influence over the government. In addition to the powerful business leaders, political elites, and governmental officers (they were beneficiary of the departed regime), "many members of the MCJD and the military in general did not trust him" (N'Diaye 2009, 142). They consequently decided to campaign against Ahmed Ould Daddah, resulting in supporting an 'independent candidate,' Ould Abdallahi, as their future president. The MCJD even tried to delay the transitional process, including postponing the presidential election. In April 2007, Ould Abdallahi was eventually elected as President of Mauritania.

The presidential election per se was not rigged, but Abdallahi's campaign was largely assisted illegally by governmental officers and resources. Campaigns were unregulated. They were possible because of the lack of the effective administrative and judicial institutions combined with the weak political party system (N'Diaye 2009; Stiftung 2009). During the election periods, many civilian and military officers who had been loyal to the departed regime still held important office and possessed resources to safeguard Abdallahi's electoral victory. Despite the MCJD's self-pledge to no interference with politics, it heavily influenced the election. Ould Abdallahi was the beneficiary of the military's involvement in the election.

However, President Abdallahi's pact with the dominant elite block could not last long. Once the euphoria that surrounded the election diminished, it became increasingly

difficult for the Abdallahi regime to side with them. President Abdallahi soon began to refuse to "play his part in a post-transition democratic regime" (N'Diaye 2009, 151). When Abdallahi took office, his regime confronted an array of political and socio-economic challenges, which were left intact, if not exacerbated, during the two-year rule of the MCJD. Simultaneously, the public expected political and socio-economic reforms to improve their living conditions. His regime was also increasingly facing pressure from his civilian associates and followers for pursuing due process from past wrongs. On the other hand, while the elite coalition opposed initiating major reforms that could threaten their interests, he also lacked support from the parliament.

To secure public support and his rule, President Abdallahi thus decided to refuse pursuing policies in line with demands of those elites. Instead, he took steps to go against the interest of the ruling elite block by initiating reforms and reaching out to opposition parties. He also created his own party, the National Pact for Democracy and Development (PNDD). It challenged military leaders by stealing those 'independent' parliamentary members who had been under the influence of the military. His regime then pursued reforms, like ending slavery and corruption, and initiating a repatriation process for black Mauritanians residing in Senegal. President Ould Abdallahi's new policies made the dominant political elites including Arab nationalist officers in the armed forces feel discontented and anxious.

Furthermore, while President Abdallahi was continuously under pressure from the elite coalition and the military, the public approval for his regime continuously declined. His government's reform efforts were overshadowed by unexpected developments like the worldwide catastrophic rise in food prices (this nation imported over 70 percent of its

food supplies). In addition, the opposition coalition in the parliament and the hegemonic elite block kept being uncooperative but rather damaging the governmental efforts (Stiftung 2009). The military leadership also kept exerting influence over civilian politics particularly through its influence over the legislative body (N'Diaye 2009).

Facing these difficulties, President Abdallahi undertook a number of radical steps to improve his relations with the elite block and improve the declining public support. The regime reshuffled the cabinet. However, the new cabinet included political figures representing various parties and the old elites accused of corruption. This angered the opposition group and Abdullah's own party members, resulting in a no-confidence vote in the parliament and the dissolution of the new cabinet. Once again, seeking to appease critics of the government, his regime broke his initial promises to the military about forgiving past human violations and even reached out to Islamic hardliners, which had been strongly opposed by the military leadership (N'Diaye 2009). Eventually, his efforts to bolster his position led him to cut ties with the ruling military leadership. Perhaps, from his perspective, reforming the civil-military relations and thus making the institution subordinated to the civilian leadership were perceived necessary to succeed in the government's efforts at improving political and socio-economic conditions. President Abdallahi replaced ministers who closely affiliated with General Aziz with non-Aziz associates. He then fired General Aziz and other top generals. This resulted in the military coup deposing President Abdallahi.

As suggested, this coup was a consequence of elite commitment problems. Mauritania's democratization led to an institutionally unregulated struggle for power, making it difficult to develop democratic institutions and abide by the democratic rules of

the game. In this political environment, political contenders had difficulty making credible concessions and compromises to each other. Facing continuous pressures and demands from the armed forces, the elected civilian leadership made decisions that went against the interests of the dominant elite group, putting them at their own peril.

Conclusion

The coup literature has shown little interest in linking democratization and coups. Whether democratizing countries are more prone to coups than countries that are not remains barely explored in this literature. This is surprising when the following phenomena are considered. First, it is not rare that military coups quickly follow democratization. In recent waves of democratization, numerous transitional democracies have undergone coup attempts. Some examples include Benin, Fiji, Georgia, Haiti, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, and Zambia. Also, throughout history, numerous fledgling democracies have been reversed by military interventions. While power ascendancy via a coup is relatively rare during the post-Cold War, coups still poses a significant threat to the fate of emerging democracies in these recent decades. Some coups even brought terrifying unrests and armed conflicts to nations like Burundi and Algeria

Second, it does not seem hard to link the well-known democratization's destabilizing effects to coups. Although conventional wisdom and 'democratic peace' theory suggest that the spread of democracy should promote peace and stability in the world, it is also known that some scholars found systematic evidence that a path of mature democracy does not go smoothly. In addition, throughout history, it has not been

rare that coup d'états and bloody civil wars were related to each other in emerging democracies. While political instability and conflict coming with emerging mass electoral politics can make states highly susceptible to civil wars, such crises can also increase coup risk. A common self-proclaimed justification for military interventions is to save the state from the political crisis. Despite these, democratization's destabilizing effects have not been linked to unpacking emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups. Consequently, this study sought to account for how and why countries moving toward democracy are prone to coups. This study found that democratization increases coup risk.

What does this finding do for the literature? Certainly, it contributes to the literature explaining cross-national variation in coup risk. More importantly, it suggests another angle to understand why democratization does not necessary lead transitional regimes to a mature democracy. Coups, not merely civil wars, are another factor for the failure of emerging democracies to transition to a consolidate democracy. Recent studies on the perils of democratization warn that promoting democracy may not necessarily result in a transition to mature democracy. They suggest that democratization leads states to undergo international or domestic armed conflicts (e.g., Snyder and Mansfield 2007). Some even claim that promoting democracy via multiparty elections in war-torn nations does not lead to democratic peace; rather it increases the risk of civil war (Brancati and Snyder 2011). However, this study underscores that the danger of democracy promotion should be also warned because of democratization's destabilizing effects on coup threats. If democratization makes states prone to coups, such coups (if successful) are likely to reverse democratization or at least threaten democratic consolidation. When rulers are

threatened by their armed forces, whether they are elected or not, their security concern would likely trump important issues, including developing democratic institution and professionalizing the armed forces (Goldsworthy 1981; Emizet 2000). In addition, as the literature on the divisionary war suggests (e.g., Levy 1988; Powell 2012-c), if newly elected rulers face an increasing coup risk, they might try to prevent a coup by trigging unnecessary conflict; some armed conflicts in democratizing states might be driven by democratization's destabilizing effects on coup threats and the diversionary interest of the ruling political leadership. Recall that democratization's destabilizing effects are not limited to civil wars, but such effects are also significant on coup risk.

Appendix

For the purpose of checking the robustness of the finding in Table 1, this research conducted further examination by using different measures of the dependent variable and of the independent variable. As shown in Table 3, the effects of democratization on coup risk consistently appear across various models. Models 1 and 2 show that democratization measured as a positive change of 3 or more on Polity IV index within two years also makes states prone to coups. To further examine the relationship between democratization and coup risk, this chapter tests an inverted U-shape impact of democracy level on coup risk. Model 3 confirms an inverted U-shape relationship between regime types and coup risk. Models 4 and 5 also present that the effects of democratization on coup risk are still positive and significant even after controlling for the relationship between the nature of regime type and coup risk. Additionally, this paper used coup data by Powell and Thyne (2011) to conduct further robustness checks. All the

three different models (Models 6, 7 and 8) using their coup data support that democratization makes regimes more prone to coups, regardless of how democratization is measured.

Table 3. Democratization and Coup Risk (robustness checks)

	Democratization > 2		Polity IV square			Powell and Thyne Data		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	Model[a]	Model[b]	Model[a]	Model[a]	Model[a]	Model[a]	Model[b]	Model[a]
Democracy (1-21)	-0.010	-0.011	0.281***	0.271***	0.265***	-0.024**	-0.024**	0.252***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.050)
Democracy^2			-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.013***			-0.013***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.002)
Democratization (>5)				0.682***		0.396**	0.390**	0.407**
				(0.186)		(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.195)
Democratization (>2)	0.452**	0.474***			0.307*			
	(0.180)	(0.182)			(0.179)			
Demonstration	0.109***	0.111***	0.100***	0.089**	0.092**	0.091**	0.095**	0.071*
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
GDP per Capita	-0.219**	-0.212**	-0.130	-0.104	-0.120	-0.173*	-0.169*	-0.070
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.098)
Change in GDP	-1.794**	-1.803**	-1.827**	-1.865**	-1.790**	-1.455*	-1.515*	-1.400*
	(0.910)	(0.900)	(0.881)	(0.886)	(0.890)	(0.782)	(0.776)	(0.799)
Govt. consumption	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ethnic Fract	1.175	1.198	0.921	0.928	0.918	1.085	1.141	0.789
	(0.926)	(0.926)	(0.955)	(0.972)	(0.950)	(0.987)	(0.985)	(1.027)
Ethnic Fract^2	-1.054	-1.075	-0.797	-0.807	-0.801	-0.979	-1.039	-0.701
	(1.032)	(1.032)	(1.090)	(1.104)	(1.083)	(1.067)	(1.064)	(1.124)
Military Regime	0.632***	0.684***	0.510***	0.560***	0.522***	0.518***	0.558***	0.418**
	(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.192)
Military Personal	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military Expenditure	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Coup-Free Years	-0.298***	-0.204***	-0.297***	-0.279***	-0.287***	-0.345***	-0.268***	-0.329***
	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.064)
_spline1	-0.004***		-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.005***		-0.005***
	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.002)
_spline2	0.002**		0.002**	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**		0.002**
	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)
_spline3	-0.000		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000		-0.000
	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)
Tsq		0.008**					0.014***	
		(0.004)					(0.004)	
Tcub		-0.000*					-0.000***	
		(0.000)					(0.000)	
Constant	-0.084	-0.298	-1.701**	-1.950**	-1.754**	-0.158	-0.336	-1.854**

	(0.713)	(0.717)	(0.808)	(0.818)	(0.803)	(0.679)	(0.682)	(0.811)
Observations	5,569	5,569	5,569	5,569	5,569	5,569	5,569	5,569
Log Likelihood	-929.5	-933.0	-917.2	-911.3	-916.0	-949.7	-953.1	-935.2
Area under ROC curve	0.8032	0.7992	0.8132	0.8159	0.8138	0.8034	0.7993	0.8145

Robust standard are errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] indicates a model with splines

[b] indicates a model with a cubic polynomial approximation (t, t^2, and t^3)

Chapter 3. Coup-Proofing Legacy and Coups in Emerging Democracies

Before transitional regimes become mature democracies, they are vulnerable to coups (e.g., Huntington 1991). While some fledgling democracies consolidate against coup threats, other emerging democracies, such as Egypt in 2013, have undergone a coup to overthrow an incoming regime.[21] In an attempt to unpack this variation, scholars have begun to pay attention to the role of coup-proofing legacies in the fate of fledgling democracies. Harkness (2012), for example, argued that in Africa the legacy of organizing the armed forces along the ruler's own ethnic group during authoritarian periods makes it highly difficult for an incoming regime to consolidate against coup threats. The recent 2013 Egyptian coup also appears to support how autocrats tried to control the armed forces and prevent coup attempts can have substantial consequences on emerging democracies' vulnerability to coup threats. It also seems that the way in which the armed forces were controlled can have critical implications for how emerging democracies consolidate against coup risk. During the authoritarian periods in South Korea in the 1980s, for instance, the authoritarian ruler, Chun Doo Whan, created intra-military divisions and gave preferential treatment to a small faction in the armed forces in order to prevent threats from the armed forces – a measure that appeared to secure Chun's rule for a while. However, when political systems were liberalizing during the mid-1980s, the internal military divisions that Chun created paradoxically played a critical role in deterring his regime's interest in reversing democratization and preventing

[21] This variation still exists even when the outbreaks of coups have globally declined during the post-Cold War era when the international environment has become hostile to attempts to depose an elected civilian leadership (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006; Clark 2007; Shannon et al. 2014; Powell and Thyne 2011).

other auto-coup plots, which helped the emerging democracy consolidate against coup risk (Kim 2008).

As suggested, the immediate survival of fledgling democracies can depend greatly on how the armed forces respond during the volatile processes of democratization (e.g., Huntington 1991; Luckham 1994; 1996), and authoritarian measures to prevent challenges from the state's armed forces can have critical implications for the fate of emerging democracies. Given that it is critical to unpack military responses to democratization and emerging democratic regimes in order to understand emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats, exploring the implications of authoritarian coup-proofing – the key to political-military relations during authoritarian rule – can lead us to develop critical insights for the strategic behaviors of the armed forces on the road of democracy and in turn for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats.[22] Yet, little attention has been paid to systematically examining the implications of coup-proofing measures in autocracies for fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats. In addition, as the extant literature focuses mostly on the negative role of political-military relations in authoritarian regimes in democratizing states' vulnerability to coups (e.g., Luckham 1996; Cheibub 2007;Acemoglu et al. 2010; Svolik 2013), whether coup-proofing legacies can facilitate the commitment of the armed

[22] Of course, coup-proofing strategies after democratization can also be critical for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk. However, what coup-proofing measures can be implemented in an incoming regime and whether they can be effective may hinge largely on coup-proofing legacies. This study underscores that depending on the nature of coup-proofing legacies, it is possible that an emerging democratic regime cannot pursue any substantial coup-proofing measures to reform and control the armed forces. Whether emerging democracies "promptly purge or retire all potentially disloyal officers," which is what Huntington (1991; 251) emphasizes as the first criteria for fledgling democracies' successful control of the armed forces, can be dependent upon coup-proofing legacies (how the armed forces were controlled and treated). Thus, this study is interested in coup-proofing legacies, rather than coup-proofing in emerging democracies.

forces to an emerging democratic regime and thus contribute to fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats remains overlooked. It is appealing to explore if emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats is likely when authoritarian coup-proofing policies provided conditions in which the armed forces are unlikely to defect from regime transition. This chapter, therefore, seeks to fill these gaps in the literature. In particular, it examines whether measures that prevented coups during authoritarian rule make coups more likely in emerging democracies. It is also interested in whether coup-proofing legacies can facilitate the commitment of the armed forces to an emerging democratic regime and thus contribute to fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats.

In authoritarian regimes, as coups have posed a main threat to the survival of the ruler, coup-proofing has been central to autocratic leadership survival strategy (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Roessler 2011; Powell 2012-a). To maintain power, coup-fearing autocrats implement serious coup-proofing measures toward their security and military forces. Recurring measures of coup-proofing in autocracies are ascriptive, material, and structural manipulation. An ascriptive manipulation is to prevent a coup by commonly organizing their armed forces along groups loyal to the autocrat and providing them with more power and higher positions. Ethnic stacking of the armed forces has been a popular measure of ascriptive coup-proofing. For instance, Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi organized the armed forces to be a Kalenjin military, excluding the Kikuyu officers who were loyal to his predecessor – Jomo Kenyatta. Autocrats, like Mubarak in Egypt, also secure the loyalty of the military in exchange for financial and material benefits. In addition to these measures, coup-

fearing autocrats rely on structural coup-proofing. A main feature of structural coup-proofing is that the rulers create and exploit the intra-military divides and rivalries by splitting the military into rival organizations and generating parallel/independent forces.

These coup-proofing measures can have varying effects on how the armed forces respond during the democratic transition, thereby dictating the nature of new civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Under the legacy of a heavy reliance on material manipulation or organizing the armed forces along a particular identity group (e.g., ethnic, regional, or religious groups loyal to the ruler), intra-military splits over democratization are unlikely; such splits have been long believed to have greater impacts on the beginning of democratization (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski, 1991; 1992; Lee 2009). In addition, the relatively cohesive officer crops and the incoming political leadership are likely to face commitment problems towards each other over establishing new civil-military relations and the control and reform of the armed forces, making emerging democracies vulnerable to coup threats.

In contrast, when coup-proofing measures like counterbalancing that are designed to create significant intra-military divides are heavily utilized, unintended consequences emerge that can play a positive role in emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk. While creating exploiting intra-military checks and balances on power is effective at preventing coups, it actually causes serious grievances from within the armed forces by generating winners and losers of the intra-military competitions (e.g., Kim 2008; Lee 2009; Powell 2012-a). In turn, such grievances would likely make the ruling authoritarian regime susceptible to intra-military splits over regime change, leading to the emergence of armed forces willing to accept the fall of the authoritarian regime and/or

support regime change. The presence of such forces within the military can provide a new regime with an opportunity to purge disloyal military factions and stabilize new civil-military relations. As Geddes (1999; 2004) suggests, intra-military divides over regime change plays a critical role in deterring coup attempts, for a key coup-deterring factor is a high probability of intra-military fights over the coup. Due to the intra-military splits, a coup is likely to face resistance from other factions in the armed forces, and the coup is likely to fail; such a coup is likely to be deterred in the first place. Consequently, this coup-proofing is likely to have a positive implication for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats.

As expected, this study finds that the legacy of counterbalancing, a proxy for structural coup-proofing, is conducive to emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats. The other coup-proofing legacies surprisingly appear to have either no impact or unexpected effects. There is no evidence that emerging democracies are likely to fail to consolidate against coup risk if their military has held large financial and material benefits during the authoritarian regimes. The results also show that the legacy of the ethnic stacking in the armed forces does not necessarily exacerbate emerging democracies' vulnerability to coup risk. Only the effect of the legacy of counterbalancing is consistent with what is expected. It also finds that the legacy of heavy collective coup-proofing, which was often centered around exploiting intra-military divides and balancing, contributes to emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk. This positive effect of the structural coup-proofing legacy seems to suggest that fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats is likely when coup-proofing during authoritarian rule generated conditions in which the armed forces

are unlikely to defect from regime transition; the legacy of the divide-and-rule appears conducive to stabilizing new civil-military relations in emerging democracies.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, it reviews the literature focusing on the armed forces to unpack emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups. Second, it presents the nature of coup-proofing in autocracies—theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses based on the observable implications of coup-proofing legacies for fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats. Third, it discusses the research design and then the empirical results.

Emerging Democracies' Vulnerability to Coups

It is a known issue that emerging democracies are vulnerable to coups. Karl's expression of "the omnipresent specter of a military coup" in fledgling democracies sums up this issue. Empirically, this is a real concern. Table 4 shows descriptive data on emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups. The first several years are particularly dangerous after a transition to democracy. Over 60 percent of coups are staged during the first three years, and over two-thirds of coups are mounted during the first five years.

Table 4. The number of coups during the first eight years of emerging democracies[23]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Number of coups	6/122 (5%)	20/119 (17%)	16/107 (15%)	7/96 (7%)	8/84 (10%)	4/77 (5%)	4/70 (6%)	1/63 (2%)

[23] Author calculated by using the dataset of Geddis et al. (2014). The denominators are calculated according to the following approach. Among all the emerging democracies surviving each year in the dataset of this study, I tallied how many of them undergo coups each year.

Yet, emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups still varies. There have been diverse claims and proposals on what pacifies or exacerbates emerging democracies' susceptibility to coups, which was reviewed in the previous chapter.[24] To recap briefly, the civil-military relations literature posits various ways in which democratizers might solidify civilian control of the armed forces. These include professionalizing the military, pursuing objective control of the armed forces, and providing the military with new missions; although, they are often purely policy proposals with little theoretical or empirical support. Alternatively, the democratization literature has explored under what structural conditions nascent democracies consolidate or fail. This literature has largely underscored factors like socioeconomic aspects, institutional strengths, and favorable international environments, suggesting that these structural conditions are critical for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk.[25] Under this research tradition, it seems natural that little attention has been paid to the characteristics and roles of the military—the main conspirator of coups. Decalo (1989, 547), for instance, finds that "much of the theorizing about sources of coup-behavior remains riveted to the alleged role played by socio-economic factors, paying scant attention to intra- or civil-military policies and variables that are the crux of the matter." In addition, factors for the consolidation of democracies against coup risk may not necessarily be identical with those for democratic consolidation. Maeda (2010) shows that some factors for the

[24] For more information, see O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1991;1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Diamond 2011; Stepan 2009.
[25] This literature offers important insights and explanations for fledgling democracies' vulnerability to coups in that it commonly assumes that factors for democratic consolidation are similar, if not identical, with those explaining the consolidation of democracies against coup risk. In this research program, coups in newly emerging democratic regimes are often attributed to different structural contexts in which democratization takes place.

breakdown of emerging democracies like presidentialism have no impacts on coup risk in emerging democracies.

In contrast, according to the coup literature, coup risk is not simply defined by socio-economic and political factors but also by military-related factors including: grievances and fragmentation in the armed forces, ethnic make-up of the military, and threats to the military as an institution (e.g., Finer 1962; Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977; Zimmermann 1979; Decalo 1989; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012-a). Some even assert that internal fragmentation in the military and threats to military's corporal interests are of paramount importance in the decision to stage a coup (e.g., Thompson 1976; Decalo 1992; Geddes 1999; 2004). Geddes (1999; 2004) claims that the single most important factor for staging a coup is the probability of intra-military divides and fights over the coup. Coup-plotters are fearful about whether or not the majority of the military is likely to oppose their coup if it is staged; if that is likely, their coup is deterred in the first place. In other words, a fear of internal divides and fights through a process of a coup and a countercoup deters their coup. Despite the importance of bringing military aspects into the bigger picture, explanations involving military dynamics have been generally missing in the literature on emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups because of the research tradition focusing primarily on factors for democracies' consolidation and survival.

Yet, some studies tried to turn the extant scholarly attention specifically to the role of the armed forces in emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk (e.g., Luckham 1994; 1996; Cook 2006; Kim 2008; Lee 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Svolik 2013; Harkness 2012). In general, this literature highlights the legacy of civil-military

relations during the authoritarian periods and the commitment problems between the armed forces and the incoming regime. Some studies (Kalyvas 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Harkness 2012) specifically contend that coup risk increases in emerging democracies when such commitment problems are severe. That is, the severity of commitment problems accounts for the variation in emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups. This literature then underscores that the outbreak of a coup in emerging democracies depends largely on the presence of factors that can exacerbate such commitment problems. In the face of severe poverty, ethnic conflict, institutional weakness, and other factors for the failure of democratic consolidation, the incoming regime and the armed forces may have difficulty committing to each other during the uncertain periods of regime transition, making emerging democracies highly susceptible to coups. The above explanation seems plausible. Nevertheless, the commitment problem-coup literature mainly focuses on the lingering effects of political-military dynamics during the authoritarian periods. According to this literature, in emerging democracies inheriting the legacy of a military regime (particularly, the legacy of significant military establishments and involvements in politics) (Cheibub 2007), a large military (Acemoglu et al. 2010; Svolik 2013), or an ethnically organized military (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkness 2012), political and military elites tend to have difficulty overcoming their commitment problems, thereby making emerging democracies vulnerable to coups. However, this literature has not examined the core factor for the dynamics of political-military relations during the authoritarian periods for the study of emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk.

Coup-Proofing Legacies and Coups

Coup-Proofing in Autocracies: Prior to delving into implications of coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes for democratizing states' vulnerability to coup threats, this section first discusses the nature of coup-proofing in autocracies.[26] Throughout history, numerous autocrats have been deposed in coups. More specifically, coups have been the most popular means of regime change in much of the authoritarian world. According to Archigos dataset (Goemans et al. 2009-b), coups explain 75 percent of "irregular exits" from power in the world during 1945-2004. Given the seriousness of coup threats for the fate of the regime, it is not surprising that authoritarian survival politics have revolved around the issue of coup-proofing (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999). As a result, coup-proofing has taken priority over other important issues in authoritarian regimes. Coup-proofing can trump policies of making a professional and effective military for the protection of the state; the need to secure protection from the military trumps the need to be protected by the military. An example of this is when Zaire's Armed Forces tried to intervene in Mobutu Sese Seko's political decisions and particularly rejected his promotion of Colonel Leonard Mulamba to Prime Minister in 1966 he developed a strong fear of a military coup (Williame 1970). His efforts at developing a professional army as an apolitical institution whose core mission was restricted to external defense were dropped, and his military polices shifted towards coup-proofing. Rather than promoting professionalism in the armed forces, his new

[26] Any efforts to prevent coups (or control the armed forces) such as the professionalization of the military can be coup-proofing. However, as assumed in the coup-proofing literature, coup-proofing in general refers to strategies and measures tied to autocrats' "subjective" control of the armed forces (in other words, arbitrary and autocratic measures of preventing a coup). For that matter, democratic (or "objective") measures of controlling the military is not considered coup-proofing measures in autocracies. In addition, the coup-proofing literature also does not consider measures to improve the legitimacy of the regime (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999)

policies geared towards dividing and crippling them; independent paramilitary units such as the SPD (Special Presidential Division) and the Garde Civile were created, accordingly (Metz 1996; Emizet 2000).

Like Mobutu, coup-fearing autocrats have devoted themselves to coup-prevention, and they have employed diverse strategies and structural obstacles to organizing and staging a coup towards their own armed forces. In South Korea, after General Park came to power through a coup in 1961, he created an anti-coup apparatus – the Defense Security Command (DSC) of which core mission was to prevent coups and protect the Park regime. The DSC had an independent command structure and a direct contact to the president office. Another Korean autocrat and a former chief of the DSC, Chun Doo Whan, sought to prevent coup attempts by staffing key posts with officers from a small military faction known as *The Hanahoe* (Group of One), as well as by having them compete against each other (Kim 2008). In other countries, autocrats pursued measures like ethnic stacking of the armed forces and the creation of parallel armed forces independent from the regular military (Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011). Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya relied on the General Service Unit (GSI) for his rule, rather than the regular military. The GSI was all staffed by Kenyatta's own ethnic group – the Kikuyu – and was similarly armed with the regular forces. Following the same strategy, his successor Daniel Arap Moi reshuffled and organized the armed forces to be a Kalenjin military, purging the Kikuyu officers (N'diaye 2002). Other dictators including Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qadhafi, and the al-Assad family also filled in their armed apparatus with their own ethnic group (Quinlivan 1999). Hosni Mubarak in Egypt surprisingly did not organize the military

along his ethnic affiliation. Instead, he pursued coup-proofing by distributing large financial and material benefits in exchange for their loyalty (Makara 2012; Frisch 2013; Nepstad 2013).

As illustrated above, authoritarian regimes have employed diverse coup-proofing measures to consolidate their control over their armed forces and maintain their reign. These coup-proofing strategies are targeted at factors tied to fundamental opportunities and incentives for coup-plotting, such as material and budgetary support, the lack of intra-military rivalries, and institutional survival (e.g., Finer 1968; Nordlinger 1977; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012-b; Makara 2013). These diverse coup-proofing measures can be grouped into the following categories: 1) coup-proofing through manipulating human resources (ascriptive manipulation); 2) coup-proofing through manipulating benefits and perks (material manipulation); and 3) coup-proofing through manipulating structural/organizational make-ups of the military (structural manipulation).

Organizing the armed forces based on certain identity groups loyal to autocrats is a popular means of preventing coups – ascriptive coup-proofing. While staffing the ruler's personal associates in the military upper echelon, the authoritarian regime also seeks to recruit military personals from communal groups considered supportive of the autocrat (e.g., ethnic, regional, or even religious groups). Moreover, they are preferentially given more power and higher positions. The existing coup-proofing literature particularly underscores ethnic stacking of the military (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Quinlivan 1999; Harkness 2012). It is considered to be a dominant form of systematic ascriptive coup-proofing measure in Africa (Goldsworthy

1981; Decalo 1989). Ethnicity serves as a defining feature of political competition and power struggle in much of the developing/authoritarian world, and thus political battles often take place across ethnic lines (e.g., Horowitz 1985). Not surprisingly, intra-ethnic coups to gain political power have been highly prevalent (Roessler 2011). In response, autocrats in those nations have sought for ethnic matching between political and military elites. The ethnic stacking of the armed forces aims to achieve the exclusion of disloyal or suspicious ethnic groups.

As seen in the Egyptian example, buying off the loyalty of the military in exchange for financial and material benefits is also a common coup-proofing measure. Providing large material benefits and prerogatives to the armed forces can appease a military's willingness to stage a coup (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Powell 2012-b). It is also conducive to cope with grievances in the armed forces, a critical motive of coups. Deteriorating welfare of soldiers is a well-known driving force for coup attempts; therefore, exploiting "the material satisfaction of the military by forms of pay-off" is critical to lower coup risk (Goldsworthy 1981, 60).

In addition, the prevalence of civil-military instabilities and coup threats prompt autocrats to create structural obstacles in the armed forces to organizing and executing a coup. The political strength of the military lies greatly in its esprit de corps (Finer 1962), and the political centrality of the military is considered a key factor for collective actions for coups and for a coup's success (e.g., Nordlinger 1977). Inevitably, coup-fearing regimes have serious concerns about intra-military cohesion, leading to implementing diverse cohesion and coordination obstacles to coup execution (Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Lee 2009). Likewise, Powell (2012-a, 39) highlights that

structural coup-proofing, like counterbalancing, is "of paramount importance and is the most visible aspect of coup-proofing." Typically, to construct structural obstacles to coup-execution, authoritarian regimes implement a policy of dividing military forces into rival organizations that check and balance each other and/or generating paramilitary (or independent) organizations with command structures outside the regular army (Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999). The presence of such divides and rivalries serves as cohesion and coordination obstacles to coup execution (Powell 2012-a). What regimes hope to accomplish as a result of this policy is competitions and rivalries in the armed forces, causing factions to fight over allegiance to the ruler and act as a counterweight against an assault from their competitors.

In general, these coup-proofing measures are found to be effective deterrents to coups in autocracies (Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012-a). Recently, considerable attention focused on how these coup-proofing measures influence regime transitions. Specifically, several studies have attributed the variation in military defection patterns in authoritarian regimes to different autocrats' coup-proofing measures and examined their impacts on the collapse of autocracies (e.g., Makara 2013; Frisch 2013; Svolik 2013). Explicitly, Makara (2013) argues that autocrats' heavy dependence on buy-off or parallel security organizations to control the armed forces was not effective at preventing military defections in the Arab Spring nations, but organizing the armed forces along communal ties made them remain loyal to their authoritarian regime. Building from the studies underscoring splits within the military regime as a vital source for a transition to democracy (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Geddis 2004), Lee (2009) claimed that intra-military rivalries in the Philippines and Indonesia,

which had been deliberately created to protect the authoritarian regimes, did not save the autocratic regimes in the wake of public protests for reforms; instead, they facilitated regime transitions. Nevertheless, the implications of coup-proofing for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk remains overlooked.

Coup-proofing Legacies and Emerging Democracies' Consolidation against Coup Risk: The implications of coup-proofing in autocracies for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats can be understood through examining how coup-proofing legacies can influence a fundamental mechanism for conflicts in democratizing states – elite commitment problems. As the democratization-conflict literature highlights (e.g., Lake and Rothchild 1996; Fearon 1998; Kalyvas 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Harkness 2012; Svolik 2013), emerging democracies are susceptible to the commitment problems between political elites, including military leaders. Democratization does not necessarily guarantee the commitment of military officer corps to the incoming regime and emerging democratic institutions and rules. To achieve "the effective exercise or even the survival of civil rule," it is imperative for the incoming regime to stabilize civil-military relations (Diamond and Platter 1996). As the previous studies find (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bratton and van de Walle 1994;1997; Cook 2006; Houngnikpo 2013), in response, the incoming regimes commonly offer some concessions to the military and even seek to make a pact with the ruling military leadership.[27] Concessions and promises that they provide to the armed forces can include financial and material benefits, amnesty for the military's wrongdoings during the authoritarian

[27] For instance, Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 460) specifically note that a military and a transitional leadership "meet behind the scenes to forge a compromise "pact" to guarantee the vital interests of major elite players."

periods, and autonomous decision-making on internal military affairs (e.g., Huntington 1991). Conversely, since democratization intrinsically requires civilian control of the armed forces, which can result in weakening the military's power and prerogatives, the likelihood of the conflict between the incoming regime and the ruling military elites over the control and reform of the military is inherently high. Consequently, emerging democracies are prone to mistrust and fear between the military leaders and the incumbent in the transitional government, leading to their difficulty to commit to each other. Such commitment problems are doomed to be complicated by how the armed forces has been organized and controlled during the previous authoritarian regime.

1) Structural Coup-Proofing: The heavy implementation of structural coup-proofing can result in helping emerging democracies consolidate against coup threats, for it can make the authoritarian regime vulnerable to severe intra-military conflicts and grievances, ultimately bringing about the mobilization of the discontented forces for regime change. In turn, it can help resolve the commitment problems between the incoming regime and the armed forces.

Various studies in the democratization literature have highlighted that splits in authoritarian regimes (particularly in military regimes) over political reforms and power transfer lead to the beginning of democratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; 1992; Geddis 1999; 2004). For example, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 19) write, "[t]here is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavages between hard-liners and soft-liners." However, this literature has barely explained why and how the splits in the armed forces erupt in the

first place (Lee 2009). Rather, only some contingent exogenous factors, such as “mass protests, economic crises, and international pressures,” are simply noted as potential reasons for such intra-military divides. They are believed to “make it the more likely that some move toward liberalization”(Przeworski 1986, 55). Similarly, some studies recently claim that authoritarian policies towards the armed forces, such as divide-and-rule measures, can also lead to intra-military divides over regime change (Kim 2008; Lee 2009). This seems reasonable, but overlooks another important consequence: heavy implementation of coup-proofing measures like counterbalancing can result not merely in such splits in the armed forces but also in emerging democracies’ consolidation against coup threats.

Coup-proofing measures dividing the armed forces and building independent security forces can be conducive to making factions and units in the armed forces compete and check against each other, hence creating cohesion and coordination obstacles to coup attempts (e.g., Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012-a). Yet, while these structural coup-proofing measures can work to deter coup plots against the authoritarian regime, this dividing and controlling measure can generate the winners and losers in the armed forces and, consequently, serious intra-military grievances. In the processes of internal balancing and competition coupled often with the ruler’s political favoritism, some military units and military officers gain more political and material power and prevent their rivals from gaining better promotions and access to key governmental and military positions. This brings about the deterioration of intra-military cohesion and even result in intra-military conflicts (Metz 1996; Emizet 2000; Lee 2009; Roessler 2011). Potential dissident forces can also emerge – the losers or the

discontented officers in the intra-military competitions – within the very institution supposed to be the last bulwark of the regime. While these discontented or marginalized officers are unlikely to challenge the existing military and political leaderships due to the substantial checks from their rivals and the low probability of their coup's success, they still look for opportunities to sack their rivals and pursue power transition in the armed forces.

When the ruling regime is facing serious protests and pressures for democratization, it may not be able to prevent rebellion and defection from those disgruntled forces. As Lee (2009, 642) observes, "[t]he fracturing of the regime is often the by-product of the policies of the authoritarian leaders, specifically their use of divide-and-rule policies to manage the armed forces." To the extent that regime change opens a window of opportunity for the discontented officers to accomplish power reversal in the armed forces, those discontented forces would likely pursue regime change. Indeed, it would likely serve them to resolve their grievances, and improve their status and power in the armed forces, thereby providing strong incentives to support regime transition (Kim 2008; Lee 2009). Their support for the democratizing forces and regime change is no surprise. Take for example those discontented officers in the South Korean and Pilipino militaries who refused orders to suppress protesters for democratization, and, rather, stood by civic outcries for regime change (Kim 2008). To pursue their political interests, it seems natural for those officer corps to align with internal and/or international forces for regime change. These officers are also a critical target for opposition groups in the society demanding democratization and looking for powerful allies (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Cook 2006; Lee 2009). Moreover, they would likely serve as forces to

oppose and deter military repression towards civilian groups calling for regime change or a conservative coup plot by political and military elites loyal to the departing authoritarian regime (Kim 2008; Lee 2009). If necessary, they would even fight armed forces willing to reverse democratization.

While the mobilization of the forces supporting regime change can facilitate democratization, it would also likely provide a critical opportunity to stabilize new civil-military relations with relatively little coup threat that also would likely ameliorate fledgling democracies' vulnerability to the commitment problems between the armed forces and the incoming regime. In effect, given the intra-military splits over regime change, coup attempts not only by the disloyal officers but also by the forces initially supporting democratization, are likely to be deterred. As is well-known in the coup literature (e.g., Finer 1962; Luttwak 1968; Geddis 2004; Powell 2012-a), the single most important factor for whether to stage a coup is the likelihood of the rejection of the coup by other military organizations. If a coup is likely to evolve into a serious intra-military fight, the coup is likely to fail, thereby deterring the coup plot in the first place. The intra-military splits over democratization can certainly lower the probability of a successful coup. To the extent that attempts to topple the emerging regime are likely to be subjected to an immediate resistance by the discontented forces accepting regime change, they are likely to be contained in the first place. In addition, when those who initially supported regime change seek more political interventions and power, they can stage a coup, but their coup is also likely to fail and be deterred in the first place. Given the legacy of the intra-military splits, their coup attempt can invite serious resistances from forces loyal to the departed regime and even provide justifications for counter-

coups. Moreover, even when emerging mass electoral politics engender serious political instability and conflicts, the risk of the intra-military fights over coups would likely lower coup risk. In short, coups by either side are likely to be deterred under the legacy of the intra-military divides. As a result of the intra-military divides, the high risk of a coup and of a countercoup would likely deter a coup attempt in the first place.

When the presence of significant armed forces supporting regime transition is coupled with the declining risk of coups, it would likely lead to the emerging regime's secure control of the armed forces. In particular, it would help the incoming regime successfully "purge or retire all potentially disloyal officers" and immediately and safely restructure and reform the military (Huntington 1991, 251). Once the potential rebels from within the armed forces are purged, the regime can establish a close rapport with the armed forces of which higher echelons are filled with officers who contributed to regime change. As soon as the new civilian regime begins to control the ruling military leaderships, it can safely place new coup-proofing measures and secure their control of the armed forces, further declining coup risk.

The incoming regime's anticipation of the low probability of coup attempts can contribute to generating some necessary time critical to reduce the armed forces' remaining influence over the political system and forge stable civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Certainly, this anticipation of the civilian authority would likely alleviate fear towards the armed forces and expand the new civilian leadership's time horizon on military reforms. Once the incoming regime purges disloyal military high-ups and other groups, it would likely become less necessary to resort to radical measures to reform and control the armed forces. It would definitely be unwise to seek the radical

depoliticization of the armed forces and the complete subservience of the armed forces to the civilian rule. Consequently, such anticipation combined with the successful purge would likely lead the new regime to negotiate with the emerging military leadership and hence secure the loyalty of the armed forces to the new regime. Rather than threatening or provoking the armed forces, the civilian leadership would seek to keep its commitments to the compromises with the armed forces. Indeed, to stabilize its relationship with the armed forces, it would be in its best interest to makes their current promises and concessions credible. In turn, these efforts of the new political leadership can convince the armed forces not to renege on the pact, contributing to the secure civil-military relations.

This newly established civil-military relation is also unlikely to derail even when some newly enthroned military generals or radical reformists in the armed forces, who were often a core contributor to regime change, challenge the emerging civilian leadership by demanding more spoils or seeking to meddle in politics (e.g., Croissant et al. 2012). Given the incumbent's reluctance to harming institutional interests of the armed forces, those rebellious military elites would unlikely earn the institutional approval for the overthrow of the new regime. It would be also hard to justify their coup. In addition, as discussed previously, if a coup is mounted, the lingering unstable environment in the armed forces derived from the intra-military splits would likely make such coup attempts subject to serious resistance from within the armed forces, thereby deterring coups in the first place (e.g., Luttwak 1968; Thompson 1976; Bienen 1985; Geddis 2004; Powell 2012). Instead, although the emerging civilian and military

leaderships might have different interests or conflictive agendas, they still would likely maintain their commitment to each other, stabilizing the new civil-military relations.

The discussion above leads to the following testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: emerging democracies are likely to consolidate against coup risk if structural coup-proofing during the authoritarian periods was implemented.

2) Legacy of large spoils to the armed forces: As presented shortly, unlike the structural coup-proofing legacy, material coup-proofing, like large spoils to the armed forces in exchange for their loyalty to the autocrat, can have negative implications for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats by making inter-military splits over democratization unlikely and by deteriorating commitment problems between the armed forces and the incoming regime. Some coup-fearing autocrats resort to manipulating material benefits and prerogatives to armed forces to prevent rebellion. However, this coup-proofing approach eventually allows the armed forces to grow and gain more power and autonomy. The growth of the military, in turn, makes the defection of the military to regime change relatively less costly. In the wake of significant domestic or international protests and calls for democratization, intra-military debates or even conflicts over regime change can take place (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Lee 2009). Despite the provision of large spoils to the armed forces, some factions might support regime change. Those officers who might be losers of the intra-military competitions might see regime change as an opportunity to outwit their rivals and improve their status. From the perspective of the military leadership, even if the autocratic regime that has provided large benefits to them collapses, regime change can

be acceptable for it would not necessarily bring about negative repercussions to the institution. When pressure for democratization from domestic forces couples with some factions from within the armed forces, the military leadership can easily opt for defection from the current authoritarian regime and even claim that they will oversee the transitional process. The large wealth and power of the armed forces that strengthened institutional cohesion are likely to prevent intra-military divides over the defection; the majority of the armed forces would likely support the regime transition. In addition, the military can still pursue opportunities in a newly emerging regime. Given its monopoly on the means of coercion, the military can demand a guarantee on the continuous provision of large benefits and perks from the incoming regime. This coup-proofing measure can make states prone to military defection to regime change.

However, despite their support to regime change, the presence of a large military will cause the incoming regime to feel insecure. Of course, such support does not necessarily guarantee their commitment to democratic rule and becoming an apolitical institution. Rather, the military is likely to continue maintaining their autonomy and benefits, if not asking for more. A desire to sustain their interest and power is easily predictable. Huntington's observation (1991, 237) that the armed forces "that had been in the forefront opposing the dictatorships also came to oppose the successor democratic governments" seems natural. While pressuring the new civilian leadership to make a pact with the armed forces, the regime's fear of this military's insubordination can simultaneously lead the incoming regime to perceive a greater need for military reforms.

In addition, the military's large consumption of national resources and its desire to maintain large benefits and prerogatives can compel the regime not to commit to their

pact with this army. Aside from the inherently rising demands of democratization for military reforms, the emerging political leadership also inevitably confronts growing demands from the society for redistribution and reform, and growing public discontent over large military spending and spoils follows. This can limit resource distribution of the incoming regime to the armed forces, threatening the regime's pact with the military (e.g., Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Acemoglu et al. 2010; Houngnikpo 2013). Moreover, if the lack of resources or the difficulty to funnel resources to the armed forces can constrain governmental concessions to the armed forces, the already existing large consumption of national resources worsens this situation. In reality, even if the civilian regime desires to mobilize resources with aims to secure the new civil-military relations, resources are often not available. Additionally, democratization itself is often a consequence of failed development strategies and economic hardships in the society (e.g., Bratton and van de Walle 2004). In this vein, it might not be a coincidence that many leaders in new democracies have a difficult time achieving credible commitments to reforms that they promise (e.g., Pevehouse 2002; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2010). Given the lack of resources, the public would not accept the regime's concessions to the over-sized military, and reneging on the bargain with the large armed forces increasingly becomes likely. The risk of conflict increases between the incoming regime and the military.

As a result, the regime may seek or is forced to prompt measures to prevent challenges from the armed forces or to secure public support, such as cutting large military expenditures significantly and purging the ruling military leadership. These measures can seriously harm the emerging civil-military relations and even result in a

military coup. Certainly, regardless of whether the regime reneges on the pact, the armed forces can easily recognize that the new civilian leadership is having a problem committing to their promises to them. As the incoming leadership expresses its interests in reforming the armed forces or pursues policies that could potentially go against the initial pact, the armed forces become aware that current commitments of the regime to concessions are unlikely to guarantee the regime's future commitments to them. Severe distrust and conflict between this wealthy military and the incoming civilian leadership over concessions and military reforms are likely to follow, leading the commitment problem to intensify. Consequently, emerging democracies become more vulnerable to coup attempts. In this light, it is understandable why previous studies have suggested that in emerging democracies, the inheritance of a large military or the legacy of military regimes makes it difficult for emerging democracies to consolidate against coup threats (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2010).

The discussion above leads to the following testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The larger spoils to the military are during the authoritarian periods, the more difficult it is for emerging democracies to consolidate against coup threats.

3) Legacy of ascriptive coup-proofing: At the heart of the ascriptive coup-proofing strategy in autocracies is the congruence between the officer corps and the political leadership. Like Kenyatta and Moi in Kenya, coup-fearing autocrats have sought to secure loyalty from the armed forces by exploiting political competitions and

conflicts across identity groups, specifically by recruiting and promoting officers from certain group(s) loyal to the regime (Horowitz 1985; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkness 2012). From an autocrat's perspective, making the fate of the armed forces coincide with that of the ruling regime is a secure way of preventing a violent challenge from within the armed forces. Certainly, during the process of implementing this measure, the regime can be vulnerable to threats from discontented officers. However, "although the creation of 'ethnic armies' has at times been highly destabilising elsewhere in Africa, the consistent policy of keeping out of the military intrinsically disloyal or suspect groups can powerfully stabilise the political hierarchy in that it produces a reinforcing 'ethnic matching of regime and army'" (Decalo 1989, 561). In addition, as seen in the nations of the Arab Spring, once the communal stacking of the armed forces is established, it can be effective at preventing military defection to regime transition (e.g., Lemarchand 1994; Nepstad 2013; Makara 2013). The communally organized armed forces were often the institutions that brutally suppressed protesters demanding democratization. However, this coup-proofing measure cannot prevent the fall of the ruling authoritarian regime. A transition to democracy can still occur in those autocracies that are heavily dependent on the communal stacking of the armed forces. Democratization in Burundi in 1993 is a prime example of this, where the armed forces were organized exclusively along the country's ethnic minority group accounting for 15 percent of the country's population – the Tutsi, the ruler's co-ethnic group (Lemarchand 1994).[28] Unless the military was completely demolished before the ascendancy of a new regime, the incoming regime would likely inherit the armed forces whose top and

[28] Indeed, the routes of democratization are various (e.g., Karl 1990; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996).

important posts are still filled with officers loyal to the departed regime. This is a critical source for the instability of new civil-military relations and severe commitment problems between the incoming regime and the armed forces (Harkness 2012).

From the incoming regime's perspective, as the ancient communal matching of the regime and military left them potentially disloyal armed forces, the presence of these forces must be threatening. Yet, while seeing the imperative to reform such armed forces, pursuing military reforms to secure their control of the armed forces must be highly risky. While measures like purging extant officer corps and wholesale ethnic turnover in the armed forces might be necessary to prevent challenges from the armed forces, such radical measures could result in the worst-case scenario – their removal from power. On the other hand, the communally organized armed forces also feel insecure about their fate under the new political leadership. They are anxious about how the incoming regime approaches taking control of the armed forces. From their perspective, their incoming regime would likely perceive them to be threatening and hostile and try to undermine their dominance in the military and their established systems of benefits and privileges by initiating new coup-proofing measures. In effect, even normal involvements of the new regime in military affairs can worsen their sense of insecurity and fear.

Under this legacy, there would likely emerge the serious suspicion and fear between the armed forces and the incoming leadership, and reaching a credible pact between the transitional regime and the armed forces over the new political-military relations must be difficult (Luckham 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkness 2012). For these militaries, promises and concessions from a transitional leadership—

who is suspicious of them and thus seeks an opportunity to reform the communally organized armed forces—are unlikely to be perceived as being credible. Even after the pact is reached, the credibility of the regime's commitment to its concessions to the armed forces is continuously challenged. Rising public demand for political and military reforms that come with democratization also would likely further complicate this situation. In addition, emerging ethnic conflict in fledgling democracies can deteriorate their trust and fear towards each other. Consequently, the ethnically stacked military would likely undergo severe conflicts with the incoming political leadership, leading to plots to derail the emerging regime.[29]

On the other hand, the communal stacking of the armed forces may have positive implications for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats if such stacking takes place in communally diverse armed forces, for it can makes autocracies vulnerable to intra-military splits over democratization. In the armed forces that were staffed along officers from various communal groups, it might difficult for a new autocrat to reorganize the armed forces along groups only loyal to him. Even with his efforts at communally stacking the armed forces, the armed forces would likely contain officers from diverse communal groups, equivalent to incomplete stacking and matching between the armed forces and the ruling political leadership. The autocrats' implementation of

[29] Certainly, a change in the communal leadership during the process of democratization can be a critical intervening variable. As Harkness (2012) argues, an ethnic-leadership change during democratization increases coup risk in emerging democracies of which politics were organized along ethnic groups during the authoritarian periods, suggesting that no communal leadership change may be conducive to emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threat. However, if the armed forces are stacked heavily along a single communal group (ethnic or regional groups), the group is likely to be a minority (like Burundi), so that an ethnic or regional leadership change is likely to occur. In addition, even if such leadership change does not occur, commitment problems between the communally stacked armed forces and the same ruler in emerging democracies are likely to be serious, for the leader would likely be forced to respond to public pressures and demands.

political favoritism towards the loyal officer corps can creates serious intra-military grievances. Decalo (1989, 557), for instance, observes that in Gabon, "the societal ethnic tensions mirrored in the military are barely contained, despite being carefully monitored and rigidly controlled by Omar Bongo's expatriate officers in key posts." When the armed forces contain various communal groups, military officers not from the ruler's co-communal group(s) are likely to be disobedient and rebellious in the rise of a regime change opportunity, resulting in intra-military splits over democratization. It is likely that the authoritarian leadership has treated these forces unfavorably, leading them to become the discontented groups in the armed forces. These forces would likely defect from the regime and align with domestic or international forces demanding regime change. They might even seek to eliminate the ruling political and military leadership. Then, as already discussed, the emergence of these armed forces would likely engender a critical opportunity for a transitional regime to relatively easily reform the armed forces and stabilize new political-military relations, thereby consolidating against coup threats. In addition, given the presence of these forces, a coup attempt by the forces loyal to the previous regime to reverse democratization, or depose a transitional regime is unlikely to be successful and consequently deterred.

The discussion above leads to the following testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Communal stacking of the armed forces during the authoritarian periods is likely to increase coup risk in emerging democracies.

Hypothesis 3-1: Communal stacking of the armed forces that contain officers from diverse communal groups is likely to decreases coup risk in emerging democracies

Finally, this chapter hypothesizes that the collective implementation of diverse coup-proofing measures in autocracies is likely to help emerging democracies consolidate against coup threats. In fact, serious coup-proofing often takes place through various measures, but it is often combined with the divide-and-rule strategy (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Quinlivan 1999; Powell 2012-a; Makara 2013). Even when ascriptive manipulation through ethnic or regional favoritism to organize the armed forces is heavily implemented, coup-fearing rulers often resort to internal balancing mechanisms in the armed forces (Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Lemarchand 1994). As coups by presidential guards, and co-ethnic officers and generals are not rare (e.g., Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011), pursuing counterbalancing is necessary in ethnically organized armed forces; ascriptive measures are often coupled with measures of internal balances and checks on the armed forces. Creating intra-military divisions and rivalries would likely prevent coups by the ruler's inner circle (e.g., Goldsworthy 1981; Kim 2008; Powell 2012-a). To deter coups, coup-fearing regimes have accordingly employed diverse cohesion and coordination obstacles to coup execution by dividing the military into competitive organizations that balance each other, which has been a prominent form of coup-proofing policies.

However, like structural coup, simultaneous implementation of various coup-proofing measures may render the authoritarian regime vulnerable to severe intra-military conflicts and grievances. In the wake of opportunities for regime change, discontented officers and their associates are likely to end up supporting regime change. They are also likely to serve as a force to deter conservative coups against an incoming regime and help

the incoming regime stabilize new civil-military relations. As a result, we can expect collective implementation of various coup-proofing measures in autocracies may have a potential for positive implications for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats.

Hypothesis 4: The collective implementation of diverse coup-proofing measures in autocracies is likely to lower coup risk in emerging democracies.

Research Design

This section presents how this chapter plans to examine the hypotheses. In line with the studies in democratic survival and consolidation and emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Maeda 2010; Svolik 2013; Geddis et al. 2014), this study employs a survival analysis to test these hypotheses. Survival models are designed to examine hazard rates – the likelihood that an event will occur at a specific point in time given that it has not occurred until that point (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Given that they are the known-approach to examine the duration until one or more events occur, they are a good fit to examine emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk. The specific technique that this study utilizes is the Cox Proportional Hazards model. This Cox model can take into account that an emerging democracy is at risk of experiencing a coup at any given point and examine the probability that an emerging democracy would eventually experience a coup at a certain time given that it had not experienced the event up to that time. The Cox model is a popular approach for the analysis of survival data.

The formula of this model is written by

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_0(t) \times \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + ... + \beta_k x_{ik})$$

Where $\lambda(t)$ is a hazard function and $\lambda_0(t)$ is an unspecified base-line hazard function. To the extent that the main focus of the study is the effect of explanatory variables, not the shape of different underlying hazard rates, this Cox model is employed (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). In this mode, the shape of the baseline hazard rate is assumed to be unknown and is left semi-parameterized. On the other hand, the specific hazard rate is a function of a set of covariates. Thus, the Cox model is also suitable for examining the effect of independent variables. This model is also known for its robustness.

To code an event failure—the onset of a coup d'état in emerging democracies—this chapter uses the same coup dataset that the previous chapter constructed. This dataset contains successful or attempted-but-failed coups in the world during the 1950-2007 periods.[30] By using this coup onset data, this research codes event failures. An event failure – coup occurrence – is coded 1 if a coup occurred in a given year during the lifespan of emerging democracies; a 0 is assigned for the rest of the periods.

To collect the data on emerging democracies, this study follows a common approach in the previous studies on the survival of emerging democracies and emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats and democratic consolidation (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000; Maeda 2010l Geddis et al. 2014). In this literature, a transition to democracy is identified based commonly on whether or not direct and competitive

[30] Like the previous chapter, coup plots are not included in the dataset for the same reasons.

multiparty elections are held rather than whether a significant change in the level of democracy occurs. Following this literature, this chapter uses the data of emerging democracies from the dataset of Geddis et al. (2014). In this dataset, states are considered to become democratic if the executive power is established as a result of direct competitive elections after the breakdown of authoritarianism.[31] Their specific coding rule to define a transition to democracy is that while "[d]emocratic is defined as a regime in which the executive achieved power through a direct competitive election," a transition to democracy is "coded 1 if the regime that follows the last year of the regime being coded is democratic" (Geddis et al. 2015, 9). This paper admits that this measure of emerging democracies may be problematic for the transitional periods before a new democratic regime comes into power can be excluded. It is a legitimate concern, but it is indeed a common problem in the literature focusing particularly on authoritarian legacies. However, since a critical theoretical focus of the study is on the commitment problems between a new political leadership and the armed forces, this study is interested in how new civil-military relations and coup risk alter under the influence of different coup-proofing legacies, overlooking some transitional periods prior to the establishment of a new regime or even the founding multiparty election may not be too problematic. In addition, by using this set of emerging democracies, we can at least minimize the risk of including autocracies normally embracing some forms of political liberalization, helping us have a consistent unit of analysis.

[31] Their specific coding rule is as follows. A transition to democracy is "coded 1 if the regime that follows the last year of the regime being coded is democratic. Democratic is defined as a regime in which the executive achieved power through a direct competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to compete, and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct competitive elections (defined in the same way as for directly elected executives)" (Geddis et al. 2015, 9).

As an alternative pool of emerging democracies, this study also collected emerging democracies by using the Polity IV's measure of democratization (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). In the Polity IV dataset, a transition to democracy is treated as six points or greater increase in POLITY score over a period of three years or less. While it can contain some autocracies, this can be a useful dataset for robustness checks. Also, this way of collecting emerging democracies allows us to include the effects of coup-proofing legacies on coup risk during the processes of transition.

Independent Variables: Three independent variables are created to capture the three different coup-proofing legacies. The first variable is about the size of material benefits the autocrat offers to military officers in exchange for their loyalty to him. To capture this, this study relies on the variable of military spoils and utilizes a conventional approach of measuring such spoils in the literature. Like other studies (e.g., Powell 2012-b), this study also uses military expenditures as a proxy measure of military spoils (*spoils*). Although this is not an ideal measure, the common notion is that military spending in authoritarian regimes reasonably captures spoils that the autocrat provides to the armed forces. Military expenditures in autocracies contain selective benefits and perks to the armed forces from the rulers, such as high salaries, high benefit packages, and autonomous acquisition of military weapons and equipment, suggesting that the variable of military spending can be a practical alternative. To relatively measure spoils on military spending and control for the amount of the expenditure by the wealth and size of the state, this chapter uses military expenditures in a per capita format, not the raw data. Military expenditure data are drawn from the Correlates of War dataset (COW 2010). To allocate a value of the legacy of military spoils for emerging democracy, this

chapter uses the value one year prior to a transition to democracy and maintains the same value for the entire lifespan of an emerging democracy. By having a size of military spoils prior to regime transition, this study examines how the legacy of material coup-proofing influences emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats.

Regarding the measure of organizing the armed forces with groups considered supportive of the departed regime, this chapter focuses on ethnic stacking of the armed forces. The reason is relatively straightforward and practical. Unlike other ascriptive coup-proofing measures like staffing important military posts with the ruler's relatives or friends, ethnic stacking of the armed forces is systematic and extensive enough to structurally distort the entire organizational nature of the armed forces, and it is also a dominant form of systematic ascriptive coup-proofing measures (e.g., Enloe 1980; Goldsworthy 1981; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Harkness 2012). As political struggles often take place across ethnic groups, intra-ethnic coups to gain political power have been highly prevalent, making the ethnic stacking of the armed forces systematically implemented (Roessler 2011).

Nevertheless, large-N data on such ethnic stacking (e.g., cross-national and time-series data) are not available in the literature. In effect, collecting data on the variable for each year and each nation more than 50 years is highly challenging; even finding sources for the measure might be difficult. Yet, a reasonable measure is available in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. Even though it does not have data on ethnic stacking of the military, it provides a reasonable proxy (Wimmer et al. 2009). The EPR identifies politically relevant ethnic groups and annually tracks their power status between 1946-2005. Their power status changes according to whether or not the representatives of each

politically relevant ethnic group are excluded from the executive branch. More specifically, by focusing on executive power, this dataset captures, among ethnic groups, "representation in the presidency, the cabinet and senior posts in the administration, including the army" (Wimmer et al. 2011, 427).[32] As noted above, it includes some aspect of the ethnic stacking in the armed forces. Since a common feature of ethnic stacking in autocracies is filling offices and positions in the military with the ruler's co-ethnics, ethnic groups excluded from the executive branch are also likely to be excluded from the armed forces. Accordingly, this variable of how largely ethnic groups are excluded from the government can be a reasonable proxy for how severely the military is organized along ethnic lines, suggesting this measure of ethnic group exclusion seems to be a reasonable alternative for ethnic stacking of the armed forces. This chapter employed this alternative measure—the size of excluded ethnic groups (*ethnic stacking*). It seems logical that the larger the population of an excluded ethnic group is, the severer the ethnic stacking of the military is. To assign a value of the ethnic stacking legacy for emerging democracies, this chapter uses the value one year before a transition to democracy and keeps the same value for the entire lifespan of the emerging democracy.

To test the Hypothesis 3-1, this study includes a squared term of *ethnic stacking,* for a reasonable way to test this hypothesis is to treat ethnic stacking of the armed forces containing officers from diverse ethnic groups as incomplete matching between military officers and political elites. Like Burundi, when most of the other ethnic groups are excluded, the armed forces are likely to be organized along a single group loyal to the autocrat. In addition, as the size of excluded ethnic groups decreases, the probability of

[32] http://www.epr.ucla.edu

containing diverse ethnic groups in the armed forces increases. This study expects to find a U-shaped relationship between ethnic stacking of the armed forces and emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk. As hypothesis 3 suggests, if militaries are stacked by a single group loyal to the departed autocrat, an incoming regime is highly vulnerable to coup attempts. Similarly, little political matching and favoritism in the armed forces would likely contribute to the political centrality of the military, a key factor for making regimes highly vulnerable to coup attempts and increasing the probability of a coup's success. Therefore, they are likely to make emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threat more difficult. Unlike these two extremes, incomplete political matching between the armed forces and the ruling political leadership would likely contribute to the emergence of dissident forces willing to support regime change.

Alternatively, this study examines it by excluding emerging democracies that may have little ethnic tension. In those regimes, as the societal and political ethnic tension barely exists, ethnic stacking of the armed forces is also unlikely. In particular, this study tests the relationship by only including emerging democracies whose ethnic fractionalization index (EFL) is larger the global mean of the EFL. The ethnic fractionalization data are taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

To measure the degree of structural coup-proofing aimed at building cohesion and coordination obstacles to coup execution, this study uses a measure of *counterbalancing*. The primary purpose of counterbalancing is to control the armed forces and prevent coups by systemically creating intra-military divisions and competitions in the armed forces (Goldsworthy 1981; Decalo 1989; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003;

Pilster and Bo ̈hmelt 2011). An ideal measure of counterbalancing would be a variable that captures the degree in which the armed forces are internally divided and checked across rival units. In the literature, there have been attempts to measure a similar phenomenon that tries to measure "both the number of rivaling military organizations and their respective strengths to capture the degree to which a state divides its military manpower into rivaling organizations" (Pilster and Bo ̈hmelt 2011, 9).

In this study, we employ a measure of counterbalancing by Pilster and Bo ̈hmelt (2011) that covers more nations and periods than the dataset of Belkin and Schofer (2003). Building from Belkin and Schofer's measure of counterbalancing (2003), Pilster and Bo ̈hmelt first captured "effective number of ground-combat compatible military organizations" both from regular and paramilitary forces and then created a fractionalization index by this formula: $C_{it} = \frac{1}{\sum_j S_{jit}^2}$, where S_{jit} is "the personnel share of the ground-combat compatible military or paramilitary organizations" (Pilster and Bo ̈hmelt 2011, 10). In this formula, a C_{it} value of 1 indicates only one ground-combat armed unit, while a higher value than 1 refers to the presence of rivaling ground-combat military organizations. Although it is not a perfect measure, it reasonably captures the degree of divisions and rivalries in the armed forces for each nation. Their dataset covers countries globally from 1970 to 2003. To assign a value of counterbalancing for fledgling democracies, this chapter uses the value one year prior to a transition to democracy and maintains the same value for the entire lifespan of the emerging democracy. Additionally, this chapter employed alternative measures for each coup-proofing legacy, shown in this chapter's Appendix. It employed measures of coup-

proofing legacies based on an average of the past three years prior to a transition to democracy.

To test hypothesis 4, this chapter needs a measure to capture the aggregate degree of collective coup-proofing effort during the authoritarian periods. By using the three measures of coup-proofing legacies, this chapter first creates three dummy variables based on whether or not each coup-proofing measure is higher than its mean value. Finally, this chapter constructs another dummy variable based on the combinations of these three coup-proofing dummies. This dummy variable (*coup-proofing*) is coded a 1 if the value of the dummy variable of structural coup-proofing is a 1 and if each of the other two dummy variables has a value of 1. This variable is a reasonable approach in the sense that regardless of whether or not the armed forces are heavily organized ethnically or bought off, heavy implementation of coup-proofing is unlikely to occur without structural coup-proofing that is at the center of the ruler's interest in coup-prevention. As a result, this paper uses this dummy variable to explore the implication of heavy coup-proofing efforts for emerging democracies' consolidation to coup threats.

Control Variables: This chapter includes a set of popular coup-causing factors, that the previous chapter used, and other control variables specific to coup risk in emerging democracies. The first set of control variables is about the political aspects of coup risk. It is widely argued that coup risk is a function of the legitimacy of the regime and political vulnerability (Huntington 1968; Thompson 1975; Welch 1976; McGowan and Johnson 1984; Clark 2007; Lindberg and Clark 2008). To capture this political aspect, this chapter includes the level of political protests. The data are taken from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive. This study also includes the level of

political constraints to the executive branch of the government. Often, regime failure or the decline of legitimacy in emerging democracies is attributable to the regime's abuse of power (Kapstein and Converse 2008). To control for this factor, this chapter includes the data of XCONST from the Polity IV dataset; XCONST is the variable for executive constraints in the dataset. Finally, this study also controls for the legacy of a military regime. Several studies point out that if the military's involvement in politics was extensive in military regimes, then this legacy makes new civil-military relations conflict-prone, making states susceptible to coups (e.g., Luckham 1996; Belkin and Shofer 2003; Svolik 2013; Thyne 2010). By using the measure of regime types of Geddes et al. (2014), this study created this legacy variable depending on if a state transitioned from a military regime.

The second set of control variables is structural factors in the society. In general, the poorer national wealth is, the higher coup risk is. It is common to control for the level of economic backwardness (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1992; McGowan 2003; Powell 2012-b). In general, poor countries are more vulnerable to economic crises or shocks and political instability, making states vulnerable to coup attempts. These unstable and deteriorating circumstances would likely serve as a pretext for coup-conspirators to intervene. Similarly, emerging democracies are likely to fail to consolidate against coup threats under these circumstances (Maeda 2010). In this study, a measure of economic poverty is created by using the natural log of GDP per capita. The data come from the WDI. Additionally, this chapter incorporates the effect of ethnic fractionalization to this study, for ethnically divided countries are prone to intra-ethnic rivalries and conflicts (e.g., Horowitz 1980; 1985; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Roessler 2011). In particular,

when emerging mass election politics is coupled with ethnic competitions, political instability and conflict are likely to take place, increasing coup risk. This variable uses ethnic fractionalization data by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

The third set of control variables is pertaining to the military. In general, a large military spending is considered as a coup-deterring factor in that large expenditures can reduce grievances in the military. It can also improve the level of military professionalism (Huntington 1957; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Larger military spending can help emerging democracies consolidate against coup threats. The data for military expenditures are taken from the COW dataset. Additionally, it controls for the effect of previous coups, for coups are often a response to the previous one. Also, as some transitions are the result of a coup, these emerging democracies may be vulnerable to a counter-coup (e.g., Huntington 1991). To capture this, the study created a dummy variable according to if a coup occurred during the one year before democratization and assigned a 1 for the entire lifespan of emerging democracies if such a coup occurred.

Finally, this study controls for international influences. It has been widely underscored that military dictatorships became unsustainable in the post-Cold War environment coupled with a global appeal for democracy (Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Stepan 2009; Diamond 2011). After the collapse of Cold War, the international community has increasingly promoted democracy abroad, and international conditions have been increasingly unfavorable for coups. There has also been an emerging anti-coup norm, which has resulted in growing international sanctions against coups (e.g, Huntington 1996; Shannon et al. 2014). To control for this phenomenon, this chapter includes a dummy variable for the post-Cold War environment.

Results

Table 5 presents the results of how each of the three different coup-proofing measures during the authoritarian periods influences fledgling democracies' vulnerability to coups. In a nutshell, except for the legacy of counterbalancing, the legacies of material coup-proofing and ethnic stacking appear to have unexpected impacts on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats. In fact, all the three legacies appear conducive to fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats. To begin with, the legacy of structural coup-proofing measures has statistically significant impacts on improving emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats, shown in Models 1 and 2. *Counterbalancing* in Model 1 helps emerging democracies consolidate against coup risk. Specifically, it reduces fledgling democracies' vulnerability to coup risk by 69 percent. This chapter also checked the effect after testing the non-proportionality of covariates. When the proportionality assumption that effects of covariates on the hazard rate remain proportional across time is violated, the Cox models produce biased and inefficient estimates for all covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001).

Table 5. Effects of Different Coup-proofing Legacies on Coup Risk

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
Counterbalancing	-0.885*	-1.837***						-0.695	-1.288*
	(0.46)	(0.668)						(0.522)	(0.684)
Spoils			-0.021*					-0.017	-0.019
			(0.012)					(0.012)	(0.017)
Ethnic Stacking				0.245	0.607	-4.718*	-4.011	0.294	0.377
				(0.777)	(0.786)	(2.685)	(2.862)	(0.883)	(0.811)
Ethnic Stacking^2						6.718**	6.272*		
						(3.287)	(3.519)		
Previous Coups	1.575	35.941***	0.805	0.661	2.313**	0.770	2.372**	1.151	36.489***
	(1.004)	(0.822)	(0.515)	(0.530)	(1.020)	(0.568)	(1.074)	(1.203)	(0.885)
Executive Constraints	0.004	0.301	0.203	0.122	0.646*	0.049	0.526	0.027	0.186

	(0.204)	(0.365)	(0.208)	(0.229)	(0.362)	(0.248)	(0.392)	(0.213)	(0.378)
Demonstrations	0.104*	0.144**	0.058	0.068	0.075	0.067	0.072	0.110*	0.144**
	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)
GDPperCapita	-0.283	-0.868	-0.400	-0.372	-1.212	-0.134	-1.017	-0.140	-0.590
	(0.502)	(0.759)	(0.381)	(0.365)	(0.752)	(0.418)	(0.754)	(0.470)	(0.820)
Legacy of military regime	0.108	-1.716	0.049	0.251	0.341	0.226	0.343	0.010	-1.556
	(0.519)	(1.530)	(0.402)	(0.388)	(0.417)	(0.401)	(0.420)	(0.567)	(1.568)
Military Expenditures	-0.290	-0.390*	0.087	-0.323*	-0.357*	-0.379**	-0.430**	-0.087	-0.134
	(0.253)	(0.220)	(0.285)	(0.172)	(0.189)	(0.178)	(0.195)	(0.332)	(0.378)
Post-Cold War	-1.254**	-1.703	-1.370***	-1.499***	-1.813***	-1.666***	-1.941***	-1.320**	-1.807
	(0.522)	(1.111)	(0.440)	(0.484)	(0.498)	(0.529)	(0.543)	(0.570)	(1.329)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.644	-6.633***	-0.252	0.028	-7.258***	0.317	-7.128***	0.435	-7.437***
	(1.182)	(2.095)	(0.800)	(0.975)	(2.103)	(1.033)	(2.214)	(1.232)	(2.310)
*ln(t)*counterbalancing*		0.793*							0.513
		(0.461)							(0.453)
*ln(t)*Previous Coups*		-46.496			-1.515*		-1.496*		-47.890
		(0.000)			(0.852)		(0.883)		(0.000)
*ln(t)*Executive Constraints*		-0.180			-0.469		-0.422		-0.101
		(0.337)			(0.301)		(0.332)		(0.355)
ln(t) GDPperCapita*		0.232			0.659		0.722		0.168
		(0.609)			(0.537)		(0.525)		(0.640)
*ln(t)*Legacy of military regime*		1.521*							1.325
		(0.882)							(0.885)
*ln(t)*Post-Cold War*		0.118							0.192
		(0.723)							(0.826)
ln(t) Ethnic Fractionalization		5.287***			5.556***		5.713***		5.675***
		(1.917)			(1.640)		(1.781)		(2.154)
Observations	693	693	726	741	741	741	741	682	682
Number of subjects	71	71	84	85	85	85	85	69	69
Log Likelihood	-101.4	-86.23	-128.9	-134.1	-123.4	-132.3	-122.0	-92.70	-79.22

Coefficients are reported and robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To make sure whether the proportional hazard assumption holds, this study conducted the Grambsch and Therneau's (1994) test of proportionality for Model 1. It found that several variables including *Counterbalancing* have a non-proportionality problem, as shown in Model 2 with the interaction terms. Even after controlling for the interaction terms, structural coup-proofing's positive effects on fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup risk still exist. While the interaction term indicates its pacifying effect decreases over time, *Counterbalancing* still appears to reduce emerging democracies' vulnerability to coup risk. Model 9, which includes the other measures of

coup-proofing legacies, also confirms its positive impact on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk.[33]

Surprisingly, this research finds that the legacy of military spoils appears to help emerging democracies consolidate against coup risk, shown in Model 3. The coefficient of *Spoils* is -.021, and its hazard ratio is .97, meaning that it reduces the risk of emerging democracies' vulnerability to coup threats by 3 percent with one unit increase of *Spoils*. Apparently, this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis.[34] Even after conducting proportional hazard tests for Model 4, the result did not change as shown in Model 3. If the implications of this coup-proofing measure of intra-military splits over regime change are taken into account, this unexpected result might not be too unexpected. Despite the potential effects of military spoils to buy off the loyalty of the armed forces, it is possible that this coup-proofing measure cannot prevent the rise of severe intra-military competitions and divisions. If these factors exist, they would likely result in the inter-military splits over regime change following from the mobilization of disgruntled officers. In turn, such splits would likely help an incoming regime stabilize civil-military relations and thus consolidate against coup risk.[35]

Turning to the effect of the legacy of ethnic stacking, this study also finds an insignificant result, which does not support the hypothesis 3. This legacy variable appears to have no statistically significant impacts on emerging democracies'

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[33] Various robustness checks were also conducted and the results are reported on this chapter's Appendix. In general, the results are similar and not sensitive to different measures of coup-proofing legacies and various model specifications.

[34] While there might be different plausible explanations for this surprising result, which is presented in this chapter's Appendix, the result might be driven by the effects of *Spoils* on leading to intra-military splits over regime change and consequential emergence of stable civil-military relations.

[35]

vulnerability to coup risk. As shown in both Model 2 and Model 3 with the interaction terms as a result of non-proportionality tests, the signs of *ethnic stacking* are positive, but its effects are not statistically significant; only its direction is consistent with the hypothesis. To test the hypothesis 3-1, this research examined an inverted-U shape relationship between ethnic stacking and coup risk by adding a squared term of *ethnic stacking*. The results are shown in Models 4 and 5. As expected, a U-shaped effect appears. While *ethnic stacking* has a negative sign, its square term has a positive sign. Both terms are statically significant. The results show that the legacy of the moderate level of ethnic stacking makes emerging democracies least vulnerable to coups.[36] This supports the contention that mixed or incomplete stacking of the armed forces during the authoritarian periods render the authoritarian regime highly vulnerable to intra-military conflicts and thus intra-military splits over regime change, thereby leading to stable civil-military relations in emerging democracies. This effect may be similar to how the counterbalancing legacy would likely contribute to emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats.

Table 6 presents empirical results for hypothesis 4. In effect, to the extent that the coup-proofing legacies largely appear to have positive implications for fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats, it might be intuitive that heavy coup-proofing efforts by using multiple measures help emerging democracies become less prone to coups. As expected, Model 2 shows statistically significant evidence that *coup-*

[36] Results by only including emerging democracies if their ethnic fractionalization index (EFL) is larger than the global mean of the EFL are reported in this chapter's appendix. After excluding the cases of emerging democracies where ethnic tension may barely exist, this tested the effect of ethnic stacking on coup risk in emerging democracies. It turns out that ethnic stacking does not have statistically significant impacts. Also, while the U-shaped relationship still appears, their impacts are statistically insignificant.

proofing – heavy coup-proofing – improves emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats, which is consistent with the hypothesis. The coefficient on the coup-proofing variable is -1.212, meaning its hazard ratio is .29. This hazard ratio suggests that if coup-proofing is heavily pursued along creating inter-military divides and competitions coupled with other measures, such coup-proofing can lower the risk of coups in emerging democracies by 71 percent

Table 6. Effects of Collective Coup-proofing Legacy on Coup Risk

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model
Coup-proofing		-1.212**	-0.858*
		(0.536)	(0.556)
Previous Coups	1.026**	1.136**	2.599***
	(0.509)	(0.499)	(0.937)
Executive Constraints	0.103	0.131	0.736**
	(0.211)	(0.201)	(0.341)
Demonstrations	0.060	0.071	0.113**
	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.056)
GDPperCapita	-0.649*	-0.651*	-1.093
	(0.372)	(0.346)	(0.676)
Legacy of military regime	0.395	0.324	-1.870**
	(0.370)	(0.376)	(0.942)
Military Expenditures	-0.124	-0.070	-0.139
	(0.170)	(0.181)	(0.181)
Post-Cold War	-1.438***	-1.300***	-1.435***
	(0.418)	(0.403)	(0.395)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.142	-0.211	-5.415***
	(0.969)	(0.830)	(1.894)
*ln(t)*Previous Coups*			-1.412*
			(0.815)
*ln(t)*Executive Constraints*			-0.576*
			(0.316)
ln(t) GDPperCapita*			0.377
			(0.509)
*Ln(t)*Legacy of military regime*			1.669***
			(0.566)
Ln(t) Ethnic Fractionalization			4.482***
			(1.580)
Observations	924	924	924
Number of Subjects	100	100	100

Log Likelihood	-147.0	-144.4	-133.6

Coefficients are reported and robust standard errors are in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Figure 1. Emerging Democracies' Vulnerability to Coup Risk by *Coup-Proofing*

Figure 1 presents a graphical result regarding the survival function of *coup-proofing* in Model 2. It clearly shows that the heavy implementation of coup-proofing measures collectively during the authoritarian periods has a significant pacifying impact on coup risk in fledgling democracies. In Model 3, the effect of *coup-proofing* is presented after conducting proportional hazard tests and adding the several non-proportional variables. It still appears that although *coup-proofing's* significant level

decreases, there are positive impacts on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threat; the variable is still significant and its sign is still negative.

An Illustrative Case (South Korean Consolidation against Coup Threats): How coup-proofing centering on intra-military divides and competitions can have positive implications for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats may be illustrated through the following South Korean case. In May 1961, a young South Korean general, Park Chung Hee, led a coup, overthrowing a nascent democracy established in 1960. Soon after his rise to power, a group of young officers, who called themselves the "*Hanahoe*"— One Mind Society—was formed under the patronage of President Park. Its origin was an alumni group of seven junior officers, including Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, from the first graduating class of the Army Academy (Class 11). The *Hanahoe* evolved into a group of some 200 members through ten graduating classes. In 1979 and 1980, Chun drew on the *Hanahoe* in his ascendency to power. Major General Chun, a protégé of Park and the chief of the DSC, executed a coup after Park's assassination at the hands of his KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) chief in 1979 and later brutally repressed civilians protesting against the coup and calling for democratization, killing over 200 people. General Chun used Park's anti-coup apparatus, the DSC, to ensure the success of his own coup.

During his rule, President Chun treated the military as the mainstay of his regime. In general, military officers enjoyed preferential treatments, including higher salaries compared to non-military governmental officials and fast-tracks to advance to higher offices of the government. Yet, his regime also focused on preferential treatment for military officers from the *Hanahoe* to prevent threats from the security apparatus, filling

key posts in the army with this faction. In addition, his regime created intra-military divisions and rivalries not only through intra-faction competition but also through intra-military competition (Han 1994; Kim 2008). This counterbalancing strategy worked for a while, but it was effective only until his regime faced serious demands and protests for democratization from opposition elites and the civil society. As public outcries for democratization increasingly expanded from the mid-80s, his coup-proofing efforts eventually backfired on the regime. At the height of political protests for democratization, the internal military division that the autocrat created paradoxically prevented his regime from reversing democratization, contributing to facilitating a transition to democracy in 1987 (Kim 2008). When the regime ordered military interventions to suppress mass protests for democratization, officer crops outside the *Hanahoe* and some member of the *Hanahoe* refused to take that order, and a group of some junior officers even threatened to stage a coup to remove the Chun regime (Ham 2014).[37] In June of 1987, the Chun regime agreed to have a presidential election through direct votes by the public. Eventually, South Korea entered the process of democratic transition and democratically elected a president in December 1987, ending the cycle of military coups.

However, as the president-elect was a core coup-conspirator of the 1980 coup and a main ally of President Chun during his rule, it is not clear how much the discounted

[37] There is another explanation for what actually stopped military interventions to reverse democratization. Some scholars attribute no intervention largely to the United States' signals and commitments to a transition to democracy in 1987 (Yeo 2006; Mckoy and Miller 2012). Right before executing military repression, President Regan sent to South Korean leader Chun a letter indicating the US's concern in military intervention. Throughout the process of democratic transitions, the US warned through diverse channels that military intervention would damage the US-ROK alliance and bring a serious disservice to Korea's interest. This pressure and the signals of the US's commitment must play an important role in deterring such military repressions. In fact, those officers who objected the military interventions might have been influenced by the rejection of the US on such military interventions.

officers who opted for regime change contributed to stabilizing civil-military relations in the incoming regime. For some conservative officers, this regime change might have been viewed as power transition from one military regime to another military regime. Nevertheless, at the outset of his rule, President Roh Tae Woo had serious troubles with the ruling military leaders who were close allies of former president Chun, and to secure his rule, he purged disloyal officers and staffed posts with his military associates and non- *Hanahoe* members (Kim 2008). Yet, no coups occurred. There were no violent challenges and stable new political-military relations in the emerging democracy might have been influenced by the legacy of the intra-military grievances and divides. The emergence of officers supporting regime change would have provided an opportunity for the Roh regime to remove the top military brass loyal to his predecessor and stabilize the new civil-military relations.

Effect of Control Variables: While the focus of this study is not on the effects of the control variables, it briefly notes interesting outcomes of their impacts. Most control variables like executive constraints, the legacy of military regime, and even economic development appear to have inconsistent impacts. Although their signs are generally consistent with what the previous studies suggested, their impacts are not statistically significant in some models. On the other hand, two variables appear to have consistently significant impacts. They are *previous coups* and *post-Cold War*. Given that coups are often a response to the previous coup, and that some regime transitions like the one in Mauritania in 2008 and Portugal in 1974 took place after an overthrow of the ruling regime by a coup, the effect of *previous coups* is not surprising. In addition, since the post-Cold War era is often characterized as an era of Western democracy promotion and

a wave of democratization, it seems natural that emerging democracies are more likely to consolidate against coup risk. Certainly, it makes sense in that incentives to stage a coup are likely to decrease in the environment of international democracy promotion combined with Western powers' anti-coup stance.

Conclusion

If emerging democracies are susceptible to military coups, why are some more susceptible to coups than others? To date, this question has been studied largely by the democratization literature underscoring contexts in which democratization takes place. Factors such as socio-economic conditions and institutional developments are considered to serve as central contexts that explain fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup risk. These factors may be important for coup risk in democratizing states. However, exploring democratizing states' susceptibility to coups (or consolidation against coup risk) without the characteristics and roles of the armed forces seems inadequate. Indeed, as the coup literature suggests (e.g., Thompson 1973; 1976; Nordlinger 1977), military-related variables such as threats to military's institutional interests and intra-military grievances are often believed to be the key to coup occurrence. Yet, due to the research tradition studying democratizing states' vulnerability to coups by focusing on factors for democracy's consolidation and survival, the role of the military is generally overlooked in the literature (e.g., Frazer 1994; Lee 2009). The existing knowledge on the vulnerability of democratizing states to coups seems to have remained partial.

This study seeks to fill this gap by bringing in coup-proofing legacies. Given the seriousness of coup threats, coup-fearing autocrats pursue serious coup-proofing measures towards their armed apparatus. Such coup-proofing measures can have critical implications for how the armed forces respond to regime transition and new civil-military relations, generating fundamental impacts on coup risk in fledgling democracies. This chapter sought to show how they specifically influence coup risk in fledgling democratic regimes.

This study found that the legacy of inter-military divides and rivalries significantly lowers the risk of military coups in emerging democracies. In addition, the legacy of heavy coup-proofing efforts centered on counterbalancing appears to help emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk, but it surprisingly appears that the legacy of military spoils does not necessarily increase coup risk in emerging democracies. Moreover, the legacy of ethnic stacking appears to have a U-shaped impact on fledging democracies' susceptibility to coup risk. Through these findings, this chapter contributes to the literature that has largely overlooked how conditions and legacies of the armed forces can determine emerging democracies' fate. Indeed, fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats depends largely on the strategic behavior of the forces influenced by coup-proofing legacies. In addition, this study offers a new insight for the literature by showing that the legacies of political-military relations during authoritarian rules do not always have negative implications for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats; in effect, the extent literature has focused mostly on the negative implications.

Appendix

In addition to the tests for the U-shaped relationship, this study conducted more tests on the effect of ethnic stacking of the armed forces on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats by only have the data of emerging democracies that are likely to be vulnerable to ethnic tension. First, this study tests the relationship by only including fledgling democracies if their ethnic fractionalization index (EFL) is larger than the global mean of the EFL. Second, it examined it by using the size of excluded ethnic groups from the EPR dataset; it only includes fledgling democracies if the size is larger than the global mean of the measure. Table 7 shows the results.[38] Models 1 and 2 show no effect of such stacking. Models 3 and 4 also present similar results. As shown in Models 1 and 3, Ethnic Stacking appears to have no significant impact, which is consistent with the hypothesis that ethnic staking of the armed forces in ethnically diverse nations helps emerging democracies consolidate against coup threats. Regarding the U-shaped relationship, Models 2 and 4 consistently show supportive evidence, but they are statistically insignificant. What these tests, including the previous one in Table 6 suggest is that unlike popular belief, ethnic stacking of the armed forces is not a significant factor for emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats and that if any, the U-shaped impacts is likely.

Table 7. More Tests of Ethnic Stacking

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(1) Model	(2) Model
	The EFL		Ethnically Excluded Group	
Ethnic Stacking	0.477	-4.900	0.477	-4.900

[38] None of the models violated the proportional hazard assumption.

	(2.426)	(6.954)	(2.445)	(7.009)
Ethnic Stacking^2		5.966		5.966
		(7.421)		(7.479)
Previous Coups	-0.375	-0.340	-0.375	-0.340
	(1.115)	(1.050)	(1.124)	(1.058)
Executive Constraints	0.020	-0.045	0.020	-0.045
	(0.410)	(0.407)	(0.414)	(0.410)
Demonstrations	-0.081	-0.125	-0.081	-0.125
	(0.210)	(0.226)	(0.211)	(0.228)
GDPperCapita	-1.350	-0.904	-1.350	-0.904
	(0.963)	(1.158)	(0.970)	(1.167)
Legacy of military regime	-1.082	-1.011	-1.082	-1.011
	(0.990)	(0.953)	(0.998)	(0.961)
Military Expenditures	0.070	-0.047	0.070	-0.047
	(0.465)	(0.498)	(0.469)	(0.502)
Post-Cold War	-4.048***	-3.860***	-4.048***	-3.860***
	(1.321)	(1.339)	(1.332)	(1.350)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.032	0.406	-0.032	0.406
	(1.684)	(2.339)	(1.697)	(2.357)
Observations	231	231	217	217
Number of subjects	48	48	30	30

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sensitivity Analysis: The purpose of this section is to check if the effects of coup-proofing legacies on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk change depending on factors like different measures of emerging democracies and different measures of coup-proofing legacies. Table 8 presents results based on the Polity IV dataset's measure of democratization and thus emerging democracy. As discussed above, Polity's measure of democratization is about a six or higher point increase in its democracy index within 3 years or less. While whether or not it includes the transitional periods before the emergence of a new regime or whether or not including the founding multiparty elections is necessary remains debatable, collecting emerging democracies in this way is suitable for more extensively examining the implications of coup-proofing legacies for fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup threats. In general, the main implications of coup-proofing legacies appear to be similar to what we already

found in the previous tests. While material coup-proofing legacy and ethnic stacking legacy do not appear to have statistically significant impacts on emerging democracies' vulnerability to coup risk, counterbalancing legacy appears to serve as a significant factor for helping fledgling democracies consolidate against coup threats. As shown in Model 5, even after controlling for other measures of coup-proofing legacies, the positive impacts of *Counterbalancing* on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup threats still appear robust. When it comes to the legacy of collective implementation of multiple coup-proofing measures, Model 6 also presents robust evidence that *Heavy Coup-Proofing* serve as a condition for helping fledgling democracies consolidate against coup threats.

Table 8. Robustness checks for Table 5 with Polity IV's Democratization[a]

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model
Counterbalancing	-0.443*				-0.602*	
	(0.241)				(0.325)	
Spoils		0.023			0.004	
		(0.220)			(0.314)	
Ethnic Stacking			-0.464	1.620	-2.636	
			(0.555)	(2.482)	(3.403)	
Ethnic Stacking^2				-2.870	4.471	
				(3.241)	(4.495)	
Heavy Coup-Proofing						-0.433*
						(0.341)
Legacy of military regime	0.917**	0.547	0.861**	0.801**	0.935*	0.868***
	(0.463)	(0.350)	(0.351)	(0.343)	(0.536)	(0.314)
Military Expenditures	0.053	-0.028	-0.245	-0.158	-0.176	-0.082
	(0.247)	(0.260)	(0.180)	(0.187)	(0.347)	(0.147)
Post-Cold War	-0.870*	-1.335***	-1.183***	-1.235***	-1.214**	-0.936***
	(0.460)	(0.376)	(0.330)	(0.311)	(0.494)	(0.338)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.296	0.602	0.622	0.398	0.846	0.897
	(1.045)	(0.650)	(0.696)	(0.748)	(1.203)	(0.613)
Observations	708	738	756	756	674	1,058
Log Likelihood	-143.4	-178.7	-167.3	-167.3	-126.0	-219.4

Coefficients are reported and robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

[a] no models violated the proportional hazard assumption

Further sensitivity analyses are also conducted according to different model specifications and measures of variables. First, this study tried different windows of time over which to define an emerging democracy's survival against a coup. Given the studies on democratic consolidation that consider some specific years without the breakdown of democratic institutions as a cut point to determine a successful democratic consolidation (e.g., Gasiorowski and Power. 1998), it seems reasonable to find a point (year) when emerging democracies transition to mature democracies or when emerging democracies become barely exposed to a coup after a transition to democracy. This study employed two different timeframes for the survival periods of emerging democracies: 4 years and 8 years. In other words, this study focused on one election term and two election terms as a cut point. All emerging democracies that are not exposed to a coup (or a successful coup) until the cut points are considered a successful consolidation against coup threats, and this study right-censored them. For the rest of them, the year that each fledgling democracy is exposed to a coup (or a successful coup) is treated the point of event occurrence (failure). With this set-up, this study examines why some emerging democracies are more likely to fail to consolidate against coup threats within the four or eight years after democratization. Additionally, this chapter created different measures for each coup-proofing legacy. Instead of a coup-proofing measure's value of one year prior to a transition to democracy, this chapter employed measures of coup-proofing legacies based on an average of the past three years prior to a transition to democracy.

In general, the effects of coup-proofing legacies on emerging democracies are similar to the previous findings. Particularly, Table 9 confirms that the legacy of heavy coup-proofing centered around the structural measure significantly lowers coup risk,

shown in Model 1. Turning to the different measures of coup-proofing legacies, this study notes analogous outcomes. As expected, the legacy of structural coup-proofing efforts in autocracies generally appears to lower coup risk in newly emerging democracies, consistent with the hypothesis and the previous finding. On the other hand, the effects of military spoils during the authoritarian periods are consistently positive on fledgling democracies' consolidation against coup risk. Also, the legacy of ethnic stacking constantly appears to have a U-shaped impact, which is shown in Models 5, 6, and 7. Table 10 presents weaker impacts of coup-proofing legacies, but it still shows the signs of the impacts are consistent with the previous findings. While their statistically insignificant impacts prevent meaningful interpretations, it still appears that coup-proofing legacies including counterbalancing and military spoils lower coup risk in emerging democracies. However, as shown in Models 5, 6, and 7, the legacy of ethnic stacking shows significant non-liner impacts on emerging democracies' consolidation against coup risk – the U-shaped impact.

Table 9. Models based on the Four-Year Lifespan of Emerging Democracies

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model
Coup-Proofing	-41.217***						
	(0.452)						
Counterbalancing[a]		-0.687				-0.628**	
		(0.432)				(0.306)	
Spoils[a]			-0.054***			-0.120**	
			(0.019)			(0.052)	
Ethnic Stacking[a]				-0.298	-10.086***	-18.752**	
				(1.442)	(3.908)	(9.107)	
Ethnic Stacking^2[a]					13.259***	23.682**	
					(4.573)	(10.884)	
Counterbalancing[b]							-0.526
							(0.517)
Spoils[b]							-0.125**
							(0.053)
Ethnic Stacking[b]							-17.055*
							(10.352)

Ethnic Stacking^2[b]							21.896*
							(12.460)
Previous Coups	0.932*	1.478*	0.421	0.517	0.555	0.899	1.818**
	(0.550)	(0.757)	(0.491)	(0.538)	(0.708)	(0.623)	(0.840)
Executive Constraints	0.061	-0.115	0.042	0.057	-0.075	-0.354	-0.097
	(0.193)	(0.242)	(0.173)	(0.217)	(0.262)	(0.334)	(0.321)
Demonstration	0.048	0.041	0.082	0.081	0.053	0.120	0.046
	(0.098)	(0.118)	(0.099)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.124)	(0.167)
GDPperCapita	-0.580	-0.062	-0.215	-0.296	0.235	1.383**	0.347
	(0.381)	(0.571)	(0.406)	(0.492)	(0.495)	(0.665)	(0.547)
Legacy of military regime	0.138	0.247	-0.242	0.158	0.247	-0.727	-1.227
	(0.599)	(0.777)	(0.613)	(0.583)	(0.662)	(0.980)	(1.599)
Military Expenditures	-0.129	-0.541	0.280	-0.477	-0.693**	0.362	1.723**
	(0.181)	(0.364)	(0.389)	(0.300)	(0.312)	(0.580)	(0.706)
Post-Cold War	-1.021*	-1.080	-1.000*	-1.477*	-1.634**	-0.424	0.536
	(0.547)	(0.765)	(0.602)	(0.765)	(0.756)	(0.824)	(0.809)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.792	-0.143	-0.932	-0.759	-0.343	0.667	1.822
	(0.758)	(1.127)	(0.757)	(1.062)	(1.058)	(0.974)	(1.494)
Observations	236	185	209	210	210	180	165
Log Likelihood	-82.78	-54.54	-76.70	-75.43	-72.13	-41.36	-25.24

Coefficients are reported and robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

a indicates a value of one year prior to a transition to democracy

b indicates a value of an average of the past three years prior to a transition to democracy

Table 10. Models based on the Eight-Year Lifespan of Emerging Democracies

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model	(7) Model
Coup-Proofing	-0.718						
	(0.500)						
Counterbalancing[a]		-0.382				-0.272	
		(0.334)				(0.335)	
Spoils[a]			-0.020			-0.018	
			(0.016)			(0.018)	
Ethnic Stacking[a]				0.421	-5.087**	-6.580**	
				(0.801)	(2.543)	(2.895)	
Ethnic Stacking^2[a]					7.329**	9.879***	
					(3.174)	(3.652)	
Counterbalancing[b]							-0.152
							(0.362)
Spoils[b]							-0.020
							(0.019)
Ethnic Stacking[b]							-5.845**
							(2.746)
Ethnic Stacking^2[b]							9.234***
							(3.382)
Previous Coups	0.911**	0.698	0.421	0.478	0.546	-0.230	0.283
	(0.415)	(0.814)	(0.412)	(0.459)	(0.539)	(0.829)	(0.657)
Executive Constraints	0.045	-0.037	0.105	0.058	-0.038	-0.183	-0.105
	(0.165)	(0.190)	(0.151)	(0.173)	(0.199)	(0.207)	(0.241)
Demonstration	0.059	0.066	0.037	0.074	0.075	0.055	0.041
	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.093)	(0.106)

GDPperCapita	-0.698**	-0.138	-0.287	-0.439	-0.187	0.474	-0.103
	(0.325)	(0.524)	(0.348)	(0.354)	(0.427)	(0.541)	(0.513)
Legacy of military regime	0.269	0.036	-0.121	0.144	0.163	-0.307	-0.440
	(0.457)	(0.632)	(0.515)	(0.451)	(0.467)	(0.768)	(0.864)
Military Expenditures	-0.093	-0.522*	-0.103	-0.347*	-0.414**	-0.417	0.115
	(0.165)	(0.308)	(0.314)	(0.196)	(0.210)	(0.472)	(0.438)
Post-Cold War	-1.566***	-1.789***	-1.785***	-1.981***	-2.149***	-1.992**	-1.608**
	(0.467)	(0.638)	(0.519)	(0.565)	(0.590)	(0.783)	(0.759)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.226	1.256	0.297	0.368	0.629	1.357	1.711
	(0.763)	(1.078)	(0.692)	(0.810)	(0.802)	(1.056)	(1.300)
Observations	505	385	415	424	424	375	354
Log Likelihood	-129.8	-87.17	-116.5	-118.1	-116.1	-75.37	-56.82

Coefficients are reported and robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

a indicates a value of one year prior to a transition to democracy

b indicates a value of an average of the past three years prior to a transition to democracy

Chapter 4. Democracy Promotion and Electoral Violence

This chapter pays attention to government-led pre-electoral violence with an aim to provide a new insight for the recent proliferation of "illiberal democracies." Many scholars have argued that it is difficult for military dictatorships to survive in the post-Cold War environment coupled with a global appeal for democracy (Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Whitehead 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Stepan 2009; Diamond 2011). Certainly, the frequency of military coups and regimes has decreased in these periods (Powell and Thyne 2011; Marinov and Goemans 2014). Emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups has been improved significantly over the last decades as well (e.g., Huntington 1996; Clark and Lindberg 2008; Powell and Thyne 2011), the previous chapters found some evidence supporting this claim. This declining coup risk is often attributed to Western pressure and assistance for democratization (Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006; Marinov and Goemans 2013; Thyne and Powell 2014; Shannon et al. 2014). Major Western democratic powers have employed diverse means to promote democratization. Their aid has been tied to progress towards democracy in recipient states (aid conditionality), and political conditionality, such as membership conditionality to international organizations (e.g., EU and NATO), has been implemented (Pridham 2000; McFaul 2000; Burnell 2000; Kelly 2004). They have also increased efforts to deter extraconstitutional threats such as coups and auto-coups (e.g., Carothers 1999; Crawford 2001; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006; Hyde and Boulding 2008; Marinov and Goemans 2014). The era of Western democracy promotion has witnessed the explosion of emerging democracies and their consolidation against coup risk.

However, many of these emerging democracies failed to transition to full-fledged democracies. Various emerging multiparty electoral regimes quickly degenerated into electoral autocracies or illiberal democracies (e.g., Zakaria 1997; Levitsky and Way 2010). Interestingly, their failure of democratic consolidation or their authoritarian reversal was rarely caused by military coups. Rather, it was often done by the incumbents in emerging democracies who abuse power and violate democratic rules and principles (Kapstein and Converse 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). The nominal presence of democratic institutions did not stop the abuses of executive power. Not surprisingly, emerging multiparty elections were often not free from the power abuse of the ruling regimes. In those emerging electoral regimes, as the Kenyan example suggests, the incumbents often resort to various forms of electoral manipulation. They even employ serious violence to win elections, posing a critical threat to the fate of emerging democracies. They intimidate, harass, and attack opposition candidates and their supporters to safeguard their victory in emerging competitive elections (e.g., Schedler 2002; Birch 2011; Hyde and Marinov 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013).

Given that international democracy promotion plays a critical role in the recent proliferation of emerging democracies, how it is associated with illiberalism in those emerging democracies seems really puzzling. To understand the rise of illiberal democracies during the era of Western democracy promotion, this research limits its scope to a single, most important form of illiberal behaviors and an essential threat to emerging democracies: government-led pre-electoral violence. It seeks to account for why some emerging democracies are vulnerable to such electoral violence during the era of the Western democracy promotion. Subsequently, this chapter also aims to explain

why government-led pre-electoral violence in multiparty elections is more common in states vulnerable to the leverage of Western democracy promoters. Unpacking this puzzle would produce important insights for the rise of illiberal electoral regimes in recent decades, which in turn may enrich the extant literature on the fate of emerging democracies.

This chapter proposes that a regime's vulnerability to Western democracy promoters' leverage, combined with the sponsors' prioritization of multiparty elections over other dimensions of democracy, creates a political moral hazard problem of rulers in emerging mass electoral politics, permitting the incumbents to commit electoral violence that otherwise would risk being overthrown in a coup. Western pressure and support for democratization make emerging multiparty elections more competitive, and such competitive elections generate a rising incentive for the incumbent to use violence to win an election (e.g., Schedler 2002; Birch 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). Yet, their electoral violence can spark political crisis and diverse forms of public dissent, such as protests and riots, and thereby induce a military coup, putting their rule at risk (e.g., Huntington 1968; Collier 2009). Such instability and conflict would likely provide an appealing pretext for military interventions in politics and coups. Ambitious military officers would unlikely be hesitant to capitalize on the declining legitimacy of the ruling regime and resultant crisis to assume power. Even during the post-Cold war era known for the international anti-coup stance combined with the rise of Western democracy promotion, the armed forces have incentives to pursue a coup in the aftermath of government-led election violence. Not all states are vulnerable to the leverage of Western democracy promoters (Levitsky and Way 2010). In addition, even if coups against

electoral regimes, including illiberal democracies, are subjected to international condemnations and sanctions, government-led pre-electoral violence makes states susceptible to coups, for, from the perspective of the masses, the overthrow of the illegitimate ruler in the aftermath of such violence can be considered “justifiable” or “legitimate.”

However, as the level of national dependence on Western powers increases, the expected benefits of pursuing a coup by capitalizing on political instability and public discontent in the aftermath of government-led election violence decreases. As such vulnerability increases, the resources and budgets for the provision of public goods after the takeover of the regime sharply decline. In addition, since effective ruling after the seizure of power requires necessary resources and budgets, Western powers’ sanctions, resource retraction, and the resultant lack of resources significantly lower the expected benefits of seizing power in a coup, marginalizing potential coup-plotters’ incentives to stage a coup. Indeed, whether Western democracy promotion is effective for democratization remains controversial, it is barely controversial that coups in the era of democracy promotion are subjected to serious international resistance and punishment (e.g., Crawford 2001; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006; Hyde and Boulding 2008; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2014).

While national heavy dependence on Western powers would likely lead potential coup-precipitators to perceive a higher risk of serious external sanctions, it also makes them believe that sustaining public support for their takeover, and thereby maintaining power after the success of their coup is difficult; that perception is likely to banish “the incentives of potential plotters to attempt a coup in the first place” (Marinov and

Goemans 2014, 801). In turn, this declining coup risk alleviates the incumbent's fear that their use of electoral violence would cause their loss of power in a military intervention, thereby serving as a permissive cause of government-led pre-electoral violence.

The empirical tests of the study support this theoretical claim. As expected, government-led pre-electoral violence increases coup risk, but a regime's dependence on Western democracy promoters, measured as aid dependence, significantly lowers the coup-inducing effects of such electoral violence. As the level of national aid dependence increases during the era of international democracy promotion, the risk of a coup declines, but the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence in multiparty elections rises. This finding highlights the unintended consequence of Western democracy promotion that, thanks to the coup-deterring effects of national vulnerability to Western leverage, the rulers in those dependent regimes become relatively free from coup threats, and they can freely resort to electoral violence in competitive elections at their disposal.[39]

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. It first provides a literature review. Secondly, it offers its theoretical claims and hypotheses. Then, its research design and empirical results follow. Finally, it concludes with a discussion on the dilemma that Western democracy promoters face; to the extent that the military in the developing world might be "only one credible counter to dictatorial power" (Collier 2008), selective acceptance of military interventions and coups may be necessary to prevent the degeneration of emerging democracies to illiberal democracies, but can cause serious consequences such as the proliferation of military coups.

[39] To the extent that the increasing coup risk can lower the risk of the electoral violence, there is a substitution effect of coups on electoral violence at the national level.

Democracy Promotion and Multiparty Electoral Regimes

As the Cold War waned, major democratic powers accelerated their efforts to promote democracy around the world and set democracy promotion as a core part of their foreign policy goals (e.g., Carothers 1999; Cox et al. 2000; Burnell 2000; Herman et al. 2002; Mcfaul 2004). In the United States, its major democracy assistance institute – National Endowment for Democracy –was founded in 1983 during the Reagan administration. Since then, democracy promotion has become a central element of post-Cold War US foreign policy (Cox et al. 2000). Presidents Bush and Clinton claimed that aiding democratization would likely promote peace and stability in the world (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Their vow to democracy promotion around the world is manifestly stated, for instance, in the following statement that the Clinton administration made:

> Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies . . . The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.[40]

In Europe, major democratic countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and France have taken a similar path that the United States made (Crawford 2001). For instance, the members of the European Union made their commitment to democracy promotion by establishing that a key objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is "to develop and consolidate democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union).

Major democratic powers' interest in promoting democracy abroad is attributable to several political and economic considerations. The collapse of the Soviet Union left

[40] National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House 1995, 2)

no alternative power for assistance for the former Soviet associates and thus opened up a window of opportunity to promote democracy in those states. It also permitted major democratic powers to reconsider geopolitical needs to support corrupt and repressive authoritarian regimes (Cox et al. 2000). For instance, the United States "downgraded Kenya's strategic importance" after the collapse of the Cold War, and the Moi regime became a target of Western democracy promotion (Brown 2001). In addition, as the ineffectiveness of development assistance is widely attributed to ineffective institutions of recipient states (e.g., Knack 2004; Easterly 2006; Djankov et al. 2008), the idea of building democratic institutions and thus establishing better governance structures in recipient states has also attracted attention from the international aid community. Massive development aid programs and other pertinent measures like structural adjustment programs turned out to be often ineffective on removing poverty and promoting economic growth. This is attributed mostly to corruption, patronage, and the lack of checks and balances, all pointing to ineffective political institutions of recipient states. Moreover, the robust statistical finding that democracies rarely fight each other created the shared belief that a world of democracies would be more peaceful and stable – the so-called 'democratic peace' thesis. This in turn guided the Western powers to promote democracy (e.g., Carothers 1999; McFaul 2004). Under these new dynamics and circumstances, democracy promotion has accordingly become a prominent component of foreign policy in Western democracies.

To promote democratization abroad, powerful democratic states like the United States and some European democracies have employed diverse policy tools and exerted pressure. For instance, aspiring and prospective members are required to meet

democracy criteria to receive economic and institutional assistance from Western democracies, and suspending rewards for non-compliance is stipulated in the membership agreement (Pridham 2000; Kelly 2004). Democracy promoters have their aid agencies devoted to democracy promotion and funded specific organizations to sponsor democratization abroad (e.g., National Endowment for Democracy). They have also tied their aid to progress towards democracy. By using their aid, they try to reward democratization and, as seen in the Kenya example, punish non-compliance to their democratizing demands (e.g., Carothers 1999; Crawford 2001; Hyde and Boulding 2008; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2014). In addition, Western donors have also focused on democracy assistance programs (democracy aid) to specifically help local challenges and forces for democratization (Carothers 1999). For instance, the United States provided democracy aid to 121 states in 2003, while offering it to only 56 countries in 1993 (Finkel et al 2007). In 2005, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) spent $1.4 billion on promoting democracy (Burnell 2008). Such democracy aid is targeted at supporting and empowering political parties and civil society groups, monitoring a founding election, and aiding democratically elected regimes.

In addition, given the known issue of emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups, Western democracy promoters have increased efforts to punish and deter an attempt to overthrow an emerging democracy. For instance, key democracy sponsors have increasingly become bounded by laws and treaties requiring the suspension of military and democratic assistance and other punitive actions such as development aid suspension (e.g., Crawford 2001; Marinov and Goemans 2014). As shown in Figure 2, it may not be surprising to see the decline of coups during the era of the international

democracy promotion.



Figure 2. Global Frequency of Coups from 1950 to 2010[41]

These Western efforts to promote democracy are, of course, pursued along with their rising leverage over target states. The demise of the alternative political and economic patron certainly strengthened Western leverage over resource provision and political and economic activities of both authoritarian and transitional states, making target states more vulnerable to the external democratizing pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010). Indeed, most of the newly emerging democracies were developing or underdeveloped countries whose economy was largely dependent upon major economic powers, while major political and economic powers and core financial international institutions were key democratization sponsors. This, in turn, increases the costs of non-

[41] Author's calculation

compliance and strengthens the power of Western leverage. Thus, it naturally became difficult to disregard such pressures coming from powerful states holding significant leverage over them and not to embrace political liberalization and democratic rules and procedures, resulting in a global wave of placing power in the hands of an elected leader (Pridham 2000; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Levitsky and Way 2010).



Figure 3. Global Count of Electoral Democracies[42]

As seen in Figure 3, the number of countries embracing multiparty elections has exploded during the era of the international democracy promotion. From 1990 to 1994,

[42] This figure is taken from Brownlee (2009). This data is originally from Freedom House. These democracies were identified by Freedom House for meeting the minimalist standard adopted by political scientists. The criteria for being counted as an electoral democracy are: 1. a competitive multiparty political system; 2. universal adult suffrage for all citizens; 3. regularly contested elections under a secure and secret ballot and the absence of massive, outcome-changing fraud; 4. significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and open campaigning (Puddington 2007, 3).

the number of electoral democracies changed from 76 to 114, thereby accounting for 50 percent increase.

Frequent Electoral Violence in Emerging Electoral Regimes

Despite the spread of emerging electoral regimes around the world from the late 1980s, many like the Moi regime in Kenya failed to transition to a mature democracy. Their embracement of democratic principles and institutions was often nominal. Authoritarian institutions and politics returned quickly to many of those newly emerging electoral regimes. Among the emerging electoral regimes, those that experience serious violations of democratic principles and institutions are commonly called illiberal democracies, hybrid regimes, or "competitive authoritarian regimes," where an election is a principal means for a turnover of power, but "incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results" (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). The explosion of these multiparty electoral regimes coupled with authoritarian institutions and party politics has recently attracted much attention in the literature.

Although formal democratic institutions, such as multiparty elections, the legislative branch, the judiciary branch, and election commission, are allowed in these electoral regimes, the executive branch of government often maintains dominant authorities over the other institutions, abuses its power, and violates the rule of law. In addition, elections in those newly emerging electoral regimes are often characterized by numerous electoral restrictions, fraud, and state-led violence (e.g., Karl 1990; Zakaria 1997; Hyde et al. 2008; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). While the incumbents illicitly use

government resources and organizations for their election campaign and victory, opposition party members and supporters, opposition candidates, journalists, and civil society activists "risk torture, arbitrary arrest and political imprisonment – all strategies the government uses to 'win' elections" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013, 149). Despite the nominal establishments of formal democratic institutions, the governments often use various fraudulent and violent measures to lower electoral competition. Opposition parties and candidates are often harassed, attacked, or jailed to discourage them from running for office. Supporters of the opposition and general voters are threatened or attacked not to vote as well.



Source: taken from Hafner-Burton et al. (2013,151): "Pre-election violence is a count of all elections in which the government harassed the opposition or used violence against civilians. Post-election violence is a count of all elections in which the government used violence against protesters following the election."

Figure 4. Global Count of Electoral Violence

Figure 4 shows that numerous electoral regimes have witnessed numerous government-led election violence – "events in which incumbent leaders and ruling party

agents employ or threaten violence against the political opposition or potential voters before, during or after elections" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013, 149).

The existing literature has commonly highlighted that election manipulation and violence are a part of regime survival strategy (e.g., Schedler 2002; Hyde et al. 2008; Birch 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). In other words, the ruling regimes try to steal an election if they are likely to lose or are highly uncertain about their election victory. In democracy, an election is an essential means of accession to power and regime change. To come into power, winning an election is the key. As multiple parties are competing for power, an election can become competitive, and election results are uncertain until votes are tallied; an election in democracy is a gamble. This can, in turn, engender an incentive to commit electoral fraud which "takes on a panoply of forms; it ranges from procedural violations of electoral law (that may or may not intend to distort results) to the outright use of violence against voters" (Lehoucq 2003, 233). Given the uncertainty of outcomes in the shadow of an election, rigging the election is tempting. Since electoral fraud can often be "a very complicated, shadowy, and slippery affair" (Schedler 2002, 37), clandestine measures to tamper with election results might be particularly attractive. In addition, depending on their expected utility of losing against the costs of electoral manipulation, they can actually pursue more explicit but fierce electoral manipulation such as harassing and attacking opposition leaders and supporters.

However, established democratic institutions and norms in consolidated democracies may prevent politicians from resorting to electoral manipulation (at least outright electoral violence) even when they are likely to lose. For instance, independent electoral institutions, such as electoral commissions, can oversight electoral campaigns,

detect and punish electoral fraud, and provide a credible check of election outcomes (Schedler 2002; Long 2012). On the other hand, as emerging democracies (or emerging electoral regimes) often lack democratic institutions and norms, the absence of these may produce a substantial opportunity for incumbents to manipulate an election. Whether the winner of the founding election would commit, after assuming power, to democratic principles and specifically to what they had promised during their election campaign remains a serious concern for politicians and candidates who were particularly members of the departing authoritarian regime. Moreover, for those elites from the departing regime, their loss of the founding election can result in a significant cut of their political power and punishments for their wrongdoings during the authoritarian periods, so that losing the founding election might be too costly. Given the institutional vulnerability of emerging democratic regimes, contending political groups are likely to be easily entrapped by political fear and commitment problems. In these circumstances, it seems natural that elites from the previous regime have an incentive to resort to diverse non-democratic means, including exclusionary and polarizing appeals to win the election. Certainly, they can also have a strong incentive to threaten or use violence against the opposing side if the election is projected to be not in favor of them (Long 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). Thus, the fact that numerous incumbents have undermined elections to prevent voters from unseating them and stop competitive candidates from running in elections is not too surprising.

Democracy Promotion and Electoral Violence

What is really striking about the recent decades' phenomenon of government-led

election violence is the deterioration of the problem. Clearly, Figure 4 shows that electoral regimes have far more frequently resorted to electoral violence during the post-Cold War than during the Cold War. Despite Western democratic powers' measures to sponsor democratization, such as election monitoring, democracy assistance programs, and aid conditionality, the rulers of target states, including those highly dependent on Western democracy promoters, have often threatened and attacked opposition candidates and their supporters, challenging their foreign democracy promoters. This is really astonishing. Particularly, since their donors' democracy promotion and their dependence on the democracy promoters would likely deter them from challenging their foreign democracy promoters and thus marginalize their incentives to use violence to win elections, the significant rise of government-led pre-electoral violence is surprising and ironic. In addition, given that the rise of multiparty electoral regimes throughout much of the developing world after the collapse of communism is commonly attributed to Western pressure and assistance for democratization (Levitsky and Way 2010), the deterioration of government-led election violence in those regimes certainly poses a critical puzzle on the effects of the international democracy promotion on such violence. Nevertheless, the literature tells us little about how this external democracy promotion is associated with the rise of government-led election violence.

Instead, there is a pervasive belief that Western measures and pressures to promote democracy abroad focused almost exclusively on multiparty elections and were often inconsistently and selectively employed, so incumbents in newly emerging electoral regimes quickly learned that they could maintain authoritarian institutions in exchange for accepting multipartism (e.g., Zakaria 1997; Carothers 1999; Burnell 2000; Levitsky

and Way 2002). This belief is popular in the field of democratization (specifically illiberal democracies) and the literature of the link between aid conditionality and democratization. For instance, Zakaria (1997, 40) wrote:

> In the end... elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government... In an age of images and symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?)

Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2010, 19) also observe that Western democracy promotion after the collapse of the Soviet Union raised "the minimum standard for regime acceptability, but the new standard was multiparty elections, not democracy."

In effect, Western major democratic powers often only diplomatically demanded democratic reforms without substantial pressure and support (e.g., Crawford 2001; Brown 2001). Also, they sent out mixed diplomatic signals and inconsistent assistance, which further made their commitment to democracy promotion questionable (e.g., Carothers 1999; Burnell 2008). In addition, their aid conditionality and suspension and other punitive measures, such as membership deferral and cancellation, were imposed arbitrarily or selectively (e.g., Crawford 2001; Hyde and Boulding 2008). In turn, such international community's inconsistent measures and pressures for democratization and their focus on multiparty elections "left many autocrats – both old and new – with considerable room to maneuver" (Levitsky and Way 2010, 19). Specifically, Young (1999, 35) notes that the incumbents quickly learned that partial reforms and openings with holding multiparty elections are often "sufficient to deflect international system pressures for more complete political opening." Accordingly, many scholars and commentators seem to observe that Western democracies did not use their leverage over

target countries consistently or make substantial commitment to democracy promotion.

On the other hand, there is little debate that, despite the inconsistent democracy promotion efforts and superficial punishments, the embracement of multipartism became unavoidable during the era of international democracy promotion (e.g., Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Pridham 2000; Carothers 1999; Brown 2001; Burnell 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). In newly emerging electoral regimes, opposition groups are often supported by empowering civil society groups and international democracy promoters, and they pose serious challenges to their ruling regime. Accordingly, elections tend to be more competitive, consequently. Faced with competitive and challenging elections, the incumbents develop incentives to threaten and attack the opposition forces in order to hold on to power (e.g., Scheddler 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2007).[43] Consequently, it is a popular notion that the inconsistent pressure and assistance for democratization and competitive elections work together to bring about the proliferation of the incumbents' use of electoral manipulation and violence. Because "external democratizing pressure was limited in several ways: international pressure was selective, inconsistent, and superficial," the incumbents may be tempted to use electoral manipulation and violence depending on the risk of losing power in competitive elections (Levitsky and Way 2005, 21).

Nevertheless, both core theories and empirical evidence exploring the relationship between Western democracy promotion and government-led election violence still remain missing. Particularly, focusing on inconsistent support and pressure of international democracy promotion would likely lead to a partial explanation for such electoral

[43] It is accordingly not surprising that multiparty elections often turn violent (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 2007).

violence, for the effect of such violence on coup risk is likely to be overlooked. In effect, for the incumbents, as a military coup is the single most important threat to the fate of the rulers, whether or not their violence to win an election invites a coup is a decisive factor for their use of such violence; regardless of whether or not international democracy promotion is inconsistent, the incumbent governments are unlikely to resort to violence in order to win an election if their violence is likely to result in a military coup.

Since the military holds a near monopoly of means of violence in the state, when it decides to overthrow the regime, it is nearly impossible to stop it (Finer 1962). As recently seen in reactions from the militaries to mass protests against the regimes in the "Arab Spring," when militaries withdraw support from the regime or forced the ruler to give up power, the rulers had to leave the office and regime change followed (Makara 2013). There is indeed extensive literature underscoring that a military attempt to sack the incumbent is likely to occur in the rise of political paralysis and turmoil (Huntington 1968; Thompson 1978; McGowan 2003). Huntington (1968, 225), for instance, argues that the military assumes the role of the guardian by overthrowing the regime in response to political "corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion," and the subsequent loss of the government's legitimacy. Certainly, electoral fraud and violence can cause serious political crises and institutional paralyses and spark public resentment and protests (e.g., Huntington 1968; Long 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). Long (2012, 30), for instance, observes:

> Institutional breakdown from electoral fraud has serious consequences for stability and consolidation in fragile democracies. Given the investment citizens make in voicing their demands through voting, the failure of political institutions to provide valid and reliable vote counts holds important implications for countries transitioning to more complete democracy. Political mobilization for

elections means that citizens are well-organized to protest rigged results that they deem illegitimate.

Such protests and riots in the aftermath of government-led pre-electoral violence can threaten the incumbent's hold on power. In particular, they would likely invite a military coup and cause the removal of the ruler from power; political instability and crisis is indeed a well-known cause of a coup which is the most frequent means for regime change (e.g., Huntington 1968; Decalo 1992; McGowan 2005; 2006). In emerging democracies, the likelihood of coups influenced by government-led election violence is higher, for such electoral violence's negative consequences are likely to be combined with democratization's destabilizing effects. The ruling regimes in fledgling democracies must be tremendously cautious about how likely their electoral violence would result in a coup and their loss of power. Then, the rising coup risk in the aftermath of electoral violence must be a fundamental constraint to an incumbent's decision to execute electoral violence and fraud. Unless there is an assurance that their electoral violence to win an election does not increase the risk of their loss of power in the aftermath, the incumbent are hesitant to resort to such violence, which will be still the case even when the international pressure and support are inconsistently implemented.

However, despite the theoretical and empirical observation on the relationship between pre-electoral violence and coup risk, the recent reality seems to tell us differently. Despite the frequent occurrences of government-led election violence in emerging electoral regimes, there has been a decline of coups in those emerging electoral regimes during the post-Cold War era. Such declining risk of coups and the recent wave of multipartism are attributed to international democracy promotion. If the regime's fear about coup threats in the aftermath of their electoral violence is real, there must be an

assurance factor to the rulers that their violence to win an election is unlikely to invite military coups during the era of Western democracy promotion. To make sense of the fascinating phenomena, it seems logical to link democracy promotion to the declining coup risk. This study accordingly focuses on how the Western democracy promotion is associated with coup risk in the aftermath of government-led pre-electoral violence to account for the proliferation of government-led election violence. Below, this chapter presents its argument about the relationship between the international democracy promotion and government-led pre-electoral violence with a specific emphasis on coup risk.

The Argument

The theoretical contention of the paper begins with the following simple but logical assumption: while fraudulent and violent elections by the sitting government generate a coup opportunity, staging a coup in the aftermath of government-led pre-electoral violence is likely to be deterred if such a coup is likely to be subjected to serious resistant and punitive measures. As noted previously, election manipulation and violence are a known factor in the modernization-coup literature. For instance, in 1960, South Korean president Lee committed serious election riggings and used violence against opposition candidates and their associates, which resulted in massive student protests and brought the nation into serious turmoil. The nation was dogged by the rumors of coups. Political turmoil and instability continued during the new regime established after the fall of the Lee administration. In 1961, a military coup eventually occurred with the pretexts of saving the states from political and economic troubles, ending democratization

(Huntington 1968). Even during the post-Cold War era known for its international anti-coup stance, coups still occurred in the aftermath of election violence by the ruling regime. For instance, Côte d'Ivoire underwent a coup twice in the aftermath of government-led pre-electoral violence in 2000 and 2001. In October, 2000, General Robert Guei, who suppressed the opposition groups and rigged the nation's presidential election that would have resulted in the victory of Laurent Gbagbo, was overthrown (Murison 2004). His overthrow brought the rise of Laurent Gbagbo to the nation's president. When President Gbagbo maintained the exclusionary policy of Robert Guei on banning popular northern Muslim politicians, including Alassane Ouattara, from running for the legislative election in December 2000, most northerners boycotted the election. Groups, including soldiers and militias, loyal to President Gbagbo committed violence against the northerners (Murison 2004; Collier 2009). Once again, Côte d'Ivoire underwent another coup in the aftermath of such electoral violence in January, 2001.

However, while the ruler's pre-electoral violence opens up a window of opportunity to grab power, coups against such violence can be deterred if they are likely to encounter serious condemnations and resistance. A coup is a costly collective action, so coup-plotters would likely carefully calculate the probability of success. They would likely undertake a coup if the expected chances of success are high (e.g., Luttwak 1968; Lichbach 1998; Powell 2012-b). Likewise, if a coup is likely to fail even when the expected reward of a successful coup is high, coup-plotters are unlikely to gamble. When coups encounter serious opposition forces domestically and/or internationally, such coups are likely to fail. When the rebels overthrow emerging democracies, domestic pro-democracy forces can protest and resist the reversal of democratization. Such a coup is

doomed to failure. The 1991 Russian Coup is a clear example. On August 19, 1991, hard-line communist elements of the Soviet government and military staged a coup d'état against the government of Mikhail Gorbachev to reverse political reforms and openness. The armed forces toppled President Gorbachev and had to return to their barrack without seizing power when they faced serious resistance from Russian people led by Boris Yeltsin (Gibson 1997).

Similarly, external punitive actions can ensue in the wake of the ousting of a democratically elected regime, which also significantly lowers the probability of a coup's success. For instance, when a military coup overthrew the first democratically elected civilian leadership – Jean-Bertrand Aristide regime – in Haiti in 1991, the international community imposed significant sanctions including trade embargos. It even later employed a US-led multilateral military intervention, known as 'Operation Uphold Democracy,' and restored a democracy (von Hippel 1995). The logic of coup-decision dynamics certainly suggests that as resistant and punitive measures against a coup lowers the probability of a coup's success, coups are likely to be deterred in the first place if those coups are likely to be subjected to serious opposition forces and measures. As suggested in the above coup-deterrence rationale, regardless of what motivates a coup, potential coup-precipitators are likely to be hesitant to stage a coup even against an illegitimate ruler if their coup is likely to face serious disapproval and resistance.[44]

From the potential coup-plotters' perspectives, the post-Cold War environment coupled with the rise of Western democracy promoters' anti-coup stance must be unfavorable for coup execution and diminish their incentives to oust an elected regime in

[44] In Appendix, this paper shows a coup-deterrence model conditional on the risk of punishments on the seizure of power through a coup.

emerging democracies. During the era of Western democracy promotion, the frequency of coups declined (e.g., Powell and Thyne 2011). The international environment combined with the rise of Western democracy promotion played a critical role in such declining risk of coups (e.g., Schmitter 1994; Huntington 1996; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Stepan 2009; Diamond 2011; Shannon el al. 2014). After the collapse of the Cold War, the global anti-coup stance emerged. Regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) mandated the automatic condemnation and punishment of coup leaders to protect democracy (Piccone 2004; Shannon et al 2014). The African Union (AU), the decedent of the OAU, showed its strong commitment to the anti-coup stance in 2002 by establishing the mandate that the AU should "immediately and publicly condemn" a coup and impose sanctions "in case of resistance" (Ould-Abdallah 2006, 23). In addition, Western democracy promoters show their commitment to anti-coup stance. Those democracy promoting states have increasingly implemented and fulfilled laws and agreements requiring punitive sanctions on coups overthrowing elected regimes after the collapse of the Cold War. For instance, in the United States, the International Security and Development Corporation Act of 1985; Section 513 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing; and Related Programs Appropriation Act in 1991; and Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in 1997 mandate the president to terminate aid disbursement in a case of an illegal overthrow of an incumbent government. In Europe, while aid suspension has been also required under the Lomé Agreement – a trade and aid agreement between the European Community (EC) and 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries singed in 1975 – in case of coup occurrence, European states' substantial pursuit of aid sanctions has

actually taken place after the collapse of the Cold War (Crawford 2001). Those democracy promoters have indeed suspended aid immediately after a coup or forced the coup plotters to restore democratic institutions. Recently, the United States cut $1.9 million of aid and $16.5 million of military assistance immediately after the coup in Honduras in 2009, while it froze all aid to Mauritania and excluded Mauritania from future Millennium Challenge Corporation programs as a response to the coup in 2008 (Main and Johnston 2009). In addition, as noted in the 1991 Haitian coup, the Western democracy promoters made military interventions to restore a previously elected regime. Although the effectiveness of Western powers' democracy promotion is widely controversial, whether the democracy promoters condemn and try to punish coups in fledgling electoral regimes remains relatively uncontroversial (e.g., Von Hippel 1995; Valenzuela 1997; Crawford 2001; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2014).

This international anti-coup environment may lead the incumbent to believe that their electoral violence would unlikely result in the loss of power in a coup. As their expected costs of losing an election increase, the rulers have strong incentives to use violence to maintain power. In emerging electoral regimes, the incumbents' fear of losing an election dictates the use of election violence (e.g., Levitsky and Way 2010; Birch 2011; Brown 2011; Long 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). Like the overthrow in a coup, losing an election brings about the loss of power. Losing power after the election or in a coup might be a similarly, if not equally, bad outcome for them. As a result, despite their fear of a coup in the aftermath of their electoral violence, if there is even a slight possibility that their violence would unlikely put them at risk, they are strongly tempted to use election violence to stay in power. In other words, uncertainty about the

probability of coups in the aftermath of the electoral violence still would likely drive them to use such violence in competitive and unfavorable elections. Given this nature, the international anti-coup environment coupled with the anti-coup stance of Western democracy during the post-Cold War can help lower their concern on the rising probability of a coup in the aftermath of their electoral violence. Indeed, regardless of the fact that democracy promoters have been accused of using its carrots and sticks selectively, inconsistently, and superficially, their commitment to the anti-coup norm is relatively unquestionable; they punish the extra-constitutional seizure of power (e.g., Von Hippel 1995; Valenzuela 1997; Hyde and Boulding. 2008; Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2014; Shannon el al. 2014). The incumbents' observation and anticipation that coups in emerging electoral regimes are far more likely to be punished than pre-electoral violence permits them to pursue pre-electoral violence in competitive elections.

However, as Levitsky and Way (2010) observe, even if their coup is likely to be subjected to international condemnations and sanctions, not all emerging electoral regimes are vulnerable to the leverage of Western democracy promoters. In addition, as the overthrow of the illegitimate ruler in the aftermath of such violence can be considered "justifiable" or "legitimate" in the eye of the masses, government-led election violence makes states vulnerable to coups. As suggested in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, electoral violence by the ruthless incumbent can result in serious domestic instability and a series of conflict, including protests and uprisings during the era of Western democracy promotion. Such violence undermines the popularity of the incumbent and the legitimacy of the regime. Empowered mass electorates and opposition parties may make serious

protests and punitive measures against such electoral violence.[45] The subsequent political crisis between the political contenders can result in paralyzing strikes and violence. Desperate opposition groups might call for the ousting of the ruler and even for military interventions to topple the government. For instance, Laurent Gbagbo, an opposition candidate of the 2000 presidential election in Côte d'Ivoire, called on his associates and followers from the society and from the military to protest for the removal of General Guei, who had committed election rigging and violence (Murison 2002; Collier 2009). Some groups might even support a coup for domestic stability. Moreover, serious instability and conflict such as postelection sectarian violence and ethnic rebellion threatens the institutional interests and power of the military. Due to these negative consequences of government-led election violence, coup-plotters might believe that mass electorates are compelled to approve their overthrow of the illegitimate regime (Thyne and Powell 2014). They might even hope that their coup would be considered being legitimate from within the society and from within the armed forces. Accordingly, even during the era of Western democracy promotion, government-led pre-electoral violence makes states vulnerable to coups, for the possibility to public support for their overthrow of the illiberal and illegitimate regime incentivizes political armies to assume power. When serious instability and conflict unfold after government-led election violence, the coup-plotters would not be hesitant to capitalize on such crises to topple the sitting government.

However, the expected benefits of pursuing a coup by exploiting the resultant

[45] To the extent that strengthening civil society and political party systems and supporting election processes are key aspects of Western democracy assistance programs (Finkel et al 2007; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010; Scott and Steele 2011), public protests for government-led pre-electoral violence might have been aided and empowered by Western support for democratization.

instability and crisis in the aftermath of government-led pre-electoral violence vary depending on the size of resources the coup-leaders can muster to stay in power. If the rebels are likely to confront the deficiency of resources and budgets for the provision of public goods after their takeover of the government, their incentives to pursue a coup in the aftermath of government-led election violence quickly decline, for effective ruling after the success of the coup requires public support and necessary resources. After the success of a coup, the provision of public goods and distribution of resources to the public are the key to stay in power (e.g., Huntiongton 1968;1996; Welch 1970; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Once the euphoria surrounding the regime change ends, the coup leaders must deal with the public expecting improvements in the political systems and their living conditions. Successful provision of public goods is essential for maintaining public allegiance to their rule. The persistency of public support is dependent upon how effectively and successfully the new leadership meets public demands. The lack of resources is likely to deprive them of public support for their overthrow and their resultant rule. Eventually, coup-plotters are likely to end up facing pressures and protests from the public for the handover of power to an elected civilian leadership (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2014). Their reign is accordingly likely to be doomed to being temporary and transitory, regardless of whether their coup was to remove the regime that severely destroyed democratic institutions.

Such lack of resources and budget to provide public goods is dependent highly upon the degree of national vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters. Even during the post-Cold War era, not all states were vulnerable to international pressure and conditionality for democratization. If states are wealthy, or

have rich natural resources or generous external patrons, Western pressure and leverage for democratization are hardly threatening or effective (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Levitisky and Way 2010). When there is little leverage over target states, diplomatic pressure for democratization and aid tied to progress towards democracy are likely to be nominal. Similarly, international pressures and sanctions against illiberal acts like electoral manipulation and military coups are likely to be ineffective. In those regimes, when government-led election violence results in serious political agitation and conflict that could trigger violence, such violence is likely to invite a military coup. Such a coup, if successful, would likely allow the plotters to maintain power much longer; their invulnerability to Western leverage combined with little recourse retraction would likely permit a longer possession of power after the coup's success (Marinov and Goemans 2014).

On the other hand, when a regime is dependent upon resources and aid from the democracy promoters, the dependency creates a significant leverage for the promoters over the regime. In turn, it renders the regime susceptible to Western pressure for democratization. Specifically, such vulnerability would likely make Western powers' democracy promotion and punitive actions against illiberal behaviors, such as government-led election violence and coups, more substantial and threatening. When a regime is dependent upon resources and aid from the democracy promoters and thereby susceptible to Western pressure and leverage for democratization, such vulnerability coupled with relatively more substantial commitment of the democracy promoters to the anti-coup norm makes the consequences of the extra-constitutional seizure of power significant and threatening. It is easily perceivable for the coup precipitators that their

coup is likely to be confronted with serious international punitive actions, such as the suspension of economic and military assistance, the termination of budget support, and/or the suspension of accession to critical international and regional organizations. In short, when national dependence on Western powers is high, the coup leaders are likely to face serious lack of budgets for public support because of international sanctions on the extra-constitutional seizure of power.

In turn, when the coup leaders have little resources left to sustain public support, it becomes increasingly difficult to stay in power. The lack of necessary resources makes public backing for the regime change fade away and eventually brings the successful coup leaders to public discontents and protests. They eventually end up confronting double condemnations and resistances not only from their international donors, but also from their initial domestic supporters. Under these circumstances, their takeover is destined to be short and temporary. Accordingly, it might not be coincidence that many coup-plotters, after their coup's success, had to quickly return to multiparty elections as a legitimate means for power transition under the pressure of Western democracy promoters during the post-Cold War era (Marinov and Goemans 2014). In sum, as vulnerability to Western leverage increases, the incentives for potential coup-plotters to pursue their takeover of power in the aftermath of government-led election violence decreases. While national dependence on Western powers would likely lead potential coup-plotters to perceive a higher risk of serious external sanctions, it also makes them believe that sustaining public support for their takeover and thereby maintaining power after the success of their coup are infeasible. Therefore, overthrowing even ruthless rulers in a coup is not attractive.

From the perspective of the incumbents in emerging electoral regimes, the more vulnerable they are to Western leverage for democratization, the lower the coup risk in the aftermath of their electoral violence is. Such vulnerability and the subsequent coup-deterring effects open up a window of opportunity for their use of election violence to win elections. Facing serious competition in emerging mass electoral politics, the incumbents aware of the relatively little commitment of Western democracy promoters to the abuses of electoral processes and procedures are likely to see substantial incentives to use violence to win the elections, but, to actually use it, still need an assurance that their electoral violence would not ikely put their regime at risks. This very high vulnerability to Western leverage for democratization that works to lower the risk of military coups gives the incumbents the assurance. This assurance, in turn, engenders the rulers' political moral hazard problem. The low risk of coups stemming from their national vulnerability to Western leverage permits rulers to further abuse power. When facing serious political competition, the interests of the rulers in winning an election coupled with such a lower probability of military challenges lead them to resort to electoral violence.

Also, the low probabilities of a coup's occurrence and success in nations dependent on Western democracy sponsors interestingly offer an opportunity to the incumbents to co-opt with the armed forces (Collier 2009), also permitting the incumbents to resort to pre-electoral violence. Their leverage-holders' anti-coup stance and their punitive actions against coups in electoral regimes can dis-incentivize challenges from the armed forces, which, in turn, can lead the military either to step aside from politics or to align with the current ruling regime. This might help explain why

mass protests often do not engender military defection to the opposition parties and/or the civil society in emerging electoral regimes vulnerable to Western leverage during the post-Cold War era, rather, the military often supports the incumbent government by joining in suppressing public outcries and protests against the regime's illiberal and violent polices. In short, a regime's vulnerability to Western leverage can work to be a permissive cause of government-led election violence in incipient electoral regimes during the era of international democracy promotion.

To be clear, this chapter contends that Western powers have increasingly devoted their measures and resources to democracy promotion. It does not dispute the literature underscoring that Western political conditionality and leverage for democratization have been inconsistently and sometimes nominally applied. As Zakaria (1997) points out, international pressure for democratization seems to be really about pressing for rule by a popular majority, and as long as the head of state was selected through multiparty elections, foreign interests in democracy promotion tend to fade away. This research also agrees that incumbents who were confronted with foreign pressure for allowing multiparty elections would quickly learn that their election manipulation and violence might not trigger serious international punitive actions against them. However, what is new about this study's argument is that the effect of Western democratizing pressure and assistance is more explicit and substantial on deterring coups than making progress towards democracy, and that emerging democracies' vulnerability to the leverage of the Western democracy promoters makes it more predictable that overthrowing an elected regime is likely to invite serious international pressure and punishment to restore democratic intuitions. As the level of such vulnerability increases, multiparty elections

are more prone to pre-electoral violence by the sitting government.

Formalizing the Argument

Based on the above discussion, this section first constructs an expected utility model of an incumbent's use of election violence to win an election and then extends it by incorporating Western aid as a proxy for a regime's vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters. Like other studies formalizing the relationship between aid dependence and dependent variables like democratization (e.g., Wright 2009; Marinov and Goemans 2014), this chapter also assumes that Western aid is increasingly tied to progress towards democracy after the collapse of the Cold War. Furthermore, as commonly assumed, it considers that aid dependence increases a regime's vulnerability to Western demands and pressures for democratization (e.g., Goldsmith 2001; Dunning 2004; Wright 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010). In other words, the more dependent states are on Western aid, the more vulnerable states are to external pressures for democratic reforms.

First, let P_W be the probability that an incumbent leader wins an election and B be the benefit of sustaining power after winning the election, where $B > 0$; B is also known to the ruler. This study further assumes $0 < P_W < 1$.

The incumbent faces a choice of whether or not he uses violence to win an election. Using election violence includes violently removing an opposition candidate or discouraging the opponent side from voting by intimidating, harassing, or attacking them. Yet, using violence in an election to hold onto power can incur two costs in general. The first one, which is probably most costly and threatening, is the overthrow of the regime

by a coup. After an election with violence, the country can become politically chaotic and conflictive, and, during the political turmoil, the likelihood of the leader being ousted by a military coup (denoted by P_c) may increase, where $0 < P_c < 1$. P_cB indicates the first cost that the leader contemplating election violence considers. The second cost (denoted by ε) that the ruler considers includes all the miscellaneous/managerial costs election violence may cause (e.g., public protests and riots). When the leader loses the election, he will get a zero return.[46]

The expected utility from using violence is given by

$$EU_v = P_W \times (B - P_cB - \varepsilon) \quad (1)$$

The first derivative of Equation (1) with the respect to P_c shows that expected utility from using violence is negatively correlated with coup risk. More precisely, $\frac{\partial EU_v}{\partial P_c} = -P_wB < 0$. To examine how a regime's vulnerability to Western democracy promoters' leverage affects the probability of government-led pre-electoral violence, we add aid from the democracy promoters to Equation (1). To the extent that Western donors have pressured for multiparty elections based on free and fair competitions by using their leverage, this chapter supposes that multiparty elections become more competitive. In this extended model, we let Aid be the amount of aid an incumbent government receives from Western democracy promoters tying their aid distribution to progress towards democracy in recipient states and simultaneously be the recipient regime's vulnerability

[46] It can be negative because of some direct costs. But for the simplicity, we assume zero benefit and zero cost. Allowing negative return does not change the result.

to the donors' demands for democratization, where $Aid \geq 0$. Put differently, Aid is a measure of aid dependence. Then, the relationship between Aid and P_c is incorporated, and the probability of a coup is a function of aid dependence, $P_c(Aid)$. Since the leverage of the democracy promoters is likely to lower an incentive of potential coup-plotters to topple an elected regime, it is also assumed that the probability of coup decreases as aid dependence increases, shown by $\frac{\partial P_c(Aid)}{\partial Aid} < 0$.

The associated expected utility from using election violence is given by

$$EU_v = P_W \times \{(B + Aid) - Aid - P_c(Aid)B - \varepsilon\} \quad (2)$$

By using equation (2), we seek to show how threats to cut aid affect the probability of election violence. Taking partial derivative of Equation (2) with respect to Aid yields,

$$\frac{\partial EU_v}{\partial Aid} = P_w\left(-\frac{\partial P_c}{\partial Aid}B\right) \quad (3)$$

Equation (3) shows that its sign is positive, given $\frac{\partial P_c(Aid)}{\partial Aid} < 0$. This result suggests that the regime's vulnerability to the leverage of the democracy promoters amplifies an incentive of the ruler to use election violence. There is also another implication. That is, if the leader has a strong preference for sustaining power than for receiving aid, his preference will further stimulate the likelihood of using violence to win. This can be confirmed by the second order derivative of Equation (3) with respect to B: $\frac{\partial^2 EU_v}{\partial Aid \partial B} = -\frac{\partial P_c}{\partial Aid}P_w > 0$, meaning that as the leader's benefits of sustaining power

increases, such vulnerability increases the probability of running an election with violence.

Hypothesis 1: As a regime's vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters increases during the post-Cold War era increases, the effect of government-led pre-electoral violence on coup risk decreases.

Hypothesis 2: A regime's vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters increases the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence during the post-Cold War era.

Research Design, Methods, and Results

To test the above hypotheses, this chapter carries out the following two projects. The primary purpose of the first project is to examine whether or not a regime's vulnerability to Western leverage lowers the effect of government-led pre-electoral violence on coup risk. After this examination, this chapter explores whether or not such vulnerability is positively associated with the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence.

Vulnerability to Western Leverage and Coup Risk

This section examines if government-led pre-electoral violence increases coup risk and whether national vulnerability to Western leverage decreases the effect of such violence on coup risk. For the above examinations, it focuses on the following three variables: government-led pre-electoral violence, a regime's vulnerability to the leverage

of the democracy promoters, and coup onset. This chapter utilizes the same conceptualization of government-led pre-electoral violence by Hafner-Burton et al. (2013). They used the dataset of the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) by Hyde and Marinov (2012-b) to construct a measure of "government-led pre-election violence." This dataset contains cross-national election data between1960 and 2006. In the study of Hafner-Burton et al. (2013, 165), government-led pre-electoral violence is denoted "as 1 if the government engaged in election-specific violence against civilians (coded from Nelda33) or harassed political opposition members (Nelda15), and 0 otherwise." According to the NELDA codebook,

> Nelda33 includes 'any significant violence relating to the elections that resulted in civilian deaths.' Nelda33 includes no specific threshold for deaths, but violence must be 'significant' and at least one civilian must have been killed. Violent attacks against civilians, such as bombings, do not count unless they result in civilian casualties. Harassment of political opposition members (Nelda15) may include a more diverse set of activities, including murder, torture, beatings, violence against participants in opposition rallies, indefinite detention of candidates or opposition supporters, forced eviction, harassment of media and number of other methods. (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013, 165)

Based on these two measures, Hafner-Burton et al. constructed a variable of government-led pre-electoral violence for their study; this variable has annual data covering the 1981–2004 periods. Likewise, my study also collected annual data of government-led pre-electoral violence during the periods ranging from 1960 to 2006 by using the NELDA dataset, meaning that this study extended the dataset of government-led pre-electoral violence by Hafner-Burton et al. (2013).

As to another main variable of interest – a regime's vulnerability to Western leverage during the post-Cold War era, this chapter uses a proxy. As is known, capturing such vulnerability is not easy. Yet, while it is not ideal, aid dependence to Western

powers is a widely used measure of a regime's vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters (e.g., Goldsmith 2001; Dunning 2004; Wright 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010). Specifically, to capture aid dependence, this study used bilateral official development assistance (ODA) from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It then transformed and logged the data in per capita form (*Aid(log & per capita))*. ODA data are taken from the WDI.

As to coup onset, the dependent variable, this chapter uses the same data of coups used for the previous chapters. In this study, a coup is conceptualized as illegal attempts initiated by the military or some non-civilian elites within the state apparatus to overthrow the executive leadership. We assign a 1 to coup onset variable if a successful or failed coup occurs given a year; otherwise, a 0 is assigned.

Turning to control variables, this study includes a set of popular coup-causing factors. The first set of control variables is about the political aspects of coup risk. It is known that the legitimacy of the ruling government and political vulnerability are critical factors for coup onset (Huntington 1968; Thompson 1975; McGowan and Johnson 1984; Clark 2007; Lindberg and Clark 2008). To capture this aspect, this study includes political protests, the degree of democracy, democratization, and civil war. The data are taken from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive, the Polity IV dataset, and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, respectively. This study also includes the level of political constraints to the executive branch of the government. Often, the ruling regime's abuse of power is the key to regime failure or legitimacy decline, thereby making states vulnerable to coups (e.g., Huntington 1968; Kapstein and Converse 2008).

To control for this factor, this chapter includes the data of XCONST from the Polity IV dataset; XCONST is the measure of executive constraints. Finally, this study also controls for a military regime, for the risk of intra-military conflicts and thereby coups is higher in military regimes (Belkin and Shofer 2003; Thyne 2010; Sovlik 2013). This chapter accordingly employs a dummy variable of the military regime type taken from the study of Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2012).

It is important to control for socio-economic conditions. The level of economic poverty and the regime's vulnerability to economic crises and shocks are controlled. In this study,we use the natural log of GDP per capita to control for the effect of economic backwardness on coup risk. This chapter also includes a variable of the change in GDP per capita to capture the sudden deterioration of economic conditions. Additionally, it incorporates the nonlinear role of ethnic fragmentation in coup risk. It employs ethnic fractionalization data by Fearon and Laitin (2003). A dummy variable of Africa is also included to control for coup proneness of the region. In addition, like other studies (e.g., Thompson 1976; Powell 2012), the size and spending of the armed forces are controlled in this chapter. The data for military size and spending are taken from the COW dataset. In addition, given that large government spending makes regimes prone to rent-seeking coups (Grossman 1991; Collier and Hoeffler 2005), the percentage of GDP consumed by the government is added to control for military elites' rent-seeking behaviors. This data is available from the WDI. Finally, we control for temporal dependence of coup risk by adding cubic splines and the number of years since the last coup.

While using the variables above, this study also constructs a dataset suitable for

event history analyses. All variables are measured annually, and independent and control variables are lagged one year to prevent a reverse causality. Regarding estimation methods, this study begins with a binary time-series cross-sectional (BTSCS) approach. However, because there might be a potential endogeneity problem between aid and coup risk (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2005), this chapter alternatively employs two-stage models with instruments; specifically, it uses the Instrumental Variables Two-Stage Least Squares method (IV-2SLS). In the armed conflict literature, potential endogeneity problems in donors' aid allocation decision are observed (e.g., Miguel et al. 2004; de Ree et al. 2009; Savun and Tirone 2011). The general notion is that the risk of a coup or a rebellion can influence donors' aid allocation and disbursement decision. If donors anticipate an increasing risk of violence in a target state, they might stop their aid disbursements to that nation, or they might send their aid elsewhere. It is therefore necessary to instrument for aid in order to deal with this endogenous process of aid allocation.

Given that for instruments to be reliable and valid, they should not be correlated with the dependent variable—they should not be correlated with the error term of the estimation—but only with the endogenous variable, this study needs to find instruments that meet both criteria. For our instruments, we use the following three variables: a dummy variable of a former British colony, a dummy measure of a former French colony, and oil rents as a percentage of GDP. None of these variables are closely related to coup onset in aid-recipient states, but they are highly associated with donors' aid allocation decision. Donors tend to provide more aid to their former colonies (e.g., Neumayer 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Despite their independence, the former colonies are closely related to their former colonizers in many areas, including socio-economic and cultural

linkages. When donors make their aid allocation decision, prioritizing development aid needs from their former colonies over other nations' requests is likely. Yet, while the colonial linkage is likely to be associated with aid inflows, it is unlikely to have direct impacts on coup execution decisions (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). In addition, since oil is a core but scarce natural resource for economic activities, it attracts donors (e.g., Collier 2006; Woods 2008). Donors have strong incentives to get along, if not appease, with oil-producing nations. Contemporary competition between the United States and China over oil in Africa demonstrates this nature. Yet, donors' decision to provide aid to oil-producing nations must be largely exogenous to coup initiation. When this variable is instrumentalized for aid, it is lagged one year. Further discussion on the details of IV-2SLS will be made when we discuss findings below.

Table 11 presents regression results based on the BTSCS estimation. Model 1 forms the basis for the rationale of this study by showing that government-led pre-electoral violence (*Election Violence)* significantly increases coup risk.[47] This suggests that when the sitting government uses violence to win an election, it makes states highly susceptible to coups. This strong coup-inducing effect of *Election Violence* persistently appears in other models. As shown in Models 3, 4, and 5, its statistically significant impacts on increasing coup risk do not disappear even during the post-Cold War era. These results strongly confirm that pre-electoral violence by the incumbents is a strong determinant of coups, which also supports the notion that the incumbents should be

[47] This study also tested the relationship by using different lag structures of *Election Violence*. It found that of the following three lag structures(t, t-1, and t-2), *Election Violence*$_t$ has the strongest effects, while *Election Violence*$_{t-2}$ has the weakest effects, and that the effects of these three are statically significant. However, given the annual timeframe of this study, a potential reversal order between coups and electoral violence events discourages the use of *Election Violence*$_t$.

concerned about the risk of being overthrown in the aftermath of their use of pre-electoral violence.

Regarding the implications of national vulnerability to Western democracy promoters' leverage for coup risk, this study began with the relationship between the post-Cold War environment and coup risk. It aimed to see if the anti-coup environment during the post-Cold War era makes coups unlikely in the aftermath of the government use of election violence. As shown in Model 2, *Post-Cold War* serves as a coup-deterring factor, and its interaction term with *Election Violence* shows that it lowers the election violence's effects on coup risk. This is consistent with this research's underlying argument that when coups are likely to be subjected to serious resistance and punishments, they are likely to be deterred.

Table 11. Government-led Pre-electoral Violence, Aid, and Coup Risk

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model
	Global		Global & post-Cold War		Africa & post-Cold War	
Election Violence	0.544***	0.801***	-0.367	4.359**	3.618**	7.685***
	(0.200)	(0.215)	(2.506)	(2.424)	(1.490)	(1.638)
Post-Cold War		-0.422**				
		(0.182)				
*Election Vio*Post-Cold War*		-0.703*				
		(0.507)				
Aid (log & per capita)			-0.045	0.005	0.009	-1.056**
			(0.153)	(0.547)	(0.354)	(0.556)
Election Vio			0.115	-3.671**	-0.851*	-5.344***
** Aid*			(0.735)	(1.628)	(0.495)	(1.894)
Aid ^2				-0.009		0.172**
				(0.085)		(0.083)
Election Vio				0.634**		0.861**
** Aid^2*				(0.247)		(0.379)
Democracy	0.026	0.049*	0.000	-0.009	-0.051	-0.074
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.109)	(0.107)

Democratization	0.360*	0.333*	0.6778*	0.673*	0.692	0.592
	(0.232)	(0.237)	(0.419)	(0.437)	(0.701)	(0.698)
Executive Constraints	-0.098	-0.129	0.038	0.062	0.284	0.368
	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.222)	(0.214)	(0.316)	(0.315)
Protests	0.039	0.045	0.037	0.056	-0.120	-0.119
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.302)	(0.419)
Civil War	0.266**	0.280*	0.676**	0.728**	1.386**	1.574***
	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.306)	(0.314)	(0.547)	(0.543)*
GDPcap (log)	-0.037	-0.113	0.051	0.039	-0.072	-0.410
	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.301)	(0.306)	(0.289)	(0.305)
Change in GDPcap	-1.189	-1.166	-1.788	-1.867	1.200	0.756
	(1.219)	(1.271)	(1.615)	(1.484)	(2.294)	(1.830)
Government Consumption	0.000	0.002	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Military Regime	0.456**	0.436**	0.885**	0.757*	1.043*	0.822*
	(0.193)	(0.198)	(0.421)	(0.422)	(0.652)	(0.645)
Military Expenditures	-0.143**	-0.072	-0.057	-0.053	-0.155	-0.146
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.247)	(0.240)
Military Size	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006	-0.007*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ethnic Frac	1.491*	1.582*	-1.547	-1.408	1.647	2.448
	(1.048)	(1.095)	(1.958)	(2.049)	(3.382)	(3.407)
Ethnic Frac^2	-1.181	-1.228	2.579	2.324	-1.103	-1.952
	(1.290)	(1.344)	(2.526)	(2.574)	(3.598)	(3.563)
AFRICA $_t$	-0.306*	-0.260	-0.069			
	(0.233)	(0.237)	(0.382)			
Coup-free Years $_t$	-0.256***	-0.252***	-0.323**	-0.327**	-0.072	-0.097
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.228)	(0.233)
Constant	-1.340	-1.006	-2.747	-2.704	-3.191	0.437
	(0.924)	(0.988)	(2.188)	(2.427)	(2.058)	(2.165)
Observations	4,064	4,064	1,628	1,628	717	717
Log Likelihood	-810.0	-804.8	-228.2	-225.3	-118.2	-114.6

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The three splines are not reported.

All variables lagged one year unless otherwise noted.

When it comes to the effects of national vulnerability to Western leverage on coup risk during the post-Cold War era, there are some inconsistent results. However, when we limit the scope to Africa, known to be highly susceptible to Western pressure and leverage for democratization (Levitsky and Way 2010), we find more supportive

evidence. At the global level, shown in Model 3, the interaction term (*Election Vio * Aid*) presents no evidence that aid dependence reduces the coup-inducing effects of election violence.



Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of Election Violence[48]

However, in Africa, there is significant evidence that *Aid* lowers the effect of *Election Violence* on coup risk. As shown in Model 5, although *Aid* does not appear to have statistically significant impacts on lowering coup risk, when it interacts with *Election Vio,* its interaction term *(Election Vio * Aid)* appears statistically significant at the 10% significance level. This is supportive evidence because of the following reason:

[48] When the 95 percent confidence intervals are added to this graph, the insignificant effects of aid dependence on coup risk clearly appear.

as *Aid* changes the sign of *Election Vio* and becomes statistically significant, although its main effect is overall insignificant, there is a crossover interaction by *Aid,* meaning that the effect of *Election Vio* becomes opposite as the value of *Aid* increases. This result suggests that as vulnerability to Western leverage increases, the effect of government-led election violence on coup risk significantly decreases. In other words, the more vulnerable the regime is to the leverage of the Western democracies, the less likely government-led pre-electoral violence is to increase coup risk. Figure 5 visualizes this interaction effect.

On the other hand, with the mixed results, the insignificant effects of *Aid* on coup risk, shown in both Models 3 and 5, seems to beg further examinations regarding the relationship between the government-led pre-electoral violence, aid dependence, and coup risk. To see if these insignificant effects are a result of the non-linear relationship between aid dependence and coup risk, this research examines a non-linear effect of *Aid* on coup risk. Figure 5 also seems to suggest the non-linear relationship. Strong evidence appears to support the non-linear relationship. As shown in Models 4 and 6, as vulnerability to Western leverage increases, coup risk decreases, but starts to increase in highly susceptible regimes, which is largely consistent with the result in Figure 5. In particular, Model 6 confirms that both *Aid* and its interaction with *Election Violence* have non-linear impacts on coup risk. The sign of *Aid* is negative, and that of its square term is positive. While the sign of the interaction term (*Election Vio * Aid*) is negative, that of its squared term is positive. In addition, all of the four variables appear to be statistically significant. What these results suggest is that while vulnerability to Western leverage generally lowers coup risk, its coup-dampening effects decline as the level of aid

dependence significantly increases, as suggested in Figure 5. Thus, these findings are still supportive of the argument that coup risk by the pre-electoral violence declines as national aid dependence rises.

Theoretically, the overall insignificant impact of aid dependence on coup risk and the statistically significant effect of the square terms make sense without substantially rejecting the logic of this study. They may be due to the pool of various regime types; authoritarian regimes holding no multiparty elections, such as Egypt, are still a large aid recipient even during the post-Cold War era. In addition, they may be driven by the fact that coups are too common in extremely poor economies. Countries whose economies are extremely poor are generally highly dependent upon external aid. In those poor nations, coup risk is inherently higher; coups might be attempts to subsist, rather than to seek for power. Regardless, as it is still true that as national aid dependence increases, coup risk by the government-led pre-electoral violence generally decreases, the hypothesis of the coup-dampening effects of vulnerability to Western leverage is still supported.

Despite reasonably supportive evidence, we cannot conclude this relationship by a priori excluding the potential endogeneity problem between aid and coup risk. As noted previously, this study reexamines the effects of vulnerability to Western leverage on the link between government-led pre-electoral violence and coup risk. By using the three instruments, this study first regresses *Aid* on the instruments to get a predicted value of *Aid*. As a second step, the predicted probability of *Aid* is used to examine the effect of vulnerability to Western leverage on coup risk in a second-stage estimation of the IV-2SLS. Finally, to examine the main focus of the study – the conditional nature of the

relationship between government-led pre-electoral violence and such vulnerability, this study makes the electoral violence interact with the predicted variable of *Aid*, and re-run the IV-2SLS estimation with the interaction term.

Table 12 presents the results of the IV-2SLS estimation. Models 1 and 4 present the first-stage results of the IV-2SLS estimation; while Model 1 is about the world as a whole, Model 4 is about Africa. Both models show that they are significant factors of the endogenous variable, which supports the validity of the instruments.

Table 12. Instrumental Variables Analysis Results

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model
	Global & post-Cold War			Africa & post-Cold War		
	First Stage	Second Stage	Instrumented Interaction	First Stage	Second Stage	Instrumented Interaction
Dependent Variables	Aid	Coup Onset	Coup Onset	Aid	Coup Onset	Coup Onset
Electoral Violence	-0.021	0.005	-0.341	0.016	0.043	4.939**
	(0.086)	(0.022)	(0.776)	(0.066)	(0.045)	(1.983)
Aid		0.018	-0.388*		-0.019*	-0.462*
		(0.016)	(0.268)		(0.014)	(0.365)
Electoral Vio Aid*			0.124			-1.204**
			(0.175)			(0.617)
Instruments						
British Colony $_t$	0.440**			-0.617***		
	(.236)			(0.241)		
French Colony $_t$	0.220			-0.457**		
	(0.226)			(0.211)		
Oil $_{t-2}$	0.786***			1.050***		
	(0.116)			(0.160)		
Democracy	-0.010	0.000	0.024	-0.040*	-0.005	-0.085
	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.094)	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.117)
Democratization	0.118	0.042	0.651*	-0.169*	0.047	0.529
	(0.152)	(0.031)	(0.435)	(0.191)	(0.052)	(0.614)
Executive Constraints	0.067	0.000	-0.018	0.155*	0.026*	0.458*
	(0.101)	(0.009)	(0.287)	(0.095)	(0.020)	(0.358)
Protests	-0.038	0.002	0.043	-0.038	-0.003	-0.113
	(0.035)	(0.005)	(0.124)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.260)
Civil War	-0.263**	0.038**	0.889***	0.047	0.088**	1.514***
	(0.149)	(0.019)	(0.301)	(0.161)	(0.045)	(0.551)
GDPcap (log)	-0.578**	0.017	-0.046	-0.218	-0.008	-0.292
	(0.194)	(0.014)	(0.313)	(0.192)	(0.015)	(0.370)
Change in GDPcap	0.731**	-0.126	-1.853	0.181	0.065	2.165
	(0.326)	(0.116)	(1.691)	(0.301)	(0.155)	(2.413)
Government Consumption	0.024**	0.000	0.012	0.012*	0.001	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.019)
Military Regime	-0.426*	0.070*	0.710	-0.553	0.106**	1.098*
	(0.312)	(0.040)	(0.432)	(0.333)	(0.057)	(0.774)
Military Expenditures	-0.009	-0.002	-0.058	0.037	-0.012	-0.231
	(0.096)	(0.005)	(0.174)	(0.096)	(0.011)	(0.255)

Military Size	-0.001***	0.000	-0.004*	-0.008	-0.000*	-0.011**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Ethnic Frac	3.690***	-0.168*	-0.354	1.922	0.150	4.028
	(1.456)	(0.091)	(2.033)	(1.095)	(0.163)	(3.549)
Ethnic Frac^2	-4.184***	0.210*	1.087	-2.092	-0.100	-3.601
	(1.626)	(0.117)	(2.621)	(1.185)	(0.151)	(3.879)
AFRICA $_t$	-0.169	0.007	0.055			
	(0.269)	(0.017)	(0.417)			
Coup-free Years $_t$	0.003	-0.001***	-0.055***	-0.003	-0.001**	-0.042*
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.012)	0.005	(0.001)	(0.022)
Constant	6.809	-0.126		5.336	0.113	-0.460
	(1.386)	(0.137)		1.142	(0.121)	(2.865)
Observations	1628	1,628	1856	618	618	619
N_clust	109	109	116	40	40	40
Partial R-squared	0.047			0.2105		

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All variables lagged one year unless otherwise noted.

Yet, to statistically confirm if they are valid, the F-tests are conducted. It is generally recommend that if instruments are valid, their F-statistic should be greater than 10 and their partial R-square should be also greater than 0.10 (Shea 1997; Staiger and Stock 1997). In addition, to test if these instruments do not influence the dependent variables (the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term), the Sargan-Hansen statistic is used. As results of these tests,[49] we found that most of the test results are fine for both models. For instance, for the two models, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. However, in Model 1, we found that the partial R-square for the instruments is relatively small; yet, their F-statistic is still over 20, and they are also significant predictors for the dependent variable.

Turning to the results of the second stage, this study first discusses the results of the global level analyses, shown in Models 2 and 3. In general, the results are similar to what we found from the models of the logit estimation. Model 2 shows that both the

[49] This study used the ivreg2 in STATA to estimate IV-2SLS models, written by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007). The ivreg2 provide all the results for the validity and reliability of the instruments.

electoral violence and vulnerability to Western leverage have no significant impact on coup risk. On the other hand, Model 3 shows that *Aid*'s effect on lowering coup risk is statistically significant, which suggests that national dependence on Western powers makes coups less likely during the post-Cold War era. Yet, the interaction term (*Electoral Vio*Aid*) presents that while its effects are positive, it is insignificant. Although its sign is opposite to what this study expected to find, its insignificant effect warns no meaningful interpretation.

When we turn to Africa, we again find supportive and significant evidence for the argument of this research. Model 5 provides statistically significant evidence that national dependence on aid lowers coup risk. Coup risk decreases as the level of such dependence increases. In Model 6, the coup-deterring effect of aid dependence is also present. Model 6 further confirms that while aid dependence lowers coup risk, its interaction term with the electoral violence (*Electoral Vio*Aid*) significantly lowers the coup-inducing effects of the electoral violence. As expected, while the government-led pre-electoral violence increases coup risk, its effect is conditional on the level of national aid dependence. In other words, such effect decreases as the level of national vulnerability to Western leverage increases. Figure 6 visualizes this nature. It shows that as aid dependence increases, the coup-increasing effects of the electoral violence sharply decreases, and that although the insignificant effect of the violence on coup risk, shown on the right side of the graph, deters meaningful interpretation, it is worth noting that in highly aid-dependent nations, the government-led pre-electoral violence makes coup risk lower than the normal periods.



Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities of Election Violence

In sum, although supportive findings came largely from the analyses focusing on Africa, this research still demonstrates that national vulnerability to Western leverage makes coups against pre-electoral violence led by the incumbents unlikely. The more vulnerable the regime is to the leverage of the Western democracies, the less likely government-led pre-electoral violence is to increase coup risk in the aftermath of the violence in electoral regimes, including newly emerging democracies. In effect, the fact that this study found most evidence from the region that is known for its high dependence on Western democracy promoters is more supportive of the argument.

Vulnerability to Western Leverage and Government-led Pre-electoral Violence

Given the evidence that pre-electoral violence led by the ruling regime is unlikely

to invite a coup in countries susceptible to Western leverage for democratization, we now turn to the issue of whether or not such vulnerability to Western leverage is a permissive cause of such pre-electoral violence during the post-Cold War era. Building from the common notion that electoral competition increases incentives of the sitting regimes to use violence (e.g., Schedler 2002; Birch 2011), the extant literature underscores that the inconsistent and selective democracy promotion makes emerging multiparty elections vulnerable to government-led election violence. In contrast, this study argues that the vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters makes coups in the aftermath of election violence by the ruling regimes unlikely, which in turn permits them to use violence to win in competitive elections. This study therefore expects to find that multiparty elections are more prone to government-led pre-electoral violence if their nations are more vulnerable to the leverage of Western democracies.

To examine the observable implications of the argument, like Hafner-Burton et al. (2013), this study carries out a cross-national analysis of multiparty elections in 105 non-DAC nations between 1989 and 2007. The non-DAC countries are the pool of Western democracy promotion. To collect the data of multiparty elections, this study uses NELDA's measure on whether opposition parties are allowed in an election. When elections are not open to opposition parties, they are not competitive or multiparty elections. Also, when there are no challengers, there is no logical incentive to resort to violence to safeguard an electoral victory. Based on this rationale, this study collected data of 686 multiparty elections of non-DAC nations from the NELDA dataset.[50]

For the hypothesis test, the same government-led pre-electoral violence and aid

[50] 871 elections were held in non-DAC countries between 1989 and 2007. This study also tests the hypothesis by using the entire set of the 981 elections.

dependence variables are used. For the rest of factors that influence government-led pre-electoral violence, this study follows the work of Hafner-Burton et al. (2013). Their work is the seminal piece empirically and globally examining the determinants of government-led pre-electoral violence with large-N data. It conducts a cross-national examination of election data from NELDA covering 1981–2004. While it overlooks the implications of vulnerability to Western democracies' leverage for government-led pre-electoral violence, their study still provides a list of important correlates of the election violence. Therefore, this study uses the variables of Hafner-Burton et al. to construct a base model.

Unfavourable Polling is assigned as 1 "under two conditions: (1) if reliable polls existed that did not favour the incumbent or (2) if reliable polls did not exist," while *Polling Unfavourable* is 0 "if reliable polls existed and favoured the incumbent" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013, 166). *Unfavourable Polling* is their key variable which is expected to increase the likelihood of the election violence, for the rulers are likely to commit election violence when they are likely to lose an election. The data come from NELDA.

Executive Constraints is included, for it might be a key factor for stopping the rulers from resorting to violence in competitive elections. Polity IV's data on executive constraints – 'the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives' – is used to control for this nature (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). An interaction term between the two above variables is included, as Hafner-Burton et al. (2013) believe that the effect of unfavorable election results on government-led election violence is dependent on the degree of institutional constraints to the executive body. As election violence is prone to repressive regimes, this study includes *Physical Integrity* to control for the pre-existing level of repression. The data are taken from the Cingranelli-

Richards dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Hafner-Burton et al. also controlled for democratic institutions' effect on electoral violence. They added *Political Competitiveness* and *Executive Recruitment*. These data come from Polity IV. This study also controls for them by using the same measures. In addition, *Electoral Fraud* and *Demonstrations* drawn from NELDA are included. Since election fraud is a main type of election manipulation, it might be highly correlated with election violence. To control for this relationship, this paper includes electoral fraud. *Demonstrations* is included to account for "other types of civic mobilization that are distinct from post-election protest, and that also may predict pre-election violence" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013, 167). Similarly, as domestic armed conflicts can lead to human rights violations, this study controls for this nature by adding a binary variable of *Civil War* from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This paper also includes GDP (log) and Population (log) from the World Development Indicators. The effect of leadership-specific factors, such as *Leader Tenure* and *Leader Age*, are controlled, and the data are from the Archigos dataset. Hafner-Burton et al. (2013, 167) claim that the risk of election violence can be influenced by "their time in office or their experience."

In line with the work of Hafner-Burton et al. (2013), this study estimates the effect of national aid dependence on the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence by using logit models. However, since donors' aid allocation decisions can be endogenous to violence in target states, this study also uses IV-2SLS. In effect, it is reasonable that donors' anticipation of the rising risk of electoral violence can result in altering their decision on aid allocations ex ante. For the instruments, this study uses the same three variables.

Table 13. Vulnerability to Western Leverage and Government-led Pre-Electoral Violence

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model
	Global & post-Cold War		Africa & post-Cold War
Aid		0.510***	0.380*
		(0.205)	(0.261)
Unfavorable polls	1.464*	2.055**	0.782
	(0.909)	(0.891)	(1.196)
*Polling*Exec. Const.*	-0.313*	-0.407**	-0.006
	(0.178)	(0.185)	(0.301)
Executive Constraints	0.110	0.177	-0.187
	(0.203)	(0.220)	(0.339)
Physical Integrity (avg)	-0.210**	-0.154	-0.143
	(0.108)	(0.129)	(0.185)
Political Competitiveness (avg)	-0.089	-0.095	0.031
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.115)
Executive Recruitment (avg)	0.142	0.144	-0.109
	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.172)
Population (log)	0.286*	0.295*	-0.080
	(0.197)	(0.208)	(0.373)
GDP (log)	-0.176	0.063	0.547*
	(0.143)	(0.159)	(0.345)
Leader Tenure	0.005	0.004	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Leader Age	0.122	0.207*	-0.152
	(0.132)	(0.144)	(0.266)
Civil War	0.641*	0.926**	0.944
	(0.444)	(0.480)	(0.615)
Electoral Fraud	1.131***	1.061***	1.592***
	(0.307)	(0.337)	(0.457)
Protests	0.100**	0.112***	0.208
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.159)
Constant	-6.386**	-9.712***	-0.347
	(3.211)	(3.678)	(5.976)
Observations	593	482	191
Log Likelihood	-303.2	-253.1	-96.69

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All variables lagged one year unless otherwise noted.

Table 13 presents the logit estimates of the effect of vulnerability to Western leverage on the risk of pre-electoral violence by the incumbents. Model 1 is the replication of Hafner-Burton et al. (2013), serving as a base for this study. Models 2 and 3 clearly present supportive evidence that national aid dependence serves a permissive

cause of government-led election violence. In Model 2, *Aid* appears to significantly increase the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence, confirming the hypothesis that national vulnerability to the leverage of Western democracy promoters makes multiparty elections more prone to pre-electoral violence by the incumbent regime. As the level of aid dependence increases, multiparty elections become more vulnerable to the government-led pre-electoral violence. When it comes to Africa, where most states are highly susceptible to the leverage of Western democracy promoters, Model 3 also shows that *Aid* increases the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence. These results certainly support the theoretical logic that because vulnerability to Western leverage makes the ruling regime less susceptible to coups, such vulnerability permits those incumbents facing a competitive election to resort to electoral violence that otherwise would cause the loss of power in a military coup.



Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Aid Dependence on Election Violence

Figure 7 shows graphical results of how the risk of the government-led pre-electoral violence changes depending on the level of aid dependence on Western powers. It clearly shows that the risk of the electoral violence is a linear function of aid dependence. As aid dependence increases, the probability of the electoral violence also rises.

Despite these findings, due to the possibility of the endogenous process of aid allocation, we should be cautious about concluding the relationship between vulnerability to Western leverage and the risk of government-led pre-electoral violence. Table 14 presents the results of the IV-2SLS estimation. Models 1 and 3 show the first-stage results of the IV-2SLS estimation. In both models, the three instruments appear to be statistically significant factors for predicting aid inflows. This study also found that, in both models, the F-statistic is greater than 10 and the partial R-square is greater than 0.10, which supports their validity. Regarding whether they are not correlated with the error terms, their Hansen-J statistic (1.317, 1.459, respectively) appeared too small to reject the null hypothesis. This study thus concludes that they are reasonably valid instruments.

To examine the effect of aid dependence on the risk of the government-led pre-electoral violence at the second stage, a predicted value of *Aid* is used as a result of regressing it on the instruments. Models 2 and 4 present the second-stage estimation results. The statistically significant effect of *Aid* on government-led pre-violence that we found from the logit estimation still appears in these models. In both models, *Aid* increases coup risk. In addition, its statistical impacts in Africa get stronger in this IV approach than the logit approach. While it was significant at the 0.1 significance level in the logit model, it is now significant at the 0.01 level, shown in Model 4.

Table 14. Instrumental Variables Analysis Results

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model
	Global & post-Cold War		Africa & post-Cold War	
	First Stage	Second Stage	First Stage	Second Stage
Dependent Variables	Aid	Electoral Violence	Aid	Electoral Violence
Aid		0.170***		0.252***
		(0.046)		(0.095)
Instruments				
British Colony	0.107**		-0.455**	
	(0.014)		(0.270)	
French Colony	0.389**		-0.405**	
	(0.196)		(0.223)	
Oil $_{t-2}$	0.107***		0.817***	
	(0.014)		(0.180)	
Unfavorable polls	0.250	0.456**	-0.207	0.239
	(0.361)	(0.198)	(0.609)	(0.331)
*Polling*Exec. Const.*	-0.048	-0.083**	0.003	0.024
	(0.064)	(0.037)	(0.149)	(0.078)
Executive Constraints	0.062	0.040	.168	-0.117
	(0.075)	(0.047)	(0.158)	(0.100)
Physical Integrity (avg)	-0.021	-0.026	-0.020	-0.019
	(0.056)	(0.033)	(0.098)	(0.073)
Political Competitiveness (avg)	0.036	-0.023	-0.007	0.015
	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.029)
Executive Recruitment (avg)	-0.0459	0.041	-0.205***	0.021
	(0.060)	(0.030)	(0.076)	(0.046)
Population (log)	-0.062	0.066	-0.024	-0.087
	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.138)	(0.095)
GDP (log)	-0.527	0.045	-0.507***	0.295***
	(0.098)	(0.049)	(0.145)	(0.111)
Leader Tenure	0.001	0.001	-0.009**	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Leader Age	-0.139	0.054*	0.036	-0.036
	(0.060)	(0.028)	(0.106)	(0.113)
Civil War	-0.112	0.189	-0.478*	0.069
	(0.190)	(0.125)	(0.296)	(0.235)
Electoral Fraud	-0.111	0.199**	-0.248	0.170
	(0.145)	(0.085)	(0.206)	(0.136)
Protests	0.024	0.016**	0.038	0.023*
	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.039)	(0.014)
Constant	5.817**	-2.009**	6.271	0.527
	(1.410)	(0.836)	(2.401)	(1.591)
Observations	379	379	98	98
N_clust	87	87	36	36
Partial R-squared	0.1962		0.3513	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All variables lagged one year unless otherwise noted.

In summary, given that vulnerability to Western leverage lowers the coup-inducing effect of government-led pre-election violence, this study expected to find the positive effect of such vulnerability on election violence by the ruling regimes. As expected, both the logit and the IV-2SLS models show that such vulnerability makes states more prone to government-led pre-electoral violence in multiparty elections, confirming the hypothesis.

Conclusion

The rise of "illiberal democracies" in the era of international democracy promotion is a puzzling phenomenon. After the collapse of the Cold War, democratization took place in numerous states. Yet, many emerging democracies have failed to transition to mature democracies. Many became illiberal democracies. Interestingly, while the spread of multiparty electoral regimes is often attributed to Western powers' democracy promotion, these electoral autocracies or illiberal democracies are often present in countries susceptible to the democracy promoters' pressure and assistance for democratization. To contribute to unpacking these puzzles regarding the rise of illiberal democracies, this chapter focused on government-led pre-electoral violence, a representative behavior of illiberal electoral regimes. Particularly, it paid attention to the unexpected implications of Western powers' democracy promotion for the risk of such pre-electoral violence.

This chapter argued that Western democracy promoters' focus on promoting multiparty elections coupled with their anti-coup stance creates the moral hazard problem of the ruling regime and permits their use of election violence. Despite the interest in

democracy promotion, the current practices of Western democracy promotion make government-led election violence unlikely to put rulers at risk by deterring coups, which unintentionally provide them with opportunities to use electoral violence. This theoretical claim is supported by empirical evidence. As national vulnerability to Western leverage lowers coup risk by government-led pre-electoral violence, it permits more electoral violence.

In relation to these findings, there emerges an important dilemma that the international democracy promoters would face. Similar to some studies warning about the danger of the wholesale denial and punishment towards coups (e.g., Collier 2009; Powell and Thyne 2014), the international community's selective acceptance of coups might be a catalyst for preventing the rise of illiberal electoral regimes. As Collier (2008) claims, the military is "only one credible counter to dictatorial power," so some coups may be "praised" to deter illiberal measures like electoral violence. Democracy promoters' selective acceptance of such coups in emerging democracies can generate the perception that as long as coups are staged to remove illegitimate regimes and restore democracy, coups can be accepted. That perception, in turn, would likely deter illiberal policies in emerging electoral regimes. On the other hand, even their selective acceptance of illicit overthrows may make power transfer from coup-plotters to civilian leaders very difficult and even cause the proliferation of violent military interventions in politics. Democracy promoters' support to unconstitutional regime changes can send out a signal that coups can be justified and supported depending on causes and circumstances. Given the prevalence of illiberal behaviors in much of the developing world, potential coup-plotters can easily find their pretexts to topple the ruling regime. They would try to justify their

coup by announcing legitimate excuses. Like political militaries during the modernization periods, they might act as a guardian of their state. Moreover, they would likely use the international acceptance to bolster support from a domestic audience. Once their coup is justified from the eyes of the public, it would be extremely difficult to make the coup-plotters hand power over to civilian rule. Accordingly, whether to support some coups that appear to remove abusive rulers in emerging electoral regimes would likely pose a serious dilemma to democracy promoters. While selective acceptance of coups may be necessary to prevent abuses of power and illiberal policies by the incumbent government, it can cause serious consequences such as the proliferation of military coups. The discussion on this dilemma seems to boil down to one conclusion that if selective praise of coups is necessary, the democracy promoters must find measures that can result in quick power transfer from coup-plotters to civilian authorities and the quick restoration of democratic institutions; otherwise, they need to alter democracy promotion policies and impose punitive measures on illiberal regimes as substantially as on coup-plotters.

Appendix: A Coup-deterrence Model

A coup is a risky behavior, and the expected utility of a coup depends on the returns from the coup. This utility function is concave and strictly increasing in the payoffs so that it reflects the risk aversion behavior of coup plotters ($U' > 0, U'' < 0$). There is a p probability that the coup plotters face significant anti-coup forces and are thereby punished. When a coup is punished, the expected return is z; if not punished with $1 - p$ probability, the expected return is y which is higher than z: $y > z$. In this light, the expected utility of the coup-plotter group is given by $EU = (1 - p)U(y) + pU(z)$,

where the probability (p) is a continuous function of two types of coup-resistance and punitive action: internal punishment (x) and external punishment (g): either type of the punishments will increase the probability of being punished $p(x, g)$. That is, $p'_x > 0$ and $p'_g > 0$.

The logic behind the probability (p) function is simple and straightforward. When the rebels overthrow emerging democracies, domestic pro-democracy forces can protest and resist the reversal of a transition to democracy. Similarly, external punitive actions can ensue in the wake of the ousting of a democratically elected regime. Moreover, the size of expected return (z) from being punished depends on x and g – (x, g) – and both types of punishments would likely reduce the size of return: $z'_x < 0$, $z'_g < 0$. Yet, the return y, by definition, is independent of either type of punishment. To show how either external or internal punishment affects expected utility from the coup and thus the probability of attempting a coup, we take the partial derivative of EU with respect to x. It yields

$$\frac{\partial EU}{\partial x} = -p'_x U(y) + p'_x \frac{\partial U}{\partial z}\frac{\partial z}{\partial x}$$

$$= p'_x[(U'_z)z'_x - U(y)]$$

Here, because $p'_x > 0, U'_z > 0,$ and $z'_x < 0$, $\frac{\partial EU}{\partial x}$ is therefore smaller than 0. Analogously, $\frac{\partial EU}{\partial g}$ is also smaller than 0. Consequently, this model shows that coups are likely to be deterred if punitive actions against a coup are likely to follow.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

The preceding chapters have sought to improve our understanding of the fate of emerging democracies by focusing on the strategic behaviors of the armed forces. Historically, emerging democracies have been prone to coups. Indeed, their vulnerability to coups is a known-issue. Nevertheless, it has been overlooked that emerging democracies' vulnerability to coups may stem from democratization. Just like leaders of mass rebellions, professional military officers also can act like political entrepreneurs. When democratization and mass electoral politics generate political instability and crisis, some political factions in the armed forces are likely to seize the opportunity to assume power.

While it is true that the number of coups has declined since the end of the Cold War, the risk of coups continues to play a critical role in shaping the fate of fledgling democracies in the post-Cold War period. Indeed, making sense of the recent proliferation of illiberal democracies is difficult without an exploration of how militaries respond to democratization. Although there is a recent spread of multiparty regimes, which is commonly attributed to Western democracy promotion, the abuse of power by the incumbents in those emerging electoral regimes continues unchecked. Western democracy promotion played a critical role in leading to the most recent wave of democratization around the globe, but its democratizing pressure was selective and inconsistent, which in turn led incumbents to figure out ways to repress dissent and violate democratic rules while still nominally adhering to democratic procedures. As Carothers wrote: incumbents during the era of the international democracy promotion

know how to “impose enough repression to keep their opponents weak and maintain their own power while adhering to enough democratic formalities that they might just pass themselves off as democrats” (Carothers 1997, 90-91).

During the era of Western democracy promotion, coupled with a global anti-coup norm, coups became unacceptable as a means for leadership change. The armed forces quickly learned that seizing power via a coup produces domestic and international resistance and punishment (e.g., aid suspension, threats to cut economic and political ties) such that their rule even if the coup was a success - would likely be provisional. As a result, the professional officer corps, including even the most politically ambitious militaries, would likely become “coup-shy.” Instead, the officer corps may even align with the current ruling regime that is abusing power. The ruling regime can exploit the diminished risk of coups by engaging in serious illicit and illiberal actions, like election violence, that otherwise would result in the loss of power in order to stay in power. This dissertation found evidence to support this logic, which implies that the recent decline in coups in emerging democracies does not necessarily result in more transitions to mature democracy.

Another implication of this study is the danger in categorically disapproving of coups. The international community’s selective acceptance of coups might be the key to stopping the proliferation of illiberal democracies. Of course, the Western democracy promoters should guide such coup-makers to resume a civilian rule and democratic procedures as quickly as possible.

This research also demonstrated that the armed forces’ commitment to democratization is critical for emerging democracies’ consolidation against coup threats.

How the armed forces were previously organized and treated – the authoritarian legacy of the civil-military relations - have a critical impact on democratic consolidation and the risk of coups. The armed forces and the incoming regime have difficulty committing to each other, and their mistrust and fear toward each other are informed by such legacies. To ameliorate their commitment problem and facilitate the successful consolidation of emerging democracies against coup threats, emerging democracies need mechanisms to induce credible commitments of both the armed forces to civilian rule and the incoming regime to democratic institutions. To find such measures, it is critical to know how the armed forces was previously organized and controlled and apply new measures to the emerging civil-military relations. For instance, simply employing Huntington's first guideline for an incoming democratic regime to secure civilian control of the armed forces in emerging democracies – promptly purge disloyal officers – may put the ruling regime at tremendous risks if the armed forces were ethnically stacked in the previous regime. Earning allegiance from an anxious armed forces is challenging and risky due to their mistrust and fear towards the new civilian authorities. Granting autonomous decision-making to the armed forces and extending other benefits and prerogatives may help the regime earn the hearts and minds of the armed forces and buy some time to gradthe new civil-military relations and dramatically increase the risk of a coup.

In sum, this dissertation has sought to contribute to the literatures on coups and democratization. In much of the developing world, the armed forces represent a key political actor, and their response to newly emerging political circumstances and political system profoundly influences the future of those states. Designing effective tools to smooth the transition in civil-military relations in emerging democracies, and thereby

enhance their survival and consolidation, is a crucial task facing policymakers. This dissertation also raises important future research questions for scholars. For instance, do coups accelerate democratic development and consolidation in the era of international democracy promotion? If a coup still occurs in such an environment for coups, it may be because the coup-precipitators may very well plan to have civilians rule after their coup's success, and they reluctantly mounted a coup to depose illegitimate, illiberal, and/or abusive leaders. Such coups would nicely fit Finer's (1962) description of military interventions – "the Man on Horseback" with high ideals. If this is the case of their coup, democratic development and consolidation are likely to be improved by these coup-plotters. Additionally, given emerging democracies' vulnerability to civil war, how do the legacies of coup-proofing influence civil wars? Where the autocrats preserved and encouraged cohesion in the armed forces, and the emerging democracies inherited cohesive armed forces, insurgencies are less likely to arise - and where they arise less likely to survive for long - than where coup proofing legacies left states with a politicized and fractured armed forces.

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