

AMERICAN REVIEW OF CANADIAN STUDIES, VOLUME 46.2**PUBLISHED ON-LINE 6 JUNE 2016****A Quiet Revolution in Diplomacy—Quebec–UK Relations Since 1960**Tony McCulloch
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Quebec's modern international outlook and its current paradiplomacy can be dated largely from the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. Since then, the provincial government in Quebec City and the Federal Government in Ottawa have had to tread a fine line in accommodating each other's constitutional rights in the field of international relations—a line that has occasionally been breached, especially in the years following the Quiet Revolution and in critical periods such as those prior to the 1980 and 1995 referenda. Foreign governments have also had to engage in careful diplomacy in order to avoid upsetting either Ottawa or Quebec City—and this has been especially true in the case of the countries historically most involved with Canada and Quebec—France, the US, and Britain. But whereas there has been some academic writing on Quebec's relationships with France and the US, very little attention has been devoted to Quebec–UK relations since the Quiet Revolution. This article seeks to fill that gap and argues that the Quebec–UK relationship since the 1960s can itself best be characterized as a “quiet revolution” in diplomacy that has largely avoided the controversies that have sometimes dogged Quebec's relations with France and the US.

Keywords: Quebec; United Kingdom; Quiet Revolution; patriation; monarchy; paradiplomacy

Introduction

While diplomatic relations between Quebec and the UK can be dated back to before the First World War—the first Quebec legation in London opened in 1908—it was not until the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, associated with Jean Lesage and the Quebec Liberal party, that the province began to take full advantage of its international potential. This new approach to international policy was spelled out by Lesage's deputy premier, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, in his now famous doctrine of April 1965—i.e., that Quebec's international relations are “the

external extension of its domestic fields of jurisdiction” under the British North America Act of 1867, since adopted by Canada as the Constitutional Act of 1982. (Michaud 2011, 390–391). This article will therefore focus on Quebec–UK relations from the election of Jean Lesage’s Liberal government in 1960 to the present. In so doing it will argue that it was in the quarter-century between 1960 and 1985 that British policymakers radically altered their view of Quebec’s political and economic significance and that the contemporary Quebec–UK relationship was thereby established. It will further argue that the acid test of this new relationship was the so-called “Battle of London” (Bastien 2014)—the patriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982 without the consent of Quebec—and that, having survived that test, the “quiet revolution” in Quebec–UK relations has been consolidated and embedded within the wider Canada–UK relationship.

The term “quiet revolution” as a description of the evolution of the contemporary Quebec–UK relationship is appropriate in three main ways. First, the current Quebec–UK relationship mainly resulted from the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. While it was the constitutional design of the British North America Act of 1867 that provided the political and legal basis for Quebec’s internationalism, it was the new, more progressive and outward looking attitude of the Lesage government that gave it birth and it was the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine that embedded it in Quebec’s international policy (Michaud 2011). Second, the “quiet revolution” in Quebec–UK relations has been relatively unspectacular—in contrast to Quebec-France relations since the 1960s—especially De Gaulle’s “l’appel du balcon” during his highly controversial visit to Quebec in 1967 (Meren 2013; Thompson 1990) and the Gabon issue soon after (Black 1997). The Quebec–US relationship has also witnessed a number of flashpoints, notably at the time of the 1995 Referendum (Lemco 1994; Blanchard 1998; Stewart 2012). Third, the “quiet revolution” in Quebec–UK diplomacy has gone largely unnoticed—as can be seen in the paucity of historical writing on Quebec–UK

relations since 1960 either in Canada or in the UK, apart from within the wider context of Canada–UK relations (Painchaud 1977; Head and Trudeau 1995; Eldridge 1997) or of Quebec’s paradiplomacy (Balthazar 1999; McHugh 2015; Ouimet 2015). While there is some academic writing on the Quebec–US relationship and especially on the Quebec–France relationship, there is very little on Quebec–UK relations (e.g. Nossal 2012, 315–331).

The *Ancien Regime* —the era of Duplessis, 1944–1959

In order to appreciate the transformation in Quebec’s international outlook since the 1960s, and in the consequent change in the British government’s attitude towards Quebec, it is first necessary to examine the perspectives of the Quebec and UK governments during the Duplessis era that preceded the Quiet Revolution. Maurice Duplessis, the leader of the Union Nationale party, first became premier of Quebec in August 1936 and soon after he closed the Quebec Government House in London on economic grounds (Balthazar, 1999). He was also opposed to any involvement in the League of Nations or any action on behalf of Britain and France against the rising power of Hitler’s Germany. Defeated in the Quebec election of October 1939, he returned to power in August 1944 largely as a result of the widespread opposition in Quebec to wartime conscription (Nish, 1970; Black, 1998). Duplessis retained power until his death in 1959, partly through a strong emphasis on Quebec nationalism—one example of which was the adoption of the *Fleurdelisé* as the flag of Quebec in January 1948—and partly because of the support of the Roman Catholic Church with its emphasis on traditional values against what was seen as the radicalism and anti-clericalism of the Quebec Liberals. The Duplessis regime also acquired an unenviable reputation for electoral corruption, which no doubt helps to explain its longevity (Nish 1970; Black 1998).

The Dominions Office in London and its successor from 1947, the Commonwealth Relations Office, certainly regarded the Duplessis regime as backward-looking and corrupt. When, in September 1954, Canadian Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, himself a

French Canadian, attacked Duplessis as a reactionary who was stirring up Quebec nationalism to keep control of the province to the detriment of Quebec and the rest of Canada, a Commonwealth Relations Office official commented: “The French-Canadian, long since cut off from any ties with France, is by nature an isolationist imbued with the sense of a vital need to defend his language, religion and culture from being submerged in the powerful English-speaking world around him. Any suggestions of Federal grants to the provinces for, say, education, roads or other matters under provincial control, is viewed suspiciously as an attempt by the Federal Government to gain some control over the affairs of the provinces.” Duplessis was characterized by this British official as “Canada’s most controversial Provincial Premier and an aggressive guardian of Provincial autonomy.” He was also seen as “militantly anti-communist,” deriving his main support from Quebec’s farming communities “to whom he extends many preferences.”¹

The motive behind the Duplessis strategy was regarded in London as a desire for political autonomy for his province rather than concern for its economic well-being. But when provincial elections were held in July 1956, Duplessis and the Union Nationale were once again victorious, winning the vast majority of seats in the Quebec National Assembly. There were widespread reports of vote-rigging and corruption after the election which seemed to confirm, as reported by the British High Commission in Ottawa, the “dark suspicion that politics in Quebec were dirtier than elsewhere in Canada.” The general standards of election campaigns in the province were considered to be very low but “whatever is wrong with political morality in Quebec, it can hardly be denied that it is the Union Nationale Party which has profited most conspicuously from the present situation.”²

Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution

The death of Duplessis in September 1959 and of his successor as premier, Paul Sauvé, in January 1960, was followed that June by elections that brought to power the Quebec Liberal

party led by Jean Lesage. The Quebec Liberals had been out of office since August 1944 but were elected with 51 percent of the popular vote and 51 seats compared with 43 for the Union Nationale (Thompson, 1984). As well as domestic reforms involving education, secularization and the ownership of natural resources, the new government set out to enhance Quebec's standing with the rest of Canada and the world. Quebec's international profile had already been raised by the visit of the president of France, Charles De Gaulle, in April 1960 (Thompson 1988; Meren 2013). In March 1961, a Ministry of Federal–Provincial Relations was established which later took over international relations as well. It was renamed the Ministry of Inter–Governmental Affairs in April 1967, retitled in December 1984 as the Ministry of International Relations (MRI), named in 2012 as the Ministry of International Relations, La Francophonie and External Trade (Quebec Government 2015a), and finally, in 2014, shortened to the Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie.

Anxious to engage with the international community, Lesage's government established legations in Paris and London, and upgraded the New York legation that had been set up in 1940. Lesage arranged to visit France in October 1961 to open the Quebec legation and he also planned to stop off in London on the way, from September 19–22. News of this visit created some consternation in Whitehall in terms of correct diplomatic protocol. On the one hand, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa recommended giving him special treatment, writing that “Lesage is outstanding among the Premiers and has been tipped by many as the ultimate choice of the Liberal Party for their national leader and as a possible future Prime Minister of Canada.” On the other hand, the Commonwealth Relations Office felt that the arrangements for his visit should be left to Canada House and that if he was given special treatment it would have to be given to other provincial leaders arriving from Canada and elsewhere.³

Lesage's visit to London proved to be a relatively low-key affair, although he met some government officials at a lunch organized by the Canadian High Commission. This was in stark contrast to the attention lavished on him in Paris, where—as the Commonwealth Relations Office ruefully noted—he was greeted by President de Gaulle like a head of state, and even in Rome, where he was treated as an international celebrity. This diplomatic embarrassment caused British—and Canadian—officials to rethink their attitude toward visits by Quebec leaders, and when Lesage planned to return to London in October 1962 to open the Quebec legation in the UK, it was decided to make more of an effort to receive him. In fact, Lesage's visit had to be canceled because of the Quebec elections that were called for November 1962, effectively postponing Lesage's return to London until May 1963. By this time his party had not only been convincingly re-elected in Quebec, but he had also played a major role in the return to power of the federal Liberals under Lester Pearson in April 1963.⁴

Thus, when he visited London in May 1963, Lesage received VIP treatment from both Canada House and the British government. This included a luncheon party hosted by the Duke of Devonshire, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations; a call on the Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys; tea at the Mansion House with the Lord Mayor of London; an audience with the Queen; and a meeting with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. He also met various business leaders—an important part of his agenda as one of the main aims of his visit was “a mission to put Quebec on the map in an industrial way and end the Province's tendency for isolation.”⁵

The highlight of Lesage's visit was the official opening of Quebec Government House on May 7, accompanied by Agent General Hughes Lapointe, who had been appointed in January 1962. It was obviously an emotional occasion for the Quebec premier and he began his speech by saying a few words in French. He then explained to the assembled dignitaries what it meant for Quebec to have an international policy. The aim, he said, was for Quebec

“to be present,” to be part of the larger community both in Canada and beyond. By raising Quebec’s international profile other countries would see for themselves what Quebec had to offer in terms of natural resources, business, tourism and culture. Pointing to the valuable work already being done by the Quebec agencies in Paris and New York, Lesage said that he was convinced that the new agency in London would be just as valuable. “We are confident,” he said, “that it will render great service to our province, and serve to strengthen the ties of friendship between the British people and Canadians in general and Quebecers in particular.” (*The Times* May 10, 1963).

While he was in London, Lesage played down the recent formation of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) which became notorious in the 1960s for its regular bombings that killed several people and injured many others. Equally embarrassing for the international image of Quebec, especially in the UK, were the troubles that took place during the Queen’s visit on October 10, 1964, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Quebec Conference on Canadian confederation, when violence between police and separatists became known as “Samedi de la Matraque”—“the Saturday of the Baton” (*Le Devoir* October 11, 1964; *Montreal Gazette* October 11, 1964; *The Times* October 11, 1964).

Because of the over-representation of rural constituencies in Quebec, the Lesage government was defeated in the general election of June 1966, although it obtained a much larger number of votes than the traditionalist Union Nationale party that took power, having campaigned on the slogan of “Equality or Independence.” Daniel Johnson, who was the Quebec premier from June 1966 to September 1968, paid an official visit to France in May 1967, where he was received with much ceremony by President de Gaulle. He was also due to meet Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London, but this had to be canceled owing—it was said—to insufficient time. In July 1967 De Gaulle paid a return visit to Quebec and visited the Montreal Expo. It was on this occasion that he made his controversial “*Vive le Québec*

libre” speech to the huge crowd that had gathered to see him in Montreal (Thompson 1988; Meren 2013).

The October Crisis, 1970

The Liberals returned to power in May 1970 under the leadership of Robert Bourassa and soon found themselves dealing with a major crisis that threatened Quebec’s relations not only with the rest of Canada but especially with the UK. This was the so-called October crisis when the FLQ kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross, and Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte. This resulted in Bourassa calling on the Federal Government led by Pierre Trudeau to invoke the War Measures Act in order that the Quebec government could adopt emergency powers for use against the FLQ, including the suspension of habeas corpus—a step announced by Trudeau on October 16 (English 2009). The next day the FLQ revealed that Laporte had been executed and that Cross would not be released until its demands had been met, including the publication of the FLQ manifesto, the release of FLQ “political prisoners,” and safe passage for Cross’s kidnappers to Cuba or Algeria. Eventually, after 62 days in captivity, Cross was released unharmed on December 3, 1970. At the same time, five FLQ kidnappers were flown to Cuba (McRoberts 1999; Tetley 2007; Bouthillier and Clouthier 2010).

In the wake of this crisis, Sir Peter Hayman, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, produced a report for London titled “A New Look at Quebec,” which gave a comprehensive review of the current state of affairs in the province.⁶ Acknowledging that the issue of Quebec was not a new one, he argued that what he called “the Canadian kaleidoscope” had been sufficiently shaken by the events of 1970 so as to justify a fresh examination of the UK’s relationship with the province. “The French Canadians in Quebec possess most, if not all, of the attributes of nationhood,” he wrote. “They have their distinctive language, culture, history, geography and substantial economic resources. They

have, too, an enemy of sorts in the English Canadians (quite apart from the pressure on their language and culture from the United States). ... They lack only political independence. Hitherto defensive, inbred, introverted, and deeply suspicious of modern trends and developments, the Quebecois were emancipated in the early '60s by a dynamic and progressive Liberal government under Lesage. The result is a young nation bursting with a mixture of new confidence and lingering self-doubt, seeking to assert itself more positively in the Canadian scene and perhaps prepared, if all else fails, to opt out of Canada.”

Under the Union Nationale government between 1966 and 1970 Quebec had lost its sense of direction, Hayman argued, but Bourassa and the Liberals now had the chance to put Quebec back on course. Bourassa’s main problems lay in the economic field. He had won the election essentially on bread and butter issues and had made much of his promise to create 100,000 new jobs by the end of 1971. At the time of his election things looked bleak for Quebec—about 40 percent of Canada’s unemployed were in Quebec, especially in Montreal. Clearly there was no quick or easy answer to this, wrote Hayman. Bourassa’s drive to encourage investment had not solved the short term problems of Quebec and the October crisis had “shattered the confidence of the province and of the rest of Canada.” The unemployment situation in Quebec was now worse than in 1970—10 percent in Quebec in January 1971 compared with a national figure of 8.1 percent. Most federal aid was going to Quebec but there was a limit to how much the Federal Government could do without upsetting the other provinces.

“What are Britain’s interests in this complex situation?” Hayman’s report continued. “It was greatly in Britain’s political and commercial interest that Canada should remain united, strong and capable of remaining independent of the United States,” he said. “We should not of course involve ourselves directly in the Quebec problem; nor, on the other hand, should we deal only with the Anglophone provinces. In fact, while strictly observing

the Federal proprieties, we should treat Quebec exactly as we do other provinces—solely in accordance with our assessment of its importance to us commercially or in any other way.” Above all, he concluded, “we must keep a very wary eye on future developments in Quebec. We must continue to hope that all will be well, but I believe it is no longer inevitable that the province will remain part of Canada in the long run.”⁷

Robert Bourassa visits to UK, 1971 and 1972

Not surprisingly in view of Hayman’s memo and Bourassa’s role in the October crisis, when the Quebec premier arrived in London he received VIP treatment, including a meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath. A briefing note for Heath prior to his meeting with Bourassa stressed his federalist credentials and the fact that the Canadian government was keen for him to be well received. “The principal objective of M Bourassa’s tour is to attract new investment to Quebec as a means of fulfilling his election pledge to create 100,000 new jobs in the Province” the memo stated. “On his success in doing so may depend not only the future of his own Government but, possibly, the continued unity of Canada as a Federal State. It is in Britain’s interest that Canadian stability and unity should be preserved both because of our considerable economic stake in the country and because Canada’s contribution to the Western Alliance could be affected if she were faced with prolonged internal disorder or if Quebec were to break away.”⁸

At the meeting with Heath on April 14, 1971, discussion centered mainly on economic matters and Bourassa explained that unemployment in Quebec, and a rise in the numbers looking for work because of an increased birth rate, made it imperative for Quebec to expand its industrial investment and that this needed to be done at a rate higher than the province’s own resources would permit. This was the rationale for his present European tour. Bourassa also said that the extreme separatist movement in Quebec was under control and that, with economic prosperity and a guarantee of cultural security, separatism would lose its

appeal. In his view, it did not make sense for Quebec, with its current economic problems, to aim for separatism when throughout the world the movement was towards greater economic unity.⁹

Bourassa made another visit to the UK the following year, ostensibly to attend and speak at a Canada–US investment symposium that was taking place in London from November 28–30, 1972. During this trip, he also met Heath again as well as Wilson, the leader of the opposition, and various government ministers and officials. At his meeting with Heath, Bourassa said that it was of comparatively small importance as far as Canadian unity was concerned whether the Liberals or Conservatives were in power in Ottawa. The crucial question was whether the Liberal Party or the *Parti Québécois*—formed in 1968—would win at the next provincial general election. He felt that the PQ’s idea of separation followed by monetary union between an independent Quebec and Canada made no sense and he compared such a situation with Europe where he believed that there could be no monetary union without economic union. Bourassa also invited Heath to visit Quebec on his next trip to Canada, to which Heath expressed interest and appreciation but made no commitment.¹⁰

Visit of James Callaghan to Quebec, 1976

In fact, Heath did not visit Canada again as prime minister and nor did his successor, Harold Wilson, who became prime minister in February 1974. However, a Canadian visit was made by Wilson’s successor, James Callaghan, in September 1976, which included a private lunch with Bourassa in Quebec City. Bourassa brought up the thorny issue of Quebec’s position under the terms of the British North America Act of 1867 by asking Callaghan if he would promise not to amend the act, or transfer it to the Canadian government—patriation, as it was known—unless all the provinces, and especially Quebec, agreed (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990, 341). The British prime minister, who had no doubt been warned to expect this request by Pierre Trudeau (who was keen to tackle the patriation issue), told Bourassa that he could

make no such commitment. The British government's relations were with the Federal Government, he said, and the UK would have to agree to any request made by the Canadian parliament.¹¹

René Lévesque and the *Parti Québécois* in power

Callaghan's blunt rejection of his approach was a bitter blow for Bourassa but worse was to follow. He and the Liberals were steadily losing public support in Quebec and the elections that took place in November 1976 resulted in a landslide victory for René Lévesque and the *Parti Québécois*, including the loss of Bourassa's own seat. In 1978, he was replaced as Liberal Leader by Claude Ryan, former editor of *Le Devoir* (Lévesque 1986; McRoberts 1999). Lévesque, who had been a member of Jean Lesage's Liberal government, had quit the party in 1967 and helped to form the PQ. He was an outspoken critic of Trudeau and was known for "shooting from the hip" during interviews and press conferences. When asked about the Queen at a press conference in 1971, he had said: "I have great respect for the Queen as she is the Queen of Great Britain which is a respectable country" but, he added, "what the hell role should she have in Quebec—or in Canada for that matter?" (CBC Digital archives 1971).

On becoming the premier of Quebec, Lévesque pursued a more diplomatic line on independence, focusing primarily on the need for good government. This strategy appeared to meet with some success and it was a worried Trudeau who met for dinner with James Callaghan at 10 Downing Street on December 7, 1978. Trudeau told the British prime minister that Canada was facing a grave crisis. An independent Quebec would be disastrous economically for the Québécois since independence could lead only to increased economic domination by the United States. Moreover, Quebec, with one-third of Canada's population, was essential to the continued existence of the country. If Canada fell apart then the continent would be dominated by one superpower, stretching from the Mexican border to the Arctic

Circle. Trudeau added that the English Canadians needed to realize that Quebec would only be happy in a confederation if she felt at home in it. Otherwise Lévesque might succeed in persuading the province to opt for independence.¹²

Trudeau had other problems apart from Quebec—his popularity had waned and his party faced defeat at the next election. In May 1979 the general election in fact resulted in a defeat for the Liberals—despite winning the largest share of the vote—and a Progressive Conservative minority government under Joe Clark. Trudeau announced his resignation but when Clark's government lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, another general election took place and Trudeau was back as prime minister in February 1980—just in time for the referendum that Lévesque had promised in Quebec, which was scheduled for November 15, 1980 (McRoberts 1999; English 2009). Like the October crisis 10 years before, the referendum debate and the very real possibility that Quebec might eventually vote for independence led British officials in Canada to discuss the likely consequences for the UK if Quebec seceded. In particular, in March 1980, John Rich, the British consul general in Montreal, produced a significant discussion paper about British policy in the event of Quebec independence.

“Clearly it is important for Britain that Canada, our Commonwealth and NATO partner, should remain strong and united,” wrote Rich. “Conversely, it is not in our interest that the ‘Quebec problem’ should be a running sore which becomes worse rather than better and consequently weakens the Atlantic Community to a degree disproportionate to its intrinsic importance.” After initial trouble of adjusting its economy if the economic union with the rest of Canada were dissolved, Rich believed that “an independent Quebec would be a viable state on the scale of the Scandinavian countries and play a responsible role in the international community. The real problem would be the future of the rest of Canada, most particularly Ontario and the Maritimes.” However, despite his forebodings, Rich felt that

separation would be avoided. "I base this on the instinctive caution and common sense of the French Canadian in the street which counter-balances nationalist enthusiasm, providing that his indignation is not over-provoked," he said. "But we cannot bank on this. Looking to the future we have to handle our affairs in Quebec in such a way that specific British interests are well promoted whichever way things turn out."

As Rich noted, Britain held quite a few cards if Quebec were to become independent. Apart from the fact that the UK was Quebec's second-largest export market, British investment in Quebec, the desire for an exchange of experience and know-how in many different fields of life, and to diversify friendships and relationships was also significant, as was the similarity of their parliamentary systems. According to Rich, there were no major bilateral problems affecting British relations with the Quebec government. Britain was liked and respected. "Modern French Quebecers are learning to distinguish the difference between the British of Britain and Anglo-Canadians," Rich wrote. "They are increasingly re-discovering Britain and like what they find. We cannot, however, take the French Canadians for granted. In our relationships the ground, fertile though it is, needs to be diligently cultivated."

"All this means," concluded Rich, "that British representation ... has a job of substance to do in Quebec, building upon already favorable foundations with an eye to the future whichever way the constitutional issue finally turns out. The City of Montreal and the Province of Quebec are stimulating and agreeable places in which to work, and I have found the French Canadians to be perhaps the most responsive of any people I know to effort made in their direction. ... My successors, whether they are called Consul-General, High Commissioner or Ambassador, and whether they reside in Montreal or Quebec City, are assured of a rewarding appointment."¹³

Sir John Ford, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, also wrote his own paper for London in which he was less optimistic than Rich about the future of Canadian unity and very concerned that the return of Trudeau would play into the hands of Lévesque and the PQ. “At present, for want of any clearly visible and unifying threat from outside, it seems as if Canada’s politicians are being borne remorselessly along by the tide of Quebec nationalism: this points to the ultimate secession of the province,” he wrote. “Yet, if that happens, it need not be disastrous to Quebec or our interests.” Ford argued that Canada under Trudeau’s leadership was not punching its weight internationally. “It is not inconceivable,” he continued, “that a strong and independent Quebec could be comparable as an ally within NATO to, for example, Norway or Denmark; although the United States would have to accept traumatic adjustments both to NORAD and to the control and administration of the St. Lawrence Seaway.” Much would depend, he thought, on the circumstances of the secession and whether “the ill-will generated thereby was such as to sour for years Quebec’s relationship with the rest of Canada and to make her an awkward partner in the defence of the North Atlantic.”¹⁴

The Patriation of the Canadian Constitution, 1982

In any event, the referendum proposal put forward by Lévesque was defeated - 60% of the electorate voting “No” against 40 percent voting “Yes.” This was not the end of the issue, of course, but the result encouraged Trudeau to proceed with his own constitutional package—the patriation of the Canadian Constitution including a Charter of Rights that would codify common law rights, recognize the treaty rights of indigenous peoples, and establish a domestic amending formula, i.e., one that would be under Canadian control. Patriation essentially meant that the process of amending the Canadian Constitution (i.e., the former British North America Act of 1867 and the new Charter of Rights) would, in future, reside in Canada rather than in Britain. The exact details were controversial, however, because the

rights of the provinces were involved which is why Bourassa had raised the subject with Callaghan in Quebec City in September 1976 and urged him to oppose Trudeau's version of patriation if it was not accepted by all of the provinces, including Quebec.

Lévesque and his ministers now raised the patriation issue with Ford and his officials in December 1980. Lévesque pointed out that Trudeau's proposals were being challenged by several provinces, including his own. Quebec's objection was based on an analysis of the 1867 British North America Act taken in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Statute of Westminster of 1931, which had officially recognized the equal status of Britain and the Dominions within the Empire. The PQ's view was that the Federal Government should not be allowed to override provisions in the 1867 Act prohibiting it from interference in matters of provincial jurisdiction. According to the minutes of the meeting, the PQ ministers "expressed the hope that the British Parliament should not act supinely by merely accepting demands placed upon it by the Canadian Federal Parliament. Then, as later, Sir John Ford stressed the need for Canadians to reconcile their own differences before the Constitutional issue was transferred to Westminster." Lévesque thought that "Trudeau would continue to place great importance on the obligation of the British Parliament to meet any Federal requirement."¹⁵

Lévesque was correct. In September 1981, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Government did have the power to proceed with patriation without the consent of the provinces but that it would be desirable to obtain their consent. It seemed unlikely that Trudeau would get even a majority of the provinces to agree to patriation but ultimately Lévesque was outmaneuvered in what was labelled as the "Night of Long Knives"—a succession of one-on-one and small group meetings throughout the night of November 4–5, 1981, as a result of which, Trudeau reached a deal with nine other provinces to repatriate the Constitution, including the Charter of

Rights. Quebec was not a party to these meetings and tried to block their outcome, but to no avail (Graham 2011).

A resolution of the Canadian Parliament was then conveyed to Queen Elizabeth II who, on April 17, 1982, acting on the advice of the UK Government, proclaimed the Constitution Act of 1982. While accepting the Canadian Parliament's request, the British government was privately aghast at Trudeau's methods and the way he had placed it in an invidious position. The British were very aware of the opposition in Canada to Trudeau's proposals—not just from Quebec—and there was some disquiet within Westminster at the turn of events. But in the end the constitutional convention of acceding to the wishes of the Canadian Parliament outweighed all other considerations (Hughes 2013; Bastien 2014).

Lévesque's frustration with the British government over its acceptance of the Constitution may explain why he did not include the UK in his European tour in June/July 1982. He eventually visited London in April 1984. "Quebec still has a 'sour after-taste' about the way the Canadian Constitution was 'rubber stamped' by your mother of parliaments," he told the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce, in what one newspaper described as "a humorous but often barbed speech." Indeed, "the Premier made no effort to play down either the continuing Ottawa-Quebec differences or his party's long-term goal of Quebec independence." But he was keen to attract British investment to Quebec and this outweighed his annoyance with the British Government, although a meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was noticeably missing from his trip. He pointed out to his business audience that Britain was Quebec's second-most important trade market after the United States and, anxious to reassure British investors, he concluded his speech by saying that if Quebec finally decided to leave Canada, there would be even greater potential for economic development (*Montreal Gazette*, April 18, 1984; *Le Devoir*, April 18, 1984). Lévesque's one

and only visit to the UK as premier of Quebec was thus a reassuringly positive occasion—despite the “sour after-taste” of the patriation episode. Also reassuring from a British point of view was the PQ’s publication of its eminently sensible and moderate international policy—*Quebec in the World*—in the following year (Quebec Government 1985).

In October 1985, Lévesque retired as premier and was replaced by Pierre-Marc Johnson, the son of Daniel Johnson, the Union Nationale premier of Quebec from 1966 to 1968. In December, the PQ was on the receiving end of a landslide victory by the Quebec Liberals, making Johnson the shortest serving premier in Quebec’s history. Robert Bourassa, the great survivor of Quebec politics, returned once more as premier, almost 10 years after his crushing defeat at the hands of Lévesque and the PQ in 1976 (McRoberts 1999; Brault 2011; Georges-Hebe 2012). Bourassa’s return marked the end of a critical phase in Quebec–UK relations from 1960 to 1985. The relationship had weathered the Quiet Revolution, the October Crisis, the advent of the *Parti Québécois*, the Referendum of 1980 and, above all, the patriation of the Constitution in 1982 and the ire of René Lévesque.

The 1995 Referendum

In the quarter century since Lévesque’s retirement, Quebec–UK relations have remained on a sound footing with little to disturb them apart from the periodic issue of Quebec separatism. During the second premiership of Bourassa from 1985 to 1994, the British Government remained an interested but neutral observer—in public at least—while the constitutional wrangles associated with the Meech Lake Accord brokered by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1987 worked their way through the Canadian political system. Bourassa visited London again in January 1989 and met Margaret Thatcher—“*La Dame de fer*” as *Le Devoir* called her (*Montreal Gazette* January 20, 1989; *Le Devoir* January 20, 1989). The main feature of the Quebec–UK relationship continued to be the economic one, as Bourassa’s talks with Thatcher made clear. As ever, he came seeking British investment in Quebec and was

also concerned about the impact of the European Union on Quebec's trading position. He retired in January 1994 to be replaced by Daniel Johnson Jr., the son and brother of former premiers of Quebec (Brault 2011; Georges-Hebe 2012).

In September 1994, Johnson and the Quebec Liberals were defeated in the provincial elections and the PQ once again formed a government, this time under Jacques Parizeau. The failure to ratify either the Meech Lake Accord of April 1987 or the subsequent Charlottetown accord of August 1992, both of which had aimed to recognize Quebec's distinctive place within Canada, had revived the separatist movement within the province and led to a second referendum in October 1995 in which some 60 percent of Francophone voters supported separation but which was narrowly defeated by a total vote of 49.42 percent in favor and 50.58 percent against (Chrétien 2007; Hébert and Lapierre 2014). Once again UK officials in Canada were careful to avoid any public involvement in the issue and similarly British ministers and officials in London adopted strict neutrality in public, mindful, as in 1980, that the top priority was for the British relationship with both Canada and Quebec to continue in an amicable way regardless of the outcome of the referendum (Bayne 2010 and 2014).

This is not to say that the British government was unconcerned at the prospect of a separatist majority in the referendum which, it was feared, would have serious repercussions for both Quebec and the rest of Canada, especially economically and strategically. Indeed, the British view was that Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien, had been far too complacent in his attitude towards the referendum and on October 28, shortly before the referendum vote, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Sir Nicholas Bayne, met with Chrétien and read out a message from British Prime Minister John Major expressing concern at the prospect of a "yes" vote (Bayne 2014).

British diplomacy during the referendum debate was very different, in public at least, from that of France and the United States. As regards the former, it was widely assumed that

French President Jacques Chirac, was ready to give immediate official recognition to Quebec as a sovereign state if the “Yes” campaign emerged triumphant after the referendum vote (Bosher 1998; Bastien 1999; Herbert and Lapierre 2014). US diplomacy, on the other hand, worked in the opposite direction as Washington made it clear that it much preferred that Canada should remain intact and indicated that an independent Quebec would not automatically be given the benefits accruing to Canada from the recently negotiated NAFTA agreement (Blanchard 1998; Stewart 2012).

With the defeat of the referendum, which he blamed on “money and the ethnic vote,” Parizeau resigned as premier and was succeeded in January 1996 by Lucien Bouchard, who had led the “Yes” campaign during the referendum and very nearly achieved victory. Bouchard had been the Canadian ambassador in Paris (1985–1988), a member of Brian Mulroney’s Conservative Federal Government, and one of the founders of the *Bloc Québécois*. Perhaps not surprisingly, Bouchard did not visit the UK as premier but he did travel to France in September 1997 for a five-day visit that was much commented upon as an indication of a “special relationship” with France that continued to test the constitutional limits of the PQ government’s international ambitions. Bouchard was accompanied by his deputy and minister for economic affairs, Bernard Landry; his minister of culture, Louise Beaudoin, and his minister for international relations, Sylvain Simard. During the visit Bouchard met with French President Chirac, and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, while his colleagues met with their counterparts. To some observers, the event resembled an official state visit, with Quebec's *délégation générale* in Paris acting “almost as the embassy of a sovereign state” (*The Economist* September 25, 1997).

Bouchard’s successor, Bernard Landry, who became premier in March 2001, came to London in October 2002 as part of the delegation that celebrated the 40th anniversary of the opening of Quebec Government House. It was also during Landry’s premiership that a

Quebec–British Council agreement was signed in April 2002 to promote cooperation in the three key areas of education, culture and science and technology. This agreement incorporated a language assistant exchange program originating in 1980 under which 60 citizens from Quebec and Britain were to be selected each year to work as teaching assistants in French or English in Quebec and the United Kingdom (Quebec Government 2015b).

Thus Quebec–UK relations remained cordial but they were less close than Quebec’s relationship with France which was underpinned by official visits to Paris and Quebec in alternate years (Quebec Government 2015c). The French government’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was also more in tune with public opinion in Quebec than the support given to President George W. Bush by the British government. On March 15, 2003, only a few days before the beginning of hostilities, a crowd of 200,000 people took part in a “walk for peace” in Montreal and similar marches were organized in other cities in Quebec—as indeed they were in Paris, London and New York (*Montreal Gazette*, March 15, 2003; *Le Devoir*, March 15, 2003).

Working in Concert, 2006

In April 2003, the Quebec Liberals returned to power led by Jean Charest who had been a member of Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government and one of only two PC survivors (indeed, briefly leader of the party) in the federal election of October 1993. Charest held office until September 2012 and brought a renewed sense of direction to the agenda of the Quebec Liberal Party, including international relations. In May 2006 “Working in Concert”—Quebec’s new international policy—was published. Its emphasis on relations with the US was readily apparent and not surprising. In the preceding year the United States had accounted for over 80 percent of Quebec’s exports (compared with 10 percent to Europe), 73 percent of its inward investment (22 percent from Europe) and two-thirds of its 3.3 million tourists (one-fifth from Europe). Second in importance to the US was France, because of the

close political and cultural relationship that had been developed since the premiership of Jean Lesage. The bilateral relationship with the UK also received several honorable mentions such as the statement that “Quebec’s historic and institutional ties with the UK generate important economic, scientific and cultural exchanges, which it hopes to expand.” Indeed, Quebec’s exports to the UK remained much greater than those to France—but a long way behind those to the USA (Quebec Government 2006).

The historic and institutional links between Quebec and the UK mentioned in the 2006 international policy document were much in evidence during the Charest premiership. For example, on December 17, 2008, the British High Commissioner to Canada, Anthony Cary, gave the President of the National Assembly and the Minister of International Relations a facsimile of the Quebec Act of 1774, as a gift from the British government to commemorate Quebec City’s 400th anniversary. In November 2008, a group of MPs from the Scottish Parliament visited Quebec and in April 2009, Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament Alex Fergusson marked Tartan Day with a visit to Quebec’s National Assembly (Quebec Government 2015b).

The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall made an official visit to Canada in November 2009 during which they spent a day in Montreal and were received by Mayor Gerald Tremblay and by Premier Charest. They visited the city’s Biodome, headquarters for Cirque de Soleil, and there was also an official dinner. *Bloc Québécois* leader Gilles Duceppe declined an invitation to the dinner saying that he did not approve of the monarchy’s position in the Canadian constitution or of the expense to taxpayers in Canada—and especially Quebec—of the royal visit. There was also a sizeable demonstration of about 150 protesters against the monarchy at the Black Watch armory where Prince Charles, as Colonel in Chief, presented the regiment with its colors (*Le Devoir* November 11, 2009; *Montreal Gazette* November 11, 2009; *The Times* November 11, 2009).

In June 2011, Charest visited London at the start of a five-day visit to Europe and the UK to promote the newly launched Plan Nord. In a speech to a large audience of business and financial leaders he affirmed: “We have rich and diverse relations with the United Kingdom. The Government of Québec wants to promote the Plan Nord with its main partners first, those with which it has strong ties” (Quebec Government, 2011). During his trip, Charest also met with key UK government figures including Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary William Hague and Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change Chris Huhne. He also had talks with President and CEO of the Climate Group Mark Kenber (Quebec Government, 2011).

In the following month, there was an official royal visit to Quebec by the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge—the first such visit since 1964. The itinerary included both Montreal and Quebec City and the popularity of William and Kate, representing a new generation of British royals, was clearly evident. The only opposition came from a small and well-behaved group of demonstrators, apparently belonging to the Quebec Resistance Movement, who collected outside an Irish pub a few streets away from the royal party at City Hall. Despite a banner referring to the Acadian expulsion of 1755, their spokesman said that they had no bad feelings toward the British empire and were more concerned with the future than the past. Essentially they wanted an independent Quebec without a monarchy (*Le Devoir* July 3–4, 2011; *Montreal Gazette* July 3–4, 2011; *Daily Telegraph* July 2–3, 2011). The largely trouble-free nature of the visit suggested that any residual resentment against Britain as the former colonial ruler of Quebec has all but disappeared and that the Quebec and the UK governments were indeed “working in concert.”

Fifty years of the Quebec–UK relationship in London were celebrated in 2012 by commemorating the appointment of the first Agent General to be based in London—Hughes Lapointe—in January 1962. In a glossy brochure published for the occasion, the Quebec

government took the opportunity to underline the significance of its relations with the UK. A message from Premier Charest said: “As the Quebec Government Office in London celebrates its 50th anniversary, these relations have evolved into a mutually beneficial partnership that is strongly reflected in the economic, cultural and institutional sectors. Today the United Kingdom is amongst Quebec’s most important European economic partners and its capital is a prime export market for Quebec’s culture” (Quebec Government 2012).

Economic data from Statistics Canada backed up this statement, showing that in 2011 the UK was Quebec’s main European economic partner and its third largest global trade partner, after the United States and China. Trade in goods between Quebec and the United Kingdom totaled \$5.8 billion; this trade consisted of exports to the UK totaling \$1.2 billion (6.7 percent of the value of Canada’s exports to the UK) while imports from the United Kingdom totaled \$4.6 billion (44.4 percent of the value of Canadian imports from the UK). The UK was also one of the largest foreign investors in Quebec, with over 128 Quebec-based subsidiaries of companies such as Rio Tinto Alcan, Rolls-Royce, and the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline. Some 50 Quebec companies were reported as having operations in the UK, including major players such as Bombardier, CGI, CAE and SNC-Lavalin (Quebec Government 2015d).

PQ interlude, September 2012–April 2014

The election in September 2012 of a minority PQ government in Quebec under Pauline Marois did not signal any radical departure from the essential nature of the Quebec–UK relationship. While it is true that during her visit to the UK in January 2013 much more media attention was devoted to her trip to Edinburgh than to her time in London—speculation being that her meeting with the Scottish first minister and leader of the Scottish National Party, Alex Salmond, constituted a “separatist summit,” appeared to be very wide of the mark. It was noticeable, for example, that the Scottish first minister did not take up Marois’ offer—

made in an interview with a Scottish newspaper, *The Herald*—to share with him documents from the PQ campaign in the 1995 referendum (*Globe and Mail*, January 28–29, 2013; *Montreal Gazette*, January 28–29, 2013). It was also pointed out by some commentators that Scotland had very longstanding links with Canada—for example, Sir John A. Macdonald, Canada’s first prime minister was born in Glasgow in January 1815—and that Alex Salmond had himself referred to these ancestral links (*The Guardian*, February 8, 2013).

Thus, the British government was unlikely to have been too concerned by Marois’ visit to Scotland in terms of its implications for Quebec–UK relations. Indeed, the pragmatic nature of this relationship is made all the more clear by comparing it to the Quebec–France relationship and the attention devoted to the doctrine of “*non-ingérence, mais non-indifférence*” (neither interference nor indifference) on the part of France towards Quebec. Rather like the so-called “special relationship” between the UK and the United States, the attitude of each French president towards Quebec is regularly examined for signs of favor or disfavor, as it was during Marois’ visit to France in October 2012, shortly after becoming premier. On this occasion she was warmly greeted by Francois Hollande, the new president of France, who appeared to be much more sympathetic towards Quebec’s international aspirations than his predecessor, Nicholas Sarkozy—a change in the political relationship between Quebec and France much discussed in the Quebec press and in the Canadian media more generally (*Le Devoir* October 15, 2012; *Globe and Mail* October 15, 2013; *Le Soleil* October 15, 2013; *National Post* October 15, 2013).

By contrast, the Quebec premier’s focus during her visit to London was very much on economic diplomacy and the headline event was her attendance on January 28 at a lunch organized by the Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce where she spoke on the subject of “Quebec—a thriving economy based on innovation and creativity.” In a press release at the end of the visit she referred in neutral terms to her time in Scotland and the potential for

developing further economic, social and cultural links. She then said: “The UK is our largest foreign trading partner after China and the United States. This visit has enabled us to maintain a dialogue with significant partners for our economy and for our development and has shown that Quebec offers clear advantages in attracting new investment” (Quebec Government 2013a). Her central message was that Quebec was “open for business”—a phrase that she repeated several times during her lunchtime address. In order to encourage UK business leaders to invest even more in Quebec she also pointed to measures that her government had recently taken to encourage foreign investment, including a 10-year tax holiday for investments of at least \$300 million in certain sectors, and a credit enhancement tax in research and development (Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce, March/April 2013). The amicable relations between Quebec and the UK were also on show at the reopening of Quebec Government House in London in May 2013, presided over by the PQ’s Agent-General Stéphane Paquet (Quebec Government 2013b). In the same month, one of Quebec’s major international companies, Bombardier, announced that it had won a contract with Transport for London worth \$137 million for train carriages to be built at its factory in Derby (Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce June/July 2013).

Return of the Liberals, April 2014

In April 2014 the Liberals were returned to power in Quebec, having won 70 seats to 30 for the PQ, and formed a majority government led by Philippe Couillard. The new premier led a commercial delegation to London in January 2015 and addressed an audience of 200 business leaders and decision-makers at Drapers Hall, in the heart of the city, on the theme of “Quebec–UK: accelerating trade relations between established partners.” In time-honored fashion he called for broader ties with the United Kingdom in terms of trade, investment, research, and innovation, pointing out existing synergies in aerospace, information technologies, life sciences, and clean technologies. He also presented Quebec’s Plan Nord

and new Maritime Strategy, centered upon the strategic location of the St. Lawrence Seaway, and referred to the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) concluded in August 2014 as a great opportunity to increase trade and investment between Quebec and the UK (Quebec Government 2015e; Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce Winter/Spring 2015).

The next day, January 16, he traveled to Wales—possibly by way of contrast with his predecessor’s visit to Scotland two years before—and met with First Minister Carwyn Jones, before visiting the newly constructed Welsh Parliament Building. He then visited the Life Sciences Hub Wales and announced a collaborative partnership between the hub and Sherbrooke Innopole, an organization devoted to the promotion of economic development in the Sherbrooke area of Quebec. The agreement is intended to encourage the growth of innovative firms and the facilitation of exchanges between universities, research institutes, and healthcare institutions in Quebec and Wales. Premier Couillard concluded his visit in Bridgend, South Wales, where he toured the new CGI security operations center that is due to create more than 600 jobs over five years, making it one of the biggest investments in Wales in recent times and a good example of Quebec’s entrepreneurial spirit (Quebec Government 2015e).

Conclusions

The quiet revolution in Quebec–UK diplomacy since the 1960s has witnessed the gradual emergence of “a very amicable relationship based on mutual respect, political pragmatism and economic cooperation”—to quote a recent Quebec Agent-General (Boulangier 2013). Mutual respect can be seen in the frequent and trouble-free meetings made by British and Quebec leaders and dignitaries to each other’s major cities and commercial centers and the warm welcome and ready access accorded to them. Political pragmatism is evident in the downplaying of the separatism issue in the years since the 1995 Quebec Referendum and the

sensitivity of British diplomats to the relationship between the Canadian High Commission based at Canada House, Trafalgar Square, and the representatives of the Quebec provincial government based at the Quebec delegation near St James Palace—a relationship that is especially delicate when there is a PQ government in Quebec City. Finally, economic co-operation has been a hallmark of the Quebec–UK relationship since the 1960s and can be seen not only in the emphasis on commercial priorities when Quebec ministers visit the UK but in the very significant trade and investment between Quebec and the UK that has been referred to above.

Underlying the current very positive relationship between Quebec and the UK is a gradual shift in focus away from separatism as a divisive issue since the 1995 Referendum, not only between Quebec and the rest of Canada but also one affecting friendly foreign states such as the US, France and the United Kingdom (Head and Trudeau 1995). Recent provincial and federal elections in Quebec—in April 2014 and October 2015 respectively—appear to afford strong evidence of the “silent revolution” in Quebec society identified by Jocelyn Létourneau whereby the younger generation of Québécois are not primarily interested in the colonial past but in a global future in which the English language and the United Kingdom, especially as part of the European Union, are likely to be key components (2013). Thus while not approaching the political and cultural affinity of the relationship between Quebec and France or the current economic and financial significance of Quebec’s relationship with the US, the contemporary Quebec–UK relationship is nevertheless an important one and worthy of rather more attention from historians and political scientists than it has tended to be given.

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Notes

¹ UK National Archives (henceforth UKNA), Kew Gardens, London, Dominions Office, DO 35/5382, Commonwealth Relations Office memo, September 29, 1954 prepared for Commonwealth Relations minister; *Manchester Guardian* 7 October 1956; *Daily Mail* October 15, 1956.

² UKNA, G.E. Crombie, British High Commission, Ottawa, to L.B. Walsh-Atkins, Commonwealth Relations Office, October 1, 1956.

³ UKNA, DO 18/268, telegram from Acting High Commissioner, Ottawa, to Commonwealth Relations Office, September 5, 1961; A. Clutterbuck, Commonwealth Relations Office, to R.W.G. Fowler, Ottawa, September 14, 1961.

⁴ UKNA, DO 18/268, R.W.D. Fowler, Ottawa, to G.P. Hampshire, Commonwealth Relations Office, October 18, 1961; B.J. Greenhill, Ottawa, to W.A.J. Hamilton, Commonwealth Relations Office, October 9, 1962; telegram from Ottawa to Commonwealth Relations Office, London, April 19, 1963.

⁵ UKNA, DO 18/268, A.W. Redpath, Commonwealth Relations Office, to L.J.D. Walmly, Ottawa, May 9, 1963.

⁶ UKNA, PREM 15/250, British High Commission, Ottawa, to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, March 17, 1971.

⁷ UKNA, PREM 15/250, British High Commission, Ottawa, to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, FCO, March 17, 1971.

⁸ UKNA, PREM 15/250, memo from FCO for Prime Minister, April 7, 1971.

⁹ UKNA, PREM 15/250, note by I. McCluney on visit, FCO, April 14, 1971.

¹⁰ UKNA, FCO 82/134, B.A. Major, FCO, to D.A. MacLeod, Ottawa, December 18, 1972, Visit of Mr Bourassa, including report of meeting with Edward Heath, November 30, 1972.

¹¹ UKNA, PREM 16/755, memo on lunch meeting at Rideau Gate, Ottawa, 16 September 1976 by K.R. Stowe; PREM 16/755, memo on patriation of the Canadian Constitution by P.R.H. Wright, Private Secretary, 10 Downing Street, September 24, 1976.

¹² UKNA, PREM 16/948, B. Cardledge, PM’s private secretary, to J.S. Wall, FCO, December 8, 1978 re PM’s discussion with Premier Trudeau at 10 Downing Street on December 7, 1978 on the Canadian political situation.

¹³ UKNA, FCO 82/1003, file on Internal Political Situation in Quebec, John Rich, Montreal, to Sir John Ford, Ottawa, March 11, 1980.

¹⁴ UKNA, FCO 82/1003, file on Internal Political Situation in Quebec, Sir John Ford, Ottawa, to FCO, Lord Carrington, March 27, 1980.

¹⁵ UKNA, FCO 82/1003, memo by A.M. Simons on 10 December 1980 concerning lunch meeting between Lévesque Government and British High Commissioner, Sir John Ford, and his officials, December 8, 1980.

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