



Körner, A; (2016) Heirs and their Wives: Setting the Scene for Umbertian Italy. In: Muller, FL, (ed.) **Sons and Heirs. Succession and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Europe.** (pp. 38-52). Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. (In Press) Downloaded from UCL Discovery: <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1472084>

BOOK CHAPTER

3. Heirs and their Wives: Setting the Scene for Umbertian Italy

Axel Körner, UCL History Department, University College London

Italian literature from the Risorgimento period – the works of D’Azeglio, Guerrazzi or of Verdi’s librettist Solera – portrayed Italian women as the defenders of morality and of the purity of Italian blood. They fulfilled their role as good wives and mothers by bearing future Italians and by holding the nation together. This description of the nation in terms of direct blood relations and kinship influenced a growing audience of patriots in Risorgimento Italy.¹ Meanwhile, what divided these patriots were Italy’s future constitutional arrangements. The question of republic versus monarchy was only resolved, at least temporarily, after the revolutions of 1848–49, when the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia took the lead in the struggle for Italian unification. Piedmont created Italy through a series of wars and the deposition of long-reigning dynasties. There were also annexations of external territories, which as late as the uprisings of 1831 had still been described as ‘foreign’ by the revolutionaries themselves.

Although a growing contingent of Italians supported the national movement, popular and revolutionary elements played only a limited role in the process of unification after 1849. Most nationalists subordinated their political and constitutional ideals to the ambition of Piedmont. As a consequence of becoming the Risorgimento’s main actor, the Savoy dynasty had to respond to this political process, justifying its position and fostering its relationship with the new nation.² Cultural symbols, including forms of representing the monarchy, helped to communicate and negotiate Savoy involvement in the life of the nation.

Having found a ruling monarch to represent the new nation state – a more straightforward process for Italians than after the foundation of the Belgian kingdom or following the unification of Germany – attention soon shifted from the kingdom’s founder, Vittorio Emanuele II, to the heir to the throne, Prince Umberto. This shift assumed particular significance after Umberto’s marriage to his cousin Margherita of Savoy in 1868. While the position of Vittorio Emanuele II as the ‘soldier-king’ was undisputed even among former republicans, the future of the monarchy was frequently questioned. A crisis comparable to the one that occurred when Prime Minister Count Camillo Cavour suddenly died in 1861, within months of the kingdom’s foundation, could easily arise after the death of the kingdom’s founding monarch. In the decades after unification, the cult surrounding Margherita of Savoy, Italy’s first crown princess, played a crucial role in rallying new sections of the nation behind the monarchy. The ways in which she performed the symbolic link between dynasty and nation made explicit reference to the idea of the nation as family. This led to novel ways of representing the monarchy.

This new image of the royal family contrasted dramatically with the ideas associated with the kingdom's founder. Proud of its dynastic conventions, the House of Savoy had a tradition of avowed unease concerning symbolic celebrations of the Italian nation. This reserve contrasted with the nationalization of the monarchy that occurred, for instance, in Georgian Britain.³ Vittorio Emanuele II was popular among supporters of the national movement, but this was mostly in recognition of his role as a military leader during the wars of liberation.⁴ His constitutional role after unification was still to be determined and his relationship with the political establishment was often tense, not least because of attempts made by his own entourage, the *partito di corte*, to influence political processes. Moreover, there was little scope for constructing the relationship between crown and nation through the image of a royal family. The king's consort, Maria Adelaide of Habsburg-Lorraine, daughter of Archduke Rainer of Austria, Vice King of Lombardy-Venetia, and mother of the future Italian king Umberto I, had died six years before unification.

Royalist myths had it that Vittorio Emanuele and Maria Adelaide's marriage was passionate and loving, but soon after the wedding Vittorio Emanuele started a long-term relationship with Rosa Vercellana, the daughter of a palace guard. The couple even had two children.⁵ While maintaining other lovers in Turin and Florence, the king also entered into open competition with Count Cavour for the affection of the former ballerina Bianca Ronzani. Apart from the fact that his wife was a member of the Habsburg dynasty whose rule over Italians he sought to end, his lifestyle did nothing to enhance his reputation as a family man. In 1869, after long political struggles with his government and his own family, the widowed king and Rosa Vercellana were united in a morganatic marriage. At that time the king seemed struck down by a fatal illness, but after the nuptials he miraculously recovered. The wedding took place just weeks after Vittorio Emanuele had married his daughter to the first cousin of the French Emperor, Prince Napoléon Joseph Bonaparte. This almost triggered a diplomatic crisis with France. 'La bella Rosina' was made Countess of Mirafiori and Fontanafredda, but remained excluded from any official dynastic role. She was a queen 'without throne and without crown'.⁶ In addition to the king's openly unconventional love life, the ritualistic focus of royal representation on military achievements and Piedmontese tradition created a distance between Vittorio Emanuele and the nation that would hamper the formation of national identity after unification.

Like his father before him, the Prince of Piedmont maintained a number of intimate relationships, before as well as throughout his marriage to Margherita of Savoy. The press and popular royalist literature provided ample coverage of his liaison with the Duchesse Eugenia Litta, who took residence in Monza, conveniently close to the palace where Umberto and Margherita spent much of their married life.⁷ Umberto's relationship with Margherita was thus very different from the life of another famous royal couple of that time: that of the Prussian crown prince Friedrich Wilhelm and Britain's Princess Royal Victoria, married in 1858 and sincerely devoted to each other.⁸ Umberto's attitude to marriage challenged the carefully constructed image of the monarchy as a model family, but it did not diminish Margherita's role in advancing the monarchy's popular appeal. This proved powerful enough to transform the sense of national identity in post-unification Italy. There can be little doubt that within months of their marriage Margherita had turned into the most popular representative of Italy's royal family. She retained this role after the assassination of Umberto I in 1900 and her retirement to the position of queen mother, despite an estranged relationship with her son, King Vittorio Emanuele III.⁹ That Margherita was a proud Savoy in her own right helped this process. Her christening in 1851 had been attended by almost the

entire political establishment of Piedmont-Sardinia, including Count Cavour, the Marchese d'Azeglio, Marchese Menabrea, and the generals Di Robilant, Durando, Morozzo della Rocca and La Marmora, several of them future prime ministers of Italy.¹⁰ Margherita's correspondence with the king suggests that Vittorio Emanuele II admired in her the daughter of his beloved and long lost brother.¹¹ Devoted to her father's memory, Margherita regarded being a princess of the House of Savoy as more important than the illusion of romantic love.¹² She responded to her role as future queen with a sense of dynastic duty as well as political imagination, and historians widely acknowledge her role in transforming the Savoy dynasty into a *monarchia popolare*, based on the popular legitimization of monarchical myth.¹³

Compared to their British counterparts the Italian sovereigns retained a strong influence on government politics, especially through the appointment of prime ministers and by conducting their own foreign policy, or *diplomazia parallela*.¹⁴ The Piedmontese constitution of 1848, the so-called *statuto*, had been a reaction to a political emergency (the first war of liberation against Austria) and provided the monarch with strong executive powers. During the post-revolutionary epoch, when most states considered restricting the political rights of their subjects, the Savoy dynasty's decision to retain the constitution granted in 1848 played an important role in giving legitimacy to the monarchy. However, many Italian patriots hoped that unification was to be completed by a patriotic insurrection in Rome, which would then lead to the convocation of a national assembly. It would be up to this body to discuss constitutional change, including the restriction of the king's existing powers and the adaptation of the constitution to the peninsula's new political circumstances.¹⁵ This never happened, though. Rome was annexed as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War, when the French protection of the Papal State simply collapsed. Dynastic interests, combined with factionalism among parliamentarians and widespread fear of radical change, prevented serious constitutional debate in 1871.

Concerns about constitutional instability, as well as the complicated relationship between court and government, left the heir with little space for political manoeuvre. Although he seems to have supported his father's belligerent ambition to resolve the Balkan question, Umberto played little or no role in his father's day-to-day politics.¹⁶ In his correspondence with his son, the king frequently mentioned a need to talk, but there is little evidence of the prince's direct involvement in politics. From the age of 21, the Savoy crown princes were automatically members of the kingdom's senate; they also represented the monarchy at public events, but there were no other provisions for their involvement in political affairs. According to Piedmontese tradition, the queen assumed a more prominent role than the heir in the representation of the monarchy – both by the king's side and in her own right.¹⁷ Along with the king, the queen was the only member of the royal family to be addressed as 'majesty'. Although Vittorio Emanuele II no longer had a queen at his side, these provisions foreshadowed the role of Margherita of Savoy after her marriage to Umberto.¹⁸ From the moment plans for a royal wedding became public, Margherita, the wife of the future king, attracted great public interest. The ceremonial attention reserved for her mirrored the conventions of other European courts and is reflected in the celebrations not only of Umberto's marriage to Margherita in 1868, but also in the arrangements for their silver anniversary in 1893. The latter event was transformed into what contemporaries described as a 'new plebiscite' for the kingdom, a metaphor referring to the popular votes, which formalized Piedmont's annexation of the former Italian states after the second war of liberation in 1858.¹⁹

The crown prince and his wife, as well as the lesser princes, maintained separate courts, including a complex hierarchy of courtiers and professional staff. Nevertheless, Umberto was given little political training to prepare him for his future role. This exacerbated the problem of his almost complete lack of formal education and intellectual interests.²⁰ It is therefore remarkable that Umberto managed to use his position as heir and that of his wife to place the relationship between nation and crown on a new basis. The process was helped by the fact that, after 1871, the king left the representation of the monarchy in the new capital largely to Umberto. The new conception of the monarchy as a royal family and the active construction of its popular appeal very much corresponded to the ideas of Francesco Crispi, who was about to become the new man of Italian politics.²¹

The gendering of the nation through the public image of the crown as a family forged, in the words of George Mosse, a previously unknown alliance between ‘nationalism and respectability’.²² By assuming a public role specifically created for her, Margherita did much to change the existing image of the Italian monarchy. Her public role seems to have been sanctioned by the king; and her correspondence with Vittorio Emanuele suggests a rather affectionate relationship.²³ In her new function she became an object of intense popular admiration, in which her perceived beauty played an important role. During one of her early visits to Bologna, the former capital of the Papal Legations, the local newspaper *Il Monitore* referred to her ‘*simpatica fisionomia*’.²⁴

Who then was this beautiful princess of Savoy? After the early death of her father, and as the daughter of a princess of Saxony, she was brought up enjoying an almost bourgeois lifestyle, which presented a challenge to the severe etiquette of the court of Savoy. Margherita’s public attitudes were influenced by her relatively liberal and modern education in which literature and the arts assumed a greater importance than the catechism, which had customarily been the focus of female education at court. The public display of her style – in terms of social relations, dress and public attitudes – helped the middle classes to identify with the House of Savoy and to transform their relationship with the monarchy. A book on Umberto, published a year after his succession, claimed that ‘the prince and the princess do not tire of taking care of their domestic affairs’.²⁵ Unlike earlier generations of the House of Savoy, they created the impression that they were as one with their people. Although Umberto, in the best tradition of the Savoy, also pursued a prominent military career, the couple’s new representation of royalty had a profound impact on Italy’s *fine secolo*.²⁶

The day after their official engagement Umberto and Margherita chose the royal box of the Teatro Regio in Turin to present themselves in public for the first time.²⁷ A new tone characterising the relationship between nation and monarchy was set with the choice of the opera performed in Turin in honour of Umberto’s and Margherita’s wedding, on 16 April 1868: the Italian premiere of Meyerbeer’s *Dinorah*.²⁸ Rarely performed today, Meyerbeer was nineteenth-century Europe’s most popular composer. *Dinorah*, better known under its original French title *Le pardon de Ploërmel* was an *opéra comique*, but Meyerbeer was most famous for large-scale historical plots of *grand-opéra*, works widely appreciated by the new opera audiences of middle-class origin. Not only was his music praised for speaking a cosmopolitan language understood across nations and cultures,²⁹ it also stood for the “urbanization of opera”, contrasting with the traditional repertoire of the court theatres and reflecting the rapid changes of life produced by the modern age.³⁰ The fact that a French opera by a German-Jewish composer was chosen for the event in Turin is remarkable in itself. While Umberto followed the Savoy family tradition of avoiding the theatre whenever

possible, Margherita developed a strong interest in music, and in opera in particular. She was especially keen on exploring composers popular among the emerging middle class: Meyerbeer, then Wagner, and later Puccini. Their works stood for the internationalization of the Italian repertoire, but also for an art form the middle classes associated with the major European capital cities, a culture to which the Italian middle classes increasingly aspired.³¹

Umberto and Margherita spent the first two winters after their wedding in Naples, described in the devotional and commemorative literature as ‘the two happiest years of their life’.³² Only three years after Italy had fought a most brutal civil war against the Mezzogiorno, a region still under a state of siege, many in the South perceived their submission to Piedmont as just another form of foreign domination.³³ Open hostility towards the new nation state notwithstanding, official communications spoke of the local population’s great affection for the royals, underlining the Savoys’ role in liberating Naples from what was presumed to be the yoke of the Bourbon dynasty. ‘In honouring the Royal House of Savoy we will always show that our affection for the dynasty stands for the cult of freedom’, the mayor of Naples, Guglielmo Capitelli, proclaimed in a manifesto to his citizens on 22 November 1868, the day the royal couple arrived in the city.³⁴ Other parts of the South had an even more immediate relationship with the family of the young princess: in Sicily, Margherita’s father, the Duke of Genoa, was remembered as the king elected by the regional parliament after its defection from Naples, during the revolution of 1848. Sicily’s constitutional experiments were soon overtaken by the events of the counter-revolution, but they remained enshrined in collective memories.

Despite the fact that the heirs were given no official political function, they became a powerful instrument in the government’s attempts to overcome the stubborn distance between the kingdom of Italy and its southern provinces. This was a remarkable development, considering that Umberto’s explicit distaste for Naples and the Neapolitans was a matter of public record.³⁵ Not much is known, however, as to exactly who shaped the heirs’ role in this process: whether the initiative came from the king, the heirs themselves or the government. Reconciliation with the South, however, emerged as an important part of a policy, which Catherine Brice has described as ‘the affirmation of the Savoys’ Italianness’.³⁶

The birth of the next in line to the throne, the future Vittorio Emanuele III, in the city of Naples assumed a particular role in the monarchy’s symbolic representation in the South. He was christened Vittorio Emanuele Ferdinando Maria Gennaro, and the last of his given names was chosen to honour the Patron Saint of Naples.³⁷ According to anecdotal literature and memorabilia it was the Princess of Piedmont who ‘chose Naples as the hometown for her first son, following the advice of the king, who intended to demonstrate once more the mutual affection between the provinces of the Mezzogiorno and those of the North’.³⁸ Exploring Margherita’s alleged affection for the people of the South, the new connection between the dynasty and the southern provinces served to suggest that generational change had the power to heal the wounds of the past. The court doctors appointed a local peasant woman as the prince’s wet-nurse and instead of keeping her nameless, as was customary at the time, Maria Maisto Cristiano’s alleged admiration for Margherita was exploited further to strengthen the connections between the royal family and Naples. As reported in one of the first official biographies of Margherita,

When Ms Maisto returned to her husband, she was full of praise for the majestic women, who had been so extraordinarily kind and respectful with her. ‘How nice she is! When she received me she gave me a kiss on the forehead! That God bless her!’ Even today Ms

Maisto's husband Giuseppe Cristiano, whenever he is asked about Queen Margherita, replies with tears in his eyes and deeply moved that she 'is a Saint! Whenever she met with my wife she kissed her, she kissed her on the forehead! A princess, a future queen, can you believe that?'³⁹

Cristiano's supposed relationship with the crown princess became part of the royal family's public relations campaign, referred to in devotional literature for decades to come. In private Margherita expressed herself in rather different words about the wet-nurse, describing her as a beggar (*pezzente*), a liar and a petty thief.⁴⁰ The dynasty's new relationship with Naples was officially sanctioned when King Vittorio Emanuele II created his grandson Prince of Naples, described in official proclamations as a Neapolitan 'fellow citizen', a *concittadino* (see Figure 3.1) According to a frequently retold anecdote, Vittorio Emanuele II visited Naples a few weeks after his grandson's birth. Margherita insisted on welcoming her father-in-law at the train station, allegedly using the same opportunity to present the newly born prince to the women of the local market.⁴¹

Figure 3.1 The Princess of Piedmont with her baby and dog (1870). Representing the monarchy as a family in a private setting was a modern media strategy designed to bridge the gap between Crown and nation in liberal Italy. © The National Media Museum (Bradford)

The idea of a king and a queen being close to their people became part of the royals' new branding, which was maintained even after Umberto's accession to the throne. Works of charity, public manifestations of compassion and contact with the people through royal visits were all part of this strategy.⁴² An illustrated biography of Margherita, published shortly after Umberto's assassination in 1900, recalled an anecdote relating to the 1884 cholera epidemic in Naples: 'Invited to honour with his presence the horse races in Pordenone, he replied to the mayor of that city, "In Pordenone people celebrate, in Naples they die. I am off to Naples. Umberto".'⁴³ In order to explore the propagandistic effect to the full, the telegram was promptly published in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno*.

Immediately after the city's annexation in 1871 the heirs moved to Rome, where they assumed a role very similar to the one they had previously occupied in Naples. They took residence in the Eternal City at a time when Vittorio Emanuele II preferred to stay in his native Piedmont and visited the new capital only on special occasions. While the heir and his wife moved into the Papal apartments of the Quirinale, the king occupied the far more modest dwellings of a ground-floor apartment in the Palazzina Gregoriana.⁴⁴ As was the case during the couple's earlier stay in Naples, many Romans – especially members of the 'black' aristocracy, who had served the Popes and their governments for centuries – perceived the so-called 'liberation' as a hostile occupation and the deposition of the pontiff as patricide. The new role assumed by the royal heirs in Rome included regular appearances at social functions, visits to public institutions such as hospitals and schools, as well as daily coach trips through the streets of Rome.⁴⁵

Folkloric rituals also played a part. In 1876, two years before Umberto's accession to the throne, Margherita participated in the revived Roman Carnival, with the seven-year-old Prince of Naples throwing chocolates and sweets from a balcony of Palazzo Fiano.⁴⁶ The

anecdote shows how similar the heirs' strategy was to the one employed a few years earlier in Naples. Making the best of her broad interest in culture and learned debate, Princess Margherita chose Italy's new capital to open her own salon. While many members of the Roman aristocracy kept their distance from the House of Savoy, her guests included artists, politicians and academics, often of middle-class origin and at times with republican sympathies.⁴⁷ While maintaining a salon was perceived as a breach of the Savoy royal etiquette, Margherita's endeavour found itself in line with the government's attempts to foster the relationship between nation and crown and to overcome resentment against the monarchy. As crown princess she was in a position to employ a form of soft diplomacy, which remained beyond the reach not only of the king, but also of the heir to the throne.⁴⁸

The heirs' new and different understanding of monarchy had a profound impact on the period of political transition after the sudden death of Vittorio Emanuele II in 1878, when some internal and external observers feared that the monarchy might not last. In contemporary discourse, the risks associated with the transition were often hidden behind royalist and patriotic rhetoric. For instance, a 'popular biography' of Umberto I, published in 1885, explained that 'Umberto's accession to the throne was most natural, a necessary consequence of the *statuto*, which Charles Albert, in 1848, granted to his people and which in 1859 was extended step by step to the rest of Italy'.⁴⁹ The fact that the author thought it necessary to underline the 'natural' ease of this process suggests that some Italians had questioned the transition. In the perception of Umberto's contemporaries, a peaceful transition of power was by no means guaranteed. During the weeks following the succession several newspapers and pamphlets expressed anxiety over the monarchy's capacity to survive the death of its first king, mirroring the fears associated with the unexpected passing of the kingdom's first prime minister, Count Camillo Cavour, in 1861.⁵⁰ Directly addressing the new sovereign in a series of articles for the *Gazzetta d'Italia*, an anonymous 'conservative' alerted the king to the fact that over the last two decades the situation of the monarchy had completely changed:

Nobody doubts that the monarchical principle served the great purpose of achieving national independence. Not even the proudest demagogues dared to suggest that King Vittorio Emanuele had to give up the crown, because he greatly deserved the gratitude of his fatherland. The danger, however, is the following. These people granted to the individual what in effect was the merit of the institution. And so they cleared the way to free Italy from any obligation towards the monarchy once the first king had descended into his tomb. As a consequence, according to these revolutionaries who stood by the soldier king, his funeral was also intended to become the funeral of the monarchy.⁵¹

The author's principal objective in writing these lines was the foundation of a new conservative party, but his argument reflected a general sense of anxiety about the monarchy's survival after the death of Vittorio Emanuele. The disparate coalition of liberal forces, which had shared power since the foundation of the kingdom, still included many currents and individuals who endorsed the monarchical principle half-heartedly, mainly for pragmatic or opportunistic reasons. The fact that the Umbertian reign ultimately strengthened the nation's existing constitutional order was owed substantially to the heir's advocacy of a new relationship between nation and crown.

The new king's proclamation, countersigned by members of his government, insisted that there was no change to the role of the monarchy in Italy's constitutional order: 'Your first king

is dead. His successor will give you the proof that the institutions do not die.⁵² However, substantial changes had already taken place. The monarchy was no longer represented through a 'soldier king', but by the head of a royal family, who had placed its relationship to the nation on new foundations.

One of Umberto's first initiatives as king was the abolition of his personal political office the *Gabinetto particolare*, transferring all of its powers to a governmental institution, the *Ministro della Real Casa*. He thus set much closer limits to the tradition of the Crown's parallel politics and responded to expectations of parliament and government. Again, popular literature on the Savoy was quick to take account of these changes, while at the same time retaining claims that Umberto's reign closely mirrored that of his father.⁵³ Umberto's first biographer provides a good illustration of this trend when explaining the numerous manifestations of support for Umberto during the early days of his reign: 'Why this outburst of love for a new king, of whom only his military virtues, demonstrated during the war of 1866, were known?'⁵⁴ Referring to the crown prince's official role rather than the image of the monarchy Umberto and his wife had created, Venosta found the answer in the king's proclamation, quoted above: 'He made it absolutely clear that he intends to follow in the footsteps of his father, imitating the great example which his ancestor had left him, devotion to the fatherland, love of progress, faith in free institutions, the pride of the House of Savoy.'⁵⁵ That the biographer ignored the changes to the institution, which had emerged during Umberto's time as heir and since his accession, shows the extent to which monarchical legitimacy was based not merely on formal laws of succession, but on the symbolic construction of continuity. As David D'Avray has explained in his study of medieval memorial preaching, the rhetoric used to commemorate a dead prince said less about the deceased than about expectations of his successor, fixing the boundaries of his office.⁵⁶ In Umberto's case, the emphasis on 'progress' and 'free institutions' was written back into the portrayal of his predecessor, with the aim of signalling to the heir how the monarchy had evolved and what this meant for his reign.

The institution of the monarchy was represented by kings and queens as well as by the heirs to the throne (and their consorts). In the decades after Italian unification, the representation of the Savoy as a family became key to the enterprise of giving a disparate nation a measure of unity, assigning a new role first to the heirs and then to the queen. Along with Italy's democratic left (the men around Agostino Depretis and Francesco Crispi), Margherita of Savoy played a crucial role in redressing the symbolic relationship between nation and crown. In this process too much agency should not be assigned to the heirs themselves. Instead, generational change within the House of Savoy coincided with an important moment of transition in the political life of the nation. This was initiated by Italy's parliamentary revolution of 1876, when the Centre Left for the first time won the majority of seats in the Italian parliament. The Centre Left was put in a position to transform the relationship between crown and nation, because they found in Margherita of Savoy a personality capable of symbolising this change. The image of Italy's first queen as the standard-bearer of a new age, therefore, is more than a construction of later generations of historians; contemporaries described her role in very similar words. On the occasion of her death in 1926 a popular historian of the monarchy defined her 'duty, first as wife of the heir to the throne and then as queen', as 'seeing to cohesion and assimilation in a country such as Italy, which for historical and ethnic reasons tended more to division and fragmentation than to unity'.⁵⁷

Whether royalty formed the basis for the exercise of power in nineteenth-century Europe, or vice versa, depended on the constitutional arrangements of each country and on the particular political dynamic of a given moment in time. While the political power of modern monarchs was subject to change and circumstances, royalty also symbolized power; not the power of particular governments, but that of the state.

Since the late eighteenth century, legitimism had lost much of its power to justify monarchical rule.⁵⁸ Therefore, its ‘secular magic’, as David Cannadine describes it, depended on popular sentiment.⁵⁹ Although modern nations often took their right to independent existence for granted, nation building remained a controversial and often brutal process. In the case of unified Italy, the Civil War in the Mezzogiorno and the forced integration of an entire region by means of military suppression offers a striking example of the cruelty with which nation building was pursued. The dramatic transformation of the political map of Europe became a powerful feature of the widely perceived change in the semantics of historical time, which Europeans associated with their experience of modernity. In this situation the symbolism of monarchy continued to exercise power.

In Italy, not the monarchy itself, but the institutions of the liberal state – parliament, government and municipalities – transformed the monarchy into a symbol and embodiment of the nation. Royal parades, weddings and funerals, state visits and the royals’ physical presence in different parts of the country provided opportunities to invest a dramatically changing external world with meaning. As David Kertzer explains, rituals helped in ‘linking the past to the present and the present to the future’, thus providing ‘a sense of continuity’.⁶⁰ While royalty was subject to constant change, it offered an illusion of stability and social coherence, which most subjects of the modern age happily embraced.

Notes

¹ Alberto M. Banti (2000), *La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell’Italia unita*, Turin. Marina d’Amelia (2012), ‘Between Two Eras: Challenges Facing Women in the Risorgimento’, in: Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall (eds), *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy*, New York, 115-33.

On the representation of women in Verdi’s operas see Susan Rutherford (2013), *Verdi, Opera Women*, Cambridge.

² On the monarchy’s strategies to affirm its role see Paolo Colombo and Valentina Villa (2012), ‘Governare il popolo, legittimare il Re: la costruzione dell’identità nazionale e dell’immagine pubblica della Monarchia dal 1861 al 1900’, in: Giovanni Ruocco and Luca Scuccimarra (eds), *Il governo del popolo, Dalla Restaurazione alla guerra franco-prussiana*, Rome, 355–74. For a recent general framework of the symbolic representation of power in Italy, in addition to the works cited below, see Maurizio Ridolfi and Marina Tesoro (2011), *Monarchia e Repubblica: istituzioni, culture e rappresentazioni politiche in Italia, 1848–1948*, Milan.

³ Linda Colley (1992), *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, New Haven and London. Although it is important to differentiate between the two queens’ offices, Catherine Brice has argued that

- Queen Victoria's emphasis on domesticity served Margherita as a model: Catherine Brice (2006), 'Queen Margherita (1851–1926): "The Only Man in the House of Savoy"', in: Regina Schulte (ed.), *The Body of the Queen: Gender and Rule in the Courtly World, 1500–2000*, New York, 195–215.
- ⁴ Umberto Levra (1992), *Fare gli Italiani. Memoria e celebrazione del Risorgimento*, Turin, 8; Umberto Levra (1997), 'Vittorio Emanuele II', in: Mario Isnenghi (ed.), *I luoghi della memoria. Strutture ed eventi dell'Italia unita*, Rome and Bari, 47–64.
- ⁵ Anecdotal literature reflecting public perceptions provides the relevant biographic detail here. See for instance: Antonio Monti (1935), 'Maria Adelaide di Savoia nelle sue prime lettere d'amore e nel dramma di Carlo Alberto', in: Antonio Monti, *Donne e Passioni del Risorgimento*, Milan, 79–107. See also Giovanni Gigliozzi (1997), *Le regine d'Italia*, Rome, 7 sq. <AQ: what does 'sq' mean? Here and for footnotes 12, 14, 42, 47> // HM: 'sequens' = synonymous for 'the following'. We can use 7–8 or 7f. instead (and amend other footnotes accordingly).
- ⁶ Gigliozzi (1997), 26; Rosario Romeo (1990), *Vita di Cavour*, Rome and Bari, 394; Denis Mack Smith (1989), *Italy and its Monarchy*, New Haven and London, 46.
- ⁷ Claudio Alberto Andreoli (2010), *Regine e dame alla corte dei re d'Italia*, Città di Castello, 68ff.; Ugoberto Alfassio Grimaldi (1971), *Il re 'buono'*, Milan, 47ff.
- ⁸ Frank Lorenz Müller (2011), *Our Fritz: Emperor Frederick III and the Political Culture of Imperial Germany*, Cambridge, MA, 32ff.
- ⁹ On representations of Umberto in the context of his assassination see Paolo Edoardo Fiora (2000), *Monza 29 luglio 1900. Il Regicidio dalla cronaca alla storia*, Milan.
- ¹⁰ Andreoli (2010), 48–9.
- ¹¹ On 8 February 1868 the king writes to Princess Margherita: 'Dieu te bénisse, et bénisse éternellement la chère mémoire d'un frère que j'ai tant aimé'; Francesco Cognasso (1966), *Le lettere di Vittorio Emanuele II*, Turin, vol. 2, 1292.
- ¹² Grimaldi (1971), 45–6; Nino del Bianco (2011), *Margherita di Savoia. Regina di cuori nell'Italia unita*, Genova, 14, 44 sq.
- ¹³ Filippo Mazzonis (2003), *La Monarchia e il Risorgimento*, Bologna, 169. For a rare personal account of Margherita's character, though during later years, see the diary of Umberto's *aiutante di campo* during the mid-1890s: Paolo Paulucci (1986), *Alla corte di Re Umberto. Diario segreto*, ed. Giorgio Calcagno, Milan.
- ¹⁴ Giulia Guazzaloca (2009), *Sovrani a metà: monarchia e legittimazione in Europa tra Otto e Novecento*, Soveria Mannelli, 89. See also Catherine Brice (2010), *Monarchie et identité nationale en Italie (1861–1900)*, Paris, 25–38. For a more detailed discussion of the monarch's constitutional position see Mazzonis (2003), 53 sq. in particular 63ff., 107 sq., 118.

-
- ¹⁵ Paolo Colombo (2004), 'Una Corona per una nazione: considerazioni sul ruolo della monarchia costituzionale nella costruzione dell'identità italiana', in: Marina Tesoro (ed.), *Monarchia, tradizione, identità nazionale. Germania, Giappone e Italia tra ottocento e novecento*, Milan, 21–33, 22; Mack Smith (1989), 4–5, 54–5.
- ¹⁶ On the attempts of Vittorio Emanuele II to influence political decisions and events through secret agents see Pierangelo Gentile (2011), *L'ombra del re. Vittorio Emanuele II e le politiche di corte*, Rome. On Umberto's support for his father's war-mongering see Mack Smith (1989), 60. Compared to his father Umberto intervened less in government politics: see Paolo Colombo (2001), *Storia costituzionale della monarchia italiana*, Rome and Bari, 85.
- ¹⁷ Although the *statuto* did not provide a more official role for the queen in representing the monarchy, arrangements were formalized by decree in 1890; Mazzonis (2003), 80, 100.
- ¹⁸ The queen's position did not extend to any political function in the narrow sense, but as Catherine Brice has been able to show, especially in later years Margherita took strong views on political affairs, and she did not hesitate to communicate these views in her private correspondence: Brice (2006), 196.
- ¹⁹ This is despite the fact that Umberto I and his Prime Minister Giolitti hesitated at giving the jubilee too much public attention; Marina Tesoro (2004), 'Prove per un giubileo. Le feste pubbliche per le nozze d'argento di Umberto e Margherita di Savoia', in: Tesoro (ed.) (2004), 95–121.
- ²⁰ Mack Smith (1989), 71. The war diaries of the liberal politician Michelangelo Castelli, describing the campaign of 1866, suggest a rather distant relationship between father and son: see Michelangelo Castelli (1888), *Ricordi 1847–1875*, ed. Luigi Chiala, Turin and Naples, 378.
- ²¹ On the early relationship between Umberto and Crispi see Christopher Duggan (2002), *Francesco Crispi 1818–1901: From Nation to Nationalism*, Oxford, 378.
- ²² George Mosse (1985), *Nationalism and Sexuality*, New York, 10.
- ²³ The king and his daughter-in-law shared a passion for pets, including exchanges on dogs and parrots. See for instance 'Il Re alla principessa di Piemonte, 16 January 1869 and 17 March 1869', in: *Le lettere di Vittorio Emanuele II* (1966), vol. 2, 1391, 1404.
- ²⁴ *Monitore di Bologna*, 30 April 1868.
- ²⁵ Giuseppe Ugliengo (1879), *Re Umberto o l'anno primo del suo regno*, Turin, 33.
- ²⁶ On Umberto's military career see Grimaldi (1971), 32ff. Giving royalty new meaning through the adaptation of middle-class values also followed the British model after Queen Victoria's accession to the throne: see Bernd Weisbrod (2006), 'Theatrical Monarchy: The Making of Queen Victoria, the Modern Family Queen', in: Schulte (ed.), 238–53.
- ²⁷ Grimaldi (1971), 51.

-
- ²⁸ Anna Tedesco (2008), “‘Queste opere eminentemente sinfoniche e spettacolose’”: Giacomo Meyerbeer’s Influence on Italian Opera Orchestras’, in: Niels Martin Jensen and Franco Piperno (eds), *The Opera Orchestra in 18th- and 19th-Century Europe, vol. 2: The Orchestra in the Theatre – Composers, Works, and Performance*, Berlin, 185–227, 202.
- ²⁹ On Meyerbeer’s perceived cosmopolitanism see for instance Eduard Hanslick (1875), ‘Meyerbeer’, in: Eduard Hanslick, *Die moderne Oper. Kritiken und Studien*, Berlin, 138–73. See also Reiner Zimmermann (1998), *Giacomo Meyerbeer. Eine Biografie nach Dokumenten*, Berlin, 321. On Meyerbeer’s reception in Italy see Fiamma Nicolodi (2000), ‘Les Grands Opéras de Meyerbeer en Italie (1840–1890)’, in: Hervé Lacombe (ed.), *L’Opéra en France et en Italie, 1791–1925*, Paris, 87–115; Tedesco (2008), 185–227; Fabrizio della Seta (1988), ‘L’immagine di Meyerbeer nella critica italiana dell’Ottocento e l’idea di dramma musicale’, in: Maria Teresa Muraro (ed.), *L’opera tra Venezia e Parigi*, Florence, 147–76.
- ³⁰ Anselm Gerhard (1998), *The Urbanization of Opera: Music Theater in Paris in the Nineteenth Century*, Chicago and London.
- ³¹ On music at Margherita’s court see Pierangelo Gentile (2013), “‘Auliche armonie’”: cultura musicale alla corte sabauda tra Risorgimento e Italia unita’, *Studi Piemontesi XLII/2* (December), 351–62, 357ff. On Puccini see Paulucci (1986), 87. Puccini is interesting in this context, because for a long time most critics had a rather tense relationship with the composer, while audiences appreciated his works: see Alexandra Wilson (2007), *The Puccini Problem: Opera, Nationalism and Modernity*, Cambridge.
- ³² Onorato Roux (1901), *La Prima Regina d’Italia nella vita privata, nella vita del paese – nelle lettere e nelle arti*, Milan, 71.
- ³³ For a recent account of the submission of the South see Enrico Dal Lago (2015), *The Age of Lincoln and Cavour: Comparative Perspectives on Nineteenth-century American and Italian Nation-Building*, New York, ch. 5. See also Paolo Macry (2012), *Unità a Mezzogiorno. Come l’Italia ha messo assieme i pezzi*, Bologna.
- ³⁴ Quoted in Roux (1901), 71. On Umberto’s and Margherita’s welcoming in Naples see also Colombo and Villa (2012), 147ff. On Vittorio Emanuele II’s lack of consideration for Naples see Valentina Villa (2011), ‘La visibilità pubblica del re nella storia costituzionale italiana: elementi di continuità tra età liberale e Fascismo’, *Storia Amministrazione Costituzione XIX*, 47–65.
- ³⁵ Mack Smith (1989), 18.
- ³⁶ Brice (2010), 11.
- ³⁷ Giovanni Gigliozzi (1997), *Le regine d’Italia*, Rome, 37–8.
- ³⁸ Roux (1901), 81.
- ³⁹ Roux (1091), 82–3.

-
- ⁴⁰ Paulucci (1986), 114–15.
- ⁴¹ Roux (1901), 87.
- ⁴² Brice (2010), 73 sq, 289ff.
- ⁴³ Roux (1901), 76.
- ⁴⁴ Gentile (2013), 357.
- ⁴⁵ Andreoli (2010), 68ff.
- ⁴⁶ Andreoli (2010), 73.
- ⁴⁷ Carlo Casalegno (2001), *La regina Margherita*, Bologna, 26 sq.
- ⁴⁸ For a local perspective on Margherita's efforts to overcome resentment against the monarchy see Axel Körner (2009), *Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy: From Unification to Fascism*, New York, ch. 8.
- ⁴⁹ Felice Venosta (1885), *Umberto I Re d'Italia. Studi biografici popolari*, Milan, 5.
- ⁵⁰ For a recent evaluation see Dal Lago (2015), ch. 5.
- ⁵¹ *Il pericolo della monarchia e dell'Italia. A sua maestà il Re Umberto. Lettere di un conservatore* (1878), Florence, 9–10. These articles were originally published in the *Gazzetta d'Italia*. A similar expression of anxiety linked to the succession is expressed in Carlo Toscani (1878), *Il 17 Novembre 1878. Ossia Chi in Italia Attenta Alla Monarchia e per quali cause*, Siena.
- ⁵² Venosta (1885), 7. Royalist publications widely circulated the proclamation. See for instance Ugliengo (1879), 17.
- ⁵³ Ugliengo (1879), 35.
- ⁵⁴ Venosta (1885), 13.
- ⁵⁵ Venosta (1885), 14.
- ⁵⁶ David D'Avray (1994), *Death and the Prince: Memorial Preaching before 1350*, Oxford.
- ⁵⁷ Antonio Monti, quoted in Brice (2006), 198.
- ⁵⁸ Paul W. Schroeder (2004), 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?', in: Paul W. Schroeder, *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe*, New York, 37–58.
- ⁵⁹ David Cannadine (1983), 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition", c.1820–1970', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 101–64, 102. On the connection between symbolic behaviour and the creation of consensus see David Kertzer (1988), *Ritual, Politics, and Power*, New Haven and London, 8–9, 78. See also Paolo Colombo (1999), *Il Re d'Italia. Prerogative costituzionali e potere politico della Corona (1848–1922)*, Milan, 33–4.
- ⁶⁰ Kertzer (1988), 9–10. See also Cannadine (1983), 105.