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United States-Russian Relations, 1917-1933

Raymond L. Cravens

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UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1917-1933

BY

RAYMOND L. CRAVENS

A THESIS
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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INTRODUCTION

"One should doff one's cap to the statue of Jupiter,
in case he returned to power." --LORD BYRON

Our task in this study is to determine whether the words of Lord Byron are true in the realm of International Power Politics. This is a study of the application of the principle of non-recognition--the refusal of acknowledgment--to Russo-American relations during the period from 1917 to 1933.

The year was 1918, and the Gladiator of Capitalism stood over the prostrate form of Russian Bolshevism and appealed for the decision of "life" or "death" to be meted out by the world powers. England signaled, "Thumbs down"; "Death," cried France; "Yes," said Japan, "let him die." But in the center of the Powers stood the United States deciding the action--vetoing the anti-Bolshevik crusade. "He is wounded and dying of his own accord," observed Uncle Sam. "Let us wash our hands of this matter and let him live--if indeed he can! Let us reiterate our confidence in the great Russian people who will eventually throw off this conspiracy. In the meanwhile, let us 'wait and see' and refuse during the interim to recognize this 'communist' experiment."

And so began the sixteen-year non-recognition period in United States-Russian relations. This thesis concerns this period and the relations of these two countries.

The writer first became interested in this subject while reading on the 1954-1955 Intercollegiate Debate Topic, "The Recognition of Communist China." On the suggestion of Dr. James H.

Peteet, Head of the History Department, Western Kentucky State College, the subject of this investigation was formulated.

This paper at best can be only a cursory study of the history of this period; however, the writer will endeavor to develop to its fullest, the effects of the official attitude of non-recognition as practiced by the United States. It is hoped that this study will result in a clear elucidation on the issue of the non-recognition of Soviet Russia as seen from the vantage point of 1955.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Definition of Terms.--Before we enter into a study of the non-recognition period of Russo-American relations, 1917-1933, let us examine a few of the terms which will confront us from time to time, and which it will be desirable that we use consistently, since they are often defined differently by different writers.

Since this paper is centered around the non-recognition of Soviet Russia, perhaps it would clarify things if we defined recognition first and then proceeded from that into our discussion of non-recognition. This writer feels that the latter can only adequately be defined in terms of the former.

Smith and Zurcher in their Dictionary of American Politics define recognition as:

"Acknowledgment by one state of the existence of another state or government. The president may recognize a foreign country by receiving its diplomatic envoy, sending a diplomat to it, negotiating a treaty with it, or issuing an appropriate proclamation."¹

White's Political Dictionary adds the following:

"The pressure of acknowledging the independence and equality of a state and its right to be admitted into the family of nations. De jure (legal) recognition is full legal recognition including the exchange of diplomats. De facto (in fact) recognition is less than full legal recognition."²

¹ E. C. Smith and A. J. Zurcher, A Dictionary of American Politics (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1944), 260.

² White's Political Dictionary, cited by J. Weston Welch, Complete Handbook on Recognition of Communist China (Portland, Maine: J. Weston Welch, publisher, 1954), 5.

It follows that if a government of a state refuses to acknowledge a new state or government by any of the means by which recognition can be expressed or implied, the state so refusing is practicing non-recognition.

The Principle of Non-recognition.--Non-recognition is nothing new to International Law. The Swiss Confederation was independent, in fact, for almost two centuries before it was recognized as such by the Holy Roman Empire in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.³ Imperial Russia, as a matter of fact, did not recognize the United States of America until 1809.⁴

Non-recognition is considered by many as a principle of International Law of considerable value. For example, we might observe that since recognition de jure of a government which came into power through revolution, terminates the diplomatic relations with the conquered government; it marks the legal demise of the victim--therefore, it could act as a discouragement to any surviving hopes of resistance. If the government desiring to be recognized has been flippant toward International Law, and obligations under it, non-recognition is justified because the law-breaker seeks acknowledgment by the very law he has defied.⁵ Non-recognition is, therefore, an addition to the forces which operate in an attempt to make International Law a reality. When it is desirable to castigate a law-breaker among the nations, a declaration of

³ John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 1, 72.

⁴ Vera Micheles Dean, The United States and Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), 5.

⁵ H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1947), 431.

non-recognition is preferable to total inaction. So long as there is predominant sentiment of the ultimate authority of International Law, non-recognition prevents its disintegration by impotence or destruction by the unqualified acquiescence to the lawlessness of force.⁶

Nevertheless, this writer feels that the "passive resistance" which non-recognition implies means very little to a large proportion of the people of the world. As a moral sanction it tends to become "fruitless exercise in moral finger shaking, an exercise calculated to irritate its object without compelling it to deliver the goods."⁷ This does not mean that it is not a principle of value, but it does mean that it tends to be unrealistic unless the nations espousing non-recognition possess enough political and diplomatic power to make the policy meaningful to the nation so castigated and also to the peoples of the world who do not look to such a method as a way to enforce an international dictum.

It will be interesting to keep in mind, therefore, as we proceed with the study of the United States' relations with Soviet Russia during the non-recognition period, that the United States was the only great power which persistently withheld its recognition of the Bolsheviks. We will see later just why this was done and why the United States was able to pursue such a policy in disregard to the action of the other great powers.

⁶ Ibid., 435.

⁷ Hardy Cross Dillard, "The United States and China: The Problem of Recognition," The Yale Review, XLIV, No. 2 (Winter, 1955), 168.

The historic recognition policy of the United States.--A logical question to inject into this discussion here is: Has the attitude which the United States expressed toward Russia from 1917 to 1933 been the historic recognition policy of the United States?

To this I wish to submit a "yes" and a "no" answer. First of all, "Yes," it appears that it is the policy of the United States to withhold immediate recognition from governments coming to power through the Communist international revolutionary movement. For example, the United States does not at the present time recognize the People's Republic of China for a number of subjective reasons. However, it appears that the Chinese Communists are in firm control of the mainland and that our non-recognition attitude is our way of disapproving of the flippant attitude of the Chinese Communists toward its international obligations, its intervention in the Korean War, its "hate America campaign," and the active efforts by it to subvert the other nations of Southeast Asia. We would have to say, therefore, that non-recognition of Communist governments appears to be a "temporary expedient" which is probably more of an "accident" than a "policy."

Actually we must conclude that "no" is the more correct answer to the question. The United States has most of the time in the past followed a purely objective policy of recognizing de facto governments without going behind the scenes to delve into questions of "constitutional legitimacy." Thomas Jefferson began this recognition policy on November 7, 1792, when he declared that "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially

declared."⁸ This doctrine which Jefferson proclaimed was far removed from the accepted ideas of International Law. It was also antithetical to the doctrine of "divine right of kings." This has led writers to conclude that the ideas developed by Jefferson relative to the de facto principle of recognition were of his own invention and were not in any way connected with international precedents.⁹ This policy was reiterated from time to time by the government of the United States. President Monroe in his seventh Annual Message to Congress on December 2, 1823, said, "Our policy in regard to Europe...is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us..."¹⁰

In 1866 Secretary of State, William H. Seward, insisted that revolutionary governments must have the support of the people before the United States would recognize them. His declaration was made in regard to the French "puppet" regime of Maximilian in Mexico which we refused to recognize because we had not "...seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico have spoken."¹¹ This was a notable departure from the historic policy, but it is one so closely tied to considerations involving the Civil War and the Monroe Doctrine that it cannot be deemed as important as the

⁸ Julius Coebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States (New York: Columbia University, 1915), 102.

⁹ Ibid., 93.

¹⁰ James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902 (Bureau of National Literature and Arts, 1903), II, 218-219.

¹¹ Ruhl J. Bartlett (ed.), The Record of American Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 305-307.

refusal of President Woodrow Wilson to recognize the Mexican Dictator, Huerta, who had come to power on February 9, 1913.

The coming to power of Huerta occurred during the Taft administration but the action on recognition was left to Wilson. His action is considered a notable departure from the de facto policy. Some writers contend that Wilson's insistence that the government be "constitutionally right" was an expression of the "reformer" quality of the President's personality.¹² It was contended that Huerta's authority rested wholly on military force and, therefore, the non-recognition was justified.¹³ Recognition of Huerta might have well been the wise course, and would certainly have been the historic course, but in the eyes of Woodrow Wilson it was not the right course because it would have been an official sanction of murder and assassination as a "substitute for constitutional procedure."¹⁴ George Creel in his book, Wilson and the Issues, refers to Wilson's action as follows: "Whether it is considered as a challenge to sordidness and an affirmation of ancient faith or as an intelligent refusal to legitimize a peril, President Wilson's rejection of Huerta stands as a great and splendid act, and those who attack him on this ground betray themselves beyond explanation."¹⁵

¹² Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1936), 546.

¹³ John Holladay Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1927), 657.

¹⁴ George Creel, Wilson and the Issues (New York: The Century Company, 1916), 16-17.

¹⁵ Ibid., 18.

Later during Wilson's administration the policy of non-recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia was begun. Although the circumstances are not the same, one cannot help noticing the similarity in the attitude of the United States Government toward the Bolshevik dictators.

In order that we may further explore the question of our historic recognition policy, we should notice that our present Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on a recent occasion said that it should be our usual policy, as President Monroe stated, to "consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us." However, he further added that it is just a general policy, and we can depart from it whenever doing so seems in our best interests.¹⁶

After proceeding from the pronouncement of the de facto policy by Jefferson all of the way to our present Secretary of State, Dulles, the matter of recognition casts a different light than a cursory inspection might reveal. In the first place, it is quite obvious that we have not followed the de facto policy strictly. We could not, therefore, say that this is our set course of action in regard to recognition of governments. It may be distasteful to some to employ the term "expediency" to describe our recognition policy, so I would like to use the term "national interest" to delineate our elusive policy. In the past it has generally been in our best "national interest" to recognize de facto governments, but this is not a fixed rule when confronted by national interests which dictate against it.

¹⁶ Philip C. Jessup, *The Two Chinas and U. S. Recognition*, The Reporter, XI, No. 1 (July 6, 1954), 22.

Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, University of Michigan Law School, summed up our recognition policy well when he said, "The policy with respect to political recognition which is most conducive to orderly international intercourse and which serves best the national self interest...is the historic policy of the United States."¹⁷

There are two schools of thought regarding non-recognition as a national policy. Some feel that it is most idealistic and unrealistic. Others think it is a fine way for us to show to the world that we really do want all peoples to be free and enjoy self-government. There appears to be a weight of evidence against the latter view because it usually takes more than an attitude of non-recognition to obtain self-government for peoples who are neither educated for, nor accustomed to, representative government. One writer observed recently that it was difficult to either "shoot" or "supervise" people into self-government.¹⁸

Actually the policy of recognizing de facto governments, as I have already pointed out, was laid down by Jefferson as an offset to the European doctrine of "divine right of kings" and was a natural outgrowth of the doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.¹⁹ That it has from time to time become expedient to withhold our recognition from a de facto government does not mean that we have wavered from Jeffersonian principles, but, rather, it indicates that we disapprove

¹⁷ Green H. Hackworth, "The Policy of the United States in Recognizing New Governments, During the Past Twenty-five Years -- Discussion," American Society of International Law Proceedings, XXV (1931), 132.

¹⁸ Dillard, op. cit., 126.

¹⁹ Latane, op. cit., 656-657.

of governments which are not constituted through the "will of the nation substantially declared."

Background of United States-Russian Relations.--Some people will tell you that it is hard for them to see the reasons for the present crisis in the world arising from the struggle between the United States and Russia, because the two countries have never actually been at war with one another. The relations have for the most part been at least ostensibly friendly, so why the abrupt change? These same people infer that all would be well between the two countries if it were not for the nature and aims of Communism.

Let us examine briefly the Russo-American relations up to 1917 to see if this conclusion is well-founded and to answer these questions.

In 1781 Francis Dana went to St. Petersburg as America's first Russian envoy to seek recognition for the young republic of the United States of America. Empress Catherine the Great did not receive him, and it was not until 1809 that imperial Russia recognized the "dangerous revolutionary upstart."²⁰ It was in October, 1809, that John Quincy Adams arrived in St. Petersburg to assume his official duties as America's first minister to the imperial court. Adams had accompanied Dana to Russia as his secretary in 1781 when he was only fourteen. His reception this time was quite different. He was immediately received with the utmost cordiality by the Tsar.²¹

²⁰ Dean, op. cit., 5.

²¹ Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1944), 12, 19.

Several events witness to the common interests of the two nations. Both had a common trade interest in opposing Napoleon's continental system; both feared the encroachments on maritime commerce by the two naval powers of that time, France and Britain.²²

On the other hand, following the American purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, a marked change came over the Russian-American relations. It was not altogether evident on the surface of things.²³ The Russian government had been friendly to us during the Civil War and had refused to go along with British proposals for recognition of the Confederacy.²⁴ Also, the United States aided Russia during a severe famine in the early 1890's by raising \$77,000,000 in relief funds and sending abroad five steamers loaded with flour. The Russians reciprocated by standing by the U. S. during the war with Spain. Nevertheless, the United States was becoming suspicious of Russian foreign policy, and Russia was soon to resent what she regarded as our "obstructive and interfering attitude."²⁵

The common interests in the international realm could not long conceal the profound differences in ideology between the autocratic Tsars and the growing American democracy.²⁶ This is well illustrated by an event of 1912 which points out the utter opposites of the two political systems.

The Russians had long discriminated against the Jews with the

²² Dean, op. cit., 6.

²³ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 78.

²⁴ Dean, op. cit., 7.

²⁵ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 78.

²⁶ Dean, op. cit., 8.

resultant immigration of Russian Jews to America. Americans had the right to come and go in Russia as a result of the treaty of Commerce and Friendship concluded with Russia in 1832. When the Russian refugee Jews became naturalized American citizens they often desired to return to Russia, claiming that they could not now be excluded since they were American citizens. The Russians, however, insisted that since the treaty did not cover this point specifically, the Jews were still to be excluded. The matter could not be reconciled on either side, so in 1912 the U. S. Congress denounced the treaty.²⁷

In addition to these ideological conflicts, there was anxiety in this country that Russia, in extending its influence on the Asiatic mainland, would challenge the interests of the United States in that area. Accordingly, President Theodore Roosevelt at first lauded Japan's attack on Russia at Port Arthur in 1904 as being in consonance with our interests. Paradoxically, we soon became afraid that Japan might prove an even greater challenge to the United States than Russia; therefore, we offered our services as mediator in the conflict which had virtually exhausted both combatants.²⁸

The coming of the first world war uncovered the weaknesses of the Russian oligarchy in rapid events. The Tsar, whose court had always spared no expense to impress visiting foreigners by the

²⁷ Randolph Greenfield Adams, A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), 413-414.

²⁸ Dean, op. cit., 9-10.

wealth and power of Russia, was soon confronted by the reality of inherent weaknesses.²⁹ Nevertheless, if Russia could hold out she would share in the spoils of the war if the Germans were defeated. President Wilson's closest foreign-policy adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, concurred with the President that an allied victory in Europe was likely to result in Russian domination of Europe.³⁰ However, Russia collapsed from within before the war could be won. The Tsars had a corrupt military administration which was made more ineffective by the inadequate railway transportation. Millions of Russian⁽²⁾ soldiers were dispatched to the front without proper equipment, causing many deaths.³¹

The general inefficiency of the Russian system caused great unrest at home and eventually led in 1917 to a popular revolution against the Romanoff ruling house and the setting up on March 14 of a provisional government by the Duma. The next day Nicholas II abdicated as Tsar in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael, who refused to accept the throne unless called by the people to do so. He urged "all Russians to submit to the Provisional Government" which consisted of a ministry chosen from, and responsible to, the Duma.³²

This news that Russia was headed for a democracy was received

²⁹ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 12.

³⁰ Eric R. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 247.

³¹ Adams, op. cit., 414.

³² N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and Other Nations with Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation, No. 247 (February, 1929), 85.

with rejoicing in Washington.³³ The United States recognized the Provisional Government on March 22, 1917, when David R. Francis, our former ambassador to the Tsarist government, addressed the Council of Ministers, expressing the pleasure of the United States to "continue intercourse with Russia through the medium of the new government."³⁴

There was a prevalent feeling, led by Wilson, that we ought to show our interest in the new government in Russia. It was, therefore, decided to send a Commission to Russia to carry greetings and "convey to the Russian government the friendship and good will of this nation and to express the confident hope that the Russian people, having developed a political system founded on the principles of democracy, would join the free people of America in resisting with firmness and fortitude the ambitious designs of the German government."³⁵ This Commission headed by Elihu Root, which went to Russia in May, 1917, opened up credits for the Provisional Government in the United States to the extent ultimately of \$325,500,000 for the purpose of purchasing military supplies in America. Of this amount \$187,729,750 had been advanced to the government in cash by November 7, 1917.³⁶

From the very beginning of the Provisional Government, a bitter political struggle had ensued between the more moderate

³³ Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, 1917-1923 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), 56.

³⁴ Houghton, op. cit., 86.

³⁵ Daniels, op. cit., 57.

³⁶ Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, op. cit., 633.

socialists, "Mensheviks," and the radical communists, "Bolsheviks." A. F. Kerensky, the leader of the Mensheviks, appealed to the delegates of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting in Petrograd in June, 1917, to "see to it that the historic mistakes do not repeat themselves; that we do not bring on a situation that would make possible the return of reaction, the victory of force over democracy." Lenin, who had previously addressed the Congress and told them that the Bolsheviks "regard all capitalists--French, English, all--as robbers," was lambasted by Kerensky, who told them that they recommended "...childish prescriptions--arrest, kill, destroy." "What are you," he asked, "Socialists or the police of the old regime?"³⁷

The world listened to the uproar in Russia but, for the most part, was more concerned with the immediate exigencies of winning World War I than with a minority revolutionary movement which talked big. The Bolsheviks vowed that they would spread a new political and economic system called communism, as theorized by Karl Marx, through the subversion of the capitalistic system everywhere. This, they said, would eliminate all war because they contended that capitalism is the cause of all war.³⁸

Despite all of the official encouragement which the democratic nations could give to the Provisional Government, its death came very soon. Russia was a nation in which 75 per cent of the people were illiterate; it is difficult, if not impossible, to impose a

³⁷ Frank Alfred Golder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917 (New York; London: The Century Co., 1927), 356-357.

³⁸ Adams, op. cit., 415.

democratic government on an ignorant electorate. It is no wonder, under the conditions which existed, that the people would be seduced by the siren call of the "Bolsheviks." They executed a successful coup on November 7, 1917.³⁹

Since that time Moscow has become the headquarters of a revolutionary movement which is well organized, motivated, and supported. Soviet Russia is a power which must be coped with as the only real challenge to the world leadership of the United States of America. Americans find it hard to rationalize the fact that Communism, the Moscow-Cominform variety, has in recent years been winning rather handily in much of Eastern Europe and Asia.

And so we can say to those people who contend that history holds no precedent for the strained relations existing between the United States and Russia, that the cause of our past pacific existence has undoubtedly been the result of a lack of contacts, rather than a mutual love or the existence of reciprocal virtue in international relations.⁴⁰ In this age of air power, atomic arsenals, and cold war, "lack of contact" is no longer practicable.

In this paper I intend to take the reader behind the scenes as much as possible so that we may better understand how U. S.-Soviet relations "got that way." We could do well to bear in mind as we study these most important years that in the future it will be the responsibility of other generations to not permit, as Kerenski admonished, "historic mistakes" to repeat themselves. We

³⁹ Ibid., 414.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 413.

know that the United States has often been "out-foxed" by the Soviet Union. Our task is to understand the tactics of this "bear that walks like a man."

CHAPTER II

REVOLUTION AND INTERVENTION

The Bolshevik Coup.--The Russian revolution had a great influence on President Wilson. After it occurred he was able to truthfully contend that the War in Europe was a battle between a combination of liberal governments on one side and autocratic governments on the other. It was now possible to justify the entry of the United States into the war by saying that she did so in the interest of preserving democracy.¹

The Commission headed by Elihu Root came back from Russia with glowing reports of the stability of the Provisional Government. Secretary of State Lansing, however, did not share the enthusiasm of the Commission. He believed that "the logic of events" pointed to a worsening of the Russian situation. It is apparent then that the Bolshevik coup d'etat of November 7, 1917, did not take the State Department by surprise.²

The effect of the Bolshevik coup d'etat was profoundly felt in the United States. On the New York Stock Exchange, leading stocks dropped from four to eleven points in a wild hour of trading, and Russian bonds and exchange rates suffered a similar decline.^{3*} It found Ambassador Behmetov on a speaking tour, at-

¹ H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), 316-27.

² Robert Lansing, War Memoirs (New York; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), 338.

³ Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954), 165.
* Quoted from New York Times (November 9, 1917).

tempting to bolster the Provisional Government's prestige in the eyes of the American people. Only the day before, he had told a Memphis audience that his countrymen were "heart and soul with the Kerensky government" and would "fight to the end" with the Allies. Nor was the ambassador's optimism to be ruffled by the contradictory news. He confidently asserted that the "intent and spirit of Russia as a whole can in no way be judged by the news from Petrograd."⁴

Although the Kerensky government had the moral and official support of the United States government, we departed only briefly from our customary policy of silence on the internal troubles of our allies. President Wilson took an indirect slap at the Bolsheviki in a speech before the American Federation of Labor convention on November 12.⁵ The Anti-Bolsheviki were materially aided when Sheldon Whitehouse, U. S. Secretary of the Embassy, permitted one of Kerensky's adjutants to "commandeer" his automobile, which carried a near-guarantee of unmolested passage in the form of an American flag, in order that Kerensky and a few officers might make their escape from Bolshevik-controlled Petrograd.⁶

It seems that the United States, as well as the Anti-Bolshevik Provisional Government headed by Kerensky, considered the coup d'etat as only a temporary setback. Kerensky's aide-de-camp, who

⁴ Loc. cit.

⁵ Ibid.

⁵ quoted from New York Times (November 13, 1917).

⁶ Ibid.

was hurriedly leaving the city of Petrograd that November day to "meet regular troops on the way to Petrograd to support" the Kerensky government, told Sheldon Whitehouse that he expected the whole affair to be liquidated within five days.^{7*} Secretary of State Lansing believed that "Russia as a nation" would "never come under the Petrograd Bolsheviki." He observed, "They are far more likely to break up into separate units claiming independence."⁸ These estimates and predictions proved to be the understatement of this half-century in the light of the present prominence of the Soviet Union. Two weeks after the coup the Bolsheviks were still in power and, in fact, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Leon Trotsky, had addressed a communication to the diplomatic corps in Petrograd, announcing the formation of the Soviet Government and requesting its recognition. The American Ambassador, David R. Francis, correctly anticipating the policy of the United States Government, ignored the message.⁹ In December, 1917, Secretary of State Lansing made his views on recognition of Russia very clear in a memorandum to President Wilson. It read in part as follows:

"Historically the Russian situation is unprecedented. It is wholly novel. It seems to me that the controlling forces are idealism and ignorance supported by weapons...The correct policy for a government which believes in political institutions as they now

⁷ U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918-Russia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), I, 224.

* Hereafter this reference will be referred to as Foreign Relations.

⁸ Lansing, op. cit., 341.

⁹ Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), 5.

exist and based on nationality and private property is to leave these dangerous idealists alone and have no direct dealings with them. To recognize them would give them an exalted idea of their own power, make them more insolent and impossible, and win their contempt, not their friendship."¹⁰

Divorce from the Allied Cause.--On the day following their seizure of power, the Bolshevik leaders proposed that "all combatant peoples (and governments) begin immediate negotiations for an honest democratic peace." In the same decree they announced their intention to publish the secret treaties concluded by the "capitalists" between February and October 25, 1917. They claimed that they were abolishing secret diplomacy.¹¹

The Allies refused to have anything to do with the Bolshevik peace proposal, but the Central Powers responded with enthusiasm. Negotiations for an armistice were begun at Brest-Litovsk on December 3, and twelve days later a definite truce was signed between the representatives of Russia, on one hand, and of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the other. Later, on December 22, the peace negotiations began; however, the Central Powers' terms were so severe that the Russians secured a suspension of the peace conference on the pretext of enabling the Allies to participate. Meanwhile, they attempted to propagandize the German people into a revolt against their government. This attempt failed; nor did the Allies agree to participate.¹²

¹⁰ Lansing, op. cit., 339-340.

¹¹ Walter Consuelo Langsam, Documents and Readings in the History of Europe since 1916 (Chicago; Philadelphia; New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939), 743-744.

¹² Lee F. Bennis, Europe Since 1914 in Its World Setting, (8th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), 86.

Meanwhile Trotsky had begun a propaganda campaign in which he did publish the secret treaties which he had found in the Foreign Office archives. This publication was made in an attempt to reveal the predatory aims of the Allies. In order that the effects of this campaign might be negated, the Allied governments called upon President Wilson to frame an answer to the charges.¹³ He delivered his now famous "fourteen points" to a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918.

Point Six referred directly to Russia. It read as follows:

"The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome in the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."¹⁴

He summed up the position in which the Russian government found itself when negotiating with Germany, and at the same time extended a bit of sympathy and understanding to the Russian people in this address. He said, "There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is

¹³ Browder, op. cit., 5.

¹⁴ U. S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 680-681.

filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity... And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action."¹⁵

All of these appeals and declarations did not keep the Russians from continuing their negotiations with the Central Powers. The complete breakdown of their army and the need for internal consolidation compelled them to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. All that remained to be done to make the treaty operative was the ratification by the Congress of Soviets.¹⁶

In another effort to forestall the final act, President Wilson addressed a message to the Soviet on March 11, 1918, which stated that although the United States could not give them direct aid, we would "avail ourselves" of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs.¹⁷ Zinoviev, president of the Petrograd Soviet, termed the president's message as "purely a move in the political game of diplomacy made to prevent Germany's pilfering everything and leaving nothing for us." The Soviet Congress voted on March 16, 1918, to accept the terms of Brest-Litovsk.¹⁸

A feeler on the official attitude of the U. S. government was made by the Japanese government through their Washington

¹⁵ Ibid., 680.

¹⁶ Browder, op. cit., 6.

¹⁷ Foreign Relations, 1918-Russia, I, 395-396.

¹⁸ Browder, op. cit., 7.

charge as to whether the Allied powers should regard Russia as a neutral or an enemy, and should they regard the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as an invalid act. The U. S. State Department replied that "the so-called Soviet Government upon which Germany has just forced, or tried to force, peace was never recognized by the government of the United States as even a government de facto. None of its acts, therefore, need be officially recognized by this Government..."¹⁹

Another event which is closely tied to the action which the Soviets took to divorce Russia from the "Capitalist" Allies and their cause was the annulling of the foreign debt of Russia. This was another "official act" which the United States refused to recognize and which directly and lastingly affected the policy of the United States toward the Soviet government. This question will be discussed at greater length in Chapter IV of this paper, so we will view it only cursorily here.

The decree annulling the foreign debt was dated January 21, 1918. Article Three declared, "Unconditionally and without exceptions, all foreign loans are annulled."²⁰ In addition to the \$187,729,750 which had been advanced to the Provisional Government by the United States (the Root Commission opened up credits for the government as a result of its visit in May, 1917), the Soviets repudiated \$75,000,000 in bonds sold in the United States, and

¹⁹ Foreign Relations, 1918-Russia, I, 397.

²⁰ Benjamin H. Williams, Economic Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1929), 226.

confiscated American property valued at \$443,000,000.²¹ See Table I on page 50.

The Bolsheviki in Peril.--An acute situation of famine existed in Russia in the spring of 1918. Ambassador Francis wired from Petrograd that he had paid the equivalent of \$125 a barrel for flour, that the people looked underfed, and that it was reported that babies were dying by the hundreds in the city.²²

Francis considered the Soviet government, as a result of this chaos, to be on the brink of collapse and requested that the United States and Allied governments be prepared to instruct foreign diplomats in Russia to support any government which should be formulated by the "Constituent Assembly fairly assembled."²³ The Bolsheviki knew that they were on unstable ground. In June of 1918 Lenin was desperately urging his supporters to hold out through the next two months for the procuring of a more certain tenure of power as soon as the crops were in.²⁴

In a situation such as this, a government such as the outlaw Soviet regime attaches a great deal of importance to recognition, because it signifies the cessation of the embarrassing and disturbing atmosphere of moral censure implied in the maintenance of

²¹ James C. Malin, The United States After the World War (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), 446.

²² Foreign Relations, 1918-Russia, I, 552.

²³ Ibid., 550.

²⁴ Ibid., 554.

the attitude, by the other powers of the world, of legal condemnation in the form of non-recognition.²⁵

The Soviets tried every subterfuge to obtain recognition. The Bolshevik delegation in Berne, Switzerland, on May 31, 1918, left their official cards at the private residence of Pleasant A. Stovall, the U. S. Minister in Switzerland. Stovall queried the State Department as to what he should do if they requested a personal interview.²⁶ The State Department replied that they preferred that he have "no relations whatever with Bolshevik representatives." The telegram was specific in pointing out that our government "does not recognize the Bolshevik authorities, either de facto or de jure."²⁷

Nevertheless, on June 5, 1918, the Soviet government, through the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, advised Ambassador Francis in Petrograd that "Citizen Litvinov" was nominated as plenipotentiary representative to Washington. The Soviets desired "closer relations, intimate friendship between our peoples."²⁸

Needless to say, we did not acknowledge either the Russian Soviets or Litvinov. Ambassador Francis considered it astounding that a British admiral and general, joined by American and French naval officers at Murmansk, had stated that "recognition of the Soviet government was the only solution of the present Russian situation." He said such a move would be a "tragic mistake" and

²⁵ Lauterpacht, op. cit., 431.

²⁶ Foreign Relations, 1918-Russia, I, 549.

²⁷ Ibid., 551.

²⁸ Loc. cit.

that the officers were unacquainted with the internal conditions; therefore, they were not capable of giving intelligent advice on this subject.²⁹

A high Soviet official called on Ambassador Francis on June 5, 1918, and communicated to him a very bitter attitude which described the situation exactly. The Soviet Union admits, he said, "We are a corpse, but no one has the courage to bury us."³⁰

Allied Military Intervention in Russia.--The situation in Russia became even more involved when the Entente powers decided to intervene in an attempt to maintain a semblance of resistance to Germany on the Eastern front. The Japanese landed at Vladivostok in April, 1918. On June 27 the Allies landed a detachment of their troops in Murmansk.³¹ There were many considerations which prompted the intervention. The Germans had already intervened and on February 9, 1918, signed a separate peace with the Ukraine. They advanced on Kiev, occupied Odessa, and by the third week in April were in control of the Ukraine. On March 9, 1918, they seized Sevastopol and the greater part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.³²

These far-reaching German interventions justified in the eyes of the Allies their departure from their primary legal obli-

²⁹ Ibid., 552-553.

³⁰ Loc. cit.

³¹ George Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1936), 421.

³² Anonymous Article, "American Intervention in Russia, I--The American Government's Policy," Current History, XXXII, No. 1 (April, 1930), 60.

gation to keep hands off Russia. Their consideration was the possibility that Germany would make herself master of Russia. This would have ended the economic encirclement of Germany and would have given them possession of the stores of munitions at Vladivostok and Archangel. It was during the German offensive of 1918 that the decision was made to intervene in Russia.³³

Since the Allied intervention in Russia did not at first jeopardize the existence of the Soviet regime in Central Russia, the Bolsheviki did not oppose the intervention with arms. The policy was to oppose the intervention when it menaced the existence of the Soviet regime and to give passive resistance when it entailed merely the loss of portions of Russian territory which, it was believed, would eventually be retaken when the "world revolution" of communism broke out.³⁴

The United States persistently withheld its sanction of the intervention question, maintaining that such action would play into the hands of the enemy and strengthen the anti-democratic Soviet forces.³⁵ Military considerations changed the attitude of President Wilson, who became genuinely concerned with the protection of Allied military supplies in Northern Russia and with assisting those Russian elements which were willing to continue the fight against Germany.³⁶ Secretary of State Lansing announced

³³ Ibid., 60-61.

³⁴ James Bunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 112-13.

³⁵ Thomas Andrew Bailey, America Faces Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), 242.

³⁶ Whitney A. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), 226.

Wilson's assent to the Murmansk expedition on June 1, 1918.³⁷ Some five thousand American troops landed at Archangel August 2, 1918. They were instructed only to guard military stores and to render such aid as was acceptable to the Russian people without interference in their internal affairs.³⁸

On the day after the Archangel landing of American troops, the Right Wing Social Revolutionaries organized an attempt on Lenin's life in Moscow. Lenin was wounded, but not mortally.³⁹ A tragic vicious circle set in. Fearful of the consequences of foreign intervention, which had the sympathy of some Russian anti-Soviet groups, the Soviet regime instituted mass terror.⁴⁰

During the Allied intervention in North Russia, there were frequent clashes with Soviet troops. These cost the lives of 244 Americans and resulted in another 305 being wounded.⁴¹ Our United States activities from the Soviet point of view constituted a violation of sovereignty--regardless of our pronounced purposes;⁴² however, Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin admitted that the United States had given only formal consent to intervention, and he did not denounce this country as he did Britain and France.⁴³

³⁸ Bailey, op. cit., 242.

³⁹ Vernadsky, op. cit., 421.

⁴⁰ Dean, op. cit., 12.

⁴¹ Frederick L. Schuman, "Soviet Russia's Claims Against the United States," Current History, XXXII, No. 5 (August, 1930), 913.

⁴² Loc. cit.

⁴³ Dean, op. cit., 12.

The Russian Revolution instantly upset the status quo in the Far East and provided Japan with another field for expansion. It is quite evident that the Siberian intervention was prompted by entirely different motives than was the intervention in Northern Russia. First of all, this conclusion is suggested by the fact that the Siberian decision was announced on July 17, over six weeks after the Murmansk pronouncement.⁴⁴ The consensus of writers is that the United States' purpose "first and last" in the Siberian intervention was "to resist the Japanese penetration of Northern Manchuria and Siberia."⁴⁵ This view is also taken by Foster Rhea Dulles, Thomas Andrew Bailey, and others.

Actually, China, in December of 1917, was the first to intervene against the Bolsheviks. However, this was in Northern Manchuria, which was nominally Chinese; and the Chinese backed down when Great Britain and the United States protested their action.⁴⁶

On July 2 the Supreme War Council had sent an urgent message to President Wilson, pointing out the necessity for the formation of an Eastern front if victory was to be secured in the Western theatre by 1919. It pointed out that not only was there evidence of a waning of Bolshevik power and a need for the reopening of the Eastern front, but also that "a force of 50,000 troops of Slav nationality, totally disinterested in the internal politics of Russia, yet determined to fight Germany for the liberation of their

⁴⁴ Griswold, op. cit., 226.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 226-227.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 227-228.

own country, (are) in control of the railway in western Siberia ...and must be friendly disposed to the Allied cause."⁴⁷

This force of Czecho-Slovaks had deserted from the Austrian army soon after the outbreak of the war and had been permitted in 1917 to join the Russian forces to fight for the independence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Upon conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, they were left hopelessly stranded in the Ukraine. The Soviet government had, consequently, agreed to allow them to retreat through European Russia and across Siberia to Vladivostok, where they would, supposedly, be transported by the Allies half-way around the world to fight again in France. Those troops made slow progress toward Vladivostok because they met opposition from loyal Soviets and, on one occasion, from former German and Austrian prisoners released on orders from Moscow. Only one contingent reached Vladivostok, and it rushed back to the aid of the others when opposition was encountered. The Czechs then joined forces with the anti-Bolshevik forces, and Soviet authority east of the Urals virtually collapsed.⁴⁸

"I have been sweating blood over the question of what is right and feasible to do in Russia," President Wilson wrote Colonel House on July 8, 1918. "It goes to pieces like quicksilver under my touch..."⁴⁹ It became evident to Wilson that increased intervention in Siberia would take place without his permission, with Japan probably taking the leading role. On July 17 the Presi-

⁴⁷ Foreign Relations, 1918-Russia, II, 241-242.

⁴⁸ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 133-134.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 129.

sent, in agreeing to American participation in intervention, sent to the Allied Ambassadors a personal aide-memoire which stated the desire of the United States that "all associated in this course of action...unite in assuring the people of Russia...that none of the governments uniting in the action, either in Siberia or in Northern Russia, contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia..."⁵⁰ This aide-memoire became the confidential orders of General Graves, the commander of the United States expeditionary force.

American intervention in Siberia involved about 9,000 United States troops who were supposed to rescue the marooned Czechoslovak soldiers and protect military supplies.⁵¹ General Graves has since convincingly shown that the Czechs were never in any serious danger, and by the end of May the Allies had given up the idea of sending them to the Western Front. The Czechs, however, did provide the interventionists with a convenient excuse for their action.⁵²

Many high State Department, consular, and intelligence officers, including Secretary Lansing, thought the Anti-Bolshevik Siberian leader Kolchak should be recognized and actively supported; nevertheless, General Graves followed the role of a neutral as outlined in his instructions. This policy proved correct because Kolchak did not have the support of the people he pretended to govern. Graves was supported in this policy by the President and

⁵⁰ Griswold, op. cit., 234-235.

⁵¹ Bailey, op. cit., 242-243.

⁵² Griswold, op. cit., 233.

the War Department. The purpose of it was to prevent a Franco-British deal with the Japanese which might have given that country Russian territory in exchange for an anti-Bolshevik crusade.⁵³

The Japanese continued to greatly increase their armed forces in Siberia and were openly taking sides in the civil strife there. The Japanese forces reached a peak figure of over 70,000 men.⁵⁴ American forces stayed on in Siberia until the spring of 1920. By that time Kolchak had collapsed, and a "deal" by France and Britain with Japan appeared unlikely. A Japanese band played "Hard Times Come Again No More" as the last American troops sailed from Vladivostok on April 1, 1920. (Japan withdrew her troops from Siberia in November, 1922, but stayed on in Northern Sakhalin until 1925.)⁵⁵

Winston Churchill urged an increase of Allied intervention forces, and more active aid to Russian groups who opposed Bolshevism.⁵⁶ He satirized the official attitudes of the Allies in this way: "Were they (the Allies) at war with Soviet Russia? Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at sight. They armed the enemies of the Soviet government. They blockaded its ports and sank its battleships. They earnestly desired and schemed its downfall. But war---shocking! Interference---shame! It was, they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled

⁵³ Ibid., 237.

⁵⁴ Dean, op. cit., 11.

⁵⁵ Griswold, op. cit., 238.

⁵⁶ Dean, op. cit., 12.

their own internal affairs."⁵⁷ Sir J. A. R. Marriott points out that "it is interesting, though futile, to speculate what might have happened in regard to British intervention in Russia had Mr. Winston Churchill, instead of Mr. Lloyd George, been in control of British policy."⁵⁸

The armistice of November 11, 1918, raised the hopes in the Anti-Bolshevik camp that the colossal military forces of the Entente countries were now free to launch an attack against the Bolsheviks and put it to a quick rout.⁵⁹

As it happened, though, the public of the Entente countries lost all interest in the Russian problem immediately after the armistice. This was a very significant fact because it was a decisive factor in the final defeat of the "Whites" movement of resistance in Russia which was evident by the end of 1919.⁶⁰

On the other hand, the fall of the Central Powers led Lenin to assert that this had "quickenened the pace of the proletarian world revolution" in the sense that it was the preliminary to an uprising of the German and Austrian proletariat, to be followed shortly by revolts in other countries. The Bolsheviks not only prepared to assist the revolution in other countries, but they intensified their opposition to the Allied forces of intervention.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Sir J. A. R. Marriott, Anglo-Russian Relations, 1689-1943 (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1944), 180-181.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 181.

⁵⁹ Vernadsky, op. cit., 423.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 423, 426.

⁶¹ Bunyan, op. cit., 113.

By the beginning of 1921 the whole of intervention in Russia was defunct. General Wrangel, the leader of the last great anti-Bolshevik army, had been driven into the sea. At long last the Soviet regime was entrenched in power.⁶² The grand total of the Allied intervention is well known; it was unique in that there were virtually no losers. The Allies had their victory: the Red flag was never hoisted successfully in Western European capitals; Russia was made weaker so she was not in a position to make herself heard at the Peace Conference, and a solid belt of Anti-Communist buffer states had been created from the Baltic to the Black Sea.⁶³ Russia had her victory: the Red flag was not hauled down from the Kremlin, and intervention may well have strengthened the Soviets by making it possible for them to pose as the champion of Russian national independence against foreign attack.⁶⁴

Reflections on the intervention are interesting in that they all view it as an unfortunate incident in United States-Russian relations. Robert Paul Browder makes the statement, "Intervention had been a mistake."⁶⁵ Foster Rhea Dulles says, "The memory of that undeclared war still remains a serious barrier to every effort to reconcile the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds."⁶⁶ In a

⁶² William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Enigma (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), 190.

⁶³ T. A. Taracuzio, War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan Company, 1940), 84.

⁶⁴ Loc. cit.

⁶⁵ Browder, op. cit., 19.

⁶⁶ Foster Rhea Dulles, Russia and America: Pacific Neighbors (New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946), 15.

letter to the President of the Council of the League of Nations in January, 1921, President Wilson wrote: "...armed invasion is not the way to bring peace to the people of Russia...attempts at military coercion can but end in disorder."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Browder, op. cit., 19.

CHAPTER III

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Deliberation and Overture.--President Wilson and his staffs arrived in Paris on December 13, 1918, aboard the liner George Washington. During the latter part of that month he was in London; two days before Christmas Edward VII gave a banquet in his honor at Buckingham Palace. Our former Ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, who was just returning from Russia, was invited to attend. During the evening the King asked Francis, "What do you think we ought to do about Russia?" Francis replied that the Allies must overthrow the Bolshevik government; the King agreed. President Wilson differed with this view, kept Francis at arm's length, and refused to grant him an audience.¹ The reflection of Wilson's attitude of the "little intervention" can be seen throughout the conference.²

The Bolsheviks had alternately attacked and asked favors of President Wilson. For example, on October 24, 1918, George Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, addressed a long bitter communication to the President in which he asked him how he could reconcile the sixth of the Fourteen Points and the message to the Congress of Soviets with American intervention in Siberia.³ On the other hand, the Soviet government turned to Wilson with an

¹ Louis Fischer, The Soviet in World Affairs (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), I, 157.

² Chapter IV of reference above is good on the attitudes of the Powers at the Paris Peace Conference.

³ Browder, op. cit., 9.

offer to negotiate after the signing of the Armistice, asking that they be invited to participate in any discussion of the Russian question at the peace negotiations.⁴

Actually the Russian situation was practically the first problem to which the heads of the Allied delegations at Paris gave consideration,⁵ but Soviet attendance at the Paris Conference soon became a remote possibility due to the attitude of both the English and French governments.⁶ The French talked "big" intervention as the solution but would fight Bolshevism with Americans, Russians, Poles, Rumanians--not Frenchmen.⁷

On January 16, 1919, conversations regarding the situation in Russia were held at the Quai d'Orsay between heads of the Allied States. At this meeting Lloyd George outlined three possible approaches to the Russian problem, namely:

(1) Military intervention. This, he said, would be difficult not only because of the vast territory of Russia but also because the expedition would be unpopular with the people of the Western countries. He asserted that under these circumstances British troops would mutiny and, therefore, the mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by force was pure madness.

(2) A cordon. He asked the delegates if they realized what a besiegement of Russia would mean. It would not, he reported,

⁴ Ibid., 10.

⁵ H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London: Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), VI, 312-313.

⁶ Fischer, The Soviet in World Affairs, op. cit., 160.

⁷ Ibid., 165.

result in the starvation of the Bolsheviki; it would, rather, mean the death of the friends of the Western Allies; it would be a "death," not a "health," cordon. Mr. Lloyd George then asked those present just who there was to overthrow the Soviets. Denekin was occupying only a "little backyard" near the Black Sea. It would appear that Kolchak was gathering members of the old regime around him and must, therefore, be a monarchist at heart. He believed that if the Allies counted on these men, they were building on quicksand.

(3) The alternative, which British policy favored, was for the Great Powers to set their conditions and then to summon all warring factions to Paris to give an account of themselves to the powers, not to the Peace Conference.⁸

Clemenceau, the French leader, contested the proposal based on the third alternative; therefore, a compromise was necessary. Clemenceau thought that the manifesto to the Russian parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They should be told, "You are threatened by Famine. We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making peace..." Humane reasons, the French leader contended, should be the reason for bringing together the representatives of all parties.⁹ This was another manifestation of the French desire to increase the intervention rather than settle the whole Russian affair through negotiation.

⁸ U. S. Congress, Senate, Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Document No. 166, 66th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 1235-1238.

⁹ Ibid., 1244.

A compromise was finally reached which called upon President Wilson to draft a proclamation inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting at some place other than Paris. Wilson's proclamation of January 22 set forth the Island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora as a safely remote spot where the delegates could meet on February 15, 1919.¹⁰ The proposal never materialized in spite of the acceptance of it by the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and by the Soviet government on the condition that the powers would refrain from interference in Russian internal affairs.¹¹ The Anti-Bolshevik forces preferred (to paraphrase a recent statement by Winston Churchill) to "war, war" rather than to "yaw, yaw."

In addition to conditionally accepting the Prinkipo proposal, the Soviets offered important concessions in regard to the debts due to the nationals of the Allied Powers. The Anti-Bolshevik forces were more implicit in their refusal than the Soviets were vague in their conditions and concessions. The "Whites" flatly declined to "confer on an equal basis with traitors, murderers, and robbers." It now appears that the proposal was fantastic in conception.¹²

This writer wonders if there could have been any connection between the French attitude favoring increased intervention and

¹⁰ Temperley, op. cit., 312-313.

¹¹ W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, Readings in European International Relations Since 1878 (New York; London: Harper and Brothers, 1931), 205.

¹² Harriott, op. cit., 181.

the adamant stand of the Anti-Bolshevik forces. Apparently these "rebels" could have been influenced by the French and British who were supplying them, and they obviously could never hope to be victorious over Bolshevism by compromising with it. It is interesting to note also that the Soviet government replied to the proposal in a slightly evasive form which leads one to believe that they were not ready to compromise either. They said, "We are ready to accept the terms of the proposals, and we are ready to talk about stopping fighting." They never did say that they were ready to stop fighting on any specific date.¹³

The Bullitt Mission - Question Mark in Paris Diplomacy.--On February 18, 1919, William C. Bullitt, member of the United States' Commission to negotiate peace, was commissioned by Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, "to proceed to Russia for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace." He was further instructed by Colonel House, Wilson's foreign policy adviser, to indicate the willingness of the United States government to support proposals for an armistice on all fronts, the re-establishment of economic relations (Russia was still blockaded by the Allies), and the conditional cessation of intervention, including the withdrawal of Allied troops. Mr. Bullitt conferred also with Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's private secretary, and they jointly prepared an outline of the

¹³ Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings, op. cit.,
1244-1245.

possible conditions of peace. Mr. Kerr reported that he had cleared the whole matter with Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour.¹⁴

Before Bullitt left he received urgent instructions from Secretary of State Lansing to do everything possible while in Russia to gain the release of our former Petrograd Consul Treadwell, who was being forcibly detained by the local government at Tashkent where he had been subsequently transferred.¹⁵ Bullitt, along with Lincoln Steffens and Captain Walter Pettit, proceeded on his mission in March, 1919. While in Russia, Bullitt and the Bolsheviks conferred and drafted terms for an agreement between Russia and the Allies. This document, drawn up on March 14 by M. Tchitcherin and M. Litvinoff, followed closely the conditions of peace which the Allies had laid down.

The Soviet Government agreed to "undertake" to accept these terms, provided they were agreed upon not later than April 10, 1919. These terms were: (1) a short armistice pending a peace conference; (2) all de facto governments in Russia were to retain the territory they held; (3) the economic blockade was to be raised and trade relations restored; (4) Soviet Russia was to have unhindered transit to ports on former Russian territory; (5) general amnesty and resumption of diplomatic relations; (6) Allied troops were to be withdrawn and assistance to anti-Soviet governments by the Allies was to cease; (7) the acknowledgment of all governments on the territory of the old Russian Empire of their obligation to pay part of the Russian debt owed to the

¹⁴ Ibid., 1246-1247.

¹⁵ Ibid., 1245.

Allies, the particulars to be worked out at a subsequent conference on the financial situation of Russia.¹⁶

During the discussions Russia's Maxim Litvinov evolved a plan which would have the United States take over all Allied claims against Russia and to cancel in return a corresponding amount of the Allied debts owed to the United States. One creditor, particularly the United States who Russia hoped would offer better terms than the other Allies, would be to the advantage of Russia. Lenin permitted Litvinov to make the proposal orally to Bullitt for the consideration of President Wilson.¹⁷

Bullitt was very much impressed with what he saw in Russia. The areas actually under the control of the Bolsheviks seemed to be in good order, and he soon became convinced that Russia would never accept anything other than a socialist government.¹⁸

When Bullitt returned to Paris the conference was getting around to the general European settlement, and President Wilson was becoming more concerned with these problems than he was with Russia. Besides, the anti-Bolshevik forces were having more success of late, and the Soviets were on weak legs. These considerations, no doubt, contributed to the disinterest that President Wilson exhibited toward Bullitt's enthusiastic report.¹⁹

Bullitt claims that he also placed the report in the hands of Lloyd George, who attached great importance to it and urged

¹⁶ Ibid., 1248-1250.

¹⁷ Louis Fischer, Why Recognize Russia? (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931), 51.

¹⁸ Foreign Relations, 1919-Russia, 85-89.

¹⁹ Browder, op. cit., 12.

its publication. He spoke, however, of public opinion as a fatal obstacle to the action he personally would desire to take.²⁰ Surprisingly, Lloyd George later discredited Bullitt before the House of Commons. He said, "No public man in England would soil his fingers by using the evidence of a man like that." He went on to say that it was untrue that he had given Bullitt written terms to give to Russia and added that he had "never heard of Bullitt until he came back from Russia."²¹ Lloyd George was accused by the opposition of a very clever explanation of the whole affair.²² This whole thing is sort of an imbroglio with a question mark. It is hard to understand why Wilson vetoed this report when he had been resisting all along French and other schemes to crush what Winston Churchill called "the foul baboonery of Bolshevism."²³

Bullitt was very much discouraged; he resigned from the American Peace Delegation and returned to America. He later disclosed the nature of his mission to Moscow and caused President Wilson considerable embarrassment.²⁴

The Germans Solemnly Swear.--Although the Russians were isolated from the peace negotiations, several "agreements" were reached relative to Russia.

Article Fifteen of the Armistice Agreement provided for the

²⁰ Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings, op. cit., 1260-1261.

²¹ Hansard Parliamentary Debates--Commons, 5th Series (1919) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1919), CXVI, Column 719.

²² Ibid., Column 731.

²³ Bailey, op. cit., 246.

²⁴ Browder, op. cit., 12.

renunciation by Germany of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk²⁵ and all other treaties, conventions, and agreements entered into by Germany with the Maximalist government in Russia.²⁶ (The term "Maximalist" refers to the Bolshevist government of Russia.) By Article 116 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany acknowledged and agreed to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on August 1, 1914.²⁷ Germany also declared her intention "not to...mix" in the internal affairs of Russia.²⁸ Germany further agreed to withdraw all of her troops from Russia when "the governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall think the moment suitable..."²⁹

The effect of the Russian problem on the Paris conference was certainly profound. It is contended that Paris cannot be understood unless Moscow is understood. The Bolsheviki and Bolshevism, without ever being present at Paris, were forces which had to be coped with at every turn. Russia played a more vital part in the negotiations than Prussia because the Prussian idea

²⁵ For text of treaty see Foreign Relations, 1918-Russia, I, 442.

²⁶ Foreign Relations, 1919-The Paris Peace Conference, VI, 845.

²⁷ U. S. Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles and After--Annotations of the Text of the Treaty, Publication 2724, Conference Series 92 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), 272-273.

²⁸ Foreign Relations, 1919-The Paris Peace Conference, VI, 845.

²⁹ The Treaty of Versailles and After, op. cit., 726.

had been defeated while the Russian idea was still rising in power.³⁰

³⁰ Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Written from His Unpublished and Personal Material, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922), II, 64.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMICS OF NON-RECOGNITION

The Blockade and the Famine.--Russia was in the throes of economic chaos immediately after World War I. One of the causes of this was the economic blockade which was imposed by the Allies in October, 1919. The United States announced on November 4, 1919, that it was not participating in the blockade; however, it refused "export licenses for shipments to Russian territory under Bolshevik control and clearance papers to American vessels seeking to depart for Petrograd, the only remaining Bolshevik port."¹

So we can see that ours was not a blockade but an embargo. Our cooperation in this matter was so completely in accord with the wishes of the other Allied powers that we did not lift our embargo until the Supreme Council decided to lift their blockade on January 16, 1920.²

At this same time Secretary of State Colby issued a statement declaring the intention of the United States to withdraw the American military forces from Siberia in the near future; however, the government made it clear that it still refused protection to Americans who engaged in Russian trade.³

Later in November, 1920, the last of the White Armies in

¹ Jerome Davis, "One Hundred and Fifty Years of American-Russian Relations, 1777-1927," Annals of American Academy, CXXXII (July, 1927), 27.

² Loc. cit.

³ Loc. cit.

Russia retreated, leaving the Soviets free to concentrate on the revival of their chaotic internal economy. Output of the industries, mines, and mills, was 13 per cent below the 1913 level because the workers who had attempted to manage the factories were not prepared to do so. The railroads were almost at a standstill. A 90 per cent deficit reflected the complete breakdown of the fiscal machinery. The agricultural policy of the government was even worse. Not only was production down to 55 per cent of the pre-war average, but also the government had been systematically confiscating the peasants' produce until they barely had enough to eat during the winter and to reseed their farms in the spring. The government was giving the peasants commodity cards as payment for their produce, but these were worthless since there was nothing to buy with them. As a consequence, the farmers were inclined to produce only enough to eat themselves. All of this, coupled with a severe drought in the summer of 1920, caused a failure of crops and a famine which took some five million lives.⁴

The American people at this time were going through a period referred to by many as "the great Red scare." Nevertheless, they answered the call for relief of the suffering and starving. Herbert Hoover offered the aid of himself, his associates, and the resources of the American Relief Administration.⁵ Hoover had been aware for some time that the Russian economy was on a weak

⁴ Robert Ergang, Europe in Our Time (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1953), 174.

⁵ H. H. Fischer, The Famine in Soviet Russia (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1935), 2.

footing. In a statement of April 18, 1919, he said, "The economic and political situation inside Bolshevik Russia today is about as bad as it can be...Russia is not only normally an extremely well fed country but formerly exported as much food as did the United States; yet today her people are dying in thousands from starvation for no other reason in the world than the fool idea that the processes of production and distribution can be broken down in a country and the population still live..."⁶

The relief operation in Russia was during a period from October, 1921, to July, 1923. It provided, among other things, some millions of dollars worth of grain.⁷ In 1921 the American Relief Association was supported in its operations of mercy in Russia by a congressional appropriation of \$20,000,000 and from the Red Cross and other sources to the extent of \$60,000.⁸

It is interesting to note that the Soviet leaders contended that the American relief program had not been free of anti-Bolshevik implications.⁹

The Impasse over the Debt.--The Soviets began to realize in 1921 that the foreign debt question was blocking the resumption of normal trade relations with other foreign countries. She, therefore, began putting out feelers, by this act suggesting that her attitude on the matter had changed. Furthermore, the Nep was

⁶ William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1944), 13.

⁷ Davis, op. cit., 27.

⁸ Malin, op. cit., 447.

⁹ Dean, op. cit., 15.

getting under way and, in general, a rapprochement was not now an impossibility.

Some of the other countries, notably Britain, were having their own economic problems. Unemployment prompted Lloyd George to negotiate a trade treaty with Russia on March 16, 1921.¹⁰ By the end of 1921 the Soviet government had secured similar trade agreements with Germany, Norway, Austria, and Italy.¹¹

Late in 1921 the Soviets notified the world powers that, although they considered themselves under no moral-legal obligation to assume ~~the~~ debts of the former regime, they were willing to consider what could be done toward settling foreign claims. Russia was henceforth invited to a Conference (the U. S. was not present) which opened at Genoa in April, 1922, to negotiate on the debt question.¹² Since the Allies had inflicted considerable damage to Russian property during the intervention in the Civil War, the Soviets submitted fantastic claims against the Allied governments.¹³ Demands and counter-demands on both sides finally caused the conference to break down. The Allies gained nothing, but the Soviets had received the de facto recognition of Europe and the de jure recognition of Germany. As a result of the conference, Germany and Russia concluded the Treaty of Rapallo in April, 1922.¹⁴

¹⁰ Bennis, op. cit., 276.

¹¹ Frederick L. Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 189.

¹² Bennis, op. cit., 211-212.

¹³ Paul D. Cravath, "The Pros and Cons of Soviet Recognition," Foreign Affairs, IX, No. 2 (January, 1931), 272.

¹⁴ Bennis, op. cit., 212.

As the other facts of this non-recognition unfold, it will become more and more evident that the debt question (usually referred to as "international obligations") was one of the most often given reasons for the withholding of official acknowledgment of the Soviet government.

We have already noted that the Bolsheviki repudiated the provisional government's bill in the United States. The aggregate amount of all other American claims (including, of course, claims by private individuals and companies) has only been estimated at as much as \$750,000,000.¹⁵

The following table gives the complete picture of the items repudiated in 1918. It will be interesting to watch the negotiations prior to recognition relative to these claims.

TABLE I

I. <u>Russian Government Obligations Held by Government of the United States:</u>	
A. Obligations of Provisional Government:	
1. Obligations representing cash advanced under Liberty Loan Acts.....	\$187,729,750.00
B. Other obligations:	
1. Obligations received because of sales of surplus war materials.....	406,082.30
2. Obligations received because of relief supplies furnished	<u>4,465,465.07</u>
Total	\$192,601,297.37
II. <u>Russian Government Obligations Held by American Nationals:</u>	
A. Loans floated in the United States:	
1. Imperial Russian government	

¹⁵ Cravath, op. cit., 272.

external loan (5-year) issued
in the United States on No-
vember 18, 1916, by syndi-
cate of New York banks..... 25,000,000.00

2. Imperial Russian government
3-year credit granted by
syndicate of New York banks;
participation in credit of-
fered to public June 18, 1916.. 50,000,000.00

3. Russian treasury notes pur-
chased by National City Bank
in April, 1916..... 11,000,000.00

Total \$ 86,000,000.00

B. Loans floated elsewhere--chiefly
Domestic War Loans sold by Russian
government in the United States.
(Estimate based on claims filed.)

1. Bonds of 5½% war loan of
1915-1916..... 12,502,598.24

2. Bonds of Liberty loan of 1917... 5,138,016.31

3. Bonds of Loan of 1894..... 2,614,025.70

4. Miscellaneous issues of Russian
bonds..... 329,517.50

Total \$ 20,884,157.75

III. Confiscated Property Rights and Interests of American
Nationals¹⁶ (Estimate based on claims filed):

A. Properties and assets of American
concerns and real and personal
property confiscated by Soviet
authorities..... 115,141,931.03

B. Bank deposits confiscated..... 209,825,348.82

C. Debts of Russian government to
private concerns..... 2,667,281.14

D. Miscellaneous claims..... 9,057,210.04

Total \$336,691,771.03^a

The student of this period of Russo-American relations must
not forget that the American intervention in 1918-1919 gave the

¹⁶ Foreign Relations, 1933-1939-The Soviet Union, 10-11.

^a This includes only recorded claims. See page 24.

Soviets a basis for a bill of damages which the Soviets compiled for future presentation to the United States.¹⁷

Litvinov expressed in a correspondence to Frederick L. Schuman, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, the willingness of the Soviet Union to discuss the funding of the war debt to the United States without raising the question of counter-claims. The counter-claims arising out of intervention would be raised only in connection with the claims of private American citizens for payment on the Tsarist bonds and for nationalized property.¹⁸

The United States was not ready in the 1920's to listen to any promises by the Soviets. Secretary of State Hughes, on December 18, 1923, expressed the attitude that there was no "reason for negotiations" on the debt question because the Soviets assume their rightful obligations any time they decide to do so. This matter will be taken up in full in another part of this paper.¹⁹

It now appears that the impasse over the debts owed us by the Russian government became less and less a valid reason for non-recognition as the events of the 1920's unfolded. This period saw long and intricate negotiations over the war debts owed us by our non-Russian allies which were, in most cases, never paid.²⁰ The Bolsheviks made the mistake of "indirectness" by openly re-

¹⁷ Frederick L. Schuman, "Soviet Russia's Claims Against the United States," op. cit., 911.

¹⁸ Ibid., 915.

¹⁹ Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 788.

²⁰ Anonymous Article, "The Soviet Union: The Question of Recognition," Current History, XXXII, No. 6 (September, 1930), 1067.

repudiating the debts. We have already seen how the attempts at reversing some of the laws of "capitalist" economics had led to chaos and how the New Economic Policy attempted to moderate "pure communism." The rashness of the Soviets on the question of debts appears to have been an equally serious mistake, because it undoubtedly alienated many Americans who would otherwise have favored recognition. For the non-communist nations, on the other hand, these impetuous acts of repudiation and disavowal acted as an "early warning device" of the dangers inherent in the communist movement. It is indeed unpleasant to think of what could have happened had the Bolsheviki not caused us to hate them from the start.

Economic Tricks in the Game of Recognition-Seeking.--Soviet Russia used every kind of subterfuge in an attempt to obtain the recognition of the United States. There were two interesting cases in which Russia used economic by-passes in their recognition-seeking.

In October, 1920, a California engineer-pioneer-adventurer, Washington Baker Vanderlip, went to Moscow to negotiate oil concessions in the Russian Far East. He was backed by a group of United States oil men. The Russians mistook him for the cousin of Frank Vanderlip, a former president of the National City Bank, and therefore, considered him an important, even a semiofficial, person. He mentioned his connection with Warren G. Harding (who was elected while Vanderlip was in Moscow) and, thereupon, was personally received by Lenin.²¹

²¹ David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), 165-166.

Vanderlip promised recognition if the Soviets would lease Kamchatka to the United States for oil exploration. Since Kamchatka was in the hands of Japan at that time, the Russians deemed that they had nothing to lose. So they negotiated a series of agreements with Vanderlip which provided for the lease of 400,000 square miles of Russian territory for a period of sixty years. Extensive trade schemes provided for the purchase in America by the Soviet government of goods to the fabulous amount of three billion dollars.²²

Vanderlip was exposed by the New York Times which editorially commented, "Mr. Vanderlip...comes from Los Angeles, a city where long contemplation of the climate has developed the lens of the human eye into a high-power magnifying instrument, and close association with the motion picture press agents has induced a carelessness in arithmetic..."²³ The whole transaction became the laughing stock of the press. Lenin had been "outfoxed."

The next spring Vanderlip made a second trip to Moscow and this time negotiated huge concessions involving the forests of the Archangel region. This new concession was to extend over ten million acres of spruce land and was to last for fifty years. This agreement was never signed, and Lenin engaged himself in covering up the incident by explaining his blunders by saying

²² Ibid., 166.

²³ Ibid., 167.

that the Russian counter-intelligence (later the GPU and NKVD) had not yet been extended to the United States.²⁴

In 1922 the Sinclair Oil Company entered into a contract with the Far Eastern Republic of the Soviet Union for an oil concession in Northern Sakhalin.²⁵ At that time the northern part of that island (claimed by Russia) was occupied by Japan as a reprisal for the torturing and massacre of more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul, his family, and official staff, at Nikolaiev^(sic) in 1920.²⁶

Here we should take note of the United States' attitude at the Washington Conference of guardian of Russia's territorial interests in the Far East. Japan gave the other powers at Washington a declaration to the effect that its "fixed and settled policy" would be "to respect the territorial integrity of Russia." The Japanese representative, Baron Shidehara, declared that "Nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese government than to take advantage of the present helpless condition of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs."²⁷

The Soviet government, in reference again to the Sinclair Oil concession, insisted that the concession required its ratification too. Consequently, on January 23, 1923, a supplemental

²⁴ Loc. cit.

²⁵ Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 697.

²⁶ U. S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Senate Document No. 125, 67th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 78.

²⁷ Ibid., 79.

agreement was signed which confirmed the grant but made the tenure of the concession contingent on the attitude of the American government toward the Soviet Regime and toward the concession granted by it. One of the conditions attached to the supplemental agreement was that the concession might be cancelled at the end of the fifth year after the date of the signing of the supplemental agreement, if normal relations between the United States and the Far Eastern Republic had not been resumed in the form of de jure recognition.²⁸

In the winter of 1923-1924 the Sinclair Exploration Company dispatched an expedition of engineers to Northern Sakhalin to survey for oil; however, the Japanese authorities prevented them from conducting any explorations, put them under military guard, and returned them to Japan by a Japanese government vessel.

As a consequence the Sinclair Company appealed to the United States State Department to take this matter up with the Japanese government, but Secretary Hughes twice refused to take action because the State Department "did not feel in a position to present the matter...to the Japanese government in view of the circumstances surrounding the case."²⁹

It seems quite obvious that the non-recognition of Soviet Russia was one of the important "circumstances" surrounding the matter. Secretary Hughes later surmised that the concessions granted by the Soviets to the Sinclair Oil Company were given

²⁸ Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 697-698.

²⁹ Foreign Relations, 1924, II, 678-681.

primarily for two reasons: (1) The wish of the Russian government to obtain Japanese evacuation of Northern Sakhalin, and (2) the Soviets hoped that they could, by having the cancellation condition, induce the Sinclair Company to influence the United States government to grant recognition to the Soviet Regime.³⁰

The New Economic Policy and the Rise in Trade.-- The Communist government was faced with either revising its economic policy or being buried under the ruins of economic collapse. It was in 1921, therefore, that Lenin abandoned "pure communism" and set forth the "New Economic Policy" (Nep) as a temporary expedient. The Nep permitted a measure of individual free enterprise. Private trading was permitted and business men were allowed a greater freedom of management. The government abandoned the requisitioning of the peasants' surplus and substituted a tax in kind which permitted the sale of the produce that was left over. A regular currency was restored and the internal stabilization of the ruble was achieved. All of this, together with the cessation of war and good harvests in 1922 and 1923, resulted in a gradual recovery which in 1927 surpassed the 1913 economic level.³¹

Several people lauded the Nep as a complete about-face on communism. Sir Philip Gibbs, British War correspondent, reported that "Russia has given up communism." Colonel Haskell, who worked under Herbert Hoover on the American Relief Mission to Russia, said, "Communism is dead and abandoned..." The ex-Secretary of

³⁰ Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 699-700.

³¹ Hrgang, op. cit., 174-175.

the Interior Fall, who was in Russia on a business errand during this time, observed that "the same leaders who preached communism...now admit their mistake..."³²

It was quite obvious, though, that the Nep was a temporary expedient with the Soviets. In a speech of March 27, 1922, Lenin declared that the Nep must be applied "in earnest and for long" until the Soviet comrades can learn to become businessmen in the interests of socialism.³³

As an outgrowth of the New Economic Policy, the United States was soon trading more with the Soviet Union than she had with Tsarist Russia before the war. In 1924-1925 the United States held first place among the nations purveying Soviet imports. In the following four years, she dropped to second place behind Germany.³⁴ This rise in trade appears paradoxical when one considers the non-recognition policy toward Soviet Russia espoused by the United States. Nevertheless, ways were arranged to circumvent the difficulties and dangers involved.³⁵

First of all, trading organizations were created in the United States to handle trade for the Soviet Union. In 1919 the Products Exchange Corporation was founded in New York; in 1924 the Arcos Limited of London opened a Soviet trading branch in New York. Later in May of the same year, the main Soviet-American

³² U. S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 617.

³³ Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, op. cit., 192.

³⁴ Browder, op. cit., 25.

³⁵ Loc. cit.

commercial agency in the United States, Amtorg, was formed when the aforementioned agencies merged. This agency was chartered as a joint stock company under the laws of New York (it also concluded at that time a concession agreement with the Council of People's Commissars), and could, therefore, conduct its business protected by, and subject to, the laws of New York; therefore, it commanded more confidence from the companies that it dealt with. Amtorg purchased goods from Russian trusts and other organizations for resale in the United States and acted as an agent for these concerns in placing orders with American firms.³⁶

The following table shows the American exports to Soviet Russia from the beginning of the New Economic Policy, 1921, to the year of the extension of recognition, 1933. The figures are for calendar years.

TABLE II

1921	\$ 14,427,000	Europe
	1,157,000	Asia
Total..	\$ 15,584,000	
1922	28,502,000	Europe
	1,393,000	Asia
Total..	\$ 29,895,000	
1923	6,305,000	Europe
	1,312,000	Asia
Total..	\$ 7,617,000	
1924	41,314,000	Europe
	789,000	Asia
Total..	\$ 42,103,000	
1925 ^{a*}	68,196,000	Europe
	710,000	Asia
Total..	\$ 68,906,000	

³⁶ Browder, op. cit., 25-26.

^a U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1925 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926), 452-455.

*Hereafter this reference will be cited as Statistical Abstract of the United States.

1926	548,499,000	Europe
	1,407,000	Asia
Total..	\$549,906,000	
1927 ^b	64,086,000	Europe
	835,000	Asia
Total..	\$64,921,000	
1928	72,504,000	Europe
	1,587,000	Asia
Total..	\$74,091,000	
1929 ^c	81,547,000	Europe
	3,464,000	Asia
Total..	\$85,011,000	
1930	111,362,000	Europe
	3,037,000	Asia
Total.	\$114,399,000	
1931	103,486,000	Europe
	231,000	Asia
Total.	\$103,717,000	
1932	12,466,000	Europe
	175,000	Asia
Total..	\$12,641,000	
1933 ^d	8,743,000	Europe
	254,000	Asia
Total...	\$8,997,000	

The Obstacles to Trade.--It is true that trade between the United States and Russia assumed large proportions during the 1920's, but there still remained obstacles to this trade which, in absence of diplomatic relations, continued to hinder commerce.

One of these problems was the difficulty which Russia had

^b Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1928,
464-467.

^c Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1930,
494-497.

^d Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1934,
426-429.

in paying for the things she bought in the United States. The official attitude of the United States was that all gold in possession of the Bolsheviks had been confiscated from the rightful owners. The American State Department ruled that U. S. Mint or Assay offices should not accept gold without sworn affidavits saying that it did not come from Russia.³⁷

The Russians tried to circumvent this ruling but were not successful. In 1928 the Soviets consigned some 5,000,000 dollars of gold to two New York banks as agents. These banks refused, however, to present the gold to the New York Assay office as owners, so the office refused to receive the gold.³⁸

The attitude of the United States toward Soviet gold caused a very unfavorable trade balance for Russia. Her policy was to make up the disparity between needed imports and available exports by using her gold reserves and the gold extracted from her mines.³⁹

The fact that Russia found it difficult to pay for the things she desired to buy resulted in active efforts to secure credit among the capitalist nations. One of the main motives behind the active seeking for the recognition of the United States was the wish to open up the possibility of borrowing in this country.⁴⁰

The United States State Department discouraged all public

³⁷ Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 725.

³⁸ Foreign Relations, 1928, III, 831.

³⁹ Browder, op. cit., 27.

⁴⁰ Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, First Era, 1919-1932 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 48.

credit operations for the Soviet Union. Secretary Hughes stated on March 21, 1923, that "not only would it be a mistaken policy to give encouragement to repudiation and confiscation, but it is also important to remember that there should be no encouragement to the effort of those Soviet authorities to visit upon other people the disasters which have overwhelmed the Russian people."⁴¹ On November 28, 1927, the Department of State reiterated its policy on Russian loans, announcing that it opposed "any financial arrangement which involved the sale of securities to the public." The reason given was the repudiation of foreign debts by the Soviet government.⁴²

There was not much market in the United States for Russian bonds, but from time to time proposals emerged. One American banking syndicate wanted to sell Russian railroad bonds and another proposed to sell bonds of an American corporation which, in turn, would make a loan to the Soviet Union to build and equip steel plants. Another interesting transaction was a deal sponsored by Harriman and Company in 1926 to lend \$35,000,000 (to be raised by a public issue of bonds) to a German export company to finance exports from Germany to the Soviet Union. Again the State Department made it clear that it would not view this financing with favor.⁴³

It should be made clear that the opposition was to "financial

⁴¹ Ibid., 46.

⁴² Foreign Relations, 1927, III, 652-654.

⁴³ Peis, op. cit., 47.

arrangements designed to facilitate in any way the sale of Soviet bonds (public credit) in the United States."⁴⁴ The State Department did not oppose private short-term credits to Soviet purchasing agencies, and, in fact, in 1927 it withdrew its opposition to long-term credits.⁴⁵

Another obstacle to trade existed in the form of United States commercial discriminations which prevented the use of Soviet ships in Russo-American commerce. On the other hand, Russian discriminatory charges against the ships of the United States, amounting to about twelve times the normal charges, had the same effect on the entry of American vessels into Russian ports. The trade in 1926-1927 was carried entirely in foreign ships.⁴⁶

The economic depression in 1929 brought to light a side of the Soviet trade program which was to cause further discrimination. The Soviets had embarked on a forced export schedule in order to pay for the increasing volume of imports. The cry soon arose in the United States that Russia was "dumping" some of her goods on the market. Actually there were few American businesses which competed directly with Russian manufactured goods, but those that did made vigorous charges. In 1930 and 1931 the Treasury Department placed special levies on Soviet safety matches and required a bond for asbestos pending further investigation into sales practices. It was charged that both items were being sold at less than a fair price. A third order was issued banning the

⁴⁴ Ibid., 46-47.

⁴⁵ Dean, op. cit., 17.

⁴⁶ Williams, op. cit., 347.

entry of lumber and pulpwood from four European areas of the Soviet Union on the ground that they were products of forced labor.⁴⁷

Russia retaliated by authorizing the Commissariat of Foreign Trade to forbid purchases in countries having discriminatory orders against Russian commerce. No official action was ever taken against the United States.⁴⁸

Conditions Favoring Trade--Why It Grew.--Despite all of the obstacles to trade which we have observed, Russia found it easier to get loans in the United States than in countries of Europe who recognized her. This tended to throw Soviet orders to American concerns.⁴⁹

American banks gave short-term credits to Russian state organizations to finance American exports such as cotton. Our non-recognition policy did not prevent contracts whereby large American corporations like General Electric, General Motors, and the American Locomotive Company sold their products to the Soviet's Government Trusts on a credit basis. No interference was made by the State Department with the customary type of business transaction or business credit.⁵⁰

Whereas the important German banks refused to discount Soviet bills, the General Electric Company, General Motors, Standard

⁴⁷ Browder, op. cit., 33-34.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 35.

⁴⁹ Louis Fischer, The Soviet in World Affairs (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), II, 764-765.

⁵⁰ Fels, op. cit., 48.

Oil, International Harvester, and other mammoth American concerns were able either to do their own financing or had unlimited long-term credits with large American banks.⁵¹

Moreover, the State Department cooperated with American business in so far as it was not required to actually recognize the Soviet regime. In May of 1925 the New York law firm of Simpson, Thatcher, and Bartlett, which represented the Soviet commercial organizations such as the All-Russian Textile Syndicate and the Amtorg Trading Corporation, requested authorization for the issuance of visas to certain Russian nationals desiring to visit the United States temporarily for business. Secretary of State Kellogg declared that the State Department "does not desire, in general, to interpose objection to visits of Russian nationals even if associated with the Soviet regime, provided the bona fide purpose of their visit involves solely trade or commerce between the United States and Russia."⁵²

The strained relations between Great Britain and Russia in 1926-1927 which resulted in severance of relations greatly helped Russo-American trade. When the London police raided Arcos Limited in 1926, the Russians transferred the greater part of their British business to the United States.⁵³

During the first five-year plan which Russia started at this

⁵¹ Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, II, op. cit., 764-765.

⁵² Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 703.

⁵³ Anonymous Article, "The Soviet Union: The Question of Recognition," Current History, op. cit., 1070.

time, a large number of Russian nationals came to the United States and Germany particularly for technical training. They did not go to England due to the strained relations, and it, therefore, resulted that Russia was reluctant to buy from Britain equipment which her technicians knew nothing about.⁵⁴

The relations between some American firms and the Soviet government became so close that negotiations actually took place between the two. In 1926 the International General Electric Company announced that it had concluded a contract with the Soviet government which provided for settlement of its claims for confiscation of its property in Russia, and for Soviet purchases of electrical equipment at from \$21,000,000 to \$26,000,000.⁵⁵

The reader will note from Table II that Russian-American trade increased greatly in 1929-1930. At the time when the United States was faced with what amounted to a buyers' strike in Europe, the Soviet Union voluntarily increased its purchases in the United States until she became temporarily one of our six best markets.⁵⁶

In the years up to 1929 the items heading the list of exports to Russia were: cotton, rubber, nonferrous metals, semi-finished goods, equipment, automobiles, tractors, and agricultural machinery. The United States imported very little from Russia.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), I, 34.

⁵⁵ Dean, op. cit., 17.

⁵⁶ Anonymous Article, "The Soviet Union: The Question of Recognition," Current History, op. cit., 1069.

⁵⁷ Browder, op. cit., 27.

The demands which the Soviet Union's five-year plan made upon American machinery, goods, and cotton caused people to forecast a steady development of commerce between the two countries.⁵⁸ It is quite obvious, though, that non-economic influences had, up to 1929, prevailed in our official attitude toward Russia, and that the assistance to American business and investment which recognition would give had been subordinated to other considerations.⁵⁹

Table III, which follows, presents a very good picture, percentage-wise, of Russo-American trade from 1923 to 1933. It should be noted, however, that the statistics on trade with Russia are rather unsatisfactory because relief shipments of 1920 and 1922 constitute a large part of the exports, and also because of the magnitude of indirect trade. Much of the trade with Latvia and Estonia, for example, was destined for Russia. Considerable quantities of cotton were sent to Russia in 1923 through Germany and England.^{60*}

The figures are for fiscal years and show the percentage of the total trade of Soviet Russia which the United States had during the years included:

TABLE III

1923-24.....	19.2%	1924-25.....	28.1%
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⁵⁸ Schuman, "Soviet Russia's Claims Against the United States," op. cit., 915.

⁵⁹ Williams, op. cit., 73.

⁶⁰ U. S. Department of Commerce, Commerce Yearbook, 1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), 528-529. Hereafter this reference will be cited as Commerce Yearbook.

1925-26 ^a	16.2%	1930.....	25.0%
1926-27 ^b	20.5%	1931 ^d	20.8%
1927-28.....	19.9%	1932.....	4.5%
1928-29 ^c	16.4%	1933 ^e	4.8%

Trade Begins to Decline--1931.--Table II reveals a decline in trade in 1931 over the previous year of \$10,682,000. This was, undoubtedly, caused, in part, by the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.⁶¹

Another cause for the decline was the Piatakov Agreement which the Russians negotiated with Germany in 1931. It guaranteed payment on long-term notes to Russia up to 75 per cent. Also, in England by 1931 the government guaranteed the creditor up to 60 per cent of his loan to Russia.⁶² These favorable conditions of credit naturally drew trade from the United States, who did not recognize the Soviets nor guarantee the creditor.⁶³

One might observe that this decline does not appear too great; however, much of the trade for 1931 was delayed export

^a Commerce Yearbook, 1926, II, 475.

^b The World Almanac, Robert Hunt Lyman (ed.) (New York: New York World, 1929), 662.

^c Commerce Yearbook, 1930, II, 545.

^d Commerce Yearbook, 1932, Foreign Countries, II, 270.

^e Commerce Yearbook, 1935, 140.

⁶¹ Schuman, "Soviet Russia's Claims Against the United States," op. cit., 915.

⁶² Browder, op. cit., 37.

⁶³ Dean, op. cit., 17.

of orders placed in 1930. Amtorg actually purchased over 60 per cent less in 1931.⁶⁴

Now the Soviets claimed that the decline in trade was caused by the discriminatory trade regulations, the lack of recognition, and the restrictions against long-term credits. They pointed to the vastly increased German trade with Russia which was established, they claimed, as a result of the normalcy of relations existing between the countries.⁶⁵

These contentions are fantastic when one considers that all of the conditions which existed in 1931 had been present, with the possible exception of the discriminatory measures, in 1930 when the United States held first place among the exporters to Russia.⁶⁶

Under Secretary of State W. R. Castle, Jr., observed in 1933 that "The marked decrease in our exports to Russia which took place during the last year has not been due to the absence of diplomatic relations...but primarily to the decline of Russia's purchasing power and to...terms of credit more favorable...available...in various other countries."⁶⁷

The high imports from Germany, which the Russians had pointed to in comparison with the decline of United States exports, lasted only as long as the credits available under the Piatakov Agreement lasted. In 1933 Germany's exports dropped to less than one-half

⁶⁴ Browder, op. cit., 37.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 42-43.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 47.

⁶⁷ Foreign Relations, 1933-1939-The Soviet Union, 5.

the 1932 level. In fact, the entire import of Russia for 1933 was only one-half that for 1932 and about 30 per cent of the 1930 figure.⁶⁸

The depression was felt in a very real sense in the Soviet Union. The prices of raw materials which the Russians had to export in order to keep even a semblance of a trade balance fell much faster than the prices of machinery and equipment which she desired to import. The difficulty which the Russians encountered in obtaining foreign credit caused them to feel a greater need for United States recognition than ever.⁶⁹

They were receiving quite a bit of cooperation from some Americans. Members of the House and Senate advocated a re-examination of Russian-American relations in the interest of trade. Representative Sabath introduced a resolution calling on President Hoover to negotiate with the Soviets for the establishment of commercial and political relations. In the Senate, Johnson of California summed up the attitude of those who favored recognition when he stated, "There are billions of dollars' worth of future orders in Russia for American workers to fill, and in these times it is simply economic idiocy for America, by its policies, to preclude Americans from trade and commerce which so readily could be obtained."⁷⁰ Two American companies, The Standard Oil Company of New York and the Vacuum Oil Company, bought oil from Russia--their influence was on the side of recognition.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Browder, op. cit., 44-45.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 46.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 38.

⁷¹ Ibid., 39.

On the other hand, the American Federation of Labor defended the "free workers against the competition with unfree labor" and continued to oppose recognition.⁷²

At this time the Soviets were planning for their second five-year plan. They used this fact to point up the necessity of speed of decision on the part of the United States to alter its policies.⁷³

The Soviets were very much interested in United States aid to enhance the success of the projected plan. We cooperated in both technicians and material. Stalin acknowledged American technical know-how in 1932 when he stated that "We observe the United States with interest, since this country ranks high as regards science and techniques. We should be glad to have American scientists and technicians as our teachers and in the technical field to be their pupils."⁷⁴

Peter Eogdanov, head of Amtorg, stated that in 1930 there were from 600 to 700 American engineers in the Soviet Union engaged in technical projects. He publicly thanked the American companies and individuals involved in this service to the Soviet Union.⁷⁵

The United States was not to be rushed, cajoled, nor flattered into recognizing the Soviet government or granting loans

⁷² Williams, op. cit., 73.

⁷³ Browder, op. cit., 43.

⁷⁴ U. S. Department of State, Cultural Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, Publication 3480, International Information and Cultural Series 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), 2-3.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

to it. In September, 1933, just prior to recognition, Secretary of State Cordell Hull advised President Roosevelt against extension of loans to the Soviets by agencies of the United States government except "as part and parcel of a general settlement of our relations with Russia." Russia had not only repudiated her debts, but she was now unable to meet her obligations to Germany under the 1931 agreement with that country.⁷⁶ Secretary Hull warned that it was believed at that time that the Soviets preferred "credits to recognition."⁷⁷

By the time we became interested in the possible economic consequences of recognition, the Soviet Union was using the "lure of trade" as a weapon in its campaign to obtain recognition for political reasons growing out of international developments, especially in the Far East.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Foreign Relations, 1933-1939-The Soviet Union, 12-13.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁷⁸ Browder, op. cit., 48.

CHAPTER V

IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE NON-RECOGNITION
POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

Propaganda Parallax.--When World War I was over American attention was turned from the Germans to the Bolshevik Russians. Soon an intensified campaign against the Bolsheviks was being waged through all of the channels of communication to the American public. This unofficial propaganda painted the Bolsheviks as greater menaces to our social order than the Germans had ever been. Lenin and Trotsky were accused of having betrayed the Allied cause and even with being involved in a gigantic German-Bolshevik conspiracy. Edgar Sisson had issued through the Committee on Public Information in the autumn of 1918 a series of documents which were supposed to prove that the revolution was wholly planned by the German General Staff and financed by German funds.¹ It is a fact that in 1917 Lenin, who was in Zurich, Switzerland, was able to return to Russia only after the Kaiser's government allowed him to cross Germany by train to Petrograd.² Time has discredited the Sisson report; nevertheless, it played an important part in creating an atmosphere in which anything at all might be believed about the Soviets because it helped to put the American public under the influence of the "great Red Scare."³

An event which greatly alarmed Western capitalist nations

¹ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 153.

² Banns, op. cit., 82.

³ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 154.

was the formation of the Third Communist International on March 4, 1919. During the Congress a manifesto was issued to the proletariat of the world in which was pledged the allegiance of the Communists to the principles of world revolution as laid down in 1847 by Karl Marx in his Communist Manifesto.⁴

President Wilson, in an address at Des Moines, Iowa, September 6, 1919, lampooned the Communist conspiracy as a threat to the United States. "And do you honestly think," he asked, "...that none of that poison has got in the veins of this free people? Do you not know that the world is now one single whispering gallery? ...Money coming from nobody knows where is deposited by the millions in capitals like Stockholm, to be used for the propaganda of disorder and discontent and dissolution throughout the world, and men look you calmly in the face in America and say they are for that sort of revolution, when that sort of revolution means government by terror, government by force, not government by vote."⁵

The State Department did its part to arouse a dislike for the Bolsheviks among the American public. In 1919 it published its Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. This memorandum played up the undemocratic and terror-

⁴ Taracouzio, op. cit., 83.

⁵ Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, War and Peace--Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers by Woodrow Wilson (New York and London: Harper and Bros., 1927), II, 15.

istic practices which were common in Russia under the Bolsheviks, citing rigged elections at polls surrounded by machine guns.⁶

The Memorandum also contained reports from American representatives gathering information from refugees from Soviet Russia. One such representative at the Finnish frontier reported the following under dates of June 25 and July 2, 1919:

"The fall of Bolshevism, which seemed inevitable even two months ago, has created the wildest terrorism. People are executed without trial in masses on mere suspicion of sympathy with the Soviet's enemies...Terror and necessity compel work for the Soviet government, but this work is much encumbered by theory, inexperience, and corruption...There will be a slaughtering of Bolsheviks as soon as the deliverers are near the centers and the Red terror ceases to be feared, but terror, hunger, and disease have temporarily caused apathy...The strength of the Bolsheviks lies in their organization. Terror, combined with most elaborate espionage at home and propaganda in and behind the ranks of the enemy, makes them still a formidable force."⁷

This shows the general vein of the reports coming from Russia. They emphasized terror, the coming collapse of the Bolshevik government, and foul nature of "communism." One of the reasons for this propaganda campaign was to justify the intervention by the United States in both Archangel and Siberia. After the war was over and the cry arose for the return of the soldier to his home, opposition developed to the administration's Russian policy. This did not mean that the American people were unconvinced by the propaganda campaign. Neither did it signify any popular clamor for recognition of the Soviet government. It

⁶ U. S. Congress, Senate, Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia, Senate Document No. 172, 66th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 37.

⁷ Ibid., 35.

was rather an expression of the growing idea that isolation and non-interference should be our policy toward European affairs.⁸

Subversive Activity--America Retaliates.--By 1919 the Communists were beginning efforts to subvert the government of the United States. The United States came to suspect any Soviet (probably rightly so) as an agent of this conspiracy. On March 19, 1919, the credentials of L. C. A. E. Martens, Russia's representative to the United States, were sent to the State Department.⁹ Martens wrote a letter to the Department of State emphasizing the desire of Moscow to enter into commercial relations with the United States, promising large orders should trade be resumed.¹⁰ Of course Martens was not recognized. In fact, he was accused of subversive activities. The state of New York raided his offices in New York City, but found nothing incriminating. Also, a Senate Committee and the Department of Labor were unable to prove anything on Martens after exhaustive investigations into his activities. He, nevertheless, became subject to deportation on the sole ground that he was a member of an alien organization advocating the overthrow of the United States government by violence.¹¹

Foreign Commissar Chicherin of Russia recalled Martens promptly, and he thereby escaped actual deportation proceedings.

⁸Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 115.

⁹ Davis, op. cit., 26-27.

¹⁰ Foreign Relations, 1919-Russia, 140-141.

¹¹ Davis, op. cit., 26-27.

This incident deeply impressed the American public of the dangers of Communism, and further strained the relations between the United States and Russia.¹²

Meanwhile, the Communists were using other means to subvert and destroy. A number of packages containing bomb devices and other "infernal machines" were discovered in the New York post office bearing the addresses of prominent political leaders; subsequently, a series of explosions occurred in different cities, including a blast that wrecked the home, and the nerves, of Attorney General Palmer.¹³

Palmer, who was dubbed the "fighting Quaker," took drastic steps which included the exclusion of a socialist newspaper from the mails and the rounding up of hundreds of so-called Reds. A song which was popular during this period went, "If you don't like your Uncle Sammy, then go back to your home over sea." In 1919, a total of 249 undesirables were put aboard an American transport nicknamed the "Soviet Ark" and deported to Russia. One newspaper enthusiastically applauding the "deportation delirium" called the "Ark's" cargo the "unholiest cargo that ever left our shores."¹⁴ Guy Empey wrote, "My motto for the Reds is S. C. S.--ship or shoot. I believe we should place them all on a ship of stone, with sails of lead, and that their first stopping-place should be hell."¹⁵

¹² Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 160.

¹³ Bailey, op. cit., 247.

¹⁴ Ibid., 247-248.

¹⁵ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 164.

Political Anxles to the Ideological War.--The Russian Bolshevik revolution divided American Socialists between a left wing which wished to affiliate with Moscow and set up a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the United States, and a more conservative group which was loyal to the democratic and social evolution concept.¹⁶ By the end of 1921 no less than twelve Communist organizations had come into being in the United States. Eight of these had a political character. Seven of the original twelve had either died out by 1921 or had been merged with other organizations, leaving the following: the Communist Party, the United Communist Party, the Proletarian Party, the American Labor Alliance, and the Workers' Council.¹⁷ The energy of the Socialists went into factional feuds, and the factions which took the name "Communist" often divided on petty points of theory or practice.¹⁸ In 1924 there were no less than sixteen Communist organizations of national scope (this indicates that factionalism was increasing after 1921 rather than decreasing), all of which were trying to wear the mantle of Lenin.

In December of 1921, a convention of all of the Communist factions was held in New York City. The organizations in attendance accepted as a principle the leadership of the "...working masses in the struggle for the abolition of capitalism

¹⁶ Preston William Slosson, The Great Crusade and After, 1914-1928 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930), 87.

¹⁷ James C'Neal and C. A. Werner, American Communism (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1947), 116.

¹⁸ Slosson, op. cit., 87.

through the establishment of a government by the working class"-- a Workers' Republic in America.¹⁹

The most important of these factions was, of course, the American Communist Party. This party ran presidential candidates in successive national elections in the 1920's and 1930's.²⁰ In 1932 the party polled its largest vote--103,000 out of the total vote of 39,000,000.²¹ The membership of the party never rose above a small fraction of 1 per cent of the total adult population.²²

During the 1920's and early 1930's, the Communists were most convenient political scapegoats. Some people with conservative ideas pointed the finger of accusation at the Communists every time any radical activity occurred.²³ There can be no doubt, however, that the Communists did bore into the American organized labor movement--they were accused of promoting the frequent and violent strikes of 1919. Communist propaganda was abundant, and some of the active strike leaders were Communist party members.²⁴ Nevertheless, the unrest which occurred during

¹⁹ O'Neal and Werner, op. cit., 116-118.

²⁰ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 161.

²¹ Dulles, Russia and America: Pacific Neighbors, op. cit., 17.

²² Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 161.

²³ Dulles, Russia and America: Pacific Neighbors, op. cit., 17.

²⁴ Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 161.

this time was due more to social conditions than to any propaganda of the Communists.²⁵

It now appears, upon close examination, that the Communist menace was greatly exaggerated during the period of the 1920's. One writer suggests that this was done in order to block economic or social reform.²⁶

Thomas A. Bailey, Stanford University History Department, summed up this period of United States-Russian relations well. He said, "The Red scare was primarily a domestic disease, and more important as a manifestation of the overwrought emotionalism of the war than as an incident in Russian-American relations. But it further seared into the American public mind the familiar stereotype of a bloodthirsty, bewhiskered, bomb-throwing, free-loving Bolshevik."²⁷

²⁵ Dulles, Russia and America: Pacific Neighbors,
op. cit., 17.

²⁶ Loc. cit.

²⁷ Bailey, op. cit., 246.

CHAPTER VI

DIPLOMATIC ISOLATIONISM--HEADLINE EVENTS: 1919-1928

Retrospect.--When the 1920's arrived, the Western nations were suffering from the "Bolshevik jitters." The Communists led by Bela Kun had been able to briefly seize power in Hungary in 1919, and Red armies approached Warsaw in 1920 causing fear lest Bolshevism consume all Europe. Finally, however, the tempest abated--the Red Army was defeated at the Vistula, and the Treaty of Riga had restored the peace of Eastern Europe.¹

The Bolsheviks were slow to recognize that the "World Revolution" was not going to materialize overnight. They continued to engineer domestic disturbances which in turn caused "Red Scares" in many countries including the United States.²

The New Economic Policy of 1921 caused a change of attitude in European countries toward the Soviet Government. In 1921 Great Britain "jumped the gun" on the other nations, signed a trade treaty, and extended de facto recognition to the Soviets. The Manchester Guardian described this action as follows: "The blow has fallen. A Bolshevik, a real live representative of Lenin, has spoken to the British Prime Minister face to face... Lloyd George has seen him and still lives...The British Empire still stands."³

¹ Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, The Great Powers in World Politics (New York: American Book Co., 1939), 332-335.

² Ibid., 335.

³ Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, op. cit., 189.

On May 6, 1921, a German-Russian trade agreement was signed. Norway did likewise on September 2, Austria on December 7, and Italy on December 26.⁴ Money talks when diplomats do not.

The reader should keep in mind the fact that the United States did not follow the lead of Europe toward a rapprochement with Russia; therefore, the period from Versailles to the recognition in 1933 was one of diplomatic estrangement for the United States and Russia.

Non-recognition Becomes Entrenched.--A question which seems apropos at this juncture of this study is: Why did the non-recognition policy become entrenched? We have observed that the United States took the stand against the big intervention in Russia; we repeatedly pledged our friendship to the Russian people; we protected the territorial integrity of Russia; but never did the American government make a secret of its repugnance to the Communist idea and its distrust of the Soviets' good faith.⁵

Keeping this in mind, let us proceed to study the attitudes and events which caused the policy of non-recognition to become entrenched. Herbert Hoover expressed the seriousness with which he viewed the acknowledgment of the Soviet government in a letter to President Wilson, March 28, 1919, in which he stated, "We can not even remotely recognize this murderous Bolshevist tyranny without stimulating actionist radicalism in every country in

⁴ Loc. cit.

⁵ Dexter Perkins, America and Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 14-15.

Europe and without transgressing on every national idea of our own." This was undoubtedly the basic reason that non-recognition became our policy with regard to Russia during the administrations of Presidents Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, and by their secretaries of State--Colby, Hughes, Kellogg, and Stimson.⁶ This irreconcilability of the revolutionary communist theory and practice with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism was the most fundamental reason for refusing to recognize Soviet Russia.⁷

Various other, more superficial reasons were given by American leaders from time to time. President Wilson, for example, based his refusal of acknowledgment on two considerations: (1) that the Soviet government did not have the sanction of the Russian people, and (2) that the United States could not recognize any pretended government which refused to respect its international obligations.⁸ (These international obligations were the loans and contracts made by the previous Russian governments with the United States and its nationals.) In addition to these, the most commonly given reasons were (1) refusal of the Bolshevik government to extend to American citizens the type of protection customarily extended to aliens in the other European countries; and (2) the prevalence of the revolutionary propaganda of the Third International which received its support from the Soviet government.⁹

⁶ Myers, op. cit., 92.

⁷ Houghton, op. cit., 94.

⁸ Loc. cit.

⁹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, The United States as a World Power, 1900-1950 (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1950), 253.

The proponents of "diplomatic isolationism" toward Russia contended, at this time, that the United States could be more insistent in prescribing the conditions under which it would confer recognition than could the other great powers, because America was not so dependent upon foreign trade and markets, and, therefore, did not have to take advantage of each and every opportunity to extend trade and open up new markets. The recognition test of expediency could be disregarded due to our economic position.¹⁰

We have previously mentioned the Red Army's counter-offensive against Poland which threatened to cause Poland's invasion of Russia to backfire into a Polish defeat. Here we should take note of a matter of diplomacy which had great significance in regard to the Russo-Polish conflict and which was a manifestation of the entrenchment of non-recognition.

On August 10, 1920, the Italian Ambassador in Washington had asked Bainbridge Colby, third and last Secretary of State in Wilson's administration, the position of the United States regarding the Russian-Polish situation. Colby addressed a note in reply in which he announced the United States policy toward Russia which was to be followed throughout the non-recognition period. It was a flat refusal to recognize the Bolshevik regime; but on the other hand, it announced our intention to refrain also from countenance of any dismemberment of Russia.¹¹

¹⁰ Houghton, op. cit., 106.

¹¹ Anonymous Article, "The Soviet Union: The Question of Recognition," Current History, op. cit., 1066.

When Woodrow Wilson left office in 1921, the ostracism of the Soviet government by the victor powers of World War I was complete. America's welcome for Russia into the "society of free nations" which Wilson embodied in his Fourteen Points was to be postponed, and "diplomatic isolationism" substituted.

April 28, 1922: Provisional Ambassador Retires.--On April 28, 1922, Mr. Bakhmeteff, the Provisional Government's Ambassador to the United States, advised Secretary Hughes that he desired to retire on June 30. On June 4, 1922, Secretary Hughes issued a formal statement to the effect that "The termination of Mr. Bakhmeteff's duties as Russian Ambassador in this country has no bearing whatsoever upon the question of the recognition of the Soviet regime in Russia, which is an entirely separate matter."¹²

Mr. Serge Ughet, financial attaché of the Russian legation, succeeded Mr. Bakhmeteff as the Russian representative of the "Russian State" whose interests it was deemed desirable to have represented during the period of non-recognition of the Soviet government. The representatives of the Russian State had custody of the property of the Russian State in the United States, and their expenses were paid out of the proceeds of this property and from funds belonging to the Russian State which were administered by them under the supervision of the Secretary of Treasury.¹³ We will see this same matter of the Russian property cropping up in 1933 when the negotiations prior to recognition take place.

¹² Houghton, op. cit., 96.

¹³ Ibid. cit.

These events hold little significance other than to bring to light some of the complications and paradoxes which a policy of non-recognition necessarily entails.

November 12, 1921--February 6, 1922: The Washington Conference.--- Although the Soviet Union was not invited to attend the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, there were Russian anti-Bolshevik "observers" present, including agents of the "Russian Supreme Monarchical Council." These were balanced by the attendance of a "trade delegation," headed by Boris Skvirsky, from the "Far Eastern Republic." (This state was a "semi-Soviet buffer state against Japan." It was formed at Chita in October of 1920, but it had never been recognized by the United States.)¹⁴

Chita, Moscow, and Washington had a common interest in getting Japan out of Eastern Siberia. Secretary Hughes obtained a statement from Baron Shidehara which pledged evacuation, non-intervention, and respect for Russian territorial integrity.¹⁵ Hughes declared that the protection of Russian interests "must devolve as a moral trusteeship on the whole conference."¹⁶ Pledges and declarations of this sort were all well and good in connection with the high ideals of international relations in existence in the minds of some people at that time, but they certainly did nothing to justify the unrealistic policy for throwing all of the burden of balancing Japan's power upon China when Russia,

¹⁴ Frederick L. Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, op. cit., 189-190.

¹⁵ Loc. cit.

¹⁶ Dean, op. cit., 15.

the one country that was Japan's natural enemy, was ignored entirely.¹⁷

Following closely on the heels of the Washington Conference was the evacuation of Vladivostok by the Japanese in October of 1922. Forthwith the Far Eastern Republic was dissolved on November 17, 1922, and again was joined to the Soviet Union.¹⁸

December, 1923: Coolidge Speaks--Chicherin Tries for Recognition.--

When Calvin Coolidge became president, conditions looked favorable for a rapprochement with Soviet Russia. This country had aided the starving millions in Russia during the famine of 1921-1922, and we had created an atmosphere favorable to an understanding between the nations. Also it was noted that neither President Coolidge nor Secretary of State Hughes emphasized the "domestic legitimacy" of the Soviet regime in their statements concerning that government.¹⁹

On December 6, 1923, President Coolidge, in addressing the Congress, had this to say about Russia:

"But while the favor of America is not for sale, I am willing to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia...Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled and to recognize that debt contracted with our government...whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meet for repentance, our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of

¹⁷ Richard Van Alstyne, American Diplomacy in Action (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1947), 365.

¹⁸ Schuzan, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, op. cit., 190.

¹⁹ Houghton, op. cit., 100.

Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we can act."²⁰

The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, promptly sent a telegram to President Coolidge indicating the desire of the Soviet government to resume friendly relations with the United States.

"After reading your message to Congress," he said, "(the) Soviet government...informs you of its complete readiness to discuss with your government all problems mentioned in your message, these negotiations being based on principle (of) mutual non-intervention (in) internal affairs." He added, "As to the question of claims mentioned (in) your message, (the) Soviet government is fully prepared to negotiate with view (of) its satisfactory settlement on assumption that principle (of) reciprocity (is) recognized all around."²¹

On December 18, 1923, the Soviet request for negotiations was rebuked twice--once from an official and once from a private source. Samuel Gompers, then president of the American Federation of Labor, stated his "private" views in this way:

"The entire Soviet structure, Constitution, State documents, official doctrine as taught in the official press, schools, and Red Army teach that the so-called 'proletarian' regime cannot be bound by any agreements made with non-Soviet governments...To discuss the possibility of 'mutual trust' with a regime resting on such foundations would not only be futile but would be an encouragement to its anti-social, communistic, and anti-democratic machinations."²²

Secretary Hughes issued the "official" statement which killed the overture. His statement of December 18 read as follows:²³

"...there would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations...if the Soviet authorities are ready

²⁰ Congressional Record, House, 68th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 97.

²¹ Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 787.

²² Houghton, op. cit., 105.

²³ Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 786.

to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith...²⁴

Secretary of State Hughes, as a result of his expressed opinion, became a detested personality to the Soviets. He was almost the only American who was openly and bitterly attacked by the Soviet press, which branded him as the sole obstacle to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.²⁵

1924: Europe Recognizes the Soviet Union.--In 1924 de jure recognition was accorded the Soviet government by the following nations: Britain, February 1; Italy, February 7; Norway, February 13; Austria, February 20; Greece, March 8; Sweden, March 15; China, May 31; Denmark, June 18; Mexico, August 1; France, October 28; and Japan, January 20, 1924. This ended the diplomatic and commercial boycott of the world's first Communist State and marked its entry into the family of nations.²⁶

Also in 1924 Stalin was at Tiflis outlining a great campaign for the Third International to promote a world revolution. Economic Europe, he contended, had reached a state of stability.

²⁴ The writer of the article "The Soviet Union: Question of Recognition," op. cit., 1067, considered the action by Hughes drastic and thoroughly indicted him for it.

²⁵ Editorial, "Assails Hughes Policy," New York Times (September 12, 1924), Column 2, 17.

²⁶ Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad, op. cit., 191.

It was, therefore, necessary to attack England by an indirect route, for the cornerstone of the capitalistic system must be shattered first of all. China was ripe for revolution, and the upheaval, once launched from there, would spread to India. This would cause English business to be thrown into confusion. Capitalistic Europe as a whole would be reached only in that way-- by a detour through the "colonial and half-colonial world."²⁷

And so we see that while the nations of Europe were jumping on the economic bandwagon of trade with the Soviet Union, the Communists were plotting the overthrow of the very governments with whom they were establishing diplomatic and commercial relations. This consideration was pointed to by some as a most valid reason for non-recognition: that relations with the Bolsheviks were better under that policy than when the "normal" relations were resumed.

1924: Soviets Protest Alleged Violation of Sovereignty.--Twice during 1924 the Soviet government communicated notes of complaint to the United States Secretary of State concerning alleged unlawful entrance of United States warships into Russian ports. It was also reported by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, that a round brass mark had been discovered on Tchukotski (Chukchi??) Peninsula in Emma Bay, Cape Puzino, obviously used for magnetic observations, bearing the inscription: "United

²⁷ Paul Scheffer, "American Recognition of Russia: What It Would Mean to Europe," Foreign Affairs, IX, No. 1 (October, 1930), 28.

States Coast and Geodetic Survey Magnetic Station...For disturbing this mark [250 fine or imprisonment." Chicherin warned the United States government against unlawful entry into territorial waters of Russia by American war vessels and emphasized that the setting of the mark and the threat to Soviet citizens borne by it constituted a "gross violation of sovereignty." He added that repetitions would be "sternly repressed by (the) Soviet government."²⁸

1924-1926: Diplomatic Complications of Non-recognition.--Our non-recognition policy toward Russia had its official complications. For example in May of 1924 the United States Ambassador to Austria, Washburn, received a note from the newly appointed Soviet Minister informing him that he had presented his credentials and that he would be happy to establish official and personal relations with our ambassador. Secretary of State Hughes instructed Washburn to "personally and unofficially acknowledge the note,...informally receive him should he call on you, but you should not return his call or otherwise assume any official relation."²⁹

The American Ambassador in Finland, Hall, became concerned in August, 1924, about his attendance at an official Finnish State Dinner at which the Russian Minister would be present. Hughes advised Hall to attend such functions but to avoid "unpleasant incidents" with the Russian Minister "by assuming a dignified attitude in accepting official hospitality." "Such

²⁸ Foreign Relations, 1924, II, 681-683.

²⁹ Ibid., 675.

private and personal relations are," he added, "of course, dependent largely on the bearing and character of others, but there need be no embarrassment to the American government in maintaining its attitude of non-recognition while permitting ordinary courtesies of a personal nature."³⁰

Our Ambassador in Mexico, Sheffield, who, as dean of the diplomatic corps, was expected to present the chiefs of missions to the new President of Mexico on December 1, 1924, inquired of Secretary of State Hughes concerning the action he should take in regard to presentation of the new Soviet Minister who was shortly to arrive in Mexico. Secretary Hughes told him that he should present the Soviet Minister if he were called upon to do so, and that if he were obligated, as dean, to call a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, he should notify the Soviet representative. He told Sheffield to receive the Soviet representative "informally" were he to call, but admonished him, as he had done Washburn, not to return the call.³¹

Another "diplomatic complication" arose in 1926 when Madame Alexander Kollontay was designated Soviet Minister to Mexico. She asked the Consul General at Berlin to find out if she could get a visa for crossing the United States en route to Mexico. Coffin, the Consul General, queried Secretary of State Kellogg, who denied her passage. The press release issued by the Department of State on November 4, 1926, stated that since the Ambassador was "one of the outstanding members of the Russian Communist

³⁰ Ibid., 676-677.

³¹ Ibid., 677.

Party, and a member of the Third Congress of the Communist International, as well as a member of the Soviet Diplomatic Service, she has actively associated with the International Communist subversive movement." The State Department viewed these affiliations as barring her from a visa under the law.³²

1927-1928: Co-existence--Announced and Abandoned.--It has already come to light in this study that the Soviets, by adopting the New Economic Policy and other compromises with capitalism, were willing to live side by side with the Western world until they could consolidate their power inside Russia. The Communists had gone underground with their schemes for world revolution. In 1927 at the International Economic Conference at Geneva, the Soviets submitted formally their proposition that the capitalist and communist worlds could live side by side in peaceful co-existence.³³

This pronouncement was reversed in August, 1928, when the Congress of the Third International, meeting at Moscow, announced that the "period of stabilization" in capitalistic industry and commerce had come to an end, and, in particular, that American prosperity was on the verge of a serious reversal. The inference was that the time was ripe for the resumption of revolutionary activity in Europe itself. "Starting points" for the provoking of clashes between the proletariat and the civil authorities the

³² Ibid., 910-911.

³³ Louis Fischer, "Bolshevik Foreign Policy," Yale Review, XIX, No. 3 (Spring, 1930), 325.

world ever were suggested. Demonstrations of the unemployed were called for on March 6, 1926, and active celebrations on August 1 ("World Peace Day") and May Day ("World Proletariat Day") were planned.³⁴

The Communists were getting ready to make political opportunities of the economic depression.

1927: The Soviets and Disarmament.--It became evident that no realistic disarmament scheme could be worked out without the support and concurrence of the Soviet Union; consequently, that government was invited in 1927 to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament. M. Litvinov, who headed the Soviet delegation, amazed the Commission by proposing to abolish all armaments from "battleships to military textbooks." The United States' delegate, Gibson, replied that the United States could not support the drastic proposals for complete and immediate disarmament which it did not believe were intended to achieve their avowed purpose. "Any other attitude on the part of my Government," said Mr. Gibson, "would be lacking in sincerity, consistency, and logic, for my government believes in one project and disbelieves in another." There appeared to be a logical connection between the Russian proposals and Russian insincerity.³⁵

1928: Soviet Russia Becomes Signatory to Kellogg Peace Pact.--In 1928 Secretary of State F. B. Kellogg issued the following

³⁴ Scheffer, op. cit., 30-31.

³⁵ Charles P. Howland (ed.), Survey of American Foreign Relations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1930), 352-354.

statement on the policy of the United States toward the Soviet regime:

"During the past four years the government of the United States has maintained the position that it would be both futile and unwise to enter into relations with the Soviet government so long as the Bolshevik leaders persist in aims and practices in the field of international relations which preclude the possibility of establishing relations on the basis of accepted principles governing intercourse between nations. It is the conviction of the government of the United States that relations on a basis usual between friendly nations cannot be established with a governmental entity which is the agency of a group who hold it as their mission to bring about the overthrow of the existing political, economic, and social order throughout the world and who regulate their conduct toward other nations accordingly."³⁶

Surprisingly, Russia was invited to become a signatory to the Pact of Paris (the Briand-Kellogg Pact) which was concluded at Paris on August 27, 1928. France conveyed the invitation to the Soviet government, which immediately complied but lamented that the Pact did not unequivocally forbid all kinds of aggression or provide for disarmament. Russia noted with emphasis the sweeping nature of the British reservations (concerning her vital interests in regard to the Empire's defense) and refused to accept them as binding upon herself since they had not been communicated officially to Russia.³⁷ (Britain severed relations with the Soviet government in 1927.)

Judge John Bassett Moore, formerly our representative on the World Court, declared that admitting Russia to a partnership in the Kellogg Pact constituted United States' recognition of Russia

³⁶ Foreign Relations, 1928, III, 882.

³⁷ Bemis, The United States as A World Power, op. cit., 724-725.

in terms of strict international law. Kellogg maintained, though, that "adhering to a multilateral treaty that has been agreed to by other people is never a recognition of the country."³⁸

And so the period of strict diplomatic isolationism came to an end. The United States and Russia were having indirect relations which would eventually lead to full recognition.

³⁸ Fischer, Why Recognize Russia?, op. cit., 77-78.

CHAPTER VII

FAR EASTERN ASPECTS OF NON-RECOGNITION

Russia's Far Eastern Policy.--From the very beginning of its existence, more than normal "Russian" imperial interests have pervaded Soviet designs on the vast domain in Eastern Asia. Pauline Tompkins states in her book American-Russian Relations in the Far East that "the new rulers at Moscow were...willing to forego the imperial Russian stake in the Far East for a foothold in the minds of their Asiatic neighbors."¹ This paper is not concerned with the efforts and results of the communist movement in the Far East. In 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was formed, and this was followed by five years of anti-imperialist activities in South China. The Marxist teachings saw a great weakness in the Far Eastern Colonial dependencies of the Western powers and preached a crusade, especially anti-British, to throw off this Western influence and domination.²

The Kuomintang Party in China was aided at first by Moscow and the Comintern. The Chinese Nationalist leaders accepted Red aid to the point of sending Chiang Kai-shek in 1923 as a student-embassy to Russia for study.³ This same young man was later to become the leader of the Chinese Kuomintang, to denounce Moscow's

¹ Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), 189.

² Ibid., 195-196.

³ Dallin, op. cit., 211-212.

aid, and even to declare in 1929 that "Red imperialism is more dangerous than the White."⁴

After the Washington Conference, the United States found herself acting as guardian of Russia's interests in the Far East. All this time Russia was waiting with patience and playing the United States against Japan in the hope that the rivalry between the two would cause one or the other to seek a settlement with the Soviet Union, to use her as an ally against the other. This would enable the Soviets to strengthen their position in the Far East at the expense of either Japan or the United States--they didn't care which.⁵

The Soviet policy was not to push Japanese-American rivalry too far. They appreciated most realistically the protection which their interests were afforded by the check which the United States exercised over Japan's ambitions. Very early in the 1920's Russia began to point out the mutuality of interests which the United States and Russia had in the Far East in opposition to the aims of Japan. Pravda reported on November 11, 1920, the following: "Harding may also try to crush Soviet government, but he will probably do his best to preserve Russia from economic and political exhaustion because the value of having a strong state back of Japan is appreciated." A year later, Izvestia observed that "in many cases their (the United States') interests and ours coincide, more particularly in regard to Japanese imperialism."⁶

⁴ Ibid., 260.

⁵ Tompkins, op. cit., 142.

⁶ Ibid., 145.

As time passed and as the United States did not include recognition with the championing of Russian interests in the Far East, the Soviet government had begun by 1922 to cooperate more closely with Japan.⁷ Russia's support of the Chinese Revolution and her friendlier attitude toward Japan caused quite a bit of Russo-American friction. The estrangement of the two countries in the Far East is illustrated by the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1925 which gave Japan the oil of Sakhalin which she needed for her fleet.⁸

Non-Recognition and the Chinese Eastern Railway.--In the Far East the chief drawback to our non-recognition of Soviet Russia was the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway.⁹ We cannot discuss here all of the Sino-Russian relations relative to this railway. We should note, though, that at the Washington Conference of 1921 one of the minor agreements was one declaring the "inviolability" of Russian rights in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway.¹⁰

The United States policy toward Russia has already been discussed as one of protection of Russian rights--not Soviet rights, but the rights of the Russian people. When in September of 1920 Peking closed the old Russian Legations and Consulates

⁷ Beloff, op. cit., 76-77.

⁸ Ibid., 116.

⁹ Tompkins, op. cit., 200.

¹⁰ Victor A. Yakhontoff, USSR Foreign Policy (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1945), 53.

In China, the United States warned China against "conniving" with the Communists at the expense of the "Treaty Rights of the Russian People." The United States was still listening to the spokesman of the Provisional Government as the true representatives of the Russian people.¹¹ The United States feared that the Soviets were attempting to start an anti-foreign movement in China designed to obtain Communist pre-eminence. The United States warned that Bolshevik "incursions" might thereupon precipitate demands on China by other nations, since it could prompt them to further aggression on the grounds that they were protecting "legal Russian rights from being confiscated on behalf of the Russian Reds."¹²

In the late summer of 1923, negotiations began between the Soviets and Chinese which culminated in the agreements of May 31, 1924.¹³ By these agreements, diplomatic relations were resumed between China and Russia, and the Chinese received the right to "eventual redemption" of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In the meanwhile, the Railway was to be managed jointly, but Russia was empowered to appoint the general manager of the road. The manager's powers were purposely vague; hence, new grounds for strife in later years were set up.¹⁴

On July 10, 1929, Chinese Manchurian authorities seized the Chinese Eastern Railway, removed the Russian general manager

¹¹ Tompkins, op. cit., 192-193.

¹² Ibid., 194.

¹³ Ibid., 200.

¹⁴ Ibid., 207-208.

from his office, and appointed a Chinese instead. As a consequence, Russia severed diplomatic relations with China on July 18, 1929. From July to December this Soviet-Chinese dispute was in the spotlight of international politics. This was Russia's first war since the intervention and the war against Poland which ended in 1920.¹⁵

The American Secretary of State, Stimson, suggested the invocation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to the Chinese-Russian controversy. He called the attention of both China and Russia to "the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War," to which they were both signatories. He appealed to them to "refrain or desist from measures of hostility..."¹⁶

On December 5, 1929, the Soviets communicated a bitter reply to the American suggestion. The attitude of the Soviets was one of "astonishment that the government of the United States, which, by its own will, does not entertain any official relations with the government of the Soviet Union, should find it possible to address to (the) latter advice and recommendations."¹⁷

The Soviets were blamed for damaging the efficacy of the Kellogg Pact; therefore, the whole incident concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway proved to be a "retarding influence" to the Russo-American understanding.¹⁸

¹⁵ Dellin, op. cit., 260.

¹⁶ Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 371-373.

¹⁷ Ibid., 406.

¹⁸ Fischer, "Bolshevik Foreign Policy," op. cit., 525.

Japan Invades Manchuria--1931.--The Manchurian incident of September 18, 1931, was closely related to Soviet-American estrangement. One of the things which convinced Japan that she could get away with the invasion of Manchuria was her knowledge of the strained relations of the United States and Russia which had been particularly bad since the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1929. The Soviet-American rift was widened by the Manchurian incident because of distrust on both sides as to the other's attitude. The Russians feared that they could gain no support in the Far East from the United States should they become involved in a war with Japan. The United States, along with other Western nations and China, put much stock in the rumor of a Russo-Japanese agreement which would give Japan a portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway in return for financial aid and compensation in North Manchuria.¹⁹ There was also the possibility that Russia would join China against Japan and thereby "infinitely complicate the situation." This eventually would likely cause a full scale war in the Far East.²⁰ In addition to this, the imbroglio grew due to Soviet fears that a combination of powers in the Far East might launch an anti-Communist crusade.²¹

The Soviet Union refused to take part in the League of Nations' attempts at settling the dispute, because Russia was not a member of the League and thirteen of the twenty-two

¹⁹ Tompkins, op. cit., 247-250.

²⁰ Ibid., 252.

²¹ Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1945), 22.

nations on the League Advisory Committee concerned with the Manchurian crisis did not have diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.²²

Russia became convinced that the Western powers were actually condoning the Manchurian invasion not so much as an acquiescence to China's dismemberment as an expression of the West's hostility toward Russia. Whereas in 1929 both Moscow and Nanking had been reminded of their obligations under the Kellogg Pact, the Western powers displayed initial reluctance to apply the Pact to the Manchurian crisis. This, coupled with the emphasis concerning the Communist menace which Japan communicated to the Lytton Commission (the League investigating committee), tended to widen the gap between Washington and Moscow during the early stages of the Manchurian conflict.²³ The Russians viewed the entire American policy toward the Sino-Japanese war as our way of "salving" American conscience rather than serving as a deterrent to the Japanese.²⁴

The Russians now had facing them on their long Manchurian frontier a Japanese army which was militantly anti-Russian and anti-Communist. The courtship of Japan had ended.²⁵ However strong the Russian renouncement of America's position, the Soviets could not disregard the potential strength of the United States in Asia.²⁶ The courtship of the United States began

²² Ibid., 23.

²³ Tompkins, op. cit., 253.

²⁴ Ibid., 255.

²⁵ Chamberlin, The Russian Enigma, op. cit., 195.

²⁶ Tompkins, op. cit., 255.

with recognition clearly the goal. In order to enhance their chances, the Russians sought to improve relations with China because it was thought this would hasten American acknowledgment.²⁷

Russia began to point to the inevitability of a Japanese-American war unless the United States should form an alliance with the U.S.S.R. The following statement is typical of Soviet observations: "Peace would not be final or be secured in the Pacific until the United States recognized the Soviet government; had normal relations existed between (the U.S.S.R. and the United States)...the Japanese would not have dared to do what they have recently done in Manchuria."²⁸

The United States was very cautious lest Japan take a recognition settlement between Russia and the United States as an unfriendly act. Secretary of State Stimson wrote to Senator William E. Borah on September 8, 1932, that the question of recognition had been informally discussed by members of the American Delegation and Russian representatives at Geneva in the spring of 1931. At that time the Japanese action in Manchuria prompted the United States to make a fight in the name of the integrity of international obligations. Secretary Stimson pointed out that had we recognized Russia at that time in complete disregard to her "bad reputation respecting international obligations"... that "the whole world, and particularly Japan, would jump to the conclusion that our action had been dictated solely by po-

²⁷ Beloff, op. cit., 84-85.

²⁸ Tompkins, op. cit., 256-257.

litical expedience and as a maneuver to bring forceful pressure upon Japan." This would have resulted in a loss of "moral standing" and would convince Japan that we were "an opportunist nation, seeking to enforce a selfish anti-Japanese policy against her by the usual maneuvers of international policies."²⁹

²⁹ Foreign Relations, 1933-1939, The Soviet Union,
1-2.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOGNITION: WHY AND HOW?

Recognition: Why?--During most of the sixteen-year period of non-recognition, the United States was in a position to be aloof to the Soviet Union where the European countries could not. Two events were to cause the non-recognition policy to come under fire. One was the depression of 1929, and the other was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.¹

These two events reveal two factors which caused non-recognition to be abandoned. One of these factors was lure of Soviet trade which the depression spotlighted; the other was the threat of Japan to the United States in the Far East which the Manchurian invasion emphasized.

The fact that recognition did not follow directly on the heels of either of these events cannot be overlooked. The significance of these events appears to be that they brought into focus the disadvantages of a policy of non-recognition, thereby causing the policy to come under more severe attack. The United States could stand aloof from the world in not recognizing Russia, but practical American politicians could not withstand for long public opinion. It seems to this writer that the same public opinion which caused non-recognition to become entrenched was one of the factors, perhaps the major one, causing it to be abandoned.

Sixty-three per cent of all those answering a questionnaire sent out by the American Foundation to twelve hundred newspapers

¹ Beloff, op. cit., 117.

throughout the United States favored recognition. Ten per cent favored conditional recognition, and only twenty-seven per cent opposed recognition under any circumstances.²

There was, however, much disquiet still prevailing concerning the possible recognition. Some of the Latin American countries had found relations with the Soviets difficult. Mexico, which had recognized the Soviet Union in 1924, severed relations on January 23, 1930. Although Uruguay granted recognition in 1926, she and Russia did not exchange missions until 1934. In 1931 the Soviet trading organization in Buenos Aires was raided and closed because of its alleged propagandist activities.³

Let us examine the various reasons which writers give to explain why non-recognition was abandoned. First, let us consider just what effect the world economic depression had on the decision to recognize the Soviets.

The year 1933 was the first year for the newly born "new deal." It was faced with bank failures, business bankruptcies, unemployment, etc. These were certainly considerations if recognition were to be justified on economic grounds.⁴ Due to the decline in trade in 1932, an important section of American businessmen came to favor closer ties with the Soviet Union.⁵ Also, the American press stressed the trade aspects of recognition.⁶ Regardless of all other consid-

² Dulles, The Road to Teheran, op. cit., 195-196.

³ Beloff, op. cit., 121-122.

⁴ Yakhontoff, op. cit., 121.

⁵ Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World Since 1919 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), 351.

⁶ Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, op. cit., 33-34.

erations the public, whose thinking was depression centered, thought of recognition as a way to trade which would mean more jobs. The public had been led to believe that the Russians wanted to buy great quantities of American goods if the necessary credits could be made available.⁷

Another one of the economic considerations of recognition came as a result of the London Economic Conference which convened in the spring of 1933, with the Soviet Union in attendance, to consider ways and means to solve the economic crisis with which the world found itself confronted. Maxim Litvinov, it is said, "thrilled the conference" by offering the extension of vast trade with the Soviet Union as the panacea.⁸ The nations of the world started jumping on the bandwagon. Britain lifted the embargo on Russian purchases of British goods and offered to resume negotiations for a new trade agreement. It was here at London that the first steps were taken in the coming recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States. William Bullitt personally visited Litvinov at the Soviet Embassy in London as Roosevelt's representative to discuss preliminaries to recognition. On July 4, 1933, the Soviets were sold a consignment of from sixty to eighty thousand bales of American cotton on the basis of a 70 per cent credit.⁹

The lure of trade was the pronounced cause for recognition. There is convincing evidence, though, that the situation in the

⁷ Allan Nevins and Louis M. Hacker (eds.), The United States and Its Place in World Affairs, 1918-1943 (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1943), 379.

⁸ Yakhontoff, op. cit., 98.

⁹ Ibid., 100.

Far East played an important role in the decision. In January of 1933 eight hundred college presidents and professors wrote president-elect Roosevelt that "failure to recognize Russia has contributed to the serious situation in the Orient and prevented adopting of policies which might have frustrated the imperialistic ventures of Japan."¹⁰

We have already seen in the preceding chapter that the Soviets began to actively seek the recognition of the United States. In February of 1933 the Soviet Military Attache' in Japan approached our Military Attache', at a luncheon in Tokyo, on the subject of recognition. He expressed the willingness of the Soviets to arrange some means of paying the debts, preferring an equivalent method rather than a cash payment. The Soviet government, he stated, "would be glad to pay the small debts owed to America, but that would necessitate the recognition of debts elsewhere, the total of which is very large."¹¹

The Foreign Press took the view that the Far Eastern situation prompted Roosevelt to decide on the rapprochement. Three good arguments which support this view are:

(1) The Roosevelt administration continued the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of the Japanese puppet state of Manchuko, thereby evidencing the interest of the United States in Manchuria where the Russo-Japanese territory joined.

(2) History reveals that the Far East has always played an im-

¹⁰ Ibid., 120-121.

¹¹ Foreign Relations, 1933-1939, The Soviet Union, 3.

portant role in Russo-American relations and certainly must have this time.

(3) In the agreement arising out of recognition, the Soviet Union waived all claims against the United States as a result of the Siberian intervention.¹³

Max Beloff in his book The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia makes this statement: "The growing menace to the American position in the Far East owing to the expansion of Japanese imperialism must have been the determining factor in persuading the United States to bring to an end the breach with Russia."¹⁴

Samuel Flagg Bemis in his book The United States as a World Power draws the following conclusion: "Above all, the increasing tension of Far Eastern politics, where the interests of Russia and the United States supported each other more than they did the Japanese policy, impelled the two nations...to close up the gap of diplomatic irreconcilability."¹⁵

This writer believes that all of the reasons outlined in this part of the paper had some influence. Of these, trade was at least the pronounced reason along with the idea that the policy of non-recognition was getting the United States nowhere. The futility of non-recognition becomes evident when one considers that international obligations, the debt which the Soviets had repudiated, had been made less important since other nations had defaulted in

¹³ Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, op. cit., 34-35.

¹⁴ Beloff, op. cit., 122.

¹⁵ Bemis, The United States as a World Power, op. cit., 253.

their debt payments. The situation in the Far East must have been on President Roosevelt's mind although it was never really admitted to have been a reason for recognition. The Russians were obviously interested in recognition because they feared both Japan and Germany.

Recognition: How?--There were considerations other than the usual ones mentioned in connection with our non-recognition policy which certainly entered into the determination of our policy toward recognition in 1933. Robert F. Kelley, Chief of the Division for Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, outlined one of these considerations in a memorandum of July 27, 1933. This memorandum, which was put in the possession of President Roosevelt, contended that unless we removed the obstacles causing friction between the United States and Russia prior to recognition, the extension of recognition with resultant official relations (as had been the experience of countries which had extended recognition to the Soviet government) tended to become "the source of friction and ill will rather than the mainspring of cooperation and good will." Kelley further observed that unless the "existing difficulties" were cleared up, formal diplomatic relations would not be a "useful relationship."¹⁶

President Roosevelt was further advised in an October memorandum by Judge Walton Moore that Russia was (a) "inclined to a more reasonable attitude toward nations who have not accorded the recognition she seeks than toward those that have, and (b) after

¹⁶ Foreign Relations, 1933-1939, The Soviet Union, 6.

eagerly seeking and obtaining recognition she becomes more indifferent to her obligations than theretofore."¹⁷

William Bullitt advised in a similar memorandum that "whatever method may be used to enter into negotiations with the Soviet government, it seems essential that formal recognition should not be accorded except as the final act of an agreement covering a number of questions in dispute."¹⁸ This formula of negotiation and then recognition became the operating procedure for the implementation of President Roosevelt's intentions to try for a rapprochement with the Soviet Regime.

Roosevelt was advised to obtain certain guarantees from the Soviets prior to the recognition. These were (1) prohibition of Communist propaganda in the United States by the Soviet government and the Comintern, (2) protection of the civil and religious rights of Americans in Russia, and (3) agreement that the recognition would not be retroactive to the establishment of that government. The last stipulation was considered essential to protect the United States government and certain citizens and corporations from suits for damages dated prior to recognition.¹⁹ It was feared, for example, that the Soviet government might try to invalidate the financial transactions which the former Provisional Government's Ambassador had had with the National City Bank of New York, with which

¹⁷ Ibid., 15.

¹⁸ Ibid., 16.

¹⁹ Ibid., 16-17.

some of the funds loaned by the United States to this government were deposited.²⁰ President Roosevelt was advised against either immediate or unconditional recognition.²¹

On October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed a correspondence to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalin, President of the Soviet All-Union Central Executive Committee, expressing his desire to resume normal and friendly relations but making it clear that although President Roosevelt was asking the dispatch of a Soviet representative to "explore all questions outstanding between our countries," the "participation in such a discussion would...not commit either nation to any future course of action..." Kalin acknowledged the receipt of President Roosevelt's message and accepted the invitation with enthusiasm. Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was to come to Washington to negotiate.²² President Roosevelt made public the exchange of notes on October 20 and made it clear that this step did not constitute recognition.²³

On October 21, 1933, S. Ughet, the Russian Financial Attache' of the former Provisional Government, notified the State Department of the termination of his official activities and turned over his outstanding work to the State Department.²⁴ The Department took over custody of the Russian Embassy building with all its records.²⁵

²⁰ Ibid., 12.

²¹ Ibid., 16.

²² Ibid., 18.

²³ Ibid., 19.

²⁴ Loc. cit.

²⁵ Ibid., 38.

There was some concern over the attitude Japan would take toward the impending recognition, which might be interpreted as directed against Japan. The Japanese government was soon to express an attitude of surprising unconcern because they considered the negotiations to be a "natural step and to be expected."²⁶

There could be little doubt that the fear of Japan was one of the motivating reasons for Russia's renewed interest in closer ties with the United States. In October, 1933, Pravda declared in a triumphant tone that "normal relations between the United States and the Soviet Union would create a correlation of forces with which adventurous groups would have to reckon." Other Russian newspapers said that collaboration of the two countries was necessary because "...certain elements in the Far East play with fire."²⁷

It was feared that Japan would become concerned quickly if political discussions of a Far East anti-Japanese nature were to enter publicly into the negotiations.²⁸ Stanley Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, asked the Secretary of State to consider ways and means of reassuring the Japanese that the forthcoming negotiations were not motivated by Far Eastern problems.²⁹

Litvinov and Secretary of State Hull began conversations on November 8, 1933. On the 10th, President Roosevelt reviewed the

²⁶ Ibid., 20-21.

²⁷ Ibid., 22.

²⁸ Ibid., 21.

²⁹ Ibid., 24.

questions of controversy with Mr. Litvinov. Negotiations continued with the problem of debts and claims being especially difficult to solve. Litvinov was finally convinced that some agreement on this point would be necessary if Russia were ever to be able to borrow money from the United States again. Bullitt informed Litvinov of the Johnson Bill which was sure to pass in January. It forbade loans to countries in default of their indebtedness to the United States. By using this information Bullitt "managed to shake" Litvinov a bit.³⁰

Finally on November 15, 1933, Mr. Litvinov, at a meeting with the President, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Bullitt, made a "gentlemen's agreement" in which Mr. Litvinov agreed to stay in Washington after the recognition was consummated to discuss with Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Bullitt the exact sum between the limits of \$75,000,000, and \$150,000,000 to be paid by the Soviet government.³¹

With this matter finally agreed upon, the President of the United States proceeded on November 16, 1933, to exchange with the Russian representative, Mr. Litvinov, a series of notes out of which the recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the the United States of America became a reality. The notes resulted in the following conditions which the Soviets accepted as their responsibility under the recognition agreement:

(1) Direct assurance by the Soviet government that they would scrupulously respect a policy of non-interference with life and affairs within the jurisdiction of the United States.

³⁰ Ibid., 25.

³¹ Ibid., 26-27.

(2) The Russian government pledged that it would restrain all persons and organizations either directly or indirectly under its control, or receiving money from it (the Third International was not mentioned by name), from agitation or propoganda within the United States or its territories, or from violation of the territorial integrity of the same.

(3) The Russian government pledged neither to permit formation or residence or lend its support to any organization or group revolutionary to the United States.³²

(4) The rights to freedom of conscience and of religion were promised to American citizens residing temporarily or permanently within Russian jurisdiction. Litvinov cited various Soviet decrees which gave these rights to Soviet citizens and said that these would apply to American citizens as well.³³

(5) Agreement to a consular convention to be negotiated with most-favored nation provisions. This was to include the right of fair trial to American citizens accused of crimes in Russia.³⁴ It was also agreed to negotiate a clause into the consular convention providing that the free exercise of religion shall not be less favorable than that enjoyed in the Soviet Union by nationals of the nation most favored in this respect.³⁵

(6) Declaration of intention to negotiate existing claims be-

³² Ibid., 28-29.

³³ Ibid., 30-33.

³⁴ Ibid., 33.

³⁵ Ibid., 32.

tween the two countries after recognition. The Soviet Union waived all claims against the United States in regard to the American intervention. They also agreed that the recognition would not be retroactive and the Soviet Union would not make any claim in respect to the previous "acts done or settlements made by or with the government of the United States, or public officials in the United States, or its nationals, relating to property, credits, or obligations of any government of Russia or nationals thereof; and judgments rendered or that may be rendered by American courts in so far as they relate to property, or rights, or interests therein, in which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its nationals may have had or may claim to have an interest in the future."³⁷ Mr. Serge Ughet, Russian Financial Attache, was notified the same day that the United States ceased to recognize him.³⁸

The Series of Documents which concluded the recognition are dated November 16, 1933. Actually the signatures were affixed at 1:14 on the morning of the seventeenth. After the signing of the momentous documents, all of those present toasted the new era which was to begin in Russo-American relations with a glass of newly legalized 3.2 beer.³⁹

Concurrent with the recognition of Russia, the United States withdrew the American fleet from the Pacific as a friendly gesture toward Japan. Russia had what she wanted--a new power balance in

³⁷ Ibid., 35-36.

³⁸ Ibid., 37.

³⁹ Browder, op. cit., 141.

the Far East. Perhaps the United States wanted this too, but we spared no effort to keep Tokyo from interpreting the recognition of Russia as anti-Japanese.⁴⁰ It was considered "intensely significant" in Tokyo that Russia should appoint her principal Japanese expert, Troyanovsky, as their ambassador to Washington.⁴¹

The stage was being set for the world conflict which was to come. The foundation was here being laid for political entente between the Soviet Union and the world she had vowed to destroy.⁴²

⁴⁰ Griswold, op. cit., 441.

⁴¹ Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 107.

⁴² Grove C. Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman, The Origins and Background of the Second World War (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943), 221.

CONCLUSION

Nothing is more futile than retrospect excursions into "hindsight" contemplations. It is difficult enough to draw conclusions as to the reasons underlying the United States' non-recognition policy toward Soviet Russia. These reasons have been outlined in Chapter VI and will not be recapitulated here. Also, Chapter VIII points out the reasons prompting abandonment of the policy of non-recognition.

This writer will not attempt to either defend or attack the United States' policy of non-recognition of Soviet Russia. The question of whether or not the policy of non-recognition was in the best national interest of the United States is a moot question which must, of necessity, be left to more capable students viewing this history from a vantage point of undeterminable years.

We do have, however, a rare opportunity here in 1955, a time so close historically to the 1917-1933 period, to see the recognition issue involving the Communist Government of China in the light of what speciously appear to be issues similar to those involved when Russia occupied China's present position. This writer, all things considered, views the recognition of Red China as basically different from the question of Soviet recognition. Since in 1933 the United States in recognizing Russia proclaimed its official toleration of communism, one cannot validly contend that the People's Republic of China should be castigated through non-recognition just because she is communist. In addition to this a question of international obligations is not a clear grievance between the two countries, since China's financial obligations to America are still

assured by Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government on Formosa. For these reasons this writer concludes that the non-recognition of Soviet Russia is not a good precedent for the same attitude toward Red China.

Above all, the recognition of Soviet Russia in 1933 announced the willingness of both the United States and Soviet Russia to tolerate one another, and even to cooperate against the common threat of Germany and Japan--especially the latter. Herein lies a striking dilemma in our present foreign policy: We pursue a policy of tolerating communism (which we call containment). We do not preach the elimination of communism except through its own internal collapse; whereas, the communist movement announces continually its intention to destroy capitalism and with it all of the existing non-communist governments of the world. Recently we have heard much talk about co-existence from the Soviet world--this is not new, as we have noted in this study. Toleration or containment of the only communist state on earth which we proclaimed in 1933 by our recognition of Soviet Russia was the first official acceptance by the United States of the present co-existence there.

Time will decide which is more realistic: refusal to acknowledge or co-existence. Above all, we must not forget that many of our present difficulties with Soviet Russia had their unhappy beginnings prior to 1933.

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