

**A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DEMAGOGUERY IN THE DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE OF NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC**

BY: SULEIMAN M. BARNABAS

(CU022100065)

JUNE, 2016

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this study was carried out by Barnabas M. Suleiman for the Award of a Ph.D Degree in the Department of Sociology, Covenant University, Ota.

Professor Ifeanyi P. Onyeonoru, Ph.D
Department of Sociology
University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

(Supervisor)

Dr. Matthew E. Egharevba, Ph.D
Department of Sociology
College of Business and Social Sciences
Covenant University, Ota.

(Co-Supervisor)

Dr. Tayo O. George, Ph.D
Department of Sociology
College of Business and Social Sciences
Covenant University, Ota.

(Head of Department)

Professor Shalom Chinedu, PhD
School of Postgraduate Studies
Covenant University, Ota.

(Dean of SPS)

DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to God Almighty Who Solely made it possible in not so long a time.

Also to the “Peoples General”, Colonel Ahmadu Usman Suleiman (rtd.) who believed in me.

And to all who struggled (and are still struggling) for genuine democracy to be birthed, nurtured and sustained in Africa, particularly in Nigeria.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Showing appreciation to those who helped make a Ph.D Thesis successful is certainly an intricate endeavour. It is almost certain to mistakenly exclude someone, so apologies in advance to anyone whom I mistakably omit from these acknowledgements.

This Thesis would never have been possible without the platform created by Covenant University that afforded me the opportunity to undertake this study. I appropriated this opportunity because of the motherly guidance of Professor Aize Obayan, whom I will forever treasure her role in my life. I sincerely appreciate the leadership of the University, headed by the Chancellor, for making me rise up to the task of learning as empowerment to make impact.

I am especially grateful to Professor I. P. Onyeonoru, who supervised this Thesis with supreme diligence, swiftness, professionalism and above all, a fatherly heart. I will ever appreciate the effort of Professor P. A. Edewor for helping me in the course of the study by bringing his expertise to bear on the Thesis at every stage of the hurdles I had to cross. I appreciate the help of Dr. M. E. Egharevba, my Co-Supervisor who never hid his desire to see a quality work coming from my Thesis. I am grateful to Dr. Tayo George, the Head of Department of Sociology, for taking my Thesis completion as her personal responsibility, thus making sure that the banality of bureaucracy in the system never infuriated her to delay the often tedious responses, for a second.

I am in debt to all my lecturers and colleagues who provided helpful advice and support, including Doctors C. T. Iruonagbe, O. H. Abimbola, D. A. Imhonopi, A. Onwumah, Ahmadu Fred, Ajibade Jegede, Folarin Sherriff, Tuesday Owoeye, Ben Agoha, Akomolafe Bayo, Idowu Adenike, Ajayi Foluke, Mrs. Mercy Ozoya, Mrs. Tolu Allo, Mrs. Owolawafe and Mr. Taiwo Kasumu and Professors Nana C. Debby and I. E. Chiluwa.

I remain indebted to my family members (father, mother and relatives) who have supported me beyond measure, financially, emotionally and socially. So many thanks to my friends within and outside Covenant University for their encouragements, including Farouk Noah Seember, Donatus Iyoha, Charles Onuh, T. C. Okafor, Eunice Amoka, among others.

I remain thankful to Dr. Oladunsi Olumuyiwa for his massive contribution to the success of this work. I also appreciate the input of Professor Daniel Gberevbie who initiated the ontological and dialectical arguments that led to the final thesis title of “A Sociological Study of Demagoguery in the Democratic Governance of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic” from the initial title of “The Political Economy of Demagogues in the Democratic Governance of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic.”

Finally, I am indebted to Sussan Leo Uduak-Abasi for her immense contribution to this work especially in the coding and data entry; Mrs. Mosunmola Akinbode who offered to freely print the Thesis, right from the proposal to the final draft; Mr. Uchenna Efobi who offered me accommodation when ‘official’ persecution meant I had to vacate my accommodation at the last moments of my Ph.D programme; and the Research Assistants in the six States and the Federal Capital Territory (Mr. Adebayo King Alfred, Mrs. Uzzi Ako-ode, Mr. LongJohn Ahmed, Mr. Ujah Joseph, Mr. Solomon Ejiga, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Ibrahim Suleiman Jauro).

ABSTRACT

There are concerns about the feasibility of democratic governance in Africa generally, and in Nigeria particularly due to pervasive demagoguery in the practice of democracy, which is still relatively understudied (particularly as it relates to the Nigerian context). In spite the seemingly remarkable progress of democracy in Nigeria, its survival, deepening and dividends are threatened by anti-democratic behaviour and practices that are antithetical to the universally acknowledged principles, values and culture of democracy. The objectives of the study were to examine the ways in which demagoguery manifests itself in Nigeria's democracy, examine the role of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic, identify the factors that make demagoguery thrive in the democratic politics of Nigeria, and examine the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

The study adopted triangulation of methods, collecting data from both primary and secondary sources. A total of 658 respondents and 20 interviewees drawn from political parties, security agencies, Independent National Electoral Commission and political office holders participated in the study. Data were analysed using frequency and percentage distributions, cross tabulations and regression (for the quantitative data), and content analysis (for the qualitative data).

Results from the quantitative data, which were complemented by the qualitative analyses, show that demagoguery pervades Nigeria's democracy and determines the country's politics. Also, the study shows that election outcomes are no reflections of a free, fair and credible democratic process, but are the outcome of a constellation of demagogic factors such as monetary inducement, intimidation, the use of security agencies and thugs to disrupt or manipulate democratic processes or outcomes, and election fraud. Two hypotheses were tested in the study. The first hypothesis showed that outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is significantly influenced by a combination of acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, intimidation and election fraud at a p-value of .000. The second hypothesis showed that money, though important, is not a significantly sufficient factor in determining the outcome of elections in Nigeria.

The implications of demagoguery for democracy and good governance are that democracy loses its idea as the government that attains or retains political power through the people and makes it

a venture of self-interests through Machiavellian politics. The findings of the study inform the recommendations that highlight the importance of citizens' education, strict and impartial implementation of sanctions against violators of democratic and electoral laws, accentuating the impartiality of security agencies and the need for constitutional amendment to protect the democratic rights of citizens against the impunity of democratic institutions, especially political parties.

Number of words: 425

KEY WORDS

Demagoguery, Democracy, Elections, Nigeria, Fourth Republic

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|------|
| TITLE | |
| PAGE..... | i |
| CERTIFICATION..... | ii |
| DEDICATION | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..... | iv |
| ABSTRACT | vi |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS..... | viii |
| LIST OF TABLES | xi |
| LIST OF FIGURES | xii |
| CHAPTER ONE..... | 1 |
| INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY | 1 |
| 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM | 4 |
| 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS..... | 6 |
| 1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY..... | 6 |
| 1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY | 6 |
| 1.6 SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY..... | 7 |
| 1.7 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS | 8 |
| 1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY | 10 |
| CHAPTER TWO | 11 |
| LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 11 |
| 2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW | 11 |
| 2.1.1 DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT..... | 11 |
| 2.1.2 DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE..... | 13 |
| 2.1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY | 15 |
| 2.1.4 DEMOCRACY: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES | 17 |
| 2.1.5 DEMOCRATIC IRREGULARITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF ELECTION FRAUD | 22 |
| 2.1.6 DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND ELECTION MONITORING IN NIGERIA | 24 |
| 2.1.7 DEMAGOGUERY, DEMAGOGUES AND GODFATHERISM..... | 26 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 2.1.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMAGOGUERY | 30 |
| 2.1.9 DEMAGOGUES IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC’S POLITICS | 34 |
| 2.1.10 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE..... | 43 |
| 2.1.11 DEMAGOGUES AND POPULISM | 49 |
| 2.1.12 DESTRUCTIVE VERSUS BENEFICIAL DEMAGOGUES | 50 |
| 2.1.13 DEMAGOGUES AND POLITICAL PARTIES | 52 |
| 2.1.14 DEMOCRACY AND DEMAGOGUERY: THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MEDIA | 55 |
| 2.1.15 MONEY, POLITICS AND NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY | 55 |
| 2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 59 |
| 2.2.1 THE ELITE THEORY..... | 59 |
| 2.2.2 MASS SOCIETY THEORY..... | 62 |
| 2.2.3 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONSIM | 65 |
| 2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK | 66 |
| 2.4 HYPOTHESES | 69 |
| CHAPTER THREE | 70 |
| METHODOLOGY | 70 |
| 3.1 RESEARCH SETTING | 70 |
| 3.2 STUDY POPULATION | 74 |
| 3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN | 75 |
| 3.4 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE | 75 |
| 3.5 RELIABILITY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT | 77 |
| 3.6 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION | 78 |
| 3.7 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION | 78 |
| 3.8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION | 78 |
| 3.9 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS | 79 |
| 3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION | 80 |
| 3.11 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY | 80 |
| CHAPTER FOUR..... | 81 |
| DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION..... | 81 |
| 4.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS (FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION): SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS..... | 81 |
| 4.2 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION) | 112 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSES | 113 |
| 4.4 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES | 116 |
| 4.5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS | 117 |
| 4.5.1 WAYS IN WHICH DEMAGOGUERY MANIFESTS IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY | 122 |
| 4.5.2 FACTORS THAT MAKE DEMAGOGUERY THRIVE IN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS OF NIGERIA | 124 |
| 4.5.3 THE ROLE OF DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY | 126 |
| 4.5.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEMAGOGUERY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA | 128 |
| CHAPTER FIVE | 131 |
| CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..... | 131 |
| 5.1 CONCLUSION..... | 131 |
| 5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS | 134 |
| 5.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE..... | 136 |
| 5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH..... | 136 |
| REFERENCES..... | 137 |
| APPENDIX A | 154 |
| APPENDIX B | 157 |
| APPENDIX C | 159 |
| APPENDIX D..... | 178 |
| APPENDIX E..... | 179 |
| APPENDIX F..... | 181 |
| APPENDIX G | 183 |
| APPENDIX H..... | 189 |
| APPENDIX I..... | 194 |
| APPENDIX J..... | 197 |
| APPENDIX K: BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION)..... | 208 |
| APPENDIX L (REGRESSION ANALYSIS)..... | 231 |
| APPENDIX M..... | 237 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|--|-------|
| Table 2.1: Differences Between Demagoguery and Godfatherism..... | 34 |
| Table 3.1: Geopolitical Zones and the Randomly Selected State from Each Zone..... | 75 |
| Table 3.2: Sampling Methods..... | 77 |
| Table 3.3: Reliability Statistics..... | 77 |
| Table 4.1.1 Socio-demographic Distribution of Respondents..... | 82-83 |
| Table 4.1.2: Distribution of Respondents by Political Party..... | 85 |
| Table 4.1.3: Distribution of Respondents by State..... | 86 |
| Table 4.1.4: Votes Influenced by Money and Material Inducements..... | 87 |
| Table 4.1.5: Political Parties and Cost of Nomination and Expression of Interest Forms in the 2015 General Elections..... | 88 |
| Table 4.1.6: Votes Influenced by Leaders/ Mentors..... | 90 |
| Table 4.1.7: Votes Influenced by Threats..... | 91 |
| Table 4.1.8: Votes Influenced by a Combination of Inducement and Threats..... | 92 |
| Table 4.1.9: Voting Process Influenced by Intimidation/ Fraud..... | 93 |
| Table 4.1.10: Voting Process Violated Democratic Rules or Principles..... | 94 |
| Table 4.1.11: Poverty is Responsible for the Inability of Delegates and Voters to Choose Candidates Independently of What Their Leaders Tell Them..... | 95 |
| Table 4.1.12: Votes Influenced by Monetary Inducement Only..... | 96 |
| Table 4.1.13: Votes Influenced by Religious Sentiments..... | 97 |
| Table 4.1.14: Votes Influenced by Ethnic Sentiments..... | 98 |
| Table 4.1.15: Votes Influenced by Use of Force..... | 99 |
| Table 4.1.16: Votes Influenced by Intimidation..... | 100 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 4.1.17: Use of Thugs to Intimidate Voters..... | 101 |
| Table 4.1.18: Use of Security Agencies to Intimidate Delegates..... | 102 |
| Table 4.1.19: Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates Were Subject to Harassment..... | 103 |
| Table 4.1.20: Election Did Not Follow Due Process and Rule of Law..... | 104 |
| Table 4.1.21: Candidates Produced By Primary Elections May Not Be Based On Merit or Leadership Qualities of Candidates..... | 105 |
| Table 4.1.22: Poor Leadership Can Result From Imposition of Candidates on the People..... | 106 |
| Table 4.1.23: Political Leaders Undermine Democracy through Imposition of Candidates and Rigging of Elections..... | 107 |
| Table 4.1.24: Election Rigging Is As a Result of Fielding Imposed Candidates for Elections..... | 108 |
| Table 4.1.25: Nigeria's Democracy Will Not Grow If There Is Imposition of Candidates and Other Forms of Electoral Malpractices..... | 109 |
| Table 4.1.26: The Greatest Challenge to Democracy in Nigeria is the Abuse of Power and Disregard for Due Process and the Rule of Law in Democratic Activities..... | 110 |
| Table 4.1.27: Qualified and Willing Nigerians Avoid Politics Because of the Dangers and Maneuverings Associated With Democratic Politics in Nigeria..... | 111 |
| Table 4.2: Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates Were Harassed..... | 112 |
| Table 4.3.1 Model Summary..... | 114 |
| Table 4.3.2 ANOVA..... | 114 |
| Table 4.3.3 Coefficients..... | 115 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|---|----|
| Fig. 2.1: Conceptual Framework..... | 67 |
| Fig. 3.1 (a&b): Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones..... | 71 |
| Fig. 4.1: Cost of Nomination Forms..... | 89 |

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

“Even as democratic legitimacy has been established or restored in many countries over the last two decades, it is threatened today by a new danger, which I call “fig leaf democracy”.

Kofi Annan (2000)

“The story of democracy contains both a celebration of the end of arbitrary rule and paternalistic politics, and anxiety that democracy could mean rule by the rabble.”

David Held (2006:231)

The global perception that democracy is the best form of government has resulted in the acceptance and adoption of democratic regimes across the globe, particularly in hitherto dictatorial States of Africa. Thus, Nigeria returned to democracy on the 29th of May, 1999 with the hope of solving the governance and development predicaments that military rule had plunged the country into over the years. This is because leadership failure has been identified as the major problem bedeviling the Third World Countries, especially in countries where other forms of government, except democracy, are in place (Ake, 2001; 2008; Onyeonuru, 2004).

This political revolution was occasioned by the struggle, in many countries of Africa, and especially Nigeria, for democratic governance to be adopted and thereby jettisoning other forms of government which have been termed dictatorship. While most African countries, including Nigeria, have become ‘officially’, democratic States, there is yet to be seen, in practice, adherence to democratic standards, norms, values and expectations in these nations due to the manipulative activities of politicians, especially political elites and political entrepreneurs who engage or sponsor all kinds of demagoguery in the quest for power. Having witnessed several elections at both State and National levels in the Fourth Republic, and seen elections being turned to war-like occasions, with losses in human lives and properties undermining the processes and outcomes of elections in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, one is moved to investigate the anti-democratic practices and the roles they play in the country’s democracy. Thus, with the massive contentions and claims about democratic irregularities such as imposition of candidates, intimidation of opponents and election fraud in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, democracy seems to

have all the features of dictatorship as experienced prior to 1999, except for the occurrence of elections that are highly and violently compromised and contentious.

Understandably, the idea of democracy has always brought about excitements and apprehensions wherever it exists as a system or form of government. Excitement because it is, expectedly, the solution to the tyranny, misrule and injustice of one (or minority) over another (the majority) in any society, and apprehensions because of the derisive maneuvering and conspicuous failings associated with the practice of democracy (Kirkpatrick, 1982; Ake, 1993, 1998; Fund, 2008; Signer, 2009; Urim, Imhonopi & Ojukwu, 2013). Thus, even though democracy should mean the form of government in which the people rule themselves either directly or through freely and fairly elected representatives, it has been rightly emphasized that “not every nation that calls itself a democracy allows the people to rule” (Bessette and Pitney, 2012: 9) and democracy does not necessarily translate to good governance (Kirkpatrick, 1982; Onyeonoru, 2004). For instance, South Korea represents a paradigm of a “democracy” that the people do not rule! By name, the country is called “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, yet it does not allow for opposition political parties, free elections and democratic accountability, press freedom, rule of law and other democratic essentials that probably informed the formation of the name.

In Zimbabwe also, democracy has presented its people no choice of leadership except the ZANU-PF headed by President Robert Mugabe. The same experience is true in Cameroun where Paul Biya and his party, Cameroonians People's Democratic Movement (RDPC), have remained the only option to rule the people. In some countries, especially in Africa, where democracy continue to suffer political blasphemy in the hands of its supposed ‘political priests’, many citizens have had to sacrifice their lives in the fight to enforce true democracy in their countries. This is especially true for countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, and many more that have engaged and continue to engage antidemocratic elements and forces to enthrone authentic democracy that survives and thrives on the principle of popular sovereignty (that political power derives from the people) and its expected dividends of securing the rights of the people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (which is the very purpose of government).

At the centre of the controversies surrounding the practice of democracy in most parts of the developing world is the practice of demagoguery, which involves the illegal, manipulative and

unconstitutional method of undermining the rules, values and ideals of democracy thereby, circumventing the democratic process before, during and after elections to achieve or promote the political ambitions of a few, to the disadvantage of the majority (Schmitt, 1976; Muravchik, 1991; Ake, 1993; Larson 1996).

In the Nigerian context, the highhandedness of politicians in power continues to raise serious concern about the country's nascent democracy. For example, during the Obasanjo regime (particularly in the second tenure between 2003 and 2007), his third term ambition was identified as the main reason for avoidable political crisis between the former president and his Vice, Atiku Abubakar, and other political actors that were opposed to his then seemingly unbridled ambition of elongating his tenure through a constitutional amendment (Ariye, Ogbomah, Ebipre, & Eric, 2012; Adeniyi, 2011). This trend of abuse of power by the executive persists in the democratic experience of Nigeria until the period of this study.

From the foregoing compendia of facts, therefore, it becomes very necessary to investigate and understand how demagoguery threatens democracy and all that it represents in the context of procedure and outcome. Furthermore, this research will provide the platform to investigate the nature of demagoguery and understand the configuration and character of demagogues as different from the concept of godfatherism that existing researches seem to have exhaustively dissected as the problem of democracy and good governance in Nigeria. Very importantly also, the role of demagoguery, how demagoguery manifests and the implications of demagoguery on Nigeria's democracy will be investigated.

The outcome of a scientific investigation and sociological analysis of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy will present much more comprehensive facts on demagoguery and demagogues and how the highly sophisticated network of demagogues frustrate the country's quest for a truly free and democratic state where popular sovereignty and the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances in government will be visible realities of democratic practices.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Failure to conduct free, fair and credible elections, which is a cardinal factor in democratic system, can undermine the essence of democracy as the best form of government where the power to choose leaders is vested in the people. Democracy empowers the people to choose leaders on the basis of freedom of choice and credible elections, but political leaders and institutions of State are requiring, through coercion and election fraud, that the people have little or no choice on who leads them. This situation has made the promise of democracy unrealizable in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Fund (2008) recommends that country-specific studies be undertaken to identify the challenges that confront democracies across the world, as every democratic regime has its peculiar challenges that creates anxieties and frustrations with democratic practice.

Despite the seemingly remarkable progress of democracy in Nigeria, its survival, deepening and dividends are threatened by pervasive electoral fraud the overbearing influence and manipulative political behaviour of demagogues which have made misrule, abuse of power, corruption, uncertainty, poverty and unemployment undeniable features of the country's democracy (Ofeimum, 2010). These democratic failings have continued to agitate democratic stakeholders worldwide because statistics show that only around 50% of countries that have embarked on democratic transitions since 1980 have achieved full democracies because of the ever-present tendencies of antidemocratic forces ever willing to stall democracy, promote authoritarian regime and make democratic gains seem unachievable (Bjornlund, 2004). All across the political nooks and crannies of Nigeria we are presented with incidences of violence due to allegations and provable indictments of abuse of power and the use of the military and thugs by politicians to impose themselves or their favoured candidates for elections as well as rigging of elections to subvert the choices of the masses (Kofamata, 2007; Bakare, 2013).

Accordingly, there is an ongoing struggle, a more fierce and justifiable battle, to free the Nigerian nation from demagoguery and the conspiracy of the few elites who have constituted themselves as the political leviathans of the country to undermine the will of the people in electing political leaders. Consequently, the fight has shifted from that of democracy as a form of government versus military rule to the battle of establishing the true meaning and practice of democracy: democracy becoming the government of the people, by the people and for the people in every sense of the analysis. Some of the major threats to realizing this democratic ideal in the

Nigerian political context include demagoguery and the overbearing influence and manipulative political behaviour of political actors, especially demagogues, a special type of elites who have overpowering control over the masses or take undue advantage of the political positions they occupy to undermine democratic practices in favour of their political ambitions.

The notoriety concomitant with democracy or democratic practice in Nigeria is further exacerbated by the seemingly tolerable posture of democratic institutions and the Nigerian people to electoral irregularities and election fraud, where the end, and not the means, appears to be the priority. This is a problem that has led to increasing doubts about the ability of democracy to produce leaders that reflect the will of the people.

Although scholars have studied the influence of demagoguery on democratic processes and outcomes on how democratic progress has been hampered by demagogic practices of political actors (Fund, 2008; Signer, 2009), most of these studies have focused on country-specific democratic experiences without dwelling on the Nigerian democratic context. Thus, to understand the role of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy, a study on demagoguery as it relates to the Nigerian democratic situation is pertinent and a response to the recommendation by Fund (2008) that researchers should undertake country-specific studies on demagoguery and what it represents for democratic opportunities, growth and dividends for the particular country.

Current studies that relate to undemocratic practices in Nigeria's democratic politics have centred on the role of godfatherism in undermining democratic values, ethos, principles and public participation in the process and outcome of democracy (Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 2013). However, existing studies have seldom dealt with the demagoguery perpetuated by Nigerian democratic stakeholders, including not just the godfathers, but the 'godsons', the electorates, the officials of the electoral body (Independent National Electoral Commission), and the Nigerian security agencies/agents. A study on demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy could help ascertain the impact of demagoguery on the practice of democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

From the foregoing, this study which is an investigation of demagoguery in the Nigerian democratic context (with particular focus on the role of demagoguery in Nigeria's democratic politics; factors that account for the emergence and thriving of demagoguery in Nigeria; how demagoguery manifests and the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good

governance in Nigeria), shows the problematic of democratic practice in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following questions were raised in this study.

1. How does demagoguery manifest in the democratic politics of Nigeria?
2. What role does demagoguery play in Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic?
3. What factors give rise to demagoguery in the democratic governance of Nigeria?
4. What are the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good governance in Nigeria?

1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to examine the basis and manifestations of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy and how the failings of democratic governance in Nigeria has remained a threat to the survival and deepening of democracy in the country. The specific objectives of this study which derive from the research questions are to:

1. examine the ways that demagoguery manifest in Nigeria's democracy;
2. investigate the role of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic;
3. identify the factors that make demagoguery thrive in the democratic politics of Nigeria;
and
4. examine the implications of demagoguery on democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is important because it investigates and provides a sociological analysis of demagoguery in Nigeria's democratic space, and shows how the political leaders in Nigeria's democratic dispensation of the Fourth Republic emerge through undemocratic routes.

The study will be of immense benefit to government, democratic institutions and the research community. For the government, it provides the basis for the Nigerian government to develop policies and action plans that will ensure the demilitarization of elections and the need to amend

the constitution to stop the impunity of political or democratic institutions that undermine citizens' democratic rights. Also, the study has provided useful information for democratic institutions and stakeholders to tackle election fraud in Nigeria from an informed standpoint. Finally, it has contributed to the body of knowledge, particularly in Political Sociology, on elections and democracy in Nigeria.

1.6 SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was carried out to investigate the existence, role and effect of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic. While it investigated the practices, behaviour, and actions of participants in the Nigerian democratic scene, it focused on Nigeria's democratic experience in the Fourth Republic, specifically from 1999 to 2015. Geographically, the study was conducted in six states and the Federal Capital Territory. Each state was randomly selected from each of the six geopolitical zones that make up Nigeria, while the FCT was included as the capital of Nigeria.

The sample population selected for this study was limited to the delegates of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the two leading political parties for the 2015 governorship/presidential elections in Nigeria. Only a few stakeholders, mainly those actively involved in Nigeria's democratic elections in the Fourth Republic participated in the study as key informants. Besides, the study's focus was on the primary elections conducted by the two major political parties (i.e., APC and PDP). Although the study did not involve other political parties and was not conducted in all the thirty-six states of Nigeria, the sample is, however, representative of the population in various other states in Nigeria, and thus can be reasonably generalized. The reason for adopting this route was because, the parties, PDP and APC, are the major political parties with widespread presence in Nigeria, while the other political parties (excepting APGA), are either only existing in names or as political twigs of the two main political parties discussed. Also, the decision to randomly select one state per political zone was informed by financial and time constraints.

1.7 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

The following key terms used in this study have been contextually explained to avoid possible ambiguity.

Demagoguery: Demagoguery, as used in this study, refers to behaviour and actions undertaken by stakeholders of democracy which undermine democratic norms, ethos, principles, and the democratic politics of free and fair elections, thereby threatening the growth and sustenance of democracy. This involves manipulative activities that undermine the sanctity, values and ideals of democracy, and includes actions such as fraudulent voter registration, bribery, intimidation, election fraud, violence, and all other irregularities that violate the constitution of Nigeria, the electoral act and other relevant laws. It also implies the use of resources and political might to act unconstitutionally and/or illegally to undermine democratic norms, principles and culture in the quest to either attain power or gain political advantage.

Demagogue: A demagogue is a leader in a political system that uses foul means, including wealth, violence, and intimidation to exploit the fears, emotions, prejudices, ignorance and weaknesses of the electorate with the goal of gaining political power, sustaining power and promotion of political motives for personal or group interests.

Democracy: This is a form of government where eligible citizens choose their leaders in a free and fair election and whereby the actions and inactions of all within its confines are guided by the rule of law.

Democratic governance: Democratic governance, as used in this study, means a system of government where individuals and institutions function according to democratic processes and norms, both internally and in their interaction with other institutions.

Democratic institutions: These are the establishments, such as the courts, independent electoral body, the judiciary, legislature, political parties, et cetera, that underpin and support democracy in order to achieve good governance.

Demo-dictatorship: This refers to a democratic government that operates dictatorially or imperiously with little or no commitment to the ethos and values of democracy.

Election fraud: This refers to irregularities relating to voting that have the potential of tainting an election, and includes phony voter registrations, bribery, intimidation, illegal absentee ballots, ballot box stuffing, forgery and any such acts as spelt out in the Electoral Act.

Elitism: This is a class of people in society, few in number, who assume superiority over others as a result of their privileged socio-economic status as defined by their wealth, educational level, occupation, specialized training or experience and other distinctive attributes that make them to arrogate the competence to govern to themselves.

Godfatherism: This is a political relationship between a sponsor (godfather) and a legatee (godson or goddaughter) in which the godfather uses his political power and wealth to secure political position for the godson/goddaughter, who upon ascension into power, offers compensations to his/her benefactor (godfather) in kind or in cash. It is the political idea of **reciprocal altruism** and it operates on the principle of *Quid pro quo* ("something for something") *or tit for tat*.

Liberalism: As implied in this study, liberalism is the notion of the importance of adhering to the values of reason, freedom of choice, open-mindedness, fairness and tolerance in the pursuit of political objectives and goals.

Plutocracy: This is a system of government that is controlled or ruled by the wealth-owning class.

Political economy: Although political economy generally implies the interdisciplinary studies that draws upon economics, political science, law, history, sociology and other disciplines in the social sciences in explaining the crucial role of political factors in determining economic outcomes, the concept as used here refers to the political and economic benefits that necessitate (and justify) the attractiveness and supremacy of demagoguery in the Nigerian political context. A political economy approach in Sociology is applied to study the effects of people's involvement in society as members of groups, and how that changes their ability to function effectively in their cultural, social, economic and political contexts.

Populism: This is a political movement that thrives on the strength of mobilized masses aimed at establishing populist political and socio-economic ideals through the direct actions of the masses.

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This study was organized into five chapters with each chapter addressing specific areas of study as shown below.

Chapter 1: Introduction: this section of the thesis provides an informative and significant discourse of what necessitated the study and it includes the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives of the study, significance of the study and the definition of key terms.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework: this section of the thesis situates the study in the context of previous studies and scholarly materials through an exhaustive review of related literature on the subject of democracy, demagogues and other related concepts being studied as available from scholars and researchers, and in research journals, articles, books, magazines, newspapers, seminars, and other papers. Furthermore, the gap in the literature was identified, which the current study attempted to fill. The theoretical framework for this study was also presented in this section. The theories used are symbolic interactionism, elitist theory of democracy and the theory of mass society.

Chapter 3: Methodology: This section presented the description of the methods that was adopted for the study, including the area and population of study, sample and sampling procedures, research instruments and the procedures for collection and analysis of data.

Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis: in this section of the thesis, the data and information that emerged as a result of the study were presented and analyzed by the use of tables, and other visual representations to illustrate the data

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations: this final chapter of the study summarized the major findings of the research, presented the conclusion and made recommendations that could save our democracy from the conundrums of demagoguery, and thus ensure the survival and thriving of democratic government in the contexts of freedom, liberty, rule of law, human happiness and national prosperity.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter involves a comprehensive review of existing literature on the concepts of democracy, demagoguery, demagogue, election, godfatherism, political economy and current studies that seek to identify and address the problematic realities of operating democracies, especially in the context of the roles played by political actors in the subversion of democracies across the world while providing justifiable basis to undertake a study on demagoguery in the democratic governance of Nigeria in the fourth republic to fill identifiable knowledge gap in existing discourse on the subject.

2.1.1 DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT

The concept of democracy as a form of government, regardless of its etymology, is ambiguous and vehemently contentious (Habermas, 1996; Held, 2006; Signer, 2009). Democracy is a term derived from the Greek word *demokratia*, the root meanings of which are *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule) (Held, 2006; Bessette and Pitney, 2012). Thus, simply put, democracy as a form of government is the type of political regime where the people rule.

In describing the controversial notion of the concept of democracy, Held (2006) notes that all political leaders, irrespective of their extraordinarily diverse views, claim to have the support of ‘the people’ and thus democratic. This is due to the fact that the political ideals of democracy which include liberty, equality among citizens, the rule of law, consent of the governed, and justice are values with universal appeals that legitimize all forms of governance, for which even the most brutal of dictators claim to uphold (Signer, 2009; Carto, 1996; Bessette and Pitney, 2012). The complexity of the concept of democracy since its inception has spurred intellectual discussions on the subject by experts. Diamond (1999) and Zakaria (1997) make distinctions between electoral democracies, liberal democracies, illiberal democracies, quasi democracies, incomplete democracies, and fragile democracies. Nigeria practices liberal democracy (Onyeonoru, 2004).

The emergence of liberal democracy in the modern era was a product of the dialectical struggle between monarchs and estates over the domain of rightful authority, religious strife and the

challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism, the rebellion of peasants against the burden of excessive taxation and social obligations, the struggle between church and state (Held, 2006). Democracy was thus conceived as a political solution to the unbridled conflict of interests and the domination of the few over the powerless majority in the society. But because this system of governance does not reckon with the tyrannical nature of power-mongers, democracy has suffered and continues to face stiff opposition from the corrupt control of an illegitimate minority, who are either in power or desperately seeking to attain power (Kirkpatrick, 1982; Samsons, 2004; Yahaya, 2007; Achebe, 2012).

Because power in a democracy resides with the people, the power to make decisions lies with the people. Consequently, whoever has the ears of the people or the authorized representatives of the people have power. Signer (2006:33) cautioned that “that power can lead to a wide range of actions, from justice to massacres”, as have been witnessed in South Africa, Germany, Rwanda, Italy, among other nations, in the past.

Schumpeter (1976: 285) contributes to the debate of the definitional problem of democracy thus:

Democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms “people” and “rule”. Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them...Now one aspect of this may be expressed by saying that democracy is the rule of the politician.

Also, the extent to which political leaders value “the people” will largely be determined by what they do with the power entrusted into their hands. Nwatu (2004) states that the notion of “the people” in Nigeria’s political dialogue, especially among politicians, carries a derogatory connotation implying a collection of poor, uneducated, vulnerable and uninformed populace who are unknowledgeable in matters relating to the public good, and for which they have to be governed with or without their consent. There is no doubting the fact that such a besmirched idea of “the people” can create an intellectual and immoral justification for the tyranny of the ruler(s) over the ruled.

There are fundamentally two types of democracy, viz: direct and indirect democracy. It is from these two exemplifications of democracy that all other forms of democracy sprout (Held, 2006). The direct democracy, which was practiced in the Athens city of ancient Greece, involved the

direct involvement of the people in passing of laws and making of key decisions on the administration of the society (Besette and Pitney, 2010). This is sometimes referred to as classical democracy because of its orthodox root (Held, 2006). In direct democracy it was out of place for any single person or group to arrogate leadership of the people to himself or themselves as all eligible citizens were obliged to vote directly on legislation and executive bills. Obviously this type of democracy was suitable for a small town or city with very little population but impracticable in modern societies. Thus, in contemporary societies all over the world, indirect democracy cum representative democracy where elected officials, chosen by the people in free and credible elections, represent the people in political affairs and are held accountable for their conduct is the form of democracy that is practiced. While Athens is the paradigmatic model of direct democracy, the United States of America is the paradigmatic model of indirect or liberal representative democracy.

2.1.2 DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

Democratic structures and culture are the building blocks for the emergence of genuine democracy, survival of democracy as well as ensuring the possibility of good governance and acceptable democratic politics. Nigeria's democratic structure exists within a framework of a federal, presidential, representative democratic republic, in which executive power is exercised by the government. That is, the Nigerian Constitution establishes the operation of three tiers of government made up of the Federal government, State government and the Local government. It also provides for the presidential system of government that comprises of the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. Each of these structural components is to act as a check and balance of the powers and actions of the other two arms.

Democratic culture refers to the norms, values, traditions and ethos which are required to structure the behaviours and practices of participants and stakeholders in a democratic system. These traditions and values include, but not limited to the rule of law, respect for human rights, periodic elections, citizens participation in decision making, freedom of the press, separation of powers and judicial independence.

According to Luckham, Goetz, Kaldor, Ayers, Bastian, Gyimah-Boadi, Hassim and Puhovski (2012), democratic structure and culture are envisioned to meet the following goals:

- i. to enable citizens' participation directly or through elected representatives in free and fair elections;
- ii. to avoid tyranny both by despotic leaders and the oppression of the minority by the majority;
- iii. to assure open and fair competition for power on the basis of the popular vote, and thus the accountability of governments and circulation of elites and power; and
- iv. to provide a forum for rational discussion of political problems and optimum settlement of different and potentially conflicting social interests.

The success or failure of democracy largely depends on the success or failure of democratic institutions (Gberevbie, 2014; Onyeonoru, 2004). Thus, where democratic institutions are weak and unable to protect democratic ideals from the bullish politics of demagoguery, whether by those seeking power or those who seek to hold onto power, the chances of survival for democracy and good governance cannot be guaranteed. Luckham *et al* (2012) warned of the danger of a democratic structure and culture that emphasized political contestation at the expense of politics of inclusion and participation. Bjornlund (2004:32) has also faulted democracies that undermine democratic cultures arguing that “genuine democracy requires substantially more than democratic elections.” Similarly, Zakaria (2003) noted that “across the globe, democratically elected regimes ... are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights.”

According to Luckham *et al* (2012), whereas the institutional arrangement and democratic culture of direct democracy were designed to maximize active citizenship participation as well as laid emphasis on civic virtue, liberal representative democracy emphasized political contestation, rational discussion, rule of law and on avoiding tyranny. Also, the liberal representative democratic model put more emphasis on institutions than the direct democracy of Athens. The democratic institutions are required to be effective in order to override the tyrannical tendencies of the executives through the separation of power and checks and balances. Representative democracy (or indirect democracy) provides key advantages over direct democracy. A major advantage of representative democracy over direct democracy is that it possibilitizes an extension of democratic rule to a large population of people, such as a country. An example of this advantage is India with a population of about 1.3 billion, and reputed to be the largest democracy in the world. Also, representative democracy permits the body of elected and accountable

officials to make sounder judgment about the public good, while remaining true to underlying public desires, than would the people themselves acting directly (Bessette & Pitney, 2012). Consequently, the elected representatives are expected to legislate and execute bills that reflect the overriding interest of the people and provide leadership that secures the rights of citizens and promotes their freedoms or liberty. Hence, the indirect or representative democracy is also referred to as liberal democracy describing the primacy of modern democratic states to provide the enabling environment for citizens to have the liberty to pursue their own interests, uphold the rule of law so as to protect the liberty of individuals without political impediments.

In gauging the democratic structure and culture of Nigeria, Onyeonuru (2004) noted that the question of the appropriate democratic structure remains unresolved and the democratic culture remains rudimentary. While it seems true that the democratic structure remains unresolved and might remain so in order to satisfy the interests of the architects of the structure, it is controversial to conclude that Nigeria's democratic culture is rudimentary, except if the word "rudimentary" does not imply elementary, but crude or rough, especially in the context of political contestations. If anything, the democratic culture of Nigeria may not resemble the globally accepted values that sustain democracy because it is pigeonholed by demagoguery. Thus, this study further investigates the unique cultures that define 'the Nigerian democracy' and how the Nigerian people relate with them.

2.1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Held (2006) reiterates the complicated factors and changes in history that contributed to the emergence of modern liberal and democratic thought all over the world. These contributory historical realities that initiated liberal democracies include: the power-struggle between the crowned heads (monarchs) and estates over the territory of rightful authority; peasant rebellions against excessive taxation burden and other social obligations; the expansion of economic activities of trade, commerce and market relations; advances in military technology; the consolidation of national monarchies, notably, in France, Spain and England; the expansive influence of renaissance culture; the struggle against the universal claims of Catholicism and other religious strife; the struggle between the Church and the State. Liberal democracy was conceived as a guaranteed solution to the tyranny of the few that characterized the monarchies and other undemocratic regimes.

Following the liberal democratic tradition, the idea of the state in modern political thought is “often linked to the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal and constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory...i.e. a legally circumscribed structure of power separate from ruler and ruled with supreme jurisdiction over a territory” (Held, 2006:58). Thus, in an ideal liberal democracy, the type that is practiced today in many countries of the world, there should be an impersonal and sovereign political order that abates the proclivity of the political class for despotism. Unfortunately, for the Nigerian state, there are certain cultural, social, economic and political dynamics that have been institutionalized by the political class, which serve a constraining influence on the actualization of authentic democracy and immaculate democratic governance. Ofeimum (2010) observed that the democratic practice in Nigeria has suffered from the supervening force of malfeasance and abuse of the electoral process because of the creepy culture of satisfying personal exigencies at the expense of an enduring ideology of collective progress among the ruling class. Thus, Nigerian leaders, having failed to deliver democratic dividends to its populace and thereby afraid of facing the electorates in a free and fair election, resort to all forms of demagoguery to frustrate every opposition to their political ambitions of holding onto power (Ake, 2008; Ofeimum, 2010; Achebe, 2012).

Liberal democracy inspires progressive deliberation. This is what Bessette (1980) refers to as ‘deliberative democracy’, a philosophical ideal of democracy that jettisons contemporary democracy that seems to celebrate a seemingly “descent into personality clashes, celebrity politics, sound-bite ‘debates’ and the naked pursuit of personal gain and ambition” (Held, 2006:232). Perhaps, it may be appropriate to say that Nigeria’s democratic situation today lacks the deliberative character of a truly liberal democracy as the “naked pursuit of gain and ambition” has rapaciously immoralized our political space to the extent that men and women of virtue stay away from the political firmament like the world dreads Ebola-plagued patients. Suffice to say, therefore, that democratic politics, when lacking the deliberative feature that nurtures its survival and robustness, becomes shallow, hysterical, media-driven, mean and empty of both ideas and quality leadership. The result is that political contestations in democratic states become mere struggle among elites to dominate a vulnerable and susceptible electorate (Schumpeter, 1976 & Fishkin, 1991).

From the following discourse, it becomes clear on why democracy is averse to demagoguery and why it does not ensemble demagogues. Demagogues take full advantage of their veneration by

the vulnerable people they claim to represent their interests to undermine democratic procedures in the quest to either attain or retain power. Besides, demagogues consider electoral contests as ‘a winner takes it all’ project and in which opposing views are considered and treated as intolerable threats to their survival (Ake, 2001; Adeniyi, 2011; Bakare, 2013).

Fishkin (1991) has, however, noted that demagoguery could be associated with all models of democracy, including participatory or deliberative democracy, warning that “it is a dubious accomplishment to give power to the people under conditions when they are not really in a position to exercise that power due to being vulnerable to demagoguery” (Fishkin, 1991:21).

2.1.4 DEMOCRACY: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

Even though there is no agreement by scholars on what democracy means, there is an overwhelming consensus that it is the best form of government and the driving force for political stability and development (Oyediran and Agbaje, 1999; Igbuzor, 2005; Fund, 2008; Held, 2006; Ofeimum, 2010). This global view was laconically echoed by Sen (1999) when he stated that:

Among the great variety of developments that have occurred in the twentieth century, I did not, ultimately, have any difficulty in choosing one as the preeminent development of the period: the rise of democracy....In the distant future, when people look back at what happened in [the twentieth] century, they will find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.

The unending debates over the ability of democratic governance to deliver the needed political leadership for nations have been amplified by pervasive demagoguery or democratic irregularities and the obnoxious activities of demagogues who have engaged undemocratic means to undermine “the peoples” will to elect their leaders in free and fair elections or change unpopular and nonperforming regimes. Signer (2009) argued that the greatest challenge facing democracies of the world today, especially developing countries, is how to stop demagogues whose hold on the democracies of their nations have made the future less bright with democracy. He stressed that wherever and whenever demagogues exist, they are not just a set of self-contained demented personalities, but a phenomenon endemic to the ideal observance of democratic practice and a notorious challenge in humanity’s ongoing struggle for a lasting state of liberty and prosperity for the masses. According to Signer (2009), demagoguery remains the

strategy of demagogues to violate the sanctity of democracy in their quest to either attain or retain political power.

The history of democracy has been the history of demagoguery and demagogues. Thus, Huntington (1991) classified the account of democracy into three “waves” each followed by a “reverse wave” featuring the ignoble roles of demagogues. In his classification, the first wave, from 1828 to 1926, comprised of the series of European revolutions (particularly in 1848), its consequent economic modernization, and the political freedoms experienced in the twentieth century. However, its consequent “wave reverse” started in 1922 when Benito Mussolini overthrew Italy’s nascent democracy. This reverse wave continued through World War II and swept up many European and Latin American countries. The second wave, which Huntington referred to as “short wave” was the era that extended from 1943 to 1962 in which the Allied Forces installed democracies in the conquered Axis countries, resulting in the increased presence of democracy in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Following the second wave again was a second reverse wave which occurred between the periods, 1958 to 1975, when authoritarian regimes held sway across the world. The third “wave” started in Portugal in 1974 pinnacle with the defeat of the Soviet Union, the consequent revolutions in Eastern Europe and the rise of democracies in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The reverse wave for the third wave is clearly staring on our faces today with the feared danger of conscripting democracy in most nations, and especially, in sub-Saharan Africa, where the unforgivable failures of “elected” leaders to deliver the desired dividends of democracy for the masses have strengthened the revolutionary request of demagogues (and their ever-willing mobs). Obviously, therefore, the reverse wave of the current wave of democracy is the rise of demagogues as a result of the monumental failures of legitimately elected leaders to stick to the universally acclaimed democratic principles, character and practice, which have in turn resulted in the impoverishment and enslavement of the masses.

Jowett (2001) related Aristotle’s argument that the history of revolutions in democracies have generally been caused by the overindulgence of demagogues in acts of demagoguery. This assertion cannot be far from the truth in the case of the overthrow of democratically elected governments in Africa generally and in Nigeria particularly, as successive military regimes in the past have cited the imperious and undemocratic role of demagogues as responsible for toppling

of the democratic governments that preceded them. Demagogues take advantage of the frustrations of the people who are the victims of the misrule, incompetence and lack of progress of an incumbent administration to endear themselves to the people as promising alternative(s). Elharathi (2014) emphasized how demagogues in the Egyptian military led by General Assisi influenced the people to march against the democratic (but highly controversial) regime of the Brotherhood presidency headed by Mohammed Morsi on the 30th of June, 2013.

Thus, democracy, as we experience it in many African countries today bears close resemblance with the features that Landa (2004) associates with fascism, including despotism and elitism. Politicians employ all resources at their disposal, whether negative or positive, ranging from funds to violence, intimidation, willful deception in courting votes and seeking to expand their “mass basis.” Herein lays the intellectual connection between Aristotle’s views on demagoguery and demagogues that link the origin of demagogues/demagoguery to democracy, and Tocqueville’s prophecy that democracy would degenerate to totalitarianism if the excesses of democratic rule and the tyranny of the majority were not addressed.

Noting that democracy was not indestructible, Keane (2009) warns that there was no in-built historical guarantee for the survival of democracy against the ever present and preying influence of the enemies of democracy, who are on the rise, and even commentators and panjandrums partially sympathetic to it are openly cynical about claims that it is the most desirable political model for all the people of the world. This sort of warning is not unconnected with the tragedy of today’s democracy under the control of self-styled democrats, who through demagoguery have altered the idea of democracy almost beyond recognition (Dunn, 2005).

In analyzing the painful experiences of citizens under the traditional totalitarian regimes of fascism and communism, and comparing the experiences with what is obtainable in democracies across the world generally, and in Africa particularly, Zencey (2012) argues that the three systems of fascism, communism and the governments and economic systems that exist in liberal free-market democracies are much more similar than different in large and interrelated aspects.

Within a democratic system, demagogues are concerned with electoral democracies, but with little or no consideration for liberal democratic value. Dahl (1979) observes that whereas electoral democracies accentuate the conduct of elections, liberal democracies emphasize the essential democratic elements of political accountability for individuals entrusted with power,

checks and balances among the institutions of government, judicial review, freedom of speech, a free flow of information, and the rule of law. The reality of democracy in Africa generally, and Nigeria particularly, suggest that there has been more towards electoral democracy than liberal democracy, using Dahl's description of the two brands of democratic experience.

Furthermore, the sit-tight syndrome among African leaders has been a major source of concern for the survival of democracy in the continent. For instance, among the longest serving presidents in the world are African presidents. For example, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea has been in office since 1979 (about 36 years); José Eduardo dos Santos of the Republic of Angola has also been in office since 1979; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe who has been president since 1980; and a host of others.

History has shown that under no circumstances or forms of government are people silent over (or comfortable with) despotic power. Mill (1861) warns against the despotic use of political power on the grounds of undesirability, inefficiency and impracticability in the long run because no one, including the despot, is superhuman to arrogate to himself or herself the knowledge of the common good for progressivity and deprive the people from deciding their own fate. Held (2006) argued that the democratic privilege of citizens or electorates of being able to replace one government by another through elections and a choice between (at least two) largely different political party platforms is key to putting in check the threat of tyranny by political office holders. Unfortunately, however, the tyrannical instinct of man, more correctly, politicians, have been proven stubborn, especially in developing countries where political office holders, in all forms of government, have sought ways of prolonging their reign through all means by manipulating the political ethics and ethos of the constitution to either deprive the people of their democratic right to change their government(s) or choose between different political platforms.

Oni (2013) and Jombo (2015) have identified adversarial legislative-executive relations, particularly in the States, as a major drawback of democracy in the Fourth Republic. Acceding to the demand of political godfathers and "Abuja-based" politicians, House of Assembly Members of several States have undermined constitutional provisions for the removal or impeachment of governors and deputy-governors as a means of settling personal political standoffs. For example, in Oyo State, the House of Assembly members, acting on the instruction of Adedibu, the acclaimed godfather of Oyo politics, impeached Ladoja, the governor, without resorting to the

constitutional provisions or procedures for impeachment. Although the Supreme Court reinstated the governor some months after his illegal removal, it remains a setback on Nigeria's democracy. That precedence was followed by many States that have their governors removed unconstitutionally by their Houses of Assembly (either through inducement or intimidation or a combination of both) (Ofeimun, 2010; Adeniji, 2011). Notable cases includes the removal of DSP Alamaseigha of Bayelsa State, Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State (in which case resulted in political situation where two persons, the deputy governor and the House of Assembly Speaker declared themselves as Ekiti State governor making Obasanjo, the president, to declare a State of emergency in the State), Nyako of Adamawa and his deputy's forced resignation which paved way for the Speaker to the become governor of the State, and the removal of deputy governors on flimsy allegations such as "disloyalty to the governor" (not to the constitution) (Ondo), poultry farming in government residence (Enugu) and so many examples.

According to Ake (2008), Adeniyi (2011) and Abdul-Jelil (2012), the monetization of politics as well as the violent and fraudulent nature of politics in Nigeria, evidenced in the "do-or-die" approach of desperate politicians, are largely responsible for the abnegation of politics by morally upright and intellectually sounds citizens of the country who ordinarily should be the leaders of the people. These arguments were corroborated by Lesch (2014) who noted that the propertied political order of developing countries is sustained by violence and other coercive instrumentality of politics which makes the demagogue particularly suited for the democratic character of the spontaneous moment and popular movement. This interpretation of political activities as not being compatible with the moral life best explains the self-extraction of competent and qualified Nigerians from the political theater and thus leaving the stage for actors who accept and subscribe to the 'immoral nature' of politics and politicking. Thus, taking advantage of the fears and apprehensions of the people, demagogues exploit the freedom secured under democracy to gain a level of power for themselves that overrules the rule of law, thereby undermining democratic values. Satkunanandan (2014) also corroborated Lesch's observation by emphasizing that demagogues "make hard-headed consequentialist calculations about political means" that have little or no moral route. Thus, for an average politician in Nigeria, the Machiavellian ideal for acquisition and preservation of power is a priority in Nigerian politics (Ofeimun, 2010; Adeniyi, 2011; Animasawun, 2013; Adebayo, 2015).

2.1.5 DEMOCRATIC IRREGULARITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF ELECTION FRAUD

Simply put, demagoguery means political mischiefs that undermine the credibility of democracy. Researchers have reported that the major challenge facing democracies all over the world remains election fraud (Bjornlund, 2004; Alvarez, Hall and Hyde, 2008; Cavdar, 2008; Smith and Donovan, 2008). Even the United States of America, reputed to be the bastion of modern democracy, underscored its democratic hypocrisy with the Florida election frauds in the November 2000 presidential elections.

According to Alvarez and Katz (2008), the social science literature boasts of little empirical analysis of election fraud, and most of the few literature on election fraud focused on estimating the extent of election fraud. The reason for the scanty empirical study of demagoguery and election fraud is due to the fact that the concepts of demagoguery and election fraud are not universal but rather “rooted in each country’s cultural and political milieu” (Cox, 1997; Bjornlund, 2004; Alvarez, Hall and Hyde, 2008).

This study, which focuses on Nigeria’s democracy, is a response to Cox’s call for researches that target country-specific demagoguery and election frauds as reflected in the cultural and political milieu of democracies all around the World. Thus, the study will add to and enrich existing knowledge on country-specific democratic irregularities and the consequences they have on the progress of democracy in Nigeria.

The need to understand country-specific demagoguery and election fraud stems from the fact that whereas election outcomes can be highly predictable in some countries based on a handful of variables such as economic progress and political stability (Fund, 2008), the same variables that explain the humiliating failures of politicians in some climes may not affect the victories of politicians in some other climes (Gelman and King, 2003). For instance, Alvarez and Katz (2008) and Gelman and King (2003) have noted that in the United States and several developed countries election outcomes can be predicted before elections occur with high levels of accuracy when the variables of the state of the national economy, incumbency and partisanship are considered. However, in several developing countries, experience has shown that incumbency is the major predictor of election victories irrespective of the performance of the economy and other factors. Thus, for instance, whereas incumbents lose elections in developed democracies

when the leadership fails to perform in office (Bessette and Pitney, 2012), hardly do incumbents lose elections in Africa irrespective of their performance in office (Ake, 2001; Ofeimun, 2010; Bakare, 2013). President Robert Mugabe is a prime example of this argument.

Thus, the most determined democrat previously, in the face of an unpopular regime, but adamant to hold on to power, might turn a demagogue overnight. This seems to be the tragedy of Nigerians under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, who prior to his emergence as the elected President of Nigeria in 2011 was considered by majority of Nigerians, including the opposition as a democrat. However, in his quest to retain his position in the 2015 election engaged in undemocratic practices through his actions and inactions, directly or indirectly (Bakare, 2013; Adoyi, 2013). A few examples will suffice. In the 2012 Governors Forum elections to elect the Chairman of the forum, the Presidency engaged in several ignoble social encounters to ensure the emergence of a favoured candidate, Jonah Jang of Plateau State against the candidacy of Rotimi Amaechi, the ‘rebel’ governor of Rivers state who had become the most unfriendly and treacherous political figure to the Jonathan presidency. When the result of that contest among the state governors was announced, the Presidency’s favoured candidate was defeated as he polled sixteen (16) votes to the nineteen (19) votes polled by the incumbent Chairman of the Governors’ Forum, Rotimi Amaechi. Appalled by the result of the election, the ‘President’s governors’ revolted against the election and proceeded to set up a ‘parallel’ forum that selected Jonah Jang as its Chairman. With all the embarrassment that the confusion brought to Nigeria, the Presidency recognized “the sixteen” over “the nineteen” by organizing a meeting with the Jonah Jang faction to formally get presidential endorsement (The Nation, 2014).

Also, the conspiracy that resulted in the disenfranchisement of Silva Timipreye, an incumbent governor at the time, from contesting under the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) was another highpoint in the demagogic exercise of the Jonathan administration. Others include the use of the military to restrict the movement of opposition figures, the harassment and intimidation of politicians opposed to his government, the confiscation of newspapers by the armed forces and the use of police for partisan objectives (Okojie, 2015).

The governors (both former and incumbents) of the 36 states of the Federation have also, in one way or the other, undermined and continue to undermine democracy using their positions and paraphernalia of office at their disposal. For example, in Ekiti State, under the leadership of

Ayodele Fayose, six (6) House of Assembly members ‘impeached’ the Speaker and suspended the other members in a House that is composed of twenty-five (25) members to the admiration of the ‘democratically’ elected governor who provided the means, in active connivance of the police, for the success of that legislative coup. Similarly, in defiance to the political imbroglio being perpetuated against the government of Rivers state by the Federal government and its agents, the Rivers state governor, Rotimi Amaechi, had sought to fight back by engaging in several undemocratic tactics thereby demonstrating, at times, the symptoms of demagoguery. A clear example of such act of demagoguery was the case in which the governor had to ‘lead’ his security details and some government officials to forcefully halt the purported impeachment of the Rivers state House of Assembly Speaker by the anti-Amaechi faction which was bent on impeaching the governor. Also, in Katsina state, the governor, Ibrahim Shema, had in a televised campaign urged his supporters to crush opposition members, whom he referred to as cockroaches. The story of how ‘democratically’ elected leaders at all levels of governance in Nigeria undermine democracy in order to achieve their selfish and parochial interests pervades the length and breadth of the country to the consternation of the vulnerable populace.

2.1.6 DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND ELECTION MONITORING IN NIGERIA

The global significance attached to democracy requires that elections must be credible for democracy to be acceptable as well as guarantee political stability. According to Huntington (1991), free, fair and credible elections are the essence of democracy. Thus, flawed elections contribute significantly to flawed democracy.

Bjornlund (2004) outlines five practical and philosophical reasons why election is the best democratic means of addressing and resolving political competition. One, International declarations and International norms explicitly institute periodic and genuine elections as the basis of legitimate government. Specifically, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that “every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity...to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot.” Two, elections contribute to respect for other rights. According to Karatnycky (1999), elections lead to admirable progress in the areas of civil liberties and human rights. Three, elections lead to practical and political consequence, including bringing an end to

dictatorship. Nigeria, Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, South Africa, Poland and Yugoslavia represent typical examples of countries where elections have catalyzed political transitions, and thereby ending violent political instabilities. Four, elections provide opportunities for citizen participation and political involvement in democracy. The prime example here is the fact that women and other minority groups that have been excluded from political participation in other forms of government have found their voices in democratic governments. In Nigeria, for example, the years of military rule never produced a woman in any key political positions such as Military Administrators or Ministers; but as a result of democracy in Nigeria, there are many women who have served Nigeria as Ministers, Deputy Governors, and other key political positions. Besides, for the first time, a minority among the minority tribes produced the leader (President) of Nigeria, all because of democracy. Five, elections contribute to effective, accountable, and stable governance. Unlike the chaos created and sustained by dictatorial, non-democratic regimes, democratic elections are acceptably viable means of managing political contestations, achieving domestic stability and gaining international legitimacy for regimes, leaders and policies.

From the aforementioned reasons, it is clear that elections are inevitable precondition to genuine democratic governments. Notably, however, not all countries and persons that have accepted democracy subscribe to free, fair and credible elections as politicians engage in all sorts of election frauds in the quest to achieve electoral victories.

The pervasive fraud that have been characteristic of Nigeria's elections in the Fourth Republic have been largely responsible for the frailties associated with democratic consolidation, including lack of confidence in the democratic process by the populace (Ake, 2001).

Thus, as a way of reducing or preventing election fraud, independent election observers monitor elections with the goal of reporting their findings on the credibility or otherwise of the elections and "seeking to persuade national and international decision makers or to influence national or international public opinion" (Bjornlund, 2004: 37). Election observation and election monitoring describe a range of activities that focuses on either confirming the credibility of elections or exposing their flaws while offering recommendations that will improve elections in the context. In addition to this role of election observation/monitoring, the observers and monitors can educate or exhort voters and other democratic stakeholders to adhere to

international standards of democratic values and principles, recommendation of election law reform, media monitoring and related activities.

Both domestic and international observers and election monitors have been involved in the elections that have been conducted in Nigeria since the advent of the fourth republic. While there have been claims and counter claims that domestic observers and monitors have always been compromised by politicians, the activities of the non-partisan international observers and monitors have been largely limited by coverage (Ofeimun, 2010; Adeniji, 2012). Hence, the international observers and monitors always report what they see in urban areas but not what happens in the rural areas. Unfortunately, however, the bulk of election fraud actually takes place in the rural areas which also has the larger population of voters.

2.1.7 DEMAGOGUERY, DEMAGOGUES AND GODFATHERISM

The term “demagogue” was first used in the ancient Greeks to describe a new set of leaders of the mob who quickly emerged to fill a power vacuum left by the demise of a reigning class of elite statesmen (Signer, 2009). The word “demagogue” comes from two Greek words: “demos” meaning “people” and “agogos” which means “leader”. Thus, demagogue literally translates to mean leader of the people. Demagogues emerge in any political system that grants power to those who command followership.

The etymology of the terms demagogue and democracy provides a clear difference between the two. Whereas democracy emphasizes the ‘government or rule of the people’, demagogue hinges on the ‘leader of the people’. The implication here is that while democracy is concerned with the process, demagogue emphasizes personality. Hence, in an ideal democratic situation, every person or citizen that qualifies to lead based on the people’s constitution have the opportunity to vote and be voted for. But demagogues, arrogating leadership right to themselves, undermine the will of the people in the quest to either impose themselves or their preferred candidates on the people.

Signer (2009) stated that the demagogic pattern emerged first in ancient Athens, which practiced the first democracy, and continued in the Roman Republic. It reappeared in its most potent,

recent and vivid form in the destruction of the Weimar Germany democracy under the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler.

The word “demagogue” was first invented by the ancient Greeks to depict “a new class of mob leaders who quickly evolved to fill a power vacuum left by the demise of a reigning class of elite statesmen” (Signer, 2006: 34). Demos meant “people” and “agogos” meant “leader”. Thus, at that time, as at present, demagogues emerged in any political system that granted power to those who connected deeply with the people.

Cooper (1956) presented a formal and a most comprehensive account of demagogues about two hundred years ago in his essay titled “On Demagogues” in 1838. Cooper described a demagogue as ‘a leader of the rabble’ committed to advancing his own interests by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the general public. This description is quite consistent with contemporary descriptions of demagogues as political figures who present their interests as the interests of their ‘people’. In Nigeria’s political experience, we often see individuals who claim to represent their people either in parts or as a whole. Thus, it is common to see different sections of ‘youth leaders’, ‘women leaders’, ‘ethnic leaders’, and so on who claim to represent as well as serve as the spokespersons of these various groups. While the ‘leaders’ of these groups are not necessarily the real demagogues, they are vital instruments of propaganda and subterfuge in the structural composition of the main political demagogue in a democracy.

Cooper (1956) identifies four major rules that guide demagogues, namely:

- i. they fashion themselves as a man/men or woman/women of the common people as opposed to the elites;
- ii. their politics is largely dependent on a powerful, primitive connection with the masses that dramatically transcends ordinary political popularity;
- iii. they take advantage of and manipulate this connection, and the raging popularity it affords, for their personal benefit and ambition; and
- iv. they threaten or completely violate established rules of conduct, institutions and the law.

While these four major rules that describe demagogues as provided by Cooper fit their personality, a very core characteristic of demagogues in power, particularly in most developing countries, is economic corruption. In most developing countries where demagogues hold sway, a

major oddity common among them is corruption, epitomized by the crass exhibition of opulence resulting from the appropriation of the wealth of the state. Thus, it will be apt to say that demagogues, more often than not, have auspicious disposition for corrupt acquirement of wealth.

As we reflect on the four dispositional philosophy or principles of demagogues as captured by Cooper and Signer, it is important to note that demagogues may not necessarily reflect the extremist dispositions of a Hitler, a Mussolini or even an Abacha. It includes interesting characters like Chavez of Venezuela, Fidel Castrol of Cuba, Adedibu of Ibadan, Obasanjo, Buhari, among others. Thus, Ceaser (1979) outlined two types of demagogues: the “hard” demagogues and the “soft” demagogues. Whereas hard demagogues use antagonism and division to appeal to the people for a revolution, soft demagogues use blandishment, deceptive skills, currying favour through difficult or unattainable vision and promises. Signer (2009) emphasized that whether hard or soft; demagogues connect with large groups of ordinary people and are deservedly reputed as villains.

Signer’s harsh conclusion that all demagogues are villains have been challenged by scholars who have argued that there are demagogues who serve the interest of the public without necessarily subscribing to the western conception of democracy, especially the liberal democratic culture (Kirkpatrick, 1982; Held, 2006). Despite categorizing all demagogues as villains, Signer accepted that there are variants of demagogues, ranging from soft to hard demagogues, differentiated on the bases of their levels of education, ideologies on violence, funds, among other factors. In Nigeria for instance, Ajidahun (2015) has argued that most youths involved in political violence and thuggery have little or no education and are not gainfully employed. However, the sponsors of political violence are politicians that are educated but subscribe to political violence as a necessary requirement for achieving political objectives or goals.

Current literature on the activities of demagogues in the Nigerian political space is limited to the concept of “godfatherism.” Researchers that have investigated this subject area present accounts of the ignominious roles played by plutocrats, Nigeria’s wealth owning, dominating class in determining who occupies available political offices in the country and how their actions have undermined the will of the masses in choosing their leaders. However, they fail to capture the sophisticated network of demagogues as transcending just the owners of wealth or godfathers (plutocrats) but a constellation of political entrepreneurs, gory and bloodthirsty political thugs,

the armed forces and sycophantic intellectuals and religious contractors whose common interest is the acquisition of power at all cost in order to protect or advance personal and group interests. As different as they are, all of these enemies of genuine liberation of the people through genuine democracy have a common theme: use their privileged positions and resources to attain power and thus use the power to advance their interest and govern the people tyrannically with little or no value for core democratic values (Ake, 1993, 2008; Bakare, 2013; Ofeimum, 2010).

Also, previous studies in this area (Abdul-jelil, 2012; Animasawun, 2013; Ajidahun, 2015) have tended to present plutocratic governments as a spontaneous phenomenon by failing to show the exhaustive, though guarded, planning, obnoxious maneuverings, salacious compromises, and sacrilegious paraphernalia constructing the relationship amongst the members of the demagogic cartel. Thus, this study presents an empirical underpinning of the extent to which demagogues use all means at their disposal to engender undemocratic processes that will both weaken oppositions and strengthen governing political elites' hold on power (in the case of dominant demagogues), on one hand, and the undemocratic methods applied by power-seeking demagogues to undermine the authority of the ruling government, and how these dialectics have deprived the Nigerian state of qualitative leadership, democratic stability and national progress.

Demagoguery, as noted earlier, is a manipulative approach — often associated with dictators and corrupt politicians. Demagoguery does not operate on reason, issues, and doing the right thing; it is largely based on stirring up fear and hatred to control people (Schmitt, 1976; Kirkpatrick, 1982; Signer, 2010). Demagoguery correlates strongly to authoritarianism. It operates on falsified or manipulated premises to cajole the vulnerable public to support unpopular regimes as well as intimidate uncompromising political opponents. Demagoguery is one of the most negative aspects of politics that undermines democracy (Signer, 2009; Fund, 2008). They noted that demagoguery operates and thrives where the constitution, electoral laws and relevant democratic institutions are undermined by political stakeholders, including citizens. This vital point emphasizes the idea that no set of laws, no institutions, no complex bureaucracy, no intricate mechanisms of checks and balances, is adequate to preserve democracy and sustain its health if the democratic spirit takes leave of the hearts of the people (Cavdar, 2008; Schedler, 2008). Sadly, every demagogue claims to be for the people. According to Samson (2004), “The will of the nation” is one of the phrases most generally abused by demagogues of every age. The tactics for demagogues in power is to silence dissenting voices from the scene by enacting or

influencing the enactment of laws that perpetuates his or her political interest. An example of this strategy was the recent decision by the Venezuelan parliament that allowed the president to rule by decree (The Guardian, 21/04/2015).

On the other hand, the demagogues seeking power undermine constitutional authorities, and may create their own state within the state through defiance to constituted authorities of the State (Signer, 2009).

Clearly, therefore, there are two kinds of demagogues: the demagogue in power and the demagogue seeking power. Of these two kinds, the demagogue in power is the more dangerous (Signer, 2009) because he or she uses state apparatus and the paraphernalia of office to further his or her political goal by intimidating and harassing opposition leaders and their followers. They could use their incumbent power to create their rules, and in some cases, change the constitution to achieve their political objectives.

Whether soft or hard, 'in power' or seeking power, minor or major, demagogues rank among history's most fascinating figures, command large followership and are devotedly revered by their fanatical supporters. Similarly, Signer (2009) stressed that all demagogues are threats to genuine democracy because they undermine democratic ethos in the pursuit of power, and that many will debate about labeling a particular demagogue as "destructive" or "beneficial" because of their personal biases toward the system being threatened by the demagogue. Thus, a leader of the people in whatever context that threatens or undermines democratic values is more or less of a demagogue and can range from a minor to a major threat to democracy.

2.1.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMAGOGUERY

There are certain features that have been identified with demagoguery which define its political manifestations (Trish Roberts-miller, 2015). Some of such features or characteristics are discussed below.

- i. **Authoritarianism:** Signer (2009) and Fund (2008) have identified authoritarianism as a feature of demagoguery. When democracy begins to drift as a result of the failure of politicians, particularly those in power, to abide by the values and practices of

democracy, despotic and tyrannical tendencies begin to play out in an attempt to curtail opposition.

In the run-up to the 2015 elections, former Nigerian President and a member of the ruling party publicly accused President Jonathan of resorting to authoritarian and despotic tactics to stifle and intimidate opposition members in order to further his political ambition of re-election as president (Adoyi, 2013).

- ii. **Disregard for rules with Impunity:** Nigerian politicians take advantage of their wealth and connections with government's coercive apparatus to violate established rule and undermine democratic ideals in order to promote personal political agenda. Some carry out their nefarious activities with the support of the security agencies. For example, in the run-up to the 2015 general elections in 2015, political thugs in Rivers state made it impossible for the All Progressive Congress in Rivers state to hold any political campaign or rally in Okrika, the hometown of the wife of the former president, Patience Jonathan, with punitive violence meted out to those who dared to insist on their constitutional and democratic rights.
- iii. **Chauvinism:** this is a kind of aggressive, bigoted behaviour displayed by politicians and their associates to weep up ethnic and/or religious sentiments to gain political advantage.
- iv. **Political persecution:** this involves the use of security agencies and other state institutions to intimidate harass and punish real and perceived opponents with the aim of muzzling opposition.
- v. **Bribery:** here, the president or his allies engage in corrupt practices that includes the inducement of relevant individuals or institutions that will serve the interest of the president on an issue. For example, during the third term agenda of president Obasanjo, it was alleged that the president's allies offered bribes in millions of dollars to the lawmakers in order to support the amendment of the constitution in favour of the third term agenda. Also, delegates for presidential primaries are also offered bribes to ensure they cast their votes for the presidents or their preferred candidates.

It is important to clarify that there is a clear difference between the concepts of demagogue and godfatherism. First, in their etymology and history, the two concepts are distinguishable. Whereas “demagogue” comes from two Greek words: “*demos*” meaning “*people*” and “*agogos*” meaning “*leader*” (Signer, 2009), godfatherism originated in orthodox Christianity (Yahaya, 2007) and implied the commitment of a godparent to nurture and care for a ‘godchild’ (new convert) upon baptism. Also, whereas demagogue as a political term originated from Athens, the political usage of the term ‘godfatherism’ is traceable to Nigeria which was made possible by the long years of military rule that created the ‘Big-Man rule’ in Nigeria (Sklar, 2006; Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 2013). Godfatherism is synonymous to patron-client political relationship (Animasawun, 2013) and neopatrimonialism (Sklar, 2006) in the logic that there is a mutual understanding that the godfathers’ resources will be deployed to aid the ‘godson’ to achieve political power, and in turn the godfather will be paid back with contracts or monetary rewards by the godson upon attaining political power.

Second, a demagogue, unlike a godfather, may not necessarily be driven by economic interest but most definitely by power or political relevance (the unyielding desire to be in control of political power). In other words, whereas a demagogue may not be a political entrepreneur, a ‘godfather’ is one whose investments in the political activities must yield economic returns. Third, whereas the strength of a demagogue is derivable from the people, a godfather derives his strength from his or her wealth or connection with the elites and powerbrokers in society (Smith, 2007; Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 2013). The third point highlights the argument of demagogues as political figures who may either be in position of power or those seeking power. When, for example, Olusegun Obasanjo was contesting for the position of president in 1998/1999, he was seen as man of the people taking into cognizance the fact that he had suffered political persecution for supporting democratic ideals against the military regime of Abacha. So, at that point, he was considered by the common people as a ‘democrat’. However, events that followed his assumption of office as a democratically elected president, such as his dictatorial disposition to issues, the fight against his Vice and all those who opposed the amendment of the constitution which many commentators had alleged as a ploy to elongate his tenure in office, and the rigging of the 2007 presidential election in favour of Umar Yar’adua remain prime example of how a supposed ‘democrat’ can turn to a demagogue with time.

Having stated these differences between demagogue(ry) and godfather(ism), it is pertinent to state that the borderline between the two can be very faint and difficult to identify because of their common identity as non-democratic elites (as the political behaviour they display undermine democratic culture and practices) and the primary purpose that they all pursue ultimately is to acquire political power. Also, an individual could combine the elements of godfatherism and demagoguery, such that the individual both has the support of the masses and seeks power or supports people to attain or sustain power as a means of attaining economic profit.

Godfatherism has been identified to be a major threat to the survival and deepening of democracy in Nigeria (Yahaya, 2007; Animasawun, 2013). Godfatherism does not only undermine the will of the people to choose their leaders (both at the primary and general elections), it goes further to deprive the people of the opportunity to experience good governance. This is because, as the candidates of the godfathers emerge at the usually flawed party primaries (Animasawun, 2013) as well as go on to “win” the electoral contests, two evils emerge. On the one hand, the protégés or stooges of the demagogue become mere, ceremonial leaders, acting out the scripts of their political haranguers, especially in the context of looting the national resources, as they were selected by these godfathers with anti-democratic agreements to protect their interests at all times by distributing the commonwealth of the people to this few but powerful political clique who benefit from the collective misery of the masses. On the other hand, as experiences from other states of the nation have shown, crisis arises between the beneficiaries of the manipulative activities (i.e. the godsons) and the godfathers when the former refuses to be loyal to the later as contained in the pre-election agreement between them (Adegbamigbe, 2007). The major occasions where godfatherism played out in the fourth republic include Saraki vs. Lawal in Kwara State, Offor vs. Mbadinunju (1999–2003), Uba vs Ngige (2003–2006) in Anambra State, Kachalla vs. Modu Sherif in Borno State (2002–2003), Uzor Kalu vs Orji (2007-2011) in Abia State, Chimaroke vs Chime (2007-2011) in Enugu State, and a host of others (Yahaya, 2007; Ofeimun, 2010).

Thus, in discussing the role of non-democratic elites in Nigeria’s fourth republic, researchers have done so much work on the contemptuous roles of godfathers and godfatherism but have not done much on the role of demagoguery (and demagogues) in Nigeria’s democracy.

The following table shows the major differences between a demagogue and a godfather, even though the two are elites in a political system.

TABLE 2.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEMAGOGUERY AND GODFATHERISM

| | Demagoguery | Godfatherism |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| Meaning/Etymology/Origin | “demos” meaning “people” and “agogos” meaning “leader”/Athens | patron-client political relationship; originated in orthodox Christianity |
| Motive | Driven by ambition for Power | Driven majorly by economic interest |
| Source of Relevance | The people or access to power (incumbency power) | Wealth or connection with the elites and powerbrokers in society. |
| Actors | Benefactor and Beneficiary (godfather and/or godson) | Benefactor (Godfather) |
| Goal | Pursuit of power both as a means and an end | Power as a means |
| Similarities | Non-democratic Threatens democracy | Non-democratic Threatens democracy |

Source: Field Survey, 2015

2.1.9 DEMAGOGUES IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC’S POLITICS

Demagogues are political leaders who have influence over a large number of people in a political territory and use that commanding influence over the people to advance their personal interests by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the masses (Cooper, 1956; Signer, 2009). Demagogues, as part of their undemocratic recipe, engage in demagoguery by appealing to ethnic, religious or class sentiments while creating a mass leader persona. Also, demagogues defy order (including democratic norms) and always have the people willing to champion revolts aimed at either seizing power or maintaining power without commitment to democratic path or ideals.

Throughout the political history of Nigeria, there exist indications and evidences of demagoguery exhibited in one way or the other by its leaders. Thus, whether of civilian or military regimes, Nigeria has produced political leaders at both State and national levels who have governed with despotism or repression and/or have sought to undermine the will of the people in the quest to either gain or retain political power. Oyediran and Agbaje (1999) have noted that the political leaders that have emerged in Nigeria, since it became a republic in 1963, have shown little or no commitment to the ideals of democracy, good governance and development as a result of either their personal or sectional interests. They maintained that the First republic was ousted by the Southern military officers because of the anti-democratic attempts by politicians of ethnic consciousness to entrench ethnic agenda at the centre (Agbaje, 2015). The January coup which had ethno-sectional outlook led to the July counter-coup that was considered a vengeance mission by the Northern military officers that culminated in the about three years civil war between 1967 and 1970.

The military regime of General Yakubu Gowon displayed symptoms of demagoguery as the regime failed to articulate plans (or be committed) to return to civilian or democratic rule. Thus, harping on the mendaciousness of the Gowon-led regime to enthrone democracy or civilian rule, the regime was overthrown in July 1975 by General Murtala Muhammed. The Murtala/Obasanjo regime quickly scheduled a democratic transition programme that led to the eventual transfer of power to a democratically elected President on 1st October, 1979.

Unfortunately the democratic experimentation of the Second Republic under Shehu Shagari failed to survive beyond December 31 of 1983 as the political class failed to adhere to the norms of democratic practice and process that guarantee the protection, survival and promotion of democracy. Consequently, General Muhammad Buhari ousted the regime of Shagari and returned Nigeria to military regime once more.

The regime of Buhari, with all its accolades for fighting corruption and instilling the culture of discipline in the country, failed to show commitment to ending military rule and returning Nigeria to democratic civilian rule. This would not pacify Nigerians and the international community because the ‘best form military regime is considered worse than the worst form of civilian rule.’ Dissatisfied with Buhari’s failure to articulate a democratic transition plan as well

as the allegations of despotism against the regime, General Ibrahim Babangida took advantage of the political firmament to oust the Buhari/Idiagbon regime in August, 1985.

Following the success of the coup led by Babangida in 1985, the regime scheduled a transition plan meant to lead to the Third Republic by setting up a seventeen-member Political Bureau in 1986 to formulate a blueprint for the transition. But this was to be the beginning of the ‘maradonic’ or Machiavellian approach to politics that Babangida became reputable for. Thus, after series of failed promises to democratize Nigeria, the highlight of which was the botched June 12, 1993 presidential election that was won by M.K.O. Abiola, Babangida succumbed to local and international protests and pressure by “stepping aside” for an interim government that he constituted, but headed by Ernest Shonekan.

The interim national government (ING) was declared illegal by a Nigerian High Court on November 10, and by November 17 the military, led by General Sani Abacha, sacked the interim government of Shonekan, paving way for him to become the new Head of State of Nigeria from 1993 through 1998. The General, before his demise in office in 1998, had earned the reputation as the most dangerous demagogue in power Nigeria has ever had and one of the most notorious despot to have emerged in African history, as he used the paraphernalia of his office to undermine democracy, good governance and human rights in his quest to remain in power.

From the foregoing, therefore, it is clear that demagogues have always accompanied the political history of Nigeria, starting from the autocratic colonial rule to democratic regimes of the First, Second, the botched Third Republic and Fourth Republics (as democratically elected leaders blatantly undercut democratic values, especially in upholding the sanctity of the electoral process and human rights), from civilian to military regimes, and from one military regime to the other.

The worst manifestation of demagogues in the democratic history of politics in Nigeria is the violation of the constitution. Thus, aware of (but impatient with) the constraints that the constitution imposes on the abuse of power by politicians, demagogues undermine the inviolability of the constitution they swore to uphold and defend by promoting the indestructability of their ambition to hold on to power to the detriment of the constitution and other democratic constitution. Oyediran and Agbaje (1999:15) emphasized the fragility of Nigeria’s constitution when they stated that “Nigeria has witnessed a lot of constitutions but it is yet to entrench constitutionalism.” In fact, the various constitutions in the recent history of

Nigeria have been a contentious subject, starting from the criticism that none of these constitutions have emerged from “the people” under an authentic democratic platform. Thus, operating within the parameters and constrictions of these pale constitutions, Nigeria’s leaders under successive democratic regimes have undermined the spirit and letters of the constitution in pursuit of their ambition to maintain their hold on power at all cost.

The following demagogues have had a troubling influence on Nigeria’s democratic politics which have either undermined or threatened democracy in the Fourth Republic. The choice of these personalities for the purpose of this review was informed by the fact they are among the very few elites that have had and continue to have the most influence on the Nigerian democratic space in the Fourth Republic.

I. OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

Former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, is regarded as one of the most privileged Nigerians ever (Kofamata, 2007). This observation may not be unconnected with the résumé of the frontrunner in the Nigerian political space. He is a traditional Chief; a ‘Four-Star’ General; a hero of the Nigerian civil war; a former member of Federal Executive Ruling Councils under two defunct military administrations; served as second in command to the military government of late General Murtala Mohammed; a former Head of State, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (1976 – 1979) after the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed; the first military leader to hand over power to a democratically elected president; survived the condemned imprisonment by the late despot, General Sani Abacha and two-term Nigerian civilian President, Commander-in-Chief, Armed forces of the federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 – 2007). Chief Olusegun Obasanjo has led Nigeria both as a military Head of State and an elected President at the onset of the fourth republic (from 1999 to 2003). However, the most controversies that surrounded Obasanjo occurred during his second term as the democratically elected president of Nigeria between 2003 and 2007. At this period, the Ogun state born former Army General engaged in certain unconstitutional actions that undermined democratic principles and thus threatened the survival of democracy in Nigeria. Ariye, Ogbomah, Ebipre, and Eric (2012) have identified some instances in which Obasanjo acted in ways that violated democratic values and culture to include the following:

- i. Declaring of state of emergencies in Plateau and Ekiti States without recourse to the National Assembly as required by the Nigerian constitution;
- ii. The illegal withholding of the funds meant for the Local Government Areas of Lagos State;
- iii. Violations of court judgments;
- iv. Subversion of the popular will through rigged elections (especially in the 2007 general elections);
- v. Undermined the rule of law;
- vi. Intimidation and harassment of opposition;
- vii. Human rights violations (Odi and Zaki Biam cases); and
- viii. Unsuccessful attempt to elongate his tenure (third-term agenda).

II. LAMIDI ARIBIYI ADEDIBU

The strongman of Ibadan politics, as he was fondly called, this Ibadan-based politician was notoriously famous for formalizing prebendalism and political patronage, especially between 2003 and 2007 (Abdul-Jellil, 2013). This political personality possessed some of the rules or elements that qualify for a demagogue as specified by Cooper (1956). He was a man of the common people (at least, within his political territory) and inspired overpowering reactions among them. His style of politics depended on a primitive connection with the masses which transcended mere political popularity. He took advantage of this connection with his people and the raging popularity it afforded him to advance his political interest. And above all, he violated established rules of conduct, institutions and the law (Simbine, 2004; Yahaya, 2007; Abdul-Jelil, 2012). The demagogue cum godfather was above the law as the state, relevant security agencies and institutions could not rise up to their constitutional duties of preventing the lawlessness that Adedibu exhibited against the governor of the State (Adegbamide, 2007). Adedibu was considered to be the most influential figure that made it possible for Senator Rashidi Ladoja to emerge as the governor of Oyo state in the 2003 general elections (Simbine, 2004). The relationship between the two deteriorated as a result of the failure of the governor (who was referred to as the godson of Adedibu) to honour the alleged

agreements between them, especially as it had to do with the regular financial settlement of the godfather from the states treasury (Abdul-Jellil, 2012).

The tension that resulted from the claims of Adedibu and the counter-claim by the governor resulted in bloody confrontations by their supporters and the arrogant declaration by Adedibu that the governor will be impeached (Simbine, 2004). At the height of the confrontation and terrorism that followed in Ibadan, the following statement was made by Adedibu.

He (Ladoja) was collecting N65 million as security vote every month. You know that governors don't account for security vote. He was to give me N15 million of that every month. He reneged. Later it was reduced to N10 million. Yet he did not give me.

(Adegbamigbe, 2007: 23).

Adedibu succeeded in ensuring the impeachment of the governor days after he boasted about it, though illegally as the procedure employed undermined the constitution (Abdul-Jellil, 2012).

III. BOLA AHMED TINUBU

Chief Bola Ahmed Tinubu is considered the most influential politician from the South-West region of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic (Olupohunda, 2014). Many reasons can be adduced for this view, but the major reasons as provided by Olupohunda include: the most persistent and successful opposition leader in the Fourth Republic; successfully coordinated the 'takeover' of the South West States from the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) through the judgments of the courts post-2007 elections and consolidating the effort in the 2011 general elections where the opposition party, Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), won the governorship elections; and playing a very prominent role that resulted in the formation of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the subsequent victory of the opposition party at the national level in the 2015 elections.

What qualifies Tinubu as a demagogue is not much because of the accomplishments noted above but his mass leader appeal and political popularity that defied national demagogues that were opposed to his unyielding political cause through his way of inspiring the masses to political fanaticism. And as emphasized by Signer (2009:36), "A demagogue can be sincerely committed

to his own causes as long as they facilitate his own relentless ambition and forge a powerful connection with the common people.” Also, Tinubu has always been accused of using the tools of propaganda and threats to further his political ambitions (Olupohunda, 2014). The maxim “Rig and Roast” is attributed to Tinubu’s threat of violence in the event of rigging elections against his political party in the South-West (Oyeleke, 2014). Thus, the use of threat to respond to the perceived rigging plans of the ruling party or INEC was a recurring practice by Tinubu and some of his followers.

IV. GOODLUCK JONATHAN

President Goodluck Jonathan had ‘lucky’ political experiences that characterized his rise to becoming the third democratically elected president of the fourth republic. After his emergence as the Deputy Governor of Bayelsa state in 1999, Jonathan became Governor in 2006 after the controversial impeachment of DSP Alamaseigha. In 2006, his party, under Obasanjo, nominated him as the Vice Presidential candidate to Musa Yar’adua in the 2007 presidential elections in which they were declared winners by the electoral body. Again in 2010, the incumbent president at the time, Musa Yar’adua, died in office, paving the way for Jonathan to be sworn-in as the president of Nigeria.

In 2011, Jonathan was elected as president, the first time in the history of Nigeria for a politician from the ‘Minority Ethnic’ group to achieve such feat. Jonathan’s actions or inactions in handling constitutional issues and the overbearing influence of his wife and aides posed serious threats to democracy in Nigeria. Among the most worrying dispositions of the Jonathan regime that brought disrepute to democracy include:

- i. Masterminding the disqualification of Sylva Timipreye, then incumbent governor of his home state, from contesting for re-election under the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 2011;
- ii. The endorsement and recognition of the faction of the governors forum led by Jonah Jang which lost the forum’s chairmanship election to governor Rotimi Amaechi by 16 to 19;
- iii. The undemocratic process that led to his emergence as the sole candidate of the PDP for the Presidential elections of 2015;

- iv. The harassment and intimidation of opposition leaders across the country by the security agencies and other agencies of the Federal Government (e.g. Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria not allowing jets carrying opposition leaders from flying or landing) (Ibeh, 2013);
- v. The militarization of elections in Ekiti and Osun States;
- vi. The unconstitutional impeachment of the Ekiti state House of Assembly Speaker and suspension of 18 other lawmakers, all of the opposition party, by 7 members of the House of Assembly; and
- vii. The undermining of democratic institutions and authorities by the security agencies as it played out in the invasion of the National Assembly and Rivers state House of Assembly by the police.

However, the acceptance of defeat and peaceful handover of power by former President Goodluck Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari strongly suggests that Goodluck Jonathan does not subscribe to the political ideology of violence. This is unique, given the antecedence of violence that have always followed the declaration of results at all levels, local, state and federal, of political contestation in Nigeria's democracy.

V. MUHAMMADU BUHARI

General Muhammadu Buhari qualifies as a demagogue because he meets the fundamental rules or elements of a demagogue. One, he is considered by many as the man of the common people such that he has successfully created and sustained a mass leader persona. Two, he inspires overpowering emotional reactions among the masses. Three, he has extreme political ambition and successfully gets the people un-frustratingly and convincingly committed to his political ambition. All these qualities combined to ensure he benefitted politically as he emerged the winner of the March 28, 2015 Presidential election, beating an incumbent, the First to have happened in Nigeria's political and democratic history. However, he has been accused of using intimidation tactics on voters as well as appealing to ethnic and religious sentiments in soliciting for votes (Akannam and Dangida, 2015).

Besides the prominent demagogues discussed above, the following list of persons can be considered to be demagogues in Nigeria's fourth republic whose political behaviour can be

interrogated in the light of democratic culture and values, and ultimately examine its effect on democracy in Nigeria.

- i. Governor Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti State (intimidation and use of grassroots appeal to undermine democratic institutions and values) such that the opposition members of the legislative arm in Ekiti State left the State due to harassment and intimidation by the executive arm (Dare, 2015).
- ii. Chris Uba of Anambra State (monetized politics, intimidation, violence and use of security agencies to undermine democratic values and institutions). This was evident in the letter of Obasanjo and Audu Ogbe (See Appendixes F and G).
- iii. Ibrahim Idris of Kogi State (monetized politics, intimidation, violence and use of thugs and security agencies to undermine democratic values and institutions)
- iv. James Ibori of Delta State
- v. Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State
- vi. Kwankwaso Ibrahim of Kano State (the Kwankwasia movement was a grassroots movement that made the former Kano Governor unassailable politically in Kano)
- vii. Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State (monetized politics, intimidation, violence and use of security agencies to undermine democratic values and institutions)

The fact remains that governors and other political heavyweights in Nigeria resort to all forms of demagoguery to outwit their opponents in democratic or political contexts (Adeniyi, 2011). The ferociousness may be in degrees, but it is seldom the case to find Nigerian politicians who would not explore demagogic routes to either attaining or retaining power. So, listing all the political demagogues in Nigeria's politics using Cooper's instruments of measurement will make the volume of this thesis unlimited.

The list of demagogues in Nigeria's politics is inexhaustible and they exist all across the length and breadth of the country, though in varied capacities in their "mass leader personae" attributes and support for undemocratic practices that helps them achieve their political goals. And as observed by Signer (2009:35, 37) "demagogues do not need to reach the extremes of a Hitler to undermine democracy...meaning he can be more or less of a demagogue and can range from a minor to a major threat to democracy." What is certain, however, is that the most extreme

demagogues pose the greatest challenges to democracy, and demagogues in power are likely to pose the greater danger to democracy and its ideals than those out-of-powers or seeking power. Signer also argued that many will disagree whether a demagogue is destructive or beneficial due to personal biases and subjective interpretations toward the system being threatened by the demagogue.

The task is not to argue whether someone “is” or “is not” a demagogue, but rather holding political leaders, whether in power, out of power or seeking power, to a high standard as demanded by democratic principles and constitutional democracy where internalized set of constitutional values and the rule of law must prevail to short-circuit demagogues, wherever they function. To achieve this, the people must take responsibility of salvaging democracy from demagoguery and demagogues by becoming well-informed, temperate, and dedicated to the rule of law so that the laws, not the decrees of the people, rules. Signer (2009:65) emphasized the role of the people in preventing the success of the demagogues in democracy because “the demagogue is a product of the people, and only the people can stop him.”

2.1.10 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The tenet of democratic governance moves beyond the sheer procedures of democracy and the establishment of democratic institutions. It involves promoting the sustainability of democracy which includes creating an enduring capacity for credible electoral process; the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government; the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the transparency and accountability of a responsible civil service, functioning at both the national and local levels (Ake, 2001; Collier, 2007). Thus, to avoid tyranny in all its undemocratic forms or democratic pretenses, political stakeholders, especially public office holders, at all levels of governance, must actively ensure rule of law, restrain in the exercise of power, ‘free and open’ political life in which citizens are able to develop and realize their capacities, and support and promote the democratic ideals of equality and liberty. Democratic governance highlights the priority of liberty and equality.

Aristotle (1941) and Held (2006) emphasized that effective democratic governance must meet the two criteria of liberty: (i) ‘ruling and being ruled in turn’ and (ii) ‘living as one chooses’, and

also the criteria of equality which include: (i) citizens have equal voting power and (ii) equal chances to hold office. Thus, liberty and equality are inextricably linked to the extent that equality is the practical and moral bases for liberty. Where officeholders fail to subscribe to this ethos, but rather turn themselves to mini-gods, indeed, demagogues, through braggadocio and belligerence, then democracy would have transformed to demagoguery.

An ideal democratic governance structure will involve a system of government where institutions function according to democratic processes and norms, both internally and in their interaction with other institutions (Norris, 2012). This fact is premised on the generally accepted idea that genuine democracy operates on significant principles, objectives and the entrenchment of certain institutional and political arrangements that are independent of politicians (Held, 2006).

Democracy can only survive, deepen and make meaning to people only if the democratic process and outcome meet the yearnings of the masses in addressing significant problems that directly affect their wellbeing. These problems include injustice, poverty, insecurity, human rights violations, disregard for the rule of law and inequality. However, the task of surmounting these challenges so as to deepen democracy and continue along the path towards genuine democratization requires the concerted effort of both the government and citizens. The government must accept responsibility for the welfare of its people and take actions that will better citizens' lives through the provision of good governance in the context of meeting their immediate needs for basic infrastructure, poverty reduction and security of lives and property (International IDEA, 2001).

In decrying the plight of democratic governance in Nigeria, wherein politicians demonstrate opulence to the astonishment of the pauperized populace, Bakare (2013) called for an audit of democratic governance in Nigeria with a view to helping the people to demand that the ruling class adapt to the norms and values of democracy, and that the political leaders of the country manage the resources of the people to deliver on their electoral promises. Luchman *et al* (2012) corroborate this welfarist conception of democracy by stressing that democratic governance must deliver certain basic democratic privileges and entitlements that include reduction of poverty and freedom from gross social inequality.

In a study carried out by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in 2001, it was clearly stated that the challenges of good governance in Nigeria manifest in five (5) aspects, namely:

- i. How to handle conflict flashpoints in a democratic manner and in a way that preserves human dignity;
- ii. How to allocate resources more equitably;
- iii. How to increase accountability and trust in government;
- iv. How to preserve the environment in oil-producing communities; and
- v. How to expand the ownership of the political process

The first point as stated by IIDEA has been a source of controversy, in and out of court, between victims of the undemocratic response, indeed genocidal approach, to conflicts in Nigeria by democratic governments. Two examples stand out here. The first was the mass murder and massive destruction of properties that was carried out by the Nigerian government under the Obasanjo administration in 2002 in Odi community of Rivers state. The second was the mass killing and massive destruction of properties at Zaki Biam of Benue State in 2005 on the revenge mission against the Tivs for killing nineteen (19) soldiers who were on peace keeping mission in the area. While the actions of the villagers who carried out the crime in the two communities were most despicable and punishable, the mass killing of thousands of innocent villagers was at variance with democratic practice and standard.

The second point which emphasizes the disparity in the allocation of resources is a major challenge to Nigeria's democratic promise of collective prosperity for its people. There is an ongoing outrage against the lawmakers on the jumbo salary and other outrageous earnings that despise the economic realities of the nation and the plight of the ordinary citizen. For example, whereas the minimum wage for workers in Nigeria is eighteen thousand naira (less than US \$100) per month or less than one thousand, two hundred dollars per year, the earning of a senator in Nigeria is put at about 240 million naira (about \$1.3 million) in salaries and allowances per year, and a member of the House of Representatives earns 204 million naira (about 1.45million US dollars) per annum (Vanguard Newspaper, 2013). The same scenario of exorbitant remunerations exists for government officials, especially ministers and other Presidential aides in Nigeria. When these figures are compared with what is obtainable in the United States of

America (Iginla, 2015), where a Senator earns 174,000 US dollars and in the UK where a Member of Parliament earns about 64,000 US dollars per year, the picture of inequality among Nigerians in terms of allocation of the country's resources (and the reason for taking electoral contests as a 'do-or-die' affair) becomes very clear.

The third point which stressed on the need to increase accountability and trust in government brings to the fore the problem of corruption in Nigeria. The average Nigerian politician, even in democracy, is considered to be fraudulent. This reputation of the average politician in Nigeria is not out of place, considering the rate of unexplainable wealth and display of avarice that are associated with politicians who, prior to attaining political offices, had little or no wealth, in addition to moderate lifestyles. Thus, political corruption demonstrated by uncorroborated means of income and flamboyant lifestyles by politicians and their family members, makes it awkward for them to be accountable and earn the trust of the people they govern.

The fourth point noted by International IDEA was the need to preserve the environment in oil-producing communities both from the degradation that they suffer and importantly also from the economic hazard that oil exploration has brought on the people in the region. Although the Nigerian governments under democratic regimes have taken deliberate steps to address the plight of the oil-producing communities through the creation of new ministries and parastatals such as the Niger Delta Ministry and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), unfortunately, the government has failed to use these establishments to make viable impact in the Niger Delta areas in terms of addressing basic infrastructures and facilitating programmes that will address the widespread poverty of the masses in the area. The reason for this failure has been attributed to the massive corruption in these Federal government controlled organizations where they have become the source of funding for political activities and contract scam by government officials and their cronies (Ofeimun, 2010). Also, these agencies are much more concerned with the political economy aspects of their responsibility than addressing issues of degradation and oil spillages resulting from the unethical practices of the oil companies.

The fifth and final concern of democratic governance listed by International IDEA was how to expand the ownership of the political process. One of the greatest challenges facing democracy in Nigeria is the unwillingness for the political class to expand the ownership of the political

process, especially as it relates to free, fair and credible elections. Having failed to serve the interest of the people, politicians engage in all forms of demagoguery and electoral fraud to subvert the democratic process in such a way that they can hold on to power whether they are wanted by the electorates or not. Thus, demagogues in positions of power, as have been the case in Nigeria, engage in electoral malpractices to undermine the will of the people “by the supervening force of malfeasance and abuse of the electoral process” (Ofeimum, 2010: 176). The election tribunal and court judgments that have retrieved stolen mandates from fraudulent politicians back to the rightful winners of electoral contests as the outcomes were in Ekiti state, Edo state, Rivers state, Osun State and other states and national assembly elections clearly show how the desperation of politicians to gain or maintain power has pushed them to the point of attempting (and in most cases succeeding) to usurp the ownership of the electoral process at the expense of the people and other stakeholders.

The argument, therefore, is that democracy cannot be deepened if the structure of democratic governance fails to deliver the dividends of democracy (Ake, 1993). Also, studies have emphasized that the survival and deepening of democracy can only be guaranteed where democratic culture thrives (Held, 2006; International IDEA, 2001; Ofeimum, 2010; Ake, 1993).

In Nigeria, democracy has been undermined by the intemperance of demagogues, especially the authoritarianism of demagogues in power whose actions and reactions to political issues undermine democracy in the light of the key principles, objectives and goal of democracy. Thus the democratic culture of debates and deliberations, liberty, press freedom, civil rights, due process and the rule of law are still in short supply in the democratic life of Nigeria (Ofeimum, 2010).

The task of building and adhering to the culture of democracy in a country that has had over thirty (30) years of military rule in his political history since independence in 1960 may not be an easy one, but the necessity to build and adhere to globally accepted democratic culture cannot be overemphasized (International IDEA, 2001). To achieve this daunting but indispensable task, the first step will be to demilitarize the national psyche traceable to the military culture of arbitrariness, command-and-obey-syndrome, intemperate language, intimidation of civil society, disregard for civil rights, disregard for the rule of law and due process, impunity, and the emasculation of the judiciary (Ake, 1993; International IDEA, 2001; Ofeimum, 2010). The

Nigerian society and especially the political class require massive education for the total re-orientation from authoritarian and despotic culture to embrace the ethics and values of democracy. This arduous task of national reorientation can best be achieved by the combined efforts of the family, society and state (International IDEA, 2001).

The quest to entrench good governance through democracy does not augur well for anti-democratic elements who consider the entrenchment of democratic values in the Nigerian political system as adversative to their parochial interests. Ake (2001) stated that the struggle for power by the Nigerian political elites was so absorbing that everything else, including acceptable democratic culture and commitment to good governance and development, was undermined and marginalized. It, therefore, means that when democratic governance, defined by the adherence to democratic culture, is not taken seriously, it engenders political instability and other negative consequences that affect peace and development. For example, Roberts and Charles (1999) have shown that there is a positive correlation between democratic governance and economic development because in democratic governance, there is the likelihood that the state will attract investment in human and physical capital and thus generate the conditions necessary for enduring prosperity. Similarly, Norris (2012) emphasized the positive impact that democratic governance has on standard indicators of economic growth, human dignity, and levels of inter-state and internal peace and security.

Another main challenge to the survival and deepening of democracy in Nigeria is the willingness of the state and political actors to identify with the culture of democratic governance in the pursuit of power (Ake, 1993; Ofeimum, 2010). To achieve this, there has to be a commitment to building strong democratic institutions that include viable political parties, independent judiciary, independent media, independent electoral body, separation of powers, among others. These democratic institutions can only be strengthened by an active and broad-based democratic politics that is not undermined by the imperious influence of demagogues seeking to attain or maintain power (John and Strom, 2004). The extent to which demagogues can be prevented from undermining democracy in Nigeria will be determined by the extent to which the people of Nigeria are willing to support the process and effort at building strong democratic institutions that will enforce the spirit and letters of the constitution on all political actors, including the state.

From the foregoing arguments and submissions, it becomes clear that the yearnings of the people of Nigeria for genuine democratic governance can only be realized when the following minimum benchmarks are in place.

- i. Political stakeholders and the Nigerian state must embrace civic virtues of self-restraint, civic knowledge, civic participation and service, and the promotion of the collective good.
- ii. The Nigerian state must create the platform and the best circumstances for all its citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, sex and religion, to express and fulfill their potentialities.
- iii. Protection from the arbitrary use of power to undermine the democratic rights of citizens, including the power to vote and be voted for without fear or intimidation.
- iv. The state must demonstrate responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry by expanding economic opportunities that reflect transparent management of the country's resources. This is because the major reasons that the military regimes that have overthrown democratic regimes in Nigeria have given is the corruption of politicians and the mismanagement of the nation's resources (Ake, 1993; International IDEA, 2001). There is no doubt that the pervasive corruption and mismanagement of the economy by Nigeria's political class has been the major source of instability and the frustrations of Nigerians with their governments.

2.1.11 DEMAGOGUES AND POPULISM

The arguments that demagogues are the product of democracy and that demagogues command large followership have been affirmed by various scholars (Kirkpatrick, 1982, Carto, 1996; Signer, 2009). Thus, Zakaria (1997) stated that when democracy backslides, it becomes a useful tool for demagogues to wipe up sentiments and passionately appeal to the people for a revolution. According to Jowett (2001), Aristotle had warned of the traps of demagogues to scuttle democracy or democratic ideals taking advantage of unforgivable ills of a democratic government against the people. Demagogues, like all other political actors, believe that "the people themselves are the only safe depository of power" (Carto, 1996:5). Thus, their politics is highly dependent on a powerful, extemporaneous connection with the people that dramatically transcend normal political popularity (Signer, 2006). Cooper (1956) emphasized the popularity

of a demagogue among the people by noting that because the demagogue is a ‘leader of the rabble’, he advances his own interests by affecting a deep devotion to the interests of the masses. This fact explains the popularity of demagogues and the fanatical nature of their followers, even though in reality they are seldom guided by public interest.

In evaluating the character of demagogues, there is always the temptation to see them as populists. This is because, like populists, demagogues have unbelievably large, obsessive followership. However, whereas populists are driven by values that address public interests, demagogues are fundamentally driven by personal or group interests that, in most, if not all cases, are at variance with public interest and democratic tenets (Signer, 2009). Also, whereas populists play by the rule, demagogues bully the rule of law. “Demagogues”, Signer (2009:36) emphasized, “break rules of order and, often, order itself.”

In an attempt to distinguish between a demagogue and a populist, Carto (1996) describes a demagogue as a politician who belongs to an artificial aristocracy, defined by wealth and/or birth, but lacking either the required talent or virtue to serve the interest of the masses. On the other hand, the populist belongs to a natural aristocracy among men, on the basis of virtue and talent. The populist, Carto argues, endowed with natural aristocracy, is the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts and government of society while the demagogue, of the artificial aristocracy, represents a mischievous influence for political opportunism that must be stopped by the people from either coming into power or continuing in power.

The populist, unlike the demagogue, seeks or takes up public duty with the sole inspiration to render just service to the public at great personal sacrifice and will seldom expect any monetary or material compensation beyond actual expenses incurred during such period of service. These public precepts are vehemently resisted by demagogic schemes because the demagogues by their philosophy exploit the vulnerabilities of the masses to their personal advantage.

2.1.12 DESTRUCTIVE VERSUS BENEFICIAL DEMAGOGUES

It takes a demagogue to oust another demagogue from the political scene. For example, in Cuba, it required a demagogue in the person of Fidel Castro to dethrone his predecessor, Fulgencio Batista, from office; in Venezuela, it took a demagogue in the person of Chavez to overthrow his predecessor, Caldera.

There are individual mass leaders who ignore democratic route to power because of the institutionalized barriers to attaining political power that have been erected by demagogues within the existing power structure. For example, Charles Taylor, Robert Mugabe, Paul Biya, and so many other African leaders who got to power through ‘democratic’ means have erected and continue to create barriers that will make it impossible for other qualified citizens to attain power or takeover government through democratic means. In such a situation, demagogues are normally required to mobilize popular protests, and where necessary undertake a coup to end the tyranny of such government, be it democracy or monarchy or any other form of government.

So, destructive demagogues are leaders of a people who either in the quest to gain or sustain political power apply all resources at their disposal, both human and material, to initiate, encourage and implement intimidation, harm and destruction to achieve their political objectives. Sociopaths like Adolf Hitler of Germany, Benito Mussolini of Italy, General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Charles Taylor of Liberia, Bashir Assad of Syria and Bashir of Sudan are typical examples of destructive demagogues. For these leaders, to be in power is a ‘do-or-die’ phenomenon. How do they advance their course? Signer (2006) stated that the destructive demagogue threatens and destroys all opposition to its interest.

Perhaps, Plato (1908) best captures the disposition of a destructive demagogue:

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf...And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies or from being a man become a wolf-that is, a tyrant?

On the other hand is a demagogue who emerges as a general force for good (Signer, 2006). When the rules of order are subverted to ensure the invincibility of a demagogue in power, it serves the good of the people for a leader of the people with extreme ambition, courage, who has a powerful connection with the people and the wherewithal to stand up to challenge the despotic system. In such instances, forces within and outside the country might come together to support

the overthrow of the demagogue in power. Few examples all over the world include: Boris Yeltsin of Russia who was instrumental to the overthrow of the despotic Soviet system; General Muhammad Buhari of Nigeria who led the coup against the inept and corrupt government of Shehu Shagari; Hugo Chavez of Venezuela who stirred the masses against the brutal and corrupt regime of Caldera; among others.

The beneficial demagogue can be a general force for good by steering the frustrated masses to undermine and/or overthrow a despotic and corrupt regime (Signer, 2009).

2.1.13 DEMAGOGUES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties are central to the realization of an individual's political ambition as the Nigerian constitution and the electoral act do not recognize independent candidacy for contesting for political offices. Thus, it is a fundamental requirement for persons with elective political ambition to be registered members of political parties in order to be supported and sponsored for elective positions at all levels, from councilor to the president. It is in this sense that Ogroh and Ikporukpo (2015) have argued that political parties in Nigeria have played key roles in Nigeria's democracy.

For demagogues to operate efficiently, the first strategy is to takeover and thus, be in control of the party structure, starting from the ward level. Once in charge of the party machinery, demagogues can use either of the following techniques of mischief to successfully victimize politicians whom they are opposed to their political ambitions, however popular they may be, and as a result sidestep the norms of party politics expected in a democracy.

- i. **Denial of Nomination form:** this happens when demagogues arm-twist the leadership of a party to deprive a member or members of the political party who are willing and eligible to contest for primary election in the party so as to pave way for the aspirant(s) of the demagogues to be the candidate(s) of the party. A valid example of this technique was applied in 2014 by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) when other presidential aspirants under the party, notably, Abduljhelili Tafawa Balewa and Mrs. Abiola Duke, were denied the party's nomination form so as to pave the way for the emergence of the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, who had been "endorsed" by the party leadership as the sole candidate for the party's presidential ticket for the 2015 presidential election. Similarly, the All Progressives Congress (APC) leadership "endorsed" the 2014

governorship candidacy of Kayode Fayemi, then incumbent, to the exclusion of other aspirants within the party.

- ii. **Party Screening:** it is a norm for political parties to screen all aspirants running for political positions under the party. Demagogues seize this practice as an opportunity to influence the screening out (and thus stop) perceived political foes from being offered the party's tickets and so unable to contest in the primary election of the party. This demagogic strategy of scuttling the political ambitions of politicians within a party-system was employed against the former (but then incumbent) governor of Bayelsa state who, at the time, was said to have political scuffle with the national party leader, president Goodluck Jonathan, who also is an indigene of the State.
- iii. **Substitution of Candidate:** the trick here is that the duly elected candidate(s) by a political party to contest for an elective position is substituted by new candidate(s) who emerge either through direct substitution of name to the electoral body or a doctored rescheduled party primary election where the newly favoured candidate(s) of the demagogue(s) emerge. A clear example of this undemocratic scheme played out in Rivers State in 2007 when Rotimi Amaechi, having been duly nominated as the governorship candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was substituted for Celestine Omehia at the eleventh hour by the party hierarchy, obviously on the directive of the national leader and president at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo. Similarly, in Kogi State, there was the last minute decision of the party to dump the original candidate of the PDP, Isah Echocho for Captain Idris Wada (the eventual winner of the December 2011 governorship election in the State).

Following the successes recorded at the courts by aggrieved party members that were short-changed by their political parties, demagoguery played out in the amendments to the Electoral Act in 2010 such that the powers of political parties to present candidates to INEC was made absolute. Hence, political parties have now been strengthened to continue their undemocratic practice of undermining internal party democracy where the will of delegates to elect party candidates are subject to the dictates of the rich and powerful politicians.

- iv. **Suspension or Expulsion of Aspirant/Candidate:** this political technique enables demagogues to influence their political parties to either suspend or expel seemingly

rebellious aspirants or candidates who defy party position or decision on political issues that are at variance with their interests. Virtually all political parties in Nigeria have been accused of employing this tactic to shortchange aspirants or candidates that are not favoured by the godfathers or demagogues within the political parties. For example, in the gubernatorial election for Imo state in 2007, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, Ifeanyi Ararume, was expelled by the party leadership few days to the election and thereby failed to present a candidate for the governorship election for daring to challenge the decision of the party to substitute his candidature for the preferred candidate of the demagogues after he had won the primary election of the party. Few years after the incident, the Chairman of the PDP at the time, Ahmadu Ali, confirmed and justified that decision (Daily Trust, September 25, 2014).

Also, political parties take revenge on its members who fail to support its position on partisan matters. For example, it was stated in the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 2007 Report on Nigeria's General elections that:

As many as 75 percent of Nigeria's incumbent national legislators did not secure their party's nomination for re-election. Some PDP watchers asserted that perceptions of party disloyalty disadvantaged many incumbents, particularly those who failed to support President Obasanjo's proposed third term amendment.

The mistrust and misgivings that party politics and politicking generate in the Nigerian political terrain have been a major source of political tensions and crises in the democratic history of Nigeria. For instance, Oyediran (1999:142) quoted Awosika, a member of the Political Bureau, as saying that:

Party politics is poisonous. It is the politics of war not of peace; of acrimony and hatred and mudslinging, not of love and brotherhood, of anarchy and discord, not of orderliness and concord; it is politics of cleavages, divisions and disunity; it is the politics of hypocrisy and charlatanism, not of integrity and patriotism, it is the politics of rascality, not maturity, of blackmail and near gangsterism not of constructive and honest contribution.

The above description of political party and what it represents cannot be far from what political parties and their leaders epitomize in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, even though these actions clearly violate the "Code of Conduct" for political parties in Nigeria (See Appendix C). Obeying party constitutions when it suits the interest of a stalwart or disobeying rules and guidelines to impose candidates have continued to feature

prominently in the politics of political parties in the Fourth Republic (Ofeimum, 2010; Adeniji, 2012).

2.1.14 DEMOCRACY AND DEMAGOGUERY: THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MEDIA

The Nigerian media has over the years been a veritable tool in many ways, including the education of citizens on their democratic rights and the fight against authoritarian regimes (Uche, 1989). Unfortunately, in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the media platform has failed to live up to the doctrine of fairness thereby becoming highly politicized and biased (Konkwo, 2015:89). For instance, Konkwo (2015) observed that "broadcasters who work in the government broadcast media are completely beholden to the powers that-be in terms of programme, organization, planning, production and transmission." Thus, the public are only given access to news that promote the political interest of the incumbent regime, and it gets worse during campaigns where opposition candidates and political parties are denied or given little access to air their political programmes. Also, politicians who own media outlets use the channels to engage in campaigns of calumny against their political opponents. This practice attained a dangerous trend in the build up to the 2015 general elections when caution was thrown to the air in the way owners of television and newspaper media defamed the candidates of opposition party, their families and supporters. For example, "death wish" adverts were sponsored in newspapers by a governor from the South-West against the person of Muhammadu Buhari and a private television station aired disparaging attacks on his chief political ally, Bola Tinubu (ThisDay 2015, March 3rd).

Generally, whereas the media has been most instrumental to the transition to democratic regime in Nigeria, it has failed to be fair to all and free from partisanship.

2.1.15 MONEY, POLITICS AND NIGERIA'S DEMOCRACY

Sociologists have long investigated the role that money plays in determining the direction of human interactions. Simmel (1907) argued that when money becomes the predominant means for establishing value in social relationships, the properties and dynamics of social relations are transformed. The consequence, according to Turner, Beeghley and Powers (2002), is that other criteria of value, such as logic, ethics, and aesthetics are displaced by monetary criterion. They argued that "the use of money has the power to transform the structure of social relations in society" (Turner et al, 2002:282). They further emphasized that money is a tool that facilitates

the acquisition of objects; used to calculate values at every juncture so that all objects in the society (including a man's worth) become assessed by their monetary value.

Simmel (1907) identified seven elements that make money crucial in social exchange, including:

- i. the desire for a valued object that one does not have;
- ii. the possession of the valued object by an identifiable other;
- iii. the offer of an object of value to secure from another the desired object;
- iv. the acceptance of this offer by the possessor of the valued object;
- v. collective units and individuals participate in exchange relations and, hence, are subject to the above four processes;
- vi. the more liquid the resources of an actor are in an exchange (that is, the more resources that can be used in many types of exchanges), the greater that actor's options and power will be at any given situation, including significant power to manipulate any exchange; and
- vii. exchanges will occur only if both parties perceive that the object given is less valuable than the one received.

From the arguments of Simmel (1907) and (Turner et al, 2002) on the role of money in social relations, this study seeks to understand how money impacts voters decisions and how candidates' electoral outcomes at elections are determined by how much money they have to spend. Furthermore, the study examines the consequences of money in Nigeria's democracy.

Turner et al (2002: 285) argue that because of the premium on monetary value by society's members, moral constraints on what is possible decrease "because anything is possible if one just has the money." They argued further, thus:

Money releases people from the constraints of tradition and moral authority; money creates a system in which it is difficult to restrain individual aspirations and desires. Deviance and pathology are, therefore, more likely in systems where money becomes the prevalent medium of exchange.

In examining democratic practices in Nigeria, it is important to examine what impact money has had, and continues to have on individuals, groups and democratic institutions. This is important because, Nigeria's democracy has been adjudged to be the most expensive democracy in the world because of the huge fund required to contest elections, whether primary elections of political parties and the general elections (Babanawa, 2013). Moreover, the Human Rights

Watch investigation of the political crises in Rivers State between 1999 and 2007 clearly showed that politicians employed monetary inducements to undermine democracy by arming thugs with weapons and paying stipends to cult groups and individuals to assist in rigging elections in favour of their benefactors (See Appendix J).

Nigeria's democracy and governance reflect the reality of the Marxist proposition that the general character of a nation's social, intellectual and political condition is the outcome of its mode of production or economic system (Baran, 1957, Ake, 2008). There exists a plethora of studies, both theoretical and empirical, that emphasize the enormous influence that the economy has over other institutions in the state (Ravallion and Van de Walle, 2008; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Besley, Galiani and Schargrotsky, 2006; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau, 2002).

For instance, Suleiman (2010) concluded, based on a study on privatization policy under the civilian regimes in Nigeria that political expediencies have been largely responsible for most privatizations in Nigeria where the beneficiaries of the privatized companies are political allies of the government in power. Thus, privatization in Nigeria has been complicated by the political class, such that the very idea of natural monopolies which ensure restriction on privatization have been undermined by the managers of Nigeria, who are quite aware that achieving minimum standard and collective prosperity in some sectors can best be assured with public provision (Suleiman, 2013; Caporaso and Levine, 1992). Even in 'democratic' regimes, Nigerians continue to witness unrestrained anarchy of ambitions sustained by the immoral and deceitful commitment to political brigandage by political thespians that are bent on appropriating the political and economic institutions of the country to achieve personal and/or group interests.

Furthermore, the political economy of Nigeria has been bedeviled with ethnocentrism, ethno-religious sentiments and incompetent leadership, all of which have fuelled corruption and lack of patriotic and competent political leadership for the country. Thus, lack of creativity in providing leadership has resulted in the overdependence of the country on unstable oil revenue (Kesselman, 2004). More so, the peculiar nature of Nigeria's federalism that allows for the central government to superintend the extraction, deployment and allocation of the resources of its component states or regions makes presidential competition to assume a 'do-or-die' method. The consequence is that the state controls the resources and economic opportunities and thus becomes the focus of competition among the various groups and interests, and for those in

government, governance becomes an industry for which survival and patronage are dependent on rent-seeking behaviour characterized by selfish interest, political connivance, corruption and electoral fraud (Achebe, 2012).

Ake (1993, 2008) and Luqman (2011) stressed that the political context of Nigeria revolves around political economy because political actors in Nigeria, right from the founding fathers, have framed the goals of their struggles as not just struggles against tyranny but the struggles for material survival and the 'equitable' distribution of resources to all the ethnic nationalities and interests in the country. Thus, continuing in that tradition, democratic contests have always engendered bitter rivalry among individuals and ethnic groups in Nigeria, where demagogues exploit these concerns to promote their parochial interests.

Prior to the introduction of the political vocabulary of "stomach infrastructure" occasioned by the 2014 Ekiti state governorship contest, the popularity and acceptance of candidates or 'candidates' favoured by political godfathers was largely dependent on the capacity of the candidates to distribute cars, money, food and other material benefits to the electorates. Where this strategy failed, the desperate political gladiators could resort to the use of intimidation and violence, including the illegal use of the security agencies and thugs, to achieve electoral success. Thus, political contestation in Nigeria's democratic experience, especially in the fourth republic, is characterized by massive electoral corruption, intimidation and violence where the probability of winning is highly dependent on candidates' or candidates' backers' superiority in terms of fund, capacity to manipulate security agencies and the electoral process, capacity to use violence and successfully subvert the democratic process to their advantage (Nwatu, 2004; Igbuzor, 2005; Ofeimum, 2010).

Because of the pervasive level of poverty in every nook and cranny of the country (International IDEA, 2001) occasioned by the high level of unemployment (Ofeimum, 2010), the Nigerian politician is never in short supply of people, especially young people, to recruit for political exigencies. Looking forward to illusive promises of jobs or positions when their political ambitions are realized, these motley crowds of youths (uneducated and educated) are assigned all forms of illegal political roles: ranging from disruption or destruction of opponents' electioneering campaigns to killing of opponents and/or their supporters to scuttle the democratic process to enable their preferred candidate(s) emerge as 'winners'.

The economic cost of political contestation in Nigeria makes access to power an exclusive preserve of the rich. For instance, Ake (1993) lamented the huge cost of nomination form for the 1993 presidential elections in Nigeria. Similarly, in the All Progressives Congress, the candidate for the 2015 presidential election, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd.) lamented the huge cost of the nomination form (above 27 million naira) which he could not afford except for the intervention of his bankers who loaned him the money (Aziken, 2014).

For politicians who are not rich enough to fund their political ambitions, they could seek for sponsorship from wealthy and willing godfathers. Yahaya (2007) has observed that desperation by politicians to win elections at all costs in Nigeria makes the courting of godfathers appealing. He emphasized that the relationship between the godfathers and their ‘godsons’ is highly contractual, reciprocal and always at variance with the will and interests of the electorates. It has also been observed that Nigeria has one of the most expensive democracies in the world in the context of financing elections because there is a balanced demand and supply for material inducement for votes by the electorates and aspirants/candidates (Babanawa, 2013).

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study draws its theoretical strength from three theories, namely: the elite theory, theory of mass society and symbolic interactionism.

2.2.1 THE ELITE THEORY

There is no consensus among scholars on the definition of elite. Keller (1963:4) defines elite “as a minority of individuals designated to serve a collectivity in a socially valued way.” Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) as well as Sartori (1979) describe elites as those citizens of a society that control the resources of society through incumbency of certain top positions in organizations. For the purpose of this study, the most fitting definition of elites is that provided by Dogan and Higley (1998:15) as “the holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations including dissident ones, who are able to affect national and political outcomes regularly.”

Although the idea probably always has been present in some form, elitism emerged as a recognizable and clearly defined part of Western political thought in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries. The leading contributors to the theory were Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) and Robert Michels (1876-1936).

Their explanation of elitism was a reaction to the Marxist analysis of politics and political power as dependent on two social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Sitton (1996) argued that the Marxist theory, irrespective of its new forms, continues to emphasize the dominance of economic class and the mode of production as the prime forces that structure politics in all human societies. But Mosca and Pareto contended that political elites determine the nature of regimes in any given society. They observed, however, that the political elites do not have power distributed equally among them at any given time; some individuals and subgroups in society will possess more power than others. Thus, there are dominant political elites (or governing elites) and non-dominant elites (out-of-power or power-seeking elites). The dominant political elites are the incumbent ruling elites, and will continue to hold onto power as long as they retain their unity and character (Rotherm, 2001).

It drew attention to the occurrence, and the important effects, of divisions that may arise within the elite of a society. Its central proposition, as stated by Higley and Burton (1989), is as follows: "A disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. A consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if economic and other facilitative conditions permit."

Scholars such as Eldersveld (1989), Putman (1976), Carlton (1996), and Ingelhart (1976) have all carried out empirical studies around the world with convincing consensus findings that permit some generalizations about the character of political elites. A central character among political elites in all societies is their unquenchable thirst for power. Elites struggle to attain power but do worse things to maintain that power. This attribute of political elites makes demagogues out of leaders, whether in a democracy or in monarchy. Also, they shared the idea that the political order of any society is determined by the extent to which elites are willing to adjust and reach compromises on their ambitions for power. What they failed to identify in their discourse of political elitism, however, is the ignoble roles of demagogues in harnessing human and economic

resources, and the paraphernalia of government (in the case of dominant political elites) to either gain or retain political power.

Ake (1993:21) observed that the ruling elites in Nigeria continue to remain a very formidable problem that “survives against all odds” because of their common features that resonates in their shared political culture ranging from its vast resources accumulated by means of state power and its success in “pushing the premium of political power ever higher and making political competition destructively intense.” More so, the ties that bind the Nigerian political elites together are far stronger than the differences that they pretentiously portray for parochial political objectives. They all approach politics with bizarre crudity, they all undermine democratic tenets in the pursuit of their personal ambitions for power, and they share a common identity for making bogus electoral promises with little or no roadmap for achieving them.

Fundamentally, the elite theory provides an argument for elite’s control of democratic politics on the basis that elites in society have the training, wisdom and wherewithal to govern, and as such democracy should provide the platform for elites to decide who attains and retains power, and not on the large population. Unfortunately, however, such argument undermines the normative significance of democracy as a system that enables “the people” to choose their leaders, and thus rendering democracy as a mere conservative doctrine (Walker, 1966). The elite theory advances the idea that the average citizen is uninformed, unwise and lacking the ability to dexterously determine policies and ideology to drive national development, thus arrogating political offices as befitting their personalities. The consequence of such ideas is that the democratic system is conditioned to rely on the “wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the population at large” (Walker, 1966: 286). This explains the situation where political leaders in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic have been reputed to impose candidates on political parties even when the candidates may not be the will of party members in general (Ofeimum, 2010; Adeniyi, 2012).

Walker (1966: 286) noted that in democratic system of government, there are two groups, namely: the elite and the citizens at large. Whereas the elite are considered as those “who possess ideological commitments and manipulative skills; the citizens at large or the masses of the system, a much larger class of passive, inert followers who have little knowledge of public affairs and even less interest”.

The mode of politics in Nigeria represents an unfortunate political culture that is anything but democratic, particularly in the context of political leaders imposing candidates on parties and in the general elections through election rigging. Political activities, including internal party politics or party primaries, political campaigns, elections, and post-election reactions, are all realities of the extent of degeneration in the country's polity, and the people's tolerance of this degeneration as 'the Nigerian factor' represents the extent to which the political enterprise have been left to the whims and caprices of the corrupt and illegitimate minority for which the Nigerian people "have been conditioned to expect the worst from our politics and politicians" (Ake, 1993).

Thus, the battered political culture that has failed to promise a bright democratic future for the people of Nigeria has created latitudes for the emergence of alternate elites, nay demagogues, who offer themselves as progressive or change political agents. Herein lies the dilemma of the Nigerian people. The Nigerian masses thus must necessarily be subjected to the rule of the demagogue, even in democracy, because the political reality of Nigeria favours demagogic democracy where only Nigerians of means or their blasphemed allies, irrespective of their moral and intellectual history, have realistic chances of attaining or retaining political power. Condemned to demagogic democracy, the Nigerian political climate is turned to politics of warfare rather than welfare so much that the constitutional standards which ought to inspire political culture become inactive, giving room for barbarism. And because "Barbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be made" (Ortega, 1930), demagogic democracy becomes the route to Hobbesian state, where life is brutish and short. The consequence is that political competitions and relations are not subject to a regulating principle to protect interests involved.

2.2.2 MASS SOCIETY THEORY

The theory of mass society (or mass society theory) emerged in the 1940s following the coinage of the term "mass society" by Karl Mannheim (1935). However, the concept was popularized in the 1950s by C. Wright Mills. The theory provides a good example of sociological thinking migrating across fields in the social sciences in analyzing the group behaviour in the socio-political context.

Perhaps, the pioneer scholar who aroused the intellectuality of other social scientists on the place and power of the masses in defining political destiny was the Spanish essayist, José Ortega

Gasset, who lived from 1883 to 1955. According to Ortega (1930) the mass society theory promotes the notion of gullible and mobilizable anti-democratic forces which constitute the frustrated strata of a country who are fanatical backers or supporters of demagogues. These members of society are easily propagandized, manipulated and mobilized by demagogues to work against regimes which have failed to salvage them out of their socio-economic predicaments.

Because democracy rides on the mantra of popular vote, elites in society make the most of the masses to achieve their political objectives and goals in a democratic system. According to Pinard (1968) the mass society theory is considered by social scientists as the most applicable and comprehensive statement of about the genesis and character of mass movements in political action. The frustration of the masses either occasioned by the corruption or ineptitude of the ruling class empowers the demagogue to engage in immoderate politics through the instrumentality of the masses. The central idea of mass society theory is that a society can develop mass tendencies in the event that the state fails to meet the economic, political and sociocultural aspirations of the populace. Thus, when the incumbent regime of a people fails to provide the leadership that responds to the yearnings of the masses, especially in addressing their economic and political concerns, people can turn to mass behaviour and mass movements either initiated or synchronized by the demagogue to initiate a revolution against the incumbent. The demagogue, if in power, could use the masses as a restraining force from altering the status quo. But if out of power, demagogues could use the masses as a revolutionary force to achieve power. Nevertheless, what constitutes a major shortcoming of mass theory is its failure to recognize that secondary groupings can also exert neutral or mobilizing functions. The maintenance and persistence of democratic norm depends on the behaviour of the tiny political elites in power whose actions may well lead to the overthrow and the enthronement of 'mass authoritarianism' under the control of the demagogue (Mills, 1956; Hamilton, 2001).

The core characteristics of the mass society theory are the concepts of mobilization and extremist politics. To actualize political objectives, the demagogue courts this group (the frustrated masses) which possesses the raw energy and the willingness to risk their un-propertied lives for revolutionary political objectives. Marx describes the social character of this mass society to include "vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail birds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, procurers, brothel keepers, porters,

literati, organ grinders, rag pickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither” (Marx, 1852: 75). The theory emphasizes the functional appeal of this stratum of mass society who lack political experience but are supportive and accessible in times of crisis for demagogues to use to achieve political objectives. Thus, the mass society theory posits the existence of a demagogic, charismatic and antidemocratic leader who takes advantage of the failings associated with the alienation of the masses by the government to organize a mass-executed revolt to seize political power (Hamilton, 2001). This theory helps to explain how political leaders prey on people's emotions or prejudices to manipulate them to achieve power.

It is important to understand the collective aspiration of demagogues and the group referred to as the mass society. Their collective aspiration of changing the incumbent regime is premised on the shared predicament of alienation, even though from different perspectives. For the demagogues, they have been alienated from power as they have little or no say in the running of the state. But for the vulnerable “mass society”, they have been deprived (alienated) of the wealth of the commonwealth through poor and corrupt leadership and oppressive regime which have caused them severe strains (Pinard, 1968). So, the change that demagogues desperately seek to navigate can be made possible by the commitment of the mass society to the cause of the demagogues. Unfortunately, progressive rebellion of the masses does not represent a viable solution to the failings of democratic governance; especially that violence and tyranny cannot bring about the demagogues’ promise of freedom and development.

Bell (1955) stated that the theory of mass society is not just a description of the reactionary forces against institutionalized lapses of conservatism but an ideology of romantic remonstrance against the deficits of all forms of governments made possible by the unrealized promises of rogue political elites existing in all forms of regimes, whether democratic or monocratic.

This theory helps to explain why the masses, especially the frustrated and not-well-to-do masses, are susceptible to being engaged by politicians to subvert democracy through ballot box snatching and electoral violence.

In the context of this study, the mass society theory provides the rationale on why and how a small, but cohesive and interconnected elites control the unorganized, uninformed and gullible masses to achieve their political ambition through the instrumentality of persuasion and

manipulation. Understandably, the poverty and lack of order that pervades the large number of youthful population in a society or political system that promises everything good, but achieves little or no collective prosperity for its citizens create the enabling environment for them to engage in undemocratic tendencies, in active connivance with another set of disgruntled elites, to either ensure change of government or undermine existing authorities.

The elites, using their resources (both material and intellectual), engage in propaganda, arm the masses for violence (if need be) or violent reaction to possible authoritarian response from States and their coercive agencies, with the ultimate aim of achieving their political ambition. In fact, the mass society theory provides an understanding of the political struggles in Nigeria's Fourth Republic where democratic contests have assumed war-like situations before, during and after elections where the contending elites recruit, train and deploy willing masses to engage one another in violence for political reasons.

2.2.3 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONSIM

The symbolic interactionist theory is a sociological theory that explains the behaviour of actors from the platform of the meanings that they give to their actions. In other words, Symbolic interactionism represents a perspective in micro-level sociological theory that addresses how members of society create and preserve society through face-to-face, recurring, meaningful interactions. In understanding how demagoguery occurs in the Nigerian political scene, it is important to know what politicians and voters in Nigeria consider as demagoguery or democratic irregularity and how they relate with actions that typify demagoguery. According to Ake (2008) demagoguery is the survival strategy of Nigerian politicians. To rule, you have to beat the rules, if the rules will deprive you of ruling. However, it is not just the politicians that have to beat the rules. The electorates do so too. The implication, therefore, is that the political behaviour and practices of the candidates and electorates is a function of the shared conversations and ideas about what has to be done for elections to be conducted 'successfully' where all the stakeholders will benefit from the process and outcome at the level of individuals, including monetary inducement for voters and compromising electoral officials, candidates and even observers. Demagoguery, thus, is a socially constructed reality about political contestations where the actors in the field are allowed some degree of freedom by the society and democratic institutions to engage in some degree of undemocratic practices as far as it "does not constitute to substantial

irregularities”, even though what “substantial irregularity” means is highly subjective and subject to the discretionary interpretations of court judges. The point here, as emphasized by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Allan (2006) is that the everyday knowledge, those things that “everybody knows” and that politicians do as they seek to gain or retain power is known and affected by the society through institutionalization or the reciprocal typification of habitualized actions.

Furthermore, symbolic interactionism makes it possible to explain how the ‘cultural truths’ of Nigerian politics reflect the behavioural disposition of political competitors and the political consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the country’s ‘own’ democratic culture. Hence, studies such as this that sets out to understand the behaviour of social actors (politicians) within a context (Nigeria) have to employ the symbolic interactionist perspective so as to appreciate the role of ideas, particularly beliefs and values, about democratic and political contestations affect the practice of democracy in the context under study. Doing this requires getting factual data about the experiences of political actors; how they interact to create, justify, sustain and relate with a democracy that reflects the social realities of the people, rather than an abstract or utopian description of democratic values.


Demagoguery in Nigeria’s democracy can be understood within the theoretical framework of symbolic interactionism if the behaviour of actors is subjected to social-exchange analysis, “where social interaction amounts to a negotiation in which individuals are guided by what they stand to gain and lose from others” (Macionis and Plummer, 2005:28). In Nigeria’s democratic context, the negotiation and exchange exist between the politicians and the electorates in which case the politicians gain power while the voters gain monetary or material inducement (Ofeimun, 2010; Adeniyi, 2011; Bakare, 2013).

Symbolic interactionism provides the logic for understanding the political behaviour of stakeholders in Nigeria’s brand of democracy and demagoguery

2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework for this study is shown in the next page (Figure 2.1). The diagrammatic representation (Fig. 2.1) shows the contrived relationships between democracy and demagoguery. It describes the conundrums that structure democracy in the context how demagoguery undermines democracy ideals.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Elections are central to democracy and democratic governance (Fund, 2008). Hence, when the processes and outcomes of elections in a democracy do not reflect the democratic traditions of popular sovereignty, free and fair elections, independent democratic institutions and the observance of the principles of separation of powers or checks and balances, then demagoguery becomes evident, as election outcomes can be determined by anti-democratic practices including propaganda, violence, bribery, intimidation, use of thugs and security agencies to undermine the will of the people in electing their political leaders. It has been argued that the challenges of democratic practice in Nigeria are traceable to acts of demagoguery which usually manifests in Nigerian elections (Signer, 2009).

The democratic tradition involves the principles, values and practices that highlight genuine democracy. They include: popular sovereignty, independent democratic institutions, free and fair elections, separation of power and checks and balances, rule of law, respect for human rights, and a secure and level playing ground for all stakeholders to perform their democratic rights without intimidation. These minimum requirements for democratic practice are constantly threatened and undermined by acts of demagoguery as politicians resort to manipulative and illegal activities to achieve electoral victories.

The interloping effect of demagoguery on democratic traditions or standards represents an affront to the will of the people and the sanctity of popular sovereignty that defines democracy. Unfortunately, a vast majority of the Nigerian people seems to identify with and compromise with politicians to use demagoguery to attain or retain political power. Demagoguery takes the form of propaganda, intimidation, bribery, threats and violence, election fraud (vote buying, ballot snatching, ballot box stuffing, and falsification of results). Politicians take advantage of the ignorance, poverty and naivety of the masses using propaganda, ethnic and religious sentiments, and intimidation to manipulate their way to power (Akannam and Dangida, 2015; Adeniyi, 2011). When politicians attain political power without being 'truly' elected by their people, it gives room for misrule, as they may not be accountable to their people (having not been truly elected by them). According to Ofeimum (2010), Nigerian leaders perpetuate tyranny and corruption because they have more confidence in winning elections through election fraud than depending on the people to vote for them.

When the democratic politics of a nation violate basic democratic ethos and values, there is the likelihood that some qualified and willing citizens will avoid politics so as to be free from the vices that accompany active political partisanship. Thus, some of the implications of demagoguery in a democracy include disenfranchisement of eligible voters and candidates, misrule, political apathy, corruption, et cetera (Adebayo, 2015; Achebe, 2012).

The issues presented in the conceptual framework and their interrelationships are crucial, not just to the emergence, survival and growth of democracy, but the crises and political instability that can transpire as a result of demagoguery in the democratic politics of in Nigeria.

2.4 HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses, stated in the alternative, were tested in this study:

HYPOTHESIS ONE

Alternative Hypothesis (HA): The outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria depends on acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, intimidation and election fraud.

HYPOTHESIS TWO

Alternative Hypothesis (HA): Money is the most significant factor in determining the outcome of elections in Nigeria.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This section presents the description of the methods that was used for the study. It includes the study area, population of study, sample and sampling procedures, research instruments and the procedures for collection and analysis of data.

3.1 RESEARCH SETTING

The research setting includes the geo-political locations, population, history, major cities and languages, and cultural and economic information of the Nigerian States that were randomly selected for this study.

Nigeria is the focus of this study. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a federal constitutional republic comprising 36 states and its Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Nigeria is located in West Africa and shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. Its coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean.

The world population data sheet of Population Reference Bureau estimates the country's population to be one hundred and seventy-seven million, five hundred and forty-two thousand (177,542,000) in 2014 (Prborg, 2014).

Fig. 3.1a Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones



Source: Nigeria Population Commission, 2015

Fig. 3.1b Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones and States therein



Source: Nigeria Population Commission, 2015

As shown in Fig. 3.1a and Fig. 3.1b, Nigeria is structured into six (6) geopolitical zones that include North-West Zone, North-East Zone, North-Central Zone, South-West Zone, South-South Zone and South-East Zone. Each of the 36 States in Nigeria produces three (senators) while the Federal Capital Territory produces one (1) senator. Thus, there are one hundred and nine (109) senators in Nigeria. However, in the Federal House of Representatives, there are three hundred and sixty members (360). This brings the total number of members of the National Assembly to four hundred and sixty-nine (469). Besides, there are seven hundred and seventy-four (774) local governments in Nigeria.

The six States that were randomly selected for this study are Adamawa, Edo, Enugu, Kaduna, Kogi and Ondo, plus the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The following is a brief history of the States containing key information on each.

- i. Adamawa State is located in the North-East geo -political region of Nigeria and was created in August 1991 from the former Gongola State. The State occupies about 38,000 square kilometers with a population of 3,178,950 (2006 census). The state is made up of 21 LGAs. The main languages are Hausa and Fulfulde besides the over 78 tribes/ethnic groups in the state.
- ii. Edo State was created from the defunct Bendel State in August 1991 and has Benin City as its capital. Edo State has 18 Local Government Areas (LGAs). The state consists of mainly Benin, Isan and Etsako-speaking groups/dialects. Arts and crafts are very popular in the state and the state can boast of the world's best wood carvers, brass and bronze sculptors. Edo State is popular for rubber, timber, oil palm and cocoa that are located in Akoko Edo, Owan and Etsako areas. The state is also endowed with several minerals such as quartzite, marble, gypsum, limestone, lignite and gold. Petroleum is found in Ovia and Orhionmwon areas of the state.
- iii. Enugu State is one of the states in south-eastern Nigeria. The state is bounded by Abia State to the south, Anambra State to the west, Kogi and Benue states to the north, and Ebonyi State to the east. Enugu State has 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and a total population of 3,257,298 based on the 2006 National Population Census. The people of the state are of Igbo extraction, and the major language is Igbo. The major towns in Enugu State are Enugu, Nsukka, Awgu, Udi, Oji-River, Ninth Mile, Oboloafor, Agbani and Adanni.

- iv. Kaduna State was part of the former North–Central State, which was created in 1967 when Nigeria changed from four (4) Regional systems to 19 state structures. In 1987, it was divided into two along the line of the old provincial boundary, thus Katsina province became Katsina State, while Zaria province formed the present Kaduna State. The state capital is Kaduna – a status it has enjoyed since the old Northern Region days. There are twenty three (23) Local Government Areas in the state, and it covers an area of 44,408.3 square kilometers. The population according to 2006 census is 6,066,562, which then put the density at about 137 persons per square kilometer. Kaduna State is a major industrial axis in the North, while Kaduna town has a lot of commercial activities and industries like the Peugeot car assembly and the petroleum refinery. Few textile industries still exist. The state has an airport, which is accessible all year round because of fair weather. It is also a major railway junction for the entire railway system between the North and the South.
- v. Kogi State, with a land area of 29,833 square kilometres, was carved out of Kwara and Benue states on August 27, 1991. Kogi is one of the states in the north-central zone of Nigeria. It is popularly called the confluence state due to the fact that the confluence of Rivers Niger and Benue occur there. There are three main ethnic groups in the state namely Igala, Ebira, and Okun; with the Igalas being the largest ethnic group. Lokoja is the state capital. Kogi State, with a population of 3,314,043 according to 2006 census, is the most centrally located of all the states of the federation. It shares common boundaries with Niger, Kwara and Nasarawa states as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to the north Benue and Enugu states to the East; Enugu and Anambra states to the south; and to the west by Ondo, Ekiti and Edo states. The state has important tourist attractions which include colonial relics such as Lord Lugard House and Ogidi (an African town with formations of Igneous Rock Mountains and a traditional art & craft industry).
- vi. Ondo State was created in 1976 out of the former Western State. The state lies between latitudes $5^{\circ} 45^0$ and $7^{\circ} 52^0$ N and longitudes $4^{\circ} 20^0$ and $6^{\circ} 03^0$ E. It is bounded on the east by Edo and Delta states, on the west by Ogun and Osun states, on the north by Ekiti and Kogi states, and to the south by the Bight of Benin of the Atlantic Ocean. The state occupies a land area of about 15,000 Square kilometers

with a population of 3,441,924 people according to 2006 census. The state has eighteen (18) Local Government Areas, with Akure as the capital city as well as the largest settlement. Some of the other prominent towns in the state are Ondo, Owo, Ore, Okitipupa, Ikare, Idanre, and Ile-Oluji. The people of the state are mostly Yoruba, although other Nigerians and foreign nationals equally live in the state. Agriculture is the mainstay of the people of Ondo State. The state has notable tourist attractions including Owo Museum, Ipale Iloro Water Falls, Igbokoda Water Front, Oke Maria Hills and Olumirin Water Falls.

- vii. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), which has Abuja as capital, is located almost at the geographical centre of Nigeria. Abuja is also the federal capital of Nigeria, having been moved from Lagos on December 12, 1991. The FCT lies within latitudes 8 23' and 9 15' N and longitudes 6 35'E. It is bounded on the west by Niger State, on the north by Niger and Kogi states, on the east by Nasarawa State and on south by Niger, Kogi and Nasarawa states.

3.2 STUDY POPULATION

The study population is key political actors in Nigeria's democracy. Nigerian political stakeholders (adults) of all political parties, irrespective of religious background, ethnic group and educational background constituted the study population for this research. For the quantitative aspect of the study, party delegates of the two major political parties, PDP and APC, in the 2015 elections provided responses to the self-administered questionnaire, while the qualitative aspect of the study involved in-depth interviews with senior INEC officials, security personnel, politicians and electorates.

The study utilized a combination of the quantitative and qualitative methods of research. The benefits of using both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single study include richness of data and deeper insight into the phenomena under study (Bhattacharjee, 2012). In the qualitative aspect of the study, in-depth and telephone interviews were conducted with purposively selected respondents who have adequate knowledge of the topics and situations under study.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The study utilized methodological triangulation, involving the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The benefits of using both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single study include richness of data and deeper insight into the phenomena under study (Bhattacharjee, 2012). In the qualitative aspect of the study, in-depth and telephone interviews were conducted. On the other hand, the quantitative aspect involved survey.

3.4 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE

The multistage sampling technique was used in selecting the sample for the study. In the first instance, the population was delineated by the six geopolitical zones that make up Nigeria. Through the use of simple random technique, six states, one state from each zone, were selected for the study. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the central seat of government, was also added for the study.

The Table below shows the geopolitical zones and the randomly selected state from each zone.

Table 3.1: Geo-political Zones and the Randomly Selected State from Each Zone

| GEOPOLITICAL ZONES | STATES ACCORDING TO POLITICAL ZONES | RANDOMLY SELECTED STATES |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| North-Central | Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau | Kogi |
| North-East | Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe | Adamawa |
| North-West | Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto | Kaduna |
| South-East | Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo | Enugu |
| South-South | Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers | Edo |
| South-West | Ekiti, Lagos, Osun, Ondo, Oyo | Ondo |

Source: Field Survey, 2015

Seven hundred (700) respondents, made up of 100 delegates per State and the FCT, participated in the quantitative aspect of study that involves the distribution of self-administered questionnaire. The decision to use convenience sampling technique to choose 100 delegates per State was based on the reality that political parties declined to provide the sampling frame that contained the details of the delegates. The researcher and research assistants worked with insiders and known delegates to be able to administer the questionnaires to the sampled delegates. Each political party (APC and PDP) was allotted 50 copies of the questionnaire. The equal number of allotment was due to the fact that the two political parties are at par in terms of strength of membership and political fortunes as evidenced in the composition of the National Assembly where the two political parties produced over 90% of the National Assembly members, and 35 governors out of the 36 States of Nigeria.

For the in-depth and telephone interviews, 20 respondents were purposively interviewed. The interviews were conducted using the detailed interview guide. Based on the request of interviewees, some of the top INEC officials and security agents were interviewed over the telephone.

The rationale for purposively selecting only two major political parties are:

- (a) The two parties (APC and PDP) produced all the senators in the 2015 election.
- (b) Over 98% of contestants who emerge as winners in the 2015 House of Representatives are from the two parties.
- (c) Only five (5) out of the three hundred and sixty (360) representatives were not from the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

In addition to those that the questionnaire was administered to, twenty (20) respondents were selected from the civil service, academia, security agencies, leaders and senior officials of political parties, civil society and media organizations. The in-depth interview sessions were tape-recorded, in addition to writing down the responses on paper (note taking).

Table 3.2: Sampling Methods

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Sampling strategy adopted | A mixture of probability and non-probability sampling |
| Sampling techniques adopted | Multi-stage sampling, convenience sampling and purposive sampling |
| Sample size for the study | Questionnaire (Quantitative) =700; Qualitative (interviews) = 20 |

Source: Field Survey, 2015

3.5 RELIABILITY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT

In order to ensure that the scales used for this study are reliable, a scale reliability check was performed on the scales to be sure that the scale's internal consistency was very reliable. Thus, one of the most commonly used indicators of internal consistency, Cronbach's alpha coefficient, was adopted to establish the reliability of the survey instrument used. The table below represents a number of pieces of information concerning the scale used for this study.

Table 3.3: Reliability Statistics

| Cronbach's Alpha | N of Items |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| .876 | 24 |

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The Alpha value, Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient, is .88. Because this value is above .7, the scale can be considered as reliable. Normally, the range of coefficient varies from 0 to 1, such that a research instrument with low or no reliability will have a score of zero (0) or close to zero (0), while a research instrument with high reliability will tend towards one (1). In the current study the Cronbach alpha coefficient was approximately .88.

3.6 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

Data was collected using both quantitative and qualitative instruments. For the quantitative method, self-administered questionnaire was employed while in-depth interviews were conducted through face-to-face and telephone conversation with respondents. The study utilized a combination of the quantitative and qualitative methods of research. In the qualitative aspect of the study, in-depth and telephone interviews were conducted with purposively selected respondents who have adequate knowledge of the topics and situations under study.

The survey design was adopted for this study. The explorative and explanatory nature of this study makes the survey design most appropriate for this work (Bhattacharjee, 2012). The forms of interviews adopted were face-to-face interview and telephone interviews.

3.7 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

This study engaged both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data were collected first-hand and directly from the sampled population through the use of structured questionnaire and interviews (telephone and face-to-face). For the secondary sources of data, information useful for this study was collected from published printed sources (books, journals/periodicals, official records, research publications, press statements, magazines, newspapers, court documents, and other scholarly literature) and published electronic sources (e-journals, websites, and internet). The data collected from secondary sources were both quantitative and qualitative.

3.8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION

The self-administered questionnaire and interviews (in-depth and telephone interviews) were utilized to get information from delegate voters and key political stakeholders in Nigeria's democracy.

i. SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire consisted of five (5) sessions and contained 32 items for which responses were required. Except for Section A of the questionnaire, which contained questions on the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, the other sections of the questionnaire (Sections B-E) adopted the Likert-scale, requiring respondents to choose from the stated options of Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree and Strongly Disagree. The thematic issues surveyed included the role of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy (Section B), factors that make demagoguery

thrive in Nigeria's democratic politics (Section C), how demagoguery manifests in the practice of democracy in Nigeria (Section D), and the implications of demagoguery on democracy in Nigeria (Section E) (See Appendix A).

ii. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

With regard to the interviews, a basic checklist was prepared to ensure that all relevant themes of the study as contained in the objectives and research questions were covered to enable the interviewer to keep the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim and objectives of the study. Data were collected by the researcher in the form of field notes and audio-taped interviews.

The politicians and stakeholders interviewed were purposively selected. Specifically, those that have had experiences of demagoguery or with demagogues and those who are knowledgeable on Nigeria's democratic conundrums by virtue of their positions in the political parties were interviewed because they represent a major source of eliciting information on demagogic operations and demagogues, and the consequences that they pose to democracy and national development (See Appendix B). They included party chieftains, youth leaders of political parties, INEC officials, security agents and elected public office holders.

Some of the face-to-face in-depth interview sessions took place at the venues recommended by the respondents as most conducive for the interview.

In the second form of interviews conducted (i.e., telephone interviews), the respondents were contacted and interviewed over the phone, based on a random selection of INEC resident electoral officers from a telephone directory of the "Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Information Kit for 2015 General Elections" as respondents.

3.9 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

In analyzing the data for this study, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of analyses was carried out. Descriptive statistical tool was used in the analysis of the socio-demographics of respondents and other relevant variable relationships. For the quantitative data emanating from the self-administered questionnaire, the returned and properly filled questionnaires were appropriately sorted, coded, and analyzed with the aid of the Statistical

Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, version 15.0) to ascertain the frequency distribution and percentages, as well as perform other statistical analyses and tests, including cross tabulations, multiple regression and Chi-Square tests.

The interviews conducted (both in-depth and telephone) were transcribed and analyzed using content analysis to either confirm or refute the findings from the quantitative data analyzed.

3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

The study was carried out with adherence to the ethical principles in the course of interacting with respondents, including voluntary participation in the research, informed consent, and confidentiality and anonymity where appropriate. Specifically, the ethical standards of American Psychological Association (APA) and Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Practitioners Association (NASA) were observed fastidiously.

3.11 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

While carrying out this study, there were some identifiable potential weaknesses of the study and the scope of the research.

Limitations: this involved external conditions that restricted or constrained the scope of this study which may have affected the outcome. In this study, the incessant defection of delegates of political parties in the 2015 elections to new parties created a scenario where delegates of PDP had changed party prior to filling the questionnaire or doing so while the questionnaire was yet to be returned. What this means is that there were delegates who felt aggrieved with their parties before defecting to other parties, and this may affect the reality of the responses provided. Also, political parties did not provide the required cooperation in releasing data requested from them in the form of sample frame. Finally, the electoral body, INEC, does not have the lists of authentic delegates for primary elections from political parties, as the powers of INEC to supervise and authenticate party primaries have been made ceremonial by the 2010 amended Electoral Act. Thus, in some cases, factions within a party have different lists of delegates, with the Courts having to rule on the authentic delegate lists.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

This study set out to investigate the influence of demagoguery on democratic practice in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The participants in this study have provided some detailed accounts of their experiences and understanding of democracy and how demagoguery operates in the democratic politics of Nigeria and the consequences that they engender in Nigeria's politics. Although the data collected using Likert scale are ordinal, they yielded nominal categories. Thus, because a Likert scale yields nominal categories, frequency distribution was considered appropriate for the analysis of the quantitative data, in the first instance. However, in the later part of the analysis, the Likert scale responses were trichotomised (divided into three categories) by combining "strongly agree" and "agree" responses, "Strongly disagree" and "disagree" responses, and "Neutral" responses to create three categories of responses from the Likert scale (See Appendix K). Afterwards, the non-parametric analysis was adopted in which chi-square test was utilized. In analyzing the Likert scale responses, using numbers to code was not adopted as changing the response format to numbers does not change the meaning of the scale, and it may be misleading to code a response of "neutral" as 3 and a response of "strongly disagree" as 1 because the numbers are comparable only in terms of relative magnitude, not actual magnitude.

4.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS (FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION): SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

The following tables contain the presentation and analyses of data based on the items in the self-administered questionnaire.

Table 4.1.1 Distribution of Respondents by Socio-demographic Characteristics

| Variables | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Gender | | |
| Male | 472 | 72 |
| Female | 186 | 28 |
| Total | 658 | 100 |
| Age | | |
| 18-29 | 87 | 13 |
| 30-39 | 195 | 30 |
| 40-49 | 208 | 32 |
| 50-59 | 112 | 17 |
| 60 and Above | 53 | 8 |
| Total | 655 | 100 |
| | | |
| Religion | | |
| Christianity | 392 | 61 |
| Islam | 233 | 36 |
| Other | 18 | 3 |
| Total | 643 | 100 |

| Variables | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Marital Status | | |
| Single | 148 | 23 |
| Married | 436 | 68 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 57 | 9 |
| Total | 641 | 100 |
| Educational Background | | |
| Primary/ Secondary | 184 | 30 |
| Tertiary | 438 | 70 |
| Total | 622 | 100 |
| Occupation | | |
| Unemployed/ Retired | 107 | 16 |
| Self Employed | 354 | 55 |
| Government Services | 165 | 26 |
| Private Services | 17 | 3 |
| Total | 643 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Age: Table 4.1.1 shows that 72% out of the total respondents are male while 28% are female. Thus, the male gender constitutes the majority of respondents in the study. This further confirms the positions of previous studies and statements that women are marginalized or under-represented in the politics of Nigeria in all aspects (Adeleke, 2015; European Union Report on the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria). A critical observation of table 4.1 shows that the age bracket of majority of the respondents in the study was between <30 to 49 years. This is highly suggestive of the participation of youths and young adults at not just the general elections, but in the primary elections of political parties before the candidates are nominated for the general elections.

Importantly also, the involvement of young people in party politics, as shown in this study, is encouraging and supports the argument of Abbani (2015) that the Nigerian youths have played prominent roles in the emergence and sustenance of democracy in Nigeria. The result of this study and Abbani's work totally contradict the harsh conclusion of Ajidahun (2015) that Nigerian youths' participation in the politics of Nigeria has been in the context of thuggery and political violence.

Religion: Table 4.1.1 shows that 61% of the respondents were Christians while 36% were Muslims, the two religions constituting 96% of the all respondents. Again, the point is that the two religions which teach against any form of cheating or malpractices produce members as politicians. More importantly, the information from responses of research participants and literature suggest that religion plays little or no role in restraining Nigerian politicians from engaging in undemocratic political behaviour. If anything, religion serves as a tool of demagoguery to deceive gullible voters.

Marital Status: The table shows that 68% of the respondents were married, 23% were single, and 9% were either separated, divorced or widowed. Thus, the marital status of the respondents were majorly married and single. From the marriage status of the respondents, it can be deduced that the Nigerian political environment attaches significance to marriage, perhaps as a demonstration of responsibility on the part of political participants.

Education: Table 4.1.1 shows the educational level of the respondents. 70% of the respondents possess tertiary educational qualification and 30% have either primary or secondary educational

qualification. What is instructive here is that most of the respondents are highly educated. But how does the level of education of the respondents help the sanctity of democratic practice in Nigeria? This question will be addressed by relevant data in the relevant sections of this study. This is even more interesting because there are no regulations on educational level as requirements for participating in primary elections, as the case is with general elections.

Occupation: Table 4.1.1 further shows that 55% of the respondents were self-employed; 16% were either unemployed or retired; 26% were in government organizations and 3% were engaged by private organizations.

Table 4.1.2: Distribution of Respondents by Political Party

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| PDP | 320 | 49 |
| APC | 338 | 51 |
| Total | 658 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

As shown in Table 4.1.2, the party memberships of the respondents are 49% for the Peoples Democratic Party and 51% for the All Progressives Congress (APC). This represents a fair share of the representation of the two main political parties used for this study.

Table 4.1.3: Distribution of Respondents by State

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Adamawa | 100 | 15 |
| Kaduna | 82 | 13 |
| Kogi | 93 | 14 |
| Enugu | 86 | 13 |
| Ondo | 100 | 15 |
| Edo | 97 | 15 |
| FCT | 100 | 15 |
| Total | 658 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.3 shows the number and percentage of participation of respondents from the States surveyed. The Table shows that 15% of the respondents are from Adamawa; 13% from Kaduna; 14% are from Kogi; 13% are from Enugu; 15% are from Ondo; 15% are from Edo; and 15% are from the Federal Capital Territory. It must be noted that the state here refers to the states where the respondents registered as a voters as reflected in the voters cards of the respondents. It does not necessarily mean the state of origin of the respondents.

Table 4.1.4: Votes Influenced by Money and Material Inducements

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 211 | 32 |
| Agree | 267 | 41 |
| Neutral | 48 | 7 |
| Disagree | 84 | 13 |
| Strongly Disagree | 48 | 7 |
| Total | 658 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.4 shows the respondents' views on how votes are influenced by monetary and material inducements. Here, 73% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that money was offered to voters for their votes in the 2015 primary elections, compared to only 20% who either disagreed or strongly disagreed that money was used to influence votes. This scenario corroborates the response of a PDP youth leader and a delegate at the 2015 governorship primary election in his State. He noted that:

Money is what makes participating for elective position in Nigeria possible. This is because you cannot initiate or sustain your political ambition without having plenty of money that you are ready to part with. You can as well forget politics without money.


The view of the respondent which corroborates the experiences or opinions of the delegates can further be substantiated by the very high cost of nomination forms for elective positions, especially those of Presidential, Governorship and National Assembly positions. Table 4.1.5 shows a comparative figure of price tags on party tickets by political parties.

Table 4.1.5: Political Parties and Cost of Nomination and Expression of Interest Forms in the 2015 General Elections

| Political Party | Presidential | Gubernatorial | Senatorial | House of Representatives |
|---------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| All Progressives Congress (APC) | 27.5 Million | 16.5 Million | 5.5 Million | 2.2 Million |
| Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) | 22 Million | 11 Million | 5.5 Million | 2.2 Million |

Source: Freedom writers, 2014.

Fig 4.1: Cost of Nomination Forms



Source: Freedom writers, 2014

Also, the current president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, had shown disdain for the high cost of purchasing party tickets for elective positions when he reacted to his party's presidential ticket cost thus:

It is a pity that I could not influence this amount that has to be paid like it was done for the ladies who are trying to participate and for the disabled. I looked left and right and could not read sympathy on anybody's face and so I kept my trap shut and felt heavily sorry for myself. (ThisDay, 2014).

Also, the Labour Party issued a statement to condemn the monetization of party tickets by the APC and PDP warning that it could derail democratic values in Nigeria.

The high cost of nomination forms will turn politics into business. The party believes that to ask for high fees for nomination forms is a creation of foundation of corruption. (Alliance for Democracy, 2014)

From the foregoing, therefore, the data strongly suggest that monetary baits as a form of demagoguery plays a crucial role in the democratic politics of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, so that qualified and willing Nigerians who have much to contribute to public service at the level of

politics are artificially stopped or forced to jettison the idea because of the lack of money. This finding confirms the observations of Fund (2008) and Simmel (1907) that some of the malady that makes fraud and foul-ups in election counts possible seems to be built into the system by design to serve the interests of the benefiting political class.

Table 4.1.6: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Leaders/Mentors

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 142 | 22 |
| Agree | 296 | 47 |
| Neutral | 50 | 8 |
| Disagree | 106 | 16 |
| Strongly Disagree | 43 | 7 |
| Total | 637 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.6 shows that 69% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that votes cast by delegates were influenced by their political leaders and mentors. Only 23% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that the votes were influenced by their political leaders/mentors. This brings to the fore the ever-present argument in the politics of Nigeria about the overbearing influence of political leaders, often referred to as godfathers, in determining those who emerge as not just flag bearers of political parties but the eventual ‘winners’ of the main elections through the roles of the godfathers. The data substantiate the argument of Walker (1966) that in democratic situations, politicians have imposed themselves as politically significant reference groups that arrogate to themselves major influence on the political behaviour the average citizens regardless of his own satisfaction or resentment.

Table 4.1.7: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes Influenced by Threats

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 90 | 14 |
| Agree | 190 | 29 |
| Neutral | 112 | 17 |
| Disagree | 140 | 21 |
| Strongly Disagree | 125 | 19 |
| Total | 657 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.7 shows that 43% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that threats were employed in influencing votes. However, 40% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed on whether or not their votes were influenced by threats, with 17% deciding to stay neutral about the use of threats to influence votes.

Table 4.1.8: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by a Combination of Inducement and Threats

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 152 | 24 |
| Agree | 194 | 30 |
| Neutral | 58 | 9 |
| Disagree | 154 | 24 |
| Strongly Disagree | 86 | 13 |
| Total | 644 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.8 shows that there is a high rate incidence of inducement and threats in influencing votes. As shown above, 54% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that votes were influenced by a combination of both inducement and threats. This corroborates the findings of Ogunbodede and Lawal (2015) that where inducement fails to achieve its aim of subverting the democratic process, it could be mixed with some level of threats and/or violence to force through the antidemocratic stratagems.

The results above substantiate the report of the Human Rights Watch that Nigeria’s elections were subject to threats and all forms of intimidations such that victory was largely facilitated by threats to the lives and properties of opponents and their supporters (See Appendix J).

Table 4.1.9: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Voting process was Influenced by Intimidation/ Fraud

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 133 | 20 |
| Agree | 202 | 31 |
| Neutral | 80 | 12 |
| Disagree | 145 | 22 |
| Strongly Disagree | 95 | 15 |
| Total | 655 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.9 shows that 51% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that voting process was characterized by intimidation and fraud. This point was corroborated by the following narrative of a respondent who reported that she was a victim of fraud in the senatorial election primary where she was an aspirant.

A former governor of my State bought about 100 ballots from the National executives of my political party which was smuggled into the box of his preferred aspirant. When other aspirants noticed this, they resisted it which led to the fracas that terminated the voting process. Unfortunately, the aspirant that was the anointed aspirant of a former National Chairman of our party was announced as the winner of the election as against the reality of what transpired at the primary election. (Senatorial Aspirant of PDP in the 2015 primary elections in a North-Central State).

Whether it is at the primary elections or the general elections it has always been a subject of accusations and counter-accusations that fraud and intimidations have always characterized elections in the politics of Nigeria, particularly in the Fourth Republic.

The data also supports the position of Arowolo (2015) that entrenched electoral fraud in Nigeria is a major threat to the survival and growth of democracy in Nigeria.

Table 4.1.10: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Voting Process Violated Democratic Rules or Principles

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 168 | 26 |
| Agree | 189 | 29 |
| Neutral | 79 | 12 |
| Disagree | 146 | 22 |
| Strongly Disagree | 73 | 11 |
| Total | 655 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015.

Table 4.1.10 clearly shows that the violation of democratic rules and principles is very high. From the Table, 55% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that there were violations of democratic values or principles in the conduct of elections by politicians and other stakeholders, while 33% either disagreed or strongly disagreed.

This very high number reflects the current danger that Nigeria's democracy faces. This danger does not necessarily have to include a military coup or truncating of Nigeria's democracy, but an indictment of Nigeria's democratic values, for which many lives have been lost to bring the nation to what it is today, democratically.

This finding also confirms the assertion by Ake (2008) that democracy in Nigeria has continuously failed to reflect the minimum democratic values that are well crested in relevant laws, including the Electoral Act and the Constitution.

Table 4.1.11: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Poverty is Responsible for the Inability of Delegates and Voters to Choose Candidates Independently of What Their Leaders Tell Them

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 275 | 42 |
| Agree | 239 | 36 |
| Neutral | 38 | 6 |
| Disagree | 68 | 10 |
| Strongly Disagree | 38 | 6 |
| Total | 658 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.11 shows that the high level of poverty and economic dependence of delegates and voters on the very rich political class is a crucial reason why voters have little or no independence in voting aspirants or candidates independently of the will of their leaders. From the table, a whopping 78% of the respondents either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that poverty was a factor responsible for voters’ decision to always vote candidates that reflected the choices of political leaders. Only a handful of 16% either “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” that poverty was responsible.

This position was corroborated by a respondent during the in-depth interview, when he narrated that in the last primary election of his party to pick a governorship candidate, the party leaders were the people responsible in writing the names of ‘loyal party members’ for the exercise, with

promise of huge monetary reward. He reflected on the exercise thus:

Initially my name was included in the delegate list for the governorship primary, but it was later removed by a party leader in my ward on the allegation that I was going to vote a candidate that the party leaders were not supporting. I protested my removal until I was reconsidered after series of assurances to our leaders that I would vote for the candidate that was favoured by the party leadership. And of course, the favoured aspirant was the incumbent governor. That was the person I voted for.

(Delegate from North-Central Nigeria).

The struggle to become a delegate is as fierce as the struggle to become a candidate of a party. The reason for this struggle is because of the monetary reward that normally comes to the delegates.

Table 4.1.12: Distribution of Respondents by Whether were Votes Influenced by Monetary Inducement Only

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 209 | 32 |
| Agree | 279 | 43 |
| Neutral | 41 | 6 |
| Disagree | 73 | 11 |
| Strongly Disagree | 51 | 8 |
| Total | 653 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.12 shows that 75% of the respondents either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that monetary inducement took place at the elections to influence voting, while 19% either “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” that money was used to influence voting.

In an in-depth interview carried out with a delegate, he narrated how money was used to induce delegates thus:

Each of the delegates was given four hundred thousand naira (400,000) as inducement. Although, 50% of the money (i.e., 200,000 naira) must be paid to the party at the ward level to enable the settlement of those party leaders or influential members whose names were not included in the delegate list. So, I was left with 200,000 naira, from which I still have to settle so many people on a voluntary note.

(Delegate, 2015 Gov. Primary).

This again emphasizes the highly deterministic role of demagoguery, as represented here by monetary inducement, in the democratic politics of Nigeria, particularly in the Fourth Republic.

Table 4.1.13: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Religious Sentiments

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 136 | 21 |
| Agree | 205 | 31 |
| Neutral | 89 | 14 |
| Disagree | 111 | 17 |
| Strongly Disagree | 110 | 17 |
| Total | 651 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.13 shows that 52% either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that votes were influenced by religious sentiments, while 34% either “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” that votes were as a result of religious sentiment.

According to Ake (1998, 2008), there are strong indications that Nigeria’s politics cannot be totally said to be free from religious sentiments, even though this factor has been structurally addressed, to a large extent, by political parties in ensuring that when a candidate for an elective position is a Christian, the Deputy or Vice necessarily becomes a Muslim, and vice-versa. This Nigerian solution to the potential tension of religious sentiments also played out during the

military regimes, except the Buhari military administration between 1983 and 1985 where both the Head of State and the ‘Vice’ practiced same religion.

However, it must be noted that the political elites continue to use religious sentiment as a demagogic tool to engender sentiments for purely political reasons, and not for the advancement of the religion *per se*.

Table 4.1.14: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Ethnic Sentiments

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 140 | 22 |
| Agree | 283 | 44 |
| Neutral | 86 | 13 |
| Disagree | 86 | 13 |
| Strongly Disagree | 54 | 8 |
| Total | 649 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.14 shows that 66% of the respondents either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that ethnic sentiments influenced votes cast, while only 21% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that ethnic sentiments influenced votes. This is expected in a country where ethnicity plays a very significant role in its political affairs. In fact, the idea of Federal Character which is enshrined in the constitution and rotational presidency (and other elective and appointive offices) contained in the constitution and other documents of political parties all give credence to the significance of ethnicity as an indispensable factor in the politics of Nigeria. The significance of ethnic sentiment highlighted here corroborates the finding of Ikporukpo and Ogroh (2015) that the electoral victories recorded by political parties in Nigeria since the Fourth republic have reflected ethnic sentimentalities.

Taking advantage of the role of ethnicity in the politics of Nigeria, politicians engage in acts of demagoguery to accuse political opponents of ethnic marginalization with the aim achieving political purposes. For example, in the run-up to the 2015 Presidential elections, supporters of the former (then incumbent) President, Goodluck Jonathan, echoed the need to allow the “Ijaw man” complete two tenures as required by the constitution for “peace to reign.” Other ethnic jingoist like the ex-militant leader, Asari Dokubo, an Ijaw man also, threatened to lead a revolt against the Nigerian nation if his kinsman, President Jonathan, was not re-elected as the President of Nigeria (Niger Delta watch, c.2014). In fact, all ethnic groups in Nigeria are sentimental and politicians use these ethnic and tribal sentiments to advance their political ambitions, not necessarily to promote the welfare of the ethnic groups they claim to champion their causes.

Table 4.1.15: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Use of Force

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 79 | 12 |
| Agree | 172 | 27 |
| Neutral | 99 | 15 |
| Disagree | 178 | 28 |
| Strongly Disagree | 118 | 18 |
| Total | 646 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.15 shows that 39% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that votes was influenced by the use of force, while 46% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that voters were forced to vote against their will.

Table 4.1.16: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Votes were Influenced by Intimidation

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 91 | 14 |
| Agree | 201 | 31 |
| Neutral | 91 | 14 |
| Disagree | 183 | 28 |
| Strongly Disagree | 89 | 13 |
| Total | 655 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.16 shows that 45% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that intimidation was employed in ensuring that voters voted for particular candidates, irrespective of who they actually wanted on their own. However, 41% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that intimidation was employed in the voting process.

Table 4.1.17: Distribution of Respondents on the Use of Thugs to Intimidate Voters

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 82 | 12 |
| Agree | 116 | 18 |
| Neutral | 123 | 19 |
| Disagree | 227 | 35 |
| Strongly Disagree | 104 | 16 |
| Total | 652 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.17 shows that 30% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that thugs were used to intimidate voters, while 51% disagreed or strongly disagreed that thugs were used to intimidate voters.

While thuggery at primary elections can be curtailed to a reasonable extent, the narrative is different in general elections where youths operate as political thugs to undermine the will of the people (Ajidahun, 2015).

Table 4.1.18: Distribution of Respondents on the Use of Security Agencies to Intimidate Delegates

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 111 | 17 |
| Agree | 154 | 24 |
| Neutral | 127 | 19 |
| Disagree | 177 | 27 |
| Strongly Disagree | 86 | 13 |
| Total | 655 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.18 shows that 41% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that security agencies were used to intimidate voters, while 40% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that security agencies intimidated voters. The use of security agencies to intimidate voters has always generated controversies in the Nigerian political space. For example, in the 2014 governorship elections in Ekiti State, Captain Sogir, a military intelligence officer revealed how the military and other security agencies worked with a political party on the orders of the presidency to rig the governorship election in favour of a particular candidate and political party (Premium Times, 2015).

Table 4.1.19: Distribution of Respondents by Whether Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates Were Subjected to Harassment

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 136 | 21 |
| Agree | 206 | 31 |
| Neutral | 121 | 19 |
| Disagree | 114 | 17 |
| Strongly Disagree | 78 | 12 |
| Total | 655 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.19 shows that 52% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that political and/or party leaders who refused to accept the imposition of candidates were subjected to harassment or political persecution. However, 29% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that party leaders opposed to imposition were harassed or persecuted.

Table 4.1.20: Election Did Not Follow Due Process and Rule of Law

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 94 | 15 |
| Agree | 216 | 34 |
| Neutral | 69 | 11 |
| Disagree | 172 | 27 |
| Strongly Disagree | 80 | 13 |
| Total | 631 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.20 shows that 49% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the primary elections failed to adhere to due process and the rule of law in the manner they were conducted. However, 40% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the elections did not follow due process and rule of law.

The reality is that neither of the parties can be exonerated from acts of electoral irregularities or demagoguery. However, the degree of violations and impunity differ, where PDP, from available data, leads all other parties. The obvious reason for the high level of impunity of the PDP was because it was the ruling party between 1999 and 2015, and so the battle to become the candidate of the ruling party was so ferocious, as being the candidate almost amounted to winning the election, not unmindful of the notoriety of using the Federal might to influence electoral victory.

Table 4.1.21: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Candidates Produced By Primary Elections May Not Be Based on Merit or Leadership Qualities of Candidates”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 151 | 23 |
| Agree | 211 | 32 |
| Neutral | 54 | 8 |
| Disagree | 141 | 22 |
| Strongly Disagree | 94 | 14 |
| Total | 651 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.21 shows that 55% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the candidates produced by the elections conducted were neither based on merit nor the leadership qualities that the candidates possessed. In other words, there were candidates that may have better leadership qualities who failed to emerge as the candidates of the parties because the demagoguery that played out at the elections. However, 36% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that candidates produced were not based on merits or perceived leadership qualities of the candidates.

The quantum number of election cases at the courts challenging the merit of the candidates of political parties for general elections and the judgments that have nullified the candidacy of some elected candidates validate the findings of this study.

Table 4.1.22: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Poor Leadership Can Result From Imposition of Candidates on the People”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 306 | 47.3 |
| Agree | 247 | 38.2 |
| Neutral | 45 | 7.0 |
| Disagree | 31 | 4.8 |
| Strongly Disagree | 18 | 2.8 |
| Total | 647 | 100.0 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.22 shows that 85% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that when candidates are imposed on the people, the possibility of ineffective leadership would be very high. This shows that there is a high displeasure at the imposition of candidates on the people, even at the level of primary elections. Just a mere 8% either disagreed or strongly disagreement that imposition of candidates could result in poor or ineffective leadership.

Table 4.1.23: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Political Leaders Undermine Democracy through Imposition of Candidates and Rigging of Elections”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 304 | 46.7 |
| Agree | 275 | 42.2 |
| Neutral | 48 | 7.4 |
| Disagree | 16 | 2.5 |
| Strongly Disagree | 8 | 1.2 |
| Total | 651 | 100.0 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.23 shows that 89% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that imposition of candidates and rigging of elections at all levels of our democracy by politicians undermine democracy. Only 4% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that political leaders undermine democracy through imposition of candidates and rigging of elections. Unfortunately, however, whereas politicians and other stakeholders of democracy agree that electoral fraud contravenes democratic principles and values, the weak democratic institutions and political culture of the country encourages, rather than deter, people to engage or promote acts of demagoguery in Nigeria’s political scenery.

This was the view of a respondent in one of the in-depth interviews conducted. The respondent explained thus:

Some of the tricks we use in rigging elections are provided by the officials of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Once they have been settled, they tell us how we can manipulate the elections successfully.

(Party agent of a major political party in Nigeria’s general elections).

Table 4.1.24: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Election Rigging Is As a Result of Fielding Imposed Candidates for Elections”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 226 | 34.9 |
| Agree | 267 | 41.2 |
| Neutral | 91 | 14.0 |
| Disagree | 29 | 4.5 |
| Strongly Disagree | 35 | 5.4 |
| Total | 648 | 100.0 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.24 shows that 76% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that when delegates emerge through acts of demagoguery, such as the imposition of candidates, it gives rise to the propensity to rig elections. This means that when candidates are fielded through flawed primary elections by political parties, the political parties and the beneficiaries of such election fraud will likely engage in more fraud or demagoguery to ensure the fielded candidates emerge as election winners at all costs. Only 10% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that election rigging could be as a result of fielding imposed candidates for elections.

The views of a former governorship candidate and a party leader of a major political party confirm the assertion that election rigging starts from the imposition of candidates. According to him:

There is so much impunity in the politics of Nigeria. This is why candidates, irrespective of their political popularity, are imposed on the party and the people by politicians, believing that the votes of the people will not be the ultimate decider of a winner of an election, but the manipulative ability of politicians on the field.

Table 4.1.25: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Nigeria's Democracy Will Not Grow If There Is Imposition of Candidates and Other Forms of Electoral Malpractices”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 397 | 61.5 |
| Agree | 189 | 29.3 |
| Neutral | 38 | 5.9 |
| Disagree | 11 | 1.7 |
| Strongly Disagree | 11 | 1.7 |
| Total | 646 | 100.0 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.25 shows that 91% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that election fraud at all levels inhibits the deepening and growth of Nigeria’s democracy, while only 3% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that imposition of candidates or manipulation of elections would inhibit the deepening and growth of democracy in Nigeria. This view was very well supported by the responses of politicians that were interviewed in the in-depth interview session. A politician from a North-Central state who admitted to have been involved in some of the undemocratic practices in elections since the advent of the Fourth Republic responded thus:

What we are doing in Nigeria is not democracy. All that is required to win election is to undermine the rules of democracy using money to compromise voters, INEC, security agencies and other party agents who will help to rig elections in your favour. Every politician, except a few people like Buhari, is involved in this undemocratic practices. But all politicians like to benefit from it. They only complain when they are not the beneficiaries of the democratic maneuverings
(Nigerian politician from a North-Central state).

Table 4.1.26: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “The Greatest Challenge to Democracy in Nigeria is the Abuse of Power and Disregard for Due Process and the Rule of Law in Democratic Activities”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 353 | 54.1 |
| Agree | 256 | 39.2 |
| Neutral | 30 | 4.6 |
| Disagree | 10 | 1.5 |
| Strongly Disagree | 4 | .6 |
| Total | 653 | 100.0 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.26 shows that a whopping 93% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that Nigeria’s democracy is besieged by the undemocratic behaviour of the political class, as they circumvent and undermine due process and the rule of law in pursuit of their political ambitions. However, an insignificant number of respondents, 2%, either disagreed or strongly disagreed that the abuse of power and other undemocratic behaviour of the political class posed serious challenges to democracy in Nigeria.

The letter written by Chief Audu Ogbah, a former Chairman of PDP and then-ruling party to President Obasanjo, on the political crises generated by the activities of the political class in Anambra State and the failure of the President to act highlights the dangers that abuse of power by politicians posed and still poses to democratic survival in Nigeria (See Appendix F). Similarly, Obasanjo’s resentful reply to the Chairman demonstrated his knowledge (and probably his approval) about the realities of unconstitutional and undemocratic political practices inherent in the Nigerian political context (See Appendix G).

The in-depth interviews conducted with respondents also confirm the results in Table 4.1.26, as the interviewees emphasized the high rate of impunity in the practice of democracy in Nigeria.

For example, a respondent stated thus:

The failure of the political class and voters to play by the rule is a great challenge to our democracy. It is a culture that thrives because voters demand and are willing to sell their votes to politicians; politicians are willing to do anything to emerge victorious at the polls because of the way political office affords them massive riches and power; underfunding of INEC makes them solicit financial assistance from politicians or public officers to do their work and in the process are compromised

(INEC electoral officer).

Respondents also gave insight into how in many rural areas in Nigeria the secret ballot is often violated in favour of the open voting so as to facilitate the clandestine objectives of buying votes and the coercion of voters.

Table 4.1.27: Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Qualified and Willing Nigerians Avoid Politics Because of the Dangers and Maneuverings Associated with Democratic Politics in Nigeria”

| Responses | Frequency | Percent (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Strongly Agree | 302 | 46.2 |
| Agree | 282 | 43.2 |
| Neutral | 32 | 4.9 |
| Disagree | 16 | 2.5 |
| Strongly Disagree | 21 | 3.2 |
| Total | 653 | 100.0 |

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.1.27 shows that 89% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that qualified

and willing Nigerians stay away from politics because of the dangerous and dirty-nature of politics in Nigeria’s democracy, especially in the Fourth Republic. Only 6% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that there are qualified and willing Nigerians who stay away from politics because of the dangerous and dirty-nature of democratic politics in Nigeria.

Responses from the in-depth interview conducted with stakeholders confirm the view that there are qualified and willing Nigerians who avoid politics because they consider the political terrain as too hazardous and unhallowed for honest people to venture into.

4.2 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION)

Table 4.3.1 Distribution of Respondents by their views on “Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates Were Harassed”

| | Responses | Sex | |
|--------|-------------------|--------|--------|
| | | Male | Female |
| N= 655 | Strongly Agree | 20.6% | 21.1% |
| | Agree | 34.0% | 24.9% |
| | Neutral | 18.5% | 18.4% |
| Total | Disagree | 14.5% | 24.9% |
| | Strongly Disagree | 12.3% | 10.8% |
| | | 100.0% | 100.0% |

The cross tabulation (Table 4.2.1) shows that of 655 respondents, by sex distribution, 55% male either strongly agreed or agreed that party leaders who opposed imposition of candidates were subject to harassment; 18% male were neutral and 27% male either disagreed or strongly disagreed. However, in the case of the female, 26% either strongly agreed or agreed; 18% neutral and 36% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that party leaders who opposed imposition of candidates were subject to harassment.

The calculated value of Chi-Square (X^2) = 12; df = 4; $p < 0.05$ at 0.017. This implies that there is a significant difference between male and female respondents regarding their views on whether

or not party leaders who opposed imposition were harassed by the powerful political forces. This is understandable from the fact that cultural factors limit the extent to which women are harassed when compared to men in the context of political defiance to party leadership. For instance, in the run-up to the 2015 general elections, even though both female and male politicians staged a walk out from the National Congress of the Peoples Democratic Party, majority of the allegations of political persecution, harassment and intimidation proceeded from the male politicians (Premium Times, c.2014).

Also, age, party, and state of respondents are significantly related to views on harassment of party leaders opposed to imposition of candidates in a cross tabulation analysis with P-Values at 0.002, 0.001 and .000 respectively (See Appendix K). However, religion, marital status, educational level and occupation of respondents were not significant predictors of views on harassment of party leaders opposed to imposition of candidates in a cross tabulation analysis with P-Values at .104, .198, .201 and .817 respectively.

Appendix K shows that religion, marital status, educational level, party, and state of respondents are significantly related to views that primary elections conducted violated due process and the rule of law in a cross tabulation analysis with P-Values at 0.02, 0.03, 0.002, 0.000 and 0.000 respectively. However, age, sex and occupation of respondents were not significantly related to views that primary elections conducted violated due process and the rule of law.

Appendix K shows that irrespective of the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, majority of the respondents believed that elections were conducted under an atmosphere of demagoguery ranging from intimidation, bribery, thuggery, imposition of candidates, application of threats and other forms of anti-democratic tendencies that undermine the integrity of democratic tradition.

4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSES

In order to explore and explain the relationship between a dependent variable and a number of independent variables or predictors, the study used the linear/standard multiple regression to address a variety of research questions. Multiple regression provided information about the model as a whole (all subscales), and the relative contribution of each of the variables that make

up the model (individual subscales). Thus, each independent variable was evaluated in terms of its predictive power, over and above that offered by all the other independent variables.

Multicollinearity: From the standard regression analysis table (See Appendix L in the Table labeled “**Correlations**”), the independent variables show some appreciable relationship (above .3) with the dependent variable (election outcome) except for the independent variables of “Votes influenced by religious sentiments” and “Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates” that do not correlate substantially with the outcome of primary elections (.27 and .29 respectively). But because they are still somewhat correlated at .27 and .29, the variables are still retained along the other independent variables.

Residuals Statistics: In the residual statistics table (see Appendix L), Cook’s Distance statistical test was determined to check whether the possible presence of any strange case had any undue influence on the results of the model as a whole. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), cases with values larger than 1 are a potential problem. From the data, the maximum value for Cook’s Distance is .018, approximately .02, suggesting no major problems.

Table 4.3.1 Model Summary

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | .481(a) | .232 | .223 | 1.240 |

As shown in Table 4.4.1, the R Square is .232. Expressed as a percentage (multiply by 100, by shifting the decimal point two places to the right), it means that the independent variables (Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates, Votes influenced by religious sentiments, Votes influenced by leaders/mentors, Votes influenced by money, Voting process influenced by intimidation/fraud, Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments, Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats) explains 23.2% of the variance election outcomes of the primaries of PDP and APC. The statistical significance of this result is reported in Table labeled 4.3.2.

Table 4.3.2: ANOVA

| Model | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|-------|------------|----------------|-----|-------------|--------|---------|
| 1 | Regression | 276.348 | 7 | 39.478 | 25.664 | .000(a) |
| | Residual | 916.811 | 596 | 1.538 | | |
| | Total | 1193.159 | 603 | | | |

This tests the null hypothesis that multiple R in the population equals 0. The model in this example reaches statistical significance (Sig = .000, this really means $p < .0005$). Hence, the independent variables significantly predict the outcome of the model.

Table 4.3.3 tells the extent to which each of the independent variables included in the model contributed to the prediction of the dependent variable (election Victory). This can be deduced from the column labelled **Beta** under **Standardised Coefficients**. Because the goal is to *compare* the contribution of each independent variable, the beta values will be used. ‘Standardized’ means that these values for each of the different variables have been converted to the same scale so that they can be compared.

In this case the largest beta coefficient is .174, which is for Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats. This means that this variable makes the strongest unique contribution to explaining the dependent variable, when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled for. The Beta value for voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud was the next strongest (.130). Conversely, **Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments and religious sentiments had the least Beta values (0.65 and 0.67 respectively)**, indicating that they made least of contributions.

Table 4.3.3: Coefficients

| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. |
|-------|--|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | B | Std. Error |
| 1 | (Constant) | .732 | .166 | | 4.395 | .000 |
| | Votes influenced by money | .085 | .053 | .074 | 1.602 | .110 |
| | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | .097 | .053 | .082 | 1.841 | .066 |
| | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | .178 | .050 | .174 | 3.582 | .000 |
| | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | .133 | .048 | .130 | 2.775 | .006 |
| | Votes influenced by religious sentiments | .068 | .045 | .067 | 1.526 | .128 |
| | Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments | .077 | .055 | .065 | 1.415 | .158 |
| | Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates | .107 | .044 | .098 | 2.452 | .014 |

The implication of this result shows that elections outcomes, particularly for primary elections, are the result of a combination of acts of demagoguery. However, the degree of influence is highest in cases where inducements or bribes were complemented by threats to voters or where threats to voters were complemented by inducements. The result answers the first research question in this study that sought to ascertain the role that demagoguery play in the democratic politics of Nigeria. It is clear from the results above that to win elections in Nigeria, a combination of undemocratic practices, including (but not limited to) intimidation, monetary inducement, threats and election frauds are all instrumental features.

Also, the results addressed the first research question and objective of this study. From the result above, it is obvious that demagoguery manifests through monetization of politics, inducements or bribery of voters and election officials, misuse of security agencies for political advantage, intimidation and fraud, ethnic and religious sentiments. However, the extent to which each (and even a combination of some) of the factors contribute to outcomes of elections vary.

4.4 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses were tested in this study:

HYPOTHESIS ONE

Alternative Hypothesis (HA): The outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria depends on acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, intimidation and election fraud

HYPOTHESIS TWO

Alternative Hypothesis (HA): Money is the most significant factor in determining the outcome of elections in Nigeria

In the light of the regression analyses performed above, the following decisions about the hypotheses are made.

Hypothesis 1: The null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis accepted (retained) because the Sig = .000. This means that the statement that outcome of elections in democratic contestations in Nigeria depends on acts of demagoguery including monetary inducement, intimidation and election fraud is true.

Hypothesis 2: The null hypothesis is accepted (retained) and the alternative hypothesis rejected as the t-test shows a p value of .110 which is not significant at the 5% level. It may be correct, therefore, that money is not the most significant factor in determining the outcome of elections in Nigeria.

4.5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Demagoguery as exemplified by intimidation of candidates and voters, vote buying, bribery, thuggery, and other antidemocratic practices have symbolic value as part of Nigeria's routine political activities. Hence, demagogic practices are enacted democratic essentials that tend to reconcile the grievances of the electorates against the political class. In this sense, all the interviewees pointed to the situation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic where the electorates, having failed to derive the benefits of democracy from the political class in terms of improved economic condition for the populace and other democratic dividends that have subsequently been promised by politicians, see election periods as the time to demand for their own share of the national cake by demanding that the politicians pay for the votes they desperately seek for during elections, either by offering them money or other material inducements. That 73% of respondents (Table 4.1.4) believed that money and material inducements were used for the elections substantiate the prominence of demagoguery in Nigeria's democratic practice in the Fourth Republic. In fact, an INEC official interviewed noted that it is at the period of elections that the citizens demand for and can get the dividends of democracy from politicians in the form of payment for votes.

Thus, while elections in Nigeria provide occasions for electorates to demand for their share of the national cake, it also provides politicians the inescapable platform to 'surrender' part of their loots to the people that have been denied the chance to benefit from the gains of democracy through the profligacy of self-centred political class. A delegate, who is also a youth leader, emphasized that the only time politicians are ready to bring out part of their loots is at election periods, and so voters are mindful of that reality and thus must demand that the politicians pay for the votes they have to get to win elections.

Demagoguery thus emerged at the point where there was a disconnect between the electorates and the political class in agreeing on the objectives and goal of democracy such that the electorates see political leaders, and not the populace, as the real beneficiaries of democracy, and politicians, seeing the hopelessness of the people towards democracy and political leaders, no

longer have to depend on the electorates through credible elections for the “people” to elect them into power. While the option of monetary and material inducements is very common, there are cases where a combination of inducements and threats has to be used to ‘win’ elections (Table 4.1.8). Consequently, on one hand, the people demand for bribe, engage in all sorts of deceptions to gain material benefits from politicians while promising their “one” vote to all the candidates and parties that seek their support and, on the other hand, politicians engage in all forms of manipulations including intimidation of voters and opponents, use of security agencies to rig elections or gain undue advantage over their opponents, use of thugs to foment violence and all sorts of election fraud to gain or retain power by foul means. These scenarios are captured in the responses of respondents such that 69% of respondents believed that delegates casted their votes on the basis of pressure and instructions from party leaders; 43% believed that threats were used to get votes; 51% believed that intimidation and fraud characterized the voting process; 55% believed that elections conducted violated democratic rules and principles; 75% believed that monetary inducement characterized the election.

The role of poverty in making the citizens vulnerable to demagoguery in Nigeria’s politics was also noted. Thus, 78% of respondents were of the view that poverty undermines democratic norms and values, as delegates seldom resist the temptation to either demand or accept bribes before they can cast their votes for candidates. This situation was substantiated by one of the interviewees who narrated his experiences when it became a struggle to make the delegate list. He confessed that he was in dire need of money to pay for his children’s school fees and to feed his family when the delegates list for the governorship primaries was composed. He eventually survived the huddles and emerged as a delegate, and that the money (N450,000) he made from the primary elections was what he used for the payment of his children’s school fees. The demand for bribe by the electorates because of poverty and the willingness of politicians to bribe voters so they can win elections clearly explain the desirability of demagoguery among Nigerians and why the phenomenon of demagoguery seems tolerable in the Nigerian democratic context. It explains the social construction of demagoguery as a political reality of Nigeria’s democracy, where demagoguery becomes the creation (shared knowledge and understanding brought into play) by the symbolic interaction between Nigeria’s electorates and the political class. Hence, demagoguery as a political behaviour is guided largely by forces such as roles, norms and shared expectations between the general public and the political class.

Furthermore, democratic principles, culture and values that encourage credible, free and fair elections, rule of law, equality and liberty, and popular sovereignty exist as “front regions” in which politicians act out formal roles that befit democracy and leadership. Front regions refer to the aspects of social life, encounters and occasions in which individuals act to demonstrate commitment to formal and acceptable roles or practices (Goffman, 1950). For instance, the average Nigerian politician engages “on stage performances” by campaigning against political violence, vote buying, election fraud, and calls for free and fair elections on the basis of “one-man-one-vote.” Maintaining such front stage disposition by politicians shows the knowledge of the existence and expression of democratic ethos and values, even though politicians are not willing to leave their political destiny to the people based on established and globally acceptable democratic ethos. Hence, politicians resort to the “back regions” (condemnable practices and encounters that must be off public knowledge or view) where they can undermine the ethos, norms and values of democracy to achieve their political ambition, such that whereas they publicly condemn acts of demagoguery and speak against antidemocratic tendencies and practices such as intimidation, bribery, violence and election fraud (front region tactics), they actually are the culprit of sponsoring and engaging in all sorts of anti-democratic practices (demagoguery) to ensure they either gain or retain power or political advantage by all means (even when the people do not want them).

This study has explored how democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been subjected to various acts of duplicitous and fraudulent practices (demagoguery) that undermine the principles and values of democracy. These acts of demagoguery, whether it is blackmail of political opponents, phony voter registrations, illegal voting, ballot box stuffing, intimidation of voters, bribery, et cetera, occur in every part of Nigeria. Unfortunately, the study shows that demagoguery is part of the political culture of Nigeria and Nigerians, especially as candidates and voters have come to accept the political culture. This study reveals that demagoguery in Nigeria’s democratic politics has been embraced by the Nigerian people as a political culture. Thus, the attitudes and habits of the average Nigerian citizens, not just the political actors, consider politics as a venture that requires little or no moral uprightness. Thus, bribery, thugery, intimidation of voters, election rigging, and all sorts of anti-democratic behaviours are necessary evils that politicians and even voters subscribe to in the course of participating in politics. These political realities of democratic practices in Nigeria make it difficult for the deepening of

democratic values and practices.

A major finding of this study is the observation that election outcomes are not reflections of free, fair and credible elections or democratic process, but are the outcome of a constellation of demagogic factors such as monetary inducement, intimidation, the use of security agencies and thugs to disrupt or manipulate democratic processes or outcomes, and election fraud. That is to say, no single variable or factor can be said to be solely responsible for the democratic irregularities; instead, politicians have to engage in two or more forms of demagoguery for any hope of succeeding at the polls. Even incumbency factor must be complemented by inducements or bribery, intimidation, et cetera for any chance of electoral victory to be guaranteed. For the contestants who may not have access to the coercive force of the State (security agencies), and may have reasoned that the democratic process was compromised, with fraudulent outcomes, they may react to such irregularities with violence. This possibly explains the incidences of election violence experienced in Nigeria before, during and after elections, as candidates and political parties normally call on their supporters and followers to “defend their votes”, “defend yourself”, “fight for your rights”, “resist rigging” among other violence-implied instructions to their supporters

Contrary to the idea that money determines electoral success in Nigeria, the study established that although money is a necessary factor, it is not a sufficient factor for electoral success. That is, money cannot do much in isolation of other variables or factors such as intimidation, use of security agencies to aid election rigging and deliberate actions of thugs and security agencies to disenfranchise the citizens and thereby subject elections to fraud and fictitious figures. Whereas it is difficult for a politician to actualize his or her political ambition without being rich, which probably explains the fact that political battles are only open to the rich in the Nigerian society, those who lose elections or are rigged out in election contests are also very rich people. For example, Atiku Abubakar who was the former Vice-President of Nigeria had all the money to prosecute both the primary election in the PDP and the main election in the Action Congress in the 2007 presidential elections. But he was intimidated and finally expelled from the PDP by his principal, Olusegun Obasanjo both in PDP and in the general elections where elections were massively rigged using State agencies (National Democratic Institute, 2007).

From this study, it becomes clear that while the religious and ethnic affiliations of candidates may be crucial at the primary elections of the political parties, they do not constitute important factors in the general elections. Thus, the political elites have adopted the principle of “power rotation” among ethnic groups and religious affiliations to address the potential tensions that ethnicity and religion can generate in Nigeria’s political affairs. The fact that President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from a minority tribe, won the 2011 presidential election substantiates this view. The same reason can be adduced for the elections of Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru Yar’dua, where votes defied ethnic and religious sentiments. However, politicians use religious and ethnic chauvinisms as tools to undermine democratic tenets, and in some cases incite political crises.

In terms of locality, the study shows that while election fraud is mostly experienced in the rural areas of Nigeria due to little or no media coverage and absence of independent election observers, more technical and sophisticated frauds are obtainable in urban areas where the independent and international election observers are represented. This situation is the reverse in the United States of America where it has been noted that election fraud is most found in urban areas (Fund, 2008).

Political parties, apparently controlled by the political class, stage-manage and authorize guidelines that disenfranchise qualified Nigerians and party members from participating in the democratic process or limit the possibilities of members to exercise their democratic rights. Hence, the high cost of nomination forms for aspirants, the charade of disqualification of aspirants by political parties on flimsy and unsubstantiated allegations of “party disloyalty” represent demagoguery activities aimed at artificially preventing qualified Nigerians from exercising their democratic rights and constitutional rights. This practice violates the code of conduct signed by political parties in Nigeria (See Appendix C) that says “every political party shall provide equal opportunity to qualified persons to participate in electoral activities.”

The transaction that happens between the political class and the people in the form of cash-for-votes, intimidation of and violence against political opponents, the bribery of electoral officers, and the compromise of security agencies are some of the acts of demagoguery that are common features that undermine the sanctity of democratic principles and practices in Nigeria.

The political class, taking advantage of a papaurized citizens and their political paraphenalia, undermines and bully the rules of democracy and consequently assume an undue amount of power over democratic institutions and the people. The Speaker of Nigeria’s House of representatives put it thus: “The greatest problem why democracy is facing serious threat in Africa is because of poverty. The poor man does not engage in democracy, he doesn’t have the tools and so is excluded from the joys of democracy” (Saturday Telegraph, 28th Nov. 2015, p.7).

Importantly also, the study provides an understanding of the ‘game of deceit’ between the political class and the electorates. While the political or ruling elites engage in bogus and unrealistic campaign promises to deceive the electorates, the electorates insist on being given money or material inducements for votes. The demand for bribe by the electorates is extended to all ‘vote seekers’ (candidates for elections) whether or not they actually would vote for the candidate(s). For them, this is one way of benefiting from the politicians who after winning elections characterstically disappear from the people and the community until the next election when they will return seeking the votes of the people once more. What this means is that: demagoguery in Nigeria’s democratic politics is not exclusive to the ruling class but also a pheomenon that is attribute-able to the electorates.

4.5.1 WAYS IN WHICH DEMAGOGUERY MANIFESTS IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY

The study investigated the various types of conduct and acts of demagoguery which adversely affect the practice of democracy in Nigeria and how they manifest. The findings show that demagoguery in Nigeria’s democracy manifests in the following ways.

Imposition of Candidates: it remains a common practice in Nigeria’s democracy for powerful politician(s) to impose candidates on political parties as flag bearers in the general elections, with little or no recourse to internal party democratic procedures. Hence, the study clearly reveals that imposition of candidates was a pervasive phenomenon among the political parties, although the figures from respondents show that it was more pronounced in the PDP than in the APC. For instance, a PDP stalwart and former spokesperson to late President Yar’Adua confirms this fact when he noted that:

Obasanjo practically made Yar’Adua president of Nigeria—from foisting him on the party to running the campaign almost all by himself

(Adeniyi Olusegun, 2011)

Vote buying: this involves the practice whereby candidates for elections and their sponsors pay voters to register to vote or to participate in elections. The findings of this study show that there is a demand and supply relationship between voters and candidates standing for elections where voters demand for monetary inducement from candidates who want to get their votes. In some cases, the candidates exchange their voters' cards for money paid by the candidates or their supporters so the cards can be kept in the custody of the buyers until the day of the elections when they will be returned to the card owners to vote as agreed on the basis of the transactions.

A respondent in an in-depth interview session who was an official the electoral body (INEC) explained his experience at the 2015 polls in a South Western State thus:

In the 2015 governorship election, due to low turnout of voters, there were many ballot papers that were left. The political party agents agreed that the ballot papers be shared among the political parties. After that was done, the smaller political party agents sold their share of the ballot papers to the highest bidder from the two major contenders in the election (that is, PDP and APC).

Voter intimidation/Violence: this consists of actions aimed at preventing a voter or voters from participating in an election or compelling a voter to participate in such an election through psychological and/or physical threats or other forms of coercion or hostility. This study shows that voter intimidation is a major way that demagoguery manifests in the democratic politics of Nigeria (see Appendix M).

Voter registration fraud: this undemocratic act of demagoguery can take several forms, including: giving false information concerning a person's age, name or address in order to establish that person's eligibility to register or to vote in an election; cloning of voters' cards and production of fake ballot papers; submitting fictitious names on voters registration rolls thus qualifying ostensive voters to vote in an election; double or multiple registration by voters; et cetera.

Ballot box stuffing and illegal voting: according to Dosanto (2008), illegal voting involves the practice of voting in an election on behalf of individuals who do not personally participate in, and assent to, the act of voting attributed to them. Also, ballot box stuffing, which consists of the practice of diluting valid ballots with fake or invalid ballots, has been identified as one of the ways demagoguery plays out in Nigeria's democracy. This study shows that illegal voting and

ballot box stuffing are prominent features in elections in Nigeria such that Election Tribunal judgments from across the states of the country have established cases of illegal voting and ballot stuffing by persons and political parties. In the 2003 and 2007 elections involving Anambra, Edo, Ekiti, Ondo and Osun States, the Tribunals and Courts have had to resort to mathematical appraisals to return victories to candidates that had been declared losers in the elections that they were the actual winners (Ofeimun, 2010).

For example, a soldier who serves in Lagos, but was deployed to a South-South state for election duties narrated how they were induced and instructed to thumb-print ballot papers in favour a political party. This was how he put it.

We were taken to a place where we saw so many ballot papers. Soldiers protected the place from any civilian intruder. We thumb-printed the ballot papers until we became tired, but we had to finish the job. That was how the candidates we worked for won their elections.

Some of the more common ways these irregularities and crimes are committed includes the use of fictitious names on the voter registers, migratory voting schemes, casting of bogus votes as a way of making up for absentee voters, deliberate and forceful invalidation of validly casted votes, signature fraud and falsification of vote counts.

4.5.2 FACTORS THAT MAKE DEMAGOGUERY THRIVE IN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS OF NIGERIA

From the data provided, it is clear that the factors that give rise to acts of demagoguery or make engaging in various acts of demagoguery by political actors thrive include: high level of poverty which makes the political class to bribe voters and induce security agencies to intimidate uncompromising voters; the notion that demagoguery is part of the game makes it tolerable to all stakeholders in the democratic theatre; the slow nature of addressing electoral flaws in political and electoral disputes and the low rate of prosecution of electoral offenders are some key reasons adduced for the attractiveness of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy, particularly in the Fourth Republic.

Poverty makes voters to sell their votes for money. Typically, voters are provided with sachet ('pure') water and snacks to eat with the promise to be paid between "₦500 and ₦1000" as reward for voting a candidate. The findings of the study show that it is an explicably pervasive practice by politicians such that the practice is considered as "part of the game" especially that

the voters demand for it. Thus, poverty makes the average Nigerian voter to see elections as means of making money from politicians whom they rightly consider as self-serving individuals, who after winning elections, turn their backs at the electorates until another election period. The finding that huge monetary inducement was a prominent practice at political parties' primary elections was confirmed by the report from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which reveals how the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) paid the sum of ten billion naira (N10b) to politicians to facilitate the bribery of delegate for the 2015 presidential primary election of the PDP. This information was also contained in the following charges brought against the suspects in the Court.

That you Col. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki whilst being National Security Adviser and Shaibu Salisu, whilst being the Director of Finance and Administration in the Office of the National Security Adviser and Hon. Waripamowei Dudafa (now at large) whilst being Senior Special Assistant, Domestic Affairs to the President on or about 27th November within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court entrusted with dominion over certain properties to wit: the sum of N10billion being part of the funds in the account of the National Security Adviser with the CBN, the equivalent of which sum you received from the CBN in foreign currencies to wit: \$47million and €5.6million Euros committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the said property when you claimed to have distributed same to the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Presidential Primary Election delegates and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 315 of the Penal Code Act, Cap 532, Vol.4, LFN 2004. (The Nation, December 11, 2015).

Ignorance and lack of education were also identified as reasons that make demagoguery thrive in Nigeria. The voters do not care about who emerges as their leaders in so far as they are offered bribes for votes. The candidates or politicians generally take advantage of this situation to engage in all sorts of irregularities to gain or retain power during elections. Thus, the democratic rights of voters are either ignorantly sacrificed at the altar of pecuniary gains or misplaced due to lack of sufficient knowledge on how to insist on their democratic and constitutional rights. Also, voters are sometimes kept in the dark as regard vital information that would enable them perform their constitutional rights. For example, in the 2007 National Democratic Institute report on elections in Nigeria, it was clearly noted that:

INEC did not begin publicizing details of how polling would be organized until April 8. Prior to this, INEC officials made contradictory statements about whether voting would be a day-long process or would follow the "June 12 formula," with initial accreditation and returning to vote at a specific, limited time. INEC initially stated that results would be relayed electronically from the individual polling stations to three points simultaneously: the ward level, the constituency level and

INEC's national headquarters in Abuja. However, as results would not be compiled by local government area or state, observers worried about how to independently confirm that gubernatorial and presidential candidates received the geographical spread of votes required by Nigeria's legal framework (NDI, 2007).

The judicial system in Nigeria seems to treat election irregularities or malpractices with kids' glove. For example, out of the 36 States that elections were conducted in 2007, 5 States' elections were successfully overturned by the Tribunals and Courts. However, no one was prosecuted or jailed for such heinous crime of stealing the votes of the people and foisting 'leaders' that were not the choices of the people on them. So, obviously, there exist little or no strict sanctions that will deter politicians and voters from engaging in all sorts of electoral irregularities or demagoguery (See Appendixes D, E and M).

4.5.3 THE ROLE OF DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA'S DEMOCRACY

One of the objectives of this study was to examine the role of demagoguery in Nigeria's democracy in the Fourth Republic. The results and findings emanating from the study and available literature clearly show that demagoguery plays a major role in Nigeria's democracy. The role played by demagoguery includes disenfranchisement of eligible contestants and voters from participating in the democratic process; corruption of the election process and election fraud, and fraudulent declaration of winners of elections. It is important to note that these findings substantiate the narratives of Donald Duke, a former governor of Cross Rivers State, on how politicians connive with INEC to rig elections in Nigeria. It tells of the fact that the Nigerian political culture is such that the political stakeholders not only accept pecuniary incentives for their political actions and decisions, they indeed consider pecuniary demands as a transactional feature of political behaviour.

Precisely in July 2010, Donald Duke, a former governor of a state from the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria, provided a detailed account of how powerful politicians, particularly governors, rig elections (Cpafrica, 2010). This was what he said:

After the courtesy call, the Resident Electoral Commissioner now moves in for one-on-one with the governor and he says: 'Your Excellency, since I came, I've been staying in this hotel, there is no accommodation for me and even my vehicle is broken down and the last commissioner didn't leave the vehicle; so help me to settle down quickly.' And the governor says, 'Chief of Staff, where is the Chief of Staff? And the Chief of Staff appears. Governor says: "Please ensure that the REC is accommodated; put him in the presidential lodge, allot two cars to him. I give you seven days to get this done. Then the relationship

has started. The governor now turns round and says: ‘call me the party chairman.’ The party chairman appears and the governor says: ‘INEC requires 50,000 people for the conduct of the elections. See to it that we meet their needs.’ The chairman goes and airs in the evening on radio and television: ‘There will be an urgent meeting of all local government chairmen and secretaries of XYZ party at the headquarters. They should report promptly at 10am because matters of urgent interest will be discussed.’ End of announcement. Now we have texts messages, so it’s easier, in no time everybody is here.” “There is not a polling booth that is more than 500. So only 200 people appear here, 300 there, 100 there, 50 there, 400 there. At the end of elections what happens? The presiding officer sits down and calls a few guys and says, ‘hey, there are a few hundred papers here, let’s thumb print. This is the real election. Well, this is not a PDP thing. I am not here to castigate the PDP; it’s a Nigerian thing. This process may sound comical and jovial, it happens throughout the country. Whether it’s Action Congress or All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), it’s the same thing. We are all the same. They start thumb printing. Some are overzealous. So, at the end of the day, you find that votes are more than the number of people that were registered to vote (ThisDay, 2010).

This study establishes that acts of demagoguery are commonplace in Nigeria’s democracy. Politicians recognize, but violate, relevant laws that guide democratic practice. This is because, the perception of the average politician in Nigeria is that, to be successful in politics one must subscribe to the Machiavellian rules of politics that understand political success as the ‘end justifies the means’. This Machiavellian politics, intolerant opposition, leads to a situation IN which opposition as an important feature of democracy cowed using all tools of demagoguery to intimidate and denigrate its members. This corroborates the views of Onyeonoru and Kester (2007) that Nigerian democratic leaders have failed to appreciate the role of opposing views, and thus react to opposition with hostility.

Furthermore, success in the politics of Nigeria substantially depends on the willingness and ability of contestants to outwit one another in the series of political schemes in all the processes involved before, during and after elections. These include the willingness to “settle” or bribe stakeholders for endorsements (and possibly engineer the exclusion of capable opponents through suspension, disqualification or expulsion), manufacturing of fictitious allegations with the goal of intimidating, harassing and orchestrating the arrest of formidable political opponents, ability to compromise security agencies to intimidate, harass and arrest perceived enemies or those opposed to their political ambition, ability to compromise election officials to act in their favour against the acceptable standard contained in the electoral act, use of thugs and security agencies to disrupt voting in areas considered to be their opponents’ stronghold, falsification of election votes to award phantom victories, application of force on election officials to declare

falsified results, et cetera.

The findings of the study revealed that even the politicians who may publicly appeal to their followers and supporters to shun acts of demagoguery and other vices that comprise the credibility of democracy secretly encourage and/or fund the acts of criminalities because they believe that their electoral victories largely depend on demagoguery. This finding substantiate the argument of Bottomore (1993) that in some democracies around the world, political actors who control the ultimate power of direct physical coercion have the utmost influence and chances of success at political contestations.

4.5.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEMAGOGUERY ON DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

This study has revealed certain implications that demagoguery has on democracy and good governance in Nigeria. These implications are discussed as follows.

- i. **Trickery:** the findings of the study show that both the political elites and the people of Nigeria engage in reciprocal deception in the country's democratic politics. Thus, during electioneering campaigns, while the political elites and/or contending candidates appeal to the electorates for votes with "unrealistic" campaign promises, the people or electorates demand for inducements as a precondition for casting their votes for candidates for elections. The people believed that politicians were not sincere in fulfilling their campaign promises and that they seek political power for personal gains as against public service, and as such should 'pay' for the votes they seek for. They collect money from all the contestants, even though they can only vote for a single candidate for an office, as they consider such act as the only way to benefit from politicians and the country's democracy. The consequence is that political deceit as a tool of demagoguery is not only employed by the political elites and election contestants, but also adopted by the electorates and the Nigerian people as a means of getting back at politicians and benefiting from politics. Individuals and groups pledge support and allegiance to election contestants with a view to extorting money from politicians rather than commitment to the ideas and competence of the contestants.
- ii. **Election fraud:** whether it is at the level of party primary elections or the general elections, the data available from this study highlight the pervasiveness of election fraud.

The absence of level playing ground for contestants, intimidation of voters and candidates, illegal voting, compromise and partisanship of electoral officers, delay or denial of justice at the election tribunals and courts, and all other forms of demagoguery result in the failure of elections to reflect the will of the people. This finding confirms the conclusion by Adebayo (2015) that fear and perceived election malpractices were a major reason for voter apathy in Nigeria's democracy. For instance, in the report of the EU Election observation Mission for the 2007 general elections, headed by Max van den Berg, the reality of elections in Nigeria was reported thus:

“The elections were marred by very poor organization; lack of essential transparency, widespread and procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of fraud; widespread voter disenfranchisement; lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates; and numerous incidents of violence.”

Despite this submission by the reputable election monitoring and observer body and the admittance by the chief beneficiary of the election (that is, Yar'Adua), the supreme court, in its characteristic manner since the advent of the Fourth Republic, upheld the 2007 election.

iii. Lack of Confidence in Democracy: the failure of political stakeholders in Nigeria to strictly adhere to due process and the rule of law in the pursuit and support of political ambitions have made the people to view democratic government and governance in Nigeria as a mere political nomenclature and a façade that has only rebranded dictatorship. This situation is worsened by the generally held belief by Nigerians that democratic governance in Nigeria has failed to improve the livelihood of the common people (Ake, 2008; Achebe, 2012; Gberevbie, 2014; Egharevba and Chiazor, 2013).

iv. Disenfranchisements: as a result of the monetization of politics and the discrimination of political parties towards its members, the political terrain and behaviour prevent qualified and willing Nigerians from participating in politics in Nigeria. The result is that politics becomes the exclusive business of the rich elites and the unprincipled members of the society (Simbine, 2004; Ofeimun, 2010; Urim, Imhonopi and Ojukwu, 2013). For instance, the extremely outrageous cost of nomination forms by the major political parties in Nigeria is a testament to the idea that to be involved in political contestations in Nigeria, aspirants must be very rich. Similarly, the pervasive realities of intimidation, fraud, bribery, and the harassment of political opponents make the democratic landscape

unapproachable for principled, honest and qualified Nigerians who would have been part of the democratic politics of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic.

- v. **Democracy as theatre of war:** as the study shows, the pervasive demagoguery that characterizes democratic practice in Nigeria has made campaigns, electioneering processes and elections as periods of violent rivalries among political opponents where political thugs, arm-wielding security agencies and voters engage one another in clashes, leading to various degrees of injuries and in some cases, deaths of innocent citizens (See Appendix M). This fact also confirms the position of General Muhammadu Buhari on the 2007 general elections (See Appendix H) that:

In general, money and other inducements were unashamedly used to influence voter behaviour in areas where the elections had taken place, while thugs and elements in the security forces were employed to intimidate, maim or even kill voters.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), after carrying out an extensively detailed investigation based on petitions from individuals and groups about the rate of violence, killings and other forms of demagoguery being perpetrated by politicians and their supporters prior to the 2015 general elections, confirmed the allegations in the commission's report with evidence of 58 deaths recorded from pre-election cases (Ibeh, 2015).

This situation poses great threats to Nigeria's democracy because genuine democracy, wherever they exist, emphasizes "real competition and effective participation" that allow qualified citizens to exercise their political and democratic rights without artificial barriers resulting from such factors as intimidation and repression (Dahl, 1971; Diouf, 1998).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the conclusion emerging from the study in the light of the research questions and the objectives that informed the study. Consequent upon the findings of the study, some recommendations are made to address critical issues raised in the study.

5.1 CONCLUSION

The main findings of this study are that Nigeria's political leaders in the democratic dispensation in the Fourth Republic are not the making of the "people" as they do not emerge from established and acceptable democratic processes and practices, and that election outcomes do not reflect free, fair and credible elections, but are the outcome of a constellation of acts of demagoguery including monetary and material inducements, intimidation, violence, use of security agencies and thugs to manipulate election outcomes and election fraud. Consequently, the acts of demagoguery that take place in the Nigerian democratic space are a socio-political reality that the political class and the electorates have come to accept as a political norm. That is to say, because of the high level of poverty and the failure of political leaders to serve the interest of the populace, there is an equilibrium situation in which the demand and supply for monetary and material inducements are equal, such that while politicians deploy every resource at their disposal to undermine the electoral process and election outcomes, the Nigerian electorates also demand for such resources as inducements before they can cast their votes for politicians of their choice. Therefore, as politicians envision their political success in their ability to circumvent or muscle democratic rules to their favour, the electorates and members of the society are willing tools ready to serve the interest of the politicians in reciprocal (give-and-take) relationship. This relationship means that the legitimacy of acquiring political power is secondary to the reality of its trappings and the spoils of 'victory'. Democratic politics in Nigeria is tailored to the 'Nigerian culture.' This culture involves monetized and belligerent politics. It embraces the Machiavellian model of politics where the end justifies the means. To be a success in democratic politics of Nigeria, one need not be so educated; need not be eloquent; need not be knowledgeable about the issues that trouble the Nigerian people; need not be godly or goodly; he or she necessarily has to be **rich and/or ruthless**. It will require 'goodluck' or more to achieve

success politically in Nigeria's fourth republic without being 'cultured' the Nigerian way politically.

The demagoguery in Nigerian democracy can best be described by the theory of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism emphasizes the idea that every society is nothing more than the shared reality that folks construct as they interact with one another. This approach sees people interacting in countless settings using symbolic communications to accomplish the tasks at hand, including electing or selecting their leaders.

With regard to elections in Nigeria, the findings of this study show that Nigerian electorates, politicians and every Nigerian seem to understand that bribery, thuggery, blackmail, and all sorts of antidemocratic activities are against the constitution and other relevant laws of Nigeria but they identify and most times engage in these practices as political norms that are unavoidable in the theatre of Nigerian politics. Thus, the behaviour of politicians and voters is based on what they believe, arising from the interactions of political actors, rather than what the relevant laws of the country stipulate about politics and politicking. Thus, for the political class and the electorates, demagoguery is mastery of politics so that the politician who masters the acts of demagoguery and succeeds politically is revered by the Nigerian people. Thus, we have political demagogues that have earned the nicknames of "Mr. Fix IT!", "Mr. Sabi", "Iroko", "godfather", etc., etc. all implying praises for politicians who have, at one point or the other, undermined democratic tenets in either imposing themselves or their cronies on the people.

The consequence of this is that the symbolic meaning of demagoguery or demagogic activities in the democratic politics of Nigeria overrides the actual facts regarding demagoguery and all the risks associated with it as contained in the constitution, the electoral act and other relevant laws of the country that discourage, prohibit and punish undemocratic or demagogic actions of political actors. Also, electoral malpractices have become collective experience that is so endemic for which "all efforts to combat it are superficial compared with the real interests that sustain it." (Smith, 2007: 228). This fact was confirmed by no other than the immediate past Chairman of Nigeria's electoral body, Professor Attahiru Jega, when he stressed that the only reason the card reader (a technology intended to curb electoral malpractice of double voting) would not work in Nigeria is because of the interest and roles of politicians to frustrate the process (Jumoke, 2014).

This study thus shows that demagoguery represents some very fundamental aspects of politicians' social experiences and political identities which can be understood through the lens of symbolic interactionism. The high rate of violence, thuggery, bribery and intimidations associated with electoral campaigns and contests, coupled with the high rate of subscription to these undemocratic practices by majority, if not all, the political actors reveal the significance of demagoguery as a prerequisite for democratic politics in Nigeria's fourth republic. This finding gives credence to Schedler's conclusion about democracy that:

Democratic norms are not perfectly realized anywhere, even in advanced democracies. Access to the electoral arena always has a cost and is ever perfectly equal; the scopes and jurisdiction of elective offices are everywhere limited; electoral institutions invariably discriminate against somebody inside or outside the party system; and democratic politics is never quite sovereign but always subject to societal as well as constitutional constraints...There is much room for nuance and ambivalence ...[and] bending and circumventing the rules may sometimes be considered "part of the game" (Schedler, 2002).

This study also confirms that the fact that because demagoguery or manipulating the democratic process has become an acceptable part of the game of politics, it is seldom the case that culprits of election fraud or antidemocratic practices are seriously sanctioned. This position concurs with the findings of Smith (2007) on why the fight against corruption in Nigeria is normally subject to political interpretation. He explained that because corruption is a popular practice or culture in the way most Nigerian politicians function, it becomes normally alarming to see selective victimization, when in fact both the prosecutors and the prosecuted and the judges are all not excusable from corrupt practices. He sums it up thus:

When politicians and government officials benefit so handsomely from corruption, it is small wonder that their anticorruption initiative have little bite...people accused of spectacular scams frequently remain in office with no obvious consequences (Smith, 2007: 228).

Bailey (2008: 89) also affirmed that politicians and their supporters base the decision to engage in demagoguery or election fraud on a cost-benefit analysis, such that "in order for fraud to be worthwhile, its expected benefit must exceed its expected cost." This explains why demagoguery thrives in Nigeria's democracy, as there are little or no harsh sanctions for individuals who subvert the rules and ideals of democracy.

Also, there is the possibility and inevitable responsibility of all stakeholders in the democratic project of Nigeria to build strong democratic institutions that will make it nearly impossible for demagoguery to survive, dominate and thrive in the country. These democratic institutions include the Judiciary, Independent Electoral Commission, free press/media, constitutional government, among others.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this study inform the following recommendations that highlight the importance of addressing the problem of poverty, voter education, strict and impartial implementation of sanctions against offenders and the need for constitutional amendment to protect the democratic rights of citizens against the impunity of democratic institutions, including political parties, the courts and the media.

For democracy to thrive in Nigeria, the political leaders must engender creative ideas and robust strategies that will address poverty by generating employment for the masses of Nigerians who are currently the agents or tools of demagoguery as well as vulnerable to inducements because of the poverty they experience in their daily lives. Also, there has to be a massive, nationwide education of the Nigerian people about the essence of democracy and the disadvantages or destabilizing roles of normalizing practices that imply aberration to democracy. This is vital because, for an average Nigerian politician and voter, electoral offences are understandably normal and expected such that “everyone” and “all politicians” engage in it in one way or the other. Thus, the attitudes of actors (politicians and their supporters) reflect those of the survival of the fittest in the battle of wits, indeed demagoguery. Nigerian politicians and electorates must learn and appreciate the *mores* of democracy by a deliberate national programme of civic education in both formal and non-formal educational institutions.

Political parties must evolve objective procedures for selecting candidates that will be open, transparent and democratic by allowing INEC to have legal responsibility to supervise and authenticate primaries of political parties to ensure that aspirants seeking nominations do not use bribery, intimidation, threat or violence to gain nomination.

The need to strictly apply relevant sanctions as prescribed by relevant laws including those of the electoral act to deal with violators of the electoral act and other forms of malpractices cannot be over-emphasized. The security agencies should arrest and prosecute offenders without fear or favour. Nigerians do not fear the law because the law is weak in sanctions! The law surrenders to might, the might of the demagogues.

As shown in this study, politicians as well as the electorates consider demagoguery (i.e., all forms of aberrations relating to democratic politics) as part of the game, nay, a necessary evil that will not attract serious sanctions. Hence, a major recommendation is that offenders, irrespective of their status in society, must be speedily prosecuted and dealt with according to the relevant laws of the country. This is how to deter demagoguery in the democratic politics of Nigeria.

Also, in order to safeguard the democratic rights of party members, it is highly recommended that there should be a constitutional amendment that clearly states the conditions under which a member of a political party can be disqualified from exercising his or her democratic rights of aspiring to be a candidate of his party for an election. This will prevent the current trend in which the political parties are used as tools to scuttle the political ambitions of constitutionally qualified Nigerians from contesting elections as the case was with Ararume versus the Peoples Democratic Party in 2007, in which case, the candidate confirmed by the court as the authentic PDP flag bearer was dropped by the party on the basis that Ararume was disloyal to the party leadership by not accepting to be substituted for the defeated, but preferred, candidate of the party leadership.

Finally, because of the reprehensible roles of political parties and their leaders in disenfranchising aspirants or candidates and serving as available tools of demagogues' imposition of candidates, it is suggested that the current electoral act that empowers political parties to present the names of their candidates either through primary election or party nomination must be repealed in favour of credible, INEC-monitored primary elections.

Democracy can be free of demagoguery and thus grow to full maturity in the context of popular sovereignty, free, fair and credible elections, liberty, respect for human rights, accountability of political leadership and strong democratic institutions when the citizens of Nigeria, the leaders

and followers, imbibe democratic cultures and *mores*, while individually and collectively resisting the lures of inducements to circumvent democratic values and standards.

5.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This study has contributed to the body of knowledge in the area of democracy with particular focus on the role of demagoguery in the practice of democracy in Nigeria. Specifically, the study has contributed to knowledge in the following ways:

1. Demagoguery is a major problem that undermines and threatens democratic practice in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.
2. The impact of demagoguery on democracy is massive and quite significant in determining the outcome of democratic elections in Nigeria.
3. Engaging in demagoguery in Nigeria's democratic politics is pervasive and considered as a political norm, making it possible for political stakeholders to engage in one form or the other without fear of being sanctioned; especially that electoral victory depends on such practices (bribery, threats, intimidation, manipulation/falsification of election results, ballot snatching, et cetera), and all political parties are involved, although in varied degrees.
4. The study presents Nigerian-specific types of demagoguery as different from what may be applicable in other political climates and advances reasons why some qualified and willing citizens avoid politics in Nigeria.

5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study opens up new areas for further research. Importantly, studies need to be carried out to ascertain the role and impact of demagoguery on Nigeria's democratic institutions generally, and Security agencies and the Judiciary, particularly. This will help enlighten relevant democratic stakeholders on the constraints that impede the performances of the institutions and consequences for democratic survival, deepening and sustainability.

REFERENCES

- Abdul-jelil, A.G. (2012) 'Godfatherism' and Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Violence and Political Insecurity in Ibadan. Peace & Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.
- Achebe, C. (2012). *There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. London: Penguin Books.
- Adebayo, F. (2015). Determinants of Voters Participation and Choice in Nigeria's Elections: A Case Study of 2015 Elections. Paper Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Democratic Experience in Nigeria (1999-2015): Gains and Losses. Adekunle Ajasin University, Ondo.
- Adegbamigbe, A. (2007, February). Above the Law. *The News*, 21-29.
- Adeniyi, O. (2011) *Power, Politics and Death: A Front-row Account of Nigeria Under the Late President Yar'Adua*. Lagos: Kachifo Limited.
- Adoyi, A. (2013, December 11). "Nigeria is Bleeding" – Obasanjo accuses Jonathan of destroying the country, PDP." Daily Post. retrieved from <http://dailypost.ng/2013/12/11/nigeria-bleeding-obasanjo-accuses-jonathan-destroying-country-pdp/>.
- Agbaje, E.B.A. (2015). From Participative Democracy to Development? Reappraisig the Constitutional Origin of Political Corruption, Citizens' Alienation and Mass Underdevelopment in Nigeria. Paper Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Democratic Experience in Nigeria (1999-2015): Gains and Losses. Adekunle Ajasin University, Ondo.

- Ajidahun, B.O. (2015). Involvement of Youths in Politics and Political Thuggery: Implications for Counselling. Paper Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Democratic Experience in Nigeria (1999-2015): Gains and Losses. Adekunle Ajasin University, Ondo.
- Akannam, T. & Dangida, A. (2015, January 22). North under siege because of Buhari —Gov Lamido. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/01/north-siege-buhari-gov-lamido/>
- Ake, C. (1993). Points of Departure. In O. F. Onoge (Ed.), *Nigeria: The way forward*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Ake, C. (2001). *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Lagos: Spectrum Books Limited.
- Ake, C. (2008). *A political economy of Africa*. Ibadan: Longman Group Limited.
- Alvarez, R.M. and Katz, J.N. (2008). The Case of the 2002 General Election. In: Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E., and Hyde, S.D. (Eds.) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E. & Hyde, S.D. (2008). Introduction: Studying Election Fraud. In: Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E., and Hyde, S.D. (Eds.) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Allan, K. (2006). *Contemporary Social and Sociological Theory: Visualizing Social Worlds*. London: Pine Forge Press.
- Animasawun. (2013) Godfatherism in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: The Pyramid of Violence and Political Insecurity in Ibadan, Oyo-State, Nigeria. available from <http://www.ifra->

nigeria.org/publications/ifra-e-papers/ifra-e-papers-108/article/animasawun-gbemisola-a-2013 (accessed 13/04/15).

Aristotle (1941). *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans. Benjamin Jowett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ariye, E.C., Ogbomah, T.O., Ebipre , P. and Eric, D. (2012). How President Obasanjo Undermined Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria. *Current Research Journal of Social Sciences* 4(3): 222-227. available from <http://maxwellsci.com/print/crjss/v4-222-227.pdf> (accessed on 19/04/15).

Aziken, E. (2014, October 17). 'Buhari took bank loan to purchase APC nomination form'. Vanguard. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/10/jonathan-blasts-buhari-says-buhari-promising/>

Babanawa, U.S. (2013). Nigerian Democracy Most Expensive In The World. Retrieved from <http://www.channelstv.com/2013/11/04/nigerian-democracy-most-expensive-in-the-world-babanawa/> (accessed 16/04/2015).

Bailey, D. (2008). Caught In The Act: Recent Federal Election Fraud Cases. In: Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E., and Hyde, S.D. (Eds.) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.

Bakare, T. (2013) "Democratic Governance In Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges." Available from <http://saharareporters.com/2013/05/06/democratic-governance-nigeria-prospects-and-challenges-pastor-tunde-bakare> (accessed on 07/04/2015).

- Bell, D. (1955). *The theory of Mass Society*. Retrieved March 16, 2015, from <https://www.cos.edu/Faculty/JohnD/Documents/PS%20MASS%20SOCIETY%20DANIEL%20BELL.pdf>
- Berger, P.L & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Anchor.
- Bessette, J. (1980). *Deliberative democracy: The majority principle in republican government* In R. A. Godwin & W. A. Schambra (Eds.), *How democratic is the constitution?* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
- Bessette, J. M., & Pitney, J. J. (2012). *American government and politics: Deliberation, democracy, and citizenship*. Boston: Suzanne Jeans.
- Bhattacharjee, A. (2012). *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods and Practices*: USF Open Access Textbooks Collection. Book 3.
- Bjornlund, E.C. (2004). *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Bottomore, T. (1993). *Elites and Society* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Cpafrica. (2010). *Lessons from the Confessions of Donald Duke*. Retrieved 27 November, 2014, from <http://www.cp-africa.com/2010/07/23/lessons-confessions-donald-duke/>
- Campbell, J.E. & Garand, J.C. (2000). *Before the Vote: Forecasting American National Elections*; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

- Caporaso, A.J. & Levine, D.P. (1992) *Theories of Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carlton, E. (1996). *The few and the many: A typology of elites*. Brookfield: Scholar Press.
- Carto, W. A. (1996). *Populism vs. Plutocracy: The universal struggle*. Washington: Liberty Lobby.
- Cavdar, G. (2008). Beyond Election Fraud: Manipulation, Violence, and Foreign Power Intervention. In: Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E., and Hyde, S.D. (Eds.) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Ceaser, J. (1979). *Presidential selection: Theory and development*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Cooper, J. F. (1956). *The American Democrat*. New York: Knopf
- Collier, P. (2007). *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cox, G.W. (1997). *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Dahl, R. A. (1979). Procedural Democracy. In P. Laslett & J. Fishkin (Eds.), *Philosophy, politics and society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R.A (1991). *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale: Yale University Press
- Daily Trust (2015, March 15) Pre- election violence: Scores killed but none is prosecuted <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/politics/19921-pre-election-violence-scores-killed-but-none-is-prosecuted>
- Dare, O. (2015, March 29). Ekiti: Fayose, APC leaders continue fierce contest. *The Nation*. Retrieved from <http://thenationonlineng.net/ekiti-fayose-apc-leaders-continue-fierce-contest/>
- deTocqueville, A. (1968). *Democracy in America*. London: Fontana.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Consolidating democracy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
- Diouf, M. (1998). *Political Liberlisation Or Democratic Transition: African Perspectives*. Africa: CODESRIA.
- Dogan, M. S., & HigleyDogan, J. (1998). *Elites, crises and the origins of regimes*. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Dosanto, C.C. (2008) Corruption of the Election Process Under U.S. Federal Law. In: Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E., and Hyde, S.D. (Eds.) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Dunn, J. (2005). *Setting the people free: The story of democracy*. London: Atlantic Books.
- Egharevba, M. E. and Chiazor, A.I. (2013) Democratic Governance and Human Development Sustainability in Nigeria. *Crawford Journal of Bus. & Social Science*, 3 (2).

- Eldersveld, S.J. (1989). *Political elites in modern societies: Empirical research and democratic theory*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Elharathi, M. (2014). Arab African Northern revolt states (2010-2014): The missed path of re-institutionalization and democratic transformation. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 8(8), 254-259.
- Fishkin, J. (1991). *Democracy and deliberation: New directions for democratic reforms*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fund, J. (2008). *Staeling Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy*. New York: Encounter Books.
- Gay, W., & Alekseeva, T. A. (2004). *Democracy and the quest for justice: Russian and American perspectives*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Gberevbie, D.E. (2014). *Democracy, Democratic Institutions and Good Governance in Nigeria*. Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, OSSREA, Ethiopia. Volume 30 Issue1, 133-152.
- Geer, J. G. (2004). *Public opinion and polling around the world: A historical encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
- Gelman, .A. & King, G. (2003). "Why are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable? *British Journal of Political Science* 23, 409-51.
- Goffman, E. (1959) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Anchor Books

- Habermas, J. (1996) *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hamilton, R. (2001) *Mass Society, Pluralism, and Bureaucracy: Explication, Assessment and Commentary*. Westport, CT.:Praeger.
- Held, D. (2006). *Models of democracy* (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Huntington, S. (1991). *The third wave*. Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Ibeh, N. (2013, April 27) FG bans Governor Amaechi's aircraft from flying in Nigeria. Retrieved from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/131640-fg-bans-governor-amaechis-aircraft-from-flying-in-nigeria.html>.
- Ibeh, N. (2015, February 13). 58 Nigerians killed in 2015 pre-election violence so far – Rights Commission. Retrieved from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/176802-58-nigerians-killed-2015-pre-election-violence-far-rights-commission.html>.
- Igbuzor, O. (2005). *Perspectives on Democracy and Development*. Lagos: Joe-Tolalu and Associates.
- Iginla, A. (2015, June 20) Compare How Much Nigeria's 'Legislators' Earn to make laws to shackle the poor. Osundefender. Retrieved from <http://www.osundefender.org/compare-how-much-nigerias-legislators-earn-to-make-laws-to-shackle-the-poor/>
- Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) <http://www.inecnigeria.org/>
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (I-IDEA) (2000). *Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogues for Nation Building*. (Stockholm: International IDEA).

- International IDEA, Code of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections (Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997).
- Ingelhart, R. (1997). *Modernization and post modernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Janara, L. (2002). *Democracy growing up: Authority, autonomy, and passion in Tocqueville's democracy in America*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- John, G. and Strom C.T. (2004). 'Political institutions and corruption: The role of unitarism and parliamentarism.' *British Journal of Political Science*, 34: 295-330.
- Jombo, C.O. (2015). *Legislature-Executive Relations In Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Ondo and Ekiti States in Comparative Perspective*. Paper Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Democratic Experience in Nigeria (1999-2015): Gains and Losses. Adekunle Ajasin University, Ondo.
- Jowett, B. (2001). *The politics of Aristotle*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
- Jumoke (December 19, 2014). Jega Accuses Politicians Of Frustrating Electoral Process. *The Herald*. Retrieved From <http://www.theheraldng.com/jega-accuses-politicians-frustrating-electoral-process/>
- Karatnycky, A. (1999). "The 1998 Freedom House Survey: The Decline of Illiberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 1, 112-25.
- Keane, J. (2009). *The life and death of democracy*. London: Simon and Schuster.
- Keller, S. I. (1963). *Beyond the ruling class: Strategic elites in modern society*. New York: Random House.

- Kesselman, M., & etal. (2004). *Introduction to comparative politics*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Kirkpatrick, J.J. (1982). *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Kofamata, D.A. (2007, May 19). The 8 years of Obasanjo's squandered and missed golden opportunities. Retrieved from <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/dan-azumi-kofarmata/the-8-years-of-obasanjos-squandered-and-missed-golden-opportunities.html> (accessed on 19/04/15).
- Kofi, A. (2000, August 30). Parliamentary Voices Must Be Heard If Global Democracy Is To Thrive, Says Secretary-General To Meeting Of Heads Of National Parliaments. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000830.sgsm7522.doc.html>
- Konkwo, D.E.J. (2011). Broadcasting and the Power of Incumbency in Nigeria. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Review*; vol.2, (March, 2011).
- Landa, I. (2010). *The apprentice's sorcerer: Liberal tradition and Fascism*. Leiden: Brill.
- Lasswell, H. D., & Kaplan, A. (1950). *Power and society: A framework for political inquiry*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lesch, C. H. T. (2014). Against politics: Walter Benjamin on justice, Judaism and the possibility of ethics. *American Political Science Review*.
- Luckham, Goetz, Kaldor, Ayers, Bastian, Gyimah-Boadi, Hassim and Puhovski (2012) Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts Of Inequality, Poverty And Conflict: A Conceptual Framework. Available from <https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Wp104.pdf> (Accessed 30/01/2015).

- Luqman, S. (2011). Democratic governance and the management of oil conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Policy options and challenges; *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*; Volume 5, No. 2.
- Macionis, J.J. & Plummer (2005). *Sociology: A Global Introduction* (3rd ed.); London: Prentice-Hall.
- Mannheim, K. (1935) 1940 *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure*. New York: Harcourt.
- Marx, K. *Capital* (Vols I, II and III).
- Mills, C.W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Morgan, K. A. (2003). *Popular tyranny: Sovereignty and its discontent in Ancient Greece*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Munn, M. H. (2000). *The school of history: Athens in the age of Socrates*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Muravchik, J. (1991). *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press.
- NDI (2008, August 5) Final NDI Report on Nigeria's 2007 Elections. Retrieved from <https://www.ndi.org/node/14493>
- Neuman, W. R. (1986). *The paradox of mass politics: Knowledge and opinion in American electorate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Niger delta watch. (c2014). *Niger Delta militant- Asari Dokubo Threatens More Attacks on Voters*. Retrieved 21 March 2016, from <http://stakeholderdemocracy.org/nigerdeltawatch/reports/view/25>
- Norris, P. (2012) *Making Democratic Governance Work: The Impact of Regimes on Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nwatu, D. N. (2004). Political Transition and the electoral process: The Nigerian experience. *International Journal of Studies in the Humanities*, 3(1).
- Ofeimum, O. (2010). *Taking Nigeria Seriously*. Lagos: Hornbill House of the Arts.
- Ogroh, S.E., Ikporukpo, I. (2015). Political Parties And Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria (1999-2015). Paper Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Democratic Experience in Nigeria (1999-2015): Gains and Losses. Adekunle Ajasin University, Ondo.
- Okojie, G. (2015, March 28). Buhari To Jonathan: Tell Your Security Agencies To Respect Our Accord. Leadership. Retrieved from <http://leadership.ng/news/420752/buhari-to-jonathan-tell-your-security-agencies-to-respect-our-accord>
- Olupohunda, B. (2014, February 16). Awolowo, Tinubu and Yoruba leadership. Punch Newspapers, Available from <http://www.punchng.com/opinion/awolowo-tinubu-and-yoruba-leadership/>
- Oni, S.O. (2013) *Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System: A Study of Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, 1999-2011*. PhD thesis, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State.
- Onyeonoru, I. (2004). Collective Bargaining in an Emerging Democracy. In A.A.B. Agbaje, L. Diamond & E. Onwudiwe (Eds.); *Nigeria's Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

- Ortega, G.J. (1930). *The Revolt of the Masses*. London: Allen & Uwin.
- Oyediran, O. & Agbaje, A. (1999). Introduction. In: O. Oyediran & Agbaje (eds.); Nigeria: Politics of Transition and Governance, 1986-1996. Bradford: Russell Press Limited.
- Oyeleke, D. (2014, April 20). US lambasts Tinubu over 'rig and roast' threat. Retrieved from <http://www.punchng.com/news/us-lambasts-tinubu-over-rig-and-roast-threat/> Patton, M. Q. (1987). *How to use qualitative method in evaluation*. California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Pinard, M. (1968). Mass society and political movements: A new formulation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 73(6), 682-690.
- Prborg. (2014). *World Population Data Sheet*. Retrieved 22 March, 2015, from <http://www.prb.org/DataFinder/Geography/Data.aspx?loc=269>
- Putman, R. D. (1976). *The comparative study of political elites*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Robert, E.H. and Charles I.J. (1999). 'Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?' *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(1): 83-116
- Rotherm, S. (2001). *Political elites in modern societies: empirical research and democratic theory*.
- Sagan, E. (1994) *The honey and the hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Acient Athens and Modern America*, Princeton, NJ: Priceton University Press.

- Samons, L. J. (2004). *What's wrong with democracy?: From Athenian practice to American worship*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sartori, G. (1976). *Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Satkunanandan, S. (2014). *Max Weber and the ethos of politics beyond calculation*. Davis: University of California Press.
- Saturday Telegraph (2015, November 28; pp. 7). Dogara:Poverty Threatening Democracy in Africa.
- Schedler, A. (2002). Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation, *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2: 39.
- Schmitt, C. (1976). *The Concept of the Political*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Schumpeter, J. (1976). *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Sen, A. (1999) "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (July 1999: 3).
- Signer, M. (2009). *Demagogue: The fight to save democracy from its worst enemy*. New York: MacMillan.
- Simbine, A.T. (2004). "Oyo-State: The Emptiness of National Policy Relevance" in: Isumonah, V.F (ed.), *Participatory Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria*, Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies.
- Simmel, G. (1907). *The Philosophy of Money* (2nd ed.) trans. Tom Bottomore & David Frisby (Boston: Rotledge, 1990).

- Sitton, J. F. (1996). *Recent Marxian theory: Class formation and social conflict in contemporary capitalism*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Sklar, R., Onwudiwe, E. and D. Kew (2006). 'Nigeria: Completing Obasanjo's Legacy'. *Journal of Democracy*, 17, 3, p. 100-115.
- Smith, D.A. and Donovan, T. (2008). Identifying and Preventing Signature Fraud on Ballot Measure Petitions. In: Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E., and Hyde, S.D. (Eds.) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Smith, D.J. (2007). *A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria*. UK: Princeton University Press.
- Suleiman, B.M. (2010). *The political economy of privatization in Nigeria: A case study of the Nigeria Telecommunications Limited (NITEL)*. (Masters dissertation, University of Hull, 2010).
- The guardian. (2015, April 4). *Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro given power to rule by decree* . Retrieved 2 March, 2015, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/16/venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-given-power-to-rule-by-decree>
- The Nation (2015, December 11) PDP, Reps, Anenih, Ayu, others named in N30b 'loot'. Retrieved from <http://thenationonlineng.net/pdp-reps-anenih-ayu-others-named-in-n30b-loot/>
- The National Population Commission (NPC) 2006 Census (2014). Retrieved from <http://www.population.gov.ng/>.

ThisDay (2010, July 27) Election Rigging and Duke's Startling Revelations. Retrieved from <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/election-rigging-and-duke-s-startlingrevelations/82334/>

ThisDay (2013, December 23). Obasanjo's letter to Jonathan: Before it is Too Late. Retrieved from <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/obasanjos-letter-to-jonathan-before-it-is-too-late/167193/>

ThisDay (2015, March 3rd) Tinubu to Sue AIT. Retrieved from <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/tinubu-tosue-ait/203168/>

Trish roberts-miller - home. (c2015). *Characteristics of Demagoguery*. Retrieved 22 March, 2015, from <http://www.drw.utexas.edu/roberts-miller/handouts/demagoguery>

Turner, J.H., Beeghley, L. & Powers, C.H. (2002). *The Emergence of Sociological Theory* (5th ed.) CA: Wadsworth Group.

Uche, L.U. (1989). *Mass Media, People and Politics in Nigeria*. New Dehli: Concept Publishing

Urim, U.M., Imhonopi, D.O. & Ojukwu, C. (2013). The Nigerianization of Democracy: What to do to make it work. In Imhonopi, D.O & Urim, U.M (Eds), *A panoply of readings in social sciences: Lessons for and from Nigeria* (pp. 1-18). Ibadan: Cardinal Prints.

Walker, J.L. (1966) A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 1966), pp. 285-295

Yahaya, A. (2007). "Godfatherism and the Democratisation Process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic", A conference paper presented at the 1st International Conference of the Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. September 4 – 7, 2007.

Yakubu, A.A. (2015) *The Role of Youths in Nigeria's Democracy*. Paper Presented at the 2nd International Conference on Democratic Experience in Nigeria (1999-2015): Gains and Losses. Adekunle Ajasin University, Ondo.

Zakariah, F. (2003). *The rise of illebral democracy at Home and Abroad*: New York: Norton.

Zencey, E. (2012). *The other road to Serfdom and the path to sustainable democracy*. England: Hanover: University Press of New England.

APPENDIX A

**STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF 2015
GOVERNORSHIP/PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES**

Department of Sociology

College of Business and Social Sciences

Covenant University, Ota

Ogun State.

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a PhD student of Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State. I am undertaking a research titled: **A Sociological Study of Demagoguery in the Democratic Governance of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.** Kindly answer the following questions honestly. Information given will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will only be used for academic purposes.

(The term demagoguery refers to the use of resources and political might to act unconstitutionally and/or illegally to undermine democratic norms, principles and culture in the quest to either attain power or gain political advantage.)

SECTION A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Sex: Male () Female ()
2. Age:
3. Religion: Christianity () Islam () Traditional () Other (please specify).....
4. Marital status: Single () Married () Separated () Divorced () Widowed ()
5. Educational Background: Primary () Secondary () Tertiary () Other (please specify).....
6. Occupation: Unemployed () Self-employed () 4. Government services () Private services () Other (Please specify).....
7. Political Party Membership: PDP () APC ()
8. State (as shown on your Voter’s card):

Please select the option that best corresponds to your opinion on each of the following statements.

(SA=Strongly Agree, A= Agree, N=Neutral, D= Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree)

| SECTION B: THE ROLE PLAYED BY DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA'S DEMOCRACY | | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| S/N | STATEMENTS | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 9 | Delegates voted for the aspirant(s) that offered money or material inducement to them. | | | | | |
| 10 | Delegates voted for the candidates that they wanted on their own. | | | | | |
| 11 | Delegates voted for the aspirant that their leader(s) or mentor(s) asked them to vote for. | | | | | |
| | | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 12 | Delegates were threatened to vote for a particular aspirant. | | | | | |
| 13 | Delegates would not have voted for the aspirant that won if there was no inducement or threat from the leader(s) or contestant(s). | | | | | |
| 14 | There was intimidation or fraud in the voting process. | | | | | |
| 15 | The process that produced the delegate was not really democratic. | | | | | |
| | SECTION C: FACTORS THAT GIVE RISE TO DEMAGOGUERY IN NIGERIA | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 16 | Poverty is responsible for the inability of delegates and voters to choose candidates independently of what their leaders tell them. | | | | | |
| 17 | Delegates were offered money for votes. | | | | | |
| 18 | Religious sentiment was involved in voting for the favoured candidate. | | | | | |
| 19 | Ethnic sentiment was involved in voting for the favoured candidate. | | | | | |
| 20 | Delegates were forced to vote for a particular aspirant. | | | | | |

| | SECTION D: MANIFESTATIONS OF DEMAGOUERY IN NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE | SA | A | N | D | SD |
|----|--|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| 21 | Delegates were intimidated to vote for a particular aspirant. | | | | | |
| 22 | Thugs were used to intimidate and harass of delegates. | | | | | |
| 23 | Security agencies were used to intimidate and harass of delegates by 'powerful' politicians. | | | | | |
| 24 | In some cases, security agencies harassed party members/leaders that were against imposition by 'powerful' politicians. | | | | | |
| 25 | Due process and the rule of law was not followed in the election process. | | | | | |
| | SECTION E: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMAGOGUERY ON DEMOCRACY | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 26 | Delegates had no freewill to choose the aspirant(s) they felt was the best to provide leadership for the people. | | | | | |
| 27 | Poor leadership can result from imposition of candidates on the people. | | | | | |
| 28 | Interference in elections or imposition of candidates from political leaders is a problem. | | | | | |
| 29 | Election rigging is as a result of fielding an imposed candidate for elections. | | | | | |
| 30 | Nigeria's democracy will not grow if there is imposition of candidates. | | | | | |
| 31 | The greatest challenge to democracy in Nigeria is the abuse of power and the failure of the political class to follow due process and the rule of law in democratic activities. | | | | | |
| 32 | The dangers (intimidation, violence, corruption ,etc.) associated with democratic politics in Nigeria makes it hard for decent, willing and qualified Nigerians to go into politics. | | | | | |

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Good day Sir/Ma. My name is Suleiman Barnabas, a PhD candidate of the Department of Sociology, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State. I am undertaking a research titled: A Sociological Study of Demagoguery in the Democratic Governance of Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

This interview is being conducted to get your input about the political happenings in Nigeria's democracy as well as the behaviour of some political elites (demagogues), and the consequences of these actions on the development of Nigeria's democracy which you have been involved in. I am especially interested in any problems you have identified or faced or are aware of that bother on the undemocratic political conduct that can derail the nation's democracy and recommendations you can make to strengthen democratic governance in Nigeria.

Kindly answer the following questions honestly. Information given will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will only be used for academic purposes.

Note: The term demagoguery refers to the use of resources and political might to act unconstitutionally and/or illegally to undermine democratic norms, principles and culture in the quest to either attain power or gain political advantage.

If it is okay with you, I will be tape recording our conversation. The purpose of this is so that I can get all the details, but at the same time be able to carry on an attentive conversation with you. I assure you that all your comments will remain confidential. I will be compiling a report which will contain all interviewees' comments without any reference to individuals. If you agree to this interview and the tape recording, please sign this consent form.

I'm now going to ask you some questions that I would like you to answer to the best of your ability. If you do not know the answer, please say so.

1. I'd like to start by having you briefly describe your responsibilities and involvement thus far with Nigeria's democratic Project. (I may have to probe to gather the information I need).
2. Are you aware of any problems OR challenges confronting democratic governance in Nigeria? (If so, probe - What have the problems been? Do you know why these problems are occurring? Do you have any suggestions on how to minimize or eliminate these problems?)
3. How has money politics, ethnicity, religion, etc. affected how politics is played in Nigeria's democracy since 1999? What roles do demagogues play in these?

4. What's your view on politicians who undermine democratic structure and culture in pursuance of their political ambition? How do democratic actors behave to undermine democracy in Nigeria?

5. How do you recommend that demagoguery or undemocratic political behaviour be stopped from Nigeria's democracy in order for the rules or principle of democracy to operate?

6. How can democratic institutions be strengthened and supported in Nigeria to ensure their stability and genuine independence?

APPENDIX C

POLITICAL PARTIES

CODE OF CONDUCT

2013

NIGERIA

1. PREAMBLE

We the registered political parties of Nigeria.

Cognizant of the roles of political parties in consolidating and deepening our democracy, ensuring an environment conducive for successful elections, political stability, enduring democracy and overall wellbeing of Nigerians;

Realise the need to be more democratic in the conduct of our activities in ensuring peace, unity, understanding, respect for each other, transparency and credibility of the electoral processes;

Mindful of the experiences and opinions of Nigerians with previous elections and the need for all political parties, in and outside of government, to work harmoniously towards the entrenchment and defence of democracy in Nigeria, and

Committed to respecting the legal framework guiding the electoral process in Nigeria, particularly the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), do hereby resolve to give to ourselves the following Code of Conduct which shall be binding.

2. **RULE OF LAW**

1. All political parties, their leaders, members and supporters and candidates shall adhere to all existing laws, and regulations pertaining to elections, and the conduct of political parties, especially the elections guidelines established by INEC through the authority of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and shall do nothing whatsoever; individually or collectively to undermine, flout, disrespect or circumvent them.

2. Every political party shall provide equal opportunity to qualified persons to participate in electoral activities.

3. Political parties have the right and freedom to put forward their views to the electorate without hindrance.

4. All political parties are enjoined at all times to hold the rights and freedom of the Nigerian people, as guaranteed by law.

5. All political parties shall ensure, and practice internal party democracy by adhering strictly to the provisions of their Party's Constitution.

6. No political party shall engage in violent activities of any kind, as a way of demonstrating its strength. All political parties shall publicly condemn any form of political violence.

7. Political parties shall ensure strict compliance with this Code of Conduct and assist the security agencies and electoral officials in apprehending and sanctioning their members who attempt to, or flout the provision of the Code, the Electoral Act and or INEC electoral guidelines.

8. Political parties shall co-operate with other stakeholders in developing further compliance and monitoring mechanisms to give the full effect of this code.

9. Every political party shall ensure the promotion of active participation of women, youth and the physically challenged in the electoral processes. Consequently, every political party shall:-

- (a) Respect the rights of women, youth and physically challenged to communicate freely with parties and candidates;
- (b) Facilitate the full and equal participation of women, youth and physically challenged in political activities;
- (c) Ensure the free access of women, youth and physically challenged to all public political meetings, marches, demonstrations, rallies and other public political events; and
- (d) Shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that women, youth and physically challenged are free to engage in any political activities.

10 Every Political Party shall (through the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) or its; (recognized agencies).

- (a) Recognise the authority of the Commission (INEC) in the conduct of an election;
- (b) Work together with the Commission to promote transparency, impartiality and confidence in the electoral process;
- (c) Obey any lawful direction, instruction or order of the Commission, or a member, employee or officer of the Commission;
- (d) Establish and maintain effective lines of communication with –
 - (i)The Commission; and
 - (ii)Other registered parties contesting the election.
- (e) Facilitate the access of the Commission or any person authorized by the Commission to their meetings, marches, demonstrations, rallies, fund raisers and other public political events of that party or candidate;
- (f) Co-operate in any lawful investigation by the Commission;
- (g) Take all reasonable steps to ensure –

- (i) The safety of members, employees and officers of the Commission, and the Chief Electoral Officer, in the exercise of its powers or the performance of any duty assigned by the Electoral Act;
- (ii) That persons referred to in subparagraph (i) are treated with utmost respect and not subjected to insult, hazard or threat by any representatives or supporters of that party or their candidate; and
- (iii) That representatives of that party or their candidate attend meetings of any party liaison committee or other forum convened by the Commission.
- (iv) No political party shall keep, use or employ a private security organization or any other group to provide, security or assist in that regard during meetings, campaigns, rallies, processions or election, except as permitted by law.

3. **CAMPAIGN ISSUES**

- (1) All political parties, their candidates, officials and agents shall work towards ensuring an environment conducive for successful, peaceful, free and fair election campaign:-
- (2) All political parties shall assist INEC in ensuring that all their members and Nigerians of voting age are encouraged to fully participate in the voter registration exercise.
- (3) Political parties shall ensure that their agents and officials are sufficiently trained for voter registration and other election related activities.
- (4) Political parties shall ensure that the processes of nomination of their candidates for any elections comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).
- (5) Substitution of Nomination process shall be transparent, democratic, and non-violent.

- (6) Political parties must ensure that nomination and/or substitution of nominated candidates are done democratically within the stipulated INEC period, to ensure the certainty of candidates for the elections.
- (7) No political party or its candidate shall during campaign resort to the use of inflammatory language, provocative actions, images, or manifestation that incite violence, hatred, contempt or intimidation against another party or candidate or any person or group of persons on grounds of ethnicity, gender or for any other reasons.
- (8) No political party or its candidate shall make indic statements through broadcast press statement, handbills, pamphlets, leaflets or other publications.
- (9) All parties shall file with the Commission details of their public rallies and meetings in any particular area prior to such meeting.
- (10) All political parties shall take all necessary steps to coordinate their campaign activities in such a way as to avoid holding rallies, meetings, marches or demonstrations close to one another at the same time.
- (11) Where there is a clash in the date, venue or timing of any such activities of different political parties, their representatives shall meet, in the presence of law enforcement agencies, to resolve the issue amicably, without resort to intimidation, force or violence.
- (12) No political parties shall sponsor or allow the wearing of uniforms and emblems depicting militant activities or allow the carrying of offensive weapons during rallies and marches, and at polling and registration centres or at any political event.
- (13) All political parties shall have equal/equitable access to public owned print and electronic media, as guaranteed by law.
- (14) Political parties, their agents or their candidates shall not protect, or exercise undue influence for the release of persons arrested for carrying offensive weapons, violation of any electoral law, regulations and guidelines of INEC's and the provision of this Code of Conduct.

- (15) All political parties shall consistently educate and emphasize to their supporters and to all voters that their vote will be secret and that no person will know how any individual has voted.
- (16) No political party or their candidates shall prevent other parties or their candidates from pasting their posters or distributing their leaflets, handbills and other publicity materials in authorized public places. Furthermore, all parties and their candidates shall give directives to their members and supporters not to remove or destroy the posters and other campaign materials of other parties or their candidates. All parties, their members and supporters shall ensure that all their party posters, leaflets and other election campaign materials are removed from public places as soon as practicable when the campaign period ends.
- (17) All parties shall discourage their members in government from using their power of incumbency to the disadvantage of other parties or their candidates during campaign.

4. **ELECTION DAY ISSUES**

- (1) Political parties, their candidates and agents shall respect the law restricting access of unauthorized persons to polling stations, collation centres, and discourage undue interference with the voting process.
- (2) Every party shall instruct its members and supporters that no weapons or any object that can be used to cause injury shall be brought to the polling station, and that no party attire; colours, symbols, emblems or other insignia shall be worn to a polling station on Election Day.
- (3) Political parties shall recognize and acknowledge the rights of accredited observers and monitors at polling stations for the purpose of observing the conduct of elections and shall grant full lawful access to party activities to such observers.
- (4) All political parties and their candidates shall ensure that their Polling Agents and officials are sufficiently trained to monitor the voting exercise to ensure free and fair elections.

- (5) Political parties, their candidates and members shall cooperate fully with law enforcement agents to ensure the safety and security of election materials, election officials, party agents, and the electorates on Election Day.
- (6) Political parties shall refrain from fraudulently procuring results and votes by invasion and forcible occupation of polling and collation centre, the manipulation of ballot boxes, result sheets or by any other unlawful means.
- (7) Political parties and their agents shall not engage in any of the following corrupt practices:
 - (a) Forcible occupation or invasion of a polling station, collation centre or INEC office;
 - (b) Destroy any electoral material or INEC property;
 - (c) Encouraging any supporter(s) to cast more than one vote
 - (d) Encouraging any supporter(s) to vote in the name of another person, living, dead or fictitious
 - (e) Buying votes or offering any bribe, gift, reward, gratification or any other monetary or materials consideration of allurements to voters and electoral officials;
 - (f) Canvassing for votes within the vicinity of a polling station on polling day
 - (g) Any other form of cheating or any act considered to be a malpractice under the electoral laws and regulations.
 - (h) Political parties, their candidates and their agents shall not obstruct, harass or intimidate journalists in the course of their duties.
- (8) All political parties, their candidates and their agents party members and supporters shall accept the official election results as certified by INEC as free and fair, or challenge the results in Court.

5. **POST ELECTION ISSUES**

- (1) Political parties shall not intimidate, harass or cajole any polling agent of a political party to sign election result, if in the judgment of such an agent the election in the polling station was not free and fair.
- (2) No political party, their candidates or agents shall procure election results fraudulently or manipulate collation sheets, ballot boxes or cause to be published or displayed by the electronic and print media such unofficial or fraudulent results, except those published or announced by INEC.
- (3) Political parties and their candidates shall endeavour to send congratulatory messages to their opponents who are announced as duly elected.
- (4) All political parties and their candidates shall refrain from the use of violent or extra judicial means in expressing their non-acceptance of election results.
- (5) Political parties and their candidates shall ensure strict adherence to provisions of the law in seeking redress against perceived electoral irregularities.

6. **PARTY FINANCE**

- (1) All political parties shall at all times maintain a record of their sources and application of funds for all of their activities, including elections and campaigns.
- (2) All political parties shall endeavour to submit their audited account and reports to INEC as required by law.
- (3) Every political party and their candidates shall strive at all times to adhere strictly to election and campaign expenses limit as contained in the relevant provisions of the law.
- (4) No political party shall unlawfully acquire property or assets for itself or members or any other person outside approved sources, or allow unlawful contributions to its funds by organizations within and outside Nigeria.

7. **IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT**

There shall be a standing Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) whose objective is to promote interparty dialogue among all registered political parties with a view to contributing to violence free, fair, credible and transparent electoral process in Nigeria; and ensuring the adherence to the provisions of the Political Parties Code of Conduct including the consideration of any breach of the provisions of this code. Hence, political parties shall to all intent and purposes subscribe to its role as platform for interparty dialogue and adjudication of deputed.

1. **ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-PARTY ADVISORY COUNCIL (IPAC)**

- (a) The instrument of authority establishing the IPAC is the political parties Code of Conduct, 2013
- (b) IPAC will continue functioning at the national level, while those of the states and the local governments are expected to evolve immediately.

2 **MEMBERSHIP**

- (a) IPAC will be constituted by one representative per political party who should also be member of his/her Party's National Working Committee (NWC); and
- (b) A representative of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

3 **STRUCTURE**

(A) **General Body**

The IPAC general body shall comprise a representative from each of the registered political parties and a representative from INEC. It shall serve as the General Assembly of IPAC and shall be chaired by the elected IPAC Chairperson. The functions of the IPAC general body shall include:-

- (i) Under the supervision of INEC, elect the seven (7) member Executive Committee of IPAC for a one year term renewable for an additional one year based on merit and commitment;
- (ii) In accordance with the relevant provisions of this code of conduct, nominate and elect the Executive, Technical and Standing Committee members for a period of one year.
- (iii) Receive periodic reports from the Chairperson and all the Committees; and take the necessary action as required.
- (iv) Approve the working documents of IPAC.
- (v) Nominate and approve an Electoral Committee to conduct the election of IPAC Executives at least one month to the expiration of the tenure of incumbents.
- (vi) From time to time engage in dialogues on inter and intra party issues.

(B) **Executive Committee**

(1) **COMPOSITION/FUNCTIONS**

The Executive Committee shall comprise of seven (7) members with the following specific designations: Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Treasurer, Financial Secretary and Publicity Secretary with the following functions:

- i) Carry out the decisions and instructions of the General body.
- ii) Ensure that all organs of IPAC function democratically.
- iii) In consultation with the other Committees, initiate issues for inter and intra party dialogue.
- iv) Review all reports before presentation to the General Body.

v) Initiate and recommend policies and programs to the General Body.

(2) **RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS**

(a) **Chairperson**

(i) Summon and preside over All IPAC meetings;

(ii) Direct the activities of IPAC under the over all supervision of the Executive Committee;

(iii) Assign specific functions to any member or Officer of IPAC;

(iv) Ensure strict compliance with the provisions of the Political Parties Code of Conduct;

(v) Be a signatory 'A' to all Bank Accounts operated by IPAC;

(vi) Approve all public statements by and on behalf of IPAC;

(vii) Approve expenditures and financial commitments on behalf of IPAC

(b) **Deputy Chairperson**

(i) Assist the Chairperson in the discharge of his/her duties;

(ii) Deputise for the Chairperson in his/her absence; and

(iii) Carryout ad-hoc duties as may be approved by IPAC Executive Committee.

(c) **Secretary**

(i) Serve as Chief Administrative Officer of IPAC;

- (ii) Be the custodian of all IPAC documents and materials;
- (iii) Conduct and direct the conduct of Correspondences between IPAC and the other bodies;
- (iv) Keep all records of proceedings of IPAC meetings;
- (v) Ensure the implementation of IPAC decisions and commitments in collaboration with IPAC Chairman;
- (vi) Render written annual report of activities of IPAC; and
- (vii) Give notice of IPAC meetings in consultation with Chairman, IPAC
- (viii) Be signatory 'B' to all Bank Accounts operator by IPAC

(d) **Deputy Secretary**

- (i) Assist the Secretary in the discharge of his/her duties;
- (ii) Deputise for the Secretary in his/her absence; and
- (iii) Carry out ad-hoc duties as may be approved by IPAC Executive Committee.

(e) **Treasurer**

- (i) Receive and pay into the Bank Accounts of IPAC all funds and payments for and on behalf of IPAC within forty-eight hours (48 hrs)
- (ii) Keep and maintain all cheque books and other financial and security documents of IPAC;
- (iii) Pay monies duly approved by IPAC Chairman;

(iv) Prepare and submit annual statements of account and quarterly reports to the IPAC Executive Committee; and

(v) Be signatory 'B' to all Bank Accounts operated by IPAC

(f) **Financial Secretary**

(i) Receive and maintain records of all donations, grants and subventions paid to IPAC;

(ii) Recommend proposals and means of raising funds to finance the programmes and activities of IPAC;

(iii) Prepare and monitor the implementation of IPAC annual budget;

(iv) Implement internal control measures to protect the assets of IPAC; and

(v) Any other duties assigned by IPAC Executive Committee

(g) **Publicity Secretary**

(i) Manage and Project positively the image of IPAC;

(ii) Co-ordinate the flow of information and the public/media relations of IPAC;

(iii) Publicize the decisions and programmes of IPAC with the approval of Chairman, IPAC; and

(iv) Advise IPAC on Media Relations.

(C) **Technical Working Committee**

25% of IPAC members shall constitute a Technical Working Committee to be elected by the General Body based on merit and commitment for a period of one year to run concurrently with the tenure of the Executive Committee. The Technical Committee will have the following functions:-

- i. Observe and monitor the implementation of the Code of Conduct of IPAC and provide periodic written report to the General Assembly;
- ii. Identify and investigate violations of the code of conduct by any political party and propose sanctions to the general assembly in accordance with the existing laws of IPAC.
- iii. Receive complaints and investigate the veracity of the claims, and propose to the General Assembly the imposition of appropriate sanctions in accordance with existing laws of IPAC.
- iv. Resolve disputes between two or more political parties arising from misunderstanding and/or breach of the code of conduct.
- v. Prepare recommendations on remedies to INEC on actions taken on (iv) above for endorsement and submission by the general assembly.

(D) **STANDING STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF IPAC**

There shall be a Standing Strategic Committee comprising of all parties with representation in the National Assembly as permanent members and additional five (5) non-permanent members from other parties to be elected by the General Body whose tenure shall run concurrently with that of the Executive Committee.

The functions of the Standing Strategy Committee include:

- i. Develop and recommend proposals that will enhance capacity of political parties to the IPAC general Assembly for onward submission to the Commission;
- ii. Serve as a platform for engagements on topical issues of national importance on non-partisan basis and present these issues to the General Assembly.

- iii. Identify issues during the electoral process that require dialogue with INEC, and make proposals for the General Assembly.
- vi. Facilitate the interest of political parties in the preparation and passage of electoral legislation.
- v. And any other function(s) assigned to it by the General Assembly/IPAC/Commission

8. **REMOVAL FROM OFFICE/COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP**

An elected IPAC Executive or Committee Member may be removed from office by a vote of at least 2/3 of Members of IPAC General Body for any of the following offences:-

- a) Financial misappropriation that is verified by a disciplinary committee to be appointed at an IPAC general meeting;
- b) Failure to comply with the provisions of the Political Parties Code of Conduct as may be determined by a Committee to be appointed at an IPAC general meeting.
- c) Where such as member resigns, decamps or cross-carpet from the political party he/she represents.

9. **FUNDING**

- (1) Political parties shall contribute funds (based on criteria/formula to be determined by the General Body for running the activities of IPAC).
- (2) INEC shall provide subvention to IPAC from time to time.
- (3) The Executive Committee shall device strategies to generate additional revenues to fund its program of activities.
- (4) IPAC funds shall be maintained and administered through a bank account with the Chairman and Treasurer or Financial Secretary as signatories (as the case may be).

10. **COMMITMENTS**

- (1) Every political party in collaboration with INEC and other relevant agencies shall ensure that this code is well publicized and fully observed by its members and supporters. Political parties shall further publicize this code, and sensitize the general public, by all lawful means available.
- (2) Political parties, having freely subscribed to this code shall:-
 - (a) be bound by this code;
 - (b) take decisive steps to prohibit leaders, officials, candidates and members from infringing this code;
 - (c) take all reasonable steps to discourage any type of conduct by their supporters which would, if undertaken by a party official, candidate or member, be in breach of this code; and
 - (d) not abuse the right to complain about the violation(s) of this code, nor make false, frivolous or vexatious complaints.
- (3) Any political party adversely affected by a breach of any of the provisions of this code shall report the breach to the offending party and seek an amicable resolution of the dispute.
- (4) Any dispute which cannot be resolved between parties shall be reported to the IPAC which shall give it a fair and expeditious hearing/s. The IPAC is empowered to recommend to INEC appropriate sanctions on erring political party, this is without prejudice to the right of parties and their candidates, or agents to pursue other legal actions.

11. **MEETING**

- (1) A quorum for meeting shall be formed by fifty percent membership of IPAC;
- (2) They shall meet quarterly and at any other time as may be necessary.

12. **DECLARATION**

This document comes into effect and is binding on all registered political parties upon its acceptance by at least 50% of the registered political parties in Nigeria.

DATED 16TH JULY, 2013

12. **ENDORSEMENT/SIGNATURES**

| S/NO | NAME OF PARTY | NAME & DESIGNATION | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|------|---|--------------------|-----------|------|
| 1. | Accord (A) | | | |
| 2. | Action Alliance (AA) | | | |
| 3. | Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) | | | |
| 4. | Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD) | | | |
| 5. | Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN) | | | |
| 6. | Alliance of Democracy (AD) | | | |
| 7. | African Democratic Congress (ADC) | | | |
| 8. | All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| 9. | African Peoples Alliance (APA) | | | |
| 10. | All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) | | | |
| 11. | Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) | | | |
| 12. | Citizens Popular Party (CPP) | | | |
| 13. | Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) | | | |
| 14. | Kowa Party (KP) | | | |
| 15. | Labour Party (LP) | | | |
| 16. | Mega Progressive Peoples Party (MPPP) | | | |
| 17. | National Conscience Party (NCP) | | | |
| 18. | New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) | | | |
| 19. | People for Democratic Change (PDC) | | | |
| 20. | Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| 21. | Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA) | | | |
| 22. | Peoples Party of Nigeria (PPN) | | | |
| 23. | Social Democratic Party (SDP) | | | |
| 24. | United Democratic Party (UDP) | | | |
| 25. | United Progressive Party (UPP) | | | |

13. INTERPRETATION

In this Code:

- * Electoral Commission’ means the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
- * Political Party’ means any association lawfully registered by INEC as such
- * ‘IPAC’ means the Inter-Party Advisory Committee
- * ‘IPC’ means the Inter- Party Committee formed by representatives of all registered political parties in Nigeria with the mandate of draft this Code.
- * ‘BOT’ means Board of Trustees of each political party
- * ‘NWC’ means National Working Committees of each party.

APPENDIX D

PROSECUTION OF ELECTORAL OFFENDERS

CPS,

Pls find forwarded update on prosecution of Electoral Offences.

1. INEC vs. ZAKARIYA BUHARI

The accused person was charged to Magistrate Court in Kebbi State for incising public disturbance at election station and being in possession of ballot paper.

The Court found him guilty, convicted him and sentenced him to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of N 40,000.00

2. INEC vs. (1) ABUBAKAR HANAFI

(2) MOHAMMED RUWA

(3) SALE MUSA

(4) RUWA BAKO

(5) ALH. ABU NA ABU

The accused persons were charged to Magistrate Court in Kebbi State for causing breach of peace by snatching and destroying a ballot box and ballot papers while depriving voters from voting. The Case was terminated for want of prosecution and accused persons discharged.

3. INEC vs. MUHAMMADU DAN – GUDALE

The accused person was charged to Magistrate Court Kebbi State for criminal conspiracy, inciting disturbance and committing electoral offences.

The Court found the accused person not guilty and discharged him.

4. INEC vs. (1) CHARLES TOLOFARI

(2) JUSTIN ADAM

(3) CHRISTOPHER OKON

The accused persons were charged to Magistrate Court in Rivers State for unlawful possession of more than one voters card. The Court found them guilty, convicted them and sentences each to 3 months imprisonment or fine of N 600.00

5. INEC vs. GODSPOWER AZOBO

The accused was charged to Magistrate Court in Rivers State for the offence of unlawful possession of more than one voters card. The accused was found guilty, convicted and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment or a fine of N 100,000.00.

T. M. INUWA ESQ.

ASST. DIR. CRI. PR.

22nd August 2013

APPENDIX E

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

NUMBER OF ELECTORAL OFFENCES AND PROGRESS MADE SO FAR

LIST OF ELECTORAL OFFENCES DETERMINED AND PENDING

| S/N | STATE | NO. OF CASES FILED | NO. OF ELECTORAL OFFENCES DETERMINED/ STRUCK OUT | NO OF CONVICTIONS | NO. OF ELECT ORAL OFFEN CES PENDIN G | REMARKS |
|------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|----------------|
| 1 | ABIA | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| 2 | ADAMAWA | 5 | 4 | 4 | 1 | |
| 3 | AKWA IBOM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 4 | ANAMBRA | 24 | 17 | 0 | 7 | |
| 5 | BAUCHI | 35 | 6 | - | 29 | |
| 6 | BAYELSA | 2 | - | | 2 | |
| 7 | BENUE | 16 | 0 | 0 | 16 | |
| 8 | BORNO | 21 | - | - | 21 | |
| 9 | CROSS RIVER | 14 | 7 | 0 | 7 | |
| 10 | DELTA | 21 | - | - | 21 | |
| 11 | EBONYI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 12 | EDO | 12 | - | - | 12 | |
| 13 | ENUGU | 17 | 5 | 0 | 12 | |
| 14 | EKITI | 16 | 8 | 0 | 8 | |

| | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|--|
| 15 | GOMBE | 3 | - | - | 3 | |
| 16 | IMO | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 | |
| 17 | JIGAWA | 31 | 6 | 7 | 25 | |
| 18 | KADUNA | 15 | 15 | 0 | 0 | |
| 19 | KANO | 25 | 22 | 4 | 3 | |
| 20 | KATSINA | 16 | 15 | 0 | 1 | |
| 21 | KEBBI | 19 | 8 | 5 | 11 | |
| 22 | KWARA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 23 | LAGOS | 17 | 14 | 0 | 3 | |
| 24 | KOGI | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | |
| 25 | NASARAWA | 11 | 8 | 0 | 3 | |
| 26 | NIGER | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | |
| 27 | OGUN | 28 | 2 | 0 | 26 | |
| 28 | ONDO | 32 | 4 | 1 | 28 | |
| 29 | OYO | 30 | 2 | 0 | 28 | |
| 30 | OSUN | 4 | 1 | 0 | 3 | |
| 31 | PLATEAU | 20 | 7 | 0 | 13 | |
| 32 | RIVERS | 12 | 0 | 0 | 12 | |
| 33 | SOKOTO | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | |
| 34 | TARABA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 35 | YOBE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 36 | ZAMFARA | 16 | 3 | 3 | 13 | |
| 37 | FCT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | TOTAL | 482 | 167 | 24 | 315 | |

APPENDIX F

PDP Chairman Chief Audu Ogbeh's letter to President Olusegun Obasanjo

December 6, 2004

His Excellency,

The President, Commander-In-Chief,

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja

RE: ANAMBRA AND RELATED MATTERS

About a month ago, the nation woke up to the shocking news of a devastating attack on Anambra State resulting in the burning down of radio and television stations, hotels, vehicles, assembly quarters, the residence of the state Chief Judge and finally, Government House, Awka. Dynamite was even applied in the exercise and all or nearly most of these in the full glare of our own police force as shown on NTA for the world to see. The operation lasted three days.

That week, in all churches and mosques, we, our party, and you as Head of Government and Leader of this Nation came under the most scathing and blithering attacks. We were singly and severally accused of connivance in action and so forth. Public anger reached its peak.

Recommendation

You set up a reconciliation committee headed by Ebonyi State Governor, Dr. Sam Egwu, and we all thought this would help calm nerves and perhaps bring about some respite. But quite clearly things are nowhere near getting better.

While the reconciliation team attempted to inspect damaged sites in Anambra, they were scared away by gun fire, further heightening public anger and disdain for us.

Bomb explosion in government house, Awka

On Tuesday, the 30th day of November, 2004, another shocking development – a reported bomb explosion in Government House Awka. Since then, the media, public discourse within and even outside of our borders, have been dominated by the most heinous and hateful of expletives against our party and your person and government. It would appear that the perpetrators of these acts are determined to stop at nothing since there has not been any visible sign of reproach from law enforcement agencies. I am now convinced that the rumours and speculations making the rounds that they are determined to kill Dr. Chris Ngige may not be unfounded.

The question now is, what would be the consequences of such a development? How do we exonerate ourselves from culpability, and worse still, how do we even hope to survive it? Mr. President, I was part of the second republic and we fell. Memories of that fall are a miserable litany of woes we suffered, escaping death only by God's supreme mercy. Then we were suspected to have stolen all of Nigeria's wealth. After several months in prison, some of us were freed to come back to life penniless and wretched. Many have gone to their early graves unmourned because the public saw us all as renegades.

I am afraid we are drifting in the same direction again. In life, perception is reality and today, we are perceived in the worst light by an angry, scornful Nigerian Public for reasons which are absolutely unnecessary.

Mr. President, if I write in this vein, it is because I am deeply troubled and I can tell you that an overwhelming percentage of our party members feel the same way though many may never be able to say this to you for a variety of reasons.

But the back stops at your table and in my position, not only as Chairman but also as an old friend and loyal defender of your development programmes which I have never stopped defending, I dare to think that we can, either by omission or commission allow ourselves to crash and bring to early grief, this beautiful edifice called democracy.

On behalf of the peoples Democratic Party, I call on you to act now and bring any, and all criminal, even treasonable, activity to a halt. You and you alone, have the means. Do not hesitate. We do not have too much time to waste.

A.I. Ogbeh, OFR

National Chairman

cc: Vice President

Chairman, Board of Trustees

Speaker, House of Representatives

APPENDIX G

OBASANJO'S REPLY LETTER TO PDP CHAIRMAN, AUDU OGBEH

I am amused and not surprised by your letter of December 6, 2004 because after playing hide and seek games over a period of time, you have finally, at least in writing, decided to unmask and show your true colour.

Having made this introductory point, let us go over systematically and, in some detail, through the whole episode of the Anambra saga. I must add that I have expressed sadness and condemned the wanton destruction of properties that took place in Anambra recently. When it turned out that, Governor Mbadinuju was an unmitigated failure in Anambra, as PDP governor in our first term, I made it clear to you that I would not go to Anambra to campaign if Governor Mbadinuju was being sponsored as PDP gubernatorial candidate in spite of his calamitous failure. You did not tell me that you were sending a discrete investigation team to Anambra to find out the situation on the ground.

You never said yes or no but I determined that, in good conscience, I could not go to Anambra to campaign for support and seek endorsement for Governor Mbadinuju.

About six weeks later, you came to report to me that you have sent two people discretely to ascertain on the ground whether people wanted Mbadinuju or not and you had received report that 66 2/3 of the people of Anambra did not want Mbadinuju.

For me, what we knew about Mbadinuju in terms of failure to pay salaries in some cases for over 7 months which led to school children not being able to take the WASCE did not need any discrete investigation.

However, your discrete investigation convinced you that I was right and you brought Mbadinuju to me, for you and I to tell him that he could not be a gubernatorial candidate of the PDP in Anambra.

You rightly, I believe, requested that I should work with you to give him a soft landing and we agreed to make him an ambassador after the election and we even agreed on which mission abroad, subject to our success in the elections.

Mbadinuju asked for a letter from me and I refused because I said that my word was my bond but that you were free to write him one. A few weeks after that meeting, Mbadinuju decamped from our party to the AD and sought election as governor of Anambra on the platform of the AD.

When the members of our party started jostling for nomination, as normal with me, I refused to endorse a candidate; it is only after the primaries that the party's candidate becomes my own candidate.

And in the case of Anambra, if I had wanted to support anybody at all, it would have been Jerry Ugokwe because he was one man I knew but, of course, I was consistent on my policy. And when Ngige emerged as the candidate of the PDP from the primaries, he was brought to be introduced to me and, of course, he became not only the party's candidate but also mine.

After enquiries about the situation in Anambra and about Ngige himself, I made a point to him that he should go and reconcile himself with his father with whom he was not on talking terms as I believed it was an abomination for an African son to be in a state of enmity with his father to the point of absolute non-communication. I advised Ngige to reconcile with his father and the rest of his family and he reported to me that he did.

The election took place and Ngige was declared the winner. I congratulated him along with other victorious candidates. Realizing that Ngige would need some assistance to help him through the teething problem of his administration, I invited him to consider having a non-partisan honorary committee of elders of the state and he agreed.

I talked to Igwe Nwokedi, Chief Mbasulike Amechi and the Anglican Bishop of Awka to get two more people with them to act as such honorary non-partisan advisory committee of elders for the governor.

For them to maintain their independence, I said that any transportation or administrative funds that they might require would be provided from the presidency rather than the state.

After two months, Igwe Nwokedi, who was supposed to be the chairman, reported that the governor was impossible to advise or to work with and that was the end of that effort. Mr. Chairman, I reported that effort to you.

When on one occasion, Chris Uba came to report that things appeared to be going wrong between him and the governor in the presence of Chief Amechi, I asked the latter to go and sort it out for them in his capacity as an elder of the state and veteran politician. I requested Chief Amechi to report back to me. The truth is that as far as Anambra was concerned, I considered it my duty to work with all stakeholders in the area of avoiding conflict and on that ground I promised to act on any report or advice from Chief Mbasulike Amechi.

I never had warning that things were going sour in the state any more until I was in Maputo, Mozambique on July 9, 2003 when I received report that the governor had resigned. I did what normally I do not do except in an emergency by using government facility for strictly non-governmental purpose. I instructed that an airplane from the presidential fleet be made available to a team to rush to Anambra to investigate what was happening. That team went on Friday morning while I was still in Mozambique and returned on Friday evening.

You will recall that the team reported to you and I that what was happening in Anambra required urgent party action to resolve it as a family affair.

A Senate Panel that followed in the same vein re-opened something similar. Mr. Chairman, the following Sunday, you received and opened a brown envelope in my residence in Abuja that contained three different letters of resignation and a video of announcement of resignation of Governor Ngige. You were as shocked as I was and you promised to do something about it that night. You left with copies of the documents and the next thing you did after that was to insinuate that Ngige's problems were caused by me.

Unfortunately, as in many other instances, you failed to do what you should have done as the chief executive of the party and rather prefer to insult me not only as the President of the nation but also as the leader of the party which you seem never to recognize or acknowledge. From that point on, I only did my job as a President by investigating.

What the police did or did not do and dishing out punishment to be confirmed by the Police Service Commission which in its own report asked for a complete investigation of the matter. That investigation was carried out by the Attorney General and his report was acted upon. After that, I deliberately remained aloof about political events in Anambra except whatever may affect security and loss of life and property.

I, in fact, asked both Ngige and Chris Uba never to come to my office or to my residence and you know this. As far as I could remember, a childhood friend of yours came with you to discuss the issue of Anambra between you and I on one occasion.

Soon after, I briefed the party caucus in detail on my role, on what I saw and did and the party caucus endorsed every action that had been taken by the executive arm of government in respect with Anambra. A few months later, two members of your Working Committee -Olisa Metu (an Ex-Officio member) and Farouk (the youth leader) -came to appeal to me to specially intervene in reconciling Ngige and Chris Uba, I refused initially because I believed it was really the responsibility of the party. But since you had shirked your responsibility as party chairman, I conceded and asked the two members of the NWC to bring Ngige and Chris Uba to me. That was the only time, after several months, that I allowed them to enter my residence.

I was shocked that a man in the position of aspirant or one elected as governor could actually resign on three different occasions in writing and on one occasion, the resignation was on videotape. I, also, was of the opinion that for Ngige to have allowed that to happen, there must have been some extra-legal motivation. There has been accusation and counter-accusation as reasons for such ungainly behaviour. When the two of them came to see me, the two young men who had brokered the opportunity for Ngige and Chris Uba to see me wanted to leave. I refused and insisted that they had to be at the meeting because I wanted them as witnesses.

After almost two hours of talk, we dismissed hoping that fences would be mended and reconciliation would be fully established. They left and waited on the corridors for a while. Olisa Metu came back and requested that I should meet with Ngige and Chris Uba alone without witnesses for them to feel free to unwind. Again, I did and that was when I got the real shock of my life when Chris Uba looked Ngige straight in the face and said, "You know you did not win the election" and Ngige answered "Yes, I know I did not win." Chris Uba went further to say to Ngige, "You don't know in detail how it was done." I was horrified and told both of them to leave my residence.

This incident was reported to you because although constitutionally, Ngige had been declared winner, for me and, I believe, for you there remains a moral burden and dilemma both as leaders in Nigeria and leaders of our party. You did not consider it important enough to do anything or talk about it. I told Ngige that the only way I could live with this moral dilemma since he had been constitutionally declared as governor is that I will continue to deal with him in his capacity as the governor of a State in Nigeria purely and strictly on formal basis either until he runs out his term, he decides to follow the path of honour or until any competent authority declares otherwise. That remains my position to date.

That notwithstanding, immediately after the Court of Appeal overturned Justice Nnaji's order, the Police promptly obeyed. That is what rule of law is all about. Furthermore, based on all that I had heard, I told Chris Uba and Ngige that their case was like the case of two armed robbers that conspired to loot a house and after bringing out the loot, one decided to do the other in and the issue of fair play even among robbers became a factor. The two robbers must be condemned for robbery in the first instance and the greedy one must be specially pointed out for condemnation to do justice among the robbers. To me, the determination of the greedy one is also a problem, maybe they are both equally greedy. Justice, fairness and equity are always the basis of peace and harmony in any human organisation or relationship.

Anambra issue is essentially a human organizational and human relationship issue.

I was on a tour of five countries in five days going from the UK through Finland and Sweden with a stop-over in Libya to Tanzania last November when the recent issue of violence broke out. The Inspector General of Police who claimed that the crowd was overwhelming for the police strength was instructed to double the number of mobile police unit by bringing additional men and women from the adjoining states. He did so and he reported that 19 looters and destroyers were arrested and charged to court with some vehicles seized. NTA coverage of that unfortunate incidents is not the issue, wars are watched like theatrical plays in the contemporary world.

The issue is whether or not the police performed or did not perform their duties.

Mr. Chairman, obviously you do not expect me to do less than I have done. I even went out to do more because since you failed to either resolve the political issues that are intra-party matters and they have been spread to engulf the entire state or decisively punish any offender, I decided in consultation with Governor Ngige, to set up a fact-finding and reconciliation committee under the Governor of Ebonyi State to put an end to the violence, create a conducive atmosphere for the Governor to return to his station and to ensure permanent peace, security through reconciliation of the known warring party members - Chris Ngige and Chris Uba - and their supporters. And this was after I had a meeting with both the PDP state chairman and the governor. Since the Governor of Ebonyi, whom I have asked to keep you fully posted on his findings and progress of his committee has not yet reported to me, and since I have taken every necessary step to ensure a resolution of the political problem in Anambra which you have failed to confront, I consider your letter opportunistic, and only a smokescreen and I believe I should answer it in some reasonable detail as I have done. I also took every reasonable step to beef up security to deal with the situation.

On Tuesday, December 7, 2004, after the party meeting on the crisis in Kogi State, you told me that you had written me a letter on threat to Ngige's life and you indicated to me, which you did not do in the letter, that one Honourable Chuma Nzeribe was the culprit. As I will not dilly-dally on an issue of security, even before I received your letter, I directed the Director-General of the State Security Service to look into the matter. It may interest you that almost on daily basis letters are received in my office of people alleging that other people want to assassinate them. All such allegations are forwarded to security people for investigation. None has been substantiated yet. But we will not take any issue of security lightly no matter who claims to be in danger.

And contrary to your belief and insinuation, just today, December 9, the governor of Anambra came to me to seek my opinion and advice on whether or not to constitute a commission of enquiry into what happened in the state. I did not hesitate to advise and encourage him to do so in order that all the facts would be exposed and verifiable truth established rather than trading in rumours.

Let me end on this note: whatever may be your reason for the ambivalent disposition and handling of the party problem in Anambra like you have done in other places and the ulterior motive for your letter, if and when in my capacity as President of Nigeria duty calls on me to act, I will not shirk my responsibility and we will at the end of the day be at the bar of the public both at the party level and national level. Let me also say that it is, indeed, unfortunate that you make so many unnecessary and unwarranted insinuations in your letter about our great country. I have taken judicial note of the ominous comparisons you made between a government in which you participated that was overthrown in a coup d'etat and this present administration.

I wonder if that is your wish since you may not now go out penniless. But whatever agenda you may be working at God is always in charge and in control. Warped perception must be differentiated from reality. Perception created and manipulated for a sinister purpose cannot be reality. The greatest danger to any country is putting truth out of favour; extolling evils of lies, deceit, treachery, disloyalty, unpatriotism, corruption and unconstitutionally. That is my greatest fear for Nigeria and it should be yours and that of any right-thinking Nigerian. Not too long ago, I challenged you to think beyond the ordinary, the expected and the self, I still put that challenge on the table.

Let it be on record that I do believe that I have invested the totality of my life in what I may call "Enterprise Nigeria" and if it means that in the process of repositioning our dear country for sustainable greatness, what is dearest to me would have to be sacrificed, I will in good conscience, not hesitate to do so.

And if that will enhance Nigeria's development, it is a sacrifice that I will be glad to make. I have reached a stage in life that I have passed the state of being intimidated or being flattered. I can stand before God and man and in clear conscience to defend every measure that I have taken everywhere in Nigeria since I became the President and will continue to act without fear or favour or inducement. And it does not matter to me what is sponsored in the Nigerian media, in particular, the print media. I believe that our vindication will come through the truth, which is the only thing that can uplift a nation and make an honest man and a sincere believer in God free.

May I crave your indulgence to copy this letter to all those to whom your letter to me was copied. In addition, I am copying the President of the Senate, the number three man in the present hierarchy of this government and a party leader in his own right, whom you deliberately left out of the distribution list of your letter for reason best known to you. One thing I will never stop doing is praying for Nigeria in general and Anambra in particular.

May God continue to bless and prosper Nigeria. In spite of the malevolence of some Nigerians, Nigeria is moving to the cruising level and cruising speed. That is the work of God and what all Nigerians and friends of Nigeria should do is to join hands in hastening the work of God in Nigeria at this juncture.

May God help us to help ourselves.

I wish you well.

Signed President Olusegun Obasanjo

APPENDIX H

TEXT OF PRESS BRIEFINGS BY
MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMADU BUHARI, GCFR
FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF JUDGEMENT BY
THE COURT OF APPEAL
DECEMBER 21, 2004

Chairman and Members of the Board of Trustees

My Colleagues in the All Nigeria Peoples Party

Gentlemen of the Press

Ladies and Gentlemen

Good Morning.

We are hereby giving our intention to appeal to the Supreme Court early next year, having listened to yesterday's judgment by the Court of Appeal with profound shock and disbelief. It is our considered opinion that this was a judgement delivered against overwhelming weight of evidence.

Ours has been the most painstaking litigation in the history of elections in Nigeria. The ANPP and myself diligently dug out all the major malpractices committed by INEC and other government agencies during the so-called elections of 19th April 2003. Our legal team put up the most comprehensive, most professional presentation ever in election petitions in Nigeria. Nobody was in any doubt about the gross violations of the Electoral Act 2002 committed by INEC, by the police and other law-enforcement agencies of the Federal Government. And nobody can forget so easily the unprovoked violence visited on ordinary law-abiding voters.

The CNPP, our party, the ANPP, and myself painstakingly pursued our case in the sure belief that we were taking this action on behalf of the Nigerian voters who were robbed of their choice and denied their electoral victory in the presidential ballot. We prosecuted our case in the belief that the judiciary would examine this case on its merit and hand down a judgement based on facts presented in court; facts which proved that there were no elections or no properly

conducted elections in a majority of states. We pursued this case at great expense, at great risk to life and limb, at great inconvenience to so many supporters. We pursued this case in the sure knowledge and belief that there was no proper distribution of materials in a majority of states, there was no collation in a majority of states: in short there were no properly conducted elections in a majority of states as stipulated in the Electoral Act, 2002.

This was the opinion of the general public, of all the political parties apart from PDP, of the credible national and international observers, of the immediate past House of Representatives and the press.

In the course of the hearings we subpoenaed INEC to produce the EC (8) forms on which the grand total of "results" they announced were "collated". Their failure to produce the Forms represents either contempt of court which is bad, or that the collations could not be tendered in court on account of internal inconsistencies which is worse. In either case, failure or refusal to tender the final "collated" figures rendered the elections null and void according to the law. The Court of Appeal should on this score alone have nullified the elections and ordered fresh polls.

We have no doubt at all that we have made our case. We have established cases of electoral malpractices in states across the country. As we have all witnessed, in several states, especially in the South East and South-South zones, results were declared even though elections had not taken place there. In some of the states where elections were allowed to hold, especially in the South-West zone, ballot boxes were already stuffed with thumb-printed ballot papers before the elections.

In several other states, especially in areas considered our stronghold, ballot papers and other electoral materials were not supplied at all. In addition, across the length and breadth of the country various kinds of electoral malpractices were observed and recorded.

In general, money and other inducements were unashamedly used to influence voter behaviour in areas where the elections had taken place, while thugs and elements in the security forces were employed to intimidate, maim or even kill voters. The atmosphere immediately before, during, and even right after the elections couldn't have been conducive to free and fair elections, and much of what happened then shouldn't have been considered acceptable polls. At least that much had been established and attested to by both domestic and foreign election observers.

Clearly, if our new democracy could be so brazenly raped this way, and our civil society groups and other oversight institutions of the democratic system were too weak and fledgling to get us remedy, our only hope lay in the nation's judiciary. And that was why we decided to challenge the result of the presidential election at the Court of Appeal.

No doubt, it has taken us a long time to reach this stage, but we are certainly not in the least

worried about the length of time. We are ready to be patient and wait, and sit it out, no matter how long it takes; because, we are not looking for quick fixes. By deciding to pursue this matter to its logical conclusion, we certainly hope to uncover the truth of the result of the presidential election.

But even more importantly, we hope to, in the process, make example to the nation to commit and rededicate itself to the democratic process - a free and fair electoral way of choosing its leadership, and an independent judicial system for setting the anomalies and distortions of the electoral process right.

This is the bigger picture of our struggle and the ultimate goal of our case. If we were to terminate the struggle at this stage or at some earlier stage, what could we have said to those killed or maimed in this struggle to defend their right to electoral freedom and free choice? And what can we say to the millions who had their votes stolen?

No, we would never abandon this struggle; we would pursue it to a successful end. And, in any case, it had never been in our character to abandon matters half-way through. Luckily, even with respect to the last polls, we have had precedents.

The ANPP had already set the example by going to the very end in the cases of gubernatorial election petitions in Borno, Sokoto, Adamawa, Anambra, Benue, Enugu Plateau, Kaduna, Katsina, Rivers and Yobe states. It should therefore be clear that even in this case, it is the intention of the party to exhaust every available constitutional remedy provided, to ensure that the people's sacred mandate is secured and protected.

And ultimately we shall overcome, because our cause is right and just; and we have full confidence in the ability and neutrality of the Supreme Court to find a just and equitable solution to the matter of the rigged elections. This belief is based on what we have so far observed; and this is in spite of our very bitter experiences at the hands of tribunals and other courts in at least ten states with respect to our petitions in gubernatorial elections and elections into both Federal and State legislatures. Even yesterday's judgment has not reduced the level of our confidence in the judicial system.

That is indeed why we have now decided to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, the highest court in the land and the final arbiter in the case. As earlier said, it is our belief that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case was given against overwhelming weight of evidence and short of legitimately expectable conclusions on clear findings of the Honourable Court. This, however, would in no way dim our belief that the courts have the final right and competence to interpret our laws and decide the merit of this case.

This judicial process, protracted though it has turned out to be for the country, is as necessary to the electoral process and the development of democracy as the actual voting itself.

This court case that the party and I instituted and the appeal, whose notice we now give, must, therefore, be seen for what they are - an integral part of the electoral process that has been constitutionally provided for.

It is true that initially I didn't want to go to court over the matter; and I was only persuaded - almost coerced - into it by the party and the force of wounded public opinion and the insistence of our supporters. I only reluctantly consented to commence litigation because I genuinely believed that that was the only path in which salvation lay; and, obviously, the people who had given their all to this democratic process, must not be allowed to totally lose hope.

And, with an atmosphere charged with all the emotion and the painful sense of loss felt by the people, we feared that unless the path to court was taken, a situation of near anarchy might have developed to engulf us all. This was what we have tried to avoid.

In several other ways, too, we had gone out of our way to restrain our supporters from taking the law into their hands. And, instead, we had tried to sensitise and orient them into accepting the principles and spirit of democratic contest, and make them accept the superiority of democracy over all the available alternatives.

The fact that there has been no general insurrection in spite of people's bitter feelings suggests that we have succeeded in calming public anger. We are satisfied with what we have done in and out of court.

Let me therefore seize the opportunity first and foremost to congratulate and express our gratitude to Chief Mike Ahamba, SAN, and his team of lawyers for a masterly performance in court, often done under difficult circumstances. I would also like to seize this opportunity to thank our millions of supporters all over the country and abroad for their continued support and concern, and, above all, for their patience. I must also thank our party for its untiring support throughout the ordeal. In the same vein, I would like to thank the international community for the interest and understanding it has demonstrated in this case.

Let me also seize this opportunity to reassure Nigerians and the international community that so long as I am alive, I will never abandon this struggle. And I will never tire in the pursuit of any right that belongs to the people of Nigeria. No doubt, Nigeria deserves more than what we witnessed in 2003.

Let me once again call on all Nigerians to unite and face the future with determination. Despite differences in party affiliation, we must remain united in our vision for the greatness of this country, and remain united in our desire to work and sacrifice to attain that greatness.

We all know the solution to the problems that we ourselves have created. We only need to believe in ourselves; and with the right leadership we have in the past shown that we are capable of doing that. So may God be with us as we go to the Supreme Court.

Long live the All Nigeria People's Party, ANPP.

Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Major General Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR.

APPENDIX I

THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH COMMISSION (NHRWC) REPORT ON THE 2015 PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE

“The run-up to Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential election has been characterized by bellicose rhetoric, a rise in hate speech, and a worrisome footprint of election-related violence.”

“The Report and Advisory itemized scores of incidents of pre-election killings and violence affecting 22 states of the federation. In the six weeks since then, the footprint of pre-election violence has spread beyond the 22 states and election-related violence in some form has been reported in nearly all the states of Nigeria. ”During that period also, the number of complaints lodged with the commission concerning election-related violence has grown by over 200 percent.” The report released by the NHRC summarized the nature, perpetrators and targets of demagoguery in the run up to the 2015 general elections as follows.

(i) Militias and gangs: It’s clear that there are gangs, cults and militias that have been cultivated and to whom the leading political parties or people claiming to act on their behalf have somewhat “outsourced” election violence. This has made election-related both transactional and casual. In some of the states, well known militia leaders have become candidates in the elections, guaranteeing that the violence is part of the election and campaign narrative.

(ii) Small arms and light weapons (SALW): In the three main locations in particular, small arms and light weapons are present in very worrying quantities in the hands of cults, gangs, militias and unlawful hands. The calibre of ordnance in private hands in Rivers State, in particular, goes beyond anything that can be licensed for private use and, indeed, beyond what is legitimate or even for lawful law enforcement purposes.

(iii) Substance abuse and psychotropic substances: In nearly all cases, there was evidence to correlate (perhaps indeed even of causation) high pre-disposition to election violence with evidence of an illicit supply network for psychotropic substances to the militias involved.

(iv) Campaign billboard wars: In most States, the two leading parties and their supporters have launched mutual attacks on the billboards of opposite parties. Campaign billboards are gouged out, defaced, painted over or destroyed as if they have injured anyone. In some of the states, there were allegations that state assets had been used to procure or condone such destruction.

(v) Hate speech: All the institutions, entities and communities whom we consulted with affirmed that hate speech was at unprecedented levels and nearly all warned that the level of such hate now presents a clear threat to national cohesion irrespective of the outcome of the elections.

(vi) Effect of closure of courts: In Rivers and Kaduna, the courts are closed, creating a major crisis of lack of access to remedies for election-related violence. The Police complain that they

suffer interference from politicians in policing election violence. They also say they have no courts to charge arrested persons to and are now short of cell space for detainees. Parties in some cases allege their supporters are being held interminably under opaque rules or “orders from above”.

Serial and repeated bomb attacks on courts in Rivers are the immediate cause of the court closures there and have not attracted the right form of reprobation from the authorities. Judges need to be secured ahead of contentious election disputes. In Kaduna, we also heard allegations of interference with lower bench dealing with violence. These fuel a growing narrative of election vigilantism and “self defence”.

(vii) The self-defence narrative: Two common expressions we heard in all the places visited were “we will not be intimidated” and “we will defend ourselves”. From political leaders this is worse than disappointing. It’s a confession of both desperation and leadership failure.

(viii) Discrepancies in casualty count between parties & police: There are clear discrepancies in casualty count between the parties, communities and police. This is most evident in Kaduna as well as Rivers, suggesting that categories are not clear or mutually dissonant or there is under-reporting of the incidents and consequences of violence. Communities and parties have a responsibility to keep law enforcement fully informed of incidents of violence, especially where human beings are killed or injured. Law enforcement agencies also have a responsibility to keep accurate records of the reports received.

(ix) Governors alleging coercion: In all Kaduna, Lagos and Rivers States, the state governments made allegations of the use of violence or threats of violence as an instrument of coercion by the opposition party in the State.

(x) PVC discrepancies: In Rivers and Kaduna, in particular, we received very credible indications that PVCS may have been “bought wholesale” by politicians or communities and indications that the practice of “community voting” could seriously endanger both plans for credible elections and the safety of staff engaged to organize or administer them. These are on a level that must be taken seriously by both INEC and the security agencies.

(xi) Allegations or perceptions of law enforcement uneven-handedness: We received allegations of lack of even handedness in law enforcement and security provisioning affecting campaigns and supporters were both rampant and too serious to ignore. Yet in all cases, the campaigns on all sides and officers making them enjoyed the protection of security agencies. Such allegations are not to be taken lightly but it is also important that political organizations should refrain from seeking to tarnish security agencies merely for the purpose of scoring political points.

(xii) Breakdown of Accord on Non-Violence: In all the locations, the parties suggest that the accords signed between the parties to promote issued-based campaigning and refrain from violence had broken down almost irretrievably. There is mutual suspicion and lack of good faith between the parties.

(xiii) Imperative of protecting internal migrants and minorities: It's clear that around these elections populations of internal migrants and minorities in many parts of Nigeria live in mortal fear of significant election-related violence. Many fled before 14 Feb. Others re-located their families to places of origin. We have received reports of fatal accidents involving women and children fleeing in this way are many. Many children have missed an entire term of school as a result. In some states, internal migrants have also re-located to 'squat' near military barracks or beside security establishments.

APPENDIX J

CASE STUDY C: RIVERS STATE

They buy guns for our youths; destroy our schools and our amenities, and our communities. They ask our youths to kill one another and do others of their biddings...Most of these youths that the state had turned into cultists, hostage-takers, armed robbers, assassins, prostitutes and thugs would have been great and meaningful to this society, but today their future is rocked with violence and evil.

—Patrick Naagbantou, Port Harcourt journalist and activist.²⁷⁹

Rivers State is the unofficial capital of Nigeria's booming oil industry and its state government is the wealthiest in Nigeria, with a budget of \$1.4 billion in 2007.²⁸⁰ Unfortunately Rivers state's relative wealth has exacerbated rather than solved its many problems. Not least, the state's wealth has led to high-stakes political competition and a resulting level of political violence that considerably exceeds even the nationwide norm.

Sowing the seeds of Violence: The 2003 Elections in Rivers

Since 1999, the PDP has maintained a virtual monopoly on elective office in Rivers State and throughout the Niger Delta through rigged elections. The 2003 elections in Rivers were both more violent and more brazenly rigged than in most other parts of the country. One local civil society group compared the 2003 electoral period to a "low-intensity armed struggle."²⁸¹ Despite a widespread lack of voting, massive voter turnout was reported and the PDP swept elective offices across the state in landslide victories.²⁸²

Human Rights Watch interviewed more than a dozen people, including gang leaders, cultists and low-level thugs, who acknowledged having organized or carried out acts of paid violence on behalf of the PDP in order to rig the 2003 elections in Rivers. All of them said that they worked on behalf of the state government or PDP candidates for office to intimidate voters, attack their sponsors' opponents or rig the voting directly in favor of then-Governor Peter Odili and the PDP.²⁸³

The PDP's primary instruments in using violence to rig the 2003 polls in Rivers were two gangs that have since been at the forefront of violent crimes and "militant" activity throughout the state: the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dukobo, and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom. State government officials have vehemently denied their sponsorship of these groups, but the activities of some officials have been documented by Human Rights Watch, Nigerian civil society groups and journalists.²⁸⁴ Ateke Tom himself acknowledged the role he played in the 2003 elections, telling Human Rights Watch that then-Governor Odili had promised cash and jobs in great quantities for himself and his 'boys' and that in return, "Any place Odili sent me, I conquer[ed] for him. I conquer[ed] everywhere."²⁸⁵ Governor Odili has consistently denied any relationship with Ateke, Asari, or any other gang leader.

The Legacy of the 2003 Polls in Rivers

Much of the compensation that PDP politicians promised to the groups they helped finance and arm during the 2003 elections never materialized. Specifically, many youth recruited by politicians to carry out electoral violence complain that they were promised additional cash payments and, more importantly, government jobs after the elections. Many gang members interviewed by Human Rights Watch point to poverty and unemployment as the sole factors motivating them to participate in political violence and crime.²⁸⁶

There are widespread complaints among these youth and their leaders that rather than fulfill these promises, their sponsors including then-Governor Peter Odili simply “dumped” them once comfortably ensconced in office. As one civil society activist who works to discourage youth from participating in cult activities explained to Human Rights Watch, “The armed groups, particularly the youth, felt betrayed by the kind of contracts they made with the politicians in 2003. They felt that having participated in rigging the election, they deserved a stake.”²⁸⁷

The result of these broken promises was a rapid deterioration of relations between many armed groups and their former sponsors. Rivers State has been awash with guns since the 2003 polls, when politicians sparked the ongoing influx of arms into the region to arm their proxy gangs.²⁸⁸ Many groups subsequently moved into using their weaponry to spark an ongoing wave of violent crime, providing protection for or asserting control over oil bunkering operations and other criminal activities to make up for their loss of lucrative political sponsors.²⁸⁹ Local civil society groups, along with many current and former Rivers state government interviewed by Human Rights Watch, are unanimous in pointing to the mobilization by politicians of gangs—most of them linked to cult groups—to rig the 2003 elections as the beginning of the state’s current epidemic of violent crime and proliferation of unaccountable armed gangs.²⁹⁰

The trend towards armed criminality sparked by the emergence and political sponsorship of armed groups during the 2003 elections has now spiraled out of control in Rivers. Militias and gangs have proliferated, maintaining camps of fighters in the creeks that engage in oil bunkering and stage bank robberies and street battles in Port Harcourt. Some of these groups have turned kidnappings for ransom of expatriate oil workers, wealthy Nigerians and their family members into a profitable business. Kidnappings have become commonplace since the beginning of 2006 and armed gangs seized more than one hundred oil workers in the first six months of 2007 alone.²⁹¹ In early 2007 the kidnapping epidemic took an even more disturbing new turn with the seizure of several young children for ransom by armed attackers.²⁹²

Turf Wars, Extortion and Impunity

Aside from overtly political violence in the months surrounding elections, insecurity for the residents of Rivers State has been worst when armed groups have turned against one another. This infighting is linked to claims on political patronage, competition over territory, oil bunkering networks, or other sources of revenue and influence.

Beginning in late 2003, a drawn-out armed conflict between the PDP’s erstwhile agents—Asari’s NDPVF and Ateke’s NDV—plunged parts of Port Harcourt and surrounding communities into a

state of terror. Dozens of local people were killed along with hundreds of fighters, tens of thousands fled their homes and riverine communities along the creeks were devastated. Human Rights Watch documented the human rights impact of that conflict in detail in a 2004 report.²⁹³ That violence is generally acknowledged to have been sparked by a power play on the part of the state government. Having fallen out with former ally Asari Dukobo after Asari helped rig the 2003 elections, the Odili administration sponsored Ateke Tom in a failed and bloody attempt to crush Asari's group.²⁹⁴

The spiral of violence that followed the 2003 elections repeated itself after the 2007 polls. In May 2007 gang members linked to another prominent militant, Soboma George, murdered armed group leader Price Igodo and as many as a dozen others. Numerous sources indicated told Human Rights Watch that Soboma was paid to carry out the attack by supporters of current Governor Celestine Omehia partly in response to concerns that Igodo was planning to disrupt the new government's May 29 inauguration.²⁹⁵

Soboma and his Outlaws gang were reportedly hired by the PDP to help rig the 2007 elections in Rivers.²⁹⁶ One cult member described a meeting in Government House in Port Harcourt just prior to the April 14 polls during which he saw government officials hand out between N5 million and N10 million (\$38,500 to \$77,000) to several different cult groups in return for their assisting or simply accepting the PDP's plans to rig the polls.²⁹⁷ Several other sources confirmed the substance of the meeting.²⁹⁸

In August 2007, Port Harcourt descended into chaos, with armed gangs waging ongoing battles in the streets of the city and wreaking devastation on the surrounding communities. Civil society activists in Port Harcourt described this fighting as being linked to struggles between various gangs to assert claims on political patronage including money and oil bunkering routes from the state government and anger on the part of some gangs at Soboma George's preeminent role in securing such patronage. As one prominent activist put it, "It's the same old story—people who were used for elections on April 14 and 21, having won the election are trying to establish supremacy against the other groups in the state."²⁹⁹ And indeed the fighting bore a grim resemblance to the events that followed the 2003 elections in Rivers—not least because one of its central belligerents was none other than Ateke Tom.

After weeks of violence, the Nigerian military's Joint Task Force (JTF) intervened, engaging in a bloody battle with the gangs in Port Harcourt. The JTF is comprised of forces drawn from different branches of the Nigerian military and is currently under the command of Army Brigadier General Yaki Sakin Bello. A tenuous calm was quickly restored after a street battle that reportedly saw dozens of gang members killed, including many killed by attack helicopter. The toll in lives exacted by the fighting was heavy: local civil society groups reported that dozens of innocent bystanders were killed or wounded along with unknown numbers of gang members. One MSF-run trauma center in Port Harcourt reported treating 72 gunshot wounds in July 2007—then its worst month on record—followed by 71 further gunshot victims during the first two weeks of August alone.³⁰⁰

Most of the wounded treated at the MSF trauma center were suffering from high-velocity gunshot wounds and most reported having been fired on at random by marauding gang members

or caught in the crossfire between rival gangs.³⁰¹ Days after the MSF's numbers above were compiled, the military intervened in fighting that yielded still further casualties.³⁰² Local newspapers reported roughly 40 dead during a day of heavy fighting between gangs and military forces in the densely populated confines of Port Harcourt.³⁰³ Local civil society activists estimated that the true number was significantly higher.³⁰⁴ A military spokesperson told Human Rights Watch that he could not offer any estimate of casualties on any side.³⁰⁵

Box 6: A Gang Leader Discusses his Role in Politics

The following is drawn from the testimony of a gang leader in Port Harcourt who was interviewed by Human Rights Watch on the eve of the 2007 elections. He, along with other youth who told HRW that they had worked to rig the 2003 elections, blamed broken promises on the part of the state government for much of the violence in which they had been involved:

In 1999 and 2003, [Governor] Odili called us and told us we should work for him. He called other faction leaders of different groups in Port Harcourt. He worked through Asari [Dukobo of the NDPVF]...They gave some groups N5 million, 3 million, 10 million...We disrupted the election in favor of our governor and his candidates—we stood at the election ground so people would not come. There was no election.

After 1999, we waited and waited and there was nothing. In 2003 they called us again and said we should work for them and again they broke their promises. They promised us opportunities, empowerment. Instead [after the elections] they started chasing us and calling us cultists...They declared me “wanted” on radio and television.

After 2003 they went and called Ateke Tom and said he should chase us and kill the members of our group. We were chased out of our areas by Ateke who was working with law enforcement groups. They killed many of my boys.

We went for a peace parlay with Ateke in Abuja. They government promised us employment, empowerment... They then said we should refund our guns to them. We did. But we kept some for ourselves because we knew we could not trust them. We have not had to acquire new weapons—we had enough arsenal.

The government people approached me to mobilize my boys for the elections [in 2007] but they are not sincere. They destroyed my house and killed many of my members with JTF [the Joint Task Force of security agencies deployed to combat unrest in the Delta]. They now approached us again and asked us to work for them but we said no, because they are not sincere.

There won't be any problems here if they work with us. The message we are going to give them is, they should create employment, job opportunities and social amenities for the youth of the Niger Delta...In this area we have oil and gas in abundance but we are not being carried along.³⁰⁶

Impunity for Violence

Recent clashes with the military aside, for the most part armed groups in Rivers State have been left to operate with near-total impunity, even where they have evolved almost entirely into purely criminal organizations willing to work for the highest bidder or simply carry out violent crime on their own. Ateke Tom and his NDV is the most glaring example.

Human Rights Watch met with Ateke Tom along with several journalists the day before the first round of voting in the 2007 polls. On paper, Ateke has been a wanted man for several years, as he has been implicated in numerous murders and bank robberies, but the camp where the meeting took place was hidden in plain view just off a major waterway and a short boat ride away from Port Harcourt.³⁰⁷ Scores of armed men dressed mostly in plastic sandals and ragged but colorful t-shirts loitered about the camp, not bothering to seek cover even when a helicopter buzzed almost directly overhead.

Asked by Human Rights Watch to explain his primary aims, Ateke demanded that the government provide jobs to him and his “boys” and that he be repaid for property he alleged the Nigerian military had destroyed during a previous military operation to break the power of his armed group. “The weapons that are with us, we can use them for any fight,” he said.³⁰⁸ Several of the armed men present in Ateke’s camp openly bragged that they would travel to Port Harcourt the next day, the day of the gubernatorial elections, to “destroy.”³⁰⁹

The night before the April 14 elections, Ateke’s men attacked two police stations in Port Harcourt, murdering several officers and burning the police stations to the ground.³¹⁰ The attackers reportedly locked one policeman inside a Hilux pickup and then tossed in a stick of locally-made “dynamite” that killed him and set the truck ablaze.³¹¹ In one press interview after the attack, Ateke said that he had no regrets for ordering the attack. “If you are fighting, people will die,” he said.³¹²

Some reports indicate that the purpose of the attack was to free some NDV fighters who had supposedly been arrested; other sources believed the goal was simply to demonstrate Ateke’s capacity for mayhem in order to strengthen his bargaining position and extort some payment in return for refraining from causing any further disruption on Election Day.³¹³ Later the same day Ateke reportedly reached a settlement with the local government chairman in his home town of Okrika to refrain from disrupting the elections there in exchange for an unspecified payment.³¹⁴ The results in Okrika were then massively rigged in favor of the PDP.³¹⁵

Since the August fighting between Rivers’ gangs and the military, Soboma George and Ateke Tom are, once again, being described as wanted men. A military spokesperson told Human Rights Watch that he “suspected” Soboma George was killed in the August fighting but these claims were widely dismissed by civil society activists. The same spokesperson affirmed that “God willing, we will catch Ateke.”³¹⁶ As of this writing Ateke remained at large.

Impunity for the Sponsors of Violence in Rivers

One of the most notorious theatres of pre-election violence in 2006 and 2007 occurred in the town of Bodo in Gokana local government, where armed groups sponsored by two prominent Rivers politicians, including the current Secretary to the State Government, unleashed mayhem in the course of a long-running political turf war.³¹⁷

The example of Bodo is by no means atypical. No government official has been held to account or even presented with criminal charges for having helped to arm the criminal gangs that have grown so powerful in Rivers State in the years since 2003, least of all former Governor Peter Odili. The impunity enjoyed by politicians is so widespread that some residents of the state are not even aware that their sponsorship of armed gangs is in and of itself illegal. One former gang member in Port Harcourt suggested to Human Rights Watch that, “If the government would pass a law preventing the politicians from giving arms to our people, it would help Rivers a lot.”³¹⁸

Impunity and 2007’s Post-Election Crisis

Soon after being sworn into office in June 2007, current Rivers Governor Celestine Omehia announced a plan to award payments of N1 million (\$7700) each to any youths in armed groups who agree to “renounce violence.”

The Rivers State government’s “policy” was harshly criticized by local activists who complained that it was unaccompanied by any measure to reintegrate members of cults and other armed gangs into society, did not spell out who or how people would qualify, and in fact did not appear to be part of any rational policy at all. The government also made no mention of any plan to hold accountable individuals responsible for large numbers of murders and other violent abuses, such as Ateke Tom, or their former political sponsors such as ex-Governor Peter Odili or some current government officials in the state.

In a July 2007 interview, Hassan Douglas, Chairman of Rivers State Niger Delta Peace and Crisis Resolution Committee—one of six committees announced under a federal coordinating committee—derided the plan’s critics and said that the program had already brought peace to the entirety of Rivers State. “Rivers State right now is a heaven for investors,” Douglas said to Human Rights Watch. “No panic, no more militias, no more hostage taking. No more fighting in any part of the state right now. Rivers State is now like it was before 1999, within the space of only one month our Governor has done this.”³¹⁹ Weeks later, Port Harcourt was engulfed in the violent chaos described above.

Government policies, exemplified by the Rivers State Government’s “millionaires” program, have not only been ineffective but have largely missed the point. When the military’s Joint Task Force intervened in August 2007 to combat warring gangs, many Port Harcourt residents welcomed the move in principle but worried that the bloodshed would prove pointless unless the politicians who sponsored and helped arm those gangs were held to account. As one leading human rights activist put it:

What will this military intervention do to the whole idea of the politicians paying, motivating, recruiting and keeping and protecting these militants? That is the whole problem...The politicians just a couple of months ago paid these boys to win the elections for them- they paid them and also gave them the [unofficial] license to go and do oil bunkering. I don't see anything coming out of this unless these politicians are dealt with.³²⁰

²⁷⁹ Patrick Naagbanton, "Funeral Song for Prince Igodo and Others," *The Port Harcourt Telegraph*, June 6, 2007.

²⁸⁰ "2007: Assembly Approves N183 Billion as Rivers Budget," Rivers State House of Assembly Press Release, http://www.riversassembly.org/news/58-2007%253A_ASSEMBLY_APPROVES_N183BN_AS_RIVERS_BUDGET.php (accessed July 13, 2007). This is roughly five times the national average across all state governments. See Human Rights Watch, *Chop Fine*, pp. 75-79.

²⁸¹ Election monitoring report on the ongoing Nigeria federal and state general elections, April/May 2003 (executive summary), Environmental Rights Action. Reproduced in *Nigeria Today*, April 26, 2003.

²⁸² Governor Peter Odili reportedly won roughly 98% of all votes cast. Human Rights Watch interviews with member of 2003 election observer mission, Abuja, February 2007.

²⁸³ Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, December 2005, August 2006 and April 2007.

²⁸⁴ Along with Governor Peter Odili, former Secretary to the State Government and Federal Transportation Minister Abiye Sekibo reportedly played a central role in sponsoring the violent activities of Ateke Tom's NDV in particular. See Human Rights Watch, *Rivers and Blood*, pp. 2-3 and 4-6 ; Human Rights Watch, *Nigeria's 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence*, pp. 14-19.

²⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007.

²⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, August 2006 and April 2007.

²⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 11, 2007.

²⁸⁸ See Human Rights Watch, *Rivers and Blood*, pp. 4-6 and 9-10.

²⁸⁹ See Human Rights Watch, *Rivers and Blood*.

²⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, August 2006 and April 2007.

²⁹¹ See “Foreign Hostages Freed in Nigeria,” *BBC News Online*, June 23, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6234008.stm> (accessed July 16, 2007).

²⁹² As of July 16, 2007, three young children had been taken hostage and subsequently released by armed groups in the Delta. These included two children of wealthy Nigerians and the three-year old daughter of an expatriate resident of Port Harcourt. See “Nigeria kidnappers free UK girl,” *BBC News Online*, July 9, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6282846.stm> (accessed July 16, 2007).

²⁹³ Human Rights Watch, *Rivers and Blood*.

²⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch interviews with civil society activists and gang members, Port Harcourt, August 2006 and April 2007.

²⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interviews and email correspondence with civil society activists, journalists and former cult members, June and July 2007.

²⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch interviews with activists and cult members, Port Harcourt, April 2007. See also Patrick Naagbantou, “Funeral Song for Prince Igodo and Others,” *The Port Harcourt Telegraph*, June 6, 2007.

²⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 16, 2007.

²⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt and Abuja, April 2007. See also Robyn Dixon, “Niger Delta’s politicians ease way into office by using thugs,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 21, 2007, citing a member of the Buccaneers cult group claiming that cult groups were paid N10 million to help rig the elections.

²⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Anyakwee Nsirimovu, Port Harcourt, August 21, 2007.

³⁰⁰ Doctors Without Borders, “Field News: MSF Trauma Center Admits 71 Over Two Weeks in Port Harcourt, Nigeria,” August 13, 2007, <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/2007/08-14-2007.cfm> (accessed August 21, 2007).

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² *Ibid.*

³⁰³ Voice of America, “Tenuous Calm Returns to Nigerian Oil City After Deadly Battles,” August 19, 2007, <http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-08-19-voa16.cfm> (accessed August 21, 2007).

³⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch telephone interviews, Port Harcourt, August 21, 2007.

³⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with military spokesperson, Port Harcourt, August 21, 2007.

³⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 12, 2007.

³⁰⁷ Like other prominent militia leaders, Ateke and his militia have several different camps scattered throughout the creeks.

³⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007.

³⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch interviews, camp of Ateke Tom, Rivers State, April 13, 2007.

³¹⁰ See “Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud,” Human Rights Watch news release, April 17, 2007, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm>.

³¹¹ Human Rights Watch interview with activist, Port Harcourt, April 14, 2007.

³¹² Robyn Dixon, “Niger Delta’s politicians ease way into office by using thugs,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 21, 2007.

³¹³ Human Rights Watch interviews, Port Harcourt, April 2007; civil society activist reports on file with Human Rights Watch.

³¹⁴ Human Rights Watch interviews with cult members and civil society groups, Port Harcourt and Abuja, April 2007.

³¹⁵ See “Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud,” Human Rights Watch news release, April 17, 2007, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm>.

³¹⁶ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with military spokesperson Major Sagir Musa, Port Harcourt, August 21, 2007.

³¹⁷ Two prominent Rivers State politicians hail from Gokana— Kenneth Kobani, the State Commissioner for Finance, and Gabriel Pidomson, a member of the Rivers State House of Assembly. In what local analysts called a struggle for position ahead of the 2007 elections, gangs allegedly linked to the two politicians carried out a series of brutal attacks on one another in and around Bodo during August 2006. At least a dozen people were killed and the community was plunged into a state of insecurity and terror for several weeks. Apparently alarmed by the scale of the violence and worried that it might set a precedent for the 2007 elections, the federal government’s State Security Service took the unusual step of arresting both Kobani and Pidomson. After several weeks in detention, however, both men were released and left to resume their posts in government. Neither was charged with any crime or received any other sort of formal sanction. See Patrick Naagbantou, “The Bodo War of Attrition,” July 31, 2006, http://www.cehrd.org/files/The_Bodo_War_of_Attrition2.doc (accessed July 12, 2007).

³¹⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Harcourt, April 12, 2007.

³¹⁹ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alh. Hassan Douglas, Chairman, Niger Delta Peace and Crisis Resolution Committee, July 16, 2007.

³²⁰ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Anyakwee Nisirmovu, April 20, 2007.

Available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/9.htm>

APPENDIX K: BIVARIATE ANALYSIS (CROSS TABULATION)

Table 4:3.1 Harassment of Party Leaders Opposed to Imposition of Candidates According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|

| | | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| N= 655 SEX Male Female | 54.6% 26.0% | 18.5% 18.4% | 26.8% 35.7% |
| | P-value=0.017 | | |
| AGE <30 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+ | 54.0% 57.3% 57.6% 62.7% 47.2% 45.2% 25.0% 45.3% | 12.6% 16.9% 15.1% 14.4% 20.2% 24.2% 35.4% 22.6% | 33.3% 25.9% 27.4% 22.9% 32.6% 30.7% 39.6% 32.0% |
| | P-value=0.002 | | |
| RELIGION Christianity Islam Others | 52.6% 51.7% 77.8% | 16.2% 21.6% 11.1% | 31.2% 26.7% 11.1% |
| | P-value=0.104 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS Single Married Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 56.8% 53.7% 35.7% | 15.5% 18.2% 21.4% | 27.7% 28.2% 42.9% |
| | P-value=0.198 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND Primary/Secondary Tertiary/ Others | 49.5% 52.1% | 16.8% 18.9% | 33.7% 29.0% |
| | P-value=0.201 | | |
| OCCUPATION Unemployed/Retired Self Employed/ Others Government Services Private Services | 51.4% 50.5% 55.2% 58.9% | 18.7% 18.8% 17.0% 11.8% | 29.9% 30.8% 27.9% 29.4% |

| | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------|-------|-------|
| | | | |
| | P-value=0.817 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 56.7% | 16.3% | 26.9% |
| APC | 47.9% | 20.5% | 31.6% |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |

Table 4.3.2 Election Did Not Follow Due Process and Rule of Law According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 48.5% | 12.6% | 39.0% |
| Female | 50.8% | 6.7% | 42.4% |
| | P-value=0.225 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 53.0% | 8.4% | 38.5% |
| 30-34 | 39.3% | 20.2% | 40.5% |
| 35-39 | 55.0% | 3.0% | 42.0% |
| 40-44 | 52.2% | 13.9% | 33.9% |
| 45-49 | 41.4% | 12.9% | 46.0% |
| 50-54 | 48.3% | 14.5% | 37.1% |
| 55-59 | 55.3% | 2.1% | 42.6% |
| 60+ | 48.0% | 10.0% | 42.0% |
| | P-value=0.096 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 50.8% | 11.4% | 37.8% |
| Islam | 46.8% | 10.8% | 42.4% |
| Others | 33.3% | | 66.7% |
| | P-value=0.022 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 48.9% | 9.0% | 42.1% |
| Married | 49.2% | 13.3% | 37.6% |
| Separated/ Divorced/ | | | |
| Widowed | 47.3% | 1.8% | 50.9% |

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|
| | P-value=0.038 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 44.1% | 6.8% | 49.3% |
| Tertiary/ Others | 50.4% | 13.4% | 36.1% |
| | P-value=0.002 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 51.5% | 5.8% | 42.7% |
| Self Employed/ Others | 47.6% | 13.2% | 39.2% |
| Government Services | 51.6% | 9.7% | 38.7% |
| Private Services | 43.8% | 6.3% | 50.0% |
| | P-value=0.610 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 64.0% | 12.2% | 23.8% |
| APC | 34.7% | 9.7% | 55.6% |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 66.4% | 4.2% | 29.5% |
| Kaduna | 40.5% | 19.0% | 40.5% |
| Kogi | 36.7% | 2.2% | 61.1% |
| Enugu | 58.0% | 9.9% | 32.1% |
| Ondo | 53.5% | 12.1% | 34.4% |
| Edo | 66.3% | 5.4% | 28.2% |
| FCT | 22.1% | 24.2% | 53.7% |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

TABLE 4.3.3 Candidates Produced by Primary Elections were not Based on Merit According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|---------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 56.7% | 8.6 | 34.8 |
| Female | 53.0% | 7.6 | 39.5 |
| | P-value=0.588 | | |
| AGE | | | |

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| <30 | 46.5 | 2.3 | 51.2 |
| 30-34 | 52.3 | 11.6 | 36.0 |
| 35-39 | 53.9 | 9.6 | 36.6 |
| 40-44 | 57.1 | 10.2 | 33.0 |
| 45-49 | 48.9 | 11.1 | 40.0 |
| 50-54 | 57.1 | 12.7 | 30.2 |
| 55-59 | 66.6 | 4.2 | 29.1 |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 59.2 | 9.3 | 31.6 |
| Islam | 48.1 | 6.5 | 45.4 |
| Others | 72.2 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
| | P-value=0.007 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 53.1 | 6.8 | 40.1 |
| Married | 56 | 9.3 | 34.7 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 57.9 | 5.3 | 36.8 |
| | P-value=0.328 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 43.3 | 4.9 | 46.7 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 56.5 | 9.9 | 33.4 |
| | P-value=0.010 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 52.9 | 5.8 | 41.4 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 61.2 | 6.6 | 32.2 |
| Government Services | 46.7 | 13.9 | 39.4 |
| Private Services | 41.1 | 11.8 | 47.0 |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 66.7 | 7.0 | 26.3 |
| APC | 45.0 | 9.6 | 45.4 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

| | | | |
|---------|----------------------|------|------|
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 34.4 | 3.0 | 62.6 |
| Kaduna | 46.9 | 14.8 | 38.3 |
| Kogi | 56.0 | Nil | 44.1 |
| Enugu | 56.6 | 15.7 | 27.7 |
| Ondo | 67.0 | 11.0 | 22.0 |
| Edo | 74.2 | 11.3 | 14.5 |
| FCT | 53.1 | 4.1 | 42.9 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 4.3.4 Poor Leadership Can Result From Imposition of Candidates on the People According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 85.3 | 6.3 | 8.4 |
| Female | 85.9 | 8.6 | 5.4 |
| | P-value=0.178 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 91.9 | 3.4 | 4.6 |
| 30-34 | 85.6 | 4.8 | 9.6 |
| 35-39 | 86.4 | 4.9 | 8.8 |
| 40-44 | 86.3 | 6.0 | 7.7 |
| 45-49 | 86.5 | 7.9 | 5.6 |
| 50-54 | 75.0 | 14.1 | 10.9 |
| 55-59 | 81.3 | 16.7 | 2.1 |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.215 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 87.4 | 5.7 | 6.8 |
| Islam | 82.4 | 9.1 | 8.6 |
| Others | 82.4 | 5.9 | 11.8 |
| | P-value=0.167 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 87.7 | 5.5 | 6.8 |
| Married | 85.7 | 7.3 | 7.0 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ | | | |
| Widowed | 75.4 | 8.8 | 15.8 |

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| | | | |
| | P-value=0.305 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 83.4 | 8.8 | 7.7 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 86.3 | 6.0 | 7.7 |
| | P-value=0.217 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 87.4 | 4.9 | 7.8 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 86.3 | 8.0 | 5.7 |
| Government Services | 82.7 | 5.6 | 11.8 |
| Private Services | 88.2 | Nil | 11.8 |
| | P-value=0.053 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 90.5 | 5.4 | 4.1 |
| APC | 80.7 | 8.4 | 10.8 |
| | P-value=0.003 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 92.0 | 2.0 | 6.0 |
| Kaduna | 91.4 | 4.9 | 3.7 |
| Kogi | 93.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Enugu | 90.3 | 3.7 | 6.1 |
| Ondo | 79.8 | 11.1 | 9.1 |
| Edo | 85.2 | 2.1 | 12.7 |
| FCT | 68.4 | 20.4 | 11.2 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

TABLE 4.3.5 Nigeria's Democracy Will Not Grow if There is Imposition of Candidates according to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 90.4 | 6.5 | 3.1 |
| Female | 91.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|------|-----|
| | P-value=0.031 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 96.6 | 2.3 | 1.1 |
| 30-34 | 94.2 | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| 35-39 | 88.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 |
| 40-44 | 91.5 | 6.0 | 2.6 |
| 45-49 | 88.8 | 6.7 | 4.4 |
| 50-54 | 84.1 | 11.1 | 4.8 |
| 55-59 | 85.5 | 8.3 | 6.3 |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.064 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 92.4 | 4.2 | 3.4 |
| Islam | 88.3 | 8.6 | 3.1 |
| Others | 94.4 | Nil | 5.6 |
| | P-value=0.066 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 93.2 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Married | 89.7 | 6.6 | 3.7 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 92.9 | 5.3 | 1.8 |
| | P-value=0.482 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 92.3 | 5.5 | 2.3 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 90.2 | 5.8 | 3.9 |
| | P-value=0.585 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 94.2 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 90.2 | 6.6 | 3.1 |
| Government Services | 90.2 | 6.1 | 3.6 |
| Private Services | 94.1 | Nil | 5.9 |
| | P-value=0.775 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 93.6 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
| APC | 88.0 | 8.1 | 3.9 |
| | P-value=0.064 | | |

| | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|------|------|
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 99.0 | Nil | 1.0 |
| Kaduna | 84.0 | 9.9 | 6.2 |
| Kogi | 95.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Enugu | 98.7 | 1.2 | Nil |
| Ondo | 81.8 | 8.1 | 10.1 |
| Edo | 89.4 | 8.2 | 2.0 |
| FCT | 86.7 | 11.2 | 2.0 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 6: The Greatest Challenge to Democracy in Nigeria is the Abuse of Power and the Failure of Political Class to follow Due Process and the Rule of Law According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 92.7 | 4.5 | 2.8 |
| Female | 94.6 | 4.8 | 0.5 |
| | P-value=0.454 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 96.6 | 2.3 | 1.1 |
| 30-34 | 91.8 | 3.5 | 4.7 |
| 35-39 | 91.3 | 8.7 | Nil |
| 40-44 | 89.9 | 6.8 | 3.4 |
| 45-49 | 93.3 | 5.6 | 1.1 |
| 50-54 | 93.8 | 3.1 | 3.1 |
| 55-59 | 97.9 | 2.1 | Nil |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.247 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 95.1 | 3.4 | 1.6 |
| Islam | 89.7 | 7.3 | 3.0 |
| Others | 94.5 | Nil | 5.6 |
| | P-value=0.159 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 91.2 | 4.7 | 4.0 |
| Married | 94.5 | 4.6 | 0.9 |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|------|-----|
| Separated/ Widowed | Divorced/ 89.5 | 3.5 | 7.1 |
| P-value=0.048 | | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | Primary/Secondary 96.1 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
| | Tertiary/ Others 91.9 | 5.5 | 2.5 |
| P-value=0.403 | | | |
| OCCUPATION | Unemployed/Retired 91.3 | 4.8 | 3.9 |
| | Self Employed/ Others 94.0 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
| | Government Services 92.8 | 6.1 | 1.2 |
| | Private Services 94.1 | 5.9 | Nil |
| P-value=0.019 | | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | PDP 94.6 | 4.7 | 0.6 |
| | APC 92.0 | 4.5 | 3.6 |
| P-value=0.125 | | | |
| STATE | Adamawa 96.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 |
| | Kaduna 80.5 | 17.1 | 2.4 |
| | Kogi 97.8 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| | Enugu 97.6 | 2.4 | Nil |
| | Ondo 93.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 |
| | Edo 88.6 | 5.2 | 6.2 |
| | FCT 97.9 | Nil | 2.0 |
| P-value=0.000 | | | |

Table 4.3.7 Voting Process Violated Democratic Rules/Principles According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|----------------------|------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 53.1 | 12.4 | 34.5 |
| Female | 58.1 | 11.3 | 30.7 |
| P-value=0.173 | | | |
| AGE | | | |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| <30 | 54.7 | 7.0 | 38.4 |
| 30-34 | 49.5 | 18.1 | 32.5 |
| 35-39 | 47.2 | 11.3 | 41.5 |
| 40-44 | 52.6 | 9.5 | 37.9 |
| 45-49 | 53.4 | 10.0 | 36.6 |
| 50-54 | 59.4 | 14.1 | 26.5 |
| 55-59 | 66.7 | 14.6 | 18.8 |
| | P-value=0.009 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 54.7 | 13.6 | 31.6 |
| Islam | 52.3 | 10.7 | 36.9 |
| Others | 72.2 | 5.6 | 22.3 |
| | P-value=0.095 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 53.4 | 10.3 | 36.3 |
| Married | 54.5 | 12.6 | 32.8 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 59.6 | 12.3 | 28.1 |
| | P-value=0.889 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 55.5 | 7.6 | 37.0 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 52.4 | 14.5 | 33.1 |
| | P-value=0.056 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 54.7 | 5.7 | 39.6 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 55.4 | 13.9 | 30.7 |
| Government Services | 53.3 | 12.1 | 34.5 |
| Private Services | 41.2 | 11.8 | 47.1 |
| | P-value=0.302 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 67.6 | 16.4 | 16.1 |
| APC | 42.3 | 8.0 | 49.8 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 62.6 | 5.1 | 32.3 |

| | | | |
|--------|------|------|------|
| Kaduna | 43.9 | 9.8 | 46.3 |
| Kogi | 76.1 | 1.1 | 22.8 |
| Enugu | 45.3 | 14.1 | 37.7 |
| Ondo | 66.0 | 11.0 | 23.0 |
| Edo | 61.8 | 11.3 | 26.8 |
| FCT | 22.2 | 31.0 | 47.0 |

Table 4.3.8 Poverty Is Responsible For the Inability of Delegates and Voters to Choose Candidates Independently of What Their Leaders Tell Them According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 79.4 | 6.1 | 14.4 |
| Female | 74.7 | 4.8 | 20.5 |
| | P-value=0.247 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 78.2 | 2.3 | 19.5 |
| 30-34 | 77.6 | 5.6 | 16.9 |
| 35-39 | 82.0 | 5.7 | 12.3 |
| 40-44 | 77.1 | 1.7 | 21.2 |
| 45-49 | 70.0 | 11.1 | 18.9 |
| 50-54 | 78.1 | 6.3 | 15.7 |
| 55-59 | 77.1 | 14.6 | 8.3 |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 82.9 | 4.3 | 12.7 |
| Islam | 69.1 | 8.2 | 22.7 |
| Others | 88.9 | 5.6 | 5.6 |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 79.1 | 3.4 | 17.6 |
| Married | 78.2 | 6.2 | 15.6 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 75.4 | 7.0 | 17.6 |
| | P-value=0.545 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 73.9 | 6.5 | 19.6 |

| | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| Tertiary/ Others | 80.5 | 5.0 | 14.4 |
| | P-value=0.445 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 76.7 | 3.7 | |
| Self Employed/ Others | 79.7 | 5.6 | |
| Government Services | 75.8 | 6.7 | |
| Private Services | 82.4 | 5.9 | |
| | P-value=0.575 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 85.0 | 6.3 | 8.7 |
| APC | 71.6 | 5.3 | 23.1 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 83.0 | 5.0 | 12.0 |
| Kaduna | 80.5 | 3.7 | 15.9 |
| Kogi | 77.4 | 2.2 | 20.4 |
| Enugu | 86.1 | 3.5 | 10.5 |
| Ondo | 86.0 | 4.0 | 10.0 |
| Edo | 80.4 | 4.1 | 15.5 |
| FCT | 55.0 | 17.0 | 28.0 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 4.3.9 Votes Were Influenced By Monetary Inducement According To Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 75.0 | 6.6 | 18.3 |
| Female | 74.0 | 5.4 | 20.6 |
| | P-value=0.205 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 77.7 | 7.1 | 15.3 |
| 30-34 | 77.2 | 8.0 | 14.8 |
| 35-39 | 70.4 | 10.5 | 19.1 |
| 40-44 | 77.0 | 4.3 | 18.8 |
| 45-49 | 66.7 | 8.9 | 24.5 |
| 50-54 | 79.7 | Nil | 20.3 |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| 55-59 60+ | 75.0 75.5 | 2.1 5.7 | 23.0 18.9 |
| | P-value=0.003 | | |
| RELIGION Christianity Islam Others | 79.7 64.9 88.9 | 5.9 7.4 Nil | 14.4 27.8 11.2 |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS Single Married Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 78.1 74.7 68.4 | 9.6 5.3 5.3 | 12.4 20.1 26.3 |
| | P-value=0.054 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND Primary/Secondary Tertiary/ Others | 71.8 75.5 | 3.3 7.8 | 24.9 16.8 |
| | P-value=0.004 | | |
| OCCUPATION Unemployed/Retired Self Employed/ Others Government Services Private Services | 77.1 73.6 78.7 64.7 | 6.7 5.1 7.3 11.8 | 16.2 21.3 14.0 23.5 |
| | P-value=0.459 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY PDP APC | 84.8 65.2 | 5.4 7.1 | 9.8 27.7 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE Adamawa Kaduna Kogi Enugu Ondo Edo FCT | 75.5 71.6 90.4 73.8 83.0 86.6 43.0 | 5.1 18.5 1.1 8.3 5.0 5.2 3.0 | 19.4 9.9 8.7 17.9 12.0 8.2 54.0 |

| | | | |
|--|----------------------|--|--|
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
|--|----------------------|--|--|

Table 4.3.10 Votes Were Influenced by Ethnic Sentiments According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 63.8 | 14.7 | 21.6 |
| Female | 68.6 | 9.7 | 21.6 |
| | P-value=0.393 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 64.7 | 14.1 | 21.2 |
| 30-34 | 66.3 | 19.1 | 14.6 |
| 35-39 | 67.0 | 10.7 | 22.4 |
| 40-44 | 66.9 | 9.6 | 23.4 |
| 45-49 | 65.2 | 9.0 | 25.9 |
| 50-54 | 59.4 | 18.8 | 21.9 |
| 55-59 | 70.9 | 8.3 | 20.8 |
| 60+ | 58.5 | 18.9 | 22.7 |
| | P-value=0.387 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 69.2 | 12.7 | 18.1 |
| Islam | 57.9 | 13.9 | 28.2 |
| Others | 88.9 | Nil | 11.2 |
| | P-value=0.015 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 72.4 | 11.7 | 15.9 |
| Married | 63.7 | 13.7 | 22.5 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 59.6 | 10.5 | 29.8 |
| | P-value=0.317 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 62.1 | 12.6 | 25.3 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 65.9 | 13.9 | 20.2 |
| | P-value=0.171 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 76.2 | 10.5 | 13.4 |

| | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| Self Employed/ Others | 64.9 | 14.4 | 20.7 |
| Government Services | 61.6 | 12.6 | 25.8 |
| Private Services | 47.0 | 11.8 | 41.2 |
| | P-value=0.145 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 69.3 | 16.8 | 13.9 |
| APC | 61.2 | 9.9 | 28.8 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 50.6 | 27.8 | 21.7 |
| Kaduna | 77.2 | 10.1 | 12.7 |
| Kogi | 78.5 | 2.2 | 19.4 |
| Enugu | 78.3 | 10.8 | 10.8 |
| Ondo | 68.0 | 11.0 | 21.0 |
| Edo | 73.2 | 4.1 | 22.7 |
| FCT | 36.0 | 25.0 | 39.0 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 4.3.11 Voting Process Influenced by Intimidation/Fraud According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 49.4 | 11.9 | 38.6 |
| Female | 55.4 | 12.9 | 31.7 |
| | P-value=0.490 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 43.6 | 25.3 | 31.0 |
| 30-34 | 53.5 | 13.6 | 32.9 |
| 35-39 | 62.3 | 9.4 | 28.3 |
| 40-44 | 47.4 | 9.5 | 43.1 |
| 45-49 | 43.3 | 6.7 | 50.0 |
| 50-54 | 51.5 | 15.6 | 32.8 |
| 55-59 | 56.3 | 4.2 | 39.6 |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 57.9 | 13.1 | 29.0 |
| Islam | 38.8 | 12.1 | 49.2 |
| Others | 61.1 | Nil | 38.9 |

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 51.3 | 19.9 | 28.8 |
| Married | 50.6 | 10.3 | 39.1 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ | | | 40.3 |
| Widowed | 54.4 | 5.3 | |
| | P-value=0.005 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 49.4 | 8.2 | 42.4 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 53.5 | 14.7 | 31.7 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 60.4 | 10.4 | 29.3 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 49.0 | 12.5 | 38.5 |
| Government Services | 52.7 | 13.3 | 33.9 |
| Private Services | 37.5 | 6.3 | 56.3 |
| | P-value=0.568 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 63.6 | 11.6 | 24.7 |
| APC | 39.3 | 12.8 | 47.9 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 46.5 | 17.2 | 36.4 |
| Kaduna | 45.7 | 23.5 | 30.8 |
| Kogi | 52.7 | 4.3 | 43.0 |
| Enugu | 59.3 | 14.0 | 26.8 |
| Ondo | 59.0 | 19.0 | 22.0 |
| Edo | 70.9 | 7.3 | 21.9 |
| FCT | 25.0 | 2.0 | 73.0 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 4.3.12 Votes Influenced By Use Of Force According To Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 38.5 | 15.7 | 45.7 |
| Female | 45.7 | 14.3 | 46.2 |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| | P-value=0.758 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 34.4 | 12.6 | 52.9 |
| 30-34 | 45.5 | 12.5 | 42.1 |
| 35-39 | 32.7 | 21.8 | 45.6 |
| 40-44 | 42.9 | 10.5 | 46.5 |
| 45-49 | 37.5 | 14.8 | 47.7 |
| 50-54 | 36.0 | 18.8 | 45.3 |
| 55-59 | 43.8 | 16.7 | 39.6 |
| 60+ | 41.5 | 18.9 | 39.6 |
| | P-value=0.149 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 38.1 | 18.2 | 43.8 |
| Islam | 38.7 | 12.2 | 49.1 |
| Others | 72.2 | Nil | 27.8 |
| | P-value=0.033 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 32.2 | 16.4 | 51.4 |
| Married | 40.8 | 15.9 | 43.3 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 43.9 | 8.8 | 47.3 |
| | P-value=0.561 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 32.4 | 13.7 | 53.9 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 40.0 | 16.8 | 43.3 |
| | P-value=0.009 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 31.8 | 7.5 | 60.7 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 40.3 | 18.6 | 41.1 |
| Government Services | 42.1 | 14.6 | 43.3 |
| Private Services | 29.4 | 17.6 | 52.9 |
| | P-value=0.048 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 53.3 | 14.7 | 31.9 |
| APC | 25.2 | 15.9 | 58.8 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |

| | | | |
|---------|---------------------|------|------|
| Adamawa | 46.3 | 15.8 | 37.9 |
| Kaduna | 35.1 | 16.9 | 48.1 |
| Kogi | 33.7 | 2.2 | 64.1 |
| Enugu | 39.6 | 19.8 | 40.7 |
| Ondo | 19.2 | 38.4 | 42.4 |
| Edo | 48.4 | 9.3 | 42.2 |
| FCT | 49.0 | 5.0 | 46.0 |
| | P-value=0.00 | | |

Table 4.3.13 Votes Influenced by Intimidation According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 46.4 | 14.3 | 39.4 |
| Female | 40.0 | 13.0 | 47.1 |
| | P-value=0.441 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 39.6 | 14.0 | 46.6 |
| 30-34 | 46.1 | 16.9 | 37.1 |
| 35-39 | 43.4 | 16.0 | 40.5 |
| 40-44 | 58.6 | 7.8 | 33.6 |
| 45-49 | 42.2 | 10.0 | 47.8 |
| 50-54 | 39.1 | 18.8 | 42.2 |
| 55-59 | 31.2 | 18.8 | 50.0 |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.128 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 46.2 | 14.6 | 39.2 |
| Islam | 43.1 | 12.5 | 44.4 |
| Others | 50.0 | 11.1 | 38.9 |
| | P-value=0.122 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 41.2 | 18.2 | 40.5 |
| Married | 46.4 | 12.9 | 40.7 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 42.1 | 12.3 | 45.6 |
| | P-value=0.849 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 36.2 | 8.2 | 55.5 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 47.2 | 17.2 | 35.7 |

| | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 42.0 | 12.1 | 45.8 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 45.5 | 13.3 | 41.2 |
| Government Services | 43.5 | 17.2 | 39.2 |
| Private Services | 35.3 | 17.6 | 47.0 |
| | P-value=0.619 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 56.6 | 13.5 | 29.9 |
| APC | 33.3 | 14.2 | 52.6 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 46.5 | 13.1 | 40.4 |
| Kaduna | 45.7 | 24.7 | 29.6 |
| Kogi | 40.9 | 1.1 | 58.1 |
| Enugu | 43.5 | 22.4 | 34.1 |
| Ondo | 38.0 | 26.0 | 36.0 |
| Edo | 46.4 | 9.3 | 44.3 |
| FCT | 51.0 | 3.0 | 46.0 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 4.3.14 Use of Thugs to Intimidate Voters According to Background Factors

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 28.7 | 20.3 | 51.0 |
| Female | 34.6 | 15.1 | 50.3 |
| | P-value=0.433 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 34.9 | 16.3 | 48.8 |
| 30-34 | 23.9 | 28.4 | 47.7 |
| 35-39 | 36.5 | 13.5 | 49.0 |
| 40-44 | 37.0 | 15.5 | 47.4 |
| 45-49 | 27.8 | 16.7 | 55.6 |
| 50-54 | 31.3 | 18.8 | 50.0 |
| 55-59 | 20.9 | 18.8 | 60.4 |
| 60+ | 16.9 | 30.2 | 52.8 |
| | P-value=0.017 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 29.1 | 19.6 | 51.3 |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| Islam | 32.7 | 19.0 | 48.3 |
| Others | 44.4 | 5.6 | 50.0 |
| | P-value=0.088 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 33.1 | 15.2 | 51.7 |
| Married | 30.0 | 20.1 | 49.9 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed | 31.6 | 21.1 | 47.3 |
| | P-value=0.537 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 25.0 | 14.4 | 60.6 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 31.7 | 21.3 | 47.0 |
| | P-value=0.031 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 31.7 | 16.3 | 52.0 |
| Self Employed/ Others | 29.6 | 19.6 | 50.9 |
| Government Services | 29.9 | 18.9 | 51.2 |
| Private Services | 41.2 | 11.8 | 47.0 |
| | P-value=0.843 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 34.9 | 21.7 | 43.4 |
| APC | 26.1 | 16.2 | 57.8 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |
| Adamawa | 27.3 | 20.2 | 52.5 |
| Kaduna | 30.8 | 25.9 | 43.2 |
| Kogi | 40.9 | 3.2 | 55.9 |
| Enugu | 33.3 | 17.9 | 48.8 |
| Ondo | 25.0 | 21.0 | 50.0 |
| Edo | 34.4 | 10.4 | 55.2 |
| FCT | 22.2 | 33.3 | 44.4 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

Table 15: Use of Security...

| Background Factors | Strongly agree/ Agree (%) | Neutral | Disagree/ Strongly Disagree |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
| N= 655 | | | |
| SEX | | | |
| Male | 39.7 | 19.0 | 41.4 |

| | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|------|------|
| Female | 42.5 | 20.4 | 37.1 |
| | P-value=0.109 | | |
| AGE | | | |
| <30 | 46.0 | 12.6 | 41.4 |
| 30-34 | 43.8 | 20.2 | 35.9 |
| 35-39 | 39.6 | 21.7 | 38.6 |
| 40-44 | 50.0 | 17.2 | 32.8 |
| 45-49 | 33.7 | 22.5 | 43.8 |
| 50-54 | 36.0 | 18.8 | 45.3 |
| 55-59 | 28.8 | 25.0 | 56.2 |
| 60+ | | | |
| | P-value=0.001 | | |
| RELIGION | | | |
| Christianity | 38.8 | 19.3 | 41.9 |
| Islam | 43.0 | 21.0 | 36.1 |
| Others | 66.6 | 5.6 | 27.8 |
| | P-value=0.111 | | |
| MARITAL STATUS | | | |
| Single | 43.3 | 18.9 | 37.8 |
| Married | 40.9 | 19.4 | 39.7 |
| Separated/ Divorced/ | | | |
| Widowed | 36.9 | 19.3 | 43.8 |
| | P-value=0.958 | | |
| EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND | | | |
| Primary/Secondary | 39.5 | 19.2 | 41.2 |
| Tertiary/ Others | 39.5 | 20.1 | 40.4 |
| | P-value=0.485 | | |
| OCCUPATION | | | |
| Unemployed/Retired | 44.3 | 18.9 | |
| Self Employed/ Others | 40.0 | 18.7 | |
| Government Services | 38.4 | 20.7 | |
| Private Services | 47.0 | 17.6 | |
| | P-value=0.872 | | |
| POLITICAL PARTY | | | |
| PDP | 45.0 | 20.4 | 34.6 |
| APC | 36.2 | 18.4 | 45.4 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |
| STATE | | | |

| | | | |
|---------|----------------------|------|------|
| Adamawa | 34.0 | 26.0 | 40.0 |
| Kaduna | 33.3 | 32.1 | 34.6 |
| Kogi | 81.7 | 4.3 | 14.0 |
| Enugu | 39.6 | 22.1 | 38.3 |
| Ondo | 23.0 | 25.0 | 52.0 |
| Edo | 32.2 | 11.5 | 56.3 |
| FCT | 40.4 | 16.2 | 43.4 |
| | P-value=0.000 | | |

APPENDIX L (REGRESSION ANALYSIS)

Descriptive Statistics

| | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
|---|------|----------------|-----|
| Elections outcome | 2.72 | 1.403 | 651 |
| Votes influenced by money | 2.23 | 1.230 | 658 |
| Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | 2.39 | 1.193 | 637 |
| Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | 2.73 | 1.397 | 644 |
| Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | 2.80 | 1.373 | 655 |
| Votes influenced by religious sentiments | 2.78 | 1.396 | 651 |
| Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments | 2.43 | 1.201 | 649 |
| Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates | 2.96 | 1.307 | 655 |

Correlations

| | | Elections outcome | Votes influenced by money | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud |
|---------------------|---|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| Pearson Correlation | elections outcome | 1.000 | .341 | .303 | .395 | .381 |
| | Votes influenced by money | .341 | 1.000 | .441 | .479 | .471 |
| | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | .303 | .441 | 1.000 | .542 | .382 |
| | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | .395 | .479 | .542 | 1.000 | .507 |
| | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | .381 | .471 | .382 | .507 | 1.000 |
| | Votes influenced by religious sentiments | .266 | .327 | .163 | .181 | .361 |
| | Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments | .321 | .412 | .275 | .361 | .412 |
| | Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates | .289 | .361 | .239 | .307 | .361 |
| Sig. (1-tailed) | elections outcome | . | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | Votes influenced by money | .000 | . | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | .000 | .000 | . | .000 | .000 |
| | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | .000 | .000 | .000 | . | .000 |

| | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | |
|--|---|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| | | Elections outcome | Votes influenced by money | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud |
| | Votes influenced by religious sentiments | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| N | Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | elections outcome | 651 | 651 | 631 | 637 | 648 |
| | Votes influenced by money | 651 | 658 | 637 | 644 | 648 |
| | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | 631 | 637 | 637 | 626 | 648 |
| | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | 637 | 644 | 626 | 644 | 648 |
| | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | 648 | 655 | 634 | 641 | 648 |
| | Votes influenced by religious sentiments | 644 | 651 | 630 | 638 | 648 |
| | Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments | 642 | 649 | 629 | 637 | 648 |
| Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates | 648 | 655 | 635 | 641 | 648 | |

Model Summary(b)

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | .491(a) | .242 | .233 | 1.229 |

a Predictors: (Constant), Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates, Votes influenced by religious sentiments, Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors, Votes influenced by money, Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud, Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments, Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats
 b Dependent Variable: Elections outcome

ANOVA(b)

| Model | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|-------|------------|----------------|-----|-------------|--------|---------|
| 1 | Regression | 297.311 | 7 | 42.473 | 28.120 | .000(a) |
| | Residual | 933.453 | 618 | 1.510 | | |
| | Total | 1230.763 | 625 | | | |

a Predictors: (Constant), Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates, Votes influenced by religious sentiments, Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors, Votes influenced by money, Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud, Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments, Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats
 b Dependent Variable: Elections outcome

Coefficients(a)

| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. | 95% Confidence Interval | |
|-------|---|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------|
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | Zero-order | |
| 1 | (Constant) | .709 | .161 | | 4.409 | .000 | | .393 |
| | Votes influenced by money | .074 | .051 | .065 | 1.459 | .145 | | -.026 |
| | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | .074 | .051 | .063 | 1.467 | .143 | | -.025 |
| | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | .191 | .047 | .190 | 4.045 | .000 | | .098 |
| | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | .128 | .047 | .126 | 2.750 | .006 | | .037 |
| | Votes influenced by religious sentiments | .084 | .043 | .084 | 1.955 | .051 | | .000 |
| | Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments | .095 | .052 | .082 | 1.828 | .068 | | -.007 |
| | Use of security agencies to intimidate delegates | .107 | .042 | .100 | 2.545 | .011 | | .024 |

a Dependent Variable: Q26 elections outcome

Collinearity Diagnostics(a)

| Model | Dimension | Eigenvalue | Condition Index | Variance Proportions | | | | |
|-------|-----------|------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| | | (Constant) | Votes influenced by money | Votes influenced by leaders/ mentors | Votes influenced by a combination of Inducement and threats | Voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud | Votes influenced by religious sentiments | Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments |
| 1 | 1 | 7.155 | 1.000 | .00 | .00 | .00 | .00 | .00 |
| | 2 | .218 | 5.724 | .00 | .02 | .14 | .10 | .00 |
| | 3 | .143 | 7.085 | .10 | .17 | .00 | .01 | .00 |
| | 4 | .127 | 7.507 | .04 | .59 | .22 | .03 | .00 |
| | 5 | .112 | 7.997 | .03 | .13 | .18 | .11 | .50 |
| | 6 | .100 | 8.459 | .02 | .02 | .10 | .17 | .10 |
| | 7 | .077 | 9.643 | .15 | .02 | .30 | .48 | .20 |
| | 8 | .068 | 10.251 | .66 | .03 | .06 | .09 | .00 |

a Dependent Variable: Elections outcome

Residuals Statistics (a)


| | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | N |
|-----------------------------------|---------|---------|-------|----------------|-----|
| Predicted Value | 1.46 | 4.49 | 2.71 | .685 | 610 |
| Std. Predicted Value | -1.816 | 2.563 | -.010 | .994 | 610 |
| Standard Error of Predicted Value | .064 | .263 | .134 | .035 | 610 |
| Adjusted Predicted Value | 1.47 | 4.48 | 2.71 | .686 | 604 |
| Residual | -3.304 | 3.407 | -.012 | 1.234 | 604 |
| Std. Residual | -2.688 | 2.772 | -.010 | 1.004 | 604 |
| Stud. Residual | -2.706 | 2.784 | -.010 | 1.011 | 604 |
| Deleted Residual | -3.348 | 3.437 | -.012 | 1.251 | 604 |
| Stud. Deleted Residual | -2.720 | 2.800 | -.009 | 1.012 | 604 |
| Mahal. Distance | .708 | 27.693 | 6.890 | 4.190 | 610 |
| Cook's Distance | .000 | .018 | .002 | .003 | 604 |
| Centered Leverage Value | .001 | .044 | .011 | .007 | 610 |

a Dependent Variable: Q26 elections outcome

Charts


Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

Dependent Variable: Q26 elections outcome



Scatterplot

Dependent Variable: Q26 elections outcome



APPENDIX M

STATEMENT BY THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION(INEC) ON THE NATIONAL AND STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN RIVERS STATE (20/03/15)

Pursuant to the Orders of the Court of Appeal, the Independent National Electoral Commission(INEC) conducted elections into various seats in both the National and the Rivers State House of Assembly yesterday, the 19th of March, 2016.

Rather unfortunately, some of these elections witnessed the disruption of the process, including the barricading of some of the INEC Local Government offices and Registration Area Centres(RACs) used for the distribution of Electoral materials which led to the late commencement of the exercise in some places and consequently, its smooth take off.

Of more serious concern was the level of threats, violence and intimidation of election officials and voters by well armed thugs and miscreants allegedly acting on behalf of some politicians, which marred the elections in some areas. There were reports of numerous attacks resulting in fatalities, kidnappings, ballot snatching, diversion of officials and materials, amongst others, which necessitated its suspension in 8 Local Government Areas.

Regrettably, such deviant behaviour has continued today. Several permanent and ad hoc staff engaged have been attacked, again resulting in fatalities, while some have been forcibly abducted and taken to presently unknown destinations.

Under such difficult circumstance, the Returning Officers were only able to collate and declare results in 1 Federal and 9 State constituencies where the disruption and malpractices were not so widespread.

Having reviewed the situation, the Commission is compelled to suspend all further action concerning the exercise in all the other constituencies in the State pending the receipt of a comprehensive report from its Field Officials and Monitors. For the avoidance of doubt, it should be noted that the suspension does not affect the constituencies where the exercise has been completed and the results declared by the Returning Officers.

Oluwole Osaze- Uzzi,
Director, Voter Education and Publicity, INEC