

KRISTINA KALLAS

Revisiting the triadic nexus:
An analysis of the ethnopolitical interplay
between Estonia, Russia and
Estonian Russians



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS	6
Author's contribution	6
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	7
INTRODUCTION	8
Conceptual framework	9
Central concept	9
Critique: extension of the nexus into pyramid	14
Studying nexuses in ethnopolitical situations	17
The contribution of the dissertation	19
Estonia as a nationalising state: from alienation to integration?	22
Russia as external national homeland: diaspora in the making?	26
International community: a player or context maker?	28
Main findings	32
Reflections on the further applicability of the model	33
REFERENCES	36
SUMMARY	41
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN	44
PUBLICATIONS	47
CURRICULUM VITAE	144
ELULOOKIRJELDUS	148

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

This dissertation is based on the following original publications:

- I Kallas, K. and Kaldur, K. (2010). “Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament”, in *Inclusion And Exclusion Of Young Adult Immigrants: Barriers and Bridges*. Katrine Fangen, Kirsten Fossan and Ferdinand Andreas Mohn (Ed.). London: Ashgate.
- II Kallas, K. (2012). “Monitoring integration in Estonia”, in *Measuring and monitoring immigrant integration in Europe*. Rob Bijl and Arjen Verweij (Ed.). The Netherlands Institute for Social Research.
- III Kallas, K. (2016). “Claiming the diaspora: Russia’s compatriot policy and its reception by Estonian-Russian population.” Accepted for publication in *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE)*.
- IV Pettai, V. and Kallas, K. (2009). “Estonia: conditionality amidst a legal straightjacket”, in *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, Bernd Rechel (Ed.). Basees/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies.

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AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION

- I The author of the current dissertation was the lead author of the article. His contribution was the theoretical and conceptual framing. She wrote the parts on historical, semantic and political juridical context as well as introduction and conclusions. She was also the main editor of the article. Kristjan Kaldur wrote the parts on socioeconomic context, living conditions and health, social networks and participation, discrimination and attitudes and immigrants and crime.
- II The author of the current dissertation was the sole author of the article, and was solely responsible for all aspects of it.
- III The author of the current dissertation was the sole author of the article, and was solely responsible for all aspects of it.
- IV The author of the current dissertation was the second author of the article. She collected the data needed to frame the conceptual framework and the timeline of the events, she also wrote the parts on background and on Estonian minority policy since 1992: from alienation to integration as well as on the role of international community in Estonian minority policy and its implementation. Vello Pettai wrote the conceptual and theoretical frame, assessing impact of the EU and the conclusions.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, nation-building processes and ethnic relations in the post-Soviet space have been a centre of attention for the international community, political analysts and researchers alike. In the case of Estonia, configurations of political power, the ethno-demographic situation and nation-building raised a series of questions for scholars of nationalism to carry out empirical research and to develop theoretical and analytical constructs. Extensive research has been carried out on Estonia's post-communist ethnopolitical regime (Hallik 1996; Smith 1996; Evans 1998; Pettai 1998; Järve 2000; Pettai & Hallik 2002), nation-building and the process of integration (Kolstoe 1995, 1999, 2000; Kolstoe *ed* 2002; Smith *ed* 1996; Lauristin & Heidmets 2003; Budryte 2005; Korts 2009) and on identity formation of Russian-speakers (Laitin 1998; Vihalemm & Masso 2003, 2007; Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009; Kolstoe 2011; Nimmerfeldt 2009; Vetik & Helemäe *ed* 2011).

Drawing on this rich body of scholarship, and in contrast to the existing single-focus studies, this dissertation provides a multi-dimensional analysis of the complex issues of ethnic relations and integration process in Estonia during last two decades. For that purpose it draws on and operationalizes one of the most prominent analytical frameworks that exists in the literature, the triadic nexus model by Rogers Brubaker (1996). Furthermore, alongside studies of ethnic relations in other triadic-type ethnopolitical situations,¹ this dissertation breaks down and devotes separate attention to four of the most salient axes within the Brubaker model and its further amplifications by other scholars. The dissertation therefore represents a more comprehensive operationalization of this multi-dimensional model in order to bring out its richness in empirical terms – something that is all too often done on a very superficial level.

This introduction will begin with a review of Brubaker's model and its later developments. Other scholars' amplifications of the model as well as criticisms are discussed alongside an overview of how the model has been applied to various ethnopolitical situations. It will then introduce the dissertation's publications and show how each one represents the study of separate axes in the expanded (pyramidal) Brubaker model. It will conclude with reflections on the usefulness of the model in delineating the stakes in these kinds of ethnopolitical situations, and whether in particular additional external actors (i.e. European institutions) have helped to alleviate the inherent 'powder keg' that Brubaker implied.

This dissertation seeks to make a substantive and analytical contribution to the study of post-Soviet ethnopolitical situation and regimes. It takes the nation-building process in Estonia as its central analytical focus and examines the factors influencing these processes using Brubaker's triadic configuration in an

¹ Brubaker's model has been applied in numerous ethnopolitical situations, most prominent among them being the case of Hungary and Hungarian minorities in neighboring states (Kemp 2006), and South East European countries (Krasniqi 2013; Stjepanovic 2015).

extended (pyramidal) form. Based upon an in-depth analysis of Estonia's case over a 20-year period, the dissertation argues that there have been noticeable shifts in the interplay in this nexus. Kin-state relations as well as the international community played a substantial role in forming the ethnopolitical regimes and the outcomes of minority rights regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. However, as Estonia's case shows, in recent years instead of becoming a nationalising state, the external national homeland – in this case Russia - has become the main protagonist in the nexus setting the interaction of ethnopolitical relations into play. Adding to Brubaker's argument it is argued here that nationalising policies and discourses of external national homeland along with a nationalising state can become the focal force in the nexus. This re-configuration of actors in the nexus alters the role of international community, mainly the EU, and raises new questions about the conflictual nature of the nexus relations.

Conceptual framework

Central concept

The collapse of the multi-ethnic and multilingual Soviet and Yugoslav states and the emergence of several dozen new or newly re-independent political communities from 'the Baltic sea to Trieste' gave rise to a high tide in research on democratization, nation-building, nationalism, ethnic relations, and ethnic, religious and linguistic conflict. To date one of the most prominent analytical frameworks for studying post-communist nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been put forward by Rogers Brubaker in his seminal work on the triadic nexus (Brubaker 1996). As Brubaker described it, the realm of CEE after communism was 'loosely integrated, polyethnic, polyreligious, and poly-linguistic' states that nevertheless almost exclusively engaged in the process of nation-building based on the model of an ethnic nation-state (Brubaker 1996, 3). The tensions that arose from these projects of 'imagined mono-ethnic communities' and the polyethnic realities erupted into numerous ethnic conflicts across the region. Brubaker argued that the potentially conflictual national question was not new to the region, but resembled a 'reframed' question from the inter-war period of post-imperial nation-states (Brubaker 1996, 3). Countries in CEE used the foundations of inter-war statehood to draw the lines of political communities, and differently from Western Europe and North America at the time, CEE 'was moving *back* to the nation state rather than *beyond* it' (Brubaker 1996, 2). As in the inter-war period, post-communist CEE's national question was characterized by a specific juxtaposition and interaction between three mutually antagonistic elements or 'nationalisms'. These three nationalisms – that of nationalising states, national minorities and external national homelands – formed a relational triadic nexus that Brubaker claimed represented a specific ethnopolitical configuration. (Brubaker 1996, 4).

The defining element in the triadic configuration was the nationalism of the nationalising state. The new or newly re-independent states that emerged after the collapse of the large multi-ethnic states in CEE were states that saw themselves as nations defined in ethnocultural rather than political-territorial terms. However, these new states were not yet ‘genuine nation-states’ because the ethnically heterogeneous population, territory, culture and polity still needed to be brought into close congruence to achieve a fully-realised nation-state. Almost without exception the new states embarked on a nation-building process that was characterized by five motives (Brubaker 2011, 1786):

- (1) The state was defined based on ethno-cultural rather than political-territorial terms and a distinction was made between the “core nation” and the citizenry as a whole.
- (2) The state was seen as *owned* by the “core nation”, that is that ethnocultural group whose name the state also bore.
- (3) However, at the same time the dominant ethnocultural group was seen ‘as being in a weak cultural, economic, or demographic position’ vis-à-vis the citizenry as a whole.
- (4) This warranted the state to implement policies that promote the interest of the majority “core nation”.
- (5) This action is seen as remedial, i.e ‘needed to redress previous discrimination or oppression suffered by the core nation.’

These claims in the name of the ‘core nation’ defined the new states not simply as national but also as *nationalising* states (Brubaker 2011, 1786). The dynamic character of the term points to the *on-going* nature of the project that consists of *discourses* and *policies* (Brubaker 2011, 1789) that were aimed at putting forward and ensuring the dominance of the abovementioned claims. These nationalising discourses and policies were meant to ‘nationalize the heterogeneous populations and territories’ of the new states (Brubaker 2011, 1786). In this dissertation we will therefore look at the on-going nature of the Estonia’s post-Soviet nation building specifically bringing out the *discourses* and *policies* that frame this project for all players in the Estonian nexus.

However, often overlooked element of Brubaker’s argument was the historical roots of the policies and discourses of the nationalising nationalisms of the newly independent states. Brubaker saw the roots of nationalising nationalisms in the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy. The unique Soviet system of institutionalised multi-nationality on a sub-state level where the several layers of the federal system were arrayed in a hierarchy of territories each of and for a particular ethno-national group set the foundations for the perceptions of post-Soviet ethnic elites regarding the “ownership” of their states. In addition to that there was an ethno-national classification of each citizen of the Soviet state – an ethnicity ascribed to each person at birth and recorded in identity documents and bureaucratic encounters (Brubaker 1996). The practice of institutionalized territorial and personal nationalism practices ‘fostered and legitimated the habit of distinguishing between the core, state-bearing nation ... and the total popu-

lation of the republic' (Brubaker 2011, 1788). This Soviet legacy played a constitutive role in developing the nationalising claims and initiating nationalising projects by the elites. Furthermore, the key theme of nationalising discourses and policies – the distinction between the ethno-cultural core and the population as a whole; the claim of the ownership of the state by the core nation; the call for remedial action to reinstate the core nation and to compensate for past discrimination – fell on the discursive framework established during the several decades of Soviet nationalities policy that they 'constitute a kind of political common sense' (Brubaker 2011, 1788). Following Brubaker, it is thus essential when analysing the empirical cases of triadic nexus to include the temporal dimension and to map out the historical roots of discourses and policies. In two studies that form part of this dissertation, it is presented how Soviet immigration and Soviet nationalities policies formed the foundations for the emergence of the nationalising nationalism of newly independent Estonia.

Secondly, the national minority, residing in the newly independent and nationalising state, but distinct from the core nation by its ethnic or linguistic characteristics, has its own nationalism. Minority nationalist claims include demands for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality and the assertion of certain cultural or political rights. Minority claims are voiced in direct opposition to the nationalising policy made in the name of the core nation by the state elites (Brubaker 1996, 5–6). The minority operates in the dual relationship between the nationalising state and the external national homeland and is often caught in-between the conflictual character of these relations. Although not clearly stated, it can be read from Brubaker that the minority does not operate of its own initiative, but rather has reactive characteristics. This sets certain perspectives in the analysis of the stances and perceptions of a national minority as it presumes that these stances are always intermediated either by the stances and perceptions of the nationalising state or national external homeland. How the national minority is caught in-between two nationalisms and the conflictual relationship between the nationalising state and external national homeland is analysed in this dissertation.

The third element of the triad – an external national homeland - engenders transborder nationalism that asserts a right to 'monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, ... and protect the interests of "their" ethnonational kin in other states' (Brubaker 1996, 5). Homeland transborder nationalism usually emerges where the ethnonational kin is seen as threatened by the nationalising nationalism of the host state. Though minority nationalism may work in the same way that homeland nationalism does Brubaker is careful to point out that minority and homeland nationalisms do not always coincide in complementary or harmonious relationships. Indeed, these nationalisms often clash when homeland nationalism is trumpeted for geopolitical, rather than genuinely nationalistic reasons (Brubaker 1996, 6). In this dissertation the focus is put on the analysis of the relationships between the national minority nationalism and external homeland nationalism to specifically bring out the incongruence in what otherwise might be a harmonious relationship.

In this mutual triadic interplay nationalising states, national minorities and external national homelands should not be seen as fixed entities, but rather as ‘dynamic and relational concepts’ (Brubaker 1996, 60). Brubaker sees them as ‘variably configured and continuously contested political fields’, arenas of struggle in which different organizations, parties, movements or individual political entrepreneurs contest to advance their own particular political stance and to gain acceptance as the legitimate representative of the field. In this manner, external national homeland as well as national minority are not ‘national’ by the fact of ethnic demography’, but are political categories construed as a result of the struggles within the fields (Brubaker 1996, 60). What makes a state an external national homeland is not its history but the claims it makes in the name of a national minority in a neighbouring state and when the elites construe certain residents and citizens of other states as co-nationals, as fellow members of a single transborder nation (Brubaker 1996, 5). In the same terms, one should not think of a national minority as a fixed entity determined by its ethno-demographic characteristics, as within the field there is a variation of specific claims made in the name of the group. It is, as all other fields in the nexus, an internally diversified ‘field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances adopted by different organisations, parties, movements, or individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to “represent” the minority to its own putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world’ (Brubaker 1996, 61). Within national minorities there can emerge, a dynamic interrelation ‘between those who advocate protection from abroad, secession and local autonomy’ (Kuzio 2001, 137).

The triadic relationship is further complicated by Brubaker’s claim that these political fields are in a mutually antagonistic relationship that binds the nationalism into an interlocking and interactive web of interdependent relational nexuses. The nationalising states are in their practices and claims directly challenged by the transborder practices of the external national homeland whose practices ‘arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalising nationalism’ (Brubaker 1996, 6). In between these mutually antagonistic relations are the national minorities. Brubaker stresses, that an important element in this relational field is *perception*. Nationalising states do not necessarily have to adopt ‘nationalising’ policies, national minorities do not necessarily have to voice demands for recognition and external national homelands do not necessarily have to put forth claims for the protection of national minorities. It suffices if the fields or actors in the fields are perceived as such by the other elements in the nexus (see also Kuzio 2001).

Variable configurations within the elements of nexus as well as interdependent and mutually antagonistic, ever changing relations between those elements create a nexus with a ‘*relation between relational fields*, and relations *between* three fields are closely intertwined with relations *internal to*, and, *constitutive of*, the fields. The approach to the national question adopted here is ‘consistently and radically *relational*’ (Brubaker 1996, 68). While Brubaker himself did not focus on the axes of the nexus and instead laid stress on explaining the dynamic

contested nature of the fields at each end of the axes (in order to disclose the relational nature of the all elements of the nexus), a closer look at the axes of the nexus is in order. Based on Brubaker’s analytical model one can discern three relational axes: that of the nationalising state and the national minority; the national minority and the external national homeland; and the external national homeland and the nationalising state. The overly relational nature of Brubaker’s nexus is captured in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Radically relational triadic nexus.

The multi-dimensional relational character of the nexus poses a true challenge for an analyst to develop a comprehensive case-based analysis of the nexus at any specific time since there are three inter-connected relationships between the fields that are in turn dynamic and relational within. It is difficult to account for all the factors that will shape the relations within the fields as well as between the fields along the axes during any given time period. Here, Brubaker concedes that ‘the contingency inherent in social and political action’ makes it hard to predict the form that competing nationalist representations will take and how those representations will interact to produce given outcomes (Brubaker 1996, 76). Based on an analysis of triadic configurations that existed during the inter-war and post-communist periods in Central and Eastern Europe, Brubaker argued that the relational and antagonistic nature of the nexus makes it unstable and potentially explosive, and that during in the interwar period, tensions between these nationalisms contributed significantly to the outbreak of war (Brubaker 1996, 8). This potentially conflictual nature of the nexus has made it ever so popular among political scientists who saw in it an explanatory framework for the numerous ethnic conflicts that sprung up in the post-Soviet and

post-Yugoslav territories. However, the nexus did not *explain* why the ethnic conflicts arise, it only points to the potentially explosive and conflictual nature of the configuration of the national question in Central and Eastern Europe.

Critique: extension of the nexus into pyramid

Initially, critique of Brubaker’s nexus was focused on his idea of statehood that was found to be confusing due to its over-relational nature. Furthermore, scholars have found Brubaker’s treatment of nation-building processes in Central and Eastern Europe as a normatively distinct region with more conflictual characteristics deeply questionable (Kuzio 2001, Smith 2002). Yet, the main debates about the nexus have focused on the configuration of various players. As numerous scholars (Smith 2002, Tesser 2003, Pettai 2006) have since pointed out, the nexus was missing one conceptual player: the international community. Although in the case of the triadic nexus from the inter-war period the influence of organisations such as League of Nations was minimal, in the post-Cold War context the role of bodies such as the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) was destined to be much greater. Smith (2002) was the first to point to the quadratic form of the nexus where the international community plays a formative role, especially in relation to the nationalising state. Since nation- building in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe became quickly permeated with the theme of ‘Europeanisation’ (Batt & Wolczuk 2002), the impact of the international community, especially the European Union, on all three players of the nexus cannot be underestimated. In this extended model the international community becomes a fourth political field that adds three more axes to the nexus. In this respect, Brubaker’s triangular model makes much more sense as a ‘pyramid’ (Pettai 2006, 127; see Figure 2).




Figure 2. The quadratic pyramid nexus.

Several authors have researched the impact of the European Union, the OSCE and the Council of Europe on minority policies and minority-majority relations in Baltic states (Kelley 2004, Pettai & Kallas 2009, Petsinis 2015) using the extended frame of the nexus. A consensus exists that the international community played a formative role in the regulation of the relational stances and perceptions in the nexus, more strongly so in the period prior to EU enlargement in 2004.

However, Kemp (2002) argues that rather than seeing the international community as a separate element, it must be treated as a context that shapes different stances within the fields as well as mutual relationships between the fields. In this respect 'the triadic nexus should be considered within the parameters of what is prescribed by international law' (Kemp 2002, 120). This relates to the stances within the fields as well as relationships between the fields. Stanbridge (2005) seconds this by pointing out that since nation-building should be seen in international context as 'a nation is only recognized as such in a system of nations', then 'international structures interact with local processes to help shape nationalist endeavours' and thus form the context to the nexus rather than a self-standing element (Stanbridge 2005, 24). Furthermore, the international community 'provides a framework, standards and potential mediation in cases when the actors have exhausted domestic and bilateral means of resolving their differences' (Kemp 2003, 123) and therefore diminishes the explosive nature of the nexus. The international community thus becomes, if to follow up on Kemp's argument, a practical category that does not alter the conceptual framework of the nexus, but needs to be taken into consideration while analysing various dimensions of the nexus and their interplay in a specific case study. The international community has the capacity to 'de-securitize' the minority question by inserting the security guarantees for nationalising states into the nexus (Kymlicka 2002, Aalto 2003).

Brubaker (2011) in his later discussions has agreed that the international community influences the relationships in the nexus, but nevertheless stresses that the influence is inserted mainly on one player of the nexus – the nationalising state. While the broader economic and political context framing the three nationalisms of the nexus differed substantially between inter-war and post-Communist CEE where 'the post-communist successor states have been more tightly enmeshed ... in a web of international organizations...' (Brubaker 2011, 1787), the international community is not a separate element in the nexus but rather forms the context around the nexus together with globalized economic relations that enmesh the nexus elements in 'denser webs of economic interdependence' (Ibid). The economic interdependence together with the persuading powers of international community has inserted a moderating power on nationalising projects of the successor states.

Brubaker has also been criticized for the over-relational nature of the nexus that weakens its theoretical power. The perceptions and stances that form the *relational relations* between the field and inside the fields apply to all three elements and three axes of the nexus. This integrates into the nexus the

moderate as well extreme players within the fields and in turn pushes the nexus 'in an extremely composite and complicated direction' where 'deriving generalized hypotheses about how the axes work becomes almost impossible to the extent that there is no longer any reality in the model, just subjectivity and multiple contestations' (Pettai 2006, 132–133). This is also precisely why Brubaker's framework should remain a conceptual, rather than a theoretical construct despite the temptation to apply the nexus framework as a theoretical construct to *explain why* ethnic tensions, or in some instances open conflicts, have emerged in post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav countries.

There also has been tendency to apply Brubaker's term of 'nationalising state' as a prime cause of the tensions and ethnic conflicts in CEE (see for example Linz & Stepan 1996; King & Melvin 1999; in specific country cases see also Arel 1995; Laitin 1998). Kuzio (2001) states that the concept of nationalising state has little theoretical value since being selectively applied only to post-communist states of Central Eastern Europe it omits the true character of the nationalising nation-building projects of Western democracies carried out just a century earlier. All democratic nation-states have been nationalising at one point in time and thus the nationalising project of post-communist successor states does not present a unique phenomenon (Kuzio 2001, 139). Kuzio also stresses that Brubaker's concept of national minorities is selectively applied only to Russian-speaking populations omitting other non-Russian minorities such as Tatars, Jews, Armenians and many others who do not regard their host states as 'nationalising' (Kuzio 2001, 142). This actually echoes Brubaker's argument that states are nationalising only if they are perceived as such by other players in the nexus and not based on any objective character of their policies.

Brubaker himself did not focus specifically on the analysis of any specific triadic configuration. He developed a historical and comparative perspective on national questions in CEE looking at different fields of various triadic configurations, but not systematically bringing out the relations within the fields and along the axes of one specific triadic configuration. Brubaker's analytical frame proved to be appealing to scholars studying minority rights, nation-building and kin-state relations in Central Eastern Europe. An array of scholarly works has emerged since, focusing on various empirical applications of the analytical frame all over CEE. Some of the more prominent examples of the cases are discussed in the next section. However, before going there, one important aspect of Brubaker's nexus application must be added. One of the strengths of Brubaker's conceptual framework lies in the temporal connection of Soviet nationalities policy and nation-building processes taking place in post-Soviet period. This part of the nexus is the only causal relation that is yet to be tested empirically in specific case studies. Researchers focusing on post-Soviet nationalism more often than not take as their starting point the collapse of the Soviet Union omitting the temporal causality linking these nationalising policies of new states to the consequences of Soviet nationalities policy. While earlier research has drawn some causal relationships between the nationalities policies

of the USSR and post-Soviet nationalising processes of the successor states (Kolstoe 1995, Laitin 1998, see also Nikiforov 2013), the later studies have omitted this causality altogether. This dissertation does not focus specifically on testing these causal relations, however, it hints at the temporal connections in the relations along the axes and between them as well as within the relational fields.

One of the unintended consequences of the approach that takes the establishment of independent states as a starting point for analysing ethnopolitics in post Soviet space is a lack of debate and in turn a consensus among researchers about the political and legal definition of the Russophone populations in the ex-Soviet successor states. Since Russophone populations appeared in greater numbers in Soviet republics as a consequence of Soviet nationalities policy, their legal status in post-Soviet space is directly linked to how the governments of their host country interpret the Soviet government's objectives. Whether Russophones could be categorised as national minorities or rather should be treated as immigrant groups, causes an irreconcilable divergence in debates among scholars and is in turn influenced by the consequences of political stances (Kallas 2014). This is discussed more extensively further below, but it suffice here to point out that more debate on the diverging approaches to defining and conceptualising Russophones in post-Soviet successor states is needed in academic and expert communities.

Studying nexuses in ethnopolitical situations

During the two decades since Brubaker's work was published, a sizeable body of scholarly work has emerged where the nexuses have been studied in various ethnopolitical situations. Brubaker himself identified additional potential "explosive" nexuses such as Hungary with 3 million Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine; Albania with 2 million Albanians in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia; Serbia with nearly 2 million Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Turkey and nearly one million Turks in Bulgaria; Armenia and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh; Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Tajiks in Uzbekistan; and Lithuania and Poles in Lithuania (Brubaker 1996, 56). The nexus framework has been used to analyse the nationalising policies, integration processes and minority rights frameworks in various corners of the world. Most of the studies have focused on Central and Eastern Europe (Brubaker's original focus), ranging from Estonia and Latvia in the north (Cheskin 2015), Hungary in the centre (Kemp 2006) to various configurations in South East Europe (Stjepanovic 2015; Krasniqi 2013). The nexus has been used as an analytical framework to discuss seemingly remote cases such as the 'Irish question' in the World War I era (Stanbridge 2005) and Mongolia and China relations over the Mongol minority in China (Bulag 2010). Most recently the triadic nexus model was used during public debate over the events taking place in Crimea in spring 2014 (Good 2014). Researchers have used single fields of the nexus such as the

nationalising state analyse cases such as Moldova (Iglesias 2013), Malaysia and Indonesia (Prasad 2013). Others have looked at various axes of the nexus such as relations between the nationalising state and national minority in Lithuania and Slovakia (Vasilevich 2013), or at the extended nexus relations between the European Union and Hungary as a kin-state (Waterbury 2008).

Walter Kemp (2006) has carried out one of the few extensive analyses of a single triadic nexus case. He illustrates the nexus in practice through the case of Hungary as external national homeland, Slovakia and Romania as nationalising states and Hungarians in those states as national minorities. Kemp's analysis takes the Hungarian Status Law as the policy stance of the external national homeland into the centre of analysis and scrutinizes the relational elements of the nexus around that stance. Kemp's main contribution lies in demonstrating the role of the international community – i.e. the European Union – in forming the perceptions and relations across the fields as well as between the fields (Kemp 2006, 119). He also points out based on the example of the Hungarian Status Law, that the relationships between the fields (the axes) are not full-complex issues where there is one relationship, but many relationships between different actors and stances within each field (Kemp 2006, 121). Kemp shows very nicely how differentiated and competing positions form under various factors and how they turn the fields into 'arenas of struggle among competing stances' (Kemp 2006, 121–122). Kemp argues that all relationships in the nexus changed depending on reactions to the latest draft of the law, as well as elections. This empirical case analysis bears out Brubaker's point about the instability generated by the shifting nature of the nexus (Kemp 2006, 122).

Cheskin (2015) applies the nexus to the identity formation process of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. He argues that in order to utilize the nexus as a conceptual model better, it is essential to combine the study of policies and practices with perceptual elements (Cheskin 2015, 81). These policies, practices and perceptual elements carry complex representations and can be perceived positively as well as negatively by the various actors in the nexus as well as within the fields. Aiming to develop a more nuanced analytical framework, he focuses on the complex relations the Russian-speaking population has with the nationalising states and their external national homeland. For this purpose he divides each field into three subfields of relations - political, economic and cultural. Each subfield refers to the relations that the national minority may have with the nationalising state, the external homeland and the international community. In this manner the Russian-speaking minority's relations towards its external national homeland, Russia, can be positive in one field (arguably cultural) and less positive or even negative in other fields (political and economic). Similarly, the relational character between the Russian-speaking national minority and the nationalising states of Estonia and Latvia can be characterized as strong in the economic field, complex and variable in the political field and weak in the cultural field (Cheskin 2015, 87–88). Cheskin's conceptual expansion of the nexus allows us to draw a much more nuanced analysis of the nature of the relations along the axes and between

the players in the nexus. It will therefore be incorporated into the analysis of these axes in the current dissertation.

However, few studies have actually examined the different axes together or developed an explicit analytical account of the relational interconnection linking national minorities, nationalising states, and external national homelands in a single case. Due to the considerable complexity of the nexus caused by its ever shifting and relational nature a comprehensive testing of the nexus in one case at a specific point in time is a true challenge. This dissertation aims to close this gap by taking up the challenge of analysing the nexus in one single case. The articles that form part of this dissertation look into a relational triadic configuration between post-Soviet Estonia as a nationalising state, the Russian-speaking population as a national minority and Russia as the external national homeland for the Russian-speaking minority. Furthermore, the dissertation introduces into the analysis a fourth relational field by probing the quadratic pyramidal nexus (Pettai 2006). The four articles that form the part of this dissertation look separately at various axes of the nexus and at the interplay between the actors, between the fields as well as within the fields.

The contribution of the dissertation

The processes that formed the ethnopolitical regime and integration challenges in post-Soviet Estonia have been recounted many times. The writing and publication of the articles that form part of this dissertation took place during a period of intense interest in ethnopolitical processes in Estonia. The heightened interest was driven, on one hand by the ethnically propelled conflicts elsewhere in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav region, and on the other hand by Estonia's process of accession to the European Union (EU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A subsequent surge of interest in Estonia's progress regarding minority integration has been driven by increased tensions between Russia and the European Union over the events in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. Russia's increasing insistence on having a sphere of interest over its closest neighbourhood and using the Russian-speaking population of neighbouring countries as a soft power tool while manipulating minority rights protection instruments internationally, has shifted the focus of research from majority-minority relations within countries to relationships between the Russian-speaking minority and Russia as a kin-state. From the rich body of scholarship that has appeared over 20 years, four players emerge: the Estonian state, the Russian-speaking population, Russia as a kin-state and the international community (mainly the EU).

This dissertation thus examines ethnopolitical processes in Estonia since the collapse of the Soviet Union by integrating these four players into one conceptual framework. The conceptual framework applied in this dissertation is that of Brubaker's triadic nexus (1996), that is extended further into the quadratic interplay of Estonia as the nationalising state, the Russian-speaking

population as the national minority, Russia as the external national homeland and the international community. The four publications that form the dissertation study in detail three axes of the quadratic nexus: the nationalising policies and practices of the Estonian state vis-à-vis its Russian-speaking population (studies I and II), Russia’s practices of claiming the body of compatriots in neighbouring countries and Estonian-Russian reactions and perceptions vis-à-vis these claims (study III) and the impact of the international community on the nationalising policies and practices of Estonia vis-à-vis its Russian-speaking minority (study IV).

With the aim of improving our understanding of interplay of four players in shaping and forming the ethnopolitical processes in Estonia, the publications that form this dissertation examine each of the relational axes between these players. More specifically, the four publications address the following research questions:

- I What practices and discourses employed by the Estonian state lead to the alienation and exclusion of the Russian-speaking population?
- II How have Estonia’s integration policies reflected the practices and discourses of the Estonian state towards its Russian-speaking population?
- III What are the reactions and perceptions of Estonian-Russians towards Russia’s claims on them as compatriots?
- IV How and with what tools did the international community influence Estonia’s nationalising practices and policies?

The four publications join four players in Estonia’s ethnopolitical processes and regime formation into the common interplay of quadratic nexus as is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Analysis of the quadratic relations in Estonian nexus: contribution of this dissertation.

The first two studies represent an analysis of the process and the policies of integration in Estonia. They enrich our understanding of structural factors and the intentions of various policy agents that emerged in post-Soviet Estonia and that influenced the processes and outcomes of interethnic relations. The third study adds the axis of Russia as the external national homeland and the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. It provides insights into the relationship between the kin-state and its claimed diaspora that has not been in focus until now. It adds to the patchy literature on Russia's relations with its co-ethnics within Moscow's neighbouring countries by analysing various indicators of connectedness among Estonia's Russophones to their kin-state. This relationship informs also the other two relationships in the nexus under the scrutiny in this dissertation – that between Estonia and its Russian-speaking minority and between Estonia and the international community. The fourth study adds the last player into the nexus – the international community. It adds to the debate over the role of the international community in developing ethno-political regimes and shaping minority rights protection systems in Central and Eastern Europe. More importantly, however, in the framework of this dissertation it integrates the field of the international community into the nexus relationship and thus allows drawing more nuanced conclusions regarding the process of integration and the development of ethno-politics in Estonia during the post-Soviet period.

The four studies that form this dissertation employ empirical data from Estonia. The first two are based mostly on an analysis of survey reports, official statistics and official policy documents. The publications conduct a secondary analysis of these sources along with the rich body of pre-existing research on ethno-political processes in Estonia. The third publication uses two types of primary data. First, individual-level data from the last two rounds of an integration monitoring survey in 2011 and 2015 are used to discern the perceptions and attitudes of Estonian-Russians towards Russia. Second, data is added from qualitative fieldwork in 2015 in Tallinn and Narva, the largest Russian-speaking towns in Estonia. A total of seven in-depth interviews with informants – selected leaders of the compatriot movement in Estonia or activists and analysts linked to the movement – were conducted in Tallinn. Additionally, four focus group discussions with Russian-speaking residents of Narva and Tallinn took place between September and October of 2015. This qualitative fieldwork was aimed at discerning the perceptions, imaginations and attitudes reflected in the quantitative survey data. The fourth publication uses secondary data, mainly accession reports by the European Union and official statements by the OSCE addressed to the Estonian state. The analysis draws on those official documents and compares the official policy actions of the Estonian state against the requests put forward in these documents in order to analyse the impact of conditionality and persuasion by the international community.

In the following section the main arguments developed in this dissertation regarding the four players and three relational axes in the nexus will be discussed. It will conclude with the main findings in relation to the interplay of the players and the character of the relations in the Estonian nexus.

Estonia as a nationalising state: from alienation to integration?

It can be read from Brubaker that the nationalising remedial state is the centrifugal force in the nexus that ignites the relational axes in the nexus. Brubaker described the nationalising state as a state that is defined in the ethno-cultural terms and a distinction is made between the 'core nation' and the citizenry as a whole. Seeing the core nation as 'weak' vis-à-vis the citizenry as a whole, the state implements policies that promote the interest of the 'core nation', often at the expense of the citizenry or population as a whole. The nationalising state is an on-going project not a static characteristic. More importantly, Brubaker asserts that the concept of nationalising state is not a theory and thus does not allow predicting how nationalising the states are (Brubaker 2011, 1807, see also Kuzio 2001). One cannot therefore ask whether Estonia is a nationalising state and instead, the state should be conceptualised as an agent of a nationalising project, and at the same time the protagonist of nationalising process (Brubaker 2011, 1808). Nationalising projects do not necessarily produce their intended results and nationalising processes may occur even in the absence of nationalising projects (Ibid). Stemming from this conceptualisation, an analysis of the nationalising state should thus look at both – projects and processes.

In his later elaborations, Brubaker (2011) has tried to develop operational characteristics for studying the nationalising state as an agent and as a leader of the nationalising process. He postulated that to grasp the ever-changing nature of the nationalising state one has to look at *discourses* and *policies* (Brubaker 2011, 1789) aiming to put forward and ensure the dominance of the abovementioned claims. There is a rich nexus of 'discursive claims, symbolic representations, formal policies, informal practices and social processes' that characterise the nationalising state (Brubaker 2011, 1807). The first two publications of this dissertation discuss the nature of Estonian discourses, formal policies and practices vis-à-vis the country's Russian-speaking population. They also examine social processes as outcomes of these policies and practices. We can thereby understand both the *projects* of nationalisation (where the Estonian state operates as an agent) and the *processes* of nationalisation (that occur as a result of these projects, but also independently thereof). Furthermore, these publications reveal the ever changing, on-going and dynamic nature of the processes of Estonia as a nationalising state and the perceptions developed by the national minorities towards the state. These publications bring empirical evidence from the Estonian case to support Brubaker's conceptual claim that analysts should adopt the concept of nation as a 'category of practice,' and nationhood as the product of cultural and political institutionalization rather than an 'immutable or ever-present embodiment of a given constituency' (Brubaker 1996, 7; 37). It is argued in this dissertation that Estonia as a nationalising state has evolved from an exclusionary nationalist state to an 'assimilationist' nationalising state with regard to its Russian-speaking minority.

The re-establishment of independence in Estonia resulted in a change in public ideology from planned-economy communism to democratic market liberalism. This substantive change also took place in different power structures and the public space from primarily Russian-language dominated and Soviet oriented to predominantly Estonian-language dominated and Europe oriented (Malloy 2009). The social and political change that followed re-independence engendered different outcomes on the ethnic groups living in Estonia and resulted in an ethnically divided society (Pettai & Hallik 2002; Smooha 2002; Lauristin & Heidmets 2003; Malloy 2009). Many of these changes are further mapped out in the first two articles of this dissertation. The changes in *policies* (primarily citizenship and language laws) brought about a transformation of the labour market, professional hierarchies, educational attainment, public standing and political participation, all of which contributed to an alienation and exclusion of Russian-speakers during the first decade of re-independence (I, II). The empirical data presented in this dissertation regarding political and juridical processes, the labour market, the education system, societal participation, discrimination, health conditions and crime set the context for understanding the nature of Estonia as a nationalising state (I). These policy processes led to objectively measurable outcomes concerning the exclusion of Russian-speakers from many spheres of life (I). However, more importantly for the analytical axis between a nationalising state and the national minority, these policies and state actions were also *perceived* as exclusionary by the Russian-speaking minority who, with the support of the kin-state Russia, put forward their own claims of recognition. Furthermore, as this dissertation shows, the policies were accompanied by a rather strong exclusionary *discourse* by the political elite that often referred to Russian-speakers as “occupiers” or “colonists” (I). The strong nationalising discourse and policies encouraged many Russians to leave Estonia during the first decade after independence.

It is important to point out here that post-independence Estonia is treated as a nationalising state not solely on the basis of the exclusion inflicted on the Russian-speaking minority, or because elite representatives or agents articulated it as such, but rather because it was perceived as such in the field of the national minority as well the external national homeland Russia. As Brubaker argues, ‘such external perceptions – and the political stance they help justify and sustain – are indeed more important than the self-understanding of participants in the political field of the nationalising state’ (Brubaker 1996, 64). The exclusion of a majority of Russian-speakers from the political community through the denial of automatic citizenship and the imposition of Estonian language in the public and private spheres sent a powerful message to this group about national identity and belonging in the new Estonia (Barrington 1995, 742; Schulze 2010, 363).

The emergence of a policy of integration in 1998 could be seen as a shift from alienating and exclusionary stances towards integrative ones on behalf of the Estonian state. However, this dissertation claims that instead of easing the exclusionary pressure, the initial policy of integration went hand in hand with

the continued promotion of the interests of the core nation (II). The first declaration of integration espoused a strong mono-ethnic attitude of what Malloy called ‘ethno-cultural existentialism and ethno-nationalism’ (Malloy 2009, 233) where the Russian-speaking population was expected to assimilate and where the integration was seen as a one-way process (II). The perceptions of the Estonian elite at the time towards its Russian-speaking minority have been described as ‘post-imperial’ (Laitin 1998) where the perceived threat from the minority with a large former imperial kin-state behind them prevented the new political power from adopting more inclusive and less ‘nationalising’ policies. The new political power, predominantly consisting of representatives of the ‘core nation’ acted ‘as if it were still a weak and victimised minority fearing for its existence’ (Malloy 2009, 234). Already in the second integration policy programme a more multiculturalist concept of Estonian society appeared and a two-way integration process was envisioned; however, it nevertheless defined the multiculturalism from the perspective of a mono-ethnic Estonian culture (II; also Pettai 2003). The most recent national integration strategies hint towards a willingness of the Estonian state to abandon the ‘Estonianisation’ project and move towards building a multicultural and socially cohesive society (II). Stemming from that one might postulate that the Russian-speaking minority would see the Estonian state as less counteractive and nationalising.

One of the founding shifts that occurred at the change of millennia and that became reflected in Estonian policy documents was a redefinition of the Russian-speaking population being temporary colonial guest workers who are about to return to their historic homeland to an immigrant population who is expected to stay (I, II, IV). However, Malloy argued that rather than seeing this as a change in perception it should be treated as a method of avoidance (Malloy 2009, 236). What was to be avoided was the conception of an Estonian state as a dual-society that would have to give recognition to the Russian-speaking population as a national minority. Brubaker postulates that ‘ethnic minorities [in former republics of USSR] think of themselves as members of distinct nationalities because this is the way they learned to think of themselves under the Soviet regime’ (Brubaker 1996, 48). The definition of Russian-speakers as a national minority is reinforced by the discourses of minority rights protection used by Russia in the international arena (III). On the other hand, as discussed above, Russians in Estonia (and Latvia), through the legal continuity discourse employed by these nationalising states, became defined as an immigrant population rather than a national minority (I, II, IV). This political stance has become a salient reference frame for some Estonian scholars (see Nimmerfeldt *et al* 2011) while Russian scholars more often than not apply the framework of minority rights protection when analysing ethnopolitical processes in Estonia (see for example Poleshchuk & Stepanov 2013).² At the same time, Kymlicka and Norman (2000) identify four main types of ethno-cultural minority communities: national minorities, immigrant minorities, religious groups and sui

² For more on the diverging discourses see Ruutsoo 2003.

generic (special kind) groups. They place the Russian-speakers in post-Soviet countries in the latter group, arguing that they are not ordinary immigrants, since they did not leave their homeland to put down roots in another nation. Thus the question of the legal status and the definition of Russian-speakers in post-Soviet countries remains an open debate in academia. This dissertation demonstrates how the conflictual definition is not merely a terminological matter since it has political implications (II), and how the semantics of exclusion that is discernible in official rhetoric and the public media affect the minorities' self-exclusion (I, 85–87). These two discourses have not formed a dialogue in neither the political nor academic arenas and until today the parallel discussions continue where Russia's political and academic debate applies the narrative of minority rights while the successor states resolve to talk about Russians as an immigrant population (Kallas 2014).

This dissertation argues that over time Estonia's exclusionary rhetoric has softened and the concomitant integration policy documents applied terms such as permanent resident population (instead of non-Estonians). Moreover, as the analysis in this dissertation shows, the reference to a 'common Estonian core' disappeared in the integration policy documents, and the principles of Estonian nationhood have become rephrased around a common state identity based on individual freedoms in order to fit better with international discourse on minority rights and freedoms (II, see also Malloy 2009, 241; Schulze 2010, 374). Arguably Estonia's political elite does not feel that Russian-speakers are a threat to the stability of the Estonian state through their inclusion into state structures (Schulze 2010, 374). Recent data also show positive change in the integration levels of younger Russian-speakers. According to the 2011 census there are substantially more citizens among younger Russian-speakers, they have a better command of Estonian language than others and their performance in the labour market in terms of incomes and professional attainment is similar to that of majority Estonians (Integration Monitoring 2015). These data indicate a gradual closing of the gap between majority Estonians and minority Russian-speakers. More importantly, however, the trust of young Russian-speakers toward political institutions in Estonia is similar to that of majority Estonians and is higher than among older generation Russian-speakers (Kallas & Kivistik 2015). Young Russian-speakers also believe more frequently than their parents that they can impact decisions and processes in the Estonian state, although a majority of them believe that ethnic Estonians have better opportunities in political participation structures (Kallas & Kivistik 2015).

Does this warrant assuming that Russian-speakers, especially younger generations, see the Estonian state as less nationalising? There have been no recent studies focusing on this question. Some indicators can be discerned from research on the identities and identifications of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. Ehala (2008) argues that during the 2000s decade there was a noticeable move toward an integrating identity among both minority and majority groups in Estonia. Brubaker argues in his most recent work (2011) along similar lines that with the new generation the ethno-national boundaries

between majority Estonians and minority Russian-speakers have become more permeable and nationalisation has become more ‘assimilationist’ and ‘culturalist’ (Brubaker 2011, 1789). However, other authors have found that there are still significant differences in the value orientations of ethnic Estonians (Korts 2009). Nimmerfeldt *et al* (2011) further argue that Russian-speaking youth identify themselves strongly along ethno-cultural lines (i.e. as Russians) instead of as Estonians. At the same time they identify rather strongly with the Estonian state and society through citizenship status. The analysis in this dissertation shows a strong territorial identification with Estonia among the Russian-speaking population, especially among younger generations (III). There are also low levels of interest in leaving Estonia. These low migration levels indicate a sense of security, although not necessarily of belonging. In more recent years, controversies over the interpretation of history, different perceptions of social and ethnic hierarchies and the increasing mobilization of ethnic differences by political actors have become obstacles to overcoming the divisions and conflictual nationalisms between the Estonian state and the Russian-speaking minority. While Estonia’s elites do not question the loyalty of the Russian-speaking population and do not see them as agents of Russia’s new imperialism, the process of overcoming that ethnic division has become deadlocked over the questions of history and partly language (Schulze 2010). At the same time there is stronger attention than ever before from the external homeland Russia. Russia has been actively pursuing a policy of diasporisation that has also affected the identities, sense of belonging and security of Estonian-Russians (III). These research results show some indications of cultural assimilation among Estonian Russophone youth into majority Estonian culture; at the same time there are multiple pressures being exerted on the sense of belonging and security among the Russian-speaking population. Schultze (2010) argues that Russia’s activism hurts integration process in Estonia by aggravating interethnic tensions and producing defensive reactions among the majoritarian Estonian population, ‘ultimately reinforcing the exclusive approach to nation building that began in the early 1990ies’ (Schulze 2010, 368). These pressures – assimilationist pressure from the nationalising state and diasporisation pressure from the historic homeland – have grown even more during the most recent emergence of geopolitical conflict between Russia and Europe.

Russia as external national homeland: diaspora in the making?

Russia has been an obvious kin-state for the large Russophone population residing in its nearest neighbourhood. A lot has been written about the fate of the 25 million Russians or Russian-speakers that turned into residents or citizens of new nation states outside of the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Firstly, Russia is a kin-state by the mere fact of ethnic demography and migration history as the majority of the Russophones are first

generation émigré ethnic Russians. However, as Brubaker argues, being a kin-state by the fact of ethnic demography does not suffice to conceptualise the state as an external national homeland. External national homelands are constructed through political action and a state becomes an external national homeland when political elites define ethnonational kin in other states as members of one and the same nation, claiming that they “belong”, in some sense, to the state (Brubaker 1996, 58). Furthermore, the kin-state has to assert its right to protect and monitor the rights and interest of the ethnonational kin across the border, and eventually take actions ‘in the name of monitoring, promoting, or protecting these interests (Brubaker 1996, 58).

This dissertation takes as its starting position the fact that Russia is a kin-state for Estonia’s Russophone population and analyses the processes of diasporisation of Estonian-Russians through the conceptual frame of Russia as an external national homeland. The third study (III) in the dissertation scrutinizes, based on the existing academic knowledge, how after the collapse of the Soviet Union the parameters of the newly defined Russian nation became deeply contested and eventually the boundaries of the imagined Russian nation were extended beyond the sovereign territory of the new Russian Federation (Brubaker 1996; Morozov 2004; Zevelev 2008). Brubaker claims that ‘Russia could not help but be implicated in the relations between nationalising successor states and their Russian minorities’ firstly, because the basic parameters of Russian statehood lacked substantial legitimacy, and second, Russian elites construed Russia as an external national homeland for the new Russian diaspora, and obliged to protect the interests of these Russians (Brubaker 1996, 51). This dissertation shows how the conceptualisation of Russia as ‘a divided nation’ by Russian academic and political elites (Laurelle 2015) entangled Russia’s foreign and internal policies into a web of kin-state policies and led to conceptualising Russia as an external national homeland. The study puts forward the claims that from an initial set of mere rhetorical claims towards Russophones in post-Soviet successor states, Russia’s policies have moved towards claiming the diaspora and eventually developing concrete actions – political and programmatic – to develop political, cultural and economic connections between the diaspora and the historic homeland and to assert a right to speak in the name of the diaspora in the international arena (III).

The political processes and public debates over the boundaries of the Russian nation have been recounted elsewhere (see for example Shevel 2011, Laurelle 2015). In this dissertation I examine various initial stances, differentiated and competing positions within Russia and their change over time regarding the borders of the Russian nation and the positioning of Russia vis-à-vis Russophones in near abroad. What stems from this discussion is that various configurations of Russia as an external homeland are construed through political rhetoric as well as policies. I show how over time the initial rhetorical stance developed into a full-fledged concept of an organic, transborder Russian nation encapsulated with the idea of *Ruskyi Mir*. This was followed by the policy actions that were aimed at building concrete structural relations between the

claimed compatriots and homeland Russia. Thus, I argue that Russia has taken a more assertive role from being a mere kin-state and that based on these positions we can conceptualise Russia as an external national homeland (III).

In current scholarship, in researching Russia as external national homeland, focus has been put on examining whether Russia is a factor contributing to the explosiveness of the nexuses vis-à-vis Russian minorities in the Soviet successor states. Instead of focusing on how Russia as an external national homeland is *perceived* by the other actors of the nexus, scholars have focused on whether Russia *can provoke* violence in order to regain control over the region (CSIS 2011; Saari 2014; Zakem *et al* 2015). In other words Russia as an external national homeland has been analysed based on its actions rather than on perceptions of other elements of the nexus. In my third study, however, I look at how Russia as an external national homeland is *perceived* by the Russian-speaking population of Estonia in the name of whom Russia claims to act internationally. This aligns with the other studies in the dissertation that similarly look at perceptions in addition to actions. The analysis in third study shows that the relationship of Estonian-Russians vis-à-vis Russia is more complex and multidimensional than Russia's claims imply. The territorial and political connections of Estonian-Russians to Russia are rather weak and do not support Russia's ambition to develop strong connections between the diaspora and the historic homeland. Furthermore there exists a significant generational gap where younger Estonian-Russians show even weaker territorial, cultural-linguistic, political and civic loyalties towards Russia. Russia's objective to develop a strong, consolidated compatriot movement that might have the capacity to mobilize Estonian-Russians has not materialized (III). Nevertheless, the initial signs of a diasporisation of Estonian-Russians are evident through a rather strong transnational cultural association with Russia. After years of flux in the post-Soviet space, the identity of Estonian-Russians shows some signs of consolidating around Russian language and the historical cultural heritage of Russia and this opens up the possibility for Russia to exert a meaningful influence on their identity formation via cultural and linguistic projects (III). Whether this influence will focus solely on support for the development of local Estonian-Russian identity based on Russian language whilst being rooted in territorial, political and civic loyalties to the Estonian state remains a question to be analysed.

International community: a player or context maker?

Since the introduction of the extended, quadratic or pyramid nexus – the debate has been whether the international community is a separate player in the nexus or forms the context around the triadic nexus. Arguments in favour of conceptualising the nexus with four players instead of three (Smith 2002, Tesser 2003, Pettai 2006) have been countered by claims that the triadic nexus should be considered within the parameters of what is prescribed by international law

(Kemp 2002, Stanbridge 2005). Brubaker, in his response to the critique, agrees, that differently from the inter-war triadic nexuses, the nationalising states of post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe are more tightly entangled in the web of international standards. However, he argues that the international community should not be treated as a separate element in the nexus but rather forms the context around the nexus, together with globalized economic relations that enmesh the nexus elements in 'denser webs of economic interdependence' (Brubaker 2011, 1787). Security concerns in post-Cold War Europe, especially the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and conflicts in various corners of the former USSR generated a rationale for tight international involvement in minority issues and led to what Sasse calls 'greater internationalisation of minority rights' (Sasse 2008, 847). This greater internationalisation was characterised by an active involvement by various international actors in minority rights issues in CEE during the post-Cold War period. In sum, there is a consensus over the involvement of international actors in the nexus although the role of the international community is debated. Galbreath & McEvoy, based on the above-mentioned debate, have thus defined the nexus as 'geopolitical nexus' (2010) that alludes to the potentially explosive characteristic of the nexus whilst being embedded in regional security issues.

Brubaker argues that the international community's impact can be measured and discerned mostly in relation to one player - the nationalising state (Brubaker 2011, 1787). Indeed, research has primarily focused on analysing the impact of the EU's conditionality and the persuasion powers of other pan-European organisations such as Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) (Hughes *et al* 2004; Kelley 2004; Sasse 2008; Pettai & Kallas 2009; Agarín & Regelman 2012). The fourth study (IV) in this dissertation forms part of the academic debate on the impact of the international community on minority rights norms and ethno-political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The publication provides a case study of Estonia in during the pre-accession and post-accession period. Estonia (along with Latvia) is a strongest test case for discerning the international transformative impact on national legislation in the area of minority rights. It is argued in this dissertation that by bringing the concept of integration, first put on policy agenda by Estonia itself, into its binding political documents, the EU actually helped to make this process irreversible (IV, 114). EU, with help from the OSCE and the CoE, created a kind of undergirding for the policy of minority rights and integration, without which it would have probably been politically unsustainable (IV, 114).

Yet, while the European integration literature has much to say about the impact of the EU on a host state's protection of national minorities, it has not considered whether integration had broader effect in transforming relations between the host state and the kin state (Galbreath & McEvoy 2010, 359). The question arises what is the role of the international community in the otherwise volatile and potentially explosive nexus and how do international organisations impact on the relational interplay among the national minority, the nationalising

state and the kin state? Does the international community act as a mediator in the conflictual nexus, or, instead, operates as a 'toolbox' for the three players in the nexus as well as within the nexus? Kymlicka (2002) argues that integration of the CEE countries into international structures would 'de-securitise' the nexus and thus act as a mediating influence on the conflicts. Galbreath & McEvoy (2010) therefore explore whether the process of European integration has indeed transformed relations within the geopolitical nexus. Based on their analysis of 15 cases of geopolitical nexuses they argue that European integration had a variable impact on the triadic interplay. In some cases such as Estonia and Latvia, European integration encouraged policy changes. At the same time, in the case of Slovakia as a nationalising state vis-à-vis its Hungarian national minority 'European integration has not led Slovakia to become a better host state' (Galbreath & McEvoy 2010, 375). These authors, however, also focus more on the impact of Europeanization on the nationalising states and do not develop further the role of the international community in altering the overall geopolitical volatility of the nexuses.

Thus, the question remains whether the de-securitization of geopolitical nexuses has indeed happened? The post-enlargement context provides a new testing ground for the study of the effectiveness of EU conditionality in anchoring political, economic and legal reforms and de-securitizing the nexus. Sasse argues, that the EU's leverage on the various components of democratic conditionality ended with each country's accession, while the leverage power of the OSCE and the CoE was shaped already from the beginning by the politics of conditionality during EU accession and consequently was also curtailed in post-accession period (Sasse 2008, 853). This dissertation argues, however, that at first the process of Europeanization indeed dampened the intensity of the majority-minority relations, and normalisation along this axis of the nexus seemed promising (IV). Furthermore, the relations along the other axis of Estonia as a nationalising state and Russia as a kin-state seemed to stabilise. Russia removed the question of the Russian-speaking minority's rights in the Baltics from its Russia-EU summit agendas, although it continued to put the issue on the agenda of various OSCE meetings. Yet, Russia did not cease to be a formative player in the nexus. As discussed in this dissertation (III), in recent decade Russia has shifted its focus from a rhetorical compatriot policy at the interstate level towards a policy of building more direct links and cooperation with Russian-speakers themselves. These actions have shifted the dynamics in the nexus where external national homeland has become the main protagonist in the nexus. Elsewhere it has been argued, that Russia's increased activism actually works against minority integration by, among other things, aggravating tensions over history and language (Schulze 2010, 368). This shift in the dynamics of the nexus to a national external homeland raises a question about the impact of the international community in stabilising the changed nexus relations. While the impact of the EU, Council of Europe and OSCE on nationalising states has been analysed extensively, the leverage that the international community has on external national homelands – in this case

Russia – has not been addressed. This dissertation points to the need to refocus the analysis of the role of the international community from nationalising states to national external homelands.

Sasse concludes that ‘the continuing problems with integration after accession and occasional protests, including provocations by Russian organisations, demonstrate that the legal changes promoted by EU pressure were not sufficient to bring about behavioural change’ (Sasse 2008, 853). Existing research on post-accession period has a contradicting assessment of the impact of international conditionality. Sasse (2008) and Schulze (2010) cast doubt on the long-term impact of the EU’s conditionality on inducing a traceable change in the attitudes of representatives of the political establishment and society at large. By contrast, Agarín & Regelmann (2012) argue that European integration ushered in greater domestic control over policy implementation on minority issues. It is important to point out that part of the explanation why the EU’s conditionality did not go beyond mere policy change in the pre-accession process is that Estonia’s elite often took on the reactive stances towards Russia’s similar claims. As Schulze argues, Russia’s use of the Russian-speaking population as an instrument for achieving its geostrategic objectives reinforced the need of Estonia’s elite to argue for the need to protect the titular nation and culture and thereby made the Estonian elite more reluctant to adopt liberal citizenship and language policies (Schulze 2010, 386). At the same time, as is argued in the study III of this dissertation, Estonia’s internal actors are similarly the protagonists of securitization of minority issue. This is often done with an aim to gain or sustain the political control and reflects the internal political power struggles between political parties. Whether the securitization of minority issues is the result of external security threats or internal political power struggles, or the interrelated combination of both, remains to be analysed. In this dissertation, the interplay of EU conditionality and Russia’s pressure on Estonia as a nationalising state demonstrates the formative role of the two external actors in the formation and development of Estonia’s ethno-political regime and processes. Further research on the impact of the international community on minority rights regimes in Central and Eastern Europe should pay more attention to the ways in which kin-states and international institutions interact to influence these regimes.

While it can be agreed that international pressure did not *per se* increase the domestic political will for effective integration policies, this dissertation does demonstrate that the continued implementation of comprehensive integration programmes together with a shift from exclusionary policies towards more integrationist if not assimilationist practices did induce some behavioural change (I, II) as part of the Europeanisation process of the 1990ies (IV). However, more nuanced investigation of the processes of Europeanisation among both majority and minority group identities remains to be done. This specific phenomenon of Europeanisation represents a particular normative backdrop for majority-minority integration in Estonia that can shed additional light on the relational axes within the nexus.

Main findings

This dissertation makes a number of substantive and analytical contributions to the study of post-Soviet ethnopolitical situations and regimes in the successor states of the USSR. It posits an empirical test of Brubaker's conceptual framework concerning the interplay of four actors in the post-Communist nation-state era. The four studies lay out, based on the empirical case study of Estonia, the relational character of the axes *between the fields* as well as between the actors *within the fields*. Estonia, as a newly independent state that embarked on a process of nation-building, bore all the characteristics of a nationalising state as defined by Brubaker. The exclusionary character of policies and discourses was self-evident and prompted some scholars to define Estonia as an ethnic democracy (Järve 2000). This dissertation, however, demonstrates how the on-going project of nation-building embedded in the process of Europeanisation, has eventually taken a less excluding character towards the Russian-speaking minority. Social stability, economic growth and Europeanisation have all contributed to the changing nature of the Estonian state vis-à-vis its minority. The role of Europeanisation on majority-minority relations in Estonia has been evaluated variously, however, as it is argued here, its impact on developing a more inclusive character for Estonia's policies and discourses has been evident in many instances. The international community has pressured for policy change; however, a process of sustained internalisation of minority rights norms has also taken place among the elites, especially the younger generation. The process of Europeanisation is still an on-going process and its impact on policies and discourses is continuous. The current refugee crisis that calls for pan-European solidarity and an open-door policy tests anew the foundations of Estonia's nation-state. This therefore emerges as the next frontier of research regarding the Europeanisation of identities, both among majority Estonians and minority Russian-speakers.

Along the relational axes between the national minority and the external national homeland, this dissertation contributes with a more nuanced understanding of how kin-state policies evolve over time triggered by internal (within-field) as well as external (between-field) projects and processes. While Russia defined itself as a kin-state for the large Russophone populations in the former Soviet republics immediately after the collapse of USSR, the concrete kin-state policies did not develop until the turn of the century. Since the reign of Vladimir Putin Russia has become more assertive in claiming Russophone populations in neighbouring countries for itself, and programmatic actions have emerged and been implemented. The concept of *Russkyi Mir* that embodies the idea of Russia as a 'nation divided by borders' has become the ideological frame that unites the nation both within as well as outside Russia's borders. Estonia's Russians continue to maintain strong cultural and linguistic affiliations with Russia as their historic homeland. Yet, due to the fact that Russia's compatriot policy is trumpeted for geopolitical, rather than genuinely minority rights protection reasons, the connection between Russia as a kin-state and the

Estonian Russian minority does not yield a complementary or harmonious relationship. Estonian Russians, while culturally and linguistically identifying with Russia, often demonstrate suspicion towards Russia's claims on them as compatriots. Furthermore, within the field of the national minority of Estonian Russians, the conflictual stances among the leaders of the compatriot movement result in a marginalisation of the movement and a withdrawal of political power from the minority. The marginalisation of the compatriot movement in turn hampers the relationship of the minority as a whole vis-à-vis the kin-state. The perceptions of Estonian Russians both toward Russia's compatriot policy as well as toward the local compatriot movement do not point to a solidification of the relationship between the minority and the external national homeland. This relationship is in still a rather fluid state, especially regarding the younger generation of Estonian Russians.

The two processes described in this dissertation – firstly, the more inclusive nature of Estonia's policies and discourses vis-à-vis its Russian-speaking population embedded in the process of Europeanisation and secondly, the more assertive claims made by Russia on the Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad – together create double pressures on Estonian Russians. These pressures are not synergetic as they draw on conflicting stances between Russia and the member states of the European Union and they are exacerbated by the overall geopolitical polarisation that has taken place since the advent of the Ukraine crisis. In many ways we can say that these parameters involving a changing geopolitical climate, Russia's nation building process, Estonia's social and political stability and generational shifts within minority and majority populations in Estonia represent the next point of departure for the study of ethnopolitics in Estonia that goes beyond what this dissertation has sought to contribute.

Reflections on the further applicability of the model

Brubaker began with a normative warning: triadic nexuses are dangerous phenomena in ethnic politics and international relations due to their conflictual nature. The nationalisms of three players in the nexus collide and form a 'geopolitical nexus' that in turn is unpredictable in its nature due to its overly relational character. The centrifugal force that sets the nexus into a conflictual interplay was, according to Brubaker, the nationalising state. Indeed, there have been several instances in recent European history where the transborder ties between a kin-state and its claimed co-ethnics in a neighbouring state have taken on political significance under the pressures of nationalisation by the host state, and the risk of political tension or even violence has emerged. The potentially explosive nature of this triadic interplay was all too clear for practitioners of ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of

the communist regimes. Brubaker himself claimed that the numerous conflict-provoking stances within the nexus were contained both by the opposing or differing stances within a field or between the fields, and by the international community that at least set sharp limits on the permissible forms of nationalism (Brubaker 1996, 67). It was argued that over time, the EU and other European institutions would alleviate these dangers (Smith 2002, Kymlicka 2002).

During the first post-communist decade, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was a most active in applying preventive diplomacy to alleviate these conflicts. The first HCNM, Max van der Stoep, was all too familiar with the triangular nexus and called this conflictual constellation 'the classic case under my mandate' (quoted in Zellner 2013, 29). After a decade of accumulating experience in mediating triadic geopolitical nexuses, the OSCE issued its Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations in 2008. The 19 individual recommendations address the conflictual aspects of policies and discourses between actors interlocked in a relational nexus with each other aiming 'to clarify how states can support and extend benefits to people belonging to national minorities residing in other countries in ways that do not strain interethnic or bilateral relations' (OSCE 2008). However, the recommendations focus almost solely on states adhering to their obligations to provide for minority rights and political participation. Using Brubaker's conceptual frame, however, the analysis in this dissertation proves that states operate in a complex and often mutually antagonistic interplay of relations between the national minority, the kin-state and the international community. The fulfilment by a national state of its international obligations alone might not lead to a 'de-securitization' of the minority issue in inter-state relations. Therefore, it could be argued that there is a need to consider the whole breadth of international principles and obligations, including the obligations that arise for kin-states, national minorities and the international community (Wolff 2013, 70).

After a period of relative calm and a lack of serious violence in minority-majority relations, the past decade has seen a return of violence on a number of occasions (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Ukraine) and a serious international politicisation of minority issues (Wolff 2013, 74). Brubaker saw Russia as a potentially revisionist state that due to its enormous military power is a much graver threat to regional and global security than any other nationalising Soviet successor state (Brubaker 1996, 45). Indeed, Russia's geopolitical ambitions expressed in its foreign policy rhetoric of 'spheres of influence' combined with more assertive claims towards the 25 million Russophones in its neighbouring states have newly destabilised the nexuses across the post-Soviet territory. In the case of Estonia the relative calm and social stability of majority-minority relations achieved with the help of the international community by the mid 2000s showed some signs of destabilisation during the Bronze Soldier riots of 2007. They became anew a focus of international security concern after the dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014. While there are gaps in Estonia's integration process that can legitimate the grievances of Russian-speakers towards

the Estonian state, in both instances the centrifugal force for conflict has been Russia as a kin-state. Brubaker claimed that external homeland nationalism is a reactive nationalism that emerges in cases where the ethnonational kin are seen as threatened by the nationalising nationalism of the host state. However, during the last ten years, the integration process in Estonia has shown a rather positive trend, especially regarding the younger generation, and in parallel the discourses and policies of Russia as an external homeland vis-à-vis Estonia and Estonia's Russians have not changed. On the contrary, as is shown in this dissertation (study III), Russia's claims toward Estonian Russians have changed from a protectionist discourse to one appropriating Russophones as a core element of Russia's nation. In this frame, the external homeland nationalism has altered its focus and turned from remedial discourses and policy demands vis-à-vis the nationalising state to one espousing assertive discourses and policies towards the national minority. While the international community achieved some success in taming the conflictual elements of the nationalising state in Estonia, its powers over the actions and policies of the external national homeland are limited. The conflictual nature of the nexus has shown itself again; however, this time around the centrifugal force of the nexus has shifted from the nationalising state to the external national homeland. Managing tensions in this kind of nexus and preventing an escalation into full-scale conflict will remain a significant challenge for the international community in the years to come.

Lastly, Brubaker applied his nexus concept to cases of post-imperial minorities or situations where minorities emerged due to large scale border changes. He did not consider cases of more recent minority formations, especially Europe's experience with immigrant populations during the post-World War II period. However, new triadic configurations appear to be emerging between more consolidated democracies in Western Europe, their immigrant populations and these minorities' historic homelands. One of the most obvious cases is the positioning of Turkey as a kin-state vis-à-vis German Turks and its claims on Turkish diasporas around the world. Turkey's discourses and policies together with Germany's reactions and perceptions warrant a new empirical application of the triadic nexus onto the post-immigrant societies in Western Europe. This, too, represents new dimensions of research that arises from the results of this doctoral dissertation.

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SUMMARY

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, nation-building processes and ethnic relations in the post-Soviet space have been a centre of attention for the international community, political analysts and researchers alike. In the case of Estonia, configurations of political power, the ethno-demographic situation and nation-building raised a series of questions for scholars of nationalism to carry out empirical research and to develop theoretical and analytical constructs. Extensive research has been carried out on Estonia's post-communist ethnopolitical regime, nation-building and the process of integration and on identity formation of Russian-speakers.

Drawing on this rich body of scholarship, and in contrast to existing single-focus studies, this dissertation provides a multi-dimensional analysis of the complex issues of ethnic relations and integration processes in Estonia during last two decades. For that purpose it draws on and operationalizes one of the most prominent analytical frameworks that exists in the literature, the triadic nexus model by Rogers Brubaker (1996). Brubaker argued that the national question in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by a specific juxtaposition and interaction between three mutually antagonistic elements or 'nationalisms'. These three nationalisms – that of nationalising states, national minorities and external national homelands – formed a relational triadic nexus that Brubaker claimed represented a specific ethnopolitical configuration. Other scholars have extended Brubaker's argument by adding a fourth player in the nexus – an international community.

This dissertation breaks down and devotes separate attention to these four most salient players and relational axes between those players within the Brubaker model. It examines ethnopolitical processes in Estonia since the collapse of the Soviet Union by integrating four players into one conceptual framework. It therefore represents a more comprehensive operationalization of this multi-dimensional model in order to bring out its richness in empirical terms – something that is all too often done on a very superficial level.

The first two studies represent an analysis of the process and the policies of integration in Estonia. They enrich our understanding of structural factors and the intentions of various policy agents that emerged in post-Soviet Estonia and that influenced the processes and outcomes of interethnic relations. The third study adds the axes of Russia as the external national homeland and the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. It provides insights into the relationship between the kin-state and its claimed diaspora that has not been in focus until now. It adds to the patchy literature on Russia's relations with its co-ethnics in neighbouring countries by analysing various indicators of connectedness among Estonia's Russophones to their kin-state. This relationship informs also the other two relationships in the nexus under scrutiny in this dissertation – that between Estonia and its Russian-speaking minority and between Estonia and the international community. The fourth study adds the last player into the nexus –

the international community. It adds to the debate over the role of the international community in developing ethno-political regimes and shaping minority rights protection systems in Central and Eastern Europe. More importantly, however, in the framework of this dissertation it integrates the field of the international community into the nexus relationship and thus allows us to draw more nuanced conclusions regarding the process of integration and the development of ethno-politics in Estonia during the post-Soviet period.

Estonia, as a newly independent state that embarked on a process of nation-building, bore all the characteristics of a nationalising state as defined by Brubaker. The exclusionary character of policies and discourses was self-evident and prompted some scholars to define Estonia as an ethnic democracy. This dissertation, however, demonstrates how the on-going project of nation-building embedded in the process of Europeanisation, has eventually taken on a less excluding character towards the Russian-speaking minority. Social stability, economic growth and Europeanisation have all contributed to the changing nature of the Estonian state vis-à-vis its minority.

At the same time, the dissertation brings a more nuanced understanding of how the relations between the national minority (Estonian Russians) and the external national homeland (Russia) have evolved over time. While Russia defined itself as a kin-state for the large Russophone populations in the former Soviet republics immediately after the collapse of USSR, concrete kin-state policies did not develop until the turn of the century. Since the reign of Vladimir Putin Russia has become more assertive in claiming Russophone populations in neighbouring countries for itself, and programmatic actions have emerged and been implemented. The concept of *Russkyi Mir* that embodies the idea of Russia as a 'nation divided by borders' has become the ideological frame that unites the nation both within as well as outside Russia's borders. Research shows that Estonia's Russians continue to maintain strong cultural and linguistic affiliations with Russia as their historic homeland. Yet, due to the fact that Russia's compatriot policy is trumpeted for geopolitical, rather than genuinely minority rights protection reasons, the connection between Russia as a kin-state and the Estonian Russian minority does not yield a complementary or harmonious relationship. Estonian Russians, while identifying culturally and linguistically with Russia, often demonstrate suspicion towards Russia's claims on them as compatriots. Furthermore, within the field of the national minority of Estonian Russians, the conflictual stances among the leaders of the compatriot movement result in a marginalisation of the movement and a withdrawal of political power from the minority. The marginalisation of the compatriot movement in turn hampers the relationship of the minority as a whole vis-à-vis the kin-state. The perceptions of Estonian Russians both toward Russia's compatriot policy as well as toward the local compatriot movement do not point to a solidification of the relationship between the minority and the external national homeland. This relationship is in still a rather fluid state, especially regarding the younger generation of Estonian Russians.

The two processes described in this dissertation – firstly, the more inclusive nature of Estonia’s policies and discourses vis-à-vis its Russian-speaking population embedded in the process of Europeanisation and secondly, the more assertive claims made by Russia on the Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad – together create double pressures on Estonian Russians. These pressures are not synergetic as they draw on conflicting stances between Russia and the member states of the European Union and they are exacerbated by the overall geopolitical polarisation that has taken place since the advent of the Ukraine crisis. In many ways we can say that these parameters involving a changing geopolitical climate, Russia’s own nation-building process, Estonia’s social and political stability and generational shifts within the minority and majority populations in Estonia represent the next point of departure for the study of ethnopolitics in Estonia that goes beyond what this dissertation has sought to contribute.

SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Veelkord triaadilisest kolmiksuhtest: Eesti, Venemaa ja eestivenelaste etnopolitiiliste suhete analüüs

Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemise hetkest alates on uute rahvusriikide ehitamine ja selle raames arenevad etniliste gruppide omavahelised suhted olnud rahvusvahelise üldsuse, poliitikaanalüütikute ja teadlaste huviorbiidis. Taasiseseisvunud Eesti puhul kerkisid üles mitmed teravad teemad poliitilise võimu jagamisest etniliste gruppide – eestlaste ja eestivenelaste – vahel, rahvustava riigi poliitikatest ja diskursustest ning üldisest etnilisest ja demograafilisest olukorrast. Need küsimused on suunanud sotsiaal- ja poliitikateadlasi läbi viima mitmeid empiirilisi uuriguid ja analüüse. Viimasel kahle kümnendil on laialdaselt uuritud Eesti post-kommunistlikku etnopolitiilist režiimi, rahvusriigi ehitamist ja selle sees toimuvat ühiskondlikku integratsiooniprotsessi ning venekeelse vähemuse identiteedi kujunemist pärast Nõukogude Liidu kadumist.

Lähtudes sellest rikkalikust teaduslikust pagasist võtab käesolev väitekirj fookusesse kogu Eesti etnopolitiilise olukorra kompleksuse pärast taasiseseisvumist. Selle eesmärgi saavutamiseks võetakse väitekirjas analüüsi aluseks laialdaselt tunnustust leidnud Rogers Brubakeri kolmikneksuse mudel (1996). Analüüsides võrdlevalt sõdadevahelise ja post-kommunistliku perioodi rahvusriikide arengu protsesse leidis Brubaker, et rahvusküsimust Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopas iseloomustab spetsiifiline vastastikuselt sõltuvuses olev suhe kolme teineteise suhtes vaenuliku elemendi või “rahvusluse” vahel. Need kolm rahvust – rahvustava riigi, rahvusvähemuse ja rahvusliku kodumaa oma – moodustavad kolmikneksuse konfiguratsiooni, mis on Brubakeri väitel iseloomulik just Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopale. Hilisemad analüüsid on laiendanud Brubakeri neksust lisades kolmiknesse neljanda osapoole – rahvusvahelise üldsuse ja rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid.

Käesolev väitekirj võtab Brubakeri mudeli lahti osadeks ja analüüsib eraldi süvitsi igaüht nendest neljast osapoolest, aga ka nendevahelisi suhteid. Väitekirjas analüüsitakse Eesti etnopolitiilisi protsesse pärast Nõukogude Liidu lagunemist liites kokku neli osapoolt ühte mõttestatud raamistikku. Tegemist on mitmetahulise ja dünaamilise suhete kolmikneksuse empiirilise juhtumi seni ühe tervikliku analüüsiga. Eesmärgiks on seatud erinevalt senistest väga üldistes joontes kirjeldatud empiirilistest kolmikneksuste olukordadest, tuua välja suhete nüanside rikkus põhinedes Eesti empiirilisel juhtumianalüüsil.

Väitekirja kaks esimest publikatsiooni analüüsivad Eesti integratsiooniprotsessi ja poliitika. Analüüsid toovad välja struktuursete mõjurite ning erinevate poliitikate kujundajate ja juhtijate rolli, mis mõjutasid etniliste gruppide omavahelist läbisaamist post-kommunistlikus Eestis. Kolmas publikatsioon lisab diskussiooni Venemaa kui olulise mõjuteguri eestivenelaste identiteedi kujunemisel ja integratsiooniprotsessi kujunemisel. Artikkel testib empiirilisel mudeli ühte suhtejoont – ajaloolise kodumaa ja rahvusvähemuse omavahelisesse suhet, mis ei ole seni uurijate fookuses olnud. Lisaks panustab

analüüs täna veel üsa hõredasse akadeemilisse teadmisesse suhetest Venemaa ja tema naabruses elavate suure hulga venekeelse elanikkonna vahel. See suhe ajaloolise kodumaa ja rahvusvähemuse vahel mõjutab oluliselt ka teisi suhteid kolmikneksuses, mis on väitekirja fookuses – Eesti riigi ja venekeelse elanikkonna vahel ning Eesti riigi ja rahvusvahelise üldsuse vahel. Neljas väitekirja publikatsioon lisab neksusesse viimase neljanda osapoole – rahvusvahelise üldsuse. Artikkel annab oma panuse akadeemilisse debatti rahvusvahelise üldsuse, eelkõige Euroopa Liidu rollist ja mõjust Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa etnopolitiiliste režiimide arengule ning rahvisvähemuste kaitse mehhanismide loomisele nendes riikides. Kuid veelgi olulisemalt, see analüüs lõimib rahvusvahelise üldsuse kolmikneksuse dünaamilisse raami ning seetõttu loob võimaluse arendada välja põhjapanevamad järeldused Eesti integratsiooniprotsessist ning ethnopolitiikast Nõukogude-järgsel perioodil.

Taasiseseisvunud Eesti kandis kõiki Brubakeri poolt viidatud rahvustava riigi tunnuseid. Poliitikate ja diskursuste vähemust välistav iseloom oli nähtav ning see andis põhjuse osadel uurijatel nimetada Eestit isegi etniliseks demokraatiaks. Käesolev väitekirja näitlikustab kuidas rahvusriigi loomise protsess, mis lõimiti euroopastumise protsessiga on lõpuks muutunud vähem välistavaks ning rohkem kaasavaks eestivenelaste suhtes. Eesti riigi ja eestivenelaste omavaheliste suhete normaliseerumisele on kaasa aidanud ka ühiskondliku stabiilsuse ja majanduskasvu saavutamine ning kiire euroopastumine kahel esimesel kümnendil pärast Nõukogude Liidu lagunemist.

Lisaks, väitekirja esitab põhjalikuma analüüsi sellest, kuidas on arenenud eestivenelaste suhted oma ajaloolise kodumaaga (Venemaaga) viimasel kahel kümnendil. Venemaa kuulutas end olevate kõikide väljaspool Venemaa piire elavate venelaste ja teiste venekeelsete Nõukogude Liidu kodanike ajalooliseks kodumaaks (Nõukogude Liidu järeletulija) kohe pärast liidu lagunemist, kuid konkreetsed kaasmaalaste programmilised tegevused kujunesid välja alles uuel aastatuhandel. Preident Vladimir Putini juhtimisel on Venemaa muutunud oluliselt pro-aktiivsemaks väljaspool Venemaad elavate venekeelsete inimeste suunal kuulutades venekeelset endised Nõukogude Liidu kodanikud Vene rahva osaks, mis täna on “tükeldatud piiride poolt” ning luues rahastusmehhanisme kaasmaalaste liikumistele ja organisatsioonidele. *Russkyi Mir* kontseptsioon on kujunenud selle ideoloogilise ja poliitilise tegevuse vundamendiks ja raamiks. Uuringud näitavad, et eestivenelased jätkuvalt seostavad ennast tugevalt keeleliselt ja kultuuriliselt Venemaaga kui ajaloolise kodumaaga. Samas, kuna Venemaa kaasmaalaste poliitikat on rakendatud sageli just Venemaa geopoliitiliste eesmärkide saavutamiseks ja mitte niivõrd kaasmaalaste endi huvide kaitsmise eesmärgil, ei ole eestivenelaste ja Venemaa suhted harmoonilised. Väitekirja ilmestab, kuidas eestivenelaste suhe Venemaaga toimib mõlemalt poolt üsna ebaselges raamistikus, kuuluvustunne ja identiteet on sagedases muutumises sõltuvalt poliitilisest konjunktuurist. Eriti kehtib see just noorema põlvkonna puhul.

Need kaks protsessi, mida väitekirjas esitatud analüüsi põhjal saab välja tuua – esiteks Eesti riigi üha suurenev poliitikate ja diskursuse kaasav iseloom eesti-

venelaste suhtes, mis on lõimitud euroopastumise protsessi, ning teiseks Venemaa üha jõulisem venekeelse elanikkonna Vene rahvuse osaks määratlemine ja soov siduda Venemaaga – koos loovad tugeva teineteisele vastanduva surve eestivenelastele. Need kaks suhet ei moodusta sünergilist tervikut, mis toetab eestivenelaste enesemääratlust, kuna nad lähtuvad vastanduvatest positsioonidest Venemaa ja Eesti vahel, mis on muutunud veelgi enam vastandlikeks Venemaa ja Euroopa Liidu vahelises polariseerumises Ukraina kriisi tõttu. Muutunud geopoliitiline õhustik, Venemaa tugev rahvusriigi ehitamise protsess, Eesti ühiskondliku ja majandusliku stabiilsuse saavutamise ning põlvkondade vahetus eestivenelaste koguonnas loovad uued alused Eesti etnopolitika analüüsimisel, mis väljub aga juba käesoleva väitekirja analüütilisest raamist.

PUBLICATIONS

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: Kristina Kallas
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Education and work experience:

- (1) Tartu University, PhD candidate in Political Science
- (2) Central European University, 2002, MA in History
- (3) Tartu University, 2000, BA in History

Work experience:

- (1) Since 2015 Tartu University Narva College, director.
- (2) 2007–2015 Institute of Baltic Studies, member of the board. Main tasks: policy analysis and policy development in the areas of fundamental rights, migration, integration, minority rights, civil society and democracy.
- (3) 2011–2015 Estonian Refugee Council, founder and head of the board.
- (4) 2007–2008 Tartu University, department of political science, researcher. Main tasks involved teaching and research work.
- (5) 2002–2006 Hill&Knowlton Estonia, senior consultant on public affairs.
- (6) 1998–2002 Foundation Archimedes European Union Innovation Centre, national contact person for EU research and development programmes.

Other relevant work experience:

- Since 2015 chairwoman of the council of Estonian Integration and Migration Foundation.
- 2014 March-June OSCE Election Observation Mission in Ukraine, early presidential elections, long-term observer.
- 2014 October OSCE Election Observation Mission in Ukraine, early parliamentary elections, short-term observer.
- 2014–2015 Volunteer-coordinator of humanitarian aid project to internally displaced people in Eastern Ukraine, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Estonian Refugee Council.
- Since 2005 expert project evaluator for European and national funding programmes: EU 5th Framework Programme, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme, Europe for Citizens Programme, Estonian Integration Foundation, Estonian National Fund for Civil Society, Open Estonia Foundation.

Research and development activities:

1. Main research areas: nationalism and nation-building, minority rights, integration, migration, language- and citizenship policies and political participation.

2. More relevant recent research projects:
 - Estonian society integration monitoring study (2014–2015). Commissioned by Estonian Ministry of Culture. Position: project coordinator. Methods: population survey (sample 1200); qualitative research (focus groups and in-depth interviews). Publication as a result of this project: Kallas, K. & Kivistik, K. (2015). *Kodakondsus ja poliitiline osalemine* (Citizenship and political participation). In *Estonian Society Integration Monitoring 2015*. Ed. Raivo Vetik & Kristina Kallas, Institute of Baltic Studies.
 - EUMARGINS: On the margins of the European Community: on inclusion and exclusion of young adult immigrants in seven European countries funded by EU 7th Framework Programme (2008–2011). Position: Senior researcher. Work methods: ethnographical data collection and interviews with Estonian informants (30 young people), analysis of national policy context, development of policy recommendations. As a result the following publication resulted from the project: Kallas, K. and Kaldur, K. (2010). “Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament” in *Inclusion And Exclusion Of Young Adult Immigrants: Barriers and Bridges*. Katrine Fangen, Kirsten Fossan and Ferdinand Andreas Mohn (eds.). London: Ashgate

Teaching:

Courses taught:

- 2004 *Nationalism and Nation-building*, Tartu University EuroCollege;
- 2005 *Nationalism and Ethnopolitics*, Political Science Department Tartu University;
- 2007 *Natsionalism ja etnopolitika (Nationalism and Ethnopolitics)*, Political Science Department Tartu University;
- 2007 *Keel, identiteet ja rahvusriik (Language, identity and nation state)*, Political Science Department Tartu University;
- 2011 *Nationalism and Ethnopolitics*, Tartu University EuroCollege.
- 2016 *Migration and Human Resources in the Era of Globalization*, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, Tartu University

List of publications:

Monographs or chapters in monographs:

- Kallas, K. (2012). “Monitoring integration in Estonia”, *Measuring and monitoring immigrant integration in Europe*. Rob Bijl and Arjen Verweij (Ed.). The Netherlands Institute for Social Research;
- Kallas, K. & Kaldur, K. (2010). “Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament”, *Inclusion And Exclusion Of Young Adult Immigrants: Barriers and Bridges*. Katrine Fangen, Kirsten Fossan and Ferdinand Andreas Mohn (Ed.). London: Ashgate;
- Pettai, V. & Kallas, K. (2009). “Estonia: conditionality amidst a legal straight-jacket”, *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, Bernd Rechel (Ed.). Bases/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies.

Other research publications:

- Kallas, K. (2016). 'Claiming the diaspora: Russia's compatriot policy and its reception by Estonian-Russian population', (forthcoming) *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE)*, Vol 16, Issue 3 on November 2016
- Kallas, K; & Kivistik, K. (2015). "Kodakondsus, poliitiline enesemäärang ja osalemine" /Citizenship, political identity and participation/. *Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2015 /Estonian society integration monitoring 2015/*. Balti Uuringute Instituut.
- Kallas, K. (2014). "Etnicheskaya politika v stranakh Baltii" /*Ethnic Politics in Baltic States*/, a book review, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Volume 45, Issue 4.
- Kallas, K. ja Marju Lauristin (2008). "Mitte-eestlaste osalemine Eesti ühiskondlikus elus ja poliitikas" /Participation of Non-Estonians in Society and Politics/, *Eesti Inimarengu Aruanne 2008 /Estonian Human Development Report 2008/*. Ühiskondliku Leppe Sihtasutus: Tallinn.
- Kallas, K (2008). "Õiguslik-poliitiline integratsioon" /Legal-political Integration/. *Riikliku Integratsiooniprogrammi 2008–2013 vajadus- ja teostatavusuuringute lõpparuanne /Final Report of the Needs Assessment of Estonian National Integration Programme 2008–2013/*. Lauristin, M. & Vihalemm, T. (Ed.). Integratsiooni SA: Tallinn.

Conference papers:

- Kallas, K. (2014). *Citizenship policy as a tool of social inclusion and exclusion in post-communist nation-building in Estonia*, paper presented at the conference "Inclusive Society", 6–7 October 2014, Collegium Civitas, Warsaw.
- Kallas, K. (2010). *Ethnopolitical paradigm shifts in multinational states. The case of Estonia*. Paper presented at 6th CEU Conference in Social Sciences "Social Science Perspectives on Global Transformations and Social Change", 16–18 April, 2010, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.

Other relevant publications:

- Kallas, K., Pohla, T. (2014). *Sisseränne Eestisse 2008–2013 /Immigration into Estonia/*. Riigikogu Toimetised, RiTo 29.
- Kallas, K., Kaldur, K. (Ed.) (2014). *Ussisserändajate kohanemine Eestis: valikud ja poliitikaettepanekud tervikliku ja jätkusuutliku süsteemi kujundamiseks /Adaptation of newly Arrived Immigrants into Estonian Society: Policy choices for development of coherent and sustainable system/* Balti Uuringute Instituut/Riigikantselei.
- Kallas, K. (2013). *A New Era in Integration Policies in Europe?* In *Immigration in Times of Emigration. Challenges and Opportunities of Migration and Mobility in the Baltic Sea Region* Anna Horgby and Veronica Nordlund (Ed.), Global Utmaning.

- Kallas, K., Kaldur, K., Raudsepp, M., Roosalu, T., Aavik, K. (Ed.) (2013). *Võrdse kohtlemise edendamine ja teadlikkus Eestis /Awareness and advancing of equal treatment in Estonia/*. Balti Uuringute Instituut.
- Kallas, K., Plaan, K., Mihkelsoo, I. (2013). *Lõimuv Eesti 2000–2011. Integratsiooni monitooringute analüüs. /Integrating Estonia 2000–2011. Analysis of Integration Monitoring Studies/*. Balti Uuringute Instituut/ Kultuuriministeerium
- Kallas, K. (2013). *Ülevaade lõimumisvaldkonna indikaatoritest Eestis, Euroopa Liidus ja valikus liikmesriikides /Overview of integration policy indicators in Estonia, European Union and selected Member States/* Policy Briefing Series No. 3/2013. Balti Uuringute Instituut/Kultuuriministeerium
- Kallas, K. et al (2010). *Is Discrimination an Issue? Young Immigrants in Labour Market in Seven European Countries*. EUMARGINS Policy Brief No. 3, University of Oslo
- Kallas, K. & Kaldur, K. (Ed.) (2008). *Integration Policies and Measures: Case Study of Good Practices in Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain*. Integration Foundation: Tallinn.
- Kallas, K. (2007). *Minorities in Transition: A Force Forward Rather than Backward. Regional workshop report*. ICDT & IBS, Budapest & Tartu.

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- (2) Kesk-Euroopa Ülikool, 2002, Budapest, MA Kesk-Euroopa ajalugu
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Töökogemus:

- (1) Alates 2015 Tartu Ülikooli Narva kolledž, direktori kohusetäitja
- (2) 2007–2015 Balti Uuringute Instituut, juhatuse liige. Tööülesanded: Eestisest ja rahvusvaheliste poliitikaanalüüsi ja uurimisprojektide algatamine ja läbiviimine sotsiaal-majandusliku arengu, integratsiooni, migratsiooni, demokraatia ja kodanikuühiskonna arendamine EL naaberriikides valdkondades.
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- (5) 2002–2006 suhtekorraldusfirma Hill & Knowlton Eesti. Vanemkonsultant Euroopa Liidu avalikkussuhete ja avaliku sektori sotsiaalse kommunikatsiooni alal.
- (6) 1998–2002 SA Archimedes, EL Teadus- ja Arendustegevuse 5. Raamprogrammi kontaktisik.

Muu tööalane kogemus:

- Alates 2015 Eesti Integratsiooni ja Migratsiooni Sihtasutuse nõukogu esimees.
- 2014 märts-juuni OSCE valimisvaatlusmissioon Ukrainas, erakorralised presidendivalimised, pikaajaline vaatleja.
- 2014 oktoober OSCE valimisvaatlusmissioon Ukrainas, erakorralised parlamendivalimised, lühiajaline vaatleja.
- 2014–2015 Eesti humanitaarabi projekti vabatahtlik koordinaator Ukraina sõjapõgenikele Donetskis, Luhanskis ja Zaporžžja oblastites.
- Alates 2005. aastast olen töötanud projektide hindamise eksperdina erinevate Euroopa Komisjoni programmide juures (5. Raamprogramm, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme, Europea for Citizens Programme) ning Eestis Integratsiooni Sihtasutuse, Kodanikuühiskonna Sihtkapitali ja Avatud Eesti Fondi programmides.

Teaduslik ja arendustegevus:

1. Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad: natsionalism ja rahvusriikide kujunemine; etniline identiteet; sotsiaalne sidusus ja integratsioon; rahvusvähemuste õigused; keele- ja kodakondsuspoliitika.
2. Olulisimad uurimistoetused ja stipendiumid:
 - (1) Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2015 (2014–2015). Uurimisprojekti raames viidi läbi elanikkonna küsitlus (valim 1200) ja kvalitaatiivuuring (personaalintervjuud, fookusgrupiintervjuud). Roll: projekti juht ja peatüki autor. Publikatsioon: Kallas, K. & Kivistik, K. (2015). Kodakondsus ja poliitiline osalemine. Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring. Raivo Vetik & Kristina Kallas (toim), Balti Uuringute Instituut.
 - (2) EUMARGINS (2008–2011). *On the Margins of European Community: Young Adult Immigrants in Seven European Countries*. Eesti partner oli IBS. Roll: Eesti uurimismeeskonna juht (5 uurijat); poliitikaanalüüsi töörühma juht. Publikatsioon: Kallas, K. and Kaldur, K. (2010). “Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament”, *Inclusion And Exclusion Of Young Adult Immigrants: Barriers and Bridges*. Katrine Fangen, Kirsten Fossan, Ferdinand Andreas Mohn (toim). London: Ashgate.

Õppetöö:

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- 2004 Nationalism and Nation-building, EuroKolledž, Tartu Ülikool;
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2007 Keel, identiteet ja rahvusriik, magistrkursus, Riigiteaduste Instituut, Tartu Ülikool;
2011 Nationalism and Ethnopolitics, EuroKolledž, Tartu Ülikool.
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Monograafiad või nende osad:

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