

University of Tartu  
Institute of History and Archaeology  
Department of General History

Marko Rasin

**The Chivalric Honour and Dishonour in Context of Descriptions of Capture and Captivity in  
Froissart's Chronicles**

Master's Thesis

Advisor: Anti Selart, PhD

Tartu 2015

# Contents

<b>Contents</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.1. Chivalry and Honour</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.2. Subject and Methodology</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1.3. Sources</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.4. Historiography</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>2. Courage and Prowess: Honour of the Field</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2.1. Cowardice to courage</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2.2. Honourable Retreat and Justifications of Flight</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>2.3. Prowess and Chivalric Warfare</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>2.4. Glory and Wisdom</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>3. Mercy, Largesse and Word: Honour in Chains, Home and Law</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3.1. Mercy and Honour of the Defeated</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3.2. Oaths of Surrender: The Role of a Knight's Word</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>3.3. Escape, Rescue and Possible Oath-Breaking</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>3.4. Loyalty and Treason: Questions of Oath and Allegiance</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>3.5. Largesse and Honour</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>3.6. Ransoming, Chivalry and Greed</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>4. Conclusion</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>5. Bibliography</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>6. Resümee</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>7. Appendix</b>	<b>63</b>

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Chivalry and honour

Chivalry and honour, a direct link exists between them two. In chivalric mind only nobility could be truly honourable and honour became one of the primary qualities of chivalry. Still questions can be asked what them too are and both can have different meanings then they had in times of yore. Chivalry is often used as a synonym for gracious behaviour, be kind and help someone, especially a woman and she might comment that chivalry isn't dead, reflecting the more romantic ideas of brave and noble knights with their shining armour and white horses. Still chivalry wasn't a romantic myth but rather something that can be seen as one of the central ideas of Middle Ages. A person with minimal knowledge of that period can probably think of knights, castles, tournaments and crusades, being also able to see the true heart of chivalry, but perhaps not recognize: the skill in arms and being warriors. In the end there are many views on knights and chivalry in the popular culture, some following the romantic ideal picture, others taking an opposite direction that is even more violent and warlike than the very actual chivalry was. Most of views from the popular culture consist of grains of truth, but rarely the whole picture.

What was chivalry then? Maurice Keen has defined chivalry has a code and culture of a martial estate that regarded war as a hereditary profession.<sup>1</sup> This is perhaps the simplest and most condensed way of defining chivalry and culture around it. The word chivalry itself comes from French *chevalerie*, which comes *chevalier* and has its origins in its word for riding, making a connection with chivalry and its origins and purpose in mounted combat. The origins of chivalry may have been modest, earlier mentions of terms *milites* and *cnicht* being more connected to a group of mounted warriors that were bound to their lords service. Over time their vocation became connected with nobility and aristocracy, becoming the knight and chivalric culture that is most seen when studying medieval history, Keen listing the time of its existence being roughly from twelfth to sixteenth century,<sup>2</sup> from the time the “mounted warriors” became like knight and chivalry that its known for the rest of the Middle Ages and until the changes in warfare and perhaps culture in general ended its age. In all of this the connection between combat and chivalry can be clearly seen and indeed combat and war were the primary interest to the members of knighthood. Its not wrong

---

1 Keen, Chivalry, 263

2 Ibid, 3

to call chivalry a warrior culture and this leads to the matters of honour and dishonour.

The word honourable is often linked to good and decent behaviour, but its a concept than just that . In the widely used words of anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers honour is defined as following: *Honour is the value of a person in its own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.*<sup>3</sup> As such the concept of honour is strongly affected by society, which is considered acceptable or worthy in one might be seen as a shameful act in another. In Chivalric culture, honour held a central importance, reputation and recognition being an important part of nobleman's life. There were a number of social norms and ideals a knight was expected to follow to be respected all while avoiding shame, humiliation or loss of eyes in front of other members of nobility. The rest of knighthood served an important role in a knight's way to reputation and recognition, because the main word about which actions were considered honourable or shameful were the knight's peers. In essence he both competed with the rest of knighthood for honour and recognition, while they were also a source of them.<sup>4</sup> This gives an unsurprising competitive view to chivalric culture, showing that by large the that reputation and recognition were the main drive for chivalry.

## 1.2. The subject and methodology

I have to admit that despite being interested in history and middle ages, the knights and chivalry weren't never among my preferred subjects and when younger I all too often found myself critical towards them, mostly seeing them in their arrogant, foolhardy and honour-obsessed misconception, although the latter word or definition actually fits chivalry. Perhaps my earlier views and thoughts were the reason why I decided to write my thesis on matters of chivalry and honour, as they actually felt something I had held some distance from. Over some time and planning the subject which had originally been "*The Concept of Honour and Dishonour in the Chivalric Culture in the basis of the Hundred Years War chronicles* ," found its focus in the first book of Froissart's chronicle and his descriptions of cases of capture and captivity, making them the way how I started discussing the nature of chivalric culture and its sense of honour. A lot is written and studied about chivalry, Hundred Years War (or rather Wars), matters of honour or Froissart's chronicle. The purpose of my thesis is perhaps not to discover something new, it would be hard to do so, but rather

<sup>3</sup> Pitt-Rivers, Julian. Honour and social status. 24

<sup>4</sup> Taylor, Chivalry and Ideals of Knighthood, 57

study and discuss chivalric culture and the importance of honour in it, trying to offer new viewpoints, widen and deepen the discussion about the subject and perhaps find some smaller details that may have been unseen before. As Keen, Kaueper and several other medieval historians have noted, despite the basis and major themes being well known and covered, there is still enough to be found and discussed to last for a few centuries.<sup>5</sup> So I hope that my paper will be useful in continuing and advancing the discussions about chivalric culture, and perhaps serve as an inspiration and a stepping stone for some other works. In more local matters this thesis becomes valuable because as far as I now there are few papers written about Western European chivalry, most of studied that touch the matters of knighthood being mostly linked to studies about Northern of Baltic Crusades and the local Military Orders. Only true connection between the events in Baltics and the Hundred Years War being the *Reisen* in Prussia and Lithuania, that a considerable amount of English and French knights visited.

Considering chivalric honour being essentially reputation and recognition, his standing among his peers and brothers-in-arms, what can there be discussed? First is the question *what were the sources of chivalric honour but also dishonour?* This question is greatly about things that could grant recognition, both positive and negative. This question also touches on keeping or preserving one's honour. The second direction is more about practicality and pragmatism, if put in a form of question, it would be: *Was there actually any dishonour and how rigid or flexible was the chivalric sense of honour?* It would be hard to believe that the concept of honour ruled chivalry so much that it would have overruled more practical applications to war and other issues. Was dishonour just a limited concept left only describing especially shameful and despicable acts, or did wrongful actions still matter and affect the knights social standing? This question also touches on the fact that how flexible the chivalric codes of honour were, how could possibly dishonourable actions be justified, perhaps even turned even acceptable. The last thought about the matter is the usage of reputation. *Was honour "used" in some way, how could it have been helpful?* Reputation can affect in many ways as does the wish to gain its positive aspect and avoid the negative. How much knightly honour itself was used, was it just how a knight was respected and seen in chivalric society or could it have affected his life or mattered in some ways more? These questions might seem generic, yet they allow the throughout observation of the subject and can lead to both other questions. A little side question is the nature of the exemplary chapter, that is discussed under the sources used, it offers both material and focus to some parts of the paper, but its mostly just a case among other. Still its interesting nature deserves some observation.

---

5 Kaueper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*, 126

Discussing these matters through Froissart's descriptions of cases of capture and captivity offers an interesting viewpoint to the question. In addition to them other descriptions and works of other chroniclers are used to offer comparisons and additional information. Cases of capture being situations where a knight or squire is captured in a combat or other similar situation, the act of combat being the part of the case. Cases involving captivity are mostly about treatment of prisoners, events happening during it and termination of the captivity, in whatever way it happens (release, escape, execution). Although informative, since capturing and ransoming noble prisoners was a major part of chivalric warfare, this viewpoint also creates limitations, when trying to make a throughout discussion about matters of battlefield and everyday life. The study is written in two major parts, first considering honour questions on the field and the second outside of it, discussing the subject through all these aspects of chivalric mind.

### 1.3. Sources

The primary source used in this thesis is the Book I (covers time period from 1322-1377) of *Froissart's chronicles (Chronicle of Jean Froissart)*, one of the most known and through chronicles about the Hundred Years War. Written by a contemporary secular clerk named Jean Froissart. Based on works of Jean le Bel, Chandos Herald and information gathered from heralds and memories of various persons he interviewed, his chronicle contains a massive amount of information about the Anglo-French conflict.<sup>6</sup> Still its not the account of events that makes his chronicle so useful, there are a considerable amount of mistakes and inaccuracies in his chronicles, enough to question the reliability of his texts. On the other hand its the intention and way how he writes that is important. Because wanting to offer an inspiration for his readers to do great deeds, Froissart opens a window into the mind of his contemporary nobility, what were their values and how they wanted to see themselves. Even besides that Froissart's love of detail offers a considerable amount of information, even about the less than inspiring material in warfare, what still might have been.<sup>7</sup> There are a number of descriptions that involve knights being captured or involve captivity in some form, often there is only a mention given, but others get a line or two. King Jean II is probably the one with the longest as being also perhaps the most illustrious and well known case of capture in the chronicle and in history of the Hundred Years War. Some members of knighthood on both sides managed to be captured several times, in some cases this leading to further complications for the prisoner.

<sup>6</sup> Curry, Anne. *The Hundred Years War*, 7-8

<sup>7</sup> Fowler, Kenneth. *Froissart, Chronicler of Chivalry*. *History Today* 36, issue 5, 50-54

Others involve some event in captivity which can include honouring the prisoner or are about the end of the captivity, perhaps touching some other matter in chivalric culture.

Among the descriptions of capture and captivity is a interesting chapter<sup>8</sup> in Froissart's description of the battle of Poitiers. Beings et after the main description of the battle, French knight Oudart de Renty and a squire Jean de Helennes are shown fleeing from the battle. These are two separate descriptions, but share a similar element, they both discover that they are being pursued by an English knight and decide to fight, managing to defeat, capture and ransom him. All this getting a rather clear and through description. Froissart typically describes heroic deeds to inspire future generations, but something in these two cases of French knightly success, while the France had suffered a devastating defeat. Is there any grain of truth in this event? Geoffery le Baker's chronicle offers an conflicting description of Maurice de Berkeley's capture, showing the knight being captured by a force of numbers and maybe in a different point in battle,<sup>9</sup> the only thing that can be confirmed being that the knight was captured and wounded in Poitiers.<sup>10</sup> But as stated, when discussing chivalric culture, the way how Froissart writes is more important than the accuracy of it. Considering chivalric culture there are two ways how this chapter can be viewed. First as a example for knighthood what courage and prowess can accomplish even on a lost day and second being perhaps Froissarts attempt to show the French chivalry in a better light in a lost battle. Anyway this and the way how many aspects of chivalric warfare can be seen in it, I am using the term exemplary chapter when discussing or using the descriptions of those two cases.

The other chronicles are used for comparison or finding additional information. Chandos Herald offers the *Life of The Black Prince*. Events in the “Edwardian” war (1337-1360) are described the Najera campaign gets a longer overview. The Heralds writing is not so much a chronicle but a eulogy to two great knights: The Black Prince and John Chandos. *Geoffery Le Baker's Chronicle* also has a strong emphasis of the life of the Black Prince and end with descriptions of the Battle of Poitiers. It occasionally gives off a strong Pro-English feel, especially when describing French kings as usurpers or describing the Anglo-French conflict, his writings perhaps influenced by the claim on French throne by Edward III. Both chronicles although informative, don't offer a similar view to chivalric culture as Froissart's writings do, but seem to be considered more accurate as historical sources. Lastly Enguerrand de Monstrelet intended to continue Froissart's work, writing in a similar style and wanting to describe the deeds of all who

<sup>8</sup> I have added the chapter to the appencix of this thesis

<sup>9</sup> Le Baker, Geoffery, Chronicle, 78

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.thepeerage.com/p2570.htm#i25699> 18.04.15

were involved, offering a view into the second half of the Hundred Years War, his work being continued by other authors while using his name. There are of course more chronicles talking about the Hundred Years War, like Jean le Bel who was a source for Froissart and covers time from the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century to the Treaty of Bretigny. In addition to chronicles there are two chivalric handbooks that also offer a view into the knightly mind. The contemporary to the Hundred Years War is the Book of Chivalry (*Livre de Chevalerie*), written by the knight Geoffroy de Charny, the handbook was probably meant to teach young members of the Company of The Star and in general meant to reform French chivalry than he and Jean II saw having failed from its former glory, because nobility had become too lazy and greedy. For Charny the capacity and deeds on the battlefield are the primary concern and source of worth. Being a contemporary practitioner of chivalry, he offers the view into the preferences and actual ideals of the knighthood, while trying to keep them practical as possible. If anything can be said about Charny, it seems that he lived up to what he wrote to his book. Ramon Llull's "*The Book of The Order of Chivalry (Llibre qui es de l'ordre de cavalleria)*" is a similar treatise, although perhaps with stronger religious tones are more idealising than Charny's closer to the ground work.

#### **1.4. Historiography**

There are a considerable amount of books, articles and papers on matters of Medieval culture, history and chivalry, but a more limited amount when discussion directly chivalric culture itself. I will be concentrating on some of the primary studies of chivalric culture and those that I have managed to have some contact with and what are available in English. There is a considerable amount of research available in German and French languages, but because of limited linguistic capacity in those languages, I'm limited to the materials available in English. Also since I'm concentrated on secular aspects of chivalric culture, the materials about crusading are not touched here. The heart or core of chivalry, especially in the form it was in medieval England, France (and Burgundy) seems to have been deeply studied, all major parts covered, but there is more than enough room for different viewpoints and smaller works in the matter.

Johan Huizinga's *Autumn of the Middle Ages* (in some versions *Waning of the Middle Ages*) is probably the book that started studies about chivalric culture, serving as a starting point and inspiration of many. Although some of the ideas given there about chivalric culture, especially touching chivalric display can still be considered when discussing chivalric culture, his view that chivalry



was mostly a façade, a coping mechanism to late medieval nobility to tolerate the grimness of their lives has been refuted, by studies that show Chivalry as a far deeper cultural phenomenon.

Maurice Keen has contributed a lot into the study of medieval culture, especially the subject of chivalry. His first book “*Laws of War in Late Middle Ages*” offers a through overview of the “law of arms” in 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century Western Europe. Discussing the conduct of war, ransoming, allegiance and legal cases involving them, Keen shows how much of that was based around the concept of sworn word of a nobleman. His study has been a valuable contribution referenced and used in other studies about chivalric culture. Throughout his life and career Keen has written several more books on Middle Ages. *Chivalry* is perhaps the best overview of chivalric culture, although not going deep into every aspect of chivalry, it gives a considerable amount of information about it, giving a clear view what it was and serves as an excellent starting point for studying or researching chivalry.

From other works that offer a general overview about knighthood and chivalry, Richard Barber's *Knight and Chivalry* and Malcolm Vale's *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy in The End of The Middle Ages*. Can be brought up. Although covering less subject than Keen's work, Barber's book offers an decent overview of history of chivalry, while Vale's book talks less about chivalric culture and more about tournament warfare in 15<sup>th</sup> century, offering views into that subject

Considering how much about chivalry can be learned from Froissart's chronicle that at some times touches the borders of chivalric literature, how much can be found from other writings, more or less fictional? Richard W. Kaeper's *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* examines the connection between medieval nobility and chivalric literature, finding that even more fictional narratives as a source of studying the chivalric mentality, carrying among heroic fiction a considerable amount of what knightly mind could have found acceptable or worthy. Several other books and studies offer different insights to chivalry. D'Arcy Jonathan Boulton's *Knights of The Crown* offers the history of chivalric orders and different obligations and traditions in them. Matthew Strickland's *War and Chivalry: The conduct and perception of war in England and Normandy*, although concentrating on earlier times than 14<sup>th</sup> century, his works give an excellent overview of chivalric culture and how it acted in warfare.

The last years have given perhaps few most thorough studies about chivalric culture. The

first being *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England 1066-1500* an overview of English knighthood, chivalric culture and its history, while the second can be perhaps considered one of the best studies in chivalry and its values is *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War*. It combines a massive amount of earlier information into a single book that gives an overview of French chivalry in late middle ages. Although concentrated of French chivalry it offers a considerable amount of information about chivalric culture, its ideals, values and how they applied to the conduct in life and war for Western European knighthood in general.

There are other books and works about the subject but those are books that are most strongly about chivalric culture and its sense of the world. Overall most studies acknowledge chivalry as a form of aristocratic culture in middle ages.

## 2. Courage and Prowess: Honour on the Field

### 2.1. Cowardice to Courage

The exemplary chapter begins with descriptions of Oudart de Renty<sup>11</sup>, a French knight who is fleeing from the lost battle of Poitiers (1356). In a similar way is also shown Jean de Helennes a squire who has quitted the king's battalion and having gotten a horse, is also trying to get away from the victorious English. Both men find themselves being pursued by a English knight and decide to attack their pursuer, managing to defeat and capture him.<sup>12</sup> Its not hard see to some kind of morale behind these descriptions, as a possible example of what courage and prowess can accomplish even in a lost battle. In a simpler sense it can be seen as a description of how courage defeats cowardice. Bravery or rather courage was often seen among highest qualities of chivalry and perhaps its the one ideal that is the same or very similar in actual chivalry and the common modern understanding of it. On the other hand its opposite cowardice was unsurprisingly among things to be avoided to prevent shame and dishonour.<sup>13</sup> In a way it seems that if anything was truly dishonourable then it was cowardice or fleeing from battle.

But what meant courage and its opposite in chivalric culture overall? Courage itself while being a knightly ideal was also considered to be among Christian virtues. Earlier church writers considered it to be a part or aspect of the virtue fortitude (*fortitudo*). Thomas Aquinas made a stronger step towards defining the nature of courage, describing its primary aspect as moderating fear and boldness for common good and seeing promotion of fearlessness and bravery as a secondary aspect.<sup>14</sup> Such was the view of church authors, but what ere the view of chivalric authors? Many of them praised it as one of the most necessary traits for a knight. Ramon Llull in his *Book of The Order of Chivalry* makes it a part of the very nature of a knight, when giving his fictional origin of the knighthood, he talks about people being separated to groups of thousand and from a being chosen one person with necessary qualities, courage being one of them.<sup>15</sup> When discussing matters further the author stresses the necessity of courage to the knight, even stating that a knight who leaves his liege on the battlefield, because he gives in to fear, is not worthy of being a knight.<sup>16</sup> Geoffroi de Charny, a contemporary of the Hundred Years War shares the view in his *Livre*

---

11 In some translations and versions his surname is Roucy, or Rency.

12 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

13 Contamine, War in The Middle Ages, 253

14 Ibid, 250-251

15 Llull, Ramon, [www.rgle.org.uk/Llull\\_B\\_C.htm](http://www.rgle.org.uk/Llull_B_C.htm) 13.04.151

16 ibid

*de Chevaliere* also lists courage and boldness among the traits necessary to be a worthy man-at-arms.<sup>17</sup> Both men were practising knights themselves had a grasp of actual values or opinions in the knighthood. Charny himself is shown living up to his ideas in Froissart's chronicle, in his decision to fight the English forces after the failed infiltration of Calais(1349) that lead to his capture<sup>18</sup> or his death in Poitiers, where he is killed while carrying the royal flag *Oriflamme*.<sup>19</sup> In fact, when describing events in Calais, Foissart gives a reflection of the chivalric view of courage and cowardice, Charny's decision to stay and fight is met by English praise, with following words given to them: "*By St. George,*" said some of the English, who were near enough to hear it, "*you speak truth: evil befall him who thinks of flying.*"<sup>20</sup>

To show bravery in front of great danger, overwhelming odds or in certain defeat were something chivalric writers loved to show chivalric bravery, straight to the Song of Roland.<sup>21</sup> Oudart de Renty and Jean de Helennes might find their courage, but the most credit of bravery among the French in Poitiers gets Jean II. Froissart describes the king bravely fighting until the end of the battle, stating that if a quarter of his forces would have fought like he did, the day had been his.<sup>22</sup> Might this be a stab at French knights who had retreated from battle or just kind words about a monarch that most both a battle and his freedom? Jean II unwillingness to retreat from battle is even mentioned by Le Baker, although he does make it less about bravery and more about overconfidence.<sup>23</sup> Did the king choose to stay on the battlefield because of his courage or did he get no chance to leave from the battlefield. Historians generally believe that Jean II decided to not flee because of his promotion of highest ideals, although there is some thought that his resentment towards his father might have influenced his decision to stay on the field.<sup>24</sup> Of course he is not the only king Jean who becomes an example of courage in Froissart's writings. In Crecy(1346), Jean de Luxembourg, the blind king of Bohemia decides to participate in the battle despite his disability. Two of his kings bind him and his horse between them and they enter the fight, doing great deeds until being overwhelmed and killed, while Charles the king's son is shown to pull his forces out and retreat.<sup>25</sup> There are two things that Froissart doesn't mention, first Le Bel's mention of the knights

---

17 Charny, Geoffroi. *Book of Chivalry*, 84

18 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap150.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html) 09.04.15

19 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

20 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap150.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html) 09.04.15

21 Taylor, Craig . *Military Courage and Fear in the Late Medieval French Chivalric Imagination*. *Journal of Medieval and Humanistic Studies*, 129

22 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

23 Le Baker, Geoffery. *Chronicle*, in Barber, *The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince*, 78

24 Boulton, D'Arcy, Jonathan, Dacre. *Knights of the Crown, The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe*, 168-169

25 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap129.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap129.html) 11.04.15

helping their sovereign on pain of death,<sup>26</sup> but also the fact that the king might have chosen that action because his own shameful retreat earlier in the battle of Vottem (1346)<sup>27</sup> Both kings seem to have come to face with the shame of cowardice, one Jean wanting to avoid it and the other wanting to redeem his and perhaps his lines name.

This leads to the question, was cowardice the greatest source of dishonour in chivalric culture? Certainly there existed strong views against it and clear connections with shame. When looking at the case of Oudart de Renty this element of that can be seen in the words given of his pursuer: "*Sir knight, turn about: you ought to be ashamed thus to fly.*" Hearing these words is enough for the knight to attack his pursuer.<sup>28</sup> This is not the only case where the connection of cowardice and shame is brought up in a confrontation. If Froissart is to be believed, the successful French military commander Bertrand du Guesclin managed to gain freedom thanks to hinting at his captors, the Black Prince's lack of courage. The chronicler describes the former in a situation where he was imprisoned by the English and because his advisers council, the Prince was not granting him a change of ransom. In one of their conversations the French commander makes a comment that although being imprisoned, he is enjoying being the most honourable knight in the world, explaining that in France and other countries people were talking that the prince is so afraid of him that he is not wanting to set him free. The latter feeling ashamed, sets a high ransom to him.<sup>29</sup> Du Guesclin himself had to defend his honour before the battle of Najera(1367). After his plan to wait with the battle and let famine weaken Black Prince's forces was ignored by the Spanish he was also accused in cowardice although a skilled commander, Du Guesclin took a prominent position on the battlefield to prove him not being a coward.<sup>30</sup> These cases certainly give a strong view how much stigma carried the notion of being considered a coward among knighthood. Apparently it could have been enough to have princes and commanders to bad military decisions as its also believed that Philippe VI might had to order the premature attack in the battle of Crecy<sup>31</sup>

The knighthood's strong rejection of cowardice was also reflected in medieval culture in general, even church literature that was usually wary about the more warlike chivalric ideals, used the image of a fleeing knight to illustrate the vice of cowardice.<sup>32</sup> Froissart is usually subtle about

---

26 Le Bel, Jean. *Chronicles of Jean le Bel*. Contemporary chronicles of The Hundred Years War, 73

27 Taylor. Craig D. *Military Courage and Fear in the Late Medieval French Chivalric Imagination*, 130

28 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

29 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_226-250/fc\\_b1\\_chap244.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_226-250/fc_b1_chap244.html) 20.04.15

30 Taylor. *Chivalry and Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War*, 134

31 *ibid*

32 Lynch, Andrew. *Chivalric cowardice and Arthurian narrative*, 2

such issues, unless its necessary to bring out something important to preserve or show the honour of the people present. A comparison of two cases with fleeing knights being captured carry a considerably different message. The case of Vauflart de la Croix might be a moment where knightly cowardice is brought up and judged by the chronicler. The knight's capture is preceded by him being cut from the rest of French forces and decides to save him by taking a separate route hiding in the marshes until the battle was over. Although attempting to hide, he was found by the French who gave him over to Philippe VI, the latter deciding to give him over to the people of Lisle, who decided to execute him.<sup>33</sup> Interestingly, there seems to be an alternate description of it in the Rome manuscript that describes the captors executing him, because they weren't willing to ransom such a coward.<sup>34</sup> Can it be in this case a hidden morale picked or written as such by Froissart to denounce such action? After a battle near Caen, Froissart describes English forces slaughtering the retreating French. Two knights, identified as constable of France (Raoul II de Brienne, Count of Eu) and earl of Tancerville are shown hiding under the bridge, worried that they would be killed by commoners, who wouldn't know to spare them because not knowing who they are and as such their value as prisoners. After seeing approaching a group of knights, lead by sir Thomas Holland who they knew from crusading, they decide to surrender to him.<sup>35</sup> The difference is simple, knighthood accepted both actions of falling in battle or being captured more acceptable than a cowardly flight.<sup>36</sup>

Dishonourable death can be seen in one of the chronicler's descriptions of events after the battle of Crecy, where a lost or late French force accidentally meet the English and soon after the fight has started decide to flee. There is no typical Froissart's statement how brave deeds were made, just a cold statement how many French were killed, their corpses left lying in the wilds and that the English would have killed a lot more if they would have had the chance.<sup>37</sup> Although death might have been a fitting punishment for cowardice in Froissart's pen or in chivalric literature, death could become very easily an fleeing soldiers fate, the largest amounts of casualties were among fleeing on the fact that it was easier to kill a opponent.<sup>38</sup> Keen has noted that extreme cases of cowardice could have been punished by death, but most men-at-arms could suffer *deshonouring*, typically as markings on their arms or reversing them in public places.<sup>39</sup> Perhaps the best way to observe such practices can be seen in obligations and punishments given to members of

33 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_051-075/fc\\_b1\\_chap058.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_051-075/fc_b1_chap058.html)

34 Taylor. Military courage and fear in late medieval French chivalric imagination, 6

35 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_101-125/fc\\_b1\\_chap123.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_101-125/fc_b1_chap123.html) 18.04.15

36 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap130.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap130.html) 09.04.15

37 *ibid*

38 Gillingham, Fontenoy and After: Pursuing Enemies to Death. Frankland, The Franks and the World of Early Middle Ages, 248

39 Keen, Chivalry, 175

monarchical orders of chivalry who were found guilty in dishonourable actions, in this case cowardly flight from battlefield. Such thing was done in the short-lived Company of The Star, that had a very specific obligation to its members. No member of the order could retreat more than 4 arpents (6 acres from a battle), failing in it the member was suspended his, arms displayed reversed and he could be expelled if he didn't manage to clear his name.<sup>40</sup> From later stages of war other examples can be found, one of the most known Sir John Fastolf's retreat in the battle of Patay in 1429. The battle was a loss to the English, with Monstrelet describing the English commander fleeing from the battle without striking a blow and for that being suspended from the Order of The Garter.<sup>41</sup>

Froissart makes little notion of fear of knights being wary or fearful of the dangers of warfare. Considering him to writing rather a example of great deeds for future knights, showing his brave examples feeling fear probably didn't belong in his intentions, neither would have wanted to see this patrons nor people in described there. In fact some of the persons interviewed by Froissart probably weren't willing to even make a mention of having felt fear or despair. Not to a chronicler and not to young members of their households, who yet had to learn the experience of war.<sup>42</sup> Froissart himself is listed as a example of chivalric chroniclers and literature in general who never discuss or mention fear directly.<sup>43</sup> His mentions being more subtle or rather directed at foes of his exemplary heroes, like descriptions how enemies are falling back in fear of some knights prowess or attacks. A mention of fear still comes up in the descriptions of great deeds or adventures, mostly in forms or some persons worry or wish to be avoiding some certain fate. When describing the imprisonment of Raymond d'Marneil, a knight who had switched from the English to the French, the knights situation is described by pitiful and great distress, because he knew that he will be given over to vengeful Edward III.<sup>44</sup> Froissart's preference to avoid direct mentions of things his readers might have been unwilling to admit doesn't mean that knighthood would have ignored the existence or feeling of fear. Richard Kaueper has argued that there is a considerable amount of chivalric literature where exist descriptions of knights feeling fear before battles.<sup>45</sup> More than often they accepted its presence, fully aware of the risks and dangers present on the battlefield. Charny is probably the best example, in his *Livre de Chevaliere* he touches on the aspect of fear and risks,

---

40 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, 196

41 Monstrelet, Enguerrand de. The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 306

42 Taylor. Military Courage and fear. Pg 4-5

43 Lynch, A. Beyond Shame: Chivalric cowardice and Arthurian narrative. Pg 1

44 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_276-300/cl\\_b1\\_chap293.htm](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_276-300/cl_b1_chap293.htm) 16.04.15

45 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence. Pg 155

encouraging young men-at-arms to overcome fear<sup>46</sup> Charny's view of overcoming the fear is a more practical and actual view. It can be argued that the very point of chivalric culture's condemnation of cowardice was to discourage it, by making the person who left the battle without fighting seem as shameful and dishonourable as possible.

In the end it can be argued that chivalric culture emphasized the shame of cowardice and importance of courage as a method of combating fear that members of knighthood. The first might be seen in cases such as Vaufart's possible ignoble death, but in general Froissart seems to prefer telling about heroes of "his age" or past to anyone who might come later. Many chivalric writers went that way, telling such tales with the intention to awaken courage and will for great deeds in their readers.<sup>47</sup> Froissart certainly has a lot of them, but this brings back the element of the exemplary chapter. Its not hard to argue that the element of courage plays a large role in this, certainly showing to members of knighthood what can be accomplished when not giving into fear. Can it go so far that it can be compared to Arthurian stories of a cowardly knight or handsome coward, where the latter discovers true value of chivalry?<sup>48</sup> Perhaps not, but the idea to look the descriptions having such cautionary nature is tempting. Together with Jean II bravery in not leaving the field it can be guessed that it might be written to lessen the effect of French failure in the battle of Poitiers. Although several questions can be asked about the connection of Exemplary chapter and matters of courage, one of them being were Oudart and Jean actually cowards who found or was there something justifiable in their retreat?

## **2.2. Honourable retreat and justifications of flight**

Although fleeing from battle was a shameful and dishonourable act, then it must be remembered that chivalry wasn't as foolhardy or empty-headedly brave as it has been sometimes mistakenly shown, there was the understanding that sometimes retreat or withdrawal is necessary, although in some cases it still carried the risk of invoking shame in the eyes of opponents and the knights themselves.<sup>49</sup> Looking at the exemplary chapter and the idea of it being about two knights finding their courage, their initial actions seem blatantly clear. But even then some facts must be considered, namely are the fleeing combatants actually fleeing or just retreating, is there any

---

46 Charny, *Book of Chivalry*, 62

47 Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood* 152

48 Lynch. *Beyond Shame: Chivalric cowardice and Arthurian narrative*. 8

49 Strickland, *Matthew. War and Chivalry*, 121



question of dishonour involved before the challenge or statement given by de Renty's pursuer? The question of if a knight can leave combat or his companions without any issues is clearly illustrated in the 13<sup>th</sup> century chronicler Jean de Joinville's work *Life of Saint Louis*. The chronicler describes a battle in the Seventh Crusade where he and other knights were being under a heavy attack, one of them a knight named Erard de Sivrey asked if he or his heirs would suffer any loss in any honour if we would leave them in attempt of trying to get help. Joinville describes himself stating that the danger that leaving and his success would have been a greater honour.<sup>50</sup> The problem faced by Erard de Sivrey might seem a weird one, why would even such question come up when the knight was planning to leave his companions only with the intention of getting help? It can be argued that in case if he had failed, some of his companions might have had thoughts that his only intention was to run away, but more important is the fact of this consideration existing. Chivalry seemed to accept the necessity, but also the existence of the question. Charny for example lists the knowledge to when and how honourably surrender or retreat among knowledge every good man-at-arms must know.<sup>51</sup>

There is one important fact that must be noted in the descriptions of the exemplary chapter, in both descriptions the flight seems to be happening after the end of the battle. The chapter itself is set after the description of the battle itself, neither of those events is shown in middle of battle, rather both knights are shown as stragglers that had managed to get away from main English host. In de Renty's case its learned that he had quitted the battle when it had become clear that the day was irrevocably lost and de Helennes having quit the king's division. At least in first case it could be considered that the flight could have happened in the end. This can be compared to the case in Caen. A usual medieval battle ended with a rout. This was a moment where the remaining armies morale broke and started a flight, on the same time being the most dangerous and lethal phase of the fight to the lost side.<sup>52</sup> As the constable and count de Tancerville after Caen, there might be the aspect of there be nothing wrong in their "cowardly actions" because the battle was already lost. In general retreating or fleeing from a certainly lost battle might have had very little reproach. For example the Knights of The Temple allowed its members to retreat without any reproach if there were no Christian banners left flying on the rallying point.<sup>53</sup> Chivalric writers took the stand in the form of showing the importance of having participated in battle, Christine de Pizan voiced his opinion about the matter that soldiers who flee without striking a blow should be punished.<sup>54</sup> The

50 Joinville, Jean de, *Life of Saint Louis*, 221

51 Charny, *Book of Chivalry*, 57

52 Gillingham, *Fontenoy and After, pursuing enemies to death*, 248

53 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 121

54 Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood*, 142

latter view being shared in Monstrelet's account of sir John Fastolf's actions. A bit opposite to such views feels the obligation of the order of the golden fleece that forbade its members to flee after they had unfurled their pennons.<sup>55</sup> Of course this might be a bit opposite but linked issue, with withdrawal being seen acceptable, until the knight hadn't given a sign that he is going to participate. But in general the feelings seem to have been towards that there is no reproach in fleeing from a lost battle.

Did king Jean II have a chance to actually retreat from the battle and in any reproach to his honour? The king's decision to stay on the battlefield has been criticised as much foolhardy as was the tactically harsh obligation given to the Company of The Star. There is actually something odd in that demand, considering that Charny himself brings up the importance of knowing when to honourably retreat in his writings.<sup>56</sup> In addition to his *Livre de chevalerie*, he himself was the person responsible for "building" the company, the question about honourable retreat was present also in the *Demandes*, one of his writings that was directly directed towards new members of the order, the answers to these questions aren't known and might have been just created for the members to read and think about chivalry.<sup>57</sup> But certainly it makes it seem rather odd. When looking at the obligation that states that knights were suspended, until they had their chance to explain and be judged, not expelled directly, it can be guessed that there might have been some less foolhardy aspect in it, but rather some acceptance of realities of warfare. Sadly because of the order's devastating defeat in the battle of Mauron (1352),<sup>58</sup> that was soon after its founding, there weren't probably any time to have meetings to discuss if a knight's flight had been justifiable or not. There is also almost nothing known about event in Mauron, with chroniclers making bare mention of it, stating only that the order found his end there.<sup>59</sup> Looking at the case of sir John Fastolf the fact that he was only temporarily suspended from the Order of The Garter, apparently having managed to explain the circumstances to Duke Bedford who at the moment was the Regent to Henry VI and leader on the English forces<sup>60</sup>

Although there is very little known of the decision that made Fastolf to leave the battle or why his actions were found right. Jean de Buleil praised him for saving his men from a devastating defeat while Jean de Waurin, one of his own subordinates describes the action taken more on the

---

55 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood 144

56 Charny, Book of Chivalry, 57

57 Boulton. Knights of the Crown, 186

58 *ibid*,

59 *ibid*

60 Dunn, Diana. War and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Britain. 124

pressure of his captains and sergeants.<sup>61</sup> Such comments of rulers and commanders being forced to leave the field because failure or cowardice of their men is a common thing in chivalric chronicles, this will be discussed below when discussing some retreats of rulers and princes. This is good when talking about matters of honourable retreat in matters of Jean II' father and heir. In a way the king's chivalric stand in battle is contrasted with the fact that his father had left the battle of Crecy and his eldest son Charles, duke of Normandy (future Charles V) had retreated with his brothers Louis and Jean from the battle of Poitiers. An question can be asked, was Jean II disturbed or angered by his sons actions?. At least Le Baker describes the King being angered and swearing an oath of not leaving the battlefield, although his description is more oriented towards king's overconfidence,<sup>62</sup> its an unsure idea, but certainly not impossible.. Combined with the strained relationship between Jean II and his father and blaming military failures on the French failure of chivalry,<sup>63</sup> might he have felt that his son by leaving had besmirched the family honour and as such he had to uphold it? Froissart is of another opinion of his family members. Already his source Le Bel mentions Philippe VI still trying to rally his forces, until being lead away by Jean de Hainault, who grabs his horse by its bridle, to fight and win another day.<sup>64</sup> This description also leads to a question that is important to consider when talking about honourable retreat, that being how possibly cowardly actions were turned more acceptable by the chroniclers, by offering justifications to it. Considering that it was less shameful to flee from a battle that was already lost, its hard to look Philippe VI retreat after his forces were broken, as something unreasonable. Considering Crecy being more lethal than most Anglo-French conflicts because giving quarter or surrendering may not have been a possibility.<sup>65</sup> He can be hardly blamed for deciding to retreat in such circumstances and probably grasped very well how much harm could his capture or death cause.

The cowardice or leaders of followers being to blame is also emphasized in Froissart's description of the retreat of his sons. Froissart makes it clear that the princes themselves might have wanted to fight, but being young they trusted too much the words and wisdom of older and more experienced knights who were fighting under their command. They had started worrying when saw the success of the English and as the chronicler describes them to think how they could save themselves from battle. They managed to persuade the princes to leave, who took some of their forces with them.<sup>66</sup> There is some both on the same conflict, but also connection with Le Baker's

---

61 Dunn, War and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Britain, 122

62 Le Baker, Chronicle, 78

63 Boulton, Knights of The Crown, 169

64 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

65 Beriac, Given-Wilson., Edward III and his Prisoners of War, 804

66 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

description of it, especially in the part that describes the Dauphin's forces being broken and forced to flee.<sup>67</sup> Did it happen in such way or can a combination of events be expected is good question. Although here can be seen something that was used by Waurin to justify Fastolf's retreat in Patay. Unlike that example, some of the of the men under the dauphin's command aren't dishonourable cowards either. Three knights are described as being responsible for getting the heir to safety: Jean de Landas, Theobald de Bodenay and a person referred just as lord of St. Venant. The first are shown helping the dauphin to get away from the battlefield and after sure of his safety decide to return to the battle. The third knight in question was left to guard the dauphin, with the former stating that in this way he will gain more in honour.<sup>68</sup> Certainly something that reflects the honour in actions of Erard de Sivrey, where leaving the battle because of a greater need, in his case getting help for his companions and in the case of "Lord of St.Venant" the protection of king's heir. In Froissart's description both knights return to the battle, Jean de Landas being listed as having fallen in battle. In addition there is a very specific comparison meeting the duke of Orleans who is described having quit the king's rear, his ranks full of knights and squires who had followed their leader, but would have rather died than suffered any reproach.<sup>69</sup>

In a interesting way both descriptions can be compared to Ramon Llull's comment connecting cowardice and lack of loyalty, how knights who give in to fear instead serving under their lieges banners not being worthy of the status of knighthood, that is mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. Jean de Hainault and the lords described when talking about Dauphin's retreat might be blamed in battlefield, but in the end they do it from loyalty to their lieges, finding their protection and safety more important than honour in the battlefield. Honour is also present among those who are in service of Duke of Orleans, their loyalty contrasting their lieges cowardice.

In many ways the questions of courage versus necessary retreat are complex. In the end it could be stated that fleeing without a good reason, it being either a battle lost without any possibility or recovery as can be possibly seen in the cases of the Exemplary chapter. Others might have been forced to this position or had to do it from necessity, loyalty perhaps being another way that could have made a retreat acceptable. Some return to the flight or retreat of Oudart de Renty is perhaps necessary. Is his flight to escape the English because he is wanting to avoid falling into their hands cowardly or would he had some good reasons to avoiding that?

---

67 Le Baker, Chronicle, 77

68 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

69 *ibid*

### 2.3. Prowess and Chivalric Warfare

There are reasons to see the exemplary chapter as an Froissart's attempt to show what courage and prowess can accomplish no matter the circumstances and certainly a lot can be said about the role of courage, but what about the other important quality? If courage is shown in the fact that the fleeing French decided to fight instead of continuing their flight, then prowess comes up in the descriptions how both men manage to defeat their enemies. Oudart de Renty manages to be better with a lance, unhorsing his opponent who falls on the ground stunned. Jean de Helennes both disarms his opponent and delivers a severe wound by thrusting his blade through Maurice de Berkeley's thighs.<sup>70</sup> Such descriptions are common in Froissart's chronicle, at some level they might feel like fillers of illustrations between accounts of actual events and indeed, most of them are the latter, a way to Froissart to describe the great deeds that he wrote to inspire future men-at-arms to great deeds, something he prefers to be describing over the accurate account of events. Illustrations or not, these still carry some considerable information about the primary source of honour in chivalric mind. As Froissart writes in the beginning of some versions of his chronicle: As firewood cannot burn without a flame, so cannot honour and glory cannot be gained without prowess.<sup>71</sup>

Prowess (*prouesse*) was a straightforward quality, it was the knight's strength and skill in combat, his ability to unhorse, wound or kill his opponent in a violent, physical contest.<sup>72</sup> Such views are also supported by chivalric writers, among them Charny being the one who draws the strongest connection between honour and prowess. In his *Livre de Chevaliere* he states how there are no bad deeds in arms, only good and better, although some are more honourable than others. This continues with a categorisation of them until he reaches statement that from the all, the deeds in war are the most honourable.<sup>73</sup> In a way even Lull's *Book of Order of chivalry* starts in a similar way, the hermit who teaches the young squire about the nature of knighthood is a former knight who chose seclusion because his age had him too weak to be a knight and as such he didn't want to dishonour his noble calling.<sup>74</sup> Both authors statements carry the message of importance of physical ability and skill on the knights part, with Charny going deep into the heart of chivalry. If the descriptions in the exemplary chapter would be looked through the lens of his writings then it could be stated that the knight's and squire's decision to fight instead of fleeing was honourable, but greater honour was the defeating of their opponents. Might there be seen the practical consideration

70 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

71 Froissart, *The Chronicles of Jean Froissart*, 88

72 Taylor, *Chivalry and ideals of knighthood*, 91

73 Charny, *Book of Chivalry*, 49

74 Lull, Ramon [http://www.rgle.org.uk/Llull\\_B\\_C.htm](http://www.rgle.org.uk/Llull_B_C.htm) 13.04.15

of getting rid of your pursuer to getting away? The importance of prowess as the primary source of honour creates some other interesting connections with other chivalric ideals such as loyalty or largesse, the first is showed in chivalric literature as a way of directing prowess to a right direction and allowing it to become honourable and the other being enabled by it.<sup>75</sup>

Whole reputations could be built with the help of skill in arms. Guillaume le Marechal (William Marshal) was a landless knight, but with his victories in tournaments had earned him enough renown that he was selected to be young Henry II teacher and the person who knighted him, the latter usually being a person with higher social standing, but his prowess and success managed to win him that position.<sup>76</sup> Its good to note here that the success that lead “The best knight in the world” there had very little to do with actual war, most of it was success on the tournament field, with a lucky chance that had brought him to the attention of the English royal house.<sup>77</sup> Such steep promotions were of course rare, but did happen. Bertrand du Guesclin, a relatively low-born Breton knight was made constable of France by Charles V.<sup>78</sup> Still through his successes Du Guesclin is considered among greatest commanders in The Hundred Years War, and person who managed to turn around France's military fortunes during the Caroline phase of war.<sup>79</sup> Although both men share in becoming defined among greatest knights of their time, it would be wrong to think that chivalric culture would had only worked on appreciation of skill in arms. Froissart describes Du Guesclin attempting to decline the offer on basis that he is not that rich or important enough, but doesn't manage to sway the king.<sup>80</sup> This was no humility or attempt to show Du Guesclin as such, the knight knew very well that higher ranking nobles might not accept him because of his lower status and might even resent for gaining a position usually reserved for more “illustrious” members of nobility.<sup>81</sup> Still those rare cases bring up the fact that recognition and renown gained through successes in battle could lead to promotions and possibilities.<sup>82</sup>

Returning to the accomplishments in exemplary chapter or rather in Froissart's chronicle, the depictions of prowess must be looked, especially those speaking of show of arms or success in combat. Considering the the fight between Jean de Helennes and Maurice de Berkeley as a show of French prowess in a battle that otherwise was lost, although Jean de Helennes is a clear winner, his

75 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence, 155

76 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 147-148

77 Duby, Guilaume le Marechal,

78 Jones, Michael. Letters, orders and musters of Bertrand du Guesclin, 1357-1380, Introduction xxi

79 *ibid*

80 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_276-300/cl\\_b1\\_chap291.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_276-300/cl_b1_chap291.html) 02.04.15

81 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood, 220

82 Saul, For Honour and Fame, 128

would-be captive is shown still attempting to get his sword he had lost in the squire's attack.<sup>83</sup> Is Froissart trying to make a statement that the knight would have been capable of fighting, lessening the blow on the knight's honour? Although there was always honour in fighting, the competitive aspects of prowess make it rather clear that loss could lead to some shame and dishonour, in the end the losing knight had proven himself to be less skilled and less capable than his opponent.<sup>84</sup> Froissart generally tries to show all participating sides as honourable as possible,<sup>85</sup> making the description of the knight trying to get his sword a little hint of his prowess and courage. The description of this fight becomes somewhat more interesting when comparing it with Le Baker's conflicting account of events. There the brave Maurice de Berkeley breaks his shield and weapons while fighting the fleeing dauphin's men and is taken down and captured by many while being horribly broken.<sup>86</sup> The chronicler's comment seems clear, one proud English knight of glorious lineage being more capable than many French, who in their lack of prowess needed the force of numbers to take him down, on the other hand it's a defence of the de Berkeley's honour, by showing him as capable as possible. Perhaps something similar can be seen also in case of Eustace d'Aubricicourt who manages to defeat one of his opponents but is soon overpowered by five others. How much truth was in those descriptions and how much they were chronicler's attempts to defend honour of remarkable persons or entire sides in a war. In any case this seems to serve as another example of the importance of prowess as source of honour.

Perhaps a better example of such matters can be seen in the case of capture and captivity of Geoffroi de Charny and Eustace d'Ribeauvieux. Their treatment after a lost battle carries some interesting shows in the matter. Charny who had been the organizer of the attempt to infiltrate Calais by bribery, gained rather scornful comment from Edward III about how the knight had attempted to gain the castle a lot less cheaper and with less work than he, while praising d'Ribeauvieux as one of the best knights in the battle and France overall, giving him a fabulous gift for his great honour.<sup>87</sup> His reactions to both men or how chroniclers have described the events can be seen in language of prowess. The words given to Charny about trying to get the city in cheaper and quicker way are might be a strong hint of the king making it clear who is more capable at war. Edward III had besieged the city of Calais for eleven months until it fell<sup>88</sup> and probably wasn't

---

83 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

84 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 124

85 Whetam, *History of Warfare, Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, Deception and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages*, 202

86 Le Baker, *Chronicle*, 78

87 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap150.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html) 09.04.15

88 Sumption, *Trial by Battle, The Hundred Years War I*, 585

happy that anyone decided to attempt, probably making it clear with these words who had been more honourable and capable in their attempts in taking the city. The case with Eustace d'Ribeumont is a different thing, perhaps its the gift why there started tales and chroniclers accounts of Edward III who had fought in the battle disguised<sup>89</sup> and supposedly encountered d'Ribeumont who he fought long until being separated.<sup>90</sup> The tale of this fight became highly popular in England. Perhaps being another thing that served to cement his reputation as a highly chivalrous king.<sup>91</sup>

The success in battle Froissart makes the skill of victorious men-at-arms in the exemplary chapter clear to anyone who reads. As described, both men manage to defeat their opponents in one strike having proved themselves more skilled in using their chosen weapons. Especially apparent is this in case of Oudart de Renty, whose skilful blow at his opponents helmet leaves him stunned, causing him to fall on the ground. Unhorsing an opponent or managing to kill his horse instead of harming him needed considerable skill and training, something what as an example was used by Marechal to unhorse young Richard I, warning him that he could have as well killed him.<sup>92</sup> In cases of both Oudart and Jean another great preference by knighthood is shown, namely the love of idea of defeating enemies with one strike. Chivalric narratives, including biographies show that attacks that maimed or killed opponents, especially in a gruesome way in one strike, were greatly appreciated.<sup>93</sup> Its hard to argue against, it even in modern sensibilities an strike that defeats and opponent in one blow is an effective one, most of the evolution of weaponry has happened to gain such strikes. Still seeing this element played in a very highly exemplary case may give hint that although everybody may have loved to hear, read or or perhaps see, but everybody knew what kind of act could grant a quick victory and be a mark of great prowess. The more idealistic fight of Jean de Helennes is only a partially longer, and as stated perhaps so to keep the honour of Maurice de Berkeley.

When talking about chivalry and warfare there is always the image of knights fighting horseback, charging with lances at their enemies. The association of knightly warfare is a strong one, historians have talked of thousand year rule of cavalry when talking about medieval warfare.<sup>94</sup>

---

89 He and The Black Prince fought under the banner and colours of sir James Manny. Froissart 150

90 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap150.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html) 09.04.15

91 Keen, Chivalry and English Kingship in the Later Middle Ages, War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles c.1150-1500, 252

92 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 174

93 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence 138

94 Morillo, Age of Cavalry revisited, 45



Exemplary chapter doesn't disappoint in that matter, both the fights start on horses and at least in Oudart's case involve unhorsing the opponent. Was the cavalry charge the most cherished way of fighting of knighthood? There is nothing that would say that knighthood had against dismounting and fighting on foot for the situation called, actually this was pretty common among the English in the Hundred Years War. Also something more important must be considered. Especially the difference when fighting against infantry or cavalry, on which cases the situation changed drastically. Against infantry the primary power of cavalry was the fear, causing them to lose morale and break lines, if they managed to hold their morale, then the cavalry was in trouble. But fight between cavalry was a different matter, instead of riding enemies down or being broken by pikes and arrows, the fights could become more of between knights, could break into fights between two men and showing quarter with taking prisoners was easier, becoming more like the image associated with chivalric warfare.<sup>95</sup> Its good to note that although fighting on horse could have been the most knightly way of fighting, this essentially could lead them to a dishonourable action, thanks to their mobility, mounted combatants were also usually among the first to flee or retreat, which sometimes caused monarch to order men he didn't trust to fight dismounted on the battlefield.<sup>96</sup> Together with the possibility of allowing the greatest source of shame in chivalric mind, being mounted played also a important role in action that many romantic views wouldn't connect with chivalry. The *chevauchee* was a devastating form of raid that relied on quick mounted attacks.<sup>97</sup> The English *chevauchee*-s during the Hundred Years those lead by Edward III and Black Prince, were highly devastating to the French. Large areas were burned and pillaged with the intention to weaken French forces, but also to discredit French rulers by them failing to fulfil their obligation as a sovereign to protect his lands and subject.<sup>98</sup> In such light *chevauchee* could be looked as a contest of prowess or honour between rulers, might such view be correct? In any way the knighthood seemed to see nothing despicable or wrong in devastating the common non-combatants in such way. The codes of conduct that gave some protection to nobility didn't just apply to commoners, leading to a statement by Kaueper that as a code Chivalry had nothing to do with the common man.<sup>99</sup> Plundering and looting themselves were already both a part and unfortunate necessity of a medieval army, it helped to pay them and on the same time were they necessary to for a army to sustain and feed itself on enemy territory.<sup>100</sup> So its hard to believe that knighthood had seen anything wrong,

---

95 Vale, War and Chivalry. 102-103

96 Morillo, The "Age of Cavalry" revisited, 55

97 Ayton. Arms, armor and horses. Medieval Warfare: A History. 126

98 Lynn, John A. Chivalry and Chevauchee. Battle: A History of Combat and Culture. Book found in google books (books.google.com) lacks any page numbers. 02.05.15

99 Lynn. Chivalry and Chevauchee.

100Lynn. Chivalry and Chevauchee.

despicable or dishonourable in such acts, perhaps views of those whose lands suffered from major *chevauchees* might have thought differently, or started planning vengeance against the attackers

Perhaps one question remains about prowess and chivalric warfare. The medieval knighthood has been sometimes defined as a “*face to face melee combat, warrior culture,*”<sup>101</sup> as seen in examples of the exemplary chapter or in other fights, when Froissart describes one then its a straight up melee combat to, but it should noted that here and then he mentions ruses and ambushes being used. The open field might have been the most preferred and most granting in honour,<sup>102</sup> but there was no dishonour in trickery, ambushes, ruses and so on. As much as chivalric display of courage and honour was appreciated, so was careful planning and subterfuge.<sup>103</sup> Edward III might make a comment about Charny's “easier attempt of taking the city, but the main strength seems to benot in the fact how the knight attempted to take the city, but than despite his clever plan he failed.”<sup>104</sup> Edward III himself was a clever and capable tactician who perhaps even might have had some liking of the idea itself, although it can be questioned if the king would even have admitted such thing. The king himself of course set up a clever ruse in answer, pulling the French into a trap.<sup>105</sup> Le Baker in his chronicle perhaps adds even fictional elements like fake walls being used to trick the French.<sup>106</sup> In the end there was no wrong or harmful to courage, honour or prowess in “more clever warfare.” Chivalric warfare wasn’t foolish and this leads to the problems that too much courage and desire for honour could cause and how chivalric culture reacted to it.

## 2.4. Glory and Wisdom

Although courage and skill in battle were among the primary sources of honour, the hunt for the latter was not always the most praised thing. Literature and popular culture are often tended to show knighthood and perhaps warrior cultures in general full of brave fools or honour above reason attitude. The actual chivalric truth in those matters was different. Chivalric culture had enough inner sense to understand where overconfidence, anger and the “quest for honour” could lead, as such restraint and wisdom were sometimes as highly valued that courage and prowess.<sup>107</sup> Still even with problems and issues acknowledged, individual knights and sometimes whole armies could fall into

---

101Morillo, Expecting cowardice, 72

102Taylor, Chivalry and the ideals of Knighthood, 72

103Saul, Honour and Fame, 155

104Whetam, Just Wars and Moral Victories, 210

105[http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap150.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html) 09.04.15

106Le Baker, Chronicle, 747

107Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 145

pitfalls typically used to describe “foolhardy chivalry.” Two of such cases will be discussed here, one about knightly overconfidence and other about honour leading to a questionable step.

The temporary capture of Eustace d'Aubrecicourt might be seen as one of such events and perhaps a point where Froissart might actually wanted to show a little cautionary tale about the dangers of overconfidence. Before the description of the young knight's capture is the description how Sir James Audley asks if he could leave the Princes retinue to join the battle of the front lines, stating that he had sworn an oath to be the best knight in the battle. Froissart describes the knight as prudent and valiant and after describing his actions, the chronicler starts to talk about how d'Aubrecicourt wanted to be among the first to engage the French. Discovering some German men-at-arms who had joined the French forces he charges at them, managing to defeat one, but being captured by five others who take him prisoner.<sup>108</sup> Can it be said that the young knight had been rash and overconfident, especially when a older and more experienced knight's prudence or wisdom is described before his brave but foolhardy actions? Being too courageous or rash was seen as a dangerous quality. When looking at the medieval idea of courage a important aspect of of must be remembered: as courage moderates fear, it also moderates boldness.<sup>109</sup> In this courage isn't so much about avoiding fear, but controlling fear and bravery both, a necessary quality on the battlefield. Overconfidence of the French and Philippe VI anger are reasons what Froissart lists as reasons why the French attacked prematurely in Crecy,<sup>110</sup> reflecting medieval chroniclers typical comments that placed blame on defeats to knight's or rulers overconfidence or rashness.<sup>111</sup>

Although chivalry wasn't so honour before reason as is a common misconception of it, there were still a considerable number of battles where overconfidence or rashness could lead to serious losses and could serve as examples as such views. Or even not so much rash actions but reliance on honour in situations where clearer head would be needed. Looking back at the discussion about power of shame strongly affecting capable rulers and commanders such as the Black Prince and Bertrand Du Guesclin, perhaps the conversation and the way how the latter gained his ransom must be considered. Froissart paints a clear contrast between the chivalrous Black Prince who had thought of offering a high ransom to Du Guesclin and his advisers who were against it. After the ransom was offered the advisers quickly tried to persuade the Black Prince to cancel the offer, but the prince, didn't want to break his already given word and hoped that the high ransom of hundred

<sup>108</sup>[http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

<sup>109</sup>Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, 251

<sup>110</sup> [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap129.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap129.html) 05.05.15

<sup>111</sup> Taylor, Chivalry and The Ideals of Knighthood, 141

thousand franks would be useful and take time. Du Guesclin's connections were enough to get him the money quickly, releasing him to war again.<sup>112</sup> At some level may it have also been a matter of honour or acting chivalrously, at least in earlier 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> century not allowing ransom to an external enemy was generally seen as a heinous act.<sup>113</sup> This may have had continued to 14<sup>th</sup> century, but there were also rising discussions and arguments of not allowing some prisoners, especially skilled captains and commanders their freedom, or even execution if necessary.<sup>114</sup> Probably had some writers started discussing the risks of extending wars because of enemy leaders finding a way to return to the field. A high ransom could have perhaps caused delay or hardened the process. So in a way allowing his ransom was the honourable act for the Black Prince to do, Froissart emphasising that he had thought of this before. Still returning a commander as capable as Du Guesclin to the field just on basis of honour might not have been the wisest act.

---

112 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_276-300/cl\\_b1\\_chap291.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_276-300/cl_b1_chap291.html) 05.05.15

113 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 199

114 Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of The Knighthood*, 191

### 3. Mercy, largesse and word: Honour in Chains, Home and Law

#### 3.1. Honour and Mercy of the Defeated

Both cases in the exemplary chapter end with their “protagonists” defeating and capturing their pursuers, leaving the battle as winners in honour and profit. Even the the descriptions of captures/surrenders are examples of ideal chivalry. In case of Oudart de Renty a perhaps more standard and down to earth variant is shown, him placing his lance on the unnamed English knight's breast and offering him the choice of surrender or death.<sup>115</sup> Considering the chivalric honour's war and success in battle oriented nature, this was perhaps the way how many if not most noble prisoners were taken. On the contrast the capture of Maurice de Berkeley by Jean de Helennes is given a considerably longer and perhaps more idealistic look: after severely wounding his opponent there is a conversation between both men, with the victorious squire offering to take care of his would be captives wounds and the latter making a comment in how he surrenders to one who has taken him in such true way.<sup>116</sup> The description continuing with how Jean de Helennes took care if his wounded prisoner, taking him on slow pace to his castle and treating him out of friendship.<sup>117</sup> This a lot more “chivalric” description than in case of the first capture, perhaps reflecting the ideas of mercy and magnanimity modern understanding of the term and contemporary church ideologists would have wanted to see. Certainly this is a lot better looking than Le Baker's account of events. But even then the pragmatic nature of actual “chivalric mercy” can be seen, as he states it himself, the young lord of Berkeley was a high ranking and rich member of nobility, such as treating him well and taking care of his wounds would have been the practical thing to do in hopes of considerable ransom. If instead of him would there have been a poor squire, would there be a story to tell? Capturing noble combatants and the compassionate treatment of them has been often seen as one of the defining features of chivalric warfare.<sup>118</sup>

It is unsure when did the practice actually began. Prisoners have been taken in war since the earliest times, but those prisoners were often enslaved or mistreated in different ways, not that the latter wouldn't happen in medieval warfare, but there tended to be limits, at least within the borders of nobility or Christendom. Gillingham has noted that there are little mentions of capturing nobles

---

115 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

116 In the translation used for this thesis, Maurice de Berkeley is just shown stating that he has been taken loyally, hinting that he has been taken in a honourable way. Another translation has by the law of arms in this statement, making the view even cleared.

117 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

118 Gillingham. John. 1066 and The Introduction of Chivalry to England. Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt. 32.

alive and ransoming them before 9<sup>th</sup> century, noting that some of the earliest shifts came from after the battle of Foutenoy that has been considered heavy on casualties and perhaps even a changing the view on warfare in the are of France. After Foutenoy there are more notes about prisoners being taken or spared, although the practice was initially limited to “intra-wars” in France and Rhineland, but started slowly spreading to elsewhere.<sup>119</sup> Orderic Vitalis an 12<sup>th</sup> century chronicler is shown describing how knights are preferring to capture enemy knights alive, instead of killing while explaining how from 900 knights only three were killed. Of course there are reasons to be careful about the chroniclers words, that a number of other comments about ransoming make it seem that the practice was growing.<sup>120</sup> During the time of Hundred Years Wars the practice was so widespread and common that some historians are using the term ransom culture to define the phenomenon.<sup>121</sup> The Anglo-French conflict seen as a rather “bloodless,” at least when talking about conflict between nobles, although the better wording would be of quarter being usually given in that conflict. The battle of Poitiers being perhaps being the crown of sparing noble prisoners, with an unusually large amount of prisoners taken, with a number of French high nobility together with King Jean being captured.<sup>122</sup>

Was this fine treatment of noble prisoners warm mercy or just cold pragmatism? The knowledge of rich ransoms being gained tends to shift the nature it towards the latter. On the other hand, perhaps it was the chivalric idea of mercy: sparing a “brother-in-arms” while gaining in worldly riches through it. A good example of this can be seen when looking at the case of Thomas Holland saving French knights in Caen. The French knights among them the constable of France and earl of Tancerville are shown to surrendering to them to be avoid being massacred by the rest of English forces. Froissart showing later how Thomas Holland was well compensated for the more important prisoner's under this care.<sup>123</sup> When looking at this description, there can be seen the element of both mercy and profit being shown. If comparing the mercy that is often attempted to connect with chivalry and the actual version of it, some things must be remembered. Church and different ideologists were the typical sources who attempted to connect chivalry stronger with some of more Christian ideals. Church ideologists or or even some other theorists often tried to draw a stronger connection between chivalry and the idea of mercy, with attempts to show all knights as

---

119 Gillingham. [https://www.academia.edu/779389/Surrender\\_in\\_Medieval\\_Europe\\_an\\_indirect\\_approach](https://www.academia.edu/779389/Surrender_in_Medieval_Europe_an_indirect_approach) 28.04.15

120 Strickland. <http://deremilitari.org/2014/07/killing-or-clemency-ransom-chivalry-and-changing-attitudes-to-defeated-opponents-in-britain-and-northern-france-7-12th-centuries/> 02.05.15

121 Ambühl, Remy. Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages. 1

122 Given-Wilson, Chris. Beriac, Francoise. Edward III and His Prisoners of War: The Battle of Poitiers and its context. *The English Historical Review*. Vol. 116, No. 468. 804

123 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_101-125/fc\\_b1\\_chap123.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_101-125/fc_b1_chap123.html) 02.05.15

members of a Christian brotherhood-in-arms and making statements that a Christian soldier should always attempt to take another alive and release him for either a reasonable ransom or without it.<sup>124</sup> Those attempts to church to show practices of knighthood being accordant with ideals of Christianity or promote the latter were nice, but in the end knighthood preferred their variation of “practical mercy.” The latter being more based on possible profits they could have gained from the ransoms being the primary reason why mercy was shown to enemies.

Something else to be discussed are the matters of honour between captor and the captive. Although chivalric culture tended to see being captured more honourable than fleeing from battle, there was still a considerable difference between a person who captured and one who was forced to surrender. As discussed earlier, chivalric culture can be seen among highly competitive warrior cultures and as such a following note by social anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers can be used: in any contest the winner winds his reputation enhanced by the humiliation of his opponent.<sup>125</sup> There are a considerable amount of depictions in chivalric literature how a surrendering knight is placed in a humiliated position: kneeling before his opponent, his neck exposed to his weapon.<sup>126</sup> There was certainly satisfaction for some victors in seeing their opponents in such state, but also a moment of shame for a proud man-at-arms who not only had suffered defeat, but also had to rely on his enemy's mercy. Perhaps its that why there is considerable amount of knights in chivalric literature who decline offers to surrender, even avoid mentioning it and prefer to fight to the death, because defeat is too dishonourable to them.<sup>127</sup> Although most members of knighthood preferred to choose surrendering and life if given a choice, such descriptions may certainly carry some hint at feelings captured members of chivalry could have felt. Froissart mentions only a few cases where members of knighthood declined surrender and rather in a form, one perhaps being Godfrey de Harcourt who in a lost battle stated that he prefers death to being taken a statement which is followed by Froissart's description of his heroic last stand.<sup>128</sup> Still returning to the matters of dishonour in surrendering, then Froissart makes barely any mentions of it. Probably its hard to find such descriptions from his chronicle, but in most accounts its seems that there was no shame or dishonour linked to being defeated and captured on a open field.<sup>129</sup>

---

124 Ambühl, Prisoners of War in Hundred Years War, 49

125 Pitt-Rivers, Julian. Honor and Social status, Honor and Shame, 24

126 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of the Knighthood, 181

127 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence, 154

128 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap171.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap171.html) 20.04.15

129 Taylor, Chivalry and Ideals of the Knighthood, 200

Of course mercy was not always given. There might have been no chance of surrendering in “a battle to the death” or in a noble versus commoner situation. As mentioned earlier, quarter was usually given in Hundred Years Wars, but even there is the exception of Crecy. The reason why no prisoners were to be taken seems to be unclear. Froissart blames the wickedness of commoner pikemen and archers, whose murderous deeds left the king without many important ransoms,<sup>130</sup> while Le Baker sets the blame on French unruliness, which caused Philippe VI to unfurl the royal flag of Oriflamme, which meant that no quarter was to be given and caused Edward III answer with a similar command.<sup>131</sup> There are thoughts that it was actually Edward III who wanting to avoid that some members of his army would be interested in grabbing prisoner's instead of fighting and wanting to secure his victory in a battle against larger enemy force, may have given that command.<sup>132</sup> As there was the chance that the enemy would not take prisoners, there were other factors that could have ended with no mercy situations. One of the simplest of them being just the fact of feelings of anger and adrenaline on the battlefield, which could make matters harder.<sup>133</sup> The view of vengeance was also strong in chivalric mind, Charny for example shows being vengeful among important qualities to a man-at-arms.<sup>134</sup> Although he himself took his vengeance after capturing his prisoner, the need for vengeance or encountering a generally hated member of knighthood could have been with any chance of mercy given.<sup>135</sup> When describing the battle of Poitiers, Froissart tells of a French knight named Jean de Claremont who was killed with no respite, owing this to an earlier encounter with John Chandos.<sup>136</sup> This encounter in question seems to have been an heraldic issue, with both knight's discovering that they are wearing same colours and markings, which sparked an argument between the two.<sup>137</sup> As it shows matters of honour or dislike towards enemy combatants could have been pretty much enough to cause members of knighthood accepting or offering the surrender.

But it is the treatment of commoner combatants that's where all the notions of mercy seem to be failing. It's interesting to note that before the shift to chivalric treatment of defeated noble opponents, the non-noble combatants had the higher chance of survival, although most of them were enslaved, the nobles were on that time under the danger of being executed, because of their

---

130 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap129.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap129.html) 25.04.15

131 Le Baker, Chronicle, 43

132 Given-Wilson, Beriac. Edward III and his prisoners of war, 804

133 <http://deremilitari.org/2014/07/killing-or-clemency-ransom-chivalry-and-changing-attitudes-to-defeated-opponents-in-britain-and-northern-france-7-12th-centuries/>

134 Charny, book of chivalry, 56

135 Charny's vengeance and many other aspects of executing already prisoners are viewed later this chapter.

136 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

137 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap160.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap160.html) 08.04.15



capacity as warriors and rulers.<sup>138</sup> Gillingham has even noted that the poor treatment of commoners on the battlefield, contrasted by the merciful treatment of members of nobility as whole can be seen as as a defining feature of chivalry as the latter part of it.<sup>139</sup> Earlier historians have linked such treatment often to a class difference, Huizinga in particular connecting it to knighthood seeing common soldiers outside their group and as such not being part of their codes of conduct.<sup>140</sup> Although some members of knighthood might have wanted to think it that, the whole question comes down to the simple fact of profit, there was no financial or political gain being gained from ransoming peasantry. There seem to have been hints that at least some mentions of captured nobles asking their captors to spare their *varles* or servants, but mostly the fate of a commoner who tried to surrender to a noble was death.<sup>141</sup> As such the knowledge of death being certain in hands on nobility made commoners more inclined to kill the former, sometimes with great cruelty. For such reasons nobility generally avoided surrendering to infantry or archers.<sup>142</sup> Still it happened, at least Froissart makes note of such events when describing the events in Poitiers, mentioning English archers capturing French.<sup>143</sup> There is also information about an archer named Robert Sadler, who managed to earn a considerable sum from ransoms,<sup>144</sup> most of those captures were probably made in the name of a noble under whose command the archers served or probably sold to members of nobility. In the end probably no noble person would have liked to give his oath to a commoner, because in theory it was still a honourable contract.<sup>145</sup> So if anything else a noble would probably had felt ashamed and dishonoured when surrendering to a commoner.

### 3.2. Oaths of Surrender and the Role of Knight's Word

In the exemplary chapter gives among other thing the description of the act of capture and with it the notes how both knights captured by Oudart de Renty and Jean de Helennes are giving oaths that they are going to be their captors prisoners, similarly is Jean II described giving one to his captor Denys de Morbeque, and in case of Eustace d'Aubrecicourt a note that the chronicler doesn't know if an oath was taken. This common element is something that was a common part of chivalric warfare. An oath of surrender was the primary way how a knight or squire surrendered to his captor

---

138 Gillingham [https://www.academia.edu/779389/Surrender\\_in\\_Medieval\\_Europe\\_an\\_indirect\\_approach](https://www.academia.edu/779389/Surrender_in_Medieval_Europe_an_indirect_approach) 28.04.15

139 *ibid*

140 Huizinga, *Mångiv inimene*, 102

141 Ambühl, *Prisoners of war in Hundred Years War* 37

142 Contamine, *War in Middle Ages*, 255

143 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

144 Ambühl, *Prisoners of War in Hundred Years War*. 101

145 Keen, *Laws of War*, 160

and how began his contract as a prisoner.<sup>146</sup> Oaths themselves played a high role in chivalric culture, as Keen has stated, most contracts between nobles were based on honour and as such a knight's honour and reputation were the primary way to enforce the fulfilment of contracts.<sup>147</sup> As seen when discussing loyalty and treason, the breaking of a solemn vow could have been seen as a treason. Oaths themselves carried considerable role in matters of chivalric honour, often being shown as great promises given in presence of other members of knighthood. This element might sometimes seem as something romantic, indeed we can't confirm how many such oaths were actually made and how much might be chronicler's and biographer's creations. Froissart describes James Audley asking The Black Prince to leave his side to engage the French because of an earlier oath he had taken, to be foremost in battle and the most valiant knight on the battlefield.<sup>148</sup> Mentions of others exist, perhaps one of the more interesting one coming from an negotiation between Henry of Lancaster and Bertrand du Guesclin, where the first was allowed safe passage through the fortress the latter was defending, so he could place his flag on the battlements, because having given such oath earlier, being only after doing so able to retreat with honour.<sup>149</sup>

Returning to cases of capture, there is only a description of a very simple oath. That is no shortening or simplification of Froissart's part. The initial oath, the one that was taken on battlefield after demanding from or accepting the surrender of an defeated man-at-arms was the simple statement that the surrendering person will be the captor's prisoner, only after the battle a more thorough contract was made and additional oaths taken from the imprisoned knight.<sup>150</sup> Typically there were obligations that the captor himself had to take towards his prisoner, most usual being the fact that he may have needed to take care or protect his new non-combatant prisoner. In case of the count of Dammartin surrendering to an English squire named John Trailly it has been seen that he is asking for them to protect or keep his safe. But the squire left and the count was left on the battlefield, where he was captured again by a Gascon and left again, despite the man's plea to be defended, only the third captor took him to his commander the earl of Salisbury, who captured him and took him under his protection.<sup>151</sup> After the battle the issue who is going to be the Count's master, although in usual cases the initial captor, John Trailly would have had the right, but because he had abandoned the count of Dammartin on the field, it was decided that because of offering the prisoner

---

146 Keen, *Laws of War*, 164

147 *ibid*

148 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

149 Taylor, *Chivalry and Ideals of Knighthood*, 79

150 Keen, *Laws of War*, 133

151 Sumpston. *Trial by fire Hundred Years War II*, 244-245

protection, earl of Salisbury gained the rights to the prisoner.<sup>152</sup> This view of obligations on the captor's or master's side can be seen very well in the description of Maurice de Berkeley's, where taking care of a chivalric prisoner is shown in a pretty idealized form and perhaps in King Jean II case, where Denys de Morbeque is in addition to capturing the king, agreeing to take him to the Black Prince.<sup>153</sup>

Both descriptions of captures in the exemplary chapter carry another important element: Both the unnamed English knight and Maurice de Berkeley are shown swearing or agreeing that they will be their captor's prisoners, rescued or not.<sup>154</sup> This element seems to be a strange one, who would want to be still considered a prisoner after being freed, but this, alongside a demand that the prisoner would not arm himself against his master or his party, on the duration of his captivity or until he has obligations towards him.<sup>155</sup> Certainly a successful captor wanted to make it certain that the prisoner would be under his obligations and unable to act against him. There is a certain element that shows up in the words rescued or not, stating an element that the obligations or status as a prisoner's didn't necessary end with being released from captivity. Marshal d'Audreham might be an example of this, after being captured in Poitiers he had to swear that he will take no arms against Edward III or The Black Prince, unless fighting under French royalty.<sup>156</sup> Such ruling probably also served a part in cases where prisoners were allowed periods of parole to leave captivity and gather their ransoms.<sup>157</sup>

As stated, honour was the keystone of such matters and breaking them could bring dishonour, an act connected to the latter often called just *deshonorement* was an act of publicly denoting a defaulting noble for his wrongful actions by displaying his arms reversed in public.<sup>158</sup> Typically an agreement for such an agreement from a ruler was needed, because only he would have had the right to confer public honour. Such action could be cheaper and less risky than trying to gain reprisal through attacking and raiding the defaulting prisoner's lands and strongly effective by directly attacking his reputation. Such action being effective is shown also in what risks it could bring. After the captain of Montcountour had decided to use this method against Bertrand du Guesclin, who he believed had broken his obligations as a prisoner after Najera, Du Guesclin

---

152 Keen, Laws of War, 166

153 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap163.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap163.html) 08.14.15

154 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap162.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap162.html) 08.04.15

155 Keen, Laws of War, 169

156 *ibid*, 52

157 *ibid* 169

158 Ambühl, Prisoners of War, 37

attacked the castle and hung the captain from the walls,<sup>159</sup> making a rather strong argument about how members of knighthood could have felt about their honour being tarnished and showing how much strength could the act of such public shaming carry.

### 3.3. Escape, Rescue and Possible Oath-breaking

There may be some question about the case of Eustace d'Aubrecicourt's temporary capture to be Froissart actually mentioning the problems of rashness in knighthood, but something else comes also up there, especially when talking about ransom contracts and oaths included to them. Namely the fact that Froissart has felt the necessity to state at his capture that he does not know if an oath was taken from him.<sup>160</sup> As seen earlier, the oath of surrender was the primary way of beginning and making a ransom contract. So what is trying Froissart say, is he trying to state that the German men-at-arms who captured Eustace d'Aubrecicourt did it somehow illegally or is he justifying the knights continued fighting after the rescue? It might be weird to think that a case of rescue being somehow illegal, yet as shown in descriptions of oaths and contracts it could become, the question is rather, did anyone care or how it was justified, be it by chivalric culture or chronicler's in general.

Why did Froissart need necessary to state the fact that he does not know if an oath was taken from the captured knight? It has been thought that Froissart had decent knowledge of law of arms and could just bring up justification or reasoning why one or other "heroic example" in his writings acted like he did, with no loss of honour.<sup>161</sup> Can it be seen as a attempt to dispel any possible thought about the knight defaulting his obligations as a prisoner? Could there have happened even this question, since there is a possibility that his captor might have been killed when the German group was attacked, among them earl of Nassau, to who the men-at-arms had been attached to whose position they had tied him to a cart.<sup>162</sup> At some level it could be argued that the fact that he was just left there could be seen as the captors breaking their obligations by not taking care or defending him. Yet as the case of Dammartin shows, such things came up, prisoners could have been taken and left on the battlefield, sometimes helpless and being captured by several different persons.<sup>163</sup> On the other hand would there been a oath taken, Eustace d'Aubrecicourt would have

---

159 Keen, Chivalry, 175

160 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

161 Whetam, Just Wars and Moral Victories, 210

162 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

163 Sumption, Trial by Fire, The Hundred Years War II, 244

been under an obligation to not participate in combat or at least would have had the need to pay for sparing his life. But would it have been actually mattered?

Considering the role of oaths in chivalric honour and the fact that a nobles word and reputation were the primary thing enforcing the ransom contracts a good question can be made. Would every rescue attempt be an illegal attempt and also escaping from captivity. As described above, ransom contracts could demand from prisoners that they don't attempt to aid their rescuers. This leads to a moment that seems same with retreating, the fact that the chivalric ideals and questions of honour clashing with actual warfare. Still since every retreat wasn't an dishonourable act of cowardice, so can't perhaps every prisoner who managed to escape heir captivity or accepted. There are known some cases where a prisoner decided to honour his agreement. There exists a mention of duke of Guelders who while fighting in Prussia (1388) was captured by a squire named Conrad. After being rescued by Teutonic knights he insisted that he is still oathbound and would have returned to captivity if heis men hadn't brokered for his release.<sup>164</sup> In a way the King Jean II decision to return to captivity in England, because of one of his sons Louis d'Anjou defaulting on his hostage-ship<sup>165</sup> can be seen as a similar activity, although often seen as foolhardy, this decision have been taken to preserve some peace with England.<sup>166</sup> There is very little known of any reproach existed escapes or could have been any further obligations demanded. The obligations could in theory continue for a long time, as seen in case of d'Audreham, who eleven years after the battle of Poitiers was still a subject to his obligations. There exists a note about escaped prisoners that if another person managed to capture them, the original master would lose the rights to him and those would be transferred to the new captor.<sup>167</sup>

Froissart gives a longer description of an rescue and a escape, the later, involving Raymond d'Marneil being partially touched on discussing aspects of loyalty. The first comes from earlier stages of war. The English knights John Boteler and Matthew Trelawney have been shown being imprisoned by a French noble named Charles de Blois who is approached by lord Lewis<sup>168</sup> of Spain, who is interested in acquiring them both with the plan of executing them both. The lord reluctantly hands them over to his ally, with a statement of him making an bad decision by executing both men.

---

164 Taylor. Chivalry and Ideals of Knighthood. 84

165 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_201-225/fc\\_b1\\_chap219.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_201-225/fc_b1_chap219.html) 18.04.15

166 Kosto, Hostages in Middle Ages, 163

167 Keen, Laws of War, 171

168 Possibly named Luis, I have found no other references of his name besides Lewis of Spain, so I cannot say with full certainly what his actual name was. Its highly probable that as with many names in the translation used here, it has been anglicised from its original form.

But the English managed to learn of the event and decide to free them in a daring assault to the encampment where both men were held, successfully retrieving both.<sup>169</sup> Certainly another great deed to Froissart to write and a great act of honour to the rescuers. But was any reproach to the honour of those they rescued? It can't be expected that they would have accepted probable torture and execution just on the basis of preserving their honour. In the case of escape, it was mentioned above that Raymond d'Marneil managed to get the help of a unnamed Englishman to help him for payment out of captivity, before being handed over to Edward III, who planned to execute for his earlier treason. Where despite the situation the description turns more into an account of a honourable adventure, than of two men who have betrayed their liege.<sup>170</sup> The unifying theme in both descriptions is the fact that the prisoners were to be executed. Threat of death was one of the primary things that could end prisoners obligations, since the moment where the captor agreed accept a surrender was the moment where he chose to spare his life.<sup>171</sup>

This leads to some other questions. Could any prisoner obligation be just voided on the clause that prisoner's life came under a threat and as such, any such contract was essentially meaningless. There were enough cases where noble prisoners could lose their lives, already the vengefulness of Lewis of Spain being seen as a indicator. Froissart touches also on the execution of prisoners and reactions to it in several places, most apparent being the case of Derval in 1373, where both besiegers and defenders executed their hostages.<sup>172</sup> When looking at cases outside Froissart's chronicle then the most known and discussed case comes from Agincourt, where Henry V ordered the execution of a large number of French prisoners.<sup>173</sup> There is a moment in Poitiers where the Black Prince is shown encountering the castellan of Amposta and wanting to execute him to send a message to cardinal de Perigord who he thought that had broken his trust and despite attempting to negotiate a truce had sent his knights to join the French (from who some had actually joined French forces on their own volition. Only John Chandos's words spared the castellan on the moment, suggesting that the prince should first meet the cardinal and speak with him that he would not waste time in battle or possibly sully his honour.<sup>174</sup> So the guarantee that surrender would be sparing of ones life, not just a stay of execution demanded on a situation and possibly captor (and his superiors). This actually illustrates highly how much reputation and connections could help a knight, as seen in the case of Caen where French knights were willing to surrender to Thomas

---

169 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_076-100/fc\\_b1\\_chap087.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_076-100/fc_b1_chap087.html) 18.04.15

170 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_276-300/cl\\_b1\\_chap293.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_276-300/cl_b1_chap293.html) 18.04.15

171 Keen, *Laws of War*, 178

172 [Http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_301-331/fc\\_b1\\_chap318.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_301-331/fc_b1_chap318.html) 18.04.15

173 Monstrelet, *The Chrronicle of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, 280

174 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

Holland they knew from crusading in Prussia and Granada.<sup>175</sup> But in other cases, had Eustace d'Aubrecicourt any guarantee that he wouldn't be killed? Could at some level stated that any surrender could be voided just because of the fact that death was an ever present possibility? It can be guessed that without any specific reasons the interest of profit probably kept most chivalric prisoners safe. And most captors probably preferred to avoid any harm to their reputations that killing their prisoners could cause.

Decision to execute a prisoner ways a considerable break of faith, he had given his freedom to his life to be spared. There were two primary reasons that allowed a prisoner to be executed: The prisoner being guilty of treason against captor or the latter's lord or there existing a considerable public weal against the prisoner.<sup>176</sup> Raymond d'Marneil falls certainly under first category, as does Aimery d'Pavia who Charny might have executed for similar reasons, although his reasons might have been more personal. The second is probably seen more in case of Vauflart de la Croix who Philippe VI had sent to the people of Lisle, who executed him for harm he had caused them.<sup>177</sup> Froissart seems to be quite against members of knighthood being executed, at least without good reason and being in some versions of his chronicles considerably vocal about events in Derval, perhaps on reasons that the capture may have been illegitimate.<sup>178</sup> There are two problems or issues executing prisoners could cause. First being the fact that executing prisoners or not showing mercy on battlefield could have affected knight's reputation making it harder to take any prisoner's, since the latter would have had a reason to believe their lives being in danger when capturing to him.<sup>179</sup> Second problem was the possible backlash to executions, this was something that perhaps affected more commanders and rulers than an "average man-at-arms." Like again as seen in Derval, although in a more direct manner, the failed negotiations did lead both sides to execute their prisoners, the attackers starting with the threat and the defender answering on his side.<sup>180</sup> These views are reflected in other cases: after Philippe VI had executed a considerable number of captured Breton nobility, Edward III planned to execute Herve du Leon, a French knight captured earlier as an act of vengeance. Only thanks to the earl of Derby's intervention he is spared and released, but stills to serve as counterpoint to the executions, by showing that the English king treated honourable prisoners better than the his French counterpart.<sup>181</sup>

---

175 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_101-125/fc\\_b1\\_chap123.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_101-125/fc_b1_chap123.html) 18.04.15

176 Keen, *Laws of War*, 179

177 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_051-075/fc\\_b1\\_chap058.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_051-075/fc_b1_chap058.html) 19.04.15

178 Kosto, *Hostages in middle ages*, 108

179 Taylor, *chivalry and ideals of knighthood*, 199

180 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_301-331/fc\\_b1\\_chap318.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_301-331/fc_b1_chap318.html) 18.04.15

181 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_101-125/fc\\_b1\\_chap101.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_101-125/fc_b1_chap101.html) 27.04.15

How did the knighthood themselves think of the chance of executing their prisoners? The loss of profit could be unfortunate, loss in reputation could have been possible. Some historians, like Keegan have argued that when Henry V give his order to execute French prisoners, then he had to order around 200 archers to do it, because his knights didn't want to, both on reasons of lost profit and unwillingness to kill surrendered members of knighthood.<sup>182</sup> Certainly there is difference of not deciding to kill someone in a fight, than a bound person, especially another noble. Certainly there could have been reasons to execute another. Still it has been observed that there is no practically bare mention by chroniclers of this being horrible event, especially since these prisoners were bound and away from the front line. Although Monstrelet or some others might have been quiet because of their connections, although the relative silence of other chroniclers is strange, hinting that perhaps most of contemporaries might have accepted the king's action perhaps regrettable but necessary.<sup>183</sup> Some chroniclers have made note of the English victory being still uncertain at that moment and as such have described the possibility of the deed being necessary to protect their rear in case if prisoners are freed and rearmed. Some of the chroniclers blaming the French attack on the supply train.<sup>184</sup> Monstrelet makes a comment of two French knights getting too close with their men and being later punished for probably causing the executions<sup>185</sup> In general it seems that executing noble prisoners could have been considered necessary, for different reasons, but not used commonly.

### 3.4. Loyalty and Treason: the Questions of Oath and Allegiance

Loyalty has a weird place among chivalric ideals and matters of honour, some historians have tried to draw a connection between loyalty and prowess, showing the first as a way to guide the other.<sup>186</sup> Although strongly connected with allegiance and being truthful, keeping ones word and general trustworthiness fall under the tenets of *loyaute*. But the previous observation have touched it enough, in the end a lot more can be seen in acts of disloyalty and treason. A knights word and oath carried considerable strength and although the above-mentioned cases about escape and rescue say a few words about it then a more general breaking of oaths and allegiances should be discussed.

---

<sup>182</sup> Keegan, John. *Face of Battle*, 112

<sup>183</sup> Edward III and his prisoners of war, 806

<sup>184</sup> *ibid* 807

<sup>185</sup> Monstrelet , *The Chronicle of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*. 281

<sup>186</sup> Kaeuper, *Chivalry and violence*, 187



Froissart describes a case where some ambiguity in the matters of loyalty seems to come up in a very strong way and involves one of most respected knights of his time. Perhaps the warning that Geoffroi de Charny gives about “those who are too ingenious and overtly subtle,” where he talks about subtlety leading a man-at-arms astray, talks about his own experiences when organising the attack of Calais.<sup>187</sup> Since besieging the castle would have been too hard, Charny attempted to use subterfuge in taking the city, by bribing its Lombardian commandant Aimery de Pavia to open the gates to him. Unknowingly to the French knight, Edward III learned of the plot and called Aimery<sup>188</sup> to England, where the latter saved himself by admitting the plot and stating that his treason isn't final yet, because he hadn't received the payment yet. The king commanded him to pretend that everything was the same and started planning a trap to the French.<sup>189</sup> There is some difference of this story in Le Baker's chronicle where Aimery is shown immediately informing the king of the plot.<sup>190</sup> In both cases the end result is the same, the French fell into the trap set by Edward III and in the following fight a number of them were captured, among them the commanders Charny and Eustace d'Ribeauumont.<sup>191</sup> Despite attempting to take the city in such way, there seems to be no harm to Charny's reputation, neither were he or any other French knight punished in harsher way than being held for ransom, hinting that Edward III didn't saw anything worse than a attack on Calais in the attempt.<sup>192</sup> Of course chivalry accepted usage of subterfuge, *ruse de guerre* and any other clever tactics as a normal part of warfare,<sup>193</sup> but an attempt to bribe a high official to betray his king should at least show Charny in some bad light, but there seems to be none, even Edward III's words to the knight might be more about him just about attempting to take the city and failing in doing that.<sup>194</sup> Would there actually been any reproach to Charny for attempting to bribe Aimery to betraying his king? Although moral questions can be made, in matters of allegiance the knight was doing nothing wrong in an attempt to bribe an enemy to betray his sworn oath.

The story between Aimery and Charny doesn't end with Calais. After Charny returned from captivity he a fte some time found the new posting of Aimery in a castle named Fentun, somewhere near Calais.<sup>195</sup> Its unknown if Aimery was relocated because of the bribe or did the king just find a

---

187 Charny, Book of Chivalry, 81

188 Aimery de Pavia is typically referenced by his first name by chroniclers and historians.

189 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap149.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap149.html) 09.04.15

190 Le Baker, chronicle, 45

191 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap150.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap150.html) 09.04.15

192 Whetam, Just Wars and Moral Victories, 171

193 Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood, 235-236

194 Kaueper, A Knight's Own Book of Chivalry, 10

195 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap161.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap161.html) 08.04.15

somebody better to his position.<sup>196</sup> Charny was true to the words he later wrote into his *Livre de chevaliere*, where he calls men-at-arms to be vengeful towards their enemies.<sup>197</sup> He attacked the castle and captured Aimery. Because there was a truce at that pint, he felt the castle untouched, making it clear that it was a private matter and returned to St. Omer where he executed his prisoner for treason and with great cruelty.<sup>198</sup> If the knight had a reason for taking vengeance he clearly had it now, but something interesting must be noted in that case. The capture being a private case, how could Aimery have been executed for a treason. At some cases oath-breaking and with that breaking of certain obligations could have been seen as a treason, although not all of them made a person a traitor. As seen in the case of Arnoul d'Audrehem this possibility was very real. D'Audrehem had been captured in the battle of Poitiers and his ransom contract included the standard not taking arms against against his master, in this case Edward III or his heir The Black Prince, except when fighting under the flag of French royalty. After being captured in the battle of Najera, the Black Prince accused him of treason, because of breaking that obligation by fighting under Enrique de Trasmara. D'Audrehem defended his actions with a simple statement that he hadn't broken any obligations, because he was fighting against Don Pedro a claimant of the throne of Castile, whose service The Black Prince as joined as knight Edward Plantagenet, but not as the heir of English crown. I any case this statement had freed him from the accusation.<sup>199</sup> As discussed a breaking of a solemn vow or a ransom contract could have been defined as an act of treason, and indeed in case of d'Audrehem, Keen observes that there might indeed have existed a possibility that the knight may have been executed if found guilty.<sup>200</sup>

Keen has noted that the questions of allegiance are perhaps the most complicated in the medieval laws of war, among them existing many different bonds, allegiances, oats and contracts that could have affected on whose side a man would have gone to fight<sup>201</sup>, when looking at the previously described case of predicament where d'Audrehem found himself, but on the same way how he saved himself from the headsman's block. The question of allegiances and bonds is a long and difficult one. From the cases observed in this paper, perhaps only Raymond d'Marneil comes closest to a case of actual treason. His and his uncle Louis de Maleval's decision to switch their sides from English to the French is described by Froissart as unfortunate event and that both lords

---

196 Whetam, *Just Wars and Moral Victories*, 171

197 Charny, *Book of Chivalry*, 56

198 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap151.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap151.html) 09.04.15

199 Keen. *Laws of war* 50-52

200 *Ibid* 53

201 Keen, 88

started a disastrous war from their castles and Edward III was greatly angered by this action.<sup>202</sup> This was treason, clear and clear, changing their allegiances on their own will and starting to wage war against them. Being guilty of that level treason was something that even routiers tried to avoid, even the notorious Arnoul de Creole, more known as the Archpriest declined fighting in the battle of Cocherel against Navarrese forces, because of holding lands that belonged to Captal de Buch, one of the leaders in the opposing army.<sup>203</sup> D'Marneil almost found how a traitors punishment feels when he was captured and would have been given over to vengeful Edward III, only to be saved by a poor Englishman who took pity for him, who helped him scape. Froissart states nothing more about him being a traitor or the Mysterious Englishman, only that it was a great adventure to them and the latter was greatly honoured and humble, by taking a lot smaller payment than promised.<sup>204</sup> Does the chronicler turn this to another great exemplary adventure, silently stating that shifts I the allegiances are normal?

### 3.5. Largesse and Honour

Returning to the exemplary chapter and the considerably lengthier description of the capture and captivity of Maurice de Berkeley, it can be seen that he was probably a lucky prisoner, with his captor being courteous and kind to him, as discussed when talking about honour and capture, true chivalric mercy was pragmatic and practical, of course would a rich prisoner treated well, such practice was usual as an attempt to get a rich and/or important prisoner to be thankful and as such pay a greater ransom.<sup>205</sup> Perhaps less about goading better ransom but offering courtesy to a highly important and high ranking prisoner can be seen in descriptions of Jean II's captivity, although under guard he had the chance to hunt, observe tournaments and was still living as a high member of nobility, although being a prisoner of another sovereign.<sup>206</sup> Treatment of prisoners can tell a few things about chivalry, but specific cases of captivity open a window to a world of chivalric sense of honour and reputation that existed outside the world of deeds-in-arms but were on the same time enabled by them. Those two cases aren't in any way common or generic, both them involving members of royalty, commanders and high nobility. The feasts to celebrate English victory after the French had failed to retake Calais or the battle of Poitiers. Both describe parts of chivalry that were important for a knight to uphold, gain and even use his honour and could have been especially

202 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_276-300/cl\\_b1\\_chap279.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_276-300/cl_b1_chap279.html) 16.04.15

203 Keen, *Laws of War* 86

204 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_276-300/cl\\_b1\\_chap293.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_276-300/cl_b1_chap293.html)

205 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 197

206 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap172.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap172.html)

useful to a king or prince wishing to be seen chivalrous.

What were those feasts discussed here and what can be learned from them. As they are linked to English victories, they are also linked to captivities of important French knights and nobles. The events in Calais touch several aspects of chivalric honour, but its important to note the events that happened there. After the battle, the captured French knights and commanders were given new outfits and brought to a great feast held by Edward III. The king's and his heirs presence or earlier participation being a surprise to the French.<sup>207</sup> After the feast is ended the king is described conversing both with French and English knights with two opposite treatments offered to the commanders of the French force: Eustace d'Ribeumont and Geoffroi de Charny. The first was celebrated as one of the most honourable knights present, gifted a chaplet or string of pearls that Edward III had worn during the feast and allowed to leave next day, without needing to pay any ransom.<sup>208</sup> His attitude towards the organizer of the plot and attack to retake Calais, Geoffroi de Charny received considerably different words from him, that are discussed under matters of loyalty and treason. This event is often been viewed as a clever political trick by Edward III to win support among French nobility.<sup>209</sup> Black Prince, who was present on the event probably learned a trick or two from his father, because after the battle of Poitiers he is shown acting in even more magnificent way towards Jean II and other high ranking French nobles who were captured in the battle. Froissart describes the latter being seated on a separate table and being humbly served by the victorious Black Prince, who declines offers to join the table by stating that he is not honourable enough.<sup>210</sup> In a way this description actually feels even a bit overblown, something just even feeling to much or too Arthurian in it. There is power of course in such zest and certainly it could have won attention among nobility. Some doubt of this event happening can be made on the clause that the mention of this behaviour is missing from the Chandos Heralds Life of The Black Prince, where exists a mention of the Price showing his respect towards the fallen by spending the night among them, but there is no other mention besides having a dinner with the captured king.<sup>211</sup> Although there may have been a supper where all the prisoners ere present, or at least the more important ones, the Prince's actions can be thought a description used by le Bel and Froissart to lessen the impact of one of the French military disasters.<sup>212</sup>

---

207 According to Froissart, Edward III and The Black Prince had fought under the banner and colours of Walter Manny.

208 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap151.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap151.html)

209 Kaueper, Historical Introduction to the text, A Knight's Own Book of Chivalry, 9

210 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap167.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap167.html)

211 Chandos Herald, Life of the Black Prince, 103

212 Taylor, Chivalry and ideals of knighthood

As stated, both event's aren't average cases, but this makes them an even better window to the more glamorous aspects of chivalry. One knightly virtue that was seen almost as important as prowess was largesse or generosity. In a way it seems weird, considering how much knighthood was about success in combat and had no qualms about harming non-combatants, generosity might seem something more out of romance, but in fact it was something that was expected among nobility. As much a knight needed to have wealth, he also needed to be able to share it.<sup>213</sup> Some chivalric writers even went so far to describe it as the mother of all virtues.<sup>214</sup> Charny a practising knight makes note of that necessity, when again talking about how to be a worthy man-at-arms is also describing the need to be generous in a form to support others of their path of becoming worthy.<sup>215</sup> There is of course a important fact to consider when discussing knightly generosity, namely that it was the way how members of knighthood tried to separate themselves from the rising merchant-class. This separation was emphasized by showing generosity and liberal living an quality of nobility, by having them to share the wealth they either had from their nobility or gained through deeds of prowess, while bourgeois were being shown to be avaricious and greedily hoarding coins.<sup>216</sup> Although generosity seems to have had his place something important in Charny's definition of it must be considered, namely the fact that he encourages to support other nobles. Considering chivalry, how much did this generous act extend to common folk, probably not very much, at least not in the way such kindness was shown towards other members of knighthood.

Eustace d'RibeauMont is probably one of the best examples of gift-giving among nobles and perhaps in ways how chivalry and politics could have been used in general. Gift-giving was no simple act of kindness among medieval nobility, but a way of showing both gift-givers and recipients honour. Between equals it served as a mark of friendship and trustworthiness, showing that both of them were honourable and cared for their obligations. Gifts between men of different status allowed the socially superior to show the receiving person as worthy of friendship and favour. By such honouring of a man of lesser rank he would in end show himself as a man of generosity and worth.<sup>217</sup> This gift marked d'RibeauMont as the most honourable and worthy of the French knights who had participated in the fight while enhancing the reputation of Edward III among both the English and French nobility, making this gesture also a powerful political move. The English king was skilled in using chivalry as a political tool to enhance the prestige of the English court.<sup>218</sup>

---

213 Kaueper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 194

214 Taylor, *Chivalry and the ideals of knighthood*, 75

215 Charny, *Book of Chivlary*, 59

216 Kaueper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 194

217 Taylor, *chivalry and ideals of knighthood*, 75

218 Saul, *For Honour and Fame*, 101

So the gesture to the knights present can be easily seen as an attempt to sway French knights in general to support his claim of the French throne. Edward III image as a chivalric king may have had some success, especially considering that there had been some doubts among French nobility about Philippe VI succession to the throne, that was only enforced by his failures at war with England.<sup>219</sup> This political power of gifts was considerable, they created connections between members of nobility that could sometimes be seen even as dangerous. Because of that The Black Prince commanded Captal The Buch to return all gifts he had gained from Charles V.<sup>220</sup> Didn't he want the Navarrese commander have any links or any gratitude towards the French king? In any case this connection created by gift-giving might have had some implications in chivalic mind, that could have worried The Black Prince. What might have Philippe VI and Jean II thought about the chaplet of string of pearls given to d'RibeauMont?

Of course the gift given to d'RibeauMont was the “grand finish” of this political move, because the whole feast probably served the purpose of the kings chivalric politics. Feats themselves were often a way to members of royalty to show the might and splendour of their courts of households, lavish entertainments like feasts and tournaments were meant to show a prince to be following the high values of chivalry, although in a larger scale than a simple show of largesse.<sup>221</sup> This leads to Black Princes supposed actions in the supper after battle of Poitiers, especially the table of honour. Although the Arthurian roots in the form of reflecting the legendary round table can be seen, there was actually a table of honour that was contemporary to the time Froissart started writing his chronicle and could have been known even participated by some knights described in his chronicles. *Die Ehrentisch*<sup>222</sup> was a tradition in the Teutonic Order to honour the best foreign knights in their fights against the pagans. Created to offer some incentive to English and French knights to participate in Prussian and Lithuanian crusades. Places on the *Ehrentisch* were deserved for twelve best knights who had proven themselves in combat. When the “Reise” was ending, a great feast was held to celebrate it. A small number of knights, usually ten or twelve were chosen by heralds and seated on the special “table of honour.” At least on one occasion gifting of of special shoulder badges is described, with golden letters *Honneur vaine dout!* engraved on them. In any case being invited to the table was considered a great honour.<sup>223</sup> Is the chronicler using knowledge of such event to note the great honour of one or both participants or the prince being inspired by the

---

219 Keen, Chivalry and the aristocracy, 211

220 Keen, Laws of War, 86

221 Keen, Chivalry and the aristocracy, 213

222 Guard, Timothy. Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade, The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century, 89

223 Keen, Chivalry, 173-174

*Ehrentisch* or just Arthurian ideas<sup>224</sup> is not know. Froissart ends his description with a speech by the prince after there are murmurings of his great honour and how much greater knight and ruler he might become.<sup>225</sup> In the end magnanimity and generosity were just another tools in a prince's or knight's toolbox. Necessary for him to feel honourable and seem to others. They became far more useful in hands of princes and kings who could use them for political ends. Just in the chronicles texts this description might have served as a way of showing the chivalrousness of both royals, by firsts grandiose act of largesse and in others case as a mark that despite his loss, his and others great deeds have at least gained to them respect and admiration to their enemies, making them despite having been on a lost side of the battle still honourable.

### 3.6 Ransoming, Chivalry and Greed

When ending the description of Jean de Helennes' successful fight and capture, Froissart makes the note of how the young squire managed to get enough ransom to be knighted. Certainly this makes an excellent point how much a successful man-at-arms could have earned from ransoming a rich prisoner. As discussed above, the primary reason for "knightly mercy" was the profit that could have been gained from the ransom, fortunes were made and lost through such actions.

The capture of King Jean II opens a view to the problems of ransoming and perhaps some other problematic moments of chivalric honour in general. After Denys de Morbeque managed to capture the king, Froissart describes around ten knights and squires also attempting to claim the king and his son and the situation becoming more and more dangerous with squabbles and fights beginning among the fighters.<sup>226</sup> A capture of a king and the gain in both renown and profit was enormous. Although it's hard to believe that any of the knights and squires could have attempted to claim the King's ransom for themselves, most important prisoners were bought by Edward III to be used in political matters,<sup>227</sup> but the gains were still enough to serve a noble well. This case can in some ways be compared to the capture of David II, the king of Scotland who was captured in the battle of Neville's Cross in 1346. The king's captor a knight named John Copeland took the king as soon he could from the battlefield and retreated to a fortified location, where he stayed with his men

---

224 Die Ehrentissch itself was inspired from Arthurian myths and the round table.

225 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap167.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap167.html) 12.04.15

226 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap163.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap163.html) 08.04.15

227 Given-Wilson. Beriac. Edward III prisoner's of war, 816

and the imprisoned king, not willing to hand him over to anyone but Edward III.<sup>228</sup> There are some considerable similarities in those cases, namely how captors and possible captors acted around a captured member of royalty. It can be argued that Copeland took his prisoner as far from battle and declined to meet anyone except a member of English royalty to avoid the king being rescued by his subjects, but when looking at case of Jean II the decision to avoid losing the prisoner to another knight could have been a possibility. Such things happened occasionally count of Dammartin being one among other cases where existed several claimants to one prisoner and there existing others. In any case, every captor had be ready to protect his claim on a captured noble.<sup>229</sup> In this light the action taken by Copeland was logical in both keeping the king away from possible rescuers, but also from anyone else who could have attempted to take the king. He was successful and was granted a considerable yearly sum that Edward III was possibly still paying in 1356.<sup>230</sup> When talking about the capture of king Jean, then most sources seem to be agreeing that Denys de Morbeque was the king's captor, Froissart shows that the argument between him and a Gascon named Bernard de Trouttes lasted long after the battle going so far that the Black Prince had to arrest both men and put the matter on hold until reaching his father.<sup>231</sup>

This leads perhaps to one of the paradoxes of chivalry in the medieval views of life. Although expected to share his wealth, nobility had great expenditures outside the largesse, namely the cost of war. Prowess could have brought in wealth and as such enabled the knight to live like a noble and practice largesse, but to get it all the knight needed to gain the money for it.<sup>232</sup> The process of knighting and The primary way of getting it was of course plunder and ransoms. As seen above, chivalric culture had no qualms of gaining wealth in this way, in fact it served as a proof of his prowess and honour. A man-at-arms who returned from war laden with loot and either prisoners or ransoms gained from them, was a person worthy of recognition.<sup>233</sup> Orderic compressed such views into a little statement that called ransom money *honorifice*, describing it as wealth gained through honourable deeds.<sup>234</sup> Over time the practice gained critics such as the author of Tree of Battles, Honore Bouvet, who attacked both ransoming and the way how chivalric warfare was fought generally, joining the ranks of those who wanted to see mercy between Christian soldiers being the primary reason for ransoming, and also limiting the sums that could be demanded.<sup>235</sup>

228 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_126-150/fc\\_b1\\_chap138.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_126-150/fc_b1_chap138.html) 18.04.15

229 Keen, Laws of War, 162

230 Beriac, Given-Wilson, Edward III Prisoners of War. 813

231 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap168.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap168.html) 18.04.15

232 Kaueper, Chivalry and Violence, 296

233 Saul, For Honour and Fame, 128

234 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 186

235 Ambühl, Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War, 49



There are some interesting words given by Black Prince during his “Arthurian” supper to Jean II. Among many good wishes he also talks of hope that his ransom will be so reasonable, that he and his father will be friends afterwards.<sup>236</sup> Like most ransoms it wasn't, becoming a considerable monetary burden for France, in this case a monetary sum of 3,000,000 *ecus* over six years, with 600,000 paid immediately at 1360 when Treaty with England was made.<sup>237</sup> A grandiose sum fitting a king and perhaps another mark of what ransoming could bring to a victorious captor and harm that it could cause to the prisoner, his lands and his wealth. Promises of reasonable ransoms are occasionally shown by other chroniclers too, Walsingham in his *Chronica Majora* for example mentions negotiations with duke of Alencon, to who a reasonable ransom is offered if he is willing to surrender.<sup>238</sup>

Can there be a monetary price for life. Its clear that chivalric culture thought so. There were practices that show the reasonable or true ransom being a one that wouldn't ruin a noble, a typical suggested sum being seen equal to one years revenue from the prisoners lands, but in truth, mots of the time the ransom demands were higher than that and could easily ruin the prisoners fortunes.<sup>239</sup> Even worse, as possibly seen in the case of Raoul II de Brienne, count of Eu and constable of France the masters of prisoners could demand political favours or even treason for a lessened sum of ransom or instead it.<sup>240</sup> The constable's sudden execution after returning from captivity in England,<sup>241</sup> might have been caused by fact that he had promised to support the claim of Edward III on French throne or promised to give him his lands near Calais and a castle with strategical value in Guines.<sup>242</sup>

If chivalry can be defined by its honourable treatment of noble prisoners and disregard for non-noble ones, then the greed for ransom money could change even that. Of course rich and influential prisoners such as Maurice de Berkeley or King Jean II were usually treated well and honourably, often with the idea to get them pay a rich ransom.<sup>243</sup> There are moments in later books o Froissart's chronicle mentions how English treat their captives well, contrasting them with the practice of Germans who treat their captives badly and attempt to extract even the smallest amount

---

236 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap167.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap167.html) 18.04.15

237 Kosto, *Hostages in the Middle Ages*, 163

238 Walsingham, Thomas. *The Chronica Maiora* or Thomas Walsingham.

239 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 194

240 Keen, *Laws of War*, 161

241 [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/ch\\_151-175/fc\\_b1\\_chap152.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/ch_151-175/fc_b1_chap152.html) 05.05.15

242 Tuchman, Barbara W, *Kauge Peegel: Kannatusterohke XIV sajand*, 166

243 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 197

of money from their prisoners.<sup>244</sup> This contrast is interesting because as seen, the ransoms themselves were usually already too high, and neither was mistreating a prisoner seen a despicable act. Mistreating a prisoner was seen an acceptable way to persuade him to accept and pay his ransom, it could be just keeping him in chains and in a dark cell, but it could involve torture as well.<sup>245</sup> In the end until the captivity didn't become too unhealthy and dangerous or the master wasn't planning on executing his captive, then a lot was allowed.<sup>246</sup> Torture and mistreatment perhaps to a limit where they couldn't be considered life threatening. In the end, in matters of ransoms, the knights become as avaricious and greedy as the merchants they were being differentiated in chivalric narratives.

---

244 Froissart, *The Chronicle of Jean Froissart*. 122

245 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 198

246 Keen, *Laws of War*, 179-180

## 4. Conclusion

There are certain possibilities and limitations when discussing the matters or concept of honour and dishonour through cases of capture and captivity. Honour played a considerable role in chivalric culture, being the primary thing besides wealth or heritage the knight needed to be respected. Shame or dishonour was a powerful thing in chivalric mind. Yet the code of honour wasn't what a common modern understanding seems to think what it was. In many aspects chivalry was a warrior culture, where both "display of chivalry" but also following the expectations placed by chivalric society and the knight's peers had to be followed to gain respect and recognition. Honour was in the end reputation in chivalric culture. And the following things can be stated about the nature, gains, losses and used of that reputation.

Considering that chivalric culture was essentially a warrior aristocracy then it seems to be no surprise that skill with weaponry and success were held in highest regard. In some way such matters are easy to be discussed through descriptions of capturing combatants, but on the other hand it also places certain limits how much the full extend of chivalric warfare and the knighthoods preferences can be seen in them. The high appreciation of skill with weapons is shown in the exemplary chapter, but the descriptions in that chapter are perhaps placed into an almost perfect way of fighting, on open field and horseback. Descriptions overall carry the importance of prowess, showing that even in lost battle capacity in fighting and courage can bring victory even in a lost battle as evidenced in the exemplary chapter or in case of Eustace d'Ribeauumont where the latter was released without ransom and honoured by Edward III for his deeds in battle. Also the fact that knighthood saw nothing wrong in trickery or ruses of war can be reflected in events of war. In general chivalry saw success in combat and war as the highest source of honour, perhaps preferring to fight in some ways more than in others. Courage comes up as another important ideal connected with honourable deeds, but perhaps not in so much direct form, but when linked with prowess as the "enabler" of latter and contrasting the shameful act of cowardice. If there was anything more connected with dishonour then it was cowardice that was seen among the worst things a knight could take, its shame so harmful that its enough to end a knight's retreat in battle or taunt him to do perhaps an unwise act. The power of cowardice was often contrasted with courage and shown as shameful as possible. This was done with the reason of discouraging fear, either through shame or like Froissart's descriptions to by attempting to inspire to great deeds. But also when talking about chivalric honour and courage, something important can be seen, chivalric culture was aware of dangers that emphasis on bravery and search of glory could cause.

Success in battle could lead to gaining prisoners to ransom, in this the honour and reputation become important matters. Prisoner taking itself was a mark of success and could bring honour and some link with it can be also drawn into the act of showing mercy. The exemplary chapter and the capture of Jean II describe an important part in the act of capturing a chivalric combatant: the oath of surrender. In cases of exemplary chapter also one of the important obligations of chivalric prisoner is described, namely the aspect where the prisoner had to swear to be his captor's prisoner even if rescued. A nobleman's sworn word carried considerable strength and such kind of oath served as a starting point for a ransom contract. Honour was the binding agent in contracts between nobility, basically turning keeping an contract into a matter of reputation and indeed one of the possible ways of reprisal to a defaulting noble could have been a public dishonouring by displaying his arms reversed. But in some cases a prisoner could have been treated as a traitor, even execution could have been possible. The matters of allegiance were also based on sworn words and oaths of fealty. There the matter of treason could come up the strongest and the matter of execution be strongest. Loyalty, especially in the form of being sure to ones word was also a high source of honour, but its considerably harder to discuss only on basis of capture cases, especially greater cases of disloyalty.

Reputation and games around it come clearly up also in "peacetime" ways of chivalry. Largesse in form of gift-giving and feasts was a chance for a noble to show himself honourable, but also honour others, gift-giving between members of nobility being essentially a "game of reputations." The feats after events in Calais and battle of Poitiers are grand cases of such behaviour, involving English royalty showing their chivalrous nature and their great honour, while also honouring select enemies. First an attempt by Edward III to win favour among French nobility, the second being perhaps a fictional description how the Black Prince honoured Jean II. Both may have been great political moves. Largesse played also another role in chivalric culture, mainly in the attempt of differentiating them from the rising ranks of the bourgeois, but in the end was also a way for a knight to use his honour for honouring another.

In the beginning the question of was there actually a thing that could be defined as dishonour in chivalric culture. Although the sources and effects of honour are rather clear to see, the aspects of this question, namely the rigidity and flexibility of honour have shown answered in a differing manner. The chivalric code may feel in first glance rigid, but in truth in truth it can be just considered "wide," there existed enough justification and acceptance of things that at first glance might seem to go against the chivalric sense of honour, but chivalric sense wasn't certainly that

flexible that every shameful or despicable deed would go with any reproach. Rather there were ways how some things were seen as not going against knight's oaths or ways they were acceptable. Fleeing from battle could have been a shameful and dishonourable act, but there were reasons like the battle being fully lost or another stringer reason existing where leaving the field and one's companions could be accepted. Another comes up perhaps in cases of captivity, where there was no obligation for a knight to merrily await the headsman's axe on the basis that his honour didn't allow him an attempt of escape, a captor had promised to spare his captives life, and him going against it freed the latter from any obligations to him. On the other hand a captor hadn't keep some prisoners alive on the basis of having shared his life, traitors and public weal were reasons where captor could dismiss his own obligation to keep the prisoner alive. In the end there existed a sense of dishonourable actions, primary among them cowardice and oath breaking or treason, but there were always exceptions and ways where such actions could have had less reproach.

In general most of the questions about chivalric honour can be discussed through Froissart's descriptions of capture and captivity, although there are matters that are harder to see or just raise more questions. The practice of ransoming could from some corner seen as a form of gaining honour because from profit and fame that could be gained from certain prisoners could increase a knights honour, but in a way these cases lead seemingly into a form of hypocrisy, there the members of knighthood may have started to ignore the aspect of treating noble prisoners well, going from simple but acceptable mistreatment to torture. Also the need for rich prisoners cloud very well lead to attempts of original captor's rights. Still its hard to build up discussion only around the case of Jean II's capture and some hints, in general its seems that with getting the ransom where as little qualms as warfare most acts fitting under the precepts of honour although some actions could be harmful towards reputation, like execution of prisoners, that could case a wider number of issues. The question of dishonour of greed in ransoming and problems caused by it is perhaps something that could be discussed further. Also the connection between mercy and honour is perhaps something that came up. In general "chivalric mercy was practical and pragmatic, value of prisoners wealth and status more important than being merciful. At a lot of level it could be argued that by showing mercy a knight could show itself as a worthy member of knighthood.

The limitations of the subjects made also difficult to discuss some important matters about chivalric culture and concept of honour. The matters of loyalty and treason, are among those, although Froissart occasionally describes cases of treason and breaking contracts or sworn word in his Book I, but its hard to go deeper into the wide word of such cases. The prowess and warfare as a

main source of honour and recognition is another thing that despite being a necessary component in gaining prisoners is again something that can be seen but not discussed in a full manner. The dishonour because lack of success in arms or humiliation of defeat are perhaps a possible direction of research for discussing chivalry. Chivalric chronicles tend to emphasize success, even occasionally defend the capacity of defeated, but what can actually be told about the matter, especially on the matter of defending the reputation of defeated by showing them as courageous and honourable or showing them defeated only because overwhelming odds?

In the end there is the matter of the exemplary chapter, throughout this paper those two descriptions that create such contrast to the fate of the rest of the French combatants. As stated in the introduction, the example how a knight should act and what success in arms can bring seems perhaps seems to convenient, especially how much detail, that has been used in this thesis for analysing the matters of knightly culture and its sense of honour. Its more of an example than Froissart's writings usually are, and perhaps that's what it is. An example of chivalric culture's values where courage and prowess bring success over an worthy enemy and through that again in honour and profit.

## 5. Bibliography

### Primary Sources

Chandos Herald. Life of the Black Prince: in Barber, Richard (ed), The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, London, Folio 1979

Charny, Geoffroi de. Book of Chivary; in Kaueper Richard, Elsbeth Kennedy (ed). A Knight's Own Book of Chivalry; 1996

Froissart, Jean. The Chronicles of Jean Froissart; Translated by Thomas Johnes; [http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book\\_1/fc\\_b1\\_contents.html](http://www.maisonstclair.org/resources/chronicles/froissart/book_1/fc_b1_contents.html)

Froissart Jean. The Chronicles of Jean Froissart; in Thompson, Peter E. Contemporary chronicles of the Hundred Years War : from the works of Jean le Bel, Jean Froissart & Enguerrand de Monstrelet; London, Folio 1966.

Joinville, Jean de. Life of Saint Louis; Shaw. M. R. B. Chronicles of the Crusades: Joinville & Villehardouin; translated with an introduction by M. R. B. Shaw; Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1963.

Le Baker, Geoffery. Geoffery Le Baker's Chronicle; in Barber, Richard (ed), The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, London, Folio 1979.

Llull, Ramon. The Book of Order of Chivalry; [http://www.rgle.org.uk/Llull\\_B\\_C.htm](http://www.rgle.org.uk/Llull_B_C.htm) Accessed 13.05.15

Monstrelet, Enguerrand de. The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet in Thompson, Peter E (ed). Contemporary chronicles of the Hundred Years War : from the works of Jean le Bel, Jean Froissart & Enguerrand de Monstrelet; London, Folio 1966.

## Secondary Sources: Books

Ambühl, Remy. *Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages*. Cambridge, 2013.

Ayton, Andrew. *Arms, armor and horses*; in Keen, Maurice (ed) *Medieval Warfare: A History*; Oxford University Press, 1999

Boulton, D'Arcy, Jonathan, Dacre. *Knights of the Crown, The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe*; Boydell Press 2000

Contamine, Philip. *War in The Middle Ages*; Wiley, 1986.

Curry, Anne. *The Hundred Years War*; New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Duby, Georges. *Guillaume le Marechal, ehk, Maailma Parim Rüütel*; Tallinn, Varrak 2007.

Dunn, Diana. *War and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Britain*; Liverpool University Press, 2000

Gillingham, John. *1066 and The Introduction of Chivalry to England*; in Garnett George, Hudson John, *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt*; Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Gillingham, John. *Fontenoy and After: Pursuing Enemies to Death*; in Frankland, *The Franks and the World of Early Middle Ages*; Manchester University Press, 2012.

Guard, Timothy. *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: the English Experience in the Fourteenth Century*; Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 2013.

Huizinga, Johan. *Mängiv Inimene: Kultuuri mänguelemendi määratlemise katse*; Tallinn, Varrak 2004



- Jones, Michael. *Letters, Orders and Musters of Bertrand du Guesclin, 1357-1380*; Woodbridge, Rochester, Boydell Press, 2004.
- Kaueper, Richard W, Kennedy Elsebeth. *A Knight's Own Book of Chivalry*; University of Pennsylvania Press 2013
- Kaueper, Richard W. *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*: Oxford University Press 2001
- Keegan, John. *The Face of Battle : A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme*; London, Pimlico, 2004
- Keen, Maurice Hugh. *Chivalry*; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984
- Keen, Maurice Hugh, *Chivalry and the Aristocracy*; in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. VI, c.1300–c.1415; Cambridge, 2000.
- Keen, Maurice Hugh, *Chivalry and English Kingship in the Later Middle Ages*; in *War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles, C.1150-1500: Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich*; Woodbridge, Boydell Press 2008
- Keen, Maurice Hugh. *The Laws of War in the Later Middle Ages*; London, 1965.
- Kosto, Adam. *Hostages in the Middle Ages*; Oxford University Press; 2012.
- Lynn, John A. *Chivalry and Chevauchee. Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*; Basic Books, 2009.
- Lynch, Andrew. *Beyond Shame: Chivalric Cowardice and Arthurian Narrative*; in Busby, Keith (ed) *Arthurian Literature XXIII*; Boydell and Brewter Ltd, 2006
- Morillo Stephen, *The Age of Cavalry Revisited*; in Villalon, A. J. Andrew. *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*; Boydell and Brewter Ltd, 1999
- Pitt-Rivers, Julian. *Honor and Social Status*; in Peristany, Jean G. *Honor and Shame: the Values of*

Mediterranean society; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965

Saul, Nigel *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England, 1066-1500*; Bodley Head 2011

Strickland Matthew. *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066–1217*; Cambridge, 1996.

Sumption, Jonathan. *The Hundred Years War. Volume I, Trial by Battle*; London, Faber and Fiber, 1999

Sumption, Jonathan. *The Hundred Years War. Volume II, Trial by Battle*; London, Faber and Fiber, 2001

Taylor, Craig. *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War*; Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Vale, Malcolm, Graham, Allan. *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France, and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages*; University of Georgia Press, 1981

Whetam, David. *Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, Deception and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages*; Brill, 2009

## **Secondary sources: articles and web sources**

Given-Wilson, Chris. Beriac, Françoise. *Edward III and His Prisoners of War: The Battle of Poitiers and its context*; *The English Historical Review*. Vol. 116, No. 468.

Gillingham, John. *Surrender in Medieval Europe, an indirect approach*; [https://www.academia.edu/779389/Surrender\\_in\\_Medieval\\_Europe\\_an\\_indirect\\_approach](https://www.academia.edu/779389/Surrender_in_Medieval_Europe_an_indirect_approach); Accessed 28.04.15

Fowler, Kenneth. *Froissart, Chronicler of Chivalry*; *History Today* 36, issue 5 (1986)

Morillo, Stephen. Expecting cowardice: medieval battle tactics reconsidered; *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 4 (2006)

Strickland Matthew. Killing or clemency? Ransom, Chivalry and Changing attitudes to defeated opponents in Britain and northern France, 7–12th centuries; <http://deremilitari.org/2014/07/killing-or-clemency-ransom-chivalry-and-changing-attitudes-to-defeated-opponents-in-britain-and-northern-france-7-12th-centuries/> Accessed 02.05.15

Taylor. Craig. Military Courage and Fear in the Late Medieval French Chivalric Imagination; *Cahiers de Recherches Medievales et Humanistes*, 24 (2012)

The Peerage: The geneological survey of peerage in Britain and as well as royal families in Europe. <http://www.thepeerage.com/p2570.htm#i25699> Accessed 18.04.15

## **6. Resümee: Rüütlikultuuri Au ja Autus Froissarti kroonikates leiduvate vangistus- ja vangistamisjuhtumite kirjelduste kontekstis**

Rüütel ja rüütellus (või rüütellikkus) on ühed tuntuimad keskajast pärinevad mõisted, mis on enamvähem tuttavad igale ühele kes natukenegi keskajast teab. Siiski see natukene tihti erineb sellest, mis keskaegne rüütlikultuur tegelikult oli, mõistes ehk kauget üldpilti ja mõningaid kilde sellest, kuid mitte täielikku pilti. Seda enamjaolt 12-15 sajandi ümbruses eksisteerinud nähtus või idee on defineeritud kui “sõjalise ülikkonna kultuuri mis nägi sõjapidamist kui oma pärilikku õigust.“ Au oli keskse tähtsusega omadus rüütelkonna seas, keskaegne ülik elas ühiskonnas kus talle seati hulk erinevaid sotsiaalseid norme ja eeldusi mida ta pidi täitma, et pälvida ühejäänud rüütelkonna austust, samal ajal vältides häbi ja alandust. Antud uurimustöö üritabki puudutada au ja autust puudutavat, käsitleda rüütlikultuuri arusaama läbi Froissart'i kroonikates leiduvate vangistus ja vangistamisjuhtumite kirjelduste.

Jean Froissart oli üks tuntumaid keskaegseid kroonikuid, kahtlemata tuntuim, kes on kirjutanud Saja-aastasest sõjast. Kuigi tema kroonikad annavad pika, põhjaliku ja detailse ülevaate sündmustest ja neis osalenud isikutest, kuid tihtipeale ning ka selle uurimuse jaoks pole see selle põhiliseks väärtuseks. Froissart'i kroonika on täis ebatäpsusi ja eksitusi, kroonik tunnistab ka ausalt oma eesmärgi rääkida suurtest tegudest, mida tulevatele põlvedele eeskujuks tuua. Allikakriitilise vaatenurga läbi võib teda näha kui tegelike sündmuste osas võrdlemisi ebausaldusväärset allikat, oma ürituses anda edasi kirjeldusi mida tema lugejaskond, ehk aadelkond, oleks tahtnud näha, askepteerida ja heroiliseks pidada, muutub Froissart väärtuslikuks aknaks temaaegse aadliku ja rüütli mõtteilma. Tema põhjalike kirjelduste seas on ka arv juhtumeid, mis puudutavad rüütlite vangistamist ja vangis viibimist, mis võimaldavad omajagu pilti rüütlikultuuri mõningastes aspektidesse. Teise üliku vangistamine ja lunaraha eest vabaduse pakkumine oli tavaline praktiseering rüütellikus sõjakunstis, osad ajaloolased nägemas kõrgest soost võitlejate head kohtlemist, samal ajal lihtrahvas east pärinevatest võitlejatest mitte hoolimist, üheks rüütlikultuuri põhitunnusteist. Eelnevalt mainitud kirjeldustest on valitud informatiivsemad nende seas on hulk erinevaid juhtumeid sisaldades kuningas Jean II vangistamist Poitiersi lahingus (1356), väarika vangi kõrget kohtlemist kui ka austasustamist, põgenemisjuhtumeid, ning samuti ka üks omapärane peatükk kahe prantsuse võitleja edust, mis on isegi liiga hea näide isegi Froissarti „tavapärase inspireerivuse“ osas, ning olles üks kasulikemaid tugipunkte teema uurimisel.

Töö on jagatud kaheks suuremaks osaks, alustades rüütellikusega lahinguväljal ja teine läheb üle vähem sõjalistele küsimustele, mis on siiski mõjutatud esimese tähtsusest. Esimene peatükk lahkab kõige suuremat au ja hiilguse allikat rüütlikultuuris sõda ja võitlust, vaadeldes vaprust ja arguse suhet aus ja autuses kui ka esitades küsimuse teemal, kas oli ka võimalust pageda, mida ei nähtud häbiväärsena. Puudutatud saab ka „võimekus“ ehk rüütli suutlikkus sõjas ja võitluses ning natuke sõjakunsti üleüldse. Edu võitluses ja sõjas olemas vaadeldud kui rüütli suurim allikas. Lõpetuseks on vaadeldud asjaolu, et rüütlikultuur mõistis aujahi ja hulljulguse probleeme.

Teises peatükis on käsitletud vandeid, lepinguid, vangide kohtlemist, suuremeelsust kui ka nende mõningaid võimalikke probleemseid kohti. Esimene puudutab vangistust üleüldse, heites pilgu nii sellele teole kui ka rüütlivääriskuse ja halastuse suhtele. Edasised kolm alapeatükki puudutavad, midagi mis väga tugevalt toetus rüütliale, lepinguid ja vandeid, eriti siis vangistamise ja vangistusega seonduvaid. Vaadeldud saab ka küsimus, kas avastades ausidemeid, mis sidusid vangistajat ja vangi võis olla vääritud ja vale pageda vangistusest. Käsitus langeb hetkeks ka karmimatele küsimustele lepete ja vannete murdmisel, heites lühikese pilgu lojaalsus ja reetmisküsimistele, keskendudes pigem viiamstele, millest kirjeldused selgemalt räägivad. Suuremeelsus viib vaatenurga võib olla kõige vähem sõjakamale asjale kõigist vaadeldud rüütlielu osadest, puudutades kinkide tegemist ja suuremeelsust kui viisi näidata oma au kui samas ka selle käigus autustada teisi, visates omamoodi pilgu rüütlipoliitikasse, ning kuidas inglise kuninglikus isikud võisid rakendada suuremeelsust ja pidusõõmasid kui poliitilisi vahendeid. Lõpus arutletakse natuke lunarahade ja rüütliku ahnuse üle.

Üleüldiselt annab töö põhjaliku ülevaate rüütliast ja selle eri tahkudest. Vääriskus oli oluline igale rüütlile, see oli reputatsioon ja hinnang, mis talle anti. Ka vangistusjuhtumid, suure üllatuseta tõestavad, et edukus võitluses, nii suutlikkust kui vaprust omades oli kõige austatum. Samas ühtede suurimate autuse allikate seas oli argus. Nii argust kui vaprust rõhutati aga lihtsa eesmärgiga, et vähendada hirmu mõju rüütlikinnas eas. Kuid vääriskus polnud omandatud vaid sõjas, vaid ka rahuajal seisusekohase käitumisega, mis omajagu mängis rolli omamoodi reputatsiooni- või rüütlipoliitikanäide, ning inglise kuningakoja liikmed rakendasid seda kui poliitilisi võtteid edu nimel. Rüütli ise oli tugev asi, põhiline jõud

millele toetusid lepingud ja nende murdmine võis tuua kaasa tõsiseid probleeme. Kahtlemata polnud rüütliau päris täiesti see, mida tavamõtte eeldab seda olevat. Isegi „päris asi“ tundub esmapilgul rangemana kui tundub. Tegelikult tuleb tõdeda selle arvestatavat praktilisust ja pragmaatilisust, niimõnigi esmapilgul autuna näiv asi aktsepteeritav vastavates olukordades. Rüütlikultuuri aumõiste või kood polnud ei jäik ega paindlik, vaid piisav et haarata enda alla eri hulka tegureid ja lahendusi ning mitte olla kinni väärituna näiva teo taga kui see oleks olnud asjatu või eluohtlik, kuid au ise oli sama reaalne mõiste kui rüütlikultuur, jaht selle järgi oluline, kuid see ise ka vajalik tööriist.

## 7. Appendix

### The exemplary chapter

**Two Frenchman, running away from the battle, are pursued by two Englishmen, who are themselves made prisoner.**

Among the battles, skirmishes, flights and pursuits, which happened in the course of this day, an adventure befel sir Edward de Roucy,<sup>247</sup> which I cannot omit relating in this place. He had left the field of battle, as he perceived the day was irrecoverably lost; and, not wishing to fall into the hands of the English, was got about a league off; when he was pursued by an English knight, his lance in the rest, who cried to him, “*Sir knight, turn about: you ought to be ashamed thus to fly.*” Upon this, sir Edward halted, and the Englishman attacked him, thinking to fix his lance in his target; but he failed, for sir Edward turned the stroke aside, nevertheless he did not miss his own: with his spear he hit his enemy so violent a blow on the helmet, that he was stunned and fell to the ground, where he remained senseless. Sir Edward dismounted, and, placing his lance on his breast, told him that he would certainly kill him, if he did not surrender himself his prisoner, rescued or not. The Englishman surrendered, and went with sir Edward, who afterward ransomed him.

It happened that, in the midst of the general pursuit, a squire from Picardy, named John de Helennes, had quitted the king’s division, and, meeting his page with a fresh horse, had mounted him, and made off as fast as he could. At that time, there was near to him the lord of Berkeley, a young knight, who, for the first time, had that day displayed his banner: he immediately set out in pursuit of him. When the lord Berkeley had followed him for some little time, John de Helennes turned about, put his sword under his arm in the manner of a lance, and thus advanced upon the lord Berkeley, who taking his sword by the handle, flourished it, and lifted up his arm in order to strike the squire as he passed. John de Helennes, seeing the intended stroke, avoided it, but did not miss his own; for as they passed each other, by a blow on the arm he made lord Berkeley’s sword fall to the ground. When the knight found that he had lost his sword, and that the squire had his, he dismounted, and made for the place where his sword lay: but he could not get there before the squire gave him a violent thrust which passed through both his thighs, so that, not being able to help himself, he fell to the ground. John upon this dismounted, and, seizing the sword of the knight,

---

<sup>247</sup> Johnes has translated the names to anglicised variants. True names should possibly be Oudart de Roucy and Jean de Henennes. Froissart on the other hand is mistaken on Maurice de Berkeley's name

advanced up to him and asked him if he were willing to surrender. *The knight required his name: "I am called John de Helennes,"* said he, *"what is your name?"* *"In truth, companion,"* replied the knight, *"my name is Thomas, and I am lord of Berkeley, a very handsome castle situated on the river Severn, on the borders of Wales."* *"Lord of Berkeley,"* said the squire, *"you shall be my prisoner: I will place you in safety, and take care you are healed, for you appear to me to be badly wounded."* The knight answered, *"I surrender myself willingly, for you have loyally conquered me."* He gave him his word that he would be his prisoner, rescued or not. John then drew his sword out of the knight's thighs and the wounds remained open; but he bound them up tightly, and, placing him on his horse, led him a foot-pace to Châtelherault. He continued there, out of friendship to him, for fifteen days, and had medicines administered to him. When the knight was a little recovered, he had him placed in a litter, and conducted him safe to his house in Picardy; where he remained more than a year before he was quite cured, though he continued lame; and when he departed, he paid for his ransom six thousand nobles, so that this squire became a knight by the great profit he got from the lord of Berkeley.



## **Lihtlitsents lõputöö reprodutseerimiseks ja lõputöö üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks**

Mina, \_\_\_\_\_ Marko Rasin (sünd. 15.07.1986) \_\_\_\_\_,

1. annan Tartu Ülikoolile tasuta loa (lihtlitsentsi) enda loodud teose

**„The Chivalric Honour and Dishonour in Context of Descriptions of Capture and Captivity in Froissart's Chronicles“,**

mille juhendaja on prof. Anti Selart,

- 1.1. reprodutseerimiseks säilitamise ja üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemise eesmärgil, sealhulgas digitaalarhiivi DSpace-is lisamise eesmärgil kuni autoriõiguse kehtivuse tähtaja
- 1.2. üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks Tartu Ülikooli veebikeskkonna kaudu, sealhulgas digitaalarhiivi DSpace'i kaudu kuni autoriõiguse kehtivuse tähtaja lõppemiseni.
2. olen teadlik, et punktis 1 nimetatud õigused jäävad alles ka autorile.
3. kinnitan, et lihtlitsentsi andmisega ei rikuta teiste isikute intellektuaalomandi ega isikuandmete kaitse seadusest tulenevaid õigusi.

Tartus 18.05.2015