

The Greek Indignants through the domestic TV news bulletins

Anastasia Veneti, Stamatis Poulakidakos, Kostas Theologou
*Technological Educational Institution of Ionian Islands, University of Athens,
National Technical University of Athens, Greece*

E-mail: anastasia_veneti@yahoo.com, s.poulakidakos@gmail.com,
cstheol@central.ntua.gr

Abstract



The Greek fiscal crisis kicked off many structural changes within the Greek society. Among these the uprising of a new form of protest, the movement of “indignados” (Spanish word meaning *indignants* in English, *aganaktismeni* in Greek). The paper surveys the ways in which the specific movement was presented to the public by the domestic TV news bulletins. The proposed research relies theoretically on the framing analysis approach, aiming to elaborate on the Media point of view regarding the specific social movement. The research method is media monitoring and analysis (stemming from the research rationale of content analysis).

Palavras-chave: social movements, framing, Media monitoring, news bulletins

Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in the condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living.

Blumer, 1939: 199

SOCIOLOGICAL definitions of movements stress their qualities of collective and innovative behaviour, their network character and multi-centrality, their extra-institutional activity, the shifting and fluid boundaries of movement membership, and the willingness of members to disrupt order a little or a lot (Gerlach and Hine, 1970). Social movements are certainly perceived





as phenomena of modernity and the industrialized society, because technological advancements, industrialization, urbanization, and ongoing democratization enhanced people to promote pressure for change collectively (Hobsbawm, 1959; Tilly, 1986). The specific research proposal aims to investigate the ways and modes the social movement of Greek “indignants” was framed by the Greek TV news bulletins.

By the beginning of the 1990s, emphasis among scholars of American social movements on the interaction and the processes involved in making social movements was regained. The specific shift was partially inseminated and developed by European “new social movement” theorists, who attempted to make sense of social activism in the post-industrial, increasingly prosperous societies of Europe. Thus, cultural sociology and social movement theory were more engaged in dialogue than at any time since functionalist analyses of collective behaviour were fashionable. In the U.S., scholars began to take more “social constructionist” views of movement politics, seeking to understand how the availability of resources and opportunities dovetailed with the use of cultural meanings by groups, and the creation of new collective identities (Morris and Mueller 1992: 351-73). Most recently, some sociologists have argued for a much broader “contention” model of movements, which sees struggle as endemic to both institutional and extra-institutional settings, and just as likely to be about cultural issues as about classically political or economic matters (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001).

Therefore, social movements are better defined as collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities rather than expressions of extremism, violence, and deprivation (Tarrow, 1994: 4). A social movement is a form of collective action. As a collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by informal response of the members than by formal procedures for legitimating authority (Turner and Killian, 1987: 223). Social movements are «those organized efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to promote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation» (McAdam, 1982: 25).

Although social movements differ in size, they are all essentially collective; they result from the more or less spontaneous coming together of people whose relationships are not defined by rules and procedures but who merely





share a common outlook on society. Roughly speaking, a social movement is a loosely organized but sustained campaign in support of a social goal, typically either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society's structure or values.¹ Our concept about social movement is rather Hegelian; it identifies with a macroscopic social change fermented with the constituents of the modern society.

History and sociology complement one another as scholarly disciplines because both are concerned with social structures and with the interpretation of social action. Therefore, our perspective on the case of Greek 'indignants' combines both disciplines and applies political communication assessment tools. These protests contain a great deal of political, ideological, ethical and emotional qualities. The entire movement is not about a mere fiscal crisis, but an accumulated anger and fury against the official legislative body, i.e. the Greek Deputies of the National Assembly, the Parliament. Major crises lead to changes of the political systems; the functional frailty of a system may be defined as crisis. To start with the chosen term/word 'indignants' (to resent, to feel aggrieved about something or aggrieved at somebody) is produced by an emotional reaction against a behaviour or a status that one can no longer stand. Despite the Greek idiosyncratic particularities of irresponsibility and viciousness one can identify larger structural issues. The stake now is not merely the fatal last five years, nor the post-war culture developed in Greece. The stake refers to the fundamental and long social arrangement emerged from the various conflicts and clashes during the 20th century and the rest is nothing but their products and local adaptations. It is rather disorienting to insist on a moralist or emotional narration that distresses the public speech since the beginning of the crisis.

Most analyses of social change in Media studies comes under three headings: a) development communication, that focuses on underdevelopment issues, b) cultural studies, focusing on fast-moving styles and cultural trends, and c) political communication, that underlines shifts in the formal political arena (Downing, 2008: 44).

1. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551335/social-movement>





Framing Theory and Social Movements

Framing can already be conceived as an important theoretical and analytical tool for understanding and studying communication. Specifically, as far as the Media is concerned, framing aims to investigate their influence in politics and the audiences, by seeking to form different patterns of presentation of the news published by them.

Lippmann, referring to the Press, first mentioned that “the Press functions as the beam of a headlight moving around continuously, bringing one incident after another from the darkness to the public light” (Lippmann, (1998 [1922])). After a wide range of research, especially in the beginning of 1970’s, Dearing and Rogers defined the agenda setting theory as the series of issues being published, and are therefore considered important within the public sphere, while at the same time other issues remain unpublished and lack in public attention (Dearing & Rogers, 2005: 53). We will show below that the function of Media framing is of a rather similar rationale.

There is a rather wide range of approaches regarding the definition of framing itself (Michalopoulou, 2008: 5). In Architecture and other sciences, framing is being used in a literal way to signify the frames used in constructions. The basic essence is the same in the metaphorical use of framing, which is the underlying of certain aspects of life as opposed to others left aside (Michalopoulou, 2008: 7). According to the sociological approach, frames stand as the mechanism for perceiving complexity of the surrounding world in a simplified way; thus, we are allowed to store the significant information and put aside all unnecessary details. Framing by this approach signifies a natural process in man’s de-codification of the reality (Goffman, 1974: 24; Samaras, 2002: 71). Thus, the framing process is being conducted under the various *subjective* influences and beliefs of each human, so that different people might frame the same event in corresponding different ways.

As a sociological process, framing is applied to the Media too- the prevailing institutions of modern and late modern societies (Pleios, 2011) - by signifying at the same time both the processes conducted by the Media institutions on one hand, and the audience on the other (Scheufele, 1999: 103-122, Gitlin 1980: 11). According to the constructionist approach of Gamson and Modigliani, Media frames have been defined as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events. The frame



suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989: 143).

However, according to the critical paradigm (D’Angelo, 2002: 876), framing inevitably encapsulates power relations. It consistently presents a mode to describe the power of a communicating text, by efficiently involving selection and salience. ‘To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’ (Entman 1993: 53).² In other words, to somehow paraphrase Norris, the essence of framing (at least for the current paper scopes) is the selective prioritization of some facts, images, or developments over others and consequently promoting one or more particular interpretation of events in specific ways, either consciously or unconsciously (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003: 10-11).³



Given the fact that news frames are particular ways in which journalists compose and narrate a news story to optimize audience accessibility, research within this domain investigates the prevalence of specific frames in the news, how certain issues are framed, and why these issues are framed in certain ways (Valkenburg, Semetko & DeVreese 1999: 550).⁴ Fundamental principle of this research tradition which coincides with the aims of the current research project is the fact that journalists inescapably frame or structure their representations of political events, by using certain frames in order to simplify and insemiate them with a special meaning, to maintain audience interest and to serve their own interests.

Our research is enhanced by bibliography concerning some general frames, frequently used by journalists to present the news. Some of the most common typologies are the one by Iyengar, who underlines the thematic and episodic

2. The author defines the word salience too as making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences.

3. Norris exact definition is “the essence of framing is selection to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby unconsciously promoting one particular interpretation of events”.

4. This part of the framing research will be- rather shortly- discussed into the presentation of our conclusions, based on the results that we will have come up with, in the end of the current paper.



ways of presenting the news (Pleios, 2011: 161),⁵ and the one by Semetko and Valkenburg (1999: 551), who distinguish the conflict frame, the human interest frame, the responsibility frame and the economic consequences frame.⁶ Apart from the general frames mentioned above more specific frames, referring to social movements, have been theoretically and empirically grounded. These specific frames constitute the core of the current research attempt.

In a Mass Mediated society, social movements depend on the mass Media in order to transmit their messages to a wider public. According to Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) Media can serve social movements in three possible ways: a) mobilization of political support, b) legitimization (or validation) in the mainstream discourse, and c) to broaden the scope of conflicts. However, Media coverage is not always easily acquired. Regular news bulletins do not focus on social movements, unless these movements stage big public events.

Moreover, the situation is getting even more difficult in cases that the social movement is less well known and challenges the status quo and the established powers or system. This is claimed by many studies (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Westergaard, et al. 1977: 95-115; McChesney, 2008) according to which mainstream Media tend to reflect the existing power structure and consequently avoid presenting opposing views. As Barker argued:

«Social movements that are long lived and effectively institutionalized within society, tend not to challenge the status quo directly, and so consequently are less dependent on media coverage for their survival. However, media coverage may be crucial for those less well known social movements whose often transitional and adversarial nature tends to weaken their ability to secure public legitimacy» (Barker, 2008).

5. Thematic framing focusing on the wider social, political, and financial parameters, presents the event in a way so as to encourage a more profound overview of its causes and effects. On the contrary, episodic framing presents the issue as a standalone event, giving priority to the atomic factor and cutting it off wider social and institutional procedures. The episodic approach coincides with the analysis of Bennett on the fragmentary, dramatized, personalized and normalized character of the news.

6. Apart from the media frames, there are specific identified audiences frames, which are the ways in which people receive and understand the media content. We will not analyze them, because it surpasses the aims of the current project. An *audience-frames* taxonomy can be found in Neuman Russell W, Marion R. Just & Ann N. Crigler (1992), Scheufele Dietram A. (1999).

Nonetheless, the way typical social movements' actions (sit-ins, rallies, mass demonstrations) are reported in the Media is crucially important. The mass communication literature surveys studies which focus on the «marginalization» or even «delegitimization» of many social movements, especially the ones that challenge the status quo, by the mass Media (Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Shoemaker, 1984; McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Traditionally, Media tend to emphasize protesters' violent actions, focus on their appearance and usually downgrade the reasons of their manifestation. This type of Media coverage is best described in the Chan and Lee (1984: 183-202) "protest paradigm".

According to the «protest paradigm», media generally support the status quo and marginalize groups that challenge it in any possible way (McLeod & Detenber, 1999: 5). The marginalization framing, when is adopted by the Media, tend to present protesters as an isolated minority characterized by overt deviant behaviour.

McLeod and Hertdog (1998: 305-330), based on the «protest paradigm», discerned the following categories that characterize social movements activities' Media coverage. The first one is the narrative structure which is in a way the script for the news story. Traditionally, these news stories focus on the violent incidents and tend to emphasize protesters' deviant behaviour (McLeod & Detenber, 1999: 5). This narration creates a conflict story usually around the conflict between the protesters and the police or any other chosen target. According to Gamson (1989: 455-467), sometimes, protesters deliberately engage in a barter arrangement by providing the Media with action that serves Media reasoning, i.e. videos and stills portraying violence, in order to attract Media attention. However, this argument is not applicable at all cases and needs further refinement. The second category is the use of official sources and official definitions. This is predominantly made in order to enhance the prestige of the story as well as to give the impression of neutrality and objectivity through journalistic research. The third category is the invocation to public opinion. According to the «protest paradigm», Media unfolds the news story by using various techniques, such as opinion polls, overt characterizations, invocation of social norms etc. (McLeod & Detenber, 1999: 6).



Finally, it is the tendency to delegitimize, marginalize and demonize the protesters. Several studies (Gitlin, 1980; Martin, 2004) have demonstrated that Media coverage of social movements' activities made them appear more

radical than they really were or in some other cases alienate the nature and public support of the protest. Gitlin (1980) suggested a comprehensive study of the press and television coverage of a mass demonstration held against the Vietnam War, in London (UK) on the 27th of October 1968. Despite the overwhelmingly peaceful nature of the march, the Media concentrated their coverage on the issue of violence, while also using quotation marks around the term «peace march».

In addition, critical coverage is sometimes complemented by another delegitimizing strategy, which involves downplaying the size of a protest (Barker, 2008). The British May Day protests in 1973 and in 2001 and the protests against the bombing of former Yugoslavia serve as prominent examples of this case. Another example of critical Media coverage can be found at the protests opposing the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the study of Catherine Luther and Mark Miller (Barker, 2008) of eight US newspapers on the coverage of the protests against the US invasion in Iraq, it was evident how journalists used delegitimizing cues to refer to anti-war protesters and legitimation cues for those supporting the invasion. According to Barker (2008), activities of social movements that challenge the governments' foreign policies, are less likely to gain media coverage or more likely to be heavily "denigrated and delegitimized". Yet, another example is that of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2005, which the national television deliberately avoid to cover and then downplayed (Dyczok, 2006: 224; Dyczok, 2005: 255-6).

Though most of the Media coverage of social movements tends to be reluctant or even critical towards them, we should not omit the fact that in some cases Media (mainly referring to independent media, but not only) supported them (Barker, 2008; Sulkanishvili, 2003). Particularly, the independent Media in Serbia (particularly, *Radio B 92*) supported the street protest and facilitated the regime change and Georgia's independent Media proved their crucial contribution in challenging legitimacy of their authoritarian government led by President Eduard Shevardnadze (Barker, 2008; Sulkanishvili, 2003: 2).

In short, the framing of news stories concerning social movements it's dual nature and importance. News report structures (Media frames) offer to their audience aspects of perceived reality. Thus, specific interpretations, attributions or evaluations are suggested to recipients of the Media messages. Therefore, Media framing is mostly crucial in the formation of public opin-





ion. In this paper, we focus on the examination of the coverage of the Greek *indignants* by their national Greek Media.

Research method, research outline and hypotheses

The main purpose of this research-as has already been mentioned- is to investigate the ways and modes the Greek “indignants” movement was framed by the Greek TV news bulletins. Television is chosen as the medium for examination due to its sovereignty within the national Media field (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Furthermore, the news bulletins function as the main information source for public opinion. Under this rationale, the proposed research relies theoretically on the framing analysis approach, mainly aiming to elaborate on the Medias’ point of view regarding the specific social movement.

Media monitoring can be considered as part of the content analysis research methodology, especially under the scope used in the current research. Content analysis’ main aim is to produce inferences from a specific text (Weber, 1990). It is a research methodology that aims to examine words or phrases within a wide range of text, a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. Researchers quantify and analyse the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part (Berelson, 1971). Within the range of texts, that content analysis may examine, are included books, essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theatre, or really any occurrence of communicative language. The variety of “texts” on which a content analysis can be applied shows its useful character (Budd, Thorp et. al, 1967). Apart from the variety of texts on which content analysis is applicable as a research method, there are also other advantages. Among others, content analysis offers the researcher the chance to conduct both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the texts under examination, being an obtrusive means of analysing content.

Media monitoring has been defined as the research method aiming at the systematic collection, analysis and use of information concerning the Media for a given period of time (or continuously) and with a certain frequency



(based mostly on the renewal frequency of the Media content). It includes not only the investigation of Media content, but of Media structures, Media function, Media regulation framework and the consumption of Media content as well, aiming- finally- at the comparative presentation of all these different Media perspectives. Moreover, “Media monitoring should be based on a concrete theoretical background, so as to provide understanding of the Media and their social contexts” (Pleios, 2011: 221).



Even though Media monitoring can be expanded in different Media aspects, we implement its most well-known feature, the one of media content research and analysis. Our examination covers the period from 25th of May (the day of the first “indignants” protest) to the end of July, when “indignants” made their last before-summer gathering. As far as the TV channels are concerned, we choose three channels based on their character (1 public NET and 2 private ones MEGA, and ANT1) and their spectatorship at the time of our research. The data gathered are to be processed using SPSS 19 and the coders reliability will be tested using the North, Holsti, Zaninovich and Zinnes coders’ reliability test (1969).⁷ Lastly, our unit of analysis is the news item, the part of the news bulletin between two introductions of the anchor(wo)man.

Stemming from our theoretical background, our main research question is formed as follows: How- in terms of framing- is the Greek “indignants” (from now on referred to as “indignants”) movement presented by the Greek prime-time TV news bulletins?

The research question can be “analysed” into several research hypotheses, which further define the ways- in terms of framing of social movements- of the presentation of the “indignants” in the news bulletins:

- H 1. According to our theory mainstream media tend to marginalize social movements, in terms of presenting them as core of overt and deviant behaviour. We expect a similar stance towards the “indignants” from the Greek TV news bulletins and especially from the public channel (NET), which mainly reflects the governmental point of view on the issues presented.
- H 2. In addition, the “indignants” are expected to be presented as delegitimized and demonized by the TV news bulletins.

7. $R = 2(C1, C2) / (C1 + C2)$, with 70% as minimum level of credibility.





- H 3. Due to being a movement challenging the existent political status quo, the news bulletins are expected to downgrade the reasons of the “indignants” manifestation
- H 4. The conflict frame is expected to have a protagonist role in the presentation of the “indignants”, especially when combined to the presence of the police in the places, where demonstrations are taking place.
- H 5. Additionally, the news bulletins are expected to make use of official sources too (governmental sources, police etc.), so as to describe and report the development of the “indignants” movement.
- H 6. As far as the size of the protests, we expect- based on our theory- that the news bulletins will downplay it, trying to undermine the importance of the movement.
- H 7. Finally, we expect a rather rare coverage of the protests of the indignants (less than 1 news item per day), even though demonstrations were taking place on a daily basis in the streets of Athens and other cities among Greece.

Results

As far as our first hypothesis- the marginalization of social movements by the mainstream media- is concerned, one can observe a lack of serious marginalization attempt of the indignants by the media we examined. In respectively high percentages (84.6%, 65% and 72.3%) all three channels of our research (NET, MEGA, ANT1), avoid in general the negative marginalization-attribution of deviant, according to prevailing moral and behavioral values, behavior- of the protesters.⁸ On the contrary, there is- especially in the private channels, MEGA and ANT1- an attempt of “positive marginalization” of the indignants, by presenting them as something “fresh” and “new”, which is not connected to the traditional party division of the citizens and therefore to the “corrupted” and “incapable” political system (Figure 1). The above described result leads us to the rejection of our first research hypothesis. Hence,

8. Our chi square statistic test is not valid for the current cross-tabulation, because of the relatively high percentage of values below 5 within the cross-tabulation. Therefore we cannot claim that there exists or not a statistically significant relationship between of the channel and marginalization frame variables.



the channels of our research did not try to marginalize in a negative way the Greek indignants.




Figure 1.

As far as our second hypothesis, the delegitimization and demonization of the indignants, is concerned, we measured both the description and projection of the indignants as violent and illegal protesters, taking- at the same time- into consideration both the journalistic discourse and the video footage.

Beginning with the violent acts in discourse, the indignants are being characterized as violent only in a small minority of the journalistic discourse (15.4% in NET, 5% in MEGA, 6.4% in ANT1). On the contrary, in most cases- especially in the private channels (MEGA 53.8%, ANT1 60.6%)- the indignants are described as a peaceful movement. The public channel adopts a more moderate stance, compared to the private ones, though our statistic test does not reveal a statistically significant relationship between the channels and the violent acts (p value $0.127 > 0.05$) (Figure 2).

Similar, but with statistically significant difference between the channels and the violence frame (χ^2 p value $0.017 < 0.05$), is the video presentation of the indignants, where the majority of the images shown by the channels (NET 51.3%, MEGA 67.5%, ANT1 69.1%) enhance the peaceful character of the rallies. On one hand, this peaceful character in the videos is




Figure 2.

underlined by the projection of images from “within” the protest and by interviews of protesters taking part in the rallies, whereas, on the other hand, only a small minority of video footage (15.4% in NET, 3.8% in MEGA and 14.9% in ANT1) shows violent actions related to the indignants protests. In the remaining percentage, where the violent acts’ frame simply does not exist (33.3% in NET, 28.8% in MEGA and 16% in ANT1), the footage shown from the protests was captured by cameras from a rather big distance from the gathered crowd, and without statements of people participating in the protest. Therefore, one could not discriminate possible violent or non violent actions. Hence, the video in these cases was coded as “not showing violence” (Figure 3).

Apart from the violence frame, deligitimization can be traced- according to our theory- by examining possible attempts of stressing out the illegal character of the protests. In this case too, our examination covers both the journalistic discourse and the video. Beginning with the discourse, one can observe an almost total lack of characterization of the protests as illegal on behalf of the journalists (NET 94.9%, MEGA 87.5%, ANT1 78.7%). Moreover, there is a significant percentage of cases- especially in ANT1, whose




Figure 3.

percentage reaches a 21.3%- when the protests are characterized as legal, a rather supportive stance towards the indignants (Figure 4).⁹

Similar is the depiction of the indignants, as far as the illegal character frame is concerned, in the video too. Channels, in general, either do not depict the protests as illegal (NET 94.9%, MEGA 85%, ANT1 85.1%), or underline the legal character of the protests by showing in the video footage their demands and commenting on them in a positive way (NET 10.3%, MEGA 11.3%, ANT1 12.8%)¹⁰ (Figure 5).

The results of Figures 2-5 make us reject our second research hypothesis, according to which the “indignants” would be presented as delegitimized and demonized by the TV news bulletins.

Our next research hypothesis deals with the downgrading of the reasons of the indignants movement by the news bulletins, due to the fact that media tend

9. Our chi square statistic test is not valid for the current cross-tabulation, because of the relatively high percentage of values below 5 within the cross-tabulation (33.3%). Therefore we cannot claim that there exists or not a statistically significant relationship between of the “channel” and “illegal character of protest in discourse” frame variables.

10. Once more our chi square statistic test is not valid for the current cross-tabulation, because of the relatively high percentage of values below 5 within the cross-tabulation (44.4%). Therefore we cannot claim that there exists or not a statistically significant relationship between of the “channel” and “illegal character of protest in video” frame variables.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.

to support- especially in crisis situations- the existing status quo. Our results demonstrate that not only news bulletins do not downgrade the reasons of the movement, but- especially the private channels' news bulletins- appear rather to support the indignants (MEGA and ANT1 reporters mention in a positive

way the causes and aims of the indignants protests in almost 30% of news items), as shown in Figure 6.¹¹




Figure 6.

Our next hypothesis deals with the presence of the conflict frame in the presentation of the “indignants”. Following the preceding rationale, we divided the conflict frame in discourse and video conflict. The conflict frame in discourse consists of journalists presenting the indignants’ protests as a reaction to austerity measures, government policies, political actors etc.

Within the journalistic discourse, the conflict frame can be traced in more than 75% of the cases in all three channels we examined, providing us at the same time with a chi square that shows a statistically non significant relationship between the “channels” and the “conflict frame in discourse” variables (p value $0.923 > 0.05$) (Figure 7).

Quite different is the presence of the conflict frame in the video footage of the channels. Primarily the public channel (NET) and secondarily MEGA do not frame- in the majority of their news items- the videos of the indignants protests with a conflict frame (either by showing their banners against

11. Our chi square statistic test does not show any significant difference between the three channels of our research as far as the downgrading of the indignados is concerned (chi square p value = $0.075 > 0.05$)




Figure 7.

the government and the austerity measures, or by presenting statements of members of the “indignants” against the current situation in Greece). Quite the opposite happens in ANT1, where in the majority of the videos (52.1%) the conflict frame is evident. This difference between the channels provides us with a statistically significant chi square, which implies that the presence of conflict frame in videos varies among the three different channels we examined (p value $0.016 < 0.05$) (Figure 8).

Apart from the existence- or not- of a conflict frame, one should comment on the “objects” of this conflict, the institutions or persons against which the indignados are presented to demonstrate. Our next Figure (9), shows us that the indignados are presented to demonstrate mainly against the imposed austerity measures and the MoU, the- widely considered corrupted and incapable-political system, and more specific against the government, either as a whole, or one or more of its members. This Figure also depicts the differences of conflict frame depiction among the channels. The public network (NET) appears to avoid presenting the indignados in a conflict way, whereas ANT1 stresses out the conflict rationale of the indignados more frequent than any




Figure 8.

ither channel.¹² These results lead us to the acceptance of our third hypothesis regarding the prevalence of the conflict frame, as the last is more evident and overwhelmingly prevalent- in the journalistic discourse and less evident in the videos.

As far as the sources of the news are concerned, news bulletins are expected to make use of official sources to a rather significant extent (governmental sources, police etc.), so as to describe and report the development of the “indignants” movement. Quite opposite from what we expected, the vast majority of news items concerning the indignants does not make use of official sources to report the movement. To become specific, all three channels use official sources for less than 20% of the news items concerning the indignants. This fact alone makes us reject our fifth working hypothesis (Figure 10).

Another important element in the presentation of a protest is the estimation on its size. According to the critical theory concerning the media presentation of social movements, we expect that the news bulletins will downplay the size

12. Though there are differences between the channels as far as the conflict is concerned, SPSS does not produce a chi square test for this cross-tabulation, because the conflict variable is a group variable.




Figure 9.




Figure 10.

of the protests, trying to undermine the importance of the movement. Once again we had to reject our- theory based- working hypothesis. Not only is

there a lack of downgrading of the protests, but the news bulletins in a rather significant percentage (NET 38.5%, MEGA 41.3%, ANT1 48.9%) refer to the size of the protests in a rather fluttering way, by underlining the massive participation in the movement (Figure 11).¹³




Figure 11.

Last but not least is our hypothesis on the infrequent presentation of the indignants by the TV news bulletins. The rare coverage of protests stands as a way for the mainstream media to downgrade the importance of such protests. According to this rationale, we expect that the indignants will appear in the news bulletins with a frequency of less than one news item per day for the period of our examination, even though their presence in the streets of Athens was on a daily basis. The next Figure (12) shows us that the amount of news items (213) for a total of 68 days of continuous presence in the streets, gives us an average of more than three news items per day (3.13), a frequent presentation of the indignants. What we should note in this quantitative analysis of the depiction of the indignants movement is that the public channel (NET)

13. Our chi square statistic test is not valid for the current cross-tabulation, because of the relatively high percentage of values below 5 within the cross-tabulation (33.3%). Therefore we cannot claim that there exists or not a statistically significant relationship between of the “channel” and “downsizing of the protest” frame variables.

dedicates far less news items to the indignants compared to the two private channels (39 compared to 80 of MEGA and 94 of ANT1).




Figure 12.

In addition, even though NET presents the indignants' news items in a higher ranking than both the private channels- the mean order of the news item is 6.49 in NET, 9.86 in ANT1 and 10.46 in MEGA-,¹⁴ the duration of these news items appears to be slightly- and not statistically significant, according to our ANOVA test-¹⁵ shorter than the average duration of the news items in MEGA and ANT1 (Figures 13 & 14).

The image becomes a little bit different if we divide the overall presentation of the indignants movement in different periods. As Figure 15 shows, the majority of the news items concerning the indignants appear within the first two weeks from their outburst (108 news items), another 42% was aired until the end of June, whereas July has an average of only 0.5 news items per day.

14. The ANOVA test we conducted showed a significant difference on the average order of the news item between the three channels we examined in the 99% significance level (ANOVA p value= 0.000 < 0.001)

15. ANOVA p value= 0.695 > 0.05 (the average durations of the news items do not vary significantly in the 95% significance level).




Figure 13.




Figure 14.

The results depicted in Figures 12- 15 lead us to the partial rejection of our fourth hypothesis on the downgraded presentation of the indignants, due




Figure 15.

to the fact that the frequency of the presentation of the indignants is not equally divided either in terms of the channel presenting them (NET has significantly less news items than the private channels and an average of 0.57 news items per day, with the least mean duration per news item), or in terms of the time period of the indignants activities (more than 90% of the news items until the end of June and only 0.5 news items per day during July).

Based on the various frame categories we included in our research according to our theory, and the use of these frames- either in a negative or a positive way- by the news bulletins, we came up with a mean support rate, based on qualitative characteristics of the presentation of the indignants, of each channel towards the indignants (Figure 16).

Within a range from one to 5, where 1 stand for totally against and 5 means totally supportive, ANT1 takes the first place as the most supportive channel towards the indignados (mean 4.14), followed by MEGA (3.89), and NET which appears to adopt a rather neutral attitude with a mean of 3.23. The ANOVA statistic test we conducted showed us that the three means have a statistically significant variance (p value $0.000 < 0.05$).






Figure 16.

Conclusion

The results we came up with demonstrate, most of our working hypotheses (6 out of 7) have been rejected by our empirical findings. The critical Media framing theory was proven inapt of predicting the attitude of Greek mainstream Media towards the indignants. It is certain that Greek mainstream Media did not develop an altruism and friendly attitude towards domestic social movements unexpectedly.

A first reasonable account for their rather positive standpoint is that the 'indignants' was a movement with international impact and powerful momentum already in another European country of the south, Spain, which offered the necessary boost and an *ad hoc raison d' être*. Furthermore, the Greek 'indignants' had some very attractive mediawise characteristics: they claimed to be "non-partified", but not in an apolitical manner; they combined a sense of national identity (channels are attracted to acts of patriotism) with citizenship qualities; they seemed detached from the ideological streams of modernity and against a corrupted and inefficient political system, a rather widely adopted view.

The Greek Media are considered as an integral part (and accessory) of this corrupted system; they are at the same time organizations and business enter-





prises depending financially on their viewers (through advertisement). Therefore, they have to incorporate a *populist* profile, especially in times of generally slow economics and recession, in order to maintain- or even enhance- their audiences, aiming to secure the best possible percentage from a continuously shrinking advertisement market.

Taking into consideration the importance of new forms of social protest for any political system, this paper could expand both domestically, so as to investigate the attitude of more Greek TV channels towards the indignants, and internationally, in order to investigate similar forms of social protest as well as the attitudes of other countries' Media in reference to these forms of protest. The movement of 'indignants' was further expanded, mainly in countries with diagnosed serious financial problems (apart from Greece, in Italy, and more recently in the UK, as well as the Occupy Wall Street movement in the USA); it differs fundamentally from similar previous movements, because it constitutes an ad hoc and straight dispute to sovereign political and social institutional structures. The aim of a further research would be to produce comparative results from different countries.

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