

Heraclitus, Seaford and Reversible Exchange

Abstract

In this essay we identify a characteristic pattern of Heraclitus' thought and language, the "figure of reversible exchange". We suggest that this figure allows Heraclitus to propose an ontological structure consisting of two intersecting circuits of relations: a pre-temporal reversible exchange between Being and Becoming and between One and Many, and a temporal reversible exchange within the Many as the very process of Becoming. Against Richard Seaford's interpretation of Heraclitus' thought as a reflection of a new world-view predicated on universal exchange-value, the Heraclitus fragments will be read as suggesting that exchange-value emerges within rhythms of concrete, temporal use-value. We shall argue that this instantiates the wider relation Heraclitus proposes between Being and Becoming.

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Introduction

A ‘figure of reversible exchange’ can be discerned in the fragments of Heraclitus. Again and again we encounter this rhetorical pattern: in the first part of a fragment multiplicity is framed and contained within unity, only for this movement subsequently to be inverted. This inversion, a chiasmus, is not merely a discursive tool of emphasis through contrast; its usage in forming watery and unstable contrasts between the Many and the One, and between Becoming and Being, suggests that the figure operates in Heraclitus with metaphysical stakes. An invitation to an analysis of the philosophical stakes of the language of the Heraclitus fragments has long been open: whereas in the *Rhetoric* (III, 5) Aristotle criticizes Heraclitus for a lack of clarity caused by inadequate punctuation, Hegel suggested that precisely the fluidity of syntax represents and operates a ‘profound speculative thought’, in which ‘the identity which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate’.ⁱ In recent years Poster has urged recognition that Heraclitus’s surviving fragments can be productively read as embodying ‘the rhetorical and hermeneutic consequences of an ontology of flux within a tradition of religio-philosophical rhetoric’, since language itself is ‘part of a radical instability of the world’.ⁱⁱ With caution but also a sense of adventure – we are not classical philologists – we here offer reflections which aim to develop such a reading of Heraclitus. It will be argued that Heraclitus presents an account of Being and Becoming not as a stable opposition but rather as moments within a differential movement, a rhythm. In contrast to any strict division between appearance and reality, Heraclitus enacts this radical thought of Being and Becoming at the very surface of his text.

In particular, our reading of Heraclitus has been prompted as a response to Richard Seaford's *Money and the Early Greek Mind* and *Cosmology and the Polis*, two recent monographs in which he presents an account of pre-Socratic Greek philosophy as a projection of socio-economic developments in an emergent monetary economy. Rather than presenting a definitive reading of Heraclitus, our aim here is to productively destabilise the account offered by Seaford, who subsumes Heraclitus into the tradition that preceded him, producing a Heraclitus whose philosophy situates particular concrete exchanges within the universal of exchange-value. If Heraclitus is, we argue, read in the context of the process of monetisation, attention to the figure of reversible exchange undermines the attempt to ground exchange within universal exchange-value, to resolve difference within an undisturbed identity. His thought and his discourse situate such an idea as a moment and reification of the rhythms of concrete, temporal use-value, an instance in the wider relation he proposes between Being and Becoming. It will be suggested that Heraclitus proposes an ontological structure consisting of two intersecting circuits of relations: a pre-temporal reversible exchange between Being and Becoming and between One and Many, and a temporal reversible exchange within the Many as the very process of Becoming. Offering a further potential value of this reading of Heraclitus, we close by considering that part of Nietzsche's sense of growing distance from Schopenhauer – central to his own philosophical development - was occasioned by a reading of Heraclitus with parallels to the one presented here.

The figure of reversible exchange

Throughout the fragments of Heraclitus we encounter a frequent juxtaposition of One and Many, grammatical singular and plural, most importantly in fr. 36/50,ⁱⁱⁱ 37/30,^{iv}

40/90, 50/12, 54/41, 83/53, 119/64, 121/66, 123/67 and 124/10 (as well as, implicitly, in the fragments concerned with the “unity of opposites”). This pattern of juxtaposition pervades even apparently non-ontological domains of Heraclitus’ thought, such as fragments of a more political slant: fr. 30/114, 62/39, 63/49, 64/121, 97/29. In this, Vlastos observes, Heraclitus can be read as engaging with a terrain of philosophical thought shaped by Anaximander’s stark division between Being and Becoming; we would argue, however, that Vlastos (like Seaford) overemphasises the continuity between Anaximander and Heraclitus.^v Whereas Anaximander’s thought pivots on a radical opposition between unity and multiplicity, this opposition is figured in Heraclitus such that it repeatedly wavers and collapses; the One is dispersed into or already contains the Many. As Schindler has proposed, the Heraclitus fragments can be productively read as ‘responding to Anaximander, who seems to have viewed the differentiation of things from each other as an act of injustice requiring expiation’:

For Heraclitus, by contrast, a view such as Anaximander’s would undermine the equiprimordiality of unity and difference; thus, there is indeed a kind of strife implied in differentiation, but this is not an injustice, but justice itself, precisely because the manyness of the world is in itself good: strife is justice because the opposition implied in differentiation makes things be what they are.^{vi}

Let us examine fr. 123/67:

ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη χειμῶν θέρος πόλεμος εἰρήνη κόρος λιμός.
ἀλλοιοῦται δε ὅκωσπερ ὀκόταν συμμιγῆ θυώμασιν ὀνομάζεται καθ’
ἡδονῆν ἐκάστου.^{vii}

[The god day night winter summer war peace satiety hunger. It changes
just as when, mingled with perfumes, it is named according to the scent of
each.]

This fragment has often been seen as an assertion of the underlying unity of the oppositional pairings of the first sentence, with the θεός as a proto-Aristotelian ὑποκείμενον [substrate] in accordance with Aristotle’s reading of Heraclitus as a material monist.^{viii} According to Robinson’s commentary, for instance, ‘its clear import is that change in the cosmos is never more than the incidental change of what is in itself changeless’.^{ix} Such a reading, however, rather hauls itself up by its own bootstraps, since contemporary commentaries have been influenced by Diels’ editorial insertion of πῦρ before συμμιγῆ. This reading, presuming that meaning must by definition be coherent, entirely ignores the dispersive syntactic movement of the first sentence: the opening nominative singular creates the expectation of a singular verb to frame the list of opposites, yet the fragment refuses such closure, leaving the sentence to open out into ever more nominatives, an assemblage never totalised as predicate of a verb. A reading bent on such closure also ignores the clear statement that this assemblage ‘changes’, with no suggestion of underlying identity.

A similar dispersive refusal of closure occurs in fr. 54/41. The fragment commences with an emphatic singularity (‘ἐν τὸ σοφόν [one is the wise]’) but does not end likewise, opening instead into ‘κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων [everything

is steered through *or* by everything]’ where one might perhaps have expected διὰ ἐνός (as in fr. 119/64 and 30/114).^x Heraclitus may allude here to a possible fragment of Anaximander preserved by Aristotle, that τὸ ἄπειρον ‘περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν [surrounds all things and steers all things]’.^{xi} But whereas Anaximander’s syntax encloses the plural object within singular verbs, Heraclitus’ disperses the singular verb into multiplicity as both subject (πάντα, neuter plural subject of a grammatically singular verb) and agent (διὰ πάντων).

The dispersive movement of One into Many is of particular sophistication in fr. 83/53:

πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς
μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε
τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.

[War is father of all, king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as
men, some he makes slaves, others free].

The syntactic structure of the first clause permits a double framing of πάντων by parallel nominative singulars, suggesting the containment of multiplicity within a unitary regulating order. This suggestion is reinforced by the sustained alliteration of word-initial labial plosives, which holds the entire clause within a single sonic unity. The teleological structure is familiar from the Anaximander fragment, which likewise deploys alliteration and framing to reinforce syntactic closure. In the Heraclitus fragment, the double repetition of μὲν . . . δὲ at first suggests that the balanced rhythm of the first clause will be replicated in the remaining clauses. Yet this

expectation is at once inverted: the second and third clauses each frame singular verbs with plural objects, suggesting the dissemination of unity into multiplicity. Returning to the first clause, we find that the One governing πάντα is not τὸ ἄπειρον but πόλεμος, grammatically singular but in sense irreducibly plural, as in fr. 82/80 (‘γινόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἔριν [all things come to be in accordance with strife]’).

In fr. 83/53, then, Heraclitus first frames and contains the Many within the One, then inverts this movement in the second and third clauses, dispersing the One back into the Many. Whereas the Anaximander fragment employs chiasmus solely to close the judicial arc of secession from and return to the One, here the fragment deploys chiasmus of syntactic organisation in a movement of reversible exchange between Many and One, One and Many. This chiastic *figure of reversible exchange* is at least as characteristic a pattern of Heraclitus’ thought and language as the figure of the ‘geometric mean’ identified by Fränkel.^{xii} It is most apparent in fr. 124/10, where unity is produced from multiplicity only to reproduce multiplicity from itself:

σுλλάψιες· ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον
διᾶδον, ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.

[Graspings: wholes and not wholes, converging diverging, consonant
dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all].

The closed arc of Anaximander’s fragment is re-opened both by the inversion in order of becoming-One and becoming-Many and by the quadruple repetition of the figure with asyndeton, suggesting an unending reversible cycle.^{xiii}

It can be noted that even the divine One itself, so often held to underlie and totalise all differences, is structured at the surface of Heraclitus' text according to a profound instability and reversibility between One and Many, and between signifier and signified. On the one hand, numerous fragments refer to various things (fire, war, strife, justice, ἄρμονίη [structure, adjustment], the wise, the θεός, αἰών [lifetime, eternity], and so forth) in such a way as to imply some position as divinity or cosmic principle. A complex network of interconnections and allusions is established between these terms; yet no identification between them is ever clinched. For example, fr. 54/41 and 119/64 are connected by two (different) verbs meaning 'steer'; should τὸ σοφόν [the wise] thus be identified with κεραυνός [thunderbolt], as interchangeable signifiers for the same underlying signified? Is κεραυνός to be identified, as Hippolytus assumes,^{xiv} with πῦρ [fire], which is itself potentially connected to numerous other terms? On the other hand, such terms are often used promiscuously; for example, σοφόν in fr. 118/32 connotes a divine principle, but in fr. 36/50 and 54/41 human wisdom, while in fr. 27/108 it hovers between the two senses.^{xv} Such a movement of signifiers is explicitly referred to in fr. 123/67, as well as in fr. 118/32:

ἔν τὸ σοφὸν μόνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἑθέλει καὶ ἑθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.

[The wise one alone is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of

Zeus.]

The divine iridesces between singularity and plurality in the very fabric of its name(s).

Many and one

The figure of reversible exchange in Heraclitus stands in striking contrast to the philosophical and rhetorical relation between Many and One in the Anaximander fragment. The teleological structure of the Anaximander fragment, whereby the interchange of τὰ ὄντα directs itself towards the realisation of justice and reproduction of unity, is predicated on the radical transcendence recorded in the term “ἄπειρον”, which Diels translates “das grenzenlos-Unbestimmbare” (the limitless-indeterminable).^{xvi} Limit, difference, multiplicity and transience characterise only that which has departed from Being. For Anaximander, the differential movement of τὰ ὄντα is thus entirely exterior to τὸ ἄπειρον, playing across its surface but not articulating its essence.

In breaking open the closed cadences of teleology in the figure of reversible exchange, Heraclitus also breaks down the transcendence on which teleology is based: the One is no longer external to and prior to the Many, on the contrary the One *is* the Many, ‘ἐν πάντα εἶναι [one thing is all things *or* all things are one thing]’ (fr. 36/50). Just as fr. 124/10 has been read in terms of the reconciliation of difference within unity, so the ambiguity of these words in fr. 36/50 has been widely ignored; not rhetorically structured according to the figure of reversible exchange, ἐν and πάντα are nonetheless syntactically reversible as subject and predicate.^{xvii} If Heraclitus here asserts a unity beneath the multiple, he also defines that unity as multiplicity itself, articulated by difference to the full depth of its being.^{xviii}

The plausibility of such a reading of fr. 36/50 is strengthened by a series of fragments which situate the One as the differential structure of the Many, the very multiplicity of the multiple as such. First among these is fr. 50/12:

ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.

[Upon those stepping into the same rivers ever different waters flow.]

The authenticity of this fragment has been much disputed, and will not be further debated here – save to note, in reply to Vlastos' charge that the contrast between the sentence's two cola is 'milder than what one expects from Heraclitus',^{xix} that watery, dissolute contrasts are entirely characteristic of the Heraclitean figure of reversible exchange. The contrast between the two cola of fr. 50/12 is established not only by the semantic opposition between τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν and ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα, but also by the sudden sonic displacement of diphthongs (principally οἶ) by short vowels, of heavy by light syllables, of sibilant and labial by dental and liquid consonants. Two dissimilar sound worlds are articulated, such that in the first colon the flow of breath is almost unbroken, while in the second it is fractured and discontinuous. Such an effect is reinforced by the displacement in the second colon of smooth by rough breathings, strongly sonically marking word-division, and by the shift from word-medial (usually circumflex) accent in the first colon to word-initial (usually acute) accent in the second: the first colon flows smoothly from one word to the next, whereas in the second colon aspiration and sudden pitch elevation split the words jaggedly from one another. The sonic continuity of the first colon is further strengthened by the near-homoioteleuton of all four of its words, creating a smoothly repetitive rhyme pattern.

The semantic contrast between One and Many, the continuous flow of the river and the displacement of waters, is thus sonically articulated across the two

halves of the fragment. We may perhaps identify in Heraclitus' reliance on sound effects to create meaning a partial solution to a question which has long puzzled commentators: why does Heraclitus speak of 'those stepping' in the plural? Certainly the plural is awkward in terms of sense; but the sonic contrast is severely weakened if ἐμβάίνουσιν is replaced by ἐμβάίνοντι. The remainder of the solution, however, lies in the fragment's syntactic dynamics. Not only ἐμβάίνουσιν but also ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν is given in the plural, where sense might have dictated the singular; conversely, in the second colon Heraclitus exploits the Greek usage of singular verb with neuter plural subject (as at fr. 54/41, 93/88). If the sonic contrast between the fragments establishes an opposition between unity and multiplicity, syntax is deployed to subvert such an opposition, such that we encounter multiplicity already within unity and vice versa.

Such a counterpoise of sound and syntax is not merely a dramatisation of the sense of the fragment. It also alludes to the pervasive figure of reversible exchange, which likewise both opposes One to Many and renders porous the boundary between them. In fr. 50/12, however, this figure is drawn in and overlaid upon itself. In other instances of the figure, the opposition of One and Many necessarily precedes the movement of exchange between them; each is stolidly presented before it can be volatilised towards the other, as in fr. 124/10 (ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα) and 36/50 (ἓν πάντα εἶναι). Refusing the strictly chiasmic structure in fr. 50/12, Heraclitus determines the One *already* as the Many, the Many *already* as the One; reversible exchange here passes into an identity in which the One is thought as the structure of the Many. If the fragment's first colon sonically pictures the unity of the river as continuous flow (of breath, of water), the second colon dissolves flow (ῥόος) into the very movement of waters in the verb ἐπιρρεῖ, apparently singular yet

semantically plural. Flow is the very structure of difference (ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα) with relation (ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα), that which remains perpetually the same (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν) only in the constant interchange of waters. In fr. 50/12, alluding to the figure of reversible exchange yet raising it to a higher power, we encounter the metaphysical stakes of this figure: that which remains the same is the structure of inter-relation which articulates the Many in its multiplicity, the One *is* the Many.

Seaford and exchange-value in fr. 40/90

Having now identified the figure of reversible exchange in the Heraclitus fragments, let us consider the impact of our analysis on a significant recent interpretation of Heraclitus. An instance of the figure of reversible exchange in the Heraclitus fragments occurs in fr. 40/90:

πυρὸς ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ
χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός.

[For fire all things are an exchange and fire for all things, just as goods for gold and gold for goods.]

This fragment plays a decisive role in Richard Seaford's interpretation of the Heraclitean cosmos in *Money and the Early Greek Mind* and *Cosmology and the Polis*. Like other sixth-century Ionian philosophers from Anaximander onwards, Heraclitus' thought is understood as a projection of 'the power of money to unify all goods and all men into a single abstract system'.^{xx} In making this claim, Seaford is

not simply in agreement with Marx, who suggests that the idea of money as ‘a general, eternal quality of nature’ works to justify and naturalise ‘the eternity and harmoniousness of the existing social relations’.^{xxi} Rather, Seaford aligns his interpretation with the first few lines of an aphorism in Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*: ‘metaphysical categories are not merely an ideology concealing the social system; at the same time they express its nature, the truth about it, and in their changes are precipitated those in its most central experiences.’^{xxii} For Seaford, the projection of money into the cosmos by the Milesian philosophers does not simply reify and naturalise emergent capital exchange, but is also a precipitate of the experience of this new socio-economic formation.

Accepting Plato’s reading in the *Cratylus* (402a) of Heraclitus as a theorist of universal flux or exchange, Seaford connects this to the fluid circulation of commodities and coinage within a monetary economy. Such circulation is possible only on the basis of an abstract, numerical exchange-value which transcends all commodities and of which they are representations: ‘like Heraclitean fire...monetary value is a single entity that in a sense persists (albeit transformed) throughout all exchanges’.^{xxiii} As Seaford argues in *Cosmology and the Polis*, ‘Monetised society and the Herakleitean cosmos are both informed by an unlimited cycle of constant transformation governed by an abstract formula (*logos*) embodied in a single element (fire) that is exchanged into and from all things “like goods for gold and gold for goods”’.^{xxiv} Seaford argues that the birth of ‘modern money’ in the sixth-century *polis* requires the development of fiduciarity, the communal attribution to coins of exchange-value in excess of their use-value, such that the value of a coin inheres in it not immediately and concretely but indirectly as a *sign* of universal exchange-value. This logic of signification is applied also to commodities exchanged for coins:

commercial transactions are understood as the interchange of replaceable signifiers for the same signified. The fluid exchangeability of commodities and coinage thus corresponds to and relies upon the absolute, qualitatively undifferentiated homogeneity of numerical exchange-value, the transcendent measure permitting quantitative commensuration of all goods. The qualitative specificity of different objects, as of parties to exchange with potentially quite opposed interests, is neutralised by monetisation. All exchange is contained and regularised within a unitary system governed by a homogeneity which traverses but is not itself articulated by the difference between objects: ‘in Herakleitos this unity of opposites is constantly transformed into a cycle by the cosmic *logos*-in-fire, and all things are one (fire): this reflects the power of socially circulating abstract value to homogenise all differences’.^{xxv}

Seaford’s reading accords the reversibility of the One-Many exchange a leading role in the development of Greek philosophy: ‘[in] presocratic metaphysics...universal power belongs to an abstract substance which is, like money, transformed into and from everything else. Presocratic metaphysics involves...unconscious cosmological projection of the universal power and universal exchangeability of the abstract substance of money’.^{xxvi} Yet the reversible transformation between One and Many, πῦρ and πάντα is itself founded on the transcendent unity which embraces and contains exchange. Physical “money” may be exchanged for commodities, yet only because both physical money and commodities are representations of abstract “money”, just as for Seaford Heraclitus’ fire is ‘the substratum of all other things’ and ‘belong[s] to a separate kind of reality’.^{xxvii} Seaford contends that cosmic fire transcends all things (including, implicitly, mundane fire, just as abstract money transcends coinage) as the numerical measure, the μέτρον or

λόγος, which inheres in yet regulates elemental exchange.^{xxviii} Far from the dissemination of One into Many as its immanent structure, for Seaford the figure of reversible exchange expresses the unlimited yet superficial exchangeability of the manifold within an essentially unitary cosmos.

Yet the exchange between One and Many, gold and goods in fr. 40/90 of Heraclitus is more radically reversible than Seaford allows. The resistance of Heraclitus' dictum to Seaford's reading may be elucidated by means of a comparison with his reading of Anaximander, whose philosophy is likewise understood as a cosmological projection of incipient monetisation in *Money and the Early Greek Mind*.^{xxix} Seaford proposes that just as abstract exchange-value neutralises the qualitative difference between parties to a commercial transaction, so in Anaximander τὸ ἄπειρον orders the interchange of qualitative opposites within a unitary system as debt and repayment: 'in monetised exchange, as in the cosmology of Anaximander, opposites originate in, and embody, a single substance into which they are reabsorbed. So too the opposition between injurer and injured is resolved by the all-embracing power of monetary value to absorb the injury'.^{xxx} This monetary model is by no means incompatible with the political-judicial language on which the Anaximander fragment explicitly draws; between monetisation and the development of *polis*-thought, including legal thought, Seaford identifies both structural isomorphism and extensive historical complicity. In particular, Seaford points to the development of judicial practices of compensation for offences; the transcendent justice which regulates and contains the difference of parties is interpreted as identical with abstract exchange-value, permitting the commensuration of offence and compensation as debt and repayment. In projecting the structure of justice in the Solonian *polis* onto the cosmos, on Seaford's reading the Anaximander fragment thus determines the

conflicting ὄντα as commensurable signs of abstract exchange-value, which simultaneously permits the circulatory exchange of opposites and totalises it within a unitary system: '[b]y providing a universal measure money permits a universe of controlled peaceful transactions'.^{xxxii}

It is here that Heraclitus' fr. 40/90 diverges radically from the Anaximander fragment and thus from Seaford's attempt to enclose both within a single movement. In Anaximander, the monetary-judicial model is alluded to in the third colon of each of the two sentences of the fragment, in the terms τάξις (ordering, assessment of compensation owed) and χρεών (necessity, with a possible allusion to χρέος 'debt'). Exchange-value stands syntactically outside the conflict of opposites, governing the chiasmic pendulum-swing whereby ἀδικία is balanced against δίκη. The rhetorical structure of the fragment thus mirrors the structure of Solonian justice, whereby the dispute is regulated from outside by an impartial, homogeneous measure. In Heraclitus's text, this triple cadence is collapsed into the double cadence of reversible exchange, articulated here by a twin chiasmus (the first organised syntactically, the second lexically). The structure proposed by Seaford, and intended to encompass both Anaximander and Heraclitus, is essentially closed and threefold: the exchangeability of goods in a transaction, whether of commodities for each other or of commodity for physical money (coinage), is predicated on abstract money (exchange-value) which stands outside and underpins the movement of exchange. Money therefore stands either entirely outside the transaction in the case of barter, or simultaneously within and outside where there is the exchange of goods for money. In fr. 40/90 of Heraclitus, however, money appears solely within an open, radically reversible exchange which reproduces itself from chiasmus to chiasmus, and consists as much in

its exchangeability for goods as vice versa: ‘χρυσού χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός’.

The possible abstract sense of both χρυσός and χρήματα as ‘money’ causes exchange-value to linger *precisely in the resonance between χρυσός and χρήματα*, an insubstantial excess over the concrete sense of each. The shared ambiguity of both terms collapses the apparent opposition between them, situating their very (semantic) interchangeability as the structure of reversible exchange, of ἀνταμοιβή. No longer an invariant substrate underlying replaceable signifiers, exchange-value thus inheres in the juxtaposition of interchangeable terms. The fragment thus would dramatise not the monetary structure, as Seaford claims, but the process of monetisation, whereby fiduciary exchange-value in excess of concrete use-value is abstracted from the exchangeability of commodities. Whereas in the Anaximander fragment the parties to the monetary-judicial exchange were held together in chiasmic unity by a third term external to the exchange, here it is the chiasmic structure of porous opposition between χρυσός and χρήματα, of difference with relation, which provides the unity of the ἀνταμοιβή, the common ground on which exchange is possible.

This reading suggests itself also in the fragment’s sonic structure. Each half of the fragment displays an alliterative and assonantal coherence clearly demarcated from that of the other half, delimiting the internal unity of the reversible exchange relation. Within each half, however, this patterning also allows the opposed members of the pair to destabilise the other; such sonic bleeding-together is strengthened by the repeated reversible juxtaposition of terms according to the chiasmic structure. The unity of the exchange does not precede the reversible exchangeability of its terms; rather, it consists only and immediately in the sonic interchangeability of πῦρ and πάντα, χρυσός and χρήματα. Just as divinity exists at the surface of Heraclitus’

text only in the convergence and divergence of its name(s), so the sonic coherence of each chiasmus exists only in the juxtaposition of different yet related terms.

Further support for this reading is to be found in the term ἀνταμοιβή, which not only connotes a commercial exchange of equal value,^{xxxii} but also ‘suggests some principle of compensation or retribution’.^{xxxiii} Alluding to Solonian judicial exchange-value, Heraclitus replaces it immediately within (and sonically integrates it with) the exchange. The position of ἀνταμοιβή at the centre of the first exchange between nominative and genitive draws it towards the two substantives on either side of it; syntactically governing the relation between nominative and genitive, it is itself disseminated into that relation. (What a different effect the fragment would have produced had its first words been πυρὸς τὰ πάντα ἀνταμοιβή!). The effect is reinforced by the word-final accents of πυρὸς ἀνταμοιβή and the word-initial accents of τὰ πάντα: the cadence of the sentence rises towards τὰ πάντα, which thereby receives the primary emphasis. Rather than governing the dual cadence from outside, ἀνταμοιβή is thus held within its movement. After the first sub-clause, it is present only in the repeated movement of exchange between nominative and genitive.

Under the proposed reading of fr. 40/90, then, the One is dispersed into the Many as the structure of interchange which articulates its multiplicity. As in fr. 50/12, the figure of reversible exchange is here overlaid upon itself. The apparent chiastic organisation of One and Many, Many and One implodes in the sonic and semantic promiscuity of its terms, such that the One, the ‘principle of compensation’, inheres in the very chiastic structure of interchange within the Many. We do not seek to challenge Seaford’s broad historical claims regarding the monetisation of the Greek world and its significance for the development of abstract philosophical thought in Ionia; but we do not see Heraclitus as fitting within the sweep of that development as

neatly as he proposes. In producing a reading of Heraclitus which differs only as a matter of progression from his reading of Anaximander, Seaford suffers from an overly rigid application of his model of early Greek philosophy as an ‘unconscious cosmological projection’ of monetary structure: ‘in Herakleitos the unity of opposites, expressed in form-parallelism, is in part a projection of the endless cycle of monetised exchange, in which the opposition between the parties to exchange derives in part from the ancient reciprocity of revenge. This latter, regulated by *polis*-enforced monetary compensation for injury, had earlier been projected onto the cosmos as an endless cycle by Anaximander’.^{xxxiv} Mapping the development of philosophy point for point onto the linear advance of monetisation in this way, Seaford leaves little room for the multiplicity of conflicting ideologies regarding metaphysics and/or exchange-value in the Archaic period. This is despite the fact that he specifically identifies Heraclitus as a figure critical of political and social developments in the period: ‘The Herakleitean cosmos is the projection, from the perspective of an individual relatively isolated from the polis [by his critical views], of the newly all-pervasive and yet isolating power of monetised exchange’.^{xxxv} Seaford’s reading of the first few lines of Adorno’s aphorism from *Minima Moralia* – that in changes in the metaphysical thought of a society ‘are precipitated those in its most central experiences’ – excludes the possibility that this precipitate may critique rather than solely reflect the experiences in question; this exclusion, tellingly, runs counter to the very critique enacted in the rest of Adorno’s aphorism after the few lines extracted by Seaford.

Fr. 40/90 does indeed allude to the structure of incipient monetised society, yet not simply as a fixed point of reference for the construction of a metaphysics by analogy; rather, it is better regarded as a sophisticated *intervention* in that structure, a

fusion of its terms which serves to trace and enact the constitutive instability of Being and/or universal exchange-value as moments within a deeper rhythm. In this, Heraclitus is not only in agreement with, but deepens with a specific and distinctive philosophical account, Marx's insight that 'the money form of an object is not an inseparable part of that object, but is simply the form under which certain social relations manifest themselves'.^{xxxvi} Yet whereas Marx foresees the end of alienation in the supersession of private property, the rhythm between Being and Becoming identified by Heraclitus operates in both elemental and in social life and has no conceivable end, because endings are apiece with its ongoing process.

From abstraction to rhythm in fr. 39/31b and 37/30

Subsidiary evidence for Seaford's reading of Heraclitus as theorist of universal exchange-value comes from fr. 39/31b and 37/30, which, he argues, also apply the monetary structure to the cosmos. Let us consider each in turn:

θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρεῖται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος
πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.

[Sea pours forth and is measured to the same amount that existed before becoming earth.]

As Seaford demonstrates, λόγος connotes 'a unifying abstraction that transcends individual sense data'.^{xxxvii} It is this abstract sense that well suits it to express quantitative exchange-value, 'quantity *expressed as an abstraction*': hence its use of a

monetary ‘account’ from the fifth century or somewhat earlier.^{xxxviii} Its appearance in fr. 39/31b thus suggests to Seaford that Heraclitus’ elemental exchange is regulated according to an abstract quantitative principle, similar to that regulating commercial and judicial exchange in the early fifth-century *polis* (pp. 232-33).

Once again, however, Heraclitus is not simply transcribing but actively intervening in contemporary usage patterns. The term λόγος, typically used to express an abstract quantitative measure, is deployed here with a marked concreteness. Of the fifth-century inscriptions Seaford cites to establish the abstract sense of λόγος, none has the phrase εἰς λόγον; one uses κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον to specify a ‘rate’ in proportion to actual amount.^{xxxix} Similarly, Thucydides records that Tissaphernes agreed to pay for any extra ships above a fixed number ‘κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον [at the same rate]’, where the non-specific abstraction of this phrase encompasses however many ships are actually provided.^{xl} Whereas κατὰ thus implies a regulative principle independent of actual amounts being exchanged – as in the Anaximander fragment: ‘κατὰ τὸ χρεών’, ‘κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν’ – Heraclitus’ phrase εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον suggests a specific, concrete ‘amount’ up to which sea is measured.^{xli} It does not suggest an abstract rate or ‘formula’ (Seaford’s translation)^{xlii} governing all possible transactions. This phrase cannot simply be read as a quasi-adverbial phrase governing μετρέεσθαι, for which the unit of measure or yardstick is typically expressed by the dative or with κατὰ;^{xliii} it connotes rather the actual result of the measurement. Further, as the only masculine noun hitherto, it must be the antecedent of ὀκοῖος, the grammatical subject of both ἦν and γενέσθαι, though sense demands that both verbs refer to sea. So far from abstraction above the exchange of earth and sea, the λόγος itself is here fused with sea and exchanged with earth through the tension of sense and syntax.^{xliv}

Rather than bearing its usual sense of an abstract principle, then, the term λόγος is re-applied with disruptive concreteness. Just as in fr. 40/90 χρυσός is re-inserted into the very circulatory exchange it ostensibly regulates for contemporary *polis*-thought, so here the λόγος is not preserved across but reproduced out of the interaction of earth and sea. Its sameness (τὸν αὐτόν) is not external to the temporal structure of the reversible elemental cycle described in fr. 38/31a and 39/31b: whereas in the Anaximander fragment the monetary-judicial ‘assessment’ syntactically surrounds time (τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν) and governs the rhythm of γένεσις and φθορά, here the λόγος itself was one thing (ἦν) and becomes another (γενέσθαι), is itself folded into the movement of destruction and creation. Yet it acts also as the hinge of that movement. Positioned at the middle of this chiasmic sentence, in the centre of its four verbs and framed by θάλασσα and γῆ, the phrase εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον joins together two transformations from earth to sea and sea to earth. Itself produced and reproduced from the reversible cycle of transformation, it is also the very relational structure of that cycle; it binds the elemental opposites into a rhythmic unity which is itself traversed by temporal difference.

A similar folding of atemporal transcendence into the temporal movement of the multiple is visible in fr. 37/30:

κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων
ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζῶν, ἀπτόμενον
μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

[The ordering, the same of all, no god nor man made, but it was forever and is and will be ever-living fire, kindled in measures and quenched in measures.]

At first, this sentence seems very much aligned with the position of Anaximander and other sixth-century Milesian philosophical thought, to which it may allude even in its first word. As Kahn demonstrates, the term κόσμος (originally ‘arrangement, adornment, good order’, whether physical, moral, military or social) was generally employed by the Milesian philosophers to refer to an organic whole whose parts are organised temporally and spatially in a unitary order, a ‘systematic unity in which diverse elements are combined’.^{xlv} The suggestion of Heraclitus’ apparent agreement with a metaphysical structure whereby difference is held within unity, time within the atemporal, is strengthened by the assertion of a identity encompassing multiplicity (τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων), as by the investment of κόσμος with the attributes of divinity: ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται alludes to the familiar Homeric formula for the gods αἰὲν ἑόντες [ever-living],^{xlvi} and for Anaximander τὸ ἄπειρον is likewise ‘ἀθάνατον . . . καὶ ἀνώλεθρον [immortal . . . and indestructible]’, ‘ἀίδιον . . . καὶ ἀγήρω [eternal . . . and ageless]’.^{xlvii} Heraclitus’ words also suggest the transcendent realm of poetic-prophetic truth, likewise appropriated by the Milesian sages.^{xlviii}

Up to ἔσται, fr. 37/30 thus situates itself in the domain of Milesian philosophy from Anaximander to Xenophanes, which reduces multiplicity to unity through the notion of κόσμος. The next words appear to continue this Milesian pattern, for they specify a material element or ἀρχή from which the entire world of κόσμος is derived, a unity to govern its unitary order just as Anaximander’s ἄπειρον steers all things. Yet this ἀρχή is immediately identified with κόσμος, rather than regulating it from

outside; the dualistic structure of Milesian thought, of ἀρχή and κόσμος, is collapsed upon itself.^{xlix} If Anaximander's opposition between ἄπειρον and ὄντα is, as Seaford argues, modelled on the power of money as 'universal measure'^l impersonally regulating transactions, fr. 37/30 of Heraclitus performs a *re-concretisation* of this power. Fire is not here a measure preserved in and governing the orderly transformation of other things, *pace* Seaford. It is itself subject to the cycle of exchange, is itself kindled and quenched. The choice of the internal accusative μέτρα (rather than an adverbial usage of μέτρως), repeated immediately after each of the participles, and the use of the plural suggest not a single abstract measure standing outside the cycle, but its concrete result in each case, as in fr. 39/31b. Fire exists, after all, only in the material movement of continuous kindling and quenching, of exchange between fuel and ash or smoke; a flame is no more than the transformation or inter-relation of things, just as a river is no more than the inter-relation of waters.^{li} Fire is not a thing, a 'substratum', but a process. As fire, then, the unitary κόσμος consists in and is produced out of a pre-temporal cycle between One and Many and by a temporal cycle within the Many: a double ontological structure of intersecting circuits of transformation and instability.

Across the Heraclitus fragments, these two rhythms are overlaid onto each other in the deployment of the term ἄπτομαι, both 'kindle' and 'touch, grasp'. For instance, fr. 90/26:

ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαυτῷ ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις,
ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὐδων, ἐγρηγορώς ἄπτεται εὐδοντος.^{lii}

[A man kindles a light for himself in the night when he is quenched in his eyes, and living he touches the dead man while asleep, awake he touches the sleeping man.]

The application of ἄπτομαι and ἀποσβέννυμαι to parallel reversible cycles of the kindling and quenching of elements and human beings in fr. 90/26 not only supports our contention that the fire of fr. 37/30 be understood as the structure of differential convergence or ‘touching’ which produces itself as transformation, as the cycle of birth and death.^{liii} It also heightens the paradox already implicit in fr. 37/30, of a flame eternal and ever-living precisely in the interchange of kindling and quenching. Fire, the One which underpins the unity of κόσμος, lives in the birth and death of the Many, in the very temporal structure of multiplicity as γένεσις and φθορά; its atemporal transcendence (ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται) consists precisely in the ceaselessness of time. Rather than standing outside of time as an abstract universal, Being contrasted with Becoming, *what is eternal is time itself*, the ceaseless orbit of temporal (inter)change in elemental processes and in human life.^{liv} Time is the flame sustained by kindling and quenching, the unity immanent in convergence and divergence.

Concluding reflections

The figure of reversible exchange has here been identified as a characteristic pattern of Heraclitus’ thought and language. The reversible exchange *within* the Many, between earth and sea or between commodities and coins, is repeatedly fused in the Heraclitus fragments with that which transcends and regulates it in the context of in

sixth-century *polis*-thought. Its chiasmic rhythm, confined by Anaximander to the realm of ὄντα, infiltrates the undifferentiated stillness of τὸ ἄπειρον, generating the figure of reversible exchange *between* One and Many as two interchangeable descriptions of one and the same structure: ‘ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον’. The chiasmic organisation of this figure thus replicates the interchangeability of the multiple, the double ontological structure of relation with difference which configures the multiple as such and produces itself as reversible exchange among its elements. The very multiplicity of the multiple, the pre-temporal double movement of divergence and convergence, difference and relation, is the unity which produces itself in time (and as time) as elemental exchange. In contrast to Seaford’s attempt to subsume Heraclitus within the general arc of the sixth-century Ionian philosophical tradition, we propose that Heraclitus deploys the figure of reversible exchange to destabilise the oppositions that structure this tradition.

A parallel of both interpretations has played a fateful role in the history of philosophy: in the extended criticism of Jacob Bernays’s interpretation of Heraclitus presented by Nietzsche in the unfinished essay *Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, and in more detail in the lecture notes recently published as *Die vorplatonischen Philosophen*. These texts were written in the early 1870s, a critical formative period for Nietzsche’s thought. Like Seaford, Bernays reads Heraclitus, in continuity with prior Milesian metaphysics, as reducing difference to an underlying identity which remains the same throughout and despite transformation. For Bernays, as Nietzsche reads him, Heraclitus’ thought is an attempt to answer the fateful question posed at the limits of Anaximander’s thought: just how did Becoming emerge from Being, the realm of injustice from justice? Heraclitus (says Bernays) finds that such an emergence can only be explained if Being is itself already pregnant

with the seeds of injustice: the identity of Being is disturbed by an ‘innewohnende ὑβρις [indwelling hubris]’.^{lv} Bernays’ ‘entire suggestion is to be rejected’,^{lvi} for it transforms Heraclitus, the thinker of radical innocence, into the philosopher of a more total guilt even than Anaximander, a guilt not only of all Becoming before the judgement-seat of Being, but even at the kernel of Being itself. By contrast, central to Nietzsche’s account of Heraclitus is the claim that the latter’s philosophy is established in direct response to Anaximander as a deconstruction of the relation of transcendence between One and Many. (Here, as so often when reading Nietzsche’s early writings on pre-Socratic philosophy, we might pause to recognise the acuteness of his insights, and to recognise how much we might learn from these often-dismissed texts).

In the early 1860s, Nietzsche explicitly and reciprocally models his reading of the history of Greek philosophy on his growing sense of distance from Schopenhauer, and the theoretical positions he takes in opposition to Schopenhauer on Heraclitus’ response to Anaximander.^{lvii} The two discourses, German and Greek, are inextricably inter-wound and overlaid in Nietzsche’s thought of the period, such that it is impossible to say that either provides the dominant paradigm for the other. Heraclitus generalizes the differential structure of the realm of ὄντα in Anaximander, fusing it with Being rather than setting it radically apart. Likewise, Nietzsche’s 1873 essay ‘Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne’ generalizes the difference between subject and object such that the *Übertragung* [transference, translation, transmission, metaphor] between the spheres of object and subject, known and knower becomes constitutive of subject and object as such. Nietzsche perceives that Schopenhauer, like Anaximander but unlike Heraclitus, opposes a temporal-differential realm of Becoming (the *Vorstellung*) to the atemporality of the *Wille*. The division of the

absolute Subject into subject and object in the passage from *Wille* into *Vorstellung*, acknowledged by Schopenhauer,^{lviii} is reconceptualised by Nietzsche not as suffering and penance but as a moment within a constitutive movement, following his interpretation of Heraclitus.^{lix} It is through entirely collapsing the Schopenhauerian *Wille*, already itself racked by the ceaseless passage into multiplicity, into relational difference that Nietzsche begins to delineate his own philosophy of immanence and innocence. The deconstructive movement of Greek philosophy from Anaximander to Heraclitus is replicated in relation to Schopenhauer by Nietzsche's essay, which lays the foundation of his later philosophy of creative *Kraft* [force] and illusion:

Zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt und Objekt giebt es keine Causalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, sondern höchstens eine *ästhetisches* Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Uebertragung, eine nachstammelnde Uebersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache. Wozu es aber jedenfalls einer frei dichtenden und frei erfindenden Mittel-Sphäre und Mittelkraft bedarf.^{lx}

[Between two absolutely different spheres as between subject and object there is no causality, no correctness, no expression, but at most an *aesthetic* relation, I mean a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into an entirely foreign language. Yet for this is required, in any case, a freely composing and freely inventing mediating sphere and mid-force.]

The opposition between One and Many, characteristic of Anaximander and of Schopenhauer, is volatilised by Heraclitus/Nietzsche in the thought of reversible exchange. This thought characterises the unity of all things not as their transcendent identity before or beneath all difference, but as the self-differing common to each which produces itself as temporal differing from its ‘opposite’, whether this be the division of subject and object, One and Many, or, at the most general level, Being and Becoming.

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- ⁱ G.W.F. Hegel *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek Philosophy to Plato*, trans. E. S. Haldane (Nabaska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), p.281. On the technical meaning of the term ‘speculative’ for Hegel see, Gillian Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology* (NY: Verso, 1981), p.52.
- ⁱⁱ Carol Poster (2006) ‘The Task of the Bow.’ *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 39 (1): 1–21. (p. 2, 16); see also G.W. Most ‘The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy’ in A.A. Long ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 332–62. For a different perspective on the ontological significance of language in the fragments, see Martin Heidegger ‘Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, (NY: Harper & Row, 1975), pp.59–78.
- ⁱⁱⁱ The fragments of Heraclitus are quoted from: Charles H. Kahn (ed.), *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). All divergences from the text printed by Kahn (except punctuation) are noted, as are significant variant readings. Two numberings are given for each fragment, first that of Kahn’s edition, then the traditional numbering from: *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, hrsg. von Hermann Diels & Walther Kranz, 6. Auflage, 3 Bände (Zürich: Weidmann, 1951). The latter will be referred to as DK. Thus ‘fr. 36/50’ refers to fr. XXXVI in Kahn’s edition and fr. 50 in DK.
- ^{iv} Reading (with Kahn) κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων after Clement and against Simplicius and Plutarch, who give κόσμον τόνδε.
- ^v Gregory Vlastos ‘On Heraclitus’ in *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, ed. Daniel W. Graham, Volume I, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 127–50. Likewise see Kahn (pp. 20, 110, 138–40, 145, 180); and Alexander Nehamas ‘Parmenidean Being/Heraclitean Fire’ In Caston and Graham, *Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of A. P. D. Mourelatos* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp.45–64.
- ^{vi} D. C. Schindler (2003) ‘The community of the one and the many’, *Inquiry*, 46(4): 413–448 (p.431). See also Sarah Kofman (1987) ‘Nietzsche and the Obscurity of Heraclitus’ *Diacritics*, 17(3): 39–55 (p.47).
- ^{vii} We omit the (editorial) punctuation in the first sentence.
- ^{viii} *Metaphysics* (983b6–984a8). See Robin Reames (2013) ‘The Logos Paradox: Heraclitus, Material Language, and Rhetoric’ *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 46(3): 328–350
- ^{ix} T.M. Robinson (ed.), *Heraclitus: Fragments* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 183; see also G.S. Kirk (ed.), *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), p.201; Miroslav Marcovich, (ed.), *Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary* (Mérida, Venezuela: Los Andes University Press, 1967), p. 417; Edward Hussey, *The Presocratics* (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 46.
- ^x We follow Kirk in reading κυβερνᾶται for the corrupt MS κυβερνήσαι. Diels reads ἐκυβέρνησε; Kahn allows the crux to stand, as does Marcovich (who however believes κυβερνᾶται to be the most likely emendation, pp. 449–50). The expectation of διὰ ἐνὸς is strengthened if διὰ introduces the agent of the passive verb, a sense attested in Herodotus; see Liddell-Scott *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) s.v. διὰ A.III.1.a.
- ^{xi} DK 12.A.15. See Kahn, p. 272; Kirk, G.S., J.E. Raven & M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 115–16.
- ^{xii} Hermann Fränkel, ‘A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus’, *American Journal of Philology* 59.3 (1938), 309–37.
- ^{xiii} See also Schindler ‘The community of the one and the many’, p. 438. The full figure is again in evidence in fr. 40/90 and 50/12, which will be discussed at length below. Non-chiastic expressions of reversible exchange between Many and One also occurs in fr. 36/50 (and 51/91 and 75/8, though their authenticity is disputed), while strict chiasmus occurs in fr. 49/126, 92/62, 93/88 and 102/36.
- ^{xiv} *Refutatio* IX.10.7: see DK p. 165.
- ^{xv} Compare H. Granger (2000) “Death’s Other Kingdom: Heraclitus on the Life of the Foolish and the Wise” *Classical Philology* 95: 260–81.
- ^{xvi} DK 12.B.1, p. 89.
- ^{xvii} See C.J. Emlyn-Jones, ‘Heraclitus and the Identity of Opposites’, *Phronesis* 21 (1976), p. 109. The only meaning Kirk considers for ‘one thing is all things’ is a material monism whereby a single

element constitutes all things, which he rightly rejects (pp. 68-70); however, the emphasis in such a reading still falls on ἔν at the expense of πάντα. Marcovich (p. 116) asserts ‘of course, πάντα is the subject here’, hence the ‘clear *ontological* implication: “beneath all this phenomenal plurality of things there is an underlying unity”’. Compare Martin Heidegger ‘Seminar in Le Thor 1966’ in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 1-10; and Jean-Luc Nancy ‘More than one’ in *Politics of the One*, ed. Artemy Magun (NY: Bloomsbury, 2013), p.1-11.

^{xviii} Compare Roman Dilcher *Studies in Heraclitus*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.112-6; Schindler ‘The community of the one and the many’, p.432-42.

^{xix} Vlastos, ‘On Heraclitus’, p. 132 n. 15. Compare Kirk, Raven & Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 196.

^{xx} Richard Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 233.

^{xxi} Karl Marx *Grundrisse* (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 86.

^{xxii} Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind*, p.230, citing Theodor Adorno *Minima Moralia*, (NY: Verson, 1979), §148.

^{xxiii} *Ibid.* p.237.

^{xxiv} Richard Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.250

^{xxv} *Ibid.* p.326

^{xxvi} Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind*, p.11.

^{xxvii} *Ibid.* p. 241; compare p. 12 and p. 237 n. 42.

^{xxviii} *Ibid.* pp. 231-32 glossing fr. 39/31b and 37/30.

^{xxix} For Seaford’s reading of Anaximander, see especially pp. 190-209.

^{xxx} *Ibid.* 205.

^{xxxi} *Ibid.* 204

^{xxxii} Gregory Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies’ in Vlastos, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, I, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 57-88 (p. 82 n. 158).

^{xxxiii} Kahn, p. 146.

^{xxxiv} Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis*, p.240

^{xxxv} *Ibid.*, p.289.

^{xxxvi} Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, [1887] 1974), p. 94

^{xxxvii} Seaford, *Money and The Early Greek Mind*, p. 233

^{xxxviii} *Ibid.* 231.

^{xxxix} *Ibid.* p. 231 n. 4, citing inscription IG I³ 78.4-8 (Eleusis, c. 422 BC): ‘Let an Athenian sacrifice the first fruits of the harvest...from a hundred measures of barley not less than a sixth-measure...If someone should harvest more or less than this much, let him offer at the same rate [κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον].’

^{xl} Thucydides *History of the Peloponnesian War* 8.29. From the 4th century, compare also Isocrates, *Nicocles* 15; Plato, *Phaedo* 96d and especially *Lysis* 215e.

^{xli} See Liddell-Scott s.v. εἰς A.III.1-2.

^{xlii} Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind*, p. 231

^{xliii} See the examples given at Liddell-Scott s.v. μετρέω III. Μετρέω is not elsewhere found with εἰς in Archaic or Classical Greek (at Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers*, 209-10, εἰς ταύτῳ is to be taken with συμβάινουσι rather than μετρούμεναι: see Aeschylus, *Choephoroi*, ed. by A.F. Garvie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 96-97.

^{xliv} This tension is occluded in Seaford’s translation of the phrase as ‘is measured to the same formula as existed before it became earth’ on p. 231, as though Heraclitus had written ‘ὁκοῖος ἦν πρόσθεν ἢ γενέσθαι γη’: the placement of πρόσθεν before ἦν indicates that the subject of the two verbs is the same.

^{xlv} Kahn, Charles H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 222. See pp. 188-93, 219-30; also Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, pp. 132-33, 312 n. 120.

^{xlvi} See Kahn, *Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, pp. 93-94.

^{xlvii} DK 12.A.15/B.3 and 12.A.11/B.2. The characterisation of κόσμος as a divinity beyond gods and men may further allude to Xenophanes’ ‘εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος [one god, greatest among gods and men]’ (DK 21.B.23).

^{xlviii} Prophecy: *Iliad* 1.70, of Calchas: ‘ὅς ἤδη τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα [who knew what is, was and will be]’. Poetry: Hesiod, *Theogony* 38: the Muses ‘εἴρουσαι τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα [tell what is, was and will be]’; compare 32. See Marcel Detienne, *The*

Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, trans. by Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone, 1999), pp. 42-45, 123-24, 130-36.

^{xlix} The doxography for Anaximander clearly distinguishes between ἀρχή and κόσμος: ‘ἀρχὴν ἔφη τῶν ὄντων φύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμον [he said that a certain indefinite nature was the principle of existent things, and from this the heavens come to be and the ordering in them]’ (DK 12.A.11).

^l Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind*, p. 204

^{li} See Burnet (quoted by Kahn, pp. 148-49): ‘The quantity of fire in a flame burning steadily seems to remain the same, the flame seems to be what we call a “thing”. And yet the substance of it is continually changing.’ See also Kahn, pp. 138, 226, 316 n. 153, 319 n. 185; Kirk, Raven & Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 198-99; Vlastos, ‘On Heraclitus’, p. 145 n. 49; Hussey, *The Presocratics*, pp. 51, 54; Schindler, ‘The community of the one and the many’, 442; Daniel W. Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 130-147. Compare also Plato’s reference (*Cratylus* 412-13) to a possibly Heraclitean doctrine of fire which ‘administers’ all things by physical penetration.

^{lii} I omit after ἐαυτῶ ‘ἀποθανῶν’ and after εὔδων ‘ἀποσβεσθεῖς ὄψεις’, both of which are rejected by Wilamowitz (followed by Kahn, Marcovich and DK).

^{liii} Compare Gábor Betegh (2007) ‘On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus’ Psychology’ *Phronesis* 52: 3-32

^{liv} The immortality of mortality itself is audible, for example, in the reversible rhythm of fr. 92/62, where life and death are fused in a multiple syntactic indeterminacy which produces itself as double chiasmus:

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων
βίον τεθνεώτες.

[Immortals mortals, mortals immortals, alive in their death, dead in their life].

^{lv} Friedrich Nietzsche *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, ed. & trans. Greg Whitlock (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 68; *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, hrsg. Giorgio Colli &azzino Montinari (Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 1967-), II.4.276, translation modified.

^{lvi} Nietzsche, *Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, 69 translation modified.

^{lvii} Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, hrsg. von Giorgio Colli &azzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), I.823-4. Translated as *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1998), 52-53.

^{lviii} Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 2 vols (Frankfurt am Main & Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1996), I, p. 38.

^{lix} Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, I.823-4.

^{lx} Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, I.884. See also D. Kirkland (2011) ‘Nietzsche and drawing near to the personalities of the pre-Platonic Greeks’ *Continental Philosophy Review* 44: 417-437