# COSMOPOLITANISM IN EUROPE-IN-CRISIS: THE CASES OF THE EU, GREECE AND TURKEY

Maria Angelopoulou

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

2014

Cosmopolitanism in Europe-in-Crisis: the Cases of
the EU, Greece and Turkey

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

15 May 2014

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I, Maria Angelopoulou, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 83.702 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I, Maria Angelopoulou, was admitted as a research student in September 2009 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in September 2010; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2009 and 2014.

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Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

AKP − Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

COREPER − Committee of Permanent Representatives

CFSP − Common Foreign Security Policy

CSOs − Civil Society Organisations

EFSF − European Financial Stability Facility

EMU − European Monetary Union

ESM − European Stability Mechanism

EP − European Parliament

EU − European Union

GDP − Gross Domestic Product

ICT − Information and Communication Technology

IKV − İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (Economic Development Foundation)

IMF − International Monetary Fund

KKE − Κουμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (Communist Party of Greece)

NAPS − National Action Plans

NATO − North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NESCS − National Economic and Social Committees

NGOs − Non-Governmental Organisations

OIC − Organisation of the Islamic Conference

OMC − Open Method of Coordination

PASOK − Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα (Pan-hellenic Socialist Party)

PKK − Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party)

QMV− Qualified Majority Voting

SGP − Stability and Growth Pact

TESEV − Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)

TISK − Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of the Employers' Unions of Turkey)

TOBB − Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, MaritimeTrade and Stock Exchanges of Turkey)

TUSIAD − Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industry and Business Association)

UN − United Nations

VAT − Value Added Tax

Abstract

Adopting a critical cosmopolitan outlook the thesis identifies a constructive engagement with the European project at a time when the crisis of the Euro-zone is still threatening the very existence of the European Union. The purpose of the study is to determine whether cosmopolitanism is feasible in Europe. I argue that the EU can be conceived as a catalyst of cosmopolitanism without being cosmopolitan *per se* due its so far limited internal and external contexts of cosmopolitanism. In the case of the EU's limited inner cosmopolitanism, I seek cosmopolitan alternatives for the EU to overcome the crisis on the basis of an institutional and civil society analysis within the conceptual framework of cosmopolitan democracy. Instead of adopting the terminology of governance either *for* or *by* the people, my cosmopolitan approach focuses on governance *with* the people. The case of Greece is of utmost importance for my research as it reveals the causes and gravity of the crisis. It also broadens the empirical basis of cosmopolitan studies by embodying both the dynamics and challenges posed to cosmopolitanism which are exemplified in the paradoxes provoked; on the one hand there is aggravation of (fascist) nationalism and domination of economics on politics perhaps leading to Greece's de-Europeanisation; on the other hand the dynamics of a paradigm shift towards a post-crisis cosmopolitanism are revealed. That kind of cosmopolitanism needs to take under consideration the role of contestation and to redefine its position in the era of global capitalism for the confrontation of the crisis. In the case of the EU's limited external cosmopolitanism, my analysis of the possible Turkey's impact on the EU and the reverse aims to demonstrate that Turkey's integration can contribute to the formation of a cosmopolitan, post-Western EU and post-national Turkey. What is of crucial importance for both cosmopolitan and Europeanisation studies is that the endogenous process of change within Turkey which is interlocking with the external dynamics of the EU may potentially lead to a distinctive 'hybrid' type of cosmopolitanisation neither merely European nor simply Asian. The conclusions drawn from this multiple case-study suggest that the current crisis may open new meanings for cosmopolitanism in Europe.

Introduction of the Thesis

Background and Context to this Study

My research focuses on cosmopolitanism, which enables me to develop an increasingly clear understanding of the world/*cosmos* in which I live, particularly by examining cosmopolitanism with respect to the case of the European Union within the current crisis. Cosmopolitanism has also shaped my view of the world as a response and critical approach to globalisation.

The idea of cosmopolitanism is most recognisable as a term of political governance and with a history that extends from classical antiquity to the Enlightenment and modernity; cosmopolitanism sought to extend republican political philosophy into a wider and essentially legal framework beyond the relatively limited modern republic. With this came the vision of a world political community extending beyond the community into which one is born or lives. Cosmopolitanism thus became linked with the universalism of modern 'Western' thought and with political designs aimed at world governance. Although the origins of cosmopolitanism lie in an essentially moral view of the individual as having allegiances to the wider world, it was to acquire a political significance in modern times once it was linked to peoplehood.

Viewed from a different perspective, I suggest that the decline of the cosmopolitan imagination associated with the Enlightenment and the rise of the nation state could be seen as the beginning of a different kind of cosmopolitanism, one less premised on the

assumptions of a world republic or on elites and also one less EU-centric. My cosmopolitan approach suggests a post-universalistic cosmopolitanism that takes as its point of departure different kinds of modernity and processes of societal transformation that do not presuppose the separation of the social from the political or postulate a single world culture. The tension between local affiliations and universal imperatives (between polis and cosmos) that arguably lies at the heart of cosmopolitan discourse has been the focus of my research.

My intention is to understand and develop knowledge that combines local and transnational perspectives. The growth of interdependence in the world with countries relying on each other to a greater extent than ever before has created a situation in which globalisation has altered certain democratic links between the citizen and the state and has moved decision-making to a higher order. At a meso-level between the state and the world, regional organisations and especially the EU have been purposefully created with a view to providing more effective management structures to deal with phenomena and processes transcending the borders of national communities. The Europeanisation of national societies has established preconditions for cosmopolitanism to emerge and whether or not this happens is an empirical question. By specifically pointing at the EU my aim is to critically revise cosmopolitan thinking through a combination of both cosmopolitan visions and realism which can demonstrate how the cosmopolitan model is feasible.

However, the current crisis is of prime importance for my research, as it has revealed the insufficient deepening of the EU political and economic integration along with the

inability of the EU to efficiently respond to globalisation and to react promptly as a supranational actor. More specifically, the Eurozone financial crisis first started when liquidity became increasingly scarce in 2008, particularly after the rescue of Bear Sterns in early 2008 and also when the US mortgage market collapsed six months later, as a complex network of financial derivative products held globally started to unravel. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008 led to an abrupt re-pricing of risks globally, caused a temporary freeze in trade financing and a global trade decline and resulted in reduced global demand and output (Lapavitsas et. al. 2010, pp. 321-323). Speculative mortgage lending by US financial institutions and trading of resultant derivative securities by international banks created a vast bubble in 2001-2007, leading to a global crisis and recession due to securitisation of subprime assets.

Especially in the Eurozone, some banks relied on US wholesale funding markets to finance their economic activities and they were also very active in the same high-risk activities. European banks began to face liquidity problems after August 2007, because state provision of liquidity and capital in 2008-2009 rescued the banks, while state expenditure prevented a worsening of the recession. However, the solvency of some EU banks was strained by significant exposures to domestic sovereign debt and by the fact that the market value drop of government bonds led to liquidity strains, as these bonds were widely used as collateral in interbank markets. In some instances, EU governments had to provide funding to vulnerable domestic banks, at the expense of their countries' debt. To rescue banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) engaged in extensive liquidity provision, accepting many and debatable types of paper as collateral for secure debt. ECB actions allowed banks to begin to adjust their balance sheets engaging in

deleveraging (Lapavitsas et. al. 2010, pp. 321-323). By late 2008, banks were already reducing their lending while they also stopped buying long-term securities preferring to hold short-term instruments — backed by the ECB — with a view to improving liquidity. The result was credit shortage, accelerated recession across the Eurozone and a sovereign debt crisis, which was exacerbated by the structural weaknesses of monetary union.

The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), prior to the global financial crisis and the debt crisis in the Eurozone, had no single, integrated, powerful and institutionalised economic governance structure. The deficits of economic governance especially in the case of the EMU did not fulfil the conditions for fiscal discipline and macroeconomic policy coordination while the latter two were non-binding. The problems in the pillars of fiscal discipline and macro-economic coordination became even more acute due to the institutional developments following the Maastricht Treaty and the diachronic democratic deficits. The implementation of the new Pact by Eurozone members brought issues of democratic legitimacy to the forefront.

Although European governments' main focus in recent years has been on economic and financial decisions, the crisis also has a political component and it is at root a political one. This is a fundamental point often missed in dry economic analyses of the institutional requisites for monetary union. Within this framework, at issue is the European Union's democratic legitimacy — the need for citizens to feel they have more influence over and participation in EU decisions. The sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone is symptomatic of the challenges of the EU's *sui generis* political status and

reflects the problem of designing effective policy responses to major problems, including economic shocks and achieving deep integration across political boundaries. The crisis has also revealed the lack of a strong sense of European solidarity between the rich member-states and those member-states in the periphery of the EU (which usually need more support especially at times of crisis), unlike federal states, where funds may be transferred via the federal budget from the strong to the weaker states. Changes in fiscal governance and in the overall economic governance and new constraints in the exercise of national fiscal and economic policy require deep institutional reforms, especially if one takes under consideration the delayed reaction of the EU institutions to the outbreak of the crisis. This is very important as for Europeans the single currency is not simply a convenient economic arrangement; it has a symbolic importance for an integrated Europe.

In order to examine thoroughly the EU economic and political crisis it is useful to analyse Greece, the first state in crisis, which exposes the flaws of the common currency and the whole European institutional structure. The sovereign debt crisis that broke out in Greece at the end of 2009 is fundamentally provoked by the intrinsic, precarious political and economic structure of the Greek state. Its immediate causes, however, lie in extrinsic causes, such as the global crisis of 2007–2009 and its implications in the EU and the Eurozone. From an economic perspective, the intrinsic causes of the Greek crisis can be attributed to the permanent fiscal deficit due to the chronic immense consumer spending even at times of growth. Following Greece's membership in the Eurozone area, state expenditures continued to increase while revenues did not follow suit, resulting in debt accumulation. When recession affected the Greek economy in

2009, dramatic increase in the cost of borrowing occurred with negative long-term repercussions on growth.[1] Among other important factors which provoked the Greek crisis are low interest rates encouraging uncontrolled borrowing of both households and the state, shrinking private savings, and low competitiveness of the country. The supply of goods and services has diachronically been characterised by inefficient use of resources given that social expenditure rarely reaches those who it is supposed to support and, therefore, does not significantly reduce the poverty rate. Moreover, the gigantism of state and tax evasion constitutes an important structural difference between Greece and other EU countries lies in revenues due the weak ability to collect taxes over the years (Valinakis et al. 2012).

Despite the economic character of the Greek crisis, diachronic institutional problems have intensified the country's recession. The system of governance has little capacity to plan and carry out reforms given its pathogenesis in terms of strategic planning, implementation of legislation, coherence and coordination. Calculations of short-term electoral gains, downgrading of long-term effects and rent-seeking have shaped the political system (ibid). Particularly, the clientelistic system is defined by a calculation of personal benefits or costs and is interwoven with a pervasive sense of distrust towards the market and competition. This anti-market bias tends to underestimate the economic benefits of a market economy as it revealed, for instance, in the form of a fundamental distrust towards entrepreneurship and competition.

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[1] Research has recently concluded that it is 90% of GDP. See Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, Ken *From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis*, NBER Working Paper, March 2010.

Particularly, high-level corruption in Greece is the result of an ever-costly partisan competition, it is associated with nepotism and patronising, weak institutions and rent-seeking behaviours developing under all sorts of ideological veils: statespersons gradually losing their sense of responsibility *vis-à-vis* protecting the public interest, trade union leaders serving the interests of workers often at a price and businesspeople using bribes to achieve their objectives.

Should we disregard all the aforementioned features of the Greek state, then the depth of the Greek crisis and the malfunctions of the political system and economy are deficiently interpreted. Accordingly, measures for the elimination of the crisis are hardly implemented or become deficient. Therefore, my interpretation of the Greek crisis suggests that it was primarily the intrinsic factors that provoked the country's recession (Kazakos 2011).

However, there are extrinsic causes of the Greek crisis which refer to the faulty architecture of the Eurozone area. The very structure of the Eurozone bears responsibility for the Greek fiscal crisis and the declining competitiveness of the country's economy. Greece may have sparked the Eurozone crisis but it was not its cause. The cause lies in the fact that the Eurozone is a fully fledged monetary union but simultaneously it constitutes an incomplete economic and fiscal union of member-states with different structures. The European Union has not created an overall framework of economic governance – a method of dealing with the inequalities between its developed core and its less developed periphery. Greece as a member of the Eurozone lacked some of the customisation tools, such as the exchange rate or its own central bank. Moreover,

the Eurozone does not have the necessary balancing mechanisms for a monetary union, for example, through a strong central budget that is typical of federations. An initial disorder may then lead regions or states in a spiral decline in their economic activities. The large heterogeneity of the countries of the Eurozone, which was not accompanied with permanent mechanisms of crisis prevention or solution, has also aggravated or not prevented the Greek crisis from spreading. Undoubtedly, the structure of the Economic Monetary Union has influenced the Greek crisis, while, accordingly, the latter affects the EU institutions and the EU decision-making process. In this sense, the analysis of the Greek crisis helps us comprehend how the EU institutions and particularly the European Parliament and Commission responded to the crisis.

The idea that the architecture of the Eurozone was defective reminds us that we must not overlook the wider context in which the Greek state operates, as EU coordination mechanisms of economic policy did not succeed in reversing Greece's budgetary deficits and low competitiveness. However, this should not lead us to underestimate the internal factors that prevented Greece's adaptation to the new circumstances and provoked accumulation of economic and political deficits.

In the face of the current crisis, the issue that arises is how can Europe guarantee its citizens' security in the globalised world and how can the 'Europe of bureaucracy' become a 'Europe of citizens'. This is inextricably connected with the problematisation what form Europe could take, i.e. to become a confederation, a federation of states (in the form of the United States), a mere economic community or something historically new, that is a cosmopolitan Europe? (Beck 2011). Therefore, the core questions that my

research tries to answer are if there is a cosmopolitan moment now for Europe and whether European integration as a post-national process can be seen as entailing cosmopolitan cultural and political possibilities.

In the thesis I argue that the EU can be conceived as a catalyst of cosmopolitanism without itself being necessarily cosmopolitan. 'Opportunities for cosmopolitanism to become more rooted in European societies than in previous times have opened up by the sharing of sovereignty and the undermining of national autonomy. But it is important not to conflate such preconditions with a fully developed cosmopolitan condition, since the EU itself is not cosmopolitan by virtue of being a transnational actor' (Delanty 2008, p. 334). The main reason I conceive the EU as a catalyst of cosmopolitan change rather than as an instance of cosmopolitanism is its limited internal and external cosmopolitanism.

More specifically, as far as the EU's limited inner cosmopolitanism is concerned, by concentrating on the perilous interaction of the diachronic EU democratic deficitis with the economic recession I seek cosmopolitan alternatives for the EU to overcome the crisis on the basis of an institutional and civil society analysis. Cosmopolitan democracy provides the conceptual framework for my approach to EU governance. My research aims to explicitly analyse in terms of democratic accountability, transparency and solidarity those institutions and issues that embody better the mixed intergovernmental and supranational type of the multilevel EU that I advocate. Particularly, the Open Method of Coordination, the European Council, Parliament, Commission, Council of Ministers, the majority voting system, economic governance and the difficulties in

institutionslising solidarity reveal the tensions betweeen the national and the transnational level.

Also, given that beyond its political and economic ramifications, the Euro-crisis has had a profound impact on European society, the research seeks the ways with which the enhancement of governance *with* people can be achieved through civil society's involvement in the decision-making process. To this end, the White Paper on Governance, Citizens' Initiative and 'Your Voice in Europe' are examined along with the inherent limitations of the functions of CSOs. Attention is also being paid to the possible implications of the current crisis on civil society.

Within this frame, an inquiry into the deep causes of the Greek debt crisis and the way in which the Greek authorities have sought to address it makes a significant contribution to the field of politics, given that the case of Greece reveals the structural problems of the European Union and the Europeanisation process itself, as well as the challenges posed to cosmopolitanism.

This is achieved not only by elucidating the importance of cosmopolitanism in Europe in determining policy responses to the financial crisis, but also by broadening the empirical basis of the theory of cosmopolitanism. Simultaneously, my research provides much-needed evidence for a more systemic or structural understanding of the deeper roots and causes of the crisis. My aim is to examine the paradoxes of the post-crisis situation in its being, i.e. on the one hand, the aggravation of nationalism, domestic contestation of European norms and domination of economics over politics and on the

other hand, the dynamics of a paradigm shift towards a new post-crisis cosmopolitanism for the confrontation of the crisis.

As regards the EU's limited external cosmopolitanism, having tried to answer a major question, whether positive political forms of regional cooperation at the EU level and institutional reforms can develop along cosmopolitan lines so as to enhance the Union's limited inner cosmopolitanism which is affected by the crisis, I intend to demonstrate that this question is also a cultural question; it concerns the capacities of the EU to transform itself in the light of the perspective of the Other, an opportunity given to EU with the enlargement process especially towards Turkey.

Beginning with issues that have been already established high on political agendas, the research will review EU-Turkey relationships and the problematic aspects of the EU's external context of cosmopolitanism which are revealed through the enlargement process. If the future of European integration is linked to the emergence of a cosmopolitan Europe, then the EU enlargement process becomes one of the key tools for its realisation. In the thesis I attempt to defend the view that the case of Turkey is able to enhance the Union's limited external dimension of cosmopolitanism; a truly cosmopolitan Europe needs to engage with Turkey in a self-critical manner and a cosmopolitan engagement with Turkey will feed back into the development of a critical cosmopolitanism in Europe (e.g. see Baban & Keyman 2008).

The difficulty in assessing Turkey's place in Europe is tied to the difficulty in defining what Europe is and what Europe we want. This is an important difference from the

previous enlargements of the EU, most notably in Central and Eastern Europe, where the accession negotiations were largely determined by the candidate country's adoption of the *acquis communaitaire*.

The thesis intends to show that this difficulty exists inside Turkey too; it seems that its EU membership is desirable inside Turkey but it is not considered to be Turkey's unique strategic orientation. What is of crucial importance for both cosmopolitan and Europeanisation studies on Turkey's accession process is that the endogenous process of change within the Turkish institutional, political, economic and social context is interlocking with the external dynamics embedded in the accession process. I argue that this may signify the beginning of a new era in Turkey which might lead to a distinctive, i.e. non EU-centered, type of cosmopolitanisation potentially.

The State of the Field/Literature Review

A considerable amount of literature has been published on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan democracy. These studies endeavour to define the human, its capacities and liabilities as universalities beyond the particular differences of social, cultural and historical condition. Especially in the past two decades a number of researchers have sought to examine cosmopolitanism with respect to globalisation arguing that globalisation involves profound transformative change and that it constitutes a central driving force behind changes reshaping the world (e.g. Held 1995; Archibugi 1998; McGrew 2002).

Taking into account that recent evidence on cosmopolitanism as a new mode of governce at different levels is largely based upon the empirical studies of Held and Archibugi, my cosmopolitan approach is firstly influenced by the works of Held (1995, 2010) who argues that the realisation of the cosmopolitan vision cannot rely on the states' democratic capacity only; as a result of globalisation, for democratic law to be effective it must be internationalised. It is also influenced by Daniele Archibugi (2008) who elaborates on Held's new democratic condition maintaining that democracy has to function simultaneously on all levels of political authority — domestic, international and global — in order to generate a lasting normative framework in each domain. Surveys such as these have reported that while they are still legally sovereign, nation states' powers, functions and authorities are being reconstituted by international governance and law, by global ecological, transportation and communications developments and by non-territorial organisations such as multinational corporations and transnational social movements.

However, my cosmopolitan research differentiates from Held's and Archibugi's approaches in that it does not prioritise universalism and all-inclusive policies only. Rather, I engage with the notion of the Other in general and the idea of national political culture in particular by reconciling universalism and particularism and re-establishing the competitive relationship between the national and cosmopolitan domains of collective belonging. Although in line with Held & Archibugi (1995, 1998) I take globalisation as the basis for a new conception of a transnational democracy beyond the nation state, I posit the European Union as a viable example of a form of democracy

beyond the nation state seeking also to analyse cosmopolitan democracy in concrete empirical terms in different contexts through the cases of Greece and Turkey.

In this sense my analysis differs from studies in the field of cosmopolitanism which have become linked over the years with the moral universalism of modern 'Western' thought aimed at world governance (a revival of this kind of cosmopolitanism can be found in Nussbaum 1996). It also attempts to confront another major problem of the field of cosmopolitan studies, i.e. that cosmopolitan political theory in recent times has tended to overshadow the contribution of social theory and sociology; reflecting the revolt of the individual against the social world to be a 'citizen of the world' was to reject the closed world of particularistic attachments (Cohen 1996; Lu 2000; Vertovec & Cohen 2002; Tan 2004).

The definition of cosmopolitanism I suggest goes beyond these conventional associations of moral cosmopolitanism with world polity or with global flows. It makes a difference by stressing the socially situated nature of cosmopolitan political processes while recognising that these processes are world-constituting or constructivist ones (e.g. see Beck 2006; Kurasawa 2004; Skrbis et al. 2001). The kind of cosmopolitanism I advocate is a connecting string between sociology and political discourse in society and in political theory taking as its point of departure processes of socio-political transformation (e.g. see Delanty 2006). I adopt a post-universalistic cosmopolitan outlook which is not reducible to mere pluralism, but it has a critical role to play in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in trying to efficiently respond

to both globalisation and nationalism. It is a critical cosmopolitanism which transforms political and cultural subjectivities in the encounter of the local/national with the global.

Related to Europe my cosmopolitan approach acknowledges that Europe still suffers from its national ontology of politics and society which undervalues its historical uniqueness and causes political impasses. However, the thesis does not seek to abolish or weaken the power of the member-states but rather to relocate existing states within a new European cosmopolitan democratic framework representing the midway between the state-centred and the federal model of democracy. In this respect, my conception of a cosmopolitan Europe contradicts considerations centring on the protection of national interests, national communities and forms of collective identity that the traditional nation state has conveyed to the EU (Hooghe 2007; Carey 2002; McLaren 2002).

Post-national Europe stumbles against the nation state, national sovereignty and national democracy. Hence, the question my research tries to answer is: is there actually a problem with democracy *per se* or with the sovereignty of the nation state visibly undermined as a result of the Euro crisis? Certainly, it can be argued that the link between democracy and the nation is so interrelated as to be impossible to distinguish between each other. But it is one thing to affirm a connection between two conceptually separate entities − the nation and the body politic − and quite another to take the two as interchangeable and then infer from this that the European Union undermines democracy.

By differentiating also from aproaches which conceive the EU as nation state or as federation of states, my research offers a case study of Europe in which it provides grounding for cosmopolitan forms of identification. A cosmopolitan Europe is first and foremost the Europe of difference, of acknowledged national particularities. Even advanced research on Europe has scarcely dared venture beyond the conventional basic pattern of nation state thinking (as for example with the work of Kymlicka 2002). The research to date has tended to focus on the EU in terms of territoriality, sovereignty, jurisdictions, and demarcation. Even at higher levels of complexity, when speaking of 'governance' or a 'multilevel system', the legal and academic discourse in Europe remains biased towards organisational and regulatory systems designed to conceive and cast the EU in the image of the nation state. The paradox that arises with this part of the EU literature is that thinking of Europe as a great nation kindles the primordial national fears of the Europeans. In the end, the controversy in the field of European studies is that this national self-misunderstanding transforms Europe and its member-states into rivals threatening each other's existence.

Moreover, although extensive research has been carried out on EU governance, many studies reach the problematic conclusion that there is no European society, no European demos or populace at all worth mentioning (e.g. Böckenförde 1991; Kielmansegg 1996; Scharpf 1999). This concept has been challenged by Beck & Grande (2009), Delanty (1998, 2009), Eriksen (2005a, 2005b) and Habermas (2001, 2003, 2012). Drawing on their works I contend that the unfolding of the Euro crisis, which has revealed the weaknesses of European politicians, policies and democratic structures, can be conceived as an opportunity to reassess the European project according to

cosmopolitanism. The EU needs to be reformed in order to set the conditions for the emergence of cosmopolitan European identity and citizenship by enhancing citizens' representation and participation.

However, my cosmopolitan outlook differentiates from approaches which are EU-centred (i.e. deliberative supranationalism; Eriksen & Fossum 2000; Joerges & Neyer 1997). I broaden cosmopolitanism's empirical foundations outside the EU, i.e. in the case of Turkey setting the problematisations whether Turkey can enhance the EU's cosmopolitanism and whether the country can become under a process of cosmopolitanisation in the future. Also, contrary to the above-mentioned cosmopolitan democrats who may rely on the notion of the privileged prejudice of European development that the 'West' inherited from ancient Greece, I analyse the case of Greece conversely. My aim is to reveal the dangers posed on the EU's cosmopolitanism by Greece and the crisis it provoked in my attempt to challenge the supposed 'Western' tradition of cosmopolitanism whereby other civilisations are supposedly catching up to the 'Western' moment of self-consciousness based on the values of the ancient Greek, Roman and Enlightenmnent period. At this point, it is interesting that no previous study has investigated Greece in relation to cosmopolitanism and the dynamics or challenges that it provokes.

Given the dialectical relationship between European integration and cosmopolitanism, I examine thoroughly Greece's and Turkey's EU integration processes. In the case of Greece, most of the literature argues that particularly at the level of the economy, foreign policy, institutions and social policy the country managed to be under a process

of internal transformation resulting from the political and economic dynamics of the EU (e.g. see Kazakos 2004; Economides 2005; Sotiropoulos 2004; Featherstone 2008). What is neglected in all these approaches is the phenomenon of de-Europeanisation in Greece which my cosmopolitan approach highlights. I argue that we need to rethink the concept of Europeanisation seeing it through the prism of a critical perspective without rejecting it but redefining it through a new conception that could relieve it from the intense evolutionary and ethical element which is now governing it. European studies would have much better to offer in the field of Europeanisation if, instead of exaggerating or imagining the integration of European practices to national political systems, they focused on the emergence of resistance and subversion that constrain Europeanisation and therefore make implementation difficult especially in the countries of Southern Europe which have been hardest hit economically by the Eurozone crisis.

In the case of Turkey I critically address approaches according to which Europeanisation is seen as an identity-building process or 'Westernisation' which would transform Turkey into a 'Western'/'European' country (e.g. see Aydin & Keyman 2004; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Önis 2009; Noutcheva & Düzgit 2012). Instead, I examine the relationship between European and Turkish domestic politics through the lens of contestation; how European politics shapes and hegemonises Turkish politics and how European policies are contested inside Turkey. This leads me to set the novel question whether Turkish contestation of EU policies may signify that Turkey is becoming under a transformative process of a distinctive type of 'hybrid' cosmopolitanisation neither simply 'European' nor simply 'Asian'. Within this frame, my research opens new

pathways for cosmopolitanisation studies in contexts not confined to the EU or only to the ways the EU's cosmopolitanisation can be enhanced.

Hence, I examine both cases of Greece and Turkey through a cosmopolitan outlook which is critical in stressing the role of contestation instead that of consensus. In this sense, my approach, yet applied to different contexts, has drawn significantly on the critical account of cosmopolitan governance by Owen Parker who contends that 'the problem arises when cosmopolitan governance is rooted in an ideal of consensus – in both theory and practice – that forecloses resistance to dominant frames or rationalities rather than offering a space for their contestation' (Parker 2010, p. 25).

Methodology

My methodology is based on the theory of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan democracy. It is qualitative and interpretive, insofar as it analyses a variety of textual sources regarding the current crisis, and draws upon data from wide contexts which are not confined to the EU in an attempt to better comprehend cosmopolitanism in Europe.

Because my research methodology is underpinned by the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, the study adopts an evaluative approach to to Europe's democratisation process from above (institutional analysis) and from below (civil society analysis), as well as to the Europeanisation processes of Greece and Turkey. It is this evaluative but also empirically relevant distinctive feature of the cosmopolitan approach that my analysis draws on. In normative terms this is significant with respect to the current

situation in which globalisation has brought about new challenges, such as the global economic crisis; it is also crucial in terms of cosmopolitanism itself, that is in testing the hypotheses of cosmopolitanism in empirical terms, i.e. in the cases of the European Union, Greece and Turkey.

This multiple-case study enables me to demonstrate that the issue of why cosmopolitanism is relevant nowadays and in what contextual conditions is not explored through one lens, i.e. a European 'Western' perspective. Rather, multiple facets of cosmopolitanism can be revealed and understood inside and outside the European Union. In this sense, my analysis differentiates from approaches which tend to be either exclusively normative without actual empirical examples (cosmopolitan political theory) or concerned with a diffusive notion of transnational movements and cultural hybridity missing any connection with globalisation (most transnational democratic theories).

More specifically, the three case chapters, i.e. the EU, Greece and Turkey, are illustrative of how cosmopolitanism might be better incorporated into the European context. They predominately address the critical question how cosmopolitanism can be achieved in Europe and particularly whether cosmopolitanism is reversible within the current crisis. The chapters on the EU and Greece have an analytical and interpretive component and reveal the EU's limited internal cosmopolitamism, while the case of Turkey is reflective of the EU's limited external cosmopolitan context. However, at the same time, the three cases use different hypotheses in order to validate the overarching point of the thesis, which is cosmopolitanism's feasibility in Europe in crisis.

To start with the case of the EU, my research is multidimensional, as at one level it intends to analyse the causes of the crisis and to indicate ways for overcoming it by enhancing cosmopolitanism in the EU. At another level, my methodology uses a hypothesis testing procedure and it is deductive, beginning with the cosmopolitan theory and its hypothesis that cosmopolitan tendencies are evident in the EU. Subsequently, it uses the Euro crisis in order to address this hypothesis through an analysis not only of the economic features of the crisis, but mainly of its political aspects which are depicted in the EU's diachronical democratic deficits. Finally, the analysis of the European crisis leads to confirmation of my hypothesis that the EU can be a catalyst of cosmopolitanism without itself being cosmopolitan.

In the cases of Greece and Turkey my research becomes inductive as it begins with the current reforms in each country and attempts to detect whether these are sufficiently Europeanised. More specifically, in the case of Greece, analysing the domestic contestation of European policies, nationalism, totalitarianism and introversion facilitates my understanding of the intrinsic aspects of the Greek crisis. In order to interpret the extrinsinc aspects of the crisis I formulate the hypothesis whether the crisis challenges cosmopolitanism or, conversely, whether it has been provoked by market cosmopolitanism and the expansion of the market. My conclusion is that both of these antithetical possibilities are taking place at the same time constituting the need for a post-crisis cosmopolitanism which should be able to confront financial capitalism and nationalism.

In the case of Turkey, the impact of the prospective Turkish accession is analysed extensively illustrating that possible membership of Turkey may enhance the cosmopolitan characteristics of the EU. Using the same analysis in order to investigate the impact of the EU on Turkey leads me to formulate the hypothesis whether the constraints on the country's reform process signify its de-Europeanisation. The examination of this possibility reveals that there might be domestic factors trigerred by external powers (the EU), which might signify the country's potential non EU-centred or non-'Western' cosmopolitanisation process. In this way the primary aim of the thesis, which is to demonstrate that cosmopolitan relations are significant factors in reshaping the world and trans-regional order, is also fulfilled by a cosmopolitan reflection on the case of Turkey.

In order to sustain this multiple-case study, my collection and analysis of documentation is critical and textually-based, relying on primary resources, such as the Hellenistic, Latin and Enlightenment works on cosmopolitanism, the Lisbon Treaty, the First and Second Economic Adjustment Programmes in Greece and Turkey's Annual Progress Reports. It is also grounded on secondary EU, Greek and Turkish literature on cosmopolitanism, the current crisis and the enlargement process.

The Feasibility and Significance of the Research

The topic of cosmopolitanism is of utmost importance in the field of social sciences as it is at the heart of our understanding of how we can make the empirical investigation of

border crossings and mixing processes overcoming the dualisms between universalism and particularism. Cosmopolitanism has also received considerable critical attention, as rather than being a utopian projection, a moral postulate or an institutional fantasy, cosmopolitanism is depicted in a wide range of cultural, social and political currents throughout the world.

My research uses the case of the European Union in order to examine whether cosmopolitanism can be practically feasible as a positive move to link democracy back to the citizens. I conceive cosmopolitanism as an ethic that is already present at least implicitly in practices of European governance. The significance of my research rests on its critical character which is revealed in all the themes chosen to be analysed. The critical aspect of my approach signifies the fact that it questions well-established norms and conceptualisations of cosmopolitan theories. It contradicts cosmopolitan studies which support a linear, progressive and universalistic conception of world order.

This is achieved by the fact that the thesis poses crucial questions and problematisations with no ready-made answers. A central critical question is if there is a cosmopolitan moment for Europe within the current crisis and, if this so, how it could be realised empirically. Another question identified is how the EU can enhance governance *with* the people instead of the usual analysis of governance *for* or the highly idealist governance *by* the people. Whether the Greek crisis implies the country's de-Europeanisation process is critical for both Europeanisation and cosmopolitan studies because its impact on the EU reveals significant issues that need to be redefined, such as the response of cosmopolitanism to totalitarianism and uncontrolled capitalism. The

problematisation whether Turkey is under a process of Middle-Eastenisation or potential cosmopolitanisation gives also substance to the emergence or need for post-Western cosmopolitanism.

More specifically, in the case of the EU my critical cosmopolitan perspective does not adopt an unproblematised analysis of the potentialities of civil society organisations as being able to participate in the decision-making process in an authentic way. Rather, it takes into account the power disparities between different subjectivities and therefore the inherent limitations of civil society in the EU.

This critical approach is further exemplified in the case of Greece whereby I argue that the dynamics of NGOs need not rely only on consensual procedures but rather on the power of contestation and on a hostile relationship with the Greek over-cetralised and corrupted state authorities. In this way, civil society in Greece can act as a counterbalance to the domestic contestation of European norms which has been provoked by the paradoxical situation of the declining power of the state and the rising nationalism as a response.

The crucial aspect of contestation has also shaped my research in the case of Turkey in examining whether the often perceived country's Middle-Easternisation implies its de-Europeanisation following the contadictory EU policies of the enlargement prosess. Rather than attributing Turkey's delayed reform efforts to the EU's limited transformative capacity or to Turkey's different culture or identity, I problematise

whether this reform process is still ongoing because it signifies a beginning of new era for Turkey becoming cosmopolitanised.

Overall, it is hoped that the outcome of this research could change the landscape of recent interpretations of the EU crisis offering a vision which is nowadays missing from the EU. What makes the cosmopolitan idea plausible in the case of the EU is that it does not rely on an illusory notion of a perfect society but instead it grounds the ideal of a cosmopolitan society in existing institutions and in constitutionally sanctioned democratic principles through various tensions and paradoxes.

Structure of the Thesis

My thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter 'Towards a Cosmopolitan Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Applications' provides the theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism with its empirical connotations by relating cosmopolitanism with the European Union. The importance of the chapter lies in the fact that it reveals how the themes of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy, Europeanisation and the cases of Greece and Turkey, which will be analysed thoroughly in the following chapters of the thesis, are articulated together in a constructive way.

The chapter first gives a brief overview of the evolution of the concept of cosmopolitanism over the years. More specifically, an analysis of cosmopolitanism as it was developed in antiquity and the Enlightenment is followed by an examination of contemporary cosmopolitanism. By identifying the relationship of cosmopolitanism

with globalisation, modernity, multiculturalism and nationalism I intend to offer a critical account of cosmopolitanism. Then, the question that becomes central for my research is whether the EU can be a cosmopolitan polity setting the conditions for the development of cosmopolitan European identity and citizenship. An investigation of the relevance of cosmopolitanism for the Europeanisation process, especially of Greece and Turkey, extends my cosmopolitan approach to the field of European integration.

The second chapter 'Cosmopolitan Democracy in the European Union: Seeking the Way out of the Current Crisis' begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of cosmopolitan democracy. It critically analyses how the cosmopolitan model is feasible as a new mode of governance by specifically pointing at the EU. Aiming to indicate ways for the elimination of the EU's democratic deficits my cosmopolitan approach to Europe's democratisation process is twofold: a) top-down and institutional, examining the accountability, transparency and efficiency of the EU's institutions and decision-making processes (i.e. the Open Method of Coordination, the European Council, Commission, Parliament, Council of Ministers, majority voting, economic governance and the institutionalisation of solidarity) in terms of their openness to pluralist consultation with the people and b) bottom-up, evaluating the involvement of civil society in the decision-making process (i.e. through the White Paper, 'Your Voice in Europe' and the Citizens' Initiative) especially within the current crisis.

My research differentiates from approaches which support either output effectiveness *for* the people or input authentic participation *by* the people by demonstrating that these levels are interrelated and by arguing that what is missing from the theorisation of EU

governance is what lies between governance *for* and *by* the people, i.e. governance *with* the people.

In the third chapter 'A cosmopolitan Approach to the Greek Crisis: the Phenomenon of de-Europeanisation in EU-Greek Relations' I provide an assessment of the deep causes of the Greek crisis which simultaneously reveal the paradoxical character of Greece's Europeanisation process. On the one hand, the case of Greece indicates how relevant and needed is a post-crisis cosmopolitanism as a new mode of governance especially within the current crisis where economics dominate politics disregarding democratic procedures and giving rise to totalitarianism. It also demonstrates one of the core premises of cosmopolitanism, i.e. that states cannot be the primary *loci* of sovereignty any more. This becomes a crucial issue particularly if one considers that the crisis was aggravated (if not provoked) by Greece's strong state corporatism and protectionism.

On the other hand, with the two parallel tendencies of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation in Greece and the rising nationalism which is reflected in the rise of the far-right Golden Dawn, Greece embodies the challenges posed to cosmopolitanism as an irreversible process. It also highlights the role of contestation of European norms and policies which is often neglected by both Europeanisation and cosmopolitan studies.

Finally, the last chapter 'Cosmopolitan Europe and the Case of Turkey: De-Europeanisation or Cosmopolitanisation?' addresses the enlargement process towards Turkey from a cosmopolitan perspective. The significance of the case of Turkey lies in the fact that it questions the post-national future of the EU. The main question I try to

answer is whether Turkey's prospective membership can strengthen the cosmopolitan characteristics of the EU leading to the formation of a post-Western EU.

Adopting exactly the reverse analysis I also evaluate Turkey's Europeanisation process through the lens of cosmopolitanism. Instead of concluding either that Turkey has been Europeanised or not, I reveal an often neglected parameter of Europeanisation studies on Turkey; the problematisation whether the amagalm of domestic motivational changes and the external dynamics of the EU may lead to its transformation to a distinctive type of 'hybrid' and non EU-centred cosmopolitanisation rather than to its de-Europeanisation/Middle-Easternisation.

Chapter 1

Towards a Cosmopolitan Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Applications

1. Introduction

This chapter develops the theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism and it presents its empirical dimensions by relating cosmopolitanism to Europe and the Europeanisation process. The aim is to reveal how cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy, Europeanisation and the cases of Greece and Turkey, which will be explicitly explored in the following chapters, are articulated together in a constructive way constituting a solid basis for my research.

Interestingly enough, there is no consensus among contemporary philosophers and theorists about how the precise content of a cosmopolitan position is to be understood and this despite the fact that cosmopolitanism as a political doctrine has a rich history dating back to ancient times. Following a short retrospection of the concept of cosmopolitanism during the Hellenistic years, the Roman Empire and the Enlightenment, one of my central aims is to call attention to different strands in recent thinking about cosmopolitanism. More specifically, my intention is to analyse the moral and political content of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan democracy focusing especially on the contemporary critical version of it. Since the world is growing

increasingly interconnected, critical cosmopolitanism envisions an alternative global world order; one that is plural and diverse rather than homogenous.

Cosmopolitan perspectives on contemporary social and political issues have made inroads into EU studies, resulting in a rethinking of transnationalism and globalisation in relation to the EU; cosmopolitanism encourages a shift from a concern with the role of the nation state in Europe to a broader sense of its role in the world while it relativises Europe and the EU by placing them in a global context. Within this frame, I offer a case study of Europe in which I provide grounding for global forms of identification.

If Europe wants to overcome its current crisis, it urgently needs to develop a new political vision and a new concept for its identity, citizenship and ultimately political integration. By focusing on the idea of a cosmopolitan Europe I outline such a political vision for Europe. To this end, I first suggest reformulating the concept of cosmopolitanism in such a way that it is not tied exclusively to the 'cosmos' or the 'globe' but it takes local affiliations under consideration. I then present a novel, cosmopolitan approach to European integration that is no longer concerned with harmonising rules and eliminating (national) differences, but with acknowledging them. I use the cases of both a member and a prospective member-state, i.e. Greece and Turkey in order to reveal my cosmopolitan conception of the Europeanisation process.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I explore the theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism as it was developed in antiquity and the Enlightenment and then I

proceed to an analysis of most contemporary versions of cosmopolitanism with respect to modernity, the issue of culture and nationalism. Secondly, I explore the basic preconditions of cosmopolitanism within Europe by giving emphasis to the content of European identity and citizenship. Finally, I extend my cosmopolitan approach to the field of European integration through a brief investigation of the Europeanisation process of the cases of Greece and Turkey which will be analysed explicitly in the subsequent chapters.

2. The Theoretical Framework of Cosmopolitanism

Roughly, cosmopolitanism as a philosophy and way of life envisages the creation of an international community which includes all the people of the world on the basis of equal worth and dignity regardless of race, religion and political affiliations.

Nowadays, the ancient tradition of cosmopolitanism has been revived aiming at the institutional and constitutional design of a new world order. According to the main principles of cosmopolitanism all people: a) are members of a single universal, yet not homogeneous community, b) have moral obligations to other human beings beyond the narrow boundaries of ethnic origin, religion, territory or nationality as people's lives are interlocked and c) are led to undertake political activity, through social transformations, to handle effectively crucial global issues. Collective decision-making about public matters should be achieved through voting procedures ensuring inclusiveness and solidarity. Those that that are affected by a process must be able to participate in the

discourse without fear of unjustified coercion and they should also have an equal opportunity to shape the decision that is reached (e.g. see Held 2005).

The concept of cosmopolitanism needs to be situated in its historical context and in its various conceptual permutations for its better comprehension. Therefore, the following sections provide a historical retrospection of the conceptual framework of cosmopolitanism and its variations.

2. 1. Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism

The philosophy of cosmopolitanism was born and developed in antiquity in Athens and Ionia by the Cynic and Stoic philosophers. Specifically, with the expansion of the Hellenistic world and the multiplicity of nationalities, languages and philosophies, the Greek polis collapsed and ceased to be considered as an autonomous and self-contained political unit. At the same time, traditional law and conventions were challenged. Consequently, a new form of intellectual tolerance towards the diversity of the new world appeared whereby the acceptance of the stranger and novelty became feasible. The radical change of people's mentality along with the new structure and form of the world was reflected in the Cynics' phrase 'I am a citizen of the world' (Diogenes Laertius VI. 63). This phrase had been attributed to Diogenes, the Cynic of Sinope (c.400─323 BC) when he was asked where he came from.

The Cynic-influenced Stoics of the 3rd century BC and the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, were the ones who introduced a clearer content in their metaphor of the

cosmopolis. The idea of positive moral commitments to all human beings transcending territorial boundaries has been one of the most fundamental elements of the Hellenistic Stoic philosophy. The Stoics visualised a reformed world, a world without sovereign cities, without discriminating between 'barbarians' and Greeks, slaves and free men (Baldry 1965, p. 160). It is true that they became influential on the theory and philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, their conception of a world community had a universalistic character and remained a utopian mental outlook; self-sufficient individuals living according to nature were conceived as citizens of the world. They were also envisaged to be forming geographically dispersed communities of sages, rejecting the customs, laws and citizenship of any city and acknowledging one another as fellow-citizens of a world which should be populated solely by rational and virtuous sages (Zeno 1999).

2. 2. Roman Cosmopolitanism

As the Greek city-states started dissolving, first in the Empire of Alexander the Great and then in the Roman Empire, cosmopolitanism gradually transformed from Cynic philosophy and Stoic ontology into an instrument of rule. That meant that it was no longer the philosophy of an ideal world but it rather became a conception for a new world order. The idea of a law common to all imperial subjects emerged as a constraint on ethnic and local nationalisms (Douzinas 2007, pp. 156-157).

It was then that reason which exists in each human being became the universal basis for the notion of a human community. Cicero (1991, pp. 27-28) wrote that 'and if this is so,

we are all subject to a single law of nature and if this is so, we are bound not to harm anyone'. Marcus Aurelius (1991, IV. 4) analysed this argument further by contending that 'if reason is common, so too is law; and if this is common, then we are all fellow citizens. If this is so, we share a kind of organised polity. And if this is so, the world is as it were a city-state'. He argued that we should recognise humanity wherever it occurs and respect the reason and moral capacity of our fellow human beings by considering ourselves as world citizens. This is the only way to avoid divisions of class, rank and ethnic origin as well as division of parties (Marcus Aurelius 1991, I.15).

Furthermore, the Roman Stoics addressed the issues of hospitality and warfare. Cicero (1991, I. 51) examined certain duties of hospitality to the foreigner. Marcus Aurelius wrote about the duty to educate oneself in order to comprehend the political affairs of the world as a whole and to be actively engaged in public life providing for all world citizens. Concerning the topic of war, Cicero analysed certain international limitations upon the conduct of warfare and advised for the resort to force only in the case of self-defence (ibid, I. 34). He encouraged the humane treatment of the vanquished and even the admission of the defeated as citizens equal to the natives. Also, he reminded the emperors of his time that punishments should always respect the dignity of every human even in cases of wrongdoers (ibid, I. 89).

On the whole, 'the Cynics and Stoics were the first to exhibit a cosmopolitan philosophy committed to universal humanism encompassing all humankind and challenging the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition for the polis' (Hayden 2005, p. 15). Despite the lack in their writings of any call for revolutionary change in the structure of

society, a new era began leading to the implementation of the idea of human brotherhood (Baldry 1965, p. 203). With the Roman Stoics nature and cosmos were both considered as tools for the resistance against the injustices of the Empire while the principles of dignity and equality were deduced by reasoning.

However, the elevation of the law of the Empire to the status of the law of the cosmos might be argued to have led to the degeneration of cosmopolitanism and its transformation into a kind of imperial globalism (Douzinas 2007, p. 159). Nussbaum is very accurate when writing that the Hellenistic and Roman Stoics in many cases accepted oppressive political practices: 'Cicero tries to mobilise the Roman imperial project but without success and Marcus focuses on the task of managing the existing empire as justly and wisely as he can, rather than on the question whether he ought not instead to dismantle it' (Nussbaum 1997, pp. 4-5). The emphasis only on moral norms, theories and reason as a general principle reveals the atrophy of the political *praxis* among the Hellenistic and Roman Stoics. 'Many Stoics dismissed the linkage between public authority and the voice of the city in favour of right reason' (Euben 2001, pp. 266). It is insufficient to concentrate on universal rules only and therefore ignore public debate and the role of political will formation (Dallmayr 2003, p. 434).

2. 3. Early Modern and Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism

Enlightenment thinkers drew upon Hellenistic and Roman Stoicism in order to emphasise the universal characteristic of the human nature; equality of human beings against hierarchical class structures, humanitarianism against simple tolerance, pacifism

against war and the unity of mankind against xenophobia. They focused upon humanity as a reaction to slaughters and wretchedness practiced by their states (Heater 1996, p. 73). Locke[2], Hume[3], Voltaire[4], Schiller[5] and Paine[6] may not be cosmopolitan thinkers *per se* but they are among the Enlightenment thinkers who challenged the power of their states trying to accomplish the ideal of human unity.

Particularly, the Enlightenment philosophical works of Immanuel Kant constitute a common reference point for contemporary cosmopolitanism. Kant followed the Stoic tradition in which rational human beings are equal, free and are treated as the *telos* of a universal cosmos. His basic proposition was that the state of nature which subsists in the international arena needs to be superseded by a universal civil society in the same way as man has evolved from the state of nature to creating civil societies (Heater 1996, p. 83). It was Kant above all who gave the name 'cosmopolitanism' to the movement for the extension of the rights of man beyond the nation. Kant (1991) explored the universalism of the concept and its particular national existence and revealed the key ways in which this contradiction was played out. He referred to lawlessness of international relations, perpetual wars that governed relations between European states,

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[2] 'By the law of nature, common to them all, a man and all the rest of mankind are one community' (*Second Treatise of civil government*, Chapter 2).

[3] 'I flatter myself that I am like you, a citizen of the great city of the world' (Diderot for Hume in the first volume of the *Encyclopedie*).

[4] 'The citizen of the universe would be the man who wishes his country never to be either greater or smaller, richer or poorer' (*Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary*).

[5] 'I write as a citizen of the world who serves no prince. At an early age, I lost my fatherland to trade it for the whole world' (*The History of the Revolt of the United Netherlands against Spanish Rule*).

[6] 'My country is the world' (*Rights of Man*).

exclusion and stigmatisation of foreigners within states and subjection of colonised peoples in the non-European world.

Kant sought to give concrete realisation to the universality of the rights of man. He proposed the civil constitution of each state (civil law) to become republican and the law of nations to be founded upon a world federation of republican states (cosmopolitan law); these laws should be based on the rights of people as citizens of the world. If the rights of man were to become truly universal, then civil and political rights had to be supplemented with cosmopolitan rights that guaranteed hospitality to strangers landing on foreign shores (Kant 1991, pp. 98-99). He envisioned the establishment of legal authority at the international level, the extension of rights to foreigners and the end to the barbarities associated with colonialism. If cosmopolitan law was to become more than mere words, a federation of nations had to be established based on mutual cooperation and voluntary consent among a plurality of independent states (ibid, pp. 104 and 114).

However, some of Kant's cosmopolitan proposals suffer from conceptual difficulties. Although Kant recognised that true peace requires not just the absence of hostilities but also the lawful arbitration of conflicts by an authority established over individuals, he failed to provide sufficient details regarding the establishment of a federative state of states, the structure of that league and the necessary preconditions for the league's metamorphosis into a federative state of states (Kleingeld 2004, pp. 318-319). Kant's federation of states relied exclusively on each government's own moral self-binding. The problem is that this voluntary association cannot become enduring and permanent

without any element of legal obligation or common government (Habermas 1997, p. 117). The appeal on reason connecting the law of peoples with the federation of states and replacing any supreme legislative power appears unrealistic.

Moreover, it seems that Kant envisaged a cosmopolitan community as a federation of states and not as a global community of world citizens. This may be because he considered the mediation of the sovereignty of states to be necessary for the autonomy of citizens because he believed that the barriers of national sovereignty were insurmountable (ibid, p. 128). Nevertheless, this position stands in contradiction with his thesis that every legal order derives from the rights given to all human beings and that these rights provide the guarantee of freedom and the essential purpose of perpetual peace making people free and citizens equal.

Also, his concept of perpetual peace and thus the abolition of warfare addressed wars with politically defined aims instead of ideologically motivated wars of destruction and expulsion. He was worried about limited wars between individual states and alliances and not of wars between federations of states (Habermas 1997, pp. 115); states soon learn how to defend themselves militarily in the knowledge that legal arguments cannot win wars and they are quick to appreciate that wars can be useful to bolster internal unity, encourage self-sacrifice and impose discipline.

2. 4. Contemporary Versions of Cosmopolitanism

Three major tenets are commonly identified as forming the core of contemporary cosmopolitanism: a) individualism – the individual is the ultimate unit of concern and analysis, b) universalism – every person, irrespective of class, gender, race or religion is equally worthy of respect and recognition by others and c) generality – the whole humanity (and not just those sharing certain common characteristics) is entitled to fair and impartial treatment (e.g. see Held 2003, p. 169; Pogge 1992, pp. 48-49).

In order to understand better the multidimensional nature of cosmopolitanism it is helpful to distinguish it from a concept that is frequently confused with, i.e. globalisation. Globalisation implies that 'events occurring on one part of the globe can affect and be affected by events occurring in other, distant parts of the globe' (Thomas 1999, p. 464). On the one hand, globalisation involves increased social, political, economic and cultural interactions that crosscut territorial boundaries, the ambiguity of the boundary and the growing interconnectedness of the national and the global.

On the other hand, the processes, problems and dilemmas generated by globalisation shape new contours of politics as divisions are sharpened at a global level. They delineate some of the starkest challenges faced in the contemporary era. Problems related with the environment, crime, terrorism, human rights, war and health are global and require global responses while global inequality and poverty are major problems. The world economy has been globalised by neoliberalism and capital mobility and it has been characterised by greater interdependence and simultaneously instability. Democracy is organised at national levels but important decisions have to be made globally where there are not mechanisms of accountability.

At exactly this point cosmopolitanism seeks the ways for overcoming this democratic deficit and restoring democracy at levels where decision-making has become more relevant. Transnational migration, communications and culture may promote an active citizenry that is empowered within an emerging global civil society and enabled to shape political, social and cultural developments. Exploring the changing circumstances of politics illuminates why nationalism and statism provide inadequate political resources to meet the problems posed by a more global age. Instead, cosmopolitanism as a more relevant and appropriate way of framing politics today can respond to the various state and society-level changes by developing transnational forms of politics, life and loyalties.

The core premises of contemporary cosmopolitanism are the recognition and appreciation of difference of thought, social life and practice, both internally and towards other societies. It rests on the both/and principle of regarding others as both equal and different and consequently calls for new concepts of integration and identity that affirm coexistence across borders without requiring that difference be sacrificed by supposed national equality. Cosmopolitanism aims to overcome the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international. Contemporary expressions of cosmopolitanism represent post-national, multi- and inter-cultural connections between political communities that preserve identities and facilitate global, regional, local and municipal *loci* of legal status and political membership.

Also, most contemporary accounts of cosmopolitanism are not of the sort the Stoics or Kant proposed but they include a normative core which has both a moral and a political dimension. The core idea of moral cosmopolitanism is the idea of the equal moral worth of persons, according to which all persons have equal moral status no matter where they are from or to which cultural, national or other group they belong. This idea has a correlation with a duty of solidarity or with collective responsibility, according to which individuals must include others besides themselves in their non-instrumental moral reasoning.[7] The basis of moral cosmopolitanism is the individual whose loyalty is to the universal human community. For example, the essay by Martha Nussbaum on cosmopolitanism grounded on the principles of generality − that persons are owned equal concern by everyone − and universality – that every person is equally an ultimate unit of moral concern − can be conceived as an example of moral universalism (Nussbaum 1996). Habermas' communication theory too can be seen as an example of an approach to the social theory of modernity that is strongly informed by a moral kind of cosmopolitanism (Habermas 1996, 1998).

At this point, it needs to be clarified that the idea of equal moral worth of persons may be considered to involve at least three steps, none of which involves the view that we have the same specific duties to each human being. 'The first step is the identification and ordering of a set of universal norms specifying maximally important objects to which human beings in certain capacities and kinds of circumstances (either shared by all — e.g. propensity to become ill — or not shared by all but recognisable by all as

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[7] See Kant's second formulation of the moral law in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*: 'so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means'. For an account of solidarity along these lines see Mason 2000, p. 27.

ground for universal care — e.g. being children, aged and congenitally disabled) should have secure access to' (Gilabert 2006, p. 5).

The second step is the identification of kinds of circumstances in which persons are or may be in need of such access and of agents (be they individuals or institutions) who are or may become able to reasonably act and respond to that need. This may include the identification of standard threats to people's enjoyment of their rights (Shue 1996, p. 17). This step also includes the identification of some people's or institutions' causal responsibilities for the deprivation of other people's access to the basic objects identified in the first step. The third step, finally, consists of the generation of different duties for different agents. 'The fact that certain agents are causally responsible for the deprivations we are trying to heal may be a reason for charging them with the primary responsibility to improve the situation. It also includes calculations as to which agents have more power to guarantee what needs to be guaranteed and what way to distribute responsibilities' (Gilabert 2006, p. 5).

Moral cosmopolitanism has been criticised for failing to be 'rooted' and not necessarily universalistic (Breckenridge et al. 2002). Yet, it is important to notice that moral cosmopolitanism does not prescribe the same duties to each person on the basis that every human being has equal moral worth (see Miller 2002, pp. 80-85). For instance, a universal norm according to which all children should be protected may be consistent with more specific norms distributing responsibilities and duties in an unequal way (so that, for example, parents have more of a responsibility to protect their own children than they do to protect other parents' children). 'The basic demand of protecting all

children may be fulfilled by all through the construction of specific norms and policies, including the distribution of protection among families and the creation of supplementary forms of public protection when family based ones fail.[8]

A similar argument may be used for the distribution of responsibilities for securing the absence of poverty in different countries' (Gilabert 2006, pp. 4-5). Cosmopolitanism requires equal concern at the level of basic norms and their justification, not at all levels of social action.

Other critics fear that moral cosmopolitanism might lead to proposing the construction of a world state (e.g. see Miller 2002, p. 84). This might lead to cultural and political imperialism or lack of recognition for the specificity of different cultural and political contexts. As it will be revealed particularly in my final chapter on Turkey, moral cosmopolitanism does require some forms of global political arrangements in order to secure on the one hand the realisation of universal norms of justice and on the other hand the preservation of (cultural) differences. If it did not, it would be an impotent moralistic fantasy. In this sense, political cosmopolitanism may take many institutional forms. An oppressive world government need not be one of them. There is nothing about cosmopolitanism that lies in principle against the existence of nation states. The collision of principle between cosmopolitans and nationalists emerges if and when the latter claim that nations are the primary sources of political morality. Cosmopolitans deny that nations are the principal *loci* of political power and not that nation states may have significant roles.

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[8] This line of argument is proposed by Goodin (1988) and by Nielsen (2003).

The crucial point of a political cosmopolitanism animated by moral cosmopolitanism is that it introduces a set of political practices, institutions and policies that maximise the extent to which the universal norms catering to the equal moral worth of all persons are fulfilled at a given time. This set may include a combination of subnational, national, international, and transnational arrangements. Conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy, as sustained mainly by David Held (1995, 2004 and 2010) and Archibugi (2008) recognise the existence of nation states and relocate their role in some crucial areas such as health care. For instance, they propose a reformed United Nations (controlled by new legislative bodies at regional and global levels) with a capacity to generate and enforce policies focused on fair labour standards, development, humanitarian intervention and preventing the impact of speculative capital flows (Held 2004). These approaches generally take globalisation as the basis for a new conception of a transnational democracy beyond the nation state.

However, with respect to contemporary moral and political versions of cosmopolitanism, there is an additional aspect that needs to be taken under consideration: the critical dimension of cosmopolitanism. This means thinking beyond the nation but also comparing, distinguishing and judging among different versions of transnational thought, testing moral and political norms, including the norms of critical thinking. The adjective critical implies reflexivity, double consciousness, comparison, negation, persistent self-reflection and an aversion to heroic tones of appropriation and linear progress.

2. 5. Critical Cosmopolitanism

Three dimensions characterise critical cosmopolitanism. The first one is the historical level of modernity referring to the different modernities which interact and undergo transformation (i.e. European and Asian modernity). The second one, in macro terms, is the outcome when two or more societies interact and undergo change of a developmental nature. Finally, the third one, in micro terms, concerns individual agency and social identities (i.e. aspects of cosmopolitanism reflected in internal socio-political change).

My concept of critical cosmopolitanism relies on Delanty's influential works on cosmopolitanism. According to Delanty, critical cosmopolitanism aims at the identification of a broader context within which Self and Other are articulated with discursive processes constituting the social world (Delanty 2006, p. 37). In contrast to the dominant Enlightenment's notion of cosmopolitanism as a transnational republican order, critical cosmopolitanism suggests a post-universalistic cosmopolitanism that takes as its point of departure different kinds of modernity and processes of societal transformation that do not presuppose the separation of the social from the political or postulate a single world culture.

'Critical cosmopolitanism signals a post-universalistic kind of cosmopolitanism, which is not merely a condition of diversity but is articulated in cultural models of world openness through which societies undergo transformation' (ibid, p. 25). The world openness mentioned by Delanty is created when the local encounters the global. In this

respect, the relationship between the global/universal and the local/national is of particular importance as the global is not outside the social world but it is inextricably embedded in it. Critical cosmopolitanism problematises whether we can think of cosmopolitanism as pluriversal and if we can, then what are the next steps for thinking and acting cosmopolitanism de-colonially.[9] Pluriversality is a play of words referring to plurality and universalism and it emphasises that political projects do not strive to establish one universal ideology. Instead, they aim for the universal acceptance of different ways of being, not by positing a 'blueprint of a future and ideal society projected from a single point of view' (Mignolo 2000, p. 744), but 'by being reflexive about one's own, and more importantly, the Other's standpoint' (Mendieta 2009, p. 252).

Furthermore, the kind of cosmopolitanism I advocate is critical for an additional reason; it acknowledges the problems cosmopolitan accounts encounter, given that many people agree that cosmopolitan principles need to be embraced, but this is not sufficient to motivate action. As critics point out, 'we have been persuaded to believe in cosmopolitanism but we are not doing cosmopolitanism' (e.g. see Lenard 2010, p. 2; Dobson 2006). One of the most forceful critiques against cosmopolitanism emphasises

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[9] De-colonial cosmopolitanism creates and enacts geo-political and body-political displacements that cannot be managed and controlled by universal principles of law implied for example in Kant's vision of a global order. This kind of cosmopolitanism does not use the term 'postcolonial' because it sees the modern global order as still very much colonial; while colonialism as the overt political and economic domination of one country over the other has ended in almost all places, the patterns that emerged in the course of colonial expansion are in operation still today. European cosmologies, epistemologies and practices of knowledge production have come to be taken as universally valid and 'objective', while others have been cast as parochial and 'cultural' simply due to their differences to hegemonic discourse (e.g. see Smith 2005; Castro-Gómez 2010; Mignolo 2008). De-colonial cosmopolitanism departs from the assumption that people can de-link from the structures of coloniality through the transformation of their consciousness and through becoming aware of the workings of these processes and challenge racial, sexual, gender and other hierarchies that were constituted through colonialism and have persisted after the end of former colonisation (Maldonado-Torres 2010, p. 115).

its weak motivational force in the absence of a transnational ethos of solidarity (Lenard 2010).

In response, I define solidarity, which is a crucial aspect of critical cosmopolitanism as: a) the postulate of equal moral worth of all human beings, b) a sense of interdependence between human beings, of empathy and common cause of others and c) the concern for individual autonomy and self-determination (Straehle 2010, p. 111). My attention shifts away from the charitable initiatives and personal motivation of individual citizens and focuses on the activity of collective political agents (i.e. formal socialist, social-democratic and green political parties, informal land-workers and peasants' organisations and branches of non-governmental organisations) acting as intermediaries between ordinary citizens on the one hand and domestic and international structures on the other.

By promoting alternative discourses of political agency and by attempting to introduce political transformations in particular public spheres (i.e. solidarity in the European Union which I will analyse in the next chapter) cosmopolitan solidarity occupies an empty space between the desirability of certain principles of global justice and their motivational sustainability. Political agents can address solidarity concerns in a way that makes sense to every participant of a shared political culture and they may use existing political structures in a way that seeks to expand the mechanisms of democratic accountability beyond those nationally available (Ypi 2010, pp. 128-129). According to my critical cosmopolitan account, relationships of solidarity do not necessarily precede the recognition of moral obligations between fellow-citizens. They may also result from

the political processes conferring to such individual moral obligations an institutional shape (a more detailed account of the ways with which the institutionalisation of solidarity could be achieved is provided in the next chapter on cosmopolitan democracy in the EU).

Critical cosmopolitanism needs also to be examined in the context of post-modernity and globalisation and to be defined in terms of its relationship with culture and nationalism. The following sections define explicitly the main features of critical cosmopolitanism with respect to all these issues.

2. 5. 1. Critical Cosmopolitanism and Post-Modernity in the Context of Globalisation

Modernity takes different societal and civilisational forms, but fundamental to it is the movement towards self-transformation, the belief that human agency can radically transform the present in the image of an imagined future. It is this impetus that constitutes the cosmopolitanism of modernity since through it different modernities interact. It lies in the basic self-understanding of modernity that there are no secure foundations for identity, meaning and memory. 'The term cosmopolitanism signals a condition of self-confrontation and incompleteness; modernity concerns the loss of certainty. Globalisation is the principal motor of modernity; modernity is not a global condition as such, but a transformative condition which can be called cosmopolitan due to its plural nature and interactive logics. Cosmopolitanism is the key expression of the

tendency within modernity to self-problematisation' (Delanty 2006, p. 35). On the basis of these remarks it could be maintained that cosmopolitanism has become one of the major expressions of modernity today due to the extent and speed of globalisation.

Several theorists have developed the notion of multiple modernities and have related this to a culturally nuanced notion of cosmopolitanism. The work of Eisenstadt (2003) and Arnason (2003) have been at the fore of such developments which have led to an entirely new approach to modernity based on multiplicity and which is highly relevant to cosmopolitan theory. This notion of multiple modernities challenges the classical theories of modernisation and signals a particular view of the contemporary world in terms of a multiplicity of cultural and political projects based on civilisational transformation (Delanty 2006, p. 34). The cosmopolitan thrust of the argument is that civilisations are internally plural and based on frameworks of interpretation which can be appropriated in different ways by many social actors within and beyond the contours of the given civilisation.

The idea of modernity as plural was already introduced by post-modernism, which has not displaced modernity but opens the concept up to cosmopolitan possibilities. As Bauman (2000) has argued, the current form of modernity is not post-modernity, but what he calls 'liquid modernity', which is characterised by social forms based on transience, uncertainty, anxieties and insecurity and is resulting in new freedoms that come at the price of individual responsibility and without the traditional support of social institutions. 'Although Bauman does not link this condition to cosmopolitanism,

such a connection can be established with respect to socio-political relations based on contingency' (Delanty 2006, p. 34).

Cosmopolitan possibilities are more evident in a conception of modernity that stresses the interaction of different modernities. The notion of multiple modernities can be seen as a basis for a cosmopolitan conception of modernity. The idea of modernity as a plural condition has led several theorists to establish more explicit links between cosmopolitanism and modernity (see Breckenridge et al. 2002; Gaonkar 2001). Cosmopolitanism could be seen as a plural and post-universalistic notion. It may be suggested that the pluralisation of cosmopolitanism can be furthermore linked to modernity as a dialogic process, as opposed to a strictly universalistic one. The universal and the particular are thus linked in the continuity of present and past. 'Theories of multiple modernity have led to a new conception of cosmopolitanism that places particular emphasis on post-universalism. A post-universal cosmopolitanism is critical and dialogic, seeing as the goal alternative readings of history and the recognition of plurality rather than the creation of a universal order, such as a cosmopolis' (Delanty 2006, pp. 34-35).

2. 5. 2. Critical Cosmopolitanism and the Multiculturalism

In the contemporary world many local settings are increasingly characterised by cultural diversity. People belong to many different cultures and the cultural differences are as likely to be within states (i.e. between regions, classes, ethnic groups, the urban and rural) as well as between states (King 1990, p. 409). Multicultural theories explore the

prerequisites for the claims towards recognition of cultural differences; on the one hand the claim that the right to differ should be recognised and on the other hand the claim that the inherent value of the difference should be recognised. Likewise, Charles Taylor (1994, pp. 64-66), Gellner (1992, pp. 49, 57) and Van der Merwe (1999, p. 328) stress the demand that we all recognise the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth. The construction of common cultures of difference (yet mainly at the national level) remains one of the key objectives of multiculturalism.

However, such formulations are inadequate as modern societies have become marked by multiple and return migrations of people that defy the simple logic evident in cases of refugees and immigration. Furthermore, such questions inevitably highlight the exclusive role of citizenship given that many nations are currently tightening their borders against 'outsiders'. The control of borders between different world regions and different nations inevitably impacts upon the dynamics of multicultural societies given that it raises questions as to who and under what conditions is to be included and excluded (e.g. see Solomos 2001). The issue of immigration and refugees is currently one of the main testing grounds for a multicultural society stressing the ongoing tension between human rights and national forms of citizenship. The dilemma has been neatly highlighted by Benhabib (1999) in that, whereas no liberal democracy can lose its right to determine its own immigration policy, it equally should not close its borders to refugees or asylum seekers. In other words multicultural societies are not simply constituted through an ongoing internal democratic and cultural conversation, but also through whom they include and exclude from their borders.

'These questions point to the enduring link between cosmopolitan and multicultural definitions of citizenship. Nations are increasingly under pressure in this regard from international agencies which confront states with a number of constraints' (Stvenson 2002). Apart from the normative pressure of universal human rights the state also has to work with different sets of social conditions which are not of its own making (such as the impacts of other states policies and mediated public opinion) and thus inevitably move such questions into a cosmopolitan frame of reference (Sassen 1998). Hence, while we might define multiculturalism as 'the desire to find the cultural and political norms appropriate to more heterogeneous societies across nations' this is likely to be contradictory in practice (Stevenson 2002). According to the cosmopolitan theorists Held (1995), Beck (1998), and Linklater (1998) without a politically robust cosmopolitan culture, global civil society and cosmopolitan institutions, the world will remain at the mercy of the interests of nation states and economic markets. Democracy needs to become a transnational form of governance by breaking with the cultural hegemony of the state. This is why hybrid phenomena and various mobilities do not necessarily lead to the democratisation of world order.

To be more specific, hybridity may be a major aspect of both cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, but it is not itself the defining feature of cosmopolitanism. 'It is easy to refer to many examples of multicultural communities, which may be called hybrid, but are not cosmopolitan *per se*' (Delanty 2006, p. 33). Particularly, cosmopolitanism differs from approaches based on the notion of hybridity, because globalisation may create hybrid cultures arising out of transnational movements of people and cultures

(e.g. see Jan Nederveen Pieterse 2004) but it also provokes other processes which entail conflict and contestation and not only networks and contacts. It is this dimension of contestation and resistance that is often neglected in these approaches.

Thus, 'cosmopolitanism is more than the simple fact of cross-fertilisation since many hybrid phenomena are not in any coherent sense of the term cosmopolitan' (Delanty 2006, p. 33). For example, in multicultural approaches to the EU, the concept of European identity remains undifferentiated and lacks a sufficiently explicit description of the power disparity between the subjects and the forms of subjectivity that they denote. That means that the formation of a European identity is not simply an issue of coexistence of multiple cultures (Pagden 2002, p. 199).

Global mobilities too may be of central importance for cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism but the fact of mobility is not the key feature of the cosmopolitan movement. A cosmopolitan political community would be based upon overlapping or multiple citizenships connecting the populace into local, national, regional and global forms of governance. Indeed, contemporary societies entail some degree of mixing as a result of the cross-fertilisation of cultures but in this respect the connection with cosmopolitanism is evident only to a limited degree. 'Many kinds of mobilities are not cosmopolitan' (Delanty 2006, p. 32); they may be open structures but this openness often associated with cosmopolitanism is in fact global fluidity, or 'cosmopolitan global fluids' (Urry 2002, p. 133).

In opposition to this emphasis on mobility as the chief characteristic of cosmopolitanism my argument is that cosmopolitanism cannot be entirely separated from the normative vision of an alternative society and also from the existing cultural traditions of societies. Identities and modes of cultural belonging, while being influenced by global mobilities are not reducible to them. 'The turn to mobilities or even to networks does not help us comprehend the world in terms of cosmopolitan challenges' (Delanty 2006, pp. 32-33).

What is lost in the multicultural conceptions of hybridity or networks is precisely this normative aspect. One major dimension to cosmopolitanism, then, is that it opens up normative questions. Without some notion of an alternative society cosmopolitanism has a limited normative application (Fine 2003). Critical cosmopolitanism is not merely about plurality. Although this is one key aspect of cosmopolitanism, it is not the main or only aspect; cosmopolitanism is not a generalised version of multiculturalism where plurality is simply the goal (Delanty 2006, p. 33). A critical conception of cosmopolitanism should rather be seen in terms of the tensions within modernity. Of particular importance in this respect is the tension between the global and the local and also between the universal and the particular. It is possible to see this tension which is expressed through communication as constituting the basic animus of cosmopolitanism.

Against notions of globalisation and universality on the one side and plurality and particularism on the other, the cultural dimension of cosmopolitanism consists more in the creation and articulation of communicative models of world openness in which societies undergo transformation. The inevitable diversity that comes from the

pluralisation of cultural traditions should not detract us from processes of communicative transformation that arise as a result of responses to the presence of global publics. Cosmopolitan culture is one of self-problematisation and while diversity will be inevitable by the pluralising nature of cosmopolitanism the reflexive and critical self-understanding of cosmopolitanism cannot be neglected. Cosmopolitanism needs to be seen as one of the major expressions of the tendency in modernity towards self-problematisation.

At this point, while being supportive of the necessity of rethinking democracy and citizenship in cosmopolitan directions I want to suggest that such ventures need to become more concerned with questions of cultural identity. This is not the usual call for the turn into more communitarian sensibilities away from the unencumbered self of liberal thought (e.g. see Sandel 1998).

The cosmopolitan project needs to steer clear of some of the moral prescriptions that have become associated with communitarian patterns of thinking while recognising that unless people are able to think and feel like cosmopolitans in the contexts of their everyday lives the project is unlikely to get very far. 'Cosmopolitanism as a cultural ideal needs to be linked to notions of urbanity, the ability to live with difference and a healthy respect for otherness' (see Stevenson 2002). It also needs to be discursively and emotionally imagined; how do people begin the process of thinking and feeling like cosmopolitans? How might cosmopolitan sensibilities be fostered in communities that are based upon the increased global mobility of some and the more place-specific identities of others? How do we learn to live together while accepting, negotiating and

constructing our differences? (e. g. see Bauman 1999; Castells 1996). The emergence of globalisation and individualisation at the same time that nations are losing their power to define makes this a crucial question.

I argue that cosmopolitan concerns have much to gain by becoming connected to questions of multiculturalism. 'If cosmopolitan questions need to be extended to more fully incorporate questions of cultural identity, they will achieve this by seeking to pluralise and reconstruct discourses of nationhood. It is not enough to point to the importance of new levels of governance but there is a need to take under serious consideration questions of identity formation within and between national societies' (Stevenson 2002).

For instance, in the case of the EU, among the main cosmopolitan scholars who have addressed the role of culture in cosmopolitanism is Habermas who introduces a distinction between national cultures as particularistic sets of beliefs/values and a political culture of civic rights and participation that Europeans have in common. It is on the latter that a European polity can be erected. Since it will expand horizons beyond existing national limitations, such European political construction will indeed lead towards a greater community (Habermas 2001, pp. 73, 74, 83). He places emphasis on a cosmopolitan European identity which requires a form of civic solidarity, constitution, common social policy and a common European civil society where fellow Europeans take responsibility for one another.

Nevertheless, after having discussed the need for normative impulses for effective social integration in Europe ─ impulses that can only come about through overlapping projects for a common political culture ─ he immediately reassures that such projects can be constructed in the common historical horizon the citizens of Europe already find themselves in (Habermas 2001, p. 103). Therefore, Habermas cannot work without a broader historico-cultural embedding of the latter, despite the conceptually neat separation between diverse national cultures and a common political culture among Europeans (Heidrun & Wagner 2002, pp. 356-357).

Overall, there are likely to remain tensions between cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism given the capacity of local or national forms of citizenship to close its borders against some global flows. 'If questions of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are complicated by introducing the question of the exclusivity of national borders, they are mutually threatened by an identity politics built upon fundamentalism. Indeed, multiculturalism's and cosmopolitanism's opposite is the attempt to build more solid and less fluid identities in the context of rapid social change' (Stevenson 2002). Despite the intensification of the global flows of peoples, a number of nationalistic and ethnically based social movements are attempting to reconnect questions of identity and territory (Gilroy 2000). The challenge at the national level remains how to articulate a more fully inclusive society and culture that also recognises the need to decentre such an identity through the recognition of diaspora and difference.

The prospects of rejoining cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism could be possible as long as they are able to reconceive questions of cultural identity. Both cosmopolitanism

and multiculturalism work with a view of cultural identity as a changing, fluid and dialogic construction (Stevenson 2002). Cosmopolitanism needs to be able to link the moral universalisms of a human rights discourse to a reflexive concern with identity formation. Instead of supporting thin identities, which develop an ironic form of distance from their current cultural attachments (e.g. see Turner & Rojek 2001), more 'rooted cosmopolitanisms' see no necessary contradiction between feelings of loyalty and commitment to particular cultures and openness towards difference and otherness (Appiah 1998). 'Multicultural questions need to engage with cosmopolitanism and its critique of national forms of thinking. Within this frame, we need to be able to sharpen our understanding of the complexity of modern social and political identities while maintaining the normative emphasis that both cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism provide. Such viewpoints have much to learn from each other given that they are both challenged by less reflexive social identities and the tensions that will inevitably persist between different levels of governance' (Stevenson 2002).

This would indeed open the possibility of maintaining a commitment towards particular national/local identities while seeking the dialogue with others who might have different connections. I argue that cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism need to be located less in a thin identity and more in the complex recognition of our loyalties and commitments to dialogue. We should resist the temptation to argue that cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism are best articulated by those who manage to avoid 'thick solidarities' (Turner 2000). It is not too fanciful to claim that a commitment to cosmos is indeed compatible with attachments to culture, place and dialogue.

2. 5. 3. Critical Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism

The essence of cosmopolitanism is the idea of moving beyond one's own specific political, communal, territorial, cultural attachments (but without downplaying them) to give allegiance to the wider human community. The aim is a better understanding of the implications of social, cultural and political transformations that transcend territorial boundaries. Within this frame, cosmopolitanism can refer to notions as diverse as global democratic institutions and transnational justice, post-national forms of citizenship and belonging along with individual values and cultural dispositions. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is closely associated with increased mobility of ideas, people and cultures and it extends membership to the world at large, beyond the narrow boundaries of a particular nation. It is based on the belief that the individual is capable of moving beyond territorial attachments due to the existence of multiple forms of identity and belonging (e.g. the cases of refugees, diasporas and migrants). In this sense, identities are fluid and not geographically or culturally bounded (Turner 2002; Beck 2006). Also, cosmopolitanism is based on individualism, meaning that it puts the morally autonomous individual at the centre of its philosophical outlook.

On the contrary, for nationalism the needs of the nation take precedence over individual interests. Nationalism focuses on the collective dimension of human life; the sole unit of analysis for nationalism is the collectivity either the nation or the ethnic group (e.g. see Smith 1995). It is this sense of belonging to a community that can be considered common and unifying to nationalist thinking. The concept of a territorially based homeland remains crucial to nationalist ideology; most nationalist struggles revolve

around territory as the object of emotional attachment to the members of the nation (Anderson 1991, p. 7).

All the above-mentioned aspects could be conceived as indicators of tensions in the relationship between the two outlooks. However, I argue that they do not irreversibly lead to an incompatibility between national and cosmopolitan perspectives. It becomes much more difficult to make categorical statements if we take under consideration that human condition can be constituted by both collectivist and individualist dimensions. In this regard, a possible clear-cut opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism may rely upon a one-sided and simplistic account of human condition as based on either unqualified collectivism or pure and rootless individualism.

Complex interconnectedness arising from globalisation requires a more nuanced and multidimensional system of governance where states constitute just one level. The inability of individual nation states to provide answers to collective questions and the ambiguity of the boundaries between the national and the international and between the global and the local mean that nation states are no longer the sole sovereign agents. The three tenets of nation states – individual autonomy, political legitimacy and democratic law − are no longer sustainable and bound together due to 'overlapping communities of fate' which are no longer situated within the borders of a single nation state (Held 2003, p. 523; Guibernau 2001, p. 431).

Finally, a new institutional framework needs to be conceptualised in opposition to traditional national forms of democracy by including local, national, regional and global

institutions (Held 1995, 2003). The principles of equal worth and dignity, active agency, political responsibility and accountability, consent, reflexive deliberation and collective decision-making through voting procedures, inclusiveness and subsidiarity, avoidance of serious harm and amelioration of urgent need could shape the new institutions needed (Held 2003, p. 515). For example, Held does not dismiss the role of the nation state completely neither does he conceive it as the primary *locus* of democracy. Rather, he contends that nation states can coexist with transnational civil society and transnational organisations, such as the UN, pointing out that it is not possible to confine politics to territorial borders (Held 2006). For these reasons, it is vital to complement institutional principles with ethical considerations, such as equal worth and recognition of diversity.

2. 6 Synthesis of Different Cosmopolitan Traditions

The review of the different cosmopolitan traditions through an analysis of the relationship of cosmopolitanism with culture and nationalism in the context of globalisation in the previous parts is of utmost importance for my research, as it supports my understanding of cosmopolitanism. Drawing on different thinkers and at the same time differentiating from them, reveals my critical perspective of cosmopolitanism.

To be more specific, my analysis of cosmopolitanism in Europe in crisis throughout the thesis takes globalisation as a starting point. Globalisation functions as the framework for my interpretation of the EU and the Greek crisis, because there are both internal and external characteristics and causes. The European crisis has been triggered by the global

financial crisis, the uncontrolled power of capitalism and the expansion of the market, while the deep causes lie in the diachronical democratic deficits and the problems of economic governance in both the EU and Greece.

This is why my primary understanding of cosmopolitanism in the European Union focuses on the EU's democratisation from above (EU insitutions) and from below (civil society), as well as on the enhancement and institutionalisation of solidarity between member-states. In this sense, my cosmopolitan approach is influenced by Held and Archibugi who endorse the requirement of cosmopolitan supranational democratic institutions and cosmopolitan transnational civic activity (e.g. in the case of the EU), as it will be revealed in the following chapter on cosmopolitan democracy in the EU. However, I conceive the EU as a catalyst of cosmopolitanism without itself being necessarily cosmopolitan. In accordance with Delanty's works, my thesis draws upon the argument that 'opportunities for cosmopolitanism to become more rooted in European societies than in previous times have opened up by the sharing of sovereignty and the undermining of national autonomy. But it is important not to conflate such preconditions with a fully developed cosmopolitan condition, since the EU itself is not cosmopolitan by virtue of being a transnational actor' (Delanty 2008, p. 334).

Moreover, my understanding of globalisation and the EU does not lead me to exaggerate the demise of the nation state. As it will be demonstrated in my research in the case of Greece, whereby the sudden loss of power and autonomy of the state within the crisis led to the rise of nationalistic and authoritarian movements, nation states constitute important *loci* of power At exactly this point, my investigation of

cosmopolitanism particularly in the case of the EU differentiates from Habermas'

cosmopolitan vision (expressed in his latest book *The Crisis of the European Union: a*

Response) of a stateless European Union as a response to the problem of nationalism

and of international relations in which no higher authority that controls the internal

affairs of the nation states exists. My analysis of the cosmopolitan multilevel

governance in the EU tries to keep a balance between, on the one hand, the reproduction

of state-like institutions on a regional scale and, on the other hand, weak

supranationalism. In the first case, indeed, the global community-building trajectory

runs the risk of shifting away from a multi-layered post-national system of governance

to a universal state (Habermas 2001). In the second case, crucial questions arise that I

attempt to answer throughout the thesis; for example, 'how can the collective identity of

democratic political communities be extended beyond the borders of existing nation

states, when what is required now is merely the opening of national publics to each

other? What could be the functional equivalent of a state in a non-state polity? Is a

federation without a state realistic?' (Eriksen 2012).

The cosmopolitan position I want to adopt for the remainder of the thesis is critical and

the research is multidimensional, as it may concentrate on the EU in the beginning but

at the same time it avoids having an EU-centred and 'Western' character. Firstly, this is

reflected in the fact that I use Turkey, a non-EU member-state, as a case study for

cosmopolitanism in chapter 4, posing the problematisation whether Turkey might

potentially constitute a type of cosmopolitanisation that is neither merely European nor

Asian. Secondly, it is also revealed in my analysis of the Europeanisation of Greece and

Turkey, which introduces novel aspects, often neglected by cosmopolitan studies on the

EU, such as the role of contestation of EU norms and policies. Another critical aspect of my cosmopolitan approach becomes apparent through the case of Turkey which embodies the intense relationship between cosmopolitanism and culture; Turkey's possible membership in the EU differs from the countries of the last enlargement in 2004, as it sets another parameter, that of culture.

The following sections examine how I conceive the EU as a catalyst of cosmopolitan change setting the conditions for the development of a cosmopolitan European identity and citizenship.

3. The EU ─ A Cosmopolitan Polity?

One way to imagine the middle course between a retreat to national isolationism and the rush to global integration is the pursuit of regional structures of governance.[10] The accelerated integration of separate nation states into new political and economic units on a regional scale may be read as a particular response to the exigencies of globalisation (Habermas 1998, Chap. 4). A cosmopolitan approach to regionalism endeavours to address the challenges of globalisation and the nation states' consequent gradual loss of sovereignty to aggregation projects that try to move beyond the limited range of current political boundaries and/or of purported ethno-cultural homogeneity. A cosmopolitan version of the post-national constellation conceives regionalism as an attempt to demonstrate how democratic politics might be re-configured integrating transnational

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[10] For a detailed description of existing regional organisations and on new regionalism recent literature includes; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1999–2001; Laursen 2003; Katzenstein 2005; Söderbaum & Shaw 2003, Van Langenhove 2010; Langenhove, Farrell & Hettne 2005.

economic and political actors. Regionalism is thus understood as a response to political and economic developments that threaten to spin out of control, by attempting to provide an effective infrastructure for governance at a transnational level.

In this way, regionalism can be generalised to represent a normative project for the articulation of a new global order. Regional governance from a cosmopolitan perspective is a complementary or subsidiary level of national and local governance and it also provides a platform for discussing non-local issues. In principle, it makes boundaries between groups involved more flexible, allows the involved individuals to have plural belongings and accepts hybrid identities for these individuals (Ballinger & Brunswick 2007, p. 53). External challenges may lead regional authorities to a better political coordination orienting the multilevel fragmented governance. Cosmopolitan new regionalism is both inward, by conditioning states' strategies and outward, by affording a dynamic contribution to the changing international system. It is not a transient but rather a structural phenomenon of international relations.

The most expansive and researched field for deploying contemporary regionalism in cosmopolitan terms is Europe (e.g. Balibar 1998; Beck & Grande 2007; Delanty & Rumford 2005). Cosmopolitanism invites us to understand European regional politics as post-national. This cosmopolitan vision means that the EU can become neither a state nor a nation. The path to the unification of Europe leads not through uniformity but rather through acknowledgement of national differences; diversity is the very source of Europe's identity and creativity.

There are few transnational fields where the dilution of national sovereignty has been so extensive and where normative orientation beyond economic and security issues plays a significant role as in the case of the EU. This post-national Europe has been transformed by cross-national interactions and the move towards a post-sovereign polity operating between, among and above the nation states. Recent studies have demonstrated that the EU is a polity based on overlapping layers of governance in which the national level is only one tier, modified by a transnationalisation of the nation state (e.g. see Rumford 2002, 2006; Eriksen 2009; Erksen & Fossum 2012).

A number of supranational institutions monitor the conduct of states while economic and social institutions are promoting a new constitutional order having direct effect upon individuals. From this perspective, the EU is not an international organisation whose legitimacy derives solely from the states but rather a polity in *its own right* directly connected to its citizens. It sets the conditions for being a regional subset of a larger cosmopolitan order, as its trans- and supra-national level of governance is part of an emerging democratic world order which mediates between the state and the world (Eriksen 2009, pp. 229-230). European integration as a postnational process is seen as entailing cosmopolitan cultural and political possibilities (Habermas 2003; Delanty 2005).

Cosmopolitan tendencies are evident in changing identity patterns too. European identity is not at odds with national, regional or ethnic identities but co-exists with other kinds of identity in a reflexive relation (Herrmann et al. 2004). This dimension of reflexivity is an important indicator of cosmopolitanism in so far as it suggests a

problematisation of self-understandings. Further examples of at least partial cosmopolitanism are the growing Europeanisation of public discourse.

Although a European demos does not exist as such, the interconnectedness of European public spheres has resulted in multiple forms of interaction between European societies creating instances of cosmopolitan consciousness. The European Union is a case for transnational democracy because 'it is unprecedented to the extent that the pooling of sovereignty has helped to develop institutions whose democratic structure cannot resemble the unified structure of the nation that organises 'a people'. In this sense, the EU is both diverse and dispersed. It is diverse since there are at any location many different people. It is dispersed since political authority is exercised at any different sites and at many levels' (Bohman 2004, p. 321).

Habermas is one of the most prominent scholars who have envisioned a cosmopolitan Europe. He argues for the priority of politics to the logic of the market. For him, the European Union is a case of democracy beyond the nation state; it is networked horizontally via markets while vertically it maintains weak political regulation through indirectly legitimated authorities (Habermas 2001, pp. 94-96). This is the reason why a political culture shared by all citizens is needed together with civic solidarity not limited to nation states but open to all people inside and outside the Union. Habermas contends that a constitution alone is not sufficient; it can only set democratic processes in motion.

The creation of a civil society with interest groups, non-governmental organisations and citizens' initiatives which can act in a communicative context is more significant. This

is the only way for the European member-states to overcome their differences (ibid, pp. 98-99) and to go a step further, proceeding from a monetary and market union to a political union. 'Democratic legitimation requires mutual contact between on the one hand, institutionalised deliberation and decision-making within parliaments and administrative bodies and on the other hand, inclusive process of informal mass communication. The public sphere will emerge from the mutual opening of existing national universes to one another' (ibid, pp. 17-18). Accordingly, institutional reform needs to be adapted to the new demands that have arisen.

For Gerard Delanty too, a cosmopolitan Europe is 'a more accurate designation of the emerging form of Europeanisation as a mediated and emergent reality of the national and the global' (Delanty 2005, p. 406). At the same time he extends his argument contending that describing Europe at the present stage of integration as cosmopolitan carries the danger of confusing cosmopolitanism with supranationalism that is a form of nationalism existing above and beyond the nation (Grande 2006, p. 96). The issue is whether the cultural specificity of Europe as a distinct reality points to the existence of a form of cosmopolitan identity that transcends previous historical divisions and whether this cosmopolitan disposition is compatible with existing national affiliations.

3. 1. European Identity in Cosmopolitan Terms

Until the creation of the European Union, forms of European identity were built up *ex negativo* ─ through contrasts between Europeans and 'others', including non-European peoples after colonial expansion and immigrants from within Europe. The 'other' was

considered to be primitive, the savage to be exploited if not 'civilised'. The model of European community-building was 'uniform integration' while diversity inside or outside the EU was conceived to be a danger.

Nowadays, due to the new world scene shaped by political cooperation, economic integration, amalgamations of arts, music and taste, media coverage, mass tourism, communication technologies, transnational migration and global risks, the query of what European identity means has become difficult to answer. Instead of seeking a single one European identity, the European Union needs to define itself in terms of a multiple identity. This would not include the category of the 'European' only, as it is hard to separate and define what elements constitute the 'European'. Neither would it accommodate ethnic and national definitions only, because human beings maintain a multiplicity of belongings that tend to push the national into the background. On the contrary, a cosmopolitan European identity would be an emergent composite identity where identification with other Europeans or non-Europeans would emerge gradually through public communications from the national to the European level and through the European to the global level (Delanty 1998, pp. 1-25).

For instance, Derrida gives another dimension to a multiple identity by quoting that 'I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, that is, European through and through. My cultural identity ─ that in the name of which I speak ─ is not only European, it is not identical to itself. I feel European *among other things*. It is up to others and up to me *among them*, to decide' (Derrida 1992, pp. 82-83). Being European does not lie among *other things* but *among the others*. This implies that people could take on roles that may

have been assigned to those who represented the Other for many years. Hence, a new kind of identity can occur that locates the Other within the subject and it links identity with alterity (Pagden 2002, pp. 203, 207). Within this framework, 'European identity is a form of post-national self-understanding that expresses itself within, as much beyond, national identities' (Delanty & Rumford 2005, p. 23). New forms of commemoration have arisen based on forgiveness and aimed at overcoming the diverse and divisive experiences of the past, thereby facilitating the formation of a cosmopolitan framework for European identity (Giesen 2003).

However, a genuinely European identity in cosmopolitan terms has not managed to develop due to divisions and rising nationalistic movements. A cosmopolitan European identity may rely on the increased degree to which people identify with and express solidarity towards people beyond the local and national level. The changes in rights as a result of demands for recognition of others and the impact of global events on national politics (i.e. the global economic crisis) along with increased intercultural communication and transnational debates on common issues may constitute crucial factors for cosmopolitan types of identification across the EU. This identity might ultimately be expressed in the capacity to relativise one's own culture or identity and to recognise the Other transcending difference and diversity (Delanty 2009, pp. 86-87).

Thus, from a cosmopolitan perspective, the identification with a community either local or national can coexist with a variety of identifications regardless of how intense they may be. The sentiment of belonging is not a 'zero-sum game'; individual and collective identity can be constituted by a multiplicity of combined socio-territorial attachments at

the same time that an increase in attachment to the global (or, in this case the European community) does not necessarily presuppose a corresponding decrease in loyalty to local or national communities.

3. 2. Cosmopolitan Citizenship in Multiple European Demoi

The debate for the existence or not of a demos in a European level reveals that the term demos is ambiguous in many cases. For many skeptics demos can exist only within the framework of a nation or state;[11] there cannot be such a thing as European people or any European collective identity or institutions that are directly linked to citizens, as it was in ancient Athens for example (e.g. see Kielmansegg 1996; Grimm 1993; Scharpf 1999). According to this view, a single European demos is necessary for a genuine community of identity.

Nevertheless, the EU has established itself as a new kind of political community which is not defined by a uniform identity ─ a demos ─ but by a plurality of its peoples ─ its demoi. Calypso Nicolaidis has introduced the term *demoi-cracy* in order to demonstrate that the EU is neither a union of democracies nor a union of democracy. Instead of this, it is a union of states and peoples and democracy can exist among EU members without their merging into a single polity consisting of state-like institutions. Multinational citizenship can emerge from accommodation and inclusion of various European cultures

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[11] Habermas & Derrida (2003) criticise Eurosceptics and their 'no demos thesis' by arguing that 'an infectious vision for a future Europe cannot emerge from thin air but from the difficulties of the situation into which we Europeans have been cast. And it must articulate itself from out of the wild cacophony of a multi-vocal public sphere'. Also, Habermas (2001) writes that 'the prognosis that there cannot be any such thing as a European people remains plausible only if the people, as a source of solidarity, actually depends on some corresponding community as a pre-political basis of trust, which fellow countrymen and women inherit as the shared fate of their socialisation'.

and regional groups, such as the Basques and the Corsicans (Nicolaidis 2004, pp. 100-103). The European demoi cannot be built on some form of homogeneity among the European peoples or on an imposed universalism, but they could be conceived to be forming a genuinely heterogeneous European public committed to respect differences. This public could consist of citizens of the EU acknowledging each other as autonomous individuals, each with a right to personal self-fulfillment developing trustworthy relationships through the acceptance of obligations to each other. The arising public spirit might therefore include a concern for the well-being of the collective and it could be transformed into public discourse if EU members had the capacity to communicate publicly beyond their nation states (Zurn 2000, pp. 196-199). This implies that EU citizenship is not a replacement of national citizenship but it is additional to it (i.e. Article 8, Part 1, Title II of the Draft Treaty of the Constitution in 2004).

Within this frame, 'European citizenship constitutes a unique experiment for stretching social and political bonds beyond national boundaries and for creating a political community in which diverse peoples become associates in a collective experience and institutional designers. Europe could thus become the setting for the more ambitious transition to a post-national tableau and the prototype for cosmopolitan experimentation on a global scale' (Kostakopoulou 2006, p. 3). As cosmopolitanism entails an outward orientation of citizens' duties towards their compatriots and resident non-compatriots, the participation of Union citizens in a wide range of associative relations and negotiations beyond national borders and without any constraints imposed by member-states is necessary.

'For instance, the presence in the EU of a host of workers, work-seekers, service providers and tourists is no longer a matter of state toleration and consent. It is, instead, an issue of exercising fundamental rights' (ibid, pp. 4, 7). Allowing Union citizens to vote at general elections in the member-state of their residence and recognising long-term resident third country nationals as Union citizens introduces an alternative conception of citizenship. Employment in the public service is not any more confined to nationals while non-nationals are not excluded from access to it. Deportation too has become more flexible as it is not based only on previous criminal convictions. A number of other flexible factors are taken under consideration, such as past conduct, the length of one's residence, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration and the extent of his/her links with the host country. That means that only under serious threats to public policy or public security is deportation acceptable.

Furthermore, the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty is an important step towards the institutionalisation of a cosmopolitan framework for EU citizenship (Eriksen 2005b, p. 30). This is very important because 'if we are to be committed to universal political rights, this commitment ought to enter into our understanding of constitutionalism, where its reflexive structure renders boundaries negotiable precisely because others can make claims upon us by virtue of their membership in humanity' (Bohman 2005, p. 725). The Charter of Fundamental Rights contains provisions on civil, political, social and economic rights in order to ensure equality, provide a European citizenship, foster solidarity and provide for justice. It also

includes numerous articles that seek to respond directly to contemporary issues and challenges of globalised risk societies. It enhances the legal certainty of citizens of Europe as everybody can claim protection for the same interests and concerns. This has been a significant development of rights and law enforcement beyond the nation state in post-war Europe which constrains the will power of the states. European states have incorporated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and many of its protocols into their domestic legal systems. So, 'the effort to include the EU Charter of human rights in the Constitutional Treaty is a strong indication of heightened consistency between externally projected and internally applied standards. The parameters of power politics have changed in Europe, a fact that actually seems to have influenced the external relations of the Euro-policy, i.e. foreign and security policy' (Eriksen 2005b, p. 33).

However, there are many limitations of the Charter especially concerning citizenship rights. The constitutionalisation of human rights has not yet managed to expand the notion of EU citizenship by providing EU citizens with the right to vote in local and European elections in the country in which they reside, as well as by giving them the right also to vote in national elections. It does not give non-EU citizens living inside or outside the EU a greater voice in European affairs. The Charter applies only to the actions of EU institutions and member-states' authorities and it is not designed to replace other forms of fundamental rights protection.[12] 'Also, certain rights concerning the right to asylum, social rights and minority rights are contested at the EU level. By

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[12] Section 1 states that the Charter will only be made to apply to the institutions and bodies of the Union and only to the member-states when they are implementing Union law. Article 51, section 2 states that the Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.

systematising the existing legal material in Europe the Charter has been reduced to the fusion of constitutional traditions in Europe which reflect a shared political culture without giving priority to genuine popular participation' (Eriksen 2005b, p. 14). The European Union does not have a system for norm implementation of its own but is relying on national political systems and national administrations in order to put its measures into effect. The real problem of the EU is the absence of a human rights regime with everything this entails: a Commissioner, a Directorate General, a budget and a horizontal action plan for making effective those rights already granted by the Treaties and judicially protected by the various levels of European Courts (Weiler 2004, p. 65).

Also, Union citizenship sets limitations to the rights of residence of non-active economic participants who are non-self sufficient and want to live in a member-state for more than three months (more than 10 million individuals are 'third country nationals' in Europe and cannot get Union citizenship). In addition, differentiations in national legislations concerning protection against racial discrimination obstruct cross-border movement of migrant citizens. They have only limited protection as the asylum policy of the Union and the low level of protection of minorities' citizenship rights testify to. Thus, 'processes of equalisation co-exist with processes of exclusion and the relativisation of the member states borders is accompanied by the reinforcement of the external frontiers of the Union and the relocation of migration controls in third countries' (ibid, pp. 7, 9).

Overall, a European political community in cosmopolitan terms needs to be based on overlapping or multiple citizenships in an attempt to achieve new levels of interconnectedness to correspond with an increasingly global world (Stevenson 2005, p. 3). The fulfillment of a cosmopolitan European citizenship depends on the capacity of EU institutions to integrate a variety of subnational social groups, but it also requires more participatory, active and involved in EU decision-making processes citizens. Institutions should be able to respond to the challenge of EU citizenship with effective solutions for Europeans at the same time that citizens need to keep a more critical stance to existent modes of citizenship by not being passive observers expecting from institutions only to find solutions.

The recent crisis has revealed that citizens need to realise that they have the opportunity to direct institutional reforms not only through the European elections but also by participating in lobby groups and in pan-European social movements and by creating strong non-governmental and non-state organisations beyond the narrow national borders in order to acquire a significant voice in the European Community. The opening of EU institutions to civil society with non-governmental organisations or various social movements could be a political strategy in order to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of decision-making processes especially within the current crisis. Bringing civil society to the fore and increasing the number of interests represented in policy-making might contribute to the development of EU identity and citizenship in cosmopolitan terms.

4. A Cosmopolitan Perspective on Europeanisation

In the previous part I presented my interpretation on cosmopolitanism, especially with respect to the EU. Now I turn to an analysis of my cosmopolitan vision with respect to the process of Europeanisation. My focus is on the complex relationship between Europeanisation and globalisation from a cosmopolitan perspective. I conceive the European project as a post-national one capable of combining particularised and nationalised assumptions and identities with more universalised expressions, such as diversity and human rights. A cosmopolitan Europeanisation is linked to the recognition of difference and integration of divergences while it is interrelated with globalisation.

4. 1. The Notion of Europeanisation and its Main Approaches

Europeanisation is a twofold process that results in the gradual creation of a new institutional framework at the EU level, where power is shared by the Union and the member-states and also affects the regulatory, institutional and political regulation of the member-states. The process of Europeanisation leads to a redefinition of functions, relations, limits, values and cultural characteristics that shape and determine the internal dynamics of the political systems. On the one hand, Europeanisation can be self-generated being grounded on the state's need to be integrated within the EU. On the other hand, Europeanisation can be intentional resulting from the political actors' aim to modernise their state by adopting the EU's regulatory standards.

My analysis draws upon the conception of Europeanisation as 'a process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules,

procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies' (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003, p. 30).

What is noteworthy in this definition is that Europeanisation is conceived as a process of institutional and policy change taking place at both European and national levels. It emphasises the importance of policy transfer and diffusion while it leads to a broad definition of the notion of policy change. Specifically, policy change resulting from the institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, shared beliefs and norms, policy paradigms and styles can be traced at domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies. In this respect, Europeanisation is a concept which acknowledges a two-way process of policy change between the EU and domestic structures of governance, unlike European integration which describes a one-way impact of the EU upon member-states (Featherstone & C. Radaelli 2003, pp. 3-26).

Although Europeanisation is generally considered as a *process* of interaction between national and EU policies, in practice the empirical indicators used often focus on policy *content*. In this context, Europeanisation is sometimes erroneously referred to as synonymous to 'convergence' (Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, pp. 217-239) or 'support for further integration' (Torreblanca 2001). The emergence of distinct structures of governance at the EU level generates adaptational pressures, the transformative potential of which is often conditioned, according to some scholars, upon the 'goodness

of fit'[13] between national and EU institutional arrangements (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse 2001).

Moreover, the studies dealing with the notion of Europeanisation often take Europe as a fixed concept or subscribe to a notion of Europe solely as a construct (Europe-as-construct). Also, the Europeanisation literature usually poses an automatic and uncontroversial top-down relationship between the European and domestic level rendering this relationship inherently and unavoidably asymmetrical. A critical analysis of neo-functional, supranational and constructivist approaches in what follows leads consecutevily to an examination of cosmopolitan Europeanisation revealing the novelty and contribution offered to Europeanisation by cosmopolitan studies.

4. 1. 1. Neo-Functional and Supranational Studies

Neo-functionalism was originally developed by Ernst Haas going beyond the dominant state-centric approaches of international relations. It extends existing theories by recognising interconnections between domestic and international politics (Smith & Ray 1993). The main idea is that states are no longer regarded as unitary social actors but instead, subnational groups, political parties, competition and bargaining on the national

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[13] Research on Europeanisation often focuses on the assumption that the degree of fit or misfit in adopting EU policies depends on the degree of compatibility between national and EU institutions. This perception disregards the fact that the distinction between European influences and those from wider tendencies for reform are not easily visible. Also, this model of the degree of compatibility or incompatibility between states and the EU is very static as it ignores the ability of the existing institutions to perform new tasks having adopted new targets. By contrast, the process of Europeanisation is the evolving context within which the state is under constant transformations (Passas & Tsekos 2009).

policy came to the fore (Schmitter 2004; Sandholtz & Zysman 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). Neo-functionalism also emphasises how regional and international contexts influence state policy transcending the domestic focus of comparative politics. National policy is not determined merely by national level factors but also by transnational coalitions and regional influence (Smith & Ray 1993). According to Haas, regional integration is the process of how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while they acquire new techniques for resolving conflict themselves (Haas 1968).

'Approximately at this point the new theoretical mainstream in international relations (regarding European integration in particular) arises which conceptualises new levels and actors' (Alpan 2011, p. 7). Within this frame, supranational governance as theorised by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997, 1998 and 2001) can be conceived as the contemporary counterpart of Haas' work. Their theory of supranational governance is based on the assumption that the growth of supranational polity competence is explained by the growth of interaction amongst private economic agents (such as multinational corporations) (Sweet & Sandsoltz 1998). The growth of this transnational society is furthered through the applicability of the rule of law, transparency and accountability while the institutions of the EU, mainly the Commission, are responsible for establishing European-level competencies. Institutionalisation emerges as an outcome but, at least partly, also as the means by which the European political space emerges and evolves (Stone Sweet et. al. 2001, p. 225).

What is noteworthy in these earlier definitions of Europeanisation is that, starting from Haas' neo-functionalist framework, the general tendency in academia has been to explain Europe as an independent variable. The association of the notion Europe in general and Europeanisation in particular with the EU institutions (Risse-Kappen 1996; Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 1995), enlargement (Schmimelfennig & Sedelmaier 2002, Hughes et. al. 2004; Preston 1997) and interest group activity (Grossman 2004; Lehmkuhl 2000) could be read along those lines.

'The main problem with this first group of studies is that they define the relationship between the domestic and European level as a top-down relationship where the domestic level is categorically determined by the European level' (Alpan 2011, pp. 8-9). This top-down approach adopted especially by supranational studies obscures the conception of Europeanisation as a two-way process by focusing only on downward causation from the EU level to domestic structures (Bache 2003, p. 3). Accordingly, Europe is conceived as a fixed, categorical and teleological realm according to which the domestic level has to adjust itself. Neo-functional versions of the Europeanisation literature also confine the domestic impact of Europe to changing policy practices and thus they neglect the more indirect ways in which European integration affects domestic politics (Vink 2002).

Accordingly, politics is framed by the narrow definition of the EU's impact as policy change or misfit between the domestic level and the European level. Politics in this respect has objectively specified rules and the political is consensual failing to grasp domestic opposition against EU norms, institutions and rules as well as EU membership

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at national and subnational levels through transformative processes (Rumford & P. Murray 2003, pp. 85-93). In this picture, Europe exemplifies a distinctly modern form of power politics (Moravscik 1998, p. 5).

4. 1. 2. Constructivist Studies

Starting from 1990s and the launch of the Eastern enlargement, the Balkan enlargement and the EU accession with Turkey, the concept of Europeanisation and the literature attached to it have developed a particular variant. 'Although that concept of Europeanisation was firstly used to explain policy transformation within EU member-states, it has now been applied to the study of non-member-states' (Alpan 2011, p. 9). This new interest of European studies in the domestic level and in values, ideas and actors overlapped with the social constructivist turn (Kratochwil 1989; Wendt 1992). 'This means that the EU needs to create its own norms, values and practices to a greater extent than any international society' (Alpan 2011, pp. 10-11). The notion of Europe here is of a constructed nature and is inspired by a theory of society that stresses the open-ended process by which the social is shaped (Rumford & Delanty 2005, p. 12).

One of the key terms in this context has been the EU conditionality, particularly the Copenhagen criteria, which act as a catalyst for domestic reforms in the fields of politics, finance, law and education. 'The concept of Europeanisation implies a different approach when the issue of enlargement is concerned, for example with the incorporation of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU integration process by means

of principles of democratisation, the rule of law, market economy and to human rights'
(Kabaalioğlu et. al. 2005, p. 1).

As Oğuzlu argues, democratisation along the EU accession process requires both the
establishment of democratic regimes in candidate states and the internalisation of the
EU's identity (Oğuzlu 2004). In this respect, the dominant logic underpinning the EU's
conditionality, according to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, p. 662) is 'the
bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward; the EU provides external stimuli for a
candidate country in order to comply with its conditions'. Recent contributions to the
European integration literature have pointed out that the Europeanisation process could
be influential even beyond the EU's geographic boundaries principally with regard to
candidate countries. Therefore, there is a distinction between the traditional
Europeanisation, which is mainly limited to the EU member-states and enlargement-led
Europeanisation, which affects candidate countries and is conditionality-driven (Moga
2010).

When it comes to the enlargement of the EU, normative considerations and a value-
based assessment of the process, rather than objectively specified interests, are at the
forefront because the EU serves as a modernisation anchor for those candidates which
are less democratic (Inotai 1997). For instance, in the case of the Eastern enlargement,
concepts such as reunification of the continent and return to Europe have all been used
to imply normative and emotional considerations rather than material calculations for an
interest-driven expansion (Samur 1997, p. 31; Checkel 1999; Christiansen et al. 1999;
Smith 1999). For Kabaalioğlu, the process of Europeanisation entails the adoption of

European values and mentality; it is no way confined to a mere adaptation of European institutions and *acquis communautaire* but it also necessitates the adoption of values that are commonly shared by Europeans. Hence, candidate countries need to determinedly alter their mentality to the way of doing things at the European level (Kabaalioğlu 2005).

'Not surprisingly, Turkish scholars' interest in the Europeanisation literature which intensified after 1999 could be classified in this category' (Alpan 2011, p. 13). At a very general level, the Europeanisation literature within the Turkish context is very similar to the Eastern and Balkan enlargement. It is usually used synonymously with democratisation (e.g. Aydın & Keyman 2004; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Öniş 2009; Kubicek 2005; Ulusoy 2008) and democratic consolidation (Kalaycıoğlu 2005; Kubicek 2005). In this respect, the tendency to set a causal relationship between the European level and the domestic level within the framework of an inherent asymmetry is endemic and generic in the literature on Turkey's Europeanisation process. There are also intense references to the policy responses to the *acquis* and changes within the state machinery and legal structure (Tocci 2005), showing it as an ultimately one-way and unproblematised process. 'The tendency to present the exigencies set by the European level and the developments on the ground of causality also shows itself at the identification of the impact of Europeanisation on Turkish domestic politics' (Alpan 2011, p. 13). The EU demands and the responses at the domestic level are presented simultaneously while Europeanisation within this context is generally presented as an external trigger that would lead to a re-alignment of Turkish politics (Öniş 2009; Tocci 2005).

However, these studies still lack adequate focus on domestic discourses. Although the notion of Europe is constructed in large part at the domestic level and is fully influenced by actors, discourses and ideational processes, Europeanisation is still provided with a teleological and uncontested content. 'The relationship between the European level and the domestic level is still unproblematised and categorical' (Alpan 2011, p. 13). Instead of taking for granted concepts like goodness of fit and misfit, the European level emerges as a panacea for democratisation and modernisation (i.e. the Europeanisation literature on the Turkish case).

4. 2. Cosmopolitan Studies on Europeanisation

Especially after the demise of the Cold War, the need to explain the drastic transformations of the social structure and the new social and political identities has been the main issue within the analytical agendas of critical theory, post-Marxism, post-structuralism and post-modernism. European studies also shifted its focus to this new academic demand and a number of studies aiming to reconceptualise an identity-based politics flourished (Alpan 2011, p. 14). Especially with the signing of the treaties of Maastricht (1991) and Amsterdam (1997), the EU reached a degree of integration where identification with Europe went beyond known forms of intergovernmental cooperation. 'New studies trying to understand Europe as an identity (e.g. see Maier & Risse 2003; Hülsse 1999; Jimenez et. al. 2004), a public sphere (e.g. see Barenreuter 2005), a possibility for multicultural citizenship (e.g. see Lavdas 2001), a political geography

(e.g. see Agnew 2001; Moisio 2002; Smith 2002) and a metaphor (e.g. see Drulak 2006) could be read along those lines' (Alpan 2011, p. 14).

Within this frame cosmopolitan studies have flourished. A horizontal exchange of socio-cultural practices and a cross-fertilisation of identities have fostered the emergence of cosmopolitanism in practice (Beck & Grande 2007). Also, the enlargement of the EU has facilitated such processes; ongoing integration and enlargement stand as a testament to the transience of the EU's spatial and cognitive boundaries as opposed to the reification of the nation state. A self-reflexive cultural and political subjectivity is developed and social change is created which could be conceived as synonymous with a cosmopolitan outlook (Delanty & Rumford 2005).

Such an outlook is rooted in the normative idea that the scope of ethical concern should not be limited by parochial boundaries. It seeks to think on or at the border noting its blurred nature (Mignolo 2000). It does not refer to the creation of a homogenous EU empire or the overcoming of differences, but it relies on the preservation of diversity in the EU. In this sense, Europeanisation entails a process of societal transformation which can be termed cosmopolitan to refer to the lack of closure in it due to its multi-levelled orders of governance and its multi-directional expansion. As it will be explicitly explored in what follows, this approach to Europeanisation gives emphasis to globalisation and its impact on member and prospective member-states as well as on their interrelationships which accordingly shape the structure and function of the EU.

4. 2. 1. Europeanisation and Globalisation from a Cosmopolitan Perspective

In the last few years there have been a few attempts to discuss the relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation. There is an agreement that the two are closely related, but there are variations in the degree of interdependence between the two phenomena.

More specifically, 'one approach claims that Europeanisation is a 'filter' for globalisation' (Tsarouhas & Ladi 2013, p. 482). In this case the EU's reaction to the pressures of globalisation is signified as well as its capacity for deep co-operation on several issues, such as political economy (e.g. see Wallace 2000, pp. 369-382). On this understanding, increased Europeanisation is the logical response to a world dominated by global financial flows and transnational corporations. The nation state needs the security offered by membership in the EU and as a consequence, globalisation legitimises European integration in the sense that greater EU competiveness is required.

A second approach moves a step forward and conceives Europeanisation as an 'antidote' to globalisation referring to the capacity of Europeanisation not only to act as a filter for the pressures of globalisation but also to promote policies, institutions and more socially just developments that affect the processes of globalisation (e.g. see Graziano 2003; Tsarouhas & Ladi 2013, p. 483). In the face of globalisation, Europeanisation becomes an active participant rather than a passive recipient trying to respond to economic globalisation by creating transnational political space. The idea here is that the EU constitutes a defensive reaction to globalisation.

A third and diverse approach to the relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation comprehends globalisation as the main force for international change (e.g. Levi-Faur 2004). In this case, Europeanisation is simply following the trends outlined by globalisation as part of it (Tsarouhas & Ladi 2013, p. 483).[14] Nation states surrender a degree of their sovereignty in order to survive under conditions of globalisation, while globalisation is the condition which has replaced the need for peace in the justification of European integration today (Tsarouhas & Ladi 2013, p. 483).

Nevertheless, the weakness of these approaches is that they examine Europeanisation and globalisation as two distinct phenomena and they seek to determine whether they have a parallel route or whether they emanate from each other. Yet, the significance of international cooperation as well as international and regional organisations (i.e. the EU) as a result of increased interdependence is often disregarded. Regional organisations constitute a step towards further international cooperation and they are inextricably connected with globalisation influencing it and simultaneously being influenced by it. As a result, the relationship between Europeanisation and globalisation is often conceived as exogenous, instead of endogenous, reflected in complex socio-political and economic structures, institutions and policies.

My approach to Europeanisation is different to what scholars have so far described.

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[14] Sala (2004) examines Italy and the reforms taking place and he argues that Europeanisation plays an indirect role in the process of change and that other global pressures are more prominent. Also, Verdier & Breen (2001) apply a quantitative research design in four different domestic dimensions and observe that in areas such as labour market and capital market, globalisation is mainly responsible for change while in electoral competition and in centre-local government the EU plays an important role.

Europeanisation can be the cause and, simultaneously, the result of globalisation. It can be the result, as Europe is the outcome of the impact of global forces, but it can also be the cause, as Europeanisation represents a force for change that extends from the regional to the global level influencing globalisation. Therefore, Europeanisation and globalisation are mutually implicated as Europeansation is both an expression and a reaction to globalisation. Perceived in this way, my approach to Europeanisation is not one-dimensional, where states are the primary units seeking to acquire a European identity. Also, it does not consider the EU as a perfect model *a priori*, being treated as an institution lying above member-states in vertical association with them. Forms of communication, dialogue and cooperation are developed instead of hierarchical relationships between national and European institutions (Manitakis 2007, pp. 119-126).

Europeanisation from my cosmopolitan perspective is a paradigm of transnationalism and regional concept of globalisation. This kind of Europeanisation does not annul the nation state but presupposes and extends it. Rather than using Europe and its member-states as the starting point for the analysis, I theorise Europeanisation in terms of globalisation and major social transformations that are not exclusively spearheaded by the EU. My cosmopolitan account of Europeanisation differentiates from the main literature which assumes an automatic and uncontested top-down relationship between the European and the domestic level.

By interpreting Europeanisation in this way and by conceiving cosmopolitanism as the internal transformation of social and cultural phenomena through self-problematisation, self-transcendence and pluralisation, it becomes apparent that cosmopolitanism is

closely associated with Europeanisation whereby different forms, discourses and agencies are emerging. The EU has become a catalyst of cosmopolitanism mainly through the Europeanisation process of both EU and non-EU states; Europeanisation concerns member-states and European countries that are not EU members, it is applicable at the subnational level and it inquires to what extent non-European countries or regions are being Europeanised (Beck & Grande 2007, p. 99). Cosmopolitanism contributes to our understanding of Europeanisation by stressing the dynamic and transformative movement that occurs because of the EU's link to the wider global context.

In this respect, Europeanisation avoids having an EU-centred character and it becomes a twofold process; from above (whereby the emphasis is on states and supranational institutions) and from below (influencing the public sphere and social movements) (Graziano & Vink 2008, p. 41). To be more specific, my cosmopolitan outlook avoids conceiving Europeanisation as a top-down transfer of policy and institutional templates which downplays the broader interplay between the EU and domestic dynamics of change.

In my analysis Europeanisation is 'a complex bottom-up and top-down process in which national policies are influenced by the formal and informal principles, norms, rules and procedures of the EU system of governance and in which domestic actors use this system in order to shape policy outcomes' (Dyson & Goetz 2003, p. 20). 'Instead of starting by describing an EU policy or institutional arrangement, Europeanisation starts by examining a domestic system of interaction comprising actors and structures,

material interests and ideas and seeks to find whether the EU provides a change in any of the main components of the system and measures the consequences of all these in terms of domestic change' (Graziano& Vink 2008, p. 41). As a result, it entails differentiation and unity in diversity which is more sophisticated than simple co-existence of nation states or multi-levelled governance with cross-cutting links between different societies (Delanty & Rumford 2005, p. 23).

Delanty and Rumford's work could be read along these lines. 'By situating Europe and the EU within a broader global context, they aim to evaluate Europeanisation as a cosmopolitan process strictly bound up with societal transformations, new social models and normative ideals, which would open up a field of socio-political possibilities instead of focusing on the change of the institutions and state' (Alpan 2011, p. 15). They argue that 'Europe is being socially constructed out of disparate projects, discourses, models of societies, imaginaries and in conditions of contestation, resistances and diffused processes of globalisation. What is being claimed in this is that Europeanisation is a process of social construction rather than one of state building and one in which globalisation in all its facets plays a key role in creating its conditions' (Delanty & Rumford 2005, p. 6). Although Delanty and Rumford do not focus on how Europeanisation influences political frontiers at the domestic level, the location of their concept within a broader context of globalisation in a more society-informed manner and the link sustained between Europeanisation and discursive, socio-cognitive transformation within the society offer a novel and unique approach to the Europeanisation literature (ibid, p. 19).

On the whole, Europeanisation from a cosmopolitan perspective differs from simplistic notions of Europe-building where Europeanisation is limited to the supersession of the nation state by a supranational authority and the changes within member-states upon EU membership. Instead, a cosmopolitan outlook of Europeanisation focusing on European transformation broadens the notion of Europeanisation and highlights its multiple dimensions. In order to demonstrate the empirical relevance of cosmopolitan approaches to Europeanisation, I use the Europeanisation processes of Greece and Turkey as case studies which will be thoroughly analysed in the following chapters.

4. 2. 2. Cosmopolitan Europeanisation and the Cases of Greece and Turkey

I intend to offer a novel approach to the Europeanisation literature with a particular focus on the Greek and Turkish contexts in which the political is not only given and constructed but also reflexive and open to contestation and negotiation. Therefore, I shift the interest of the Europeanisation literature to novel conceptions of Europe as a political and contested realm. My argument is that research on the field of Europeanisation needs to go beyond explaining change at the domestic level and present a more political and reflexive account of Europe in general (Goetz et al. 2008).

The case of Greece is of particular importance for my research because it is the most prominent example of a member-state's problematic Europeanisation process. My cosmopolitan approach to the Greek case emphasises a paradox in the Greek Europeanisation; at the same time that national policies are becoming European a parallel tendency arises, that of contestation and negative Europeanisation or de-

Europeanisation. De-Europeanisation proves that Europeanisation is not identical with modernisation (i.e. the development of socially fair procedures for the achievement of the EU objectives) without deep reforms, in the same way that the typical incorporation of the acquis communautaire is not necessarily identical with Europeanisation (Maravegias 2008, pp. 353-360). The notion of de-Europeanisation from a cosmopolitan perspective is of prime importance for Europeanisation studies as it highlights an often neglected aspect by Europeanisation scholars, i.e. the role that the contestation of EU norms by domestic actors plays in shaping the Europeanisation process.

The relevance of Greece for Europeanisation and cosmopolitanisation studies is also revealed by the current crisis. The Greek economic and political crisis is usually interpreted by scholars inside and outside Greece in two different ways (Pesmazoglou 2011, pp. 172-178). The first approach considers Greece as an isolated incident, as a separate case due to the particular and complicated features of its identity, society and political system which are not observed in the other EU countries-in crisis. From this perspective, the emphasis is put on Greece's unreliability, irresponsibility, corruption and bad management of its economic affairs. The second approach conceives the crisis of Greece as a part of the wider changes of the global community arguing that the crisis has been provoked by the unregulated accelerating power of markets within the frame of globalisation.

A sober assessment of the situation requires a conjunction of these two approaches, as the first one disregards the fact that Greece, the EU and the rest of the world are interdependent, while the second one can be dangerous, shifting responsibilities outside

Greece. The case of Greece demonstrates the inherent limits of the Europeanisation process and the challenges posed to cosmopolitanism. Greece may be an exceptional case with complex characteristics that differentiate it in a negative way from the other EU states-in crisis, but it is inextricably linked to the European Union, putting at risk the stability of the entire European project.

As far as the case of Turkey is concerned, in chapter 4 my attempt will be to understand how Europe has hegemonised Turkish politics and how demarcated political frontiers fall within the category of European studies. I suggest that to understand the process of integration and accession it is necessary to problematise regarding the extent to which the EU can act as an inceptive provider for reforms. My cosmopolitan approach to Turkey's Europeanisation criticises top-down approaches which consider Europeanisation as a simple policy transfer from the EU to the host country. On the contrary, my analysis is both top-down and bottom-up giving more room to social processes at the domestic level. This is even more relevant in case of the candidate states where the uncertainty and power asymmetry embedded in the notion of conditionality go beyond the technicalities of the policy processes of the candidate states (Sunay 2008, p. 1).

Finally, cosmopolitanism offers a novel approach to Turkey's Europeanisation as it does not conceive Europeanisation as being synonymous to 'Westernisation'. Given that cosmopolitanism occurs in a variety of societal forms and that there are European and Asian expressions of cosmopolitanism, the kind of Europeanisation I advocate is not

limited in terms of explaining the reasons for Turkey's resistance out of cultural and identity-based concerns but instead in terms of socio-political transformations.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism and introduce its empirical connotations which will be further explored explicitly in the next chapters. Among the main themes analysed were critical cosmopolitanism, the significance of cosmopolitan democracy as a new mode of governance, the relevance of the EU and the Europeanisation process for cosmopolitanism at the regional level and the reasons which led me to choose Greece and Turkey as case studies for cosmopolitanism.

In this chapter I also examined recent debates about cosmopolitanism as a form of political and cultural response to the various challenges arising from globalisation. Instead of analysing cosmopolitanism in terms of different dichotomies, I addressed the possibility of combining allegiance to the wider human community with national affiliations by taking into account the connection between the universal and the particular and the global and the local. My main argument was that if the cosmopolitan ideal is to have any real meaning it should be based on an ethical commitment to the recognition of difference, diversity and otherness at the local and global levels. 'Reconciling' cosmopolitanism and nationalism helps to move beyond the otherwise Eurocentric and elitist nature of the cosmopolitan perspective. Cosmopolitanism addresses one of the major challenges facing modern societies – the accommodation of

ethnic and cultural diversity. It is neither possible nor necessary for cosmopolitanism to disregard the nation state but rather what is needed is 'reconciliation' between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Cosmopolitanism is not supranationalism that exists above and beyond the nation. In this sense, cosmopolitanism both as a political and cultural principle and as an emerging reality deserves to be taken into account in the creation of new avenues of political action.

Finally, by analysing cosmopolitanism in relation to the EU and the Europeanisation process I attempted to reveal that the European Union is seen as a unique project of regional integration that is unsettled and unfinished. Different theoretical approaches, such as neo-functionalism, supranationalism and constructivism attempt to analyse the EU as a polity in its own right. Europe, however, is still perceived in national terms as an 'unfinished nation', an 'incomplete federal state', as though it ought to become both a nation and a state. Europe's further integration should not be oriented to traditional notions of uniformity inherent in a 'European federal state'. Europe's actual distress consists in precisely this inability to grasp and understand the historically new kind of reality that cosmopolitan Europeanisation represents: the call for the integration of differences and divergences. Cosmopolitan integration is based on a paradigm shift in which diversity is not the problem but rather the solution. The concept of cosmopolitanism is the key to understanding and shaping new forms of political authority that have emerged in Europe beyond the nation state.

Chapter 2

Cosmopolitan Democracy in the European Union: Seeking the Way Out of the Current Crisis

1. Introduction

This chapter contends that an emerging new mode of governance, that of cosmopolitan democracy, provides an answer to the changing world order in which the globalisation of political power has meant that parts of the Westphalian system have been altered. It also uses the European Union as a case study for cosmopolitan democracy aiming to examine democracy at different levels, from the subnational to the national and supranational level. The analysis of the cosmopolitan model of democracy by specifically pointing at the EU reinforces the overarching point of my thesis which is to critically examine how the cosmopolitan democratic model is feasible or practical as a new mode of governance.

The importance of investigating the EU in relation to cosmopolitanism lies also in the fact that the growth of inter-dependence in the world, with countries relying on each other to a greater extent than ever before, has created a situation in which globalisation has removed certain democratic links between the citizen and the state and moved decision-making to a higher order. As a meso-level between the state and the world, regional organisations and especially the EU have been purposefully created with a view to providing more effective management structures to deal with phenomena and

processes transcending the borders of national communities. The cosmopolitan world order would see democracy flow across borders and not be restricted to an individual state, thus creating a situation where transnational and supranational bodies such as the European Union, would remain powerful, but have far greater democratic legitimacy originating from citizens.

The current EU crisis is a significant point of reference for my research, as it reveals that the diachronic democratic deficits of the EU, which provoked the crisis, have become even more acute rendering cosmopolitan democracy topical at the present time. This is because the EU institutions and particularly the European Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers along with the Open Method of Coordination, the current voting system, the system of economic governance and the efforts to institutionalise solidarity encompass the tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism which constitute the unique mixed type of the multi-level cosmopolitan EU that I envision.

Scholars of the European Union have analysed the EU's legitimacy mainly in terms of two normative criteria; output effectiveness for the people (e.g. Scharpf 1997, 1999; Pierson 1996; Bulmer 1998) and input participation by the people (e.g. Diez 1999; Parsons 2003; Jabko 2006).

[1] In this chapter I argue that missing from this theorisation is what lies between input

(governance by the people) and output (governance for the people), namely governance with the people (e.g. see Schmidt 2006). This type of governance consists of processes analysed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest consultation. My analysis provides a critical account of the EU institutions in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy of the European policies. By focusing on the efforts to date by the EU to include civil society in the decision-making process my aim is to critically approach civil society in terms of the EU's responsiveness to citizen concerns and also those theories which envisage the highly idealistic, if not impossible, authentic participation *by* the people. As it will be discussed, these two different levels (the top-down and the bottom-up) are not separate; the accountability, transparency and efficiency of the EU's decision-making processes are examined along with their openness to pluralist consultation with the people.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the beginning, the theoretical concept of cosmopolitan democracy as a new mode of governance is presented with a particular emphasis on its different levels and its comparison with other models of democracy for its better comprehension. The subsequent part examines the empirical connotations of the cosmopolitan model of democracy in the case of the EU. Then my cosmopolitan analysis is divided into two interdependent parts.

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[1] According to Scharpf (1996, 1999) democratic legitimacy is a two-dimensional concept which refers to both the inputs as well as the outputs of apolitical system. On the input side democratic legitimacy requires mechanisms which are reflected in representative institutions whereby political decision-makers can be held accountable by the means of elections. On the output side democracy should be able to produce effective outcomes, achieving the goals that citizens collectively care about.

The first part contains my cosmopolitan proposals for the EU's democratisation from above. The Open Method of Coordination, the European Council, Commission, Parliament and the Council of Ministers have been purposely chosen for my analysis together with the current voting system, the system of economic governance and the efforts to institutionalise solidarity.

The second part supports and focuses on governance *with* the people. Of particular interest for my research are the possible implications of the crisis on civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The part concludes with specific proposals for the strengthening of civil society.

2. Cosmopolitan Democracy as a New Mode of Governance

I use the term governance instead of government intentionally when analysing the model of cosmopolitan democracy because 'the governance turn in EU studies' (e.g. see Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006) implies a move away from the traditional understanding of hierarchically ordered states in which public actors steer in a top-down manner (Mayntz 2003, p. 28).[2] Governance instead refers to various non-hierarchical coordination modes between public and private actors (Benz 2009).[3] It shifts the focus

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[2] Reconstructing the conceptual evolution from steering to governance theory, Mayntz highlights the shifts from policy development by government combined with policy implementation by public agencies to a bottom-up perspective, i.e. specific sectoral structures and target groups. Another modification was from further policy development and implementation in public/private networks and self-regulating societal systems to European policy effects on domestic structures and policy making, including EU-level policy-making and finally to political input processes at the EU and the national level (Mayntz 2003, p. 30).

[3] The basic mechanisms Benz (2007, pp. 7-8) discerns besides hierarchy (coordination by unilateral adjustment) are based on network (coordination by unilateral/mutual adjustment, trust and consent), markets or competition (coordination by mutual adjustment) and negotiation (coordination by agreement).

from public actors and hierarchical decision-making to the interaction of public and private actors and non-hierarchical political structures (see Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 2003; Kooiman 1993). Accordingly, it revaluates non-state actors in political decision-making and has therefore become an important point of reference for research on EU-society relations. 'The governance turn in EU studies' has refocused academic attention from questions of what drives the integration process to questions of how the EU is governed and in parallel to questions of EU/society relations. In this academic reorientation in EU studies, questions of legitimate governance and participation have moved high up on the research agenda.

More often than not, democratic theory has taken the nation state for granted assuming that democracies can be understood largely by reference to the forces and actors within delimited territorial boundaries. Cosmopolitan democracy questions this assumption in a globalising world where nation states suffer from democratic deficits, as their citizens are affected by decisions taken outside their borders. This section analyses democracy taking under consideration regional and global interconnectedness.

Cosmopolitan democracy denotes the effort to politically institutionalise cosmopolitan moral beliefs in order to show how transnational democracy would work while it keeps legitimacy enshrined with liberal democracy. Many issues that require governance have moved from the national to the international level requiring democracy to be organised. There are different versions of institutional cosmopolitanism; for instance, Otfried Höffe (2007) is the proponent of an 'ultraminimal' and federal world state, while Jürgen

Habermas (2001) and Michael Zürn (2000) support the widening of global governance structures (regimes, NGOs, but without a world government).

My research draws upon David Held (1989, 1995, 2010), Anthony McGrew (1997, 2002) and Daniele Archibugi (1998, 2011), who suggest the institutionalisation of cosmopolitan rights based on global civil society and global regulation of the economy. According to their approaches, cosmopolitan democracy explores the application of norms and values of democracy at different levels ranging from the local to the regional and global level. The cosmopolitan programme intends to democratise the global arenas of decision-making that are dominated by the state and market forces. It extends the scope of democratisation beyond the state-society relations stressing participation, law-making and agenda-setting by the citizens of the world through their representatives. Finally, the cosmopolitan project of democracy places importance primarily on the role of civil society and public sphere; interactions faced by publics can generate organisational activities that eventually could get transformed into institutionalised control mechanisms.

Although my approach is influenced by the works of Archibugi and Held (1995, 1998) who take globalisation as the basis for a new conception of a transnational democracy beyond the nation state, in fact it differentiates from their firm commitment to universalism which is mostly normative. My account of cosmopolitan democracy is post-universalistic and in this regard it is influenced by the works of Delanty (2006 2008, 2009) and Rumford (2002, 2006). In this sense, it is not confined to an analysis of the democratisation of global institutions and of global civil society only but it uses the

European Union as a case study for cosmopolitan democracy in order to reveal its feasibility as a mode of governance. My research is also critical in that it does not exaggerate the dynamic of civil society. Although I recognise its importance, I also take under consideration the limitations of the role played by civil society particularly in the case of the EU. The following sections are indicative of the way cosmopolitan democracy is conceived in its different levels and aspects and through its comparison to other conceptions of democracy.

2. 1. Cosmopolitan Democracy as a Twofold Process

Cosmopolitan democracy is a twofold process. It is both a top-down process, where states create new institutional structures and a bottom-up process, where dynamics of rule-making are promoted by publics.

As a top-down process, cosmopolitan democracy encourages the creation of regional parliaments (e.g. Latin America and Africa) or enhances their role (e.g. the European Parliament). It also entails the entrenchment of a cluster of civil, political, economic and social rights in order to shape and simultaneously control democratic decision-making. These rights need to be enshrined within the constitutions of parliaments and assemblies at the national and international level.

The institutional proposals of cosmopolitan democracy vary and can be short and long-term. In the short-term, the reform of the UN Security Council is considered necessary by cosmopolitans in order to give developing countries a significant voice and alter the

veto system. Also, the creation of a second UN chamber on the model of the European Parliament and of a new International Human Rights Court is envisaged together with enhanced political regionalisation and the establishment of a small but effective and accountable, international military force (Archibugi, Held & Kohler 1998, pp. 296-304).

In the long-term, some of the objectives of cosmopolitanism intending to enhance democracy at the global level include the formation of a global parliament connected to regions, nations and localities and of an interconnected global legal system. The public funding of deliberative assemblies and electoral processes, the elimination of the nation states' coercive means of compliance and the demilitarisation and transcendence of the war system are also among the proposals of cosmopolitan democracy for the democratisation of world order. Finally, the formation of a second authoritative assembly of all democratic states and agencies is also an objective. This second assembly would then become an authoritative centre for pressurising global issues, e.g. health, disease, food supply, the developing countries' debt and the instability of the hundreds of billions of dollars that circulate the globe (Archibugi & Held 1995, pp. 106-111). Contrary to the present diplomatic representation at the UN, members of the second assembly would not be accountable to their governments but to their electorates. Any national group of deputies would represent their polity in its political, social and cultural diversity. The representation of a country's societal groups and forces aims at giving societal actors a voice at the United Nations (ibid).

As a bottom-up process, cosmopolitan democracy places importance primarily on the role of civil society and public sphere which also exist in the international system.[4] Non-governmental organisations are prominent actors as these groups can work with and within, across and against states and international governmental organisations. Politics in transnational civil society could also be a matter of promoting social and ecological sensibilities of citizens and of exerting pressure on multi-national corporations. It may also be largely an issue of questioning, criticising and publicising. In this way the decisions and policies of states may be influenced by the discursive force of transnational civil society (Dryzek 2002, pp. 129-132).

Cosmopolitan theorists propose the enhancement of non-state and non-market solutions in the organisation of civil society and the introduction of limits to private ownership of key 'public shaping' institutions, media and information. The provision of recourses to those in the most vulnerable social positions to defend and articulate their interests is a main goal together with the creation of diversity of self-regulating associations and groups in civil society. Other possible objectives could be the systematic experimentation with different democratic organisations in civil society and the multispectral economy and pluralisation of patterns of ownership and possession (Pogge & Moellendorf 2008).

The conditions for effectiveness of civil society in global civil society require the creation of transnational coalitions and networks on specific global issues with the participation of civil society organisations from different domains of action through

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[4] The role of civil society and public sphere is explored explicitly by Bohman (2006), Cochran (1999) and Lynch (2000).

public awareness campaigns, protest, lobbying, alternative policies and practices. 'The deployment of a multilayered strategy (i.e., local, national, regional and global) and the creation of 'vertical alliances' with UN agencies, like-minded governments and business actors might also be significant factors for the development of civil society at different levels' (Marchetti 2010).

2. 2. Levels of Cosmopolitan Governance

Cosmopolitan democracy is not just the achievement of democracy within each state, but more accurately a process of reconstruction of global governance. It is an endless process rather than a set of norms and procedures as it seeks to address the democratisation of global economic relations enhancing governance with the people. Global sites and transnational networks of power which operate beyond the scope of territorial control are of utmost significance for the cosmopolitan mode of governance (Held 1995, p. 237). Cosmopolitan democracy extends the scope of democratisation beyond the state-society relations stressing participation, accountability, law-making and agenda-setting by the citizens of the world through their representatives. It advocates multiple citizenships as people may enjoy citizenship in their own communities and simultaneously in wider regions.

'Democratic institutions need to be redesigned and developed to reflect the multiplicity of issues, questions and problems that affect and bind people together irrespective of whether they are living in one state or another' (Boagang 2002, p. 52). Given that contemporary patterns of globalisation and regionalisation tend to undermine existing

national forms of democracy cosmopolitan democracy attempts to specify the principles and the institutional basis upon which democratic governance within, between and across states is relied in order to be expanded (McGrew 1997, p. 220). Therefore, cosmopolitan democracy is to be conceptualised in terms of its different levels of governance. It explores the application of norms and values of democracy at different levels ranging from the local to the global one.

At local level, cosmopolitan democracy strengthens the structure of the local government by crossing the borders of more than one state; intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations aim at bringing together communities and local bodies that do not belong to the same state.

At state level, the cosmopolitan project supports internal democracy in states not by intervening militarily but by assisting international organisations to organise and certify elections. Enhanced diplomatic actions, economic sanctions and conditionality for participation in regional organisations are some of the means for strengthening democracy in states. Cosmopolitan democracy does not prescribe identical procedures in distinct national communities. It also encourages granting rights to immigrants and refugees equivalent to those of the state's nationals according to the cosmopolitan principles of equality and diversity (Archibugi, Held & Kohler 1998, pp. 209-212).

At regional level, problematic issues or conflicts are dealt more efficiently through regional organisations that include both state representatives and representatives from various local communities (i.e. the EU).

At global level, cosmopolitan democracy offers a working frame whereby citizens and global movements could be connected. Non-governmental organisations may act for the pursuit of an increased transparency, control and accountability of global governance (Archibugi, Held & Kohler 1998, pp. 209-212).[5]

2. 3. Cosmopolitan Democracy and Other Models of Democracy

For a comprehensive understanding of cosmopolitan democracy its comparison to other state-centred and transnational models of democracy would be beneficial. There is a theoretical debate about what democracy might mean in the era of globalisation which forces us to radically rethink democratic theory and to adjust existing democracy accordingly. The suggested remedies range, roughly, from building the institutions of a democratic world government to more modest suggestions for increased participation and deliberation within existing global governance.

To begin with, cosmopolitan democracy differs from both the statist and federal models of democracy; the traditional state-centred model of democracy is extremely weak as it does not promote intrastate democracy while the federal model of democracy is extremely strong, coercively imposing democratic orders on lower levels.

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[5] The issue of NGOs is critically addressed in the case of the EU, i.e. in the last part on the EU's democratisation from below, where I explicitly examine the inherent limitations, democratic deficits and problems of accountability of CSOs.

The key features of a state-centred democracy are territoriality and sovereignty. The state stands above all other associations and groups within its geographical area and it monopolises public decision-making and enforcement (Nugent 2010, pp. 421-422). However, from a cosmopolitan perspective, states cannot retain the ultimate decision-making power any more, as decision-making competences are not exclusively exercised by national governments, but also by institutions and actors at 'higher' and 'lower' levels. In many states subnational levels exercise significant powers with regional and local authorities engaging in policy activities that are not entirely controlled by national governments.

According to the federalist model of democracy, power is divided between central and regional decision-making institutions. This division of power is protected by constitutional documents while disputes are settled by a supreme judicial authority. In theory the division of power is balanced between the central and regional institutions. But in practice some policy responsibilities inevitably overlap and some policy areas are primarily the responsibility of the central institutions, especially in foreign affairs, security, defence and management of the currency issues (ibid, p. 424). The problematic aspect of this model is that the federal government has the authority and the coercive means to impose respect of democratic principles on component states, meaning that conflict may arise if different bodies of the federation express contrasting opinions. Federal democracies are legally integrated state-based orders premised on the existence of a sense of common identity and destiny, so as people can turn into compatriots who are willing to take on collective obligations. This basis of federal systems might make

their response to global problems problematic, as it does not take into account the heterogeneity and diversity of populations with different constitutions.

Therefore, when comparing state-centred and federal models with cosmopolitan democracy, it becomes apparent that the latter represents the midway between these two models, as it encompasses states with different constitutions within an overarching democratic world order. It differs from the federalist models in that it does not seek to abolish existing states or replace their powers with an entirely different institutional framework. Rather, existing states are relocated within an overarching democratic law.[6] 'Cosmopolitans are searching for ways to rescue, reframe and harness nation states so that a more cosmopolitan character is adopted by suggesting various means, elections, referenda and sampling for the incorporation of citizens directly within these institutions' (Brassett & Smith 2007, p. 19).

Furthermore, cosmopolitan democracy is to be distinguished from any internationalist account of democracy which, commencing from the communitarian premise that states constitute the principal moral and political foundations of world order, aspires primarily to a cooperative society of states rather than peoples. The internationalist account of democracy remains state-centric in so far as it is conceived in terms of enhancing the transparency and accountability of international institutions to national governments (McGrew 2002). Cosmopolitan democracy differs from international democracy since the term international depicts a type of organisation that is characterised by a two-level representation; the existence of governments within states and the creation of an

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[6] For the relationship between cosmopolitan democracy and the state see Archibugi & Held (1995) and Held (1995, p. 230).

international government-based community. The term cosmopolitan on the contrary, allows for the introduction of a third level of representation; one that requires a more active participation of individuals in global political matters.

In addition, cosmopolitan democracy differs from deliberative democracy in many crucial aspects. On the one hand, deliberative democracy is interested in the discursive sources of existing systems of global governance and the role of transnational civil society in establishing deliberative democratic control over the terms of political discourse (Dryzek 2000, p. 138). On the other hand, it is not a discrete model of democracy so much as a mechanism for resolving and legitimising public decisions. In this respect it has value only in the context of established democratic frameworks (Saward 1998). Furthermore, despite its emphasis upon discourse, paradoxically deliberative democracy tends to overlook crucial factors which cosmopolitan democracy takes under consideration, namely the problems that language and cultural diversity present to the construction of a genuine transnational deliberative public sphere (McGrew 2002, part 2, section 11). 'In arguing too that the deliberative communities are essentially constituted through the all-affected principle, the basis upon which stakeholders are to be incorporated − whether as direct participants or through representatives − is never clearly specified. Indeed the emphasis upon self-organisation tends to ensure that the procedural requirements and institutional conditions of effective deliberation remain somewhat vaguely stipulated. Unlike cosmopolitan democracy, there is significant silence about how intractable conflicts of interests or values can be resolved deliberatively without recourse to some authoritatively imposed solution' (ibid).

Especially in the case of the EU, given that governance in the EU is constituted on the basis of a market rationality, the response of deliberative democracy is always restrained because it moves beyond this rationality and the subjects that it promotes; a market rationality which constitutes the spatial and cognitive reality that is the EU acts as a condition of possibility for the emergence of deliberative governance for the EU (e.g. see Parker 2010, 2012). Deliberative governance allows space for the resistance of market rationalities but the vision upon which deliberative democracy is presaged and within which civil society operates is itself co-constitutive of the market.

My critical cosmopolitan account of democracy on the contrary recognises that civil society is not entirely disconnected from the framing discourse of a market cosmopolitan government. As it will be revealed in my analysis of civil society in the EU, I advocate governance *with* the people questioning the feasibility of authentic participation *by* the people and taking under consideration the various limitations; participatory democracy is in practice conditional upon a particular constitution; it permits certain subjectivities while excluding others while there is a connection and mutual dependence between political authority and civil society. There is unwillingness on the part of deliberative democrats to fully grasp the potential limitations of resistance in civil society (Dryzek 2006). This is because deliberative democracy advocates an inclusive, discursive and reflexive mode of governance grounded on consensus rather than on compromise (Habermas 2001). Cosmopolitan democracy by acting as critic of imperative of solutions and by exposing dangerous tensions and paradoxes reveals types of contestation which are able to restructure European politics.

Finally, as far as the relationship between cosmopolitan and liberal governance is concerned, cosmopolitans, like liberals, conceive deliberation as a means of guiding foreign policy, forging transnational ties and institutions and articulating shared global values. Held's list of cosmopolitan principles includes the 'equal moral status of persons' and the idea of 'active agency', understood as 'the the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective, and to be self-determining' (Held 2002, pp. 24-26). As Held concedes, these ideas are 'intertwined with liberalism and the Enlightenment' and 'clearly tied to particular traditions and places' (ibid, pp. 25).

Unlike liberals, however, proponents of cosmopolitan democracy have a broader account of the agents of deliberation; deliberators can include state representatives, non-governmental organisations, including corporations, civil society groups and individual citizens. Cosmopolitans do have a powerful strategy for combating charges of intolerance. 'Their willingness to allow more comprehensive liberal ideals into global public reasoning goes hand in-glove with recognition that the interpretation of these ideals is determined in public' (Brassett & Smith 2007, pp. 16-7). It may also be the case that some of Held's cosmopolitan values, particularly the idea of 'active agency', would even be inadmissible as public reasons within a liberal democratic society, at least according to the Rawlsian ideal of public reason (see Rawls 1999, p. 146). It should be noted that, for their part, cosmopolitans are highly critical of Rawls's attitude towards pluralism (e.g. see Rawls 1993). They believe that his willingness to tolerate non-democratic peoples leads him to neglect the interests of individuals, particularly

those within non-democratic societies who may be campaigning for progressive reforms (McCarthy 1997, p. 213).

Also, 'liberals presuppose radically different conceptions of deliberation in domestic and international contexts; the former is the public reason of a democratic community of citizens, comprising a wide range of civil, political and social rights, whereas the latter is the public reason of a society of equal peoples, comprising a minimal range of human rights'(Brassett & Smith 2007, p. 16). Cosmopolitans, on the contrary, see little difference in the nature and content of deliberation in domestic and international contexts. Both can be conceptualised as a democratic process of public reasoning between free and equal citizens and both appear to be realisable within broadly similar institutional frameworks but without recreating institutions of the nation state at transnational and global levels.

Having examined the theoretical framework of cosmopolitan democracy the next part intends to reveal the empirical connotations of the cosmopolitan mode of governance in the case of the European Union.

3. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU

A promising perspective for an innovative conceptualisation of new governance is offered by the theory of cosmopolitan democracy. When examined in relation to the EU cosmopolitan democracy intends to offer a model of democracy beyond the nation state.

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The EU is a real-life attempt to develop a democratic system of multi-level governance and it can be a possible frontrunner of cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi 2008). Cosmopolitan democracy can be formalised in Europe by a step by step approach through the simultaneous institutionalisation of seemingly two competing and conflicting principles, i.e. supra-nationalism and intergovernmentalism. It differs from merely supranational approaches which locate Europe above the states and combat national particularities as obstacles to European integration. It also differs from purely intergovernmental approaches which want to subordinate Europe to nation states and national interests.

Instead of arguing either that the EU requires a framework of legally binding legitimising constitutional principles, i.e. a system of supranational federal European political institutions that are superior to national bodies or that there can be no ceding of national sovereignty and that the EU has already gone too far, I support a middle way which reveals the intermediate character of the EU to be both coherent and legitimate. From this mixed perspective it proves perfectly possible for the EU to acknowledge both the validity of certain general norms and obligations and the need for supranational collective action in those areas where global processes have rendered it prudent. Such acknowledgement does not require the adoption of a totally unified political system (Bellamy & Castiglione 1998, pp. 172-173).

Cosmopolitan democracy advocates expanding the concept of the public beyond its national borders and opening it up to an emerging European space (Sweet et al. 2001). Expansion of power at the supranational level is not equated with loss of power at the

lower level. In fact the opposite holds and as a consequence nationality, transnationality and supranationality reinforce and complement each other. This has proceeded in two directions; inwards, through constant extensions of the power of the EU and the resulting structural adaptations in the member-states and outwards, through the constant enlargements.

Cosmopolitan democracy in the European Union also proposes multi-level governance structures applying dialogue's frameworks and mutual learning for managing differences. It outlines a new post-national model of democracy for Europe that no longer marginalises citizens but gives them an active role in European decision-making processes (e.g. see Marks et al. 1996). However, the multi-level structures suggested by cosmopolitan democracy do not resemble those of conventional federal systems, which establish a stable division of labour between a limited number of levels of government with general jurisdiction over a given territory or a given set of issues and mutually exclusive membership. Neither do they advocate an anarchical, fluctuating superimposition of single purpose jurisdictions with overlapping memberships.

Rather, in my cosmopolitan account the EU is envisaged as a polity in its own right characterised by various levels such as centre of population, member-states, subnational units and various dimensions of policy-making (Held et. al. 1999). Specifically, there is great horizontal institutional heterogeneity, complex formal institutionalised ways of decision-making through different systems of representation and accountability entrenched in supranational and international structures both at the Union and at the member-state level. In vertical terms there is an increasing degree of cooperation

between different governmental levels while in horizontal terms cooperation exists amongst several groups of actors. As a consequence, the EU combines national and supranational bodies in policy-making. Under these circumstances there is a high degree of shared decision-making competences and responsibilities (Budge & Mackay 1994, p. 264).

Governance in the EU from this cosmopolitan perspective acknowledges and integrates difference and diversity. For instance, Beck and Grande stress the importance of preserving diversity and Europe's uniqueness vis-à-vis the nation state. An attempt is made throughout their institutional prescriptions to balance respect for otherness with the integrationist imperatives of supranational problem-solving. They support a number of policies such as *inter alia* the establishment of a constitution, the use of well-designed pan-European referenda[7] and the implementation of a set of anti-majoritarian[8] institutional checks and balances. Other notable concrete examples mentioned in their work include the principle of mutual recognition − which permits the maintenance of legal variation as long as legal provisions are mutually compatible and therefore

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[7] Although Europe-wide referendums create independent possibilities of intervention for the citizens that complement existing institutions of parliamentary democracy, it is unclear how European referendums should be initiated by the citizens as a general rule and not by supranational institutions, such as the European Commission or by national governments (Beck & Grande 2007, p. 236). Also, it is doubtful how it could be achieved for the results of European referendums to be binding for the supranational institutions at the same that the supranational institutions should retain the possibility of reacting to the results of a referendum (ibid).

[8] As it will be revealed below, in the section of my institutional analysis, I do not share the argument by Beck and Grande that cosmopolitan democracy cannot operate on the majoritarian decision-making but must seek consensus. My approach to cosmopolitan democracy maintains that majority voting enhances room for manoeuvre and the decision-making capacity of the EU institutions. Also, the alternative proposition by Beck and Grande (2007, p. 239) for the introduction of a 'reflexive loop' into the decision-making process, meaning that those involved in the decision-making process could decide on a case by case basis on how to arrive at a decision (Offe 1982, p. 332), might severely endanger the effectiveness-legitimacy dilemma. However, of particular interest is their proposal for the introduction of a 'qualified right of veto' which would not be accorded to individual member-states as has been the case to date but to a small group of states. This would prevent individual member-states from blocking decisions and blackmailing other member-states (Beck & Grande 2007, p. 239; Dehousse 1995, p. 133).

recognisable across EU borders − and the notion of variable geometry, whereby the integration process can vary in terms of its speed and participating members, as in the case of Monetary Union (Beck & Grande 2007).

These propositions by Beck and Grande aim to overcome Europe's democratic deficits which I intend to analyse in what follows. The EU is an emerging democratic regime in many cases incapable of addressing its legitimacy deficit through democratic improvements. 'Brussels' is often perceived as a 'foreign' level of government superseding peoples' own and trusted national institutions. The EU shows that if the trust-dimension of legitimacy stays unaddressed, more democratisation may paradoxically lead to less legitimate governance.

3. 1. EU Democracy in Crisis

The unfolding of the Euro crisis has revealed the weaknesses of European politicians, policies and democratic structures. The debt crisis has been so mismanaged since the start of 2010 that the survival of the Euro is now in question together with the survival of the EU itself as a political and economic project.

Although the EU had set from the beginning that the creation of solidarity was fundamental for the achievement of a political union, the current economic crisis has caused dramatic erosion in the spirit of solidarity. On the one hand, there is a strong opposition from many EU states in assisting the countries in the Mediterranean South

which face financial problems, possibly because these states appear to be enjoying significant electoral profits. On the other hand, states-in crisis which suffer from economic problems cannot receive the so-called 'rescue packages' as a manifestation of strong solidarity given that the current system of economic governance is a system of disciplinary sanctions and penalties. These austerity-driven policies are creating downward spirals of lower demand, greater debt and are directly leading to the impending Euro-zone recession.

Moreover, the current crisis revealed that the missing element of the Union is a supranational and inclusive system of governance. Monetary union without adequate financial and especially political union is difficult to be achieved. The spatial extension of the market may had beneficial outcomes in Europe but the singular operation of a market logic may paradoxically transform liberal governance to social strife which the liberation of the market intended initially to overcome (e.g. see Parker 2012). Also, the intergovernmental-confederal side is increasingly dominated by Germany and France. This is particularly depicted in the European Council which has become unbalanced and Germany-dominated with France being also influential. The legitimacy and role of the more transnational European Commission – and to a lesser extent the European Parliament – has come under stronger challenge in this crisis than ever before, while most initiatives have been passed onto national governments (Nugent 2010, pp. 179-207).

Multilateralism is at risk of turning into unilateralism, equality into hegemony, sovereignty into the deprivation of sovereignty and recognition into disrespect for the democratic status of other nations. A split is present between the countries that already or will soon depend on the rescue funds and the countries financing the rescue funds, while the conflict between the Euro-zone countries and the EU countries outside the Euro-zone seems to escalate (Comelli 2012, pp. 2-3).

The crisis has revealed that the heart of the EU's democratic problem is preference for elitism, technocracy and partial democratic structures which lack a political understanding of functional democracy in terms of engaged and critical citizens holding those in power to account. It seems that as more powers have been shifted over the years to the EU level, the practice of using intergovernmental meetings and summits, which are backed up by technocratic monitoring and implementation and are made up of complexity, lack of transparency and accountability, creates a distance from EU citizens.

In addition, the failure over the years to effectively eliminate the EU's democratic deficits is now in a perilous interaction with its economic inadequacies. These diachronic democratic deficits refer to the output of a political process (i.e. the legislation and regulations) and show that voters' policy preferences are not reflected in the output. Simultaneously, they refer to the political process itself and its input, where voters are not adequately represented and they do not have the means to exercise influence on decision-making processes. In the European Union governance *with* the

people is much weaker than governance *for* the people since political participation and citizen representation are situated primarily at the national level. In the EU, the indirect representation provided by nationally elected executives through the Council is strong while the direct representation of the European Parliament (EP) is much weaker, given the second-order nature of EP elections in which citizens' voting focuses more on national rather than European issues. European peace and prosperity may depend upon supranational cooperation and development but political legitimacy resides in the institutions of nation states. As a result, trust in the EU institutions is falling while nationalism and Euroscepticism are growing in many countries.

Therefore, in the face of the current crisis, the question that arises is 'how can Europe guarantee its citizens security in the risk-storms raging in the globalised world and how can the 'Europe of bureaucracy' become a 'Europe of citizens'. Should Europe become a large nation, a confederation, a federal state, a mere economic community, an informal UN, or something historically new: namely, a cosmopolitan Europe' (Beck 2011)?

The fact that the crisis in the EU revealed the inability of the states to confront the problems alone rendered cosmopolitan democracy a current topic of interest for the democratisation of the European Union, the strengthening of its democratic legitimacy and ultimately for the overcoming of the crisis. For that reason the following sections constitute a comprehensive analysis of how democracy in Europe can in practice be reconstructed according to cosmopolitan democracy. Equal emphasis is put on its democratisation from above i.e. at the level of the EU institutions and to its democratisation from below i.e. at the level of civil society. It should be mentioned that

these two parts are not separate, focusing either on the logics of institutional form and decision-making practices or on the ideational constructions and discursive interactions of identity and community in civil society. Rather, my cosmopolitan analysis encompasses both the internal processes/practices of EU governance and interest consultation with the people.

3. 2. Europe's Democratisation from Above ─ a Top-Down Approach

Enhancing democratic legitimacy in the multi-level European polity is an important challenge. This part addresses legitimacy problems of the EU's institutional rules in terms of both effectiveness of the EU's policy outcomes and the EU's responsiveness to citizens. My aim is to analyse how accountability, transparency and efficiency of the EU's decision-making processes could be achieved with their simultaneous openness to pluralist consultation with the people. To this end, the Open Method of Coordination constitutes the focus of my research together with those EU institutions which represent better the above mentioned mixed (between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism) cosmopolitan and multilevel type of the EU that I advocate. Therefore, specific attention is given to the European Council, Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers, to the institutionalisation of solidarity, the voting system and the economic governance in the EU, because they embody the existing tensions between the national and the supranational level which have become more acute within the current crisis.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)

The Lisbon Treaty has incorporated the Open Method of Coordination which is based on iterative benchmarking of national progress towards common EU objectives and organised mutual learning. The OMC has become the EU governance instrument of choice in complex and domestically sensitive areas where member-states diversity precludes harmonisation and where strategic uncertainty encourages mutual learning at the national as well as at the EU level (e.g. see Zeitlin 2005). The OMC is applied to a wide range of policy areas including innovation, information society/e-Europe, enterprise promotion, social inclusion, education/training, pensions, health care, youth policy, better regulation and culture. The OMC has been explicitly conceived by its architects as a new pathway for European integration, as a 'third way' between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. At this point, it needs to be stressed that the OMC was never intended to serve as the sole governance instrument for the Lisbon Strategy. It was always supposed to be combined with other EU policy tools, including legislation, social dialogue, Community Action Programmes and the structural funds.

OMC processes have helped to raise the salience and ambition of national employment and social inclusion policies in many member-states. They have contributed to changes in national policy thinking (cognitive shifts) by incorporating EU concepts and categories (such as activation, prevention, lifelong learning, gender mainstreaming, social impact assessment and social inclusion) into domestic debates, by exposing policy makers to new approaches and by pressing them to reconsider long-established but increasingly counterproductive policies (such as early retirement) (Zeitlin 2005). These OMC processes have likewise contributed to changes in national policy agendas

(political shifts) by putting new issues on the domestic agenda and/or raising their relative salience (such as activation, pension reform, childcare provision, gender equality, child poverty and well-being, and integration of immigrants).

OMC also concerns procedural shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements. The European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Social OMC have contributed in most member-states to better horizontal coordination and cross-sectoral integration of interdependent policy areas; enhanced vertical coordination between levels of governance; improved policy steering and statistical capacity; increased consultation, involvement of non-state actors, social inclusion and to a significant extent employment; and the development of transnational networks for participation of non-state and sub-national actors in EU policy making (Zeitlin 2005). It should be mentioned that OMC processes are not the only cause of these shifts in governance arrangements. The degree of involvement of non-state/subnational actors in particular depends also both on domestic institutional configurations and the actors' own strategies.

Moreover, as Parker (2010, pp. 16-17) argues, 'the open method in a sense offers more governance; it provides a way of integrating networks – prevalent and often celebrated in orthodox approaches to local and national level public policy – into the supranational level governance. Such ideals accord with the cosmopolitan democracy literature, which advocates the inclusion of civil society in deliberative governance processes. This open method is seen as including all relevant representatives from government and non-government in a deliberative learning process. It also involves the establishment of

general and relatively loose strategic guidelines at EU-level, which member-states are encouraged to follow, but in their own particular way and without legal coercion' (Parker 2010, pp. 16-17). For Beck and Grande (2007, p. 75) too 'this method is extremely hospitable to national, regional and local differences because it places them under the protection of the sovereign member states'.

However, OMC processes especially with respect to social protection/ inclusion also suffers from significant weaknesses. Chief among these are lack of openness and transparency with bureaucratic actors playing a dominant role at both EU and national levels; weak integration into national policy-making with National Action Plans (NAPs) serving more as reports to the EU than as operational policy steering documents; and limited bottom-up or horizontal policy learning with few examples of upwards knowledge transfer and cross-national diffusion of innovative local practices.

Also, in the absence of any specific institutional mechanisms to ensure a mutually reinforcing feedback between the social, economic and employment dimensions of the re-launched Lisbon Strategy, the practical effectiveness of such feedback remains decidedly limited with wide variations across member-states. Involvement of non-state and subnational actors is often confined to formal consultation and/or information exercises with limited opportunity to influence substantive policy direction or content. Civil society actors, such as NGOs and voluntary associations are much less involved in most member-states, often because of difficulties in obtaining access to consultation and coordination processes which are dominated by Finance or Economics ministries with whom they have little contact (e.g. see Begg & Marlier 2007; Begg 2007).

In addition, 'the method borrows from the lexicon of management and accountancy which is intended to provide a wieldier basis for trans- EU co-operation than a traditional legal directive and yet it is underpinned by a disciplining intent. Indeed, the ostensibly open method may be less open than the institutional rhetoric and its proponents would claim. In the arena of employment policy the discussion is not open to the extent that it can scrutinise the full range of economic policy that could be utilised in this area' (Parker 2010, pp. 17-18).

With respect to accountability, the method does indeed contain structures of horizontal review and scrutiny. Yet these structures are both designed and used by administrative actors as learning opportunities rather than as a means to call other states 'dynamically' to account. While this function may itself be important, the effectiveness of peer review has been further constricted by its confinement to a select group of explicitly 'Europeanised' policy actors. 'Not only are traditional, hierarchical forms of accountability diluted under the method, but there is little evidence of the multiplication or broadening of the accountability of actors upon which the transformation thesis relies. While we may therefore have a more 'dynamic' form of rule, this dynamism could precisely inhibit the necessary procedural frameworks and temporal space, within which adequate accountability relationships can arise' (Dawson 2009).

With respect to subsidiarity, while new structures of participation have arisen in certain contexts, these structures are manned by procedural 'gatekeepers' at the national level. 'Local and regional governments – as the main implementers of EU level targets – have

no automatic right of structural entry into strategic discussions of social inclusion and protection policy, either at national or European levels' (ibid). Furthermore, where local input is evident, its capacity to feed back into or re-frame central practice is limited. The second great hope that the OMC could use the diversity of the European polity and the presence of local involvement as a spring-board to a more legitimate European order also seems unfounded.

Of course these conclusions need not lead us to abandon the idea of the OMC. A reflexive reform strategy for the OMC could remedy a number of these challenges. This strategy would involve a greater commitment on the part of the Commission to monitor and enforce participation requirements (as well as a greater commitment on the part of member-states to acquiesce in such monitoring). It would also involve demands for greater transparency and integration between different peer review bodies. Perhaps most of the above mentioned shortcomings stem not from any intrinsic weaknesses of the OMC *per se* but rather from procedural limitations of specific OMC processes (e.g. see Zeitein 2005). Hence, a potentially fruitful strategy for improving the effectiveness of existing OMC processes would be to apply to their own procedures the key elements of the method itself; benchmarking, peer review, monitoring, evaluation and iterative redesign.

In any case, the problematisation whether greater participation rights, i.e. a commitment to local involvement and a more robust peer review system available to the OMC could eliminate important disparities of power between the various actors involved or could lead to distorted outcomes will still remain (Kröger 2009, pp. 12-13; Büchs 2009).

'With no firm procedural basis for the method within the European Treaties nor any indication of a political willingness on the part of the Commission to interfere in domestic constitutional structures, who could enforce or monitor participation requirements effectively? And would member-states even agree to such a move?' (Dawson 2009). Perhaps it may be necessary to tone down the hyperbole with which both the OMC more broadly and part of the EU literature have been greeted. The 'lesson' of the OMC could be an inspiration for reform of European law in a broader sense and a warning against the dangers of executive dominance and political alienation that lay dormant within the larger debate over new governance in the European Union.

EU Institutions

The institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, insofar as they represent continuity with the past rather than some radical new departure, have confirmed the resilience of the EU's hybrid and interdependent system of government in which executive and legislative powers are basically shared between two intergovernmental institutions, i.e. the European Council and the Council and two supranational institutions, i.e. the European Parliament and the Commission.

Evaluating the function and reaction of the EU institutions to the crisis one may observe that both the European Commission and the European Parliament have failed to influence decisions from bail-outs to general financial and economic structures and regulation (Glencross 2013, pp. 11-13). Furthermore, a new round of treaty changes and the suggested creation of separate governance structures for the Euro-zone are likely to

result in a further decline in their role and influence in the future. The decisions so far taken focus on the continuation of the current system of incremental solutions without any treaty change. They rely on the European Council – that is national leaders – to set the agenda (as opposed to the European Commission) and they create new intergovernmental funding arrangements such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its successor the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (to avoid breaking the 'no bailout' clause). They also create arrangements to scrutinise member-states' public finances and take action before imbalances develop and they use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to police austerity measures.

Thus, this mosaic of measures, some taken within and some outside the framework of the EU treaties is in practice sidelining the European Commission and the European Parliament. The fact that the EFSF was established outside the treaties has allowed member-states to get around the 'no bailout' clause in the European treaties. But it also means that every legal decision has to be ratified by all national parliaments. In the same line of thought, every executive decision to deploy the funds for their intended purpose has to be agreed unanimously by every state government. This provides an opportunity for Eurosceptic populists to rally every time a new crisis emerges. At the same time it places much greater burdens on the deficit countries than the creditors while a rules-based Europe may transform to a power-based Europe. This pattern is in danger of turning peripheral countries into a frame of excessive centralisation of national policies with punitive consequences for the recovery of the weaker Euro-zone economies.

Mere economic policy co-ordination is not a solution because citizens do not understand the arrangements or feel that their voice is heard. In fact, there is a need for a European convention (in the sense of a forum/gathering) on the future of Europe in order to make a bold leap forward to political union through a new treaty change (Habermas 2006, pp. 25-46). In front of this situation, my cosmopolitan proposals aim to provide a framework for the enhancement of legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU institutions.

For instance, when analysing voting behaviour in the European Council it seems that even where qualified majority voting (QMV) is required, the Council prefers to reach a consensus. The Council does not vote formally in many cases where QMV is required and much of the decision-making is often done before proposals even reach the Council, in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and Council working groups.

In addition, the weakening of the power of the European Council becomes necessary. This is because the Council of Ministers has lost power to the European Council, as the latter acts at a higher level of that of the Council of Ministers, attempting to settle those issues on which the ministers have been unable to reach an agreement. There is no rigid hierarchical relationship between the two bodies. The Council of Ministers refers all significant matters to the European Council for final decisions and all the issues considered by the European Council are prepared and channelled by the appropriate formations of the Council of Ministers. 'This situation creates the impression that all major decisions are taken by the European Council, while all other 'second order' decisions by the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament too has been by-passed

by the European Council, as the EP does not have access to the Council's agendas and deliberations and because manoeuvrability of the Council of Ministers proposals, when dealing with the EP, is hindered when these proposals stem from the Council's decisions' (Nugent 2010, pp. 177-178).

As far as the Commission is concerned, the two institutional innovations (i.e. the Commission comprising two-thirds of the total number of member-states and the President's election by the Parliament) raise concerns as to their effectiveness. A Commission smaller in composition raises the issue of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, 'because the absence of some larger member-states from the composition of the Commission casts doubts whether these states will accept the Commission's decisions as sufficiently legitimated. On the other hand, the smaller member-states might not entirely support the Commission's decisions because they are not going to be fully represented' (Ioakimidis 2010, p. 74). Moreover, the European Commission should be considering the pan-European interest rather than acting as technocratic enforcer of austerity rules irrespective of member-state politics. Also, the president of the European Commission could be directly elected by all the European citizens. While the Commission and the Parliament each have their respective problems to address, they are the only guarantees against the domination of the interests of large (and rich) member-countries. The Commission has to be consulted before adoption of any major fiscal or economic policy reform with potential spill-over effects, so as to allow for an assessment of possible impact on the Euro area as a whole.

In the case of the Council of Ministers, although a permanent president exists with the Lisbon Treaty, in thematic councils the six-month rotation of presidency is still maintained. 'A more effective solution would be the election of presidents for thematic councils for a period of two and a half years or the assignment of the president's election to the European Commission's members' (Weale 2006, pp. 64-65). With this presidency system adopted by the Treaty, the Union will continue to have multiple presidents, i.e. the permanent president of the European Council, Eurogroup's president and the three member-states presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers has weak executive power given the role of the European Commission in legislative initiative and enforcement. But the most negative features of the Council are its secretive mode of operations behind closed doors which have unavoidably weakened its links with the national constituencies.

With respect to the European Parliament, despite the efforts to strengthen its role, there are several problems that complicate its operation. The European Parliament does not have full legislative powers. Unlike national parliaments, it does not have the final say on what is going to become law. It is the European Commission and the European Council which are the crucial legislative authorities, as the former is liable for the initiation and elaboration of legislation while the latter for its approval.

More specifically, 'the European Parliament does not have the authority to exercise full 'positive' legislative role by introducing, developing and transforming its own suggestions into law. Also, its 'negative' role is limited; while it has the right to veto most legislation acts in the consultation process, the Council has the power to overturn

Parliament's amendments, which have or have not been accepted by the Commission and to ignore the EP's rejection of legislative proposals' (Nugent 2010, pp. 177-178). Quite often too, the Council does not react to the EP's legislative proposals especially when it does not want to introduce them, thereby causing the Council's decisions to remain pending awaiting confirmation. In the same way, despite the fact that the Parliament is trying to confer its opinion as soon as possible, the Council is commonly observed taking preliminary decisions while the Parliament's decisions are still pending.

Another important aspect of the EP's functions is that the linkage between citizens and political parties at the European level is weak, since elections are second-order events and there is no common public forum within which discussion of policy alternatives can take place. 'Parties in the European Parliament do not act as the link between the government and the public as parties at the national level do. This implies that strengthening the Parliament does not necessarily strengthen democratic input, as the connection between voters and legislators is much more complicated' (Weale 2005, p. 140). A possible solution could be for the European Parliament to become a fully-fledged parliament and the European Council a second chamber and legislator together with the EP. Also, the European Parliament needs to be reformed by having all its members elected on an EU-wide basis. In this way, local representation would be achieved through the ministers being accountable to the Council, while EU representation would be managed through the generally elected members of the Parliament.

Majority Voting

When evaluating the voting system of the Lisbon Treaty, it is legitimate to ask whether the identified changes from unanimity to QMV will remove the national veto power in any areas of policy that are critical to member-state sovereignty. Foremost is the change to qualified majority voting in many aspects of the areas of freedom, security and justice. Another change of interest is the broadening of QMV on EU laws that support free movement of professional services. The extension of decisions taken by majority in the Council of Ministers is a step forward for the enlarged EU's ability to act efficiently. 'It is also positive that decisions in the Council of Ministers taken on the grounds of the ordinary legislative procedure will be decided as a rule by qualified majority. Exceptions to this rule, when Council decisions are to be taken on the basis of unanimity, will have to be explicitly listed. In the end, this will not only substantially improve the enlarged EU's ability to act. It will also help prevent unjustified crossover deals' (e.g. see Emmanouilidis 2004).

However, as Brendan Donnelly and Lars Hoffmann have accurately argued, the Constitution's additional areas for QMV (which carried over into the Lisbon Treaty) are mostly 'echnical policy areas with cross-border implications (Brendan Donnelly & Lars Hoffmann 2003). Andreas Føllesdal (2004) has commented too that it is unsurprising that the default procedure [QMV] does not apply in a number of key cases involving legislation on matters close to national sovereignty. Indeed, although several of the changes arguably go beyond the category of technical adjustment, the areas of QMV consist primarily of non-critical areas relating to the functioning of the EU and its current programs.

Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the Lisbon Treaty's new areas of qualified majority voting represent a major shift towards greater centralisation at the supranational level. With respect to voting power and voting procedures, the EU appears to be basically the same organisation under the Treaty of Lisbon as it was before. 'The decisions that have been moved from unanimity to a qualified majority are largely technical, and they do not alter the Union's basic identity. The same can surely be said of the new areas of EU activity for which QMV applies' (Sieberson 2010, pp. 954-955). Perhaps member-states still prefer to take decisions by unanimity because of the fear that national authorities are unlikely to transpose EU directives into national law with enthusiasm especially if they disagree with them while national bureaucracies may not be helpful in implementing unwanted legislation. But decision-making by unanimity might be responsible for procrastination, delay and unsatisfactory or no decision-making. For example, EU enlargements have made unanimity difficult by increasing the number and variety of interests represented in the Council (Nugent 2010, pp. 155-157).

Economic Governance

In the case of the reformed economic governance system the first basic problem addresses the fact that the Euro area is a monetary but not a fiscal or even a political union. 'This is precisely why there is no guarantee clause. 'No bail out' is not credible with integrated financial markets' (Belke 2010, p. 5). Also, the simple but obvious and central problem inherent in both the old and the proposed 'new and improved' Stability

and Growth Pact (SGP) is that none of them disposes of any mechanism to override national sovereignty. 'Taxing and spending decisions rightly rest with the elected representatives of each individual country − and since there seems to be no vision of full political union at least in the former hard currency countries − this is quite safely not going to change' (Annunziata 2010, Neumann 2010). Up to now there is no technical solution for the problem of determining the exact threshold beyond which an existing imbalance is 'harmful' and to whom it is harmful ex ante. However, there is point in more generally monitoring large external deficits.

In addition, 'the treatment and integration of national parliaments disposing of budgetary prerogatives will continue to represent a critical issue. The national parliaments tend to insist on exercising their rights which makes a European peer review of draft budgets prior to the national budget process an event of low probability in the near future. This creates a constitutional problem which could not be solved by integrating the European Parliament. These problems notwithstanding, an effective coordination by means of the exchange of information and creating transparency of information flows would be useful' (Belke 2010, p. 9).

Also, the European Council agreed to follow most of the proposals included in the EU Commission package, i.e. to tighten the SGP and to set up a system aimed at reducing macroeconomic imbalances produced by a lack of convergence of economic policies within the Euro area. It obviously took the view that the main source of the Euro area debt crisis has been the 'misconduct' of national governments which have permitted their budget deficits and debt levels to explode and have implemented too few measures

to avoid divergent movements in their economies. Nevertheless, in the long run only the central bank but not the governments can control bank credit, the conditions for lending and the development of unsustainable private debt levels (de Grauwe 2010). Reforms of the economic governance in the Euro area need therefore not only focus on the serious responsibilities of national governments − as done in the Commission package − but also on those of the European monetary authorities, and in particular those of the European Central Bank. The *status quo* European rescue package has to be urgently substituted by a permanent crisis mechanism.

In this context, 'it is remarkable that the proposals do not tackle at all the still significant undercapitalisation of the European banking system. But, strikingly, all proposals implicitly assume that European funding will be used only to bail out governments which in turn might apply these funds to bail out their own banks. The word 'bank' does not even appear in any of the proposals although the banking issue is deeply connected with the state of public finances and the necessary volume of an emergency fund' (Belke 2010, p. 11). What has certainly been missing within the proposals by the EU Commission in order to make the whole package of governance reform complete and workable is the scheduled establishment of a crisis solution mechanism. A permanent mechanism or body (a European Monetary Fund) need to be established, after due examination of its pros and cons, which should not take more than one year, to be an overseer of sovereign debt developments and to complement the SGP as a mechanism of last resort for cases in which market financing is no longer available for a government and/or member-state exposed to balance of payments problems. It could be based on existing mechanisms (the European Financial Stability Facility, the European

Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and the European Balance of Payments Assistance Instrument). 'It could also include clear rules *inter alia* on membership criteria − such as fulfilling the minimum requirements for national budgetary rules/institutions − decision-making procedures and funding, conditionality for exceptional loans, monitoring and finally, resources and powers' (Belke 2010, p. 12).

Solidarity

The current crisis has raised many questions for solidarity at the European level. It has made us problematise about the triad of solidarity, responsibility and coordination and what it implicates. A major question is whether European solidarity is a 'cyclical' European solidarity, meaning that it occurs only in a situation of crisis. The ambiguous concept of solidarity in EU law has been revealed too; is it a legal duty or moral orientation? What is the legal nature of European solidarity? What is written and how is it implemented?

'Showing solidarity is a political act and by no means a form of moral selflessness that would be misplaced in political contexts. Solidarity looses the false appearance of being apolitical once we learn how to distinguish obligations to show solidarity from both moral and legal obligations' (Habermas 2013). The fact that the EU can become more democratic does not necessarily mean citizens will show more solidarity.

In the EU's rush to implement the Lisbon Treaty little attention has been paid to the 'Solidarity Clause', now enshrined as Article 222 in the Treaty on the Functioning of

the European Union. This one page provision creates one of the most explicit demands upon EU member-states to act jointly and to assist one another in the face of disasters, emergencies and crises on the European continent. Yet the precise meaning of this demand and its implications for EU institutions and member-states has yet to be fully assessed.

Briefly put, policy-makers need to take a short, medium and long-term view of the Solidarity Clause. The short-term view might focus on the upcoming 'implementation arrangements' and the need to clarify the position and role of the Clause *vis-à-vis* other existing instruments in the EU. The medium-term would examine situations in which the Clause might be 'triggered', as well as national readiness to provide solidarity to others. The long-term view would then widen the perspective to consider the development of the Solidarity Clause over time, not only under conditions of 'Europeanised' crisis cooperation but also as a spur to thinking about solidarity obligations more broadly (Myrdal & Rhinard 2010).

In a recent study, the Paris-based think tank Notre Europe proposed two conceptual distinctions of European solidarity; one based on reciprocity and another based on enlightened self-interests (Fernandes & Rubio 2012). These two flavours of solidarity are either defined by the rationale of a simple transactional arrangement, rooted in a joint insurance policy against the possibility of a specific calamity or by the rationale of self-interest, which leads governments to identify their own national goals in a shared strategy of integration which consequently secures the stability and viability of the common project (ibid). In other words, European solidarity is either the shared concept

of equal partners/countries pooling common risks or the diversified (financial) support from stronger/richer member-states for weaker member-states in order to create or sustain European stability.

However, solidarity during the crisis has been hampered by two main reasons, i.e. the difficulty of EU leaders to define their own national self-interests in order to help others and the actual lack of solidarity mechanisms in place (ibid). The principle of European solidarity in financial terms is often circumvented by the member-states' perception of considering the budget negotiations as a zero-sum game and the debate of net contributor versus net receiver, where every single member-state fights for its own financial gain (Mijs 2012).

In the public perception the current debate on European solidarity is often reduced to the economic crisis within the Euro-zone and the related sovereign debt crisis faced by several member-states. One intrinsic part of this conception includes a causal link that is perceived by EU's political leaders between solidarity and coordination; with stronger and more effective economic policy coordination the current debt crisis would have probably been avoided (Fernandes & Rubio 2012). Consequently, countries-in-need were blamed for failing to apply the coordination mechanism. From a different point of view, the argument is that richer Northern states should pay for poorer Southern states and the belief is that the requested reforms are an opportunity rather than punishment. Yet solidarity is not a one-way approach but has to include commitments of responsibility by the country receiving (financial) aid. In that regard Vignon (2010) has

emphasised the intrinsic link between solidarity and responsibility and has noted that solidarity only grows stronger with consequent responsibility.

The question that arises then is how the enhancement of solidarity, one of the core principles of cosmopolitanism, could be achieved for the effective handling of the EU crisis. The challenge for the EU is to extend solidarity from the national to the regional level. This in turn will contribute in overcoming differences and finding commonalities that can fulfill moral cohesion at a socio-political level, instead of looking beforehand for specific, unique forms of European identity, culture and belonging. For instance, giving stronger political emphasis to the fact that collective and individual solidarity is a value encouraged by the treaties and that member-states should be inspired by it in the conduct of their national policies is necessary for the promotion of European solidarity, communal cohesion and equality.

Especially in the current period of crisis solidarity of the sort of financial aid offered to the states-in crisis needs to be directed in the social sphere too; rebalancing the dialogue between finance ministers and social affairs ministers to the advantage of the latter who now have practically no say in the affairs of the EU could lead to the introduction of more socially just and equal measures at the domestic level for the elimination of the crisis. This is because solidarity defined purely in terms of economic output can be partly solidarity. In this line of thought, taking concrete measures to fight poverty e.g. by setting a minimum European wage could be a long-term objective (Fernardes & Rubio 2012).

Finally, the objective of greater social solidarity and equality cannot obscure the overriding necessity of deep structural reforms in several member-states in order to reduce differentials of competitiveness. The crisis has revealed that the uncontrolled systemic contingencies of a form of capitalism driven by unrestrained financial markets are transformed into tensions between the member-states of the European Monetary Union. If one wants to preserve the Monetary Union, it is no longer enough given the structural imbalances between the national economies to provide loans to over-indebted states so that each should improve its competitiveness by its own efforts. Closing competitiveness gaps (upwards) remains a long-term way to close the gaps in national economic performance and from this to create the conditions of and the means for lasting solidarity both between states and within them. Solidarity thus could signify a cooperative effort from a shared political perspective to promote growth and competitiveness in the Euro-zone as a whole following a collective analysis of the level of public debt acceptable to the EU.

In this respect, introducing Eurobonds as new resources to support a fairer and more balanced growth could be a well understood display of necessary solidarity between countries with excessive budget surpluses and other states. 'Eurobonds would promote further market integration, especially on the supply side, and greater debt management coordination. The efficiency gains from a unified bond market could be substantial: liquidity could be enhanced by larger outstanding volumes and the more so if the common Eurobond would become eligible for delivery into a futures contract. Greater liquidity would, in turn, reduce liquidity premia and, thus, the costs of borrowing for Member States, with greatest advantage for smaller and medium sized issuers. Finally,

to the extent that issuance of national bonds would come to an end, some member-states with smaller funding needs would save the costs of maintaining their national primary markets and dealer systems' (Favero & Missale 2010, pp. 13-15).

The European Monetary Union (EMU) could also turn into a transfer union with comprehensive and permanent solidarity mechanism between its members. Such a measure needs to be accompanied with increasing the Union's own resources as part of the new financial framework and directing them towards new active solidarity policies at the EU level and of course with allowing the European Central Bank to buy national bonds.

Overall, without strong ties of solidarity the Union would be dominated by national interests and rivalries. If the way out of the current crisis is deeper political integration, the growing solidarity deficit is bound to make further political integration a task of herculean proportions. What is required is 'more Europe' which basically means 'more solidarity'. In this way, the EU could become a cosmopolitan polity achieving the 'ever closer union' together with the economic and political deepening of European integration on the basis of solidarity between people. For the protection of the EU and Euro-zone radical changes are required which can be achieved only by the revision of the Lisbon Treaty and not by a new intergovernmental treaty to (re)impose fiscal discipline. The crisis is an opportunity for the EU to complement the Monetary Union with an economic, fiscal and political one according to cosmopolitan principles, taking under consideration that democratic politics require political diversity and a range of political choices.

3. 3. Europe's Democratisation from Below – Bottom-Up Approach

The increasingly blurred boundaries between public authority and private actors across the levels of governance have paradoxically resulted in an ever-stronger perceived distance between the EU and its citizens. The turn to civil society participation in the EU is inherently preoccupied with rendering EU policy-making more democratic and with introducing new avenues to analyse state/society relations beyond state-centred and top-down steering. The aim is to widen concepts of EU policy-making from the notions of alternative coordination modes to traditional hierarchical steering. Civil society participation becomes therefore a means to promote the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions, the accountability of the Union's day-to-day policy-making and the acceptance of the integration process at large.

The two dominant but distinct conceptualisations of civil society referred to in EU research stand for two different underlying democratising logics and at the same time two discrete applied approaches developed in EU governance; the inclusion of organised and activated civil society groups in EU policy-making and the formative role of civil society in the incremental evolution of a trans-European public sphere.[9] 'Both,

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[9] Following this logic, participation has a formative meaning. Researchers on deliberative (or discursive) democracy have amply focused on the question of how to overcome the Union's democratic deficit by strengthening various forms of deliberation in the interaction with civil society. This perspective views civil society as a foundational element of a wider public sphere which is expected to play a decisive role in normatively rooting the integration process. A European public sphere is a social construct in the sense that it emerges in the process through which Europeans engage one another and debate issues of common European concerns across borders (Risse 2010; Habermas 1996; Eder & Kantner 2000). Citizens deliberate openly about public policies and thus provide an answer to 'the hollowing-out of the nation state, the emergence of multilevel governance and the dispersal of power to multiple agencies and sectors have all challenged the centrality of representative institutions' (Newman 2005, p. 121). Eriksen argues that democracy at the level of the EU requires a 'single overarching communicative space accessible for

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the notion of civil society, as active policy collaborator and as the heart of an emerging public sphere, attempt to provide an alternative or complementary legitimising mechanism to the principle of representative democracy' (Heidbreder 2012, pp. 8-9).

My cosmopolitan approach to civil society in the EU multilevel setting builds on civil society as organised societal interests, as participant in policy-making or as opposing the state rather than as the carrier of an emerging EU order with a genuine EU public sphere which creates – or promises to do so in future – input legitimacy of a polity in its own right. In this sense, my research avoids merely normative assumptions about the social or public sphere and it differs from studies on deliberation and identity research in the EU. I share an image of the EU both as a regulatory polity attributing civil society a policy-oriented role and as a participatory system of governance operating on public-private partnership and suggesting a service-oriented role for civil society.

These conceptualisations stand in contrast to an image of the EU as an emergent polity with a social constituency in the making and with a genuine trans-national civil society in its own right. I argue that it is more realistic to conceive civil society participation as an asset to increase the quality of policies and services delivered by the EU (output legitimacy), but also as pragmatic answer to perceived shortcomings in input-legitimacy that cannot be fully overcome due to the persistent multi-level system of governance.

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all, in which proponents and opponents can voice and justify opinions and claims, and mobilize support in order to sluice them into decision-making units via social movements and political parties' (Eriksen 2005a and 2006). One of the most elaborated conceptualisations of deliberative practices in the EU emerged from the study of comitology, arguing that comitology indicates that national representatives' move from bargaining for state interests to a form of Europeanised inter-administrative discourse (Joerges & Neyer 1997).

My approach to cosmopolitan democracy in the EU advocates governance with the people, meaning pluralist consultation by decision-making with a wide range of governmental and non-governmental bodies. Governance with the people is necessary and complementary to governance for the people. Cosmopolitan democracy via civil society involvement can be considered as a promising supplement to representative democracy. My analysis intends to give a pragmatic character to the potentialities of civil society in the EU by taking into account the inherent limitations of the EU as a multi-level polity and without advocating the tempting but utopian vision of authentic participation by the people.

More specifically, in the European Union there are no pan-European elections in a direct manner *by* the people for determining the parameters for consultation *with* the people. Also, as Parker contends, one might take under consideration that 'participatory governance is in practice *conditional* upon a particular constitution; it permits certain subjectivities while excluding others. Despite a rhetorical openness to the reformulation of normative frameworks – reflected in the epithet govern*ance* - such reformulation is itself conditioned or framed in terms of the realisation of a consensual possibility' (Parker 2010, p. 21).

My cosmopolitan account of civil society in the EU is critical of the current deliberative approaches and it draws upon Parker (ibid, pp. 21-22) who contends that 'even in the most radical, pluralist, difference-respecting, deliberative accounts it is possible to detect an act of power or government; an attempt to conduct; civil society involvement in transnational deliberative contexts is the panacea towards a truly transnational

democracy. But civil society becomes a subject of governance at a price; it is simultaneously rendered an object of government. Its freedom is constrained; it is responsibilised and rule-bound both by legal frameworks and by those who it represents. It is, in short, engaged in a contractual implication with the state, the public institution, or, more broadly, with a dominant rationality or regime of government. In the EU context this contractual implication is sometimes explicitly clear'.

My critical assessment highlights also the limits of Commission-driven civil society participation. It acknowledges that participation as a notion inherent to European governance can promote accountability through openness, transparency, consultation, communication and other tools. Yet, it stresses that 'this conception of governance does not in itself encourage citizens to become active, because the policy-making process remains complex and is even made more complex by governance practices' (Magnette 2003, p. 14). This judgment is not merely empirical but refers to specificities of the type of participatory governance the EU has set up that may by definition limit the actual potential of these tools to enhance the democratic quality of EU decision-making.

Although the governance turn in combination with new technological capacities has triggered the introduction of new participatory tools and a certain issue-specific impact on the legitimacy of decisions cannot generally be denied, this has by-and-large not led to a major shift in actor constellations. Despite the fact that NGOs can indeed develop a tangible impact on EU policy-making, supporters have little opportunities to really influence policies, campaigns or strategies due to the highly elitist internal governance structure of these organisations (see Warleigh 2001; Rek 2007; Chryssochoou 2002).

In addition, the scope conditions under which civil society could theoretically boost democracy in the EU and multilevel polities more generally should be taken under consideration. The EU experience highlights that civil society organisations which participate in EU policy-making are in an inherently contradictory situation. On the one hand, they need to be highly professionalised Brussels-activists. On the other hand, they need to remain deeply rooted in their very diverse national, regional or local stakeholder contexts. It is doubtful how CSOs can indeed successfully manage contradicting claims by developing workable strategies in the EU multilevel system (Heinelt & Meinke-Brandmaier 2006).

Despite the existing strategies to bridge conflicting claims, the tension between internal organisational demands and demands for successful participation at the EU level is more than a practical challenge for the respective organisations. It illustrates conceptual tensions that are systematically implied by an institutionalised inclusion of (organised) civil society in EU policy-making, which is at a more abstract level a trademark of collective actors (Heinelt & Meinke-Brandmaier 2006, p. 209).

Since the early 2000s, the inclusion of civil society as a way to boost democratic legitimacy has been a prominent item on the EU's political agenda. The most evident expressions are the White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) and the European Convention (2001) as a forum to draft a comprehensive reform treaty that culminated in the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe (2004). The Treaty of Lisbon that eventually emerged from this process introduced the most concrete new instrument to

involve citizens directly. The Citizens' Initiative, operational since April 2012, creates for the first time an instrument for citizens to call on the Commission to initiate legislation. 'While the logic of the White Paper builds on (new) governance approaches and wider expectations about legitimacy gains from stakeholder involvement in the policy processes, the logic of the Convention is strongly associated with theoretical expectations about deliberative democracy and identity formation in the EU. The third tool, the Citizens' Initiative, builds on the logic of direct democratic involvement of citizens in the policy formulation phase of EU policy-making. In contrast to the first two logics, it stands in the tradition of procedures to guarantee democratic input legitimacy even though the Commission maintains its ultimate right to initiate legislation' (Heidbreder 2012, p. 10).

The White Paper was the most important initiative laying out the Commission's general objectives focusing predominantly on the supranational policy formulation. The most tangible impact of the principles suggested in the White Paper has been the incremental elaboration of the Commission's consultation regime, i.e. the voluntary inclusions of organised civil society. Participation is featured as a key concept and one of five principles of 'good governance' in the White Paper, supposed to enhance both the efficiency and the legitimacy of European governance to respond to the expectations of the Union's citizens and to help follow a less top-down approach (Magnette 2001, pp.3-11).

'Even though the White Paper on European governance of August 2001 is revaluated, it mainly concerns the organised civil society while it is often focused only on specific

interests. Above all, it remains relegated to the advisory stage and not extended to the decisional one. Indicative of this is that in June 2011, the EP and the Commission have decided to merge their 'transparency registers' to a single database that lists all individuals or organisations that take part in EU policy-making.[10] The White Paper does not formulate an explicit policy programme but offers a more general, normatively influential template. It is also less ambitious regarding concrete reforms' (Heidbreder 2012, pp. 15). It does not challenge the Commission's legislative powers or suggest any more far-reaching changes to the institutionalised decision-making processes (see Joerges et al. 2001).

Kohler-Koch contends that while the White Paper proposes to strengthen civil society, structural deficiencies of societal representation in EU governance such as problems of collective action, missing yardsticks for representation, and selectivity in the interaction of EU institutions and interest groups remain unsolved (KohlerKoch 2001). Parker (2010, pp. 22-23) too maintains that 'openness and representativity might seem like *reasonable* conditions for involvement in decision making, but the issue of establishing what in concrete terms constitutes these criteria is an act of considerable political power. Many who do not engage in the contractual implication − who do not demonstrate their 'representativity' to the Commission's satisfaction − are left unrepresented. There is a connection and mutual dependence between political authority and civil society; they seem to legitimise one another. Consensus then becomes possible only via government, via the exertion of political power'.

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[10] On the merger of the EP and Commission registers see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-773_en.htm.

The most important policy tool introduced in the follow-up of the White Paper was the establishment of an online consultation system. To date, the Commission advertises all ongoing consultation procedures across basically all policies on the website 'Your Voice in Europe'. In its own words, 'Your Voice in Europe' is the European Commission's single access point to a wide variety of consultations, discussions and other tools which enable you to play an active role in the European policy-making process. This web-site has three sections; consultations, discussions and other tools.[11] The public provision of basically all policy proposals hence offers formally the opportunity for all interested groups – recorded in the respective EU registers – to express their views during the Commission's policy formulation phase.

However, 'taking a closer look at who participates in these procedures it is revealed that despite the outreach to a European civil society at large, organised, professionalised groups remain the standard representation of civil society in EU policy-making. This is mainly due to the demands for expertise and resources – ranging from language skills, access to information and time availability – needed to contribute in the procedures offered by the Commission's traditional consultation regime' (Heidbreder 2012, p. 16).

A formal expression of the link of official citizenship rights granted by the EU and the more elusive notion of a European civil society is the Citizens' Initiative introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009).[12] Other than the consultation regime that offers purely informal participation options for civil society, the Citizens' Initiative provides that

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[11] See the Commission web-site: http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/.

[12] See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/.

citizens can invite the Commission to issue legislative proposals in areas of EU competence. Once having met all requirements for submitting an initiative, the organisers of an initiative will meet the Commission representatives in person and have the opportunity to present their initiative at a public hearing in the EP. The Commission has to decide whether to act on it within three months and has to publish a reasoned response. While the initiative thus gives a limited and indirect right to initiate legislation to citizens, the formal right for policy initiation remains in the hands of the Commission. In order to be considered by the Commission, organisers of an initiative must form a 'citizens' committee' of at least seven members from seven different member-states and need to deliver supporting signatures of at least one million EU citizens coming from at least seven member states within a year after launching an initiative. In addition, specific quotas for the number of signatures requested from each of the 28 member-states apply according to the relative size of the populations.

On the one hand, introducing the terminology of participatory democracy in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU goes beyond mere informal stakeholder inclusion in policy formulation and implementation. The Citizens' Initiative offers citizens the opportunity to ask the Commission to initiate legislation. On the other hand, since the Commission is not bound by such a mandate of a Citizens' Initiative, the consultative element remains predominant even in this direct democratic instrument. So, we can thus place this initiative between stakeholder participation and the deliberative democratic tools; it goes beyond mere stakeholder involvement because it grants formal rights in the policy-formulation phase to civil society, yet it stays behind hard legislative powers because it

is still up to the Commission whether and in which form it reacts to an initiative launched by EU citizens (e.g. see Heidbreder 2012).

Among the EU institutions, the Commission sticks out as activator. Even before the turn to new governance modes, the Commission held close links to various interest groups and external experts (Quittkat & Finke 2008). Since the publication of the White Paper, the Commission has intentionally expanded the definition of participation and actively supported the formation of CSOs to participate as providers of information and input to its policy-making. The Commission has undertaken the task to mobilise civil society and create 'grassroots' lobbying at the European level, so these can, in turn, outweigh the most powerful business groups already present. The ultimate goal is a more comprehensive and responsible policy-making and the improvement of institutional transparency. 'The opening to civil society with non-governmental organisations or various social movements is a political strategy in order to increase the legitimacy of decision-making processes. This is also a means of improving public's sensitivity for the whole process of decision-making, where the belief that the agreements are reached behind closed doors will no longer exist' (Schmidt 2006, pp. 25-26).

However, the Commission has set increasingly demanding criteria for representation that public interest groups have difficulty in meeting. Such requirements may increase the professionalisation of the organisations representing civil society and thus decrease their inclusiveness. As a consequence, groups' independence can be undermined, something which is accentuated by their substantial funding from the EU. Regarding the discourse of civil society as constituted by the European Commission and the European

Economic and Social Committee (EESC), it favours a functional, output-oriented conception of civil society involvement. This results in a preference for contacts with Brussels-based confederations of associations and stimulates the emergence of large NGO-networks covering a broad range of issues at the EU-level (Smismans 2003, p. 491). This specific structure of European civil society explains among other things why EU-level NGOs are far too elitist to allow supporters a role in shaping policies and hence fail to assume a Europeanising function as conceptualised by advocates of active citizenship (Rek 2007, Warleigh 2001).

In addition, civil dialogue has no legal basis provoking great uncertainty about the identity of the actors involved and raising concerns about their confined access to the decision-making process. This problem refers to NGOs and associations involved in all areas which do not fall in the economic sphere like consumer protection, development cooperation, environment, human rights and protection of women and children. The characteristics of represented interests lead to a structure generally not vertical or centralised but very flexible by a network arrangement.

Therefore, whether, in which way, and to which degree the Commission incorporates inputs from the various consultation procedures is fully up to the Commission's undisclosed appraisal; civil society has no formal decision-making role. It is therefore difficult to assess systematically the impact of the consultation regime, but agreement exists that CSOs' impact varies between policy fields and the resources to provide expertise, information, or lobby special interests. It seems that the Commission is trapped between opposing claims on legitimacy, namely input and output-oriented

legitimacy, which are difficult to reconcile; 'one set of claims coming from the Monnet tradition of thought, where the stress is on unity, efficiency, responsibility and impartiality; and a second set of claims coming from the post-Maastricht critique of the Union, which highlight diversity, clarity and democracy' (Tsakatika 2005, p. 193). 'Apart from the Commission, the European Parliament in particular has regular and intensive contacts to various interest groups. However, consultations by the Commission and the EP have remained quite isolated as it is usually the same CSOs in Brussels with whom both institutions interact' (Heidbreder 2012, pp. 14-15).

On the side of civil society, it should be mentioned that business groups are better organised at the EU level than economic groups and especially non-economic groups. Also, due to the need for high professionalisation to effectively take part in EU policy processes, there is a clear bias towards CSOs rather than less organised grass root movements (Kohler-Koch & Buth 2011; Saurugger 2006). The dominant mode of participation in the EU privileges an institutionalised professional type of civil society and supports the creation of such CSOs, which creates a certain dilemma; in turn professionalisation limits the bottom-up character of grass roots activists, including movements in opposition to public authorities, which are however essential features of civil society if it is to fulfil a legitimising and communicative role (Heidbreder 2012, pp. 18-19).

Therefore, the overall achievements in meeting the high political and theoretical expectations have been rather disappointing. In practice, 'the promise of involving civil society has not bridged the gap between Europe and the people, but rather sponsored a

Brussels-based CSO elite working in the interest of deeper integration' (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 335). But also the more encompassing expectation of an emerging public sphere has been disappointed in that 'enhanced societal participation as such does not necessarily support the emergence of a larger engaged public and deliberation in the general public sphere' (Dabrowska 2007, p. 300).

This might be explained by the fact that 'transnationally active NGOs are typically run by economically relatively well-off, 'Western'-educated, white, heterosexual men, whereas participation by more marginalised groups is limited' (Tallberg & Uhlin 2012). On the one hand, the need for professionalisation to be able to exert influence makes communication between the EU-level CSO actors and the grass roots level extremely difficult (Kohler-Koch & Buth 2011). On the other hand, the self-understanding of non-governmental organisations does not really match the delegation model suggested by the EU's participatory governance model (Heidbreder 2012, pp. 18-19). 'What links Brussels' non-profit associations from the perspective of its members down to the single citizen is the shared concern to be fighting for a good purpose. This is an understanding of representation that is not compatible with a model of delegation. The European NGOs are not delegated to implement the interests of their organisational members but see themselves as executers of a mission and communicate with their member organisations and basis to fulfil this mission together' (Kohler-Koch 2011, p. 266).

In addition, until now, the pre-existing territorial and resource-dependent bias that privilege certain CSOs over other, less-organised, professionalised and more locally anchored civil society seem to persist. The image of civil society in EU policy-making

is that of an expert, partner and professional organisation. CSOs have supportive functions, mainly for the Commission but cannot effectively control accountability of the Commission. Moreover, almost all CSOs receive funding from the Commission to support their work. Although most organisations do not estimate this to limit their independence, hardly any CSOs really act in the civil society sense of 'opposing' public policy-making. All in all, CSOs widely fail to act as 'transition belt' between the EU and citizens (Altides 2011).

Conclusively, without downplaying the significance and the crucial role played by civil society for the strengthening of the EU's democracy, legitimacy and effectiveness, my cosmopolitan governance approach is critical of approaches which invoke participatory democracy by demanding authentic governance 'by the people'. These approaches neglect that civil society is not an organised collective actor that provides input for more efficient policy-making and that participation itself does not always generate societal integration.

My cosmopolitan perspective reconciles system effectiveness and citizens' inclusion in the decision-making process and contends that EU civil society is unlikely to quickly develop into a unified and coherent entity but will for some time remain an assemblage of most Europeanised national publics. These national publics are more likely to format a joint sphere of contestation based on multiple, layered identities than a transmission belt between supranational institutions and the single citizen. In this sense, the intended democratising effect of civil society participation has not matched the high hopes when measured along the self-declared goals of any EU initiative.

Civil Society in the EU within the Crisis

In the current period of crisis the question that arises is what have the implications on civil society been and whether it has been strengthened or weakened. It would also be interesting to indentify if and how it is possible for people who protest against austerity measures and criticise the whole foundation of the EU and its integration to be included in the institutional decision-making.

The crisis may have increased the need for civil society engagement in providing services and support, yet it has put these organisations in danger. Many civil society organisations depend on government funding which is decreasing. The participants in civil society organisations may also be financially handicapped by the crisis leading to a potential double problematic when it comes to financial support. One of the most important aspects of the financial crisis has been a sharp turn towards austerity in many European countries with the objective of reducing public deficits and strengthening the financial health of the public coffers. Obviously, this can have a negative effect on CSOs when seeking public funds for the meeting of civil society objectives. Some countries (particularly the Southern) have been heavily dependent upon public funding for their activities as it will be revealed in the next chapter on Greece.

In the case of trades unions, membership has been decreasing, which has led to decreased income from membership fees. 'Some CSOs may have less opportunity to engage with politicians, given the change in discourse towards something determined

by economic terminologies and frames such as 'return on investment'. As the key stakeholders in public positions are now finance ministers, difficulties arise in communicating the needs of society via CSOs who are not well versed in the discourse of finance ministers. As individuals try to solve their own problems, there is a problem in generating general solidarity and little in the way of a sense of working towards common societal goals in the CSO community' (Shahin, Woodward & Terzis 2013, pp. 44-46).

The risks are different for different clusters of CSOs. They may lose their capacity to interact with policy-makers by becoming too focused on obtaining financial support and enter into a 'CSO war' effectively competing with other CSOs. Coordination across the EU becomes much too difficult to manage. Civil servants and politicians become too engaged in trying to solve their own problems of legitimacy and fiscal responsibility to open up to discussions on societal problems with a broad range of CSOs. The National Economic and Social Committees (NESCs) and equivalents are stalemated and cannot provide a space for constructive dialogue between all partners. 'These risks also affect the relationship between individuals and civil society, as society goes through a complex set of changes where engagement is not at all easily codified. It seems that individuals become more apathetic about societal values; the perceived legitimacy of CSOs in European society declines as individuals need to focus on their own individual problems. Particularly at the European level, where the perception is that most of the problems have arisen, there is a challenge to promote the idea that the EU can also provide solutions. Citizens may emerge as socially and yet not politically aware or active' (ibid).

Many smaller local-level CSOs are finding it very difficult to shift from models of financing that are heavily reliant upon local authorities to ones that can obtain funding from elsewhere. This argument is also valid for those countries where civil society is heavily embedded within public institutional structures (i.e. Greece). Connected to this, one of the major risks for smaller CSOs is that their voice gets lost amongst the large number of voices that are becoming more and more vocal as the impact of the crisis makes itself tangible at an increasing rate in many countries. This risk of being lost in the cacophony of voices is made even more complex in certain respects by the responses of certain governments to the crisis using the frame of austerity. The forums for discussion between CSOs and policy-makers have been changed and this has resulted in long-standing political relationships having to be re-wired as interactions have shifted towards more concerns over financial − as a complement to social − accountability. In many cases, this has resulted in changes in discourse at the level of policy-maker, where terms such as (economic) efficiency and (social) return on investment are used instead of broader notions of solidarity and public value.

Ironically, however, the crisis has worked as a mobilising force, creating new forms of engagement for citizens and economic activity. Perhaps paradoxically, some of the risks of the financial crisis may spur civil society creativity and new forms of engagement. In this sense, the financial and socio-economic crisis, which has now emerged as a fundamental crisis of the EU's role in European society, can be seen as an opportunity to rejuvenate the ambitions of civil society to find a different and potentially more productive and co-operative role in decision-making processes. With the onset of the

crisis, the challenge is to examine whether the social influence of CSOs has been enhanced or eliminated. 'Despite the focus on organising and engaging citizens in contestation against the various implications of the crisis in most EU states, there may be constructive voices in order to deal with the crisis. The crisis may force organisations to seek out new allies and address different policy interlocutors who may offer other options. In any case, the socio-economic crisis triggered by the financial crisis in Europe has resulted in an increased need for CSOs to work hand in hand with governments to solve these pressing problems that have emerged, in part, as the result of the crisis' (Shahin, Woodward & Terzis 2013, pp. 9-10).

Many CSOs need to adapt well to the need to diversify their sources of income, although there are challenges to maintaining the desired levels of income across the board. Large CSOs with pan-European, transnational and/or global approaches might have greater capacity to deal with increased administrative burden in searching for funding. In any case, CSOs now have the unique opportunity to strengthen their message and show that they can function together more coherently, cross-sectorally, to help solve some of Europe's longstanding problems (ibid). They also have the opportunity to use the moment of the crisis to encourage further debate on how civil society as a whole relates to policymakers.

As CSOs enhance their capacities to deal with the current economic crisis, there can be more efficient and effective delivery of services while also maintaining key societal values within these bodies and within society as a whole. There may be openings for increased funding, as public authorities recognise that some services and activities can

be more effectively carried out by CSOs. To build voice and find new channels, coordination and networking between CSOs need to ensure that all societal actors are engaged in determining what is best for the current problems. Given the public concern about crisis, it may be in the future that policy-makers open up and engage to a far greater level with CSOs in discussions on how services should be delivered towards society. Citizens and residents may thus become much more attached to specific and meaningful activities carried out by CSOs in their local and national (and European) environment.

In order for the crisis to signal the beginning of a new era for European civil society, the establishment of non-governmental and civil society organisations liaison functions is needed for crisis management together with the identification of their liaison officers within the Council Secretariat with a view to strengthening their capacity to dialogue with a variety of agencies. In the same line of thought, the establishment of modalities for routine information exchange with relevant agencies and civil society groups at the field level becomes necessary in close collaboration with the European Commission.

What is required for the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is to think more about engagement and participation of citizens in CSOs in order to ensure that we maintain an active and democratic society based on principles of justice, equality and fairness. Also, 'the development of mechanisms to encourage and support bottom-up actions that can be made sustainable is necessary. In order to do so, there is a need to first recognise that civil society is increasingly unstructured, mobile and very often purposely not bound to any institutional framework and to ensure that this engagement

spans across the different groups within the EESC and that the maximum benefit is gained from the different levels of needs, while also maximising engagement opportunities' (Shahin, Woodward & Terzis 2013, pp. 47-48).

What is crucial for CSOs is to encourage cross-sectoral engagement and interaction between different civil society groups, by providing opportunities for such initiatives to take place at the local and national levels and to increase better organisation, enhanced communication strategies, more effective delivery (where appropriate) in order to ensure that the right 'discourse' is used when talking to politicians and policymakers. Within this frame, 'it is necessary to help the National ESCs and their equivalents to engage in supporting the activities of civil society in their own regions and countries by enhanced networking and engaged discourse within and amongst their European partners. This message needs to be more widely spread at the national and subnational level through different channels, perhaps engaging with social media in more creative ways' (ibid).

4. Conclusion

This chapter has examined both the theoretical concept of cosmopolitan democracy and its practical connotations with respect to the case of the European Union particularly within the current crisis. The aim was to address the democratic deficits of the EU and to reveal that cosmopolitan democracy as a mode of governance can be feasible. A major question it tried to answer is whether institutional reforms can develop along cosmopolitan lines beyond narrow economic and security concerns. To this end, the

Open Method of Coordination was analysed in my attempt to examine whether citizens'
participation enhances both the efficiency and the legitimacy of European governance.
Also, the European Council, Parliament, Commission and Council of Ministers were of
utmost important for my research revealing the mixed multi-level type of the EU
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. An analysis of the voting system
of the EU together with its economic governance and institutionalisation of solidarity
intended to demonstrate the tensions between national sovereignty and supranational
policies.

Moreover, my cosmopolitan approach to EU emphasised the need for governance *with*
people. My analysis was critical of deliberative approaches which envisage authentic
participation *by* the people in a multi-level and complex polity such as the EU. In this
respect, I provided a critical cosmopolitan outlook of the limited conditions for civil
society' participation in the decision-making process along with the problematic
features of the organisation of many CSOs and NGOs. I also addressed the question
whether austerity from the public sector means that civil society organisations now need
to fill a space, thereby generating new modes of governance.

Finally, it should be noted that any analysis of the relationship between the EU
institutions and civil society cannot be confined to one chapter only. For the purposes of
the present thesis my research chose to focus on those aspects that could best indicative
of my proposals according to the cosmopolitan mode of governance. Future research
needs to be conducted on how EU institutions and civil society organisations have
reacted to the EU's financial crisis and what is the forecast in the years to come, as

governments respond to the fall out; if the capacity of civil society organisations to participate in decision-making processes changed and if so, what are the consequences of this change for the function of European institutions; what role civil society organisations will have in the new period of austerity that appears to have gripped most of the EU's member states; if civil society organisations' capacity decreased or if they have been 'filling the vacuum' created by the democratic deficits of the institutions; what is their relationship to policymakers in light of the financial crisis and its consequences and if there is a bigger role for them in the democratic process.

Chapter 3

A cosmopolitan Approach to the Greek Crisis: the Phenomenon of de-Europeanisation in EU-Greek Relations

1. Introduction

In this chapter my aim is to address the Greek sovereign debt crisis from the perspective of cosmopolitanism. Having examined cosmopolitan democracy in the EU in order tp identify the ways with which the crisis could be overcome, I now focus on the current Greek recession and how it has been expressed in Greece. My aim is to better comprehend the European institutional and financial crisis given that the Greek crisis has a twofold character; the particular, diachronic and structural Greek problems may have sparked the Eurozone crisis but they do not constitute its causes, as they brought EU and Eurozone democratic deficits into the forefront, which did not manage to prevent the crisis. More specifically, both internal and external factors are central in explaining the causes of the Greek crisis and the subsequent Greek reaction. By analysing the special features of Greece that have provoked the crisis through a cosmopolitan lens I try to answer the question why Greece is in the position it finds itself in. However, my approach is not confined to Greece's exceptionalism and it is extended to the wider context of the Greek state through an examination of the deeper causes which provoked the global and the EU crisis and also, of the implications of the Greek recession on the EU. My intention is to draw conclusions for the prospects the Greek crisis has revealed for the future of the EU and Greece.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the beginning, I provide a short analysis of the intrinsinc characteristics of the Greek crisis in order to demonstrate the depth of the recession and the inadequate efforts of the Greek authorities to handle it efficiently. My ultimate aim is to reveal the peculiarity of the case of Greece and why it differs from the other states-in crisis.

To this end, a general outline of the diachronically positive and negative features, contradictions and implementation problems of Greece's Europeanisation process explains the causes and consequences of the crisis for Greece's political and social system. The particularity of the case of Greece rests on a dual process which is taking place in the country with both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation tendencies at the same time and which is often neglected by Europeanisation studies. By de-Europeanisation I mean the domestic contestation of EU policies and norms whereby national policies become less oriented towards Europe making the Europeanisation process reversible. I focus particularly on the Greek political system and Greek nationalism together with the growing power of the over-centralised Greek state with its features of clientelism, populism and corruption which unavoidably affect civil society. I conclude this part of my analysis with proposals for the elimination of the country's deficits and for the restructuring of policy-planning and decision-making process.

Finally, I evaluate the Greek crisis by highlighting its extrinsic deeper causes and by revealing the importance of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan studies. The origins of the current crisis, whereby economics seem to dominate politics disregarding

democratic procedures and giving rise to nationalism and totalitarian movements, indicate how relevant and needed a post-crisis cosmopolitanism as a new mode of governance is. The paradoxical character of cosmopolitanism, which lies in the fact that the uncontrolled expansion of the market provoked the crisis while initially it was the cosmopolitan market that led to prosperity in the EU and governance beyond boundaries, demonstrates that a post-crisis cosmopolitanism needs to be able to deal with the capitalist system in a critical way. I intend to offer a novel analysis of the dynamics of cosmopolitanism by contending that cosmopolitanism is not an irreversible process and that cosmopolitan studies need to find ways to respond to these challenges. Under these conditions, the crisis could signify the beginning of a new era, opening new meanings beyond economic globalisation. Within this framework, the works by Arendt on totalitarianism and Beck on the risk society provide a philosophical perspective for the current debates on the elimination of the crisis.

2. The Chronicle and Depth of the Greek Crisis

With little doubt, the last three years have shown for Greece one of the most astonishing reversals of fortunes a country has ever experienced. For about ten years (beginning in the mid-1990s) the country was growing at amazing rates, by some 4.5% per year, a performance surpassed within the European Union only by Ireland. By the year 2000 it had achieved an impressive convergence programme, bringing down its inflation rates and budget deficits from the double-digit figures of the 1980s to within the strict limits of the Maastricht rules.

In the process, Greece seemed to have dealt successfully with a number of historical challenges; the huge shock of post-communist transition in its neighbourhood, as it rather seamlessly absorbed a migration inflow representing some 10% of its population; the challenge of market liberalisation and economic modernisation, as it began to implement a number of deregulation/liberalisation policies including the privatisation of public utilities and the banking sector; and the Maastricht challenge, as it achieved its political goal of entry into the common currency with only one-year delay.

'In the dawn of the new millennium Greece seemed to have transformed itself in numerous respects. For the first time in its history it became a net capital exporter with impressive foreign investments in the banking sector, in telecommunications, energy and increasingly in a wider range of activities. Transport and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) infrastructure had also been upgraded immensely, a shift to green energy and modern technologies was slowly taking place and Athens seemed to have been transformed into a cosmopolitan capital. Unemployment rates were declining and a dynamic business class was developing while levels of consumption and wealth accumulation were unprecedented' (Monastiriotis 2013).

These developments were given their symbolic culmination in 2004 when the country successfully hosted the Summer Olympics. So, by 2005 Greece was unquestionably a success story; in socio-economic terms, the country had all but converged to the development levels of Europe; in political-economic terms, it had reinstated itself firmly on the map of the 'European core'.

However, in February 2010 the Greek government openly admitted that it was unable to refinance its debt through market borrowing. 'Greece has put forth an immense effort over the last three years and indeed has taken impressive steps toward achieving fiscal sustainability with occasionally remarkable results. In the three years since the beginning of the crisis it implemented a fiscal tightening of some 20% of GDP (around €50bn, while it has committed to measures cumulatively totalling €65bn by 2015) and reduced its budget deficit by an impressive nine percentage points, despite having lost a fifth of its GDP since 2009' (ibid).

The First Memorandum of May 2010 introduced a much more pervasive set of measures. Wages in public utilities were cut initially by 3%; the so-called 13th and 14th salaries (bonuses for Christmas, Easter and annual leave) were capped at €500 for public sector employees, €400 for pensioners and completely abolished for high-wage earners; VAT rates increased to 23% and additional tax hikes were imposed on luxury consumption (e.g. an additional 10% tax on imported cars), on so-called inelastic expenditures (alcohol, cigarettes and fuel) and on property; additional levies were imposed on high pension earners and business profits; and further savings were envisaged through controls on public expenditure and investment.[1]

The Memorandum also saw a radical reform of the pension system. The retirement age was raised from 60 to 65 (from 55 to 60 for special categories) and was to be equalised for men and women by 2015. 'Penalties were introduced for early retirement and pension payments were to be suspended for pensioners who were still employed −

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[1] For the extent and potential impact of these early measures, especially in their geographical dimension, see Monastiriotis 2011, pp. 323-337.

completely for pensioners below the age of 55 and by up to 70% for older pensioners. The number of insurance and pension funds was to be reduced through mergers and consolidations resulting in a sizeable reduction of pension entitlements for a number of professional occupations (such as lawyers, journalists and doctors). Replacement rates for new retirees were capped at 65% and all final salary schemes were to be abolished' (Monastiriotis 2013).

Finally, changes were also introduced on the wider economy, including legislation for the liberalisation of closed professions (decided again in July 2011 and still not fully implemented), the consolidation of various public bodies and companies (also not yet fully implemented) and changes in employment protection legislation (reduction in notice periods, rise in the lawful redundancy rate, softening of unfair dismissal rules and a drastic cut in severance pay entitlements).

Despite the measures implemented in 2010, Greece's fiscal position remained unsustainable due to the slow implementation of some of the measures and the recession in the Greek economy which turned out to be much deeper than initially hoped for (a 5% drop in GDP in 2010), especially in the absence of measures to boost investment. In June 2011 and again two months later the government introduced further austerity and reform measures, most of which were tax/revenue based, including a higher income tax rate at the upper income scale, a sizeable levy on own account workers, a controversial new property tax and a lowering of the tax-free income allowance.[2]

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[2] For a detailed account of the labour market reforms since the crisis, see Kyriakoulias 2012 and Koukiadaki & Kretsos 2012, pp. 276-304.

'Following negotiations for a second bailout, a new 'Midterm Package' was introduced in February 2012 which reduced the minimum wage by a staggering 22%, fully decentralised the wage bargaining system (giving seniority to individual contracts over the wage floors agreed on in national and occupational pay agreements) and foresaw a cut in public sector employment by 150,000 by 2015. Further taxes on property were introduced and a number of social benefits were cut, such as expenditure in key sectors such as health and social security' (Monastiriotis 2013).

These measures generated huge public discontent and led to prolonged political instability which started with a major cabinet reshuffling in July 2011, continued with the forced resignation of Prime Minister George Papandreou in November 2011 (replaced by former European Central Bank Vice President Loukas Papademos, who was not a member of the parliament) and climaxed with the double election of May/June 2012, which led to the current two-party coalition government under the premiership of centre-right leader Antonis Samaras. Negative assessments by the troika experts regarding the pace and commitment to reforms added to these developments creating a prolonged period of uncertainty about a possible 'Grexit' − despite the successful completion of a substantial haircut of the Greek debt held by the private sector (agreed to in July 2011, modified in October 2011 and implemented in February 2012).

Implementation of many of the measures (especially those relating to rationalisation of expenditures and public sector restructuring/reform) remained slow for most of this period while structural reforms stalled until the autumn of 2012. Then in October 2012 a

new agreement was reached with the country's creditors for the release of the funds under a second bailout agreement of February 2012 (under much more advantageous repayment terms and including a partial buy-back of Greek debt) in exchange for a new set of measures that were approved in the parliament in November 2012. These measures have been largely in line with measures agreed to or legislated previously, but this time with much stricter safeguards on implementation. Amongst the new elements are a further reduction in social benefits, further increases in fuel taxes, complete abolition of the 13th and 14th salaries, some further cuts in pensions, further reduction in dismissal notice periods in the private sector and the introduction of new taxation legislation.

All in all, between January 2010 and January 2013, pensions and public sector payments have declined by over 25% on average, effective tax rates have increased perhaps by more than 20%, public sector recruitment has been frozen and labour laws have been substantially deregulated (especially concerning employment protection and wage-setting). At the same time, wages in the private sector have declined by at least 15% cumulatively (Bank of Greece, Governor's Report for the Year 2012).

Also, very little has been achieved with regard to privatisation (less than €1bn has been generated so far), the closure/amalgamation of redundant public bodies, public sector downsizing (the target of 15,000 dismissals was not even close to being met, while at

the same time a number of key services experienced significant understaffing) and especially with tax evasion.[3]

Whereas tax hikes and spending cuts are undoubtedly recessionary, fiscal expansion can in turn be highly inflationary and will almost invariably lead to a deterioration of the current account, thus leading to more borrowing. This is especially so in a country such as Greece, where market rigidities are acute, savings are low and the propensity to import is particularly high. 'With high imports, black market economy, tax evasion and the weak production base in Greece, it is extremely unlikely that any form of fiscal expansion − and definitely any expansion that would be income- or transfer-based rather than investment-based − would be able to generate the size of the spillovers needed to halt the rising trend of public debt' (Monastiriotis 2013). 'Taking into consideration the political and credibility constraints, which made an externally financed fiscal expansion practically impossible, leads to the conclusion that austerity was the only option. On this, Greece already had a poor record but the handling of the crisis seems particularly illuminating' (e.g. see Monastiriotis & Antoniades 2012).

From the very early stages of the crisis, Greece appeared to enter into a form of collective denial with the majority of Greeks failing to appreciate the severity of the country's fiscal problems and with an evident lack of introspection, engaging in unproductive blame-shifting (blaming the Germans, the banks, the markets, the

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[3] A detailed evaluation of the measures up to the spring of 2012 can be found in the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, March 2012 and The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece − First Review, December 2012.

politicians, even capitalism at large) and occasionally in short-sighted and self-interested acts of civil disobedience (such as the 'Refuse to Pay Movement').

Although such reactions are consistent with wider descriptions of the Greek mentality, the political elites almost uniformly across the political spectrum played a key role in legitimising and even mobilising public discontent (Chalari 2012). As early as the spring of 2010, even the Prime Minister, George Papandreou of the socialist party (PASOK) was attacking the profit-seeking markets for 'engineering' high bond premia for a country that just a few months earlier had admitted the largest misreporting of statistics in European history (overture of the Prime Minister to the Greek population on February 2 2010 and April 23 2010). Meanwhile the opposition − including the party New Democracy of Antonis Samaras who is now the current Prime Minister that later came to implement most of the austerity measures − was denouncing all fiscal consolidation efforts suggesting that reforms and fiscal consolidation were not necessary (i.e. the conversation in the Greek parliament for the approval of the First Memorandum on May 6 2010 and his speech against the Memorandum on June 28 2010).

In those circumstances, the handling of the crisis revealed five important collective failures by the Greek political system; 'a failure of communication (to the public of the need for austerity and the criticality of the situation), a failure of co-ordination (among and within political parties which appeared uninterested in abandoning party tactics even when the country was at the brink of collapse), a failure of negotiation (with the

Euro-zone partners for a fiscal consolidation programme that was more feasible, less harsh, more constructive and growth-oriented), a failure of implementation (of the various reforms which were announced time and again resulting in a huge accumulation of political costs but which were often not implemented) and a failure of strategy (astonishingly, the idea of a 'Marshall Plan for Greece', which was eventually agreed to in July 2011 but has yet to be activated, came from the Commission, not from Greece. To this day, Greece has said very little about a new 'Investment Compact' for the country other than the helpful but emphatically limited release of pre-committed Cohesion Policy funds)' (Monastiriotis 2013).

Given these failures the crisis unavoidably became increasingly unmanageable, resistance to reforms and to austerity became stronger and more legitimate, government expenditures became increasingly inelastic and policy design and implementation became largely reactive with little attention to policy complementarities and synergies. It is also not surprising that Greece's creditors became increasingly impatient, demanding tougher measures which then reinforced the vicious cycle of recession and de-legitimisation.

Given this situation, my cosmopolitan approach attempts to answer the question how the situation in Greece changed so dramatically in September 2009 when Greece first indicated a substantial divergence from its budget deficit target. The following analysis of Greece's Europeanisation process begins with the internal factors which can explain the current recession. The argument is that developmental problems in the Greek state, civil society and political system, which already pre-existed in Greece, are mainly responsible for the outbreak of the crisis and are revealed in the existence of a parallel

tendency of de-Europeanisation in the country, often neglected by the Europeanisation literature.

3. Greece's (de-) Europeanisation from a Cosmopolitan Perspective

For ten years or so, a vigorous literature has grown up around the Europeanisation of Greece during the Simitis (1996-2004) and Karamanlis (2004-2009) governments. According to the main literature, the articulation of a pro-European ideological discourse, the rapprochement with Turkey and Greece's accession to the Euro-zone area were the main events signifying a deeper process of Europeanisation which essentially began in 1996.[4]

This started to be expressed firstly by some Greeks, mainly academics, but very soon it became the main motto of the official governmental discourse. On March 2000, the then prime minister Costas Simitis proclaimed that 'with our entry into the Euro-zone we achieve the equal position of Greece within the strongest group of member-states of the Union' (Simitis 2002, p. 43). In 2002, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou claimed in the parliament several times that the values of the European Union come as a positive challenge in the region and stressed that Greece has taken over the 'historical role' to propagate these values in the Balkans. The former Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis concluded too that 'Greece managed not simply to participate in the hard core of the Union, but also to actively promote the European perspective of all of its neighbours' (Karamanlis 2008).

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[4] Among the first studies on the Greek Europeanisation process are the following: Lavdas (1998); Ioakimidis (2000, 2001); Pagoulatos (2000).

Compared with these pompous pronouncements, the academic literature on Greek Europeanisation is admittedly more subdued. One part of it has analysed the 'limits' and the 'problems' that this process faces in the case of Greece (e.g. see Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008; Ioakimidis 2000, p. 359) while another part with scholars like Kazakos (2004, p. 903) have contended that the Greek version of Europeanisation is fragmented and not organised, phrasal instead of actual. In any case, most of the literature has argued that particularly at the level of the economy, foreign policy, institutions and social policy Greece managed to be under a process of internal transformation resulting from the political and economic dynamics of the European Union.

For instance, Economides (2005, pp. 471-472) has maintained that 'membership in the EU had an Europeanising influence on Greek foreign policy with the main effect of strengthening the international credibility of Greece'. Sotiropoulos (2004, pp. 275-279) also concluded that the Greek welfare state had been Europeanised in the period of Simitis, particularly in the areas of employment, pensions and public health. Finally, Featherstone (2008, p. 181), who considered membership in the Euro-zone area to be an important step of Europeanisation, has drawn the following impressive conclusion; 'Greece is gradually adjusting itself, is much less the scapegoat, and it remains a part of the hard core of the EU. There are no imminent dangers'.

Following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and the induction of the country to international surveillance, the above observations seem most outdated and totally

unrealistic. The international image and credibility of Greece admittedly are currently at their lowest point (Tziovas 2010). The rising unemployment projected by the IMF at a record 15% for the years 2011-15 and the draconian cuts in pensions and minimum wages dissociate Greece again from the European social model with which it previously converged (IMF Report 2010, p. 11). Also the risk of bankruptcy of the Greek state since the end of 2009 together with the upheaval that this caused to the international financial markets and several EU councils made the country again the scapegoat of Europe.

Facing these recent developments my cosmopolitan approach is critical raising a number of questions around the recent literature on the Greek Europeanisation: a) to the extent that it is obsolete, can we consider the literature on Greek Europeanisation as a successful attempt to explain the changes that occurred before 2008 or do we need to radically challenge it as an unfortunate attempt of embellishing a superficial, corrupted or falsified phenomenon?, b) is Europeanisation an easily reversible process or does this reversibility is related to how hastily and superficially it has been attempted? and c) if it is indeed reversible, what are the reasons that made this possible in the case of Greece?

Among the researchers who have studied this problematisation in relation to Greece only Featherstone and Radaelli seem to have wondered if Europeanisation is an irreversible process. However, as regards Featherstone, nowhere in his text does he attempt to answer this question (Featherstone 2003, p. 3). This omission is not surprising because the theory of Europeanisation is characterised by intense evolutionary and ethical conceptions which would have been undermined if the proper

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attention had been given to cases where member-states invalidate European institutional practices in their national political systems. It is not accidental that in almost all cases the theory of Europeanisation has been applied to empirical studies which lead to the predictable conclusion that one or another state has been Europeanised to a greater or lesser extent while only in a few cases it has been applied to studies which lead to the opposite conclusion. Even then, the interpretation adopted does not emphasise the process of negation of European rules and policy frameworks, but it reaches the neutral conclusion that these policies simply failed to be incorporated to the national context.

With respect to Radaelli, one of the leading theorists in this field, he has devoted some useful lines for the case of reversibility or negation of Europeanisation. According to him, a state that is subjected to the influence of the EU may react in four different ways: a) absorbing the institutional practices of the Union mildly, b) being transformed into a dynamic trajectory of Europeanisation, c) remaining passive or d) being 'entrenched'. The fourth case, which is described by Radaelli (2003, pp. 37-38) as 'negative Europeanisation' meaning that national policy becomes less European than it was, will be the focus of my cosmopolitan approach stressing the dynamics of contestation of well-established policies and attitudes. However, because the terms 'entrenchment' and 'negative Europeanisation' contain a creeping and discredited perception which treats the phenomenon as a regressive and irregular reaction to European norms and practices, it would perhaps be more accurate to describe the same phenomenon with a clearer and more neutral term such as 'de-Europeanisation'.

Now if we accept the assumption that from 2008 onwards Greece's membership in the Eurozone has been endangered, then the crucial question that immediately arises is why this occurred so rapidly. It would be wrong to conceive the global financial crisis as the only cause for this shift because other EU states which suffered from the same economic crisis did not show similar tendencies of de-Europeanisation as happened with Greece. Moreover, if we examine historically some of the key areas where there is a clear erosion of policies and institutional practices of the EU today in Greece, such as the economy and institutions, then we will find that these phenomena had become apparent very before 2008.

At this point, it might be argued that Greece's failure to adapt to the EU and to integrate to the global community is connected with its failure to overcome the inherent contradictions that form its identity and provoke introversion. For instance, Greece tries to balance between excessive consumption and limited production. For the past two decades it has been engaged in uncontrollable consumption while its productive powers remain still poor, because the Soviet-type economy system and organisation, the strong role of the public sector and the 'closed off' professions prevent productivity and competitiveness. This productive model does not enhance the export capability of the country and it is based on loans.

Furthermore, there is the contradiction that Greece has modernised its political institutions and enhanced their roles and functions following its membership in the EU while it maintained the bureaucratic management and mentality which shaped them over time; Greek institutions continue to function within the frame of patronage,

clientelistic relationships, corruption and iniquity. Another antithetic feature lays in the fact that although the state is conceived as the guardian of the population, at the same time it is perceived as the enemy. Greek people expect their state to solve every arising problem but its inability to respond to these high standards renders the state a foe and the cause of damaging and unpleasant situations. In the same line of thought, the Greek state experiences one more contradiction, as its identity bears the characteristics of both a postmodern and a pre-modern state. On the one hand, it is integrated, yet insufficiently, in the supranational system of the European Union. On the other hand, the Greek people often complain for conceding sovereignty to the EU.

Finally, Greece wavers between its European and anti-European status. It is true that Greece is a European member pursuing deeper integration and encouraging European transformation into a political union with a Common Foreign and Defense Policy as well as a common budget. Nevertheless, the current crisis has revealed a strong anti-European movement encouraged from the far-left and right nationalist parties, which conceive the EU's economic aid to Greece as intervention to its internal affairs. This controversy is a remnant of the past, as Greece's accession to the EU in the 80s was accompanied by a debate between the leaders of the two major parties regarding the position of Greece; according to Andreas Papandreou of the socialist party Greece belonged to Greece while for Konstantinos Karamanlis from the right-wing party Greece belonged to the 'West'. This debate revealed Greece's confusion about its identity as from the beginning the European Union had been considered as a

supranational authority which threatened the state instead of presupposing and extending it.[5]

The above contradictions can be explained by the fact that very often people are experiencing the illusion that they are threatened by outside forces, whether these are neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey and the Balkans) or global forces (e.g. Germany and the U.S.). Recent developments on the Greek economic and political crisis have showed that the economic assistance requested and provided for Greece is conceived by a significant portion of the Greek population as a threat and violation of the country's sovereignty.

Therefore, a defensive attitude is created in the society due to the insecurity caused by the geographical position of Greece between East and West, as well as by the traumatic experiences provoked during the establishment of the modern Greek state in the 19th century (it is remarkable that the cause for all ills for the new state had been attributed to the unfavourable stance of France, Great Britain and Russia towards Greece). Subsequently, foreign policy becomes equated to defense policy with introvert

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[5] My analysis of the contradictions of the Greek state and society is influenced by the article of Ioakimidis (2011). However, it differentiates from Ioakimidis' approach which perceives the EU as the means for Greece in order to overcome its contradictions. My argument is that the instrumental treatment of the EU by Greece has worsened its integration to the EU. The resolution of Greece's antithetic features should be the precondition for the safeguard of its position in the EU and the Euro-zone. Greece's balance between openness (being in line with European policies) and introversion (in adopting a defensive stance towards the EU and the rest of the world) which is reflected in the ambivalence of its society between pro-'Western' and anti-'Western' sentiments can be devastating for the country's cultural identity. Greece in its attempt to eliminate the crisis by renouncing the tragic mistakes of its past is likely to have no identifiable identity while its voice during the crisis risks of being lost. Therefore, the crisis urges Greece to redefine its identity, the objectives, motives and benefits of its accession to the EU in order to proceed ahead as a member-state with a clear orientation. Greece has to determine its position within an unstable international community and to strengthen its position within the EU by revealing the pluralism and polyphony of its identity (Tzoumaka 2009, pp. 70-77).

dimensions while the state's provision with defensive armaments is the priority of the foreign policy.

Moreover, the Hellenistic and Byzantine heritage creates a sense of superiority of Greek values against values of other populations. Because of this sense of arrogance caused, introversion becomes a characteristic of the Greek people. This combined with intolerance, xenophobia, ethnocentrism and nationalism renders the state the supreme and absolute power.[6]

Of course searching for the causes of Greece's de-Europeanisation before the crisis should not lead us to the extreme conclusion that the entire Europeanisation process was completely arbitrary or non-existent. The relevant literature is one-sided, however, displaying only the integration policies without paying sufficient attention to the severe alterations/deteriorations and to the incidents of negation of policies that had been taking place in the Europeanisation process together with the initial internalisation. More specifically, because there is not any sufficient critique, the literature on the Greek Europeanisation never had the analytical tools to conceive the possible coexistence of dynamics of Europeanisation with tendencies of de-Europeanisation where many of the first are overthrown by the second.

For instance, if we turn our attention to the field of Greek economy, one of the key areas where Europeanisation is considered to have occurred, we can see more clearly how this

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[6] See Ioakimidis 1999, pp. 144-149 and 2005, pp. 15-65, where he examines in detail Greek people's conceptions of their country as: a) a European country, b) the center of the world and c) a tributary and poor country.

dynamic was undermined from the outset by a parallel trend of de-Europeanisation. According to the literature, there are two important aspects of economic Europeanisation that Greece experienced after 1996; the change in the economic operation of the state from a 'developmental' to a 'stabilising' status (Pagoulatos 2000, pp. 192-193) and consequently the country's accession to the Euro-zone area in 2001.

Regarding the first case, the EU realised eventually in November 2004 that the Simitis government achieved the convergence criteria for the Economic and Monetary Union but only after Greece had systematically falsified the statistics on the national deficit and debt from 1997 to 2003 (Eurostat 2004, pp. 11-12). Although this case is discussed by Featherstone, his analysis results in the optimistic conclusion that the problem was overcome by the stabilising dynamics of Greece's Europeanisation process (Featherstone 2008, pp. 167-168). What has been overlooked is the fact that the falsification of statistics is not simply a moral or political issue, but also a very serious case of negation of the EU basic rules and practices by the Greek political system.

In other words, if we accept that the accession of Greece to the Euro-zone area has been a leading event of Europeanisation, then at the same time we must also recognise that this achievement was the result of the systematic manipulation of the macroeconomic data by Greece in an attempt to prove its supposedly Europeanism deceptively. The limits of the analysis of Featherstone become apparent if we consider that this crisis was not overcome hopefully, as he noted in 2008. In January 2010 too, a new European Commission report discovered again that the Karamanlis government had conducted a falsification of data on national deficit and debt data in 2009.

With respect to the second main manifestation of Europeanisation in the economic field, i.e. the transition of the state's role from 'developmental' to 'stabilising', a few remarks need to be expressed. First, there are serious methodological issues surrounding the use of the terms 'developmental' and 'stabilising' which are quite vague in theory while empirically they prove to be rather inadequate to describe the historical role of the state in the Greek economy. For example, it is very doubtful if before 1990 Greece was indeed a 'developmental state' (Pagoulatos 2000, p. 205). Secondly, from 2004 to 2009, the budget deficit reached approximately in two years the 8% of GDP while in 2009 it reached the 16%, performances which are barely distinguishable from those of previous decades and anyway they could hardly be considered to be compatible with the features of a 'stabilising' state. At the same time, from 1990 onwards the debt has begun to move to the very high levels of 90-100% showing a steady growth which again is inconsistent with the features of a 'stabilising' state.

It is necessary to emphasise that the phenomenon of de-Europeanisation in Greece or perhaps elsewhere requires a much deeper and more comprehensive study so as it could be understood in its full dimension. In order to achieve this, it is firstly necessary for the research to be disconnected from the power structures that permeate a large part of academia, especially in the fields of political science and international relations where research programmes are often guided by the priorities of the political and bureaucratic elites. Therefore, if we want to actually contribute to setting up a genuine European identity in the Greek political system, it is necessary primarily to decouple as much as possible the meaning of Europeanisation from the strong element of propaganda that

surrounds it, particularly when studied in connection with societies of problematic modernisation such as Greece. To achieve this however, we need to rethink the concept of Europeanisation, seeing it through the prism of a critical perspective. My cosmopolitan approach does not mean to reject it, but mostly to redefine it through a new conception that could relieve it from the intense evolutionary and ethical element which is now governing it.

It is not possible to continue to analyse national political systems on the degree to which they have been Europeanised while neglecting how several aspects tend to de-Europeanise them in the fear that this might be taken to questioning the whole project of Europeanisation. European studies would have much better to offer in the field of Europeanisation if, instead of exaggerating or imagining the integration of European practices to national political systems, they focused on the emergence of resistance and subversion that constrain Europeanisation making implementation difficult especially in the countries of Southern Europe. In this sense, my cosmopolitan perspective aims to demonstrate that it would be much more useful if we had fewer celebrations for the alleged advances of Europeanisation in the last decade and more critical studies on the causes of the Greek crisis which make this process move forward very slowly.

Therefore, in the following sections my intention is to reveal the two parallel tendencies of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation in different domains and to demonstrate that Greece is an uncommon and extremely complex case to be Europeanised; it has not been fully integrated to the EU and has therefore revealed the limits of the processes of Europeanisation when applied to a centralised state such as Greece. This is why the

crisis leads Greece to inevitably adjust its identity within an unstable global community and to confront the dilemma of either be isolated or integrated within the global community as an organic member. As a consequence, Greece balances between introversion and extroversion and the way it will handle its financial deadlock will determine whether it will seize the opportunity to cosmopolitanise its society remaining within the EU or not.

3. 1. The Greek State and Civil Society

It could be argued that Europeanisation has brought about positive effects on the society of Greece. Among the most important developments since Greece's membership in the EU could be considered to be decentralisation, whereby the decisions made by actors at different levels are not monopolised only by governmental agencies. Within the current crisis the restriction of the leading role of the state, the elimination of state's economic interventions and activities, the liberalisation of the banking system and the adoption of European legislation to safeguard the transparency of transactions between the state and public enterprises are ongoing in Greece for the overcoming of the recession under the guidance of the European Union.

Among the positive consequences of the crisis is the fact that the inability or unwillingness of the state to provide a solution and to respond effectively to economic and social problems has enhanced solidarity and the strengthening of civil society and social movements. The power, the role and the control exercised by central governmental institutions are under a process of a gradually weakening at the same time

that the role of civil society and non-governmental actors is being enhanced. This is obvious in: a) the weakening of the control of the state on various social organisations and thus in the strengthening of their independence (mainly due to the state's inability to finance social organisations in order to control them), b) the enforcement of various social groups which seek to fill the governmental gap in promoting social policies and c) the arising social movement during the crisis against the dominant role of patronage which is shaping the Greek political system and the relations between the state and society (i.e. the 'Indignant Citizens Movement' which started from Spain and extended to Greece).

Therefore, people have gradually realised that the state is weak to handle either crucial domestic issues provoked by the crisis or problems with a global dimension that affect Greece and require supranational coordination. Accordingly, actors of civil society have been activated in order to address the problematic situation, thereby resulting in the weakening of the Greek state's power which is no longer regarded as the only source of authority. Solidarity is developed among the population which is manifested in charity actions for the weak social groups.[7] In addition, communal feelings and a sense of unity are created, as people gradually realise that they share common problems regardless of their ideologies and political beliefs and thus, appear to renounce their selfish emotions. The common sense of anger and deception by politicians might be argued to operate in a unitary way, while collective solidarity mechanisms developed among the civil

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[7] Examples of NGOs which were established following the outbreak of the crisis are the following; 'Social Pharmacy of Kalamata' (January 2010), 'Atenistas' (September 2010), 'Patinistas' (December 2010), 'Solid Network of Athens' (January 2012), 'Social Pharmacy of Drama' (February 2012), 'Solid Team Youth of Diakopton Village' (May 2012), 'All together Village' in Lesvos (October 2012), 'Social Pharmacy of Patissia' (November 2012), 'Movement of Young People in Municipality of Erineos' (November 2012).

society play an essential role in the cohesion of the Greek community. By initiating generosity or altruism and by expressing mutual concern for the common good, these mechanisms provide a guarantee for unity against the risk of bankruptcy and poverty.

However, one should be concerned by the fact that solidarity has been developed among the Greek citizens not only as a reaction to the corrupted Greek politicians but also quite often as a defensive attitude against the 'bad Europeans' who are in many cases considered to be exploiting the crisis by offering Greeks high-interest loans. Although it is true that the European efforts for solidarity granted so far have often been well overdue, this kind of aid has managed to avoid a default in payment in Greece and to stop the crisis from spreading. As solidarity is accompanied with responsibility, the challenge for Greece who is the beneficiary of solidarity is to prove that it did not exploit the given conditions of eligibility, that it will strive to contribute again to the life of the European community and that it realises the weight of its responsibility. Solidarity without reciprocity is not sustainable, because irresponsibility shown by the Greek authorities and disrespect for the stability pact represents a breaking of the trust established between the countries that have adopted the Euro.

Another problematic characteristic of the Greek state lies in a paradox that has been revealed by the Greek crisis; at the same time that the state proved weak to confront the crisis alone and recognised the significance of its EU partners for inquiring assistance, the nation state strengthened its political significance and the issue of national identity came to the forefront intentionally in the politicians' desperate attempt to maintain the democratic order harmoniously.

This might be explained by the fact that the crisis which led Greece to seek international and global financial aid shocked the Greek society provoking introversion, a defensive attitude especially against Europe and a wave of protests for conceding sovereignty to the EU. In a country such as Greece, where culture and national identity are diachronically the only prerequisites for the production of democratic legislation and public policies (modern Greeks very often call themselves as the descendants of Pericles) while national identity remains the only integral part of citizenship for the consolidation of the bonds between citizens, the crisis soon got nationalistic dimensions. This in turn demonstrated the deficient Europeanisation of the political system; the implications for the political system were severe, as it split into various nationalistic left and right-wing parties which still nowadays support Greece's exit from the EU and the Euro-zone.

The main reason for the hostile treatment of the EU by Greece is the attitude of the Greek political parties to repulse their tragic responsibilities by blaming the EU for the painful measures they impose (Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008, pp. 39-45). The fact that the EU guides Greece to reform its system but it leaves room for the Greek state to determine the way it will proceed to restriction of its operating costs is intentionally disregarded and never mentioned in a sincere way by politicians.

Fortunately, as a reaction to the arising nationalistic movements as well as to the possibility of Greece's bankruptcy with tragic consequences for the society and the economy progressive citizens are activated and brought together. This depicts the

dilemma between tradition and modernity among the populations and politicians; social culture is conceived by some as a continuity and distinctiveness of Greekness that should be protected by a strong nation state (i.e. the Greek nationalistic far left- and right-wing parties) while for others it requires change towards a more progressive direction (i.e. the two parties, the liberal and the socialist of the coalition government).

A balance needs to be maintained by politicians between the idealised conception of the past heritage and the excessive faith in the progressive nature of exogenous institutions and cultural norms. The only way to achieve this balance is the adoption of an extrovert stance, of a consensual spirit, an attitude of collaboration and consultation with all of the parties of the parliament and ultimately, the co-ruling of different parties so as responsibilities to be shared for the easiness of the turbulent social situation.

Therefore, the crisis shows that it cannot be addressed by the state alone, but rather that it has a cosmopolitan character, meaning that it leads Greece to be consulting at the regional and global level with other European and non-European states for the elimination of its financial problems. Consultation needs not remain confined to the level of the nation state but rather it needs to be enriched with ideas, practices and regulations which extend regionally and internationally. Accordingly, the role of the state in preserving social culture and national identity could include existing global or regional practices and arrangements that are essential for social reform. To this end, the role played by NGOs can be of utmost importance.

Greek NGOs and CSOs

The relationship between the Greek state and civil society has been complicated following Greece's membership in the EU. It is true that a wave of pluralism has appeared from 1980 onwards in the form of formal, informal or volunteer groups. Also, non-governmental organisations have increased their resources and have strengthened their position in Greek politics. Nevertheless, Greece is an uncommon case with thousands of Greek NGOs. This depicts a rather ostensibly dynamic force of non-governmental organisations in Greece, because their actions usually are insignificant. These organisations do not operate autonomously and remain firmly embedded in a network of intergovernmental relations controlled by the state. The connection between the state and various social interest groups, whether public, private, professional or non-governmental, is affected by the fact that their sponsorship has been selected de jure by Greek governments over time.[8]

As a result, organisations of civil society act on limited and transparent networks being directed by political parties and having the characteristics of trade unions. The action of most organisations renders accordingly weak and dependent on the Greek state, being often subject to political influences (Andreou 2006, p. 254). NGOs and CSOs appear in

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[8] For example, 14 people associated with the 'Circle of Patmos', a non-governmental organisation, were arrested on charges of misappropriation of public funds and money laundering. According to the data presented by the police, this NGO had received donations amounting to 9.5 million Euros in the period 2000-2010 while revenues of just 6.5 million Euros had been recorded in its accounting books. The main objective of the 'Circle of Patmos' − officially − was to develop religious culture and raise awareness of environmental issues and it funded various forums held at sea. The Ministry of Environment and Energy gave the 'Circle of Patmos' 1.2 million Euros. The state lottery OPAP granted 1.2 million Euros over the years, the National Assembly funded the organisation with 300 thousand Euros and the Ministry of Culture gave 60 thousand Euros. The NGOs scandal flared up in Greece over a year ago, when everyday life began to feel the effect of the economic crisis more strongly. More than 39 million Euros sank into the hands of about 700 NGOs in the period 2007-2009. Governmental organisations and European funds were donated for various and often obscure causes – 25 thousand Euros were given for the study of the history of the youth movement of the left-wing party KKE (Report of the Economic Police of Greece on the Greek NGOs for the period 2000-2010).

many cases as appendices of state mechanisms giving the pretense of self-organisations. There are also NGOs and profit organisations which are organisations for funds absorption. In this case, they have no action and they are focused only on receiving economic resources.[9] Despite their constant advocacy of effectiveness, transparency and accountability, relatively little is known about the Greek organisational structures, management systems, modes of operation and effectiveness. Predominantly, Greek NGOs have received a considerable degree of criticism because of the democratic deficit which plagues their organisational structure and undermines their right to influence international channels.[10] Their democratic deficit is such that even the most humanitarian of NGOs are dependent on governmental influences.

Despite the problematic functions of Greek NGOs and CSOs, their need to be restructured and their utility lies in the fact that during the crisis civil society organisations transcending the national borders of Greece are able to reduce the so far insurmountable barriers of national sovereignty. In this way, Greek non-governmental organisations with global scope can be a force towards more cooperation with similar civil society organisations not only nationally but also globally. The links of NGOs with

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[9] The NGO 'Greek modelling' received another 25 thousand Euros to develop their activities; 'Citizens of tomorrow action' received 50 thousand for its unspecified activities. The 'wireless network of the Corinth bishopric' was also funded with 25 thousand Euros. NGOs with names like 'Actions for the man', 'Arcadian youth 2000', 'Specialised institute to establish the quality of citruses in Trianisos' received the same amount as well. The list of NGOs in Greece that register a business and receive grants without reporting on their activities includes hundreds of names (Report of the Economic Police of Greece on the Greek NGOs for the period 2000-2010).

[10] Some of the biggest violations were made in the employment and retraining programmes, which were managed by the government, but carried out with the active participation of NGOs. The condition for the grants was to open at least one new job if the state covered all the costs of hiring new staff. Also, it is quite interesting for the function of the Greek democracy that among the NGOs that were funded by the state were those of Margarita Papandreou (the mother of the previous Prime Minister George Papandreou). Also, the 'Centre for Research and Action on Peace' was funded by the state twice with 90 thousand and 25 thousand Euros, whereas the Andreas Papandreou Institute for Strategic and Development Studies received 125 thousand Euros from the same programmes.

global networks of the same interest could connect Greece with the rest of the world for the confrontation of common transnational problems such as the financial and political current crisis. This could be conducted on the basis of the realisation that while globalisation has beneficial effects for some, for others it has caused problems, as in the case of Greece. The opportunity for Greek citizens to express their views by virtue of being members of NGOs may facilitate to varying extents their inclusion in the decision-making process at the state and regional level.

The enhancement of NGOs and CSOs is significant for Greece as in the country's conception of international relations oversimplified ethnocentric stereotypes of world affairs prevail together with the formation of a political discourse with nationalist and populist character (Tsakonas 2002, pp. 428-429). Therefore, Greek NGOs need to exchange knowledge and influence policy outcomes widely around the world through the individuals who act on their behalf and, in so doing, they could participate in spheres of authority that allocate values and evoke compliance as they engage in activities that activate and delineate each sphere. This in turn might accord them a significant degree of legitimacy (Marangudakis et. al. 2013, pp. 20-22).

Also, Greek NGOs which participate in a European network can be represented in the EU acting as mediators notifying the European Union for the problems that Greece faces and transferring to Greece the conclusions drawn from the consultation process with the EU and particularly with the Commission. The fact that the financial crisis of Greece seems to have deprived it from participating in the decision-making process at the European and global level renders the action of NGOs indispensable. It is also

important given that the crisis has provoked strong nationalistic sentiments among the population and has therefore divided it (ibid, pp. 27-29).

NGOs and CSOs can play a crucial role in domestic politics too. Of particular significance for countries facing economic problems such as Greece are NGOs with developmental character.[11] The majority of work undertaken by Greek NGOs needs to relate to the eradication of poverty, establishment of a culture of peace and democracy, promotion of human rights and thereby to the facilitation of the construction of a more cosmopolitan and democratic world order. Under these conditions, the formation of a pluralistic and discursive democracy in Greece might be achieved which could therefore be based on plurality, respect of (cultural) differences and tolerance against any kind of fanaticism and totalitarianism. In this frame, NGOs could provide a forum in Greece where discourse ethics could ascertain the validity of dialogue and contestation of well-established practices in a productive way.

Although consensual procedures frame a significant framework for the action of NGOs and CSOs, perhaps a relationship of 'hostility' between state and society may be more relevant for the case of Greece. From this angle, Etienne's analysis becomes noteworthy. In his paper (2013) he proposes an alternative approach to describe and make sense of the relationship between state and society for a large proportion of Greeks in the terms of mutual hostility and controlled negative reciprocity. 'A relationship of hostility between state and society is one where regular, repeated

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[11] For instance, they have contributed very significantly in finding ways for the accommodation of homeless people in the centre of Athens.

interactions are characterised by non-cooperation, non-enforcement and non-violence' (Etienne 2013, pp. 4-5).

Antagonism might be a constitutive element of the state-society relationship rather than a threat to that relationship's existence (ibid. p. 17). It is within that ideal type that the notion of civil disobedience is the more meaningful since it implies that informed and active citizens would carefully scrutinise the extent of their obligations to the state with reference to a set of principles.[12] This relationship is characterised by mutual negative expectations; the state is expected to be a pain for the citizen and the citizen is expected to make the state pay for it. 'In other words, there is generalised mutual distrust. Yet, that distrust does not imply mutual alienation; there is also an element of commonness that has ruled expressions of distrust. This is revealed in the way negative reciprocity is controlled' (Etienne 2013, p. 29).

In other words, NGOs and CSOs would challenge Greek authorities by refusing to comply when they disagree with the acts or the demands of the state (Coleman 1980). There is little support for the idea that state-society relationships in Greece resemble the social contract picture of positive reciprocity. There is, however, evidence of episodic civil disobedience, particularly during the crisis, suggesting that the social contract, which had been in place in the past, has now been put under increasing strain within the crisis. The almost systematic non-compliance of universities with a reform voted in 2011 that weakens professorial and student union control over university governance (Abbott 2012) might be considered as an example of civil disobedience.

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[12] Habermas (2010) too has discussed how various elements in current day Germany – indicated by such events as the rise of the Wutbürger in Stuttgart in 2009 – suggest a growing hostility towards the state from previously less vocal parts of civil society.

In addition, what is needed for the internal organisation of Greek NGOs and CSOs is the enforcement of the communication between different organisations of the Greek civil society for the achievement of common targets within networks of interdependence. For these reasons civil society groups should be put under a common umbrella for the better coordination of their action. Firstly, a platform could be institutionalised for the incorporation of data. Also, special magazines need to be published more frequently in order to inform the public constantly about the new developments in the field of each organisation. Non-governmental organisations could be activated with respect to issues of education and they should provide technical support so as to influence decision-makers.

Secondly, collaboration is required between NGOs and CSOs with different interests for the submission of propositions to sponsors and international organisations according to the local/regional needs. Greece needs to realise that an important factor for the success of civil society groups is their cooperation to achieve their objectives. This presupposes that many NGOs are conscious of the fact that there exists a degree of commonality regarding their aims and the moral framework which guides (or should guide) these aims.

Finally, it would be effective for overcoming the crisis, if organisations of civil society could establish a national and regional network according to the interests of the majority of non-governmental activists. This formula could be accompanied by a common estimation of the budget to be needed and by the effective disposal of funds in

coordination with international organisations in an attempt to reduce the competition between national civil society groups. Finally, non-governmental organisations in Greece need to be occupied with the systematic collection and analysis of data in order to enhance their reliability locally and globally. They should provide politicians and the media with information about their action.

3. 2. The Greek Political System

The political system has remained largely unaffected by Greece's Europeanisation process as it has failed to change radically and eliminate its practices of nepotism. The comparatively weak and delayed development of the Greek middle class, the intense politicisation of the social and economic relations and finally the extremely influential role of the public sector along with the extensive clientelistic practices attributed the character of populism to the operation of the Greek political system.

As far as the Greek parties are concerned, populism and clientelism characterise their function. Populism has become a main characteristic of the Greek parties as until the 1980s parties were not well[13] organised and were dependent on networks of local leaders who acted as the real power centres of party formations. Nowadays they still continue to remain dependent on the strong personalities of their leaders (Lavdas 1997, pp. 50-52). Populism gradually became a form of political discourse and thus, a considerable part of party strategies. Greek parties favour and use populism as a mode

[13] I use the term populism drawing upon Ernesto Laclau (2005, p. 39) who defined populism as 'a certain political logic, a type of discourse characterised by the emergence of equivalences, popular subjectivity, the dichotomic construction of the social around an internal frontier and the discursive construction of an enemy'.

of mass manipulation by provoking political polarisation (usually between left and right-wing parts of the population) and by establishing opposing social identities against immigrants for example (Matsaganis 2013, pp. 160-168).

This polarisation is particularly apparent in political parties which are divided to the Europeans-modernisers and conservatives-preservers of the Greek traditions. It also reveals that the Greek parties have not yet overcome their initial reservations for Greece's convergence with the European Union.[14] Thus, it could be argued that the relations between the parties are conflicting and that the Greek parties want the process of Europeanisation to advance further but to the extent that the influence they exercise on the Greek state for the fulfilment of their personal interests is not endangered.[15] The populist character of some of the Greek parties is reflected especially in their propositions for the confrontation of the crisis. Instead of proposing developmental measures, they are against every kind of liberalisation, privatisation and reduction of the size of the public sector, promising to hire again those that have been laid off (i.e. SYRIZA, the main party in opposition).

As regards clientelism, the more tenuous civil society is with respect to the state, the stronger the tendency is for the development of clientelistic relationships. An important factor for the development of patronage is the omnipotence and gigantism of the Greek state and public sector together with the underdevelopment of civil society and private

[14] For the Greek political parties and European integration see Dimitrakopoulos Passas & 2004, pp.101-124 and Constantinides 2009, pp.125-142.

[15] See Ioakimidis 1996, pp. 44-49 and 2007, pp. 32-39 where he analyses in detail the phenomenon of the 'asynchronous Europeanisation' of Greece, namely the gap between the theoretical acceptance of European politics by political parties and practically the problematic implementation of policies by the country.

sector which could control and safeguard transparency of the state's functions. That gigantism of the Greek state which provokes patron-client relationships is apparent in the public sector, in the high rate of public expenditure and in its extensive regulatory role and participation in economic activities, i.e. in the fields of production and labour market through regulatory rules that are depicted in bureaucratic, opaque provisions for granting state aid, grants and subsidies of all kinds, in the establishment and operation of public enterprises, in state monopolies and in the interventions of the Greek system in the banking system.

Also, trade union movements play an important role for clientelism because they are under the control of political parties and are unable to express and serve the real working interests, leading ultimately to the detachment of workers from trade unions. As a result, the citizen is trying to be served in a privileged way bypassing the legitimate progresses not because his/her requests are necessarily illegal but because the legal route presupposes lengthy and fruitless process and because bureaucrats are not well educated to conduct such processes on time. The use of political means avoids any conflicts and facilitates the citizen especially in cases of arbitrariness of regulations.

Another important aspect of the Greek political system is that in Greece there is a long history of extremism in politics which started in the fierce civil war between the right and left-wing of the 1940s and left its mark during the Cold War years. Especially with the military dictatorship of 1967-74 right-wing extremism became a dominant part of the political landscape.

During the post-1974 years of reconciliation at the initiative of Konstantinos Karamanlis' moderate right, a new form of small but violent terrorist movements of a left-wing, anarchic and anti-American leaning arose which focused on well-chosen targets and were led by the November 17 organisation. The Greek state since the 1980s was confronted with a left-wing extremism which lasted almost twenty years until the government created an efficient anti-terrorist squad which effectively scuppered November 17. Even after the downfall of the November 17, however, some splinter groups remained in force and continued their city-based guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, Greek police became accustomed to extreme left-wing violence during many demonstrations and protests and identified areas of high degree of surveillance in Athens, i.e. in the region of Exarcheia. So for almost four decades Greek authorities, police and security forces are dealing with extreme groups of the far-left and right, while mainstream parties are diachronically connected with extra parliamentary violent organisations.

Nowadays, a revival of the 'two extremes' schema has become evident; there are two 'extremes', one on either side of the political spectrum, i.e. a far-right and a far-left one, both equally detrimental to democracy. The social and political crisis has led large segments of Greek society in a state of anomie exemplified both in 'anomic' far left-wing protests but also in the rise of Golden Dawn.

To begin with the contemporary far-right Golden Dawn, in Greece's recent twin elections of 6 May and 12 June 2012 it won about 7% of the vote in both instances. Golden Dawn was founded in 1993 by Nick Michaloliakos who was arrested in 1978 as

a member of another ultra-right organisation and convicted of possessing firearms and explosives. The Golden Dawn organisation believes in the superiority of the Greek nation and the white 'race', it is hostile to immigrants, homosexuals, Marxism and multiculturalism and it has an anti-Semitic ideology that defends the activities of the paramilitaries who collaborated with the German Army during the German occupation.

Although its leadership does not describe the organisation as fascist or Neo-Nazi, members of Golden Dawn salute in a way that is reminiscent of Hitler, cite Rudolf Hess as a 'hero' in their journal, they participate in gatherings of far-right groups from all over Europe and they frequently visit Berlin where they assemble to commemorate the anniversary of Hitler's defeat. Across Greece party branches have been opened at a record pace with pupils actively recruited in schools. In villages black-clad supporters proudly sporting the party's insignia have proliferated and in the Southern Peloponnese, traditionally a stronghold of the right, Golden Dawn graffiti are scrawled over the roads and even rocks that dot the landscape of seaside resorts and archaeological sites. Racially motivated violence has soared to such a degree that European officials blasted Greece for failing to take adequate action.

Far-right violence[16] needs to be considered in the context of the wider extremist phenomenon which already existed before the crisis and intensified afterwards. So, what we are seeing today is a new type of prevalent extremism in many cities of Greece which has been aggravated by the very deep economic crisis, the national loss of

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[16] While revising the last chapters of the thesis, a left-wing musician, Pavlos Fissas, has been stabbed to death in Athens and the suspect is a member of the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn. This is not an isolated incident of mortal violence committed by Golden Dawn given that numerous are the cases of uncontrolled aggression to death (e.g. against a Pakistani immigrant in January 2013).

sovereignty, the impoverishment and rising unemployment of a large part of the population. The substance of the issue is Golden Dawn's exploitation of a moral panic against the presence of immigrants. Given that over the last five to six years Greece has faced a growing wave of irregular immigration coming mainly from Muslim countries, violent acts committed by Golden Dawn were gradually accepted by segments of the population, especially in urban centres where large concentrations of migrants created discontent in everyday interactions.

The rise of Golden Dawn is also an indication of an extreme social and political crisis in Greece with widespread feelings of anger that do not always take the form of collective struggle in a productive way. When anger takes the form of such individualised despair and is combined with the repulsing ideological residue of authoritarianism, conservatism, nationalism, 'lumpen' sexism and violence, which are still pervading aspects of Greek society, then social solidarity is replaced by a kind of social cannibalism easily represented and manipulated by the fascists. Members of Golden Dawn have taken on the role of the police (the Greek police are often accused of colluding with the extremists)[17] and they are supposed to provide a good pressure to the political system whereby corruption goes unpunished and poverty soars (The Council of Europe's Report on human rights in Greece, 16 April 2013).[18] Also, with its nationalistic rhetoric Golden Dawn appeals to the bruised pride of Greeks who see their

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[17] On Friday 27 September 2013 two policemen were arrested and they are accused of links to Golden Dawn.

[18] Commissioner Nils Muižnieks and his delegation visited Greece from 28 January to 1 February 2013. In the course of this visit the Commissioner held discussions with state authorities and non-governmental, national and international organisations.

country surrender to the 'diktats' of foreign lenders. Therefore, the broken trust between politicians and citizens constitutes a main reason for the rise of the far-right.

In order to comprehend the rise of Golden Dawn, we must also take into consideration another important development in the past two years, namely the fact that government in many 'sensitive' cases has acted as an authoritarian state of emergency; the practice of passing laws through parliament in special fast sessions without any actual discussion (even in the case of complete overhaul of labour law), the dismantling of social rights through simple acts of cabinet, the extreme police violence against protesters and the intensified effort toward the penalisation of collective forms of protest lead to the legitimisation of a 'strong state' that deals with anomie. This, in its turn, gives extra legitimacy to the Golden Dawn's openly authoritarian, ultra-conservative and – despite the populist references to 'Greek workers' – openly pro-business discourse (The Council of Europe's Report on human rights in Greece, 16 April 2013). Also, from a liberal perspective, it might be argued that the sharp rise of Golden Dawn in the last two years has been also facilitated by the 2011 'Indignant Citizens Movement' because of the latter's populist discourse and its exploitation by left-wing parties (Doxiadis & Matsaganis 2012, p. 13). It should be clarified that although the financial crisis may explain the 'legitimation' of Golden Dawn, it is not itself sufficient to explain the deep causes of its strengthening. Hence, it is questionable whether this totalitarian organisation constitutes an ephemeral phenomenon.

Regarding contemporary left extremism, the June 17 2012 national elections brought about a new opposition to the government of New Democracy with SYRIZA

positioning itself at the opposite polar end of Greek parliamentary politics. SYRIZA is a constellation of left-wing components, some of them of an anarchic and extreme left leaning. Its political rhetoric is problematic as well; next to the memorandum/anti-memorandum schism, the existence of SYRIZA with its anti-memorandum discourse has become the most acute point of that political division. For the left there are a few questions to be faced; when the members of SYRIZA use the rhetoric of violence, of overthrowing the state, of a new insurgence, of striking at collaborators – which rhetoric is drawn from an earlier epoch, a time of real revolutions and real wars – do they mean social battle? If not, then how do they engage productively with the possibilities for a real and radical transformation of capitalism and the political system? What are their alternative propositions except the use of violence and their total negation of everything (from the EU to globalisation and capitalism)?

This entire situation has unpleasant and unavoidable consequences for the stability of Greece's coalition government. This is due to the pressure exercised to the right-wing New Democracy, which is the main partner of the coalition, by Golden Dawn, as the latter seems to be gaining voters traditionally supporting the right-wing party. Pressures were also exercised by the withdrawal of the Democratic Left (the third party supporting the government) from the coalition government.[19] This incident revealed Greece's lack of experience with coalition governments and consensus procedures. The fact that PASOK, Greece's social-democratic party and partner to the coalition government, is on the verge of disintegration, makes the situation even gloomier.

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[19] Due to the unprecedented decision of the Prime Minister to suddenly (but temporarily) shut down ERT − the public radio and television company − in order to restructure its function.

At this point, an explicit reference needs to be made to the Greek socialist party (PASOK) because it was the first time the term and notion of cosmopolitanism was ever used by its previous leader George Papandreou. George Papandreou in his attempt to propose alternatives to the crisis of the Euro-zone and Greece invoked cosmopolitanism in order to show that the economically-driven debate on the confrontation of the EU crisis is obsolete and that emphasis should be given to the production of socially effective policies. A gradual shift had been conducted from references to European integration by the then Prime Minister to references to more general and cosmopolitan concepts such as global governance, global democracy, and global citizenry. With the motto 'Greece with a strong identity in Europe and the world' the focus of policy turned from Europeanism and left-wing federalism to a new cosmopolitan globalism for the democratisation of procedures, the unification of citizens in joint actions and the strengthening of the socialist parties globally against neoliberal globalisation. The new European agenda of Papandreou and PASOK included not only European integration and institutional reforms but also global issues.

However, any reference to the means that would give cosmopolitanism a more pragmatic character to Greece and the EU was missing, while simultaneously the individual political tone of Papandreou over collective bodies gave the impression of an elitist perception of world politics. This was revealed by the dominance of the Ministry of Economy for the confrontation of the crisis and the lack of its consultation with the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection (Dimitrakopoulos & Pasas 2004, pp. 65-68). Thus, a vague and often contradictory concept of an authoritarian patriotic cosmopolitanism was adopted by Papandreou. The fact that he failed dramatically to

proceed to reforms in the name of cosmopolitanism and to persuade his European partners for the progress of Greece revealed how dangerous the misuse of cosmopolitanism becomes when the cosmopolitan rhetoric is not accompanied by specific measures.

In front of this situation, the reform of the political system and the change in parties' mentality could be achieved within a broader framework of reform of the European parties. The cooperation of the Greek with the European parties on burning European or national issues is crucial as it could change their functionality removing policies of populism and nepotism.

A necessary precondition for this is the change in policy by the European parties. The initiative to combat the tendency of political parties to present national rather than European programmes should be undertaken by the political parties in European Parliament, i.e. the European People's Party, the Socialist Party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and the Group of the Greens / European Free Alliance. These European parties need to determine and declare their visions for European integration; if they support or oppose a political union of Europe; what are their suggestions for the economic governance of the Union; what they propose for the European social model and its enhancement; what do they suggest for the protection of the environment. The European parties and groups should clarify and transfer their positions on issues of pan-European interests. On this basis, European parties could cooperate with the relevant national parties of the same ideology for the problems arising within member states or

for European issues by inviting them to continually inform the public about their positions on topical issues discussed in Brussels.

Also, Greek parties, in order to acquire European characteristics and to be integrated into the EU, need to actively participate in European and international politics joining the process of European will formation, to be well organised and modernised so as to express the political will of EU citizens and not only of Greeks. Regarding their purpose and organisation they need to be something more than a mere election campaign organisation or a simple support organisation of parliamentary groups and parliamentary work and finally, to be represented at regional and international level surpassing the narrow boundaries of Greece (Ioakimidis 1998, p. 154).

Greek parties in order to serve the interests of civil society and to act as mediators between the central bureaucracy and civil society need a pluralist frame of multiple interest groups without being subordinate to practices of nepotism and populism. At a later stage, the elimination of state's corporatism could be achieved with the establishment of institutions of larger social groups (e.g. think tanks) offering recommendations and influencing the decision-making process (Schmitter & Lehmruch 1979, pp. 7-52). In this way Greek corporatism could be contained, which is currently characterised by the formation of collective interests through a limited number of uniform, hierarchical organisations that enjoy state protection and by the consequent representative monopoly of employees in large sectors of the economy.

Overall, it becomes apparent that the way the process of Europeanisation is perceived is a necessary precondition for the restructuring of the political system in Greece. Greek governments conceive over the years the fact that they are forced to share powers with other supranational institutions at many levels as weakening their control over society, citizens and various interests. Greek parties need to comprehend that the willingness of each state to convey some of its powers to the EU does not necessarily entail loss of national sovereignty or autonomy (as many nationalist Greek parties contend nowadays). Instead, it signifies relocation of the state's power at upper and lower levels through interactive procedures with the EU. Membership in the EU encourages governments to cooperate and share functions with actors, institutions, individuals, associations beyond and outside the governmental/administrative institutions. As it has been revealed by the crisis, the Greek state and the political system seem to resist the fact that European institutions can influence political behaviour and policy-making and subsequently to try to prevent institutional or political changes imposed by the regulations of the Union (Ioakimidis 1998, pp. 29-32).

The above mentioned negative consequences deriving from the existence of a de-Europeanisation process are inextricably connected with the EU. Therefore, having analysed the causalities of the Greek financial and political crisis I now intend to explore the crisis' relation to cosmopolitanism; whether the same crisis can be considered as a crisis for cosmopolitanism in Europe or whether a post-crisis cosmopolitanism could be the new vision for Europe and for the confrontation of the current recession.

4. Evaluating the Crisis: Towards a Post-Crisis Cosmopolitanism?

The examination of the intrinsic factors of the Greek financial problems is not sufficient for a multifaceted approach to the current Greek crisis. Despite Greece's pathogenesis in terms of strategic planning, implementation of legislation, coherence and coordination, there are external factors which have sparked the Greek crisis and more specifically the global and European financial crisis. Addressing broader issues, such as the dominance of economics over politics, which give rise to nationalistic and totalitarian movements, along with the inherent ambiguities of cosmopolitanism can help us comprehend both the dynamics and the challenges posed to cosmopolitanism. This accordingly can help us problematise whether the beginning of a new era might emerge, creating an unexpected hope for a real cosmopolitanism based on a genuine possibility of emancipation and dialogue about world problems in the international community.

Maybe a potential new beginning or qualitative shift towards a new regime of a social and cosmopolitan ethics might emerge with a renewed conception of the common good in the world community. The post-crisis scenario can be a development of a new cosmopolitanism in both international politics and in the activities by corporations and other organisations and institutions helping to build up an international civil society. With the EU crisis we can see how the whole foundation of the EU society is shaken. We need a better way to deal with the capitalist system, a new post-crisis scenario for a new era of cooperation paying equal attention to the role of consensus and contestation and establishing a regime of effective problem-solving.

The debt crisis in Europe is not simply an economic crisis. It is a political crisis because the Euro-zone created a common currency without a common political system. This worked great for a while as countries benefited from the stability of the Euro. But now that debt and recession plague Europe indebted countries like Greece are losing control of their politics. Without the political sense of a common fate, Europeans and particularly the Germans do not want to suffer for the sake of the Greeks because they have no faith that if they bail the Greeks out now, the Greeks will reform their systems and require another bailout in a few years.

There is another debate behind the scenes that few are paying attention to. Amid the repeated rejection of Eurobonds by Germany's leaders is the insertion of a caveat. Eurobonds would be possible if they came with treaty reform. In essence, Germany is willing to bail Europe out but only if the countries in the Euro-zone agree to give up a substantial amount of their sovereignty over economic policy. As a consequence, German-Greek relationships are constantly deteriorating. Linked to the bail-outs for the Southern European countries, a new nationalistic resentment has developed an inflammatory logic of conflict stoking hatred of Europe. The donor countries press the Greeks through austerity programmes while the latter conceive themselves as folk suppressed by the dictates of the EU which violate their national independence and dignity (Comelli 2012, pp. 2-3).

Especially when ethnic identity becomes a significant variable in analyses of the EU crisis there is a danger of an undifferentiated treatment of the Greeks and Germans couching the social struggles which take place in Europe today in purely national terms.

The caricature of the Greeks as an undifferentiated, irrational and lasy mass leads to the demonisation of Greece and generally the European South as it imposes nationalistic and culturalistic frames on the crisis not being consistent with the principles of cosmopolitanism.

In turn, Greece's response by accusing the Germans of being Nazis distracts the country from its real problem which is the growth of actual neo-Nazi political formations that on a daily basis assault people. Meanwhile, this worrisome form of nationalism is legitimised by the Greek parties which either portray the austerity programme prescribed by Germany and the Europeans as the only means of national salvation due to their incapacity to negotiate better terms for their loans or keep a very nationalistic stance against the 'bad' Germans. Populations react negatively to escalating political demagogy which arises by the crisis and strengthens extremist politics.

Under these conditions, cosmopolitanism can be the first casualty of rising ethnic tensions. At the same time it seems that the future of Europe will depend on whether cosmopolitan outlooks can prevail over those parochial voices in both the European North and South. For cosmopolitanism to prevail someone may contend that Europeans and especially Germans must have a frank public discussion about what it means to be European, how European citizens should behave towards other Europeans in terms of solidarity and why a strong Europe is in favour of German national interests. The problem here is that the so-called 'German' or 'national' interests more often than not serve as the ideological means through which the interests of political and economic elites become projected as the interests of the nation; it is questionable whether these

interests coincide with the very European project and the demands of the publics. The intentional identification of these capitalist elites with the general interest obscures the ways in which the European project has long played a role in the defence and restructuring of capitalist social relations within the European continent.

In front of this situation the works by Arendt (1973) on totalitarianism and Beck (1992) on the risk society which deal with global crises and EU politics provide a philosophical perspective on the current debates about the confrontation of the EU and Greek crisis. I seek to synthesise key insights from Arendt's and Beck's work in order to better grasp globalisation. I propose that Arendt's unique insight into totalitarian movements and Beck's notion of risk society remain very much pertinent in the light of a globalising world where the conditions of extreme deprivation and exclusion have become thoroughly bound up with the structurally unequal conditions of the global political economy.

What Germany is demanding nowadays is that Europe abandons its political control over economic matters and cedes decision-making to an apolitical centralised European bureaucracy. Behind such a desire may be the subordination of politics to economics that Hannah Arendt saw as one of the defining features of the modern age. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt argued that the transfer of the economic principle of unlimited growth to politics underlies imperialism. Imperialism has its economic roots in the 'realm of business speculation'; national entrepreneurs sought new markets and they enlisted state support for economic expansion. 'Expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central idea of imperialism' (Arendt 1973, p. 125).

Arendt maintained that the rise of imperialism and the spread of economic thinking in the political sphere mean that politics becomes subservient to economics. She feared the confusion of economics and politics and especially the elevation of economics over politics. Since politics demands the imposition of limits and stabilising forces that stand in the way of constant transformation and expansion, she contended that imperialist expansion brought with it a grave and destabilising threat to the political order. When politics under the sway of economic imperatives is forced to expand on the world stage, political leaders must offer ideologies that give meaning to an ever-larger, undefined, disconnected and homeless mass a population that replaces a citizenry. Under the economic imperatives of growth, politics becomes world politics (ibid).

In this sense, a contemporary example of the elevation of economics over politics may be considered to be the EU crisis and the Greek case. Greece's current crisis is strongly related to a kind of neoliberal financial capitalism that is not overall democratic. It is noteworthy that the financial policies − the Growth Pact, the Pact for the Euro and the different Memoranda of Understanding − driving the process of the elimination of the crisis are often implemented by bodies not directly elected by EU citizens or accountable to them, therefore undermining the possibility of any democratic cosmopolitanism.

Perhaps the problem is that the cosmopolitan ideal has not been properly implemented, leaving the EU as a decentralised set of states with a range of conflicting national objectives. The Greek crisis is a manifestation of a deep crisis of democracy and

equality in EU institutions which subordinates the democratic will of the people to finance interests. More significantly, this small economy is proving to be systemic at the political, social and economic level as it is threatening the European integration project itself and it reflects much wider dangers for Greece and the EU.

Particularly, the Greek case embodies the contemporary dangers which are associated with the dominance of a market cosmopolitan Europe, meaning that 'it is the notion of market – as common or single market – which has, above all, constituted and called forth a space of government beyond parochial bonds; it was the enlargement of markets which precipitated cosmopolitan government in Europe in the aftermath of war' (Parker 2012, pp. 25-27). As Parker has argued, the ambiguity between on the one hand the expansion of market as guaranteeing peace and prosperity in Europe and on the other hand the need to tame market enhancing social institutions and solidarities permits a space for resistance and politics. However, in the case of Greece this space has been covered by chauvinism (Parker 2012, pp. 25-27).

Chauvinism especially expressed by the far-right Golden Dawn raises the problematisation that a violent potential might be inherent in any cosmopolitan attempt to govern Europe. There is the risk that the market may validate itself through various cultural outlets and the possibility of highlighting its potentially violent tendencies is often foreclosed. Definitely the rise of Golden Dawn is connected with domestic factors of the political system and civil society. But the rise of this kind of nationalism could be also perceived as a reaction to the market cosmopolitanism in Europe which has been 'imposed' as ethical corrective or panacea (Ellinas 2013).

At this point, the need for a critical account of finance capitalism becoming part of cosmopolitan studies adds a very important dimension to the more abstract (i.e. based on general principles) ideal of economic cosmopolitanism of just redistribution of wealth and material aid. Critical considerations of this sort are in any case conducive to the more general ideal of economic cosmopolitanism if its plea for global justice (or aid) at the economic level is to acquire substance and to avoid sounding gestural or being characterised as chimeric utopianism. The challenge Europe confronts today is not only to enhance solidarity as I attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapter but also to become avatar of a decentred liberalism. Among cosmopolitanism's possibilities can be the capacity to acknowledge ambiguities and tensions of the kind mentioned above and to adapt accordingly. Support for cosmopolitan liberalism does not necessarily clash frontally with the nature of the emerging global order. It would be wrong for EU policies to be based on the assumption that the new world order is the antithesis to liberal internationalism.

Definitely the case of Greek crisis has posed the question whether the country's growing inequalities in the life circumstances and chances highlight intrinsic limits to the liberal international order or these disparities should be traced to other phenomena, i.e. the particularisation of the Greek nation state. The latter is undoubtedly contributor to these disparities but one of the key causes of the gulf lies in the tangential impact of the liberal international order on the regulation of economic power and market mechanisms. 'The focus of the liberal international order is on the curtailment of the abuse of political power, not of economic power. It has few, if any, systematic means to

address sources of power other than the political. Hence, it is hardly surprising that liberal democratic processes, human rights and flourishing economic inequalities exist side by side' (Held 2004, pp. 142-143).

This accordingly explains a crucial result of the financial crisis, i.e. that the critique of economic liberalism increasingly spills-over into a doubting of the creed's political dimensions. Basic core liberalism is criticised and conceived as regressive and unsustainably hegemonic. But in a multi-nodal, polycentric world order it can be spun in a more favourable light, regaining resonance as a focus on the core of liberal values while leaving scope for institutional variations across regions and cultures. Tackling crisis-upon-decline requires the EU to reflect on how the liberal order should be recast in cosmopolitan terms in a way that retains its essential features. That kind of liberalism might be more subtle and implicit, more accepting of variation and more about setting broad parameters for economic and political comportment.

The most crucial consequence of the subservience of politics to economics following the Greek and European crisis concerns the sentiments of exclusion from the decision-making process that have been provoked among the Greek population, especially when the interim unelected government of Papademos was formed in November 2011. These sentiments of exclusion are connected with the rise of totalitarian movements. Arendt saw totalitarianism as the product of mass society which arose from the breakdown of classes and nation states. Its members had no interests, no concern for their wellbeing. Instead, what they had was an anxiety brought on by loneliness, the experience of not

belonging to the world and a desire to subsume themselves in any organisation that would extinguish their individual identity permanently.

With their insistence on absolute loyalty and unconditional obedience totalitarian movements filled this need; they provided people with a sense of structure and belonging. The widespread political apathy of the masses in Greece and the use of violence as a means of political expression by far-right extremists are reminiscent of the twentieth-century proto-totalitarian movements in Europe that Hannah Arendt identified in Part III of The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she described the rise of a violent 'mob' from the disenfranchised and indifferent 'masses' of post-war Europe (Arendt 1973, p. 415). The political apathy and inaction of the masses provided the soil for growth of totalitarian movements. Economic issues and private interests took precedence over political issues and the masses exited from the political arena creating a vacuum which the 'mob' sought to fill.

Arendt's description could be easily applied to the situation in Greece, where the ultra right part Golden Dawn has won 18 of the 300 seats in the Greek Parliament. The 'mob' is now beginning to emerge from the indifferent masses in Greece who have been displaced and disenfranchised by the European financial crisis. The 'mob' became the leader of the aimless, atomised and apathetic masses. Members of Golden Dawn are gradually becoming the leaders of the marginalised masses in Greece through the means of violence.

The intoxication of violence that the 'mob' experiences becomes a self-perpetuating reign of terror. The recent events in Greece with the assassination of the left-wing supporter Pavlos Fissas by a member of Golden Dawn deserve attention as they indicate the culmination of a process in which violence escalates to terrorism. Arendt identified terrorism as the preferred means of political expression by the 'mob'. She explained that what proved so attractive was that terrorism had become a kind of philosophy through which to express frustration, resentment and blind hatred, a kind of political expressionism which used bombs to express oneself, which watched delightedly the publicity given to resounding deeds and was absolutely willing to pay the price of life for having succeeded in forcing the recognition of one's existence on the normal strata of society (Arendt 1973, p. 439).

However, this situation is not irreversible. According to Arendt, totalitarianism as it appeared in Hitler's Germany and in Stalin's Soviet Union was the culmination of a process, not an inevitable one, but one that unfolded by ignoring, co-opting, or crushing all opposition. As a process, it could only have been stopped and could only be prevented in the future by people dedicated to a single principle; that no one should be excluded from political life, which meant, in her cosmopolitan terms, from humanity. The only answer to this paradox was more political life, including protest in all kinds of political forums. This is what Arendt had meant by identifying totalitarianism as a novel form of government which has the consequence of eliminating politics (Arendt & Jaspers 1992, p. 69). In this sense, Arendt's different version of cosmopolitanism, i.e. that each person's humanity is dependent upon every person's (and thus every state's) refusal to commit a crime against humanity, a crime expelling persons from the human

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circle, from humanity, as under totalitarianism,[20] is pertinent in the light of the obliteration of personhood through several perversions of power that plague contemporary political activity on a global scale and especially in the case of fascism in Greece.

Perhaps the recent ongoing developments in Greece for the confrontation of Golden Dawn, whereby the anti-terrorism unit arrested 32 members of Golden Dawn − among them the head Nick Michaloliakos, the spokesman Ilias Kassidiaris, as well as the deputies Ilias Panagiotaros and Ioannis Lagos − on the charge of forming a criminal organisation[21], indicate the beginning of a new era for Greece and the EU. Although this well overdue effort must be widespread and extended to the basis of the organisation in order to demonstrate that it has not been initiated for impressions, the country has now entered a process in which it could manage to prevent totalitarianism from speading. The activation of the government and justice bodies was the outcome of a campaign that the media launched revealing the tactics of Golden Dawn along with civil society's well-organised upheaval expressed in everyday protests for the assassination. National organisations like Expel Racism and international groups like Human Rights Watch played also an important role for this resistance to totalitarianism.

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[20] See Essays in Understanding 1930-1954, Formation, Exile, Totalitarianism (Arendt 1994).

[21] The Minister of Public Order, Dendias, handed out the criminal case file to the Supreme Court Arios Pagos on Friday 27 September. The state prosecutor then decided that the cases should be charged as felonies for establishment and participation in a criminal organisation, homocides, money laundering and blackmailing. Also, the irrevocable referral of Golden Dawn's deputies to the Supreme Court is expected for the loss of their parliamentary seats (the Greek state provides members of the parliament with immunity which in this case has been lifted, an event which hasn't been since the end of Greece's military dictatorship in 1974). According to the Greek criminal law, the members of Golden Dawn will probably remand in custody until their hearing before the court, while they will be sentenced from 5 to 20 years for each felony. Another symbolic gesture for Golden Dawn's isolation is a regulation that was voted in the Greek parliament on Thursday 26 September discontinuing state subsidies to parties the members of which participate in criminal organisations depicting Golden Dawn.

It may be difficult to predict what might be on the horizon in Greece and to speculate on

what might happen with Golden Dawn but it is the first victory of democracy in a

difficult and long lasting battle which may reveal that cosmopolitanism can prevail in

Europe eventually; Greece may pave the way for other EU countries to use the same

democratic tools in similar situations. Probably the crisis functioned in a paradoxical

way; given that Golden Dawn pre-existed the crisis, the recenssion with its tragic

consequences for the Greek population brought the organisation to the parliament and

therefore to the forefront thereby revealing its real face and leading to the beginning of

its end.[22] Paradoxically, Golden Dawn did not alter its actions in order to integrate in the

country's political system and hence it functions as a springboard for apocalypse of

fascism's methods to Greece and the rest EU countries.

Moreover, the Greek crisis may also be of particular interest for an additional reason. It

reflects 'risk society' concerns of the kind of Ulrich Beck's sociological

cosmopolitanism which is an alternative to a more philosophical *qua* normative

cosmopolitanism.[23] The fact that the Greek crisis manifests a deep crisis of democracy

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[22] According to the latest opinion poll which was conducted by ALCO following the assassination and before the prosecution of the members of Golden Dawn, the party's percentage has declined dramatically within only a week from its last 10.8% percentage (in June) to 6. 7% (*Parapolitika* 28/9/2013).

[23] Global risks empower states and civil society movements, because they reveal new sources of legitimation and options for action for these groups of actors; they disempower globalised capital, because the consequences of investment decisions contribute to creating global risks, destabilising markets and activating the power of that sleeping giant the consumer. Conversely, the goal of global civil society and its actors is to achieve a connection between civil society and the state, that is, to bring about a cosmopolitan form of statehood. Beck focuses on environmental and health risks, but especially on global financial crises and transnational terrorist networks (Beck 2002). He stresses the 'cosmopolitan moment' of world risk society; a) involuntary enlightenment, b) enforced communication across all differences and borders, c) the political power of catharsis, d) enforced cosmopolitanism, e) risk as a wake-up call in the face of the failure of government and f) the possibility of alternative government in a globalised world (Beck 1992, 1999, 2002).

and equality at the institutional level in Europe is not just risky, but it is also threatening the European integration project itself. I place great importance in giving space to another kind of critique of the Greek recession, more complex perhaps; even if the crisis does not eventually prove to be systemic, even if it turns out to be 'harmless' − not threatening to European priorities – Greece (in its 'financial crisis' status) remains a litmus test of European and cosmopolitan ideality, a challenge for the world to ponder on its double standards, on its hypocrisies and complicities, on its ethico-political deficits and at the same time on its chances for a new start and for a shift in direction toward more normatively desirable responses.

Despite EU assertions for equality and solidarity, the European response to Greece in all the cosmopolitan challenges that it has so far presented is the response of the rational egoist (projected at a more collective level) who can live with inequalities, democratic deficits and injustices, so long as those remain 'non-systemic' or non-threatening for stronger parties' interests or stability. As Beck (2013) argues, 'the financial crisis is an example of the victory of a specific interpretation of modernity; neo-liberal modernity after the breakdown of the Communist system, which dictates that the market is the solution and that the more we increase the role of the market, the better. But now we see that this model is failing and we don't have any answers. A few years ago no one would believe that Greece would pose a major problem. Yet, now we are in a completely different situation because in the fear of a potential catastrophe suddenly new things may become possible; new institutions, fiscal compacts or a banking union. This is a huge mobilising force, but it's highly ambivalent because it can be used in different

ways. It remains to be seen whether it could be used to develop a new vision for Europe or perhaps to justify leaving the European Union'.

In conclusion, within this frame the arising question is if there is a basis for the doctrine of cosmopolitanism in the present situation where on the one hand we see the emergence of narrow nationalism and xenophobic movements and on the other hand an imperialistic neo-liberal empire of unfettered marketisation. The case of Greece reveals that current developments in European integration which are linked to populist backlashes, Euroscepticism and violence have challenged our understanding of cosmopolitanism as an irreversible process. These developments are effectively sponsored by the financial, economic and social crisis in the Euro-zone and the political impotence in dealing with it.

We have to ask how we can cope with difference and pluralism in a just manner and what kind of cosmopolitanism is possible in the age of financial capitalism, in an age where increasingly all value is defined by financial markets that dwarf national economies and also carry huge lobbying pressure enabling buyouts of politics and new secure tax havens in a worldwide network. If there is a connection between capitalism and cosmopolitanism, then it is now important to realise that we face an era of currency divisions with major economies competing against each other to devalue their own currency and lower the exchange rate through 'quantitative easing' that cuts the price of exports and increases the price of imports. I see the need for cosmopolitanism *in* the age of financial capitalism, where the 'in' conjunction puts cosmopolitanism and capitalism side by side rather than in a subjunctive or conflicting relation.

5. Conclusion

The current economic, political and social crisis in Greece constitutes the framework within which I developed my research. My approach attempted to deliberate on the origins, implications and management of the Greek crisis.

I intended to reveal that adjustments of the Greek policies to the EU existed, but these adjustments were mostly institutional, i.e. typically morphological within the existent Greek political-administrative culture. Rather than analysing the aspects which have been 'more' or 'less' Europeanised in Greece, I adopted a cosmopolitan perspective in order to demonstrate that a tendency of de-Europeanisation always existed in Greece and especially in the Greek political system and civil society. In this frame, the current crisis is not the cause of Greece's de-Europeanisation process but rather its escalation.

Cosmopolitanism and its dynamics of contestation offer a critical innovative approach which does not exaggerate the whole integration process of Greece but emphasises its dual and paradoxical nature; on the one hand, mainly a top-down Europeanisation has been attempted in Greece with a formal adoption of the EU rules and standards; on the other hand due to this top-down Europeanisation strong resistance to the EU still dominates the majority of the Greek population resulting from the centralised character of the Greek state and the strong national identity and nationalism as a reaction to the fact that Greece is under surveillance.

The analysis of the features of the Greek crisis intended to generate new theoretical perspectives grounded on cosmopolitanism about the EU politics of extreme austerity. My ultimate aim was to examine the paradoxes of the 'post-crisis' situation in its being, i.e. the aggravation of critical tensions leading to increased economic, political and social problems in the EU and simultaneously the sign (or need) of a shift towards a new post-crisis cosmopolitanism for the confrontation of the crisis. In order to be determined that the crisis is not a confirmation of the crises provoked by economic globalisation but alternatively that it opens new meanings, both the EU and Greece need to find ways to confront the rising nationalism and totalitarianism and to rebalance the relationship between politics and economics.

Chapter 4

Cosmopolitan Europe and the Case of Turkey: de-Europeanisation or Cosmopolitanisation?

1. Introduction

Having examined the EU's limited internal cosmopolitanism in the previous chapters of the thesis within the framework of the EU and the Greek crisis, I now turn to an analysis of the EU's external concept of cosmopolitanism by focusing on the case of Turkey. My aim is to address the EU enlargement process towards Turkey in order to investigate whether Turkey's membership is able to strengthen the Union's external cosmopolitanism and therefore the relationships between the EU and regions of Asia and Middle East. In this sense, this final chapter on Turkey is complementary to the preceding analyses, as the case of Turkey offers a new context to my inquiry into cosmopolitanism that is not confined to the EU. Therefore, this chapter is necessary for the completion of my multifaceted research in cosmopolitanism and it relates to my overall argumentation for cosmopolitanism in Europe, as it enriches cosmopolitan and Europeanisation studies by linking the concept of cosmopolitanism with the notion of Europeanisation of candidate states.

More specifically, an important step towards providing a sound conceptual foundation for my project with respect to Turkey is the development of solid research questions but without ready-made answers to the question of Turkey's accession prospects; how a

truly cosmopolitan Europe needs to engage with Turkey in a self-critical manner; and if this is possible, in what ways a cosmopolitan engagement with Turkey will feed back into the development of a critical cosmopolitanism in Europe. My main thesis is that the enlargement of the EU to include much of Central and Eastern Europe can be conceived as setting a precondition of cosmopolitanism; it might lead to the emergence of a multi-centred Europe beyond a narrow 'Western' conception of Europe (e.g. see Delanty 2003, pp. 8-24).

The possible accession of Turkey has presented a serious challenge to the post-national Europe itself. In this context, Turkey constitutes an important test case for this new Europe and its future not only on cultural but also on geopolitical grounds. I therefore suggest that the decision to include or exclude Turkey from the post-national Europe is a decision that the EU needs to take not only with reference to an essentially inwardly-oriented integration project, but also in terms of its role in a drastically changing international order.

My aim is to open a new line of inquiry in the field of Turkey-EU relations that can provide clues about actual prospects, local dynamics and frames of change. My work exemplifies the search for an analytical framework rather than for a symptomatic analysis of Turkey-EU relations. I identify the deficiencies of existing theories of Europeanisation and I propose a new model for understanding supranational integration using the Turkish example as a case study.

In order to do so, I suggest that to understand the process of Europeanisation and accession it is necessary to problematise the extent to which the EU can act as an incentive provider for reforms. In this framework, I look at the EU's own failings in its commitments to the Turkish candidacy, but I do not underline these as the main set of obstacles in Turkey-EU relations. Instead, I treat them as one side of the equation (the anchor side), the other side being Turkey's commitment and ability to undertake reforms (the credibility side). This leads me to question whether the accession process triggers the reforms as an external force driving internal change or if domestic change has been spearheaded by domestic actors that have used and have been strengthened by the external EU anchor (Tocci 2005). If the second is true, then could such a development constitute potentially another variety of cosmopolitanism, perhaps an arising form of cosmopolitanisation[1] outside the European Union which could subsequently mark the emergence of new kinds of relations between the societies of Europe and Asia?

The structure of the chapter is the following. In the beginning I present the political significance of the enlargement process and I turn to an analysis of the conceptual framework of cosmopolitanism in relation to Turkey and its Europeanisation process. Then the chapter is divided into two interrelated parts.

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[1] I use the concept of cosmopolitanisation in the way Beck uses it. Cosmopolitanisation is not a process of transformation that flows from cosmopolitanism necessarily, but it can be the experience which we are facing at the beginning of the 21st century; namely, that the frontiers of years have no longer the same significance. We find ourselves then in a situation of global interdependence which we cannot escape and which we cannot avoid. This new situation manifests itself in the experience of the impossibility of marking the borders with others, with otherness (Beck 2006). 'Cosmopolitanisation thus becomes internal globalisation where global concerns become part of the everyday local experiences and moral life-worlds of people around the world. It involves defining ourselves by reference to the internalised other whereas under nationalism we define ourselves against the other who was external to ourselves' (Beck 2002, p. 18).

In the first part I analyse explicitly the impact of the Turkish possible membership in the EU together with Europe's capacity to integrate Turkey through a presentation of the arguments in favour and against Turkey's membership. My main argument is that Turkey's membership questions the post-national future of Europe and tests Europe's ability to deal with questions of geopolitics, post-nationalism and cultural plurality. Therefore, I focus on whether Europe is about to take a form of a yet another national identity which turns Europeanisation into another national building project framed by the cultural boundaries of a Europe with a Christian heritage or whether the EU with Turkey can become a cosmopolitan entity consisting of transnational linkages between member-states (Oğuzlu 2004, p. 340).

Finally, in the second part I use the reverse analysis focusing on the impact of the EU on Turkey. I evaluate the Europeanisation of the Turkish political system, society and foreign policy from a cosmopolitan perspective. My intention is to introduce a new parameter/problematisation in the field of Turkey's Europeanisation process; whether the current developments especially in Turkey's foreign policy indicate a 'soft-Europeanism', perhaps leading to a particular type of cosmopolitanisation neither simply 'European' nor merely 'Asian' instead of its de-Europeanisation in the post-2005 era.

2. Cosmopolitan Reflections on EU Enlargement towards Turkey and
   on Turkey's Europeanisation Process

This section intends to reveal how the issues of the enlargement, Turkey's Europeanisation process and cosmopolitanism are articulated together constituting a solid basis for the subsequent evaluation of both Turkey's implication on the EU and the EU's impact on Turkey in the next two parts. The political significance of the enlargement process needs to be stressed especially nowadays given that the current crisis challenges the whole European foundation and accordingly affects the relationship of the EU with candidate countries. Cosmopolitanism can offer a new dimension to enlargement especially towards Turkey and it can broaden the methodological tools used by Europeanisation studies when exploring Turkey's integration.

2. 1. The Political Significance of the Enlargement

The political significance of the enlargement lies in the fact that it is the founding of a new political order creating or altering political procedures. Within the frame of the current crisis the EU is losing momentum with the enlargement process becoming the victim of its own success. Following the entry of 12 new members in 2004/07, enlargement fatigue has become a widespread phenomenon in many member-states. At the same time, there is also an increasing accession fatigue in a number of candidate countries. As a result, the EU erodes the power of attraction to its European neighbourhood. This does not mean that EU widening will come to an end but the pace of enlargement is slowing down and it seems rather unlikely that the Union will expand beyond Croatia (and Iceland?) in the years to come. As a consequence, the European project has been deprived of one of its key sources of dynamism given that EU enlargement has been a major impetus for economic, political and institutional change

since the 1970s. Following its huge enlargement in 2004/07 the EU's approach towards its European neighbours has become rather reactive in the sense that the Union has responded defensively to the calls of prospective accession countries and has been mainly driven by a concern to guard the EU and its members against unwanted turbulence at its borders.

The question that arises is what the EU's future value is beyond the mere preservation of past achievements. The answer to this question is first and foremost connected with the EU's ability to co-influence global developments given that enlargement reinforces peace and stability in Europe. It is in the EU's strategic interest to take the enlargement process forward by remaining credible for all the sides involved.

On the side of prospective members, the enlargement process provides a unique incentive for political and economic reform in the enlargement countries bringing the accession countries up to European standards in all areas covered by the EU treaties. Aspirant countries need to be well prepared through rigorous conditionality and to have a clear and tangible European perspective once conditions are met.

On the side of the EU, 'the enlargement process helps it to better achieve its policy objectives in a number of areas which are critical to economic recovery and sustainable growth, including regulatory convergence and the internal market, energy, transport, the protection of the environment and efforts to limit climate change as well as making the EU a safer place' (European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, 2010-2011, p. 3). Especially within the current crisis these objectives are vital for the

EU in order to deal with the economic crisis, to restore growth for jobs through the 2020 reform agenda and to make the EU a safer place. The EU's global competitiveness may be enhanced from closer integration with countries that have a number of comparative advantages.

In the future, the EU's policy towards its neighbourhood needs to follow a different paradigm along the lines of the strategic objective of a global Europe. In order to regain attractiveness a debate about the EU's finalité would be counter-productive in the present situation due to the conceptual schism among and within member-states. Instead of stressing the ultimate finality of the Europeanisation process, a convincing formula explaining the ongoing need for Europeanisation needs to be adopted. The straight-forward message that enlargement is in the mutual interest of the Union and aspirant countries should be presented and explained clearly to the public for a better understanding and support for enlargement. Beginning with issues that have already been established high on political agendas, my attention is drawn to the EU-Turkey relationship in what follows through the lens of cosmopolitanism.

2. 2. Cosmopolitanism, Europeanisation and the Case of Turkey

Cosmopolitanism offers a novel approach to Turkey-EU relations aiming to enrich the debate on Turkey's membership in the EU with a theoretical perspective which goes beyond states' preferences and policy-making in the EU. This is of prime importance as a major challenge today is the development of dialogue across different cultural and civilisational worlds. The case of Turkey provides my analysis with the opportunity to

look at emerging forms of cosmopolitanism in wide contexts which are not necessarily confined to the EU. Also, the kind of cosmopolitanism I advocate helps us give answers to the reasons why domestic opposition to Europeanisation emerges and so to give differentiated responses to patterns of adaptation at domestic level. If the ultimate aim of Europeanisation is the convergence of national policies with the EU, it is necessary to ask why it fails in particular instances.

In most approaches this failure is justified with a focus on formal institutions and conditionality. So, for instance, rationalist institutionalists claim that the EU's transformative power is rather limited and they explain how enlargement decisions become path dependent (e.g. see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005).[2] The sociological/constructivist approach includes ideational, normative and cognitive factors to the definition of EU institutions and conceives the EU as a model or promoter of socialisation and norm diffusion providing an understanding of the basic ideal behind enlargement as the expansion of a liberal community (e.g. see Kabaalioğlu 2005; Öniş 2003. The intergovernmental method of decision-making in the EU allows members to cut deals with one another and bypass the supranational power of EU institutions for key policies such as enlargement, while member states' egoistic interests and cost/benefit calculations determine major EU policies (e.g. see Schmitter 2004; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991).

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[2] Differing national senses of appropriate institutional forms, coupled with path-dependent logics of adjustment, account for the persistence of national politico-administrative models in the face of what many have presumed to be growing pressures for institutional convergence. In the path-dependence process agents face the cost of reversing the institutions. Hence, previous institutional decisions lock the members in as the sunk costs related to societal adaptation prevent their exit (Hall & Taylor 1996).

However, the deficiencies of these approaches lie in the fact that they cannot provide answers to the following questions: 'what were the factors which led to the Luxembourg decision not to include Turkey in the list of candidate countries in 1997? Why was there a change of heart in the EU two years later' (Müftüler-Baç & Mclaren 2003, pp. 18-19)? Another constraint might be considered to be their lack of identification with why widening has not been accompanied with deepening and why Turkey first is about to freeze relations with the EU.

To begin with, democratisation scholars dealing with the change in civil-military relations, cultural rights of Kurdish origin people in Turkey, religious rights and minority rights often disregard the reasons which lead to Turkey's non-implementation of the reforms it formally adopted. Focusing on soft policy areas scholars tend to predict that Europeanisation would not be extended to strategic or hard policy domains such as foreign policy (e.g. see Özcan 2008). Those studies generally rely upon the assumption that Europeanisation is opposed to national fixed and predetermined interests. This further limits the Europeanisation literature in terms of ontological openness.

In order to avoid this, my cosmopolitan approach seeks to reveal that much of the literature on Turkey-EU relations overlooks the internal dynamics of Europeanisation (Kahraman 2000, pp. 1-20). 'Indeed, the EU's internal dynamics have not been included into the analyses of Turkey's Europeanisation until these have become explicitly

obstructive to Turkey-EU relations. Unavoidably, concepts like the EU's absorption capacity[3] and permanent derogations[4] are generally understudied' (Buhari 2009, p. 98).

Although the EU's limited transformative power constitutes an important parameter for the research in Turkey-EU relations and/or Turkey's Europeanisation process, the role of contestation is disregarded. Particularly, a closer look at the politicisation of the notion of conditionality and the antagonisms that the conditionality articulates at the political landscape (which has been the case in Turkish politics after 1999) leads my analysis to a broader re-conceptualisation of how domestic level interacts with discourses at the EU level; 'rather than assuming an automatic and uncontroversial relationship between the European and domestic level, which is inherently asymmetrical by definition in the Europeanisation literature, we need to look at the relationship between European and Turkish domestic politics through the lens of contestation and how the former shapes and hegemonises politics' (Alpan 2011, p. 4).

That means that in the case of Turkey my research is tilting towards seeing Europe as a contestation where domestic actors define and redefine their positions and roles; the uncertainty and power asymmetry embedded in the notion of conditionality go beyond the technicalities of the policy processes (e.g. see Sunay 2008, p. 1). This is an on-going, unfixed and contested process based on political struggle. My approach thereby enriches the debate on conditionality constituting a new research horizon for the

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[3] This concept was introduced to the EU official texts by the European Copenhagen summit of 1993 and has explicitly problematised the context of future EU enlargement waves since the European Council of June 2006. For the discussion of this concept see Emerson et al. 2006.

[4] The Negotiation Framework Document determining Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU states that the EU reserves the right to impose permanent derogations/limitations on three policy areas, namely agricultural subsidies, free movement of people and structural policy (regional aid).

literature and differentiating from approaches which are mostly concerned with issues specific to the EU and do not address broad questions in social and political theory.

Within this frame, a cosmopolitan perspective of Turkey's membership differs from the attitude to conceive Turkey's Europeanisation as part of an overall project of modernisation. In contrast, the kind of Europeanisation I advocate is not limited in terms of explaining the reasons for domestic resistance out of cultural and identity-based concerns (Buhari 2009, p. 99). I critically address approaches according to which Europeanisation is seen as an identity-building process or 'Westernisation' which would transform Turkey into a 'Western'/'European' country (e.g. see Aydin & Keyman 2004: Baç 2005; Önis 2009; Noutcheva & Düzgit 2012).

These approaches tend to be constructivist and are mainly top-down considering Europeanisation as a simple and direct policy transfer from the EU to the host country, Turkey. Thus, there is a lack of differentiation between EU-isation (legal and formal adoption of EU *acquis* by state) and Europeanisation (a wider and deeper process that affects the cognitive schemes at societal level).

For these reasons my analytical tools combine a top-down relationship between the European and domestic level − grasping both the European opposition to Turkey's EU membership in terms of identity/culture and the domestic Turkish opposition to conceding sovereignty to the EU − with a bottom-up approach which gives more room to social processes at the domestic level. In this way, the kind of cosmopolitanism I advocate proceeds a step further by emphasising the socio-political transformation

which arises from globalisation and the interaction between EU and Turkey and/or between Turkey and other international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and international non-governmental Organisations.

This wide analytical context can accordingly explain issues in which there is an apparent confusion. For example, in the case of Turkey's own identity the rising Islamism is perceived as a counter-process (becoming Middle Eastern) but Turkey's Islamists are surprisingly pro-European. In the case of the EU, there is no consensus on the EU's identity and whether it refers to a liberal nationalist Europe, to a wider Europe as a community of values, to Europe as a democratic and socialist alternative between capitalism and communism, to a modern Europe as part of the 'Western' community based on liberal democracy and social market economy or to a Christian Europe (Buhari 2009, p. 99). Therefore, any analysis which equates Europeanisation with 'Westernisation' unavoidably remains confined when secularism, liberalism, democratic principles, minority and human rights come into play.

Europeanisation as post-national may entail cosmopolitan cultural and political possibilities but cosmopolitanism is not a European or a universal 'Western' condition. More accurately, it occurs in a variety of societal forms and there are 'European' and 'Asian' expressions of cosmopolitanism. In this chapter I bring neither a simply 'Asian' nor a merely 'European' experience to bear on the debate on the multiple expressions of cosmopolitanism. Turkey is under transformation and the way it will handle its relations with both the EU and Middle East will demonstrate whether it could become a 'hybrid' polity in the future offering a new model of cosmopolitanisation or cosmopolitanism.

Such an outlook offers a richer and analysis of the variety of cosmopolitan frameworks that exist in the world and moreover, offers a basis for a new conception of cosmopolitanism. It shows that cosmopolitanism is particularly relevant to Europe and Asia and to their emerging kinds of regionalism.

However, it should be clarified that the cosmopolitan analysis I adopt contrasts with approaches which conceive Turkey as a bridge. Although the bridge approach may avoid cultural notions and purely strategic analyses, it does not provide a comprehensive framework for understanding Turkey-EU relations. The bridge approach is built on the perception that the 'West' is a single camp ('Western' civilisation) and synonymous to the EU/Europe and it is problematic conceiving Turkey as a bridge rather than as a part of the 'West'/EU-Europe. If Turkey is bridging two assumedly divergent if not oppositional civilisations, it is thus thought as a *sui generis* country (or torn country) rather than a member of the 'Western' civilisation.

Finally, 'bridge assumptions imply an ontological rationalistic stance in the sense that they theorise Turkey-EU relations through strategic cost-benefit analyses by taking Turkish and European states' strategic interests as fixed and predetermined. In this context, the EU is thought as an institution which would be influential as long as it maximises the self-interests of the Turkish and European state actors' (Buhari 2009, pp. 94-95). I argue that the analytical tools are missing to conceive both the opposition to Turkey's EU membership in terms of identity-culture and the ideational change in Turkey in the direction of democratisation, liberalisation and advancement of human rights.

Furthermore, cosmopolitanism when related to Turkey's Europeanisation studies is critical to the tendency to define Europeanisation in functional terms as a response/instrument serving domestic short-term economic interests of Turkey. In that case, the change and continuities associated with Turkey's Europeanisation are explained with the cost-benefit calculus (or logic of consequentiality); if the expected economic and strategic benefits outweigh the costs including sunk costs associated with adaptation, then domestic actors will allow for some change while their parochial interests are given (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). These studies may be useful to predict the domains where Europeanisation is perceived as challenge to domestic interests (e.g. cutting of state-subsidies). However, there are several cases which cannot be explained in terms of economic-strategic benefits.

Overall, the analysis of the political significance of the enlargement process and the ways cosmopolitanism differentiates from mainstream Europeanisation approaches to Turkey's membership intended to reveal the often neglected emergence of post-Western Europe and post-national Turkey without taking for granted the origin of models propagated as European. This can be revealed in detail in the following investigation of the implications by the EU of Turkey's accession which aims to highlight the significance of Turkey for a cosmopolitan Europe and vice versa.

3. The Impact of Turkey on the EU

Since Turkey's candidacy, there is a debate regarding Turkey's 'Europeanness' mainly due to the fact that it is difficult to place Turkey into any neat category. Not only does Turkey not appear to fit any one geographical category, but it does not fit any cultural, political or economic category either. Most of its land mass lies in Asia, yet Turkey's progressive elite consider their country to be part of Europe and support its EU membership. The majority of its population is Muslim and yet Turkey is a secular country by choice. Culturally, most of the country reflects the peculiarities of a wider Middle Eastern culture and yet it participates in European cultural events. It professes to have a liberal economic system, but the remnants of the planned economy still hamper the country's development. In religious, historical and geographical senses Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, yet any development impinging upon the *status quo* of the Balkans and the Caucasus directly affects Turkey just as much.

Because of these complex characteristics, the debate about Turkey and Europe raises major questions about the identity of Europe and the rationale of Europeanisation. Addressing Turkey's membership requires coming to terms with issues and questions that have been deferred in the past; what are the outer geographical limits of the EU? Which of the competing visions for the EU should hold sway? Is there a common European identity? What kind of an entity is the European Union? Does it rest on a collective identity? If so, how does Turkey fit into that common identity? The ambiguity regarding the EU's own future will have clear implications upon Turkey's future accession to the EU as one of the most critical tasks that the EU has been dealing with is the future of Europe itself and what kind of regime model it will adopt (e.g. see

Güney 2005, pp. 311-312). Confronting these questions is necessary if fundamental concerns about Turkish accession are to be allayed.

Therefore, my cosmopolitan approach to Turkey's membership in the EU concentrates on whether and how Turkey's membership will directly affect the political, institutional and economic conditions of the EU and what the connection between cosmopolitanism, Turkey and the EU might be. My main argument is that the debate on Turkey's membership is not just a debate about the integration of yet another country into a transnational political organisation. It is a debate about the *raison-d'être* of a polity like the EU, given that Turkey's membership raises questions of culture and identity. Among the aspects which are taken into account is the fairness of the European Union's approach to Turkey, i.e. whether the EU is raising hurdles to be overcome before Turkey join above those that countries like Bulgaria and Romania had to meet and whether the EU is discounting the Copenhagen criteria. The research also refers to the EU's policy on Cyprus, i.e. to the fact that Cyprus became an EU member-state despite the fact that it voted against the Anan plan which could offer a resolution to the island. Finally, it pays attention to the growing anti-Turkish feeling, especially in France and Germany, i.e. whether Europe is reverting to a racist past.

3. 1. Turkey's Membership as Weakening the EU

Beginning with approaches which are against Turkey in the EU, it is expected that Turkey's membership will impact on the EU's identity, institutions and decision-making process, on internal dynamics and balances, economics, external relations and

policies. Accordingly, the international, geopolitical and security role of the EU will radically change. Although my analysis focuses on cosmopolitanism, a wider perception is adopted taking under consideration three dominant axes; big states' interests vs. small states' interests, federalists vs. intergovernmentalists and poor members versus rich members (or net contributors to the budget vs. net receivers from the budget).

More specifically, there is a widespread view that some geographical delimitation of Europe is necessary if the idea of Europe is to retain meaning and practical utility. Thus, proponents of this view argue that if Turkey joins the EU, there is no logical basis for denying membership to Ukraine and perhaps Russia down the line leading to an EU that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In this logic, if Turkey were admitted to the EU, Morocco would reasonably expect to follow and perhaps Lebanon and Israel leading to the end of the EU as we know it. These approaches justify their position not on the basis of religious reasons but rather on the basis of geographical reasons (Jordan-Bychkov et al. 2009, p. 392).

A more common view is that Turkey is partly only European not only geographically, but also historically and culturally; culturally Turkey combines a mixture of 'Eastern' and 'Western' influences rendering its 'Europeaness' highly controversial unlike previous enlargements. The importance of places like ancient Greece and Rome, medieval Flanders, Enlightenment France, Germany and Britain is often highlighted in this conception of Europe which has produced a unique mix of self-criticism, belief in an Enlightenment-informed conception of rationality, confidence in a particular conception of justice, commitment to democracy and faith in progress. This

civilisational thesis presumes demographic purity in the EU, namely that there is no commingling of ethnic or religious identities within the civilisational area of the EU.[5]

In addition to the above mentioned geographical and cultural reasons, there are many reasons related to the distribution of funds which impede Turkey's membership in the EU. As Laffan and Stubb (2008, p. 79) state, 'after Eastern enlargement many of the former recipients of cohesion funds were no longer eligible for many EU funds'. According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009, p. 81) 'the negative position of countries like Italy and Greece in the past, despite their border position, reflected the potential losses enlargement imposed via trade and budgetary competition'. Turkey's membership could deteriorate the distribution and redistribution of the EU's funds. It seems that questions about cultural linkages, political considerations and the budget distribution may affect the reluctance or willingness of the EU to admit Turkey (e.g. see Flam 2003).

Furthermore, it is often argued that Turkey's membership will create new instability problems for the EU. As Giamouridis (2007, p. 200) observes, 'Turkish accession means that the EU in reality swaps the instability problems of a stable neighbour with severe instability problems of Iran, Iraq and Syria'. Turkey could undermine the European Common Foreign and Security Policy and thus the EU as an international actor. It might be easier to hit European or American targets in Turkey due to its

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[5] However, this thesis ignores the complexity of the actual conditions in the 'torn countries' while at a practical level 'a civilisational thesis explains neither the past and present relations between Turkey and Europe nor the future strategic interests of the states involved' (Dahlman 2004, p. 562). The unavoidable consequence is that people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms and they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion.

geographical proximity to the troubled areas of Middle East. This physical accessibility of Turkey to Middle Eastern terrorist groups might make its incorporation into the EU more problematic, given the increased burden of securing the EU's borders that Turkey's incorporation might pose.

There are also fears that Turkey as one of the largest states in the EU could deteriorate the whole political and institutional European architecture, including the voting relations between member-states (Baldwin & Widgren 2005). As Müftüler-Baç (2008, p. 213) argues, 'Turkey's impact on EU decision-making in the Council will be substantial. […] Since Turkey has a population of 71 million, predicted to increase to 83 million by 2014, it would make Turkey the most powerful country in the voting system'. Turkey would be among the poor members of the EU with most probably an intergovernmental preference.

Thus, the core European states, the original six who would like to see integration become deeper, would be concerned about the impact of another state with intergovernmental preferences that is also large enough to block decisions. In other words, if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the fact that the largest member of the EU is not part of the evolutionary process of European integration might have some repercussions for the future of that integration. This is why federalist oriented states such as France have reservations about Turkey's accession and why those states with intergovernmental preferences such as the United Kingdom view Turkey's accession more favourably (Müftüler-Baç 2004, p. 33).

Also, Turkey would make the formation of blocking minorities harder for large EU members. It is likely that small states will benefit from Turkey's value as a coalition partner, as it is expected that Turkey would take the side of the small, poor states on Council decisions due to their common interests in matters of agrarian politics and EU sunsidies.

Moreover, Turkey's membership is often considered to affect the public opinion against the EU. According to Avery (2008, p. 193), 'public opinion is influenced by fear of an influx of Turkish migrant workers and the idea that Turkey is different, it is not part of Europe in geographical terms'. 'It was the inclusion of soft predictors such as feelings of identity and anti-immigration attitudes that contributed most to the aforementioned result. This is why the existence of significant European opposition to Turkey and more importantly in Austria, France and Germany can be observed' (Müftüler-Baç 2008). Therefore, public discourse against Turkey provides nationalists, fundamentalists and xenophobes in Europe and Turkey alike a popular and evocative discursive toolkit with which to build domestic agendas based on suspicion and exclusion.[6]

Conclusively, the above-mentioned negative attitude towards Turkey's possible accession may be attributed to the fact that the dual pressures of deepening/widening have brought the EU in front of a crisis. The majority of European citizens perceive the EU as a distant apolitical apparatus which lacks resilient debates on the future of

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[6] Political opposition especially to immigration from Turkey is mostly expressed from Europe's 'new right' parties. Xenophobia is only one expression of the new right movements that tend to include Euro-sceptics, nationalists, and, in some cases, neo-fascists. Notable parties espousing strong anti-immigration measures and their share of votes in recent parliamentary elections are Belgium's Flemish Block; Jörg Haider's Austria Freedom Party; the Danish People's Party; the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn; Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front; Italy's Northern League and the post-fascist National Alliance (in Berlusconi's coalition government); the British National Party; and the Greek Golden Dawn.

Europeanisation, the objectives and content of EU policies. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 with the French and Dutch referendums and the 2008 onwards economic crisis illustrated the limits of Europeanisation and the lack of a common European identity able to hold European peoples together. In the absence of a common identity and under conditions of crisis which threaten the national interests of member-states, introversion is provoked together with people's tendency to rely on nations and nationalist policies influencing negatively their relations with other EU nations and especially with non-EU members such as Turkey (Müftüler-Baç 2011, p. 6).

The very existence of an ongoing debate on the desirability of Turkey's membership is understandably received in Turkey as evidence of the lack of a clear and consistent EU strategy and commitment (Tocci 2005, p.77). This becomes apparent especially if one considers that due to the challenges arising from Turkey's accession, the Commission has overemphasised the 'open-ended' and long-term nature of the accession process, the possibility of halting the negotiations and perhaps most problematic of all, the prospect of 'permanent' restrictions on the free movement of persons from Turkey into the rest of the EU (Commission of the EC 2004a, 2004b, and 2004c).

3. 2. Turkey's Membership as Strengthening the EU's Cosmopolitan Character

Having presented the main reasons why Turkey's prospective membership is considered to be weakening if not endangering the EU, my aim now is to refute the arguments against Turkey's membership. In order to achieve this, my analysis does not emphasise only the benefits deriving from Turkey in the EU but it also extends its scope to the

field of cosmopolitanism. It constitutes a critical cosmopolitan outlook which examines how Turkey can enhance the cosmopolitan character of the EU. At the same time it highlights the EU reforms that are necessary for such a cosmopolitan character to be materialised and it takes under consideration the dangers which are inherent in cosmopolitan approaches to Turkey's membership.

Turning now to the specific benefits gained by Turkey's membership in the EU, Turkey's accession would provide a golden opportunity for the EU to reform its EU decision-making process and modify the current institutional equilibrium between small and big states against the EU's risk of becoming a 'free-trade zone' in the wake of successive rounds of enlargements. Introducing new systematical institutional reforms to improve the functioning of the Union and to maximise the benefits derived from enlargement becomes necessary, as when it joins the EU Turkey will become the EU's most populated member-state.

Turkey's political weight would be comparable to that of Germany, based on voting weight by population share. Turkey will be a too powerful member for the EU given that Turkey is about the same size as the ten new member-states in population. Yet, the fact that Turkey is one country, not ten, alters the political impact dynamics of its membership. Therefore, Turkey would have an important voice in the decision-making process in view of its population share which will be reflected in the Council voting system (Moberg 1998). Also, Turkey's accession would significantly affect the allocation of European Parliament seats of current member-states, in particular the medium sized and large countries. The impact on the functioning of the Commission

would be less important given the planned reduction of the members of the Commission from 2014 onwards.

Perhaps Turkey's accession could lead to the introduction of new more symmetrical institutional reforms to improve the functioning of the Union; it would modify the current institutional equilibrium between the so-called 'north-West core', which is less reliably integrationist or federalist than in the past, and Mediterranean countries, which are affected by the crisis and prefer the decisions to be taken by supranational institutions rather than by intergovernmental fora.

In addition, the EU has also concrete economic interests in integrating Turkey. Turkey is one of the largest markets in the world and it is the seventh major import partner with the EU and the fifth major export partner (European Commission 2009). As Avery (2008, p. 192) notes 'its growing economy and young labour force would bring benefits for the single market'. Moreover, Turkey has a strategic location with respect to Europe's future energy supplies from the Middle East and more importantly from the Caspian region. 'Turkey is a transit country for important energy networks including the northern Iraq-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. For gas, Turkey will become an increasingly important transit country between the enlarged EU and the Caspian producers as well as the Middle East' (Monnet & Penas 2005, p. 5). Turkish accession could help secure access to these resources and their safe transportation into the EU single market. It would diversify possible EU supply lines offering alternative export outlets for Russia, Middle East and the countries around the Caspian at the same time that it might develop further as a major oil transit country.

With respect to foreign policy, 'an enlarged EU will carry more political weight in its external relations and policies' (Nugent 2003, p. 504). Turkey's accession would significantly add to the EU's hard and soft power capabilities enhancing its role as an international actor. It would also demonstrate the strength of the enlargement policy as a civilian tool in achieving the foreign policy objectives of the Union. This is why Turkey's negotiations with the EU for European foreign policy are of symbolic importance. One needs to keep in mind that the EU has relied on the policy of enlargement as one of its most powerful tools for promoting its foreign policy (e.g. see Manners 2002; Sjursen 2002; Müftüler-Baç & McLaren 2003; Smith 2004).

Turkey's geographical proximity to major areas of instability, the Central Asian Republics, the Middle East and the Caucasus might facilitate the Common Foreign and Security Policy by giving the EU new foreign policy concerns. The European Union will need to develop further controls to serve its borders especially in the East. As the European Union is now facing complex demands on its own security in terms of illegal migration, porous borders, terrorism and religious fundamentalism, Turkey's integration might provide further incentive to strengthen the EU's international role and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Also, Turkey's membership could strengthen the EU's Mediterranean policy as Turkey has become a regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean and its importance has increased in recent years. Turkey's accession by increasing the country's internal stability and well-being might accordingly affect the region towards a more peaceful direction (Özcan 2005, p. 134).

The European Union with Turkey as a member would have a different weight in world politics due to the added value that Turkey would bring in terms of capabilities. More specifically, Turkey's path of modernisation has inspired many other Middle Eastern countries for combining secular democratic values with Islam. Its EU membership might foster a better understanding between European and Muslim civilisations. Turkey's unique role in Europe of bringing together different cultures around a common understanding is important if one considers the fact that one of the sources of the current crisis in international politics comes from a lack of understanding between different cultures and religions. 'Turkey's endorsement of the European stance in world matters could bring legitimacy to the EU's position in the eyes of non-Europeans' (Müftüler-Baç 2008, p. 69).

Also, Turkey's military contribution in terms of troops and equipment has been substantial and its geographical proximity to the areas of conflict might enhance its role in strengthening EU-led operations (e.g. MacMillan 2009). Turkey's inclusion as an EU member might provide the EU with new mechanisms to deal with these new risks and with a unique opportunity to become a great power in international politics. In the highly turbulent security environment of post 9/11 Turkey found itself as the only Muslim member of NATO which had the capacity to connect the 'Western' world and Islamic countries.

Furthermore, it can be said that 'Turkey projects stability and contributes to the struggle against terrorism, illegal migration and drug smuggling and would be able to perform this role more effectively if it was a full member of the Union' (Logan 2009, p. 34).

Turkey's strategic importance in fighting global terror cannot be neglected while in order to tackle with the huge challenges and opportunities in the Middle East both Turkey and the EU need to cooperate and work together (Logan 2009, p. 34). Turkey could assist the EU to combat terrorism, extremism and intolerance, illegal migration and porous borders (e.g. Laciner 2005). Terrorism seems to be the major international threat for the 21st century and the fact that many terrorists turn out to be of Middle Eastern origin has led to a new demarcation in international politics, i.e. 'Western' civilisation versus Islamic civilisation. A Muslim country's membership into the EU might ease some of the tensions between these seemingly different worlds.

At this point, it should be mentioned that a major challenge that the EU faces nowadays is not to let its current sovereign debt crisis to potentially slow future rounds of enlargement. In the post-Cold period, European identity has become a focal point for analysing European politics. Nevertheless, European identity has been reconstructed with ethno-cultural dimensions clarifying who is European and who is not. 'The very idea of what Europe was from the beginning is defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, the 'other', i.e. the non-European barbarian or savage, played a decisive role in the evolution of the European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states' (Müftüler-Baç 2000, pp. 25-26). European political elites' discourses on Turkey's accession need to focus on Turkey's importance to the formation of Europe as a cosmopolitan space and collectivity in order to move Turkey away from the position of the Other. The future of Europeanisation and Turkish membership depend upon the emergence of a cosmopolitan Europe and the resolution

of the ongoing identity struggles in both the EU and Turkey. In this sense, Turkey's accession has a symbolic value in transforming the EU into a cosmopolitan union.

Cosmopolitanism suggests the construction of European identity according to democratic principles, respect for rule of law and human rights, tolerance for diversity and the basic underpinnings of liberalism. A common European identity from this angle de-emphasises the different ethnic origins and increases the role of adherence to democratic principles as the key element of Europeanness. Cosmopolitanism emphasises the diverse and discontinuous nature of European history and identity. 'The very meaning of Europe is defined by discrepant moments and interventions made by marginal identities which have constantly reinterpreted European values. As a result, there is no fixed notion of European identity while European culture is defined by diverse and conflicting cultural traditions' (Baban & Keyman 2008, p. 121). In this sense, the need to stress the cosmopolitan aspect of European identity is not simply an attempt to overcome the problems of turning Europeanisation into another nation-building project but it is dictated by the growing transnational linkages between the multicultural and diverse member-states.

Within this frame, Turkey's membership in the EU is not an example of Europe losing its identity but a redefinition of what Europe will come to represent in the global age. Turkey tests Europe's ability to deal with questions of post-nationalism and cultural plurality and it rises questions of what the borders of Europe are, who the Europeans and the others of Europe are. In deciding about the future of Turkey, Europe is deciding about its future in terms of the formation of European identity and the role of Europe in

today's global relations; adopting a vision of Europeanisation limited to the close economic and political cooperation of member-states or a broader vision that eventually transforms these member-states in a cosmopolitan way (Baban & Keyman 2008, p. 115). This cosmopolitan vision differs from a nationalist outlook which perceives both European and Turkish identities in zero-sum terms in the fear of heterogeneity and ignores the shared histories between the two or the many differences between and within the current 28 EU member-states (Parker 2009, p. 1095).

As Europe is in a transitional stage between an accelerating transnationalism and a growing introversion due to the current crisis, the case of Turkey provides Europe with a unique opportunity to prove that the European project is not culturally sealed, isolated and irrelevant in the global state of affairs. Turkish membership could be critical in engaging Muslims with the European political process and by so doing enabling Europe to embrace a pluralistic European identity that includes Christianity, Islam, Judaism and other religions. By arguing that Turkey's accession will strengthen the cosmopolitan character of the EU I do not mean that Turkey's membership can only be possible if either the Europeans or the Turks are ready to give up essential parts of their cultural identity but rather if they reconstruct their political and social systems in terms of cosmopolitan openness.

More specifically, integrating Turkey into the EU and realising the dynamics that may result from its membership does not mean that the EU will not need to be reformed institutionally given that the co-existence of multiple ethnic and religious identities does not automatically translate into integration. At this point, it is remarkable that especially

the case of Turkey reveals the inconsistencies in the EU's overall approach to enlargement and particularly the fact that the enlargement policy of the EU continues to be discussed within the frame of intergovernmental cooperation with all the restrictions that this implies. In the governance of accession negotiations only a limited number of actors are directly involved, such as the Commission, the Council (along with the ministries of foreign affairs of the member-states) and the governments of candidate states. The European Parliament and non-governmental organisations which may be effective in the daily decision-making procedures of the EU, are barely present in the enlargement process.

The same is true for the parliaments of candidate countries. 'Accession consists predominantly of a bilateral intergovernmental negotiation between the applicant state and the EU in which the Commission plays the part of mediator. In the previous enlargement, this bilateral character rendered it difficult for the Central and Eastern European Countries to present a common front to the EU' (Schrijvers 2007, p. 31).

As the candidate state has to comply with the whole *acquis communautaire* and *politique*, one cannot speak of real negotiations as there is little to negotiate about apart from the length and quantity of transition periods and the budget. Newcomers have to comply with the EU system, most of which is untouchable, defined before accession without any contribution from the candidate country. In order to be legitimate in the future, the ongoing creation of the EU in the present needs to reflect interests of people inside as well as outside its present boundaries. 'Since there is an international political struggle over membership in the EU, treating enlargement decisions as a purely internal

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affair of the Union will only perpetuate and perhaps exacerbate existing political conflicts' (Agné 2011, p. 13).

In the case of Turkey this asymmetric interdependence is expressed in the fact that the EU finds it difficult to press Turkey towards change because of the Turkish perception that the EU needs Turkey as much as Turkey wants EU membership. The implication is that Turkey is different from the other candidates and needs to be treated as a special case which is reflected in Turkey's treatment by the EU institutions; at the supranational level policy-making towards Turkey gets stuck between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 'The decision-making procedure is such that the Commission makes a proposal but the Council of Ministers and the Council of the European Union have to adopt the proposals so as these can become Community decisions. This sometimes hampers Turkey's relations with the EU in instances when the Commission would like to adopt a package on Turkey but sees it blocked in the Council of Ministers by one or more of the member-states' (Müftüler-Bac 2002, p. 84).

When the issues of enlargement are dealt with within the institutions of the European Union, my cosmopolitan approach contends that it would be beneficial for both the EU and applicant countries if candidate states are offered the opportunity to participate in some of the institutional proceedings. 'For example, to the extent that the state institutions of the applicant country do not provide equal representation to everyone who lives in that country, the EU could mediate between these possibly conflicting interests and provide institutional access also for these less than equally represented groups. In the case of Turkey this is likely to apply for instance to women and Kurds'

(ibid, p. 18). This suggestion could be realistic given that in today's informal European political practice nationals of non-member countries do act as European citizens. Since adequate representation of such groups in European institutions might be necessary for the legitimacy of these institutions when deciding on enlargement, one could notice that it would not represent a dramatic institutional shift in the present EU system. 'Inclusion of transnational actors in varying stages of the European policy process is already well-developed and the space for such inclusion has also been appropriated by opposition and minority groups of applicant countries' (Agné 2011, p. 18).

Moreover, new tools of empowerment such as welfare provision, education, training possibilities and inclusion into the public sphere need to be developed as well as institutional reforms offering the EU the opportunity to deal with the dual challenges of enlargement, i.e. cultural diversity and all-inclusive democracy. One of the key cosmopolitan propositions for increased democracy in the EU would be to grant voting rights to all the legal residents in the EU territories. This accordingly would be a welcomed transitional stage for the integration of citizens of non-member states. The EU also needs to make certain institutional changes, such as mobility rights to the migrant populations, political and cultural rights to the residents and increased democratic participation not only for migrants but for all minority groups, because the EU countries have different practices on this issue.

By reforming political institutions according to these directions and by reflecting a concept of democracy which does not discriminate against outsiders, EU policies could gain legitimacy and become more cosmopolitan. This accordingly could impact

positively on the problem-solving capacity of the Union once enlarged as willingness to cooperate for the solution of joint problems, such as the current crisis, could be facilitated through the deepening of European integration. In this way, integration of multiple cultures in the EU would enable strengthening democracy at the supranational level as well (Müftüler-Baç 2011, pp. 10-13).

These reforms would be adequate not only from the perspective that politics require some level of democratic legitimation, but also from the perspective that there is reason to expect that such reforms will produce effects that most people would regard as beneficial. One might expect those reforms to consolidate democratisation and economic reforms in applicant countries. 'By reflecting a concept of democracy which does not discriminate against outsiders, EU policy could gain legitimacy outside the present EU. Political leaders in applicant countries less committed to democracy perhaps could then no longer dismiss democracy as a rhetorical cloak for the EU to inflict its own preferred political structures on neighbouring countries. Instead, democracy would come to mean political procedures in which people solve their disagreements in common and with equal respect to the views and interests of everyone politically affected' (Agné 2011, p 18).

Particularly in the case of Turkey a vital step would consist in creating fora in which Turkey and the EU could coordinate their policies without entangling each issue into the membership problematic. These fora could be built upon current institutions, among them the Association Council of the Ankara Agreement and the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. In a similar way, the European Conference could be

upgraded from a forum simply discussing the adjustment of applicant countries' political and economic systems according to EU requirements to a permanent conference including all concentric circle states and dealing with matters in which EU decisions affect others beyond its full members. The Conference's presidency could then have to rotate among all its members and not reserved to the EU.

In the same line of thought, the EU and Turkey need to devise different communication strategies for each member-state. Rather than taking the European Union as a coherent whole, individual contexts need to be taken into consideration. The communication strategy in each country needs to be devised in two levels, one for elites and one for masses.

'For elites, high-level meetings with the participation of academics, policymakers and/or the media would be useful. Thematically speaking, these may either focus on Turkey and its path to accession or alternatively they may concentrate on a set of issues that are of interest to member-states and indeed involve Turkey as a significant part of the equation (e.g. energy security, defence or demographics). The second is a viable option in that it prevents emotional barriers from being erected in advance and reveals Turkey's significance as a player and its cooperation on such vital issues in an indirect way. Partnerships among grassroots organisations and information-producing and opinion-shaping establishments are also indispensable. These ideally go beyond an exchange of ideas and information through project clusters operationalised between the host country and Turkish institutions' (Aydin & Esen 2007, p. 137).

For the peoples of Europe and their opinions on Turkish accession, the media is of utmost significance in shaping the perspectives of individuals. There seems to be scarcely any effective effort to prevent the drastic impact of scare-mongering on the part of political figures on both sides. 'Perhaps the best strategy might be to address leaders directly, particularly those with a negative outlook in an effort to try and make a positive change in their perspectives. One of the points to consider in devising a communication strategy for the road ahead is the way in which Euro-barometer surveys (or others) and their results are framed and interpreted, as well as the discourse adopted and the images conveyed to the public in the media.[7] Although a communication strategy is the way forward, certainly much more is needed to keep Turkey's accession process going' (ibid, p. 138).

As far as the issue of conditionality is concerned, the cosmopolitan principles of fairness, objectivity, universality and impartiality (avoiding higher, lower or double standards and rules)[8] need to guide the EU's treatment of Turkey not in the logic of identity but in the logic of cosmopolitan rights. The importance of the theory of cosmopolitanism politically and ethically lies in the fact that it permits us to criticize and provide alternatives to the nationalistic outlook or essentialism that has created divisions in both the EU and Turkey (Parker 2009, p. 1087). It avoids thinking in terms of inside/outside dichotomies either within or between Turkey and the EU. 'The

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[7] Opinion polls, like the media, tend to shape public opinion and draw attention to certain issues, particularly in cases where respondents tend to be ambivalent about or unaware of a certain issue that is brought to their attention in a context when contacts and information are scarce. The way the question is framed also influences their responses and tends to shape their perspective in an issue area brought in the spotlight.

[8] Evidence of this is that a candidate country such as Romania that was by all accounts a long way from meeting the Copenhagen Criteria was included in the EU enlargement process in the Luxembourg Summit.

narrative of Europe as a space of common cultural roots and core values is being abandoned in favour of a conception of Europe based upon a commitment to cosmopolitan values and ideas of peace, human rights, social justice and social solidaridy' (Rovisco 2007, p. 204).

However, this political process runs the risk of entailing the constriction of a normative vision of EU-Europeaness through themes of homogenising European values of human rights and diversity (e.g see Parker 2009, p. 1096). This universalistic stance might mean that Turkey can become European by adopting EU values and standards of human rights and democracy (Giannakopoulos & Maras 2005, pp. 30-31). The EU as a political and moral order is in danger of being associated with the universal values of human rights and democracy while Turkey with the lack of them (Arikan 2003, p. 25). Or, alternatively, supporters of Turkey's membership may present accession as means to turn Turkey from an instance of 'disruptive' difference into one of 'mere' difference (Bodisky 2009, pp. 22-23).

Linked to these issues is the question whether conditionality should be framed as a technical or a political issue. There seems to be no clear consensus on the definitions and the boundaries between political criteria and technical ones. Whether objectivity or measurability is the main requisite of being technical is also unclear. The EU is dealing a blow to its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish public opinion by framing political conditionality in a political (and therefore by definition constantly changing) framework, rather than in one which is technical and objective (i.e. a list of requirements to be followed through to the end). 'It is precisely the politicisation of

conditionality together with an overemphasis on open-endedness that disturbs the Turkish audience and arouses suspicions of a 'hidden agenda' behind them' (Aydin & Esen 2007, pp. 133-134).

'The likelihood of alternative scenarios, such as a privileged partnership for Turkey in lieu of full EU membership together with the possibility of permanent safeguard clauses in the areas of freedom of movement and structural policies may stand in opposition to the EU's liberal democratic orientation' (Saatcioglu 2012, pp. 161-162).[9] This would provoke irreversible disappointment in Turkey, especially if one recalls the failure of the European Court of Human Rights to oppose the headscarf ban at universities, the EU's failure to adopt a balanced Cyprus policy to honour its moral obligations to those in the north of the island who accepted the Annan Plan for a settlement, the negative statements by the governments of Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark and the EU's rather liberal visa policy vis-à-vis other countries such as Russia and Ukraine but not Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit et. al. 2013, pp. 45-59).

Overall, my cosmopolitan account of Turkey's prospective membership intended to be critical recognising the importance of the case of Turkey for cosmopolitanism in the EU and simultaneously the need for the EU to conduct institutional reforms. It analysed the dynamics that may derive from Turkey's accession and it revealed that 'the adoption of a cosmopolitan outlook as a dynamic and reflexive political project is an important ethico-political alternative to the ethical closures met in European opposition to Turkey's membership' (Parker 2009, p. 1098). At the same time, it demonstrated the

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[9] Articles 6 (1) and 49, Treaty of Rome.

inherent risks that might pertain perhaps because an apparently inclusive cosmopolitan vision of Turkey being integrated in the EU creates exclusionary conceptions of the EU through its normative representation.

4. The Impact of the EU on Turkey

Having examined in the previous part what the implications of Turkish accession on the EU are, my focus now shifts to the impact of EU membership on Turkey. This two-way perspective is important because the EU is influencing and simultaneously it is influenced by Turkey. The question what the successive waves of accession imply for the EU needs to be set alongside the question what changes can the EU perspective provoke to Turkey as these two questions are two sides of the same coin. My analysis extends the scope of these questions by problematising whether these reforms indicate the crucial role of the external trigger of the EU or whether they constitute a combination of domestic progressive powers with the European motivational forces which could lead the country to a distinctive EU-driven but not EU-centred model of cosmopolitanisation.

For decades Turkey wished for accession to the EEC/EU, but the political and military Kemalist establishment of the country obstructed or denied to go ahead with the implementation of deep and sensitive reforms. Turkey wanted to enter the Union immutable trying to achieve relaxation of the Copenhagen criteria and being unable to comprehend the political content and the dynamics of the Europeanisation process.

This situation has been altered after the rise in power of the AKP party in 2002 which has adopted a more pro-European and liberal stance. Paradoxically, after the 2002 elections the AKP became the first political party − the members of which are most probably the great grandsons of the opposition of the 1920s − that was able to adopt European norms and rules in such an ambitious fashion. The liberalisation encompassed an economic, political liberalisation, financial reformation and immense privatisation which ended in the minimalisation of state involvement in the economy. Legal reforms changed the traditional state-society relations outlook in Turkey and the Turkish state dominates less the political sphere than in the past. What we witness is more and more involvement of individuals, civil society, peripheral segments and circulation of controversial ideas and new social movements in the political life. With the diffusion and spread of knowledge, education and wealth, a large and still growing strong middle-class has evolved allowing the coexistence of a strong religious identity with the modern way of life. Interestingly, however, opposition to the democratising moves comes from the secular Kemalist elite, as revealed in the recent social unrest, on the grounds that these reforms might open Turkey to the divisive cleavages of Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. For instance, the AKP leadership is known for their aversion to alcohol. **'The issue at stake in Turkey is not whether the government promotes or condemns drinking, nor is it defending one's ability to get drunk, as would be the case in non-Muslim societies. Rather, given the split religious and cultural attitudes towards drinking in Muslim Turkey, which is also a democracy, the issue at stake is maintaining the notion that citizens in a liberal democracy are free to choose for themselves. Drinking might, therefore, be seen as one of the litmus tests of the AKP's

commitment to liberal democratic values within the context of the Turkeys' majority faith, Islam' (Ersöz, Hurriyet Daily News 5/10/2010).

My cosmopolitan approach to Turkey's process of reforms focuses on the country's Europeanisation investigating the following axes-questions: a) Turkish nationalism, i.e. is the understanding of the world dominant among the Turkish policy elite less post-nationalist than that found in the rest of Europe?, b) Turkish understanding of history, i.e. is Turkey capable of discussing crimes of the past with its European partners?, c) the Kurdish issue, i.e. is there a tendency in Turkey towards peace or towards more conflict?, d) the role of the Turkish military, i.e. is it ever going to accept a truly subordinate position, comparable to that of militaries in the rest of the EU?, e) the role of Islam in society, i.e. is Turkish society, as some Turkish commentators warn, becoming more Islamic and less secular?, f) the state of human rights, i.e. will Turkey be tolerant of other religions and support full freedom of speech? and g) the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy, i.e. is the Middle-Easternisation of Turkey's foreign policy pushing it away from the EU?

The evaluation of Turkey's reform process commences from the fields in which the dynamics of Europeanisation have become more obvious and then it proceeds to the constraints which seem to impede the country's accession to the EU.

4. 1. Dynamics of Turkey's Europeanisation Process

In 2001 Turkey adopted a major Constitutional package aiming at fulfilling the Turkish objectives for the Adoption of the *acquis.* A new Civil Code was adopted which tried to establish gender equality in marriage. In 2002 three more packages of constitutional reform aimed at abolishing the death penalty in peacetime, revising the anti-terror Law and opening the road for the retrial of all the cases that the European Court of Human Rights found to be in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Particularly important here is the retrial of the Democracy Party's parliamentarians who had been in jail since 1994 for supporting terrorism and Kurdish separatism in Turkey. The retrial of these cases began in March 2003 and these parliamentarians were released on 9 June 2004, lifting in that way an important barrier to Turkey's accession negotiations.

There have been considerable advances in freedom of expression and protection of cultural rights (Human Rights Watch 2006). For example, on the Kurdish question, the Criminal Code was amended in 2001 to allow freedom of expression in languages other than Turkish. In 2002, changes made to broadcasting law opened the path to the establishment of Kurdish radio and TV stations. That same year, the State of Emergency in effect in South-Eastern Turkey was removed entirely. In 2003 a ban on teaching Kurdish in private courses was lifted (Grigoriadis 2009). Also, in the summer of 2003 the Turkish Parliament ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These are important developments because Turkey was the only candidate country in 2002 that had not ratified these Covenants. The 1999-2005 reforms included considerable

measures taken to expand the freedom of assembly and association, especially by easing the restrictions on organising demonstrations and by abolishing some pre-existing limitations on setting up associations, their membership requirements and the general regulations regarding their activities. On the freedom of peaceful assembly these reforms brought the legal framework broadly in line with EU standards which were also reflected in implementation (European Commission 2007 and 2008).

In the judicial system, the State Security Courts which contained a military judge were abolished in 2004. Further, following a 2004 constitutional amendment ratified by the Turkish parliament, the supremacy of international and European human rights treaties over domestic legislation was recognised. A new penal code was adopted in 2004, which strengthened sanctions against certain human rights violations and abolished or amended several articles, such as those criminalising incitement to class-based, ethnic, religious, or racial hatred. Finally, the laws on the Court of Cassation and the Council of State were amended to decrease their current backlog by establishing more chambers, changing their working methods and appointing a large number of judges and prosecutors to these courts (European Commission 2011, p. 17).

Also, the AKP government began a vast campaign on torture and ill treatment. It revised the Penal Code for torture cases and adopted a measure that would prevent sentences because of torture being converted into monetary fines. Furthermore, the Turkish government adopted European standards for death penalty. The August 2002 package had already eliminated death penalty in peace time and in 2004 Turkey abolished death penalty in all circumstances including wartime. A recent Council of

Europe report recorded a downward trend in recent years in both the incidence and severity of torture and ill-treatment cases in line with the government's zero tolerance policy against torture announced in 2003 (Council of Europe 2011b, p. 14)

As far as the army is concerned, it has been diachronically able to legitimise its guardianship through its unique position in society as the most trusted institution. This guardianship role has led to four interventions: two direct ones in 1960 and 1980 and two indirect interventions by memorandum in 1971 and 1997. The constitutional tool through which the military expresses its views is the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the president of the republic, until 2003, it had been composed of the prime minister, the chief of the General Staff, the ministers of defense, internal and foreign affairs, the commanders of the army, navy and air force and the general commander of the gendarmerie. The NSC used to submit its recommendations for the internal and external security of the country to the Council of Ministers and these should be given priority for the achievement of independence, integrity, indivisibility, peace and security of the country.

Since 2003 a number of sweeping changes has been adopted concerning the role of the military in politics. An explicit causal mechanism linked the EU accession process with potential improvement in civil-military relations; the civilian members of the National Security Council were increased from five to nine and instead of meeting every month it was decided that the NSC would meet once every two months. The position of the Secretary General of the NSC, traditionally reserved for a military official, was now given to a civilian. The number of civilians working in the under-secretariat increased

relatively to the military officers. 'The Turkish military which articulated its commitment to 'Westernisation' and democracy on several previous occasions found itself rhetorically entrapped and could not reject reforms due to concern about the negative impact of such an action on the military's legitimacy and credibility in the society' (Sarigil 2007, pp. 50-52).

Finally, concerning judicial matters regarding the military, the 2010 constitutional amendments introduced further reforms such as lifting the constitutional restrictions on the trial of the perpetrators of the 1980 coup, allowing for the trial of the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the army, navy, the air force and the gendarmerie before a high tribunal for any offences committed during their official duties; and limiting the jurisdiction of military courts to military service and military duties (Gürsoy 2011, p. 303).

An increasing credibility of Turkey's EU accession process has also served to raise the credibility of civil society actors who have been pushing for democratic change. Different civil society groups in Turkey have been active in a wide array of activities and have come from very different political persuasions. They have included liberal, left-wing as well as religion-inspired groups. These organisations have pursued both different and overlapping agendas, ranging from civil and socio-political rights, to collective and individual human rights, to religious rights and freedoms, gender issues and environmental concerns.[10] 'The idea that civil society pushing for democratisation

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[10] Examples include the 'Mosaic and Horizons', 'Turkish-Greek Civil Dialogue', 'Local Civil Initiatives', 'European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)' and the major Turkish pressure group 'Young Businessmen Association of Turkey' (TUCIAD).

in Turkey gained an 'external ally'. The establishment came under pressure for change both from above (the EU level) and from below (civil society). A more credible EU accession process allowed actors pushing for democratic change (including civil society) to defend and justify their proposed reforms' (Tocci 2005, pp. 80-81).

4. 2. Constraints of Turkey's Europeanisation Process

'Although in many policy areas engagement and commitment is noticed by the Turkish side for the implementation of reform policies and the promotion of wider socio-political changes, manifestation of incoherencies and contradictions can be discerned between the 'European language' that the Turkish leadership uses and the systematic practice of government agencies which hinder the country's convergence with the European model' (Serbos 2008, p. 8).

Despite the fact that in 2002 the Turkish constitution was changed to comply with the EU *acquis* and broadcasting and that education became possible in Kurdish, mandatory religion classes in primary schools and textbooks do not introduce Alevi Islam to children. Apart from restrictions exercised by the state against freedoms of expressions and religion, individual cases of violence against religious minorities have reached troublesome levels. Individual aggressions have also taken place against the members of the Christian clergy and other non-Muslim citizens. These instances of violence and their ineffective handling are preventing the building of the much needed trust of the non-Muslim communities towards the state and are undermining further reforms (Ulusoy 2011, p. 419).

As far as minority rights are concerned, Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens of Turkey are among the most frequent litigants at the European Court of Human Rights. Violations committed by Turkish security forces during the State of Emergency Rule, the dissolution of Kurdish political parties and the prosecution of individuals who advocate a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem are among the cases brought by Kurdish citizens. Other cases brought by non-Muslim citizens of Turkey have mostly been cases of property rights violations and discrimination of non-Muslim foundations (US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2012, p. 203). Most of the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish villagers displaced during the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) are still living in hardship in the cities.

Also, many constitutional amendments have left restrictions to the protection of rights untouched particularly in the case of associations advocating Kurdish rights or promoting a particular cultural-religious identity, while the Court of Cassation ruled to close the teachers' union (Ektim Sen) because of its calls for education in languages other than Turkish. At the level of implementation, there has been a strong tendency within the judiciary either to rely on other provisions left untouched or to (mis)use the amended laws to restrict the freedom of expression. Although most of these ongoing prosecutions have resulted in acquittals, cases continue to be brought forward. The indictment in 2005 of the novelist Orhan Pamuk, on the basis of his statements regarding the state's approach to the Kurds and Armenians, is a notable case in point. The reasons for the narrow and false understanding of the minority issues in Turkey may be attributed to the fact that Turkey did not follow global developments in minority

issues; perhaps the acceptance of a different minority identity was considered tantamount to the recognition of minority rights potentially leading to state disintegration (Grigoriadis 2009, p. 144).

In addition, the substantive legal grounds for sanctioning a party (as happened with the People's Democracy Party in March 2003) have not been entirely altered. The law on political parties continues to restrict the use of languages other than Turkish in official meetings and programmes. There is also much work to be done with regard to freedom of expression. The changes to the criminal code and other laws that restrict expression did not bring legislation into line with the European Convention, as every week brings more prosecutions so redolent of the 1980s and 1990s that it is very difficult to argue that a new age has dawned. Also, in many cases, the Anti-Terror Law is used in combination with the Penal Code (Article 220 − propaganda in favour of a criminal organisation) to persecute even non-violent statements when they are perceived to concur with the aims of a terrorist organisation (Council of Europe 2011a, paragraph 27).

Regarding the power of the military, it continues to retain its autonomy, while there is still a lack of transparency and accountability regarding the powers of the gendarmerie. The Internal Service Law of the armed forces is untouched; it allows substantial military intervention in politics through Article 35 and Article 85/1, which define the duties of the Turkish armed forces in protecting and preserving the Turkish Republic on the basis of the principles referred to in the preamble of the Constitution, including territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism (European Commission 2011, p. 13). 'One

should also note that the military's omnipotent power does not only come from the institutions, but from the fact that the Turkish military is still the most trusted institution in Turkey and that declarations by military officials are still regarded as very important. The Europeanisation process in terms of the military's role in civilian politics cannot be achieved by institutional reforms only but it requires a much longer socialisation process in Turkey' (Müftüler-Baç 2005, p. 27).

Civil-military relations in Turkey are not to be treated only as a structural problem that would be informed during the accession process but also as part of the Turkish collective identity which is tied to the image of the Turk as a soldier and conqueror. 'The Turkish education system re-emphasises this collective identity by presenting Turkey as a warrior nation and by teaching the heroism of the armed forces diachronically; this in turn is reflected in civil-military relations where the military is perceived to possess an aura. As long as this collective identity and the kind of support it brings for the armed forces do not change, it seems unlikely that legal changes in compliance with the EU will bring about civilian oversight of the security forces' (Müftüler-Baç & Gursoy 2010, p. 412).

Moreover, pressures from and support by civil society for EU-related reforms have remained extensively confined either to the organisations related to big business and the private sector, such as the 'Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association' (TUSIAD) and the 'Economic Development Foundation' (IKV) or to organisations run by liberal intellectuals, such as the 'Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation' (TESEV) (e.g. see Diez et al 2009, pp. 6-7). However, as Onis (2002, fn. 21) admits,

'not all business associations are equally enthusiastic about the EU-induced reform process'. Examples include the 'Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and Stock Exchanges of Turkey' (TOBB) and the 'Confederation of the Employers' Unions of Turkey' (TISK).

This can be attributed partly to the top-down and elite-based institutional reform programmes which have failed to bring political liberalism to the heart of Turkey's politics and partly to Ottoman history which lacked any equivalents to the concepts of citizenship and civil society (Grigoriadis 2009, p.19). For many years bureaucracy had the greatest weight in determining policy as members of the emerging bureaucratic class monopolised state power and organised their own clientelistic networks. The triumph of clientelism and the state-centric ideology meant that horizontal social networks remained weak. The unity of the state, the presumed indivisibility of the people, the absolute dominance of collective interest over individualistic ones and the concentration of all powers in the state were principles that restrained the development of Turkey's civil society (Grigoriadis 2009, pp. 43-44).

In addition, 'Westernisation' in Turkey has been largely a process that took place against and in spite of the 'West' rather than in partnership with it. Nowadays this is also reflected in Turkey's wish to be included in the EU while rendering the EU's conditions for membership all the more difficult to accept. 'The opposition to the EU within the Turkish political and intellectual establishment is cognitive rather than material, rooted in the way Kemalism perceives the country's security environment and constructs threats to its national security. Therefore, the evolution of Europe into a

supranational entity disturbs groups who are sensitive to national sovereignty attesting to the fact that 'Westernisation' policies have not been internalised. This image of a conspiratorial 'West' bent on the destruction of the Turkish national integrity with the collaboration of internal enemies continues to exert a strong influence on people's mentality' (Kosebalaban 2002, pp. 131-133).

What is the most worrying issue in the case of Turkey is nationalism which has been based intentionally on common citizenship instead of ethnicity without extending beyond national borders; the population has diachronically consisted of people from many different ethnic backgrounds and for that reason, according to the Turkish constitution, all citizens of Turkey are considered Turks. 'What started as an attempt to create a Turkish nation through constitutionalism using public consensus turned into an attempt to force various elements within the Turkish state into a homogenous society through demographic homogenisation' (Aydin 2004, p. 33). This aspect of the Turkish nation-building interacts with the Kurdish issue which became an element of both Turkey's domestic and external policies during this period. Still, the ruling elites refuse to acknowledge the structural pluralism of Turkish society which needs to be understood as essential to the formation of a modern multiethnic democracy (ibid).

It therefore seems that the intensity of Europeanisation historically collides with the idiomorphic authoritarian model of modernist nationalism and uniform identity that was inflicted by the Kemalist elites for the establishment of a narrow and monolithic Turkish nation state. This model conflicts with the model of a post-national state which evolves in Europe as a result of the integration process. The ideology of Turkish nationalism and

the role of the state which preserves Kemalist heritage regarding the context of national sovereignty, internal cohesion and overall stability resist the dynamic transformation arising through integration in the EU. Quite often the image of the 'West' in the Kemalist mentality continues to represent the Other failing to approach the dynamics of Europeanisation with the constant flow of mutual pulling and sharing of traditional national sovereignty (Serbos 2008, pp. 9-10).

The appearance of serious ideological and political conflicts and segregations is already observed in the frame of a power struggle that is taking place in Turkey's domestic politics between the traditional (conservative Kemalists) and more European friendly elites (Kemalists-Reformers or moderate Islamists who belong to the progressive wing of the governing party AKP) in order to redefine the boundaries between the state and society as well as the relationships within the state structures and society.

The question that arises is whether members of the AKP intend to establish a religious regime or to safeguard basic human rights in order to allow people to freely express their religious, political and ethnic beliefs; is this an attempt to undermine the state or a source of strength in democracy? 'Since its establishment the AKP expressed the widely shared demand of religious freedom and it brought the issue of religious freedom to the centre of the political debate not as a religious issue but alongside wider aspects of freedom of opinion and human rights' (Aras & Gokay 2003, pp. 157-158). The Islamist support for EU membership may be tactical; Islamists may simply like to use the membership process to improve their own political rights. The EU reform process might

be a convenient tool in the hands of the AKP to eliminate the remaining bastions of secularism from the state.

In other words, EU accession may be used as a pretext to attack the judiciary and the military, the only institutions that could combat political Islam. This instrumental/consequential logic on the part of the AKP government towards the EU might be considered to have diluted Turkey's identity-based commitment to EU membership in an effort to further Islamise Turkish society. For example, the key figures of the Party have not minced words in criticising European institutions most notably the European Court of Human Rights when the latter made it clear that the wearing of headscarves (turbans in Turkey) could be prohibited in public places if it was perceived as a threat to Turkey's secular identity.

A possible interpretation of this situation may be that Turkey's location at the intersection of the 'West' and the 'East' has resulted in an identity crisis both national and international. The current protests that began a few months ago over a controversial construction project at Istanbul's Gezi Park revealed to the astonished leadership in Ankara and a surprised global public how open the identity of modern Turkey remains. At the heart of the current protest lies the dissatisfaction of some elements of Turkish society – primarily (but not exclusively) the young middle class – with the increasingly arbitrary and autocratic style of Prime Minister Erdoğan's government.

This strong public opposition has been provoked by the following factors: the country's involvement in the Syrian conflict (which has led to terrorist attacks in Turkey);

legislative attempts to restrict freedom of behaviour (such as the recent restrictions on the sale of alcohol); and liberal economic and investment policies which ignore social and environmental matters (Turkey has a strong tradition of leftist and 'green' movements). In broader terms the current protests are directed against the entirety of the Turkish political system which may meet democratic standards in the procedural dimension but in the dimension of political culture and values it is often distant from the liberal-democratic standards the 'Western'-oriented part of Turkey's society has come to expect. Given that during the writing time of this thesis these developments are ongoing, it remains to be seen whether or not the protests will be a historical milestone, viewed as helping Turkish society turn the corner and mature towards a stronger and more transparent democracy.

Thus, the recent ongoing developments in Turkey together with the so far impact of EU conditionality on domestic politics in Turkey reveal that it is difficult to reach a conclusion whether EU accession necessarily lead to better governance, more democracy, regionalisation and stabilisation. More specifically, on the one hand, there is no doubt that the EU is responsible for squeesing the 'trigger' and acting as the initial catalyst for the beginning of the reform process in Turkey. On the other hand, the interaction of domestic factors and deficiencies in the EU conditionality may lead directly or indirectly to unexpected effects. For example, Turkey's relatively large agrarian population and conservative Muslim elements in society make Turkey equally susceptible to Eurosceptical tendencies which may be translated by domestic political parties into populism. Similarly, the increasing formal and informal EU pressures might tempt major Turkish actors to take in haste decisions concerning effective and

accountable institution building. This can possibly lead to a centralisation of power and to the emergence of a 'core executive' at the expense of the participatory democracy and civil society resulting in a highly elite-driven democratisation process.

Perhaps contemporary Turkey could potentially offer a new 'model' which may be a kind of a 'hybrid' of 'Europe' and 'Asia' and 'Middle East' with all the other political and social elements these would entail. This kind of model may not necessarily 'fit' the framework of an EU-centred model but it might share some of the common features which define the cosmopolitanisation process in general. These may be the side-by-side existence of various national identities by means of the principle of constitutional tolerance which is neither defensive nor passive but instead active; the opening up to the world of the Other, perceiving difference as an enrichment and treating the Other as fundamentally equal and secondly, the reconfiguration and opening up of the legal, political, and economic potentialities found at the national and local levels. The novel question that arises then, which is neglected by scholars specialised in Turkey's Europeanisation process, is whether one could characterise Turkey's so-called Europeanisation as a distictive type of cosmopolitanisation in the future.

At this point, Turkey's foreign policy may prove to be more revealing of this problematisation than its domestic policy and therefore indispensable for my cosmopolitan approach. For reasons of space and coherence I will not examine thoroughly the foreign policy of Turkey but only those aspects which are relevant to my investigation of whether Turkey is moving to a distinctive type of cosmopolitanisation. These aspects are related to the examination whether the recent so-called Middle-

Easternisation of the Turkish foreign policy is indicative of its de-Europeanisation or maybe of its non EU-centric cosmopolitanisation.

4. 3. Turkey's Foreign Policy; de-Europeanisation or Potential Cosmopolitanisation?

The Europeanisation process has traditionally evolved as a framework for analysing the changes that occur in EU member-states, specifically with respect to the first pillar issues and the adaptation that the member-states go through in various aspects of the EU's *acquis communautaire*. However, it is much more complicated to apply the logic of Europeanisation to candidate states and to the area of common foreign policy-making. Some European norms adopted by candidate states include the acceptance of Common Foreign and Security Policy, identification with a larger European collectivity, collaboration with other European states in formulating policy, multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to international problems and the use of diplomatic and economic means rather than military instruments in solving disputes.

There is a difference between member and candidate countries with respect to Europeanisation of foreign policy because there is no *acquis communautaire* which could be presented to the candidate as in the first pillar harmonisation (Müftüler-Bac & Gursoy 2010, p. 408). Also, there is a lack of the opportunity for candidates to upload their policy priorities to the EU level policies and to determine the agenda of European foreign policy. 'The Europeanisation of foreign policy-making for candidate countries might be concerned with changes in the decision-making procedures which is probably

less of a concern for member-states For example, in candidate countries if there are actors in foreign policy decision-making other than democratically elected officials, for example the military, the Europeanisation of foreign policy-making would essentially lessen the role played by these actors' (ibid).

Beginning with the factors that shape Turkey's foreign policy diachronically, the traditional sources of the Turkish foreign policy can be summarised under three headings: geographical location, realpolitik, and the process of 'Westernisation'. The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international arena together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage have made Turkish diplomats sceptical and cautious. The Anatolian peninsula being also the main channel for migrations from the East and invasions from both the East and the West has encouraged a sense of insecurity as well. Another important reason for Turkey's geographical insecurity is the fact that it is surrounded by many neighbours with different characteristics, regimes, ideologies and that the relations between them and Turkey may not always be peaceful.

'Still another point of historical significance is that there is a sense of greatness in the common Turkish mind being based on a perception of a nation which had established empires and was master of a world empire. Centuries of old Ottoman supremacy over the Arab states and the Balkans left the Turks with a conviction of their superiority' (Aydin 2004, pp. 18-19). Also, the role of Islam needs to be taken under consideration in foreign policy-making, since Islam, unlike Christianity, does not prescribe the separation of religion from politics.

In addition, the country's overall political philosophy and the nature of its political regime have influenced its choices in international arena. Political instability has influenced Turkey's foreign policy as the period between 1994 and 2002 was an era of either coalition governments or minority governments preventing Turkey from taking progressive steps in fundamental matters, such as the relations with Greece and the matter of Cyprus. Apart from political stability, another important factor influencing Turkey's foreign policy is the frequent disagreement for the handling of sensitive issues between governments and parties in opposition. For instance, with respect to the issues of Cyprus and Greece the parties in power prefer to come to terms with Greece, especially from 1999 onwards, while the opposition usually accuses the government of not attaching adequate importance to national interests (Bagci et al. 2007, p. 26).

Since Turkey's candidature in 1999, its foreign policy has been Europeanised as procedural changes have come to the forefront with the civil-military relationship at the core. In terms of style, Turkey has pursued its foreign policy interests in regional and multilateral settings and has adopted civilian/economic instruments in achieving them. It has also tried to contribute to the emergence of EU-like regional security complexes in its own environment through civilian diplomacy, international law, multilateralism and regional institutions. In terms of process, the decision-making in foreign and security policy realms has become increasingly civilianised. Elected civilians, non-governmental civil society organisations, such as TUSIAD, the Human Right Association and the semi-official Turkish Chambers of Commerce, business associations and economic interest groups have gradually become more influential in defining foreign policy interests than appointed bureaucrats. A politicisation/de-

securitisation of all potential security problems has been achieved so that their resolution through bargaining, consensus-building and negotiation has become possible. Diplomacy has been redefined as achieving win-win outcomes for all parties involved rather than imposing Turkey's will on the others.

The old distinction that used to exist between the domestic and external realms is no longer considered by Turkish foreign policy-makers to be valid. The 'zero problems with neighbours' approach of the current AKP government appears to reflect this understanding.[11] Ankara now acts on the assumption that growing regional economic, social and political interdependence on the one hand and internal liberal-democratic transformation on the other hand are needed for the emergence of EU-like security communities in its neighbourhood. One recent example in this regard pertains to Turkey's leading role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Turkey has gained observer status in the Arab League and it participates in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) while it has a pioneering role in the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative. Specifically in the Balkans Turkey contributes to various regional initiatives with

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[11] However, the Syria crisis is requiring a response from Ankara not easily articulated within the zero-problems logic. It has to deal with around 250,000 refugees on Turkish soil and the fact that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)-aligned groups have taken control of some key Kurdish towns within Syria. The significance of this development may be muted by Ankara's negotiations with the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, over a political solution to Turkey's own Kurdish conflict. The Syria crisis has underscored the limits on Turkey's ability to remain aloof from, or simply to act as mediator in, escalating regional power struggles. Turkey's frustration with American restraint has prompted it to act independently of Washington, further boosting its confidence as a regional hard- and soft-power centre of influence. Meanwhile, Ankara's Syria policy has jeopardised substantial economic ties and has run the risk of Turkey being too closely identified with factionalist regional power games to an extent that undermines its ability to mediate in other conflicts. But by accepting those risks, it remains to be seen in the future whether Turkey has matured as a regional strategic actor forging new alliances and even taking a proactive approach to solving its biggest national security challenge; the PKK and Kurdish aspirations. Carefully managed, the new turn towards dialogue with the PKK may enhance the prospects for long-term stabilisation of Turkey's Kurdish problem. Conversely, a breakdown in that dialogue runs the greater risk of regional conflict given the Kurdish gains as a result of the Syrian rebellion.

objectives ranging from traditional peacekeeping to stabilisation and support for the integration of the Balkan countries into the European Union.

Although Turkey's foreign policy has been Europeanised in terms of style, process, and outcomes, a reversal of the positive atmosphere in Turkey for the EU has been conducted since 2004 following the possibility of alternative scenarios like 'open-endedness', 'assimilation capacity' and 'referendum' which provoked scepticism in Turkey as to the issue of EU. Also, the fact that Cyprus-GA became an EU member-state regardless of whether a resolution was achieved in this period[12] and that the 5th expansion of the EU with 10 new members came true on 1 May 2004 disappointed Turkey. Its reform process has slowed down since then, affecting accordingly its foreign policy. In the EU Council of State and Government Heads Summit Meeting, which was held in Brussels on 16-17 December 2005, it was decided that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria enough to begin negotiations and anticipated that negotiations were to start on 3 October 2005. In the Summit decisions, however, there were also verdicts − that were going to create problems and cause the negotiations to be frozen under 8 headings − regarding what Turkey had to do with respect to its relations with Cyprus and Greece.

Following these incidents, Turkey's intensified rapprochement with Islam has been attempted. It may be argued that Turkey's foreign policy has increasingly been Middle-Easternising or de-Europeanised. This might mean that Turkey develops its foreign

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[12] In the referendum held simultaneously on both sides of the island in 24 April 2004 64.9% of the Turkish people accepted the Annan Plan, whereas 75.83% of the Cyprus-GA rejected it. Therefore, the possibility of the entrance to the EU of a 'United Cyprus' was gone thereby.

policy on the basis of a novel geographic imagination which puts an end to the alienation of Turkey's neighbouring countries. However, that vision of the minister of foreign affairs Davutoğlu might be conceived as neo-Ottomanism[13], meaning that most of Turkey's foreign policy activism occurs in former Ottoman territories. Davutoğlu's approach to tackle the challenges of globalisation in a post-national age making boundaries meaningless has been formulated with references to historico-cultural affinities creating geo-political imperatives to return to the backyard of the former Ottoman Empire (Davutoğlu 2001). In this way, Turkey's post-modernity seems to be embedded in its Ottoman past. For example, he aims to bring the Ottoman past into play to provide a position for Turkey in the Middle East peace process when arguing for the conflict over Jerusalem that 'no political problem in the region can be resolved without utilising Ottoman archives' (Davutoğlu 2001, p. 333). In this respect, a kind of neo-Ottomanism may be the primary motive behind Davutoğlu's geo-political imagination.

Maybe the problem lies in Davutoğlu's conviction that Turkey can become a 'pivotal' or 'central' state with regional, even global reach which is based on Turkey's historical and geographical depth; historical depth refers to Turkey as the 'epicenter' of historic events, while geographic depth demonstrates Turkey's comparative advantage of being a Middle Eastern, Caucasian country and as much a European country as an Asian one. Davutoğlu has described the transnational character of the Muslim civilisation on the basis of common cultural and political responses to colonialism and 'Western' modernity in different parts of the Muslim world. By stressing the prominent position of the Muslim world or the Muslim civilisation in the global scheme of things (Davutoğlu

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[13] For more see Tunander 1995 and Constantinides 1996.

2008, p. 96), he suggests that the 'West' has created a myth of the Muslim threat to provide an ideological justification for strategic and tactical operations in order to have control over these potentialities (e.g. see Murinson 2006, pp. 949-951).

At this point, the problematisation that arises is if Turkish foreign policy in neighbouring regions is actually assuming a hegemonic role for Turkey or if we are witnessing an inclusive approach for building peace and security based on the dynamics within these regions; if this is a calculated action on the part of Turkey to turn the face of the country away from the 'West' towards the 'East' or if this may be explained by Turkey's national security interests and the nature of Turkey's relations with the European Union and the United States which have increasingly become informed by developments in the Middle East.

'In this sense, Middle-Easternisation does not suggest a break with the 'West' but rather the growing salience of the Middle East in Turkey's relations with the 'West'. Perhaps the increasing Middle-Easternisation of Turkey's foreign policy has concomitantly resulted in the adoption of a more pragmatic/rational rather than an emotional/romantic approach towards the EU and the United States' (Oğuzlu 2008, p. 3). The possibility of the EU offering Turkey strong membership prospects appears to have decreased parallel to the growing chaos and instability in the Middle East. For that reason, developments in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular may be more important in the redefinition of Turkey's security interests.

Hence, Turkey may have adopted a more cosmopolitan, active and assertive foreign policy in order to contribute to the emergence of peace and stability in the Middle East. In this way Turkey may act like a European country while trying to help resolve security problems in a generally non-European region; rather than being dissociated from the 'West' Turkey might have adopted the EU's norms in the field of foreign and security policy (ibid, p. 5). In this line of thought, Turkey may embrace a new strategic thinking in its relations with the 'West' that is based more on cost-benefit calculations than on identity-related factors. Turkish elites are increasingly becoming aware of the fact that the pronunciation of the 'Eastern' aspects of Turkey's national identity, namely Turkey's Islamic character and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, might accrue it more benefits than costs in its relations with the 'West'.

As a result, Turkey might have not begun to turn its face away from the 'West' towards the 'East' but rather there may be a strategic calculation that such a course of action would simply increase Turkey's bargaining power *vis-à-vis* Europe and more generally the 'West' (Oğuzlu 2008, p. 7). This might indicate that Ankara has become aware of the possibility that Turkey's proximity to the growing chaos and instability in the Middle East may have contributed to the EU's reluctance to accept Turkey for membership. Therefore, Ankara by intensifying its efforts for the existence of a cooperative and stable environment in the Middle East and demonstrating that Turkey is in fact a security-producing country facilitates a conducive environment for the continuation of liberal democratic reforms domestically (Oğuzlu 2008, p. 16).

In cosmopolitan terms, the EU may represent a Kantian security complex, in which the possibility of using brute force in settling disputes is low due to the decades-long integration process in economic, political and security realms. In contrast to the EU, the Middle Eastern region may look like a classic textbook example of a Hobbesian security complex in which the possibility of interstate and intra-state warfare is extremely high. 'Worse, the possibility of Turkey being drawn into such a security complex is quite high given Turkey's proximity to the region as well as its vulnerability to what happens there. Perhaps what Ankara wants is to escape the danger of being a part of the Hobbesian security complex to the South and to become a part of the Kantian security complex to the West. For this to happen, two things need to materialise at the same time. On the one hand, Turkey needs to undertake the so-called Copenhagen criteria at home while on the other hand, this internal reformation process needs not to be negatively impacted by external developments in the Middle East' (Oğuzlu 2010-2011, p. 680).

On the whole, it might be argued that perhaps the AKP government in the post-2005 era is turning to a kind of 'loose Europeanisation' or 'soft Euro-asianism' due to the loss of enthusiasm for the EU membership in Turkey both on the part of the government and the public at large. The question that arises then is if this might be considered as a distinctive type of cosmopolitanisation being undertaken by Turkey; a cosmopolitanisation that is neither simply 'European' nor 'Asian'.

On the one hand, despite the EU's ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, the ongoing accession process with the EU would contribute to Turkey's sense of security through

the transformation of Turkey's structural conditions in line with the EU. A Turkey that has finally reached satisfying state-society relations and become more Europeanised through the EU accession process might become more able to stand with a recognised ability to determine the dynamics of regional politics.

On the other hand, is indeed the worst outcome for Turkey for its prospects for EU membership to falter due to its weak domestic performance in the EU-oriented reformation process, as it is often presented by scholars on Tukey's Europeanisation studies? (Oğuzlu 2004, p. 12). Will this accordingly affect Turkey's response to globalisation and the way it can cope with the security challenges and risks of globalisation? It remains to be seen in the future whether this special combination of endogenous factors shaping Turkey's process of change and of the launch of Turkey's EU reform which forms and times that process of change will accordingly lead to a special type of the Turkish foreign policy cosmopolitanisation or to its de-Europeanisation (with the possibility of accession or any other kind of EU partnership having been vanished by either or both sides).

5. Conclusion

This chapter complemented my overall argumentation throughout the thesis that cosmopolitanism can be feasible in Europe by broadening the context of cosmopolitanism in the case of Turkey. My aim was to demonstrate that the enlargement process would enhance the EU's external cosmopolitanism particularly through Turkey's membership and that there can be another variant of cosmopolitanism

inside Turkey which is not EU-centred. The Union's enlargement criteria are not arbitrary and there is another variable aside from politics and economics that accounts for Turkey's perpetual outsider status. That variable is identity which has been reconstructed so far with ethno-cultural dimensions clarifing who is European and who is not. Europe's uncertain boundaries increase the importance of historical, racial, ethnic and cultural factors in constructing a Self vs. Other identity (Müftüler-Baç 2000, pp. 24-25). This is why I argued that if Europe constitutes a democratic political space, then it needs to use the same methodology and benchmarks, the same criteria and same rules that have been applied to other new members of the EU without having higher or lower or double standards for Turkey. 'In cosmopolitan terms, the norms of universality and impartiality indicate that the decision about Turkey would be fair and objective as long as it is not framed by a reference to Turkey's Muslim population or Turkey's geography. Instead, that decision would be based on the ability, the capacity and will of Turkey to become a more democratic country' (Baban & Keyman 2006, pp. 15-16). In an era of interdependence, pluralism and multiculturalism where Europe ends should not be a matter of geography but of liberal values and democratic practices clearly defined and brightly illuminated so that the candidate countries know whether they have chances to access the EU.

The issue of EU enlargement and Turkey's membership go beyond a relatively simple analysis of whether the candidates are able to meet the Copenhagen criteria. For thar reason, my cosmopolitan approach to the Europeanisation of candidate states and particularly of Turkey differed from the traditional understanding of Europeanisation through the prisms of neo-functionalist and/or intergovernmental theories as it avoided

being EU-centric by concentrating on the candidate state Turkey and on how EU norms-policies are contested domestically. It also differed from approaches which are either only bottom-up or top-down. My cosmopolitan conceptualisation was a merger of the top-down and bottom-up approaches portraying Europeansation as an ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels. This approach considered Europeanisation as a cycle of interactions and change at all levels and did not attach any analytical primacy either to centre-building or to domestic change, but instead it conceived them as coexisting in a vicious circle.

Inside Turkey it seems that its EU membership is desirable, but it is not considered to be Turkey's unique strategic orientation. What is of crucial importance for both cosmopolitan and Europeanisation studies on Turkey's accession process is that Turkey's prospective EU membership has been an important trigger of its democratisation reform but it is doubtful that this reform is taking place simply through an externally inspired process of social change in Turkey. What instead appears to be in the making is a process of change largely driven by endogenous factors. However, the precise form and timing of domestic change is intricately linked with the launch of Turkey's accession process. The endogenous process of change within the Turkish institutional, political, economic and social context which is interlocking with the external dynamics embedded in the accession process may signify the beginning of a new era in Turkey leading potentially to a distinctive type of cosmopolitanisation. Limiting cosmopolitanism to the specificity of the EU results not only in the neglect of other variants of cosmopolitanism but it also confines the true significance of

cosmopolitanism which resides in learning from the Other in the context of global concerns.

Conclusion of the Thesis

Restatement of Aims/Research Questions

The thesis was set out to explore the concept of cosmopolitanism by identifying a constructive engagement with the European project at a time when the crisis of the Euro-zone is still threatening the very existence of the European Union.

The purpose of the current study was to determine whether cosmopolitanism in Europe is feasible and it can result in positive political forms of regional cooperation at the EU level and also in institutional reforms along cosmopolitan lines, i.e. going beyond the narrow economic and security concerns that have become apparent especially in the Greek case. This question is also a cultural question and concerns the capacities of the EU to transform itself in the light of the perspective of the Other; in this sense the research was undertaken to evaluate if this opportunity is given to the EU with the enlargement process especially towards Turkey.

The desire to interpret the existing socio-political situation in the EU, Greece and Turkey was a principal inceptive for the conduction of this research. In this investigation, the aim was to comprehend predominately the political dimensions of the crisis and most importantly to specify ways to respond to it.

Returning to a serious issue posed at the beginning of this study, i.e. that the controversy and debate about the best strategies for the achievement of cosmopolitanism at the EU level has largely raged unabated, the aim of the thesis was to set vital questions in the context of the EU crisis within the cosmopolitan discourse; can we see a new beginning, a qualitative shift towards a new regime of social ethics of responsibility as a kind of new event emerging out of the crisis or should we just say that the crisis is nothing more than a confirmation of the negative consequences of economic globalisation? Is it possible to argue that the crisis opens new meanings that help us move beyond introversion, nationalism and the dominance of economics over politics?

Empirical Findings

The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarised within the respective chapters on the cases of the EU, Greece and Turkey. The relevance of cosmopolitanism for these cases and its feasibility are revealed by my qualitative analysis of identifying the ways with which Europe could overcome the crisis enhancing its limited internal (i.e. the chapters on the EU and Greece) and external cosmopolitanism (i.e. the chapter on Turkey)

In the case of the EU, my cosmopolitan approach started from the assumption that there are bases for cosmopolitanism in the European Union; it was open to possibilities for this, yet it was also critical, in ways that go beyond utopianism, by looking for the inherent difficulties-paradoxes for cosmopolitanism's realisation. One of the more

significant findings to emerge from this study is that the EU can be a catalyst of cosmopolitanism even if it has not yet been cosmopolitan *per se*. The central argument was that the EU needs to enhance further its democratic potential by evolving into a cosmopolitan community. To this end, I demonstrated how the EU can reform its institutional instruments according to the cosmopolitan principles of solidarity, unity and cooperation. My recommendations concerned the Open Method of Coordination, the European Council, Parliament, Commission, Council of Ministers, voting system, economic governance and the institutionalisation of solidarity. My research also sought to find the means to strengthen the inclusion of civil society in the decision-making process focusing mainly on the White Paper, the Citizens' Initiative and on the possible implications of the current crisis on CSOs. Instead of adopting the terminology of governance either *for* or *by* the people, my critical cosmopolitan outlook focused on the more realistic governance *with* the people.

The case of Greece was analysed too, in parallel with the case of the European Union and it revealed the causes and the impact of the crisis on both cases and their interdependence. This analysis led me to contend that a dual process is taking place in the country with both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation tendencies at the same time. By de-Europeanisation I meant the negative Europeanisation whereby national policies become less EU-oriented making the Europeanisation process reversible as it has been reflected in Greece's political system and civil society. This tendency of de-Europeanisation gave me accordingly the impetus to examine whether cosmopolitanism in Europe is becoming reversible. Indeed, the arising (fascist) nationalism in the country and the role of domestic contestation of EU norms which can impede the whole

Europeanisation process provided me with a critical cosmopolitan perspective of the challenges that cosmopolitan and Europeanisation scholars have to deal with in order to make their approaches more sustainable.

I argued that this sustainability could be achieved with a post-crisis cosmopolitanism which should not be linear and consensual. To a large degree this kind of cosmopolitanism needs take under consideration the role of contestation and to integrate tensions and paradoxes that simultaneously challenge it (i.e. although cosmopolitanism has relied on the expansion of market, the crisis and the following domination of economics over politics makes us reconsider what kind of cosmopolitanism is possible in the era of global capitalism).

In the case of Turkey, my examination of the possible EU implications of Turkey's membership demonstrated that Turkish accession to the EU tests Europe's ability to deal with questions of post-nationalism and cultural plurality and it raises questions of what the borders of Europe are, who the Europeans and the Others of Europe are. In deciding about the future of Turkey, Europe is deciding about its future; adopting a vision of European integration limited to the close economic and political cooperation of member-states or a broader vision that eventually transforms these member-states in a cosmopolitan way.

Through my analysis of the possible implications on the EU by Turkey's prospective membership, a first major finding was that Turkey is able to enhance the Union's limited external context of cosmopolitanism and that its membership is not an example

of Europe losing its identity but a redefinition of what Europe will come to represent in the global age. Europe is in a transitional stage, between an accelerating transnationalism and cultural diversity on the one hand and a growing introversion due to current crisis on the other hand. The case of Turkey provides Europe with a unique opportunity to prove that the European project is not culturally sealed, isolated and irrelevant in the global state of affairs.

I also supplemented the examination of Turkey's implications on the EU with a similar analysis of the impact on Turkey by the prospect of EU membership. In order to do so, I investigated Turkey's Europeanisation process thoroughly. In my attempt to interpret the supposed weakness of Turkey to be Europeanised in crucial issues my second major finding emerged. It included the innovative problematisation whether this weakness may in the future imply Turkey's 'Middle-Easternisation' and its subsequent de-Europeanisation or perhaps the beginning of a new era potentially; Turkey being a distinctive type of 'hybrid' unique cosmopolitanisation which is neither 'European' nor 'Asian'.

Theoretical Implication/Contribution

My study confirms previous findings according to which the conceptual framework of cosmopolitanism offers new meanings and alternative conceptions of the world especially under the globalisation process (Archibugi & Held 1995; Archibugi, Held & Kohler 1998). The research results indicate that, indeed, cosmopolitanism as a new mode of governance is the key to understanding and shaping new forms of political

authority at the local, regional and global level. The thesis contributes additional evidence suggesting, particularly in the case of the EU, that the challenge nowadays is how to bring civil society to the forefront and make EU institutions more democratic, transparent and accountable to the European people. This cosmopolitan outlook adds to a growing body of literature (e. g. Delanty & Rumford 2005; Beck & Grande 2007) which conceives the EU as a catalyst for cosmopolitanism through the Europeanisation process without itself being necessarily cosmopolitan.

My work also broadens the fields of cosmopolitan studies as the current crisis of Greece embodies in *praxis* the dynamics of cosmopolitanism and the challenges that it faces in the era of globalisation. More specifically, the study has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of cosmopolitanism given that the Greek crisis has affirmed one of the core features of cosmopolitanism; that it is no longer possible to talk of the state ─ either the nation state or its sub- or supranational variants ─ as the primary *locus* of political power. For instance, in the case of the EU some state functions have lost a degree of sovereignty upwards, in the field of economic policy as well downwards, in the field of EU regional policy (Held et al. 1999, pp. 76). The case of Greece with its strong state protectionism, state corporatism and weak civil society controlled by the state proves that the power of overcentralised states has been altered due to globalisation. It also demonstrates that states need to embrace transnational strategies of responding to globally mobile capital and corporations as the indissolubility between politics and territory, political influence and national sovereignty is no longer valid.

My thesis has also enhanced the understanding of another equally significant question that cosmopolitan scholars are required to deal with; how cosmopolitanism can empirically tackle the nationalistic reaction to globalisation. The arising nationalism in the EU is the biggest test for cosmopolitanism; alterations of the states' functions and their weakening capacity to confront crucial global problems that require interdependence are accompanied with the enhancement of nationalism. Substantive European cosmopolitanism exists next to more banal forms, while forms of non-cosmopolitanism should not be underestimated. The links between Europeanisation and globalisation may be diffuse and highly intertwined but there is a paradox; both phenomena point to a growing interconnectedness of social processes at a transnational level while remaining firmly grounded to the local region. Greece's problematic Europeanisation reveals the strong uneasiness of the relationship between the nation state and the EU at a transnational level and therefore, the weakness of the EU to react as an international actor in the pressing political and economic aspects of globalisation.

Greece is a revealing case in this sense. Together with pro-European actors which support Greece's modernisation process (i.e. the country's openness, privatisations and a smaller and functional public sector) there are many anti-European groups and parties, either left wing or far-right, which impede the adoption of reforms complaining for conceding sovereignty to the EU. The case of Greece can serve as a base for future studies suggesting specific strategies on how national issues can be addressed in a productive rather than extremist way. Also, similar cross-national and comparative researches may be conducted to other EU states-in crisis in order to confirm and synthesise the different implications of the EU crisis on cosmopolitanism in Europe.

It is interesting to note however that the empirical findings in this study provide a new dimension of the Europeanisation process which does not necessarily offer always pathways for cosmopolitanism as suggested by Delanty and Rumford (2005) and by Habermas (2003) too. This is indicative in the case of Greece whereby a tendency of de-Europeanisation along with the rising nationalism and fascism in the country demonstrate how dangerous can be the domestic contestation of European norms. In this sense, the present study makes a noteworthy contribution to the Europeanisation literature opening new horizons for research which is usually one-sided and confined to the predictable conclusion of existing types of more or less successful Europeanisation (e.g. Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008; Ioakimidis 2000).

Furthermore, one of the most noteworthy issues to consider is that the results of this research support the idea that cosmopolitanism is rooted in the normative idea that the scope of ethical concern should not be limited by parochial boundaries (e.g. see Brassett 2008, p. 324). Cosmopolitanism seeks to think *at* or *on* the border, noting its blurred nature and therefore it is a counter to founding EU-Europe on civilisational unity. In this sense, the case of Turkey reveals the importance of the theory of cosmopolitanism politically and ethically. A cosmopolitan outlook permits us to criticise and provide alternatives to the nationalist outlook or essentialism that has created divisions in both Europe and Turkey. It is a dynamic and reflexive political project that could be an important ethico-political alternative to the ethical closures met in Turkish nationalism and in European opposition to Turkey's membership (e.g. see Parker 2009, pp. 1098-1099).

Clearly, the findings of the research add to the literature that the idea of conditionality, central to the EU's enlargement policy, is related to the ever-present tension with a cosmopolitan outlook between the universal and the particular (Bulley 2009). The Copenhagen criteria 'require the prospective members to respect democracy, safeguard human rights, guarantee the rule of law and ensure the protection of minorities before they can begin official accession negotiations with the EU' (Parker 2009, p. 1096). Theoretically these might be considered to offering a cosmopolitan minimum in the sense that they aim at safeguarding the cosmopolitan conditions of difference and plurality (Beck & Grande 2007, p. 71). However, even if candidature and conditionality are possible, they may be understood in terms of the imperialistic, homogenising, civilising or even despotic tendencies of cosmopolitanism due to their inherent coercive possibilities (Beck 2006, p. 45). The economic and political criteria might be 'considered to go beyond an acceptable minimum and so, potentially undermine a cosmopolitan respect for difference' (Parker 2009, p. 1096).

Although the current study is influenced by cosmopolitan approaches which maintain that the Europeanisation process should be free from all of cultural attachments and based instead on shared universal principles (e.g. Habermas 1998; Lacroix 2002), it suggests that the 'civic' values upon which a cosmopolitan Europe would be built are not culturally neutral. Such values emerged from the 'Western' European historical experience, meaning that non-'Western' European aspirants for membership are faced with two choices; either they must set aside values and practices of their own historical, cultural, and national experience or they must attempt a consensus with their partners in

a cosmopolis around values which allow for the reconciliation of the local and the universal.

Within this framework, the findings of my thesis may impinge on existing cosmopolitan theories, as I have argued that debates on Turkey's EU membership may construct a normative representation of the EU that justifies EU accession in terms of 'normalisation'. In this way, 'the support for a cosmopolitan EU may adhere to a distinction between 'mere difference' to be tolerated and 'disruptive difference' to be contained, which legitimises an interventionist stance *vis-à-vis* Turkey; changes in state interventions and institutions supported by this normalising project go beyond installing 'unity in diversity' in cultural-political terms. They involve economic de- and re-regulation that might entrench social and territorial inequalities' (Bodisky 2009, p. 12). Cosmopolitan visions of Europe, though they are critical of nationalist and imperialist constructions of cultural difference, may partake in a culturalisation of politics that enables and obscures particular state interventions in social relations and in processes of state transformation (Mamdani 2004; Yúdice 2003).

Diversity can thus be presented as a value to be fostered as long as its expressions are compatible with universal values of the European political project, in particular human rights and democracy. Thus, Europe's diversity may turn to be placed within a unifying frame of 'universal norms' (Beck & Grande 2004, p. 31) or a 'common ethical-political dimension' (Habermas 2001, p. 108). Diversity and human rights may appear as cultural values of Europe while promoting respect for human rights is frequently linked to promoting respect for cultural diversity (e.g., in the form of cultural rights). In this way,

the EU is associated with universal values of human rights and democracy, while Turkey with the lack of them. 'These universal values allow for diversity but the celebration of 'mere difference' may easily slide into a concern with the containment of 'disruptive difference'. Because Turkey is construed as lacking that capacity, it might be constituted as an instance of 'disruptive difference' to be contained and transformed in the process of EU accession' (Bodisky 2009, p. 23).

In order to counter the single linear narrative defining the cultural characteristics of Europe and its cosmopolitan orientation the research has offered new insights into the supposed Turkish resistance towards the EU which tends to revolve around questions of national identity and sovereignty; it has posed a new problematisation of whether the current reform process of Turkey is a combination of the external trigger (the EU) and domestic factors of modernisation. The theoretical implication of this is the possibility of Turkey being an example of 'hybrid' cosmopolitanisation, broadening the contextual conditions of cosmopolitanism and ensuring that cosmopolitanism is not explored through one lens, i.e. a European 'Western' perspective, but rather, that multiple facets of cosmopolitanism can be revealed and understood.

Policy Implication/Recommendation

The findings of this study have a number of important implications for future practice. The thesis has used empirical findings to show that the current European policies are not making the anticipated impact for the successful confrontation of the political and economic crisis. The theory of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan

democracy constituted the core of my analysis for a better understanding of the European Union. By examining cosmopolitanism with respect to the case of the European Union, the aim of the thesis was to explain explicitly why the EU is trapped in the dilemma between, on the one side, the economic policies required to preserve the euro and, on the other, the political steps to closer integration. This is particularly reflected in the institutions of the European Union which come across as unapproachable, unreal, and often menacing to the citizens they are intended to serve.

My theoretical arguments for the justification of cosmopolitanism in Europe suggest the need for policy review which will enable solidarity, unity and cooperation. A cosmopolitan approach to tackle the EU crisis would focus on Europe's democratisation process at two levels; a) top-down, seeking to eliminate the inconsistency between the internal functioning of EU institutions and the ideas of the European treaties, as well as to close the gap between policy development and implementation, democracy and efficiency, and b) bottom-up, emphasising the importance of governance *with* the people through the involvement of civil society in the decision-making process. A cosmopolitan reading on the democratic deficits of the EU institutions suggested that EU governance mean a non-hierarchical, non-centrist, non-communitarian and non-market-oriented democracy. Moreover, my cosmopolitan emphasis on the principle of solidarity can be used to develop targeted interventions aimed at the institutionalisation and enhancement of solidarity at the EU level for the elimination of the crisis.

There is also a definite need for the EU to take concrete measures by exercising specific pressures to the Greek state for the effective handling of the rise of the far- right Golden Dawn. It is highly questionable whether the reports issued by the European Commission on human rights in Greece are sufficient to confront this kind of fascism.

A number of important changes need to be made with respect to the enlargement process too. The findings of the study have suggested that unless the EU accepts Turkey as a member-state, cosmopolitanism in Europe will not be fully attained. In any case, an implication of the thesis is that both sides, the EU and Turkey, need to clarify their intentions and interests. The EU needs to determine whether it prefers a kind of 'privileged partnership' with Turkey rather than membership. Turkey too should clarify whether its national interests lie only in the Middle East with or without the EU.

Limitations of the Thesis

The study has offered an evaluative cosmopolitan perspective on important national and regional developments and was conducted in the middle of the current EU crisis. As a direct consequence of this framework, various limitations were encountered during the analysis stages of the research which need to be considered.

The most important limitation of my thesis lies in the fact that the EU crisis has not been overcome yet, making in this way the conduction of safe conclusions for the future of the EU very difficult indeed. This accordingly has resulted in the fact that mainly questions and problematisations have been posed without ready-made answers and clear

empirical results. Despite the various limitations which were encountered during the analysis stages of the research, the various hypotheses and questions worked together to provide an alternative scenario for Europe. This vision has been grounded on the concept of cosmopolitanism, which is feasible for the EU given that some of its features have already taken place. However, its fully realisation depends on the willingness of member-states and supranational institutions to transform the current crisis to a unique opportunity to reform the EU substantially.

Another weakness of this study was the paucity of specific propositions on how cosmopolitanism could be reconceived in the age of capitalism and economic globalisation. Although the thesis has addressed this issue generally, it was not specifically designed to evaluate factors with which capitalism could cease to actually undermine the democratic development of societies under the influence of cosmopolitanism.

In addition, the concept of cosmopolitanism which has been the core of this research is subject to another limitation. In such areas like the EU there is often not a common consciousness – there are different interpretations of what causes the problem (e.g. how the Greek and European crisis is caused), different interests (e.g. in introducing Eurobonds or not), power inequalities (e.g. between powerful states such as Germany and France and other less powerful, such as Greece and Portugal), and different ideologies with varying views on how best to solve the crisis (from a neoliberal to federalist or cosmopolitan or even interventionist perspective). As a consequence,

strong empirical findings are needed in order to demonstrate the dynamics of cosmopolitanism in comparison to other competing democratic theories.

Moreover, the current investigation was limited by the ongoing developments in Greece and Turkey. It is uncertain how Greece will manage to eliminate its crisis and its democratic deficits which have become even more acute with the rise of nationalism and fascism. As the thesis has made a connection between the case of Greece and cosmopolitan theory, the theoretical implications on cosmopolitanism may diverge in the future depending on the way Greece and the EU will respond to the current political crisis. Also, in the Turkish case my study has analysed possible different variables for the future of Turkey instead of concentrating on one only. There are several possibilities open for Turkey, but whether it will manage to become a distinctive type of cosmopolitanisation will depend on the way it will handle its domestic political crisis with the current protests, the Syria crisis and the general turmoil in the Middle East.

Recommendation for Future Research

Future research could fill in the gaps of the thesis by building on from the current research and responding to the limitations.

Analysing the problems of cosmopolitanism involves looking at its ambiguities and ideological misuses. There is a tension between a well-developed theory of cosmopolitanism and an underdeveloped mention of the ways it can be realised. Indeed in most cases the model of cosmopolitan democracy appears to be very ambitious, if not

utopian, downplaying the limits of democracy at the international level. The scale of the

debate on whether cosmopolitanism can be feasible generally and particularly in Europe

and whether it can offer an alternative sustainable vision for the confrontation of the

crisis of the EU is extensive and multifaceted even at the local level. To generate

achievable policy strategies and development targets with regards to the elimination of

the democratic deficits of the EU there is need for more case studies at the national level

to allow further assessment of the local dimensions of the subject. Cosmopolitan

democracy needs to be concerned with specific issues and areas giving a pragmatic

connotation to its principles. For that reason, I attempted to examine it with respect to

the European Union and Greece and Turkey. However, more case studies perhaps of

other Mediterranean states-in crisis from a cosmopolitan perspective would be

enlightening for the causes and the handling of the crisis. This accordingly could

generate further comparative research with the case of Greece enabling a better

comprehension of the challenges posed to cosmopolitanism.

In breaking with the cosmopolitan trend which sees universal inclusion as a panacea to

the problems confronting citizenship, I adopted an agonistic, but still cosmopolitan,

perspective in my thesis. For these reasons I used the case studies of Greece and Turkey

in order to demonstrate that contestations are inextricably linked to cosmopolitanism as

they assure that power relations are challenged and that democratic politics remains

dynamic and alert. By highlighting the dynamic of contestation of European norms at

the domestic level of both Greece and Turkey, the purpose of the thesis was to

reconsider the consensual ontology on which many contemporary accounts of

deliberative cosmopolitan governance seem to be grounded (Parker 2010). That issue of

contestation potentially leading to conflict is an intriguing one which could be usefully explored in further research. Less attention paid by cosmopolitanism to its embodiment in powers, conflicts and inequalities that affect its feasibility and might perhaps take it in directions which favour the interests of the more powerful (Martell 2008, pp. 129-143). 'This leaves out contradictory interests and ideological demands that mean pursuing politics at transnational levels is as much about conflicts to be won by some over others as about agreements that can be achieved through a cosmopolitan coming together' (ibid, p. 136).

Future research needs therefore to concentrate on the investigation of a less idealistic, more modest vision of a dialogic politics which in its acknowledgement of power relations seeks to preserve a space for genuine dissent. 'Perhaps part of what dialogic understanding entails is the acceptance of divergence, breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of the often tortuous process of democratisation. The power relations that condition and limit dialogic possibilities need first to be interrogated' (Butler 1990, p. 19). In cosmopolitanism there is a communalist assumption that deliberation will overcome conflicting interests and that risk leads to communication and contexts for action between opposing parties – an involuntary democratisation, public debate and participation in decisions which otherwise evade public involvement (e.g. see Beck 2006).

However, politicisation cannot exist without the production of a conflicting representation of the world. For democracy to happen, citizenship needs to be conceptualised in a way that remains fruitful to its role as the means for collectively

contesting and not simply deliberating about democratic politics (e.g. see Tambakaki 2011). Therefore, a number of possible future studies could approach cosmopolitanism by subjecting it to contestation which is inherent in politics.

Exploring the following as future research strategies can facilitate the attainment of this goal. What might be pursued at the EU level could be: a) an understanding of the conflicts involved over the confrontation of the crisis at the level of nation states and at the Euro-zone level, b) judgements on which sides certain economic interests, political objectives and sought outcomes lie, c) calculations about possibilities for alliances or multilateral agreements along such lines and d) politics around the unavoidably arising conflicts. Cosmopolitans need to develop more the qualifications made about power and contestation in global politics that at present remain only qualifications instead of structuring principles in their analyses.

Further research of the topic of capitalism and cosmopolitanism is strongly recommended that has not been covered in the present study but is considerably worthwhile to investigate in the near future. A better understanding needs to be developed on cosmopolitanism and the ways it could provide an insightful and critical perspective on capitalism but without being conceived as an alternative to capitalism. It would be interesting to examine how cosmopolitanism in association with market capitalism and under the influence of globalisation could further the interests not only of principal owners of capital but most importantly of people.

Additional empirical investigations are needed to estimate whether the concept of de-Europeanisation, as it has been shown in my study by the case of Greece, is an ephemeral phenomenon closely connected with the crisis or not and how states can respond effectively to it. This in turn could be connected with an examination of the rise of fascism not only in Greece but also in other member-states. At this point, considerably more work will need to be done to assess the EU's reaction to the rising far right movement by recommending specific initiatives or interventions that the European supranational institutions should undertake.

Finally, if the debate on Turkey's membership in the EU is to be moved forward, a better understanding of the impact of the European crisis on the whole enlargement process and particularly towards Turkey needs to be developed. The questions and problematisations posed in this study regarding Turkey's potential cosmopolitanisation or de-Europeanisation provide useful insights for future research to concentrate on the current protests that take place in Turkey and whether these might signify the beginning of a new era for the Turkish democracy. At the same time, I suggest that before conclusions are drawn on that issue a study on Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East should be carried out taking under consideration the ongoing developments in Syria.

Fulfilment of Aims

This thesis has fulfilled the aim of highlighting the possibility of opening new pathways for Europe especially within the current crisis. While it did not confirm that Europe has fully become a cosmopolitan polity, it did partially substantiate that the Europeanisation

process entails cosmopolitan social and political capabilities. By proposing cosmopolitan democracy as a new mode of governance the study has contributed new and unique evidence to the debates on the EU's lacking policy inspiration.

It is the first study of its kind to examine the case of Greece with respect to the challenges posed to cosmopolitanism and to highlight the dynamic of the process of de-Europeanisation which is rarely recognised by the Europeanisation literature. It is also the first to allow the possibility of a new kind of cosmopolitanisation in the case of Turkey which is neither 'Western' nor 'Asian'.

In spite of what is often reported about the elimination of the crisis in releavant theoretical and policy debates, in practice current mostly economically-driven proposals have offered partial solution to the prevailing and persistent democratic deficits of the EU. Europe is still perceived in national terms as an 'unfinished nation', an 'incomplete federal state', as though it ought to become both a nation and a state. Europe's actual distress consists predominately in precisely this inability to grasp and understand the historically new kind of reality that Europeanisation represents.

This study strongly supported the argument that cosmopolitanism can offer a new vision which is now missing from the EU. The benefits of cosmopolitanism have been shown to be comprehensive and sustainable in the long-term. The cosmopolitan perspective used has not only been moral and political, but above all, it has been critical. To this end, the cases of Greece and Turkey have been also used in order to reveal the dynamics and deficiencies of cosmopolitanism. Greece can be a revealing case study of

cosmopolitanism indicating the latter's significance for reshaping state politics and the relationship between the state and civil society. This is mainly because the current crisis in Greece has been provoked by the issues that make cosmopolitanism more relevant than ever (i.e. the inability of the state to confront crucial problems alone, strong state corporatism, weak civil society, introvert economy and nationalism). The significance of the case of Turkey too lies in the fact that its prospective membership can contribute to the formation of a post-national, post-Western, more open and extrovert Europe.

The thesis has indicated ways in which it might be enhanced by further research and the possibility that other cross-national studies might be appropriate for similar investigation. It is the case that a wider range of case studies is needed to enhance the current findings and strengthen the interpretations that can be made about the handling of the EU crisis within a cosmopolitan framework. In this sense, it is hoped that the thesis constitutes an important step forward in this process.

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