

DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

How do public private partnerships
influence business school performance in
english-speaking Caribbean?

Kamla Mungal

2012

Aston University

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HOW DO PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS INFLUENCE BUSINESS SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN?

KAMLA MUNGAL
Doctor of Business Administration

ASTON UNIVERSITY

March 2012

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THESIS SUMMARY

This thesis addresses the question of how business schools established as public private partnerships (PPPs) within a regional university in the English-speaking Caribbean survived for over twenty-one years and achieved legitimacy in their environment. The aim of the study was to examine how public and private sector actors contributed to the evolution of the PPPs. A social network perspective provided a broad relational focus from which to explore the phenomenon and engage disciplinary and middle-range theories to develop explanations. Legitimacy theory provided an appropriate performance dimension from which to assess PPP success.

An embedded multiple-case research design, with three case sites analysed at three levels including the country and university environment, the PPP as a firm and the sub-group level constituted the methodological framing of the research process. The analysis techniques included four methods but relied primarily on discourse and social network analysis of interview data from 40 respondents across the three sites. A staged analysis of the evolution of the firm provided the 'time and effects' antecedents which formed the basis for sense-making to arrive at explanations of the public-private relationship-influenced change.

A conceptual model guided the study and explanations from the cross-case analysis were used to refine the process model and develop a dynamic framework and set of theoretical propositions that would underpin explanations of PPP success and legitimacy in matched contexts through analytical generalisation. The study found that PPP success was based on different models of collaboration and partner resource contribution that arose from a confluence of variables including the development of shared purpose, private voluntary control in corporate governance mechanisms and boundary spanning leadership. The study contributes a contextual theory that explains how PPPs work and a research agenda of 'corporate governance as inspiration' from a sociological perspective of 'liquid modernity'. Recommendations for policy and management practice were developed.

Keywords: PPPs; inspirational governance; competitiveness; private voluntarism; boundary spanning leadership; legitimacy in governance.

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Finally, the model of inspiration in liquid spaces of interaction is still best exemplified by my extended family to whom this thesis is dedicated.

*In dedication to the memory of my father, Mr. Paul Ramsilla Boodram,
who left me amongst his legacies...to my mother Dolly, all other
members of my family network, and my children Vishal and Sarda...
...my own legacy to the world.*

Our contribution is achieved through the blessings, inspiration, support and guidance of Mother Saraswati, the mother of all.

DECLARATION

This thesis is my own original piece of work, based on data that I gathered and analysed. All extracts and non-original work have been appropriately attributed and cited. The literature review, research questions and methodology were presented at the AMBA Doctoral Symposium at Grenoble, France in February 2011. No part of this thesis has been submitted for a degree elsewhere.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	3
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	5
LIST OF TABLES	15
LIST OF FIGURES	17
LIST OF APPENDICES	18
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	19
1.0 THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.....	19
1.1 A PARTNERSHIP AGENDA FOR RELEVANCE OF BUSINESS SCHOOLS.....	19
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY	20
1.2.1 Academic Purpose.....	20
1.2.2 Professional Purpose	21
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY	23
1.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS.....	24
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS	26
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: THE STUDY OF PARTNERSHIPS	28
2.0 INTRODUCTION	28
2.1 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL RATIONALE.....	29
2.1.1 Originality and Contextuality of the Research.....	29
2.1.2 Significance and Practical Utility of the Research.....	30
2.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.....	31
2.2.1 The Broad Scope of PPPs	31
2.2.2 The Need for Partnering Across Sectors	32
2.2.3 PPPs as Long-Term Commercial Partnerships	33
2.2.4 PPPs as Inter-Organisational Relationships	34
2.2.5 PPPs in Education and Business Schools.....	35
2.2.6 Challenges to PPPs.....	36
2.2.6.1 Conceptual Challenge as ‘Partnership’	36
2.2.6.2 Political Challenges.....	37
2.2.6.3 Dynamics of Risk and Value.....	38
2.2.7 Insertion into the Field of PPPs.....	38
2.2.8 What is Not a PPP?	39
2.3 SECTORS AND TENSIONS: PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NON-PROFIT	39
2.3.1 Tensions across Sectors.....	39
2.3.1.1 Tensions of Philosophy and Ideology	40

2.3.1.2 Institutional and Behavioural Differences.....	40
2.3.2 Voluntarism and the Non-Profit Sector.....	41
2.3.3 Crossing the Divide.....	43
2.4 Organisational-Institutional Context of PPPs	44
2.4.1 Organisation-Environment Challenges in Developing Countries	46
2.4.1.1 External Environment: Scarce Economic Resources in Developing Countries	46
2.4.1.2 External Environment: The Implications of Small Size.....	47
2.4.1.3 Challenges of Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean	48
2.4.1.4 Challenges in Participatory Models	48
2.4.2 The Internal Environment: Defining the Purpose of the PPP Organisation.....	49
2.4.3 The Internal Environment: Structure of the PPP Organisation	51
2.5 GOVERNANCE IN CROSS-SECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS	53
2.5.1 Convergence of Corporate and Collaborative Governance.....	54
2.5.1.1 Transparency and Accountability in Governance	55
2.5.1.2 Power and Dominance	55
2.5.2 University Partnerships in Governance.....	59
2.5.2.1 The Changing Role of the University in Society	59
2.5.2.2 University Governance and the New Managerialism	61
2.6 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TENSIONS IN BUSINESS SCHOOLS - RELEVANCE AND RIGOUR	62
2.7 CONCLUSION.....	64
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	66
3.0 INTRODUCTION	66
3.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE.....	68
3.2 A LINKING FRAMEWORK: PURPOSE, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY	69
3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY AND THE STUDY OF PARTNERSHIPS	69
3.4 AGENCY, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONAL REALISM	70
3.5 STRUCTURE AND ‘LIQUID MODERNITY’	72
3.8 LEGITIMACY THEORY AND PPP PERFORMANCE.....	73
3.8.1 Accountability and Legitimacy	73
3.8.2 Governance and Accountability.....	77
3.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	78
3.10 CONCLUSION	78
CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	80
4.0 INTRODUCTION	80
4.1 DESIGNING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	80
4.2 WORKING WITH THE UNDERPINNING PHILOSOPHY: CRITICAL REALISM	82

4.3 DEVELOPING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	84
4.3.1 Overview	84
4.3.2 Deriving the Research Questions	87
4.3.2.1 Research Question 1	87
4.3.2.2 Research Question 2	89
4.3.2.3 Research Question 3	91
4.3.2.4 Research Question 4	92
4.4 EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	94
4.5 CONCLUSION	94
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY	95
5.0 INTRODUCTION	95
5.1 Research Design and Rationale for the Design: Case Study	96
5.2 MULTIPLE CASE RESEARCH DESIGN	97
5.3 DEFINING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS	98
5.4 THE USE OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	99
5.5 SELECTION OF CASES	101
5.6 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES	102
5.6.1 Mixed-Method Design: The “Third Methodological Movement”	102
5.6.2 Research Technique 1: Semi-Structured Interviews	103
5.6.3 Research Technique 2: Archival Records	105
5.6.4 Research Technique 3: Participant Observation	106
5.6.5 Research Technique 4: Social Network Methods and Tools	108
5.7 DATA TRIANGULATION	110
5.8 PILOT OF THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT	111
5.9 DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL AND PROCESSES	113
5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents	114
5.9.2 Archival Data	117
5.9.3 Participant Observation	118
5.10 ASSEMBLING THE BACKGROUND DATA	119
5.11 DATA ANALYSIS: STRATEGY, PROCEDURE AND PRESENTATION	119
5.11.1 Analysis of Qualitative Data	122
5.11.1.1 Content Analysis	122
5.11.1.2 Text Analysis Procedures	122
5.11.1.3 Text Coding	123
5.11.1.4 Social Network Analysis	125
5.11.1.5 Presentation of Social Networks	125
5.11.2 Within-Case Analysis	126

5.11.3 Cross-Case Analysis.....	127
5.12 Research Quality: Validity, Reliability and Generalizability.....	127
5.12.1 Validity.....	128
5.12.1.1. Construct and Theoretical Validity	128
5.12.1.2 Internal Validity	129
5.12.1.3 External Validity and Generalizability of Findings	129
5.12.2 Reliability.....	130
5.13 RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENTATION FORMAT	130
5.14 Ethical Issues in the Research Process.....	131
5.14.1 Beneficence and Non-Maleficence.....	132
5.14.2 Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Anonymity.....	132
5.14.3 Researcher as Participant	134
5.15 Assumptions and Limitations of the Methodology	137
5.15.1 Limitations of the Design.....	137
5.15.2 Limitations of the Methodology, Instruments and Data Collection	138
5.16 CONCLUSION	140
CHAPTER 6: CASE ANALYSIS - GERRAN BUSINESS SCHOOL	141
6.0 INTRODUCTION	141
6.1 IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF GERRANTOWN ON THE PPP	142
6.1.1 Background to the country	142
6.1.2 Economic, Geographic and Social Vulnerabilities	142
6.1.3 Competitive Environment of Business Education	143
6.1.4 Small World Effect	144
6.1.5 Risk-Averse Business and Regional Isolation	145
6.1.6 Summary: Influence of the Country Context on the Partnership	145
6.2 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, GERRANTOWN CAMPUS	146
6.2.1 Financial Constraints.....	147
6.2.2 Resource Constraints, Regionalism and Strategic Actions	147
6.2.3 ‘Town and Gown’ Effect	149
6.2.4 Institutional Features of the University System	150
6.2.4.1 ‘Oxbridge’ Governance: Ideology, Values and Curriculum	150
6.2.4.2 Faculty Norms in Academia.....	152
6.2.4.3 Institutionalised Administrative and Academic Processes.....	153
6.2.4.4 ‘Pure’ Versus ‘Applied’ Research.....	154
6.2.5 Summary: Influence of the University on the PPP	156
6.3 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF PPP - GERRAN	156
6.3.1 Purpose: Strategic Developmental Organisation.....	156

6.3.2 Motivation for a Separate Organisation	157
6.3.3 Bridging the Relationship Gap.....	157
6.3.3.1 Building Relevance to Business and Addressing Development	158
6.3.4 Private Sector Motivation and Public Sector Obligation in a Co-Operative Model ...	159
6.3.5 University Ownership and Control	161
6.3.5.1 Social Network at Establishment	161
6.3.5.2 Control by Ownership and Right of Appointment.....	162
6.3.5.3 Structure of the Current Board of Directors: Social and Professional Ties	162
6.3.5.4 Stakeholder Model of Governance and the Common Good	164
6.3.6 Outcomes of Governance: Strategy Facilitated by Trust	166
6.3.6.1 University Supportiveness and Trust	166
6.3.6.2 Commitment to Competitiveness.....	166
6.3.6.3 Hierarchical Control and Trust among Actors	166
6.3.6.4 Primacy of the University System, Role Definition and Trust as Control Mechanisms	168
6.3.6.5 Shared Control and Unity of the Corporate Body.....	169
6.3.7 Private Control of Strategy and Public Ownership	170
6.3.7.1 Private-Sector and Academic Actors as ‘Resources’ in Governance.....	170
6.3.7.2 Learning and Congealing through Trust	171
6.3.7.3 Academic Disengagement – Constraints to Academic Resources	172
6.3.8 Cognitive Social Structure in Governance of Gerran.....	175
6.4 STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY: ACHIEVEMENT OF PURPOSE AS PERFORMANCE	176
6.4.1 Contribution of Actor Sub-Groups to the Strategy of the PPP	176
6.4.2 Socio-Political Legitimacy and Future of the PPP.....	179
6.5 CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS	180
6.6 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA IN THE CASE.....	180
6.7 CASE PROPOSITIONS	181
CHAPTER 7: CASE ANALYSIS - APPLE BUSINESS SCHOOL	183
7.0 INTRODUCTION	183
7.1 IMPACT OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT OF ARDEN ON THE PPP	183
7.1.1 Background to Arden.....	183
7.2 IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF ARDEN ON THE PPP	184
7.2.1 Economic and Political Influences.....	184
7.2.2 ‘Means-End’ Divide on Competitiveness in a Regional Market	185
7.3 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, ARDEN CAMPUS.....	186
7.3.1 Perception as ‘Ivory Tower’ and Ideological Differences	186

7.3.2 University Motivation for the Partnership: Financial and Stakeholder Needs.....	187
7.3.3 Compelling Private-Sector Purpose and Control	188
7.3.3.1 Private-Sector Led Initiative at Establishment.....	189
7.4 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE PPP AT APPLE.....	191
7.4.1 Purpose of the PPP: Strategic Entrepreneurial Organisation	191
7.4.2 Private-sector control: voluntary game in a competitive environment	192
7.4.2.1 Motivation for Control	192
7.4.2.2 Contrasting ‘Moral Syndromes’ and University Protectionism	194
7.4.2.3 Dense Network of Private-Sector Support to Key Organisational Actors	196
7.4.2.4 Separation of Management and Ownership in Corporate Governance.....	197
7.4.3 Relational Trust, Empowerment and Disempowerment through Curriculum Roles ..	199
7.4.4 Boundary Spanning Based on Conflict Management	200
7.5 STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY	203
7.5.1 Private-Sector Cognitive Social Structure.....	203
7.5.1.1 Dense Network of Private-Sector Contribution	205
7.5.2 Inside-Out Strategy and Leadership.....	206
7.6 CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS	207
7.7 CASE CONCLUSION: PPP SUCCESS AS A STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANISATION	208
7.8 SUMMARY OF CASE FINDINGS	209
CHAPTER 8: CASE ANALYSIS - ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL.....	211
8.0 INTRODUCTION	211
8.1 IMPACT OF THE CONTEXT OF ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL ON THE PPP: ROTTERDAM.....	211
8.1.1 Background to Rotterdam	211
8.1.2 A Hub for Regional Co-Operation.....	212
8.1.3 The Private Sector and Governments of the Region	213
8.1.4 Constraints of Size and Competitive Environment	213
8.1.5 A Culture of Respect and Partnership in Rotterdam	214
8.2 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM CAMPUS.....	216
8.2.1 University as an Institution for Regional Integration.....	217
8.2.2 Reputable Brand and Growth of Green University, Rotterdam	217
8.3 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS	218
8.4 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL	218
8.4.1 Background to Rotter Business School.....	218
8.4.2 Purpose of the Business School: Outreach Arm of the University	219
8.4.3 Nature of Private Involvement.....	219

8.4.4 Organisational Structure of the PPP: Corporate Training Entity	222
8.4.5 Ownership and Control	223
8.4.6 Financial Arrangements	224
8.4.7 Structure of the PPP Governance Mechanism	225
8.4.7.1 Motivation for PPP Governance Structure.....	225
8.4.7.2 Roles in the Governance Structure.....	225
8.4.7.3 Stakeholder Model of Governance in a Quasi-Market Context.....	226
8.4.7.4 Private Sector Cognitive Social Structure.....	228
8.4.7.5 Boundary Spanning Role of Directors	229
8.4.7.6 Threats to Internal Legitimacy of Rotter School of Business	230
8.5 STRATEGY OF THE PPP	232
8.5.1 Contribution of Actor Sub-Groups to Key Decisions.....	232
8.5.1.1 Organisational Separation and the Value Chain of Knowledge.....	234
8.6 FUTURE OF THE PPP.....	237
8.7 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CASE DATA	237
8.7.1 Limitations of the Findings	237
8.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AT ROTTER	238
CHAPTER 9: CROSS SITE ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION.....	240
9.0 INTRODUCTION	240
9.1 THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SITE ANALYSIS	240
9.1.1 Causal Toolkit for the Analysis.....	241
9.1.2 Proposition 1: Determining Purpose and Linking to Structure	242
9.1.3 Proposition 2: Determining Structure and Linking to Strategy.....	242
9.1.4 Proposition 3: Determining Strategy and Linking to Outcome.....	243
9.1.5 Proposition 4: Evaluation of PPP Performance.....	243
9.2 VARIABLES ACROSS SITES	244
9.2.2 Variables at the Level of the Firm.....	245
9.3 EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF THE PPPS.....	246
9.3.1 Funding Arrangements.....	246
9.3.2 Governance Arrangements.....	248
9.3.3 Growth of Private Sector Ideology	248
9.3.3.1 Birth of Private Ideology.....	248
9.3.3.2 Advancement of Private-Sector Ideology	249
9.3.3.3 Protection of Ideology in a Space of Constraint.....	250
9.3.4 Institutionalisation of the Ideology and Strategy of Competitiveness in a PPP	251
9.3.4.1 Private Dominance and Notions of Quality	251
9.3.5 PPP Strategy and Competitiveness	252

9.3.6 Managing Internal Threats	253
9.3.7 Summary of Ideology of Privatization and Governance across the Schools	253
9.3.8 Gerran: Development Purpose, Loose-Coupling and University Stewardship in Stakeholder Governance	254
9.3.9 Apple: Competitive Purpose, Loose-Coupling, and Private Control in Corporate Governance	255
9.3.10 Rotter: An Arm of a Developing University	255
9.4 INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE: ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS	256
9.4.1 Organisation of the Interpretation	256
9.4.2 Research Question 1: Defining Attributes of the PPP.....	256
9.4.2.1 Establishing Purpose: Addressing Country Needs or Embracing Opportunities .	257
9.4.2.2 Connection-Based, Shared and Facilitative Purpose of the PPP	257
9.4.2.3 Developing Cross-Sectoral Relationships.....	258
9.4.2.4 Managing Relationships and Resources in the PPP	259
9.4.2.5 Close Coupling of Governance Structure and PPP Purpose	259
9.4.3 Research Question 2: Composition and Structure of the PPP	260
9.4.3.1 Maximising Partner Contribution through Structure and Strategy	260
9.4.3.2 Restricting Partner Contribution	261
9.4.3.3 Optimising Private Contribution in a ‘Voluntary Business’ Game.....	261
9.4.3.4 Contradictory Supportive and Protectionist Public Roles.....	262
9.4.3.5 Optimising Private Management.....	263
9.4.4 Research Question 3: Opportunities and Constraints of the PPP	263
9.4.4.1 Cultural Embeddedness and Relationships	264
9.4.4.3 Challenging Institutional Embeddedness with Trust	265
9.4.4.4 Optimising Strategy by Boundary Spanning.....	266
9.4.5 Research Question 4: How does the PPP Build Legitimacy?	267
9.4.5.1 Leadership as Strategy	267
9.4.5.2 A strategy of Relevance	268
9.5 CONCLUSION	270
CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS	271
10.0 INTRODUCTION	271
10.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH.....	271
10.1.1 Research Purpose	271
10.1.2 Research Process.....	272
10.1.3 Answering the Main Research Question.....	273
10.2 DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS: LINKING FINDINGS TO THEORY	273

10.2.1 Defining Attributes of the PPP Governance Structure (Research Question 1)	273
10.2.1.1 A strategy for Optimising Private Ideology	273
10.2.1.2 Theme 1: Moving from Private to Shared Purpose and Shared Value	274
10.2.1.3 Theme 2: Optimising Models of Cooperation.....	275
10.2.2 Composition and Structure of the PPP Governance Arrangement (Research Question 2)	277
10.2.2.1 Theme 3: Structuration and Network Flows	277
10.2.2.2 Theme 4: Optimising Governance	279
10.2.3 Opportunities and Constraints of the PPP (Research Question 3)	281
10.2.3.1 Theme 5: Optimising Embeddedness through Boundary Spanning	281
10.2.3.2 Theme 6: Managing Trust.....	282
10.2.4 How Does the PPP Build Legitimacy? (Research Question 4).....	283
10.2.4.1 Theme 7: Governance, Leadership, Strategy and Legitimacy	283
10.2.4.2 Theme 8: Strategy of Relevance	285
10.3 EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	286
10.4 ASSUMPTIONS, DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS.....	286
10.4.1 Assumptions.....	286
10.4.2 Delimitations	287
10.4.2.1 Contextual Delimitations at Country Level	287
10.4.2.2 Contextual Delimitations at Firm Level.....	287
10.4.2.3 Contextual Delimitations at Actor Sub-Group Level.....	288
10.4.3 Limitations of the Study.....	288
10.4.3.1 Theoretical Limitations	288
10.4.3.2 Managerial Limitations	288
10.4.3.3 Limitations of the Findings	288
10.5 MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH: A RESEARCH AGENDA	289
CHAPTER 11: CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY AND PRACTICE	293
11.0 INTRODUCTION	293
11.1: INSERTION INTO THE FIELD OF PPPS	293
11.1.1 Redefinition of PPP in the Context	293
11.1.2 Evolution of a Model of Collaboration	294
11.1.3 Redefinition of the PPP Problem for National Policy.....	294
11.2 PROBLEMATISING PRIVATE SECTOR PPPS.....	295
11.2.1 The Right to Public Financing and Resource.....	295
11.2.2 The Demand for Competent Regulatory Frameworks	296
11.3 EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR PPPS IN EDUCATION	296
11.4 THE FUTURE OF PPPS	298

11.4.1 Gerran: Inspiring Innovation in Teaching, Learning and Research	299
11.4.2 Apple: A PPP at Crossroads of Separation	299
11.4.3 Rotter: A PPP at Crossroads of Reintegration	300
11.5 MANAGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE	301
11.5.1 Description of the Management Tool.....	301
11.5.1.1 Optimising Purpose, Structure and Strategy	301
11.5.1.2 Optimising Governance and Leadership	304
11.6 CLOSING REFLECTIONS.....	305
11.7 FUTURE PROFESSIONAL AGENDA	306
BIBLIOGRAPHY	308

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Modes of Welfare Provision and Funding	51
Table 2: Classification of Firms with Ownership Rights and Profit Orientation	58
Table 3: Assessment and Review of the Semi-Structured Interview Protocol: Pilot	112
Table 4: Case Study Database	114
Table 5: Interview Respondents: Gerran Business School	115
Table 6: Interview Respondents: Apple Business School	116
Table 7: Interview Respondents: Rotter Business School	116
Table 8: Summary of Archival Data	117
Table 9: Tests of Ethical Conduct	136
Table 10: Respondents' Comments on the Competitive Environment	144
Table 11: Financial Constraints at Gerrantown Campus	147
Table 12: Respondents' Views on Resource Constraints and Loss of Regionality	148
Table 13: Respondents' Comments on the "Town and Gown" Effect	149
Table 14: Respondents' Views on Institutionalised Ideology, Values and Curriculum Focus	151
Table 15: Institutionalisation of Faculty Norms	153
Table 16: Institutionalised Administrative and Academic Processes	154
Table 17: Effects of Institutionalisation of 'Pure' versus 'Applied' Research	155
Table 18: Motivation and Approach to the Partnership	160
Table 19: Appointment of the Board of Directors	163
Table 20: Evidence of the Stakeholder Model of Governance	165
Table 21: Respondents' Views on Structural Equivalence and Relevance	170
Table 22: Respondents Views on Learning within the Board of Directors	172
Table 23: Constraints to Academic Resources in Governance	174
Table 24: Respondents' Views on the Future of the PPP	180
Table 25: Respondents Views on the Impact of the Environment on the PPP	185
Table 26: Public versus Private Good	186
Table 27: Perception as 'Ivory Tower' and Ideological Differences	186
Table 28: Motivation for the Partnership	188
Table 29: Compelling Private Sector Purpose	189
Table 30: Need for a Separate PPP Organisation	192
Table 31: Purpose of a PPP Governance Structure	195
Table 32: Governance Strategy and Leadership at Apple	198
Table 33: Expectations of the Other and Role Expectations	201

Table 34: Respondents' Views on Conflict at Apple.....	202
Table 35: Evidence of Boundary Spanning Based on Relationships at Apple	203
Table 36: Inside Out Strategy and Leadership at Apple	207
Table 37: A Hub for Regional Co-Operation at Rotter.....	212
Table 38: Segregation with Lack of Government Commitment and Private Sector Capability	213
Table 39: Constraints of Size and Competitive Environment.....	214
Table 40: Education, Partnership and Development at Rotterdam	216
Table 41: The University as an instrument for regional integration	217
Table 42: Brand Reputation of Green University, Rotterdam	218
Table 43: Rotter as a Corporate Training Entity	223
Table 44: Relational Constraints at Rotter	231
Table 45: Reintegration of Rotter	237
Table 46: Evolution of Ideology of Privatisation and Governance Models.....	254

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Representation of the Theoretical Framework	67
Figure 2: Factors Informing the Design of the Conceptual Framework	81
Figure 3: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Conceptual Framework and Research Questions ..	85
Figure 4: Conceptual Framework for the Study of PPPs	86
Figure 5: Case Study Design.....	98
Figure 6: Unit of Analysis.....	99
Figure 7: Research Design	100
Figure 8: Model of Data Analysis.....	121
Figure 9: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Gerran	161
Figure 10: Social Network of KOAs - Gerran	167
Figure 11: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance - Gerran	176
Figure 12: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions – Gerran.....	178
Figure 13: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Apple.....	190
Figure 14: Social Network of Key Organisational Actors at Apple	196
Figure 15: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance at Apple.....	204
Figure 16: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions at Apple	205
Figure 17: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Rotter	220
Figure 18: Social Network of Key Organisational Actors at Rotter	228
Figure 19: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance at Rotter.....	232
Figure 20: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions at Rotter	233
Figure 21: Causal Model of PPP Evolution	244
Figure 22: Comparison of Variables across Sites	247
Figure 23: PPP Findings Model.....	292

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS	328
APPENDIX 2: WAYS OF PARTNERING.....	329
APPENDIX 3: OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE - THEORY AND CONCEPTS	330
APPENDIX 4: MAJOR THEORISTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS RELATED TO PPPS.....	341
APPENDIX 5: COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE THREE CASES	345
APPENDIX 6: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT: KEY ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS	349
APPENDIX 7: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT: OTHER DIRECTORS	350
APPENDIX 8: EMAIL TO RESPONDENTS.....	351
APPENDIX 9: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS PROTOCOL	352
APPENDIX 10: EMAIL FROM INDEPENDENT EXPERT	353
APPENDIX 11: CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT	354
APPENDIX 12: SUMMARY TABLES	355

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Collaborative systems that include public and private stakeholders face several challenges which must be addressed for successful partnering (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Bovaird, 2005; Dienhart and Ludescher, 2010). The problem arises as public and private organisations develop institutionalised systems that are unique and appear incompatible in many respects (Ghobadian et al., 2004a; Hodge and Greve, 2005). This study examines the partnership between the private sector and a university in the establishment and development of business schools in small, developing societies of the Commonwealth Caribbean to determine what contributes to their success. The thesis yields explanations of PPP success by examining the confluence of variables in the relationship between public and private sector actor sub-groups which affected the strategic decisions and legitimacy of the PPP organisations at various stages in their evolution.

1.1 A PARTNERSHIP AGENDA FOR RELEVANCE OF BUSINESS SCHOOLS

In recent years, business schools have been subject to increasing criticism with respect to the value of the MBA degree and the professional relevance of management scholarship (Ivory et al., 2006; Bennis and O'Toole, 2005; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; Ankers and Brennan, 2002). Some of the solutions to the challenges of business schools include mechanisms to increase relevance to the market such as adopting more market-oriented perspectives in strategic planning (Bailey and Dangerfield, 2000) and the management of faculty in new forms of knowledge co-production (Ivory et al., 2007 et al; James and Denyer, April 2008). These strategies involve the forging of alliances with the private sector (George et al., 2002). Alliance formation, and the factors that contribute to the success of alliances predominantly in the private sector, have been the subject of many studies (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Hitt et al., 2000; Harrigan, 1985; Parkhe, 1993; Pisano and Teece, 1989). While the importance of sector is underscored in studies focused on PPPs (e.g. Widdus, 2001; Hodge, 2006; Hall and Kennedy, 2008; Jones and Bird, 2000; Pessoa, 2008; Samii et al., 2002), the dynamics of the relationship between the public and private sectors in various industries, including

education, is largely unexplored in the academic literature. This study examines the PPP in governance arrangements in business schools by adopting a social network perspective and middle-range theories that explain strategic alliances. The research contributes a contextual theory of strategic alliances involving public and private sector partners in the governance of business schools in small developing countries.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

1.2.1 Academic Purpose

The challenge of this doctoral research is to arrive at defensible explanations of how business schools as PPPs meet the need to provide a relevant education in their societies. The response to the challenge of relevance in education came from various researchers, invariably seeking the advantage of collaboration between academia and industry (e.g. Starkey and Madan, 2001; Clinebell and Clinebell, 2008). Inclusion of the private sector in the governance of academic institutions, however, requires an understanding of the role of factors such as trust in the relational governance structure and process (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Collaborative strategy was examined from the perspective of the Board of Directors. The study examined the partnership phenomenon from a relational perspective, within the firm and in relation to its external environment. It is expected that the study of the partnership phenomenon in the process of strategic management will contribute to the discourse on achieving relevance in business education.

Several factors related to the context and history of cross-sectoral partnerships combine to provide a strong rationale for this contribution to the theories that explain strategic alliances and collaborative governance. It is evident that more partnerships are being fashioned across both the public and private sectors, involving for-profit and not-for-profit organisations, in an effort to harness the benefits, tangible and intangible, that can derive from such engagements. The assumption that these arrangements bring superior benefits is questionable and our understanding of how partnerships work is limited as PPP studies have been more descriptive, advocating and evaluative rather than explanatory (e.g. Jamali, 2004; Pessoa and Frias, July 2008; NEI Transport, 2001). This study will provide theoretical support for PPPs as a strategy to improve performance outcomes.

1.2.2 Professional Purpose

The empirical context for the research is the three business schools established as PPPs within Green University¹, a regional university with three campuses located in three countries of the region. The study seeks to determine how the PPPs functioned over the years and attained legitimacy in their environments. It focuses on identifying the factors and exploring the relationship between the factors that influence PPP governance models in business education in the context of the study. The researcher's interest is in the process by which the relationship creates value, having regard to the differing inputs of the public and private sectors in the process of partnering. The intention of this study is to explore the factors that influence PPPs for successful outcomes and to develop a theory that is contextualised in the realities of small, developing countries. This model will serve as a useful guide to practitioners engaged in PPPs in the region.

The study is critical to small, developing countries of the Commonwealth where organisations are more susceptible to the vagaries of economic, cultural and social environmental influences and the arbitrariness of individual action (Baldacchino, 1993; Briguglio, 2003). In small countries, success is often attributed to individual actors and the evidence of organisational learning and institutionalisation is weaker than for more developed countries (Baird et al., 1994; Lane et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007). Many PPPs in developing countries are being established with a view to advancing the development agenda (Pessoa, 2006) and, as such, it is important to establish the boundary conditions within which theories provide explanatory power and managerially relevant insights. The results of the study will provide valuable guidance to practitioners in the field and to policy makers as they engage in further partnerships with a view to optimising results.

The development agenda of small, commonwealth states gives rise to the question of the relative value of academic literature from developed societies in general, and the UK in particular, from which many institutional models were derived and to which they cling with some tenacity (Baldacchino, 1993). The small island states of the Commonwealth Caribbean gained independence in the latter half of the twentieth century and established fledgling institutions largely on the model of the metropolis. It

¹ Pseudonym.

is claimed that “...the orthodox development paradigm, in both its liberal and radical traditions, has borne little relevance to small developing states, either in theory or in practice” (Baldacchino, 1993, p.29). Further, it appears that “...mainstream development theory and strategy have borne little relevance to small developing states and continue to be perplexed by them” (Baldacchino, 1993, p.30). The failure of mainstream development theory is explained as an inability to respond to local realities and it is suggested that “...globally inspired innovations have often failed because they were not well attuned to the needs, values and cultures of the local context” (Crossley and Holmes, 2001, p.396). This is corroborated by authors in the Commonwealth who advocate “...a praxis informed by local experiences and guided by locally determined objectives; a formal intellectual tradition which is authentically native to their habitat” (Girvan and Jefferson, 1971; McIntyre, 1971, cited in Baldacchino, 1993, p.33).

Moreover, small states face unique vulnerabilities when compared with the metropolis including those of size and scale that result in a “phantom of liberty” (Armstrong and Read, 2002, p.435). The rapid development of some small states suggests that smallness is not a necessary condition for lack of development and indeed, some small states appear to “...offset this vulnerability and increase their resilience by means of appropriate endogenous policies” (Armstrong and Read, 2002, p.435). The suggestion that “...microstates have hardly ever looked at themselves critically in terms which are not of foreign, typically western, provenance” (ibid.) may provide insight into the reasons for the absence of local literature on small, developing states.

Indeed, the Caribbean has looked to integration within the region as a mechanism to overcome the limitations of size and other vulnerabilities but has failed despite several efforts (Axline, 1978). Relationships with the private sector are also challenging as “...the West’s impact during the nineteenth century on most of the developing world succeeded in producing almost everywhere an antipathy to private enterprise and, particularly, to foreign private enterprise” (Barsotti, 2002, p.338). The decolonisation of small states resulted in the removal of what were considered to be foreign authoritarian regimes and subsequent installation of democratic ones. The transformation project of democratization is viewed as one that requires strengthening of the new democratic regime and “protecting it against an authoritarian backlash” (Casper and Taylor, 1996, p.2). Institutional structures offer such protection and this

study emphasizes structure over agency in the investigation of the factors that contribute to successful dyadic relationships between the public and private sector sub-groups in formal governance roles. It is argued that, in such strategic networks of fluid structures, “fitness for purpose” is best evaluated in the public domain and, as such, legitimacy is an appropriate success indicator of their performance (Diamond, 2006).

Demonstration of fitness for purpose is achieved at the level of the firm as firms generate value, not governments (Porter, 1985). The PPP organisations in this study are not-for-profit organisations established to contribute to the organisational purpose of relevance in business education. Explanations of the PPPs as firms comprising public and private resources, including private voluntarism in governance, are postulated. It is argued that activities at the level of the firm provide an opportunity for the conversion of the technical knowledge of the West into valuable outputs to be used by developing nations, addressing the contention of Hagen (1963) that forces quite independent of the degree of contact determine whether a nation uses the knowledge of the West for economic growth.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The research is guided by a conceptual framework which was developed from a critical review of the literature on partnerships. The framework highlighted concepts and an appropriate interrogative process for answering the overall research question: *How do public private partnerships influence business school performance in the English-speaking Caribbean?* The following sub-questions were developed to guide the collection of data:

1. What are the defining attributes PPPs established as business schools in small, developing countries of the Caribbean region?
2. How do the composition and structure of the governance arrangement support the contribution of public and private partners to decision-making?
3. What opportunities and constraints are presented by the embeddedness of the PPP social network?
4. How does the PPP strategy utilized by business schools in the English-speaking Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success?

The objective of the research is to develop a dynamic model to optimise the performance of PPPs established in similar contexts.

1.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

The study uses existing theories and contributes explanations of how public-private partnerships in business schools in small, developing countries are established and evolve as they attempt to address their purpose. The main propositions of the explanations of PPPs address the relationships between public and private sector actor sub-groups in voluntary organisations in the context. The explanations that have emerged hold implications for the practice of cross-sectoral partnering in higher education in small, developing countries. The findings of the study led to a reformulation of the view of PPPs as follows:

PPPs exist in 'liquid spaces of interaction' (Lichtenstein et al., 2006) inspired by actors in 'semi-autonomous spheres' (Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004a) of public and private institutions, seeking solutions with the other, against legitimacy threats and perceived gaps by the other. Actors participate in different ways, based on whether the PPP is perceived as an opportunity or constraint and their own position as resource limitation, support or inspiration. The embeddedness of actors in their institutional contexts and configured identity in the 'space of interaction' creates tensions and institutional distortions which influence their participation and PPP performance. The PPPs challenge institutional norms and agency is more an 'act of interpretation' (Suddaby et al., 2010, p.1239) of the meaning of structure of the network. PPPs and their parent organisations develop cognitive and socio-political legitimacy in the resolution of the gap, in a process that inspires innovation from one or the other.

Causal explanations of success in the governance of the PPP at each school relied on unique configurations of relationships and tensions in each case. As such, they could not be combined to produce a compelling cross-case argument that answers the research question that guided the study. This finding therefore led the researcher to posit a theory of 'corporate governance as inspiration' in liquid spaces of interaction and to re-define the research question in the context of these spaces. The new question "In what spaces of interaction do PPPs inspire innovation in business schools in small,

developing countries to achieve their purpose?” creates an agenda for further research into the inter-institutional arrangements considered as public private partnerships.

Corporate governance as inspiration is based on a contextual economic theory of the firm. It is a theory of social change derived from the perspective of critical realism and contextualised at the level of the firm in business schools established as semi-autonomous public-private organisations in small, developing countries of the Caribbean. The theory of social change proposes that partners in the PPP arrangement resolve tensions so as to optimise the legitimacy of the socio-technical system in a process that recognises several tensions of structuration (Giddens, 1984) as they confront the meaning structure of the social network (Fuhse, 2009).

The thesis derives from the focus of the study on the Board of Directors and the way in which they inspired and facilitated social change. The study attempted to address a local need to understand why PPPs exist, the role they play as organisations in the context and how actors in institutional roles must come to them (Balgobin, 2005). The PPPs were established to respond to the need for relevance in business education by bridging the gap between the University and private sector in each country. They were legally established as non-profit semi-autonomous organisations, with boards of directors that separated ownership from management (Tricker, 1984). The power to appoint members of the board of directors reflected the ‘ownership’ of the PPP where private sector actors served as volunteers and University actors adopted the role of elites. At the level of the firm, public and private actor sub-groups adopted roles that reflected ownership, stakeholder agency and voluntary contribution as the PPPs challenged and redefined institutional norms to seek their economic success and legitimacy. In this context, protectionism and trust were found to be antithetical to PPP economic success. Private sector actors in regimes contributed to PPP economic success in an enactment of games described as ‘voluntary monopoly’.

The PPPs were initiated by the private sector and challenged the view that PPPs should bring private resources into public projects, rather than bring public resources into private projects (Datta, 2009). Co-opted or voluntary partners with differing ideologies co-existed to provide resources or influence which were shared or contributed. Where resources were contributed, PPP challenges arose in relation to value for money

(Weihe, 2008; Yong 2010). There was close coupling of the PPP purpose and structure in a process of ‘structuration’ to attain the purpose of the organisation (Giddens, 1984).

Corporate governance as inspiration is based on the view of the firm as a cosmos (Latour, 2004; Latour, 2007). It recognises the dynamics of disequilibrium that engage the tenets of a resource-based view of the firm, competitive strategy, and structuration for optimisation. It recognises the dynamic tensions between purpose, structure and strategy at the level of the firm and the particular role of the Board of Directors in PPP organisations. Corporate governance as inspiration proposes that the governance of the firm is a process for the optimisation of responsibility, ownership and leadership in cross-sectoral partnerships.

Where PPPs are established as strategic developmental organisations, the purpose of corporate governance appears to be the inspiration, direction and control of leadership behaviours and strategy in the interest of the developmental purpose. This future research agenda that includes the “leadership challenge” (Kouzes and Posner, 2002, p.xviii) is perhaps already being addressed in the Caribbean context through explorations of leadership based on a humanist philosophy (Ferguson, 2009).

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis is structured into eleven chapters. Chapter One presents an overview of the entire study and locates the problem within its context. It also describes the rationale for the study of the problem in business schools in small, developing countries and explains the focus on the governance mechanism of the PPP.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide an overview of the problem and explanations derived from both theory and practice. Chapter 2 presents the Literature Review with a critical assessment of partnerships that have emerged across sectors. PPPs are explored in the context of the New Public Management and the issues of cross-sectoral governance arrangements that involve public institutions and the private sector are examined. An overview of strategic alliances, as the main form of private sector partnerships, provides insight into the factors that underpin successful partnering in business arrangements. Based on the literature, the framework for investigating partnerships at the level of the firm by focusing on the purpose, structure and strategy of the

partnership or alliance emerged. Chapter 3 addresses the Theoretical Framework and examines the theories that have been used to explain the success of strategic alliances and PPPs. In this chapter, the focus is on explaining why these theories provide an appropriate framework for deriving explanations of PPP success. This chapter is extended and complemented by the Conceptual Framework described in Chapter 4, which guided the research process. The conceptual framework combines and distils the findings from the practice literature reviewed in Chapter 2 with the theoretical framework in Chapter 3 to produce a “road-map” (Leshem and Trafford, 2007) for investigating the PPPs in the context in which the problem was derived.

Chapter 5 describes the research design and the processes for data collection, data analysis and presentation of the findings. Methods and research techniques are described and justified in the context of the research problem. The chapter includes a description and rationale for the philosophical underpinnings of the study. Assumptions and limitations and methods to address them in the study are identified.

The analysis of three cases is presented in Chapters 6 to 8. A background to each case is presented and the analysis follows the format of the country and institutional environment, the PPP as a firm; the dynamics of governance of the firm are included. Each case analysis ends with a summary of findings and questions raised for examination in the ensuing case.

Chapter 9 includes the cross-case analysis and distillation of findings of the study using the evidence across the cases. This is guided by propositions derived from the research questions. Major themes are explored and causal explanations across the three cases are provided. The findings provide insight into new theoretical advances that further the explanations of success in cross-sectoral collaboration partnerships. These are discussed in Chapter 10. In the final chapter, the application of contributions to policy concerns related to cross-sectoral partnering is elaborated. The final chapter also examines the significance and utility of its findings for management practice. It includes a management toolkit that is a consulting tool for the management and optimisation of PPPs as organisations. This is the source of the original challenge that inspired the researcher and the chapter includes final reflections of the study.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: THE STUDY OF PARTNERSHIPS

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The problem identified for this research is to provide an explanation of how business schools established as public-private partnerships (PPPs) in small, developing countries achieve success. The problem is examined in the empirical context of the governance of organisations established as strategic alliances between a public university and the business community in the private sector of small, developing countries. The alliances were established with the broad purpose of achieving relevance in business education and contributing to the development agenda by bridging the gap between the University and the private sector. The study is located in the broader context of partnerships between public and private actors and agencies established for various purposes, with different legal and organisational forms and with varying outcomes. This chapter seeks to provide a critical review of cross-sectoral collaboration in order to identify the professional challenges, theoretical gaps, tensions and opportunities in PPP research.

The review proceeds by providing a theoretical and practical rationale for the research, establishing its significance to small, developing countries. The PPP phenomenon is examined to locate the study in the field and identify concepts and propositions relevant to the research. At the country level, issues particular to small developing countries are discussed to determine the challenges they present to the transfer of practice of PPPs from other contexts. The review then turns to the firm and includes an analysis of the evolution of cross-sectoral partnering arrangements in institutions and strategic networks, examining the history of partnerships and PPPs to develop understandings that will guide the work (Webster and Watson, 2002).

This critical review of the literature on partnerships compares and contrasts the emergence of the partnering phenomenon in the public and private sectors in developed and developing contexts. From this perspective, the relevance of theories and models from developed country contexts, including PPPs in the UK where the voluntary sector is actively engaged in partnerships with both government and the private sector, is examined. The partnership literature is reviewed to determine appropriate theoretical frameworks for studying cross-sectoral partnerships and the gaps or opportunities in the academic literature. Specific insights from public sector attempts at partnership with

the private sector are drawn from research on the New Public Management (NPM). Gleanings from private sector collaboration are derived from an examination of strategic alliances and networks. Finally, the relevance gap in universities and business schools is examined, particularly in relation to tensions in university-business governance arrangements, and the professional discourse is summarised in the chapter's conclusions.

2.1 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL RATIONALE

Many years of research into the problem of business school relevance led Corley and Gioia (2011) to conclude that theoretical contributions borne out of academic research in management must meet two criteria – originality and utility. PPPs produce new social configurations that are unexplored in the traditional management literature and “...traditional management theory offers limited guidance for the rapidly evolving models under which public, private and not-for-profit sectors co-operate in the provision of public services” (Bertels and Vredenburg, 2004, p.34). Further support for the possible emergence of new forms of theories inherent in PPPs is provided by Jones and Bird (2000) who, in their study of theoretical and political presentations of partnership in education in England, admitted that existing theorisations might be inadequate to understand the dynamics of partnerships.

2.1.1 Originality and Contextuality of the Research

Higher education institutions that are responding to changing conditions and paradigms are emerging as “entrepreneurial universities” with changing internal factors and a dynamic relationship with the environment that sustains their entrepreneurial drive (Gibb et al., 2009; Cano and Pulido, 2007; Guerrero and Urbano, 2010). Such universities have been found to be both knowledge producers and disseminators with support measures for entrepreneurship (Kirby, 2005). Further, entrepreneurial universities develop administrative techniques, strategies and competitive postures (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2001). For most universities, the problem of shifting the paradigm still remains and this perhaps warrants a shift in considering the organisational and institutional context in which faculty and researchers undertake their roles – the business school and the university as an institution.

2.1.2 Significance and Practical Utility of the Research

Collaborative efforts involve combinations of public, private and not-for-profit agencies and organisations in an effort to harness the benefits, tangible and intangible, that can derive from such partnerships (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). PPPs are deemed to be a panacea for the development challenges of many countries and there is a cry for increased public-private co-operation and partnership, especially in education (Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). Yet, challenges to implementation of PPPs in these contexts diminish the potential value to be derived (Pessoa, 2006). This study contends that small, developing countries require a different model of participation in PPP projects.

There is a paucity of research on the relationship between academics in public universities and the private sector in small, developing countries, the empirical context of this study. The way in which they collaborate to derive benefits for each other, and for the purpose of development, must be understood. The role of the university in small, developing societies in the Commonwealth Caribbean is linked to the development purpose and the university is seen to be an instrument of economic readjustment and social and political change (Williams, 1968). Where there is room for only one national university, it is suggested that the ‘Oxbridge’ model may not be best suited as this model is located within a space where other universities adopt the responsibility for responding to the social and technological needs of the modernised society (ibid.). The practical question of what university model is appropriate for small, developing countries and how the university responds to the demands of its environment is central to this study.

Practical utility is seen as the applicability of research to the problems practicing managers face and, as such, theories of practical importance would “...focus on prescriptions for structuring and organising around a phenomenon and less on how science can further delineate or understand the phenomenon” (Corley and Gioia, 2011, p.18). Corley and Gioia suggest that tests of originality often lie in the way researchers integrate, rather than in the way they create new, concepts, and that theories should be opportunity driven (ibid.). This work, while it does not provide a model of how researchers can bridge the academic-practitioner divide to create great research contributions, does provide a lens of “prescience” through which we should examine the world for new insights (Corley and Gioia, 2011).

The concern for practical utility and consideration of prescience appear to be relevant to another conception of the gap that contributes to the problem of business school relevance – the distance being created between business and society (Huff and Huff, 2001). There is the recognition that “...we as a field have drawn the boundaries of our intended influence so narrowly that we have unintentionally abdicated our societal leadership responsibilities” (Corley and Gioia, 2011, p.28). This statement however, positions the role of academia and business to respond to societal needs from a motive of personal and professional “responsibility” – a motive that drives the corporate social responsibility movement (Weisband, 2009; Stratling, 2007; Moon, 2002). The realities and problems of developing countries, however, are so exacerbated that business and academia have found it necessary to explore the phenomenon as a strategic consideration in their business models (Prahalad, 2010). From this perspective, poverty and other social realities of the developing world are viewed as a business opportunity with a profit motive linked to social development (Prahalad, 2010) requiring other indicators of business performance such as the “triple bottom line” of business success (Elkington, 1998). This is also consistent with the view that “...both business decisions and social policies must follow the principle of *shared value* (Porter, 2008, p.487; author's italics).

2.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

2.2.1 The Broad Scope of PPPs

Public private partnerships have existed for many years and have evolved into many different types of relationships, often appearing to be a nebulous concept (Weihe, 2006). Yet, co-operation between the public and private sectors has been evident throughout history in the evolution and development of society (Wettenhall, 2003; Wettenhall, 2005). PPPs include organisations in various sectors and are often fundamentally different with regard to “...legal status, governance, management, policy-setting prerogatives, contributions and operational roles” (Jamali, 2004, p.416). Despite these variances, the relationship is considered a PPP if it is characterised by “...joint definition of specific goals, and a clear assignment of responsibilities and areas of competence between the partners in the pursuit of a common endeavour” (Jamali, 2004, p.416). PPPs also fit the broader description of strategic cooperative agreements

and with respect to their positioning in a continuum of hierarchical control as opposed to market control, they can be described as “...contractual business networks based on joint multi-party strategic control, with the partners collaborating over key strategic decisions and sharing responsibilities for performance outcomes” (Todeva and Knoke, 2005, p.3).

PPPs are understood by many to be co-operative relationships between the public and private sectors for the delivery of public infrastructural projects and services (e.g. Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Yong, 2010; Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Skelcher, 2005a; World Bank, 2007). PPP arrangements exist in many developed and developing countries and across several sectors including education, health and infrastructure (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). Some authors discuss the complexity of defining PPPs and have concluded that the questions raised depend on “...how far you cast the net of definition” (Greve, 2010, p.87). The PPPs considered in this study are those collaborative ventures described as PPPs by authors such as Hodge and Greve (2005) and Pessoa (2008) who define PPPs broadly as institutional co-operation between public and private actors and agencies. The study extends the thesis of public-private partnerships as “...cooperative efforts between the private and public sectors in the areas of technical, professional, and educational activities as well as research, management, and public policy” (Mitchell, 1990, p.29). The bases for varying definitions and characteristics of PPPs are discussed in the sub-sections below. The PPPs in this study must be understood in the context of the overall evolution of private and public sector co-operation.

2.2.2 The Need for Partnering Across Sectors

Democratic society has always concerned itself with the just and equitable provision of services in all realms of human life (Paehlke, 2004). The role of the state in the provision of services was prominent in this regard until the 1970s when disillusion with “...the role of the state as an agent of accumulation, development and economic redistribution...swung the ideological barometer toward a celebration of the market” (Howell and Pearce, 2002, p.3). Free-market capitalism advanced with modernisation, democracy and liberalism but did not yield the equitable outcomes anticipated in market-state relations (Jessop, 2002). Warnings about the free-market economy, which

developed through the years, especially in the eighteenth century, came quite early from Polanyi (1944). Polanyi opposed free-market capitalism as the cause of political and social collapse, as he saw it as displacing the natural social state – a system of mutual obligation that bound and protected individuals (Polanyi, 1944). Separation of thought with respect to statism and free market ideology resulted in the emergence of public and private sectors as the vanguards of the state and free markets, respectively (ibid.). Within the last few decades, PPPs were seen “...as a means of reducing the dominance of the public sector and as a means of improving organisational efficiency through the market” (Harris, 2005, p.79).

The early 1980s saw the emergence of collaborative and cooperative ventures between the public and private sectors as strategies of neo-statism and neo-corporatism; a negotiated approach to balancing co-operation and competition (Jessop, 2002). Public private partnerships became a dominant feature of this public-private cooperation and have provided a workable solution to many of the problems of financing, management and service quality in the provision of education, health services and public infrastructure (Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Ghobadian et al., 2004a; Hodge and Greve, 2005). The phenomenon of PPPs, as it may be so described, given the range of projects and co-operative institutional arrangements included in the umbrella term of PPP across the globe, is prevalent in developed and developing societies where they have different drivers, purposes, forms and impact (Jamali, 2004). The review describes some of the arrangements included under the umbrella term of PPPs so as to explore the country and institutional factors that motivated their emergence, examine the way in which they worked and derive insights that would contribute to an improved understanding of the problem identified for this study of cross-sectoral alliances.

2.2.3 PPPs as Long-Term Commercial Partnerships

A PPP is defined as “...a long-term commercial arrangement for the delivery of public services, where there is a significant degree of risk-sharing between the public and private sectors” (Yong, 2010, p.7). They are predominant in the development and execution of infrastructure policies and projects in many countries (Weihe, 2008; Hodge and Greve, 2009). In the UK, they are popularised as private finance initiatives (PFIs) which are contractual agreements “...where the private sector performs the

DBFO functions and in return receives a fixed payment stream from the government” (Yong, 2010, p.10). They are considered as only one sub-set of the broader set of PPPs and the applicability of the PFI model to PPPs in developing countries is challenged on the basis of two major issues: “...(i) the capacity of developing countries’ governments to provide a regular payment stream to the PFI contractor and (ii) the poor creditworthiness of some governments for private investors and therefore the higher cost of capital and concomitant impact on the value for money of the potential contract” (ibid.). A broader definition that blurs the resource distinction between public and private is suggested by Skelcher (2005) who claims that PPPs “...combine the resources of government with those of private agents (businesses or not for profit bodies) in order to deliver societal goals” (Skelcher, 2005b, p.347). The research raises questions of how money and value are combined and leveraged in the PPP to deliver on the goal of social and economic development.

PPPs are guided by long-term contracts (Wettenhall, 2007) or partnership agreements where partners “...have a mutual interest and a unified commitment” (Yong, 2010, p.8). This type of collaboration appears to be antithetical to most forms of contracting which involve competition (Milward and Provan, 2003). The nature of the contract is usually relational and it is claimed that it is only these that will produce genuine partnerships (Wettenhall, 2007). Relational contracts are usually long-term, mostly implicit, involve a large measure of trust between the parties, and they have been described elsewhere as “social contracts” (Macneil, 1980). In developing countries, however, it is suggested that PPP contracts should avoid ambiguities and include regular monitoring and reporting mechanisms and key performance indicators for monitoring success (Yong, 2010). A major focus of this study is the assessment of the extent to which elements of relational contracting and mechanisms for monitoring performance are utilised to legitimise and sustain the PPPs in business education in developing countries.

2.2.4 PPPs as Inter-Organisational Relationships

PPPs are broadly defined as “...cooperative institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors” (Hodge and Greve, 2005:1). This definition is extended to include the importance of purpose and interests of actors whereby the PPP is

considered to be “... a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the private sector to achieve a common objective while both players pursue their own individual interests” (Pessoa, 2008, pp.3-4). In these arrangements which may include any combination of public institutions, private organisations and NGOs, there is collaboration to pursue clearly defined common goals while leveraging joint resources and capitalising on the respective competences and strengths of the public and private partners (Widdus, 2001; Pongsiri, 2002; Nijkamp et al., 2002; Jamali, 2004).

A more recent evolution of PPPs in the UK are strategic service partnerships which are hybrid organisational forms through which public and private sector organisations pursue shared interests (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Baker, 2008). While actors generally belong to multiple networks and contribute to them all through the various roles they play, the creation of new organisational and structural frameworks that guide the partnership arrangements requires exploration of how these new frameworks account for partnership outcomes (Diamond, 2005). This is a significant component of the agenda of this work.

2.2.5 PPPs in Education and Business Schools

PPPs in education were found to attain different levels of success. There are four main objectives of PPPs in education: increasing enrolment, improving educational outcomes, reducing inequality and reducing cost (Patrinos et al., 2009). PPP contracts gives schools more decision-making authority in terms of how they manage the allocation of resources, thereby gaining efficiency. In the UK, the Education Action Zones projects were PPP projects in the education sector designed to “...take education–business links to a qualitatively new level... to bring the resources and capabilities supposedly possessed by business directly to bear on a broad educational agenda organised around objectives of social cohesion as well as economic productivity” (Jones and Bird, 2000, p.492). It was found that theories of ‘networking’ and ‘heterarchy’ are “...not fully attentive to the ways in which the interplay of network partners is affected by inequalities of power and resources, and to the systemic presence in partnerships of conflicts over influence and management” (Jones and Bird, 2000, p.504). Similarly, in their evaluative study of private finance initiatives (PFIs) in education in the UK, Kakabadse et al. (2007) noted that while PFIs are motivated by

the need to raise standards in schools, the “hard” benefits of PFI adoption related to cost control and project management were realised as opposed to the “soft” factors in terms of impact on teaching and learning. Other studies that have sought to identify the impacts that education partnerships have on the quality of education outcomes have yielded different outcomes (Eaton and Akbiyikli, 2005; Gibson and Davies, 2008). In their study of private investment in infrastructure at two primary schools in the UK, Gibson and Davies (2008) found that the PPP significantly impacted student attainment and behaviour and the attitude of school personnel. Challenges to sustainability of the relationship were a major concern as the PPPs were viewed negatively as an attempt to privatise education. Still, there is no mention of how exactly this unique configuration of relationships and processes influenced the quality of outcomes in education. While the study identified correlates of success, there were no rich investigations into the processes - acts, activities and behaviours - that brought about these successes.

2.2.6 Challenges to PPPs

2.2.6.1 Conceptual Challenge as ‘Partnership’

The definition and meaning of ‘partnership’ are perhaps the most contested notions within the partnership literature (Diamond, 2006). Some authors claim that ‘partnerships’ have become over-used and ill-defined in terms of conceptualization and as a policy response (Laffin and Liddle, 2006). In an examination of a case study, Wettenhall (2007) concluded that many relationships purporting to be PPP are cross-sectoral mixes but are “...far from “partnerships” and often likely to involve elements of grossly uneven risk-bearing, lack of proper accountability and even exploitation” (Wettenhall, 2007, p.392). The author suggests that PPPs are defined by “...consensual decision-making and horizontal, non-hierarchical relationships (resulting in) significant synergies between the parties... for the benefit of the communities involved” (ibid, p.407). Wettenhall (2007) also notes that a genuine PPP is marked by mutual benefit and mutual respect and trust between the partners that remove the competitive and exploitative tendencies evident in some PPP arrangements.

2.2.6.2 Political Challenges

In the UK, PPPs face political challenges and are considered a language game in the privatisation drive as "...a number of governments have tried to avoid using the term 'privatisation' or 'contracting out' in favour of speaking about 'partnerships' (Hodge and Greve, 2009, p.34; Savas, 2000). It is claimed that public agencies enter into co-operative arrangements to get more resources, satisfy norms and values, obtain political advantage, solve problems, reduce uncertainty and obey legal mandates (Weiss, 1987). It is suggested that PPPs are most challenged when "...political differences come to the surface among the agencies and the diverse constituencies to which they must respond" (Friend, 2006, p.261).

A more positive linguistic agenda related to PPPs is the use of the generative marriage metaphor to describe the relations between public and private partners (Datta, 2009; Miraftab, 2004). It appears that the marriage metaphor holds some potential for explaining PPP success as a generative metaphor is a "...vehicle (for organizing) our thoughts about the tenor in a new way, selecting and emphasizing features of the subject matter different from those highlighted by conventional language, and even pointing out properties of the underlying subject that had gone unnoticed until the metaphor drew attention to them" (Lewis, 1996, p.493). Although there are "multiple meanings" associated with the phenomenon of public-private partnering (Linder, 1999, p.35), PPPs are now widely understood to be more than a political game in many settings and are considered to be a sustainable commercial arrangement designed to obtain significant value for money (Weihe, 2008; Yong, 2010). The privatization agenda of PPPs is debunked on arguments that include the fact that PPPs are based on co-operation rather than competition between the public and private sectors and endorses new roles for each (Linder, 1999). The extent to which this is the meaning of partnership in emerging economies must be understood as business-group capitalism and public-private capitalism are particularly common outcomes of privatization and neither is well researched because of their rarity in the West (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). An important differentiator is that "...the purposes remain public, even though the resources are eventually mixed" (Linder, 1999, p.46).

2.2.6.3 Dynamics of Risk and Value

Another defining feature of PPPs is the transfer of risk from the public to the private sector (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Yong, 2010). In developed countries where PPP projects are financed by the private sector and government transfers to the private sector over time, much like a “mega credit card” (Greve, 2010, p.588; author’s quotation marks), the question of value for money arises (National Audit Office (UK), 2008; Yong, 2010). Some researchers equate value with synergy and note that the model of collaboration in the PPP arrangement provides the potential for generating ‘simple cost savings’ or ‘real synergy’ where substantive surplus value is generated (Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Weihe, 2008). The way in which the PPP is conceived to balance risk and value provides an opportunity for evaluation and it is suggested that in evaluating the success of the PPP “...we ought to base our analysis on the underlying objectives of PPPs” (Hodge and Greve, 2010, p.96).

2.2.7 Insertion into the Field of PPPs

This study adopts the broad view of PPPs and notes that the term is also used to describe the numerous ways in which civil society actors and voluntary ‘third sector’ organizations interact with the public sector (Hodge and Greve, 2010). In this study, the PPP phenomenon results from the contribution of public and private partners to the strategy of business schools established as not-for-profit organisations within universities. The PPPs are long-term economic arrangements between public and private organisations for the purpose of relevance in business education. Issues of PPPs as political games, management initiatives and governance in tertiary education are explored. This study is located in the broader stream of literature on PPPs as it examines a long-term commercial arrangement between actor sub-groups from the private sector and public universities. It also considers PPPs as relational exchanges for the creation of value as opposed to discrete transactions (Dwyer et al., 1987). Additionally, it examines the organisational and structural frameworks of PPPs that are new organisational forms, accountable for the implementation of the partnership (Diamond, 2005).

2.2.8 What is Not a PPP?

In view of the range of collaborative arrangements considered under the PPP umbrella, it is useful to demarcate the partnership literature that is not considered relevant to this work. The following list of criteria serves to clearly define the structural and organisational relationships that are not directly relevant to this study of partnerships:

- Partnerships that are short-term projects within and across sectors;
- Projects governed by traditional contractual arrangements considered as spot or classical contracts (Kay, 1993);
- Networks of firms engaged in strategic alliances within and across sectors for organisational value creation, rather than for an overarching, public purpose.

2.3 SECTORS AND TENSIONS: PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NON-PROFIT

2.3.1 Tensions across Sectors

Several studies have discussed the differences between the public and private sectors (Vigoda-Gadot and Kapun, 2005; Ghobadian et al., 2004a; Perry and Rainey, 1988; Weintraub, 1997; Cho and Lee, 2001). Dichotomies are created as the profit goals of private organisations are contrasted with the service goals of larger bureaucracies that shape the lives of citizens through public policy (Murray, 1975). One study of management in the public and private sectors found that there were only three major differences and concluded that “...public organizations are more bureaucratic, and public managers are less materialistic and have weaker organizational commitment than their private sector counterparts” (Boyne, 2002, p.97).

Tensions between the private and public sectors also emerge from the management literature that provides a discourse of “public bad, private good” (Jamali, 2004, p.415; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). With respect to education, Ball (2007, p.3) observes that the discourse of public sector reform generates a “discourse of distrust” that portrays the public sector as “...ineffective, sloppy, unresponsive, risk-averse and innovation-resistant”. The author considers the role of private actors in ‘entrepreneurial governance’ (Hall, 2003) and the “destatalisation” and the re-articulation of the relationship between organisations and tasks across the public-private divide (Ball,

2007, p.3). Any examination of what goes on inside the “black box” of the PPP relationship warrants active consideration of the different philosophies and values of actors and the institutional and behavioural differences inherent in the sectors.

2.3.1.1 Tensions of Philosophy and Ideology

This study focuses on the contribution of actors in two structurally categorised groups (public and private sector) to the strategic direction of a not-for-profit organisation with a developmental purpose. It assumes different ideologies of these two groups. Ideologies may be assumed to be “...the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests and values of groups” (Van Dijk, 1993, p.258). The importance of ideology in understanding social life is underscored by the fact that “...we all live and communicate with and through ‘ideology’ and we are all both ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘victims’ of ideology’, thanks to the fact that we speak a language and live in a culture” (ibid.). Meanings of actions are interpreted from an understanding of “cultural models” which are a “...groups’ construction that becomes a resource that an individual may call on to guide his or her actions” (Gee and Green, 1998, p.123). In this study, the existence of an ideology and the presence of cultural models that guide the actions of groups are assumed on the basis of the categorization of actors into roles based on their employment and occupation status. This presents methodological challenges and limitations to the work. Some of the major challenges to PPPs include areas of ideological contestation by those opposed to private ideology, especially from the non-profit sectors that advocate political legitimacy, partnerships and collaboration (Taylor and Warburton, 2003).

2.3.1.2 Institutional and Behavioural Differences

A typology of differences between public and private sector organisations was developed by (Ghobadian et al., 2004b). The authors cite several areas where behaviours of public and private sector actors differ. With respect to motivation, the private sector’s profit motive and the creation of shareholder value is contrasted with the public sector’s concern for the economic, social and environmental well-being of the community (ibid.). Another significant difference is the scope of products or services. In the private sector this is determined by business imperatives and managers exhibit a high level of control and discretion whereas in the public sector this is

determined by statutory requirements and/or social considerations (ibid.). Differences are also cited in the pursuit of quality where the private sector is motivated to do so if it makes commercial sense and the public sector assesses quality in terms of social impact. The cultural traits of competitiveness and entrepreneurialism in the private sector are contrasted with fairness and respect for hierarchy and traditions in the public sector (Ghobadian et al., 2004b); the full list of characteristics is presented in Appendix 1. These differences are considered in the relationship between public and private sector actor sub-groups in the PPP.

2.3.2 Voluntarism and the Non-Profit Sector

The non-profit or voluntary sector is considered important to this work as the PPPs are established as not-for-profit organisations where actors contribute voluntarily (e.g. Radin and Romzek, 1996; Waddock, 1988). The voluntary sector includes organisational forms that fall outside the typical definitions of public and private sectors and is variously referred to as the charitable sector, independent sector, voluntary sector, tax-exempt sector, non-governmental organisation, *économie sociale* or non-profit sector (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). As a result of definitional issues, Salamon and Anheier (1997) suggest “...a movement away from the *institutional notion of non-profit sectors* toward an *operational definition of non-profit organizations* (p.496, their italics).

Salamon and Anheier (1997) describe four major types of definition of the non-profit sector including the legal definition, the economic/financial definition that recognises the differences of source of revenue from market activities or contributions, the functional definition that emphasises the function or purpose for which the organisation is established and the structural-operational definition that emphasizes the structure and operation of the entity. Based on their analysis of the models of non-profits around the world, Salamon and Anheier (1997, p.48) concluded that the “structural-operational” definition of the non-profit sector is “...a useful foundation around which to organize serious thinking about and research”. The authors suggest that there are five guiding principles:

1. The entity must be organized or institutionalized to some extent, private or institutionally separate from government.

2. The organisation must be privately as opposed to publicly controlled.
3. The entity must also be self-governing and equipped to control their own activities.
4. Voluntary organisations do not distribute profits to stakeholders or shareholders and surpluses are “plowed back into the basic mission of the agency” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p.33). This contrasts with the private for-profit sector that focuses on profit distribution to shareholders. It does not negate the need for a commercial sense and managerialism in the advancement of the cause as advocated by Porter (1985).
5. Not-for-profit organisations must involve “...some meaningful degree of voluntary participation” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p.34) and actors are usually involved “...in the giving of gifts of time or other valuables for public purposes” (Salamon and Anheier, 1997, p.13). In the continuing debate on the differences between ‘giving’ and ‘volunteering’ and the way in which they contribute to civic life, Jones (2006) concluded that “...volunteering is most strongly promoted by community ties and increased giving is best explained by personal resources and helping values” (p.249).

The voluntary sector in the UK and the US is well developed and these countries appear to share a conceptual understanding of this sector whereas developing countries are characterised by a general lack of a distinguishable non-profit sector (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). The UK and the US may therefore provide insight into voluntarism in partnerships. The voluntary sector considered here is the private voluntary sector, as opposed to philanthropic organisations, and is “...a set of private organizations providing a wide variety of information, advocacy, and services” (ibid.). The question arises as to whether the voluntary contribution of the private sector in PPPs in developing countries is reflective of social entrepreneurs who implement “private sector strategies for social sector success” (Emerson and Twersky, 1996:quotation in title; Kearns, 2000) or whether it is “...based on the traditions of the voluntary sector itself than in the competition-based management approach inherent in private sector administrative theory and practice” (Bush, 1992, p.391). It is argued that

“...administration in the voluntary sector should be mission based and mission driven; be grounded in the historical traditions of altruism, compassion, and philanthropy; remain sensitive to the key value of volunteerism and to the phenomenon of the volunteers themselves; continue to act as mediating structures between the individual, the community, and the public and private organizations of modern society...” (Bush, 1992, p.391).

The production of revenue by doing a social good also appears to be acceptable for non-profits (Dart, 2004) and there may be room for synergies between both views. The research seeks to examine the tensions that affect the nature of private and public voluntary contribution to PPPs established as non-profit organisations in developing countries.

2.3.3 Crossing the Divide

Reaching across sectors to partner requires crossing many divides, including the bridge between the ideology and values of the public sector, the pragmatic concerns of the private sector and the moral codes that guide the voluntary sector. Advantages of partnering in PPP arrangements for the public sector include better programme performance, cost-efficiencies, and better service provision while the private sector gains better investment opportunities or opportunities to expand its business interests (Jamali, 2008). Non-profits are urged to examine how their narrow interests may be perceived as advocacy and to focus on attaining technical and political legitimacy as they seek to participate in new forms of governance (Taylor and Warburton, 2003).

The issues raised in examining the divide between the private and public sectors suggest an internal focus on the part of the private sector (Ghobadian et al., 2007). It appears that private actors are motivated in the main by projects that are commercially viable and would be achievable on their terms of engagement (ibid.). Austin and McCaffrey (2002) examined the motivation of businesses and business leadership coalitions to engage in PPP arrangements. The authors found that CEOs choose to become engaged in community affairs in three ways – as individual civic leaders, as corporate CEOs or as members of a business collective (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002, p.40). They found that motivation usually centred on economic crises but then may

progress into the experience of the more strategically motivated partnerships. They also found that governance alliances were often pragmatic, functional partnerships that were purpose-driven with a primary focus on particular outcomes usually centred on economic development (ibid.). Their research framework of regime theory led them to describe this as a pro-growth orientation (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). This study though acknowledges the relational nature of PPPs and stops short of using relational theories to explain its findings. Yet, it is powerfully descriptive and hints at the challenges and competencies required to partner across the divide, as well as the various levels at which PPPs must be considered including the individual actor/organisational and institutional levels.

PPPs and other cross-sectoral collaborations result in the blurring of activities and responsibilities towards a “...diffuse forcefield in which public and private interests have to be reconciled” (Jamali, 2008, p.416). The complexity of reconciling opposing values in PPPs to “...marry the best of both sectors’ in order to overcome the weaknesses of both” is noted (Baru and Nundy, 2008, p.68). This requires the adoption of the view of partnerships as an opportunity rather than a threat of loss of control (Jamali, 2008). In an attempt to address the realities of partnering, Jamali (2008) suggested that the focus should be on “...identifying common goals, delineating responsibilities, negotiating expectations and building bridges...Attention needs to be accorded to developing mechanisms – structures, processes and skills – for bridging organizational/interpersonal differences and nurturing communication and coordination” (p.427).

2.4 Organisational-Institutional Context of PPPs

The PPP forms a socio-technical system which is “...the outcome of the activities of human actors...embedded in social groups which share certain characteristics (e.g. certain roles, responsibilities, norms, perceptions)” (Geels, 2004, p.900 parentheses in original). The involvement of cross-sectoral partners in different roles in the organisation raises questions about how actors from public, private and non-profit sectors enact their roles in the PPP organisation. The research contributes to the body of work that “...views organizations as constructs that interpret and elaborate institutional pressures” (Suddaby et al., 2010) and seeks to understand how elements of the broader

environment become elaborated within organisations (ibid.). A philosophy of organisations espoused in the developing country context is that the organisation is a combination of resources, strategy and execution for the attainment of purpose (Balgobin, 2005). This study examines how the cross-sectoral relationship influences the mechanism by which purpose is defined and resources are combined for organisational performance.

Several normative theories and policy guidelines, however, provide suggestions for successful partnering. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) has published a checklist for successful partnerships that includes factors such as leadership, networking and alliances, accountability, skills assessment and building trust. Kanter (1994) also suggests that key ingredients of effective collaboration include eight 'Is' which are individual excellence, importance, interdependence, investment, information, integration, institutionalization and integrity. In like fashion, Austin (2000) proposed seven 'Cs' as guidelines for managing strategic collaborations viz., connection-based purpose, clarity of purpose, congruence of mission, strategy and values, creation of value for all parties, communication, continuous learning and commitment. Hudson and Hardy (2002) also produced six principles for effective partnerships and Huxam and Vangen (2005) distilled six themes about collaborative practice. These 'normative recipes' tend to highlight steps that should be taken to ensure success but downplay other important factors that explain how that success is achieved.

Strategies to enhance success in partnerships include establishing a clear, shared sense of direction, adapting leadership to fit structure and moving from competition to collaboration (Berliner, 1997, p.5). In a study of strategic alliances, Gulati (1998) concluded that attention should be paid to five areas: "...(1) the formation of alliances, (2) the choice of governance structure, (3) the dynamic evolution of alliances, (4) the performance of alliances, and (5) the performance consequences for firms entering alliances" (p.293). This evolutionary perspective provides a framework for examining the total involvement of firms and partners in strategic alliances. Davies and Hentschke (2006) also sought to understand the managerial implications of partnership arrangements and found that for partnerships to improve organisational performance, "...the preconditions for partnering, the change dimensions involved in partnering and the mechanisms for partnering have to be given serious consideration if success is to be

achieved” (pp. 224-225). The authors cite major gaps in knowledge about the “why” and “how” of partnerships, an agenda for further exploration and research which is undertaken in this research. In this study of small organisations in the developing country environment, it is posited that the environment influences cross-sectoral partnerships within the organisation.

2.4.1 Organisation-Environment Challenges in Developing Countries

Organisation-environment theories explain the dynamic relationships of the socio-technical systems or internal environment and the external environment in which the organisation is located (Khandwalla, 1988; Jaeger and Kanungo, 1990). In this study of PPPs, the strategy of the alliance can be interpreted in the context of the external environment that features development challenges, and the internal environment that presents other performance challenges. An attempt to study PPPs in developing countries requires consideration of the environment and, as noted by Kiggundu et al. (1983) “...each time the environment is involved, the theory developed for Western settings does not apply, because it assumes contingencies that may not be valid for developing countries” (p.91). These differences are largely cultural, economic and political (ibid.).

2.4.1.1 External Environment: Scarce Economic Resources in Developing Countries

The scarcity of economic resources is perhaps one of the main challenges for developing countries (Hardy 1990; Briguglio, 1995; Stiglitz, 1998) and this affects the ability of the PPP organisation to secure project financing (Yong, 2010). Hardy (1990) concurred that the stage of economic development renders such countries “...more vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations, recession, inflation and external debt” (p.83). Indeed, organisations in such contexts of scarce resources may be more pressured to justify their existence in terms of economic success and counteract legitimacy challenges, especially in the early stages of their establishment. PPP projects in developing countries differ from those of developed countries mainly in the ability of governments to repay the private sector over time (Yong, 2010). The issue of transparency and quality in decision-making is even more important in small, developing countries where organisations are more susceptible to the vagaries of

economic, cultural and social environmental influences and the arbitrariness of individual action. In small countries, success is often attributed to individual actors and the evidence of organisational learning and institutionalisation is weaker than for more developed countries (Baird et al., 1994; Lane et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007).

2.4.1.2 External Environment: The Implications of Small Size

The issue of size is also a factor considered in this study and it may be argued that in small developing countries the problems of development are exacerbated by the size of the countries which render them more vulnerable to development pressures. A feature of small island states is their limited capacities both to produce and to consume as they cannot create monopolies and operate large-scale operations, they cannot develop substantial internal markets and they cannot raise large amounts of capital/finance on the home market (Bass, 1995). These factors often “...render the economies of these states very vulnerable to forces outside their control – a condition which sometimes threatens their economic viability. The GDP or GNP per capita of these states often conceals this reality” (Briguglio, 1995, p.1615). The economic vulnerability of small island developing states (SIDS) is demonstrated in their exposure to foreign economic conditions, remoteness and insularity, proneness to disasters and demographic changes, often caused by emigration patterns (Briguglio, 1995, p.2003). In some cases, SIDS do not necessarily have a relatively low GDP per capita and this conveys “...the impression of a relatively strong economy, even when, in reality, their economies are extremely delicate” (Briguglio, 1995, p.1624). In an attempt to present a broad overview of the problems of size within their geographic space, Douglas (2006) concluded that many of the problems of small island states are related to their “...insular geography and their fragile environmental and ecological characteristics” (p.76). The author goes on to explain the complexity of the environment of small island states that “...although spatially small, they nevertheless have characteristically uneven development within and across their island regions. They have complex and differentiated relationships within and between communities and island governments. These characteristic complexities give rise to resource management and governance issues” (ibid.).

Challenges faced in education due to size include the tendency for “...the relationships among various sub-groups in the population to...be characterised by strong personal

ties” (Bacchus and Brock, 1987, p.6). This susceptibility to nepotism and patronage may often lead to maladministration and partiality in education (ibid.). In particular, small developing nations experience geographic isolation due to underdeveloped trade linkages that often result in their dependence on one or two countries for trade relations (Bass, 1995). This phenomenon, along with their various other dependencies, tends to militate against the development of external linkages and partnerships that are necessary for curriculum development as there are “...fewer people available than in larger countries to do a wider variety of educational work” (Brock, 1987, p.25).

2.4.1.3 Challenges of Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean

It is argued that development requires more than just economic models as it involves the transformation of society as a means and an end of the development process (Stiglitz, 1998). The Caribbean laments an “implementation gap” and an “...over-emphasis on economic considerations and the tendency to overlook political, administrative and socio-cultural factors” in development planning” (Ryan and Bissessar, 2002, p.319). The assumption that price can perform all the co-ordination in an economy is challenged in developing countries which do not possess “...a full set of markets...[and]...the appropriate infrastructure, human capital and institutions” (Stiglitz, 1998, p.17). This results in less clarity on the next stages of the development process and, as such, development strategies should no longer be understood as a ‘road map’ but should be presented as a process model that can be adapted with the “...transformation of institutions, the creation of new social capital and new capacities, in some cases to replace traditional institutions that will inevitably be weakened in the process of development” (Stiglitz, 1998, p.16).

2.4.1.4 Challenges in Participatory Models

Development strategies should necessarily include processes for participation and ownership and the involvement of outsiders cannot take the place of this local ownership (Stiglitz, 1998).

The partnership literature, including the UK literature on PPPs, therefore provides limited guidance on how the partnership should be structured for development impact. If development strategies are to acknowledge the historical context of the society

(ibid.), it is clear that the development trajectory of the UK and other developed countries will be of limited value. In the Caribbean in particular, participation in development is affected by several factors including the fact that there is a less developed civic society participation in developing countries (Salamon and Anheier, 1997).

Caribbean literature provides some insights into the challenges faced in partnership initiatives. Efforts to introduce the NPM in small states of the Caribbean met with political and economic challenges (Brown, 2002). In another study of NPM implementation, it was found that "...the ethnic composition of the society and the way the governments operated were critical factors" in the implementation efforts across states" (Bissessar, 2002, p.514). The more ethnically homogenous societies allowed for a more democratic system of governance that "...allowed for co-operation and negotiation between the various governments and oppositions" (ibid.). Yet, in an attempt at private participation and collaboration in the social partnership in Barbados, it was found that even in such 'homogeneous' societies, the model of private participation was affected by the private sector's "...capacity to make meaningful use of the opportunity in the interest of the private sector as a whole and in the wider national interest" (Brown, 2002). The social partnership model represents one of the most significant efforts at cross-sectoral co-operation in the Caribbean (CEPAL Naciones Unidas, 2010).

2.4.2 The Internal Environment: Defining the Purpose of the PPP Organisation

PPPs distort organisational arrangements and are coordinated between markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1991) and any attempt to explain PPPs as organisations requires an application of an appropriate theory of the firm. The purpose, structure, strategy and governance of the firm in cross-sectoral arrangements are examined to determine how they distort existing theories of how the firm works. The review draws insights from the NPM, strategic alliances of firms and various cross-sectoral partnerships in understanding how partnerships work in organisations.

The PPP organisations in this work are purpose-driven entities that involve the voluntary contribution of public and private sector actor sub-groups in governance roles. As not-for-profit organisations in education in small, developing countries, they

are driven by the purpose of providing a relevant education for development. In this context, the concept of the 'strategic developmental organisation' which is defined as "...an organization that is given, or assumes on its own, the responsibility for the growth and development of the domain in which it operates" appears to be appropriate (Khandwalla 1988-89, cited in Khandwalla, 1990, p.24). An example of strategic developmental organisations are the Indian Institutes of Management and Technology which were established in India to train scarce managerial and technological manpower needed to speed up the industrialisation effort (Khandwalla, 1990). The Indian Institutes of Management were established as a collaborative effort of the Indian Government, MIT Sloan School of Management and the business sector. These organizations tend to have three main characteristics: a developmental mission with respect to the sectors in which they operate; a moderate to high resource dependence on the government in the context of scarce resources; and, as a consequence of their youth, a developmental mission and change purpose. Additionally, their tasks and activities are usually unfamiliar, non-routine and risk-laden (ibid.). The study of PPPs is expected to unearth similar issues related to challenges of development and responses of the alliance that led to successful performance.

Researchers claim that an actor's understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences his/her contribution to its success (Harrigan, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Austin, 2000). In the case of strategic developmental organisations, the motivation of actors to contribute to the organisation's purpose is paramount. One Caribbean scholar suggested that actors in organisations "...must play and take the responsibility for playing. From this comes ownership. And once the constituents of an organisation feel a sense of ownership, then anything is possible" (Balgobin, 2005, p.25). A positive psychology of thinking (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) serves to provide an appropriate framework to interpret the evidence in order to determine the quality of participation, sense of ownership and contribution to the cause. This is advocated by a Caribbean academic who suggested that in interpreting the evidence of the world one should not "...look for selfishness everywhere...; it taints the purity of the world if you stare at it through perverted eyes" (Balgobin, 2005, p.28).

2.4.3 The Internal Environment: Structure of the PPP Organisation

Partnerships represent the ‘Third Way’ of delivering public services as opposed to hierarchies and markets (Powell and Glendinning, 2002; Giddens, 1998). The ‘Third Way’ is best understood from the perspective of networks which are described as reflecting a central co-ordinating mechanism based on trust as opposed to commands and price competition inherent in bureaucracies and markets respectively (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Powell and Glendinning, 2002; Rhodes, 1997; Powell and Exworthy, 2002; Ansell and Gash, 2008). Many writers equate networks with partnerships and yet others claim that “...partnership is an organisational structure which is analytically distinct from network as a mode of governance” (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, p.314). Partnerships are viewed as representing a range of forms of co-ordination including networks, hierarchies and markets and may be described as partnership, alliance, collaboration, co-operating, network, joint working and multi-party working (Huxham et al., 2000, p.339). In a study of partnerships using both a deductive and inductive approach, Powell and Glendinning (2002, p.27) concluded that partnerships may be viewed as “quasi-network” or an intermediate form of co-ordination between hierarchies and markets. These quasi-network forms of governance merit further exploration to determine how they work, and what value is derived or sacrificed.

The main issues of structure in the PPP arrangement are related to co-ordination and control of the organisation. Control is effected through control of funding and the provision of the service. Table 1 explains the shift away from public control towards private control and locates the area where PPPs in the study are located.

Table 1: Modes of Welfare Provision and Funding

		FINANCE (FUNDING)	
		Public	Private
PRODUCTION (PROVISION)	Public	(1)	(2)
	Private	(3)	(4)

Reproduced from Whitty (2000), after Klein, (1984)

The shift away from the pure welfare state model (Cell 1) is achieved by various strategies including:

- charging for public services previously paid for out of taxation (Cell 2);
- letting the private sector run a service that continues to be paid for out of taxation (Cell 3);
- selling public services and transferring their functions to the private sector (Cell 4);
- deregulating the private sector or liberalizing arrangements that previously prevented the private sector from competing with state-provided services (Cells 3/4 competing with Cells 1/2) (Whitty, 2000, p.2).

The financing model of PPP organisations, which may be found in all cells except Cell 1, is important to understand in the face of public accountability challenges in developing countries.

One of the fundamental concerns regarding the co-ordination and control of firms is the issue of ownership. In the case of PPPs, public ownership is heralded and it is felt that the PPP “...must aim at bringing private resources into public projects, not public resources into private projects” (Government of India, 2007, cited in Datta, 2009, p.73). Where ownership is shared, the issue becomes one of governance and the creation of value for both partners. In the case of non-profit ownership Otten (2008), in a blog post, asserts that “...no one—not the founder, the current executive director, the board, no one—owns a nonprofit. Nonprofits exist for the benefit of the public good, working on behalf of some portion of that public good”. Otten in the blog post further advises that control of the non-profit is important, as “...it doesn’t belong to board members, either, who are there as the protectors of that public trust and must exercise their responsibilities to keep that trust”. In the case of PPPs established as firms, actors as protectors of the firm or public trust, may demonstrate behaviours consistent with public or private organisations, despite the absence of legal ownership.

Issues of co-ordination and control also arise in the network structure adopted through partnerships between private firms. In a study of partnerships between schools, Berliner (1997) distilled forms of partnerships described as networking, co-ordinating, co-operating and collaborating based on the actions and skills involved in the process (the forms of partnerships are described in Appendix 2). Berliner (1997) identifies drivers of collaborative efforts in a range of sectors and organisational forms, including education and business alliances, as the demand to do more with fewer resources, the need to

establish new markets, the need for sharing expertise and the need for professional learning communities.

2.5 GOVERNANCE IN CROSS-SECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS

Reviews of the trends in the transition from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in the era of the NPM reveals that the term ‘governance’ is used in various ways and embodies different meanings (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1996). What is evident though is that “...governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between, and within public and private sectors have become blurred” (Stoker, 1998:17). The conceptions of governance in the NPM appears to be related to the way in which government makes use of new forms for the delivery of services including franchising, contracting within ‘quasi-markets’ and engaging in strategic service partnerships (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This is directly relevant to this study where a new organisational form was established to execute a traditional role of the university.

The emergence of public-private relationships in governance arrangements presents new meta-frameworks of accountability and control (Acar et al., 2008; Acar and Robertson, 2004; Dubnick, 2005; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004b). The implications of PPP governance for universities and business schools that serve the public interest must be examined. Boards of directors are generally closed communities but where they have public impact it is particularly important to understand how they work to influence outcomes. Despite the significance of the board of directors to strategic decision making in firms, and its support function to managers in small networks (Borch and Huse, 1993), several authors have noted the lack of studies on the functioning of the board of directors (Mace, 1948; Mace, 1971; Thompson, 1967; Vance, 1983). Authors concur that, with respect to how the board of directors works, “...this field of management has suffered from much non-science, rule-of-thumb, and reliance on chance” (Castaldi and Wortman, 1984 cited in Borch and Huse, 1993, p.24).

2.5.1 Convergence of Corporate and Collaborative Governance

Public-private forms of governance have emerged in a period of changing governance structures at the macro and micro levels; from nations to firms and families (Michalski et al., 2001). Governance, whether public or private and at all levels of analysis, may be defined as "...the general exercise of authority" (Michalski et al., 2001, p.9). Corporate governance has had a longer history of analysis and may be viewed as "...the system by which the company is directed and controlled" (Cadbury, 1992, p.14). The separation of management and ownership in systems of corporate governance is underscored by Tricker's (1984, pp.6-7) assertion that "...the governance role is not concerned with running the business of the company, per se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations for accountability and regulation by the interests beyond the corporate boundaries".

Concerning governance, similar strands of thought are evident in both the private and public sectors (Rhodes, 1996). There is increased emphasis on integrity, accountability of persons in roles and a polycentric state with increasingly collaborative patterns of co-ordination (ibid.). The appeal for governance in the Caribbean is linked to widespread corruption "...the continuing immiseration of the mass of the population, clumsiness in the handling of public affairs...and doubts about public probity in the conduct of public affairs" (Nettleford, 2002, p.11). A governance model where government is seen as a network of social or power partners, seeking to maximise the benefits of interaction between government, private sector and community, is advocated (ibid.).

The contrasting characteristics of hierarchical and market forms of governance have led to the position that networks exist along a dichotomy of markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975; Thorelli, 1986). Based on historical and anthropological evidence however, it is argued that networks create a new administrative form with distinct capabilities and limitations (Powell, 1991; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Networks are best understood in terms of their descriptive characteristics and critical components and it is generally agreed that "...they are distinct from market or hierarchical arrangements in their heavy reliance on reciprocity, collaboration, complementary interdependence, a reputation and relationship basis for communication, and an informal climate oriented

toward mutual gain” (Larson, 1992, p.77). Other factors critical to successful ‘collaborative governance’ include face to face dialogue and the development of commitment and shared understanding (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p.1). In contrast, market governance arrangements rely primarily on price for control whilst hierarchical structures rely heavily on administrative authority (Larson, 1992). The conclusion is that there is room for further exploration of the way in which interacting networks function to produce valuable outcomes (Leiblein, 2003). An exploration of the reasons why firms engage in network relationships and the process by which those objectives are achieved is critical to understanding how strategic networks work (Ingraham et al., 2002; Dubnick, 2005; Skelcher, 2005a). With respect to partnerships as ‘governance’, two dimensions appear to be important to their performance: the financial arrangements between public and private actors and the tightness of organisational linkages between the two actors (Hodge and Greve, 2007). In this relationship, control mechanisms are critical to their success. Bradach and Eccles (1989) mapped price, authority, and trust as control mechanisms onto market, hierarchy, and network, respectively, and noted that these are ideal types that in reality are often combined. It is posited that in PPPs hierarchical mechanisms must co-exist with other forms of control in understanding network governance (Ingraham and Lynn, 2004).

2.5.1.1 Transparency and Accountability in Governance

Acar et al. (2008), in their study of accountability, noted that the network arrangements that exist in PPPs require different forms of accountability as, in this relationship, one party has no hierarchical authority over its partners and no full control over performance. The authors concluded that accountability as managing expectations, as opposed to the traditional notions of accountability as answerability, would be a more appropriate framework to use in PPPs where hierarchical authority is absent (ibid.). The intention of this research is to discover the realities of network structures, exploring issues of governance and accountability in understanding what makes PPPs work.

2.5.1.2 Power and Dominance

It is claimed that “...governance theory analyses power not as ‘social control’ but as ‘social production’” (Taylor, 2007, p.299). In this case, the analysis moves away from

fixed ideas about power as a commodity rooted in particular institutions to more fluid ideas of power developed and negotiated between partners (ibid.). In an analysis of power in public-private regimes, it is suggested that a distinction is drawn between “power to” and “power over” but both conceptions of power are intertwined in the interpretation of social situations (Stone, 2006, p.26; author's quotations). The social production model or “power to” provides an opportunity to consider how actors come to embrace *and stay with* some courses of action rather than others (Stone, 2006, p.24; author's italics). Although it is claimed that it is not possible to separate ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ (Domhoff, 2006) it is important to understand which conception of power is enacted in addressing the PPP purpose. Does the public role align with the governance discourse that includes propositions about an ‘enabling’ state, ‘steering’ not ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) or is ‘power over’ enacted in the relationship? Within the firm, power may be understood to derive from access to resources (Rajan and Zingales, 1988), rather than influence. It is claimed that when this is understood we can “...broaden the definition of the firm, understand the role played by (the) internal organization, and explain a variety of real-world institutional arrangements” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p.424).

A discourse of dominance may be seen to be inherent in groups, including sectoral groups (Van Dijk, 1993). A powerful group may influence the minds of others and exert control over the other (ibid.). Socio-political discourse analysis is a mechanism for understanding power relations and dominance; the more groups have access to discourse the more socially powerful they are (ibid.). The study undertakes a socio-political discourse analysis to focus on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance (ibid.). Dominance is “...the exercise of social power by elites, institutions, or groups, that results in social inequality” (ibid., p.250). The study pays attention to the “...structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events (that) play a role in these modes of reproduction” (ibid.). It recognizes the complexity of the socio-political goal of understanding how partnerships work, where each partner has widely differing interests, yet works sustainably towards some common goal. The research questions the extent to which dominance exists in PPPs in relation to ideology, activities, strategies or meanings. Acts and activities may sometimes be construed as dominant acts in the relationship;

however, the study focuses on the attainment of such dominance in the interest of a third party, the stakeholders or higher purpose and the legitimacy of the organisation.

2.5.2 Privatisation as Strategy

Many critics of the activities related to education under the NPM, view them as privatisation in disguise and this results in tensions within the political sphere (Savas, 2000; Whitty, 2000). The primary purpose of this strategic option is to promote economic development in emerging, developing, and developed economies (Zahra, 2000). The way in which it works, however, may result in outcomes that do not meet the planned purposes.

It is claimed that “...privatisation makes companies move from defensive and reactive strategies to analytical and prospective ones” (Zabalza and Matey, n.d., p.2). The firm relies more on deliberate strategies through the strategic planning process, and on strong signals from the market (Mintzberg, 1994; Miles et al., 1978). In addition, privatised firms tend to explore more competitive strategic positioning and utilize strategies such as portfolio diversification and internationalisation (Zabalza and Matey, n.d., p.2). The process also leads to changes in managerial incentives, organisational structure and culture (Zahra, 2000). The contribution of partners to the strategic actions of the firm provides a basis for the assessment of the success of the new model. This study seeks to determine how PPPs enacted the ideology of privatisation for attainment of their purpose.

Zahra (2000) presents a summary of the literature to describe the behaviours of newly privatised firms. Table 2 presents research at multi-levels and in different economic conditions including emerging economies. The dependent variables represent different outcomes based on profit appropriation orientation and ownership rights; the row shaded blue appears to be the range of structures in which PPPs may be classified:

Table 2: Classification of Firms with Ownership Rights and Profit Orientation



Taken from Ghobadian et al. (2004); Original in Salas (1998) adapted in Zahra et al. (2000)

The PPP is not an ‘arms-length’ arrangement and has the aim of generating surplus value for one or both partners (Datta, 2009). This usually involves extensive contact, co-ordination and information flows between actors, and the will to look beyond their own boundaries (Faulkner, 1995; Klijn and Teisman, 2005; Nooteboom, 1998) As such, PPPs are very similar to strategic alliances and networks in the private sector. The literature on strategic alliances spawns a number of new variables to be considered in understanding what challenges partnerships face and how they address them to achieve success.

The emergence of strategic alliance and inter-firm co-operation has prompted researchers to explore several factors believed to lead to the creation of value including partner selection and the formation of alliances (Li and Rowley, 2002; Hitt et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), the motivation for partnering (Gulati, 1995; Harrigan, 1985) and the flow of resources between firms (Das and Teng, 2000). A large number of studies have sought to understand how collaboration produces competitive advantage (Lin, 2006; Todeva and Knoke, 2005; Kanter, 1994). Though many of these studies were undertaken on business partnerships, the establishment of such alliances between partners in the public or non-profit and private sectors has also emerged across

the globe and researchers have also sought to understand how they work to create value (Hall and Kennedy, 2008; Austin, 2000; Samii et al., 2002).

Studies have highlighted the fact that the motivation of partners to engage in the alliance directly influences the framework for collaboration and the mechanisms by which they create value. In their study of PPPs in education, Davies and Hentschke (2006) underscore the importance of understanding the motivations for the partnership of public, private non-profit and private for-profit partners. The authors point to the fact that private sector motivation which is not profit driven is different from that which is propelled by a concern for profit (ibid.).

The studies on partnerships and networks evolved from examining the phases and features of partnerships for an agenda "...focused either on the antecedent conditions or the structural properties of inter-organizational relationships in comparison with other governance forms (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, p.91). Ring and Van de Ven (1992) provide a summary of these studies that were approached mainly from transactions cost or agency theory perspectives. Additionally, research from organisational sociologists has focused on "...the environmental conditions and contingent factors that explain the formation and structure of cooperative inter-organizational relationships" (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, p.91). These contributions are considered variance theories that "...deal(s) with variables and the correlations among them" and attempt to understand the extent to which factors are more significant to the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2004, p.248). Ring and Van de Ven affirm that process theories are also important in understanding partnerships and propose a process framework for the development of co-operative inter-organisational relationships that includes consideration of negotiations, commitments, executions and assessments (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, p. 97). This transition to relational processes and variables is considered fundamental to the overall attempt to explain how partnerships work.

2.5.2 University Partnerships in Governance

2.5.2.1 The Changing Role of the University in Society

The role of the university and its relationship with society have been the subject of much debate (Bargh et al., 1996). The university's dominance with respect to the

production of knowledge is increasingly questioned in twenty-first century society as knowledge moves from being incidental to the economy and becomes "...an integral part of what is now in effect a scientized society" (Delanty, 2002, p.185). As knowledge became increasingly useful for capitalism the modern state and the university entered into alliances in which the university promised useful knowledge and the state gave way to academic autonomy in the process (Delanty, 2002). The university and the progress of the nation-state have been intertwined ever since and the university is the producer of knowledge in two senses. It generates academic/scientific knowledge that is increasingly useful to the nation state and it is a site of cognitive evolution as it grapples with the contradictions of modernity. According to Delanty, "The university became progressively implicated in the major social struggles of modernity and gradually shed its isolation in the ivory tower of academia" (2002, p.187).

A major aim of this research is to determine how the institutional features of the university system influence the PPP. Universities in developing countries adopted the European models of their colonial masters and "...must function in the unequal world of centers and peripheries" (Altbach, 2002, p.3). It is postulated that this existence at the periphery has resulted in academic dominance of the metropole which includes cleavage to the institutional model, norms and values of the North (Ibid.). The way in which the PPP is implemented within the university system to respond to global pressures of university massification, accountability, privatization, and marketization (Altbach, 2002) in the face of the additional pressures of their contexts is significant to this work.

Changes in governance are anticipated and it is claimed that governance has become more complex, multi-levelled and shared as more actors are drawn into the arena in the "massification" and "marketization" of the university (Bargh et al., 1996, pp.2-3; author's quotation marks). The two main models of the academic governance of universities are the professorial model of self-governance and, with the advent of student power in the 1960s, shared governance (Delanty, 2002). The advent of shared models of governance has brought academic freedom and the governance of knowledge into question. One view is that the university has always had the right to govern knowledge as it produced knowledge for its own use but this is contested by the

recognition that new cultures of knowledge are emerging that contest the freedom of science and the dominance of scientists and academics (Delanty, 2002). It is expected that there would be significant differences in the role the private sector plays in the governance of universities and the production of knowledge in developing countries.

In the engagement of the university in the challenges of modernity and postmodernity, academic self-governance changed to more participatory forms of governance (Riesman and Jencks, 1998). Within the principle of academic self-governance, the university evolved a dual system of control (Dearlove, 2002). In each institution, university 'Council' has been the body responsible for finance and the control of resources and has a 'lay' majority. The Senate is the sovereign academic authority and has no lay membership (ibid.). This study postulates that the model of participatory governance adopted by the university in small developing countries is a response to challenges to its legitimacy and utility.

2.5.2.2 University Governance and the New Managerialism

Reed (2002) undertook a study of the changes in UK universities in an attempt to explore the way in which the tenets of the NPM influenced university governance since the 1990s. University governance is defined as "...the general *organisational technologies and practices* through which higher education institutions attempt to regulate and control what happens within their, increasingly porous and contested, boundaries" (Reed, 2002, p.164; author's italics). It was found that the new managerialism presents several challenges to university governance (Dearlove, 2002). Firstly, "...collegial governance seeks consensus through committees and so involves sluggish decision-making that is conservative and biased in favour of the status quo at the same time as it is inward-looking and insensitive to resource constraints and to external realities" (Dearlove, 2002, p.265). Further, the system of university governance "...can be indifferent to institution-wide concerns, degenerating into the selfish pursuit of narrow departmental advantage based on ugly log-rolling coalitions of heads of departments" (ibid.). Indeed, universities as a professional bureaucracy are bottom-heavy with the capacity to block changes of which faculty do not approve (ibid.). This tension between university and corporate governance as the PPP attempts rapid innovation in addressing the development purpose is a major subject of this study.

There has been increased representation of business interests in the structures and cultures of wider society and in the governance of universities and colleges (Thompson 1971; Monbiot, 2000). Moreover, the state itself is seen to be intertwined with corporate capitalism (Monbiot, 2000). The extent to which business schools in developing Commonwealth nations inherit the UK ‘Oxbridge’ model from which they are derived is questionable. In the UK, the growth of business schools is seen to be “...not simply a training in the ‘techniques of management’...but also a training in the ideology, values and purposes of capitalist enterprise” (Miliband and Mundial, 1969, p.253) It is claimed that since these schools depend on the donations of wealthy capitalists, they are hardly likely to be critical of corporate capital and its ideology (Taylor and Steele, 2011). The question of how the private sector in the socioeconomic context of developing countries participates in the governance of business schools and the impact on ideology is a significant concern of this study.

2.6 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TENSIONS IN BUSINESS SCHOOLS - RELEVANCE AND RIGOUR

Academic actors in public universities and private sector actors as stakeholders view the public-private divide as tensions between academic rigour and real world relevance (Clinebell and Clinebell, 2008; Tushman et al., 2007). This section explores the literature, seeking the emerging understanding of the relationship between these two concepts and the mechanisms used to attain both. Further, the review explores the mechanisms utilized to attain relevance and rigour and highlights the successes, the challenges they present, and the areas open for further consideration and exploration. In so doing, the review examines the “gaps” so as to determine the exact nature of the problem in which to locate the questions of the study.

The overall quest for a relevant education that can address the concerns of organisations is a global issue. Broader concerns about the problem of relevance in business school education have been raised by many researchers (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Ankers and Brennan, 2002; Ivory et al., 2006; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002). Pfeffer and Fong (2002) surmised the end of business schools, questioning the impact of business education on management success and the overall relevance of management scholarship. Ivory et al. (2006) echoed this concern about the future of business schools

in the UK in the face of allegations of irrelevance, lack of utility of ideas and the production of poor quality graduates described by *The Economist* in 1991 as “...critters with lopsided brains, icy hearts and shrunken souls” (quoted in Ivory et al., 2006, p.8).

A more theoretical exploration of the problem of bridging the gap between relevance and rigour through the conduct of collaborative research yields even more dismal conclusions. In an examination of the “gap” using Luhmann’s systems theory, Kieser and Leiner (2009) found that “...specialized systems of modern societies are highly autonomous – ‘autopoietic.’ They operate in isolation from each other”. Systems produce communications which are apparently incomprehensible to each other. Two characteristics of systems, ‘self-reference’ and ‘operative closure’ prevent barriers to communication though they may use external events as prompts. Kieser and Leiner (2009) cite the work of Siedl, writing in 2005, and explain that systems are self-referential which means that “...every operation refers in some way or other back to itself” (p.520). Science is understood as a truth system which generates theories and methodologies in a process that depends on the falsification of knowledge in a self-referencing process (Kieser and Leiner, 2009). The “practice system of organisations” on the other hand is an economic system which generates returns in a process that assesses relevance using experiential and scientific knowledge (Kieser and Leiner, 2009). The authors suggest that the two communication systems cannot meet and the gap between theory and practice cannot be bridged. This study contends that PPP performance measured by survival suggests that some progress towards bridging the gap between theory and practice must have been made in the PPP organisations that form the empirical context of the research.

In their use of systems theory to explain the codes by which academic and practitioner systems work, delineating the factors that define systems and outlining the contradictions and differences between the two systems under consideration, Kieser and Leiner (2009) exposed opportunities for others to come to different conclusions and offer suggestions as to how the “gap” can, in fact, be bridged. In fact, these authors themselves, through their own surmising that “...apparently, Van de Ven and Johnson (2006) are not convinced that collaborative research is able to meet the standards of rigorous research without subsequent theoretical and methodological upgrading” (Kieser and Leiner, 2009, p.529) perhaps opened the way for academics to consider

how “upgrading” can take place. Systems theory evolved from an examination of biologically bounded systems and is often criticised as having an internal focus with “boxed in” arguments, leading researchers to consider organisations as “open systems” that are influenced by environmental factors (Katz and Kahn, 1978; Donaldson, 1985). The challenge for business schools to cross the divide requires “out of the box” solutions and answers may reside anywhere.

2.7 CONCLUSION

PPPs appear to be both promising and contested as a form of institutional co-operation. The developing context of small island states, however, presents unique realities for these collaborative ventures between the public and private sectors in the governance of business schools. It appears that the findings of studies of PPPs in developed countries may be challenged by the reality of small, developing countries where PPPs appear to be a promise that cannot be ignored. The context raises questions such as:

- How does the PPP form, rather than nomenclature, serve the interests of partners and stakeholders in a context where the label ‘PPP’ is only just entering the political agenda?
- How do actor sub-groups in the governance of PPPs in the developing world tackle the issues of politics and strategy that arise in the developed world?

Based on the discussion in this chapter, it is proposed that key success factors related to PPP performance in business schools in developing countries are derived from an understanding of how the following elements work to produce successful outcomes:

- *Definition of purpose*: This is negotiated between the public purpose of the social good and private stakeholder interests. With regard to small, developing countries, issues of market size, economic realities and social issues appear to present unique opportunities and challenges to PPPs.
- *Definition of the PPP structure and contractual agreement*: This is negotiated between ‘arms-length’ and relational contracting between organisations. Issues of public contribution and private voluntarism appear to moderate the impact of relational governance in the PPP as an organisation.

- *Governance*: This is a negotiated version of ownership, control and direction of the firm. Elements of power, role definition, structure and accountability are fundamental to the governance of the PPP.
- *Strategy and execution*: These are negotiated between markets and hierarchies and include elements of trust, co-operation in roles, accountability and performance expectations.

These are the factors that will be explored in the study. They form the basis for the conceptual framework that guides the study, which is described in the Chapter 4.

The engagement of private interest in PPPs has changed the form of ownership rights and the orientation of public services from non-profit and based on moral codes to other forms that include non-profit and for profit arrangements. They have done so for many purposes – purposively seeking the best resources, technical expertise, practices, financing and support infrastructure where they reside. Networks of relationships are created for various reasons and with different expectations of partners. The challenge is how to make them work and how to do so sustainably. The literature reviewed in this chapter identified factors that are relevant to the success and failure of cross-sectoral partnerships but does not sufficiently identify the inter-relationships between the factors that provide explanations of how they work. A broader theoretical framework is required and is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.0 INTRODUCTION


This study explores how alliances between actors from public universities and private sector partners in the governance of business schools in small, developing countries influence the strategy and legitimacy of the schools. The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter, and the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 4, together seek to outline, describe and justify the appropriateness of the perspective, theories and constructs that underpin the research methodology and guide the development of defensible explanations of PPP performance. In this chapter, the academic literature is reviewed to highlight the main theories found to be relevant in constructing explanations of how PPP governance mechanisms, as strategic, cross-sectoral inter-organisational linkages, work and to identify an appropriate performance dimension for assessing PPP success.

The literature review includes a critical examination of the extant theories used to explain partnerships to distil an appropriate theoretical framework for the study. Theories included in the review are articulated at all three levels of generalisation: grand theories that are applicable across contexts, middle-range theories that are specific to a phenomenon and situation or practice-specific theories appropriate to cross-sectoral relationships (Mateo and Benhan-Hutchins, 2009). In the first section, the review discusses the network perspective and social network theory as a grand theory and explores its value to the study of cross-sectoral partnerships and the governance of such organisations.

The study is guided by an overarching framework that includes two complementary perspectives – network perspective and the new economic sociology. The concepts, theories and methods drawn from both perspectives provide the theoretical framework to explain cross-sectoral partnerships. The concept of embeddedness, developed from contemporary sociology through the work of Granovetter (1985) is employed to explain how expectations, with respect to the behaviours of actors, are generated based on their embeddedness in the context. Network theories then provide descriptions and explanations of the distortions created by the configuration of actors in the PPP network. In order to understand how the PPP governance structure functions in its

context, an integrative theory that links purpose, structure and meaning in social networks is utilized (Fuhse, 2009). In order to address the ‘why’ question, the framework includes consideration of the meaning of network structures (Fuhse, 2009) in the tradition of ‘relational realism’ (Mische, 2011). Legitimacy theory, as a stakeholder acceptance theory, allows the researcher to analyse the relationships in order to explain the survival of the PPP organisation. The theoretical framework is presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Representation of the Theoretical Framework



Source: Self-Elaboration

3.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE

The study is approached from a social network perspective. A perspective is viewed as a "...device for filtering an examination of social events and processes, so that certain things are excluded while others appear particularly prominent" (Wallace and Wray, 2006, p.65). The social network perspective has been adopted for this study based on the findings of the review of literature on partnerships undertaken in the preceding chapter. The professional literature on partnerships, both in the public and private sectors and across institutions and organisations, has provided a plethora of appropriate propositions and concepts that should be considered in any examination of the partnership phenomenon. The literature, however, has not provided relational analyses of how the behaviours and actions of actors in the partnership influence those of the other partner and affect the dynamics of the relationship. In this study, the basic proposition is that the behaviours and actions of actors in public and private sub-groups are influenced by the presence and actions of the other group. It is also affected by the way in which each sub-group perceives factors at the firm and institutional levels. Wasserman and Faust (1994) describe the social network perspective that "...encompasses theories, models, and applications that are expressed in terms of relational concepts or processes" (p.4). Utilising this perspective, this study is designed to contribute to relational theories of partnerships, exploring the dynamics of the partnership in its context.

The social network perspective is adopted as, in this study of public-private relationships, it allows the researcher to focus away from the atomistic concepts that emerge in the research and to extend the examination to consider the relationship between concepts, exploring how features and changes in one affect the others (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.4). This perspective allows the researcher to draw on appropriate theories that describe and explain the linkages or ties between the actors at all levels of the analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Network theory also includes well-defined concepts and linkages between concepts that serve to describe the relations between actors (ibid.). The theory, therefore, provides a basis for describing relations between actors in a defined unit of analysis, such as the relationship between the public and private actors in affiliated networks as they consider decisions by the partnership (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

3.2 A LINKING FRAMEWORK: PURPOSE, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY

The research on partnerships undertaken in the public, private and non-profit sectors has utilised various theoretical bases and generated testable propositions. The main theories employed in these studies are transaction cost economics theory (Williamson, 2005) and social network theory (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Moreover, researchers have found it useful to combine theories to generate appropriate frameworks from which to explore partnerships and explain the findings that emerge (a summary of theoretical propositions derived from the literature on partnerships is presented in Appendix 3). The research summary is organised on the basis of the broad constructs of purpose, structure and strategy that form the conceptual framing for this research study.

The social network perspective provides the basis for the relational approach but a framework that defines which constructs will be explored is required. The linking framework explores public-private relationships with regard to the fundamental questions of why the partnership was formed, how it was structured and what actions were taken. The relationship between purpose, structure and strategy provides an appropriate conceptual lens from which to explain how the partnership works. These broad concepts connect to facilitate the task of explanation at all levels including the actor level, organisation level and country level. Though the network perspective and its focus on relations between actors, yields useful descriptions of actor relations and relations to events, it does not sufficiently guide the analysis of how these attributes of actors influence the way in which the partnership works. In order to facilitate this level of explanation, the research utilizes the concepts and theories of sociology, mainly drawn from the ‘new economic sociology’ as advocated and defined by Granovetter (1985). This responds to the observation that “...one area where a great deal of work remains is integrating network concepts and measures into more general social and behavioural science research” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.733).

3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY AND THE STUDY OF PARTNERSHIPS

Social network explanations of phenomena are built on the relationships between units in a study. Wasserman and Faust (1994) explain that “...social network analysis provides a precise way to define important social concepts, a theoretical alternative to the assumption of independent actors, and a framework for testing theories about

structured relationships” (p.17). A technical explanation of the fundamental memes of social network theory and a list of relevant social network concepts used in this work is included in Appendix 4.

Apart from being understood as a “perspective”, social networks are now considered by some to be a paradigm (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Freeman, 2004) where “...people influence one another... to build a cumulative body of knowledge...a ‘normal’ science in the sense described by Thomas Kuhn...that both generates puzzles and solves them” (Freeman, 2004, p. 6). Yet others have claimed that the field of social network research better serves the generation of new theories based on several attributes of the field in its current developmental status (Kilduff et al., 2006). Social network theory is perhaps one of the most widely used theories that have informed the study of partnerships (Acar and Robertson, 2004e.g.; Ahuja, 2000; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). Establishing the explanatory power and academic significance of this theory to understand what makes PPPs work in the context is critical in this study. Some of the tensions in the theoretical framing must be confronted and the research position defined, beginning with the tension between agency and structure.

3.4 AGENCY, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONAL REALISM

The study of PPPs is approached from a critical realist perspective and seeks to understand how public and private actor sub-groups in governance roles contribute to the strategic actions of business schools. The problem of structure and action was confronted by Giddens (1979, p.49) who argued that “...it would be true to say that those schools of thought which have been preoccupied with action, have paid little attention to, or have found no way of coping with conceptions of structural explanation or social causation”. Giddens proposed the theory of structuration which, he claims “...begins with an absence - the lack of a theory of action in the social sciences” (1979, p.2). He contends that structuration requires bringing voluntarism and determinism together, demanding a theory of the acting subject and must “...situate action in time and space as a continuous flow of conduct, rather than treating purposes, reasons etc., as somehow aggregated together” (ibid.). Giddens argues against dichotomies but recognises the role of the actor in the process, though requiring a theory of the actor.

Social network theory and relational realism provide an opportunity to examine the ‘meaning structure’ of networks (Fuhse, 2009) and account for the actions of sub-groups in structural relationships. The extension of network theory in this area is driven by the growth of the community of network theorists who, in the main, comprised an academic network within their university community (Mische, 2011), and spanned the various areas, and among whom are White (1992) and Tilly (2004) who applied the “relational perspective,” taking some of the broader theoretical insights of network analysis and extending them into the realms of culture, history, politics, economics, and social psychology, making marginal use of formal network methodology (Mische, 2011, p.1). It is suggested that “...relational thinking is a way to overcome stale antinomies between structure and agency through a focus on the dynamics of social interactions in different kinds of social settings” (Mische, 2011, p.1). The relational perspective and social network theory contend that actors exist in social networks that form a structure within which human action occurs. A relational sociology (Emirbayer, 1997) provides an opportunity to examine the roles that actors play in these group structures. In these roles, they make choices that can be attributed to influence on each other in affiliation networks. From a critical realist perspective, we can only analyse them from critical analysis of the roles they play within social networks and the influence of the network structures on actors. As such, the research questions and data gathering instruments relate to roles and group influence, rather than individual action or individual agency.

The meaning structure of the networks, which includes the expectations and cultural relations in interpersonal structures, is included in the analysis (Fuhse, 2009). In attempting to explore the meaning structure of the network, it is noted that “...the primary nature of meaning is neither subjective nor objective, but rather intersubjective—it only exists as incorporated in specific social structures *between* people” (Fuhse, 2009, p.59) and “...actual network structures result from the cultural patterning of relationships between role categories”. While network theory acknowledges actor attributes, the agenda of network theory is “...to explicate the connection between structure and outcome” and it is suggested that while these may be very important it must be noted that “...structural differences alone have effects” (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, p.14).

Although it is claimed that structuration has not (yet) been used successfully as an alternative to the structure/agency dichotomy (Crosbie, 2004), the focus of the study on the stability of the networks requires an analysis of the structural arrangements, acknowledging that "...structure provides a means by which organisational stability can be maintained, as the rules and procedures have the effect of moderating behaviour" (Baker, 2008, p.34). The observation of behaviour in defined roles, from a critical realist perspective that privileges an ontology of behaviourism, confines the study to one of structure. Further, trends in management reform in the 1990s have resulted in a move away from leadership and behavioural principles and towards more structural emphases on flexibility and innovation, thereby reinforcing the partnership ideal (Reijniers, 1994; Linder, 1999).

As argued above, this work privileges structure over agency and further work examining the agency of individual actors, including actor leadership, would be helpful for a more complete understanding of the PPP phenomenon in business schools in small, developing countries. Actor-network theory recognizes the socio-technical system in which actors include both human and non-human actors that together define the network to be studied (Callon, 1991; Latour, 1996, Guo, 2005). The board of directors in this study is considered the non-human actor in the affiliation network. Further work using actor-network analyses would also aid understanding of how the network functioned.

3.5 STRUCTURE AND 'LIQUID MODERNITY'

Another perspective that would challenge the notion of structure and organisational stability is the sociological conception of a "liquid modernity" rather than a postmodern reality (Bauman, 2000). Bauman (2000) defines the duty of sociology as identifying and engaging with the changing human experience in an attempt to understand that experience. He defines and identifies the differences between modernity and postmodernity and moves toward a concept of "liquid modernity" in explaining how previously "solid" ideas have now become more flexible and fluid (Bauman, 2000, p.8). As structures become more "liquid", as in the case of PPPs, they challenge traditional structures and the view of space as "...solid and stolid, unwieldy and inert side, capable of waging only a defensive, trench war - being an obstacle to the resilient

advances of time” (ibid.). This individualized theory of human action and social change presents another perspective from which to approach the study of cross-sectoral collaboration aimed at problem solving.

3.8 LEGITIMACY THEORY AND PPP PERFORMANCE

PPP organisations were established as new entities to address the problem of relevance of business education to society and, therefore, the study required an overarching framework from which to understand their evolution and performance. In light of the claim that the evaluation of success should be based on attainment of the underlying objectives of the PPP, it is argued that social judgement and legitimacy theory provides an appropriate theoretical frame from which to explore PPP performance and accountability (Suchman, 1995; Brown, 2001).

Accountability in PPPs and inter-organizational networks differs from traditional forms of accountability and it is expected that PPP performance will be evaluated by different stakeholders on differing dimensions. PPPs created societal expectations with regard to the provision of solutions to the problem of relevance and this served as their measure of performance in the external environment. Acar and Robertson (2008) found that several factors influenced the expectations of PPP performance including the power differential between participating individuals and organisations which affects their ability to influence policy, including that of accountability. It may be construed that PPP performance and accountability would be judged by external stakeholders in relation to their parent organisations. The internal legitimacy of the organisation would be influenced by factors such as the centrality and significance of the partnership to participating organisations and institutions and it is reasonable that PPP participants who are volunteers must view accountability mechanisms as “...reasonable and practical” (Acar and Robertson, 2004, p.333).

3.8.1 Accountability and Legitimacy

Organisations face different institutional conditions that shape their actions in different countries (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The emergence of PPP organisations in response to social challenges appears to be an opportunity to create bridges across the sectors (Jooste, 2009). The PPP provided a vehicle to challenge institutional norms

faced by the publicly funded university as it attempted to account for performance in the face of development challenge and perceptions of lack of relevance in education. In this case, the private sector comprised a significant stakeholder body that demanded greater relevance to business in business education.

Legitimacy, as a construct, may be operationalised from the definitions of Edwards (2000) and Brown (2001). Edwards (2000, p.5) explained that “...Legitimacy is generally understood as the right to be and do something in society—a sense that an organization is lawful, admissible, and justified in its chosen course of action” (Edwards, 2000, p.5). The question of how organisations derive legitimacy is addressed by Brown (2001) who identified four bases of legitimacy: legal, moral, political, and technical or performance-related (p.64). In this study, legitimacy will be explored as the responding variable of business school performance as the research examines the bases on which the business schools, with their PPP governance arrangements, achieved the right to undertake the tasks traditionally pursued by the universities to which they were attached. Expectations about legitimacy and accountability derive from analysis of all levels at which an organisation exists but is best understood at the level of “...the articulation of *societal ideals* that are established by laws or widely held social norms and expectations” (Brown, 2008, p.5; author's italics). In many cases, civil society organisations, between hierarchies and markets, have not been subject to state regulation and Brown (2008) explains that in the absence of socially agreed norms and standards of legitimate behaviour, civil society organisations “...can *actively construct legitimacy arguments and accountability systems* rather than wait passively for governments and other regulators to set and enforce standards” (p.11; author's italics). The author explains that cross-sectoral partnerships and other such organisations may influence their own legitimacy through strategic actions and accountability measures (ibid.). These organisations do so “...through conformance discursive means or adoption of new practices” (Bitektine, 2011, p.151). It may be construed that this was a critical role for the PPPs as institutions of higher education in business.

Legitimacy may be understood as “...a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system or norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574).

Legitimacy theory begins with the assumption that no organization has the inherent right to exist and proposes that “...organizations exist in society under an expressed or implied social contract (Campbell, 2000, p.82). Business schools exist as new ventures which need resources from their environment and, with limited resources, actors are motivated to provide these resources if they hold the “...*belief or feeling* that the venture is indeed competent, efficient, effective, worthy, appropriate, and/or needed” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p.416; authors' italics). In order to ensure their survival and growth, business schools must deliver desirable ends, distributing economic, social, or political benefits to business and society from which they derive their power (Shocker and Sethi, 1974; Oliver, 1991).

Taylor and Wharburton (2003) argued that “...while many third sector organizations give high priority to political forms of legitimacy—in the sense of participatory structures and accountability to members and beneficiaries—government is generally more likely to give priority to technical forms of legitimacy, e.g., the quality of research and the ability to implement policy” (p.321). Where the PPPs derive funding from financial allocations to the university, accountability as technical legitimacy appears to be critical to their success. The overall accountability of educational organisations to all stakeholders, including government, is considered critical to this study of PPP success.

Chaskin (2003) attempted to establish the relationship between the two concepts and concluded that legitimacy is “...the extent to which an organization justly and properly speaks for and acts on behalf of...its constituency” (p.178) whereas accountability is “...the extent to which organizations that speak or act on behalf of a community are fulfilling their stated goals and can be held responsible for their actions” (p.182). The continuing existence of the PPPs may be considered a demonstration of their legitimacy in the environment. Their accountability to stakeholders, however, would require a much more diverse set of appropriate measures.

Accountability and legitimacy are considered to be culturally embedded concepts (Taylor and Warburton, 2003) and moral legitimacy is considered to be significant to sectors where accountability is based on values and organisations seek “...to account for decisions in terms of substantial ethics” (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, p.513). While this may be a necessary condition for decision-making, in the face of scarce resources and

within a firm established to generate societal value, technical legitimacy may be a useful external measure of accountability. Within the firm, and especially for business schools, financial accountability may contribute to technical legitimacy.

The discussion above supports the thesis that the main challenge for educational institutions is to maintain internal and external moral and technical legitimacy. Further, for business schools, this legitimacy must be attained in the “...eye of the beholder” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) from those in academia concerned about achieving the broad purpose of education and the external stakeholder concerned about relevance to business.

The literature on PPPs supports the use of legitimacy theory to explain partner involvement in the development and implementation of organisational strategy. This theoretical framework derives from the work of institutional theorists who argue that legitimacy building is a critical purpose that informs organisational strategies and structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Taylor and Warburton (2003) provide further support for this position in their study of the legitimacy of third-sector organisations in the policy process, and concluded that as nations moved from “government” to “governance”, with increasing emphasis on partnerships, the question of legitimacy and accountability becomes important.

Partnerships between the university and the private sector attempt to achieve stakeholder impact based on technical legitimacy with respect to providing services to business to promote their development. This is consistent with the actions of third-sector organisations, which generally base their acceptance in society on political and technical legitimacy (Taylor and Warburton, 2003; Brown, 2008). These organisations gain legitimacy through engagement in partnerships deemed critical to their cause and the management of these relationships for development outcomes (Covey and Brown, 2001). Exploration of network structures or partnerships led Human and Provan (2000) to conclude that legitimacy is critical to the survival of such organisations and that consideration must be given to “...three conceptually distinct dimensions of legitimacy – the network as form, the network as entity and the network as interaction” (p.327). Indeed, it is understood that alliances provide critical resources such as legitimacy and market power, which contribute to the success of the firm (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1999).

In a recent study, Bitektine (2011) explained the process by which evaluators arrive at a judgment with regard to the legitimacy of an organisation. The author claims that "...as social actors evaluating an organization perceive its features, structural attributes, and outcomes of its activity, they subject these perceived features to different forms of analytical processing...(which) yields different types of judgments" (p.156). The two types of judgements may be termed "cognitive legitimacy", understood as the judgment of the organisation as belonging to certain known organisational forms (Bitektine, 2011, p. 156), and "socio-political legitimacy" in which "...the observed features of an organization, its structural attributes, and outcomes of its activity are benchmarked against the prevailing social norms: the actor renders a judgment as to whether the organization, its form, its processes, its outcomes, or its other features are socially acceptable and, hence, should be encouraged..." (Bitektine, 2011, p.157).

PPPs are formed by establishing relationships that include entities, firms and individuals and aim to adopt the legitimacy resources of their partners or 'parents'. It may be construed that, in so doing, and as they evolve and establish their own bases of legitimacy, they influence and are influenced by their partners or 'parents' in different ways. At the early stages of evolution, threats may derive from concerns about the rationale for partner involvement. Private sector partners, driven by for-profit concerns, "...may be attracted to invest both financially and technically in a partnership if there is a significant potential for return on investment compared to other available investment opportunities" (LaFrance and Lehmann, 2005, p.219). The inclusion of public and private partners in cross-sectoral alliances shifts the conversation from profitability and return on investment into areas of legitimacy and sustainability, propelling stakeholder theories and the now ubiquitous corporate responsibility paradigm (LaFrance and Lehmann, 2005; Weisband, 2009) where corporate governance must address the issue of stakeholder impact and welfare. At later stages of their evolution, PPPs may threaten their parent organisation on the very bases from which parents derive their legitimacy. This study will explore the bases of legitimacy that underpin the evolution of PPPs.

3.8.2 Governance and Accountability

The governance mechanism is fundamental to accountability in the PPP as it is intended to aid in the achievement of purpose and contribute to the increasing

legitimacy of the PPP. Major theories of corporate governance include agency theory that advocates governance structures to safeguard owners from opportunistic behaviour by management and maximise the interests of shareholders in the ownership structure of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Berle and Means, 1932). Separation of the role of the chairman and chief executive office is a strategy that allows for control of management (Tricker, 1984). Donaldson and Davis (1991) explain that this is necessary whether opportunistic behaviour is driven by self-interest or Theory X behaviour (McGregor, 1960) or by the exercise of responsibility, driven by motivation to achieve (McClelland, 1961; Herzberg et al., 1959) respect and reputation. The role of the boards of directors is not well addressed in organisational and strategic management theories (Tricker, 2000) and this study of PPPs may contribute to this area. The 'separation and control' issue is addressed differently in stewardship theory which combines ownership and organisational control and includes the role of the board in the strategy of the firm (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It is claimed that corporate governance can learn from public governance in areas such as division of power and institutionalised competition (Benz and Frey, 2007). The way in which the governance structure works in PPP arrangements is central to this study.

3.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Using the theoretical framework described in this chapter, the researcher seeks to:

1. Examine the factors that influence the PPP governance model in business schools in developing countries;
2. Develop a dynamic model to guide actors in PPP governance arrangements in developing countries.

3.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined the theoretical framework that guided the study of PPPs in business schools in developing countries. The study utilized the broad perspective of social networks, employing various theories, concepts and methods derived from this perspective. The argument proposed to justify the appropriateness of the relational approach to examining the PPP was derived from the recognition that: (a) actors are

embedded in their contexts, which creates expectations of actions, and (b) these expectations and actions are distorted by the configuration of actors in the PPP structure, in the context in which it exists. Explanations of PPP performance were deemed to derive from the tradition of “relational realism” as described by Mische (2011). Finally, corporate governance and legitimacy theories were used to develop a framework for assessing accountability of the PPPs. The theoretical framework provided theoretical propositions and concepts that could inform the analysis of findings. These are described in the conceptual framework presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

4.0 INTRODUCTION


The review of the literature evaluated the status of the field with respect to partnerships in general and cross-sectoral partnerships in particular. The theoretical framework described the elements of the social network perspective, social network theory and the concept of embeddedness and argued that they provide an appropriate theoretical framework to guide the study of PPPs in the governance of business schools in small developing countries. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework that was used to develop the research questions and guide the selection and construction of the research instruments. In the description of the conceptual framework, the opportunities and gaps identified from the review of the literature and from the discussion of the theoretical framework provide justification for the design of the conceptual model.

4.1 DESIGNING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The question of whether or not to use a conceptual framework was discussed extensively by Miles and Huberman (1984) with the conclusion that this tool is an effective guide to the successful execution of the research project. It is argued that all research uses a conceptual framework, whether explicitly or implicitly (Bickman and Rog, 2009) and that for qualitative research, where one is studying a fairly well understood phenomenon, "...a loose, highly inductive design is a waste of time" (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.27). Moreover, in cases where qualitative research is "confirmatory" a pre-structured design is recommended, at least "...enough to reach the ground" (ibid., p.28).

The conceptual framework may include concepts drawn from theory and from practice (Maxwell, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1984). The conceptual framework in this study focuses attention on the purpose, structure and strategy of the governance mechanism and the interrelationships between these concepts.

Figure 2: Factors Informing the Design of the Conceptual Framework



Adapted from Maxwell (2009, p.218)

The process of developing the conceptual framework commenced by examining the problem functionally rather than theoretically (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Conceptualisation commenced with the instrumental proposition that the partnership must be designed to address some purpose and must be structured in relation to that purpose. Further, and logically, the activities of the partnership must serve the purpose for which it was established and structured. This provided the basis of the framework that the operation of the PPP is an outcome of the relationship between purpose, structure and strategy. Revealing and recognizing experiential knowledge, as in this case, is not “...a licence to impose (one’s) assumptions and values uncritically on the research” (Maxwell, 2009, p.225) but, through the process of “*critical subjectivity*” whereby experiences of the researcher are raised to consciousness, experiential knowledge may be included as part of the research process (Reason, 1998, p.12, cited in Maxwell 2009, author’s italics).

4.2 WORKING WITH THE UNDERPINNING PHILOSOPHY: CRITICAL REALISM

Making clear one's philosophical position can be a tool that guides the development of the conceptual framework and the questions raised in the study (Maxwell, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1984). Realism is the philosophical position that a mind-independent reality, which has its own inherent order, exists and can be studied (Fay, 1996). Further, from this philosophical position, one considers that "...while many things scientists are interested in, such as internal human processes, cannot be directly observed, one can usefully measure them and study them in the context of theoretical explanations" (Lee and Lings, 2008, p.30). The ontological position of the critical realist is such that "...we must *assume* the existence of an objective reality so that we can make claims about cause and effect relationships; even though these claims will be imperfect" (ibid., p.112; authors' italics). The interest of the researcher in how the partnerships worked demanded an exploration of cause and effect in each case. The need to make causal statements from cases required a "...philosophical stance that transcended the limitations of positivists who contend that there are regularities or law-like generalisations in material or social settings that provide the basis for both explanation and prediction (and) interpretivists (who) deny the possibility of knowing what is real and reject the possibility of discerning causality" (ibid.).

Critical realism, by its very definition, presupposes a "...mind-independence of the world" (Sayer, 2000, p.2) which makes it problematic. In acknowledging the "...entrapment of knowledge within discourse" and the possibility of only knowing the world through available discourses, studies from a critical realist stance are limited to the reality that is available to the researcher (ibid.). The ontology of critical realism is therefore challenged as we cannot know "... the essential features of reality beyond our knowledge" (Cruickshank, 2004, p.568).

In a critique of critical realism, it is claimed that "...internal linkages between practice, theory and metatheory, evident in (Karl) Marx's writings, provide a richer understanding of society than do the structured, causal relationships offered by philosophy" (Gunn, 1989, p.87). The value of this critique to the researcher is an acknowledgement of the sociological agenda and the importance of obtaining a rich understanding of how the societies in the study influence the PPP outcomes. An

appropriate inclusion in the conceptual framework of the study is therefore a “sociological realism” which, coupled with the interest in social networks and the concept of embeddedness, gave rise to a sociological movement referred to as “relational realism” (Mische, 2011). This is defined by Tilly (2004) as “...the doctrine that transactions, interactions, social ties and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life” (p.72). The tradition of ‘relational realism’ has led to the proposition that “...cultural taste or values shape network structure, rather than the other way around” (Mische, 2011, p.11).

Tilly (2004) suggested that “...events or outcomes are what critical realists investigate, that is the external and visible behaviours of people, systems and things as they occur, or as they have happened” (p.120). He further argued that “...change in one body results in change in another body with which it has necessary relations [and] we rely on these referential and interdependent relations to underpin our theoretical understandings”. Despite this reality, “...structures may be ‘invariant under certain transformations’, that is, they can continue to exist while their constituents undergo changes in attributes which are not relevant to their reproduction” (Sayer, 1992). This is crucial because it recognises that there must be invariance in the system so that “...building theory and progress then become possible” (Easton, 2010 p. 121).

The research sought to uncover the invariance within structures and this led to questions regarding the structures, events and group motivation in Research Question 1. The researcher also sought to understand how the composition and structure of the governance arrangement within the board of directors supported the contribution of actor sub-groups. Research Question 2 confronted the tensions of agency and structure and acknowledged the importance of individual actor contribution but from a critical realist stance of agency within structure or “structuration” (Giddens, 1979) and the influence of networks of sub-groups. Actors were not analysed as autonomous actors and this is a limitation of this study. It contrasts with studies that focus on the stories of elite actors from an interpretivist stance that accessed “...the historical record and actor-centered sources of beliefs and actions” (Bevir et al., 2003, p.24).

It must be noted that, despite the philosophical orientation, the sources of evidence are similar. Interpretation of the evidence, however, is limited to the purpose for which the philosophical stance was adopted and the way in which it guided the research

questions. The limitations of the study on the roles and structures of the board of directors, from the critical realist stance that probed the “necessary” and “contingent” relationships in the pursuit of plausible explanations (Sayer, 2000; Easton, 2010, p.121) are acknowledged. Further, this study attempted to understand the contribution of actor sub-groups within the affiliation network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.40) of the board of directors and to assess overall supportiveness in the network as a factor that contributed to its sustainability. Actors were grouped into sub-groups based on their assigned attributes of ‘public’ and ‘private’, the major role classification on the board of directors. Actors’ motivations and contributions were assessed in relation to the roles they performed, rather than to the actors as individuals and this is another limitation of the philosophical stance of critical realism.


This study of how partnerships worked required a philosophical stance that allowed the researcher to obtain an “objective truth” within the socio-technical system that propelled change and success through the years. Having crafted the partnership as an organisational phenomenon that is operationalized in roles and rules, the case study method was deemed to be effective for the study of PPPs as relationships in specific organisations: “...it is only from a critical realist perspective that a full appreciation of metaphor's indispensability for scientific theorizing can be had” (Lewis, 1996, p.505). In constructing the framework, social concepts such as ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ were included and expressed in terms of their contingent relationship with other concepts in the study. These concepts are explored in the case studies which are considered to be ideal for the generation of propositions from a critical realist stance as the analysis gradually transitions “...from actions through reasons to rules and thence to structures” (Sayer, 1992, p.112).

4.3 DEVELOPING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

4.3.1 Overview


According to Maxwell (2005, p.4) the conceptual framework should answer the question, “What do you think is going on with the issues, people, or settings you plan to study?” The model below illustrates the propositions derived from the literature on partnerships that affirmed the importance of the research focus on purpose, structure and strategy in the new governance arrangement and the links between those concepts.

Figure 3: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Conceptual Framework and Research Questions



Having defined and justified the research focus on purpose, structure and strategy, the broad research questions were defined. In order to answer the ‘how’ question, further elaboration of the framework, to enhance the elements that would facilitate explanation from a relational perspective, was necessary. This required clarifying and establishing possible relationships between the concepts and consideration of the context of the study. The conceptual framework demonstrating the relationship between the concepts and the influence of the context is illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Conceptual Framework for the Study of PPPs



In its extended form, the conceptual framework is a model of the theoretical position of the researcher, though it is not theory (Sutton and Staw, 1995). The model, though it may be presented graphically, must also be explained to clearly demonstrate how concepts evolved and the relationships between concepts (ibid.). The conceptual framework was derived from the goal to understand what makes private sector-university strategic alliances work. The study was approached from a relational perspective and sought to address the relationship between the core constructs of purpose, structure and strategy, and the influences of the broader institutional and geographic contexts, i.e., the university and the private sector in small developing countries, on the functioning of the partnership. The section that follows describes the theoretical propositions drawn from the research literature and, recognising the limitations of the literature and the contexts in which studies were conducted, extends those propositions to include consideration of the influence of context and the notions of the researcher drawn from experience and integrated into the research through the process of critical subjectivity (Maxwell, 2009). In this process, research questions that guided the collection of data were drawn from the conceptual framework.

4.3.2 Deriving the Research Questions

The research questions were derived from theoretical propositions in the literature on social networks and legitimacy. Realities of the context also provided some direction in crafting the research questions and sub-questions.

4.3.2.1 Research Question 1

The research on PPPs suggests that characteristics of the inter-organisation linkages related to the motivation of partners and, in this case of PPPs, the sector influences on motivation, coupled with the attributes of the network in which the alliance is embedded, influence the structure of the alliance. These factors work to create a new organisational form that transcends the defining attributes of the partners themselves with respect to decision-making so that they are reflective of neither hierarchies nor markets but present a new meta-framework that is driven by purpose and the context in which they are located (Thorelli, 1986).

The importance of sector impact on motivation, history and other attributes relevant to understanding the characteristics of PPPs in their context, is the focus of Research Question 1. Research Question 1 and the sub-questions served to distil the concepts and attributes considered in exploring the PPP relationship. Some of the concepts are not defined in relational terms but impact the relationship between actors. The question sought evidence relevant to purpose and structure.

1. What are the defining attributes of PPPs established as business schools in small, developing countries of the Caribbean region?

1a. What is the structure of the board of directors?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

The formal structure guides the decision-making process. Firm-specific capabilities influence the choice of governance structure (Leiblein, 2003). Structure would vary the decision-making process between the hierarchical, committee structure of universities and the autonomous 'market' structure of the private sector in a small democracy.

1b. What factors propelled the establishment of the School?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

One's understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences one's contribution to their success (Harrigan, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Austin, 2000). This question seeks to establish connection-based purpose (Austin, 2000). The schools were set up at a time of economic downturn and IMF-led structural adjustment. They were established as affiliates of the university, with much greater autonomy with respect to decision-making.

1c. Why were both private sector directors and university directors included in the governance structure?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

PPPs are established to obtain benefits, support and expertise, wherever they reside in a 'happy marriage' (Datta, 2009). The purpose of including actors from each sector in the governance of the PPP is therefore related to expectations of their contribution. This question addresses the respondents' views on the link between relevance and resource contribution in governance.

1d. What motivates directors to contribute to the governance of the schools?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

Motivation for partnering influences the model of collaboration and network outcomes (Berliner, 1997). Motivation to participate may be linked to institutional or organisational concerns and is related to the meaning to the social network (Fuhse, 2009). Understanding how contribution in the social network is related to the presence of 'the other' sub-group is informed by social network analysis. 'Social homogeneity' or 'social capital' are outcomes of ties and flows in the social network (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). In network flow theory, ties are viewed as channels for transfer or flow of resources (either material or non-material) whereas the network architecture, which considers network ties, can result in 'co-ordination' or 'adaptation'. The research seeks to determine what network effects were occurring between and within actor sub-groups within the social system, thereby influencing network performance (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011).

Question1: Open codes

Governance form, private purpose, public purpose, academic disconnect, environmental challenges, curriculum relevance, business in environment, role of the board, role of the private sector, role of the public sector, legitimacy, motivation of the public sector, motivation of the private sector, motivation for a PPP, historical network.

4.3.2.2 Research Question 2

The link between structure and purpose is viewed as a duality; purpose influences structure and is influenced by the process of structuration or human action within structure (Giddens, 1984). In an attempt to deconstruct the “riddle” of structure and agency, Archer (1998, p.191) suggests that “...its solution ultimately precludes scientism” and offers the option to researchers to seek answers in relational elements that are not defined as real in the positivistic worldview (Lee and Lings, 2008). Realists view structure and agency as ontologically separate and use this as the basis for examining the interface between structure and agency so as to “...analyse the processes by which structure and agency shape and reshape one another over time and to explain variable outcomes at different times” (Archer, 1998, p.203). The examination of the relationship between structure and agency is considered from the perspective of groups of actors – public and private - and does not include a theory of the individual actor. The perspective of “relational realism” allows the researcher to explore the relationship by examining the way in which the embeddedness of actors in the context influences the network.

The variables to be explored in answering Research Question 2 include relational variables such as trust, friendship, professional support and respect measured on pairs of actors mapped in the affiliation network of their contribution and ties to the strategy of the school. Other variables related to network composition or actor attributes related to the public and private actors in the network will also be explored in the study (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

2. How do the composition and structure of the governance arrangement support the contribution of public and private partners to decision-making?

2a. What are the key strategies that have positively impacted the school?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

Precedents yield expectations which guide the actions of rational human beings (Young, 2001). Economic actions are influenced by the previous actions of partners in the PPP. The strategy in itself would impact the relationship with the university and with the private sector.

2b. What is the topology of the network of key organisational actors (executive directors and chairmen) within the board of directors?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

Network flows and network architecture provide data to determine network resources and effects (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). The social position of actors in small countries would greatly impact the partnership and the strategy of the schools would be guided by the professional network of key organisational actors. For this network of actors as individuals, the analysis does not seek to determine influence of actors as elites but to determine the presence of network effects such as ‘contagion’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011).

2c. What is the topology of the network at the establishment of the schools?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

It is claimed that “...stable economic institutions begin as accretions of activity patterns around personal networks. Their structure reflects that of the networks, and even when those are no longer in place, the institutions take on a life of their own that limits the forms future ones can take; they become ‘locked in’” (Granovetter, 1992, p.9). This question contributes to an understanding of how the partnership evolved and contributed to the success of the business schools.

2d. To what extent did the governance structure facilitate/hinder the decision-making process?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

Granovetter (1992) suggests that “...the level of network fragmentation and cohesion, or coupling and decoupling, is a major determinant of outcomes” (p.10). This question will provide insight into the dimensions of the relationship between public and private actor sub-groups and contribute to an assessment of the general atmosphere of the network. Relational outcomes such as liking, friendship, admiration, career support, personal support, energy and trust are expected to be unearthed as dimensions of supportiveness in the network (Cross and Parker, 2004). This is to determine the extent to which actor sub-groups were able to cross the divide and provide support for decision-making.

Question 2: Open codes

Key decisions, trust, friend, collegiality, competition in the partnership, challenges to relationship building, challenges to building technical legitimacy (internal), challenges of managing opposing roles.

4.3.2.3 Research Question 3

The embeddedness of firms can be more broadly defined than their social relationships or structural embeddedness to include institutional, cultural, and political elements and this presents opportunities and constraints to actors (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). The network environment at the level of the firm also provides constraints and opportunities that derive from the “network flow” and the “network architecture” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). The effects of the network and the dimensions of embeddedness of actor groups in the internal and external environment will influence the relationship between partners and influence network success; this is the focus of Research Question 3.

3. What opportunities and constraints are presented by the embeddedness of the PPP social network?

3a. How does the role undertaken within the governance structure fit with the primary roles of actors in the public and private sectors?

Theoretical and contextual rationale:

A strong tie is created by the inclusion of people on the board of another firm where there is a functional relationship (Granovetter, 1983). This question seeks to explore the connection between roles on the boards of directors and other roles in the daily, wider institutional context in which directors work. Embeddedness in the institutional context influences the PPP at the organisational level.

3b. To what extent does the environmental context of the school provide opportunities and constraints to organisational decision-making?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

Embeddedness in the context influences decision-making (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). The embeddedness of firms can be more broadly defined than their social relationships or structural embeddedness to include institutional, cultural, and political elements and this presents opportunities to, and constraints on, actors (ibid.). Networks also demonstrate cultural and cognitive embeddedness (Swedberg, 1997). The extent to which actors and roles are embedded in the context has implications for the PPP relationship.

Question 3: Open codes

Transfer of learning to public sector, transfer of learning to private sector, institutional factors, economic environment, opportunities, constraints, cultural embeddedness, cognitive embeddedness.

4.3.2.4 Research Question 4

Networks produce a new organisational form which faces legitimacy challenges that must be addressed to ensure their survival and growth (Human and Provan, 2000). The research seeks to determine how such legitimacy challenges influence decision-making in developing countries as it directly relates to business-university relationships. In exploring answers to Research Question 4, legitimacy gaps and concerns will be identified from the perception of key decision-makers and legitimacy theory will be

used to explain how the strategic posture (Magness, 2006) of the business schools serve to address those gaps and concerns. The findings with respect to Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 will inform Research Question 4 and further explain how the alliance strategy effectively transcends legitimacy challenges presented within the strategic network to create value for the schools.

4. How does the PPP strategy engaged by business schools in the English speaking Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success?

4a. What were the main concerns of the schools at various points in time?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

The strategies of the organization include actions designed to build internal and external legitimacy at various times in the life cycle of the entity. The bases upon which legitimacy may be acquired include legal, moral, political, and technical or performance-related (Brown, 2001). For new organizations, it is expected that the bases of legitimacy would evolve over time and in relation to the evolution of the wider university. The task of the governance body would be to build legitimacy, facilitating the success of the school as a new entity.

4b. What strategies were adopted to build the legitimacy of the school?

Theoretical and contextual rationale

The organization uses internal or external strategies to build legitimacy and ensure its survival (Human and Provan, 2000). The schools have developed in different ways, each choosing strategies that suit their internal and external contexts, but which afford them legitimacy in the context in which they operate. For these new schools, performance-related socio-technical legitimacy would be acquired through the provision of a more relevant set of curriculum-related and other experiences that are judged positively by stakeholders (Bitektine, 2011). This has implications for the role of the university and the relationship with the business schools.

Question 4: Open codes

Concerns, legitimacy of the university, legitimacy of the private sector.

4.4 EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework described was used to develop the research questions and sub-questions and inform the construction of instruments used for data collection. The evaluation of the conceptual framework was an ongoing process in the methodology of the research. Following data collection and analysis, and based on the findings, new concepts and new questions were included to examine the relationship between purpose, structure and strategy. The revision of the conceptual framework is addressed in Chapter 10.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter provided a description and explanation of the conceptual framework which was developed to guide the research that sought to address the question of how the PPP governance structure in business schools in small developing countries influences the performance of the schools. The justification for the use of a conceptual framework in this study included the broad literature on partnerships in various contexts that yielded concepts and propositions that could guide the development of questions and the analysis of the data. The use of “relational realism” confined the analysis process to examining the relationships that influence the performance of the partnership.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

5.0 INTRODUCTION

This study was undertaken to provide an explanation of how PPPs in the governance of business schools work to influence the strategic actions of the schools in small, developing countries in the Caribbean. This chapter presents an explanation of, and provides a rationale for, the methodology used to conduct the research. The purpose of methodology is to “...describe and to examine the logic of composition of research methods and techniques, to reveal their powers and limitations, to generalize successes and failures, to find domains of appropriate application, and to predict possible contributions to knowledge” (Krippendoff, 1985, pp.10-11). This chapter explains how the components of the methodology work together to achieve this purpose and promote confidence in the research.

The research adopted a multiple case study design and the chapter explores the principles involved in case study research and the applicability of this design to the study of cross-sectoral partnerships in the particular context. The rationale for the selection of cases is also explained. Case study research allows for the use of multiple sources of data, and multiple data collection techniques, allowing for data triangulation as the researcher corroborates the evidence obtained (Yin, 2009a). The data collection sources, techniques and logic for their use are presented in this chapter.

In an attempt to explore the differences in findings across cases and to test and extend the theoretical propositions, cross-case comparisons were developed from the data gathered at each site. The cross-case comparison focused on the differences in findings across the cases, with respect to the emerging themes, providing explanations for these based on relationships between concepts. In this chapter, ethical issues relevant to case study research are identified and mechanisms to ensure ethical conduct in the research process are discussed. This is especially significant as the researcher was a participant in the context and employed at one of the research sites. Finally, the chapter identifies assumptions and limitations of the research methodology with respect to its appropriateness and sufficiency to answer the research question.

5.1 Research Design and Rationale for the Design: Case Study

Case study methodology has been extensively used for research into PPPs (Jones and Bird, 2000; George, et al., 2002; Davies and Hentschke, 2006). In most cases, models of PPPs possess high political currency and studies have been evaluative, attempting to rationalise their value in the context in which they exist. Given the level of immaturity of academic and explanatory research applied to investigations of PPPs, the field is open for studies that may engage different theoretical frameworks, disciplines and research paradigms that will add to knowledge of the social dynamics of partnerships and guide practitioners engaged in these social constructions for particular purposes and in particular contexts.

Case study design was considered to be optimal for the purpose of the research which is to explain how PPPs work. Yin (2009) makes the point that “how” and “why” questions are more explanatory and make a compelling case for the use of case studies, histories or experiments. In this study of cross-sectoral partnerships, the case study design allowed the researcher to investigate existing and historical elements of the partnership as an event over which the researcher had little or no control (Yin, 2009a). It must be noted though that many researchers maintain that case studies are only appropriate for exploratory research whereas surveys and histories are appropriate for descriptions and experiments are the hallmark of causal research. This is debunked by Yin (2009b) who described compelling examples of explanatory and descriptive case studies. The iterative method (Merriam, 1998) by which variables are examined contributes to the development of more convincing arguments.

The three cases of PPPs in business education in small developing countries presented a unique situational context to explore the phenomenon of partnerships. The partnerships were established at approximately the same time, for the same overarching purpose, by the same university in three different territories. Case studies are appropriate to the examination of context that surrounds a particular phenomenon (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009a) and the three cases contributed to the robustness of the findings in the context. The conceptual framework included variables that emerged from the literature and provided a “...map of theories and issues regarding the research topic” which guided the investigation to understand how PPPs work (Leshem and Trafford, 2007, p.99). The conceptual framework allowed for consideration of contextual variables, dealing with

events and the processes that connect them, so as to ascertain causal linkages in the complex social phenomenon of cross-sectoral partnerships (Maxwell, 2004). The cross-case comparison allowed for the advancement of explanations where contradictory or disconfirming evidence was found (ibid.).

The final compelling reason for the use of case studies for this research, linked to their relevance for contextual explorations, is the possible contribution value with respect to the theories that underpin the research. The theoretical framework included grand theories of the embeddedness of economic action in social relations (Granovetter, 1985) and the network perspective for understanding those relations (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). It also included a range of theoretical propositions derived from the study of particular instances of cross-sectoral and strategic alliances. The case study design, with its focus on context, provided an opportunity to extend or debunk the applicability of middle-range or situation-specific theories (Mateo and Benhan-Hutchins, 2009). This yielded significant contextual knowledge which, it is argued in Chapter 11, would be useful for the advancement of practice in the field.


It was noted previously that the state of empirical research into PPPs does not provide adequate models for understanding how they work. This researcher adopted a critical realist philosophy and a reflective and pragmatic stance, seeking to determine the best use of research for the purpose of effecting action and change, while, at the same time, engaging in the changes. This is described by Moldoveanu and Martin (2008) as the development of an ontology that can “...guide and shape managerial action” (p.95), as opposed to the engagement of an ontic dimension which merely facilitates cognitive understanding and categorization.

5.2 MULTIPLE CASE RESEARCH DESIGN

The PPP social phenomenon in business schools is unique in the Caribbean region. As such, it appears to lend itself to a single case study (Yin, 2009a). Yet, the phenomenon is replicated in three countries and the inclusion of cases in these sub-contexts adds significant value to the research. Multiple case studies are considered a “replication” rather than a “sampling” design and they provide the opportunity for either “literal replication” of similar results or “theoretical replication” of results that contrast for anticipatable reasons (Yin, 2009a, p.54). The three case studies, by the very nature of

their points of convergence and divergence, provide a rich context and opportunity to generate interesting results that would enhance the conceptual framework for further research and development of guidelines to practice in the field of PPPs. The multiple case study design used for this research is presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Case Study Design



Adapted from Yin (2009, p.57) (Original Source – Cosmos Corporation)

5.3 DEFINING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Yin (2009) advised that there are five components of the case study research design including questions, propositions and unit of analysis. Tellis (1997) advises that the case study methodology selects a unit of analysis as a system of action rather than a person or persons. In the case of the PPPs in the study, the network is defined as the relations between public and private sector directors as actor sub-groups and their relationship to constructs (events) in an “affiliation” network model (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In affiliation networks, the unit of observation is the event and in this case, the strategic decisions taken by the boards of directors comprise the events (ibid.). This is represented as follows:

Figure 6: Unit of Analysis



Source: Extrapolated from Wasserman and Faust (1994).

The research is explanatory and can be categorized as instrumental as it seeks to understand more than what is obvious to the observer (Stake, 1995). The analysis is therefore extended to include the dynamics of the social system in its socio-cultural, historical and political context.

5.4 THE USE OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The study of PPPs in the particular context of business schools in small developing countries uncovers a number of theoretical, empirical and contextual complexities that warrant the selection of an appropriate approach to the study that would capture these complexities. It is useful to understand how the theoretical framework is related to, and guides the development of, an appropriate conceptual model to guide the study.

The theoretical framework presents a critical analysis of the theories and explanations that underpin the study of the phenomenon. It provides concrete concepts and ideas and a detailed explanation of how they work together to explain a phenomenon of interest (Mateo and Benhan-Hutchins, 2009). In this study, the grand theories of embeddedness of economic actions in social constructions (Granovetter, 1985) provided the explanatory framework for the study. Theories of strategic alliances and networks yielded key concepts and propositions which helped to explain the findings.

The conceptual framework was developed from the analysis of grand and middle level theories. The conceptual framework is more "...abstract and refers to global ideas about groups, situations and events of interest to a science" (Fawcett, 2004, p.88). The

conceptual model provides “...discipline-specific assumptions that tie together abstract concepts of interest and that represent the first step in developing theoretical formulations needed for scientific activities” (ibid.). Concepts and issues related to the partnerships, the organisational context of business education and the broad environmental context of the partnership were included in the conceptual framework that guided the development of the research instruments.

Miles and Huberman (1994) advocate the use of a conceptual framework as “... the best defence against overload” (p.55) which allows the researcher the opportunity to utilize the variables deemed to be important to the study. While the conceptual framework guided the study, it did not limit the researcher’s attention only to the data related to the concepts in the framework. Indeed, the framework itself was reviewed and refined on the basis of the data gathered in a process of meta-cognition as suggested by Leshem and Trafford (2007).

Figure 7: Research Design



Source: Extrapolated from Yin, 2009a

5.5 SELECTION OF CASES

Three business schools in the English-speaking Caribbean that are governed and managed as PPPs comprised the target population of cases for this research. The sample selected included the business school where the researcher was employed and two other business schools established under the same university in other Caribbean territories. The unit of analysis was the relationship between public and private sector directors and the relationship of each group to the key events at the country, firm and dyadic levels. Public sector directors included university personnel who were current or past members of the boards of directors and contributed to their governance. This group also included university employees who were instrumental in the operations of the schools. Private sector directors were defined as members of industry and external organisations who were represented on the boards of directors and who, in one case, was instrumental in the establishment of one of the schools. Both private and public sector actors contributed to the establishment and/or governance of the schools for varying periods in their history.

The cases were selected based on their areas of similarity and difference. They were all PPPs in business education in small developing countries in the same geographic region. They were established around the same time in which the region was experiencing economic challenges. In addition, they were all affiliates of the same university. The three cases provided an opportunity for exploring variation or homogeneity with respect to behaviours, beliefs and actions (Borgatti, 2003). The study focused on variation among the selected cases, emphasizing opportunities and developing causal arguments that focused on structural or topological concepts (Borgatti, 2003). A summary of some of the key areas of homogeneity and difference with respect to the cases in the study is presented in Appendix 5.

Green University presented an opportunity for the examination of partnerships between the public and private sectors in the governance of business schools. Although the business schools were all established under the same university in the overall context of small developing countries, there were several areas of difference with respect to the establishment, governance arrangements, organizational and strategic position that impacted on the relationship between the public and private sector directors of the

schools. These were actively considered in the analysis of data in the process of developing causal explanations.

5.6 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

The participatory or critical paradigm (Creswell, 2003) that underpins this research motivated the selection of methodological tools and data analysis methods that would yield both objective understandings and rich, discursive data characteristic of qualitative research (Robson, 2002) with a view to providing contextual and meaningful explanations. While the case study format is the same as many of those cited in the literature on PPPs, essential differences are inherent in the philosophy and paradigm, theoretical framework, approach to analysis of the data, reporting of outcomes and utility of the findings.

5.6.1 Mixed-Method Design: The “Third Methodological Movement”

The study falls into the mixed-methodological paradigm by virtue of the inclusion of tools that approach the analysis of data from both a positivistic and an interpretative philosophical position in order to give further credibility to the findings and conclusions. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p.5) explain the evolution of the mixed-method paradigm and refer to this movement as the “third methodological movement”. The “third methodological movement” emerged, not in response to the paradigm wars, but as a result of a concern for problem solving (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Mixed methods designs “...incorporate techniques from both the qualitative and quantitative research traditions yet combine them in unique ways in order to answer research questions that could not be answered in any other way” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003, p.10). In this study, the traditional tools of qualitative research - interviews, participant observation and document analysis - were used. In addition, the study incorporated the tools of social network analysis which was developed out of a “...propitious meeting of social theory and application, with formal mathematical, statistical and computing methodology” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.10). In this case, the quantification of ties in the networks locates the design between the positivist and interpretivist paradigms and acknowledges the researcher as a realist, using a mix of methods to find explanations of social phenomena.

In this study, mixing the methods serves a developmental purpose as “...the results generated by one method shape subsequent instrumentation, sampling or analysis strategies of the other method” (Rossman and Wilson, 1994, p.322). The purpose of mixing designs in this case may be conceptualised as “waves” in the methodology where one method shapes the next and where the second method cannot proceed without the first (ibid.). Social network concepts and analysis techniques were used to develop the “ego” nodes of the key strategic actions of the schools from the perspective of key organisational actors. Subsequently, qualitative data was mapped onto the networks to determine network attributes which served the purpose of explaining how the relationship between public and private actors worked to influence strategy and performance (Borgatti, 2003). This mixing of methods is also referred to by Creswell (2009) as the “concurrent embedded model” whereby the researcher uses the mixed methods approach in a single phase of data collection in order to obtain data that would “...assess different questions or different levels in an organization” (p.214).

In this study, multiple perspectives (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) were generated by use of multiple data collection methods and multiple accounts at the same site. The use of three research sites rooted in different contexts added rigour to the findings. This is consistent with the suggestion that, in doing case study research, evidence of various kinds should be collected from multiple sources on “...what people *say*, what you see them *doing*, what they *make* or *produce*, what documents and records *show*” (Gillham, 2000a, p.20; author's italics). In this study, evidence was collected from interviews and documents, and in notes recorded in the process of participant observation.

5.6.2 Research Technique 1: Semi-Structured Interviews

This was the primary method of data collection in this study. The study used semi-structured interviews to obtain the perspectives of interviewees (Gillham, 2000b; Patton, 2002). Open-ended interview questions were designed to lead the discussion based on Research Questions 1, 2 and 3, seeking to understand the characteristics of the partnerships, the challenges presented in governance and decision-making, and the strategies and critical social networks of the business schools.

The agenda of explanation in this study prompted the use of “laddering” techniques to cause the respondent to think critically about his/her actions and thoughts as they

related to motivation, addressing the question, “Why is that important to you?” (Reynolds and Gutman, 2001, p.26). The laddering strategy also provided evidence and prompts to the causal analysis within the framework of the linkages between purpose, structure and strategy (ibid.). The study utilized the network sampling idea of “snowballing” originally proposed by Goodman (1961) and deemed particularly useful in producing data on “ego-centred networks” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.35). In this respondent-driven sampling technique, interviews commenced with the executive directors and chairmen and the nominated persons from amongst the public and private sector directors. This was done to ensure that important actors were not omitted in the research process.

The interview as a research technique is an important source of data in case study research. This study was located in the professional workplace and explored a topic that inherently includes discussion of disputes, successes, events and perceptions about the quality and value of a professional relationship among actors. In this context, interviewing was the best technique to “...see life in the round, from all angles, including multiple sides of a dispute and different versions of the same incident (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.4). Other research tools such as surveying, statistical techniques, and experimenting were considered and found to be inappropriate for several reasons. The research sought to explain how the relationship worked and to develop a dynamic model that could be used to explain PPP performance. More importance was therefore placed on the interaction rather than the distillation of concepts and the generality of theoretical implications based on responses from a variety of actors (Gefen and Ridings, 2002). As such, the survey method was found to be inadequate. Statistical techniques, though quite compelling in social network analysis, were also not useful for the research. There was no existing data source that could be trusted for accuracy and completeness, and the limitations of the research with respect to time and purpose did not facilitate the generation of a database.

The semi-structured interview format was found to be best suited to the purpose of the study. In this study of PPPs where the problem was evident but the precise details of what to examine and how to examine it were not well defined, the semi-structured format of the interview was particularly useful (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). This format allowed for the research to explore concepts and issues as they arose while maintaining similarity between the interviews so that comparisons could be made

(Kvale, 1996). This required the researcher to understand the background of respondents and master the technical language of the research problem to engage in the conversational interview (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).

5.6.3 Research Technique 2: Archival Records

Archival records available to the researcher included both publicly available documents and organisational documents; both official and informal (Pershing, 2002). Publicly available documents included formal studies of phenomena at the research sites, books and publications produced by the University and its business schools, web pages, global reports, and mass media publications. Organisational documents included speeches, email correspondence, internal reports and legal agreements which were useful sources of evidence related to the research question. Document analysis in social research is a well-established practice and methods of analyzing texts are fairly well defined in this field (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009a; Fairclough, 2003). Archival records were included in the research as they served to facilitate across-method triangulation and validate claims of respondents in the interview process. The limitations of using archival records included access to documents (Lee and Lings, 2008) and in this study access to minutes of meetings and other documents was restricted, except at the site where the researcher was employed. This resulted in dependence on the interviews which gave respondents the freedom to decide what information should be conveyed to the researcher. The study therefore placed more emphasis on the interviews but documents were used to corroborate the evidence and provide a chronologically accurate account of events.

Documents are useful, even though they may be biased (Yin, 2009a). Researchers have noted that "...you can't trust the accuracy of records – official or unofficial, primary or secondary" (Babbie, 2007, p.342). When using documents, researchers must be cautious about their validity and the extent to which they have been edited before being stored in archives or published (Yin, 2009a; Babbie, 2007). Research that depends on historical data, as does this study, benefits from data gathering processes that serve "...to bring historicity and temporality into the method itself" (Somers, 1996, p.79; Aminzade, 1992). Documents were used to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources and also to confirm the dates, accuracy of information on contracts and the purpose and activities of the organisations (Yin, 2009a). Moreover, they were

analysed to obtain historical perspectives about how the partnerships worked. The devices used included “...tracking, content analysis and case study aggregation analysis” (Pershing, 2002, p.37).

5.6.4 Research Technique 3: Participant Observation

This research project included the researcher as a naturalistic researcher; not a detached ‘scientist’ but a participant observer, who acknowledges and looks out for his/her role in what they discover (Gillham, 2000a). Participant observation involves watching participants’ everyday actions and listening to how they describe and interpret their own and others’ actions. The methodology seeks to describe and gain insights from the everyday lives of participants (Jorgensen, 1989). Participant observation aims to provide practical and theoretical truths about human existence by provoking concepts and generalisations formulated as interpretative theories that may guide critical examination of other propositions and theories used in the research process (Jorgensen, 1989).

A research investigation is not neutral; it has its own dynamic and there will be effects (on individuals, on institutions) precisely because there is someone there asking questions, clarifying procedures, collecting data and recognising that this is a part of doing good research (ibid.). Participant observation is a critical component of the research design, intended to acknowledge overtly the role of the researcher as a participant in the organisation and therefore, subject to researcher bias. Field notes were used to record observations that included “...an account of events, how people behaved and reacted, what was said in conversation, where people were positioned in relationship to one another, their comings and goings, physical gestures, [the researcher’s] subjective responses to what [was] observed, and all other details and observations necessary to make the story of the participant observation experience complete” (Mack et al., 2005, p.21). It was important to note the value of both “emic” and “etic” perspectives. The researcher, in an attempt to obtain the emic or “native’s perspective of reality” recorded events as they occurred from the perspective of the subject. The etic perspective or “external, social scientific perspective on reality” was obtained by subjecting the emic data to scientific analysis (Fetterman, 2009, pp.547-548).

The procedures used in this method included preparations to collect information such as determining beforehand what were some of the critical observations related to the visit, using keywords during interviews and scheduling time to expand notes at the end of the main sessions using the format for the study (Mack et al., 2005). Human and Provan (2000), in their study of legitimacy in networks, noted the importance of participant observation but were unable to obtain permission to act as participant observers. In this study of networks, the researcher, as an employee at one of the sites, had access to events, actions and processes that provided appropriate contexts in which to observe the dynamics of the partnerships.

Yet, having access to the research site is a necessary but insufficient reason for using the powerful scientific research method of participant observation. In fact, the method is best used where the phenomenon is large enough to be studied as a case and the research problem can be addressed by data gathered in the field (Jorgensen, 1989). Moreover, the method is most appropriate where "...the research problem is concerned with human meanings and interactions viewed from the insiders' perspective (Jorgensen, 1989, p.13). It is evident, from the explanations included in this chapter, that the study of public-private partnerships in the governance of business schools in the Caribbean meets the criteria, outlined above, of case research methodology and an engaged research practitioner with access and an insider perspective.

The researcher and the research design were prepared to optimize participant observation. The conceptual framework modelled the research problem at multiple levels: pairs of actors, within the organisation and across organisations and also included variables in the wider environment. This required the revisiting of data in an iterative process that can span the levels of analysis and use observation to reflect and make judgments and linkages that are often unapparent at first glance. The conceptual framework guided this process and worked to substantiate and inform its revisions in the face of continued challenges to its validity. Field notes of observations, notions and possible explanations were captured at the research sites, following the interviews and particular events. They were then coded to explanations that evolved from the other data where relevant. Where the researcher's observations did not match other data, they were included in possible rival explanations of the observed phenomenon.

Participant observation is perhaps the most contested research technique and the most artful in the study of human subjects, requiring the researcher to "...cultivate appropriate interpersonal skills as well as related abilities to think and act with sensitivity and creative judgment in the field" (Jorgensen, 1989, p.9). Gaining rapport, building trust and using memory are integral to the success of this research tool (Bernard, 2000). The researcher, as a professional who interacted with participants at all the sites, had developed interpersonal relationships with the key respondents who could facilitate access. From the commencement of the study, she indicated that she would be requesting their assistance and obtained support for the research. Participant observation was included in the confidentiality agreement. Building rapport and trust in this way did not require the researcher to maintain naivety or adopt manipulative tactics to establish rapport (Bernard, 2000). Other technical skills, including objectivity and value neutrality, were actively considered by the researcher in the process of recording field notes (Bernard, 2000).

5.6.5 Research Technique 4: Social Network Methods and Tools

Studies of collaboration and partnerships, including strategic alliances, have relied heavily on social network methods and analyses (e.g. Gulati et al., 2000; Larson, 1992) and Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) provide an overview and typology of the studies of various forms of partnerships that have utilized network theorizing and methods. Social network theory and the concept of embeddedness that were included in the theoretical framework for this study have utilized network concepts in their description and include relational concepts as the basis of their explanatory power (Swedberg, 1997). Social network analysis can be used to "...study structural variables measured on actors in the set (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.9). The relational structure is considered to be equivalent to the pattern of relationships among actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The purpose of the analysis was to understand the patterns in the system and then, the attributes of actors in terms of their location in the system. Network methods were also used to study the process of change over time as structures, their impact and their evolution are the primary focus of the theory and methodology (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

In this study, four social networks are presented and analysed to provide explanations that are plausible and relevant to the study of cross-sectoral partnerships in governance

mechanisms. Firstly, the social structure of the founding members of the PPP provides information about the cohesion and connectedness of the actors in the founding network and the “shape” of the ties with respect to the inclusion of private and public actors (Borgatti et al., 2009, p.894). In this network relational ties are dichotomous and only ties that are present are included. They are also directional with respect to the influence of actors in the organisation in that actors contributed to the establishment of the organisation (ibid.). The network is shaped by the number of actors in public and private sub-groups. The second network deemed to be important in this study, in which the setting includes small numbers of actors and the presence of defined sub-groups, is the influence network of key organisational actors. In this network, key organisational actors as ‘egos’ were asked to name the persons (alters) who provided professional support and influenced the attainment of organisational goals. Based on the number of ties to actors within sub-groups, the researcher could infer the degree of influence of sub-groups and the impact on the relationship between sub-groups in the overall network architecture.

The third network is derived from an application of the construct of “cognitive social structure” defined by Krackhardt (1987) as “...a set of relational statements between all pairs of actors in the system...” that includes a “sender,” a “receiver” and a third person, the “perceiver” who is the actor who perceives the relationship (Krackhardt, 1987, p.113; author's quotation marks). This network is an affiliation network in which respondents as “perceivers” identify, by ranking from most significant to least significant, the four actors (senders) whom they perceive as contributing to the strategy of the school. In this network, there is no implication that the reported perceptions of actors are correlated with “objective” relationships that may exist (Krackhardt, 1987, p.113; author's quotation marks). Explanations and predictions can be derived from the shape of the network based on the density of private and public sub-groups determined from the average perceptions of sub-group contribution.

In the final social network defined in the study, the strategies defined by key organisational actors are analysed and classified into two groups - ‘cognitive’ and ‘socio-political’ - based on the researcher’s assessment of the way in which stakeholders would perceive and judge such actions as legitimate. Data from respondents, both public and private, on the contribution of each sub-group to the strategy of the organisation, are mapped as a dichotomous relation to either one or the

other category and the strength of ties to the category is determined by the number of ties to each category. The inclusion of data from both public and private actors on the contribution of public and private sub-groups is consistent with the methodological solution of Krackhardt (1987) to the problem of informant accuracy encountered in social network theorising in that "...what people say...bears no useful resemblance to their behaviour (Bernard et al., 1982, p.63). The use of data from the perceiver from the opposite sub-group, for example, private actors' perceptions of the actions of public actors, provide some veracity to the data (Krackhardt, 1987). This network emphasises the actions of actor sub-groups and extends the discussion on cognitive social structure described in the aforementioned network.

5.7 DATA TRIANGULATION

Researchers must be concerned about the clarity of their perceptions and validity of their communication (Stake, 2005b). As such, every effort must be made to ensure data integrity, accuracy and confirmability (ibid.). The research technique in the data collection process to achieve greater accuracy and confirmability of the data is known as triangulation (Denzin, 1978). Triangulation is defined by Denzin (1978) as "...the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (p.21). In this study, data from documents was triangulated with the data obtained from interviews in a process of methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978). In addition, participant observation was used as a "within-method" form of triangulation using "multiple comparison groups". The same phenomena were observed across the three sites where possible, checking for internal consistency and reliability of the data. Further, participant observation was used for "between methods" triangulation for convergent validity of the interview data. With respect to the analysis, the research process included reflexivity, whereby the analysis of field data was guided by the process of critical self-reflection to consider factors such as whether the character of the research data was affected by factors that included the sensitivity of the research issues, the presence of the researcher or the relationship between researcher and respondents (Waddington, 2004, p. 157). The process also included the extended mode of analysis suggested by Atkinson and Delamont (2005), as multi-level analysis served to encapsulate frames from within which to understand the data.

5.8 PILOT OF THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

The interview instrument was piloted with one member of the existing board of directors at the first case study site. This was conducted in her office and at her convenience. The relationship was not open and therefore responses were very restricted to the interview questions. Based on the progress of the discussion, the interviewer did not ask the last question on the interview instrument. The findings in the pilot interview and actions taken are given in Table 3; 'P' refers to the prompt from the interview process, 'R' is the response of the respondent or outcome of the interview, and 'A' refers to the considerations and actions taken as a result of the response.

The pilot interview resulted in several changes to the instrument that served to generate useful data for addressing the research question (see appendices 6 and 7 for the final instrument). The responses seemed reserved and non-committal and the researcher gave further thought to questions that would elicit more open responses. The interview yielded important insights and the data was retained and used in the overall analysis.

In the conduct of case studies, the first case is usually considered to be a test or pilot case and this study observed this research tradition (Yin, 2009a). The study positioned the first case (at the workplace of the researcher) as a pilot case that aided the researcher in developing relevant lines of questions. Yin (2009) makes the point that the pilot case study is not a pre-test and that, done properly and using the case study protocol effectively, will help the researcher to improve the questions used in data gathering and provide conceptual clarification for the research design. In the process of engaged scholarship, this theoretical exploration was facilitated by selecting key respondents who provided feedback on the quality of the interview questions and new theoretical insights about the research design. In addition, analysing the findings at the pilot site and generating the case report served to illuminate areas of omission, ambiguity or inadequacy of data for answering the research questions.

Table 3: Assessment and Review of the Semi-Structured Interview Protocol: Pilot

Test	Interaction in the Pilot Interview
Anonymity	<p>P: Interview preamble: “Please note that this interview will be kept confidential and your anonymity will be maintained as far as possible” (Researcher, Interviewer).</p> <p>R: “That is impossible! You will always know who is making statements. But I have no problem with that. You are free to quote me” (Pilot respondent).</p> <p>A: This was a major consideration and it was necessary to take steps to safeguard the identity of respondents as far as possible. It was also decided that the statement should be retained in the preamble of the interview instrument.</p>
Restricted responses from respondent	<p>R: The respondent produced very short responses to each question in the pilot. Further, the failure of the recording device resulted in very limited data from the pilot interview.</p> <p>A: Several variables might have been responsible for this:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Distance in the relationship between researcher and respondent, in which case, it would be necessary to take actions to reduce distance in further interviews. ➤ Closed lenses with respect to the interview questions, in which case, the researcher would be prepared to expand the preamble of the interview as required.
Destruction of data	<p>P: “The data from this interview will be kept safely and securely and destroyed after 2 years” (Researcher, Interviewer).</p> <p>R: “Why would you do that? It is archival records! You should not destroy the data. You can donate the interview, with my permission, to the Main Library. Of course it can be blocked for a period” (Pilot respondent).</p> <p>A: This suggestion was in contravention of the UK Data Protection Act. The possibility of restricting access to the thesis was considered but the researcher made no promise to do so.</p>
Audio-recording	<p>P: “I am requesting your permission to audiotape this interview” (Researcher, Interviewer).</p> <p>R: “It goes without saying... I would expect you to audiotape it” (Pilot respondent).</p> <p>A: This position would have been adopted as the respondent was also a researcher. Yet, the statement was retained in the interview prelude as it is a necessary part of ethical conduct in the academic research process (Wiles et al., 2005).</p>
Uncertainty of respondents that their involvement in the organisation positions them to contribute to the research topic.	<p>P: “Please do indicate to me if at any point you are uncomfortable with the questions asked and if you wish to stop or defer the interview” (Researcher, Interviewer).</p> <p>R: “I think this interview will be very short because I was only (position). Of course, if you talk to (name)...and you can talk to (name)... it would be more valuable” (Pilot Respondent).</p> <p>P: “Your input will be very important to the study” (Researcher, Interviewer)</p> <p>R: “I am not sure about that but let’s go ahead” (Pilot Respondent).</p> <p>A: This vignette suggested that the respondent did not feel that his/her contribution would be valuable. It also suggested some level of disengagement with the research, researcher and/or the organisation. The researcher was alerted to attempt to make people feel that their contributions were important.</p>
Restrictive	<p>P: “Why do you think the governance structure included both private sector</p>

Test	Interaction in the Pilot Interview
questions with answers documented in history	<p>directors and university directors?” (Researcher, Interviewer).</p> <p>R: “Well it was a given. It was agreed that there must be a board of directors that included the Principal as Chairman of the Board. There was a ratio – two thirds corporate sector and one third... (University)” (Pilot Respondent).</p> <p>A: This response suggested that the question was too restricted and did not encourage the researcher to reflect on purpose. The question was retained to give direction and a new question was added to the interview instrument, specifically examining the reason for the partnership.</p> <p><u>New Question:</u> But what do you think the University hoped to achieve through involvement of the private sector?</p> <p><u>“Laddering” Opportunity:</u> Why was this important to the University? To have the Principal as Chairman?</p>
Questions and probes	<p>P: New laddering question: “Why was this important to Green? To have the Principal as Chairman?” (Researcher, Interviewer)</p> <p>R: “Well, it was Green programmes that were being delivered and the Principal has to ensure that what is delivered meets with Green requirements for quality. It is important to understand that it’s Green. This is what attracts students to the business school.</p> <p>A: The rapaciousness with which the answer was given prompted the researcher to probe. The probing question focused on roles and this was critical to the purpose of the study.</p> <p><u>New Question:</u> But what do you see as the responsibility of private sector and UWI directors?</p>

5.9 DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL AND PROCESSES

The data collection protocol was developed to ensure the integrity of the case study evidence in the data collection process. It also guided the process of data management, ensuring that data was accessible, comparable and well preserved (Yin, 2009a; Wiles et al., 2005; Stake, 2005b).

The case study protocol serves to demonstrate how data was collected using each research technique.

Table 4: Case Study Database

Research Question	Source of Data		
	Interviews	Archival Documents	Participant observation
1. What are the defining attributes of the PPP governance structure utilized by the business schools?	Interviews	Document analysis based on conceptual framework	Observations of activities and behaviours related to the partnership, using case study questions and conceptual framework as a basis for observations.
2. How do the composition and structure of the governance arrangement influence the contribution of public and private partners to decision-making?	Interviews (reporting codes, counts, relationship among concepts)	Document analysis (reporting concepts and relationship among concepts)	Observations of activities and behaviours related to the partnership, using case study questions and conceptual framework as a basis for observations
3. What opportunities and constraints are presented by the structural embeddedness of the PPP network?	Direct question on the interview		Observations of activities and behaviours related to the partnership, using case study questions and conceptual framework as a basis for observations
4. How does the PPP strategy utilized by business schools in the English-speaking Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success?	Though this is not a direct question on the interview it was ascertained based on the data in the interview protocol using the definitions of legitimacy in the conceptual framework	Documents provided evidence of performance and sources of legitimacy	

5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents

The respondents at Apple Business School included existing and past members of the Board of Directors, senior administrative staff at the University who interacted with the School and critical informants in the private sector who had close relationships with the School. Respondents selected for the research were sent emails requesting their participation in the research. Existing members of the Board of Directors were selected based on availability and ‘snowballing’. There was also an attempt to include a balance from the public and private sectors and, as such, some new members of the Board from

the private sector were excluded from the research. The email included a formal commitment agreement between the researcher and the director/participant that included the purpose of the study, research techniques, target group and a request for a meeting (Appendix 8). The researcher then followed up with telephone calls to schedule interviews. Interviews were rescheduled as many times as necessary to facilitate the timetables of participants. All interviews were conducted face to face.

The participation of respondents at the other two sites was secured and arranged by the executive directors of those schools. They made arrangements for interviews to be held within a defined period of up to five (5) days. Interviews were held at respondents' offices and homes and also at the business schools or the hotel where the researcher stayed during the process of data collection. Where participants were not available during the week of face-to-face interviews, those interviews were conducted by teleconference. This entire process required extensive follow up by the researcher. The lists of participants in each case are presented in tables 5 to 7.

Table 5: Interview Respondents: Gerran Business School

Position in study	Experience	No. of Respondents
KOA**	Private	1
KOA	Public-private	2
KOA	Public	1
Director	Public	5
Director	Private	3
Director	Public-Private	1
Total Respondents		13

** KOA = *key organizational actor*

Table 6: Interview Respondents: Apple Business School

Position in study	Experience	No. of Respondents
KOA	Private	1
KOA	Public-private	2
KOA	Public	4
Director	Public	3
Director	Private	3
Protagonist	Private	1
Staff	Public	2
Total Respondents		16

Table 7: Interview Respondents: Rotter Business School

Position in study	Experience	No. of Respondents
KOA	Private	2
Director	Public	3
Director	Private	4
Management staff	Public	1
Management staff	Private	1
Total Respondents		11

At each interview the interview protocol was read. Interviews were taped with the express permission of participants and fully transcribed to capture pauses, intonation and other expressions. Forty (40) interviews were conducted in total for the three cases. At the close of the interview respondents were thanked for their participation in the study.

5.9.2 Archival Data

Archival data was collected at all three sites based on availability and access. The data included in the study is presented below.

Table 8: Summary of Archival Data

	Apple	Rotter	Gerran
Minutes of meetings	X		
Brochures	X		
School magazines	X	X	X
Newspaper publications	X	X	X
Books	X	X	X
Websites	X	X	X
Affiliation agreement and/or other formal agreements	X	X	X
Strategic plans	X		
Emails	X		

Access to documentation at the site where the researcher is employed was unrestricted. This was not the case at the other two sites as demonstrated in Table 9; the request was made for access but denied on the basis of confidentiality in both cases. In an effort to obtain more archival data while respecting the right to confidentiality, a document analysis schedule was developed to guide a research assistant approved by the executive directors to extract the relevant data from the records (Appendix 9); this however, did not yield any results.

The use of archival data also presented the problem of how much data to collect and how to identify data that would relate to the phenomenon of PPPs being studied (Bickman and Rog, 2009). Multiple data sources in qualitative research are used to support validity of conclusions in that "...the more diverse the sources and methods, the greater confidence there is in the convergence of the findings" (Bickman and Rog, 2009, p.23). The researcher confronted this challenge of data triangulation focused on the research issues by developing the document analysis protocol based on the research

propositions and the concepts included in the conceptual framework. The researcher attempted to collect data from as many documented sources as possible.

The use of archival data requires that the researcher be sensitive to its possible areas of bias (Yin, 2009b). Archival data is subject to under or over representation depending on the context (ibid.). In this study, the documents collected were both public and internal documents of organisations and, as such, the data is represented from the perspective of the organisation and subject to “editorial leanings” of insider actors (Luke, 2009). Indeed, with regard to the phenomenon of cross-sectoral relationships, the data would make limited direct references to the phenomenon and there was need for active interpretation in the actual selection of data to be drawn from records. Based on this constraint, the data collected was significantly more than that used in the analysis and presentation of the case findings.

5.9.3 Participant Observation

Participant observation is considered one of the more powerful research methods in ethnographic studies (Babbie, 2007; Bernard, 2000; Jorgensen, 1989; Fetterman, 2009). The method demands significant preparation and attention to activities in the process including “discovering the obvious” and taking field notes (Bernard, 2000). In this study, the researcher engaged in participant observation while carrying out her professional duties. There was no attempt by the researcher to insert herself into situations that appeared to be sources of field data and participant observation. Field notes were recorded after interviews with respondents that yielded observations deemed worthy of inclusion in the study. The field notes included descriptions of what occurred and the researcher’s analysis of the event (Fetterman, 2009). In some cases, observations were audio recorded, transcribed and included in Nvivo for analysis. In other cases, field notes were written, often at the end of the day following the event. In one case, the researcher was required to use her field notes to construct a report of a particular occurrence. The report was requested as part of the professional duties of the researcher and there was no prior knowledge within the organisation that the field notes existed. It was important to report only what was considered to be the facts of the situation.

There were more opportunities for participant observation at the site where the researcher was employed. The researcher used reflective processes and documented the actions, contexts and dates of observations relevant to the research issue. Data collected using participant observation was also historical. Observations were noted as they were made from the commencement of preparation for the study, well before formal approval was granted to commence data collection. This data was reviewed for relevance and notes found to be irrelevant were discarded prior to data analysis.

5.10 ASSEMBLING THE BACKGROUND DATA

The background data on the schools were significantly linked to the data analysis and findings in this multilevel research. For the Apple case study, background data was collected by the researcher from archival records. In the case of Rotter Business School and Gerran Business School, the researcher developed the descriptions of each phenomenon and sent this to a key organisational actor (KOA) for checking. The background data confirmed the appropriateness of the three cases selected for this study of PPPs. Similarities between the three cases included their presence in small developing countries and location within the same university system. In addition, the governance structure in each case included actors with public, private and a mix of public and private experience. The local realities of the university campus and its relationship with the society in which it existed presented points of difference that could facilitate “...the comparison between two sets of things – persons, roles, activities, sites as a whole – that are known to differ in some other important respect” (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.237) .

5.11 DATA ANALYSIS: STRATEGY, PROCEDURE AND PRESENTATION

Yin (2009) suggests that the formulation of a sound data analysis strategy at the start of the research study will aid in the collection of data and lead seamlessly into analysis. The analysis presents the logic that links the data to the research question and the criteria for interpreting the findings (Stake, 2005a; Yin, 2009a). The data analysis strategy is intended to “...help you to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations” (Yin, 2009a, p.30). The strategy for interpreting the findings of the case study may include identifying and

addressing rival explanations, allowing for analytic generalization in the testing of theories and the development of new theories (Yin, 2009a). The procedure for data analysis is to start with the research question, identify evidence that addresses the research questions or sub-questions, draw a tentative conclusion or finding/s related to the research question and decide on how to present the evidence so that readers will understand why you have come to those conclusions (Yin, 2009b). This section addresses how the case analysis was conducted to arrive at a general explanation for the performance of PPPs being studied.

This study examined three cases of PPPs as alternative governance structures in business schools, created through the strategic alliance of Green University and members of the private sector in the countries of Arden, Gerran and Rotter. Each case was analysed to determine the variables and relationships between variables at three levels of analysis of the PPP relationship - the private and public actor groups, the organisational level and the environmental context of the country in which each partnership was located. Explanations were derived based on the interaction and linkages between variables and the relationship between public and private actors that resulted from the way in which their interaction was influenced by the factors in the context and at the various levels of analysis. The individual case reports present plausible explanations with regard to what made the PPP arrangement work at each site, over the past twenty-one years, the shortest time that each school existed. The propositions described in the theoretical framework were examined in the light of evidence derived from the research. The analysis was approached from the social network perspective and from a critical realist paradigm and produced explanations of the dynamics of the public-private relationship in the PPP governance structure and the influence of that relationship on the key strategies of the school. The research techniques employed produced qualitative data which was analysed using social network analytical methods and data coding guided by the analytic technique of content analysis.

Figure 8: Model of Data Analysis



Source: Extrapolated from Yin (2009a)

5.11.1 Analysis of Qualitative Data

5.11.1.1 Content Analysis

The contextualisation of research and search for meanings that may influence behaviours makes content analysis an appropriate analytical methodology. The data obtained was analysed using content analysis which is defined by Krippendorff (2004) as “...a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p.18; author’s italics). The content was coded and broken down into manageable categories of keywords, phrases or themes. The researcher then analysed the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, making inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and the culture and time of which they were a part (ibid.).

5.11.1.2 Text Analysis Procedures

The study incorporated text data from three sources: interviews, observations and documents. Interviews and participant observations are researcher-instigated data and therefore subject to the limitations and opportunities of the research environment whereas documents are naturally occurring data, influenced by the social context in which they were constructed (Perakyla, 2005). Three major tools of text analysis are used in this study. The first is the historical and Foucaultian way of analyzing and interpreting texts (Perakyla, 2005, p.872); the second is conversation analysis (Sacks et al., 1974) and the third is critical discourse analysis which seeks to understand power and dominance in relationships (Van Dijk, 1993).

In describing the use of the Foucaultian method used by Armstrong (2002), Perakyla (2005) indicated that the focus is on the ‘propositional content’ (not the linguistic forms) of the texts, “...trying to pin down the assumptions and presuppositions that the texts incorporated” (Perakyla, 2005, p.872). One technique is to analyse the text by examining the characteristic language, especially the use of rhetoric which is “...how texts (spoken and written) *persuade* their readers and hearers” (Silverman, 2004, p.73; author's italics). The interview allowed the researcher to overcome distance in “...space and in time; past events or faraway experiences, by studying people who took part in them” (Perakyla, 2005, p.869).

Conversation analysis studies offer “...qualitative descriptions of interactional structures (e.g., turn taking, relations between adjacent utterances) and practices (e.g. telling and receiving news, making assessments)” (Perakyla, 2005, p.875; author's parentheses). This method “...is attributed to [Harvey] Sacks who started to study the very structures of the interaction itself” (Schegloff, 1992, p.xviii). Interviews were recorded and transcribed to include the structures of the interaction such as pauses and linguistic devices (Silverman, 2004, p.73). The researcher included incidents in the participant observation memos where they were evident during the interview process. The coded memos along with the text analysis provided insights into how public and private actors functioned in the PPP arrangement. The methods were also mutually reinforcing with respect to the theoretical propositions and were used separately, following the advice of Perakyla (2005) who indicated that “...rather than combining different methods...we should perhaps let each method do its job in its own way...and then, only at the end of that, let their results cross-illuminate each other” (p.881).

5.11.1.3 Text Coding

Data collected from the three sources were all converted to text and used in the analysis and case reports. Interviews were transcribed and checked for accuracy. Data from archival documents from each site were summarised in a single document in text format. Audio files from the process of participant observation were also transcribed and a single document in text format was produced. All data collected were included in the process of analysis.

The data analysis was facilitated to a limited extent by the use of data analysis software. Data analysis software are tools available to the researcher and it is important to describe exactly how they are used to support the process. The qualitative data analysis software, NVivo 8, was used to code and categorize text from the interviews, archival records and participant observation memos, thereby aiding the process of triangulation. Nvivo 8 is a code and retrieve programme that facilitates theory and conceptual building. Codes and patterns were developed into causal networks using explanatory effects matrices in order to develop an integrated understanding of the case (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

In the open coding process, codes were not limited to those generated from the theoretical and conceptual framework. Other codes were developed where they appeared to fit the research questions or present a possible causal link to events. This was necessary in order to capture the meanings in the language and the way in which public and private actors interpreted the interactions. It was important that the use of the software did not transform the data analysis into a rigid coding by words as suggested by (Kelle, 1997). While it would have been simple to identify word frequencies or coding stripes, and even sort by sector to find recurring concepts, the process of analysis at this point varied to generate the most appropriate and useful axial codes.

The study sought to determine how the governance relationship between public and private partners in the PPP arrangement contributed to the survival of the business schools. The study attempted to do this by emphasizing the unit of analysis as the relationship between public and private sector directors with respect to the key strategies of the schools. The main strategies identified by the KOAs in the interview processes were extracted (Research Question 2) and through data reduction, selective codes were generated to reflect each strategy. These were considered to be core categories that are enduring in the schools (Borgatti, 2006). These selective codes formed the basis for axial coding.

The process of axial coding was used to identify important concepts that embodied the relationship among the codes. Axial coding "...is the process of relating codes (categories and properties) to each other, via a combination of inductive and deductive thinking" (Borgatti, 2006, website). The conceptual framework served as a guide to relate open codes to the key strategies (selectively coded). Borgatti (2006) explains that through axial coding relationships are developed using a causal relationships in a framework that includes a description of the phenomenon, causal conditions, context intervening conditions, action strategies and consequences. This framework was not used and instead, the conceptual framework, which is also based on causal relationships for the purpose of explanation, was used to guide the process of axial coding. This process led to the identification of findings of the study which were explained using the theoretical propositions.

5.11.1.4 Social Network Analysis

In this study, four social networks were mapped and analysed as an integral part of providing answers to the research question. The initial task of the analysis was to map the professional networks of KOAs to determine their density and then to assess the impact that this could have on the PPP and relationships between sub-groups of actors in the network. The second network examined in this study of PPPs was that of actors and relationships that were instrumental in the establishment of the schools. The historical network architecture was mapped to determine the density of public and private actors at the start of the school. The network was extended as far as possible to include actors and ties that could be identified from the interviews and documents. Two other networks were constructed to determine the density of actor sub-groups which contributed to the strategy of the PPPs. The social network research method adopted by Krackhardt (1987) was used in this study to determine the weighted perceptions of colleagues of the contribution of public and private actors to the strategy of the school. In this case, data collection deviated from the usual who to whom matrices and included the perceptions of actors with respect to the contribution of their own group and that of the other groups in the study (ibid.).

5.11.1.5 Presentation of Social Networks

In the networks included in the case, nodes representing actors with mainly university experience are coloured yellow whereas green nodes denote actors with both public and private sector experience; private sector actors are denoted by blue nodes. The designation 'KOA' means the actor is considered a key organisational actor in the business school. The unique challenges to ethical conduct in social network research required that the research adopt measures to protect the anonymity of actors (Borgatti and Molina, 2003; Borgatti and Molina, 2005). Actors are given anonymity in three different ways in the study. Actors are referred to as 'respondents' and by sector experience, where 'Pub' represents 'public,' 'Priv' represents 'private' and Pub/Private represents an actor having both public and private experience. Names are fictitious and are only used where they contribute to the analysis. Names have no relationship to gender as this is not a factor in this study. The masculine form of the third person is used where references are made to actors.

The combination of qualitative and social network analysis is not without precedence and advances in network methodology have provided the opportunity to utilise the appropriate combination of tools to study the social relationships between actors and answer the research question on how the relationship between public and private sector actors in the governance of business schools in the Caribbean influences their contribution to strategy and impacts the outcomes for the schools (Breiger, 2004).

5.11.2 Within-Case Analysis

The study included qualitative data from three sources: interviews, the reflections of the researcher as participant researcher, and archival documents. The purpose of the analysis was to derive explanations of how PPPs work in business schools in small, developing countries. In this study, the research question and theoretical propositions that emerged from the critical review of the literature were used to guide the data analysis (Yin, 2009a). Data that either supported or refuted those propositions were presented and explained. Possible alternative explanations were identified and assessed to determine whether they should be examined and treated iteratively in the process of within-case verification (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Rival explanations, such as whether private control was motivated by a concern for financial risk and possible demise, were identified and assessed as they arose from the data and participants' perspectives.

The overall data analysis strategy was supported by the use of appropriate analytic techniques. As an explanatory study, pattern matching and seeking out patterns related to possible dependent (e.g. private motivation) and the independent (e.g. relationship, trust, etc.) variables is a valid analytic technique (Yin, 2009a). The study included both existing and past members of the boards of directors and, as such, included both real-time and retrospective data. The analysis of the public-private relationship was conducted across levels that included the public and private actor sub-groups in the governance arrangement, within the organisation with respect to the purpose, structure and strategy of the organisation and the wider context of the university and country. Relationships between the concepts and variables that emerged from the analysis of data were analysed to generate plausible explanations of PPP performance in each case.

5.11.3 Cross-Case Analysis

This study includes three cases of PPP governance in business schools in small, developing countries. The cases were selected on the basis of several points of comparative similarity and difference. The aim of multi-case design is to “...increase generalizability, reassuring oneself that the events and processes in one well-described setting are not wholly idiosyncratic” (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.151). By comparing sites or cases, one can establish the range of generality of a finding or explanation and at the same time pin down the conditions under which that finding will occur (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The use of multiple sites in this study facilitated the development of general explanations of PPP governance in business schools in small, developing countries. The extent to which the findings can be generalised depends on the replication logic of analytical generalisation where “...the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory” (Yin, 2009a, p.43).

Cross-site analysis requires the researcher to devise an appropriate method that would produce “a meta-ethnography... (that includes) a theory of social explanation that both preserves uniqueness and entails comparison” (Hoblit and Hare, 1983, p.1). The main findings in each case were analysed within the case study and the propositions derived from one case were examined across subsequent cases, explaining where differences in the contexts would have yielded different outcomes. Where differences existed across cases, they were addressed in the cross-case analysis through propositions and explanations. The cross-case analysis was undertaken to identify key issues that emerged from the findings and to explain the similarities and differences across the sites. The cross-case analysis was reviewed for clarity and accuracy by an independent expert from one of the research sites.

5.12 Research Quality: Validity, Reliability and Generalizability

Scientific research requires the researcher to demonstrate the validity and reliability of his/her study, making the case that the findings are accurate and credible (Patton, 2002). Further, researchers differentiate between the internal validity and external validity, explaining the latter as “...defining the domain to which the study’s findings can be generalised” (Yin, 2009a, p.40). In case study research, various tactics are used

to meet the criteria defined by these tests of quality and the following sections will demonstrate how these tactics were used in this study to meet the demands of the tests of rigour and quality.

5.12.1 Validity

Wasserman and Faust (1994) explain that “...a measure of a concept is valid to the extent that it actually measures what it is intended to measure” (p.57). Research that is deemed to be valid is, by nature, credible as the arguments are logically consistent and the data collected and analysed support the conclusions that have been drawn (Patton, 2002). Yin (2009a) indicates that the quality of the research design in case studies can be judged by three dimensions of validity: construct validity, internal validity and external validity.

5.12.1.1. Construct and Theoretical Validity

Construct validity refers to the process for “...identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2009a, p.40). In this study of partnerships, attention was paid to construct validity during the literature review and development of the conceptual framework. The constructs were determined from existing research and the relationship between the constructs was developed from the theoretical framework that included the relationship between structure and purpose (Giddens, 1984), the influence of the embeddedness of economic actions in social networks (Granovetter, 1983) and consideration of a range of constructs and concepts from the literature on PPPs, strategic alliances and other forms of partnerships.

Construct validity “...arises when measures of concepts behave as expected in theoretical predictions” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.58). As such, the authors suggest that construct validity of social network measures (and measures attained using other instruments) can be studied by examining how they behave in a range of theoretical propositions. The theoretical propositions that formed the basis for the generation of questions to guide the research were tested in the process of data analysis. Where a concept did not behave as expected, the process yielded a theoretical contribution that met the requirements of originality (incremental or revelatory) and utility (scientific and practical) (Corley and Gioia, 2011).

Construct validity is demonstrated in case study research by using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence and having key informants review the case study report (Yin, 2009a). The cross-site analysis was reviewed by one member of staff at Apple who is familiar with all the sites and the findings confirmed (Appendix 10). This independent expert was selected for his knowledge of the region, his familiarity with the business schools, interactions with both academic and private sector actors and institutions, and his expertise in corporate governance.

5.12.1.2 Internal Validity

In this explanatory study of PPPs, internal validity was particularly important (Yin, 2009a; Yin, 2009b). Case study researchers must demonstrate confidence in the analysis of relationships between variables or else “...we are left with interesting stories of what happened, of unknown truth and utility” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.11). This research used the analytical techniques of pattern matching and explanation building with the aid of organisational logic and sense-making models to meet the test of internal validity (Yin, 2009a). The logic model used in the analysis is a multi-level model that traces the strategic actions of the schools over time and explains their legitimacy in terms of the public-private relationship.

Two mechanisms within the study greatly facilitated internal validity. Firstly, a mixed-method design utilized data obtained from both qualitative and quantitative analytic processes and, secondly, a multi-level analytical strategy examined variables in the environment, institutional context and actor sub-group level, giving scope to the research. The multi-level analytical strategy is a valid one as the concepts that describe variables in the macro-environment of developing countries are “...global properties (which) are relatively objective, descriptive, and easily observable” and can be generated from the researchers’ analysis of the data (Klein and Kozlowski, 2000, p.215).

5.12.1.3 External Validity and Generalizability of Findings

Several theorists warn that researchers should not commit the perennial error of attempting to generalise their case study findings, explaining that the process of generalisation in case study research is based on analytic generalisation or

generalisation to the theory (Yin, 2009a; Perry et al., 1998; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Using the principle of analytic generalisations in case studies, determinations were generalised in so far as there was evidence of “replication logic” predicting similar results or contrasting results for reasons which are anticipated based on the theoretical framework (Yin, 2009a).

5.12.2 Reliability

Reliability is another test of a good quality case study; “A measure of a variable or concept is *reliable* if repeated measurements give the same estimates of the variable” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.58). The objective in the case study is to demonstrate that if another researcher adopts the same procedures and conducts the same case study they would arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009a). The reliability of this study was facilitated by the use of a case study protocol and by developing the case study database (Yin, 2009a). The protocol carefully described the process used by the researcher and, if followed, should lead another researcher to the same conclusions. The database was also easily examinable and included notes on the observations and reflections of the researcher stored in Nvivo, case study documents, and interview transcripts.

5.13 RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENTATION FORMAT

Communication of theories is a critical consideration in qualitative research and the acceptability of the theoretical framework was considered in the presentation of the findings. Glaser and Strauss (1965) capture the essence of the problem as “...how to describe the social world so vividly that the reader can almost literally see and hear its people – but see and hear in relation to the theoretical framework” (p.9). This is perhaps one of the best contrasts between qualitative and quantitative research and supports the use of qualitative methods for this enquiry into PPPs. Human and Provan (2000) used the direct words of interviewees to present their findings about critical factors in network evolution. Researchers suggest that qualitative data are characterised by their richness and fullness because of the opportunity to explore a subject in as real a manner as is possible (Dey, 1993; Robson, 2002). This contrasts with the ‘thin’ abstraction or reductionism that characterizes interpretive work (Lee and Lings, 2008) and which the researcher was cautious to avoid.

The presentation of findings of this multiple case study sought to address the expectations of various audiences including thesis examiners, academic colleagues, policy makers and practitioners involved in PPP arrangements. The findings, therefore, are reported as three individual cases that included the most important evidence highlighting the existence of variables. A cross-case analysis was conducted to determine similarities and differences between the cases, and account for social change within the PPPs.

5.14 Ethical Issues in the Research Process

The National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects (1978) developed fundamental principles to govern human research: "...respect for the autonomy of persons, beneficence, or concern to support the best interests of human subjects in research and the best interests of society; and justice or fairness of procedures and outcomes so that there is an equitable distribution of social benefits and costs" (cited in Stanley et al., 1996, p.12). The Commission developed a set of guidelines for ethical, scientific research that include *inter alia*, validity of the research design such that subjects are not used for trivial purposes, and voluntary informed consent whereby it is ensured that subjects consent freely, without threat of undue inducement, and that they be informed and understand all that they reasonably need to know prior to giving consent.

The study is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and, as such, guidelines included in the Framework for Research Ethics (ESRC) published by the ESRC were followed in the conduct of this research. The guidelines include six key principles, including clarity on the independence of research and making explicit any conflicts of interest or partiality (Economic and Social Research Council, 2010). Based on the ethical and moral principles that underpin scientific research, and the dictates of the Framework for Research Ethics, the researcher identified the ethical issues of beneficence, non-maleficence, informed consent, confidentiality/anonymity, and the potential for conflicts of interest arising from the employment of the researcher at one of the case study sites, as significant to this study involving members of the boards of directors of business schools in small developing countries. The measures taken to stave off threats to research ethics are described below.

5.14.1 Beneficence and Non-Maleficance

It is expected that the results of this study will inform practitioners engaged in cross-sectoral partnerships and engineer greater value from those partnerships, especially in the context of developing countries with limited resources and tremendous hope for such arrangements (Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). In ensuring non-maleficance, it was important that participants felt completely at ease with respect to their personal and professional protection as a result of participating in the research. Non-maleficance was guaranteed by adopting the principles of informed consent. Additionally, one key informant was asked to review the case study report and provide a response in an email.

There was an instance of apparent perceived maleficance. In one case, a key participant required a signed legal document from the researcher that indicated she would be liable to legal proceedings in the event of any breach of confidentiality. Although this condition was accepted, the participant eventually declined to participate in the study. On reflection, this might have been due to the apparently competitive relationship between the researcher's organisation and the primary organisation of that participant. This required the researcher to demonstrate non-maleficance, as schools might be considered to be 'vulnerable populations' and to optimize the benefits of the research (Sieber, 2009). At the other two sites, access to all participants was facilitated by the executive directors who were at liberty to indicate the position of the researcher at one of the "sister" business schools. This approach to gaining access to participants at the other two sites apparently served to mitigate perceptions of maleficance.

The use of confidentiality agreements (Appendix 11) with respondents served to militate against non-maleficance. Further, the researcher took steps to protect the data which was stored on the desktop of her personal computer, as this was an organizational asset. Storing the data on the desktop with passwords ensured that no one could have access to it, other than the researcher.

5.14.2 Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Anonymity

The principle whereby participants must be fully informed about research prior to giving their consent must be adopted with respect to research involving human subjects (Fontana and Frey, 2000). It is recommended that the researcher be completely open about the research, the position and intentions of the researcher, and the purpose of the

research (Patton, 2002). In this study, the interview preamble highlighted the objectives of the research project, the methodology, the purpose of the research and participants' right to withdraw at any time (Appendix 6); the interview pre-amble was also included in the Confidentiality Agreement (Appendix 11).

During data collection at the other two sites, whenever respondents mentioned the site where the researcher was employed, the researcher ensured that she explicitly stated that she was employed there and the position held. This was important to ensure that respondents were fully aware of the fact and would give due consideration to it during the interview.

Confidentiality and anonymity are related but different concepts (Wiles et al., 2008). Confidentiality in research is generally taken to mean that the researcher will employ all possible measures to protect the respondent from being identified (Wiles et al., 2008) and that identifiable information about respondents will not be disclosed without permission (British Sociological Association, 2004). The researcher maintained confidentiality by not deliberately or accidentally disclosing any information gained from an interviewee in ways that might identify an individual and by presenting findings in ways that ensured that individuals could not be identified (Wiles et al., 2008).

Participants in the study were made anonymous by the use of a naming protocol as follows:

- Number: numbers generated in random order;
- Sector: type of experience - public or private;
- Post on boards of directors – director or KOA.

This protocol served to preserve the context and important variables in the study while maintaining the anonymity of respondents. In addition, the naming protocol was used in transcripts of the interviews retained as part of the data bank. Fictitious names were used in some network diagrams where individuals were important to the analysis of the data.

5.14.3 Researcher as Participant

The methodology raised ethical concerns about the position of the researcher as an active participant and presented ethical challenges to exploring the work of people at strategic levels of the organisation and at other organisations, at times considered as competitors. The issues related to the participant researcher, including ethics and over involvement with the research goals (Rapoport, 1970 cited in Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996), were addressed by various means. Firstly, the Confidentiality Agreement (Appendix 11) included the theoretical underpinnings of the study and declared the researcher's intentions, ensuring that the academic purpose of the research was clearly communicated. Other issues of researcher as participant were explored in the execution of the research instruments.

The interviews were held to high standards of rigour and ethics by the way in which they were conducted and transcribed. Though a research assistant was engaged to transcribe the interviews, she was advised about the sensitivity of the information and a promise of confidentiality was obtained. She was also selected as a relative of the researcher who had no interest in the issues of the research or the respondents themselves. Interviews were conducted at the convenience of respondents and at times when they were not distracted by other activities. This required ensuring that each interview was confirmed in advance and rescheduled as required for participants' comfort. The researcher made introductory statements regarding confidentiality and anonymity (Appendix 7), asking interviewees to raise any concerns they might have regarding these issues, and indicating to participants that they could stop the interview at any time. No matter how well acquainted the researcher was with the interviewees, care and time was taken to read the interview prelude that outlined the measures to maintain confidentiality and protection of data. This perhaps served to instil confidence in the respondents who, in all but two cases, were unreserved in their responses to the questions.

The trade-off to maintain an ethical stance with respect to participant observation was greatest. The researcher was faced with many instances where it would have been expected that she would divulge information gained through the research process for the benefit of the other in the conversation. The position adopted by the researcher was to maintain a position of "no comment" on issues that arose. It is very easy to construe

where such situations, in some cases, could compromise the job position of the researcher. This was not the case in this instance and it may be that the researcher's history of maintaining an ethical stance served her well in this study. This would confirm the notion assertion of Jorgensen (1989) with respect to behavioural competencies of the participant researcher.

Ethical issues required active consideration and action at all stages of the research including planning the study, designing instruments, and collecting, analysing and reporting data. Participant observation, though a powerful research technique in research designs that utilize qualitative data, presents several areas of ethical challenge based on the proximity of researchers to their subjects (Babbie, 2007). The use of this research technique, and other areas in which the research presented ethical challenges, must be overtly addressed. Lofland and Lofland (1995, p.312) identified issues raised in social research which served as tests of ethical conduct in this study; they are presented in Table 9.

The research design and process of implementation included full consideration of all elements of ethics in research. The data will be stored electronically and securely for two years at the home of the researcher after which, as participants were advised, it will be destroyed in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act (1998).

Table 9: Tests of Ethical Conduct

<i>Test 1: Is it ethical to talk to people when they do not know you will be recording their words?</i>
Response: The interview preamble specifically sought respondents' explicit permission to audiotape the interview. Audio recordings were made only where this permission was granted either on the tape or prior to the interview. In the pilot interview the respondent indicated that audio-recording was "expected" but the researcher retained this component of the interview preamble.
<i>Test 2: Is it ethical to get information for your own purposes from people you hate?</i>
Response: There was no respondent in the study who the interviewer would describe as eliciting feelings of "hate."
<i>Test 3: Is it ethical to see a severe need for help and not respond to it directly?</i>
Response: This test presented a fairly strong challenge to the researcher as the schools were in varying stages of their institutional development and would benefit from advice from each other. The researcher did not make such interjections except to clarify conceptions of respondents where they did not match publicly available information. The findings of the study and implications for practice will be shared with all the business schools at the end of the study.
<i>Test 4: Is it ethical to be in a setting or situation but not commit yourself wholeheartedly to it?</i>
Response: The research topic was of immense professional interest to the researcher. Despite this, there were respondents who the interviewer felt would not provide any useful information in the interview. It was important that the researcher seek to overtly demonstrate interest and attention to the interview.
<i>Test 5: Is it ethical to develop a calculated stance toward other humans, that is, to be strategic in your relations?</i>
Response: The researcher concurs with the arguments of (Kagan, 1998) with regard to the relationship between intrinsic and instrumental value and concluded that all relations are strategic. All relations however, can be accompanied by appropriate emotional ties and ethical conduct where care for the other is genuinely reflected in one's actions. For example, during data collection at the other sites, the researcher took along chocolates for the secretarial staff that was assisting with scheduling interviews. Though there was no interaction between the researcher and the secretarial staff prior to the study in the context of the researcher's professional duties, the study provided the opportunity to build lasting professional relations where care (and chocolates, unless they are deemed to be not in the best interest of the receiver) would continue to be demonstrated.
<i>Test 6: Is it ethical to take sides or to avoid taking sides in a factionalised situation?</i>
Response: This test was also quite challenging to the researcher. The topic of the study was well known in all contexts and the researcher, in her position, found that her opinion was sought increasingly over the duration of the study on matters that involved the relationship between the public and private sector actors. It was important to provide an unbiased professional opinion but not to utilise any data or make reference to any data sources to form that opinion. The researcher took full note of the importance of maintaining a non-judgmental, neutral and objective position on matters related to the study, observing all protocols of data management in the process (Fetterman, 2009; Bernard, 2000).
<i>Test 7: Is it ethical to "pay" people with trade-offs for access to their lives and minds?</i>
Response: This issue was not confronted in this research.
<i>Test 8: Is it ethical to "use" people as allies or informants in order to gain entrée to other people or to elusive understandings?</i>
Response: This issue did not arise in this study. The use of the "snowballing" technique whereby respondents are asked to name other respondents who can provide useful data, holds the potential for some breach of ethics with respect to access to respondents (Goodman, 1961; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The researcher only advised respondents, and only when it was asked, that they were selected for inclusion in the study by another respondent. Names were not provided at any time.

5.15 Assumptions and Limitations of the Methodology

Social science research that is underpinned by a philosophy of critical realism is always limited by the fact that researchers use available and overt evidence of social phenomena from which to draw interpretations (Lee and Lings, 2008). Studies in the interpretative paradigm openly acknowledge this limitation but stoutly defend the scientific validity of the research process and the tendency to “...mix and match things” in understanding social phenomena (ibid., p.64). This sub-section addresses the limitations of the mixed methods and multiple case study design with respect to illuminating the PPP relationship and answering the research question.

5.15.1 Limitations of the Design

The quality of a research design depends on “...the degree to which the investigator has used the most appropriate procedures for answering the research question(s) and implemented them effectively” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009, p.309). Case study designs are generally limited by the very factors that constitute the strength of the design: factors that limit their utility to answer other questions that may be important to understanding the research problem (ibid.). Mainly, the methodology for arriving at the results of case studies constrains their statistical generalizability and the findings cannot be deemed to exist in other populations (Yin, 2009a). Generalizability in case studies is limited to analytic generalisation, or generalisation to the theories (ibid.).

The study is limited by the selection of sites based on criteria that included access and time frame for completion of the research. Yin (2009a) acknowledges that good case studies are difficult to do and require extensive time commitments, based on the research techniques employed and the way they are used in relation to the research question. In this study, the research methods employed required significant time on each case to collect data using interviews and archival records. As such, only three case studies in the particular context of small, developing countries were conducted. The design is therefore limited with respect to statistical generalisation or “transferability” of the findings across populations (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The small number of cases and their deep contextualization in small, developing countries in the Caribbean region constrains generalizability, transferability and external validity. Transferability, however, “...is relative in that any high quality

inference is applicable to some condition, context cultural group, organization or individuals other than the one studied...(and) the degree of transferability depends on the similarity between those studied and the ones that the findings are being transferred to” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009, p.312).

Some authors argue that it is not possible to derive causal explanations from case studies and that any such attempt is merely speculative (Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Guba and Lincoln, 1989). However Miles and Huberman (1984), also in the qualitative paradigm, claim that “...field research is far *better* than solely quantified approaches at developing explanations of what we call *local causality* – the actual events and processes that led to specific outcomes” (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.132; author's italics). The authors propose that field data can provide serious *confirmation* of plausible causal models drawn from aggregated survey data, and produce genuinely powerful explanations...by demonstrating how the path of causality actually works (ibid.).

5.15.2 Limitations of the Methodology, Instruments and Data Collection

Social network is best known for its methodology and it is expected that those in the field would use the methodology and contribute to its development and advancement (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Borgatti, 2003). In its design, the research incorporated mainly the theoretical bases of the social network perspective. However, the social network methodology was considered to be less appropriate for yielding causal explanations where several contextual variables are present. Such a design is well served by the traditional tools of qualitative research such as interviews (Borgatti, 2003). This justification however, does not shield the researcher from the possibility of disdain by, and taunts from, social network “purists” who often vehemently argue that researchers who use the concepts, but not the full methodology, in analyzing social networks engage in a watered down version of network research (Borgatti, 2003).

The research design was also limited by the selection and implementation of research techniques. The interview context is “...one of interaction and relation; the result is as much a product of this social dynamic as it is a product of accurate counts and replies (Fontana and Frey, 2000, p.647). The accuracy and completeness of responses from participants is therefore limited to their interpretation of the interview context and

questions, as it must be recognized that “...interview participants are actively constructing knowledge around questions and responses” (Fontana and Frey, 2000, p.647). The design also made limited use of participant observation as there was not full immersion in all contexts, as in the case of anthropological and ethnographic research with less bounded units of analysis (Bernard, 2000). Other limitations of the participant observation method were addressed earlier in this chapter.

While traditional research techniques are used in network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Borgatti, 2003), there is still some concern about the validity and reliability of network data collected through verbal reports (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The researchers suggest that there is a need to have a better understanding of the properties of different questions that are used to elicit information from network members and the influence of different question response formats. In this study though, the researcher varied the traditional network socio-metric question and asked respondents to give information on their perceptions of other actors’ network ties. This “cognitive social structure” design served to provide more useful information as actors reported on their own group ties and the group ties of the other partner in the public-private relationship (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.52).

The study was limited by accessibility to respondents and archival data, for interviews and document analysis respectively. In the case of accessing respondents, the researcher made repeated calls and sent emails to obtain participation. This was done over the extended period for data collection from the date the researcher received ethical approval to conduct the research (February 23, 2010), to December 2010 when data collection ended as was stated in the agreement with participants. Where data was limited, the researcher sought the inclusion of other respondents who could contribute to the study. The efforts were successful and the data set is considered to be complete and useful with respect to the research question.

The researcher attempted to conduct the interviews face-to-face so that she could establish an interviewer-interviewee “relationship” and allow respondents to “live in the moment” thereby facilitating richer and more valid data (Hertz, 1997). Data was collected in three countries and, as such, the researcher was forced to conduct some of the interviews by telephone where respondents’ schedules did not allow for the interviews to take place during the period scheduled. Even so, the researcher attempted

to build a “relationship” by using a tone and speech that conveyed warmth, graciousness and gratitude for their participation. There was no perceived difference in the quality of data between interviews conducted by phone and those conducted face-to-face.

Participant observation was easily facilitated at the site where the researcher is employed; however, the use of this data-gathering tool was limited by the researcher’s constrained presence at the other two sites. There was no conceivable way to mitigate this, short of requiring participants to keep diaries of important events that could contribute to the research. The limitations of the respondents as senior executives did not render this feasible.

5.16 CONCLUSION

This chapter included an explanation and justification of the research design and the process by which the research was conducted. It examined, in logical sequence, the design of the study, the processes used to develop the conceptual framework and instruments, and procedures used for data collection and analysis. It also explored the ethical issues faced in the research design and in the conduct of the research. Finally, the chapter included a discussion of the limitations of this scientific research study. The following four chapters present the findings and analysis of the individual cases and a cross-case analysis from which the researcher attempts to formulate theoretical principles concerning social structure in the context of the research and address the research questions of the study. The cases are presented in the order in which the business schools were established to aid understanding of the evolutionary trajectory.

CHAPTER 6: CASE ANALYSIS - GERRAN BUSINESS SCHOOL

6.0 INTRODUCTION

Gerran Business School evolved from a project which commenced in 1987 at Green University in the country of Gerrantown. The business school was established in 1993 as an institute with a PPP governance mechanism to oversee its operations. The PPP structure has functioned consistently over its twenty-three year existence. The business school is located within the university campus and is deeply embedded and institutionalised within the rules of the Gerrantown campus. The variables and factors that influenced the PPP governance arrangement at Gerran are described and analysed to produce explanations of how the PPP attained legitimacy.

In this case, respondents were found to possess mainly university experience, experience in business, and a combination of university and private sector experience. In the presentation and analysis of the data, respondents are categorised into three groups: public, private, and public-private, consistent with their overall type of experience. The implications of this classification are discussed where the differences between the groups were material to the analysis and impacted the PPP governance arrangement. The case analysis is presented in three major sections. The first section examines the environment of the partnership and focuses on the country and university contexts, isolating the factors that appear to be relevant to the success of the school. The second section of the case report focuses on the PPP at the organisational level. Factors relevant to the purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP are identified and, using relational analysis underpinned by a critical realist philosophy, the relationship between those factors are examined to determine how they impacted the performance of the cross-sectoral model of governance. At the third level, the case examined the interactions of sub-groups of actors within the governance structure. Data drawn from the case to support the analysis are presented in evidence pods within the relevant sections. This presentation format is also used in the other two cases.

6.1 IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF GERRANTOWN ON THE PPP

6.1.1 Background to the country

Gerrantown is a small developing country in the Caribbean. The country gained independence from Britain in 1962 and has had a history of political stability over its post-independent years. Gerrantown is "...known for its strong sense of self-identity" (BBC, 2011) but is still plagued by widespread poverty and crime (ibid.). The country has a GNI of US \$4,990 (World Bank, 2009, cited in BBC, 2011). Because of "...its limited productive capacity, the island nation is heavily dependent on imported goods and on foreign debt relief to sustain its struggling economy" (Encyclopedia of the Nations, (2011). International migration is high in Gerrantown but this has also increased the level of remittances received making it one of the greatest contributors to the national GDP (Adams, 2003). In the year 2000, the country had the highest migration rate of all developing countries and this was predominantly at the tertiary education level (Adams, 2003, p.29). This phenomenon is demonstrative of the economic and developmental vulnerability of small island states (Briguglio, 2003; Briguglio, 1995).

6.1.2 Economic, Geographic and Social Vulnerabilities

Economic and social vulnerabilities resulted from the on-going crisis in the economy, dependency on foreign resources and the geographic location of the country within the hurricane belt that often caused infrastructure damage with attendant economic costs. The country experienced a perpetual scarcity of financial resources in the overall economy and this impacted the PPP. The affordability of business education for students as individuals, and the limited financing available from the private sector, presented challenges for the business school. Market size was limited due to the impact of migration on the overall size of the population. The economic context contributed to social issues such as crime and poverty, including the associated ills of health challenges.

There were several vulnerabilities that appeared to emanate from the socio-economic, historical and geographic context of the country. Despite the contextual challenges, the environment was essentially viewed by both actor sub-groups as providing opportunities for the business school "*...to generate (and) to advance solutions towards*

the building of resilience to those vulnerabilities” (#1 Pub/Priv KOA, Gerran). Public actors’ concerns emanated from the ability of students to afford fees whereas the public-private sub-group was concerned with affordability from the perspective of what it meant for the activities of the business school.

“If you think about an economic side, we are so tremendously dependent on resources that are not Gerrantown backed ...it affects us so very, very badly.” (#1 **Pub/Priv KOA, Gerran**)

The absence of a comment from private actors suggested that they did not consider the environment as having significant impact on the success of the business school.

6.1.3 Competitive Environment of Business Education

The geographic proximity of the country to the metropolis, the open economy, and the largely unregulated education market facilitated the entry of providers that were more robust and in a better resource position. Despite this, it appeared that Gerran was able to find its space within the market and establish its brand. This may have been externally influenced by the strong cultural self-identity amongst citizens of Gerran and internally by its organisational presentation to the market as a privately managed institute of Green University backed by renowned people on its board of directors.

The concern for the survival of the business school in its highly competitive environment was shared by respondents in all sub-groups. This factor appeared to be positioned as a constraint more than an opportunity for the business school, although the business opportunity was overtly acknowledged by university actors. One actor noted:

“...there was a business opportunity because this business school has been established as a private company” (#3 **Pub/Director, Gerran**).

Business was seen as an opportunity to earn profits and this drove the competition to provide business education. In one case, the familiarity of university actors with the region was viewed as an ‘inimitable’ resource that could favourably position the business school amongst its competitors (Barney, 1988; Peteraf, 1993, p.188; Barney, 1991). Evidence of this is presented in Table 10. All actor sub-groups lamented the extent of competition in Gerrantown.

Table 10: Respondents' Comments on the Competitive Environment

Public	"Certainly competition is often strongest in the business training and education area... given the belief that business education is the key to a BMW or SUV, based on your preference" (#2 Pub Director, Gerran).
Private	"...recognising the increased competition, I don't know if you know what is happening in Gerrantown where all the...everybody is here now and the day when Gerran was the only business school offering an MBA (is) far-gone!" (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran).

6.1.4 Small World Effect

In the small country of Gerrantown, social distance was greatly reduced and this may have perpetuated the "small world effect" (Newman, 2000, p.1; Kochen, 1989) that may have influenced the cognitive social structure and behaviours of actors. The short social distance between people in the society was demonstrated in the structure of the Board of Directors and it was suggested that they "...*all seem to be sort of cut off from the same cloth!*" (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). In the wider environmental context of the country, the prominence of directors, as leaders of government and large businesses appeared to positively influence the acceptance and legitimacy of the PPP, thereby aiding in building the brand within the society. The small world effect appeared to be a feature of the society and, as such, a reality of the working environment of business school graduates. The implications of the small world for governance, curriculum responsiveness and the profile of the business school graduate were articulated by respondents as follows:

"You have to understand too, you know, that it is a very small society! People come to the table knowing people, understanding their position, respecting their contribution and...they also (take) on board with the governance architecture...they also have other objectives to fulfil." (#4 Pub Director, Gerran)

"[The reality of] working in the Caribbean is the fact that very quickly you get to the top. ...You know you were supposed to be a. the guru on the one hand and b. who the hell do you think you are on the other hand." (#1 Pub/Priv Director, Gerran)

The comments of respondents with respect to the small word effect appeared to reside on a continuum of implications from positive and supportive to negative and deterministic. The challenge to business education in the region was underscored by the respondent who ventured that the business school must produce graduates who are able

to take immediate control of business enterprises. Overall, the existence of the small world effect held implications for the relationships in the PPP and is considered in the explanations developed.

6.1.5 Risk-Averse Business and Regional Isolation

Gerrantown is a member of CARICOM. Respondents commented on the lack of integration of the society within the Caribbean region and the resulting sense of isolation from the rest of the region. The separation from the region appeared to emanate from socio-economic and historical factors in the development of the region in general, with some attribution to the actions of the leadership of Gerrantown. There also appeared to be perceptions of opportunistic behaviours by the business sector in some countries more capable of regional expansion.

“Lack of regional integration and ability to benefit from regional instruments is also ...because of our own failing ...to address the weaknesses in the Gerrantown economy.” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran)

The impact of isolation and the overall social, economic and cultural factors in the society prevented collaborative efforts between businesses in Gerrantown and the private sector across the region. One respondent noted the lack of competitiveness and innovation across the Caribbean and this may have been partly attributed to lack of regional co-operation. More importantly, the loss of opportunity of regional integration weakened the private sector which engaged in risk-averse business. This increased the distance between sectors, including between academia and business. Respondents noted:

“the sense that one gets is that they’re (private businesses) not adventurous... Basically, most people just lend money to Gerrantown government and got big returns.” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran)

Respondents indicated that despite the offering of the university, business was perceived as lacking innovation and maintained the status quo across the region.

6.1.6 Summary: Influence of the Country Context on the Partnership

Private sector actors in particular, saw the environment as a source of opportunity, engendering personal commitment. One respondent commented:

“Well it makes the school...it almost makes me paranoid and in my view paranoid is the best antidote to complacency. The rate at which things happen in Gerrantown forces the school to always be on the lookout for embracing change, recognizing the external dynamics. You are not forced into almost a false cocoon because of the environment you are in.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran)

The directors saw the opportunity for the business school “... *to be in the forefront in providing support to public sector and private sector, to get out of particular situations, to guide them through particular situations*” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran). It was noted though that the most important consideration for the Board of Directors was “how” to influence the transformation.

Overall, the directors were in agreement with the analysis of the vulnerabilities and challenges of the context and this therefore provided a common point of departure with respect to the business school agenda. Respondents appeared to link the country’s development concerns and agenda to the purpose and responsibility of the business school. The smallness of size and the resulting reduced social distance appeared to create a sense of personal and collective responsibility for all categories of actors, suggesting a network culture that is influenced by the culture and contextual variables (Fuhse, 2009). This appeared to positively influence the relationship between actors in the governance structure and it appeared that the cultural embeddedness of actors at Gerran Business School in the context of Gerrantown provided the business school with opportunities for building trust and acting in concert (Dequech, 2003; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). The extent to which actors in the PPP considered environmental factors as critical to strategy will be considered in a later sub-section of the case report. The second major consideration in the analysis of the external environment in this study is the context of the University in which the PPP was embedded.

6.2 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, GERRANTOWN CAMPUS

The first campus of Green University was established by Royal Charter in Gerrantown in 1948. The University serves the Caribbean region and includes fifteen contributing countries, all of which are English speaking as current or former colonies of Great Britain. The University’s administration is headed by a vice-chancellor and each campus is managed by a principal who is also designated ‘Pro-Vice Chancellor’. The

extent to which the embeddedness of the PPP in the context of the University presented constraints and opportunities to PPP performance is examined in this section.

6.2.1 Financial Constraints

Green University, Gerrantown, was publicly funded and university financing was limited in the country with on-going economic challenges. The short history of the University also resulted in restricted access to endowments and substantial contributions from any local sources, including alumni. The concern for financing was expressed by all stakeholders but from different concerns about impact. Public actors were concerned about survival and, in relation to the environment, affordability of the programmes for students. The public-private and private actors examined benchmarks and long-term sustainability. This is an area of ideological difference between the public and private sector where the private sector is focused on profitability and the public sector is concerned about impact on the community (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). Respondents' comments on the financial constraints are presented in Table 11.

Table 11: Financial Constraints at Gerrantown Campus

Public	“The most critical concern for the business school was always the financial situation at the school and “...whether they’re surviving... (and) paying the bills...” (#5 Pub Director, Gerran)
Private	“Funding is the constraint. The environment is not rich enough, we don’t have a lot of benefactors like a Harvard or a Princeton.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran)

6.2.2 Resource Constraints, Regionalism and Strategic Actions

The concern for financing appeared to be related to the overall concern for resources which led to an examination of the extent to which regional resources within Green University are shared. There was a distinct lack of regional co-operation between the campuses of the University, including the business schools of each campus. This influenced the resources available to Gerran and the competitiveness of Green University. Co-operation between the campuses of Green University across the region was encouraged by the University administration, but this goal remained an elusive commitment of the University hierarchy.

Three related variables in the context appeared to create the need for a search for resources outside the country – the smallness of the country and the declining population due to migration in the overall context of economic constraints experienced by all sectors of the economy reduced the possibility of generating financing from local sources. Despite these challenges, it appeared that the “...strong sense of self-identity” (BBC, 2009), together with the tradition of income from remittances favoured the search for resources among the members of the Gerrantown diaspora and alumni of Green University more so than from other regional university partners. Respondents’ concerns regarding resource constraints, regionalism and strategic actions at the business schools are presented in Table 12.

Table 12: Respondents’ Views on Resource Constraints and Loss of Regionality

Public	“One of the issues ...I don’t think there is enough concern about is regionalism and regional co-operation among the business schools.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran)
Public-private	“To the question of governance we have seen a public-private governance internal to Gerrantown and a public -private governance internal to Arden, and to Rotterdam. The very fact that we are in a sense independent ought to have made it easy for us to come together, but for funding issues, for ‘we’re the best issues,’ ... you get this kind of noise.” (#1 Pub/Priv Director, Gerran)
Private	“So raising funds whether through alumni endowments, opportunities for large corporate, rich individuals to, naming opportunities to give huge monies is something that we had to embark on... (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran)

The optimism with regard to the possibility of drawing resources from the campuses of Green University across the region was not shared by actor groups. The private sector focused on the models of university endowments as demonstrated in larger universities in more developed countries. Strategies suggested by the public-private actors to search for resources within the region contrasted with the strategic posturing of private actors. The next sub-section examines the contrast between the ‘resources’ of a university and the influence of the country context on the use of those resources. This further explains the contrast between academic and instrumental resources – “social sense” versus “commercial sense” (Ghobadian et al., 2004a, p.298).

6.2.3 ‘Town and Gown’ Effect

The history of management studies at the University influenced the perceptions of the business sector and propelled the “town and gown” relationship between academia and business (McWilliam et al., 1997, p.307; Bruning et al., 2006). It appeared that the general problems of disseminating research results (Crosswaite and Curtice, 1994; Wandersman et al., 2008) and building community-university relationships was further exacerbated by factors unique to the small, developing country context. Communication is influenced by socially and culturally constructed conceptions and values (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986; Gumperz and Hymes, 1972). In the case of Gerrantown, discourse generally used for public education via the media appeared to be negatively viewed within the university community suggesting that the power distance between academia and the lay population was wide (Fairclough, 2001). This point is emphasised in the language of two University respondents, who used lay language in emphasising areas for better communication with the private sector and included statements such as “*boy, this is a possibility*” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran) or “*well boy, come and meet our new graduates, we think this batch is a good group*” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). This is an area for further research to examine the influence of the developing context on the dissemination of research for public education (Wandersman et al., 2008) and the relationship between business research and practice (Wandersman et al., 2008). Respondents’ comments on the ‘town and gown’ effect are included in Table 13.

Table 13: Respondents’ Comments on the “Town and Gown” Effect

Public	<p>“When I was in school going in university, academics frowned on the idea of making their work public... putting something in the newspaper or going to a rotary club and make a speech ...and to some degree the university culture has not changed enough... because you’re a talk show host, you would suffer. Most of them suffer, you can’t become a professor!” (#3 Pub/Director, Gerran)</p> <p>“So we’re coming back many of us in my age group and older, from the days when the businessman was sort of unlettered, crude, uncultured, whatever and he went into business because he had no real scholarly potential in getting to alternatives like lawyers, doctors and Indian chief academia, and there was an aloofness of academia from business.” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran).</p>
Public-private	<p>“The whole business of management training at the university was something that was pushed in a sense, certainly in Gerrantown, more by the private sector than by the university, because our university’s traditions were such that the teaching of management wasn’t seen as something integral to a university and management studies...” (#1 Pub/Priv Director, Gerran)</p>

The university actors acknowledged the “town and gown” effect openly and, as such, this may have positively influenced their interactions and relationship with the private sector actors. The state of the private sector in Gerrantown did not inspire confidence in a wide sub-set of private actors with respect to the knowledge base of the private sector, and as such, also contributed positively to the public-private relationship. The open expression of this effect from the public-private and public actors could be attributed to two other variables. The interview process itself was more aligned with the competencies and professional space of these actors as it gave them the opportunity to reflect in an open and relaxed environment. Secondly, it is perhaps indicative of the non-threatening relationship between public and private actors. This point is further supported by the fact that private actors did not emphasise the town and gown effect.

6.2.4 Institutional Features of the University System

6.2.4.1 ‘Oxbridge’ Governance: Ideology, Values and Curriculum

The ideology, values, curriculum focus and standards of the University appeared to contrast starkly with those of the private sector (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). The values and research agenda of the University appeared to be inwardly focused, attempting to mitigate the historical influences of colonialism and slavery and develop an understanding of local society and its challenges. Local knowledge was the purpose of the Royal Charter, the instrument used to establish the university in the newly independent territory (Bargh et al, 1996) and the University established by Royal Charter was expected to be responsive to “...the ‘professional’ needs of an urban and industrial society” and represented “...practical efforts to balance the ‘ivory tower’ idea of a university with the needs of the community” (Bargh et al., 1996, p.2; author's quotation). At Gerran, the University was seen as a response to the challenge of change (Sherlock and Nettleford, 1990) and, devoid of the responsibility for financing, which was vested in the state, the University developed a governance mechanism that resembled the established ‘Oxbridge’ model, its preeminent benchmark (Bargh et al., 1996, p.2). One respondent noted:

“What caused the problem in the first place is that the university was, in particular its social sciences faculty was isolated from the rest of the community. It did not immediately feel its developmental role as one of the strategic partnerships with the private sector. The scholarship was very negative to the whole private sector ethos and so that had to

change, you couldn't have national development with these two agents, at each other's throats, separate and apart in the same environment, but not cooperating and so on..." (#4 Pub Director, Gerran)

This model became only slightly adapted to include students in the governance mechanism, consistent with the governance changes in universities in the UK propelled by the "massification" and "marketization" of university education (ibid.).

The variables associated with the history of the university within the developing country context impacted the University agenda. This seemed to influence early decisions with regard to the structure of the PPP and the separation of roles and responsibilities between private and public actors on the Board of Directors. Respondents' views on the institutionalised ideology of the University are presented in Table 14.

Table 14: Respondents' Views on Institutionalised Ideology, Values and Curriculum Focus

Public	<p>"I'm just speculating though, that part of the decision to make this into a private company in an autonomous entity, was to try to get away from the 'gown' stigma in the phrase 'town and gown.'" (#1 Pub Director, Gerran)</p> <p>"...whenever he comes he says 'all you guys doing is study(ing) slavery'. That's what he says about the university and the university has a history of association with left politics and a hotbed of radicalism and so forth and so on..." (#2 Pub Director, Gerran)</p>
Private	<p>"...we have to beat back that social science dominance! ...And the cross culture with the university is stifling!" (#3 Priv Director, Gerran)</p>

The extent to which the values and norms of the University was divorced from those of the private sector was evident in the opinions expressed by both public and private actors. The separation of academia from the society of Gerrantown appeared to give impetus to the view held by the University that the gap between its actions and the expectations of the society, including business, was indeed too large. The problem was felt and expressed in the concerns for development and a deeply felt need on the part of the University to engage with its stakeholders.

The question of how curriculum relevance in business education is attained and how the university supports that process appeared to be a main focus of Gerran. The importance of the business school to the University with respect to making the university relevant to the society was shared by one respondent who indicated:

“I’d say relevance, relevance. If we did not have a school of business we would be missing out... on contributing to the success and dynamism of our societies in ways that would not be excusable!” (**#1 Pub Director, Gerran**)

The ideology, values and role of the curriculum in business education was a predominant factor in this research across all cases. As a participant observer, the researcher pondered the question of the relationship between business knowledge and academic knowledge and reflected:

“I had to rethink the relationship between business and university knowledge from a “happy marriage” based on what they contribute to each other.... Academia presents a process for validating all knowledge through the scientific process and mechanism for sharing knowledge through education. As such, academia formalises business knowledge through research and disseminates it through curriculum processes; academia therefore deepens ‘business’ knowledge” (**Participant Observation**).

This is consistent with the views expressed by Mintzberg (1994) who described the inter-relatedness of relevance and rigour, developing each other through different processes. The development and utility of this relationship in the interest of development appeared to be the focus of the business school.

6.2.4.2 Faculty Norms in Academia

The institutional embeddedness (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) of faculty within the university environment appeared to negatively impact their ability to engage with the private sector. Though the university actors recognised the need for faculty in business studies to engage with the private sector, they also noted the extent to which their institutionalisation in the university environment and in academia presented challenges to them in attaining this goal. The acknowledgement of the limitations of the faculty explained by their institutional embeddedness in academia was shared by the public and public-private sub-groups. The absence of a comment on this from the private actors suggested that they held confidence in the faculty at Gerran School of Business. This factor therefore did not appear to present barriers to the PPP governance structure. Respondents’ views are presented in Table 15.

Table 15: Institutionalisation of Faculty Norms

Public	“The posture of the current (university position) is “... to try and build a higher degree of engagement but believe you me, even though he tries, I mean he would probably expect us to respond very much more quickly and sort of organically than we can. We just don’t damn well know how to do it! We have not spent the last 10, 20, 30 years building and deepening relationships with the private sector!” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran)
Public-private	“Gerran could be playing a very dynamic role in, at least demonstrating to Gerrantown society that there are choices and the consequences of choices.” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran)

6.2.4.3 Institutionalised Administrative and Academic Processes

The institutionalised administrative and academic processes of the university contrasted with the rules governing the behaviour of actors in the private sector. This difference influenced the extent to which the PPP could adopt new systems and processes that would facilitate innovation. The realities of the different systems of administration appeared to be challenging to private sector actors. Directors noted the extent to which institutionalisation of systems and processes within the University presented challenges to the PPP. Gerran Business School was the postgraduate department of the Faculty of Social Sciences and within the structure of Green University, the programmes were offered under “... *the aegis of the School for Graduate Studies and Research in order to protect its academic integrity*” (#2 Pub/Priv, KOA, Gerran). Tensions between academic integrity and real world application of knowledge were evident. This was described by one respondent who indicated “*It’s a graduate degree; it’s something where you must be adding value. When I employ some who has an Undergrad, it just tells me that you know how to learn. When I employ someone who has a Graduate Degree, I expect you to come into my shop now to add value*” (#1 Priv Director, Gerran). Respondents’ further comments are int Table 16.

Table 16: Institutionalised Administrative and Academic Processes

Public	<p>“...as in any participating system, had some limitation, how do you put academics and business people to work together? Business people are accustomed to taking a decision and it is implemented immediately ... So I think both sides had to learn...” (#1 Pub KOA, Gerran)</p> <p>“The university bureaucracy could be onerous, I hate saying so but it is the truth... The university is the ultimate democracy. We rule by committee. For a business school, you want a business school to operate better like a business, otherwise I mean, you want it in fact to be a business, to be a corporation in many respects.” (#1 Pub/Director, Gerran)</p>
Private	<p>“I started to say to them, ‘Why aren’t you speaking to the Law School about programs in business and law? How do you resolve disputes in a country that doesn’t have a good track record with the resolution of disputes, and that they cost!’” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran)</p>

6.2.4.4 ‘Pure’ Versus ‘Applied’ Research

The University seemed to focus on ‘pure’ versus ‘applied’ research. The long tradition of the established practice of scholarship within the University and the limited transfer of scholarship to practice, especially in the business setting resulted in a stark divide between ‘academic’ and ‘practice’ knowledge. The division was even more evident when one respondent demonstrated the challenge to accommodate a public-private actor, possessing doctoral qualifications and several years of university experience, within the conceptualisation of ‘academic’ indicating: “*But I don’t know if he’s an academic, he’s a senior manager*” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran). The conceptualisation of ‘academic’ in this case derived from engagement in the practices of curriculum and ‘pure’ research with the associated publications as opposed to management. This is demonstrative of the gap between the activities of academics and practitioners which, to be bridged in the university system, requires the management of academic activity where the display of managerial competencies is underpinned by experience gained from engagement in teaching and research (Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008). Respondents’ views are in Table 17.

Table 17: Effects of Institutionalisation of ‘Pure’ versus ‘Applied’ Research

Public	<p>“...it’s what we do as academics. Some academics really philosophically and consciously retreat from the decision making process. They say ‘I’ll give you the results and give you the data, you make the decision.” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran)</p> <p>“I mean I have a student who runs a business that goes out and gives advice to people and ...end up saving them millions of dollars ...In a sense she is an academic, except, that is, she don’t write paper!” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran)</p>
Private	<p>“...research to what end? I know in academia, you are awarded for research but is it something that you can apply?” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran)</p>

Despite the nomenclature and classifications, public actors appeared to hold respect for people in the private and public sectors whose actions produced results for the firm and country. Public actors appeared to value the need for relevance of research to the business sector and the need for appropriate mechanisms for dissemination. The fact that the public-private actors did not make this point suggested their appreciation for both research forms and perhaps an understanding of how they relate to each other. The importance of research and the way it was conducted by faculty was discussed at a Board of Directors meeting held while the researcher was present at the site for data gathering. One private respondent recalled this event and indicated that:

“You understand, as private sector. Yeah you’re doing research but what is that research adding value to: the private sector, the development of this country, the region? And again, we are reminded by the academia you can’t force people. They choose their research. I said okay ... So you see I have to learn.” (#1 Priv Director, Gerran)

In this comment, the private actor appeared to be positioned as a passive recipient and suggested acceptance of the fact that it was necessary to learn how academia functions, but not to challenge it. This is a point for further examination of practice within PPP arrangements to determine if there was unquestioned acceptance of the way in which academia functioned and, therefore, the need for the PPP to function within those parameters. Again, in this comment, the development agenda at all levels was the concern, rather than only business or private success.

6.2.5 Summary: Influence of the University on the PPP

The PPP governance structure at Gerrantown was linked to the overall disconnect between academia and business. The governance mechanism was established to transcend barriers in the university-business divide and build relationships with the private sector. The concerns were readily acknowledged by the respondents from the University. Yet, they also appeared to respect the University and noted its importance in the environment. Further, the relationship between the business school and the Gerrantown campus appeared to be positive and symbiotic and, as such, presented opportunities for the mutual benefit of both institutions in their continued development. All sub-groups of actors concurred with the view that the Chairman of the Board of Directors should be drawn from the private sector and that a larger private sector representation was required in the governance structure. At this level, the analysis of social networks yielded variables that informed the explanations of how the PPP worked.

6.3 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF PPP - GERRAN

The University viewed the relationship with the private sector as a mechanism to bridge the gap and contribute to the attainment of its social purpose. From the perspective of the business school, the relationship with Green University "...provides Gerran with its broad institutional identity and reputation, as well as the framework for its governance structure and quality control mechanisms" (Gerran School of Business, 2010, p.5). The inclusion of the private sector in the governance arrangement impacted the governance structure and strategy of the business school.

6.3.1 Purpose: Strategic Developmental Organisation

The business school was established to develop management competencies and address the education needs of business within the country and region. The engagement of the private sector was deliberate and the partnership was approached from the pragmatic purpose of development and responsiveness to business on the part of the University (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). The instrumental link between the education and development purpose of the PPP served to assert the concern for the social good in the process. The primacy of the university in the relationship was recognised by the

business school which “...responded to the management development needs of the country as well as the mandate of its parent institution, Green University” (Gerran School of Business, June 2010, p.5) and acted as an “...outreach arm of the University” (Amended Memorandum of Association, 1998, p.1). The wider inclusion of the region was reflected in the mission statement of the organisation “...to produce world-class transformational leaders equipped to shape the economic development of the Caribbean” (ibid.). The assumption of responsibility for the growth and development of the business sector and the wider region places the business school in the category of strategic developmental organisations (Khandwalla, 1990; Khandwalla, 1988). In this context, the PPP governance relationship was informed by the way in which partners understood the purpose and as such, their involvement in the processes of governance.

6.3.2 Motivation for a Separate Organisation

The institutionalised governance mechanism at Green University, Gerrantown comprised committees and councils. The bureaucracy that was institutionalised in the university governance structure was a major determinant of the decision for a separate business school. Further, the university governance mechanism was restrictive with respect to private sector participation, presenting a wide gap between the University and the private sector in the level of control over targets, scope of operations and other ideological and working practices normally adopted by private managers and executives in the conduct of business (Ghobadian et al., 2004a). This appeared to be one of the reasons for the establishment of Gerran as a private company. This legal form and the installation of a board of directors of representative stakeholders altered the organisational form of the PPP by including elements of public and private purpose, structure and strategy in which the governance mechanism functioned.

6.3.3 Bridging the Relationship Gap

In a strategic alliance of public and private actors, it is necessary to determine how actors view their purpose, as their understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences their contribution to its success (Harrigan, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Austin, 2000). Actors in all sub-groups held the shared purpose of bridging the gap between the University and the private sector and this influenced their contribution to

its success (Austin, 2000; Gulati, 1995). One University respondent affirmed the purpose:

“...the motivation behind it was the intention of the university to serve the business community much better than it had done.” (**#1 Pub KOA, Gerran**)

The purpose of the business school to provide a relevant university education was therefore linked to the understanding that the involvement of business actors in the governance structure would bridge the gap between the University and the private sector in several ways. The inclusion of private sector directors therefore appeared to be taken for granted and one director expressed this when asked about the motivation of the University for including private sector directors on the Board:

“...I know you’re asking me a rhetorical question but I think the simple reason is that the university recognized, particularly in the field of business, it was important or, as part of the outreach process, it was important as part of a way of informing the policy direction, informing curriculum development, a way of ensuring relevance.” (**#3 Pub Director, Gerran**)

The structure was seen as a mechanism for demonstrating respect for business and consideration of their needs in the academic activities of the business school. One respondent noted this and also emphasised that the University approached the problem from an empowered rather than a deficit perspective.

“You need to know what people want and it’s not to say that our curriculum, our scholarship and so on, is going to be entirely demand driven, and it’s not to say that we won’t have something to bring. Quite the contrary! But I think it gives us a certain relevance to be able to engage and it shows respect for the private sector, what they have been able to do and what they have been able to achieve.” (**#3 Pub Director, Gerran**)

6.3.3.1 Building Relevance to Business and Addressing Development

There was strong agreement among all actors that the purpose of the business school was to build the relationship through relevant curriculum programmes and research. In so doing, it was believed that there must be both ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research and that with respect to programmes, there was a role for the contribution of the University in ensuring programme relevance. One respondent made the point that both Mode 1 and

Mode 2 research was important to the University but appeared to link Mode 2 in the context (Gibbons, 1994; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Huff and Huff, 2001).

“I believe that, although we don’t disavow blue sky research, what we do want to promote are programmes that are going to be relevant to the Caribbean society.” (**#1 Pub Director, Gerran**)

The applicability of research to the development of society in general, and of business in particular, was noted by other respondents who indicated:

“...we should also use that knowledge in a way which advances the development of the country and in the case of business schools, the development of businesses, advances businesses!” (**#3 Pub Director, Gerran**)

The organic linking of business and national development required that the business school undertake curriculum and research activities to develop managers who possessed the “methodological rigor” that deepens thinking and reflection and the “intellectual rigor” required for relevance in business (Mintzberg 1994, p.399). Further, it required that graduates also possess an orientation to society as a source of business opportunity which must be approached with ethical and responsible action. The extent to which the PPP governance mechanism, in its structure and articulation of its purpose, was aligned with this outcome is discussed in the following sections.

6.3.4 Private Sector Motivation and Public Sector Obligation in a Co-Operative Model

The motivation of partners in PPP arrangements for engaging in the partnership directly influences the framework for collaboration and the mechanisms by which they create value (Davies and Hentschke, 2006). At Gerran, the motivation of the private sector to engage in the partnership was related to three main factors –the positive reputation of the University, the struggling economic context of Gerrantown, and the related need for high quality human resources for businesses to grow. Respondents concurred that the private sector was anxious to build a relationship with the University in order to bring skills and technical knowledge to the workforce from the activities of the business school. The reputation of the University, propelled by the fact that many of the private-sector directors were graduates of the institution, was also a factor that motivated directors to engage in the partnership. The University instilled pride among private

sector directors, and this, coupled with the strong sense of self-identity (BBC, 2011) of the society, would have also influenced their commitment to its institutions.

Public sector involvement in the Board of Directors, however, was based on the position held within the structure of the University. As such, University directors were appointed by virtue of position and motivation was limited by this factor, amounting to the discharge of an obligation. Four employees of the University indicated that they were not very engaged in the activities of the business school. There was evidence of personal motivation on the part of public actors but that too was propelled by the institutional rules of the University. It was acknowledged that contributing to the Board of Directors was an opportunity to provide service which enhanced promotional opportunities.

Despite their appointment based on position held within the University and overt confession of non-engagement in the PPP governance, the University directors appeared to support the initiative. This was seemingly influenced by the shared commitment of all directors to the purpose of the success of the business school and the development agenda. The collaborative mechanism reflected a model of co-operation (Berliner, 1997) and suggested supportiveness in the network (Cross and Parker, 2004) in that there was contribution by partners to the work of the organisation, aimed at a shared vision. The motivation of partners, however, influenced ‘what’ and ‘how’ they contributed within the governance structure and this will be discussed in the next section. Respondents’ comments on their motivation for partnering are given in Table 18.

Table 18: Motivation and Approach to the Partnership


Public	<p>“... the private sector was perhaps more anxious to change the nature of the position of the relation of mistrust, of antagonism, of dispel and the search for legitimacy.” (#4 Pub Director, Gerran)</p> <p>“...it’s part of the job, I would say. I have never considered the alternative of not being on the Board.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran)</p>
Private	<p>“...we are getting entrepreneurial skills and so on, by the, what business school does ... So they’re getting a massive return for their investment.” (#1 Priv Director, Gerran)</p> <p>“... I have always admired the Gerran School of Business as a business school. Everything pointed in a positive favour in terms of me wanting to be on the board of Gerran.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran)</p> <p>“For us it’s a learning as well. It’s a fact that we feel as if we’re giving back and a number of the members are former graduates of the university.” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran)</p>

6.3.5 University Ownership and Control

6.3.5.1 Social Network at Establishment

The network of actors involved in the establishment of the business school is presented diagrammatically in Figure 9. In this network, the ties between actors were all professional ties in that all actors were employees of Green University, Gerrantown Campus. The actors associated with the units and departments of Gerrantown Campus are displayed relationally with the symmetrical ties indicating continued relationships between nodes. For example, Tony Wong was instrumental only in the establishment of the organisation but did not have any substantive working tie to the organisation after it was established. In the case of Quinn Freddy, the actor was linked to both the Faculty of Social Sciences and Gerran Business School in an ongoing relationship. Red connectors are used to demonstrate the hierarchical relationship between structures at the Gerrantown campus. The length of ties has no significance in the network and only relates to the convenience of representing the data.

Figure 9: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Gerran



6.3.5.2 Control by Ownership and Right of Appointment

The impetus to establish the business school originated from within the University, motivated by the existence of the new programme introduced within the funded project and the practical demands of providing continued postgraduate management education. The governance of the business school therefore included a dense network of University actors from its conception. This was emphasised by one respondent who indicated that: “...*from the word go, the Gerran programme was an integral part of the Faculty*” (#2 Pub/Priv, KOA, Gerran). The University created a new organisational structure to give the project some degree of autonomy and flexibility with respect to the bureaucracy of University control.

This network demonstrates the influence of the University in the establishment of Gerran Business School. The density of public actors was greater than that of public-private actors. Actors from the private sector were not present at the time the business school was established. This created a network identity that was reflective of the institutionalised processes of Green University, Gerrantown (Fuhse, 2009). The control and ownership by the University appeared to be maintained over the evolution of the PPP but did not limit the future forms of the network which, in the current period, included a majority representation of private actors on the Board of Directors. This contrasts with the finding of Granovetter (1992) that the historical network structure limits the forms future ones can take. Although control was established by legal provisions, the commitment of directors’ was motivated by commitment to purpose, driven by environmental factors, which superseded the importance of the legal mechanism.

6.3.5.3 Structure of the Current Board of Directors: Social and Professional Ties

The Board of Directors at Gerran Business School at the time the research was conducted comprised fourteen members with four University directors, eight private-sector directors, one executive in residence and a student representative. Table 19 presents the structure of the Board of Directors and factors considered in the appointment of members.

Table 19: Appointment of the Board of Directors

	University Directors	Private Sector Directors	Executive in Residence	Student Representative
Number	4	8	1	1
Rationale for selection	Position held in the University including Vice-Chancellor, Principal, Executive Director and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Company Secretary.	Position of influence in private or public sector. Included representatives of the Private Sector Organisation, Government, and various industry sectors	This is a position that is indicative of the tendency of the Board to appoint persons who can contribute particular competencies to the Board	Appointed by the Board of Directors on an annual basis.
Period of appointment	The post is held "...for such time as they hold the substantive post within the University..." (Articles of Association, 1995, p.5).	'...for a period of TWO YEARS ... (Articles of Association, 1995, p.2; capitalisation in original).	Two years	One year
How selected and appointed	Appointed by virtue of position held within the University. The Director is replaced when he no longer holds the position	Appointed by the Vice-Chancellor based on recommendations from the Board		
Appointment of Chairman	Held by Principal of the University until 2008	Decision taken by the Board of Directors in 2008 to appoint the Chairman from among private sector directors		

In relation to the ratio of actor sub-groups, the number of private sector actors in the current, as opposed to the historical, network appears to contrast with the finding of (Gulati, 1998) whose study of strategic alliances demonstrated that "...the social networks of prior ties not only influenced the creation of new ties but also affected their design, their evolutionary path, and their ultimate success" (p.294). In the context of the small developing country, the professional ties to which Gulati (1998) referred are replaced by social ties. Selection to the Board of Directors was based on the previous performance, prominence and positions of actors in the society in a model of governance based on stakeholder engagement.

6.3.5.4 Stakeholder Model of Governance and the Common Good

In the act of moving the project out of the Department and creating a new organisational structure to manage the postgraduate management offerings, the Business School adopted many of the institutional structures and processes of the Gerran campus of Green University in which it was deeply embedded (Myers and Sacks, 2003). The committee model of governance, with participation based on hierarchical positions was retained. Given the requirements of a private establishment, the format for presentation of the governance structure was the Board of Directors. The governance architecture included representative stakeholders. The configuration included staff, university leadership and representatives of private sector organisations and industries. The initial statement on including the private sector ‘...*from time to time*’ (#4 Pub Director, Gerran), suggested that in the stakeholder model of engagement, private sector representatives were selected based on representation of an industry or sector. This criterion for inclusion of private actors was consistent with the stakeholder model of governance, similar to the rationale for inclusion of students in the massification of education (Bargh et al., 1996). This conflagration of purposes within the same governance model may have impacted the contribution of private sector actors as, in the mid-stage of the evolution of the business school, private contribution would have congealed into the existing hierarchical form of governance and administrative authority which was evident at the establishment of the school. This model of stakeholder representation, however, appeared to be accepted by directors who opined that representatives brought the right mix of skills to the Board. The extent to which representatives acted as individuals or in concert with their private sector colleagues was not evident from the research and presents an area for further research. This model, however, would have contributed to the building of internal ‘cognitive legitimacy’ for the PPP within the University (Bitektine, 2011).

The model of including representative stakeholders on the Board of Directors appeared to be embedded in the committee model of governance employed by the University. This recognition of the importance of addressing the “individual good” of the bodies that stakeholders represent excludes the conception of a “common good” but recognises the possibility of a “common interest” as the sum of all the individual interests (Argandoña, 1998, p.1094). The development of the governance model is explained by stakeholder theory which “...is intended both to explain and to guide the structure and

operation of the established corporation...and views the corporation as an organizational entity through which numerous and diverse participants accomplish multiple, and not always entirely congruent, purposes” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p.70). The transition of the purpose of the business school from serving individual or collective interests of stakeholders to a shared purpose of development, defined as the “common interest” and good of society appeared to be related to the control of the governance mechanism and management of relationships by the University. Evidence of the stakeholder model of governance is presented in Table 20. This factor appeared significant with respect to eliciting commitment by all directors on the Board to the purpose and actions of the business school.

Table 20: Evidence of the Stakeholder Model of Governance

Public	“...we have often had representatives from the Ministry of Finance...Bank of Gerran... the commercial sector...the banking and financial sector... And also I would say from private sector organisations... So it’s been a mix.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran)
Private	“...the board structure is important. It’s not just private sector, but it’s private sector with specific type of expertise that is also brought into the board level.” (#1 Priv Director, Gerran)
Document analysis (Legal control by the University)	<p>The legal instruments that established the company and the Board of Directors prescribed the limits with respect to the number of persons on the Board of Directors and the relationship between the University and Gerran Business School. The Directors in actor groups and the number from each sub-group were defined in the Articles of Association and included: “The Principal...or his nominee; TEN members of the...Private and Public Sectors; SIX members of the academic and/or administrative staff of the University...and the Executive Director...” (Articles of Association, Gerran Institute of Business Limited, December 6, 1995). This structure did not give control to the University through the number of Directors from within the institution. Rather, the legal instruments placed legal control with the University through control of appointments to the Board of Directors and included the following statements:</p> <p>“(b) The Board of the Institute shall comprise not more than eighteen members who shall include a majority of members in whose appointment the Vice-Chancellor and the Principal of the Gerrantown Campus have concurred” (Ordinance 31, The Gerran Institute of Business, p.80).</p> <p>“(e) The appointment of the Director of the Institute by the Board shall have the prior approval of the University” (ibid.).</p>
Document Analysis (Showing Support of the University)	<p>With respect to financial arrangements, the Affiliation Agreement stated that “The Institute undertakes the responsibility of meeting its expenses without prejudice of the right of the Institute to accept any grants, loans or other resources from the University which the University may offer.” (Instrument of Affiliation, Gerran Institute of Business and Green University, dated July 02, 1993, p.3)</p> <p>The provision for academic staff by the University was noted in the Instrument of Affiliation which stated “3. (a). The University undertakes that it will...provide members of academic staff, in such numbers and in such grades as the Institute may require, to carry out the academic functions of the Institute” (Instrument of Affiliation, Gerran Institute of Business and Green University, dated July 02, 1993, p.2). The Institute was expected to reimburse the University “...all or part of the cost...” of providing such academic staff (ibid., p.3. (b)).</p>

6.3.6 Outcomes of Governance: Strategy Facilitated by Trust

6.3.6.1 University Supportiveness and Trust

The relationship between the public and private sectors on the Board of Directors reflected the support of the University for the strategic direction of the business school. The arrangements outlined in the Affiliation Agreement defined the division of responsibilities and roles of each organisation which demonstrated University support. Areas of support included programme arrangements and financial buffering through the provision of infrastructure including faculty and buildings. In its evolution the Business School relied less on the University for financial support and this would have contributed to its internal ‘socio-political legitimacy’ within the University.

6.3.6.2 Commitment to Competitiveness


The University held the view that the Business School must “...operate better like a business ...to be a corporation in many respects” (#1 Pub Director, Gerran). As such, it was expected that it must be managed as a business without reliance on public funding. The company was seen as “...an institution which would be separate and distinct from the normal administration of the University and an institution in which the business community could play a more effective role and a larger role in the decision-making process” (#1 Pub KOA, Gerran). The structure of the governance mechanism established in this context retained the primacy of the University and accommodated private participation in the role of engaged stakeholders. The functioning of the PPP governance mechanism based on the structure and directors’ understanding of its purpose is explained in the sub-sections that follow. The first sub-section examines the social network of KOAs at Gerran.

6.3.6.3 Hierarchical Control and Trust among Actors

The social network of KOAs of Gerran Business School is presented in Figure 10. This network provided data with respect to the density of actor sub-groups in the professional network of KOAs. This data enabled the researcher to make inferences with respect to actor sub-group contribution to the school’s development. This network represents the professional social network of four of the nine KOAs who held these positions throughout the history of the school. The network includes the top four people

on the Board of Directors that respondents identified as providing significant professional support to them in the management of the School. Where respondents indicated more names, these were included in the network. Order of priority was not a factor in this network. The selection of KOAs was based on access and availability of persons to the researcher. The length of ties is not significant in this network and is used for convenience in the presentation of the data. All names are fictitious.

Figure 10: Social Network of KOAs - Gerran



The network includes seven people from the private sector, four people with public-private experience and four people from the University. The density of actor sub-group appears distributed and non-homophilous (McPherson et al., 2001; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954) and there is no indication that any KOA relied on the professional support of people based primarily on their sectoral experience. As such, it may be inferred that the flow of resources from alters in the network increased the social capital of KOAs and the performance of the network. In this network, KOAs were from all sectors and every KOA sought professional support from at least one other KOA, who in only one case belonged to the same sector. The professional support from other KOAs indicates the strength of the professional relationship between actors from within the University and a reliance of the PPP on hierarchy and control by authority within the University. This, however, did not appear to negatively influence the formation of relationships with private actors. In fact, the density of the private sector actors in the

networks indicates they were strongly engaged in the key decisions and direction of the school. This form of engagement appears to be explained by a resource-based view of the firm where the KOA draws resource support from the network to maximise the value of alliance partners (Gulati, 1999) and build competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001). An alternative explanation of control and dominance by alliance partners within the small strategic network is contested by the assertion of one KOA who indicated that “...one of the things they definitely do is get out of the way and allow me to manage, and I respect that a lot” (#1 Pub/Priv KOA, Gerran).

6.3.6.4 Primacy of the University System, Role Definition and Trust as Control Mechanisms

The new company form changed the roles and expectations of both the university and private sector actors. The way in which the new form of governance included elements of price, authority and trust, which are the ideal types of market, network and hierarchy (Bradach and Eccles, 1989), influenced its performance. Respondents were alert to this and considered the co-ordination of the new system:

“The decision certainly was taken at Gerran then to create a company, so the Gerran School of Business is a company as you know and there was then the need to a. to unambiguously identify the role and authority of the University in this the scheme of things and there was also a need to identify the role and authority of the private sector” (#1 **Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran**).

Having established roles within the legal framework, the PPP appeared to have functioned in a manner by which trust evolved.

Studies of alliances in all sectors have asserted that trust is important to the success of partnerships (e.g. Larson, 1992; Cross and Parker, 2004; Austin, 2000). In this case, respondents indicated that trust had to be developed and appeared to be facilitated by the control of the University through the non-reliance on private funding and control of appointments to the Board of Directors by the University. This structure is consistent with the conclusion that hierarchical mechanisms must co-exist with other forms of control in network governance (Eccles, 1985; Stinchcombe, 1985; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ingraham and Lynn, 2004) and contrasts with the finding of Rondinelli and London (2003) that mutually developed collaboration procedures are indicators of trust. In this case, the reputation and developmental trajectory of the PPP appeared to have

instilled trust from the private sector. In the context of scarce financial resources within the country, the search for financing depended more on the competency of private directors to source and manage funds and contributions, rather than the injection of their own funds. Working with the funds of a third party ensured that there was no issue of private control or domination and this appeared to engender trust of the private sector from the University actors.

6.3.6.5 Shared Control and Unity of the Corporate Body

Control of the new governance structure by the University created a culture of collaboration based on an overall appreciation of the value of stakeholder input and a governance form that was configured as a traditional university committee and designed to elicit stakeholder involvement and resource contribution. Moreover, the resource contribution expected from private sector actors was primarily their knowledge of the private sector in general and of their industries in particular, and what academic knowledge was necessary for their development. Additionally, private sector actors were expected to contribute to the development of the private sector through relationship building and advocacy, ensuring that the private sector was more receptive and placed greater value on university inputs to their businesses. This purpose was articulated by both the private and public sector actors and constituted a shared understanding that contributed to the perpetuation of the partnership.

Dodd (1932, p.1160) contested the ideas of a business executive, Owen D. Young, and claimed that:

“If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members, that they are...trustees for an institution (with multiple constituents) rather than attorneys for the stockholders” (1932, p.1160; author's parentheses).

This statement was extended by (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) to include the phrase ‘with multiple constituents’ to accommodate the notions of shared responsibility in governance and the development of stakeholder theory. The findings of this study further extend the statement to account for the notion of shared purpose amongst stakeholders in PPP arrangements as follows:

“If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers [and Directors]

of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members, that they are...trustees for an institution [with multiple constituents]...*[motivated by a shared, compelling purpose that reflects the common good of society].*" (Researcher's italics).

6.3.7 Private Control of Strategy and Public Ownership

6.3.7.1 Private-Sector and Academic Actors as 'Resources' in Governance

The academic actors at Gerran generally did not actively participate in the PPP arrangements. They were included in the governance structure by virtue of positions of influence which could bring administrative convenience within the university processes and ensure the control of academic quality. University actors commented on the fact that they had an 'overlapping presence' indicating "structural equivalence," which is the similarity of nodes in their connections within the network (Lorrain and White, 1971). The rationale for inclusion of University directors was seen to be the 'education' of private sector members with respect to how academia functions. The University actors' analysis of their limited role on the Board of Directors appeared to be a symptom of understanding the purpose of the organisation and the relevance of their own involvement and contribution. Respondents' views on structural equivalence in the network of actors are presented in Table 21.

Table 21: Respondents' Views on Structural Equivalence and Relevance

Public	<p>"We had no useful function. It was overlapped and people were there as a matter of right" (#3 Pub Director, Gerran).</p> <p>"I don't think that it's a one size fits all, I think it depends on the particular phase in which you are going through... so that in a sense, maybe you could even have a Board with no academics so to speak, and it wouldn't matter, right, so long as the academic issues are going to Faculty Board" (#2 Pub Director, Gerran).</p>
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Academics engaged in the scientific research process develop skills of long-term thinking, meta-cognition and analysis (Leshem and Trafford, 2007). These skills are developed and demonstrated in a context designed to facilitate argument and counter argument amongst peers and colleagues who trust each other's processes for arriving at conclusions and for accommodating differences in the conclusions. This contrasts with private sector 'impatience', 'intuition' and decisiveness. With respect to the PPP, to allow the private sector to control and dominate the Board of Directors suggested that

the PPP required more private sector logic and strategy at the level of the Board of Directors and that the academic as resource would better serve the PPP at other levels. It appears that in the evolution of the PPP, the governance structure must also evolve, coupling and uncoupling (Weick, 1976) with actor groups based on the stage of evolution of the organisation and indeed, of the university in the society in which it exists.

6.3.7.2 Learning and Congealing through Trust

The context of a shared governance structure between private and academic actors presented a network in which transactions between the University and private sector actors were either recognised as learning opportunities or opportunities for accommodating constraints. The Integrated Model of Network Research proposed by Fuhse (2009) is employed to demonstrate the impact of the network on actors and to develop a theory of academic contribution to PPP governance. Using this model, the Board of Directors in the PPP governance mechanism is the “order principle” that, in this case, is the “opportunity” for the interaction of academic and private actors (ibid., p.53). The expectations of behaviours of people in the ‘academic’ and ‘private sector’ categories inform the “transactions” that take place at the Board of Directors. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) occurs when the behaviour demonstrated in the transaction is conceived of as being inconsistent with the expectations of the category. This is demonstrated in the opinion of one University director who, with respect to a particular activity undertaken by the Board of Directors, expressed the opinion that the private sector’s behaviour was becoming indistinguishable from that expected of the public sector:

“...but I’m very surprised at the way the private sector is going with ... though. I’m not very surprised, I’m just, I am bemused! Because the private sector is becoming more bureaucratic than the state sector!” (#2 **Pub Director, Gerran**)

The constraints and learning opportunities presented by the public-private network in business schools were discussed by both public and private actors. Private actors felt that the presence of the University actors kept them aligned to the realities of working in an academic context and with the broader private sector. Respondents’ views are presented in Table 22.

Table 22: Respondents Views on Learning within the Board of Directors

Public	<p>“...it had to be a mistrust first, institutional learning process where each of the institutions, university, the business school is to learn the nuances and the objectives and the aims and so on of each other.” (#4 Pub Director, Gerran)</p> <p>“...So I think both sides had to learn and ...that was one reason I personally remained ...longer than perhaps I should have because I wanted to make sure that both sides were working together” (#1 Pub KOA, Gerran).</p>
Private	<p>“We think you can (snaps fingers) introduce it next month and then (we question) ‘why you not doing it, other universities doing it, why you not doing it?’ But understanding takes so much more and keeping us within the realms of the articles and association and understanding the university, because the school is a subset of the overall university and making sure that we are properly aligned” (#1 Priv KOA, Gerran).</p>

Transfer of learning also took place from Gerran to Green University, Gerrantown, and this was noted by all actors. University actors indicated that trust was built by this process that emphasised the institutional relationship between the University and the business school. This is reflective of the extent to which the business school was administratively embedded in the University as an institution (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Private sector actors thought that they contributed their expertise to the business school and allowed it to develop a more strategic mode of operation and strategic outlook.

The mitigation of risks to the legitimacy of the business school as it standardised its practices was aided by the transfer of learning from the private sector to the business school, facilitated by reduced bureaucracy and decentralised management (Meyer and Rowan, 2008). The fact that private sector actors did not hold the view that they too were learning suggested that the value of academic knowledge was not transferred to them, a finding that is consistent with the disengagement of academics from the Board of Directors.

6.3.7.3 Academic Disengagement – Constraints to Academic Resources

The opportunity of the shared governance structure between private and academic actors did not readily accommodate sharing of the ‘resources’ and expertise of academic actors in the transactions accommodated by this arrangement. In fact, the shared commitment to development, together with ownership and control by the university, kept university actors committed to the purpose, though distant from the

collaborative governance structure. The governance mechanism whereby the Board of Directors met for a few hours on a quarterly basis to provide overall support and guidance to management appeared more aligned with the activities of corporate governance or "...the general exercise of authority" (Michalski et al., 2001, p.9) in a "...system by which the company is directed and controlled" (Cadbury, 1992, p.14). Further, when the Board adopts a strategic role, "...directors guide the definition of the corporate mission and are called upon to assist in the development, implementation and monitoring of the firm's strategies (Demb and Neubauer, 1990, p.157). These responsibilities and actions contrast with the ethos and conversations of traditional committees in universities and was recognised as such:

"We know how to run sub-committees and committees at the university level, Finance and General Purpose and Faculty board and all that kind of stuff. Faculty board is not a board. Faculty board for years has been a talk shop and I mean, it is a different kind of thing from what you expect to happen in a private sector setting." (#3 Pub Director, Gerran)

It appeared that the conversational space of the governance structure constrained the academic actors in several ways. In an analysis of the communication transactions that take place between people, Gibson (2000) found that a speaker's conversational agency, which may be understood in the context of PPP governance as the ability of an actor to "...carve out a trajectory that could lead to the advancement of...goals," is constrained by structural and situational constraints and not by pre-existing intentions. In addition to the traditional one-speaker constraint and the relevance constraint of speaking to whatever was just said that governs all conversational discourse (Gibson, 2000), the inclusion of private directors with contrasting ideologies, coupled with the context of quick decision-making, appears to have created a situational constraint in which academic actors were subject to additional communication vulnerabilities. Despite this, University actors continued to contribute and support the efforts of the business school. University actors, though, questioned whether they needed to be on the Board to make their contributions. Respondents' views are presented in Table 23.

Table 23: Constraints to Academic Resources in Governance

Public	“And I find that private sector people tend to be impatient with that kind of stuff and...they just come and give their report and...not into long talking.” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran).
Public-Private	“This is where the public-private sector independence, the school with the board doesn’t easily allow for the bridge that is necessary across the board. It doesn’t prevent, it doesn’t stop it, but it’s something that I don’t think has happened as much as we would like...I don’t know if it is simply because of the Caribbean and its problems.” (#1 Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran).
Private	“...natural inclination is almost impatience with puffery...(which) moves away from being what the academics are used to, they like to pontificate, maybe. So I think I bring that sort of...they say let’s make a decision and quickly.” (#2 Priv Director, Gerran).

Despite the restrictions of contributions, general support from all directors appeared to be enhanced by the fact that the space of the collaborative governance structure differed from the hierarchical administrative space of University committees in that it was not “sluggish...inward looking...conservative...and insensitive to resource constraints...” (Dearlove, 2002, p.265). In this context, the concern for the fiduciary duties of the Board of Directors and the requirement for immediate decisions that must be taken with imperfect knowledge appear to be better aligned with the context in which private sector leaders and managers function on a daily basis and demonstrate their competence essentially through competitive actions. These factors however, appeared to challenge the readiness of academic actors to contribute to decision-making.

In the next section, the actual contributions of public and private actors will be discussed and explained. These findings contrast with those of Ansell and Gash (2008) who found that factors critical to the success of collaborative governance include face-to-face dialogue and the development of commitment and shared understanding. Departing from the work of Fuhse (2009), the findings and explanations lead the researcher to propose the theory that the order principles embodied in PPPs as governance mechanisms in the context of business schools constrains the participation of directors embedded in academic institutions. The findings present an opportunity for further research that analyses the communication content of PPPs to determine how interactions of partners address the constraints of the governance context.

6.3.8 Cognitive Social Structure in Governance of Gerran

The cognitive social structure of the main contributors on the Board of Directors to the strategy of the School is presented in Figure 11. In this affiliated network, respondents were asked to name, among existing and past directors, the top four people who contributed to the strategy of the school. This network was constructed to obtain the overall perceptions of sub-group contribution to the strategy of the school and to provide data regarding the cognitive social structure of the Board of Directors. Names have not been included in this network in order to protect the anonymity of respondents and actors.

The frequency with which private sector actors are named in this network is seventeen; public actors numbered seven, and people with a public-private background were named fourteen times. This indicates that respondents felt that private and public contributions were both valued but the public sector actors were least engaged in the Board of Directors. This is consistent with the data obtained from public sector actors in the interviews.

In this network, three respondents emphasised the contributions of actors based on position held as opposed to the person. In one case, the public sector respondent placed emphasis on the role held within the University and, in the other, the public sector respondent noted the contribution of the funding agency. This is indicative of the strong ties within the University of public respondents. In one case, the private sector respondent noted that contributions were based on the competencies that people brought from their general roles in the public and private sectors. Given the density of private and public-private actors in this network, the cognitive structure in the network may be described as private-sector dominant.

Figure 11: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance - Gerran

Colour code	Public	Private	Public-private	
	1	2	3	4
Respondent 1				
Respondent 2				Funding Organisation #1
Respondent 3				
Respondent 4				Post in University
Respondent 5				Post in Gerran Business School
Respondent 6				
Respondent 7				
Respondent 8				
Respondent 9				
Respondent 10				
Respondent 11				Everyone plays a role
Respondent 12				Not on Board long enough

6.4 STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY: ACHIEVEMENT OF PURPOSE AS PERFORMANCE

6.4.1 Contribution of Actor Sub-Groups to the Strategy of the PPP


The assessment of the performance of the PPP was guided by an analysis of the network of contributions of public and private actor sub-groups to major decisions and actions of the school throughout its history. The network was developed from the axial coding of the strategies and decisions considered important from the perspective of KOAs. The network methodology of obtaining the cognitive social structure of the entire network by asking all actor sub-groups to indicate what they considered to be the contribution of both the public and the private sector actors was employed (Krackhardt, 1987). The strategies determined to be important by KOAs were classified into the two groups based on the researcher's analysis of whether they were significant to the 'cognitive legitimacy' or the 'socio-political' legitimacy of the school at the relevant point in time (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, pp.656-658; Bitektine, 2011). This was determined by the extent to which the actions served primarily to legitimise the form of the business school or to demonstrate its competence with respect to achievement of its purpose.

The PPP, as a strategic developmental organisation, presented challenges with respect to stakeholder evaluation of its legitimacy. The mapping of contributions of public and private actors to the strategic actions of the school is presented in Figure 12. This was based on the extent to which strategies would have promoted stakeholder evaluation of the new organisational form as either 'cognitive' or 'socio-political' (Bitekine, 2011).

This classification is appropriate based on the newness of the business schools as ventures in the environment and the likelihood that they would be evaluated by stakeholders based on ‘gut feel’ in the absence of “...external tests of reliability” of their actions (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, p. 651, author’s italics). Further assessment of the PPP performance was based on the comments of respondents on the future of the PPP governance form in the continued evolution of the business school. Using the assessment of external legitimacy from the perspective of stakeholders and internal legitimacy among firms, in this case the university and business school, is consistent with the conclusion drawn by Human and Provan (2000) that both forms are necessary for the survival of networks. This method of analysis is also consistent with the relational realist perspective and the importance of the meaning structure of the network (Fuhse, 2009), in this case, the meaning of strategic actions to the society in which the network of actions is located.

In this network, the contribution of actors was analysed in two sub-groups – public and private. Actors who were included in the category “public-private” were also asked to comment on the contribution of both public and private actors, the two sector categories that guided the data collection and which were the focus of the research problem. As such, they are included in the respondent groups, presented as circles on both sides of the blocks, which represent the strategies. The respondent groups are included on both sides of the network diagram as all respondents named contributions that were analysed as relating to either ‘cognitive’ and ‘socio-political’ categories of actions, based on their purpose at the point in time they were executed. There is no indication of the time period in which strategies were executed in the network diagram and time is noted in the analysis where it appears to be significant. The two time periods – ‘early days’ and ‘current’ used in the analysis below refer to the period before 2008 when the Board of Directors was chaired by the Principal of the University and when the private sector assumed chairmanship of the business school, respectively.

Figure 12: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions – Gerran



The network indicates that both public and private actor sub-groups contributed to the development of both cognitive and socio-political legitimacy of the business school throughout its existence. Strategies undertaken in the early days to build cognitive legitimacy, including the provision of a building and the pursuit of accreditation, were supported by both actor sub-groups and contributed to the cognitive legitimacy of the business school in the society. Strategies deemed important in the current setting were supported strongly by private contribution and suggested that private sector actors in the PPP governance were more involved in the actions towards socio-political

legitimacy. This appears to be symptomatic of the disengagement of academia from the PPP and may thwart the sustained progress of the PPP with respect to addressing the problem of business school relevance which, it is argued, requires both methodological and intellectual rigour, academic and private engagement (Mintzberg, 2004). Having attained cognitive legitimacy, it appears that the impact on the development purpose should now be perceived by the society. Failure to achieve socio-political legitimacy with regard to its purpose may affect the future of the PPP model and lead to the eventual re-integration of the business school into the university.

Dense networks of ties to the private sector contribution to strategies that produce socio-political legitimacy suggest that the model of stakeholder involvement in the PPP governance of the business school has worked to evolve a socio-political legitimacy that would sustain the business school in its society. This is explained by the levels of trust generated in the PPP, propelled by shared commitment to the development purpose in the organisational context of scarce financial resources. Further it appeared that trust was a facilitator of private strategic actions; responsibilities were shared based on expectations of competencies in actor sub-groups in general. The network demonstrates instances of actors 'crossing the divide'. The crossing of the divide by both sub-groups is indicative of supportiveness in the network (Cross and Parker, 2004) and the level of trust amongst actors.

6.4.2 Socio-Political Legitimacy and Future of the PPP

The general agreement amongst respondents was that the PPP governance arrangement was more effective for the business school. With respect to how this was achieved, respondents' views ranged from increased effectiveness to improved outcomes. One respondent concluded that the success of the PPP did not reside in the activities of the Board of Directors and that relationships were more important in the partnering process. This appeared to be consistent with the findings in the case with respect to the PPP established as a strategic developmental organisation. It was also noted by respondents that the PPP, at this stage in its evolution, had only achieved cognitive legitimacy and needed to adopt strategies that would build its socio-political legitimacy in the environment. Respondents' views on the future of the PPP are in Table 24.

Table 24: Respondents' Views on the Future of the PPP

Public	<p>“What I would say is that the partnership between the private and university enabled a better quality of decision making than would have been possible if the university handles that exclusively... People came in and brought skills and experiences that we in university could not possibly have or even dream about” (#3 Pub Director, Gerran).</p> <p>“Well I don’t think the public private partnership is...I don’t think the board is the key to the public private partnership, that’s the first thing. We could have a board which was entirely (university) persons and I don’t see where that would be the big issue. The key to it is establishing those relationships and it’s not just the relationships which I say we already have...” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran).</p>
Public-Private	<p>“I say all of that indicate that obviously the PPP thing is vital for us, because the nature of our governments is that we’re going to have a government involvement in the means of production in an on-going way.... But I don’t know if we have opened the door and is that because of this governance structure or what, I don’t know. It’s something that we need to ask ourselves” (#1 Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran).</p>
Private	<p>“I mean, my humble opinion, the future direction is that it has to be a full ownership of the private sector for it to add value. A business school is not an undergraduate degree (#1 Priv Director, Gerran).</p>

6.5 CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS

The PPP is a purpose-driven organisation that evolves based on its evaluation. In the case of business-education partnerships established as strategic developmental organisations, partners provide resources to the organisation and guide its direction to attain the purpose. In this competitive context, the flow of resources to the PPP and between the PPP and its parent university influences the development of each organisation, and may enhance or threaten the legitimacy of one or the other. It is therefore imperative that the University position itself to accommodate the existence of the strategic developmental organisation and the role of ‘boundary spanners’ in this context appears important, not only to manage the interaction and relationship but more importantly, to manage the bases of legitimacy from which each institution derives its right to exist.

6.6 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA IN THE CASE

1. Concern for accuracy as the study relied on the memory of respondents; in some cases, they indicated that both memory and level of engagement in the partnership would have influenced the accuracy of their responses. This was

addressed through the process of corroboration across respondents and with documents.

2. It was assumed that the persons who signed the Affiliation Agreement were instrumental in the establishment of the school.

6.7 CASE PROPOSITIONS

The following propositions with respect to PPPs in business schools in small developing countries are derived from explanations in the Gerran case. These will be examined in the other two cases.

1. The PPP is a means of partner resource sharing and co-operation (Berliner, 1997). The social space of governance that includes both academia and business presents constraints that limit the ability of academic actors to communicate and share their “inimitable resource” in the governance mechanism of the PPP (Barney, 1991). It appears that the order principles (Fuhse, 2009) embodied in PPPs as governance mechanisms constrain the participation of directors embedded in academic institutions.
2. The environment is a source of motivation and inspiration to private sector directors who contribute to the strategy of the PPP organisation to address the development purpose.
3. The institutionalisation of the PPP as a form that is evaluated by stakeholders based on the application of evaluative principles of ‘cognitive legitimacy’ is a necessary precursor to the actions that promote socio-cultural legitimacy. The embeddedness of the PPP within the institutional framework of the University inspires respect and co-operation within the PPP network and promotes ‘cognitive legitimacy’ within the university environment and in the wider society.
4. The institutional culture of universities in which academics are embedded restricts their participation in the planning and execution of strategic actions aimed at attaining socio-cultural legitimacy in the environment. The discourse structures of the Board of Directors constrain their participation in governance.
5. The success of a social network is related to the establishment of trust, collegial relationships and cultural identity, facilitated by concern for the development

agenda (Fuhse, 2009). This agenda however, does not guide the strategic actions of business schools towards socio-political legitimacy.

6. The historical form of social networks does not limit the form future ones can take. PPPs are established for a particular purpose and the structure is constantly evaluated against the purpose.
7. For business schools in small developing countries, the success of the PPP governance mechanism is related to directors' commitment to a shared purpose such that it supersedes any individual or collective purpose of stakeholders.
8. Hierarchical control, a shared and compelling purpose, and networks built on social and professional relationships promote the development of trust. Trust serves as a facilitator of strategy but strategy controls PPP networks, established as strategic developmental organisations, leading to their success.

CHAPTER 7: CASE ANALYSIS - APPLE BUSINESS SCHOOL

7.0 INTRODUCTION

This second case study of PPPs as an alternative governance structure in business schools highlights the unique factors in the PPP arrangements in Apple Business School, which was created through the strategic alliance of Green University and members of the private sector in the country of Arden, and also examines propositions based on the findings at Gerran Business School. The case included two members of the University staff who were directly involved in the administration of the business school and one member of the adjunct staff of Apple who was involved in the establishment of the business school. This respondent was identified in the selection process of snowballing.

7.1 IMPACT OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT OF ARDEN ON THE PPP

7.1.1 Background to Arden

Arden is considered a developing country, though it is fairly cash rich as an ‘oil and gas’ based economy. The country has a GNI per capita of US \$16,490 (World Bank, 2009, cited in BBC, 2011). The country suffered two major oil shocks whereby government revenues decreased substantially and the country experienced what is referred to as “Dutch Disease” where growing GDP did not equate with the level of development (Davis, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1995). In the late 1980s, Arden was experiencing a financial depression and several companies of major conglomerates were in crisis. This was fuelled by trade liberalisation and other IMF-led structural adjustment which resulted in greater competition and increasing pressures on businesses to perform. As such, the climate was ideal for the development of a business school in Arden. The political environment of Arden is very stable with long-serving governments and a strong resistance to change. The society is competitive in the context of the “Dutch Disease” economy where resources are, at different times, scarce or abundant. Business practice is not resistant to this overall climate and culture and businesses have been very cautious in their expansion efforts. Few businesses have gone abroad and business has essentially remained in the Caribbean region. The

environment of Arden presented unique constraints and opportunities to the PPP arrangement at Apple Business School.

7.2 IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF ARDEN ON THE PPP

7.2.1 Economic and Political Influences

Apple Business School appeared to consider the effects of the national, regional and global environment on the school's strategy and performance in different ways. Within the country of Arden, government policies and heavy subsidisation of education through student subsidies resulted in increased access and demand for tertiary education, a policy initiative that resulted in expanded enrolment at institutions across the country, including Apple and the Arden Campus of Green University. Public-sector directors saw the growth of the business school as a threat to the brand and, in a small market, a threat to selectivity in student admission and programme quality. Private-sector actors believed that the environment was only a consideration with regard to the strategy and acknowledged that: *"...regardless of the economic context or the exogenous variables that are affecting your operation, you always have to find a way to react or to adapt"* (#2 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). The private-sector actors viewed the heavy subsidisation of education in the local market as a risk of internal complacency and adopted strategies to move away from reliance on products that attracted government subsidies. This orientation of directors suggested that they operated in an 'entrepreneurial mode,' adopting actions that suggested *"...that the environment is malleable, a force to be confronted and controlled"* (Mintzberg, 1973, p.46). The strategic orientation of the private-sector actors to the environment and the defensive orientation of public-sector actors reflected their roles in the PPP and appeared to influence the relationship between public and private actors on the Board of Directors (Table 25).

Table 25: Respondents Views on the Impact of the Environment on the PPP

Public	“Well for one, government having still in place its generous 50% at postgraduate, you have to agree that has in fact impacted positively on the organisation in terms of numbers and...also on the cautious side...I think it needs some exclusivity and I am not seeing that.” (#1 Pub Director, Apple)
Public-Private	“...there is always limitations but our job is regardless of the economic context or the exogenous variables that are affecting your operation, you always have to find a way to react or to adapt.” (#2 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple)
Private	“All you do is understand the context and find those aspects of it that could add impetus to what you doing.” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple) “I don’t think it mattered. What mattered was the vision and the drive of the directors to create that thing (Apple), that’s what matte... once we have the idea of always having quality, top fellas, it’s assured!” (#3 Priv Director, Apple)

7.2.2 ‘Means-End’ Divide on Competitiveness in a Regional Market

The ‘small world’ effect discussed in the case of Gerran Business School also existed in Arden. Private-sector actors, however, were actively engaged in regional trade and were able to extend their market into the region, obtaining a competitive position within the region. This enhanced the prominence of the private sector and led to their opinion that environmental factors did not limit the strategy and competitiveness of the firm. The environment did not serve as a source of inspiration, as at Gerran (Case Proposition 3) but motivated private sector actors to utilize strategies that confronted environmental realities. Contrary to the findings at Gerran, the environment was seen as an opportunity, rather than a source of constraint to the private sector, and they recognised the value of business education. The University recognised that there was an internal opportunity for the private sector to guide the University in its own expansion and management of regional activities but believed that the University differed from the private sector with respect to their consideration of the public good as opposed to the private sector’s concern for profitability. This ‘means-end’ values argument (Von Wright, 1968) appeared to be the fundamental difference that affected the relationship between public and private actors in the PPP (Table 26).

Table 26: Public versus Private Good

Public	<p>“Green would tend to operate more and put higher value on the social good. There are programmes of study that we run here which are not necessarily economically viable but which, in the milieu of things that we do at university, we feel are necessary for the social good” (#1 Pub KOA , Apple).</p> <p>“I think they wanted to leave a legacy, that’s my very positive view, because the energy they put into it” (#2 Pub Director, Apple)</p>
Private	<p>“...actually...the impetus for the establishment of the business school did not come from the university. It never did! It came from the private sector” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple).</p>
Participant Observation	<p>“It was very clear that private sector protagonists were all eager to explain their role in the establishment of the business school” (Memo: Participant Observation).</p> <p>“The rationale for the establishment of a new University in Arden was the apparent distance between academia and practice at Green University” (Memo: Participant Observation).</p>

7.3 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, ARDEN CAMPUS

7.3.1 Perception as ‘Ivory Tower’ and Ideological Differences

Both the University and the private-sector actors acknowledged that there was a disconnect between what the private sector needed and products of Green University, Arden. Private sector actors noted that there was a difference of ideology, and the University was thought to be “...*rabidly opposed to the notion of business education*” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple). The differences were deep-seated and private actors thought that it translated into a lack of respect for people in business. Respondents’ comments are in Table 27.

Table 27: Perception as ‘Ivory Tower’ and Ideological Differences

Public	<p>“My understanding was that it was a response to a historical situation where it is encapsulated in a cliché used at the time ‘town’ did not meet ‘gown’...Some of the stereotypical notions had to do –were ideological” (#2 Pub Director, Apple)</p>
Private	<p>“That is the business they were supposed to prosecute. But remember the University was a socialist place...and these people view business schools as foreign and what business schools teach as alien, and not true academia, and so they tend to kill it (#6 Priv KOA, Apple).</p> <p>“But we have such a strong private sector side on the board that we don’t have a problem. But left to him, everything would be redone and redone and redone and rechecked and rechecked and rechecked. Total waste of time, couldn’t run a roti shop in my view!” (#3 Priv Director, Apple).</p>

Differences with regard to ‘application’ of learning were also perceived in the wider context of Arden as, in the early 2000s, a new university was established in Arden to address the skills gap in the country. The objectives of the new university were articulated in terms of relevance and it was thought that the new institution would not conflict with the portfolio and purpose of Green University as it “...will not cater for the broad mix of courses offered by Green University, Arden, but will instead place emphasis, largely, on meeting the specific needs of the country to take it forward as rapidly as possible to be an industrialised nation” (Trinidad and Tobago News Bulletin Board, 2004). University actors acknowledged that over the years there was a “...*separation between university and industry*” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). The relationship with government however, was enhanced over the years because of the University’s dependence on government funding. The way in which Green University responded to national concerns about the relevance of its programmes to industry and the overall development of the University would have influenced the PPP.

7.3.2 University Motivation for the Partnership: Financial and Stakeholder Needs

The partnership between the private sector and the University was driven by different but related needs of the University and business. At the time of the establishment of the business school, the gravity of the economic problem in Arden resulted in financial challenges for the Arden Campus of Green University which was dependent on government funding. The University saw the need for a business school and the project was in the planning stage for some time. The opportunity provided by the private-sector’s proposal to fund the business school was attractive to the University which conceded to the establishment of Apple. This appeared to be the motivating factor that drove the partnership for the University. It would appear that the University felt compelled though not convinced that it should ‘franchise’ its educational responsibility to the private sector, despite the differences that strained the level of trust between the sectors. It seemed to approach the partnership as a compulsion and concession, rather than an opportunity. This was reflected in the speech of the Principal at the launch of the business school when he emphasized that:

“Education is a national asset, not a Private indulgence, and the burden of cost of higher education must be borne by all.” (Address by Professor Narrie Biswas, *Industry and Commerce and a Knowledge-based Society*, 1989, p.78)

The existence of the MBA programme at Gerrantown was also a factor that could have propelled the decision, in which case the business school would have been a mechanism for ensuring parity between the campuses, so that the Arden Campus would “...be in sync with their contemporary global trends and to be on par with other universities” (#1 Pub Staff, Green Univ., Arden). University actors, however, acknowledged the need for leadership development in business and management for national and regional development. They also recognised that they were not meeting the needs of stakeholders and that the support of industry was needed to produce distinctive graduates and contribute to its developmental mission. It appeared though, that in the context of scarce resources, the push of the private sector was the main factor that contributed to the establishment of the business school, although it was facilitated by public sector actors who understood the broader institutional and societal needs (Table 28).

Table 28: Motivation for the Partnership

Public	“The reason for the establishment of Apple was ...3-fold. One, the Institute was established at a time when the Faculty of Social Sciences was overwhelmed by the demand for undergraduate management education within Green University...It was recognised in the faculty that there was a missing link in the education of students in management studies. That missing link was the link to the private sector because students were always being told when they applied to the private sector that they didn’t have the experience. The Faculty was looking for that linkage” (#3 Pub Director, Apple).
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7.3.3 Compelling Private-Sector Purpose and Control

At the time of the establishment of the business school, Arden was facing a period of protracted economic recession. Business leaders recognised that there was a talent gap and a dearth of senior managers who could lead the local development and regional expansion of their businesses (Table 29). The various accounts of actors’ involvement in the start-up of Apple illustrate the widely felt need of the private sector in Arden. Additionally, at least one private company had started in-company corporate training and this evolved into an affiliated university.

The purpose of providing relevant education and creating leaders for the society of Arden was a laudable objective for both the University and the private sector. The need to expand their businesses and the dearth of management talent, along with the

differences in ideology of the private sector and Green University, led the private-sector to seek the partnership with the University and control of the PPP. While this strategic alliance had the overall purpose of development, it appeared to directly answer to the needs of the private sector. The motivation for the PPP was related to needs at the level of the firm and the competitiveness of each institution, rather than the broad developmental purpose as in the case of Gerran Business School. The articulation of the purpose at the level of the firm appeared to establish a competitive relationship from the time of establishment of the PPP. Whilst both organisations held the shared purpose of producing relevant graduates who could lead the growth and internationalisation of organisations, articulation of the purpose at the level of the firm propelled a competitive relationship that militated against the development of shared purpose and collaboration aimed at contributing to the success of the PPP.

Table 29: Compelling Private Sector Purpose


Private	“[Private-sector actor] went to him and [University actor] said ‘well if you guys are prepared to pay for it you getting what you want’ (#1 Priv Director, Apple).
Public-Private	“The self-interesting part from the point of view, from the private sector, was to make sure that they had an institution that could develop managers that could hold their own in a changing world.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple).

Both partners agreed there was a disconnect between the programmes of Green University and the needs of the private sector, and it was also agreed, on a macro level, that Green University and the private sector were engaged in this arrangement for the wider interest of the country and its people. The University and the private sector entered into an affiliation agreement in which the business school was established as a non-profit PPP in Arden with a board of directors to control the organisation. Shared purpose did not supersede the relationship as in Gerran (Case Proposition 7), but the private sector’s interests and ideology appeared to dominate.

7.3.3.1 Private-Sector Led Initiative at Establishment

The business school was established with the funding of the private sector in Arden. The social network of actors involved in the establishment of the business school is presented in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Apple



The relational ties between the protagonists involved in the start-up of Apple Business School included professional relationships, institutional competitors in market rivalry, acquaintances and one family relationship. The social network included nine private-sector actors and two university actors. One university actor had a family tie to a private sector actor in the network and this could have contributed to the decision to establish the school. The relational embeddedness and dense private sector network that included colleagues and rivals demonstrated the extent to which the private sector as a whole was affected by scarce talent. Financing was provided by five private sector actors in the network, from rival banks and conglomerates, and one manufacturer with collegial ties to one central actor in the network. Actors who provided financing are depicted by heavy coloured lines around the nodes. All names in the network are fictitious.

One of the leading social network researchers described the genesis of social network theories and analyses as residing in one of the most potent ideas in the social sciences which is "...the notion that individuals are embedded in thick webs of social relations and interactions" (Borgatti et al., 2009, p.892). The social interactions and relations that exemplify these networks tend to be adopted by network members (ibid.). In this context in which diverse actors in professional relationships provided funding, and considering the negative perceptions of Green University with respect to business education, the private sector insisted on control of the organisation. This was reflected in the Affiliation Agreement which gave control to the private sector by a majority representation on the Board of Directors.

7.4 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE PPP AT APPLE

7.4.1 Purpose of the PPP: Strategic Entrepreneurial Organisation

The University did not express the need for a separate organisation to address private sector needs. University actors believed that the PPP required the legitimacy of the University in order to offer its programmes. They also acknowledged that the brand of the University was well-established but that the purpose and uniqueness of the programmes of the PPP required that Apple establish its own brand, separate from the University. Private-sector actors, however, cited other reasons for the PPP to be established as a separate organisation, including the need to remove itself from the bureaucracy of the University. Further, private-sector actors held the view that they only needed the University as an accrediting and legitimising agency. The private sector recognised the need for 'cognitive legitimacy' of the new organisational form and Green University in Arden served that purpose (Bitektine, 2011). The view expressed by one respondent that "*...programmes need to be blessed by the university; it could be any university*" (#2 Priv Director, Apple) indicated the confidence the private sector had in their own ability to establish and lead the academic institution as a PPP. Moreover, one University director acknowledged that the need for a separate institution was to brand the business school as an organisation that was distinct and apart from the University (Table 30). Private-sector opinion was that they needed to control and direct the organisation and this factor appeared to be the reason for the relationship challenges between the private sector and University actors in the governance structure.

Table 30: Need for a Separate PPP Organisation

Public	<p>“But it didn’t want to be controlled by the bureaucracy of Green, which would retard its growth and its development and its reflexiveness and so on. So it’s something like England in the EU, one foot in and one foot out.” (#2 Pub Staff, Green Univ, Arden)</p> <p>“...we’ve inherited a seriously British attitude to bureaucracy and to the way in which a firm operates.” (#1 Pub Staff, Green Univ, Arden)</p>
Public-Private	<p>“...university saw the need as well to create an institution that could be flexible and agile enough to be more responsive perhaps, than the rest of the university which was seen earlier as sort of not as connected as it needed to be with the society as a whole.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple)</p>
Private	<p>“..., perhaps because of the latent opposition in the university anyway, to things related to business and management, would be better accomplished by setting up a separate structure.” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple)</p>

The need for the endorsement of the relationship by Green University indicated that the University was a source of ‘cognitive legitimacy’ but its brand was not a resource with respect to the ‘socio-political legitimacy’ of the business school as a separate entrepreneurial organisation. The extent to which Green University was not seen as a source of ‘technical’ support to the business school threatened the legitimacy of the University as an institution relevant to business development in Arden. This finding corroborates the finding in the Gerran case that ‘cognitive legitimacy’ is a necessary precursor to ‘socio-political legitimacy’ but contradicts the finding that embeddedness in the University institution engenders respect and promotion of cognitive legitimacy of the PPP (Case Proposition 3). Loss of respect suggests that cognitive legitimacy was attained mainly through the use of Green University’s brand.

7.4.2 Private-sector control: voluntary game in a competitive environment

7.4.2.1 Motivation for Control

The question of control of a new entity involving public and private partners is a critical one that shapes the outlook and operations of the entity. Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996, p.142) note that, in network organizations “...control is not exercised in the form of hierarchical authority” but rather in terms of “...relationships between relative equals”. In the case of Apple Business School, there appeared to be unequal positioning of partners and control by the private sector was evident.

The private sector retained control and direction of the organisation through its majority on the Board of Directors. One respondent explained that the private sector actors held the opinion that the organisation must be managed as a business if it were to succeed and achieve the aims of the private sector. He indicated that they:

“...felt at the time that if it were not private sector responsive-driven and led, that it would become just another academic institution and they wanted to walk that thin line between academic creditability and economic responsiveness.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple)

The non-profit legal form of the organisation placed ownership with the ‘cause’ of business education but the private sector felt private-sector control of the PPP was critical to its success. The motivation to lead and execute it however appeared to be linked to the reputation of the business leaders. While there was no financial gain for any director, public or private, the motivation of the private sector could not be attributed to moral codes as in the case of non-profits (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), given the practicality of the need for leaders to facilitate their success. Motivation to control the organisation appeared to be linked to several factors including private-sector actors’ success and visibility in the business environment of Arden, and the need to protect their reputation. One director indicated that he had put his name there “*and don’t want it spoilt*” (#3 Priv Director, Apple). Other corporate members noted that there was a return on their investment of time through recognition and attainment of the highest levels of self-esteem from their involvement in the development of the business school. The contribution to country development was important in that they were able to stand out and be recognized for their contribution to a small developing economy.

The impetus for engagement in the PPP on the part of the University was quite different. The University, in the early years, experienced financial cuts and sought the support of the private sector through the PPP. In addition, there was the opportunity to understand the needs of the private sector and build a relationship in the national interest. Further, there was some intention to achieve transfer of learning and one respondent indicated:

“...for me, by working with the private sector in the establishment of the school it could have given Green University a chance to reflect on its own processes and to see how it can get as nimble as the private sector.” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple).

In the case of Apple Business School, however, business was more strongly vested in the relationship and the University's purpose was not achieved under private-sector control. In fact, the "facilitating" role of the University, established in the Affiliation Agreement, was maintained only through the mechanism for appointing directors from the University to the Board of the School by virtue of position. The role of providing guidance with respect to programmes was not executed to meet the expectations of the private-sector directors and this also resulted in conflict.

7.4.2.2 Contrasting 'Moral Syndromes' and University Protectionism

Apple Business School was oriented as a strategic entrepreneurial organisation that viewed revenue generation and growth as critical to its success (Mintzberg, 1973). The financial arrangements with Green University, Arden, included only payment for administrative services provided to Apple. In this context, Apple expanded over the years and University directors became increasingly apprehensive about the focus on revenue generation and differences in the organisational form between Apple and the University. In fact, the situation was reflective of the overall difficulty of the private and public sectors to meet on common ground and supportive of the stance by Jacobs (1992, p.32) who described the public and private domain as two ethical systems with different "moral syndromes". The public domain is characterized by the 'guardian syndrome', the private domain by the 'commercial syndrome' (ibid.). Although the PPP represented a quasi-market in the relationship between the University and the private sector, its operations differed from the conceptualisation of the quasi-market movement as "...a set of arrangements which had more in common with models of market socialism than with free market capitalism" (Bartlett et al., 1998a, p.1). The outlook of Apple as more of a free market capitalist resulted in an increasing response by the University as a competitor to 'protect' the society from what was perceived as private interest and to regain credibility in the field of business education. One respondent commented on the reason for the apparent opposition from the University directors and concluded that:

"They (are) acting in self-interest. And it has to be that. It can't be that they just rabidly opposed; they come in the Boardroom and go mad! It has to be that it is more beneficial to them to oppose the business school than to support it" (#6 Priv KOA, Apple).

Despite the powerfully moral and relevant overarching purpose for the University, it appeared that the perceived needs were more connected to the response of the University to engage in a ‘franchising’ arrangement and the most senior executives in the private sector of Arden, to volunteer their time and expertise to establish and operate a business school. The governance model, embodied in the Memorandum and Articles of Association, clearly outlined the contribution and role of Green University as a ‘facilitating’ agent for the business school but was fairly silent on the expectations of the business sector except to state that the institution “is responsible for meeting its expenses” (Affiliation Agreement) and granting autonomy and control to the private sector to operate the institution (Table 31).

Table 31: Purpose of a PPP Governance Structure


Public	<p>“Well, it’s really to make sure in the way forward in strategic thinking, strategic plan(ning) that we take cognizance of the concerns of the private sector” (#1 Pub Director, Apple).</p> <p>“There may have also been reasons associated with how the institution is going to be funded... I think in all of this business would like a more business-like approach!” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple).</p>
Public-Private	<p>“...sometimes the private sector can be very myopic in its very own interest or can be very narrow on a particular ...So I feel that you need that mix and you need also the creative tension effectively managed to get the creative output out of an institution like Apple” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple).</p>
Private	<p>“I think that they wanted an MBA programme that was run...they wanted a product that would suit their purposes. Not a product that made academic sense to a bunch of academics but wasn’t applicable to what they needed” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple).</p>

It would appear that in this contractual arrangement, located between markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1991; Thorelli, 1986) the issue of control positioned the University directors to adopt a more ‘protectionist’ stance, seeking to safeguard the University’s domain of academic knowledge and academic quality. Although the roles of the University outlined in the Memorandum were consistent with their capabilities (Leiblein, 2003), there was tension between the University and the private sector with respect to the quality of programmes and the strategic management of the business school. The absence of a shared alliance strategy was evident (Gomes-Casseres, 1998) and the loose coupling of the organisations in a competitive arrangement where one legitimises the other established a relationship where the success of one resulted in the loss of legitimacy to the other. This was further demonstrated in the contribution of actors to the strategic actions of the school discussed later in this case report.

7.4.2.3 Dense Network of Private-Sector Support to Key Organisational Actors

At Apple Business School, KOAKOAs were responsible for management and decision-making, though the Board of Directors held overall responsibility for the strategic development of the business school. The network of KOAs was mapped to determine the density of public and private sector support for key decision makers.

Figure 14: Social Network of Key Organisational Actors at Apple



The network of KOAs revealed a high degree of “node homogeneity” which refers to “...the similarity of actors with respect to behaviours or internal structures” (Borgatti et al., 2009, p.894). KOAs held professional ties to more private-sector directors than to University directors. In the case of University KOAs, they relied on other KOAs as well, which was consistent with the boundary spanning role of University KOAs in their relationship with Apple. The dense network of private-sector support suggested that the business school was dominated by private sector beliefs and practices, similar to the network of actors who were instrumental in establishing the business school. This suggested that the network, which was started as an accretion of professional relationships, sustained its private sector identity throughout its evolution. This is consistent with the findings of Granovetter (1992, p.9) that “...economic institutions begin as accretions of activity patterns around personal networks. Their structure

reflects that of the networks, and even when those are no longer in place, the institutions take on a life of their own that limits the forms future ones can take. They become ‘locked in’”(author’s quotation marks). While economic conditions restrict what are the possibilities, social networks determine what actually occurs and outcomes may differ if the social structure is different (ibid.). This finding differs from that of the Gerran case where the social network morphed based on purpose and practical problems at any point in time. The factor that appeared to cause the difference was control by the private sector and the organisational identity of the business school as a corporate organisation, governed by a social network of private actors and corporate governance principles.

7.4.2.4 Separation of Management and Ownership in Corporate Governance

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) differ in many ways including structure, governance and conditions that lead to their creation (Jarillo 1988; Powell, 1990). The choice of governance structure was governed by the rules of the Affiliation Agreement that gave control to the private sector. The Board of Directors established principles of corporate governance which reflected their competences and ‘moral syndrome’. The participation of the University was governed by the rules of the Affiliation Agreement which defined participants at the apex of the hierarchical system of the University’s organisational structure. In the PPP, the monitoring of partner contribution in the process of governance was related to the aim and purpose of the alliance (e.g. Albers, 2005). The incentives for the alliance resided in the attainment of its purpose but did not further define participation incentives at the level of the firm for either partner. The only safeguard against opportunistic behaviour (Dyer et al., 2001) was the legal agreement to dissolve the alliance in situations of irresolvable conflicts (Affiliation Agreement, 2003, p.3).

The Board of Directors monitored the brand and controlled the school’s development and evolution through three main mechanisms. The first was the focus on profitability and management of the Board of Directors by the principles of private management and financial accountability; the second was the selection, monitoring and support of the school’s leadership and, the third was the monitoring of the quality of graduates entering the workplace. It appeared that the Board of Directors depended on the leadership to craft and defend the viability of the organisational strategy, referencing

and benchmarking against the strategic actions of global institutions. This separation of management and ownership with the oversight of the Board of Directors appeared to be a successful model for Apple (Table 32).

Table 32: Governance Strategy and Leadership at Apple

Public	“...without compromising the quality of the university’s output because Apple’s graduates are first and foremost graduates of Green. I want to re-emphasize that (#1 Pub KOA, Apple).
Public-Private	“I took a lot of high risks with Apple and I basically tried to do things that were very creative and innovative” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple).
Private	<p>“And of course we been through many executive directors in this time, ...[Name of KOA] and so forth and so on and I think once more again today we have an excellent man...He’s full of ideas and is going to move it to another level, which is what I think is going to happen.” (#3 Priv Director, Apple).</p> <p>“...forget the finances, because we are so solid financially you don’t have to worry about that, what was needed was an executive with a lot of future in him, and that he has” (#3 Priv Director, Apple).</p> <p>“What could happen down the road that I can’t think of now. Financial crisis, we’re in Arden, the economy and so on. But education is something that would always be necessary, always. And what we got to do and this guy understands it, is quality, quality, quality. Even if we have a smaller number of people we got to have high quality students coming out of there that is the key to the whole thing, and if he keeps raising the quality as he’s doing, that’s the best guarantee of the future”</p>

Public sector participation in this case, in the role of monitors of curriculum quality, would have created tensions at the level of the Board of Directors. The political embeddedness of university actors in internal politics and competitiveness between both institutions was evident in the responses of actors. It was evident that the private sector members of the Board were operating in a familiar environment and control of the School from their perspective meant running a good business of postgraduate business education. In the relationship between the private and public sectors, there was a “connection-based purpose” but the “clarity of purpose” for the university was not evident (Austin, 2000).

The density of their sub-alter networks appeared to contribute to their collaborative actions in the interest of the School. This is in contrast with the conception of Rose Coser (1975) cited in Granovetter (1985, p.204) that “...there may be an inherent *weakness in strong ties*” (Coser’s italics). It would appear that the strong ties of the professional networks of KOA to private sector partners resulted in strong ties to the strategy of the private sector to the organisation. Further, it may be construed that the

weak ties between public and private partners drove strong ties among directors within their own sector. This appeared to connect strongly to the emergent strategic actions of the business school. While the pattern of tie connections did not offer useful information flows (Gulati, 1998) it appeared to drive the development of strong ties and sub-group cohesion among private actors, leading to purposive action towards organisational strategy. This is consistent with the proposition of network theories that emphasize structure and contend that the optimal structural design is contingent on the actions that the structure seeks to facilitate (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).

7.4.3 Relational Trust, Empowerment and Disempowerment through Curriculum Roles

The alliance between the University and the private sector resulted in the creation of a new organisation which was loosely coupled to the University as its parent institution and the private sector (Orton and Weick, 1990; March and Olsen, 1975; Glassman, 1973). The University actors saw their role as providing guidance with respect to the curriculum, having many years of experience with curriculum design and evaluation. They also saw their role as guiding Apple to build an institution that demonstrated academic values through research, faculty development and programme quality. This was an empowering role of the University in the ‘products’ of Apple. One respondent noted:

“Well it is important that Green University’s persons are on the Board. It is Green University’s programmes and we are there to see that the programmes are *of Green University quality*” (#5 Pub KOA, Apple).

The private-sector actors however, considered the role of the University to be a facilitator of programme approval and programme administration. They did not trust the University to design the programmes they required to solve their management challenges. Programme design and quality of delivery resided with the PPP and the early separation and distinctiveness of Apple’s programmes and implementation strategy resulted in apprehension about quality on the part of the University. Although some University actors recognised the importance of having business leaders as an integral part of curriculum delivery, this was still experimental from their perspective and, as such, they continued to be apprehensive about curriculum quality. The control of ‘product’ quality and the positioning of the University as an administrative facilitator

of programme approval would have placed them in a disempowered role with respect to the curriculum and added to the relationship challenges between public and private actors on the Board of Directors. The trust between actor sub-groups with respect to the curriculum was challenged and conceptions of quality varied. While they both subscribed to the importance of a high quality programme, they held opposing opinions about the nature of the programme and the process for ensuring quality.

The gap between theory and practice was seen as ideological and this placed a significant strain on the relationship as it challenged the technical legitimacy (Brown, 2008) of the University as a source of relevant business knowledge. Respondents noted:

“You see Green University’s story is that government signs a check and rights everything” (#2 Priv Director, Apple).

“Yes, and what’s important with the business acumen is an eye for running a balance sheet and a profit and loss account, university people haven’t got a clue! ...So yes we lecture this and lecture that and lecture the other and now we feel lovely and at the end of the day one would get a wonderful reputation for some esoteric subject but it won’t do the bottom line any good and it really would not be a building block for the school for the future! It would not!” (#2 Priv Director, Apple).

The University’s role in quality assurance appeared to conflict with their fiduciary responsibilities on the Board of Directors to contribute to the growth strategy of the School. There was antagonism over the time taken for approvals and the fact that the University did not appear to be guiding and facilitating the process in their actions outside of the Board of Directors. This also contributed to the deepening of conflicts and division between the public and private-sector partners in the PPP.

7.4.4 Boundary Spanning Based on Conflict Management

The PPP was created out of a lack of trust in the University to deliver a relevant business education. It was also established as a separate institution to isolate its processes from the inflexibility and other inefficiencies of the bureaucratic co-ordinating system of the University. In so doing, the PPP evolved a corporate governance strategy and private sector control of the new organisation.

“The private sector wanted to take control and stay in control of the thing was because they felt the university was irrelevant and they don’t know how to handle money, they don’t know how to run a business so

what I think (University protagonist) was trying to do was drive greater relevance into the University system” (#6 Priv KOA, Apple).

Private-sector actors appeared to be cognitively and culturally embedded (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Dequech, 2003) in the rules of the practice of business whereas University actors were similarly embedded in the institutional rules of the University institution. The different expectations of each actor appeared to be related to ownership of the entity. This created tensions that demanded boundary spanning activities by actors in the appropriate role positions within the governance of the PPP (Baker, 2008; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002; Noble and Jones, 2006).

Table 33: Expectations of the Other and Role Expectations

Public	<p>“The private sector is expected to provide expertise and guidance with respect to the needs of the financial sector” (#5 Pub KOA, Apple).</p> <p>“(Name) was spectacularly ineffective as (boundary spanning role) and spent so long sitting on the fence he must have been welded to it. A stronger (role) might have been able to put a stop to the constant squabbles between the Green University and the private sector directors” (#7 Pub KOA, Apple).</p>
Public-Private	<p>“The business school has had a series of bad (Boundary spanners) (#6 Priv KOA, Apple).</p>
Private	<p>“New programmes have to be approved by the university and very often it’s just blocked and stopped which just takes time. What I think I should get done in a month or two months or three months for the most, might take a year and that I think is a, that’s a negative really” (#3 Priv Director, Apple).</p>

The lack of clarity with regards to ownership, control of the organisation by the private sector and the increasing disempowerment of the University actors in the competitive space led to conflict in the relationship (Table 34).

Table 34: Respondents' Views on Conflict at Apple

Public	“I would say that there is one challenging area in this relationship and it has to do with what could be possibly seen as territorial interest, what could be seen as competition becoming an issue” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple).
Private	<p>“There is no way ever, ever that the school would be subjugated to the bureaucracy of the university in a manner that was illogical and unreasonable” (#1 Priv Director, Apple).</p> <p>“I think a certain level of jealousy existed but that is more because the business school had its own autonomy and its own funds” (#1 Priv Director, Apple).</p> <p>“No, protection. I mean a fella like ... (name), all he concerned is how he can jam anything and protect the university” (#2 Priv Director, Apple).</p>
Participant Observation	“I observed a confrontation between a University Director and KOA about the organisational relationship between Green and Apple. The conflict escalated but they came to the conclusion that the relationship was not clear and needs to be clarified, as this was affecting the decisions that needed to be taken and the relationship between the public and private sector Directors” (Memo - Participant observation)

Actors in boundary spanning roles appeared to manage the interaction space at the Board of Directors in a manner that recognised members of the Board as “...a board of true captains, whether it’s from industry or academia” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). The management of the Board of Directors was executed in “...such a way as to not intensify conflict, (and) not inhibit the growth and development of the institution (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). As such, the management of conflict and relationships appeared to be the focus of boundary spanning activities at the level of governance and the system was co-ordinated by respect for individuals, rather than institutional trust. In this context, the management of the relationship was approached from the perspective of constraints rather than opportunities which militated against boundary spanners seeking opportunities for leveraging the talents of each other for product and market innovation in the interest of both institutions. Further, it appeared that the boundary spanning activities designed to reduce conflict at the level of the Board of Directors, negatively affected the operations of the business school and led to lack of confidence in the actors in boundary spanning roles and the value created through boundary spanning activities (Table 35).

Table 35: Evidence of Boundary Spanning Based on Relationships at Apple

Public-Private	“...so basically I sort of presided over the board in such a way as to not intensify conflict, not inhibit the growth and development of the institution, but I was very concerned about quality in the institution” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple).
Private	“I think the whole thing is a bureaucracy, to be very frank, it’s a bureaucracy. Fortunately (Name) is a very good (boundary spanner) and a very good man ... But he has to ...listen to his cohorts from the university and so forth and so on because he’s got to deal with them all the time. But he has his heart in the right place and he’s very knowledgeable and I think a good (boundary spanner)” (#3 Priv Director, Apple).

The findings advance the conclusion of Noble and Jones (2006) that a strategy of boundary spanning in PPPs is required and it is proposed that the strategy must address the different levels of the organisation and identify roles and activities of boundary spanners. This study further suggests that the boundary spanning strategy should address opportunities, as opposed to addressing challenges as was advanced by Noble and Jones (2006). The benefits of boundary spanning appear to emanate from the creation of collaborative mechanisms between the parent institutions and the PPP so that they create value for all organisations throughout the evolution of the PPP.

7.5 STRATEGY AND LEGITIMACY

7.5.1 Private-Sector Cognitive Social Structure


The cognitive social structure of the social network of actors in the PPP governance arrangement was determined using two social networks. The first was the overall perception of contribution of actor sub-groups to the development of the business school (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance at Apple

Colour code	Public	Private	Public-private	
Respondent	1	2	3	4
Respondent 1				
Respondent 2				
Respondent 3				
Respondent 4				
Respondent 5				
Respondent 6				
Respondent 7				
Respondent 8				
Respondent 9				
Respondent 10				
Respondent 11				

The second was the contribution of actor sub-groups to particular strategies of the business school (Figure 16).

Figure 16: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions at Apple



7.5.1.1 Dense Network of Private-Sector Contribution

The social network in Figure 15 indicated that both actor subgroups recognised the dominance of private-sector contribution in the PPP governance mechanism. This was consistent with the level of private-sector control in the PPP described earlier in the report. The social network in Figure 16 demonstrated the engagement of both subgroups with the strategies that enhanced the ‘cognitive legitimacy’ and ‘socio-political’ legitimacy of the PPP. The University contribution, however, was focused mainly on activities related to the cognitive legitimacy of the business school; the private-sector contribution appeared to be equally focused on cognitive and socio-political legitimacy.

The cognitive social structure demonstrated the importance of both sub-groups at the strategic level of the organisation but also provided evidence that the University contribution related to operational and quality assurance activities. This is consistent with the conclusions arrived at in the case of Gerran Business School with respect to the levels at which the contribution of University actors in the PPP arrangement provides most value. Another significant finding from the cognitive social structure of the network was the absence of contribution of directors from both actor subgroups with respect to five out of nine key strategies of the business school aimed at attaining socio-political legitimacy. This suggested that the advancement of the business school in respect of stakeholder judgment as a strategic entrepreneurial organisation was more directly related to the leadership and management of the organisation.

7.5.2 Inside-Out Strategy and Leadership

Apple Business School used an inside out strategy of internationalisation to establish its legitimacy from its inception (Human and Provan, 2000). The importance of international activities and benchmarks was cited by all the private sector directors who noted that it was important “...to try to build international alliances and build an international reputation” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). In addition, the Board of Directors recognized that international accreditation would serve to position the School as a legitimate and high quality player and the decision was taken to attain international accreditation (Minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, May 9, 2000). The University directors’ opinions on this strategic direction of the School were not evident in the research but this would have further estranged the partners as the University did not seek international accreditation for its social science programmes. Apple’s inside-out strategy in which it built a portfolio of products and strategic actions to enhance its socio-political legitimacy served to position the organisation as a strategic entrepreneurial organisation in Arden (Table 36).

Table 36: Inside Out Strategy and Leadership at Apple

Public	“Well it’s always to guide the strategic direction of the entity” (#1 Pub Director, Apple).
Public-Private	“I didn’t have the means at that time to make it as the means of business creation because of the way it was developed, it could not have emerged as a facilitator of entrepreneurship in that way because in a sense it had to find itself entrepreneurly first and to win respect in the market place. So the first thing was to position it at the centre of business ideas, business thinking, business action” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple).
Private	“These are serious people who have serious responsibilities and have serious influence. Whether we use the influence, or have cause to use the influence or not, they are there and available to us moving forward” (#2 Priv Director, Apple).

It appeared that the strategic direction of the organisation was dependent on its leadership. The private sector alluded to this and made several references to the emphasis placed on having *‘the right man’* to lead the PPP (#3 Priv Director, Apple). Leadership was one of the main strategies adopted by the Board of Directors as a means of ensuring quality in the organisation. The evolution of the business school, however, was defined by the disruptions and progress achieved within the bounded periods of service of leaders.

This study did not address issues of individual leadership and the emphasis on leadership presents an opportunity for further research to determine how this factor influences PPP performance. The selection of persons to the Board of Directors was also a strategy used to gain legitimacy in the context of Arden. Whilst one of the roles of the private sector was to ‘open the doors’, this was seen to be at the level of strategy execution rather than the student recruitment model observed at Rotter Business School. Selection of directors from the private sector was based on their visibility and the business school was governed by individuals from the highest echelons of the private sector hierarchy. This served to instil confidence in the technical legitimacy of the activities of the business school within the private sector of Arden (Suchman, 1995; Brown, 2001).

7.6 CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS

From the purpose and structure of the PPP, it appeared that the motivation for sustained private-sector participation in the non-profit entity was located at the firm level in which private-sector actors demonstrated group identity in an ecology of games in

strategic decision-making (Bacharach et al., 2006). Though they articulated the overarching purpose of contribution to country and operated Apple through voluntary contribution, it appeared that in a dense network of powerful private sector leaders they could not risk failure in an activity at which they were known to be masters – the generation of revenue and operation of a business. Despite not having financial returns, they appeared to play with finance, without risk, in a game that was all too familiar to them. This is referred to by this researcher as “voluntary business game”, a game played by the private sector, defined by the rules of the private sector, but with no personal financial return or risk. The game is facilitated by the social network of similar actors in which personal legitimacy is at stake. It is also propelled by the overall network of public-private structure and relations. The thesis of “voluntary business game” is extrapolated from the framework used by Klijn and Teisman (2005) to study PPPs in Europe; the framework “...sees policy processes as a series of games (where) the multiplicity of actors and their various...perceptions, interests and strategies, make these games complex” (Klijn and Teisman, 2005, p.139).

7.7 CASE CONCLUSION: PPP SUCCESS AS A STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANISATION

In this case it was found that the composition and structure of the PPP governance arrangement resulted in the minimisation of the role of the University and maximisation of the role of the private sector. Although the overall purpose of contributing to the development of talent for the private sector and the country’s development was stated by both actor sub-groups, the actions of the public and private sector members on the Board and within the ambit of the governance arrangements were often at odds. As such, the attainment of the goals of one set of actors resulted in the de-legitimising of the other.

There was distinct segregation of the social networks of University and private sector directors underpinned by collegiality and sectoral philosophies and motivated by the strength of relational networks. Although the performance of the School continued to be strong, it was achieved at the expense of the legitimacy of the University through a relationship that was often in conflict, rather than trust. The success of this PPP was reflected in its consistent attainment of financial goals and increasing legitimacy in the

country of Arden. Whilst this challenged the University in a closed system, positioned as a competitor, it provided opportunities for both the University and the PPP to attain the broader purpose of national and regional competitiveness. The PPP engaged both the University and the private sector, and they were both influenced by the PPP and by each other. The University's continued engagement with the PPP appeared to be linked to the recognition of the value of the business school. Disengagement from the partnership was also prevented by the possible threat to the University as it would be seen as contrary to its *raison d'être* which is developmental, a claim it held in common with the business school which sought "...to develop the international competitiveness of people and organisations" (*Mission Statement, Apple*).

7.8 SUMMARY OF CASE FINDINGS

The following are the findings of this case with respect to the functioning and legitimacy of the PPP in its environment:

1. Granovetter (1992) claimed that "...stable economic institutions begin as accretions of activity patterns around personal networks" (p.9). It appeared that the growth and development of Apple was reflected in the trajectory created by the social network of prior ties which influenced its "...evolutionary path, and their ultimate success" (Gulati, 1998, p.294). This contrasts with the findings at Gerran and was explained by factors that included the density of the private sector network of actors, control of the PPP by the private sector and the dense network of business leaders in the PPP governance mechanism. This contrast is explained by the difference of ownership, purpose and control of the PPP as a voluntary organisation. Private actors in control experienced contagion in dense networks and engaged in 'voluntary monopoly' which optimised private ideology and led to the success of the business school.
2. Clarity and consistency of actions related to the larger purpose were not achieved and there was loss of legitimacy and value for the University. Though strategic control was held by the private sector, the University maintained the role of quality assurance and sought control through their oversight of academic programmes. This orientation to their role defined their purpose and placed them in a position where the tensions of processes in the University's efforts to

control quality negatively affected the relationship. Control and dominance by the private sector, coupled with weak boundary spanners and boundary spanning focused on managing conflict, appeared to be the factor that limited and distorted the nature of University involvement at Apple. This contrasted with the findings at Gerran where University participation was constrained by the space of interaction on the Board of Directors (Case Proposition 4).

3. Financial accountability and private control within the firm appeared to be the main factors that explain the success of the PPP in a competitive environment. In the governance arrangement, private-sector actors viewed accountability as attainment of competitive purpose (Acar and Robertson, 2004; Acar et al., 2008). This was the antithesis of the virtue of protectionism adopted by University members in the context where purpose was neither clear nor shared.
4. Boundary spanning has particular challenges at the governance and management levels where they conflict with each other. Boundary spanning, envisaged as a political role in the PPP, weakens the emergence of opportunities for product and market development involving both institutions. The PPP requires a boundary spanning strategy that addresses the different levels of the organisation and identifies roles and activities of boundary spanners. The boundary spanning strategy should address opportunities, as opposed to the strategy of addressing challenges advanced by Noble and Jones (2006). The benefits of boundary spanning appear to emanate from the creation of collaborative mechanisms between the parent institutions and the PPP so that they create value for all organisations throughout the evolution of the PPP.

CHAPTER 8: CASE ANALYSIS - ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL

8.0 INTRODUCTION

This case distils the findings with regard to the factors that influence the relationship between the public and private partners in the governance of Rotter School of Business, the third business school established by Green University. In the analysis, theoretical propositions and explanations derived from the other two cases are compared and contrasted with the findings in this case. In this way, the theoretical propositions of PPP success in business schools in small, developing countries are challenged or made more robust. In this case, respondents were mainly from the private sector. Managers of the business school were included as respondents as they sat on the Board of Directors. They were classified as private KOAs because they held responsibility for the corporate success of the business school. The analysis that follows discusses events, where appropriate, in two generational time periods (Pfeffer, 1992) defined as ‘the early years,’ from establishment to about 2005, and ‘current’ which is marked by the entry of the new Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences into the University and the PPP governance arrangement. The two generational time periods are considered significant to the analysis as the entry of the new Dean resulted in a discernible shift in the relationship between the University and the business school (Joshi et al., 2010).

8.1 IMPACT OF THE CONTEXT OF ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL ON THE PPP: ROTTERDAM

8.1.1 Background to Rotterdam

Rotterdam is one of the most prosperous and developed Caribbean islands. The country ranks in the top 50 countries on the Global Competitiveness Index Ranking 2010-2011 compared with Arden at 41 points and Gerrantown at 52 points lower than Rotterdam (World Economic Forum, 2010). The country has the third highest rank of the Western Hemisphere on the Human Development Index, after the United States and Canada. The country is a former British colony and gained independence from Britain in 1962. It is a ‘Commonwealth realm’ with Queen Elizabeth II as its monarch and head of state and a prime minister as the head of government (BBC, 2011a). It is a centre for financial services and an attractive tourist destination. GNI per capita is estimated to be

\$12,196 or more (World Bank, 2010). The territories of the sub-region provide a market for business in Rotterdam.

8.1.2 A Hub for Regional Co-Operation

The geographic location and advanced state of development of Rotterdam within the region positioned it as a centre of activity for the sub-region within CARICOM. The institutions of Rotterdam, including Green University and Rotter School of Business, included the countries in the sub-region within the bounded space of their market. Public and private actors viewed this as both a constraint and an opportunity. University actors viewed the geographic dispersion and small size of the market as a logistical constraint with respect to programme delivery. Private sector actors acknowledged these factors as a constraint to business but endorsed them as an opportunity for regional integration. The availability of air-travel around the region and to the hub facilitated the thrust for regional integration and the private sector directors saw this as an opportunity for developing networks of people and increasing the availability of talent. The embeddedness of both institutions, Rotter School of Business and Green University, Rotterdam within the broad purpose of regional integration influenced the structure and activities of the Board of Directors and the purpose, structure and strategy of the business school. Ultimately, it influenced the legitimacy of Rotter Business School in Rotterdam and the sub-region (Table 37).

Table 37: A Hub for Regional Co-Operation at Rotter

Public	“I think that the opportunities would be that we are close to the needs. You are not a great distance from your clients ...” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter).
Private	<p>“Geographically it is a challenge. In the earlier years we were offering the programmes as face to face and especially in the masters level programme people came here...” (#3 KOA, Rotter).</p> <p>“Rotterdam is a hub, I think Rotterdam is well suited because you had access to the university, to the university library, to the registrar, to all the things that you needed and that’s why the falling into the Rotter School of Business was done with tremendous ease” (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter).</p>

8.1.3 The Private Sector and Governments of the Region

Within the region, the development status of the private sector was related to the overall economic position of each country. Arden was considered to have the most aggressive corporate entities and the actors in this country were involved in establishing facilitating mechanisms for regional trade. There was therefore some perception of unfair advantage for Arden’s business sector which leveraged the opportunities available for regional trade. In the climate of suspicion, collaborative efforts were further constrained. Governments of the region did not commit strongly to regional unification and viewed the private sector as either insufficiently developed to contribute to the economic and development success of the region or, in the case of large corporate entities, it was believed actors were demonstrating opportunistic behaviours. In this context of mutual distrust and lack of confidence between the private sector and government, private sector agencies, many of which were involved in the establishment of Rotter Business School, viewed their facilitating roles as significant to the process of economic development. Further, collaboration amongst the business schools was also affected by this overall regional climate (Table 38).

Table 38: Segregation with Lack of Government Commitment and Private Sector Capability

Private	<p>“Many of the national governments felt that the private sector as a whole...was not really interested in working in the field of economic and social development but they were interested in pursuing their own bottom line- profits... Also, in many cases, they didn’t think the private sector had the capability of making the kind of contribution” (#5 Priv Director, Rotter).</p> <p>On the private sector side there was a distrust of government and working with governments. All they trying to do is get hold of your books and tax you more or whatever” (#5 Priv Director, Rotter).</p>
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8.1.4 Constraints of Size and Competitive Environment

Several factors contributed to reducing the size of the market for Rotter Business School. Competition from other providers offering similar products was a factor that was noted by both public and private actors. In addition, Green University, in its quest to promote regional co-operation, established an informal agreement between the business schools which divided the regional market such that it confined Apple Business School to operate in Arden, Gerran Business School in Gerrantown, and

Rotter Business School in Rotterdam and the other countries of the sub-region. This constrained the operations of Rotter as it was faced with the dual challenge of a market geographically spread over several island territories with a smaller population size than the other two business schools of Green University. In considering possibilities for expansion, one respondent noted:

“...we also have to be mindful with the size of the market. The market could only manage but so much because we are not the only players in the market” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter).

University actors accepted the small size and geographic spread as a reality of their operations but private sector actors noted the debilitating effects on economies of scale and competitiveness of Rotter, which influenced the legitimacy of the School as a business (Table 39).

Table 39: Constraints of Size and Competitive Environment

Public	<p>“One of the issues too is competition in the local market and regionally as well.” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter)</p> <p>“Well I think size would be one of the constraints that, although we are not confined to operating only in Rotterdam and the Eastern Caribbean. We can stretch out to Belize and places like that too but I think once you go too far out of the OECS then you start to meet up: one Gerran and then Apple and therefore you start to become competitive there.” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter)</p>
Private	<p>“...they faced competition from offshore providers” (#1 Priv Director, Rotter).</p> <p>“I mean I have long argued that because we have this sort of ‘Entente-Cordiale’ with the other business schools in the Region, we don’t compete in each other’s territories. That is so ‘un-business’ it is hurting us.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter)</p>

8.1.5 A Culture of Respect and Partnership in Rotterdam

The development success of Rotterdam was attributed to several factors including “...a sound post-emancipation educational system, a stable political system, an effective trade union movement, positive benefits from the colonial administration, a dynamic private sector and an effective NGO movement” (CEPAL Naciones Unidas, 2010). These factors were identified by respondents in the interviews and noted as contributing factors to the success of the PPP. The cultural and historical embeddedness of the University was noted in the research process, indicated by the continued reference to persons by endowed titles, such as the title of knighthood, ‘Sir’ during interviews. It

was also noted in the number of pictures, as opposed to descriptive indicators of development, included in a book published on the history of the Campus. The texts, however, provided limited information to an outside researcher investigating the impact of the Campus on its resident territory. This phenomenon was also observed in respect of publications regarding the history of the other two campuses where there was little indication of the way in which the Campus influenced the strategy of development.

In a study of ‘social dialogue’ and the success of the Rotterdam model of tripartite partnership, Fashoyin (2001) concluded that the success of social partnership in the context could be attributed to the absence of major conflict in the history of the country, the commitment to partnership from all sectors evidenced by the presence of a single workers’ union and private sector agency, a stable political process founded on pluralistic democracy, a homogenous society with strong family ties and civil society that plays a strategic role in social dialogue where citizens “...know when Government is pursuing the overall good of the people” (Fashoyin, 2001, p.60). In this context, it was noted that “...social partnership agreements would have to maintain a certain degree of flexibility, enabling business to make appropriate responses to the changing competitive environment” (ibid.). The structure and functioning of the PPP appeared to be influenced by the context of successful social dialogue at the national level, through the involvement of representative organisations. The private sector noted the opportunity of the culture of Rotterdam for education organisations, including business education whereas University respondents did not suggest these factors as opportunities or constraints (Table 40).

Table 40: Education, Partnership and Development at Rotterdam

Public	<p>“...what should our priorities be in this current environment? Should it be to retain fundamentally that developmental function and to subsidize that or should we be looking to secure our future in financial terms by making sure we develop programmes that are going to meet the immediate needs of the market as we see them?” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter)</p>
Private	<p>“Rotterdam knows that without partnering of some kind, the standard of living is going to drop. Rotterdam relies on partnering to keep the standard of living, which is reasonably high, to where it is.” (#5 Priv Director, Rotter)</p> <p>Rotterdam has a tripartite thing, government, private sector (and) trade unions which is operated very well, its prevented major crises and major strikes in this region. And it still exists today. I think it needs to be strengthened a bit more, maybe adding the NGOs who now have a viable movement of some kind.” (#5 Priv Director, Rotter).</p> <p>“...whether it is governmental or non-governmental, people in this region have the same desire for educational development so the politics doesn’t affect us.” (#3 KOA, Rotter)</p>
Document	<p>The development success of the country “...has been due to a sound post-emancipation educational system, a stable political system, an effective trade union movement, positive benefits from the colonial administration, a dynamic private sector and an effective NGO movement.” (CEPAL Naciones Unidas, 2010)</p> <p>“It is widely acknowledged that the success in terms of political and social development is underpinned by a shared vision.... It is however not extensively documented exactly how these underpinnings were established and what organisational and institutional mechanisms were created to facilitate public-private dialogue.” (Ibid)</p>

8.2 THE CONTEXT OF GREEN UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM CAMPUS

The Rotterdam Campus of Green University was established as the College of Arts and Sciences in 1963. The campus was established by Royal Charter and reflected principles and ideologies similar to those of the other two campuses. Green University, Rotterdam, was established to serve the needs of a subset of the Caribbean region that included Rotterdam and nine other independent territories of the Caribbean region. From its establishment “...the campus sought to establish itself as part of the regional community (Fraser et al., 2003, p.2). Its first principal was “...dedicated to promoting the interests of the campus and committed to regionalism” (Fraser et al., 2003, p.3). The campus principal has noted that quality “...is best measured in terms of relevance” (Fraser et al., 2003, p.ix). The findings of the study confirmed the positioning of the University as an institution for regional integration.

8.2.1 University as an Institution for Regional Integration

Several regional institutions, including CARICOM, have been established to co-ordinate and promote co-operation among countries of the Caribbean region. The private sector of the region established the CAIC which functions on the basis of partnerships and claims that they "...are a supporting voice at the regional level for national representative bodies and seek to impact upon the development, growth and competitive positioning of the Caribbean business environment through partnership activities" (Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce, 2011). The location of Rotterdam in the midst of several other small developing countries of the region has placed the responsibility for regional co-operation on several institutions of Rotterdam. Green University, as a signatory to the treaties for regional co-operation, was a major institution with the responsibility for the unification of the region and held responsibility for formulating policies and performing functions in relation to co-operation and regional unification (CARICOM Secretariat). The Rotterdam Campus of Green University, geographically located in close proximity to the other developing countries, was viewed as the Campus that served the sub-region. Respondents noted the success of the PPP with respect to the inter-relationships and linkages among the region's private sector and the inclusion of the public sector which bridged the gap between two sectors considered vital to the tourism and financial services based economy. This was facilitated by the small size of the geographic space and social cohesion within the territories (Table 41).

Table 41: The University as an instrument for regional integration

Public	"The university was established in the first instance to have a developmental function for the people of the Caribbean." (#1 Pub Director, Rotter)
Private	"...the university is a very integrating factor and having it in Rotterdam ...has brought a lot of persons ...together with tremendous networking." (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter)

8.2.2 Reputable Brand and Growth of Green University, Rotterdam

Green University was a well-established brand within the region and the Rotterdam Campus was also recognised as a relevant actor in the policy-making process. Table 42 illustrates the extent to which both public and private sector directors placed value on

the Green University brand. In this context, the business school leveraged the brand to enhance its success in the environment. At the same time, the Rotterdam campus grew significantly with the addition of a number of taught masters programmes that respond to market demand.

Table 42: Brand Reputation of Green University, Rotterdam

Public	“One of the reasons that the schools have been successful in attracting quite high quality directors is that Green University does actually have quite a good reputation... there is an element of prestige involved in being associated with the Green University brand.”(#1 Pub Director, Rotter)
Private	“The receptivity of the university by the community in that when we came out we had a very strong and positive image.” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter) “The people of Rotterdam are very supportive of the Rotterdam campus of Green University... the support for the university is very strong.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter)

8.3 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

The development status of Rotterdam, which was facilitated by its education and social culture, provided opportunities for the PPP. Public and private actor sub-groups recognised the opportunities and the logistical challenges of operating in a segregated geographic territory. The University was held in high acclaim and the business school recognised this and leveraged on the value of the brand. The regional agenda was both mandated by the University and culturally embedded amongst actors. The effect of the environment on the organisation and on the PPP are considered in the explanations and propositions derived from the further analysis of the PPP at the level of the firm.

8.4 FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ROTTER BUSINESS SCHOOL

8.4.1 Background to Rotter Business School

Rotter Business School, Rotterdam, was the third business school to be established as a PPP by Green University. The PPP was initially established as a partnership between Green University, Rotterdam, and the private sector of Rotterdam, through the facilitation and active involvement of the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce, Inc. (CAIC). The CAIC “...is an umbrella organization for private sector representative bodies” (CAIC, 2011). The PPP has been in existence for twenty years.

The organisation was established in 1991 as a Centre for Management Development of the Rotterdam Campus and was upgraded in 2006 as a school of business. The School is located in the CARICOM Research Park of the Rotterdam Campus of Green University in accordance with the Affiliation Agreement which stated that “...the headquarters of the... (School) shall be at the Rotterdam Campus, Rotterdam”.

8.4.2 Purpose of the Business School: Outreach Arm of the University


The purpose of the business school was viewed by public and private directors in very different ways, based on their stakeholder interests (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Within the framework of the University, the business school was given the portfolio of providing training programmes and short courses that were relevant to the management needs of private business and public sector agencies. In the early years, the innovation of taught masters within the University system presented a conflict of ideology between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ teaching and research and the business school was seen to be the outreach arm of the University to deliver ‘applied’ programmes in management education. The separation of portfolios was deemed to be important in maintaining the distinction between the activities of the Rotterdam Campus and those of the Business School. The clarity of the portfolio served to quell dissent between actors in the University and Business School. The separation however, provided the Business School with access to a market but without a product strategy and opportunity for product innovation (Baden Fuller, 1995). This appeared to affect the growth of the organisation.

8.4.3 Nature of Private Involvement

The historical network architecture included actors from the University and actors from the private sector who belonged to CAIC. These actors all held the shared purpose of regional integration and regional development. The role of CAIC was to facilitate the development of the private sector for regional trade. Kris Sears of Rotterdam and Grey Hound of Arden were business colleagues and friends and, along with CAIC, they secured USAID funding for the start-up of the business school. Kris Sears and Xavier Prince were the signatories to the Affiliation Agreement. One respondent noted that “...*half of the guys who were on the Board at CAIC literally came over to be on the Board of Rotter School of Business*” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). All actors named in the

historical network, except Neptune Cross, served on the Board of Directors of Rotter Business School.

Figure 17: Social Network Architecture at Establishment of Rotter



The structural embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997; Granovetter, 1992) of the actors in the network with ties to the social partnership agenda, the private sector movement for development, and the University as an institution for integration, influenced the regionalist agenda and social identity of the PPP. The relational embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996) of the actors from CAIC suggested that they were “cohesively tied” and would emulate each other’s behaviour (Gulati, 1998, p.296). The architecture of strong social ties in the historical network also influenced the information flow of the network and promoted the development of trust among private sector actors (Granovetter, 1973; Podolny and Baron, 1997). Moreover, the structural and relational embeddedness of actors in the network suggested that the cognitive social structure amongst private sector actors impacted the cognition and mental representations of actors (DiMaggio, 1997; Emirbayer, 1997) embedded in social relations and actions that involved co-operation rather than competition, facilitation and support, and reliance on external aid funding for project development, influenced the nature of private involvement in the PPP. This contrasted with the nature of private involvement at Apple that featured a

regime focused on profitability. Along with the other factors, including the spread of the territories to be serviced by the business school, it appeared to restrict the extent to which business actors in the PPP demonstrated competence for producing wealth, the core competencies associated with private sector actors (Ghobadian et al., 2004a).

Public and private actors in the network adopted the role of facilitating the entry of Rotter Business School in the various territories. This distortion in the competitive context produced positive short-term and negative long-term impacts for the business school. The context of the organisation shaped the strategy (Porter, 1994) of stakeholders as an entry mechanism and this, along with the reputation of the University, protected the business school from local rivalry. In the early years, the school achieved social impact as it was able to create the social networks of actors as alumni across the sub-region. This however, appeared to create a situation in which the market was saturated with respect to the programme offerings and Rotter Business School experienced severe financial challenges in the later years.

In light of its portfolio of high-end, expensive products, University actors viewed the business school as a “money-making entity” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter), with the dual responsibility of serving the business community whilst achieving its own success as a business. The functioning of the School as a business was understood to be aligned with the demand of the private sector for similar type competencies in the training programmes. The implications for the structure of the business school that impacted its performance as a business entity included reduced bureaucracy, efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service in the delivery of programmes. The continuing challenges to achieve financial success resulted in University actors questioning the appropriateness of the governance and strategic direction of the business school.

Private sector actors viewed the business school as an opportunity and mechanism to fill the talent void in the private sector which was experiencing a dearth of senior and middle management. The private sector need and partnership culture of the Rotterdam society that drove the establishment of Rotter Business School as a separate entity was unlike the deep-seated development needs that propelled the establishment of Gerran Business School. A rival explanation for the establishment of the School was that Green University, having already established business schools at its other two

campuses, would have deemed it important to serve Rotterdam and the sub-region in the same way.

There was clarity with respect to the purpose of the PPP from the perspective of public and private actors (Austin et al., 2000). This factor, together with the social identity (Ellemers et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2000) of private sector participants as ‘regional integrationists’ and advocates of social partnerships, drove the establishment of the business school. What was lacking, however, was a shared or connection-based purpose (Austin, 2000) that motivated both public and private actors in the PPP governance structure. The developmental purpose evident at Gerrantown was not present in the environment at Rotterdam.

8.4.4 Organisational Structure of the PPP: Corporate Training Entity

The business school oriented its structure as an outreach arm of the University in the organisational structure of a ‘corporate training entity,’ as opposed to a ‘corporate university’ where training products are developed through organisational analysis and research and delivered to fill particular gaps in the knowledge base of employees in business. It appeared that the purpose of the private sector was unevenly accommodated in the agenda of the business school and the University only engaged with the business school administratively with respect to the quality of its programmes. There was little evidence of the contribution of the University to the knowledge base on which the products of the business school relied. As such, its socio-political legitimacy, based on its product portfolio and relevance to the business sector, was compromised (Table 43).

Table 43: Rotter as a Corporate Training Entity

Public	<p>“Rotter School of Business is set up in theory as a money making entity. Nonetheless, it still has a service function and ironically that’s exactly what the private sector directors sitting on the board are saying repeatedly, that we need you to help us develop the skills and so on in the interest of our society and in the interest of our business.” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter)</p> <p>“...Rotter could provide a way of, a means of outreach and a means of customized programmes that we cannot spend as much attention on...” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter)</p> <p>“...the postgraduate level would have to come back over to us(#2 Pub Director, Rotter).</p>
Private	<p>“Taught masters is a fairly new phenomenon as you know, and you really wanted less of a research degree and more of an applied programme so you had to create a vehicle for that.” (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter)</p> <p>“...these academics sit up on the hill and have no sense of what really goes on down in the trenches of business... So my guess is that they recognized that they needed an arm that was not seen as so academic and aloof from the real business world.” (#3 Priv KOA, Rotter)</p>
Document Analysis	<p>“The mission of the Rotter School of Business is to provide education, training, development and conduct research while serving as a conduit for organizational growth in companies and organizations in the Caribbean region.” (Strategic Plan of the Rotter School of Business 2009 -2012:2)</p>

8.4.5 Ownership and Control

The Rotter School of Business followed the trajectory of the other two schools and was established as a private company limited by guarantee, not having a share capital (Articles of Association of The Rotter School of Business, Inc.). As such, ownership by the ‘cause’ of education was legally affirmed and control of the organisation was effected by the Board of Directors and management. The legal arrangements initially indicated that the Board of Directors “shall comprise not more than twelve (12) members who shall include the three (3) shareholders of the Company who can be transferred and therefore not hold permanent shareholding” (*Affiliation Agreement*, 1991, p.1). In a later review of the by-laws, control of the business school by the University appeared to be the purpose for establishing the ratio of public to private sector members and it was agreed that the “... *Board should be no more than sixteen, nine of whom must be affiliated - and that word is very key - affiliated with the university*” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). This statement suggested, however, that there was a recognised need to have more private involvement. In this arrangement, several actors from the private sector were involved in other mechanisms of the university and as such, were considered to have fulfilled the requirement of ‘affiliation’ to the University.

The revised by-laws also affirmed control by the University and stated that “...*the Principal would always be either the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman...and there is an executive committee of three which will always be the Chairman, the Principal and one other*” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter).

The current Board of Directors comprises ten persons from the private sector and external agencies and four persons from within the University structure. Control of the organisation by the private sector ‘ideology’ was seen to be important and people who were ‘affiliated’ to the University were thought to possess an “...*appreciation for both sides (whereas) university players tend to be more one-track in their orientation. They tend to see things in a fairly ‘siloed’ kind of orientation*” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). University actors and those from the private sector appeared to endorse the ownership and control structure of the PPP.

8.4.6 Financial Arrangements

The Rotter School of Business was considered to be responsible for meeting its expenses. This was noted in the Affiliation Agreement which stated: “The CMD undertakes the responsibility for meeting its expenses, without prejudice to the right of the CHSB to accept grants, loans or other resources from the University which the University may offer” (*Affiliation Agreement*, 1991, p.2). The University committed to providing academic staff “...in such numbers and in such grades and the...(School) may require, to carry out the academic functions of the ...(School) on such specific terms and conditions as may...be agreed to from time to time with the... (School)” (*ibid.*). The Affiliation Agreement also indicated that the University will assist the School “...through the use of its good offices in the procurement of grants or other financing from regional and international bodies” (*Affiliation Agreement*, 1991, p.3). Finally, the University committed to the provision of “...adequate adult lecture rooms to seat forty-five (45) persons for the purpose of conducting its academic and training programmes. The cost of such facilities will be the responsibility of the... (School)” (*ibid.*). The School has generated revenue mainly from fees charged for its programmes but has also received financial endowments from international development agencies, including USAID, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Investors Club (IIC), and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). It has also received financial endowments from organisations in Rotterdam.

Rotter Business School was financially dependent on the Rotterdam campus and this would have contributed to their conformance with the control initiatives of the University actors. This was noted by one respondent who affirmed: “*Dependency brings, well, if I give you money you have to do what I tell you and that also could restrict our competitiveness*” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter). The University actors either empathised with the financial challenges of the business school or viewed them as a threat to the University’s resources and another reason to question the internal legitimacy of the separate existence of the business school.

8.4.7 Structure of the PPP Governance Mechanism

8.4.7.1 Motivation for PPP Governance Structure

The PPP governance mechanism was established at the start-up of the business school. It was intended to recognise the role of the University as guardians of the quality of programmes, in that the business school sought the imprimatur of the University for their programmes. The private sector and University adopted joint responsibility for direction and control of the new organisation in the early days, giving due attention to recruitment of KOAs and supporting the new organisation financially. The University appeared to have trust in the private sector with respect to the governance of the business school and the Affiliation Agreement was fairly open, giving no emphasis on the actor sub-group composition of the Board of Directors. One respondent addressed the difference in nature of the private sector and University governance mechanisms and suggested that:

“University directors tend to be largely academic and not to detract from that, their experience is largely confined to the governance around academia and the governance around public sector type of administration models. As a result, I think sometimes in some of those structures, some of the disciplines around accountability, performance, governance and just straight or just simple or fundamental business practices tend not to be as rigorously adhered to or pursued as we would in the private sector.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter)

8.4.7.2 Roles in the Governance Structure

The Affiliation Agreement committed the “...Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, or such other official as may be designated by the University, shall be responsible for obtaining all other necessary approvals for any programme...” (*Affiliation Agreement*,

1991, p.3). The Affiliation Agreement did not include any other guidelines with respect to the operation of the PPP or its governance structure. In the case of Rotter, two committees were established as the geographic dispersion of directors in various territories challenged the use of committees in the governance structure. One respondent explained:

“There are two committees really and you see the reason we have to keep those kinds of things to a minimum is because of the spread of our Directors. They’re very useful. One is really university committee...The Finance is the one that meets a lot more frequently.” (#2 **Priv KOA, Rotter**)

The business school appeared to be administratively embedded in the University’s hierarchy and structures for programme approval and programme administration. The structure appeared to conflict with the definition of a PPP characterised by “...joint definition of specific goals, and a clear assignment of responsibilities and areas of competence between the pairs in the pursuit of a common endeavor” (Jamali, 2004, p.416). There was an absence of shared understanding of the ‘goals’ and public and private actors held different and conflicting understandings of the purpose of the PPP. The demarcation of areas of responsibilities in the legal agreement provided clear roles for the University actors. This, however, translated into administrative support and there was little indication of the University’s involvement and commitment to the development and enhancement of the research and teaching ‘products’ delivered by Rotter Business School. Further, the limited engagement of private sector directors in the formulation and control of strategy was evidenced by the lack of clarity of the role of the private sector directors in the management and accountability of the School in the context of a defined strategy. University actors appeared to distance themselves from the performance outcomes of the School but co-operated in the provision of administrative support and boundary spanning actions (Baker, 2008).

8.4.7.3 Stakeholder Model of Governance in a Quasi-Market Context

The stakeholder model of governance (Freeman, 1984) established the importance of stakeholder interests in the strategy of the business school. While business felt the demand for talent, there was less felt need on the part of the entire society for development, as was evident in the case of Gerran. The preference for private sector competences and involvement in the Board of Directors suggested that there was a

perception that private involvement in the governance of Rotter would have served to enhance the strategy and competitiveness of the business school. This however, appeared to be distorted by the stakeholder model of governance which was propelled by the need to include representatives of various territories, and private sector directors who had a history of affiliation with the business school. This is consistent with the view that "... board size and composition are not random or independent factors, but are, rather, rational organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment (Pfeffer, 1972, p.226). As such, the members of the private sector on the Board of Directors were not necessarily selected for their business competencies and acumen but included professionals and executives in reputable businesses and business organisations. The University actors, as in the case of Apple and Gerran, were selected to the Board of Directors based on the positions they held within the University hierarchy.

The rationale for selection of private sector directors supported the business strategy of the organisation. Private sector directors provided access to the market in their territories and "opened doors" for the business school, which influenced their position in the market (#3 Priv KOA, Rotter). This was also viewed as the role of University actors, who, by virtue of their position within the University, served to provide technical advice and access to resources. This interference in the market operations affected the competitiveness of the business school (Porter, 2008) and contributed to the quasi-market positioning of the business school (Le Grand, 1991; Bartlett et al., 1998a; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993).


In the case of Rotter, the quasi-market arrangement (Le Grand, 1991) was established by the independent competitive nature of the business school in relation to the traditional University as provider of business education. The operation of the PPP influenced the market from both the demand and supply sides. With respect to demand, the social position of private sector actors influenced demand in the various territories and the supply of students. On the supply side, the business school operated in a competitive environment but was legitimised by the brand of the University. The quasi-market that was established under motivational conditions of profit and output maximisation, and the added motivation of purchaser as user, and as provider appeared to influence the success of the PPP in the early years (Bartlett et al., 1998b).

This model of governance, with market type incentives, depended on the motivation structure of the agents involved in decision making (Le Grand, 1997). One respondent indicated that “...if it had been operating as a private entity it would have gone broke by now. It’s not sustainable as it currently operates, in my opinion, as a business” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter). The business school was heavily subsidised by the Faculty with respect to the provision of buildings and some administrative support that was not costed. The stakeholder model of the Board of Directors warranted further examination to determine how it influenced the outcomes of the PPP.

8.4.7.4 Private Sector Cognitive Social Structure

The density of the private sector actor sub-group in the social network architecture of KOAs at Rotter Business School demonstrated continued structural and relational embeddedness of KOAs in the private sector cognitive identity which influenced the meaning structure of the network (Fuhse, 2009). The network of KOAs is presented in Figure 18.

Figure 18: Social Network of Key Organisational Actors at Rotter



All KOAs relied on the private sector for information and support. Further, the inclusion of KOAs from the University indicated loose-coupling of the business school with the University as its parent institution at its highest levels (Weick, 1976). This was explained from the perspective of roles as well and one KOA noted that:

“...everybody has tremendous strength. I tend, and that may not be a good thing, I tend to discuss things more with my private sector

colleagues and [KOA] always, always seeks the advice of... [University actors]. That's a role she plays, both, she has to deal with both" (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter).

In the current PPP governance structure, one KOA noted his tendency to be self-sufficient, resulting in a network support structure directly related to the routine operations of the business school. This respondent commented:

"I am fairly self-servant you know, or self-sufficient, I am. I tend to be the very self-sufficient type. Unfortunately, it has its advantages and its disadvantages." (#1 Priv KOA, Rotter)

8.4.7.5 Boundary Spanning Role of Directors

The role of individuals as boundary spanners, in the environment on the part of the private sector directors, and with the University on the part of their representatives, featured strongly in this case. This suggested the absence of a shared and unifying purpose, which placed actors in the position of having to defend (University) or advocate (private sector) for the existence and functions of the business school. The Board of Directors, in the early days, performed more of a service function than a strategic function (Zahra and Pearce, 1990). This reflects boundary spanning roles whereby boards, as boundary spanners, link the corporation and its environment (Zahra and Pearce, 1990). In the early days, the Board of Directors' role with respect to establishing links between the business school and the environment served to capture the market and extend the legitimacy of the business school by socio-political judgment mechanisms and beyond the cognitive legitimacy it developed through the reputation of the Green University brand. Boundary spanning however, was a less appropriate role for the University with respect to building a strategic relationship and establishing a shared purpose. The division of the market through the establishment of the business school perpetuated the ideological separation and suspicion with regard to the 'quality' of programmes. This is directly related to the fundamental concern about what is valid knowledge from the perspective of a university and what knowledge should be disseminated in the context of teaching at the business school (Mintzberg, 2004). It appeared that the role of the University was currently being extended, through boundary spanning in the first instance, to address the issue of knowledge and the relationship between both institutions for the sustainability and seamless integration of both the University and the business school with respect to the knowledge 'product'.

The problem of divided responsibilities and boundary spanning was evident in the observation of one respondent who described the boundary spanning role of one director:

“I am pretty sure he seems committed to the Rotter School of Business and to see that they get their share of the pie. He is handling that fight right now and, as I said, I think it is a credit to management.” (#2 **Priv KOA, Rotter**)

The movement into strategic roles is evident in the current scenario but may be due to the intervention of individuals, rather than the broad orientation of the Board of Directors. This is evidenced by the unclear definition of roles amongst members of the Board, lack of evidence of strategic planning or oversight control of strategy.

The role of University actors as guardians of quality and gatekeepers of the programme approval process presented some frustration to private sector actors who, in later years, sought to implement corporate governance techniques and strategic decision-making within the PPP governance mechanism (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1990; Demb and Neubauer, 1990). One respondent reflected:

“...but I don’t understand why it is we can’t run it exactly like how we run our businesses but we can’t because we are now part of the university and things don’t happen with the alacrity with which we do our things.” (#1 **Priv KOA, Rotter**)

In this case, the researcher observed that participants appeared to be motivated by self-fulfilment in the good of their actions, reputation and commitment to regional integration. Directors from both actor-sets were proud of both the business school and the University and attributed the school’s success to individual actions, but more directly to its management. The sense of ownership appeared to be lacking but they were positively engaged in making a contribution (participant observation).

8.4.7.6 Threats to Internal Legitimacy of Rotter School of Business

There were several constraints in the relationship between Rotter School of Business and its parent organisation, Rotterdam Campus of Green University. While there appeared to be mutual respect between public and private actors, control mechanisms within the governance of the business school and the strategies adopted by the School did not yield the expected financial performance. As such, the business school was challenged to achieve internal legitimacy within the University (Human and Provan,

2000). This influenced the emergence of trust between public and private actors, with respect to the fiduciary responsibilities for organisational performance. Among the factors that appeared to contribute to this were dependence on the local market, the limited availability of faculty expertise, curriculum decisions, resource constraints and financial dependence of the business school on the University campus. Another factor that contributed to constraints in the relationship over the years was a historical problem whereby one KOA had established a confrontational relationship with the University. The fundamental problem, however, appeared to reside in the competitiveness between the two institutions. This was fuelled by the separation of the executive and business training, which constituted the portfolio of the business school, and the growth of the University as a provider of applied business education. Table 44 below gives evidence of the relational constraints between the University and the business school and the concerns of public and private sub-actor groups throughout the history of the business school.

Table 44: Relational Constraints at Rotter

Public	<p>“And then we also have an unresolved situation in the sense that the relationship between the Department of Management Studies, here on campus, and the Rotter School of Business has not been as smooth as we might have liked.” (#1 Pub Director, Rotter)</p> <p>“That came about at the time at which the school started out and a suspicion on the part of the private sector that the Faculty of Social Sciences had some kind of lurking interests that were counter to theirs and therefore that it was useful to have this separate body that would then look after private sector interest.” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter)</p>
Private	<p>“But from where I stand it seemed to have worked well and in fact it’s a model that I think should be adopted throughout the university.” (#1 Priv Director, Rotter)</p> <p>“That’s the most friction that I have seen, is around that (curriculum). I don’t know if that make sense.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter)</p>

The impact of the growth of the Rotterdam campus on Rotter Business School appeared to place the wider faculty as an attractive provider of relevant business programmes. Even in this competitive context, boundary spanning was evident within the relationship. One respondent noted:

“I had no difficulties with being able, as I told you before, I can handle paradox and therefore my style was that I can handle these two worlds and I was able therefore to strike up a very good relationship with the [KOA] and we have worked very well together.” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter)

8.5 STRATEGY OF THE PPP

The strategy of the PPP was described as “A strategy for lean, mean efficiency, a strategy for relevance, a strategy for quality” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter).

8.5.1 Contribution of Actor Sub-Groups to Key Decisions

The social network presented in Figure 19 maps the top four people deemed to have contributed significantly to the strategic direction of the business school, constituting the overall cognitive social structure of the organisation.


Figure 19: Cognitive Social Structure of Overall PPP Governance at Rotter

Colour code	Public	Private			
	1	2	3	4	Comment
Respondent 1					Two longest serving private sector members
Respondent 2					People who run it
Respondent 3					People who run it
Respondent 4					
Respondent 5					
Respondent 6					
Respondent 7					
Respondent 8					Directors from the Region
Respondent 9					
Respondent 10					
Respondent 11					Question omitted from interview in error

The frequency of private actors mentioned in the cognitive social structure described in the network is thirty-three compared with two people named from the University. The private sector contribution was considered to be significant to the operations of the business school. In one case, the respondent indicated that the directors from the region were most valuable and in two cases, the management of the School was deemed to be the most important contributor to the School’s development. In one case, the question was omitted in error. In this network, the cognitive social structure of the network of actors may be described as private sector dominant.

In the social network presented in Figure 20 which mapped the contributions of both actor sub-groups to specific ‘cognitive’ and ‘socio-political’ strategies and actions, it was found that both actor sub-groups contributed mainly to the activities of business school that were related to ‘cognitive’ legitimacy.

Figure 20: Contribution of Public and Private Actors to Strategic Actions at Rotter



The support of the Board of Directors therefore ensured that the business school was viewed as a university structure, a legitimate provider of business education. University actors were seen to contribute mainly to activities related to the quality of programmes and quality of service. Private sector actors contributed mainly through their business expertise in the operation of the business school as an entity and in providing access to the market. This is consistent with the ‘outside-in’ strategy described by one respondent who indicated: *“Yes well we rely on the environment to survive in large measure and because of the softening of the market right now, the contraction of the market, in terms of the economic environment, we see as inhibitors.”* (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter)

In this social network, there were fewer ties of members of the Board of Directors to the strategic decisions and actions of the business school than were found in the other two cases. This suggested that management was perhaps more involved in the strategic decision-making processes than the Board of Directors. Moreover, the strategic

direction of the business school appeared to be controlled by one person. This was also the case at Apple Business School in its earlier days, which was mentioned by one respondent from Apple who indicated that the main concern for him upon assumption of duty “...was the one identified by a quality assurance report that was done about six months prior (2002) by the University...which said that the business school was essentially the work of one man and that there is a great vulnerability here” (#1 Priv/KOA, Apple). This phenomenon of management ownership and control in a system that did not demand accountability for performance was related to the Board of Directors’ model of supportive private sector actors in geographic territories. This contrasted with the corporate governance model whereby directors possess “...the formal authority to ratify management initiatives, to evaluate managerial performance and to allocate rewards and penalties to management on the basis of criteria that are supposed to reflect shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The stakeholder model of governance in this case, was influenced by the nature of private actors as representatives of corporations, NGOs and actors affiliated with the University. Directors, in the early stages, appeared to be more concerned with the attainment of social objectives of impact and regional integration and less concerned with fiduciary responsibilities and the performance of the business school as a competitive entity. Further, several directors were tightly coupled to management in longstanding professional relationships and one respondent indicated: “Granted very many of them are my personal friends but outside of that, the relationship with the (key university stakeholders was important)” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). This reduced the focus of the Board of Directors on the control of the organisation and positioned it as a service support body. As such, the control and strategic direction of the firm were within the ambit of the School’s management and this limited its strategic initiatives towards socio-political actions. The business school focused mainly on its cognitive legitimacy as it appeared to be focused on the purpose of social impact that de-emphasised strategic direction and control by the Board of Directors.

8.5.1.1 Organisational Separation and the Value Chain of Knowledge

The separation of the business school from the University in a strategy aimed at reducing bureaucracy to deliver a more relevant and efficient service to executive clients impacted the value chain of business education (Porter, 2008). Using the

concept of the value chain as described by Porter (1985), value in business education may be understood to derive from the creation of knowledge through research through to the point of delivery for the education service provider, but to the point of utility for the business organisation. In the separation, the business school was established at the interface of both the University as producer of knowledge, and business as the end user, loosely coupled to both (Weick, 1976). The PPP governance structure, which emphasised service to management rather than strategic functions (Demb and Neubauer, 1990; Gopinath et al., 1994), coupled with the market strategy for accessing and delivering service to clients, de-emphasised consideration of value in the production of knowledge and sustainable generation of new 'products'. The relationship with the University was expected to be a value adding partnership with "...the understanding that each player in the value-added chain has a stake in the others' success...as one competitive unit" (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988, p.95). This arrangement would allow actors to "...look for opportunities beyond their own corporate boundaries...[and] for ways the resources at one part of the value-added chain could be used in another" (ibid, p.95). In this model, faculty create value at the start of the knowledge chain through research that yields relevant and useful findings and business enhances the applicability and utility of knowledge in firms.

In the business-university partnership at Rotter, the focus of University directors on administrative support and the relationship gap between the University and the business school are evidence of the separation of the production of knowledge at one end of the value chain and the impact of business education at the user end. Moreover, the suspicion by the University actors regarding the quality of education delivered at the business school suggested faculty disengagement from the knowledge product. The internal competition generated, together with the independent growth of the University as a provider of 'relevant' business education in its own right, and the declining financial sustainability of the business school, threatened the internal legitimacy of the business school as a part of the University.

Application of the 'value adding partnership' concept to the operation of the business school suggested that the administrative benefits of separating the organisations were not complemented by value adding activities beyond organisational boundaries of the business school and University that would have allowed for the "...recognition of serious threats that lie elsewhere along the value-added chain" (Johnston and Lawrence,

1988, p.96). PPPs may be considered as a value strategy in which the collaborative mechanism is loosely coupled to the parent organisation/s or stakeholder interests and, as such, the success of the PPP is dependent on the creation of shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2011). The success of the PPP is dependent on the attitudes and behaviours of participating managers (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988) with respect to seeking opportunities beyond organisational boundaries and implementing strategies for sustained collaboration in the enhancement of value at the respective points of the value chain. Strategy is “...the art of creating value...(and) is the way a company defines its business and links together the only two resources that really matter in today’s economy: knowledge and relationships or an organization’s competences and customers” (Normann and Ramirez, 1993, p.65).

The PPP is an opportunity for the creation of an appropriate value strategy (which) is “...primarily the art of positioning a company in the right place on the value chain – the right business, the right products and market segments, the right value-adding activities” (ibid.). For the PPP and cross-sectoral arrangements, this requires the demonstration of collaborative competencies in management and governance to create network structures where shared purpose and individual destinations are recognised and communicated, and shared value serves as the control strategy. This finding extends the ‘shared value’ contribution of Porter (2006; 2011). It also extends the findings of Bradach and Eccles (1989) and Ingraham and Lynn (2004) who recognised that the PPP combines mechanisms of co-ordination and control, creating network structures that utilise market co-ordination with price as control and hierarchical mechanisms with authoritative controls. The findings in this study, however, contrast with the findings of Bradach and Eccles (1989), and Gulati (1998) in the conclusion that trust is not the control mechanism of PPPs in the context of business schools in small developing countries. This study argues instead that ‘shared purpose’ is the mechanism for network co-ordination and ‘shared value’ is the control strategy. The strategy of the organisation is therefore to grow, innovate and create shared value. This was recognised by one respondent who perceived the importance of a shared purpose and destination as the basis of the PPP:

“I think where the public sector needs to catch up with the private sector is on aligning that strategy for delivery and aligning those goals for what we produce...Worry less about how the private sector gets there and

how the public sector gets there, but the more important thing to do is to agree on the agenda.” (#3 Priv Director, Rotter)

8.6 FUTURE OF THE PPP

At the time of writing this thesis there were plans for the restructuring the operations of the business school and integrating the school into the Faculty of Social Sciences. The opinions of respondents with respect to this restructuring are presented in Table 45. It appeared that the acceptance of the restructuring arrangements by the management of the business school was based on the limitations of size and financial concerns that challenged its internal legitimacy.

Table 45: Reintegration of Rotter

Public	“...we are actually going through a review of the governance relationships with the Faculty and the Rotter School of Business because we are going to actually have to integrate them into what we call a Faculty Centre” (#2 Pub Director, Rotter).
Private	“Bigger, more comfortable. Where we see it in the next 5 years is making a fairly quantum leap in terms of the whole question of innovation, creativity, entrepreneurship, leadership in the region” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter). “... I think it is clear that we are part of the Faculty ... but we want to see how we can work more closely with the faculty so that somewhere down the line some of their faculty will have responsibility for teaching on some of our programmes” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter).

8.7 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CASE DATA

The data gathered in this case was limited in two ways. Firstly, there were only two respondents in the category of ‘public’ and, as such, there was no access to the historic experiences of persons who had retired. Secondly, the access to documents was limited and the researcher only had access to some agreements.

8.7.1 Limitations of the Findings

There was no indication of transfer of learning from the University to the business school with respect to knowledge and relevance of business knowledge. Although the faculty of the University taught at the business school, there was no data available on

the way in which they adapted their teaching to address the issue of relevance. This was not a direct question in the research but was a finding in the other two cases.

8.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AT ROTTER

The success was based on the Board of Directors and PPP as market strategy for a section of the education market considered as ‘executive training’. This strategy had the effect of giving primacy to the market and responding to the features of the environment, rather than the product. The product strategy was therefore based on market and internal efficiency in delivering to the market. Cognitive legitimacy was facilitated by the reputation of the University but socio-political legitimacy was not addressed by the business school. In fact, this was based on alignment of the executive experience with the logistical and administrative requirements of ‘executives’ in a responsive market strategy. The University still placed value on what the business school was doing but there was no explicit value to the parent organisation. Further, the parent organisation had grown to accommodate the fundamental elements of the portfolio of the business school and presented a source of internal competition, challenging the internal legitimacy of the business school. Without a distinctive product and business strategy the School’s sustainability was threatened and the structural relationship with the University was in the process of being re-evaluated. The following are the major case findings:

1. Recognition of the role of the PPP in the creation of shared value determines the effectiveness of boundary spanning behaviours.
2. The PPP is a mechanism for resource sharing that requires the co-operation of partners. Actor involvement was based on relationships, mutual concerns and commitment to development. Trust is a facilitator of this process but does not motivate actors to continue in the long-term relationship.
3. The institutionalisation of the PPP as an organisational form evaluated by stakeholders as a part of the University (cognitive legitimacy) contributed to its success throughout its history. This however, appears to be challenging the future success of the PPP.
4. Participation of University actors based on defined roles supported the administrative processes but did not acknowledge the knowledge ‘product’ and

the role of the University in the production of business knowledge. Contracts and role definition have specific but limited usage in the execution of PPPs.

5. Financial dependence outside of contractual arrangements distorts the level of trust. Financial sustainability is critical to the continued success of the PPP.
6. The PPP exists in a competitive space along with parent institutions and is influenced by the rate of growth and success of the parent institution. According to Johnston and Lawrence (1988), "...when all the partners are strong, the entire value-added chain can stand up to the toughest of competitors, integrated or not" (p.96).

CHAPTER 9: CROSS SITE ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION

9.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the cross-site analysis and interpretation of the findings across cases. The objective of the chapter is to move towards the development of “...incrementally more powerful theories” and to develop a model to guide practice by examination of past literature, insights of the researcher and empirical observations across the cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.548). The cross-site analysis was undertaken by identifying the variables found to have within-case significance and developing ‘time ordered’ and ‘effects matrices’ to demonstrate causal explanations across the cases (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p.190). Causal streams are presented in meta-networks, which were developed based on variables analysed at the three levels of the study. The meta-networks respect the site level analysis and include a summary of the within-case analysis of actor perceptions and actions with respect to variables identified and the resultant effect of those perceptions on the relationship between public and private actor subgroups at each site (Ibid). The effects of convergence and divergence of partner sub-group perceptions of variables on partner synergy are extrapolated and analysed to explain the impact on the purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP.

This chapter is organised into five sections. In the first section, the process of conducting the analysis is explained. The second section demonstrates the cross-site analysis to determine the variables that created ‘spaces of optimisation’ in the PPPs. The third section engages the sense-making process and examines the inclusion of private ideology and the relationship between purpose, structure, strategy and outcomes across the sites. The final section includes an interpretation of the ‘time’ and ‘effects’ events in relation to the Research Questions to derive the overall findings of the study.

9.1 THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SITE ANALYSIS

The process of cross-case analysis was aided by the development of themes or patterns of evidence considered significant to the theoretical propositions that guided the study, and to the policy and practice of cross-sectoral partnering (Yin, 2009a). The themes cut across levels of the study and case explanations were constructed by drawing on the findings from more than one level, across the sites. The comparison was undertaken

using three main analytical processes in the coding. The first level of coding served to **isolate the variables** across the three cases and determine the causal networks in each case (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The second level was the determination of connections and disconnections, in a process of sense-making (Weick et al., 2005; Selsky and Parker, 2010) to link antecedents with new interpretations to yield explanations. The third level was an interpretation of the relationship and ‘meaning structure’ within the social network (Fuhse, 2009). This conceptual schema informed the decision with regard to the organisation of the chapter and presentation of data at the three levels of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1984).

The analysis is undertaken by interpreting the evidence to arrive at a conclusion as to whether actors perceived that variable as an opportunity or constraint, and deriving a ‘resultant outcome’ of actor perceptions and interactions on their **support for** and **contribution to** the PPP, based on the theoretical and conceptual framing of the study. The process of analysis was aided by a ‘causal toolkit’ in which the Research Question (RQ) was used to generate researcher-derived propositions in relation to the theoretical framework. The propositions created an opportunity to examine ‘**spaces of optimisation**’ (SOO) (Soja, 1999) and produce a lens from which to evaluate PPP performance based on the ‘optimisation of space’(OOS) and relationships (Lichtenstein et al., 2006). This process of sense-making (Wright, 2005; Henneberg et al., 2010; Selsky and Parker, 2010; Weick et al., 2005) aided the researcher to arrive at a conclusion on the process by which PPPs attain performance outcomes. The sense-making process is embodied in the ‘causal tool-kit’ described in section 9.1.1.

9.1.1 Causal Toolkit for the Analysis

The ‘causal toolkit’ was developed to link the findings related to the purpose, structure, strategy and outcomes of the PPP to answer the research questions. The study adopted the evolutionary perspective and included the search for indicators of evolutionary change in the alliances. This provided the framework for examining the performance result of the total involvement of firms and partners in strategic alliances in their evolution. Probing and linking questions were developed to guide the analysis using the propositions derived from the research questions as a guide. The causal model is based on the assumption of logic in the process that assumes rational behaviour and the

purpose of optimisation of results in time and space, as opposed to a process of serendipity or determinism, in arriving at decisions.

9.1.2 Proposition 1: Determining Purpose and Linking to Structure

Proposition 1: Public and private-sector institutions in small developing countries face unique performance challenges that drive the establishment of PPP organisations, which must possess a clear purpose, structure and strategy to address institutional needs.

Causal questions to determine the attributes of the PPP:

1. Who and what in the country and institutional environment inspired the establishment of the PPP?
2. What did they hope to achieve? (Purpose or cause).
3. How was this different from their existing attributes?
4. Why was it necessary?
5. When did it become necessary? (Felt needs created by difference between current capabilities and vision).

Linking question to organisational level: Why was the purpose not attainable within the existing structures? This question will isolate the constraints of institutions and opportunities of the other.

9.1.3 Proposition 2: Determining Structure and Linking to Strategy

Proposition 2: PPPs are established by parent institutions to optimise the value of contributing partners in governance arrangements.

Causal questions to understand the attributes of the structure of the PPP organisation:

1. How should the partnership be structured to optimise organisational resources? (Organisational attributes of the PPP).
2. How should it be co-ordinated and controlled? (Governance and leadership – attributes of control).

Causal question linking structure to strategy to actor sub-group level on governance: What attributes of the PPP structure inspired the strategic actions of the PPP governance mechanism?

9.1.4 Proposition 3: Determining Strategy and Linking to Outcome

Proposition 3: Actors, as they interact in PPPs and demonstrate embeddedness in their environmental and institutional contexts, will encounter opportunities and constraints and this will influence their support for the PPP organisation and contribution to its evolution.

Defining attributes of the governance mechanism:

1. What is the structure of the governance mechanism?
2. How was it connected to the purpose of the PPP?
3. What affected its functioning?
4. How did it affect the form of the organisation?
5. How did it affect the purpose of partners?

Linking question to impact: What was achieved in the PPP with respect to its original purpose?

9.1.5 Proposition 4: Evaluation of PPP Performance


Proposition 4: The public institution provides cognitive legitimacy to the PPP which increasingly develops socio-political legitimacy and creates value for both partners as it evolves.

1. What were the achievements of the PPP?
2. How do the achievements align with the original purpose?
3. How do the achievements of the PPP impact the institutions from which it was established?

Linking question to cycle of development: What changed in the PPP and what are the next steps in its evolution?

The findings are mapped to establish a causal model. Major linkages in the model are illustrated in Figure 21.

Figure 21: Causal Model of PPP Evolution



The analysis proceeds by examination of the variables in the environment and at the level of the firm that presented opportunities and constraints to the PPP social system. The data is presented in data-reduction tables (Appendix 12).

9.2 VARIABLES ACROSS SITES

Miles and Huberman (1984) explain that “...cross-site causal networking is a comparative analysis of all sites in a sample on variables estimated to be the most influential in accounting for the outcome or criterion measures” (p.197). The variables across the sites are drawn from the individual cases and are highlighted in the meta-network in Figure 22.

9.2.1 Variables in the Country and Institutional Environment

Analysis of the external environment was undertaken to determine how actor sub-groups perceived the environment as providing a source of opportunity or constraint to

the business school, the University itself, the society or the private sector. A summary of the antecedents and effects on the PPP is presented in Appendix 12.

The environment produces opportunities and constraints to the strategy of organisations (Child, 1972; Leifer and Delbecq, 1978; Kiggundu et al., 1983). The PPPs at Gerran and Apple generally viewed the environment as a source of motivation and inspiration, but not a constraint to strategy. Rotter, however, perceived the external environment as a significant constraint to its governance structure and strategy. This resulted in the escalation of particular activities and the de-emphasis of others, based on actor sub-group perceptions and meanings attached to variables.

National policy with respect to social partnerships and education provided opportunities for the PPPs and University. The effects of size and competition were viewed as constraints that affected the business schools, especially at Rotter and Gerran. The developing country environment was perceived as an opportunity for the business school, except at times when government revenue increased, as this prompted competitive behaviour between the PPP and the University as the University sought to grow as an organisation; this was the case of Apple. The environment was chiefly a source of inspiration for actors at Gerran and Rotter but, at Rotter, it was seen to be a constraint to the structure of the Board of Directors and overall performance of the PPP.

The institutional environment also presented opportunities and constraints that affected the supportiveness of actors in the network for the PPP (Appendix 12). The institutional environment constrained the participation of private sector actors and the autonomy of the business school at all three sites, to varying degrees. Support for the business school was evident at Rotter and Gerran but not at Apple where the development of the business school was not seen by University actors to be linked to constraints of the University.

9.2.2 Variables at the Level of the Firm

The need to recognise the business school as an entity and the need for increasing private influence led to the establishment of all three organisations as legal non-profit organisations with varying partnership arrangements and governance structures. Differences in the PPPs related to who was inviting the resources of whom into the

entity, an issue of control of the organisation. The findings of the study led the researcher to classify Gerran as a strategic developmental organisation, Apple as a strategic entrepreneurial organisation and Rotter as a business education arm of the Rotterdam campus of Green University. The University played various roles in establishing the legitimacy of the business schools. At Gerran it legitimised the content of the business school's programmes, whereas at Apple it legitimised the form of the business school as a University. At Rotter, it legitimised the relationship between the University and the business school. The variables at each site and across sites are outlined in Figure 22.


9.3 EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF THE PPPS

The analysis now adopts an evolutionary perspective, seeking to determine what each PPP was attempting at various phases in their development and the rationale for their actions.

9.3.1 Funding Arrangements

Both Rotter and Gerran received seed funding at start-up from an international funding agency. The private sector at Apple contributed seed funding and the school later received a significant endowment from a corporate leader. Rotter continued to depend on financial contributions from Green University whereas Gerran progressed to financial independence. Apple maintained financial independence although there were challenges as to whether Green University received financial value for its contribution to Apple. The question of value for money in the PPP (National Audit Office (UK), 2008; Yong, 2010) appeared to be tied to the overall contribution of the business schools to the purpose of relevance as assessed by stakeholders who judged them as having high socio-political legitimacy in the environment.

Figure 22: Comparison of Variables across Sites



9.3.2 Governance Arrangements

The governance arrangements included public and private actor sub-groups with various control mechanisms. Rotter and Gerran adopted a stakeholder model of governance, whereas Apple adopted an economic model of corporate governance based on competitive behaviour. The private sector sub-group on the Board of Directors at Apple adopted a strong sense of ownership from the start-up of Apple and this influenced the extent to which they controlled the organisation. It appeared that the Board of Directors retained responsibility for the direction and control of the business school by placing private accountability measures on the leadership and management of the business school. At Rotter and Gerran, the University retained ‘ownership’ of the business school and the stakeholder model of corporate governance was evident as the boards of directors served to support the leadership and management of the business schools. Control of the business school by the Board of Directors was more evident at Gerran than at Apple where control appeared to be linked with organisational leadership and management. The way in which private ideology was adopted and diffused through the business schools accounted for the various performance outcomes.

9.3.3 Growth of Private Sector Ideology

The inclusion of private influences in the organisational structure of the University commenced at Gerran Business School, Gerrantown. The birth of private-sector ideology in Gerrantown appeared to be related to the social and economic needs of Gerrantown and the understanding that the University ought to be serving the developmental needs of the society. The sections that follow present the analysis in a sense-making process that examines the impact of private ideology on the purpose, structure, strategy and outcomes of the PPPs.

9.3.3.1 Birth of Private Ideology

Inclusion of the private sector commenced at Gerrantown with the University’s recognition of the need for, and the push by, the private sector facing challenges in the economy and the separation of the university from their needs.

“The whole business of management training at the university was something that was pushed ...more by the private sector than by the university because our university’s traditions were such that the teaching

of management wasn't seen as something integral to a university.” (#1 **Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran**)

The structure of the arrangement was acceptable to both actor sub-groups who indicated as follows:

“There was a lot of debate about whether it should be embedded as was the department of management studies in the faculty of social sciences and I think what emerged is “hey, let's not do that.” (#1 **Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran**)

The stakeholder governance mechanism that evolved at Gerran was unlike that of Apple and Rotter which featured private sector dominance from inception. Country influences propelled this but private sector control impacted the strategy of the PPPs in different ways. Apple gained socio-political legitimacy whereas Rotter retained its tight coupling to Green University, Rotterdam.

9.3.3.2 Advancement of Private-Sector Ideology

The advancement of private sector ideology was evident from the establishment of the PPPs as autonomous firms; this was evident at Gerran Phase 2, Apple Phase 1 and Rotter Phase 1. The ideology of private involvement appeared to spread rapidly across the campuses and was motivated by different conceptions of purpose, structure and strategy at each site. At Gerran, the purpose of including the private sector was linked to the need to cross the divide to advance the cause of the private sector and the University. A space for the optimisation of private ideology was created at Gerran.

“It was very clear that the programme needed to be very employer related and so there was a clear need to bring the employers, I mean from the private sector on board from the early days.” (#1 **Pub/ Priv Director, Gerran**)

“... the private sector was perhaps more anxious to change the nature of the position of the relation of mistrust...They knew they needed...the intellectual capital if they're going to run business.” (#4 **Pub Director, Gerran**)

Private ideology at Rotter was not as evident at establishment. It appeared that Rotter was established to commercialise the University's programmes by providing programmes that were directly relevant to the needs of the private sector. This created a 'space of opportunity' that was more operational than ideological.

“The University was not into... designing programmes for the market, into the commercial operation of programmes as they are now.” (#2 **Pub Director, Rotter**)

The commencement of the relationship between private and public sector actors at Apple was not based on a ‘space of opportunity’, as in the case of Gerran and Rotter, but on the ‘space of constraint’ and acknowledged weakness of the University and the hesitation of the private sector in the relationship.

“It provided us with the link to business through...bridging the gap between the University and the private sector and saying ‘alright, since you know nothing about the University, come and see.’” (#3 **Pub Director, Apple**)

“The reason the private sector didn’t do it on their own was because they wanted the university’s accreditation.” (#6 **Priv KOA, Apple**)

The effect of establishing the business school in a ‘space of constraint’ resulted in tensions between both actor sub-groups at Apple and the growth of private control through dominance of the private sector actor sub-group and growing competitiveness between the University and the PPP.

9.3.3.3 Protection of Ideology in a Space of Constraint

In the early days of Apple’s existence the private-sector appeared to be in search of legitimacy as a resource and the University also seemed positioned to defend its right to educate, acknowledging its resource constraints. It appeared that the private sector sought to protect the ideology of private business and capitalism whereas the University sought control over quality and the social good. Respondents indicated the following:

“But it didn’t want to be controlled by the bureaucracy of Green, which would retard its growth and its development and its reflexiveness and so on...It wants to be autonomous but at times it wants to be inside of Green.” (#2 **Pub Staff, Green Univ, Arden**)

“Because you have that kind of socialist/communist kind of logic and these people view business schools as foreign and what business schools teach as alien, and not true academia, and so they tend to kill it.” (#4 **Pub/Priv KOA, Apple**)

The issue of ‘who’ needs ‘whom’ appeared to arise when the University and the private sector sought to locate themselves in a position of power in the relationship. The University acceded to control by the private sector as they were initially comfortable

with the executive leadership and the agenda of relevance was shared. Later they sought control through institutionalisation of the roles of KOAs. They noted, however, differences embedded in their governance arrangements. In later years, the differences between the actor sub-groups and the embeddedness of the University actors in the institution appeared to threaten the relationship.

“The university guys take the appointment to the Board of the business school as if they are appointed to any other committee. Because remember in a university system, Academic Board is a board! ...And so they treat it as a committee and they don't see the legal liabilities, they don't see the other aspects that relate.” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple)

At Gerran, where there was trust in the leadership and the purpose was shared, the private sector ideology grew. At Apple, it grew through private sector ownership and competitive strategy. The arrangement provided University legitimacy to the PPP which focused on accountability as profitability of the organisation. This model of corporate governance contrasted with the stakeholder model observed at Gerran and Rotter where University control and ownership were evident.

9.3.4 Institutionalisation of the Ideology and Strategy of Competitiveness in a PPP

The ideological separation of the University and the private sector in the PPP at Apple appeared to result from the private-sector's competitive behaviour. At the growth phase, the social network of actors demonstrated increasing private control and an ideology of competitiveness. The institutionalisation of private ideology was attained with increasing negative impact on the relationship between the University and the business school.

9.3.4.1 Private Dominance and Notions of Quality

The network at establishment was 'owned' by the private sector through financial contribution and representation on the Board of Directors. Private-sector dominance in the network was affirmed by all interview respondents. The growth of private ideology was linked to the growth of quality in the curriculum process and recognition of the business school as a premier brand, distinct from Green University.

“We always wanted to see progress, adopting the most vanguard methods of teaching and subject matter and ultimately to get the

university to be recognised within our domain as the premier business school in that area.” (#2 Priv Director, Apple)

The increasing focus of the private sector on the leadership and curriculum of the school threatened the right of the University actors to protect the quality of the programmes. Additionally, innovation in curriculum and the application of knowledge in various forms appeared to create contestations in the minds of university actors. The private sector, approaching the PPP as a business, isolated the answer to the question “What business am I in?” as curriculum and defined the main resources for innovation in the curriculum as results-driven leadership and corporate strategy. The rapid growth and institutionalisation of innovation in the operations of Green University distanced the university actors, and effectively placed control of the curriculum within the PPP. This led to redefinition of curriculum standards using international benchmarks for business education, which were not evident within Green University, and a loss of respect and trust resulted.

“But we have such a strong private sector side on the Board that we don’t have a problem. But left to him, everything would be redone and redone and redone and rechecked and rechecked and rechecked. Total waste of time, couldn’t run a roti shop in my view!” (#3 Priv Director, Apple)

The relationship was held together by the fact that Apple was increasingly developing its own legitimacy and respect in society, despite the university adopting more protectionist behaviours. Individual actors also appeared to play a role in keeping the relationship together by reaching across apparent boundaries between academia and corporate strategy.

9.3.5 PPP Strategy and Competitiveness

The strategy of the PPPs at Gerran and Rotter were based on the nature of private involvement and the competencies and roles of individual actors and actor sub-groups. These schools adopted an “outside-in” strategic approach. They were focused on the environment, seeking to mitigate perceived weaknesses and leverage areas of strength on the boards of directors. This was motivated by the commitment of directors to the University, the business school and the development agenda. The adoption of responsibility for strategic management of the PPP weakened the role of directors as fiduciaries for the PPP as an organisation, reducing the role of the Board of Directors to

a mechanism to control the organisation and ensure accountability to stakeholders. At Apple, however, the strategy of the school was more directly related to internationalisation and the adoption of global standards. This inside-out strategy appeared to result from the opinion of directors that the environment must be acknowledged but must not be allowed to control the direction of the organisation.

9.3.6 Managing Internal Threats

Threats to the corporate strategy at Apple emerged from within the University and from the PPP itself. Threats related to the autonomy to design and manage programmes and the overall relationship and control of the University over Apple; respondents indicated:

“Apple fought like crazy, tirelessly, tenaciously, to get them accepted in the programme ... because the University was clear in its mind that you had to have a first degree to do it” (#2 **Pub Director, Apple**).

“I remember one of the recommendations in the audit report was that the School (Apple) should come directly under the day to day administration of the Head of Department and I remember... vigorously disagreeing for the reason that ... this is a business enterprise... why would you bring it under an already over-burdened Department of Management?” (#2 **Pub Director, Apple**)

9.3.7 Summary of Ideology of Privatization and Governance across the Schools

The summary demonstrates the development of private ideology and the configuration of the models of corporate governance at each school, at each stage of their evolution.

Table 46: Evolution of Ideology of Privatisation and Governance Models

Gerran	Analysis	Shock to next phase
Phase 1	Establishment of ideology of privatisation at the top level of University hierarchy in a committee structure	Programme expansion
Phase 2	Stakeholder model of corporate governance established and retained. Slow infusion and development of private ideology with an outside-in strategy of development	Leadership change
Phase 3	Enhanced private sector involvement located at the top of the hierarchy. Stewardship model of corporate governance university ownership and control and outside-in strategy of development	Leadership change
Apple	Analysis	Shock to next phase
Phase 1	Stakeholder model of governance with shared control	Leadership change
Phase 2	Agency model of corporate governance with private ownership and control and inside-out ‘bottom-line’ strategy of development	Leadership change
Phase 3	Agency model of corporate governance with private ownership and control and inside-out ‘academic’ strategy of development	Alliance strategy
Rotter	Analysis	Shock to next phase
Phase 1-2	Stakeholder model of governance retained throughout the evolution of Rotter with private ownership at establishment moving to University ownership and control	Governance change

The ideology of privatisation appeared to evolve differently and at different times across the cases. Moreover, the ideology was emphasised by the relationship across and within institutions based on leadership shocks. The approaches to sustaining the ideology across the schools differed, according to their environmental contexts and the embeddedness of actors within institutions.

9.3.8 Gerran: Development Purpose, Loose-Coupling and University Stewardship in Stakeholder Governance

Gerran established a purpose of development and this was reflected in the organisational development of the business school. Despite the fact that a private sector actor served as Chairman of the Board, it is felt that the Board of Directors is “...*too heavily weighted with the preconceptions of the University*” (#3 Priv Director, Gerran).

Ownership and actor embeddedness within the University and the stakeholder model of governance that incorporated private sector needs and interests served to establish the cognitive legitimacy of the business school as a provider of business education. Competitiveness of the school as an institution, however, appeared to be compromised by the lack of appropriate management controls, as the Board serves as a support to management and strategy, rather than a control and accountability mechanism. This reflects a stewardship approach to corporate governance (Muth and Donaldson, 1998).

9.3.9 Apple: Competitive Purpose, Loose-Coupling, and Private Control in Corporate Governance

Gerran optimised its purpose of development but not its competitive behaviour and contribution to purpose. Apple however, was loosely coupled with the University and focused on organisational performance. The development purpose appeared to be a means to the end of organisational performance. The Board of Directors served as a control and accountability mechanism on the leadership and management of the business school. University control was effected through the Chairmanship of the business school, but the overall reporting relationship to the Board of Directors was maintained with strong private sector control on financial accountability. Socio-political legitimacy was achieved by the growth of the business school and this established a competitive relationship between the University and the business school. Apple optimised its competitive purpose and strategy, but not its relationship with the University.

9.3.10 Rotter: An Arm of a Developing University

Despite the recognition that the business school was an economic organisation with a profit-seeking orientation, the tension between profitability and service was evident and the Board of Directors was established as a direct support to management. University dominance was evident, propelled by the stakeholder model of corporate governance and the appointment of directors based on representativeness in the market rather than expertise to support the management of the school (Cornforth, 2002). Boundary spanning within the University, individual actor contribution and the leadership and management of the business school appeared to be major success factors at Rotter. The business school built socio-political legitimacy in Rotterdam but its sustainability as an

entity was compromised by its continued reliance on financial and technical product support from Green University. At the same time, the University appeared to have grown and adopted practices related to profitability and product differentiation. This has led to the possibility of the business school becoming re-integrated into the University and the disestablishment of the current PPP model. The growth of the University campus at Rotterdam appeared to be driven by private ideology and the Rotter School of Business became increasingly folded into the overall University.

The evidence presented in this section demonstrates the evolution of the ideology of privatisation and its impact on the socio-political and cognitive legitimacy of the PPPs and their parent institutions.

9.4 INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE: ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

9.4.1 Organisation of the Interpretation

This section relates the evidence to the conceptual framework of the study and provides an interpretation of the evidence to distil findings and contributions in relation to the research questions. Each research question is discussed in separate sections for clarity. The format for presentation of the section is as follows:

1. Presentation of the research question and propositions.
2. Identification and discussion of themes based on the evidence related to the research question and propositions.

9.4.2 Research Question 1: Defining Attributes of the PPP

Research Question 1: What are the defining attributes of the PPP governance structure engaged by the business schools?

Proposition 1: Public and private-sector institutions in small developing countries face unique performance challenges that drive the establishment of PPP organisations, which must possess a clear purpose, structure and strategy to address institutional needs.

9.4.2.1 Establishing Purpose: Addressing Country Needs or Embracing Opportunities

The PPPs were initiated by the private sector in response to socio-economic challenges in the country environment. Where the University perceived constraints and acknowledged challenges to its relevance, support for the PPP was evident. In an attempt to assert the public claim to ownership of PPPs, Datta (2009) proposed that PPPs "...must aim at bringing private resources into public projects, not public resources into private projects" (p.73). Although vulnerabilities in the environment were a source of shared concern in all three cases, the **invitation** to the private sector emerged only at Gerran. At Apple, the demand was generated by the private sector, as a result of differing ideologies between business and Green University. The collapsing economy at Arden also created a **compelling need** and the University agreed to the partnership, recognising the gap between the University and the society in general. At Apple and Gerran, there were **compelling deficiencies** of human resources and development, respectively.

At Rotter, however, the University did not perceive the need for the partnership in the context of an advanced economy and the University's positive reputation in society. The partnership was therefore established as **an opportunity** to develop the private sector, facilitated by a social partnership agenda within the country. The objective of private sector development and purpose of regional development and integration was established by the influence of CAIC on the Board of Directors. Whilst one's understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences one's contribution to their success (Austin, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Harrigan, 1985) it appeared that motivating the contribution of both public and private partners is dependent on the connection to purpose.

9.4.2.2 Connection-Based, Shared and Facilitative Purpose of the PPP

Public-private connection was achieved where both actor sub-groups had similar perceptions of environmental factors as providing constraints or opportunities to their own development, the business school or to the society. Connection in the public-private relationship was also achieved where one actor sub-group identified sources of opportunity or constraints to the business school, or to the other partner. This was the

case at Gerran where the public and private sector actors connected on a number of issues in the environment, including the university context. Within the country context, the small size and competitive environment of the economy were factors on which actor sub-groups connected in the case of Gerran and Rotter and this resulted in the **connection-based purpose** for the strategic collaboration (Austin, 2000).

Shared purpose in the PPP was a result of connection on economic and social variables that affected a broad range of stakeholders and to which each sub-group was committed. This only resulted when both the public and private sectors were motivated by **similar needs**, as was evident at Gerran. This is the first major finding of the study. Their felt concerns led to the shared purpose of development for the business school, the University, the private sector and for the wider country. This appeared to be facilitated by the cultural embeddedness of both actor sub-groups in the context (Dequech, 2003). It appears that the exacerbated needs and vulnerabilities of the environment of developing countries, coupled with a strong cultural identity, as was evident at Gerran, motivate actors to achieve its shared purpose. The attainment of a shared vision and purpose was acknowledged as an important factor in building the competitiveness of a country; it appeared to stimulate action and competitive behaviour in the creation of **shared value** (Porter and Kramer, 2011). At Rotter and Apple, however, University actors **facilitated the business school** as a revenue generating unit that addressed the training needs of the private sector; an agenda that was outside of the purview of the University and perhaps paradoxical to the purpose of the University itself. The **facilitation of the purpose of the other, despite ideological differences**, is the second finding of the study.

9.4.2.3 Developing Cross-Sectoral Relationships

At Apple and Rotter, where the private sector sought the partnership with the University, the functioning of PPPs at the organisational level may be compared with the practices of strategic alliances in the method and rationale for partner selection and engagement. At Rotterdam, the private sector agency positioned its members on the Board of Directors of the business school and co-opted the support of Green University, Rotterdam campus. These two institutions connected on their mutual purpose of regional integration. One University actor and one member of the private sector at Apple acknowledged that Green University was not the private sector's first

choice for the partnership and establishment of the business school. Having failed to acquire an international partnership, Green University was approached for the partnership. The third finding of the study is that **PPPs may include co-opted partners who hold differing ideologies for the purpose of acquiring resources, including legitimacy.**

9.4.2.4 Managing Relationships and Resources in the PPP

According to Berliner (1997), the PPP in education is a means of partner resource sharing and co-operation. Gerran established its expectations of the private sector's **co-operation** to advise the University about its needs and to ensure its **programmes were relevant**. In establishing the new company, the University sought to accommodate the private sector's participation. At Rotter, the private sector sought the University's imprimatur for the business programmes as they were not in the business of education. They depended on Green University in this regard but the University held no expectations of returns from the relationship. This was due to the perception of a positive reputation of Green and, as such, their engagement with the business school was **a contribution of resources**. At the inception of Apple, the resource-sharing plan involved collaboration between the private sector, the public sector and Green University with expectations of major stakeholders clearly outlined. The private sector at Apple, however, did not envision reciprocity and mutual interdependence due to the differing ideologies. Their purpose was accommodated by the University's contribution to facilitate the academic tasks and eventually this arrangement led to competition in the relationship. Alignment of the partnering model with the expected partner contribution ranged from resource sharing to resource contribution. Where **resources were 'contributed' rather than 'shared,' through co-optation rather than collaboration, internal competition created challenges to the PPP**; this is the fourth finding of the study.

9.4.2.5 Close Coupling of Governance Structure and PPP Purpose

The PPP at Gerran was structured to bring university knowledge and public resources to the business school. In the context of economic stringency, public sector actors in government were invited on the Board of Directors to facilitate the provision of resources to the business school. As such, actors changed over the years in accordance

with the resource needs of the business school. The Board of Directors at Apple included several members of the private sector who established a private sector ideology in the control and accountability of the organisation. At Rotter, private participation essentially comprised members of a non-profit organisation established to facilitate the development of the private sector in the region and provide access to markets in small countries. The PPP demonstrates **close coupling of purpose and structure to derive particular resources**; this is the fifth finding of this study.

9.4.3 Research Question 2: Composition and Structure of the PPP

Research Question 2: How do the composition and structure of the governance arrangement influence the contribution of public and private partners to decision-making?

Proposition 2: PPPs are established by parent institutions to optimise the value of contributing partners in governance arrangements.

9.4.3.1 Maximising Partner Contribution through Structure and Strategy

Gerran Business School was controlled by the University. Its establishment within the University structure and the representational structure of the private-sector involvement posed no threat to University control. In fact, in Phase 3 of Gerran's development, the University revised the Memorandum of Affiliation to grant control to the private sector through the placement of a private-sector actor in the role of KOA, a role traditionally held by the University. This decision appeared to be driven by the motivation to secure more private involvement. It appears that this occurs under conditions of resource constraints, retention of public control and ownership, and the development of trust at the executive level. At Apple, the private sector contributed seed funding to the establishment of the school and, in order to protect the investment, requested control of the PPP. At Phase 1, the private sector relied on the University actors to guide decision-making but later utilized private control and accountability practices in the governance and organisational strategy of the PPP. Private sectors actors, who were competitors in business, admitted their reputation was linked to the success of the business school. This contributed to the success of the business school and their control increased as the University withdrew its co-operation, due to challenges to its own legitimacy. This

discussion distils the sixth finding of the study. Actor sub-groups in PPP networks **are motivated to maximise partner contribution under conditions of trust, resource constraints and public control and ownership.**

9.4.3.2 Restricting Partner Contribution

At Rotter, the historical network of private sector actors was retained throughout the school's evolution. As such, the nature of private involvement changed very little over the years. As representatives of a private sector organisation and country representatives, the nature of private involvement was different from Apple. This was similar to the model at Gerran, but the impact was less at Gerran as there was a strategy for inviting directors onto the Board of Directors to provide market access within territories, resulting in a quasi-market situation at Rotter (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). In a small market, this appeared to negatively impact the competitiveness of the business school and, as such, its financial health was compromised. Based on this analysis, it may be concluded that in the absence of a strategy of alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1998), expectations of private contribution to governance on a board of directors are **distorted by the cognitive embeddedness of private-sector actors in institutional frameworks.** This is the seventh finding of this study.

9.4.3.3 Optimising Private Contribution in a 'Voluntary Business' Game

Actors are automatically classified into two actor sub-groups and expectations of each sub-group are established in the PPP. The categorisation of private-sector actors and separation of the camps at Apple resulted in conflict and lack of trust as there was a difference of ideology at the start. In this context, it appeared that private sector actors coalesced in a dense network and established dominance and control of the business school. University actors increasingly withdrew from active participation on the Board of Directors for their individual reasons.

This appeared to further propel the private sector to action, driving them to take actions to develop the business school to international standards of quality, establishing marked differences between the business school and the University, its parent organisation. This appeared to be a game of power between actor sub-groups. It was driven by several factors including the dense network of private actors who were at the helm of

the top businesses of the country and could not risk failure in their undertaking at the business school. In addition, as a voluntary organisation, there was no risk of personal financial loss and actors appeared to be embroiled in a game of business, a game in which they had demonstrated competence. Finally, University actors embedded in institutional bureaucracy and controlled by the allocations of particular programmes to the business school and to the University, were disadvantaged players in the game of organisational development and growth. The institutional history and context of the PPP produced a set of variables that motivated strong private contribution, the eighth finding of this study. **Private control and strategy reflected a ‘voluntary business’ game** in which private-sector actors appeared to be engaged. This confirms the findings of Bissessar (2002) and Ryan and Bissessar (2002) that political and cultural factors affect the implementation of cross-sectoral projects. At the level of the firm, trust and respect, rather than economic factors, affected the relationship.

9.4.3.4 Contradictory Supportive and Protectionist Public Roles

University actors in the PPPs were required to oversee the academic quality and facilitate the approval of the business school’s programmes. This worked at Gerran where public actors actively withdrew from governance and acknowledged their role in the administrative academic process. At Rotter, University actors perceived their role on the Board of Directors to be one of **‘guidance and facilitation’**. In this case, University actors also felt their presence on the Board of Directors was necessary for **boundary spanning**, attempting to rationalise the activities of the business school to their University counterparts. This arose due to historically weak ties between the University campus and the business school, stemming from the lack of felt need for the PPP on the part of the University.

The public role in assurance of quality was seen as **‘protectionist’** from the perspective of the university and its conceptions of academic quality and, at the same time, **‘supportive’** of the innovations in the PPPs. At Apple, this apparently oxymoronic position was demonstrated as protectionism in the context of expansion of university education and wider threats to the legitimacy of Green University. The protectionist stance was interpreted by private-sector actors as being self-serving and this led to their declining trust in, and respect for, University actors. The protectionist stance was increasingly adopted as the country’s resources climbed at the turn of the century and

opportunities expanded for both the University and the business school. The private-sector actors responded by expanding the search for external benchmarks of quality, seeking guidance from external sources. This led to the ninth finding of the study. Mistrust in the PPP leads to public protectionism which constrains the opportunity for mutual learning and growth in the partnership. Further, protectionist roles in governance oppose the fiduciary responsibilities of actors on a board of directors (Kaplan, 1975). This leads to the tenth finding of the study that **public actors in protectionist roles in the governance of PPPs face role contradiction** at that level, especially in competitive contexts.

9.4.3.5 Optimising Private Management

The business schools were all able to successfully engage the private sector in their governance structure and this led to more innovative and enterprising undertakings at the schools. Private-sector management practices were evident at all sites, consistent with the direction of the NPM movement (Ferlie, 1996). The integration of faculty and management created cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) for University actors as this structure was dissimilar to the traditional separation of ‘administration’ and ‘faculty’ at the University. At Apple and Gerran, private management practices produced innovation in management in attempts to address the issue of relevance. The private sector at Apple, recognising that education was not their core business, employed a leadership strategy and an accountability and performance evaluation mechanism for the top management of the school that was derived from private sector management practices and based on profitability. This led to increasing financial success at Apple. The strategy of using directors to access markets at Rotter appeared to sustain the school but did not optimise private contribution. The findings across the cases led to the conclusion that in small, developing countries, the **growth of the PPP organisation is directly related to the strategy for optimising private-sector management in the network**. This is the eleventh finding of this study.

9.4.4 Research Question 3: Opportunities and Constraints of the PPP

Research Question 3: What opportunities and constraints are presented by the embeddedness of the PPP network?

Proposition 3: Actors, as they interact in PPPs and demonstrate embeddedness in their environmental and institutional contexts, will encounter opportunities and constraints and this will influence their support for the PPP organisation and contribution to its evolution.

The PPPs experienced constraints and found opportunities in the wider country and institutional environments. These are referred to as the ‘external environment’ and ‘internal environment’ respectively.

9.4.4.1 Cultural Embeddedness and Relationships

The external environment of Gerran presented several constraints and opportunities to the business school. The strong cultural and social identity of the people of Gerrantown (BBC, 2011b) served to accentuate the relationship between actor sub-groups on several variables. Actor sub-groups connected on the importance of variables in the environment, especially the socio-economic context, the competitive context of business education and the implications of the small world phenomenon on the PPP (Chapter 6.1). Many actors were educated abroad and returned to contribute to the country’s development. They held the view that Gerran was an opportunity for Gerrantown and linked the country’s development concerns directly to the purpose and responsibility of the business school. This led to the establishment of a shared purpose between actor sub-groups. In addition to the ‘ownership’ and control by the University through its development, competitiveness between the PPP and the University was reduced due to the cultural embeddedness and friendships among actors.

Opportunities in the external environment were also perceived by Rotter. The emergence of a social partnership within Rotterdam, the presence of a market in the sub-region, the activities of the regional private sector organisation, and the active support of private sector leaders from the other two countries provided an opportunity for the private sector organisation to establish the business school. In the case of Apple, the opportunity was created by the economic challenges experienced at the time. This leads to the twelfth finding of the study that **PPPs derive purpose and are motivated by embeddedness in the environment**. Perception of environmental factors as opportunities or constraints is unrelated to whether they are positive or negative factors in the environment.

9.4.4.2 Political Embeddedness and Competition

A major constraint to regional cooperation among the campuses of Green University was the extent to which each campus was economically and politically embedded in its own country environment. This was due to a history of failed political efforts at regional integration and each campus was sustained by the financial contributions of the government in the country in which it was located. Actors at Gerran and Rotter, constrained for resources, viewed the regional context of the campuses as a constraint of their external environment. This affected the strategy of the PPPs as they focused their efforts on their geographic space and diaspora.

In the case of Apple, private sector actors were concerned about the success of business, despite the environment. The private-sector actors grasped the opportunity to expand the operations of the business school and enhance its socio-political legitimacy. This increased the level of perceived competition between the business school and the University. This study revealed that PPPs exist in a potentially competitive relationship with their parent institution and, **in the absence of an appropriate boundary spanning strategy, the growth of one organisation negatively impacts the other.** This is the thirteenth finding of the study.

9.4.4.3 Challenging Institutional Embeddedness with Trust

The PPP as an organisation was constrained by actor embeddedness in the established rules of the University. At Gerran, it appeared that University actors felt disempowered in the discourse at the level of the Board of Director where the environment required rapid and significant decision-making (Chapter 6.3.6.3). The level of trust in the relationship guided the University actors to suggest changes to the structure of the Board of Directors to reduce University representation and optimise the role of the Board. The converse occurred at Apple where University actors, in the context of increasing suspicion and competitiveness between the business school and the University, held strongly to the view that the University should have a majority representation on the Board to protect the academic quality of the business school. The study concludes that, where embeddedness presents constraints to PPP performance, **optimisation of public resources is facilitated by trust.** This is the fourteenth finding of this study.

9.4.4.4 Optimising Strategy by Boundary Spanning

Boundary spanning roles of KOAs were important in the evolution of the PPPs. Significant changes in the relationship between Rotter and the Rotterdam Campus were achieved in recent years through the presence of a University actor on the Board of Directors. Commitment to the development of both the business school and the University department, led to the proposal of several changes for the business school, including its reintegration into the University department. This decision may threaten the existence of the business school in its current format but will also provide an opportunity for another level of public-private relationship that includes synergies in product development. Boundary spanning also appeared to be a function of KOAs at the business school and this was one of the factors that maintained the School's existence. This function appeared to be directly related to the acceptability of actors as technically legitimate (Brown, 2001) in both the world of business and academia. This led to the fifteenth finding of the study; **boundary spanners in PPPs in business schools must possess technical legitimacy in both the University and private sector** in order to effectively undertake this task.

Actors in boundary spanning roles at Apple appeared to manage the interaction space on the Board of Directors in a manner that recognised the Board as “...*a board of true captains, whether it's from industry or academia*” (#1 Pub KOA, Apple). The management of the Board of Directors was executed in “...*such a way as to not intensify conflict, (and) not inhibit the growth and development of the institution*” (#4 Pub/Priv KOA, Apple). As such, the management of conflict and relationships appeared to be the focus of boundary spanning activities at the level of governance. In this context, the management of the relationship was approached from the perspective of constraints which militated against boundary spanners seeking opportunities for leveraging the talents of each other for product and market innovation in the interest of both institutions. At Gerran, there was early and prolonged boundary spanning by a single KOA that appeared to be focused on similar learning across the divide. It appeared that in the PPPs, boundary spanning activities are focused on relationship management when actors are deeply embedded in their traditional contexts. **The focus of boundary spanning on relationship management detracts from the strategic purpose of the PPP.** This is the sixteenth finding of this study.

9.4.5 Research Question 4: How does the PPP Build Legitimacy?

Research Question 4: How does the PPP strategy utilized by business schools in the English-speaking Caribbean help to build legitimacy and contribute to their success?

Proposition 4: The public institution provides cognitive legitimacy to the PPP which increasingly develops socio-political legitimacy and creates value for both partners as it evolves.

This section brings together the discussions and findings above to answer the overall Research Question that guided the study: How do Public Private Partnerships influence business school performance in the English-speaking Caribbean? It addresses the responding variable of legitimacy and also includes some of the author's reflections and metacognition based on the findings.

9.4.5.1 Leadership as Strategy

Leadership of the business school was recognised as a critical strategy in all three cases. Gerran and Apple sought to optimise the leadership of the business schools and appeared to select leaders with both business and academic expertise. In one case, the search for a leader of the business school took two years. By constantly revisiting its leadership and matching leader competencies to the strategic challenges of the University, as in the case of Gerran, and applying private-sector measures of accountability to the PPP leadership, the practice at Apple, the business schools emphasised leadership in their strategy. The leadership phenomenon was not the focus of this study, which centred broadly on issues of governance. This presents an area for further study. Rotter maintained its leadership structure for most of its existence. As such, its strategy appeared to be closely coupled to the competencies of executive management. The nature of the private sector representation on the Board of Directors did not facilitate the introduction of private-sector principles of performance management that would enhance the competitiveness of the PPP. This appeared to contribute to the escalating financial challenges of the business school and threaten its technical legitimacy internally in its relationship with the University. It also threatened its moral legitimacy in the wider environment as a provider of business solutions (Brown, 2001). This study therefore concluded that **PPP evolution is directly related to its privatisation and leadership strategy**. The autonomy of the business school and a private cognitive social structure enhances its success. This occurs when performance

management practices align with a strategy of competitiveness. This is the seventeenth finding of the study.

9.4.5.2 A strategy of Relevance

The business schools all claimed the agenda of relevance in business education as the primary purpose for which they were established. They achieved success in this regard, but in different ways. Gerran's embeddedness in its socio-cultural context, the presence of trust, the alignment of strategic challenges and leadership competencies all served to develop the school incrementally in a manner that was responsive to the local needs of business and society in Gerrantown. The demonstrated qualities of this business school led the author to categorise Gerran as a 'strategic developmental organisation' (Khandwalla, 1990).

The constellation of causative factors at Rotter positioned the business school as a 'corporate training agency' for the private and public sectors, serving as an 'outreach arm' of Green University, Rotterdam. The strategy of leanness and efficiency, however, did not appear to be well aligned with the purpose of business development which requires a constant flow and regeneration of innovative products and practices. This is best achieved through a product strategy and the deepening relationship with the University, which has established a track record in the development of new, relevant and innovative business solutions. The new proposition holds much potential for the product strategy at Rotter. Threats to private sector participation in the PPP could arise in this case and boundary spanning activities focused on the value created from the solutions at the merged entity would be required.

Apple soon moved from need to opportunity-driven motivation, morphing into an entrepreneurial business school as the private-sector principles of management became more evident and achieved more significant impact on business and the society of Arden (Thompson, 1999). The business school increasingly undertook high profile activities benchmarked to international standards. This strategy of internationalisation and innovation served to contribute to the rapid development of socio-political legitimacy. This, however, was accompanied by increasing suspicion and lack of trust for the business school on the part of the University. This leads to the eighteenth finding of the study that **trust is a facilitator of relationships and incremental**

strategy but militates against rapid innovation in business schools as education organisations.

In all cases, the University's name and reputation contributed to the cognitive legitimacy of the business schools. Where the University was held in high regard in the society, cognitive legitimacy was both an opportunity for survival and a constraint to the development of the schools' socio-political legitimacy. Where the University's reputation was strong, at Rotter and Gerran, the business schools required more innovative strategies to establish socio-political legitimacy. This did not threaten the existence of the schools but made it more difficult for them to become differentiated. In the case of Gerran, the University's endorsement of, and contribution to, the products of the business school helped to establish the reputation of the business school in the society.

Rotter's strategy of tight-coupling to the business school enhanced its reputation as an integral part of Green University, Rotterdam. The University provided legitimacy to the relationship with the business school. In the absence of a boundary spanning strategy to optimise the alliance based on its products, coupled with a performance management system that was not focused on improving competitiveness, the business school floundered to continue to provide innovative solutions. In the case of the PPP at Apple, the reputation of Green University, Arden, as a provider of education with strong relevance to country needs was threatened in the society. Leading thinkers suggested that the Arden campus should focus on graduate education and research whilst other institutions address the human resource talent needs of the country (Spence, 2011). Apple increasingly sought a new cognitive legitimacy as a business school through its strategy and marketing. This further compromised the University's participation in the PPP as the business school relied less on the University to provide legitimacy to its form. The nineteenth finding derives from this reality. In PPPs, **cognitive legitimacy is the antithesis of socio-political legitimacy in phases of high innovation**. Strategies to promote socio-political legitimacy in the PPP lead to increasing distance between the norms and practices of the business school and the University.

9.5 CONCLUSION

The findings of the study hold implications for theory and for the broad field of PPPs. Firstly, contributions to theory emerge in several disciplinary areas and the discussion focuses on the theoretical connections based on the findings related to the meaning structure of the PPP network. This is the focus of Chapter 10. Secondly, explanations of PPP success derived from this study indicate significant areas in the professional field of PPPs that open the discussion for examination of the field in a new light. Indeed, actors at all the business schools project the enhancement of the relationship and the increasing success of the business schools.

CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

10.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the discussion of the findings focuses on distilling the theoretical contributions that emerged from the study. The chapter seeks to link the findings of the research to the body of theory that underpinned the research, extending the body of theoretical knowledge that **explains the success** of partnerships and **PPPs**. New theoretical insights were arrived at by examining existing theory and research in PPPs, strategic alliances and the NPM, and adopting the perspective that management theories should lead to positive change (Ghoshal, 2005). The focus of the study on explaining success locates it within the research tradition of ‘positive psychology’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) which calls for “...as much focus on strength as it is on weaknesses, as much interest in building the best things in life as on repairing the worst” (Ghoshal, 2005, p.86).

The chapter is organised into five main sections. The first section provides an overview of the research process undertaken so far. It examines the process from formulation of the research questions to arriving at findings. In the second section, the author undertakes an extended discussion of the theory, linking findings to the theory and identifying contributions. This is organised by **theoretical themes** that emerged from the findings in relation to each research question. The third section provides an evaluation of the conceptual framework with respect to its appropriateness to provide answers to the research questions. The assumptions, delimitations, and limitations of the study, are presented in section four. In the final section, a summary of the contributions is presented and opportunities for further research are identified.

10.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

10.1.1 Research Purpose

This study addressed the main research question:

- How do public private partnerships in the governance of business schools in the English-speaking Caribbean influence their performance?

The objective of the research was to:

1. Examine the factors that influence the PPP governance model in business schools in developing countries; and
2. Develop a dynamic model to guide actors in PPP governance arrangements in developing countries.

10.1.2 Research Process

In order to understand how PPPs fit into the overall study of partnerships the researcher undertook an examination of the field of PPPs to determine what has been studied and possible areas for research. The review of the literature found **that PPPs** create network forms of organising that uniquely combine features of hierarchies and markets (Thorelli, 1986). Although studies of PPPs were prolific, they were often evaluative and directed at political interest. These studies, however, yielded important concepts and a plethora of middle-range practical theories. Gaps in the field were found in relation to process studies that posed the ‘how’ question; what makes this work?

The study then moved to construct a theoretical framework that would provide a compelling and directed approach to the study. Explanations of PPP behaviour were found to rely on network theories (e.g. Gulati, 1998) and the concept of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) which explained ‘distortions’ in the expected behaviours of public and private actors as they engage in cross-sectoral partnering. Theoretical propositions from the literature focused on the purpose, structure and strategy of PPPs but did not connect these constructs to outcomes and did not examine the process of cross-sectoral partnering. The plethora of existing constructs in the field required the researcher to define particular boundaries and create an organising framework that defines and connects the dimensions of the relationship that were critical to successfully answering the research question. The design framework focused the study on the relational link between public and private actors in interactions at three levels: the group level within the PPP governance structure, the firm level, at which it examined the relationship with respect to organisational purpose, structure and strategy, and the environmental context of developing countries.

The research design was then developed (Chapter 5). Three case studies, using multiple methods and multi-level analysis allowed the research to obtain insights into how actors connected on purpose, structure and strategy in the evolution of successful PPPs.

The research design allowed the researcher to deep dive into the actual interactions through network analysis of actors in the governance arrangement.

10.1.3 Answering the Main Research Question

Two main instruments helped to guide the definition of sub-questions that guided the research. Based on the conclusion from the theoretical framework that network theory and legitimacy theory interacted to provide understandings of the factors that contribute to network success, propositions drawn from both theoretical positions guided the development of the first instrument (see Figure 2 p.81).

The conceptual framework was developed to focus the research on the relationship between purpose, structure and strategy in PPPs in small, developing countries in order to arrive at findings and that provide intertextual coherence (Locke and Golden-Biddle, 1997) in the field of PPPs (see Figure 3, p.85). Social network perspective and relational realism provided the relational emphasis and directed the study within the theoretical framework of the new sociology (Granovetter, 1990). Middle-range theories were drawn to explain the findings.

10.2 DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS: LINKING FINDINGS TO THEORY

10.2.1 Defining Attributes of the PPP Governance Structure (Research Question 1)

10.2.1.1 A strategy for Optimising Private Ideology

PPPs in developing countries may be considered organisational devices that emerge in actors' attempts to evolve the ideology of privatisation and competitive behaviour within institutions, and effect country development. To this end, the PPP organisation adopts varying attributes between hierarchies and markets (Powell, 1991) by the optimisation of space created through opportunities or constraints of the country and institutional environment. Where actors optimise spaces created by country need, the locus of control is external and this inspires commitment, but not necessarily the demonstration of corporate behaviour through achievement motivation (Weiner and Kukla, 1970; McClelland, 1965). This is affected by the embeddedness of actors within institutional contexts, as demonstrated in Gerran and Rotter. Where actors optimise

spaces in the ideological divide, as in Apple, and do so in the context of increasing competitive behaviour and mistrust in the space of optimisation, the locus of control is internal to actor sub-groups and inspires entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of private-sector actors (Ahmed, 1985). This increases the ideological divide between sub-groups but stimulates the growth of the PPP firm.

Actors in developing countries at different points in time are inspired to respond to external needs of the country environment or internal needs of the institution. When public and private actors interact at the level of governance, competitive behaviour is optimised when the space of interaction inspires private management practices, an internal locus of control and ownership for private-sector actors which results in the adoption of entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of the firm.

10.2.1.2 Theme 1: Moving from Private to Shared Purpose and Shared Value

Studies of PPPs have shown that **public agencies** enter into cross-sectoral strategic alliances for several reasons including political benefit (Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Savas, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2010; Elg and Johansson, 1997), risk sharing (Medda, 2007), resource sharing (Weiss, 1987), economic development across various sectors and institutions (Rondinelli and London, 2003; Widdus, 2001; Burke, 2010), and partnering to innovate for development (Samii et al., 2002). Government and public agencies generally seek to get more resources, satisfy norms and values, obtain political advantage, solve problems, reduce uncertainty, and obey legal mandates (Weiss, 1987). Engagement of the private sector by public agencies is usually triggered by crises and, as such, are generally “...pragmatic, functional, purpose driven and centred on economic development” (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). The findings of this study confirm this and also indicate that, in environmental conditions of severe social and economic challenges and strong social identity, public sector actors culturally embedded in the context are motivated by the development purpose.

This study also revealed that PPPs in small countries are established by the motivation and actions of the **private sector**. This finding counters the assertion of Datta (2009) that PPPs must be understood as a mechanism of bringing private resources into public projects, not public resources into private projects, so that they maintain their moral codes (Datta, 2009). The *first contextual contribution* of this study is the recognition

that in small countries, PPPs are also initiated and established by the voluntary action of private sector, who, when they connect with public sector agencies on similar needs in the environment, establishes a shared purpose that sustains the partnership. This study therefore contributes to the development of a **process theory for establishing shared purpose in PPPs motivated by private need**. The study also found that PPPs may include co-opted partners who hold radically differing ideologies about the purpose of acquiring particular resources.

The literature on strategic alliances claims that one's understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences one's contribution to their success (Austin, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Harrigan, 1985). In this study, shared purpose was found to be an optimising, though insufficient condition for establishment of private sector ideology and competitive strategy in the alliance. Where this occurred, it was facilitated by public-private disconnection at the level of the firm and the blurring of the boundaries between the PPP organisation as a non-profit, and as a profit-seeking enterprise. This study found that this occurs when private sector actors develop dense networks in conditions of internal competition between the PPP and its parent institution. The blurring of the boundary between successful for-profits and non-profits is one of the strong signs that creating shared value is possible (Porter and Kramer, 2011). The attainment of a shared purpose is an important factor in building the competitiveness of a country; it appears to be an important pre-cursor to the creation of shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2011).

10.2.1.3 Theme 2: Optimising Models of Cooperation

Berliner (1997) identifies drivers of collaborative efforts in a range of sectors and organisational forms, including education and business alliances, as the demand to do more with fewer resources, the need to establish new markets, the need for sharing expertise, and the need for professional learning communities. This study contrasts with the findings of Berliner (1997) on all these dimensions clarifying where they apply at different stages of PPP evolution and with varying understandings of the purpose of the alliance. This research revealed that PPPs engage in several models of partnering, based on the purpose, structure and human agency that influence the relationship. The partnering model is aligned with the expected partner contribution that could range from resource sharing to resource contribution to partner co-optation. Austin (2000)

produced a list of guidelines that include the seven ‘Cs’ of collaboration in strategic alliances and included establishing a connection-based purpose that engages people. This study found that, when partners connected on the need or opportunity for the PPP, this influenced their conception of their contribution. At Rotter and Apple, the University perceived the PPP to be appropriate to the needs of the private sector, but not necessary to them. As such, their contribution to the Board of Directors was viewed as a donation of time, ‘technical expertise,’ and in the case of Rotter, financial resources in academia. This finding provides the basis for the *second contribution* that actor engagement in PPPs varies with their connection to the purpose of the PPP and influences the model of collaboration and resource contribution which affects organisational outcomes and partners relationships. This suggests a refinement of the phrase “that engages people” proposed by Austin (2000) to include the connection and its implication. In this case, the opportunity exists to optimise the model of collaboration and produce an appropriate alliance strategy by examining how public and private actors connect on the purpose of the PPP and contribute resources to the attainment of purpose (Gomes-Casseres, 1998). This contribution also extends the proposition of Gulati (1998) that strategic alliances result in a new form of governance and decision-making process intended to maximize value of alliance partners (ibid.). Based on the findings of this study, it is claimed that the maximisation of value is achieved through optimisation of the model of collaboration.

This study also deviates from Berliner (1997) in the proposition that partnerships are driven by the need for sharing expertise and establishing professional learning communities. In the case of Apple and Gerran, the University actors expected the private sector to inform them of what was required to deliver a relevant business education and, in all cases, the University actors saw their role as the protection of academic quality and this resulted in the main, in University directors explaining to the private sector how academia worked in order to guide the strategy of the PPP. Private sector actors at Apple and Gerran, however, saw their role as sharing business expertise to develop the organisation through the insertion of private management practices into the operations of the business school. This is an opportunity for further research to determine how PPPs create professional learning communities through sharing of expertise and how this influences the attainment of the purpose of the PPP. This information would further serve to optimise the model of collaboration.

Berliner (1997) further suggests strategies to enhance success in partnerships including establishing a clear, shared sense of direction, adapting leadership to fit structure and moving from competition to collaboration (p.5). The findings of this research supported these conclusions but differed on several points. It was found that competition in PPPs is embodied in their structure based on the fact that the new PPP organisation is established to address the challenges of the parent organisation. In the case of business schools, this challenge is in the form of relevance and, as such, PPP success threatens the legitimacy of the parent institution on its right to deliver education, attacking the institution at its core purpose. As such, perceived internal competition in the partnership, during stages of rapid growth of the PPP, is an expected outcome. The findings also indicated the importance of adapting leadership to fit structure but as this was not the focus of this study, leadership of PPPs is suggested as an area for further research.

10.2.2 Composition and Structure of the PPP Governance Arrangement (Research Question 2)

10.2.2.1 Theme 3: Structuration and Network Flows

With this question, this study sought to explain how PPPs optimise their contribution to decision-making by examining the composition and structure of the board of directors. The research question was derived from concepts and theories of sociology, mainly drawn from the ‘new economic sociology’ as advocated and defined by Granovetter (1985), and network theory (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The theoretical framing responds to the observation that “...one area where a great deal of work remains is integrating network concepts and measures into more general social and behavioural science research” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:733). The study therefore adds to this area of theory described as ‘relational realism’ carved out from the integration of the two research traditions of sociology and network theory (Oliver and Myers, 2003; Fuhse, 2009; White et al., 2009; White, 1992).

The theory of structuration provides an integrative framework that links purpose and structure (Giddens, 1979; Giddens, 1984). The researcher aligns with Giddens (1979) and adopts the position that actors actively contribute to the success of organisations as decision-making by actors resulted in the restructuring of the governance arrangement

in ways that optimise value from the alliance. In explaining the evolution of industries, Granovetter (1992) suggested that "...stable economic institutions begin as accretions of activity patterns around personal networks. Their structure reflects that of the networks, and even when those are no longer in place, the institutions take on a life of their own that limits the forms future ones can take; they become 'locked in'" (p.9). This study found that university actors are motivated to adopt decisions that alter the historical network structure so as to maximise the value of alliance partners. The *third contribution* of the research is that optimisation of the network appears to occur under conditions of resource constraints and is dependent on the historical embeddedness of public actors and the development of trust at the executive level where public control is maintained. It is important to note that Granovetter (1990, p.106) discounted conceptions of determinism in the theory and proffered the explanation that "...outcomes can vary dramatically even for the same economic problems and technologies if the social structure, institutional history, and collective action are different and that these crucially limit and shape future possibilities". This contribution to the theory of strategic alliances in business schools located in small developing countries is supported by the 'network flow model' and 'network architecture' model of social network theorising (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). Utilising the 'network flow model', the *fourth contribution* of this research was distilled. It was found that in high-growth phases, PPP evolution was characterised by dense private-sector networks which develop under conditions of competitiveness and display contagion with respect to the flows of influence (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). This leads to a cognitive social structure (Krackhardt, 1987) that is private-sector dominant in its ideology and increasingly controlled by the sub-network of private actors in the governance of the voluntary PPP. Institutional embeddedness of university actors in their contexts contributed to the separation of roles in the social network, which established camps of responsibility for strategy on the part of the private sector and accountability for quality by the university. The social context of governance and university actor institutional embeddedness also compromises their participation in governance and contributes to disengagement. Disengagement of university actors is compounded in contexts of high levels of mistrust. This finding contributes to the theoretical dialogue on social networks and responds to the suggestion that "...since ties are multiple, fluid, and narratively constructed (and reconstructed) in relation to evolving timeframes, the new

challenge for network analysis...was to understand this link between temporality, language and social relations” (Mische. 2011, p.4).

The social network of actors in the PPP also included private actors who were representatives of institutions or sectors. Deep-level application of network theory and analysis of the social networks revealed that these social networks possess a strong private-sector cognitive social structure but their architecture includes friendship and professional ties, a criterion for private-sector actor selection that assumed actor support in obtaining market access (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). This was evident at Rotter and to some extent at Gerran and reflects the theory of small worlds (Kochen, 1989; Newman, 2000). The phenomenon was mitigated at Gerran by the domination of the networks of KOAs. Where there was evidence of the small world, private-sector actors demonstrated behaviours that were aligned with public-sector ideology, placing priority on social outcomes as opposed to profitability. Amongst other differences, an area of ideological difference between the public and private sector is the private sector’s focus on profitability and the public sector’s concern about impact on the community (Ghobadian et al. 2004a). The presence of trust in the network served to heighten the blurring of the structural boundaries, but did not achieve ideological flows. This finding contributes to the empirical literature on PPPs associated with the ‘blurring of the boundaries’ and the complexity of reconciling opposing values in the objective of PPPs to “...marry the best of both sectors’ in order to overcome the weaknesses of both” (Baru and Nundy, 2008, p.68).

10.2.2.2 Theme 4: Optimising Governance

The governance arrangements at Gerran and Rotter reflected elements that combined stakeholder, stewardship and agency theories in different ways. In the case of collaborating actors from various sectors and agencies the governance form, structure and order is the result of the interactions and relationships among influencing stakeholders (Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993, p.64). The models at Gerran and Rotter featured stakeholder involvement in corporate decision-making where trust relationships and business ethics were the main proposals for stake-holding management (Letza et al., 2004). This study found stakeholder governance PPPs included public control and private competitive strategy facilitated by private actor sub-group agency, with trust as a the coordinating mechanism (Jones et al., 1997).

At Rotter, the relationship bore features of a franchising arrangement in that the business school utilised the legitimacy of the University and the governance mechanism to establish a quasi-market in the tradition of the NPM (Powell and Exworthy, 2002; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; Bartlett et al., 1998a). In the case of Rotter, the governance mechanism developed as an integral part of the strategy of the firm. In this case, competitive strategy was not optimised. This study aligns with the suggestion and contribution by Mador et al. (2008) that the increasing presence and influence of third sector organisations “...require understanding of the privatisation process of these organisations based on the specific nature of their context and settings” (Mador et al., 2008, p.605).

At Apple, the separation of control and management reflected agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and this motivated the management of the school to higher levels of performance and competitive behaviour. This study contributes the proposition that PPP performance is optimised in governance mechanisms with public control and private strategic management structures. In this arrangement, the separation of management and control in dense networks of private actors on the Board of Directors serves to optimise the competitive purpose of the PPP. The emergence of the governance model and competitive behaviour (Daily et al., 2003; Cadbury, 1992; Benz and Frey, 2007) created tensions on the Board of Directors. The study found that university actors in protectionist roles in the governance of PPPs face role contradiction in that setting. Public actors in the PPP hold fiduciary responsibility to the university and, as such, in the absence of boundary spanning behaviours (Leifer and Delbecq, 1978; Noble and Jones, 2006) and a strategy of alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1998), developed protectionist behaviours as they perceived the PPP as a competitor. This finding is aligned with the expectations of corporate governance behaviours relating to particular fiduciary duties: the duty to act in the corporation’s interests and to not compete with the corporation (Kaplan, 1975). These rules would be breached by a protectionist and competitive stance that debar public actors from acting in the interest of the PPP (Kaplan, 1975). The *fifth contribution* of this study is that public actors face role ambiguity and develop protectionist behaviours as competitive relationships develop between the parent organisation and the PPP. Public actors face role ambiguity (Hartman and Johnson, 1989) and demonstrate protectionist behaviours which distort their role as fiduciaries for the corporation and create tensions between public and

private sub-groups. This contribution based on role theory (Van Sell et al., 1981; Hartman and Johnson, 1989; Biddle, 1979; Tubre and Collins, 2000) confirms the conclusion of Tubre and Collins (2000) that role ambiguity should not be dismissed as an unimportant variable determining job performance. This finding extends the contribution of Tubre and Collins (2000) by providing an explanation of **how** role ambiguity influences public actor performance in governance roles in PPPs.

10.2.3 Opportunities and Constraints of the PPP (Research Question 3)

10.2.3.1 Theme 5: Optimising Embeddedness through Boundary Spanning

This study has supported the view that PPPs derive purpose and are motivated by opportunities in the environment (Hodge and Greve, 2010) and that the environments of developing countries present unique challenges to the partnership (Jamali, 2004; Baru and Nundy, 2008; Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). Actors embedded in contexts perceive opportunities and constraints that subvert original plans and intentions and influence the direction of the partnership. Two other findings in this study related to the embeddedness directed the researcher to examine their implications with respect to boundary spanning. The discussion examines challenges of the PPP that emerged in the study from embeddedness of actors and the resultant perceptions of constraints and opportunities and contributes to the theory of boundary spanning.

The process by which members of an organisation participate in networks outside the organisation and manage the interface between the organisation and the environment is referred to as ‘boundary spanning’ (Newell & Swan, 2000). Leifer and Delbecq (1978) posit that “...persons who operate on the periphery or boundary of an organization, performing organizational relevant tasks, relating the organization with elements outside it, are called boundary spanners” (p.41). The study found that PPPs exist in a potentially competitive relationship with their parent institution and, in the absence of an appropriate boundary spanning strategy in the inter-organizational relationship, the growth of one organization negatively impacts the other. The study further revealed that boundary spanning activities found at all case sites focused on relationship management when actors are deeply embedded in their institutional contexts. The ***sixth contribution*** is that the focus of boundary-spanning activities on relationship management detracts from the strategic purpose of the PPP. This opposes the conclusion of Jones and Noble (2008) who emphasise relationships and the

development of social and psychological contracts in the process of boundary spanning during implementation of the PPP. The findings of this research lead to the contention that boundary spanning across organizations requires attention to strategy, rather than relationships, to produce ‘win-win’ outcomes for both partners.

The findings of this study support the conclusion of Noble and Jones (2006) that a strategy of boundary spanning in PPPs is required. The research confirms the value of an evolutionary approach to boundary spanning as advanced by Noble and Jones (2006) and, in the *seventh contribution* of this research, it is proposed that the boundary spanning strategy of PPPs must address the different levels of the organization, seeking opportunities and identifying particular roles and activities of boundary spanners in the evolution of the organization. The study found support for boundary spanning strategies that address opportunities (Baker, 2008), as opposed to the strategy of addressing challenges advanced by Noble and Jones (2006). The benefits of boundary spanning appear to emanate from the creation of collaborative mechanisms between the parent institutions and the PPP to derive value for both organizations throughout the evolution of the PPP. One of the outcomes of positive PPP relations is the development of trust.

10.2.3.2 Theme 6: Managing Trust

One of the findings in this study was the impact of trust on the PPPs. This section discusses trust as a process. Studies of alliances in all sectors have asserted that trust is important to the success of partnerships (e.g. Larson, 1992; Cross and Parker, 2004; Austin, 2000). In the opinion of Adler (2001, p.217), “...trust is the key coordinating mechanism in the community form” and institutional trust is important in the evaluation of partners in the arrangement. Eberl (2004, p.258) argues that “...trust is based on emotional bonding and thus cannot be fully controlled by organizational measures. Rather, organizational structure can provide a context that fosters closer relationships”. Following this argument, this study posits that effective boundary spanning will be able to contribute to trust building by optimising the relationship between actor sub-groups. Trust in institutions or ‘institutional trust’ “...depends on their perceived legitimacy, technical competence, and ability to perform assigned duties efficiently (Khodyakov, 2007, p.123). Using the process conceptualisation of trust, Khodyakov (2007) proposes that “...trust is a process of constant imaginative

anticipation of the reliability of the other party's actions based on (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor, (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partner's actions, and (4) the belief in the honesty and morality of the other side." (Khodyakov, 2007, p.126; McKnight and Chervany, 2000).

This study found that optimisation of the PPP is facilitated by trust in situations where embeddedness presents constraints to PPP performance. In this study, it was found that trust serves as a facilitator of positive relationships and incremental strategy, but debilitates rapid innovation in PPPs oriented as entrepreneurial organizations, especially during phases of high growth. This researcher argues against the proposition that success of a social network is related to the establishment of trust, collegial relationships and cultural identity, facilitated by concern for the development agenda (Fuhse, 2009) and proposes that the economic success of the PPP is propelled by a lack of trust between actor sub-groups and protectionist behaviours by public actors. This is the *eighth contribution* of this research. This researcher argued that development of institutional trust depends on effective boundary spanning and a strategy of alliances. These findings have implications for management in the development of trust through boundary spanning and an effective and dynamic strategy of alliances.

10.2.4 How Does the PPP Build Legitimacy? (Research Question 4)

10.2.4.1 Theme 7: Governance, Leadership, Strategy and Legitimacy

Moving away from public to private models for delivering public products and services results in tensions and political uncertainty (Ball, 2007; Peters and Pierre, 1998). In this study, business schools in small developing countries established PPPs in an effort to bring private-sector influences to the public offering of business education. The initiative is considered successful as the organizations have survived and attained legitimacy in the markets in which they are located. The PPPs represented a move towards privatisation, through their establishment as non-profit organizations governed by the university and private sector volunteers. It is noted that "...privatisation makes companies move from defensive and reactive strategies to analytical and prospective ones" (Zabalza and Matey, n.d. p.2). The firm relies more on deliberate strategies through the strategic planning process and strong signals from the market (Mintzberg, 1994; Miles et al., 1978). This study found that PPP evolution is directly related to its

privatisation and leadership strategy where the autonomy of the business school and a private cognitive social structure enhances its success. This occurs when control mechanisms align with an organizational strategy of competitiveness. This research advances, as its *ninth contribution*, a theory of ‘**voluntary business game**’ which contends that private-sector actors in dense networks in voluntary PPPs demonstrate sustained competitive behaviours in contexts of increasing internal competition and loose-coupling (Weick, 1976) of the private and public-sector actors and institutions. This is facilitated by differing ideologies with respect to purpose at the firm level and, building on the assertion of Whitty (2000) that privatisation could be understood as an attempt to contribute to privatisation in an ideological sense, the study advances a notion of ‘quasi-ideologisation’ as the outcome of the PPP arrangements in the context in which they were studied. Although existing studies demonstrate political motives on the part of PPPs using game theory this study aligns with Medda (2007) in the application of game theory as organizational strategy (Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Scharpf, 1997; Savas, 2000) and attributes private-sector competitiveness in PPPs to the formulation of a strategy for competitive advantage (Porter, 2008). At the level of the organization, this is based on the shared ideology of the private actor network that financial performance is an output indicator of business success, including the business of education. The application of game theory can be explored in further research that focuses on analysing actual decisions taken within the board of directors. This is included as a delimitation of this work due to inaccessibility to minutes of the meetings of the boards of directors across the case sites.

Private sector-driven strategies are aligned with the development of socio-political legitimacy and, in the case of rapidly advancing socio-political legitimising of the PPPs, the public partner serves as a legitimising resource to the PPP. This finding links the two forms of legitimacy judgment advanced by Aldrich and Fiol (1994) and distils the *tenth contribution* of the research, proposing the thesis that cognitive legitimacy by the public institution increasingly functions as an antithesis to socio-political legitimacy and threatens the PPP relationship. In this study, where the development of socio-political legitimacy was tightly coupled with the advance of the PPP as a business entity, corporate governance practices were evident and leadership and management accountability was primary. It is proposed that when organizations understand the basis

from which their legitimacy in society derives (Brown, 2001), and work consistently towards its attainment, they increase their chances of survival in the environment.

10.2.4.2 Theme 8: Strategy of Relevance

The study commenced with the problem of relevance in business education (Clinebell and Clinebell, 2008; Boyd et al., 2010; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; Grey, 2004; Hawawini, 2005; Ivory et al., 2006; Mintzberg, 2004). Studies have located the problem as a gap between theory and practice of business and advanced several solutions to ‘bridge the gap’ in the scholar-practitioner divide (Hay and Heracleous, 2009) or ‘gap the bridge’ (Weick, 2001), based on their perspective of the problem. Researchers located the problem in various areas of business schools’ operations including research, the curriculum and the relationship between them (Mintzberg, 2004; Starkey and Madan, 2001) and offered suggestions that addressed the student as the output of the system (Moldoveanu and Martin, 2008) and the professionalization of business schools by enhancing their reputation (Rindova et al., 2010; Baden-Fuller and Hwee Ang, 2001; Baden-Fuller et al., 2000). Other researchers proposed the management of interdependencies and complex relationships (Boyd et al., 2010) and the employment of strategies that allow for the meeting of ‘fads’ and ‘fundamentals’ of management (Weick, 2001). This research was undertaken to seek a scientifically validated suggestion for the governance of business schools in small developing countries and to offer a thesis of relevance as the objective of the governance mechanism of business schools in those settings. To this end, the study found that the PPP strategy was a useful and appropriate start to addressing the problem of relevance. The study found that boundary spanning strategies that advance opportunities for shared value through resource optimisation in the network contribute to the success of the network. In order to survive they must compete in the context of scarce resources and, as such, develop a dynamic strategy of alliances that optimises the collaborative advantage (Kanter, 1994), spanning the environment to move towards shared purpose at the broadest level, and internal and external boundary spanning in an institutional framework that brings reputation that redefines professionalization in business education (Trank and Rynes, 2003) and draws out innovation and enterprise through collaboration.

10.3 EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study was undertaken by examining the PPP governance mechanism through the relationship between public and private-sector actors on phenomena related to the purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP. The research drew on variables at three levels: the environment, the PPP organization and governance, and focused on the directors of the business schools as the main data source. The conceptual framework was found to be wholly appropriate to the study. It was constructed on an appropriate theoretical framework that aligned network perspective and theory with legitimacy theory and provided the researcher with the opportunity to draw on deep and mid-range theories and to fully integrate ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ perspectives (Pike, 1954) to explore the PPP phenomenon and contribute to theoretical knowledge in the field.

10.4 ASSUMPTIONS, DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The study of public-private relationships included a number of ways in which the researcher proactively prevented an undertaking to do it all and reactively responded to situations encountered in the process of conducting the research, yet giving attention to the ‘making’ of validity of the process and confidence in the findings (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008, p.988).

10.4.1 Assumptions

1. PPP success is defined as social judgment and is evaluated on the basis of the cognitive and socio-political legitimacy of strategies adopted by the organization. There are other bases for judgment of the success of the PPP which adopt other indicators of success. These are dependent on the perspective and criteria of other evaluators. Social judgment is considered an appropriate construct to explain PPP survival in the context of the study as the organizational activities were undertaken in the public domain and in the interest of the ‘cause’ of business education.
2. The study assumed a causal relationship between purpose, structure and strategy of an organizational form. It also assumed a causal relationship between the contribution of public and private actors on the Board of Directors and the development of organizational legitimacy.

3. The study assumed the cases shared similarities that could be examined to produce a powerful theory of PPPs in the context of developing countries. The justification for this assumption was premised on two main contextual realities. Firstly, there were institutional similarities between the business schools based on their attachment to the same University and establishment during the same time period. Secondly, there were environmental similarities based on their shared historical evolution from colonialism and existence of a ‘Caribbean identity’ developed through interactions in a shared geographic and trading space.
4. The study assumed that interactions between actor sub-groups at the governance level impacted the strategic direction of the PPP as a firm. This assumption was justified as the PPP governance arrangement was the most tangible structure for the inclusion of the private sector.

10.4.2 Delimitations

10.4.2.1 Contextual Delimitations at Country Level

The study was delimited in relation to the environmental context at all the levels at which the relationship was examined. At the country level, the study was conducted in countries classified as small, developing countries.

10.4.2.2 Contextual Delimitations at Firm Level

The relationship between public and private actors was examined mainly from the perspective of the Board of Directors. The PPP, in this context, was established as a new firm and, as such, the examination considered the actions of public and private actors in relation to the governance of the new firm and with respect to the impact on the parent organizations. The justification for the focus on the firm level is that it constituted a legally defined structure within the PPP and a clearly defined point of interaction between actor sub-groups. Further, the assumption of actor sub-group contribution was the focus of the study and the individual actor contribution was not actively investigated.

10.4.2.3 Contextual Delimitations at Actor Sub-Group Level

There was no differentiation of the private sector into size of companies, ownership structure, or any other variables that distinguished the nature of private contribution, except that which emerged in the case of Rotter.

10.4.3 Limitations of the Study

10.4.3.1 Theoretical Limitations

The study is underpinned by the network perspective and legitimacy theory. Whilst the network perspective is wholly appropriate for understanding the relationship between partners, the theories that explain alliances and partnerships are essentially drawn from research conducted on the private sector and public governance. Limitations therefore arise from the application of these theories to the cross-sectoral analysis.

10.4.3.2 Managerial Limitations

The study was conducted solely in the context of business schools in small developing countries. As such, generalizability of findings is limited to similar contexts. The use of the dynamic model for guiding actors in PPP governance mechanisms will also depend on the skill of the practitioner in the consulting process.

10.4.3.3 Limitations of the Findings

1. Theoretical saturation was not possible due to the small number of cases and the limitations of the use of methods. Although selected for their similarity, the differences between the cases emerged the most relevant issues pertaining to the study of PPPs in business schools in small developing countries.
2. The findings of the study are limited by the skills of the researcher. Attentiveness to evidence, the ability to analyze and interpret evidence were skills of the researcher that constrained the findings and interpretations in areas, but also advanced knowledge in others.
3. The findings are also limited by the level of physical and psychological access to respondents and evidence. Interpretation of evidence considered the context of the research and that of respondents, attempting to ‘wade’ through the

responses to distil the psycho-social content of the discourse and create the optimal ‘mosaic’ of causation with respect to PPP performance. Interference at various physical and psychological levels would have constrained access and impacted the research process.

4. The study did not actively interrogate many of the issues that emerged and, as such, findings are closely coupled to issues of governance and cross-sectoral partnering, rather than to other issues such as motivation at the individual actor level. This is a limitation of the critical realist approach to the study and provides an agenda for further research.

10.5 MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH: A RESEARCH AGENDA

The PPPs which comprised the site for empirical investigation of the research question all survived and grew in different ways. Yet, none of them appeared to be maximising the contribution of partners. At Gerran, private sector attributes of competitive behaviour and the University’s knowledge system were not optimised, mainly due to embeddedness in the country and institutional environment. At Apple, competitiveness and growth of the PPP was attained by sacrificing the relationship with the University and, at Rotter, the growth of the University itself did not include the business school in product innovation and restricted its contribution to overall support for their activities. Where actor sub-groups dominated the relationship, their behaviour appeared to be motivated by their own need for reputation, goal attainment, demonstration of personal competence or the possibilities of private ideology. The inspiration of the ‘other’ was not evident, yet, this appears to be the solution for maximising the potential of the partnership. Inspiration was reflected in the partnership, but at the actor level, and related to the need to learn from the other.

This study contributes a theory of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ in cross-sectoral partnerships in business schools in small, developing countries. The concepts of ‘creativity’ and ‘inspiration’ derived from Western literary traditions are applied to the findings of this study from the work of Timothy Clarke (Clark, 2001). It is noted that ‘inspiration’ has not been subject to debate and instead accommodated within the ‘ecstatic intuition’ or ‘Romantic imagination (ibid., p.1). The relevance of the concept to governance derives from the translation of inspiration according to Derrida (quoted

in Clarke, 2001, p.1): “In ‘The poetic’, Derrida writes “let us say it, would be that which you desire to learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other and under diction, by heart’...inspiration has barely been part of a continuously sustained tradition of debate”

The thesis of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ removes the responsibility for governance from the pinnacle of the firm and locates it wherever the heart of the firm lies, through the art of composition of strategy. Clark (2001) explains the process of inspiration as “...the process of composition as the site of a unique, valuable and rare transformation and even revolution of the psyche; in a word, ‘inspiration’” (quotations in original). This appears to be an appropriate scientific explanation for success in PPPs, presenting an opportunity to bridge the ‘self-referential’ and ‘auto-poetic’ nature of these systems that prevent communication across them (Kieser and Leiner, 2009).


Indeed, the process of learning across the firms spreads the ‘inspiration’ to do right and good by finding the best where it exists. Perhaps the creation of value lies at the feet of the most uninspired employee, but most importantly, there must be connection from the feet to the head and vice-versa. What is governance? What forms will it take? What actions will it look like? Where will it be located and how will it work? The findings of the study have demonstrated that governance in PPPs and cross-sectoral alliances occur in spaces of optimisation that emerge out of psycho-social and environmental conditions. The ‘fluidity of spaces’ is reflective of the postmodern tradition of ‘liquid modernity’ which posits that value is derived in spaces created within the context of man (Bauman, 2000). Based on the findings of the study, the research suggests we optimise by starting from the heart of man and strategizing outwards.

This study has revealed that PPPs represent the moving ideology of privatisation across levels and time. The purpose of ‘relevance’ inspired at the country or institutional level, where it is shared, becomes a ‘cause’. This creates the opportunity to optimise the process of a purpose becoming a cause. The structure of ‘institution’ becomes ‘partnership’ in the PPP arrangement and creates an opportunity to link the ‘cause’ to the ‘organization strategy’ in the PPP. Governance becomes a strategy to ‘inspire’ by optimising the linkage of ‘cause’ to ‘partnership strategy’. This process has time and effect outcomes and relational outcomes based on how it evolves in societies. The ideology moves by structuration based on the needs of the people, rather than any overt

changes in public or private institutional characteristics. The thesis of corporate governance as inspiration is proposed as a mechanism for inspiring change in the professionalisation of business education in PPPs in small developing countries.

The research revealed that in the absence of an articulated alliance strategy (Gomes-Casseres, 1998) beyond the legal instruments by which they were established, the PPPs evolved mechanisms that contributed to their sustainability and legitimacy in the societies in which they existed. The main findings of the study and the theoretical contributions are illustrated in the Findings Model below. The contributions are derived by extending models, adding to theoretical discussions and emphasising contradictions where they apply. The theorists and theories to which this study contributes are included in the model. The model includes the PPP environment as a source of opportunities for action within the PPP organization. The performance of the PPP is assessed in the 'zone of judgment' and this provides impetus for change and evolution of the PPP.

Figure 23: PPP Findings Model



The findings of this study hold implications for social policy and management practice.

CHAPTER 11: CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY AND PRACTICE

11.0 INTRODUCTION

The findings and theoretical contributions of this study have several implications for organizational development in PPPs in small, developing countries of the English-speaking Caribbean. In this discussion chapter, the findings of the study are examined in relation to policy and management practice. The author attempts to achieve ‘intertextual coherence’ by problematizing the findings of the study in relation to the existing literature on cross-sectoral alliances (Locke and Golden-Biddle, 1997), including the presence of PPPs in business education that are motivated by the private sector. This is attempted to offer guidance based on the findings related to PPPs and their implications for higher education policy.

Consistent with the objective of the research to generate a dynamic model of partnerships that would guide the development of PPPs and cross-sectoral relationships, the study provides a model for interrogating the partnership to understand its attributes and evaluate its potential to contribute to its purpose. The contribution of the study to policy resides in the questions that would guide decision-makers in small, developing countries to assess the value of the PPP in order to effect policy decisions that impact the future of these organizations that are motivated by societal needs.

11.1: INSERTION INTO THE FIELD OF PPPS

11.1.1 Redefinition of PPP in the Context

PPPs examined in this study exist in ‘liquid spaces of interaction’ (Lichtenstein et al., 2006) inspired by actors in ‘semi-autonomous spheres’(Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004a) of public and private institutions, seeking solutions with the other, against legitimacy threats and perceived gaps by the other. Actors participate in different ways, based on whether the PPP is perceived as an opportunity or constraint and their own position as one of resource limitation, support or inspiration. The embeddedness of actors in their institutional contexts and configured identity in the ‘space of interaction’ creates tensions and institutional distortions which influence their participation and PPP performance. The PPPs challenge institutional norms, and agency is more an “act of interpretation” (Suddaby et al., 2010, p.1239) of the meaning

of structure of the network. PPPs and their parent organisations develop cognitive and socio-political legitimacy in the resolution of the gap, in a process that inspires innovation from one or the other.

11.1.2 Evolution of a Model of Collaboration

Based on this re-definition of PPPs and the model of collaboration in the context, several deviations from the existing literature on PPPs arise which bear policy implications for publicly funded universities and PPPs in developing countries. These will be identified in relation to the critical success factors and policy recommendations to support PPPs in education in developing countries, extending the suggestions advocated by Jamali (2004). Voluntary private participation in the PPPs studied requires reconsideration of some of the conclusions regarding private investment. Firstly, the notion ‘return on investment’ as advanced by Scharle (2002) must be understood in terms of PPP performance. Secondly, the ‘latent’ reasons for inviting private participation do not always reside in the differences between public and private (Jamali, 2004, p.417) but, as revealed in the study, may be undertaken in an effort to defend against legitimacy threats. It is noted that because of the stronger position of the private partner, more stringent governmental regulation and transparent regulatory frameworks are needed (Pongsiri, 2002; Scharle, 2002). It is also necessary to remove threats to market competition to inspire private actors. The extent to which there is confidence in these affects the participation of the private sector in PPPs.

11.1.3 Redefinition of the PPP Problem for National Policy

PPPs in education and other projects across the world are currently understood as the transfer of financial and other forms of risk from government to the private sector where it appears to be better managed, and the transfer of management practices from the private to the public sector for political gain (Medda, 2007). This study found that:

- ❖ In business schools in small, developing countries, the PPP problem is redefined as a means of bringing the ideology of privatisation into the public ‘cause’ of education by challenging institutional rights, norms, capabilities and legitimacy. PPPs acknowledge the right of the private sector to do so, as they seek appropriate solutions to problems faced by business and society.

This reality has implications for national systems of accountability and financing of education in small, developing countries. Developing countries are constrained by regulatory and financial constraints (Pessoa, 2008) which can impact PPPs and their parent organizations in the context of constrained resources and decision-making for optimisation. At the national level, understanding PPPs has been a process of ideological suspicion and the questioning of partners' rights and roles. Evaluators have challenged the competencies and roles of the public sector (Peters, 1997) in general and in service sectors, including education, with the stinging and unhelpful intent to highlight incompetence and inefficiency (Ball, 2007). Motivation to engage in partnerships has depended on evaluation of risk and determination of private gain based on level of risk. This study, however, focused on PPPs that emerged from need, with no consideration of risk in the relationship. The PPP problem appears to be the transfer or sharing of resources at different levels of the organization and the determination of what resources should be best transferred by which actors and in what areas of need.

11.2 PROBLEMATISING PRIVATE SECTOR PPPS

11.2.1 The Right to Public Financing and Resources

Two of the PPPs in this study were initiated by the private sector's interest and intervention in business education which threatened the fundamental role of the University as provider of relevant education and triggered their response. The success of the PPPs appeared to establish the right of the private sector as a participant in education provision and, in one case, directly threatened the legitimacy of the University as provider.

Publicly funded universities in small, developing countries are the centre of education for economic development and, as such, tend to receive preferential treatment with respect to public financing and support. This is not the case in large countries where private involvement is often evident through the activities of large corporations in education (Pessoa and Frias, July 2008). Indeed, the business schools in the study attempted to involve government representatives and other key public sector players who could ensure equity in the provision of financing for business school endeavours.

11.2.2 The Demand for Competent Regulatory Frameworks

PPPs in education in small, developing countries interface with two direct areas of national policy: regulation or accreditation and financing. Questions regarding the legitimacy of the PPPs in society and the capacity of government agencies to understand and support them were raised by (Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004a) who asked:

“Do the new actors or governance arrangements have legitimacy? Does the public trust them, the courts, the privatized companies, the independent regulatory agencies, the expert networks, the large business enterprises? What is the relationship between institutional controls and trust? How ‘independent’ are independent regulatory agencies... Who controls the controllers? What are the roads for public discourse on the performance of governance mechanisms, criticism, redress?” (p. 158)

PPPs, based on the purpose for which they are established, deviate from the norms of institutions and require new competences of regulators who must judge their value. As such, regulators themselves must be considered competent, independent and legitimate (Pessoa, 2007). To this end, small developing countries must undertake steps to ensure transparency and competence in the public system mandated to manage and control PPP activities.

11.3 EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR PPPS IN EDUCATION

A review of the extant literature demonstrates that research on the performance of PPPs in education has not been able to connect the strategy of PFIs with school performance based on student success (Kakabadse et al., 2007; Jamali, 2004; Davies and Hentschke, 2006; Jones and Bird, 2000; Gibson and Davies, 2008). Indicators of performance at the level of primary and secondary education include output indicators of test scores and, only in some cases, on the happiness of teachers and students in the learning context (Gibson and Davies, 2008). Based on the findings of this research, it is recommended that the evaluation focus of the policy maker with regard to PPPs in education should be based on the academic capabilities that would lead to business and management change, and national development in emerging economies (Liefner and Schiller, 2008).

Table 47: Dimensions of Performance Important to Policymakers: Start-up Phase of PPP

Phase of development: Start up	Assessing capabilities of the PPP in business education	Indicators of performance (Policy makers build capability to manage and evaluate PPPs on these indicators)
Purpose	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How connected is the purpose to national developmental goals? 2. To what extent do actors align with the vision and purpose of developing competitively? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expressions of purpose • Actions aligned with purpose
Structure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How does the governance arrangement provide for competitive strategy? 2. How does the PPP provide for accountability within its structure? 3. To what extent do the structures of the PPP align with the need for public accountability on the attainment of the purpose of the PPP? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control • ‘Ownership’ of the cause • Commitment to the cause • Level of trust and collaboration at the site of action
Competitive strategy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How does the PPP plan to achieve self-sustainability? 	Financial and programme management
Leadership strategy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the leader’s orientation to leadership across both organizations? 2. What is the leader’s orientation to issues that would arise across both organizations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic plan • Strategy of alliances • Indicators of influence on critical thought
Performance outcomes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How will the PPP assess its performance? 2. How is the performance of each partner addressed? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impact of research, teaching innovation and programme innovation • Knowledge emergence processes

At the growth phase of the PPP, policymakers in small, developing countries are faced with decisions regarding the allocation of funding among institutions. Table 48 includes some of the questions for consideration at this phase.

Table 48: Dimensions of Performance Important to Policymakers: Growth Phase of PPP

Phase of development: Approach to government through the window of need (Baker, 2008)	Assessing capabilities of the PPP in business education	Indicators of performance (Policy makers support PPPs in refining these indicators)
Purpose	1. How connected is the purpose to national developmental goals? 2. To what extent do actors align with the vision and purpose of developing competitively?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expressions of purpose • Actions aligned with purpose
Structure	1. How does the governance arrangement provide for competitive strategy? 2. How does the PPP provide for accountability within its structure? 3. To what extent do the structures of the PPP align with the need for public accountability on the attainment of the purpose of the PPP? 4. How has the structure changed, and what is its impact on the accountability of the PPP?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control • ‘Ownership’ of the cause • Commitment to the cause • Level of trust and collaboration at the site of action
Competitive strategy	1. To what extent is the PPP developing self-sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial and programme management • Programme evolution
Leadership strategy	1. What is the leadership’s orientation to managing complexity across both organizations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reflects the social-psychology of managing spaces to optimise both • Influencing critical thought
Outcomes	2. What performance measures have emerged which are useful for internal communication and for communicating to the public?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impact of research, teaching innovation and programme innovation • Impact on development • Relationships across institutions

11.4 THE FUTURE OF PPPS

The future of PPPs appears to be best understood from a broad consideration of the future capabilities of man and society to solve problems through innovation. Indeed, all the respondents in the study pointed to the enlargement of the PPP presence and agenda

in the solution of the problems of their countries and region. It is expected that alliances will continue to be formed with non-traditional partners of opposing ideologies. It is the reality claimed by the philosophical orientation to life of ‘liquid modernity’ which moves the problem beyond postmodernism into a reality that is fluid and adaptive (Bauman, 2000). Systems should be “...flexible enough not to bar freedom of future movements in the constantly changing volatile circumstances...(o)r the precariousness of human partnerships now burdened with expectations greater than ever, yet poorly, if at all, institutionalized, and therefore less resistant to the added burden (Bauman, 2000, p.50). The problem will continue to exist with respect to optimising PPPs, by optimising institutionalised systems to support them as they create shared value for the common good.

11.4.1 Gerran: Inspiring Innovation in Teaching, Learning and Research

The main insight from Gerran Business School with respect to the continuity of the PPP was related to the importance of the programme content. One respondent indicated:

“I don’t think the Board is the key to the public private partnership... The key to it is establishing those relationships and it’s not just the relationships which I say we already have.” (#2 Pub Director, Gerran)

The comment suggests that the future of the PPP lies in the space from which the problem emerged: relevance of the curriculum. This is consistent with the findings of the study and it is recognised that leadership of the schools appeared to be a major factor in their survival and growth. Regulatory frameworks that recognise the advances of this PPP would be inclined to provide support for its curriculum innovation efforts.

11.4.2 Apple: A PPP at Crossroads of Separation

The PPP at Apple appears to present a direct threat to the legitimacy of the University. This has occurred in the context of a lack of boundary-spanning behaviour and attempts to optimise the space of interaction for transfer of learning. One respondent indicated that the PPP governors should:

“If the School is the graduate management school of Green University, then it should align its mission with that of Green University and concentrate on delivering academic programmes... As a constituent part of Green University, the debilitating undermining and internal

competition... should cease because there would be no reason for it.”
(#7 Pub KOA, Apple)

Based on the findings, this would re-constitute the business school into the very institutionalisation it was created to avoid and restrict its autonomy and entrepreneurial and innovative behaviour, thereby threatening its success and restricting its purpose of country development based on competitiveness. As such, the researcher disagrees with this recommendation. In this case, the research presents an option of optimising boundary spanning behaviour with a view to redesign the institutional framework within which management and business education must co-exist in a seamless relationship. The public policy framework would need to support the innovative purpose of the PPP and build institutional capability within the public sector to continually understand its purpose and evaluate its impact.

11.4.3 Rotter: A PPP at Crossroads of Reintegration

The PPP at Rotter appeared to be divorced from the product innovation that was evident at the Rotterdam campus of the University. As such, respondents indicated the possibility of its reintegration into the main campus from where it can be better supported in its purpose. One respondent indicated her vision of the future:

“Perhaps a lot of the other guard would have moved on and so we would have an emergence of people who understand these kinds of movement... and understands the value of having the school of business aligned to the university way.” (#2 Priv KOA, Rotter)

Loose-coupling of the University and the private sector is supported by the findings of the study, yet, in the case where the PPP did not evolve a product strategy, reintegration appears to be an optimal solution. Having a critical mass of persons who understand the nature of the PPP and cross-sectoral alliances at all levels, and across all sectors, is a rational and hopeful recommendation for PPPs in small, developing societies. In this and all cases, government would be encouraged to support research and development of the ‘third sector’ organizations in ways that stimulate purposive action in relation to social problems.

Having explored the broad alignment of the findings of the study with the field of business education in small, developing countries and suggested an analytical generalisation and implication for policy with respect to cross-sectoral alliances, the

study now turns to the process by which the firm, as a PPP, can optimise its performance.

11.5 MANAGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE

The findings and theoretical contributions of the study provide the basis for the development of a '**management tool**' for evaluation of the performance of PPPs and development of an optimised model of boundary spanning leadership. The management tool comprises a series of suggested questions to evaluate PPPs with respect to the way in which they combine public and private sector ideology, organizational structures and institute governance mechanisms to produce a new form that will be able to deliver public services and attain their defined purpose. PPPs are usually considered to be "... a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the private sector to achieve a common objective while both players pursue their own individual interests" (Pessoa, 2008, pp.3-4). As such, the management tool is developed on the assumption that the PPP is 'locked in' to the shared purpose of partners.

The model focuses on optimising the PPP and is therefore congruent with the tradition of 'positive psychology' (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This is considered an important contribution to the practice of PPPs which usually engage institutions and actors over long periods of time and with defined value creation propositions for both public and private partners. Indeed, it is also considered critical for business schools in the continuing search for relevance, the purpose for which the business schools, included in the study, were established. The model is not theoretically limited to optimisation and will also guide the establishment of new PPPs as the questions raised will alert actors to the potential change 'crises' that require reorienting of the PPP and its actor sub-groups to its purpose.

11.5.1 Description of the Management Tool

11.5.1.1 Optimising Purpose, Structure and Strategy

The management tool includes a series of suggested actions to determine how the purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP are adapted in the fluid environment of actor sub-group interactions. The actions are directly related to the findings of the study (Table 49).

Table 49: Management Tool to Guide PPP Performance

PPP Dimensions	Research Findings and Suggested Actions
<p>Optimising actor connection on purpose of the PPP</p>	<p>F1. Shared purpose in the PPP was a result of connection on economic and social variables that affected a broad range of stakeholders, including those external to the PPP or its parent institutions. This only resulted when both the public and private sectors were motivated by similar needs (How did they arrive at similar needs?)</p> <p>F12. PPPs derive purpose and are motivated by opportunities in the environment. The social and economic challenges of developing country contexts provide opportunities for the contribution of both sub-groups to enhance country competitiveness</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revisit actor sub-group congruence with respect to their understanding of the purpose of the partnership. 2. Examine the motivation of actors on institutional and country variables that influence the purpose of the PPP. 3. Examine connections between actor sub-groups on the needs to be addressed by the partnership <p>F8. The institutional history and context of the PPP may produce a set of variables that motivate strong contribution of one actor sub-group.</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Examine the variables that motivate strong contribution by actor sub-group 5. Examine rationale for constrained participation of the other partner
<p>Optimising actor connection on PPP governance structure</p>	<p>F2. PPPs may be established as efforts to bring private resources into public projects or public resources into private projects. University actors facilitated the business school as a revenue generating unit that addressed the training needs of the private sector; an agenda that was outside of the purview of the University and perhaps paradoxical to the purpose of the university itself. This occurred despite the absence of a plan for financial contributions of the business schools to the University (Organization)</p> <p>F3. PPPs may include co-opted partners who hold differing ideologies, for the purpose of acquiring particular resources (Organization). The forms of PPP co-operation range from tolerance to contribution and support. The ‘happy marriage’ analogy may be revised to a ‘functional relationship’</p> <p>F4. PPPs engage in several models of partnering, based on the purpose, structure and human agency that influence the relationship. The partnering model is aligned with the expected partner contribution that could range from resource sharing to resource contribution. (Organization)</p> <p>F6. Public actors are motivated to adopt decisions that alter the historical network structure so as to maximise the value of alliance partners. PPP governance networks are restructured in response to constraints in the environment. This is dependent on the historical embeddedness and retention of public control and the development of trust at the executive level of the PPP</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Examine the model for resource sharing to determine the nature of resources and relation to the PPP purpose. 2. Examine the efficiency and effectiveness of resource sharing model.

PPP Dimensions	Research Findings and Suggested Actions
	<p><i>3. Examine the structure and roles of partners in the arrangement</i></p> <p>F5. PPPs result in a new governance form intended to derive particular resources and value from alliances partners. The PPP demonstrates close coupling of purpose and structure to derive particular benefits from actors. (Organization).</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <p><i>1. Examine the connection between purpose and strategy</i></p> <p>F9. High levels of mistrust leads to academic protectionism which constrains the opportunity for mutual learning between partners in the PPP.</p> <p>F10. Public actors in protectionist roles in the governance of PPPs face role contradiction at that level, especially in competitive contexts</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <p><i>1. Examine the participation of actors in roles and determine measures to optimise their participation in the PPP.</i></p> <p><i>2. Examine issues that impact trust and assess this in relation to strategy and purpose of the PPP and determine the implications for boundary spanning.</i></p> <p><i>3. Construct opportunities to inspire innovation in both organizations.</i></p>
Optimising actor connection on organizational strategy	<p>F7. In the absence of a strategy of alliances, expectations of private contribution to governance on a Board of Directors are distorted by the cognitive embeddedness of private-sector actors in institutional frameworks.</p> <p>F14. Optimisation of the PPP is facilitated by trust in situations where embeddedness presents constraints to PPP performance.</p> <p>F17. PPP evolution is directly related to its privatisation and leadership strategy. The autonomy of the business school and a private cognitive social structure enhances its success. This occurs when performance management practices of the organization are aligned with a strategy of competitiveness.</p> <p>F11. In small, developing countries, the growth of the PPP organization is directly related to the strategy for optimising of private-sector ideology in the network.</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <p><i>1. Examine the ideology of privatisation in the PPP.</i></p> <p><i>2. Determine to what extent private-sector ideology is institutionalised in the environment.</i></p> <p><i>3. Assess the contribution of private-sector actors in relation to expectations.</i></p> <p><i>4. Determine how embeddedness is influencing actor sub-group behaviour</i></p> <p>F13. PPPs exist in a potentially competitive relationship with their parent institution and, in the absence of an appropriate boundary spanning strategy, the growth of one organization negatively impacts the other.</p> <p>F15. Boundary spanners in PPPs in business schools must possess technical legitimacy in both the University and private sector in order to effectively undertake this task.</p> <p>F16. Boundary spanning activities are focused on relationship management when actors are deeply embedded in their traditional contexts. The focus on relationship management detracts from the strategic purpose of the PPP. Organizations that understand the basis from which their legitimacy in society derives, and work consistently towards its attainment, increase their chances of survival in the environment.</p>

PPP Dimensions	Research Findings and Suggested Actions
	<p>F18. Trust is a facilitator of relationships and incremental strategy but debilitates rapid innovation in business schools as education organizations.</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Determine the outcome for partner organizations in the PPP. 2. Examine the actions of boundary spanners in the PPP. 3. Examine the institutional embeddedness within the PPP. 4. Craft opportunities for boundary spanning and innovative destruction of institutionalised processes and structures. 5. Build inspiration within the network to address opportunities for both organizations
<p>Optimising PPP relationship based on emerging legitimacy outcomes</p>	<p>F19. In PPPs, cognitive legitimacy is the antithesis of socio-political legitimacy in phases of high innovation. Strategies to promote socio-political legitimacy in the PPP leads to increasing distance between the norms and practices of the business school and the University.</p> <p>Concerns for Review</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Determine the extent to which actors are committed to the ideology of privatisation. 2. Explore the ways in which their development will influence each other. 3. Craft change management strategies for boundary spanners within both organizations.

The questions highlighted in Table 49 are intended to interrogate the PPP on its purpose, structure and strategy. This however, will only provide information regarding that status of PPP performance and issues in the relationship. The management of the relationship relies on one's adoption of private ideology and 'positive psychology' in leading others to seek opportunities that arise for both partners in the PPP environment. This strategy based on the thesis of 'corporate governance as inspiration' addresses the issue of leadership in the PPP context of a fluid relationship between ownership and control.

11.5.1.2 Optimising Governance and Leadership

The purpose of the PPP is determined at establishment, with public and private actors having some idea of how the PPP aligns with the institutional purpose of the public actors. Purpose becomes strengthened, or threatened, for either public or private partners as the PPP develops. The role of boundary spanners (Baker, 2008; Jones and Noble, 2008) becomes important and the way in which they seek opportunities to creatively destroy the organization (Schumpeter, 1942) and enhance relevance must be

examined. While the thesis did not confirm ‘How do PPPs work?’ it raised a new question of ‘Where do PPPs work?’ and guides the direction of further research to examine the issue of leadership.

The model of PPP performance is based on an extension of the causal links between purpose, structure and strategy of the PPP, considering the influence of environmental, organizational and group level variables that continue to impact the PPP. The model includes the considerations and questions in relation to the alliance strategy, the organizational outcomes and legitimacy evaluation of the PPP, based on the findings of the study, and seeks to guide the governance model of PPPs in business schools in small, developing countries.

11.6 CLOSING REFLECTIONS

This thesis is as much about the DBA doctoral process as it is about corporate governance in cross-sectoral partnerships. In this process of attempting to become a scholarly professional (Phillips and Pugh, 2000) the researcher identified a research challenge that held her passion in her own professional trajectory in the real world. The DBA project became an attempt to seek a sustainable solution that respected the academic process, recognising the challenge of producing a defensible contribution to management theory and a laudable contribution to management practice in the context. The work is submitted as an exhibition of the current skill level of the scholarly practitioner but more so, and in this case, represents a commitment to improving the practice field. It extends the work of regional scholars, addressing challenges and raising further questions. Any errors are understood to be that of the researcher.

Knowledge of corporate governance as inspiration and the leadership agenda it generates has potential value for all societies. The content and methodology of a humanist and humanitarian approach to corporate governance and leadership is priceless. The leadership journey appears to have started at Apple, where the philosophy of leading from above the line is posited as a response to the crisis of leadership (Ferguson, 2009). Further research will interrogate its scientific rigour and relevance in different societies in the management of the leadership education process. Further application will explore the impact on actors – to examine the creation of value for self and the other in one’s life project.

At its broadest level, this thesis is about optimising cross-sectoral partnerships and at the empirical level it examines the role of business schools in the inspiration of business and society, leading to development. Whether the development agenda is viewed as the business of business education and from its most negative theoretical perspective of transaction cost (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), or one adopts the view of education as a social good, it is evident that the sustainability and well-being of society, including that of business, depend on the same factors and shared understandings. The confidence in the utility of the research to the researcher as practitioner emerges from engagement in the scientific process and an appreciation of the value of that process for arriving at appropriate questions and a process of engaging actors in the context and analysis of the data to arrive at solutions that can be considered.

11.7 FUTURE PROFESSIONAL AGENDA

This thesis of ‘corporate governance as inspiration’ (Clark, 2001) which was derived from the examination of the interactions of people, spaces and identities in the search for value, contributes to the theory and practice at the levels of social life, from which it was drawn. For business schools, the most recent articulation of the problem and a solution was presented by Nitin Nohria, Dean of Harvard Business School who noted:

“The moral legitimacy of business was challenged recently... (and)...the rise of business schools in developing countries will be good for business education as a whole – we can learn from each other” (Nitin Nohria, Dean, Harvard Business School, Interview with Financial Times, Podcast)

This thesis, at its broadest level, connects the global environment of business schools to their purpose of educating people for business and society. The answer to the question “how,” from where the problem was observed, is posited by this researcher as follows:

- ❖ The concern for the social good is a necessary, but insufficient condition for success and the creation of value. In the governance of business schools lies the ability to devise strategies that will inspire many to ‘gap the bridge(s)’ (Weick, 2001) and develop inspirational networks of people and spaces. This is achieved by weaving threads of connections among sectors and organizational forms to inspire the attainment of developmental purposes (Bauman, 2000).

Cross-sectoral alliances, presented with the opportunity to engage, ‘maximise the value’ (Gulati, 1998) of a range of resources and behaviours driven by varying ideologies. In so doing, they adopt different purposes, organizational and governance mechanisms, and strategies that guide their response to the need for performance, defined in various ways. In the context of business schools, whether optimisation is viewed as the business of business education, or just business, and actors prioritise the ‘social good’ or the ‘business good’, the end result must be the creation of value. Examination of the organization, and the sustainability and well-being of society, including that of business, depends on the same factors and shared understandings. The confidence in the utility of the research to the researcher as practitioner emerges from engagement in the scientific process. The process itself has generated respect for academia as a value-creating and inspirational engagement in society. The utility of the research for investigating the problem of partnerships emerges from various factors related to the research process including the case study design, the use of multiple methods of data collection, and multi-level analysis of the phenomenon, including the group level, organizational level and country level. PPPs are generally embedded as cases in particular contexts and the elements of the context are critical to their functioning. This chapter distils the practical knowledge that has emerged from the study with respect to the problem of university-business partnerships in the governance of business schools in small developing countries. It addresses the research question:

✚ How do public private partnerships influence business school performance in the English-speaking Caribbean?

...to produce an answer that is limited by its research methods and context. By examining the factors that influence the governance model, the study has confirmed the relevance of ‘relational realism’(White et al., 2009; Fuhse, 2009) to the study of PPPs and the influence of relationships between variables in arriving at decisions and actions.

In the spirit of positive organization studies, it is noted that in 1876, Daniel C. Gilman, the first president of Johns Hopkins University expressed the hope that American universities would one day “...make for less misery among the poor, less ignorance in the schools, less bigotry in the temple, less suffering in the hospital, less fraud in business and less folly in politics” (quoted in Harkavy, 1998, p.4; Martin et al., 2005, p.3). It is to this end that this researcher now turns with a process and commitment to offer humbly this agenda to the world.

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APPENDIX 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Cross reference: 2.3.1 Tensions across Sectors (taken from Ghobadian et al., 2004, pp.297-298).



APPENDIX 2: WAYS OF PARTNERING

Cross Reference: 2.4.3 The Internal Environment: Structure of the PPP Organisation
(taken from Berliner, 1997, p.4); original in Shine-Ring, 1994).



APPENDIX 3: OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE - THEORY AND CONCEPTS

Cross reference: 3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY

Social network theory may be considered a perspective, a theory, a methodology and, most significantly, a way of viewing the world through relational concepts (Borgatti, 2003). Wasserman and Faust (2004) summarized the fundamentals of the social network perspective as follows:

- “Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent, autonomous units
- Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or flow of resources (either material or non-material)
- Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action
- Network models conceptualise structure (social, economic, political etc) as lasting patterns of relations among actors.” (p.4)

Research, using social network perspective and methodology, moves away from a focus on monadic variables (attributes of individuals) to a focus on dyadic variables (attributes of pairs of individuals). Network theorists “...posit interpersonal processes in which one person imitates or is influenced by or receives something from another” (Borgatti, 2003:np). The network environment is described in terms of providing benefits and constraints which actors exploit and manage (Borgatti, 2003).

Social Network Theory

The theory is described by (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:6) as deconstructed into three layers: “...a deep layer that defines the rules of a theoretical universe with which to work, a middle layer which consists of a theorem derived from the rules of the universe, and a surface layer that connects to the variables associated with a specific empirical setting” (p.6). The authors explain further that “...the deep layer consists of a very simple model of how social systems work, which is essentially that they are networks through which information (or any resource) flows from node to node along network paths consisting of ties interlocked through shared endpoints” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:6). The ‘paths’ or network ‘girders’ or ‘ties’ “...simultaneously imply both connection and disconnection, with the length of paths indicating the degree

of dis-connection” (ibid.). The path model is referred to as the “*network flow model*” and through logical and mathematical reasoning the “*network flow model*” extends into the middle level, deriving the theorem that “...transitivity (closure; clusteredness) slows network flows by increasing path length” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:6)italics and parenthesis in original). At this middle level of analysis, the process of developing theory involves identifying “...constructs defined on the underlying model...and relating them to outcomes in the same universe” (ibid.). The surface level of analysis “...can be seen as a “personalization” of the theory that ornaments the basic theory with variables drawn from the immediate empirical context, and which serve as an interface to general social theory” (ibid.).

The authors use the example of the theory of “strength of weak ties” proposed by Granovetter (1973; 1983) to explain how the theorist adds the strength of ties as an antecedent to transitivity (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). In this research of cross-sectoral alliances, the network approach facilitates a better understanding of the way in which actors, public and private, through their ties, influence each other and the decision process. This is considered a far more fruitful approach than an analysis of only the decision outcome (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The network flow model may be a useful model that can explain how the strength of ties in “ego” centred networks of KOAs, comprising public and private directors as “alters”, influences decision-making within the network (ibid.).

In a further explanation of how the network flow model works, Atkins (1974; 1977), cited in Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell (2011, p.8, italics in original) explains that “...two major kinds of relational or dyadic phenomena... referred to as *backcloth* and *traffic*” are important in understanding network flows. The underlying infrastructure (backcloth) serves as a conduit to the flows (traffic). In this study, the professional support network of KOAs is analysed. In this case, the “backcloth” is the professional tie between the KOAs and the directors who serve on the board of directors. The “traffic” is the flow influence or contribution. The study also includes the social network analysis of an affiliation network. The affiliation network is a two-mode network that has one set of actors, who may be grouped into sub-sets, and the second mode is the set of events to which the actors belong (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In the case of the partnerships, the event comprises the strategic action in the development

of the schools. The “traffic” is the contribution of the actors in public and private sub-groups to the event whereas the “backcloth” is the similarity of conceptualisation of the event.

Other fundamental theories developed from the “elemental theoretical memes” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:2) of social network theory include the structural hole theory of social capital (Burt, 1992). This theory is based on the “*network architecture model*” in which node success is a result of the ego’s alters acting in concert with or on behalf of the ego, thereby creating a much stronger bonding within the network and making it a more robust (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:10). In this case “...it is the alignment between nodes produced by the flow that yields the outcome” (ibid., p.11). The network architecture model will be used to describe the network relationships that led to the establishment of the schools.

The purpose of network theorising is deemed to be connected with the nature of explanations derived from the “elemental theoretical memes” of the “network architecture model” or the “network flows model” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011:13). The study uses this process and identifies how the network creates flows that result in contagion or social capital. This is illustrated in the summary below:

Network Functions by Model and Research Tradition

(Taken from Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell (2011, p.13))



In both cases, the outcome of network research is either the acquisition of social capital or social homogeneity. With respect to the network flow model, the outcome on the one hand is capitalization which means that nodes acquire “...ideas, resources and opportunities through their ties, and this process either directly increases their human capital or increases their ability to exploit their human capital, which in turn contributes to their success in terms of performance and rewards” (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011, p.14). Contagion, on the other hand, refers to nodes adopting the qualities of their

environment through the process of "...contamination/infection/staining so that one's location in a network has much to do with one's acquired traits" (ibid.). With respect to the network architecture model, the outcome of social capital is that networks provide benefits because they can co-ordinate multiple nodes and bring resources to bear on a problem in a co-ordinated fashion (ibid.). In the case of adaptation, the node converges with its environment through adaption, in a mode similar to the phenomenon of convergent evolution, such that it becomes morphed into the environment (ibid.). The outcomes of social network theory will demonstrate the effect of the network on the schools, providing a rationale and explanation of their attributes, behaviours and performance outcomes.

Whereas these concepts and explanations in basic network theorizing provide a useful point of departure from which to explain how partnerships work, the explanations themselves are limited to the concepts that emerge but do not provide answers beyond the immediate descriptions and conclusions within the context of the relationships amongst concepts and findings in the network. What it does offer though, is the opportunity to ask further questions which will then allow the researcher to engage with the data in a new way, or seek alternative sources of data to enrich the quality of the explanations. For example, the research may yield an explanation that the level of adaptation in the network is high and that public and private partners are essentially non-distinguishable. This does not, however, provide a full explanation of how adaptation within the network structure promotes action and influences performance.

Concepts in Social Network Analysis

Social network theory and analysis is "...based on the assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting units" (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.4). In the definition and analysis of social networks, fundamental concepts that are well defined within the research perspective are employed. Those concepts that are relevant to the theoretical framework are presented below; the definitions are taken from Wasserman and Faust (2004):

Actor and Mode: An actor is a social entity that may be an individual, corporate, or collective social unit. This study views actors as individuals as well as groups – public and private directors on the board of directors and stakeholders who are instrumental to

the success of the business schools. Actors may be of one type, in which case the network is a one-mode network or they may be conceptually different types, thereby constituting a two-mode network.

Affiliation Network: This is a special type of two-mode network comprising one set of actors, who may be sub-divided into groups, and their relationship to an event. The event may be a club or organization to which they belong. In this study, the affiliation networks of sub-groups of private and public actors and the key strategic actions of the schools (events) are analysed to determine the contribution of actor sub-groups to the strategy of the schools. In this case, the unit of observation is the event, the strategic action of the school.

Relational Ties: Actors are linked together by social ties, which may be viewed as “girders” or “pipes” giving rise to “structuralist” or “connectionist” explanations of the phenomena within the network (Borgatti, 2003, p.1002). Relations may be quantified by examining two properties: “...whether the relation is directional or non-directional and whether it is dichotomous or valued” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.44; authors’ italics). The analysis undertaken in this study will examine different ties between actors, and between actors and events in developing descriptions of the networks and explanations in the process of theorising.

Structural and Composition Variables: Structural variables are measured on pairs of actors and refer to ties of a specific kind. In this study, the structural variable is the professional tie between actors in the governance structure. Composition variables are actor attributes and this study has identified the attribute of belonging to the private or public sector and belonging to other organizations and institutions as the only compositional variables relevant to the research problem.

Network Population: The network population refers to the total set of actors from which a sample may be drawn. In this study, the population comprises persons who held membership on the board of directors (current and past) and persons from the private or public sectors who played influential roles in the development of the school.

The Concept of Embeddedness

One of the more widely used concepts in social network theory, the concept of “embeddedness”, is employed to facilitate the development of explanations. The concept and its application are explored below.

Origin and Meaning of Embeddedness

In their attempt to highlight the potency of social network theory for the advancement of new theoretical ideas, Kilduff et al., (2006:1033) outlined four interrelated principles which they consider to be central to the development of new theoretical ideas: “the primacy of relations between organizational actors, the ubiquity of actors’ embeddedness in social fields, the social utility of network connections, and the structural patterning of social life” (2006:1033). These ideas they found recurring in social network research and, in this study, will be central to the multi-level analysis and crafting of explanations of partner engagement and action in the context of PPPs. The concept of embeddedness is explored in the context of its inclusion in theoretical propositions that derive from social network theory.

Granovetter’s theory of the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) utilised network theory to explain that strong ties are unlikely to be a source of new information and value to the individual. The strength of ties theory required explanation of the concepts and description of the strength of ties, and the concept of embeddedness was utilised to answer the question ‘why?’ Polanyi (1944) introduced the notion of embeddedness to emphasize the primacy of society in pre-capitalist times and to make the point that economics was a branch of sociology and that this was changed in capitalist society (Swedberg, 1997). Granovetter’s use of embeddedness, however, clearly located “...economic actions as truly social actions in capitalist society” (Swedberg, 1997:165). In the “classical’ period when economics concerned itself with the market from a “Smithonian” perspective, sociological theory was struggling to gain credence and set itself an agenda delimited to social life (Granovetter, 1990). The sociological agenda from the perspective of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim resulted in an “...impact that defined economic sociology as a field that did not mainly concern the day-to-day workings of the economy” (Granovetter, 1990:90). This defines what Granovetter considers the “old economic sociology” in which he is critical of neo-classical

economic theory to adequately explain differing outcomes for the same technological problem. He contends with the frustration of his own arguments and concedes that "...outcomes can vary dramatically even for the same economic problems and technologies if the social structure, institutional history, and collective action are different and that these crucially limit and shape future possibilities" (Granovetter, 1990:106). He acknowledges the need for such sophisticated dynamic models and the role of the "new economic sociology" in achieving this. He also contends with the issue of over-determinism and uses his analysis of the case of electric utilities to demonstrate that there are many possible outcomes but "...historical contingencies embedded in the structure of social networks, of resource mobilization, and of relations between actors and government determined which of them (outcomes) did occur" (Granovetter, 1990:107). This conclusion opened up the new economic sociology to a broader agenda that includes institutional theories, organizational theories and apparently oxymoronic configurations such as actor-network analyses (Swedberg, 1997).

Embeddedness surfaced as an appropriate concept, emerging from network theory to demonstrate the relationship between actors and their environment. The embeddedness concept bridges the two world views of economics and sociology with theorists giving primacy to one or the other - economic goals embedded in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985) or social outcomes that derive from economic concerns (Williamson, 1975). The concept is also used to explain the influence of institutions as a context for economic action (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Dacin et al., 1999; Baum and Dutton, 1996). The concept of embeddedness gives wide berth to the generation of explanations of actor behaviour in partnerships, fostering causal linkages by demonstrating levels of embeddedness in phenomena at different levels and in different socio-temporal contexts. As such, it allows for consideration of the influence of a number of concepts and theories as possible explanations whilst guarding against the tendency to be deterministic in such explanations. Network perspective and network theory focus the study on the relational concepts and processes (strategies) involved in explicating the broad research question. The focus on relations, the influences of one on the other, is appropriate to the agenda of creating an appropriately dynamic model with sufficient explanatory power, alluding to how PPPs work. The next sub-sections will focus on some of the applications of the embeddedness concept in other areas of

organizational and institutional life; elements that require active consideration in this research.

Structural and Relational Embeddedness

The embeddedness concept derives from the work of Granovetter (1985) and was extended in his later work (Granovetter, 1992) where he proposed an agenda for "...a new economic sociology" that emphasizes "...classical sociological arguments about the embeddedness of economic goals and activities in socially oriented goals and structures" (Granovetter, 1992:3). Granovetter (1992) identified two aspects of embeddedness: relational and structural. Relational includes the extent to which parties in a dyadic arrangement consider each other's needs and goals and the behaviours they exhibit (Uzzi, 1996). Structural embeddedness refers to the extent to which a "...dyad's mutual contacts are connected to one another" (Granovetter, 1992:35) thereby enabling social mechanisms to co-ordinate and safeguard exchanges (Jones et al., 1997).

Institutional and Political Embeddedness

The concept of embeddedness was more broadly defined than its social relationships or structural embeddedness to include institutional, cultural, and political elements (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). The study of partnerships, with influences from small social networks and the well-established institution of the university within small societies, requires the broader consideration of the embeddedness of relations within these social constructions. Granovetter (1973) explicitly tied the study of embeddedness to a network perspective but suggests that once the initial network has "congealed" into an institution, the original network plays less of an important part (Swedberg, 1997; Granovetter, 1992).

Myer and Rowan (1977:340) explain that "...in modern societies formal organizational structures arise in highly institutionalized contexts...(and) organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work (as)...institutionalized in society" (1977:340). They do so in order to increase their legitimacy in the context in which they operate and, in most cases, to attract necessary resources (ibid.). Attempts to conform to institutionalized rules often conflict sharply with efficiency and success criteria, and undermine the organization's

legitimacy and support. The authors contend that "...the formal structures of many organizations in post-industrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities". In the case of business schools, the lack of external legitimacy within the business environment is strongly demonstrated in the arguments related to the lack of business school relevance. The extent to which the partnership provokes organizational structures and strategies that are embedded in the institutional context of the university must be considered in explanations of how the governance structure works. A broader explanation of the institutionalisation of education and the influence of corporate society on the purpose of education unearths factors that are significant in the particular context of education.

Internal and External Political Embeddedness

Political embeddedness may also be a factor that influences the performance of the partnership, as economic action is always located in the context of political struggle (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Zukin and DiMaggio define political embeddedness as "...the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions," such as the legal framework of the state (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). In studies of the evolution of business networks, Halinen and Törnroos (1998) note that most research tends to ignore the broader contextual setting in which both actors, and dyads of actors are embedded. Attention to political issues should consider the four forms of political embeddedness: "...political settings, political actors, the political activities of firms and political resources" (Welch and Wilkinson, 2004:3).

Cognitive and Cultural Embeddedness

Other forms of embeddedness that may be considered in an examination of the relationship between public and private sector partners in a strategic alliance include cognitive and cultural embeddedness. Cognitive embeddedness "...has to do with factors that limit the human mind in its mental processes" (Swedberg, 1997:168) or "...the ways in which the structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of economic reasoning" (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990:15-16). This conclusion is supported by research from cognitive psychology and decision theory (ibid.). With respect to the value of cognitive embeddedness as a factor in explaining behaviour, Zukin and

DiMaggio project that "...the notion of cognitive embeddedness is useful in calling attention to the limited ability of both human and corporate actors to employ the synoptic rationality required by neo-classical approaches" (p.16).

According to Zukin and DiMaggio economic behaviour is culturally embedded as shared collective understandings shape economic strategies and goals. Economic culture affects the economy through "...beliefs and ideologies, taken for granted assumptions, or formal rule systems" (p.17). Dequech (2003:463) cites Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) and explains the way in which cultural embeddedness influences economic action and rationality:

"Culture sets limits to economic rationality: it proscribes or limits market exchange in sacred objects and relations... or between ritually classified groups. Moreover... culture may shape terms of trade... Culture, in the form of beliefs and ideologies, taken for granted assumptions, or formal rule systems, also prescribes strategies of self-interested action... and defines the actors who may legitimately engage in them... Culture provides scripts for applying different strategies to different classes of exchange. Finally, norms and constitutive understandings regulate market exchange." (2003:463)

The consideration of culture seeks to focus on the use of culture rather than the production of culture so as to "...lay a foundation for a view of culture as working through the interaction of shared cognitive structures and supra-individual cultural phenomena (material culture, media messages, or conversation, for example) that activate those structures to varying degrees" (DiMaggio, 1997:264). In networks, it provides a ground where people "play" in a safe environment that is reflective of a set of values that are endemic to their culture.

Cultural Embeddedness and the Relational School

Network theorists of the "relational" school undertook various research projects focused on the relationship between networks and culture (Mische and White, 1998). The broad perspectives employed adopted various positions with respect to culture including the view of networks as a conduit for culture (Oliver and Myers, 2003e.g. ; Marwell et al., 1988), networks as shaping culture, networks as cultural forms, and networks as culture via interaction (Mische, 2011). Other scholars who applied and extended the concept of embeddedness in relation to culture, linking culture to institutionalism, include John Levi Martin (2003; 2009) who traces the genealogy of

the “field” metaphor in social analysis from Lewin and Bourdieu through new institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 2001; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2008; Mohr, 2010). The conception of networks as cultural forms may be particularly relevant to this study of partnerships in that the partnership may produce a new cultural form and model of institutional change (Mohr and White, 2008).

The concept of embeddedness, and all its particular applications with respect to the study of relationships, organizations and institutions, has promulgated new research trends in the area of the new economic sociology. It is clear that the embeddedness concept and its intertwinement with other concepts and theories that explain partnerships and strategic alliances yield much insight into how they work.

APPENDIX 4: MAJOR THEORISTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS RELATED TO PPPS

Cross Reference: 2.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Dimensions of partnership	Proposition	Researcher/ Theorist	Theoretical roots	Empirical context
Purpose				
Political/ strategic game	Partnerships do not form in PPP arrangements because of the complexity of actor composition, institutional factor and the strategic choices of public and private actors.	(Klijn and Teisman 2003)	Game theory	PPP – public policy – Dutch case
Political strategy	PPPs are a means to avoid the opprobrium associated with ‘contracting out’ and ‘privatization’ as a result of its basis on the assumptions of the neo-liberal economic paradigm and the pervasiveness of this paradigm in the public policy community	(Savas, 2000)		Public policy – PPPs in the UK
Motivation for private participation in PPPs	Urban crises can trigger engagement and cross-sectoral collaboration. Governance alliances between business and government are usually pragmatic, functional partnerships that are purpose driven with a primary focus on particular outcomes usually centred on economic development.	(Austin and McCaffrey, 2002)	Regime theory	PPPs
Motivation for partnering	Public agencies enter into co-operative arrangements to get more resources, satisfy norms and values, obtain political advantage, solve problems, reduce uncertainty, obey legal mandates	Weiss (1987)		Public policy
Maximising value of partners	Strategic alliances result in a new form of governance and decision-making process intended to maximize value of alliance partners	Gulati (1998)	Network theory	Strategic alliances
Clarity of purpose and connection based purpose	One’s understanding of the purpose of collaborative alliances influences their contribution to its success This question seeks to establish connection-based purpose	Harrigan (1985) Gulati (1995) Austin (2000)	Network theory	Strategic alliances
Motivation for non-profit collaboration	“An organization is more likely to increase the degree of formality of its collaborative activities when it is older, has a larger budget size, receives government funding but relies on fewer government funding streams, has more board linkages with other non-profit organizations, and is not operating in the education and research or	Guo and Acar (2005)	Resource dependency, institutional and network theories	Public policy

Dimensions of partnership	Proposition	Researcher/Theorist	Theoretical roots	Empirical context
	social service industry.”			
Competitive advantage	Strategic networks are a mode of organising for competitive advantage	(Jarillo, 1988)	Strategy and competitive advantage	Strategic networks
Structure				
Structure and embeddedness	Economic actions are influenced by the social context in which they are embedded and actions can be influenced by the roles and social position of actors in the networks.	Gulati (1998, p.295)	Social network theory and concept of embeddedness	Strategic alliances
Structure and evolution for survival	“If personal relationships do not supplement formal role relationships over time, then the likelihood increases that conflicts will escalate between the role specialists of the organizational agents”	(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992:109)	Transaction cost economics and agency theory	Strategic alliances
Managerial complexity	PPPs are difficult to manage and are time-consuming. This is because PPP projects bear institutional characteristics that continually link local projects with supra-local arenas which are located across a whole range of different networks	(Klijn and Teisman, 2005)	Institutional theory	PPPs – public policy and management
Markets and hierarchies	Collaborative governance creates a form of control that is between markets and hierarchies	(Powell, 1991; Thorelli, 1986; Johnston and Lawrence, 1991; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; Pisano and Teece, 1989)	Transaction cost economics; resource-based view of the firm	Strategic alliances
Co-ordination in network governance	Network form of governance is a response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency. These exchange conditions drive firms toward structurally embedding their transactions, which enables firms to use social mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges	(Jones et al., 1997)	Transaction cost and social network theory	Strategic alliances
Governance structure	Firm specific capabilities influence the choice of governance structure	Leiblein (2003)	Transactions cost; Resource-based view of the firm; real options	Strategic alliances

Dimensions of partnership	Proposition	Researcher/ Theorist	Theoretical roots	Empirical context
			theory	
A process model of the evolution of alliances - Control and co-ordination	A process model of network formation that highlights the important of reputation, trust, reciprocity and mutual interdependence.	(Larson, 1992)	Social control; institutional theory	Strategic alliances
Resource alignment and firm performance	“Partner resource alignment directly affects collective strengths and inter-firm conflicts in alliances, which in turn contribute to alliance performance.”	(Das and Teng, 2000:61)	Resource-based view of the firm	Strategic alliances
Support within the network	The dimensions of relationships that can be used to assess the general atmosphere and supportiveness in a network include liking, friendship, career support, personal support, energy and trust	Cross and Parker (2004)	Social network theory	Strategic alliances
Sustained private participation in cross-sectoral alliances	“Regimes form and stay in existence because powerful public and private actors bargain, develop trust, and mutually learn to solve problems. The defining characteristics of regimes are that they are inter-organizational, sustained, coordinating and empowering.”	John and Cole (1998, p.387; Austin, 2002)	Regime theory	PPPs
Strategy and Decision-Making				
Performance of alliances	Five key issues for the study of alliances: (1) the formation of alliances, (2) the choice of governance structure, (3) the dynamic evolution of alliances, (4) the performance of alliances, and (5) the performance consequences for firms entering alliances	Gulati (1998)	Embeddedness in social networks	Strategic alliances and networks
Alliances as strategic tools	Studies of partners similarity and alliance governance.	Pangarkar and Klein (2001; (Dodourova, 2009)	Transaction cost economics	Strategic alliances
Value creation	The establishment of inter-firm collaboration is a complex phenomenon that is driven by a variety of processes, including transaction costs, strategies of the firms involved and other organizational and geographic variables	Lin (2006), Angel (2002, p.341)	Combined – resource-based view of the firm, Transaction cost economics, Network theory, embedded-	Strategic alliances

Dimensions of partnership	Proposition	Researcher/ Theorist	Theoretical roots	Empirical context
			ness concept	
Conditions for successful partnerships	Propositions with respect to how to make partnerships work	Kanter (1994), Austin (2000).		Strategic alliances
Strategy formulation	Actor-network theory can be used to facilitate strategy formulation and explain how social and technological elements determine interest alignment	Gao (2005)	Actor-network theory	National policy
Conditions for successful partnering	Mutually developed collaboration procedures and information sharing processes are fundamental indicators of trust and willingness to transfer knowledge and, as such, are also critical preconditions to overcoming the obstacles to cooperation in interactive collaboration	(Rondinelli and London, 2003)		Cross sectoral collaboration
Resource asymmetries, power and decision-making	Structural change and the adoption of innovations within inter-firm networks is influenced by political activities during the decision process.	(Elg and Johansson, 1997)	Resource based view of the firm; strategic networks	Strategic alliances
Network survival and legitimacy	Networks use various strategies to legitimize their existence. Both internal and external strategies are necessary for the survival of the network	Human and Provan (2000)	Social networks and legitimacy theory	Strategic alliances
Governance and legitimacy	The UK “Third Sector” must establish its legitimacy to participate in the new forms of governance that includes partnerships	(Taylor and Warburton, 2003)	Legitimacy theory	Public policy

APPENDIX 5: COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE THREE CASES

Cross Reference: 5.5 SELECTION OF CASES

		Campuses of Green University		
		Apple, Arden	Gerran, Gerrantown	Rotter, Rotterdam
ESTABLISHMENT AND UPGRADE	Year and Form	<p>1989 –Institute of Business, affiliated to Green University, Arden Campus</p> <p>1990 – Established as a registered charity in Arden</p> <p>Nov 1994 – Memorandum and Articles of Association signed with Green University, Arden Campus</p> <p>2003- Developed and signed the Bylaws outlining the regulations governing the partnership</p> <p>2005 – Moved to new site and upgraded to a School of Business. Renamed after a donor in accordance with international naming convention for business schools.</p>	<p>1987 - Collaborative management project between Green University and an international donor agency.</p> <p>1990 – Established as an Institute of Business, functioning as a department within the Faculty of Social Sciences</p> <p>1994 – The Institute of Business is incorporated as a Company limited by guarantee</p> <p>2001 – Upgraded and re-named the Gerran School of Business (GSB)</p> <p>2002 – The GSB is moved to upgraded facilities</p> <p>2002 - GSB received 40th Anniversary Award for Excellence in Education by the donor agency</p>	<p>1991 – Established as a Centre of the Rotterdam Campus of Green. This was a collaborative effort that included governments of several small islands, the Rotterdam campus and an international donor agency</p> <p>2006 – Renamed the Rotter School of Business</p>
	Initiated by	Private sector individuals	Green University, Gerrantown	Regional private sector organization
	Seed Funding	Private sector	International Funding Agency	International Funding Agency
GOVERNANCE	Composition of the Board of Directors (based on legal agreements)	Comprises two-thirds private sector and one-third university members	Comprises not more than 18 members who shall include a majority of members in whose appointment the Vice-Chancellor and the Principal of the Gerrantown campus have concurred.	Limited to 16 members no more than 9 of whom must be affiliated to Green University, Rotterdam

	Campuses of Green University		
	Apple, Arden	Gerran, Gerrantown	Rotter, Rotterdam
Role of the Board of Directors	Develop and approve policy direction, accountability for strategic direction, oversight on major operations	Develop and approve policy direction, accountability for strategic direction, oversight on major operations	Board of Directors serves management in an advisory capacity
Current Chairman drawn from	Principal, Green University, Arden	Private sector	Private sector
Appointment of Executive head	Executive Director appointed by Green University, Arden on the advice of the Board of Directors	Executive Director appointed by Green University, Gerrantown on the advice of the Board of Directors.	Chief Executive Officer appointed by Green University, Rotterdam on the advice of the Board of Directors
Main criteria for selection of Executive head	International experience in the private sector and with Universities		Experience with corporate sector
Main criteria for selecting members of the Board (non-University)	Private sector experience, expertise and prominence	Individuals and representatives of companies, NGOs, Government etc of strategic importance to the business school.	Consensus of the Board of Directors and representation of the smaller island territories served by the School
Role of Executive Director in relation to the Board of Directors	Ordinary member. ED is in a reporting relationship to the BOD	Ordinary member. ED is in a reporting relationship to the BOD	Ordinary member. ED is in a reporting relationship to the BOD
Voluntary nature of the Board of Directors	Supported by the voluntary contribution of time from members of the Board of Directors	Supported by the voluntary contribution of time from members of the Board of Directors	Supported by the voluntary contribution of time from members of the Board of Directors
Appointment of private sector Directors	Nominated and appointed by the Board of Directors.	Nominated by the Board of Directors and appointed by the Principal, Green University, Gerrantown	Nominated and appointed by the Board of Directors.

		Campuses of Green University		
		Apple, Arden	Gerran, Gerrantown	Rotter, Rotterdam
	Appointment of University Directors	Appointed by Board of Directors mainly, though not necessarily, by virtue of position at Green University, Arden. Once appointed, may remain on the Board of Directors even if position at the University changes.	Appointed to the Board of Directors by virtue of position at Green University, Gerrantown only. Once the position is no longer held, the appointment is rescinded.	Appointed to the Board of Directors by virtue of position at Green University, Rotterdam only. Once the position is no longer held, the appointment is rescinded
	Nature of non-University Directors	Senior executives in high profile positions in the country who are respected in the private sector	Representatives of organizations drawn from either private, non-profit or government sector. Individuals from leading private sector organizations.	Representatives of organizations drawn from either private, non-profit or government sector. Individuals from leading private sector organizations.
	Appointment of Directors from other Sectors	No	May include representation from Government, public and private sector organizations, NGOs etc	May include representation from Government, public and private sector organizations, NGOs etc
ORGANISATIONAL FORM	Voluntary – Non-profit distributing	Funds ploughed back into the operations. Payment made to Green University, Arden for specific services by contract.	Funds ploughed back into the operations. A percentage is also paid to Green University for services provided.	Funds ploughed back into the operations and payments to Green for services by contract.
	Private or Public	Private autonomous. No direct funding from government or Green University, Arden	Semi-autonomous. 50% financing from Green University, Gerrantown.	Semi-autonomous. Obtains financing in variable amounts from Green University, Rotterdam.
	Legal Form	Affiliate of Green University. Incorporated under the Companies Act as a Non-Profit organization in Arden.	Affiliate of Green University. Incorporated under the Companies Act as a Non-Profit organization in Arden.	Affiliate of Green University. Incorporated under the Companies Act as a Non-Profit organization in Arden.
ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY	Strategic Planning	Strategic planning is guided by the Executive Director with input and approval from the Board of Directors	Strategic planning is undertaken as a joint activity that includes the Board of Directors and management	Strategic planning is undertaken as a joint activity that includes the Board of Directors and management

		Campuses of Green University		
		Apple, Arden	Gerran, Gerrantown	Rotter, Rotterdam
Faculty model	Few internal faculty hired by Apple Business School on contract and no tenure. Mainly adjunct faculty model drawn from Green University and reputable international business schools	Few internal faculty hired by Green University, Gerrantown and placed at Gerran Business School. Mainly adjunct faculty model drawn from Green University and reputable international business schools	Internal faculty are also in management. Mainly adjunct faculty model drawn from Green University and reputable international business schools	
Relationship between management and strategy	Management does not sit on the Board of Directors.	Management does not sit on the Board of Directors.	Management sits on the Board of Directors and help to craft and manage strategy	
COUNTRY ATTRIBUTES	Development and Competitiveness Indices (Higher ranking – more competitive and developed)	Global Competitiveness Index 2010 – Rank (84); Score (3.97) Human Development Index 2010 – 59	Global Competitiveness Index 2010 – Rank (95); Score (3.85) Human Development Index 2010-80	Global Competitiveness Index 2010 – Rank (43); Score (4.45) Human Development Index 2010-42
	Economic Stability	Dutch Disease	Unstable	Stable
	History of social co-operation	Weak	Strong	Strong
	Cultural Elements	General respect for authority but open to challenge	Established and respected positional authority.	Established and respected positional and conferred authority e.g. Use of Title of “Sir” as knighted by the Queen of England

APPENDIX 6: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT: KEY ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS

Cross Reference: 5.8 PILOT OF THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

Preamble to Interview

Thank you for taking the time to facilitate this interview. The research topic is public private partnerships as governance mechanisms. You have been selected for this interview as a (past) _____ of the _____ School.

Please note that this interview will be kept confidential and your anonymity will be maintained. The data from this interview will be kept safely and securely and destroyed after 2 years.

I am requesting your permission to audiotape this interview. Please do indicate to me if at any point you are uncomfortable with the questions asked and if you wish to stop or defer the interview.

1. How long have you been the Chairman/ Executive Director of CHSB?
 - 1a. What is the structure of the BOD? (To be determined from document review).
 - 1b. What would you say was the reason for the establishment of the School?
 - 1c. Why do you think the governance structure included both private sector Directors and University Directors?
4. a. What did you see as the main concerns for the School at the point of your tenure?
 - 2a. What are some of the key decisions taken that have positively impacted the School during your tenure?
 - 2b. Who would you say are/were most influential in helping you to arrive at the best decisions?
 - 2c. Who would be the top 4 persons in order of priority who you sought professional advice from on key decisions in the interest of the School?
 - 2d. To what extent did the governance structure facilitate/hinder the decision-making process?
 - 3a. How did your role at the School fit in with the other roles you perform at the University/private sector?
 - 3b. How did the context of the School constrain your choices?
 - 3c. How did it provide opportunities for you and the School?

Based on the responses, and consistent with the “laddering technique” in interviewing, respondents will be probed with the question: “Why is/was that important to you?”

APPENDIX 7: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT: OTHER DIRECTORS

Cross Reference: 5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents

Preamble

Thank you for taking the time to facilitate this interview. The research topic is public private partnerships as governance mechanisms. You have been selected for this interview as a past _____ of the _____ School. Also, you were identified by _____ as having played a critical role in decision-making at the School.

Please note that this interview will be kept confidential and your anonymity will be maintained. The data from this interview will be kept safely and securely and destroyed after 2 years.

I am requesting your permission to audiotape this interview. Please do indicate to me if at any point you are uncomfortable with the questions asked and if you wish to stop or defer the interview.

1. How long have you been on the Board of Directors of the Cave Hill School of Business?

1a. What encouraged you to join the Board of Directors of the _____ School?

1b. Why do you think the governance structure included both private sector Directors and University Directors?

4. a. What did you see as the main concerns for the School at the point of your tenure?

2a. What are some of the key decisions taken that have positively impacted the School during your tenure?

2b. In what way were you able to contribute to the decision/strategy?

2c. Who would be the top 4 persons in order of priority who contributed to these decisions?

2d. To what extent did the governance structure facilitate/hinder the decision-making process?

3a. How did your role at the School fit in with the other roles you perform at the University/private sector?

3b. How did the context of the School constrain your choices?

3c. How did it provide opportunities for you and the School?

Based on the responses, and consistent with the “laddering technique” in interviewing, respondents will be probed with the question: “Why is/was that important to you?”

APPENDIX 8: EMAIL TO RESPONDENTS

Cross Reference: 5.9.1 Interview Protocol and Selection of Respondents

Dear (Name)

I am presently pursuing my DBA at Aston University and at this time, engaged in gathering data for my research on the topic of Public Private Partnerships in business schools. I have selected the three business schools associated with the (Green University) as subjects of the research. As a member of the Board of Directors of the (Name of Business School), I am seeking your kind assistance and participation in this research.

I am humbly requesting an interview with you at your earliest convenience. The interview is expected to be about one hour long.

I will follow up with a call to you in this regard.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.

Best regards

Kamla Mungal (Mrs)

APPENDIX 9: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS PROTOCOL

Cross Reference: 5.9.2 Archival Data

**DOCUMENT ANALYSIS PROTOCOL
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
NAME OF SITE:**

Document Reference:

Title:
Full Date:
Type of Document (Board paper, Agreement, email etc):
Published by:
City:

Concepts	“Quotation”	Who said/ wrote it	Page number	Description of context in which it was said
PURPOSE OF THE PARTNERSHIP				
Formation				
Motivation				
Relevance				
Quality (what)				
Control				
Accountability				
Legitimacy				
STRUCTURE OF THE PARTNERSHIP				
Roles				
Relationship				
Trust				
Respect				
Collaboration				
Competition				
Collegiality				
STRATEGY OF THE PARTNERSHIP				
Quality (How)				
Legitimacy				
Efficiency				

APPENDIX 10: EMAIL FROM INDEPENDENT EXPERT

(Received June 6, 2011)

Cross Reference: 5.11.3 Cross-Case Analysis

Hi Kamla,

This chapter on cross site analysis and findings clearly presents the key findings of the doctoral research and hence contribution to the existing body of knowledge. Having previously read the individual cases, I can say that this chapter brings the comparative analysis required and so a holistic view of the dynamics of PPPs related to our business schools (in terms of their evolution, challenges and future). The theoretical/ managerial contributions are also presented which in turn brings the value of the work to management practice and the governance of PPPs. This may be the most important chapter!

I have no suggestions for improving this chapter because I find it well written and loaded with all relevant data.

All the best...

Regards

(Name)

APPENDIX 11: CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

Confidentiality Agreement

September 10, 2010

(Name and Address)

Dear (Name)

I wish to thank you for your willingness to be a respondent on my research study related to public private partnerships in business school governance. I wish to underscore the fact that your anonymity will be maintained throughout the study as fictitious names will be used for the organization as well as for participants in the study.

The study includes three major forms of data collection:

1. *In-depth interviews*: Each interview is expected to be approximately one hour and will be conducted at your convenience. Interview data will be kept confidential and will be stored at my home. Additionally, the data from interviews will be kept safely and securely and destroyed after 2 years.
2. *Document analysis*. Documents including strategic plans, emails, memos etc will be analysed based on the research questions.
3. *Participant observation*: This involves my own interpretation of events that I have been party to/witnessed in my involvement during the data collection period. It will include an account of events, how people behaved and reacted, what was said in conversation, where people were positioned in relationship to one another, their comings and goings, physical gestures and my subjective responses to what was observed. Again, participants' anonymity will be maintained.

Data will be gathered over the period September to December 2010.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may also withdraw from this research study at any time.

I will appreciate if you would sign the attached copy of this letter, indicating your consent to be included as a participant in this study.

With many thanks

Sincerely,

Kamla Mungal

(DBA Student and Principal Researcher)

(Participant)

APPENDIX 12: SUMMARY TABLES

Summary Table 1: Antecedents effects matrix: Summary of variables in the environment and supportiveness in the environmental social system

Reference: The variables across the sites are drawn from the individual cases and are highlighted in the meta-network in Figure 22.

9.2.1 Variables in the Country and Institutional Environment

Opposition to PPP	Support for PPP	X – not identified
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Environmental variables	Gerran	Rationale	Apple	Rationale	Rotter	Rationale
1.Economic constraints	Cs-all	Under-development and uncompetitiveness	Cs-all in 'crashes'	Dutch disease	Cs-all	Uneven development
			Op-all in 'booms'	Partner competition		
Geographic vulnerabilities	Cs-all	National disaster, Close to metropole	Cs-bs	Small market	Cs-all	Market dispersion
Foreign competition to business school	Cs-unv and ps	Geographic proximity to Metropole	X	X	Cs-bs	Online universities from Metropole threatened their model
Local competition to business school	Cs-unv and ps	Larger market	X	X	X	X
Small world	Op—all	Social cohesion; Capability to address small social distance	Cs	Small market to increase student competitiveness; Inferiority complex	Cs-all	Nationalism and corruption in small territories threatens growth of business
Lack of regional integration	Cs-all	Limited resources	X	X	Cs-bsc	Size and scale
Size of region	X	X	Op-ps and bsc	Regional market for business creates motivation for talent	Cs-bsc	Scale; Not for university as they were established in the regional market with larger scale of operation
Private sector	Cs-all	Constrained	Op-bsc	Regional market for business	Op-bsc	Demand for training by the

Environmental variables	Gerran	Rationale	Apple	Rationale	Rotter	Rationale
competitiveness		development	and ps	creates motivation for talent		private sector
Social vulnerabilities (Crime etc)	Cs-all	Linked to economic vulnerabilities	X	X	X	X
Government subsidization of education to students			Op-all	Partner competition and Apple's growth		
National value for education					Op-all	Both University and Rotter grew but they were not in competition with each other
National social partnership					Op-all	Establishment of the business school
Hub for regional business					Op-all	Build networks across the region and achieve regional integration and optimization of the market

Summary Table 2: Antecedents Effects Matrix: Summary of variables in the institutional environment and supportiveness in the network

Opposition to PPP	Support for PPP	X – not identified
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Institutional variables	Gerran	Rationale	Apple	Rationale	Rotter	Rationale
Discipline scholarship- not management	Op-all Cs- bsc	Business did not value academic research	X	X	X	X
Faculty norms in academia	Cs-bsc	Faculty embedded and connection is difficult	X	X	X	X
Academics disengaged from business and society – ‘aloofness from business’	Op-all	Need to connect with society to facilitate development was recognised by all.	Op-bsc and Unv	Establishment of the business school (Phase 1) The University did not ask for it.	Op-bsc	University did not see the need for it
University efforts to integrate region	Op-all	Seeking to optimise regional resources	X	X	Cs-bsc	University rules of non-competition with other business schools constrained the market
Commitment to regionalism but lack of integration	Cs-all	Resource constraint	X	X	Op-bsc	Opportunity for business school to contribute to regional integration
‘Town and gown’ effect	Cs-all Op-bsc	Ideological difference but not a constraint due to private-sector’s need for education	Cs-bsc	Recognised by University but not problematised; Affected the competitiveness of business	Op-bsc	Demand by business for relevant training
Bureaucracy	Cs-bsc	Recognised by the University and the decision taken to establish an autonomous business	Cs-bsc	Cited as a main reason for establishment of PPP. Private sector made autonomy a condition for their contribution	Cs- bsc	Affected service quality to students and University attempted to assist