

Introduction

Realizing the Human Experience:

Vulnerability & Human Suffering

Human relationships have long been the focus of scholarly attention. Whether it is an examination of the non-instrumental relationships which sustain the quotidian existence of individuals throughout the world, or the more central relationships of power, legitimacy, and authority which feature in the development of governmental structures relationships at a very basic level, shape the human experience. Throughout history different aspects of relationships have played a key role in developing an account of this experience which is, throughout this work, referred to as ‘the political’. ‘The political’ refers to the sight where the actions and interactions of politics unfold. Ancient and pre-modern political thought displays a balanced appraisal of both the instrumental and non-instrumental relationships within this sphere. In fact, to distinguish between these different types of relations was, for philosophers like Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, an unnecessary scholarly endeavor.¹ The modern turn in political and moral philosophy, as this work will document, reflects a changing series of assumptions which outline the demarcation of public and private realms of action which distinguish between personal and public relationships.² Modern political thinkers, represented in the ideas of the social

¹ This is a point that is well noted by Preston King and Graham M. Smith “Friendship in Politics” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 10 no. 2 (June 2007),125-145 and “Introduction” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 10 no. 2 (June 2007), 117-123. They articulate how the idea of a ‘private life’ is at odds with ancient understandings of the political community which supported the development of individuals as moral beings. The notion of a public and private divide, they go on to show is very much a modern phenomenon. The diminishing influence of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship in the formal discourses of politics reflects this modernist turn.

² This idea is well documented in the writings of feminist scholars. They note, and challenge, the distinction of public and private lives and the ensuing idea that a public sphere is dominated by a male

contract tradition, reflect an attempt at institutional design which locates a pre-eminent role for instrumental relationships.³ Such a focus provides a means of limiting the negative consequences of being human in common; however, this focus has revealed alternative consequences which are likewise equally problematic. In the absence of non-instrumental relationships within a formal account of 'the political' an understanding of the ideas, values and goals with support and sustain the unique personalities of individuals, within the community, is otherwise absent. This work acknowledges, in the opening chapters, the dominance of instrumental relationships within the broad field of International Relations⁴; however, it seeks to engage with this phenomenon and proposes an account of being political which situates the knowledge associated with non-instrumental relationships as equal and valuable components within an account of being human, in common, which emphasizes the relationality of politics.

A relational ontology which structures an account of 'the political' is at odds with formal accounts of international politics. International Relations has long since abandoned the idea of relationality focusing instead on the instrumental roles of power and authority in order to engage with its pre-eminent concern; anarchy. Consequently, as Hollis and Smith point out, most works within IR can be situated within a fourfold schema which, while loosely conceptualized, identifies either an individual or holistic point of origin

persona while a feminine experience is left to exist within the private sphere. This idea is documented through an analysis of 'care ethics' in Chapter Four.

³ From an historical perspective these tradition is reflected in the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. The influence that this tradition has had on IR and international politics will be revealed, in Chapter One, through an examination of the development of *ius gentium* in the modern age and the idea of a domestic analogy in contemporary international politics.

⁴ Throughout this work International Relations (IR) will reflect the formal academic discipline of International Relations whereas international relations (ir) will reflect the discourses which examine the practices therein. Likewise the events under examination within IR will be referred to as international politics.

which can explain or understand international politics. Explanatory approaches, they argue, reflect a philosophical interpretation of the scientific method. On the other hand, scholars who seek to understand international politics work from within the discipline itself eschewing the idea of impartiality and unbiased interpretations of unfolding events.⁵ An examination of the historical development of IR reveals that throughout its relatively short history these different methodologies have exerted a considerable degree of influence. The early years of IR demonstrate a desire to understanding the events of international politics as scholars sought to blend the disciplines of history, philosophy, law in order to engage with the events of diplomacy.⁶ This approach was called into question after the Second World War which ushered in the behaviorist revolution. This methodology espoused the rigor of impartiality and objectivity in order to determine how states, the primary actor of international politics, could maintain their survival and security within the climate of the Cold War.⁷ Broadly speaking this turn engendered a series of scholarly ideas which coalesce, in North American, with the academic discipline of Political Science and espouse a framework of impartial and unbiased instrumental relationships.

⁵ Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁶ This is well documented within introductory texts to IR. See for example Chris Brown, *Understanding international relations*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Robert H. Jackson, *Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and finally, Michael Nicholson, *International relations: a concise introduction*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). A good investigation of how all of these fields can come together is evident in the edited text by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1968).

⁷ An excellent description of this unfolding of events alongside a heartfelt criticism is offered by Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

Events in the United Kingdom unfurled in a somewhat different manner. They reveal a sympathetic interpretation of more ‘understanding’ approaches to international politics. A description of this idea begins with the works of ‘English School’ scholars. Such a descriptive account prefaces an examination of contemporary normative works in order to situate a relational account of ‘being political’. The English school is represented through the works of Hedley Bull, Herbert Butterfield, and Martin Wight. All of these authors were interested in the relationship that ethics could play within international politics and examined the practices of conflict and diplomacy in order grapple with the tense relationship of morality and international politics.⁸ Their examinations provided a critical response to the philosophical structuring of politics within a scientific methodology. Yet their ideas share some similarities with their North American counterparts. Their works are structured by an examination of instrumental relationships which highlight the potential of international law and world order to establish a series of rules which, in the absence of a foundational account of morality, could guide state behavior and mitigate anarchy. Martin Wight is keen to establish means of classifying international political theories. He questions the idea of International Theory and instead identifies three thematic interpretations of international politics; Machiavellian, Kantian, and Groatian. On the other hand Hedley Bull investigates the possibility of a ‘Classical Account’ of international politics while engaging with the discourses of world order and *inter alia* anarchy.⁹ Herbert Butterfield is slightly distinguished from this generalization

⁸ This point is well documented by Adam Watson who provides an excellent overview of the idea of an English school approach. See, “The British Committee for the Theory for International Politics,” Leeds University, <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/watson98.doc> (accessed September 27, 2005).

⁹ See for example Martin Wight, *International theory: the three traditions*, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds., with an introductory essay by Hedley Bull (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991); “Why is there no International Theory?” *International Relations*, 1 no. 2 (1960), 1-35; and “An anatomy of international thought” *Review of International Studies*, 13 no. 3

owing to his interest in the relationship of Christianity and history, the philosophy of history and international relations.¹⁰ As a whole the importance of these authors is twofold. They challenge a natural law approach, which is advocated throughout this work. Consequently, a brief exposition of both their own works is helpful in order to engaged with traditional critiques of IR and natural law morality. Likewise, it is instructive to look at the contemporary influence of the English school and its bearing on wider normative interpretations of international politics.

An English school agenda stagnated during the Cold War years. It was reignited as a research agenda in the early 1990s by Barry Buzan and Richard Little with the publication of “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR”. This article argued that an English school approach could stem the tide of liberal and realist interpretations of international politics articulating the idea of an international system of civilized states.¹¹ As Tim Dunne points out in his examination of this political tradition the English school can be understood as representing a consensus within international politics which recognizes the centrality of states and articulating at the same time a series of rules, norms and institutions which are viewed as legitimate by all.¹² This idea echoes the idea of Hedley Bull who claims that international conflict, when systematically

(1987), 221-227. For Hedley Bull see, *The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); “International theory: the case for a classical approach” *World Politics*, 18 no. 3 (1966), 361-377; and finally, “Order vs. Justice in International Society” Paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the P.S.A. at Birmingham, March 1971.

¹⁰ See for example the inclusion of Herbert Butterfield’s chief work, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, (New York & London: Norton, 1965); or, his contributions to Wight & Butterfield. The legacy of Butterfield within IR is well documented by Ian Hall, “History, Christianity and diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and international relations” *Review of International Studies*, 28 no. 4 (2002), 719-736.

¹¹ Barry Buzan, “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR” *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), 471-488.

¹² Tim Dunne, “Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive Interpretations of International Society” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30 no. 1 (2001), 67-91; and, *Inventing international society: a history of the English School*, (London: Macmillan, 1998).

analyzed can be controlled through properly understood rules and regulations articulated through the discourses of international law.¹³ The English school remains a contested and troubled theoretical framework for some scholars of IR. Ian Hall has questioned the value of this framework which, he claims, marginalizes the important distinctions in and amongst its seeming members.¹⁴ Alternatively, Nicholas Rengger highlights the point first made in the 1970s by E.B.F. Midgley.¹⁵ English School advocates, they both claim, cannot provide a solid foundation upon which the legitimacy of their claims rest.¹⁶

The emergence of this particular framework, regardless of its internal quarrels reflects a wider series of changes within the discipline. It established the necessary space in which a normative focus on international politics concerned primarily with moral and ethical interpretations and responses to international politics could emerge. Scholars such as Chris Brown¹⁷, Molly Cochran¹⁸, Mervyn Frost¹⁹ and Janna Thompson²⁰ all provide works which fall broadly into the category of normative international politics. They each confront the idea of morality and ethics within IR and provide, in their own way, an

¹³ Hedley Bull, "Natural Law and International Relations" *British Journal of International Studies*, 15 no. 2 (1979), 171-181.

¹⁴ Ian Hall, "Still the English Patient? Closures and inventions in the English school" *International Affairs*, 77 no. 4 (2002), 931-942. This work elicited a dynamic response from Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "The 'English patient' strikes back; a response to Hall's mis-diagnosis" *International Affairs*, 77 no. 4 (2002), 943-946. They claim that Hall misunderstands the idea of the English school and 'misrepresents the idea of an international system in world history'.

¹⁵ E. B. F. Midgley, "Natural Law and the 'Anglo-Saxons': Some Reflections in Response to Hedley Bull" *British Journal of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (1979): 260-272.

¹⁶ Nicholas Rengger, *International relations, political theory and the problem of order: beyond international relations theory?* (London: Routledge, 2000).

¹⁷ Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: international political theory today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

¹⁸ Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁹ Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in international relations: a constitutive theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

²⁰ Janna Thompson, *Justice and world order a philosophical inquiry*, (London: Routledge, 2002).

account of moral institutional design. Normative works within IR can be located within the junction of moral philosophy, political theory and international politics. Like most scholarly works within this field these studies engage with the assumed centrality of the state, yet question this particular state of affairs and ponder the historical idea of the *polis* and the possibility of a *cosmos*. There is within this works a nod towards to the possibility of ethical communities within international politics and an associated discourse which transcends, and permeates, the seemingly static boundaries of a state-based system. As Toni Erskine has pointed out, this normative development ought to be understood as the natural outgrowth of domestic political theory into the theater of international politics.²¹ She goes on to argue, in opposition to Bull, that this development provides an otherwise absent historical background to the emerging discipline of international political thought.²² Collectively these works engage with the schema establish by Hollis and Smith. Normative international political thought responds to the ethical dilemmas which emerge within an instrumental political framework guided by power, authority and insecurity.

Chris Brown's seminal work *International Relations theory: New Normative Approaches* offers a schematic ordering system of this burgeoning field of normative international

²¹ Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of 'Dislocated Communities'*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

²² The idea of an disciplinary interest in international political thought is evidenced in the emergence of following texts; Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, Nicholas Rengger, *International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). This idea is likewise supported through the development of new journals which overtly engage in the ideas of political theory, international politics and the history of political thought as well.

politics.²³ He articulates the possibility of cosmopolitan and communitarian frameworks and contrasts these approaches with one another. Communitarian political thought, broadly speaking, locates a central role for the community. It is within this communal space that individuals are constituted and the values and ideals which they articulate first take shape. The idea of a communitarian political thought is articulated in the works of authors such as Mervyn Frost, Alastair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. Mervyn Frost adopts a neo-Hegelian framework in order to establish a link between embedded norms within the community and a conception of the individual. Individuals, communities, and states, he argues, play a mutually constitutive role which shape and re-shape their very being.²⁴ While Frost looks to embedded norms in order to stem the tensions associated with the international ideal of political sovereignty alongside the norms of non-intervention and human rights, Alastair MacIntyre focuses instead on the role of traditions in our understanding of what it is to be human. Traditions emerge from shared understandings within the community which gives rise to the values and ideals towards which individuals all strive. They provide a necessary background knowledge which gives meaning to the rules and institutions guiding our daily lives.²⁵ Finally, Michael Walzer, like Frost, engages with the norm of international sovereignty in order to determine when, and how, individuals facing grave danger can be protected. He situates his account of political obligation and responsibility within the community. It is within the community that individuals are provided with meaning in their lives. Consequently

²³ Brown, 1992.

²⁴ Mervyn Frost, 1996; and, "A turn not taken: Ethics in IR at the millennium" *Review of International Studies*, 24 no. 5 (1998), 119-132.

²⁵ Alastair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: a study in moral theory*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

when faced with a ‘supreme emergency’ they can act collectively in order to ensure their own protection.²⁶

On the other hand, cosmopolitan assumptions originate within the individual who is a source of value. Broadly speaking cosmopolitan thinking highlights a universal conception of right and good. It engages with the fragility of the human condition and espouses a commitment to a global community comprised of individual, moral, beings. To be a cosmopolitan, according to Martha Nussbaum, is to display a primary allegiance to a community of global citizens.²⁷ Likewise Toni Erskine identifies the idea of ethical cosmopolitanism which notes that “everyone, regardless of where he or she stands in relation to political borders, community boundaries, and even enemy lines, is equally an object of moral consideration.”²⁸ This is in keeping with Patrick Hayden’s identification of three cosmopolitan ‘moments’. In his work *Cosmopolitan Global Politics* he notes the centrality of the individual, conceptualized as equal beings, a universal account of morality, and a universal interest in the well-being and development of individuals as members of a global community.²⁹

Patrick Hayden goes on to distinguish between what he identifies as moral and legal interpretations of cosmopolitanism. The former focuses on the moral equality of all individuals *qua* individuals whereas the latter is keen to promote a global political order

²⁶ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, Third Edition*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

²⁷ Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” *The Boston Review*, (1994), 1-8.

²⁸ Erskine, *op. cit.* 2009, 1.

²⁹ Patrick Hayden, *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*, (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005).

premised on a universal understanding of legal rights and duties.³⁰ Much like Hayden, Jeremy Waldron distinguishes two types of cosmopolitan thinking. Cosmopolitanism, he argues, can be located at once in the discourse of political philosophy as well as the philosophy of law. A cosmopolitanism that is rooted in political philosophy espouses a utopian ideal and draws on the notion of the *polis* in order to construct a global moral state. This idea corresponds roughly to the legal cosmopolitanism identified by Hayden and challenges the state-centric idea of international politics. On the other hand, the cosmopolitanism he attributes to the philosophy of law draws on the assumptions of Immanuel Kant. According to Waldron, Kant's use of the phrase, 'cosmopolitan law' reflects the contemporary ideas of 'international law'. Kant, he argues, employed this idea chiefly to investigate the intersection of law, justice and right within a particular ambit of human life. As he concludes, for Immanuel Kant, the idea of a perpetual peace, and a cosmopolitan right was not cosmopolitanism *per se*, rather, it was a thesis embedded within the idea itself.³¹

This cosmopolitan distinction is evident in the normative discourses of IR. Within this ethical subset one can further distinguish two differing frameworks. Liberal interpretations, which draw on the original ideas of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*,³²

³⁰ The focus of this critique of cosmopolitan assumptions focuses on the moral and ethical uses of the idea. This is not to discount the works of such scholars as David Held and Daniel Archibugi who use cosmopolitan ideas in order to engage with the discourse of world order. See for instance David Held, *Cosmopolitan democracy: an agenda for a new world order*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); or, Daniel Archibugi, *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

³¹ Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?" *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8 no. 2 (2002), 229. He articulates these ideas in order to clarify his original arguments which are evident in the following, "Minority Cultures and The Cosmopolitan Alternative" *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform*, 25 (1991), 751.

³² John Rawls, *A theory of justice*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971).

employ the rhetoric of rights in order to establish the well-being of the individual. These ideas are best displayed in the works of Charles Beitz³³ and Thomas Pogge³⁴ who, as students of Rawls, sought to extend justice as fairness beyond the political state. They offer an international ethic which responds to the plight of suffering others throughout the world. Charles Beitz, like the communitarian scholars already highlighted, engages with the idea of international sovereignty alongside the possibility of universal human rights. His investigation of economic institutions, situated within the state, provides a means of developing an account of international distributive justice which benefits individuals, conceptualized as members of a global community. This approach has wielded a formidable influence within the wider discourses of ethical international politics.³⁵ An understanding of Beitz's work prefaces an understanding of the ongoing debates of justice and morality in the wider discourses of IR. The relationship of justice and economics is likewise visible in the works of Thomas Pogge. He argues that global economic inequality prohibits a realistic engagement with the vulnerabilities of being human. He proposes, in the same vein as Beitz, the idea of distributive justice focusing

³³ His original work is Charles Beitz, *Political theory and international relations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). His cosmopolitanism is further developed in later publications such as "International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Literature" *World Politics*, 51 no. 2 (January 1999), 269-296; and, "Social and Liberal Cosmopolitanism" *International Affairs*, 75 no. 3 (1999), 515-529.

³⁴ See for example, Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice" *The Journal of Ethics*, 9 (2005), 29-53; "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties" *Ethics & International Affairs*, 19 no. 1 (2005), 55-83; *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); "A Global Resource Dividend" in *Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship* David A. Crocker & Toby Linden, eds., 501-536 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1988).

³⁵ See Nicholas Rengger, "Reading Charles Beitz: twenty-five years of Political Theory and International Relations"; Chris Brown, "The house that Chuck built: twenty-five years of reading Charles Beitz"; David Miller, "Defending political autonomy: a discussion of Charles Beitz"; Simon Caney, "Global interdependence and distributive justice."; Catherine Lu, "Cosmopolitan liberalism and the faces of injustice in International Relations"; and finally, Charles R. Beitz, "Reflections" *The Review of International Studies*, 31 no. 2 (2005), 361-423.

on the redistribution of global natural resources which challenges the centrality of state borders within the international system.³⁶

One can also distinguish a Kantian cosmopolitanism which, like liberal versions, notes the vulnerability and frailty of the human condition. This interpretation highlights the autonomy of the individual within the community and is well documented in the works of Onora O’Neill.³⁷ Her cosmopolitanism draws on what she identifies as a Kantian Ethic which is derived from, but ultimately distinct from, the original works of Kant.³⁸ She employs this theoretical framework because, she claims, it takes seriously the empirical claims of a Rawlsian influence in moral philosophy but views the centrality of the state, its border, and the bounded nature of justice discourses with a degree of skepticism. Furthermore, this particular framework sustains an account of human moral agency which draws on the ideas of Kantian reason, freedom, action and individual judgment. Such an approach, she claims, can facilitate the shifting role of the state and the cosmopolitan ideal of universal morality. These ideas are presented in their most refined

³⁶ Currently a second generation of scholars who have, in the past, engaged with cosmopolitan ideals, are now turning to an alternative work of John Rawls, *The law of peoples: with “The idea of public reason revisited”*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). This facilitates an account of a cosmopolitan citizen embedded within a community of friendship. See for example, Erskine, 2009; as well as Catherine Lu, “Political Friendship among Peoples” *Journal of International Political Theory*, 5 no. 1 (2009), 41-58 and P.E. Digeser, “Public Reason and International Friendship” *Journal of International Political Theory*, 5 no. 1 (2009), 22-40. This idea is challenged by Simon Keller, who claims that the link between individuals and their friendships when applied to inter-state relations is dubious and ontologically challenging. See “Against Friendship between Countries” *Journal of International Political Theory*, 5 no. 1 (2009), 59-74.

³⁷ See for example Onora O’Neill “Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice” *Review of International Studies*, 26 (2000), 45-60; *Faces of hunger: an essay on poverty, justice and development*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).

³⁸ There are she claims, three different ways of labeling the works of Kant, and its various interpretations. The first, Kant’s ethics reflects the original works he produced. A second category, ‘Kant’s ethics’ is the first round of interpretations of his ideas which, she notes, is distinctly negative in its tone. A third and final category ‘Kantian Ethics’ reflects a discourse derived from the ideas of Kant, but is distinct from his original interpretations. This work is largely positive and has been used within IR to develop a discourse of international cosmopolitan ethics. See Onora O’Neill, “Kantian Ethics” *A Companion to Ethics*, Peter Singer, ed., 175-185 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1991).

state in her latest work, *Towards justice and virtue* where O'Neill seeks to provide an account of justice premised on practical reason in order to accommodate both universal and particular assumptions of human good.³⁹

Cosmopolitan discourses regardless of their origin, represents the chief response to the problems of human suffering and inequality within the theater of international politics. Underlying their structural differences cosmopolitanism is united in its recognition of the frailty of the human condition and the vulnerabilities which this brings about. A cursory glance within international politics by cosmopolitan scholars reflects the inequalities associated with the structures of global governance. They reveal a deep seated malaise as individuals lucky enough to live in a developed and stable state thrive to the detriment of other, less able beings. For cosmopolitan scholars suffering exists within the structures and practices of international politics. These structures are man made and are, logically, capable of being changed. Potentially, they could be restructured in order to better address the frailty of the human condition addressing the needs of individuals. The possibility of change is central to the human experience. It represents, in the wider discourses of the history of political thought, the emergence of the modern notion of human progress. It combines the cognitive abilities of individuals, understood as political agents, to structure the social world. Cosmopolitans engage with the notion of progress. In so doing they highlight a series of assumptions about the human being. The idea that individuals possess the wherewithal to affect structural change, and effectively deal with the contingent factors of being human, is a decidedly modern phenomenon. It assumes a

³⁹ Onora O'Neill, *Towards justice and virtue: a constructive account of practical reasoning*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

degree of control in the natural world, which in reality individuals struggle to realize. As Cynthia Helpern notes, modern conceptions of the individual assume that human knowledge and ingenuity can responsibly address and react to the problems which emerge when individuals live together.⁴⁰ This idea is likewise documented by Niamh Middleton. She notes how the philosophy of the social sciences, loosely based on a scientific methodology facilitated an understanding of individuals as autonomous and knowledgeable beings.⁴¹ Knowledge, it is revealed, empowered individuals who sought to limit the contingent frailty of being human in common. It facilitated political agency directed at improving the human experience.

This historical turn had serious implications for moral institutional design. It was assumed that in order to focus on the potential for human progress, an impartial and sterile institutional design was necessary. Consequently, human progress came to be associated with the public realm of ‘the political’. This move further entrenched the centrality of instrumental relationships to the detriment of non-instrumental relationships. This, in turn, marginalized the social assumptions associated with ‘being political’.

Consequently, contemporary interpretations of moral cosmopolitanism begin with a series of assumptions which sustain an impartial and autonomous moral agent. This individual exists unaware of the wider social assumptions which support his or her moral development. This isolated state challenges effective agency and denies a realistic

⁴⁰ Cynthia Helpern, *Suffering, Politics and Power: a genealogy in modern political theory*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).

⁴¹ Niamh Middleton, “Aquinas, the Enlightenment and Darwin” *New Blackfriars*, 86 no. 1004 (July 2005), 437-449. This point is likewise noted in Hyn Yol Jung, “Enlightenment and the Question of the Other: A Postmodern Audition” *Human Studies*, 25 no. 3 (September 2002), 297-306.

understanding of human vulnerability. They fail to engage with the idea that suffering might just reflect either one of two uncontrollable variables, being social or moral luck.

Discussions relating to moral luck become relevant when sought after ends are not achieved. As Bernard Williams points out deliberative agents may act in a morally appropriate manner yet sought after ends may remain elusive.⁴² At this point one must then look beyond the controllable, to the contingent, and ponder the consequences of one's actions. Are remorse and regret suitable reactions to negative consequences, or should individuals continue on, aware that, regardless of the outcome, their reasonable deliberations were best suited to the sought after, yet elusive ends? As Williams points out, regret and remorse remain unpalatable in a modern context. He highlights the central assumptions of John Rawls to make his point clear. His account of deliberative rationality does not allow for the possibility of blame and the practical methodology he articulates is a sound one. Morality and luck, within this liberal framework, can not co-exist simultaneously, in the lives of individual political agents. It highlights the lack of control which individuals have over the natural world and challenges the modern ideals of institutional design.

Likewise a Kantian perspective is hard-pressed to accept a role for moral luck in the daily lives of individuals. This idea is expressed by Thomas Nagel, in response to Bernard Williams, when he highlights that virtue, according to Kant, is equally available to all individuals. He acknowledges that it may be more difficult for one individual over

⁴² B.A.O. Williams and T. Nagel, "Moral Luck" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 50 (1976), 111-35 & 137-151.

another to achieve a virtuous state but his exposition of the autonomous will leading to an understanding of the moral law provides an account of the free individual who exists outside contingent life factors.⁴³ One can draw parallels between this idea and the early writings of Martha Nussbaum who contrasts the tragic and vulnerable experiences of Hector, in the battle of Troy with the experiences of Agamemnon who must sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia, in order to appease the Gods and set sail for Troy.⁴⁴ While Hector is aware of the moral tragedy he is experiencing and mourns graciously incorporating the experience into his moral trajectory, Agammemnon remains aloof and unaffected. This state of being is unsatisfactory and as the Chorus reveal, his unwillingness to bend to the hands of fate requires punishment. *The Fragility of Goodness* articulates an ancient moral framework revealing an account of human life that is vulnerable and balances on the precipice of tragedy. For Nussbaum, moral experiences are set within the community which advances a notion of moral goodness. This stands in stark contrast to the Kantian experience whereby right is an independent standard discoverable through human reason, and is not focused on the community. The autonomy of right facilitates the removal of moral luck from the contemporary moral experience in a way that Aristotelian readings of the moral life and its contingencies could not. Her Aristotelian examination of luck and tragedy hints at the ensuing account of being political which facilitates the contingent and unpredictable human experiences which challenge the ideal of progress.

Moral luck is but one aspect of the human experience that allows for the expression of human vulnerability. Another aspect which demonstrates an individual's potential for

⁴³ Williams & Nagel.

⁴⁴ Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

tragedy, and therefore suffering, lies in their social nature. The idea that individuals are naturally social beings is a contested one; however, as this work unfolds the social ontology of being human will emerge and with it another related assumption; individuals require both instrumental and non-instrumental relationships in order to develop as moral beings. This work highlights the centrality of non-instrumental relationships as vehicles of social learning within 'the political' which engage with both the public and private aspects of the human experience in an equal manner. It describes how familial relationships educate children on social expectations and behavior within the community. Likewise, they establish the reciprocal expectations of care and love which help to foster a greater sense of solidarity, friendship, and perchance, charity within the community. These values and ideals, this work argues, preface an alternative structure and role for both the individual and the community which is both ethical and moral and relevant to normative IR discourses. This institutional design does not preface the non-instrumental relationships over their instrumental counterparts, it simply reiterates their importance; however, in so doing it reveals the vulnerability which modern and contemporary institutional designs seeks to limit. With care, love and friendship also comes the possibility of hurt, mistrust, fear which can arise in egotistical situations of desire. Such are the contingent factors which human beings can not control and when left unaddressed can lead to the wider consequences of suffering.

The various cosmopolitan institutional designs reveal a proclivity to deny the very aspects which unit individuals as beings in common. The denial of non-instrumental relations, and therefore uncontrollable contingencies, within this realm does not afford a

realistic means of engaging with what it is to be a human being. When Nussbaum, and *inter alia*, Williams, speak of moral luck they are asking their readers to grasp the sensitivity of living together aware that there are situations in which individuals exercise limited control on their outcomes. When these outcomes are negative, this is referred to in many political discourses, as a tragic state. It is the reality of this experience which is recreated throughout this work through the deployment, and defense of a natural law account of politics. This account offers a critical interpretation of international politics which allows for a re-engagement with non-instrumental relationships. Non-instrumental relationships, it will be argued, reveal a particular type of knowledge which stands in stark contrast to the impartial cosmopolitan individual. It acknowledges that individuals, while founded on a social and moral ontology, are in effect unique beings. It is this individuality which must be addressed within the community if our shared vulnerabilities are to be acknowledged. Until this acknowledgement permeates the wider structures of international politics, and the vulnerability of the human experiences is engaged with, the tragic nature of international politics will remain and the discourse of moral international politics will have, at best, a limited, influence on the ability to accommodate the vulnerability of the human condition.

Individuals, regardless of their location, are vulnerable and frail beings. This vulnerability marks the primary means that individuals can relate to each others as beings in common. Our shared vulnerability stems from our need to engage with each other and reflects our inherent social nature. It demonstrates the shared need we all have to live within a community of individuals. These communities reflect both the instrumental and

non-instrumental relationships which provide the reciprocal support that individuals require to develop and care for others in turn. A failure to identify and engage with this natural sociability limits the possibility for human moral development which in turn, limits the possibility of a realistic conception of 'the political'. While cosmopolitan scholars articulate an understanding of human vulnerability, their supporting assumptions fail to offer a means of realistically grappling with the challenge of vulnerability itself. It is the absent social assumptions of being human which facilitate the personal knowledge of individuals, in their daily lives and experiences which incorporates the vulnerability of the human experience within 'the political'. This work reflects an alternative means of understanding what it is to be a human being as a social and moral individual. It situates itself within the historical and contemporary conceptions of natural law morality in order to move beyond the structural assumptions of the cosmopolitan discourse which, it argues, is unable to seriously address the contingent, and particular variables of being human within a moral community.

Suffering is both a natural and political experience. Its consequences are expressed in the daily experiences of being human. As William E. Connolly points out suffering is an ongoing activity. Particular individuals 'bear, endure, undergo, or submit' to experiences which limit their ability to develop in a morally acceptable fashion. To suffer is to experience the opposite of joy, comfort, mastery and wholeness.⁴⁵ As a political phenomenon, suffering can be located as the opposite corollary to agency. It is the inability to act and express hurt and pain. It is, as David B. Morris points out, a silent

⁴⁵ William E. Connolly, "Suffering, justice and the politics of becoming" *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry*, 20 no. 3 (September 1996), 251-252. This idea is likewise articulated in "Chapter five: Suffering, Justice and the Politics of Becoming" *Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, David Campbell & Michael J. Shapiro, eds. 125- 153 (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

process. In order to understand this process one must experience it. It is incommunicable.⁴⁶ The relationship of agency and suffering is likewise comment on by Cynthia Helpen who notes the manner in which both come together. “Politics sits squarely in the middle of that void between active and passive, patient and agent, sufferer and deliverer,” she writes.⁴⁷ One can extend this idea further situating ideas about suffering not only within ‘the political’, but also within a moral framework as well.

This is a valuable step beyond political notions of suffering because it facilitates the idea that suffering is part of the human experience. Consequently, any attempt to engage with this phenomenon requires an holistic understanding of being human drawing on both instrumental and non-instrumental relationships. Non-instrumental relations provide the knowledge to engage with particular instances of suffering aware of the particular attributes of individuals within the community. It demonstrates that responses to suffering can be both individual and particular provided the response is couched within a wider moral framework. This twofold approach to understanding and engaging with human suffering is facilitated by a natural law framework. It articulates the absolute ends of goodness and the particular ends of human development which provide the sensitivity to address the vulnerabilities of the human experience through a particular understanding of love and charity. This approach highlights the most basic aspect of a shared account of humanity, our common frailty. It also highlights the relational nature of the being human. A natural law morality consequently accepts the structural focus of cosmopolitan

⁴⁶ David B. Morris, “About Suffering: Voice, Genre, and Moral Community” in *Social Suffering*, Arthur Kleinman, ed. 27 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

⁴⁷ Helpen, 10.

accounts but argues that the impartialist assumptions of their origins fail to address the totality of the human experience and by extension, human frailty as well.

Before moving on to engage more fully with the idea of natural law morality one further interpretation of cosmopolitanism must be examined. Second generation cosmopolitan scholars have sought to address the challenges of impartialism and universalism which accompany both the liberal and Kantian interpretations. The ideas of Catherine Lu and Toni Erskine reveal a cosmopolitan framework which embeds the individual within a particular conception of the community. This facilitates a reworking of cosmopolitanism while simultaneously challenging the dichotomy established by Brown. Catherine Lu attempts to ‘salvage’ the idea of an ethical cosmopolitanism by highlighting different images of humanity. She challenges the utopian critique through an exegesis of human vulnerability and the proclivity individuals, as agents, have to do morally evil deeds; however, she does not express vulnerability and frailty in isolation. She is also aware of the particularisms which define each individual. Cosmopolitanism, she claims, need not be a homogeneous ethic. This particularity avoids the challenges of imperialism which underscores its universality. She concludes that cosmopolitanism can be ‘non-idealist, non-alienating and non-coercive.’⁴⁸ These ideas are similarly taken up by Toni Erskine who seeks to articulate the idea of embedded cosmopolitanism which not only addresses the shortcomings of previous cosmopolitan thinkers but invites otherwise excluded scholars, namely, communitarian ethicists into the debates in order to enrich the role of the ethical community alongside the individual. Their works provide many parallels with

⁴⁸ Catherine Lu, “The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism” *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8 no. 2 (December 2002), 244-267.

the soon to be elaborated natural law approach; however, while one can find evidence of an improved interpretation of cosmopolitanism, they fail to discuss the relationality of human experience which, it is argued, is required in order to address the vulnerabilities of being human in common.

Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of Dislocated Communities represents a detailed and thought out response to many of the challenges faced by cosmopolitan scholars. It also engages with the manner in which IR proposes to study the idea of normative international relations.⁴⁹ Erskine's ideas draw on the works of many scholars, in particular Michael Walzer, Onora O'Neill, and a group of feminist scholars which she labels, 'different voice feminists' in order to argue that when individuals are conceptualized within particular relationships the idea of geographic communities is dissolved opening up the possibility of a porous international ethic. Relations, for Erskine, sustain human autonomy and self-sufficiency all the while providing an account of the 'dislocated community'. Individuals can choose which relationships will define who they are and what allegiances and affiliations will be close to their heart while other will remain further afield. This idea of community highlights the centrality of shared membership but remains an informal conceptualization. They can overlap, increase or decrease depending on the nature of the individual. Moreover, they are, for Erskine, the primary means of addressing both the impartiality and universality critiques of previous cosmopolitan accounts.

⁴⁹ Toni Erskine, 2009.

A cursory glance of this idea seems to improve on previous interpretations; however, at the same time alternative challenges must be addressed. The theme of vulnerability key to many of her predecessors and contemporary's works is all but absent from her theoretical framework. Like Beitz and Pogge, she draws on the asocial individual attributed to the ideas of John Rawls. Owing to this influence there remains an overt acceptance of the pre-social self. Moreover, she brackets human agency from the moral experience. How an individual can embed themselves absent a strong idea of agency remains problematic. Another inconsistency is the manner in which norms and instrumental relationships are used to make the case for an embedded community and a responsibility to strangers, even during times of war. Instead of pointing to the underlying vulnerability of being human Erskine highlights the legal discourse of the Geneva Conventions to add credibility to her claims of partial cosmopolitan ethic. While her notion of community begs for an examination of non-instrumental relationships she remains focused on the instrumental relations of formal IR discourses as represented in the international laws of war. Consequently one wonders whether or not Erskine is able to bridge the gap established by Brown so long ago. What emerges from Erskine's re-working of the cosmopolitan ethic is in fact a desire to recapture the relationship of the individual and the community which typifies pre-modern moral thought. This relationships would provide the elusively sought after unity which Erskine seeks to establish though her engagement with the works of communitarian and feminist thinkers.

A natural law framework sustains the elusively sought after unity of 'embedded cosmopolitanism'. Advocating the morality of natural may seem an unexpected ethical

traditional to invoke within international politics. Indeed, it is understood by some to be a less than palatable turn. Yet it is to the natural law tradition that this work turns in light of the previously articulated idea of human suffering. It notes the vulnerabilities associated with both moral luck and an inherently social nature and claims that only a framework that articulates an holistic account of being political will successfully begin to address the phenomenon of human suffering. As individuals, we are all linked by our common frailty and the possibility of death. Indeed, death is the ultimate expression of moral failure in the presence of human suffering. A natural law framework addresses this most basic of human phenomenon which incorporates the realities of the human experience. It advocates the integration of human non-instrumental relationships alongside the formal structures of governance in order to provide knowledge of what it is to be a particular person within a larger moral framework. Consequently it improves the impartiality of the cosmopolitan discourses by articulating the idea of persons in relations. It openly addresses the relationship of morality and ethics within international politics and engages with the idea of tragedy in IR more broadly. It provides a response through the articulation of an account of moral agency which locates the potential for positive action within each and every individual conceptualized as members of particular and distant communities. It assumes outright the social and moral nature of individuals and espouses a symbiotic relationship between individuals which reflects a particular ordering of the moral community. The community, on this account, is the end of personal non-instrumental relationships structured within an account of moral governance engendering institutional patterns which sustain individual identity within the community. It identifies who will care and support us and who we support in turn.

A natural law framework also provides a critical standard from which to evaluate current political structures and determine if they are meeting the primary needs they were originally created to meet. As this work will reveal, the ends of human happiness, or integral human fulfillment, coupled with the particular knowledge gained in through non-instrumental relationships of love provide a means of evaluating the patterns which emerge from formal political structures. It develops a casuistry of wellbeing drawing on a re-articulation of the ends of universal human rights while simultaneously challenging their current liberal interpretation. The value of a pre-modern natural law framework lies in the challenge it mounts against the impartiality of modern liberal political thought and the contemporary political subject therein. Likewise, it is skeptical of the ideal of human progress and its centrality in the task of institutional design. Instead, it focuses on the idea of human engagement.

This final focus on human engagements, and relational being, distinguishes this natural law account from its cosmopolitan cousins. The pre-social origins which Erskine identifies, and are visible in other scholars as well, do not necessitate an associated account of agency at the outset.⁵⁰ Owing to the relationality of human beings and the epistemic relationships of thought and knowledge, a natural law interpretation offers an account of agency, and individuals, as moral agents alongside and within an unfolding natural law interpretation of being political. It is the possibility of agency which allows

⁵⁰ While Erskine brackets the idea of agency within her work she does not discount the need to account for the idea of individual and collective moral agency. See Toni Erskine, *Can Institutions have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations*, (Houndsville: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). She articulates an all-encompassing definition of agency and examines the role of institutions and states in light of this idea.

for a critique of current institutions as well as the possibility of future change. It is the possibility of change which drives this work. It seeks not to engage in the debates of suffering per se, but rather, having identified the problem of human suffering and locating its place within the formal structures of international politics through an exegesis of cosmopolitan discourses it seeks instead to propose an account of international politics which engages with the possibility of moral institutional design in light of man's inherent vulnerabilities which emerge when individuals are simultaneously conceptualized as social, moral and necessarily political beings.

Chapter One moves quickly beyond the cosmopolitan works identified in this Introduction and locates alternative accounts of tragedy in International Relations. It does this through an examination of political philosophy and international political thought documenting the loss of non-instrumental knowledge within domestic institutional design and the discourse of international law. It offers an historical account of political and moral philosophy beginning with the enlightenment. It then highlights the challenges posed for more modern interpretations of international politics and the changing relationship of ethics and morality within the discipline itself. This is achieved through a formal investigation of the contemporary idea of tragedy in international relations and draws on a wide range of authors who exist within the peripheries of the realist discourse in IR.

Chapter Two proposes the idea of a natural law framework. As was documented in this Introduction, the natural law framework is decidedly pre-modern and focuses on the

relationality and vulnerability of the human experience. Yet Chapter Two is concerned with addressing the criticisms of natural law within the formal discipline of IR. It offers an historical overview of the tradition before demonstrating the presence, albeit a hidden one, within contemporary debates of IR through the distinction of thick and thin ideas of natural morality. Chapter Two establishes the presence of natural law in international politics and goes on to show how an assimilation of thick and thin accounts is possible owing to the work of the 'New Natural Lawyers'. It challenges their interpretation but offers at the same time a defense of the theological criticisms highlighted by English School Scholars, in particular Hedley Bull. It draws on the Papal Encyclicals and the philosophical ideas of Weber in order to demonstrate that faith reflects ideas and that ideas are central to the human experience. Moreover, it demonstrates how this notion of faithful politics can inform contemporary international politics when one seeks to offer a realistic appraisal of the human condition.

Chapter Three builds the necessary framework needed to adopt an account of politics in which instrumental and non-instrumental relationships feature as equal and prominent sources for institutional patterns. It draws on the ideas of Thomas Aquinas in order to articulate an account of the natural law individual and locates these ideas in his original ideas of natural law. It builds on the interweaving of thick and thin natural morality in order to demonstrate that within his works Aquinas provides a vision of the community that supports agency and challenges the centrality of the state in International Politics. It articulates an account of being human premised on the potential of human development

in order to espouse an account of political obligation and responsibility derived from the idea of love.

Chapter Four draws out the nuances of the natural law account of love. It uses this idea to offer an account of the natural law agent alongside the community espousing the ideals of civic friendship when it is coupled with the natural dominion of the Salamanca Theologians. It concludes through an account of the order of charity in order to demonstrate the possibility of an unbounded account of international politics. This facilitates the development of fluid and dynamic institutional patterns which accommodate the idea of individuals conceptualized as agents of justice. It highlights the possibility of commutative interpretations of justice, as opposed to distributive accounts located in cosmopolitan discourses and shows how this idea complements the relationality of being. It situates this work alongside pre-existing feminists debates about care and shows how the natural equality of being which features within the morality of natural law can offer insight into the possibility of relational politics.

This work draws to a close by demonstrating how, in the end, the morality of natural law can affect the structures, practices, and traditional ideas of international politics. It begins with a description of ‘the international’ in order to demonstrate the possibility of an open-ended account of international politics. This facilitates a non-territorial account of the political community. This is followed by an acute critique of human rights and provides instead, a natural law response. This facilitates the development of a casuistry of wellbeing which demonstrates the feasibility of collective moral agency. The Chapter

concludes through an articulate of 'the personal' - an informed account of international politics which engages, one final time, with the vulnerability of being human, in common. It notes that individuals are fallible but reiterates that when situated within the proper moral structures there is a possibility to do goodness, but that individuals can at times err, and in such instances the possibility of human suffering is greater.