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CADBURYS' NEW FACTORY SYSTEM

1879 - 1919

Michael Colin Rowlinson

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Aston in Birmingham

September 1987

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM
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This thesis examines the reasons for *Cadburys'* move from a city centre site to a greenfield site in Bournville in 1879 and the subsequent development of the factory and the Bournville community. The founding of the Bournville Village Trust by George Cadbury is discussed in relation to the Garden City movement. The welfare and personnel management policies which *Cadburys* adopted in the 1900s are considered in relation to welfarism in general, especially in the United States. The extent to which the idea of a "Quaker employer" can explain *Cadburys* policies is questioned both methodologically and empirically. The early use of scientific management at Bournville is described and related to Edward Cadbury's writings on the subject. Finally, the institution of a Works Council Scheme in 1918 is described and its uses are discussed. It is concluded that *Cadburys* instituted a new factory system in this period which consisted of a synthesis of ideas borrowed from elsewhere and that for a variety of reasons *Cadburys* was an appropriate site for their implementation.

KEY WORDS: BUSINESS HISTORY; THE LABOUR PROCESS; MANAGEMENT;
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; WELFARE.

For Babs And Mick And Caroline

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ABBREVIATIONS

B.W.M.	<i>Bournville Works Magazine</i>
Board Mins.	Cadbury Brothers Ltd., Bournville Board Committee of Management Minutes
Board File	Committee of Management File
B.W.M.C.	Bournville Works Men's Council
B.W.W.C.	Bournville Works Women's Council
B.V.T.	Bournville Village Trust
G.W.C.	Girls' Works Committee
M.W.C.	Men's Works Committee
I.I.R.C.	Interim Industrial Reconstruction Committee

NOTE:

Cadburys is used throughout for the firm of Cadbury Brothers Ltd., to distinguish it from members of the Cadbury family - the Cadburys.

The same applies to *Rowntrees*, and the Rowntrees. Italics are used to denote company names, as opposed to families.

INTRODUCTION

Sources

This thesis is a business history, it focuses on one particular firm and on the development of the management of that firm, *Cadburys*. However, it is by no means a definitive or comprehensive business history, it concentrates on certain aspects of the firm, namely those concerned with labour-management and brings in other issues insofar as they affected labour-management and provided the context for it. The primary source material used for the research was the Cadbury Collection held by *Cadbury Schweppes* at their Bournville Works. The research has concentrated primarily on the Board Minutes of Cadbury Brothers Ltd. from 1899 to 1939, and the files accompanying them. These have been used extensively because previous studies have not had access to these sources to anything like the same extent, and it was thought that the arguments of previous writers on *Cadburys*, and on subjects in which they were involved, could best be confirmed or refuted by studying this new material. The themes which have been studied have been selected partly on the basis that they are issues where previous writers have taken a position, that goes for the chapters on Quaker Employers and on Scientific Management. The questions which needed to be considered were quite simply; should *Cadburys* best be regarded as a Quaker employer? And, did they use scientific management techniques? But more than that, each chapter has tried to identify and assess an important element in the institutional framework of *Cadburys* labour management as it emerged in the period before World War Two. Because each of these institutions can be conceptualised separately, even though their implementation was carried out over time and not all at once, the chapters dealing with them overlap chronologically to a large extent. This is chiefly because the institutional framework was laid down in a particularly active period in the firm's history.

Although the primary source material, the Board Minutes and Files, and the extensive Committee and Works Council documents, have been gone over thoroughly, it might be thought from a conventional business history point of view that they feature too little. This is because an

attempt has been made to continually contextualise the firm. This is not in terms of prevailing general economic and social conditions, but rather the particular social movements for which there is some evidence that *Cadburys* were identified or associated with, or influenced by. Unless there is some evidence of their association with elements of the context in which they found themselves then it has been thought best not to speculate, for fear of collapsing the firm into its economic context or portraying its management as somehow all-knowing and aware of everything that went on. On the other hand, if the primary sources had been used alone to tell a story an important, and probably vital aspect of the firm's history would have been overlooked.

Cadburys were not essentially innovators, and the policies implemented at Bournville were not developed independently by the firm. They borrowed ideas from other firms, and preferably ideas which they had already seen practically applied. The extent to which they did this is striking, in fact the extent to which they did it systematically could be called an innovation in itself. This is an important element in the history of the firm, and it also has implications for examining the diffusion of labour management ideas. It points away from an emphasis on the ideological predispositions of employers, which can be seen as an attempt to explain their actions in the absence of real evidence as to where their practices originated. *Cadburys'* real achievement needs to be seen not in terms of successive innovations, but of a *novel synthesis* of innovations which had been developed outside of the firm and which they adapted to fit their own institutional framework. The particular combination which resulted is what made *Cadburys* distinctive.

In considering the particular contexts from which *Cadburys* borrowed their ideas the research has had to move out of the primary source material. In each instance only contemporary published material has been used which appears close to the *Cadburys* or which members of the firm were likely to be aware of. This approach in itself has highlighted some interesting contemporary literature and its connection with *Cadburys*; the books by Budgett Meakin on welfare and J.E. Prosser on wages were of special interest and are examined in Chapters four and

five. However, no attempt has been made to follow up primary source material for each of the movements which influenced *Cadburys*. Instead, mostly secondary sources have been used. So, for example, material relating to the Garden City Association has not been examined in relation to the development of the Bournville Village Trust.

Agency

The underlying theoretical problem of this thesis is the problem of human agency, and the difficulty of avoiding a wholly social system or social action approach. This is by no means a new discovery in history or sociology as Abrams has explained:

It is the problem of finding a way of accounting for human experience which recognizes simultaneously and in equal measure that history and society are made by constant, more or less purposeful, individual action and that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history and society ... It is the problem of individual and society, of consciousness and being, action and structure. It is easily, and endlessly formulated, but, it seems, stupefyingly difficult to resolve.¹

It is not suggested that this thesis represents any original contribution to the wider theoretical problem, it is certainly not another theoretical manifesto. However, it is this theoretical dilemma which underlies the approach which has been taken. An attempt has been made to avoid a sort of storybook narrative. This is a problem which particularly afflicts business history. Leslie Hannah has described this affliction:

business historians, who in general quite properly prize their allegiance to the facts of the individual case, have sometimes tended to see events in the history of the firm as unique, biographical events explicable in terms of particular or even accidental concatenations of historical forces.²

However, it is difficult to agree with Hannah's explanation for this clinging to an antiquarian tradition when he says that:

The reason for the virtual absence of good, thematic, conceptual work can be traced to the unusual structure of the profession of economic history in Britain.³

Instead, the roots of the theoretical weaknesses, or, quite frankly, the almost complete absence of theory, in some business histories should be looked for in the ideological preferences of some of their writers. It is necessary to do more than just produce exhortations for theory, some reasons needs to be given *why* theory is necessary. It was a prerequisite for this thesis that theory should be examined, because the first question to be answered had theoretical implications; why study *Cadburys*? or, indeed, why study any individual firm? In attempting to answer this question a working theoretical approach was developed. This is what the first Chapter discusses, developing a methodology appropriate for the thesis. It is not a comprehensive survey of theoretical approaches appropriate to business history, that would take up a thesis in itself. There are some glaring omissions, Alfred Chandler's *The Visible Hand* and Edith Penrose's *The Theory of the Growth of the Firm*. These, and others, have not been omitted because they were inappropriate but because they did not actually inform the approach taken. It is not a manifesto for what should be done, it is an attempt to give the reader an idea of the methodology used in the research which actually has been done. Essentially that consists in a synthesis of Marx's *Capital*, Shumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, and Chandler's *Strategy and Structure*. This appears to be an odd combination, but then an adulatory biography of an "entrepreneur" can seem as strange from another standpoint.

The problem for the apologists for capitalism, be they conscious or unconscious apologists, is that once they start to analyse the historical process in business in theoretical terms they are forced to abandon one of the ideological defences of capitalism; i.e. a belief in the superiority of the market as it is enshrined in economics. Leslie Hannah hints at this in his introduction to a series of recent articles on business history:

On the theoretical level, a frequent theme is the inadequacy of a neoclassical framework of analysis for understanding the various points at issue: the transfer of technology, the objectives of the firm, or the decline of an industry.⁴

Unfortunately, once the idea of the all-pervasive market has been left behind as neither efficacious nor historically tenable, the all-consuming concern with Britain's relative economic decline starts to raise the ugly question as to who is responsible for it. It is no wonder that explanations are sought, not in terms of the failure of the entrepreneurs, but of the negative attitudes to them. The redemption or damnation of the entrepreneur is not really the concern of a Marxist; to put it crudely, if capitalism goes, then the capitalist goes with it.

This thesis does not concern itself with Britain's relative economic decline, or with *Cadburys'* economic performance. Their performance has been sufficient for the firm to continue to operate on a large scale; and it is quite likely to continue to do so, even if anything comes of the persistent takeover rumours. The political stance of this thesis is such that an identification of the interests of the working class with any particular capitalist concern or national economy, is precluded. If the focus of this thesis had to be summed up in one word, it would have to be *hegemony*.

Labour management has to be seen as an element of hegemony. It does not have to be seen as the only element or anywhere near the most important, but it is always part of the overall hegemony. It is important, therefore, to try to understand how particular varieties of labour management came about, what were the reasons for introducing them? How did they develop? And how were they or could they be challenged? In Chapter Two the idea that Quakerism could have represented something coherent enough to explain the formulation of *Cadburys'* labour management is examined. The "Quaker employer" as a distinctive entity, which explains labour policies, is however rejected, and instead that image is seen as a construction based very much on what *Cadburys* were already doing at their Bournville works.

On the other hand, this does not mean that the subjective factor is being rejected. The adoption of specific labour management policies by *Cadburys* needs to be examined by looking at the actual historical process by which they came about. The firm's actions cannot be read off from its sectoral location. The docility or otherwise of its

labour, its sexual composition and degree of trade union organisation; these cannot be taken as given, they are, in part, the outcome of the actions of those firms which dominate any sector. Similarly, the prosperity or otherwise of a firm is the product of decisions taken within the firm and not just the effect of the firm's location in the market. The actions of the firm itself are a part of the process of creation of any industrial sector. So the actions of an employer cannot be reduced to the alleged interests of his industrial sector; which is what Mathias appears to do when considering the enlightened industrialists of the late 19th century:

the prosperity of these new industries was not much involved in export markets as a rule, so that the minds of the employers were not as obsessed with the fear of competition from low-cost production from abroad. Rather they knew that their prosperity depended upon good wages and employment at home, upon rising social standards, possibly on increased leisure; certainly upon the shopping baskets of a million housewives. Lever and Cadbury had good cause to know that the power of the working classes made them rich, and could more easily see that the economic implications of the trade unions might be a healthy influence, implying a wider home market and better standards of labour. That is to say, the assumptions from which they were operating came from a different world of values from those of the coal owners.⁵

Not only is this inadequate, it is also inaccurate, as is shown in Chapter Four by the examination of the competitive context in which *Cadburys'* welfare measures were introduced in the 1900s.

Cadburys' ability to take advantage of an expanding market and to succeed in its adoption of new welfare policies was the result of an earlier decision to move to the Bournville site, outside of Birmingham city centre. This facilitated the development of a distinctive identity, centred on the Bournville Village, as well as allowing straightforward physical expansion. The significance of Bournville and how it came about, and the obscure relationship between the factory and the Village, is examined in Chapter Three.

While business history suffers from insufficient generalisation, the same cannot be said of the labour process literature. There are

few studies of the so-called labour-process debate which stand up to Abram's criteria for an outstanding sociological study:

in which theory, evidence, and concept really do maintain a close, fluent dialogue with no bullying.⁶

The labour process literature suffers from over-generalisation and attempts too often to force limited material into grand theoretical frameworks. Too often a discussion of abstract and tendential concepts, of deskilling especially, is confirmed or refuted by a piece of hole-in-the-corner empirical research⁷, or by a reworking of the secondary sources. Howard Gospel's review of a recent book of essays on deskilling applies to the labour process literature generally:

All the essays acknowledge the need for a historical context ... However, for the business historian it is also a pity that there is really no in-depth study of a particular firm or industry over a period of time. Equally, in some of the essays the empirical base is weak and attempts at refinement of Marxist theory become even more metaphysical and removed from historical reality.⁸

Chapter Five, on Scientific Management, is not an attempt to confirm or refute Braverman. Instead it assesses the significance of Edward Cadbury's limited opposition to Taylorism in relation to the application of scientific management techniques at Bournville. The use of an American consultancy firm to improve organisation in the factory in the period before WW1 indicates that *Cadburys* were more willing to incorporate scientific management than has previously been thought. The new material which has come to light from the research on this aspect of the firm's development has implications for the consideration of the time at which Taylor's ideas were actually accepted in Britain.

The Substantive Institutional Framework

Once the welfare and management framework had been established in the period before WW1, then the firm had a momentum along a particular line of labour management. The institution of a Works Council scheme at Bournville fitted into this line of development, although it is hard to see what objective requirements of the firm were met by it. The Works Councils suffered from a lack of direction because their role was

unclear, however they became enduring institutions at Bournville. The initiation of the Works Council scheme is described in Chapter Six.

With the establishment of the Works Councils the basic institutional framework for *Cadburys* labour management was complete. The subsequent history of the firm shows that these institutions remained essentially intact, although they were extended or restricted to suit requirements. The continuing importance to the firm of the institutions which were initiated in the period between 1899 and 1918, is shown by their prominence in one of Cadbury Brothers' own publications reviewing the inter-war years, *Industrial Record 1919-1939*, with its chapter on "Welfare and Social Security". There is no actual periodization, however, because the initiation and implementation of the different aspects of labour management did not result from logic internal to the firm. Although the formation of a private limited company, and the promotion to the Board of four younger Cadburys marked a turning point for the firm in 1899, this facilitated the adoption of welfare and production techniques. The new Directors were able to carry through these developments, but the context in which the ideas behind them arose was much wider than the firm itself. Then, with the Works Councils, their initiation was the result of the deliberations of the Whitley Committee. It would be inconsistent to have a periodization which started with an endogenous turning point, say 1899, and finished with an exogenous one, say 1918, when the Works Councils started. The chapters are therefore thematic and cover varying periods.

It should be noted that each of these institutions is of a substantive and enduring nature, they are not like the platitudinous ephemera of name-changing corporations hoping to evoke an efficiency enhancing corporate culture by a few catchy slogans. While the idea of a Quaker employer is seen as untenable, the reality of the welfare provisions or of the timing of work, is not questioned. *Cadburys* may not be best conceptualised as a Quaker employer, that does not mean to say that it was like any other firm, only that different explanations for its distinctiveness must be sought. The firm expanded considerable

time, energy and resources on such things as welfare and recreational provisions. Just one example will suffice to indicate this, the

Table 0.1 *Expenditure on New Buildings*^a

	1901	1902	1903
Philanthropic Works	£1,600	£6,195	£7,102
	(incl, £1,500 Men's Pavilion and Recreation Ground	(incl, Men's Pav, & Girls' Baths £3,500 part Cost	
Business Works	£15,600	£12,995	£23,573
Total	£17,200	£19,190	£30,675

expenditure on new buildings in the early years of this century. (see table 0.1). Investment on such a scale during a period of intense international competition when the firm had to develop new products indicates a very real commitment. Once established, the policies which resulted in such expenditure were not easily abandoned. What needs to be explained is how the firm became wedded to these policies, and why the union with them was so enduring. And it is these concerns that occupy this thesis.

Corporate Culture

If a business history is to avoid becoming a lengthy narrative lacking in analysis and interpretation, then a methodology needs to be developed which will reveal the salient points in the history of a firm without collapsing that history into the more general history of the economy and society. It must be recognised from the outset that one purpose of developing such a methodology and, making it *explicit*, is political. Business history is certainly an arena for ideological conflict; some of the bland hagiographies which pass for business histories are surely evidence of how one-sided the conflict has largely been. At least one champion of the businessman has had no hesitation in setting out, in an academic setting, an eclectic defence based on diverse literary sources, or what he sees as the hard done by hero of business.'

Since one recent writer on *Cadburys* has focused on the same period as is dealt with in this study, looking for the "Creation of a Company Culture", this will do as a convenient starting point for setting out the method used in *this* study. Not that explicit attention to "corporate cultures" is particularly typical of business. However, if it is true, what Dellheim says, that:

The current boom in the study of corporate culture and the concern with the role of rituals, symbols, beliefs, and myths within the corporation have suggested new lines of inquiry for business history,

then it would be as well to deal with this approach at the outset and to say why it is *not* appropriate for the study of business history and why little or no attention is paid to this boom here. This is especially necessary where *Cadburys* are concerned because as expert myth makers they make an excellent subject for the the students of corporate cultures.

According to two writers on *Corporate Cultures*:

The company's real existence lay in the hearts and minds of its employees.

With this in mind it is hardly surprising that they found confirmation for their views in much of the ephemera that makes up business biography:

We wanted to see what had made America's great companies not merely organizations, but successful, human institutions...

There we stumbled into a gold mine of evidence. Biographies, speeches, and documents from ... giants of business ... show a remarkable intuitive understanding of the importance of a strong culture in the affairs of their companies.³

Stumbling into it is hardly the way to find the substantive elements in the histories of businesses; although it has to be conceded that it is probably as good an approach as any for finding endless, meaningless anecdotes, or "myths" and "rituals".

The objection to such an approach to business history is that it is ahistorical. It may be the latest approach, (and a more academically respectable approach than the old in-house hagiographies), which is conducive to writing eulogies of capitalists and of the so-called "corporate cultures" which they are supposed to have created. But it ends up with history being written upside-down.

Long ago Marx and Engels saw a similar problem with contemporary historians who, either "totally neglected or else considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of history ... [the] ... real basis of history ...

The 'idea', the 'conception' of the people in question about their real practice, is transformed into the sole determining active force, which controls and determines their practice.⁴

(It is worth calling up Marx and Engels on *The German Ideology* for a clear assertion of the stance taken in this study:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour ... Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive

forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its further forms ... If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process, as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.⁵

Even if they had heard of it, Marx and Engels would probably have given the notion of "corporate cultures" short shrift. Nevertheless, they indicated where a genuinely historical study of a business would start. For Dellheim:

A historical approach to company culture begins with the guiding beliefs of the founders.⁶

This is a contradiction in terms, because the notion of a "company culture" is itself merely a contemporary self-conscious articulation of a legitimization of business, and particularly of managers at certain levels within corporations.⁷ It is a nonsense to project a recent fad back on to business history. Although employers might have actually believed, (and Sir Adrian Cadbury quite clearly still does believe), that their ideas shaped their real practice as employers, the reality is that it is their real practice which will have delimited and restricted their ideas. Marx and Engels's aphorism applies to business histories which focus on the ideas of the founders as the source of employers' practices:

Whilst in ordinary life, every shop keeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight.⁸

The Personification of Capital

This is not to say that the capitalist is guilty of deceit, even of self-deceit, or that he is consciously motivated purely by self-interest. What needs to be stated is that the capitalist is constrained by the mode of production, by capitalism and, more specifically, by the particular form those relations of production take within history. The relations of production, these must be the real starting point, the real basis for the history of a business, and for the ideas of its founders and of their successors. For Marx, the

"objective content of the circulation" of money was the "subjective purpose" of the capitalist:

it is only in so far as the application of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will.⁹

What needs to be shown therefore, is the process by which the objective content of capital becomes the subjective purpose of the capitalist. This cannot be done by mere assertion, to do so would leave this approach open to the charge of being teleological, of reifying capital.

All this is not to say that ideas are simply *determined*, or worse, irrelevant. In *Capital* Marx himself can sound, at his most rhetorical, as if he sees things in a very determined way:

The capitalist ... As a capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But capital has one sole driving force, the drive to valorize itself, to create surplus-value, to make its constant part, the means of production, absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus-labour. Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.

Marx hears, "the voice of the worker, which had previously been stifled in the sound and fury of the production process", making demands upon the employers:

and I demand it without any appeal to our heart, for in money matters sentiment is out of place. You may be a model citizen, perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A., and you may be in the odour of sanctity as well; but the thing you represent when you come face to face with me has no heart in its breast. What seems to throb there is my own heartbeat.¹⁰

Clearly this is not the voice of the worker speaking, this is Marx speaking to the worker! It is a warning to the worker not to be taken in by the apparent niceness of any individual capitalist. It is an assertion that the capitalist cannot transcend the drive of capital. It is an antidote to the notion that capitalists define their own role, or that the founders of firms can set out the objective aims of firms.

However, it is not necessarily of no interest whether or not a capitalist is in the odour of sanctity, or the R.S.P.C.A., or the Society of Friends, *once* it is accepted that such membership does not define the capitalist's soul nor become his sole driving force. The well meaning capitalists, and their pet historians, might well reply to the worker that, the conditions of labour in the history of capitalist production, far from being, as Marx put it, the outcome of "a struggle between collective capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e. the working class";¹¹ are the product of the working out of the ideas of the capitalist:

Business is the instrument of disinterested ends. We have never regarded business simply as business. It is also a social experiment, and our underlying purpose is to show that business success is not only consistent with a high regard for the welfare of the workpeople, but the corollary of it.¹²

Which is right? Is the capitalist's soul the vehicle for the self-valorization of capital, the capitalist merely capital personified? Or, can capital be the vehicle for the working out of the capitalist's schemes for betterment?

Marx, again, stated:

Capital therefore takes no account of the health and the length of life of the worker, *unless society forces it to do so* ... Looking at these things *as a whole*, it is evident that this does not depend on the will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.¹³ [emphasis added]

Before going on it should be noted that Marx did not consider the ideas of the ruling class as homogeneous, he was aware that some could be in the Society of Friends, others in the R.S.P.C.A., and still others in the odour of sanctity, and they could fall out amongst themselves:

The division of labour ... manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the

others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between two parts, which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class.¹⁴

To utilise this approach it is not sufficient to reiterate, "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" and to leave it at that, because:

The individuals comprising the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think.¹⁵

It is necessary to investigate their thoughts therefore, in relation to material relationships; where they diverge and collide and how the one is subordinated to the other. Things are not as they appear to be or as the capitalist imagines them to be:

It is not because he is a leader of industry that a man is a capitalist; on the contrary, he is a leader of industry because he is a capitalist. The leadership of industry is an attribute of capital.¹⁶

Schumpeter: The Totality of Capitalism

However, care must be taken not to render this theoretical approach tautological. Schumpeter, dealing with another aspect of Marx's theory, warned:

in practically all cases the theory can be made tautologically true. For there is no policy short of exterminating the bourgeoisie that could not be held to serve some economic or extra-economic short-run or long-run, bourgeois interest, at least in the sense that it wards off still worse things. This, however, does not make that theory any more valuable.¹⁷

Tautological or teleological assertions that this or that action or idea is the working out of deeply laid plans conforming with "definite 'objective' class interests", apart from being useless, invite well-deserved ridicule:

This sort of thing ... merely shows that nursery tales are no monopoly of bourgeois economics.¹⁸

That the capitalist per se is capital in general personified is an a priori statement, it precedes, but in turn informs analysis. But, to allege that the thoughts of each and every capitalist were at all times the expression of the requirements of this or that capital, would not only be tautological, it would be stupid. If capital is, as Marx would have it, personified in the capitalist, and if, as Marx would also have it, those persons have consciousness and can think, then their thoughts must be more or less accessible to historical investigation insofar as those thoughts have been communicated and acted upon. In other words, the process by which ideas come about and are developed in relations to real conditions should be open to historical investigation. In an individual enterprise this means focusing on the way the organisation of production develops alongside the development of the ideas of the capitalist. Of course this not the whole story, the capitalist is also a member of a class, a fact of which he will be more or less aware, and his ideas will be shaped by the wider interests of that class as well as by the particular developments within his own enterprise. It should be noted at this point that the line of investigation being proposed does not entail identifying which ideas are in conformity with the capitalist's objective interest and which are not; it is difficult to see how the a priori abstract and general objective interest of a class *could* be pinned down to any particular bourgeois notion. The process of the selection of ideas will to some extent be identified with the selection of individuals to personify capital, but this process will be subtle. Unless the capitalist is threatened with bankruptcy as an individual, or the existence of the capitalist system, and with it the capitalist class is threatened, the capitalist, as much as the worker, will be able to carry on with a whole rag bag of ideas, some of which will serve his interests as a capitalist, other which will contradict those interests and still others which will be irrelevant mystical nonsense about inner lights and such like.

Pointing up the inadequacy of a "pure theory of the capitalist machine", Schumpeter identified something of this process of selection:

the capitalist arrangement, as embodied in the institution of private enterprise, effectively chains the bourgeois stratum to its tasks. But it does more than that. The same apparatus which conditions for performance the individuals and families that at any time form the bourgeois class, *ipso facto* also selects the individuals and families that are to rise into that class or to drop out of it. This combination of the conditioning and the selective function is not a matter of course. On the contrary, most methods of social selection, unlike the 'methods' of biological selection, do not guarantee performance of the selected individual.¹⁹

The selection of individuals, and with it the selection of their ideas can only really be understood at the level of the totality of capitalism. If a particular firm is to be singled out then two things need to be borne in mind; firstly that the actions of that firm can only be understood as part of the totality; and secondly that the ideas, say of the founders, which *appear* to direct that firm must, methodologically and ontologically, be related to the material relations within the firm as well as to the totality. Schumpeter explains this well:

The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. It may seem strange that anyone can fail to see so obvious a fact which moreover was long ago emphasized by Karl Marx ...

This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in. This fact bears upon our problem in two ways.

First, since we are dealing with a process whose every element takes considerable time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects, there is no point in appraising the performance of that process *ex visu* of a given point of time; we must judge its performance over time, as it unfolds through decades or centuries ...

Second, since we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what happens in a particular part of it - say, in an individual concern or industry - may indeed clarify details of mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background of that process and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative

destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it or, on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull."²⁰

For reasons which will be explained shortly, this does not mean that a case study is irrelevant, that it necessarily collapses into an analysis of the whole process. What it does mean is that the capitalist cannot be judged aside from the capitalist system. The individual capitalist has to be judged in terms of the effect of the overall process. True, his success or failure as a capitalist can be assessed; his character as an individual, whether misanthropic or philanthropic, might be commented upon. But such judgements cannot be equated with judgements on the whole process with which the individual capitalist is identified, whether he believes it to be so and whether he likes it or not.

The Biographical Approach

Charles Wilson warns against sacrificing "the concrete to the abstract" and asserts that capitalism and capitalists are not a constant but change between time and place, and so:

The close study of the history of private business provides a salutary warning against the temptation to reduce the enterprise too easily to a formula.

So far so good, but not so his attitude:

Briefly, it is that capitalism, like any other economic or social system, must be judged on its merits; likewise the capitalist, being inherently neither better nor worse than other men but only having greater power than some for good or evil.²¹

His appeal for a biographical approach to business history, his "study of a few of the great *entrepreneurs* whose genius helped to provide abundance", in order to redress, as he sees it, the balance of history, surely belies any claim to neutrality? (Why do capitalists and their apologists always feel so hard done by? It really is a phenomenon in itself.²²) It is clear that the *capitalist* cannot be really be judged separately from *capitalism*. If the total process of which the individual capitalist is a part is condemned, then it is not a matter of saying that the capitalist, as an individual man, is

inherently good or bad, but that the capitalist can only be the personification of capital. He cannot, however good his intentions, transcend by his own will the system which defines his existence.

This is where McKendrick is mistaken in his defence of the businessman when he says,

The black cap is ready for the businessman before the evidence has been heard.²³

He quotes Schumpeter as the originator of the metaphor:

capitalism stands its trial before judges who have the sentence of death in their pockets. they are going to pass it, whatever the defence they may hear; the only success victorious defence can possibly produce is a change in the indictment.²⁴

They do not mean the same thing. Schumpeter is referring to the capitalist system, therefore the capitalist in the generic sense is sentenced along with capitalism. He means that the whole system has been prejudged, and in that sense there is little the individual capitalist can do if he stands accused of being a capitalist; perhaps the theories of managerialism can be seen as an attempt to enter a plea of "not guilty"? McKendrick is not really dealing with condemnations of the whole process but with attitudes to businessmen within the process. To the extent that he is concerned with defending the totality he is concerned that the baby has been thrown out with the bath water, that the attacks in British fiction on the "heartless industrialists" have been too successful, to the point where the pursuit of profit itself has been so disparaged that it is ignored. McKendrick misses the point because he lumps together the various attacks on the capitalist and capitalism, both reactionary and progressive attacks as essentially a "Luddite" frame of mind. It is as if Karl Marx's and Frederick Engels' sarcastic dismissal of the capitalist do-gooder,

the bourgeois is a bourgeois - for the benefit of the working class.²⁵

can be put side by side with Charles Dickens' appeal to Scrooge's better nature. The one condemns the bourgeois as a bourgeois, the other condemns him only when he is mean. For Marx and Engels, clearly, it was a contradiction in terms for a bourgeois to act in the interest of the working class, his very existence is against their interest.

All this means that the capitalist must be judged generically, as part of the whole process which he personifies. So that although a case study, of a particular capitalist or capitalist enterprise, might throw some light on the overall process, it is not the place for a judgement on the capitalist, it can only furnish supporting evidence.

Perfect Competition

This does not mean that a case history is irrelevant. The fact that the purpose of the capitalist's personality is predicated upon the requirements of capital does not reveal his individual character. He may choose to fulfil the requirements he personifies in different ways. That he has the choice to do so is clear from the fact that he operates as part of a process whose inexorable tendency is towards concentration and monopoly; the stifling constraints of perfect competition are unreal because that state of affairs can be seen as an ideological fiction.

Even if it is not accepted that classical political economy and neoclassical economic theory have to be seen in part as attempts to justify capitalism and the liberal-democratic state²⁷, there are doubts about the usefulness of the concept of perfect competition *within* neo classical economics and business history. In the first camp, R.H.Coase has argued that:

It can be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supercession of the price mechanism...The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.

In other words, he seems to be saying that under perfect competition, firms would not exist. But they do exist, and with them comes an economic system in which there is planning of a different sort to

simply individual planning. Quite simply, the theory of the firm under perfect competition does not fit the real world, as Coase shows:

If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.²⁹

With firms, then, there are capitalists who have to plan and direct labour, and who have some discretion in how they go about doing this.

From the second camp, the business historians, Leslie Hannah has made the point, in discussing the "imperfections of competition in the British economy during industrialization" that:

it may legitimately be doubted whether the idealized state of "perfect competition" (as conveniently defined in economic theory) existed at this (or indeed at any other) time.²⁹

The Case Study And Business Historians

What needs to be shown now is the usefulness of a case study and how it should be done. The methodology *itself* should throw into question such a notion as that of a "Quaker employer". The starting points are these; firstly that at the time when any particular enterprise is founded, there is a process, a system, already in existence, and any enterprise can only operate as a part of that process, whatever its founders might believe. Secondly that the bourgeois thinks. This leads on to the point that the real relations of production within a particular enterprise are neither given, that is predetermined, on the one hand, nor are they the product of the ideas of the capitalist, be he the founder or the successor or whatever. (Neither are they, incidentally, the inevitable outcome of the technology used.) An approach which down plays the existing process, the process which both impinges on a firm as an externality and at the same time expresses itself within the firm, will overplay the role of the capitalist. This will, in business history, lead to an identification of the capitalist's biography with the firm.

Wilson justifies business history along these lines:

it is not necessary to claim that business history is history of the highest calibre. But it has at least one

merit: it brings the historian to close grips with a problem fundamental to the philosophy of history - the essential relationship of the individual and society. Thus, the business historian must sometimes feel that he is a biographer writing primarily biography conceived in terms of a particular kind of concrete achievement - the business itself. Then, with only a slight shift of emphasis, his function changes, and he becomes the analyst of - what I conceive to be - a socially valuable process initiated, guided, and developed by human agency.³⁰

It is difficult to see quite what the shift of emphasis consists in. In the first place the capitalist's biography is expressed as the business, in the second the process of building the business is the expression of human agency, the capitalist again. The result of this approach is that although the context of a firm's development might well be described, the relationship between the wider process of accumulation which is expressed within the firm, the *labour* process, and the development of the firm, along with the capitalist's ideas, is not really analysed. So that the account of the business is not well integrated. This is not to say that all accounts of business and businessmen must centre on the labour process within the firm, not at all. Rather that when they are dealt with, the labour process, the conditions of labour, wages and welfare etc., should not be seen as simply the *result* of other developments, especially not of developments in the heads of capitalists.

This is what tends to happen in business history. The labour process may be covered in part by an examination of technical developments, but as far as labour itself goes as part of that process, it is dealt with in a chapter on its own, which might as well be an appendix. Here the conditions of work are dealt with, accounts of welfare provisions and wage levels are given, and possibly the problems or otherwise of recruiting a labour force might be examined. There are, too, the inevitable jolly excursions or company dinners.³¹ But this chapter is not really integrated into the overall account of a firm, it is almost as if it is there because it is thought that somehow it ought to be. B.W.E. Alford, for example, seems hard pressed to fill his chapter on "Employers, Employees and Welfare, 1860 - 1901" at W.D.

and H.O. Wills. The first part of it is an account of the fortunes of the Wills family, while the second part consists of data, such as wage rates, which are left uninterpreted, and a series of dubious and bland observations. The profit sharing plan, he says:

was not a counter to unionisation, since no such tendency existed because of the high degree of unskilled and female labour.

His assessment of the reasons for the welfare provisions have nothing to do with the labour process at all:

Whatever misgivings one might have about industrial paternalism, in Wills' case it sprang from the partners' sincerely held belief in their moral responsibility for the welfare of their employees.

If Wills really did have "extraordinarily advanced views on industrial relations and welfare, when judged by the lights of late Victorian England", Alford does not explain why. It is tempting to ask the question, how many employers can be considered extraordinary before they become ordinary?²²

The workers were there, but it is difficult to see from the typical business history what part they played in the story. Unless, of course, they went on strike. But strikes are not representative of most workers' experiences, yet even without strikes, workers resist, and the labour process needs to be managed.²³

Wilson's history of Lever Brothers is predictable in this respect. Lever was "The Enlightened Capitalist", and, despite the implicit criticism of his welfare schemes in the rather bland characterisation of them as "despotic benevolence", he is ultimately vindicated. Thus, Lever's "was not only an enlightened regime, but an efficient one", whose "wider importance lay in the fact that:

in an age when the study of industrial relations was in its infancy, it demonstrated that efficiency and success could be combined with social health and humanity, and even suggested that there might be some connection between the two.²⁴

In one of the better business histories, D.C. Coleman avoids any such bland characterisation of the firm's labour relations policy "as

one of benevolent despotism, kindly autocracy or the like." Nevertheless, in his obligatory chapter on "Work, Wages and Welfare", that policy, as "revealed in action" is seen as the creation of men with particular "motives and attitudes of mind". What is not explained is how the pursuit of the policy might have shaped those "motives and attitudes", or why the policy fitted the requirements of the firm at any particular time.³⁵

Different Approaches to Business History: Ozanne; Lazonick; Fruin

There are exceptions to this trend in business history, such as Robert Ozanne's history, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester*. Not feeling constrained to eulogize the capitalists concerned as exceptional or farsighted Ozanne has been able to recognise that:

The significance of the Harvester story in the history of labor relations may be its representiveness ... the company's policies toward employees and unions were mostly borrowed from other firms.

Therefore he has been able to *situate* the McCormicks in terms of national movements and their relevance to International Harvester's requirements. The McCormick's views on labour policies are not portrayed as the outcome of deeply held timeless beliefs but more as the result of living through historically identifiable events:

Management's education in employee relations was forced upon it piecemeal by its unpleasant experience with unions. As the mass production of reapers was developed, the production process created stresses and strains among the workers.

For all its strengths, however, Ozanne's study falls down by setting up an untenable counterfactual. In the years between 1907 and the U.S. entry in World War I he says:

the amount of money spent on welfare ... was never large, and certainly less than would have been spent directly in wages had the company dealt with a union.³⁶

For reasons explained already, the implied possibility that the employers could be judged more favourably if they had acted differently cannot be admitted. It is better to explain the theoretical basis for

criticising capitalists, (as is attempted in this thesis) than to pretend to pass an objective judgement in retrospect.

A more recent approach to business history, one which Chandler and Daems consider to be "neo-Marxist", has attempted to consider the questions of why and how the modern business enterprise developed.³⁷ However, despite its promises, this "institutional perspective", best represented by William Lazonick, ends up by following the inclinations of an economist and abandoning the potentially interesting subjective element in the "social character of labour" in favour of reducing the worker to a neatly quantifiable "consumption bundle". This can then be grafted on to what Lazonick considers to be the inadequate production function in neoclassical economics, as just another explanatory variable.³⁸ The subjectivity of the entrepreneur is in turn squeezed out of the analysis by constraining him inside the "institutional structure", essentially simply the structure of an industry. In part this may simply be due to a lack of sociological training.³⁹

More seriously Lazonick, following John Commons, confuses Marx's vital conceptual distinction between labour and labour-power. Commons discussed the conflict between Proudhon and Marx, which is always a useful starting point for clarifying Marx's ideas. Unfortunately Commons ended up confusing the distinction between the exchange of wages for labour-power, (which according to Marx could be considered a *fair* exchange) and the use of labour by the capitalist in the labour process. What Commons developed, in effect, was a concept of the work-effort bargain.⁴⁰ Lazonick has taken up this concept and developed his critique of Marx further, to the point where alleges that:

Class conflict disappears as an endogenous element in the Marxian model.⁴¹

This is not the place for a full-blown defence of Marx against Lazonick, but it needs to be said that by turning attention away from the labour-process, (after Marx had spent so much time trying to focus attention on it), Lazonick ends up building up the importance of the price mechanism (c.f. Coase above). Although he follows Coase and Marglin⁴² in recognising that:

neoclassical general equilibrium theory ... provides no inherent reason why capitalist firms even exist,"⁴⁴

Lazonick ends up seeing managers as believing in their own ideology to the extent that their decision-making could be ruled by market prices.⁴⁴

In opposing neoclassical economics Lazonick and Elbaum are quite right to point out that:

If we want to understand the operation of the capitalist economy as it exists in the real world, we have *to study* it ... the case study approach is absolutely necessary to the development of a theoretical structure that can lay claim to capturing (as all good theory must) the essence of the economy it is purporting to describe.⁴⁵

However this is not really much more than an appeal for empirical verification, they have not really developed a methodology which locates the case study approach or which really explains why a case study should be done. Without this the case study can degenerate into a mere illustration of overarching structures, and this seems likely with an approach which seems to exclude the subjective in favour of focusing on production functions and market prices.

Mark Fruin does not fit readily into any theoretical camp (or, as should be considered in dealing with business history, any *anti*-theoretical camp). Nevertheless, Chandler says of his history of Kikkoman that it is a business history written as it should be because it:

deals not only with all aspects of operating the enterprise, but also with the changing relationships between the managers and the owners ...; between owners and managers and workers, foremen, labor recruiters, and union officials; between managers and their suppliers and distributors; and finally the relationships between the enterprise and its competitors.⁴⁶

Whether or not Chandler has identified the essential elements Mark Fruin has brilliantly demonstrated how to write a business history which lays stress on the dynamic relationships both within the firm and the wider society. His history of the Japanese soy sauce manufacturers locates the firm in terms of the changing ideology of the state, the

requirements for and demands of labour and the decisions taken. His account is by no means a Marxist one, it is certainly more favourable towards business, but his method must surely inform any attempt by a Marxist at business history. It is hard to quote from this history because it is not littered with generalised concepts that have little meaning or a-historical typologies constructed for the sake of slotting the firm under consideration into one particular box. Perhaps Fruin's account is so good because, in addressing the Western reader, he has had to knock down the notions that certain elements of the firm's history would be given. Thus he points out that study of Kikkoman and other Japanese companies confirms:

that before the 1920s and 1930s Japanese industrial workers were not especially loyal, hard-working or dedicated.

Similarly, it is often suggested that the family style of management is a cultural given for Japan, however,

in this one case at least, it was not. This management style was created and consciously crafted.

This was after a serious strike at the company in 1927-28.⁴⁷

Alfred Chandler

Alfred Chandler has done much to develop a methodology for business history in his study of *Strategy and Structure*. However, it must be recognised at the outset that Chandler's approach is seriously weakened because he did not concern himself with the structures which firms build to administer the field units which carry out:

the fundamental economic functions of an enterprise, such as the plant, district marketing office, purchasing unit, laboratory and the like.⁴⁸

This disclaimer is insufficient and Chandler has been rightly criticized because he,

ignores the importance of factory organization as a means of disciplining workers, rather than as an external 'given' for managers.⁴⁹

Chandler's weakness is not so much that he omitted the labour process from his study of *Strategy and Structure*, as that he externalised it from his analysis. This means that Chandler's distinction between strategic and tactical policies and procedures (p. 11) is at best semantic and at worst tautological:

Chandler's 'strategies', in effect, are those business decisions or policies that he chooses to emphasize, but there are others.⁵⁰

The result of this is that Chandler appears to relegate decisions affecting labour to the merely tactical level. Because if:

Strategic decisions are concerned with the long-term health of the enterprise. [and] Tactical decisions deal more with day-to-day activities necessary for efficient and smooth operations, (p. 11)

failing to deal with "fundamental economic functions" in his analysis of "strategy" Chandler in effect leaves these functions as tactical.

If the executives of an "industrial enterprise" are "responsible for the fortunes of the enterprise"; and their function is to "coordinate, appraise and plan"; and:

the actual buying, selling advertising, accounting, manufacturing, engineering or research ... is usually left to such employees as salesmen, buyers, production supervisors and foremen, technicians, and designers" (p. 8)

then the labour process becomes an area of merely "functional work" (p. 8). Not the least of the problems with this approach is that executives whose innovations have been related to the labour process appear in a bad light when judged by Chandler's criteria:

Clearly whenever entrepreneurs act like managers, wherever they concentrate on short-term activities to the exclusion or to the detriment of long-range planning, appraisal, and co-ordination, they have failed to carry out effectively their role in the economy as well as in their enterprise. (p 12)

This sounds fine, until it is realized that concentration by executives on so-called "administration" precludes them from dealing with the running of,

a plant or works, a branch or district sales office, a purchasing office, an engineering or research laboratory, an accounting or other financial office, and the like.
(p. 9)

It is hard to see why the labour process itself is not considered part of the "framework of goals, policies, and procedures" which decides the long-run health of a company. The continuation of the "smooth and efficient day-to-day operation" (p. 9) of a plant may well contribute to defining the basic goals of an enterprise and could be one factor explaining the reluctance to embark upon the implementation of a new company structure to complement essentially *marketing* strategies of diversification.

Despite this fundamental weakness Chandler's social action approach does offer some theoretical justification for a methodology which involves an historical case study. His ideological stance and his taking of the labour process as essentially a given, leads him to exaggerate the importance of the "administrator". Nevertheless, he does attempt to locate a role for the administrator and to assess the relative importance of the various externalities which affect decision making in a particular historical setting:

Although the enterprise undoubtedly had a life of its own above and beyond that of its individual executives, although technological and market requirements certainly set boundaries and limits to growth, nevertheless, its health and effectiveness in carrying out its basic economic functions depended almost entirely on the talents of its administrators.

The market, the nature of their resources, and their entrepreneurial talents have with relatively few exceptions, had far more effect on the history of large industrial firms in the United States than have antitrust laws, taxation, labor and welfare legislation, and comparable evidences of public policy. (p. 384)

Chandler does not collapse the general into the particular, as he points out:

four phases or chapters can be discerned in the history of the large American industrial enterprise ... Although each company had a distinct and unique history, nearly all followed along this general pattern. Because all of them operated within the same external environment, these chapters in the collective history of the enterprise as

an economic institution followed roughly the underlying changes in the overall American economy. (p. 385)

Thus, although a general pattern can be identified the history of each firm does not follow that pattern identically, the external environment does not become the sole determinant of a particular firm's history. The external environment may call for a new strategy on the part of a firm, and in order to properly carry out that strategy a new structure may need to be devised, but the environment, the market, does not of itself call into existence a new structure:

Only a study of a company's internal business documents and letters can accurately reveal the details of structural reorganization. (p. 380)

Chandler's recognition of "the importance of the market in shaping corporate structure and strategy" (p. 343) does not mean that he loses sight of the actual *process* by which changes in strategy and structure take place, in fact that is what the conceptualization of structures following strategies is all about. Chandler puts a forceful argument for this attention to the process whereby the multidivisional structure was built to meet new needs:

Complexity in itself, it should be emphasized, did not assure innovation or change; some responsible administrator had to become aware of the new conditions. Furthermore, awareness had to be translated into a plan for meeting the new conditions, and then the plan had to be accepted by most of the senior executives. Since such a program dealt with the relations between persons rather than with technological or mechanical developments, the working out of the plan was more complicated than merely bringing a new product or process into effective use.

Analysis of this basic structural innovation requires examination, first of the conditions calling for change and second, of *the process of innovation*. (p. 299)
[emphasis added]

The only objection there can be to this is that there is no reason to stress the process leading to the implementation of the multidivisional structure as dealing with "the relations between persons" above all others. Of course the persons whose relations would be most affected by "technological or mechanical developments" or "a new product or process" are less likely to be in a position where they have

to be consulted or persuaded to accept the change. There is no reason why the questions Chandler asks about the developments in his four case studies of the multidivisional structure should not be applied similarly to developments concerning the labour process:

What created the conditions of complexity in the four companies? Why were these four among the very first large corporations in America to find their existing managements inadequate to carry out the tasks of over-all coordination, appraisal, and policy formulation? And then, why and how did individuals within these companies become aware of these needs, how was this awareness transformed into action, and how were the plans and policies modified once in action? (p. 299)

In terms of the labour process and a study of one particular firm the questions would have to be first what external factors, what competitive pressures forced a change? Then some idea would need to be given as to what extent the firm was a genuine innovator and developed the labour process itself or incorporated developments from elsewhere. The implications of the changing labour process would then have to be examined; how the actions of the firm changed in relation to the labour process.

Central to the structural change involved in bringing about the multidivisional enterprise was the perception of the need for change. Although Chandler is quite clear that:

Unless structure follows strategy, inefficiency results ... there was a time lag between the appearance of the administrative needs and their satisfaction. (pp. 314-315)

Inefficiency, in whatever form, cannot of itself inform those responsible for efficiency how to restore it. So that actions cannot be explained by, for example, simple reference to the profitability of a firm. The stimulus cannot explain the response, therefore there must be a range of possible responses. Here is Chandler's methodology put most clearly:

By forcing the reorientation of existing resources and the accumulation of more and often quite different types of personnel and facilities, growth brought new problems and new demands at every administrative level. Such needs required the planning and replanning of the design

used to administer the resources, old and new, available to the enterprise. Yet, rarely did the building of the necessary structure come immediately. Its construction called for *time, thought, and energy*. The training, temperament, and daily activities of the executives responsible for the company's basic decisions vitally affected the attention given to and the solutions proposed for these needs. In this way executive experience and personality helped determine the course and rate of structural adaptation and innovation. (p. 283)

What all this leads to is a conceptual framework, a methodology with which to examine the development of the labour process and, perhaps as important, the creation of conditions to facilitate and accommodate that development, such things as welfare and workplace democracy. What is conceptually precluded is an explanation which puts the capitalist's ideology in the forefront. Rather the emphasis will be on the external conditions forcing change within the firm.

In the case of *Cadburys*, this means that, from the methodological starting point, Quakerism, or any other beliefs or attitudes of the employers, can be seen as inadequate for explaining labour policies. Rather, what is required is a search for the precipitating factors which required decisions concerning labour management to be made, albeit that those decisions would be shaped by the ideas and experiences of those making them.

Political Implications Of The Methodology

Finally, it should be noted that, according to DuBoff and Herman, Alfred Chandler was trying to write "amoral" history in "Strategy and Structure", by drawing on:

economics and organization theory to discern patterns in industrial development - and to steer clear of moralizing about men and institutions of the past."

Unfortunately this is not possible; concepts drawn from economics and organisation theory are necessarily ideologically loaded. Hopefully the method developed here will avoid any cheap moralising, although the political stance is obvious. While it has to be admitted that in an analysis which takes a stance vis a vis capitalism as a totality

simplistic judgements about whether any particular capitalist is good or bad are out of place, still there is no reason why business history, any more than any other field of historical investigation, should be free from political judgements. At least this is a more honest approach than those who believe that the activities of the entrepreneur, (even the choice of words is political, entrepreneurs or capitalists?), are valuable in themselves and who then go on to make judgements which predictably exonerate individual capitalists. Judgements as to the good or bad intentions of the individual capitalist may be out of place, nevertheless, as Yeo and Yeo have put it:

capitalists need understanding in time and opposing in place: situating historically and contesting politically.⁵²

Few, if any, business histories have tried to do that.

Chapter Two
QUAKER EMPLOYERS

The Idea

'Throughout the century of progress and change, there has been unity - a unity brought about because during the whole period the business has been the daily personal concern of a family that has steadily tried to apply, as an employer of labour, the principles of its Quaker faith.'

This is the conclusion of the hagiography of the firm, which was written in 1931 to celebrate a centenary of the firm of Cadbury. It is a useful starting point because it indicates that this was how *Cadburys* saw themselves, and how they wanted to be seen. As the previous chapter has indicated, the methodological approach of this thesis is such as to throw into question the idea that such a unity *could* exist. If such a pronouncement had been confined to *Cadburys* sponsored company history, it could be dismissed easily without having to pay too much attention to it. However, there are several accounts of Quaker employers which take on the idea that Quakerism has in some sense marked out these employers as different to other employers, and which have more or less accepted that there has been some sort of unity brought about by Quakerism.² The purpose of this chapter is to examine briefly some of the aspects of that alleged unity and how it relates to *Cadburys*.

Probably the most important account of Quaker employers in academic discussions is John Child's, which focuses on the attitudes of British Quaker employers towards industrial relations and labour management in the inter-war period. Even though he situates their interest in labour management in the context of industrial and social unrest in the first quarter of this century, Child's contention is that the Society of Friends provided the main impetus for the formulation and conception of "new conceptions of industrial management" on the part of Quaker employers.³ His account is couched in terms of Quaker precepts and pressure from other members of the Society of Friends on employers.

A more recent account deals specifically with *Cadburys* in terms of Quakerism. For Charles Dellheim, the Quaker element is a vital one in the history of the firm:

Cadburys ... provides an opportunity for analysing the relationship between religious beliefs and economic action.

The Quaker beliefs of the Cadbury family shaped the ethic of the firm. The Cadbury family's social and industrial experiments were, on one level, an attempt to reconcile religious convictions and business practices. *Cadburys'* distinctive managerial culture and strategy combined the pursuit of employee welfare with the quest for systematic organization. The Cadburys practiced benevolence without autocracy and pursued efficiency without turning workers into living tools. Three main influences formed George and Richard Cadbury's beliefs: the Quaker ethic, which shaped their views of the nature and purpose of business; the experience of turning around a failing firm; and an exposure to the social problems of the industrial city...

The Quaker ethic was the cornerstone of *Cadburys* ... *Cadburys* was a model firm, it was not typical ... The Quaker business ethic legitimized but also tempered capitalism by defining the proper means and ends of business.⁴

This does not really go much beyond what Williams, the company's own historian, said about its history. It is hoped that the account which follows will show up the inadequacies of an approach such as Dellheim's by highlighting some of the inconsistencies and discontinuities in Quakerism and among Quaker employers which have been overlooked or downplayed by those who have stressed the unity of Quaker firms.

The less academic accounts of Quaker firms should not be dismissed because they reflect the ways in which the Quakers themselves have seen themselves. Writing in 1939, for example, Paul Emden heaped fulsome praise on the Quaker merchants of the 19th century for their:

Nonconformist respectability, middle-class respectability, in the highest grade of perfection - and the English middle class was once described as the natural representatives of the human race, the most outstanding figure of which was the independent shopkeeper ... Quakerism bred men who did business like saints, and saints who were most efficient business men, who ... helped make England what it is: a manufacturing country.

For him, the Quakers were, "the most enlightened employers that exist ... they never lost sight of the human factor."⁴ A recent account of *The Quaker Enterprise* by a member of the Society of Friends is more candid, and probably reflects the fact that for the Society of Friends today, in which teachers and growing numbers of social workers are well represented, the image of middle-class respectability associated with shopkeepers might not be so appealing. They are not keen for the Society to be seen as a group of "wealthy philanthropists".⁵ David Burns Windsor, himself a teacher, is prepared to concede that:

The Quakers were of their time ... The great Quaker entrepreneurs of the last century were true Victorians. They stand out as members of the new, large, self-satisfied, self-righteous middle-class, who regarded themselves as the arbiters of a civilised society and administrators to a less educated world. They presented an austere and sober benevolence to the world. They were pillars of local society, comfortable in the knowledge of their own status. Benevolent they may have been, charitable and anxious to improve the lot of mankind, but it tended to be a fatherly benevolence predicated on a view that they knew what was right and good for people. Their image was inseparable from the ideal self-image of their time.

This is a significant point. It can be extended, however, to say that their image in retrospect has been very much the ideal image of the writer's time, projected back on to them. Windsor himself goes on to say that the *Friends in Business* "attained enormous power as individuals but chose to use that power for the benefit of their employees, their local community, or their industry."⁷

Slavery and Social Reform

In view of Child's assertion that:

Quakerism has *always* stressed the need for democratic human inter-relationships. (emphasis added)⁸

which is not very different to Emden's view that Quakers have a "burning passion for social justice ... rooted in the Quaker tenets",⁹ it is worth looking briefly at some instances of social reform and the Quakers' relationship to them. This will show that Quaker attitudes have not been unchanging and cannot be taken as given; and attempts to

see them as such end up being tautological, with Quakerism invoked to justify almost any stance. For example, Quakers played an important part in the emancipation of slaves,¹⁰ and by the end of the 19th century they "formed the backbone of the anti-slavery movement."¹¹ However, Eric Williams' observations need to be taken into account before this is pounced on as evidence of the Quakers' unchanging views:

conscience awoke very slowly to the appreciation of the wrongs inflicted by slavery ... The attitude of the churchman was the attitude of the layman. The 18th century, like any other century, could not rise above its economic limitations.

Quaker nonconformity did not extend to the slave trade. In 1756, there were eighty-four Quakers listed as members of the Company trading to Africa, among them the Barclay and Baring families. Slave dealing was one of the most lucrative investments of English as of American Quakers, and the name of a slaver *The Willing Quaker*, reported from Boston at Sierra Leone in 1793, symbolizes the approval with which the slave trade was regarded in Quaker circles.¹²

Williams rightly dismisses the 19th century view that the anti-slavery movement represented the English middle-class at its best:

British historians wrote almost as if Britain had introduced Negro slavery solely for the satisfaction of abolishing it.¹³

In the early 19th century the Quakers were not universally admired for the virtues later attributed to them. William Cobbett "hated Quaker speculators"; throughout his *Rural Rides* he "heaped violent and vulgar abuse on Quakers and Jews alike".¹⁴ He called the Quakers "the pestiferous sect of non-labouring, sleek and fat hypocrites." Then there was *The Poor Man's Guardian* which,

bitterly compared their solicitude for slaves abroad with their position of privilege at home, resting on the labours of the inarticulate poor.¹⁵

These points have been quoted from Isichei to highlight some inconsistencies in the Quaker image, not to allege systematic hypocrisy. She makes the point that Victorian accounts of Quakerism show much interest in and widespread admiration for the Quakers, but that discrepancies are understandable because:

Victorian Quakerism, of course, was not a monolithic entity.¹⁶

Which reinforces the argument being put forward here, that Quakerism in the early 20th century did not represent a given phenomenon which can be invoked to explain the actions of Quaker employers.

The Factory Acts

Quaker attitudes to the Factory Acts of the 19th century show another discontinuity. In the 1900s the Cadburys supported minimum wage legislation and certainly endorsed the earlier legislation which restricted the hours of work for women and children.¹⁷ However, this was not the position of the Quaker manufacturers at the time the Factory Acts were passed. Marx did not seem aware of any reputation as enlightened employers of the Quakers in the long footnote in *Capital* where he dealt scornfully with the manufacturers who were fined at Dewsbury magistrates court in 1836 for violating the Factory Act by having kept five boys, aged between 12 and 15 years, at work for 30 hours almost continually,

in the "shoddy-hole", the name for the hole where the woollen rags are pulled to pieces ... The accused gentleman affirmed in lieu of taking an oath - as Quakers they were too scrupulously religious to take an oath - that they had, in their great compassion for the unhappy children, allowed them four hours for sleep, but the obstinate children obstinately would not go to bed.

Elsewhere in *Capital* Marx dealt with the manufacturers who revolted against the Ten Hours Act of 1847:

They informed the (factory) inspectors very coolly that they would set themselves above the letter the law, and reintroduce the old system on their own account ... Thus, among others, the philanthropist Ashworth, in a letter to Leonard Horner (a Factory Inspector) which is repulsive in its Quaker manner.¹⁸

Isichei has dealt with this episode quite comprehensively and concluded that:

No Quaker played a prominent part in the agitation for the limitation of factory hours. Where they appear in its history at all, it is almost always as its inveterate

opponents ... the hostility of many Quakers to factory reform does not mean that they were hypocrites in their philanthropic efforts ... men such as Bright naturally absorbed the ideals and assumptions current in the class and period to which they belonged.¹⁹

Isichei's description of the Quakers' opposition to the Factory Acts indicates the danger of falling into the trap, which she only just avoids, of accepting that Quaker capitalists should be judged in their context when their actions jar against the 20th century conscience, but of seeing them as able to transcend the constraints of time and class when they were identified with social reform, which allows for an historical continuity to be constructed for Quakerism.²⁰ The record of prominent 19th century Quakers such as the Peases, Brights and Ashworths in opposing the Factory Acts shows that the Quaker employer was not always an advocate of factory reform. At the same time as they opposed limitations on the working hours of factory children, some Quakers protested the philanthropy of their support for the Anti-Corn Law League. Isichei cites this as evidence that for some Friends:

philanthropy was not the fruit of pure and uncomplicated benevolence, but often sprang from very mixed motives ... the Anti-Corn Law League ... could be variously regarded as a political movement, the instrument of an economic pressure group, or as a philanthropy, and indeed it was all three ... the peculiar charm of the League, to Bright and many others, was the fact that to support it could be regarded as philanthropic as well as an investment.²¹

The Ironmasters

These are issues which do not necessarily indicate the relations within Quaker enterprises; Dellheim at least acknowledges this in relation to Quakers in general, although of course he uses the point to exaggerate, anachronistically, the virtues of *Cadburys*.²² However, according to Child:

The principle of democratic relationships in the workplace has long been beld by Quakers, as Raistrick has indicated in his study of Quaker industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²³

This seems unlikely to have been the case, and warrants further inspection. Raistrick wrote three books during the 1940s and 50s

concerning Quakers in industry, including the one Child refers to.²⁴ He was a member of the Society of Friends and a student of their history. His study of Quakers in the 17th and 18th centuries was written during a Fellowship at Woodbrooke College in Selly Oak, the college founded by George Cadbury which is near Bournville. It seems likely, therefore, that he would have been looking for any historical evidence to confirm the self-image which Quakers employers had of themselves in the 1930s and 40s. Even the title of one of his books strongly suggests this: *Two Centuries of Industrial Welfare: The London (Quaker) Lead Company; 1692 - 1905*. It seems very unlikely, to say the least, that the Darbys, the subject of his other book, could have had a similar commitment to industrial democracy in the 18th century as the *Cadburys* had in the 20th. In this case there is an alternative account of the 18th century ironmasters, written earlier in this century, which appears to be oblivious to the Quakers' reputation for industrial democracy. Towards the end of the 18th century there were growing numbers of Methodists amongst the ironmasters, but the Quakers were still predominant. Ashton's picture of the ironmasters as a whole leaves something to be desired for those looking for precedents for the enlightened Quaker employers of the 20th century:

The austerity of the ironmasters, whether cause or effect of their sectarianism, affected every side of their lives. Successful themselves, they were intolerant of what might appear weakness or inefficiency in others; and though their charities were numerous there was little of the milk of human kindness in their constitutions. At that time, more than any other, industrial leadership demanded men of an autocratic mould; and, individualists as they were both by nature and circumstance, they resented any attempt on the part of the workers to determine, in any measure, the conditions of their working life. In more than one, indeed, there was developed something approaching contempt for the aspirations of labour ... most of the ironmasters had little time or inclination for political speculation and their main concern was that industry should be left alone: although there were among them philanthropists, and demagogues ... most of them were, apparently, content to accept social conditions as they found them.²⁵

Quaker Business Success

At this point it would be as well to examine some of the reasons which have been advanced to explain the predominance of Quakers in certain industries, for exmple cocoa and their success in business generally. Corley, who considers the Quaker element to be vital in the story of the biscuit manufacturing firm of Huntley and Palmers, gives a sort of noddy's account of the Quakers' success in business which he attributes to three Quaker virtues.²⁶ However, this subject needs to be treated more seriously and critically, for the reasons given by Isichei:

It is well known that in the 18th and 19th centuries many Quaker families rose to great wealth ... The Quakers are mentioned in every discussion of the relationship between puritanism and business success ... and in view of the small size of the Society and the large number of Quaker firms whose names have become household words, there is little doubt that they have achieved outstanding success out of all proportion to their numbers.

It is worth quoting Isichei at some length because she has made a comprehensive study of *Victorian Quakers*, (and Dellheim appears to have overlooked the points she makes, although he cites her book). She gives an implicit warning against taking too seriously the biographical and anecdotal studies of Quaker businesses because:

Quakers themselves tended to explain their success in terms of puritan qualities of character, especially industry and frugality.

She gives George Cadbury and Joseph Storrs Fry as prime examples of this tendency; but she goes on to say:

Yet frugality alone never established any large fortune, and insofar as conspicuous business success is attributable to traits of character at all, it is equally due to ruthlessness, willingness to take risks, energy, imagination, and ambition - qualities which have very little to do with religion, and are certainly not the prerogative of any denomination ... Rags to riches stories are as rare in Quakerism as elsewhere. Most of the great Quaker entrepreneurs were sons of a small manufacturer or well-to-do-tradesman.

This was the case with J.S. Fry, Joseph Rowntree, and George Cadbury. Of the Quakers' business success, she says:

the available evidence suggests that it is less attributable to specifically puritan traits of character than to the prosperity and internal cohesion of the Quaker community.

Added to which, for all the warnings against the spiritual dangers of wealth, common in any Christian Church:

*Victorian Quakerism sanctioned and indeed encouraged the pursuit of wealth.*²⁷ [emphasis added]

This is an important point to be made, because it throws into question the idea that the welfare measures implemented by *Cadburys* and others were somehow the outcome of a feeling of unease at being successful capitalists. The confusion over this point can be examined in relation to Weber, because the attributes of Quakers which are portrayed as being at odds with their positions as capitalists are in fact the very attributes which Weber saw as explaining the rise of capitalism. Weber put this quite clearly when he wrote:

the supposed conflict between other-worldliness, asceticism, and ecclesiastical piety on the one side, and participation in capitalist acquisition on the other, might actually turn out to be an intimate relationship. ... striking ... is the connection of a religious way of life with the most intensive development of business acumen among those sects whose other worldliness is a proverbial as their wealth, especially the Quakers and the Mennonites.²⁸

Weber supported his argument with a quote from J.A. Rowntree's *Quakerism, Past and Present*:

Is it merely a coincidence, or is it a consequence, that the lofty profession of spirituality made by Friends has gone hand in hand with shrewdness and tact in the translation of mundane affairs? Real piety favours the success of a trader by insuring his integrity and fostering habits of prudence and forethought, important items in obtaining that standing and credit in the commercial world, which are requisites for the steady accumulation of wealth.²⁹

Weber

This is not the place for an extensive critique of Weber's thesis in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, however, it should be explained that it is not especially relevant to this thesis.

Although he discussed the contemporary over-representation of Protestants in the ownership of capital in his introductory chapter on "Religious Affiliations and Social Stratification", his main concern was with the origins of capitalism itself, and not with the rise of particular groups into an already existing capitalist class:

the problem is that of the origin of the Western bourgeois class and of its peculiarities. (p 24)

He was concerned to refute what he saw as crude historical materialism which sees ideas as merely part of the superstructure by showing that capitalism appears as the result of the "ethical aspect of the capitalist entrepreneur" (p. 193) and that:

the spirit of capitalism ... was present before the capitalist order. (p.55)

R.H. Tawney set out three main objections to Weber's thesis, the gist of which is that Weber overlooked several other important factors which are not economic in his over-concentration on the Protestant Ethic.³⁰ Other writers have acknowledged the connection between Quakers and capitalists, but have seen it in a more direct way, with Quakerism as the expression of business success rather than the explanation for it. Dissent was attractive to those already independent enough to be able to embrace it.³¹ Ashton puts this argument forward in relation to the ironmasters:

In the great manufacturers of the 18th century the qualities of the self-reliance, assertiveness, and adventurous enterprise were strongly developed; and the dignity and reticence of the service of the Established Church made small appeal to men of this type, whose ardent spirit called for more individualism, more spontaneity - one might almost say more venturesomeness - in public worship. Quakerism, Methodism, Unitarianism answered their need better.³²

Whether these arguments are right or wrong, they do not really explain the rise of the great Quaker industrialists, such as the Cadburys, in the latter half of the 19th century, because they are concerned with an earlier period, the Industrial Revolution, or the

period before it. For Weber, once capitalism was established the capitalist spirit became ubiquitous and:

In such circumstances men's commercial and social interests do tend to determine their opinions and attitudes.³³

What is striking is the convergence of Weber's views with Marx's over the actual operation of capitalism once it is established:

Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. (p. 53)

In a Weberian study of the Quakers, Nevaskar makes the point well, when he says that:

it is no longer necessary to call upon religious forces to sustain economic life, because he who does not follow suit simply cannot be successful. Once institutionalized, the capitalistic system no longer requires the spirit of capitalism.³⁴

For Weber then, as for Marx and Schumpeter, capitalism confronts the capitalist as an external reality to which he must conform:

capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever *renewed* profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise. For it must be so: in a wholly capitalistic order of society, an individual capitalist enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction.³⁵

As for the motivation of the modern capitalist, constrained as he is within the capitalist system, Weber says:

Of course, the desire for the power and recognition which the mere fact of wealth brings plays its part. (p. 70)

A point which Weber makes is worth bearing in mind as an antidote to those who look for explanations of either the success of the Quakers in business, or the welfare and philanthropic ventures of Quaker employers, in the conscious application of Quaker precepts. Although he took as the starting point for his investigation into the relationship between "the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic

culture" (p. 45) the works of Calvinism and the other Puritan sects, he explained that:

it is not to be understood that we expect to find any of the founders or representatives of these religious movements considering the promotion of what we have called the spirit of capitalism as in any sense the end of his life-work. We cannot well maintain that the pursuit of worldly goods, conceived as an end in itself, was to any of them of positive ethical value. Once and for all it must be remembered that programmes of ethical reform never were at the of interest for any of the religious reformers ... (men like Menno, George Fox, and Wesley) ... were not the founders of societies for ethical culture nor the proponents of humanitarian projects for social reform or cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul and that alone was the centre of their life and work. Their ethical ideals and the practical results of their doctrines were all based on that alone, and were the consequences of purely religious motives. (p. 90)

In other words, business success and other worldly achievements, including philanthropic projects, have to be seen as by-products of the doctrines of Quakerism. While it is not necessary, therefore, to attempt to assert that Quakerism, as a religious doctrine, was at any time primarily concerned with the promotion of capitalism, at the same time it cannot be alleged that Quakerism was devoted to the amelioration of the ill-effects of the capitalist system. Thus Weber saw philanthropy on the part of the capitalist as:

simply a survival of that ascetic feeling which looks upon enjoyment of wealth for oneself as morally reprehensible.³⁶

Quakerism into the 19th Century

Weber's "ideal type of the capitalist entrepreneur" bore a close resemblance to the 18th century capitalist and quietist Friend.³⁷ However, whether Quakerism played an important part in the rise of the bourgeois class, or whether adherence to it was a product of that rise; once that class was established, with various Quakers firmly entrenched within it, and within the solid middle-class, then Quakerism lost its importance. If, in an earlier period Quakerism had been an important part of either the dissimulatory ideological superstructure or of the

ethical underpinning of capitalism, it had lost its particular importance by the end of the 18th century or thereabouts. As E.P. Thompson has remarked:

It is evident that there was, in 1800, casuistry enough in the theology of all the English churches to reinforce the manufacturer's own sense of moral self-esteem.³³

From then on sections of the Society of Friends began to move away from their previous quietism. Raistrick makes this point, that:

By the end of the century the Quakers were respectable, they were holding key positions in the financial world, their children were 'marrying out' and being disowned, and they had so many and varied 'trusteeship' relations to their customers and employees, that they had to conform to the new world which their own industry was creating.

From that point a divergence becomes apparent, though not a fission. Rather did the membership of the Society retain a unity of belief and worship, but followed two separate ways of secular expression.³⁴

In fact the Society went into decline, and the number of friends went down from an estimated 19,800 in 1800 to 13,859 in 1861, when the first official returns for membership were taken. Its numbers picked up after that, although by 1900 there were still, only just over 17,000 Friends. The Society of Friends went through a series of changes during the 19th century, as Isichei has described. For one thing, Friends were allowed to marry outside the Society. Then, during the period between the 1830s and the 1850s, "Quaker attitudes to politics were transformed". Where before, although they had been an effective pressure group, they officially deplored and had a deep distrust for elections and party politics. But that distrust was almost completely abandoned, says Isichei:

It was one of the most rapid and complete reversals of attitude in Quaker history.

It represented a manifestation of the important change which Isichei says took place within Victorian Quakerism,

by which Friends grew closer to the society in which they lived ... it reflected changes in Dissent in general.⁴⁰

Isichei's study of Victorian Quakers makes two points over and over; first, the solidly middle-class composition of the Society, apart from "a glittering superstructure of great industrialists and financiers", the average Quaker was a prosperous tradesman; and second, the pursuit of wealth by members of the Society.⁴¹ This means that Quakers generally were in sufficiently advantageous positions to embark upon a rise into the capitalist class proper, and they revered wealth and devoted much energy to its accumulation in order to be able to do so. Which means that Quakerism cannot explain the rise of particular Quaker industrialists. This means that it was the particular process of accumulation itself which these industrialists adopted which must explain their success. Isichei comes close to this when she says that:

it is abundantly clear that the success of those who rise to great wealth must be explained, not in terms of their individual traits of character or motivation (though naturally the wealthy, in *post facto* interpretations of their success, explain it as a triumph of character) but in terms of the external framework of the opportunities available to them, and of the prevailing economic and social conditions.⁴²

The factor missing from this is the organisation of the enterprise itself, which may or may not have had anything to do with Quakerism, but which is necessary in order to be able to explain how it was that, with a rising population enjoying higher living standards and consuming less alcohol, increased expenditure went on cocoa and chocolate, amongst other things, and not some completely different products. To say that the population had more money in its pocket does not, in itself, explain how certain capitalists, and not others, got their hands on it. Only increased productivity or efficiency in these firms can explain their continuing success and expansion after a certain point because, in the absence of an influx of capital from external sources, no amount of asceticism, abstinence, self-denial, could supply the capital necessary to fuel the process of accumulation. Although, of course, the comfortable positions they were in to start with and their Quaker connections would have ensured sufficient capital to embark upon that process. To the capitalists of the time, their technical or organisational advantages might not have been obvious as

explanations of their ability to take advantage of an expanding market, and this in part might account for their resorting to explaining their success in terms of their own thrift. Besides which, to quote Isichei again, "even strict members [of the Society] found plenty of permitted avenues of expenditure" for their wealth. ⁴³ The Cadburys lived in comfortable houses, if not mansions, and they generously supported their political ambitions; and albeit that they nearly always had some didactic or philanthropic purpose, Richard Cadbury found the time and money for a series of trips abroad in the years up to his death in the 1890s. ⁴⁴

Politics, Profits, and Philanthropy

When they became involved in politics, the Quakers, like the Nonconformists generally, were Liberals, because:

only from the Liberals could Nonconformists expect redress for their disabilities ... Another reason for the allegiance of the Nonconformists to the party was their concurrence in its principles of general policy, or at least the principles of its more advanced wing. ⁴⁵

However, the Home Rule issue divided the Nonconformists, including the Quakers; John Bright, Lewis Fry and Arthur Pease, all turned Unionist. ⁴⁶ Whereas George and Richard Cadbury supported Home Rule, which meant that they were politically isolated in Birmingham, which went over to Unionism with Joseph Chamberlain. ⁴⁷ By the 1890s the Nonconformist conscience was undergoing a transformation, as Bebbington has described:

the more favourable estimate of state action for moral purposes, constituted the most dramatic change of mind ... Sympathy for *laissez-faire* was steadily superseded by a wish to legislate against particular evils ... The growth of the conscience cannot be accounted for by the novelty or increasing gravity of social problems. What changed was not the problems so much as Nonconformist awareness of them. ⁴⁸

Members of the Society of Friends became increasingly aware of the shortcomings of philanthropy, and philanthropists were increasingly subject to criticism from socialists. George Cadbury and Joseph Rowntree were part of a new pattern of philanthropy among Victorian

Quakers which rejected the "moral distinction between the way in which money was made and the use to which it was put".⁴⁹ This represented a significant turnaround, because earlier in the 19th century the Quakers tended to conform to the more grotesque image of the Victorian "zeal for well-doing".⁵⁰

All this goes to show that Quakerism was far from being an unchanging body of doctrine. Members of the Society of Friends went through a series of fundamental changes in their attitudes during the 19th century, along with other Nonconformists and the middle class in general. It seems unlikely that the Quakers were sufficiently cohesive in their social and political thinking to provide a critique which would, of itself, provide the impetus for Quaker employers to rethink their industrial management techniques. There is, moreover, a definite contradiction between Child and the Weberian standpoint. Child has noted what he sees as:

The distrust, and at worst, marked antipathy of Quaker views towards private industry and the profit-seeking employer.⁵¹

Given the social composition of the Society of Friends, this would have amounted to something like self-hatred! The Cadburys certainly do not appear to have manifested any such tendency, as anyone who has read any of their many self-congratulatory writings can well attest.

There are further reasons why it seems unlikely that *Cadburys* were responding to pressure from members of the Society of Friends in the management of the Bournville Works. The Cadburys exercised considerable influence, and George Cadbury was used to getting his own way when he gave generous financial support to a cause with which he agreed.⁵² He was well-connected politically, and, along with Seebohm Rowntree, he was one of the Liberal Party's leading financiers.⁵³ Since 1881 he had owned a group of Birmingham weekly newspapers, and during the Boer War he responded to pressure from Lloyd George to support an initiative to capture a newspaper in order to oppose the war, as a result of which he became the proprietor of the *Daily News*. The paper supported the Liberal Party, and after the Liberal's electoral victory in 1906, when three members of the paper's staff were

elected, there was a backlash against George Cadbury from his political opponents. The Cadbury and the Rowntree owned newspapers were dubbed the "Cocoa Press", and George Cadbury was referred to as the "serpentine and malevolent cocoa magnate" of the "Cocoa Trust". Even so, in 1910, in collaboration with the Rowntrees, George Cadbury considerably extended his newspaper interests.

A Slavery Issue

Given their prominence, the Cadburys were bound to be subject to accusations of hypocrisy. Thus, they were accused of benefiting from the duties on cocoa and chocolate, (a charge they vehemently denied), while at the same time supporting Free Trade, which denied others the benefits which they allegedly enjoyed. The most serious single instance of alleged hypocrisy centred on the accusation that *Cadburys*

acquiesced in a system which amounted to slavery on the plantations in San Thomé and Príncipe off the Angola Coast of Africa from which part of their supply of raw material was bought.⁵⁵

Following an article in the *Standard* in September, 1908, *Cadburys* took action for libel. The case was heard at the Birmingham Assizes in December 1909, and to the Cadburys' obvious amazement the jury awarded the firm a derisory farthing in damages. Much could be made of this episode, but it has been well covered elsewhere⁵⁶ and it is not the purpose of this study to gloat over alleged instances of hypocrisy or inconsistency; *Cadburys* is a more interesting case considered as an example of a genuine Quaker employer. Suffice to say that the firm did not act quickly over the issue. The Board first heard of the conditions of slavery on the island of San Thomé in April 1901, when they decided to:

assist in the investigation, and if need be the publication of the facts, through the Anti-Slavery Society or otherwise.⁵⁷

William Cadbury visited Lisbon in 1903 to try to get assurances that the slave conditions would be abolished in the Portuguese colonies. In 1905 Henry Nevinson had his book published describing the

conditions on San Thomé as *A Modern Slavery*; and in 1908 William Cadbury visited San Thomé himself and collected material for his own book on *Labour in Portuguese West Africa*, which was published in 1909. However, it was not till March 1909 that *Cadburys*, *Frys*, and *Rowntrees* announced a boycott of cocoa from the two islands, following the failure of the Portuguese Government to fulfil pledges of reform. After the court case, George Cadbury wrote a letter to the firm's employees thanking them for their sympathy and explaining the firm's position in the matter:

It was most difficult to decide whether we should be guided by our own feelings, which would have led us immediately to give up the use of the cocoa, or by commonsense, which clearly showed us that there was no other way of ascertaining facts and bringing the necessary pressure to bear except by continuing as buyers, and this everyone who carefully thought out the subject, and was fully acquainted with the facts, fully confirmed.⁵⁸

However, it should be noted that San Thomé was an important source of cacao internationally, and for *Cadburys* especially. In 1902 San Thomé accounted for 14.3% of the world's harvest of cacao beans, and this had risen to 15.5% by 1912, during which time production on the island had doubled, although subsequently it went into decline.⁵⁹ It remained the main source of cacao for *Cadburys* during the 1900s. (see table 2.1) Whatever the rights and wrongs were of this episode, it clearly shows that *Cadburys* were able to weather the storm of an attack from the Tory press, which must have had more clout than the Society of

Table 2.1 *Percentage of Cadbury's Cacao from San Thomé* ⁵⁰

1899	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904
43,15	45,2	54,76	52,23	60,3	55,8
1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910
48,18	47,2	49,49	32,09	4,32	nil

Friends. Again, this makes it seem unlikely that pressure from the Quakers would have been a significant factor in the firm's decisions over labour management. It must be said that a reading of the Director's Board Minutes, which, although they were confidential, were certainly written with an eye to posterity, does not leave the impression that their policies were permeated by a desire to conform to Quaker precepts.

Cadburys and the Labour Movement

It might be thought that the labour movement would have had some criticism of *Cadburys* which could have been backed up with effective pressure, but this does not appear to have been the case. Here again George Cadbury, "the Chocolate Uncle",⁵¹ had exercised some influence due to his financial donations. He gave financial assistance to the I.L.P., at a time when they badly needed funds, and he had given financial backing to individual Labour candidates, such as Philip Snowden.⁵² In David Howell's view, George Cadbury

clearly saw the I.L.P. as part of the Radical family and hoped that he could reduce antagonisms. He reassured Herbert Gladstone, "any influence I may have acquired will be used to prevent the I.L.P. opposing Liberals; if this is not the case, they will get no more from me."⁵³

It was not so much that the I.L.P. was compromised by George Cadbury's financial backing as that it was unable to articulate any coherent critique which would have precluded accepting his support, because, as Howell explains, it,

grew out of and continued to advocate a range of Radical claims that could cohabit with, and linked intimately with, liberal capitalism.⁵⁴

I.L.P.ers, such as Snowden, were close to George Cadbury's Nonconformist Radicalism, which facilitated his role as go-between for the Liberal Party and the I.L.P.

The "politico-religious aspect" of the early I.L.P. propaganda, "found its most extreme expression in the Labour Churches", according to P.P. Poirer.⁶⁵ The Labour Church was founded in 1891, in part as a reaction against the increasing respectability of Nonconformity.

Inglis describes it thus:

Untheological in its teachings, Nonconformist in its spiritual ancestry, the Labour Church preached a creed that was vague and materialistic.⁶⁶

Although by 1912 it had lost direction and become a mere auxiliary to the I.L.P., Labour Churches survived in certain places, such as Birmingham, where for a time it was "the centre of the socialist movement," because they could become convenient mediators between different organisations.⁶⁷ This seems to have applied to the areas of Birmingham near Bournville. The Northfield Labour Church was founded in about 1912 and, "served as a meeting place for many who had sympathies to the left, but were not necessarily in agreement with the programme of the I.L.P."⁶⁸ There was already a Labour Church at Stirchley, which held meetings in the Stirchley Institute (see below Ch. 3) at least until 1917.⁶⁹ There is an account from the Northfield Labour Party of how the patronage of certain Quaker employers affected the emerging local labour movement:

To be a socialist was to be suspect to employers, but perhaps that mattered a little less in Northfield than elsewhere. The most important of the local employers (except Herbert Austin), were Quakers and Adult Schoolworkers ... There were advantages and disadvantages to this state of affairs. On the one hand, it meant money, protection and influence. On the other hand, the paternalist outlook of some of the Quaker masters did not mix kindly with the rising tide of socialism, and not many of them would follow as well as lead. Some like J.W. Wilson and Oliver Morland, were outright opponents of Labour. Some gave money but not active work, and some changed their allegiance. But their most important contribution remained the strengthening of the Christian spirit, and the traces of that were to remain long after the party had shed the tutelage of the wealthy.⁷⁰

If the Nonconformist sympathies of the local labour movement meant that it was unlikely to be able to articulate a critique of *Cadburys*, then it was not alone. Even Robert Williams, a militant leader of the National Transport Workers Federation and a member of the Communist Party, could only offer an oblique indictment of firms like *Cadburys* and *Rowntrees*, which implicitly accepted conditions at their factories:

the very nature of world finance and world capital makes it inevitable that all those within its grip shall be creatures of their own system. A Quaker family might seek to improve conditions in its cocoa factories, while preaching international peace, and at the same time put its financial reserves at the disposal of a banking corporation - which in its turn sent missionaries with the Bible and liberal supplies of gin and subsidised apostles of "Empire", like Cecil Rhodes ... and all that kind of "pioneer" - and thus be as responsible for bringing about a World War as any set of international exploiters without any qualms or misgivings.⁷¹

If a prominent labour leader could only come up with this sort of tortuous piece of empty invective in his criticism of Quaker employers, it can hardly be expected that a disparate group of middle class do-gooders like the Society of Friends could have developed a coherent critique of, or mounted any effective pressure on *Cadburys* sufficient to influence their decisions in relation to labour management.

Quakers and Industrial Strife

Now the Quaker employers can be looked at in relation to the Conferences of Quaker Employers which were held in 1918, 1928, 1939, and 1948,⁷² and their importance in relation to *Cadburys* can be assessed. John Child has referred to "the absence of strife" during the years from 1906 to 1922 in factories run by Quaker employers, and has suggested that their concession of the principle of industrial democracy and recognition of "the worker's rights as a person", was *not* the outcome of their own experiences "of a struggle for relative power in the factory."⁷³ He has alleged that:

In the years immediately after the First World War, propositions of a human relations nature were just beginning to be advanced ... (and) the harmony prevailing at factories under Quaker management ... lent ... support

to the view that improved personal interaction could provide a solution to labour troubles.⁷⁴

He maintains that in the early years of this century:

Quaker employers ... were ready to extend a recognition to trade unions as a system of and a means to greater expression of workers' interests, [although] they felt unhappy with the basis of unionism which was, in fact, the idea that those interests necessarily conflicted with those of employers.

This gives the impression that Quaker employers were not themselves directly involved in serious labour disputes, and that while they might have been responding to the general conditions of unrest, their actions need to be explained in terms of other pressures, such as from the Society of Friends, which bore directly upon them. However, it is suggested in this thesis that the *image* of the Quaker employers as liberal and enlightened has directed attention away from any disputes in which Quaker firms were involved. Thus it is understandable that in examining management thought, mainly through the eyes of management thinkers such as Edward Cadbury, Child has overlooked one or two significant conflicts involving Quaker firms. The Quaker connection in these disputes has not been brought out; it needs to be researched further, although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to give more than an outline from mainly secondary sources.

The Matchgirls' Strike

First of all there was the famous Matchgirls' Strike of 1888 against the Quaker firm of Bryant and Mays. Here was an example of a Quaker firm which, although it might have reformed itself later (see below ch.4), subjected its women workers to appalling conditions. This strike was of great significance; for Sir John Clapham it was, along with the London dockers' strike, one of the "most important events, in the world of wage-earning during 1888-9":

Victory for the six or seven hundred women workers who came out from the lucifer-match factories was a trifling thing to the statistical eye; but it seemed to be a symbol, a symbol of the weak things of the world confounding the things that were strong; although in fact one very strong thing, public-opinion skillfully roused and directed, was on the match girl's side.⁷⁵

This was an important strike in that it showed that a group of unskilled workers could be organised and could win. Not surprisingly, accounts of Quaker firms which mention Bryant and May, "another Quaker family business", do not hint that they were the firm at the centre of the Matchgirls' Strike.⁷⁷ It is not being suggested here that *Cadburys* were in any way party to Bryant and Mays poisoning of their women workers with phosphorus; but it is suggested that *Cadburys* must have been aware that another Quaker employer was in the public eye as a result of its terrible working conditions.

Jenny Morris has identified another Quaker firm which qualified for the description of it as a "bad employer":

Barclay and Frys was ... a box-making firm in Southwark whose women workers struck against wages of 9/- to 11/- per week in 1908.⁷⁸

This may be an obscure dispute in comparison to the Matchgirls' Strike, although the firm concerned was hardly obscure in terms of the Society of Friends, uniting, as it did "two great Quaker names".⁷⁹

Jacobs and the 1913 Dublin Lockout

There is another episode concerning a Quaker employer which is even more significant. One of the firms represented at the 1928 and '38 Conferences of Quaker Employers was W.R. Jacobs & Co., Ltd. of Dublin. It was one of the six firms, along with *Cadburys* and *Rowntrees*, which were listed, in 1928, as being, "pleased to give details of their Schemes to any who apply."⁸⁰ In 1960 *Jacobs*, then of Liverpool, and still a family firm, became a subsidiary of Associated Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd, and so became associated with Huntley and Palmers. The firm therefore comes in for attention from Corley, in his history of Huntley and Palmers. He remarks in passing that in 1914:

Jacobs, after some months complete shut-down in Dublin caused by strikes and civil troubles there, was now building a branch factory at Aintree, near Liverpool.⁸¹

By glossing over what turns out to be an important event involving a Quaker firm in this way, as if it were a mere hiccup in the history of

biscuits, Corley shows the weakness of a narrowly-focused business history.

There is not scope here to discuss the full implications of the dispute in which *Jacobs* played a leading role, there are many accounts of it elsewhere, which have been used to piece together enough of the detail of the conflict to be able to situate *Jacobs* biscuit factory within it. For a left-wing assessment, John Newsinger's will do:

The Dublin Lockout of 1913 is without any doubt the most important industrial struggle in Irish history. At the same time, the Lockout was one of the most important struggles in British history; it was an integral part of the great labour unrest that swept over the British Isles in the years 1910 to 1914 and had tremendous repercussions in Britain as well as Ireland.³³

First of all an assessment of *Jacobs* is necessary; it is of more interest than Bryant and Mays because apart from simply being represented at the later Conferences of Quaker Employers, the firm appears to have been quite definitely in the camp of "Quaker Employers", as being enlightened and having welfare provisions for its workers. Budgett Meakin mentioned the firm briefly in his survey of *Model Factories* published in 1905 (see below ch.4). He noted that the firm had a roof garden on top of its new factory buildings for the use of the workforce, as well as,

an ingenious swimming trough of lead-lined wood ... some 40 feet long ... with room to swim in one direction.

More conventionally, free medical attendance and medicine at 2d was provided, supplemented by home visits to sick workers.³⁴ Arnold Wright's *Disturbed Dublin* (1914), is an account of the Lockout which takes the employers' side. In this book he devoted a chapter to *Jacobs*, entitled "A Model Factory". Founded by, "a member of an old Quaker family", he says the firm's factory in Dublin's city centre employed upwards of 3,000 men and women in 1913. As well as the roof garden, used by "the girls" in the dinner hour, there was a dining-hall where the workers could get hot dinners at cost price. There was "a department exclusively devoted to the physical welfare of employees", attended by a doctor and a dentist who gave free advice and treatment, and:



In adjoining departments the lady welfare secretary, who is a qualified nurse, with the help of two assistants, looks after the health and well-being of the girls, and they can consult her at any time during working hours. All injuries, no matter how trivial, have to be reported at once.²⁵

It is hard to say from these brief accounts whether *Jacobs* had gone anywhere near as far *Cadburys* had by 1913 in instituting what were, in effect, modern personnel policies. However, *Jacobs* was clearly to be numbered among the enlightened Quaker firms, and there are similarities with Bournville, the firm was in a similar sort of industry, biscuit manufacturing, and its workforce was largely made up of women workers.

Starting in August, 1911, there had been a general labour unrest throughout Ireland, which lasted into the next year and in which *Jacobs* was affected. These strikes were characterised by their "spontaneous and sympathetic nature" and it was by his use of the "sympathetic strike" and the policy of refusing to handle "tainted goods" that Jim Larkin, the leader of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, earned "the reputation of being a revolutionary syndicalist." During this period most of the spontaneous demands made were quickly conceded.²⁶ In the period leading up to the Lockout *Jacobs* took a concessionary position, taking back a man they had sacked when the union threatened to strike. However, according to Wright:

Instead of ensuring harmony [this] was only an incitement to the Larkinites to strengthen their grip on the business. Messrs. Jacob, who are above everything employers who value the human tie, noted with concern the changed attitude of their workers.²⁷

In June, 1911, the Dublin Employers' Federation Ltd was established, "modelled on the Cork Employers Federation, which had crushed Larkin's union in Cork in the summer of 1909."²⁸ The employers were led by William Martin Murphy, whose extensive business interests included the Dublin United Tramway Company and the Irish Independent Group of Newspapers. The various left-wing accounts of the Lockout are agreed that behind the conciliation which went on during the summer of 1913, Murphy was planning to beat Larkinism. Not surprisingly the

Irish Worker denounced Murphy as "a soulless, money grubbing tyrant". According to Emmet Larkin, this was not an accurate picture of him; he was a hard working and able businessman, and although he was opposed to sweating:

like many another employer of his day, he considered himself the final arbiter in matters concerning his business, and he would stand no interference.²⁹

Hostilities commenced on August 15th, when Murphy informed his newspaper and tramway workers that all members of the I.T.G.W.U. must resign from the union or accept dismissal notices. The union responded by "blacking" Murphy's newspapers, to which his reply was to lock out all the union members in his newspaper dispatch department. The dispute rapidly escalated and on August 26th, 700 tramway workers "walked off their trams, leaving them wherever they happened to be."³⁰ On the 28th, Larkin was arrested and charged with seditious libel, but he was let out on bail and remained defiant. On what became known as Bloody Sunday, 31st August, Larkin addressed a demonstration which was attacked by the police, and he was arrested again and detained.

At the same time, on August 29th, Murphy met a small number of members of the Employers' Federation. They agreed that there should be a general meeting of the employers to unite them in a policy of opposition to the I.T.G.W.U. However:

Before the general meeting was called it was decided to invite the representatives of the leading trades and industrial organisations and of several of the large firms employing labour to consult with the committee of the [Employers'] Federation.

This body met twice, and decided to call a general meeting of Dublin employers for September 3rd. *It included George Jacob.*³¹ Events pre-empted the proposed general meeting. On September 2nd, the Coal Merchants' Association issued a manifesto announcing that they were locking out all their employees belonging to the I.T.G.W.U., and 2,000 workers walked out at *Jacobs* when the firm received a delivery from a flour mill where all the union members had been dismissed.³² Wright describes the events at *Jacobs*:

Messrs. Jacob issued a letter to the Press intimating that they had decided to close down their works owing to the obstacles put in the way of the transaction of their business by the Union ... So far as they were concerned, they said there was no objection to their men belonging to any union; but of late, it having come to their knowledge that undue pressure was being brought to bear upon some of their employees to become members of the Irish Transport Workers Union, they prohibited the canvassing for membership within the factory, or the display of any badge while on the premises which indicated membership of any special union. This action on the part of the firm, in conjunction with the dismissal of men who refused to handle flour tendered by them under contract ... led to the strike.³³

404 employers attended the meeting on September 3rd; and it was George Jacob who proposed the second resolution. This was unanimously supported by the employers; the agreement to which they bound themselves read as follows:

We hereby pledge ourselves in future not to employ any persons who continue to be members of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union, and any person refusing to carry out our lawful and reasonable instructions of those placed over them will be instantly dismissed, no matter to what union they belong.³⁴

From then on the conflict escalated, and by September 22nd some 25,000 Dublin workers were affected and 27 unions were locked out. Representatives of the employers, including Murphy and Jacob, met delegations from the British T.U.C. and from the Dublin Trades Council, but nothing came of these meetings. An executive committee was appointed by the Employers' Federation, its 13 members included George Jacob, and Murphy was president. They declined a further meeting with the T.U.C. delegation because they could not see that anything could be achieved, "so long as the Larkinite organisation was an active force."³⁵ Murphy said that they would starve the workers into submission.³⁶

The Government intervened in the dispute and a Board of Trade Court of Inquiry opened on September 29th. The employers' case was that trade was impossible in the face Larkin, his union, and the policies of the sympathetic strike and tainted goods. Larkin represented the workers' side, and he subjected the employers to severe

cross-examination, George Jacob especially. In his summing up, Larkin denounced the employers and attacked *Jacobs* in particular. They had, he said:

the worst sweating den in the four corners of Great Britain.⁹⁷

The Commissioners' report condemned the use of the sympathetic strike; "No community could exist", they said, if it became the general policy of Trade Unionism. They also condemned the document that the employers required their workers to sign:

Whatever may have been the intention of the employers, this document imposes upon the signatories conditions which are contrary to individual liberty, and which no workman or body of workmen could reasonably be expected to accept.⁹⁸

The employers rejected the Report as a basis for settlement, and they refused to withdraw the undertaking as to non-membership of the I.T.G.W.U. In their formal reply to the Commissioners they indicated that they were not opposed to trade unions or to collective bargaining as such. Wright put the employers' case; they were, he said:

prepared to negotiate as soon as the workers provided trustworthy machinery and trustworthy men to end the system of sympathetic strikes ... they did not wish to appear to dictate as to the internal management of trade unions, ... [but] they were compelled again to refuse to recognise the Union until it had been reorganised on proper lines, with new officials who had met with the approval of the British Joint Labour Board. (p. 216)

Public opinion began to harden against the employers; a famous open letter to them was printed in the *Irish Times* castigating them for their lack of humanity. An Industrial Peace Committee was dissolved on November 11th, 1913, with the majority giving their support to the workers' side; their decision was influenced by the use of three companies of Surrey infantry to protect *Jacobs'* scabs. However, as the dispute dragged on, the workers lost the support of the British T.U.C. and their funds dried up. Larkin was not popular with the British trade union leaders, and the more they saw of him, "the less they liked him."⁹⁹ They were certainly not going to commit themselves to the sort of sympathetic strike action which Larkin demanded of them. Larkin

conceded defeat on 30th January, 1914, and the Dublin workers began to return to work on the employers' conditions. The Relief Fund ran out on 11th February, however:

by the middle of February there were still some 5,000 workers locked out, and the last to accept defeat were the women of Jacobs' Biscuits, who did not go back until mid-March.¹⁰⁰

Although this is not the place to assess the wider significance of the Dublin Lockout, it can be stated that it was more than a wage dispute, as Wright argued:

It was not a question so much of hours of work or rates of pay as of a system, (ie Larkinism).¹⁰¹

The involvement of any group of workers in such a conflict needs to be examined in terms of wider factors than just their wages or conditions.¹⁰² E.P. Thompson has reiterated the point that:

The explanation for discontent "must be sought outside the sphere of strictly economic conditions."¹⁰³

Furthermore, the Dublin working class appear to have been fighting for something more than simply the right to organise, which the employers said they were prepared to concede, so long as it was in a form of organisation acceptable to them. A few points can be made about the I.T.G.W.U. and its organisation of *Jacobs'* workers which could be usefully born in mind when considering *Cadburys*.

The I.T.G.W.U. was established in Dublin in December 1908, but it only admitted men to membership:

it was not until September 1911 that a sister organisation, the Irish Women Workers' Union was founded by Larkin's unjustly neglected sister, Delia.¹⁰⁴

As an implacable opponent of the union and an avowed apologist for the employers, Wright made a good observer of the strengths of the union's organisation. Of the period leading up to the Lockout, he said:

to ... a complete extent by this time Mr Larkin had realised his ideal of a Union which should embrace all sorts and conditions of workers ... The female element was especially encouraged, and not improbably the dead set made against Messrs. Jacob from the first was due to Mr Larkin's perception of the peculiarly good facilities

which the working staff of the factory offered for pushing his propaganda in a feminine direction.¹⁰⁵

A contemporary account of the Lockout by a journalist who was sympathetic to Larkin and Irish Nationalism, W.P. Ryan, hinted at the influence of the union over the workers' lives, when he referred to:

the sweeter, brighter and positively joyous side of "Larkinism". Apart from the schemes and deliberations of the chief workers, (of the union) social and otherwise - Miss Delia Larkin and others have brought new life and hope to the women and girl toilers - there are rounds of concerts, dances, Irish classes, lectures, and other rallies that, day in day out, including Sundays (when drinking and dullness is a temptation or a curse in Dublin), make life enlivening and exhilarating for young and old amongst the poorest of the poor.¹⁰⁶

The significance of these activities, (which sound similar to some of those initiated by some employers at their own factories, such as Bournville), does not lie in their wholesomeness or their didactic nature. Their intrinsic content was almost incidental, what was important was that they took place under the auspices of a militant trade union and so fostered the independence of the workers involved.

Quakerism Versus Syndicalism

It was all very well for Edward Cadbury in his book on *Industrial Organization* (1912), to claim that:

The test of any scheme of factory organization is the extent to which it creates and fosters the atmosphere and spirit of co-operation and good-will, without in any sense lessening the loyalty of the worker to his own class and its organisations. (p. xvii)

However, in the context of Bournville he could easily afford to accept the workers' solidarity with their class, because unlike *Jacobs* workers, the *Cadburys* workforce was not likely to be drawn into an organisation which would organise them in militant solidarity against his own class.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the I.T.G.W.U. did not seem to be characterised by the sort of deference to enlightened employers which British labour leaders displayed and which allowed *Cadburys* to have a free rein at Bournville. Wright's indignation at this trait of the

I.T.G.W.U. probably indicates the frustration of those Dublin employers who had their concessions spurned:

As the Larkinite movement developed, it manifested an unmistakable tendency to syndicalistic methods. The most conspicuous indication of the influence of the subversive principles of the continental labour anarchists was shown in the dead-set made against certain employees whose reputation for dealing fairly with their employees was high. This was in accordance with the theory of Syndicalism that the good employer is the worst enemy of labour, because under him the working classes are apt to be contented and to decline to assist in securing that revolutionary change in economic conditions which, according to the extremists, is imperatively needed in the interests of the masses. Almost the first establishment to be put in the *Irish Workers'* pillory was Jacob's Biscuit Factory.¹⁰⁹

Of course it is impossible to say how *Cadburys* would have reacted if they had confronted anything like a revolutionary syndicalist organisation, the fact is, they did not have to contend with one. *Jacobs'* response to the challenge from the I.T.G.W.U. highlights something like "that indefinite area of toleration", which E.P. Thompson has identified in relation to an earlier period in English history, "which was upset only at the point where unionists became uncomfortably successful or 'insubordinate'.¹⁰⁹ Unlike *Jacobs*, *Cadburys* were able to carry on well within that area of toleration, and it would have been gratuitous for them to try to define its boundaries. Not that they could have been conscious of the limits to their own toleration, which could only have been revealed in a dynamic process of conflict such as did not take place. That they remained latent does not mean that these boundaries did not, or do not, definitely exist, because they are a necessary concomitant of capitalism.

The experience of *Jacobs* put into a somewhat different light Edward Cadbury's observations on the demands of the workers in relation to "The case against Scientific Management", which he wrote in 1914:

Our whole scheme of social, industrial, and political life rests on the idea and practice that management and control are in the hands of the middle-classes and the rich ... the growth of the Labour Party and Trade Unionism, and *even syndicalism properly understood*, are expressions of the workman's demand to control his own

life. And this demand will have to be reckoned with, for as we have seen there have already been strikes arising out of the attempt to introduce the mechanism of scientific management into various establishments.'''
[emphasis added]

The challenge of syndicalism was something more real to Quaker employers than might have been supposed if *Jacobs* was overlooked. Fortunately for him, Edward Cadbury needed to do no more than try to understand, which he seems to have been capable of doing with some sophistication. He was not *forced* to explain what his response would have been to a similar demand for control from the *Cadburys* workforce, neither could he have been expected to do so in the abstract. By the time of the 1918 Conference of Quaker Employers the more pressing threat was of increasing state control, which the employers were concerned to pre--empt by their own actions. Syndicalism had been relegated in importance, and it was only considered as a rival, and unworkable, form of industrial organisation. Wilfrid Irwin, a Manufacturing Chemist, contended that:

industry must either be carried on by the employees as at present, or by the State, or by the employees, and in the last case this would mean syndicalism. Very few supposed that such a system as that could last.'''

The involvement of *Jacobs* in the Dublin Lockout shows that a firm which was clearly identified with the image of Quaker employers and which had implemented welfare provisions in the period before World War One could take a position which was firmly opposed to trade union organisation. This suggests that the attitude to trade unions on the part of employers adopting welfarism, whether Quaker or otherwise, was more the product of their particular experiences with trade unionists and labour leaders and of the type of union organisation with which they had to deal, and less the outcome of a coherent ideological position which incorporated both welfarism and a liberal stance regarding trade unions. This means that a division between employers adopting welfarism on the basis of their motivation vis a vis trade union organisation becomes less tenable, and so there can be less of a

distinction between British and American firms during the period up to the First World War, as will be seen in Chapter 4, below.

Cadburys and Employers' Organisations

Given the central role that *Jacobs* played in the Dublin Employers Federation, it would be useful to look at *Cadburys'* dealings with other firms, and their attitude towards employers' organisations. As will be seen (in chapter 4), *Cadburys* took note of the technical and welfare developments that were taking place at other firms, but this did not necessarily involve anything like an organisation on the part of the employers. However, some policies were discussed in a more formal setting. In September 1909, Mr. and Mrs. Edward Cadbury invited various employers to, "A conference of representatives of manufacturers interested in the welfare of factory women". The *Works Magazine* explained the need for such a meeting:

Rapid development has taken place in this country during the past decade in work by enlightened manufacturers interested in the welfare of their employees, and this conference marks an important stage in the movement. So far there has been little interchange of views amongst British manufacturers ... and Saturday's conference was designed to provide an opportunity for doing this.

An indication of the concern for efficiency, as well as welfare, was given by Miss Anderson, "the principal lady inspector of factories", who:

pointed out the opportunities open to employers of labour who took an interest in their workers to find out for themselves the actual relationship of length of hours and stress of work to fatigue and efficiency, the bearing of education on the character of work, and so forth.

The tone of the conference was different to the later Quaker conferences. It was in the main a sharing of practical experiences, with Edward Cadbury reading a paper "describing the principles of welfare work, illustrated by references to the schemes in operations at the Works. Principal points of his paper referred to discipline among workers, and the dealing with inefficiency." The preoccupations of the employers were still Victorian; there were two papers on Thrift, one by the *Rowntrees* representative, "one how to teach the women, and

especially the younger girls, to save." Five of the sixteen firms represented were definitely Quaker businesses, so although the Society was well represented, it was far from being an exclusively Quaker meeting. The sixteen firms were: Wills (Bristol); Crosfield (Warrington) - Quakers; Nelson (Edinburgh); Reckitt (Hull) - Quakers; Packer (Bristol); Jacob (Dublin) - Quakers; Pascall (London, Confectionery); Colman (Norwich); Chivers (Cambridge); Johnson (Bootle); Hudson, Scott and Son (Carlisle); Cash (Coventry); Robertson (Catford); Lever Brothers (Port Sunlight); Rowntrees (York) - Quakers; Cadbury (Bournville) - Quakers.¹¹²

Cadburys appear to have seen themselves as distinct from other employers, and in 1906 they instituted a measure which they must have hoped would prevent them becoming associated with any sweating employers. The Board decided "to ascertain openly as a Company Labour Conditions" in British firms before placing any tenders with them.¹¹³ In 1913 the policy was extended and made more systematic. Within a week of this, the weakness of the policy was revealed, when the Buying Committee reported "unsatisfactory labour conditions at Garton's works". The Board had to concede that, "we cannot enforce our usual stipulations in this case," because Garton's had a monopoly of the English glucose trade.¹¹⁴ Exceptions were also made for, "foreign Houses ... Because we are so dependent on these for certain classes of goods that we cannot enforce conditions similar to home"; and for firms employing less than ten people, although trade union organised firms were to be preferred. Replies to the enquiries made were to be accepted unless the Trade Unions gave information to the contrary. Considering firms having a monopoly, it was decided that:

we continue to buy from such, if no other source is available, it is considered we should always advise them of our views on labour conditions.¹¹⁵

The difficulties of applying it notwithstanding, the policy did not become a dead letter. Although several letters had been sent to them, six engineering firms had still not replied to *Cadburys'* enquiries by May, 1914, so the accounts with five of them were closed.¹¹⁶

In 1922, the direct enquiries were dropped when orders were placed with firms which were members of recognised Employers' Associations, this was "to be taken as sufficient evidence that they conform to agreements entered into between the Employers' Association and the Trade Unions." Although the Board made the point that:

it is understood that any recommendations now made are in no way to lower the labour conditions adopted by firms who receive our orders,"¹¹⁷

In 1933 the enquiries were dropped altogether, "owing to the good level of working conditions and rates of wages now generally prevailing in this country."¹¹⁸ It is not necessary to go into the validity of this claim, and it is hard to assess the significance of the policy or of its abandonment. Even so, it seems unlikely that other firms would have taken kindly to *Cadburys* enquiring about their labour conditions and deferring to the trade unions for information. If *Cadburys* saw themselves as separate from other firms at the time when they initiated the policy, the later erosion and eventual abandonment of it seems to signify that they were becoming more aligned to other employers generally.

/ This seems to be confirmed by the firm's attitude to employers' organisations. Although they had co-operated with *Frys* and *Rowntrees* for a long time in agreeing to such things as advertising rates,¹¹⁹ they seem to have been reluctant to join any wider organisations. In 1908 they declined an invitation to join the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance and in 1910 they decided not to become fully accredited members of the Biscuit Manufacturers' Association, although they agreed to become corresponding members. In 1911 they did decide to subscribe to the British Paper Box Manufacturers' Federation; this was probably to ensure proper representation for the firm on the Trades Board set up for the card-box trade in the 1910 legislation.¹²⁰

The Engineering Employers' Federation

The Directors of *Cadburys* found themselves in a quandary when they came to consider joining the Engineering Employers' Federation, in 1920, because:

however much we might be benefitting by action the Federation was taking we could not join it as long as they insisted in the inclusion of the lock-out clause.¹²¹

This stance can certainly be attributed to a Quaker preference for arbitration. During the engineering dispute of 1897, George Cadbury expressed his sympathy for the workers and donated £50 per week to their cause, taking the view that the employers were in the wrong and that they were deliberately setting out to smash the unions.¹²² The firm continued to give effect to the stance by making contributions of cocoa in cases of strikes, although in 1914 the position was modified so that from then on contributions would only be made "in such cases where the masters refuse to arbitrate." Even so, several tons of chocolate were distributed by the firm in mining districts during the Coal Crisis in 1921.

In 1922 the Engineering Employers' Federation cleared the way for *Cadburys* to join by agreeing:

That in the event of a movement, either local or national, for a variation in working conditions, [i.e. wage reductions. *Cadburys*] should be at liberty to pay existing rates until the dispute is settled.

In effect this meant that *Cadburys* was not bound by the Federation to serve notice on its employees. Neither was the firm required to subscribe to the "Subsidy Fund." On these terms the Board agreed the firm should become an Associate Member of the Engineering and The National Employers' Federation.

Even though *Cadburys* was excluded from the Federation's "lock-out" clause, the firm soon found itself having to take a stand with its fellow employers. Two months after joining the employers' organisation the Board felt they had to turn down a request "that a collection should be taken in the Works on behalf of the men affected by the Engineering dispute." Although the Board were "prepared to consider the general question of principle if the matter is pressed by the Council". The principle was not pressed, but it can be speculated that in effect it consisted in this; *Cadburys* was not going to lock-out its own workers, but neither was the firm going to allow its workers to

make collections to support others who were in dispute with its fellow members of the 'Employers' Federation.¹²⁰

This represented a real shift in *Cadburys* position. What had been a point of principle for George Cadbury, a principle to which he gave practical effect, became a vestigial gesture. But to leave it at that is to be too dismissive. George Cadbury could give support to the engineers in the 1890s because to do so did not impinge on his own prerogatives as an employer. The general principle was being modified so that it became a pragmatic policy of trying to insulate the Bournville factory from disputes in industries with which it was not primarily concerned. *Cadburys* was an engineering employer in 1922, it had been for some time, but the bulk of the workforce, including nearly all the women, were cocoa and chocolate production workers. So, although the firm could not avoid being pulled into the Employers' Federation in order to be able to be party to negotiations with engineering workers, locally and nationally, since engineering was not the firm's main activity it could afford to pay something over the industry rate to its own engineers in order to avoid an actual dispute.

So, when the employers' side in the Engineering and Metal Trades Dispute decided to impose wage reductions in three stages, starting from 31st July, 1922, *Cadburys* responded to a mass meeting of their engineers by agreeing to delay the wage reductions. Although they said that they felt bound to follow the terms of the National Agreement the firm constantly stalled in bringing in the reductions and found various exemptions for its workers, who were paid a minimum of 12/- per week above the district rate to start with.¹²¹ Therefore *Cadburys* were able to insulate themselves from a dispute in the engineering industry, because engineering was not their main activity and so they could pay their engineers something over the going rate. But this was not the outcome of their Quaker principles. It meant that where the firm dominated the cocoa and chocolate industry, it was able to set the rates. But in other industries with which it was involved, it tried to insulate itself by identifying itself as a more generous, enlightened,

different sort of employer. Partly this called on *Cadburys'* Quaker image.

The Conference of Quaker Employers

As for the conference of Quaker Employers; it should be said that by the time the first one was held, in 1918, *Cadburys* and *Rowntrees* had already got well-established welfare practices. There were not really any specific proposals made at these conferences. Like the pronouncements of the Society of Friends' Industrial and Social Order Council during the same period, the discussions of the Quaker Employers never really went beyond exhortations for individual Quakers to examine their consciences. In fact the Committee on War and the Social Order, which was set up in 1915 as a result of the outbreak of War, expressed itself very much as a middle class religious group might be expected to do, it was vague. For example, when it considered "Private Property and Interest", the Committee decided that:

it is a matter for personal interpretation to be put upon the terms employed.

In the ideal of Society, we believe that all property, with the exception of such things as are necessary for personal and household use, should be owned communally...

We do not yet see fully how this ideal is to be carried out in practice, but we are convinced that it is our duty to work towards it strenuously and fearlessly ...

In July 1919, the Committee supported nationalisation, as long as there were safeguards where a danger of "monopolistic exploitation" existed. However, nationalisation was not thought to be the best way to secure the self-expression and, "complete economic freedom for the individual, which we desire to attain." Of course compensation was thought to be necessary, because without it, any expropriation would be "unfair". When the Committee made a clear declaration in 1924, that the private ownership of land was unchristian, the Yearly Meeting was,

unprepared ... to make a definite pronouncement on the general principle involved.

Such vague pronouncements do not sound as if they would cause much trouble for Quaker employers, especially not those who were already

acting in an enlightened way. The representatives from *Cadburys* do not appear to have displayed any unease at the Conferences of Quaker Employers. George Cadbury Jnr. opened a session at the 1918 Conference by asserting the responsibilities of an employer to the community:

There are some districts where the manufacturer is bound to provide houses, there are some recreations which fit on to the factory system, and when his duty calls he must provide these. If an employer goes to a remote country district, he is almost bound to find houses for his workpeople. Recreation for these people he must find, too. The dinner time is a peculiar factory problem, and besides canteens, playing fields are very desirable. *Apart from these reasons, they give the occasion for uniting the staff and workpeople in works of common interest, which are valuable in themselves from every point of view.* [emphasis added]

This does not seem to indicate any discomfiture on his part, it seems more like a description of the measures *Cadburys* had taken at Bournville as the way for employers to meet their responsibilities, and it is hardly surprising therefore, that later in the conference he had the chance to take a party round Bournville:

to see the arrangements for social and physical recreation at the Bournville Works, including the swimming bath, gymnasium, dining rooms, games pavilion, etc., and the beautifully laid out grounds which the employees have the right to use.¹²⁵

Lawrence Cadbury's address to the 1938 Conference on the "Public Control of Industry" was similarly anodyne as far as employers would have been concerned:

I advocate no sweeping extension of State control in industry and commerce ... in recent years it has been driven home to us that State control of our economic life involves more than materialistic consideration of such things as whether Capitalism or Socialism is the more efficient. Freedom of enterprise is a bulwark against the Totalitarian State, and thus is as well a bulwark in defence of freedom of the subject and individual liberty...

In conclusion, therefore, I feel that not only on the economic merits of each scheme, but on general grounds as well, we ought to give each proposal for the extension of State control careful scrutiny.

This sounds very like a commonplace which most employers could have voiced equally well, and it does not seem much less so for his attempt to give it a Quaker tinge by pointing out that:

State control of the economic machine also has a close connection with the building up of aggressive armaments.

Suspicion of further state intervention was an issue which dominated the 1948 Conference, hardly a concern peculiar to Quaker Employers.

At the 1918 Conference the voice of labour was heard, and the second session was given over to three speakers, who each represented labour in some capacity, "to place before the Conference what they considered to be the legitimate claims of Labour." Harold Clay, the late Chairman of the Leeds Labour Party, and a left-wing tramwayman, appeared wary of the employers. He advised them to recognise the Shop Steward movement and to work through the Trade Union movement. He warned them that:

They were mistaken if they felt it was possible to get joint action between Employers and Employed by getting a joint committee on the lines of the Whitley Report.

If the workers were able to choose their own foremen and control the discipline in their workshops, he said, then the employers,

would find that Labour would be prepared to meet round the table, and discuss other matters in a way they would not at present.

He went on to criticise the Quaker employers' proposals contained in the Memorandum for the conference because they;

seemed to savour somewhat of a benevolent desire of the 'capitalist with a conscience'. Labour was not particularly favourable towards benevolent despotism, or despotism of any kind, but rather desired to work out its own destiny. The assistance given by the better type of employer would be readily accepted, but the workers did not want employers to do too many things for them. That idea was running right through the Labour movement to-day.

More reassuring were the words from Tom Hackett, billed as "a Birmingham Labour Leader". He told the Conference that:

what those present needed to recognise was that ultimately the ideal of Labour was a co-operative one. How could they obtain such co-operation between Capital and Labour, and management and worker, as would make that possible? Employers would find that ill-paid, badly housed people and those who were undeveloped, educationally and physically, were a bad asset, and everything they could do as employers to increase the status of the workers would ultimately redound to their benefit and credit.

As for the workers' demand for the right to control their own destinies and have a say in their conditions of work:

He was coming more and more to believe that that was a justifiable demand, and one which might be admitted without proving detrimental to business.¹²³

Needless to say, the only kind of revolution he had in mind was "a revolution in ideas". Tom Hackett, however, was more than just a labour leader, he was the "avuncular"¹³⁰ Works Foreman at the Bournville Works, a position he held for twenty six years from 1906 until his retirement in December 1932. This meant that he was head of the production staff, and in charge of personnel on the men's side of the factory. He was a member of the Drafting Committee for the Works Council, and a Management Representative of the Mens Council from 1918 onwards. According to his testimonial in the *Works Magazine* on his retirement, "T.H." was "regarded as the natural spokesman of the employees as a whole". From 1913 to 1920 he was a Labour councillor, on the Birmingham City Council; in the 1918 General Election he was unsuccessful as the Labour candidate for the Kings Norton constituency.¹³¹ So when he spoke to the Conference it was hardly as an indifferent representative of labour, even if he was speaking in a personal capacity. Incidentally, he was a member of Stirchley Methodist Church, so the Conference could not have been an exclusively Quaker affair.

The composition of the Conferences is interesting. The numbers of those attending and firms represented were as follows:

1918	86 members listed	from 57 firms
1928	100 attended 33 interested but unable to attend	from 62 firms
1938	113 attended 25 interested but unable to attend	from 64 firms
1948	119 attended 46 interested but unable to attend	from 58 firms

Out of the 27 firms represented in 1918 whose location is known, 10 were in Birmingham. In 1928, 16 of the firms represented were in Birmingham, and none from London, although 2 firms were in Croyden; not one of those attending was from London, while there were 37 from Birmingham, 9 of them Cadburys. At the 1938 Conference, there were only 9 Friends from London, representing only 3 London firms, and one of those was the Cadbury owned News Chronicle Ltd; there were 39 from Birmingham. This should not be taken to mean that Quaker businesses were more concentrated in Birmingham than London, they may have been, but not to the extent represented by the Quaker Employer's Conferences. Each of the Conferences was held at Woodbrooke, near Bournville, which had been George Cadbury's home until 1902, when he handed it over to the Society of Friends for use as a college.¹³² All of this tends to suggest that the initiative behind the Conferences came from Birmingham, and that many of those attended were probably marshalled under the influence of the Cadburys.

This means that these Conferences can be seen as a vehicle for propagating the views of certain prominent Quaker employers, namely *Cadburys* and *Rowntrees*, who had already implemented policies in their own factories which fulfilled the requirements of the image of a "Quaker employer". In fact, the image of the Quaker employer was probably derived more from the existing practices of these firms than it was imposed upon them. Once the image was set, precedents could be selected for it to suggest an enduring quality. The opening address to the 1918 Conference by the Conference Chairman, Arnold Rowntree M.P., suggests how this process took place:

I have been looking round in preparation for this conference, for the record of friends in the realm of constructive industrialism ... I find recorded many

interesting instances of the efforts of early Friends to maintain just dealing and business integrity, and much willingness to make whatever sacrifices were necessary to that end.¹³³

Quaint Quakers

The usefulness of the Quaker employer image was that although the Cadburys certainly believed in it themselves, it was open to permutation, because essentially it was the employers themselves who defined it. There was no powerful external agency which could enforce conformity to it. The Nonconformist conscience had been fractured by the rise of Labour, and Nonconformists had retreated from political involvement as a body in their own right, realising the secularising effect of such involvement. According to Bebbington, "By 1910 the period of the Nonconformist conscience had come to an end."¹³⁴ In an increasingly secular society, conformity to a religious ideal would give a firm an identity which would make it seem somehow special and imbued with a morality lacking in other firms. At the same time, that secularism itself would ensure that few people would really know, or perhaps care, what that identity should consist in. Perhaps that explains why some writers on Corporate Cultures appreciate modern corporations which have a "religious tone".¹³⁵

By the time of the Quaker Employers' Conferences the idea of an employer motivated by religious convictions must have seemed increasingly anachronistic and, as it does today, not a little quaint. This quaintness was stressed by the search for tenuous historical precedents showing that Quaker employers had always been somewhat different to the norm. This is exemplified by a brief history of *Frys* which appeared in the *Frys Works Magazine*, in 1928, the year of the firm's bicentenary.

This started with a reference to "our honest God-fearing Quaker founder ... the plain-spoken and plain-habited Quaker who kept that tiny shop." This "sober-minded Quaker" was likely to have been alarmed by the lawlessness of the 18th century:

In the England of 1728, therefore, where excess both in language and behaviour was the rule, the restrained and precise lives led by the Quakers must have made them almost a race apart.

In the face of this general drunkenness, "Our plain forthright Quaker founders had to sell their goods." Needless to say, "The personal touch was always in evidence" at the firm:

This attitude was part and parcel - in fact the very essence - of the Fry psychology, since it was ingrained in the Frys not to look upon their employees as so many cogs in a machine for producing dividends but as human creatures possessed of immortal souls, for whom they were largely responsible. This patriarchal policy was indeed a case of casting bread upon the waters, for it engendered a feeling of loyalty on the part of employees the value of which to the Business was beyond rubies.

Lest it might be thought otherwise, it was pointed out that although the Directors were "reared in the atmosphere and traditions of the Society of Friends", the "Fry Spirit" could not be thought of as dull:

Candour, freedom of speech and humour are the dominant notes in our social life ... This spirit of toleration and liberty is one of the finest things at J.S. Fry and Sons Ltd., where one may think like an Anarchist so long as one does one's job like a decent citizen.¹³⁶

It should be noted that none of the Frys ever attended the Conferences of Quaker Employers, and that the firm was not represented except as part of the British Cocoa and Chocolate Company, which Edward Cadbury represented at the 1948 conference.

Any account of the so-called Quaker employers which takes as its starting point the Quakerism of a firm's founders or Directors should be wary that it is not reproducing the kind of simplistic history contained in the *Frys' Works Magazine*, which explains very little, although its acceptance certainly needs explaining.

Chapter Three
BOURNVILLE

Myth Making

Building work on the Bournville site started in January 1879. *Cadburys* employed men directly to do the building work, although they were under the supervision of a foreman bricklayer lent by *Tangyes*, the local Quaker engineering firm. George Cadbury made the rough plans for the factory himself and they were worked out in detail by a Birmingham architect. The transfer from the old works at Bridge Street, in the centre of Birmingham, started in June and was finished by the end of September 1879.

There is not much information in the *Cadbury Collection* on the Bridge Street works or on the early development of Bournville. This in itself is significant, because later on the firm kept nearly all its documents, partly with an eye to posterity, and occasionally Board Minutes were rewritten so that they would sound better if they were to be sent out as instructions. So the lack of material covering the early period at Bournville suggest two things: first, that George and Richard Cadbury did not see everything they did as being so significant that they had to keep a record of it for posterity in the way that the Board subsequently did, and second that their style of management did not generate the same volume of documents as the committee system of management did in the 20th century.

Retrospective accounts need to be read critically because they are clouded by the later image of Bournville. This is the case especially with the two centenary publications by I.A. Williams and T.B. Rogers. The Board *decided* to celebrate a centenary for the firm in 1931. It was thought that the actual manufacture of cocoa had begun in 1831. There had already been a "Bournville Jubilee" celebration in September 1929 and it was obviously decided that the centenary celebrations would be even more lavish and publicise the firm better.²

The firm paid Iolo Williams £350 for work on his book and the Centenary Celebration Committee allocated £200 or £300 to advertise it. Approximately 4,450 copies were given to employees with at least 10 years' service and 450 were distributed to pensioners. The firm was

pleased with the reviews given to Williams' book in the press and they were quoted with approval in the *Works Magazine*. One of the reviews sums up the significance of the book, "The firm can celebrate its Centenary this year with the issue of a record of its achievements that few firms can equal and none excel".³

Rogers was the editor of the *Works Magazine* and the firm's Advertising Department spent over £7,500 on 180,000 copies of his short account of the firm's history. Copies were sent to customers in this country and were also used by associated companies in Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

In other words, at the time these two accounts were written the firm was concerned to publicise its image both to its customers and workers. It would be surprising if such histories indicated anything other than a continuity between the firm's past and present policies. Both histories draw heavily on a volume of reminiscences from people who worked at Bridge Street or at Bournville in its early days. Some of these recollections were used in the *Works Magazine* in 1909 and others were collected in preparation for the centenary. This volume itself was edited and the accounts are all deferential in tone. The vocabulary of these old workers gives an idea of the paternalism, they refer to the Cadbury brothers as "Mr. George" and "Mr. Richard". One of them wrote, "I never knew men work harder than our masters, who were indeed more like fathers to us."⁴ Rogers refers to the intimate history of the firm contained in the reminiscences which "first and foremost ... tell of the close human relations between master and man".⁵

In their search for a unity between the past and the present these histories present precedents that are so tenuous as to almost belie that continuity in themselves. For example in Williams' account of Bridge Street it says:

though the organization of physical training and athletics, as we understand it to-day in a factory, was a thing undreamed of then, the men were encouraged to play cricket and football.⁷

Or again, George and Richard Cadbury's "sense of responsibility to their employees" is stretched by Williams to include their payment system:

On the material side, the lot of the workers at Bridge Street was very soon improved by the introduction of a piece-work system, which resulted in an increase both in their earnings and in their output.¹⁰

This would have put the introduction of piece-rates at 1861, when George and Richard took over the running of the business from their father, but an ex-forewoman who remembered George Cadbury coming into the business said he introduced a piece-rate system then, which was about 1856. The womens' wages had been 2s 6d to 7s 6d per week, but with the new piece-rate system they earned three times as much and did four or five times more work, she said.¹¹

According to the article in a 1909 issue of the *Works Magazine*:

The great educational experiment now going on in connection with Bournville Works goes back for its origin to such small beginnings as the provision of copy books for boys, and the holding of a small sewing class once a week in the evenings at Bridge Street, when Mr. George Cadbury used to read aloud as the work proceeded.¹²

As for the early history of Bournville, the *Works Magazine* found an even more tenuous precedent, a horizontal bar was erected, "the earliest beginning of the present gymnasium."

An Outline Of The Firm's Early History

The myth making aside, it is possible to give a brief outline of the firm's early history. The original "Cadbury Brothers" were John Cadbury, (1801-1889) and his older brother Benjamin Head Cadbury, (1798 - 1880). John started the business in 1824, Benjamin Head joined him in the partnership in 1847, when the factory was moved to the Bridge Street Works. For some time the business was mainly concerned with trade in tea and coffee. Cocoa only accounted for about a quarter of the firm's trade in 1861, the year that John Cadbury handed over responsibility for the business to his sons, Richard, (1835 - 1899), and George. (1839 - 1922). The business had gone into decline, according to Williams, because of John Cadbury's ill health. In 1859

only 11 girls were employed, as compared to "a score or more" in 1852.¹² Richard and George Cadbury revived the firm's fortunes and shaped the business along the lines it has developed on since.

During the 1860s the firm moved over from the tea and coffee trade to concentrate on cocoa and chocolate production. Two important lines were launched. In 1864, Mexican chocolate first appeared. This "vanilla flavoured cake chocolate" was still being made by *Cadburys* "in a slightly different form" in 1931. George Cadbury travelled to Holland to buy a machine for making finer cocoas, and it was probably this machine which was used to make Cocoa Essence, which was first sold late in 1866. This made *Cadburys* the first English manufacturers to use the Dutch method for pressing out some of the cocoa butter from cocoa. This process for making "Chocolate Powder" had been patented in 1828 by the Dutch cocoa manufacturer, C.J. Van Houten and it meant that there was no need to add a starchy substance to counteract the excess of fat, usually referred to as cocoa butter, which is present in the cocoa bean. As well as improving the cocoa product, in effect creating an entirely different product, the cocoa butter "which had been removed could be used as a basis for manufacturing chocolate in a solid form, which in turn cheapened the cocoa produced."¹³ *Frys* followed *Cadburys* two years later in adopting this process.

Temperance And Cocoa

At this point it is probably worth saying that the best explanation for the dominance of the three Quaker firms, *Cadburys*, *Frys* and *Rowntrees*, of the English cocoa and chocolate industry, is probably not any desire on their part to manufacture a product associated with temperance and having nothing to do with war.¹⁴ The Cadburys were prominent in the temperance movement and they "lost custom when they ceased to provide customers with wine."¹⁵ As early as 1815, Quakers were promoting tea drinking and teetotalers undoubtedly helped to popularise tea at social gatherings in the 1830s, by which time the Quaker Yearly Meetings were "buzzing with zeal for the anti spirits movement". However, even though cocoa was much advertised in teetotal periodicals in the 1840s and 50s, *Cadburys* had to adopt a process to

produce a palatable drink before the firm could benefit from any increase in cocoa consumption due to a decline in alcohol consumption. As was common in the first half of the 19th century, *Cadburys* combined "the functions of dealer processor and retailer" and had "interests in tea and coffee as well as in cocoa." Concentration on any one of these activities would have been compatible with their temperance beliefs.

The cocoa and chocolate market in Britain in the late middle and late 19th century was in fact dominated by two foreign firms, *Van Houtens*, which probably sold more cocoa in Britain than any single British firm until the late 19th century, and *Menier*, the french chocolate firm, which opened a subsidiary factory in London in 1870. Although "the diffusion of new techniques" might have been slow in the industry as a whole, (certainly *Van Houten's* cocoa processing was well established before *Cadburys* took it up),¹⁷ the three Quaker firms probably diffused ideas among themselves quite quickly. This would have been facilitated by the Quaker traditions of inter-visitation and apprenticeship. George Cadbury had worked in *Rowntrees* grocery business before starting in his father's business in 1856, and it is clear from the correspondence concerning *Morning Readings* that *Cadburys* and *Frys* were in close contact.¹⁸

Adulteration

Having put on the market "a pure straightforward concentrated and unadulterated product", *Cadburys* "pushed this to the exclusion of other types" of cocoa, and gradually their other, adulterated lines, were dropped.²⁰ Cocoa Essence formed the basis for the expansion of the firm's business, along with, but to a lesser extent, chocolate manufacturing.

The old "adulterated" cocoas were more like a sort of soup than they were like the modern cocoa beverage. The fat of the cocoa bean was counteracted by adding such items "as powdered lentils, tapioca...or arrowroot." There was good reason to advertise the medical properties of cocoa, "since the product must almost certainly have tasted like medicine, it was only logical to pretend that it had

medicinal properties".²¹ George Cadbury remembered the product in a speech he made in 1921:

only one fifth of it was cocoa, the rest being potato starch, sago, flour and treacle. Other manufacturers made the same article - a comforting gruel.

Even so *Cadburys* launched several variants of these adulterated lines in the early 1860s. For example there was "Iceland Moss", "a beverage of semi-medical appeal, being a mixture of cocoa and a dried gelatinous lichen...which was reputed to have great health giving properties. It was first sold by *Cadburys* in 1861."²² This does not appear to have been a *Cadburys* branded product, however - an advert in a grocer's diary for 1887 drew attention to *Dunn and Hewitt's* "lichen islandicus", or Iceland Moss. Although they "called themselves the inventors of Iceland Moss", other firms, including *Rowntrees* also produced it.²³

The time was right for pushing a product that could be advertised as pure and unadulterated. "It was in the 1860s ... that the public at large was first protected from wholesale fraud and poisoning by the adulteration of food." There had been a series of revelations in the *Lancet* in the 1850s "of the poisonous compounds in thirty of the commonest foods daily sold by supposedly reputable business firms". So, although the first Adulteration of Foods Act of 1860 "was completely ineffective",²⁴ and did not affect the adulteration of cocoa, it was obviously a good move to gain attention for their new Cocoa Essence to have it favourably noticed in the *Lancet* and *The British Medical Journal*. Although their competitors protested that "they only mixed their cocoa with perfectly wholesome materials - sugar and flour, for example", this only gave *Cadburys* free publicity for their unadulterated product. The Cadburys themselves were involved in the discussions and inquiries leading up to the 1872 and 1875 Adulteration of Food Acts:

George Cadbury gave evidence to the Committee appointed to consider the working of the 1872 Act, and suggested that (as is now the custom.) the word Cocoa should be used only for unmixed preparations of the cacao bean, and that mixtures of cacao bean with sugar or other substances should be sold always under the name of chocolate.²⁵

Perhaps *Cadburys'* involvement in this movement for state intervention explains their later readiness to advocate legislative solutions to social problems which their own activities brought them into contact with, such as housing and minimum wages. The campaign for the Acts of 1872 and 1875 showed the need for the backing of State inspection "to enforce even a common honesty amongst a large section of business men."²⁶ The adulteration of foodstuffs was "one of the main points of contention" in the controversy over free trade at the time, and *Cadburys*, for reasons which can be explained entirely by self interest, found themselves in the camp advocating state intervention as opposed to the obstinate manufacturers who continued with adulteration and advocated the principles of *laissez-faire*.²⁷

For the "strenuous advertising campaign" extolling the virtues of the new pure Cocoa Essence to be successful, the firm was presumably bound to withdraw its own adulterated lines.²⁸ As one former "traveller" for the firm remembered it:

There had been a steady growth in trade up to Christmas, 1874, when a sweeping change took place. The tea and coffee trade was given up, and the Homeopathic, Rock, Iceland Moss, Breakfast, Pearl and Gem Cocoas were no longer sold - only pure Cocoa now being made. In 1875 there was a great increase in the sale of Cocoa Essence, Mexican and other Chocolates. In 1876 I more than doubled my turnover of 1875.²⁹

Bournville: A Purpose-Built Cocoa and Chocolate Factory

From the retrospective accounts it is difficult to assess the reasons for *Cadbury's* move from Bridge Street to Bournville. One thing is clear, however, by the 1870's *Cadbury's* had become primarily cocoa and chocolate manufacturers. They had moved into the Bridge Street Works when their activities included tea and coffee distribution and their premises were more suited to warehouse and packing activities. The new works at Bournville were designed specifically for cocoa and chocolate manufacturing. At Bridge Street, south facing windows had given trouble in the summer, but at Bournville, in a part of the factory "there were no windows, the reason being that, in hot weather, the direct rays of the sun can be extremely troublesome in a chocolate

factory"³⁰. The Bridge Street works "had a street frontage of 81 feet in length, and occupied about 1,200 superficial yards of land". It was a two-storey building, "on the ground floor of the factory were the store-house, the roasting ovens, the 'kibbling mill', and other machinery, while above was the packing room"³¹. The Bournville factory, as it was built in 1879, "was mainly a rectangular one-storey block", approximately 330 feet long and 150 feet wide, with other buildings projecting off of it. Roughly speaking then, the new factory at Bournville had something over twice as much floor space as there had been at Bridge Street (see figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3). Having bought initially 15 acres and acquired more of the open land around the factory subsequently, George and Richard were able to extend the works on the one site. "By 1889 the original area of buildings had been doubled, and about trebled by 1899".³² The expansion was reflected in the number employed. When the Bridge Street works closed the firm had employed about 230, this went up to just over 300 almost immediately after Bournville started working. An article in the *Works Magazine* in 1909 gave the employment figures for Bridge Street and Bournville (table 3.1).

Table 3.1³³: *Employment at Bridge Street and Bournville*

	1879 (Bridge Str)	1889 (Bournville)	1899
Men	66	300	601
Women	140	796	1885
Office, Travellers, etc.	24	97	199
Total	230	1193	2685

Philanthropic Reasons for Moving to Bournville

What is much less clear is the extent to which "the need for more ample accommodation for a growing business coincided with the development of certain ideas in the minds of Richard and George Cadbury". According to Williams they looked for a new site for the

factory in the country rather than in Birmingham for a combination of commercial and philanthropic reasons:

Figure 3.1 *Plan of Bridge Street (from T.B. Rogers p. 27)*,



Aston University

Illustration removed for copyright restrictions

Figure 3.2 *Plan of Bournville Works 1879 (from the BWM Oct. 1909*



Illustration removed for copyright restrictions

Figure 3.3 *Illustration of Bournville Works 1879 (from the BWM Oct 1909)*



They were not perhaps the first employers to take their factory out of the centre of the city, but they were probably the first to do so with so large a social element in the reasons which decided them upon the step; and even more important than the move itself was what it led up to - the experiments in factory organization, and in housing reform, which are associated with the name of Cadbury.³⁴

George Cadbury's biographer even went so far as to say that:

Even in its infancy the new factory and its surroundings contained the germ of all the ideas subsequently developed on so large and elaborate a scale.

Richard and George Cadbury,

saw with a clearness, rare in the industrial world of the time, that the efficiency of their business depended less upon machinery and methods than upon the human element engaged in it.³⁵

It is almost axiomatic for *Cadburys* that whatever they did, they did it before they read about it. But this is all part of the firm's own myth making; Bournville did not spring fully formed from George Cadbury's mind like a goddess from the head of a Greek god. What is needed is a brief assessment of the significance of Bournville, at the time when the factory was built. To accept the tenuous precedents for all the subsequent developments given by those associated with the firm would be to accept that Bournville had the same significance in 1879 as it had from the point of view of, say, 1931. On the face of it this seems pretty unlikely. A few aspects of the factory can be examined to throw some light on the subject.

Dining Facilities and Industrial Workbreaks

One of these is the provision of dining rooms for the workers at Bournville. Although the factory was purpose-built for cocoa and chocolate production, for the first few years there were no dining rooms for the employees, who "took their meals in certain of the workrooms, or, during fine weather, in the open air, the only actual dining-room being a small one set apart for the use of the partners".³⁶ The reminiscences of some of the employees who worked at the new factory give some idea of the conditions and how they got by:

We had some rough times to put up with ... We had to look after ourselves, and cooked our own dinners on a small gas contrivance. The 'large room', as we called it, answered the purpose of dining room and boxing room as well.

And another:

What is now the Bournville Cocoa Department and No.1 Moulding Room had to do duty for Order Room, Stock Room, Crème Making and Boxing, Card Box Making and Flour Room. / The morning meetings also had to be held in the same room, and it was used also by the girls as a dining room.

The room was heated by two large coke stoves, and in these the girls for some weeks had to warm up the dinners brought with them from home.

While the article in the *Works Magazine* described,

the old cottage which stood within the precincts of the Works for several years ... In the kitchen of this cottage the girls used to cook their dinner until a proper dining room was provided.²⁷

By 1886 there were 17,820 square feet given over to the extensive dining rooms and catering facilities, given the numbers working in the factory this gave ample provision for expansion. In fact the dining rooms were continually extended until in 1905 "*Cadburys* had the largest dining-halls of any industrial concern in England"²⁸. This suggests that developments such as the dining rooms were *precipitated* rather than *facilitated* by the move to Bournville. Richard Cadbury wrote a book which was obviously intended to publicise the "model" character of the Bournville Works. *Cocoa: All About It* was published in 1892 under the pseudonym "Historicus". The account of the catering suggests that it was the outcome of necessity as much as vision:

Owing to the comparatively isolated position of the Works, ample provision has to be made for all requirements as regards cooking. Spacious dining rooms have been provided separately on the premises for both men and women. Gas stoves and cooking apparatus have been erected, and hot dinners can be procured in a very few minutes. So complete are the cuisine arrangements that there is little delay in servicing all from the kitchen, which is constructed between the men's and women's dining rooms, which are quite distinct.²⁹

Richard Cadbury was obviously keen to draw attention to the "model" characteristics of the works in terms of what constituted a "model" factory at the time he was writing, e.g., the separation of men and women. It should be noted that *Cadburys'* products were themselves part of "the modernization of eating habits and diet" which facilitated the development of industrial catering. Products like chocolate and cocoa played a part in the development of,

the industrial work break, instituted in the last years of the 19th century, and hastened by the industrial canteens pioneered by producers of foods made from tropical commodities, where tea, coffee, cocoa, biscuits, and candy could be had inexpensively. Prepared foods, in other words, accompany the increasing frequency of meals taken outside the home and outside the familial context.⁴⁰

Although it is only one aspect of the firm's history this development of industrial catering illustrates the point that *Cadburys* was part of the "social revolution" that Wilson has "discerned in late Victorian Britain". There is no reason to suppose that George or Richard Cadbury could have foreseen the self-reinforcing process which would lead to the growth of their firm. Much less important, perhaps, than retailing, industrial catering was connected with the mass manufacture of foodstuffs, and it would be fair to say that, as with retailing changes and mass manufacture; "each indeed was a function of the other".⁴¹

Temperance and Bournville

One reason for *Cadburys'* keenness to provide dining rooms was probably temperance. In the mid-19th century catering facilities for workers outside the home centred on the public house. In the 1870s "temperance catering" was taking off throughout the country, this grew from a realisation on the part of temperance reformers that there were practical ways in which they could mitigate the drink problem. Working class habits and expectations were changing, living standards were rising and commuting was developing on a large scale:

Instead of carrying their lunch to work and eating it in a public-house, working men began to buy hot meals at mid-day.⁴²

From the outset Bournville was seen as a "cocoa community, removed from the smoke and vices and drinking temptations" of Birmingham. *Cadburys* could advertise their cocoa not only as "an auxiliary to the temperance cause" but as emanating from a "picturesque prohibitory village"⁴³. The idea of what constituted a "model" factory changed over time, when *Cadburys* first moved to Bournville the temperance aspect was important, but later, although the firm still enforced the prohibition rules in relation to the Works and the village, this was not so important for advertising purposes.

Cadburys and other Chocolate and Cocoa Manufacturers

There would have been an awareness at *Cadburys* of the developments taking place at other cocoa and chocolate factories with which they had to compete. That would indicate that *Cadburys* were not out of the ordinary in building a new factory. For example, in a brief survey of the activities of other cocoa and chocolate manufacturers between about 1857 to 1890, James Epps and Co., Homeopathic Chemists, London, are mentioned. This firm,

obtained considerable publicity for the extent and complexity of their premises. The buildings and equipment (erected in 1878) were described in engineering papers. The fact that cloak rooms were established in every floor was noted with approval as a time saver ... A canteen was provided. Girls were said to be able to earn £1 a week weighing and packing (1500 packets a day).⁴⁴

"Historicus" could match this:

Bournville is certainly a model factory, both for its size and its completeness, and because it contains most modern improvements in the application of machinery for the manufacture of Cocoa and Chocolate ... Messrs. Cadbury have built 16 semi-detached villa residences, which are inhabited by their most prominent hands.

He described the process by which "the well-known and absolutely pure Cocoa essence, for which the firm is so celebrated" was made before stating:

that the most excellent system of payment is adopted, by results. At this factory almost all the employees are engaged in what is known as piece-work, which is satisfactory alike to the firm and to the hands. The system has, we understand, worked well, and the work-people, both male and female, are well satisfied with the manner in which they are treated, and we were gratified to be assured more than once how fortunate it was deemed to be employed at Bournville. This good feeling between employer and employed is of almost inestimable value, both socially and commercially ... If all manufacturers would make the interests and happiness of their employés a part of their business, it would add to their prosperity and do something to solve the important problem of labour by cementing the friendship of masters and workpeople.⁴⁵

It is obvious from these two accounts that for one thing *Cadburys* was not way ahead of the English competition, the firm was only just behind Epps in having a new purpose-built factory. For another, it was important for *Cadburys* to establish their "model" character, not just in terms of manufacturing but also for their treatment of workers.

This was probably in part due to the reputation of the French firm, *Menier*. *Cadburys* were keen to use French nomenclature, as were a number of English firms; the name "Bournville" was decided on for the new factory "because it had a French sound, and French chocolate was then looked upon as the best".⁴⁶ *Cadburys* were obviously aware of the competition and *Menier* were noted as:

Very extensive advertisers, with particular reference to the extent and complexity of their factories, also their working conditions and 'welfare work' at Noisiel (3,000 employees). Issued booklets about cocoa and choc. in 1857 and about 1878...

Menier established his London factory in 1870, and obtained numerous descriptive 'write-ups' in trade papers. Trade increased in U.K. from 1 ton p.a. in 1862 to 800 tons in 1879.⁴⁷

"Historicus" was obviously trying to counter the claims of *Cadburys'* rivals. The *Menier* brothers were somewhat ahead of *Cadburys* in their development of an "attractive cite" at the Chocolate *Menier* Works at Noisiel (Seine-et-Marne). Since 1874 they had been building solid brick houses for their workers. By 1899 there were 295 tenements,

mostly two to a house. "sheltering 1,400 persons out of a force of 2,100...

The Menier brothers are content with a small return ... but they do not sell their houses, in order to keep out undesirable persons. They reduce rents according to fixed scale after ten years' occupancy (the oldest workmen thus pay no rent), and the stability of the force is high.⁴³

Noisiel may have been well established before Bournville was developed, but it was built in the tradition of the 19th century community-builders, whereas Bournville Village represented something quite different⁴⁴. Gilman's description hints at *Menier's* involvement in the daily lives of their workers:

Around a central square are situated the various institutions maintained by the firm. A general store supplies all the necessaries of life - provisions, dry goods, firewood, etc. - at cost, the firm baking bread, and furnishing meat from cattle raised on its farms ... In large refectories employees from outside the *cité* can warm the food they bring with them. Restaurants and 'canteens' supply board and lodging at low prices fixed by the firm.⁴⁵

Nineteenth Century Community Builders

There was a well-established tradition of community-building in 19th century Britain, but it went through several phases, and the motives of individual community-builders were different at any one time. In the early part of the century wealthy landowners created "Picturesque" villages. Following the example of Blaise, near Bristol, built in 1810 by the Quaker banker John Scandrett Harford:

Unsuspecting villagers in different corners of England were being herded into pattern book hamlets to fulfil the aesthetic or philanthropic dreams of their landlords.

At the same time the Industrial Revolution meant that housing for workers had to be considered. Although early on industrial housing did not represent any revolution in terms of architecture or planning and so conferred little prestige on the capitalists in aesthetically aware circles, it did represent "a more important step forward, the first flickering evidence of humanitarian concern". Industrial housing was

provided out of necessity first of all, but with a variety of other motives and of course the retrospective accounts obscure the original intentions, so that Darley is right to pose the question:

It is hard to disentangle the motives of the early industrialist who provided better housing and facilities for his workers - if he was merely concerned with expediency why was he so rare?⁵¹

When an employer decided to set up a large works in the open country, especially in sparsely populated areas like Scotland, "the decision ... was taken to be synonymous with the need for new housing". The scale of these enterprises meant that they were bound to assume a wider social significance, "the total environment was under the control of a single employer," and so

The management of the housing property gave the villages their character and was usually symbolic of the employers attitude to his workmen in general.⁵²

So, although it is true, for example, that in the 1760s the Quaker firm at Coalbrookdale, "was obliged to build extensively in order to provide housing for the incoming workers"⁵³, it was equally true that the provision of housing, in itself at that time, constituted an experiment in social welfare.⁵⁴ It should be remembered then that expediency at this time necessitated experiment, and that, "It took very little to better the average state of affairs and people regarded as particularly enlightened employers [who] were building cottages in the late 18th century that were only reaching a minimum standard"⁵⁵. These villages were on the whole run along very paternalistic lines, this was a time when the employers were trying to deal with workers' morality and to "reform the whole man"⁵⁶. The relationship in the villages reflected the relations at work, "leisure no less than work was under paternalistic control"⁵⁷. Employers could not resist the temptation to go "far beyond benevolent paternalism" and even "the enlightened Non-Conformist element in employers were liable to have managers who drilled holes in the shutters to observe which workers stayed up late"⁵⁸.

The process of urbanization gathered momentum during the 19th century, "Townsmen outnumbered countrymen for the first time in 1851",

but the British city "remained an appalling place to live in ... because urban and industrial expansion still outstripped the spontaneous or planned attempts at urban improvement"⁵⁹. As well as the terrible conditions "the town was becoming beleaguered by working class discontent", with the Chartist agitation and revolutions in Europe in the 1840s, the poor were seen as a threat.⁶⁰ A limited response on the part of capitalists was to build "model communities", there was an element of competition among some industrialists, especially those in Yorkshire who had family connections with each other, to establish these "model villages", which they built:

quite simply to reflect their sponsor's notions of what industrial society should be like. They usually represented a substantial improvement in environment standards, but there was no question of challenging the existing systems of society. On the contrary ... They were paragons of capitalist industrial society - conscious attempts to re-establish the assured harmony of village life in an industrial setting, this time with the factory and mine-owner usurping the role of the feudal landlord.⁶¹

These "communities" and their creators were easily identified, examples are, Sir Titus Salt and Saltaine, founded in 1850 and largely built by the mid-1860s, this is perhaps the best known; also in Yorkshire were Copley and Akroyden, both built by textile industrialists, Colonel Edward Ackroyd and the Crossleys, although these are both suburbs of Halifax in effect.

Each one can be said to have been ahead of its time in one way or another. For example, Bromborough Pool was started in 1853 by the Wilson brothers, the proprietors of *Price's* candle factory. The factory was moved out of London to a site near Liverpool, and close to where Port Sunlight was to be built, and in contrast to Saltaine which was still "strictly speaking back-to-back", the plain cottages were each provided with gardens at the front and rear as well as having "water-borne sanitation at a time when the pail or cesspit was the usual form of sanitation"⁶².

Whether or not this or that "model village" was more or less advanced, or was created by a combination of "enlightenment" or expediency in greater or lesser proportions:

In the mid-19th century there was still a very deep gulf stretching between the wordy utopias of the idealists and the conscientious employer who made some attempts at building a satisfactory community for his workmen.⁶³

Even so, it is hard to agree that the "alternative communities" which proliferated in the 19th century, or the even larger number of manifestoes for them, were "inspired by ideologies opposed to the established order"⁶³. Like the earlier schemes proposed by Robert Owen the later utopian theorists needed to attract the support of private capital in one way or another and the debts entailed often led to their downfall.⁶⁴ Most of these utopians plagiarised Owen and his followers, although often adding a religious twist of their own. For example, one former Owenite who planned to set up a self-supporting agricultural community for 300 families was John Minter Morgan. For all his claims to social justice he showed himself to be "something of a social reactionary...

the Model Institution "neither interferes with the distinction of class or of wealth...the families of the aristocracy and of the shareholders would have any opportunity of visiting and advancing the schools composed of children assembled in better order and more susceptible of improvement."⁶⁵

Quakers had long been attached to various community projects. Robert Owen acknowledged the influence on his ideas of John Bellers, the Quaker who proposed a national network of "colleges of industry" at the end of the 17th century. Then there was William Allen, a Quaker who set up a small self supporting small-holding community at Lindfield in Sussex. He had started fundraising in 1823, and by 1831 there were 25 cottages, a school and workshops. This was one of the earliest models for the tradition of charitable "home colonies" set up during the 19th century. However, Quaker settlements during the 19th century "were more akin to model villages than to alternative communities," and Joseph Pease, the Quaker who developed Middlesborough, was "relatively unmarked by the great wave of utopian community planning".⁶⁶ It is not surprising then, especially given their temperance sympathies, that in 1849 John and Benjamin Cadbury gave their firm's backing to a "Model Parish Mission", whose object was to establish a parish without

drinking facilities, and having "Model Schools, Villas, Cottages, Farms, Allotments and Factory." *Cadburys* were to donate the profits from the sale of "Model Parish Cocoa", which they manufactured. This does not make them remarkable, but again it provided a convenient precedent, to be cited much later by the firm's historian.⁶⁷

In fact it was not till the 1880s, "long after the great era of the factory village" that utopianism and industrial housing schemes came together, for example in the Society for Promoting Industrial Villages, set up in 1883 by several prominent Victorians including the Congregational M.P. Walter Hazell, of the Aylesbury Printing firm, although this was largely idealistic and produced no positive results.⁶⁸

Port Sunlight

Lever's Port Sunlight was more in line with the 19th century community builders, it was the result of "the meeting of.. two streams of thought - profit sharing and housing reform." The first plans were drawn up in 1888, and were completed by 1890. In 1898 there were 278, and by 1901, "720 houses, about 700 of which were occupied by Lever's employees." Lever was influenced by European developments, and he made a number of visits to Agneta Park, a Dutch village established in 1883 by Van Marken, a yeast manufacturer and prominent social reformer.⁶⁹ At Port Sunlight, however:

Despotism - or at any rate heavy paternalism - made its appearance at many points...Radical Liberal though he was, Lever found it hard to avoid the temptation to create a kind of twentieth century feudalism of his own.

Rents were not low, and the financial basis of the "dictatorial benevolence" was the expenditure on "the interest payable on the capital which it had taken to build the village", and the income from the interest on capital contributed by *Lever Brothers* "towards the sharing of prosperity."⁷⁰

Lever's attempt to "exonerate capitalism" contrasted with the later development of Bournville:

Like a possessive parent, Lever could not, as Cadbury was able, leave the village he had founded any measure of independence.⁷⁰

In part, this might be explained by the different characters of the two industrialists, but also important was the changed context in which Bournville took shape. Lever later on associated himself with the Garden City movement, but when he set up Port Sunlight his vision was still very much that of the 19th century paternalist community builder. The firm's historian, Charles Wilson, was hard put to defend Lever:

criticism was inevitable. Lever had himself, with the best of intentions, created his own dilemma. If he did nothing for his workpeople, he ranked himself with the most backward of employers; if he contributed to their welfare, it seemed that his contribution was doomed to be regarded as salesmanship...it was not only his opponents who made the criticism,⁷²

but also staunch admirers. Other comments have been less generous.

no one in Port Sunlight can forget, as they spend their money, from whence it came - no doubt, just as the first Lord Leverhulme would wish...Lever is capitalism enlightened strictly in its own interest. The higher management come to stay.

Bournville And Utopianism

It was not just "the vaguely William Morris indulgence" of George Cadbury that allowed him to avoid such harsh criticism. By the time the Bournville village came into being there was a strand of utopian thought which could be readily identified with it, and what is perhaps most important, there was a way of setting up such a village which would free the village from the dictates of the founder, be he or she a capitalist or communitarian⁷³

As Ebenezer Howard himself pointed out in *Garden Cities Of Tomorrow*, the only difference between his own and other proposals for land reform was

not a difference of system, but a difference (and a very important one) as to the *method* of its inauguration...it

is proposed to purchase the necessary land with which to establish the system on a small scale, and to trust to the inherent advantages of the system leading to its gradual adoption.

The method favoured by Howard was the setting up of a trust:

The estate is legally vested in the names of four gentlemen of responsible position and of undoubted probity and honour, who hold it in trust, first, as a security for the debenture holders, and, secondly, in trust for the people of Garden City.⁷⁴

These ideas must have gelled with George Cadbury's. Whether or not the plans for a village were made in 1893, or whether such a venture was in George and Richard's minds when they moved the factory to Bournville,⁷⁵ does not really matter. What is more important is that George Cadbury was in a position to adopt, or at least adapt to, various elements of Howard's scheme. George Cadbury's estrangement from Birmingham Town Council may in part explain the decision to embark on a building programme at Bournville. He had been a member of the Council for a year or so after being elected in 1878, but "he was not at home in the atmosphere of public discussion." Even so, he was a strong supporter of Joseph Chamberlain, until Chamberlain left the Liberal Party over Home Rule in 1886, after which the Cadburys and Tangyes became more isolated. The famous "civic gospel" did not extend to municipal house building for the working class. The council was dominated by entrepreneurs who opposed any subsidy for housing, and in 1889 it was decided that "since unsubsidised houses...were not economically feasible, none would be built at all." The entrepreneur councillors favoured flats, a solution "opposed by all types of Birmingham workers". So, with Birmingham expanding and with the Bournville factory itself a centre of attraction for builders, if George Cadbury was to make a contribution to housing, he would have to do it himself.

In 1893, 120 acres were bought and the next year building began. Initially 143 houses were built and sold at cost price on 999 year leases, and with the mortgages which were made available by the firm, it has been said that they were "well within the ability of the thrifty

workman" to afford. Not all the leaseholders were *Cadburys* employees, and some were obviously a bit too thrifty, selling up and making profits of over 30% in 3 years. This was not the intention, and so George Cadbury "decided to turn the Bournville Building Estate into a Charitable Trust." The Bournville Village Trust was formed on December 14th, 1900. The present B.V.T. Community and Information Officer says:

It is difficult to say precisely when the concept of a Building Estate developed into that of a Garden Village, but all evidence points to the period just before the Trust was founded in December, 1900.⁷⁷

Ebenezer Howard and Bournville

This seems likely. Howard's book was first published in October 1898 under the title *Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path To Real Reform*, setting out a blueprint for a "Garden City". In the summer of 1899 the Garden City Association was formed, and Howard was giving lectures with lantern slides to publicise his ideas.⁷⁸ One of the principal reasons for employers' housing ventures has probably always been "to satisfy a humanitarian urge, which is sometimes vague and sentimental".⁷⁹ Now there was a Utopian scheme with which employers could identify their ventures, and Bournville was just at the right stage of development for that to be done. Although Howard's proposals were the culmination of various ideas which had been around for some years and gathered together various elements of earlier ideal schemes, his real contribution was not in the details of actual town building but in setting out an idea for reform which would appeal to employers in a position to implement it. He was able to inspire "practical..eminent" men not only with his "ardent enthusiasm" but by keeping to principles which would appeal to them, "a new idea":

The idea is nothing less than a vision of a transformed English industrial civilisation. No revolution has taken place...The ordinary machinery of Parliament is adequate to give the enabling powers necessary. There is no antagonism to any class. Landlords are not regarded as worse than any other people. There is no "waiting till some party is in power". No abolition of anything in

particular except slum dwellings and overcrowded industrial districts, and these disappear like a dissolving view.⁸⁰

Howard was "a realist as well as a utopian", "a practical idealist". He accepted the inevitable modifications that soliciting allies entails, and "the process of winning support exerted an important influence on the meaning of the Garden City."⁸¹ He identified himself with Blatchford's *Merrie England* while at the same time distancing himself from Blatchford's autarchy, (p.133). He made it clear that his ideal was not the same as the Socialist, "to make society the owner of land *and of all instruments of production*," (p.135). *Garden Cities* reads as if it was written to allay the fears and secure the support of capitalists:

No reader will confuse the experiment here advocated with any experiment in absolute communism. Nor is the scheme to be regarded as a socialistic experiment.. (p.114)
..the chief difference between the scheme advocated in this work and most other schemes of a like nature which have been hitherto advocated or put into actual practice...is this: while others have sought to weld into one large organization individuals who have not yet been combined into smaller groups on their joining the larger organizations, my proposal appeals not only to individuals but to cooperators, manufacturers, philanthropic societies, and others experienced in organization, and with organizations under their control, to come and place themselves under conditions involving no new restraints but rather securing wider freedom." (p. 116)

In other words, although he was asking for their support, he was not telling businessmen how to run their businesses. His utopia was essentially confined to town planning, and for this reason he was able, unlike a whole string of 19th century would-be reformers from Owen onwards to secure the support of a few progressively minded capitalists. In fact his scheme could have been tailor-made to appeal to George Cadbury. Howard "was as much concerned for free enterprise as for social control",⁸² and to find a middle way between the "two directly conflicting views" of the socialist and the "individualist". Then, of course, there was his advocacy of temperance reform, and he noted approvingly in the 1902 edition of his book the "complete

restriction" of the drink trade in the Deed of Foundation of the B.V.T.³³

Setting up the Bournville Village Trust

Setting up a Trust allowed Bournville Village to be separated from the firm. Employers at the time were realizing the advantages of trusts for administering pension schemes³⁴. So, although George Cadbury's gift to the BVT, (consisting of 500 acres including the village of 370 houses, 143 paying ground rent and 227 to let to weekly tenants) was absolute, and he surrendered all private interest in the estate, he retained *de facto* control. The first nine Trustees were all members of the Cadbury family, with George as chairman, succeeded by his widow when he died in 1922. Later on Trustees were appointed from the City of Birmingham, The Society of Friends and the University of Birmingham. The separation of firm and the BVT has always been important to the latter's identity:

The Trust has always been quite separate to the Firm that is so close on its doorstep. Although ... George Cadbury was the chairman of the Trustees, and also Chairman of Cadbury Bros., he always kept the two, sometimes conflicting, interests separate; something which his descendants continue to do today.³⁵

Certainly George Cadbury, unlike Lever, "resisted (the) temptation ... to become a kind of feudal magnate at Bournville", but it was Howard and the Garden City movement who supplied the means for him to do so. The nominal independence of the Trust was part of the democratic vision with which it was identified, and George Cadbury could be credited with introducing democratic government when he set up the Village Council.³⁶ The original idea for "a community of small owner-occupiers"³⁷ might have developed into a pleasant enough environment surrounding the works, but it would have been completely independent of the firm, *Cadburys* would have had little say about who lived there, so it could not have been claimed as any real benefit for the workforce. If the properties were sold at market values there would have been no guarantee that workers could afford them, and it

would have been difficult to deny any financial gain from the venture, and George was quite vehement about this in relation to the B.V.T.:

To say that I derive an income from the Bournville Trust is to accuse me of dishonesty to the public, and I hereby give notice that I will prosecute any person whom I find making such a statement in the future.²⁸

On the other hand, since the firm itself did not directly control the Estate and not all the tenants were employees, the venture avoided the stigma of a company town where the houses are tied and used for overt control of workers, "who are treated, in effect, like irresponsible children."²⁹ It was not as if company housing of this sort was disappearing at the turn of the century³⁰

Bournville and the Garden City Idea

Ebenezer Howard "utilized the widespread interest in his idea to gather support for the planning and building of an experimental Garden City."³¹ In May, 1900, the Garden City Association formed a company, Garden City Limited, and George Cadbury bought shares which he gave to the B.V.T. as part of the endowment. In 1902, the Garden City Pioneer company was registered with a view to setting up Garden Cities in Britain; Ebenezer Howard became one of the Directors, along with Edward Cadbury, who was authorised to do so by the *Cadburys* board. The next year the site for Letchworth Garden City was purchased. The first conference of the Garden City Association was held at Bournville in September, 1901. 1500 officials concerned with urban problems attended. "The Bournville conference won the Garden City a place in British town planning discussions which it never lost. Flanked by Cadbury and Lever on the platform, Howard could allow himself a measure of triumph." (The second conference, in 1902, was held at Port Sunlight.)³²

The Cadburys as individuals gave their generous support to Howard and the Garden City movement, and Bournville may have anticipated in some ways and given an impetus to the venture at Letchworth, but there was a symbiotic relationship between Cadburys and the movement. George Cadburys biographer conceded that:

Even the gift of Bournville Village - an independent act on the part of George Cadbury, and designed for public purposes - was not without a collateral influence on the business: the jerry-builder was kept at a distance; the home conditions of the workers were maintained at the highest possible level; and the firm could claim that it owned "a factory in a garden".³³

But this does not quite explain why the village was such an asset. Even though the firm was financially separate, there had to be some relationship expressed between the factory and the village, and between the village and the wider Garden City movement. According to one of the ex-Bridge Street worker's reminiscences:

It was always the ardent desire of the heads of the firm to take the workpeople out of the town, and to build "a factory in a garden."³⁴

However, there is no mention of that term by "Historicus", although Richard Cadbury did allude to a rural idyll and to garden imagery, referring to Bournville as "the aptly named "Worcestershire Eden"... a happy and busy scene of labour."³⁵ The wide use of the word "garden" in relation to the works seems to have originated with the Board's decision in July 1901 to order 1/4 million copies of a pamphlet called *The Factory in a Garden*. These cost the firm 3d each and were distributed free to visitors.³⁶ It may not be that significant, but *Cadburys*, the firm, had a publication out with the word "garden" in the title before Howard's book was re-issued with the title *Garden Cities*. If, in the idea of *Garden Cities*, "factories... have become slightly buildings standing in gardens",³⁷ then this must be due, in a large part, to the efforts of *Cadburys*. Howard himself had little to say about the design of factories, except that they should be built on specially allocated areas. It seems churlish, therefore, to suggest that Bournville represents a corruption of Howard's utopian model. "the term *garden* has led to misinterpretation", it is true, but that is not to say that there is only one interpretation. If,

Howard revealed his originality... in the creation of true, complete, urban units in which all forms of human activity should be represented,

then Bournville falls short of the requirements on several counts. But it never was merely a "workers colony", the legal form, the trust, and the ongoing concern to achieve a social mix on the estate are elements which were incorporated from the Garden City idea. In fact, Howard's originality was in securing the support of those, like George Cadbury, who could give the movement sufficient backing to make it a reality. Part of that support consisted in incorporating some aspects of the Garden City in the development of Bournville. Howard did not protest against the trend for the Garden City to become a planning movement. It seems unreasonable, therefore, for the utopians to claim the franchise on interpreting the significance of the word "garden", but then, "Nothing is more discouraging to any idealistic movement than partial success."³⁰

George Cadbury Junior, Town Planning and Garden Cities

Not surprisingly, George Cadbury Junior's book on *Town planning* is at variance with Howard's more utopian followers on most points concerning terminology. For example, Osborn says:

Howard, who chose the term (Garden City), as meaning as much a city in a garden - that is, surrounded by beautiful country - as a city of gardens.

And:

It is misleading, though good authorities have been guilty of the practice, to describe a Garden Suburb as a suburb "laid out on Garden City lines"...However well planned, such a place is wrongly called a Garden City...Garden Village has been used as a name for a small settlement containing a factory and an associated openly planned housing estate; it should not, however, be used generically for such settlements if in a suburban situation.³¹

Whereas for George Cadbury Junior:

The terms "Garden City" and "Garden Suburb", now in general use, are employed to convey what is a comparatively new departure in Housing and Town Development schemes - viz. the provision of houses with their own gardens attached. (P.113)

Elsewhere he compares houses at the same rent in Bournville and neighbouring Stirchley, and concludes:

It cannot be denied that all the advantage lies with the Garden City development. (P12)

That George Cadbury Junior counted Letchworth, Hampstead, Harbone, Port Sunlight, Earswick and Hull as part of the Garden City movement, (P.29), did not mean that he had lost sight of the distinction between a suburb, like Bournville, and an "attempt to deal with the town as a whole", as at Letchworth(P.20). Nor did he lose sight of the utopian element in the Garden City movement, albeit that his vision of the future was a fusion of Kropotkin and various trends, especially technological, which he identified as already taking place. (Pp 151 - 152). In his earlier book, *The Land and the Landless*, he quoted Kropotkin with approval on the need to disperse industry into the countryside. Perhaps in 1908 Bournville could still be seen as part of such a process. As a concerned capitalist, as opposed to an arcane architect, he was able to identify force for change which might not wait for the laying out of the definitive Garden City, Garden Village, Satellite Town or Green Belt:

Undoubtedly at the present time, (he was writing in 1914), a large factor in the Labour Unrest is the desire of the masses of the working classes to obtain the means to live a proper life for both themselves and their families. One aspect of this unrest is their dissatisfaction with their present housing conditions...they see little improvement in the vast acres of suburbs growing up round the cities...no possibility of getting away from the dull monotony of the streets, and no chance for their children to get the freer air of more countrified surroundings... (P.14)

This undoubtedly is the force which lies behind the demand for Town Planning, and unless Town Planning schemes meet this demand in a generous spirit, providing amply for the unsatisfied longing, they will be doomed to failure.

It seems ironic that in a city later blighted by disastrous tower blocks, George Cadbury Junior, an apologist for a major private housing venture within the boundaries of Birmingham, and a member of the City Council Town Planning Committee could have observed as long ago as 1914 that:

One of the most important factors which differentiates the question of Town Planning in England from that of

other places is the Englishman's desire for a house - a home, and not a tenement.¹⁰⁰

Of course Bournville would be identified with whatever ideas were in vogue if this were at all possible. George Cadbury Junior advocated municipal town planning and supported the Town Planning Act of 1909, although he did not think it went far enough in granting power to municipalities. Needless to say, he thought of Bournville as "a Town-Planned area".¹⁰¹ In fact it is fair to say that Bournville is significantly similar to the subsequent Garden City and municipal housing ventures of the inter-war period. Where previous housing developments had often provided "kitchen gardens" in the form of allotments¹⁰², at Bournville the emphasis was on providing "the modern house-and-garden", anticipating the "standard that characterised the vast British building effort of the inter-war years."¹⁰³

Bournville's architect explained George Cadbury's thinking behind the provision for the factory worker to "pursue the most natural and healthful of all recreations, that of gardening...

the working man on the land...instead of his losing money in the amusements usually sought in the towns, he saved it in his garden produce - a great consideration where the poorer class of workman was concerned.¹⁰⁴

This Puritan rationalisation for a pastime was amplified by George Cadbury Junior:

Allotments are often at a little distance away, and a definite effort has to be made to visit them. The natural place for a garden is round the house itself, and this permits of odd moments being usefully employed therein which might otherwise be wasted. (P.114)

He used evidence from a group of entrants in the Bournville Gardeners' Association competition to confirm that "gardens give a very much higher yield than any other form of land cultivation ... That this means increased wealth cannot be gainsaid."¹⁰⁵ Although tenants' gardens were not controlled by the firm's management, as at Port Sunlight, it is obvious that this Puritan attitude to recreation would have a paternalistic aspect to it. In 1905 it was reported that there were gardening classes and,

It is a condition of tenancy that gardens shall be properly kept, but only two have had notice to leave on this account.¹⁰⁶

The Planning of Bournville Village

Bournville was spared the grid, not only thanks to George Cadbury's rural vision and his flexibility, but because he had the sense to leave the layout essentially to an architect who realised that the "method should not be too obtrusive or the arrangement too mechanical", and that the "gridiron" should be avoided¹⁰⁷. If Howard's writings expressed a contemporary "reaction against suburbia...in a romanticism which accorded in no way with the realities of village or rural life", and Sir Raymond Unwin, one of Letchworth's architects "acknowledged a debt to pre-industrial patterns in his aesthetic treatment of space¹⁰⁸", then Bournville too was seen by its architect as representing a pre-industrial rural idyll:

One of the objects of the Garden Suburb, as it is called, is the amalgamation of all classes in the same district, the artisan and the well-to-do living in reasonable proximity to one another. With the abolition of the unsightly row, the aesthetic objection at least to such an arrangement is removed, for in the interesting disposition of houses of varying sizes lies one of the secrets of beautiful village buildings, as is testified in so many well known old villages.

George Cadbury Junior shared this romanticism to some extent, believing that:

One of the pressing problems of the day is the revival of English rural life. It is essential both to individual and national well-being that the English people should be brought into closer relationship with English land.

However, he recognised that:

The chief, the persistent cause of the alienation of the people from the land is to be found in the development of modern manufactures and commerce involving the complete re-organisation of society.¹¹⁰

It is not surprising, therefore, that "the actual houses of Bournville ...are neither genuinely rural, nor, of course, handsomely urban." The houses are intended for "Birmingham workingmen", so if the

style of the cottages is "what most people would draw if asked to draw a house"¹¹¹, that would seem to indicate that the architect, Harvey, succeeded in his own terms:

What will have to be provided are *homes*, and it should clearly be recognised what constitutes the *home* demanded by the large section of the community which the [housing] problem affects. (P.4)

If Bournville was to fulfil George Cadbury's "abstract desire to give an object lesson in housing", the rents would have to be economic so that it was clear that the venture was not one of charity¹¹². To this end Harvey explained:

Economy of construction has been the main object in the design, without sacrificing that pleasant environment, privacy and homeliness of appearance which are ... essential to the cottage house. (p. 17)

The drive for economy, combined with a desire to provide up-to-date conveniences, did lead to at least one amusing development. The desire to supply all cottages, however small, with a bath, meant that in many houses the bath was placed in the kitchen. One of these ingenious ways to accommodate the bath in the kitchen was "the Patent Adjustable Cabinet Bath ...

In this arrangement the bath is hinged at the bottom of one end in order that it may be easily lowered from and raised back into the cabinet, where in its vertical position it is no inconvenience when not in use.¹¹³

These aberrations aside, the houses are, today, "the sort of well-built, undistinguished family houses that delight building societies and estate agents"¹¹⁴. This may seem a condemnation, but it hides the real success of Bournville. It was never intended solely for *Cadburys'* workers and the Trust has tried to retain a social mix on the Estate over the years, being more or less successful in successive developments. In the 1980's the unconscious racism of the Trust's outdated housing allocation policy for tenants has come to light and been acted upon.¹¹⁵ The beauty of Bournville, aesthetics aside, is that it can be identified with *Cadburys* more or less to suit the

particular end in mind. To identify the firm closely with the Village, the ideals of the founder of the Trust, who was also the Chairman of the firm, are invoked. To distance the Village from the firm, the independence of the Trust is stressed. Bournville is today, and it seems it always has been, a desirable place to live. Middle-class suburbanites are keen to foster a spirit of community. Fêtes, accommodated on *Cadburys* land, reproduce a tame and anaesthetised vision of pre-industrial village life. Where today the myth alludes to life in the village earlier in the century, the earlier myths obviously had to allude to the nonexistent harmonious pre-industrial village. Bournville has a feeling of continuity, of tradition, of community. There is a constant reference to the past, but in reality it is a nostalgia for an age yet to come. This has continued because *Cadburys* have not intervened in a heavy handed way to impose the firm's vision of what village life should be like.

The subtle obscurity of the connection between *Cadburys* and Bournville has blinded the apologists for both and confounded critics of either. For example, J.B. Priestley, on his *English Journey*, accepted the claims that the B.V.T. was separate:

There are a good many things to be said about Bournville, the village. The first is that it has nothing whatever to do with the firm of Cadbury Bros. Ltd. This came as a surprise to me - as I had always thought that the firm built the village for its workpeople, on a sort of patriarchal employers' scheme. Nothing of the kind.

But this meant that he did not develop any understanding of the relationship between the firm and the village, and his doubts about *Cadburys'* benevolence and paternalism were not linked to the village. He clearly felt that the factory could be oppressive, taking over people's lives:

Once you have joined the staff of this firm, you need never wander out of its shadow.'''

But having hived off the village, he did not discuss how the firm's shadow might have affected Bournville, and especially those workers for

whom his observation was particularly apt, who both worked in the factory and lived in the village.

Cadbury Workers And Bournville Village

The subtle obscurity of the relationship between *Cadburys* and Bournville Village can be examined in a variety of ways, but most important must be the number of *Cadburys'* workers housed in the village and the proportion of residents who were employed at the Works. Unfortunately exact figures are not available, this in itself being a manifestation of the independence of the Trust, which has not kept detailed records of where residents worked. The writings by those associated with *Cadburys* all make the point that the houses were not exclusively provided for employees at the works. These are misleading because all of them up until 1923 used the figures from a private census taken in 1901 and quoted in a Village Trust booklet at the time. The proportions given then were likely to have changed in 20 years, during which time the Village had expanded considerably. According to these figures 41.2% worked in Bournville, presumably its *Cadburys'* workers; the householders' occupations were given but not the work done by those employed by *Cadburys* (table 3.2).

Table 3.2 *Occupations of Householders in Bournville 1901*¹⁷.

Employed at indoor work in factories	50.7%
Clerks and Travellers	13.3%
Mechanics, carpenters, bricklayers, and various occupations not admitting of exact classification	36.0%

Figures in the *Board File* give a more accurate picture for the year 1904 (tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). An examination of these figures shows that even if all those aged 13 and over were working, not more than 800 could have been employed at *Cadburys*, and this is very unlikely because the firm did not employ married women, so a certain proportion of adults must have been housewives who were not working. There does not appear to have been any housing suitable for single women in the village at this time, so apart from the daughters in some

Table 3.3 *Population of Bournville in 1904*

Percentages of a total population of 2,641:

Adults	61,9%
Young Persons (13-17)	8,6%
School Child (5-13)	19,3%
Infants	10,2%
Average number per house	4,75

Table 3.4 *Districts in Which Bournville Householders were Employed in 1904.*

Bournville	44,4%
Birmingham	38,1%
Selly Oak	33,3%
King's Norton	4,2%

Table 3.5 *Status of Housing in Bournville, 1904* ¹¹⁵

Number of houses built or in course of erection = 589

Lease 999 years	128
Let on rent (belonging to or administered by B,V,T,)	366
Cadbury Bros, Ltd	24
Endowment Houses	38
Alms Houses	33

households, most of the female workforce must have come from outside the village. In 1904 there were 3,784 workers at *Cadburys*, 2,394 of them were women. Early on the rents in the village were thought to be high, so it appears that only a fraction of the *Cadburys'* workforce could be housed on the estate. What ever "object lesson " Bournville presented to the world, *Cadburys* still had to rely on a workforce, especially a female workforce, housed in less salubrious surroundings. By 1912 the population of Bournville was about 4,300¹¹⁶ and the

workforce at *Cadburys* was 6,458; ten years later the estate population was about 5,500¹²⁰ and the workforce over 9,000. If the proportions of householders working at *Cadburys* had stayed roughly the same, it would still mean that only a fraction of the workforce was housed in Bournville. Realistically, the best way for one of the single women working at the factory to either stay in Bournville or move onto the estate would have been to marry one of the better paid men in the works.

One of the virtues Bournville claimed was that unlike earlier 19th century industrial settlements it was not a hermetically sealed village entirely dependent on one factory and its proprietor. This was undoubtedly true, and in line with the new vision of what a "garden" village should be like. It was also fortuitous for *Cadburys*, because the firm's success in its main activity, the production and packaging of cocoa and chocolate, depended on a supply of women workers whose wages, while they might have been higher than women elsewhere, were not sufficient to enable them to afford to live in Bournville. Perhaps the much maligned mining villages which continued to be built well into this century might have had a more model character if not all the miners had had to be housed and if the low paid could have been the dependants of wage-earners elsewhere and shipped in.

For this reason it is fatuous to suggest that Bournville became a suburb because of external factors; the expansion of Birmingham and the growth of industry in more outlying areas, for example, the Austin works at Longbridge. As an accessory to the Bournville works the village had to be situated within easy reach of other parts of Birmingham not just so that those residents not employed at *Cadburys* could find employment, but more important so far as *Cadburys* were concerned, so that the firm could recruit sufficient labour from surrounding districts. This was labour that the firm needed to employ but which it could not afford to provide with housing up to Bournville Village standards: Letchworth, the first Garden City faced a similar problem, and unskilled workers had to commute into the city by bicycle.¹²¹ No doubt this possibly unexpected, and certainly unexpressed dilemma, in part explained the *Cadbury* Director's

enthusiasm for municipal housing to follow their "object lesson" set by Bournville.

The Local Labour Supply

It is hard to tell where most workers came from to work at Bournville in its early days. After a break of several weeks, during which the plant was being moved, the Bridge Street workers were re-employed at Bournville. The women workers started work at 6:00 a.m. when Bournville started up, but, one woman recalled:

This was very awkward for the girls, because the trains did not leave Birmingham before 8.30 in the morning, and to walk from home was too far.

While according to another,

having to be at work at six in the morning, most of us had to walk the whole distance from town.

Some of the women found lodgings in Stirchley, and for others; "the Firm provided us with good beds at the Works":

Those who did not take advantage of the arrangements referred to above came up to Bournville in the early morning by van or whatever else could be chartered. At length, however, the firm induced the Midland Railway to run an early morning train, enabling the employees to go home early daily. Later still the firm abolished early morning work.

Richard Cadbury's daughter, Helen Alexander, said that with the growth of the firm, the old mansion on the estate, Bournbrook Hall, was bought up, its name changed to Bournville Hall and then:

It was adapted for use as a home for about sixty of the workgirls, who lived at a distance. They boarded there altogether, or, if they wished it, went to their own homes over Sundays.¹²²

A woman born in 1850 was invited to the firm's Jubilee and she described to the *Magazine* editor her experiences at Bournville, where she worked for 8 years. Her memory was not very accurate, but she

paints a more candid picture of what it must have been like than that contained in many of the *Personal Reminiscences* or the BWM. She said she started working for the firm in 1860, aged 10. When Bournville started up she went to live in Stirchley. "Orders poured in when the factory started. Girls worked from 6 in the morning to 6 at night". Therefore she was commissioned to go out and find sleeping accommodation at cottages in Stirchley and district. She "bought bedsteads and blankets, and girls were fitted up in dormitories in work rooms ... In 1879 already Nettlefolds had their factory, and their worker's wives put girls up.

When the transfer to Bournville came the girls' 'young men' in the town resented it: they didn't want to lose them ... Mrs Duffield [who lived in the cottage within the precincts of the Works] did *not* cook meals for girls, but *warmed* their dishes.

When Works started at Bournville a professional cook was engaged to teach girls to cook. The men could invite their wives.¹²³

Another worker from the Bridge Street days remembered more and probably summed up accurately what occurred:

Many country boys and girls were sent on in addition to the two hands coming up every day by rail (then only a single line). Builders were soon busy erecting dwelling houses (in addition to those being built by the firm in close proximity to the works, now chiefly occupied by firemen and others required to be on the spot). And as the factory grew, so the villages around grew and prospered.¹²⁴

Nicholas Paine Gilman's observations on *Cadburys* made in the 1890s, (and probably based on publications from or correspondence with the firm) confirm many of the points made so far:

The Bournville works are especially noted for the kindly manner in which girls, the great majority of the employees, are treated; *only ten per cent* of them come from Birmingham, the remainder from the surrounding villages. In the busiest part of the year, from September to December, the hours of work are from 6 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. (1 p.m. on Wednesday and 12.30 p.m. on Saturday). The girl arriving so early receives a cup of tea and a biscuit; she is allowed half an hour for

breakfast, fifteen minutes for lunch, and one hour for dinner. For the other months of the year the are from 8.45 a.m to 5.30 p.m., - 1.30 p.m. on Saturdays.¹²⁵
(emphasis added)

Later on the firm specified a radius of employment for workers. In 1908 this was set at 3 miles for men.¹²⁶ Birmingham city centre is about 3½ miles from Bournville, so that the firm would only recruit from the South West side of the city, from the surrounding villages and suburbs.

In 1911 the boundaries of Birmingham city were extended so that the city was enlarged considerably and covered over three times the area it had previously, much of it as yet underdeveloped. Bournville came within the new city boundaries. Although he later became a member of the city council Town Planning Committee, George Cadbury Jnr. appears to have been opposed to the extension of the city in the first place. Where before *Cadburys* could regulate developments around their factory through the BVT, when the city was extended the firm would have to influence the city council if in the migration from the city centre to the outskirts "the mistakes of old Birmingham" were not to be "quickly repeated in the new areas"¹²⁷. Nevertheless, a summary of the evidence George Cadbury Jnr. gave to the Enquiry for the Extension of Birmingham in January 1910, as requested by the Board, gives some idea of *Cadburys'* stance vis a vis Birmingham city up to this time. Out of 4,880 employees, only 459, 9.4% lived in Birmingham, including the suburbs of Quinton and Harborne. 90.6% lived "in this district". He explained the firm's rules stipulating a 2 mile radius for girls and 3 miles for men. He mentioned that 438 employees lived at Kings Heath, a suburb to the east of Bournville, although there were no special trains for employees living there. Further:

We had no property in Birmingham except stables and an upstairs showroom. Price of Electric Power offered by Birmingham did not compare favourably with the price that we can make it ourselves.

He explained the Educational Scheme in operation at Bournville:

and said that I did not think Birmingham offered us any better system than we had here for Continuation Schools. I pointed out that this District provided for 98½% of our students living in this area and that Birmingham only provided for 1½%, and that only 75 students live in the Birmingham area, or 7% of the total, all of whom were provided for in the Birmingham area.

678 *Cadburys'* employees were attending Evening Continuation Schools in Kings Norton, and 319 Technical Classes. Whereas only 75 employees attended classes of any sort in Birmingham. George Cadbury Jnr. concluded:

In view of the evidence given, rates were likely to materially increase ... and that we had nothing to gain by being annexed.¹²⁸

In other words, *Cadburys* saw themselves as self-contained in terms of their supply of labour and educational provisions for it. But the Village itself was *not* self-contained, labour had to be recruited from surrounding areas, although preferably not from central Birmingham.

Later the firm was forced to relax the rules on the radius, for example in 1912 an allowance was made towards the rail fares for young women employed outside the usual radius¹²⁹. The need for the rule itself indicates that the firm had difficulty recruiting labour locally.

A "Housing Problem"

During World War I the problem became more acute, and since it was not only a problem of recruiting but also of retaining labour it began to be perceived as a "Housing Problem in connection with [the] works". In view of the "scarcity of available houses for workmen in this district", the firm started negotiations with the BVT for the purpose of purchasing land to extend the estate.¹³⁰ At the same time the Board approached Weoley Hill Ltd, (a housing society formed in 1914 under the auspices of the BVT to develop the north-west side of the estate, it sold nearly 500 houses on 99- year leases, many of them purpose-built) with an offer to invest in the loan stock of the society in return for having the "right of pre-emption on a number of houses", possibly 8 or

10.¹³¹ Presumably this was considered with a view to housing some of the more senior employees of the firm. Weoley Hill Ltd. submitted plans to the firm for about 40 houses, but it is not clear how many were to be allocated for the firm's use. The houses and land were to be the property of Weoley Hill Ltd, *Cadburys* was to invest in the society's loan stock, and the BVT form of lease was to be adopted when letting cottages.¹³² This shows the interconnections between *Cadburys*, the BVT and the society housing ventures; the requirements of the firm were being met, at the same time the BVT was used for administrative purposes and the housing society retained its separate identity. This was to become something of a pattern for the future.

At the same time the firm wrote directly to the BVT asking for the option on the tenancy of any houses the Trust could offer.¹³³ If pressed this policy could have resulted in the subordination of the village to the expediency of *Cadburys* workers' housing needs.

The firm itself did own some houses, and the M.W.C. could nominate tenants from the growing list of applicants which it held¹³⁴, but this was not really a solution. The rule stipulating the radius within which employees must live was becoming less and less tenable, by 1917 the firm was paying half of the weekly rail fares for men living more than 5 miles from the Works, "owing to inability to obtain houses or lodgings in the neighbourhood". The 3 mile radius rule was in effect allowed to lapse for two years, and it does not appear to have been restored after the War.

Housing for *Cadburys*' workers received constant attention from management committees through 1917 and '18. Only a few houses belonging to the firm or the Trust became available and a long list of applicants built up. By January 1919 there were 130 applications on the list and more were continually coming forward. It was anticipated that the situation would get worse as men returned from the Forces. The Mens' Works Committee suggested that the firm should build houses themselves, if they could take advantage of a Government Scheme, or

failing that the firm should work in conjunction with some already established society.¹³⁶

Works Housing

Something of a solution came with the setting up of the Works Councils (see chapter 6). The firm was obviously reluctant, having successfully set up the BVT, to enter directly into major housing ventures in its own right. The Works Councils, through a sub-committee, the Interim Joint Housing Committee, proposed that houses should be built on land owned by the BVT to relieve the housing problem. So there was an opportunity for the firm to respond favourably to an obvious need for housing, without the firm itself appearing to be the architect of interference in the village or the provider of paternalistic housing for its workers. Although the Board *did* ask the Interim Joint Housing Committee to consider providing 1 in 20 larger houses with 4 or 5 bedrooms suitable for employees receiving about £500 p.a.

The Board seems to have got its way. The Bournville Works Housing Society Ltd. "developed one of the few portions of the Estate which are reserved for employees of Cadbury Brothers Ltd.". It started operations in 1919 and built mostly two and three bedroom type houses, with a few four-bedroom:

The necessary capital was provided, partly by the Public Works Loan Board and partly by Cadbury Brothers Ltd.

The important thing about the Society is that every tenant must become a shareholder, and that the shareholders are largely represented on the management committee.¹³⁸

Building proceeded rapidly; the Works Housing Society provided houses for *Cadburys'* employees but it could be represented as simply one of the four Bournville public utility societies concerned with the cultivation of a "community spirit", (along with the co-partnership Bournville Tenants Ltd, formed in 1906; Weoley Hill Ltd formed in 1914 and the Woodlands Housing Society Ltd formed in 1923).

By May 1925 the Estate was expanding rapidly; £100,000 of work was in hand; 3 houses per week were being built to add to the existing 1,442 already completed; 114 houses were in progress with another 52 to be built immediately. In fact the year 1924-'25 saw the most building on the Estate of the inter-war years. The Works Housing Society had 118 houses completed, 47 being erected and another 44 planned. 80% of its applications were for two-bedroom houses. *Cadburys* had loaned considerable amounts to employees to buy their houses. It was felt that Bournville Finance Limited could readily make loans to employees partly because "a man's character, status and prospects are sufficiently well-known to his employers and fellow workers as to form a guarantee of security for money advanced to him, which is as safe, or safer, than any legal document".

One hundred and thirty five of the houses built by the Works Housing Society were sold in the way before World War II. The Society was also partially financed by the Firm direct; one third of the total cost of the houses being built was met by the firm. The Pension funds for *Cadbury* workers also allocated considerable sums for housing in Bournville, £40,000 was loaned to individuals and £55,000 invested in the Works Housing Society.¹³³

Even with these developments, Bournville Village was still only housing a fraction of the workforce, which had risen to an inter-war peak of nearly 11,000, just over half of them women. In 1924 the Board decided to provide some housing accommodation for single women. A tender was approved and it was estimated that after the architect's and other fees were added and a Government subsidy of £100 per house deducted, the net cost would be £19,658, that is £378 for each of the 52 bungalows to be built. The proposed weekly rent of 12/-, inclusive of rates, was approved. Single women were to have the first option on tenancies because the £5,000 allocated from the Pension Fund in the first place was intended for this purpose.¹⁴⁰ The firm was prepared to take more control of these bungalows than it had in relation to those built by the Works Housing Society; this development was more like conventional tied housing. It was stipulated that none of the bungalows were to be sold but were to be retained for letting:

in the first instance to a) women employees, b) Women Pensioners, c) widows of employees or pensioners.

The Women's Council was asked to recommend women for the tenancies; already a large number of applications had been received although there had been no invitation to apply for tenancies. Further stipulations by the firm were that it should be made clear that notice of termination of tenancy would be given whenever persons in occupation ceased to be included in the categories a), b), c); tenants were not to have the right to sub-let without the firm's consent and the maximum number of persons in one bungalow was not to exceed four. Thirty eight of the bungalows were built by the firm and 14 by the Women's Pension Fund.¹⁴¹ These bungalows may have contributed to the social mix of Bournville Village, and a development specifically designed for single women may have been quite novel, but in relation to the thousands of women working for *Cadburys* it was only a gesture, however well-received it may have been as such.

The Advantages of Bournville for *Cadburys*

The existence of the Bournville Estate gave *Cadburys* the opportunity to make such gestures. Since the Trust was nominally independent of the firm, any additional ventures sponsored by the firm which the Trust could not have undertaken could be seen as superogatory rather than an obligatory meeting of the firm's responsibilities in relation to a tied housing development. The Trust could oversee all housing, looking after the administration, and, because all the houses were either let or sold on leasehold, the Trust could ensure that the character of Bournville village was retained. On the other hand, although the firm could invest directly in housing ventures and take the credit for providing them, the B.V.T.'s independence from the firm meant that *Cadburys* did not get entangled on a vast scale with the "responsibilities, dangers and criticisms of owning their employees homes." The firm was not to become saddled with the cost of the upkeep of the housing in later years, or with the delicate tasks of raising rents, of balancing the interests of leaseholders and tenants etc. Since Bournville village has become a desirable suburb of Birmingham,

there have been no problems either for the firm or the Trust in letting or selling properties. It was the B.V.T., rather than the firm, which employed direct labour for building.¹⁴²

Where in recent years the firm's interests have brought it into conflict with sections of the Estate population, the Trust has been able to assume the role of mediator, and the B.V.T., rather than the firm, has come to be seen by some as, in a sense, the spiritual trustee of the founder's vision. By setting up the Trust George Cadbury, almost certainly unintentionally, found a way to develop Bournville without the firm getting itself into a situation where it could be seen as being in conflict with its workforce both as workers and as tenants. The early eschewal of paternalism has meant that as the Bournville factory has contracted and become less important in the decentralised company structure during the last 25 years, the firm has more easily been able to free itself from commitments to the Estate, and to make the B.V.T. stand on its own two feet. Right up until the 1960s the firm took an interest in the preservation of a Green Belt on the outskirts of South Birmingham and, where it had any influence, the fostering of some kind of "community spirit". But with the rapid contraction of employment at the factory since the 1960s, and the requirements of the local authority for housing, the continued expansion of such responsibilities would have become an embarrassment, and so the firm has conveniently divested itself of them. This is not to say that the firm and the Trust are no longer identified in many people's minds, they are very much so. But when it comes to real policy decisions their separations can be stressed, notwithstanding the fact that the Cadbury family are still represented as Trustees¹⁴³

The Bournville Community

Whatever the strict legal position, or the statistical position vis a vis the workforce and the village population, Bournville village has been of immense *ideological* importance to the firm of *Cadburys*. The village has provided a community which could be identified with the firm; that this community has *never been* synonymous with the more important community of *Cadburys'* workforce has meant that the exact

composition of and relationship with that latter community has been obscured. The Bournville *village* community and the community of *Cadburys* workers have been confused, not in a dissimulating sense which can be unveiled to reveal where *Cadburys* real interests and intentions lay, but in a more substantive and effective way. This is not the place for an extensive discussion about the nature of community, but it must be asserted that "community" is a word beloved of all parties, which means that its meaning is an ideological battleground.¹⁴⁴

Constructed with Ebenezer Howard's vision in mind, a vision gutted of any implications for class conflict, Bournville village certainly became a community *in* itself. But it was always unlikely to transcend its geographical (and aesthetic) boundaries to become part of a working class community *for* itself.¹⁴⁵ While it is important to recognise that:

Employers as well as employed are bound up with the communities where production is located ... [And] how management is an active agent within and at the same time influenced by the community. The community can be both a facilitating or a restricting device for management.

At the same time if "communities are continually made, unmade and remade"¹⁴⁶, then employers are not just agents *within* "the community", they are, in a real sense, the creators of communities. If they contribute towards a community it is not in conformity with some objective market requirements on their part, but with their own visions of what a community should consist of.

Cadburys' vision of a well-housed, heterogeneous, independent and partially self-governing community, derived in part from the Garden City movement, cannot be reduced to the objective market requirements of a mass production cocoa and chocolate manufacturing firm, to suggest so would be crass. What is interesting is the way in which the interests of the firm coalesced with that vision. From the turn of the century until the 1960s, the Bournville factory had pride of place in *Cadburys'* world wide organization. This was in no small part because of the identification of the firm with the village which it had in effect both created and nurtured and whose positive aspects reflected

on the firm. The predominance of the Bournville Village as a shining example of a particular kind of community must be seen as in part responsible for the subordination of sections of the workforce, especially women, and for the unconscious exclusion of them from that community of workers as householders.

This is not the place for a lengthly theoretical discussion of this issue. However, the theoretical stance of this study should be made clearer. The importance of community for Marx has been overlooked. This emerges from debates quite outside the scope of this thesis, for example Thompson writes:

whether or not we believe, or can afford to believe, with Marx, that the proletariat alone embody futurity and the possibility of community, it is important that we remember and acknowledge that the creation of community ... is a political task that goes against the grain of capitalist society.¹⁴⁷

The important point here is that the creation of Bournville, as a community, which it appears to have been, in part can be held responsible for pre-empting the creation of a class-based community, which could transcend capitalism. *Cadburys* did not have a sort of blueprint for a community based on objective market requirements. What they did have, and to some extent still do, was a vision of community, in part utopian, which they were able, as employers, to impose. It is not, therefore, a question of counterpoising the interests of the Bournville community to the interests of *Cadburys* as capitalists. Rather, it is a question of being able to see how the definition of Bournville as *the* community, and its general acceptance as such, has itself been the hegemonic exercise of power by *Cadburys*.

An Unemployment Experiment

A good example of *Cadburys'* actions in relation to the Bournville community is the Valley Pool Scheme which the firm set up in 1933. The firm had already provided relief work for its own employees who were "surplus to factory requirements" during 1930, when improvements were made to the roads near the factory. Then in January 1933 the Valley Pool was started as "an Unemployment Experiment". A Model Yachting

Pool was built to "provide a valuable public amenity in the locality".

It was:

the outcome of a desire on the part of the Bournville Village Trust in conjunction with the firm to make a practical experiment in finding work for a limited number of men who would otherwise have been unemployed during the winter.

The men employed worked 4½ days per week on the scheme itself and were required to attend occupational classes for two half days. The *Works Magazine* made it clear that:

Though the Firm are contributing towards the cost of the scheme and loaning equipment, the work is being carried out by and for the Bournville Village Trust. This is important, as the Bournville Village Trust is a charitable organization working under the Charity Commissioners and not a privately owned profit-making concern.

Also, the work being done was not part of the essential work of estate development:

It is not a work which sooner or later would have to be carried out under ordinary business conditions. The labour employed on it is thus in no way competing with regular development work.

Only men who were, for one reason or another, not eligible for Unemployment Benefit were engaged, and although the wages paid, (38s. 11d. per week plus a mid-day meal on 4 days), were lower than the weekly earnings of those employed full-time on estate development work, they were higher than the State Unemployment Scheme, and, it was pointed out:

They must be considered in relation to the conditions under which the work is carried out and to the fact that the work itself is neither profit-making, essential, nor competitive.

Sixty four men were employed on the whole scheme up to July 1933. They were not skilled building workers, so the work took longer than it would have otherwise, although *Cadburys* loaned a foreman from the Works Building Department. At the end of the scheme the men would be qualified for full Unemployment Benefit. In fact additional work was

found and the scheme was extended through 1933 with the construction of a road which would provide a through-route from Harborne to Bournville. In January 1934 a further £5,000 was allocated by the firm to provide 6 months relief work and the BVT responded to a request from the firm by preparing a plan showing developments in the Bournville area which could be carried out, "particularly with a view to improving amenities of various routes of access to the Works"¹⁴⁸.

The Valley Pool Scheme may well have been a gesture, but there is nothing to suggest it was in any way a cynical gesture on the part of *Cadburys*. There undoubtedly have been instances of employers trying to foist their idea of community on to a workforce or locality in a cynical and manipulative way, but this is not one of them. What the firm did was to reaffirm its commitment to the Bournville *Village* community; the existence of that community provided the site for the well-meant philanthropic gesture, which in turn reinforced the definition of the community and its special relationship with *Cadburys*. George Cadbury Jnr. did support a similar initiative on a city housing estate, Allens Cross, "where many of our employees live" and were "involved in its social life". Thirty or forty men laid out a recreation ground, but this was "voluntary unemployed labour", with *Cadburys* supplying the necessary supervision. It was an attempt to see a housing estate emulate the community spirit of Bournville.¹⁴⁹ The Valley Pool Scheme was more sensitively handled, it showed the firm as concerned to alleviate distress in the locality but without offending organised labour. As Ted Smallbone, a Communist Party member working for *Cadburys* at the time, has put it in his autobiography,

the yachting pool was ... a very nice job but, you know, once again keeping the community a Cadbury community.¹⁵⁰

The Remnants of Paternalism

There were still, in the 1900s, elements of 19th century paternalism in *Cadburys'* attitude to the locality. Not only was the manufacture, sale or distribution of alcohol prohibited on the Bournville Estate, the firm also tried to influence the habits of neighbouring Stirchley. A "Coffee House" operated in Stirchley Street

called the "Cyclists Arms", although its relationship with the firm is unclear. Certainly as the factory's catering facilities expanded the establishment lost trade. Although the teetotal societies continued to grow into the 1900s, the "coffee-public houses" had gone into decline in the 1880s. The Cyclists Arms report to *Cadburys* Board for 1899 confirms the miscalculation which lay behind the "coffee taverns"; "that working men went to public-houses to enjoy the social life without caring if they drank any alcohol"¹⁵¹. The report makes sad reading:

I am very sorry to say our dinner trade has decreased because our customers say they can get beer for their dinner at other shops, at the same time they say our dinners are much better than our competitors.

The "Coffee House" made only £1-7-6 for the year 1899, and by 1901 it was in a bad financial position.¹⁵²

The BVT represented a much more comprehensive vision of what working class life should be like; that the firm was still sponsoring what was really a throwback to an earlier narrow paternalistic intervention in the working class community only goes to show that the vision represented by the BVT was a newly emerging one.

Acceptance of the Vision of Bournville

The firm was not shy in pushing the new vision of Bournville, both to its customers and its workers. In 1903 an essay competition on "The Housing Question" was run in the works and a series of the prize-winning contributions appeared in the *Works Magazine*. These essays faithfully reproduced the views on housing held by the Board; there were quotes from the *Daily News* (the Cadbury owned newspaper), from Rowntree's *Poverty*, from Charles Booth and Ebenezer Howard; Bournville was pictured in a good light by all. Even so, they are uncannily perceptive. The first prize went to the essay which noted that:

One fact impresses itself upon the writer ... and that is, that in spite of the numerous denunciations which have been written against the factory system, that system seems to have come to stay. The Garden City Association's scheme is one which appeals very strongly

to the average man, because its working is based upon the factory system.

Although the success of Port Sunlight and Bournville was well-known, the essayist believed:

It is however the local authorities who are best able to take in hand the housing of the people of the country at large ... as to the kind of houses the local authority should erect, the electors of members to these bodies have the opportunity of putting men on them who are able and willing to carry out suitable schemes, and it is quite obvious that if working men can get good houses with bathrooms and large gardens a healthier generation can be reared.

The only woman whose essay appeared posed a question:

We have nothing to thank capitalist enterprise for, as regards working class dwellings, and the question comes, how and by whom are these dwellings to be built?

Her answer was for Local Authorities to be given the power to acquire land at its fair value and to build houses to let at fair rents, but not to sell:

I believe that if this scheme were to come into action, and if employers would take more interest in their workpeople, and last, but not least, if men would live as men, in every sense of the word, there would soon be many examples of our beautiful Garden Village in our suburbs, and the jerry builder and slums would be things of the past.¹⁵³

There was of course the *Factory in a Garden* booklet available for customers visiting Bournville, but for the wider chocolate consuming public, in case the associations of *Cadburys* might be lost on them, the firm decided to adopt the name "Garden City" for a new chocolate assortment line¹⁵⁴. However, the firm was not quite clear how to utilize Bournville, in 1907 the Board considered,

that it would be better not to advertise the village and social arrangements in the press, otherwise the notices received from visitors and others will lose their value.¹⁵⁵

If the village was to advertise itself, and in doing so help to sell *Cadburys* products, then the firm was not averse to giving the Trust a

nudge in the right direction. In 1921, for example, the Board encouraged the BVT to bring out a new pamphlet, "the present booklet being now somewhat out of date". References to be included were recommended, as well as when the booklet should be given to visitors during their tours of Bournville. It was also suggested "that a draft of the new booklet should be submitted to the Advertising Committee for their suggestions before publication"¹⁵⁶.

Politicians were impressed by the identification of the firm with the village. In May 1911 some of the delegates attending an I.L.P. conference in Birmingham visited Bournville. "After being conducted round the village the party were entertained at tea by the firm". George Cadbury addressed the guests, he told them that Bournville Village was the ideal for every sober, industrious man, and that such homes should be minimum:

They need not be the maximum; if all were equal life would be on a dull level.

He praised the Labour Party for its Christian based pacifism and internationalism, and, from the *Works Magazine* report, it seems the compliments were returned:

Mr. Keir Hardie said that if local authorities could be compelled to follow where private enterprise has led, we should speedily eradicate slumdom and consumption.¹⁵⁷

Bournville as an Entity

Bournville, the factory and the village, must be considered as an entity. The trusteeship of the Village Trust by members of the Cadbury family has meant that there has always been a close connection. But more importantly, the Village has housed *sections* of the *Cadburys* workforce and the myth has grown up that *Cadburys* workers live in Bournville Village. They do not necessarily, and they never have for the most part. Most of the *female* labour engaged on the actual production work has had to be recruited from the surrounding areas, as well as many of the male workers. The quaint contentment of the pretty suburb can too easily be confused with a contentment with "the factory system" on the part of the workers at *Cadburys*. If the workers were

contented, it was *not* because they were all happily housed in a garden village during the period being examined here.

As for the factory, the move to Bournville undoubtedly facilitated the rapid growth of the firm. The Bournville site was able to incorporate successive innovations and to accommodate extensions, but the ideal which Bournville represented changed over time. In retrospect the firm was attributed a continuity of purpose. For example, in 1933 the staff were told that,

In the extension of the factory the firm, of course, had always had an Ideal Plan: they had one long before Lenin and Trotsky tried to get a world patent on the idea.¹⁵³

This was wishful thinking, there never was such an "Ideal Plan", there was no way that there could have been. The ideals of Bournville were generated externally to the firm, which was able to incorporate them. What Bournville did provide was a suitable *site* for various plans and ideals to be applied on. It has developed as an entity because the various schemes applied at Bournville subsequent to the initial move in 1879 have had a cumulative effect. The site on which they were applied was not merely geographical, it has been ideological too.

Chapter Four
WELFARE

Social Control

At this period we advertised our 'sobriety' by sporting a 'Bunch of Blue', and an agitation in the Press was advocating the necessity of restraining the working man's propensity to increase the population too readily. This was the exclamation, with consternation, of our Foreman as we discussed the situation: 'Well, so help me God (I don't know who his deity was), it's come to a nice pass when a working man mustn't have a drink, he mustn't have a smoke, and now they want to deprive him of the sacred right vouchsafed to him by Providence of reproduction. What the H... will he have left!'

This recollection of the early days at Bournville shows the reaction of the 19th century working class man to attempts by the middle class to interfere in his lifestyle. There is a wealth of literature on this subject, and it does not need to be dealt with in detail here. However, a few points can be made in relation to *Cadburys*.

First of all, the Quakers, and the Cadburys especially, were heavily involved with attempts at social control during the 19th century. But Quakerism, as an almost exclusively middle class religion, did not perform a "double service", as both an "ideological self-justification for the master-manufacturers and for their satellites", and also the religion "of wide sections of the proletariat". That role fell to Methodism, and it is E. P. Thompson's particular *bête noire* for that reason.² So the Quakers do not have to be dealt with in terms of a sect which tried to, or still less succeeded in inculcating its own beliefs onto the working class. Pollard has argued that:

The code of ethics on which employers concentrated was ... rather limited. It was left to the Evangelical Movement and to forces outside industry to develop out of the needs of the bourgeoisie a momentum of its own, and to direct and absorb the spiritual energy of the working classes which was largely left untouched by the new work discipline.

If this was the case, then some of the preoccupations of the Cadburys can be seen in terms of the common concerns of 19th century employers,

"with the character and morals of the working classes". One particular concern of the Cadburys:

The question of drink does, perhaps, show the link between morals and efficiency most clearly.

Although for Pollard, "The attack on drink could be seen as part of an attack on much else of the existing village culture"³, this does not mean to say that with the industrial revolution, and the English working class already "made", in some sense, the anxieties and preoccupations of the capitalist class went away. The transition between one system and another is not "fixed, finished, and mechanical", the working class, capitalism in fact, constantly needs to be remade. So it is not surprising that in late-Victorian Britain there were, "points of anxiety ... urgent clusters of anxiety"⁴. The concern with the drinking habits of the working class most certainly did not disappear with the passing of village culture.

Sellers makes this point most forcefully:

the chapel temperance society may be seen, by the century's end, as the bastion of those who believed in self-help and self-improvement - and had achieved their ambitions. Temperance which, like Sabbatarianism, had started off as a popular movement, became in proletarian eyes increasingly a symbol of upper-class dominance as the century progressed. Whatever forms of state intervention the Victorian working-class may have welcomed (and they were not many) interference with their drinking habits or their Sunday sporting pursuits on the part of a backward-looking Nonconformity was certainly not among them ... [There was an] outrage felt by the humbler classes against this meddlesome interference.⁵

Never ones to await legislation, Richard and George Cadbury were as meddlesome as any. Their father, John Cadbury, had been Secretary of the Birmingham Temperance Society and was one of those in the official teetotal movement who "carefully preserved its reputation with the religious public by repudiating all heretical connexions"⁶. George Cadbury was associated with the "extreme wing of the temperance party" in the 1870s, as a supporter of the prohibition group, the United Kingdom Alliance. Although he later modified his attitude and turned to municipalization'. Richard Cadbury gave his support to the Gospel

Temperance cause and the Blue Ribbon Campaign, which in the summer of 1882 was cooperating in its work with the Society of Friends⁸.

The brothers were active in the Adult School Movement. The Friends First Day School Association was established in 1847 at a conference in Birmingham; John, and his father Richard Tapper Cadbury, were among the founders, who tended to be evangelicals and teetotalers like themselves. Isichei has noted that many famous manufacturers and men who were later to become well-known were active Sunday School teachers for many years. As well as George Cadbury, Joseph Rowntree and Joseph Storrs Fry were strong supporters of the F.F.D.S.A. In fact, in 1900, the Adult School paper, *One and All*, "actually urged its readers to drink cocoa, in gratitude for benefits received⁹. Although the Adult School Movement's main purpose was spiritual as far as George Cadbury was concerned, it also taught the habit of thrift through its "banks and benefit societies". The methods of recruitment appear to have been not far short of kidnapping, and the extremes of paternalistic interference indulged are suggested by a remark George Cadbury made:

If I want to know whether men are truly converted ... I do not go to the church where they attend, but to the home to find out whether their professions are turned into realities, whether they are less selfish, their tempers under better control, their wives happier, their children better fed and clothed.¹⁰

(For bodies such as the Blue Ribbon movement and the Good Templars in the 1880s, religious and temperance conversion were seen as much the same thing incidentally¹¹.)

These philanthropic activities on the part of the Cadburys were reflected in their business. This is indicated by a description of the Bridge Street Works from as early as 1852; just two years after Richard Cadbury joined the firm and 3 years before George Cadbury started work there:

Care was taken to employ girls of good moral character, and no opportunity was neglected of influencing them in the best things, endeavouring to teach them habits of order and pleasant manners which might reach beyond their work hours to their homes and families. Once a week during the summer they were given a half-holiday, and

twice a week they left work an hour earlier than usual to attend evening school. Some of the men had learnt a steady habit of saving, and with nearly all, from the mere force of quiet example in their masters, teetotalism was the rule. Reproof was not often needed, but when given, it was more as an appeal to the better feelings than a demonstration of anger.¹²

George Cadbury's biographer claimed that the firm was the first in Birmingham "to adopt the principle of the Saturday half-holiday". Reductions in the hours of work such as the Ten Hours Bill, were seen as temperance measures and:

Temperance reformers encouraged the general contemporary trend towards substituting the Saturday half-holiday to 'Saint Monday'. The factory economy required the simultaneous presence of large numbers of employees; it was worth granting a Saturday half-holiday if Monday's working hours could thereby be preserved. The Saturday half-holiday gradually spread southwards after the 1840s.¹³

The running of the firm overlapped with George and Richard's philanthropic activities even after the move to Bournville:

A Friends' Meeting had been established in the works soon after moving to Bournville, and was held on Sunday mornings in the room then used as the forewomens' diningroom.

As an alternative venue for recreation to the public houses, they built the Stirchley Institute, completed in 1892. This was intended primarily for the Society of Friends, and was used for the Friends' Meeting. However, it was not limited to sectarian use:

The Institute soon became the headquarters of a flourishing adult school, with children's Sunday Schools, temperance societies, savings funds etc.

With the result that:

After some years other members of the Society of Friends came to live in the district surrounding Bournville and shared in the management of the work. Any of the inhabitants of Bournville and Stirchley who cared to attend were welcomed at the various meetings, but a great number, especially of the teachers and others in responsible positions, were drawn from the ranks of the workpeople. This helped to strengthen the ties between them and their employers, bringing them together, beyond

their business relations, in an effort to spread the gospel amongst the homes crowded together below the railway line, on the outskirts of the factory.

As with the Cyclists Arms, the firm maintained a puritanical Quaker attitude towards recreation in Stirchley, and attempted to impose its views. Dancing and the use of scenery and footlights were prohibited at the Stirchley Institute by the firm in 1901⁴.

Then, finally, there were the morning religious services. All the writers associated with the firm say that Richard Tapper Cadbury had held similar services. Whether or not this was so, in 1866 George Cadbury wrote to Joseph Storrs Fry to find out about the services which had been practised at Frys cocoa works for some years. Fry sent a detailed reply setting out the methods and benefits of the system; "the arrangements for light and ventilation", the separate entrances for men and women, the manner of service etc. In a postscript Fry pointed out that in addition to the religious benefit:

I think that there is a great advantage in bringing the workpeople once a day under review. It is often a means of observing their conduct and checking any tendency to impropriety.¹⁵

These "Meetings for Worship" were dropped after three years, but were started up again in 1871. A notice to this effect was issued; littered with biblical quotations, it indicates something of the firm's feelings on the matter:

In recommencing these meetings we deeply feel our responsibility, and the difficulty of our peculiar position as employers, of holding them consistently ...

We want every one who attends to feel their responsibility; remembering that a large company is composed of individuals ...

It is our custom to sit together for a little time in solemn silence; so that each may wait on the Lord for themselves, without depending upon man ...

Our company is composed of various nationalities and denominations: - Episcopalians, Independents, Baptists, Methodists, Friends, Roman Catholics, etc. and of a large number who belong to no outward church ...

Trusting that we all, both employers and employed, may be permitted to strengthen one another to resist those

temptations by which we are all surrounded and to which we are all by nature prone.¹⁶

The Morning Readings continued until the end of 1912, when, according to Williams:

it was realized that, in a factory employing several thousand men and women, the custom had ceased to be practicable.¹⁷

Welfare Before and After 1899

It may be thought that too much attention has been paid here to these incidences of concern for the workforce on the part of the Cadburys. The reason for stretching out these aspects of of Cadburys is twofold. First, to hint at their paternalistic nature, and second, because the retrospective accounts of the firm dwell on these provisions in their desperate attempts to establish precedents for and a continuity with the later welfare developments. These early developments at Bridge Street and the early Bournville factory hardly qualify for inclusion under the term "welfare". Still, insofar as they can be considered as such, they appear to fall into two rough categories. One, the expedient; those provisions necessitated by the move to Bournville, such as the dining rooms; and Two, the moral. The requirements which were later to be met by welfare provisions, were only fulfilled by these earlier measures incidentally. This is indicated in Richard Cadbury's biography, written by his daughter, Helen Cadbury Alexander, and published in 1906. Welfare at the works is a small part of the book, (which deals at length with Richard's philanthropic works), and it receives a fraction of the attention paid to it in George's biography written in 1922. This cannot be explained by the different characters of the two brothers, after all, they were partners in the running of the firm. Alexander's observations on the morning readings give a good indication of the character of such early "welfare" provisions and their effects:

One reason of the happy relationship between the partners and their workers was to be found in the keen interest taken, *not only in moral and temporal concerns, but also in the spiritual welfare of the people ...* The services were always of the simplest character ... The whole occupied, on average, only about seven or eight minutes;

but its influence, and the fact that masters and work people stood on the same level in the presence of the great Master of all, may in no small degree account for the harmony that existed between them - and the fact that there has not been a serious dispute in the history of the firm needs no comment.'²⁸ [emphasis added]

Even if Cadburys "insisted that the 'right spirit' of mutual understanding and respect govern ... relations with ... employees", in common with other Quaker employers, it is hard to see that these attitudes alone, or even in a large part, accounted for later welfare developments. Having been fortuitous in enjoying harmonious relations with their workers, Cadburys may well have been concerned to retain something like the 'right spirit'. However, the personal measures taken in the 1900s were more substantive than anything which preceded them, and cannot be seen as ad hoc outgrowths of a continuous policy or philosophy'²⁹. There was a definite break in the history of the firm and in its personnel developments. This is acknowledged by George Cadbury's biographer. He divided the history of "the experiments" into two phases, and it is worth quoting at length what Gardiner said because he describes the background adequately and goes as far as any account associated with the firm does towards accepting this break:

for the earlier of these [phases] George Cadbury and his brother [Richard] were wholly responsible. It was a phase which was governed by the conditions of a smaller enterprise, and of a time when the awakening to the evils of the industrial system was only beginning. It was a highly personal and in some ways a paternal effort to humanize the conditions of labour.

The second phase, which was unfortunately more complicated, developed with the great expansion of the business, and the emergence of the new ideas in the industrial movement. It may be said to have begun with the death of Richard Cadbury in 1899, the conversion of the business into a private limited company, and the appointment of a Board of Directors of which the two sons of George Cadbury and the two sons of Richard Cadbury were members. It was under this new government, later enlarged by, the admission of other members of the family, that the larger organized schemes of insurance, education, and so on, were developed.

Although he did not initiate them, says Gardiner, George Cadbury was "in entire sympathy" with these schemes. Such schemes, including the

Works Council, were "the work of the *inheritors*" of Richard and George Cadbury's "great tradition of progress"²⁰. But this does not explain the *process* by which the personnel measures adopted by the new directors came about.

Cadbury's Markets in the 1900s

The context in which the welfare measures were adopted needs to be examined first, because there is the idea that they were granted on the part of enlightened employers enjoying secure home markets for their goods²¹. This is an important idea to deal with, because it is commonly used to explain away those firms having welfare provisions as exceptional cases which cannot be generalised, unless as Engels put it,

Table 4.1 *Trade in the British Isles in Cash Terms, 1899-1909*²⁵

	1899	1900	1901	1905
Cocoa	£430,398	£460,595	£502,056	£488,122
Chocolate and Confectionery	£438,058	£501,650	£544,949	£569,215
Total Trade in	£868,456	£962,244	£1047,005	£1057,337
Percent of Cocoa	49.5	47.9	48.0	46.1
	1906	1907	1908	1909
Cocoa	£529,197	£637,034	£522,982	£552,444
Chocolate and Confectionery	£597,497	£699,894	£694,303	£751,440
Total Trade in	£1126,694	£1336,928	£1217,285	£1303,884
Percent of Cocoa	46.1	47.6	42.96	42.37

it is found that such "so-called reforms ... can be reduced to saving schemes or to cheapening the means of subsistence of the worker"²².

Therefore some idea of the competitive situation *Cadburys* were in needs to be found out, and, perhaps more important, the firm's perception of the competition.

Certainly there was a general expansion of the firm. In the ten years from 1890 to 1900 the tonnage of cocoa produced increased by 90%, while chocolate and confectionery production increased by 169%. Cocoa production went from 1,137 to 2,163 tons and confectionery and chocolate production from 1,965 to 5,289 tons²³. In 1909 2,413 tons of cocoa were manufactured, and 7,795 tons of confectionery and chocolate²⁴. For the trade in the British Isles in cash terms, see table 4.1. At the same time there was an expanding export market, (see tables 4.2 and 4.3).

Table 4.2 *Cadburys' Export Trade, 1891 - 1911*

Year	Total	Cocoa	Chocolate	
1891	£59,540	£29,947	£29,593	
2	62,087	28,954	33,133	
3	59,952	28,863	31,089	
4	55,395	24,572	30,823	
5	64,189	26,584	37,605	
6	74,937	27,748	47,189	
7	85,860	30,369	55,491	
8	99,807	34,384	65,423	
9	108,554	37,986	70,568	
1900	138,801	41,975	96,826	
1	176,821	43,474	133,347	
2	181,168	38,058	143,110	
3	184,032	41,936	142,096	
4	197,882	43,881	154,001	
5	205,106	43,932	161,174	
			<u>Best</u>	<u>Common</u>
6	209,250	45,072	102,571	61,607
7	251,902	52,795	122,558	76,549
8	255,459	48,835	115,836	90,788
9	304,533	62,500	146,616	95,417
1910	364,724	68,637	186,659	109,428
11	445,932	80,430	235,602	129,900

 Table 4.3 *Cadbury's Export Markets, 1903 -1909*²⁶

	1903	1904	1905	1906
Australia	£69,293	73,981	74,010	80,388
New Zealand	£16,317	17,019	17,516	17,653
India	£23,886	27,649	31,374	30,898
S. Africa	£40,429	40,469	39,726	36,170
Europe	£10,398	12,571	11,848	12,520
U. S. A.	£122	95	143	99

	1907	1908	1909
Australia	96,350	100,857	126,640
New Zealand	27,883	32,418	31,943
India	36,290	35,466	37,517
S. Africa	36,540	33,805	43,840
Europe	13,076	12,398	12,582
U. S. A.	114	84	89

The sales returns for the years 1908 and 1909 show the importance of the export trade to the firm (see table 4.4).

Table 4.4 *Sales Returns, 1908-1909*

	1908	1909
Export	£255,455	304,526
Total	1,583,866	1,609,082

These figures admittedly only give a snapshot of the situation, but they show that *Cadburys* was expanding, that chocolate and confectionary were becoming more important than cocoa - by 1911 cocoa accounted for only 30% of the home trade²⁷ - and that the firm's export market was an important part of its trade, although it was heavily dependent on specific export markets in the British empire.

What the figures do not show is the position of the British cocoa and chocolate industry in relation to other countries. This is indicated by the imports of cacao, (the raw material for cocoa and chocolate) from different countries. (see table 4.5)

Table 4.5 *Cacao Imported by Different Countries in Metric Tons*²⁸

	1894	1909	1914
Germany	8,189	26,671	53,672
Great Britain	9,793	20,219	28,579
Netherlands	9,502	11,991	31,587
France	14,636	21,449	25,672
Switzerland	2,084	6,731	9,919
<u>European Total</u>	55,428	103,264	181,489
U.S.A.	7,811	31,654	73,201
Australia	295	591	1,476
<u>World Total</u>	64,276	137,581	264,215

What these figures clearly show is that the cocoa and chocolate industry internationally was growing rapidly, and that *Cadburys* had to expand if it was not to be overtaken by foreign firms. Exports would have to be a vital part of the firm's expansion, but even in Australia.

their most important export market, the local industry was expanding rapidly. In fact *Cadburys* noted the increased competition in the Melbourne area when there was a decrease in their trade for the year 1905 over 1904. As early as 1899, the Board considered the possibility of manufacturing in Australia and supplying other colonies from there, but consideration of the matter was deferred, and no more was said about it until 1911, when the Board decided "definitely not to consider the proposal" to start manufacturing in Australia.²⁹ The proportion of cocoa cleared by *Cadburys* in the United Kingdom stayed fairly constant. "Historicus" said it was about a third of the 20,224,175 lbs imported, but it appears to have dropped during the 1900s. (see table 4.6)

Table 4.6 *Cocoa Cleared in the United Kingdom, 1907-1913*³⁰

	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>Cadburys</u>	
	(in pounds)	(lbs)	(% of total)
1907	44,445,200	14,130,550	31.79
1908	46,411,600	13,818,143	29.77
1909	53,495,781	12,426,570	23.22
1910	53,095,184	13,629,220	25.66
1911	55,992,207	13,018,069	23.24
1912	61,828,735	15,811,146	25.57
1913	60,818,404	14,492,282	23.83

English Competitors

Cadburys kept a close eye on their English competitors. They were in close touch with *Frys* and *Rowntrees* over questions of prices, advertising and distribution, added to which the *Rowntrees* were political allies, and, of course, all three families were Quakers. In 1900 *Frys* appear to have been ahead of *Cadburys*. The Board noted that *Frys* said their output was 400 tons per week, whereas *Cadburys* was 340 tons. But *Frys* failed to move out of the centre of Bristol, where by 1921 they had 8 factories and 16 subsidiary factories. During the 1900s *Cadburys* sales overtook *Frys*, and *Frys* went into decline until the formation of the holding company, the British Cocoa and Chocolate Company, when they were, in effect, taken over by *Cadburys*.³¹

Rowntrees, however, had moved a part of their factory out of York in 1890, and bought up a site of over 200 acres a mile out of the city, where they later built their own model village, New Earswick. In 1903 *Rowntrees* erected a new steel frame factory. This was a seven storey, purpose built "model cocoa factory" utilising "the modern method of economical factory management"³³. So *Rowntrees*, as *Cadburys* well knew, were in a position to expand, and were already, in 1903, attracting international attention for their provisions for labour from the director of the American Institute Of Social Service, the "social engineer", W.H.Tolman.³⁴

At the end of 1901 an established London tea company, *Mazawattee*, introduced cocoa and chocolate. They had erected new factories at New Cross in London which, they claimed, had "the best and newest plant in the world" for cocoa and chocolate manufacturing. 1500 men and women were employed, although not all on cocoa and chocolate production, because the firm's tea blending and coffee manufacturing were also concentrated at the works. Given the excess demand for high class cocoa and chocolate, they anticipated a great demand for their new product following a massive advertising campaign. Press cuttings give an idea of how this firm saw where the market had grown, and the way to appeal to the public:

the impetus given to the trade by the Queen's chocolate gifts (in the early stages of the war) ... it is said ... the late Queen ... never did a kinder action for the chocolate makers than when she lovingly made Tommy Atkins the proud possessor of a tin of cocoa.

Mazawattee advertised itself as:

An English firm making an English article ... English chocolate by the English and for the English.³⁵

It is worth noting that *Cadburys* reluctantly agreed to supply ½lb tins of chocolate, which Queen Victoria paid for and which were sent to the troops in South Africa, on the

distinct understanding that we should make no profit on the order, and that our name should not appear upon the tins, and so far as it lies in our power we should avoid

all advertisement in the matter as the order is connected with the present war in South Africa.³⁷

George Cadbury, it will be remembered, bought up the *Daily News* in order to oppose the Boer War.

Foreign Competition

However, the competition which was setting the pace for the British firms came from Europe. As noted in Chapter Three, *Cadburys* were not penetrating the rapidly growing markets abroad, especially in the U.S.A. and Germany. Whereas, in 1902, the Board noted, the German firm *Stollwercks* had a factory employing 2,200 in New York whose trade was increasing rapidly³⁸.

Not only that, the British market was being penetrated as part of the general expansion of European, and especially Swiss manufacturers. Swiss chocolate exports nearly doubled, from 7.9 million francs in 1899 to 14.4 million francs in 1901. As a circular advertising "new mild-chocolate recipes in English language" explained, "Mostly the export of the milk-chocolates has increased, for only this kind of chocolate has caused the large revival of the Swiss chocolate manufacturing industry". Early in 1903 each of *Cadburys'* directors received an article translated by the firm's Export Office giving extracts from the Swiss Board of Trade report for 1901:

The products of Chocolate and Condensed Milk, during the year 1901 realised a figure, which hitherto has never been known in the country. Chocolate was exported to the total value of 14½ million Francs, which shows an increase of 43% on that of the previous year. 1¼ million Francs worth of it went to Italy, 1½ million to Germany, 2¼ million to France and nearly 7 million to England. The consumption of England was greatly increased by the troops being stationed out in So. Africa. As a result of this, also, out of the nearly 29 million francs worth of condensed milk which was exported, not less than 18¼ millions went to England. But no doubt this enormous and exceptional increase, on account of the restored peace, will remain unique.

Swiss exports to the U.S.A. from January to October 1902 nearly doubled the figures for 1901, coming to 161,271:

And as it is known, Swiss Chocolate has gained a good footing in every country of Europe, it follows that it must be the same all the world over.

Cadburys followed the progress of the Swiss in the press. In 1902 the figures again showed that England was the best customer for Swiss chocolate, especially milk chocolate. Figures for 1902 showed that Swiss milk chocolate exports had nearly doubled, having risen to nearly 7 million francs. The Board took notice that the Swiss firms of Lindt and Sprungli Ltd were "proposing to wake thing up a bit in the U.K." They had taken on larger and better premises and appointed a new representative in the U.K.³³

It is quite clear, then, that *Cadburys* did not enjoy a secure home market in the 1900s. The international market was expanding rapidly and there was no way that the British firms could be insulated from the competition from European firms which were taking full advantage of the growing opportunities internationally. Even if there had been effective protective barriers, something the *Cadburys*, as Liberal Free Traders vehemently opposed, important export markets would have been lost. Besides which, one Swiss manufacturer had already spelt out what action would be taken if the principal export market for Swiss chocolate, (worth £400,000 out of total Swiss chocolate exports of £910,000 in 1903) were threatened by tariffs:

should Mr Chamberlain's proposals ever be accepted by the British public, the principal continental chocolate factories would manufacture a certain part of their output in the U.K.

One large Swiss chocolate firm had already built a branch factory in Paris in order to be able to compete successfully with the French industry when France reduced its tax on sugar³⁴. Quite clearly, as *Cadburys* were well aware, they had to meet the foreign competition, especially the Swiss milk chocolate.

Milk Chocolate

Milk chocolate was first produced on a large scale by Daniel Peter, of Vevey, Switzerland. He made his first milk chocolate in 1876 and by 1894 "sales had reached important dimensions". *Cadburys* first put a milk chocolate, made from powdered milk, on the market in 1897. But it was not sweet and milky enough for public taste. The recipe needed to be improved and mass production methods developed because the firm was not able to compete with the Swiss product⁴⁰. *Cadburys* tried their own appeal to chauvinism, at the end of 1899 it was decided to put a small label on the Milk Chocolate saying "made with pure English Milk and Cream only"⁴¹.

More significantly the firm started to investigate milk chocolate production, especially in Europe. As early as February 1900 it was suggested that George Cadbury Jnr. "should visit Switzerland with a view to find what Milk is used by Swiss makers". Later that year the head confectioner was sent abroad to make enquiries about "the making of Milk Chocolate". He reported back on his visit to Dresden, Berlin, and Cologne, and told the Board about how the continental manufacturers were using fondant machines, from Lehmans, the Dresden engineering firm, for milk chocolate production; in one factory he reported there were, "40 machines!" The very next week *Cadburys* ordered another Lehman fondant machine themselves; they appear to have only had 2 machines and were obviously alarmed at the mechanisation abroad. Early in 1901 plans were passed for the arrangement of new Milk Chocolate machinery, and Otto Unger, the head confectioner, was visiting Switzerland again finding out about Milk Chocolate making⁴².

Milk chocolate production trials were started in 1902, and the chocolate was thoroughly tested by the firm against the Swiss manufacturers' products. Following a satisfactory reception for the new milk chocolate production was expanded later in the year. *Cadburys* were still not making great inroads into the milk chocolate market, and at the end of 1902 they had to lower their prices so as to be at the same rate as *Rowntrees'* milk chocolate. Export sales of milk chocolate trebled from £2,108 in 1902 to £6,898 in 1903, but they were still only a miniscule part of total exports (compare table 4.2). However,

progress was being made in the production of milk chocolate, for example, the new factory for its production was designed so that the moulded chocolate could be wrapped straight from the moulds⁴³.

By 1904 it was realized that the firm needed to get out a new milk chocolate line. It was suggested that it should be "light in colour, and with a little nut in it". Several possible names were discussed; "Jersey" or "Highland Milk", "Milkolate" or "Nucolate". In August the name "Dairy Milk Chocolate" was agreed on. The new Milk Chocolate Department building was started, at a cost of £7,318 complete without the machinery. At the end of 1904 the firm placed orders with a German firm for the purchase of machinery to make milk chocolate by the "dry milk process"⁴⁴. The firm was hampered in its investigations of machinery used for this process, because the German engineering firms did not really know how the Swiss manufacturers used their milk condensing machinery. Nevertheless, a sample produced by this method was approved for "C.D.M." in March 1905 and production of the new line was started at once, with the Board agreeing that, "this will not take the place of our present milk Chocolate." Which shows that they did not realize how important this product was to become for the firm. Advertising for "C.D.M." was started in the same month, with the "C.D.M." labels reading "Rich in Cream". By June 1905 output of C.D.M. was up to 13½ tons per week and more machinery was ordered so as to be able to keep a more constant output. At the end of the year the line known as "Ordinary Milk" was withdrawn so that in future the firm would have two milk chocolate lines, "Block Milk" and C.D.M. At the same time it was decided to use C.D.M. instead of "Block Milk" for making Milk Chocolate Easter Eggs⁴⁵.

At the same time as C.D.M. was being developed and launched the firm was still watching the Swiss industry closely, members of the firm were visiting Switzerland and reporting back. After a visit in November 1904 George Cadbury Jnr. was asked to advise the firm on whether to purchase shares in one or two Swiss companies. Early in 1905 a representative of the firm, Mr. E.J. Organ, gave a verbal report

to the Board on his recent visit to Switzerland, on the basis of which it was decided to consider establishing a small chocolate and milk condensing plant in Switzerland⁴⁸. This visit was particularly interesting because Organ brought back "a large amount of printed and official documents", which George Cadbury Jnr. went through and used to compile some statistics comparing the Swiss industry's costs with *Cadburys* for 1903 (see table 4.7).

George Cadbury Jnr.'s report shows the extent to which the firm was closely following their Swiss competitors. What is more, the Swiss do not appear to have had any distinct advantage over *Cadburys* in terms of labour and raw material costs, and *Cadburys* were keenly aware of any advantages that the Swiss did have.

Although they did not seem to be aware of it at the time, the launch of C.D.M. meant that *Cadburys* were able to compete effectively with the Swiss. By 1907 the firm was having to consider buying a creamery business. No action was taken in this case, where a business in Ireland was being offered for sale. By 1911 however, some action clearly had to be taken because a large proportion of the milk reaching the Bournville works was "unfit for use in the manufacture of milk chocolate". Therefore a milk condensing factory was started up at Knighton, in the milk-producing area of Shropshire and Staffordshire. Another, larger factory followed in 1915⁴⁹.

Going back to 1905, this was clearly a vital year for the company. Although there were important machinery suppliers in Britain, (one of them, incidentally, Bakers, was another Quaker firm⁴³, but this does not seem to have affected *Cadburys* buying policy) in 1905 extensive new arrangements of machinery resulted from visits to Germany⁵⁰. *Cadburys* were having to keep up with their Continental competitors, and part of this meant having to buy the same machinery as the European firms were using.

Cocoa

Cadburys were also being pressed by foreign competition in the cocoa market by cocoa produced by the so-called "Dutch method":

Table 4.7 *Costs of Production in Switzerland and for Cadburys*

	<u>Switzerland</u>		<u>Cadburys</u>	
	Cost	Ave. Price	Cost	Ave. Price
<u>Cocoa</u>	112,760	80/9	121,269	56/4
<u>Sugar</u>	Ave. Price		Ave. Price	
1902	£12. 16. 3		-----	
1903	£13. 5. 10		£16. 10. --	
1904	£20. 4. --		£18. --. --	
<u>Milk</u> (winter price)	5,86d/gal		9,3d/gal	
	"As the milk in Switzerland is so much richer than in England the cost per gallon is hardly a fair test, so that I am also giving for comparison costs per lb. of dried milk excluding all costs of labour, condensing, etc".			
"Therefore dried milk powder costs"	4,3d/lb,		7,5d/lb,	
<u>Coal</u>	"The larger part comes from Germany; the average price delivered to the frontier duty paid is:			
	22/6 /ton		7/6 /ton	F.O.R. pit.
<u>Coke</u>	Ave. Price		Ave. Price	
	27/2 per ton		11/9 per ton	
<u>Duties</u>				
Cocoa	4,7d per cent		9/4 per cent	
Sugar	3/-- per cent		4/5 per cent	
Coal	2d, per ton		----	
<u>Labour</u>	"Skilled labour is about the same price as in England. Italians are used for unskilled labour, & the average is also about the same as in England ...			
	"Cost of machinery is about the same as in England. It is subject to a duty, but the most essential machinery we already purchase from Switzerland. ... Mr Organ in summing up recommends that it is far simpler to establish a factory than to buy one ...			
	"While our experiments are still pending with regard to milk chocolate, I should not like the firm in any way to launch out in Switzerland, but at the same time I think it might be useful to set up a small experimental station in which to really test if there is any difference in the quality of Swiss & English milk apart from its richness. The relative richness however does not make much difference, as it merely means a slight extra amount of condensing to get the same result in this country. The question is however, - Does Swiss milk contain some flavour or aroma which cannot be detected by analysis but which may give it some superiority to the palate?			
	"Mr Organ suggests that if possible one of the Directors who has a farm, should endeavour to purchase one or two of the Fribourg cattle from which the milk used by Caillers, Peters & Nestles is obtained, & see if on English pasturage they would give the same results.			
	"Perhaps the other information obtained by Mr Organ & confirmed by the official documents is that the very finest cocoas are used, but probably in much less quantity..."			

[Cadburys were in the process of testing this last point⁴⁷.]

Shortly after his invention of "chocolate powder", C.J. Van Houten introduced another variation ... It was observed that "Chocolate Powder" prepared with alkalized cocoa was darker in color, milder in flavour, and appeared to be more readily mixable with, (they called it "soluble in"), warm water.⁵¹

Othick gives a convincing account of the effect on the cocoa market of this process, which dates from the 1860s:

For reasons which are difficult to discern, the new type of cocoa proved more acceptable to most palates, and the old product was gradually supplanted. The success of the alkaline variety of cocoa probably owed much to the fact that it was pioneered by Van Houten, who were already a well established name in a wide range of markets. The major British firms were at first reluctant to use the new method because they maintained that it represented a return to adulteration, and that absolutely pure cocoa essence could not be improved upon. However, they were eventually forced to follow suit when it became clear that the alkaline cocoa was proving more popular than the pure cocoa⁵².

This seems a fairly accurate account as far as *Cadburys* were concerned. The question of whether to produce an alkalized cocoa does not appear have been discussed until 1905, when it was decided to call the product "Bournville Cocoa", to put the firm's name on it and to label it, "prepared by Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Bournville, according to the Dutch method". Even so, the firm was cautious in its approach to launching the new line. Initially machinery was set up to produce only 2 to 3 tons per week and to try it out:

on the market in S.Africa, Queensland and New Zealand only, (where the sale of Essence is practically nil), and to give it a thoroughly fair trial by sampling &c. Afterwards it will be considered for the Home trade⁵³

At one point the Board even retreated from this cautious policy and decided to launch the new Bournville Cocoa in New Zealand only for a year. However, the product was actually put on the market early in 1906, with preparations for a weekly output of 10 tons per week. After only a few months, during which time experiments were carried out with colouring Bournville cocoa, the necessary machinery was put in hand to expand output to 20 tons per week. At the same time, after careful

tests, it was decided to use a process from a German cocoa machinery firm, Bauermeister, to press cocoa for both Essence and Bournville Cocoa⁵⁴.

1905, then, was a crucial year in the firm's history in terms of the products which would ensure its future prosperity. Both C.D.M. and Bournville Cocoa were introduced under pressure from foreign competition, which *Cadburys* was well aware that it had to meet. In both cases the firm studied carefully the processes used abroad, insofar as this was possible; it bought the appropriate machinery from the same suppliers as its competitors, primarily from Germany; and in its cautious approach to these new lines the firm does not appear to have been aware of how important they would become. In no sense can *Cadburys* be seen as having been market leaders in the international cocoa and chocolate industry of the 1900s. Othick's assessment seems fair:

there was from an early stage an awareness of what was going on abroad, a willingness to imitate anything that looked worth imitating. Both Rowntrees and Cadburys were assiduous visitors to international exhibitions and trade fairs in various parts of Europe, always on the look-out for new ideas. This tends to reinforce the belief that we are here dealing with imitators rather than innovators; but, of course, imitators are often more successful than innovators⁵⁵.

In the years before WW1 C.D.M. became the most important chocolate line and production of Bournville Cocoa overtook Cocoa Essence (see Table 4.8).

This then, was the market situation faced by *Cadburys* in the 1900s. If the firm later came to dominate the home and colonial markets, then it was due to the decisions taken and the products launched in the early years of this century. This was the context in which the substantive welfare policies were started, and their introduction needs to be examined in relation to their context.

Table 4.8 Goods Made in Tons, 1890 - 1914⁵⁶

I; 1890-1900

	1890	1891	1892	# 1894	# 1898	1899	1900
Essence					1591		
Total Cocoa	1137	1229	1156	1345	1628	2073	2163
Best Plain Choc,					332		
Mexican					164		
Milk Choc,					44		
Total Best Choc,	360	452	436	488	540	677	749
Common Plain Choc,	501	609	561	523	817	909	1050
Specialities				446	846	↓Spec	&Creme↓
Crems	1098	1249	1372	1057	1729	↑3114	3490↑
Butter and							
Shellqty Sold	676	758	801	938	1145	1404	1466
Total	3778	4297	4347	4877	6841	8222	8990

II; 1901-1907

	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907
Essence	2238	2286	2263	2471	2192	2320	1983
Bournville Cocoa						158	642
Total Cocoas	2305	2358	2345	2534	2279	2552	2715
Best Plain Choc,	681	524	536	435	402	393	388
Mexican	299	160	165	181	170	188	183
Milk Choc,	79	140	271	351	292	304	289
Milk with Nuts						84	328
C.D.M,					142	352	424
C.D.M, with Nuts							
Bournville with & without nuts						2	50
Total Best Plain Chocolate	1071	833	972	967	1019	1327	1663
Common Plain Choc,	1176	1011	986	863	892	888	1010
Specialities	1264	1418	1386	1450	1488	1649	1953
Crems	2770	2873	2608	2409	2467	2352	2603
Biscuits	142	185	214	184	157	127	146
Butter and							
Shellqty Sold	1486	1656	1624	1663	1467	1622	1003
Total Goods	10317	10449	10268	10193	9890	10645	11242

(Table 4.8 Continued)
III: 1908-1914

	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914
Essence	1707	1482	1085	1028	960	872	714
Bournville Cocoa	706	827	886	907	1139	1116	901
Total Cocoas	2515	2413	2268	2114	2340	2251	2136
Best Plain Choc.	443	418	416	430	462	485	399
Mexican	187	182	206	237	277	320	333
Milk Choc.	340	350	351	298	284	301	267
Milk with Nuts	389	430	692	495	409	344	236
C.D.M.	450	476	1141	1407	1927	2486	2813
C.D.M. with Nuts			55	284	542	772	991
Bournville with & without nuts	85	104	216	360	531	732	854
Total Best Plain Chocolate	1894	1960	3077	3511	4432	5440	5929
Common Plain Choc.	981	817	1141	1386	1467	1501	1552
Specialities	2077	2174	2451	2710	3211	3643	3411
Cremes	2465	2470	2859	3019	3285	3522	2752
Biscuits	189	211	283	214	267	308	271
Butter and Shellqty Sold	1020	844	615	Butteronly 711	→ → → → → → → → ↓ 756	733	613
Total Goods	11319	11053	12886	13859	15982	17606	16801

A Private Limited Company

Richard Cadbury, who had run the firm in partnership with his brother George since 1861, died in March 1899 aged 64. George Cadbury was 60, so it was by no means too soon to bring some younger members of the family into the senior positions in the firm. Richard's sons, Barrow Cadbury (1862 -1958) and William A. Cadbury, (1867 -1957, were already working for the firm; as were George's sons, Edward, (1873 - 1948), and George Junior, (1878 - 1954). By a prior arrangement Richard and George had agreed that if either one of them died, the survivor would convert the business into a company⁵⁷. This was done, and the four cousins joined the Committee of Management of the firm. The first meeting of the new Board took place on the 18th April, 1899. It was an inauspicious meeting, only nine short items were minuted, including the appointment of a Works foreman and Edward Cadbury arranging for 20 "new girls" to be started⁵⁸. Shortly afterwards, in June, the name of the firm was changed to Cadbury Bros. Ltd.⁵⁹

The new Board met weekly, and at the second meeting the duties to be undertaken by the five Directors were allocated. Twenty separate duties were listed; the four younger Directors took on most of them, with two of them taking responsibility for each item in most cases. Barrow Cadbury, had joined the firm permanently in January 1882:

he was first set to gain experience in many branches of the business, working in both the cocoa and the chocolate departments. He claimed that he had learned the job thoroughly from the bottom and had shared in all the ordinary work.

He was then associated with the sales side⁶⁰ as well as doing work "in the nature of personal assistance to his father and uncle"⁶¹. He was made responsible by the new Board for Cocoa Buying and Travellers (with his brother William), and for Export and Export Travellers (with Edward).

William A. Cadbury had entered the business in June 1887, after working "in the engineering shop of J.J. Seekings, Gloucester, predecessor of W. Sisson and Co. Ltd.", (the Quaker firm which *Cadburys* later took an interest in) for some time in 1884 and, in 1886, gaining "some eight months experience in the machine shop and drawing office of the well-known German cocoa and chocolate firm of Stollwerck". At Bournville:

He was mainly engaged on the engineering side, taking responsibility for the maintenance of the buildings and plant, the introduction of new machinery and processes, and the selection and engagement of male labour.

From 1888 to 1892 he was required to work as a traveller, once every six weeks or so, "in keeping with the tradition of the Firm". It is his signature, incidently, which has become the familiar trademark of *Cadburys*.⁶² As a Director, as well as the duties he shared with Barrow, William took responsibility for Advertising (with Edward), and for Machinery and "Men and Work" (with George Jnr.).

After his entry into the firm in 1893, Edward Cadbury was closely related with the growth in foreign trade.⁶³ George Cadbury Jnr. had started at University College, London in 1896, where he studied science, but he had to abandon university after only one year because

he was required in the family business.^{e4} When he became a Director, at only 21 years of age, he shared with his brother Edward the duties for "Women and Work", paying out wages, and the "Monthly returns book".^{e5}

The Board soon became aware of a need for delegation and a more systematic way of working. After William suggested that periodical reports from the various Sub-Committees should be brought to the Board, he and Barrow were asked to suggest an agenda for future meetings. The agenda they brought forward listed about 100 periodical reports "to be laid before the Directors meetings through the year ... to be called for the first meeting in each month". Most of these reports did appear, but they were rarely discussed. On the whole all they consisted of were lists, or tables of figures; they were not the kind of reports which would stimulate discussion or require decisions and so they were simply submitted and then filed. The list of reports to be submitted in January shows this well enough:

Total men employed; Total women employed; Men over 50 years old; Men and Women over 20 years Service; Easter Eggs; Cocoa Ess. weighing, and returns of sizes of packets and tins made; New machinery bought; London Parcels; Girls work hours; Daybooks Cash (Quarterly); Travellers return (Annual Statement); Comparison of number of orders received (Quarterly); Clerks, number employed and wages; Bad debts.^{e6}

If it was the case that around the turn of the century, in American manufacturing industry, "some way was needed to put 'method' into the management of firms" and that, "To exercise authority so as to provide co-ordination requires information and time to use it,"^{e7} then *Cadburys* appear to have been seeking for solutions to similar problems in their tentative steps to organise the Board's work. With the four new, younger Directors on the Board, allocated to specific duties, the firm could devote the necessary time, thought and energy to the exercise of authority. However, what it yet had to do was to delegate sufficiently to be able to ensure that the Directors were not deluged with useless information and that the right sort of information reached them. If anything the new Directors can be seen as having fallen for the kind of empiricism which characterised some of their

later social investigations where perhaps it was more likely that the facts could speak for themselves.⁶⁸ It is doubtful whether the detailed statistical profile revealed in these interminable reports meant very much at the time they were submitted.

Learning From Other Firms

Where *Cadburys* did not have to interpret information was when it was coming from outside the firm. As has already been noted, *Cadburys* were keen to learn from other cocoa and chocolate and engineering firms the secrets of the art of manufacturing. However, the willingness to learn from abroad developed beyond just observing the manufacturing processes, into a general awareness of a range of initiatives taken by other firms, included their welfare provisions.

The way in which this awareness developed can be observed in relation to Stollwerck Bros. of Cologne, the German chocolate firm which William A. Cadbury had spent time at in the 1880s. Just after starting work for *Cadburys*, George Cadbury Jnr. spent 6 months visiting *Stollwercks'* factories in Germany and in Pressburg, Hungary. This was in 1897 or '98, and the purpose of his time there was "to study the techniques of manufacturing chocolate, in which two continental firms then surpassed us"⁶⁹. In 1900 Louis Barrow, "a cousin of the Cadbury family", was appointed as Engineer to the firm⁷⁰. He and George Cadbury Jnr. visited Hamburg and Cologne and on their return gave a report to the Board on chocolate-making machinery, some of which it was agreed to order from Germany, including a Milk Chocolate Mixer. George Cadbury Jnr. also gave a detailed report on the "Dining Arrangements, Baths etc. of Stollwerck Bros." The facilities provided there included a kitchen built to provide 1,000 diners, with several dining rooms; two for the general public, one each for men and women; and separate dining rooms for the women employed, men, foremen and forewomen. There were "douches" and baths available for men and women, which they could use for a small charge. A library containing 2,000 books provided free membership to factory employees. A "flourishing choral Society" made use of the Concert Hall and Theatre provided.⁷¹

+ Memor in F.

Stollwercks were ahead of *Cadburys* in each of these provisions. The next year, 1900, a Musical Society was formed at *Bournville*, but, like the Dramatic Society (founded in 1912), it had to find space in the various dining rooms. It was not until 1927 that the Concert Hall, "with its well-equipped stage, dressing rooms, and auditorium seating over a thousand people, was built". The Mens' and "Girls'" Recreation Grounds had been opened in 1896 and were improved on subsequently. In 1902, in commemoration of the coronation of King Edward VII, the firm made a gift of a pavilion for the men's ground, which was "equipped with shower baths and a gymnasium". An open-air swimming bath was also built for the men.⁷²

It was in August 1900 that the Board decided to put up a Girls Swimming Bath, with provision for hot baths above the dressing rooms, and Edward Cadbury was delegated to find out more and to obtain an estimate of the cost. When plans were submitted in September the next year, and an estimate given of £6,500, it was decided that before proceeding the baths at Cologne and Brussels should be inspected. Subsequently the pool was built, and Williams gives a glowing account of the facilities which were provided:

the splendid girls' swimming bath, which is 80 feet long by 45 feet wide, and is equipped with many accessories in the way of spray baths, slipper baths, hair-drying apparatus and the like. These baths are in use all the year round; being kept at an even temperature by a steam system.⁷³

So, lavish as the women's swimming pool undoubtedly was when it materialised, the idea of providing it was hardly an original one. In fact "bath houses" for employees were quite commonly provided by German employers in the 1890s as part of welfare provisions; just about every German employer mentioned by N.P. Gilman had some such provision, although swimming baths were rare. In France, at the *Chocolat Menier Works*:

Bath-houses and laundries meet the needs of the population for cleanliness.⁷⁴

Regarding another of the facilities at *Stollwercks*, *Cadburys* already had ample dining space for their workers. However, at the end

of 1899 George Cadbury Jnr. and Alfred Fasham, who was Works Foreman from 1900 to 1906, visited the dining rooms provided by William Hartley, (another non-Conformist, a primitive Methodist) for the workers in his jam factory at Aintree, near Liverpool. He also saw the provisions made at *Levers* and at *Barons'* of Leeds. William and George Cadbury Jnr. were directed to consider the suggestions made in the latter's report, and given the power to carry them out, "such as they think desirable"⁷⁵. Improvements were made in *Cadburys'* kitchen arrangements as a result, and the rules for workers using the facilities were relaxed a bit; it was recommended that smoking be allowed in areas apart from the actual Dining Rooms and that the checks of plates and cups etc. should be abolished. Incidentally, the dining facilities appear to have been well used at this time, it was reported that 1400 to 1500 women dined at the Works.⁷⁶

Profit Sharing Plans

Another initiative which the *Cadburys* Board noted the details of in 1900, was the "Scheme of Profit Sharing" which the cocoa and chocolate firm, Clarke, Nicholls and Coombs, Ltd., had operated since 1890 at their "Clarnico" Works in Hackney which employed over 2,000 workers, mostly women, during its busy season. The scheme worked as follows:

After paying the ordinary Shareholders 6% on their capital, the surplus profits are divided in equal proportions between the Work-people and the Shareholders ... All those who have worked one year participate in the Bonus.

During 1899, "£56,000 was paid in weekly wages, or including the Bonus £63,750". So, although it was called a "Profit Sharing" scheme, the workers did not actually own any shares and they did not have any control of the company; it was just an annual bonus assessed on profits in effect.⁷⁷ *Cadburys* did not introduce the "Prosperity-sharing Scheme" until 1923; and this, like the Clarke, Nicholls and Coombs Scheme, did not involve the workers actually owning shares. The firm paid a "dividend" on a notional block of shares held on behalf of the employees. The money went into the Welfare Fund, on which the first call was payment for short-time, the balance was distributed among

employees in proportions assessed on their age, length of service, and sex.⁷⁴

There was no reason given as to why *Cadburys* did not introduce any kind of profit-sharing in the 1900s. Certainly the reluctance to cede any control of the company must in part explain it.⁷⁵ However, the striking feature of many of the so-called profit-sharing schemes which were started in the 1880s and 1890s, is that they did not in fact involve giving workers any real say in the running of the business in which they worked. In the main they were bonus schemes designed in such a way as to try to enlist the enthusiastic support of the workers for the employers to run their business as they saw fit. In no way can such schemes be conceived of as some sort of "halfway house" by which workers could move towards replacing the employer by having "some voice in management".⁷⁶ These schemes were seen as an antidote to socialist ideas among the workforce, (and later, the Conservative Party saw them as antidotes to nationalisation), or as panaceas for industrial relations. As modifications of the wages system, F.W. Taylor was probably right to criticise them for being blunt and ineffective instruments when used as incentive schemes. At the more ideological level, as attempts to institute some sort of co-partnership, they could be backward looking and paternalistic, as at *Levers*.⁷⁷

Gilman saw the movement from actual profit sharing agreements to welfare-institutions as the insertion of an "intermediate stage":

Practically they result, however, in an 'indirect dividend to labour', ... They depend for their existence upon realized profits, made in the usual way, and appropriated in part by the employer for the benefit of his workpeople, purely at his own discretion and usually under no agreement with the employees.⁷⁸

It would be better to see the provision of welfare as a refinement of some of the ideas behind profit-sharing. The latter essentially consisted of a bonus accompanied by more or less paternalistic rules or exhortations, and were prone to rejection in toto or breakdown when there were losses. The provision of welfare *institutions* was a more accurately directed intervention in the lives of the workers. As such it can be seen as superceding the kind of all-consuming concern with

every aspect of the worker's life entailed in paternalism as represented by profit-sharing schemes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.¹³³ It does not appear to have been a conscious decision on the part of *Cadburys*, but in attempting to incorporate the most up-to-date thinking on welfare into their business the firm appear to have missed out an element of an intermediate paternalistic stage in the development of welfare techniques represented by profit-sharing. The later Prosperity-sharing Scheme at *Cadburys* was not part of the earlier profit-sharing movement. Through the Welfare Fund and the short-time payments what was provided was what has been called a "common scheme", (as opposed to the more individualised profit-sharing systems) in which general conditions for the workers were actually altered.¹³⁴ Where profit sharing merely hoped to induce workers to respond in this or that way, welfare provisions, being more direct, did not require a response in the same way.

Sick Pay

This refinement in welfare is illustrated in a small way by another of the provisions advertised by Clarke, Nicholls and Coombs, where, "In case of sickness employees are paid two-thirds of their wages for 6 weeks. In case of death their representatives receive £5.¹³⁵ Up until 1903 there was in operation at *Cadburys* a "Sick Club, and Infectious Diseases Fund". At the close of 1899 it had 2,460 members who paid £1,655 in subscriptions. £897 was paid out in sick pay to members and a further £48 was donated towards funerals. The firm met half the cost of the funeral donations as well as making a contribution of £125 to the Sick Club. The report of the Sick Club for 1899 informed the Board that:

During the year 843 'declaring-on' notes have been received and most of the cases have received visits from one or other of the two Nurses employed by the firm.¹³⁶

A Sick Club in some form may have existed when the firm was still at Bridge Street¹³⁷. At the end of 1902, however, the firm decided to abolish the Sick Club:

and in lieu ourselves to pay Sick pay, the same to be at the rate of half average wages. The amount however not to exceed 12/- per week for men, and 9/- per week for girls. ... Sick pay to be made through the wages books, on certificate to be furnished by nurses. Infectious disease fund payments, also funeral allowances in full to be made by the Firm at the rates as before.

Scales of sick pay rates and funeral donations were drawn up according to age and sex, with men also receiving a funeral donation in case of their wife's death.²³ By administering sick pay themselves the firm was not consciously setting out to undermine their workers' independence, and the new scheme was clearly more generous. What was gained was a more systematic administration, with the firm being able to monitor *all* cases of sickness through the nurses in return for a sick pay guaranteed at known rates. There was no question of discretion in any payments, on the other hand it fell to the nurses paid by the firm to define sickness. (In 1919 a voluntary contributory scheme was returned, to which the firm paid 50% of all costs.)²⁴

Contacts with other Companies

Visits to other firms in order to find out about welfare provisions continued, and developed into reciprocal arrangements with some other employers, for example Peak Freans, the biscuit manufactures. As *Cadburys* developed more fully their own welfare, these fact-finding visits were not made with the intention of emulating provisions elsewhere but for the purpose of assessing other firms' facilities in comparison to *Cadburys* and to discuss points of mutual interest. For example, *Bryant and May's* Diamond Match Factory near Liverpool was visited in August 1904, (they had obviously reformed themselves since the Match-girls' Strike in 1888); although *Cadburys* were impressed by the ventilation in the work-rooms where phosphorous was used and noted that, "The whole buildings are a model of their best factory in America... the most disappointing part of the whole place was the dining room, which was in the basement". It was observed that at *Peak Freans*:

they are much hampered from want of room from imitating us in dining and other accommodations and in social work but are very anxious to do all in their power.

When the Men and "Girls" Works Committees were set up at Bournville in 1905 consideration of various aspects of factory organisation at other firms could be delegated to them. A few months after it started work the Mens Works Committee studied a report on a visit to Crosfields; including their profit-sharing scheme, about which it was decided to enter into correspondence. It was also decided to have notices of the Factory Act posted in the Bournville Works.³⁰

As has been seen already, *Cadburys* were not at all reluctant to travel abroad in order to obtain information about manufacturing processes or to look after their interests in other ways. Immediately after he had started working for the firm Barrow Cadbury was sent to the U.S.A. and Canada for two months with the Works Foreman. Although this was for Barrow's health, and in order for him to be introduced to the American side, it was also "in part a business training trip". One result of the trip was "the establishment of American and Canadian agencies".³¹ In June 1901 Edward Cadbury returned from a 5 month tour of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The Board held a special meeting to consider his report, which was mostly concerned with marketing. In Australia the cocoa market was dominated by *Frys* and *Van Houtens*, and in the chocolate trade Edward Cadbury thought there was a need for advertising in order to "educate" customers "to appreciate a good class of chocolate". However, he went further than this in safeguarding the firm's interests; considering the possibility of tariffs being imposed; he reported that:

I granted £50 to the funds of the Free Trade party as no doubt a great deal of pressure will be put on both sides by the local manufacturers, and I also saw C.M. Reid, the leader of the Free Trade Party.

I am anxious that when the tariff is fixed we should have equal consideration with others.³²

George Cadbury Jnr.'s Visit to America

In the same year, 1901, George Cadbury Jnr. made a trip abroad which was especially significant. It was probably seen as part of his

training, and as the youngest of the four new Directors he was presumably the one most easily spared; however, this appears to have been the first tour *specifically* concerned with gaining information on industrial organisation. According to W. Marks, George Cadbury Jnr.,

went to America and saw in a few enlightened firms there schemes by which employers could make known to the management their ideas and suggestions about improving products and working conditions.³³

In fact the visit assumed more significance than this implies. At the Special Meeting of the Board which considered matters arising out of George Cadbury Jnr.'s report six items of particular interest were minuted:

- 1) "Suggestions and Complaints. Agreed to try the Suggestion and Complaint desks as used by the National Cash Register Co., arrangements to be made for those not at Bournville (travellers and fixers etc) to hand in the same."
- 2) "Suggestion to set a man apart to look to getting new goods to have further consideration."
- 3) The question of "Lantern Lectures on Social Betterment" was referred to George Cadbury Jnr. and E.S. Thackray, (who was responsible for advertising) to make enquiries.
- 4) Picture postcards of Bournville; a series to be started.
- 5) "Each Visitor to receive cocoa and chocolate samples with pamphlets (ills'd) of the Works and Village".
- 6) "Agreed to consider the question of opening part of the Works to Visitors next year."³⁴

Each of these points was followed up and in some instances led to the creation of important and substantial institutions at the Bournville Works. The idea of some sort of "Invention Scheme" was first considered in May, 1899, when Edward Cadbury suggested to the Board that:

Some steps be taken to interest the younger employees in improvement suggestions on inventions which would further the work of the place.³⁵

However, it seems as if this idea had to wait until George Cadbury Jnr. reported back on a scheme that was already in operation before *Cadburys* would implement it. It was left to George Cadbury Jnr. to draw up the details of the Suggestion Scheme, which was inaugurated in May,

1902.⁹⁶ From the outset separate committees considered suggestions from the men and the women. When the Suggestion Committees became the Men's and "Girls'" Works Committees, in 1905, the latter continued to deal with the womens' suggestions, but the Mens' Suggestion Committee was reconstituted with 3 members being selected by employees, two elected by the foremen, and two representing the Board. Prizes were awarded according to, "the general principle of ... the value of the suggestion in saving time, labour or material". In his book, *Experiments in Industrial Organization*, Edward Cadbury recognised the value of the scheme beyond merely cutting costs:

No doubt efficiency at Bournville is assisted by the Suggestion Scheme, not only in pecuniary value but also in the development of the mental and creative power which makes both men and girls more efficient and valuable workers, and fosters an intelligent independence.⁹⁷

Judging by the attention Williams gave the Scheme, it was considered something of a centrepiece at the Bournville Works.⁹⁸ By 1910 both the men and the women were submitting well over 1,000 suggestions each year.⁹⁹

As for point number 2), it was George Cadbury Jnr. again who was assigned to work out the details for setting up a "small Experimental Department".¹⁰⁰ Item 4) was the first and most easily carried out; 60,000 postcards in 6 different designs were ordered.¹⁰¹ The pamphlets for visitors were already available, with the earlier decision to order 1/4 million copies of *the Factory in a Garden* booklet which contained a brief description of the factory emphasising the facilities provided as well as views of the Works.¹⁰² The National Cash Register Co. developed a stream of factory publications for advertising purposes and for communicating with employees of the firm, especially the sales force. The house organ, *The N.C.R.*, was first issued in 1892, and many other U.S. firms started factory publications in the late 1890s and early 1900s.¹⁰³ One of the first British house journals started in 1895. Lever's *Progress* began in 1899, and the *Cocoa Works Magazine* was first issued by Rowntrees in 1902.¹⁰⁴ Cadburys had started a *Travellers Weekly Circular* as early as 1891, an introductory letter which went out with the first issue explained why:

The number of our representatives having considerably increased, we find it most desirable that we should preserve the spirit of unity amongst them, and also it is of importance that they should be advised promptly of any information of importance.¹⁰⁵

Even though Edward Cadbury first suggested "a magazine for the works" in November 1899¹⁰⁶, it was not until the end of 1902, in response to a Suggestion from the Works, that the *Bournville Works Magazine* was started. Each employee was given a free copy¹⁰⁷ and in the first issue, which came out in November 1902, its intended purpose was set out:

It will embrace all departments, and it is the object of the paper to reflect as fully as possible every aspect of the social and industrial life at Bournville ...

But above all, the aim of the paper is to promote what for lack of a better word we may describe as the Bournville 'Spirit' - to foster comradeship and good fellowship, and to add one more to the links binding together the community at Bournville in mutual service.¹⁰⁸

The B.W.M. continued until January 1969 when it was announced that "one of the great Bournville institutions" would be replaced by a publication serving the recently formed Cadbury-Schweppes Group as a whole.¹⁰⁹

The Visitors Department was also to become an important Bournville institution. While there had already been informal visits to Bournville, most likely in connection with the Village and the Garden City movement, in 1902 it was decided to authorise the firm's travellers to encourage customers to visit Bournville. The letter sent out to the travellers outlines the usefulness that the Directors saw in such visits, although it shows that they were reluctant at first to follow J.H. Patterson's example by letting visitors into the factory:¹¹⁰

Our travellers at home and abroad report that a visit to Bournville has in nearly every case created a favourable impression in the minds of customers. The directors therefore have concluded to make it easier for them to see the social work connected with the company is connected with the family, such as the Village and Almshouses ...

P.S. In giving orders for admission do not lead customers to think they will see Works.'''

Subsequently visitors were allowed into the Works, although initially only specially selected parties which were taken round in small groups.''' In September 1906, "a specially invited party of representatives from the leading newspapers were entertained and shown over the Works and Village, it cost the firm £180 to lay on this visit. It may seem as if this is an incidental and trivial aspect of the firm's activities, but the numbers involved are quite astounding, especially as the general public came to be invited. Although the visits were discontinued for a time with the outbreak of World War Two, it was not until the late 1960s that their usefulness to the firm was seriously questioned (see Table 4.9)''.

Table 4.9 Numbers of Visitors to Bournville

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>
1903	3,844	
1904*	4,840	£103
1905*	7,414	£170
1906*	9,188	£292
1909	12,779	
1913	19,734	
1927	37,180	
1928	52,273	
1929	91,179	
1930	135,553	
1938	163,827	

* "Excluding almost daily small parties estimated at 2,500,"

Budgett Meakin

Implementing point 5) arising from George Cadbury Jnr.'s visit to America, "Lantern Lectures on Social Betterment", led to an interesting and amusing episode. George Cadbury and his son, George Jnr., secured the services of one Budgett Meakin as a lecturer on Social Betterment at the end of 1901. He was to be engaged for 3 years, paid a salary and supplied with a lantern. It was decided from the outset that

although *Cadburys* supported Meakin's idea for the formation of a "Social Betterment League", this could not be formed for so long as Meakin was working for them and competing firms were excluded from his lectures because it would be "something like false pretences". Even so, it was decided that it would look better if Meakin appeared to be independent and that his lectures "must be under some organisation". Therefore it was agreed that he should work under the auspices of the Garden City Association, with *Cadburys* paying his expenses through the Bournville Village Trust. His salary was to be an honorarium from the Trust and there was to be no appearance of this item in *Cadburys'* balance sheet. Meakin's "Shaftsbury Lecture" on the housing problem, which he said would "point to the various schemes, public and private, that have already done a great deal towards lessening the evil", were, not surprisingly, favourably noticed in the Cadbury owned *Daily News*.

Towards the end of his contract the Directors received a suggestion from Meakin for the formation of a British Institute of Social Service, but they felt "unable to enter into this larger scheme". The next month, in September 1903, the Board replied to a letter from Meakin stating that they had "no intention of renewing the contract" for his lectures, because "they will have had their day" after 3 years, but that:

We are interested in your scheme for the founding of a Social Institute, and shall be glad to send you a subscription for the first year of £50, and also to allow our name to stand with those of Lever Bros. and Chivers, as firms who are anxious to forward anything in the direction of social betterment among the working classes.

Meakin was clearly disgruntled at not getting his contract renewed and expressed his opinion that not only had he expected that he would continue to be employed by the firm but that he had hoped for a salary increase as well! At this point he revealed himself as a bit of a sharp character, when he wrote:

You must forgive me if I sometimes found it difficult to understand whether I spoke to a Director, a Trustee [of the B.V.T.] or an individual, but I have never known what proportions of the funds placed at my disposal were contributed by the firm, the 'special Propoganda Fund' of

the Bournville Village Trust ... or from individuals: nor do I ask.

Still, he must have realised that he would be unwise to fall out with the Cadburys if he wanted their backing for his new venture and if he was to be able to carry on with the lectures he had been giving. So he wrote thanking them for their £50 contribution and reassuring them that:

With regard to my lecture on model factory conditions, you need have no fear of my giving any details regarding manufacture, as the only reference I shall make to it will be to point out the beneficial effect of such surroundings and care for employees on the articles produced, their purity and general quality ...

My intention in this lecture is to treat successively each phase of the subject, illustrating them by views from whatever factories or stores provided the best examples. The phases would be such as Position of Factory (in a garden): Construction and Adornment (light, ventilation, cleanliness, colour on walls etc, plants and creepers): Provision for the Comfort and Health of Employees, (cloak rooms, baths, rest rooms, doctors and nurses, dining facilities, etc.) Provision for the Physical, Intellectual and Moral Training of Employees, (the social secretary, recreation, reading rooms, classes, suggestion boxes, etc.), the Employees at home: (housing, gardens, education, clubs, provision for sickness and old age, etc.) This is a mere incomplete outline, but you will realize how often Bournville will be called upon to illustrate a point, and how much more valuable from a business point of view this will be than if I were to give a big dose of it all at once.

As well as Bournville, Meakin had been to a large number of factories in Europe and America¹¹⁵, collecting information for his lectures. He subsequently used this in his book, *Model Factories and Villages*, which has a photo of *Cadburys Works* in the frontspiece and which gives generous attention to Bournville throughout. As his letter indicates, the attributes of what constituted a "model" factory were chosen so as to portray *Cadburys* in a favourable light. Future researchers must be warned against using Meakin's valuable book without being aware of the bias in his selection and the views of the employers who he represented.¹¹⁶ This whole episode serves as an antidote to the idea that *Cadburys* were at all times motivated by lofty ideals.

The Significance of the National Cash Register Company

It would be useful to examine in more detail the significance of George Cadbury Jnr.'s visit to the U.S.A., and to the National Cash Register Company (N.C.R.) in particular. *N.C.R.* was the leader in its industry and can be seen as an example of the type of American firms which Litterer examined; "concerned with the design and manufacture of metal products", and whose very success led to their development of "Systematic Management".¹¹⁷ At *N.C.R.*, as a result of a consignment of faulty registers being returned from Europe in 1894,¹¹⁸ costing the firm some fifty thousand dollars, and after several strikes and lockouts, the president of the firm, John H. Patterson, a perverse and arbitrary character, decided to introduce a "sweeping welfare program". Patterson's flamboyance and his "unorthodox methods" insured that his measures attracted wide attention - and controversy". In Nelson's view:

It would have been difficult to find a large manufacturer in 1900 [in the U.S.A.] who had not heard of Patterson or his spectacular schemes.

The welfare plan at *N.C.R.*:

had a marked impact on the development of systematic welfare work [and] foreshadowed the future course of welfare activity, notably the shift in emphasis from housing and community work to factory working conditions.¹¹⁹

It is impossible not to see that *N.C.R.* had anticipated nearly all of the developments which took place at *Cadburys* in the 1900s, and it is probably worth while dealing with some of these developments in relation to *N.C.R.* to some extent. For example, according to Sir Adrian Cadbury:

The importance of committees in our company structure stems directly from the Quaker influence of the founders.¹²⁰

However, it is clear even from the firm's own historian that the committee system did not emerge until the 1900s:

as in 1899 the number of heads of the firm had been increased from two to five, so not many years later some definite system of delegating managerial duties (though

without shifting the final responsibility from the Directorate) had to be evolved. This took three forms: the subdivision of work by the establishment of new specialised departments; *the creation of management committees* responsible to the Board for various spheres of activity; and the recognition of a definite managerial staff. (emphasis added)

The Men's and Women's Works Committees, which were started in 1905, were:

general managerial committees which dealt with a great many varied activities, largely connected with welfare work, in the factory.¹²¹

A contemporary observer, N.P. Gilman, noted how J.H. Patterson and his brother, who was the vice-president of *N.C.R.*, had "reorganized the usual factory regime...

The entire business is conducted, under the direction of the president, vice president and general manager, by a series of committees.¹²²

Nelson describes how Patterson,

drastically altered the managerial hierarchy, abolishing the post of superintendent and creating a unique and highly decentralised *committee system*. Henceforth an executive committee made up of the officers dealt with long term problems while a factory committee consisting of department heads operated the plant.¹²³

Cadburys never went so far with their committee system, and when the duties allotted to each of the three committees operating in the works, (the foreman's Executive, the foreman's Committee, and the Suggestion Committee, renamed the Work's Committee in January 1905) were set out, they could by no means be said to have constituted operating the plant. In fact the Men's Works' Committee was characterised by its deference to the Board for even minor decisions, even after the scope of its work was enlarged in 1908¹²⁴. There is no actual evidence that the idea for *Cadburys* Committee system came from Dayton Ohio, but there is no more real evidence that its evolution owed anything to the Quaker influence. The latter seems unlikely as a convincing explanation however; the caution with which the firm set up their committees hardly bears the hall mark of any inspiration on their part. It is more likely that

Cadburys, who seem to have had few innovations themselves, partially incorporated a system which George Cadbury Junior had observed working at *N.C.R.* to meet their own emerging managerial requirements.

There is another aspect of *N.C.R.* which is of interest because it highlights how *Cadburys* were quite different and, possibly, better able to institute welfare practices than many employers. In the summer of 1901 there was "a widely publicized labour dispute" at *N.C.R.*:

it was widely - and mistakenly - believed by businessmen and the public generally that welfare work was responsible for the strike and lockout that closed the plant ... and led to the reassessment of Patterson's program. ¹²⁵

In fact the dispute was precipitated by the recruitment of an old style foreman:

As *N.C.R.* expanded in the 1890s and the demand for supervisory personnel increased, Patterson and his subordinates often raided other firms, attracting experienced men with offers of higher wages. Most of the newcomers adjusted to the Patterson system of management with relative ease. But one ... proved to be a continual source of embarrassment and contention. Reputed to be a successful manager ... [he] nevertheless had serious deficiencies that made him an anachronism in the *N.C.R.* environment. An unmerciful 'driver', an example of the abusive, authoritarian type of foreman who flourished under the old style of supervision ... He was belligerent, overbearing and ... strongly anti-union.

When this foreman started sacking union men Patterson backed him up and the conflict culminated in a lockout of all 2,300 production workers on May 3rd 1901. Where before Patterson had impulsively supported union organisation of his workers and agreed contracts with twenty or so unions, after the dispute ended, and the strikers had returned to work as non-union workers, he "refused to enter into formal contracts ... and the welfare program and Labor department gradually undermined the unionists' strength". Although he curtailed certain of the welfare activities:

Patterson's basic commitment to welfare work was in no way altered. *N.C.R.* remained a pioneer in the field long after the conflict was forgotten.

More significantly Patterson realized the need to change the way the factory was run at the lowest level, to prevent foremen operating in the traditional way. To do this he started a new Labor Department, which had more far-ranging powers than the Employment Department which preceded it:

The *N.C.R.* Labor Department became the first modern personnel department in American industry ... Designed to curtail the powers of ... foremen ... the *N.C.R.* Labor Department anticipated the personnel management movement of the World War I period and thereafter.¹²⁶

George Cadbury Jnr. must have visited *N.C.R.* around the time of the strike and lockout; whether he was there before, during, or after the dispute, it is not clear, but the dispute must have been known about at *Cadburys* by the time they came to discuss the proposals arising out of his visit. Still, *Cadburys* do not appear to have been put off by Patterson assuming an anti-union stance, they continued to take notice of developments at *N.C.R.*. In 1902 a report on the Girls' Gymnasium at *N.C.R.* came before the Board.¹²⁷ Soon after it started, in 1905, the Mens Works committee circulated articles from the "*National Cash Register Co.'s Book*"; which they decided to pass on to the editor of the *Works Magazine*.¹²⁸ Some time later, in 1913, Laurence Cadbury, (1889-1982), George Cadbury's son, was given a year off from working at Bournville to allow him to travel. He went to America and spent part of his time working for *N.C.R.*, where he took an interest in punched-card machines, which meant that *Cadburys* was to the fore in their use up until the time when the first computer was bought.¹²⁹ In 1921 it was the Mens Works Council which came up with a suggestion to show an *N.C.R.* film, *Efficiency*, to members of the staff, the Councils, and the foremen and women.¹³⁰ According to his biographer, "Patterson was probably the first to take up the industrial use of the motion picture."¹³¹ Whether or not he was, *Cadburys* were not slow to take up the idea, by 1933 they were making their own sound films showing how chocolate was made.¹³²

The way in which *Cadburys* followed *N.C.R.* does throw into question the dichotomy set up by John Child, in which:

Industrial welfare may ... be distinguished according to whether it was designed to close the enterprise to trade

unions or whether a more open-minded policy was adopted¹³³

The hostility of American employers to trade unions can be seen as the product of their experiences in dealing with unions. Certainly the motives behind American welfare practices were often to ward off the trade unionism which employers feared. For example, at International Harvester, another firm which was strongly influenced by *N.C.R.*:

The basis of International Harvesters' long opposition to unionism remained, however, not any theoretical class ideology of management but the company's extensive and unpleasant experience with unionism.¹³⁴

This seems to go for J. H. Patterson himself, when he said:

It is sometimes said that I oppose labour unions. That is not true. I have refused to run other than an open shop for the single reason that unions prevented me from having a closed shop ...

I have never opposed unions as such; I think that, well organized, they are mighty good things. The workman needs all the protection that he can get. But I do think that they should confine themselves to bettering conditions rather than fomenting strikes for trifles, and I think that to-day the big labour union leaders do take this broad attitude.¹³⁵

Cadburys experiences were not such as to lead them to adopt an anti-union stance. George Cadbury had "always been a warm supporter of the trade unionist movement", and had amicable dealings with labour and trade union leaders, at a national level.¹³⁶ It is not necessary to speculate what *Cadburys* attitude would have been if they had confronted a militant trade union organisation at Bournville. Even if the amenable workforce there was in part their own unconscious creation, this was the reality they experienced and on which their attitudes were based.

The Importance of Foremen at *Cadburys*

Not only did *Cadburys* enjoy the advantages of an amenable workforce on which to experiment, and good relations with national labour leaders who seem to have approved of the developments taking place at Bournville (see above ch. 3); they also created a situation

for themselves in which they were less likely to be troubled by the kind of anachronistic foreman who helped spark off so much unrest at *N.C.R.*. To some extent *Cadburys* anticipated *N.C.R.* when in 1898 they abolished "the system of using fines and deductions as means of discipline". A.G. Gardiner remarked that, "This safeguard against petty tyranny and worse is fundamental to industrial rights at Bournville."¹³⁷

There was also likely to be some feeling of a unity of purpose between the Directors and the management based on shared religious convictions. This is not to say that religious conviction was the motivation for management, or for the institution of welfare practices; but rather that it would have facilitated a common *interpretation* of their actions. The higher management were probably Quakers; in 1901 a list, containing 21 names, was drawn up of members of the firm who wished to attend the Society of Friends' Yearly Meeting. The list included Louis Barrow, a cousin of the Cadburys and the Engineer to the firm, and Sophia Pumphrey, who was head forewoman from 1903 until she retired at the end of 1918. Each person on the list was to be allowed "the privilege of attending once in 3 years." Their wages would be paid in full during their absence, and William Cadbury privately gave those attending in 1901 £5 between them. This special treatment suggests both that the 21 were management employees and that the Quakers, as a group, were favoured amongst the management and were close to the Directors and the Cadbury family.¹³⁸

As for the rest of the management, staff, and supervisory employees, there is no suggestion that the firm ever offered any material advantage in order to advance the views of the Cadburys among them.¹³⁹ However, with George Cadbury being publicly identified with the temperance movement and with the restrictions on alcohol in Bournville village, where any foreman might hope to live, it seems likely that potential recruits might have found the prospect of promotion more agreeable if they were in accordance with the Cadburys over the question of alcohol. In any case, the public stance was translated into policy within the firm; in 1900 it was decided to only take on total abstainers as clerks, and then in 1903 total abstainers

were to be given preference as foremen and forewomen.¹⁴⁰ This policy would probably have resulted in the recruitment of non-conformists who would have been close to the social ideals of the Cadburys. A good example was Tom Hackett, who later became the Works Foreman, who was a Methodist, an active socialist and who was at the same time closely identified with *Cadburys*.

The Directors certainly felt close enough to the foremen to take them into their confidence, as is shown by a communication sent out in September 1903:

STRICTLY PRIVATE
To Foremen & Sub-foremen:
Gambling

... Will you kindly give us a report in writing as to the gambling practices of our workpeople, either on or off the premises.

Definitely mention the names of all those whom you know to make a practice of gambling, or who have any dealings with bookmakers...

Even though the firm was acting in this blatantly paternalistic way, and trying to use the foremen as spies on the workers' private lives, at the same time there was a more modern strand of thinking in operation, with George Cadbury Junior and Barrow Cadbury considering, "what can be done to raise the standard and to help the foremen."¹⁴²

With an amenable workforce which did not have a record of militancy; with sympathetic national labour leaders and with a homogeneous management in tune with their policies, any hostility to organised labour on the part of *Cadburys* as a firm would have been gratuitous, to say the least, whatever their social or political views. There does not appear to be any tenable dichotomy between the motives of employers implementing welfare practices based on their attitudes towards unions. *Cadburys* were able to adopt the same welfare or personnel practices from *N.C.R.* as, say, *International Harvester*, even though the motives of all three were supposedly different. There does not seem to be any reason to separate off *Cadburys*, and they could well be covered by Nelson's characterisation of American firms which developed welfare work:

The common denominator was an interest in improving the lives of working people in ways consistent with the employers' economic objectives.¹⁴³

Women's Work And Welfare

Another common denominator between *Cadburys* and the American firms which introduced extensive welfare programmes before World War One, was the employment of large numbers of women. Of the 40 manufacturing firms in America identified by Nelson, he says:

most were major employers of dependent employees, women and children, for whom they felt a special sense of responsibility.¹⁴⁴

Phelps-Brown rather quaintly explains some of the reasons for this in Britain in the 1900s:

Most sorts of factory work still imposed a stigma as such ... people often felt that no decent self respecting girl could ever work in a factory. One difficulty about factory work for women was that they were liable to molestation by the men, or would hear their bad language, and it was the mark of an enlightened employer that he kept the sexes apart.¹⁴⁵

There is a difficulty, however, in explaining welfare practices by the presence of large numbers of women. While this might be convincing in the case of firms which *started* employing women in increasing numbers in the 1900s, it does not appear to be sufficient for those firms, like *Cadburys*, whose workforces had consisted of a large proportion of women long before the interest in extensive welfare provisions. A shift of emphasis is needed to see that the employment of large numbers of women did not of itself generate welfare practices, but that firms employing women were more likely to be interested in the emerging ideas on welfare and, because of the attitudes to women working, more ready to publicize their welfare provisions.

In order to illuminate this aspect of welfare, it would be useful to outline some of the attitudes which were held towards women workers at *Cadburys*. First of all it has to be stated that cocoa and chocolate confectionery manufacturing have been characterised by a rigid sexual division of labour, which has been axiomatic for those organising

production. Clearly this facilitated the segregation of men and women at the Bournville works. In the 1900s, large numbers of women were engaged in the hand processes involved in production, to which they were thought especially suited. The connection between hand-work, women and paternalism is evident in a recent (1975) book on *Sugar and Chocolate Confectionary*, which gives a description of covering centres with chocolate by hand:

Great care is taken over hygiene. In well-managed establishments, hands are inspected every morning and afternoon, and nail varnish is never permitted. Chocolate dippers are usually women, because they seem to have an aptitude for the work. For mass production, enrobers are used.¹⁴⁷

The first enrober was made by the French firm, *Savy Jeanjean*, in 1903, and *Cadburys* bought their first enrober from them in 1907¹⁴⁸. Handwork continued at Bournville long after this, however. For example, an employee of *Cadburys* has described the problems involved with producing Cadbury's Milk Tray:

First of all we were not allowed to produce it on an enrober before the war, [WW2], the reason being we could not imitate the hand marks on the surface, also we could not obtain a 42% chocolate covering.

Experiments were carried out with a thicker covering chocolate until, using an enrober:

We eventually decided to fill a 4lb box with an assortment of Milk Tray ... Two girls were trained for the marking and finally a patterned box was produced and shown to Mr Paul [Cadbury] for his comment. By a slight alteration to the marks, making it a little easier for the operator, Milk Tray was re-started for the first time on an enrober. [in 1946]¹⁴⁹

The 1930 editions of books by two authoritative writers on cocoa and chocolate, who worked for *Cadburys*, indicate the pros and cons of enrober covering, and its relation to the employment of women. First, A.W. Knapp gave a simple description of the enrober:

The crèmes or other "centres" which are to be coated or enrobed with chocolate are arranged in rows on a moving

canvas belt which passes them on to a woven wire conveyor. The army of centres are marched straight through a miniature cascade of chocolate, the surplus of which is shaken off and passes on to a canvas belt which conveys them through a cooling tunnel to the girls who pack them into boxes. The production and boxing of chocolate-covered goods in all their variety of substance, form and decoration, entail much handwork, and are the greatest labour-absorbing items in the cocoa and chocolate industry. They explain also the high percentage of female labour employed therein.¹⁵⁰

H.W. Bywaters began his chapter on *Covering With Chocolate* with an outline of the advantages of the enrober, from which it is clear that chocolates covered by hand-processes were considered superior for a long time after the enrober appeared:

Many attempts have been made to introduce machines for dipping several units at a time, but it is only comparatively recently that a type of machine has been discovered which performs the work so well that it is gradually eliminating hand dipping from all factories where chocolate goods are manufactured by modern mass production methods. The modern enrober ... has been brought to such a pitch of perfection that even experts find difficulty in distinguishing between machine and hand covered goods. The advantages attached to the use of an enrober are many and varied. The finished chocolates have a uniformity which is lacking in hand covered chocolates ... The number of attendants required to operate an enrober is much smaller than the number of girls required to cover the same goods by the hand-dipping process, and, moreover, the work involved is much less tedious.¹⁵¹

While enrobing was only one of many manufacturing processes carried out at Bournville, it does illustrate the point that it was taken for granted that women should be employed on the labour-intensive processes. This meant that they were most subject to seasonal fluctuations. However, the policy which *Cadburys* operated of not employing married women resulted in an increased turnover of labour which lessened the need for workers to be laid off owing to seasonal fluctuations or mechanisation, thus insulating male workers from the insecurity of seasonal work and lessening the need for seasonal work as such.¹⁵² Over a period of three years, 1900, 1901 and 1902, just over

300 women left to be married; their average age on leaving was 25, and their average length of service was 8 years.¹⁵³

It is not exactly clear when the practice of not employing married women was started. Although it seems to have pre-dated the formation of the limited company in 1899¹⁵⁴, the newly formed Board soon made it a clear policy when they resolved that:

no married women whose husbands are living be employed in the Works, and that no widow be taken on to work without a special resolution passed by the Board in each separate instance.

At the same time a scale of Marriage Gifts for men and women was drawn up, ranging from £1 after one year's service, to £5 after 13 years. They were also given a Bible.¹⁵⁵ In the 1900s, *Cadburys* were certainly neither alone nor anachronistic in their operation of a "marriage-bar". It was rigidly enforced by many employers for white collar work and for shop assistants, and a number of unions operated "marriage dowry" schemes¹⁵⁶. It continued to be operated by the Civil Service, as it did by *Cadburys*, until the 1940s, when labour shortage was a greater problem than the residual fear of unemployment.¹⁵⁷ *Cadburys* changed over from their policy of employing only single women to employing large numbers of part-time women, which again allowed them to use women workers to meet the requirements of seasonal fluctuations.¹⁵⁸

The usefulness of the marriage bar to *Cadburys* conveniently coalesced with the under-estimated way in which the ideology of social reform at the time reinforced a certain conception of a woman's role as wife and mother, which Morris's study of the origins of minimum wage legislation has revealed.¹⁵⁹ In fact an examination of *Cadburys* policies towards their own women workers in conjunction with their support trade boards reinforces Morris's argument that the minimum wage legislation passed in the early 20th century needs to be seen as an exercise in social control.

Cadburys marriage bar was justified in similar terms to some of the arguments for minimum wage legislation; the effects of work on women and children. Putting the case for the minimum wage in 1907, Clementina Black wrote:

the thing which seems to me perhaps the most terrible of all: the change of the working girl into the working woman ... Her language is devoid ... of any tenderness or emotion.¹⁶⁰

While part of Constance Smith's *Case For Wages Boards* concerned the *Indirect Effects of Sweating ... On the Future of the Race*¹⁶¹. These can be compared with George Cadbury's response to a question put to him about the employment of married women in 1910:

Mr Cadbury will never take the mothers away from their homes and children. He told me, with a grave smile, that when he had allowed married women to work for him, he found that their husbands were quite content to loaf about doing nothing, living on the wages of their wives; and he added that the poor things invariably came back after child-bearing to work long before they were fit to work.¹⁶²

Edward Cadbury co-authored two important books, on *Sweating* and *Women's Work and Wages*. It is not at all surprising that one of his arguments against sweating was that it represented unfair competition:

At the present time many small masters continue to exist just because they are enabled to compete with more efficient factories by paying miserable wages to their sweated women. It would be an almost unqualified gain to drive all such trades as box-making, paper bag-making, etc., into factories where machinery could do the work. It is altogether uneconomic for women to compete with machinery that can do the work so much more expeditiously than the sweated worker can.¹⁶³

The imposition of a minimum wage was therefore necessary, he argued, because:

Any trade employing workers who are paid a wage insufficient to maintain health and vigour is a parasite on the community. The employers in such trades receive a subsidy analogous to a bounty so far as the workers are deteriorated or have to be subsidised by friends, or by poor relief and charity.¹⁶⁴

To some extent these arguments need to be seen as an attempt to justify a humanitarian cause in terms of efficiency and general prosperity. However, it is clear that the Trade Board legislation was largely aimed at sweated homeworkers, and the decline in their numbers was generally approved of later by supporters of the Trades Boards.¹⁶⁵ Although

Edward Cadbury did not state it, and was probably not conscious of it, the logic of his argument was the exclusion of married women from the labour force.

Edward Cadbury developed his argument in favour of protective legislation, and dismissing the feminist arguments against it, in relation to the history of the Factory Acts and the 1874 Act in particular, which restricted the hours of women and children in the textile industries. He endorsed the view that men would not be substituted for women as a result of protective legislation because the nature of their work was different.¹⁶⁶ Conversely, Barrow Cadbury later used a variant of the same argument to explain that, although women's wages at Bournville were considerably less than men's, even for work of equal value, women were unlikely to be substituted for men, because their aptitudes were for different types of work.¹⁶⁷

It is not necessary to invoke the problematic concept of patriarchy to see that both the marriage bar and the protective minimum wage legislation, represented "an ideological commitment to the family". It was also the case that, as with earlier periods in which protective legislation for women was passed:

There were ways in which young children could be looked after and workers fed and cleansed which did not involve women as unpaid domestic labourers.¹⁶⁸

In the 1870s, Richard Cadbury, struck by the number of children in Birmingham who were not properly looked after, had founded a crèche.¹⁶⁹ In his survey of welfare institutions, N.P. Gilman identified several European firms which had crèches.¹⁷⁰ Perhaps surprisingly, Meakin summed up the alternatives quite neatly:

One sad feature of the industrial world today is the number of mothers of young children, who are engaged in work away from their homes, leaving the all-important formative years to less capable, often quite incapable, hands. To obviate this evil in some measure, so long as it must exist - a result of misfortune, waste or neglect - the ideal measure is that adopted by Messrs. Pretty and Son, at their corset factory in Ipswich. The establishment of a nursery where the little ones may be left by their mothers in the best of care. Two meals and all necessary attention from trained nurses, including a walk in the park on a fine afternoon, may be secured by a

payment of 2d a day, but the lady whose work this is must be otherwise richly paid. Some firms, however, such as Messrs. Cadbury, refuse to employ married women at all.¹⁷¹

Cadburys: A Site For Welfare

Cadburys needs to be conceptualized as the site for the implementation of the developing ideas on welfare. They do not have to be examined as innovators in the field of industrial relations. Although they implemented new methods of labour management which went beyond the old kind of welfare which was, as Child has pointed out, "extraneous to the actual process of managing"¹⁷², their ideas were developed out of the institutions they had observed already in operation at other firms. As the earlier part of this chapter has shown, *Cadburys* was not in a position where they were free of competition and able to experiment.¹⁷³ Rather they were in a position of having to respond to competition, especially from Europe. In that situation it seems unlikely that they would have adopted untried methods, either in relation to manufacturing processes or industrial relations. If a firm is conceptualised as a site for the implementation of an innovation, be it social or technical, then there is no need to seek for teleological common denominators between all the sites for a particular innovation.¹⁷⁴ The historical process can be grappled with without collapsing either into abstract generalisation on the one hand or simple biography on the other. Melling has rightly stressed that

Industrial benefits did not suddenly appear with the onset of work-place conflict or systematic management, any more than they sprang from the enlightened imagination of Cadbury or Rowntree.¹⁷⁵

This chapter has tried to give some idea of the process by which, it could be said, industrial benefits found the site for their implementation in part in the enlightened imaginations of *Cadburys*. These ideas did not suddenly appear, their implementation at Bournville took place because the younger Directors were searching around for new innovations which would help them to beat their European competitors. *Cadburys* is significant because the welfare ideas which they adopted in

the 1900s, which were not new, took root firmly and became identified with the firm, and with its success. This meant that while on the one hand they would be prepared to look abroad again for ideas which seemed to match their requirements, the welfare, or rather labour-management institutions which they now had would form a significant part of the situation into which further innovations would have to be applied.

Chapter Five
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

Pensions

By the time Edward Cadbury came to write his book on *Experiments in Industrial Organisation*, published in 1912, the welfare policies, or, more accurately, personnel management, was firmly established at Bournville, and any subsequent developments would have to be seen to be compatible with that framework. One element, for example, of that institutional framework was the Men's Pension Fund, started in June 1906, followed by the Women's Savings and Pension in June 1911.¹ As with so many initiatives, the motivation for and the origins of the pension schemes are unclear. Hannah has referred to the Cadburys' "idealism" in relation to their introduction of pensions, as opposed to most other firms where pensions and associated personnel policies were mostly just "an expression of new requirements."² Cadburys had been considering the question of pensions for some time; in 1902, one of the Directors of Huntley and Palmers visited Bournville to talk to them about it.³ There is no way that the pension scheme can be seen as an advertising ploy, (the firm was making a gift of £60,000 simply to cover back service for employees), but the firm was keen to publicise its initiative. Publication of press notices was being arranged by three press agencies, the editors of 13 London and Provincial papers were interviewed and notices sent to about 100 provincial papers, "with very satisfactory results".⁴ The scheme was also seen as a way to spread middle-class standards to their workers, a consideration that Hannah says was in the minds of some employers in this period.⁵ Cadburys and Rowntrees cooperated in drawing up their pension schemes and when Rowntrees put theirs into operation in November 1906, a table showing the points of difference between the two schemes was drawn up for the Cadburys Directors. Rowntrees scheme applied to women as well as men, but where Cadburys included all their men, "without exception at ages between 16 and 50", at Rowntrees eligibility was "confined to permanent employees of 20 years of age and upwards of 6 months standing". It was considered that, "Earlier age of entry inculcates thrift before manhood."⁶

Discipline and Slow Workers

Other aspects of personnel management can be more clearly seen to have emerged from an interest in efficiency. Edward Cadbury discussed the question of discipline for women workers in the book on *Experiments in Industrial Organisation*. The system of fines was abolished in 1898, he said, when punishment and dismissal were put in the hands of the directors; the foremen and forewomen could only report delinquencies to them. As a result of this there was an improvement in timekeeping, conduct and the quality of work; Edward Cadbury considered fines to be unsatisfactory because workers considered a fine to be the end of the matter. The economic effects of the change were beneficial to the firm, he said, and efficiency increased as a result of weeding out the inefficient. A higher class of workers was obtained, even though fewer dismissals were necessary. He gave the figures for the number of women discharged, suspended or cautioned between 1899 and 1910. 1901 was the worst year, with 41 discharged, 1.78% of the workforce, and 281 disciplined in all, 16.4% of the workforce. By 1910 these figures were reduced to 22 discharged (0.7%) and 35 disciplined (2.22%). There was no need for deductions to be made for bad work because most of the women worked on a piece-rate system and were only paid for good work. "Bad conduct" included: -

untidiness of person, noisiness, impudence to superiors, moral delinquencies, and disobedience. The rules are extremely strict with regard to cleanliness. (p.74)

Then there were the "slow workers":

those that regularly earn less wages than the minimum fixed for their class of work.

Dismissal was a last resort; "reformative" and "remedial" measures were tried first. Medical treatment was available if they were in poor health, the firm even provided a convalescent home. Extra food was provided to supplement a poor diet resulting from poverty in the worker's family. Only five to seven per cent of the slow workers were found to be "indolent and lazy", he said. One cause of inefficiency was found to be when a woman was in the wrong place, "trying to do work for which her physical capacity, or her temperament, is unfitted" In

these cases a change of employment brought improvement. However, most cases of "slow workers" were found to be due to a "state of physical debility", and the women were given six months further trial and put under the doctor's care.⁷

The evolution of the policy towards "slow workers" is interesting. The firm set scales for the minimum wages for women, both dayworkers and pieceworkers. In September 1901 these rates were set as in table 5.1. However, failure to earn the minimum wage by piece-workers was treated as a disciplinary matter, at least until November 1901. In the "Girls' Black Book Summary" for the year ending November 1901, 41 women were discharged, and 6 of these were "for being slow and coming under the minimum wage."⁸

Table 5.1 *Minimum Rates for "Girls Wages", September 1901.*⁹

21 yrs. & over	18 to 21	15 to 18	under 15
15/-	12/-	9/-	4/-

The system for dealing with slow workers appears to have changed at the end of 1901. The "Girls' Wages Audit" in April 1903 showed the average weekly wages. (see table 5.2)

Table 5.2 *"Average wage per girl per week." 1900-1903*

1900-1	1901-2	1902-3
14/18	15/-	15/6

John H. Jones, who compiled the report, said:

I attribute the increase in average chiefly to Mr E. Cadbury's policy of issuing notices to slow workers adopted at end of year 1901.¹⁰

In January 1905, a report was submitted to the Board on "Slow and Inefficient Girls". The report was drawn up on the basis of investigations into the 61 slowest piece-workers, those whose wages

fell seriously below the minimum, who were interviewed after a period of six weeks. The nurse was able to confirm the investigator's opinion that "bad health" was the main cause, but the report went on to consider several others. It is worth quoting at some length, because it shows how the welfare provisions, such as the medical service, were beginning to be used for systematic selection procedures and how definite employment policies were emerging:

It will also be noted that the fingers of those who we take at 21 or over do not seem sufficiently pliable for them to reach the speed of those that we take on younger, & I would suggest to the Board as far as possible that 18 or at least 20 be the limit of age for engaging piece-workers.

The Board will see that some are put down as lazy or indifferent or talking too much, but I find that those who are put down as lazy or indifferent either come from well-to-do homes where their financial aid is not needed & the money is merely earned as pocket-money, or from very poor homes where they have to do a good deal of housework & where they are badly nourished.

Sometimes the habits of the girls cause them to be inefficient, such as staying up very late at night & getting insufficient rest, or coming without a proper breakfast.

...I would suggest the Board consider the following points & if thought well embody them in a Minute of instruction:

- 1) That only girls living in their own homes are engaged, only taking on those who live in lodgings in case of pressure or exceptional circumstances; these latter as a rule are not as efficient as those from home.
- 2) That we endeavour to adhere strictly to the 2 mile radius.
- 3) That no girl over 20 should be engaged.
- 4) That we should have as stringent a medical examination as possible, & instruct the doctor to reject those he has the slightest doubt about.
- 5) I should like the Board's instructions as to those girls working here who are chronic invalids, as they give a good deal of work to the nurses & certainly do not pay us to keep on. Of course if we are to give them notice it will mean hardship in a certain number of cases, but if the Board likes, I will get a return of these and their circumstances.
- 6) Do the Board wish girls at present coming from places

outside our radius (many of whom no doubt lodge during the week at Selly Oak) replaced by girls living in the neighbourhood? If we did this, no doubt again there would be some cases of hardship. I should be quite willing if the Board wish, to furnish a return of these girls.

The Board will notice in the above recommendations I am purely aiming at increased industrial efficiency & would request their kind consideration how far they wish this obtained, even at the risk of inflicting hardship on some of those who are at present working for us.

<u>Health</u>		<u>Parents</u>		<u>Where Living</u>	
Good	12	Both Parents	41	At home	48
Fair	14	Mother only	13	Lodgings	11
Bad	34	Father only	2	With Brother	2
		Orphans	5		

Remarks on Work

Good	16	Talk too much	3
Fair	7	Too easy going	2
Slow & Steady	11	Slow	2
Improving but slow	5	Walks from	
Indifferent	7	distance	3
Lazy & slow	6	Bad eyes	1 "

This report is interesting in several respects. The same sort of social science techniques Edward Cadbury used to compile the information for his books on *Women, Work and Wages* (first edition 1906) and *Sweating* (first edition 1907) were being used, albeit on a much smaller scale, (interviewing schedules and the like), by the firm for its labour management. There was also a similar concern for the workers' welfare, but whereas in the social surveys the evidence which was collected was used to argue for minimum wage legislation, the implications for the firm's efficiency were less philanthropic; if categories of women could be identified as inefficient, then they would no longer be taken on.

Cadburys was also in a much better position to improve its efficiency than those firms which used homeworkers, who would often not even know who their workers were, let alone their efficiency etc. It was the latter who were aimed at by the Trades Boards Act. However,

more than that can be said about the comparison between *Cadburys* and the "sweating" employers. A theme running through the contemporary literature on sweating and minimum wages was that the factory worker was more efficient than the homemaker because of the more extensive use of machinery. But the observation of slow workers indicates that efficiency could be improved and wages increased without resort to new machinery and in advance of the imposition of minimum wage legislation.¹² It may seem obvious, but it needs to be stated, that, if by paying better wages *Cadburys* were able to secure better, more efficient workers, this could only be done by instituting a sophisticated selection procedure with criteria for efficiency being laid down. The selection of workers did not just appear as a good idea, it emerged as a refinement of various practices, and to institute it the firm needed to use its welfare provisions such as the medical services.

Piece-Rates and Rate-Cutting

Management of the women piece-workers was becoming more systematic during the 1900s; the last vestiges of any kind of sub-contracting system were ended at the beginning of 1903, when it was decided that, "All implements and materials needed for Card Box making to be supplied free by the Firm in future." At the same time, as an experiment, Time Registering Machines were to be tried in one department. Then at the end of 1903 Card Box wages were transferred to the control of the central Wages Office.¹³

The women's piece rates came in for constant scrutiny, and if there was a general increase in average piece-rate wages, this was not due to an increase in the piece-rates, which appear to have been continually cut. Roughly speaking what appears to have happened was that the average wage was calculated and those piece-workers who consistently earned above this had their piece-rates cut. This is indicated by a remark in the Wages Audit Report in October 1900:

In calculating alterations in piece work rates I take an average rate of 4½d. per hour, taking 42 hours to the week, this gives an average wage of 15/9 per week.

This process seems to have undergone a rapid refinement, to the firm's advantage. The October 1900 Report showed £82 saved by "alterations in piece work rates". Although this was turned into a £96 nett increase in wages due to the introduction of Long Service Allowances to compensate older workers whose earnings probably diminished. However, in his Report in April 1901, J.H. Jones was able to report that the reduction in wages from alterations in piece rates would be:

£551. 8s. Od. per year (48 weeks)	
less increase in wages (from the last Report)	£96. 0. 0.
Approximate reduction	£455. 8. 0.

Seven piecerate prices were raised, affecting 14 women, while 21 prices were reduced, affecting 95 women. There is no evidence of any outright resistance, but this straight rate-cutting did have an effect in some instances. In one case 25 women had their rate cut by nearly half, and it was noted that:

This is a most exceptional reduction & is explained by the fact that 5 of the girls increased the amount of work produced so rapidly, that in 4 weeks their wages rose from 11/1 to 22/4 per week, & 4 other girls in 3 weeks rose from 5/1 to 19/10 per week. Unfortunately since the price has been altered the amount of work produced per girl has considerably decreased.¹⁴

This seemingly arbitrary practice of rate-cutting needed to be better justified, probably the more so as the men's piece-rates were coming under increasing scrutiny. In his Report in May 1905, J.H. Jones listed the 132 piece-rate prices which had been adjusted over the previous year and observed that:

Most of the above alterations are due either to alteration in size or range of work or improvement in method of working.

The annual report concluded:

I am now giving quite half my time to investigating men's piece rates and shares etc.¹⁵

These Wages Audit Office Reports show the detailed attention that was being given to piece-rates during the 1900s. The rates of pay per hour for each piece-work section were calculated and constant refinements in the system were made to give more information that was more accurate.¹⁶ From 1900 at least, there was a drive towards breaking up the gangs of piece-workers and paying individual piece-rates, but this was not always possible because of the difficulties where women did several different kinds of work in a day, and also the cost of extra labour for booking work done.¹⁷

The Printing Shop escaped being put on to piece-work in 1899 because it was reported, "that this does not seem to be a practical possibility." Not so fortunate were the men in the Chocolate Moulding department, whose wages were investigated resulting in them receiving the following letter from the firm in February 1900:

The Directors of the Company are now equalising wages throughout the works. They find that to do this they must increase below a fair standard wage & bring those who are above such a standard into line. They decide that in future your wages will be [x] per week, which will still be above the standard for your work.

In consideration of the time which you have worked for the old firm, it is proposed to defer this alteration till March 1st. 1901.

Their new wage rates were to be made up of day money and shares, which indicates that a piece-rate element was being introduced. For the first half a dozen men the list of those affected there were to be significant wage cuts. With twenty years' service each, 34 year old J. Sparks and 35 year old H. Bull were to have their wages cut by 10/- per week, from 49/- and from 48/-.¹⁸

Thus it appears quite clear that there was a drive towards more systematic labour management during this period. This can be summed up by a Board Minute from 1906:

the suggestion is approved that the girls might be allowed to sing say twice a day for half an hour whilst they are working, the singing to be done systematically.¹⁹

Experiments in Industrial Organization

Experiments in Industrial Organization, (London 1912) can be seen as having served several purposes for *Cadburys*. It was used both to advertise the firm and for the information of certain employees. Edward Cadbury submitted a draft of the proposed book and was "encouraged ... to proceed with the publication of the work". One thousand copies were ordered for the firm initially, and a copy was sent to every representative, both home and export. Later that year, 1912, it was decided to send copies to foremen, forewomen, the Staff, the visitors' guides and to all important visitors.²⁰ The book therefore, represented the firm as it wanted to be represented, both to its customers and its workforce. So, for all that it is some 300 pages long, it was not merely an academic tome on management thought, it bore a relation to the real practices at the Bournville Works.

A wide range of subjects were covered and, as John Child has put it, "the description of Bournville practice in 1912 reads much like a modern personnel manual."²¹ Amongst other things, it deals with; the selection of employees (pp 2-4); education (p. 13), physical training (pp. 20, 33), and apprenticeship (p. 44) programmes for young workers; provisions for the workers' health, including the surgery (p. 95) and the dentist (p. 103). The chapter on "Organisation" (p. 200) gives a somewhat idealised version of the management structure, in reality delegation did not take place very readily:

At the centre is the Board of Directors, who discuss and settle all general problems, connected with every part of the business, while each director specialises on some one or two departments, and by means of committee or staff organizations, keeps himself in the closest touch with the details, as well as the general problems of his department. Thus one director deals with buying, another with advertisements, and others with sales, costs, men's departments, women's departments, etc. (pp. 200-201)

Edward Cadbury was aware of the pitfalls of paternalism, and his response to the question of whether it was desirable for a factory to be the centre of the workers' social life, as at Bournville, was that in the case of a factory in a village, or on the outskirts of a city,

the works naturally became the focus for recreation, given the lack of alternatives. However:

providing that no coercive attitude is assumed by the employer, and that the institutions are allowed to develop naturally to meet the needs explicitly expressed, and the workers themselves have to contribute to the cost of the maintenance, and control the management, little, if any objection can be raised.
(p.260)

As for Welfare Work in factories; he thought that although there was no mention of it as such in his book, it could be claimed that:

the organization of the Firm embodies the principles that must be at the root of all successful welfare work.
(p.262)

He warned that welfare work would prove to be counter-productive if it was only done for advertising purposes.

Edward Cadbury on Payment Systems

However, it is Edward Cadbury's treatment of payments systems and work organisation, and their relationship to his later critical stance on scientific management, and to the actual practices at Bournville, which need to be focused on here. In *Experiments in Industrial Organization* he argued forcefully the case for piece-rates, while at the same time conceding the danger of them being abused. This can be seen in terms of him trying, at the same time, to assure customers that products were being made as cheaply and efficiently as possible, and to establish that the workforce was being fairly treated.²² This is rather blandly put in a passage on the factors considered in rates of wages and methods of remuneration in the Women and Girls' Departments:

A manufacturer working under modern industrial conditions must obtain an adequate return for the wages paid, a return which will enable him successfully to meet his competitors, and to place his goods on the market at approximately the same price as they do, and yet receive a fair margin of profit. On the other hand, the wage of the employee must be adequate. There should be an inducement to the employee to make the maximum effort, and yet this inducement should not lead to overstrain. Some form of piece-work is the best method of obtaining these ends, and although it must be admitted that piece-work is open to abuse, this abuse

can, under a rational system and proper conditions, to a large extent, be avoided. (p.140)

On the employer's side the greatest abuse being the selection of the fastest workers and expecting all others to conform to their standard. Edward Cadbury pointed out, however, that there are variations due to different methods, and the best method should be chosen as a standard and other workers taught to follow it. This led him to state an apparent contradiction, that output could be increased and, at the same time, strain on the piece-worker reduced. (p.141) He went on to say that piece-workers should always be able to earn more than time-workers because they will make more effort, needing a reward from both economic and "ethical" standpoints:

Piece-work not only means more effort, but it also means more thought and interest in the work on the part of the worker. If properly trained, the worker will try to find the quickest method of work, and the one involving the least strain; and it has been found that when a piece-rate has been fixed, where previously there had been a time-basis, the output has doubled without any undue strain on the part of the worker, largely as the result of adopting better methods. This especially applies to hand processes. (pp 142-143)

Echoing Taylor's advocacy of "individualising ... workmen and stimulating each man to do his best"²³, he went on to say that the share system, used on processes which depended on the combined efforts of a group, and where the number of shares per worker depended on age, experience and responsibility, was not as satisfactory as individual piece-rates because of "slower or less energetic workers tending to absorb some of the earnings of the faster and more energetic ones". (p.143) Though of course he would not put down the slow workers in the same way that Taylor put down the "few misplaced drones, who do all the loafing and share equally in the profits."²⁴ There was, however, a parallel with what can be seen as Taylor's egalitarianism. Taylor believed that it was "just and fair that men of the same general grade ... should be paid about the same wages when they are all working to the best of their abilities."²⁵

Monotony and Machinery

When he dealt with the two subjects in his book, Edward Cadbury separated piece-work from the discussion of monotony. He conceded the existence of monotony, but he described his book as:

an attempt ... to show how the organization of the Works aims at minimizing some of the disadvantages and drawbacks of factory life. (p. 244)

So that it was "factory life" as a *given* generality to which "drawbacks" could be attributed, and the specificity of Bournville vis a vis such "drawbacks" did not, therefore, have to be considered. Thus Edward Cadbury was better able to acknowledge the existence of monotony and its harmful effects:

It is not much advantage to point out, as some economists do, that compared with savage or backward races, an unskilled man is relatively skilled, and that probably not one-tenth of the present population of the work force have the mental and moral faculties, the intelligence, and the self-control, that are required for the work of tending machinery; and that even amongst a manufacturing population only a small part are capable of doing many of the tasks that appear at first sight to be entirely monotonous. It must be admitted that many of the processes are monotonous, and subdivision of labour is carried on to such an extent that there is a narrowing of interest. Variety is the essence of life and *machinery is the enemy of variety*. The aim of automatic machinery is to do exactly the same thing over and over again. This monotonous employment applies even in a greater degree to women than to men, because women are put to lighter and more automatic machines. Under present conditions at least 50% of the workers must be engaged in in unskilled or semi-skilled work.²⁶ [my emphasis]

This was making a "fetishism" of machinery, like that illustrated by Braverman, as if it was the "machines" which were to blame for the situation, rather than the social relations within which they were employed.²⁷ It was almost as if the "machinery" itself subdivided labour; whereas it was the piece-rates advocated by Edward Cadbury which facilitated the introduction of the machines and kept the workers at them. Amongst other things it was the firm's own attitudes towards women which "put" them "to lighter and more automatic machines".

By removing from his discussion the specificity of Bournville vis a vis monotony, and with it, to some extent the sexual division of labour, Edward Cadbury was better able to introduce Bournville's peculiarities in a favourable light, as if these alone distinguished Bournville, these peculiarities being those which were external to the causes of monotony, external to the work itself. So, for example, in the educational provisions at Bournville it was possible for an unskilled man to undertake a wider field of study than the purely vocational because:

Very often his work is monotonous and depressing, the sub-division of processes being carried to such an extent that there is a narrowing of interest, while automatic machinery almost eliminates any demand for initiative and adaptation.²⁶

While "girls" were "first employed on mechanical work, which demands concentration to attain the standard required, and yet does not entail much physical or mental effort" (p. 20), breaks for physical training lessened the "monotony". Physical training was required, he said, to counteract the conditions of industrial life; "even in the best equipped factories ... the occupation is sedentary and their movements are restricted and confined by the tasks that are often very automatic."²⁷ Apparently physical training counteracted this by developing the physique; it also had mental and moral effects, bringing out qualities of alertness, concentration, and self-control, as well as providing recreation. Physical training was therefore compulsory for "boys and girls" up to 18 years of age, and although there was no deduction from *time-wages* when the training was taken during work hours, it was noted that:

The time taken up by this training has not been found to lessen the piece-work earnings to any appreciable extent. (pp 26-27)

When writing his *Experiments in Industrial Organization* in 1912 there was for Edward Cadbury an inevitability about work itself, the actual labour process, while at the same time there was scope for experiment in the provisions for labour outside of the work itself, but still within the workplace. This is shown by his reference to the

Suggestion Scheme at Bournville, which required initiative and enterprise, although he admitted that:

In regard to the unskilled workers, however, it must be admitted that as far as the workshop itself is concerned, much monotony remains, and the best method at present for ameliorating this, is to have short hours, and to encourage boys and girls to take full advantage of educational facilities so that they may be have in their leisure time as varied and full a social life as possible. (p. 246)

Taylor was also an advocate of shorter working hours because he believed it to be:

a matter of ordinary common sense to plan working hours so that the workers can really 'work while they work' and 'play while they play', and not mix the two.²⁹

But Taylor did not acknowledge the need for any amelioration of the effects of his scientific management, in fact he saw as the result of it that:

each workman has been systematically trained to the highest state of efficiency, and has been taught to do a higher class of work than he was able to do under the old types of management; and at the same time he has acquired a friendly mental attitude toward his employers and his whole working conditions, whereas before a considerable part of time was spent in criticism, suspicious watchfulness, and sometimes in open warfare. This direct gain to all those working under the system is without doubt the most important single element in the whole problem.³⁰

Prosser

Taylor's views were in accord with those of J.E. Prosser, who in 1919 worked in the Works Organization Department at Bournville and was a Management Representative on the Piece Rates and Grading Committee,³¹ so that his views can be taken to represent those of at least an element of *Cadburys* management at the time. In his book on payments systems, published in 1919, Prosser asked himself the question, "What are the advantages claimed for the employee under Scientific Management?" He alluded to "a fierce controversy in the United States with regard to the merits of Scientific Management", where, he said,

amongst other things it had been alleged that under Scientific Management:

while men receive increased wages and work shorter hours, yet during their working hours, they are reduced to something like automatic machines. There is a lessening of interest owing to specialization. All the thinking and planning is done for them. No longer are they compelled to use initiative, to remedy errors, to foresee difficulties, and to act as their discretion dictates.³²

But this was clearly not Prosser's view, he favoured Scientific Management; like Taylor he believed that:

It would be anomalous that science should be given a free hand elsewhere but excluded from the workshop.³³

Answering his own question about the advantages of Scientific Management Prosser's reply was that not only were the ameliorative measures, advocated by Edward Cadbury themselves the result of Scientific Management but that the work itself was enhanced for the worker, an enhancement which would extend beyond work. In Prosser's own words:

Together with the increased wage there are: shorter hours, more sanitary and comfortable surroundings, improved health due to a more regular and purposeful life, and a result of the valuable training he has received, experiences a complete mental revolution; his increased concentration develops a higher degree of skill; he learns to co-operate intelligently with other workmen and with the management he becomes ambitious and looks for promotion to the post of instructor, or foreman, or, in rare cases, to that of a scientific investigator. the general stimulus extends to his life outside the factory, and his general education improves in a measure impossible under the old system. Again, the scrupulous care of tools and machinery results in fewer accidents.³⁴

Edward Cadbury and Scientific Management

Writing in another context, Edward Cadbury himself expressed a different view of work. In "The Case Against Scientific Management" he indicated that monotony was not simply the inevitable outcome of the application of machinery. He referred to the subdivision of work as

having an effect on "the personality and character of the worker." As for the bad intellectual condition of unskilled workers, he said:

Even if monotony of work is not solely responsible for the condition of things it at least intensifies it and does nothing to counteract it. Therefore any further sub-division of labour in the direction of eliminating any little judgement and initiative as to methods of work, valuable as it might be in its immediate results on production, would almost certainly in the long run produce effect which would lower the whole capacity of the worker ... *would not this tendency be accentuated by the Taylor system?*²³⁶ [my emphasis]

Edward Cadbury's views on Scientific Management appear to be directly opposed to Prosser's; but only six years after Edward Cadbury wrote criticising Scientific Management, Prosser was writing advocating it, and at the same time administering piece-rates at Bournville. If, as is implicit in Edward Cadbury's argument against Scientific Management, monotony was not merely a concomitant of "machinery" and "factory life", its increase and its demoralising effects on the worker were the result of *the conscious application of a management technique*. This would apply to Bournville as it would to any other workplace.

In fact Edward Cadbury was only opposed to certain elements of the Taylor system. He acknowledged the need for:

scientific selection of workmen ... time-study of operations ... recording of results ... standardisation of tools and equipment ... [and] careful cost estimates.

He had two main objections to Taylor. His first objection was to the "task idea", and he quoted Taylor who described this as the "most prominent single idea in modern scientific management"²³⁶. It was Edward Cadbury's view that in "the task idea ...

We reach the most important point, for we are dealing not with inanimate things, but with men and women, with all their physiological and psychological needs and possibilities, as well as prejudices and social sympathies. Even if on the productive side the results are all that the promoters of scientific management claim, there is still the question of the human cost of the economies produced ... The essence of the system is the concentration of attention upon limited and

intensive tasks. The work is minutely sub-divided and this must mean monotony and greater nervous strain.³⁷

This can again be contrasted with Prosser, who saw the "task" fairly uncritically as, the standardised performance for:

A certain series of operations, with stipulated motions and rests, in a definite sequence, with prescribed tools and appliances, with a careful carrying out of instructions in regard to speed, feeds, etc., and with a definite degree of quality and accuracy.³⁸

So, when Edward Cadbury was arguing against scientific management he asserted that its achievement of greater productivity "must mean monotony and greater nervous strain". But in his book on *Experiments in Industrial Organization*, published not three years before and based on Bournville, he claimed that the piece-rates he advocated could increase output and at the same time reduce strain. In his book, depressing monotony and the sub-division of labour were associated with automatic machinery, *not* with the conscious application of a particular payment system. He objected to "differential bonus schemes", (although it is not quite clear exactly what he meant by these), on the grounds that they reduced the workman to a "living tool", inducing him to "expend his last ounce of energy".³⁹ As far as Taylor was concerned:

These two elements, the task and the bonus (which ... can be applied in several ways), constitute two of the most important elements of the mechanism of scientific management.⁴⁰

Essentially the "bonus" consisted in the payment of a large premium, or "bonus", whenever the workers accomplished the carefully measured daily tasks assigned to them. One way of doing this was through establishing "differential rate piece work".⁴¹ Prosser identified scientific management with the "differential or graduated piece-rate", under which:

The more a man produces, the greater does his piece-wage become.⁴²

Prosser appeared to be referring to Bournville when he described what he called a "variant of the premium system", where:

In the case of a man whose theoretical rating is 10d per hour, he is paid a time-rate of 5d per hour and in

addition a piece-rate which is calculated to yield at least a further 5d per hour. This is equal to a 50 per cent premium system ... an ingenious attempt to combine the merits of the piece-wage and premium methods.

This was a variation on the Halsey premium, and according to Prosser it minimised the "consequences of grave error".⁴³ The objections to the Halsey premium could be countered, he said, but to do so:

The conditions under which the work is done, e.g. the supply of raw material, the provision of specially adapted tools, gearing, and machines, must first be highly organized, and for these *we must look to what is now being called "Scientific Management"*.⁴⁴ [my emphasis]

As far as Prosser was concerned then, "scientific management" was not precluded by the Halsey premium; and, given Prosser's prominent position in determining piece rates and his advocacy of scientific management, it was not precluded by the payment system in operation at Bournville. It should also be remembered that from the outset Taylor had implied that the methods for payment of wages were, as Nadworny explained, "but a part of the total problem".⁴⁵

The Task idea was unacceptable to Edward Cadbury, even "assuming that the best conditions for the welfare of the employee are actually carried out as far as possible".⁴⁶ So he was not content to see Taylor's system applied in its entirety, even if it was accomplished by ameliorative welfare measures. Apart from his own objections to certain elements of scientific management, he recognised the danger of it provoking industrial unrest. Trade unionists, he said, had seen the dangers of the task idea, and as a result:

The trade unionists assert that the whole system is unremunerative to the worker, - an exacting and rigorous process which paves the way for deterioration both mental and physical in a future generation, and which courts inevitable failure as soon as the trade unions are strong enough to stop it. The trade unionists are thus definitely opposing methods, some of which in themselves are legitimate and even necessary when properly used.⁴⁷

Edward Cadbury saw parts of scientific management as beneficial to the relations between the employers and the trade unions; the standardisation of processes and operations, and detailed cost systems would make the free and open discussion of wages easier.⁴⁸ But in the long run, he argued, "differential bonus schemes ... must either demoralise the workman, or more likely in England, produce great resentment and result in serious differences between masters and men". He saw the wider implications of the application of the Taylor system (see quote above chapter 2. on Syndicalism).

Edward Cadbury's second main objection to scientific management followed on from his first objection to the "task idea"; he objected to the hostility to the trade unions. In the discussion on scientific management, in the *Sociological Review* in 1914, he accused Taylor of not discussing the "relation of his system to trade unionism". He believed that because the English trade unions were ahead of their American counterparts the Taylor system was unsuitable for England. He was not simply being pragmatic, he saw the trade unions in a positive way, and their hostility to scientific management he cited as evidence to support his view of the workers' mentality, as opposed to the views of what he called "efficiency engineers".

Taylor believed that:

Personal ambition always has been and will remain a more powerful incentive to exertion than a desire for the general welfare.⁴⁹

This was not Edward Cadbury's view, and he took issue with H.L. Gantt on the need to attract workers away from their trade unions by the use of incentives which relied on the workers' self interested motivation:

Gantt says at bottom the worker is governed just by narrow self-interest. I think that the modern democratic movement disproves this assertion. There is a devotion and spirit of solidarity that cannot be explained on any such basis. The solution of these problems will have to come by working through the unions, and any attack upon the workman's power of collective bargaining is foredoomed to failure. Of course up to now the unions have failed to understand this new industrial advance. They will have to admit many of the new methods and principles, and one of the next steps of advance is to educate them as to its

possibilities and to use collective bargaining as one of its means.

Taylor predicated scientific management on, "the firm conviction that the true interests" of employees and employers "are one and the same".⁵⁰ Edward Cadbury did not see such a complete identity of interests, and he observed that:

In any wages system, there must be some element of driving, and the interests of employers and employed are never absolutely identical.⁵¹

This was not an idea which he set up simply in opposition to scientific management, he had said much the same thing in his book,⁵² and his brother, George Cadbury Jnr. expressed a similar opinion later during the negotiations to set up a Joint Council in 1918, where it was rejected by the other employers.⁵³

Edward Cadbury certainly saw a danger to the community if industrial problems were settled in a spirit of "class antagonism and warfare", and he believed that for a long time to come employers would have a large part to play in the lives and well-being of their workpeople. In this he saw Bournville as a useful contribution towards the "settlement of such industrial problems".⁵⁴ According to Edward Cadbury, what wage earners wanted was:

more control over their own lives. The problem of the future which the capitalist classes have to meet is in the first place a wider and more equitable distribution of wealth and leisure, and in the second, to devise some method by which the workers can have some share in the control of the industry in which they are engaged.⁵⁵

It was necessary to work *through* the trade unions in implementing elements of scientific management, he said, because:

in the long run it will defeat itself for employers to consider a man merely as a tool. We must keep in mind that a man and his personality is always an end in itself, and working people in the future will have to be treated less as tools and more as men.⁵⁶

Edward Cadbury accepted that scientific management would become generalised, therefore he had to propose a way in which it could be modified so that the worker would not be treated as a "tool",

vulnerable to excessive speed-up and monotony. From early on, Taylor, Gantt, and others had denounced rate-cutting, and they tried to make the practice unattractive to employers.⁵⁹ Edward Cadbury and the Taylorites therefore shared something of the same problem; how to convince employers not to use scientific management methods unscrupulously? The strategies devised by Taylor and his followers were uniformly opposed by trade unions.⁶⁰ This was not such a problem for them because they were opposed to unions anyway, and they saw their system as a way to erode the workers' allegiance to their unions. However, Edward Cadbury saw,

no reason why the system, possibly modified on certain lines, should not be developed with and through the assistance of the trade unions. My opinion is that any other policy pursued in this country would be foredoomed to failure.⁶¹

G.D.H. Cole, for one, was not convinced that Cadbury's methods could accommodate the workers, and he set out what amounts to the central objection to Edward Cadbury's case; that is, that scientific management would:

take the easier path, and, in the pursuit of profits, bring about its own downfall. I doubt if, under the present system, 'enlightened' employment is possible for more than a small minority of employers.⁶²

The Card Box Committee

Edward Cadbury advocated modifications to scientific management for two reasons essentially. The first can be called ethical, and the second was because he approved of trade union organisation and wanted to see it preserved and enhanced. Furthermore, the trade unions provided a counterveiling force which could prevent the application of any element of scientific management unless it was demonstrated that it could be satisfactorily modified. The methods which had been applied at Bournville therefore had to be seen to be generally applicable to industry.⁶³ For this reason Edward Cadbury exaggerated the importance of the so-called "Card Box committee" at Bournville.⁶⁴ This committee had been set up around 1910 to discuss with the workers changes in the payment system of the Card Box Department. This was a large "Girls'

Department" where women workers made up the cardboard boxes for chocolates; paper-box making was one of the trades which was covered by the Trade Board Act, which came into force in January 1910, and which regulated hours and minimum wages. This committee seems to have solved most of the problems Edward Cadbury had set for himself; it had secured the workers' acceptance of a new wages scheme, and at the same time actually improved their level of trade union organisation. It is worth quoting him, yet again, at some length on the subject of this committee:

The point I wish to emphasize in this method of fixing wages is that no attempt is made to detach the workers from collective bargaining, but the influence is in the other direction. We work through and with the trade unions. The educational effect on the girls concerned, especially the representatives, must be great, and they are taught to see the employers' side and made to realize the complexity of wages rates. The girls also realize the fact of competition, and that wages paid to them must bear some relation to the rate of wages paid by competitors, and that the only way we can maintain a higher rate of wages than our competitors is by more efficient management and more skilful workers. They also feel that they have some control over the conditions of their work and wages. Needless to say there has been a distinct improvement in output. It must not be thought that either the firm or the workers gained all they asked for, but we came to a responsible compromise which has been accepted by the whole of the department. The greatest gain has been a growth in mutual respect and understanding between the workers on the one hand and the Firm and its officials on the other.

The wonder is that such a committee was only set up in the one department, and *within* the firm its importance was only really acknowledged retrospectively, when it was cited as a precedent for the Shop Committees being proposed in 1917.

The importance of the Card Box Committee was that it enabled Edward Cadbury to point to the successful negotiation of wage rates by a committee which could, by implication, be used to secure the workers' cooperation with a modified form of scientific management. But the committee operated in a department where there was no significant resistance by the workers which needed to be overcome in the first

place. The women workers appear to have been unionised to some extent, and they elected mostly trade union members as their representatives on the committee.⁶⁴ However the effectiveness of this union organisation must be questioned. The directors themselves had encouraged membership of the National Federation of Women Workers, and a branch was established at Bournville in 1908. The branch was probably of some significance locally, because it elected a delegate to the Birmingham Trades Council in 1909, and she became the first woman to be a member of the Trades Council Executive.⁶⁵ Even so, the independence of the union from the management must be in doubt when, according to Edward Cadbury, "some members of the Firm had presided in the district at organizing meetings held by trade unions". He attributed the women workers' organisation to the recent awakening of an "industrial consciousness", and also to the impact of the Trade Board Act.⁶⁶ Union membership was reported to have increased as a result of the Act, and a Card-And-Box-Makers Union was formed.⁶⁷

Resistance to Scientific Management

There was trade union resistance at Bournville, and Edward Cadbury acknowledged it in his book in 1912:

One or two unions will not at present recognise piece-work at all, and even where they do, it is demanded that the minimum shall be guaranteed. This latter principle has been recognized.

The strategy for overcoming this resistance was not the setting up of a committee however:

In such cases the men in charge of machinery are given a bonus or commission on the work or output of their department, and it will at once be seen how materially they can affect its output, particularly in case of a breakdown; and it is not only a question of repairing breakdowns, but also, and mainly, of keeping the machines from breaking down. By giving the men an interest in the output of their departments, their bonus naturally depends upon the maintenance of the highest possible efficiency in the machinery, and this calls for their constant watchful care.⁶⁸

This was more akin to Gantt's strategy for overcoming resistance. It also indicates that there were sections of workers at Bournville who

were resisting even the introduction of piece-rates, but ~~the~~ resistance was not coming from the recently organised women working in what was, elsewhere, a "sweated" industry. The resistance came from the skilled men's sections.

So Cadburys had come up against the obstacle of trade union resistance at Bournville, but they had not devised any strategy to overcome resistance and at the same time leave trade union solidarity intact. It was that solidarity, however, which was to be the safeguard against the challenge of employers using, or even abusing, an unmodified scientific management. There could be no guarantee that other, less scrupulous employers, would not use similar tactics to those used at Bournville, not only to impose piece-rates, but to implement the whole of scientific management. Edward Cadbury had given a favourable picture of Bournville, and of his dealings with the workers there. Still he did not convince his contemporaries in the debate over scientific management. J.A. Hobson shared Edward Cadbury's views as to the dangers of scientific management, but in considering the claims made for Bournville, he asked:

How far is this theory and practice of a private firm compatible with successful profit-making, so as to be held out as an example for general adoption?⁶⁹

G.D.H. Cole made the point more firmly; he said that the generalised application of scientific management would be *forced* on employers, and that therefore the workers' individuality would not be a consideration.⁷⁰

Of more immediate concern to most workers than their individuality would have been the fear of rate-cutting, and it was this fear which any advocate of scientific management had to allay. Prosser, like Taylor⁷¹, was concerned to dissociate the newer payment systems which he advocated from the practice of rate-cutting associated with the old piece-wage system. However, the need for the reiteration of his advice, "to avoid anything in the nature of 'cutting'," itself belies his assurance that:

The newer systems, happily, are not so closely associated with rate-cutting as is the piece-wage system. (p.83)⁷²

The problem with Prosser's advice was that it was directed to *employers*, and the disincentive to them of rate-cutting was that they would need to gain the confidence of the workers in order to use any system to the best advantage, therefore they should avoid bringing the system into disrepute.⁷³ Prosser admitted that in some cases where scientific management had been applied in the U.S.A. there was some justification for the fear that,

however honourable may have been the motive of the pioneers in this field, unscrupulous firms adopt the new system and use it as a means of exploiting and exhausting the workmen.

This fear was particularly justified,

if the men begin to dissociate themselves from their Trade Unions, and thereby lose that valuable asset of collective bargaining *which alone* gives them security and enables them to make a stand against an unjust wage-system or demand a proper share of the increased profits resulting from improved organization.⁷⁴ [emphasis added]

On scientific management Prosser concluded with the question:

What is likely to be the attitude of the British trade-unionist towards the methods of Scientific Management? Our workmen have a strong dislike for any scientific study of motions or close measurement of output and effort. Yet surely they must recognize that nothing will prevent the publication of the results of scientific research in the field of factory administration.

But what if the workers failed to "recognize" this and resisted "the new science"? Well then, Prosser replied:

In any case, international competition will inevitably cause our workers to face the situation sooner or later.⁷⁵

So, for all the rhetoric, Prosser did not really countenance any independent trade union organisation strong enough to resist scientific management. The unions either accepted the elements of scientific

management which Prosser (or *Cadburys*) deemed appropriate, or else competition might force them to accept it *in toto*.

Conditions at Bournville, 1912

For Edward Cadbury it was important to show that Bournville had some important lessons for the question of how to apply scientific management. He clearly believed that the experience of the Card Box Committee was instructive. Without attributing to him any attempt at dissimulation, it is necessary to go further into the operations at the Bournville Works to get some idea of the developments going on around the time Edward Cadbury was writing about factory organisation and scientific management, in order to see how far the Card Box Committee was representative of what was happening.

As in any large factory, conditions were not uniformly idyllic, and *Cadburys* were more concerned than most firms to ensure that instances of bad conditions should not lead to any adverse publicity. Following a letter from the Factory Inspector in 1912, modifications were made in various departments in the factory, and in the Card Box Room the latest pattern of guards were fitted to all the "corner staying machines".⁷⁶ The responsibilities of the head forewoman and the Works Doctor (for the women's side) are indicated by a discussion of the conditions in the Card Box Room in 1912. They reported that they had found the room to be:

very dry and oppressive ... There was a strong blast of hot dry air driving into the room, also various leakages from the hot water pipes ... and several girls complained of boiling water dropping on them.⁷⁷

From this it would appear that the firm delegated to the head forewoman and the women's doctor, personnel duties and responsibility for such things as health and safety.⁷⁸ The conditions in the "flour rooms" were making it difficult to find a sufficient number of women to do the work. This is worth noting in view of the fairly rigid sexual division of labour at Bournville, because one solution considered for overcoming this difficulty was to hand the work over to the Men's Department.⁷⁹

The Works Organisation Department

More interesting was the setting up of the Works Organisation Department in October 1912.⁸⁰ The new department was originally going to be called the "Piece Rates Wages Department", which probably would have been more accurate. The necessity for a new department was decided on by the Board as the result of a report submitted on the work of the Men's Piece Rate Department.⁸¹ This department was under the charge of J.E. Bellows, a Quaker,⁸² who came to work at the Bournville Works in September 1911. His work did not properly start until April 1912, when he started to "study the operations in the Chocolate Mill for the purpose of putting that Department on an individual piece work basis." After that he turned his attention to the Milk Departments with the intention of "getting the Mould Making put on piece work". Bellows' report on the work of the Men's Piece Rate Department up to September 1912 shows clearly the lines along which he was working:

The share systems in force heretofore have led to many difficulties, and I am strongly in favor of individual piece work as being fairer to all parties ...

The method of fixing the piece rates in the past on the amount of work that has been done instead of on the amount of work that ought to be done has necessitated repeated revisions of the rates which must inevitably lead to discontent and to restriction of output. It is my aim where possible to get a fairer basis by carefully timing the work. Where this has been done correctly, the worker ought to be allowed a larger margin for increase above his normal before revising the rate than has hitherto been the case, and if the rate were guaranteed for a good long period - say, five years, it would no doubt encourage freedom of output. Of course, any alteration of method would involve an automatic revision of rates, but I think the worker should have a share of any increase due to improved machinery.

I believe that the extension of individual piece work wherever possible will greatly promote the efficiency of the Factory, but in my opinion a result as important should come from the careful time study of the various operations. This time study not only shows up the weak places in the organisation, but it also shows the extent to which the plant is being properly utilised ...

In a brief report it is not possible to touch on all the points deserving notice, but it might be advantageous if there were a more ready inter-change of labour between the departments. We have worked out a bonus scheme for

foremen on an efficiency basis, which I hope would encourage them to use their labour to the best advantage and to report at once when they were able to dispense with surplus labour.

Our small staff has been augmented recently by M. Oyston, who is assisting with timing work.⁶³

The implications of this report in terms of scientific management are numerous, whether or not it is accepted that Bellows was actually applying scientific management. The Board was clearly impressed with Bellows' work, because he was appointed to head the new Works Organisation Department and given a place on the Men's Works Committee. George Cadbury Jnr. outlined Bellows' duties as follows:

Investigating and reporting on the organisation of labour, including remuneration, efficiency of machinery, and departments as a whole, and submitting proposals for improvement of organisation of departments. This includes general oversight of men's wages and devising of new schemes of remuneration ...

Issuing reports on efficiency of men and machines to Works' Foreman's Department and issuing data for preparing Piece Rates to the Girls' Wages Office.⁶⁴

Bellows' appointment meant that the prerogatives of the senior managers had to be clarified, and a division of labour emerged. At the end of October 1912 a list of duties was drawn up for Tom Hackett, the Works foreman; these show that he was becoming very much like a personnel manager. One of his duties was "Supervision of personell", which included:

Seeing new applicants (men) with Director.

Arranging the necessary staffs of men in various Departments.

Arranging for the interchange of men, extra shifts, etc.

Notices to employees referring to engagement, discipline, and discharge.⁶⁵

Although J.H. Jones was to continue to have charge of the "Girls piece rates department", Bellows was to provide the "data" for the piece rates. The Board confirmed that Bellows would still have to consult

the Head Forewoman's office, "in regard to all matters affecting the Girls' departments."²⁰

American Consultants

Another significant move at this time was the decision of the Board, in September 1912, to engage the services of Suffern and Sons, described as "an American firm of business experts". They were initially hired,

in regard to the unloaders gang, covering operations from train to stores, at a fee of perhaps 125 guineas, with the provision however that their engineer should be excluded from all manufacturing departments. [This provision was probably to do with keeping manufacturing processes a secret].²¹

It is not clear when *Sufferns* started work at Bournville. One of their employees came to Bournville in June 1913, "to assist in the organisation of a Planning and Ordering Department", which was, "an attempt to centralise in one control the ordering of the work passing through the departments concerned."²² Another of their employees, J.E. Whiteford, continued to visit Bournville in connection with this work. He also assisted Bellows with putting the Unloaders Gang on to piece-work in 1913.²³ Whiteford, a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, was described by the Board as the, "Efficiency man from Sufferns". He appears to have been employed directly by *Cadburys* to carry out a series of reorganisations at Bournville, including the Engineer's Department in February 1914; Cardbox standardisation in March 1914, which was to take him six to eight months and cost about £1,000; and when he finished his work on cardboxes in January 1915 he was put on to transport arrangements.²⁴ It was Whiteford who loaned Prosser much of the literature "relating to American systems".²⁵

The only mention of Suffern and Sons which the research has located comes from the history of the Whittin Machine Works, U.S.A. There it was decided in the spring of 1912, "to give efficiency engineering a test" by letting the New York partnership of Suffern and Son start work in one department. In the summer of 1912, three Suffern

men worked in the Whitinsville plant, "making time and motion studies, setting up piece rates, and improvising new manufacturing procedures." There was dissatisfaction with the fees that Sufferns charged and a feeling that they did no more than the Whitin company had already done. So, when Suffern's contract finished in December 1912 it was not renewed. However, Navin went on to say that:

although Suffern's work was looked upon as no more than a qualified success, it was nonetheless retained by the Whitin Machine Works and was extended to other departments in the shop by employees in the Whitin organization who had been trained to make time studies by Suffern's own men.

Which was not surprising given that it was reported at the time that:

The results ... obtained by means of a time study and bonus system ... brought about a reduction of 25% in the labor cost while increasing the production nearly 50% and increasing the earnings of workmen more than 26%.⁹²

Scientific Management at Bournville

Cadburys' new Works Organisation Department was similarly successful, as was shown by Bellows' report on the first year of its work, which is worth quoting at length. First, the Chocolate Mill was divided into:

17 piece-work group, each paid independently of the others. Before making the change the Chocolate Mill was probably the most efficient man's department in the Factory, but the change had an immediate effect, the efficiency has increased, and it has been kept much more uniform than before. *Moreover, we have a better control over the wages of the department. With each piece-rate we specify the exact operation covered by the rate, this enables us to keep a close track of the changes of process which are constantly occurring. Formerly, those changes went on without the piece-rate being revised, and then sudden revision became necessary, and naturally caused dissatisfaction; whereas, by amending the rate as each change occurs, not only is there no violent hiatus, but the reason for the revision is self-evident to the worker. [emphasis added]*

Comparisons were difficult because of the lack of previous records, even so, Bellows could report:

the week our new scheme started in the Chocolate Mill the output per man went up, and I estimate the average since has been about 8% higher than for the same period last year.³³

There appear to have been instances of soldiering, but Bellows overcame them:

The next department to receive attention was the Mould Making Department. Some years ago a sort of bonus system was in operation here, but it was afterwards dropped, and the department lapsed into ordinary day-work once more. We made a series of time studies of the work, and after considerable preliminary investigation started an individual piece-work scheme for the makers of new moulds. This scheme was in operation for months, but the workers appeared to be working to a fixed arrangement, and the scheme looked as though it might ultimately collapse. However, the workers finally come round, and the output per man has now gone up considerably. In one case it would appear that work which used to take 6.7 hours is now done in about 3.5 hours. In other cases the difference is not so great but I should judge that we shall be able to show an all round improvement of 20%.³⁴

With the Unloaders Gang the men were divided into "small piece-work groups"; after the operations had been carefully timed and the Works Organisation Department had "endeavoured to secure, as far as possible, a regularity of work." Irregularity of work was one of the main difficulties, but where this had been overcome, Bellows was able to "show some very satisfactory results." Using figures from the Cost Office he found that the effects of the reorganisation were:

that the cost for handling the cocoa, timber and tinsplate on the 1912 basis would be about £1,290 as compared with £873 on the 1913 basis - a saving of £417 a year.

Bellows concluded on the Unloaders Gang as follows:

After looking carefully into the figures I think we may say that the wages saving ... due to the reorganisation, would amount to £600 a year. In addition to this there is a saving of overhead expense, due to the reduction of the gang by about 20 men, and this can be set off against any extra clerical work involved in the new system. Moreover, the above saving has been effected *without any expenditure on machinery or plant.* The workers are earning about 25% more wages, and the men

are becoming expert at their work, and are not drawn on for filling vacancies in other departments. Formerly, the changes were so frequent that there was a considerable loss through this cause alone.

The progress of the Works Organisation Department was rapid. As well as the Chocolate Mill, the Unloaders, the Moulding Department and the canal boat journeys, which received detailed attention in Bellows' report, the department started six new piece-work groups in various parts of the factory. It also "made revisions in 22 other departments, besides making 6 new individual books and revisions in 23 others." All this was not achieved without meeting some resistance, as Bellows explained:

During the year we have had one or two disputes with Trades Unions; the most serious of these was that caused by a reduction in the piece-rates of the French Confectionery Department last Autumn. The matter was settled amicably by our granting certain concessions. The wages of the workers in that department have considerably improved in the meantime, and although the old discontent no doubt still lingers, there can be no real ground for dissatisfaction. The only other dispute of any consequence was that over the reduction in the Packers' piece-rates, due to the installation of conveyor, [sic] and also over minimum rates for Home Packers. In this case, as we had already dealt liberally with the workers, we did not yield to their demands.⁹⁵

There does not appear to have been any serious dispute at Bournville, but the activities of the Works Organisation Department did not go unnoticed. In March, 1913, the *Daily Herald* reported that, "for some little time the Bournville works have been the scene of more or less serious disputes amongst all grades of workers." The "French Department" dispute had been settled satisfactorily because of the intervention of the Workers' Union organiser said the report. Since then the box-making department had been receiving attention, with the result that a new scale was proposed which would mean reductions in earnings for the women of up to fifty per cent. The result was an influx into the trade unions. The *Daily Herald* also noted:

Another innovation which is causing considerable ill-feeling amongst the employees at Bournville is the introduction of a speeder-up, who comes to the works

with all the latest American ideas on the subject. Much bad blood has ensued in consequence, and the management would do well to look into things before it is too late.

An indication of how the firm was able to carry through its extensive reorganisation of piece-work and wages throughout the works was the letter which sixteen women of long standing in the box-making department sent to the Board expressing "respect for, and confidence in the firm, and trust that our long and cordial relations may not be disturbed by any irresponsible newspaper twaddle".⁹⁶

It is hard to say whether *Cadburys* were applying scientific management at Bournville because it is hard to identify exactly what scientific management is. If time-study symbolised scientific management, then it can definitely be stated that *Cadburys* were implementing it. The remark of another employer in the discussion on scientific management in the *Sociological Review* of 1914 seems to describe the situation fairly accurately. Walter Hazell, the Chairman of the Aylesbury printing firm of Hazell, Watson and Viney Ltd, remarked that:

Mr Cadbury's firm are carrying on scientific management in an admirable way, and Mr Taylor's scheme appears to be somewhat the same idea under another name.⁹⁷

If Edward Cadbury can be said to have responded to Taylorism "with caution and distrust", as Littler argues, then it was only within a certain context and to certain elements of Taylorism.⁹⁸ J.A. Hobson had already reviewed scientific management critically in the *Sociological Review*, in 1913.⁹⁹ If Edward Cadbury was to retain his political credentials he could hardly do otherwise. However, his response to scientific management can best be seen as an assertion that the essentials of scientific management, work measurement especially, could be implemented without Taylor's hostility to the trade unions. Taylor used the general interest in the labour problem to push his ideas on scientific management. It may even be this contradiction that brought scientific management to *Cadburys*; that by promoting his system by offering it as an alternative to trade unions, Taylor aroused a discussion which brought his ideas to the notice of the Cadburys, who took an interest in social science debates. If Taylor's ideas on

labour were an essential component of scientific management, then *Cadburys* were against them. But Taylor was, as Nelson has put it, "more than most prominent men ... a product of his environment".¹⁰⁰ His views on labour were predictable, but they could have changed, and left his ideas on scientific management intact.

Cadburys, like the National Cash Register Company before them, introduced both "systematic management procedures and a varied welfare program."¹⁰¹ What this study shows is that they had implemented welfare provisions at Bournville, and were developing systematic management along their own lines, well before scientific management was applied in their works. The firm's ability to introduce scientific management without a confrontation with the workforce was in part the product of the welfare and personnel measures already taken. *Cadburys* borrowed their welfare practices from other firms, notably *N.C.R.*, and they used an American firm of consultants to help them introduce scientific management. But the two innovations were introduced separately. Personnel measures were not introduced in order to offset the adverse effects of scientific management; instead the personnel policies can be seen as having allowed for the selection of workers who could be incorporated into a loyal workforce, which was then a suitable site for the implementation of Taylor's system, but without the necessity for antagonising the trade unions. If Taylor's views on labour were a product of his own experiences and milieu, then so were Edward Cadbury's. Considering that their views were opposed, it is interesting that *Cadburys* could still implement Taylor's techniques.

The Diffusion of Taylorism

The early adoption by *Cadburys* of what must surely be seen as essential elements of scientific management is an important example of the diffusion of Taylor's ideas, and it shows that certain employers were quite able to perceive the usefulness of such measures as time study without the need to take on Taylor's crude notions of economic motivation. Braverman has summarised the position after this process of diffusion as follows:

Taylorism dominates the world of production; the practitioners of "human relations" and "industrial

psychology" are the maintenance crew for the human machinery. If Taylorism does not exist as a separate school today, that is because, apart from the bad odor of the name, it is no longer the property of a faction, since its fundamental teachings have become the bedrock of all work design.¹⁰²

What is striking is the extent to which the process was already well underway in the 1910s at *Cadburys*. With the maintenance crew largely in position waiting, *Cadburys* only had to distance themselves from the bad odor in order to be able to implement the essentials of Taylorism.

Early on it was understood at *Cadburys* what Gramsci said certain American industrialists understood:

that "unfortunately" the worker remains a man and even during his work he thinks more, or at least has greater opportunities for thinking once he has overcome the crisis of adaptation without being eliminated: and not only does the worker think, but the fact that he gets no immediate satisfaction from his work and realises that they are trying to reduce him to a trained gorilla, can lead him into a train of thought that is far from conformist. That the industrialists are concerned about such things is made clear from a whole series of cautionary measures and "educative" initiatives".¹⁰³

This concern was not the outcome of a dissimulatory consciousness of purpose, it was the product of a definite historical process consisting of real experiences and of the ideologies in which they were understood. The result was that *Cadburys* did not implement scientific management *and then* discover the need for a concern with the worker's minds. They had already arrived at the point where they expressed such a concern and which allowed them to introduce Taylorism relatively smoothly; the very smoothness of it all may make it appear as if it was the unfolding of a design, but it was not. There was nothing inevitable about the definite historical process of diffusion whereby scientific management came to the notice of *Cadburys'* directors and was introduced into Bournville. Furthermore, if the firm was to be able to continue to use scientific management then it had to refine and develop its institutional framework in order to ensure its hegemony within the factory continued. This is what the Works Councils represented.

The Firm's Initiative

The Bournville Works Men's Council first met on 21st November 1918.¹ This marked the beginning of the Works Council scheme at Bournville. At this point, with the creation of two Works Councils, one for men and the other for women, the institutional framework of industrial relations at Bournville for the next fifty years was established. The discussions which led to the setting up of the Works Councils started around October 1917. First, the Mens and "Girls" Works committees considered the Whitley Report and made suggestions. In October 1917, the Whitley Report was discussed by a foremen's conference, at which George Cadbury Jnr. praised the report, asserted the need for it to be discussed and said he expected the foremen to be acquainted with it. Each foreman was to be circulated with a copy of the Whitley Report and the Foremen's Committee was to respond to it in writing to the Directors.²

The initiative for a Works Council scheme undoubtedly came from the Board, and George Cadbury Jnr.'s enthusiasm for some scheme along the lines of the Whitley Report appears to have precluded outright rejection of the idea by the otherwise lukewarm foremen. They resigned themselves to the immanence of some such scheme and confined their remarks at this first conference, and at a subsequent one in November 1917, to pointing out the difficulties they anticipated and the safeguards they would want.³ One of the foremen expressed his fears about recent developments:

A working man has got a report out putting the bottom dog side of the business. This thing will in all probability come along, and we foremen will have a toughish time through it.

As for the Whitley Report, he said two things were missing from it:

one was, anything about conduct, and the other, the cost of work ... We could start with these two things, together with education.⁴

These remarks summarise the doubts the foremen had and the limited role they saw for any Works Council scheme; the administration of welfare would not impinge on their prerogatives.

At their second conference one of the foremen endorsed George Cadbury Jnr.'s proposal for the Foremen's Executive Committee and the Works Committee to draft a scheme for consideration by a *preliminary* Committee. This was seen as a safeguard by the foremen, as is indicated by remarks on the idea reported in the *Works Magazine*:

We have certain persons in the shops who are quite right for this committee. There is another good reason why we should set up a preliminary committee - this committee could be disbanded if it were not right. The same thing applies in the girls departments - they may have some hot-heads.⁵

There was a discussion as to whether the preliminary committee should be presented with a ready-made scheme, but it was decided that there would be a better chance of support for the scheme if those appointed to the committee were asked to frame it. There was then, to be a "democratic element" in the preliminary committee.⁶ This seems to have been successful in securing support for the Works Councils; in the Men's Council report on its first year's work it was alleged that:

The value and stability of the Bournville scheme lies in the fact that it was mutually drawn up by workers and management, who worked in equal numbers side by side on the Drafting Committee.⁷

The first meeting of the Drafting Committee set up to draw up a scheme was on 9th February 1918, and prior to the meeting each member of the committee was sent a copy of the Whitley Report.⁸ In fact the appointed Committee only met in order to arrange for the election of the Drafting Committee itself, which consisted of eight representatives appointed by the Firm and eight elected by the workers.⁹ There was a separate Drafting Committee for the women, and notice of the election for it went out in February 1918.¹⁰ The Drafting Committee had drawn up the substantial part of the scheme which was to be finally accepted by May 1918,¹¹ and the finished scheme appeared in the July issue of the *Works Magazine*¹². But before the Works Councils were put into

operation, the support of the workforce, and, perhaps more importantly, of the trade unions, had to be secured.

Relationship to the Whitley Report

The Bournville Works Council scheme was certainly developed as a result of the Whitley Report. There had been some kind of consultative body in operation for some time in the form of the Card Box Committee, but there is little record of the working of this committee and it had certainly not been significantly extended since its inauguration around 1910. Of course though, the Card Box Committee was alluded to as a successful precedent in the course of setting up the Works Council scheme. In fact proposals for a scheme of "Shop Committees" on the Men's side of the Works were quite advanced before the Men's Works Committee decided to ask the Girls' Works Committee for a report on the Card Box Committee.¹³ The Mens' Works Committee sent a letter asking about the Card Box Committee on 27th September 1917,¹⁴ but earlier that same month the Men's Works Committee had a meeting with the only item for discussion, a report from the Staffing and Rules Sub-Committee on the Whitley Report and Shop Committees, where each paragraph of the Report had been gone through separately.¹⁵ In his report on the Card Box Committee J.H. Jones, a management representative on the committee, definitely saw the significance of the Card Box Committee retrospectively in terms of the Whitley Report, and he concluded:

Whatever the fate of the Whitley Report, we hope to see Committees established for all Trades and Branches of labour at Bournville, for we are certain that Industrial Autocracy, however beneficially administered, cannot in the future exist in a Political Democracy.¹⁶

So, the discussions preceding the Bournville Works Council scheme were precipitated by the Whitley Report, and reference to the Whitley Report was one of the ways in which first the foremen and later the workers in general were won over to support the scheme. The notice to workers of the election of the Drafting Committee described it as a committee to draw up and submit a definite scheme "for the Bournville and Stirchley Works *on the lines of the Whitley Report*". It concluded:

The Firm have for some time been considering the possible formation of Shop Committees and the report of

the Whitley Committee has brought this matter to a head.¹⁷

The Men's Works Committee Annual Report for 1917 summarised the position under the heading "Shop Committees":

When the Whitley Report first appeared it was at once recognized that this was a document of considerable importance affecting factory life, and the Staffing and Rules Sub-Committee devoted a considerable amount of time to the study of this report and its application to conditions at Bournville. As a result, they were able to bring forward a scheme for the formation of shop Committees which was approved at a Foremen's Conference held in the latter part of the year. The matter is at present receiving further attention and it is hoped that a useful and workable scheme will shortly be presented.¹⁸

The tone of this report, incidentally, seems to belie the significance subsequently attributed to any "democratic element" in the drawing up of the Works Council scheme, suggesting, as it does, that a scheme for Shop Committees was well under way in 1917 before the Drafting Committee had even been elected.

Early on, however, the firm began to distance the Bournville Works Council from the Whitley Report; at an early meeting of the Drafting Committee in February 1918 George Cadbury Jnr. said he, "hoped the Committee would not feel itself too strongly tied by the Whitley Report."¹⁹ A pamphlet put out by the firm in 1923, *A Works Council in Being*, explained that the Works Council "did not, strictly speaking, proceed from the Whitley Recommendations, but was rather a definite step taken in extension of a policy which has guided the joint affairs of the firm and their employees for many years past." Although it admitted that the Bournville Works Council "movement is so closely identifiable with the spirit and principle of the Recommendations of 1917 that it is regarded here as one."²⁰ By 1931 the Works Councils were distanced even further from the Whitley report, Williams acknowledged that "to a certain degree these councils were the outcome of the report" and that they "were modelled upon part of it". But he alleged that the Works Councils were:

To an even greater degree ... the logical outcome of the Works Committees established in 1905, and of the ever-

increasing amount of work that was thrown upon them as years went on.²¹

While the Bournville Works Council scheme was introduced as a response to the Whitley Report, its *perceived* relationship to that report depended on several factors. One was the attitude and importance of the trade unions, both at Bournville and in general. Another was the importance of the Works Councils in the running of the Bournville Works and its correspondence to a Whitley Council. Then later of course there was the importance of Whitleyism generally and the firm's attitude as to whether it would be best to stress the Works Councils' relationship to Whitley or to the continuity of Bournville.

The Employers Organise

At the end of 1917, representatives from four firms, *Cadburys, Frys, Rowntrees and Carsons*, met in a "Conference on Conditions of Employment in the Cocoa and Chocolate Trade". George Cadbury Jnr. took the chair and the first item for discussion was the comparison of wage rates paid by the four firms. The prospect of unionisation was discussed and,

It was thought that the tendency might be for the unions to press for the payment of wages for all firms on the basis of the highest wage at any time being paid for a particular class of work by any one employer (hints had already been thrown out in this direction at Bristol), and that the only way of dealing with the matter was by a frank interchange of information.²²

The Whitley Report was considered and,

The unanimous opinion was that the Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Trades from the workers point of view should be associated for this purpose.²³

But the employers were worried that they might be swamped if they were forced into the general Confectionery Trade. They decided to organise themselves to pre-empt this and they thought that the trade unions which most affected them "would form a separate section of the Unions for Confectionery Workers". Most of Fry's workers, except for the confectioners, were already in the Union and a considerable number of women at Carsons, near Bristol, had also joined. Arnold Rowntree had been in discussion with Ernest Bevin and, "it had been suggested

that the Confectionery Trade offered a good basis for the formation of a Council on the lines of the Whitley Report." It was decided that the Cocoa and Chocolate industry should organise itself so as to establish a separate identity, "as in the event of the Government grouping the Confectionery, Cocoa and Chocolate industries together, such an organization would still be a distinct branch." The idea of an Employers' Federation was not favoured because it would be distrusted by "those interested in Social and Trade Union questions." It was agreed that there should be an informal meeting with representatives of the Unions concerned,

but it would be better if the matter could be so arranged as to let the suggestion for a combination for this purpose come from the workers themselves.

To this end, it would appear, Arnold Rowntree was to see Bevin to try and arrange a preliminary informal meeting. It was also agreed to extend the conference to other firms in the Cocoa and Chocolate Trade. A list of such firms was to be prepared and a conference called to discuss the Whitley Report.

An informal meeting followed between the four firms and representatives of the trade unions. Bevin warned that the Cocoa and Chocolate Trade would be discredited by being classed as a sweated industry if it had to have a Trade Board forced onto it with rates applicable to the low grade Confectionery Trade. He believed the Cocoa and Chocolate Trade could go further than a Trade Board, and he proposed a permanent arrangement between employers' and employees' representatives which would be facilitated by the employers being well organised. Bevin's suggestion seemed to correspond to the employers' hopes for the workers' side to appear to have taken the initiative and the other trade union representatives present went along with the idea of a Council being set up. Although Mary MacArthur, of the National Federation of Women Workers did not think the proposed Council should be substituted for the Trade Board, which should continue as protection for the employees of small manufacturers. The Council could then give a lead with higher wages in the better branches of the Trade. This was an important consideration because, as Arnold Rowntree pointed out, one

real difficulty was that of the 96 manufacturers stated to be in the Cocoa and Chocolate Industry the four firms represented 80% of the trade, although it is not clear on what basis he meant this.²⁴

Having been given the go-ahead by the Trade Unions, in the shape of Ernest Bevin, the four employers went on to organise a wider meeting of employers, with invitations being sent to all firms in the trade employing more than 100, in order that the four firms committed to an arrangement with the trade unions could carry through the understanding reached.²⁵ Representatives from 20 Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers and from the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance attended a meeting in January 1918 at which George Cadbury Jnr. outlined the meeting which had taken place with the Unions. He proposed a Council carrying on alongside the Trade Board and said there was a need to consider whether a Federation of Manufacturers of Cocoa and Chocolate should be formed. He clearly favoured such an Association and he listed the advantages it would have for manufacturers as the formulation of a national policy for labour; preventing manufacturers being played off against each other; the standardisation of conditions to eliminate friction among workers in various factories; the need for employers to have information when dealing with labour. It was clearly the smaller manufacturers who needed persuading, and addressing them George Cadbury Jnr. said that the Unions would force standardisation anyway, so that they would be better off if they were represented on a Council laying down general conditions than if they were not consulted. It was necessary, he said, to face up to negotiations with Trade Unions and to pre-empt the Unions going into the Cocoa and Chocolate Trade unilaterally which would result in a situation where unorganised employers faced organised workers. He warned his fellow employers on two counts, firstly that,

Labour is not so unorganized or uneducated as many people seem to think; it has studied the questions probably more than the employer, and its representatives have been at it all their lives.

Secondly he recommended a sub-committee be set up to draft a scheme for a Cocoa and Chocolate Employers' federation, as a branch of the Food Manufacturers Federation because,

In the event of the employers not setting up a Federation of their own, there is a serious likelihood of the Government setting up a Constitution and compelling us to join. Surely it would be better for us to enter this voluntarily.²⁶

There were some doubts as to the need for a new federation which might duplicate the work of the Food Federation and the Federation of British Industries, but in general George Cadbury Jnr.'s views were endorsed. A motion was carried, "that this meeting approves of a joint working Council of employers and workpeople," and a sub-committee was set up from the meeting. The fact that it *appeared* to the other employers that the trade union side had taken the initiative helped the four firms who were committed to some Council being set up, one reason for this was that it seemed to offer the employers an opportunity to preempt government interference. This was indicated by the Chairman of the meeting, Sydney W. Pascall who represented Pascalls Ltd. as well as being Chairman of the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance. He was in favour of the general idea of a Council but saw a need for the Meeting to make up its mind on the direction to be taken. He asked,

were we in favour of moving along the lines of the Whitley Report or did we prefer to go along on present lines? ... Now we had been approached by Labour we were in a better position than if we had approached Labour ... It would be much better to make our Industry self governed, with Labour and Management working together on those lines, than to have Government machinery imposing impossible conditions upon us.

It was going to be one of two things he thought, therefore,

Far better to have Labour and Management working together than for the management to be under the harrow of a Government working through more or less uninstructed controllers.²⁷

These arguments were reiterated at a later meeting in January 1918 when the Cocoa and Chocolate manufacturers' representatives were trying to gain the support of the employers' organisations, (the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance and the Food Manufacturers' Federation), after it had been agreed that the Cocoa and Chocolate Industry was not large enough to stand absolutely by itself. Here objections were raised to the necessity for any organisation because the Whitley Report had pre-

supposed the existence of well organised bodies on both sides. The employers' side was well organised, and the Government had congratulated the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance on this point, but the workers were not well organised, comparatively few were in unions. It was thought that the Trade Boards might be duplicated and that it would be better to await the proposed extension of the Trade Board Act.

Not suprisingly, other employers objected to an organisation which might be hostile to the Trades Boards and to an arrangement with the trade unions which would strengthen their hands, which,

would mean practically forcing their employees into the unions; also forcing employers to pay higher rates than were laid down by the Trade Boards.²⁸

To counter this it was pointed out that the Whitley Committee had been considering unorganised industries and that it looked for a development along the same lines as for organised industries. As well as that there was a tendency towards union organisation and it was thought that it would be better to prepare for negotiations with the unions before being compelled to do so. "There was, so far," it was noted,

no suggestion of any unfriendly feeling on the part of the Unions, and the attitude Labour would take up by their trade ... The days of a tame Trade Union were past, and the trade must face the present and possible future. There was no reason for organised employers to fear Labour, but a united front was absolutely necessary.

Thanks to Ernest Bevin, the Cocoa and Chocolate manufacturers could back up such perceptive observations by pointing out that the suggestion for the proposed arrangements "had come from the workers themselves, most of the workers being in one or other of the Unions which had amalgamated." But in feigned magnanimity the four firms approached said they would not commit themselves without consulting the whole of the trade. Sydney Pascall elaborated on the pre-emptive potential of the opportunity the employers had been offered by the unions. He saw the need to recognise a new spirit, the Labour Party was strengthening itself and it would be a factor to be reckoned with. Government control and controllers would try to obtain the support of

Labour, therefore there was a choice between working with Labour for the common good, "or of declining the invitation extended and facing the future with a possible alliance of State Controllers and Labour against the Industry."²⁹

Cadburys Relations with Government

The need to act on the *Whitley Report* felt by *Cadburys* and the other three main Cocoa and Chocolate manufacturing firms indicates the seriousness with which they took the Report. In the first Report it was pointed out that although the Government was not in favour of compulsory arbitration it was, "anxious to see Industrial Councils established as soon as possible in the organised trades", due to the experience of the War, the need for reconstruction and the avoidance of disputes after the War.³⁰ So that they could undertake the duties the Government asked of the proposed Councils,

the Government desire it to be understood that the Councils will be recognised as the official standing Consultative Committees to the Government on all future questions affecting the industries which they represent, and that they will be the normal channel through which the opinion and experience of an industry will be sought on all questions with which the industry is concerned ... it is intended that Industrial Councils should play a definite and permanent part in the economic life of the country, and the Government feels that it can rely on both employers and workmen to co-operate in order to make that part a worthy one.³¹

There was an appeal for the recommendations of the *Report* to be carried out and an assurance that the Government would assist in establishing Industrial councils.

Cadburys would have taken particular notice of this on several counts. They had been affected by the War, for example at the beginning of 1917 the export of cocoa preparations and confectionery had been prohibited, although that had been partly offset by a prohibition on import being imposed at the same time according to the Directors' *Report for the Year 1917*.³² The same report outlined the position faced with cocoa, stocks had declined and prices had risen due to the restrictions on imports,

Towards the end of the year it became evident that prices would continue to advance owing to restricted supplies; the leading manufacturers therefore placed the facts before the Government and control of prices of raw material and cocoa powder and butter came into operation early in 1918.³³

At the request of the Government the firm had taken up the "manufacture of articles of food outside the usual scope of business". Having had to deal with the Government as a result of the War, quite clearly the firm did not want to be left out of any consultations with the Government regarding control over the industry which might continue after the War. The position the firm found itself in during 1917 is indicated in the introduction to the Report for that year:

The business problems of the time have necessitated frequent conferences with Government Departments, both in our individual capacity and in conjunction with other manufacturers and associations, such as the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance, and particularly with J.S. Fry & Sons Ltd and Rowntree & Co Ltd.³⁴

The extent of their enthusiasm for the setting up of a Whitley type Council for their industry, and even more for a Works Council scheme at Bournville, cannot, however, be explained merely by *Cadburys'* desire to be heard by the Government. To have done that all they would have had to do would be to make sure that they were involved in any developments taking place in their industry, but they went further and initiated those developments. In *Experiments in Industrial Organization* (1912), Edward Cadbury had portrayed the firm as having anticipated and gone beyond legislative and public provisions for workers.³⁵ He believed that:

Factory Legislation, however, of necessity can embody only to a limited degree of the national conscience and experience. It can fix only a minimum standard. Such legislation is defensive, and aims to protect the workers from positive physical injury and overstrain, and, in a limited degree, from under-payment.

Therefore it was up to "enlightened manufacturers" to experiment in improving factory organisation, not just as an end in itself but as a means to educating the community, proving the practicability and

economic necessity of further advances beyond existing law.³⁶ With this in mind then, it was likely that *Cadburys* did not want to appear to be lagging behind other firms or for it to seem that they were unresponsive to the Government's proposals and in need of being cajoled.

Edward Cadbury's views had not changed by 1918, he looked to changes still in industrial organisation. He was quoted at length in Directors' Report for 1917, looking to the future, he said,

Industry will have to be organized, both from the Capitalist and Labour point of view, very much more completely than at present. Manufacturers in this country, if they are to hold their own in the face of the fierce international competition that will follow the war, whether immediately or after a few years, must cease to act as isolated units, and co-operate in research, in organization, and probably in buying and selling. Labour must also organize, and Capital and Labour must learn that, however wide apart their interests appear to be, yet careful organization and a high average output are essential to preserve the trade of this country, and to pay a much higher standard of wages that I believe we shall think essential in the future. There must be some method by which Capital and Labour in each industry can meet together and discuss the problems of that industry; Capital must take Labour into its confidence, and Labour must feel an increased sense of responsibility.³⁷

The difficulty facing *Cadburys* was that the *Whitley Report* did not really apply to them or their industry. The *Report* itself had pointed out that,

Although the scheme is only intended, and indeed can only be applied, in trades which are well organized *on both sides* ... it rests with those trades which did not at present possess a sufficient organization to bring it about if they desire to apply it to themselves.³⁸ [my emphasis]

The firm could take steps to organise itself with other employers in the trade, but labour was not organised. At the first meeting of the Drafting Committee George Cadbury Jnr., in his opening remarks, conceded that 80 to 90% of them were not organised either. Even so, he asked,

Were they to work entirely on trade union lines, or embrace those without a union?

In reply, one of the Workers' Representatives,

pointed out that the appendix of the Whitley Report stated definitely that the scheme applied only to employers' associations and trades unions.³⁹

George Cadbury Jnr. thought it would be a pity to exclude the unorganised, because admitting them might be the first step in their organisation. But another of the Workers' Representatives came back,

The authors of the report say it is not possible to include many of these aims if employers and workers are not organized.

It was at this point, under pressure, that George Cadbury Jnr. first started to distance the proposed Works Council from the *Whitley Report*.⁴⁰ The Cadburys then, found themselves in a contradictory position, in order to be seen to be complying with the recommendations of the Whitley Committee they had to persuade both their own workforce and other employers to co-operate, and to do this they had to distance themselves from the *Whitley Report*. They tried to convince other employers in the trade that they could pre-empt what the *Whitley Report* presupposed, that was, trade union organisation. Whereas the Bournville workforce, at least the already organised sections of it, had to be convinced that the proposed Works Council scheme, while not in line with the Whitley Committee's proposals for Works Committees, could bring about a sufficient organisation for the workers to make the *Whitley Report* applicable.

The approach from Bevin was of course useful for the firm in its dealings with both workers and other employers, but dealings with national union officials were not in themselves sufficient to set up a Works Council at Bournville, and they did not correspond to the industrial situation which the Whitley Committee had been a response to. Tom Hackett, the Works Foreman at Bournville, displayed an awareness of this general industrial situation in his address, "On the Labour Problem", to "The New Year Gathering at Bournville in January 1918, reported in the *Works Magazine* Hackett spoke of the changes in

relations between Labour and Capital during the War and of the "trouble at Coventry, Manchester and Glasgow." He referred to the rapid growth of the Shop Stewards' movement in the last 18 months and said this indicated an attitude that Union leaders must not be blindly trusted and must consult the rank and file. Workers, he said, had recognised the need to stand together after the War so that their conditions would not be worsened. He concluded,

The opportunity was before us at Bournville to set up an ideal council, to which he hoped the Firm would give a large measure of executive power, which would control vital principles and help to define what should be looked upon as a reasonable standard of life.⁴¹

Cadburys and Shop Stewards

So, there was an awareness at Bournville that the *Whitley Report* was a response to the Shop Stewards' movement, but the Works Council cannot be seen as a direct response to the growth of a Shop Stewards' movement at Bournville itself. The firm's considerations of the *Whitley Report* were already well under way by the time recognition was extended to Shop Stewards in the Bournville Works,⁴² and this late organisation on the part of the workers may go some way to explaining the Board's apparent confusion as to the nature of trade union shop stewards' committees as opposed to Whitley type committees. As early as July 1917 the Board had proposed setting up Shop Committees at the milk condensing factories at Frampton, Knighton and Badsey, but these were to have a limited and specific purpose, the disposal of Hospital Notes.⁴³ In considering the Board's proposal for a Shop Committee at Frampton, the Staffing and Rules Sub-Committee reported,

if it is the desire of the Firm that these Shop Committees should be formed on the lines of those generally recognised in Trades Union circles, then they should be composed of a certain number of workpeople from the men's and girls' sides of the place respectively. If the Firm wish these Committees after the Bournville Committees, SUB-COMMITTEE RECOMMEND that both sides of the Works should be represented, as in the previous proposition, and that a number be appointed by the Firm and an equal number by the workpeople by means of a democratic election.⁴⁴

It is not clear what the "Bournville Committees" referred to were, neither is it very clear whether the Committee understood the distinction between such committees and trade union committees. They appear to have been under the misapprehension that the type of shop committees "generally recognised in Trade Union circles" could actually be set up by the Firm. Although it pointed out that on "Bournville committees" the management and workers would be *equally* represented, the sub-committee does not appear to have understood that management would not be represented at all on a Trade Union shop committee, otherwise it would have been clear that the firm could not initiate such a committee.

This confusion continued, and appears to have emanated from the Board itself, as is shown by the way the applications for recognition from shop stewards were dealt with. On the 3rd December 1917, George Cadbury Jnr. reported to the Men's Works Committee that he had received a letter from the Engineering Department asking for full recognition of Shop Stewards. In response to this the

Men's Works Committee agreed to recommend to the Board that full recognition should be granted provided that our future action with regard to Shop Committees was not in any way prejudiced, and the Engineer and T.H. [the Works Foreman] were requested to interview the men concerned.⁴⁵

This gives the impression that the Men's Works Committee thought the Works Council scheme would replace any committees set up by the shop stewards, and the Board seems to have equated shop stewards with the proposed "Shop Committees". This is indicated in a note from the Board which read,

agree with the Men's Works Committee that we should fully recognise *Shop Committees* for the Engineering department, provided that such are purely advisory committees, and this will not prejudice any future action we may wish to take on the Whitley Report.⁴⁶
[emphasis added]

The Men's Works Committee noticed the apparent confusion on the part of the Board and was of the opinion that the Board minute should be referred to the Shop Stewards, but only after it had been "amended

accordingly". A week later the Board returned their note, amended so as to agree to "recognise *Shop Stewards* for the engineering department."⁴⁸ (emphasis added)

Recognition of the shop stewards, although extended readily on the part of the firm, appears to have been seen as a temporary measure before the Works Council came into operation. The firm's recognition of the "Shop Steward Movement" was reported in the January issue of the *Work Magazine* 1918, and the editor set aside space for reports of the movement in the Works by the convenor, H.J. Morcombe, recognising that "without all the freedom possible this page would fail in its purpose."⁴⁹ Morcombe took the opportunity to address the unrepresented shops,

we say: Organize and elect your stewards in time for the next meeting ... and take your place in this national development of trade unionism.

He went further, however; "The difference" he said,

between the shop steward movement and Government suggestions is that the first is dynamic, the second is static; the first is a social force drawing workers together, teaching communal responsibility; the second works only to balance forces and leave things much as they are ... The shop steward movement (is) a reassertion of the value of the individual in the face of the pitiless shop systems which exhaust the nervous energy of the worker, whether the day be long or short ... In many firms the stewards' work will be limited to trade union police duty; here where the management recognises there are duties beyond the production of profit, the shop stewards may hope to assist in building for the future.⁴⁹

This was an ambiguous argument by Morcombe, it indicates an awareness of the general trade union hostility to Whitley style Works Committees,⁵⁰ an attitude with which he associated himself with, but at the same time he showed a willingness to see developments at Bournville in a different light. As if the development of a Works Council as proposed by the management at Bournville was more in line with the Shop Stewards' movement than it was with the Government's proposals.

Cadburys were in the position of having to convince trade unionists, albeit trade unionists whose leadership nationally and in

the Works were only too ready to be convinced, that the Works Council scheme would diverge from or even go beyond the Whitley Committee's proposals. While at the same time, in securing the co-operation needed to set up a national council, other employers had to be persuaded that they could pre-empt either government or trade union intervention in the running of the industry, and by implication water down the Whitley Committee's recommendations.

H.J. Morcombe continued to be critical of developments following from the *Whitley Reports* in his column in the *Works Magazine*. In the March 1918 issue he reported the comments on the first National Industrial Council contained in the *Labour Gazette*; trade unionists, he said, could not be enthusiastic about the Council for the Pottery Industry. Still, he left things open for developments at Bournville by his remark that, "Much the best method is to build from the workshop, as the Firm is attempting to do here". He went on:

The Bournville Works stewards have given part of one meeting and the whole of the second (of two aggregate stewards' meetings held in February) to the discussion of Shop Committees at Bournville. Briefly, the stewards are out for the preservation of trade union independence.⁵¹

Incidentally, Morcombe was one of the workers' representatives on the Men's Drafting Committee as well as being the shop stewards' convenor. He does not appear to have objected to any proposals brought forward by the Drafting Committee, so from the outset there was no question of him abstaining from the firm's initiatives leading up to the Works Council scheme.

Securing Support for the Councils

George Cadbury Jnr. was in effect thrown back on the workers at Bournville for support in his efforts to set up some sort of national council because of the setbacks to the initiatives by the four Cocoa and Chocolate manufacturers. They had eventually persuaded the other employers that some sort of Joint Industrial Council be set up, and a motion was passed to that effect on 21st February 1918. These efforts culminated in a meeting on 4th March 1918 between the committee of the

Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers and two representatives from the Ministry of Labour. Unfortunately the Committees from the Confectionery and Jam Manufacturers were also present, on the suggestion of the Secretary of the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance and the Food Federation, R.M. Leonard, who had told the Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers that the Government would probably prefer a Food Council with panels for each trade rather than a Cocoa and Chocolate Confectionery Council. Therefore, he said, it would be necessary to co-operate with the Jam trade, 80% of which was made by members of the Food Manufacturers Federation. The representatives from the Jam and Confectionery trades were unenthusiastic. One representative from a confectionery firm, C. & E. Morton Ltd was anxious to ensure that "outside persons and bodies would not be brought in to organise the Trade on the workers' side," he saw a need to avoid trade unions, he was even dissatisfied with the Trade Boards, and while he was prepared to see them continue he wanted no extension.

This attitude must have undermined George Cadbury Jnr.'s approach to the Ministry of Labour representatives; he wanted to know from them whether Works Councils and Committees and could be taken as a basis for the work people's representation given their unorganised state; how could unorganised labour be brought in to the Council be recognised by the Government and take over the work of the Trade Boards so as to avoid a division of interests, the *Whitley Report* having recommended that wages were one of the matters to be considered by a Council. One of the Ministry of Labour representatives, Mr Clay, replied that the Whitley Committee "were quite emphatic that the National Councils must be representative not of employers and employees as such, *but of existing associations.*" If, therefore, trade union organisation was inadequate to represent the workers a Council on the lines of the *Whitley Report* was not possible. The Report, he said, applied only to organised industries, there was no Government pressure to form a Council and one would only be recognised if "it was exclusively representative of existing Institutions." But, he added, "there was everything to be said for the formation of a body which might serve the same object as proposed, but having no official recognition." Mr

Heath, the other Ministry of Labour representative went on to say that a Joint Industrial Council could be set up based on the existing trade unions and Associations of Employers, but that the Trade Boards would remain in force because the authority of the Council would only be moral. Where Trade Boards were already in existence for semi-organised industries the second *Whitley Report* proposed that they be extended, but still a Joint Industrial Council could be set up to deal with matters outside wages. Where there was no Trade Board in existence, he said, a Joint Industrial Council with a dilution of Government officials would be appropriate for semi-organised industries.

None of these suggestions from the Ministry of Labour was acceptable to the employers, either to the advocates of the Council, like the Cadburys, or to the unenthusiastic. No Council would be welcome which included Government officials as members in the same capacity and with the same powers as on a Trade Board, presumably because it was Government interference in the industry which the employers had hoped to avoid by setting up a Council. There was no point then, in setting up a Council which would have Government officials on it if there was not going to be any Government interference if a Council was not set up other than an extension to the Trade Boards.

The employers were not so candid as to give this as the sole reason for their wanting a Council in the light of the reaction from the Ministry of Labour. In the discussion it was stated that "any form of Council would not be of much use unless it was what Labour really wanted." The employers, in other words, did not want to appear to be the only obstacle to the aspirations of labour. Once again the Chairman, Major Pascall, summed up the employers' position. He proposed that the committees from the three trades, Jam, Confectionery and the Cocoa and Chocolate trade, should meet the trade unions and point out to them the difficulties in the way of forming an Industrial Council and that these were not due to any unwillingness on the part of the trade but to the Government's attitude. "Under no circumstances" he said,

would employers be prepared to force their workpeople to join a Trade Union. In any arrangement provision must be made for the adequate representation of unorganised labour and also for the elimination of the conflicting interests of various Trade Unions and the concentration upon Cocoa, Chocolate, Confectionery and Jam.⁵²

The Attitude of Organised Labour

The lack of success in initiating a National Council must have made George Cadbury Jnr. even more anxious to secure the co-operation of the workers at Bournville for any developments along the lines of the Whitley Committee's recommendations. But what was crucial was the support of the organised section of workers at Bournville, even though they were in a minority. These workers had to be persuaded to accept a Works Council for the Bournville Works which was largely ununionised. This meant the workers going against the advice of organisations like the National Guilds League, which warned that Joint Councils might undermine trade unionism and that although there was a need for negotiation between Employers' Associations and Trade Unions no system was acceptable unless "based upon the full and complete recognition of Trade Unionism, both nationally and locally, and in the mine, factory or workshop." According to this argument only in industries where,

effective Industrial Unionism exists [could] standing joint machinery of negotiation ... function with real success.

This was in no way an endorsement of the *Whitley Report*, which was seen as striving for a permanent improvement in relations between employers and workmen, based on the premise that a fundamental identity of interest existed between the employed and employers, which the Guilds League rejected. This was based on a recognition of the fundamental antagonism between workers and employers, and the proposed Industrial Councils were seen as "in effect, no more than an extended type of conciliation machinery."

There was one let out admitted by the National Guilds League which the workers there might have looked to, that where effective industrial combination was secured locally, or in a particular factory or workshop, before it was secured nationally then,

under the necessary safeguards, a local or works council may be acceptable when a National Council would be disastrous to Labour.⁵³

But against this was the need for a strong rank and file movement as the basis for trade unionism. It advocated setting up trade union Works Committees which should be recognised by employers, but these were seen as entirely different from the Joint Works Councils in the *Whitley Report*. Such Workshop Committees should consist entirely of trade unionists, because, it said,

Representation of non-unionists in the workshop, such as the *Whitley Report* seems by implication to contemplate, is both dangerous and inadmissible.⁵⁴

The problem for the organised workers at Bournville was that whereas nationally the labour and trade union movement saw a danger in the proposed Whitley Committees diverting already well-organised workers, at Bournville the offer of a Works Council scheme was not a concession due to the strength of workforce organisation, and it seemed to offer the opportunity to rapidly extend trade union organisation in the Works. Pamphlets such as Sydney Webb's, published in 1917, on *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions* did not really apply to Bournville because the problem facing the workforce was not one of an organised workforce facing an intransigent employer who was refusing to recognise trade unions or trying to divert them. *Cadburys* would probably have endorsed Webb's assertion that:

It is clear that the British workmen will, after the war, less than ever consent to sit down quietly under industrial autocracy.⁵⁵

The restoration of pre-War conditions was not sufficient for Bournville, because the Works had not been extensively organised, what was needed was some way to extend trade union organisation at Bournville. There is some indication of the proportion of the male workforce which was covered by trade union agreements at Bournville in 1913, according to figures compiled by the firm. (see table 6.1)

 Table 6.1 *Men aged 24 and over affected by Trade Unions at Bournville, 1913*

	Total	Under 30/- per week	30/- and over per wk
Not affected by Trades Unions	835	185	650
Trade Society Conditions	606	179	427

Forty departments were unaffected and fourteen were covered by trade union conditions; the most important were the fitting Shops with 176 men; the Bricklayers, 72 men; the Carpenters, 61 men; the Stock Room, 57 men; the Painters and Plumbers, 34 men; the Pipe Shop, 31 men; and the Printers, 29 men. The only workers engaged on actual Chocolate or Cocoa production who were affected were 20 men in the Mould Making department.⁵⁶

There was an awareness among the Bournville workers of the generally wary attitude towards the *Whitley Report* on the part of labour leaders, although the extent of this awareness is hard to judge. There was in circulation at the Works a pamphlet on *The Workers' Committee: An Outline of its Principles and Structure*, which Morcombe referred enquirers to in the February issue of the *Works Magazine*.⁵⁷ This pamphlet gave an outline of shops stewards' activities, it bemoaned the separation of officials from the rank and file and the divisions between trades and sexes. It argued the need for Workshop Committees to organise and to break down the barriers between workers in preparation for the formation of the "Great Industrial Union".⁵⁸ H.J. Morcombe alluded to the hostility to the *Whitley Report*, for example in April he noted that trade union Executives, especially in the engineering and craft unions, as well as in the Employers' Federation, "do not look with any pleasure upon the *Whitley Report*".⁵⁹ But he put this down to the Trade Union Executives' failure to recognise the importance of the Shop Stewards' movements. More information regarding official status for stewards had come from the Government

than from Trade Union Executives he said, and he anticipated unofficial action from the Shop Steward Movement because, as the *Whitley Report* recognised, "there is a wealth of suggestions at present lying dormant in the practical knowledge and experience of the workers." This was a contradictory position Morcombe held, especially given the role Bevin had played in the Cocoa and Chocolate manufacturers' attempts to set up a National Council. However, it was a useful position for him to hold in terms of negotiating with *Cadburys* over the form the proposed Works Council should take. It meant he could embrace the Bournville Works Council scheme, even if it was part of a movement which, nationally, was opposed by trade unions, on the grounds that his response was a local, rank and file response to proposals from an enlightened employer which could benefit the trade unions in the Works. Morcombe's position, if not intentionally, conveniently corresponded to what the *Cadburys* needed, because a non-existent or too compliant shop stewards' movement in the Works could not have lent credibility to the proposals for a Works Council, while a movement imbued with revolutionary ideas and strong enough to resist would have had none of it.

The Problem of Unorganised Workers

At first George Cadbury Jnr. had tried to argue that a Works Council at Bournville would have to include non-unionised workers because otherwise it could not be part of a National Council which would have to represent non-unionised workers in a trade where only 10 to 20% were in unions. In such a situation, he told the first meeting of the men's Drafting Committee, the Works Council could be an example to others. "Obviously", he said,

if a National Council is to be set up, it must embrace all employers and employed in the industry, and although the *Whitley Report* refers specifically to organized industries I believe the authors ... contemplate encouraging industries which are unorganized to take similar action. In any case a National Council could hardly be called National, if it only represented a minority of the industry. The Drafting Committee will have to consider the relationship of the Factory Council to Trade Unions, and while recognising fully Trade unions and all they have done, clearly unorganized workmen must not be shut out. A National Council, therefore, while having among its representatives

members of the various Unions concerned, will probably also consist of others who represent Factory Committees from unorganized factories.

Pointing out that the women also had a Drafting Committee even though 80 to 90% were unorganised he said,

It is important that we remember woman's place in industrial life and give them full recognition.⁶⁰

But as the likelihood of any development in the trade taking place at a national level receded, the implicit argument that Bournville workers would have to admit the unorganised or be left out carried less weight. The Shop Steward Movement in the Works was being strengthened as well, by February Morcombe could report a meeting having taken place consisting of fifty four elected stewards or their deputies. Twenty five new Departments had joined and there were visitors from another six Departments present at the meeting. As well as this a Birmingham Workers' Committee had been formed, representing twenty six factories. This had met in the Co-operative Hall in Bournville, and proposed to draw up a card of instructions for stewards, to include new arrivals being approached by stewards and asked about trade union membership. It was agreed that,

No section of workers or department shall start or accept new conditions, or basis without informing an aggregate meeting of Stewards.⁶¹

George Cadbury Jnr. needed the workers to organise so as to make any Works Council scheme more credible, but he did not want the process of organisation to preclude a Works Council, or for its unevenness to exclude the unorganised majority at Bournville. It was reported in the May issue of the *Works Magazine*, under the title "proposed Works Council, Trade Unionism and the Whitley Report", that George Cadbury Jnr. had met with Shop Stewards and representatives from departments without stewards. Here he was still able to allude to developments outside Bournville. It was reported that:

He considered with some of the labour leaders that we should find some better recognition than as a Trades Board industry. The method of Trades Board election he

considered unsatisfactory. There was no organization to appeal to on either side⁸²

He thought the chocolate and cocoa industries could be considered practically as in the intermediate stage of partial organisation, even though 80 to 90% of employees were not unionised. He told shop stewards that meetings had taken place in London of a group of cocoa and chocolate manufacturers and that out of 96 manufacturers about 30 or 40 were anxious to develop along the lines of the Whitley report. He saw a problem in that unionisation was unlikely to be rapid, especially because more women than men were employed and "women were difficult to organise." However, the main plank of his argument was the advantage of having an exemplary council at work at Lournville:

If it were possible to work out a scheme in the factory ... a wide extension of the principle would be possible - from the factory to the district and national committees, which might receive Government recognition, and be of great national value. Such a scheme would need the full backing of all the factory, so that he could go to the Ministry of Labour and say: 'Here is a scheme which has been thrashed out by our workpeople.' He anticipated the fear of trade unionists, but the facts must be looked in the face that we were an industry employing a larger number of women than men.

He saw an extension of union membership as being difficult, but even if sympathetic employers could not strengthen unions by any pressure, he said, "There was no objection to stewards giving a card of rules to new employees."

Morcombe, the convenor, referred to the difficulty of non-unionists being on workshop committees determining the conditions for unionists, he,

thought the non-unionist had no right to a word on such a subject as collective bargaining for the fixing of minimum rates, and hours of labour. Outside of these questions he did not think unionists would have any objection.

He thought that in practice the working of a scheme would be left to trade unionists anyway. Trade union support therefore, necessary for

the credibility of any Council and which could be used as an argument for Government recognition, had become a bargaining counter.

On the scope of the Works Council, George Cadbury Jnr. came back, he

said that the Directors had been anxious for a long time to associate the workpeople more closely in the business. They wanted to get away from the idea that they as Directors should always extend privileges, and that various schemes should always be made at the top.

The firm had tried to be more democratic, he said, for example the Pension Scheme had joint responsibility, and so,

The time had come when they felt that they ought to associate representatives from the rank and file with the management.

The scope of the Works Council should therefore be wide, and even if non-unionist representatives were elected to it he thought it should consider wages;

He would not rule out wages; it would be the workpeople themselves would do so if that were done ... The more trade unions and employers could settle the question of wages, the more he would be pleased.

The situation the Firm wanted to avoid was one where the trade unions would have negotiations separate from the Works Council and any wider councils which might be set up. George Cadbury Jnr. therefore reassured the shop stewards that they, "would form an essential link with the Trade Unions and the Works and National Councils." Pointing out that the idea of a "central Stewards Council" intended by stewards had been held over, he asked whether there would be two committees or not, and he "expressed the personal hope that there would be one Committee (each side meeting separately if necessary.)"⁶³

The Firm was in the position of needing trade union support for the Works Council, and to secure this it seemed to be prepared to encourage trade union membership and to allow for the negotiation of wages in the Works Council scheme. Although other employers might have seen some kind of Whitley Council on a national basis as a way to preclude trade union organisation and interference in their industry,

Cadburys were not hostile to trade unions and they saw a Works Council as a way to accommodate the growing shop stewards movement. They were keen that any recognition extended to the shop stewards should not interfere with their plans for a Works Council. This was reflected in George Cadbury Jnr.'s attitude to the "Vigilance Committee", which he met in June, 1918. This committee had been nominated at a Shop Stewards' meeting and appointed by a vote of the whole Works; it was probably intended that it should look out for the workers' interests in any difficulties arising in the labour situation as a result of the end of the War. George Cadbury Jnr. answered questions from the committee concerning discharged soldiers and conscientious objectors. The Men's Works Committee, probably acting on George Cadbury Jnr.'s suggestion, decided to recommend to the Board that the Vigilance Committee be recognised;

provided that it in no way prejudiced or interfered with the new Works Council. It was also thought that the need for this Committee would only be temporary and that when the Works Council gets properly established there would be no necessity for this Committee to exist.⁵⁴

Trade Union Support Secured

The meeting of shop stewards in May went over the nearly complete proposals from the Drafting Committee.⁵⁵ This seems to have resulted in general approval being given to the Works Council scheme, so it was possible to go on to seek wider trade union acceptance for the Bournville Works Council scheme. The Joint Drafting Committee, composed of the Men's and Women's Committees, sent out letters to the District Committees of all Trade Unions represented in the Works inviting them to a Conference with the Drafting Committee, and enclosing copies of the *Works Magazine* outlining the schemes for Shop Committees and Works Councils, and offering to pay the Trade Union representatives' expenses.

This Conference took place on August 31st and was addressed first by George Cadbury Jnr., he conceded that,

I am aware that the ideal formation of this Works Council would be in conjunction with the various Trade

Unions, but one has to recognize the facts and these are that less than half of the men in this factory are organized, and certainly only about 20% of the women, therefore it would be impossible to set up a Council in this Factory through the Trade Unions alone ... I think so far as the organized workers are concerned they are quite willing to work with non-unionists in the working of this Council. Of course, ultimately, and I think I am voicing the wishes of the Directors when I say, we look ultimately for the whole of the workpeople to be organized. Just as the masters are being organized we understand and recognise that the workpeople must be organized too, and therefore, we are very anxious that nothing should be put in the way of complete organization by the setting up of this Council, and nothing done to block or put off the organization by the setting up this Council, and nothing done to block or put off the organization of the workpeople.

He went on to ask for the help of the Craft Union representatives who were present in setting up the Factory Council, even though the Craft Unions would not be represented on a National Council because any problems they had would probably be settled another way.^{ee}

Morcombe, the shop stewards' convenor and a member of the Drafting Committee, replied to a question about who had considered the scheme,

It has been before the Foremen's Association and they have sent in suggestions. Then the Shop Stewards throughout the Works have a meeting generally once a month, which is known as the Aggregate Meeting of Shop Stewards and every member is expected to attend, either in person or by deputy. The Drafting Committee which has drawn up the scheme is composed of the representatives of the Staff, Foremen and Forewomen, and of the workers themselves, so that all the suggestions that have come from the Shop Stewards have not been embodied in the scheme but generally speaking, it has been arrived at by consent. If sharp differences have developed they have been whittled down by discussion.

Both George Cadbury Jnr. and H. Morcombe appear to have been able to present the Works Council scheme to the local trade union bodies as something which had already secured the support of trade union members and workers generally within the Works. This must have made the trade union representatives wary of attacking the Works Council for fear of alienating their existing or potential members at Bournville. Morcombe explained that the Manufacturing groups in the Works did not have the

same tradition of organisation as the craftsmen, only the Stock Room was well organised. Still he hoped it would be the recognised practice for anything under the scheme affecting "labour conditions ... a term easily understood in practice," he said, to be submitted for approval to Trade Union district committees. This, he said, was because:

I know there is very great danger here that something may be suggested which would be beneficial to a few but dangerous to the majority concerned ... This scheme ... does not commit the Trade Unions, but protects their interests all the way through.

Two suggestions came from the trade union representatives. One, who was surprised at the lack of organisation at the Works, wanted to know if a clause could be inserted,

to the effect that both the Directors, Management, and Committees responsible for drafting these rules express a wish that all operatives in this Works would join their Trade Unions.

George Cadbury Jnr. agreed to this, although he thought the lack of union membership was largely due to the trade unions themselves sending representatives to the Works who did not know about the issues. He was less keen on the suggestion that members of the trade unions be present on the Council, but without voting powers for matters affecting trade unions, he said this would be put before the workpeople⁶⁷ He repeated his general argument about the need for a National Council of some sort:

At present this industry has a Trades Board ... We work under the regulations of the Trades Board. We are very anxious that we should be removed out of that category. It is very important that we should be properly organized ... When the War is over there will be a great many questions to be discussed, with regard to raw materials, transport, and things of that kind, and it is necessary that there should be some National Committee organized by the Government to deal with these matters and this Committee will be the body recognised by the Government for dealing with these matters.⁶⁸

Overall the impression was being given to the local trade union representatives that developments along the lines of a National and a Works Council were taking place anyway; with the support of the

Bournville workforce, the Firm, and the Government, it was up to the unions therefore, whether or not and to what extent they would be involved.

Given this it is not surprising that the *Works Magazine* was able to report that when the conference was thrown open for discussion,

Nothing in the way of criticism followed, but helpful suggestions, since adopted by the Drafting Committee were made.⁶⁹

The Scheme Implemented

The way was now clear for the setting up of the Bournville Works Council scheme. The final version of the scheme did not differ much from the initial proposals put forward by George Cadbury Jnr. A booklet on the *Powers and Functions* of the Works Council was issued by the Drafting Committee and approved by the directors.⁷⁰ This gave notice in the front page that "there is an advantage to both sides in negotiating with organised labour" and that therefore trade union membership was desirable. A list of the trade unions represented in the Works followed, together with advice as to which union it would be appropriate for different sections of workers to join. There were to be Shop Committees in each department consisting of equal numbers of representatives from the Firm and the workers, the workers to have one representative for every ten in the department, with a minimum of three and up to twelve representatives. Each side had the right to meet separately, something which had pleased the trade union district representatives.⁷¹ The workers representatives were to be elected annually. Examples of subjects suggested for the attention of Shop Committees were given as; grievances, health, timekeeping, efficiency and production, waste etc, new processes, education, trade union and conditions and, "Advice on arriving at and adjusting wages." One of the general regulations was that trade union rules were not to be contravened.

The Works was divided into eight Groups and there were to be Group Committees consisting *only* of workers' representatives. The idea for

these Group Committees had come first from the Woman's Drafting Committee, and an aggregate shop steward's meeting had asked for the men's side to have "group committees of workers only, as in the girls' scheme," included for the men.⁷²

Finally there was the Works Council itself, consisting of eight management representatives and eight workers' representatives, one from each of the Groups. There was to be a separate Council for men and women, as there were to be separate Shop and Group Committees. The men's and women's councils were to meet monthly, although a Joint Council of men and women would meet quarterly. The Works Councils were to have executive power when it was delegated to them by the Board, otherwise they had to act through the Board or with the Board's consent. They were to have the power to ask for outside advice, and this included the trade unions. When matters affecting the unions were discussed a union representative could be present.

The Reduction in Hours of Work

One of the first decisions of the Men's Works Council was to recommend to the Board a reduction in the hours of work to 45 or 44, on the basis of assurances from the Shop Committees that output could be maintained. This followed the receipt of a letter from *Rowntrees* informing the council that they had decided to offer their workers reduced hours, from 48 to 47 hours per week, if the workers were, "prepared to agree to this without any change being made in the rates of Piece or Day wages."⁷³ *Cadburys'* Board approved a reduction of hours to a maximum of 45 hours, on being advised that output would be maintained, and left it to the Councils to consider the implementation of this.⁷⁴ This decision raised a number of questions about the power the Works Councils would be able to exercise. Firstly, it set a precedent for the Councils being able to determine standard hours at Bournville. This was effectively taken away from the Bournville Works Councils however. In March 1919, only a month after agreeing to the Council's recommendation for reduced hours, a note from the Board informed the Councils that although they were to consider standard wages and they would be consulted in negotiations, the Board itself

would deal with *specific* matters on wages and conditions of labour. The establishment of standard hours and rates of wages in the Cocoa and Chocolate trade was being dealt with by the Cocoa and Chocolate Panel of the Interim Industrial Reconstruction Committee, which included representatives from the Cocoa and Chocolate Trades and the trade unions.

When the Workers' Representatives on the Men's Council pushed for consideration of a forty hour week, in 1929, they were given short shrift by Lawrence Cadbury, who dealt with the point as follows:

We are already working a 44 hour gross weekly; net 42 hours, 53 mins. The industry generally works a 48 hour week, although a few firms under the Interim Industrial Reconstruction Committee Agreement work a 47 hour week. Only about three firms work a 44 hour week. To this extent Bournville has to meet the competition of a longer working week by increased efficiency, which in turn requires the highest possible degree of mechanical organisation ...

Such a reduction would increase the cost of production, with consequent higher prices, which in turn would mean reduced sales and therefore less work. Quite apart from this, any question of a further reduction of hours must be one for the employers in the industry as a whole to determine by negotiation on the body constituted for that purpose - the I.I.R.C.; it is not a matter which can be the subject of separate individual negotiation.⁷⁵

This clearly shows that the reduction in hours in 1919 was probably already in the minds of the management and that the Works Council were a useful vehicle for ensuring its implementation with assurances that output would not be reduced. By 1929 the firm saw no such role for the Councils, which were in the position of proposing grand schemes, such as the reduction in hours, without having the real power to extract even small concessions.

The National Agreement

By May 19th, 1919, a National Agreement had come into force at Bournville, this was between,

the Interim Industrial Reconstruction Committee of the Cocoa, Chocolate, Sugar Confectionery, and Jam Industries on behalf of manufacturers of Cocoa and

Chocolate on the one part, and the National Federation of Women Workers on the other.⁷⁶

The "interim industrial reconstruction committees" were based on the Second Report of the Whitley Committee, they were a modified form of joint council for industries where organisation was considerable but not representative. They were regarded as temporary bodies and it was hoped that they would develop into fully-fledged joint industrial councils, as a number of them did according to E. Wigham.⁷⁷

Under "Hours of Work" the National Agreement layed down 47 hours as constituting a full working week, although a clause allowed that, Trade Unions shall be at liberty, if they so desire, to arrange by amicable means with individual employers for a shorter working week than 47 hours, but not less than 44 hours.

Obviously the agreement had incorporated the existing arrangements at firms party to it, 44 hours being worked at Bournville. But once in force this national agreement precluded the possibility of the Bournville Works Councils being able to change the hours of work again. Other matters dealt with by the agreement were:

2) Payment for Overtime, 3) Lost time and a guaranteed daily minimum, 4) Washing time, 5) Payment for Summer and Statutory Holidays, 6) Rates of Wages, 7) Piece Rate earnings, 8) Application of Working Hours, 9) Maintenance of duration of agreement, 12) General Proviso.

There was not much left for the Works Councils at Bournville to deal with.

The Subordination of the Councils to the Firm

Secondly the shortening of hours with the assurance that output could be maintained meant that piece rates were not adjusted. Even before the general reduction in hours of work at Bournville the Board had made it clear that it would not agree to pay the same weekly wage for fewer hours unless output was maintained. The Engineering Department Shop Committee had petitioned the Works Council for a reduction in hours from 53 to 47 per week in line with an Agreement

covering the Engineering Trades. The Shop Committee wanted their hours to be reduced while the subject was under discussion and protested,

against any reduction of wages as the result of the change of hours, and pressing for the continuance of pay on the 54 hours per week basis, until the reduction is justified by the decrease in the cost of living.

The Board agreed to the reduction in hours, but George Cadbury Jnr., attending the Works Council for the Firm, pointed out that although,

they felt compelled to fall in line with the National Agreement ... The Board could not accept the view that over-time when abolished should be paid for, and must retain the right to say what over-time should be worked.

The engineers must have realised that the question of hours raised the problem of the prerogatives of the Works Council and the Board because their Shop Committee then recommended that:

two representatives of the workers should be appointed on the Board of Directors; such members to be ex officio members of the Council without voting powers.

But the Men's Works Council rejected this recommendation.⁷⁰ This clarified the subordination of the Works Councils to the Board of Directors, already the weakness on the workers' side was being shown up. The more organised section of the engineers might have expected to be able to go further, but it was kept back by the fact that the other representatives on the Council represented less organised groups of workers.

Piece Rates

Following the reduction in hours there was a series of applications to the Works Council for piece-rate increases. For example, Group 3, the Chocolate Manufacturing Departments, asked for a revision of piece-rates,

so as to enable each worker to receive at least 5/- additional payment each week. They state that it is impossible to maintain the same output in 44 hours, and the result is a loss to each worker of 5/- each week.⁹³

Like other, similar requests, this was referred to the Piece Rates Committee, which was not a Works Council sub-committee and had more

management than workers' representatives on it. Not surprisingly, in July 1919, a month after the request from the Chocolate Manufacturing Departments, the Piece-Rates could report to the Men's Council that it had gone into new schemes and had rectified piece-rates where requests had been made, but that no outright concessions had been made.

However, difficulties with piece-rates continued to arise, and the problem, so far as the workers were concerned, was not solved by equal representation on the Piece-Rates and Grading Committee, which was achieved.⁸⁰ Fundamentally, the workers were frustrated in their efforts to negotiate over piece-rates because they did not have a proper shop stewards' organisation. During WW1, the introduction of payment by results, in various forms, into engineering and munitions workshops, led to an increase in the work of shop stewards who were called upon to negotiate. According to G.D.H. Cole:

During 1917 and 1918 these were among the questions with which the workshop movement was principally concerned.⁸¹

However, these workshops were not generally affected by an intensive use of Scientific Management techniques.

At Bournville, Scientific Management was in operation and the workers, who were in a generally weak position in the production departments where piece-rates operated, tried to deal with the effects of it *procedurally* through the Works Councils. The Shop Secretaries were not in an equivalent position to shop stewards⁸², and they did not negotiate piece-rates at a shopfloor level, as happened in the engineering industry. This was not a practice which *Cadburys* had to call upon Scientific Management to break therefore, because they had not been subject to it.

The situation at Bournville was indicated by a Report of a Men's Council Sub-Committee on the "Timing and Piece Rates Operations", submitted in February 1920. For the Management side of the Committee:

a case was submitted showing the necessity for the introduction of timing of piece rate operations as a development of the scientific management of industry, and the need for such method to be introduced in order

to combat and survive the competition which is beginning to be experienced.

The Workers' Representatives on the Committee,

emphasized the prejudice which was wide-spread throughout the Works against the timing of operations with the consequent fear in most minds that such timing was the fore-runner of rate cutting and reduction of wages.⁸³

The Workers' side on the Men's Council were not successful in preventing the timing of work, and there is no evidence of any significant resistance to it in the Works. The second report of the Special Committee on "Timing and Time Studies in the Works", on which management outnumbered the workers' representatives four to three, drew up a notice for the Group Committees. The Groups were to be advised that

Time Studies and Timing of Operations will only be applied in the first place to new processes and new operations. So that there may be no misapprehension that an overhauling of piece rates is immediately contemplated.

However, it is worth quoting at some length the notice which the Committee proposed to send out to the Groups. It is, to say the very least, very suggestive of full blown Scientific Management:

TIMING AND TIME STUDIES IN THE WORKS

It is asked that the Works Organisation Office should now be authorised to take up systematic timing and time studies. The information gained would be used -

1. (a) As the basis of piece rates.

Timing & time study are recognised as the only reliable methods of obtaining accurate information. It must be obvious that to have this reliable basis is in the best interests of all.

(b) The fixing of rates by estimates, comparison, records and analysis of time sheets is proved to be faulty, leading as it does to "high" and "low" rates. Without interfering with any man's total wage, it is hoped to equalise abnormal individual or group piece rates, placing them all on the same remunerative level, without lowering the value of the share or bonus.

(c) In all cases where, as the result of time-study, improvements are effected in machinery or methods, the men's rates will not be adjusted in strict ratio to the

improvement. The Piece Rates Committee will continue to give one third of the advantage to the men, including the auxiliary workers.

2. (a) To co-operate with the Management and the Planning and Production Departments through the Foremen by generally reporting on matters affecting Management as revealed by the time-study such as cases of bad material, defective shop arrangements, delays in supplies of raw material, and making suggestions in regard to method in the provision of mechanical means to save labour.

(b) In cases where skilled men are found doing unskilled work any re-arrangement of the job will certainly not adversely affect their wages.

(c) Also to give information in regard to times of processes, operations and transport (with best routes), and figures relating to actual and maximum capacities of machine and shops.

(d) The result of a thorough analysis of time would tend strongly to make it possible, by a better arrangement of work, for employees to earn their wages with a diminished expenditure of energy.

In all effective time-study, special attention is paid to the question of fatigue and nervous strain.

(e) Above all, wages will not be a decreased as a result of time-study; nor will the relative amount of effort be increased.

If a high wage is to be maintained there is only one way in which to secure it - efficiency and production. Increased efficiency and production will result in increased wages.^{e4}

Whatever safeguards were drawn up, as they were^{e5}, there was no way in which the workers side could *effectively* negotiate with management once the timing of operations was accepted as valid. Sidney Webb argued, in 1918, in relation to the premium system of payment by results, that:

The verification of the basis and of the calculation of this "time" is ... practically out of the reach of the ordinary mechanic.

Although the information collected by time studies was supposedly available to the workers, there was no hint of the concession suggested by Webb:

In principle, it seems to me only fair, if these things are to be made matters of bargain, that the workmen should have their own rate-fixer, to agree with the employer's rate-fixer, on this all-important element of the wage-contract.^{es}

At Bournville, the matter was not really open for negotiation. The I.I.R.C. set national minimum wage rates for the industry, in a negotiating body sanctioned by the trade unions. The departments affected by piece-rates were those covered by the I.I.R.C. rates. The workers only really brought complaints forward when the wages received were not at the level above the I.I.R.C. rates which they were supposed to be. The basis of the timing was not questioned, let alone open for negotiation. By attempting to extend union organisation bureaucratically from above using the Works Council, trade unionists at Bournville were locked into a framework where shopfloor control of piece-rates was precluded. For so long as the trade unionists saw the Works Council as a vehicle for extending union organisation, they were themselves part of the obstacle to any effective resistance to Scientific Management. If *Cadburys* does not feature in books such as Littler's which survey the extent to which Scientific Management was used in Britain^{es7}, it is because there was no serious conflict over its introduction.

Trade Union Weakness and the Works Councils

The Bournville Works Councils did not really represent any well organised force on the workers' side. For this reason they did not have any definite role to play. The firm hardly needed to make concessions to placate a force which did not exist. The Councils were therefore given control of residual matters, which could be easily delegated to them and which fill up a lot of time in order to make them appear important, but which did not involve real negotiations. So the Council was largely tied up with education and welfare in the Works. It is not clear what role *Cadburys* had envisaged for the Works Councils. Possibly they were seen as a necessary adjunct to a National Joint Council. But, with *Rowntrees*, and *Pascalls*, *Cadburys* were almost alone in taking seriously the proposals for joint workshop organisation in the Whitley Reports. The I.I.R.C. did not require the Works Councils,

and they formed no part of the national negotiations which were carried on by the trade unions, with Bevin alone taking the position of chairman on the I.I.R.C. for the trade union side for at least its first twelve yearsw in existence.⁸⁹

As early as December 1918 the Whitley Reports ' proposals were being dismissed; the Labour Research Department noted that:

The great Trade Unions, for the most part, took little notice of the [Whitley] Report, preferring their own methods of negotiation; and the Councils have therefore been set up in trades which only a very elastic interpretation could include under the term 'well organised'.⁹⁰

Where they were strong enough, the trade unions resisted the Whitley Report's proposals. According to Wigham:

One reason why so few joint industrial councils set up joint works committees was trade union hostility to the development of an alternative channel of representation.⁹¹

The weakness of the Works Councils from the trade union point of view was confirmed in the aftermath of the General Strike. There is a sufficiently brief outline of the Strike at *Cadburys* in the pamphlet, *The Nine Days in Birmingham*:

On the outbreak of the strike the firm applied to the Trades Union Emergency Committee for permission to remain open and to transport its goods. This was granted on the grounds that Cadbury's was a food factory. Production workers were not therefore called out though some men, such as fitters and electricians, did come out. Within a day, however, the Trades Union Emergency Committee was forced to reconsider the situation. Various abuses of the permit system had been reported. The firm had apparently been supplying companies operated by black-leg labour, a non-essential theatre had been supplied with chocolates and cocoa, and administrative staff at Bournville had been working in the electrical department. Consequently the Committee decided that all union labour would have to be withdrawn and a notice was sent to the various branches of the unions concerned.

All union work was to cease at 5 p.m. on May 6th. Every union except the National Union of Clerks responded to the call ... Altogether approximately 50% of the male workforce came out ... as did 12% of the women.

However, the strike was shortlived at *Cadburys*, by the 10th workers were flooding back, and at no time did the Works have to close. After the strike the unions lost considerable numbers of their members.⁹⁴

There is no evidence that *Cadburys* victimised strikers, unlike other Birmingham employers, such as *Tangyes*, who demanded that strikers re-apply for their jobs.⁹⁵ Neither did *Cadburys* withdraw from negotiations with the trade unions, on the I.I.R.C. However, they were clearly disenchanted with the unions and this was reflected in a statement to the Councils by the Board on the 17th, May 1926, setting out "changes in the Organisation of The Council." Five points were set out, and two were of particular interest:

- 1) To remove any conditions stated in Council Rules, or undertood, which make membership of a Trades Union a necessary qualification to the holding of office either on the Council itself or any of its organisations. Such offices would therefore be open to trades unionists and non trades unionists.⁹⁴

Previously all Workers' Representatives had had to be trade union members, and in cases where it was doubted, the trade unions were asked to vouch for their membership.⁹⁵ Point four in the Board's statement was:

To abolish the Group Committees (on which in the past the Management has had no representation).⁹⁶

The management believed that the Group Committees had been used to organise the strike.⁹⁷ Needless to say, the Board's proposals went through. This indicates that the workers had no real power in the Bournville Works Councils, and there was little that was essential to substantive negotiations in the Works Council structure. In September 1924 Edward Cadbury had told the Women's Council that:

The Shop and Group Committees were an essential part of the Council organisation.⁹⁸

But when it was suspected that the Group Committees were being used to organise *against* the firm, suddenly they were no longer essential. It was this degree of subordination of the Works Councils to the firm which allowed them to carry on in the same form until the 1960s. By that time the trade unions were in a sufficiently strong position to

have to be negotiated with, and they were brought into the Works Council organisation.⁹⁹ The trade unions continued to operate within the the Works Council structure throughout its existence, largely on the basis that it could be used to further trade union organisation in the works. The irony was that if at any time they had succeeded in organising the Works and seriously challenging the management *through* the Councils, then the Councils would have been abolished. Here again, *Cadburys* was not required to define too specifically the boundary to its toleration.

CONCLUSION

The New Factory System

Daniel Nelson has argued that during the period from 1880 to 1920 a new factory system appeared in the United States. According to Nelson there were:

three basic elements in the transformation: a technological dynamic, as technical innovation produced, often inadvertently, fundamental changes in the factory environment and in the human relationships that derived from it; a managerial dynamic, as administrators attempted to impose order and system on the manufacturing organisation; a personnel dynamic, as managers began deliberate efforts to organize and control the factory labour force. In practice the three were inseparable, often indistinguishable, and affected every plant differently. Yet by 1920 the trend was clear.¹

It seems quite clear that the new factory system was instituted by *Cadburys* at Bournville between 1879 and 1919. First there was the move to Bournville itself, and the purpose-built factory which allowed for the firm's expansion on the basis of European cocoa production methods. The second element had to wait until 1899, when the younger Cadbury directors took over the running of the business and met the requirements of a growing workforce with welfare and personnel techniques borrowed from Europe and the U.S.A., notably the National Cash Register Company. This answered the firm's continued growth based on products developed by European firms, notably milk chocolate which became the most important line. The administration of a welfare system, along with the technical requirements of the firm, meant that during the 1900s *Cadburys* was developing its own systematic management techniques, with management committees set up and statistics for such things as piece-rates copiously compiled. Then in the early 1910s the third component of *Cadburys'* new factory system was instituted. Scientific management was introduced, with the time-study techniques which symbolised Taylorism being used extensively throughout the works to determine the level of work that should be done by workers. The services of an American consultancy firm were engaged to help with this process, but what *Cadburys* did not borrow from the U.S.A., was the

Taylorites hostility to labour. *Cadburys* had no need of this, they were not attracted to Taylorism because they wanted a way to break the trade unions, nor did they need to break the unions in order to impose scientific management. The fourth aspect of the new factory system at *Cadburys* was an industrial relations framework, based on the *Whitley Reports*, whereby a Works Councils scheme was set up. A national council was initiated by *Cadburys* and the other large cocoa and chocolate firms to deal with the unions over the question of wages. While at Bournville the two Works Councils, one for the men and one for the women, and a system of shop committees in each department with management representatives, tied up the workers in endless procedure and the administration of the already existing welfare paraphernalia. x { Albeit inadvertently, this Works Council scheme in effect frustrated the emergence of a strong shop stewards' movement which might have challenged the scientific management techniques which were used. The union-organised workers accepted the Works Councils because they saw in it a way to organise the largely non-unionised women workers. For this reason they continued to work within the Works Councils, even when the subordination of the Councils to the Firm had been clearly demonstrated.

It is a mistake to conceptualise *Cadburys* in retrospect in terms of a unified entity, such as a Quaker employer, because each of the elements of the new factory system at Bournville was generated exogenously to the firm. Each innovation was implemented separately and was borrowed from distinct movements. Initially the European cocoa and chocolate industry provided the necessary momentum, *Cadburys* borrowed what were essentially 19th. century paternalistic welfare provisions along with technical methods from Europe. But the later innovations came from movements outside of the industry. There was not an unfolding of a series of necessarily connected measures at Bournville. There was no necessary connection between say, scientific management and Whitleyism, each was identified with a distinct movement, although of course they impinged upon each other, as they did at *Cadburys*. The new factory system at *Cadburys* was in fact a *synthesis*. The the firm may have made each component in the synthesis

its own and in the proces developed a distinctive system. But it definitely was a synthesis, *Cadburys* had few management innovations of their own. If the inner light of Quakerism gave the Cadburys any inspiration, then it was the inspiration to continually borrow ideas.

Production Sites

The significance of the *Cadburys* case is that it gives an insight into the diffusion of management ideas. As each innovation developed it created what can be conceptualised as latent production sites, that is, sites where their application would be appropriate.² The application of any innovation in a suitable production site will depend on a definite historical process in which the capitalist must become aware of the innovation and consciously apply it. This will be in part an ideological process, the ideological stance of the capitalist will predispose him to consider the innovations propogated by some movements and to reject others. Thus the firm can be seen as in some sense an ideological production site. The production site will consist of the previous developments of the firm, the real experiences and practices of the firm, including the succession of innovations which have been applied already. The production site will therefore be suitable for some innovations, but unsuitable for others, depending on the synthesis which has already taken place. The usefulness of this conceptualisation of the process of diffusion is that it allows for the heterogeneity of firms applying the same organisational innovations. So that, for example, the components of the *Cadburys* site for scientific management need not have been the same as those of American employers who were opposed to organised labour. By recognising the historical process of diffusion it is possible to avoid the search for the teleological "objective functions" of developments such as welfarism which only end up stating the truisms of capitalist production relations and which fails to provide a tenable distinction between firms.³ In other words, the reification of capital can be avoided and the necessary personification of capital accumulation can be seen as an essential part of its dynamic.

The usefulness of this case study is that by concentrating closely on the unpublished primary sources it has shattered the notion that *Cadburys* developed independently;⁴ an impression carefully nurtured by the firm itself in its creation of the mythology of the Bournville community, itself a vital component in the site created, which allowed *Cadburys* to enjoy a degree of insulation from wider conflicts. This means that instead of trying to understand *Cadburys* in terms of the firm's pronouncements as a Quaker employer, or of dismissing those pronouncements and attempting to identify the objective requirements which necessarily led to *Cadburys* developing as it did; the firm can be located in the context of the trends in management thinking and the practices of other firms from which it borrowed. This means that surveys of published material will not reveal the actual process of diffusion, and static categorizations are unlikely to capture the historical reality.⁵ *Cadburys* shows the importance of understanding a firm not in terms of its independent development but of its interdependence with identifiable movements. This points to the importance of Taylor's scientific management movement in providing consultancies which diffused the techniques which he pioneered. Individual firms may have developed similar techniques independently at the same time or even before Taylor,⁶ however, Taylor's importance was in creating not only the techniques themselves but a movement which diffused them. Taylor encouraged management reform by raising the bogey of labour unrest,⁷ but this did not mean that all those firms, like *Cadburys*, which had scientific management brought to their attention, shared Taylor's preoccupations with the Labour problem.

Owen, Ideology and Welfare

Merkle's study of scientific management gives an idea of the process by which Taylor's ideas were diffused and how they fitted into different ideological contexts.⁸ It should be possible to trace the diffusion of welfarism in a similar way. A brief outline of the way in which welfarism came to be adopted by *Cadburys* in relation to ideological considerations can be given. Melling has dismissed the attempts by writers on welfare before World War One to identify the welfare movement with the likes of Robert Owen as simply spurious

"attempts to give welfare services a respectable historical pedigree."⁹ This was clearly true to a large extent, and *Cadburys* provided precedents on such a scale which made them mythmakers par excellence. However, the treatment of Owen by some welfare writers reveals something more than this.

Pollard has explained that unlike the technological innovations of the Industrial Revolution, the methods of labour management pioneered by employers like Owen were rejected by most employers because they "ran counter to the accepted beliefs and ideology of the employing class."¹⁰ Although Owen's personnel practices cannot be cited "as an anticipation of modern methods of labor management", because they were developed in keeping with early 19th century paternalism,¹¹ the attitudes of some early 20th century welfare writers to Owen indicates to some extent the reasons why certain employers more readily accepted welfare measures. These writers realised that personnel policies were a way to ameliorate capitalism to the advantage of the employer, and that there was no threat to capitalism involved in welfare. They used Owen to illustrate this point, by separating his record as an employer from his image as a socialist. This was put clearly by N.P. Gilman in 1899:

Owen's life, after his connection with New Lanark closed, does not concern us ... That fine establishment was not conducted on socialistic lines. The one principle governing it was that the proprietors were satisfied to receive a moderate return on their capital ... from this point of view it may well seem a misfortune that Robert Owen did not confine himself to the thorough development of the plans which occupied him at home until 1815, and the advocacy of their general extension to other manufactures. The influence of such an example, unconnected in the public mind with impracticable schemes of socialism, might in time have been very great.¹²

What this meant was that not only was Owen used to give welfarism a respectable antecedent, but his example *as an employer* demonstrated the compatibility of welfarism and capitalism. More than that, there was the realization that welfare paid. According to John Child:

while Robert Owen had, early on, insisted that 'welfare' paid material dividends, there was little scientific

evidence for this until the physiological experiments in munitions factories during the first World War.

With this in mind he has argued that the few employers who took an interest in working conditions and labour management before 1914, were the exception pioneers who were "following motives peculiar to themselves."¹³ Of course it is true that "this whole area .. is problematic. It could be that firms are profitable in spite of welfare rather than because of it."¹⁴ However, it seems quite clear that at *Cadburys* it was *believed* that welfare paid. In 1913 Barrow Cadbury was questioned by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, and was asked whether:

You believe that everything which you have so far done, in the way of giving special advantages, does, as a matter of fact, pay the firm in the shape of increased efficiency in general work?

He answered, "I am sure of it".¹⁵

Nelson has observed that, in this period, American manufacturers, "seldom acted until they were convinced that change would pay tangible returns. It was no coincidence that John Patterson adopted the slogan 'it pays'."¹⁶ The caution with which *Cadburys* acted in the 1900s in relation to their new lines; the need they felt to see each welfare and personnel measure they implemented already working at another firm; and the competitive situation which they were in; these all strongly suggest that the firm would not have embraced welfarism if it was not certain that welfare would pay. The "peculiar motives", that is the directors's Quakerism, provided a positive ideological interpretation of welfarism, along with the generally paternalistic attitudes to women workers. Once a group of prominent Quaker employers had adopted welfarism, and interpreted it in positive Quaker terms, *then* the identification of Quaker employers with welfare and the idea of a distinctive "Quaker employer" could become prominent. This reinforced the commitment of *Cadburys* and other employers to welfarism, and the most prominent welfarist Quaker employers, *Cadburys* and *Rowntrees*, enjoyed generally favourable relations with their workers. Whether or not, or to what extent this was actually due to welfarism, it is very difficult to say, but there was no hiatus in their own experiences

sufficient to cause them to question the usefulness or to abandon their labour management policies. In this respect *Cadburys* were different to many American firms where, "the welfare secretary often led a precarious existence."¹⁷ At *Cadburys*, as Edward Cadbury explained in his book (see ch. 5) there was no welfare secretary as such. Instead the division of labour amongst the management meant that personnel management was integrated into the management structure. The Works foreman, Tom Hackett, became a sort of avuncular personnel manager, a role which fitted with his own religious and political convictions. When the administration of piece-rates and production in the "Girls" departments was centralised in the 1910s, the head forewoman took over a personnel role.¹⁸ The ideological commitment to welfare existed at *Cadburys*, but what is important to note is that it was, as much as anything else, the result of the satisfactory experience of the implementation of welfarism. The commitment continued at *Cadburys* until after World War Two, partly this was because the administration of welfare became very much the *raison d'être* for the Works Councils. The review of Edward Cadbury's *Experiments in Industrial Organisation* in the *Sociological Review* of 1913 concluded that:

the Bournville firm is an exponent of the working of the existing system at its very best rather than a pioneer of a new industrial order.¹⁹

This was meant as a criticism, in fact it was *Cadburys* strength.

Cadburys Wedded to Welfare

The commitment to welfare and to Bournville and the strength of the firm's position in the years after the implementation of the new factory system comprised the site for subsequent developments. Geoffrey Jones has adequately discussed *Cadburys* overseas factories, but it may be useful to note that the firm's desire to have control of any overseas venture and to build their own factories may well have been a product of their wish to reproduce Bournvilles. The first overseas factory was established near Hobart, Tasmania in 1921, and it does not seem to be an exaggeration to suggest that the firm wanted an

idyllic setting for the new factory; they already had a factory in a garden, so the Australian factory could be a factory by the sea.²⁰

Later still, the centrality of Bournville in the *Cadburys* organisation, and the commitment to the works and the locality may have partly explained why the firm did not adopt a decentralised multidivisional structure until the late 1960s, when Bournville became less important in the overall company structure.²¹ This was to have serious repercussions for the Bournville works and the locality in terms of employment. It can be seen then, that *Cadburys* appropriateness as a site for the new factory system in the period from 1879 to 1919 meant that the firm became tied to certain policies from that period, notably a commitment to welfare and to Bournville, which meant that it was a less appropriate site for important subsequent developments such as overseas expansion, diversification, and decentralisation.

APPENDIX A.

Average earnings. c1913

Guy Routh gives the following figures for average earnings, 1913/14¹

<u>Men</u>	1913/14	<u>Women</u>	1913/14
1. Professional	£	1. Professional	£
A. Higher	328	A. Higher	...
B. Lower	155	B. Lower	89
2. B. Managers, etc	200	2. B. Managers etc	80
3. Clerks	99	3. Clerks	45
4. Foremen	113	4. Forewomen	57
<u>Manual</u>		<u>Manual</u>	
5. Skilled	99	5. Skilled	44
6. Semi-skilled	69	6. Semi-skilled	50
7. Unskilled	63	7. Unskilled	28
<u>Average</u>	92	<u>Average</u>	50

The *Cadburys* Board "Report for the Year 1913"² contained the following item:

Manufacture. Owing to better organisation, the cost of manufacture has slightly decreased, but it is satisfactory to note that this has been accompanied with a rise in the average wages paid. The average wage for workmen, including boys, for the last three years has been: -

1911	£73: 13: 10
1912	£75: 8: 5
1913	£76: 15: 9

During the year 1913 the average wage for men over 21 was: -

£91: 6: 6

and for boys under 21: -

£38: 1: 0

The average wage for women, including girls has been: -

1911	£38: 18: 9
1912	£39: 11: 11
1913	£41: 2: 4

APPENDIX B.

The Status of Women

B.L. Hutchins wrote in 1915, that:

In spite of the increased range of occupations open to women ... the position of woman is a highly insecure one, and ... she is considerably handicapped by the reaction of status on occupation ... while most women work for wages early in life, their work is usually not permanent, but is abandoned on marriage, precisely at the time of life when that greatest economic efficiency may be looked for ...

The ordinary view of the subject is that a woman need not be paid as much as a man, because her requirements are less, and she is likely to be partially maintained by others ... If a woman cannot expect to be paid more than the commercial value of her work when she has children entirely dependent on her, it seems inconsistent that she should be expected to take less than the value of her work when she is partially maintained at home; surely the wiser course would be to strive to raise the standard of remuneration so as to benefit those who have the heavier obligations.⁴

These arguments can be contrasted with the contemporaneous views of Barrow Cadbury when he was questioned by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service in April 1913⁵: -

- Is copying letters done by boys, or is that done by typists? - That is all done by the typing office.
- Do you employ girls altogether in the typing office, or do you employ any boys? - We employ girls altogether, that is a separate office. There are one or two women in our general men's office who do typing, and in our export office the men do their own typing.
- Are the girl typists segregated from the rest of the office? - Yes, there is a typing office and a general girl's office.
- Do girls and men sit in the same offices together? - No, we have a rule all through the factory that men and women do not work together anywhere, and the same rule applies to the offices.
-
- Can you say what proportion of your women leave to marry? - The majority of our women employees leave to get married. I am afraid I cannot tell you beyond that. I think probably the test is that in our women's pensions scheme very few remain with us till they are 60 years of age.
- Suppose a woman left to be married and subsequently became a widow, would you allow her to come back again? - No, we have been very strict about that. We have openings in the kitchen department only.

- About two fifths of your clerical staff, I take it, are women? - Yes.

- Are they in the main engaged in work similar to the work done by the men? - I have a few headings. For instance, making out accounts, checking invoices and cash sheets, and forwarding invoices ... I think you may say that much of the work done by the women is the same as that done by the men.

- And will the average pay of these women be equal to that of the men? - No, it is considerably less.

- You have a large number of women employed in your non-clerical departments? - Yes.

- You told us that in no department of your works do the men and women work together? - That is so.

- It has been the deliberate policy of the firm, you say, to segregate them? - Yes.

- Did they at any former period work together? - I think it must be 30 or 40 years ago.

- Then the present practice is not the result of any unfortunate experience of men and women working together?

- No, it is on principle; we think it is better.

- But you cannot avoid the men and women coming together occasionally on matters of business? - No, and we go out of our way to make social opportunities out of work hours for them to meet together at concerts, and one thing and another; they have plenty of opportunity.

- Seeing that your men and women are kept in separate compartments, if I may so put it, you must have women to supervise women? - That is so.

- Therefore you will have women in positions of considerable responsibility? - Yes, they are included under forewomen ... there are forewomen in our works generally over the departments.

- Having women in these positions of responsibility as superintendents you will be able to form some opinion as to the capacity of women for control and management; would you mind saying what your opinion is upon that point? - I think we have every reason to be satisfied that they do very well over women. In the opinion of the heads of our office ... The advantage which the male clerk has over the female clerk is that his physical powers permit him to work at greater continuous pressure; that he is usually more dependable in the matter of health, and that, having learned his work, his period of service is likely to be much longer than in the case of women clerks; he enters into it as his life work.

- ... what do you say as to the comparative outputs of men and women engaged in similar work on your clerical staff? - I do not think we have any figures as to that. I should think that a male clerk has on the whole more capacity than a woman, that is to say, if he is a thoroughly good clerk he can probably turn out more work.

....

- Do you make the women any gratuity on marriage in addition to the contributions they have paid into the superannuation fund? - We give a present of 20s to each girl who is to be married.

- ... It is usual, is it not, in commercial life, to pay women less than men - the wages of women are fixed at a lower rate than those of men? - That is so.

- What is the foundation of that practice? Is it that the out-turn by men? - To some extent that is so; but I should have thought that it was owing to the greater responsibilities which rest upon a man in having to run a home.

- Let me put it in this wider way. Is the undoubted fact that women receive less pay than men founded on the experience that, taken as a whole, women are less efficient agents than men? - I do not feel very confident to answer that.

- Then on what reason is the disparity of payment justified? We have the fact, I believe the universal fact, that women are paid less than men? - I do not think that I wish to justify it. I simply take it as it is.

- I am asking you whether you can advise us as to what the foundation of the fact is. We find it a universal fact in commercial life, is there any substantial justification for it or is there not? - My only feeling is that it is because the man has the responsibility before him of starting a home and all the expenses connected with it, and that probably more claims will come on him than on a woman.

- That, you think, is the justification, apart altogether from the work that is done; it appeals to something outside the work for which payment is being made? - ... we are guided by competition outside. Our own standard of wages at Bournville is above the average standard in the district. I think that is all I can say.

- But still your standard of wages, which you tell me is above the standard in the district, nevertheless presents this feature, that the wage paid to women is less than the wage paid to men? - Yes, that is correct.

- I was endeavouring to see what was the justification for that. You point out to me what no doubt is an important factor, that a man has greater responsibilities to meet; he is the breadwinner; but I want to know if you can tell me whether in your experience the work turned out by women is less valuable to you than the work turned out by men, or is of equal value to you? - It is rather difficult to say. Speaking of office work, I should say that a woman's work is rather more mechanical than a man's, that a man would have more originality in some ways.

- Do you think that the comparative value of the work of the two is represented by the difference in the price paid for it? - No, I do not.

- The difference in price is then not a criterion of the comparative value of the two works? - No.

- If the clerical work of women were appreciably cheaper than that of men, taking everything into account, on commercial grounds you would employ more women and fewer men would you not? - I do not think so, I do not think that we should take that element into account.

- Firms with which you compete would have that factor before them? - Where we employ a good many of these women is in outside offices and women's departments where we should not have men under any circumstances. For instance ... scattered through the works in the different women's departments where we should not have men clerks.

- In the general office where the work is on the whole pretty much the same you have no temptation on the ground of cheapness to increase the proportion of women? - We have actually only 46.

- You find that the men's work is not so much more expensive than that of women, in spite of their wages being higher, as to make it worth your while to displace them by women? - No.

- It is also true, is it not, that you retain the services of men longer? - That is so; they stay on until 60 or beyond if they have health.

Appendix C. Number Employed

Table c.1 1879-1899

Year	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883
Men	108 (66)	(126)			
Women	126 (140)	(177)			
		(24)*			
Total	234 (230)	218 (303)	268	357	462
Year	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888
Men					
Women					
Total	515	559	642	786	824
Year	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893
Men	(300)				
Women	(796)				
	(97)*				
Total		1046	1337	1425	1355
Year	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898
Men					
Women					
Total	1534	1628	1647	1943	2129
Year	1899				
Men	(601)				
Women	(1885)				
	(447)*				
Total	2430 (2685)				

*Office and Travellers etc. (figures from B.M.W)

Table c.2

Year	Dec 1895	Dec 1896	Dec 1897	Dec 1898	Dec 1899
Men	638	669	712	759	662
Women	1381	1536	1689	1889	2021
Total					
B'Vilel	1922	2104	2290	2531	2760
Total	2019	2205	2401	2648	2883

Year	June 1900	Dec 1900	June 1901	Dec 1901	June 1902
Men	935	1112	1265	1283	1214
Women	1941	2185	2234	2300	2340
Total					
B'Vilel	-	3175	-	3459	-
Total	2876	3297	3499	3583	3554

Year	Dec 1902	June 1903	Dec 1903	June 1904	Dec 1904
Men	1277	1317	1407	1390	1408
Women	2431	2409	2444	2394	2478
Total					
B'Vilel	3583	-	3716	-	3748
Total	3708	3726	3851	3784	3886

Year	June 1905	Dec 1905	June 1906	Dec 1906	June 1907
Men	1412	1420	1534	1650	1819
Women	2431	2481	2489	2563	2666
Total					
B'Vilel	-	3737	-	4213	-
Total	3843	3901	4023	4213	4485

Year	Dec 1907	June 1908	Dec 1908	June 1909	June 1910
Men	1912	1941	1962	2045	2393
Women	2771	2769	2821	2946	2978
Total					
B'Vilel	4501	-	4601	-	-
Total	4683	4710	4783	4991	5371

Year	June 1911	Dec 1911	June 1912	Dec 1912	June 1913
Men	2630	2735	2867	2956	3023
Women	3295	3447	3591	3774	3843
Total					
B'Vilel	-	5972	-	6506	-
Total	5925	6182	6458	6730	6866

Year	Dec 1913	June 1914	Dec 1914	June 1915	Dec 1915
Men	2994	2988	2826	3159	3112
Women	3876	3803	3595	3706	3908
Total					
B'Vilel	6635	-	-	-	-
Total	6870	6791	6421	6865	7020

Year	June 1916	Dec 1916	June 1917	Dec 1917	Dec 1918
Men	2728	2528	2116	2068	2363
Women	3570*	3499	2914	2758	2947
Total					
B'Vilel	-	-	-	-	-
Total	6298	6027	5030	4826	5310

Year	1919	June 1920
Men		4671
Women		3627
Total		
B'Vilel		
Total	7936	8298

*513 "girls doing men's work"

MEN AND WOMEN EMPLOYED BY THE FIRM IN BRITAIN 1879-1938.
(from *Industrial Record 1919-1938.*)



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THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN.
(from *Industrial Challenge, The post-war years.*)



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NOTES.

INTRODUCTION.

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- 123.)Board Mins: 571, 15.7.1914; 427, 4.5.1921; 439, 4.5.'21; 134, 30.1.1922; 264, 8.3.'22; 511, 17.5.'22.
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- 135.) Deal & Kennedy, op cit., p.195.
- 136.) *Frys Works Magazine*. *Frys'* bicentenary issue, 1728-1928, "By The Way." F.J. Gilshenan, pp.14-29.

CHAPTER 3: BOURNVILLE.

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- 2.) *B.W.M.* Oct., 1929, pp.297-309. C.f. Alexander, op cit., p.36, the date for the start of cocoa manufacture is not clear, she said John Cadbury started experimenting with pestle and mortar to make cocoa and chocolate around 1835.
- 3.) Board Mins: 395, 11.6.1930; 543, 20.8.'30; 47, 21.1.'31.
- 4.) Board Mins: 314, 20.5.'31; 413, 8.7.'31.
- 5.) "Personal Reminiscences of Bridge Street and Bournville 1929." and *B.W.M.* Sept., and Oct., 1909, Vol., VII, pp.326-341,360-381.
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- 7.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.47.
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- 10.) *B.W.M.* 1909, p.372.
- 11.) *B.W.M.* 1909, p.380.
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- 13.) J. Othick, "The Cocoa and Chocolate Industry in the Nineteenth Century." in Oddy and Miller, (eds), *The Making of The Modern British Diet*. 1976, p.81. L. Russell Cook, *Chocolate Production and Use*. 1963, pp.115-117.
- 14.) Raistrick, *Quakers in Science and Industry*. op cit., p.345.
- 15.) Brian Harrison, *Drink and The Victorians*.1971, p.156.
- 16.) Harrison, *ibid.*, pp.165,302.
- 17.) Othick, op cit., pp.80,83,84.
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- 24.) H. Perkin, *Origins of Modern English Society*. 1985, pp.440-442.
- 25.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., 41-42.
- 26.) Perkin, op cit., p.442.
- 27.) Blackman, op cit., p.158.
- 28.) C.f., Othick, op cit., p.81, "even large, reputable firms like Rowntreeand Cadbury ... continued also to produce the adulterated type of cocoa until as late as 1890." Also Gardiner, op cit., pp.34-35, "'Absolutely Pure' became henceforth the motto of Cadbury Brothers." after 1872.
- 29.) *B.W.M.* 1909, p.336.
- 30.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.60.
- 31.) Rogers, op cit.m, pp.26-27, quote from Richard Cadbury.
- 32.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. pp.60,69, Gardiner, op cit., p.34.
- 33.) Actually there are different figures given for numbers employed, see Appendix C.

34.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. pp.54-55.

35.) Gardiner, op cit., pp.35-36.

36.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.59, c.f., *B.W.M.* 1909, p.327, George Cadbury's memory seems to have gone a bit awry in 1909 when he told how, "the first train-load of working girls and men" to come to Bournville, "could come out into the country where complete dining arrangements and playgrounds had already been provided for men and girls."

37.) *B.W.M.* 1909, pp.367,376,381.

38.) *B.W.M.* June, 1925, p.181, and Oct. 1909, p.375. Also, (Sir) Noel Curtis-Bennet, *The Food of The People: being The History of Industrial Feeding*. 1949, p.191.

39.) Richard Cadbury, ("Historicus") *Cocoa: All About It*. 1892, p.56.

40.) S.W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History*. 1985, p.147. The exigencies of WWI. compelled the firm to question its largesse in relation to the "Cocoa Supplied to Girls' Departments," however, the consideration of the matter indicates the scale on which drinks were being provided by 1917, *G.W.C. Min*, 350, 19.2.1917:

"The Catering Committee report that in connection with free drinks supplied by the kitchen to different departments in the Works, 120 lbs., of sugar are used each day. The quantity of sugar is being reduced by 50%, but the question was raised at the Catering Committee as to whether, in view of the sugar problem, it was not desirable to reduce the free drinks supplied where such are not absolutely necessary. 150 gallons of cocoa per day are supplied to Girls' Departments.

"Milk is also supplied to some departments to conform with the Factory Act ...

"Catering Committee also ... whether cocoa could not be supplied in the place of tea for free drinks ... tea is only supplied to girls coming at 6 o'clock in the summer ... [In two departments] Cocoa had been granted to girls ... because of the coldness of the rooms ... Arrangements being made to notify Kitchen when girls are away and the Kitchen then to supply the correct quantity for the department, - ½ pint per girl allowed."

41.) Charles Wilson, "Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britain." in *The Economic History Review*, 1965, p.190-191.

42.) Harrison, op cit., p.303, D.J.Richardson, "J. Lyons & Co. Ltd.: Caterers and Food Manufacturers, 1894 to 1939." in Oddy and Miller, op cit., pp.161-162.

43.) "Scrapbook 1862-1930." article from *The Citizen Toronto*, 23.7.1881:

"Cocoa v. Whiskey."

"We learn from the *Alliance News* that [Cadbury Bros.] has recently

followed the example of Sir Titus Salt, of Saltaire, Yorkshire, and Mr. Richardson, of Bessbrook, Ireland, by creating a new settlement and prohibiting the sale of alcoholic liquors in it."

44.) "Scrapbook." Information on the activities of other cocoa and chocolate manufacturers.

45.) "Historicus." op cit., pp.53,72-73.

46.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. p.58, also, "Scrapbook." information on other cocoa and chocolate manufacturers, 1857-1890.

47.) "Scrapbook." ibid., p.4.

48.) N.P. Gilman, *A Dividend to Labor: A Study of Employers' Welfare Institutions*. New York, 1899, p.150. C.f. Meakin, op cit., pp.355-357, "erected since 1874 ... 312 semi-detached brick cottages ... None of the houses are sold, but the rents, which represent but from a twelfth to a tenth of the wages of the householders, suffice to pay 3 per cent. on the investment. After ten years' occupation the rents are reduced by degrees till the oldest inhabitants, all employed in the chocolate mill, pay nothing. A commodious almshouse awaits those unable to work longer. M. Menier has since built a smaller 'cite' of 58 houses and 5 shops at three kilometres' distance."

49.) P. Waller, *Town, City and Nation*. 1983, pp.174-176.

50.) Gilman, op cit., p.150.

51.) Gillian Darley, *Villages of Vision*. 1975, pp.26-30,62.

52.) S. Pollard, *The Genesis of Modern Management*. 1968

53.) Ashton, op cit., p.199.

54.) Raistrick, *Dynasty of Ironfounders*. op cit., p.272, *Quakers in Science and Industry*. op cit., p.142.

55.) Darley, op cit., p.62.

56.) Pollard, op cit., p.231.

57.) Ashton, op cit., p.196.

58.) Darley, op cit., p.65.

59.) Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*. Penguin, 1969, pp.158-159.

60.) Darley, op cit.

61.) D. Hardy, *Alternative Communities in Nineteenth Century England*. 1979.

62.) Alan Watson, *Price's Village*. 1966, p.21, Waller, op cit., p.173, Darley, op cit., p.65, C. & R. Bell, *City Fathers: The Early History of Town Planning in Britain*. 1972, pp.253-263,266. F. Engels, "The Housing Question -II." in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works in three volumes*. Vol.2, 1973, p.338, "old Akroyd ... This worthy was certainly a philanthropist of the first water. He loved his workers, and in particular his female employees, to such an extent that his less philanthropic competitors in Yorkshire used to say of him that he ran his factories exclusively with his own children!"

63.) Hardy, op cit., p.12.

64.)c.f., Marx & Engels, "*The Manifesto of The Communist Party*. op cit., obviously, on utopian schemes, or Edmund Wilson, *To The Finland Station*. Fontana, 1974, esp. Part II, chs., 3&4, for the range of communities started in America in particular where the movement, "diverted the attention of the dissatisfied from labour organization and socialism." L. Benevolo, *The Origins of Modern Town Planning*. 1967, deals with the problems Owen had in attracting private capital because his ideas made little sense to capitalists, also the ideas of Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Cabet.

65.) Darley, op cit., p.84.

66.) Hardy, op cit., p.245, note 42, p.246, note 3; C. & R. Bell, op cit., p.183; Darley, op cit., p.86.

67.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.20.

68.) Darley, op cit., p.68; C. & R. Bell, op cit., pp.266-267, "Their only success seems to have been the foundation of a smallholding, thrillingly entitled the Total Abstainers' Industrial Farm."

69.) Wilson, *The History of Unilever*. op cit., pp.145-146; Darley, op cit., p.75; Gilman, op cit., pp.161-165.

70.) Wilson, *ibid.*, pp.147,148,150.

71.) Darley, op cit., p.74.

72.) Wilson, *The History of Unilever*. op cit., p.149, also pp.143,290-296.

73.) C. & R. Bell, op cit., p.285. It should be noted that most of these accounts of Port Sunlight and Bournville and other industrial villages draw heavily on the firms' own publications, and therefore dates and details are often wrong. For example, Bournville Village is often cited as having been started in 1879, when the factory opened, which would have made it well ahead of its time. This probably accounts for some of the confusion on the subject.

74.) Ebenezer Howard, *Garden cities of To-morrow*. 1946, pp.123,50-51. (First published, Oct., 1898, as *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real*

Reform., reissued with slight revisions in 1902, as *Garden Cities of To-morrow.*)

- 75.) As was claimed later, e.g., by George Cadbury's widow, *B.W.M.* Oct., 1929, p.302.
- 76.) L.J. Jones, "Public Pursuit of Private Profit? Liberal Businessmen and Municipal Politics in Birmingham, 1865-1900." *Business History*, pp.243,252,253; Gardiner, op cit., 61-69,74.
- 77.) P. Henslowe, *Ninety Years On: An Account of The Bournville Village Trust.* 1984, p.5; *The Bournville Village Trust 1900-1955.* 1955.
- 78.) D. Macfadyen, *Sir Ebenezer Howard and The Town Planning Movement.* 1933, p.23.
- 79.) L. Magnusson, "Company Housing." *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.* Vol. 3, 1937, p.116.
- 80.) Macfadyen, op cit., pp.29-31,195.
- 81.) F. Choay, *The Modern City: Planning in the Nineteenth Century.* 1969, p.108; Lewis Mumford, Introduction to *Howard's Garden Cities.* 1946, op cit., p.30; R. Fishman, *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century.* 1982, p.53.
- 82.) F.J. Osborn, Preface to *Howard's Garden Cities.* 1946, op cit., p.11.
- 83.) Howard, *ibid.*, pp.90,103. The Deed allowed the Trustees to change this by a unanimous vote.
- 84.) L. Hannah, *Inventing Retirement.* 1986, pp.18-19.
- 85.) Henselowe, op cit., p.7.
- 86.) Gardiner, op cit., pp.145,152.
- 87.) C. & R. Bell, op cit., p.271, even this critical account of Town Planning concedes that Bournville, "has a sense of community, and is free from the feudal aspects of many other tycoon foundations." N.P. Gilman, op cit., p.194, appears to have been quoting from the firm's publication when he wrote of the houses at Bournville being built so as to make it "easy for workingmen to own houses with large gardens."
- 88.) Gardiner, op cit., p.163, George Cadbury issued a handbill containing this statement in response to rumours circulating in Stirchley at the time of the District Council Election in 1907.
- 89.) H.B. Davis, "Company Towns." *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.* Vol. 3, op cit., pp.119,123.
- 90.) Especially in the mining villages, Magnusson, op cit., p.117; Meakin, op cit., p.352.

- 91.) Mumford, op cit., p.30.
- 92.) Fishman, op cit., p.61; Macfadyen, op cit., p.41; Gardiner, op cit., pp.145,157; Board Min, 381, 24.6.1906.
- 93.) Gardiner, op cit., 106.
- 94.) *B.W.M.* 1909, p.367.
- 95.) "Historicus." op cit., p.53; also, Gilman, 1899, op cit., p.195, "Nor is it strange that visitors to this immense factory, surrounded by green fields, shady lanes and highly cultivated grounds, call Bournville 'a Worcestershire Eden,' and speak of its women-workers as 'the luckiest girls in the world.'"
- 96.) Board Mins: 644, 16.7.1901; 345, 14.5.1907.
- 97.) Macfadyen, op cit., p.31.
- 98.) Fishman, op cit., pp.62,87; Choay, op cit., p.27, terms both residential communities for the wealthy or middle class, and workers' colonies, as, "pseudurbias ... an outgrowth of hybrid planning which, though crucial, was nonetheless of a retrogressive tendency and indicated a reduced pattern of behaviour with respect to the rich and diversified vocation of the city." She characterises Bournville, along with Port Sunlight, Krupps, and Agneta Park, as a "paternalistic pseudurbia." R. Thomas, Introduction to Howard's *Garden Cities*. 1985, p.viii, argues that the Garden City Association began the corruption of the term "Garden City" and the change in the title of Howard's book. If this is so, then surely Howard himself was guilty of diluting his ideas in order to secure support for them?
- 99.) Osborn, op cit., pp.26-27.
- 100.) George Cadbury Jnr., *Town Planning*. 1915, p.20; George Cadbury Jnr., & Tom Bryan, *The Land and The Landless*. 1908, p.135.
- 101.) George Cadbury Jnr., *Town Planning*. op cit., pp.128,139.
- 102.) Gilman, 1899, op cit., mentions them several times.
- 103.) Osborn, op cit.
- 104.) Alexander Harvey, *The Model Village and its Cottages: Bournville*. 1906, p.62, Harvey was the B.V.T. architect until 1902, and thereafter was the consulting architect.
- 105.) C. & R. Bell, op cit., remark that, "Bournville houses have gardens, many of them quite large gardens. It is strictly in the *Sybil* tradition, with horticulture on the reverse of the coin from shiftless, slum-dwelling drunkenness. Early Bournville tenants were greeted with a ready-dug garden and newly-planted fruit trees." George Cadbury Jnr., *Town Planning*. op cit., p.119; c.f., Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*. op cit., p.167, "the Protestant aversion to sport."

106.)Wilson, *The History of Unilever*. op cit., p.148; Meakin, op cit., p.438; George Cadbury Jnr., *Town Planning*. op cit., p.118, "In the Birmingham Town Planning Schemes a clause is inserted to give the Corporation power to come in and tidy up a neglected garden. This is very necessary."

107.)C. & R. Bell, op cit., pp.274-275; Harvey, op cit., pp.62-64.

108.)Darley, op cit., p.91.

109.)Choay, op cit., p.108.

110.)Harvey, op cit., pp.3-4; G. Cadbury Jnr., & Bryan, op cit., p.v,4.

111.)C. & R. Bell, op cit., p.273.

112.)Gardiner, op cit., pp.141,147.

113.)Harvey, op cit., pp.51-52.

114.)C. & R. Bell, op cit., p.273.

115.)The B.V.T. was criticized by the Commission for Racial Equality for unwittingly discriminating against ethnic minorities in 1982. The naivete of the B.V.T. General Manager at the time was indicated in his remark to the press that, "the Trust did not have the resources to conduct a complete survey of tenants. However, a study of tenants' names indicated that at least 20 were from ethnic minority groups." *Birmingham Post*, 3.8.1982. Measures were subsequently implemented by the Trust to rectify the situation. See Pat Niner in collaboration with Valerie Karn, *Housing Association Allocations: Achieving Racial Equality. A West Midlands Case Study*. (The Runnymede Trust) 1985, pp.62-64.

116.)J.B. Priestley, *English Journey*. 1934, pp.89,95.

117.)Meakin, 1905, op cit., p.436; Harvey, 1906, op cit., p.11; Edward Cadbury, *Experiments in Industrial Organisation*. 1912, p.282; Gardiner, 1923, op cit., p.146:

Figures given: Proportion of Householders Working in:

Bournville	41.2%
Birmingham	40.2%
Selly Oak	13.9%
Kings Norton	4.7%

Note, Selly Oak and Kings Norton are within a mile of Bournville

118.) Board File, re. Min, 530, 1904, "Bournville Village 1904."

Rents. Houses belonging to or administered by B.V.T.:

14	Houses	4/6 per week and under 5/6 with rates
7	Houses over 4/6 per week and under 5/- with rates 6/-	
59	Houses over 5/- per week and under 5/3 with rates 6/6	
123	Houses over 5/3 per week and under 6/- with rates extra	
74	Houses over 6/- per week and under 7/- with rates extra	
38	Houses over 7/- per week and under 8/- with rates extra	
51	Houses over 8/- per week (including shops)	

Edward C. *Experiments* pp 273-287 Appendix on BVT.

1912-731 houses in the village rents:

31	x 4/6 pwk or under rates extra
138	x 4/6 up to 5/3 pwk rates extra
132	x 5/3 up to 6/- pwk rates extra
85	x 6/- up to 7/- pwk rates extra
68	x 7/- up to 8/- pwk rates extra
109	x 8/- including shops
168	sold and occupied by owners

Gardiner p 148:

25	houses x 6/- or under per wk.
120	houses over 6/- up to 7/6 per wk.
122	houses over 7/6 up to 8/6 per wk.
63	houses over 8/6 up to 9/6 per wk.
36	houses over 9/6 up to 10/6 per wk.
58	houses over 10/6 up to 12/6 per wk.
16	houses over 12/6 per wk

excluding rates, which in the district in Sept 1922 were 15/10 in the £ approx. "This, added to the rent, gives a figure that certainly presupposes a good and steady wage on the part of the tenant."

119.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. op cit., p.281.

120.) Gardiner, op cit., p.147.

121.) Meakin, op cit., p.352; Magnusson, op cit., p.117, "In 1925 between a quarter and a third of all British coal miners lived in company houses, of which over a third were rent free." Fishman, op cit., pp.74-75, Letchworth rents were too high for unskilled workers employed in the town, who had to commute to work in the Garden City from cheaper and substandard housing beyond the "Agricultural Belt."

122.) *B.W.M.* 1909, pp.366,378-379; Alexander, op cit., p.206; also, "Brandon Head" (pseudonym for a member of *Cadburys*), *The Food of The Gods: A Popular Account of Cocoa*. 1903, p.49.

123.) "Scrapbook." op cit., to T.B. Rogers, editor of the *B.W.M.*, the Magazine Office, Dec., 1928. The comments on Mrs. Joliffe's account, presumably by Rogers, make interesting reading in themselves, and show

the firm's attitude to its history around the time of the Jubilee and Centenary of the firm, "The kindnesses of Mr. R.C. and Mr. G.C. were scarcely suggested in Mrs. Alexander's [op cit.] and Mr. Gardiner's [op cit.] books ... Prominent things: 1.) Personal contact of employers with employees, and 2.) thought for their comfort." It should be noted that Helen Cadbury Alexander was Richard Cadbury's daughter, and Gardiner was the editor of the *Daily News* appointed by George Cadbury when he took it over.

124.) *B.W.M.* 1909, p.366.

125.) Gilman, op cit., p.192.

126.) Board Min, 717, - 15.12.1909.

127.) George Cadbury Jnr., *Town Planning*. op cit., p.24.

128.) Board Min, 220, 23.3.1910.

129.) Board Min, 119, 13.2.1912.

130.) Board Mins: 282, 14.4.1915; 327, 5.5.1915.

131.) *The Bournville Village Trust 1900-1955*. op cit., p.25; Board Min, 328, 5.5.1915.

132.) Board Mins: 388, 26.5.1915; 411, 2.6.1915.

133.) Board Min, 572, 12.8.1916.

134.) Board Min, 541, 30.8.1916.

135.) Board Min, 164, 14.2.1917; M.W.C. Staffing & Rules Sub-Committee Report No. 33, 4.10.1917.

136.) M.W.C. Annual Report 1917; M.W.C. Plans & New Developments Sub-Committee Report No. 1, 3.1 1919.

137.) B.W.M.C. Report No. 2, 15.2.1919, Interim Joint Housing Committee; Board Min, 268, 19.3.1919.

138.) *The B.V.T. 1900-55*. op cit., p.25.

139.) *The B.V.T.* *ibid.*, p.32; *B.W.M.* May, 1925, pp.148-149, information given to a party of 25 members of the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association. The party was met by Mrs. George Cadbury senior., Chairman of the B.V.T., Edward Cadbury, George Cadbury Jnr., Walter Barrow, and other officials of the Trust; "George Cadbury [Jnr.] spoke of the inadequate attention given by municipalities to the development of the community spirit in their housing estates, and said that, happily, the public utility societies ... [at Bournville] had the opportunity of cultivating it."

Bournville Housing. Cadbury Brothers Ltd., 1924, p.25, addendum 31.1.1925, houses built and building, 1923 & 1924.

Bournville Village		720		768	
Bournville Tenants		145		145	
Weoley Hill		140		197	
Woodlands		6		44	
Works Housing Society		60		165	
Cadbury Bros.		49		103	
Alms Houses		66		66	
Others		50		68	
Total		1,236		1,556	

140.) Board Min, 454, 14.5.1924.

141.) Board Min, 89, 4.2.1925.; *B.W.M.* May, 1925, p.149; *B.W.W.C.* Min, 100, 13.2.1925.

142.) T.R. Navin, *The Whittin Machine Works since 1831*. 1950, p.74; Magnusson, *op cit.*, pp.117-118; c.f., C.W. Cheape, *Family Firm to Multinational: Norton Company, a New England Enterprise*. 1985, pp.137-139. *B.W.M.* May, 1925, p.149, 135 men were employed in 1925; *The B.V.T. 1900-55*. *op cit.*, p.6, 70 men were employed in 1955.

143.) See forthcoming South West Birmingham Project Working Paper, Dennis Smith & M. Rowlinson; also Paul S. Cadbury, *The Expansion of Birmingham into the Green Belt Area*. Report to the Directors of Cadbury Brothers Ltd., 1968.

144.) R. Williams, *Keywords*. 1976, p.66, "Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe an existing set of relationships, or the warmly persuasive word to describe an alternative set of relationships."

145.) J.L. Melling, *British Employers and the Development of Industrial Welfare, c.1880-1920: An Industrial and Regional Comparison*. PhD thesis, Glasgow, 1980, pp.85-102, essentially seems to be arguing simply that, market relationships underlay the activities of employers in their contributions to the 'local' community.

146.) R. Whipp, "Labour Markets and Communities: an historical view." *The Sociological Review*, 1985, 33:4, pp784--785; see E.C. Lindman, "Community." in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. Vol. 3, *op cit.*, pp.102-105, for a very brief description of the evolution of the term "community" in social science which shows clearly that it cannot be taken as an unproblematic given entity.

147.) P. Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*. 1985, p.12; Marx & Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. *op cit.*; *The German Ideology*. *op cit.*

148.) *B.W.M.* Jan., 1933, pp.2-4; July, '33, pp.197; Board Mins: 748, 20.12.1933; 23, 10.1.1934; Priestley, *op cit.*, p.92, gives a favourable account of the experiment and indicates the positive propaganda purpose

behind it, which has a contemporary liberal ring about it, in showing the willingness of the unemployed to work, and their suitability for work.

149.) *B.W.M.* June, 1933, p.70.

150.) Ted Smallbone, quoted in ch. 3, of a draft of , H. Williamson, *Toolmaking and Politics: The Life of Ted Smallbone- an Oral History.* 1987.

151.) Richardson, op cit., p.163; A.E. Dingle, "Drink and Working-Class Living Standards in Britain, 1870-1914." in Oddy & Miller, op cit., p.132; Harrison, op cit., pp.303-304.

152.) Board Mins: 642, 13.2.1900; 73, 4.2 1902:

Cyclists Arms Year Ending 1899:

takings £363- 0- 6

expenses £361-13- 0

£ 1- 7- 6

153.) *B.W.M.* 1903: July, pp.248,250; Aug, pp.279-280; George Cadbury Jnr., & Bryan, op cit., posed the question, "Who Owns England?" and were critical of the rise of the factory system which completed the process of, "the alienation of the people from the land", which meant that by the middle of the Nineteenth Century English land was in the possession of about a half a % of its people. From this it seems reasonable to suggest that the question of land ownership was not seen as threatening by the Cadburys as *manufacturers*.

154.) Board Min, 784, 10.11.1903.

155.) Board min, 552, 3.9.1907.

156.) Board Min, 240, 14.3.1921.

157.) *B.W.M.* May 1911, p.156.

158.) *B.W.M.* June 1933, p.173, W.N. Hallet of the Engineer's Department gave a description of the factory extensions at the monthly Staff Lunch. The simple policy of the firm had been, he said, "Always have a building in hand. As soon as you have finished one, start another." Although the policy had been more cautious with the general trade depression, he conceded.

CHAPTER 4: WELFARE.

- 1.) "Scrapbook." op cit., notes supplied by F. Ward, 30.9.1929., n.b., not included in the volume of "Personal Rminiscences." R.C.K. Ensor, *England 1870-1914*. 1936, p.163, footnote, "a 'Blue Ribbon Army' had a great vogue from 1878", and in the 1880s, "'Armies' were noticeably common."
- 2.) E.P. Thompson, op cit., p.391; see E.J. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men*. 1968, ch.3, pp.22-33, discusses "Methodism and the threat of Revolution in Britain." Whatever the role of Methodism was, Quakerism could hardly be considered as a candidate for a similar role.
- 3.) Pollard, op cit., pp226,227,229. Could it be that once the living culture of the pre-industrial village had been all but destroyed in the life of the urban proletariat, then the way was clear for the appearance of the rural idyll as an acceptable vision for the capitalist class?
- 4.) Yeo & Yeo, op cit.
- 5.) Sellers, op cit., p.43.
- 6.) Harrison, op cit., p.173, "Secularism was one of the few reforming causes from which the teetotal leaders abstained." Note the number of references to the Cadburys in this book.
- 7.) Gardiner, op cit., pp.65-67; Harrison, op cit., p.385.
- 8.) Alexander, op cit., p.203.
- 9.) Isichei, op cit., p.265.
- 10.) Gardiner, op cit., pp.45-46,52.
- 11.) Sellers, op cit., p.42.
- 12.) Alexander, 1906, op cit., p.79, paraphrased the original account, which is interesting because she actually plays up the paternalism reflected in the original. C.f. Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. 1931, pp.22-28, quotes directly from the article, "Visit to a Chocolate Manufactory." Oct. 30th, 1852.
- 13.) Gardiner, op cit., p.27; Harrison, op cit., p.305.
- 14.) Alexander, op cit., pp.270-271; Board Min, 390, 12.3.1901.
- 15.) Gardiner, op cit., pp.29-30; Alexander, op cit., p.138; Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., pp.50-51, shows the embarrassment at such an obviously paternalistic practice felt in 1931, "a custom which is , perhaps, as famous, and as much misrepresented, as anything in connection with the firm of Cadbury... At no time was attendance compulsory ... Clearly, from employers less sincere than

Richard and George Cadbury, the Morning Reading might have been resented."

16.) "Scrapbook." op cit., "Meetings for Worhip to recommence on Monday, 27th February 1871."

17.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.51.

18.) Alexander, op cit., pp.138-139. N.b. ch. XXV. "What is my faith?" pp.356-368, on p.362, it is stated that, "The Society of Friends is organised on a plan of democratic self-government. It knows no class distinctions of clergy and laity." But there is no discussion in this chapter of industrial matters vis a vis religious faith.

19.) C.f. D. Nelson, "'A Newly Appreciated Art': The Development of Personnel Work at Leeds and Northrup, 1915-1923." *Business History Review*, 1970, p.520, an American Quaker firm enjoying the "right spirit" which adopted personnel measures to meet "the extraordinary conditions created by the [First World] War."

20.) Gardiner, op cit., pp.113-114.

21.) Mathias, op cit., pp.372-375. see Introduction above.

22.) Engels, "The Housing Question." op cit., p.331.

23.) Board min, 474, 23.4.1901.

24.) Board Min, 155, 1.3.1910.

25.) Compiled from Board Mins: 526, 26.8.1902; 386, 1908; 483, 10.8.1910. N.b. different figures appear for the same year in various tables because they are taken at different times during the year.

26.) Compiled from Board Mins: 7, 1906; 29, 12.1.1909; 683, 21.12.1909. Table 1891-1911, from Board Min, 795, 15.10.1912, Export Dept figures. N.b. Board Min, 728, 15.11.1910; "Best Goods" definition confirmed to include all goods of 1/- per lb. and upwards, Cost Dept were asked not to pass any goods at 1/- per lb. and upwards which did not bear 15% profit.

27.) Compiled from Board Mins: 105, 8.2.1910; 645, 3.9.1912.

28.) From a table in H.W. Bywaters, *Modern Methods of Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacture*. 1930, p.30.

C.f. Zipperer, op cit., p.38:

"Import or Consumption [of cacao] in the various lands; increase for 1908 on 1901.

		1908 (German tons.)
U. S. A.	106%	4261529.3
Germany	86.5%	3435190
France	14%	2044450
England	11.3%	2105152
Holland	10%	1582100
Spain	11%	658011.3
Switzerland	33.3%	582050
Belgium	144%	455408.1
Austria-Hungary	120%	370730

29.) Board Mins: 7, 1906; 303, 1899; 370, 9.5.1911.

30.) Compiled from Board Mins: 204, 1910; 383, 9.5.1911, 285, 22.4.1914.

31.) Board Min, 945, 3.7.1900.

32.) G. Wagner, "Joseph Storrs Fry (1826-1913.)" *Dictionary of Business Biography*. Vol. 2; G. Wagner, *The Chocolate Conscience*. 1987.

33.) A. Briggs, *Social Thought and Social Action*. 1961, p.10; Board File, re Min, 341, 31.5.1904, press cutting, "Rowntrees' Steel Frame Factory."

34.) Board File, re. Min, 837, 24.11.1903, "The Labor Department of a Great Cocoa Factory in England." Oct. 21, 1903. American Institute of Social Service - Commercial Letter Service." W.H. Tolman, ("social engineer") *Social Engineering*. 1909.

35.) Zipperer, op cit., p.42, Fig. 6, shows the almost exponential growthj of cacao consumption *per head of population* during th Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuriesw. It more than doubled between 1900 and 1910. Board Min, 330, 3.6.1902, extract from the *Gordian*, 5.5.1902.

36.) Board Min, 769, 15.11.1901.

37.) Board Mins: 379, 7.11.1899; 395, 14.11.1899; 419, 15.11.1899; 451, 28.11.1899; at least 40,000 ½lb. tins of chocolate were supplied by *Cadburys* to the Queen. Board Min, 505, 19.12.1899, the firm even delayed using the Royal Warrant which was granted to them until 1st Jan. 1901, "so as to entirely disconnect it with present events."

38.) Board Mins: 457, 22.7.1902, Circular issued by the *Gordian*; 254, 24.3.1903; J. Othick, op cit., pp.89-90, "between 1900 and 1905, annual exports of chocolate from Switzerland to Britain averaged nearly 13 million Kilograms, compared with less than 3 million kilograms exported to Germany, the next most important market."

39.) Board File, re. Min, 623, 1904, newspaper cutting, report of combinations of firms in the Swiss chocolate industry: Swiss chocolate exports: 1902, 5,200,000lbs - value £720,000; 1884, 580,000lbs. - value £52,000; 1903, 6,500,000lbs. - value £910,000.

40.) Russell Cook, op cit., pp.117-118; Knapp, op cit., p.29; Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. p.81; W. Marks, (in collaboration with Christopher Cadbury,) *George Cadbury 1878-1954*. 1980, pp.14-15.

41.) Board Min, 466, 5.12.1899.

42.) Board Mins: 611, 6.2.1900; 33, 16.10.1900; 55, 23.10.1900; 83, 30.10.1900; The machines referred to were probably the "conches" which were used to manufacture the smoother fondant chocolate which was invented at the end of the Nineteenth century and replaced the coarse, gritty chocolate which was made up until the early Twentieth century. See Zipperer pp.138-141, showing Lehman "conches" in operation in a row of fifteen. Knapp, op cit., p.139; Russell Cook, pp.118-119; Board Mins: 262, 8.1.1901; 357, 5.3.1901.

43.) Board Mins: 141, 12.3.1902; 308, 27.5.1902; 845, 9.12.1902; 82, 2.2.1904; 504, 18.8.1902.

44.) Board File, re. Min, 2, 1902, report, 23.12.1904, visit by the analyst and engineer to Passburg in Berlin. File, re. Min, 484, 26.7.1904; Board Mins: 416, 28.6.1904; 493, 9.8.1904; 544, 23.8.1904; 796, 16.11.1904; 859, 13.12.1904; 36, 17.1.1905. Bywaters, op cit., pp.227-228, "Manufacture of Milk Chocolate by the Dry Process."

45.) Board Mins: 262, 22.3.1905; 286, 29.3.1905; 359, 19.4.1905; 520, 27.6.1905; 860, 7.11.1905; 870, 7.11.1905.

46.) Board Mins: 749, 1.11.1904; 874, 13.12.1904; 179, 28.2.1905.

47.) Board Min, 238, 15.3.1905.

48.) Board Min, 331, 14.5.1907. Williams *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., pp.91-95, the two milk condensing factories at knighton and Frampton actually produced the "almost completely dry mixture of cocoa, sugar, and milk, known as 'crumb'", which could be transported to Bournville for the final processes which converted it to milk chocolate. According to B.W. Minifie, *Chocolate Cocoa and Confectionery: Science and Technology*. 1970, pp.91-93, the development of the "crumb process ... revolutionized" the manufacture of milk chocolate. The sales of milk chocolate in the U.K. greatly increased and far exceeded those for dark chocolate since the crumb process was used. Milk chocolate is less popular in the U.S.A. Europe because milk powder is more often used. The crumb process gives milk chocolate a rich, creamy, "partly caramelized flavour." Because large quantities of fresh milk are required crumb factories were set up by the chocolate companies adjacent to milk-producing areas in England and Ireland. The crumb has storage properties because of the low level of moisture in it. It can be kept for 6 to 9 months in bins and retains its flavour as long as the moisture in it is kept low. "Milk crumb will keep better than full

cream milk powder and this enables manufacturers to build up stocks during the 'milk flush' periods." Minifie gives a description of how crumb is made. Although, c.f. Russell Cook, op cit., p.209. It is not clear whether the crumb process was used for C.D.M. from the outset. If it was, then it may well constitute a genuine innovation on the part of Cadburys. This needs further investigation but it is beyond the scope of this brief study.

49.) A. Muir, *The History of Baker Perkins*. 1968.

50.) Board Mins: 93, 30.1.1906, Machinery Report; 32, 1906, Report, 19.1.1906, on a visit to Germany by George Cadbury Jnr. and the edngineer, making recommendations for processes to be tried in manufacturing, machines to bem,n purchased, and machines to be tried.

51.) Russell Cook, op cit., p.116; Knapp, op cit.:, pp.126,128; Bywaters, op cit., pp.110-112.

52.) Othick, op cit.; c.f. Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., pp.82-83.

53.) Board Mins: 539, 4.7.1905; 755, 3.10.1905.

54.) Board Mins: 779, 10.10.1905; 221, 20.3.1906; 243, 27.3.1906; 377, 15.5.1906; 405, 5.6.1906; 426, 12.6.1906; Board File, Re. Min, 243, 1906; Zipperer, op cit., pp.208-209, Hermann Bauermeister, Altona-Ottensen. German firms were at the time manufacturing the most powerful cocoa butter processeds in the world.

55.) Orthick, op cit., p.88.

56.) Table compiled from Board Mins: 196, 11.3.1914; 293, 1913; 422, 1912; 49, 1909; 201, 1915; 9, 1906; 74, 1905; 895, 23.12.1902; 8, 7.1.1902; 474, 23.4.1901. N.b. Cocoa butter is a by-product from cocoa manufacture and is used in chocolate manufacture. According to "Historicus", op cit., p.61, "The husk or shell is sent off to Ireland and elsewhere to be used as a light, but by no means unpalatable table decoction, under the designation 'miserables'." The use of cacao shell for this "Cocoa tea" seems to have been in decline and later writers refer to the problem of finding a use for this constituent of the cacao bean, e.g. Bywaters, op cit., p.27, "There is still a fortune awaiting the person who is able to find a better use for shell ... Beyond the limited use as a sourc for theobromine, practically the only other outlet is a constituent of cattle foods." Knapp, op cit., pp.118-121; Russell Cook, p.119; Zipperer, pp.81-84.

57.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.75.

58.) Board Mins: 5 & 9, 18.4.1899.

59.) Board Min, 113, 20.6.1899.

60.) P.W. Bartlett, *Barrow Cadbury: A Memoir*. 1960, p.33.

- 61.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., pp.72-73.
- 62.) *William A. Cadbury 1867-1957*. 1958, pp.1-2, n.b. see the cover of this book for W.A.C.'s signature.
- 63.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.72.
- 64.) Marks, op cit., p.11.
- 65.) Board Min, 16, 25.4.1899.
- 66.) Board Mins: 97, 30.5.1899; 116, 20.6.1899.
- 67.) J. Litterer, "Systemmatic Management: Design for Organizational Recoupling in American Manufacturing Firms." *Business History Review*, Winter, 1963, pp.370-375.
- 68.) See, e.g.: W.A. Cadbury, *Labour in Portuguese West Africa*, op cit.; Edward Cadbury, et al., *Women's Work and Wages*. op cit. Which were probably influenced by Sebohm Rowntree's *Poverty*. which was first published in 1901.
- 69.) Marks, op cit., p.11; Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.73.
- 70.) Williams, *ibid.*, p.83.
- 71.) Board Mins: 963, 10.7.1900; 987, 16.7.1900.
- 72.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., pp.181,185.
- 73.) Williams, *ibid.*, pp.185-186; Board Mins: 1046, 29.8.1900; 744, 18.9.1901. These Baths are no longer in use. However, an indication of how advanced theyh were at the time3 they were built is given by the fact that the company now wants to demolish the building which they are in, which is right by the main entrance to the factory, but it is facing considerable opposition partly because it was one of the first continental sized pools to be built in Britain, and for that reason is of some historic interest.
- 74.) Gilman, op cit., pp.69, Krupps; p.87; p.151, Menier. Neither Gilman nor Meakin, op cit., mention Stollwercks, so neither could have been comprehensive.
- 75.) Bebbington, op cit., p.55; Meakin, op cit., pp.184,422; Williams, *Cadbury*. opcit., p.88; Board Min, 499, 19.12.1899.
- 76.) Board Mins: 600, 30.1.1900; 743, 27.3.1900.
- 77.) Meakin, op cit., p.193; "Scrapbook." op cit., other cocoa manufacturers, 1857-1890; Board Min, 996, 25.7.1900.

- 78.) Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp.165-166; *Bournville Works and its Institutions*. p.13, for those aged 24 and over, with at least nine years' service, women were allocated two shares and men three shares.
- 79.) Williams, *ibid.*, p.116; Gardiner, op cit., p.97.
- 80.) Gilman, op cit., Appendix II, p.366, list of profit sharing firms. Phelps-Brown, op cit., pp.211,215.
- 81.) H. Jones, "Employers' Welfare Schemes and Industrial Relations in Inter-War Britain." *Business History*, March 1983, pp.66; Bebbington, op cit., p.55; Fishman, op cit., pp57-58; F.W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*. 1967, (first published, 1911), pp.94-95; Wilson, *Unilever*. op cit., pp151-156.
- 82.) Gilman, op cit., p.111.
- 83.) C.f. Wilson, *Unilever*. op cit., p.157.
- 84.) E.D. Proud, *Welfare Work: Employers Experiments for IMproving Working Conditions in Factories*. 1916, p.5,144.
- 85.) Board Min, 996, 25.7.1900.
- 86.) Board Min, 714, 13.3.1900, Sick Club Report Balance Sheet for Year Ending Dec. 30th, 1899.
- 87.) Williams, *Cadbury*. p.48.
- 88.) Board Mins: 6987, 29.10.1902; 754, 18.11.1902.
- 89.) Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp161,268-269.
- 90.) Board File: re. Min, 542, 1904, visit to Bryant & Mays; re. Min, 189, 1905, visit to Peek Freans. M.W.C. Min 142, 15.4.1905.
- 91.) Bartlett, op cit., p.32; Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp.62,73.
- 92.) Board Mins: 611, 2.7.1901; 645, 19.7.1901.
- 93.) Marks, op cit., p.18.
- 94.) Board Mins, Special Meeting 8.11.1901: 822,823,824,827,828,829.
- 95.) Board Mins; 56, 16.5.1899; 82, 30.5.1899.
- 96.) Board Min, 899, 3.12.1901.
- 97.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. op cit., pp.212-218.
- 98.) Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp.103-109.
- 99.) Board File: re. Min 547, men's figures; re. Min 913, 1915, women's figures.

100.)Board Min, 925, 11.12.1901.

101.)Board Min, 877, 26.11.1901.

102.)*The Factory in a Garden*. n.d., c.1921. There are several undated copies in *Cadburys'* library. The booklet was regularly updated, but it stayed essentially the same, containing mostly attractive views of the works with a little bit of text.

103.)S. Crowther, *John H. Patterson: Pioneer in Industrial Welfare*. 1923, pp.113,288-289; Tolman, op cit., pp.32-33.

104.)Phelps-Brown, op cit., p.77; Briggs, op cit., p.11.

105.)"Scrapbook." op cit., the *Traveller's Weekly circular*. started 21.4.1891.

106.)Board Mins: 392, 7.11.1899; 515, 2.1.1900.

107.)Board Mins: 563, 9.9.1902; 654, 14.10.1902.

108.)*B.W.M.* No. 1, Vol. 1, Nov. 1902, p.1.

109.)*B.W.M.* Jan 1969, the last issue, p.51.

110.)Crowther, op cit., pp.95-96.

111.)Board Mins: 432, 16.7.1902; 433, 16.7.1902; 435, 22.7.1902.

112.)Board Mins: 263, 26.4.1904; 630, 11.9.1906.

113.)Board Min, 691, 2.10.1906; Board File, re. Min 823, 1906; *The Venture Programme*. Central Television.

114.)Board Min 823, 6.11.1906; Directors' Annual Reports: 1939, p.11; 1938, p.7; *B.W.M.*: Jan. 1933, p.10; April 1931, p.102; Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp.89-91,247.

115.)Board Mins: 929, 17.12.1901; 110, 184, 196, 211, 273, 511, 1902; 593, 25.8.1903; 660, 29.9.1903, also Board File; Board File re. Min 692, 1903.

116.)C.f., C.R. Littler, *The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies*. 1982, p.198, note 8; Briggs, op cit., p.89.

117.)A.D. Chandler, *The Visible Hand*. p.358; Litterer, op cit., pp.370-371, footnote 10; D. Nelson, "The New Factory System and the Unions: The National Cash Register Company Dispute of 1901." *Labour History*, Spring, 1974, p.163, footnote 1, draws attention to the relevance of Litterer in relation to systematic management and *N.C.R. C.f.* Crowther, op cit., p.177.

118.)Crowther, *ibid.*, p.190.

119.)D. Nelson, *Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States 1880-1920*. 1975, pp.106,107; c.f. Gilman, 1899, op cit., "Six years ago it was losing \$1,000 per day; there were many strikes and lockouts, and the factory was set on fire three times, 'supposedly by disaffected employees.'"

120.)Sir Adrian Cadbury, "The Need for Organizational Change." quoted in, A.L. Minkes & C.S. Nuttall, *Business Behaviour and Management Structure*. 1985, p.61. Although Sir Adrian Cadbury has made the point to me that he was in fact referring to the way the Board operated very much on a committee system. So even if the committee system referred to here, involving management committees, cannot be attributed to Quakerism, it could be admitted that the Board operated along Quaker lines.

121.)Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp.83,86; Board Min 55, 24.1.1905, "Cmtees Duties." See *Industrial Record 1919-1939*. pp.7-9, for an outline of how the Committee system developed subsequently.

122.)Gilman, op cit., p.228.

123.)Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. op cit., pp.107-109. It really is worth reading Nelson on *N.C.R.*, the parallels with Bournville are so striking, it is almost as if one of the Cadburys *had* to have been there!

124.)Board Min 55, 24.1.1905; M.W.C. Min 1, 28.1.1905, list of duties of the M.W.C.: Ambulance (arrangements); Foreign substances in chocolate; Lodge keeper's and Watchmen's arrangements; Lighting rooms at night; Night visits to Works; Savings Fund Collectors; Supply of chocolate to employees; Suggestion Scheme and Prizes; Works' Exhibition (arrangements); Works' Rules. Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. pp.202-204.

125.)Nelson, "The N.C.R. Dispute." op cit., p.163; Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. op cit., pp.107-109.

126.)Nelson, "The N.C.R. Dispute." pp.168,175-177.

127.)Board Min 394, 1.7.1902.

128.)M.W.C. Min 19, 11.2.1905.

129.)J.F. Crosfield, *A History of the Cadbury Family*. Two Volumes, 1985, Vol. 2, pp.661,664.

130.)B.W.M.C. 24.1.1921; Board Min 105, 31.1.1921.

131.)Crowther, op cit., p.246.

132.)*B.W.M.* April 1933, p.130, "The Night Watchman's Story."

133.)Child, *Management Thought*. op cit., p.37.

134.)Ozanne, op cit., pp.32-33,247.

- 135.)Crowther, op cit., p.205.
- 136.)Gardiner, op cit., p.77.
- 137.)ibid., p.102.
- 138.)Board Mins: 399, 412, 18.3.1901.
- 139.)C.f. Gardiner, op cit., p.187.
- 140.)Board Mins: 158, 22.11.1900; 624, 15.9.1903.
- 141.)Board Min 602, 1.9.1903.
- 142.)Board Min 628, 15.9.1903.
- 143.)D. Nelson, *Frederick Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Mangement*. 1980, p.19.
- 144.)Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. op cit., p.115; c.f. Littler, op cit., p.91, although Littler uses Meakin, op cit., so ther may be a bias towards firms employing women.
- 145.)Phelps-Brown, op cit., p65.
- 146.)Ozanne, op cit., p.31.
- 147.)S. Cakebread, *Sugar and Chocolate Confectionery*. 1975, p.45.
- 148.)J.J. Nolan, *The Enrober Story, 1907-1960*. unpublished manuscript, July 1960, p.1.
- 149.)ibid., p.11.
- 150.)Knapp, op cit., p.146.
- 151.)Bywaters, op cit., p.269.
- 152.)Gardiner, op cit., p.99.
- 153.)Board Min, 383, 12.5.1903.
- 154.)see the "Scrapbook." op cit., letter to T.B. Rogers, (B.W.M. ed) 7.8.1929, Mrs. Caroline Joliffe said she received the first marriage gift in 1887, although she was not a very reliable source.
- 155.)Board Mins: 199, 25.7.1899; Min 208, 25.7.1899; 292, 19.9.1899.
- 156.)S. Lewenhak, *Women and Trade Unions*. 1977, pp.91-96.
- 157.)S. Boston, *Women Workers and the Trade Union Movement*. 19c0, p.240.
- 158.)*Industrial Challenge, The post-war years*. 1964, pp.57-59.

- 159.) Morris, op cit., pp.192-193.
- 160.) C. Black, *Sweated Industry and The Minimum Wage*. 1907, p.134, the preface to this book was written by A.G. Gardiner, editor of *The Daily News* owned by George Cadbury, and George Cadbury's biographer.
- 161.) C. Smith, *The Case for Wages Boards*. c.1909, p.35.
- 162.) Gardiner, op cit., p.31.
- 163.) Edward Cadbury & G. Shann, *Sweating*. 1907, p.124.
- 164.) *ibid.*, pp.121-122.
- 165.) D. Sells, *British Trade Board System*. 1923, pp.147-152. (A book recommended to Bournville workers by the Works Councils.)
- 166.) Edward Cadbury, et al, *Women's Work*. pp.24-25,36; c.f. Lewenhak, op cit., p.72.
- 167.) Board File re, Min 553, 1913, Barrow Cadbury's evidence to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, see Appendix B.
- 168.) S. Walby, *Patriarchy at Work*. 1986, p.115.
- 169.) Alexander, op cit., pp.133-135.
- 170.) Gilman, pp.96,142,144,149.
- 171.) Meakin, op cit., p.55.
- 172.) Child, *Management Thought*. op cit., p.36.
- 173.) c.f. Ozanne, op cit., p.73.
- 174.) Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. p.115.
- 175.) J. Melling, "Employers, Industrial Welfare, and the Struggle for Workplace Control in British Industry, 1880-1920." in H.F. Gospel & C.R. Littler, (eds), *Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations*. 1983, p.62.

CHAPTER 5: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT.

- 1.) Williams, *Cadbury*. op cit., pp.157,159.
- 2.) Hannah, *Inventing Retirement*. op cit., p.22.
- 3.) Board Min 191, 8.4.1902.
- 4.) Board File, re. Min 789, 30.10.1906., p.2; Board Min 239, 20.3.1906.
- 5.) Hannah, *Inventing Retirement*. op cit., p.23

- 6.) Board Min 850, 31.10.1905; Board File re. Min 789, 30.10.1906, p.1.
- 7.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. pp.70,74,75,78-80.
- 8.) Board Min 741, 24.9.1901.
- 9.) Board Min 860, 19.11.1901.
- 10.) Board Min 337, 28.4.1903.
- 11.) Board File re. Min 45, 17.1.1905, Report a.).
- 12.) M.E. Bulkley, *The Boxmaking Industry*. 1915, pp.4.51-53.
- 13.) Board Mins: 55 & 58, 13.1.1903; 897, 22.12.1903.
- 14.) Board Mins: 3, 2.10.1900; 500, 30.4.1901; c.f. Nelson, *Taylor*. op cit., p.9, and Littler, op cit., pp.83-84.
- 15.) Board File re. Min 412, 16.5.1905.
- 16.) Board File re. Min 350, 1907.
- 17.) Board Min 3; 2.10.1900, "Cutting Room" Report.
- 18.) Board Mins: 465, 5.12.1899; 766, 10.4.1900; 678, 27.2.1900.
- 19.) Board Min 825, 6.11.1906.
- 20.) Board Mins: 450, 11.6.1912; 679, 11.9.1912; 951, 10.12.1912.
- 21.) Child, *British Management Thought*. op cit., p.36.
- 22.) An example of how company propaganda intended for one audience is not suitable for another was when a video made by *Cadburys* for its workforce in the 1980s, showing how a competitor's product was better value for money, found its way on to local television.
- 23.) Taylor, op cit., p.81.
- 24.) Taylor, *ibid.*, p.95.
- 25.) Taylor, *ibid.*, p.138.
- 26.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. pp.244-245.
- 27.) H. Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. 1974, p.336.
- 28.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. p.20.
- 29.) Taylor, op cit., p.87.
- 30.) *ibid.*, pp.143-144.

- 31.) *B.W.M.* 1919, pp.182,258.
- 32.) J.E. Prosser, *Piece Rates Premium and Bonus.* 1919, p.74.
- 33.) *ibid.*, p.77.
- 34.) *ibid.*, p.73.
- 35.) Edward Cadbury, "The Case Against Scientific Management." *op cit.*, pp.6-7.
- 36.) *ibid.*, p.3, quoted from Taylor, *op cit.*, p.39, Taylor actually said, "Perhaps the most important..."
- 37.) Edward Cadbury, *ibid.*, pp.3-4.
- 38.) Prosser, *op cit.*, pp.64-65.
- 39.) Edward Cadbury, "Scientific Management." *op cit.*, p.7.
- 40.) Taylor, *op cit.*, p.122.
- 41.) *ibid.*, pp.68,93.
- 42.) Prosser, *op cit.*, p.57.
- 43.) *ibid.*, p.33., in introducing this system Prosser wrote, "The Writer knows of a factory in which is used an interesting variant of the premium system." He went on, "the system just described ... has been used with considerable success in the solitary instance known to the present writer." His coyness in dealing with this particular firm was probably because it was *Cadburys* where he worked.
- 44.) *ibid.*, pp.31-32, Halsey, incidentally, was a forerunner of Taylor, he first outlined his "premium plan" to the American society of Mechanical Engineers in 1891, and according to M.J. Nadworny, *Scientific Management and the Unions 1900-1932.* 1955, p.3, "he rejected both the day wage and piecework payment."
- 45.) Nadworny, *ibid.*, p.4.
- 46.) Edward Cadbury, "Scientific Management." *op cit.*, p.5.
- 47.) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 48.) *ibid.*, p.p.44.
- 49.) Taylor, *op cit.*, p.95.
- 50.) *ibid.*, p.10.
- 51.) Edward Cadbury, "Scientific Management." *op cit.*, p.9.

- 52.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments. op cit.*, pp.271-272, "Any wages system must contain an element of compulsion and driving, and although a mutual understanding on the part of the employer and employee may lead to smooth working and the best economic interest of each obtainable under the system, yet it can never be said that the interests of employer and employed are absolutely identical."
- 53.) "Conference on Conditions in Cocoa and Chocolate Industry 1917-1918." The Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers' Sub-Committee Report, 29.1.1918, was based on George Cadbury Jnr.'s notes, but the paragraph was deleted in which he wrote, "the interests of employers and employed are in some respects opposed."
- 54.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments. op cit.*, p.272.
- 55.) Edward Cadbury, "Scientific Management." *op cit.*, p.19.
- 56.) *ibid.*, p.8.
- 57.) Nadworny, *op cit.*, p.25.
- 58.) *ibid.*, p.25.
- 59.) Edward Cadbury, "Scientific Management." *op cit.*, p.47.
- 60.) G.D.H. Cole in *Scientific Management. ibid.*, p.37.
- 61.) Gardiner, *op cit.*, p.95.
- 62.) C.f. Littler, *op cit.*, pp.83-84, who takes on board this exaggeration.
- 63.) Edward Cadbury, "Scientific Management." *op cit.*, p.18.
- 64.) *ibid.*, p.17.
- 65.) S. Lewenhak, *op cit.*, pp.124-125.
- 66.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments. op cit.*, p.270.
- 67.) Lewenhak, *op cit.*, p.125.
- 68.) Edward Cadbury *Experiments. op cit.*, pp.159-160.
- 69.) J.A. Hobson in *Scientific Management. op cit.*, p.36.
- 70.) *ibid*, pp.36-37.
- 71.) Taylor, *op cit.*, p.121.
- 72.) Prosser, *op cit.* p.83, c.f., pp.35-36,53,59,73,75, for his warnings about the danger of rate-cutting becoming associated with: the Halsey Premium; the Cost Premium; the differential piece-rate; Scientific Management; and the Emerson Efficiency Bonus.

- 73.) *ibid.*, p.59.
- 74.) *ibid.*, p.77.
- 75.) *ibid.*, p.77.
- 76.) G.W.C. Min 8189, 26.6.1912, discussion of a letter from the Factory Inspector.
- 77.) G.W.C. File 11.1.1912, Report from Sophia Pumphrey, head forewoman since 1903, "Heating in the Card Box Room."
- 78.) c.f., D.F. Stanes, *The Employment of Women in Supervisory and Managerial Positions in the cotton, clothing, biscuit and cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery industries in England*. MSc. (Econ.) London, 1955, p.44.
- 79.) G.W.C. Min8411, 7.5.1912.
- 80.) Board Min, 825, 29.10.1912.
- 81.) Board Min 722, 24.9.1912.
- 82.) Board Min 240, 24.3.1915.
- 83.) Board File re. Min 722, 24.9.1912.
- 84.) Board File re. Min 825, Oct. 1912.
- 85.) Board File re. Min 914, 26.11.1912.
- 86.) Board Min 898, 19.11.1912.
- 87.) Board Min 724, 24.9.1912, perhaps significantly this was the same meeting at which it was decided to introduce the "Piece Rates Wages Department."
- 88.) Board File re. Min 829, 19.11.1913, Works Organisation Department Reportt, 10.11.1913, J.E. Bellows.
- 89.) J.E. Bellows, Board File re. Min 828, 19.11.1913, "Works Organisation Department Report." 10.11.1913.
- 90.) Board Mins: 132, 18.2.1914; 175, 4.3.1914; 8, 6.1.1915.
- 91.) Prosser, *op cit.*, Preface, "The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Mr. J.F. Whiteford, Mem. Am. Soc. Mech. Engrs., for the loan of much literature relating to American systems."
- 92.) Navin, *op cit.*, pp.318-320,607; Littler, *op cit.*, p.203.
- 93.) Board File re. Min 828, *op cit.*
- 94.) *ibid.*, p.2.

95.) *ibid.*, pp.2-4,6.

96.) Board File re. Min 207, *Daily Herald* cutting, 3.3.1913; letter from Q Block, 6.3.1913.

97.) in *Scientific Management*. op cit., p.38.

98.) Littler, op cit., p.95.

99.) J.A. Hobson, "Scientific Management." in *The Sociological Review*. Vol.VI, No. 3, pp.197-212, July 1913.

100.) Nelson, *Frederick Taylor*. p.20.

101.) *ibid.*, p.17.

102.) Braverman, op cit., p.87.

103.) A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. 1971, p.310.

CHAPTER 6: THE WORKS COUNCILS.

1.) *B.W.M.* Dec. 1918, pp.281-289.

2.) *B.W.M.C.* "Reports in Preparation of the Men's Works Council, 1917-18." Item No. 2, Foremen's Conference, 31.10.1917.

3.) "Reports in Preparation." *ibid.*, Item No. 4, Letter from the Secretary of Foremen A to George Cadbury Jnr., 27.11.1917; Item No. 5, Report of adjourned Foremen's Conference, 27.11.1917.

4.) "Reports in Preparation." *ibid.*, Item No. 2, p.6.

5.) "Reports in Preparation." *ibid.*, Item No. 5, p.5.

6.) *ibid.*, pp.8-9.

7.) "Reports in Preparation." *ibid.*, Item No. 32, *B.W.M.C.* Report for the period 21.11.1918 to 31.12.1919, the first year. This "democratic element" is alluded to in Cadbury Brothers' pamphlet, *A Works Council in Being*. 1923, p.5; c.f., Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury*. op cit., p.115.

8.) "Reports in Preparation." Item No. 1, *The Whitley Report*. No.1, *Industrial Councils*. The Ministry of Labour, 1917; Items Nos. 11 & 12, George Cadbury Jnr.'s suggestions to the first meeting of the Drafting Committee, 9.2.1918; *B.W.M.* Feb. 1918.

9.) "Reports In Preparation." Items 8 & 9: Notice to workers to elect a Drafting Committee; results of the election. n.b., three of those appointed on to the election committee by the firm were actually elected by the workers on to the Drafting Committee.

10.) *ibid.*, Item No. 10.

- 11.) *ibid.*, Item No. 25, Drafting Committee Minutes, 6.5.1918.
- 12.) *ibid.*, Item No. 21, *B.W.M.* July 1918, pp.158-166.
- 13.) The M.W.C. had already considered the report of its own Staffing and Rules Sub-Committee on 11.9.1917, when it corresponded with the G.W.C. about the Card Box Committee. M.W.C. Min 1330, 1.10.1917, report received from the G.W.C. showing the work of the Card Box "Shop Committee."
- 14.) M.W.C. File, 1917, Min 1330, 1.10.1917.
- 15.) M.W.C. 11.9.1917, *op cit.*
- 16.) M.W.C. File re. Min 1495.
- 17.) "Reports in Preparation." Item No. 8, *op cit.*
- 18.) M.W.C. File, M.W.C. Annual Report 1917.
- 19.) "Reports in Preparation." Item No. 25, Drafting Committee Minutes, 2nd or 9th of Feb. 1918.
- 20.) *A Works Council in Being.* *op cit.*, p.3.
- 21.) Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury.* *op cit.*, p.115.
- 22.) Conference on Conditions of Employment in the Cocoa and Chocolate Trade, 6.12.1917, p.1.
- 23.) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 24.) *ibid.*, informal meeting of Trade Unions and Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers Representatives, 18.12.1917.
- 25.) *ibid.*, meeting of the four manufacturers, 18.12.1917.
- 26.) *ibid.*, Meeting of Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers' Representatives from 20 firms, plus the Manufacturing Confectioners' Alliance, 10.1.1918., pp.6-7.
- 27.) *ibid.*, p.8.
- 28.) *ibid.*, Meeting of the Committee of the Cocoa and Chocolate Manufacturers, 29.1.1918; 7 reps from the manufacturers, 3 from the Manufacturers' Confectioners' Alliance, 2 from the Food Manufacturers' Fed'n, and 1 rep a member of both the Alliance and the Fed'n.
- 29.) *ibid.*, pp.4-5.
- 30.) *The Whitley Report.* No. 1, *op cit.*, p.3.
- 31.) *ibid.*, p.4.

- 32.) Board Min 616, 10.7.1918, *Directors Annual Statement, Report for the Year 1917*. "a confidential statement to the Sales Committee, Men's and Girls' Works Committees, and the Buying Committee." p.6.
- 33.) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 34.) *ibid.*, p.1.
- 35.) Edward Cadbury, *Experiments*. *op cit.*, e.g., p.122, the Workmen's Compensation Act, *Cadburys* did not make use of the clause allowing employers to refuse payment for the first week of illness. p.239, the Works library.
- 36.) *ibid.*, pp.266-267.
- 37.) *Directors' Annual Statement 1917*. *op cit.*, pp.12-13, quoted from a contribution by Edward Cadbury to the *New Age*. [?]
- 38.) *Whitley Report*. No. 1, *op cit.*, p.5.
- 39.) "Reports in Preparation." Item No. 25, Drafting Committee Minutes first meeting, 2.2.1918.
- 40.) *ibid.*, p.3.
- 41.) *B.W.M.* March 1918, pp.58-63, "The New Year Gathering."
- 42.) *M.W.C.* Min 948, 9.7.1917.
- 43.) *M.W.C.* 1917, Report of the Staffing and Rules Sub-Committee 19.7.1917.
- 44.) *M.W.C.* Min 1639, 3.12.1917.
- 45.) *M.W.C.* Min 1683, 10.12.1917.
- 46.) *M.W.C.* Min 1723, 17.12.1917.
- 47.) *M.W.C.* Min 1764, 31.12.1917, the note from the Board read, "Men's Works Committee's recommendation is approved that the shop steward movement be recognised throughout the Works." George Cadbury Jnr. read out a letter from the convenors of the Bournville shop stewards' meeting, "asking that the movement should be extended to the whole Works, and it was AGREED that this, together with a report on this movement from the *Birmingham Daily Post* of Dec. 22nd. should be referred to the Staffing and Rules Sub-Committee."
- 48.) *B.W.M.* Jan. 1918, pp.25-26, "The Shop Steward Movement. Recognition by the Firm."
- 49.) *ibid.*, p.26.
- 50.) E. Wigham, *Strikes and the Government 1893-1981*. 1982, p.44,

- 51.) *B.W.M.* March 1918, pp.73-74, "The Shop Steward Movement."
- 52.) Conference on Conditions in Cocoa and Chocolate Industry 1917-18. op cit., meeting of the committees of the Cocoa and Chocolate, and Confectionery and Jam Manufacturers, with Mr. Clay and Mr. Heath of the Ministry of Labour, 4.3.1918.
- 53.) "Reports in Preparation." op cit., Item No. 17, *Notes for Trade Unionists on the Whitley Report*. National Guilds League, London 1918, G.D.H.Cole et al., pp.3-4.
- 54.) *ibid*, pp.6-8.
- 55.) Sidney Webb, *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions*. 1917, p.93.
- 56.) Board File re. Min 431, 1913, position as on 10.5.1913.
- 57.) *B.W.M.* Feb. 1918.
- 58.) "Reports in Preparation." op cit., Item No. 7, J.T. Murphy, *The Worker's Committee: An Outline of Its Principles and Structure*. Sheffield 1917, stamped on the front cover, "Stirchley Labour Church meets Sunday 6.30 p.m. Stirchley Institute."
- 59.) *B.W.M.* April 1918, pp.91-92, "The Shop Steward Movement."
- 60.) "Reports in Preparation." op cit., Item No. 11, 9.2.1918, pp.3,4.
- 61.) *B.W.M.* Feb. 1918, H.J. Morcombe, "The Shop Steward Movement. Further Progress."
- 62.) *B.W.M.* May 1918, pp.115-117.
- 63.) *ibid.*, pp.116-117.
- 64.) M.W.C. Min 915, 15.7.1918, the wording of this minute suggests that George Cadbury Jnr., was the mover. *B.W.M.* Aug. 1918, p.195, "Trade Union Notes." H.J. Morcombe, massmeeting of employees held Sat. 29.6.1918, decided to set up a Vigilance Committee with 7 members, "to deal with the troublesome questions that cluster round the forcible transfer of men from industry and the putting of other men into their places."
- 65.) "Reports In Preparation." Item No. 18, Notice to Shop Stewards from H.J. Morcombe, the Convenor, of Stewards' Meeting 10.5.1918, in order to go through the nearly complete proposals of the Drafting Committee.
- 66.) "Reports In Preparation." op cit., Item No. 23, report of conference, 31.8.1918, with delegates from trade union District Committees, p.1.
- 67.) *ibid.*, pp.2-3.

68.) *ibid.*, p.7.

69.) *B.W.M.* Oct. 1918, also "Reports in Preparation" *op cit.*, Item No. 22, "General Outline of Shop Committees and Works Council." Report of conference with trade unions represented at Bournville, 11 unions attended, the scheme was given approval and best wishes for it were expressed. One of only two suggestions made was, "that a clause be inserted in the book of rules stating that both the Directors and Drafting Committee preferred that the workers' representatives should belong to Trades Unions."

70.) "Reports in Preparation." *op cit.*, Item No. 33, *Powers and Functions.*, also in the front of Vol. 1, *B.W.M.C. Mins* Nov.1918-Dec.1919.

71.) "Reports in Preparation." *op cit.*, Item No. 23, p.3, Trade Union delegate and local councillor, Saunders, was pleased that the Workers' Representatives and the Firm's representatives could meet separately if they wanted to.

72.) *B.W.M.* July 1918, p.162.

73.) *B.W.M.C.*, 6.1.1919.

74.) *ibid.*, 3.2.1919.

75.) *B.W.M.C. Workers' Representatives' Minutes*, 1930, Report by H.J. Morcombe on points raised during 1929.

76.) British Cocoa & Chocolate Company, [*Cadburys* and *Frys*] Joint Board File re. Min 260, the Agreement was to come into force on and from 2.6.1919, but the Joint Board decided to operate it on and from Monday, 19.5.1919.

77.) Wigham, *op cit.*, pp.42,45.

78.) *B.W.M.C.* 29.11.1918, 6.1.1919.

79.) *B.W.M.C.* 23.6.1919.

80.) *Workers' Reps' Minutes*, *op cit.*, 1930, Piece Rates & Grading Committee, Amended Powers and Functions 1929.

81.) G.D.H. Cole, *Workshop Organisation*. 1973, (first published 1923), pp.58,64.

82.) Interview with Ted Smallbone, 1987.

83.) *B.W.M.C.* 5.2.1920.

84.) *B.W.M.C. Special Committee Report No. 2*, 12.4.1920.

85.) *Workers' Reps' Mins*, *op cit.*, 1924. *B.W.M.C.*, Joint Meeting, Men's and Women's Workers' Representatives from the Groups covered by the

Piece Rates & Grading Committee, Piece Rates and Timing of Operations guidelines submitted to B.W.M.C. 18.4.1921.

86.) Sidney Webb, *The Works Manager Today*. 1918, p.65.

87.) Littler, op cit.

88.) G.D.H. Cole, op cit., p.119.

89.) *B.W.M.* Feb. 1930, pp.63-65, "The I.I.R.C."

90.) The Labour Research Department, *Monthly Circular*, III, 6, 1.12.1918, quoted in J.T. Ward, & W. Hamish Fraser, (eds), *Workers and Employers, Documents on Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Britain since the Eighteenth Century*. 1980.

91.) Wigham, op cit., pp.44-45.

92.) Birmingham Public Libraries, *The Nine Days in Birmingham*. 1976, pp.31-32,40.

93.) J. Branson, *The General Strike at Cadburys 1926*. B.A. dissertation, Birmingham University, 1976, p.47.

94.) *B.W.M.C.* Min 274, 17.5.1926.

95.) *B.W.M.C.* 2.12.1925, Rules & Discipline Committee Report.

96.) *B.W.M.C.* Min 274, op cit.

97.) Interview with Howard Smallwood, *B.W.M.C.* Secretary, 1937-1960, and T.G.W.U. Bournville Works branch Secretary 1935-1960.

98.) *B.W.W.C.* Min 500, 26.9.1924.

99.) see, Smith, Child, & Rowlinson, forthcoming, *Innovations in Work Organization: The Cadbury Experience*.

CONCLUSION.

1.) Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. op cit., p.ix.

2.) Ernest Mandel uses the concept of "production sites" in his theory of technological revolutions. Partly by this he is able to avoid collapsing "scientific and technical invention and discovery" into "technological innovation." The former he allows a relative, if declining, autonomy. He does not resort to a highly deterministic view of basic science because he does not link it in a simple and mechanical way to productive technology. (*Late Capitalism*. 1978, pp.248,256.)

New machines require "production sites" to be created for them before they can be used. These "production sites ... imply long-term possibilities for the expansion of newly accumulated capitals." In this way Mandel includes the structure of capital as an ingredient in a

technological revolution. The downward phase of the long wave creates production sites for new technology, "only small and adventurous capitals condemned to experiment - in other words, to fall short of full valorization, will dare to venture into 'new realms' of energy and motive machinery." (*Late Capitalism*. p.119.)

Mandel does not develop his concept of a "production site" beyond this, and it has many weaknesses left as it is, as if a site were objectively identifiable from the structure of capital alone. However, it could be argued that a potential production site is a relative concept, and that its realization will depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the technological innovation to be sited.

Mandel does attempt to include changes in labour organisation in his theory of technological revolutions, and he hints at the need to examine the dispersion of management techniques, such as Taylorism, when he says that, "their *experimentation* and initial introduction generally occur toward the end of an expansionist long wave, their *generalization* coincides with a depressive long wave." (*Long Waves of Capitalist Development*.1980.)

There does not appear to be any reason why the concept of production sites should not be developed to allow for the separation between social science concepts, and their application, in suitable production sites, as management techniques. The nature of each production site need not be identical and the criteria for their suitability could include the ideological disposition of the capitalists and their hegemony over the workforce, if the term had not been used to mean something completely different, these could be thought of as "ideological production sites". This would have to be developed further if it was to be of much use, and it is only put forward tentatively here. However, it does partly explain how *Cadburys* has been conceptualised for this thesis. And this thesis has tried to grapple with the same fundamental theoretical problem for Marxists as Mandel does albeit on a much vaster scale, in his treatment of long waves in capitalist development, because for Mandel it is essential to assume, "a *dialectic of the objective and subjective factors of historical development*, in which the subjective factors are characterized by *relative autonomy*." (*Long Waves*. p.49.)

3.) Melling, PhD thesis, op cit., Vol. 2, pp.13,245.

4.) c.f., Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. op cit., p.115, "While each firm acted independently, the handbooks suggest several common reasons for the introduction of welfare work."

5.) e.g., Littler, op cit.

6.) e.g., Dupont, in E. Dale, *The Great Organisers*. p.31.

7.) Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. p.163.

8.) J.A. Merkle, *Management and Ideology*. 1980.

9.) Melling, PhD thesis, op cit., Vol. 2, p.110.

10.) Pollard, op cit., p.226, c.f. E.P. Thompson, op cit., p.858.

- 11.) R. Bendix, *Work Authority and Industry*. 1974, p.49.
- 12.) Gilman, op cit., pp.61-62; Proud, op cit., pp.18-20; Curtis-Bennet, op cit., p.162.
- 13.) Child, *British Management Thought*. pp.35-36.
- 14.) Melling, PhD thesis, op cit., p.68.
- 15.) Board File re. Min 553, 1913, (see Appendix.)
- 16.) Nelson, *Managers and Workers*. p.163.
- 17.) *ibid.*, p.112.
- 18.) Stanes, op cit., p.44.
- 19.) R.C. Davison, *The Sociological Review*, April 1913, p.175.
- 20.) see *Industrial Record*. op cit., pp.78-79. G. Jones, "Multinational Chocolate: Cadbury Overseas, 1918-1939." *Business History*, March 1984; G. Jones, (ed), *British Multinationals: Origins, Management and Performance*. 1986.
- 21.) see D. Smith & Rowlinson, forthcoming, South West Birmingham Project Working paper; D.K. Channon, *Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise*. pp.170-171.

APPENDICES.

- 1.) G. Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-1979*. 1980, p.104.
- 2.) Board Min 387, 20.5.1914, Report for the Year 1913, p.2.
- 3.) Board File re. Min 787, 1915; re. Min 772, 1913; also Board File 1911 for wages 1908-1911.
- 4.) B.L. Hutchins, *Women In Modern Industry*. 1978, (first published 1915.)
- 5.) Board File re. Min 553, 1913, Minutes of Evidence by Barrow Cadbury to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service.

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