

BRITAIN AND THE PACIFICATION OF THE LEBANON 1841-5

With the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria in 1840, and the signing of the Straits Convention in July 1841, there comes a period of relative quiescence in the Eastern Question. The restored province provided a constitutional problem which took five years to solve.

Prior to the Ibrahimian occupation, Lebanon had been governed by a local family and was virtually independent of the Porte, but the Shehab prince, the Amir Bashir, had traitorously supported the rule of the Egyptians. After the Egyptians had been driven out, Turkey resolved to improve her hold on the Syrian pashaliks and in particular, on the autonomous province of Lebanon. The Amir Bashir was deposed.

By nature of the promises made to the sects of Lebanon during the 1840 fighting, that their loyalty to the sultan would be rewarded by an improved administration and the recognition of their traditional liberties, the Turks committed themselves to a greater extent than they would have wished, but since the powers who ejected Muhammad Ali had allowed their military commanders to be the bearers of the Turkish promises, they took it on themselves to see these promises honoured, and Turkey found it difficult to evade her obligations. The promises included the right of the Lebanon to select its own prince, and to have its own administration.

England assumed a pre-eminent influence in local affairs by virtue of her leading part in the military operations of 1840, and Palmerston was not inclined to surrender it to France, who by nature of her centuries-old religious link with the biggest sect in the Lebanon - the Maronites - had customarily wielded the greatest, and indeed the only, European influence in Syria. France, readmitted to the concert of powers, set about the recovery of the influence she had forfeited by a too exclusive advocacy of Muhammad Ali. Palmerston reorganised his consular service, appointed a "purely political" consul-general, and might even have set up a

counterbalance to the Franco-Maronite liaison by establishing relations with the most warlike of the sects, the Druses. But in August 1841 the Whigs fell from office.

Russia acted with Britain in an effort to preserve the Anglo-French rift, Metternich tried to balance, and Aberdeen attempted to bring the western powers together again in a second entente. But in Syria, as in their Mediterranean and colonial policies, Britain and France were on divergent courses. Canning, who replaced Ponsoby at the Porte, was largely responsible for the successful implementation of the promises Turkey made to the Lebanon, and the consular corps in Lebanon supervised their operation. The restoration of the Shehab family in the person of a septuagenarian nephew of Amir Bashir was not a success and in 1842 he too was deposed by the Turks. The European representatives fought for the legitimist principle but the Shehabs had no competent scion to offer. The Turks tried to take this opportunity to establish direct rule, but again Europe intervened. The separatism of the sects, and in particular of the Druses, rendered a unified administration impossible, and two civil wars proved the point.

Europe was obliged to forsake schemes of a united Lebanon under a Christian prince and to set up separate Maronite and Druse administrations in 1843, and the system endured until the twentieth century. Austria and France had been party to the efforts to secure a single regime for the Lebanon but when this proved impracticable they would not coerce the Turks to establish a dual system which would reduce Catholic influence. They accused Britain of complicity in the civil wars, and hindered Canning's efforts to effect the dual system of administration. After two more years of wearying negotiation he brought the system into working order, largely with Russian assistance.

French archives on Syria are closed, but the P.R.O. material is very full and there are copious Blue Books; the Aberdeen papers, contemporary memoirs and private papers throw light on a period which history has labelled, paradoxically, as the entente cordiale.

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
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CHAPTER I.

There exists a tendency, and it is an understandable one, to regard the close of the era of Egyptian rule in Syria as the end of yet another chapter in the Eastern Question. It is understandable because the events of 1832 and 1841 exhibit a certain finality, but it is by no means an entirely correct notion, for it ignores a continuity of the few years subsequent to the Straits Convention with the two, perhaps the ten, that had gone before. The Egyptian occupation, the disquieting concession which Turkey had made to Russia in 1833, and the isolation of France from the concert of powers, all came to an end in 1841, but other things remained not just as reminders of the past, but as positive forces to affect the trend of future events, and the relationships in which the powers stood to one another in Eastern affairs during these years. These forces, positive yet largely unseen, took such form as a mutual distrust on the part of England and France which the uneasy entente of Aberdeen's and Guizot's creation could never quite dispel, a determination on the part of Russia to maintain the schism between the western powers which had begun to appear before 1834, a suspicion

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in England that France had not abandoned the wide horizons of Bonaparte, and a desire -- almost an idée fixe -- on the part of Metternich to restore equilibrium in Europe by facilitating the return of France to the bosom of the nations. A brief retrospective survey of what has come to be called the Muhammad Ali era will give some idea of the way in which such forces germinated and grew.

From the moment of his invasion of Syria in 1832, Ibrahim Pasha could count on the sympathetic backing of French opinion, for in that country there persisted "a vague notion of the interests of France being compensated for the advantages which Great Britain derives from India, by the permanent dominion of French influence in Egypt, whether by the stratageme of diplomacy or by war."⁽¹⁾ The sentimental inclination towards Egypt and its ruler had quite recently induced Polignac to think seriously of calling Muhammad Ali to help in the reduction of Algiers, and of compensating him territorially for his assistance. With the triumphant march of the Egyptian army to the borders of Turkey itself, Varennes, representing the Pasha's friend among the European powers, tried to secure

(1) Madden, Egypt Mehemet Ali, London (1841) p. 102.

from the Porte, an acceptance of French mediation. His efforts to this end caused both Stratford Canning and Mandeville great annoyance, ⁽¹⁾ but the appearance of the Russian envoy Muraviev at Constantinople, his audience with the Reis Effendi on December 23rd, 1832 and with the Sultan on the 27th, and above all, the undisguised fact that Russia intended to obstruct the pasha by a direct warning to Cairo, threw Mandeville and the French chargé d'affaires into temporary agreement.

Varennés' efforts at mediation were temporarily forgotten in the endeavours to prevent Turkey falling entirely beneath Russian influence. Palmerston, unfortunately, was not, as yet, in a position to undertake prompt action as Broglie was. So, just as he had rejected the Sultan's formal request in October for naval assistance, for reasons he never explained satisfactorily, now he was content to move Ponsonby to Constantinople, and Campbell to Egypt as consul-general where he was to communicate "freely and confidentially" with his French and Austrian colleagues. (2)

(1) Mandeville to Palmerston Separate of Sep. 26, 1832, F.O. 78/213. Used by Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, London [1912], pp. 151, 155.

(2) Goriainow, S. M., Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, Paris [1910] pp. 27, 48.

The Russians won the contest against the French and the British at Constantinople. Varennes failed to arouse any spirit of conciliation in Ibrahim who waited at Konya for the order to advance. Muhammad Ali alone could call the halt; Ibrahim was merely the instrument of his orders. Ibrahim had already told this to Duhamel, Muraviev's aide, and was not to be moved by French pleading after having weathered Russian threats. Ibrahim's resistance to menace and solicitation alike, Palmerston's indecision and Metternich's confidence in the disinterestedness of the Czar,⁽¹⁾ drove the Sultan to accept, much against his will, the assistance Russia had persistently offered him. By February 1833, Muraviev the Russian envoy was back from a visit to Egypt, Muhammad Ali having promised that his troops, for

(1) Metternich knew of the decision, made in Council by the Czar on Sept. 16, 1829, whereby Russia gave an entirely new complexion to her Turkish policy. For the new policy of restraint see Kerner, R. J., Russia's New Policy in the Near East after the Peace of Adrianople *Camb. Hist. Journal*, [1937], p. 280, Temperley The Crimea, London [1936], p. 57. Also Marten's Traité conclus par la Russie, St. Petersburg [1838] IV., p. 437. For Palmerston's strictures on Metternich see Baker, Palmerston on the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, E.H.R. Vol. 43, [1928], p. 83. In the despatch, (No. 23 of Dec. 6, 1833 F.O. 78/220) which Baker gives in full, Palmerston complains "The real interests of Austria and Great Britain in this matter are the same; ... But Austria seems to have abandoned, on this subject (the prevention of Russia pushing her advantage) her antient and natural policy."

the time being would not advance beyond Kutaya. Taking their swiftly-vanishing opportunities, the British and French representatives tried desperately to delay the acceptance of the Russian offer of succour. They were powerless, and on February 20th nine Russian vessels dropped anchor at Buyukdere. For England and France, the worst had come to the worst.

Roussin, who got to Constantinople on February 17th (1) as French ambassador, was in time for the symbolic scene, and even made two last despairing efforts to induce a withdrawal; in the first place he threatened to leave the Porte if the Russian admiral was not ordered out within twenty-four hours (a haut ton with which Mandeville was disinclined and unauthorised to associate); in the second, by guaranteeing that Muhammad Ali would accept the terms Turkey had originally offered. Unfortunately for Roussin, Muhammad Ali contemptuously rejected the offer of South Syria a second time, and Ibrahim was told to advance; in the ensuing panic at Constantinople Roussin advised entire

(1) Hall, op. cit., p. 158.

(1)
acquiescence on the part of the Sultan. The Czar was
angered by his conduct and Pozzo di Borgo's protest,
delivered in Paris against the ambassador, was supported by
Austria and Prussia.

With the retreat of Ibrahim behind the Taurus, Russia
was ready to withdraw her forces, and her influence was
supreme enough to have Roussin's application for French ships
to pass the Bosphorus rejected. Ponsonby took the view
that it was best to accept Russian professions of an early
withdrawal. On July 10th the Russian ships left, the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (2) having been signed on the 8th.

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- (1) Ponsonby and Roussin were supported by a number of Turkish
ministers who predicted that to accept Russian assistance
and defy Ibrahim would lead to rioting in the capital,
and great ill-feeling among the Sultan's subjects.
(Bolsover, "Lord Ponsonby," Slavonic Review, July
[1934], p. 99).
- (2) For the text of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi see
Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, London [1845] II,
pp. 925-8. The secret article is also printed. Pro-
fessor Temperley op.cit. rejects the views of Hall, (p. 165) and
Goriamow (p. 43) that the treaty gave Russia access
to the Mediterranean and quotes P. E. Mosely with
approval. Mosely, Russian Diplomacy and the opening
of the Eastern Question in 1838-9, Cambridge, Mass.,
[1934] p. 20 asserts that Russia's real aim was to
secure from the Porte recognition "of her paramount
interest in Turkey and of her previous right of
intervention."

Ponsonby and Roussin failed to prevent ratification, and Ponsonby was in favour of ordering Sir Pulteney Malcolm's squadron through the Straits. ⁽¹⁾ On August 27th Ponsonby protested against the Treaty and Roussin followed suit, but Turkey defended it on the basis that the separate clause did not close the Straits absolutely and that she retained a discretionary power in this respect. ⁽²⁾ Ponsonby was not persuaded that she had a say in the matter. The emergence of the full significance of Unkiar-Skelessi, and the supremacy of the Russian Butenyev drove the new ambassador to seek a counter poise in Muhammad Ali, and in his agitation he even made to his chief the startling suggestion that Muhammad Ali should march on Constantinople to anticipate the revolution about to break out, and replace the Sultan by a prince. The ratification of Unkiar-Skelessi, and the meeting of the European autocrats at Munchengratz which was believed to have devised a division of the Ottoman Empire, ⁽³⁾ caused considerable back-biting between East and West, and gave increasing weight to the

(1) Bolsover, op. cit., p. 101.

(2) Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 55 of Sept. 15, 1833, F.O. 78/224. Used by Bolsover, p. 101 and pp. 114-22

(3) Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, London [1874] II., p. 169. Martens, op. cit., IV., p. 445.

fierce Russo-phobia of the septuagenarian ambassador; Palmerston struck out, in words, against the "Apostolical and Holy Alliance abomination of the name of Canning," and in his turn effected the removal of the Lievens. (1)

From this time forward the Foreign Secretary foresaw that Turkey's future safety depended on the reduction of Russian influence at Constantinople, and this could best be effected by a strengthening of the Empire, of its internal organisation, and by an overhaul of the military forces which would in time relieve Turkey from the necessity of limping along on Russian crutches. The Sultan was bluntly informed that Muhammad Ali was to be preferred as ruler of Constantinople to one who allowed St. Petersburg to dictate his relations with the rest of Europe. (2)

The threat was not really necessary. The Sultan was only too ready to escape from Russian influence, and through Vogorides assured Ponsonby that the treaty of July 8th would become "merely paper" if the ambassador would help him

(1) Greville, Memoirs, London [1888] III, p. 90, May 27, 1834, The Times, May 23, 1834.

(2) Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 23 of Dec. 6, 1833. F.O. 78/220 Printed at length in Baker, Palmerston on Unkiar-Skelessi, EHR 43, [1928], p. 86

(1)
to achieve his independence. These first steps towards a restoration of Turkish confidence in the good disposition of Britain were probably effected without the knowledge of Butenyev. Vice-Admiral Rowley was ordered to be ready to enter the Straits should the Sultan call on him to do so, though it was not till June 1834 that he anchored in Vourla Bay with six sail-of-the-line.

Ponsonby's personal influence mounted steadily in the Turkish councils as, under instructions, he pointed out that it was Russia's interest to weaken Turkey, Britain's to strengthen her. This argument seemed to be confirmed to the Turks by the Russian refusal to give active support to an invasion of Syria, Unkiar-Skelessi only being for defensive purposes.

From 1834 onward Ponsonby systematically tried to bring Palmerston to favour a punitive campaign against Muhammad Ali to culminate in the interposition of some buffer territory between the domain of the Pasha and that of the Sultan.⁽²⁾ His fanatical hatred of the Pasha he tried,

(1) Ponsonby to Palmerston. Secret, Dec. 19, 1833, F.O. 89/225.

(2) Ponsonby to Palmerston, Secret, Sept. 15 1834, F.O. 78/238. See Bolsover, p. 110 for Ponsonby's efforts to embroil Britain and Russia at this period. Also Guichen, La Crise d'Orient de 1839 a 1841 et l'Europe, Paris [1931], Chapter I.

not without success, to transmit to London, and the Foreign Secretary believed that Egypt would have to be kept at bay if just to prevent Russia "rescueing" Turkey in more enduring style than she already had done. But Palmerston's methods of securing Turkish integrity were different from what Ponsonby would have wished, and though he often warned Muhammad Ali, he would not be drawn to attack him.

During the brief Peel-Wellington ministry, Ponsonby tried his tactics out again, and to get it to adopt an aggressive policy towards Russia. In his attempts to extract from the Turkish Council its interpretation of Unkiar-Skelessi, he was invariably countered by Butenyev. Turkey could not be got to concede that in any emergency, she would close the Straits impartially to all powers. Ponsonby seems in fact, to have really been angling for the opposite answer and this he claimed to get on December 29th, 1834, from the Reis.

Unkiar-Skelessi was "an offensive treaty against Great Britain."⁽¹⁾ But Wellington was not ready to be swept into hostilities with Russia, preferring to accept the Czar's avowal that Unkiar-Skelessi conferred no great military advantage on Russia, and he took the power of peace and war out of the hands of the ambassador by revoking Palmerston's discretionary

(1) Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 11 of Jan. 12, 1835.
F.O. 78/252 cit. in Bolsover, p. 107.

(1)
instruction to Ponsonby respecting Malcolm's squadron.

In April 1835 Palmerston was in office again, and Ponsonby returned to the attack, trying to increase the Foreign Secretary's fears of a Russo-Egyptian understanding for partition of the Ottoman Empire. He was assisted by David Urquhart, whose anti-Russian mania was being disseminated in England in newspapers and imaginative pamphlets. (2) Very naturally, the Czar retaliated. He would not release Turkey from her pecuniary obligations, and delayed the firmans for Chesney's expedition on the Euphrates. Ibrahim withheld the means of transport from the Levant coast to the river, from the members of the expedition. It seems too that the Russian consul in Egypt intrigued with Muhammad Ali to abort the expedition. Duhamel was alleged to have persuaded Muhammad Ali to bring to the notice of the Sultan, that actual annexation by Britain was always preceded by

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- (1) For Wellington's decision to revoke the "discretionary order" see Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, Cambridge [1938], p. 117. On his return to office, Palmerston left the revocation in effect, and ignored Ponsonby's tirade against the Duke's "fatal despatch" until May 1836 when it was renewed with limitations as to its use.
- (2) Bolsover, p. 107. Crawley, C. W., Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-40, Camb. Hist. Journal, [1929], p. 65, mentions other writers who supported Urquhart's efforts to rouse popular opinion. On Urquhart generally, see the Life by G. Robinson, London [1920]. Also Bolsover, David Urquhart and the Eastern Question 1833-37, Journal. Mod. History, December [1936], p. 444.

the growth of commercial enterprises. The Pasha wished to be persuaded to stop the expedition, but Ponsonby brought pressure to bear at the Porte and Chesney continued to survey the great river with the Sultan's firman.

In the more obvious deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations, the possibility of a rift between England and France was lost to view, and such a phenomenon only began to appear with the accession to power of Thiers in 1835. Broglie, and the Whigs and Tories alike in England, though they (1) failed to avert the disintegration of the Quadruple Alliance over Spain, had steered clear of such vexed questions as Algeria. Thiers acted with a disregard for tender consciences, reminiscent of Palmerston himself. He would not recognise the Sultan's claims to Tripoli or Tunis, prepared to attack the Bey of Constantine, and sent Hugon to keep the Turkish fleet out of the Bay of Tunis. At Cairo and Constantinople he initiated moves to give stability to the existing relations of Egypt and the Porte, and to confirm the territorial arrangement between them under a French guarantee; such activity Aston attributed to a desire for achieving swift popularity, and concerning which Campbell

(1) In September 1836 Palmerston told Granville to inform Molé "that we look upon France as backing out of the alliance as fast as she can, that we are sorry for it but wash our hands of the consequences." Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, London, [1874] II, p. 240.

could get no information out of de Lesseps in Egypt or Granville out of Paris. ⁽¹⁾ Though it did not lead to any material results, Muhammad Ali observed the growing divergence between the two powers in Mediterranean and Near Eastern affairs. Broglie, he noted, had along with the Doctrinaires, been opposed to the retention of Algeria. Not so Thiers. The British Foreign Secretary was more preoccupied with Muhammad Ali himself, and believed that of any, Russia was the most likely of the powers to cooperate with Egypt, in the retention of the status quo, if in nothing more ambitious. The reason did not lie in ignorance or a tendency to discredit the seriousness of French Mediterranean interests, so much as in the fear of Russia's far greater capacity to interfere with effect in the Levant by nature both of geographical proximity and military strength. While Thiers was trying to give some degree of permanence to the Kutaya settlement, Palmerston was realising its essential instability more and more.

"It seems to the British government that there can be no security for permanent peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, as long as they have both of them an army in Syria; for neither of them can look upon their present state of occupation as permanently satisfactory. Mehemet Ali has too much, not to wish for more; and the

(1) Hall, p. 227.

Sultan has lost too much to be able to sit down contented with his losses. Each party must therefore consider his present position in Syria as a starting point for an attempt to accomplish the object of his desire; the one to further encroachment on the Turkish Provinces; the other for the reconquest of Syria." (1)

The indecision of 1832 had given place to such emphatic opinions as this, and in such a struggle as he predicted the Sultan could not be allowed to sustain defeat.

Ponsonby made great use of the anarchic state of Syria under the Egyptians to show the absolute necessity of expelling Ibrahim, and at the same time that he manipulated all the information which came to him to prove the ruinous effect of the occupation on British trade, he continuously withheld from the knowledge of the Porte Palmerston's pacific advices, persuading the Sultan to wait a little longer before attacking Syria, until the Foreign Secretary could be brought into more belligerent mood. (2) But Palmerston stayed adamant, and would not support Turkish

(1) Palmerston to Clanricarde, No. 108 of July 9, 1839 FO 65/250, quoted in full in Temperley, op. cit., p. 90.

(2) Bolsover, Lord Ponsonby, p. 108.

aggression. Durham's ⁽¹⁾ reports of Russia's military dispositions on the Black Sea, and the perennial difficulties of the Circassian campaigns carried more weight than Ponsonby's talk of Russian designs, and it was typical of Palmerston that he tried to weigh Russia's potentialities for carrying out her supposed intentions. ⁽²⁾

The eclipse of the Sultan by the Pasha would have put a man at Constantinople capable of cementing the badly administered empire into an efficient despotism. In

- (1) The Earl of Durham had resigned from office when Palmerston refused to revoke the appointment of Stratford Canning to St. Petersburg, and according to Palmerston it was Durham who induced Ward to bring forward his appropriation resolution in May 1834, which led to the resignation of Stanley, Graham, Richmond and Ripon. (Bulwer, II, p. 1945) Durham was appointed to St. Petersburg on July 5, 1835, but as the consent of the Czar was obtained prior to submitting the appointment to the King there was, according to Lord Melbourne, "the devil to pay about this appointment." Durham resigned in the spring of 1837 and was invested with the order of the G.C.B. by the new Queen in June 1837. He was appointed high commissioner for "the adjustment of certain important questions depending in the provinces of Lower and Upper Canada" in 1838. See C. New, Lord Durham, Oxford [1929] Ch. XIV.
- (2) Palmerston studied "the military bearings of the geography of the Levant" with the assistance of Chrzanowski the Polish general, and achieved considerable familiarity with the subject. See Granville Papers, G.D. 29/14 Palmerston to Granville, July 8, 1839, in which the Foreign Secretary enlarges on the strategic importance of Diabekr to Turkey, and calls it "the central key of the whole of Asia Minor."

such a position Muhammad Ali's propensity for mischief would be very great. In command of both routes to the East, he could facilitate Russian expansion in Central Asia, and afford her riverine access to the Gulf. Alternatively, with a grip on Turkey and Syria, he and France could divide Tunis, Tripoli and Morocco, and between them possess half the Mediterranean coastline. As the friends of Muhammad Ali, the French might penetrate to the Middle East or down the Red Sea, using Syria as a springboard, for the memory of Napoleon and his grandiose schemes was always liable to tempt the French temperament east again. Whether the Pasha would be inclined to afford such facilities to his French friends and Russian neighbours was of course, another matter. But such possible consequences of a Turkish defeat had to be borne in mind.

Palmerston with his preference for the Euphrates route to India to the Red Sea route, could not see Syria in the hands of anyone who might be disposed to use it to Britain's disadvantage. For this reason he warned Muhammad Ali off an expedition to the Gulf via the Hijaz in 1838,⁽¹⁾ and off encroaching beyond Deir (Dayruz-Zur) towards Baghdad, and above all he forbade the pasha to declare his

(1) Temperley and Penson, op. cit., p. 126.

(1)
 independence. The route whose possibilities were still being estimated by the expedition on the Euphrates in the latter 1830's would take time to develop as a trade route, but it was ready-made for the passing of an army. Immediate possession gave immediate military advantage, and this was what Palmerston foresaw. Fears for the future derived colour from the happenings of the moment, in the Middle East. In Persia, MacNeill and the Russian Simonitch haggled for supremacy in the Councils of the Sha' and when the lord of Persia was urged to the siege of Herat in 1837 by Simonitch, he found the defence in the hands of an Englishman -- Eldred Pottinger. At Kabul a similar position pertained. Witkewitch, Simonitch's agent, was working on Dost Mahomed, and against Sir Alexander Burnes to join a

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- (1) Campbell to Palmerston No. 34 of May 20 1838 FO 78/312
 Campbell to Palmerston No. 33 of May 19 1838 FO 78/342
 Campbell to Palmerston No. 36 of May 25 1838 FO 78/342

Also Hall, p. 233. Palmerston's reply to Campbell's information that the pasha contemplated declaring his independence is in his despatch No. 21 of July 7, 1838. FO 78/343, and is printed in full in Temperley & Penson, op. cit., p. 124.

Cheshire, The Expansion of Imperial Russia to the Indian Border (Slavonic Review 1934) p. 22.

(1)
 Russo-Persian alliance. How seriously Russia took this activity scarcely matters. It was not the prelude to serious penetration into Northern India, but rather the response on her part to what was expected of her. The bogey of Russian activity was worth keeping alive at one moment, worth letting decline at another. In the remaining time before the outbreak of the Second Syrian War, Ponsonby maintained his old tactics of ignoring Palmerston's instructions. When Palmerston resisted the Egyptian declaration of independence, Ponsonby made no effort to dissuade the Sultan from his intention of invading Syria. Though Palmerston wanted Unkiar-Skelessi replaced by a five-power convention, (2) he was unwilling to consider drastic means.

(1) Bell, Lord Palmerston, London [1936] I, p. 266 and Chap. XIII. Temperley, *op. cit.*, p. 97. The notion that Britain should counteract Russian activity in Asia by some more active technique than the mere holding of the Sutlej and Indus was held by a minority of officers in India and at the Board of Control. The activities of these agents in Central Asia are treated in H. W. C. Davis, The Great Game in Asia, 1800-44, Raleigh Lecture 1926 (Proc. Brit. Academy XII). Amongst them they produced a number of enthusiastic but frequently misinformed books; A. Conolly, Journey to the North of India, London [1834], A. Burnes, Travels into Bokhara, London [1834], de Lacy Evans, The Designs of Russia, London [1828]

(2) Bulwer, Palmerston, II., p. 270.

He withdrew the squadron from Vourla, and Ponsonby saw
 his dreams of an Anglo-Turkish alliance fade away. ⁽¹⁾

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The concept of a Russo-English rapprochement at the expense of France was perhaps thought of at St. Petersburg as far back as 1833. ⁽²⁾ Russia's improving relations growing from small beginnings like the symbolic suicide of Witkewitch and the decline in activity in Central Asia after 1837, proceeded through bigger things like the visit of the Czarevitch in 1839 to England, to the great diplomatic triumph of Nesselrode and Brunnow. What Nesselrode saw was that, fundamentally, England was for the sultan and France for the pasha. Russia must profit from the

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- (1) The czar sought Ponsonby's removal as a danger to the peace of Europe, particularly after the "Vixen" incident at Soujouk Kalé, The Times Jan. 27, 1837 (Hansard XXXVI, 133, XXXVIII 621) Metternich thought Palmerston too tolerant of his "errements les plus extravagants."
- (2) Soon after Munchengratz, Nicholas discussed the Unkiar-Skelessi treaty at length with Bligh, showing an extreme desire to convince Britain of his pure motives. He was a "chevalier anglais" he said, and pointing to his star of the Garter, said "Honi soit qui mal y pense." cit. in Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, p. 168. Lord Durham did much by his personal popularity in St. Petersburg to reduce the tension which had resulted from the czar's refusal to accept Canning as successor to Heytesbury.

situation. Thus in April 1839 it was apparent to Ficquelmont the Internuncio, that,

"Une guerre telle que l'Empereur Nicholas reve, celle qui plait à son courage et excite le plus vivement ses passions, c'est une guerre de principes contre la France. Or, cette guerre est impossible, tant que l'alliance de la France et de l'Angleterre subsiste: il faut donc les séparer et attirer à soi l'Angleterre. Tel est le but instinctif non moins que le calcul raisonné de l'Empereur dans sa conduite avec l'Angleterre." (1)

Palmerston worked assiduously after 1833 for the regeneration of an economically sound and militarily capable Turkey. (2) While the process was coming along, the Pasha

(1) Guichen, op. cit., p. 52.

(2) For details see Rodkey, Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey 1830-41, Journal Mod. History, Part I in No. 4, Dec. [1929] p. 570; Part II in No. 2 June 1930 p. 193. In 1836 a military mission under Lt. Col. Considine and Captain Du Plat was sent to Turkey with 24 tons of British arms, models and drawings. (F.O. 78/299 Memorandum on arms and stores for Turkey and Persia, July 5, 1836). Du Plat carried out military surveys in the Balkans and the Archipelago. Palmerston was equally keen to exclude French officers from the Turkish service and would have preferred the employment of Prussians. (Palmerston to Ponsonby No. 121 of June 6 1838 F.O. 78/329). Most British missions were cut short by the Turks themselves. The most successful was that of Capt. Williams who set up the "artillery laboratory" at Tophana which endured until 1842.

and the Sultan were kept from coming to blows. Ponsonby was ordered to preserve passivity at Constantinople, and Muhammad Ali was warned against disturbing the peace. All the time, Palmerston urged "that wise system of organisation -- military, naval, financial, and administrative, (1) which could best be effected during the reign of peace." Turkish cadets were taken in to Sandhurst and Woolwich, Chrzanowski was sent to report on Asia Minor, and military and naval missions -- usually rendered nugatory by the Turks themselves -- were sent to Turkey to impart western techniques and demonstrate western equipment. Internal re-organisation was only less important. By August 1839, Palmerston wrote confidentially to Beauvale that if Turkey would only regularise her provincial administration, (involving as it did the better collection of taxes, payment and control of pashas, abolition of the sale of offices), if security of life and property could be guaranteed, "there would be an end of all the nonsense which people (2) talked about Turkey being in decay and falling to pieces."

The armament race between Turkey and Egypt began in 1838, between an aggressive Sultan, and a pasha victorious

(1) Palmerston-Ponsonby No. 40 of No. 4 1835, F.O. 78/251, quoted by Rodkey, op. cit. Part I, p. 57.

(2) Rodkey, op. cit., Part II, p. 202.

in his expedition to Najd. Muhammad Ali had managed to avoid conflict with Europe, and his ultimate downfall was to be due to a failure on his part to see that Europe would actively oppose him, if he went too far against the Sultan; he was optimistic that Europe could never agree.

While stopping short of an alliance -- Palmerston rejected Reschid's advances only months before the war broke out anew -- England embarrassed Muhammad Ali where and when she could. The Commercial Treaty of 1838⁽²⁾ was intended to be a limitation of his authority by obliging him to abolish monopolies which his sovereign had agreed to see swept away. Similarly he was told in January 1839 that any movement against Aden⁽³⁾ would be treated as an attack on a British

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- (1) Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 92 of April 22 1839 F.O. 78/355. For the more intimate details of Reschid's mission, see Temperley, The Crimea, p. 98.
- (2) Text of the Commercial Convention of Balta-Liman is in Hertslet, Complete Collection of Treaties [1840] Vol. V., p. 506. Bulwer's account of his own contribution to the drafting of the Convention (Life of Palmerston, II, p.257) differs considerably from his report of July 18, 1838, which is enclosed in Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 174 of July 25 F.O. 78/332. The latter report is nearer to the facts, and the former ignores the contribution of Urquhart.
- (3) Dodwell Muhammad Ali, Founder of Modern Egypt, Cambridge [1931] p. 149. Palmerston to Campbell, No. 18 of June 8, 1838 F.O. 78/343, in Hall 233. Aden was taken after a quarrel between the East India Company and its ruler, on Jan. 16, 1839, just as Muhammad Ali was defeating the Wahabi and becoming master of the Yaman and the Holy Cities. The timing was, of course, intentional.

possession. Furthermore the Pasha had been left in no doubt as to what line of action England would take should he try to separate entirely from his Sultan; she was not put off by offers of trade concessions or promises that as Kalif he would give England easy access to India, that he would fight Russia with her. Palmerston could not afford to take any chances. Muhammad Ali might do all he said, or he might do the opposite.

"The British Government speaks only for itself; but feels itself bound to declare to him (Muhammad Ali) that if he should unfortunately proceed to execute his announced Intentions; and if Hostilities should (as they indisputably would) break out thereupon between the Sultan and the Pasha, the Pasha must expect to find Great Britain taking Part with the Sultan in order to obtain Redress for so flagrant a Wrong done to the Sultan, and for the Purpose of preventing the Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; and the Pasha would fatally deceive himself if he were to suppose that any Jealousies among the Powers of Europe would prevent those Powers from affording to the Sultan, under such Circumstances, every assistance which might be necessary for the Purpose of upholding, enforcing, and vindicating his just and legitimate Rights." (1)

Before the clash of the rival armies at Nizib, Palmerston and Soult were in entire accord, but both the French

(1) Printed in full in Temperley and Penson, Foundations, P. 124, see p. 9 2.

navy and the lower chamber were infected with a desire to avenge old scores. ⁽¹⁾ When, after Nizib, news of the Collective Note of July 27th by which the representatives at Constantinople invited the Porte to withhold any decision on Muhammad Ali's demands without the advice of the European courts, was received in Paris, it was against the flow of popular opinion; in London and Vienna it was well received. The Turks were but too glad to put their destiny into sympathetic hands. Soult allowed Roussin to sign the Note believing that Russia would be isolated; ⁽²⁾ the latter was, however, quite willing to let Unkiar-Skelessi lapse, ⁽³⁾ and

(1) Revue des deux Mondes, 1er aout, 1852. L'Escadre de la Méditerranée. Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, Paris [1911-14], IV., p. 53 sqq.

(2) Guizot, Mémoires, Paris [1858] Pièces historiques, Soult à Bouquenev, 17 Juin, 1839.

(3) Temperley The Crimea p. 111 and 426 n. 167 quoting Guichen, op. cit., p. 62, who tells of an interview between Bourquenev and Palmerston in 1839. Palmerston said that in 1835 he had asked the Duke of Wellington's opinion "on the two possible systems of British policy," the opening of the Sea of Marmora to the fleets of all nations, or the closing against all fleets. Wellington responded promptly that in the former case Russia would be near her bases and resources, Britain would not. Britain ought therefore to adopt the second line of policy. Wellington seems to have urged Palmerston into the policy which he would have adopted, had he been uninfluenced.

to cooperate with Europe, and when this was understood in France, a sudden reticence to coerce the Pasha too harshly became noticeable. Soult had suggested Vienna as the seat of negotiation, under the impression that Russia would resist a conference. He now objected to the choice of Vienna strenuously. Bulwer reported that France would not go against Egypt until "the whole question-that portion of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia as well as that relating to Egypt and Mehemet Ali -- is decided." (1) France hesitated to enforce the return of the Sultan's fleet, and in Louis-Philippe's declaration that the Porte should give Muhammad Ali the conditions which would satisfy him Bulwer found an inconsistency which the French king only justified by the need of a peaceful solution of the crisis above all else. Soult told Medem that France would never coerce Muhammad Ali and Metternich observed that "England for an obvious interest wishes to reduce the power of Mehemet Ali, France for an interest equally clear wishes, if not to increase, at least to preserve, the Power of the Pasha."

It needed but the simplest wisdom to see that Russia might very well try to step into the breach which France was so obviously about to create. Ponsonby, ever suspicious

(1) cit. in Hall, p. 250.

wanted Turkey to avoid making any provocative moves lest these lead to trouble in which, he felt sure, that Muhammad Ali would appeal to Russia; but Brunnow was about to mitigate even Ponsonby's apprehensions.

The proposals which Brunnow brought to London on September 15th, 1839, involving a surrender of all that Unkiar-Skelessi had conferred, greatly surprised Palmerston. Brunnow proposed that England Prussia and Russia should coerce Muhammad Ali into accepting Egypt hereditarily. Russia would help by other engagements than Unkiar-Skelessi, which she would now let fall, and in its place accept "as a permanent principle and standing rule" the closure of the Straits to warships. ⁽¹⁾ Soult rightly thought that Palmerston would see the underlying intention, but did little to dissuade the Foreign Secretary from acceptance. All he would suggest was the restoration of Adana, while Muhammad Ali should keep Egypt, Arabia and Syria hereditarily. It was the Whig friends of France who stopped a breach with her for an agreement with Russia, and Sebastiani was offered Egypt, and the Acre pashalik without the fort. This evidence of weakening by the European representatives in London, added to the sudden departure of Brunnow, was

(1) Goriainow, p. 522 sqq.

thought to mean a breakdown of his mission, and induced a spirit of stubbornness in France. Soult said Muhammad Ali could not be expected to accept the Sebastiani offer. (1) Time, Soult believed, was on the Pasha's side, and as he was unwilling to go to extremes he avoided making any resolute stand on the Pasha's behalf. "In the French councils there is a mixture of positiveness and of vagueness, positiveness as to what will not be done, vagueness as to what may be done." (2)

The return of Brunnow (3) shattered French complacency for although Soult had consistently believed that Palmerston and Nesselrode would not agree, (4) there were indications that they were now going to do so. The French

(1) Guizot, Mémoires, IV., p. 365.

(2) Thus Bulwer to Palmerston, Oct. 4 1839. See Hall, p. 257.

(3) Russia deliberately protracted the negotiations, and on Feb. 14th, Brunnow wrote home "the best course for our plans is not to conclude, but to let negotiations drag on: the greater the delay, the more painful will be the relations between France and England." (Hasenclever, Die orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-41, Leipzig [1914] 122) quoted in Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, Cambridge [1930] p. 203.

(4) Guizot, IV., p. 367.

(1)

government was informed that negotiations were under way in London for the formation of an active alliance in support of the Ottoman Empire, and Palmerston told Neumann that should France stand aside he was willing to proceed without her. Sebastiani transmitted this news to Paris and the transmission is itself important when it is remembered how often after 1840 France waxed pugnacious over the way in which, as she alleged, Palmerston kept her in the dark until the moment he put a copy of the July 15 Convention into Guizot's hands.

In February 1840 Guizot replaced Sebastiani; the day after he got to London Thiers replaced Sault. Thiers was willing to maintain good relations with England if he could, and told Guizot to emphasise to Palmerston the nature of Russia's design. On the other hand he gave no indication of a willingness to moderate Muhammad Ali's territorial position; Guizot was to bring to Palmerston's notice the cost and difficulty of fighting Muhammad Ali, and the

(1) *Affaires étrangères*, 654, Angleterre, Sebastiani à Sault, janvier 5 1840 quoted in Hall, p. 258. Later Guizot told Cowley that "France would not have quarrelled about the treaty of 15th July if they had had fair warning that it would be signed without them if not with them." (Bulwer, Vol. 3, Appendix 3. Hobhouse to Palmerston, July 7 1843). Palmerston's demolition of this line of argument from the Blue Books is highly convincing, although the Blue Book in question is a drastic reduction of the original correspondence (Levant Correspondence, Part I, A and P 1st Session (1841) XXIX [322] and [304] 1 - 735). Professor Temperley comments that Blue Books are rarely so prominent for their revelation of the true sequence of events. See *The Crimea*, p. 430, n. 196.

danger of allowing Russia once more to come forward in a protective role in Turkey. ⁽¹⁾ Thiers, now minister, was confident enough of ultimate dissension in London to pay little heed to Guizot's intelligence that things were moving to a head, and certainly much of his confidence derived from the chronic state of disagreement and the treacherous conduct of English cabinet ministers and public men. ⁽²⁾ Ellice perpetuated Thiers' ideas in Paris. An offer of May 8, adding the Acre fort to the first offer was rejected. "We could not suggest it to Mehemet Ali; he would refuse it, and we could not refute his arguments." Through the agency of Coste at Constantinople Thiers tried to effect a settlement favourable to Muhammad Ali, and in Egypt Cochelet firmly supported the pasha in his refusal to lower

(1) Guizot, V., *Pièces historiques*, Soult à Guizot, février 19, 1840.

(2) Palmerston wrote later on: "The greatest difficulties I had to encounter in the whole transaction, arose from the unprincipled intrigues in our own camp." (Bulwer and Ashley's *Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston* London [1870-76] II, p. 323n). Lord Shaftesbury wrote: "Lord Holland writes to Guizot and tells him everything The Duc de Broglie writes to Lord Lansdowne and Lord Lansdowne writes to Broglie there has been foul intrigue to displace Palmerston." (in Bell, I, p. 308). See also *Lieven-Grey Correspondence* London [1890] III., 317. Of Ellice, Palmerston wrote to Granville, "I hear that Thiers says he has three agents upon whom he can rely -- Guizot, Flahault, and Ellice." (October, 1840, F.O. 27/600, quoted by Hall, p. 265). For Ellice's intimacy with Louis Philippe see *Creevey Papers*, London [1904], II., p. 309.

his terms. Coste⁽¹⁾ informed the Turkish Minister for Commerce that France alone of all the powers was not seeking for gain, and that she was strong enough to force her will upon Europe. England wanted Egypt and was trying to get Turkey to declare war on Egypt for this end, but it would be easier to give it to the Pasha temporarily than to see it pass into the hands of England in perpetuity. Syria could go to Ibrahim, Adana to a brother; when they began to bicker one with the other, as inevitably they would, Turkey could step in again. The dismissal of Husrev, Grand Vizier and Muhammad Ali's personal enemy, was now effected with the assistance of that friend of Thiers during an earlier ministry, the Sultana; Cochelet gave Muhammad the news first, and no obstacle seemed to remain in the way of a settlement involving the exchange of Syria for the captured fleet. Thiers told Guizot to keep the negotiation secret in London, but it got out,⁽²⁾ and Ponsonby

(1) An intimate of Thiers, "Your Lordship knows the intimacy which exists between M. Coste and M. Thiers and he undoubtedly does speak the sentiments of the President of the French ministry." (Ponsonby to Palmerston, Separate and Confidential, May 29, 1840 F.O. 78/394)

(2) Cochelet's confidential communication got into the hands of Apponyi, Austrian ambassador in Paris, who informed Neumann, who in his turn informed Palmerston.

was able to stop this collateral effort of the French government to effect a settlement which would, if completed, have presented Europe with a fait accompli rendering nugatory any further negotiation in London. Ponsonby persuaded Reschid and Fethi Ahmed to spoil the negotiation with Sami Bey, the Egyptian envoy, by threatening to resign, and Palmerston was enabled to use the French negotiation at Constantinople and Cairo as an additional reason in cabinet for protection of the young sultan.

The end of negotiation in London was in sight, the time for action drawing near, and for Guizot personally the failure of Sami Bey's mission had unpleasant repercussions. He felt a frigidity on the part of his colleagues, and noted Palmerston's sudden increase of activity. At this stage Guizot himself made what Major John Hall considers to have been his only blunder while acting for Thiers in London. Instead of interpreting the coldness of his colleagues at its face value, he persisted in the belief that France would not be left out of any negotiation. Certainly the cabinet was still making things difficult

(1) Hall, p. 273

(2) Hall, p. 276

(3) Hall, p. 274. Guizot concedes that he was misled at this stage of negotiations, in his Memoires, V, 218.

for the Foreign Secretary, and Palmerston in his turn was ready to resign if he could not carry the negotiations; the result would be the division of the Ottoman Empire into two parts "whereof one would be a dependency of France and the other a satellite of Russia."⁽¹⁾ The timely news of the Syrian revolt and the threat of Palmerston to resign led to the Convention for the pacification of the Levant of July 15, and the Foreign Secretary's final success over the dissidents of the cabinet. On July 17 Guizot was handed a copy.

The negotiations leading up to July 15 were, of course, unknown to the general public in either country, and remained so for a long time to come. To the diplomatists in London France had not been cheated, but merely outmanoeuvred; those who disliked the French connection were pleased but the men who took the longer view -- Peel, Wellington, Aberdeen, -- felt that the rebuff could have been more gentle than, in fact, it was. Reeve hoped that relations with France "would not be imperilled for the sake of a desperado like Mehemet Ali,"⁽²⁾ but there was ample evidence

(1) In Palmerston's letter to Melbourne offering resignation should the cabinet reject his policy. Bulwer, II, 356.

(2) Article in The Times, Aug. 3, by Reeve.

that the hope would prove vain, for the effects of the signing were very great in France. The publication of the news in Paris on July 27 could not but be a great shock to the average citizen ignorant of the tortuous precedents to the Convention. The effect was electrical; papers otherwise tolerant took on the tone more usually associated with the "National."

Thiers' response was to arm Guizot with a memorandum with which he was to beard the lion of the Foreign Office in his den.

"Treat Lord Palmerston as he treated you. Read out to him this written declaration. Question him boldly. Ask him whether he has any plans for helping the rising in Syria and what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha return a flat refusal to the Sultan's demands. Press him hard. Place him in the position of having to confess that he has acted in a very foolhardy fashion Be careful, however, to frame your questions in such a way that should he decline to answer them, you are not compelled to announce a rupture of relations. For the moment France must restrain herself." (1)

Palmerston was not the man to submit to being pressed hard or being forced into any sort of confession as Thiers wanted; he was firm though agreeable with Guizot, and confidently awaited further news from the East.

(1) Affaires étrangères, 655, Angleterre, Thiers-Guizot (undated), in Hall, p. 282.

Until such news came, the King and Thiers sat at Chateau d'Eu allowing their seclusion to be interpreted as injured innocence or silent menace. It was hoped, and with considerable justification, that Berlin and Vienna might hesitate to ratify the Convention; also that further trouble might arise in the English cabinet; should these things happen a five-power agreement might be reached guaranteeing Turkey on the conditions of Kutaya, or a mediation between Muhammad and the powers on the basis of the hereditary possession of Egypt, and of Syria during his lifetime, by Muhammad Ali.⁽¹⁾ Both schemes had at one time or another been scouted by France, and their resuscitation by Thiers, hinted at an incipient acceptance of a situation he could not alter; "We must see what England means to do before deciding what France shall do either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance of power;" Thiers had gone on the defensive. Momentarily, the progress of the Syrian insurrection faltered, and Paris hoped that Ibrahim might yet prove the master. The dissension in the cabinet flared up again, and Palmerston was prodded into answering Thiers' memorandum of July 21, explanatory of French policy. His answer was however, no more than an amplification of his memorandum of July 17

(1) Guizot, Mémoires, V., 271.

to Guizot. It ended with the hope that France would re-enter the concert after the treaty of July 15 had been executed.⁽¹⁾

In the Levant Stopford moved into action, having been warned by the Admiralty to look out for "any sudden movement of the French squadrons in consequence of orders which might be sent from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation."⁽²⁾ So far as Palmerston was concerned, there was little to fear. On August 15 Pontois got Cor to express to Reschid France's disapproval of the Porte having signed the Convention, and to tell him France intended to oppose the allies' actively. Cor also told the Russian minister that he regarded an Anglo-French war as inevitable. All ministers at Constantinople reported this home and Pontois had to disavow the indiscretion.

Nevertheless, September 1840 was the high-water mark of Parisian anger. The fortification of the city was begun, Thiers kept the company of impetuous journalists, and the old talk of a campaign au Rhin was again to be heard.⁽³⁾

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- (1) The reply was intended for publication and was more a justification of his policy, than a conciliatory explanation (vide "The Times" Oct. 7, 1840.
- (2) Stopford's orders and the details of naval activity are in Admiralty, I, 5503.
- (3) Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV., 242. Times, Sept. 1 1840.

The king vented his wrath on the Prussian and Austrian representatives in Paris, ⁽¹⁾ while the Duc d'Orleans adverted on the necessity of war. There were strikes, and in the streets stirring fragments of the Marseillaise were to be heard. In the midst of all this effusion of ill-feeling and violent intentions, came the test. In mid-month the Pasha invoked French protection and mediation, stating his willingness to surrender Crete, Adana, and the Holy Cities, and his desire to retain Egypt hereditarily, and Syria during the lifetime of Ibrahim; thus it was Muhammad Ali and not Palmerston who called France's bluff, and Thiers was given a last opportunity of breaking the treaty of July 15.

At home Russell had quickly repented of July 15 and Ellice was trying to cause a cabinet crisis in which Clarendon might replace Palmerston; ⁽²⁾ he corresponded with Russell and Melbourne, while Greville and Guizot had their heads together. "The Times" reported that "every transaction within the doors of the British council chamber was as well known

(1) Lloyd Sanders, Melbourne Papers, London [1890] p. 472.

(2) Thus Bulwer claims to have provided Palmerston with information picked up in Paris, which enabled the Foreign Secretary to prepare himself for a cabinet attack. (Bulwer, II, 343)

upon the bourse as in the deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall,"⁽¹⁾ and it is little wonder that Palmerston was not disposed to allow his colleagues to help him to make his decisions. Russell, who seemed most likely to rock the boat, and to open negotiations with France on Muhammad Ali's proposals, was brought into line by Queen Victoria's personal plea not to show ministerial weakness at this stage.

In the cabinet on October 10,⁽²⁾ two despatches from Thiers were considered. One -- that of October 3 -- was a wordy exposition of French conduct since the Collective Note of July 27, 1839; the second of October 8 dealt with the Sultan's deposition of Muhammad Ali from the government of Egypt. While prepared to leave Syria to the fortunes of war, France could not see the Pasha deprived of Egypt. French writers have subsequently made out that Thiers was here laying down a casus belli; but Thiers had in fact already been told by Granville that the deprivation was a means of coercion and not necessarily part of the final settlement.⁽³⁾ So Thiers merely "forced an open door."

(1) "The Times," Dec. 7, 1840.

(2) Hall, p. 305.

(3) The phrase is L. Véron's in his Mémoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris, Paris [1853-5] Vol. IV, 27. See Hall, p. 305.

The cabinet nevertheless ordered Palmerston to get the Pasha reinstated if he made an early submission.

Thiers left office when it became obvious that he must take some line of action commensurate with his past declarations. The King did not agree to all the passages which Thiers wrote for the Speech from the Throne, and on this score fell out with his minister who now gave way to the Soult-Guizot administration.

In the East, the myth of Egyptian power was dispelled by the Austrian and English naval squadrons, a handful of marines, a few thousand Turks, and the Lebanon in arms, in a matter of weeks. The Napoleon civil, as Metternich called Thiers, had hoped that a Russian army would be required in support of the naval squadrons but both Chrzanowski and Jochmus had observed that Nizib had not been easily won, and both thought that seapower would be the crucial factor by cutting communications with Egypt.⁽¹⁾ This was precisely what happened.

In France the Soult ministry had to shoulder the responsibilities which Thiers had found insupportable, and

(1) The decisiveness of sea-power in a contest with Egypt was also recognised by the aged oracle, the Duke (Temperley p. 91, 418 n. 131). Jochmus' opinions are found enclosed in Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 213 of Aug 12, 1839 F.O. 78/358, and Chrzanowski's plan of attack is enclosed in Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 205 of Aug. 7, 1839 F.O. 78/357.

it looked to the English government to consider its difficulties sympathetically and to realise how much its fate was in British hands. Palmerston was winning his battle and could afford to ignore the plea. His reply to Thiers' despatch of October 8 displeased Guizot by its uncompromising tone and its revelation that Muhammad Ali's future was being left to the Sultan alone, giving France no chance of gaining anything for him. By February 1841 the firman granting Egypt to Muhammad Ali hereditarily was sent from Constantinople, though to the last the Sultan tried to tie the Pasha down as much as he could. Palmerston and Ponsonby had not got the Pasha out of Egypt but, finding contentment in what was practical, had prevented Egypt's domination of the Levant. The powers, with the exception of Russia, were now ready for an amicable settlement with France whereby she would recognise what had been done without her, and in the same month that the Pasha received his firman, Bourqueney was invited to the Foreign Office for conversations with Palmerston. The signing of the Convention of the Straits on July 13, 1841 was the last major act of the Melbourne administration.

If the signing caused a release of tension on both sides of the Channel, it was no cause for rejoicing in France itself, and was looked on by many as an abandonment of a position which, while it was dangerously isolated,

was splendidly dangerous and popular with a large percentage of Frenchmen. In that position France stood forth bravely in the face of Europe for the right of the Pasha to keep what he had taken in contest from his sovereign -- the right, in fact, of revolution. The signing of the Straits Convention was interpreted as submission to the will of Europe and an abandonment of Egypt in the moment of her greatest need. Yet in spite of the furore, the ministry continued to get majorities in favour of its foreign policy.

The dark days of 1840, when the two nations came so near to war, when Thiers was demanding a revision of the 1815 settlement and Palmerston's colleagues were slipping one by one from his support, were the culmination of a process of estrangement which had been developing since Egypt first entered Syria; and while it was those days in particular which left their indelible impress on the minds of Frenchmen and Englishmen and which leapt to mind at any mention of Syria for years to come, that the two countries had been at odds in the Levant for many years past was little appreciated in diplomatic circles, and only realised, perhaps to some extent fostered, by the traders and merchants, the military observers, and the Urquharts who dwelt and travelled in the East.

CHAPTER II.

It was probably Napoleon who, more than anyone else, drove men to look for Syria on the map. Before the time it was submerged SYRIA IN 1840 in the

minds of commercial men and sailors, and even after 1840 Syria existed in its own right.

"Mount Lebanon, that great natural fortress between the Eastern and the Western world. ...it also has claims on England's watchful vigilance and sympathising care."

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Acres, he gave the Levant coast a new prominence in the eyes. England's Indian Empire had been built by

(1) A French politico-scientific mission to Greece in the 1820s, the parallelism by "discovering" that Napoleon had descended from an Imperial Italian, the Emperor Porphyrogeniti. (v. Miller, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1877, p. 107; Foxe, *English Historical Review*, 1877, p. 107.)

CHAPTER II.

It was probably Napoleon who, more than anyone else, drove men to look for Syria on the map. Before his time it was submerged within the Turkish Empire, except in the minds of commercial men and sailors, and French missions, yet after 1815 Syria existed in its own right, for though still part of the same empire and though its political status was quite unaltered, it had now a new significance which was quite its own, and which it had not possessed before. Napoleon had been so prodigious a success in the military sphere that when he said he would destroy Britain by attacking India, most people found it easy to believe him. He had marched armies across Europe with consummate skill; the comparison of his intended march to India with the expedition of Alexander the Great in the same direction was hard to escape. ⁽¹⁾ Napoleon allowed himself seventy days to reach India, and though, in practice, he did not pass Acre, he gave the Levant coast a new prominence in English eyes. England's Indian Empire had been built by sea-power

(1) A French politico-scientific mission to Greece accentuated the parallelism by "discovering" that Napoleon was descended from an Imperial family, the Kalomeri Porphyrogeniti. (vide Miller, Europe and the Ottoman Power, English Historical Review, XVI [1901], p. 452.

almost entirely, and was certainly held intact by it. The sea was not Napoleon's medium ⁽¹⁾ and by him the attacker's road to India was suddenly transformed from the high seas and the route round Africa to the overland routes across Syria to the Gulf. On the one England stood supreme, on the other she did not have a regiment. ⁽²⁾ As well as revealing to England the slenderness of the threads by which the Indian possessions were held, Napoleon also bequeathed to his own countrymen his vision of the tricolour waving along the land routes to, and actually in, India.

Yet if Napoleon was responsible for focussing attention on Syria by the determination with which he sieged Acre,

(1) Holland Rose, Napoleon and Sea Power, Camb. Hist. Journal [1924] p. 138 says: "It is clear that the influence of sea power aroused in him no living interest." Nevertheless the argument that he did not seriously contemplate invasion of England is inapplicable to so unconventional a man as he who madly dared and lost at Acre. He is not to be judged by conventional standards of tame probability. The final verdict seemed to be that Napoleon underestimated the power of an army based on a fleet, and failed to adapt his precise methods on land to the technique of improvisation so vital for success at sea. As Holland Rose says "The Napoleonic spirit and the sea spirit are incommensurable."

(2) Holland Rose, Political Reaction of Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition, E.H.R. [1929], p. 48.

prior to striking east towards Persia, he was not responsible for the beginnings of serious French interest in the Levant. The quarter of a century before 1800 was a period during which Englishmen in the Near East generally were already witnessing the growth of French commercial interests, particularly in Egypt, and were forecasting the growth of her political ambition in the future. By virtue of their exclusion from the Cape route, the French had often thought of "undoing their insular rivals by approaching India along the more direct overland routes."⁽¹⁾ Their designs were mainly built on a desire for commercial advantage and communication with their Indian possessions, and it was to a large extent their interest in Egypt and its route to the east that stimulated English interest in the same region.

Warren Hastings had a big part in establishing the "overland" route in the 1770's by sending exploratory missions into the Red Sea⁽²⁾ in the ships of the East India

(1) Hoskins, H. L., Overland Route to India in the 18th Century, History 9 [1924], p. 302. Dodwell, Muhammad Ali, Founder of Modern Egypt [1931], p. 6.

(2) Dodwell, op. cit., p. 56. Wood, A. C., A History of the Levant Company, Oxford [1935] p. 166. The shortest passage from London to Calcutta via the Cape was 150 days, but by Suez the time was cut to 63 days. (Hoskins, p. 312)

Company, and by making commercial agreements with the Beys of Cairo for the passage of goods to British vessels waiting at the quays of Alexandria. Baldwin too, ⁽¹⁾ helped to pioneer the route. As the Company's agent in Egypt he lost a fortune in the process of encouraging his superiors to use the route as a regular link between the United Kingdom and India. Much of the good was undone when, out of deference to the wish of the Sultan, an Act of Parliament of 1782 made the nascent Red Sea trade illegal. The French and Dutch now held the trade between them. At first British merchants could scarcely credit that the mere whim of the Sultan had been recognised by their government; Baldwin warned that "France in possession of Egypt, would possess the master key to all the trading nations of the earth she might make it the emporium of the world and England would hold her possessions in India at the mercy of France." ⁽²⁾ This state of affairs the English government seemed to have now brought upon itself, and

(1) George Baldwin, Levant Company factor in Cyprus and Acre 1760-68 appointed Consul in Cyprus 1771. Resigned in 1773 to promote the development of communications between Suez and India. He was consistently opposed by the Levant Company, and of course by the ambassador whose hands were tied by the Company. The arrival of the French provided the stimulus to the East India Company, and in 1786 Baldwin was appointed its agent in Alexandria. For details see Wood, op. cit., p. 168.

(2) Hoskins, p. 311.

except for the carrying of Company mail, the English flag was no longer seen at Suez.

The prohibition to trade in the Red Sea, however, did not last, nor did it mean the end of British interest in the region. In 1785 Ainslie, the British ambassador to the Porte, was at pains to prevent the success of French negotiations for Suez and Jiddah. The Porte rejected the French propositions, whereupon the French promptly switched pressure to Cairo where the Beys gave them exclusive trading rights in the Red Sea, though refusing to declare their independence under French protection. It was the beginning of transisthmian trade for France.

This state of affairs, so promising for France, did not last long, and Baldwin's anxiety was gradually calmed by the resumption of direct rule over Egypt by Turkey; Baldwin came back into his own as British consul in Cairo in 1786 to offset French influence as far as was possible, and to act in the dual capacity of postal agent and political observer, to ensure the passage of mails and "to watch the motions of the French, and their particular designs." His salary was made dependent on obtaining equal trading rights with the French, and Turkey was induced to allow a limited amount of trade to be restored to Britain in the Red Sea. Though limited by the agreement

with Turkey to carrying mail, the vessels were soon arriving at Alexandria and Suez with merchandise; French competition swiftly proved unequal to the struggle, and the East India Company even broke into the Mediterranean trade in open competition with all comers.

In the period to which he gave his name, Napoleon enlarged the boundaries of Anglo-French contact, notably in the lands beyond Syria. His persistence in trying to take Acre suggests its value to him, as well as the value of Bayrut and Alexandretta. In Persia England took counter measures against French agents trying to pull the Sha' to their side, and it was Malcolm's task "to counteract the attempts of these villainous, but active democrats, the French."⁽¹⁾ In January 1801, England and the Sha' signed an agreement for mutual aid in the event of an attack by France or the Afghans, and English influence lasted till 1808. Malcolm went on to Baghdad where he got the Turkish Pasha to organise his defences. "Thus under the stimulus of the fear caused by Bonaparte's eastern design, England succeeded in spreading her influence through the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, at the Court of

(1) Holland Rose, J., Political Reactions of Napoleon's Eastern Expedition, p. 56.

Teheran, and at Bagdad." (1) The French connection with the Maronite Christian population of Lebanon was of great potential value to her also, for Lebanon was a good spring-board for penetration into the Middle East. It was primarily a religious connection but now there were signs of it becoming a political one.

In England, there had never been a shortage of men willing to prove the value of Syria and the superiority of the Euphrates route to the east over the Egyptian route, and their arguments got additional weight in 1798-1801 when the route actually was used, with evident success, for the transmission of Indian mails. One of the stoutest advocates of the "alternative route," Barker the Levant Company's consul at Aleppo, stood forth for the route from Aleppo to Basra against the agent of the Company in Constantinople, Peter Tooke, who favoured a variation down the Tigris. The Company decided in favour of Barker, and would not close the Aleppo route finding it to be "safer, quicker and cheaper." Barker's appointment was confirmed and his salary increased. (2)

(1) Holland Rose, J., op. cit., p. 57. The French march into Syria led Lord Mornington to send Captain John Malcolm a mission from India to Teheran. Malcolm himself wrote that the aim of his mission was "to restore British trade in the Persian Gulf, to win over the Shah of Persia."

(2) Wood, A., Levant Company, p. 186.

The nearness of Lebanon to the "alternative" route and its own admirable position on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean raised a host of speculations and warnings. There was always the possibility that Napoleon's alliance with the Sha' might be renewed, though it was hoped that British sea power would again prove the deciding factor in any contest with France in the Levant.

"The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would be attended with great difficulties from the locality of the countries of its supposed invaders. In what would France find security for a free passage for her arms by land to India after the Russians were fairly possessed of Constantinople? and without such for many years subsequent to their invasion how could the French succeed in their gigantic, not to say romantic, project of attacking our Indian possessions by land? What advantages would not the English possess over the French, in a contest for Syria, by the priority of possession that our Navy could furnish the means of obtaining especially in a country so full of natural barriers Acre resisted 12,000 Frenchmen, when guarded by Turks, and two English ships companies; and there are many points in Syria more easily defended than St. Jean d'Acre." (1)

(1) Barker, Syria and Egypt under the last Five Sultans, London [1876] II, p. 53. Barker ignored the fact that the "points in Syria more easily defended than St. Jean d'Acre" were less valuable militarily. It is of interest that Barker writes here from the standpoint of the defender and not the attacker. France was the power from whom he expected attack; Britain could organise the resistance of Turkey, or even take the task out of Turkish hands. Palmerston shared the view of Chrzanowski that Diabekr was the inland key to Turkey and Acre the coastal key to Baghdad. When Colonel Rose asked for advice on the reconstruction of Acre in 1841, Palmerston directed that it should be restored to its former strength on the land side only. (Rose to Palmerston No. 37 of May 16, 1841. F.O. 78/455 with Palmerston's pencilled comments).

Even though England was fighting for Turkey in 1803 Barker suspected that in spite of "the gallant Britons who are saving at the price of their blood these scoundrels from perdition," the day would come when Europe would see "the Porte forming stronger and closed connections with France than ever; their predilection for them breaks through the flimsy veil which covers their sentiments and actions."⁽¹⁾

Barker must have felt his predictions fulfilled in 1807 when he suddenly found himself personally, as well as his country, at war with the Porte. The French diplomatic corps tried to have him apprehended but he escaped to Deir el-Kammar in the Lebanon where he got sanctuary in the convent of Harissa, which was under French protection!

But these fears were premature. Until the thirties there was still far too much striking at shadows on the part of the Levant Company and Crown agents in Syria, and only the East India Company agents and British merchants in Egypt had any solid foundation for their apprehensions; the time, if it ever came, was not yet when

"the people of France, at home and abroad,
its periodical press, its offices in the

(1) Barker, II., p. 73.

Levant, its subordinate functionaries breathe but one language in respect to the right and interest of France, to have its influence dominant in Egypt and Syria." (1)

With the accession of Louis Philippe, a foreign policy reminiscent of the halcyon days of Bonaparte, became a necessity of his dynasty, (2) and the need for such success drove him to the restoration of the Spanish Bourbons, the expeditions to North Africa and Ancona, the support of Muhammad Ali, to the disastrous Tahiti episode. The (3) enthusiasm for Muhammad Ali grew apace in the thirties developing along with a Mediterranean policy which had high hopes of success. Being the only aggressive power on its fringe, and hemmed in against continental expansion by the pains of Castlereagh and Metternich, France naturally looked to North Africa, and to the assistance of Egypt in the project of establishing an Empire, while her attitude to Turkey was determined by her relations with Muhammad Ali.

(1) Madden, Egypt and Mehemet Ali, p. 101.

(2) Louis Philippe was repeatedly reminded in after years of his Hotel de Ville programme of 1830. His dilemma as a barricade king seeking respectability led him to deplore revolution to autocratic Europe, but in France to adopt other tactics. He was accustomed to casting "ecstatic glances at the tricolour like one who has found a long-lost mistress." (Heine) Letters from Paris, transl. Leyland, London [1905] I, p. 141.

(3) It is not without significance that the Pasha has been lionised in later times, chiefly by French writers. See P. M. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptien sous Mohamed Ali et la Question d'Orient [1930]; Driault, L'Egypte et l'Europe - La Crise de 1839-41, Cairo [1930-4]; Guichen, La Crise d'Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l'Europe [1921] H. Guys, Rélation d'un séjour de plusieurs années à Beyrouth [1842]

If Muhammad Ali had ultimately kept Syria, France would have possessed the predominant European influence from Alexandretta to Fez, and it was because no one felt she had abandoned the wide horizons of Napoleon that France came to be distrusted by England and suspected of partnership in a grand dessin in the Mediterranean and the lands bordering it. (1) The late twenties and the thirties saw the spread of her influence in Syria under Ibrahim, in the North African possession for which she fought so bitterly, and in the councils of the Pasha of Egypt.

With the extension of Muhammad Ali's dominion into Syria, Colonel Churchill thought it must now "be clear to every English mind that if England's Oriental supremacy is to be upheld, Syria and Egypt must be made to fall more or less under her sway or influence." His fear was that one power would possess both routes to the east, a fear shared by no less a person than Palmerston, but the divergence of their views lay in Churchill's desire to see Syria brought under direct British control. But the Sultan was "as

(1) The most important work is undoubtedly Douin, Mahomed Aly et l'Expedition d'Alger, Cairo [1930]. The Pasha's reticence to join actively in a reduction of the Barbary States lying west of Benghazi was probably due to fear of an alliance between other powers with Muslims. Muhammad Ali seemingly did not like the idea of France "taking root in Algiers." In July 1830 he told Barker the siege of Algiers would last a year. "He is Turk enough to feel that the humiliation of the Bey would be a blow" (to Islam) Barker II., 152.

good an occupier of the road to India" ⁽¹⁾ as the Foreign Secretary could wish for, since he was the person least capable of utilising it in a way inimical to British interests. Muhammad Ali might use it for his own ends or put it at the disposal of France and Russia for theirs. Churchill stayed adamant. "I call upon my countrymen to adopt this political doctrine and nail it to the National Colours:- That when Mount Lebanon ceases to be Turkish, it must either become English, or else form part of a new independent State." ⁽²⁾ Churchill's fear of France was only less than Urquhart's of Russia.

Certainly many Frenchmen, if not the government, were very much taken with the notion of a strengthening of the Syrian connection, and there was an increase in missionary activity notably on the part of the returned Jesuits, as well as a conscious effort on the part of travellers to

(1) Bulwer, II., p. 145.

(2) Churchill, Mount Lebanon, [1853] I., Preface, p. vii. Churchill was a major under Colonel Rose in 1841 and collected data for the military survey on Syria until the military detachments were withdrawn by Lord Aberdeen in December. He was responsible for the survey of the pashalik of Damascus. Nejb, pasha of Bagdad tried to stop him by bringing serious charges against Churchill's private conduct. Colonel Rose promptly initiated a court-martial to which Nejb was invited to send witnesses. The case fell to the ground and Churchill was acquitted. The French cancellier in Damascus gave testimony against him. (N. W. Werry to Bidwell, private, Sep. 6, 1841, F.O. 78/447)

revive the mutual regard between France and Lebanon which had characterised their relations during the reign of St. Louis. Not even in times of difficulty had France abandoned the Maronites. When Napoleon crushed Egypt and the Sultan declared war on him, the French in Turkey retired, not to France but to Lebanon "et alors que le drapeau français était partout amené dans l'Empire ottoman il flottait librement sur la croupe du Liban. Ainsi comme aux temps des Croisades, le Liban fut encore à ce moment la dernière citadelle de l'influence française."⁽¹⁾ Jerusalem, traditional object of British, Russian, and Prussian piety, held second place to Mount Lebanon in French eyes and there were some who, both before and after the Egyptian occupation, advocated annexation by France herself of the Lebanon. The protection over the Maronites created an interposition between Sultan and subject which was ill-defined but capable of regularisation in favour of the protecting power. "The protected country will pass in a few years altogether into the system of the protecting nation there is but a resolution to take, a protection to declare, a flag to unfurl."⁽²⁾

(1) Ristelhueber, Traditions françaises au Liban, Paris [1918] p. 295.

(2) From Lamartine's "Voyage en Orient," quoted by Madden, Egypt and Mehemet Ali, p. 103.

In Lamartine's scheme of division of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt would be abandoned to Britain, and France would take Cyprus and Syria. With "the boundless stage opened to the population and resources of Europe," he was confident that France was strong enough to stake her claim in the Levant.

Palmerston was not ignorant of French interest in all parts of the Mediterranean which were non-European, and while he recognised that a great deal of the talk of expansion in the Chambers was merely quixotic, he also saw that territorial acquisition was a practice which Louis Philippe must try to indulge in as well as talk about. The invasion of Algeria was a result of such indulgence. There was also no doubt that the French were well entrenched in the administration of Egypt, though the extent to which they influenced Egyptian policy was harder to ascertain; France had always strengthened Muhammad Ali in doing what he wanted to do and the real test of influence is the ability (1) to persuade someone to act contrary to their own wishes.

(1) Clot Bey was not the ideal companion, tending to drive the Pasha in the direction of warlike undertakings for which he had already shown a propensity in Arabia and the Sudan. "War," Clot wrote, "in spite of the particular calamity which it brings with it has been always the most active promoter of civilisation great men are those who have left the most popular recollections, and which excite the most admiration and enthusiasm It is especially in barbarous countries that the end justifies the means." Madden, Muhammad Ali, p. 57.

Syria too must quite obviously come within the orbit of French attention and the propagation of her influence received almost as much effort as did conquest elsewhere. It was the coast on which France must set foot to penetrate to the Middle East. Just how she would go into the interior if she got the chance, she probably did not know; she might renew the alliance of Napoleon with the Sha' or try commercial penetration. "The absolute necessity that the expansion without should be in proportion to the immense expansion within, which has been produced by the revolution in affairs" was a principle always kept in view by French foreign ministers as indeed it was bound to be in a country exhibiting among its youth "an exuberance of life which threatens to break bounds."⁽¹⁾

France was fatally deceived in thinking that Syria could become part of the impressive Egyptian empire, for in such an arrangement Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary of a power with no land forces between itself and its Indian

(1) Lamartine, see Madden, p. 104.

possessions other than a small garrison in Malta, could not acquiesce. ⁽¹⁾ He could not watch the growth of an active land power in the Near East if it lay in his power to prevent it. In his distrust of the Pasha Palmerston was blinded to the administrative good which Muhammad Ali might have achieved in the Ottoman dominions, and which he had in fact achieved in Egypt to some degree (his Egyptian civilisation was not by any means "the arrantest humbug" which Palmerston thought it was) and only saw the dangers of a unified régime extending from Constantinople to the Gulf and the Red Sea. But to see such dangers was a paramount duty attaching to his office.

He therefore opposed Muhammad Ali in 1839 when the Second Syrian War broke out and looked like going in his favour. France was obliged to withdraw her support from

(1) For Palmerston on Muhammad Ali, and the territorial position in Syria and Mesopotamia see Temperley, p. 89, sqq., Dodwell, Ch. V. Also Rodkey, Attempts of Briggs & Company to Guide British Policy in the Levant in the Interests of Muhammad Ali Pasha 1821-41. Journ. Mod. History, V., Sept. [1933], which quotes from the F.O. records to show that Palmerston was opposed to the Pasha gaining power in Asia, as early as December 1832. Briggs thought recognition of the Pasha's friendship would bring concessions in the Red Sea and its route. Everyone did not see so penetratingly as the Foreign Secretary. Russell thought "the old Pasha ought not to be allowed to set the world on fire, whatever he may do in Syria or even in Mesopotamia." (Gooch, The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, London [1925] I., p. 15, 24)

the Pasha when, in the face of united Europe, he appealed to her for assistance. Even then Muhammad Ali had every reason to be grateful to her, for if she was sensible enough not to try a contest with a group of powers which had fought her successfully once before, one repercussion of her manifest anger was for her protégé to be let off more lightly than Turkey would have wished. In consistently acting with her friends who signed the collective note of July 27, 1839 and in realising that Egyptian intentions would be unacceptable to Europe, lay France's best chance of obtaining the gratitude of Sultan and Syrians alike. Had she sent an expeditionary force to Syria in 1840 with the British and Austrian squadrons -- an arrangement on which she might well have insisted by nature of her local influence -- the oppressed Maronites would have seen before their eyes fulfilment of the age-long belief that one day the warriors of France, as in the days of the Crusades, would come to save them from the heathen. The French position would have been secured for generations.

The support of Muhammad Ali in France however, was a stronger sentiment and could not be withheld in the moment of his greatest triumph. The Syrian connection gave way to the Egyptian. That the Lebanon would be more completely submerged in an Egyptian régime than ever it had been in

the Turkish Empire was unavoidable but it was popularly believed that it would be possible to intercede on behalf of the Maronites and maintain protection of them in some form. In addition to the popular enthusiasm for the Pasha among French people, the French government knew very well that acquiescence in the collapse of his power without remonstrance could lead to revolution. No curtailment of the popular desire for a resounding foreign policy could be lightly undertaken.

Before turning to Syria itself some further reference must be made to Russia, bearing in mind that until Brunnow arrived in London Palmerston was virtually obsessed with the belief that she, and not France, was the power most to be feared in the Levant. ⁽¹⁾ Unkiar-Skelessi was the real beginning of an ever deepening distrust on the part of Palmerston and it is in the nature of a tragedy that the great reversal of Russian policy towards Turkey effected in council on September 16, 1829, was unknown to the

(1) So late as June 8, 1838 he informed Granville of his belief that should war break out between Muhammad Ali and Turkey, "the Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan, and a Russian garrison would occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles; and once in possession of those points, the Russians would never quit them." Bulwer, II., p. 267.

Foreign Secretary for so many years, this in spite of the fact that Metternich was fully cognisant of the reversal and that normally he was adept at dropping secrets. Consequently Palmerston bred amongst his countrymen a distrust of Russian intentions which had little foundation in fact.

Russia was making no deliberate movement towards India so much as extending her own southern frontiers. (1) It has been said too that the movement towards India was merely a case of following a line of least resistance. Russia would have gone south earlier, perhaps as early as the seventeenth century, if Persia had not been so strong at that time. Thus it was accidental that Russia drove east to Siberia and not south-east in the days of the Mogul empire. After 1815 the long-deferred movement began. When Napoleon had proposed a march on Kandahar in 1801 it was rejected by Russia, but a year later Paul I sent an army "to wrest India from the British and to capture Indian trade for Russia." It did not get beyond Oranienburg. Henceforth it was little more than a gesture

(1) Lobanov-Rostovsky, The Shadow of India in Russian History, History 14, [1929], p. 217. For a wider study of the subject see Skrine, The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900 [1903].

on the part of Russia to talk of marching to India, and at Tilsit Alexander showed no enthusiasm for the idea. In 1854 and 1878 the Russian general staff was to throw out plans for marching to India via Astrabad and Persia but significantly, Russia did not take her great opportunity in the 1830's when the Sha' was at the gates of Herat. The Russian attitude was not merely lackadaisical but was probably the result of a realisation that the technical difficulties were very great.

Yet the psychological value was too great to allow the scheme ever to be permanently discarded. Rostovsky said of the situation, "this created a fundamental misunderstanding between the two nations and was the cause which generated one of the most vicious circles history has known. Indeed a crisis was caused invariably by England's suspicion of Russia's attitude, and this attitude in its turn was governed by the crisis."⁽¹⁾ In Turkestan alone Russia made progress, and this from economic as much as military reasons, yet the notion persisted right through the thirties that Russia was capable of infinite devilry. Dissenters from this view looked to the state of the

(1) Rostovsky, p. 224.

(1)

Russian army and the intervening terrain and less to faith in the Czar's intentions as the reasons for complacency.

"You must either disbelieve altogether in the existence of the Russians, or you must believe that they will be at Kandahar next year. Public opinion recognises no middle holding ground."⁽²⁾

The dissenters were however in a minority, and most people including those who ought to have known better, believed with Melbourne that it was "no less than the question who is to be master in Central Asia."⁽³⁾

(1) (Wellesley) Diary and Correspondence of First Earl Cowley, London [1930] p. 205. Wellington, whose opinion must carry great weight, declared "We have nothing to fear as to the Indies (i.e. India). Deserts, mountains, passes render distant expeditions very difficult. One can only act with great armies, and the more the line of operation is prolonged, the weaker it becomes. The climate destroys those who are not destroyed by the enemy." Professor Temperley, who discovered this theory of the Duke's in a letter from the Austrian Neumann to his government, finds a parallel in Kitchener's opinion of a Russian advance into Persia; see The Crimea, p. 418, n. 131. Lord Heytesbury in 1829 tended to minimise Russia's means of aggression, rather than the difficulties she would encounter: "Russia possesses fewer and less formidable means of aggression than any other of the Great Powers." (in Crawley op. cit., p. 50)

(2) Lady Cecil, Lord Salisbury [1921-36] II., 159.

(3) Crawley, p. 48.

This illusion was not really shattered until the Crimean War when the Russian forces were seen in action for the first time since 1815, and the idea of the Russian menace gave way to an opposite sentiment emphasising its military impotence. Hence in 1876 there were opinions about in England which only wise military heads and radicals had held in 1833.⁽¹⁾ But for most people in Melbourne's time, the British and Foreign Review's graphic sentence was taken, often quite literally, as the true picture of the facts, when it said that daily the grass of the Indian frontier was anxiously scanned for the imprint of Russian feet.⁽²⁾

The riverine routes to the Gulf were flanked on the far side by Persian territory and it was well known that in Teheran the Sha', with an army officered by Frenchmen, was lectured by English and Russian diplomats trying to withhold him from, and urge him into the paths of glory. The

(1) See, for instance, the near contemptuous tone of Campbell, A Handy Book on the Eastern question, being a very recent view of Turkey London [1876] p. 163. Also Thoughts on Our Foreign Relations by an Member of the H. of C. [1853] p. 32. "An immense deal of nonsense has been talked and written on the subject of Russia. Mr. Cobden very properly exposed this many years ago."

(2) Crawley, p. 65.

route from Aleppo to Baghdad, the route followed by diplomats bound for the Persian capital, was the sole means of rapid access to Persia from the west. It had not been developed as yet but towards this end Chesney began to survey it in 1835. If it ever became necessary to move troops into Persia and Central Asia they would have to come from India, the Gulf or the Levant. Had Muhammad Ali obtained the latter he could have allowed Russia to take Persia in its entirety, or perhaps have taken it himself. For this reason also the Sultan was the best occupier of the road to India, and thirty years later Barker, son of Barker, could still write

"If a hostile power becomes mistress of the Bosphorus, England's Navy could no doubt defend the Suez Canal, but would not be of the least use in Asia Minor and Persia, Mesopotamia and the shores of the Persian Gulf, Bushire and Bender Abbas, and even Kurrachee." (1)

Furthermore it was generally, if erroneously, believed that the alternative route was much shorter than the Red Sea route; also that it might in time and after adequate surveying prove to be the best route to India for troops and manufactures, and therefore the best safeguard against Russian advances because it enabled these to be taken on the flank.

(1) Barker, Syria and Egypt, II., p. 54

Russia appreciated this herself and obstructed Chesney as much as she could. Chesney failed to show the value of the route for immediate development, but Barker the elder blamed his government and thought Chesney "neglected and overlooked by an ungrateful country," in spite of which "his name will live for ever as the pioneer of the greatest work in reference to India, of the nineteenth century."⁽¹⁾

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(2)
 Syria in 1840 was still more of a geographical than a political name, and the negotiations of Muhammad Ali and the great powers only helped to aggravate the confusion which previous indiscriminate use of the name occasioned. There was no political entity called Syria but there was a group of Ottoman pashaliks, each based on a city or town of importance, which, considered jointly, were roughly coterminous with geographical Syria. Geographical Syria

(1) Barker, II., 243. Barker's friendship with Chesney explains the enthusiasm of his eulogy. While Muhammad Ali and the Russian Duhamel were intriguing to hamstring the Euphrates expedition (Bolsover, Lord Ponsonby p. 107), Chesney spent his time with Barker at Souedia. Mrs. Barker launched one of the expedition's 2 vessels.

(2) See maps I and V. For a brief but illuminating account of the topography of Syria, see A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, Oxford [1946] p. 6.

itself may be considered as being separated from Egypt by Sinai, from Najd by the Nafud from 'Iraq by the Hamad, Shamiyah, and Jazirah steppes, from Anatolia by the Taurus mountains. The Syrian pashaliks ⁽¹⁾ connected Turkey proper and Egypt, stretching from the foothills of the Taurus mountains in the north to El Arish in south Palestine, where the coast-line swings westward towards the delta and the sand, formerly a ribbon down the Levant shore, spreads southward into the haze of Sinai. The pashaliks of Syria were bounded on the east by the pashalik of Baghdad theoretically, but in fact by the desert.

The events of the period 1841-5 are restricted in the main to the country north of Haifa, and in particular to the range of the Lebanon. Thus the consulate of

(1) There is much confusion in the Blue Books and F.O. archives as to the number of pashaliks in geographical Syria. Wood recognised at least 4; Adana, Aleppo, Acre and Damascus. The Turks themselves recognised Tripoli in addition. Their extent is very vague, and that of Damascus is in one place said to extend from the Euphrates to Gaza, in another to be much smaller. The Europeans in the Empire seem to recognise as pashaliks only those areas which had traditionally been called pashaliks but which, after 1826, were classified as the biggest of 3 types of areas of jurisdiction. These biggest regions were ruled by a Mushir or 3-tail pasha, the next in magnitude by a Ferik and the smallest by a Liva. Thus Baghdad, Damascus and Acre were under Mushirs, but Tripoli was ruled by a ferik, or 1-tail pasha. See White, Three Years stay at Constantinople London [1846], Vol. I., Chap. I. (Ubicini and Courteille, Etat présent de l'Empire Ottoman Paris [1876] p. 89)

(1)

Jerusalem has little place in this study. These events do, of course, have an influence on the districts of the south but the regions which supported settled as opposed to nomadic communities felt the weight of Ibrahimian and Turkish misrule most, and consequently it was in them that the ferment of the 1840's is really seen. More specifically the settled districts were Mount Lebanon or "the Mountain," which flanks the Mediterranean from Tripoli to Sayda; the great sweeping Biqa' valley into which the mountain falls on the east; further east again and beyond Hermon the Ghuta of Damascus deriving its life from the waters of the Barada; in the north the extensive plain round Aleppo, and in the south the plains of Esdraelon and Samaria. On these last four regions the tribes of the desert constantly encroached, and only the Mountain, insulated by Biqa' and the Anti-Lebanon, escaped their depredations. When the

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- (1) There is a work on the Jerusalem consulate by itself. Hyamson, British Consulate in Jerusalem, London [1939]. The British consulate became more important when the other powers set up agencies there, and when the Protestant bishop was installed in January 1842. Prior to the appointment of W. T. Young as vice-consul on September 19th 1838, there was a British consular agent at Acre; Moses Abraham Finzi, who had been appointed on May 18, 1837. He was dependent on the Consul-general at Bayrut until the arrival of Young. Young was the first consular representative of any European power to reside in Jerusalem, and he took up duties there in March 1839. France, Prussia and Sardinia appointed consuls there in 1843, the United States in 1844, Austria in 1849 and Spain in 1854.

consuls wrote of the "desert line" they thought, not of any natural division between the desert and the sown so much as of a line between regions of government and anarchy. According to the strength of the pashas of Aleppo and Damascus the desert line might be near or far off, but in the times of their preoccupation in 1841-5, it ran north and south touching against the eastern walls of Aleppo, Hamah, Homs and Damascus.

The Mountain, because it was the most settled and intensely populated region in Syria, felt more than anywhere else did, the weight of Egyptian rule, and because it was also the most sensitive and at the same time the most articulate region, the reaction against Ibrahim was born, grew and erupted there before spreading to the rest of the country. The people of Lebanon had helped Ibrahim's conquest but they also played the leading part in the Ottoman restoration.

In the absence of reliable statistics it is only possible to speculate on population figures, but it seems that Lebanon contained a fifth of the population, though its own area is only about a tenth of all Syria. (1) The unity of the

(1) For the Lebanon Volney estimated 105,000 in 1784; Poujade, 200,000 in 1860; the Maronite Patriarch in 1840, 482,000; Ubicini 200,000 basing his figures on the 1861 Blue Book. The Patriarch's estimate can be discounted. Consul Moore's estimate of 167,000 is reasonable since it was made at approximately half-way between 1784 and 1860, and is midway between the figures of Volney and Ubicini. Moore's was taken by Bowring in his Report as an authoritative figure. (See Bowring's Report F.O. 78/360) p. 14.

sects in 1840 was really the unity of the Lebanon and not of all Syria. The nomads round Aleppo, the Ansariyah, and the Nablusian families all contributed to the expulsion of Ibrahim, but it was the Druses and the Christian mountaineers of Lebanon united in arms who played the major part in the expulsion.

Mount Lebanon, one hundred miles long and rarely more than thirty wide, is a huge ridge back, bounded to the north by the Homs gap, to the east by Biqa', and in the south it gradually falls away into a region of complicated drainage round Lake Hula. The ridge is breached at one place only -- due east of Bayrut a sinuous road, threading through numerous villages, climbs to a high saddle in the skyline, and is the only obvious route from the coast over into Biqa'. There are other routes in number, like those from Sayda to Djezzin and Merje 'Ayun but they are tortuous to a degree rendering them of little use as lines of internal trade. The Mountain supported a population out of all proportion to its natural resources and the results of this disproportion were a low standard of life and an intensive agricultural technique in which man seemed to be continually losing his struggle against nature.

Twenty miles south of Bayrut lay Sayda, giving its name to the pashalik in which Bayrut and the Mountain lay,

a small town and with no direct trade with Europe, deprived of a prominent place in the Damascus trade by its poor communications with that city. Fifty miles to the north of Bayrut where the great spine of the country begins to bend eastwards from the coast and towards the Homs gap lay Tripoli, a town of small trading consequence. The Mountain itself had a great number of large villages scattered along its huge terraces and flanks, and the route from Bayrut into Biqa' was strung with places which were to get a tragic prominence in the years following the Egyptian occupation -- Ba'abda, Shuwayfat, Hammana, Alayh, Ras al-Matn and the small fortress-like township of Zahle with its prospect of Mount Hermon.

Far to the north of Lebanon lay Aleppo, again the capital of a pashalik and the biggest entrepot for European merchandise. Its position had been its fortune; through the busiest port on the whole coast Alexandretta, it drew the produce of Europe and transmitted it to Baghdad and Persia in vast camel convoys, down the right bank of the Euphrates. Frenchmen and Englishmen had lived in Aleppo since the sixteenth century and their solidly-built khans are still to be found near the sukhs to which they sold their broadcloths and manufactures. Aleppo, by nature of its isolation, stood very much on the periphery of the events of the 1840's. Proximity to Turkey proper also

tended to make supervision effectual, and as its population was predominantly Muslim it accepted Turkish rule more readily than did Lebanon.

Damascus, spiritual centre of the faithful, exerted a tremendous if unseen power. The sanctity it derived from its connection with the Prophet was heightened by its glory as onetime capital of the Ummayyad caliphate. The great mosque projecting its steep-roofed minaret into the clear sunlight dominated the daily scene as emphatically as Islam dominated all other religions to be found in the holy city, and, even when out of sight, over the peasant in the field, Damascus exerted its strange magnetism, drawing his eye to the horizon over which it lay, whenever he took respite from toil. Only in Damascus of the three major towns, could the murder of Jews and the manhandling of protected Christians have taken place. Neither the easy familiarity of Aleppo with the European, nor the cosmopolitanism of Bayrut, had as yet penetrated to Damascus. The Damascene pashalik was the greatest in Syria; its pasha had a great pre-eminence over his fellows, and if the pashalik carried no explicit jurisdiction over the others, its holder set the fashion in his attitude to subject religions which the others would follow.

It is small wonder the region exhibited, and still exhibits, a compound of manners, religions, traditions, and architectural styles. The successive overlaying of one civilisation over another has led to an incredible hybridisation in everything, with the exception, perhaps, of religion. The cause of the phenomenon lay in the geographical structure of the country, at the cross-roads of an east-west route from Baghdad to the Syrian ports and a north-south route from Anatolia through Aleppo, Damascus, the Haouran, Jezreel and the Shephalah to Egypt. In the hill regions flanking the routes, -- the highlands inhabited by the Ansariyah, the Lebanon, Mount Hermon, the Jabalu'd Duruz, the hilly backbone of Palestine -- minute religious groups existed in pockets and patches. The majority of the population was Sunni (orthodox Muslim) in the plains and ports, and no city had a majority which was other than Muslim. In the hills, however, the orthodox were not so much in evidence, and one or other of the sects usually predominated. In the coastal range north of Lebanon were the Ansariyah, in the Mountain north of Bayrut the Maronites, the Druses in south Lebanon and the hinterland of Sayda as well as on the flanks of Hermon, the Matawilah in the Jabal Amud north-west of Lake Hula. Then there were pockets: Samaritans on Gerizim, Isma'ili Shi'is and Kurds in Ansariyah territory.

The Lebanon like the rest of the country had felt the impact of successive civilisations, but though it did retain some material signs of their passage, it had a peculiar propensity for retaining no more than a few representatives of every conceivable sect. This was largely due to the inaccessibility of the Mountain from the surrounding country, and to the practice of small sects of making for the protection it offered on the dispersal or persecution of their communities. As a refuge the Lebanon could show Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Druses, schismatics of all sorts. The reforming zeal of Mahmud, the English merchant with his Lancashire cotton goods, Ibrahim with his shadowy pan-Arabism, ⁽¹⁾ existed alongside this heterogeneous society and amongst them destroyed its near medieval aspect. It was the merchant who made the first inroads on its antiquity; the transformation did not come from within. Ibrahim's rule in Syria might ⁽²⁾ have been no more than "the false start" so far as Arab

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- (1) Ever a problematical business. Nevertheless it is almost certain that while Muhammad Ali found it impossible to pose as Arab (Dodwell, 126) and even set Arab against Turk (Driault, V., No. 8), Ibrahim favoured a primitive form of Arab nationalism. (Dodwell 256). Professor Temperley's view is that Palmerston was in error in suspecting that the pasha wished to become Kalif (The Crimea, p. 419, n. 142 (b)) and that signs of nationalism are not to be expected in this early period. Nevertheless, they are numerous. Colonel Rose and his associates talked quite frequently of the spirit of nationalism of the Maronites and Druses. Rose speaks of a distinct organisation in Syria's Lebanon - "the Shebab or "la jeune Syrie" of all young Nationalities about the most noxious." Rose to Canning, N^o 28 of April 15, 1845 F.O. 195/250.
- (2) The phrase occurs in George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, London [1938] p.

nationalism is concerned but its contribution too, towards a dissolution of the old order, was emphatic. Europe did the rest.

In Egypt French engineers, surveyors, traders, artificers and builders played a big part in hurrying through that unnatural industrial revolution, the superficial prosperity of which was not destined to outlive Muhammad Ali himself. (1) Syria however, was not endowed with the natural resources which make industrial development possible; Ibrahim was content to leave the feudo-agricultural society he found there, and his regime was most suited to the trader and the missionary for the latitude it gave to both. He made a few gestures to religious minorities, allowing them to be represented on town sharia and in the magistral courts in the cities, and above all gave a degree of toleration which, while it did not please the orthodox Muslim, made his rule more acceptable than that of the Turks. The Jews enjoyed free exercise of their religion for it was not strong enough to constitute a danger to good order or to Ibrahim's dream of Arab unity. Ibrahim's order to his governors said "Do not forget you answer for the tranquillity and submission of your districts with your head; as to the measures to

(1) Dodwell, Chapter VII.

be taken, I leave you quite free."⁽¹⁾ He wanted order in the first place to enable the programme of fortification, taxation and the transmission of raw materials to Egypt, to be carried through. So long as the passes into Turkey could be fortified, the Syrians made to contribute to the expenses of occupation, and Adana and Ladhiqiya deforested, Ibrahim could afford to put out of his mind the purely temporary nature of the occupation. He was not disposed to do anything just yet which might make the powers regret the Kutaya arrangements more than they already did.

Preoccupied with the construction of military works, he left to the Amir Bashir the task of keeping the Mountain in order, as he had already been doing for many years. Bashir was well suited to his task being a good dissembler and swift to act. Over a period of years he had put a stop to their family strife by a mixture of confiscation and mutilation. He secured the adhesion of the Patriarch -- the other great disruptive force in the Mountain -- by becoming himself a Christian, this in spite of his Druse origin. When Ibrahim came to Syria he found in Bashir a willing tool for keeping the most turbulent part of the new province in order, a man who knew it intimately and who since 1821 had wielded absolute power there.

(1) Poujade, Le Liban et la Syrie [1867] p. 8.

(1)

Unlike the administration of Mustapha Pasha in Crete, Ibrahim's was not a success in Syria. Syria was altogether a more complex problem. Certainly Ibrahim cut out much of the bribery of the courts, as the consuls attest; he removed the inequality of Muslim and Christian before the law; allowed plaintiffs to take their cases to the court of an official if they feared the vagaries of law as dispensed by the muftis, by a decree of marked similarity to William I's division of the spiritual and temporal courts. Trade and agriculture benefited. At the end of the occupation there were settlers on the plain of Adana where there had been Kurdish nomads at the start. But Ibrahim was perpetually in arms, and his religious toleration did not please the ulema. The system of taxation and forced enlistment were the fundamental causes of unrest. The equal distribution of taxes did not console people crushed by it. The miri, assessed like the Norman bovate was still the largest source of revenue; the haraj was collected by Imperial firmans; the firdeh, a capitation tax was Ibrahim's own innovation. Ruthless deforestation, seizure of livestock, purchase at enforced prices, and forced labour increased further the resentment of the people.

(1) Dodwell, p. 242 sqq.

Within the fortress which Ibrahim made of Syria, the daily life of the European was little affected, and when it was, governments were not slow to make prompt representations to Alexandria. The East had been for so long the scene of trade and barter, of the coming and going of shipping, of enterprise and speculation, and for so long the happy hunting ground of adventurers, religious missions, half-pay officers and travellers that the scene showed a numerous European population spread through all the different strata of society from the highest to the lowest. In Syria the proportion of Europeans was much smaller than elsewhere in the Asiatic part of the empire.

The Maronites were the most numerous people in the Mountain and numerically equal to the other sects put together. The founder of their religion Maron lived in the seventh century in a convent on the Orontes near Hamah, and his monothelite teaching in his own day gained very few adherents. The Imperial forces drove it below ground, but in the days of Arab power, its amirs were allowed to administer the districts of north Lebanon to which the sect still was in the main restricted. Geographical isolation and Turkish indifference in such matters allowed the tiny group to grow and gradually to draw within its influence, and ultimately its control, the peasantry of the whole mountain as far

south as the Nahr-el-Kelb. Towards the end of the twelfth century Jacques de Vitry described them as

"men armed with bows and arrows and skilful in battle, inhabiting the mountains in considerable numbers, in the province of Phoenicia not far from Bibles. They are called Maronites from the name of a certain man, their master Maroun, a heretic, who affirmed that there was in Jesus Christ but one will or operation."

The sect abjured this heretical belief in 1167 and the way opened for a more decided recognition of it by Rome. Thus the Patriarch of the Maronites assisted at the general Council of the Lateran during the Pontificate of Innocent III, and his missionaries made great inroads on the Syrian church which was more inclined to adhere to the simple facts of Christianity as expounded by the apostle James than to counteracting the effects of the new religion. By the time of the Crusades the Maronites were a strong people, distinct and virtually independent in their mountain fastness.

They met the Crusaders as the latter were forcing their way down the coast to Jerusalem: the mutual respect of what was, superficially, Christianity in arms, and the outpost of Christianity in the east, was both natural and spontaneous, and they joined forces on several occasions.

More than this need not be said of those distant events, yet from the fortuitous meeting of Maronite and Crusader

there dated an enthusiasm in France for the Maronites which from time to time inspired men of politics as well as men of religion, while the Maronite peasantry preserved a sentimental picture of crusading Christianity in the Holy Land and a hope of its revival right down to the nineteenth century.

Through the agency of her diplomats, religious orders and traders in the Levant, France showed her concern for the well-being of the easternmost branch of the Church and for the people who were its laity, long before any other power did the same, and if by the 1830's the French government began to use the religious lever to improve its political ascendancy in the Levant, the men it sent out were not by any means devoted exclusively to this end.

Even prior to the Crusades, and as early as the fifth century Frenchmen had gone on pilgrimage to the East; Merovingian missions bore gifts to Jerusalem, and in the ports of France and Spain small colonies of Lebanese traders appeared. The concession which Charlemagne got from Harun al Raschid, the right of self-government which the Crusaders accorded to the Lebanese when the états francs were set up, and the written protection which St. Louis is alleged to have given to his five hundred mountaineers at Damietta in the hey-day of Franco-Lebanese co-operation, strengthened the tie. In 1536 a convention was concluded

between Francis I and the Sultan laying down the privileges of Roman Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, and from this time the Capitulations can be said to have originated, along with the related but erroneous assumption, that France had been given a general protectorate over the Christian subjects of the empire regardless of their particular type of Christianity. The result of the Capitulations was that the Maronites enjoyed a large degree of independence, not extended to other Christian sects in Syria, and this state of affairs lasted until the coming of the Egyptians in 1832.⁽¹⁾

The Maronite Patriarch assisted by French religious orders in the propagation of the faith was still careful to prevent any encroachment upon his own authority, and the Maronite hierarchy continued to hold provincial councils for the regulation of their affairs and discipline, to which the Pope only sent an observer. Though adhering to the Roman communion, no interference on the grounds of

(1) The convention of 1536 was followed up by quite specific protections over the Maronites. In 1649 Muhammad IV gave Louis 14 the title of "Protector of the Christians of Mount Lebanon;" in 1737 the same title was renewed for the benefit of Louis XV. In 1796 the Capitulations were renewed by the Directory whom Turkey recognised as "Protectress of the Catholic Church of St. Benedict at Galata, and of all Christian establishments in the Sultan's dominions." For a detailed reference to the history of Franco-Maronite relations, see Abd Allah Sfer Pasha, Le Mandat Français et les traditions françaises en Syrie et au Liban, Paris [1922] p.1-16.

ecclesiastical discipline was tolerated. The Patriarch himself was elected in solemn conclave of twelve local bishops, and on his success was given a pelisse of honour by the Prince of the Mountain.

The Patriarch took the name of Patriarch of Antioch. Considerable lands attached to his office and he drew much revenue from his eight bishoprics. Though there were Armenian-Catholic, Syrian-Catholic, Greek-Catholic and Chaldean-Catholic Patriarchs of Antioch, the Maronite alone had a tradition for political meddling and continually found himself at odds with the feudal lords of the flock. The flock itself, made up of simple folk was susceptible to his will and uncritical of his priests. For all his practical independence, the Patriarch was not disposed to sever either a useful link with Rome or the goodwill of Catholic Europe by any injudicious insistence on his own power. Maronite Catholicism varied from the European variety only in its outward forms; if Maronite services were enlivened by Arabic music, the dogmas of Rome were preserved intact and the early heresies of Maron had been for a long time respectfully but firmly obliterated by the unqualified conformity of his spiritual descendants.

French interest in the Christians subject to Ibrahim drew the two people together more firmly than ever, reviving

the old impression that "cette nation que nous trouvons établie sous le nom de Saint Maron est une partie de la nation française, car son amitié pour les Français ressemble à l'amitié que les Français se portent entre eux."⁽¹⁾ In the religious sphere France's ascendancy was as predominant as that of Britain in the world of commerce, and the impossibility of weighing such influence only served to accentuate rather than diminish the general impression of her ascendancy.

During Ibrahim's regime all the seven religious orders recognised by ⁽²⁾ M^e Salverte were active in Mount Lebanon. ⁽³⁾ The Maronite church was already well organised;

(1) Extract from French Smyrhene newspaper sent by Canning to Aberdeen, July 2nd 1844. Aberdeen Papers, Add MSS 43139. The quotation is from a letter of St. Louis which the paper had published.

(2) Salverte, La Syrie avant 1860, [1861] p. 6

(3) It was organised according to the Lebanese Synod on an extensive scale with bishoprics in Bayrut, Tripoli, Djebail, Aleppo, Baalbek, Damascus, Tyre, and Sayda.

its churches were sprinkled throughout the whole Mountain, varying in size from the Patriarchal residence at Kadisha to the grottos which had been the homes of anchorites; religious edifices and shrines existed in profusion. The peasantry, pursuing a changeless existence of the most primitive sort, was dominated by its clergy. Into this framework the French orders fitted quite easily. (1) The priest christened the child, moulded his simple piety, and buried him on his decease; he was ever present. Further the peasant was also subject to a temporal lord, having his place in a feudal society which submerged his individuality as completely as Norman feudalism could have done.

Thus from two sources the Maronite peasant learnt obedience -- submissive to his sheik's command he also wore the blinkers of the devout without demur. The B'sherre was the focus of the Patriarch's power, and his convent of Kanobin stood in the gloom of the Kadisha gorge. When

(1) The orders staffed Maronite schools at Ain Warka, Ba'abda, Hurhuriya, and other towns in the Mountain. The Jesuits had colleges in Aleppo, Smyrna, Damascus and Aintura. The best pupils from the schools went to one of the colleges, usually to Aintura. Aintura had its annual deficiencies made up by the French government. On their return to Syria in the thirties the Jesuits built new colleges at Bayrut, Zahle and Gazir. The Lazarists, who had taken over Aintura on the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1774, added to the original mission and rebuilt the church of the Cross in Ladhiqiyah. The Franciscans had establishments in Aleppo, Bayrut, Damascus, Tripoli, Harissa and Sayda. (Ubicini and Courteille Etat présent de l'empire Ottoman, p. 64.)

American missionaries appeared to tempt him they were unceremoniously bundled out.
(1)

From time to time the orders skirmished with Protestantism as it endeavoured to establish a footing and the circulation of dangerous literature was carefully watched. When in 1824 the Pasha of Aleppo was ordered to sequester all books of the Bible Society, consul Barker was closely affected as his brother was the Society's distributor in Constantinople.

"I cannot express my anguish for this unexpected thrust. If I had not some hope that the firman was issued without Lord Strangford's participation, I should be still more indignant at

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- (1) The influence of France would have been strongly felt by the traveller visiting the Lazarist College at Aintura. The walls of the refectory were lined with 16 prints on the miracles of the founder Vincent St. Paul. In the classroom hung a picture representing the Virgin appearing to a nun in a Paris convent chapel with rays of light emanating from her downstretched hands. The boys of the college each wore a medallion with a replica of the picture, and in French, were the words "Towards the end of 1830, the young sister of charity, M--, being at prayers, saw the Virgin of Immaculate Conception, as she is represented in the medal, surrounded with glory and having a globe under her feet" (on which the word France is labelled) "Vivid rays of light darted in great profusion from her hands, but concentrated on one particular spot. Suddenly a voice exclaimed -- "These rays are the symbol of grace which Mary obtains for mankind, and the point of the globe where they fall in more abundance than on any other is France." The medal commemorates this divine visitation.

this triumph of the Roman Catholic Mission at Constantinople, which casts so foul a stain upon ours. Will the British public tamely suffer so egregious an insult? Can it be borne that Catholic potentates shall have the privilege of maintaining and protecting an army of priests dispersed through every part of the Grand Seignor's dominions, while to the subjects of the King of Great Britain it shall be forbidden to furnish the Rayahs with the Book on which is founded their religion? while the Catholic priests in Turkey possess everywhere flourishing seminaries and convents like castles, and carry on with security their daily intrigues" (1)

(2)

The American Mission to Syria and the Holy Land, nearly twenty years old in 1840, produced religious and scientific works from its Bayrut press. It was a small unit, and its field was the Christian populace, the Muslims being by law beyond its scope, and limitations of money and members kept its endeavours on a modest scale. It set up small classes in Bayrut, Aleppo, and Hasbayya to hear its evangelical teaching. In its small way it endeavoured to introduce an approach to Christianity different to that of the orders, a Christianity that reformed manners and bettered the social condition, by lifting life to a higher plane.

(1) Barker, II., 339.

(2) Beaumont, Diary of a Journal to the East, London [1856].
C. D. Warner, In the Levant, Boston [1877] p. 162 sqq.

It determined to make the Christian name respected by superior practical qualities, rather than by devout lives alone.

The great activity of the religious missions would not have been possible had Ibrahim chosen to suppress it, but obscurantism would have caused trouble among the sects, and for another reason, France was of incalculable value to Egypt and toleration for the sects oiled the wheels of their relations. Toleration was, too, rather more than a technique with Ibrahim. More truly than his father he was an Arab, and to him Islam's supremacy was still secure however much its glory might have become tarnished. Under Ibrahim, as under the Turks immediately before and after him, religious fanaticism was the thing of a moment, and as likely as not stimulated by non-religious causes. (1)

The occupation was quite acceptable to the religious orders, and even for the merchant it involved a momentary release from Turkish meddling.

(1) Curzon, Visits to Monasteries in the Levant, [1851] p.198 et seq. relates how Ibrahim attended the Holy Sepulchre in May 1834 to see candles lit by divine fire. Scores of pilgrims died in the battle to light the first candle, and patriarchs were carried out "overcome with the glory of the Almighty." Ibrahim himself barely escaped death. For a similar "ceremony" see Rose to Aberdeen, No. 4 of Jan. 26 1842, F.O. 78/494.

(1)

For over two hundred years British ships had dropped anchor in the ports of Alexandretta and Ladhiqiyah attracted to the great commercial city of Aleppo. The city's recent decline, in no small measure due to East India Company competition in Persia with Indian silk, had not seriously affected the modest but steady flow of British goods to Bagdad, and there were good reasons why the Syrian trade became of additional importance to Britain. The continental powers were fostering their own industries by a system of protective discrimination against British produce, and as William Russell observed to his brother "The Edinburgh Review may sneer at List and all he says but the world is practising his teaching." (2) The British scale of production was still on the increase and the country could not afford to lose the outlet and stimulant of its export

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- (1) A. C. Wood, Levant Company, Ch.V.
J. T. Bent, The English in the Levant, EHR., (1890)
p. 654.
- (2) "A species of Berlin Decrees, more stringent even than those of Napoleon, were silently but surely spreading over the Continent against us; and it required far more than the mere repeal of the Corn Laws to effect a reciprocal liberalisation of European commercial relations." (Monypenny, Life of Disraeli, Vol. II., p. 136) Peel wrote to Croker in 1842 (Croker Papers [1884] II., p. 382) of "the languishing commerce and languishing manufacturing industry of this country. France, Belgium, and Germany are closing their doors upon us."

trade. The South American markets became of prime importance overnight, and the Turkish empire was attractive because of long-standing familiarity with the Levant and the free-trade conditions which pertained there. Additionally, the traditional supremacy of British trade indicated that she would be able to resist the competition of all comers, and the government was the more ready to encourage the expansion of trade in the light of the Levant's increasing strategical and political importance.

(1)
Aleppo, in the 1830's was still the distributing centre for places as far north as Tokat, as far east as Van and Mosul, and through it, as to a lesser degree through Damascus, Britain and Europe sent their manufactured goods, as they had done for generations. Now British manufacturers began to cut out the middlemen and to receive orders from native buyers through their own agents in the country, thereby regularising trading and making payment surer. Aleppo and Damascus in 1838 imported twice the number of British long cloths imported in 1836 and 1837. France sent a negligible number of bales and Italy stood second.

(1) For a commentary on the Aleppine trade in the 19th century see L. Farley, Turkey [1866]. Even in the fifties when Aleppo was in swift decline, there were still 10,000 active looms producing. Britain took the city's entire output of mohair, and gold silk.

to England on the Aleppo market, and even then with a considerable amount of stuffs of English origin. Lead, an article Britain could have exported, was prohibited by Muhammad Ali because of what could be made with it. (1) Both sultan and pasha derived much revenue from the trade of the country, and England's individual contribution to its prosperity was very great. The long cloth was the basis of her success, and along with grey "domestics" and cotton yarn. (2) The first two items rendered any local industry worthless, and had pushed out East India cotton which used to enter the country through the Gulf.

In the ports British shipping fell below that of France, Egypt, Turkey, and sometimes even Greece, in numbers and tonnage per annum, but the invoice values of her cargoes were immeasurably greater every year until 1840 almost without exception. (3)

(1) Bowring Report, p. 120.

(2) Bowring Report, p. 36.

(3) F. H. S. Werry to Bidwell, No. 9 of April 16 and 8 enclos. F.O. 78/448 enclosing a "Return of the British Navigation and Trade at the Principal Ports within the Consulate of Aleppo, during the year ending Dec. 31, 1840." The returns for Bayrut are in Moore to Bidwell, No. 33 of May 28, 1841 F.O. 78/449, but unfortunately the invoice values for 1840 were not recorded by the Bayrut customs house.

It had been thought by the Europeans in Syria that commerce would be permanently disrupted, and Barker wrote in 1831 to Aberdeen that "the trade of Syria, not only for the English, but likewise for the French, had died a natural death." Ibrahim took no part in Syrian trade, and the only economic venture he tried was the poor coal-mine at Qornaile. While Egyptian vessels swarmed in all the Syrian ports, and the northern forests were denuded, the Europeans were largely left alone, and Barker mistook a momentary lassitude for something more serious. Campbell the British consul-general in Egypt, visiting Bayrut in May 1836 found British commerce operating satisfactorily according to the Capitulations; "no obstacles appear now to exist to the free exercise of our commerce."⁽¹⁾ Consul-general Farren received a reply to a questionnaire from the Aleppo merchants, telling him that

"the imports direct from Great Britain of English Manufactures and Colonials have exceeded those of former years when imported by circuitous routes of Leghorn Trieste etc. in a most extraordinary degree; there having arrived within a period of 2 years from London and Liverpool direct at the port of Alexandretta alone 20 English vessels of the registered tonnage -- say 2934 and conveying for this market no less than 9430 Bales, Barrels and Cases of English Manufactures and Colonials and 1553 pieces of Brazil wood exclusive of what

(1) Campbell to Palmerston, No. 18 of May 27, 1836. F.O. 78/282

has been landed at the ports of Beyrout and Tripoli intended for the Damascus Market." (1)

The access of prosperity was largely attributable to the conversion in 1830 to direct trade between England and Syria, and in 1836 the Damascus customs were farmed at three times the 1829 figure.

"The British trade with Syria has augmented notwithstanding the obstacles it has encountered and would increase considerably if the resources of the Country and industry of the people were not so crippled by him (Muhammad Ali) -- the British trade at present with these parts is greater than that of any other Country of Europe."

Bowring saw no limit to the market for European goods in Syria if it was methodically expanded, and to show that the advantages were not all one way added the modest belief that "the presence and influence of European and especially of British Merchants cannot but produce habits of greater punctuality and probity." (2)

(1) Farren to Palmerston, No. 37 of June 1836, F.O. 78/291 encl answers to Campbell's questionnaire.

(2) Bowring Report p. 82.
Werry to Bidwell, (Private) July 20, F.O. 78/410.
The end of the Levant Company's monopoly with its own dissolution in 1825 allowed British traders to enter the ports of the Levant quite freely in after years. The whole idea of a trade monopoly was at variance with the doctrines of Smith, and the plans of Huskisson at the Board of Trade. The growing closeness of political ties between Turkey and England was one very great reason for the dissolution of the Company but Foreign Secretary Canning's invitation to it to surrender its charter ended with the significant comment that the charter's privileges "may be deemed by parliament and the public to be useless and injurious restrictions upon trade." Wood, p. 200.

The trade through Ladhikiya, Bayrut and Tripoli, like that through Alexandretta was one of annually increasing value, far outstripping the values of any other nation's cargoes; it produced for Britain a favourable balance, which, though fraught with trouble for Turkey, would have delighted Adam Smith could he have seen the consular archives.

The British, French, Sardinian, Tuscan, and Russian traders resident in Syria got along well enough. Just prior to 1838 Russia, by nature of her commercial treaty of 1832, stood in the best position in the Persian and re-export trade. ⁽¹⁾ There was vigorous competition for local markets, and trading privileges, a competition between the merchants primarily, though home governments were beginning to urge their consuls not to slip behind in the contest ⁽²⁾ for commercial advantage. Trade relations between the communities more and more tended to mirror the relations

(1) White, A Three Year's Stay at Constantinople [1846] III., Chapter entitled Porcelain Dealers, gives an excellent account of the benefits accruing to Russian trade from this treaty. Many British firms consigned their goods to Russian-protected firms, which were able to deliver to retailers 2% cheaper than they could themselves. When the treaty was renewed in 1843 firms under Russian protection multiplied by twenty.

(2) Palmerston to Campbell, No. 21 of Nov. 22, 1836, F.O. 78/281

of the mother countries, hostility showing itself between merchants of estranged countries, and amity reflecting the political amity in other cases or at other times.

"The commercial settlers in this country, are not as in other parts of the Levant, long established, and individuals of mature age and character, but in general they are young men sent out by merchants and manufacturers and for the first time freed from the authority and restraint of their employers and families, and by the influence of social order." (1)

Each community exaggerated the prejudices of the mother country, cherishing them as a link and remembrance of home, and the tendency had a material repercussion in the relations with other trading communities. Had the merchants declared peace and war, friendship and hostility, in synchronisation with their governments, the daily situation might have been easier, but bad communications with home and the distortion of news coming by letter and word of mouth caused an unfortunate time lag in the adjustment of mutual relations.

The strained Anglo-French relations of the 1840 crisis did not really end during the rest of Louis-Philippe's reign, and putting their own interpretations on the events, the communities in Syria tended always to live in the past to

(1) Farren to Palmerston, No. 4 of Jan. 6, 1836. F.O. 78/291.

some degree, and to perpetuate a rather theatrical conviction of the evil intentions of one another. The frigidity thus engendered permeated all their relations, and infected the consular body. Basili, the Russian consul in Bayrut, was in constant apprehension of the French tie with the Maronites and gave special vigilance to Russia's own protégés the Greek Melkites. British traders shared the suspicion and believed France to be working for a restoration of Muhammad Ali. Britain's own interests were purely annexationist in French eyes and behind them stood the evil genius of Palmerston. The growth of British trade was merely an indication of her ever-closing grip on Syria.

* * * * *

Ibrahim's need for money steadily turned the Lebanon against him. The taxing of mills and the appropriation of crops led to the first outward signs of discontent at Nablus. Reduction of the turbulent districts led him on to disarm the inhabitants, and this in itself put him in an invidious position for while disarmament was intended to prevent further resistance, it only managed to create it. The Matawilah in the region of Acre and Safad followed the example of Nablus, then the Ansariyah copied the Matawilah. The Christians under the orders of Bashir were at first

the tools of Ibrahim and used by him to suppress insurrections as far off as Hebron; they marched against the Druses in 1836, but in time themselves felt the heavy hand of Ibrahim as the young men of the Mountain were conscripted to die in distant Arabia or the Sudan. Bashir's position as governor got weaker and so did that of Ibrahim as a result. The sects drew together and Bashir could not break their unity. Their spontaneous rising in 1840 gave the allies as obvious a location for initiating the land struggle against Egypt as Spain had been for the destruction of Napoleonic power. At first the revolt was but one more revolt to Ibrahim, but it grew until it got beyond his control. The French ambassador at Constantinople was petitioned in 1840 by the greatest Maronite princes, including the senior Shehabi, by the Druse sheiks and the Matawilah, not to obstruct the expulsion of Ibrahim. "La presse française dit que la France n'admettra aucune arrangement qui aurait pour base de restituer la Syrie à son legitime souverain. Cela se peut-il? Les Syriens ne peuvent le penser." But, refusing to believe that Europe would unite against her protégé, France stood by Muhammad Ali till her physical support was requested, squandering centuries of influence in Syria. Only then did she abandon him; and until France abandoned Egypt she would do nothing for the Christians

of Lebanon. After July 13, 1841, she set about the systematic recovery of the position she had forfeited in Syria, by the too exclusive advocacy of the pasha.

CHAPTER III.

In November 1840 Guizot called Granville to him on the 6th telling him that Bourqueney had been instructed to try and find some grounds for an agreement with the powers

THE CONSULS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEMS

so that France might take part in the general pacification of the disturbances in the Levant. Guizot wanted an armistice to be imposed and the actual state of possession of the two

combatants. "It is impossible to estimate at too high a value the importance to the Porte of the maintenance of order in Syria."

showed his refusal to realize that the treaty of July was incompatible with such a settlement. Aberdeen. realized that Muhammad Ali had already, by his greed and his belief that the powers could not agree to fight him, forfeited his right to say such special consideration. The objects of the treaty of July 15 were in process of being achieved; the time to be achieved could not now be altered. The Syrian people had been called to arms and the Sultan could not abandon them. Guizot asked if it was worth risking "the dangerous consequences that may result to all the world, from France not concurring in the settlement of the peace of Europe", but at the very time he was thus speaking, Europe was daily waiting for news of the fall of Acre, and not ready to be intimidated just as the end of hostilities seemed to be in sight. Palmerston

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1. Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 5th 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.9.

said that since the treaty had been made it must be executed, and we were not ready to withdraw from the position we had adopted. "M. Guizot seems, indeed, in the whole of their conversation to have gone upon the assumption that the Treaty of July last is not to be executed, and that the only thing to be considered is what mode of breaking that treaty would be the least disagreeable to the Contracting Parties."

France had always been welcome to join the alliance and she still was, but she would be met in coin if she was "to endeavour, by force of arms, to prevent a settlement distasteful to her, and calculated to defeat her unavowed designs." He professed himself in the dark as to what Guizot might mean by "exposing¹ to hazard the peace of Europe."

In Syria the war was going against the Egyptians slowly but quite surely, and in Egypt the recently arrived Colonel Galisse began the organisation of the defences in Abukir and Alexandria.² Bayrut and Tripoli had been evacuated and the battle of the Ardali heights fought in October; Ibrahim's biggest troop concentration left Zahle on November 21, and on December 29 he struck south from Damascus. The movement of the allied H.Q. down the coast from Bayrut to Acre, drove Ibrahim to adopt the route to Ma'an, instead of a direct march to Ramle. It was February 1841 before Ibrahim got to Gaza whence he took ship to Egypt. The journey was a tragic one for the Egyptians,

1. Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 12th 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII. [c 337] p.11.

2. Larking to Palmerston, October 6th 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII. [c 337] p.13.

and their losses en route led one to compare it to the 1812 retreat from Moscow.¹ "What has been done in Syria by Commodore Napier, by General Jochmus, and by Captain Walker, and the brave men under their command...destroyed the spell of Muhammad Ali's fortune."²

In September 1840, Richard Wood,³ a dragoman from the British Embassy in Constantinople, had reconnoitred the Syrian coast from Bayrut to Sayda on the "Cyclops", concerting with the local people on the best ways of arming them. As a result of his observations on the Egyptian defences of Sayda, the town was bombarded and taken on the 26th by a small force,⁴ most of the garrison of 3,000 being taken prisoner. Wood met the local divan of Sayda on the following day and read out a copy of the Sultan's firman nominating 'Izzet Pasha as the first governor of Syria after the occupation, and an Arabic version of the Treaty of July. Wood, by virtue of special powers accorded him by the Porte, nominated a governor of Sayda. Amid great enthusiasm he announced to the assembled people

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1. Jochmus to Palmerston enclosed in Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 140 of April 23rd 1841. F/O.78/433. See also Driault V. No.1. The losses during the retreat alone were in excess of 18,000 men.
 2. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Nov. 18th, A. & P. [1841] VIII. [c 377] p.14.
 3. Richard Wood, appointed student attaché to the Embassy in 1824. Employed in Syria in 1831, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 40. Appointed Dragoman to the Embassy October 1834, Consul at Damascus May 18, 1841. Appointed agent and Consul-General in Regency of Tunis, August 30, 1855. Made a C.B. Oct.13, 1865; and a K.C.M.G. Dec.10, 1877. Retired April 1, 1879. Made a G.C.M.G. Aug.29, 1879. (See F.O.List for 1888).
 4. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct.19, 1840. (5 enclosures) A. & P. [1841] VIII. [c.337] p.14.

that in future, rule would be by the Hatti Scheriff, and according to a system devoid of the taxative abuses with which they were familiar. On the 29th, with a force of 100 marines, he landed at the mouth of the Damour, in an effort to contact the Prince of the Mountain, and if possible the Amir Bashir himself. Relatives of the Prince met Wood in the vicinity of Damour; he gave them boyourouldis as sub-governors of their respective districts, and instructed them to cut off the Bayrut garrison should it try to join the main force. He believed that if Deir el-Kammar fell to the allies, Ibrahim's only alternatives were to bottle himself up in Acre or retreat southwards towards Haifa and Palestine. The Matawilah country just south of Sayda was ready to receive the allies and to help prevent Ibrahim reaching it by holding the Pass at Ras Nakora.

It was with the Prince of Lebanon, Ibrahim's collaborator, the Amir Bashir, that Wood had most difficulty. Although by now a very lukewarm supporter of Ibrahim, that Prince's position was jeopardised by whatever cause of action he might adopt. A reversion in his loyalty to the Porte at a time when Ibrahim might still be able to retain Syria by his military prowess, was as sure to see the end of his career, as was an active adhesion to Ibrahim should the allies win the struggle. Not knowing what to do for the best, Bashir chose the most suicidal of courses and did nothing at all. Wood felt obliged to set a time limit within which Bashir should announce his adhesion to the Sultan, rather than allow him to "use his authority to

our prejudice." On October 8, when the time limit expired, Wood gave a firman superseding him to Bashir al-Kassim,¹ nephew of the Amir and leader of the insurgents, who had proved his loyalty by being the first to join the revolt among the princes of the Mountain. On October 10 Ibrahim's troops were in full retreat towards Zahle from the Ardali heights, last major engagement in which they took part in Syria. Soliman Pasha abandoned Bayrut and escaped with a fifth of his men.

Events moved swiftly after the evacuation of Bayrut. The fall of Acre on November 3 was the critical point of the campaign, more, perhaps, than was the conflict on the Ardali heights. After Ardali it was still a moot point whether Ibrahim would abandon Syria, and there were many signs that from the collecting point at Zahle he might retire, not south to Egypt, but north through Big'a to the plain. But the ease with which Acre was taken finally pricked the bubble of Egyptian strength. No one doubted how the campaign would go from that time onward, and even though Egyptian troops were still in the north of Syria, Ponsonby could recommend a lifting of the blockade of the coast. On November 16 Palmerston wrote to Granville that "the rapid progress of events in Syria has put all contingent suggestions [by France] of an earlier date out of the question" even if they had not been infringements

1. Wood's Memorandum on his Services in Syria. F/O 78/961. For the date on which Bashir was appointed see Temperley "The Crimea", Note 265, p.442. Also, Wood to Ponsonby Oct.10, 1840, encl.2 in Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct.19, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.15.

of the July 15 treaty.¹ Stopford was told to offer Muhammad Ali Egypt hereditarily if he submitted promptly, and France was informed of this as a proof of our intention not to deny it to Muhammad Ali.² The pasha, for his own part, was inclining to the view that France could not, after all, assist him in the present crisis,³ and while there was still the hope that, by hanging on till spring, he might be saved by French negotiation, he took care to ensure the free transmission of British Indian mails, and not to obstruct British commercial interests in Egypt.

Ibrahim was still at Zahle in mid-November, his Kurds at Baalbek and another big force at Zebedani. Big forces were still in the north with Ahmed Menekli Pasha.

Wood set about the organisation of guerilla forces along the route which Ibrahim would have to take to Egypt.⁴ Thayka Said was given temporary command of Safa, Tiberias, Nasra, and Saour; others were appointed along the Damascus road and in the Jabal Halil (i.e. Hebron). These shaykhs Wood presented to Selim Pasha, the Turkish Commander in Chief, who approved their assignments. Arms were issued to them and their people, and their task was, first, to harry Ibrahim,

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1. Palmerston to Granville, Nov.16, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.33.
 2. Palmerston to Granville, Nov.16, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.34.
 3. No.35 Larking to Palmerston, Oct.28, 1840. A. & P. [1841] [c 377] p.37.
 4. Wood to Ponsonby, Nov.4, enclod. in Ponsonby to Palmerston. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 377] p.69.

and second, to close in on him if he stood and gave the allies battle. This was important work for the European land forces were wholly inadequate to, and not intended for, a major campaign. The badawl of Palestine had already, for the most part, made their submission, and the important towns and villages of Nablus, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jenin, Nazareth, Tiberias and Safad were all under men who had sworn their faith to Selim and the Musteshar. The country south and east of Acre was ready to bar Ibrahim's retreat. "Wood," Ponsonby believed, "by his ability and exertion had done more towards the success obtained in Syria than any other man, excepting Commodore Napier."¹

Muhammad Ali was thrown into extreme dejection by the news of the fall of Acre and not all the efforts of Walewski or Cochelet could dissuade him from deciding to surrender all if he could retain Egypt. The news of a change of government in France only confirmed him in his intentions. Reverses were damaging to his dynasty and not merely to his military circumstances. His people began to murmur against stringencies heretofore borne because of the tangible returns the Pasha was continuously able to show. Though the trend of events was in favour of the allies, it was not, at the time itself, so obvious as it later became that October had been the turn of the tide. It was partly obscured by the unabated activity

1. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Nov.11, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.69.

of the Frenchmen at the pasha's court and in Syria, activity which was reported by Larking and Ponsonby and well known in the Foreign Office. Père Etienne, General Superior of the Lazarists, came to Sayda from Egypt to prohibit the Lebanese Catholics from taking up arms against the Pasha.¹ Father Leroi of Aintura met him and advised him to return without coming ashore, as the clergy were in no mood for reconciliation. He returned without setting foot on land. The Austrian, Steindl, and Wood, believed Ratti-Menton at Damascus, like Méloises at Bayrut, to be at the bottom of the activity of French consular agents in Tripoli, Sayda, and the lesser towns. Méloises had a steam vessel at his command which he used to keep Alexandria informed of all that transpired in Syria. Wood got a ten-day quarantine enforced at Bayrut to cripple its functioning.

Apprehension among the allied commanders was also caused by the Turks themselves; 'Izzet Pasha was quite clearly incapable of bringing tranquillity to the province as it was progressively recovered from Ibrahim. A few practical gestures would have sufficed to confirm the people in their adhesion to the Sultan, but 'Izzet expected an unenquiring return by the Syrians to their rightful sovereign. From the stern Egyptian administration the people had derived certain benefits, albeit with qualifications. Yet Turkey could reap immediate

1. Steindl to Stürmer - received from Ponsonby. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.54.

advantage by cutting down the taxation which Ibrahim had so frequently stepped up. 'Izzet was not disposed to act on Wood's recommendations in this matter until he received specific instructions from the Porte, and in delay lay the danger. As yet, Ponsonby and Wood alone were concerned with the need for immediate concessions, and Ponsonby sought the withdrawal of 'Izzet. St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin were too busy congratulating themselves on the favourable turn of events to worry about Syria; Muhammad Ali was still the major interest and the reimposition of Turkish rule in the recovered province a secondary matter.

Certainly, it was not to be expected that Syria could be of much significance to the powers while the attitude of France was so menacing. French anger was at a high pitch and in the debate on the Address in the Chamber of Deputies, opened on November 25 by Soult, Thiers explained his late ministry's policy in a three-hours' speech.¹ The army was to be increased by 639,000 men, and explanations with the powers suspended till the spring; when the army was ready the Treaty of July 15 was to be revised, and modifications in the 1815 settlement made more suitable to the interests and glory of the French nation. Guizot tried, on the following day, to reduce the effect he knew the speech would have in Europe by arguing against it, but Palmerston was a pillar of solidarity in the face of

1. Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 27, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.60.

French threats. That France could be allowed into the settlement at this stage, he avowed was impossible, for "France declined to take an active part in the Alliance as a supporter of the Syrians; and in the recent debates in the French Chambers it has been openly avowed that France is the supporter of Muhammad Ali."

If she came into the conference now it would therefore be as the latter's protector. The general debate on the Address ended on December 3, and looking back over it Granville thought it "remarkable for the disclosure of the views and projects of the late Ministry."¹ Guizot had to tread carefully. Muhammad Ali's letter to Louis-Philippe putting himself at the disposal of the King and asking for his intervention was not published in the "Moniteur", but the reply to it urged him to accede to the terms Stopford had offered him.

Ponsonby reported that in Syria, as in Egypt, French agents (unspecified) were active in trying to stiffen the Egyptians to carry on the fight, and in causing trouble before the new Turkish administration could settle down. That régime was not very promising to start with, so when 'Izzet was replaced by Selim Pasha, Ponsonby thought it grounds for congratulation. To assist Selim, Wood whose official capacity had now become that of interpreter to Sir Charles Smith at H.Q. in Palestine, was recalled from "such trifling duties"² and told to "resume his active exertions among the Syrians."

1. Granville to Palmerston. Dec.4, 1840.

A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.63.

2. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Nov.18, 1840. A. & P.
[1841] VIII [c 337] p.72.

He was freed from all authorities in Syria, and though the agent of the Sultan in advising Selim, he reported to Ponsonby for instructions, advice and approval, and Wood's appointment was approved by Palmerston who acknowledged that Her Majesty's Government felt morally obliged to secure for the Syrians an acceptable administration.¹ Wood and Stopford had exhorted the Christians and Druses to return to their true master. This they had done manfully. It was now incumbent on Britain and her allies to see that the Syrians would not regret the change, which while it was justified to the powers on the grounds that it liquidated a territorial arrangement fraught with danger, required to be justified to the people of Syria also. Dissatisfaction with the settlement would lead to a renewal of unrest, and a reopening of the question the allied powers were trying to terminate. With Palmerston the issue was not the same as it was with Wood. To him it was a Syrian question first, while what measures Ponsonby and Wood should try to see effected by Selim did not immediately concern Palmerston - "Her Majesty's Govt. is not sufficiently conversant with the internal arrangements of Turkish Administration to be able to say what specific measures would be best .." - and his prime concern so far as Syria was concerned was for² "tranquillity".

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1. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Dec.12, 1840. A. & P.
[1841] VIII [c 337] p.78.
 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Dec.12.1840. A. & P.
[1841] VIII [c 337] p.78.

With the disappearance of Ibrahim into Egypt, Syria became the focus of attention for the representatives at Constantinople. The real difficulties attaching to a settlement, obscured for so long by the war, were only gradually revealing themselves in the opening months of 1841. That the search for a settlement would give so much trouble, no one could have anticipated, even if on no other grounds than the general ignorance of otherwise well-informed people, of the country and its requirements. Till mid-1841 the attention of the European governments was absorbed by the construction of a settlement à cinq which would terminate "that state of agitation regarding the affairs of the East, which ... disquieted the world and placed in jeopardy the peace of Europe." Thus preoccupied the cabinets did not turn to any serious consideration of Syria until after July 13, 1841. Not till then did Metternich elaborate his opinion that the former system of administration by pashas should be revived, with St. Jean's separated from the pashalik to which it had formerly belonged.¹ For the present, the British Foreign Office subscribed to his view, for lack of useful knowledge of Syria. It was the representatives at the Porte who, in the meantime, were obliged, by reports of dissatisfaction in Syria, to cast about for some alterations in the Turkish administration, alterations which at one and the same time would satisfy the

1. Metternich mentioned the scheme as early as November 1840, see Beauvale to Palmerston, Dec. 2. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p. 78; Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 6 of Jan. 19, 1841. F.O. 78/427.

changed outlooks of both rulers and ruled; and if it was the representatives at Constantinople who in time stimulated their governments to a concern for a satisfactory settlement of the Syrian question, the representatives themselves were made au fait with the nature of the problems requiring solution, by the consuls who had recently returned to their offices in the recovered province.

With the evacuation of Bayrut and the return of Consul Moore, Wood was appointed to be his vice-consul,¹ though for what immediate purpose is obscure, except that it gave the Porte extra inducement to place trust in him. He did not enter into any of the normal duties of his new appointment, and the restoration of the consulates to working order was left to the three who held them at the outbreak of hostilities.* Wood went with Sir Charles Smith as interpreter, as the H.Q. moved south after the retreating Ibrahim, and was not seen in Bayrut again until Moore's urgent request for the return of

1. Ponsonby made the appointment (Ponsonby to Palmerston, Sept. 26, A. & P. [1841] XXIX [c 323] p. 1044). Palmerston approved it. (Palmerston to Ponsonby, Oct. 17, p. 1060). Niven Moore, appointed Cancellier to the Embassy at Constantinople, Nov. 17, 1822; consul at Bayrut, Jan. 13, 1835; at Aleppo, May 15, 1841; reappointed to Bayrut, Nov. 27, 1841; was Acting Consul General for Syria, Dec. 5, 1848 till June 12, 1850; appointed Consul-General for Syria Dec. 13, 1853. Made a C.B., Oct. 30, 1860; retired Nov. 30, 1862.

* See Appendix A.

the Seraskier in February 1841, when the arrival of Albanians threatened to aggravate a sufficiently disturbed state of affairs. Only then did Wood take up his duties as adviser to Selim Pasha, whose appointment as successor to 'Izzet Pasha, Ponsonby also secured. Moore's initial difficulty was to find himself a fresh residence, his former one having been destroyed. Stopford ordered N.W. Werry back to Damascus as soon as the Egyptians left (Dec.22) and he was installed in his own residence again by January 4.¹ His son, writing his first despatch to Palmerston after his return to Aleppo described a triumphal entry amid the acclamation of Muslims and Christians alike.²

The consuls were too interested in their personal futures during the first weeks of their return to pay very much attention to the confused state of affairs about them; from the correspondence of all three it is evident that they sensed something was in the air in London.³ Where their fears

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1. His archives had been left with his Dutch colleague.
 2. F.H.S. Werry to Ponsonby No.1 of Jan.29, (Copy) enclo. in F.H.S. Werry to Palmerston No.6 of Feb.15, 1841. F/O.78/448. Was employed in affording assistance to Chesney's expedition, and subsequently that of Captain Lynch on the Euphrates. Acting Consul at Aleppo 1837-41; Vice-Consul at Mytilene 1842; Vice-Consul Benghazi 1852; transferred to Tunis 1856; intermittently acting Consul-General 1856-67; retired 1869.
 3. F.H.S. Werry to Bidwell (private) Feb.15. F/O.78/448. Moore to Palmerston No.17, March 24; Moore to Bidwell (private) March 11, 1841. F/O.78/449. N.W. Werry to Bidwell (private) March 22nd, 1841; May 20, 1841; July 19, 1841. F/O.78/447.

originated they do not reveal, and they received no hints from the Office to sustain them. Yet that Syria presented itself suddenly as a problem of some magnitude was shown by the attention now being given in the Foreign Office to the organisation of consulates in Syria. The evacuation by Ibrahim, and the peculiar political requirements of Lebanon which Turkey was not considered by many people to be able to meet without European guidance, foreshadowed an extension of consular duties beyond their usual limits. France regarded the problem similarly. Her consuls were to restore France to her former position of influence with the Maronite Christians, without alienating Muhammad Ali by a too close association with the consuls of those powers which had coerced the pasha. This latter part of French policy for the immediate future was more important than the re-establishment of confidence and amity with the Maronites, and before July 1841 there were no distinct signs in the Levant that France had abandoned Muhammad Ali's interest. Thus N.W. Werry wrote in April:

"I have learnt from a source which I consider authentic that some important changes are contemplated by the French Government in its diplomatic relations with this part of the Ottoman Empire and with the Viceroy of Egypt." 1

The French consul in Tarsus, Juchereau de St. Denys was destined for Alexandria, as was the acting-consul in Bayrut when M. Bourrée should return from France. These two and a

1. Clapperton to Ponsonby, No.5 of Mar.20 (copy) enclo. in Ponsonby to Palmerston, No.134, April 21, 1841.
F/O.78/433.

third were to go to Egypt in place of Cochelet, now in France

"to try the effect of other agents upon H.M. Ali [sic] as it is distinctly stated by its partisans that the Oriental question is by no means settled which gives room to suspect that it does not wish it settled in the manner prescribed by the four Powers."

Moore, too, recognised the beginnings of French activity when he reported his belief that a French consul-general for Syria was about to be appointed, now that "the french" were "doing all they can to recover their lost influence in Lebanon."¹ A little uncharitably, he did not think the arrival of grain for the Mountain from France was motivated by humanitarianism alone.²

Besides the incentives to a reorganisation of the consular offices provided by the access of Syria's political importance and by the opinion of the British consuls that her French colleagues were about to initiate a drive to recover their lost prestige, it was also expected that the return of the country to the Sultan would lead to a renewed interest in it, as a potential market for their goods on the part of British manufacturers. The north Syrian trade, though never seriously dislocated by the occupation, was destined to receive renewed attention from English manufacturers, now that so many European countries were beginning to exclude British goods with the intention of nurturing their own industries.

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1. Moore to Bidwell (private) Jan.27, 1841. F/O.78/449.
 2. Moore to Palmerston, No.14 of Mar.22m, 1841. FO.78/449.

Though this attention began in the 1830's,¹ capital could not be attracted to a country over which the gloom of imminent strife hung for eight years. The fortress-like nature of Ibrahim's Syria was not calculated to attract the investor. Now that Ibrahim was gone the prospect was brighter, and the consular service would need to be maintained numerically and increased in efficiency, in anticipation of a revival of the onetime greatness of the Aleppo market.

The political problems presenting themselves for solution in the recovered province were manifold, and in some respects novel. The Turks in 1841, more so than the Bourbons in 1815, had learned and forgotten nothing, and with this most unsatisfactory disposition came back to power in Syria.

Under the recently deposed Amir Bashir the Lebanon had been ruled with the rod of iron. Although lying within one of the Syrian pashalike - that of Acre - the Lebanon was one of five regions in the Empire possessing a privileged type of administration in which local princes and dignitaries took

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1. Trade had been good for both sides in the 1830's, to the improvement, it was widely thought, of our political relations with the Ottoman Empire. Palmerston to Nourri Effendi, Oct. 23, 1835. F/O.195/122. Confirmatory statistics in Bailey: The Economics of British Foreign Policy, Journal Mod. History, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec. 1940), also Bowring's Report on Syria. F/O.78/380. On June 13th, 1844, Lt./Col. Williams wrote to Stratford Canning from Erzerum, "The quantity of English goods passing through this place for Persia is truly surprising and I have no doubt it will still increase to a great extent." (Aberdeen Papers, Add. MSS. 43139). The agitation for better communications with Britain came from the merchants in Smyrna chiefly. (Canning to Aberdeen, March 30th 1842 (separate) F/O.78/476.

the place of pashas as the supreme representatives of the Sultan.¹ Rather than modify the system according to local needs, the Turks preferred to give these regions a distinct administration within the framework of the pasha system. The Lebanon's ethnic and religious patchwork made it one of these and for centuries it had been ruled by local princes, unmolested in their rule so long as they recognised the suzerainty of the Porte, paid the required taxation, and kept the province quiet. The Shehabi family had possessed the reins of government for the past 140 years, ruling in the style of the despot, and it is extremely doubtful whether any other technique would have been equally effective in the preservation of order.² The rule of the Amir Bashir Shehab undoubtedly brought a peace without precedent, but it was a very mixed blessing. The preservation of peace by cold-blooded murder, mutilation, deportation and wholesale confiscation of property is near to being a contradiction in terms, but Bashir's rule was of that nature. Machiavelli might have applauded it as did the coterie of shaykhs and amirs about Bashir but the Druse shaykhs and ordinary people of all sects were bitter in their hatred of it. The Prince of Lebanon, by a ruthless technique extorted far more from the

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1. The others were Moldo-Wallachia, Samos, Crete, Mount Athos.
 2. For the rule of the Shehabi prior to 1840 see Churchill, Mount Lebanon, London [1853].

people in taxes than he ever sent to the Porte. The Druse shaykhs who resisted him were dispossessed, their property handed out among the Prince's supporters. Such a system only served to exacerbate the hostility between the great native houses, divided loyalties occasionally achieving the supreme mischief of splitting the family asunder.

The continuance of the system, uninfluenced by external forces, depended on the Shehabi themselves to a great extent. If they could produce another Bashir to succeed the old Amir, the system which favoured a nucleus of families might endure. The Amir who began life as a Druse had latterly adopted Christianity, finding that his main support came from its professors, and from the Maronite Patriarch in particular. The Patriarch was as much a prop of Bashir, as Bashir became of Ibrahim; perhaps more so because while Ibrahim could have dispensed with Bashir it is doubtful if Bashir could have dispensed with the Patriarch. The Patriarch's hold on the spiritual allegiance of the Maronite Christians was stronger¹ than Bashir's authority over them. Seeing this, Bashir enlisted the Patriarch on his own side, and their marriage de convenance was of incalculable use to both. Bashir's secession from Druzism, and his close association with the Maronite

1. The Patriarch's Encyclical to the people of Deir-el-Kammar (in Rose to Palmerston, No.87 of Sept.16, 1841 F/O.78/456) shows the medieval nature of his dominion. The penalty for reading the books "filled with corruption" of the American missionaries was for the unfortunate to fall "under the great excommunication..Let the windows of Heaven be open, and rain upon him fire and brimstone..let the earth open her mouth and hell swallow him up alive."

Christians alienated the Druse families too far for reconciliation ever to be possible. The question of who was to succeed the old Amir was deferred by the arrival in 1832 of Ibrahim in Syria, nor was it ultimately solved by the Mountain itself. Wood precipitated the question in 1840, but also answered it by his appointment of a Shehab scarcely less old than the prince he deposed.

However loyal to his Sultan, and influential in the Mountain, the ex-Amir's nephew, the Amir Bashir al-Kassim Shehab was over seventy and a personally unimpressive man. Like the Seraskier Selim Pasha his excellent military qualities were not equalled by a capacity to rule. His contribution to the expulsion of Ibrahim had been greater than that of the Turks themselves. Nevertheless he only became prince by the default of his uncle. Wood had persistently applied to the latter to return in his allegiance to the Sultan and had he done so, he indubitably would have been confirmed in his position as prince; he did not and Wood, who for weeks had carried a firman with a blank date space, was obliged to fill it in and give it to the nephew as a sign that he had replaced his uncle.¹ It was unfortunate that the bestowal of the principedom was made as a reward for services rendered, instead of being given to the most capable and eligible man. The

1. Wood to Ponsonby, Oct.12, 1840, enclos. in Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct.19, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.18.

ex-Amir, suitably supervised, would have been a better choice in the opinion of many people, but his character was, in reality, too strong for Turkish supervision, and in time he would have thrown it over again. Also, he was so much the object of Druse execration that his position could only have been maintained with force.¹ But there were others.

What was the attitude of the Porte? She had derived little advantage from Syria for nearly ten years, and in 1840 she showed a natural but unwise desire to make up for lost time. The province ought to pay for its liberation, and its new pashas were determined to extract the additional wealth which Ibrahim and Bashir had got for themselves. That the province needed a respite from excessive taxation, that excessive taxation had been the prime cause of revolt, did not matter very much to the Turks. Yet it is only right to remember that they had good reasons for not making many conciliatory

1. The general ignorance of Europe as to the different peoples inhabiting the Lebanon has been fossilised in the Blue Books. The authority by which Bashir assumed the principedom was entitled "Firman appointing Emir Bechir el-Kassim Prince of the Druses" according to A. & P. [1841] XXIX [c.323] p.977, and was obviously based on the assumption that there were mainly Druses in Lebanon though in truth the Druses were a small sect. Palmerston too persisted in talking of the Druse authority in Lebanon until mid 1841. Thus, "although it would be very imprudent and unjust to attempt to deprive the Druses of any of the privileges and immunities which by prescription they enjoy, it would be very inexpedient unnecessarily to extend the Druse jurisdiction and system over a town like Beirut." (Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.84 of April 19th 1841, F.O.78/428). He approved of Ponsonby sending to Syria for information before concerting with his colleagues on its future government." The first steps towards forming or suggesting a plan for the future, is to obtain full and accurate information as to the past." (Palmerston to Ponsonby No.52 of Mar.23, 1841. F.O.78/428).

gestures towards the mountaineers. They had been denied possession of the whole of Syria for a long period, and the ex-Amir had abetted their expulsion in spite of the fact that if anyone should have been grateful to his sovereign it was he. He was one of the few privileged princes in the empire enjoying a very real independence of his suzerain, and was the recipient of several fiscal concessions. Now that the boot was on the other foot and the Turkish power was restored to a plenitude not enjoyed since before the rule of the ex-Amir, the Turks wanted to make the most of the situation and to strengthen their hold, not only on the Syrian pashaliks, but on the Lebanon itself. Bashir had abused his autonomous position; by reason of his default Turkey was now entitled to reduce the degree of his successor's autonomy.

The mountaineers had received promises from all manner of people in the name of the Turkish government, that in return for their active co-operation against Ibrahim they would be free from the abuses to which the Egyptian had subjected them. The amount of taxation would be reduced by eliminating those taxes which Ibrahim had introduced for the first time into Syria. The inviolability of property and person would be secured by the operation of the Sultan's Hatti-Scheriff; by the same document equality of the sects before the law was promised. Above all the Christians would have restored to them their traditional privilege of being ruled by a Christian amir of their own choosing. All these

promises were made in the name of the Porte, and by her authority. It is doubtful however if the exemption from all taxation for a period of three years granted to the people of the Kasrawan by Selim Pasha was authorised by the Porte, and certainly she had no intention of accepting an obligation she had not sanctioned.

The difference between the intentions and Syrian expectations was very great then and a cause of much anxiety to those interested in a rapid and peaceful settlement for Syria, and, more particularly, the Lebanon. The Turks wanted to increase their grip on the privileged province at the same time that they returned to power in the surrounding pashaliks; the mountaineers, having just emerged from Ibrahim's régime wanted a new lease of personal freedom; the Turks wanted the Mountain to pay its share towards the cost of the liberation, the mountaineers were not disposed to accept fresh Turkish taxation in the place of that against which they had revolted; the Turks intended to restore a reverence for the supremacy of Islam, the mountaineers intended to cling to the letter of the Gulhané decree; above all the Turks wanted to prevent another Shehab coming to power if he was going to follow in the steps of the ex-Amir; the people of the Mountain had been promised that they should appoint their own prince and while the ex-Amir was a general figure of execration among them, his family could still command respect among the Christians, if never again among the Druses,

and the appointment of his nephew had been generally acclaimed.

Great Britain and Austria had allowed officers of their armed forces to be the bearers of the promises which the Turks made,¹ and while Palmerston and Metternich were largely indifferent to the manner in which the promises might be implemented,² they were not prepared to countenance an evasion of them, lest their own good faith be called into question by the Syrians.³ At first they saw no real grounds for believing that the Turks would not honour their self-imposed obligations, but once 'Izzet Pasha, and, after him, Selim Pasha applied themselves to bringing the province back to normal after the expulsion, it became evident that the Turkish régime in Syria was reluctant to allow the Mountain to retain its large measure of independence.

The powers saw the essential injustice of the Turkish attitude. The peoples of the Lebanon had been promised that they should be ruled by a prince of their own choosing, and Bashir had only taken office on the guarantee that he should be in no wise curtailed in the exercise of the power his predecessor had wielded. This guarantee he had in writing.

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1. Stopford and Napier were the most eminent.
 2. During the occupation Palmerston warned Muhammad Ali against "the exercise of severities towards the Christians of Syria" (Palmerston to Campbell, No.5 of May 9, 1836, F.O.78/281).
 3. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.40 of Mar.2nd 1841, F.O.195/180. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.43 of Mar.4th 1841. F.O.195/180.

Was an adjustment possible whereby the Turks, while honouring the promises made, could feel that they now had some safeguard against the misuse of Lebanese autonomy? And could an arrangement be made which would satisfy not only the Turks and Christians, but also the Druses? Palmerston, Metternich, Ponsonby and Wood believed that the traditional constitutional arrangement already in force would suffice. All it needed was honest operation. If Bashir al-Kassim continued to show the same loyalty to the Porte that he had already shown, the Turks had nothing to fear. The taxation question could be settled by a compromise in which the Turkish Treasury could recoup itself for recent expenditure, without mulcting the Mountain. The mountaineers, by being sensible and realising that they were still the Sultan's subjects, could not grumble at being requested to pay reasonable taxes, which were only a fraction of Ibrahim's exactions. Bashir could, and, indeed, must, make an effort to win Druse confidence, by ruling them through the intermediary of the Shaykhs Bashir¹, and by showing every consideration to their religious eccentricities. This would mean keeping the Patriarch in check, and moderating his antagonism towards the Druses. Above all, Bashir must lean on his Turkish superiors enough to enforce his decisions, yet not so much as to bring on himself the censure of his subjects. The Turks, in their turn, would need to back his authority,

1. Naaman Djinblatt, who became the prince Bashir al-Kassim's intermediary with the Druses, was of the family of the Shaykhs Bashir.

actively if necessary, yet only at his invitation. Unfortunately, so many requisite qualities of tolerance, patience and sympathy with the other parties' points of view, were not in evidence.

The consuls of England, Austria, Russia and Prussia too were anxious that the Porte should show some sense of proportion, particularly in their relations with Lebanon, and though the part they played in moderating Turkish interference and in procuring for the Syrians their rights might at first glance seem an unwarrantable activity in affairs which were not their concern, their efforts were also directed towards bringing the sects into a more dutiful relationship with their rightful sovereign. By the Capitulations they were restricted to a supervision of the interests of their nationals and had no powers of intercession between Turk and subject except in so far as their own nationals or protected persons were concerned. ¹

1. The powers of consuls in the Levant had always been very ill-defined, and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of August 24th 1843, which was supposed to give the required degree of definition, hardly altered consular practice in the East. (Text in Hertslet, VI, 500, 840). In 1844 a Foreign Office Memorandum (F.O.352/28) said "The defects of the present system would warrant an abrupt change in the constitution of the whole body" (No Date). The first "General Instructions for Her Majesty's Consuls Issued by the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department" appeared in 1846, and "Instructions to Consuls relating to Matters affecting the British Merchant Marine under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854" in 1856. These 2 sets of rules have been continually revised; in 1879, 1893 and 1907 complete revisions appeared.

The Turks initiated their first consular legislation in 1860 and the first thing of importance was "Regulations concerning the Diplomatic Corps and Consuls of the Sublime Porte on Leave, Sefer 1, 1287" (i.e. May 1st 1870). Consular Regulations appeared in the 1870s, Consular Instructions in 1884. (Aristarchi Bey, Legislation Ottomane, Constantinople, [1874], Vol.3.

It was the promises made to the Lebanese peoples in the process of recovering Syria that gave the consuls the right to interfere, and to press their advices on the Turkish governors after 1840.

Had all the promises been defined by Turkey before they were uttered, the occasions on which the consuls might legitimately have interfered would have been specifically recognisable, but some of the promises were couched in general terms - and while this might have encouraged the Turks to believe that they had committed themselves to very little in particular, and therefore to nothing they did not want to concede, the consuls were able, by the same breadth of interpretation the Turks had allowed themselves, to interfere on any occasions when they considered the promises were being violated or evaded. The whole question of European intervention therefore hinged on the various interpretations of the promises made, and without being prodded to it the Turks would have almost certainly withheld the privileges in taxation and curtailed that of Lebanese autonomy.

The first Turkish instrument of government, 'Izzet Pasha, was in Palmerston's opinion "not a man well qualified for the particular duty which has been imposed upon him" since "the interests of the Sultan and the honour of the British Crown require that the Pasha sent to govern in any part of Syria should be a man who will, actively and in good faith, carry into effect the provisions of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhané, and fulfil the promises made to the Syrians in the name of the Sultan by the British Agent, Mr. Wood." 1

1. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Nov.9, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.24.

The Foreign Secretary himself initiated the practice of interfering with the mechanism of the Turkish administration in Syria by exerting pressure for the removal of 'Izzet Pasha.¹ The practice was widely followed by the diplomatic and the consular corps. It was possible for most Turkish misdemeanours to be construed as affecting "the interests of the Sultan, and the honour of the British [or any other] Crown", and consequently the consular corps if it did not ordain what would and would not be done, was swift to press for changes of policy, personnel or tactics when these did not correspond to their own ideas.

The nature of the privileges was not clearly thought out, and it was unfortunately, at least for the Syrians, that they stayed in this nebulous form until, and after, they were made to them. Palmerston had thought there were "various ways in which the Syrians might be supported and assisted .. it being explained to them .. that the support of the Allies is given to them on the understanding that they remain faithful to the Sultan; but that the Allies will recommend to the Sultan to grant to his Syrian subjects such future arrangements as may make their condition happy and prosperous." 2

Wood himself had been the official bearer of the promises on behalf of the Turkish Government, yet he too had made general as well as specific promises.

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1. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Nov.9, 1840. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.24.
 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.149 of June 15th and enclo. F.O.195/182, in which the establishment of Bayrut as a free port is urged.

It is more than likely that the promises, as made by him, were rather more attractive than he was authorised to make them. Wood was a Catholic like the Maronites, he enjoyed the unusual importance of the position to which the Turks appointed him; the lack of precision in his instructions gave him a dangerous latitude of expression. That he was not authorised to promise a restoration of specific privileges alone is shown by the fact that the representatives at Constantinople proceeded to analyse the nature of Lebanon's traditional privileges more than six months after general promises of their revival had been made.

By mid-February 1841 the centre of drafting activity switched from Constantinople to London, from Turkey's relations with Egypt to Europe's relations with France, and Ponsonby¹ found himself able to turn to a settlement of Syria itself. He now had time to read Moore's report to the Albanian soldiers² in Bayrut. Colonel Rose² was requested to put in writing what he had "seen and heard" in Syria, but his report, good though

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1. The Turkish fleet was at Marmorice on the way from Egypt, Ibrahim's army was in Egypt again. The pasha's firman confirming his dynasty in the rule of Egypt was sent on Feb.14. On March 16 Palmerston sent Ponsonby a copy of a draft Protocol for a Conference of the Powers, and another for a convention including France. Palmerston ordered the British consuls back to Egypt as soon as their colleagues were ready to go, "and the sooner the better". Palmerston to Hodges March 2, 1841. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.240.
 2. Rose was sent to Syria to join Sir Charles Smith's staff and to organise the staff arrangements of the Turkish troops. He was Assistant Adjutant-General to Sir Charles Smith. (Palmerston to Rose, Oct.20th, 23rd 1840. Rose Papers Add. MSS.42796).

it was, dwelt more on the military aspects of the campaign recently ended.¹ For an intimate knowledge of the state of feeling in Syria, for guidance on the political requirements of the province, Ponsonby looked to Wood, who was an astute and indefatigable observer.

"Some short time ago Baron de Stürmer proposed that we should consult about making regulations for the settlement of Syria. I replied, that it was a subject of great magnitude, requiring strict examination into facts and mature deliberation, and that I should think it best to see our situation more clearly before we acted. I am very unwilling to act upon this matter ... until after I shall have satisfied myself that the real interests and welfare of the Syrians and of the Porte are to be promoted by the measures that may be proposed. I have written to Syria to procure from thence statements of the precise nature of the old institutions of that country, and for information whether or not the people generally were well content with those institutions, and how they could be altered or modified so as to produce satisfaction and security against the abuses of authority ... I have asked for information respecting taxes." 2

Wood was too preoccupied at the moment, along with Moore, with getting the Albanians withdrawn from Bayrut, to have time to supply Ponsonby with the information he required. Moore and the Werrys had been left in the rear of the allied armies to put their consulates into working order, to reorganise the archives, assess damage to British property, hear the complaints of British nationals who, as traders and business men

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1. Ponsonby to Palmerston, No.70 of Feb.21, 1841. F.O.78/431.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.52 of Mar.23, 1841. F.O.78/427.
 2. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Feb.25, 1841. A. & P. [1841] VIII
[c 337] p.343.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.72 of April 8, 1841. F.O.78/427.
Ponsonby to Palmerston, No.75 of Feb.25, 1841. F.O.195/185.

had been caught up in Bayrut during the bombardment. It was a heavy programme rendered more exacting by the state of confusion Ibrahim had left in his wake. In the absence of the Seraskier in the south with the armed forces Moore was largely left to himself in Bayrut. The Turkish governor of the town was not the sort of individual so badly needed to restore law and order with tact yet firmness, and when a force of Albanians, which had marked its passage down the coast from Tripoli to Bayrut by a series of outrages on the civilian populace, reached the town in early February they caused general consternation. The governor's first inclination was to order all women and children into the city from the country. Moore prevailed on him to withdraw his order and wrote to the H.Q. at Jaffa for assistance, and the prompt return of Turks of ability as well as authority.¹ The Albanians had shown signs of making trouble, and the Spanish vice-consul had been fired upon; "the town is evidently in the power of these brigands." Within four days the "Vesuvius" was in St. George's Bay with Husayn Pasha and Wood aboard. The Seraskier Selim Pasha quickly followed himself, and his actions, in contrast to those of the Turkish governor of Bayrut, were decisive. He called the town shari'ah together on the 19th February, and on the following day convened a meeting to which all the consuls were summoned, in order to hear complaints against the Albanians

1. Moore to Palmerston, No.8, Feb.23rd 1841, and 1 enclo.
F.O.78/449.

and to allocate blame.¹ The meeting decided that the Albanians should be moved to Malatia gradually.²

On March 23 the Porte agreed to the withdrawal. Since Ponsonby's last meeting with Stürmer, Titow had been to see him, having been instructed by Nesselrode to concert with him for a rapid settlement of the Syrian question. Titow's instructions stated that he was to give his attention to obtaining, not whatever the Syrians wanted, but the fulfilment of the promises made to them by Wood in the name of the Sultan.³ He was ready enough to accept any temporary arrangement the Porte might make but an ultimate settlement must include full satisfaction of the promises; since only Wood had officially made them, he was alone capable of saying how far any of the promises had already been honoured. He had been on the spot for six months now. Titow suggested Wood should be recalled to enlighten the representatives of the state of Syria, "the wishes, wants and rights of the Syrians", and to advise on the manner in which the ancient liberties of the Mountain could be restored without an infraction of the Sultan's authority.

The absence of statistical information or informative literature on the remoter parts of the Empire threw great

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1. Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 6 and 1 enclosure. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.347.
 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.67 of April 2, 1841. F.O.195/181.
 3. Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 17, 1841. A. & P. [1841] VIII [c 337] p.358.

weight on the testimony and knowledge of individuals like Wood, who had passed several years in Lebanon.

Wood was sent a letter in accordance with the wish of Titow, recalling him, but it was mid April before he could leave Syria.¹ The unity of the sects was breaking down now that the common enemy had disappeared, and not all the precautions that Wood had taken could prevent the reappearance of disorder between the tribes and the sects. Lack of military support caused the failure of Wood's interim régime until the appointment of some more permanent administration. Until the first signs of disturbance, Wood had thought the tranquillity of the country due in no small measure to himself; his disappointment was now considerable. "After a great deal of perseverance and unpleasant discussion with the ex-Seraskier 'Izzet Pasha, on his first arrival, I succeeded in appointing such Governors to the different districts and Towns as I thought could be depended upon for their loyalty and prudence in governing the Syrians. I nominated also to the various offices under them my own people to act as checks upon them, to follow out my directions and to keep me regularly... informed of all that occurred...complete success attended every undertaking...and the Syrians were ruled for 6 months without any ostensible form of Government..."²

The breakdown was due to the feudal lords of Maronite Lebanon trying to recover their swiftly vanishing power, and to Druse indulgence, in the pastime, so long denied them, of

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1. As above.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.72, April 8, 1841. F/O 78/427.
 2. Wood to Ponsonby, Feb.17, 1841, enclo.1 in Moore to Palmerston, No.10 of Mar.1st 1841. F/O 78/449.

fratricidal feud. Wood was inclined to interpret the present effervescence as a reaction to the rigidity of Ibrahim's rule, and a release of energy which would prove of short duration. In the absence of competent Turkish officials it had devolved on him to lead back the people to peaceful habits, "calm their agitated minds and rob imperceptibly the feudal Lords of assumed rights, they have ceased to enjoy in reality for ages." The Turkish Seraskier, and the pasha of Damascus deferred to his opinion because of his superior knowledge of the country, and the new prince was a willing puppet in his hands, to such an extent that Wood could tell Ponsonby, "I have given instructions to the Emir Bechir for the Establishment of provincial regulations for its [Lebanon's] administration until the sanction of the Porte can be received." 1

These regulations were calculated to achieve two ends, the strengthening of the Syrian attachment to the Sultan, and the loosening of the feudal tie between local lord and man. It is evident in which stratum of society Wood located the current of independence from the Porte. The employment of the feudal lords as governors was an ironical manoeuvre. "By the re-establishment of order and peace in Mount Lebanon the Sublime Porte will gain an accession of moral and physical power in the very centre of Syria, to be made use to us in suppressing confusion, and anarchy in the adjoining mountainous districts."

Preoccupied with watching the progress of his scheme, and anxious at the signs of its breakdown in the shape of growing unrest not only between Maronites and Druses, but between

1. Wood to Ponsonby, Feb.17, 1841. enclo.1 in Moore to Palmerston, No.10 of Mar.1st 1841. F.O.78/449.
Moore to Palmerston, No.11 of Mar.9th 1841. F.O.78/449.

Druses and Druses, and Christians and Muslims, Wood did not leave Syria till April 17, but in the meantime sent Ponsonby a report giving some of the information Titow and Stürmer wanted supplied.

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 Syria, he reported, had traditionally been split into the four sanjaqs of Adana, Aleppo, Acre and Damascus, each with a ferik. A supreme central majlis of twelve was based on Damascus, four members coming from Constantinople, a Muslim Syrian from each sanjaq, and a rayah from each. Each rayah represented the predominant non-Muslim sect in his sanjaq, so that there was a Maronite for Aleppo, an orthodox Greek for Adana, an "Iseralite" for Acre and a Greek Catholic for Damascus. This council was supreme in civil matters, appointing individuals to subordinate councils and offices. In the other sanjaqs there was an Ayalet majlis each with twelve members, six being Muslim and six Christian; the Christians again represented the largest sects. With each ferik or military lieutenant-governor was a Defterdar from the Porte, holding supreme civil authority and presiding over the majlis. The ferik whose function was exclusively military was the nominee of the Seraskier. There were two financial secretaries for all Syria, one for the North, and one for the South. After supreme and ayalet majlisi, there were local municipal councils in Tarsus, Aintab, Ladhiqiya, Tripoli, Homs, Hamah, the Lebanon,

1. Wood to Sublime Porte, Feb.22, 1841, enclo.3 in Moore to Palmerston, No.10 of Mar.1st, 1841. F.O.78/449.

Bayrut, Sayda, Sur, Nablus and Jaffa, on which the Kassaba or faubourgs as well as the big villages of the district were represented. The members chose their own president.

Mount Lebanon had lain within the Sanjaq of Acre, though being distinct from it by nature of its special administration. The Seraskier was supreme in the whole province of Syria and the prince of Lebanon came beneath his authority. In the settlement of any difficulties the prince could call on the ferik of the sanjaq of Acre for military aid, or on the advice of the Defterdar. He was not obliged to take either at any time unless he proved incapable of bearing his responsibilities. The Shehabi had always been strong enough to dispense with Turkish aid, and the ex-Amir had tried to exclude Turks from the Mountain. Officials, in his time, were regarded as intruders, with no right to be there; the indifference of Turkish officialdom had allowed the attitude of the Shehabi to permeate their aristocratic supporters and to ossify, making it increasingly difficult for the Turks ever to regain their original position of authority. The Porte had done nothing to stop this dangerous process. The problem now was to re-introduce Turkish officials in a more than nominal capacity, to ensure that the Mountain did not revert to its absolutely independent status.

Wood followed his report to Constantinople after a brief interval, but had to wait about Buyukdere until such time as the European representatives called for him.

By the time Wood left it became evident that Syria was going to give a lot of trouble. The enthusiasm for the Sultan subsided swiftly, except among the ordinary people. Then came reaction and the breakdown of the unity of the Mountain. The Turks, by incredible folly, brought the Albanian irregulars into Bayrut only three months after the city had been evacuated. The people were ready to resist them, blow for blow, should they cause trouble. Moore knew this when he wrote to Gaza in February for support. The Albanians were withdrawn, but the mountaineers had learned to suspect the Turks again. The vacillation of the governor of Bayrut was not wiped out by Selim's prompt action.

The governor of Bayrut might have been ineffective but he had no potential for doing positive damage as had the governor of Damascus. Nejjib Pasha, by his methodical reactionary policy towards Christians made himself popular with the Muslims but he seriously jeopardised the success of any permanent settlement which the Porte might introduce in the future. Sent as governor by Reschid, Nejjib had been Muhammad Ali's wakil for many years. Feeling, however, that Ibrahim had given the Syrian Christians too much freedom he introduced regulations pleasing to the Muslim population, and bearing hard on the Christian minorities. The Damascenes were predominantly Muslim, and there more than anywhere else the Christian was on sufferance. Furthermore, the Christians had not been wise enough to enjoy the toleration Ibrahim gave them,

quietly, but chose instead to come into occasional controversy and trials of physical strength with the Muslims. Nejib's programme, forbidding Christians to enter Damascus on horse-back, and obliging them to dress in black was a revenge for those days.¹ More than the anti-Christian discrimination, Nejib's appointment of Abdul Hadi as governor of Gaza, and muhasil of its surrounding districts was suspected by Colonel Rose, acting commander of the British detachments still in Syria, and by Wood and Moore.² Hadi had helped Ibrahim to take Syria and had defended it against the Sultan in the late war; the sight of such friends of Muhammad Ali appearing in responsible positions in the province which had caused all the trouble excited both the annoyance and the concern of the consular corps in general, with the exception of Ratti-Menton³ who got on excellently with Nejib.

There was another cause of turbulence besides the Turks and this was Druse dissatisfaction with the new Amir. The Druses had been the backbone of resistance to the Egyptian occupation, and the greatest sufferers under the ex-Amir's rule before that. An expedition sent to the Haouran by Ibrahim in 1835 was shattered; a bigger force, largely Maronite,

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1. Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 15, 1841. Enclo.2.
A. & P. [1843] LX [c 455] p.6.
 2. Rose to Palmerston, May 4, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX
[c 456] p.149.
 3. Rose to Palmerston, No.3, under Flying Seal, July 26.
F/O.78/406.
Rose to Palmerston, No.77, of Aug.14. F/O.78/406.

under Soliman Pasha, had to extricate itself by an armistice. When Wood came to the coast in 1840, he took the earliest opportunity to solicit Druse help. In the expulsion they had taken a prominent part. The Druses watched the succession of one Shehab by another with suspicion, attributing the appointment to Wood's religious affinity with the Maronites, and were unwilling to be governed, as they had been for the past twenty years, with extreme severity. The Druse chiefs wanted a revival of their feudal independence as it had existed before Sumkanea.¹ The spirit of clan solidarity - asibiyyah - held the Druse feudality together so tightly that there was no variation from this opinion among the lower orders. Furthermore, if anything was to be done, it ought to be done before Bashir's rule settled down.

Had Bashir al-Kassim been a younger and a popular man, he might have dispensed with the guidance given him in such great measure by Wood, Moore and Rose. Had he been of the same stamp as his predecessor, he might have commanded local respect, if not affection but his reputation, made in war, as the first to espouse the Sultan's cause was soon forgotten. He was too old to undertake the problems besetting any holder of his office and had little realisation of their nature, let alone their solutions. He was also too old to change his autocratic outlook to satisfy the hopes of the people for a

1. In 1821.

more tolerable rule; he was a Christian yet there were others more competent. He owed his position to the fact that he was a Shehabi, yet there was even a Shehab who was more popular. The Amir Amin, the "Pen of the Mountain" was a man of learning as well as prestige, and the heir to great wealth. Bashir al-Kassim was a bad choice, and Wood and Ponsonby were primarily responsible for it.¹

Bashir's shortcomings could not be entirely overcome by taking his responsibilities from him. Colonel Rose and Wood were his chief advisers; he took their counsel uncritically and made no effort to do without it. The position was abnormal. In a country like Syria where the individual counted for so much, the successor of the ex-Amir needed to be of vigorous character. Wood appointed a former collector of customs at Bayrut but now Moore's dragoman as secretary to the prince;² an intelligent man but one very much under English influence. Through Mr. Misk Wood, and therefore Ponsonby, had a direct link with the prince, and from him they received intelligence of all who wrote to the Amir, and came to know the sentiments of the Patriarch, the amirs and the shaykhs, by this method.

For the first three months of 1841 the Patriarch was well disposed towards Bashir, but was alienated in time by the

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1. Wood had contacted Bashir in 1834 and 1835, with a view to securing his cooperation against the Egyptians when the expulsion should come. He and Ponsonby stayed blind to his shortcomings longer than Rose, Moore, or Werry.
 2. Moore to Palmerston, No.10 of March 1, 1841.
F/O.78/449.

latter's determination to pay the Porte a fair annual tribute from the local revenue and taxes. This induced the Patriarch to reestablish contact with the exiled Amir in Malta with a view to securing his return to power. The Druses for their part were so incensed by the Prince's consultation with Wood for the establishment of a representative Divan for the Mountain that they determined to take the Prince's life. Before Wood left Syria on April 17 the Prince had lost all his onetime popularity, and was neither respected nor feared. The rest of April and May were unfortunate months for Bashir. In accordance with a request by him the Turks arrested the Amir Ibn Raslan of Shuwayfat, Shaykh Husayn Talhouk of Aylut, and Abdul Melek. ¹ It was more than accidental that the Turks should choose this opportunity to be efficient, and to set Maronite against Druse when, on so many other occasions they had failed in their duties. That the arrested men were allowed to go free after promising good behaviour did not mitigate Druse annoyance. Bashir acted correctly in invoking Turkish aid, but not wisely, since he showed his dependence on them as his physical arm, and his inclination toward cooperation. The main reason for the arrest was the intractability of the chiefs on the question of a divan, which might limit their power. Wood had convinced

1. Moore to Palmerston, No.20 of April 3rd 1841 and 2 enclos. F/O.78/449; Rose to Palmerston, May 3rd, A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.147.

Bashir that the Mountain ought to be ruled by a divan, after the style of the sanjaq divans, giving proportional representation to all major sects. Over a divan the Prince was to appoint a president. The leading Druse shaykhs viewed such an assembly hostilely as their power would be centred in it, "and they assert that the Druses are not sufficiently represented in it."¹

At the same time that the Prince and the Druses were drifting apart, the Turks in Syria were about to raise up a subject which was not only of major importance in itself, but also in its repercussions on the Prince's position. This was the subject of taxation. The weight of Egyptian taxation had been the prime cause of the revolt against Ibrahim, and great circumspection was therefore required in approaching the question afresh. As a result of their experiences at the hands of Egypt, Rose found the Maronites "extremely alive to their own interest."² They had paid three major taxes - ³ firdah, miri, haraj - all exorbitant and ever increasing, and

1. Rose to Palmerston, May 3, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.147.

2. Rose to Palmerston, May 3, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.147.

3. The term haraj was used very indiscriminately by many people, including Turks. Urquhart thought it was a poll-tax; the Encyclopaedia of Islam (which is frequently in error) I, 1051 calls it a land-tax. In this instance haraj is interpreted, as Professor Temperley interprets it in "The last phase of Stratford de Redcliffe 1855-8" E.H.R. XLVII, [1931] p.236, as a tax which Christians paid as exemption from military service; in fact a sort of scutage.

escaped by no one, until they got beyond all reason and all tolerating. Turkey expected to get considerable wealth from a province which Ibrahim had shown to be so productive, and the cost of the liberation did give her a measure of justification. The sects equally naturally expected relief from the fiscal excesses of Ibrahim. Neither side could have its own way entirely, and the other party be satisfied; neither side was disposed to countenance the other's point of view. "The inhabitants of Lebanon will not contribute enough, and the Turks demand too much taxation."

The question of taxation was taken up by the Musteshar Effendi at Bayrut without any prior reference to Constantinople. About the 12th April he submitted his plan of taxation to the Divan of Bayrut, with a technique which was both crude and melodramatic.¹ Coming so soon after the ostentatious reading of the Tanzimat Hairiye² in Bayrut, the method jarred the more on the consuls and on the Divan. The Musteshar locked the doors of the Divan, and made those present swear not to divulge what he was about to put to them. After a reference to Ibrahim's book of taxes, he proposed the introduction of a capitation tax varying according to the means of the individual, of a 12% export and import tax according to the 1838 treaty of Balta Liman, a 10% tax on all produce, and the haraj to be paid

1. Colonel Rose to Palmerston, May 3, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.147.

2. Moore to Palmerston, No.21 of April 16th 1841. F/O.78/449.

by the Christians. The capitation tax was immediately recognised as nothing less than Ibrahim's firdah - the tax which had brought ruin to the Mountain and had precipitated the insurrection - and the Musteshar's offer to change its name was scarcely a realistic way out of the difficulty. Though the Christians were opposed to the taxes the Muslim members were ready to side with the Turks if just because the Christians stood to suffer most, from having to sustain the haraj as well as the capitation tax. The upshot was a series of bitter debates. The capitation tax was contemptuously dismissed; the haraj had never been collected before in the Mountain since the Christians, by protecting themselves, could not legally be required to pay it; the 10% on all produce was deemed unnecessary since the Tariff - the 12% export tax - was alone a sufficient demand from the Mountain. Thus three taxes were eliminated and the haraj came in for serious criticism.

When the Musteshar's proposals became widely known they caused intense speculation. The Divan for the Mountain itself was still at the blueprint stage,¹ but the Turks had made no effort to consult the Amir as an alternative means of bringing the Mountain within the system they were devising for the pashalik as a whole, and on April 23 the Prince of Lebanon rode down from Deir el-Kammar to Bayrut, accompanied by two

1. Rose to Palmerston, No.30 of May 3rd, (Copy) in Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.148 of June 15th, 1841. F/O.195/182.

Maronite princes, the Bishop Tubia, and several Christian shaykhs, to take part in the discussions. The Prince had no legal place in the Divan of Bayrut for the town did not lie within the Mountain; like the Mountain it lay in the pashalik of Acre, but since the Turkish authorities were trying to legislate in Bayrut for the whole pashalik, Bashir came to represent the Mountain and to preserve its special privileges. His entrance into the discussions could scarcely be objected to, because of his social equality with the highest Turks, but the Turks had a distinct distaste for his presence. Though old, he was far less pliable than the Divan of Bayrut, with its several Muslim members.

As a means of ridding themselves of Bashir the Turks proposed that when the Divan for the Lebanon was constituted it should provide a lump sum of four thousand purses, and pay the Tariff in lieu of all other taxes. Rose was disturbed by the duplicity of the Turks, for at the same time that the Musteshar's secretary offered this abatement, the Musteshar ¹ himself told Rose that the four taxes would still be levied. Bashir was willing enough to accept the reduced terms offered him, but Bishop Tubia, the Patriarch's representative was not. He and his colleagues rejected the abatement, on the grounds that to impose any form of taxation right away was unjustifiable for two reasons; firstly, indemnification was owing to many people for their taxes in the late war, and secondly, a uniform system for the whole Mountain would be unfair to the

1. As above.

people of Kasrawan who had been promised three years exemption from all forms of taxation, by Selim Pasha in writing and by Wood, Napier and Stopford verbally. Rose was of the belief that the Mountain would fight should the Turks try to enforce the settlement, and felt certain that "the circumstance of the Turkish Government demanding a heavier taxation from Lebanon than Ibrahim Pasha had done, and more than it could pay, would alone be a source of pain to Her Majesty's Govt." 1

Rose would have urged patience on the Turks, but being a military officer without the supervisory responsibility which the consuls had assumed, he acted in the way which seemed most correct and enlisted the support of the Bayrut consul, to go with him to Selim. They offered it as their opinion that the amount demanded was excessive, and that it was not worth a few thousand piastres to create serious misunderstanding with so influential a part of Syria as the Lebanon. Selim agreed to suspend the scheme of taxation until the wishes of Constantinople had been obtained. ² Momentarily at least, crisis was averted, and reference to Constantinople, it was hoped, would provide a more responsible approach to the problem.

On the suspension by Selim of the scheme of taxation for the Mountain, the Amir Bashir signed a document in which he agreed to pay the Tariff, that is, the 12% on exports and imports, and 3,500 purses annually, less 2,200 for the expenses

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1. Rose to Palmerston, May 3, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.147.
 2. Rose to Palmerston, No.30 of May 3, 1841. F/0.78/455.

of government. This document was signed in the Bayrut consulate, Moore's residence, couched in the form of an agreement with the Turkish authorities.¹ Bashir accepted it only because of his loyalty to the Sultan. His sense of loyalty was shared by very few people, and was considered by the Patriarch and the Christian amirs as but another manifestation of his weakness. The document was a Turkish brainchild, and by signing it Bashir made an attempt to commit his people to the payment of some sort of taxation. Rose and Moore, instrumental in referring the question to Constantinople, would not now encourage the Prince to reopen it, but it is very likely that they urged him to be more sympathetic towards Turkish claims than his colleagues had been. When Bashir communicated the contents of the agreement to the deputies of Lebanon, those of Kasrawan claimed exemption; so too did the rest if the people of Kasrawan were not going to pay. Rose expected this; "Lieutenant Colonel Higgins informs me that he heard considerable promises made last year by Her Majesty's servants to the Mountaineers, when he was at Djouni."²

The meeting at which Bashir's agreement was presented was held at Ainab, three miles from Bayrut.³ Rose estimated

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1. Rose to Palmerston, June 2, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.161. Moore to Palmerston, No.24 of May 4, 1841, and 2 enclos. F/O.78/449.
 2. Colonel Bridgeman told Palmerston Napier had given promises very freely. (Bridgeman to Palmerston, No.20 of Mar.24th 1841 (Copy) in Palmerston to Ponsenby, No.117 of May 12th 1841. F/O.195/182).
 3. Rose to Palmerston, No.45 of May 28, 1841. F/O.78/455.

that eight hundred deputies from all parts of the Mountain attended. Bashir told the assembly he had exerted himself to the utmost to reduce the taxation proposed by the Turkish authorities who, however, continued to demand 4,200 purses yearly and the payment of the Tariff. Deputies then brought forward their arguments for compensation and exemption.

Bishop Tubia proposed that the Tariff should not be levied between Tripoli and Acre and that the meeting should petition France, upon which Archbishop Benjamin of the Greek Orthodox Church asked "Why France? France has nothing to do with this matter. We ought to address ourselves to England and the allied powers."¹ Tubia replied that Britain had identified herself with the Turkish demands. The archbishop denied this, and Tubia observed that the meeting ought to petition England, Austria and France, on which the former asked why Russia should be left out. The outcome was that the Porte alone was petitioned.² The Druses took the opportunity to propose that

Bashir should be replaced by a Muslim amir but the Maronites resisted it in a body. "If the Turks have been too grasping, the Mountaineers, on the other hand, have been not honest in their general refusal to contribute the necessary support to the Government, and their conduct is not the less blameable, because this opposition is in reality based, not so much on their own impoverished state, as on the hopes which they found on the weakness of the Turkish Government."³

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1. Rose to Palmerston, May 28, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.154.
 2. Moore to Palmerston, No.39 of June 3rd 1841. F/O.78/449.
 3. Rose to Palmerston, May 22nd 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.154.

At the end of May Selim received the petition which the Ainab representatives had drawn up on the 22nd for transmission to the Grand Vizier. He called Rose, Captain Pring and Moore, to advise him whether to forward it or not. As usual the British officers had to decide on the spur of the moment whether they could accept the invitation with propriety, and in reporting to Palmerston made it clear that they "felt that it would be the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that we should counsel his Excellency on this matter because the present state of feeling in the Mountain is chiefly to be attributed to the proposed introduction of the Tariff." 1

They also thought the Turkish authorities had done much to meet the wishes of the Syrians, and deserved consideration for having referred the question to Constantinople. Having agreed to give their advice, they proceeded with him to an analysis of the petition, not for its content but as a document and a petition. They concluded that it ought not be sent. The signature of Bashir as convener and president of the meeting was lacking, nor had the petition been forwarded through him; it rested on the assumption that the taxes had been demanded whereas they had only been proposed; the language, far from being in the style of a petition was "such as no subject should use towards a sovereign"; finally they thought that the sentiments expressed were not typical of the people as a whole but were those of "wicked and designing agents." Selim agreed. It was suggested to Selim that he should write to Bashir,

1. Rose, Pring and Moore to Palmerston, June 2. A. & P.
 [1843] IX [c 456] p.160. Moore to Palmerston, No. 59
 of June 3, 1841. F/O.78/449.

acknowledging the subject's right to petition his sovereign, but stating the petition could not be forwarded because of its defects. "The letter of course comes from his Excellency as his own act." It was expected that such a letter would show the people of the Mountain that they were too optimistic if they believed no opposition could be offered to any demand which they might choose to advance.

The Ainab meeting was a most significant indication of the balance of forces, and so far as Rose and Moore were concerned its revelations were thrown into bolder relief by the subsequent conversations they had with the Amir's secretary on the progress of the meeting. Misk was an admirable witness, and his experience as a customs officer enabled him to assess the reasonableness or otherwise of the fiscal proposals.¹ Misk frankly admitted the Maronites to be trying to separate themselves as much as they could from the Tariff, and believed that if the petition was ignored they might begin a token insurrection. The Tariff was intended to replace the monopolies, he thought, but since the only monopoly in Syria was a trivial one on salt, he thought it could be reduced.² To Rose's

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1. Rose to Palmerston, No.45 of May 28, 1841. F/O.78/455.
Rose to Palmerston, May 28th 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX
[c 456] p.154.
 2. In a "Memorandum of Sept.20 [drawn up in the Foreign Office] for Sir R. Peel respecting taxation in Lebanon" it is explained to the Prime Minister that there was great opposition to the 12% of the 1838 export tax, and although it was introduced in place of monopolies of which there was only one in Syria, Turkey was entitled to make up her losses, and to apply the tax to all provinces.

question what he thought the Mountain would really agree to pay, he said the people would agree to 3% and 3,500 purses. Misk also commented on the growth of French influence.¹ The consuls had given the Maronites to understand that in the event of the Porte not listening to their petition, the French fleet would assist them, and had declared that Britain would make common cause with the Turks against the Mountain. The French consuls were increasing Maronite intractability and alienating the Druses further than ever from the Maronites. The Druses aversion for the French had prevented them signing any petition which might lead to French intervention; and because they thought they must sign all or none of the petitions they signed none. "From the difference of opinion which took place, it is clear that nothing would be easier than to arm one of these parties against the other," Rose told Palmerston.²

The choice of Bashir had not been a good one, a fact which Wood alone was still disposed to overlook. Rose and Moore had no delusions about him, but the soldier and the old public servant instinctively rallied to the man placed in a position of authority.³ Bashir did not take much part in the

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1. Rose to Palmerston, No. 45 of May 28, 1841, No. 47 of June 2, 1841. F/O.78/455. Wood to Ponsonby, No. 16 of Oct. 3, 1841, F/O.78/447. Moore to Palmerston, No. 38 of June 3, 1841, F/O.78/449. Bourrée, the consul whom France recalled for his sympathy and assistance for the insurgents was re-appointed to Bayrut, because of his standing in the Mountain. (Moore to Palmerston, No. 54 of July 26. F/O.78/449.)
 2. Rose to Palmerston, No. 45 of May 28, 1841. F/O.78/455.
 3. Rose to Palmerston, No. 30 of May 3, 1841. F/O.78/455. "Unfortunately, he [Bashir] is above 72 years of age, has had two paralytic strokes, is deaf, and his personal appearance is against him."

debates at Ainab nor did he seem to command very much authority. The feeling of the Druses was so strongly against a divan that Bashir failed to introduce the subject at all. The Maronites largely indentified him with the Turks. Within a matter of days of Ainab, Rose found out that the Patriarch, in spite of his fervid defence of Bashir against the Druses, was already in process of deserting him.¹ The disappearance of Bashir's predecessor to Malta did not kill, perhaps it even created, the impression that the aged Amir would return one day. The Patriarch could not be indifferent to the matter of who was prince, for his peculiar influence of the Patriarch could only be limited by an equally strong prince. His relations with the ex-Amir had exhibited the characteristics of an armed neutrality, and though not the best of situations it had possessed the virtue of consistency. The Patriarch had known the limits of his own power. With the succession of the nephew he might have had good cause for self-congratulation if the new situation had shown a likelihood of being permanent. Unfortunately Bashir al-Kassim was showing a tendency to let

1. Moore, Rose and Pring to Palmerston, No.47 of June 2, 1841. F/O.78/455. Largely through Moore, the Turks agreed to open a packet of suspect mail. It contained 4 letters from the Patriarch and from Bashir (the exile) to one another, in which they talk of a possible restoration. The Patriarch prays God "that the day of your return may come soon." Another letter to the exile says that "it is now certain that letters have been received by the French consuls from the Ambassador at Constantinople to persuade the inhabitants...not to accept the hard terms, and that if any disturbance should arise..they will have the assistance of his nation."

the Turks encroach on his authority. His personal incapacity gave the Turks confidence to enforce a taxation programme more stringent than the ex-Amir would have accepted, so the Patriarch corresponded with the exile with a view to securing his return.

Rose was depressed by the political scene. After the rejection of the petition of the Maronites and Druses the latter clung to their belief that a divan would swamp their interests, more closely than ever. The Turks and the Maronites each tried to draw them their way; ¹ could the Turks capture their friendship they would prevent the establishment of any unifying administration, could the Maronites bring them into line their demands for a reduction of taxation would be irresistible. The Turks thought Druse dislike of the Maronites would make it easy for them to establish a friendship based on a full recognition of all traditional Druse privileges. The Maronites and Druses were quite incompatible as peoples, and the attitude of the Patriarch did not reassure the latter any. Maronite numerical superiority and the unbending will of the Patriarch, Druse disdain and religious exclusiveness, kept the sects apart. The Turks had failed to capitalise out of this situation up to the moment, and Rose could not see them doing so. Any "ill-timed event might...commit the Druses, and cause them, even in opposition to their policy, and to their wishes, to

1. Moore to Palmerston, No.56 of Aug.5, 1841. F/O.78/449.
Rose to Palmerston, No.44, Oct.5, 1843. F/O.78/537,
found the policy still energetically pursued.

connect themselves with the malcontents." The Turks would play the Maronites' game for them, and bring the sects together.

This apprehension on the part of Rose explains his approach to the leading Druses of Deir el-Kammar in the interests of peace.¹ It was a timely approach, showing immediate results, his messenger arriving at the same time as a Druse from the Anti-Lebanon who had come to invoke the assistance of the Druses of the Mountain in rejecting a demand of Nejb Pasha for an immediate payment of taxes. The Druses of Deir el-Kammar sent word back to their brethren that they had decided to be guided by Rose's counsel urging good order and tranquillity. The ugala of Anti-Lebanon replied that they would follow this advice. This was reported by Rose on June 6. His despatch of the 22nd told of activity in a different direction, but also motivated by his concern for the preservation of peace.²

The political settlement of Lebanon was not Rose's concern. That was a matter between the Turks and the Prince of Lebanon, as representative of the people. As a military officer he had no defined responsibilities in civil matters, except to support the consuls of Bayrut and Damascus in the execution of their

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1. Rose to Palmerston, June 6, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.162.
 2. Rose to Palmerston, June 22n, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.163.

duties. Any interference in civil affairs would be decided on by the representatives at the Porte, should the Turkish government be thought to have fallen short in the task of securing a settlement appropriate to the requirements and having regard to the privileges of the people. Yet for the moment Rose, supported by, rather than supporting, Moore, acted the rôle of firman. He had approached the Druses urging passivity on them, and his knowledge of the Patriarch's correspondence with the exile Amir made him doubt whether Bashir by himself would be able to counteract the Patriarch's machinations. The exile had always been able to keep the Patriarch in check, but now the position was reversed, and the present prince, for all his good intentions, did not command the same power as the exile. The Patriarch could prohibit payment of the taxation with greater effect than Bashir could order it. In an endeavour to strengthen the Prince's personal position, and his standing among the Maronites, Rose and Moore accepted an invitation to visit the Amir Haidar at Beit-Mereh on June 7.

Haidar was a Maronite and a fervent Catholic, but by his probity and talent acquired a reputation among the people rare in a country which customarily reserved its esteem for the man of action. Without the attributes of the warrior,

1. Moore to Palmerston, No.40 of 12 June 1841. F/O.78/449.

or the questionable abilities of the intriguer, Haidar held the respect of all; as one of the ex-Amir's victims he shared the aura of martyrdom which tinged all whom the Pasha of Egypt had kept in Sennaar.¹ Haidar also had qualities calculated to attract Rose and Moore. Coming from an older family than the Shehabi, and aware of the Prince's ineptitude, Haidar was disappointed that he had not been entrusted with any great responsibility. To his visitors he observed that the former laws of the country were no longer observed, and that the people who had formerly preserved respect for the law were now unable to do so; Rose took this as a hint that he did not approve of the intended institution of a divan, and that at heart he was a strong believer in the rule of the aristocratic families. "It appeared very desirable..to secure the good offices of so influential a person as the Emir Haidar, in the present state of affairs, more particularly as the age and infirmities of the Emir Bechir circumscribe his powers of action, a fact to which the Emir Haidar alluded very guardedly."

Haidar might have done much to sway the Ainab meeting to pay at least some of the taxes, and would have moderated the petition to the Porte. Fortunately a niche existed in which he might be installed. The Prince had reverted to the practice of appointing over the Druses, a representative of their traditional ruling family, and had chosen for the office Shaykh Na'aman Djinldatt. Rose proposed to Haidar that he should

1. F/O.78/462.Memorandum by Joseph C. Brettell respecting the... Christian Emirs of Mount Lebanon..sent as Prisoners to Alexandria.

become the representative Christian dignitary under Bashir. The proposition pleased him greatly.

While Rose and Moore frankly realised that the assistance of a capable man of influence would do much to sustain Bashir, it is doubtful if they understood that it might also detract from Bashir's personal position by depriving him of the very duties which justified his retention of the princely office, and which he should have been able to perform himself. They approached Selim on the matter of the appointment. "Selim Pasha is quite alive to the failings of his Highness, and approves of his being assisted in the duties of his Government by the Emir Haidar. The Emir Bechir himself also sanctions the arrangement."

The appointment exemplified a curiously reversed practice, whereby policy in quite important matters was made at low level, receiving the successive approval of higher and higher authorities. Thus the military commander Rose and the consul Moore proposed their plan to Haidar and gained his acceptance of it before seeking the approval of Bashir and the Seraskier, yet either of the last two could have vetoed the scheme. Both, however, approved it. Rose believed "the Turkish Ministry will throw no difficulties in the way" and in informing Palmerston of the arrangement ventured "to hope that the appointment of the Emir Haidar, which will, I trust, strengthen both the Government of the Sultan and of the Emir Bechir, may receive your Lordship's approbation." It did.¹

1. Palmerston to Rose, Aug. 9, 1841. A. & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p.164. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No.148 of June 15, 1841. F/O.195/128.

It is doubtful whether this was a good way of compensating for Bashir's shortcomings or not, for reasons already mentioned, but it is more than ever doubtful if it did not tacitly raise a fresh and major problem. The division of Bashir's power, leaving him with nominal superiority, but in fact short-circuiting him almost entirely from active participation in government, accentuated the cleavage between Maronites and Druses by recognising it. Bashir had none of his uncle's strength, which had enabled the latter to ignore the separatist tendencies of the sects, and to rule the country without having to conciliate or crush any particular sect more than any other. The nephew's continuance in power depended on his skill in balancing, between Maronites and Turks, or rather the cooperation he gave to those who worked out his balancing policy for him. He leaned on Wood till Wood was recalled, and after him on Rose and Moore. The question of a divan, foreshadowed in the meetings Bashir had had with Wood in private, was still far from being settled. Bashir had failed to bring it forward at Ainab, and the appointment of Haidar in June, coupled with the prior appointment of Shaykh Na'aman did not show any confidence on the part of Bashir or of Rose in the attainment of an ultimate settlement in which the two sects might be brought together. Agreement by the Christian amirs and the Druse shaykhs to a divan would be no small success, for to both sides it involved sacrifice. The Druses would lose the advantage of their military prowess which compensated for numerical inferiority. Proportional representation

might do justice to numbers but it never could do justice to real power. The Druses actually superior to the Maronites in any show of physical strength, would have only a third of the representation of the Maronites on a divan. The Christian amirs were not enthusiastic for a divan even though they would have dominated it. The Patriarch too, feared the effect of a divan on his own personal position.

As a result of being in daily contact with the Seraskier at Bayrut, or with the pashas in Damascus and Aleppo, the British consuls were able to see the methods by which the Turks sought to regulate the administration of the pashaliks, at first hand. The Divan of Bayrut had rejected the terms sprung on them by Selim's musteshar; so too had the Prince of Lebanon though not unsympathetically; the Ainab delegates had been emphatically against them. It was a bad start, hinting at Turkish determination to get what they could and to evade the promise of a three years' exemption made to the Kasrawan. Selim was a good soldier, but like his Musteshar, was no negotiator. No effort was made to bring the leaders of the mountaineers over as a preliminary to negotiation and deprived of the services of Wood at a vital moment the Turks failed to settle the taxation question. Their knowledge of the terms they proposed was fragmentary, otherwise they would have refuted the false arguments put forward by Tubia at Ainab. The taxes were not six times Ibrahim's, and the Tariff would not hit

Lebanon severely at all.¹ On the other hand the Turks chose a bad time, when the people were still flushed with military success, to innovate a tax so insulting as the haraj, and their suggestions generally, showed their poverty of sound financial advice.

As individuals few of the Turks would bear scrutiny.² Rose wrote of the Musteshar "who ranks as a Minister of State... and is the highest civil authority in this country", that he had for some time been suspected of speculation in corn, and that ultimately Selim proved he was pocketing large sums as a result.³ The Seraskier, personally brave, was a man of abysmal ignorance believing the earth to be borne on the horns of a bull. Moore was incensed that the Turks could send such people to high offices in Syria, to offices demanding tact, patience and industry from their holders.

"To give examples of Fanaticism, Venality and Folly would, I am pained to say, be to cite names considering the rank and position of the parties from whom better things might have been expected, and if such be the case in the highest grades it is superfluous to say how prevalent must be the evil."⁴

1. The Maronites, and in particular the bishop Tubia, refused to realise that since most Syrian trade was with other parts of the Empire, and since the Tariff could only be levied on genuine exports to other countries, the Lebanon had little to fear from the Tariff.
2. Ponsonby to Palmerston (Private) May 23, 1841. F/O.78/434.
"I am furious against Reshid Pasha who seems on all occasions to have selected the greatest scoundrels in the Empire for...the offices of trust and power." Palmerston pencilled on this despatch that Reshid "is a fool."
3. Rose to Palmerston, May 22, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.151. Rose to Palmerston, No.31 of May 4, 1841. F/O.78/455.
4. Moore to Palmerston, No.25 of May 4, 1841. F/O.78/449.

The choice of officials was uniformly bad; their conduct was always partial and provocative, and in some cases highly inimical to the continuance of law and order. Nejjib Pasha was the best example, and was the more dangerous because he was an enthusiastic Muslim, and not merely a baiter of Christianity. In Damascus, the capital of his pashalik, Nejjib forbade the use of white turbans by Christians and ordained that they should enter the Holy City on foot only. He received 50,000 piastres from Mahmud Abdul Hadi for making him governor of Gaza. The celebration of the Prophet's birthday on May 3 had rarely been so ostentatious. In Bayrut, Selim gave further demonstrations of discrimination against the Christians. Though often petty, the regulations outraged the respectable classes, whom the Turks ought to have conciliated. The governor of Sur, a Matawilah, had been so flagrant in his acts of violence that even Selim had seen the danger.¹ At the request of Moore he was recalled and gaoled. Lieutenant Colonel Alderson, wrote to Rose from Haifa that the qadi had been ill treating the Christian inhabitants. The widespread nature of the misrule concerned Rose greatly for he feared that the Turks, in their generally repressive policy, might fall foul of the Druses. It says much for Rose that he recognised this possibility, and did not think of Druzism as a mere variant of Islam and therefore as a party well disposed to the return of the Turks.

1. Rose to Palmerston, No.31 of May 4th, 1841. F/O.78/455.

The Turks themselves made this mistake and thought it would be relatively easy to bring them over to their side merely by being anti-Christian. Instead the Druses were just as anti-Turkish, as they were anti-Christian, and "it was not possible to determine whether any imprudent act of the Turkish Government...might not commit the Ds."

Complaints were common of the tyrannical treatment of Christians by Muslims, and of the inability and unwillingness of the local authorities to preserve order or check oppression. but most of the occurrences took place too far off for the consuls to be able to intervene and Rose's senior officers were all employed on the task of collecting data for the military report on Syria.

Such a system of oppression was not likely to endear the Turks to the Syrians, but the consuls were chiefly concerned with its effect on the Mountain. Though the Turkish pashalik encompassed it geographically the Turks themselves had had no foothold in it for any purpose, administrative or otherwise in Bashir's time. Nevertheless, their policy in the big towns like Bayrut and Damascus, so near to the Mountain and being so closely linked with it, could have serious repercussions. The more tolerant the Turks chose to be, the less insistent would the mountaineers be on entire independence of them. For this reason no question was of more importance than that which quite suddenly in May brought the relationship of Muslims and Christians to the fore in a case at Bayrut involving a representative of each party.¹

1. Rose to Palmerston, June 28. A. & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p.164.

The mufti of Bayrut declared that he would not listen to Christian evidence against Muslims, and the Christian, who claimed not only that he was blameless but that the Muslim had been the aggressor, was convicted on the evidence of the Muslim witnesses, without being heard. Moore represented the injustice of the trial to the Seraskier, and Selim had the case retried; again the mufti rejected Christian evidence, and the unfortunate was put back in prison with the additional discomfort of chains. Rose and Moore called on the support of Captains Waldegrave and Pring. In a joint letter to Selim they protested solemnly against the declaration of the mufti as an outrage on common sense, and a mockery of justice. The mufti, they said, contravened the Hatti-Scheriff which had been publicly proclaimed in Bayrut; to expose the Christians to "aggression and to assassination without a hope of redress" was the inevitable sequel to rejecting their evidence. Lastly they declared it to be "the anxious wish of His Majesty's Government that all classes of the Syrian population should be in full possession of the enjoyment of complete security for their persons, and of an impartial administration of justice." As on all such occasions when Turkish intransigence had to be overcome, the petitioners were not averse to exacting pressure by reminding Selim "that Her Majesty's Government will hear with indignation the declaration of the chief Turkish law officer" and asking "whether it is your intention that the gracious dispositions and orders of His Imperial Highness the Sultan and his instructions, explaining and amplifying the Hatti-Scheriff... should guide the administration of justice in this country."

The question was not settled until mid-August but resulted in the dismissal of mufti. Unfortunately, the relation of Christians and Muslims was not permanently regulated by this individual case, and others cropped up from time to time to harass the consuls.

Until the return of Wood to Syria, Rose, Moore and Werry carried on their efforts to preserve quiet, settling one question and immediately finding themselves confronted by another. Werry's son in the north saw little of the agitation which pertained in Lebanon though his despatches never tell of tranquillity.¹ The picture which builds itself up from the despatches of the consuls and Rose, during June and July, just prior to the return of Wood, was one of growing anarchy in the countryside, on the desert line, along the roads, and in Hebron, showing an increase in the frequency of incidents between Turks and Christians, a mounting resistance on the part of the latter. As far north as Aleppo the Ansariyah from the coastal range, and the Zor tribes, had brought traffic in the city to a standstill.

A Turkish officer was shot on the Bayrut road. The roads north of Damascus were infested by badawi and Major Wilbraham found his uniform his best protection in that district. Ahmed Bey, nephew of Selim told Rose that the state of the

1. The Aleppo pashalik was in such an uproar that Europeans thought fit "to suspend such recreations as required them to lose sight of its (Aleppo's) walls." Moore to Aberdeen, No.2 of Nov.25th 1841, F/O.78/448.

road from Tarsus through Adana, Aleppo, Homs Hamah, Tripoli to Bayrut had induced him to traverse it with an escort; the anarchic mood spread to all parts of the country. "There are no newspapers in this country, but the inhabitants correspond a great deal, and the accounts of occurrences are...transmitted from place to place with singular correctness by the scribes, or learned men..from one part of Syria to another; it is to be regretted that almost every post from the north, from Tripoli, Damascus, Zafed, El Hebron, Jaffa, Gaza brings the news of occurrences." 1

Nejib ignored the critical nature of the situation, removing the popular governor of Damascus to Hama, and putting a Muslim in office as governor of Hassir. "The appointment of Nejib Pasha has done more harm to the Sultan's cause in Syria than can be imagined: all ask, 'How can we believe that the Sultan is sincere in wishing the Hatti Sheriff to be carried into execution, when 2 months rule of his Lieutenant in Syria have made us regret even the iron rule of Ibrahim Pasha?'"

"The History of the British in the East shows

that they ever enjoyed the privilege of

having a true governor independent of

the Governor-General of India." 2

Richard Wood.

1. Rose to Palmerston, July 24, 1841. A. & P. [1843] IX [c 456] p.171. Rose to Palmerston, No.79 of Aug.18, 1841. F/O.78/456.

CHAPTER IV

Wood went to Constantinople in April but it was June

THE CONFLICT OF WOOD AND ROSE

before he was called on by the representatives to concert measures to be adopted with regard to Syria. In the intervening period

"The Druses alone would prevent any other party from assuming an ascendancy in Lebanon."

was not idle, but gave Ponsoby the full benefit of his knowledge. The reports were, all tinged with the conviction that the

Turks were not equal to the difficulties the country presented, amply demonstrated to Ponsoby that the sooner something was done

"The history of the Druses does not show that they ever enjoyed the privilege of having a Druse governor independent of the Governor-General of Mount Lebanon."

the better, but the ambassador was debarred from giving Syria his undivided attention. His final negotiations with the Pasha's territorial

position. He had been able to do so. Richard Wood then depicted the state of the country to Palmerston, and had adverted chiefly on

the rule of the Pasha of Damascus.¹ Palmerston responded by demanding through the Turkish ambassador in London Kelle's dismissal and punishment.²

On the 4th June, however, Ponsoby, Sturmer the Internuncio, and Titow met at Pera at the Internuncio's house with

1. Ponsoby to Palmerston, No 191 of June 8, 1841 & 1 enclo. FO 78/484.
2. Palmerston to Ponsoby, No 156 of June 15 1841, FO 195/182.
Palmerston to Ponsoby, No 166 of July 3 1841, FO 195/182.

CHAPTER IV

Wood went to Constantinople in April but it was June before he was called on by the representatives to concert measures to be adopted with regard to Syria. In the intervening period he was not idle, but gave Ponsonby the full benefit of his knowledge. The reports sent by Moore, all tinged with the conviction that the Turks were not equal to the difficulties the country presented, amply demonstrated to Ponsonby that the sooner something was done the better, but the ambassador was debarred from giving Syria his undivided attention by the delicate nature of the final negotiations with Muhammad Ali on the subject of the pasha's territorial position. He had been able to do little more than deplore the state of the country to Palmerston, and had adverted chiefly on the rule of the Pasha of Damascus.¹ Palmerston responded by demanding through the Turkish ambassador in London Nejjib's dismissal and punishment.²

On the 4th June, however, Ponsonby, Sturmer the Internuncio, and Titow met at Pera at the Internuncio's house with

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 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 156 of June 15 1841, FO 195/182.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 168 of July 3 1841, FO 195/183.

Wood and Laurin in attendance.¹ At last free to consider the Syria question unharrassed, they came to agreement very swiftly, and decided to approach the Porte's Minister of Foreign Affairs separately, advising him to remit all illegal taxes, to order Turkish officials to give Christians full right of worship, to reward those princes who had distinguished themselves in the war, and to grant to Bashir and the Patriarch the privilege of being separately represented at the Porte by a Kapu-Kiaya or agent of their own choosing. Wood and Testa as dragomans, took the report of the proceedings in to the Reis Effendi. Rifa'at Pasha accepted all the points, but insisted that the prince's agent should be a nominee of the Porte. The Reis also wanted the agents to be in attendance on the Defterdar in Syria, and not at the Porte, but against this the dragomans argued that the whole point of having agents at all was so that the Defterdar could be circumvented when necessary, and his misdeeds reported to the Imperial Divan.² The point was sound enough but went in the face of Turkish practice. The Kapu-Kiaya at the courts of the pashas were appointed by the Porte, and neither the prince nor the Patriarch was of equal importance to a pasha in Turkish eyes. Rifa'at told Wood that only the Princes of Servia, Moldo-Wallachia and Samos could nominate their own Kapu-Kiayas, and the Porte had no intention of

1. Ponsonby to Palmerston, No 191 of June 8 1841, & 1 enclo. FO 78/484.

2. Wood to Ponsonby, June 8, enclo.3 in Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 8 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c 455] p.7.

conferring such a privilege on Lebanon.¹ Testa agreed to this in spite of his instructions; the Turkish attitude was at least constructive though symbolic of her determination to prevent Syria eluding her supremacy. The Porte did not want to concede the principle of the privilege and she was not merely discriminating against Bashir; she offered far less opposition to the appointment of an agent for the Patriarch, since such a person would not represent a political master. Ultimately, after days of wrangling, the Turks did give way and allowed Bashir too, to have a Kapu-Kiaya at the Porte though still not of his own choosing.

In the struggle for concessions, Wood submitted to Rifa'at a series of memoranda, detailing the state of the Syrian countryside, the maladministration, and, of course, the remedies. They were lucid accounts and the observations were generally sound.²

Rifa'at himself asked for the information and the golden opportunity was not allowed to pass. Wood was nothing if not comprehensive, beginning with a criticism of the practice of buying and selling offices, and the bakshish system, pertaining so widely, whereby people who sought redress were obliged to make money gifts. The Turkish forces in Syria were five months in arrears with pay, and their commissariat very poorly organised. The latter circumstance led to villages having to maintain troop detachments. Turkish officers were disdainful towards the people,

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1. Wood to Ponsonby, June 8 1841, enclos in Ponsonby to Palmerston No 191 of June 8 1841, FO 78/434.
 2. Wood to Rifa'at Pasha, May 23rd 1841. A & P [1843] LX [c 455] pp 15, 17, 19, 22.

gave them none of the assistance so often requested, and were ignorant of the country. Turkish authority was less and less respected. "The Sublime Porte should instruct her officials and Pashas to show greater activity, to pay greater attention to the wants of the Syrians, and to govern them with more justice and moderation, but to show energy and firmness when it is required." The first shot to be fired would cause a revolt, and the Turkish "military and pecuniary resources are too slender to put it down." There should be fewer high officers in Syria but they should be more efficient.

When Wood proceeded to consider the officers by name, Nejb took pride of place, and was blamed as being the chief agent in hurrying on calamity. He had unjustly seized a servant of Amir Bashir, and it was thought that the Christians intended to release him by force. Nejb also proposed to remove the Amir Said al-Din and the Amir Effendi, governors of Hasbayya and Rashayya and eminent guerilla leaders in the late war. Their influence in Anti-Lebanon was great. Nejb had appointed yet another of the Abdul Hadi family to a governorship. The Musteshar Effendi in Bayrut had asked Bashir to pay five thousand purses per annum in taxes, but Bashir offered to resign rather than try raise it. There were still plenty of illicit taxes being raised, such as Ibrahim's tax on industry, in different places where the Turks were able to overshadow the populace. Sur and Sayda had refused to pay tithe. The people had no means of obtaining justice, for the sharia'ah were refusing to accept Christian evidence or to refer heir cases to the mekkemes (courts of justice), and the latter were notorious for the venality of their judges.

The solution of all difficulties must begin with a swift adjustment of the taxation question so that abuses could be eliminated progressively. The hand of Bashir must be strengthened by allowing him an agent who would report all his difficulties to the Porte. Bashir could never consent to having an agent with the Defterdar and "in virtue of the imperial firman which he possesses, he is in no wise subject to the orders of the Defterdar, or of the Pasha of Saida."¹ A Kapu-Kiaya at the Porte was Bashir's only protection against their illicit influence in the affairs of the Mountain. Should the Porte refuse his request she would only be encouraging him to isolate Lebanon from all control, and he would fall back on local support against any interference by the pashas. The question of an agent for the Patriarch was of no difficulty, Wood wrote; the grant would be to the Porte's own advantage. Able to correspond directly with the Imperial Divan, the Patriarch would not need to have further recourse to the protection of any European power. The lesser points made by Wood included a plea for the dismissal of Shaykh Mahmud Abdul Hadi from Gaza, now that the Egyptians were digging wells and stationing troops near El Arish; and a suggestion that a ferik should be appointed to Jerusalem to arbitrate in the lively feuds pertaining between the Greek, Latin, and Armenian branches of Christian piety.

In concluding, Wood fired off a minor broadside which could have been written by Palmerston himself. "When the Under-

1. Memorandum on the Kapou-Kiaya of the Emir Beshir" A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 19.

signed went to Syria the Sublime Porte had given him special instructions to make sure of the co-operation of the Christians against the Egyptians, and to promise them as a reward the re-establishment and confirmation of their rights and privileges, and also the execution of the provisions of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane . . . Although they have by their distinguished services, proved how worthy they were of the good opinion which the Sublime Porte had formed of them, has the Sublime Porte kept her engagements with them ? No!"¹

The concessions made under pressure of the representatives' note and Wood's memoranda promised a rectification of this sorry state of things. Palmerston and Ponsonby were both as concerned as Wood about the Turkish failure to settle the taxation problem, and the former read Rose's despatches of May 22 and 28, which told of the Ainab meeting, with dismay.² Ponsonby was ordered to press for an immediate settlement but by the time Palmerston's instructions arrived, Rifa'at had dictated to the dragoon Frederick Pisani an analysis of the concessions which the Porte had been pleased to draw up for its Syrian subjects.³ The analysis showed Turkey to have conceded everything she had been pressed for, except for the right of Bashir to nominate his own agent at the Porte, and Ponsonby thought "the affairs of Syria are

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1. Wood's Memorandum of May 27 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 26.
 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 175 of July 15 1841 & 2 enclos FO 195/182.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 15 1841. A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 31.
Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 13 1841. A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 32.
 3. Pisani to Ponsonby, July 28 1841. A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 35.

settled in a satisfactory manner." A Defterdar was appointed to go to Syria to remit all illegal taxation, to pay compensation and to report on what further could be done to ease the burdens on the people. He was given a list of men to be rewarded for their services to the Porte, and in response to the demand that all should enjoy religious freedom, was ordered to allow all Syrians to "enjoy the rights and privileges they enjoyed during the Egyptian administration."^X

The analysis would have pacified Palmerston too, had he believed that it would be carried into effect. Ponsonby evidently thought it would be, but that Nejjib would need to be removed first.¹ It only took a few weeks for the ambassador to realise that his optimism for the future was without foundation. By the end of July Nejjib was still in office and unchecked; Rifa'at's analysis had not been implemented, and "day after day, week after week, months have passed away and nothing has been done;" Ponsonby presented an official note stating that not one of the arrangements agreed on at Pera had been put into effect.

^X The Austrian Internuncio had pressed the Porte not to treat the Christians less well than Muhammad Ali had done. Ponsonby was told by Palmerston to secure better treatment than Muhammad Ali had provided. No 40 of March 2 1841. FO 195/180.

1. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 156 of June 15 1841 FO 195/182
Palmerston to Chekib Effendi, August 9 1841. A & P [1843]
LX [c455] p 33.
Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 18 1841. A & P [1843] IX
[c455] p 34.

It was increasingly apparent to Ponsonby and his colleagues that Wood should go back to Syria. Rifa'at had asked for him to be sent, and though Ponsonby was willing enough he told Palmerston of his fears.¹ He wanted Wood to go because of his great standing in the province, but he was also keenly aware that not one of the promises of which Wood had been the bearer had been carried out.

"I have in consequence thought it right to detain here Mr. Wood, knowing that his return to Syria must be mischievous in its effects under such circumstances, for the Syrians would demand from him why his promises are not performed and Mr. Wood must either allow the Syrians to hold him a liar and deceiver, and to charge the British Ambassador and even Her Majesty's Government with deceit and falsehood, or Mr. Wood must declare that the Porte is guilty of breaking its promises, and by so doing there would be an end put to the respite from mischief that has been obtained by the suspense in which the Syrians have been still held and the hopes they have still nourished that we here should succeed in obtaining for them what had been promised to them."

Ponsonby said he had informed the Porte that Wood would be kept until the Turks began to operate the details of the analysis.

On July 28, Rifa'at told Pisani that Ponsonby's official note had been considered in the Divan, and as a result Hadji Edhem Bey the Defterdar now in Bayrut, had been sent a reprimand for denying to the Syrians who had visited him that he had any instructions to pay them compensation, and he had been told to pay out immediately.² Palmerston congratulated Ponsonby³ for his part in

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1. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 27, 1841. A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 34.
 2. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 28 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 35.
 3. Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 26 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 38.

securing this very promising gesture, and even though the news from Syria did not indicate that the major question of a taxation settlement had been resolutely taken in hand, it was impossible to withhold Wood any longer. On August 10 the Internuncio, Ponsonby, and Wood met to review their achievements, and consult on this question.¹ Their views, and those of their governments, were "identick". The Internuncio spoke very flatteringly of Wood and asked for him to go as soon as possible. The Porte shared his wish, and expressed a desire that Wood might superintend the conduct of the Ottoman officers in the execution of the promises made to the people. As a result of pressure from two quarters Ponsonby sent Wood twelve days later.

If Ponsonby was a keen advocate of the abilities of his dragoman, Wood himself was not inclined to belittle them. When Ponsonby asked him to summarise what had been achieved for the Syrians, for the Internuncio's perusal at the meeting of August 10 Wood divided the memorandum into two sections.² The first consisted of five points; the remission of illegal taxes, the appointment of the Kapu-Kiayas, the compensation of Syrians who had distinguished themselves in the war, the appointment of a ferik to Jerusalem, and the compensation of the people of Djounie for their losses. For these achievements Wood allowed the ambassador, Rose and Moore to share the credit. Part two contained seventeen points, and constituted Wood's own record. He claimed that he personally got the civil governor of Gaza dis-

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1. Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 11 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 38.
 2. "Memorandum of what has been obtained of the Sublime Porte for the Syrians", A & P [1843] LX [c455] p 39.

missed; also Shaykh Abdul Hadi, muhassil of Gaza and Ramle; he wanted Nejjib to leave the Christians alone and to withdraw his discriminating acts against them; the Amirs Said al-Din and Hanguar were confirmed in their respective governments of Hasbayya and Rashayya, and Baalbek; a promise extracted from the Turks that a customs-officer would go to Syria with him to regulate the customs-houses; the taxation of Mount Lebanon was fixed at 3,500 purses, from which 2,280 purses might be deducted for expenses of administration; the ex-amir was debarred from returning to Syria; the late Musteshar had been recalled; Bashir Kassim was confirmed in his position; a vizieral letter had been sent to the Patriarch announcing the Porte's good disposition towards him and the people of Lebanon; and lastly, the Porte had authorised Wood to see that these things were carried out. Also on Wood's list were two points which referred to the most recent problems in Syria, arisen to tax the patience and ingenuity of Rose and consul Moore. Wood claimed that he had got ~~the~~ the Porte to reject the proposal of Yussuf Pasha and the Musteshar that Djebail should be taken from the Mountain and added to the Pashalik of Tripoli;¹ he had dealt similarly with the proposal of the Musteshar that the Lebanon should be divided between Amir Bashir and the Druse Na'amar

1. This question cropped up again in more serious form in 1843 but was suppressed by Aberdeen, who called it a "wanton policy" on the part of Turkey. If the Porte wished to prevent European interference in its affairs then it must "cease to pursue a course which must inevitably lead to fresh interference." Aberdeen to Canning, No 25 of February 15 1843, FO 78/513.

Djinblatt. The rejection of the latter proposal, Wood wrote, had been secured "for the present." It was a significant reservation.

Hugh Rose was a very different sort of man from Wood. The latter had a strain of Jewish blood; he was also a Roman Catholic. He had spent almost the whole of his life in the East, whereas Rose had only come to it in 1840. It might seem that all the advantages lay with Wood, for his knowledge of the peoples, their language and institutions was thorough, but his long immersion in the eastern way of life denied him the objective approach which Rose was able to bring to his duties. Rose was forty, and had spent half his life in the army; he had served in Ireland for several years in the 1820's, when sedition and violence were rife, and had gained valuable experience there in the settling of disputes by conciliation and by force. This experience stood him in good stead in Syria, where the political atmosphere exhibited many of the features characteristic of the Irish scene. The plots, the burrowing activity of agents, the violence which did not stop at **murder**, the moderate few and the many extremists, were all there; even the absence of a sympathetic government, Disraeli might have claimed, was common to both countries.

Rose had originally gone to Syria in 1840 with the British detachments, and had served on the staffs of both Brigadier General Michel and Colonel Bridgman.¹ Both these men

1. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 42 of Mar 4 1841 FO 78/427.

died in the course of the campaign against Ibrahim and Rose succeeded to the position of command on April 6, 1841. After the country had been cleared of Egyptians Rose was entrusted with the compilation of a military report on Syria, to be prepared by the detachments still left in the country under his charge.¹ It was a difficult task, for Rose encountered that unreasoning obstinacy on the part of the Turks by which Palmerston's military missions under Colonel Considine and Captain Williams had been rendered abortive.² Nejjib Pasha in particular was unwilling to have Major Churchill surveying through his pashalik in cheerful independence, and tried to prevent him.

The signs of so much British activity did not gratify Bourrée or Ratti-Menton; the sight of Turkish soldiers firing British artillery pieces under the instruction of British officers at sea markers off Ras Bayrut, and of the "Magpie" and "Beacon" taking soundings along the coast, were melancholy signs that Britain was taking great interest in a country formerly under unchallenged French influence. Ponsonby did not favour the survey either. "I have seen evil already from the Mission of English Officers being too suddenly adopted; It appears to me that things can be done little by little and will not be done by other means; The wedge has already been entered, thanks to circumstances and it may be driven home by well regulated strokes."³

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1. Rose to Palmerston No 26 of April 21 1841 FO 78/455.
Rose to Palmerston No 31 of May 4, 1841, FO 78/455.
 2. See Rodkey, Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey 1830-41, Journal Mod. History, Dec, [1929]. p 370. The correspondence of Considine with the Foreign Secretary is in FO 78/306.
 3. Ponsonby to Palmerston No 70 of February 21 1841 FO 78/431. When the Turkish Divan asked for the withdrawal of Rose's detachments Ponsonby did not think the request could be reprised
Ponsonby to Palmerston No 276 of Sept.², 1841 FO 78/437

Wood was disturbed too, but his reasons were almost purely personal. The days when he had maintained law and order in the Mountain by his own arrangements, and had dictated the policy of the prince of Lebanon, had disappeared. As the first British representative to play a major political part in Syrian affairs, Wood looked forward eagerly to a resumption of his labours as soon as Ponsonby would let him go. The Mountain, he believed, could be kept as a unity if Bashir were suitably advised in the ruling of it. The recent suggestion of the Musteshar that it might be divided, was shelved at Constantinople largely through the efforts of Wood with a promptitude born of alarm rather than weighed opinion. Ponsonby shared **this** desire for an undivided Mountain, and was animated by a strong distrust of Colonel Rose's growing interest in, not to say enthusiasm for, the Druses.

Rose in the course of supporting the British consuls during Wood's absence from Syria, swiftly took the lead among the European agents, in local affairs. In the discharge of his duties he felt keenly the difficulties of being a military commander in a country where his every act, thought it might be carried out merely in the interests of peace and good order, could be construed as political meddling. He regretted this not just because of what the French consuls, or ~~Basil~~ the Russian might say but because he was never sure of the attitude his own government or supervising ambassador might adopt. It is **more** than likely however, that Rose, already in the employ of the Foreign Office as head of the detachments and no longer under the control of

Lord Hill at the Horse Guards, and with numerous political contacts at home,¹ had some knowledge that he was destined for employment for some time to come in a political capacity in Syria. He had no official intimation of this before August, and in the meantime he continued to steer a mean course between the strict interpretation of his instructions and the requirements of the immediate situation.

Of the extent of French influence in the entire Mediterranean region, no one was in two minds. That influence was strong in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Syria, weaker in the Balkans. Britishers who came in contact with the French, whether as diplomats, merchants, or consular officials in any one Mediterranean region, suspected them in all the others. "I believe the intrigues of the French had much success in many parts as well as Tunis," Ponsonby wrote to Palmerston;² Consul Blunt reporting "the efforts made by the French at Joannina [i.e. Janina] to excite the Albanians to rise against the Porte" to the ambassador, added that he was accustomed to receiving "accounts from many other parts of the Empire of similar conduct on the part of French Agents."³ The Foreign Office itself told Ponsonby of the "intrigues of French partisans" in Tunis as reported by our

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1. Werry to Bidwell, December 4 1841 (Private) FO 78/449, refers to "the Colonel's influence with his connection Lord Moreton " who is . . . a close and influential one with my Lord Aberdeen "
 2. Ponsonby to Palmerston No 56 of February 20 1841 FO 78/430.
 3. Encl 1 in Ponsonby to Palmerston No 7 of January 10 1841 FO 78/430.

Consul-General there,¹ and of the insurrections in Greece "excited by the Greek government and probably . . . encouraged also by the government of France."² Palmerston himself thought it "very desirable that M. Caporal and the other French persons who hold appointments in the local government in Candia, should be removed;"³ and Ponsonby did not hesitate to ask Pontois for an explanation of the conduct of the French consul at Salonika in the troubles there. Metternich got similar impressions⁴ from the reports of Sturmer, the Internuncio, and from those of Adelpour, the Austrian consul-general in Bayrut.

Rose, Moore, and Wood then were not unusual when they gave prominence in their despatches to the extent of French intrigue in Syria, and only Werry senior, consul at Damascus, preferred the suspicion of Russia. Werry distrusted "the french" but not to the same extent as Wood, and he customarily looked beyond Syria as the centre of their intrigue.⁵ The events of 1840 and those through which he was living in 1841 made him accredit Syria with more political importance than he had ever given it before in his despatches.

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1. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 5 of January 19, 1841, FO 78/427.
 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 162 of June 26 1841, FO 78/428.
Ponsonby to Palmerston, No 231 of July 12 1841, FO 78/346.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 191 of August 3 1841, FO 78/429.
 3. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 118 of May 14 1841, FO 78/428.
 4. Ponsonby to Palmerston, No 234 of July 13 (Confidential) Enclo 1 (copy) Sturmer to Metternich May 20 1841, FO 195/186.
 5. N.W.Werry to Bidwell (private) February 20 1840 FO 78/410
"I fear the marching of our forces into Tartary from the North West Indian frontier . . . will bring our interests into direct collision with those of Russia, at all events it seems likely to produce a struggle between the Two Powers for the Supremacy of moral influence, if not for positive power and Force in Central Asia."

"I mentioned in my despatch to His Excellency Lord Ponsonby the measures pursued by the french authorities to increase their influence generally in this country and principally in connection with Mount Lebanon; what is the ultimate view they entertain is not discernable at present; whether it is to gain a footing in the mountains, and thereby Govern or Conquer Syria, or whether it is to prepare it for the return of the Egyptians in this Country or simply to gain an ascendancy of influence, some further time is required for their plans to be clearly understood and developed -- the first would appear unattainable so long as we hold the maritime supremacy which would not be changed essentially, by any political combination between France and Russia; and the second though depending on the same cause, is susceptible of chances, which a communication between france, mehemed ali and the uncertain policy of Russia might involve:- and the whole with the third hypothesis depends on the feeling of the population, which is generally favourable to the British."¹

The recovery by France of her lost influence was not so formidable a task as it superficially appeared to be, for the Christian people were not entirely forgetful of a centuries-old link, and the Maronite Patriarch was largely financed from Paris. Despite the recent deterioration in their relations, he and the French agents swiftly discovered that they were d'accord on a number of issues. Both desired the paring of Turkish influence to a minimum, both disliked Bashir, as a British tool in French eyes, and a Turkish tool in those of the Patriarch; both believed that their interests would best be served by a restoration of the exiled Amir Bashir.²

The resumption of good relations between Ratti-Menton and the Patriarch was effected even before Wood left the country in April; a French steamer brought money from France for the

1. N.W.Werry to Palmerston No 9 of May 20, 1841, FO 78/447.
2. Moore to Palmerston No 38 of June 3rd 1841. FO 78/449.

restoration of convents and relief work; on March 20th. More than by donations of money, Moore thought the chief means "employed by the agents of that Government is to awaken the jealousy of the Maronite clergy by insinuations that the conversion of the people to the Protestant faith is the ultimate object of England." He was probably right; the Patriarch feared the effects of missionary Protestantism on his flock, should it be able to practise on a wide scale. His fear of England in this respect had no foundation, but there were American missionaries in the Mountain; they were confused with Englishmen in the Maronite mind and the peasantry were forbidden to have any contact with them. Rose thought it best to emphasise the absence of English missions, and not to damage relations with the Patriarch by trying to intercede on behalf of the Americans.¹

He found the mountaineers "spoilt and misled by the French . . . There is no intrigue or misrepresentation, however unworthy, which the French agents and merchants, do not use to excite the country against the English government."² Méloises, Bourrée's predecessor, told the Patriarch that England was responsible for the system of taxation which the Turks were trying to introduce, and an agent added that the "Wasp" and the "Inconstant" had left Bayrut to stop French vessels reaching the coast with relief money. Rose rebutted the charges publicly at one of the many

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1. Rose to Palmerston, No 73 of July 26, 1841, FO 78/456. Rose stopped a Swiss of the Church of England who was proselytising among the Druses and the chaplain of the *Revenge* whom he called a "parasite" (Puseyite?). Rose to **Aberdeen**, No 107 of October 7 1841, FO 78/457.
 2. Rose to Palmerston, No 30 of May 3 1841, FO 78/455.

Ainoob meetings, and of course, it was he and Moore who got the whole taxation question suspended. Once the Ainoob meetings broke up, the Patriarch's object was temporarily achieved.

"Mr. Misk . . . states that the French have certainly gained considerable influence with the Maronites and that their Patriarch is favourably disposed towards them . . . The object of the Mountaineers appears to be to avail themselves of the offer of the French assistance in order to free themselves of the Tariff and to gain all they can from the Turks. The French have given them to understand that they will assist them in July with their fleet in the event of the Sublime Porte not listening to their petition."¹

With a section of the Druses as well as with the Maronites the French had improved their position.² Largely through the Comte de la Ferté, a former son-in-law of Molé, in business partnership with the Abd el-Melek family, the consuls made their first contacts among the Druses. Méloises assembled the Abd el-Meleks at Btater to disseminate instructions for disorder, telling them that money was coming and that the present undertakings would succeed in dividing the Mountain and prevent their absorption in any Divan. Moore believed the last argument carried great weight with the Druses. Certainly it had the desired effect, for Amir Amin Raslan, Shaykh Youssuf Abd el-Melek and Hussein Talhouk mauled a few Christian priests and indulged in some extortion. Bashir wanted the faction crushed, and Wood advised the Seraskier to agree. Moore met Nejob Pasha and Selim, and prevailed on the latter to arrest the

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1. Rose to Palmerston No 45 of May 28 1841. FO 78/455.
Moore to Palmerston, No 22 of May 27 & 1 enclo 1841, FO 78/449.
 2. Moore to Palmerston No 19 of March 29 1841 FO 78/449.

shaykhs. They were apprehended but released on a promise of good behaviour.

Rose was sensible enough to bear in mind that the French consuls might be committing their government to a far greater extent than that government knew. Méloises was given to verbal indiscretions and he and Rose crossed swords on more than one occasion. Ratti-Menton openly professed his dislike of Guizot, and with Méloises

"acted on the old instructions and in the spirit of the policy of M. Thiers, of whom they were warm admirers, the main object of their endeavours being to prove that M. Thiers' views with respect to this country were correct and that those of Her Majesty's Government were erroneous."¹

The two men were trying hard, not just to recover their country's influence, but by a less commendable industry, to show that Turkey was not capable of supervising the country.

The word had gone round that the French fleet was coming in June now and not July, and while he was sceptical of France disapproving Turkey's financial demands on the Syrians in so brusque a manner, Rose advised Selim to be ready for any contingency, and Palmerston thought some precautions would be wise; Selim brought three battalions from Sayda into Bayrut, and disposed cannon about the town. Two Turkish frigates arrived to await events. If the French did come Rose intended to call in all his detachments to Acre, but "being in the dark as to the real intentions of the French government" he was content to

1. Rose to Palmerston No 124 of November 8 1841, FO 78/458.
Ponsonby to Palmerston No 290 of September 15 1841, FO 78/437

"quietly continue to suggest precautionary measures to the Seraskier."¹ There was always the possibility that France would act in concert with Muhammad Ali, and consul Young in Jerusalem informed him that Ibrahim was building bread ovens and water tanks every four days' march along the route from Cairo to El-Arish.² It was at this juncture as they awaited the coming of the French fleet, that Rose and Moore were invited to meet the Amir Baidar.

Before the resumption of the taxation question in August, British influence was pared to a minimum, and the British consuls were represented as being whole-heartedly in sympathy with Turkish policy. A glance through Rose's despatches would have swiftly dispelled the notion; he condemned Turkish misrule as strongly as Patriarchal bigotry. Beauvale in Paris thought it was time the Maronite clergy was paid by Turkey instead of France,³ Ponsonby that Austria should replace France as the protecting power, but Rose had a more practical suggestion to give his ambassador. Casting about for a means of strengthening his country's position, he advocated an association with the Druses.

What might appear to have been nothing more than a backyard squabble between the henchmen of Palmerston and Thiers, manoeuvring for petty local influence, after the main contest was over, was coming to be regarded in more serious light at

1. Rose to Palmerston, No 49 of June 2 1841, FO 78/455.

2. Rose to Palmerston No 42 of June 2 1841, FO 78/455.

3. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 6 of January 19 1841, FO 78/427.

home. Originally, Palmerston had shown little interest in the settlement of Syria, and what interest he did show was restricted to securing the fulfilment of the promises made by British agents and officers in 1840. To Bashir's plea for sea ports he turned a deaf ear -- "it is for the Sultan's interest to diminish instead of increasing the extent of those Anomalous Authorities, such as that of the Emir Bechir" and "it would be very inexpedient unnecessarily to extend the Druse jurisdiction and system over a town like Beyruth."¹

His political interest was stimulated by two factors; firstly the cumulative evidence of Ponsonby's and consular despatches showing that France, or at least her agents, were making a strong bid to recover her traditional influence and to oust the British, led him to wonder whether to make a fight of it. Secondly, the military report compiled by Colonel Rose's detachments gave a timely emphasis to the teachings of Chrzanowski, on the value of the many-harboured Levant coast. Could the latter be left undisputed to France again, to France already well entrenched on the African littoral, to France who had never formally abandoned Muhammad Ali? Might not France try to mend her unhappy relations with Russia, and to co-operate with her at the Court of Persia? Furthermore France in Syria and Russia in the Principalities made Constantinople too much like the rose between the thorns.

1. Wood, Moore and Rose wanted Bayrut to become a free port. It would be a boon to the Lebanon and would "advance British interests in this quarter." (Rose to Palmerston No 30 of May 3 1841, FO 78/455) Ponsonby thought the whole idea "very mischievous policy" (Ponsonby to Palmerston No 63 of Feb 20 1841, FO 78/430) Palmerston's reply is in No 84 to Ponsonby April 19 1841, FO 78/428.

What stimulated Palmerston most is **not** known but there can be no doubt of a quickening of his interest during July and August. His understanding of local circumstances improved swiftly and he seems to have read Dr. ~~Bowring's~~ comprehensive report on Syria with great care. Unfortunately his interest developed too near to the end of the Melbourne ministry to manifest itself very much either in action or declaration of policy. His response to Rose on the subject of a connection with the Druses is with one exception the most tangible mark he left behind to show that he had been attracted to Syria politically as well as for its strategic and commercial value.

The Druse nation seemed, to the consuls, to be a most convenient counterbalance to the nascent France-Maronite liaison. If the French consul in Bayrut could reside for days with the Patriarch,¹ if Ratti-Menton could entertain the Christian clergy of Damascus with banquets on Louis-Philippe's birthday² and "s'attache au meme temps a Nedjib Pasha," that liaison was fairly close. The relations of Moore and Rose with some of the Druses were already quite amicable. Moore, on the release of the Druse chiefs held in captivity by Muhammad Ali was the recipient of addresses of gratitude when they landed at Bayrut from Egypt on March 12,³ accompanied by

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1. Rose to Palmerston No 49 of June 2 1841, FO 78/455.
 2. N.W.Werry to Palmerston No 5 of May 6 1841 FO 78/447.
 3. Moore to Palmerston No 12 of Mar 16 1841, FO 78/449.

Lieutenant-Colonel Napier. It entered Moore's head first that his government could make a useful connection with them, for, "if Great Britain does not take measures to consolidate the influence she has acquired in this country, France and Russia will replace her."¹ Rose was first swayed by Mr. Thompson the American missionary who came to Bayrut from the fastnesses of the Druse country in July especially to see him. He had been approached, Thompson said, by the Druse chiefs of Soueida in Haouran to secure for them commercial relations with England, and a form of protection similar to that which France gave the Maronites, and Russia the Greek Orthodox minority. They had spoken to him of their traditional connections with England -- which must have puzzled Thompson considerably -- and wanted a new tie. Thompson thought they could be made Protestants.² Rose pondered the whole question for a week before putting pen to paper.

The Druses,³ once the masters of a territory stretching from Antioch in the north to Safad in the south, and even including Tadmor to the east, were now a quiet minor sect by numerical standards, but the decline in their material fortunes had only served to draw tighter the bonds of their feudal theocracy, and while other minorities -- the Yezidis round

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1. Moore to Palmerston No 18 of March 25 1841 FO78/449.
Moore to Palmerston No 10 of May 29 1840 FO 78/412.
 2. Rose to Palmerston No 39 of May 22 1841 FO 78/455.
 3. See P.K.Hitt, Origins of the Druses, Columbia University Historical Series, Vol 28; Springett, Secret Sects of Syria, London [1922] Ch XXV; Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, London [1866] A Catechism of the Druse Religion; Earl of Carnarvon, Recollections of the Druses of Lebanon, London [1860]; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Article on Druses by Carra de Vaux; al Rudhrawari; Dhayh kitab tajarib al-Umam, Oxford [1921] trans. into English by D.S. Margolouth, Vol.6.

Aleppo, the Ansariyyah north of Tripoli, the Isma'iliyyah round Homs -- were insignificant, the Druses remained a most powerful factor in local affairs. In any trial of strength, the Muslim population could have overpowered them by sheer weight of numbers, but throughout the Lebanon they were the terror of the Maronites just as they had been the bane of Ibrahim during his occupation. "One Druse cloak is worth four Maronites," ran a popular saying in the Mountain.

Druzism was almost as old a religion as that of the Maronites, and in the days of its founder, Hamza, had proselytism had been carried on in North Africa, 'Iraq, Persia and India. Hamza's deification of the third Fatimite Kalif, Hakim bi Amrillah, in the early years of the eleventh century, had been taken up with alacrity by his Persian disciple, Darazi, and Darazi took the infant religion from Egypt and spread it among the people of Wadi al-Taym in South Lebanon. The religion, which became a repository of Persian, Hellenistic, and Judaeo-Christian beliefs, made out that Hakim the blood-thirsty and half-demented Kalif, would reappear on earth as the last of a succession of ten divine incarnations. The divine essence crops up from time to time in different people, but emanates from the same source, whatever people might call it. Hakim had already been preceded by Adam, Noah, Moses, Jesus (Isa ibn Usuf) and Muhammad, and on the day of his reappearance he would lead his adherents -- the elect of men -- to positions of honour in a new age.

True to the type of Shi'ah sects, Druzism fell back on the idea that truth is only found by an allegorical interpretation

of the Qu'ran, and the main principles Hamza devised included entire honesty, recognition of Hakim's divinity, and mutual aid. The religion as preached by Darazi, was scarcely a century old, when its heads decided that the "day of grace" had passed, and no one else was to be admitted to the ranks of the believers. Proselytism was abandoned, and Druzism was passed on hereditarily from that time. To divert attention from the religion, Druses adopted widely the practice of taqiyyah or deliberate concealment, whereby they began to profess orthodox Islamism, and even to attend Maronite churches.

Druzism greatly intrigued European travellers in the early nineteenth century, who were impressed by the exclusiveness of its people, and the mystery of its religious practices. Thus Captain Light¹ thought them to be "the remnant of Israel who fled the wrath of Moses after the destruction of the molten calf"; Canon Parfitt² that they were "the descendants of Arabs, Persians, Hindoos, Jews and Christians;" Rose, who once picked a small calf idol from a dead Druse thought them Jewish in origin. Aberdeen told Queen Victoria that the Druse prince whom Palmerston allowed to be educated in England "is neither Mohamedan nor Christian; but entertains some Superstitious belief peculiar to the Druses, of which very little is known, and of which they make a great mystery."³

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1. H. Light, Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Holy Land, in 1814, London, [1818].
 2. Parfitt, Among the Druses, London, [1917] p 33.
 3. Aberdeen to Queen Victoria, November 25 1841, Aberdeen Papers, ADD MSS 43041.

French scholars have traced descent from the crusading Comte de Dreux who led the survivors of the siege of Acre to the hills. Fakr al-Din has been recognised as the son of Godfrey de Bouillon, and support has come from "learned" articles in the Revue de l'Orient.¹ In France there were societies of Commandeurs du Liban and Druzes Réunis, while a poem of Hebur announces:

"Those stormy seats the warrior Druzes hold;
From Norman blood their lofty time they trace,
Their lion courage proves their generous race."²

These explanations are sheer fantasy, for the existence of the **Druzes** as a distinct people was known long before the crusades.³ Nevertheless the Druzes have always been willing to add to the confusion by fostering belief in a European origin; and during the nineteenth century they insisted on their English ancestry. "None but the Druzes," they told Rose "could have taken Acre in four hours," and they had been more and more disposed to say so, since the revival of French friendship for the Maronites.

Rose was gratified by the Druse approach as communicated by Thompson, for itself as well as for the lever it could become if only the Foreign Office would sanction its use. He wrote to Palmerston first, and there is no mistaking his own enthusiasm for the project he forwarded. The Druzes wished for commercial relations, the fostering by Great Britain of local industry, and the education of Druse children by British teachers. Rose mentioned these things but devoted his despatch to other aspects of

1. For example, No 10, Paris [1841].
2. Beaumont, Diary of a Journey to the East, London [1856].
3. Hitti, *op cit*, p.1.

the connection. He thought the Druses would seek British aid in "other matters" since they would reject Bashir's Divan for the Mountain in the form which Wood had mapped out earlier in 1841¹, and the Druses "must exercise great influence over the fate of Syria." They were great friends of the Russian proteges, the Greek Antiochans.

"The Druses alone would prevent any other party from assuming an ascendancy in Lebanon, but united with the Greek Antiochans, they must command it -- and Her Majesty's Government, thus in possession of the confidence of these two powerful and united parties would be enabled to exercise a wholesome influence in this country."

The Maronites were weakening in their friendship for Great Britain because they considered her to be on the side of Turkey, but their defection "would be counterbalanced by the friendly feeling of the Greek Antiochans and the Druses towards Her Majesty's government if Your Lordship should be pleased to authorise any steps to be taken to meet the views of the Druses."²

Palmerston's draft reply, bearing the Queen's signature, is a highly interesting document.³

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1. Wood to Husayn Pasha February 20 1841, FO 78/449 enclo 52 in Moore to Palmerston No 10 of March 1 1841.
 2. Rose to Palmerston No 39 of May 22 1841 FO 78/455. Moore too thought this was Britain's opportunity to "maintain our influence unimpaired" (Moore to Palmerston No 37 of June 2 1841 FO 78/449) Three months later when the Druses had alienated much of the consuls' sympathy he wrote "The Christians certainly are impressed very generally with the idea that England is favouring the Druses. . . and its requires unremitted exertion to remove this idea," (Moore to Aberdeen, No 68 of Oct 1 1841, FO 78/449) and Rose told his chief, that when the Druses said they were his in peace and war he "instantly repressed these sentiments and set them perfectly right, as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government". (Rose to Aberdeen, No 107 of Oct 7 1841, FO 78/457).
 3. Palmerston to Rose, No 8 of July 15, FO 78/454.

"I have to instruct you to state to the Druses that the British government will gladly establish that connection and that system of communication with the Druses which the Druse chiefs desire," but "the basis of that connection must be, that it is in no degree to interfere with, or to weaken, the connection of the Druses with their sovereign the Sultan; but that, on the contrary, the object and intention of the British Government must be by exciting its good offices and its just influence at Constantinople in favour of the Druses, to prevent differences between the Druses and the Sultan, which might loosen the Bonds which ought to exist between a Sovereign and His Subjects."

The terms of Palmerston's despatch are not entirely convincing. Rose, who was openly advocating a counterbalance to the France-Maronite connection was given no warning as to his own conduct, nor was Palmerston the man from whom we can expect any such reproof. In August he was to tell Ponsonby that "it would be vain for the British Government to hope to establish any useful influence over the Maronites . . . But England may establish among the Druses an influence useful to England and serviceable to the Porte;¹ and for that purpose it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make a different arrangement about the appointment of Consul General in Syria." The different arrangement was to give the post to Rose, a military man, rather than to Wood, a civil public servant, of Maronite inclinations. The Foreign Secretary, it should be remembered was devoting considerable attention to Syria by now; he reorganised the consular

1. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Draft of August 16 1841, FO 78/429. It was not sent as a despatch. As Palmerston's minute shows, it was changed into a private and confidential letter.

service,¹ revived the consulate-general, got the Admiralty to station a squadron on the Syrian coast², sought a firman enabling Britain to allow all Jews to seek redress through her consuls;³ he repeatedly urged Ponsonby to secure a firman to commence the building of the Protestant church in Jerusalem,⁴ and calmly told his ambassador that a bishop would be sent out without the formality of obtaining the sultan's consent. A bishop who had no intention of proselytising among Muslims was beyond the jurisdiction of the Porte.⁵

Palmerston's condition that any connection with the Druses was not to have any adverse effect on the relations with their sovereign, should thus be treated very circumspectly. It is the sort of platitude with which the archives are littered, and is often no more than a device of despatch writing, written with an eye to future Blue Books. In this instance it was possibly sincerely written, but the innocence and the legitimacy of any interposition between the sultan and his subjects is a double delusion from which British Foreign Secretaries have fre-

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1. For the scheme for training British graduates as dragomans see Alison's Memorandum respecting Education of Persons for service in the East, in Palmerston to Treasury, Draft May 21 1841, FO 78/467; Palmerston pressed acceptance on the Treasury, saying that it would be economical in the long run. Britain had no Oriental schools as had Paris and Vienna, and the East India College at Haileybury did not instruct in Turkish. (Palmerston to Treasury, May 25 1841, FO 78/467) The appointments were made in June (Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 143 of June 11 1841, FO 78/428).
 2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 200 of August 13 1841, FO 78/429.
 3. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 33 of February 17 1841, FO 195/180.
 4. Ponsonby to Palmerston, No 288 of September 15 1841, FO 78/437. The Turks would not give a firman, but merely "an unavowed permission" for building to begin.
 5. Palmerston to Ponsonby, No 227 (Confidential) August 27 1841, FO 78/437.

quently suffered, and Palmerston was no exception. Aberdeen, so penetrating in his perception of false notions in others yet so blind to his own, had no doubts of the underlying importance of Palmerston's reply, and one of his earliest tasks on coming to office was to disabuse Rose of any ideas of a political liaison with the Druses. Rose's despatch forwarding the Druse request, and Palmerston's reply were also carefully cut out of the 1843 Blue Book on Syria, by Aberdeen.

Palmerston must also have been aware that to establish distinct commercial and educational links with the Druse people at this moment was singularly inopportune. The Druses were seeking to avoid subjection to a Divan for the Mountain, which in its turn would have to be defined in its relation to Turkish authority, and the Foreign Secretary's response to their appeal was bound to increase their intractability. Rose was told to submit details for the establishment of commercial relations, to report what goods could form the basis of reciprocal trade, and to enquire of the Druse chiefs what form the educational scheme should take. The addition of a condition might have salved Palmerston's conscience, and reassured the Queen, but such a refinement was lost on the Druses. Britain had become their friend.

Three days after writing to Palmerston, and therefore of his own accord, Rose wrote to the Druses¹ that his government

1. Rose to Palmerston, No 540 of June 6 1841, FO 78/455. The negotiations with the Druses are entirely elided from the Blue Book.

would be delighted to assist them in any way within its power, but that nothing could add so much weight to his representations to his government as his assurance that the Druses had determined to continue to be faithful subjects of the Sultan, and to use their influence to preserve peace. The Druse 'uqala accepted this condition cheerfully. The Druses feared that if the Mountaineers successfully resisted Turkish taxation demands again, their next step would be to secure a political independence comparable to ~~that~~ which pertained under the ex-Bashir. Already anxiety expressed itself in clashes here and there in Biq'a, notably at Hasbayya and Djezzin,¹ where Christians began to go to church armed. Thus when Bashir Kassim by order of the Porte, called the deputies of the Lebanon together in August, to try once again to reach a settlement of taxes to be paid by them to the treasury at Sayda, the Druses plotted his assassination. The Patriarch warned Bashir of this, and refused to advise the Christians to attend because of the poor state of Druse-Maronite relations. Rose and Moore could not get the Patriarch to reverse his decision but Bashir went to Ainab in spite of all warnings.²

The Ainab meetings³ began promptly but in a fortnight of continuous negotiation nothing was decided. Once more meeting at the scene of their April triumph against Bashir and the Turks, the deputies swiftly resumed their intractable attitude; the Turks were too indifferent to the powers of association

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1. Rose to Palmerston, July 24 1841, A & P, [1843] LX [c456] p.171.
 2. Moore to Palmerston, No 58 of August 7th 1841, FO 78/449.
 3. Rose to Palmerston, August 18, 1841, A & P, [1843] LX [c456] p 179.

to change the meeting place to somewhere like Bayrut itself where the fullness of Turkish power, however, modest that really might be, could be seen. Mustapha Pasha represented the Turkish administration at Ainab and was even less of a success than Selim had been at the tedious practice of negotiation. After a few days, he retired to spend the rest of the time shooting, leaving his duties to the governor of Acre. With an inefficient and ultimately non-existent, president, the meetings swiftly degenerated into vituperative attacks on the Turks by all the sects. They again refused to pay the Tariff, and offered one thousand purses a year plus the cost of government in the Mountain. Selim Pasha in Bayrut was exasperated by their truculence and told Rose that if the accounts continued to be unfavourable he would resort to arms. Rose with Moore, called on the Patriarch, who put forward the same arguments that his bishop had advanced at the meetings.¹ The Mountain would pay a 3% Tariff but not 12%, give one thousand and perhaps one thousand two hundred purses to the Sultan, and raise the salaries of the prince and his officials once the Porte had laid down what amount they should be. By this means the Patriarch hoped to have the right of paying the prince, any idea of which, as Moore told him, was an assumption of the Sultan's prerogative. Further, to cut the Tariff by 9% was a reduction unlikely to be accepted by the Porte. The Patriarch responded that if the Turks tried to enforce the full Tariff the consequences would be fatal. He hoped the deputies would petition the British Government, their only

1. Rose to Palmerston, August 18th 1841 A&P. [1843] LX [c. 456] p. 180.

hope in the present difficulties.

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At this critical juncture Wood reappeared in Syria, landing at Bayrut on August 28.¹ He knew that Ponsonby, his colleagues and the Turkish ministry expected him to effect a swift settlement. He attended the meeting at Ainoob on September 2nd, and the problems which had endured for so long were solved on the same day. He had been instructed to stand by the agreement made by Bashir with the Turks in which the overall amount to be levied was three thousand five hundred purses, less two thousand two hundred purses for the prince's administrative expenses. Only in a case of complete deadlock was he to modify that arrangement.

"I endeavoured to persuade them that their pretension could never be acceded to without depriving the Sublime Porte of the right it has of defraying, through its own officers, the expenses of the administration of its various provinces; that the Sublime Porte could never be brought to receive only a stated sum of money from its provinces without interfering in the details of their respective administrations; neither could it be expected that it would . . . erect Mount Lebanon into a principality; and that, in short, it was unreasonable in them to demand to be placed in the same position as Egypt."²

The amirs and shaykhs gradually fell silent before this onslaught, and knowing that not the least item to them was the money they would lose by being deprived of the lucrative task of collecting the taxes from their feudal domains as well as

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1. Wood to Palmerston, August 28 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c456] p 182.
 2. Wood to Palmerston, September 7 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c456] p 183.

other extortions of their own devising, Wood was wise enough to allow them to levy an extra 5 % on the revenue of their districts, as a compensation. After the example of Bashir, many noble families surrendered their immunity from taxation, and many who considered the system generally favourable to the Mountain, complimented Wood on his firm handling of the assembly. The notables and deputies signed an engagement to pay the tribute in the manner agreed on between Bashir and Selim, and confirmed by the Porte. Selim and the Musteshar responded two days later with a list of salaries for the officers who were to serve under Bashir -- qadi, magistrates, qa'immaqams, secretaries, police officers and gendarmes.¹ The overall total for salaries was two thousand one hundred purses, leaving out of the three thousand five hundred purses for the whole Mountain, one thousand four hundred for the Imperial Treasury.

The question of the Divan, a question purely pertaining to the Mountain, was aired on the same day, and settled. Selim introduced the subject himself, stating quite frankly that its main object was to reduce the chances of arbitrary rule. Bashir gave prompt assent to the immediate introduction of the Divan or majliss for the Mountain; the amirs followed his example, but without enthusiasm. They were reluctant to establish an authority

1. "Document signed by the Emirs and Sheiks, promising to pay Tribute" A & P [1843] IX [c456] p 184. Also, "A Note Specifying the Salaries of His Excellency the Emire Beshir . . . of the Judges and Magistrates . . . and other Public Servants" p 185.

to which they would become amenable, and "which would finally deprive them of the power of molesting and vexing their clients with impunity."¹ Reasons without number were produced why the system would not work, and the Christian amirs demanded seven out of the twelve seats on the majliss -- four Maronites, two Greeks, and one Greek Catholic. In addition, they tried to specify that the remaining five should consist of two Druses, two Muslims, and one Matawilah.

The Druses resisted furiously, and nothing that Wood or Selim could at first propose induced the Christians to relent. Once more Wood wore the resistance down, and after consultation with Selim, a boyourouldi was issued whereby the eleven members of the majliss were to consist of a president appointed by Bashir, (and the Christians were assured he was bound to be a Christian), three Maronites, three Druses, one Turk, one Greek, one Greek Catholic, one Matawilah. Wood deemed this arrangement a good one, and informed the Foreign Secretary of its inevitable popularity among the lower orders since these had petitioned the prince often for a divan to which they might bring their grievances.

"The inhabitants of Lebanon have been more favoured by the Sublime Porte than any other portion of its subjects: their laws, privileges and liberty have been secured to them, and the taxes are moderate. Everything now depends upon the Emir Bechir's conduct . . . With the best intentions he has not, however, the requisite energy and tact to appease the minds of the people and to

1. Wood to Palmerston, September 7 1841, A & P [1843] LX
[c455] p 183.

quiet the dissensions that unhappily exist between the different sects inhabiting the Mountains, and which may lead to serious consequences."¹

The meeting broke up, and the amirs and shaykhs, momentarily pacified, went home.

Wood now turned his mind to other things and intended going with the Seraskier to Jerusalem, leaving Bashir to attempt what was quite beyond his powers, but before going he visited the Patriarch.² Wood showed the irascible old man the concessions, obtained for the Maronites as he had listed them for the Internuncio prior to leaving Constantinople. While the Patriarch expressed his gratitude to England and Austria in fulsome terms, he was sceptical of the success of the Divan, not because Bashir would be incapable of operating it, but because the sects would quibble over every decision, and decide major issues by recourse to arms. Wood emphasized the benefits the poorer classes would obtain from it, and delivered a parting shot on the dangers of Syria losing Anglo-Austrian sympathy by "restless conduct." Britain had Ottoman tranquillity and prosperity at heart and would witness with displeasure any disturbance which lacked just cause or motive. The Patriarch feared the Druses, but Wood guaranteed their conduct if the Patriarch would do the same for the Maronites. Wood thought the latter the more unsettled sect at the moment, and to do more

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1. Wood to Palmerston, September 7 1841, A & P [1843] XL [c456] p 189.
 2. Wood to Palmerston, September 7th 1841, A & P [1843] XL [c456] p 191.

for them would be to incur the suspicion of Turkey.

The interview ended with the Patriarch requesting Wood to convey his thanks to Her Majesty's Government for the concessions obtained, and "expressed his regret that it should have been thought at Constantinople or elsewhere that himself and his nation were acting under French influence. He desired me to state that the French had, by their equivocal and vacillating conduct lost all their influence . . . that he looked to England and Austria for support since he had proofs of the sincerity of the Interest they took in their prosperity . . . the fact of his having made known his wishes through the Representative of Great Britain and not through that of France at Constantinople to the Sublime Porte, and had acquired through his medium most important privileges and concessions, and had offered to renounce French protection altogether."¹

As the representative of the Turkish government, taking pride of place over Selim, and with powers to which no consul could pretend, Wood was the principal architect of the taxation and administrative settlements. Rose had discreetly stood aside from the Ainab disputes prior to Wood's coming, yet he received,² simultaneously with the arrival of Wood -- and the timing was obviously intentional -- a communication from Ponsonby stating that his conduct with reference to the Druses had led Turkey to ask for the recall of the detachments from Syria. Rose immediately wrote to Palmerston vindicating his conduct.³ In his dealings with the Druses he had always insisted on loyalty to the Porte, but Turkish officers disliked him for his out-

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1. Wood to Palmerston, No 5 of September 7 1841, FO 78/447.
 2. Rose to Palmerston, No 86 of September 7 1841, FO 78/456.
 3. Rose to Palmerston, Private & confidential, August 28 1841, FO 78/456.

spoken condemnation of the late Musteshar and the Governor of Gaza. These individuals, he wrote tried to get him withdrawn because he was too inconvenient a witness of their misdeeds. Ponsnby had warned him against any "pour parler" with the Druses but this he attributed to the desire of the Ambassador and Wood to have him withdrawn. Wood, in particular, wanted to maintain British influence unaided, with two thousand pounds per annum to oil the machinery, and Ponsnby supported this scheme. Rose complained that Ponsnby had never sent him the firmans for his officers to begin instruction of Turkish troops, although they had been applied for. As for Wood, his Catholicism was well known with the Druses who had actually sought Rose's protection from a man they considered as a partisan. (Wood had been made a Knight of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem with much ostentation, and was in the habit, according to Major Wilbraham and other officers, of receiving presents from Christians.)

Rose was not at all certain that the meeting of September 2nd was the end of the Mountain's problems. The assembly surrendered because Wood had made it plain that the representatives of Austria, England, Russia and Prussia were behind Turkey in adhering to the arrangements made by Selim and Bashir a few months before. Wood's timely distribution of watches pacified its members momentarily. The ordinary people, on ~~the~~ other hand, were not likely to renounce the conviction instilled by the Patriarch that "in justice they ought not, and

what is more that, in reality, they cannot, pay the Tariff."¹ Rose predicted that the Tariff would cause further trouble; the Divan would raise new problems rather than settle old ones, because it contained six different sects, and five different creeds, which had been at odds for generations. The men in the Divan would all be aristocrats since the franchise was restricted to leading men in the villages, the effect of which would be for the members to defend the privileges of the electorate before anything else.

If Wood had got his way Rose would have been packed off to Malta with his detachments, and he himself would become the prince's guiding star in administration and the handling of the Divan. The Divan would secure a margin of supremacy over the Druses since the president was bound to be a Maronite. Rose, on the other hand, was enthusiastic for the connection with the Druses; he said little of the necessity of Druse obedience to the mandates of the Divan, and the Druses thought of him as a friend who would not see their interests swamped.

After the meeting of September 2nd, Rose went with Shaykh Na'aman to the Druse country to explain the difficulties in the way of establishing trade relations, and to find out how the latter would be best initiated.² At ~~the~~ Deir el-Kammar he met an assembly of notables which included the Druse qadi, the joint governors of the town, and 'uqala from the Haouran. The

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1. Rose to Palmerston, 6th September 1841, A & P [1843] LX [c456] p 195.
 2. Rose to Palmerston, No 90 of September 18 1841, FO 78/456; A & P [1843] LX [c456] P.196.

effect of such a distinguished and colourful gathering on Rose was considerable. France and other nations, he was told, had approached the Druses often to establish an alliance but "you come but once, and then you came openly and we ran to meet you." To prevent the Patriarch killing the scheme of education in its infancy, Rose was asked to get Palmerston to extract a firman from the Porte. Rose agreed that a firman would be valuable, but he wanted to interview the Patriarch, to tell him Britain would not proselytise among the Maronites, or set up schools in the districts of mixed population. Above all, he knew the Druses feared the Divan and just as Bashir had sought self protection in a Kapu-Kiaya at the Porte against the Turkish officers in Syria, the Druses now asked him to forward their request for a similar agent of their own.

The opinions of Rose and Wood were therefore at variance on the question of the Mountain, the latter wishing to keep the country a political unit under the Christian part and getting his support from Ponsonby, the former anxious to protect Druzism and, consciously or unconsciously, to bolster Druse separatism by inducing Palmerston to enter into particular relationships with them. The clash in ideas on policy between Ponsonby and his superior did not develop, for by the end of August the moribund Melbourne ministry fell, but it did reveal itself in the precedents to the appointments of Wood to be consul of Damascus and Rose to be consul-general of Syria.

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The reshuffle of the Syrian consular officers and the reappointment of a consul-general had been in contemplation for some time at the Foreign Office, and along with his embryonic connection with the Druses, were the most material indications of Palmerston's continued interest in the political significance of Syria after the Egyptian crisis.

The unreality of a war with Russia, the romantic rather than the practical contemplation thereof, was perhaps contributory to Urquhart's and Palmerston's talking so much about such a calamity. But it was the nearness of an actual encounter with France in 1840 that confirmed that nominally friendly states, that neighbours, could have incompatible interests in distant Turkey, and that they might fight for them. Fortunately the greater forces were on Palmerston's side, and the more frayed tempers on the other. Had they both been on the same side war would surely have come.

Syria leapt to the forefront in 1840; it was, for a time the Eastern Question. The Foreign Secretary believed the time ripe for an overhaul of the consular service, and notably in Syria. The self-imposed duty of seeing the promises made to the Syrians honoured, the renaissance of commercial interest, the need to cement the strong position which the war had given England, the lack of sound information on a province so militarily vital, demanded the attention and services of competent consuls and subordinates. In February 1841 Palmerston appointed Lieutenant Colonel Neale British paid vice-consul at Alexandretta¹

1. Palmerston to N.W.Werry, No 1 of Mar 18 1841, FO 78/447.

in place of Hays who resigned, and confirmed as paid vice-consul in Tarsus John Clapperton, an appointee of Werry junior.¹

On May 18th, notification of the reshuffle of the Syrian consuls was sent from Downing Street. Wood was appointed consul in Damascus;² Werry was to go to Bayrut,³ and Moore was to go to Aleppo as soon as Werry got to Bayrut from Damascus.⁴

Other appointments in the surrounding countries confirmed Palmerston's interest. In August, Colonel Taylor, the East India Company resident at Bagdad was made consul in that pashalik;⁵ Lilburne was appointed to Cyprus,⁶ Suter the vice-consul at Trebizonde was appointed to the newly-opened consulate at Kaisariéh,⁷ and Colonel Rose was made consul-general of Syria.⁸ Ponsonby was as disturbed as Wood by Rose's appointment, and tried to get it withdrawn. He had been given no official intimation of the intended revival of the consulate-general, and had previously been satisfied with the appointment of Wood as consul in Damascus. News of the nomination of Rose reached Ponsonby in early September, at the very time when his protégé was carrying through the taxation and Divan schemes;

^x Cf. position in July 1831 when Barker wrote "I think it very probably Mr. Farren's appointment has been done away with as consul-general. When Lord Aberdeen informed me of it officially, I told him frankly . . . that the trade of Syria, not only for the English, but likewise for the French, had died a natural death, and that a consul-general could not resuscitate it." Barker, op cit. Vol. II, p.170.

1. Palmerston to F.H.S.Werry No 1 of Mar 18 1841, FO 78/447.
2. Palmerston to Wood No 1 of May 18 1841, FO 78/447.
3. Palmerston to N.W.Werry No 3 of May 18 1841, FO 78/447.
4. Palmerston to Moore No 6 of May 18 1841, FO 78/449.
5. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 205 of Aug 14 1841, FO 78/429.
6. Palmerston to Treasury, August 16 1841, FO 78/462.
7. Palmerston to Ponsonby No 220 of August 24 1841, FO 78/429.
8. Palmerston to Rose No 18 of August 19, 1841, FO 78/454.

Ponsonby had already warned Rose against too close an association with the Druses and certainly had not visualised this promotion which made Wood the colonel's subordinate.

Ponsonby wrote to Palmerston, advocating Wood as having superior qualifications for the post of consul-general, and reminding him that Wood could supply "the best information that can be had upon the subject (of Syria) as no man has half the knowledge . . . which is possessed by Mr. Wood, whose invaluable services have been so great and successful in the execution of the wishes of Your Lordship." But Palmerston had a definite objection to the appointment, while being fully aware of Wood's abilities. It would not matter elsewhere, but it did in Syria, that Wood was a Roman Catholic.¹ In disputes with the Druses he would lean to the side of the Maronites, "at least the Druses would think so." It was a waste of time to try to cultivate any useful friendship with the Maronites who "will always, through the agency of their priests, lean upon France." Rose was appointed to the post.

Not even then did Ponsonby give way, but deferred acting on orders to get Rose his exequatur, until he had made every effort to prevent the appointment. When it became evident that Palmerston was insistent, Ponsonby waited till Aberdeen came to office and tried to argue that Turkey would not give an exequatur for a revived office,² and that his successive

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1. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Draft of August 16 1841, FO 78/429; changed to private letter.
 2. Ponsonby to Aberdeen, No 10 of Oct 6 1841, FO 78/437.

efforts had all failed. It was best to be content with the consular system as it already existed. Ponsonby left Constantinople a week later. Bankhead, the chargé d'affaires who took over the embassy when Ponsonby left for leave in England on October 3rd, got Rose's berat without very much difficulty.¹

Writing to Rose on August 19, Palmerston said the appointment was to give him greater authority while in command of the detachments in Syria. The consuls were under his control, but as the object of the appointment was "purely political," he was not to bother himself with commercial matters. The office of consul-general was not to interfere with his military duties or restrict him to any one place. The appointment was one of Palmerston's last acts at the Foreign Office, for on September 3, the day after Wood had settled the taxation and Divan difficulties at Ainab, and before Rose had received word of his new title, the Earl of Aberdeen was at the Foreign Secretary's desk.

Werry predicted trouble between the pasha who were already divided in sympathy with different parties in the Mountain. He found it hard to decide just what powers Wood still had from the Porte, and thought he would clash with Rose

1. Bankhead to Aberdeen, No 38 of Nov 19, 1841, FO 78/438. N.W. Werry, and the French Ratti-Menton had vizieral letters, and not berats. In 1831 Sir Robert Gordon failed to get a berat for Farren recognising him as consul-general of Damascus; instead the berat given stated that Farren "sera désormais Consul Générale à Acre." (Ponsonby to Palmerston, No 228 of July 11, 1841, FO 195/186.)

sometime. Wood's position was a n "Anomaly in Consular Jurisdiction" and he did not think a Hodges or a Campbell would have tolerated it. Wood ought to have become Oriental Secretary at Constantinople, and Werry himself have been left at Damascus.¹ Werry, under the stress of his own martyrdom, underestimated Rose's forbearance and tact,² and overestimated Wood's position, quite devoid of the special powers which the Imperial Divan had bestowed on him now that the outstanding difficulties in Syria had been settled. Of the two he leaned to Rose,

"I think he sees much clearer and further than Wood with all due deference to the diplomatic talents of the latter." He did not think they would fall out so much that Syria would be split into Druse and Maronite states though this might happen by the pressure of an outside force; "what Thiers failed in doing by arms conjointly with Mt. Ali [sic] the pacific policy of Guizot may do with intrigue."

Werry's own cup of sorrow, now merely full by his removal to Bayrut,³ was about to run over. When Werry arrived from Damascus, Moor handed over the Bayrut archives on October 9th, and set out for Aleppo without further ado. Both Haidar and Bashir petitioned for his retention at Bayrut, but Moore would not forward them, as being personally affected by their contents.⁴ Rose sent them home, adding that Moore was always

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1. N.W.Werry to Bidwell (private) Nov 19 1841, FO 78/449.
 2. Aberdeen Papers, Add MSS, 43140, Aberdeen to Rose November 4 1841.
 3. Werry to Bidwell (private) Oct 8 1841, FO 78/449 "...How I shall manage God only knows... I have once more descended into the unenviable position of vice-consul, which the post of consul here must henceforward only be regarded as such." For Werry at his abusive best see his private letter to Bidwell of Dec 4 1841, FO 78/449.
 4. Rose to Palmerston No 88 of September 1 1841, FO 78/456.

resourceful and willing to shoulder responsibility. It would be good if he stayed. His despatch addressed to Palmerston was answered by Aberdeen. On November 27 the Foreign Secretary replied that Moore should return to Bayrut, and a new exequatur would be obtained for him. Werry was ordered to Aleppo in his stead.¹ By early 1842 the position stabilised itself with Wood at Damascus, Werry at Aleppo, and Rose and Moore at Bayrut.

The changes in the Syrian consular service in 1841^x have not been detailed to show the declining fortunes of Werry, although among four such different men as these it was important which one held which office. What emerges chiefly is the concentration of English attention on the Mountain as opposed to Syria as a whole. The order of precedence among the consulates had long been Aleppo, Damascus, Bayrut, and that Palmerston subscribed to that view is evident from his appointment of Werry for whom he had little patience to Bayrut, and his promotion of Wood to Damascus and Moore to Aleppo before he himself left office. The resurgent commercial significance of Aleppo after the occupation may account for his adherence to

^xWhat was admitted on the dissolution of the Levant Company in 1825 could, in all honesty have been conceded again in 1841. The government was not "in possession of sufficient information to enable them to form a decided opinion as to the alterations which the good of His Majesty's Service and the Protection of British Interests in the Levant will render it necessary to make." (Correspondence of the Chief Clerks Dept., Foreign Office to J. C. Herries, July 23/1826 F.o. 366/348.

1. Aberdeen to N.W.Werry, (Separate) of Nov 27 1841, FO 78/449.

the traditional notion of precedence. It was Aberdeen who altered the order to Bayrut, Damascus, and Aleppo in 1841. In accepting the petition for Moore's return to Bayrut he wisely conciliated people with whom Britain was on good terms, and showed more concern for Lebanon politically than for Syria economically. The rise of Bayrut as the focus of English interest in Syria was further enhanced by the establishment there of the consulate-general, and Damascus, where the consulate-general had been in the past, now fell to second place.^x

^x On his return to Constantinople, Stratford Canning observed that the consuls had not, in the past, been in the habit of communicating direct with the Foreign Office "to the same extent as now", and occasionally he forgot to forward despatches which were for the Office, and only under flying seal to himself.⁽¹⁾ In a private letter to Aberdeen he asked "Do I exaggerate when I say that the importance of this post . . . is increasing daily? If the increase is proportioned to that of the correspondence it is great indeed!"⁽²⁾ And so it was. Nor did the correspondence increase by the pressure and variety of events alone; men like Wood and Wose enjoyed their direct correspondence with Downing Street, Rose even attaining the greater intimacy of a private correspondence with the Foreign Secretary. Canning was so much impressed by the flood of writing pouring through his embassy from Syria that Fonblanque was the only serious competitor he could find. In time when his own despatches grew fat, he apologised for their "consular lengthiness."⁽³⁾

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- (1) Canning to Aberdeen, Mar 23 1842, Aberdeen Papers, ADD MSS 43138.
 (2) Canning to Aberdeen, June 16 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add MSS 43138.
 (3) Canning to Aberdeen, March 17 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add MSS 43139.

ABERDEEN REPLACES PALMERSTON

"You say that the Turks believe our real entente to be with Russia, and not with France. So far as they are concerned, I rather think they are not wrong. Here, and at Paris, an entente is indispensable for the peace of the world,...But at Constantinople, I have no hesitation in saying it is our true policy to act in strict concert with Russia."

Aberdeen.

CHAPTER V

Europe was surprised to see the Whigs, who had been so successful in their recent foreign policy, fall from power in the autumn of 1841, but the English electorate was genuinely weary of the domestic incompetence of the Melbourne ministry, and of its financial vacillations in particular. Peel was swept to victory because he possessed the qualities the country needed so badly. Political economy engrossed his attention far more than purely political questions, and he was practical and hardworking. The problems besetting him were great. One person in every eleven was a pauper, wages had not been so low since 1815, the revenue was falling. Imposts on every sort of article either for revenue or protection, stifled any chance of financial recovery, rather than promoted it.¹

The election, in which Peel received the support of the lesser clergy, the large country proprietors and,

1. Cole and Postgate, The Common People, London [1938] Ch.XXV.

above all, of the commercial middle-classes who had been the mainstay of the Younger Pitt, had been characterised by the intense activity of Chartism and the Anti Corn Law League in their endeavours to secure seats, and Cobden had just called Bright to the struggle. Both organisations looked to Peel for concession in return for support.¹ Melbourne's eleventh-hour conversion to freer trade deceived none, but drove Peel to declare more categorically for protection than he might otherwise have done. Chartism consequently aligned itself with many of his candidates at the hustings. Cobden, nevertheless, was not without hope that the silent minister would prefer free-trade in corn before he would tamper with the mechanism of the constitution. "The aristocracy and the people are gaping at him, wondering what he is going to do."²

The country did not have long to wait. On February 3rd, 1842 the Speech from the Throne referred to "the state of the finances and of the expenditure of the country", and regretted that "for several years past the annual income had been inadequate to bear the Public Charges."³

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1. E. Halévy, A History of the English People, 1841-52 London [1947] PP 3.7.10.
M.Hovell, The Chartist Movement, Manchester [1925] Chapt.XII.
 2. J.Morley, Life of Richard Cobden London [1881] II, P.181, Greville, V, P.89. March 13th 1842.
 3. Hansard, 3rd series LX, P.2 et seq.

Within another week Peel had introduced his measure for a sliding-scale on corn, and to remedy the financial position which was indeed serious, he budgeted with the precision and skill of one who had fully mastered his subject. He produced the first of his great tariff revisions, and fearlessly brought back the income-tax, no doubt with the advice of Sir James Graham. The income-tax was intended only as a temporary measure, to tide the government over until the tariff reductions should encourage increased yields.¹ These things were not carried without furious parliamentary battles, but the criticism that Peel had got his inspiration from the Whigs was small criticism indeed.²

It took a number of good harvests to cut the feet from under the League, and at first the latter sought, along with Chartism, to canalise the wide discontent of the workers, the antipathy towards the Poor Law, and the dissatisfaction which was struck at Ashley for excluding wage-earning women from the mines.

"There is an immense and continually increasing population, deep distress and privation, no adequate demand for labour, no demand for anything, no confidence, but a universal alarm, disquietude and discontent...Certainly I have never seen... so serious a state of things as that which now stares us in the face."³

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1. Halévy, op.cit. P.12., Morley, Cobden [1902] P.31., Greville, V. P.84, Feb.11th, 1842.
 2. Halévy, op.cit. P.16. C.S.Parker. Life and Letters of Sir James Graham. London [1907] I, P. 310 et seq.
 3. Greville. V,P.121. Nov.2nd. 1842.

The motions for corn-law repeal and the strikes of of 1842¹ culminated in the assassination in January 1843 of Peel's secretary, who was mistaken for the head of the government.²

Throughout 1843 the repealers kept up their pressure, and there was evidence that the government was not obstructive on principle, but was deciding on the form and degree of relaxation of the laws protecting the agricultural interest. Graham called free trade principles "the principles of common sense" in the House, and advised Peel against half measures.³ The Opposition made much of the government's flirtation with free trade, but Russell did not attempt seriously to obstruct the unmistakable trend in its policy. Disraeli, indeed, reminded the Opposition that free trade had not originated with them, just as Peel had reminded that they "could not pack up the principles of free trade and carry them off with them." The Whigs in fact, still contained a strong agricultural interest which favoured protection, and as a party were not committed to repeal until the last moment. As Gladstone pointed out, the difference of government and opposition was one of degree only, and the issue cut across parties. In spite of Peel's revitalisation of Conservatism the antagonistic undercurrent within its ranks grew steadily. Voluble opposition

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1. West, History of the Chartist Movement London [1920] P 171. "Times" Aug.5th, 1842.
 2. Halévy, p.33. Letters of Queen Victoria London [1908] Vol.I Peel to Prince Albert Jan.20th 1842. P455.
 3. Hansard, 3rd series, LXVI P.687 Feb.15th 1843.

confined at first to Cobden, spread in 1844 to "Young England" and its illustrious recruit when Disraeli lashed Peel on the tyranny of his party rule,¹ but there was no one capable of taking the Prime Minister's place. Good harvests in 1843 cheapened corn, and the profound effects of the brilliant 1842 budget began to emerge.² Business generally shook off its lassitude, the cotton and woollen industries picked up, and the manufacturing midlands prospered again. A spirit of optimism reappeared in 1844 in marked contrast to the previous impression that the whole industrial mechanism was run down,³ and while the case for factory legislation was taken up afresh, opposition to the Poor Law weakened. Railways boomed, and railway speculation continued to be a popular way to bankruptcy. Track laying, at a stand in 1842, was taken up again when parliament sanctioned the laying of eight hundred miles of new track in 1844, and a further increase in 1845.⁴

With great surpluses at its disposal the government was able to reduce the interest on the National Debt, and in 1845, to undertake further tariff simplification.⁵ In spite of the opposition of Roebuck and Radicalism to the continuation of income tax, and of anxious protectionists, Peel had the

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1. C.S.Parker, Sir Robert Peel London [1899] II, P.486, for Disraeli's exclusion from office. Monypenny Life of Disraeli II. P.162
 2. Halévy, P.81. Fay, Life and Labour in the Nineteenth Century Cambridge [1920] P.145.
 3. Annual Register 1843, P.1 et seq. 1844 P.I et seq.
 4. J.H.Clapham, The Early Railway Age Cambridge [1930] P.417.
 5. For the budgets of 1844, and 1845, see Halevy, P.85.

unbounded confidence of the country. Taxation had decreased to the tune of £20,000,000 since he had taken office, and flourishing trade increased the revenue by £15,000,000. Had it not been for the split over corn, Peel's ministry might have equalled that of Lord Liverpool for longevity.

Peel was one of the very first statesmen to appreciate the problems of a large proletariat, problems which could not be met by more "bobbies" and magistrates. The situation to him was far more complex than Disraeli's simple picture of the rich and the poor. England was still exploring itself and the interaction of social and economic phenomena were not all understood. The discontent of Paisley was startlingly dangerous, the spectre of revolution never far away, yet social security was out of the question, not because it was not desirable, but because it was impossible; there could be no system of food subsidies, and the only alternative was to take the duties off basic articles of food. When Peel realised that supply and demand was so intermittent in food, and did not move at the same tempo as the fluctuation of employment, he was driven to free trade, thus going as near as the mentality of the age would allow, to guaranteeing food. The constant intellectual pressure of the Anti Corn Law League, exerted over a number of years, drove him further along the same path.

He was prepared to introduce some reduction of the corn duties in any case in the winter session of 1845; but before forcing the issue he wanted another good harvest.

The harvest of wheat, like that of Irish potatoes, was bad yet Peel jumped at the adventitious chance to put his long-held belief into practise. His party was split from top to bottom because his conversion, in Bagehot's phrase, had resembled the dropping of sand by a river; a process massive in time but which is negligible daily.¹ For the sake of his beliefs no man took more immense political risks than Peel. The preoccupation of the Peel ministry with domestic affairs had a profound effect on the nature of its foreign policy. Peel himself had no patience for the pyrotechnics of Palmerston, and his cabinet was composed of competent administrators devoted to a policy of retrenchment at home and therefore to one of tranquillity abroad. Goulburne, Sir James Graham and Gladstone² found the daily task of governing more than enough for them, the pacific Earl of Aberdeen accepted the Foreign Office without enthusiasm but found it to be the treadmill which suited him most,³ and only Palmerston, of the Opposition, prepared himself for criticism of the man who had usurped the chair which long usage had made Palmerston's own. Russell was anxiously considering whether Peel's own party would give the Prime Minister the chance to initiate reforms of taxation and the corn laws,⁴ and had little fear of Aberdeen running amok.

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1. Croker, like the Duke, attributed Peel's conversion to "fright" (Croker to Duke of Wellington, April 5th 1846 Croker Correspondence III.P.65)
 2. F.E.Hyde, Mr. Gladstone at the Board of Trade
 3. E. Jones Parry, A. Review of the Relations between M. Guizot and Lord Aberdeen 1840-52 History 23, [1938] P.27.
 4. Gooch, The Later correspondence of Lord John Russell. Vol.1 , Introduction

The high Tories, the squires, the members representing the commercial classes and industrial nouveaux-riches and Cobden's knot of Radicals were agreed that this was not the time for quixoticism in foreign affairs and Cobden "assured Lord Palmerston that there was a growing opinion in the country, that we had meddled too much in the affairs of foreign countries". Domestic problems overwhelmed every outside question, and it would be "much better if our governors attended more closely to the conditions of our people at home."¹ Even when he did look abroad, Cobden continued to deprecate an interventionist policy which would violate the tenets of his pacifist commercialism.² The antipathy of Conservatism towards bellicose Liberalism threw it into unsought alliance with him and some of the radical groups. Aberdeen was heir to the diplomatic revolution which Palmerston had brought about under Russian pressure in 1840. The Brunnow mission, with its offer of the lapse of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, brought Palmerston to the conviction that co-operation with France in the East, and in other parts of the world was becoming impossible. Russia offered irresistible terms and they were accepted. Aberdeen inherited the new friendship with Russia at the same time that he determined to repair the old one with France. The Czar, for his part, was equally determined to make the rift between the maritime powers permanent and to adjust all

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1. Cobden, H. of C. Aug. 10th 1842, see Annual Register 1842 P. 230 "Times" Aug. 11th 1842.
 2. Ruggiero, European Liberalism P. 97 et seq. Oxford [1927]

difficulties which had kept Britain and Russian apart in the past; Guizot played Russia's game by his equivocal conduct in Anglo-French difficulties.

While the Czar was consistency itself,¹ in his concern for Ottoman integrity, for friendship with Britain, and in his distaste for the King of the French, Louis-Philippe and his minister did less than they could have done to inspire British confidence. Guizot professed a desire for good relations, yet was obliged in the last resort to gear action to the mandate of Chambers which were anything but friendly to Britain. Louis-Philippe professed disinterestedness in precisely those places where his agents were believed to be most active - Spain, Greece, Morocco and Syria. On the occasions when King or minister were charged with inconsistency, they fell back on the plea that the Chambers needed to be placated for the stability of the ministry which stood between France and war with Europe and the dynasty which stood between France and revolution. The exasperation which this caused in Britain, and in the cabinet itself, was occasionally near to insupportable. At the time of the very protracted Portendic negotiation Peel² wrote,

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1. William Russell was highly suspicious however. See his letter to John Russell, Jan. 9th 1842. Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell I. P. 52.
 2. For Peel's supervision of all government departments, see Jennings, Cabinet Government, Cambridge [1936] P. 139-141.

"It seems pretty clear that monarchy only exists in France by sufferance and as long as it acts subordinately to the public clamour of the day. The refusal to do Justice in the Case of Portendic, The refusal to ratify the Treaty of 1841,... are clear indications that Government independent of newspaper dictation and popular clamour, does not exist in France",¹

and later, when Guizot reminded Aberdeen that "l'amour propre et la susceptibilité des assemblées" must not be ignored, Peel asked Aberdeen if the French minister thought that Britain herself was beneath an arbitrary monarchy, and without an assembly which could be equally "susceptible on the point of Honour".²

Palmerston's treatment of France had almost been too much for Metternich, and although Austria had been one of the allies of 1840, she was anxious to salve French ill-feeling and to smooth her re-entry into the concert of nations. Equilibrium remained Metternich's greatest passion, and the result, as the Czar observed to Stuart de Rothesay, was that he always vacillated, afraid when England and Russia were not friendly, yet leaning to France when they were. Metternich, however, was in decline at Vienna, just as Austria was in Germany, for Metternich and Austria were emblematic of the past, and the young Germany which looked to the future cast its eyes upon Prussia.³

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1. Peel to Aberdeen, July 6th 1842, Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS. 43062
 2. Peel to Aberdeen, Dec. 19th 1842, Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS. 43063
 3. Russell said as much to Lansdowne; Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, I, P58.

The possibility of an economic bloc in Europe embracing France, Austria and Russia¹ was given a great deal of prominence in France after 1841, and was really Talleyrand's old political maxim that the Orleans dynasty must seek its allies among the autocracies, in the new and more fashionable garb of an economic policy. Britain feared its repercussions on her own economy but Russia saw in it a sinister design on the part of France whereby the autocratic trinity was being undermined. Britain was well disposed towards Prussia who seemed to be progressively taking the place of the declining Austria in the balance of European power. The Germanic connection of the Queen and her husband, and the admiration of British liberal thought for Prussian science strengthened the good disposition.² Furthermore, any danger to this disposition was removed when Prussia and France, far from setting up the much publicised bloc with Austria, opposed one another fiercely at Brussels. France wanted tariff barriers with Belgium removed yet, unreasonably, made future customs agreements between Belgium and Prussia a casus belli.³

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1. Granville to Palmerston, No.27 of April 23rd 1841 F.O.27/623. Aberdeen told Peel that in any future war, "the preservation of Guizot's government will be an object of prime importance both at Vienna and Berlin." (Oct.2nd 1842 Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS.43062)
 2. See The Edinburgh Review VOL.LXXIX, 1844, P.105. "The German Zollverein". It is very favourable to the growth of commercial policy ought to move alike in the direction of maintaining and strengthening our connection of friendship and alliance".
 3. Prince Albert to Aberdeen, Jan.1st 1843. Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS.43042.

Britain had no wish to see Antwerp swarming with French vessels, and urged Berlin to resist French projects with tooth and nail. Palmerston made it very clear that Belgium was not independent like other states as Guizot evidently thought, for "other Independent States have a Right, if they please, to use their Independence by making a Sacrifice of it". Belgium was guaranteed and could make no exclusive agreements with France, or any other power.¹ The dispute spoiled the chance of good relations between Paris and Berlin, and the Czar for one breathed freely again.

Aberdeen's immediate task on coming to office was to pour oil on troubled waters left by Palmerston; the entente with France needed to be recreated by a show of peaceful intentions, and an end of all the diplomatic pin-pricking. The Convention of July 13th had officially terminated the estrangement between the countries, but reconciliation is a process and not an event. The disappearance of Palmerston was a prerequisite of reconciliation, and that had been effected. When Guizot put out feelers in a speech at Lisieux on August 22nd Peel responded to "M. Guizot's frank declaration that he rejoiced in the prospect of friendly relations between France and the other powers of Europe",² and Aberdeen told

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1. Palmerston to Bulwer, No.120 of July 23rd, 1841 and 4 enclos. F.O. 146/237.
 2. Temperley, The Crimea, P.151

Princess Lieven that "our conduct will be so plain and straightforward, so cordial and friendly with each, and so entirely without petty jealousies, or the influence of personal prejudices and passions, that it will be hard if we do not make ourselves respected by all".¹

Aberdeen was very anxious to co-operate with Guizot in restoring an entente but not to contemplate anything closer or more official; and ready to maintain a parallel policy whenever possible with the country he considered to be the strongest in Europe, without being "a lover of what is called the French alliance".² Aberdeen's early optimism stemmed from his confidence in his ability to find a way out of any crisis, with the aid of Guizot, and not from any faith in French intentions. On the contrary, he was frequently chagrined to find the Chambers stirring ill-feeling, and compared their vituperation with the reserve of Parliament.³

Aberdeen was fully aware that French agents abroad did not always act in accordance with instruction from Paris.

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1. Aberdeen to Lieven, July 6th 1841, cit.in Balfour, Life of George, Fourth Earl of Aberdeen, London [1922] II, P.191.
 2. Aberdeen to Lieven, Sept.7th 1841, Balfour op.cit.II, P.122. see also Quarterly Review, LXVII, March 1841, "Foreign Policy" p.254: "Let us have amity with France, sincere and open...but not in such secret and undefined obligations as would estrange us from the collective policy of the rest of Europe."
 3. Balfour, op.cit, II.P.138.

"I am a little afraid of French agents in the East; our may sometimes be violent, prejudiced and mistaken; but there is no intrigue, or double-dealing about them. In fact, the greater part of the misunderstanding which may ever arise between our two Governments will be mainly owing to the misplaced zeal and officious activity of inferior agents".¹

Nor was his distrust limited to French agents alone. On occasions, "it requires all my confidence to believe in the veracity of M. Guizot",² and the constant gulf between the actions of French agents abroad and Guizot's professions was forever driving him to conclusions which he did not welcome - "they the French government go to work in such a roundabout way that it is difficult for them to inspire confidence".³ He tried to attribute the divergence to Guizot's loose hold upon his subordinates, rather than to any concurrence in their activities or utterances, and the correctness or otherwise of his diagnosis is not so important as the fact that he did very little in the light of it. Here was exemplified his great fault.

The misfortune of Aberdeen's character was his pacifism, an admirable characteristic when considered out of relation to circumstances, and one which has not been neglected by his descendant and biographer⁴, but one which was as uncompromising as the belligerence of Palmerston. It warped his perspective, and if the prime duty of a Foreign Secretary

1. & 3. Aberdeen to Lieven, Dec. 21st 1841, cit. in Balfour, op. cit. II, P. 136.

2. Aberdeen to Lieven, Oct. 19th 1841, cit. in Balfour, op. cit. II, P. 123.

4. Stanmore, The Earl of Aberdeen, London [1905]

is to defend and propagate national interest, led to some serious defalcation in the performance of his functions. Aberdeen's pacifism largely explains his great fault which was his unwillingness to strike back, even in language; thus Guizot was never resolutely brought to account by him for an explanation of the mysterious ways of French diplomacy; nor was the over-use of British indulgence on the plea of possible revolution in France ever seriously challenged, or put within reasonable bounds. When, by an almost unprecedented piece of bad faith, Guizot refused ratification of a treaty of which France had been a founder-member, Aberdeen sent a strong note but this dwelt mainly on the dangers of an executive allowing itself to be overruled by the legislature. One can easily imagine how Palmerston would have despatched an unanswerable piece of ad hoc reasoning to enrage Paris.

The interests of Britain and France were at odds in many parts of Europe, but when Aberdeen came into office they were divergent mainly in Spain and Belgium, North Africa and the Levant.

Little needs to be said of the first two. During his brief mission to Paris in 1835 Cowley became convinced that fear of Europe alone prevented Louis-Philippe giving active assistance to Don Carlos to place him on the Spanish throne.¹

1. For a comprehensive study of the problem of Spanish succession see E. Jones-Parry, The Spanish Marriages, London [1934] Wellesley, Diary and Correspondence of Lord Cowley P.199

On his re-appointment in 1841 he found Louis-Philippe still very much engrossed with the Spanish situation and insistent that Isabella, whom Don Carlos had failed to displace, should marry a Bourbon, and preferably the son of Don Carlos. In spite of having appointed a minister to Madrid, there was no mistaking Louis-Philippe's hostility towards the Regent Espartero,¹ and it was evident that he occasionally toyed with projects of his own with regard to the girl-queen's marriage. Don Carlos was lodged in Bourges, and thousands of his followers were maintained in France; their timely release could be most damaging to Espartero's position.²

In October 1841 an insurrection broke out in the Basque provinces and O'Donnell seized Pampeluna. The intention was to march on Madrid but the Regent's forces swiftly reasserted themselves. With the failure of the rising Louis-Philippe was at considerable pains to show that throughout he had done nothing for its success and had predicted its failure. Through Saint-Aulaire it was repeatedly explained in London that if the hand of Isabella were offered to a French prince, it would be rejected; nevertheless "Lord Aberdeen thinks.. that the King often changes his opinion on this subject".³

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1. Queen Victoria to Aberdeen, Oct.16th,17th Dec.14th,1841. Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS. 43041.
 2. Wellesley, Lord Cowley P.217, Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, P.338.
 3. Wellesley, Lord Cowley P.212, Bulwer to Palmerston, No.92 of June 7th 1841. F.O.145/240.

Cowley, like Aston was told that the marriage was a purely Spanish affair, and should signs appear of France trying to influence the issue in favour of any French prince they were to be opposed by every means. Aberdeen tried to get the northern powers to appoint representatives to Madrid to give stability to the Regent's position and to reduce the intrigue which the presence of French and British agents tended to promote.¹

For Metternich it was particularly difficult to recognise a régime such as Espartero's; he was sure neither of its durability nor of its intentions, but Gordon got him to accept Britain's picture of things, and to follow her in trusting to the Regent's intentions when the Queen should come of age.² Louis-Philippe, on the other hand, predicted a crisis when the royal majority should arrive, and a possible coup by Espartero. The solution lay in a Bourbon marriage before that time. In March 1842 Louis-Philippe sent Pageot, late chargé at Madrid, to London to bring Aberdeen round to this view but Aberdeen not only adhered to the belief that the marriage was a purely Spanish question but induced Metternich, whom Pageot approached next, to return a similar answer.³

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1. Aberdeen to Cowley No.14 of Dec.7th 1841 F.O. 146/238.
 2. Aberdeen to Cowley No.3 of Jan.7th 1842 and 2 enclos. F.O. 146/245.
 3. Aberdeen to Cowley No.43 of March 22nd 1842 F.O.146/246, Wellesley, Lord Cowley, P.227.

Metternich showed Gordon the memorandum Pageot had submitted to him. By it France asked for his mediation between herself and Britain, and to persuade Don Carlos to resign his claim to the throne in favour of his son, who might marry Isabella. Metternich refused interference in Spain, and like Aberdeen was very opposed to any congress on the question. Pageot told Metternich a marriage with a non-Bourbon would be a casus belli but this was omitted from his memorandum. Nevertheless the possibility of a marriage between Don Carlos' son, the Prince of Asturias, and Isabella, left some impress on Metternich's mind. Aberdeen to whom he broached the subject, replied that although it might have solved problems when the parties were at one another's throats, it could not now that Don Carlos had been expelled from Spain, "Prince Metternich has been misled by a fancied historical analogy, [with the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella] ,which in reality has no existence".¹ Nesselrode was unwilling to commit himself on the subject of the marriage, and when Pageot visited him he expressed the hope that France would give no countenance to the Juntas set up within her frontiers.²

The political implications of what was superficially a commercial interest on the part of France in Belgium were inescapable in Britain as in Germany. Aberdeen adhered to the

1. Aberdeen to Cowley, No.64 of April 22nd 1842 and 2 enclos. F.O. 146/247.

2. Aberdeen to Cowley, No.76 of May 20th 1842. F.O.146/247.

view expressed by Palmerston to Seymour, namely, that

"to a Commercial Treaty between France and Belgium founded upon fair and equal terms and containing no mutual concessions which each Country is not prepared to make to all other Countries, Her Majesty's Government would have neither the wish nor the right to object",¹

but like his predecessor Aberdeen felt that the projected treaty was a step towards the political absorption of Belgium. In spite of the protests of Britain and Prussia, a France-Belgian commercial treaty actually was signed on July 16th 1842, and remonstrances from Arnim and Dietrichstein could not shake it. The possibility of a Franco-Belgian customs-union led Aberdeen to circularise the northern courts on the legality of such an agreement. He made out that it would violate that protocol of the conferences recognising Belgian independence in 1830 in which the powers pledged themselves not to seek "exclusive influence or separate advantage". Arnim was informed by Bulow that if France and Prussia fought over Belgium, the former would annex it if she won and "if the contrary, that she could expect neither favour or mercy", while Guizot maintained a reserved attitude towards Britain and Austria. Louis-Philippe maintained that he was keeping Leopold on his throne by helping him out of his difficulties in marketing Belgian industrial produce but that a league with Prussia would be tantamount to a declaration of war on France. Metternich did not miss the inconsistency.

1. Palmerston to Seymour, No.14 of August 13th 1841 F.O. 10/83

Throughout 1842 Prussia pressed Aberdeen to call a conference in London on Belgium, but Aberdeen refused, believing it would be impossible for France to withdraw from negotiations at Brussels with credit.¹ The unanimity of Europe was known to France, and the interviews Apponyi had with Guizot would have their effect.² Aberdeen, in fact, was quite ready to see Belgium join the Zollverein, thus rescuing herself from France.

"It is quite evident that for some time past the French Government have taken great pains to conciliate and flatter the King of the Netherlands, and apparently not without success. They have encouraged his alienation from England and Prussia, and have held out hopes for a reliance on French support".³

Aberdeen had little difficulty in persuading the Queen to write to Leopold personally, and Prince Albert sent the Foreign Secretary the reply she received.⁴ Leopold ridiculed the idea of Belgium leaning on France exclusively.

"If Belgium becomes a French province, it will be impossible to preserve the Rhine frontier from France. The Powers have in this respect no choice. If France should lay hands upon us, they would be obliged to protect us, because it will be a question of their own skin".

In spite of Leopold's tone, it was evident that he would continue to play off France against Prussia and get what ever he could for Belgium out of the resultant situation.⁵

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1. Aberdeen to Prince Albert Jan.28th 1843 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43042. Peel to Aberdeen, Dec.29th 1842, Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS.43062
 2. Aberdeen to Prince Albert, Dec.30th.1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43042.
 3. Aberdeen to Queen Victoria, Nov.14th 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43042.
 4. Leopold to Prince Albert, Jan.25th 1843 enclo.in Albert to Aberdeen, Feb.4th 1843. Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43042.
 5. Westmorland to Aberdeen, No.3 of Jan.10th 1844.F.O. 64/249

The French North African possession was still the scene of strife although twelve years had elapsed since Metternich put the intercepted correspondence of a French ambassador into the hands of Aberdeen, and thereby proved that Polignac was dissembling when he denied that France was contemplating an attack upon Algiers with the aid of Muhammad Ali of Egypt.¹ Polignac had explicitly denied any intention to colonise or garrison any part of the African coast, and in the last resort had refused any further official explanations. Since 1830 Britain had persistently refused to recognise the fait-accompli, her consul continued to get his exequatur from Constantinople, and in 1840 when Guizot was first appointed to London Palmerston told him that England opposed "the foundation of new and independent states which might assume in the Mediterranean a role not easy to foresee". Louis-Philippe could not, nor was he disposed, to allow the Algerian venture to languish, for if it was a pis aller, it was also a great safety valve whereby the French cult for la gloire and conquest could be released. Into it the King poured the flower of his army and wealth he could ill afford, year after year. The difficult terrain, the climate

1. G. Douin, Mohamed Aly et l'expédition d'Alger 1829-30, Cairo [1930].

In May 1830, Aberdeen wrote: "The affair in truth begins to wear a sinister appearance....if the projects of the French Cabinet be as pure and disinterested, as is asserted by M. de Polignac, he can have no real difficulty in giving us the most entire satisfaction". Stanmore, Lord Aberdeen. P. 97

and the fierce resistance of Abd el Qadr led him seriously to doubt whether Algeria would ever prove of value to France, but he dared not call the halt.

The declaration by Thiers in April 1841 that the expulsion of Muhammad Ali from Syria had cheated France out of her projected acquisitions in the Near East might have been no more than a verbal flourish, but its popularity in the Chamber was unmistakable. ⁽¹⁾ More than ever there was need to stop French expansion along the African coast, particularly in the direction of Egypt, and Palmerston took his stand on France's previous professions, whereby she ⁽²⁾ promised not to encroach on Morocco or Tunis. The Sultan of Morocco was advised not to harbour Abd el Qadr when Bougeaud drove him out of Algeria, and to settle outstanding trade disputes between his own people and the French merchants in Mogador. Tunis, more important to Britain for its proximity to Malta, was also more attractive to France. Turkey was anxious to strengthen her grip on what was still a nominal part of her Empire and

(1) Bulwer to Palmerston, No. 9 of April 16th 1841. F.O. 27/623.

(2) Palmerston to Bulwer, July 22nd, 1841 (Sep. and Conf.) F.O. 146/237

the Bey was oppressed by the idea that Britain and France were to be his executioners. Palmerston swiftly dispelled the idea,⁽¹⁾ and through Sir Thomas Reade informed the Bey that, his practical independence would be maintained.

"Your Excellency can rely on the protection and support of England."⁽²⁾ Aberdeen maintained this attitude,⁽³⁾ while Louis-Philippe professed to Cowley the same lack of interest in Tunis he had already expressed to Bulwer, so long as Britain dissuaded Turkey from asserting her authority over Tunis. Should Turkey actually undertake an expedition, however, a French naval squadron would be ordered to attack

(1) Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 176 of July 15th, 1841 F.O. 78/429

(2) Palmerston to Bey of Tunis, enclos. in Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 144 of June 11th, 1841. F.O. 195/182.

(3) Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 90 of July 18th 1842. F.O. 146/259

it. Aberdeen was angered by this brusqueness, ⁽¹⁾ particularly when a French squadron actually appeared in the proximity of the Straits in 1842 to execute the order, and Metternich thought it was too generous a gesture to the Chambers; through Canning pressure was brought to bear on the Imperial Council and Sarim renounced further intentions towards Tunis.

It is, of course, very necessary to keep a sense of proportion with regard to the magnitude or otherwise of Belgium, Spain and Morocco as diplomatic problems. Neither Belgium nor Spain presented crucial issues at this time although both were the cause of a respectable amount of correspondence between the powers. Britain had far more pressing business in North America, Metternich was preoccupied with unrest in Italy, and the Czar was perplexed by financial difficulties in his sprawling territories. But Belgium and Spain are important without being in themselves major questions, because, unlike America, Italy and Russian finance, they were not extraneous to the relations of the powers. Spain attracted Britain and France, Belgium was important to France, Prussia and Britain; nor could Russia and Austria stand aside completely from questions which bore directly

(1) Aberdeen to Canning, No. 36 of Dec 31st, 1841
F.O. 78/439

on the balance of power. In part they reflected, in part contributed some modification or emphasis to the relations of the powers. In Spain there was reflected not just the traditional British suspicion of French dynastic policy in the peninsula, but the more recent distrust engendered in 1840; the influence the Spanish question exerted on Anglo-French relations was always malevolent, weakening the entente, making easier Russia's designs, and therefore driving Louis-Philippe and Metternich into friendship. The attention France bestowed on Belgium reflected her dissatisfaction with the fetters fastened on her in 1815, the British fear of Antwerp falling into the hands of a power capable of using it against Great Britain. The contest of France and Prussia, which might already be called traditional, was only superficially a struggle for preferential agreements. It had much deeper effects on national feeling than on tariffs. Prussia, who might have separated from Russia in favour of the west, was driven back into the eastern camp, at least until 1848; her antagonism towards France, following so closely after 1840, made her the knight-errant of Germany, and the natural successor to Austria. (1)

(1) At the Schiller memorial meeting in Leipzig in 1841, Goethe was held to execration as representing authority and servility, while Schiller was champion of the freedoms. The abolition of federated Germany for united Germany was also demanded. The effect of the French xenophobia in 1840 and of the plans to break through the riverine frontier on the east, was to kindle German patriotism. "Die Wacht am Rhein" originated in this period.

Russia was confirmed in her belief in French restlessness. Metternich, who continued to deal in personalities, believed with renewed faith that Louis-Philippe would only abandon his intermittent delinquencies when Europe gave him its support and confidence, and he in return, acquired its respectability.

As a political problem North Africa differed from Belgium and Spain for two main reasons. Firstly, it involved France and Britain alone, and secondly, it had a bearing on the Eastern Question. Algeria was nominally still Turkish but in fact was a French possession, and as such fitted into the scheme of French colonial expansion as well as into French Mediterranean policy. The annexation was fundamentally inimical to Britain's position in the Mediterranean, for both powers wished to predominate in the seas between Africa and Europe, and between Spain and the Levant coast. Geography gave France Toulon, and history gave Malta to Britain. The parity of their naval forces in 1840 only made the balance between them more

sensitive to any new advantage falling to one side or the
 (1)
 other.

The objectives behind the desire for ascendancy in the Mediterranean were manifold, but broadly speaking, the Mediterranean was primarily vital to Britain as the route to her Indian Empire, while to France it was important for its command of the lands around it; a line of communication for Britain, a potential mare nostrum for France. Many other factors attracted the maritime powers. Strong naval forces reinforced those treaties restricting Russia to the Black Sea. France could maintain direct communication with Egypt, Syria and the Porte, Britain could guard the "alternative route" by cutting communications should the threat come from France, or by landing troops at the Levant ports should

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- (1) The French fleet consisted of 20 ships-of-the-Line, 22 frigates, 35 steamers and in all 225 vessels. This was the target laid down in 1840, to be reached by 1841, and far exceeded France's peace establishment. The estimates for 1840 came to 66,810,300 francs, in 1841 the expenditure was 100,311,400 francs (Bulwer to Palmerston, No. 49 of May 10 1841, F.O. 146/240).

Britain had a small nominal superiority, with a steam navy of 39 vessels, and 29 building. Sidney Herbert, Secretary to the Board of Admiralty wanted 15 steamers to be built annually for some years to come, and was the force behind the new experimental squadron which left Spithead in June 1845. He was also troubled by the so-called "effective" list on the whole flag list there is not a single Admiral to whom the Admiralty could propose to spend a few weeks in October and November in the Bay of Biscay. Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, London [1906] Vol. I., p. 27.

it come from Russia. British naval strength was also a guarantee that Muhammad Ali would not disturb the existing territorial position.

The acquisition of Algeria seemed to be one more stage in the process whereby France was encircling the Mediterranean, if not with actual possessions, at least with spheres of influence. Further expansion could only be at the expense of the Turkish Empire in Africa, and this Britain was anxious to prevent, mainly because it would affect her own position and the security of Malta, but also because it would damage Turco-French relations and perhaps encourage further French designs in co-operation with the Pasha of Egypt. This in itself would set a dangerous example to Russia. Consequently it became a prime duty with Aberdeen to maintain peaceful relations between Paris and the Porte, by getting both capitals to forego any attempts to improve their position in North Africa, ⁽¹⁾ and in one extremely cryptic despatch he hinted that Britain would occupy Tunis ⁽²⁾ herself rather than allow Turkey to do so.

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(1) Aberdeen to Canning No. 36 of Dec. 31st, 1841 and 2 enclos. F.O. 195/184.

(2) Aberdeen to Canning No. 86 of July 14th, 1842. F.O. 78/474.

Stratford Canning's experience lessened the need for any detailed instructions when he was sent to Constantinople for the fourth time, and if not yet known as the Elchi, he was the one British diplomat of truly great stature. ⁽¹⁾ He would have preferred employment at home, but already the association of his name with that of Constantinople was irresistible.

(2)

In appointing Canning Aberdeen wrote that British policy had long been distinguished by its concern to support

- (1) In 1842 Peel wished "we had a really good man in Paris" (Dec. 28th); and on the appointment of Bulwer to Spain the Queen believed "a very strong man" should go to bolster Cowley. (Peel to Aberdeen Oct. 4th 1843) Aberdeen agreed but "Paris is so near that we always know and can direct what is going on" (to Peel, Oct. 10th 1843). Bulwer, the Queen thought, was "a great coxcomb" but Aberdeen considered him a "clever man." (Aberdeen to Peel Oct. 10th 1843) Stuart de Rothesay was incurably ill from the beginning of 1843; "his reading is mechanical, for his intellect and memory are, at times, quite gone he confuses subjects in the most distressing manner." (Bloomfield to Aberdeen Dec. 12th 1843) "Poor Lyons is a sailor, of no great capacity, and very little discretion; but thoroughly honest and straightforward." (Aberdeen to Guizot, Nov. 11th, 1844) Aberdeen Papers ADD. MSS 43062, 43063, 43143, 43144. Palmerston remarked that, "We had at all those Courts men of talent, energy and enlightened views. The present Government has substituted for those agents a set of dotards and fools Stratford Canning is an exception." Bulwer Life of Palmerston, III., p. 11.
- (2) Ponsonby embarked for Malta, October 13 (Ponsonby-Aberdeen, Separate, of Oct. 10th 1841. F.O. 78/437) for leave in England. He was at Malta when Aberdeen sent his No. 4 of Oct. 27th 1841 replacing him with Canning. (F.O. 195/184)

the Turkish power and avert its dissolution from internal or external forces, and thought it was demonstrable that the separation of Greece was in conformity with this principle. In the negotiations of 1827 Turkey's rights and interests "were invariably asserted and maintained by the British Government." Furthermore Aberdeen was convinced that the great powers shared his opinions and had no designs on the Empire. Of course all the powers were aware of the defects of the Turkish character, but the existing territorial position was satisfactory to Europe, and essential to its tranquillity. Because Turkish stability was essential to European tranquillity well-considered reform needed to be kept constantly before the attention of the Imperial Divan, and this could only be done through the union of the representatives at Constantinople. Aberdeen did not suggest any "formal conference of Ambassadors" (1) but since Canning's colleagues would probably get instructions conceived in a similar spirit to his own, co-operation should be very possible through mutual frankness. In Britain's own case, "as our policy in the Levant is perfectly disinterested we can well afford to lay it entirely open

(1) Aberdeen to Canning No. 2 of Oct. 30 1841. F.O. 195/184;
No. 29 Dec. 22 1841. F.O. 195/184.

to our Allies." Aberdeen added a few suggestions on the need for army reform, he suggested too that the Sultan and Muhammad Ali should be kept on good terms, and now that the Canadian trouble ⁽¹⁾ had disappeared Greece should be induced to improve her relations with Turkey and to join her in talks for a commercial convention. Turkey was to be comforted with the knowledge that Britain would not tolerate any territorial encroachment by Greece on the Empire.

As to Syria, "Syria is that portion of the Empire in the condition of which you will naturally feel the warmest interest, and which may justly claim all your solicitude." ⁽²⁾ The state of the country called for great magnanimity on the part of Turkey on the questions of taxation and compensation.

"You will use your endeavours to prevent, if possible, the benevolence of the Sultan from being frustrated the condition of the numerous Christian population is now become a source of lively interest. Different sects put forward their respective claims to our attention: but a portion of Syria scarcely

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- (1) Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 173 of May 18th 1841.
F.O. 78/434.
Ponsonby to Palmerston, No. 230 of July 12th 1841.
F.O. 78/436 and 3 enclos.
- (2) This part of Canning's instructions is printed in A of P [1843] LX [c455] p. 41.

either Christian or Mahomedan, is immersed in a state almost of pagan superstition. The efforts of pious and devoted men may perhaps lead to the blessings of a more enlightened education, and of a purer faith. But whatever may be done or attempted for the intellectual and moral improvement of these persons, the utmost care should be taken never to shake them in their allegiance, or diminish their loyalty."

Aberdeen was by no means satisfied as to the true nature of Palmerston's intentions with regard to Syria, at the time of his leaving office. Syria rose from a lowly position to that of the most important facet of the Eastern Question too late for Palmerston to give a precise direction to British policy, but Aberdeen put the worst complexion on the equivocal despatch of July 15. He observed the many-sided nature of his predecessor's interest and noted his anxiety to prevent collective intervention by Europe in any form, in Syria. (1) Was it because France, readmitted to the concert of nations, might insist, by nature of her traditional friendship with the Maronites, on taking part in any forcible adjustment of Turkey's relations with the Lebanon, or on a temporary occupation of the province? If so the question of possession of the Lebanon might be

(1) See Palmerston to Ponsonby No. 175 of July 15 1841.
F.O. 78/429

revived. Aberdeen noticed how Palmerston had reacted to the access of French activity in Syria, and the appearance of unaccredited French "men of note and ability" in the Balkans and Levant,⁽¹⁾ and he now decided to call the halt.

As has been mentioned, he told Canning that representations on Syria ought to be the outcome of consultation among the allies, and in addition to showing Brunnow Canning's instructions, he directed Canning himself to show them to Guizot and Metternich, on his way to his post. For independent action on Syria was out of the question; it would encourage other powers to adopt the same method and "increase the disorganisation which so extensively prevails and which threatens at no distant period to subvert the entire fabric of the empire."⁽²⁾ He stripped the projected connection with the Druses of any political significance,⁽³⁾

(1) Piscatory went to Greece; Emil Girardin, editor of "The Press" to Germany; and Blanqui the political economist to Bulgaria, Servia and Turkey. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 199 of Aug. 13 1841. F.O. 195/183

(2) Aberdeen to Canning, No. 6 of Jan. 22nd, 1842. F.O. 78/473

(3) Aberdeen to Canning No. 22 of Dec. 3rd 1841, F.O. 78/439

and was at pains to show Canning the non-political and unprivileged nature of the new Protestant bishopric of Jerusalem. ⁽¹⁾ Druse education was only to be undertaken after the Porte had granted permission, and even then in prudent style rather than in the way desired by "some of our wild gentry in this country." The Lebanon would not be allowed to swarm with missionaries because they would only embarrass an already delicate political position.

To Rose also Aberdeen sent advice calculated to dispel any inflated notions he might have of his government's political intentions, ⁽²⁾ specifically warned him against dealings with the Druses, ⁽³⁾ and reduced the propensity of the consul general's office for mischief by taking from him the "purely political" character Palmerston had bestowed. ⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) Prussia frightened the ulema in the Imperial Divan but England preferred to proceed with the building in Jerusalem, rather than to seek more official permission for its construction than Turkey had already given. (Ponsonby to Aberdeen, No. 4 of Sept. 29th 1841. F.O. 78/437)
- (2) Aberdeen to Rose No. 12 of Nov. 26 1841. F.O. 78/454. Rose was told to express to Naaman Djinblatt the government's disappointment at his participation in the civil war of late 1841. He "must be well aware that the first wish of the British Government is that the different sects should live in peace."
- (3) Aberdeen MSS, ADD MSS 43140, Aberdeen to Rose, Nov. 4 1841
- (4) Palmerston to Rose No. 18 Aug 19 1841. F.O. 78/454
Aberdeen to Rose No. 6 1841. 454

Rose's duties were now to be "rather of a political nature," and the military detachments under his command were withdrawn in December (1) to prove to Turkey that the rumours of a British annexation were without foundation. The military survey, in which Palmerston had shown such interest, was cut short. Aberdeen had no time for it and doubted its propriety. (2) Rose stayed behind "in the Civil capacity of Her Majesty's Consul-General;" Bayrut was to be his residence but he was to travel from time to time, to study political events and "to exert the Influence which your position is calculated to invest you with for the promotion of peace. In your intercourse with the Turkish Authorities you will be careful to abstain from meddling interference, you will freely give your advice when asked for, and on all occasions when you feel it incumbent upon you to interpose either to protect British privileges or interests or to dissuade those Authorities from acts of oppression and violence against the Christians or the Druses." (3)

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- (1) Ponsonby to Palmerston No. 376 of Sep. 2, 1841 F.O. 78/437
 Aberdeen to Canning No. 2 of Oct. 30, 1841, F.O. 78/439
 Aberdeen to Rose No. 9 of Nov. 24, 1841, F.O. 78/454.
- (2) Aberdeen to Canning, No. 5 of Nov. 2 1841 and 2 enclos;
 Aberdeen to Bankhead, No. 4 of Nov. 9 1841 F.O. 195/184
- (3) Rose Papers, ADD MSS 42796, Aberdeen to Rose, Nov. 2, 1841.

The appointment as Palmerston had made it was rather an impressive one; Rose, as the British civil and military chief, a senior officer strengthened by the prestige of a revived title, was the most powerful functionary ever employed by his country in Syria. His duty was purely one of supervision of the political acts of the Turkish authorities, the duty Wood had been given by the Porte between July 1840 and April 1841. Aberdeen restored the office of consul-general to its normal form, erasing the hybrid military-political office with which Palmerston would have overawed the Turks. The special nature of Rose's position was withdrawn and he was no longer to neglect the routine tasks of his office. The consuls, who had been informed to regard Consul General Cartwright at the Porte as their superior prior to Rose's appointments, were issued with a fresh instruction to send copies of their despatches to the new Syrian consul-general.

On his way to take up his new appointment Canning called on Guizot in Paris and on Metternich in Vienna.

Guizot expressed his entire concurrence in the tenor
(1)
of Canning's instructions, offering to sign them as if he had

(1) Yet Cowley wrote to Lord Wellesley on Oct. 6th: "the policy of France is the extension of French influence over Belgium, over the Rhine, the Mediterranean, along the North African coast, in Egypt and Syria, the submission of Spain. This is the policy of all French ministers of whatever party." Wellesley, Diary and Correspondence of Lord Cowley, p. 209.

(1) himself drawn them up. The suspicious gesture caused satisfaction to the British government, but it did not reflect any sentiment of cooperation on the part of the Chambers. The tone of the debates in early 1842 was as angry as ever, and the ministry continued to be stigmatised for having given way to Europe, and for having allowed Britain to supplant France in the Levant.

In the Chambre des Pairs the Prince de la Moskowa was saying (2) that with the bombardment of the Syrian ports, "l'Angleterre de Pilnitz, de Copenhague, de Waterloo, avait apparu à nos yeux," and in the Deputies a fiery speech of Béchard's which was very well received castigated British Eastern policy for its cynicism. (3)

"Voilà, messieurs, l'état actuel de l'empire ottoman La Russie qui, depuis Catherine II, a l'oeil toujours fixé sur Constantinople, attendra peut-être longtemps encore l'heure propice pour s'en emparer. Et qu'importe à l'Angleterre, maîtresse maintenant des cours de l'Euphrate et du littoral de la Syrie, que lui importe que cet édifice miné croule un peu plus tôt, un peu plus tard?"

Britain was now in the process of reaping the harvest of the recent settlement. Baghdad which might have gone to

(1) Canning to Aberdeen, No. 1 of Nov. 15th, 1841. FO 78/439

(2) Moniteur, Jan 12th, 1842

(3) Moniteur, Jan. 17th, 1842.

the Pasha last year was now wholly under British dominance.

"L'Angleterre est maitresse de ce marché comme elle va l'être des marchés d'Alep et de Bassora, qui sont les entrepôts du commerce de l'Asie mineure, et de la Perse."

As to the French connection with the Maronites, "ce protectorat est à la veille de disparaître devant le patronage des Anglais."

Guizot's position was not strong in the Chambers ⁽¹⁾ and it had originally been doubted whether he would ever reach the end of the first session safely. ⁽²⁾ He commanded respect without making friends and Thiers had been able to carry over a segment of the Doctrinaires to the Opposition. In such a situation it was more than Guizot's political life was worth to pour cold water on the belligerence of the Deputies. At the same time he was obliged to minimise the lively and ubiquitous nature of French agents' activity abroad, in order to retain the friendship of Britain. Thus to foreign diplomats Louis-Philippe would insist that "this system of attempting to get influence in foreign Countries

(1) Princess Lieven to Russell, Jan. 19th, 1842, Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, I, p. 5.

(2) Granville to Palmerston, No. 27 of April 23rd, 1841. F.O. 27/623.

only costs a great deal of money and does no good,"
 (1)
 but did not dare to be so blunt in the Chambers.

In Vienna Canning found its "experienced and illustrious
 (2)
 Minister" in agreement with every detail of his instructions.
 The two men left no topic unconsidered, and gave their greatest
 attention to Greece and Syria, the flashpoints of the Eastern
 Question. Like Britain, Metternich placed great reliance
 on Turkey's avowed intention to govern her Christian subjects
 according to the spirit of the Hatti-Scheriff, and believed
 (3)
 France and Russia to be similarly inclined, if rather too
 ready to leave the Sultan to "minister to his own recovery."
 Canning did his best to soothe Metternich on the subject
 of the Protestant bishopric which was to be established in
 Jerusalem. On Canning's departure, Metternich authorised
 him to represent to King Otho the sentiments of the Earl
 of Aberdeen on Greece as those of the Austrian government
 also.

Greece, whither Canning proceeded from Vienna, was
 causing great uneasiness in Turkey, and attracting the

(1) Bulwer to Palmerston, April 20th, 1841 (Private and
 Confidential) F.O. 146/240

(2) Canning to Aberdeen, No. 2 of Dec. 2nd 1841. F.O. 78/439

(3) Canning to Aberdeen, No. 3 of Dec. 9th 1841. F.O. 78/439

attention of France and Russia. King Otho, whose relations with his people were far from satisfactory, had resorted to the old tactic of turning public interest abroad. In 1840 he had contemplated, or had seemed to contemplate an invasion of Turkey, and the threat still persisted. In November 1841 Rifa'at Pasha called Bankhead, the British chargé, the French representative and the Russian chargé to an interview and presented Turkey's complaints against Greece. (1) As a result, representations were made at Athens but Otho had done nothing. Bankhead and his colleagues all thought the Turkish claims undeniable and Lyons was ordered to prod the Greek government to give swift satisfaction. (2)

Greece had not compensated the Muslims who had lost property and estate when she achieved independence, and very extensive hardship prevailed among them. The non-fulfilment of her obligations by Greece violated the Protocols of the Conferences in London and Constantinople, yet Otho was in no position to pay out, and his unpopularity, or rather the unpopularity of his Bavarian advisers, led him

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- (1) Bankhead to Aberdeen, No. 30 of Oct. 29 1841 (copy).
In Aberdeen to Cowley No. 11 of Nov. 30 1841. F.O. 146/238
- (2) Aberdeen to Canning, No. 24 of Dec. 7th 1841. F.O. 195/184

to flaunt the sovereign of Greece and to consider repudiating her demands. The Candian revolt in 1841 for unification with Greece ⁽¹⁾ was fostered by him despite the protests of Sir Edmund Lyons; returned rebels were given public welcomes; there were violations of Turkish territory. A commercial treaty which Zographos was negotiating at the Porte was stopped on the eve of its completion. The powers' loans to Greece instead of serving to resuscitate national prosperity, were used to set up military resources far beyond Greek defensive requirements. Otho was not deflected from his warlike habits by the Frenchmen at his court, and although Louis-Philippe accused Russia of constantly intriguing at Athens, ⁽²⁾ it was Lagrene who studied the maps of Turkish Thessaly with General Schmaltz, ⁽³⁾ Guizot who was unwilling ⁽⁴⁾ to advise the removal of the unpopular camarilla and who ⁽⁵⁾ sent Piscatory, an unscrupulous follower of Thiers, to Greece.

(1) Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 191 of Aug. 3rd, 1841. FO 78/429

(2) Bulwer to Palmerston, Private and Confidential April 20 1841. F.O. 145/240

(3) Palmerston to Bulwer, No. 47 of May 18 1841. F.O. 146/236

(4) Granville to Palmerston, No. 73 of Mar 1st 1841. F.O. 146/239

(5) Piscatory, in an election speech at Chinon in 1842 declared "qu'il avait renversé le Ministre Anglais Mavrocordato et constitué par ses soins et ses démarches le Ministre Français Christides." (in the "Siecle," July 19, 1842)

Neither Palmerston nor Aberdeen was in doubt that it was France who stirred the Candian trouble. Metternich, who informed Guizot that Greece needed to be pacified was chagrined to have his opinions returned to him as Guizot's own, and was at a loss to reconcile such professions with the activity of French agents.

Canning did not find any great republican tendencies in Greece, only a desire for constitutional safeguards against royal irresponsibility and arbitrariness. His tone with Otho could not have been more brusque, and Aberdeen told Cowley that his language was that "not of England only, but of the Alliance." Otho was ignoring capable Greeks in his council, in favour of autocratic friends. Canning told him that "the Throne of Greece had not been set as an idle pageant," lectured him on the dangers of losing Athens without winning Constantinople, and advised concentration on internal reform. Lyons reinforced Canning's other meetings with members of the Greek government. Metternich, through Sturmer, urged patience at the Porte until the outcome of Canning's mission was known, and the measure seemed to be amply justified. Mavrocordatos was sent to the Porte to pick up the threads of Zographos' treaty, many of the secret societies were suppressed, and the payment of Turkish proprietors began. While Canning was proceeding to his

post, civil war broke out in the Lebanon.

The celerity with which Wood apparently settled the problems of taxation and administration in the Mountain was no guarantee of success; indeed it militated against any longevity for the schemes devised on September 2nd, for the Arab is convinced by protracted and leisurely negotiation rather than by the quick-fire method with which Ponsonby's favourite overpowered him on that occasion. The novelty of the watches and shawls distributed, gave way in a matter of days to a feeling of disillusionment, and perhaps to a sense of shame in his own supineness. (1)

No one except Bashir was satisfied with the double settlement of September 2nd. By the establishment of the tribute, the superiority of the Porte became inescapable; by the prior subtraction from it of the Amir Bashir's governmental expenses, the prince gained unprecedented strength. Bashir was now in a position to pay regularly a nucleus of adherents, and was independent of the Patriarch who had hoped to control his purse-strings. The Druses,

(1) Rose to Palmerston, Sep. 6th 1841. A & P. [1843]
 LX [c 456] p. 195.
 Wood to Palmerston, Sep. 7th 1841. A & P. [1843]
 LX [c 456] p. 183 and its Enclosure

No. 1: "Document signed by the Emirs and Sheiks promising to pay Tribute."

chiefs and people alike saw the emergence of the Shehab's power in much of its former plenitude. To the Christian mountaineers the situation was familiar; their shaykhs had evaded the weight of the taxation, and put it onto the shoulders of their feudal inferiors -- people they were honour-bound to protect. This was significant evidence of the tremors running through the feudal edifice from time to time.

The Divan too was everybody's bogey, not because the different parties did not want it but because they only wanted it if they could dominate it. To the Druses the arrangement devised by Wood reserved the position of prince to the Christian families in perpetuity,⁽¹⁾ as well as all the plums of office. The Maronite chiefs had no faith in their own ability to keep their mastery of the Divan, knowing that the Druses were strong enough to repudiate decisions they did not like. Furthermore, the Maronite aristocracy were more tenacious of their feudal powers than the Druses if just for the reason that their position was deteriorating while that of their Druse counterparts was stable.

(1) Wood to Palmerston, Sep. 7th 1841. A & P [1843] LX [c 456] p. 188 and Enclosure entitled, "Order for the establishment of a Meglis."

Wood's system could not endure so long as Bashir was left to operate it unaided. Wood himself knew this. (1)

The Druses were prepared to enjoy the respite his weak rule gave them but knew it could not last. As an alternative, they favoured a modification of the existing system of the prince ruling through a Druse family, enabling them to have a representative at Constantinople similar to the Kapu-Kiaya of the Maronites. Already Na'aman Djinblatt was acting as lieutenant to Bashir as was the Amir Haidar for the Christians but a Kapu-Kiaya at the Porte would be a far more notable recognition of the Druses as a distinct people, and by an authority superior to that of Bashir. (2)

The Patriarch too had little respect for Bashir knowing his obsequiousness towards the Sultan. He had long worked to isolate the Mountain from Turkish interference knowing that his own political position stood to gain thereby and that it would undergo diminution if the Turks managed to assert their supremacy.

In a community so primitive and so divided against itself as that of the Lebanon, it would be sanguine to expect the responsible heads to come together in an attempt to

(1) Wood to Palmerston, Sep 7th 1841 A & P, [1843] LX [c. 456] P. 189.

(2) Rose to Palmerston, Sep. 16th A and P. [1843] LX [c456] p. 197.

unravel the constitutional difficulties besetting the Mountain, and the time was drawing near when the Lebanon tried to cut the knot it was unable to untie. The Druse and Maronite chiefs failed to work out an adjustment of their position with relation to each other in the Mountain, or their position under Turkish suzerainty. The Turks were exasperated to find themselves faced with an irrational situation in which the sects preferred to veto Turkish suggestions without offering any constructive ideas of their own.

Rose predicted that trouble would emerge from the momentary silence in the Mountain -- "I say silence, for I fear that it is only silence, and a very temporary one" -- and that no one, amirs deputies or people, would accept the system of September 2nd. ⁽¹⁾ The pretext for disturbance he thought was most likely to take the form of resistance to the Tariff, and it troubled Rose that the Tariff originated in the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Treaty of August 16th, 1838. He could have consoled himself by following Wood's example and observing how greatly the chiefs exaggerated its potentiality for causing distress. ⁽²⁾

(1) Rose to Palmerston, Sep. 6, 1841 A & P [1843]
LX [c 456] p. 194

(2) Wood to Palmerston, Sep. 7, 1841 A & P [1843]
LX [c 456] p. 191

As to the Divan he feared "that the heterogeneous materials of which the Divan will be composed, will offer obstacles to that unanimity which is so desirable in legislative assemblies," he foresaw the anger of the Patriarch and the growth of a sentiment he called "dormant patriotism."⁽¹⁾ Wood himself was not entirely complacent about his achievements and on the 5th visited the Patriarch to urge acceptance of the Tariff upon him,⁽²⁾ even agreeing to meet a commission appointed by the Patriarch and to prove to it why the Patriarch should support the Tariff.

On the 12th of September Rose went off to the Druse country round Deir el-Kammar with Na'aman Djinblatt to the meeting where the great Druses expressed their anxiety for the future, begging Rose to forward to Lord Palmerston their request for a kapu-kiaya at Constantinople.⁽³⁾ While he was at Deir el-Kammar the first signs of unrest appeared in a perfunctory clash between Maronites and Druses.

(1) Rose to Palmerston, Sep 10th, 1841 A & P [1843] LX [c 456] p. 194.

(2) Wood to Palmerston, Sept. 7, 1841 A & P [1843] LX [c 456] p. 190

(3) Rose to Palmerston, Sept. 16th, 1841 A & P [1843] LX [c 456] p. 196
Rose to Palmerston, No. 90 of Sept. 18th 1841, F.O 78/456

Deir el-Kammar was Druse-owned but only one fifth of its population was Druse and just less than half the remainder were Maronite. The cause of trouble was a trivial incident at Ba'aqlin, a Druse village two miles from Deir el-Kammar. (1) The local Druses thereupon drove the Christians out and cut them off from Deir el-Kammar so that they were in danger of annihilation. Foreseeing the danger Rose requested the Christian shaykh of Deir el-Kammar to go with him and intervene but Youssuf declined; he preferred to order messengers to raise all Christians to arms and to the succour of their threatened brethren. Rose intervened, putting himself between the messengers and the door, and declaring that he would not permit such a mode of proceeding. He was alive to the awkwardness of his position as he himself later wrote, but the possibility of a general conflagration was great. Youssuf was persuaded to call the Christians to order. Rose visited the Druse qadi to get him to do the same. Finally the three men parted the engaged forces, the qadi going to the Druses, Rose and Youssuf to the Christians. Rose led back a column of four hundred to Deir el-Kammar and the Druses retired to Ba'aqlin. In Deir el Kammar once more Rose visited the Maronite convent,

(1) Rose to Palmerston, Sep. 18th 1841 A & P [1843]
LX [c 456] p. 197-9

and sending for the Christian elders, persuaded them not to allow any of the inhabitants to leave the town or renew the fight. The Druses gave similar promises. On leaving for Bayrut he was overtaken by a deputation and thanked for his good offices; the Patriarch and Amir Bashir added their congratulations later; he responded that his government would lose all interest if they repeated such irresponsible conduct.⁽¹⁾

The promptness with which Rose prevented the clash developing into a major conflict on September 14th equalled the speed of Wood's settlement but he was as helpless as Wood in eliminating the causes of trouble. The hostility of Maronites and Druses was "of ancient date," and while the British consuls, assisted by their Austrian colleagues did what they could to assuage angry passions the forces working against them were numerous and in aggregate more powerful.

Nevertheless Rose did all he could to prevent a recurrence of trouble. Through Misk, Moore's former dragoman, he advised Bashir to cultivate Druse friendship with a view to putting them more at their ease under his rule; he got

(1) Rose to Palmerston, Sep. 18th 1841, A & P (1843)
LX [c 456] p. 198.

Bashir to take up his residence at Deir el Kammar and pointed out to him that the more he won his way into Druse confidence, the less dependent would he be upon Patriarchal good will.⁽¹⁾ Working against Rose were two men and a rumour; the Patriarch, who persistently sought a revision of the Tariff and the mode of its collection; Nejib, the pasha of Damascus who complicated an already complex situation by raising Muslim feeling against the Christians and the spreading rumour that the ex-amir had actually been allowed to return to Constantinople from Malta on a British vessel.⁽²⁾ Of the three factors, the last was the most formidable. Rose himself could scarcely believe the rumour, since the very possibility of a return of the exile would be enough to weaken the ruling prince's position further and hearten adherents of his predecessor, among them the Patriarch. If Bashir had shown himself in the Mountain the precarious peace which Rose was striving to preserve would be irretrievably lost.

The ex-prince had recently been granted permission to return to Constantinople. Originally he had sought letters of recommendation from Stopford to Ponsonby and Reschid Pasha, letters which the impressionable sailor would have given⁽³⁾

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- (1) Rose to Palmerston, Sep. 23 1841, A & P. [1843] LX [C 456] p. 199.
 (2) Rose to Palmerston, Oct. 1st 1841, A&P [1843] LX [c 456] p. 201
 (3) Stopford to Viscount Canning (Private) Oct. 12, 1841 and 2 enclos. F.O. 78/470.

had not the Foreign Office warned the Admiralty against such a procedure. Palmerston made it plain that Bashir was entitled to no special consideration from Britain. He had not as he averred and Stopford believed, surrendered on a promise of British protection. Wood's despatches to Ponsonby proved adequately that the ex-amir had been recalcitrant to the end and that far from having surrendered, Wood had been obliged to depose him.⁽¹⁾ The Foreign Office was consequently at pains to dissociate itself from any supposed responsibility regarding the ex-prince's personal safety, although the Colonial Office was reminded that there was no objection to the governor of Malta improving relations with his son the Amir.⁽²⁾ What Rose subsequently could scarcely credit actually transpired and the ex-amir was taken to the city of intrigue in a British man of war, his expenses being borne by the British public.

The ordinary Maronite folk, among whom there was a widespread loyalty to the name of the Sultan, and among whom the British consuls found far less opposition to the system of taxation than the Patriarch and his Bishop Tubia would have led them to believe existed,⁽³⁾ were carried into

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- (1) Palmerston to Admiralty, Draft, March 31, F.O. 78/466
 (2) Palmerston to Colonial Office, Draft (Confidential) June 28, F.O. 78/467
 (3) Wood to Palmerston Sep. 7th. A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 191.

the vortex of civil war by their lords as inexorably as the highland peasantry in Scotland were driven into support of the Young Pretender by their chiefs in 1745. The dissatisfaction of the Maronite and Druse chiefs with one aspect or another of Wood's settlement, that is of the settlement they had themselves accepted under the influence of petty bribery, led to mutual recrimination and then to bloodshed rather than to self examination. The Turks bolstered the Druses in their determination to evade the Divan system or any other form of cooperation with the Christians. The Patriarch encouraged the latter not to pay Bashir the taxes he had promised to pay to Turkey. ⁽¹⁾

Meetings of the discontented took place at different points in the Mountain and notably in the Kasrawan; grievances were aired and incendiary speeches made. Nejib Pasha, at his most provocative, got Shibli-el-Aryan to arrest the Amir Said al-Din, governor of Hasbayya, and the sight of the unruly Druse renegade apprehending a man distinguished for his part in the Egyptian expulsion was symbolic of the disorder to come. ⁽²⁾ The Patriarch signed a

(1) Moore to Palmerston, No. 68 of Oct. 1st, 1841 F.O. 78/448

(2) Wood to Palmerston, No. 6 of Oct 18, 1841, F.O. 78/447

document with "the Princes of Meten, Faluga and Carnayel" to the effect that those who agreed to the propositions of September 2nd, should alone fulfil them; he accused the Amir Haidar of being partner to an understanding with Bashir Kassim and Na'aman Djinblatt to force through the terms which had been accepted on that day; ⁽¹⁾ in the Matn he sponsored a meeting which swore that the twelve hundred purses due to be paid annually into the Sultan's exchequer at Acre would not be paid in full but would be reduced to 1,000; he tried by a proclamation to initiate an arrangement in Biqa' whereby two local church dignitaries assumed the authority over the people traditionally ruled by Druse lords. Rose later told Aberdeen that this was in itself enough cause for war; finally the Patriarch got the chiefs to endorse his decision to resist Amir Bashir's efforts to collect that part of the revenue which was to be for his own use as the expenses of his administration. ⁽²⁾

The Patriarch playing on the frayed tempers and imaginations of the Christians and Nejib Pasha inciting the faithful of Damascus to extremism against unbelievers in general

(1) Wood to Palmerston, Oct. 4, 1841. A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 213. Also encl 2 in above, "Letter from Emir Haidar of Solima to the Emir Bashir."

(2) Wood to Palmerston, Oct. 4th 1842. A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] P. 213

as well as seeking to seduce the Druses into similar practices, were mainly responsible for the trouble which broke out on October 13th. The Maronites had been the aggressors in the affray at Ba'aqlin a month previously but now it was the Druses who struck first. As could be expected from a people of their warlike accomplishments the attack on Deir el-Kammar was previously planned and vigorously executed.⁽¹⁾

The spark was provided in the town itself when a Druse and a Christian came to blows. The former shot the latter and the struggle began, lasting four days and nights in all without interruption during which time Bashir Kassim was besieged in his Seraglio. He attempted to negotiate by signals with the attackers but they were in no mood for appeasement.⁽²⁾

In Bayrut Rose learned of the attack on the morning of the 14th and went to the Seraskier Selim Pasha to get the disorder suppressed, electing to go himself to the scene of strife. Selim immediately offered to send Ayoub Pasha the chief of staff with Rose and so it was arranged. Rose

(1) Wood to Palmerston, Oct. 19th, 1842 A. & P [1843] LX [c 456] p. 218

(2) Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 12th, 1842, Oct. 20th 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 225, 227.

also asked the Seraskier to invite the French consul to go with him since Bourrée's influence with the Christians would be invaluable to a swift settlement. This was an important change in practice for Rose who entertained no doubts as to the subversive activity of his French colleagues in Bayrut and Damascus in the past. Formerly cooperation had only been possible with the Austrian Adelbourg and to a degree with Basili the Russian consul. Rose had frequently hoped for cooperation from Bourrée which the latter's predecessor, Méloises, had withheld in the past, but Bourrée, who was a far more conciliatory person than Méloises, had been unable to meet Rose half way until recently. He had been sent to his post without any instructions for his conduct and his subsequent isolation from his colleagues, -- from Basili who disliked him intensely as from Adelbourg who distrusted his intentions unless evidence than Rose was prepared to accept -- was comparable to the recent isolation of his government from the other powers of Europe. He learned of his government's policy the best way he could, he told Rose, and that was from the newspapers. (1) Rose hastened again to invite the cooperation of Bourrée in light of the news he had recently received that France had signed the Treaty

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 125 of Oct. 10, 1841 FO 78/458

of July 15, "the result of the termination of what has been called the Eastern Question."⁽¹⁾ The French agents in Syria would continue to take sides with the Maronites as long as they were shunned by their fellows. Rose now sought to gain a valuable collaborator and assuage French animosity by bringing Bourrée into active association with himself and the other consuls.

Rose asked the Seraskier to invite the French consul to go with him and Ayoub. Selim refused. Of his own initiative Rose called the consuls to a meeting. Bourrée would not act because he was still without orders and was afraid that cooperation would lead the Maronites to think that France now approved of the British forces being in Syria, whereas in truth she disapproved vehemently. The argument displeased Rose since he was now consul-general and not merely the head of the military detachments, but he contented himself with the observation that he had not heard that the French government made this a point of difference of opinion between the two governments at the signing of the Treaty of July 15th.⁽²⁾

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- (1) Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 20th 1841 A & P [1843] LX [c456]p. 236.
Aberdeen to Rose, No. 19 of Aug. 19th 1841, FO 78/454.
- (2) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 112 of Oct. 20th 1841, FO 78/457
Rose to Aberdeen, No. 135 of Nov. 19th 1841, FO 78/458

On the morning of October 15th Rose and Ayoub Pasha set out with a small escort and as they covered the twenty-five miles to the besieged town ample evidence of the conflict presented itself to their gaze. The party moved through the Maronite and Druse lines towards Deir el-Kammar. As it neared the town Rose saw charred houses wrecked vineyards and other grimmer signs of the struggle. He sent letters to Nasif Bey and the other Druse chiefs conducting the siege as well as to the amirs Melkem Shehab and Assad who were organising the Christian relieving forces, telling them he was empowered by the Seraskier to bring them to peace. (1)

A cease fire was ordered and word sent to Bashir in the Seraglio to do the same. Rose collected the Druse chiefs about him and they explained their reasons for having taken to arms. Rose listened but flatly refused to exonerate them from the responsibility of having taken the first life. He directed Bashir and the Druse chiefs to send their people home. The Christians who were down to their last rounds, were glad to go, and the Druses, whose casualties were very heavy willingly followed suit. Returning to Bayrut Rose sat down to analyse the causes of the conflict for the enlightenment of Aberdeen and Ponsonby.

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 22nd, 1841. A & P. [1843]
LX [c 456] p. 238

Though going to live at Deir el-Kammar Bashir had failed to consult with the Druses on the question of the Divan as he could so profitably have done, and by his immediate actions brought out all the old antipathy towards his dynasty. Bashir considered that as Hakim or governor of the whole Mountain he could rule the people of Deir el-Kammar immediately; the Abunekeds, lords of Deir el-Kammar in the persons of Nasif and Hamoud adhered to the feudal principle that he could only interfere mediately. "If the Emir Bechir wishes to do anything, let him give us the orders and we will lead forth our jen; but if the Emir Bechir persists in his determination of acting directly with retainers of Deir el-Kammar, I myself will take the field with all my force, cut off all the roads, and blockade him in Deir el-Kammar;" which was exactly what Nasif had done.⁽¹⁾

After Rose and Ayoub enforced peace the Christian casualties in Deir el-Kammar alone came to fifty dead while the Druses lost two hundred; in the surrounding villages to which the fighting had spread there were many more dead and wounded.

(1) "Memorandum of a Conversation with Sheik Youssouf," enclo 2 in Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 20th, 1841 A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 227

As well as reporting to Aberdeen his part in this second pacification, the consul-general also called upon the Seraskier and his Defterdar as soon as he got back to Bayrut and to them as to the Foreign Secretary told of what he had seen and his conviction of Druse culpability. (1)

On the subject of Bashir he dwelt chiefly on the Turkish failure to succour him. Little confidence though he had in the Prince he would continue to support him until such time as his government might discard him. He warned that a resumption of the struggle was a very real probability unless all strong points of the Mountain were garrisoned and effective support given to the Prince. The Seraskier believed that his proclamations would be enough to preserve peace but in this he was wrong.

The Patriarch issued an order that all Christians were to take up arms against the Druses or be excommunicated. The Amirs Melkem and Abdu'llah who had over three thousand men in their camp at Ba'abda threatened that the Druses would soon be exterminated. (2) Nevertheless Selim Pasha not

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 28th 1841, A. & P., [1843] IX [c 456] p. 242.

(2) Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 29th, 31st, Nov. 1st, 8th A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] pp. 242, 245, 247, 248, 249.

only rejected Rose's suggestion that all the Maronites under arms should move to the north of the Nahr el-Kelb and that Turkish brigades should be stationed at Damour Deir el-Kammar and Ba'abda to keep order, but continued to provoke the Druses to further violence. The despatch of 1200 troops to a distance of no more than three miles from the walls of Bayrut achieved nothing except to elicit from the local Christians the comment that they preferred Druse hostility to the friendship of Turkish soldiery. (1)

The Druses and Maronites now joined battle throughout the whole of South Lebanon and in the villages of Biqa'. The main Maronite objective -- the relief of Deir el-Kammar -- was not realised in a month of bitter fighting and on November 5th Bashir evacuated his capital and fled to Bayrut. "By sunset there was scarcely a Maronite on this side of Nahr el Kelb."

"The events of the last few weeks have shown that the Maronites so far from being able to attack and drive the Druses out of their country and exterminate them, as they said, after a short combat, tremble for their existence as a people. If the Druses, instead of knocking their heads against Zahle and its resolute inhabitants, had gone from Shooyfat into the Meten, the discouragement of the Maronites from Nahr el Kelb

(1) Rose's account of the hostilities is in his Nos. 132 and 135 of Nov. 19th 1841, F.O. 78/458

to Tripoli was so great, that I really believe that they would have laid down their arms, and made such terms as they could with the Druses. The Patriarch had made up his mind to fly." (1)

It would be purely conjectural to say whether Canning, with his unrivalled ability for relating internal events at the Porte to the outward aspects of Turkish policy, would have been able accurately to interpret the strength of a movement of which Rose and Werry saw unmistakable signs among high Turkish officials and which might be termed a policy of personal insurance. Nejjib and many of those nominated by him as distinct governors were reputedly the friends of Muhammad Ali; Rose was swift to notice that the Seraskier Selim Pasha and his entourage never spoke of the Pasha of Egypt except in deferential tones. (2) During the fighting which had lately finished many of the officers on both sides were of the Syrian brigade, one of the finest in the Egyptian army. It had been part of the settlement with Egypt that all Syrians serving under Ibrahim should be given the opportunity of returning to their homes, but it was only when hostilities between Maronite and Druse were imminent that the difficulties, of Egyptian creation, in

(1) Aberdeen Papers, ADD. MSS. 43140 Rose to Aberdeen, Dec. 3 1841.

Rose to Aberdeen, No. 141 of Dec. 4th & 1 encl. F.O. 78/458

(2) Rose to Aberdeen Nov. 19th 1841. A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 261.

the way of a general disbandment were removed. Suddenly 8,000 efficient soldiers accustomed to taking life carelessly were poured back into the Lebanon and Rose found them in the thick of the engagements of October and November. They were easily recognised by the remnants of Egyptian uniform which most still wore. ⁽¹⁾ With these men to keep events in extreme confusion Muhammad Ali was also strongly represented at Constantinople. His own emissary was trying to negotiate a marriage between one of his sons and a daughter of the Sultan with Syria as the dowry. ⁽²⁾ The reappearance of the ex-prince Bashir at Constantinople only seemed to thicken the plot. These circumstances served to intimidate those Turkish officials -- and Rose believed they were numerous -- who were loyal servants of the Porte, but to bolster those who had been friends of the Pasha. Many of the

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 230

(2) See Canning to Aberden, April 25th 1842, Aberdeen Papers, ADD MSS 43138

(1)
 latter, and Nejib Pasha in particular, were believed to be in direct communication with Egypt as were several of the Druses whom Muhammad Ali had invested as Beys. The Patriarch had secretly corresponded with the ex-prince Bashir during his brief exile in Malta and by following a policy of his own independent of that of the Prince Bashir Kassim he hoped to prove the latter's incapacity, subject the Druses, and bring back the old Bashir. It was small wonder that the high Turkish officials found it extremely embarrassing to declare emphatic loyalty to the Sultan when the Turkish grip on Syria was so insecure, and that in securing their careers against a sudden or violent end, they found it worth their while to be civil to the memory of Muhammad Ali. (2)

(1) Thus on June 8th Ponsonby wrote to his chief (No. 191, F.O. 78/434) that "the British Government should take a very high tone with the Porte, or Syria will be lost by the timidity (sic) of the Ottoman Ministers, who are afraid of giving offence to individuals like Nejib, or his protectors."

Also N. W. Werry to Bidwell (Private) Dec. 2nd 1841
 F.O. 78/447.

(2) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 145 of Dec. 7th 1841 & 1 enclos.
 F.O. 78/458
 Rose to Aberdeen, No. 122 of Nov. 19, 1841, F.O. 78/458
 Rose to Aberdeen, Nov. 19th, A. & P. [1843] LX [c 456]
 p. 254.

In part this explained the failure of the Turks to control the passions of the sects in Syria. The well-intentioned dared do nothing. Under the instructions of the Pasha of Damascus Shibli el-Aryan disarmed the Christians of Rashayya and Hasbayya and invested Zahle. The intervention of Wood in favour of any person invariably indisposed Nejib against the latter more than ever and the discriminatory acts against Christians in Damascus were all part of the same plan to create general confusion. Another explanation for the Turkish failure is that they were not capable of resolute action except with greater forces and therefore were obliged to fall back on the iniquitous practice of divide et impera. It was a good enough day to day policy but was an evasion rather than a solution of difficulties.⁽¹⁾

Thus it was because they could not or would not that the Turks made no effort to enforce order in the way that Rose and his colleagues would have wished.⁽²⁾ The Prince had been refused military assistance repeatedly. On the rare occasions when it was sent it arrived too late. The force at Ba'abda watched his palace burn; that other

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 123 of Nov. 1st, 1841 F.O. 78/458

(2) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 126 of Nov. 11th, 1841 F.O. 78/458

force encamped at a short distance from Bayrut watched Druses and Maronites skirmish fiercely without interfering; Reschid Pasha left Bayrut for Zahle with the object of raising the siege but arrived determined to disarm the Christian garrison. The Druses who had failed to penetrate the defences of the town were let in by Reschid after he had persuaded the defenders to give up their arms. Above all the safe conduct extended to the Amir Bashir by Mustapha Pasha on October 5th enabling him to come to Bayrut was contemptuously ignored by the Druses who belaboured him personally as he escaped. The Turks sought no redress. (1)

As a direct result of Turkish neglect the impotence of Bashir rendered his continuance in office quite impossible. Even his military qualities seemed to have deserted him in the defence of Deir el Kammar. The Maronites had fought under the banner of the Patriarch rather than under that of Bashir and certainly the Patriarch had been the driving force behind them. He had paid them, provided them with (2)

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 141 of Dec. 4th, 1841 F.O.78/458
 Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 28th 1841 A. & P. [1843]
 LX [c 456] p. 243
 Rose to Aberdeen, Nov. 19th 1841 A & P. [1843]
 LX [c 456] p. 254 is a point-by-point analysis of the occasions on which the Turks could have intervened, but did not.

(2) Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 31st 1841 A. & P. [1843]
 LX [c 456] p. 247

slogans and even directed their strategy. Bashir did none of these things. As the struggle slowly turned against the Maronites the Patriarch arranged for his personal withdrawal in a British vessel, but it was Bashir and not the Patriarch who in popular eyes epitomised Maronite defeat. After his escape from Deir el-Kammar the prince visited Rose at the British consulate general. He was dispirited and had no enthusiasm left for his office. Rose was not inclined "to advise his Highness to demand the active continuation of his power as Emir Bechir, because I knew that his inefficiency had contributed to bring about the present state of affairs,"⁽¹⁾ nor would he take upon himself to advise resignation. On the last day of 1841 Lord Aberdeen withdrew the support of the British government when he wrote to the consul-general saying "the removal of the present Emir Bechir and the nomination of his successor, will be most likely to lead to the restoration of peace in the Lebanon."⁽²⁾

The main lesson of the civil war was to show the intense mutual antipathy of the sects yet in the last despatches of

(1) Rose to Aberdeen, Nov. 11, A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p.253

(2) Aberdeen to Canning, No. 35 of Dec. 31st 1841 F.O. 195/184

Wood and Rose in 1841 neither men foresaw that the solution of the constitutional difficulties of the Mountain might lie in a division of the country. The Druses themselves were the first to regard this as the only solution and it took time for Turkey and the European powers to accustom themselves to it.

Wood observed that "the history of the Druses does not shew that they ever enjoyed the privilege of having a Druse Governor independent of the Governor-General of Mount Lebanon."⁽¹⁾ This was not strictly correct but was applicable to the last 150 years. The Hauran was their great remaining stronghold, a region as big as the Mountain; in it they had been able to maintain an entire independence of such redoubtables as Djezzar and Ibrahim. There was a possibility that by ruling the Druses through Na'aman Djinblatt Bashir would have been able to allay all fears for Na'aman was a person of inestimable standing among the Druses. But the moment Bashir made a false move as at Deir el-Kammar the fragile confidence of the Druses was shattered.

"It has been suspected for some time past that the Druses entertain the project of establishing a principality of their own, which suspicions

(1) Wood to Aberdeen Nov. 4th 1841. A & P. [1843] LX [c 456] p. 284.

are now confirmed by their asking an Imperial Firman for the appointment of a chief of their own together with the establishment of a fixed tribute to be paid annually by them." (1)

(2)
At a meeting which took place on November 5th at Shuwayfat between the Druses shaykhs on the one hand and the Seraskier and consuls on the other in an effort to make peace the Druses requested that a brother of Said al Din should rule over them. The plea was rejected and they finally agreed to receive any officer the Seraskier might appoint to take temporary command in the Mountain. Nevertheless the Druses sent a petition to Constantinople repeating their request. (3) It frightened the Christians enough for them to send a Fetwa, or legal sentence of Turkish law, proving that the Druses could not be considered Muslims and praying that the Porte would not divide the government of the Mountain, and for the moment all hands were against the

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- (1) Rose to Aberdeen, No. 142 of Dec. 7th, F.O. 78/458
- (2) Rose to Aberdeen No. 125 of Nov. 10th 1841 and 1 enclos. F.O. 78/458
Rose to Aberdeen Nov. 10th A. & P. (1843) LX (c 456) p. 252.
- (3) The Petition of the Druse Nations to the Sultan, is enclosed in Wood to Aberdeen, Nov. 4 1841, A. & P. [1843] LX [c. 456] p. 284.

Druse idea, though in fact the principle of legitimacy had failed to justify itself to the people.

Apart from the French, the consuls were in agreement with one another though they had different reasons for so being. The Prussian Wickenhauser merely followed in the wake of his Austrian colleague. Basili associated himself with Rose and Adelbourg on every occasion on which Rattimenton and Bourrée stood aside, for the reason that they were Roman Catholics strongly linked to the Maronites, while the Greek Melkites who were under Russian protection cut a very indifferent figure in local affairs. The French connection always impressed Basili with the absence of any Russian link. Rose had tried to draw Bourrée from the very difficult position in which he was placed by his absence of instructions, but Bourrée had to tread carefully. His attitude was understandable although he did little to remove the misconception his colleagues placed upon it. Instead of abstaining rigidly from any form of action he was as unwise as to meddle in little, but to his colleagues symbolical, ways. Although on excellent terms with the Patriarch he did not utilise the friendship to urge discretion upon him. The money from France and Austria, sent originally for relief purposes but used to pay Maronite

irregulars, brought no protest from him, while Wood was given singular proof that it was Bourree and his colleague of Damascus who propagated the belief among the Maronites and even the Turks, that Britain was cultivating Druse friendship prior to annexing Syria.

THE YEAR OF STRATFORD CANNING --

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSION

"Syria is that portion of the Empire in the condition of which you will naturally feel the warmest interest, and which may justly claim all your solicitude."

Aberdeen.

CHAPTER VI.

The new year opened with an event which profoundly modified the situation in the Lebanon. This was the deposition by a Turkish adjudicator sent to Bayrut of the prince Bashir al-Kassim. The Turks gave no warning of their intention, and yet, far from bringing protests from the European representatives, the act was thoroughly approved by the latter. What did matter was that the Turks substituted a direct rule of their own instead of allowing the Lebanon to select a successor to Bashir.

Bashir's position had been declining over a period of months, and the civil war sealed his fate.^{1.} Aberdeen was particularly concerned about the amount of bloodshed in which "both parties have vied with each other in committing every species of enormity. Men, women and children have, on both sides, been the victims; houses, churches and entire villages have been destroyed".^{2.}

Though suspecting that the Turks had fostered the struggle he was driven, not only to press for Nejjib's removal, but to believe that Bashir should be suspended from his functions. He was unwilling to press deposition on the Porte, since that would be an admission of having "backed a wrong horse" and hoped Turkey would remove Bashir of her own initiative.

1. Aberdeen Papers. Add. Mss.43140. Aberdeen to Rose. Nov. 30.

2. Aberdeen to Canning, Dec. 22. 1841. A & P.[1843] LX [C.455]¹⁸⁴¹ P:45.

As to a successor, the ex-Amir or a scion of the house of Muhammad Ali was out of the question, and of the only candidate which the Shehabi were able to bring forth, the Amir Amin, Aberdeen remarked unenthusiastically

"it would not be necessary that he (Canning)

"should offer any objection to his

"nomination".^{1.}

Mustapha Pasha, who deposed Bashir was sent to Syria in response to the urgings of the European representatives, primarily to investigate the complaints of the people. He was a man of inferior abilities, selected for other reasons than his suitability for the post.^{2.} Rose, Werry, and Captain Michell of the "Inconstant" who met Mustapha when he landed at Bayrut, were soon made aware of his displeasure. He told them that he would not have had to come had not Europe insisted, and complained that the state of the Ionian Islands was incomparably worse than that of Syria though Britain had been established there for many years now.^{3.}

Mustapha's subsequent conduct was equally ominous. In interview he delighted the Druses and depressed the Maronites, questioned the right of the Maronites to be governed by a Maronite prince, and said Druse influence

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1. Aberdeen to Canning. No 17 of Nov. 27. 1841. F.O. 78/432 Aberdeen to Canning. Nov. 27. 1841 A & P. [1843] LX. [C.455] P.43.
 2. Bankhead to Aberdeen. Dec. 17. 1841. A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.47.
 3. Rose to Aberdeen. Dec. 30. 1841. A. & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.321.

had to be taken into consideration. He declared that the consuls had grossly exaggerated the extent of the late struggle and that Turkish inactivity was misrepresented.

"But a three hours ride from Bayrut would convince
 "even a sceptical person of the real state of things;
 "he would see some six or seven small towns or
 "villages, four convents, the houses of the Emir
 "Bechir, Emir Melkem, and numerous other persons,
 "reduced to ashes".¹.

Mustapha convoked ten major meetings of Druse and Christian nobles within a month of his arrival but they were fruitless. The mountaineers were chiefly concerned with the restitution of pillaged property, and the Druses were unwilling to give it back. Although it was against their interests the Druses favoured the appointment of a Turkish authority to ensure their escape from Christian government, while the party of the ex-Amir in Constantinople was growing among the Christians and notably among the Patriarch's adherents who saw in the restoration of the exile the only mode of restoring their fortunes. Bourrée too told Rose that the ex-prince seemed the best "Commissaire de Police" available.² Admiral La Susse expressed a similar opinion to Adelbourg.

The moment for a deposition of Bashir was very opportune, and now that Ponsonby was gone, the unfortunate man had no

1. Rose to Aberdeen, Dec.30th. 1841 A & P. [1843] LX [C456] P.323.

2. Rose to Aberdeen.No.150 of Dec.30.1841 F.0.78/458.

zealous advocate at the Porte. Nevertheless, while everybody was disposed to see Bashir go, only the Druses were willing to have a Turk replace him.¹ The Patriarch was in a great dilemma and sent to Rose for advice. The privilege of selecting a ruler from one of the local families was in the balance. What should the Maronites do? Rose consulted Wood and Adelbourg before replying. From Wood he affirmed that the promise of a Christian prince locally elected had been made; with Adelbourg he advised the Patriarch as to procedure. The pasha should be petitioned first for a clear recognition that the promise still stood, and if he would not accept the petition an Ardil Madar (general petition) might be sent through Mustapha Pasha to the Porte. If Mustapha would not forward the petition then it should be sent through the Maronite Kapu-Kiaya at Constantinople.²

Meanwhile Mustapha and Selim did their utmost to get the deputies of the sects to put in writing their acceptance of a Turkish governor, and their threatening technique had some effect. Very influential amirs like Haidar and Bashir of Brumana went over to their side. The signs of secession frightened the Patriarch and his bishop Tubia convoked a meeting in January, 1842, of all Christian deputies, lay

1. Rose to Aberdeen, Dec. 30. 1841. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P. 326.
 2. Rose to Aberdeen Jan. 5. 1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P. 327.

and clerical, and got them to sign a hedje binding themselves to petition the Porte for a Shehab, and take an oath that whoever violated it would answer with his life and property. It was an extreme measure but the Patriarch feared, as he had once before shown he feared, a coalition of feudal lords which would be content to exercise their traditional powers in their own Maqa'ates or domains under a Turkish authority.¹

Mustapha countered vigorously. He forbade the Patriarch to interfere in political matters, put the unfortunate prince Bashir on a vessel bound for Turkey and appointed an Austrian renegade, Omar Pasha, as "Prince, or Governor, of the Mountain."²

When the news reached Constantinople Stratford Canning, newly arrived from England, was one of the first to hear of it. Canning was disinclined to act until he had fully studied Syria's problems, but as he explained,

"support of the Christian privileges violated

"by the Seraskier; the decided opinions of

"the French and Austrian ministers; the opinions

"not less decisive of our own agents on the spot,

"especially of Mr. Wood", drove him to inform Sarim

1. Rose to Aberdeen, Jan. 12. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX C [456] P. 333.
 2. Rose to Aberdeen, Jan. 31. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX C [456] P. 337.

Effendi that "Her Majesty's Government would very
 "much lament that the Porte should make any
 "permanent change in the Government of Lebanon
 "which should have the effect of depriving the
 "family of Shehab of the prominent position in
 "that Government which it has so long enjoyed."¹ His
 colleagues delivered similar expressions of their concern
 for the Shehabi. Sarim tried to explain that the promises
 made in 1840 by Stopford and Izzet Pasha were given to the
 ex-amir alone, and then only if he surrendered in a given
 number of days, but Guizot told Bourqueney and Nesselrode
 instructed Titow to support Canning in his refusal to accept
 this as the truth of the case.

Canning was impressed from the moment of his arrival
 by the atmosphere of political and social reaction prevailing
 once more in the Empire.² The Turkish Government was using
 the religious lever with considerable effect in many parts of
 the provinces to stir anti-Christian and anti-European feeling
 among the Muslim populace, while there were numerous signs that
 many of the reforms which Mahmud and Reschid had carried
 through - particularly in the judicial and fiscal spheres -

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1. Aberdeen to Canning No.24 of Mar.11.1842.F.O.195/191, gives the government's approval of Canning's expedient.
 2. Canning to Aberdeen (Private) Feb.9.1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD.MSS. 43138.

were being jettisoned in favour of a return to older and more corrupt methods.¹ "Reschid Pasha went too fast. This error was made us of, not to go slow, but to go back".² The Hatti Scheriff had not even been translated into some of the Balkan tongues, let alone acted upon; the old method of tax collection, inefficient though it was, was being revived out of sheer perversity. The propensity of Turkey for good or evil towards subject peoples needed watching, for Canning was in doubt that Turkey was more important to Europe than she had ever been before. "The direction for good must come from without, and with England mainly rests the responsibility".³

In this view the ambassador seems to have been right; he found his colleagues temporarily exasperated by Turkish cupidity and reaction, and inclining to sympathy with the victims of the system. Britain and Austria were now doubly anxious that Turkey should not feel the blast of this apparent decline in concern for her future integrity. Truly, neither France nor Russia repudiated the slogan of Turkish integrity, but then had not Britain herself, in association with those very powers, shown - at least to their own satisfaction - that the practice of territorial amputation was not

1. Canning to Aberdeen.No.14 of Feb.16. No.21 of Feb.16.1842. F.O. 78/475.

2. Canning to Aberdeen.April 20.1842. Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43138.

3. Canning to Aberdeen, April 20.1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43138.

incompatible with the theory of the preservation of integrity?

Canning's first friend was Sturmer the Internuncio, a man who had had a strong dislike for Ponsonby's sensational methods¹. but who now had the orders of his court to give full co-operation and confidence to Canning. Bourqueney was friendly but suspect, and Titow reserved.²

Britain was the power whose friendship Russia valued most, and she had derived great satisfaction from Clanricarde's communication that Britain would actively prevent Egypt altering the status quo in the East, should the pasha try to do so.³. To bring about the active co-operation of Titow and Canning the Czar now sought to confirm the British government in its confidence in Russian intentions towards Turkey, through the agency of Brunnow, the Russian Gentz, and to assure her that Russia would not embarrass her in her difficulties in Northern India. As regards Turkey, the Czar thought that country should stand unsupported as well as she might, with none attempting either to prop or collapse her; Nicholas' attitude was, in Professor Seton-Watson's graphic comparison, that of the person "who hopes for an inheritance in the course of nature rather than one who seeks to wrest it prematurely from

1. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, P.219.

2. Canning to Aberdeen. Feb.9.1842. Aberdeen Papers ADD. MSS.43138.

3. Palmerston to Bulwer.No.61 of June 1.1841. F.O.146/236.

its present holder."¹.

As to India, the Czar was sympathetic to British difficulties, and when France failed to ratify the Slave Trade Treaty in February 1842,² opened his heart to Stuart de Rothesay, Aberdeen's minister to St. Petersburg, on Afghanistan. Stuart de Rothesay referred to the difficulties of the East India Company in a conversation with the Czar, saying that to keep order in the territory beneath its supervision the Company was taxed to the uttermost. The Czar told him

"I perceive that you are precisely suffering under
 "the same embarrassments which annoy me, that the
 " extent of country you occupy renders it almost
 "necessary that you should go further, and that
 "you find it equally inconvenient to advance, with-
 "draw, or to remain in your present position; that
 "some general system of occupation must therefore
 "necessarily be grounded upon an actual state of
 "possession which may be conclusive...In short, it
 "appears convenient that we now understand our
 "relative positions, and what has hitherto been
 "a closed subject may now be discussed openly

1. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, P.197.

2. Aberdeen told Cowley in a private letter of February 12, that the failure to ratify counteracted all the Conservative tendencies of France since 1830. Aberdeen Papers. ADD.MSS. 43129.

"between us"

and this was a relief to Russia.^{1.}

Having emerged from beneath the cloak of the villain, the Czar was anxious to cast it about the shoulders of France. Nicholas continued to hold the most unfavourable opinions of Louis-Philippe; on New Year's Day 1842 the French diplomatic corps absented itself from court, as Pahlevi had previously done in Paris.^{2.} Casimir-Périer was decorated on his return from St.Petersburgh for his able conduct of what would today be called a "cold war". The Czar enjoyed the estrangement and talked frequently to Stuart de Rothesay of France's "customary perfidy". Not blunted by the failure of his attempt to secure a quadruple alliance against France or by the lack of success of the conversations with Clanricarde on the future of Turkey, he continued to court British friendship and co-operation in the East at the expense of France.

It was as a result of Russian pressure at Teheran that Anglo-Russian relations improved and the Sha' was persuaded out of Gurian which belonged to Herat.^{3.} The Czar expressed his desire that Greece should be restrained from provoking Turkey too far, and as to Syria he joined Metternich and

1. Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen No.34 of Feb.22nd 1842 (copy) enclo. in Aberdeen to Cowley No.46 of March 22.1842 (confidential) F.O. 146/245.

2. Aberdeen to Cowley, No.1. of Jan.4.1842 F.O.146/245.

3. Palmerston to Bulwer.No.22 of June 25.1841. and 2 enclos. F.O.146/237.

Aberdeen in pressing for the removal of Nejjib Pasha. Russian assurances did a great deal of good in official circles in Britain, without making much impression on parliament until relations with France began seriously to deteriorate in 1843. At first, Canning too was rather sceptical, but his deposition to be cold with Titow sprang from personal reasons to some extent. Already he had learned that St. Petersburg had tried to stop Turkey accepting his appointment, just as his appointment to the Russian capital in 1834 had been rejected. Canning's personal antagonism died hard, and Aberdeen who divined this, warned him against it.²

The removal of Bashir Kassim and the appointment of Omar Pasha prepared the ground for the introduction of a régime of black reaction which the carefully edited Blue Books of the period cannot wholly obscure. To consolidate his supremacy before Europe and return to the attack, led Mustapha to act swiftly. If Turkish administration could be shown to be superior to Shehabi rule, the claims of the latter to be restored might be permanently resisted. The system Mustapha introduced was the same that Canning had observed in action at the heart of the Empire on his arrival, and which, report said, was being enforced in the Balkans as well.

Mustapha's plan was direct enough. He intended to secure

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1. Canning to Aberdeen. Feb. 9. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.53.
 2. Aberdeen to Canning. April 25. 1842. Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43188. It is worth bearing in mind that Nesselrode, who was still in power had considered Canning as "soupconneux, pointilleux, defiant." (Greville Memoirs II.P.365.Feb.16.1833).

written approval of his regime in the belief that it would seem to the European representatives that the people of Lebanon had voluntarily surrendered the privileges recognised by Wood. If the Syrian question could be temporarily closed in Turkey's favour the Porte would be the better able to resist any reinvestigation at a later date. As to means, the Druses were to be used to coerce the Christians into signing petitions to the Porte expressing the desire that Omar should long continue as prince of the Lebanon. With the Patriarch excluded from political affairs and a handful of the leading amirs already seduced the task did not seem to be too difficult.²

Of the petition which Mustapha drew up and circulated for signature, Rose commented that "it is immaterial how many signatures are attached ... but they have all been obtained by corruption, intimidation and promises."³

Questioned by some of the lower orders of the mountaineers some signatories admitted they had no right to sign on behalf of the whole population, but were induced to do so in the belief that Mustapha had come to Syria to stay as Governor-General. "Certainly many of the Maronites do not
 "show that moral courage that men ought
 "to do, and many of them had proved themselves

1. Rose to Bankhead No.9. of Feb.12.1842 F.O. 78/494.

2. Canning to Aberdeen.No.39. of Feb.26.1842. F.O. 78/475.
 No.107. of May 18. 1842. F.O. 78/478.

3. Rose to Canning. May 9 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.396.

"spiritless and venal; but in charity we ought
"to transpose ourselves into that situation, alone,
"helpless, with their wives and children in remote
"villages".

What aristocratic resistance there was centred round the Amir Abdullah, brother of the deposed Bashir al-Kassim, and when Mustapha called on him to sign two documents, approving Omar's rule in one, and by the other agreeing to accept the most severe punishment if it could be shown that he had caused any resistance to the petitions he refused to sign and was given refuge on board the "Inconstant".¹ Mustapha was furious with Rose, and demanded Abdullah's person, Rose countered that he could prove that the petition circulating in the Mountain was in the handwriting of Mustapha's Secretary and was not drawn up by the Christian amirs at all. The Blue Book prints in full a meeting between Moore and Mustapha in which Moore, as Rose's representative, carried the attack to the Seraskier, and after cornering him and proving his guilt as regards the petition, extracted a safe conduct for Abdu'llah when he

1. Rose to Canning. Junell. (private) enclo. in Canning to Aberdeen. No.136 of June 27.1842 F.O. 78/478. Rose to Aberdeen. June 5.1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.339.

went ashore again.^{1.}

However much Rose tried to obstruct the petition, Mustapha's position was still strong and his scheme was carried forward with vigour in spite of the defection of the Druses in February.^{2.} The great Muslim population could still be mobilised in support of a Turkish régime, and to this end Mustapha switched his residence from Bayrut to Damascus. His plan of action was in reality two-pronged, and he also intended to undermine the position of all Europeans in Syria and to induce them to quit the country. He had a competent assistant in Nejb whom Aberdeen considered "an atrocious fanatic of the old school".^{3.} Nor was he without a European ally.

1. "Minute of an Interview between Mr. Moore and the Seraskier Mustapha Pasha. June 7.1842." A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P. 409.
2. The Turco-Druse honeymoon did not last very long, as Wood predicted it would not. While the Druses took advantage of the freedom given them by the Turks, and enjoyed the fruits of Christian property, there was a core of uqala and chiefs built round Na'aman Djinblatt which was rigidly opposed to any sort of Turkish rule; it had stood aside from recent events however, and was out of touch with popular Druse feeling. The Turks, duped by hopes of proselytism among the Druses, did the damage themselves. They sent mollahs to build mosques at Shuwayfat and Deirel-Kammar, to pull down Druse horlvee (shrines) and burn sacred books. Omar Pasha took up residence at Beit ed-Din whence he could survey Deirel-Kammar, and appointed a governor over Hasbayya who was hated by the Druse populace. The Druse reaction was so intense that Rose was told a Muslim Shehab would be accepted with gratitude.
(Rose to Aberdeen. Feb. 6. Wood to Aberdeen Jan. 31. 1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P. 339.345.
3. Aberdeen to Canning. Feb. 24. 1842 (copy) Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43138.

Basili had frequently told Adelbourg that he detested British and French influence in Syria, and Rose attributed his antagonism to Russia's small stake in the country.¹ The Greek Orthodox sect was numerous but had no amirs and was therefore debarred from taking any important political rôle. In spite of this, Basili was motivated by an intense dislike of Lord Ponsonby who had persuaded the Porte to expel the Greek Orthodox Patriarch from Constantinople,² and an even greater distaste for the Jesuits who had been turned out of Russia. He tried to bring Selim and Mustapha Pasha to close the Jesuit establishments at Bayrut and Bikfaya. The friendship of Basili and Mustapha was close and the Russian encouraged the Turk to adopt the system of petitions to secure local approval of direct Turkish rule, and to play on the dangers, particularly to the Patriarch of the Maronites, of the "English priest".

The Protestant bishop³ who was installed in Jerusalem in late January 1842 never actually set foot in Lebanon, even although his vessel called at Bayrut for coals and to pick up Rose who escorted the bishop to his post.⁴ Mustapha

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1. Rose to Bankhead. No.10 of Feb.13.1842 (confidential) F.O. 78/494.
 2. Canning to Aberdeen. No.35 of Feb.26.1842 F.O. 78/475.
 3. The Reverend Michael Solomon Alexander. Bishop of the United Church of England and Ireland in Syria, Chaldoea, Egypt and Abyssinia; Aberdeen to the Archbishop of Canterbury (Draft) Nov.6 1841 F.O. 78/470. The Impulse to establish a bishopric came from Prussia; see Palmerston to Ponsonby.No.187 of July 26.1841 F.O.195/183 enclos.Bunsen's Memorandum Jul.15. 1841.
 4. Moniteur Dec.15.1841. Jan.9.1842.

refused a letter of recommendation to the Pasha of Jerusalem, and invited Bishop Tubia to present a petition of protest to Constantinople¹. Bishop Alexander did not forget this and, once established, retaliated by sermonising against the presence of Turks in the Holy Land. Lord Aberdeen, who had been loud in the praises of the bishop's personal qualities, swiftly came down upon this early indiscretion. It was his desire and intention that the new bishopric should not occasion undue anxiety in Paris, Vienna, or St. Petersburg and to this end he had sought to bring it into being unobtrusively.² He wished for no special concessions from the Porte, and directed Consul Young to dissociate himself from the Bishop's activities, and not to extend protection over his servants indiscriminately.³

By March Turkish ascendancy was entire, and Mustapha was making life quite unbearable for the Europeans in Damascus and other towns. Rose heard that all Europeans were to be denied justice and that their employees were to be advised to surrender their protections.⁴ Mustapha charged N.W. Werry and Major Churchill with immoral conduct

1. Rose to Aberdeen No.4 of Jan.26. 1842 F.O. 78/494.

2. Aberdeen to Canning. Feb.24.1842 (copy) Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS "I hope you will have no difficulty about our Jerusalem Bishop. Our demands are so moderate that they cannot be refused."

3. Aberdeen to Young No.1. of May 3.(copy) enclo.in Aberdeen to Canning, No.51 of May 3. F.O.195/192.

4. Rose to Aberdeen No.19 of Mar.7.1842 F.O.78/494.

Rose to Aberdeen No.21 of Mar.17.1842. F.O.78/494.

and excessive interference in his affairs, and said it was impossible to keep the peace with such people around him. Wood became embroiled in a dispute with Nejjib Pasha who accused the consuls kavasses of drawing their swords on a Turkish officer.¹ The Muslim population was roused to a dangerous pitch, and the sermons in the mosques heightened the tension to such a degree that many wished to kill off their families to make themselves more ready to die in the extinction of the infidels.² The state of public order declined and there were scimmages between Christian and Muslims in the bazaars of Damascus. Within a period of two months, 43 bodies were lifted from the city's canals. The majlissi were swept along on the emotional current and instead of administering justice impartially became mere recorders of Mustapha's and Nejjib's decisions. Passages from the Qur'an were loudly intoned in the Street-called-Straight, and the feast of Bairam had rarely been more ostentatiously celebrated.

Canning was embittered by all he heard from Syria;
 "a Turkish Authority just appointed to the high
 "station of Governor of Mount Lebanon for the express
 "purpose of calming angry passions and quelling

1. Canning to Aberdeen. No.41 of March 3.1842.F.0.78/476. For the history of the Timoni Affair, see Rose to Aberdeen No.17 of March 7.1842.and 16 enclos. F.0.78/494.

2. Rose to Aberdeen No.28 of April 5. F.0. 78/494.

"disorder commences his Government by composing
 "and addressing petitions to himself which set
 "forth an ideal and supposed statement of
 "apprehended future misdeeds, and misfortunes,
 " which he imputes to a British Bishop ... does
 "his best to indispose them to a friendly power ...
 "excites the people whom it is his duty to calm".^{1.}

The ambassador took up all the complaints of injustice sent to him, particularly Wood's dispute with Nejib, telling Sarim that "if such be the degradation to which the Queen of England's Agents are exposed, it would be better for them to leave the country at once."^{2.}

He was also angered by Basili's friendship with the high Turkish officials and his active support of direct rule.

Canning's concern was deepened by a fear of the unknown. He suspected that momentous conversations were going on between Sami Bey, the representative of Muhammad Ali and the Turkish Grand Vizier without knowing their exact nature. The Pasha was sufficiently restored to the favour of his sovereign to be conveying his troops to Bayrut in Egyptian warships, and it was not out of the question that he would be called on to keep order in Syria.

1. Canning to Aberdeen No.35 of Feb.26. 1842 (Confidential) F.O.78/475.

2. Canning to Sarim Effendi, in Canning to Aberdeen. No.81 of April 19.1842 F.O. 78/477.

News of a revival of religious feeling came from many parts of the Arab world, and that was an emotion by which Muhammad Ali might well profit; Sir Thomas Reade reported evidence of it from Tunis, and it showed itself in Baghdad and the region of the Gulf. When Werry offered the suggestion that even the fierce resistance to British arms in Afghanistan might be explained in part by the increase of Muslim fanaticism Addington, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, found the opinion worthy of consideration. Canning secured the dismissal of the incompetent Askar Ali from the governorship of Tripoli and obtained the appointment of a more energetic successor to suppress the rebel Abd'al Jalil. Jalil was a friend of Muhammad Ali and a brother-in-law of the Sultan of Morocco, and therefore a man deserving of some attention. Canning asked his chief to allow two ships-of-the-line to escort the new pasha to Tripoli as a means of "increasing our influence upon the Coast of Africa." By the new appointment he felt reasonably sure that he had taken all the precautions he could on the far side of Egypt, and he tried to tranquilise Syria on the hither side before any of the schemes which he suspected were under consideration could materialise.

Canning's colleagues did not share his fears of Muhammad Ali; and except for the removal of Nejib, were not very inclined to coerce the Porte over Syria. All

agreed that the situation there was unsatisfactory but there was indecision as to how much pressure might legitimately be brought to bear on the Turkish ministry.^{1.} Titow was unwilling to move except in his own time and according to his own lights; Sturmer was ill, and even the accounts of Maronite misery seemed unable to move Bourqueney.^{2.} Aberdeen tried to show Nesselrode that Britain had no designs on Syria,^{3.} and urged the need for co-operation on Guizot, but failed to see, at least for a while yet, that Europe was divided on the tactics to be employed, rather than in sentiment. This is easier to understand in the case of Russia than of France or Austria. Having herself renounced a policy of acquisition at the expense of Turkey, and having acted on a new principle for a dozen years now, Russia was anxious to see an identical policy become the basis of relations between the other powers and the Porte. As a consequence of this sensitivity towards the Sultan's sovereign rights she was very diffident to condone intervention by other powers. Russia thought Ottoman Turkey was an anachronism in the nineteenth century world, an empire so ill-digested

1. Canning to Aberdeen April 25.1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD.

MSS.43138.

2. Canning to Aberdeen No.74 of April 7. 1842 F.O. 78/497.

3. Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen No.49 of Mar.19.(copy)
enclo. in Aberdeen to Canning No.52 of May 6.1842 F.O.195/
192.

and so lacking in unifying force that in time it must fall apart. The resulting situation would be precarious because certain other powers would compete with Russia in securing territory, markets or spheres of influence, but Russia could console herself on two points. The dissolution would most probably be a process rather than an event, and the most suitable moment for stepping in would be easily recognisable. Yet if Russia could await disintegration from within with some complacency, pressure on the structure might come from without at a time when Russia was unprepared for it. It therefore became her interest to limit European interference in Turkey, and to moderate its nature when it became necessary. Russia cannot be blamed for regarding Syria as an Anglo-French tilting yard, or for advising her representative to play down the seriousness of the situation if the Porte could be relied upon to settle the problem unaided.

The necessity of playing a lone hand was not displeasing to Canning. Through his new friends in the Imperial Divan, and through Sarim Effendi he urged the deposition of Nejjib and Omar and his pressure seemed to bring early results when, on March 3rd, he was able to tell Aberdeen that a better arrangement would be coming soon in Syria; "Omar Pasha will be removed".¹

1. Canning to Aberdeen. No.43 of March 3. 1842 (decyphered)
F.O. 78/476.

A few days later Sarim and his dragoman visited Canning and made a confidential offer whereby Omar was to be recalled and the ambassador's nominees sent to take over the high offices in Syria. Canning realised that to appoint other Turks would be to perpetuate the existing system but if he played his cards skilfully he thought he might eventually bring about "a final settlement of the Country". Further conversation with Sarim revealed that the Imperial Divan had been toying with the idea of dividing the country into Druse and Maronite administrations until such time as the Shehabi might be restored. In reply, Canning objected to the alteration of the existing arrangement for yet another temporary system. A permanent solution was already overdue, he told Sarim, and there was nothing "to prevent the immediate restoration of the Shehab family".¹ Sarim seemingly accepted Canning's argument but said additional information would be required from Syria to initiate any fresh settlement.² Canning was disappointed to find Sarim unwilling to enlarge on the form the new settlement would take, but suspecting insincerity warned him that some form of "intermediate Christian Government" would alone be acceptable to Christian Europe.

1. Canning to Aberdeen. Mar.16.1842 (Separate and Confidential)
F.O.78/476.

2. Canning to Aberdeen.No.54. of March 16.1842 (Confidential)
F.O. 78/476.

Canning's only real supporter was his chief.

Aberdeen was never so energetic as when his moral principles were outraged, and then even his conciliatory nature abandoned him. The continuance in office of Nejib and Omar,¹ and the sudden spate of discriminatory acts against Europeans in April 1842 led him to warn the Porte against such short-sightedness. "Her Majesty's Government regret
 "to see that .. the Porte seeks to
 "evade the performance of its promises,
 "by broadly alleging that the complaints
 "of the Foreign Agents in Syria against
 "the conduct of the Turkish Authorities,
 "are wholly destitute of foundation."

Continued violence and injustice would only produce a reaction in England detrimental to Turkey's own interests. Aberdeen's tone surprised Nesselrode who had always thought of the Scots Earl as a rigid non-interventionist, and the Russian approached both Berlin and Vienna to restrain signs of any meddlesome supervision of Turkey. Meyendorff, representing Russia at the court of Berlin read to Hamilton a despatch from Nesselrode which criticised Austria, Britain and France for seeking Omar's dismissal, and approved Titow for withholding his co-operation from their representatives.² It was Turkey who simplified Canning's task by her own cupidity and brought the powers

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1. Aberdeen to Canning.No.26.of Mar.24.1842. F.O.195/191.
 Aberdeen to Canning. Feb.24.1842,Aberdeen Papers.ADD.MSS.
 43138.
2. Hamilton to Aberdeen.No.43.of April 16 (copy) encl.2. in
 Aberdeen to Canning.No.52. of May 6.1842. F.O.195/192.

together on the Syrian question.

In defence of Mustapha Pasha, and therefore of his whole regime, the Porte pleaded that its information from Syria revealed no details of maladministration or violence similar to those with which the consuls supplied the diplomatic corps, and although there was unanimity in the reports received by Bourqueney, Canning and Sturmer, the Turks singled out the British consul-general as the object of their wrath. Colonel Rose jauntily attributed this to his own condemnation of high officials in Syria. The Foreign Secretary came to the prompt assistance of his subordinate. He referred the Porte to Rose's exertions on her behalf since the day he was wounded in 1840 at Majdal leading a handful of Turks against a superior Egyptian formation. In addition he gave the consul-general himself tangible proof of the Government's confidence in its servant. For a day or two scribbled minutes passed between the ground and first floors of the old Foreign Office, headed - somewhat ambiguously - "Rose's Bath", and the outcome was that Rose became a Companion of the Order.¹

Wood's contest with Nejib was rapidly becoming a test-case, on which all eyes were fixed; Nejib's removal became Canning's main objective for "since Nejib Pasha's

1. Rose to Aberdeen. Feb. 25. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C 456] P. 350
Hammond to Rose. Mar. 2. 1842 Rose Papers ADD. MSS. 42796.

administration it (Damascus) has become the Timbuctoo of Asia".¹ The condition of the dispossessed Maronites was pitiful and likely to worsen if the Druses stayed in possession of their lands during the coming harvest. Their petitions for compensation and the return of their property were cynically ignored at the Porte, and by the Turks in Syria. However, the ways of diplomacy are devious, particularly at Constantinople, and on April 7th Canning's perseverance produced the sudden dismissal of Nejib.² The event created a sensation in Damascus.³ Selim Bey was sent to Syria to obtain a true knowledge of the state of affairs so that the difference between Turkish and European accounts might be explained, and to enable Turkey to work out a solution of the constitutional position.

The attitude of Canning's colleagues altered almost immediately. Sturmer and Bourqueney joined him in representations to Titow that Basili was encouraging Mustapha to consolidate the Turkish position in Syria although this was a direct contravention of the 1840 promises, and already

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1. Wood to Canning. April 6 (extract) in Canning to Aberdeen. April 20. 1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD.MSS. 43138.
 2. Canning to Aberdeen. April 7. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.76.
 3. Canning to Aberdeen. No.98 of May 4.1842. F.O.78/477.

through Stuart de Rothesay Aberdeen had asked for Basili to be warned though not reprimanded.¹ Wagner the Prussian said that although he was without instructions he would give Canning his assistance,² and Nesselrode swiftly enabled Titow to join his colleagues,³ Sarim Effendi convened a meeting of the diplomatic representatives at his house on the Bosphorous for May 27th⁴.

Prior to the meeting there were consultations among the diplomats to decide on what they were to urge and how they were to urge it. Aberdeen directed Canning into closer co-operation with Titow, for although Nesselrode seemed disposed to support Basili on the grounds that the consul had only advised the Turks to take charge in Syria⁵ until another Shehab could be found, the Foreign Secretary was not willing to act without Russia at Constantinople. Russia had behaved very well in Persia to Afghanistan and "we cannot

1. Aberdeen to Rose. No.4. of Mar.29. F.O.78/493.

2. Canning to Aberdeen.No.74 of April 7. 1842 F.O. 78/477.

3. Canning to Aberdeen. No.77 of April 11. F.O. 78/477.

4. Canning to Aberdeen. May 18. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455].P.78.

5. Nesselrode was impatient of the criticism of Basili, who was one of the ablest men in Russian service, and enjoyed the confidence of his Government, Basili had been tutor to Nesselrode's son, now Secretary to Legation at Berlin. Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen, No.60 of April 19th (copy) enclo.4. in Aberdeen to Canning No. 52 of May 6.1842 F.O.195/192.

be insensible to her active friendship".^{1.}

Consultation revealed a variety of opinions as to tactics. Titow was instructed to work for a Shehab restoration, yet he thought that if the Reis Effendi gave a blunt refusal the powers would have to accept the situation. Silence would be offensive.^{2.} Metternich believed there was little hope for the Shehabi and instructed the Internuncio not to attend a conference which had as its object insistence on a restoration of the family.^{3.} Bourqueney was willing to join Canning in a strong condemnation of the existing régime and to argue strenuously for the Shehabi, but not to go so far as Canning who thought that silence and "the threat of ultimate consequences" were legitimate tactical resources in overcoming the Turks.^{4.} It is scarcely surprising that the Turks detected the lack of unity and that the conference of May 27 achieved little.

Canning opened the discussion.^{5.} His reports from Syria were not the same as those of the Turkish Government, and there was reason to believe the petitions were being extracted by force. His colleagues confirmed that their reports were similar. Sarim contended that his government were

1. Aberdeen to Canning. April 25. 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43138.

2. Canning to Aberdeen. May 24. 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43138

3. Canning to Aberdeen. May 19. 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43138

4. Canning to Aberdeen. May 24. 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43138

5. Canning to Aberdeen. A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.80.

satisfied with the truth of their reports, and that from the petitions, it was obvious that the return of the Shehabi would cause further trouble. The petitions were signed by known people, while the consuls derived their knowledge from malcontents who toured the consulates. The representatives countered that the signatures obtained by Mustapha were not numerous and that they featured on other petitions forwarded separately by the Christians, that the Christians must have forgotten their traditional liberties amazingly quickly. The diminution of taxation did not explain their supposed satisfaction with Turkish rule, since that had originated before Omar's time. If there was any tranquility it was due to the faith of the people in Europe. The Austrian chargé read a despatch from Metternich showing the need for a restoration of the Shehabi. The violence of the recent change of Government in Lebanon could have a serious effect on the other subject peoples of the Empire, and "examples drawn from history were adduced in order to show the necessity of forbearance and prudence with regard to inhabitants of mountains."¹. Doggedly the Turks resisted a Shehab restoration, maintaining that their appearance would cause a rising among the Maronites as well as the Druses. Suppression would be costly and "repugnant to humanity".

1. "Substance of a conference held at the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. May.27.1842" A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.89.

Canning to Aberdeen Nos.122 and 123 of June 9. F.O.78/478.

The meeting degenerated into a conflict between adverse impressions and irreconcilable testimony.

The meeting ended on an interesting note. The Austrian chargé d'affaires de Kletzl persuaded Canning to "shadow out" an administrative alteration which might avert catastrophe. Canning, apparently with reluctance, asked if the Porte would offer opposition to a system by which Maronites and Druses would be placed under separate chiefs selected by each party. The Turks fought this suggestion too and Canning did not press it. Selim Bey, writing from Bayrut, found that the "present administration, by the
 "admission of everybody leaves nothing
 "to be wished for, and the inhabitants
 "of Mount Lebanon are very well satisfied
 "with it. The Consuls of the Allied
 "Powers, residing in this country, are
 "the only persons who look upon matters
 "in another light."1.

The deadlock of May 27 led to recrimination between the French and Russian representatives.² Bourqueney was strongly in favour of a fresh move and directed his remarks chiefly at the Russian chargé who, in deputising for Titow, had openly favoured the Austrian scheme for a division of the Mountain. As it happened Canning only withheld his own support from the plan because he was not authorised to sponsor it. He had not given it a great deal of prominence, and had really mentioned it because Metternich had asked him to

1. Canning to Aberdeen.No.124 of June 9.1842 F.O.78/478.
 Selim Bey, to Grand Vizier. A & P. [1843] LX [C.406] P.89.
 2. Canning to Aberdeen.No.122 of June 9.1842 F.O.78/478.

do so. Nevertheless, he was finding it very difficult to support the Shehabi, and the meeting finally shattered any hopes of a restitution. Moore reported that many mountaineers were as willing to try the old exile again as his untried son, the Amir Amin. Soon after the meeting he wrote to Lord

Aberdeen, "I cannot but regret the apparent
 "necessity of our sticking to the
 "restoration of the Shehabs. I
 "should be tempted to rejoice if you
 "were to detect the absence of any such
 "necessity, but I must presume, till better
 "advised, that honour, consistency, justice,
 "humanity and France and Austria are all
 "ranged on the side of the Maronites".¹ His

analysis overlooked the point that Metternich had already abandoned the Shehabi and that France was virtually alone in supporting their return to an undivided inheritance. With the failure of collective action, Canning himself made one more attempt to break the resistance of Sarim the Reis Effendi and the Grand Vizier to the Shehabi.

Canning had found his most regular source of confidential information in the Seraglio, but it was necessary, now that the Grand Vizier was rumoured to be in decline, "to press the advantage by a more active means of expression". Canning's choice fell on Riza Pasha, who, though just another Turk on the Syrian administration was opposed to all idea of division. Through Riza a secret meeting was arranged between Canning and

1. Canning to Aberdeen. No.125 of June 9.1842 (Most Secret)
 F.O. 78/478.

the Sultan. They met in a kiosk on the Bosphorous on June 8th. The Sultan thought Syria was quite tranquil, and had swallowed whole the reports that the people really wanted Turkish rule, and that the consuls were responsible for the creation of contrary accounts. Then he admitted that his ministers were old and conservative, and said that with ten good pashas he could effect a scheme of internal reform throughout his Empire. Canning bluntly advised him to get rid of the men in the highest posts of the Imperial Divan, and advised a Shehab restoration in Syria. But the sultan was as antagonistic towards the Christian family as his ministers. Though he failed to move the Sultan, Canning was not altogether displeased with the meeting. It revealed to him that the Sultan preferred to arrange matters with him personally, and resented concerted action by the representatives, and this was perfectly acceptable to the individualistic ambassador.

Aberdeen did not like the atmosphere of secrecy in which Canning met the Sultan, but the meeting had immediate results on the ambassador's relations with the recalcitrants of the Divan, just as previous separate action had secured Nejb's dismissal. At the Porte in 1842 it was impossible for a secret to be kept for long and Canning's meeting swiftly got to the ears of Izzet Pasha the Grand Vizier, who was not blind to the probability that his dismissal had been

sought. Izzet sent Canning a present of two horses which induced the ambassador to tell Aberdeen that he had brought the Grand Vizier "completely upon his knees"¹.

Canning sent Alison to explain his inability to accept the gift. Izzet closed the door behind Alison and urged the need for an Anglo-Turkish alliance to strength to withstand Russian power and French revolutionary principles. He made himself out as a reformer but said there was need for caution in this respect. It was in Lebanon, where the position was almost insoluble, that English assistance was most needed.²

The meetings of May 27th and June 8th confirmed that from the Sultan downwards there was a stiffening over Syria. Canning's despatch, and private and confidential letter of June 27th, (the day on which Alison met 'Izzet) reveal that the Grand Vizier's invitation, whether intended seriously or merely as a bait to separate Canning from his colleagues, proved irresistible to the ambassador. He did not give serious consideration to 'Izzet's plea for an alliance but he showed his belief that France and Russia were the disruptive forces, and was very ready to advance his own personal standing, which he invariably considered synonymous with the influence of Britain, in the Turkish councils. The slim thread of his confidence in a Shehab restoration, getting finer from day to

1. Canning to Aberdeen. June 27.1842.Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.

2. Canning to Aberdeen. June 27.1842 (Private & Confidential) F.O.
43138
78/478.

to day, now snapped. In the despatch to Aberdeen, Canning recounted the difficulties in the way of bringing the family back. Rose told him that the Turks would act against any prince, and that it would be a great mistake "to suppose that all the personal virtues and sound principles of government ... are to be found in full perfection on the side of the Christians".¹ Moore said that princes and clergy alike were corrupt. The Maronites had done nothing for themselves, and had been fated with "hostile neighbours, faithless protectors, or uncertain friends", while support of the Shehabi was the offspring of custom rather than of enthusiasm. A division of the country would be difficult, but it was impossible to unite Druses and Maronites. Any system would have faults, and Lebanon bade fair "to become a standing field of battle for the array of adverse systems, of hostile passions, and perhaps also of conflicting foreign intrigues," but since he and his colleagues had failed to get any one system adopted, it remained for the British government to decide what was to be done for the future. Was the traditional ruling family to be restored or abandoned for another? Was the Lebanon to stay intact or be divided between Maronites and Druses? In his private and confidential letter Canning emphasised that

1. Canning to Aberdeen.No.186 of June 27. F.O.78/478.

"the whole conduct of the Government towards me
 "hinges at present upon the affairs of Syria, and
 "that according to the line which may be taken
 "respecting them in Her Majesty's Councils and to
 "my eventual management of them under Your Lordship's
 "instructions will be the amount of influence to be
 "exercised henceforward by this Embassy over the
 "external or the internal policy of the Porte". 1.

Aberdeen was not so ready as Canning to work alone and continued to prefer frank discussion among the representatives on all subjects, followed by individual rather than collective representation to the Porte. This policy was particularly necessary with regard to Syria, since other powers, and notably France were so interested in the form an ultimate settlement would take. Furthermore, Aberdeen was not willing to be drawn into any such alliance as 'Izzet had proposed. When Canning forwarded a request for British advice as to whether Turkey should give Abd el Qadr the assistance for which he had appealed,² Aberdeen's reply left no doubt that Britain did not favour giving any help to the illustrious rebel. He also warned the Sultan against any reopening of the dispute with Tunis.

"The Porte need scarcely be reminded that a powerful
 "neighbour has now established himself on the
 "frontier of Tunis .. it is no less the interest
 "of Great Britain than it is of Turkey that the

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1. Canning to Aberdeen. June 27 (Private & Confidential) F.O.78/
 Aberdeen to Canning N.72 of June 21.1842 F.O.195/192 (478.)
 2. Canning to Aberdeen.No.111. of May 24.1842 (Confidential)
 F.O.78/478.

"present state of possession on the Southern
 "short of the Mediterranean should remain
 "undisturbed".^{1.}

Turkey ought not to forget the assurances she had given to France last year.

On June 27th, the day on which Canning wrote home for a change of instructions, Guizot and Cowley met to discuss the meeting of the diplomatic corps with the Turkish authorities.^{2.} Guizot thought a commission should have gone to Syria with Selim Bey to compile a report which would enable a suitable settlement to be evolved. He blamed Titow for the failure of the meeting when he seized on the scheme of division of Lebanon. In reality it was Titow's chargé who had done this and Titow himself, on his return to duty after illness, brought his policy into alignment with that of his colleagues within a matter of days by sending a request similar to theirs for the return of the Shehabi to an undivided Lebanon.^{3.} Russian defection was no more than could be expected, Guizot maintained, but he hoped France, Great Britain and Austria would continue to co-operate in the East, and indeed in all things.

Aberdeen was ready to give Guizot his full, but not his exclusive co-operation. French dilatoriness over the

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1. Aberdeen to Canning No.86 of July 14.1842 F.O.78/474.Cf. Palmerston to Ponsonby.No.176 of July 15.2 enclos.F.O.195/183
 2. Cowley to Aberdeen.No.216 of June 27(copy)enclo.in Aberdeen to Canning.No.77 of July 4.1842 F.O.195/192.
 3. Canning to Aberdeen.No.123 of June 9.1842 F.O.78/478.

settling of the Portendic claims created a very bad impression in ministerial circles, and there was patently little excuse for it. The Opposition made full use of it and Aberdeen regretted that Guizot could be so indifferent to the parliamentary position of the Peel ministry and yet expect that same ministry to help him out of his difficulties with the Chambres.^{1.} The near certainty that Guizot would be unable to ratify the Slave Trade treaty and the widespread belief in Britain that France was more to be watched in the Pacific, Mauritius,^{2.} Gambia^{3.} and Muscat^{4.} even than was Russia in Central Asia, were both interpreted as aspects of the same irresponsible chauvinism. It was impossible to depend on such a wayward friend to the exclusion of other friendships and Aberdeen was not disposed to act without Russian concurrence in the Eastern Question. Nesselrode was aware of this and through the decrepit Stuart de Rothesay supplied Aberdeen with assurances on every subject which could possibly raise the Foreign Secretary's suspicions. On July 2nd he gave the British Minister a copy of the Russian version of the meeting of May 27th and on learning from Titow that he

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1. Aberdeen told Bulwer "I have been able hitherto to keep the matter quiet in Parliament, but this is becoming more difficult, and an explosion may take place at any moment".
 2. Aberdeen to Bulwer No.1. of Sep.13.1841 F.O.146/238.
 3. Aberdeen to Cowley.No.14 (Slave Trade) of Nov.19.1841.F.O. 146/238.
 4. Aberdeen to Bulwer No.6. of Sep.21.1841. F.O. 146/238.

had withheld from Canning a copy of his instructions to his dragoman, sent a copy to London.¹ It was Nesselrode's belief that Turkey had not expected Russian unanimity with the other powers in Eastern affairs, and consequently such collaboration must be the basis of future action. In two other matters Aberdeen required assurances - Wallachia and Persia. The rumour was current at Constantinople that General Kissilev was to replace Prince Ghika as hospodar of Wallachia, thus violating the provisions of Akerman and the Règlement Organique. Ghika, who had been guilty of great discourtesy towards Queen Victoria as well as of incompetence certainly needed to be dismissed, but Aberdeen thought his successor should be appointed according to the existing rules and not because he was a Russian puppet.² Brunnow had reassured Palmerston in the past and now repeated the assurance to Aberdeen,³ while Stuart de Rothesay was informed that although General Duhamel would go to Wallachia as adviser to the prince, he would go back to his post in Persia as soon as quiet was restored.⁴

On the question of Persia nothing could have excelled Russian discretion. The dispute which arose between Turkey

1. Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen.No.47 of July 2 (copy) enclo. in Aberdeen to Canning.No.84 of July 12.1842 F.O.195/192.
2. Aberdeen to Canning.No.56 of May 24.1842. F.O.195/192.
3. Aberdeen to Canning.No.63 of June 3.1842. F.O.195/192 No.129 of Oct.24.1842.F.O.195/193.
4. Aberdeen to Canning.No.59 of May 26.1842. F.O.195/192.

and Persia in 1842 was one over frontiers - in this instance over a frontier 700 miles long running through wild country and migratory tribes.¹ The Turks were determined to obtain Mohammera and emphasised their intentions by a massacre of Persian subjects at Kerbela. The Sha', in his turn, was guilty of frontier incidents and savage reprisals. Both Canning and Titow tried to facilitate the opening of negotiations between the opposed sovereigns, and in August these actually did begin. Their progress was painfully slow and it was Russia who finally invited Britain to join in offering themselves as joint mediators.²

In London Brunnow too did not fail to draw Aberdeen's attention to the "heureuse union" of Russia and Britain and on July 18th reminded the Foreign Secretary that Britain could not afford to alienate the Czar in the present state of tension between Paris and London over Portendic. Sir Robert Peel's language in Parliament on Afghanistan was all Russia could ask for but his very different tone on Poland only encouraged France to greater efforts to split the friends. Russia had nothing but good intentions towards Britain, and

1. Lane-Poole. Life of Sir Stratford Canning. London. [1888].
P.121.

2. Aberdeen to Canning. No.116 of Sept.23.1842 F.O.195/193.
"The fact of Great Britain and Russia acting together ... cannot fail to have a most beneficial influence for the maintenance of the peace in the Levant, a fact which must have a general bearing on Asiatic questions and Asiatic people at large, who are always speculating upon the supposed jealousy, and distrust between our two Governments".
"My Government is desirous not to act single-handed but openly and frankly(sic) in concert with you." Brunnow to Aberdeen Sep.8.1842 (Confidential) Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43144.

for real confidence it was vital that the latter should reciprocate. Peel's speech was certainly inopportune and the more surprising in the light of his bitterness towards France.¹

Procrastination over the Portendic claims on the part of France stimulated Peel to give opinions which would have made even Palmerston blanch and his own willingness to settle a French claim to compensation for the detention of a French vessel, erroneously held as a slaver, only added fuel to his fire. He declared that Britain "should be fully

"justified, so far as a mere question of Right is
"concerned, in taking the Law into our own hands,
"and procuring by force, that is by the seizure of
"French property, as an equivalent Compensation for
"the losses of our subjects".

He would withdraw the commissions because of the continued delays and say that "we feel justified in imputing to the

"French Government intentional deceit, and a
"course of conduct inconsistent with Honour ...
"This is a decided insult no doubt, but what is
"the French Government to do about it ... If
"they demand reparation let us refuse it".²

The furore which the Portendic affair was creating in

1. Brunnow to Aberdeen. July. 18. 1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD. MSS. 43144.
See William Russell to John Russell. Jan. 9. 1842. Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell I. P. 52.
2. Peel to Aberdeen July 10. 1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD. MSS. 43062.

England brought Government Opposition and press into momentary agreement. The Queen and the Duke were indignant, and Peel, as has been seen, positively afire,¹ and these circumstances helped Brunnow. Aberdeen had before him a despatch of Cowley's informing him that Casimir-Périer the French courier at St. Petersburg, had been instructed to bring the conduct of Titow to the attention of Nesselrode.² France accused him of working through Basili, the Russian consul in Bayrut, to extract petitions in favour of Omar Pasha from the people of the Mountain. Cowley believed this information came privately from Bourqueney. Casimir-Périer was to say that his government could only assume that Titow acted without instructions, and that whatever course Russia might pursue Austria, France and Great Britain would always act together over Syria. If the Porte continued to reject their representations other means would be found to bring order to Syria. On the day after his interview with Brunnow, Aberdeen sent Bloomfield a despatch, directing him

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1. On the non-ratification of the Slave Trade treaty, Peel commented that it was absurd of Guizot to expect the British Government to let him off lightly. He thought there was "no end to the concessions we may be called upon to make, on such a ground". It was important that Britain did not sanction France's withdrawal, as Guizot would misrepresent this sanction. "Guizot wants to get a Triumph out of his non-ratification, and to this he has no claim." Peel to Aberdeen. (Confidential) Oct. 11. 1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD.MSS.43062.
 2. Cowley to Aberdeen. Despatch of July 8. 1842 (copy) in Aberdeen to Canning No. 88. of July 21. 1842. (Confidential) F.O. 195/192.

to inform Nesselrode that the British opinion of Titow was not adverse and that Britain did not associate herself with the French protest.^{1.}

A reply to Canning was sent on July 21st.^{2.} In the preamble to his despatch the Foreign Secretary remarked that reports from Syria were still very unsatisfactory and that the "Allied Powers" had been obliged to consider how far their desire for peace might justify intervention. Even if European sympathy had not been attracted, the powers would have been obliged to see the positive engagements undertaken by the Porte, and in particular that which promised an improved administration, honoured. The question of taxation seemed to have been reasonably settled, and the appointment of Bashir el-Kassim had seemed a "natural guarantee" of an improved administration. But the Porte had only promised the restoration of a Christian prince and not necessarily of the Shehabi, and indeed it had now become obvious that that family could not "reasonably be considered as indispensable". The popularity of the Shehabi was not universal and could not be estimated even among the Maronites in a

1. Aberdeen to Bloomfield.No.15 of July 19.1842.(Confidential) (Copy) enclo. in Aberdeen to Canning No.88 of July 21.1842 FO.195/192.

2. Aberdeen to Canning No.93 of July 21.1842. FO.195/192.
A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.102.

country where "anything like a popular voice must be very uncertain". All its scions were personally disqualified except the Amir Amin, and none had any clear hereditary right. In another despatch, also of the 21st,¹ Aberdeen set forth the British Government's ideas. The Austrian ambassador had recently suggested that a division of the country might be brought about, and the Turkish ambassador had viewed the suggestion favourably. Aberdeen now told Canning to propose such a division to the Porte. The petitions from Syria were all highly suspect, and while the system now recommended was far from ideal, it was unlikely that a very enlightened scheme would be any more successful.

"One thing is certain," Aberdeen concluded, "With every desire to respect the independence of the Porte, to abstain from all interference in the internal administration of the empire, and making allowance for the many and great difficulties in the government of Syria, the Powers of Christendom will never tolerate a continuance of these excesses, which are, in truth, perfectly gratuitous, and which it is manifestly in the power of the Turkish Government at once to check."

In a private letter of the same day Aberdeen expressed his confidence that the plan would be accepted by the other representatives and that it would at least help them over the present impasse.² A return to joint consultation was

1. Aberdeen to Canning.No.94. of July 21.1842 F.O.195/192.
 2. Aberdeenn to Canning.July 21.1842. Aberdeen Papers ADD. MSS.43138. A. & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.104.

highly desirable, though it was still possible that of any, Bourqueney might try to rock the boat. "I confess that I

"am a little apprehensive of the activity of French interference in Syria. They wish to make up for former remissness, and play a prominent part", to split the powers and put Russia in "an insulated state" similar to their own in 1840."

There was every excuse for Titow being hesitant to act Aberdeen went on; he was afraid of England and France having similar views on Syria, and probably deluded by British papers speaking with an air of authority, saying that an Anglo-French fleet was bound for Syria; even Vienna and St. Petersburg had not wholly discredited the idea.

Of his own initiative, Brunnow sent Titow instructions identical to those sent to Canning, and Nesselrode commended his opportunism later.¹ Metternich approved the scheme, and Guizot, after an attentive perusal "of the plan of

"selecting from each Nation of the Druses and Maronites a Native Chief who should respectively govern his own people under the superintendence and control of a Supreme Turkish Authority",

sent Bourqueney similar instructions.² In addition, he wrote to Berlin requesting Bulow to direct the Prussian representative to join his colleagues on the subject.³

1. Bloomfield to Aberdeen.No.53 of Aug.13.1842(copy) enclo. in Aberdeen to Canning No.109 of Aug.24.F.O.195/193.

2. Cowley to Aberdeen.No.287 of Aug.12.1842 (copy)enclo.in Aberdeen to Canning.No.105 of Aug.24.F.O.195/193.Canning to Aberdeen Aug.26.1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.106

3. Cowley to Aberdeen No.258. of July 29.1842 (copy) in Aberdeen to Canning. No.100 of Aug.4.1842,F.O.195/193.

Before Cowley withdrew Guizot took the opportunity to say that France "had much reason to be grateful to Her Majesty's "Government for their frank and loyal conduct both with respect to Morocco and to Tunis".

France had sufficient to occupy her in Algeria, and had no wish to extend in any direction.¹ The unknown destination of a French squadron already at sea, but the suspicion that it was bound for the Levant, did much to counter the good effect this conciliatory declaration might otherwise have had.

The French squadron, under the command of Admiral La Susse, left Toulon in early June and the mystery of its whereabouts caused considerable anxiety to the senior naval officer in Malta, Sir Edward Owen. Canning conjectured that it had no determinate object beyond the revival of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. He thought the increase of French activity in all the Turkish provinces, and the sudden increase of consular appointments in the Balkans and at Mosul were facets of the same policy.² Canning believed the situation called for the stationing of an equal number of

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1. Cowley to Aberdeen.No.259. of July 29.1842 (copy) in Aberdeen to Canning.No.101 of Aug.4.1842 F.O.195/193.
 2. Canning to Aberdeen No.263 of Dec.1.1842 F.O.78/482. "the french (sic) legation has been for some time unusually active in trying to obtain fresh consular appointments in the Levant, and I am the more inclined to pay attention to these circumstances because there are other symptoms of increasing endeavours on its part to reach at an ascendant influence which ... may in time become a source of serious inconvenience through out the Levant. The applications which have come to my knowledge are for Jerusalem, Moussoul, Sophia and Vana".

British ships at Smyrna, the Piraeus and on the coast of Syria, to offset those of "a jealous but not I trust, unfriendly rival", but not for any parade of military strength¹. When it became definitely known that La Susse's destination was the Levant, Canning advised Owen to detach Sir David Dunne to see what La Susse was doing, and to take the opportunity of "exhibiting Her Majesty's flag in those parts most frequented by the French squadron".²

After a brief stay at Smyrna, La Susse sailed under circumstances of extreme secrecy and on August 8th his two line of battleships entered St. George's Bay at Bayrut. He brought despatches for the consuls, and told Colonel Rose that his visit was not connected with the political situation, but by his conversation convinced the consul-general that his government had sent him. In a later interview La Susse told Rose that he had been sent by Guizot as a result of Lord Cowley having said that British ships were going to the Levant, and the admiral added that he had expected to find British vessels in Bayrut on his arrival.³ To both Rose and Adelbourg, La Susse gave it as his opinion that without

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1. Canning to Aberdeen.No.145 of July 7.1842 F.O.78/479.
 2. Canning to Aberdeen.No.156 of July 27.1842 6 enclos.F.O.78/479.
 3. Aberdeen to Canning No.139 of Oct.31.1842 F.O. 195/193.
Cowley had not spoken to the French government on the movement of ships.

union among the powers there could be no settlement of the Syrian question, that all except one agent should be withdrawn, and that the one should negotiate a settlement.

Rose was angered by La Susse's arrival as a factor likely to strain relations between the Turks and the Maronites even further, and although the admiral appreciated this he showed no signs of leaving.¹ The Christians interpreted the arrival of ships as the coercion of Turkey, and besieged the consulates for arms. Rose returned "an admonitory negative" to those who visited him, and it was consequently an extremely embarrassing experience for him when Sir David Dunne arrived on August 20th. He remained only a few days, but the presence of an Anglo-French force had its effect.

So far back as April 7th. 1842, Omar Pasha took firm hold of his courage and arrested Nasif Abuneked, the hereditary Druse governor of Deir el-Kammar and their best military leader, Said Djinblatt the brother of Nalaman, as well as Husayn Talhouk, Shaykh Hootoor Amad and the Amir Ahmed Raslan.² The first reaction among the Druses was to fly to arms and Omar realising his own insecurity in the midst of hostile territory took the bold line and threatened to execute

1. Adelbourg spoke of La Susse's "coup d'état". Rose to Aberdeen Sep.3.1842. Aberdeen Papers. ADD.MSS.43140.

2. Canning to Aberdeen. April28.1842. Aberdeen Papers.ADD.MSS.43138.

the arrested chiefs if he was attacked. The Druses held back and the unfortunates were marched to the bagnio at Sayda.¹

What the Turks achieved by this action puzzled the consuls and the only light the Turks themselves shed on it was to explain that of late the Druses had been insubordinate. Mustapha told Adelbourg that he intended compensating the Christians for their losses, and ultimately to disarm all sects of the Lebanon.² This would partly explain the arrest since disarmament was something the Druses would resist to the last. For the moment the Turks felt the arrest justified, for one of its first effects was to induce the Shehabi to offer Mustapha their services should the Druses attack Omar Pasha in Beit ed-Din. Abdu'llah Shehab asked Rose if he ought to offer his services to the Turks; Rose replied that if the Turks needed Maronite help they would call for it.

On June 7th a small body of Turkish horse arrived in Gazir, heart of the Kasrawan, to arrest some 50 Maronite shaykhs who had refused to sign the petition Omar Pasha was circulating. The shaykhs announced that if they were denied refuge on board the "Inconstant" they would destroy the force sent to arrest them.³ Rose responded that such a movement

1. Rose to Aberdeen. April 8.1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.

368.

2. Rose to Aberdeen. April 8.1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.369.

3. Rose to Aberdeen. June 8.1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.407.

to the ships would cause the Albanians to be sent to the Kasrawan. Any resistance would lead him to request British vessels to leave the coast; if they would submit quietly he would inform Constantinople immediately. Moore took care to explain to Bourrée why Rose had refused refuge to the Maronites and Adelbourg warned Mustapha of the impolicy of these additional arrests.¹ Mustapha was sufficiently impressed to recall the force Omar had sent to Gazir.

The upshot of circulating petitions and arresting local dignitaries was "a general panic and feeling of uncertainty." Many of the wealthy people of Lebanon sought refuge in the convents and on ships in Bayrut harbour. The habit of seeking European intercession spread to the Druses and Na'aman, Said, and Husayn Talhouk entreated Rose to persuade Lord Aberdeen to procure their liberation. Rose forwarded their request but reminded them that "a diminution of zeal in their favour on the part of Her Majesty's Government" was traceable to their own conduct which had made intercession in their favour difficult.² Lord Aberdeen refused to request their release and thought they were in the best place for the present. He advised Rose to inform the prisoners that a general settlement of the Syrian question

1. Rose to Aberdeen. A & P. [1843] LX [C,456] P.428.

2. Rose (unaddressed) May 7.1842 (private) Probably to Bidwell or Addington. F.O.78/495.

would indubitably alter their fortunes and that his unwillingness to do anything for them was irrespective of whether they were pro-Shehab or not.¹

Throughout the country generally there was a marked increase in the number of incidents and in the disorderliness of northern Biqa' and Anti-Lebanon. The desert line swarmed with anazi tribesmen, hovering about the rich towns of Damascus, Hamah and Homs.²

By July there was a desperation in the Turkish efforts to extract the petitions so urgently wanted. Having arrested Druses and having tried to arrest Maronite leaders, the Turks sowed permanent distrust of themselves among both sects. The Druses and Maronites began to make advances to one another, and the local friends of the pasha were slipping from their support one by one. The truth was that the Turkish aptitude for sowing discord lacked that intelligent application which would have made it truly Machiavellian. Druses and Maronites were made inveterate enemies when Mustapha allowed the former to reap the profits of the Maronite estates. But Mustapha failed to utilise Druse support in any practical way, and when he dispensed with it and seized the Druse chiefs, he did so before taking the precaution to make some advances to the Christians. He isolated himself unthinkingly, and instead of

1. Aberdeen to Rose No.12 of Sep.3.1842 F.O.78/493.

2. Rose to Aberdeen. A & P. [1843] LX [C,456] P.421.

repairing the damage by a prompt resumption of good relations with the Druses, made an all out bid to secure the petitions he required while Maronite feeling was sullen but before it got out of hand.

On July 4th, two weeks before Aberdeen finally and formally broke with the past British policy of trying to secure a Shehab restoration Mustapha made his last major bid to get the petitions he wanted.¹ Selim Bey and Ali Bey were sent into the hills above Bayrut to ascertain the opinion of the inhabitants with respect to a governor. At Shuwayfat which was predominantly Druse an assembly consisting of two deputies from every village of the plain of Bayrut was convoked, and to it were submitted two documents for signature. The first was a list of Christian losses at the hands of the ex-prince Bashir. It got many signatures. The second was a petition to the Sultan in favour of Omar Pasha's rule. The leading Druses and the Matawilah signed it as did the Greek Malkites but the Maronite deputies counterpetitioned for the Shehabi. Amir Amin Raslan, the Druse lord of Shuwayfat, who attended the meeting for the purpose of intimidating the deputies, had the men who offered the petition seized. The Maronites, who were in a majority, fled from the meeting. Others, too terrified even to fly, signed the petition in favour of Omar.

1. Rose to Aberdeen. July 7. 1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.422.

The Maronites who fled visited the Seraskier in Bayrut in their hundreds and flocked round the doors of the European consulates, complaining of the conduct of Selim Bey and Amin Raslan. The consuls visited Mustapha in a body, related the events of the meeting, and complained of the choice of Shuwayfat, for the meeting. Mustapha promised an inquiry into Selim's conduct to which Rose could only observe that it was over two months since Mustapha had promised a commission of inquiry on the subject of indemnities would traverse the Mountain.

Penetrating further into the Mountain, Selim and Ali Bey convoked a second meeting, this time at Muklara, seat of Na'aman Djinblatt.¹ They called all Na'aman's vassals, Druse and Christian, from the surrounding Shuf and invited them to petition for Omar's retention in power. The Druses expressed their willingness to sign if Mustapha would release the Djinblatt brothers from the Bagnio of Sayda. Selim promised to ask Mustapha to do so and three hundred Druses rode into Bayrut to press the Seraskier in the matter. Mustapha who was very alarmed managed to evade an interview. The Porte's officers would not openly resist the restoration of a Christian prince should the popular desire for one to be proven but it was still just possible for Mustapha to fall back upon the old expedient of setting

1. Rose to Aberdeen. Aug.6. A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.430.

the sects against one another. Only fear, in Rose's opinion, would stop the Turks from resorting to this plan and it would take a line of battleships to prevent them. If ships did appear however, it would have to be with a specific purpose and not merely to boost Maronite feeling.

By August the representatives at Constantinople mobilised for the attack with the new instructions from their respective governments, which directed them to urge a division of the Mountain.¹ Mustapha's spirits sank as his last efforts misfired and as the Christians sent off a vigorous counterblast to the Porte in the form of 14 petitions in favour of the Shehabi, two being from the Greek Antiochans of Djebail and Batrun, who had heretofore supported Mustapha. In all the Maronite messengers carried 50 documents - petitions complaints and remonstrances. Rose who saw them before they left the country counted 11,673 names. Zahle and a large part of the Kasrawan had still to send their petitions; so had the Greek and Maronite clergy. Many former Turkish supporters like the powerful Hazen family which had mulcted the Kasrawan with Turkish blessing had now gone over to the Shehabi. The Amir Haidar returned in his allegiance to them also.

The Druses manifested their stiffening resistance to

1. Canning to Aberdeen. A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.106
 2. Canning to Aberdeen. Aug.16.1842. A & P. [1843] LX [C.455]
 P.105.

the Turkish dominion in other ways. Like the Muslims and the Christians they viewed the prospect of a general disarmament with dismay and were fully determined that it should not come to pass. When Mustapha tried to draw many of them away from the scene of events by requesting them to give military service in Urfa, Diarbekr and Mosul, there was virtually no response. Husayn Talhouk from his imprisonment informed Rose that he was still pro-Shehab;^{1.} so did Na'aman "the most cunning of a cunning people", adding that he would like to be the lieutenant of the Druses to the Amir Amin and that the Turks would never be able to rule the Lebanon.^{2.}

As the result of an outbreak of trouble in Gazir Mustapha promptly garrisoned the Kasrawan with Albanians. The people sent a messenger to Rose and "as on so many previous occasions, what may be called the usual question was asked... whether resistance should be made to the Turks. I earnestly deprecated it." When the troops reached Gazir they met with silent hostility but no actual resistance; the Turks had effected a long cherished plan and occupied the strongest military position in the country, commanding the coast road from Bayrut to Djounie, and the Albanians were sent into other Christian districts under the eyes of La Susse

1. Rose to Aberdeen Aug.6. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.

430.

2. Rose to Canning. July 26. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.

and Sir David Dunne.¹

Wood in Damascus was more optimistic than Rose and energetically mentioned to counteract the influences making for trouble in that quarter. Shibli el-Aryan had returned to Damascus from an expedition to Homs and Hamah and the people of Zahle feared that the Turks might let him again turn his arms against them as he had done last winter. Wood asked Ahmed Pasha, the successor of Nejb and with whom he had a much easier time, to send a column of cavalry for the protection of Zahle from any surprise Druse attack, and thereby revealed that he too did not know how little the Druses were inclined to bolster the Turkish administration any longer.² The culmination of Wood's precautionary activity was the reinstatement of the Christian Amir Hangiar as Governor of Baabek, a position Wood had secured for him in the first place. Wood intimated to the Amir with greater optimism that Rose could now muster, that moderation and prudence in action were needed to prevent complaints from the peasantry against him, and that in all things he should take his lead from the Pasha of Damascus. But the Amir "did not appear to entertain the same sentiments of respect and consideration for the Turkish authorities which he did heretofore."

1. Rose to Canning Aug.30.1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.440.

2. Wood to Aberdeen, Aug.18.1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.436.

At a meeting on September 15th, and against the background of the approaching thunder of a second civil war in the Lebanon, the European representatives put forward the scheme of division which Aberdeen had suggested to the other courts of Europe but for which Metternich was really able to claim paternity.¹ Like that of May 27th the meeting was lively and protracted with both sides again taking their stand on the reports received from their agents in Syria. Selim Bey, lately returned from Bayrut and called to the meeting by the new Turkish Reis Effendi, Sarim, asserted that the people were generally in favour of the existing system, that the division of the Mountain would lead to fresh trouble and was not popular. The Turks had no objection to the appointment of Kapu-Kiayas representing the sects at the court of the supreme Turkish authority in Syria, but the appointment of a Christian and a Druse to fill the post of qa'immagams was reconcilable neither with the tranquility of the country nor the true interests of the Porte. It was enough to carry on local administration under a senior pasha as it was carried on elsewhere in the Empire, by the village notables.

The representatives repeated the arguments so often adduced; they dwelt particularly upon those contained in Aberdeen's instructions to Canning; and they again complained of the corruption and intimidation used in getting up the petitions for a Turkish governor and feeling the embarrassment

of engaging in a process of mutual recrimination, implored the Turkish ministers to take a more statesmanlike view of the question. Above all, the adoption of the plan now suggested was urged as the only means of bringing tranquillity to a dangerously turbulent province.^{1.}

Every approach to the subject was cut short "by a positive, though not uncourteous, refusal." All that was obtained was an agreement on the part of Sarim Effendi not to make a final decision now but to shelve the matter until the Sultan's personal opinion could be taken. In this suspended state the question remained for a while longer.^{2.} On September 26th the Turkish Council circularised the representatives making much of the improvements they had already effected in Syria and promised the removal of the Albanian, the dismissal of Omar Pasha, the restitution of plundered property, confirmation of the ancient privileges as to religion and taxation. They also offered to nominate Turkish governors over each sect and to allow each to choose a representative who should stay in residence with the supreme authority who

1. Canning to Aberdeen. Sept. 16. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.112.

2. "I am now labouring through him (Riza Pasha) to carry the point of the Druse and Maronite appointments. It is difficult very difficult; but I do not quite despair. On our field day (sic) I was reduced to the necessity of getting privately into the room where he and his fellow-turks had retired, in order to persuade him, and through him, them, to adopt the suspensive answer, which still leaves open a door for success. My colleagues know nothing of this." Canning to Aberdeen. Sep. 17. 1842 (Private & Confidential) Aberdeen Papers. ADD.MSS.

was to be a vizier.^{1.}

Earlier in the year when the Turks refused to accept the return of the Shehabi and the representatives had been obliged to seek their government's permission to suggest the system of a division of Lebanon under Druse and Maronite qa'immaqams, they had been at their wits end for a means of overcoming Turkish stubbornness. The introduction of qa'immaqams would still secure to the Christians the good government they had been promised if the Imperial Divan and the Grand Vizier could be persuaded to allow it, but the appointment of an active Turkish authority over the qa'immaqams would be a limitation of the practical independence to which the sects were accustomed. The representatives were satisfied that the establishment of a supreme vizier in Syria would not alter the theoretical constitutional position since he would merely be assuming the supervisory duties of the Pashas of Sayda who had traditionally, but for many years only nominally, included the Mountain within their surveillance. The practical side of the arrangement however would involve a decided concession to the Turks and an improvement of their hold on the province such as they had not enjoyed since the pre-Shehab era. Further concession to the Turks was tantamount to entire surrender so their desire to appoint Turkish

1. Canning to Aberdeen. Sept. 27. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.112; "Instruction from Sarim Effendi to the Dragoman of the Porte" P.113. Aberdeen to Canning. No.128 of Oct. 24. 1842 F.0.78/474.

officials to the office of qa'immaqam was firmly rejected. Yet if it was rejected what new arrangement could be suggested to the Porte? The representatives in desperation and their well of inventiveness run dry asked their governments to bring pressure to bear on Turkey to appoint local men and not Turks to the Druse and Maronite governorships;¹ they enjoined their consuls to persevere in their efforts to preserve order for a while longer. But it was now too late.

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The Turks in Syria finally precipitated serious trouble between themselves and the Druses by a sequence of petty escapades which revealed the extent of their military incapacity only too clearly. From Gatziflis, the vice-consul in Tripoli, Rose received word that 400 Turkish regular troops had marched from Tripoli into the heart of the Mountain to apprehend the Amir Abdu'llah. They were met by a strong force of Mountaineers which inflicted heavy casualties.² In another engagement on the main road between Bayrut and Damascus a small force of Druses ejected a Turkish garrison thus flouting Mustapha's authority only five miles from its seat. Omar Pasha disarmed 300 Druses of the Abunekeds and by an energetic coup rounded up the Druse leaders still at large. Those who slipped through

1. Canning to Aberdeen. Sep. 30. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.

116.

2. "Report of the Vice-Consul at Tripoli". Oct. 12. 1842 A & P.
[1843] LX [C.456] P.444.

Omar's net went into Biqa' and Shibli was sent out to bring them in under promise of full personal security. Then quite abruptly Shibli himself ceased to be a loyal servant and went over to the Druses.^{1.}

The desertion of the illustrious Druse was a great blow to the Turks, and not even Zahle, which had known the terrors of his siege, could resist a thrill of pleasure at the thought of his grim talents now being brought to bear upon the Turks. Ruchard Wood believed that Shibli should have been jailed long ago, and still thought so, but realised that the die was now cast. His efforts to reconcile Shibli with Ahmed Pasha failed. Shibli wrote in all directions inviting the assistance of the shaykhs of Haouran and the Leja.^{2.}

The consuls were no longer capable of controlling the course of events, and Rose, in an excess of despair, finally gave up the attempt. The immediate reason was Mustapha's declared intention to disarm the whole Mountain. Nothing could be more suicidal, and in accordance with instructions from Canning, and the Internuncio, Rose and Adelbourg were only too ready to decline giving further advice to the Mountaineers as to their conduct.

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1. Wood to Aberdeen. Oct. 26. 1842 Aberdeen Papers. ADD. MSS. 43140.
 " Oct. 27. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C. 456] P. 446
 2. Wood to Aberdeen. Nov. 6. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C. 456] P. 450

The Christians widely reproached the pair with exhorting them to patience and prevailing on them to refrain from hostilities which might have given evidence of their dissatisfaction and in the long run better their condition.

"You induce us to be obedient of the Sultan,
 "but do you induce his authorities to
 "treat us with indulgence, or with
 "common justice? You do not mediate;
 "your influence is one-sided. You hold
 "our hands, but you cannot prevent the
 "Turks from striking us. We have waited
 "too long, we are further off than ever
 "from our object".

Rose became a mere spectator, "as I think the continuation of advice ... to be submissive to the Turkish authority in this country would be useless,

"and in a measure compromise the sincerity
 "or good intention of the advice"¹.

Adelbourg wrote similarly to de Kletzl. "The Porte can

"only blame herself and her advisers; for
 "never was a Power more eloquently and wisely
 "counselled, and never was honest counsel less
 "profited by".

The influential Druses still at large - Amir Amin Raslan the Abdel Meleks and the Talhouks - wrote to the Maronites inviting co-operation for the restoration of the Shehabi². and Omar Pasha replied by seizing the property of the Djinblatts thereby making himself the first objective of the Druses when they rose.³.

As the result of their repulse in the north of the

1. Rose to Canning. Oct. 25. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.453.
 2. Rose to Canning Oct. 28. 1842 A & P. P.453.
 Rose to Aberdeen. Oct. 15. 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43140.
 3. Rose to Aberdeen. Nov. 5. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.455.

Mountain, their expulsion from Khan Husayn and withdrawal from Gazir, the Turkish Troops were confined to Zahle and Beit ad-Din.¹ The force at Zahle was negligible; the 3000 in the Beit ed-Din district were divided between Deir-el-Kammar and the numerous palaces of which Beit ed-Din was almost entirely comprised. The Druse plan was to surround the district, cut off supplies, and reduce the centres of resistance one by one. In early November Shibli el-Aryan moved into the scene of operations with a big force. Already Youssuf Abd el-Melek had cut communications with Bayrut and blocked all routes out of the Deir el-Kammar pocket.² Almost unnoticed, Mustapha Pasha slipped away from Syria leaving in his place as supreme authority Assad Pasha, and there was a strange unreality about the manner in which Ahmed Pasha, of Damascus, after paying his respects to his new superior in Bayrut, was refused permission to return to his pashalik by the direct road in spite of a humble application to the insurgents.³ The Christians now had enough proof that the Druses were sincere in offering to collaborate with them against the Turks, but Rose was convinced

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1. Rose to Aberdeen. Nov. 7. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.456.
 2. Rose to Aberdeen Nov. 9. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.456.
 3. Rose to Aberdeen. No. 82 of Nov. 9. 1842 F.O. 78/496.

that the Christians would let the Druses do the fighting. Mustapha's successor showed signs of intelligence and there was a possibility that the imminent struggle would be brought to nought; furthermore "the Turks are never so practicable as when they are in distress."

Calling once more on the assistance of Adelbourg, Rose visited Assad, but on the day after the interview Assad sent word to the consul-general that Omar was already being attacked.¹ While they had been in conference the Druses were wrenching up the water conduits leading into Beit ed-Din. Assad did not know how to answer Omar's appeal for help, for while surrender was too repugnant to bear contemplation, the Druses had the upper hand.

Omar made a sally against the Druses on November 9th but when they regrouped to counterattack he retired into Beit ed-Din again.² Secret efforts to bring the inactive Christians to his support failed. The Maronite amirs of the Matn ignored his call as did those of Djezin. The weapon of intrigue was blunt beyond further use. Assad made pacific advances to the Druses and told Omar not to take the offensive but merely to preserve his situation. Finally he took the bold step of releasing Na'aman enjoining him to calm

1. Rose to Aberdeen.No.83 of Nov.9.1842 (Confidential) F.O.78/
496

2. Rose to Aberdeen.Nov.11.1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43140.

his people. Na'aman thanked him but refused to take any such responsibility upon himself.^{1.} Shibli and Youssuf Abd el-Melek demanded the liberation of all the imprisoned shaykhs, Omar's dismissal and no conscription or disarmament. Assad boggled at this, but tried to throw Turkish unpopularity back on to the Druses by alleging that the Druse chiefs had been gaoled for their refusal to pay the Christian indemnities. Shibli had an effective retort; he had sufficient documents to show that the Druses had paid out 60,000 purses to high Turkish officers including Selim, Mustapha and the Grand Vizier himself, in the form of bribes.

On November 21st a foraging party from Beit ed-Din was surprised and driven twelve miles in retreat.^{2.} The Druse grip tightened and Deir el-Kammar was evacuated. Forces from Bayrut and Sayda trying to relieve Beit-ed-Din were repulsed with ease. There were now 6,000 Druses engaged in the seige and the Albanians at Bayrut mutinied. It was not until December 5th that a determined march by Reschid Pasha from Sayda led to the relief of Beit ed-Din.^{3.}

At this critical juncture Rose received a despatch from

1. Rose to Aberdeen Nov. 24. 1842 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43140.
 2. Rose to Aberdeen. Nov. 28th. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.463
 3. Rose to Aberdeen Nov. 28. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.465.

Canning authorising him to mention in a circumspect manner to the leading people of the Mountain that the Turks were expecting to give way soon and retract the form of government now in force. Shibli retreated to Rashayya and the conflict showed signs of disintegration. Assad even thought of taking the offensive but none was competent enough to take command. Shibli denied that the struggle could be thought at an end as long as Omar remained in office, but Omar was as good as gone. Now that the struggle was turning against the Druses the Christians offered their neutrality to the Turks under certain conditions. These were that Abdu'llah should get a guarantee of personal security, all Christian prisoners should be released and all privileges restored. Assad accepted their conditions and Rose's prediction that the Christians would not fight if they could bargain, was fulfilled.¹

The Druses retreat into the pashalik of Damascus brought Wood into action once more. On December 13th Shibli surrendered to the Pasha of Damascus on a pledge of indemnity and although many insurgent shaykhs retreated into the wilds of the Djebel es-Shaykh his surrender was an indicative of the end, as his desertion to the Druses had been of the start of, hostilities.²

1. Rose to Aberdeen. Dec. 7. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456]. P.466.

2. Wood to Aberdeen. Dec. 14. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX C.456] P.477.

The unwillingness of chiefs still at large to surrender was justified when Shibli was arrested in Damascus on the day after his submission.¹ Wood who had been looking for an opportunity to intercede between Turks and Druses urged Ahmed to moderate his acts and restore confidence in the Turkish name. Ahmed's argument for the expediency of arresting Shibli were unanswerable and Wood was satisfied with his promise to write to the Porte for a full pardon. A representative of Assad Pasha arrived from Bayrut ordering Ahmed to carry on the war against the Druses but the latter had already promised Wood that he would try to make peace by conciliation. He had given his consent to Wood to invite the Druse chiefs to submit, and to make any arrangements he thought suitable to a realisation of this end. The arrival of Assad's orders temporarily deranged this understanding.²

In interview with the Turks Wood observed that the Druses could scarcely be accused of revolt against the Sultan, when in reality they had only defended themselves against the unaccountable proceedings of its functionaries; that it was generally known the Turks had incited them to exterminate the Christians; that they were surprised to see their chief seized and their safe conducts violated. Wood reminded them

1. Wood to Aberdeen No.87 of Dec.18.1842 F.O. 78/498.

2. Wood to Aberdeen.Dec.26.1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.479.

that Ibrahim had lost 25,000 men against the Druses and that they were running a great risk in attempting a similar feat with inferior means and abilities. The Turks finally agreed that conciliation would be the better policy.

Calling on his Austrian colleague, Merlato, Wood wrote to the Druse chiefs in Anti-Lebanon, many of whom were on the point of removing themselves to the pashalik of Bagdad, transmitting copies of a general amnesty, pledged by Ahmed Pasha. Amin Raslan and Youssuf Abd el-Melek were included in its terms and Misk, who conveyed the amnesty, returned bringing several shaykkhs with him. Wood presented them to Ahmed as they came into Damascus and they were then allowed to disperse to their villages. Many of the chiefs stayed in Damascus as the guests of the British consulate for a few weeks. Wood hoped that Lord Aberdeen would excuse his direct part in bringing about the accommodation with the Druses. "British influence has justly increased, while I have served at the same time the real interests of the Porte"¹.

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Lord Aberdeen's reply to Stratford Canning's plea for assistance against Turkish intransigence, dated October 24th, took a firm line.² The Turkish offers to remove Omar Pasha and the Albanians, to complete the restoration of Maronite

1. Wood to Aberdeen Dec. 26. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.456] P.480.
 2. Aberdeen to Canning. Oct. 24. 1842, A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.
 Aberdeen to Canning. No. 128 of Oct. 24. F.O. 78/474 (112.)
 Aberdeen to Canning. Nov. 24. 1842 Aberdeen Papers. ADD. MSS.
 43138.

property, but as to the appointment of Muslim governors over the Maronite and Druse populations, "Her Majesty's Government cannot be satisfied with this arrangement". The question did not turn as the Porte seemed to think, on the amount of credit to be given to the varying reports received by the Turks on the one hand and the representatives of the five powers on the other, but on the pledge given to the British ambassador by the Porte in 1840 that the ancient rights and privileges would be respected. Relying on this pledge, Her Majesty's Government had committed itself to the people of Lebanon through the agency of British military and consular servants. Britain had therefore become morally responsible for its fulfilment. As it was one of the ancient privileges that the Lebanon should be ruled by locally elected princes, Her Majesty's Government was bound to insist on the Porte securing to the Lebanon the enjoyment of "this most essential privilege". Then came what the ambassador had been waiting for. "Accordingly, Your Excellency is

"instructed to state distinctly to the Porte ...
 "that no arrangement of the affairs of Syria, which
 "shall not include this indispensable provision;
 "will be accepted by Her Majesty's Government as
 "the fulfilment of the pledge given to them by the
 "Porte, in favour of the Syrians, in the year 1840".¹

The news from Syria spurred Canning to great efforts towards securing early acceptance by the Turks of the European

1. Aberdeen to Canning. Oct. 24. 31. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX
 [C.455] P.120.

proposal.

On November 16th the ambassador interviewed Sarim Effendi and pressed Aberdeen's argument, "avoiding any expressions which might be taken as menacing or unfriendly", but in a "frank and warm style" which was not entirely thrown away on Sarim.¹ On the 23rd, it was decided at a meeting which took place at Canning's house that the representatives should again urge the Reis Effendi to call a meeting like that of September 15th, not for the purpose of resuming the struggle, but to declare in the most impressive manner the unanimous decision of all the five cabinets.² Canning declined to present a single statement in the name of all, believing that unanimity could be better expressed by five than by one. His optimism rose once more and Colonel Rose was told to confide to the leading people of the Lebanon the confidence of the representatives that Turkish stubbornness would soon break down.

The Imperial Council weakened before the prospect of another meeting with the diplomatic corps and on December 7th

1. Canning to Aberdeen. Nov. 17. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.124

2. Canning to Aberdeen. Nov. 26. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.126

agreed to appoint local personages to the twin offices of qa'immaqam.¹ Mustapha Pasha who had recently returned from Syria was replaced by Assad Pasha as supreme Turkish governor. Canning dashed off a despatch to Rose the same day in the hope that the news would reduce the amounting tension and elaborated his views on the new settlement later and at his leisure.²

The deliberate exclusion of the Shehabi as candidates for the Christian qa'immaqam was accepted without resistance once the main concession was made, and only de Kletzl the Austrian charge wanted to remind the Porte that their exclusion could only be condition.³ His four colleagues were only too willing to let well alone and to give the new experiment a chance to succeed. It was generally agreed that Aberdeen's tone had won the day proving in Canning's view that "in all which affects the great foreign interests of

"this country the voice of England, when used
 "even to whisper a positive determination is
 "heard above every sound that reaches the
 "ears of the Turkish Council".⁴

In Bayrut Rose communicated the news of Europe's triumph to Assad withholding any expressions of his own satisfaction. The pasha however was of greater mental

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1. Canning to Aberdeen. Dec. 7. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.128
 Aberdeen to Canning. Jan. 6. 1843 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.128
 2. Canning to Rose. Dec. 7. 14. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.135.
 3. Canning to Aberdeen. Dec. 17. 1842 A & P. [1843] LX [C.455] P.132.
 4. Canning to Aberdeen No. 2. of Dec. 17 F. 0.78/482

stature than his predecessors and accepted the news with sincere thanks. The consular corps was unanimous in according Canning the main credit for the new arrangement. Colonel Rose, Moore and Wood were conscious of their own exertions along with those of Adelbourg and, intermittently, those of their other colleagues, in preventing the Turks from proceeding to disastrous extremes. They had brought moderation into the Turkish counsels at vital moments without which the Lebanese might well have been provoked to look for assistance against their sovereign from Egypt.

If the Porte could be induced to apply the system evolved on December 7th with sincerity and efficiency there was a chance that the province which now seemed to be no more than a battleground of factions would become a bastion of strength protecting Turkey from Egypt. But constitutions imposed from above are notoriously unsuccessful and great patience and understanding are essential qualities in the people entrusted with their execution. Unfortunately the Turks rarely exercised these qualities, and as the difficulties of applying the new system emerged progressively it became evident to all but the most sanguine that the moment had not yet arrived when Europe could conscientiously shelve the problem of the Lebanon.

THE BREAKING AWAY OF THE

CATHOLIC POWERS

"Much, if not all, still remains
to be done."

Canning.

CHAPTER 7

It was during 1843 and 1844 that Lord Aberdeen's mention of "a cordial understanding" first struck the imaginations of Guizot and Jarnac¹, and that the Royal Families exchanged visits, yet it would be incorrect to regard these years as a period of friendship or confidence between the two maritime powers. Queen Victoria went to Eu because the political skies were grey, and not because they were blue. Relations were greatly embarrassed by events in Spain, North Africa and the Pacific. The conflict of interests inexorably forced the nations apart, and mutual regard was virtually restricted to the Foreign Secretary in London and Guizot in Paris. Nevertheless the entente, which was a reality to very few, and a political device which ignored the true state of affairs to most people, did get support from one stratum of society. The business class which recognised in war a hindrance to trade and the spread of mutual confidence, who indeed often succumbed to the notion that a foreign policy was dispensable, were the people who secured Guizot's majorities when the Chauvinists

1. Jarnac, Lord Aberdeen, *Revue des deux Mondes*, Juillet 15, 1860. Jarnac was Philippe de Rohan-Chabot, Comte de Jarnac, First Secretary to the French Embassy in London.

threatened to overturn him, and who supported Aberdeen's pacific policy in Britain.

The marriage of the Queen of Spain continued to cast its shadow over the relations of Britain and France and to weaken mutual confidence, but France and Britain came nearest to an open rupture of relations over the extension of a French protectorate over the Society Islands¹ in the Pacific, news of which was published in the French press in March 1843. The power of the British Navy and the net of possessions across the face of the entire earth seemed to guarantee Britain's hegemony on the high seas for an indefinite time to come. That Britain held this enviable position with extreme nonchalance during the administration of Sir Robert Peel did not mitigate the displeasure of France or her navy. That navy continued to be the unhappy foundation on which the immortality of Horatio Nelson was built. The susceptibility of his countrymen obliged Guizot to refuse to ratify the Slave Trade treaty which Saint-Aulaire signed on December 20th 1841. By the treaty Britain would have set up an intolerable inspectorate of the shipping of other nations, and it was not until 1845 that a fresh treaty, less damaging to the French feeling, was devised.

1. J. R. Baldwin, England & the French Seizure of the Society Islands, Journ. Mod. History, No. 10. 1938.

In the course of pursuing a vigorous policy in the hopes of annexation in the Philippines, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf¹, East and West Africa², it was only in the nature of things that France would come into conflict with British interests. Aberdeen was inclined to adopt the view that no reasonable objection could be made to French activity, unless, as in New Zealand, Britain had already staked her claim³. Nevertheless, the crisis of 1844 which almost led to war resulted from the extension of a protectorate by France over a group of islands, over which both Canning and Palmerston had refused to extend a protectorate in the past. The protectorate was not authorised by the French government but once it was established, Louis-Philippe found disavowal of the impetuous Admiral Dupetit-Thouars too dangerous to be attempted⁴.

Annexation was a more serious matter. When Pritchard, the former British consul in Tahiti used his influence with the local Queen to urge resistance upon her and her people, Dupetit-Thouars deposed the Queen and annexed the

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1. Aberdeen to Cowley, No.23 of Feb. 25th 1845 FO 146/280
Aberdeen to Cowley No.37 of March 25th 1845 FO 146/280
 2. Aberdeen to Cowley, No.25 of June 30th 1845 (Slave Trade)
and 44 enclos.FO 146/282
 3. Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 138 of Oct.9th 1843 FO 146/261,
Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, p.351
 4. Guizot, Mémoires, VII, p.56. Moniteur, March 20, 1843.

islands. The arbitrary style in which the protectorate, and after it the annexation were proclaimed, are wholly indefensible¹. Queen Pomare sought neither. Equally indefensible was the conduct of Pritchard. The French Council rejected the annexation and reinstated Pomare, in the teeth of bitter parliamentary opposition, and there is little question that Pritchard would have been warned by Aberdeen had not the ex-consul been expelled from Tahiti under circumstances of extreme ignominy. The announcement in "The Times" of Pritchard's experiences in a French dungeon tinged him with martyrdom.²

"Never since I have been in this country, wrote Jarnac, have I seen anything to equal the excitement which the news from Tahiti has aroused. The religious party took up the case at once. Meetings of the "Saints" have been convened, violent speeches have been delivered all over the country..... Lord Aberdeen appears to be growing more apprehensive daily. He is convinced that some form of satisfaction must be given."³

On May 31st, 1844, the Czar of all the Russias appeared in London with dramatic effect. The moment was highly propitious for the demolition of the entente yet Nicholas failed to accomplish it. The entente, like the Turkish

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1. See Aberdeen to Cowley No.142 of Oct.17th,1843 FO 146/261 enclosing a collection of privately printed papers.
 2. "The Times", July 30th, 1844.
 3. cit. in Hall, p.361.

Empire, contained "a principle of vitality, an occult force", which set at nought all calculations predicting its dissolution¹. Ironically too, the Czar was so much trusted by the British government in the East that he had no bargaining counter to employ in London. Also, the geographical remoteness of Russia caused a doubt as to whether Britain could expect timely assistance from the Czar in any crisis with France. The Czar left London on June 9th, confident, yet with nothing achieved.

Three days before he left, Britain was officially informed that France was contemplating an incursion into Moroccan territory². Representations at Fez had failed to get satisfactory assurances that the irrepressible Abd el Qadr who was skulking in the Riff, would be prevented from preparing new expeditions into Algeria. Bougeaud, the French governor of Algiers was ready to root out Abd el Qadr, but Louis-Philippe was anxious to avoid fresh trouble with Britain. A frontier incident at Oujda on May 30, led to the despatch of Joinville to Moroccan waters with a French squadron, and although Guizot assured Aberdeen that occupation was not under contemplation, and that Tangier, residence of the

1. Aberdeen to Canning, No.9 of Jan.20th 1844 FO 78/552

2. Aberdeen to Cowley, No.179 of June 21st 1844, FO 146/270

European consular corps, would not be bombarded in the event of hostilities, the British government was warned in both Houses that the punitive expedition into Morocco would end in the same way as that against the Dey of Algiers in 1830. When Tangier actually was bombarded¹ Peel fumed that France was "presuming on our weakness in the Mediterranean", and expressed the Palmerstonian view that she was "much more likely to presume upon our weakness than to take offence at our strength".

Aberdeen held firm, and advised against any ostentatious fitting out of ships, but through Lord Cowley represented to the French government that "the attack upon Tangier, after the repeated assurance of M. Guizot that it would be respected in all circumstances, had greatly surprised the British government...occupation of the coast of Morocco could not fail to be viewed in a very serious light by Great Britain, and must lead to evils of great magnitude".

Guizot misinterpreted the full significance of this crisis² in the life of the entente and neither the furious attacks of the French press on Pritchard, nor the caustic comments of "The Times" on Joinville's seamanship before

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1. Aberdeen to Cowley No.241 of Aug.23rd.1844(and 1 encl.) FO 146/272.
 2. Guizot, Mémoires, VII,p.97.

Tangier¹, could induce him to give Aberdeen satisfaction, however modest, on the claims of Pritchard to some form of indemnity. Jarnac approached the King personally, and commented ominously: "M. de Nesselrode is staying at Brighton. He affects to be unconcerned with politics. But it is said that he remains here in order that he may be upon the spot, should a serious disagreement arise between France and England".² The settlement of Pritchard's case by a money compensation was arranged just in time to be announced before the prorogation of Parliament on September 5th, 1844.

The Moroccan dispute was settled soon after. La gloire was satisfied by the demolition of a Moorish army on August 1st, and the bombardment of Mogador on the 15th. Britain's opposition to any permanent advantage induced France to be moderate in her demands. Louis Philippe followed up the end of the crises with a visit to London in September; he wished Tahiti "at the bottom of the sea" but the Queen saw that the entente was irreparably damaged³. Aberdeen could no longer deny what he had long sought to overlook; that "in spite of all calculation it is possible that war may suddenly and when least expected, take place".

1. "The Times" August 21st 1844

2. Hall, p. 365

3. Queen Victoria to Leopold of Belgium, Sept. 15th, 1844, Letters of Queen Victoria

For London and Paris the crisis in the Pacific overshadowed every other consideration of foreign policy and it is not surprising to find that Eastern affairs as a whole, and not just the outstanding problems in the Lebanon, tended to languish during 1843 and 1844. Russia, of course, was entirely free from serious entanglements with any other power, and was able to pursue her policy of friendship and collaboration with Britain in the East undisturbed. The universality of agreement between England and Russia was not attributable to the spirit of friendship alone. It so happened that no question arose in which their respective interests were in serious conflict.

In the Middle East Russian activity was reduced to an annual campaign into Dhagistan, and this was not to be feared since it was only part of a scheme to colonise Georgia with political undesirables. When the guerilla leader Shamil, who disputed Dhagistan with the Russians appealed to Turkey for assistance, Rifa'at Pasha explained that Turkey was at peace with Russia¹. The Czar invariably showed a sympathetic interest in British difficulties in India. At Erzerum Captain Williams and Colonel Dainese concerted as intermediaries with the representatives of

1. Canning to Aberdeen, No.103 of May 25th 1844 and 1 encl.
FO 78/557

Turkey and Persia throughout these years and a treaty was not signed until 1846¹; at Teheran Colonel Shiel and Medem prevented the Sha' from going to extremes and secured his promise to prevent hostilities while the mediation was being carried on.

When in 1844 Canning devised a scheme of frontier demarcation Nesselrode concurred in almost every detail². Co-operation at Constantinople, Erzerum and Teheran allowed the British trade with Persia to carry on without interruption, and Britain responded to Russia's good disposition by refusing to accept Circassian representatives in London. Not even British good offices, it was explained, would be acceptable in a question in which only unconditional surrender would be considered.

In Servia a revolutionary out-break in March 1843 replaced Michael Obrenovic with Alexander Karageorgovic and Lord Aberdeen was informed of the violence of the coup by his consul-general in Belgrade, Fonblanque. Russia protested at the Porte against the coup and demanded that Alexander's position should be regularised by the holding of elections, since his present mode of accession was contrary to those treaties between Turkey and Russia which laid down the principles upon which a prince could be appointed. Turkey at

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1. For Canning's instructions to Captain Williams ,
See his No.23 of Jan.31st,1843, to Lord Aberdeen FO 78/513
 2. Canning to Aberdeen, No.70 of April 27 and 35 encls.FO 78/556
Canning to Aberdeen No.257 of Nov.16 FO 78/563

first resisted Russian demands and Canning encouraged her in this attitude¹. Lord Aberdeen however, took a different view of the matter from Canning; "Her Majesty's Government are under no uneasiness whatever" he said, and ordered Canning to take his lead from Sturmer and to urge Turkey to give way². Russia was not making any demands which existing treaties with Turkey did not authorise her to make. Canning was obliged to withdraw his support, and this seems to have caused him great embarrassment with Riza Pasha, as well as some disagreement with his chief³.

Nesselrode showed Stuart de Rothesay all Butenyev's despatches and went out of his way not only to convince Aberdeen of the legitimacy of Russia's standpoint, but to conciliate Canning⁴. He sent a memorandum to Constantinople for Canning's personal enlightenment, by which it was explained that if the five powers had taken action in the Lebanon on an engagement "purement moral contracté envers eux lors de la retraite de l'armée Egyptienne" it was surely with consistency that Russia should now interfere on behalf of "la nation serbienne" to which she had the obligations of a protector under her treaties with the Porte. The continuance

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1. Aberdeen to Canning No.16 of Jan.31st 1843 FO 195/217.
 2. Aberdeen to Canning No.68 of May 20th 1843 FO 195/217.
 3. Aberdeen to Canning No.65 of May 20th 1843 (Confidential) FO 195/217
 4. Aberdeen to Canning, No.66 of May 20th 1843 and 2 enclos. FO 195/217.

of good relations between Canning and Butenyev, notwithstanding the suspicion of Russia which was instinctive with Canning, was carried into their relations in Syria, and Canning looked more readily to his Russian colleague than to Bourqueney or Sturmer for frank discussion and active co-operation.

On January 6th, 1843, the Turkish ambassador in London called on Lord Aberdeen to inform him that on December 17th the Reis Effendi had accepted the form of government which the representatives of the powers had pressed for so long¹. A few days later the Foreign Secretary received Stratford Canning's despatches and in replying to them expressed his gratification at "the success which has attended Your Excellency's zealous and persevering efforts"². Like his ambassador, Aberdeen believed that the initiation of the system of qa'immaqams would be attended with many difficulties, and would be characterised by the administrative ineptitude which Europe knew so well. On the other hand the Turks had accepted the principle of the solution which Europe had evolved, and it only remained for the representatives to see that she did not default in putting the new system into operation.

1. Aberdeen to Canning, No.1 of Jan.6th 1843 F.O.78/513

2. Aberdeen to Canning, No.6 of Jan.20th, 1843 F.O. 78/513.

Aberdeen's roseate view of the Syrian question was far too premature, and it is surprising to find it shared even momentarily by so experienced a man as Canning. In Canning's case, it was purely a reaction due to a sudden relaxation of tension. The continuous struggle against Turkish obduracy, which had proved fruitless for so long, led him and his colleagues to magnify their achievement of December 17th. In February, 1843, when disillusionment had once again established itself, Canning analysed this volatility between confidence and despair for his chief.

"It is only by temporising, by taking advantage of incidental opportunities, by returning frequently to the charge, by rendering services accepted with no good grace, by overlooking many unpalatable proceedings, and making the most of every fractional concession, that confidence, such as it exists in the East, can be obtained."¹

On the question of how closely the Turks might be supervised in the fulfillment of their obligations in Syria, Aberdeen and Canning were sharply divided. Aberdeen, like Metternich, was averse to any reopening of the Syrian question, and was prepared to trust to the good intentions of the Porte². It was futile to mentor the Turks closely in the hope of securing a model administration. "We must not fix our scale of excellence too high, and we must be content with that

1. Canning to Aberdeen (Separate and Confidential) Feb. 18th, 1843 F.O. 78/516.

2. Aberdeen to Canning, Dec. 6th 1843, Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS. 43138. Aberdeen to Canning, No. 9 of Jan. 20th, 1844, F.O 78/552. Canning to Aberdeen, March 1st, 1844, Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS. 43138.

which in Christian States we could not endure." Aberdeen had no fond dreams of regeneration of the Empire. Furthermore Turkish independence was a reality to him, and he was often troubled by the propriety or otherwise of European interference. The upshot was that Aberdeen strenuously opposed any signs of collective interference in Turkish affairs, at the same time that he was a warm advocate of joint consultation among the representatives.

To Canning this view was false. A triumph arising out of prolonged negotiation was not the signal for a relaxation of effort or a mood of complacency, but for an intensification on the part of the representatives in their attempts to make the Imperial Divan accept further gradual reform as the only means of holding the Empire together. It was the moment to make Turkey realise that Europe's interference resulted from a real concern for her stability. Those persons like the Austrian chancellor who were prepared to allow Turkey to generate fresh problems for Europe to solve were taking a shortsighted and timid view of the situation, and after all "people are beginning to whisper that age is making its inroads on the brightest intellect of Prince Matternich". Interference was not advisable for its own sake, but non interference as a principle was equally dangerous. The Turkish rulers, by their lack of understanding of the great constitutional and

economic problems confronting them, would precipitate catastrophe sometime, and since the repercussions would undoubtedly be felt in Europe, Europe had a right to offer her advice. After all, Canning argued, Turkey was usually the chief beneficiary when ever she adopted the advice of Europe. He averred that the pressure he had ever exerted for internal reform "may be taken as an envelope for the rest" of the matters in which he took an active interest¹.

Already Canning had other matters looming ever larger on his horizon. He was excited by the rumoured return of Reschid Pasha from the Paris embassy to become Foreign Secretary, "a fertile source of conjecture and speculation" at Constantinople. If Reschid tried to return to a programme of reform, a grand encounter with the Grand Vizier could be expected. But Reschid might establish a really good system of intercommunication between the diplomatic corps and the Porte and this was badly needed. In foreign affairs

"the leading questions of general interest during the past year were those of Syria, of Persia, of Greece, of Walachia and of Servia. Notwithstanding some doubtful appearances I am satisfied that the affairs of Mount Lebanon will give no further trouble of a serious Character here...those of Walachia have been settled... The difficulties with Persia are submitted to negotiations the difficulties encountered in treaty with Greece, belong rather to the Greek than to the Turkish Government".²

Servia had become the most important question.

1. Lane-Poole, Life of Canning, II, p. III.

2. Canning to Aberdeen, (Separate & Confidential) Feb. 18th, 1843, F.O. 78/516.

Assad Pasha senior Turkish officer in Syria was entrusted with the initiation of the system of qa'immaqams but the instructions which Sarim sent to him on December 7th, 1842 were sketchy to the point of uselessness. Thus Assad was informed to place a "Maronite over the Maronites, a Druse over the Druses"; the details were left to him. As a result of consultation with the leading Maronites and Druses, he appointed the Amir Haidar and the Amir Amin Raslan as Christian and Druse qa'immaqams respectively, the former taking up residence at Brumana, and Raslan at Shuwayfat¹. Colonel Rose was of the opinion that Assad had made a faux pas by allowing the qa'immaqams to be elected by the sects instead of appointing them himself. As a result the Druses had chosen someone incapable of damaging their feudal position. Raslan was "of good family... but of weak head... one who could only...discredit the new plan". It was perhaps a reflection of Assad's own poverty of ideas that he invited the two men to submit statements outlining what they considered to be the tasks attaching to their office.

Assad was not very communicative and in order to find out what arrangements he had made, or was intending to make, for the government of the Mountain, Adelbourg and Wildenbuch

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No.1 of Jan.1st,1843 F.O 78/535

the Prussian consul called on him in early January¹.

Had the qa'immaqams been appointed; were their spheres of jurisdiction to be geographical, that is to say, over specific areas owned by their own people, or by "nationalité" or religion, that is, over people professing the same religion wherever they might live; would troops be stationed in places under their administration; in disputes between the two chiefs "quelle sera la dernière instance?" Assad replied that the appointments had been made, but that the existence of districts which were not populated exclusively by Maronites or Druses but which contained mixed populations made division into purely Druse and purely Maronite zones impossible. Consequently the Maronite qa'immaqam would rule over all Maronites irrespective of their place of residence and the Amir Amin Raslan would do the same. Troops would only be maintained in the qa'immaqamates by the request of Haidar or Raslan, otherwise they would be quartered in Sayda or Bayrut. In all disputes Assad himself would be the final authority. It came as an unpleasant surprise to Assad's visitors, as to Rose, to find that the Druse and Maronite authorities were not to have distinct territories of their own, and their reasons are not far to seek.

1. Canning to Aberdeen, No.27 of Feb.1st 1843 F.O.78/516

Strictly speaking Assad had obeyed the order to place a Druse over the Druses, and a Maronite over the Maronites, only by adopting a most injudicious method. That part of Lebanon which lay to the north of the Nahr el Kelb was almost purely Maronite, while that part lying south of Bayrut and in the hinterland of Sayda was purely Druse. In between however lay a region peopled largely by Maronites but owned by Druse feudal lords. This region had originally been one of Druse fiefs or maqa'atas in which both lord and man had been Druse. However the rapid rate at which Maronite population had increased led the sect to spread more and more towards the south of the Mountain and into the territory of the Druses. In time increasing numbers of Maronite families became feudal dependents of the Druses. Thus in their maqa'ata the Abunekeds ruled a Christian population while their own people were very few. The position was reversed in a few places but while there were in all only about a thousand Druses under Christian lords, there were roughly twelve thousand Maronite Christians under Druse jurisdiction.¹

The Druse lords in particular were very insistent on exercising their feudal powers, and these included a power of punishment not extending to death, service in time of feud, so many days labour by the peasant on the lord's

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 3 of Jan. 7th, 1843 F.O. 78/535

domain, and other smaller rights symbolic of Druse supremacy and Maronite subjection. The new jurisdiction of the Maronite qa'immaqam cut right across this close relationship of lord and tenant. The Imperial Divan had not prescribed where one jurisdiction should start or the other cease and Assad was quite incapable of taking the initiative himself.

The Druse qa'immaqam was not a person of any great intellectual stature, and held the post which Na'aman, of the chief Druses could have occupied with credit. Raslan's counterpart the Amir Haidar was of balanced character but since the struggles of 1841 and 1842 between the Maronites and Druses his antipathy towards the Druses had grown apace. He now insisted that no Druses could possibly be allowed to live in those parts of the Mountain which they had desecrated, and that they could not have any further jurisdiction over Christians. Raslan and his chief supporters recognised that Haidar was laying claim to Deir el Kammar for the Christians, and this they would never allow. Inspection of the late amir's tax-roll showed that the lords of the maq'atas in or about Deir el Kammar were Druse without exception.

Rose and Adelbourg were disturbed at the fashion in which the two qa'immaqams had brought out party hatred again, instead of calling on Assad to help them repress it¹. They

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No.5 of Jan.7th 1843, F.O 78/535

regretted too that Assad had not thought fit to make a public announcement of the Porte's orders, and that he had made no preparations to support the two amirs. The consuls were not unanimous in their condemnation of Assad's vacillation and, as ever, defection in their ranks allowed the pasha to resist the pressure which might otherwise have been brought to bear on him. Bourrée opposed division of the Mountain on any basis whatever and was at odds with the Maronites for having accepted its principle. He insisted that now, more than ever, was the moment for a return of the Shehabi. Basili wanted the Greek Antiochans to be granted a separate administration and told Moore that he favoured a further dismemberment of the Mountain in their favour¹. Assad was on the point of conceding Basili's request when the other consuls, including Bourrée, intervened to dissuade him. The Antiochans were put back beneath the rule of Haïdar.

It soon became obvious to Assad that the difficulties confronting the qa'immaqams were too great for their mediocre abilities, but in his irresolute fashion he turned his attentions elsewhere and concentrated on the establishment of an indemnity divan to consider claims to compensation which he himself estimated at 100,000 purses². The divan was quickly brought into being and served to divert attention

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 1 of Jan. 1st, 1843, FO 78/535

2. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 24 of March 7th, 1843 FO 78/535

from the perplexities of Haidar and Raslan for a few weeks. Rose attended one of its sessions and found that it worked with unusual impartiality¹. The deposed Bashir al-Kassim was even sent the pistols presented to him by Queen Victoria and which had been looted from his palace at Ba'abda. The Bishops Tubia and Arsenius were quite overcome by the divan's efficiency and the former informed Rose that "what we enjoy of good we owe to Your Government". The Druses, for their part, were chagrined to find the divan making many demands on them for compensation, and Raslan tried to resist the demands made on him personally by turning Muslim, and declaring that Christian evidence could not be advanced in any case against him.

The indemnity divan which entered upon its functions amid the general acclamation of the Christians in late January, was by late February only exacerbating the circumstance it was intended to make at its inception. The principle whereby the Amir Haidar ruled over every Christian in the Mountain, and Raslan over every Druse swiftly showed itself to be unworkable and highly inimicable to the continuance of peace. Thus Haidar told the Christians of Shuwayfat, the capital of a Druse maqa'ata, to obey him and not their feudal lords, the Raslan family. He also demanded that the Abunekeds be excluded from their capital,

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 31 of April 5th, 1843, FO 78/536

Deir el-Kammar. Such demands could only lead to further trouble with the Druses should Assad choose to enforce them, since they were equivalent to dispossessing the Druses of their feudal rights, and even of their lands. The Druses as a whole were indignant that the Shaykh Said Djinblatt, the popular and younger brother of Na'aman had been obliged to stay with the Banu Sakr for safety's sake, and when the "wild boy", as Rose called him, reappeared in the Shuf it indicated that the Druses were preparing to defend their privileges if the need arose. Under pressure from Rose, Assad wrote home for guidance¹.

The emergence of difficulties in applying the system of qa'immaqamates did not destroy that complacency which Canning had manifested at the beginning of the year. On March 1st, 1843, the ambassador had a private meeting with Sarim Effendi², at which he persuaded the Reis to agree to the geographical division of the country where this was possible, and the appointment of municipal officers drawn from the predominant religion in regions of mixed population. Each qa'immaqam was to be paid 7,500 piastres a month and to have sixty paid police at his call. The Turkish troops in occupation of Deir el-Kammar would be

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No.31 of April 6th, 1843 FO 78/535
2. Canning to Aberdeen, No.41 of Mar.2nd, 1843(Confidential)
FO 78/517

withdrawn once the country had quietened down. Sarim promised that the Albanians would be withdrawn and the indemnity divan given every encouragement. Canning wrote to Aberdeen on March 15th, "I entertain a sanguine hope that the affairs of Mount Lebanon may now be considered as really and even permanently settled in so far as they constitute a question between Europe and the Porte". The Porte had accepted his suggestions and it rested on the consuls, acting in accordance with the "cardinal virtues of unanimity and uniformity", to see the arrangements scrupulously applied.¹

On April 10th Assad Pasha received Sarim's despatch informing him of the conversation with the British ambassador. He called Rose to him and proposed that the geographical division should be made, but on the conditions that the Christians in Druse territory should emigrate, that feudal lords with bad records in the late wars should be expelled from their lands, and that the minorities which still remained under Druses or Maronites, such as Matawilah or Greek Antiochans, should be represented at the residence of the qa'immaqam by a vekil. Rose believed these conditions were reasonable and advised Assad to call a meeting of the other consuls to acquaint them with his intentions².

1. Canning to Aberdeen, No. 51 of March 15th, 1843 FO 78/517
2. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 35 of April 10th, 1843 (Confidential)
FO 78/536

Rose felt the responsibility of giving Assad his individual advice but had repeatedly failed to gain their assistance, in his discussions with Assad. The French naval force in Syrian waters had been reduced to one vessel as an indication of France's drawing off from Syrian affairs¹, and even Adelbourg by order of his government was becoming more and more passive². At the meeting convoked on April 11th Adelbourg said that he was unauthorised to offer any opinions. Basili was away from Bayrut, but Bourrée, Rose, their Prussian colleague Wildenbuch and Assad agreed that the geographical division should be effected, and that the vekils should leave the tasks of government to maqatadjis and qa'immaqams. In cases where the vekil sought redress he should go to the maqatadji or feudal lord first, and only proceed to the court of the qa'immaqam if he was denied justice³.

Just as the sectarian division of the Mountain had proved unworkable because of the conflict of rival jurisdictions, the geographical system was endangered by the problem of Deir el-Kammar. That town lay in the territory of the Druses but the prince Bashir Shehab had opened it to Christians and in a very short time it became the most

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 43 of May 9th 1843 FO 78/536

2. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 42 of May 6th, 1843 FO 78/536

3. Rose to Canning, No. 26 of April 30th (copy) encl. in

Rose to Aberdeen, No. 44 of May 11th, 1843 FO 78/536

prosperous town in the Mountain, with a population of Christians outnumbering that of the Druses by four or five times. Thus it could be justifiably be considered a mixed district. With the banishment of Bashir the Abuneked family which owned Deir el-Kammar resumed control of the town. Their repression was of such a nature that prosperous traders like the Sousas sold out and returned to Bayrut. During the strife of 1841 and 1842, trouble had broken out in Deir-el-Kammar first and had led the Turks to garrison the town in the interests of future peace. The initiation of separate Maronite and Druse authorities caused the Maronites to make a serious bid for supremacy in Deir el-Kammar, and the Druses to resist them furiously. Deir el-Kammar was capital of the Druse country, location of a Druse horlvee or religious meeting place, and seat both of a mekkeme (high court) and of the hereditary Druse gadi. There could be no question that the Druses would fight to retain it. Rose therefore maintained that to give Deir-el-Kammar to the Christian qa'immaqams would not only ignore the geographical divisions of the country but would "convert a measure which the Powers intended to be healing and beneficial into one of heart-burning and irritation".

At the meeting of April 11th Assad wanted to set a Christian government over Deir-el-Kammar and Bourrée agreed with him, but Rose and Wildenbuch asserted that the Turks should rule temporarily through Maronite and Druse mutsellims,

ultimately evacuating the town, in accordance with the agreement of December 7th, 1842, and the representatives' instructions to the consuls. Adelbourg agreed to give Rose his confidential support in obtaining a temporary Turkish governor of Deir el-Kammar¹.

Bourrée in subsequent conversation with Rose and Wildenbuch, told them he was afraid of the strictures of the Deputies in France, but gave it as his personal opinion that Deir el-Kammar should in time go to the Druse qa'immagan². Guizot's ministry had already had one serious defeat over Syria, he said, and could not sustain another. Rose suggested that he might help his government by giving the other side of the question and "not put into strong colours the position of the Christians in the Druse country". In spite of his apparent acquiescence in the establishment of a Turkish governor over Deir-el-Kammar, there could be no question that Bourrée, like Basli was not with his colleagues³.

The Maronites in the mixed districts were not attracted by the plan of emigration as a solution of their plight, and Rose thought their fears justified whenever he thought of

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1. Rose to Canning, No.20 of April 30th (copy) encl. in Rose to Aberdeen, No.44 of May 11th, 1843 FO 78/536
 2. Rose to Canning No.27 of May 1st (copy) encl. in Rose to Aberdeen, No.44 of May 11th, 1843, FO 78/536.
 3. Rose to Canning (Private & Confidential) encls.4 in Rose to Aberdeen, No. 45 of May 27th, 1843 FO 78/536

Raslan. Like all the consuls he was concerned for the well-being of the Christians; "everyone is aware of, and is most anxious to ameliorate the position of the mixed Christian population", but in a place like Lebanon "no talent or time could form a plan which would please all; the good of the great majority must be sought and the best that circumstances will admit must be done for the remainder".¹ It was unreasonable to expect the Druses to surrender their feudal jurisdiction yet leave their lands in Maronite hands. He told Canning of cases in the plain of Bayrut where Christians had been Druse tenants for generations; "the mixed population are entirely a working one, holders of ground under the Druse chiefs".

It was this working population in the mixed district which was most in need of some definite settlement. The everyday life of the peasant was seriously dislocated by the general discontent and the Maronite lords were prepared to use this hardship to achieve their own political ends. They pointed out that only by being allowed to transfer their allegiance to Maronite chiefs could the lot of those people subsisting under Druse rule be improved. Thus on May 9th Rose received a deputation of ten Maronites, only two of whom

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No.42 of May 6th 1843, FO 78/536

were from the mixed districts. When he asked why this was, he was told that the other eight were patriots acting for the general good "a denomination which excited my attention". He replied that since the powers had asked for the qa'immaqam system, he could not support their prayer to be released from Druse rule.¹

Although tension between the sects began to manifest itself yet again in ways with which the consuls were now thoroughly familiar², there was no disposition either at Bayrut or Constantinople to urge the Turks into a swift and effective settlement of the administrative problems of the Lebanon. Canning told Rose that "So great are the difficulties which beset this question of Deir el-Kammar that no solution of them entirely unobjectionable is to be expected"³. The Foreign Office archives for the rest of 1843, both consular and ambassadorial devote much space to the pathetic condition of the Christian populace, but do not show that the representatives at Constantinople took a very active interest in the future of the distracted province. There was a distinct decline in Canning's interest, which was undoubtedly due to the apathy of his colleagues. Rose's sympathies were all for the Maronites by September, and he feared that

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1. Rose to Aberdeen, No.43 of May 9th, 1843 FO 78/536
 2. Wood to Aberdeen, No.19 of June 14th, No.20 of June 23rd, 1843 FO 78/538
 3. Canning to Aberdeen No. 206 of Sep.30th, 1843, F.O.78/522.

failure on the part of Assad would make the return of the Shehabi inevitable¹.

On the 9th of September Canning brought his colleagues together in a conference meeting at his house². Adhesion to the geographical basis of the division was again confirmed. As to Deir el-Kammar it was agreed that the town should not be the residence of either qa'immagam, that its Maronite and Druse communities should each have a vekil, and that the Turkish garrison commander, and after him Assad himself, would arbitrate in difficulties arising between them.

But the reaffirmation of a common opinion on the affairs of Lebanon was half-hearted.

1. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 68 of Oct. 10th 1844 FO 78/537

2. Canning to Aberdeen, No. 206 of Sept. 30th, 1843, FO 78/522

THE LAST PHASE

"In Syria we may still hope to succeed, but after what an interval of bloodshed, plunder, confusion and misery."

Canning.

CHAPTER 8

The Syrian question, which hung fire throughout most of 1843, had receded from the immediate vicinity of the Foreign Secretary's attention in the course of that year. The difficulties which had taxed the ingenuity and patience of Europe throughout 1842 were overcome in the December, and the responsibility for supervising the operation of the dual administrations in Syria had been thrown back upon the consuls, with evident sighs of relief.

Lack of precise orders from Constantinople caused Assad Pasha to flounder hopelessly in a morass of problems and to achieve very little in the course of 1843. There was nothing approaching unanimity among the consuls, and in Pera Canning found that "there is divergence of opinion as well here, as in Syria".¹ His colleagues could not be brought to put steady pressure on the Porte in support of the scheme for which their joint efforts had won acceptance. Bourqueney was immovable, the Russian envoy wished to wait until he had had prior conversations with Basili and "the Austrian seemed to be disinclined to take any further part in the discussion of the subject".² It was not until September that Canning

1. Canning to Aberdeen, No. 104 of May 7th, 1843 FO 78/517

2. Canning to Aberdeen, No. 110 of June 1st, 1843. FO 78/519.

brought them together in the meeting whose main decisions were the affirmation of the geographical mode of dividing the Mountain and the exclusion of the town of Deir el-Kammar from either qa'immaqamate. This was the only collective achievement of the European representatives in 1843.

It was therefore with dramatic suddenness that the problems of Syria were conveyed from their natural habitat in early 1844 and placed before the notice of Guizot and Lord Aberdeen by a colourful, though not entirely admirable person known as Murad Archbishop of Laodicea.¹

Archbishop Murad was, or preferred to be, the official representative of the Maronite Patriarch, clergy and nation. He had passed eighteen months at Constantinople prior to visiting the courts of Europe, and had petitioned the diplomatic corps to support the return of the Shehabi to Syria in the person of Amir Amin. He was entirely unsuccessful, and by order of the Maronite people travelled to Paris early in 1844. According to Lord Cowley, Guizot had several conversations with the Archbishop who proposed a restoration of the Amir Amin. Then Murad visited Cowley and would have come to London had not the Ambassador advised him against such a course of action. As an alternative Murad

1. Aberdeen to Canning, No.43 of March 19th 1844 FO 195/229

presented Cowley with a petition to his government, and it was forwarded to the Foreign Secretary in Cowley's despatch of March 4th¹.

Murad's petition reminded Lord Aberdeen that British civil and military officers never ceased to promise the Shehab family a restoration of its traditional rights for its loyal conduct. The Foreign Secretary was therefore asked to support the restoration of the family to its rightful position in the Lebanon. The Foreign Secretary was assured that the French government would give its support to a restoration if Britain would do the same. Murad signed the petition in his capacity as "Réprésentant de la Nation Maronite". Aberdeen replied courteously but firmly that Britain saw the division of the Mountain as the only solution of its great difficulties. Murad sent a second letter in mid-April in which he tried to disabuse the Foreign Secretary of his faith in the qa'immaqam system. The Turks were deliberately hamstringing it by withholding payment from the two qa'immaqams, and, "moins quelques mauvais esprits" both Maronites and Druses wanted the Shehabi back. Murad suspected that Lord Aberdeen was being misled by Colonel Rose's reports. Aberdeen promised an investigation². Not content with this assurance Murad sent a third letter in May elaborating his opinions of Rose, and this was answered with a stinging rebuke.

1. Cowley to Aberdeen, No. 126 of March 4th (copy) encl. in above

2. Aberdeen to Canning, No. 68 of April 30th, 1844, and 2 enclos.
FO 195/230.

"I have read with sentiments which I will describe, the calumnious and unworthy statements set forth... against a Servant of the British Government whose conduct has in every respect entitled him to their fullest approbation; and I grieve that You, Sir, calling Yourself the Intimate friend of Colonel Rose, should have allowed Yourself to be the channel of such statements. It is my intention to transmit the original of that Petition to Colonel Rose in order that he may be acquainted with the names of the Parties who have presumed to address to Her Majesty's Government such base and ungrateful insinuations against him."¹

Although the Foreign Secretary was not disposed even to consider Murad's proposition seriously, he was by no means certain that the archbishop had had a similar reception in Paris². Signs that France and Austria were dissatisfied with the geographical division of the Lebanon were numerous, and since the European governments based their respective policies on the information which their consuls supplied, it is in Syria itself that the divergence of opinions as to the true state of affairs pertaining there, must be sought.

The inability of the consuls to support the geographical division of the Mountain, during 1843, despite their agreement to do so on January 10th of that year, led Colonel Rose to tell Lord Aberdeen at the beginning of 1844 that the

"impression produced on my mind... is that they cannot have instructions to support effectually the Turkish Authority in Syria, and that there still exists a feeling of pique, or ill-will, or deeper feeling towards

1. Aberdeen to Archbishop Murad, May 18th (copy) enclo.3 in Aberdeen to Canning, No. 79 of May 31st 1844 FO 195/230.
2. Aberdeen to Canning, May 1st, 1844 Aberdeen Papers, ADD. MSS.43139

the Sultan's rule here; much may certainly arise from the French, and individual character, but the Agents could not have acted as they have done if they were furnished with instructions at all similar to those of Her Majesty's Servants".

When the Catholic Powers realised that they had given their agreement to a scheme which would cut down the sphere of their influence in the Levant, they began to seek a way out of this position¹.

In the Lebanon Bourrée showed marked unwillingness to unite with his colleagues, and tried to draw Adelbourg to his side. Rose tried to counter by bringing his colleagues together at his house on February 14th, 1844, to give active support to the territorial division of the Lebanon.² Bourrée said his instructions were too vague to allow of any definite action, Adelbourg that his contained no mention of the future of the mixed districts. Both declared that there never had been clear agreement as to what form the division was to take - sectarian or territorial. To show that this was not really the case Rose reminded Bourrée that he had once read out Bourqueney's instructions in which the minister approved the adoption of the geographical division. Had he remembered, Rose might also have argued, with even more effect, that Bourrée had written an enclosure in one of his despatches home in which he professed his support for the geographical system.

1. Temperley, *The Crimea*, p. 192. Rose to Canning No. 17 of Mar. 27th 1844 and 1 encl. FO 195/23

2. Rose to Canning, No. 8 of Feb. 15th, 1844 FO 195/234

Rose did not expect too much from Bourrée for the future; "he [Bourrée] has constantly before his eyes not so much the position of the mixed Christian population as the opposition in the French Chambers". If, as Bourrée had told him, "M. de Bourqueney ... has sent no instructions then I venture to think that the responsibility rests on that Gentleman".¹ Assad told Wildenbuch that Bourrée had asked him to suspend execution of the Porte's orders, and French merchants began to agitate against them, not "sparing either Your Excellency or myself" as Rose told Canning.

The different native parties were also all at odds.² The indemnity divan had atrophied although much work still remained for it to do, the Patriarch had once again taken up the cause of the Shehabi, and a Shehab committee centred on Deir-el-Kammar systematically intimidated those mountaineers who were willing to stay under Druse rule in the mixed districts. As to the Shehabi, their cause was only maintained by the aristocratic Christian families who would profit by a return to power by the Amir Amin or the old exile Beshir Shehab. Rose was convinced that the Maronite peasantry were not so insistent as their superiors on the return of a man who had been "the Nero of the Levant".

1. Rose to Canning, No.14 of Mar.23rd,1844,FO 195/234

2. Rose to Canning, No.27 of May 3rd, 1844, FO 195/234

Assad showed little energy at this crucial time and in an attempt to force him into action Rose visited him sometime near the end of March.

"I made a calm exposition of the whole of his proceedings as regarded the matters of the Government...I finished by telling His Excellency that the universal opinion in which I must reluctantly share was that His Excellency had acted as he had done with the view to the establishment of Turkish Rule in the Mountain. This announcement produced vehement and agitated declarations."

In May Rose had another important interview with Assad. As a result of their last meeting the Pasha had brought the indemnity divan back into vigorous action and it had a good effect on those Christians who were genuinely apprehensive of living beneath a Druse qa'immaqam as well as a Druse maqatađji. Rose suggested that Assad should establish another divan to decide on the boundaries of the maqata's comprising the mixed districts, and to assure the Christians that they had numerous safeguards, even under Druse jurisdiction. They could appeal to their vekil in the maqata's, to their respective qa'immaqam, to the supreme Turkish authority or to the ready ear of the European consuls.¹

The disposition of the Druses to pay off the indemnities and to resume good relations with the Maronites led the Shehab committee to intensify its efforts to achieve a territorial separation from the Maronite qa'immaqam, the Amir Haidar.² Rose was approached by a deputation which

1. Rose to Canning, No.27 of May 3rd 1844 FO 195/234
2. Rose to Canning, No.33 of July 3rd, 1844 FO 195/234

expressed a desire "to enter into the most intimate and friendly relations" with the British Government, but Rose resisted their advance just as his superior had resisted Archbishop Murad. Soon afterwards Halil Pasha arrived at Bayrut, almost the last of the long succession of pashas¹. He was accompanied by Charles Alison, superintendent of the British student-attachés at the Porte, who was now sent by Canning to investigate the claims made by Murad against the consul-general and to co-operate with Rose in exerting "a beneficial influence on the united councils of Halil Pasha and the Pasha of Sidon".²

Canning was in no doubt that "it will be far better to abstain from meddling altogether with the affairs of this Empire than to do so by halves...the question of Syria affords a pregnant instance in confirmation of this remark".³ He and his colleagues had achieved nothing prior to May, 1844, and a meeting at the house of the Internuncio on the 31st of that month showed that their views on the form of government which each wished to see in operation were so utterly at variance that Bourqueney and Sturmer announced their intention of writing home for a revision of the geographical system. Canning argued that the existing system needed fair trial before it was discarded but his pleas were rejected.⁴

1. Rose to Canning No.35 of July 4th, 1844 (Confidential) FO 195/234

2. Canning to Alison, June 12th, 1844, FO 352/26.

3. Canning to Aberdeen No.117 of June 3rd, 1844 FO 78/558

3. Canning to Aberdeen, No.67 of Mar.27th 1843, FO 78/476

4. Canning to Aberdeen, No.119 of June 13th, 1844 & 5 enclos. FO 78/558

The ambassador's account of the meeting of May 31st was sent home in his despatch number 110 of the same day, and was despatched overland through Vienna. Sir Robert Gordon, British representative at the court of Austria, read the despatch and promptly communicated its contents to Metternich. Was Sturmer acting under the orders of his government? Metternich replied that until the present, the Internuncio had not been acting in accordance with his instructions, but that instructions now on the way to him would justify the line he had previously taken. Neumann in London would inform Lord Aberdeen of the nature of these instructions and would explain that the Austrian government had been driven by the reports of its consuls and the Internuncio himself to believe a Shehab restoration to be essential. If Gordon's own account is accurate, he accused Metternich of having no faith in the existing system and told him that his new instructions to Sturmer resulted from his incorrect view of Syrian affairs. Metternich was sufficiently impressed to send fresh orders to the Porte directing Sturmer to support any reasonable proposition for effecting the existing arrangements. If it failed, Metternich hoped Lord Aberdeen would agree to the return of the Shehabi.¹

1. Gordon to Aberdeen, No.46 of June 16th (copy) enclo.1 in Aberdeen to Canning, No.104 of July 8th, 1844, FO 195/231

In Paris, Apponyi met Cowley on the 28th of June and told him he had been ordered to seek French co-operation to obtain a Shehab restoration¹. Guizot had agreed to this, and when Cowley approached him, said he had informed Bourqueney some weeks back that the Amir Amin was the only guarantee of future tranquility. Aberdeen suspected that Archbishop Murad had influenced the French minister and told Cowley to lay the case for and against the Shehabi frankly before Guizot². The family had already proved "a notorious failure", and was mainly behind the present disorder in the Mountain. Copies of Rose's despatches were sent to show Guizot that Murad had been formally denounced by the Maronite Patriarch for professing to have representative powers with which he had never really been invested. Again basing his beliefs on the reports of Rose, Aberdeen said that the qa'immaqams were popular enough except with a small faction. If however, a fair trial showed it to be inadequate, Britain would be ready to try a different solution. Aberdeen's despatch of July 5th had the same effect on Guizot that his brother's remonstrance had on Metternich. Guizot agreed to await the return of Mr. Alison from Syria before sending any new instructions to Bourqueney.³

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1. Cowley to Aberdeen No. 321 of June 28th (copy) encl. 2 in Aberdeen to Canning, No 104 of July 8th, 1844 F.O. 195/231
 2. Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 187 of July 5th 1844 FO 146/270
 3. Cowley to Aberdeen No. 385 of July 29th (Confidential) (copy) encl. 1 in Aberdeen to Canning No. 127 of Aug. 6th 1844, FO. 195/232

In St. Petersburg, Bloomfield gathered from conversations with Nesselrode's deputy, Count Woronzow-Daschkow that Russia disapproved of the attitude adopted by Vienna and Paris, and that Butenyev would not be given any fresh instructions. France was blamed for increasing the difficulties in Lebanon and the Czar was of the opinion that the boundary between Maronites and Druses should be redrawn¹.

Until the return of Alison to Constantinople in August Gordon periodically communicated consular correspondence passing through his hands to Metternich since the Chancellor's information seemed frequently "to be at variance with what has reached Her Majesty's Government". Metternich for instance, claimed that several members of the Divan of the Mountain were willing to receive the Shehabi and that Assad Pasha had asked to be relieved of his duties².

The Capudan Pasha arrived at Bayrut with 6 sail-of-the-line on June 23rd, and within a month had quelled the restlessness in the north of the Mountain, as well as the sporadic outbreaks in Biqa'³. The Shehab committee made great efforts to show that Alison, who came with Halil, had been sent to override Rose and to find out to what extent a

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1. Bloomfield to Aberdeen, No. 75 of July 13 (copy) enclo. in Aberdeen to Canning, No. 120 of July 31st 1844 FO 195/232.
 2. Gordon to Aberdeen No. 56 of Aug. 16th (copy) enclo. in Aberdeen to Canning, No. 142 of Sept. 4th 1844 FO 195/233.
 3. Rose to Canning No. 39 of Aug. 2nd 1844 FO 195/235.

a Shehab restoration would be welcomed¹. Alison's mission took him into all parts of the Mountain and Rose himself staked a great deal on the findings of the attaché; "If the present plan should fail no engagement, to my knowledge, leads Great Britain to interfere further".² Alison returned to Constantinople on August 3rd and the essence of his report was that the Shehabi were not popular among the ordinary people of the Mountain. Alison also told his chief of the injudicious conduct of Foujade who had replaced Bourrée in July when the latter went on leave to France. Foujade's tendency to associate with the most disorderly elements, and his sensational accounts of Turkish defeats in different parts of the Lebanon led Canning to declare that "the corps consulaire are beginning to feel ashamed of this sorry bungler; for villainy itself, when successful, enforces a certain degree of admiration". When Canning complained to Bourqueney of Foujade's conduct, the ambassador did not answer except to lament a change in Canning's attitude towards him³.

Canning found Sturmer unwilling to exercise the patience his superior had urged upon him under pressure from Sir Robert Gordon⁴. Rather illogically, the Internuncio said

1. Rose to Aberdeen, July 10th, 1844 (Private & Confidential) Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43140.
2. Rose to Canning, No.42 of Aug.27th 1844 FO 195/235
3. Canning to Aberdeen, Aug.17th 1844; enclos.Extract Alison to Canning(undated) Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.43139.
4. Canning to Aberdeen No.134 of July 2nd,1844 FO 78/559

that if the present system was successfully applied he would support it. Canning found this attitude "too decisive to leave any room for discussion". Conversations with Rifa'at Pasha revealed that both Sturmer and Bourqueney had visited the Reis, the former to state that Austria would support the present system but giving it as his opinion that "cet arrangement parait impraticable", while Bourqueney asked for a "Chef Maronite", and suggested that the old amir Bashir Shehab would probably increase the tribute to the Porte. Canning lamented that he was "really at a loss to know what more can be done". In despair he turned his eyes upon "that zealous public servant", Colonel Rose.

The final scene in Syria came on September 2nd at a time when the affairs of the distracted province seemed to be in as great a state of flux as ever. To a convocation of the deputies of the Mountain, Halil Pasha announced his intention of applying the geographical division. There was nothing new in a declaration which had been made with a frequency bordering on monotony by Assad, but on this occasion the assembly which was the biggest since Wood's council of the Mountain in September 1841, was persuaded to accept the principle and all its attendant details. There were two main explanations for Halil's success¹.

1. Rose to Canning, No.44 of Sept.2nd 1844 FO 195/235.

The first was Adelbourg's unqualified support for Rose and Halil. He was brought to declare his personal opinion at the time of Alison's visit, and had given the charge a despatch to take back to Sturmer for him. Adelbourg was notoriously antipathetic towards the Patriarchal and Shehab parties although he never showed this in his official capacity. Adelbourg told Alison and Rose that if he gave his true sentiments on Syria he "should have on his back all the old Catholic women at Vienna, the Maronite Patriarch and others". (Rose to Aberdeen, August 11th, 1844, Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS.43140) In the despatch to Sturmer he stated that the rejection of the Shehabi by the people had been conclusive and that the Turks could keep order by consistently supporting the qa'immaqams if they tried. Rose thought the despatch would enable the Austrian government "to assume a very reserved position as to the Shehabs, or abandon them altogether". The opinion of Adelbourg added to his own, and that of the Prussian and Russian consuls would show that "the case of the Shehabs' was not one on which a great and prudent Government ought to found a change of policy". Before the meeting of September 2nd Adelbourg warned all Christians who visited him that he would give no countenance to frivolous complaints against

the system, and in more kindly fashion told them they had nothing "de quoi se redouter".¹

The resignation of the Bishop Tubia from the assembly of deputies on the very day upon which Halil met the assembly caused great dismay among the Maronites who regarded him as their foremost spokesman, and great delight to the Turks. Rose who advised Halil to accept Tubia's offer of resignation observed that "the neck of the opposition is broken, the leader of it is gone". Why Tubia resigned it is quite impossible to say but it is regrettable to find that Rose, who customarily abhorred the spirit of intrigue, was in this instance party to an understanding with the Turks by which Tubia was paid the arrears due to him as a member of the Divan. The timing of Tubia's payment was such that it can only be considered in the light of a bribe².

To the assembled deputies Halil explained that the Porte was willing to pay three quarters of the money still owing to the Maronites by the Druses. The mixed districts were allocated to the jurisdiction of Haidar or Raslan according to whether they were Christian or Druse owned. When the Christian deputies were given an opportunity to state their objections they enlarged chiefly on their fears of the Druse

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1. Rose to Canning No.45 of Sept.3rd,1844 & 3 enclos.FO 195/235
Rose to Canning,Sept.3rd 1844(Private & Confidential)
FO 195/235
Rose to Canning No.46 of Sept.5th,1844,FO 195/235
 2. See Rose to Canning,Sept.3rd,1844 (Private & Confidential)
Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43140

qa'immaqam, but Assad recounted the number of safeguards available to them.

For a while after September 2nd the Shehab committee tried to intimidate Christians in the mixed districts into a rejection of Druse rule, and both Adelbourg and Tubia were pilloried for their defection from the cause of the aristocratic Maronite families¹. Poujade disapproved of the encouragement given to the Christians to emigrate. The Yezbekies and the Maleks disappointed from their exclusion from high office, sought to make trouble.

Nevertheless the great majority of the people of all sects welcomed any settlement, and the present one did not seriously alter the lot of people living in areas of unmixed population. Significantly, the Shehabi were never once asked for at the meeting and the fact struck the consuls very forcibly. The Djinblatts were still, as ever, very popular with their tenantry and when Halil gave resolute support to Haidar and Raslan he found that it worked like a charm. "If the Turks would only act with fairness", Rose said, "and France not interfere, I think affairs will go on well here".²

1. Rose to Canning, No.51 of Sept.22nd 1844 (Confidential)
FO 195/235. Rose to Canning No.52 of Sept.23rd,1844
FO 195/235.

2. Rose to Aberdeen Sept.10th,1844 (Private) Aberdeen Papers,
ADD.MSS.43140.

At Constantinople Canning was the recipient of the Porte's congratulations, and elatedly informed the Foreign Secretary that "the long pending question of Mount Lebanon might be considered as brought to a satisfactory termination"¹.

Although Metternich notified Adelbourg of his approval of his conduct, the Catholic Powers did not accept the sentiment lightly and in the course of 1845 fought a desultory rearguard action on behalf of the Shehabi². Thus in February 1845 Lord Aberdeen received a confidential letter from Reschid Pasha the new Reis Effendi, informing him that Bourqueney had lodged a protest against the Lebanon settlement and had drawn Turkish attention to a pronouncement of Guizot's in the House of Peers on January 12th in which that minister had said, "La paix est dans l'unité du pouvoir, en dehors de l'unité, il n'y a que désordre et guerre"³.

In May, there was a third and last effusion of blood in the mixed districts⁴ and Rose set the seal on his personal record in the service of the sects by leading a column of six hundred Christians from Abbaye through the heart of the Druse country to Bayrut and safety⁵. By September Canning found the

1. Canning to Aberdeen, No. 203 of Sept. 17th 1844 & 1 encl.
FO 78/561.

2. Jarnac to Aberdeen, Jan 12, 1846. Aberdeen Papers, ADD.MSS.
43133.

3. Canning to Aberdeen, Feb. 6th, 1846 (Private & Confidential)
Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43139.

4. Rose to Aberdeen, No. 111 of May 3rd 1845 FO 78/597.
Rose to Aberdeen, May 4th, 1845. Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS.
43140.

5. Rose to Aberdeen, May 13th, 1845. " " " " 43140.

entire Empire quieter than at any time within his recollection. Disarmament was progressing in the Mountain, and in December the incompetent Raslan was dismissed. In November Bourree returned to duty in Bayrut and when Colonel Rose complained of Guizot's latest instructions, the consul revealed the true reason for French resistance when he explained that "the despatch you allude to was written to quiet our Chambers; we have not your admirable system of Private and Confidential letters which rectify or qualify a public despatch".¹

Within a short period of months the existence of the two zones within the Mountain had been widely accepted, and the ga'immaqams had gained valuable experience in the technique of working in collaboration with the maqatadjis who ruled in their own territories in accordance with the traditional feudal methods, as well as with the vekils who represented the minorities living within the maqa'atas.

In July 1846 the Earl of Aberdeen sent to his consul-general in Syria a despatch couched in terms of appropriate finality.

"Happily the Lebanon is now tranquil and everything appears settled, which I certainly very much attribute to your own exertions; so that your great object now will be to keep matters as they are... You will have been informed of the recent dissolution of Sir Robert Peel's Government and the return of the Whigs to office."²

1. Rose to Canning, No. 101 of Nov. 30th, 1845 FO 195/251

2. Aberdeen to Rose, July 4th, 1846 Aberdeen Papers ADD.MSS. 43140.

CONCLUSION

The Treaty of July 13th 1841 ended a decade in which the territorial position in the East had been in portentous suspense. Had the Pasha of Egypt been able to prosecute his designs successfully, the threat to the security of British India would have been profoundly felt both in London and Bombay. It is extremely difficult, and fortunately not very necessary, to assess how justified a man like Palmerston was when he laid it down as a principle that the alternative route to the East could never be allowed to pass into the hands of a power able to use it to the disadvantage of Great Britain. It is enough that he believed in his principle whole-heartedly, and that the majority of his countrymen followed his example.

The Straits Convention brought about a great release of tension in Europe, but it did not reduce the Pasha's thirst for power or France's friendship for him. The Turks, for their part, remained embarrassingly incorrigible, and made it difficult for a person of Aberdeen's sensitivity to believe in Turkish inviolability as a matter of right with very much enthusiasm. However, Britain's own strategic interests in the Near East made it easier for her to be all-forgiving and to hope, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that Turkey might be persuaded along the path of enlightened reform and technological progress. Stratford Canning embodied this dual attitude of Britain towards Turkey; the distaste for her stark medievalism and frequent brutality, yet the concern for her existence as the one alternative to a scramble for power in the Levant which would certainly lead to war in Europe.

The sudden growth of British interest in Syria after 1840 was the measure of Britain's undiminished concern for Ottoman integrity. The fragmentary picture which was built up from consular reports was never reassuring, and was rendered more alarming by its very incompleteness. The half-rumours of new schemes on the part of Muhammad Ali, and the suspicious conduct of foreign agents, prevented Britain from withdrawing her interest from Syria at the same time that she withdrew her naval squadrons. The buffer between Sultan and Pasha contained elements which were respectively responsive to one side or the other; it had been handed back to the Sultan, but the Pasha had known the pride of possession. The immense influence which France exercised in Lebanon made it inevitable that Britain should try to counteract it, at least temporarily, until the territorial position became stable once more.

Palmerston, and after him Aberdeen, fell back on the technique which is customarily associated with the name of George Canning, and collaborated in diplomacy, as far as they were able with the power whose independent policy they feared most. Collaboration at Constantinople was more difficult than it was in London or Paris; in Syria and between the consuls it was frequently impossible.

This desire to prevent isolated action on the part of France led Britain to take an abnormal interest in the fate of the people of Lebanon, and to bring Russia into association with herself. The result was that for almost five years Europe, and Britain in particular, gave no small part of its attention to devising a form of government for Lebanon. The unreality of a protracted constitutional struggle, fought on behalf of a motley collection of illiterate sects is largely attributable to the persisting belief in western Europe that a constitution was the cure for all ills - a belief which was

an unconscionable long time a-dying.

Britain stood forth for a division of the Mountain into Druse and Maronite zones, only partly for the benefit of the sects. If Aberdeen himself did not deliberately attempt to reduce the influence of a Catholic power in Lebanon, there can be no doubt that this was one of Colonel Rose's motives, and Rose's opinions carried great weight with both Canning and the Foreign Secretary. Prussia, the other Protestant power, followed Britain's lead steadily. Metternich, who originated the idea of division, only abandoned it when he saw its effect on the position of the Catholic powers in Syria. To Metternich the issue was not really of intrinsic importance, but the deterioration of Anglo-French relations and the drawing together of Britain and Russia probably had its effect, and drove him to seek a counterbalance as was his practice.

By the ultimate division of the Lebanon, the prime cause of further trouble in the distracted province seemed to have been removed. Political division gave some guarantee of peaceful relations between Maronites and Druses and reduced the probability of isolated French intervention. Once this was achieved, there was a perceptible decline in British interest. She could afford a certain amount of complacency now. After the Turkish surrender in December 1843, and the acceptance of the principle of division, the burden of seeing the system put into effect was largely thrown upon the consuls. The Protestant bishopric was not intended by Aberdeen as an answer to the French missions. The possibility of a connection with the Druses was cut short by the fall of Palmerston; and when the Druses themselves alienated Colonel Rose by their guilt in the civil war, theirs was a lost cause.

The settlement, which was not resolutely applied until 1845 was ominously unsuccessful at first, and Aberdeen and Canning were even ready to countenance the return of the Shehabi. Then gradually it fell into gear, and by 1848 was justifying itself. The Druses never forgave Britain for depriving them of Deir el-Kammar, and the Turks lost all direct access to the Mountain, but a Bashir or a Djezzar was no longer needed to keep order. The civil war of 1860 sprang from economic causes, and was in some measure a blow struck against the feudal edifice. Europe's influence had been beneficent, as Professor Temperley has said, but this was in spite of Europe. It is difficult to resurrect these five years of miserable conflict and intrigue, as he has done, into "a notable achievement in international control."

In later years no effort was made to challenge the local ascendancy of France. The work of the missions carried on and grew, thanks to the aid of the French government. French diplomatic intervention helped to secure recognition by the Ottoman government of one after another of the Uniate churches, and in many ways to promote the interests of Catholic foundations. The French protectorate over the Catholics in the Holy Places was given formal recognition at Berlin in 1878; and in the same year the Prefect of Propaganda at Rome instructed all Catholic authorities in the Levant to conduct their dealings with local authorities through French representatives. Similar statements were made in 1880 and 1888.

The growth of anti-clericalism in France and the separation of Church from State in 1906 made no difference to policy. French governments of whatever complexion recognised that anti-clericalism was not for export. It was the existence of a French tradition which led to part of the Syrian coast being excluded from the scope of the promises of Arab independence made by the British government to the Sharif Husayn, which

caused Syria and Lebanon to be assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and helped to form the decision of the peacemakers to confer the mandate on France.

Even if tradition rests on legend it cannot be ignored. There is no room here to say what historical rights are and whether they exist. But the historical connection has helped to determine the emotional attitude of France towards Syria and Lebanon, and to mould French policy. The French tradition both prior and subsequent to the 1840's must be of significance to all those to whom history and tradition have meaning.

APPENDIX A.MOVEMENTS OF THE CONSULS DURING THE EGYPTIAN EVACUATION

The British consuls in N. Syria in 1841 were three; N.W. Werry at Damascus, F.H.S. Werry his son in Aleppo, and Niven Moore in Bayrut. All had been ordered out of the country by Ibrahim during his struggle with the British, Austrian and Turkish forces, and for good reasons. The consul was a mine of local information and intelligence, and to him all informers against Ibrahim naturally gravitated. They were therefore admirably suited to supply to the small land force sent against Ibrahim the very information it needed - news as to the changing attitude of the sects and tribes towards the Egyptians. Had the consuls reported that these people were solidly for Ibrahim, the expedition would not have been able to attempt a march against him without additional troops being sent to join them from Europe. The consuls were able to take the local pulse as it were, and to observe an ever-increasing resistance towards Ibrahim.

N.W. Werry was put under surveillance in Damascus by Ibrahim's order soon after hostilities began, where he passed all October, then was ordered to Bayrut by Sharif Pasha under instructions from Egypt. (N.W. Werry to Palmerston, No.1 of Nov.5, 1840. F/O.78/410.) In Bayrut he still managed to keep Stopford and Napier informed as to Ibrahim's strength,

while he claimed the credit for bringing Sharif Pasha to the Sultan's side. Moore had tried to get Sharif to cooperate with the Druses of the Shuf, Hasbayya and Rashayya, thereby offsetting the efforts of Baudin the French cancellier at Damascus who had worked on the Greek Catholics just as assiduously, only to get them to fight for Egypt. Werry's son, in Aleppo, with a flare for the dramatic possibilities of the situation as well as a disregard for Soliman Pasha's order of the day and its death penalty for spying, had been in the habit of sending his despatches out of Aleppo folded differently from the usual style in order to conceal their true nature. The Egyptians caught him at his game, and escorted him to the coast (F.H.S. Werry to Bidwell (Separate) Nov.4, 1840. F/O.78/412); Hays, the vice consul of Alexandretta was "forcibly expelled" (Vice Consul Hays to Bidwell (Private) Nov.9, 1840. F/O.78/412. F.H.S. Werry to Ponsonby, Dec.17, 1840, in F.H.S. Werry (Private) to Bidwell, Dec.17, 1841. F/O.78/412) and Barker of Souedeia with him. The three took refuge on the "Magicienne" which took them to the sunny remoteness of Larnaca in Cyprus to await their return to active duty. The Bayrut Consul, Moore, was allowed to stay at his post by the Egyptians and only quit it of his own accord on September 7 to avoid the discomfort of the imminent bombardment which began on the 9th. Only then did he send his family to Cyprus. He was only away from his post a month, a month passed on board ship in Djounie Bay, yet within sight of Bayrut the whole time.

On October 9 the Egyptians withdrew and Moore returned to his post to find his residence destroyed and his property largely gone. (Moore to Aberdeen (Private), Oct.9, 1841. F/O.78/449). His archives were intact. But if Ibrahim could afford to leave Moore alone, if he only ordered N.W. Werry out of the Holy City and if the Aleppo consul and his subordinates of English origin were marched to the coast only to be liberated there, there was one man whom Ibrahim would have dearly liked to apprehend. He put a price on the head of Richard Wood. (Hays to Bidwell (Private) Nov.9, 1840. F/O.78/412).

Ponsonby's dragoman was originally sent to the coast of Syria in 1840 to collect information on the state of feeling in the Mountain. There were so many rumours and conflicting stories, when what was wanted was a knowledge of the facts, that Wood was sent as a person of long residence in the East and having many contacts in Lebanon (Ponsonby told Palmerston that "no man has half the knowledge of the general and particular state of parties and individuals in that country which is possessed by Mr. Wood". (No.161 of May 12, F/O.78/433), with the ability to interpret what he saw with accuracy. Wood had to provide information which would be of value to Stopford as well as to Ponsonby and this he did to the entire satisfaction of the latter. "Mr. Wood's letter contains more solid information on the affairs of Syria, than all the other accounts put together; it states facts instead of vague

suppositions." Put ashore from the "Cyclops" in July 1840 at Zouk and Djebail he learned of the progress of the insurrection; he landed in Bayrut itself but was not allowed through it to the hinterland; he made two visits to Tripoli on the "Edinburgh". Moore referred to his activity in guarded terms. "The Edinburgh is gone down to Tripoli, taking the passenger who came down by the Cyclops." The main result of Wood's reconnaissances was the decision that the moment was right for the attack on Ibrahim, and by the time Bayrut was bombarded Wood believed that through his own personal efforts "every individual mountaineer" knew of the British plan of campaign. The Patriarch and Bashir el-Kassim were requested to succour the levée en masse.

PART 1. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, AND COLLECTIONS
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- FO 78 : Despatches to and from Constantinople 1832-46
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 - : Despatches to and from the British Consuls in Aleppo, Bayrut, Damascus and Jerusalem 1832-46
 - : Correspondence to and from the British Consul-General in Egypt 1841-46
 - : Correspondence between the Turkish Ambassador in London and the Foreign Office 1841-46
 - : "Domestic, Various". Volumes containing interdepartmental correspondence with the general public. 1841-46
 - : Consular, Domestic". Volumes containing interdepartmental correspondence relating to the consuls and the consular service.

B. Archives of the British Embassy at Constantinople in the Public Record Office

- FO 195: Despatches to and from Constantinople
- : Despatches to and from the British Consul-general in Syria 1841-6
 - : Despatches to and from the Consuls in Aleppo, Bayrut, Damascus and Jerusalem. 1840-46

C. Archives of the British Embassy at Paris in the Public Record Office

- FO 27 : Despatches to and from Paris 1841-46
- : Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the French representative in London

FO 146: Despatches to and from Paris 1841-46

D. Archives of the British Embassy at Vienna in the Public Record Office

- FO 7 : Despatches to and from Vienna 1841-46
- : Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Austrian representative in London

E. Archives of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg in the Public Records Office

FO 65 : Despatches to and from St. Petersburg 1841-46
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FO 83 : Consular Exequaturs (Vol.1984), Consular Commissions (1220, 1221), British Orders, Bath, military (937)

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FO 96 : Minutes, Memoranda etc. of Lord Palmerston (Vols.17, 18,19,20)

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
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The
LEVANT ROUTES
 to
PERSIA & INDIA
 ▨ Over 6,000'
 ○ Over 600'
 400 MILES

