THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNAL RELATIONS WITH
REFERENCE TO SOME OF THE MAIN HISTORICAL
TREATMENTS.

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

The introduction consists of a brief statement of the points at issue between the doctrines of internal and external relations together with the programme to be followed in the following chapters. I have tried to make it clear in the introduction that my main concern in the following chapters will be with **proffering a critical estimate of the doctrine of internal relations** whose claim regarding the internality of all relations seems to me to be unjustified.

In the first chapter I have tried to show that Aristotle's treatment of the concept of relation contains in an implicit form the seeds of the doctrine of external relations. An attempt has also been made to show that the origin of two important views which the supporters of the doctrine of external relations claim that the internalists contradict can be traced in the writings of Aristotle. These are that relations are not qualities and that they do not always belong to the essences of things.

In the second chapter a refutation of the arguments of Bradley, the chief exponent of the doctrine of internal relations, will put us in a good position to reject the doctrine of internal relations.

I have tried to establish in the third chapter that the arguments employed by the internalists other than Bradley also do not stand the test of criticisms.

In the conclusion I have reiterated my claim that it is impossible for all relations to be internal. I have also made it clear that I shall not try to answer the question whether, granted this, relations would be all, or only some of them, external, since my chief concern in the present paper is with denying the internality of all relations.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of external and internal relations has received considerable attention from philosophers in modern times. Much has been said in support of the one or the other view of relations. The reason why these modern philosophers have shown so much interest in this issue is primarily this, that this issue is closely connected with two important ontological theories, viz., monism and pluralism. The doctrine of external relations, which is advocated by the pluralists has two different forms, a moderate one and an extreme one. According to the extreme one _any_ relation that _anything_ has to any other thing is external. According to the moderate one not all relations are external, but some are internal. The remaining alternative is the doctrine of internal relations, according to which _all_ relations are internal.

I feel that our ideas on relations owe a great deal to the facts revealed in the course of discussions of the theory of internal relations by its exponents. Yet I cannot find myself in agreement with the theory of internal relations, although I feel that the more plausible view is the moderate form of the doctrine of external relations to the effect that some relations are external and some internal. In what follows I shall therefore try to make a critical

evaluation of the theory of internal relations as it is
upheld by its chief supporters.

But in our attempt to make a critical evaluation
of the doctrine of internal relations we shall meet at
the very outset a great difficulty.   The difficulty is
that of finding an unequivocal statement of the doctrine
of internal reltaions.   As Ewing pointed out, (cf. 'Idealism'
by A. C. Ewing, 1934, pp. 117-194) there are at least ten
different meanings of 'internal relation'.   Research might
find out more.   But we might anyway try to find out some
central meaning of the theory of internal relations.   And
we might roughly (without entering into the controversies
arising out of the technical use of certain terms) distinguish
between the theories of internal and external relations in
the following way.   According to the theory of internal
relations the terms of the relations are necessarily related,
so that if they did not have these relations they would not
be what they are or would be other than what they are.
According to the doctrine of external relations not all
relations are necessary, at least some, if not all, relations
being such that if the terms did not stand in them, they
would still be what they are.

My main concern in this paper will therefore be,
as it is evident from what I have said so far, not so much
with settling the issue of internality and externality of

relations and deciding whether all relations are external
or whether some are, as with examining the claims of the
interalists to the effect that all relations are internal.

In making a critical estimate of the doctrine of
internal relations we shall depend a great deal on the
criticisms of the doctrine advanced by the externalists.
In course of the exposition we shall try to show that two
very important views held by the chief exponents of the
theory of internal relations, namely that relations belong
to the essence of things and that they are properties or
qualities of things, are completely wrong.   Pluralists
who support the externality of relations have tried time
and agian to point to the falsity of these views.   Explicit
formulation of the pluralists' view that relations do not
always belong to the essences of things and that they are
not qualities of anything can be found in the writings of
contemporary philosophers like Moore and Russell.   But the
origin of the views can be traced as far back as the writings
of the philosophers of the earliest days like Aristotle.

At the beginning of the paper we shall therefore
devote a considerable time to discussing Aristotle's views
on the nature of relations.   We shall pay this special
attention to Aristotle's views on the nature of relations
not only for the above reasons but also for some other
reasons.   Firstly, many of the criticisms directed against
the internality of relations show a strong similarity to,
if not influence of, Aristotle's views on relations.

Secondly, many of our criticisms of the theory of internal relations bank a great deal upon the concpets of essence and accident, a fair treatment of which concepts directs us necessarily to Aristotle's views on them which we are forced to discuss in revealing Aristotle's views on the externality of relations.

In the course of our exposition we shall also consider some of the main arguments as these are proffered in some of the main historical treatments of the theory of internal relations. We shall examine first the arguments proffered by Bradley in support of the internality of all relations and then the arguments employed by philosophers other than Bradley like Bosanquet, Joachim, Ewing and Blanshard in support of the same view. We shall devote our second chapter to the examination of Bradley's arguments and our third chapter to the examination of the arguments presented by philosophers other than Bradley. We shall end our paper with some concluding remarks.

Italics used in the quotatioms at various places of the paper are always, unless specified, those used in the original.

I shall use two kinds of footnote in the following chapters, one kind introduced by asterisks, the other by numbers. Those introduced by numbers will be used exclusively for giving page references of the quotations used.

CHAPTER I

ARISTOTLE'S TREATMENT OF RELATION[*]

Aristotle's discussion of the concept of relation is one of the oldest ones available on the subject. And it is very interesting to note that even such an early discussion contains in an implicit form the seeds of the doctrine which later on emerged as the doctrine of external relations. The objective of this chapter is to expound and examine Aristotle's discussion of the concept of relation and finally to show the insight with which he carried on the discussion.

Aristotle described relation as a category. According to Aristotle categories are the highest kinds of predicates and equally highest kinds of being which we recognise, the kinds of what things are.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to give a complete account of all the categories named by Aristotle. It is sufficient for our present purpose to go into some detail only with two main categories, namely, quality and relation. Aristotle discussed the categories

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[*] Quotations used in this chapter from Aristotle's work, 'Categories', are from the translation of that work by J.L. Ackrill. Other quotations from his various works are from the Oxford Translation of his works.

mainly in the logical works known as the 'Organon' and in the metaphysical work called 'Metaphysics'. Therefore, in our account of the categories, we **shall rely** mainly on these works. We shall start our discussion of the categories with an account of the category of substance.

Substance: Examples of substance are man, horse, etc.

In the 'Categories' **Aristotle** distinguishes between two kinds of substances, namely, first substance and second substance. First substance is the concrete individual thing which forms the subject of all logical predicates, and the substratum of all real attributes. Second substance comprises the species and genera under which first substances fall.

Quantity: In the 'Metaphysics' Aristotle defines quantity as "that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'."[1] (He is defining quantity as an actually extended body!) In the 'Metaphysics' he says, the distinguishing mark of quantity is its measurability; whereas in the 'Categories' he says, the distinguishing mark is that equality and inequality may be predicated of it.

Quality: Examples of quality are white, grammatical etc.

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1. Metaphysics, 1020 a 8.

We shall devote a considerable amount of time in discussing both the category of quality and that of relation. The reason for so doing will reveal itself as we proceed.

In the 'Categories' we read: quality is "that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified some-how."[1] Qualities are of four kinds: (1) habits and dispositions of mind and body; (2) capacities or natural powers; (3) affective qualities (sensible); (4) figure or shape.

At several places in the 'Topics' Aristotle assigns the differentia to the category of quality. Consider for example the statements: "the differentia always indicates a quality of the genus" (Topics, 128a26). "no differentia indicates what a thing is, but rather of what sort it is, such as 'pedestrian' and 'biped' " (Topics, 122 b16).

The description of quality in the 'Metaphysics' adds very little to that given in the 'Organon'. However, we have, in the 'Metaphysics'[*] the following classification of quality: (1) the differentia of the essence; (2) that which exists, besides quantity in the essence of unchangeable

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1. Categories, 8 b 25

* Metaphysics, Δ 14.

objects of mathematics, e.g. the plane and the solid as present in the composite numbers; (3) the modifications of substances in respect of which they change, e.g. heat and cold; (4) good and evil.

Relation: examples of relatives are, double, half, larger etc.

In the 'Categories' Aristotle has no noun for 'relation', but exploits a preposition having the force 'relative to', 'in relation to'. In this treatise he does not, for the most part, treat of relations (similarity, slavery etc.) but rather, in effect, of relatives (similar, slave). The distinction between relations or relational properties and relatives is drawn at the end of the chapter on relatives in the 'Metaphysics': "Further, there are the properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called relatives, e.g. equality is relative, because the equal is, and likeness, because the like is."[1]

Relatives are discussed at considerable length in both the 'Organon' and the 'Metaphysics'.

In the 'Categories' Aristotle gives two criteria for being a relative. The first criterion he mentions at the beginning of the chapter on Relatives. According to the first criterion "We call relatives all such things as

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1. Metaphysics, 1021 b 6-8.

are said to be just what they are, <u>of</u> or <u>than</u> other things,
or in some other way <u>in relation to</u> something else."[1]
The second criterion appears in 8a28 of the 'Categories',
(similar criteria appear elsewhere also, e.g. in the Topics,
142a29, 146b3).   Aristotle introduced this second criterion
for a specific purpose.   He had maintained right from the
beginning of the **discussion** about the categories that
substances are not relative.   But towards the end of the
chapter on relatives he shows signs of being somewhat puzzled
as to whether substance can be relative in character.   But
he decides definitely that in regard to primary substances
there is no such possibility, for "An individual man is not
called someone's individual man;   nor an individual ox
someone's individual ox."[2]   He grants that in regard to
some secondary substances (e.g. parts such as head and hand)
"there is room for dispute."[3]   However, he tries to evade
the conclusion of calling those secondary substances like
head and hand relatives with the help of the second revised
criterion of relatives.   According to the second criterion
"those things are relatives for which <u>being is the same</u>
<u>as being somehow related to something</u>,"[4]

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1.   Categories, 6a36.

2.   Ibid, 8a15

3.   Ibid, 8a26

4.   Ibid, 8a32.

The introduction of these two criteria has given rise to lots of controversies. There has been controversy specially about the difference between the two.

Certain points about the two criteria demand our attention. In the first place, according to Aristotle, the first criterion makes head and hand relatives, while the second does not. Secondly, the first criterion is about what is said, called, but the second is not so. Thirdly, according to Aristotle, whatever satisfies the second criterion also satisfies the first. Fourthly, the second criterion is said to have a consequence concerning the necessity of "knowing definitely" that to which something is related (Categories, 8a35-37). Aristotle writes: "It is clear . . . that if someone knows any relative definitely he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of." The fact that this necessity does not hold in the case of head and hand is taken to show that they are not, by the revised criterion, relatives (Categories, 8b15-19).

There is a very interesting discussion about the last point in Mr. J. L. Ackrill's notes on Aristotle's Categories in his translation of Aristotle's 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione' (with notes). Because of lack of space it is not possible to reproduce the discussion in detail, though some segments of the discussion demand

consideration.

According to Mr. Ackerill the last point might
do a great deal in clarifying the distinction between
the two criteria.   Aristotle seems to be saying that,
according to the second criterion it is impossible to
know that X is relative without knowing what it is relative
to; whereas according to the first criterion it is possible
to know that X is relative without knowing what it is
relative to, though it would necessarily be relative to
something.   But this would make the second criterion
too strong.   It would not include 'half', 'slave' etc. in
the category of relatives, since it is possible to know
that a number like 55 is 'half' of some number, that Callias
is a 'slave', without knowing what 55 is half of, and who
Callias' master is.   We might water down the strong
criterion by saying that one may know that X is relative
without knowing what it is relative to, it being required
only that someone knows or could find out what it is
relative to.   But then the criterion would seem to include
'hand' and 'head', given that a 'hand' or 'head' must
be someone's hand or head.   Alternatively, we might lay
emphasis on the phrase "definitely know" and say that one
cannot definitely know that 55 is half of some number
without knowing what that number is.   But then no reason
is apparent why it should be possible to know definitely

that X is a head without knowing whose head it is.

Anyway, we must conclude that Aristotle's introduction of the two criteria of relatives leaves room for much controversy. And it is not easy to know what Aristotle's answers to these charges might have been.

Aristotle writes in the 'Categories' that the category of relation sometimes admits of contraries[*] and of variation in degree,[**] but not always. Every relative has a correlative, and the two are interdependent. The correlative becomes clear only when the relative is given its correct name, and, in some cases, if there is no current term for the correlative, one must be coined for it.[***]

In his explicit treatment of relative terms in the 'Metaphysics', Aristotle shows that, relations are based on: (1) unity and number, e.g., as are equality and in-equality; (2) action and passion, for "Things that are active or passive imply an active or passive potency and the actualisation of the potencies";[1] e.g. "as that which can heat to that which can be heated",[2]; (3) measure, for "that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves reference to it."[3],

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[*]   Categories, 6b15

[**]   Ibid, 6b20

[***]   Ibid, 7b10-12

1.   Metaphysics, 1021a15

2.   Ibid, 1020b28

3.   Ibid, 1021a30-a32

e.g., as the mind is related to that which the mind knows, because the latter is the measure of the knowledge in the mind.[*]

In the 'Metaphysics', Aristotle describes "what is relative" as the "least of all things a kind of entity or substance".[1]   The reason, "is the fact that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or movement."[2] While there is change in respect to substance, quantity, quality, place, any change in respect to relation, always results from change in one or more of the above four. That there may be change in respect to relation in which the thing related does not change at all, but only the correlative changes, is a sign, says Aristotle, of the superficiality of the category.

Place and time are discussed by Aristotle in the fourth book of the 'Physics'.

Place: examples of place are, in the Lyceum, in the market place etc.

"The existence of place", he says, "is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement."[3]   "When therefore another body occupies the came place, the place is thought to be different from all the bodies

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* Cf. Metaphysics, 1056 b 35
1. Metaphysics, 1088a23
2. Ibid, 1088a30
3. Physics, 208b1

which come to be in it and **replace** one another."[1] Aristotle distinguishes between a common place in "which all bodies are"; and the special place "occupied primarily by each."[2]

Time: examples of time are yesterday, last year etc.

Time, he reasons, implies both change and movement. Hence he defines it as the "number of movement in respect of before and after."[3] Time is measured by the 'now' and 'movement'.

Action and Passion: Action and passion are discussed in the 'Metaphysics' only. Examples of the former are: cutting, burning etc; and that of the latter are: being cut, being burned etc.

When two things come in contact, of which one is actually what the other is potentially, a change occurs. Viewing that change as the actualisation of the potential, we term it action, considering it as the potential becoming actualised, we term it passion.

Position (Posture) and Condition (State): examples of the former are: is lying, is sitting etc; and examples of the latter are: has shoes on, has armour on etc.

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1.   Physics, 208 b4-6

2.   Ibid, 209a32-33

3.   Ibid, 220a25.

Position and condition are nowhere discussed
by Aristotle.   In fact, the only two complete enumerations
in which he mentions them are found in the logical treat-
ises, 'Categories' and 'Topics'.   Aristotle's doctrine
of categories, at least the way in which he presents it,
is avowedly full of insoluble difficulties.   (1) In the
first place, several of the items he has placed in the
particular categories do obviously tend to be classified
in different categories.   We might refer in this connection
to the passage 10a16 of the 'Categories'.   Here Aristotle
says that 'open textured' and 'close textured' are not
qualities;   since they signify rather the position of the
various parts of the whole things.   But if this is so,
then according to his own interpretation entities represented
by locutions denoting shape and outward configuration of
things should be classified under position, in spite of
the fact that he regarded shape and external configuration
of things as qualities.

(2) In the second place, his classification is
not fully exhaustive.   In some places Aristotle has left
no hint as to which category an item should belong to.
For example, although Aristotle denied that 'open-textured'
and 'close-textured' signify qualities, yet it is not clear
into which category Aristotle himself would have wished to
put openness of textures, roughness etc.   Moreover, there

are expressions like 'knowledge of music', 'multiple of 3'.
Now are these locutions combinations of words each of which
stand for things belonging to different categories;   or do
the entire expressions stand for single items to be located
each in a single category?   There are obviously more reasons
for taking the latter view, because 'knowledge of music' is
not a mere union of words representing things belonging
to different categories like the expression 'bent stick'.
'X knows music' cannot be dissolved as 'X is a bent stick'
can be, into 'X is bent' and 'X is a stick'.   Moreover,
these expressions are similar to expressions like 'capacity
to resist easy division' and 'incapacity to resist division',
which represent hardness and softness.   And since hardness,
softness etc. are according to Aristotle items each in a
single category, is it not natural to regard 'knowledge of
music', 'multiple of 3' as signifying single entities belong-
ing to single categories?

Yet it is not easy to find a place for things
represented by expressions of this kind in the Aristotelian
scheme of categories.   Aristotle himself seems to put
'knowledge of grammar' into the category of quality (cf.
Categories, 11a36).   But does not such an expression
obviously have some resemblance to expressions denoting
relatives?   Neither should we treat such expressions as
denoting some entity that falls both under quality and

relation since in that case it will point to a weakness
in the very foundations of the distinctness of the
different categories.

(3) In third place, Aristotle gives a list of
ten categories; but the question seems unavoidable: do
the categories not seem to overlap? This question arises
specially because of certain conflicting statements
Aristotle makes in many places. Take for example the
remarks in the passage from 11a20 to 11a36 (the same
passage we have just been considering): "We should not
be disturbed lest someone may say that though we proposed
to discuss quality we are counting in many relatives (since
states and conditions are relatives). For in pretty well
all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to
something, but none of the particular cases is. For
knowledge, a genus, is called just what it is, of something
else (it is called knowledge of something); but none of
the particular cases is called just what it is, of something
else. For example, grammar is not called grammar of some-
thing nor music music of something." Now this passage
does not seem to fit in with the notion behind the Aristo-
telian genus – species classification and the Aristotelian
division of the categories. If any particular species of
a genus does not come under that genus, what ground is there
for saying that it is a species of that genus? If any

species of relative is not relative, why should we call
it a species of relative, rather than a species of quality?
Categories are like genera. If any species of one category
can be a species of another category, how can we then
distinguish between one category and another? The last
paragraph of the chapter on **quality** also throws doubt on
the validity of the distinction of the categories: "More-
over, if the same thing really is a qualification and a
relative there is nothing absurd in its being counted in
both the genera."[1] Perhaps we can defend Aristotle in
the following way.

Aristotle divides knowledge into its species in
the Topics. He says, "the differentiae of relatives are
themselves relative, as in the case also of knowledge.
This is classified as speculative, practical and productive;
and each of these denotes a relation."[2] This division of
knowledge into its several species is different from the
division we have shown in the last paragraph. And in this
way we might avoid the question, how the species may not be
relative while its genus is so, by saying that 'knowledge
of **music**' is not a proper species of knowledge. Moreover,
since theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge etc. are
relatives, acceptance of these as species of knowledge

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1. Categories, 11a37
2. Topics, 145a13-18.

raises no categorical problem. But if we try to defend Aristotle in this way, the question arises, what _are_ we to do with expressions like 'knowledge of grammar', 'multiple of 3'? The attempt to fit things denoted by such expressions into Aristotle's scheme of categories gives rise to the dilemma which we have shown on page 2D.

So we must admit that the way in which Aristotle presents the doctrine of categories is full of difficulties.

But the fact that Aristotle's presentation of the doctrine of categories is defective does not necessarily throw doubt on the very possibility of such a doctrine. There might appear much truth in the doctrine, if it were revised and presented in a different way. Perhaps Aristotle himself was aware of the defects in his presentation of the doctrine, and he might have thought of revising the doctrine. That this is a possibility, occurs to us specially because of Aristotle's reducing the number of categories from ten to four in his later works. Perhaps he was aware of the fact later that the categories which he had formerly thought to be distinct are not all equally distinct; and was trying to make the list of categories perfect.[*]

So a revised and perfect classification of things into the different categories does not seem impossible. Such

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[*] Cf. Physics, 200b30, which seems to subsume action and passion under relation.

categories might be exhaustive as well as distinct. The
scope of this chapter does not permit the possibility of a
detailed examination of the question of the possibility of
such a perfect list of categories. But an examination of
the question of the distinctness of the categories appears
to be possible as well as very useful for the present
chapter for reasons that will be obvious later on. So let
us undertake such an examination.

In some cases the distinctness of some of the
categories does appear to be maintainable if we conduct
a closer analysis of the categories in question and remove
some of the obvious defects of Aristotle's presentation of
them. For example, at first sight, it might be thought
that state is hardly distinguishable from quality, nor
position from place. But a closer analysis and examination
will show that the case is not really like that. A state
is something which characterises a whole through the
condition of its parts; thus we call a man shod, because
he has shoes on his feet. A quality, on the other hand is
comparatively simple, and if it characterises a whole, it
does so through being present in the same way in its various
parts, or anyway in the various parts of its surface.
Striking examples of such qualities are colours. If we
call a sheet red, we do so beause all parts of it are alike
red. One might ask, how can the same thing be true of
shape or external configuration? It might be said of a

man that his shape is square. Surely all the parts of his body are not square! But a defence of Aristotle is not impossible if we remind ourselves of our previous discussion where we remarked that in Aristotle's system shape ought to be included under the category of position.

But Aristotle has spoken very little about the last six categories, i.e. place, time, action, passion, position and condition. So we cannot be sure if Aristotle did really think that these categories are all distinct. Perhaps he did not think that they are all equally distinct, since he sometimes gives shorter lists of categories or leaves their precise number vague. At any rate, even if he did think them to be distinct, yet he did not make any explicit attempt to show the ultimateness of the last six categories. But he has devoted a considerable time to describing the first four categories of substance, quantity, quality and relation. And it is evident from his discussion of these categories that the difference between these categories is more fundamental than that between others; because although he reduced the number of categories in many places, yet he rather omitted the latter six categories than the former four. And he even made explicit attempts to show the distinctness of these four (as will appear from our later discussion). Anyway, the question of the distinctness of the four categories is very important to us; and we must devote our attention to these four categories.

Are these categories mutually exclusive? And more import-
ant for our present purpose is the question of the distinct-
ness of the categories of quality and relation. <u>Are these
two categories mutually exclusive</u>? And this question is
a vital one, as will be obvious later. The question arises
specially after reading the passage (which we have already
seen to throw doubt on the validity of the distinctness of
the categories in general*) to the effect that there is
nothing absurd in counting the same thing under both the
genera of quality and relation. I think the two categories
are mutually exclusive for Aristotle; and the distinctness
of the two can be shown on the basis of Aristotle's treat-
ment of them. Yet we must admit that the question is not
easily answerable.

The question is really a difficult one, and it
cannot be answered by a superficial glance at Aristotle's
account of the two categories. Even apart from the question
whether Aristotle's account of the two categories is suffic-
ient to show the distinctness and ultimateness of the two,
there might still remain the question: are relation and
quality two irreducible things?

In fact, we see a propensity among certain thinkers
to overlook the distinction between relation and quality.

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*   See the ~~third~~ second paragraph of page 21 - end of first para-
      graph of page 22.

We can refer in this connection to Johnson's view of relation as a transitive adjective.[*]   He says that in addition to ordinary adjectives which usually refer only to the substantives which they characterize, there are adjectives of another type which exhibit a reference to some substantives other than that which they directly characterize.   Adjectives of this other type are relations.   Comparing the two propositions 'X sleeps' and 'X hits Y', we note that 'sleeps' is an intransitive and 'hits' a transitive verb.   Accordingly, he maintains that we ought properly to call 'sleeping' an intransitive and 'hitting' a transitive adjective.   Thus, we see that Johnson defines relation as a 'transitive adjective'.   Are we then to say that relations can be reduced to qualities?   I think that examination will show that Johnson's view is not a tenable one.

It is an acknowledged general rule that, the definiens should not contain anything that may even indirectly tend to contain the definiendum.   [There are of course exceptions to this rule (cf. R. Robinson's book on Definition); although they do not apply to this particular case.   An example of such an exception would be a definition of 'diagonal' which read 'a square is divided into two isosceles triangles by a diagonal.[**]]   But this rule seems to be

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[*]   See W.E.Johnson's Logic, Vol. I, p.204n.
[**]   Cf. R. G. F. Robinson's 'Definition', p. 145.

violated by Johnson in his suggested definition of relation
as a transitive adjective.   For the very word 'transitive'
conveys a sense of relation.   'Transition' or reference to
another implies indirectly being in relation with another.

This tendency to reduce relation to quality,
thinks Russell, is seen also in traditional logic.   Trad-
itional logic holds that all propositions have the subject-
predicate form.   It believes that that which is predicable
of a term is its property.   Now relational propositions,
being of the same form, predicate something of the sub-
stantive, and hence relations are qualities.

But relational propositions are of such a kind,
maintains Russell, that if we reduce them to subject-predicate
form, and say that what are predicated in such propositions
are qualities, they cannot convey the meaning they seek to
express.   So Russell objects to the tendency to identify
relation with quality.[*]   He says that the main objection
against taking relations as qualities comes from the consid-
eration of asymmetrical relations.   Symmetrical relations
such as equality or inequality can be regarded as expressing
possession of a common property or different properties.
But when we come to asymmetrical relations, such as greater
and less, the attempt to reduce them to qualities becomes

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[*]   See Russell's 'Our Knowledge of the External World',
    1922, pp. 58-59.

impossible.   To say that when one thing is greater than
another, and not merely unequal to it, that means that
they have different magnitudes, is to say something that
is incapable of explaining the facts.   Thus we shall have to
say that one magnitude is greater than the other;   and thus
we shall have failed to get rid of the relation of greater
and less.

Can we get any suggestions from Aristotle's writings
about how to distinguish quality from relation?   I think
we can.   And I also think that this suggestion reflects
Aristotle's view on the externality of relations which we
hinted at at the beginning of this chapter.[*]   Aristotle
placed relation and quality in two separate categories.
At one place of course,[**] as we have seen, he leaned danger-
ously towards obliterating the distinction between relation
and quality by saying that there is nothing extraordinary
in any item's coming under both the classes of relation and
quality.[***]   But in spite of this we might say that
Aristotle must have thought relation and quality to be
distinct; otherwise he could have reduced them to one

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[*]   See page 9.

[**]   See page 22

[***]   Cf. Categories, 11a37.

category instead of making them two. As we have already suggested, Aristotle might not have thought seriously about the problem at the time of writing the 'Categories'.

He did, however, say explicitly that the distinguishing mark of relatives is that they always require correlatives (Categories, 6b28), while that of qualities is that they are responsible for similarity (Categories, 11a15). But we must admit that the last criterion is not a very strong one. Two persons, for example, two brothers, might be similar not only by virtue of possessing some common characters like both having brown hair, but also because both of them have the same relation to the parents. So we have to conclude that although Aristotle did make some attempts to distinguish the two, yet his criteria were not very strong. At the same time it is very interesting to note that Aristotle left some suggestions for distinguishing the two categories, which, it worked out, might have been a stronger criterion for distinguishing the two categories.

The suggestion referred to is this, that qualities can be essential to things whereas relations can never be so. That Aristotle believed in the insubstantiality of relations is obvious from his writings. And that he believed in the essentiality of some qualities is also obvious enough. We shall give evidence for holding such a view very

soon.* Let us for the present resume our discussion. It must be said that although Aristotle held qualities in some cases to be essential, yet if he were to prove explicitly the distinctness of the two categories by this means, he ought to have said that every quality is essential to something or other; otherwise he could make only the weaker claim that only some qualities are essential, and he could not then avoid the dangerous consequence, which someone might press him to accept, of assimilating relations to those qualities (or some of them) which are not parts of essences. In order to strengthen the claim to distinguish relation from quality, some such view as the following might have been profitable to Aristotle.

There are in nature species, and also classes of inanimate objects. Some qualities are essential to any member of a certain species or class. Heat for example, is essential to fire, cold to ice, sweetness to honey, sound to music. Besides these essential qualities members of these classes or species possess some other qualities also which are not essential to any member of these classes and species. But though these qualities are not essential to members of these classes, they are essential to members

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* See pages 34 - 35 (end of first paragraph).

of other classes or species.   The quality cold for example,
is not essential to water.   But coldness is essential to
ice.   Sweetness is not essential to milk or apple, but it
is essential to sugar and honey.

I am just suggesting that some such view might have
been more profitable to Aristotle than just saying that
qualities do in some cases belong to essences of things.
What I am doing here is not trying to prove definitely that
every quality is essential to something or other,   The
scope of the present chapter does not permit the possibility
of undertaking such an examination of all qualities and
trying to show that every quality is essential to something
or other.   So all that we can do is to say that it might
have been possible for someone, if he undertook such a task,
to show by dividing the properties up into groups that
every quality is essential to something, and he might have
been able to say that every quality is essential to something
whereas relations are never so.

Aristotle may not have made an unqualified assertion
like the above one, but he undoubtedly made at least the
weaker claim that all relatives are accidents, but qualities
may in some cases be essential to things.   Aristotle
explicitly described relation as an accident in his account
of the 'predicables'.   We read also in the 'Nicomachean
Ethics': "That which is per se, i.e., substance, is prior

in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an offshoot
and accident of being)";[1] Aristotle's discussion of the
concept of relation in the 'Metaphysics', also, bears evidence
of his view of relation as an accident.   As we have already
read,[*] Aristotle describes in the 'Metaphysics', "What is
relative" as the "least of all things a kind of entity or
substance."[2]   The reason, we saw,[**] is given as, "the fact
that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or
movement."[3]   If relation be such that change in respect of
relation makes no change in the thing related, then relation
cannot be the essence.   For a thing cannot lose its essential
property without losing its identity.

It might be asked now, granted that Aristotle held
relation to be an accident, but is not the same thing true
of quality?   Did he not list quality also in the account
of the 'predicables' as an accident of being?   Our answer
is that it is true.   Yet it is obvious that Aristotle
treated some qualities of things as essential to the things.
We can establish this point in the following way.

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1.   Nicomachean Ethics, 14, 1096 a 20-22.

2.   Metaphysics, 1088 a 23.

3.   Ibid, 1088 a 30.

*   See page 17.

**   See page 17.

In discussing 'definition' Aristotle says that definition is the statement of essence. Let us take some such definition: Man is a rational animal. Now what are animality and rationality? Are they not qualities? Are not animality and rationality that in virtue of which a particular individual is called a human being? One might object here to the treatment of animality as a quality. Still rationality is undoubtedly a quality in the Aristotelian sense, since rationality is a differentia and Aristotle himself said in the 'Metaphysics'[*] that quality is in one sense the "differentia of the essence."[1] And although Aristotle himself did not assign any place for animality in the categorial scheme, yet we can say at least this that if we follow his own criteria for things belonging to different categories, then we ought to describe animality as a quality. Animality is definitely not a relation, nor a substance ('animal' is of course a secondary substance but animality is not), nor a quantity nor place etc. So there are good reasons for treating animality also as a quality. Moreover, if, as we have seen Aristotle himself saying in the 'Metaphysics', quality is in some sense the differentia of the

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1. Metaphysics, 1020 a 34

* We have already referred to this point on page 11.

essence, then surely to that extent quality constitutes
essence, since essence consists of genus and differentia.
Again, Aristotle also describes one type of quality, in the
Metaphysics, as that which exists besides quantity in the
essence of unchangeable objects of mathematics.[*]

Aristotle had a firm conviction that relations
cannot be essences.   And this conviction contains the seeds
of the doctrine of external relations.   I also think that
this is the reason why Aristotle did not reduce quality to
relation, in spite of the great difficulty he had to face
in distinguishing the two.

There might be a demurrer to our claim that
Aristotle held qualities to be different from relations.
It might be said that according to Aristotle the different
answers to the question 'of what sort is it?' represent the
qualities.   Now an answer to the question 'what sort of
a man is he?' might be 'brave', 'generous'.   Thus 'generous',
'brave' etc. would be qualities according to Aristotle's
criterion of a quality.   But it might be said that since
'generous', 'brave' etc. are relational properties, if they
are held to be qualities, it would follow that a quality is
relational.   We might answer such an objection by saying
that 'generous', 'kind' etc. are not relational in the sense

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[*]   We have already referred to this point on page 11-12

in which 'father of', 'larger than' etc. are relational.
If the son does not exist then the property 'father of'
cannot exist, or at least it cannot be instantiated in
the subject under discussion.   It could in other subjects
of course.   If Y does not exist, then we cannot impute the
property 'larger than Y' to X.*   But the qualities 'generous'
and 'kind' when ascribed to any person, are not dependent
on the relations to any other person in that way.   Even if
there exists no individual to which the person can be gener-
ous, even if the man whom we call generous has no property,
the man can still be called generous in the dispositional
sense.   (Of course the person concerned must have the
concept of property and the concept of an other man to
whom he can be generous; yet he could be called generous
even in the absence of material property or the absence of
the person to whom he can be generous).

But the supporter of the Aristotelian view will

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*   A bit of complication is of course associated with what
I say here. It might be said that what I say here might be
true of properties such as 'larger than'. But it is not
obvious, it might be said, that what I say works also for
intentional functions such as 'thinking of'. X may now be
thinking of the King of France (perhaps without realising
that there is no King of France at present). Thus although
the King of France does not exist, X can still 'think of'
him, in an **intentional way**. But it is obvious that the
issue involved here leads us to a rather large topic a
thorough discussion of which is not possible within the
limited scope of the present paper.

have to face another set of objections if he wants to demon-
strate the distinction between quality and relation with the
help of the notions like essence and accident. Someone
might impugn the very distinction between essence and
accident.

We need some more elucidation of the point here.
Aristotle distinguished essence and accident on several
grounds.   One of the grounds is that those attributes which
"_must_ inhere in their subjects of necessity"[*1] are essential
attributes.   The subject must possess them.   Their loss
would result in the destruction of the subject.   Attributes
other than these are accidents.   An accident is an attribute
"which _may_ . . . belong or not belong to any one and the self-
same thing,"[**2] an attribute is thus an accident if the
object would remain in substance the same even without it.
Let us turn our attention to another very important aspect
of this concept of essence.   Aristotle classified things
according to genus and species.   Things belong to the same
species if they share some particular (not just any) common
characters.   These characters are the essence.   He apparently
believed species to be fixed and tended to ignore what could

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*   Italic used is mine.

**   Italic used is mine.

1.   Posterior Analytics, 73 b 24.

2.   Topics, 102 b 7.

not be classified within them.   This shortcoming is held
by modern philosophers like Stebbing to be fatal.   Stebbing
maintains that the modern theory of evolution destroys the
basis of Aristotle's essence theory.[*]

     Aristotle believed in **natural kinds** and species.
He also believed species to be fixed and unchanging.   In
his view ancestors of present species have never been very
different from their present descendants.   Roughly speaking
his theory was like this: from eternity there were in the
world some definite species.   But modern theory of evolution
has provided a different explanation of the species.
According to this theory living organisms have all arisen
from a unified and simple ancestry by a long sequence of
differentiation of descent lines from that ancestry.
According to this modern theory species are now considered
to have been evolved from pre-existing species by gradual
modification and to have no absolutely fixed character.
Acceptance of the theory of evolution involved the corollary
that neither are the characters of the species fixed, nor are
the present species replicas of their ancestors.

     Similar objections are raised by Locke also.
Locke, for example, says that what Aristotle calls essences
are really inventions or the workmanship of the understanding.[**]

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[*]   Cf. L.S.A.Stebbing's 'A Modern Introduction to Logic', p.433

[**]   Cf. Locke's 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', III,
    3, 12, 13 and 14.

Our abstract ideas of species, he says, are made up of complex ideas of similar particular substances, retaining only what is common to those different complex ideas. There is no generality in nature corresponding to these abstract ideas. He calls these ideas nominal essences.

The construction of nominal essences is usually relative to practical interests, and different interests lead people to classify things in different ways. Similar views to the effect that the distinction between essential and accidental properties are relative were held by John Dewey (who held the distinction to be relative to our sub-jective interests in them[*]) and C. I. Lewis (who held the distinction to be relative to our vocabulary[**]). Class-ification is solely dependent on particular interests; and the selection of what we regard as essential for a class is not absolutely so, it is somewhat arbitrary. (But it is only somewhat arbitrary, not absolutely so. Because some selections are better than others). The distinction between essence and accident is not made from any objective stand-point, but from a somewhat subjective one. So we cannot make any absolute distinction between essence and accident.

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* Cf. John Dewey's 'Logic, The Theory of Inquiry', p.138.
** Cf. C. I. Lewis' 'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation', p.41.

The objections roughly amount to this: since
fixity of species cannot be maintained, therefore the
distinction between certain properties as essential and
others as not essential to species cannot be maintained.
This distinction is more or less arbitrary depending on the
interest with which we classify. Now Aristotle was concerned
solely with showing the essences of natural species. But the
concepts of essence and accident are not confined within
the sphere of natural species only. They are applicable
also in the sphere of inanimate objects. So doubt as to
the validity of the distinction between essential and
inessential properties may also arise in the case of inanimate
objects. So someone might say that since classification
is relative to interest, in this sphere, there are no
objective grounds for distinguishing between essential and
inessential properties.

Our answer is that although we cannot maintain the
fixity of species, yet that does not disprove the existence
of natural species. We are struck by the remarkable
biological phenomenon that two similar animals reproduce
offspring with qualities similar to theirs. But the new
offspring does not have the characters peculiar to another
species. This is what happens naturally. We can of course
somstimes interfere with the natural course of events and
interbreed with the help of members of different species.

But that does not disprove what happens naturally and normally. So there are objective reasons for calling a species a species.   What are called essential properties of a species are by no means our arbitrary and subjective selection. There are objective reasons for saying that lions and tigers form two different species.

Secondly, we might classify inanimate objects in as many ways as we like according to interests and usefulness;   still, when we do classify, there are objective reasons for our doing so.   Our regarding the qualities as essential to that class does not by any means depend merely on our subjective and arbitrary selection.   So the distinction between essence and accident is a valid one.

We may conclude that though the form in which Aristotle presented the distinction between essence and accident may not be free from defects, still the distinction between essence and accident is a valid one.   So we can say that there are some properties which can very well be spoken of as essential and that some qualities belong to that class of properties.   With the help of this revised form of the doctrine of essence and accident we can distinguish qualities which are sometimes essential from relations which are never so.

Now such a view as the above one of the nature of relation contains in an implicit form the seeds of the

doctrine of external relations. The exponents of this doctrine differ among themselves regarding the nature of relation. Some regard some relations as external while others are internal, and others seem to be in favour of treating all relations as external. But all of them are at one in rejecting the theory of internal relations, according to which all relations are internal.

Aristotle maintained that relations are external or non-essential. I think that Aristotle's view is commendable, in spite of its defects, in suggesting (at such an early stage of the discussion of the concept of relation) the externality of relations.

Aristotle's view then, we see, contains in a nebulous form the doctrine of external relations. And it is interesting to note here that the tendency to distinguish between relation and quality looks like being a characteristic feature of philosophers who support the externality of relations. Aristotle, to whom the realist philosophers owe much of their views, believed them to be different and struggled hard to show the difference between the two (although he did not insist on it in the last resort). Russell, who for all we know, might have been influenced by Aristotle's treating relations and qualities as belonging to separate categories, argued very strongly against reducing relations to qualities in several places of his works.

His argument applies in fact not only against reducing
relations to qualities, but against treating relations as
properties even.   Moreover, Aristotle's claim that relations
do not always belong to the essences of things seems to be,
as we shall see in the next chapter, echoed in the arguments
used by modern philosophers like Moore and Ayer, showing the
externality of relations.

Before closing the present chapter let us take a
glance at some objections that might be raised against
imputing the view of externality of relations to Aristotle.
Someone might refer to certain passages in Aristotle's
writings and say that these passages give contrary evidence
to our ascription.   Attention might be directed to Aristotle's
definition of certain natural phenomena like eclipse and
thunder.   Aristotle defines eclipse, for example, as
"Deprivation of light . . . by the earth's coming in between."[1]
Since definition states the essence of a thing, one might
say that this is a case where relation to something else is
treated as an essential attribute of eclipse.   So at least
in some cases Aristotle believed relation to be essential
or internal to a thing.   But it must be noticed that in
cases like this Aristotle is not speaking of essences of
things but of events only.   And although there may be doubt

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1.   Metaphysics, 1044 b 15.

as to whether Aristotle believed the relations between
certain natural phenomena to be external, there is no
doubt that he believed in the externality of all the
relations between all the particular things.

Again, Aristotle defines house as "'bricks and
timbers in such and such a position'", threshold as " 'wood or
stone in such and such a position' ".[1]   So it seems that
relation to something else is essential to a house or
threshold.   But here what is essential to a house or thresh-
old is not its relation to something other than itself,
but only its having a certain structure, only its having a
certain form.

Moreover, Aristotle says that the motion of all
things in the universe is due to God, the prime mover.
The prime mover moves only as being the object of desire.
It itself is never changed by anything beyond itself.   Yet
everything in the universe is related to God.   The prime
mover is the single ruler of the universe, that on which
"the heavens and the world of nature" "depend".[2]   So the
dependence of things of the universe on God seems to be
internal to the things.   But our answer to this objection
is that even according to this view things do not depend on
God for their qualities or essence, they depend on Him for
their existence only.

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1.   Metaphysics, 1043 a 6ff

2.   Ibid, 1072 b 13.

CHAPTER II

BRADLEY ON INTERNAL RELATIONS

In the preceding chapter we have expounded and
examined Aristotle's view of the nature of relations and
have shown that his treatment of the concept of relation
contains in a nebulous form the doctrine of external relations.
We should now look at the arguments advanced by the internalists
in support of their claim that all relations are internal.
Bradley is supposed to be one of the chief exponents of the
doctrine of internal relations,* although he himself claimed
that he held this doctrine only as relatively true, i.e.,
truer than the external relations view (both in its extreme
and moderate forms), against which he directed his criticisms
mainly.   Many leading idealists in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were highly impressed by his views on
this subject, and they supported the doctrine of internal
relations with arguments more or less similar to his.   As I
have said before I cannot find myself in sympathy with the
doctrine of internal relations although I feel that our
notions of relations owe a great deal to the facts revealed
in the course of discussions of this theory by its advocates.

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*   Bradley sometimes uses the terms 'intrinsic relations' and
     'extrinsic relations' instead of 'internal relations' and
     'external relations'.

So I think it would pay us immensely to examine Bradley's view in order to give a critical evaluation of the doctrine of internal relations.

In making a critical survey of Bradley's views on this topic, we shall show the defects inherent in Bradley's view and shall show that the main defect of his view is that it makes two claims neither of which can stand the test of criticisms, viz., that relations are qualities and that relations belong to the essences of things.   And it is interesting to note that these two important facts about the nature of relations, viz., that they are not qualities and that they are not parts of the essences of things, were pointed out long ago by Aristotle as they are pointed out in modern times by philosophers like Russell, Moore and Ayer.

A very thorough and precise exposition of Bradley's views about the notion of relation itself can be found in the third chapter of his 'Appearance and Reality', the chapter which, according to the author, gives us, so to speak, a key to the entire book.   Some interpreters of Bradley's philosophy, like Prof. R. Wollheim, are of the opinion that in this chapter he argues against the possibility of the theory of external relations and gives at the same time an exposition of the concept of internal relations.   I am not sure whether Bradley himself meant this chapter to be taken in this way, because a glance at this chapter does not,

at least at the outset, convey to one the impression that
he there engages himself in settling the issue of internality
and externality of relations.   All his interest appears at
the outset to be in showing the logical inconsistencies
involved in the relational way of thought.   He seriously
set before himself the task of impugning the doctrine of
external relations and pleading for the relative merit of
the doctrine of internal relations mainly in the Appendix
B which he added to the second edition of 'Appearance and
Reality'.   In his unfinished essay called 'Relations'
which was published posthumously and in several places of
the book 'Essays on Truth and Reality' also, Bradley tries,
to a certain extent, to show the relative merit of the doct-
rine of internal relations over that of external relations.
Yet, it appears from reading those above-mentioned pieces
that these latter writings do not contain any new view that
was not already expressed in the third chapter of 'Appearance
and Reality.'*   Bradley's explicit arguments against
externality and his arguments for internality of relations
are really exposition and elaboration of pithy arguments

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*   Regarding the essay, 'Relations', Bradley himself said
     that it contains nothing really new. It deals with the
     same point of unsatisfactoriness of any ' "relational"
     stage of experience' about which he spoke before. Prob-
     ably he is referring here to his showing of the contra-
     diction involved in relational way of thinking in the
     third chapter of 'Appearance and Reality'.

against the reality of relations appearing in the third
chapter of 'Appearance and Reality'.   Thus although the
primary source of Bradley's views on externality and inter-
nality of relations is the Appendix, yet we shall do well to
scrutinise the embryonic forms of the arguments against
externality of relations (as they are found in the third
chapter), which were later on made explicit in the Appendix,
while all the time keeping it in mind that these arguments
were primarily directed against the relational way of
thinking.

Our task of finding out Bradley's exact views
about any issue is made very difficult by the flowery style
of his writing.   Although the luxuriant growth of rhetoric
that is usually found to obseure his real view in most
places is fortunately not very prominent in the third
chapter of 'Appearance and Reality', yet it is present to a
considerable extent even in this chapter.   Anyway, we shall
try our best to find out the gist of his arguments on re-
lations employed here.

Bradley uses the word 'quality' as a correlative
of relation in this chapter.   It is natural to ask for an
explanation of this exception to the traditional choice
of vocabulary.   The reason for his so doing is that, having
disposed of the traditional Aristotelian analysis of things
into substances and qualities in the second chapter of the

book, he moves on to a phenomenalist analysis of things into a collection of qualities.* He starts his discussion of relation in this connection. That is why he makes 'quality' the correlative of relation.

We should now look at the arguments employed in this chapter. He argues that relational experience and thought are self-contradictory. The contradiction involved may be put in a nutshell in the following form. Every relation must seek unity of terms, yet if it attains that, no relation is possible (since in unity there cannot remain any discrete terms to be related). Terms in relation must, and yet cannot retain diversity (since if they remain absolutely diverse, what effect does relation have on them?) Looked at from a different point of view the argument might also appear to be directed against the upholders of the doctrine of external relations who consider relations and terms to be independent of each other. It seems to be saying that if you look at them in this way, you are bound to get yourself involved in the above contradictions, whereas a relatively truer view will be to look at terms as inseparable from relations, which is the view recommended by the theory of internal relations. We pointed out earlier that according to Bradley the very concept of 'relation' itself, whether internal or external, is full of contradictions. So the

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* 'Qualities' here stands for instances of universals like the particular red colour of a red dress which is a unique instance of the universal 'redness', and not for universals like redness.

question naturally arises why did he then, so to speak, approach one horn of the dilemma rather than the other? The answer is that according to Bradley the theory of internal relations is nearer the truth than the theory of external relations. If someone points to the curtains of my room which are sky blue in colour and asks me 'what colour are they?', my answer would definitely be wrong if I say 'they are dark blue'. But my answer is at the same time nearer the truth than if I say 'they are all red'. Similarly, according to Bradley to say that all relations are internal is nearer the truth than to say any or some are external.

It should be noted here that Bradley is here all along working under the impression that terms cannot be separated from their relations; relations should be considered as something 'in' the terms (cf. the etymological meaning of the term 'internal'). And one way of considering something as 'in' something is definitely provided by the analogy of qualities inhering 'in' things. This gives us so to speak, the first hint that Bradley is treating relations as qualities. We shall find more hints as we proceed to discuss the actual arguments Bradley uses against relations.

The contradiction I put briefly above is actually elaborated in four separate arguments by Bradley. Taking both relation and quality he seeks first to show that each

of them is impossible without the other, and then that
each of them is unintelligible even taken with the other.
[Bradley here seems to be suggesting the idea that if two
concepts are both mutually dependent and mutually incompat-
ible, then the two are invalid, or at least invalid when
used at the same level in the same context; and that if two
things mutually presuppose one another then also they are
invalid.]

He begins with quality and shows that "Qualities
are nothing without relations".[1]   "You can never . . . .
find qualities without relations".[2]   Whenever we perceive
qualities, we always perceive many qualities, and manyness
of qualities implies relation.   A multitude of things must
have some relations with each other.

Multiplicity or 'plurality' of things "gets for us
all its meaning through relations."[3]   For there to be a
plurality the units must each be separate from one another.
So there must be a relation of difference among many units.
So everything is related to every other by the relation of
difference at least.   As Bradley puts it "if there are no
differences, there are no qualities, . . . But, if there is

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1.   Appearance and Reality, F.H.Bradley, 9th impression,
     p.21.

2.   Ibid, p. 22.

3.   Ibid, p.22.

any difference, then that implies a relation."[1]

Terms taken without relations have no intelligible meaning. "Unfortunately, taken together with them, they are equally unintelligible."[2] "They cannot, in the first place, be wholly resolved into the relations."[3] Because then there will remain nothing to be related. So a term, for example A, must have some aspect, for example a, on the basis of which it can enter into relation with the other. All the same, there must be some aspect of it, for example α, which results from its being in relation, otherwise it could not be said to be related at all. Then "Each has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the relation."[4] These two aspects are then the ground and consequence of the relation. Yet if the term in relation has to maintain its unity, its two aspects must be combined or related, and then even inside the two aspects 'a' and 'α' there must appear a diversity of aspects, the ground and the consequence of the relation. And in this way an infinite process of division and sub-division is started.

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1.   Appearance and Reality, p.25.

2.   Ibid, p.25.

3.   Ibid, p.25.

4.   Ibid, p.26.

In short, if you envisage terms and relations as
independent of each other, (as those who adhere to the
externality of relations must do), according to Bradley,
you are landed in a contradiction. The terms must be, and
yet cannot be related. If terms are to be united or
related, they must somehow lose their independent characters
in the relation or unison (cf. there must be some consequence
of the relation), otherwise how can we say that they are
united at all; yet they must also have some character not
wholly resolvable into the unity composed of the terms
(cf. there must be some ground of the relation). The terms
in relation must then have two aspects, ground and conse-
quence of relation; and then the problem arises about the
relation between these two characters, which lands us into a
fresh chain of contradictions.

If we look closely at this argument then it will
appear that the contradiction which Bradley presents does
not really arise even in the case of external relations.
If a shoe is larger than another, there must be some feature
of it which is sufficient to account for its being larger
in size; and equally there must be some feature of it
which depends upon its being larger. But Bradley fails
to detect that these two notions invariably refer to the
same aspect. It is really the same feature of an object
which might be viewed from two different points of view.

It is the exact size of a shoe by virtue of which we call
it larger than another; and at the same time, if it were
not larger than the other, it is its size that would of
necessity be different (assuming the other shoe remained the
same). (I am indebted for this point to Prof. R. Wollheim's
book, 'F. H. Bradley', p. 117).

Prof. Wollheim suggests that Bradley ignored this
point because of his wrong assimilation of relations to
processes. He treats relation as something that starts
up as a result of some property of an object, and then
under way has some repercussion on that object - thereby
creating another property of the object.

The same dilemma that we have seen to arise in
the case of terms, arises, Bradley shows, even if we start
with relations. "They are nothing intelligible, either
with or without their qualities. In the first place, a
relation without terms seems mere verbiage;"[1]   "But how
the relation can stand to the qualities is, on the other
side, unintelligible."[2] Relations must relate terms, yet
this condition of relation cannot be fulfilled, because
if a relation is to relate its terms, one term in relation

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1.   Appearance and Reality, p.27.

2.   Ibid.

must be independent of the other, yet if terms retain absolute independence, no relation is possible.

The same contradiction might be represented in a slightly different form as follows. Every term in relation must have independent existence. It is not constituted wholly by its relation to the other. It must be independent of its relation to the other. Yet if it is absolutely independent of the relation, it cannot be said to be in relation. And we will then require another relation to relate the term to the relation. Yet with regard to the second relation the same contradiction will arise and we will then be forced to an infinite regress.

Bradley expresses the infinite regress in the following way. In order to hold between terms, a relation must be something to them. But "in what intelligible way will it succeed in being anything to them",[1] if it does not itself bear a relation to the terms? Thus, there must be not only the terms and the relation between them, but also a relation between each of the terms and a relation. But if this is so, then the same problem is repeated about these further subsidiary relations, and we will require further relations between them and their terms and so on ad infinitum.

Supposing Bradley meant this argument to be directed

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1. Appearance and Reality, pp. 27-28.

against the externality of relations, could it then be taken as inflicting a serious blow on the doctrine of external relations? I do not think so. For the difficulty that he might have imagined his opponent to be facing does not really confront his opponent. No relations, whether external or internal need to be themselves related to the relata. A relation simply relates, that is its special capacity, and in order to relate its terms, it does not have to be related to them. Gum attaches a stamp to an envelope. But in order to do that it does not require another thing to attach it to the stamp. [It is to be noted here that there is another possible interpretation of the argument which, however, offers no criticism of relations. Whenever a relation relates two or more terms, it avowedly has to its terms the relation expressed by saying that it relates them. This involves an infinite regress, but undoubtedly a harmless one. If we interpret the first part of the locution 'in order for a relation to hold between terms it must itself be related to them' as stating a prior stipulation, then of course the claim becomes dubious, because if relationship assumes or presupposes relationship, it is undoubtedly a vicious concept. But if the purport of the first part be 'if a relation relates its terms', then we are confronted with the consequences of relationship, and even if relationship entails relationship infinitely, it does not prove the

invalidity of the concept of relation.]*

The reason why Bradley thinks that relations, in order to relate, must be related, is that he is perhaps confusing relation with something else.   Indeed, it has been pointed out by Russell that, "Bradley conceives a relation as something just as substantial as its terms, and not radically different in kind."[1]   That is why he is troubled by the relation of a relation to the terms it relates.

The infinite regress concerned is demonstrated by Bradley also in the second chapter of 'Appearance and Reality', where he puts it in the form: "The problem" (of relation)" is not solved by taking relations as independently real. For, if so, the qualities and their relation fall entirely apart, . . . Or, we have to make a new relation between the old relation and the terms; which, when it is made, does not help us.   It . . . . itself demands a new relation . . ."[2]   Relations should not, according to Bradley, be considered 'independently', they should not 'fall apart' from their terms, they should not be 'between' the terms.

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1. An Outline of Philosophy, B. Russell, (London, 1927), p.263.

2. Appearance and Reality, p.18.

* I am indebted for the remarks put inside the square brackets to Prof. Wollheim. See Wollheim's 'F.H.Bradley', pp. 115-116.

Does he not seem to be suggesting that like qualities they should not be 'independent' of the thing; they should not 'fall apart' from the things of which they are qualities; but should inhere 'in' the things?

Bradley's being influenced by the false analogy between a relation and a quality is betrayed by the language he adopts in many places of the third chapter of 'Appearance and Reality'. Everything, we have seen him to be asserting, is related to every other thing by the relation of difference at least. Difference according to him is a relation. This difference, he argues, must fall either outside the things which are different, or it must fall inside a thing. But if it falls inside a thing, then he maintains, it "separates each" thing "into two qualities in relation."[1]

The difficult situation in which Bradley imagines the adherent of the theory of external relation to be exists, if at all, only because of a misconception of the nature of relations. This confusion between a relation and a quality is also evident in those writings of his where he explicitly fights against the theory of external relations in order to make room for the relatively truer doctrine of internal relations. Let us therefore turn our attention to those writings. As I have said before, there is mainly one

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1. Appearance and Reality, p.24.

source of his demurrer against external relations, Appendix
B of 'Appearance and Reality."   The unfinished essay entitled
'Relations' and several places of the 'Essays on Truth and
Reality' also provide some demurrer against the theory.
We shall begin with the Appendix B.

      Bradley deals with the question, "Are qualities
and in general are terms altered necessarily by the relations
into which they enter?"[1]   And the implication of the phrase
'alter necessarily' seems to be that in the absence of the
relations the terms would be necessarily different.   He
takes it for granted that relations are qualities.   "Our
question", he writes, "does not ask if terms are in any
sense whatever qualified by their relations.   For everyone
. . . admits this in some sense, . . ."[2]   And he understands
the externalists to maintain that the absence of a relation
makes no difference to the terms.   It becomes then easy
for him to deny the externality of relations, since there
does not appear to be much reason for calling some qualities
of particular things their qualities and not other things',
if their presence or absence makes no difference to the things.

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1.   Appearance and Reality, pp. 513-514.
2.   Ibid, p. 514.

"At first sight", Bradley agrees, "obviously such
external relations seem possible . . . They seem given to
us, . . . in change of spatial position and again also
in comparison."[1]   But if relations such as these make
no difference to the terms, he asks "What is the meaning
and sense of qualifying the terms by it?   If in short it
is external to the terms, how can it possibly be true of
them?"[2]   In fact, if the absence of some qualities of X
and Y makes no difference to X and Y at all, why should we say
at all that they are qualities of X and Y;   why should we say
that the propositions ascribing those qualities to X and Y
are true of X and Y?   But not only is Bradley misrepresent-
ing the nature of relations by taking them to be qualities,
he is misrepresenting the contention of the externalists
in another respect also.   He understands externalists to
suggest that the alteration of spatial positions etc.
makes no difference at all to the things.   But in fact what
the externalist would assert is not that the change of
spatial position implies no change of any property of the
things at all;   of course it implies a change of property;
But it does not imply a change of the essential properties
of things.   We will explain our contention more fully on
another occasion later in this chapter.[*]

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*   See page 65.

1.   Appearance and Reality, p.514.

2.   Ibid.

So far we have shown that Bradley construed a
relation as a quality of the things it relates.   But now
I want to show how Bradley misconceived relation not only
as qualifying the terms related, but also as qualifying the
situation in which it occurs.

In some places Bradley explicitly says that
relations are characteristics or qualities of relational
wholes. Relations are, according to him, impossible outside
a totality or unity.   "Relations are unmeaning except within
and on the basis of a substantial whole",[1] "does not a relation
imply an underlying unity and an inclusive whole?"[2]   "Both"
(relation and immediate experience) "are alike in being ways
that hold a diversity in unity."[3] "Now the experienced
relational situation must - to speak loosely - be viewed as
a whole which has parts."[4]   Bradley's point is not just
that relations are always to be found inside unities or wholes,
but is rather that they are 'of' wholes, or are qualities of
wholes.   They qualify wholes composed of terms, and not
terms in their supposed individuality.   "Certainly every
content and aspect of the relational situation as an exper-
ienced fact may and must be taken as qualifying in some sense

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1.   Appearance and Reality, p. 125.

2.   Essays on Truth and Reality, Bradley, p.193.

3.   Collected Essays, Bradley, p. 634.

4.   Ibid, p. 636.

the situation as a whole;"[1]   "the relations themselves
cannot exist except within and as the adjectives of an
underlying unity,"[2] i. ." a relation is unmeaning, unless
both itself and the relateds are the adjectives of a
whole."[3]

Now whatever might be the merits of Bradley's
arguments about the internality of relations in other
respects, we cannot, in any way, allow this misrepresentation
of the nature of relations, i.e., representation of relations
as qualities.   We have already hinted briefly at the
impossibility of taking relations as qualities in the
previous chapter,[*] although we did not make there the
distinction between treating a relation as a quality of the
relational situation or of the related terms.   Following
Russell[**] we can now point out particularly, that, there is
no possible way in which we can treat at least asymmetrical
relations as qualities of the relational complex.   Take the
case of the relation between two people, X who is 20 years
old, and Y who is 19 years old.   The proposition 'X is older
than Y', it might be suggested, asserts of the whole composed
by them viz. (XY), that '(XY) contains diversity of age'.

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1.   Collected Essays, Bradley, p.636.

2.   Appearance and Reality, p.512.

3.   Ibid, p.394.

*   See pages 26-29.

**   Principles of Mathematics, B.Russell, pp.224-226.

But such a proposition cannot be said to give us the entire fact about the relational complex.   For such a whole (XY) must be different from another whole where Y is older than X and which might be represented in the form (YX).   And this distinction cannot be explained in any way save by reference to the relation of the components X and Y, where X stands in the relation of 'older than' to Y.   For (XY) and (YX) consist of precisely the same parts;   their difference lies solely in the fact that 'older than' is, in the first case, a relation of X to Y, in the second, a relation of Y to X.

Neither can relations be viewed as qualities of the relata.   In showing the impossibility of such a treatment of relations we shall once again follow Russell.[*]   The advocate of treating relations as qualities will probably say that the proposition 'X is greater than Y' embodies two propositions, each imputing a certain property to X and Y respectively, the putative qualities being the magnitudes of X and Y.   But these propositions will not, in that case, give the whole meaning expressed by the proposition 'X is greater than Y'.   In order to convey that meaning he will be forced to say 'X's magnitude is greater than that

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[*]   Principles of Mathematics, B. Russell, p.222.

of Y' and thus he will fail to get rid of the relation of greater and less which he attempted to do away with.

Bradley brings out a number of objections against externality and also a number of arguments in favour of internality of relations in the Appendix B referred to above. But in fact he seems to be directing his effort mainly towards demolishing the foundations of the opposite view rather than towards trying to construct a new building (as of course one would expect in view of his total opposition to relations in Chapter III of 'Appearance and Reality'). Take for example the insufficiency he tries to demonstrate in the position of an externalist.   He says that "the terms" and their external "relations, do not by themselves include all the facts,"[1] every relational complex implies a whole.   "In various respects" this "whole has a character . . . which cannot be shown to consist barely in mere terms and mere relations between them."[2]   Take for example the relation between a table and a chair which is to the left of it.   This relational complex cannot be expressed merely by the terms 'the table' and 'the chair' and the relation of being 'to the left of'.   If this arrangement is altered, and the table is placed to the left of the chair, the relational complex acquires a new property.   And of what, if not

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1.   Appearance and Reality, p.515.

2.   Ibid, p. 515.

of the terms can we predicate this quality? "to predicate
this new result barely of the external relations seems,
. . . impossible."[1]   So far as the relation 'being to the
left of' is concerned, this relation cannot be said to
have changed.   But this problem does not really compel the
externalist to give up his stand-point.   He can simply say
that the change of position has **invested** the table and the
chair with new properties, viz., the table now acquires the
property 'to the left of the chair' and the chair the
property 'to the right of the table'.   But such a change
does not necessarily change the table and the chair.
If the acquiring of these properties altered the essential
properties of the table and the chair, then only they
might be thought to have changed necessarily.

This brings us to a very central notion of Bradley's
arguments against the externality of relations.   He would
say that the reason why we think that such a change has not
necessarily altered them is that we identify the things
with certain general characteristics like 'table' and 'chair';
we think of them as of certain kinds, we refer to them only
as instances of certain universals, so that whatever changes
they might have undergone they still remain table and chair.
But to think of them as 'table' and 'chair' or as Bradley calls

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1.   Appearance and Reality,   p.515.

it, as 'characters' is to start with "premises" which "were not true or real,"[1] and which will give us a wrong conclusion, viz., that change of relations does not change the things themselves.   If on the other hand you take the particular things not as 'characters' but as concrete existing things or as "existences", then you will be bound to regard the position of the externalist as false.   Thus we see Bradley arguing:[*] "But an important if obvious distinction seems here overlooked.   For a thing may remain unaltered if you identify it with a certain character, . . . If, . . . you take a billiard ball and a man in abstraction from place, they will of course . . . be indifferent to changes of place.   But . . . neither of them, if regarded so, is a thing which actually exists; each is more or less a valid abstraction.   But take them as existing things and take them without mutilation, and you must regard them as determined by their places and qualified by the whole material system into which they enter. . . . The billiard ball, . . . if taken apart from its place . . . in the whole, is not an existence but a character, and that character can remain unchanged, though the existing thing is altered

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1.   Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.521.

*   Italics used in this quotation are mine.

with its changed existence."[1]

A number of interesting issues are imbedded in this passage which we must consider to a certain extent. In the first place, what does Bradley mean by 'taking'? Does he mean by it 'thinking of'? If so, how else can we think of a thing except by catching it up in a mesh of universals, by thinking of it as of a certain kind?

It is true that in our experience things appear to us as qualified by a number of characteristics simult-aneously, e.g., the table appears in our experience as being something of a certain sort, of a particular shape, size, colour, as occupying a certain space and so on. As Prof. Wollheim shows in his book on Bradley, according to Bradley, "Things are, and come to us as, wholes; and to understand them we must understand them as wholes."[2] What we on the other hand in our thought do is to carve off a part of a whole which is a collection of properties, say the abstract universal 'table' of which a particular table is an instance, and refer to this whole by means of this single property 'table' and thus get ourselves involved in abstraction. In this way Bradley tries to condemn thought and reasoning in order to make room for immediate experience, and says that

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1. Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.517.

2. F.H.Bradley, R.Wollheim, p.109.

thought can give us only partial or relative truth. But actually this condemnation of thought is illegitimate. Because his statement that 'thought can give us only partial or relative truth' then would lead to a peculiar self-refuting position. If every piece of reasoning confines us only in partial truth, then even the reasoning that every piece of reasoning gives us partial truth itself becomes only partially true.[*] He can thus condemn reasoning only at the cost of defeating his own position.

Anyway, the whole theory of external relations, according to Bradley's analysis, turns out to be based on vicious abstractions. Why do we after all have to consider the sheet of paper on which I am writing to have <u>in itself</u> remained the <u>identical sheet</u> even though it has been smeared all over with writing? Is it not due to a prejudice in us of distinguishing between essential and accidental or external properties of things? There is not in fact any absolute and objective distinction between 'intrinsical' or essential and 'external' or inessential properties. This distinction is really the result of abstraction from actual existences <u>by thought</u>, the result of identifying a thing with an 'identical character'. Such an abstraction might be useful yet it cannot possess absolute validity. In fact, "Every-

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[*]   We shall speak about a similar point on the treatment
       of partial truths on p. 78.

thing other than this identical character may be called relatively external . . . absolutely external it cannot be."[1]   He says, "for a limited purpose, you can divide your individual term, and take one part as what you call 'essential'.   And so far as this division is made, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic relations will hold.   Whenever that part of your term which you select as its essence remains outside of some relation, . . . the relation so far is extrinsic.   And . . . where the entrance of the term includes, . . . the essence also as in one with the whole term, the relation here is intrinsic.   But no such distinction, . . . can have more than relative validity."[2] A relational property like 'being smeared with writing by me' is just as essential as the property 'being a sheet of paper' is.   At this point we ought to remind ourselves of our discussion in the previous chapter of the Aristotelian treatment of essence and accident, and on his insistence on treating relations as accidents.   We have tried to show that our regarding certain qualities as essential to certain classes or things does not depend merely on our subjective and arbitrary selection.   Hence it seems possible to make an objective distinction between essential and non-essential qualities of things.   We shall now try to show the

1.   Appearance and Reality, Bradley, pp. 517-518.

2.   Collected Essays, Bradley, pp. 645-646.

impossibility involved in Bradley's claim about taking
relations or relational properties as essences. (I use
this disjunction here, because when philosophers speak of
relations being essential they often mean that relational
properties of things are essential to them. Cf. Moore's
Comment quoted below).

That Bradley held relational properties of things
also to be essential is evident from some such remarks of
his as the following, where he tries to explain what he
means by all relations being internal.* "a relation must
at both ends affect, and pass into, the being of its terms."[1]
"every relation, . . . essentially penetrates the being of
its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical;"[2] "qualities
and in general
ʌ . . of terms ... are altered necessarily by the relations."[3]
Similar remarks are made by Joachim in his book 'The Nature
of Truth': "All relations 'qualify' or 'modify' or 'make
a difference 'to the terms between which they hold.' **

Now it is not easy to make out what these state-
ments signify. Yet one sense of such statements is that
relations are essential to the terms. A similar suggestion
is made by Moore in his essay, 'External and Internal
Relations', where he tries to give a certain interpretation

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1. Appearance and Reality, p.322.

2. Ibid, p.347.

3. Ibid, p.514.
* Italics used in these quotations are mine.
** Cf. The Nature of Truth, H.Joachim, p.12; Italics
used are mine.

of the above statements. He rightly observes that 'philo-
sophers who talk of relations being internal, often actually
mean by 'relations' 'relational properties'."[1] Reflecting
on the use of expressions like 'affect', 'modify', he remarks
that part of the meaning of expressions like 'all relations
modify their terms' is that "In the case of every relational
property which a thing has, it is always true that the thing
which has it would have been different if it had not had that
property;"[2] [And this might have been suggested by some
such cases as where the possession of a relational property
like 'being held in the flame' actually modifies a thing
like a 'sealing-wax'. We can say that the sealing-wax
would not have been in a melted state if it had not been
in the flame. Now it is to be kept in mind that the case
cited here is a case of causal efficacy; it does not
establish a metaphysical point. Yet I think that the meta-
physical doctrine might have been suggested by a case like
this.] The above statement might again be put in the form
that -"in the case of every relational property, it can
always be truly asserted of any term A which has that
property, that any term which had not had it would necessarily
have been different from A."[3] And such a statement might,

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1.   Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, 1922, p.282.

2.   Ibid, p.283.

3.   Ibid, p.284.

according to Moore, be said to express the dogma of internal relations.

Moore rightly discerns a sense of logical implication in phrases like 'would necessarily have been'. This phrase is linked in meaning to 'follow from'. For example, one way of saying with regard to properties P and Q that any term which had had P would necessarily have had Q, is 'from the proposition with regard to any given term that it has P, it follows that the term has Q.' Thus according to the dogma of internal relations the terms of a relation must under all circumstances have it. With regard to any relational property P, the proposition 'A has P' becomes a necessary proposition. And one way of expressing the fact that a certain property P is essential to a thing A is surely that the proposition 'A has P' is a necessary one.

Moore objects to such a dogma by saying that, in the case of many relational properties, the fact that the things have them is a mere matter of fact. "it seems . . . evident in many cases", writes Moore, "that a term which has a certain relational property, might quite well not have had it: that, for instance, from the mere proposition that this is this, it by no means follows that this has to other things all the relations which it in fact has."[1]   Thus it

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1.   Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, p.306.

cannot be said with regard to every relational property
that the proposition asserting that a thing has it, is a
necessary proposition.

Moore says that it may be true that A has P, and
yet it is not true that from the proposition that a thing
has not got P it follows that the thing is other than A.
But he thinks that the reason for disputing this fact is
that it is in fact true that if A has P, and X has not, it
does follow that X is other than A.   He maintains that
the internalists confuse with one another two propositions
one of which he admits to be true, viz., (1) that if A
has P, and X has not, it does follow that X is other than A,
and the other which he maintains to be false, viz., (2) that
if A has P, then from the proposition with regard to any
term X that it has not got P, it follows that X is other
than A.   It is a mistake, he thinks, to suppose that
proposition (2) follows from proposition (1).

Moore tries to show precisely that proposition
(2) does not follow from proposition (1) with the help of
certain symbolic devices.   He puts the true proposition
with which the internalists are confusing the dogma of
internal relations, viz. (1) that if anything has a relational
property and another thing has not, it does follow that
the latter is other than the former, into symbolic form as
follows (taking P as a relational property):

(1) "What we assert of P when we say

$$XP \text{ entails } \{\overline{YP} \quad * \quad (\overline{Y = X})\}$$

can be truly asserted of every relational property."

In the same way, i.e., by taking P as a relational property, he symbolises the dogma of internal relations (2), that if any term has any relational property then from the proposition with regard to any term that it has not got the relational property it follows that the latter term is other than the former term, as follows:

(2) "What we assert of P when we say,

$$XP \quad * \quad \{\overline{YP} \text{ entails } (\overline{Y = X})\}$$

can be truly predicated of every relational property."

We must stop here a little to explain two of the symbols used above, namely, 'entails' and '*'.   In the first place, 'p entails q' means 'q follows from p'. Secondly, by putting the symbol '*' between two propositions, for example, p and q, as in 'p * q', we briefly express the proposition that 'It is not the case both that p is true and q is false.'

That (2) does not follow from (1) can, Moore says, be seen as follows.   It can follow from (1), if from any proposition of the form 'p entails (q * r)' the proposition 'p * (q entails r)' can follow.   And that it does not follow

can be seen by considering the following three propositions:

(a) 'All students in the degree course are more than 18 years of age.'

(b) 'The young boy who lives in the other flat is a student in the degree course.'

(c) 'The young boy who lives in the other flat is more than 18 years of age.'

We can surely maintain that (a) here does absolutely __entail__ (b * c). It absolutely follows from (a) that 'The young boy who lives in the other flat is a student in the degree course' and 'The young boy who lives in the other flat is not more than 18 years of age', are not, as a matter of fact, both true. But it by no means follows from this that 'a * (b entails c)'. For what this latter proposition means is "It is not the case both that 'a' is true and that (b entails c)' is false". And, as a matter of fact, '(b entails c)' is quite certainly false. From the proposition (b) "The young boy . . . student in the degree course" the proposition (c) "The young boy . . . 18 years of age" does __not__ follow. It is, therefore, clearly not the case that every proposition of the form 'p entails (q * r)' entails the corresponding proposition of the form 'p * (q entails r)'.

A similar line of attack against the view that all relations are internal seems to be pursued by Prof.

Ayer in a paper which he read in a symposium on 'Internal
relations', which is published in the Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 1935,   Supplementary volume XIV.
He says in that paper that the claim of an internalist to
the effect that, 'if A has the relational property P, then
anything which has not got P is necessarily other than A'
is simply another way of asserting that 'the proposition
"A has P" is analytic.'   And one feature of analytic
propositions is surely that such propositions are necessary
ones.   We find Prof. Ayer saying "And now we may state the
dogma of internal relations . . .   We find that to assert
that all relations are internal to their terms is equivalent
to asserting with regard to any relational proposition that
if it is true then it is in fact analytic."[1]   He finds it not very
difficult to show that this is false, since in order to do
that "we have only to produce examples of relational propo-
sitions which may very well be true, without being analytically
true."[2]   For instance, it is in fact true that I am now
perceiving a piece of paper, and that the sofa in my room
is in front of the fire-place.   But none of these true
propositions is analytic.   "Although false, it is not self-
contradictory to say that I am not now perceiving a piece of

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1.   P.A.S. 1935, Supplementary volume XIV, p.175.

2.   Ibid, p.175.

paper, or that the sofa in my room is not in front of the fire-place,"[1]

It might now be objected by Bradley that the reason why it is considered that a proposition asserting 'A has P', where P is a relational property, is not a necessary one is that you are characterising a thing by a certain abstract universal like 'human being' or 'sofa', whereas in reality these things are characterised 'by the whole material system into which they enter', without reference to which they become abstractions.   But I do not think that such a demurrer is a valid one, because the basis of Bradley's objection is itself controversial.   He holds that reality is one; multiplicity is, roughly speaking, aspects of this unique Reality.   Therefore between different elements of the universe there is a necessary connection, so much so that you cannot take away any element of it apart from the others.

But the type of Monism that Bradley advocates cannot be supposed to be above criticism.   He tries to explain the apparent multiplicity of the world with the help of the famous principle of 'identity in difference'. Without this the monist cannot give any satisfactory account of the world.   Yet the principle of identity in difference is impossible if we adhere to Monism.   The reason is that

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1.   P.A.S. 1935 Supplementary volume XIV, p.175.

such a principle involves many partial truths, which combine
into one whole of truth.   But in strict Monism partial
truths are not only not quite true;   they cannot even be
true at all (or false, for that matter).   The monist claims
that they are 'partly true'.   But in order even to 'be
partly true' they must 'wholly subsist', which is impossible
according to Bradleyan Monism, as that would create a
plurality.   Hence there cannot be any partial truths on a
monistic view.

        We see then that Bradley's monistic position is
not above criticism.   But since this monistic position is
the basis of the objection that Bradley is raising here,
there arises doubt as to the validity of the objection
itself.

        Apparent externality of relations is, according
to Bradley, due only to our ignorance, our short-sightedness
so to speak.   All relations are necessary.   None can be
mere conjunctions.   We might think that a particular quality
like red-hairedness is absolutely indifferent to its relations.
Red-hairedness might appear in different people of different
ages, different sexes and different states of health.   It
has therefore relations with all these different character-
istics.   But none of these relations are essential to it.
For could we not know red-hairedness without knowing these
things?   Bradley's answer to this is that although we do

have some knowledge of red-hairedness, we do not have full knowledge of it. Red-hairedness is an integral part of an organism and is indeed so bound up, for example, with the structure of hair-fibres, and this in turn with all manner of constitutional factors determining racial and individual differences, that our notion of it supplies us with an extremely meagre acquaintance with it. Full knowledge of red-hairedness would, in fact, involve knowing the entire universe. It is only because of ignorance that we think that we know red-hairedness without knowing all the relations of red-hairedness with all these characteristics. "if you could have a perfect relational knowledge of the world, . . . you could from the nature of red-hairedness reconstruct all the red-haired men. In such perfect knowledge you could start internally from any one character in the Universe, and you could from that pass to the rest."[1]

But here again, as we have shown a little while ago, Bradley is basing his case on something which is highly controversial. Different elements of the universe are, according to him, aspects of the one Reality, so that you cannot know any one element fully unless you know the rest of the universe. But as we have shown a little while ago, Bradley's monistic position cannot be held to be above

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1. Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.520.

criticism.   Hence since Bradley bases this objection on his monistic position, we come to doubt the validity of the objection.

Moreover, according to Bradley, nothing short of knowing the entire universe would amount to 'fully knowing' anything.   But then he will be led to a self-defeating position.   Because if everything other than knowing the entire universe amounts to partial knowledge, then even this piece of knowledge would also be 'partial knowledge'.   And we will then not even 'know fully' that there is such a thing as 'full knowledge'.

Bradley employs several relatively less strong arguments for internality of relations, not all of which do I want to consider here because of lack of space.   I do not think that any of these arguments possess any great strength. (Neither do I think that even the combination of them can have much force, because these different arguments do not appear to supplement one another.)

An example of such relatively unimportant arguments is the following.   Whenever there is a relation there is a whole or unity.   "And, where the whole is different, the terms that qualify it . . . must so far be different, and so far therefore by becoming elements in a fresh unity the terms must be altered."[1]   Now it is true that when we have a physical whole like a chair, its parts might be said to

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1. Appearance and Reality, pp. 518 - 519.

constitute a unity.   If the whole is altered and we
construct a table out of the parts of this chair, the parts
undergo considerable changes. The arms are converted into
legs of the table, the seat to its top.   The arms then
would no longer remain arms nor the seat the seat.   Now
it seems doubtful whether such changes could be considered
to be essential changes of the things related. Although
the conversion of the seat of a chair into the top of a
table is a considerable change (since the seat can no longer
be called a 'seat'), it seems controversial whether it could
be regarded as an essential change of the things related.
It all seems to depend on how you choose to describe the
things related.   If you describe the objects related as the
'seat of a chair' or as the 'top of a table' then of course
such a conversion might be regarded as an essential change.
If on the other hand you describe the things as 'pieces of
wood', then you can hardly call such a conversion an
essential change.

          And I wonder, if all relational complexes could
be said to make wholes or unities.   Where, for example,
is the unity in a relation of difference between a pen and
a pencil?   Bradley might of course try to defend his case
by saying that the pencil and the pen cannot be considered
to be different at all if they do not have unity in some
respect such as both being used for purposes of writing.

But I wonder what the point of unity between a pen and
an abstract quality like kindness might conceivably be!
Perhaps it will be said that the point of unity consists
in the fact that they are both thought of by me.   Now such
a unity will be found between any pair of things that I
care to select.   And undoubtedly some artificiality is
associated with this conception of unity.   How, for Bradley,
do I manage to unite the pen and kindness by the relation
'being thought about by me' unless they already each stand
in some common unity with me (so that I can be in the
relation 'thinking about' with respect to them) and so with
each other?

But even if we admit unity in every relational
situation, there is still room for doubt whether Bradley's
claim that 'by becoming elements in a fresh unity the
terms must be altered'* is a valid one.   Two pencils which
are both red have a unity as regards their colour.   Now
one of them might become an element of a fresh unity, when
for example the second pencil is cut so that the first
pencil comes, without itself changing, to have the same
size as the second.   Here then we have a case of unity
where one of the terms forming the unity does not necessarily
alter by becoming an element of a fresh unity.   The same
term may become an element of one unity in one respect,
and of another in another.

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* See bottom of page 80 - end of first paragraph of p.81.

Perhaps this looks like begging the question against Bradley. He would perhaps insist that by becoming an element in a fresh unity a term necessarily changes. But I fail to understand in which respect the particular pencil of which I am speaking can be said to have changed! Has it been completely changed into something else? Has it altered in respect of its shape, or colour or size? Perhaps it will be said that the change is in the following respect: in one case I am thinking of the pencil as having the same colour as another, in the other I am thinking of it as having the same size as another. But then the difference would lie in my thought only, not in the object of which I am thinking.

Bradley tries to exploit the alleged unity involved in relational situations as a weapon against the externalists in other places in his writings. He seems to say that if you start with discrete units merely, how can a collection of them produce a unity? Take for example the passage in the essay, 'Relations': "And from terms taken as in themselves unrelated, and from a relation not taken as itself their relation, there is no logical way to the union . . . required for, the relational fact. . . . Or, to regain this, we may fall back blindly on a form of experience which in its essence is not relational."[1] As remarked just now,

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1. Collected Essays, Bradley, p.643.

I cannot see the necessity of regarding all relational
situations as unities. And I think that Bradley's effort
to seek unity in every relational situation is an effect of
his trying to construct the relational situation on the
model of 'immediate experience' or 'feeling'. My first
objection to such a view is that I do not see the necessity
of viewing the relational situation on the model of feeling.
Secondly, there are of course indivisible unities between
relata in certain relational situations, as for example
in the relation between a part to the whole which unity
might be said to imply the internality of the relation
concerned in <u>some sense</u>, although not in an absolute sense.[*]
But this does not establish an indivisible unity in every
relational situation, and hence the problem of recreating
such a unity out of discrete units does not appear in all
spheres.

We have made a long critical survey of Bradley's
views on relations. During the course of this survey we
have tried to show in various ways that his arguments
against external relations and for internal relations do not
stand the test of criticisms. We have also tried to show
that two of the very important views Bradley holds with
regard to relations, namely, that relations belong to the
essences of things and that they qualify the things or the
relational situations, are completely wrong. Pluralists

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[*]   See my discussion of this topic on p. 120 below.

who support the externality of relations have tried time
and again to point to the falsity of these views.   Explicit
formulations of the pluralist's views that relations do not
always belong to the essences of things and that they are
not qualities of anything can be found in the writings of
contemporary philosophers like Moore, Ayer and Russell.
But the origins of these views can be traced as far back
as the writings of the philosophers of the earliest times
like Aristotle.

CHAPTER III

SOME OTHER ARGUMENTS ON INTERNAL RELATIONS

We have made an extensive study of Bradley's
arguments for the internality of all relations in the
preceding chapter.   We have done that with a particular
object in mind.   We have remarked there that Bradley is
the chief exponent of the doctrine of internal relations.
Many leading idealists down from the nineteenth century
to the present day have been greatly influenced by Bradley's
arguments and supported the doctrine of internal relations
with arguments similar to his.   So we examined Bradley's
arguments in some detail with the hope that we would be
in a good position to refute the doctrine of internal
relations if we can refute Bradley's arguments on the inter-
nality of relations.

In the present chapter we shall have a look at
some of the main arguments employed by philosophers other
than Bradley in support of the doctrine of internal
relations and try to see whether we can refute them.   In
the course of our study of these arguments we shall try to
show that a great majority of them are essentially similar
to Bradley's arguments and that the same objections that
apply to his arguments apply to them also, while there are

a few other arguments which have a more independent character and demand separate treatment.   Our programme in examining these arguments will hence be twofold: (I) examining those arguments which are essentially similar to Bradley's arguments, and (II) examining the more original ones.   Accordingly I propose to make two sections, the first of which will deal with the first part of the programme,[*] and the second with the second.

Section I

In this section we shall start with some of Joachim's arguments as we find them in his 'The Nature of Thought'.   He says, ". . . a purely external relation is in the end meaningless and impossible."[1]   To admit a relation to be external is, according to him, to make a relation a kind of third thing separate from the two relata. And if a relation is a thing, it will itself need to be related to the things which are independent of it.   This argument is very close to the argument Bradley employs in the third chapter of 'Appearance and Reality' in order to demonstrate the infinite regress involved in taking relations

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1.   The Nature of Thought, H. Joachim, p. 11.

*   There will be an obvious exception to this programme. For reasons that will be explained later on p.89 we shall consider one argument of independent character in Section I.

as fully real which we have discussed on page 52
of our second chapter. We must remember our remark in the
last chapter* that although this argument is primarily
directed against the reality of all relations, yet we can
find here an embryonic form of the argument against the
externality of relations which is later developed more
fully in many places of 'Appearance and Reality'. Hence
it could be regarded in some sense as an argument against
the externality of relations and we shall do well to note
the similarity of this argument to the argument Joachim
uses against the externality of relations (although Joachim
did not believe relations to be unreal). Bradley argues
there that in order to hold between terms a relation must
be something to them. But if it is to be anything to them
it must itself bear a relation to the terms. And then the
second relation will also have to be related to the first
and so on ad infinitum.

Like Bradley Joachim also takes relations to be
qualities of the terms. He says that he does not maintain
that every relation is nothing but the adjectives of its
terms. But he maintains that "every relation at least
qualifies its terms, and is so far an adjective of them,

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* See pages 47-48.

even if it be also something besides."[1]

He argues that "so far as A and B are related, they are eo ipso interdependent features of something other than either of them singly:[2] This reminds us of Bradley's insistence on the presence of a unity and a whole in every case of relation, which admission is impossible if relation is taken to be external. Internalists seem here to be pointing out to the externalists that you cannot obtain the indivisible unity present in every relational complex with the sole help of discrete units which are not by their very nature united.

I am afraid we will only bore the reader with repetitions if we try to assess the validity of the kind of arguments quoted above after all we have said in the previous chapter.

Bosanquet has given another quite interesting argument for the internality of all relations in his 'Logic' which argument, though it has got a more or less independent character, we want to discuss in Section I for the reason that in Section II we want to discuss those independent arguments which form themselves into a definite kind into which kind the present argument cannot be fitted. He says

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1. The Nature of Thought, H.Joachim, pp. 11-12.

2. Ibid, p.12.

that all relations are internal in the sense that they are
all "grounded in the nature of the related terms."[1]   He
prefers the phrase 'relevant relations' by which he means
"relations which are connected with the properties of their
terms, so that any alteration of relations involves an
alteration of properties and vice versa."[2]   Now it is not
very clear what Bosanquet means by all this.   But he seems
to mean something like the following.

It seems impossible to conceive that a relation
could relate its terms if it were not somehow rooted in their
nature.   As he explains, "In a large proportion of cases
the relevancy of the relations to the properties of the
related terms involves a community of kind.   You cannot
have a spatial relation between terms which are not in space.
You cannot have a moral relation between terms which are
not members of a moral world."[3]   In all cases the properties
of the terms are _relevant_ to the relations in which they
stand to each other.   There is undoubtedly some truth in
his contention.   For a relation to occur at all a necessary,
though not always a sufficient, condition of its occurrence
must be found in the properties of the terms.   In the case

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1.   Logic, B. Bosanquet, p.277.

2.   Ibid.

3.   Ibid, pp. 277-278.

of mathematical relations like 'half' and 'double', the
nature of the terms is a sufficient as well as necessary
condition of the appearance of the relations.   That 4 is
half of 8 follows solely from the nature of the terms
themselves.   In the case of a relation like spatial con-
tiguity of a book to a table, some of the properties of
the terms form the necessary condition of its appearance.
Because it is a book therefore it can be kept on a table.
An abstract quality like kindness cannot be kept on a table.

But even if we grant that there is some truth in
the contention of these internalists that relations are
grounded in the nature of the terms or that the qualities
of the terms are relevant to their relations, this does not
by itself prove that the relations are internal in every
case in the sense that the terms could not be what they are
if the relations were different.   The former could prove
the latter if the nature of the terms were in every case
the sufficient as well as the necessary condition of the
appearance of the relation.   (We have already noted this
fact in the second chapter).   If P and Q have the qualities
a and b, and if they are related by virtue of a and b and by
virtue of a and b only, then we could say that if they are
not so related, they do not have the qualities a and b.

Bosanquet's opinion regarding the internality of
relations is very well summed up in the following quotation

from his 'Logic', "Relations are true of their terms. They express their positions in complexes, which positions elicit their behaviour, their self-maintenance in the world of things."[1]   The first sentence of the quotation appears to be implying that if the relations are purely external, we cannot sensibly speak of them as true of their terms. If the terms are not related by virtue of their own nature, then a proposition asserting such a relation cannot be true of the terms.   To say that relations (or more properly speaking propositions asserting relations) are true of the things related, is to say that they are not made true by us. In fact truth is truth irrespective of whether anyone acknowledges it as true or not.   And he appears to be arguing that the relations which are true of any terms are made true by the nature of the terms themselves and are therefore internal to them.   (Cf. Bradley's remarks: "If in short" a relation "is external to the terms, how can it possibly be true of them?   To put the same thing otherwise, if we merely make the conclusion, is that conclusion a true one?"[2]) But, as a matter of fact, all we can say from the fact that relations are true of the terms is that relations are grounded in the nature of the terms.   And as remarked just

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1.   Bosanquet, Logic, p.278.

2.   Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.514.

now, we cannot pass from this to the conclusion that in the absence of any given relations the terms would always be altered essentially.

The second sentence of the quotation also cannot establish the internality of relations.

It is true that in every case of relation there is a complex[*] and the terms in relation <u>sometimes</u> occupy a peculiar position in it, such that if that particular position is altered, the properties of the relata undergo some changes. Bosanquet seems to be influenced here considerably by Bradley's insistence (which we considered in the middle of the second chapter) that we will have a different relational complex if we change the sense of the relation. Hence if the sense of the relation is altered in these cases, the position of the terms will be altered and consequently the properties of the terms will undergo substantial change. But it must be noticed, in the first place, that the terms in relation <u>do not always</u> occupy a peculiar position such that the change of that position does necessarily involve some change of the properties of the relata. Take for example the symmetrical relation of 'equal to'. Whatever the terms might be that are related by the relation of equality they do not occupy a peculiar position in the relational situation consisting of the terms

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[*] This does not imply that in every case of relation there is a unity or whole. All that it implies is that every case of relation is a complex case consisting of many particulars.

and the relation. If A is equal to B, then B is also equal to A. Even in some asymmetrical relations, such as 'to the left of', the terms might change places without altering their non-relational properties (though of course not without altering relational ones such as position). Secondly, even in those places where the terms in relation do occupy each a peculiar place, the alteration of the position of the terms does not necessarily invest the relata with substantially different properties. For example, A which is 2 inches long has the relation 'longer than' to B where B is 1 inch long. Now the positions of A and B cannot be altered without bringing in some change in the length of either A or B. Yet the internalist cannot claim such a change to be a substantial change absolutely. Whether it is so or not depends on how you describe A and B.[*]

SECTION II

Among recent advocates of the theory of internal relations we see a tendency to draw support for their doctrine from the analysis of the relation of cause and effect. We get a clear glimpse of this tendency in the writings of people like A. C. Ewing and Prof. B. Blanshard.

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[*] For a discussion on a similar topic see page 81.

In his book titled 'Idealism' Ewing discusses the nature of
causal connection and tries to establish that the universe
is a system with the help of two arguments, viz., (a) all
things in the universe are either directly or indirectly
causally related to the rest of the universe and (b) being
causally related involves being related by a relation of log-
ical entailment.   The presence of this relation implies,
according to him, that the nature of any one thing, taken
by itself, is incomplete and internally incoherent without
the whole system on which it depends.   But although he
considers the universe to be a system in which everything
is internally related to everything else, he says that it
does not imply that all relations are internal in some of the
important senses of the term such as making a difference to the
relata, or being such that none of the relata could exist
unless the other existed.   Prof. Blanshard is obviously
influenced by arguments such as these and uses the argument
that being causally related involves being logically or
necessarily related as one of the sets of arguments trying to
demonstrate the stronger thesis that all relations of all
things are internal.   Ewing tries to connect his arguments
with the comments of certain internalists in the following way.

Some internalists lodge a common complaint against
the externalists in various words.   In simple phraseology,
their complaint is that bare external conjunctions are

irrational.   Thus Bradley says that the view of the
externalists makes relations "mere conjunctions" and that
mere conjunctions are 'irrational'.   ~~(We have already referred~~
~~to this complaint on page   of this chapter)~~.   Bradley
bases on this argument the view that relations must be
grounded in their terms.   "The process and its result to
the terms, if they contribute nothing to it, seems really
irrational throughout.   But, if they contribute anything,
they must surely be affected internally."[1]   Joachim says
that the doctine of external relations reduced relations
to irrational coincidences, and that external relation is
not an answer to the problem of how things can be related
and yet remain independent but only a name for the problem
to be solved.[*]   Similar remarks are made by Bosanquet,
who says that every science rejects relatively 'bare con-
junctions'.   He asks: "Is there any man of science, who, . . .
apart from philosophical controversy, will accept a bare
given injunction as conceivably ultimate truth?"[2]   It appears
that the 'irrationality' of which these thinkers complain
would only disappear if all relations could be regarded as
logically following from their terms or from a whole in which

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1.   Appearance and Reality, p.515.

2.   The Distinction Between Mind And Its Objects, B.Bosanquet,
     pp. 59-60.

*   Cf. The Nature of Truth, H.Joachim, p. 44ff.

their terms are included.   All this seems to assume that
the connections of different things and different events
are capable of a rational explanation deducible a priori
from their nature.

The advocate of external relations, Ewing remarks,
would presumably deny that there is any need to suppose the
relations of things to be intelligible.   He would say that,
even if it is the business of the scientist in some sense
to look for causes, this is not to seek to reveal the logical
ground of the effect, and it does not imply that the causes
he finds have any internal logical connection with their
effects.   To this controversy, Ewing writes, the key is the
concept of causality and he therefore embarks on a long
discussion about the nature of causation.   After some dis-
cussion he tries to show that the universe is a system in
the sense that there is a direct or indirect causal connection
between everything in the universe and that being causally
connected involves being connected by a relation of logical
entailment.   But, as we have remarked just a little while
ago, Ewing is not a thorough-going internalist.   He maintains
that the proposition, 'Everything in the universe is internally
related to the rest of the universe' does not logically
exclude the proposition, 'Some of the relations between
these things are external to them.'

Prof. Blanshard takes his cue from writings like this, and being an extreme internalist he produces a similar set of apparently strong arguments which he uses as one of the sets of arguments pointing to the internality of <u>all</u> relations in his book, 'The Nature of Thought.'

We should therefore examine these arguments if we want to refute the doctrine of internal relations.

Blanshard actually uses a number of arguments in favour of the internality of relations. But we shall concentrate only on those arguments dealing with the nature of causal relations, not because these are the strongest ones, but because most of the others are indebted to a large extent to Bradley's arguments on internality and externality of relations which we have already dealt with in the preceding chapter.

With regard to causality Blanshard says that there are two propositions about causality which, if they could be shown to be true, would establish that everything in the universe is internally related to everything else. The propositions are, firstly, that "all things are <u>causally</u> related directly or indirectly;"[1] and secondly, that "being causally related involves being <u>logically</u> related."[2]

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1. The Nature of Thought, Blanshard, 2nd vol. p.492.

2. Ibid, p.492.

Now it is difficult to see what Blanshard thinks
he has proved with the help of these arguments. Even if
these arguments are valid, all that they would establish
at most is that <u>all the things</u> of the universe are related
by a relation that is necessary. But if Blanshard thinks
that these sets of arguments could be used, like the other
sets of arguments in his chapter on internal relations, in
demonstrating the validity of the general thesis that <u>all</u>
<u>relations</u> are internal then we must remark that they would
not be sufficient to prove the thesis. The proposition
that all the <u>things</u> of the universe are related by <u>a</u> relation
that is necessary does not imply that <u>all</u> the relations
between all these things are internal. Secondly, I do not
believe that even Blanshard's claim that all the things of
the universe are related by <u>a</u> relation that involves logical
necessity, viz., the relation of causality, is a valid one.
And in what follows I shall try to show that the arguments
Blanshard uses in order to prove his above thesis are not
cogent. Although Blanshard produces a number of arguments
in trying to establish the truth of both these propositions,
in examining Blanshard's view I propose to confine our atten-
tion to the second proposition, viz., "being causally related
involves being logically related." The reason is that if
we succeed in demonstrating the falsity of the second propo-
sition, then even if the first proposition be true, the claim

to establish the internality of all relations will not be
justified since even if all things are causally related,
that does not mean that they are logically related.

We should now take a look at the arguments advanced
by Blanshard in support of his claim that causal relations
involve logical necessity.   The arguments he advances fall
under three heads:-

(a)   The first evidence of such necessity, he
says, is to be found in the realm of inference.   Here, our
entertainment of the premise is the cause (or part of the cause)
of the emergence of the conclusion in our minds.   He does
not say that causality reduces to logical necessity.   He
only holds that "when one passes in reasoning from ground
to consequent the fact that the ground entails the consequent
is one of the conditions determining the appearance of this
consequent rather than something else in the thinker's mind."[1]
Thus entertaining the premise determines, or tends to determine,
our thoughts taking one course (viz. entertaining the
conclusion) rather than entertaining some other premise since
one of the objects of the two thoughts logically entails
the other.

But do the arguments he produces really prove that
inference, which involves a causal relation, involves also

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1.   Nature of Thought, p.496.

a logical relation?   One doubts whether it is so.

We say that there is a necessary connection between being a triangle and having 3 angles.   If anything is a triangle then it is logically necessary that it will have 3 angles.   Yet one might entertain a premise without being able to deduce the conclusion, although the premise entails the conclusion.   It is a common occurrence with school children that they are sometimes unable to see what certain premises in geometry entail though they have the premises clearly before them which logically entail the conclusion.   Yet if two things are necessarily related, then given the one the other must follow.   It is true that in the case of a valid inference the premise logically entails the consequent, yet that is not sufficient to establish the necessary appearance of the thought of the conclusion in the thinker's mind.

Blanshard might say at this point that what he means by saying that causality involves logical necessity is that if one thing is an effect then among all the factors conditioning it logical necessity must be one.   He tries to prove the validity of this argument by demonstrating the presence of such logical necessity in various cases of causation.   In the case of inference such a necessary factor, he claims, is the premise's logically entailing the conclusion.

Now that the existence of the logical relation of entailment is not a necessary condition of the causation of the thought of the conclusion by the entertaining of the premise is also shown by Prof. Ernest Nagel in his essay titled 'Sovereign Reason.'[*] It often happens, he says, that a man, by entertaining a premise arrives at an invalid conclusion. In such a case the thought of the premise is a cause or part of the cause of the thought of the conclusion, and hence two thoughts are causally related, yet the propositions about which he is thinking do not logically imply one another.

Protests naturally arose against Mr. Blanshard's bold claim that causality involves an element of logical necessity. It has been argued against him that since logical relations are timeless how can they be elements of causal relations which connect temporal events? It would be as meaningless to say that one such event entails another as to say that the premises cause the conclusion. In answer to such an objection he says that the events causality connects are not naked events endowed with no sort of character, "if what happens is nothing, then nothing happens."[1] Logic deals with characters. Hence one can

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1. The Nature of Thought, p.497.

*   Cf. Sovereign Reason, pp. 287-288.

safely say that the characters dealt with by logic are
an integral part of the causal processes found in inference.
From this he takes the further step that the relations between
these characters also enter into the causal processes. In
support of his claim he cites the example of association by
similarity. And he says "it would be idle to deny that
the similarity of content does at times have something to
do with the appearance of an associate."[1] (By appearance
he perhaps means here the appearance of the associate in
the mind). Thus a relation within the content, he shows,
plays a part in the causation of events.

But does the example cited above establish Blan-
shard's point? It could have done so only if the relation
of similarity were a logical relation. That it isn't, is
obvious enough. A relation of similarity in size between
a halfpenny and a shilling is sometimes causally responsible
for the operation of a gas meter, but it is absurd to claim
that there is a logical relation between the shilling and
the halfpenny.

Blanshard also uses a reductio ad absurdum to
convince his readers of the presence of necessity in/the causality
displayed in inference. He says that "unless necessity does
play a part in the movement of inference, no argument will

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1. The Nature of Thought, pp. 497-498.

establish anything."[1] If the special character of the
evidence and the cogency of the argument do not lay under
some degree of compulsion the course of thought towards
accepting the conclusion, "no conclusions are ever arrived
at _because_ the evidence requires them."[2] In the absence
of the necessary connection we can no longer say that the
premises require the conclusion and consequently the
argument would become invalid, it would not establish any-
thing.

Some one might say at this stage that it is true
that unless the premises of the inference entail the con-
clusion, the inference becomes invalid. Yet there is nothing
in that admission that requires that necessity does play a
part in the movement of inference. If anything does play
such a part at all, it is the apprehension of necessity.
Blanshard anticipates such an objection and attempts an
answer in his book 'Reason and Analysis' in the following way.

He says there that such an explanation of the
emergence of the conclusion assumes what has to be proved.
What we have to explain is how the conclusion emerges in our
thought. Now to perceive that the premise entails the
conclusion, we must have both of them clearly in mind, and

1.The Nature of Thought, pp. 497-498.

2.   Ibid.

105.

this is equivalent to saying that the conclusion emerged
because it had already made its appearance.

What Blanshard has said above is true,   But we
must point out here that Blanshard himself is guilty of
begging the question when he says that what causes the
emergence of the conclusion in the thinker's mind is the
logical entailment between the premise and the conclusion.
He assumes from the start that there must be a cause
responsible for the appearance of a certain conclusion in
the mind.   A human mind is a highly complex entity.
Thousands of thoughts could have crossed a mind when one
thought emerges in it.   It is extremely difficult to say
what causes what thought in a human mind. It may be that
some of the thoughts are not caused at all.   But Blanshard
is assuming from the start that the emergence of the con-
clusion in a man's mind must be caused.   And since he
cannot find any other thing that could be entrusted with
that causal task, he fancies the logical entailment to
perform that task.

(b)   But although, Blanshard maintains, the
influence of causality is displayed most plainly in infer-
ence, it can be traced in other cases of mental causation
as well, although its presence is not so evident in those
spheres.   Indeed, the necessity present in these spheres
is, according to him, not absolute.   There is an element

of contingency here. There is no doubt that some of us will be very surprised at this comment. If we see that Norman is shorter than Henry, then we say that 'Henry is necessarily taller than Norman.' The statement does not assert that Henry <u>may be</u> taller than Norman. It asserts that Henry <u>must be</u> so. If anything is a triangle then it must have 3 angles equal to two right angles. Yet Blanshard remarks, "necessity, whatever our first impressions, is a matter of more or less, and that between a complete demonstration and a mere accidental conjunction it may be present in very many degrees."[1] It seems that Blanshard is taking the ear-mark of necessity to be something other than what we usually take it to be. This becomes evident if we consider some such remarks of Blanshard as the following:

"A painter is painting a landscape that is half completed, and he finds himself moved to put a tree in the foreground. Is such a development normally quite unintelligible? Certainly most painters would not say so. Is it then an example of pure necessity? No again; it clearly falls somewhere between."[2] It seems that Blanshard is taking the ear-marks of accidental conjunction and necessity to be unintelligibility and intelligibility

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1.The Nature of Thought, p.499.
2. Ibid, pp. 499-500.

respectively. But does it really follow then that wherever there is intelligibility there is necessity? Intelligibility can at best be the sign of the absence of causal contingency. When we understand why an occurrence is like that and not otherwise, we can at most claim that there is some cause for its being thus, that it is causally necessary. But it if a far cry to say that intelligibility is the sign of logical necessity. Yet Blanshard seems to be claiming that. Take for example his remark on page 500 of The Nature of Thought: "Does the . . . premise here, 'All who think lightly of their own deserts are grateful', express a causal or a logical connection? We suggest that it expresses both. If a man whom we know to think little of himself proves grateful for another's esteem, is that, apart from inductions made on such people in the past, . . . as unpredictable and unintelligible, as if he had begun talking in a Sumerian tongue?"[1] He admits that it is true that one cannot isolate in human nature the precise reciprocating conditions of gratitude, or formulate one's law as anything better than a tendency; but that, after all, is not utter darkness; "we do have some insight into why the man of low self-esteem should be grateful for the esteem of others."[2] He quotes

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1. The Nature of Thought, p. 500.

2. Ibid.

with approval some of Ewing's remarks: "It seems to me that we can see and to some extent really understand why an insult should tend to give rise to anger . . ."[1] It should be noted however, that Blanshard himself admits that the alleged law connecting low self-esteem and gratitude states only a "tendency", not an invariable connection, to which therefore exceptions may (and presumably do) occur. And the sense in which a law expressing only such a tendency also expresses a logical necessity seems very obscure to us.[*]

(c)   It is time to look at Blanshard's third set of arguments attempting to prove the internality of all relations.   With the help of these arguments he tries to prove that logical necessity is present even in causality found in physical nature.   And there is no doubt that the claims he makes in this section constitute a very important part of his defence of the internality of relations in general.   In this section Blanshard brings out a number of objections against the regularity view, according to which all that we can sensibly mean by saying that A causes B is that whenever there occurs one event of the kind A — defined as precisely as possible — it is followed by an event of the kind B — defined with similar care.

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1.   A.C.Ewing , Idealism, p.176.

*   I am indebted for this comment to Prof. Nagel's book, Sovereign Reason;   see Sovereign Reason, p.291.

But even if the objections against the regularity view be valid, since Bradley's view is a contrary and not the contradictory of the regularity view, we are not thereby compelled to accept the view which Blanshard puts forward if the arguments for it are not wholly cogent. We should now look at the arguments themselves.

We can make successful predictions concerning future occurrences of events on the basis of observing past sequence of events. In order to do so we need to argue: __because__ b has followed a in the past, it will continue to do so. Now unless a is connected with b by something more than mere conjunction there is no ground for this argument whatever. We cannot save the argument by saying that whenever we have argued from past uniform sequence of events to future uniform sequence of similar events, we have found our expectations verified. Because verification itself is also another sequence and hence cannot claim any special merit on account of which it can justify the argument from any past sequence of events to their future connection. The answer that is often given to justify such inductive arguments is that such arguments are valid since they are based on the uniformity of nature, that is, they are based on the principle, 'same cause, same effect? Now since uniformity of nature is the principle of the argument, it must be more than a chance conjunction

of symbols or characters, otherwise it cannot justify the
argument.   And hence the connection between cause and effect
in virtue of which we predict their future connection is
always implicitly taken as intrinsic.   Now it is implied
that this connection is a necessary one.

Blanshard gives further elucidation of his con-
tention.   He says that what justifies the statement 'same
cause, same effect', is an insight of ours to the effect that
when something is the cause of something else it produces
its effect by virtue of its special nature.   If a cause's
special character is in no way involved in the production
of the effect, why say it produced something?   But to say
that 'a produces something by virtue of its special nature'
is to imply that the connection between a and its product
is a necessary one.   In Blanshard's own words, "To say that
a produces x in virtue of being a and yet that, given a,
x might not follow, is inconsistent with the laws of identity
and contradiction."   For "a's behaviour is the outgrowth
or expression of a's nature.   And to assert that a's
behaviour, so conceived, could be different while a was the
same would be to assert that something both did and did not
issue from the nature of a.   And that is self-contradiction.
The statement would also, . . . conflict with the law of
identity.   It implies that a thing may remain itself when
you have stripped from it everything which it is such as

to be and to do.   To strip it of these things would be
to strip it, so to speak, of the suchness that makes it
what it is, i.e., to say that it is other than it is."[1]

Let us analyse the consequences of his contention
in some detail.   According to him the strangling of
Desdemona by Othello was the outgrowth of Othello's special
nature, and to fancy that Othello had not acted as he in
fact did would be to strip him of the suchness that made him
what he was.   It then follows that the compound proposition
'Othello strangled Desdemona, but it is nevertheless logically
possible for Othello not to have done so', is logically
impossible.   Hence according to this argument every true
proposition which imputes a causal action to Othello or
to any other individual is logically necessary.

Since according to Blanshard Othello's behaviour
is the expression of Othello's nature, in the absence of
his behaviour of strangling his nature must be logically
admitted to have altered.

What then is a particular individual's nature?
We must admit that it is extremely difficult to answer this,
since the term 'nature' is used in a wide variety of senses.
Yet we can get some hint as to what Blanshard means by the

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1. The Nature of Thought, pp. 513-14.

nature of a non-relational thing. By the nature of a
non-relational thing he means its properties. "By the
nature of an apple we mean its roundness, its redness, its
juiciness, and so on."[1] But what properties of Othello
will be altered if Othello did not kill Desdemona? It is
extremely difficult to point to any such property. But of
course Othello would no longer possess the relational
property of being the killer of Desdemona. And the absence
of such property might be said to imply then the alteration
of Othello's nature if and only if Othello's nature is made
identical with the total set of attributes that may be truly
predicated of him. But then the argument will be reduced
to a tantology. It will be like saying 'if all the proper-
ties that are actually predicable of x were not truly predic-
able of x, then the properties that are actually predicable
of x could not be truly predicated of x.'

In his book, Reason And Analysis, which is pub-
lished later than 'The Nature of Thought', Blanshard tries
to answer a number of possible and actual objections against
the view that necessary connection is present in the relation
of cause and effect. He deals to a considerable extent
with the objections directed against the presence of necessary
connection in inference. However, the answers do not seem
to me to be very satisfactory. In what follows we shall try

1. The Nature of Thought, p.478.

to have a glimpse at some of these answers.

In answer to the objection that even if the
necessity linking the propositions does work causally, the
emergence of the conclusion is conditioned by many other
factors like the thinker's interest in the argument, the
normal functioning of his brain, he says that he does not
maintain that the logical relation of entailment between the
propositions is the sufficient cause for the appearance of
the conclusion. He claims to assert only this that this
relation is a necessary condition of the mental event. But
we have already shown on page 102 of this chapter that the
existence of such a necessary connection is not a sine qua
non for an inference. And I do not see any need to repeat
it here.

He makes some fresh attempts to answer a very vital
objection to his thesis which we have already examined him
trying to answer on page 102. The objection is to the effect
that causality links events, and that a timeless relation
is no event. Blanshard's answer to it is that although
the common conception of cause is the sufficient cause or
the conspicuous change occurring just before the occurrence
of the effect in the proximity, yet this conception is based
on an arbitrary selection and the word should be legitimately
applied to the sum of the conditions given which alone the

effect will occur. And in this sense of the word the
necessity linking the objects of the thought cannot be
omitted from the cause. Yet there is nothing in this
argument to show that a logical necessity can be a condition.
Each of the examples of the necessary condition he has been
able to give, in the course of the arguments, except the
unique condition of necessity, is either an event or a thing
or its character like the exerting of the normal pull by
gravitation, density of the air, a particular level of the
table.*

We will finish examining Blanshard's claim that
the causal relation is a necessary one, by observing a
comment he makes on pp. 470-471 of his Reason And Analysis.

Here he reiterates his claim, which we have already
examined on page 110 that to assert a causal connection
between two particulars say a and b is to say that a produces
b in **virtue** of its special nature, and to assert this is to
assert a necessary connection between a and b. He quotes
in support of this H. W. B. Joseph's assertion, "So long
therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that
it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert
that what is a is something else than a which it is declared
to be."[1] He remarks that this is certainly true if the

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1. H.W.B.Joseph, Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed.p.407.
* See page 457 of Blanshard's Reason And Analysis.

causal properties of a thing are introduced into its
definition.   Gold is soluble in aqua regia.   If gold
did not dissolve in aqua regia we should not call it gold.
And he considers at this point a comment made by Stebbing
that we do not include in the nature of a thing all its
causal properties.*   He agrees with Stebbing on this
point.   He admits that we do not commonly include in the
nature of a ball the causal property of being capable of
initiating motion in another if it strikes the other with
a certain velocity.   But he rejects her claim that the
causal relation referred to above is an external relation
by saying, that, including a causal property in the definition
is not the only way of arguing for its internality.   "Even
if a thing is not its behaviour", he says, "still if we say
that it behaves in this way in virtue of having this nature,
that it is such as to behave in this way, then we are saying,
I suggest, that it could not lack the causal property while
possessing this nature . . . . if it is in virtue of roundness
that the ball rolls, then a ball that was unable to roll,
would not be a ball."[1]   There is surely something odd about
this claim.   An internalist like Blanshard would say that
'food must nourish'.   But what exactly does such an assertion
mean?   Does it mean 'food is that which nourishes'?   But is

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1.   Reason And Analysis, p.471.

* Cf A Modern Introduction to Logic,/ Stebbing, pp. 285 ff.

it then a necessary statment?   An internalist like Blanshard
would certainly say that it is so, because if anything is
food then it must nourish.   Yet we see so many conditions
under which food does not nourish, e.g. if any person who
eats food cannot digest it then food does not nourish him.
But in that case an internalist would say that it is wrong
to call something food if it does not nourish.   'Food'
means 'that which nourishes'.   But in that case the thesis
of the internalist would be reduced to a tautology like
'that which nourishes nourishes'.

We have examined to a considerable extent the
arguments of some internalists who try to draw support for
their theory by the analysis of the relation of cause and
effect.   We will sum up the discussion by saying that our
examination of their arguments has revealed to us that there
is nothing in them that can establish either that all
relations are internal or even that all things in the
universe are related by a logically necessary relation,
namely, the relation of causality.

Concluding Remarks

I do not think that it is necessary to go into
further exposition and examination of the arguments advanced
for and against the doctrine of internal relations. My
main concern in the present paper has been with giving a
critical exposition of the doctrine of internal relations.
I have examined to a considerable extent the main arguments
brought forward by philosophers for the doctrine. And I
hope that I have said enough to indicate that there is no
reason why we should accept the claims of an internalist,
at least without further qualification, that all relations
are internal in the sense that the absence of any relation
whatsoever would entail necessary alteration of the related
things.

I do not think that the arguments brought forward
by the supporters of the doctrine of internal relations are
strong enough to establish the claim that all relations
between objects are internal in the absolute sense. But do
we necessarily have to accept the view that all relations are
external if we deny the doctrine that all are internal? It
is difficult to give a straightforward answer to such a
question. Several points need to be made clear at this
stage. In the first place, I must admit that the arguments
I have so far come across in favour of the externality of

all relations do not appear to me to be very convincing.
People like Russell are supposed to be extreme externalists
who admit nothing beyond simple terms and external relations.
Yet all his energy seems to be directed towards refuting
the view that all relations are reducible to qualities of
the relata or relational wholes, which view he takes to
be the fundamental tenet of the internalists.   (See
Russell's 'Principles of Mathematics', pp.224-226 and p.222;
'My Philosophical Development', p.54, p.55 f;   'Logic and
Knowledge', p.335;   'Philosophical Essays', pp. 163f, 166-
167).

I think that Russell is right in his contention
that relations cannot be reduced to qualities or adjectives
of the relata or of the relational complexes.   Yet the
main thesis of the internalists does not consist only in
claiming relations to be properties of the relata or
relational complexes.   And Russell has not explicitly made
any attempt to refute the further contention of the intern-
alists that every relation, though not a property, gives
rise to a property which is internal to the relata in the
sense that their absence would entail essential modification
of the terms.

I think we cannot find any better way of refuting
such a claim than by turning our attention to Moore's
arguments which we have considered in the second chapter.[*]

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* See pp. 73 - 75.

Following Moore we can successfully show that the claim
of an internalist that in the case of every relational
property which a thing has it is always true that the thing
which has it would have been different if it had not had
that property is definitely wrong.   But as we have remarked
before, Moore is willing to admit the internality of some
relational properties.

Shall we then admit that there is no way in which
we can maintain the externality of all relations?   Now
it must be admitted that if we look a little closely at
the instances Moore advances in his essay, 'External
Relations', in trying to show the internality of some of
the relational properties, then we will find that even
the internality of these properties really depends upon
how you describe the things that have these relational
properties.

In his essay, 'External Relations', Moore says that
the relational property 'having this as a spatial part' is
internal to a whole.   He says with regard to a whole
coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow, "That
particular whole could not have existed without having that
particular patch for a part."[1]   "from the proposition with
regard to any term whatever that it does not contain that
particular patch it follows that the term is other than the

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1.   Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, p.288.

whole in question . . .'[1]   Yet considering the relation
which the red patch has to the whole patch, he says, "the
red patch might perfectly well have existed without being
part of that particular whole."[2]   Thus, according to Moore,
the relational property 'being a spatial part of this whole'
is not internal to the red patch.   Yet 'having this for a
spatial part' is an internal property of the whole patch
half of which is red and half yellow.

But it must be admitted that even calling these
properties internal depends really upon some linguistic
considerations, upon how one describes the terms that have
these relational properties, upon how one identifies the
patches.   In particular, a patch may or may not be identified
in terms of either its position in a whole or the parts
it contains.   If it is identified in terms of the position
it has, then the property of having that position will be
internal to it.   Again, if it is identified as being the
whole which contains such and such parts, then the property
of containing those parts will be internal to it.   Moore's
attempt to say that the property of having such and such
patch for a part is internal, while being a part of such and
such a larger patch is external, presumably stands or falls

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1.   Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, p.288.

2.   Ibid, p.288.

with saying that to identify a patch in terms of its being the whole which contains such and such parts is more plausible or acceptable than to identify a patch in terms of its being a part of such and such a whole. Thus we see that even calling the property of 'having this for a part' internal really depends upon what is considered as being the more plausible way of defining something. Hence even the properties that Moore claims to be internal cannot be held to be so absolutely.

But someone might ask me at this stage, 'will you then maintain that all relations are external?' Now I must say that the maintaining of the externality of _all_ the relational properties in the case of particular existing things seems to depend on many considerations. Although the externality of _most_ of the relational properties seems to me to be easier to maintain in this case, as compared to the cases of the universals, yet maintaining the externality of _all_ the relational properties, even in this sphere, is impossible without discussing some controversial topics that are associated with it.

Take for example the relational property 'being more rational than a certain horse' that Socrates might be said to possess. Is it an external property of Socrates?

Obviously, the answer to such a question depends on many things. If I describe Socrates as a man then of course, assuming the definition of 'man' as a 'rational

animal', such a property must be regarded as an internal property of Socrates.   But then there is the risk of admitting the internality of such a relational property at the cost of a certain truism.   Saying that 'being more rational' is an internal property is really expressing the fact that 'being rational' is an internal property of man.   Now that being rational is an internal property of a human being is one way of expressing the fact that 'what is a rational animal must be rational'.   If on the other hand you point to a certain indistinct patch of colours moving behind a bush at a certain distance and say "That moving patch is Socrates", then of course it is obvious that the relational property 'being more rational than a certain horse' is not an internal property of what you point to, even though what you point to is Socrates (because it is not an internal property of moving patches as such).   But then the question arises whether we can properly describe Socrates as 'that moving patch'.   People might object to such an identification of Socrates with 'that moving patch'.   Obviously, they might say, Socrates cannot be said to possess all the properties of 'that moving patch'.   'That moving patch' might be indistinct, it might get smaller as it moves.   But can one sensibly speak of Socrates as possessing those properties?   In a sense then the question of the internality or externality of relations depends to a large extent on

certain linguistic considerations, on the question how one
describes the things related.

It is obvious from our discussion that the question
of the internality or externality of relations is also
closely associated with essences. The question whether a
certain relational property is internal to a thing or not
depends on whether in its absence the thing changes essentially.
Now it is highly controversial whether individuals have any
essences or not. Moreover, the question what is meant by
individual essences is also controversial. Are we to take
the Aristotelian sense of essence according to which the
essence of an individual distinguishes an individual from
members of different species? (According to such a sense
of 'essence' the 'essence' of an individual like Socrates
is being human). Or are we to take the other sense of
individual essence, according to which the 'essence' of an
individual is the collection of those properties that differ-
entiate an individual member of one class from other members
of the same class? (In this sense the essence of Socrates
would be the assemblage of properties peculiar to Socrates).
If we take the latter sense of essence, then the relational
property of 'having Xanthippe for wife' and 'drinking hemlock'
is internal to Socrates; whereas it is not so if we take
the former sense of essence.

Thus we see that the issue of the internality or

externality of relations cannot be settled absolutely
without discussing some of the controversial topics that
are associated with it like the problem of description, the
problem of individual essences.   In general the problem
of description of the terms does not arise much in the
case of deciding the internality of the relations between
universals.   Take for example the relational property
'being intermediate in shade between red and yellow' that
the universal 'orange' colour possesses or the relational
property 'being half of 8' that the number 4 possesses.
These properties seem to be internal to the terms irrespective
of how we describe the terms related.   Their withdrawal
does not seem to be possible without a complete change of
the terms related.   Here one cannot possibly say that even
the internality of these properties depends on how you
describe the terms.   One cannot say that if you describe
the terms as numbers or as colours, then of course the
absence of these properties would not imply a complete alter-
ation of the terms, on the grounds that then we need say no
longer that what we are considering here is the relation
between 4 and 8, or the relation between the colour orange
and the colours red and yellow.   Again, we cannot sensibly
say that if we call the number 4 'the whole number that falls
between the whole numbers 3 and 5 then the relational property
'is half of 8' is not internal to it.   Yet we can sensibly
say that if we call the queen 'the present monarch of the

United Kingdom' then the relational property 'is the wife
of Prince Philip' is not internal to the queen.[*]

Thus it appears to me that it is easier to
maintain the internality of relations in the cases of

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[*] There is undoubtedly the possibility of an objection to
what I maintain here. It might be said that the
question whether the relational properties concerned
are internal to the numbers depends on how the numbers
are introduced. No doubt the number 9 would not be
the number 9 if it were not the square of 3. But it
is a fact, though a contingent one, that there are
9 planets. Therefore the number 9 can be described
as 'the number of the planets'. Now would it be
the case that the number of the planets would not be
the number of the planets if it were not the square
of 3? One might feel inclined to say that the number
of the planets could **very** well be the number of the
planets without being the square of 3 because there
might in fact (unknown to the astronomers) be 10
planets, and even if there are in fact 9 planets
there might have been 10 planets. Similar objections
might also be raised with regard to the colours that
we have so far been considering. It might be said
that if the colour orange be described as the colour
of the dress Miss Jones is wearing, then it becomes
doubtful whether it would not be the colour of Miss
Jones' dress if it were not intermediate in shade
between red and yellow (since it is a contingent
fact that the colour of Miss Jones' dress is orange,
which dress might have been of any other colour).
But I must emphasise here the fact that my
view here that it is easier to maintain the internality
of the relational properties of the universals is
only a prima facie view, to which objections of the
kind stated above do exist. Neither am I interested
in proving the internality of all these relational
properties. I am only suggesting the possibility of
their internality. My main concern in this paper is
with examining the claims of the internalists to the
effect that all relations are internal.

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universals.   For this reason I remarked at the beginning[*]
that what appears more plausible to me between the different
views as to the internality or externality of relations is
the moderate view that some relations are internal and some
external.   Yet even in the sphere of universals we shall
be confronted with the issue whether the distinction between
the universal and the particular is a legitimate one,
whether there is anything called a universal over and above
the particular.   It seems then that even here we cannot
really <u>prove</u> the internality of the relations between the
universals without inviting some controversies.   All that
we can say here at most is that the internality of relational
properties seems less difficult to maintain than the inter-
nality of the relational properties of particular physical
objects.

Hence it seems desirable to consider those contro-
versial topics associated with the issue of external/internal
relations referred to above for an absolutely thorough
treatment of the issue of the internality or externality of
relations.   But a thorough discussion of these associated
problems is beyond the scope of the present paper.   It will
demand at least (if not more) as much space as I have
devoted so far in this paper to considering the arguments
for and against the doctrine of the internality of relations.

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* See page 5.

But I must say this, that my main concern throughout the present paper has been with examining the claims of the doctrine of the internality of all relations. And although we cannot entertain the thesis of the externality of all relations or the internality of some and externality of others without bringing in some discussions on those controversial topics associated with the problem of the characterisation of relational properties as external or internal, we can say at least this that neither can the thesis of the internality of all relational properties of all relata be maintained absolutely. The internality of some relational properties appears to be easier to maintain, yet even proving _that_ requires discussion of a lot of controversial topics which is impossible in the present space. Neither am I interested in _proving_, rather than _suggesting_ the internality of some relational properties. My main concern in the present thesis has all along been with a critical examination of the thesis of the internality of all relations. And I think I have shown enough to indicate that the supporters of the doctrine of internal relations cannot justifiably claim that all relations are internal absolutely, without adding any further qualification to their statement.

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