Abstract of thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D.
by
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'Schiller's view of Tragedy in the Light of his General Aesthetics'.

Schiller's tragedies, his theory of tragedy, the relation between the latter and his general aesthetics, and, finally, the relation between his aesthetics as a whole and his tragedies have all been exhaustively discussed during the last century and a half. My justification for submitting yet another study on the relation between Schiller's theory and practice is that I attempt to examine Schiller's poetry *qua* poetry, and by the method appropriate to the study of poetry; his aesthetics *qua* aesthetics, by the method appropriate to that discipline and with some knowledge of its problems and achievements; and lastly, the relation between poetic practice and aesthetic theory, in due awareness of the delicate critical problems involved.

This approach, it is hoped, will do more justice to the complexity of the subject than the customary approach to it from an overall biographical, philosophical, or 'ideengeschichtlichen' point of view. Such studies have resulted in views of Schiller that are conflicting with each other and contradictory in themselves. By making due allowances for the distinct nature and objective of statements made in poetic, aesthetic and general philosophic context, respectively, and by approaching each with the method of investigation appropriate to it, no difficulty has been found in seeing the closest relation between the various aspects of Schiller's work.

The detailed textual analysis of Schiller's tragedies has brought to light a well-defined pattern of tragedy in which certain fundamental features remain constant. The tragic theme is found to be concerned with the integration of the individual and with the tragic untenability of onesidedness. The tragic hero, though in fact onesided, throughout Schiller's tragedies maintains a contemplative pose: he appears to be resting in the enjoyment of his full human potential. Lastly, the structural principle of externalisation is found to be operative throughout the tragedies: the protagonists are linked by the fact that each is the embodiment of those functions which the other suppresses in himself.

This pattern of tragedy is borne out and explained by Schiller's theory of tragedy and general aesthetic theory. The tragic fact of onesidedness finds its explanation in the *Aesthetische Briefe*, which define onesidedness as the tragic predicament of modern civilisation and propound that ideal of integration and totality which is the criterion of value that is operative throughout the tragedies. The contemplative bias of the tragic hero, which belies his real condition, is explained by the purely formal considerations put forward in *Über das Pathetische* and borne out by every aesthetic essay from Schiller's pen. The dualistic structure of the tragedies, finally, is seen on the one hand to be an expression of Schiller's view of reality as expounded in the *Aesthetische Briefe*; on the other hand it is governed by formal considerations voiced throughout his aesthetic writings.

Thus that homogeneity of Schiller's art and aesthetics which impressed Goethe and Humboldt and which of late has tended to be lost out of sight, emerges as the final result of this thesis. It is hoped that the unified conception it presents will carry conviction in the measure in which it is based on the awareness, rather than the denial, of complexity.

SCHILLER'S VIEW OF TRAGEDY IN THE LIGHT OF HIS GENERAL AESTHETICS.

Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D.
in the University of London, June, 1951.

by

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If there is any one quality in Schiller which communicates itself to the common reader above all others and beyond all doubt, it is his integrity of mind and purpose. This awareness has prompted Schiller critics, however divergent in their specific aims and approaches, to seek for some unity underlying Schiller's work as a whole, and thus it is that there is scarcely a single one of them who has not assumed that a relation between Schiller's tragedies and his aesthetic theory exists and who has not attempted to define its nature, at least in general terms. We are accustomed to hear Max Piccolomini and Thekla termed Schöne Seelen, and to see Schiller's theory of sublimity illustrated by reference to, say, Johanna or Don Caesar. Yet, for all this informal terminological traffic across the borders of theory and practice, and for all the general predisposition to see Schiller's poetry, thought and life as one undivided whole, the view of his work as it emerges from the body of criticism, surprisingly enough is very far from unified. Indeed, as time goes on, it seems to be becoming less so. The unity between tragic poetry and theory, at first tacitly assumed if not fully borne out by analysis, has tended of late to be selfconsciously and explicitly denied, and not, one suspects, without a certain satisfaction. And the view of a life work rent by conflicting currents has given rise to the view of a personality similarly rent, a tragic personality. Karl Berger, in the introduction to the second volume of his Schiller book, could still justify the wider space he decided to devote to Schiller's theoretical endeavours by the aim of the biography as a whole, "die allen ernsthaft Suchenden Schiller in der Ganzheit und Einheit seines Wesens erschliessen möchte."[1] That was

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1. Karl Berger, Schiller sein Leben und seine Werke, München, 1914. Vol. II, p.IV.

written in 1908, six years before the first world war. In 1944, Max Kommerell adopts a very different language: "Ein anderes ist die Wirkung der Kunst auf den Menschen, ein anderes die Lebensdeutung, die sie gibt", he says. "In dieser ist Schiller, der dort die Aussöhnung des Menschen mit sich selber lehrt, unversöhnlich. Zwei Welten zerreissen den Menschen, sobald er handelt, in ihrem Anspruch, so dass die Tragik des Menschseins hier als Tragik des Handeln-müssens erscheint."[1]

The failure to view Schiller's work, the tragedies and the aesthetic theory, as a unified whole, springs from a variety of reasons, partly methodological, partly ideological, and often both together. In the three great biographical studies of Minor,[2] Berger[3] and Bellermann,[4] dating from round about the turn of the century, the essential coherence of Schiller's work is taken for granted rather than demonstrated. Bellermann indeed does not explicitly treat of Schiller's aesthetic theory at all, concentrating entirely on an analysis of his dramas. Yet he no less than the others, operates with categories such as the schöne or erhabene Seele, familiar from Schiller's aesthetic essays, and applies them to the characters of Schiller's poetic creations. And neither he nor the others doubt that the same fundamental idealism pervades Schiller's poetry and theory alike, forging an unbreakable bond between them.

This early view of Schiller's work as a totality, comprehensive but vague, in more recent years has given way

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1. Max Kommerell, Geist und Buchstabe der Dichtung, Frankfurt a. Main, 1944, p. 173.
2. J. Minor, Schiller, Berlin, 1890.
3. K. Berger, op. cit.
4. L. Bellermann, Schillers Dramen, Berlin, 1898.

to attempts to arrive at a more precise appreciation of the relation between theory and practice. The method that suggested itself was to single out from the whole of Schiller's aesthetic writings those that deal with the theory of tragedy in particular, and to make them the basis, explicit or implicit, of the examination of the tragedies themselves. It is obvious, that a selective procedure of this kind must sacrifice width and inclusiveness of vision in favour of precision; a precision moreover which must remain doubtful since the truth of the part has not been shown to cohere with the truth of the whole: the specific relation between the tragedies and the theory of tragedy may have been placed in a sharp light, but the relation of each of these severally and both together to the Schiller of the Ästhetische Briefe and Anmut und Würde has been left in the dark.

Such partiality of result is in fact the common feature of a great many critical works otherwise differing widely in respect both of method and emphasis, and hardly to be classed together. To this group belong the studies of Robert Petsch,[1] to name but one early representative, Gerhard Fricke,[2] Benno von Wiese,[3] Reinhold Buchwald[4] and William Witte.[5] The two last named critics indeed, especially Buchwald, concede considerable space to an enlightened discussion of Schiller's general aesthetic views, without however attempting to relate them to Schiller's tragedies.

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1. Robert Petsch, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit in Schillers Dramen. München, 1905.
2. Gerhard Fricke, Der religiöse Sinn der Klassik Schillers München, 1927.
3. Benno von Wiese, Die deutsche Tragödie von Lessing bis Hebbel. Hamburg, 1948. Vol. I, Chapters V - VIII.
4. Reinhold Buchwald, Schiller. Leipzig, 1937.
5. William Witte, Schiller. Oxford, 1949.

When they embark on an analysis of the latter it is in terms of the well worn categories derived from the theory of tragedy. These same categories, interpreted either along orthodox Kantian or along new Christian Kierkegaardian lines, form the basis of the analyses of the tragedies by Petsch on the one hand and Fricke and von Wiese on the other. The great majority of critics, until quite recent times, have held those of Schiller's essays that concern themselves with the sublime and the theory of tragedy, to be most strongly influenced by Kantian thought.[1] Hence many a discussion of the relation between Schiller's tragedies and his theory of tragedy starts from the assumption that Schiller's theoretical terms have the connotation familiar from Kant, and that Kantian terms can be freely used in the discussion of Schiller's theory and practice, without risk of falsifying his meaning. Petsch, for instance, uses the terms empirisch and intelligibel throughout his study, and assumes that the same scale of values which appears to be operative in Schiller's theoretical writings, and which is certainly operative in Kant's philosophy, can be applied to Schiller's tragedies as well: he sees the tragic fact in the suppression throughout by the tragic heroes, of their intelligible nature in favour of their empirical sense of nature, and the act of catharsis in the restitution of the former. The predominantly moral categories of Kant receive a religious or metaphysical colouring at the hands of Fricke and Wiese respectively. On these they base their analyses of the

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1. These include, among others, Fischer, Grün and Hemsen, who deplore the Kantianism of the theory of tragedy as a relapse from Schiller's dominant aesthetic tendency; Drobisch Ternaschek, Twesten and Überweg who insist on the existence of a moralistic Kantian and an aesthetic trend side by side; and finally Vorländer, Cohen and Cassirer who deem that Schiller remained a faithful Kantian not only in his theory of tragedy, but in all his aesthetic writings.

tragedies themselves, with the result that the relation of the latter to the theory of tragedy, from which the categories ultimately derive, is only too evident, whilst the relation of the tragedies to Schiller's aesthetic theory in general, which was left out of account initially, is more than problematic.

In another group of recent criticism yet another tendency in the assessment of the relation between Schiller's tragedies and his aesthetic theory has made itself felt. This group of critics, under the influence of Nietzsche, George,[1] and, in some cases, of more recent German political and ideological trends, considers Schiller's tragic genius and his aesthetic-philosophical tendencies to have stood in each other's way and to be fundamentally incompatible. The common feature in which critics like Gerhard Fricke[2] in his later study, Max Kommerell[3] in his earlier one, Harald Jensen,[4] Werner Deubel,[5] Melitta Gerhard[6] and Kurt May,[7] in their recent studies, all agree, is that they regard Kant's moralistic rationalism to be an alien element superimposed

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1. Cf. the interesting summary of trends of Schiller criticism by Rudolf Unger, Richtungen und Probleme neuerer Schiller Deutung,(Nachrichten von der Gesellschalt der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 1937), which suggests, albeit in a different content and for different purposes, the distinction between a Kierkegaardian and a Nietzschean trend of Schiller criticism, which I have adopted.
2. G. Fricke, Die Problematik des Tragischen im Drama Schillers. Frankfurt am Main, 1930.
3. M. Kommerell, Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik. Berlin, 1928.
4. H. Jensen, Schiller zwischen Goethe und Kant. Oslo,1927.
5. W. Deubel, Umrisse eines neuen Schillerbildes. Jahrbuch der Goethe-Gesellschaft, 20. Band, 1934.
6. Melitta Gerhard, Schiller. Bern, 1950.
7. K. May, F. Schiller. Idee und Wirklichkeit im Drama. Göttigen, 1948.

on Schiller's true genius and inimical to it, a view, incidentally, which to a certain extent is echoed by Korff's[1] distinction between moral and amoral ingredients both in Schiller's tragedies and his theory of tragedy. Exactly which aspect of Schiller's thought these critics reject as alien to his genius depends on what precisely they mean by Kantian moralistic rationalism, and what conception they oppose to it. Kommerell, Jensen and Miss Gerhard consider that Schiller's fulfilment lay in his approximation to Goethe's paganism: hence the Ästhetische Briefe, the aesthetic testimony of this friendship, are deemed to be a fruitful complement to Schiller's poetic productions.[2] Miss Gerhard goes further than this. Acutely conscious of Schiller's severe limitations as a creative poet, she regards the Ästhetische Briefe as the apex of his literary achievement taken as a whole. Fricke and Deubel, on the other hand, consider that the real Schiller is not the Goethean Schiller, but the forerunner of Kleist, the poet of Demetrius, overshadowed by metaphysical pessimism and unconditionally laying himself open to tragic experience. From this point of view, the harmonious trend developed in the Ästhetische Briefe must appear alien, a valuation that is implicit in Fricke and explicit in Deubel, whilst the late essay Über das Erhabene, its pessimistic passages emphasised and those that demand an interpretation in the

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1. H.A. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit. Leipzig, 1930. esp. Vol.II.

2. Harald Jensen (op.cit.), however, is very critical even of the Ästhetische Briefe. He considers the first ten letters to mark the peak of Schiller's rapprochement to Goethe; whilst he sees in the abstract second part a regression to Kant. This latter part of the letters, he argues, not very convincingly, Schiller never submitted to Goethe, and he knew very well why he kept them from him. The essay Über das Erhabene Jensen considers to be a sudden eruption of Schiller's Kantianism which was merely temporarily suspended, never finally overcome.

wider context of the Ästhetische Briefe, ignored, is seen as the only true theoretical equivalent of the great tragedies. This tendency to construct a tragic personality with the late tragedies, especially Demetrius, and Über das Erhabene as its twin pillars, culminates in Werner Deubel, who roundly declares Schiller to have been a pioneer of a tragic German culture, a thesis advanced by Udo Gaede[1] as early as 1908 and since implicit in the more moderately phrased contentions of many others. Deubel's final judgment "dass gerade die klassischen und noch mehr die idealistischen Wertsetzungen die Vollendung Schillers als Tragiker verhindert haben"[2] is almost verbally adumbrated by Fricke's contention "dass von den idellen Voraussetzungen Schillers her das Tragische im strengen Sinne unerreichbar ist."[3] And Gumbel sums up this whole trend of Schiller criticism when he says: "Schiller geht nicht mehr vom Dualismus in den Idealismus, sondern kommt aus dem Idealismus in das Gefühl letzter Ohnmächtigkeit des Ideals gegenüber dem Wirklichen."[4]

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1. Udo Gaede, Schiller und Nietzsche als Verkünder der tragischen Kultur. Berlin, 1908. For a similar thesis, cf. also Herbert Cysarz, Von Schiller zu Nietzsche. Halle, 1928. Gaede, it is true, does attach much importance to Schiller's ideal of integration as developed in the Ästhetische Briefe. However, his reading of this essay as of the whole of Schiller is dominated by Nietzschean categories. He sees in Schiller's ideal of totality the forerunner of Nietzsche's superman. Gaede's imposition of extraneous categories mars the value of his study considerably, and the picture of Schiller which emerges, is lacking in a sense of historical perspective.

2. Cf. op.cit., p. 50.

3. Op. cit., p. 36.

4. H. Gumbel, Die realistische Wendung des späten Schiller, Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstiftes, Frankfurt a. Main. 1932. p. 159.

Thus the principle of selection, first on methodological and later on increasingly ideological grounds, has led to a picture of the poet and thinker that is fraught with contradiction. The coherence of his poetry with some part of his theory is asserted at the expense of its opposition to another. A total view of his tragedy and his theory as a whole is receding into a distant past. The only recent work that never leaves it out of sight, the monumental study by Cysarz,[1] unhappily is marred in its scientific value by the extreme subjectivity of its method and presentation. And not only is part of the theory excluded from the more recent views of Schiller. Those critics who on the basis of the tragedies and the theory of tragedy arrive at the notion of a tragic Schiller, must find themselves acutely embarrassed by the existence of Wilhelm Tell. Benno von Wiese, for instance, can only account for this drama by letting Schiller perform a salto mortale from his wonted extreme "Geschichtspessimismus" to an equally outspoken "Geschichtsoptimismus".[2] Indeed the presupposition of the 'tragic Schiller' leaves open only one consistent course, and that is to interpret Tell tragically too. This has in fact been attempted by W.G.Moore,[3] who sees, in this play, the working of a "fate that attacks man at the root

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1. Herbert Cysarz, Schiller. Halle/Saale, 1934. The following statement is characteristic of Cysarz' position: "insofern stimmt die Tragödie mit der Schillerschen Freiheits- und Schönheitslehre zutiefst überein. ... Die Schönheit bewahrt das Urbild 'der höchsten der Formen, der menschlichen', die Tragik strebt es in die Wirklichkeit zu reissen, in unendlichem Opfer- und Läuterungsgang zu erringen. Auch Schillers klassische Tragödie sucht also den ästhetischen Menschen, der nicht durch Schwung über sich selbst hinaus, vielmehr durch Befestigung seiner Mitte- und Mittler-Stellung am grössten Ganzen webt." (p. 330f.)
2. Op. cit., p. 324.
3. W.G.Moore, A New Reading of Wilhelm Tell. German Studies, Presented to H.G.Fiedler. Oxford, 1938.

of his existence and makes of his freedom and will an illusion and an instrument of evil."[1] If Schiller-criticism is to be safeguarded against such like distortions of the man and his message, be it as an apostle of a tragic Germanic culture, be it as a highpriest of Georgean aestheticism; if the more whole and humane view of Schiller such as Goethe and Humboldt cherished of him, is to be saved and made fertile for the future, the critic must face two major tasks. He must view Schiller's tragedies not only narrowly in relation to his theory of tragedy, but to his aesthetic thought as a whole. And to do so, he must accord to the tragedies themselves a greater attention, the kind of attention which all poetry requires to reveal its deeper meaning. This may sound strange in view of the fact that virtually all the critics whose work has been discussed, have made the tragedies themselves the centre of their investigation. Here a word must be said about their method of examination, which in one respect is surprisingly alike. Even where the tragedies have been the conscious starting point, categories abstracted from Schiller's theory of tragedy or from Kant, have been more or less consciously applied to them. With the help of these categories - such as the sinnliche versus the sittliche Wesen etc. - the skeleton of a general Schillerian view of life has been constructed, the actual characters of his tragedies being made to fit into this framework and to fill it in. Thus Schiller's tragic heroes are seen as embodiments of a view of life worked out and laid down elsewhere. As has been indicated before, the ultimate source of such categories is by no means always Kant. In the case of the recent study by Melitta Gerhard, for instance, they derive from Stefan

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1. Op. cit., p. 291.

George whose new Hellenism does indeed betray the influence of Schiller's philosophy of culture. Thus the categories with which Miss Gerhard operates - such as that of the "leib-geistige Einheit des Menschen"[1] are in fact relevant to Schiller's thought. They might be expected, therefore, to represent a fruitful conceptual framework for the understanding of his tragedies, too. As a matter of fact, Miss Gerhard's interpretations of the tragedies follow the most conventional lines and contribute nothing new to their understanding as works of art, to Schiller's view of tragedy, or to the relation of his poetic creations to his theory. The reason for this is that even the most appropriate categories, imposed on the work of art from the outside, inhibit the proper functioning of the receptive faculties on which criticism ultimately depends; thus they represent no less of a hindrance than any preconceived ideological attitudes whatever, however alien.

Such procedure then is bound to have serious repercussions on the critic's reading of any given play. In the measure in which he reads into the drama, or the dramatic character, what is not there, he will fail to read out of it what is there. He will either repress facts that do not fit his interpretation or, at the best, consider them as inconsistencies to be charged to the poet's account. To give but three examples which could be multiplied almost indefinitely. Bellermann starts out from a conception of Marquis Posa as a noble and fine character, a real 'Schillerian hero'. Drawing on the text accordingly to build up this character, he is then landed with half a dozen important passages, which do not fit into his scheme, and for which he gently but firmly takes Schiller or even Posa himself to task: for according to them, Posa is less

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1. Op. cit., p. 200.

noble than he 'ought' to be. What Bellermann does not see is that to arrive at any adequate notion of what Schiller intended with Posa, these disturbing passages, in fact, the text in its totality, should be incorporated. Similarly, Mr. Witte, in his recent study, argues that Posa's "dangerous gamble fails - largely, it must be admitted, because Posa shows himself less cool, practical and circumspect than one might have expected. His principal mistake is that he does not take Carlos into his confidence in time and thus omits (for entirely insufficient reasons) to ensure his co-operation."[1] Tell-tale phrases such as "it must be admitted", "one might have expected" or "for entirely insufficient reasons" show that Mr. Witte is operating with extraneous criteria drawn, not from the text itself, but from an imaginative construction of the ideal hero as he 'ought' to be: what emerges from the text as a whole is not that Posa is not sufficiently circumspect, but, on the contrary, that he is too rigidly so. And finally, an example from Mr. Garland's recent Schiller book.[2] Speaking about Wilhelm Tell, he argues that the Parricida incident was hardly necessary to throw into relief the moral character of Tell's own deed. For the monologue in the sunken road had already made it clear that Tell was impelled to his action by a public-spirited motive. In support, Mr. Garland quotes the lines

> Die armen Kindlein, die unschuldigen,
> Das treue Weib muss ich vor deiner Wut
> Beschützen, Landvogt,

which in a footnote are translated as follows: I must protect poor children and faithful wives against your fury,

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1. Op. cit., p. 143.
2. H.B. Garland, Schiller. London, 1949.

vice-roy.[1] Mr. Garland has gone to the text with a preconceived notion of what to Schiller constitutes a moral deed: it must be, as indeed it would be for the Kantian, a deed from which all purely personal motives have been carefully eliminated, a deed determined by public-spirited motives. Hence Tell, in his reading, protects any and all faithful wives. But if Schiller's real meaning in Tell is to be understood, the fact that his hero uses the singular gender, in defining a quite particular and personal motive, must not be overlooked. Tell's deed is intended to be both personal and moral. Indeed, in this play as in others, Schiller evolves the conception of the wholly personal moral deed, a conception which comes as unexpectedly from an alleged adherent to Kant's categorical imperative as it is crucial to a deeper understanding of his tragedies.

Such examples of the critic imposing extraneous categories on the text itself - be they categories derived from Kant, Kleist, Nietzsche, from Schiller's own theories, or belonging to the critic himself, - raise fundamental problems of critical method. In a short historical survey these problems can naturally not be gone into. They will, however, be systematically discussed at the point in the thesis where such a discussion is most necessary, i.e. before any answer to the question of the inter-relation of Schiller's theory and practice is attempted.

This thesis setsout to relate Schiller's tragedies to the whole of his aesthetic theory, and it has been found that by greater attention to the poetry, that is, to the actual verbal pattern, not just to characters as mouthpieces of thought and motives, no difficulty arises in seeing the closest possible relation and the essential unity and

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1. Op. cit., p. 244.

continuity of Schiller's mind and work. I have, therefore, chosen as my starting point a very detailed examination of one of Schiller's plays. My choice of Fiesco for this purpose - probably the least liked of Schiller's tragedies and the one which critics have found most difficult to see as an organic stage in Schiller's poetic development - has been determined by a variety of reasons. Firstly, a close examination would seem to confirm Schiller's own original high opinion of its artistic merit; and Schiller being the sternest of his critics, his judgement is not to be ignored. The play does indeed emerge as a surprisingly coherent and satisfactory work of art, and one moreover whose essential continuity with his later poetic productions, both in point of theme and method of presentation, is not difficult to see. Furthermore, Fiesco bears a much closer relation with his aesthetic thought as a whole than might ever be suspected. This is all the more surprising if one considers that the play was written long before the concepts and categories of Schiller's mature aesthetic had been consciously evolved - proof indeed of the underlying unity of his mind! - Finally, contrary to the hero of Die Räuber, who undergoes a catharsis, the tragedy of Fiesco is complete: a fully developed view of tragedy emerges, realised poetically in a number of motifs and symbols which will form the materials of all the later tragedies. In view of this essential continuity, the examination of the poetic motifs assembled in this play will yield all the material necessary for the understanding of the later plays and the view of tragedy evolved in them. Moreover, an early cross-section through the materials with which I shall be concerned, will enable me to raise straightaway and in their entirety the problems of my method, and to take them as dealt with thereafter.

Chapter Two is concerned with the main body of Schiller's tragedies. This chapter attempts to answer the question whether any unified conception of the tragic hero, the tragic theme and the structure of tragedy - in short a unified view of tragedy - can be discerned in Schiller's dramatic work as a whole. Although it might appear from the finished chapter that the bulk of Schiller's dramatic work has been treated in a somewhat summary fashion, each tragedy has in fact been subjected to an analysis no less rigorous than that accorded to Fiesco. The more selective method of presentation adopted here is justified in view of the fact that my aim is not a critical account of Schiller's individual plays, but an account of his view of tragedy in general. It would be tempting and profitable to conclude this chapter by an examination of Wilhelm Tell, the only one of Schiller's plays that does not end tragically. For as, to know anything fully, we must know its opposite, so our understanding of Schiller's view of tragedy would be more complete if we had vivid and direct experience of what he felt not to be tragedy. And indeed, an examination of Schiller's last finished work would illuminate and retrospectively confirm the findings of this chapter in a rather surprising fashion. Since, however, such an examination would, strictly speaking, fall outside the confines of this thesis the mere statement that it bears out the conclusions reached in this chapter must suffice.

The third chapter of this thesis attempts to relate Schiller's view of tragedy as it emerges from the tragedies themselves to Schiller's theory of tragedy, on the one hand, and to the Ästhetische Briefe on the other. Before an actual answer to this difficult question can be attempted, however, the methodological problems that are involved in such an undertaking must be considered. The chief points

I shall raise are the problems, presented especially sharply by drama, of how to arrive at the meaning of a literary work of art, and the relation of this total poetic intention to the personal beliefs of the poet as expressed in his theoretical pronouncements. In this connection, the methodological assumptions underlying some recent critical studies of Schiller will have to be discussed in some detail, since it is felt that the failure of the writers concerned to ask these questions inevitably sidetracked them into investigating the wrong kind of problem, and, thus, into giving the wrong kind of answer. The relation between Schiller's theory and practice will then be dealt with under the three main headings of tragic hero, tragic theme, and structure of tragedy respectively. The essays primarily concerned in this contact are Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts in einer Reihe von Briefen, Über das Pathetische and Über das Erhabene.

The discussion will, however, not be confined to these essays exclusively. The amplest reference will be made to other essays, such as Über Matthisons Gedichte, Über den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer Sitten, and Von den Notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen, in which questions of style and treatment of poetic material are discussed in general terms. It is important that Schiller's notions on the treatment of tragedy should be firmly placed into a wider aesthetic context - rather than into a moral or metaphysical context as has so often been done -; and it will be found that his views on tragedy are in fact entirely in line with his general aesthetic. In the main portion of this chapter I shall confine myself to an exposition of Schiller's aesthetic views, stated as far as possible in his own terms. The last section attempts a re-statement of some of his conceptions in modern terminology, and an assessment of their peculiar merits and limitations

in the light of contemporary aesthetic trends. It is hoped that these concluding remarks may throw some light on the interrelation between Schiller's aesthetic thought and his artistic creativity, and on the ultimate connection of both with his human personality.

CHAPTER ONE

Schiller's Fiesco has been commonly criticized on the ground that the main action is cluttered up, to the point of confusion, by a mass of theatrically effective but dramatically unnecessary incident. E. Kühnemann, for instance, writes: "Im übrigen macht sich nun das rein äusserliche Geschehen, die Staatsaktion, Verwicklung und Intrigue, deren Schilderung Schiller anzog, für sich selber gar zu breit und beherrscht das Stück."[1] Herbert Cysarz comments: "Im Fiesco wird die dichterische Folgerichtigkeit durch das Theater vergewaltigt."[2] Kathleen Cunningham sums up her discussion of the drama in the words: "Die organisch sich abspielende Handlung der Räuber fehlt vollständig. An ihrer Stelle zeigt sich eine Tendenz zum Zufälligen, zum rein Episodenhaften. Das Situationspathos herrscht vor."[3] And indeed, if Fiesco is taken to be a political play, as it commonly is, there would seem to be a surplus of incident beyond that required for the management of the plot. Even if we admit that Fiesco had to be shown deceiving the tyrant into thinking him a dissipated libertine, the objection remains, and has often enough been voiced, that too much space has been accorded to his entanglement with Julia and too much

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1. Eugen Kühnemann, Schiller, München, 1905, p.182.
2. Herbert Cysarz, Schiller, Halle/Saale, 1934, pp. 94-95.
3. Kathleen Cunningham, Schiller und die französische Klassik, Bonn, 1930, p.29.

attention lavished on its details.[1] Julia's collision with Fiesco's wife,[2] might seem redundant (II.2.) since it does not in any way affect the development of the action and since moreover the pain caused to Leonore by Fiesco's apparent infidelity is repeatedly brought to the reader's attention by other means.

The bewildering complexity of the first act, with its masked ball, its criss cross of intrigues, and most of all, the elusive role played by the central figure in all this confusion, has often been commented upon. It may be argued that most, if not all, of this maze of incident is necessary for the purposes of exposition: it is part of Fiesco's political genius to mask his conspiratorial schemes from both camps alike, the Republicans as well as the tyrants, so as not to endanger them. But neither the elaborate pretence enacted in front of Verrina's tableau, nor indeed the theatrical staging of the conspiracy itself in Act IV can be similarly explained. The latter in particular seems to run counter to the direction of the plot. The cluster of incidents necessitated by it seems dramatically redundant. Most striking among these is the confusion among the nobles who had been invited to Fiesco's entertainment and now uncertainly await admission. The

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1. cf. J. Minor op.cit., p.55 where he says: "lediglich der Wunsch, dem Spiel des Herzens neben dem der Politik einen freieren Spielraum zu verschaffen, und vielleicht auch die Begierde, sich an einer zweiten Frauengestalt zu versuchen, können Schiller zur Erdichtung dieser Figur bewogen haben... Er nahm sie aber sofort ernst und ernster als nötig war..."

2. K. Berger op.cit., p.287 takes exception to the "abstossenden, für den Verlauf der Handlung gleichgültigen Zankscene mit Leonore." Similarly, L. Bellermann op.cit., p.129 cites among such scenes as present "keinen Fortschritt der Handlung... und wohl auch keinen bezweckon,...die Scenen im Anfang des zweiten Aktes zwischen Julia und Leonore, welche der Handlung gar nicht dienen..."

purpose of this retarding incident, which takes up the six opening scenes of the IVth Act, is difficult to see. The plot at this point requires the denouement of the action, not further procrastination. Again, the treachery of the Mohr would seem dramatically significant if it either served to foil Fiesco's conspiracy or else showed him retrieving the situation, thus demonstrating his powers of leadership. In fact, it does neither. It no more leaves a proper impress on the plot, than do the extraordinary actions of Fiesco to which it gives rise. Bellermann very pertinently raises all the objections which may properly suggest themselves to a dramatic critic primarily concerned with the handling of the plot.[1] And indeed, Fiesco's reassurance of the frightened Republicans is offset by his resolve to give up the conspiracy and by his liberation of the traitor. On the other hand, this liberation and the additional information the traitor discloses to the departing messenger of the Duke are nullified by the barrenness of their effect upon the further course of the action. True, Fiesco seems to follow up the trend begun in the IVth Act by the warning he gives to his opponent in the opening scene of the Vth Act, in the midst of the conspiracy: but like the events leading up to it, this crowning incident, whilst running counter to the overall direction of the plot, at the same time fails to modify it: Andreas does not heed the warning extended to him and all continues as before. Here is perhaps the most blatantly redundant incident of all, tho' to single it out does not accurately reflect the cumulative tendency of the criticism of Fiesco. There is scarcely an element in the whole

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1. op.cit., pp.134 ff.

complex of the action that has not at one time or the other been deemed superfluous: to mention only one - the justification for the whole subsidiary action centring in Bertha has time and time again been questioned. Bellermann writes: "Im Fiesco könnte man alles, was sich auf Berthas Entehrung bezieht, wegschneiden, und es würde dadurch weder die Handlung im Ganzen noch Fiescos Charakter berührt,"[1] and this opinion is emphatically shared by Düntzer,[2] Berger[3] and others. Yet if all these alleged redundancies were added together and subtracted from the play, little of its bulk and less of its distinctive character would be left. There is no doubt that, were Fiesco's strange and illogical warning to the Duke to be cut out of the plot, we should feel a sense of loss. But it would be difficult to defend this intuition. It is scarcely sufficient to insist that this and the other inconsequential acts are somehow in keeping with Fiesco's character. For if they did fit into the customary picture we have of him, we should not call them redundant; we should prefer to describe the surplus of activity in terms which would show it to be not an accident, but an essential quality inherent in Fiesco's make-up.

Is there such a way of defining this disturbing but distinctive quality? To answer this question, an examination of the situations in which Fiesco displays it, is necessary.

Seen from the point of view of Julia, each one of her three encounters with Fiesco bears a more urgent, a more passionate character than its predecessor. She starts by calling him her slave (I.4) and ends up by confessing

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1. op.cit., p.133.
2. H.Düntzer, Schillers Leben, Leipzig, 1881, p.75.
3. op.cit., p.283.

herself to be his. (IV.12.) By contrast with this movement, the unchanging character of Fiesco's own response is all the more striking. And as we watch him statically sustaining the note of passion which he had struck at the beginning, we begin to doubt its sincerity. - Eventually Fiesco himself tells us that he has been playing throughout, an interpretation which criticism has accepted, although with some reservations: Miss Cunningham, for instance, writes "Es wird nicht klar, ob Fiesco wirklich spielt oder nicht" and asks "ob der Dichter sich für das Spiel so begeistert, dass es ernst wird?" Here as elsewhere in the play, she concludes, "scheint sogar der Dichter selbst durch die Maske verwirrt zu sein."[1] If Miss Cunningham suspects a change of intention on the part of the poet, Karl Berger attributes Fiesco's show of passion to a change of intention in the hero himself. "Dieser selbst," he writes, "treibt sein herzloses Spiel mit soviel 'Feuer', vergisst über den heissen Wallungen seines Herzens die kalte Berechnung so sehr, dass sogar der Leser über den wahren Charakter seiner Absichten im Zweifel bleiben kann."[2] But is there any ground for supposing that cold play at any point turns into hot passion? The sententiousness of Fiesco's words in the first encounter and the exaggerated aptness of his gestures at once draw the reproof from Julia that he is performing a 'Schauspiel' (I.4.); and the impression of deliberateness is strengthened by all that ensues. The silhouette, at first demanded from Julia with every show of passion, is duly returned to her at the end and contemptuously called "Theaterschmuck". Julia's sardonic request that Fiesco's wife be called to the scene, far from being forgotten as a casual remark would be, is

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1. Kathleen Cunningham, op.cit., p.26.
2. op.cit., p.280.

literally fulfilled by Fiesco. Leonora is made to watch the final humiliation of her rival behind the scene of the concert hall, an arrangement of which the reader is aware, and which serves to heighten the sense of the theatrical. Julia's hair-style, the topic of an amorous conversation in her rooms, is once more pointedly alluded to as she is being led to prison. - Not a thread that is not gathered in, not a reaction that is not to the point in the extreme - as when Fiesco describes the spectacle he has prepared for Julia as "zum Totlachen" (IV.3) or as when, taking his cue from Julia's "wenn du mich kalt erwürgtest, Fiesco?" (IV.12.) he plays on the word until he has found a pretext for ending an embarrassing scene. Do not these facts suggest that neither Fiesco, nor his creator, forgets his intention at any point, and that, so far from being overcome by his emotion, Fiesco handles it with playful detachment? There is every indication of a conscious pattern both in what he does and what he says - he calls his amorous affair a Roman as early as II.4. and again in IV.13. and a Komödie (IV.10.) - And it is the pattern itself, not Julia, which commands his passionate interest.

Thus the possibility suggests itself that the superfluity of Fiesco's actions here and his playful detachment may perhaps both have to be included as an essential part of his character. The question arises whether the same conjunction may not in fact exist in those other instances where the superfluity of his actions is marked. If so, an explanation would have been found on the psychological plane for Fiesco's tendency wantonly to take up certain lines of action, only then to drop them again. Whether this notion of playfulness will prove to be something more than a working hypothesis, depends on how

much support it receives, not only from an examination of those other parts of the action that have been deemed superfluous, but also from an examination of Schiller's methods of characterisation, of the principal images of the play and its style in general.

At first sight, we do find Fiesco persisting in the same playful response in a variety of widely different situations, just as he was found to maintain the same response in the face of Julia's rapidly changing reactions. In the first act, he plays with Gianettino's vanity, with Verrina's earnestness and Bourgognino's indignation, as he has played with Julia's sensuality; in the second, with the outraged aristocrats, the seething crowds in the street and the artisans in his palace, with his fellow Republicans, and finally always with the Mohr, who alone responds to his mood and plays back. Yet it may be argued that all this is mere pretence, significant for its ulterior motive but of no account in itself. Such an interpretation leaves some questions unanswered. Take for instance the topics of his conversation. On no less than five separate occasions in the first two acts it is about playing, or an activity akin to playing in its lack of purposiveness, namely art.[1] But is this way of drawing attention to the fact that he is playing the best method of inducing belief in his pretence? It is the inconspicuously worn mask that will pass unnoticed and unquestioned. And only a fool such as Gianettino mistakes it for his nature: "der arme, sorglose Wicht," he calls Fiesco. (III.10.)

A second problem arises if we discount Fiesco's playfulness as mere pretence and of no importance in itself. It concerns the crucial figure of the Mohr. With his

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1. For a further discussion of this point, cf. pp. 55 ff.

henchman Fiesco is under no constraint to pretend: with him he is perfectly candid. In this figure and in this relationship, conceived in full freedom from historical sources, was Schiller's opportunity to reveal, from the beginning, the 'real' Fiesco behind his mask: and he used it to show us a Fiesco delighting in play! - In this connection the scene between Julia and Leonore, so frequently singled out for attack on the ground of its redundance, assumes an unsuspected significance: for the topic of conversation in this scene, totally independent as it is of Fiesco and his plots and plans, is none other than love seriously felt versus love playfully handled as an art. A coincidence indeed, if this tragedy is not concerned with the problem of playfulness except temporarily and incidentally on its upper levels.

Thus a certain amount of evidence, and evidence of different kinds, would seem to point in the direction of the hypothesis we are examining. Yet as long as there remain two motives for Fiesco's behaviour it is impossible to ascertain with certainty which of them is the determining one. It is only when the external constraint to pretend is obviated, and replaced by an opposing necessity for straightforward action, that it is possible to know unambiguously whether Fiesco's playfulness is more than a passing accident of his behaviour: whether in fact it is its determining cause. What then is the nature of his actions once his pretence is shed, his purpose declared and his course set? If Fiesco were the man of action he is commonly deemed to be, his actions now would be practical, purposive and pressing in the measure in which they lacked these qualities before.[1]

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1. cf. e.g. Eugen Kübnemann, op.cit., p.179, who stresses these qualities in Fiesco once he has shed his pretence.

But what, in the light of such expectations, are we to make of Fiesco's monologue at the opening of Act III? This monologue inaugurates the active phase of his political career. Here, the full range of Fiesco's aims and ambitions is disclosed, with the frankness which soliloquy permits and in the final form in which they will henceforth govern his actions. Is it not paradoxical that Schiller should have prescribed in the stage directions that these revelations be accompanied "mit erhabenem Spiel"? - Again, what are we to make of Fiesco's sudden dropping of his avowed purpose when, on receiving the message from Andreas, he unconditionally discharges the Mohr who has just proved the danger he is to Fiesco's cause by betraying the conspiracy to the tyrant? And of the warning which Fiesco himself, at the crucial moment of the battle, extends to Andreas, whom he had previously recognised to be the real head of the opposition? A clue to the nature of these actions may be found in the reactions of others. Concerning the first incident, Verrina exclaims: "Bist du wahnsinnig, Mensch? War es denn irgend ein Bubenstreich, den wir vorhatten? ... oder war es nicht Sache des Vaterlandes?" (IV.9) Calcagno comments on the release of the Mohr: "Was? was? Leben soll der Heide? Leben und uns alle verraten haben?" (Iv.9.) whilst Andreas retorts, laughing, as did also the departing Mohr, "Du bist bei Laune, Freund! Bring deine Schwänke bei Tag. Mitternacht ist eine ungewöhnliche Stunde." (V.1.) The incredulousness of each one of the speakers is the measure of the utter lack of purpose which friend and foe alike discern in Fiesco's actions. But their consent about the nature of these actions goes further. A Bubenstreich, Verrina calls Fiesco's plan, and Andreas uses words evoking similar associations: Laune, Schwänke; whilst both he and the Mohr are moved to laughter. Are

not these sufficient indications that Fiesco is here playing, playing at rebellion, as Verrina hints, and playing at chivalry, as he had before played at plotting and pretending? The only other explanation for responses so inappropriate to the situation, and so blatantly aimless, is the one on which Verrina touches for a moment: namely that Fiesco is insane. This not being the case, the sole function of this comment appears to be to throw into the sharpest possible relief the frivolousness of Fiesco's response.

Thus playfulness remains dominant, in a situation in which every motive for such a response has been removed and the strongest motives for an opposite mode of response are at hand. Does Schiller, by means of indirect characterisation, support and throw further light on the feature of playfulness suggested by the plot?

When, at the opening ball, Fiesco recognises Verrina in one of the three black masks that seek him out, the latter observes: "Fiesco findet seine Freunde schneller in ihren Masken, als sie ihn in der seinigen." (I.7.) This might seem to mean no more than that Fiesco disguises his real intentions more cunningly and thoroughly than the Republicans. But the interesting thing is that Fiesco is not actually wearing a mask, whilst the Republicans are. Thus, with regard to Fiesco, Verrina uses the word mask in a purely metaphorical sense, to draw attention to a trait of his character. And this more intimate association of the mask with Fiesco's person is underlined by comparison with himself, to whom the mask is a physical, and in that sense extraneous property. Fiesco's mask of playfulness then, he seems to suggest, is of an altogether different kind from his own: not an extraneous accessory to be used or discarded, but something more closely connected with his real nature: for with him, mask and real face coalesce. This distinction

between different kinds of masks is underlined by yet another circumstance: on two occasions in the play the extraneous nature of masks in the ordinary sense is underlined by pantomimic means. Both Verrina and, before the first word of the play is spoken Leonore, tear off their masks, and with the conventional sign of being at play, the mood it betokens vanishes. Leonore gives way to an outburst of grief about her husband, whilst Verrina vents his grief about the fate of Genoa.

A variety of comments reveal a Fiesco playing with other human beings, even as he plays with life and fortune. When asked to invite certain nobles "zu einer Komödie auf die Nacht", which is to see the rebellion, the Mohr comments adroitly: "Mitzuspielen vermutlich". (III.6.) And one of these nobles, waiting for Fiesco to receive his guests, remarks: "Mich deucht, es fing schon an [das Lustspiel] und wir spielten die Narren drin." (IV.4.) - When Fiesco discloses his project to his wife, Leonore likens it to a Spiel; she tries to shake his confidence by reminding him of the dangers, saying: "Sagst du das - und standest bei jenem geisterverzerrenden Spiele - ihr nennt es Zeitvertreib - sahst zu der Betrügerin, wie sie ihren Günstling mit kleinen Glückskarten lockte, bis er warm ward, aufstand, die Bank forderte - und ihn jetzt im Wurf der Verzweiflung verliess?" (IV.14.) The same image is once more taken up in Verrina's judgment of Fiesco, shortly before he sends him to his death: "der verschlagene Spieler hats nur in einer Karte versehen," he says to Fiesco. "Er kalkulierte das ganze Spiel des Neides aber der raffinierte Witzling liess zum Unglück die Patrioten aus." (V.16.) - These last two views assume a special significance; for not only does Schiller assign them to the two characters most intimately acquainted with Fiesco; they are also stated well after the

turning point in Fiesco's career when his true intentions are known to both Leonore and Verrina: yet the metaphors of playing persist. - Julia uses words reminiscent of Verrina, again after the supposed turning point: "Über den verschlagenen Kopf! Wie künstlich ers anlegte, mich in seinen Willen hineinzulügen." (III.10) just as earlier on she had said "Schön! Schön! Sehenswürdig! Rufe doch jemand die Gräfin von Lavagna zu diesem reizenden Schauspiel!" (I.4.) And although admittedly Fiesco is seeking to delude the countess at the time when she marvels at his cunning - yet these words, taken in conjunction with so many other affirmations that Fiesco is playing, have their effect on the reader: inevitably they strengthen his doubt whether the 'real' Fiesco is after all so different from the Fiesco that pretended to play. - Julia's words add a new facet to his characterisation: she sees playfulness to be connected with art. And this modification gains in importance as it is corroborated independently by other characters. Verrina calls Fiesco "ein Anbeter der Kunst", who "erhitzt sich gern an erhabenen Scenen", and indeed bases his plan to test Fiesco on this very trait. (I.13.) In the eyes of his wife, Fiesco is more than 'art-ful', more even than a lover of art. When Leonore calls him a "blühender Apoll" (I.1), a yet closer connection is hinted at, and it is borne out when, later in the same scene, she says of him: "Mein Genuas grösster Mann, der vollendet sprang aus dem Meissel der unerschöpflichen Künstlerin, alle Grössen seines Geschlechtes im lieblichsten Schmelze verbindend." She sees in him a perfect work of art sprung from the chisel of the divine artist: a common enough metaphor in the heyday of Shaftesbury's influence, and frequently recurring in the work of the young Schiller

it is true;[1] but not without special import here. This is brought out by a very revealing simile. Recalling the scene between Fiesco and the Countess which she had witnessed, Leonore describes "die starre, tiefe Betäubung, worin er gleich dem gemalten Entzücken versunken sass, als wär um ihn her die Welt weggeblasen und er allein mit dieser Julia im ewigen Leeren." (I.1.) Fiesco's transport - the "heissen Wallungen seines Herzens" as Berger called it - in truth is an artistic transport, a "gemaltes Entzücken". No doubt Fiesco has a design on the Countess: but in the act of carrying it out, passion - not for the woman, but for the design itself - overtakes him; it becomes its own end. The designer, interweaving himself in the human pattern he is creating, himself becomes part of the design and all purposes that point beyond it lapse into abeyance: "als wär um ihn her die Welt weggeblasen und er allein mit dieser Julia im ewig Leeren." Leonore, through her simile, tells the reader more than she herself knows consciously: for she believes Fiesco to be passionately in love with Julia. But that she is here the mouthpiece of the poet is evident from the fact that her description is independently borne out, on the dramatic level, by Fiesco's behaviour with the Countess, which has already been discussed. - And may this description not illuminate other incidents as well, which convey the impression at once of aimlessness and yet purposiveness, of playfulness and yet absorption, of coldness and yet of passion? We need only think of the scene in which the Maklerei, here alluded to in a purely metaphorical sense, is introduced into the actual plot; or the nocturnal warning of Andreas. Thus

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1. cf. Die Räuber, IV, 4. ed.cit., II, p.150, ll.14 f.
Kabale und Liebe, I.3 & V.7. ed.cit., III, p.367, ll.13 f., and p.498, ll.157 ff.
Don Carlos, III, 10, ed.cit., V, 2. p.310, ll. 3109 ff. p.315, ll. 3230 f.

a variety of widely different characters, placed in widely different relationships with Fiesco, all concur in attributing to Fiesco a set of characteristics ranging from gambling via 'art-fulness' and love of art, to pure 'playfulness': and these characteristics, notwithstanding their difference, are bound together by the recurrent use of the words Spiel and Kunst.

Does what Fiesco says of himself, by its matter and style, bear out this indirect characterisation?

Perhaps the most immediately striking statements from Fiesco's own lips are those he makes when the Republicans come to him to test his true intentions. On being introduced to the painter Romano Fiesco greets him with the words: "Ihre Hand Romano. Ihre Meisterin ist eine Verwandte meines Hauses. Ich liebe sie brüderlich. Kunst ist die rechte Hand der Natur. Diese hat nur Geschöpfe, jene hat Menschen gemacht." (II.17.) And he welcomes the painter's offer to show his last work, saying: "Ich bin heute ganz ungewöhnlich heiter, mein ganzes Wesen feiert eine gewisse heroische Ruhe, ganz offen für die schöne Natur." (II.17) What manner of state is this, in which the whole person relaxes, freed from all constraints, and responds with a receptivity which is at the same time active, "heroisch" - what state is it but the aesthetic state as Schiller was to define it later, in the letters Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen? And indeed, Fiesco's greeting to the painter, with its proud dictum that art alone makes men, adumbrates the crucial challenge of the letters on aesthetic education: "Der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt."[1] - These then are weighty

1. Uber die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, ed.cit., letter 15, X, p.327, ll.13 ff

words on the lips of a Schillerian hero;[1] and the present context contains nothing to suggest that they are anything but a sincere expression of Fiesco's personality and convictions.

Another important piece of self-characterisation we actually hear from Leonore: "Ich hörte dich wohl einst schwören, meine Schönheit habe alle deine Entwürfe gestürzt" - she reminds him as he is about to head the rebellion. (IV.14.) In the light of the earlier statements about himself, the word "Schönheit" claims our attention. Yet, as she herself realises in the following words, this assessment of his own motives is not quite correct: for her beauty cannot now keep him from pursuing his ambitious plans. What is it, then, that does in fact induce Fiesco to overthrow his projects? For overthrow them he does, as soon as he receives Andreas' letter, and later when he modifies his original intention of giving up the conspiracy completely, and instead decides to warn Andreas. Perhaps incident and allusion will illuminate each other mutually. On receiving Andreas' letter, Fiesco exclaims, "in heftiger Bewegung": "Bei Gott! Auf die ganze Kriegsmacht der Republik - auf das war ich nicht gefasst. Der alte schwächliche Mann schlägt mit vier Zeilen dritthalbtausend Mann. (Lässt kraftlos die Hände sinken) Doria schlägt den Fiesco." (IV.9.) What kind of an action is it which, in the eyes of Fiesco, defeats himself and three and a half thousand men massed in the name of a good cause? Fiesco's own antithesis may help here. Four lines on a scrap of paper versus an army of men: this suggests a light and

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1. Bellermann (op.cit., p.151) draws attention to the connection of Fiesco's words with the above quoted words from the Ästhetische Briefe, but attaches no significance to it, since the thought Fiesco expresses "ist... durch den Zusammenhang der Gedanken nicht gefordert und wird nur lose angefügt."

spiritual thing - or is it a thing at all? - versus something heavy and material; and the epithet "schwächlich" adds the suggestion of frailness. The qualities suggested by Fiesco's words are reinforced by the content of the letter. It reflects not merely a good deed, but a good deed done lightly, naturally, with graceful ease - a deed such as that of the Samaritan, which Schiller was later to describe as the prototype of the beautiful deed,[1] and which is superior to the "merely" dutiful or good deed in virtue of just this quality of light grace. Is it too much to suggest that the lightness here alluded to, which by its very lightness rises superior to a thing both weighty and good, should be the lightness induced by form and beauty?[2] That beauty is indeed the quality in Andreas which Fiesco seeks to rival and before which he bows, is supported by the fact that Fiesco twice calls him "schöner Stern" (III.5.) later to proclaim "dein Stern geht unter, Herzog" (V.1.), which obvious reference to the earlier metaphor; and this view is borne out by Andreas himself, who refers to his rule as "das schönste Kunstwerk der Regierung", (II.13.), and who alludes to his ship by the name of "Bellona" in a context which clearly imparts symbolical significance to the name (V.1.). Having read Andreas' letter, Fiesco resolves: [illegible]: - and the stage direction reads "mit Adel" -: "Ein Doria soll

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1. Cf. letter to Körner 18. Feb. 1793. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit. III, pp.262 f.

2. In the Ästhetische Briefe, Schiller repeatedly stresses lightness as the sign of the aesthetic response or object: e.g. "Indem es mit der Empfindung zusammentrifft, legt das Nothwendige den seinigen [Ernst] ab, weil es leicht wird." (Letter XV; ed. cit., X, p.325, ll.23 ff.) or: "der ernsteste Stoff muss so behandelt werden, dass wir die Fähigkeit behalten, ihn unmittelbar mit dem leichtesten Spiele zu vertauschen." (Letter XXII; ed. cit., X, p.352, ll.20 f.). Italics are Schiller's own.

mich am Grossmut besiegt haben? Eine Tugend fehlte im Stamm der Fiesker? Nein! So wahr ich ich selber bin ... ich werde hingehen und alles bekennen!" (IV.9.). In discussions of Fiesco's character, much has been made of his magnanimity, which has been regarded as the chief impulse running counter to and foiling his ambition.[1] But such an interpretation fails to account for the second question Fiesco puts here, which adds an important qualification to the first one. It is not so much the thought of magnanimity as the thought of any quality whatsoever missing from his make-up, which prompts Fiesco's decision to throw up his project. Is not this ideal of the fully developed personality, affirmed by the words "so wahr ich ich selber bin", an aesthetic ideal? Already the Schiller of the Schaubühne had seen the function of theatrical art in that it "jeder Seelenkraft Nahrung gibt, ohne eine einzige zu überspannen"[2] and the mature Schiller was to insist that only aesthetic culture can restore to man "die höchste aller Schenkungen; die Schenkung der Menschheit". He called "die Schönheit unsere zweite Schöpferin",[3] words which do indeed echo those which Fiesco speaks to Romano. - Thus, taking all his utterances together, it seems as if Fiesco is moved to respond absolutely, not to the beauty of Leonore, but to beauty as such, and that for the sake of beauty he overthrows all specific aims and projects, however cherished.

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1. Cf. Benno von Wiese, op.cit., p. 217, where he describes Fiesco as ... "grossmütig bis zur Selbstaufgabe, fasciniert vom Traum der Macht..."
   Cf. also M. Gerhard, Schiller, Bern, 1950, p. 58, who defines ... "Ehrgeiz, das Machtstreben als Verführung der Sehnsucht nach Grösse" as the theme of the play.-
   Cf. also W.Witte, op.cit., pp. 120 f.

2. Die Schaubühne als moralische Anstalt betrachtet, ed.cit. III, p. 513, ll. 15 f.

3. Ästhetische Briefe, letter XXI, ed.cit., X, p.348, ll. 6 ff.

The matter of Fiesco's revelations about himself is borne out by his manner. At the opening of the monologue that marks the turning-point, he says "wilde Phantasien... haben... mein ganzes Wesen krampfig um e i n e Empfindung gewälzt. - Ich muss mich im Offnen dehnen." (III.2.) These words follow closely upon the shortlived subordination of his own ambitions to the happiness of Genoa. The image underlying this statement is not immediately evident. It is, however, brought out by juxtaposition with another statement, made by Sacco about Verrina: "Genua ist die Spindel, um welche sich alle seine Gedanken mit einer eisernen Treue drehen." (I.3.) Clearly, the two statements require to be read together. It is Genua round which all Verrina's thoughts revolve, and on which Fiesco had likewise sought to centre his whole being. But this concentration of the whole personality on any <u>one</u> object or overriding emotion, in the case of Fiesco is expressed in an image connoting extreme constraint and revulsion. "Krampfig" and "wälzen" represent a significant intensification of "mit eiserner Treue" and "drehen". And the right of the whole person is at once affirmed in the words that follow - words that evoke a sense of unlimited freedom and expansion. - By the choice of his words, Fiesco here adumbrates the choice he will later make on the level of action, when he rejects a course of action which, though good, fails to bring into play the whole of his personality. The full development of his personality and comprehensiveness of experience - this indeed is the keynote of the soliloquy that follows. At first sight, it reads like an ebullition of a "grosser Kerl" in the typical manner of <u>the Storm and Stress</u>. Yet do the images he uses bear out such an impression? "Drüber zu <u>brüten</u> mit Monarchenkraft - zu <u>stehen</u> in jener schrecklich erhabenen

Höhe, niederzuschmollen [lächeln] in der Menschlichkeit reissenden Strudel - den ersten Mund am Becher der Freude-schlagen zu sehen unvergoltene Wunden" - none of these connote active participation in the rough and tumble of life, but its contemplation from a distant and elevated vantage point.[1] - The verbs especially are devoid of any active meaning; furthermore their grammatical form - they are all infinitives - helps to divest them of what active force they would carry if used in a finite form; and finally, their initial position helps further to reduce the tension of the periods that follow. When finally Fiesco uses the ancient symbol of mastery over life, the symbol of the charioteer, play significantly predominates over passion. "Die unbändigen Leidenschaften des Volks gleich soviel stampfenden Rossen mit dem weichen Spiele des Zügels zu zwingen".

Indeed, an underlying notion of play forms the connecting link between several metaphorical expressions he uses. "Ist was ins Garn gelaufen?" He asks of the Mohr - an idiom taken from the sphere of the hunter (III.4.) suggesting a mixture of purposiveness and play, which befits the context in which it occurs. - When the nobles, outraged by the tyrant's coup, press for a popular rebellion, Fiesco replies: "Genua ist da, wo das unüberwindliche Rom wie ein Federball in die Rakete eines zärtlichen Knaben Octavius sprang." (II.5.) The point of the comparison is clear. Fiesco hints that Genua is ready to go into his net as Rome fell

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1. Schiller quotes these words in a letter to Fr. Schröder, (13 June 1787, ed. cit., I, p. 347) who was then producing Don Carlos on the Mannheim stage. Schiller begs him to put his all into the production and to make it an inspired one. - The purely aesthetic context of this reference would seem to support my reading.

into Octavio's - indeed, the indefinite article conveys that Octavio's name is mentioned merely by way of illustration, for which another could equally well be substituted.
- The epithet "zärtlicher Knabe" deserves mention. It recalls the "schwächliche alte Mann" Andreas who has defeated "dritthalbtausend Mann" by a scrap of paper. Here too, the frail defeats the powerful; the populace of Genua which is tumbling into the tyrant's net, is described as the "blinde, unbeholfene Koloss": and what ensures victory over its massive might, is playful mastery. Both the passages are based on the image of a net. This image recurs yet another time. When Bourgognino doubts the integrity of Fiesco's intentions, the latter puts him in his place with the words: "Ich dächte doch, das Gewebe eines Meisters sollte künstlicher sein, als einem flüchtigen Anfänger so geradezu in die Augen zu springen." (I.8.) The predicate "künstlicher" reveals and underlines the difference in the associations evoked by Gewebe from those connected with Garn or Rakete. They are less associations of play or skill, more purely associations of art, of design without reference to anything outside. Is it not strange that Fiesco should use an image which fails to point beyond itself, when he consciously seeks to intimate that there is some worthy purpose beyond his apparent aimlessness? To appreciate the significance of the net, and especially the Gewebe images, mention must be made of another image which recurs on several occasions in the play. It is the image of Faden, in the main associated with the Republicans, just as the Gewebe images are used by Fiesco. Sacco relates to Calcagno that he must work for a revolution so as to liquidate his debtors. Asked about the extent of his debts, he replies: "So gross, dass mein Lebensfaden, achtfach genommen, am ersten Zehenteil abschnellen muss."

(I.3.) - Again, Verrina, having cursed Bertha as an incentive to the Republicans' determination to free Genua, sums up the situation in the words: "An diesem teuren Faden halt ich deine, meine, eure Pflichten fest." (I.12.) Each time, the image suggests some object assuming a vital importance because life is bound up with it and depends on its attainment. Genua must be freed, or else Sacco's, and Bertha's life thread will snap. Thus, by its similar connotations in two independent contexts, the image of the thread comes to signify an urgent and vital attachment to an object or cause, such as the freedom of Genua. It is Fiesco himself who eventually brings these two lines of images, so far developed quite separately, together, in his conversation with the nobles. For he predicts that the blind and awkward colossus - the populace of Genua - must of necessity tumble into the net "eines zärtlichen Knaben," because, for all its noisy show of power and passion, its stupidity is such that it stumbles - "über Zwirnfäden". By this juxtaposition of images Fiesco brings out the contrast between passionate attachment to an object - an attitude we associate with the Republicans - and playful handling of it, one which we associate with Fiesco himself: if previously he has rejected any one emotion predominating at the cost of the whole personality, now he rejects any emotional attachment as such: it is 'blind', 'plump', stupid, disastrous. - The result of this juxtaposition of image patterns is to define more clearly, by contrast, the meaning of Gewebe: it does not lead beyond itself, a vital link between the world of persons and objects. Rather does it rest complete in itself, an elaborate pattern without a purpose, a thing of art rather than of nature.

In the light of these images the fact that the language

Fiesco uses is imbued with metaphorical expressions drawn from the sphere of art assumes a new significance; it is true that some of these refer to his actual deliberate masquerading - such as when he refers to his flirtation with Julia as a "tolle Roman" (IV.13.), a "Harlekinsleidenschaft", (ibid.) a "Roman" (II.4.), and calls her silhouette a "Theaterschmuck" (IV.13.) or when he calls the attempt on his life, which he is about to stage with the Mohr's help, ein 'Possenspiel' (II.9.), or says to the latter: "Die Schellenkappe habe ich nun aufgesetzt, dass diese Genueser über mich lachen; bald will ich mir eine Glatze scheren, dass sie den Hanswurst von mir spielen" (II.4.) - or as when, finally, he announces to the Mohr that a secret army will enter the town "verkappt", as "Savoyarden", "Komödianten" or "Musikanten" (II.15.). The occurrence of many of these terms may be explained by the factual situation; but even that does not require the constant allusion in terms of art. Moreover, metaphors creep in where there is no question of conscious pretending: twice in one scene does he refer to his wife's despairing outburst as an "Auftritt" (III.3.) - a term strangely discordant with the genuineness of her grief. To the respective parts of the Republicans in the conspiracy about to begin he refers as Rollen (IV.10.). And words such as Meister, Meisterstück or Meisterstreich abound. Taken singly, some of these may indeed be of no consequence. Together, they form a verbal pattern the cumulative force of which is irresistible.

And lastly, it is worth looking at that turning-point in the second Act where Fiesco supposedly sheds pretence and assumes his real active identity. In the short monologue preceding the disclosure of his true intentions to the Republicans, he says: "Alle Maschinen des grossen Wagestücks sind im Gang, zum schaudernden Konzert alle Instrumente gestimmt. Nichts fehlt, als die Larve herabzureissen und

Genuas Patrioten den Fiesco zu zeigen." (II.~~15~~16.) Is it not strange that images of art should be used both to mark the end of pretence and the beginning of purposive action? For if anything, the musical image connotes a more highly organised artistic activity. And indeed the image foreshadows precisely what Fiesco will do on the plane of action. One remembers Zenturion's caustic remark: "Mich deucht, es [das Lustspiel] fing schon an und wir spielten die Narren drin." (IV.4.)

A variety of indications on the levels of plot, character and language, independently and consistently all point in one direction: the playfulness of his response is not an extraneous accident of Fiesco's behaviour, but a constituent inherent in his very nature. And a mass of references to art in general and to the theatre in particular indicate the more specific character of Fiesco's mode of response. Is Fiesco then an actor? This hypothesis must now be more closely examined.

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Jakob Minor criticises Schiller for having bestowed an inordinate amount of attention upon the figure of Julia and Fiesco's relationship with her. "Denn die bloss geheuchelte Liebe hat er mit dem ganzen Feuer einer wahren Leidenschaft geschildert und nicht ohne eine gewisse Selbstzufriedenheit den Zuschauer irregeführt, welcher seinem Helden die erlogene Liebe eher als die wahre zu seiner Gattin glaubt."[1] There is undeniably some truth in this observation. In the two scenes in which Fiesco is shown with his wife, he appears unsure of himself, faltering, torn. With Julia he is reckless

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1. Op.cit., p.55.

and fiery. Leonore doubts his love. Julia believes in it, and in their last encounter which, with Leonore watching behind the scenes and the nobles appearing at a given sign, is staged in the literal sense of the word - he himself calls it a 'Schauspiel' - she is ready to surrender to him, and abjures all the 'Künste' by which she has hitherto kept him at bay. There does indeed appear to be an inverse ratio between the artificiality of Fiesco's behaviour and the naturalness of its effect. Nor is the instance Minor notes the only one in the play. Consider for instance Fiesco's relationship to his wife. His feelings carry the mark of conviction only when he displays them to a public: as when, on being made a duke, he thinks of his duchess first; or when, having murdered her, he recalls the triumph he would have experienced at her side; or when he blows her kisses on horseback, after the faked attempt on his life. This whole incident is worth examining more closely. Up to this point Leonore has doubted her husband's affections. Just before Arabella reports the incident she has witnessed, Leonore has said: "Hätte Fiesco mich lieben können, nie hätte Fiesco sich in die Welt gestürzt." (II.10.) Yet when his gallantry is reported to her, she at once blushes in "Entzückung". (II.11.) Not that she is under any delusion that Fiesco shares the emotion he has inspired. "Sein Herz wirft er den Dirnen nach," she says, "und ich jage nach einem Blick." (ibid) This comment betrays a strange double-consciousness: he prostitutes his feelings, she knows, and yet they compel her assent. This is what might be said of the performance of an actor, or, for that matter, of any artist. And here it is of interest that Fiesco himself describes the whole incident of which this is part, as a "Possenspiel". And is it not the formal perfection of Fiesco's action which is stressed in Arabella's judgment - an aesthetic judgment which precedes the actual

account of the episode - "nie sah ich unsern gnädigen Herrn so schön" (ibid.)? - Again, there are the two attempts on Fiesco's life, one real, the other faked. These two incidents provoke comparison by reason of the fact that one sets out to be an imitation of the other. The actual attempt on Fiesco's life is perhaps not very impressive. There is next to no action - the Mohr's move to stab Fiesco being foiled by the latter - and, instead, an uninterrupted patter of conversation; Fiesco's immediate reaction to the Mohr's attempt in particular strikes a very prosaic note. "Sachte Kanaille", he says (and there is no stage direction even to hint that he is raising his voice), and, a moment later: "Du hast schlechte Arbeit gemacht" (I.9.). A dispassionate observation such as this divests the situation of any emotional appeal it might otherwise have had. Now compare with this the imitation: the very fact that the incident is staged, excludes the possibility of any emotions on the part of Fiesco. His preparations are precise, technical and workmanlike. - Yet oddly, the ensuing scene differs from its model, in that it is charged with emotion. "Die ganze Versammlung hing ihm odemlos in starren Gruppen entgegen; er sprach wenig, aber streifte den blutenden Arm auf, das Volk schlug sich um die fallenden Tropfen wie um Reliquien. Der Mohr wurde seiner Willkür übergeben, und Fiesco ... Fiesco begnadigte ihn. Itzt raste die Stille des Volks in einen brüllenden Laut aus, jeder Odem zernichtete einen Doria, Fiesco wurde auf tausendstimmigem Vivat nach Hause getragen." (II.14.). Formerly there had been next to no action; here there is next to no talk, but pure pantomime addressing itself through the eye to the emotions. The few drops of blood are a palpable example of the extraordinary economy of means employed to bring out the essentials of the situation,

whilst the impression they make on the crowd testifies to the extraordinary effect engendered by such economy. - Here indeed, as the effect proves, is an evocation of a perfect situation of its kind. Once again we are inclined to regard the imitation as more real than the real thing.

This impression is confirmed as we compare the two conspiracies of Fiesco and Gianettino running side by side; one conducted with blustering violence on the principle that "Gewalt ist die beste Beredsamkeit" (I.5); the other staged as a Komödie; and at least two incidents are so similar as to provoke comparison. German soldiers figure in both; and by this fact alone the poet binds the two incidents together; for these characters, so out of keeping with the rest, make their appearance in no more than three situations in all, once with each tyrant; and thus serve as a connecting link between them. In the first incident German soldiers inform Gianettino in the presence of Fiesco of the appearance of a suspicious throng in town and harbour. These are in fact Fiesco's soldiers. In the second instance they inform Fiesco, in the presence of his shaken fellow conspirators, that the conspiracy is known to the enemy. Gianettino responds sincerely to a piece of news which might well be his salvation; Fiesco's reaction to a piece of news which might be his undoing, is, in the literal sense of the word, staged: for when the news first transpires he alleges it to be his "Veranstaltung" and forces the bringer of the message to carry through his "Rolle" in the supposed fake. And again the superiority of the artificial response is brought home; Fiesco masters a situation fraught with danger, while Gianettino allows his chance to slip by. - We have thus no less than four instances in which Fiesco's highly artificial response to a given situation is contrasted to his own or someone else's

spontaneous response to the same or similar circumstances. The circumstances, in each case, are such as to call for a straightforward emotional rather than an artificial reaction. Yet paradoxically, the artificial response is each time shown to be the more compelling of the two. It is precisely this last fact which Minor, in the case of Fiesco's response to the two women, had criticised as a weakness of the play. But seeing the insistent repetition, and the consistent use of contrast the poet makes to stress the point, are we not forced to regard what Minor takes to be the poet's error, as his deliberate intention? The extraordinariness of Fiesco's reaction is not, as Minor thinks, an isolated freak: it is a consistent mark of his behaviour altogether. Fiesco, the poet tells us, responds to situations of life as if life were a great stage.[1]

Nor indeed are these the only instances where Fiesco responds primarily not as a man but as a showman. One need only think of his handling of the Patricians and the journeymen that storm his palace in noisy indignation: smiling, aloof, turning their excited confusion into consternation at their own helplessness and adoring faith in

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1. Cf. also Minor's criticism of the treatment meted out to Julia: "Noch gröblicher misslungen ist aber das frevelhafte Spiel, welches Fiesco mit der Imperiali zu ihrer Demütigung treibt und zu welchem er taktlos alle Verschworenen als Zeugen herbeiruft. Der Abgott der genuesischen Frauen setzt hier jede Rücksicht gegen das zarte Geschlecht beiseite... Bedenkt man nun gar, dass Fiesco ihr Mitschuldiger ist, ... so erscheint uns diese poetische Gerechtigkeit ... hart und grausam ... Dass doch der Dichter der Anthologie den Grundsatz "Mensch sein" ... der schwachen Imperiali gegenüber so ganz vergisst!" etc. Op.cit., p.57. The critic's intuition is sounder than his reason, as such words as 'Spiel' and 'poetische Gerechtigkeit' show, which really put their finger on the facts of the case. - But Minor, Bellermann, and Kühnemann are all too easily swayed by moral sentiments, which they superimpose on the poet's intention.

his power and wisdom; or of his dealings with the republican leaders and the painter; fanning their sense of superiority and then shattering it as he shatters the tableau before him, and putting up his own image instead; or of his calculated entry into the courtyard, which by the modesty of his bearing deflates the passions his delay had previously inspired; or, finally, of his nocturnal visit to Andreas, dreamlike and dazzling like a visitation. Are these scenes, each one of which leaves a profound impression on those that witness them, spontaneous effusions of his personality, or are they not on the contrary so effective because a virtuoso here carefully stages his personality? The instances cited are too many to be discussed in detail. But certain features, for the most part familiar from the four instances which have been previously discussed, recur in all of them, and must now be mentioned; and here attention to the stage directions will help to reveal the poet's intentions.

1) In all the instances great stress is laid on Fiesco's coldness, which was found to be a mark of his behaviour in the first group of instances. If in the first group that coldness was underlined by contrast with an analogous situation in which ordinary emotions were displayed, here it is stressed by contrast with the emotions of the other characters. Consider for instance the stage directions of II.5., the scene between Fiesco and the Patricians: of the latter we read: "rasch ins Wort fallend", "fällt ihm wieder ins Wort", "hitziger fast", "stürmisch", "aufbrausend", ungeduldig, hitzig. And referring to Fiesco: "Nach einigem Stillschweigen", "spöttisch", "lacht", "fängt zu lachen an".[1] - The same impression is conveyed when

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1. For a quite similar contrast cf. the stage directions of II.8., II.17., IV.7.

Fiesco quietly sits down, in response to the excited journeymen's cry: "Schlage! Stürze! Erlöse!"[1]

2) In all these instances where other characters respond emotionally, Fiesco is occupied with technical problems of how to attain certain effects, a feature we have already noted in the first group of instances, such as his preparations for the fake assassination. In some cases he admits this much explicitly, as when he says to his fellow conspirators: "Da seid ihr, wo ich euch wollte" (III.5.) or, after his opening speech to the conspirators, in an aside to Verrina: "Es ging wie ich wünschte, Freund." (IV.6.) or, as when earlier in the same scene he says to the guests: "Diese Anstalten, die Sie noch kaum mit Entsetzen beschauten, müssen Ihnen itzt frischen Heldenmut einhauchen. Diese Schauder der Bangigkeit müssen in einen rühmlichen Eifer erwarmen...." (IV.6.)

In the last encounter with Julia his own words and stage directions together suggest that, while Julia goes through an emotional crisis, Fiesco is busy making an emotional effect. "Wenn du mich kalt erwürgtest?" she asks, and he, lingering on the word kalt, is working out the problem of how to effect transition from feigned heat to feigned coldness: a fact that is borne out by the stage directions that follow: "Den Ton in Kälte verändert", and "Mit tiefer, frostiger Verbeugung". (IV.12.)

But for the most part we must glean his preoccupation

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1. This may seem insignificant enough in isolation. As a matter of fact, the poet has brought out the relevance of Fiesco's response here by the contrasting use he makes of the same feature elsewhere. Cf.III.5., Sämtliche Schriften, ed.cit., III, p.93, ll.21 f.

from the stage directions themselves. Most telling among these is the one which precedes the revelation of his plans to Verrina and his fellow Republicans. It runs: "Er geht mit majestätischem Schritt im Zimmer, und scheint über etwas Grosses zu denken. Zuweilen betrachtet er die andern fliegend und scharf, endlich nimmt er den Maler bei der Hand und führt ihn vor das Gemälde." (II.17.) He appears to ponder something great, even as Verrina and the painter ponder great things. In fact, he is watching, gauging the situation and working out the exact effect he wants to achieve, as indeed he does achieve it. Surely the 'scheint' cannot be taken lightly here? - Other stage directions, such as "nimmt einen aufgebrachten Ton an", (IV.12.), "schlägt ein Gelächter auf" (IV.7.), all reveal that he is similarly preoccupied with effects: i.e. with the technical problems presented by a situation rather than with the emotional, moral or practical issues it raises. -

3. Another recurrent feature is Fiesco's tendency, observable in all these instances, to refer to himself in the third person or in personification. And although this is a familiar feature of the rhetorical style of young Schiller, in the case of Fiesco the device is used with considerable discrimination. Fiesco resorts to it virtually only when other evidence too points to the fact that he is staging himself, "Fiesco [verliert] nichts an der grossen Welt - Fiesco wird lieben" (III.6.) he tells Gianettino, trying to impress the latter with his libertinism; and to Bourgognino - "Gehen Sie ~~hinein~~ heim, Bourgognino, und nehmen Sie sich Zeit, zu überlegen, warum Fiesco so und nicht anders handelt," (I.~~9~~8.), words which immediately follow Fiesco's description of himself as a master weaving a

'Künstliches Gewebe'. "Republikaner Fiesco? Herzog Fiesco?" (II.19.) he asks himself in the monologue that sees his shortlived renunciation, trying out and savouring either part. And "Zum schaudernden Konzert sind alle Instrumente gestimmt. Nichts fehlt, als die Larve herabzureissen und den Genuesen den Fiesco zu zeigen." The last two illustrations are perhaps the more remarkable, occurring as they do in monologues; and the definite article in the last example particularly serves to create the impression that Fiesco is viewing himself from the outside, as if part of him had become another person.

"Denkt auf den Löwen" Fiesco reminds the journeymen (II.8.), and in II.18. he asks his fellow Republicans "dachtet ihr, der Löwe schliefe weil er nicht brüllte?" When he breaks the suspense of the conspirators confused by sentinels and clanking arms, it is as "der Hausvater" (IV.6.); to Andreas he announces himself as "der Freund", "der Verräter", and "die Schlange" alternately; and pushed into the water by Verrina, his last words before dying are "Hilf, Genua, hilf! Hilf deinem Herzog!" (V.16.) The implicit suggestion that Fiesco is adopting a role, is certainly borne out by stage directions such as the "mit veränderter Stimme" which heads his nocturnal encounter with Andreas, and "als käme er eben aus dem Schloss" when he goes to interview the Duke's messenger; a stage-direction which foreshadows the studied indifference he shows in the actual interview. And it is interesting to see by what means he has been enabled coolly to take on a part, and carry it through successfully, at a moment fraught with tension and anxiety. The key to his behaviour is to be found in the preceding scene, in which Fiesco visibly works his way back from initial consternation to self-control. - As has

been previously shown, Fiesco at once responds to the unforeseen news by pretending that it was a put-up show - in fact by staging the situation and assuming a certain part. But he is as yet shaken and Verrina, for one, suspects that he is pretending. The interesting thing is that, from this point onwards, Fiesco begins to conduct two conversations, a whispered one with Calcagno and a public one with the conspirators, the changeover being marked by stage directions prescribing laut or leise respectively. Not all this switching over is necessary. At one point at least, he repeats himself literally: "(Laut) He! Man soll Wein bringen. (Leise) Und sahn Sie den Herzog erblassen? (Laut) Frisch, Brüder! Wir wollen noch eins Bescheid tun auf den Tanz (sic!) dieser Nacht! (Leise) Und sahn Sie den Herzog erblassen?" Six times in all, he breaks into the part he has assumed to discuss the truth with Calcagno and six times he returns to it again. Oddly enough, this procedure seems to steady him. For when at the end of the scene the arrival of the duke's ordonnance causes the situation to deteriorate, he not only calms the despairing conspirators but successfully plays the role of indifferent innocence towards the soldiers. Does it not seem as if Fiesco put himself a technical problem here, because the exercise of his virtuosity is instrumental in restoring his mastery over the situation?[1] In the measure

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1. An analogous situation elsewhere in the play would seem to support this interpretation. Julia, vexed by her brother's contempt of Fiesco, "tritt zornig zu einem Flügel und spielt ein Allegro." After some time, Gianettino asks her: "Nun, Schwester, hast du deinen Zorn bald verklimpert?" (III.9.) This passage shows that Schiller was quite conscious of the emotional relief and detachment afforded by the switching of the attention to the material medium in which the activity takes place - the choice of the word verklimpert with its extremely material associations

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in which his interest is switched to the handling of his part, the urgency of the situation itself recedes, and its emotional grip on him relaxes.

Together, this evidence suggests a marked tendency on Fiesco's part both to be himself and yet to see himself as if he were another person, outside himself. Now such a doubling of consciousness is most commonly experienced in front of a mirror. We see ourselves acting and moving, and yet are separated from this mirrored self: we are spectators. If then a mirror figures in the play, the possibility of a connection with what has been previously said at once su gests itself; and occur it does quite consistently throughout the play, three times as a stage property that becomes part of the action itself. Furthermore the mirror occurs metaphorically in images used both by Fiesco and by others about Fiesco. It is the fact of its repeated use on different planes of the play, the poetic plane as well as the dramatic, which prompts the question whether Schiller has not attached to it a more than factual significance. In the Theaterausgabe of Fiesco the following stage direction precedes the first scene between Fiesco and Julia: "Ein prächtig erleuchteter Saal im Palaste des Fiesco... In diesem Saale müssen zween

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would hardly seem to be accidental. This switch of the attention has been recognised by modern aestheticians to be one of the key processes in artistic creation and appreciation; and has been exhaustively discussed in Bullough's article "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle", British Journal of Psychology, Vol.V, 1912, p.100. As will be shown later, the figure of Julia is a close parallel to that of Fiesco. The same mode of responding is presented in both characters. So that the incident referred to, which from the point of view of the plot is redundant, would seem to serve only to illuminate by a parallel a tendency that is characteristic of Fiesco.

grosse Spiegel vorne hängen, worin sich Julie und Fiesco besehen."[1] Neither Fiesco nor Julia is spontaneous in this scene. They both play-act, consciously aiming at producing certain effects: and each has a mirror in which the self is reflected. - In their second encounter, we find the following stage direction: "Er hat sie fertig gemacht und führt sie vor einen Spiegel." (III.10.) This action follows upon a conversation in which Fiesco explains to Julia that consciousness is the secret of effectiveness and demonstrates this principle by the way he rearranges her dress for her. Looking into a mirror is again associated with actions of an unusually conscious character, - actions in which the 'how', the form, becomes a matter of intrinsic interest.

On the third occasion where a mirror figures as part of the action, the stage direction runs: "Er [der Mohr] reicht ihm einen Zettel und nistet sich hart an ihn. Fiesco tritt vor einen Spiegel und schielt über das Papier. Der Mohr geht laurend um ihn herum, endlich zieht er den Dolch und will stossen. Fiesco dreht sich geschickt und fährt nach dem Arm des Mohren. - Entreisst ihm den Dolch." (I.9.) This is the first time we witness Fiesco in action, dealing practically with a practical situation: he is warding off the Mohr's attempt to kill him. Obviously, Fiesco's primary object in looking into the mirror is to watch the Mohr: to let him reveal his intentions - which Fiesco suspects - and yet to keep an eye on him. But it is too much to suggest in the light of the preceding episodes, that Fiesco, threatened by danger, instinctively effects that inner separation of his consciousness which allows him to watch what he is doing and do it with perfection, rapt in the execution of it? Schiller could

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1. Schiller, Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., III, p. 347, footnote.

certainly have found no more telling symbol for Fiesco's mode of acting than by letting him execute his first action in front of a mirror. Moreover, if we adopt this interpretation, it is easy to account for the striking sobriety and even flatness of an incident which would naturally lend itself to a more colourful treatment, a sobriety moreover which might appear all the more striking in a play which has often been accused of a tendency to exaggeration and melodrama. It is Fiesco who divests the situation of all its melodramatic propensities by diverting his attention from its practical and emotional bearings to the formal problems it raises. Of this the poet's "geschickt" and Fiesco's own judgment "Du hast schlechte Arbeit gemacht" bear witness - in short, Fiesco answers a challenge of life and death, in terms of technique and skill.

Does not the presence of all these features in combination point to the conclusion that Fiesco's dominant response to all manner of situations is an aesthetic one? Indeed, taking the word in a general, though significant sense, may we not say that he approaches life as the artist approaches his medium, and that he is, in fact, an artist in that sense? In Fiesco's detachment from the practical and emotional bearings of any given situation on the one hand, and in his elaboration of its formal propensities on the other, may be recognized the negative and the positive aspects respectively of that process of Distancing which modern aesthetics, since Edward Bullough elaborated it, has come to regard as a vital factor in the creation and appreciation of art.

At this point,however, the objection will be raised that we lack the central piece of evidence necessary to prove that Fiesco is an artist. We must - it must be said - be able to prove not only the recurrence of certain aesthetic processes, but the existence of actual artistic

productions in the manner in which these can be shown to exist in Goethe's tragedy of a creative artist, Torquato Tasso.[1] And this is where the significance of a fourth feature of Fiesco's actions becomes apparent: the references to and conversations about art which accompany those actions.[2] There is scarcely one of them that is not described in terms borrowed from the sphere of art.[3] He diverts the attention of the indignant patricians to a statue of Venus, and ironically suggests that they try to find its like in reality: for "dann werden Sie die Phantasie der Marktschreierei überwiesen haben ..... und ..... gewonnen haben den verjährten Prozess der Natur mit den Künstlern." (II, 5,).

He returns to the same thought, as together with his fellow Republicans he looks at Romano's painting. "Mehr solche Nymphen, Romano," he says, "so will ich vor Ihren Phantasien knien und der Natur einen Scheidebrief schreiben." (II, 17.) This reaction is all the more striking for its contrast to Verrina's response. The latter is wholly preoccupied with the content and message of the picture, and soon passes from the contemplation of the Klötze Römer to the less remote thought of the Klötze Genua and from there back to actuality and action: for he ends by hitting the canvas. As against this, Fiesco's thoughts range from

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1. For a detailed discussion of Tasso's poetic creations, cf. E.M.Wilkinson, "Goethe's Tasso. The Tragedy of a Creative Artist," Publications of the English Goethe Soc., Vol.XV, 1946.

2. Minor (op.cit., p.64) has noted the frequent occurrence of such references and conversations. He explains them as proof of Schiller's endeavour to attain historical accuracy in his depiction of the Italy of the Renaissance, which was eminently the "Land der Kunst".

3. For examples, cf. pp.52-53.

the artist's effects - which he calls 'unnachahmlich' - to the artist himself and to the nature and place of art. They remain in the sphere of art; more than that, he acknowledges its autonomy and that it is distinct from and superior to reality. For a third time the theme art versus nature recurs and the superiority of art is emphasised, this time in the second encounter with Julia. "Die Sinne müssen immer nur blinde Briefträger sein". - Fiesco reminds Julia - "und nicht wissen, was Phantasie und Natur mit einander abzukarten haben." (III, 10.)[1]

To assess the significance of these conversations, it must be remembered that unlike Goethe's Tasso, Fiesco is a tragedy of an artist whose medium is, not words, but life itself: since Fiesco fashions in a different medium from that of his creator, Schiller cannot, as Goethe did in Tasso, incorporate into his play actual products of Fiesco's creativity capable of independent analysis. He can only point to the fact that art is being created, by a variety of indirect means.

The most insistent of these pointers are the conversations about art, occurring as they do in every case where Fiesco 'stages' himself and the situation. They show Fiesco preoccupied with questions of form; and drawing the attention of his audience to points of form. This is a method the artist adopts, but never the would-be deceiver. The latter aims at creating a complete illusion; the former strives to engender in his audience illusion that remains conscious of itself: for only as long as they do not confuse

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1. For further examples of conversations about play or art accompanying Fiesco's actions, cf. I.7, I.8, I.9, - scenes which are for the most part, taken up by a discussion of the conventions and rules of gangsterdom, itself conceived as an art.

his presentation with nature, do they appreciate his art.[1]

The function of these conversations is to draw the attention both of the characters in the drama, and of the audience, to the existence of art forms. And that is as much as can be done through the medium of words. The forms themselves which this artist in actions creates, fall outside the poet's sphere of competence. They are capable of being epically presented by another character in the play, or else of being pantomimically presented by the actor. There is only limited scope for epic description in an art form restricted to dialogue and action. Schiller has resorted to it, in relating Fiesco's fake assassination through the mouth of Arabella and Lomellino, and we may regard the twofold account as an indication of the importance the poet assigns to this piece of pantomime. For the rest, it falls to the actor to do the poet's job for him, namely to present Fiesco's art. In this connection it is interesting to note that very detailed stage directions, in which the poet emphatically prescribes to the actor that he shall present Fiesco as acting, have in fact been introduced into the stage version of the tragedy. In the

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1. Cf. Edward Bullough's formulation of this point: To imitate nature so as to trick the spectator into the deception that it is nature which he beholds, is to forsake art. (Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle, (art.cit) cf. also Schiller's own formulation of the point: "... der Dichter so wie der Künstler überhaupt [soll] auf eine offentliche und ehrliche Art von der Wirklichkeit sich entfernen und daran erinnern, dass ers tut..." letter to Goethe, 24. Aug. 1798 (ed.cit., vol.VI, p.33) where he writes: "Die Idee besonders von dem notwendigen Auseinanderhalten der Natur und Kunst wird immer bedeutender und fruchtbarer." In the notion of "aufrichtiger Schein" the same conviction is expressed. Ästhetische Briefe, letter XXVI, ed. cit.,X, p.373, l.5.

closing scene of the play, for instance, where Fiesco stages the renunciation of his ambitions, the stage direction runs as follows: "Fiesco behauptet in dieser Scene eine erhabene Kaltblütigkeit und Ruhe, welche dem Schauspieler mit allem Nachdruck empfohlen wird."[1]

The preceding analysis has brought into prominence a mode of behaviour not usually associated with this character, widely accepted as being of an active and ambitious disposition: the aesthetic mode. In what relation then does the aesthetic mode of response stand to the practical side of his being? To answer this question, Fiesco's behaviour had best be examined in that part of the play in which the practical side should, by rights, come uppermost. This situation arises when he has revealed his intentions and must implement them in action. It arises more acutely when the conspiracy is prematurely betrayed to the enemy. To appreciate the significance of Fiesco's reactions, the external situation must be visualized as concretely as possible.

Fiesco's party is ready to strike at the tyrant, all roles are distributed, the last orders given. It is vital to strike at this very moment; for the tyrant has prepared his own coup, and the only way to avoid the death of the Republican leaders and ruin of the cause is to forestall him at once. Moreover, the Republicans' plan has been betrayed to the enemy and the Republicans' only remaining chance lies in immediate action, before the tyrant has had time to exploit his tactical superiority. It is at this moment that Fiesco, moved by the beauty of Andreas' response, elects to call off the conspiracy. Schiller could hardly have conceived a situation of more unambiguous urgency: if

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., III, p.340 ll.4 f.

Fiesco had it in him to respond to practical and moral needs, he would do it now. Yet he responds as the 'artist' he is. Schiller, however, has not left it at this one test: he has repeated it under more stringent conditions. At the very moment when the Mohr, having already betrayed the conspiracy in the first instance, wantonly divulges further information concerning Fiesco's movements to the duke's messengers, Fiesco releases him with the words "Du hast das Verdienst, eine grosse Tat zu veranlassen - entfliehe!" (IV, 9.)

When eventually Fiesco goes to warn his enemy Andreas, the situation has become aggravated. Fiesco has meanwhile inflicted mortal insult upon Gianettino's sister and has imprisoned her as a hostage. His own words show that he is aware of the fact that he cannot now retract his steps but must go on, to the end. "Die Brücke ist hinter mir abgehoben," (IV, 14.) he says to his wife, as she tries to stop him. Thus he is in no doubt about the inevitability of his step. Nor are its implications allowed to escape him. For in the conversation with his wife he is made to realise that her life, not only his own and the Republicans', depends upon the issue of the fight.

He leaves her in a frenzy of anguish hovering between life and death. It is in this situation that Fiesco befriends his enemy, and cautions him, in an assumed voice and in language rich with metaphor.

Each one of these three actions argues, more cogently than the one before it, the purposelessness of Fiesco's response: their cumulative effect is overwhelming. In the last one, the essential disconnectedness of Fiesco's specific mode of activity from other modes of activity is fully apparent. It is neither caused by the plans and purposes of his active life - indeed it cuts right across them - nor is it designed to affect these activities: Fiesco

goes to fight for the cause he has first championed and then so utterly disregarded, as if the interruption did not exist. His isolated act achieves nothing, modifies nothing, and is modified by nothing outside itself. And this immediate unrelatedness of Fiesco's response to anything outside it is a final token of its aesthetic quality. Disconnectedness with the world of purposes has been regarded as the hall mark of the aesthetic mode, by Kant as well as Schiller. Kant defined the aesthetic judgment as the perception of Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck, and Schiller's own statement runs as follows: "In dem aesthetischen Zustande ist der Mensch also Null, in sofern man auf ein einzelnes Resultat ... achtet, und den Mangel jeder besonderen Determination in ihm in Betracht ung zieht ..... Die Schönheit giebt schlechterdings kein einzelnes Resultat weder für den Verstand noch für den Willen, sie führt keinen einzelnen ..... Zweck aus, ... hilft uns keine einzige Pflicht erfüllen."[1] This position has been consolidated by modern aesthetic thought. Samuel Alexander, for instance, defines the beautiful as "the object of the constructive impulse when that impulse has become contemplative instead of practical."[2] And Edward Bullough insists that a fundamental characteristic of aesthetic and artistic experience is the "putting of the

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1. Ästhetische Briefe, letter XXI, ed. cit., X, p.347 ll. 14 f. Cf. also Über das Pathetische ed.cit., X, p.175 ll. 9 ff. "Die Dichtkunst führt bei dem Menschen nie ein besonderes Geschäft aus, und man könnte kein ungeschickteres Werkzeug erwählen, um einen einzelnen Auftrag, ein Detail, gut besorgt zu sehen ..... Sie kann dem Menschen weder raten, noch mit ihm schlagen, noch sonst eine Arbeit für ihn tun ..."

2. Samuel Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms of Value, London 1933, p.22.

phenomenon ..... out of gear with our practical, actual self; .... allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends ....."[1] This describes precisely the relation in which Fiesco's action has been seen to stand to the wider context of his personal needs and ends and to those implied in the general situation. His action exists outside the world of purposes, outside the requirements of cause and effect; what purpose and justification it has it carries within itself; they lie in its own perfection. Its autonomy is the autonomy of art. That this reading is correct, is confirmed by yet another consideration. Attention has repeatedly been drawn to the strange fact that the firing of the gun which is to mark the beginning of the battle, is heard twice in the play. First at the end of the scene between Fiesco and Leonore (IV, 14.); then again, in the second scene of Act V. This double occurrence of one and the same event at successive points of time is a usual enough feature in epic and novel; in drama it is so startling as to be hardly explicable in terms of mere slipshodness on the poet's part. Yet this is the only kind of explanation that has been advanced.

At one level, the explanation of the repetition seems obvious in view of what has been said before: the canon volley most vividly epitomises the urgency of the situation and the need for concentrated action. Hence, preceding Fiesco's act and following after it, it serves to offset the extraordinariness of the interlude. But there is more to it than this. In one sense, time elapses between the

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1. Edward Bullough, art. cit., p.89. Cf., also Ernst Cassirer: An Essay on Man, New Haven, 1944, p.164, "Play and Art ..... are nonutilitarian and unrelated to any practical end. In play as in art we leave behind us our immediate needs in order to give our world a new shape."

event and its repetition - to wit, the time during which Fiesco warns his opponent. Yet in another, and more important, sense, no time passes, the event being one and the same.[1] In this sense what happens in between must be regarded as taking place essentially out of the time-dimension of the drama. Time itself stands still while Fiesco commits the most absolutely purposeless of all his actions. It is by this feature of being in time but essentially not of it, that we finally recognize Fiesco's action as an aesthetic act. The later Schiller never tired of stressing timelessness, as well as unpurposiveness, as of the essence of creative and aesthetic experience, both in its objective and subjective aspects. Of the aesthetic object he says: "Da ist ..... keine Blösse wo die Zeitlichkeit einbrechen könnte";[2] and, contrasting the aesthetic state with all other states which must be understood in terms of their causes and consequences stretching into time in both directions, he says: "Hier allein fühlen wir uns wie aus der Zeit gerissen."[3]

Schiller's second tragedy then is a play about art; a peculiar kind of art, that is, practised not in the special medium of the poet, or the sculptor or the painter, but in the vast and intangible medium of life itself, and not at certain times nor in a place set off from the every-day

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1. From the form of the four references to this event that occur, it is clear that one salvo only is fired - the word 'Kanone' is in the singular throughout. "Verrina... wird mit einer Kanone das Signal zum Aufbruch geben" (IV. 10.); "Ihr werdet mich abholen, wenn die Kanone kommt"(IV.13.); "Man hört den Kanonenschuss" (IV, 14.); and "Auf den Galeeren krachte eine Kanone". (V.2.).
2. Ästhetische Briefe, Letter XV, ed. cit., p.328, ll.20f.
3. Ästhetische Briefe, Letter XXII, ed. cit., X, p.349, ll. 26 f.

scene like the stage or studio, but always and everywhere;[1] wherefore it is difficult to apprehend the distinct character of the activity. Edward Bullough, who like Schiller insists that the aesthetic mode is not departmental, operative in certain specifiable situations, but an attitude of life, capable of pervading it in its entirety, gives a description of the artist in life which is noteworthy because of the closeness of the analogy with our theme. He says: "There are many who are 'actors', not in the sense that they pretend to do and think before others what they could neither do nor think in the privacy of their own chambers ....., but in the sense that they perform perfectly natural and spontaneous acts with a consciousness and so clear a perception of their nature, their value and their sensuous, concrete effectiveness that those acts assume to them an intrinsic importance (quite apart from aims and results) .....; that in the doing they experience a kind of separation from themselves, a doubling of their consciousness, as if they were two individuals of which one acts, and the other looks on, criticises and enjoys, with the

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1. This fact explains the effect Fiesco has on others. Time and again, they are shown thrown into confusion and dismay, cf. II,17, p.77, ll.13-14; II.18 (Verrina) p.78, ll.2-5; IV, 2, pp.108-9, ll.16 ff.; IV.12, p.126, l.15, etc. Moreover, so great is the confusion Fiesco creates, that those around him are threatened in their sense of reality. The nobles, Andreas, and Leonore, at different times and in widely different situations, declare themselves in a dream; (cf. III.3, p.86, ll. 7, 15; IV.5, p.112, l.6; V.4, p.139, l.10). Small wonder, since Fiesco perpetually and without warning switches over from reality to art, and begins to handle his fellow human beings as materials rather than as men. It is difficult to see what other explanation could be advanced to meet these striking facts than that Fiesco creates art in the materials of life, and that the boundaries between art and life for him are fluid.

free and impartial interest which the artist feels in the production of his own handiwork. Thus they combine in themselves practically the threefold aspect of artist, work of art and spectator, an exceedingly complex mental state which is common enough in the actor, and is realised more often than is thought in actual life. And the result is a curious enhancement of the acts ..... an investing of them with a value as 'ends in themselves and a doing them for their own sake' ....."[1]

Fiesco, too, by that strange switch of the attention from the practical and emotional aspects of any given situation to its formal qualities - a switch for which Bullough has coined the term aesthetic distance - perpetually invests his actions and the situation in which he acts, with a value as an end in itself. This quality is present in his actions no matter whether he seems to be pretending or emerging from pretence: for even where he would seem to throw off his mask, as when he knocks over the painter's tableau, saying "der Schein weiche der Tat", he is not relinquishing art; he composes a tableau of the living group before him. He enters into life, not to be bound by it, but to subjugate life itself in its entirety, spell-binding it into the motionless perfection of form.

Not, of course, that Fiesco has no ends and purposes outside his art. He has. He is the practical intriguer that critics have taken him to be, busy with designs on friend and foe alike. But what starts by being a design with an object, in the end becomes a design for its own sake, whose end lies in its internal coherence. This reading of the play as a whole would seem to be finally borne out by Schiller's statement of his theme in the

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1. Edward Bullough, A Course of Lectures delivered Autumn, 1907. Privately printed, Cambridge. p.77.

foreword to the play. "Ich habe in den 'Räubern' das Opfer einer ausschweifenden Empfindung zum Vorwurf genommen," he says. - "Hier versuche ich das Gegenteil, ein Opfer der Kunst und Kabale."[1] Kabale, the design with an ulterior end, that becomes Kunst, the design which is its own end, inevitably leading to tragedy in the world of purposes: this is the tragic theme of the play.[2] But before pursuing its tragic implications we must indicate something more of the total statement of the theme throughout the play, of which it is indeed the organising principle.

"The style in Fiesco is extremely uneven" writes Mr. Garland[3] in his recent book on Schiller; and in this judgment critical opinion has generally concurred. Time and again, exception has been taken to the tendency in some scenes towards bombast and hyperbole, and regret has been expressed that the new urbanity of dialogue which Schiller achieved in his second drama, should have been confined to a few scenes only, notably those with the Mohr. Karl Berger's judgment on this point runs as follows: "Das Bestreben" - he says - "die Kälte der "Staatsaktion" durch die Glut der Empfindung zu besiegen, verführte den Dichter zu unnatürlichen Übertreibungen und gemachtem Schwulst; bezeichnenderweise versteigt sich das Pathos gerade da ins Grässliche und Ungeheuerliche, wo das Tragische mehr gekünstelt als frei gewachsen ist:

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1. Sämmtliche Werke, ed. cit., III, p.6, ll.8 ff.
2. In the Erinnerung an das Publikum appended to the stage version of the play, Schiller writes: "Der Genueser Fiesco sollte zu meinem Fiesco nichts als den Namen und die Maske hergeben das übrige möchte er behalten." (Ibid., p.350, line 13 ff.). Seeing the importance the word Maske assumes within the play as a symbol of Fiesco's artistic impulse, is it not likely that this statement about the play too uses the word significantly? If so, it would point in the same direction as the rest of the evidence.
3. Op.cit., p.60.

charakteristische Beispiele dafür sind Verrinas im Grauenhaften schwelgender Racheschwur nach Berthas Entehrung (I, 12.) und Fiescos massloses Wüten an der Leiche Leonorens ..... doch den Geschmacklosigkeiten im einzelnen könnte man ebensoviele Schönheiten ..... z.B. die Fortschritte in der Führung des Dialogs, besonders in den Scenen Fiescos mit dem Mohren, den Senatoren und den Handwerkern, die oratorisch grossartige Fabelerzählung, entgegenhalten".[1] But for the fact that most critics add to their catalogue of 'Geschmacklosigkeiten' Verrinas conversation with Bourgognino (III,1.), this judgment is wholly representative of the general trend of criticism. And indeed, there seems to be much truth in the observation, though not necessarily in the judgment to which it leads. If for the moment, we disregard the much criticised scene showing Fiesco by the dead body of his wife, the drama from the point of view of language and style, seems to be divided into two sharply contrasting halves: the one dominated by Fiesco and, to a lesser degree, the Mohr, Julia and Gianettino; the other dominated by Verrina, Bertha, Leonore and the lesser Republican figures. Is this division haphazard, indicative of the poet's limited capabilities? Or does it rather reflect his intention?

The style in the Fiesco-half of the play, on the whole, is conversational, ironical, and of a certain urbanity. This impression is created by various means, such as the use of an ironic form of address suggesting a superior intellectuality - a suggestion which is strengthened by the fact that this device is a literary

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1. Karl Berger, op.cit., p. 293; for similar opinions cf. Otto Harnack, Schiller. Berlin 1905, p.93; L. Bellermann, op.cit., p. 136; J. Minor, op.cit., p. 70.

echo: Lessing makes frequent use of it.[1] Julia addresses her rival variously as "gutes Tierchen" (II, 2.), "mein Schatz" (II,2.), "Würmchen" (II,2.), she refers to her as "die Fratze" (I, 4.) and asks of her "was will denn das Köpfchen" (I,4.), whilst to Fiesco she says: "über den verschlagenen Kopf" (III, 10.). Fiesco himself calls the Mohr "Canaille", "Bestie" and "höfliche Bestie", (all I, 9.), the last denomination bringing out the humorous quality in his earlier contemptuous references. The sudden change from Sie to Du in Fiesco's address to Romano "Tritt her, Maler" (II, 17.) produces a similar effect. And Gianettino calls his Councillor Lomellino "Närrchen" (II,14.), his sister, with patent irony "Schwesterchen" (III, 8.); he refers to Fiesco as an "armer Wicht" (III,10.). Then there is a striking use of foreign, chiefly French, words which helps to build up the same impression. They abound in the speech of Julia, who speaks of "Delicatesse" (I, 4.) of the "delicatesten Zirkel" (II,2.) "Assembleen" (II,2.) "Connaissancen", "Galanterien", "Impertinenzen" (I,4.) "Garnierung" (I,4.) and "Karessen" (II,2.). A sentence such as "Scharmant, Madam, Ihre Gäste durch Domestiken bekomplimentieren zu lassen" (II,2.) is by no means an isolated occurrence. Fiesco, too, speaks of "Kavalier" (I,8.), of his "delikate Ohren (II,i.) of "Sottise" (III,10.) of a "Raquette" (II,5.); and when, by the body of his wife, he ends by promising Genua a "Fürsten wie ihn noch kein Europäer sah" (V, 13.) the word Europäer, in an apparently emotional context, has a suggestive force far exceeding the conscious intention of the statement and alien to it, a force derived from the cumulative effect

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1. Lessing's influence on the diction of Fiesco is discussed by Minor, op.cit., pp.66-67.

of foreign words throughout the play. Gianettino, too, speaks of 'dem possierlichen Brande' (II, 12.) of the necessity to treat Julia 'delicater' (III,9.) and of the dancers who "springen à merveille" (I,4.). The Mohr's speech, in particular, is permeated with foreign elements; such as "Exerzitium", "Testimonium", "mein Genie" (all I.6.) "Kavalier" (II,4.) "Kreaturen", "pardonnieren", (III,4.) "karessieren" (II,15.) "Entree" (III,16.) and many others. His last words, by the introduction of a foreign word, achieve an effect comparable to that of Fiescos' "Europäer" speech. Condemned to hang, he says "so mags sein, - und der Teufel kann sich auf den Extrafall rüsten" - and the choice of 'Extrafall' by the sense of civilised aloofness with which such words - admittedly a feature of contemporary polite usage - have been invested, during the course of the play, through their consistent association with Fiesco, fully bears out the stage direction 'resigniert'.

The remarkable thing is that these stylistic devices on the one hand virtually do not occur in relation to the Verrina group, and that, on the other, they extend to the whole Fiesco group, regardless of the differences of character it encompasses, creating a stylistically homogeneous bloc. From the point of view of psychological probability, it is strange that the 'Bestie' Mohr, and the boorish Gianettino should use language as recherché as the brilliant Fiesco, and Julia with her cultural pretensions. And it is the same with the images used by these divers characters. The same images drawn from the sphere of play, and craft and art, which have been found associated with Fiesco, recur in the cases of these subordinate characters, welding them even more firmly together into a group with Fiesco, than the use of a common vocabulary alone could have done. Julia uses, in metaphorical contexts, words such as "Schauspiel" (I,4.)

"Kunst" and "Künste", relating to love and the passions (IV.12.) "Geschmack" (I.4 and II.2) and "Gewerbe" (II,2.). She likens love to a game of chess and makes the metaphor that is involved explicit by concluding: "Ach zu unglücklich hab ich gespielt, dass ich nicht auch mein Letztes noch setzen sollte". (IV,12.) The Mohr makes free and unsolicited use of words like "Geschmack" (I,4, I,6.) "Komödie" (IV,9.) "Spektakel" (III,7.). He considers his profession as a "Gewerbe", a "Zunft" (I,4.), considers himself a "Stümper", or "Genie" alternatively, and is echoed by Fiesco himself in his use of "Meisterstück" (I,4. and V,13.). He uses the image of "Garn" (III,14.), amalgamating the hunting and the "Gewebe" images associated with Fiesco, and he echoes the gambling images used by and of Fiesco, when he says to the latter: "Um Köpfe werden sie karten, und der Eure ist Tarock" (III,4.): even Gianettino is brought within the orbit of this imagery by his insistent use of "Possen" (II,12.) and especially by assimile which stands out because of its notorious associations: "So steh ich wie Nero auf dem Berge und sehe dem possierlichen Brande zu"; (II,12.) and not only the association of Nero fiddling, but also that of Fiesco standing on "jener schrecklich erhabenen Höhe" (III,2.) and gazing down in aesthetic enjoyment upon the human vicissitudes below, comes to mind; and indeed the latter image receives some of its tone and colour from its conjunction with the first.

Furthermore, the Fiesco group is united by means of direct characterisation. This comes out very clearly in the stage directions. It is Fiesco, Julia, Gianettino and the Mohr, that laugh in this play; and it is they who are constantly characterised by directions such as 'spöttisch', 'hämisch', 'boshaft' - traits that are fully borne out in their actual behaviour.

Finally, the same cohesion between the individual figures of this group exists on the plane of action. There is the parallelism of the two conspiracies, Fiesco's and Gianettino's; of whom one misuses the woman whose fate is so insistently identified with that of Genua (cf. I,12.), whilst Fiesco is charged with the same crime against Genua herself: "Du hast eine Schande begangen an der Majestät des wahrhaftigen Gottes, dass du dir die Tugend die Hände zu diesem Bubenstück führen und Genuas Patrioten mit Genua Unzucht treiben liessest"[1] (V,16.). And both would-be tyrants die by violence. Again there is the parallelism between the execution of the Mohr and Fiesco's own end, a parallelism which Verrina makes plain, when he uses the word 'Galgen' - which we associate with the Mohr's end - with reference to Fiesco's crime, asking "Aber doch die Gesetze liess <u>die</u> Canaille noch ganz?" (V,16.). And then there is, finally, the connection between Fiesco's and Julia's fate, of which the reader grows aware when Fiesco - perhaps himself conscious of the echo, picks up, in a sudden realisation of his helplessness, the very word which Julia had used before, when about to surrender to him: "Das Bekenntnis willst du noch haben ..." She had owned to him "dass alle unseren weiblichen Künste einzig für dieses wehrlose Stichblatt fechten, wie auf dem Schach alle Offiziere den wehrlosen König bedecken?" (IV.12.) And he echoes: "Wahr ists, wahr - und ich das

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1. From the beginning of the play, the connection between the two actions, and men, is pointed by phrases of deliberate ambiguity, such as Verrina's "Wer Genua unterjocht, kann doch wohl ein Mädchen bezwingen?" (I.11.) and his answer to Bourgognino's "wo find ich den Räuber?: "Eben dort wo du den Dieb Genuas findest". (I.12.) The thief of Genua, as Verrina states explicitly in V.16, is Fiesco, (<u>ed.cit.,</u> III, p.158, ll. 1 f.)

Stichblatt des unendlichen Bubenstücks." (V.13.)

It seems then, that there is a homogeneity of treatment extending over that area of the play which is dominated by the figure of Fiesco. This homogeneity, encompassing as it does not only the planes of action and language but that of character as well, points to the operation of an organising principle more potent than any one of these, namely the controlling poetic theme.

The area of the play that is dominated by Verrina presents a similarly unified aspect. The high emotional pitch of the language has frequently been commented upon, in general adversely. It is caused partly by the persistent use of words denoting basic human facts, passions and experiences - words, moreover, permeating a vocabulary which in contrast to that used by the Fiesco group is almost wholly German. The perpetual reiteration of words such as 'Herz', 'Blut', 'Seele', 'Vaterland', 'Tränen', 'Himmel', 'Schwert', by every figure connected with this group, keeps up the tension, and serves to embed such varied figures as Leonore, Calcagno and Sacco, Verrina, Bertha and Bourgognino in a homogeneous verbal texture. The sword and the heart, for instance, return with the force of a leit-motif, whether it be in the closing scenes of the first act in Verrina's house, in the recognition scene between Bertha and Bourgognino, or in the last scene given to Leonore where, almost crazed, she dons the fateful disguise and joins the battle. And the fact that the sword, here as in the earlier scenes, appears as a physical part of the action as well as being interwoven into the texture of the images, only serves to heighten its force; the concrete and the metaphorical react one upon the other to produce the symbolic. We may pick out almost at random phrases such as the following spoken independently by different characters in various contexts: "Ein Schwert

liegt im Saal. Verrina schaut wild. Bertha hat rote Augen," says Sacco (I, 1.). A little later, Verrina echoes: "Diese Männer sind tapfer und gut. Beweinen dich diese, so wirds irgendwo bluten." (I.12.) And Bourgognino, earlier on in the play, had challenged Fiesco to a duel in words recalling Leonore's grief, not Bertha's: "Man wird Ihnen auf eine gewisse Träne eine blutige Antwort abfordern." (I.8.) These statements, alike in their succinctness as well as in the images that nourish them, not only point to a connection between the characters referred to - Bertha and Leonore - but also establish an overriding link between the divers characters of the speakers. Furthermore, we may assume that the connection between tears, i.e. suffering - and action, stressed as it is so explicitly and consistently, will bear on the theme that is being developed.

One further example of the unity of language may suffice to make the point clear. Leonore and Bourgognino, notwithstanding the gentleness of the one and the impetuosity of the other, use virtually the same metaphor in widely different contexts. Bourgognino says of the documents that have come to light regarding Gianettino's coup : "Gebt mir die Zettel. Ich reite spornstreichs durch Genua, halte sie so, so werden die Steine hinter mir herspringem ...." (III,5.) Leonore says of Fiesco: "Weinen möchten diese Quader, dass sie die Beine nicht haben, meinem Fiesco zuzuspringen - diese Paläste zürnen über ihren Meister, der sie so fest in die Erde zwang, dass sie meinem Fiesco nicht zuspringen können." (V,5.) The language itself attunes the characters that belong to a group to one another. They are forged of the same verbal material, and it is only within the limits of that unity that their individuality is allowed to develop. Again the metaphor itself is telling. For the discrepancy between the violence of the motive force and the inertia and deadness

of what is moved, is indicative of an opposition traceable throughout that area of the play with which we are concerned. It is present in the vocabulary itself; for side by side with words expressive of a state of being deeply moved which have been noted above, there is to be found a steady stream of words denoting obstruction, impediment, disease and death. References abound on all sides to physical conditions such as convulsions, the goitre and sickness in general, and mental conditions such as paralysing grief, rigidity - all culminating in death. Verrina is most vocal in this respect. But the idea that he develops on the plane of imagery is echoed on the plane of action in the death-like state to which Bertha is condemned "Lähme die Zeit mit deinem Gram", he says (I.12.) - and in the sickness of mind that befalls Leonore. And that we are here concerned with a theme of the play itself, not merely with the psychology even of a group of characters, becomes evident from the fact that on the outside view of Julia too - she belongs to the Fiesco group - passion appears connected with some distortion of nature: in one scene, she speaks of '<u>missfärbige</u> Leidenschaft', of '<u>grämliche</u> Empfindsamkeit', and of a '<u>frostige</u> Kuss' which she opposes to the 'blühende Ideal' that 'smiles' at Fiesco in company more versed in matters of taste. (II,2.)

If we now turn to characterisation, it becomes evident that just as the Fiesco group is characterised by laughter and malignity, the group centred in Verrina forms a whole in virtue of the earnestness, the sincerity and violence of the emotions depicted. This common trait is quite evident from the stage directions, and is borne out by the content of the speeches and references to one another.

Indeed, so great is this unity of character extending over the group as a whole, that it has more than once been felt to lead to psychological inconsistencies. This

question has been raised, in particular, regarding the characters of Sacco and Calcagno. "Auch auf diese Verschwörer", says Jakobe Minor, "erstreckt sich der Widerspruch, an dem die ganze Handlung krankt: wo sie als Verschworene auftreten, sind sie enthusiastische Tryannenmörder und jedes Pathos fähig; dann wieder stellen sie sich als catilinarische Existenzen heraus, als die kleinen Verbrecher, welche sich dem erhabenen Verbrecher an die Rockschösse hängen."[1] And Ludwig Bellermann voices a very similar criticism: "Es macht einen verletzenden Eindruck", he says, "dass diese beiden niedrigen Seelen, die der Dichter I.3. geradezu als Lumpe gezeichnet hat, hier in so ernster Lage so feierlichen Schwur tun";[2] these inconsistencies, it is true, exist on the psychological plane. The decisive question is,however, whether they are not contained in and explained by a more inclusive consistency - the consistency of thematic structure.

On the plane of action the same picture emerges, in this area of the play as much as in that governed by Fiesco. Take, for instance, Leonore's appearance on the field of battle, in disguise. That this action is not solely dictated by her individual make-up is indicated by the fact that it has its exact parallel in the action of a different character: Bertha, too, joins in the battle, also in disguise. In both scenes the sword plays an important role. And whereas Bertha, despite her disguise is recognised by Bourgognino, Leonore fails to be recognised by her husband. The words "Ich kenne diese Stimme", and "Ich bin hier sehr bekannt" (V,8.) are ironically echoed, a very little later, in Fiesco's :

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1. Jakob Minor, op.cit., p. 58.
2. Ludwig Bellermann, op.cit., p. 147.

"Kenn ich nicht diesen Busch und Mantel? Ich kenne diesen Busch und Mantel." (V,11.) Both actions then serve to state one theme; and both would seem to be related to Fiesco, the chief carrier of the theme of the play, and have the function of elucidating the theme centred in him. Indeed the conclusion suggests itself that the whole Bertha complex - her rape and her relation to Bourgognino - which have very frequently been denied any significance in the plot and structure of the play,[1] has the function of elaborating the main theme, by means of parallel and contrast. This possibility is further confirmed by another part of the action. Verrina orders Bertha and Bourgognino to flee though it be their wedding night, and takes a heavy hearted leave of them, the thought of Fiesco's impending death uppermost in his mind. Why this intrusion of an irrelevant incident which, coming as it does so near the main catastrophe, cannot command the reader's interest? The answer lies in the fact that this situation again parallels one in which Fiesco has been shown just before: Fiesco, by his wife's dead body, swears that he will "dieser unglücklichen Fürstin ... eine Totenfeier halten, dass das Leben seine Anbeter verlieren und die Verwesung wie eine Braut glänzen soll". (V,13.) There is the same clash

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1. Cf. Bellermann (op.cit., p.133) "Im Fiesco könnte man alles, was sich auf Berthas Entehrung bezicht, wegschneiden und es würde dadurch weder die Handlung im Ganzen noch Fiesco's Charakter berührt." Cf. also Berger (op.cit., p. 283): "Der Dichter ..... liess die um Bertha's Entehrung sich drehenden Scenen ohne wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Handlung selbst". Also Düntzer, who calls the whole complex "ein an sich überflüssiges Motiv".
Others maintain that Schiller was mainly prompted to include this complex in the economy of his drama by the wish to try his hand at the Virginia motif made fashionable by Lessing's Emilia. e.g., cf. Minor, op.cit., p.42.

between the notions of a bridal feast and death in both incidents. Only whereas Verrina makes a grim and deadly business even out of a "Brautnacht", Fiesco makes a feast and a thing of beauty even out of death. He transforms it into art.[1] The function of this incident - like the rest of the complex to which it belongs - is to help towards the realisation of a general theme, concerning itself with a mode of action; and the function of this theme is, in turn, to throw light upon the central theme of the play.

But what is this theme which language, characters and action of the Verrina complex combine in stating, and how is it related to the central theme of the play? Here the examination of a speech by Verrina may be useful. In it he describes to Bourgognino the state of mind and soul appropriate to the deed on which he has resolved, - the murder of Fiesco. It runs as follows: "Jüngling! ich fürchte - Jüngling, dein Blut ist rosenrot, dein Fleisch ist milde, geschmeidig; dergleichen Naturelle fühlen menschlich weich, an dieser empfindenden Flamme schmilzt meine grausame Weisheit. Hätte der Frost des Alters oder der bleierne Gram den fröhlichen Sprung deiner Geister gestellt, hätte schwarzes, klumpigtes Blut der leidenden Natur den Weg zum Herzen gesperrt, dann wärst du geschickt, die Sprache meines Grams zu verstehen und meinen Entschluss anzustaunen" (III,1.). This passage, and the scene of which it is part, are central; from the point of view of the

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1. It is to be noted that the word "Anbeter" as used here by Fiesco, ironically echoes Verrina's earlier use of it to describe Fiesco's dominant trait: "Fiesco ist ein Anbeter der Kunst" (I,3.). The two statements, read together, as they should be, suggest a great deal about the theme of the play. The "Anbeter der Kunst", in the sense in which Fiesco is one, ends by being turned away from life, towards death. It remains to be seen in what sense this indication through the form is borne out on the planes of character and action. Cf. p. 96 of this chapter.

plot, because Fiesco's downfall is here decided; from the point of view of the theme, because it receives its fullest imaginative statement here, in the characterisation of the general attitude and specific deed which Verrina opposes to Fiesco's mode of being. These lines are the focal point of the two main groups of images that recur throughout this area of the tragedy. On the one hand, we have Blut, Fleisch, Natur, Herz, menschlich, empfindend; on the other, grausam, Gram, Frost, bleiern, schwarz and klumpigt, gestellt and gesperrt, with their logical opposites, weich, geschmeidig and schmelzen, words indicative of states which preclude an action such as is demanded now. The connection between these two sets of images, hinted before, here becomes patent. By piling them up together in this short passage, the poet tells us, more surely than through the content of Verrina's words, what Julia, speaking of "missfärbige Leidenschaft", "grämliche Empfindsamkeit" and "frostiger Kuss" has already indicated: ugliness and distortion are inherent in a passionate and single hearted response to a given situation. All Julia's epithets are echoed here and intensified. The spiritual organism, to be fitted for Verrina's singlehearted deed, cannot be fully alive. There is no supple interplay of its parts, they do not feed and vitalize each other. Instead, it is in a process of hardening, congealing, stagnating - with intercommunication all but brought to a standstill. Such is the state of soul of Verrina, who like Leonore, Bertha and Bourgognino, is devoted to one overruling emotion, be it love of a person, love of country, or love of freedom, and who subordinates to that emotion all the rest of his being. His organism is no longer the sentient living whole it should be. It is not only the particular horror of the deed on which Verrina has resolved that reduces a man to this state. Rather, as

Verrina points out to Bourgognino, is the state the condition of the deed. And indeed, the characterisation of Verrina throughout the play, both by himself and others, puts the emphasis on that rigidity which reaches its culmination here. He is referred to variously as the "Starrköpfigste Republikaner" (I,6.) "hart wie Stahl" (I,7.), and possessed of an "eiserne Treue" (I,3.). He compares himself to the "eisgraue Römer" (I,10.), calls himself "eisgrauer Vater" (II,17.), speaks of his 'frozen' heart (I,10.) and says to Bourgognino - "ich werde zu Eis, wenn ich mir etwas denke" (IV, 15.). The life to which he condemns Bertha he likens to "das gichterische Wälzen des sterbenden Wurms" (I,12.). His 'Zorn' is "totenfärben" (I, 10.).

The human personality governed by one dominant emotion: this then is the theme developed through the Verrina complex and crystallised in the passage that has been examined. Its full importance,however, and the bearing it has on the main theme of the play is brought home by the formal arrangement of the play. The poet has placed this key passage next to the great monologue, in which Fiesco gives the fullest expression to the aesthetic mode of experiencing and finally decides in its favour. A close connection between the two scenes is thus established. It is reinforced by the echo of a crucial phrase: "Es ist eine Qual, der einzige grosse Mann zu sein" (III, 1.) says Verrina, and Fiesco reiterates: "Dass ich der grösste Mann bin im ganzen Genua!" (III,2.) Thus the poet invites us to compare the two modes of being, represented by Verrina and Fiesco respectively, each with a claim to human greatness. Verrina's life turns on <u>one</u> passion, the freedom of Genua; and never more than at the moment when he sacrifices Fiesco for the sake of it. This is precisely what a moment later Fiesco rejects: "Wilde Phantasien ..... haben mein ganzes

Wesen um eine Empfindung gewälzt, Ich muss mich im Offnen dehnen."[1] It is significant that the emotion is not specified: the opposition is between any one emotion and the wholeness of his being.[2] Wholeness of being and experience, the supple interplay of all his faculties, sensitive responsiveness to every impression - these indeed are the marks of the aesthetic mode of life as Fiesco develops it in this scene: a mode in every characteristic diametrically opposed to the one realised by Verrina, which is summed up in the words that precede the statement we have examined: "Ich ... [will] durch Verzerrungen zu dir sprechen" (III,1.).

It is not easy to find a description for the mode of being which the poet contrasts with that of Fiesco. For the figures through which it is gradually defined are moved in different ways by different objects: Sacco and Calcagno are motivated by selfish and ignoble ends, the one by need for money, the other by his passion for Leonore; Leonore by love of Fiesco; Bourgognino by love of Bertha - as she by love of him - and by patriotism; and Verrina, finally, by the pure idea of freedom. But different as the objects they strive for may be, they all do strive for some object, and it is this object and the emotions roused by it, which is the motive of their actions. This common quality of an attachment to an end is brought out by the image which Verrina uses when he makes the assembled Republicans swear to avenge Bertha: "An diesem teuren Faden halt ich deine, meine, eure Pflichten fest" (I,12.). By coupling Bertha's lot, insufferable under the curse, with the outcome of the

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1. The connection between this image and the metaphor used to describe Verrina (Genua ist die Spindel, etc.) has been touched on before (cf. pp.43-4). It should be quite clear now.

2. Cf. also p.33 of this chapter.

conspiracy, Verrina rouses the strongest possible emotions and creates the strongest possible interest in the attainment of the objective. He links it with the deepest human passions. And the conspirators respond in the same spirit, each making his personal happiness and salvation depend upon the outcome of the cause with which he identifies himself. This response is diametrically opposed to Fiesco's. It has been seen that he responds disinterestedly to a given situation; and even where the situation has an urgent practical or emotional appeal for him, he proceeds to cut out this side of it altogether, by concentrating on its formal aspects. Fiesco then seeks to maintain aesthetic distance in all his actions; Verrina and the group which he dominates seek to reduce distance altogether. Fiesco keeps aesthetic distance even when in danger of life. Verrina lets an interest intervene even when looking at a picture. Fiesco treats even actions that serve a purpose beyond themselves, as though they were an end in themselves. Verrina, by the curse he lays on Bertha, imposes a super-end over all the single ends - deine, meine, eure Pflichten that motivate the different characters. Fiesco's actions, being an end in themselves, are ultimately ineffectual - he neither kills the tyrant nor gains his objective. But by the same token they are also beautiful. The actions of Verrina and his group do lead to their objective: the tyrant is killed by Bourgognino. But, being merely means to an end beyond them, they are also ugly. Some are morally ugly, such as those of Sacco and Calcagno - even in the way in which they propose to do away with the tyrant (III, 5.); other actions, especially those of Leonore and Verrina are aesthetically ugly. It is not for nothing that the deed of Verrina, on which he bases his melancholy claim to greatness, should be the murder of a friend, executed in an aesthetically displeasing fashion.

Verrina himself stresses the essential ugliness of it when he corrects his first formulation 'ertrunken' to "Ertränkt, wenn das hübscher lautet" (V, 17.). And indeed, there is scarcely an action or reaction of Verrina's which does not reflect the ugliness inherent in what may be called, in a very wide sense, the interested or practical mode which he represents. Critics have often enough noted the fact; but they have not seen the necessity of its being so, a necessity founded in the exigencies of the theme of the play itself. This theme may now be more fully stated as the aesthetic mode of being which is disinterested and impractical, versus the interested and practical mode of being, be the interest moral or pragmatic.

But, it will be objected, this whole analysis falls to the ground; it rests on an artificial and untenable division. For Fiesco's reaction by the dead body of his wife is just as ugly as any reaction of Verrina's, probably more so. Indeed critics have usually cited this scene as the most offensive of all.[1] In it, Fiesco behaves scarcely like a human being. The stage directions describe him as "viehisch um sich hauend", "mit frechem Zähneblecken gen Himmel", and additional force is lent to such suggestions of bestiality by his own words: "Tretet zurück, ihr menschlichen Gesichter!- Ah, hätt ich nur Seinen Weltbau zwischen den Zähnen, etc." (V.13.) These are excessive words and gestures, even for a Sturm und Drang hero; and they are all the more striking because of their contrast to the perfect poise and control usually evinced by Fiesco. He is depicted as the most civilised of human beings, formed, playfully superior; and then, when confronted with the

1. Cf. Kühnemann, op.cit., p. 189; Berger, op.cit., p.283; Minor, op.cit., p.70; Bellermann, op.cit., p. 136; Witte, op.cit., p. 123.

human lot, he is reduced to a response that altogether falls below the human. The unusual aesthetic distance which we have come to associate with him, gives way to an equally striking lack of any distance at all. Nor is this the only instance there is of the limits to Fiesco's composure. Three times in the play allusion is made, in front of Fiesco, to death by poisoning: and each time the mention elicits a similarly uncontrolled response from him.[1] This threefold repetition of the same motif, distributed among different characters, is striking and we may infer that the trait revealed in Fiesco has a more than incidental significance. The peculiar quality of death by poisoning, distinguishing it from death in open battle, is its insidiousness. The victim is doomed before he knows it. Death is under his skin; he was as incapable of foreseeing it as he is now helpless in evicting it. It is a very similar quality in the later situation, Fiesco's murder of Leonore, which enrages him in special measure. Here, too, what happened could not be guarded against. It is the result of a configuration of accidents which eludes human calculation. In the later, as in the earlier incidents, then, it is the experience of the inscrutability and incalculability of life, and of the helplessness of human beings, which causes Fiesco's composure to break down in such a startling fashion. His aesthetic distance, then, one must conclude, is not based upon an acceptance of the human lot, its uncertainty of all but death. Rather does it seem designed as a bulwark against this precarious condition; for when fate overtakes him, it does so destructively, inimically, sweeping all aesthetic

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1. Cf. III,4, (ed.cit., III, p. 92, ll. 9 ff.); III, 5, (ed. cit., III, p.95, ll.14 ff.); and IV, 15, (ed.cit., III, p. 132, ll. 5 ff.)

distance before it. That this conjecture is justified becomes clear from Fiesco's great monologue, which represents the most concentrated and explicit statement of the aesthetic attitude. There he says, in what the stage direction 'mit erhabenem Spiel' indicates as being the most directly revelatory passage: "Zu stehen in jener schröcklich erhabenen Höhe - niederzuschmollen in der Menschlichkeit reissenden Strudel, wo das Rad der blinden Betrügerin Schicksale schelmisch wälzt ..... tief unten den geharnischten Riesen Gesetz am Gängelbande zu lenken - schlagen zu sehen unvergoltene Wunden, wenn sein kurzarmiger Grimm an das Geländer der Majestät ohnmächtig poltert etc." (III, 2.) The deepest spring of the aesthetic attitude which would treat life as sublime play, is the wish to remain above it, out of reach of its wrath and inaccessible to the wounds it would inflict. It springs from the resolute refusal to close with fate, and with life altogether.

That Fiesco's attitude is a defensive mechanism inspired by fear, and designed to ward off the object of his fear, also becomes clear from the rigidity with which that attitude is maintained. It has already been shown that he persists in an emotionally distanced aesthetic response in at least four situations demanding a straightforward response of feeling,[1] and in fact eliciting it from other characters. It is not that feeling and instinctual reactions do not enter into his response at all. It is only because they are present too that his response can be legitimately called an aesthetic one; for the hallmark of the aesthetic state is the presence and harmonious interaction of all the human faculties. But if feeling and instinct enter into his response, they do so in a

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1. Cf. p. 40ff of this chapter.

subordinate fashion, strictly controlled by the overall aesthetic intention. Never is feeling allowed to endanger form, let alone to disrupt it.

This permanent subordination of feelings and instincts is manifest in Fiesco's relations to other characters of the drama, not only, however, in the sense that from his end the relationship is characterised by lack of warmth and spontaneity: over and above this, the character at the receiving end of the relationship has come to embody in his being some aspect of Fiesco's own emotional make-up. Some inner psychological trait of his is externalised, and incarnated in another character, as well as in the outward situation of that character. In various fashions, the Mohr, Leonore, Bertha and Julia, through their being, their situation, as well as through Fiesco's relation to them, tell us something about the inner drama that is enacted in the hero's soul.

This device of externalising inner states and conflicts in the manner described is so characteristic of Schiller's dramatic technique, and becomes so absolutely fundamental to the structure of his dramas, and, furthermore, to the understanding of the relation between the dramas and the theory, that it may be well to show its working in some detail here, using the figure of the Mohr as an illustration.

On the face of it, there is no unequivocal suggestion of any unusually close relation between Fiesco and the Mohr. The Mohr, it is true, has an important part in putting the schemes of Fiesco's brain into practice. Even Fiesco must grudgingly admit the value of his complicity. Furthermore there is Verrina's insistence on the similarity of the crimes perpetrated by slave and master, and of the punishment due to both. Against these indications of a link must be set the Mohr's double treachery towards his master, and Fiesco's no less callous dismissal of his servant

the moment he has done his work.[1] These argue the most casual of connections. Nor could their respective situations put them more widely apart. The one, an aristocrat, an Apollo, clad in white, a knight and a Christian gentleman. The other, a slave, ugly, black, a scoundrel and a pagan. Or does perhaps the very nicety of this opposition suggest an inner link between the two?

Fiesco explains to Julia the place and function of the senses and instincts in the following metaphors: "Die Sinne müssen immer nur blinde Briefträger sein" ... and "unsere Sinne sind nur die Grundsuppe unserer inneren Republik. Der Adel lebt von ihnen, aber erhebt sich über ihren platten Geschmack" (III,10.). Three things are striking in these words: firstly the Platonic analogy between individual and State, inner psychological and outer social organism, which is implicit in the first metaphor and expressly stated in the second. This analogy suggests that the outer action of the 'Republikanisches Trauerspiel' may itself be a metaphor for an inner, psychological meaning.

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1. Fiesco's dismissal of the Mohr is one of the things responsible for the impression, among critics, that Schiller, in this first historical panorama, neglected psychological relationship in the interest of episode and action. Cysarz (op.cit., p.102) writes of this incident: "Wir erblassen. Ist Fiesco von Irrsinn befallen? Schiller zeigt Fiesco's angeborenen Leichtsinn, die augenblickliche Verblendung, nicht mehr, Doch was ist Schillern die Psychologie?" The critic fails to make any distinction between the psychological insight of Fiesco, i.e. a character within the drama, and the psychological insight of the poet. This is a particular form of the general critical fallacy of reading any dramatic statement as if it directly expressed the author's view. This fallacy, especially in the form in which Cysarz is its victim, has done incalculable harm to Schiller criticism, particularly in Germany. It is directly responsible for the picture of Schiller as a poet of high ideals and moral standards but little psychological finesse, a picture which only Jung has challenged in his penetrating study (C.G.Jung, Psychologische Typen Ch.III. Zürich, 1925).

Nor is this analogy isolated. It is supported by a great deal of the imagery of the play, as when Fiesco speaks of the "aufgewiegelten Sinne" as slaves, and Julia addresses them as "gärende Rebellen".[1]

Secondly, the position assigned to the senses in this inner republic is worthy of note: they are serving members, vitally useful and exploited, but despised. Thirdly, the image of the Grundsuppe in itself is striking because of its unusualness. When in the Vth act we meet the dismissed Mohr again, looting and burning, he introduces himself with the words: "Ich war der Mann, der diese Suppe einbrockte - mir gibt man keinen Löffel!" (V,7.) The idiom he uses takes us back to Fiesco's words. And we see that Fiesco's servant has experienced the same exploitation at the hands of his master which the latter had laid down as the proper treatment for the senses; and senses, moreover, which had been called servants and slaves. In the light of this link, the very first words of the Mohr, in which he reveals his identity to Fiesco, take on a new significance in retrospect: "Ein Sklave der Republik" he he calls himself (I,9.). A cheated slave of the inner republic as well as of the outer one, we ask ourselves? A host of other verbal links, both direct and indirect, confirm the suggestion that the Mohr is an externalisation of the sensual - instinctual side of human nature in general, and of that side of Fiesco's personality in particular. Time and again, the senses are metaphorically associated with treacherous desertion, with darkness, and with fire. Julia speaks of "unsere tödliche Seite, ... die .... beim ersten Seitenblick der Tugend den Feind verräterisch

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1. III,10 and IV,12 are especially important in this context and many examples could be cited from these scenes.

empfängt." Fiesco combines fire and desertion in one metaphor: "Eben dann würde meine Empfindung die Feuerfahne der deinigen gewahr und liefe desto mutiger über." Fire, night, treachery are all interwoven in her plea: "Mensch, dein Gesicht brennt fieberisch wie dein Gespräch! Weh, auch aus dem meinigen ..... schlägt wildes, frevelndes Feuer, Lass uns das Licht suchen ..... Die aufgewiegelten Sinne könnten den gefährlichen Wink dieser Finsternis merken, Geh! Diese gärenden Rebellen könnten hinter dem Rücken des verschämten Tages ihre gottlosen Künste treiben." (IV.12.) Is it not odd that these associations, examples of which could be multiplied, crowd in thick and fast just after the Mohr's treachery has become known, and just before he is finally presented, a deserter at large, burning and looting under cover of darkness? The interconnection between large dramatic facts and imagery is too close and persistent to be overlooked. It is as if through the figure and fate of the Mohr, the poet were offering a comment on the playing with fire that goes on, at the same time, between Fiesco and Julia. As Fiesco allows the Mohr some measure of freedom in the conviction that he has him under absolute control, so he, and in a similar fashion, Julia, allows his senses an appearance of liberty in the assumption that they can be put in their place under all circumstances; a mistaken assumption as it turns out, for Julia's passions are soon inflamed, and Fiesco, irate at the Mohr's incendiarism, in the very next scene stabs his wife. And it is as if to point the connection between the Mohr and Fiesco, when Julia, in her last words, calls him "Schwarzer heimtückischer Heuchler" (IV, 13.).

Other image patterns help to build up a complex network of connections between Fiesco and the Mohr, showing the

one to embody in his being a part of the other's nature; notably animal-imagery, and imagery of anatomical organs which is connected with the former. The animal imagery is extended throughout the play, its focal point being the allegory of the animal kingdom by which Fiesco gains the adherence of the artisans. It is striking that this imagery is wholly limited to the Mohr and Fiesco, and to references to them by others. It thus constitutes a special bond between these two characters; on official occasions, it is true, Fiesco likes to see himself as the lion or tiger, and this would seem to put him far apart from the Mohr, whom he calls thrice a Bestie, and who by his own descriptions as well as Fiesco's, emerges as of a lesser breed - a dog, a snake, a fox, etc. But when he speaks with the Mohr, Fiesco refers to himself in exactly the same terms, and permits the Mohr to refer to him likewise. He is a fox (III, 14 and III,4), a dog (II, 4) a snake (II,15 and V,1) and so on. And, what is more important, the conversation between him and the Mohr is full of references to the lower senses and to direct sensory knowledge obtained through them. Fiesco asks the Mohr to find out "die Witterung des Staates" (I.9) "Ob du nicht irgendwo einen Meuchelmord witterst" (II,15.), of the Jesuit who suspects him, he says "ein Fuchs riecht den andern" (II,4.). The Mohr tells him that he has "den Befehl vorausgewittert" (III,4.) - "ich wittere den Frass"; and their conversation abounds with mentions of animals: 'Mäuse', 'Ratten', 'Kater', 'Lastochsen', and of words such as 'Morast', 'Mistbeet', creating in the reader a strong awareness of the creature side of life. Together, the Mohr and Fiesco have a common language, the language of instinct and sense. And who would doubt that the animals to which they are likened symbolise that side of human nature

in which they are one? In the light of this image pattern, the extravagances of Fiesco's behaviour by the dead body of his wife assume a new significance. Are Fiesco's words and gestures theatrical excesses of a young poet as yet unversed in matters of taste? Or do they not represent an attempt to show as directly as is possible the instinctual, the night side of Fiesco, of which we have so far only known indirectly, through his connection with the Mohr? To show, as it were, the animal in the man?

The animal imagery forges, on the level of language, a bond between Fiesco and the Mohr; the imagery centred in organs of the body makes the nature of the connection that holds between these two, clearer still. For the single organ is not self sufficient but part of a whole bigger than itself. The effect of the recurrent association of the Mohr and Fiesco with single organs of the body therefore is to suggest that neither is complete in himself but that they form part of one whole. Fiesco is repeatedly associated with the head of a body; in the case of the Mohr references abound to feet, until we begin to see in him a personification of a busy and servile pair of feet; a character, incidentally, which connects him with the "blinde Briefträger" to which Fiesco likens the senses, thus giving a specific application to that general definition. A few examples will make the point clear. In II.9. the Mohr enters with the words "Meine Sohlen brennen noch", and he counters Fiesco's announcement that he will give him orders, with the words: "Wohin lauf ich zuerst? Wohin zuletzt?" He conveys his acceptance of Fiesco's proposal that he should let himself be caught and suffer torture in the first degree, with the remark: "Sie werden mir das Gelenk auseinander treiben, das macht geläufiger" (II,9.) - as if the procedure should be justified if only this one

one capacity were enhanced. Fiesco, in speaking to the Mohr, does so in terms suggesting the physical speed of the latter. "Woher so in Atem?" "Du eilst nunmehr, was du eilen kannst" ... "unsere flinke Nacht" .... (III,4.) and as he frees him finally, "Fort, Bursche, dass du Genua auf den Rücken kriegst". None of these references in itself is particularly remarkable, but by their cumulative force they build up a picture of this character which is finally consolidated by a very striking remark of the Mohr's: "Aber nun hell auf, Freund Hassan .... Meine Füsse haben alle Hände voll zu tun - ich muss meinen Magen karessieren damit er mir bei meinen Beinen das Wort redet". (II,15.) Here the humorous variation of the familiar idiom "ich habe alle Hände voll zu tun" to "meine Füsse haben alle Hände voll zu tun" forces us into awareness of the identification of this man with his feet; and the following sentence bears out the impression that he in his entirety consists only of the inferior organs, and that of these the most vital are the feet that serve his master.

Only a small number of the links have been mentioned which constitute the connection between Fiesco and his servant. They are to be found on every level of the play: in the choice of character and circumstance, in the organisation of the plot, in the related themes of discourse, but most of all on the poetic level of the play, within its verbal fabric. Dramatic characters, like the world in which they have their being, are a composite creation of words, words spoken by them and of them. It is the unusual degree of intercommunication between these word complexes - their likeness, the likeness of their associations, etc. - which in the last resort makes us ascribe to the characters that special relationship of a partial identity, which we describe by saying that an aspect of one has become the

whole being of the other.[1]

Externalisation of inner states is not merely achieved through other characters. It extends, in this play as in all other plays by Schiller, to the natural as well as to the political and social scene in which the characters are set. The landscape which forms the background of Fiesco's monologue in III,1., like the wilderness in which Verrina, in the preceding scene, communicates his momentous decision, conforms in all essential characteristics to the attitude revealed by the speaker. The expansiveness, the wide and beautiful sweep of the gulf of Genua does not merely reflect the openness and width of the aesthetic state; they are its visible extension: and the connection between inner state and outer scene is brought home by such remarks as "Ich muss mich im Offnen dehnen" or such a gesture as is described in the stage direction "Mit offnen Armen dagegen eilend". These are indeed aids to the eye and the actor

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1. The conception of externalisation of aspects of one dramatic character in the being of another is a familiar one in modern literary criticism. William Empson, in his Seven Types of Ambiguity. London, 1947, p.46, makes use of it when he says: The fool acts as a sort of divided personality externalised from the King"; and Robert Heilmann, in an article entitled "The Unity of King Lear" (publ. in Critiques and Essays in Criticism. New York, 1949) argues that externalisation of different aspects of Lear and the conflict between them in the other characters of the drama accounts for the tightness of its structure and its essential unity. Heilmann does not however attempt to prove these unusually close interconnections between the different characters by analysis of the verbal materials of which they are composed. He thinks that it is possible to deduce them from the plot alone, an assumption with which I cannot agree. Thus in his article, he presents his conclusions without supporting evidence derived by close textual analysis, whilst in his book (R.B.Heilmann, This Great Stage, Image and Structure of King Lear. Louisiana, 1948) he bases his analysis of image patterns on the assumption of the principle of externalisation stated apodictally in the

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to visualise the scene. But the whole visible scene is itself an externalisation of the inner action, subservient to the theme of the play and strictly controlled by it. And so with the plot, and the whole social and political configuration on which it is based. Fiesco is indeed a Republikanisches Trauerspiel, tracing the development of a social and political organism from a state of latent oppression, through open rebellion, to tyranny, and ending in the liquidation of the principal champion of freedom who has turned out to be more dangerous than the official tyrants. But for all that, this political and social development is also an extension of the inner psychological development of the principal character, and unless these over-tones of meaning are perceived, the full significance of the play is missed. Schiller himself has made the analogy between the outer and inner Republic explicit, and supported it by a vast amount of imagery which points in both directions: thus he has given us the cue for reading the inner in and through the outer. The state of suppression in which Fiesco seeks to keep feelings and instincts, corresponds to the oppression which he tends to exercise in the body politic outside him. The poet has projected the inner state into the outer and it is the rebellion within him, which is foreshadowed in the tumult of the battle without. The Mohr and Leonore, both frustrated in their way, joining the battle and turning against him (Leonore dons the cloak of his enemy) are outer embodiments of his own impulses which, long frustrated, well up uncontrollably in the heat of battle and lead him to kill

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introduction. (Op.cit., pp.33-34.) Granting however, that Heilmann is correct in his conclusions on Shakespeare's technique, if not in the way he arrives at them, the similarity of Schiller's procedure is very striking indeed.

his wife. The symbolic significance of the outer action here becomes fully apparent. For Leonore is a part of Fiesco; and the outward act of murder is equally an inner act of self destruction. And finally, Fiesco's shortlived tyranny: what is it but the poetic metaphor for the absolute rule of the dominant impulse in him, when every other impulse has died off and atrophied? This inner tyranny is externalised not only in the political scene, but also in Fiesco's individual relationships with other characters apart from the Mohr. Different as his attitude to his own wife is from that to Julia, and both from that to the Mohr, they are all alike in one respect: he thwarts every one of these characters. He will not go out fully to any one of them - not even Leonore - yielding himself up to his feelings and loyalties and allowing himself to be governed by them.

Indeed, we may regard the degree of the hero's aloofness from these three figures as the exact index of the relation in which he stands to the impulses that are embodied in them. The bond with Leonore he at least accepts even though in fact he is no more true to her than to his own noblest impulses. In forsaking her he forsakes his heart. Julia he callously disowns. In the case of the Mohr, the dissociation is complete. The manner in which Fiesco pays him off, not just the fact of his dismissal, is telling: he throws the money 'hinter sich' (III, 6.). He has not begun to face the fact of his connection with this embodiment of his shadiest impulses. And this division in his own personality becomes patent when he sends the Mohr to his death with the words: "Die Kirche bedankt sich für die Blattern des Heidentums" (V,10.).

But there is yet another relationship. Languishing away in imprisonment "im untersten Gewölbe" (I, 12.) of

her father's house is Bertha, the daughter of his friend, and the cause and most powerful spring of the uprising of which Fiesco is the head. The closeness of the connection that should exist between them is evident. Yet he knows nothing of her fate. For Verrina's mention of his grief goes unheeded, and Fiesco's promise to enquire into its causes is forgotten (II, 17.). From the point of view of Fiesco, the two actions evolve quite separately. Has the poet forgotten to forge an obvious link, or is Fiesco's ignorance a deliberate piece of characterisation? That the poet has not been oblivious of the connection, has already been seen. It became apparent when the connection was pointed out between the rape of Bertha by Gianettino and the rape of Genua by Fiesco. Through this parallel, supported by several other traits in the characters of both tyrants, Fiesco is from the start associated with Bertha's fate. And this link, forged at the beginning of the play, is once again brought before the reader at the end, by means of form; in the last scene but one the theme of guilt, suffering and redemption is taken up by Verrina when he asks Fiesco to redeem the most unfortunate victims of tyranny, the galley slaves. This motif had already received a full statement in the first act, in which Bertha has been cursed by her father and her redemption been made contingent upon the fate of Genua. Stripped of all accidents peculiar to the particular situation, the similarity of the motifs sounded at the beginning and end of the play, is striking. In both cases Fiesco's splendour is offset by the introduction of suffering creatures languishing in an underworld existence of which the world is oblivious, harshly punished for an old or partial guilt, and vainly hoping for redemption. Verrina says that the ocean into which the galley slaves weep their tears, knows nothing of their misery, and clearly this metaphor serves to draw attention to Fiesco's complete

ignorance of their lot. Similarly, the carefree, gay Fiesco of the first act is totally unsuspecting of the tragic events that take place in Verrina's house. The abrupt division of the first act into two halves utterly opposed in mood suggests their lack of connection on the psychological, at least on the conscious, plane; at the same time, however, the strictly contrapuntal arrangement of the two halves suggests the awareness of a connection in the poet's mind. Clearly, then, the incidents introduced at the beginning and at the end of the play must be seen together. They are alike in themselves and connected moreover by the fact that Fiesco reacts to them in a like fashion. Furthermore, they are linked by the repeated use of the word Erlösung, and through the person of Verrina, who figures in them both. Nevertheless, they are not mainly introduced to tell us something about Verrina. For the same motif is introduced a third time in a totally different psychological context. The Mohr, about to be hanged, offers to redeem his crime as a galley slave. The association of the Mohr[1] with this motif points its significance. For the Mohr, as has been shown, is an externalisation of the creature side of Fiesco. It is Fiesco's own creature side, its dark entanglements, its guilt, its suffering beyond hope of redemption, which he denies in sending the Mohr to his death.

But the full measure of his estrangement from these deepest levels of his own humanity, the completeness of their repression, becomes apparent in his ignorance of Bertha's fate. He knows neither of the violence that has

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1. The Mohr, too, is shown from the beginning to be an outlaw from human society, a member of an underworld of which Fiesco knew nothing. In this too, his position is similar to that of Bertha and of the galley slaves.

been done to her, nor of her despairing hope of redemption. He is altogether shut off from that part of his humanity which to others is the deepest spring of their suffering and strength and, paradoxically, of their freedom. For it is Bertha who fires the Republicans to overthrow the tyrant. Motivated by fear of the human lot, he fails where, accepting it, they succeed. Instead, he becomes a tyrant, in the inner as well as the political significance of the word. This fact is once more brought home to the reader in the conversation with Verrina which precedes Fiesco's death. For when Verrina asks Fiesco to redeem the galley slaves, his words are invested with a fuller meaning than Verrina is aware of, by the verbal and thematic echoes they evoke in the reader. Verrina murders Fiesco because he will not lay down the tyrant's cloak. The full verdict of the poet is that Fiesco must die because he will not redeem the violated deeps of his own humanity. That these are past redeeming the reader knows. For by the dead body of his wife, Fiesco has for a moment laid himself open and revealed depths which are no longer human. He is all but turned into a dog.

But to say that Fiesco is repressing his emotions and vital impulses would seem to be a contradiction to the main thesis advanced in this chapter. For the aesthetic state is, by definition, a state in which all functions, the senses as well as the intellect, are released in their totality, in which receptivity and activity are fused. How can such a state be associated with repression of one part of the human personality? The apparent contradiction in the interpretation corresponds to a contradiction within the play itself. It is implicit in the tragic irony of its final metaphor: that of the would-be champion of freedom, who has become a tyrant <u>all unknown to himself</u>.

The key to this contradiction is to be found in an observation made earlier on.[1] There, Fiesco's unchanging playfulness had been contrasted with the rising curve of Julia's passion. Other characters too contrast similarly with Fiesco in this respect. As Julia is gradually and perceptibly dominated by a sensual passion, so Verrina in the course of the play subordinates all his responses to his will, so Leonore is gradually overruled by the strength of her emotions: everywhere Schiller has shown characters changing in response to the demands of the changing situation, yielding to a tendency towards unbalance common to all. Only Fiesco stands in their midst, unmoved. However the outer situation may change, however the emotional constellations of those around him may change, his response evinces an unchanging inner balance, as if it were altogether removed from time and change. And the increasing inappropriateness of his responses is reflected in the outer form he gives them. The whole of the fourth act, like the first, is dominated by one of Fiesco's entertainments. But while this framework for his intrigues strikes the reader as not altogether unnatural at first, the festivity of the fourth act is ludicrously out of keeping with the realities of the situation - and the impression of a discrepancy is shared by every character. The same response in such a totally changed situation does not, in fact, remain the same. It is by reason of the static character of his balance that it becomes a false balance, and thus becomes the cause of his undoing. For to maintain it, he must arrest the ebb and flow of his inner being, he must avoid, by repression, that tendency towards unbalance to which everyone else in the drama is subject, and subject to their detriment. So far from allowing himself to be ruled now by the intellect, now by his emotions, as the situation

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1. Cf. pp.20 ff. of this chapter.

demands, he meets every situation alike in the full harness of the aesthetic response. Thus his response, still full and sensuous even while he muses over the beauty of Genua, imperceptibly deteriorates as it becomes fixed. This change is reflected in the change of meaning that occurs within one of the principal symbols of the play. Seeing - e.g. seeing himself in a mirror - at first connotes a truly aesthetic activity of Fiesco's, sensuous yet distanced. In the end, it has come to connote a rigid control over senses and feelings: "Herrschsucht hat eherne Augen", Leonore says to Fiesco, "worin ewig nie die Empfindung perlt" (IV,4.). The symbol of aesthetic activity is still used, but the quality of the activity has changed, for Fiesco, fearful of the incalculable, has excluded sense and feeling from his seeing, so that his control may be all the more perfect. To describe this process of a shrinkage of perception as it were, the words of a modern writer may be quoted, who says: "Superficial perception may be increasing, while the kernel of perception may be shrinking".[1] This deterioration is confirmed from another side, again through the symbol of seeing. For the feelings which Fiesco fails to incorporate in his narrowing perception are now shown to be themselves unseeing or blind. "Dann übereilen sich zwei Augen, und ich ermorde mein Weib" (V,13.) - these are the terms in which Fiesco relates his impulsive rashness and its consequences. And the spiritual blindness by which he is overcome as he gives rein to his impulses, finds expression in the plea for sight and distance which precedes the words just quoted: "Ah, dass ich stünde am Tor der Verdammnis, hinunterschauen dürfte mein Aug auf die mancherlei Folterschrauben der sinnreichen Hölle ... Könnt

1. Hermann Broch, The Death of Vergil, quoted by R. Heilmann, This Great Stage, op.cit., p. 223.

ich sie sehen, meine Qual, wer weiss, ich trüge sie vielleicht" (V. 13.). The blindness and complete lack of aesthetic distance which he here experiences, is the converse of the excess of distance that has increasingly marred his aesthetic response. Thus the latter in the end deteriorates into a pose, which becomes apparent at the moment when Fiesco accepts the dukedom, the token of tyranny. He does so standing "die ganze Zeit über, den Kopf auf die Brust gesunken, in einer denkenden Stellung" (V.12.). The inner significance of the act belies the contemplative appearance. The full measure of the debasement of the initial aesthetic response,however, becomes apparent when, after the death of his wife, he promises the Genoese "eine Totenfeier, ... dass das Leben seine Anbeter verlieren und die Verwesung wie eine Braut glänzen soll" (V,13.). The aesthetic mode, which the "Anbeter der Kunst" had chosen as the gateway to the fullest life, in the end comes to be associated with stagnation, decay and death. It is precisely this deterioration for which Oscar Wilde found the haunting symbol of the portrait of Dorian Gray, which decays as surely as Dorian defies time in unchanging beauty. This failure to fix a contemplative response, its deterioration and the disintegration of the personality is not only Fiesco's tragedy. It is the central tragedy in every one of Schiller's tragedies, from Die Räuber to Wilhelm Tell. Sometimes we witness the tragic process from its inception, as with Marquis Posa, Don Manuel or Demetrius. At other times, as in the case of King Philipp or Elisabeth, in Maria Stuart, the hero is presented in its final stages, his fuller and finer life already atrophied, his tyranny established, only his fearful persistence in total power telling us of that totality of being he once sought. In every case however, the same paradox is voiced. Freedom

and fullness of life can be gained only by being lost. The attempt to realise them by statically persisting in the freest and fullest of responses, the contemplative response, is inspired by fear, leads to repression and ends in the ultimate destruction of the personality.

CHAPTER TWO

This chapter demands an act of faith on the part of the reader. It attempts to distill from eight full length tragedies and a number of fragments some basic features of the tragic personality, the tragic theme and the structure of tragedy in Schiller's work. The ideal method for such an undertaking would be to subject each drama to as full an analysis as has been accorded to Fiesco. This alone could put the reader in possession of all the data necessary to draw conclusions about any given tragedy or about Schiller's tragic work as a whole. The reader would see for himself that certain image patterns recur throughout all the plays and seem moreover to be interrelated in similar fashion. He would see that these key images, occurring, as they do, not only in different dramas, but in widely differing local contexts within each individual drama, do in fact assume an overall poetic meaning which remains more or less constant from one tragedy to the other. He would see the increasing tightness of the linguistic structure of Schiller's tragedies accounting for an ever more complete fusion between their dramatic and poetic elements. Through their close interweaving with the imagistic texture, the big dramatic facts of any given tragedy, the external action, and even the stage properties figuring in it become invested with a transliteral, symbolic meaning: the plot itself becomes the ultimate methaphor of the meaning of the play. Just as the fact that Fiesco's accomplice should be a black man and a pagan has been found to possess symbolic significance, so the symbolic import of Karl Moor being a robber, or Elisabeth of England and Demetrius being bastards could be

fully established. Again, the symbolic nature of Fiesco's refusal to descend to the galley slaves and to redeem them from their suffering has been shown. Analogously, an apparently incidental action, such as Marquis Posa going to see Don Carlos in his prison, would emerge from a full analysis of the verbal texture of the play, as an action of profound symbolic import. Finally, it has been shown in Fiesco that stage properties such as mirror and sword, and even the scenery associated with the tragic protagonists - the wide sweep of the Gulf of Genua on the one hand, and the nocturnal wilderness of the other - have been found to possess a more than local import. The same is true of the sword of the Jungfrau von Orleans, the royal diadem found in possession of Maria Stuart; and again of the wide vistas and the manifold prisons that figure in Schiller's dramatic works.

A thoroughgoing analysis of these lines does in fact form the basis of the argument advanced in this chapter; to present it in full however, is clearly impossible within the given framework of the thesis, if only for reasons of space. In many instances it has been found unavoidable to operate with conclusions derived from previous analysis without demonstrating the critical procedures which in fact led up to them. It is partly to mitigate the disadvantages of this manner of presentation that so large a space was given over to the examination of Fiesco. Having demonstrated in one instance, and in the greatest possible detail, certain permanent features of Schiller's poetic technique and thereby indicated the critical method underlying this whole second chapter, it was thought possible to proceed to a more comprehensive view of Schiller's tragic work without undue risk of sounding arbitrary.

In the light of the analysis of Fiesco, the steady

recurrence in Schiller's tragic plots of two features assumes some interest. Fiesco, it has been seen, regards himself as a liberator but is in reality a tyrant, a political constellation which was shown to have a very direct bearing on the central theme of the tragedy. A similar paradox is perceptible in Die Räuber. Karl Moor, forsworn to liberate society from the constraints of law and convention, becomes its worst scourge. Marquis Posa's conscious notion of himself as champion of a liberal order founded upon Gedankenfreiheit, is belied by the position in which he is in fact shown. He rules the king, uses the Queen and Carlos as tools for the realisation of his secret plan, arrests the prince when he upsets the scheme and threatens to murder Eboli. It is he, "Der Sohn und Vater zu Gefangnen macht" (IV, 22); and these words of the duke of Alba fairly indicate the despotic character of Posa's rule.[1] A similar duplicity marks Wallenstein's political career. Intent on liberating Germany from a foreign yoke, he himself "drückt / des Kaisers Länder mit des Kaisers Heer." (Pic. II, 7.) The same Wallenstein, in whom Max had seen the liberator of every personality, of

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1. The same dichotomy could be demonstrated in the remaining tragedies, even though it is less immediately evident on the level of the plot. It is striking, for instance, how consistently Johanna, the liberator of her country, on the verbal level is associated with force, in relation to her country and her friends no less than in relation to her enemies. She promises the Dauphin "Bezwungen leg ich Frankreich dir zu Füssen! (I.10); - Of Burgund, yielding to her entreaties, she says: "Er ist bezwungen" by Johanna (III.4.) and the black knight admonishes her, saying:

   Entlasse
   Das Glück, das dir als Sklave hat gedient,
   Eh es sich zürnend selbst befreit... (III.9.)

   These are but a few of many examples which could be cited.

every inborn faculty, all but arrests his ward when for the first time he exercises his freedom, and seeks by a show of force to coerce troops "ins alte Bette des Gehorsams." (Tod, III, 20) In Maria Stuart, Elisabeth, to all appearances the head of a free and constitutional state, by the unlawful murder of her rival becomes a despot. The end of the tragedy leaves no doubt that Shrewsbury's prophecy has been fulfilled:

F u r c h t , die schreckliche Begleitung
Der Tyrannei, wird schaudernd vor dir herziehn
Und jede Strasse, wo du gehst, veröden. (IV, 9)

Nowhere is the paradoxical twist of the plot more strongly evident than in Schillers last drama. "Alles was nach Knechtschaft schmeckt, ist ihm ganz unerträglich", Schiller says of Demetrius in the paralipomena to the fragment; and Demetrius himself voices his ideal thus:

Die schöne Freiheit, die ich----
Will ich verpflanzen---
Ich will aus Sklaven --- Menschen machen,
Ich will nicht herrschen über Sklavenseelen. (I.)

this same Demetrius, entering his native land to free it of the despotic rule of Boris Godunov, murders the man who knows the secret of his birth, overrules the instinct of the Queen-Mother, imprisons the true king of Russia and enslaves its people. In the case of Fiesco the political role assumed by the hero betokens an attempt on the psychological plane to persist in the freest of all responses, the contemplative response. The outer drift to tyranny signifies the illusory nature of this attempt: for the aesthetic state, statistically maintained, gives way to a state of inward repression. What are we to make of the steady recurrence, throughout Schiller's tragedies, of so fundamental a paradox? Again, Fiesco's false claim to total inner freedom has found symbolic expression in his usurpation of the crown. The

frequency with which this symbol recurs in Schiller's tragedies is striking indeed. Both brothers in Die Räuber are usurpers: Franz usurps the place of his elder brother and his father, whilst Karl arrogates to himself the powers of divinity. Präsident von Walther has by violent means put himself into the place of his predecessor, and hopes that his son will rise still higher "zunächst nach dem Throne - zum Throne selbst, wenn anders die Gewalt soviel wert ist als ihre Zeichen" (Kabale und Liebe I,7). Marquis Posa - in his last conversation with the Queen - admits that he was tempted to sacrifice the heir-presumptive and to usurp his place on the throne:

> Der König schenkte mir sein Herz. Er nannte
> Mich seinen Sohn - ....
> Es ist vorbei. Karl oder ich! Die Wahl
> War schnell und schrecklich.... (IV.21) [1]

Wallenstein's "königliche Hoffnung" is the main-spring of the outer and inner action of the tragedy. Cutting short all hopes of Max and Thekla, he voices his own aspirations thus:

> Sie ist das Einzige, was von mir nachbleibt
> Auf Erden; eine Krone will ich sehn
> Auf ihrem Haupte, oder will nicht leben. (Tod, III, 4)

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1. In the seventh letter in Briefe über Don Carlos Schiller argues that Posa's true motive for withdrawing from Carlos is not undue solicitude for his friend, as Posa himself deludes himself into thinking, but the temptation to replace him on the throne. In support of this argument the above passage is quoted by Schiller in the original form in which it appeared in the Thalia, ending in the words

> Wenn ich
> Den grossen Wink der Vorsicht missverstanden,
> Die m i c h , nicht i h n , auf diesem Thron gewollt.

Schiller concludes "Also hat er doch g e w ä h l t , und um zu wählen, musste er also ja den Gegensatz sich als möglich gedacht haben." (Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit. VI. pp.58 f.)

Again, Elisabeth is fighting for a crown she knows not to be hers by right of birth, and it is the rankling knowledge of this, that finally causes her to remove her rival. She signs Maria's sentence with the words:

Ein Bastard bin ich dir? - Unglückliche!
Ich bin es nur, so lang d u lebst und atmest.
Der Zweifel meiner fürstlichen Geburt,
Er ist getilgt, sobald ich d i c h vertilge. (Maria Stuart IV, 10)

In Die Jungfrau von Orleans, it is the figures of Isabeau and Burgund that spring to mind in connection with usurpatory schemes. The heroine herself would seem to have no connection with these, fighting as she does in support of the true king. Yet strangely enough, when she comes to recognise her tragic guilt it is in terms of the familiar symbol of usurpation that she voices it:

Nimm, ich kann sie nicht verdienen,
Deine Krone, nimm sie hin! (IV,I)

And her father too, foreseeing Johanna's presumption in a thrice repeated dream, had seen her crowned and bearing a sceptre. Could it be that the recurrence of the same poetic motif indicates an essential continuity of theme in this tragedy too? In Die Braut von Messina it is two acts of usurpation which form the palpable cause of the conflict between rulers and people on the one hand, and the members of the ruling family on the other. Isabella reminds her sons of the nature of their relation to the people:

Wie könnten sies von Herzen mit euch meinen,
Den Fremdlingen, dem eingedrungnen Stamm,
Der aus dem eignen Erbe sie vertrieben,
Sich über sie der Herrschaft angemasst? (I,4.)

whilst the old duke's rape of his father's bride issued in the curse that divides the family. In Warbeck and Demetrius,

finally, the motif of the usurper was evidently to have been the centre of the action: the former believes himself to be a usurper whereas in fact he is the true heir to his title; a reversal of the poetic motif in its usual form which, significantly enough, Schiller eventually deemed unsuited for tragic treatment. Demetrius, on the contrary, believes himself to be the righteous heir to the Russian throne but learns that he is no less of a usurper than his predecessor King Boris whom he has ousted from his place.

Even without adducing proof of the precise significance of this dramatic motif in each individual tragedy, the mere fact of its steady recurrence throughout Schiller's tragic work and its constant association with the figure of the hero indicates that it possesses a central symbolic significance. The possibility suggests itself that the would-be liberator who is a tyrant, and the pretender to the crown who is a usurper are ultimate metaphors of a common meaning in Schiller's tragedies, just as they were found to be the ultimate metaphors of the meaning of Fiesco. But what could this meaning be? To suggest that Schiller's tragedies in their entirety concern themselves with the impossibility of persisting in the freest of responses, the contemplative response, in order to preserve the total freedom of the personality, at first sight seems unlikely in the extreme. For are not Schiller's tragedies fraught with drama and conflict, and is not the tragic hero an active character fighting in a clearly defined cause? It is true, that Wallenstein surprises us by his protracted inactivity in a situation that calls for action; an impression that has been noted by Cysarz,[1] and is very well summed up in the words of K. May: "... im ganzen Umfang des

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1. op.cit., pp.318 f.

zweiten Teils tut er den entscheidenden Schritt zum Handeln noch nicht, - bleibt unbeweglich stehn in seltsam erregendem Widerspruch zu dem Bild des Mannes, das wir ... von seinem Wirken... mitbringen: Ist er ein Zauderer, eine Hamlet-Natur? "[1] May goes further than this. Wallenstein's belief in the stars reveals him as an essentially contemplative nature, enjoying "beglückte Schau - kontemplativ entspannt."[2] And R. Buchwald arrives at similar conclusions, regarding "das Träumen und Spielen" as intrinsic elements of Wallenstein's tragic character.[3] But even if it were granted that Wallenstein shows traces of a contemplative attitude he would seem to be the exception rather than the rule. For figures such as Karl Moor, Ferdinand von Walter, Don Carlos, Maria Stuart, or Don Cesar, are they not rash and passionate characters, deeply involved in the concrete situation in which they find themselves, and responding wholeheartedly to its practical or emotional appeal? There can be no doubt that this is so, and that these traits openly conflict with the characteristic structure of the contemplative response: the harmonious interplay of the human

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1. op.cit., p.109.
2. op.cit., p.118. May indignantly rejects Cysarz' explanation of Wallenstein's inactivity. According to the latter, it is caused by the psychological shock he sustained at Regensburg, when he was dropped by the Emperor. The ground on which May rejects this reading - in my view the only possible one - is symptomatic of a wide-spread tendency in recent German Schiller criticism: it is, May says, "ein Restbestand psychoanalytischer Deutung, nirgends weniger angebracht als in einem Stück wie diesem, und in einem solchen, in dem es gerade nicht auf den Psychologismus der Menschen- Darstellung ankommt. Schon der Gedanke an eine solche Auffassung ist gegen den Instinkt und Geschmack." (op.cit., p.114) One would like to know why.
3. op.cit., vol.II, p.383. Neither May nor Buchwald regard this contemplative strain as a manifestation of Wallenstein's hybris. On the contrary they regard it as the redeeming feature of the realist.

faculties in their entirety. Easily determined as these characters are by powerful passions and elemental impulses, they seem far removed from the indeterminacy and balance of the contemplative state.

It is, however, striking that the above-named characters, with the exception of Don Carlos and Maria Stuart, are not the title heroes of their respective tragedies. This is evident in the case of Die Räuber and Die Braut von Messina; whilst the original title of Kabale and Liebe had actually singled out Luise as the tragic heroine of the play. Moreover, the argument has long since become a common-place of Schiller criticism, that it is not Carlos but Posa, not Maria but Elisabeth, who are the true tragic heroes of the plays in which they figure. Of the straight-forwardly active character of these latter figures, and the course they steer, it is far less easy to be certain; and the same is true of figures such as Franz Moor, Luise Miller, Wallenstein, Johanna, Isabella, as well as Don Manuel and Demetrius. These characters seem to dwell in the realm of possibility rather than of actual reality. They seem to contemplate the situation in which they find themselves, and the line of action they might take, rather than to adopt an actual rôle and follow a definite course. Thus they tend to retard the action of the play rather than to precipitate it. Luise's inactivity, for instance, has often been critically noted. And indeed, at point after point in the drama, she fails to implement by any positive decision the love for Ferdinand she professes; a mode of behaviour foreshadowed by the strange words she speaks on her first appearance: "Ich will ja nur wenig - an ihn denken - das kostet ja nichts." (I,3.) Again, Marquis Posa prefers to toy with the tempting potentialities inherent in his sudden rise to power rather than to commit himself to either of the courses open to him. The

decision he eventually takes comes tragically late and is forced upon him by the events. Exactly the same might be said of Wallenstein and Elisabeth of England. It is significant that the first decisive action of these heroes, like Fiesco's murder of his wife, takes place very near the end of the tragedy and all but coincides with the catastrophe. Posa makes his decision in IV, 21; Elisabeth signs Maria's sentence of death in IV, 10 - only to deny, in the next scene that she has come to any decision - and Wallenstein does not commit himself to a definite course until well into the third part of the trilogy. - It is this group of characters, by far the larger group, represented in every drama and in the role of tragic hero in most, that evidently calls for closer attention. For if anywhere, it is in this group that we may detect an affinity with Fiesko, the embodiment of a tragic theme which, we have some reason to suspect, may recur elsewhere in Schiller's dramatic work.[1] To test this hypothesis it may be useful to examine that figure whose character and function in the economy of the tragedy of which he forms part has proved more refractory to critical endeavours than that of any other Schillerian hero, the figure of Marquis Posa. On one basic point all critics seem in agreement: they see in Marquis Posa an active fighter for the ideal of humanity. Melitta Gerhard sums up this

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1. The final justification for regarding the characters that belong to this group as the tragic heroes of their respective plays, lies in the fact that they, rather than their opponents, fulfil the overall aesthetic function which falls to the central figure in the organisation of a tragic work as a whole. This function will be discussed at length in Chapter Three.

universal trend[1] by describing him as a "glühenden Künder und todbereiten Streiter einer besseren Zukunft."[2] Epithets such as 'glühend' and 'todbereit' serve as an indication of the kind of problem that confronts the critic operating with this hypothesis. He will inevitably find himself at loggerheads with the drama itself and Schiller's own interpretation of it in Die Briefe über Don Carlos. To describe Posa as 'todbereit', fails to take note of a striking incident related about him. Of all the knights defending St. Elmo against the Turks, he alone escaped with his life, and returned to Alcala, "die angefangenen Studien zu enden". (III, 7.) This may suggest a number of things: the one thing it does not suggest is that Marquis Posa is especially 'todbereit'. Again, in the third of the ~~the~~ Briefe über Don Carlos, the 'fiery' Posa is introduced as "der kältere, der spätere Freund",[3] whilst in the drama itself we find not only a host of images connected with fire and fever converging on the person of Carlos, but Posa's solemn declaration to the King,

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1. E. Kühnemann, (op.cit., p. 269) calls Posa "einen mutigen Künder". K. Berger, (op.cit., p. 517) says "Seine feste Willenskraft, sein diplomatisches Geschick und seine zielsichere Entschlossenheit machen ihn zum Herrn der Lage, wo er auch auftritt." W. Witte, (op.cit., p. 141) characterises Posa as "a man of daring and imaginative action... a constructive reformer", to which he adds disapprovingly "even if his programme is not as clear and concrete as one might wish." What criteria is Mr. Witte bringing to bear upon the subject of the discussion? B. von Wiese, too, stresses the active character of Posa's idealism. "In Marquis Posa's Ideal", he writes, "lebt der G l a u b e a n e i n e T h e o d i z e e, a n e i n e H e i l s o r d n u n g, die immer erst im Kommen ist, aber für die einzustehen eine nicht nur politische, sondern auch religiöse Entschiedenheit verlangt, die den absoluten Wert in einer bedingten Welt durchsetzen will.." (Op. cit., pp.231-2.)
2. M. Gerhard, op.cit., p. 104.
3. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., VI, p.40.

Die lächerliche Wut
Der Neuerung, die nur der Ketten Last,
Die sie nicht ganz zerbrechen kann, vergrössert,
Wird mein Blut nie erhitzen.... (III,10.)

Important words such as these, spoken in the culminating scene of the drama, cannot be ignored. And indeed, Miss Gerhard takes exception to them and to the whole passage of which they form part, regarding it as inconsistent with the active character of Posa's political aspirations and explaining it as an intrusion of Schiller's "eigenste Gesinnung ..., die, den Umkreis des Dramas sprengend, wider Willen hervorbricht."[1] The same, or similar, objections had already been voiced by Minor, Berger, Bellermann and others. "Wie kann Posa", asks Minor, "dem König gegenüber so zuversichtlich behaupten: "Die lächerliche Wut der Neuerung wird mein Blut nie erhitzen", da er doch mit den Aufrührern und Protestanten im Bunde steht? Wie kann er sagen, dass das Jahrhundert seinem Ideal nicht reif sei, da er doch seinen Freund Carlos zur Realisierung desselben bestimmt hat?"[2] Similarly, Bellermann criticises Posa's protestation "Meine Wünsche verwesen hier" and his contentment to be a citizen of future centuries as unbecoming to an active idealist. Indeed critics have felt the whole tenor of this central scene to be out of keeping with their conception of Posa's character, and Minor states a universally accepted view when he writes: " Nicht bloss der Dichter hat in dieser majestätischen Scene

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1. Op. cit., p. 107 f.
2. Op. cit., Vol.II, p. 571. Similarly, Berger writes: "Bedenklicher ist es schon, dass Posa, der entschiedenste Anhänger der Glaubensfreiheit und Förderer der niederländischen Rebellion, dem König gegenüber behaupten kann: "die lächerliche Wut der Neuerung wird mein Blut nie erhitzen. Das Jahrhundert ist meinem Ideal nicht reif." (op.cit., vol.I, p. 518.)

den Faden aus der Hand verloren, auch seine Charaktere fallen aus ihrer Rolle."[1] Once the essentially active character of Posa is assumed, the main scene of the tragedy inevitably stands condemned from the point of view of psychological probability and dramatic economy and becomes acceptable only as an eloquent expression of Schiller's own humanitarian ideals. But this is by no means the end of the objections. Once the inner justification of this crucial scene is denied, neither Posa's subsequent actions leading to the catastrophe nor the motivation of these actions are exempt from criticism. Bellermann, operating with the hypothesis of Posa's active heroic character, has compiled a formidable catalogue of objections which do in fact follow from the initial position he adopts. He criticises Posa's request for a warrant of arrest, to be used against Carlos, the subsequent arrest, Posa's last talk with the Queen, his eventual self-immolation, and his political plan revealed to us by the Duke of Alba. To this may be added Berger's objection to Posa's secretiveness towards Carlos and the Queen as well as towards the King - an objection also raised by Kühnemann - and to the general lack of circumspection Posa evinces in the latter part of the drama, a point also stressed by Witte. - Finally, Bellermann queries the probability of Posa's behaviour when as a boy, he suffered Carlos to be punished for an offence he himself had inadvertently committed while playing: "Und das hätte sich der Knabe Roderich gefallen lassen?" Bellermann asks, concluding "Es sieht so aus als hätte Schiller um der Wendungen willen, die sich im ersten und fünften Akte recht wirkungsvoll daran knüpfen, diese Geschichte erfunden, die seinem Helden

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1. Op. cit., vol.II, p. 571.

garnicht gut zu Gesichte steht."[1] The importance of this incident, so confidently dismissed by Bellermann, is indicated by its prominent position. Placed at the very outset of the tragedy - it is related in the second scene of the opening act - this incident for the first time shows Posa faced with a challenge to act: and it shows him passively evading the challenge. Unlike Carlos, he is reluctant to accept that what started as play, has turned into bitter reality. There is little in this incident which points to the accepted view of Posa as an active fighter for the ideal: and indeed, we may fairly doubt the correctness of a conception which forces us to dismiss as mere inconsistencies so many traits of Posa's character, that there is little of him left.

May we not rather regard this early incident as a clue in the direction of our own tentative hypothesis; the hypothesis namely, that in his tragic heroes Schiller depicts a mode of response to life which is contemplative rather than active? The absence of a straightforwardly emotional and practical response on Posa's part, enhanced by its contrast to the impassioned reaction of Carlos, and moreover coupled with the association of play, might well point in this direction. And indeed, the word play recurs throughout the drama, to describe, not the harmless activities of the boy, but the intrepid and desperate schemes of the man. It is of an action of the gravest import, i.e. Posa's arrest of the Prince, that the Queen says:

ich fürchte,
Sie spielen ein gewagtes Spiel. (IV, 21.)

And Posa's reply shows that he accepts this description.

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1. Op.cit., p. 284.

He simply carries on her thought with the words:

Ich hab es
Verloren. (ibid.)

adding later:

Wer hiess auf einen zweifelhaften Wurf
Mich alles setzen? alles! so verwegen,
So zuversichtlich mit dem Himmel spielen?
(ibid.)

And indeed, this final assessment of what he has done, merely echoes the first intimation of his intentions he had earlier on given to the Queen. Seeing her amazement that he should have been sent to her by the King, he says:

Gesetzt, ich .... wär es müde,
An Philipps Hof den Sonderling zu spielen?
(IV, 3.)

and the whole passage, with its thrice repeated 'gesetzt' and its cautious subjunctives, supports the impression, created by the word spielen, that Posa has not committed himself to any one course in all seriousness. This impression, that he has been playing, is finally clinched by Don Carlos. His tribute to his dead friend is strewn with references to Spiel an odd sounding word at this solemn moment, and from the lips of one who believes in the high seriousness of all that Posa stood for.

Mein war er,
... Als seine scherzende Beredsamkeit
Mit Ihrem stolzen Riesengeiste spielte
(V,4.)

he says to the King; and we cannot fail to be struck by the description of Posa's passionate eloquence as scherzende Beredsamkeit. Again, Posa's attempt to deflect the King's suspicion from Carlos to himself is described as "plumpe Gaukelspiel". Of Posa's relation to the King as a whole, Carlos says:

Ihr Zepter war das Spielwerk seiner Hände;
(ibid.)

and he sums up Posa's character by calling him "dies feine

Saitenspiel". (Ibid.) By this image, the picture of Marquis Posa is, as it were, rounded off: for it is in the same words that Carlos describes his friend at the outset of the tragedy: a 'zartes Saitenspiel', he calls him. (I,2.) Thus prologue and epilogue are at one in suggesting that it is in the sphere of play and art, that we must look for an explanation of Posa's personality.

It is natural to suppose that such an aesthetic bias, if it exists, will reveal itself in Posa's own thoughts and ideals; and thus it may be illuminating to examine his conversation with the King, in which he expresses his views with the utmost fulness and frankness. And indeed, the views he voices are permeated with aesthetic conceptions. To him, God is a 'Künstler' (III, 10.); his living creation bears the hallmark of freedom, "der Freiheit entzükkende Erscheinung" (ibid), in all its parts. And it is the same aesthetic freedom to which he would have the King restore his own creation, the state. The King, in Posa's eyes, is an artist too,

der erfahrne Kenner,
In Menschenseelen, seinem Stoff, geübt,
(ibid.)

But instead of being the centre of a living creation, sustained by the life of its parts and reflected in it - Von Millionen Königen ein König - he has usurped all the life and made himself the master of an artificial whole every part of which bears the degrading stamp of his purpose. When Posa speaks of the "traurigen Verstümmlung" of humanity, when he pleads:

Stellen Sie der Menschheit
Verlornen Adel wieder her! Der Bürger
Sei wiederum, was er zuvor gewesen,
Der Krone Zweck!
(ibid.)

he is lamenting that loss of aesthetic totality which Schiller

deplores in the sixth aesthetic letter, and outlining that ideal of the aesthetic state, of which Schiller, in the 27th letter, speaks as follows: "In dem ästhetischen Staate ist alles - auch das dienende Werkzeug ein freier Bürger, der mit dem edelsten gleiche Rechte hat, und der Verstand, der die duldende Masse unter seine Zwecke gewalttätig beugt, muss sie hier um ihre Beistimmung fragen."[1] - And no doubt the ideal which the Marquis opposes to the 'vorgewogne Tat' expected of the servants of the state, is that of an aesthetic act. He rejects that mode of activity which singles out one function at the cost of the rest, which demands

> Nur meinen Arm und meinen Mut im Felde,
> Nur meinen Kopf im Rat -
>
> (III,10.)

which is merely the means to an extraneous end, instead of being an end in itself.

> Ich aber soll zum Meissel mich erniedern,
> Wo ich der Künstler könnte sein?
>
> (ibid.)

Posa asks, and the metaphor he employs leaves no doubt that he is here evolving an aesthetic conception.

It is significant that Posa rejects the King's offer of a post in which he might put his ideals into practice. For actively to strive for the realisation of the aesthetic Absolute, to which he is pledged, means to compromise this Absolute; it involves actions which have purposes beyond themselves. As the King points out; to the patriot or the moralist the means, the 'how', whereby the ideal is achieved, is immaterial. To Posa it is all important.

Do we then imply that in the fateful interview Posa not only voices an aesthetic ideal, but also evinces an

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, pp.383-4.

aesthetic mode of response from which he is unwilling to budge? Against this it will be argued that the whole venture of confronting the King with the truth is the daring and purposeful action of one inspired by the desire to transform reality. And this view would seem to be confirmed by the concluding words of the soliloquy which precedes the interview: "In diesem Glauben will ich handeln". But what exactly is the purpose he pursues and the end that he achieves? The absence of any clear intentions is striking. Posa neither gives up Carlos nor does he abandon the King. He embraces both these causes which as every one in the play knows are irreconcilable; and in so doing, he embraces neither. His activities in the one direction are neutralised by his activities in the other. The King's confidant, he is yet constrained from exploiting his position by the need to keep it secret from his friend. He accepts neither post nor favour, Carlos' confidant, he is yet hampered in every step he takes on his friend's behalf by his secret alliance with the King. Indeed, the Posa of the fourth act remarkably resembles Fiesco who at once heads a conspiracy and consorts with the leader of the opposition. And in this play as in Fiesco, the blurring of the action by a multitude of intrigues and counter-intrigues may be due, not as critics have thought, to the poet's loss of aim and consequent inability to manage his plot, but to a fundamental lack of purpose on the part of his tragic hero.

The precise character of this unpurposiveness is illuminated by the monologue that precedes the conversation with the King. Between the last word of Posa's soliloquy - - handeln - and the first word addressed to him by the King, there intervenes the following stage-direction: "Er macht einige Gänge durch das Zimmer und bleibt endlich in ruhiger

Betrachtung vor einem Gemälde stehen. Der König erscheint in dem angrenzenden Zimmer, wo er einige Befehle gibt. Alsdann tritt er herein, steht an der Türe still und sieht dem Marquis eine Zeitlang zu, ohne von ihm bemerkt zu werden." (III,9.) On this note of inactivity the scene ends; and it is not until the beginning of the following scene that movement and life return and the tableau dissolves Posa "geht dem König, sobald er ihn gewahr wird, entgegen und lässt sich vor ihm auf ein Knie nieder, steht auf und bleibt ohne Zeichen der Verwirrung vor ihm stehen." (III,10.) Is it not odd that on the threshold of the fateful moment, the "Augenblick, der einmal nur sich bietet", (III, 9.), which will decide the purpose of his life, Posa should stand sunk in aesthetic contemplation, the most unpurposive of human states, and that, oblivious of time and reality, he should miss the moment when it really comes? Again, is it not odd, that in the preceding soliloquy he should think of the opportunity afforded to him by chance as the raw-material of art-der rohe Stein, der Leben annimmt unter Bildners Hand -, and of himself as the artist? (III,9.) In such a context yet another figure of speech becomes remarkable. Is it mere chance, Posa reflects, that has led me here? a thought he expresses as follows:

> Eigensinn
> Des launenhaften Zufalls wär es nur,
> Was mir mein Bild in diesen Spiegeln zeigt?
> (ibid.)

Taken by itself, this reference to his mirrored reflection might be of no more than factual significance. But considered in the full aesthetic context in which it is set, its symbolic import is inescapable. Here as in Fiesco, the hero's awareness of his mirrored image betokens that inner separation, that doubling of the consciousness which takes place in the aesthetic act. Posa is in what

E. Bullough in a passage quoted above,[1] describes as an exceedingly complex mental state", in which one and the same person may combine in himself "the threefold aspect of artist, work of art and spectator". He is the Bildner, the Bild, and the 'I' that looks into the mirror. The result of this state, Bullough says, "is a curious enhancement of the acts" that spring from it, "an investing of them with a value as ends in themselves and a doing them for their own sake..." It is precisely this aesthetic conception of an act the value of which lies in the doing rather than in the results it achieves, which Posa, a little later, expounds to the King; and it is precisely this aesthetic disinterestedness of Posa's bearing, the curious unrelatedness of his passion, which communicates itself to the King and persuades him that it is safe to suffer this "sonderbare Schwärmer". (III,10.)

Posa himself confirms the King in this impression. Twice in their conversation he explains how it is possible that with such dangerous convictions he should yet be acceptable to the King:

> Kann ein Gemälde Ihre Ruhe trüben? -

he asks him, and himself replies:

> Ihr Atem löscht es aus.
>
> (ibid.)

And again, later on:

> Darf ich es frei gestehen, grosser König?-
> Sie sehn jetzt unter diesem sanftern Bilde
> Vielleicht zum ersten Mal die Freiheit.
>
> (ibid.)

It is the two words 'Gemälde' and 'Bild' which contain Posa's explanation of this anomalous relationship, a sincere explanation, as emerges from the fact that he had already used the same metaphor in his soliloquy. Posa

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1. Op.cit., p.77.

believes himself to be as profoundly self-contained, as far removed from the world of persons, purposes and powers, and as essentially timeless as a work of art. And there is much truth in this comparison. For like the Gemälde, which the King finds him contemplating, Posa moves others rather than is moved himself. Like a thing of beauty, he persists in unchanging balance and harmony, in the midst of a changing situation and changing responses. Yet the comparison is not wholly true, and it is left to the Queen, in her last talk with him, to point out the flaw in it. She, too, had been a Bild to him, as he now confesses; and its contemplation was to have attuned Carlos to the highest spiritual beauty. His love was to have been his aesthetic education.

> Zur höchsten Schönheit wollt ich ihn erheben:
> Die Sterblichkeit versagte mir ein Bild,
> Die Sprache Worte - da verwies ich ihn
> Auf dieses - meine ganze Leitung war,
> Ihm seine Liebe zu erklären.
> (IV, 21.)

To this the Queen replies:

> ....Glaubten Sie
> Im Ernst mich aller Weiblichkeit entbunden
> Da Sie zu einem Engel Mich gemacht,
> Zu seinen Waffen Tugend ihm gegeben?
> Das überlegten Sie wohl nicht, wie viel
> Für unser Herz zu wagen ist, wenn wir
> mit solchen Namen Leidenschaft veredeln.
> (ibid.)

The Queen reminds him that to identify living beings with works of art, and living relationships with the relation between percipient and work of art, is to deceive oneself. For sentient beings are subject to time and change. The spiritual and sensual functions of the human personality cannot be arranged, once and for all, in a fixed pattern after the manner in which spiritual and sensuous elements are fused in the finished form of a work of art. The human form is never finished; it must for ever be created

out of the flux that is life. That Elisabeth is here voicing the poet's view, is borne out alike by characters and action: for how different is Elisabeth's suffering and the headless despair of the Prince from that aesthetic harmony in which Posa would have them persist. To point this contrast Schiller has employed yet another, a poetic, means. An actual picture plays an important part in the action: the picture of himself which Carlos sent to Elisabeth, his bride to be. At the height of the action this picture, already the cause of much suffering and suspicion, is introduced on the stage. And here "das schöne Bild" as the Infanta calls it, becomes at once the occasion and the foil of the unendurable hurt the Queen sustains. The end of the scene shows

> Die Königin in Tränen, und auf ihrem
> Gesichte Blut -
>
> (IV, 10.)

the same Queen, whom, just before, the Princess had called "meine schöne Mutter". There can be no doubt about the symbolic import of what might appear a mere stage property. For in the mind of the reader, the concrete object becomes impregnated with the spiritual significance of the image pattern that corresponds to it and in turn endows that image pattern with an almost physical poignancy.[1]

Posa, as much as the other characters in the play,

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1. In the story which the Marquis tells the Queen at their first meeting - a lightly disguised version of her own story and Carlos', - it is the picture the woman sends to the man, not vice versa as in the plot, that cements the love between them. Apart from the psychological interest of this substitution - Posa later invests the story that the Queen does not love the Prince but uses him as a tool in her political schemes, and later still, that it is he himself, Posa, who loves the Queen, - its repercussions on the poetic plane of the drama are considerable: the actual picture that figures in IV, 9, comes to be associated with Elisabeth as well as Carlos. Thus, by yet another means, the concrete object acquires a general, symbolic significance.

falls short of that ideal aesthetic harmony in which he deems himself to persist. For by persisting in it, irrespective of the changing situation and its changing impact, he inevitably does violence to himself, and his response is impoverished. This deterioration is manifest in the fateful conversation with the King. For Posa's aesthetic response, still rich and true as he gazes upon the painting, ceases to be true when he maintains it in the face of a challenge to action. It is only by an act of inner repression that he is enabled to maintain aesthetic distance and to assure the King:

> Die lächerliche Wut
> Der Neuerung .....
> Wird mein Blut nie erhitzen.

And indeed, this act of repression is unmistakeably manifest in the words and gesture immediately preceding this assurance. Having owned that he is dangerous to the King, Posa continues:

> Ich bin es nicht, mein König. Meine Wünsche
> Verwesen hier.
> (Die Hand auf die Brust gelegt.)
> (III,10.)

This allusion to secret decomposition is strange from one so alive and free; and strangely enough, 'Freiheit' and 'Verwesung' appear oddly mingled in his vision of the Creation.

> ..... Auf Freiheit
> Ist sie gegründet - und wie reich ist sie
> Durch Freiheit! Er, der grosse Schöpfer, wirft
> In einen Tropfen Tau den Wurm und lässt
> Noch in den toten Räumen der Verwesung
> Die Willkür sich ergetzen -
> (ibid.)

The full significance of this word from Posa's lips, however, does not become evident until the end of the play, the Grandinquisitor answers Philipps question: "Wem hab ich gesammelt?" with the words:

Der Verwesung lieber als
Der Freiheit -
(V,10.)

With these words, sentence of death is passed on Carlos. They signify the final victory in this tragedy of the forces of death over the forces of life. This verbal connection lights up in retrospect the whole dramatic action. It reveals the nature of Posa's complicity with the King and the share he has in the death of his friend. Both are the tragic consequences of his attempt to preserve total freedom by persisting in an unchanging aesthetic harmony; as in Fiesco such fixity betokens decay and death.

Once again, shortly before his death, Posa resorts to the image of a work of art. But now he understands that the perfect symmetry of art is the mark of death; and now he whose blood was never to be incensed by his ideals, knows that to be human is to be fired by the sight of beauty to deeds and devotion. Urging the Queen to be true to her own and to Carlos' love, he asks:

Was geht es König Philipp an, wenn seine
"Verklärung" in Escurial den Maler,
Der vor ihr steht, mit Ewigkeit entzündet?
(IV, 21.)

The examination of Don Carlos has thus proved what the recurrence of the dramatic motifs of the liberator and the usurper had indicated: the identity of its tragic theme with that of Fiesco. Here, as there, the poet is concerned with the impossibility of perpetuating a contemplative response to life, and with the inner falseness of that response. Here, as there, the poet uses every means at his disposal, dramatic, psychological and poetic, to create the impression of the aesthetic distance and indeterminacy of the tragic hero, only to destroy the impression he has taken such pains to create. When Marquis Posa's aesthetic distance breaks down eventually, he is

driven to the verge of murder. The long repressed vital impulses that well up, are violent and far from beautiful. He himself realizes this, calling his threat to Eboli 'barbarisch'. His aesthetic freedom had been an illusion, disguising the predominance of his intellectual ~~feelings~~ faculties and the tyrannical hold they exercise over his instincts and emotions. - Why should Schiller have come back to a theme so unexpected in, and, one might think, unsuited to, a literary genre primarily concerned with action? This question will be answered in the final chapter of this thesis. What is of interest here, is that the unexpected recurrence of this theme in yet another tragedy does lend considerable support to the hypothesis that the concern with a quasi-contemplative mode of being may be central to Schiller's tragic work as a whole.

In the light of this hypothesis the main body of Schiller's tragedies will now have to be examined. In view of the bulk of the material it is proposed to adopt a highly selective procedure. Taking our cue from Fiesco, as before, we shall investigate whether such poetic and dramatic elements as one might reasonably expect to be used in the delineation of a quasi-contemplative consciousness, and such as are in fact used to delineate that consciousness in Fiesco, occur in the rest of Schiller's tragedies. In the first place, we shall look for the recurrence of the four interrelated image-patterns which have been found to be most intimately associated with the quasi-contemplative state of Fiesco: the imagery of sight, of distance, the imagery based on certain scenic properties, and the image of the charioteer. Secondly, we shall investigate whether, as in Fiesco, there is an unusual number of references to play and art in tragedies not prima

facie concerned with art and artists; and the connection of such references with the figure of the tragic hero. Lastly, we shall examine whether the activity of Schiller's tragic heroes evinces that unpurposiveness which is so outstanding a feature in the case of Fiesco and which, moreover, is a feature associated with the aesthetic mode of activity as such.

Although it would be possible to offer evidence from each tragedy bearing on each of these points, this is hardly desirable. In some cases this would entail a lengthy and detailed textual analysis, and such digressions would tend to clutter up the argument rather than to make it stand out clearly. It is therefore proposed to discuss a sufficient number of tragedies to establish the points in question.

In Fiesco the aesthetic mode of response has been seen to be poetically formulated in terms of certain recurrent image-patterns. That area of the play which is centred in Fiesco is permeated by images of sight - and sight is the aesthetic organ par excellence - just as the area that is dominated by Bertha and Verrina is marked by images of blindness. Again, Fiesco's response is associated with images of height interpolating spatial distance between himself and what he sees - and spatial distance, like temporal distance, is a frequent concomitant of aesthetic distance - just as conversely Verrina and Bertha are associated with images of depth: one need only think of Bertha's catacombal existence. And again, the open and expansive character of the aesthetic response has found its external reflection in the scenic setting associated with Fiesco, and in his images of wide vistas; whilst, conversely, the inner construction characteristic of Verrina has left its mark on imagery and outward setting

alike: witness Bertha's prison and the oppressiveness of the setting in which Verrina announces his resolve to kill the tyrant. At the two climactic points of the tragedy these separate imagistic strands are gathered into one complex metaphor. At the zenith and the nadir of his career, in the great monologue which shows him contemplating the fullness of his powers, and in the catastrophe which overtakes him as his aesthetic distance breaks down, Fiesco visualises himself standing on a lofty height and gazing upon the boundless vistas of life that spread below. And on the first of these occasions this aesthetic relation to life has found its final embodiment in the image of the charioteer playfully mastering his team of horses.

Throughout Schiller's tragedies, these imagistic strands recur with a remarkable constancy, now separately, now clustered together into one single metaphor, and always in the closest association with the figure of the tragic hero. One would hardly associate an image as suggestive of freedom and poise as that of the charioteer with a character as base and hypocritical as that of Franz Moor. Yet that is precisely an association Schiller stresses, and repeatedly so. Franz seeks to incite Hermann, his henchman, to help him remove his brother Karl; and this is the promise he holds out to him: "Ha! wie dich der ältere Sohn ... aus diesem unedlen Staub ... ans Licht emporheben wollte! - Dann solltest du, ganz wie du da bist, mit Gold überzogen werden und mit vier Pferden durch die Strassen dahinrasseln.." (II,2.) These words, it is true, are said to someone else and for a special purpose; yet it becomes clear that the image he uses here has some abiding meaning for Franz himself: later in the same scene we find it associated with the superior position of his

brother Karl, a position coveted by Franz: "Itzt hat der stolze Strudelkopf den Zügel in Händen, ... und ich ... werde tiefgebückt vor seiner Türschwelle - " (here Franz breaks off). And for a third time Franz uses the same image, this time in conjunction with the life he plans for himself. In his important expositional soliloquy at the outset of the tragedy, he sums up his resolve to rise superior to the commonness of life, in the words: "Aber der gnädige Herr gibt seinem Rappen den Sporn und galoppiert weich über der weiland Ernte." (I,1.) In the first two of these instances, it will be noted, the image of the charioteer is, by contrast coupled with the association of height. And again, in the most immediately revelatory image of all, the word 'weich', reminiscent of Fiesco's "mit dem weichem Spiele des Zügels", suggests playful mastery rather than force.

The image of forces playfully reined is again coupled with the suggestion of lofty height in the speech of Marquis Posa in which he surveys the ruin of his plans.

> Wer hiess.....
> Mich.....
> So zuversichtlich mit dem Himmel spielen?
> Wer ist der Mensch, der sich vermessen will,
> Des Zufalls schwere Steuer zu regieren
> Und doch nicht der Allwissende zu sein?
> (IV, 21.)

Posa asks the Queen. The attempt to reign chance which Posa abjures here, recalls the central scene of the play, his long conversation with the King. For in the soliloquy preceeding this conversation Posa has announced his resolve to harness the chance of the moment to his own ruling purpose:

> Den Zufall gibt die Vorsehung - zum Zwecke
> Muss ihn der Mensch gestalten.
> (III,9.)

And the vision of humanity and Creation which Posa unfolds

before the King in the ensuing conversation: is it not a vision of vast and distant spaces, seen distantly down the passage of time?

At the end of Wallensteins Lager, in which the main themes of the tragedy are adumbrated - all the imagistic strands that run through Fiesco's monologue are gathered into one metaphor, voiced by the first Cuirassier:

> Frei will ich leben und also sterben,
> Niemand berauben und niemand beerben
> Und auf das Gehudel unter mir
> Leicht wegschauen von meinem Tier.
> (Lager, 11.)

That this metaphor carries strong aesthetic associations, becomes especially clear when it is read in the context of the speech of which it forms part. Beside his own humanity, the Cuirassier has no possessions, and desires no possessions. To the striving of other men, good or bad as the case may be, but always for an ulterior purpose, he opposes his own characteristic mode of activity: that of pure disinterested contemplation. The word 'schauen' suggests a more contemplative and less practical activity than 'sehen'. And does not the contrast between the words 'leicht' and 'Gehudel' suggest that the Cuirassier is free because he transmutes chaotic matter into form, and does not the prefix 'weg' express the elimination of the baser material ingredients of what he sees, through the power of his vision? The aesthetic character of the Cuirassier's response is evident throughout his speeches. Two examples may suffice:

> Er muss vorbei an der Städte Glanz,
> An des Dörfleins lustigen, grünen Auen,
> Die Traubenlese, den Erntekranz
> Muss er wandernd von ferne schauen.
> (ibid.)

What is striking here is not only the repeated emphasis on the activity of 'schauen' - and 'von ferne schauen' at that - but also the concentration on the aesthetic aspect of what

he sees. Later on in the same scene, the Cuirassier contrasts the Arkebusier's subjective view of things with his own disinterested vision. He says:

Wo du nur die Not siehst und die Plag,
Da scheint mir des Lebens heller Tag.

The word 'scheint' is here used with deliberate ambiguity. As the predicate of 'heller Tag' it means shines. By its juxtaposition with the 'siehst' of the previous line, its alternate aesthetic meaning is brought to the fore. It connotes an awareness of things as pure appearances. - The metaphor of the rider viewing the world from aloft thus signifies an aesthetic response to life. But the deeper implications of this response are not allowed to escape us. The Arkebusier points out what the Cuirassier's metaphor involves. To ride above the common throng in fact entails

Über anderer Köpf wegtraben (ibid.)

This accusation the Cuirassier accepts. In times of war and injustice, he rejoins, he that will not "auf [sich] trommeln lassen", can but do as he does. He that will not be played and beaten up, his image suggests, must do the playing and beating himself. And that indeed the Cuirassier accepts riding rough shod over the lives of others, both as the only alternative to being beaten down himself, and as the concomitant of the lofty humanity in which he himself would persist, becomes evident from the speech that follows. Reverting to the metaphor he had originally used, he concedes:

Gehts auf Kosten des Bürgers und Bauern,
Nun wahrhaftig sie werden mich dauern;
Aber ich kanns nicht ändern-seht,
's ist hier just, wies beim Einhaun geht:
Die Pferde schnauben und setzen an,
Liege wer will mitten in der Bahn,
Seis mein Bruder, mein leiblicher Sohn,
Zerriss mir die Seele sein Jammerton,
Über seinen Leib weg muss ich jagen,
Kann ihn nicht sachte bei Seite tragen. (Lag.II.)

On the level of the plot the figure of the Cuirassier is linked equally with Max and Wallenstein. On the one hand, the regiment to which he belongs is commanded by Max; on the other hand it is he who leads the soldiers' opposition to the Emperor's scheme of dividing Wallenstein's army and who eventually devises a plan to counter this decision. And indeed, both these associations are borne out on the poetic level of the play. For it is Max who in the end suffers the fate that is adumbrated in the above quoted metaphor of the Cuirassier. His death is related as follows:

> ... hoch weg über ihn geht die Gewalt
> Der Rosse, keinem Zügel mehr gehorchend,
> (Tod, IV, 10.)

And later Thekla asks:

> Ward ihm sanft
> Gebettet, unter den Hufen seiner Rosse?
> (Tod, IV, II.)

Wallenstein, on the other hand, admits in words strikingly similar to those used by the Cuirassier, that it has been the chief endeavour of his life

> ..... in die Höh
> Zu kommen, über die gemeinen Häupter
> Der Menschen weg zu ragen .....
> (Tod, III, 4.)

And this image, in turn, recalls its inverse, an image which occurs in an earlier passage of the play. On the eve of the battle of Lützen, Wallenstein relates, he dreamt that he was in the midst of the battle:

> Mir tötete
> Ein Schuss das Pferd, ich sank, und über mir
> Hinweg, gleichgültig, setzten Ross und Reiter,
> Und keuchend lag ich, wie ein Sterbender,
> Zertreten unter ihrer Hufe Schlag.
> (Tod, II, 3.)

The formal link between these two passages and the two metaphors used by the Cuirassier suggests that the theme enounciated through the latter in Wallenstein's Lager has

found its dramatic embodiment in the tragic hero of the play. Like the Cuirassier, Wallenstein seeks to rise above common life as the only alternative to being trodden under; an alternative indeed, which he has explicitly formulated in the conversation with Max which immediately precedes the account of his dream:

> Ich muss Gewalt ausüben oder leiden-
> So steht der Fall. (Tod, II, 2.)

he had urged, and:

> Wo eines Platz nimmt, muss das andre rücken,
> Wer nicht vertrieben sein will, muss vertreiben;
> (ibid.)

And in the light of this formal connection the waking experience which immediately precedes the dream and is juxtaposed to it, assumes an enhanced significance. Wallenstein relates:

> Es gibt im Menschenleben Augenblicke,
> Wo er dem Weltgeist näher ist als sonst.....
> Solch ein Moment wars, als ich in der Nacht,
> Die vor der Lützner Aktion vorher ging,
> Gedankenvoll an einen Baum gelehnt,
> Hinaussah in die Ebene. Die Feuer
> Des Lagers brannten düster durch den Nebel,
> Der Waffen dumpfes Rauschen unterbrach,
> Der Runden Ruf einförmig durch die Stille.
> (Tod, II, 3.)

Does not this description of Wallenstein gazing from on high upon the distant tumult of life, recall the Cuirassier's metaphor, and does it not inevitably become tinged with the aesthetic associations of that earlier passage?[1]

The imagery of sight is indeed prominent in the drama and clearly centred in the figure of the tragic hero. This

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1. In this connection it is interesting to note that as Questenberg relates in II, 6, Wallenstein lapsed into an unaccountable inactivity after the battle of Lützen despite the fact that this battle had assured his undisputed military supremacy, by the death of Gustav Adolf.

intimate association with Wallenstein is achieved, in the main, by frequent references, literal or metaphorical, to Wallenstein's eyesight, both by himself and others, by the extensive use of synekdoche[1] Wallenstein's eye comes to stand for Wallenstein - and, finally, by the unusual number of references in stage directions[2] to the intentness of Wallenstein's gaze. The central reference comes from Wallenstein's own lips. Comparing his own cosmic visions with Illo's blindness, he says:

> Die sieht das Aug nur, das entsiegelte
> Der hellgebornen, heitern Joviskinder.[3]
> (Pic., II, 6.)

The words 'hell' and 'heiter' occur again in Thekla's description of the image of Jupiter, her father's planet.

> Ganz in der Mitte glänzte silberhell
> Ein heitrer Mann.....
> (Pic., III, 4.)

she relates. The precise quality of Wallenstein's vision described by the word 'heiter' thus becomes apparent from an examination of the prologue of the trilogy. For there,

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1. Cf. Pic. III, 4, Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., XII, p.138 l.1525.
   III, 5, ibid., p.145, l.1704.
   III, 8, ibid., p. 153, ll.1867, 1873 and p.154, l.1876.
2. Cf. Pic. II, 3, ibid., p.101.
   II, 5, ibid., p.107.
   Tod. I, 4, ibid., p.217.
   I, 5, ibid., p.217.
   III,15, ibid., p.296.
   III,18, ibid., p.310.
   III,23, ibid., p.322.
   IV, 3, ibid., p.331.
3. Cf. p.144 of this chapter, especially the footnote.

'heiter' is one of the key words. It occurs four times in all, and each time it is associated with art. The first reference is to the new theatre hall itself:

... ihn hat
Die Kunst zum heitern Tempel ausgeschmückt,

The second reference is to Friedrich Ludwig Schröder, who had transported his spectators

... in die heitern Höhen seiner Kunst.

In the concluding paragraph of the prologue, the words 'heiter' and 'Kunst' are used almost synonymously. It is by being unnatural, by using the 'artificial' devices of metre and rhyme, that the poet is able to lift

... das düstre Bild
Der Wahrheit in das heitre Reich der Kunst...

And the last words of the prologue once again reiterate the quintessential character of art:

Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst.

In the light of these associations that have accrued to the word heiter can we doubt that the tragic hero, is meant to convey an impression of himself as possessed of an essentially aesthetic mode of awareness?

The imagery-patterns of both sight and of height have received immense stress in Die Jungfrau von Orleans, and are centred in the figure of the tragic heroine. The first of these image patterns assumes prime importance in connection with Johanna's spiritual powers. She is a visionary; and as her vocation is revealed to her, her eyes are opened by the Holy Virgin -

Und sie berührte
Mein Augenlid .....

her spiritual awakening and her power of seeing are one and the same thing. The second image pattern, that of height, is similarly coupled with Johanna's vocation. At the beginning of the prologue, Raimond, in his first speech

relates:

> Jetzt liebt sie noch zu wohnen auf den Bergen,
> Und von der freien Heide fürchtet sie
> Herabzusteigen in das niedre Dach
> Der Menschen, wo die engen Sorgen wohnen.
> (Prolog, 2.)

and in the light of the many metaphorical allusions that follow - she is described as "die hochbegabteste", as blessed "mit hohen Wundergaben" etc. - this description becomes invested with a more than literal significance. Twice in the drama, in widely divergent and prominent positions, these images, combined with an image of expansive vistas, are clustered together into a single metaphor. At the height of her career, when the enemy is vanquished, Dunois says of her:

> Sie sollte eines Fürsten Hand entehren,
> .....
> Die jedes Grösste, Höchste dieser Erden
> Klein unter ihren Füssen liegen sieht;
> (III, 1.)

and this metaphor recalls a very similar one used to describe Johanna at the beginning of the play. Raimond continues the speech quoted above, as follows:

> Oft seh ich ihr aus tiefem Tal mit stillem
> Erstaunen zu, wenn sie auf hoher Trift
> In Mitte ihrer Herde ragend steht,
> Mit edelm Leibe, und den ernsten Blick
> Herabsenkt auf der Erde kleinen Länder.
> (Prolog, 2.)

These metaphors are curiously reminiscent of that voiced by Fiesco in the central soliloquy of the play. Does not its twofold repetition by characters as different as Raimond and Dunois, suggest that the poet is here formulating a fundamental aspect of Johanna's being and response to the world?

In Die Braut von Messina the opening chorus introduces the image of lofty heights, and firmly establishes its association with the rulers of Messina. They are

..... die ragenden Gipfel der Welt
(I, 3.)

and of the mother and her sons it is said:

Hoch auf des Lebens
Gipfel gestellt,
Schliesst sie blühend den Kreis des Schönen.
(ibid.)

A little later in the same scene, the image of height is combined with the associations of seeing and of wide vistas perceived to form one embracing metaphor; and inevitably, the aesthetic associations which have accrued to the original image become transferred to the metaphor of which it now forms part:

Ja, es ist etwas Grosses, ich muss es verehren,
Um einer Herrscherin fürstlichen Sinn,
Über der Menschen Tun und Verkehren
Blickt sie mit ruhiger Klarheit hin.
(I, 4.)

Isabella's vision and tranquility become especially emphasized by contrast with the differing attitude of the chorus. For in the lines that follow, the chorus says of itself:

Uns aber treibt das verworrene Streben
Blind und sinnlos durchs wüste Leben.
(ibid.)

Voiced as it is by the chorus, the mouthpiece of the poet, we may assume that this poetic motif bears directly on the central theme of the tragedy, and indeed this suggestion is confirmed by the fact that the same metaphor is taken up in turn by the principal tragic figures of the play, Don Manuel and Isabella, Relating his love to the chorus, Don Manuel says:

..... über allen irdschen Dingen hoch
Schwebt mir auf Freudenfittichen die Seele,
Und in dem Glanzesmeer, das mich umfängt,

Sind alle Wolken mir und finstre Falten
Des Lebens ausgeglättet und verschwunden.
- Ich sehe diese Hallen, diese Säle ....
(I, 7.)

And in the climactic scene of the tragedy, Isabella, surveying her life and her achievement, says:

Gegründet
Auf festen Säulen seh ich mein Geschlecht,
Und in der Zeiten Unermeßlichkeit
Kann ich herabsehn mit zufriednem Geist.
(II,5.)

By yet another formal link the poet has underlined the thematic significance of a motif voiced alike by the chorus, Don Manuel and Isabella, and its special connection with the figure of the tragic heroine. At the end of the play we find it echoed once again by Beatrice. Condemning her mother's vain attempt to master fate, she says:

Blödsichtge Mutter! Warum dünktest du
Dich weiser, als die alles Schauenden,
Die Nah und Fernes aneinanderknüpfen
Und in der Zukunft späte Saaten sehn?
(IV, 4.)

In Demetrius, finally, the close association of the imagery of sight with the imagery of height emerges clearly, both from the finished portion of the work and the extant prose drafts. As with Johanna, his elevation from his lowly station coincides with the opening of his eyes. He himself relates this event:

Und also jählings aus des Unglücks Tiefen
Riß mich das Schicksal aus des Glückes Höhen.
Uns jetzt fiels auch wie Schuppen mir vom Auge!
(I.)

In one of the prose drafts Schiller describes the same event as follows: "Eine Binde fällt von seinen Augen ... Wie seine Besinnung steigt, erhebt er sich und steht jetzt mit dem ganzen Anstand eines Fürsten in der Gesellschaft."[1]

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1. Sämmtliche Werke, ed. cit., vol.XV, 2. p.391.

The prose draft, too, gives us an indication of how, in the climactic scene of the drama, the two imagistic strands of sight and height were to be combined with an image of vast vistas, and woven into a single embracing metaphor. Demetrius' entry into Russia, Schiller's notes tell us, was to be heralded by an abrupt change of scene: "unmittelbar aus den düsteren Umgebungen des Klosters" - the background against which the Queen Mother is portrayed - the spectator was to be transferred to "eine freie, heitere Landschaft, wo Demetrius mit seiner Armee in Russland's Grenzen eintritt ...."[1] "Die Scene" - Schiller writes - "ist im höchsten Grade lachend und offen und erweitert des Herz gegen des traurigenge und nakende der vorhergegangenen."[2] Here the hero was to be shown pausing "auf einer Anhöhe"; and the various drafts concur in the description of the scene he was to have beheld: "Das Auge verliert sich in heiterer Ferne";[3] "es ist eine unermessliche Ferne";[4] and again "Das Auge schwimmt hin im unermesslichen Gesichtskreis".[5]

Thus, a cluster of images, prominent in Fiesco, and there associated with the dominant aesthetic response of the tragic hero, has been found to recur throughout Schiller's tragedies, and here, too, it is found to be centred in the figure of the tragic hero. In all the tragedies examined, these images are part of an extensive pattern, and their meaning tone varies according to the context in which they are placed. Thus, for instance, the image of height in many contexts carries associations of power and ambition. But when it is conjoined with the image pattern of sight -

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1. Ibid., p. 542.
2. Ibid., p. 544.
3. Ibid., p. 542.
4. Ibid., p. 544.
5. Ibid., p. 544.

itself an extensive image complex - and with the peculiar scenic imagery that goes with it, an overall aesthetic significance does strongly suggest itself. The hypothesis that Schiller's tragedies are concerned with the presentation of an aesthetic, or quasi-aesthetic, mode of response has therefore received some measure of confirmation. Whether it is ultimately tenable will depend on the support it receives from the examination of an image pattern which we might expect to play a crucial part in the delineation of an aesthetic response to life: the image pattern based on the notions of play and art. In the last resort it will depend on an examination of the mode of activity displayed by Schiller's tragic heroes.

One would not expect images of play and art to be of more than incidental import in a tragedy of such turbulence and apocalyptic seriousness as Die Räuber. Indeed the first words given to Karl Moor: "Mir ekelt vor diesem tintenklecksenden Säkulum", and his contemptuous opposition of the artificiality of his own age with its 'Trauerspielen' and its 'französischen Tragödienschreiber' to his own ideal of full-blooded life prepare the reader for a drama brimful of bustling action. Yet these passing references echo a metaphor used by Franz in the monologue which immediately precedes this scene. Resolved to ruin his father, he brushes aside the thought of paternal love with the words: "Das ist eine Eitelkeit von ihm, die Schossünde aller Künstler, die sich in ihrem Werk kokettieren, wär es auch noch so hässlich." (I,1.) In his own eyes Franz is a work of art, albeit an unsuccessful one. And once again, shortly before his death, Franz, anxious to prove the mortality of his soul, returns to the same image: "Empfindung ist Schwingung einiger Saiten," he argues, "und das zerschlagene Klavier tönet nicht mehr. Wenn ich meine sieben Schlösser

schleifen lasse, wenn ich diese Venus zerschlage, so ists Symmetrie und Schönheit gewesen." (V, 1.) This recurrence of the same image in prominent positions, spanning, as it were, the beginning and end of Franz's career, suggests a more than coincidental significance. And indeed, for all the apparent persistence and purposiveness of his plots, he voices them in the language of art and play, familiar to us from Fiesco. Words such as 'Stümper', 'Werk', 'meisterlich' abound in relation to himself and his plots.[1] The plan to murder his father by making his despair, he calls "ein Originalwerk", "ein Werk ohne gleichen", "eine Kunst, die's verdiente, dich zum Erfinder zu haben" (II, 1.). And he resolves to put it into action with the words: "Der Plan ist fertig-schwer und kunstvoll wie keiner -". When Karl's return threatens to upset his plot, he complains "dass ... dieser unstäte Landstreicher durch meine künstlichsten Wirbel tölple", but comforts himself with the thought: "Es ist nur noch Spielarbeit übrig." (IV, 2.) Having allotted to his henchman Hermann his task in the crime he concludes: "die Katastrophe dieser Tragikomödie überlass mir!" (II,1.) This characterisation is borne out independently by other figures of the tragedy and borne out, at that, when the catastrophic consequences of Franz' actions have become fully apparent. 'Spiel' and 'Künste' incongruously echo through the solemn indictments of Moser and Karl. Reminding him of the victims of his crimes, Moser asks: "Glaubt Ihr wohl, diese neunhundertundneunundneunzig seien nur... zu Puppen Eures satanischen Spieles da?" (V,1.) And when Karl comes to realise that he has been the victim of his brother's villany, his short monologue is punctuated by the fourfold repetition of the words: "Spitzbübische

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1. Cf. I, 1; II,1; IV,2.

Künste". (IV,3.)

A discussion of the imagery of art in Kabale und Liebe, is complicated by the fact that art, and in particular music, is the central and all-pervasive poetic symbol of the tragedy. Its impress is evident even on the level of the plot. It is the story of a musician's daughter and a nobleman who came to her father to learn to play the flute. And art, which occasions the outward action of the tragedy, becomes the symbol of its inner theme, love; whilst the different modulations of this symbol are indicative of the differing attitudes towards love evinced by the various characters in the tragedy. This attitude ranges from Ferdinand's utter surrender to his passion to the Präsident's callous play with it. And thus the word Kunst, and the images based on it, serve to express the one and the other, as well as a number of intermediate attitudes. There is the 'biegsame Hofkunst' (III,1.) of the Präsident, whose first words show him incredulous of the seriousness of the affair which Miller, in the opening words of the tragedy, had recognised. To the courtier and to Wurm it is a 'Roman', a 'Farce',[1] unimportant as long as Ferdinand is willing, "in meine Entwürfe zu spielen" (I,7.) and to be ended by means fair or foul, if not. "Das Gewebe ist satanisch fein! Der Schüler übertrifft seinen Meister," the Präsident comments on the plot of Wurm, laughingly (III,1.); and here as everywhere the words he uses are those familiar to us from Fiesco. At the other extreme, there are the cosmic metaphors in which Ferdinand voices the ardour and harmony of a love that has become his religion. "Mein Vaterland ist, wo mich Luise liebt, deine Fusstapfe in wilden, sandigten Wüsten mir interessanter als das Münster meiner Heimat... Wo wir

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1. I.5, (Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., III, p.374, l.9), also III,1, (ibid., p.423, l.10; p.424, l.4.)

sein mögen ... geht eine Sonne auf, eine unter-Schauspiele, neben welchem der üppigste Schwung der Künste verblasst! Werden wir Gott in keinem Tempel mehr dienen, so ziehet die Nacht mit begeisternden Schauern auf, der wechselnde Mond predigt uns Busse, und eine andächtige Kirche von Sternen betet mit uns." (III,4.) The force of all this imagery converges upon Luise. To Wurm, she is "das schönste Exemplar einer Blondine" (I, 5.) to her mother, a "Schöne Seele" (I, 1); in the eyes of Ferdinand she is God's masterpiece which he promises to return to heaven "schöner, als er dich von sich liess" (I,4.), Lady Milford likens her to an 'unberührten Klavier' touched by love's 'erste einweihende Silberton' (IV, 7.) whilst Miller's speeches - and gestures - suggest that to him his daughter is all but identified with his instrument. Throughout the tragedy images of art continue to be associated with Luise, but their significance changes. To Ferdinand, she remains a work of art - "dieses schöne Werk des himmlischen Bildners", "alles so schön - so voll Ebenmass - so göttlich vollkommen! - Überall das Werk seiner himmlischen Schäferstunde!" (V,7.) - but it is a work of art marred by a secret flaw - a melodious sounding instrument with "zerrissenen Saiten", "Gift in so schönen Gefässen" - a work of art standing unrelated to the greater life and harmony of the universe which it had formerly seemed to reflect, and mocking it: "Tränen um die Gottheit .... die so mutwillig um das herrlichste ihrer Werke kommt. - O, mich deucht, die ganze Schöpfung sollte den Flor anlegen und über das Beispiel betreten sein, das in ihrer Mitte geschieht." (V, 7.) And now that Ferdinand's art metaphors have been divested of their cosmic resonance, they give way to those flat and artificial images previously employed by the Präsident and Wurm. His affair with Luise, he bitterly suggests, is a 'Roman', a 'Duett', 'Komödie', a 'Lustbarkeit'. (V, 7.) This change of imagery

undoubtedly reflects Ferdinand's own deluded state of mind. But it does more than that. It also reflects the limitations of Luise's love as they become apparent in the course of the tragedy. This is borne out by the change in the images she herself uses. In her first enthusiasm she echoes her lover's far flung fervent metaphors. Almost her first words are: "Wenn wir ihn über dem Gemälde vernachlässigen, findet sich ja der Künstler am meisten gelobt. Wenn meine Freunde über sein Meisterstück mich ihn selbst übersehen macht, Vater, mussdas Gott nicht ergötzen?" (I, 3.) And, a little later in the same scene: "... wie das widerklang durch die ganze mitfreuende Welt ... ich sah keine Welt mehr, doch besinn ich mich, dass sie niemals so schön war. Ich wusste von keinem Gott mehr, und doch hatt ich ihn nie so geliebt."[1] (Ibid.) For her, as for Ferdinand, it would seem, her love is her life and, in the words of her lover, "der Faden zwischen mir und der Schöpfung." (II,5.) Yet, as tragedy between the lovers deepens, the metaphors she uses become curiously and incongruously slight. Already the anacreontic character of the images in which she describes death and grave to her father - "Der Ort ist zum Finden gemalt" - "ein holder, niedlicher Knabe, blühend.." causes one to suspect the seriousness of her resolve to die for the sake of her love. Stranger still are the suggestions she makes to her lover when they are left alone and the time of reckoning has come. "Wollen Sie mich akkompagnieren, Herr von Walter," - she asks, "so mach ich einen Gang auf dem Fortepiano." and: "Sie sind mir auch

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1. Significantly, she resorts to this type of imagery only once again: at the end of the conversation with Lady Milford in IV, 8. after her aside: "Ha! so könnt ich mir ja noch den Schein einer Heldin geben und meine Ohnmacht zu einem Verdienst aufputzen." These words serve to make the falseness of the following metaphors patent.

noch Revanche auf dem Schachbrett schuldig. Wollen wir eine Partie, Herr von Walter?" And, when this suggestion too meets with silence: Herr von Walter, die Brieftasche, die ich Ihnen einmal zu sticken versprochen - ich hab sie angefangen. - Wollen Sie das Dessin besehen?" (V,7.) These words, it is true, on the dramatic and psychological level find their explanation in the awkwardness of the immediate situation and in Luise's desire to alleviate the strain. Yet thus to limit their significance would be mistaken. However actual their reference here, these words form part of a poetic pattern which, at this point of the play, has gathered an absolute momentum of its own and animates them with its full imaginative force. Thrice, in one breath, Luise speaks of play where her own fate and that of Ferdinand is at stake. Could the poet be telling us, then, that Luise becomes a tragic figure because in some sense she too, like Fiesco and Posa, has been playing with life and fate?

In Wallenstein references to play and art abound. The fact has often been noted that the great general, when at long last he is introduced in person, should appear in the circle of his family, surrounded by an air of domesticity. This becomes the more remarkable in the light of what follows. For if the point of these introductory scenes has been to provide a foil for the man of action, this point has certainly been missed. The first scene given over to the portrayal of the soldier-politician, the scene with Terzky, shows the hero in a very dubious light. Throughout Terzky's speeches, words and phrases such as 'Spiel', 'Reden', 'Masken', 'zum Narren haben', 'zum besten haben', are used to describe Wallenstein's behaviour, in antithetical opposition to the 'Ernst' and 'Taten' demanded by the situation. Terzky's final words are: "So hast du stets dein Spiel mit uns getrieben!" (Pic., II,5.)

and this characterisation is borne out on every side. Questenberg opposes Wallenstein's "weise Kunst" to Gustav Adolf's "Tapferkeit", and speaks of the battles he gave, as "Kampfspiel" and 'Kriegsspiel" respectively (Pic., II,7.) The scenes in which Wallenstein's request for an oath of unconditional allegiance is realised, fairly resound with words such as "Gaukelkunst, Spiel, Spielchen, Spielzeug" etc. Octavio warns his son: "Man ... spielt aufs schändlichste mit dir und mit uns allen" (Pic., V, 1.), and later uses the same words when he is about to enlighten Buttler: "Ich fürchte, Oberst Buttler, man hat mit Euch ein schändlich Spiel getrieben." (Tod, II,6.) Such words do not merely characterise one phase of Wallenstein's career. They persist to the end of the tragedy, long after the stars have hardened his resolve to act; indeed, they are increasingly used to describe his relation to the stars. "ein eitles Spiel," Gräfin Terzky calls it, a "hohle Kunst", powerless to determine him "im Augenblicke der Entscheidung" (Tod, I, 7.). A statement such as this - and examples could be multiplied - by its emphasis on the idleness of Wallenstein's preoccupation with the stars, and on their failure effectively to determine him, endows the words Spiel and Kunst with a special significance. They do not merely mean the exercise of skill for a practical end. The words of Gräfin Terzky are echoed in the "dunkeln Künste", of which the Duchess speaks, (Tod., III,3.) and in the "Teufelskunst" attributed to Wallenstein by his murderer MacDonald. And the epithets the latter uses to describe the condition of Wallenstein - four in as many lines - vividly suggest that in this tragedy, too, we may expect to find that connection between art and play, and a state of rigidity which is familiar to us from Fiesco: Wallenstein is described as "fest, gefroren, mit der Teufelskunst behaftet

undurchdringlich." (Tod, V, 3.) Finally, there is Buttler's characterisation of the man, coming as it does, just before the catastrophe, his words oddly contrasting with the solemnity of the moment:

> Ein grosser Rechenkünstler war der Fürst.....
> Die Menschen wusst er, gleich des Brettspiels Steinen,
> Nach seinem Zweck zu setzen und zu schieben,
> Nicht Anstand nahm er, andrer Ehr und Würde
> Und guten Ruf zu würfeln und zu spielen.
> (Tod. IV, 8.)

It would be tedious to enumerate the many occasions on which Wallenstein himself uses words like Spiel and Kunst, and other words derived from the aesthetic sphere. He does make extensive use of them, in a variety of meanings, and in the most varied contexts, political, astrological and personal, and most of all perhaps in relation to his daughter. Suffice it to consider two of his statements; one which occurs at the end of the scene with Terzky in which for the first time we come face to face with the man of action and are made to wonder about the character of his activities; the other, made when at long last he finds himself trapped by necessity, and analyses those very activities in retrospect. The first statement runs:

> Der Kaiser, es ist wahr,
> Hat übel mich behandelt! - Wenn ich wollte,
> Ich könnt ihm recht viel Böses dafür tun.
> Es macht mir Freude, meine Macht zu kennen;
> Ob ich sie wirklich brauchen werde, davon,
> denk ich,
> Weisst du nicht mehr zu sagen als ein andrer.
> (Pic. II, 5.)

and it draws Terzky's exasperated reproof: "So hast du stets dein Spiel mit uns getrieben!" (ibid.) In the second passage Wallenstein considers his defection from the emperor which has now become a fact. It runs:

Beim grossen Gott des Himmels! Es war nicht
Mein Ernst, beschlossne Sache war es nie.
In dem Gedanken bloss gefiel ich mir;
Die Freiheit reizte mich und das Vermögen.
Wars unrecht, an dem Gaukelbilde mich
Der königlichen Hoffnung zu ergötzen?
Blieb in der Brust mir nicht der Wille frei.....

Do not these two passages voice an essentially aesthetic response? The idea of defection attracts Wallenstein, not for its results, but because of the state of heightened awareness it releases in him. Poised between two powerful pulls and determined by neither, he enjoys the sense of his full human potential, of his will as such, disengaged from any object of volition: the idea of himself as a being set free from constraint - "ein befreites Wesen", as Gordon says later in the play - induces a complex mental state, in which he is at once the contemplating subject and the object he contemplates; a condition perfectly expressed by the words "In dem Gedanken bloss gefiel ich mir." A little later in the same monologue, Wallenstein himself confirms the essentially contemplative character of his activity, by stressing its unpurposiveness:

Jetzt werden sie, was planlos ist geschehen,
Weitsehend, planvoll mir zusammen knüpfen...

And if further proof were needed, it is furnished by Wallenstein's reference to the "Gaukelbild der Königlichen Hoffnung." For these words refer back to those "sieben grosse Königsbilder" in the astrological tower which Thekla describes at the beginning of the tragedy, and to the opening scene of the final part, in which Wallenstein is shown sunk in their contemplation. What are these "Herrscher des Geschicks" (Tod., I,7.), which Wallenstein contemplates, but the outward projections of his inner powers?[1] And as for the activity to which contemplation

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1. This reading is supported by the 25th of the Ästhetische Briefe. Speaking of the rise of a
(continued next page)

seemingly gives rise - "Jetzt muss gehan - delt werden, schleunig, eh die Glücksgestalt mir wieder wegflieht überm Haupt" (Tod., I, 1.) - does it not remain strangely indeterminate, and unrelated to the actual decision demanded from Wallenstein a moment later?

The steady recurrence of an image pattern drawn from the aesthetic sphere, associated with the figure of the tragic hero, and constant in its significance, has been proved in the case of five of Schiller's tragedies. The same could easily be demonstrated for the rest. To clinch the point, however, it will only be necessary to examine one more play of Schiller's late dramatic period. For this purpose Die Braut von Messina suggests itself, in Schiller's own eyes the most purely tragic of his works. This drama has the advantage that through the utterances of the Chorus we gain direct access to its thematic structure. For unlike the dramatis personae themselves, the Chorus, in its function as commentator, acts as the poet's mouthpiece. Throughout the tragedy, the Chorus voices two main themes: the theme of beauty and the theme of change. From the chorus which immediately precedes the first entry of Isabella and her sons, it appears that the

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contemplative attitude towards the world, Schiller says: "Daher kein Wunder, wenn die uralten Dichtungen von dieser grossen Begebenheit im Innern des Menschen als von einer Revolution in der Aussenwelt reden und den Gedanken, der über die Zeitgesetze siegt, unter dem Bild des Zeus Versinnlichen, der das Reich des Saturnus endigt." (Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., X, p.365. ll. 15 ff.) It will be noted that Zeus, or Jupiter, "ein heitrer Mann mit einer Königsstirn" (Pic., III,4.) is the star of Wallenstein, and that at the beginning of the final part of the Trilogy Wallenstein feels ready to act because "Saturnus Reich ist aus."... and "Jupiter, der glänzende, regiert.." Internal evidence apart, the 25th letter leaves no doubt, that Schiller, in this crucial scene, is characterising a contemplative attitude and the contemplative nature of the activity engendered by it.

first of these themes, beauty, is equally associated with every member of the ruling family alike:

> Hoch auf des Lebens
> Gipfel gestellt,
> Schliesst sie blühend den Kreis des Schönen,
> Mit der Mutter und ihren Söhnen
> Krönt sich die herrlich vollendete Welt.

It becomes increasingly clear, however, from a number of indications that beauty is more specifically connected with Isabella and one of her two sons, Don Manuel. At the end of the introductory chorus the initial comprehensive reference to the mother and her sons is narrowed down by the introduction of a religious symbol:

> Höheres bildet
> Selber die Kunst nicht, die göttlich geborne,
> Als die Mutter mit ihrem Sohn.
> (I, 3.)

It might be thought that this limitation is coincidental to the religious allusion. That this is not so, however, becomes evident from the formal arrangement of the first act. For its main action is symmetrically flanked by two long choral reflections on the theme of beauty. Thus the action and the persons that principally figure in it, are brought within the purview of the thematic structure in which they are embedded. And the principal characters of the first act are Isabella, who in its opening scenes effects the reconciliation between her sons, and Don Manuel, whose love-story dominates its closing section. The suggestion that the theme of beauty is centered in these two characters, is borne out by the prevalence of aesthetic imagery in references made both about them and by them. Isabella is likened to a "Götterbild" by Don Cesar (II,5.), whilst Beatrice remembers her "göttliche Gestalt" (III,3.) - and recognises her with the words: "O schönes Engelsantlitz meiner Mutter!" (IV, 3.) Don Manuel is characterised by his sister as "schön wie ein

Gott", (II,1.), and this emphasis on his aesthetic aspect is borne out by Isabella and underlined by the contrast with Don Cesar.

> Wenn ich die Hand des Bruders freundlich drücke,
> Stoss ich den Stachel nicht in deine Brust?
>
> (I, 3.)

she asks Don Manuel, whilst her question to Don Cesar, though similar, is significantly modulated:

> Wenn ich das Herz an seinem Anblick weide,
> Ists nicht ein Raub an dir?
>
> (Ibid.)

Again, she urges Don Manuel:

> Wer unter diesen, die du Freunde nennst,
> Darf deinem Bruder sich zur Seite stellen?
>
> (I, 4.)

To Don Cesar she says, however:

> Wo ist ein edler Bild als deines Bruders?
>
> (Ibid.)

Taken singly, such points seem insignificant. It is by their repetition that they become meaningful, both by delineating the characters of Don Manuel and Isabella and the mutual relation between them, and by establishing their association with the thematics of the play. And indeed, this association is strengthened by the matter and manner of their own speeches which abound with aesthetic images and conceptions. To Isabella human endeavour is "Menschenkunst" (IV,1.). She reads the passion of her sons as "schöne Neigung" (IV,1.). The hermit whose counsel she seeks, looks down upon "das aufgelöste Spiel des Lebens" (IV, 1.); an image which is echoed and retrospectively illuminated when Don Cesar, faced with the tragic tangle of incest and its tragic solution, speaks of "unser furchtbar aufgelöstes Schicksal." (IV, 6.) To Isabella the bonds of friendship between her sons were to have been "schöne Bande", Don Cesar's love for

his brother "schöne Liebe" bearing "schöne Früchte" (IV,5.). And these nostalgic reflections are but an echo of her earlier hope of a life adorned with beauty: a hope held out to her in her dream vision - "ein Kind, wie Liebesgötter schön, sah ich im Grase spielen" (II,51), and voiced as the culminating plea to her sons:

> Der schönen Liebe sei das neue Leben,
> Der Eintracht, der Versöhnung sei's geweiht.
> (I, 4.)

This ideal of harmonious beauty has found its dramatic embodiment in the figure of Don Manuel and his idyll with Beatrice. The essentially aesthetic character of his relation to his betrothed - his sister - becomes patent from his last long speech in which he describes her bridal array. The loveliest materials, wrought into things of beauty by the craftsman's skill and the hand of art, are to reveal the supreme beauty of Beatrice's form. It is a picture of beauty enhancing beauty, of form enhancing form, of light illuminating light, with scarce a word to recall the dark regions of elemental forces and formless matter. And as the beauty of the Orient is displayed in its perfection, for everyone to see - "

> Denn fertig und vollendet findet sich
> Dies alles auf dem Bazar ausgestellt.
> (I, 7.)

so in turn it serves to display the perfect beauty of Beatrice, destined

> .... auf erhabnem Fussgestell des Ruhms
> Vor ganz Messina ausgestellt zu werden.
> (ibid.)

Image and verbal echo suggest alike that Don Manuel sees his bride as he sees the ornaments displayed in the bazaar, with an impersonal delight in pure appearance; in the inherent loveliness of the human material and the beauty of its sculptured form. "Das schöne Ganze", which his vision has wrought, for the reader, is no longer the person

Beatrice, but a pure design of colours and forms of which the human form is the compositional centre. The analogy which Schiller uses in the introduction to Die Braut von Messina to illuminate the way in which the tragedian composes his materials, might be used equally aptly to describe the word-picture wrought by the tragic hero: he composes in the same manner "wie der bildende Künstler die faltige Fülle der Gewänder um seine Figuren breitet, um die Räume seines Bildes reich und anmutig auszufüllen, um die getrennten Partien desselben in ruhigen Massen stetig zu verbinden, um der Farbe die das Auge reizt und erquickt, einen Spielraum zu geben, um die menschlichen Formen zugleich geistreich zu verhüllen und sichtbar zu machen...."[1] And indeed, the contemplative stillness which engenders Don Manuel's composition, is communicated to us through its form. The longest of his speeches - it occupies 46 lines, considerably more than his account of his first meeting with Beatrice - is almost wholly composed of nouns, adjectives and participial forms, with a bare minimum of verbs in their finite form. In strange contrast to its introductory words "Doch nur mit ihr werd ich beschäftigt sein", its syntax expresses the virtual cessation of activity; and the "ich" of the lover is lost in the disinterested contemplation of the object: until the end of the speech, the personal pronoun does not recur again. - The same stillness of contemplation characterises Don Manuel's relation to Beatrice taken as a whole.

> Versunken in dich selber stehst du da,
> Gleich einem Träumenden ....

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., XIV, p.9. ll.8 ff. For a discussion of the over-all aesthetic function of this verbal invocation of a plastic vision, see Chapter Three, p.271.

the Chorus says, in what are virtually the opening words of the scene. The first meeting between the lovers on the part of Don Manuel is characterised by the instantaneous standstill of all activity but that of seeing.

Bewegungslos starr ich das Wunder an,
Den Jagdspiess in der Hand, zum Wurf ausholend -
..... so stehn wir schweigend gegeneinander -
Wie lange Frist, das kann ich nicht ermessen,
Denn alles Mass der Zeiten war vergessen.

And that timelessness of the aesthetic experience familiar to us from Fiesco and Marquis Posa, is rendered in yet another simile, in which Don Manuel expresses his future happiness:

Das Morgen wird dem schönen Heute gleichen,
.....
Mein Glück wird sein gleichwie des Baches Fliessen,
Gleichwie der Sand des Stundenglases rinnt!
(I.7.)

In such timeless bliss Don Manuel would persist. The announcement of the incumbent removal of Beatrice from her refuge to him is a threat: for, as he explains to the Chorus:

Ein jeder Wechsel schreckt den Glücklichen.
(ibid.)

It is interesting that in the case of this character too, the endeavour to persist in a timeless and changeless aesthetic response is associated with that secretive reserve familiar to us from Marquis Posa. The Chorus's comments on this trait, voiced at the beginning of the scene, are echoed in Don Manuel's closing admonition:

Was ihr vernahmt,
Bewahrts in eures Busens tiefem Grunde,
Bis ich das Band gelöst von eurem Munde.
(ibid.)

And the same trait is confirmed by Isabella's characterisation of her son:

Der liebte
Von jeher, sich verborgen in sich selbst
Zu spinnen und den Ratschluss zu bewahren
Im unzugangbar fest verschlossenen Gemüt!
(II, 5.)

This description of Don Manuel recalls an image he uses in the attempt to justify his silence to the Chorus:

Geflügelt ist das Glück und schwer zu binden,
Nur in verschlossner Lade wirds bewahrt,
Das Schweigen ist zum Hüter ihm gesetzt,
Und rasch entfliegt es, wenn Geschwätzigkeit
Voreilig wagt, die Decke zu erheben.
(I, 7.)

Through this image and many others like it - Don Manuel speaks of his "verschwiegne Glück" twice in this scene and relates that he brought his bride "verborgen nach Messina" - this dramatic figure is drawn into the orbit of what is probably the most extensive image pattern of the play. This pattern, based on the words verborgen and verschlossen, is closely associated with the poetic symbol which dominates the play and permeates the texture of its language: the symbol of the volcano hiding in its depths "des Feuers verschlossner Gott" (IV, I.),"des Feuers eingepresste Glut"(I,1.). It is ultimately centered in the figure of Beatrice, "die lang Verborgne" (II, 5 and IV, 3), die Tiefverborgne (IV, 2.), "die Wohlverschlossne" (II,6.), whose exile lies "an verborgner Stätte" (II,5.), on the slopes of the volcano. This image pattern tells us of locked up elemental forces. Embodied in the figure of Beatrice, they break forth, kindling "heisse Liebesglut" (II,5.) in the brothers and engulfing "das ganze Haus in ungeheurer Feuerflut" (ibid.): a fate that is adumbrated in the dream of the old duke, and symbolically fulfilled in the action of the hermit. The association of this image pattern with the figure of Don Manuel bears out on the poetic plane of the tragedy, what his persistence in unchanging harmony has intimated on the psychological plane:

Don Manuel's fixed aesthetic response, like that of Fiesco and Posa, is founded on the secret repression of vital impulses. That this is so, is confirmed by the pronouncements of the Chorus which follow upon the revelation of his love. The timeless and changeless harmony they have just witnessed - "die Leere der Stunden", and "das ermüdende Gleichmass der Tage" - to the men of Messina signifies, not "ein lebendiges Leben", but stagnation: "das stockende Leben". (I,8.) It means the impoverishment and eventual atrophy of the vital functions of the human organism:

> Denn der Mensch verkümmert im Frieden,
> Müssige Ruh ist das Grab des Muts.
> (ibid.)

In the last resort, as the word 'Grab' intimates, it means death. Is not this verdict borne out by the death of Don Manuel, and made dramatically palpable by the protracted presence on the stage of his dead body?

In the preceeding sections of this chapter, a good deal has emerged as to the nature of the activity of Schiller's tragic heroes. Fiesco leads one conspiracy and consorts with the head of the other; Marquis Posa is at the same time the friend of Don Carlos and the King's confidant; and Wallenstein toys with the idea of defection from the Emperor without yet intending to throw in his lot with the enemy. In all these cases, the mainspring of such strange duplicity is the hero's delight in his own human potential rather than his desire for any definite achievement. As Wallenstein puts it: "Die Freiheit reizte mich und das Vermögen". And the indeterminacy and purposelessness of the mood is reflected in the inconclusiveness of the result. The hero's activities in the one direction are neutralized, and nullified, by his activities in the other. And what is true of these dramas, is equally true of the rest. When

Schiller's tragic heroes do eventually act, their action is as inconsequential, as fraught with contradiction, and in the last resort, as pointless as those we have discussed; and this is the result of seeking to embrace two incompatible courses simultaneously. Franz Moor, for example, his agnosticism shaken by Moser's faith in the immortality of the soul, utters the following prayer: "Höre mich beten, Gott im Himmel! - Es ist das erste Mal - soll auch gewiss nimmer wieder geschehen - Erhöre mich, Gott im Himmel!" (V, 1.) The self-contradictory character of this invocation is illuminated by the words that follow: "Mein doch! Was treibt Ihr? Das ist ja gottlos gebetet, "Daniel says to his master (ibid.). Again, Luise, torn between Heaven and Ferdinand, wants to die for the latter and yet not forfeit her salvation: "Ich will in den Fluss springen, Vater," - she announces - "Und im Heruntersinken Gott den Allmächtigen um Erbarmen bitten." (V, 1.) And here again, Miller's comment underscores the peculiar nature of this action. He replies: "Das heisst, du willst den Diebstahl bereuen, sobald du das Gestohlene in Sicherheit weisst." (ibid.) Indeed, Miller's words are more illuminating than Luise's. For the metaphor he uses echoes an image previously used by Luise herself with reference to her love for Ferdinand: "Mein Anspruch war Kirchenraub", she has told her lover, "und schauernd geb ich ihn auf" (III, 4.). By this formal link, the poet, through the mouth of Miller, defines the nature of Luise's action precisely. She wants to commit sacrilege, and yet not to commit sacrilege. Again, Elisabeth, in Maria Stuart, would both enjoy the full extent of her power and yet not commit herself to a policy of power; at the same time she would kill her rival and not kill her, a hope she expresses to Mortimer as follows:

Ich wollte die Gesetze handeln lassen,
Die eigne Hand vom Blute rein behalten.
(II, 5.)

And strangely enough, the same desire to combine the incompatible becomes perceptible in Johanna. No sooner has she become conscious of her love for Lionel, and therewith of the full range of the potentialities inherent in her personality, then she resorts to a course of action as self-contradictory as any:

Rette Dich!
Ich will nichts davon wissen, dass dein Leben
In meine Macht gegeben war.
(III, 10.)

she says to Lionel; and her unwillingness to be committed by the decision she takes, is expressed in a threefold fashion: by her desire not to know of it, by her use of the past tense which robs her action of its force and consequence, and by the pantomimic gesture that accompanies her words: she speaks to Lionel "Mit abgewandtem Gesicht".

The same inconclusiveness, which is revealed by such straightforward statements of intention is borne out, on the poetic level, by the imagery that is associated with the actions of the tragic heroes. To establish this point in detail, and in every case, would lead too far. A few examples must suffice. In this context the imagery of fire assumes a special importance. This image-pattern has already been encountered in several plays, notably in Fiesco, Don Carlos, and Die Braut von Messina, and each time it has been seen to be associated with vital human impulses and their repression. The peculiarly indeterminate and ineffectual character of the activity of the tragic hero is frequently expressed by images of fire locked up in the hero's breast. Thus King Phillip says to Marquis Posa:

Um dieser
Enthaltung willen, solche Meinungen,
Mit solchem Feuer doch umfasst, verschwiegen
Zu haben bis auf diesen Tag - um dieser
Bescheidnen Klugheit willen, junger Mann,
Will ich vergessen, dass ich sie erfahren,
Und wie ich sie erfahren.
(III, 10.)

and this assessment merely confirms what Posa has said of himself:

Meine Wünsche
Verwesen hier.
Die lächerliche Wut
Der Neuerung .....
Wird mein Blut nie erhitzen.
(III, 10.)

The King can suffer Posa in his realm, precisely because the vital impulses of the latter remain buried in his breast, and do not fire him into decisive action. The "Gedankenfreiheit" Posa demands, is an ambiguous thing. On the face of it, it signifies freedom <u>of</u> thought, but its fundamental meaning for Posa is freedom <u>in</u> thought: it is contemplated freedom. <u>Maria Stuart</u> characterizes Elisabeth by a similar image:

Weh Euch, wenn sie von Euren Taten einst
Den Ehrenmantel zieht, womit Ihr gleissend
Die wilde Glut verstohlner Lüste deckt.
(III,4.)

And here too the image, part of an extensive pattern, illuminates Elisabeth's inconclusive toying with her French suitor, with Leicester, and most of all with Maria herself. The same image recurs repeatedly in <u>Die Braut von Messina.</u> Reviewing her past actions, Isabella says to Diego:

Nichts Kleines war es, solche Heimlichkeit
Verhüllt zu tragen diese langen Jahre,
Den Mann zu täuschen, den umsichtigsten
Der Menschen, und ins Herz zurückzudrängen
Den Trieb des Bluts, der mächtig, wie des
Feuers
Verschlossner Gott, aus seinen Banden strebte!
(IV, 1.)

and the same thought is expressed when, at the opening of the tragedy, she says to her servant:

> Zu lange schon erstickt ich der Natur
> Gewaltge Regung....
> (I, 2.)

In both these statements Isabella is referring to her daughter, secretly rescued by her and yet kept hidden long after the death of the old duke. This curious half-heartedness is caused by the ambiguity of the dreams and oracles that heralded Beatrice's birth. She was to unite her brothers "in heisser Liebesglut", and she was to be a flame devouring all "in ungeheurer Feuerflut" (II,5.). She was to be at once a blessing and a curse. (IV,4.) Thus Isabella would have her live and yet not live; an inconclusiveness suggested on the dramatic level by her prolonged inactivity, but only fully revealed by linguistic means. For just as Isabella keeps her elemental impulses locked up and buried in her heart, so Beatrice, the child of her heart, as Isabella calls her, is locked up and buried in her place of exile." Verborgner war sie nicht im Schoss der Erde" Isabella assures her sons (II,6.); and the implication of this image becomes evident when, in another context, Beatrice's refuge is described as "des Lebens Grab" (I,7.).

Thus the actions of Schiller's tragic heroes evince that ineffectualness and purposelessness which we had found to be associated with the activity of Fiesco and Marquis Posa. Poised between two powerful pulls, they let themselves be determined by neither. Instead, they persist in the awareness of the differing, and incompatible, potentialities open to them, and in the sense of freedom and integrity that such contemplation affords them. The examination of the mode of action of the tragic heroes would thus seem to confirm, what the investigation of the

principal dramatic motifs and image patterns has suggested: that Schiller is at pains to depict, in the figure of the tragic hero, a quasi-contemplative response to life. Not, of course, that this response is genuine, any more than it is in the case of Fiesco and Marquis Posa. The very fact that it is a fixed response, extended to all manner of situations challenging the personality in all manner of ways, throws into relief its inherent falseness. And indeed, the imagery of fire which has just been discussed, leaves no doubt as to the inner repression of vital impulses on which the static balance of the tragic hero is inevitably based. This repression, suggested by the imagery on the poetic plane and reflected on the level of the outward plot in the drift of the tragic hero towards political tyranny, is finally confirmed by his psychological development. His freedom and aesthetic distance, so carefully cultivated, break down, and long suppressed elemental impulses surge up in all their primitive violence. One need only think of Franz Moor's and Luise's terror at the hour of reckoning, of the naked power instincts displayed by Wallenstein when confronted by Max's insurgent troops, and by Elisabeth when face to face with her helpless rival, of Johanna's sudden passion, of Isabella's unbridled invectives against the gods, and of the murder Demetrius commits to prevent the secret of his birth from leaking out. And as the psychological integrity and totality of the tragic hero prove to be an illusion, so also does his freedom from determination prove to be a figment of his mind. Without his knowledge, his deeper impulses have in fact long determined him. Wallenstein expresses his realisation when he says:

Blieb in der Brust mir nicht der Wille frei
Und sah ich nicht den guten Weg zur Seite,
Der mir die Rückkehr offen stets bewahrte?
Wohin denn seh ich plötzlich mich geführt?
Bahnlos liegts hinter mir, und eine Mauer
Aus meinen eignen Werken baut sich auf,
Die mir die Umkehr türmend hemmt!

(Tod. I, 4.)

From the beginning of the tragedy Luise's course is determined by her attachment to her father, an attachment so insoluble that the freedom of choice she protests to her lover and Lady Milford becomes but a vain pretence. (III,4, and IV, 7.). From the outset, this compulsion, of which the heroine is only dimly aware, is clearly revealed to the reader by means of imagery. Images used independently and repeatedly by Ferdinand, Miller and Luise herself, concur in suggesting that Miller's child belongs to her father in the way in which money belongs to its owner, even as the Landeskinder belong to the Landesvater and are treated by him as saleable property. Thus when Luise says at the beginning of the tragedy: "Ich will ja nur wenig - an ihn denken - das kostet ja nichts" (I,3.), the poet reveals at one stroke her tragic inability to give herself to her lover, and the cause of this failure: except in thought, Louise is not free to dispose of her wealth, for she is wholly possessed by her father. So, too, Elisabeth is determined without knowing it by that "wilde Glut verstohlner Lüste" (III,4.) which Maria uncovers as her secret motive force. For it is by playing on her feminine desires that Leicester entices her to encounter Maria; an act which in Elisabeth's own view commits her to nothing, but which in fact determines her course. Again, long before Johanna's determination by her vital impulses becomes manifest, it is betrayed in the excess of her religious zeal, an excess which leads her to overstep her appointed task and kill her opponents in battle, to defy the warning

words of the Black Knight and, finally, into the fatal encounter with Lionel. - Isabella's course is determined from the moment she saves the life of her child. In rescuing Beatrice, she has preserved an elemental force which is both a blessing and a curse, a force of life and a force of destruction as the oracles insist, and above all one which cannot indefinitely be kept imprisoned. Demetrius, finally, conscious only of his freedom, and the freedom he would restore to his native land, from the beginning is determined by those dark power impulses that lead him out of his monastic seclusion onto the throne, and eventually turn him into a despot.

This real determination of the tragic hero, however, for the most part remains concealed. The majority of tragic heroes do not become conscious of the motive forces that do in fact determine them; these are brought to the reader's notice principally by the imagery that connects the two protagonists. From these imagistic connections it emerges that the tragic antagonist is the externalisation or dramatic embodiment of those elemental impulses which in the tragic hero himself are kept in suppression, just as, conversely, the tragic hero is the dramatic embodiment of the intellectual functions which are suppressed in his antagonist. This mode of interrelation between the principal figures of Schiller's tragedies, and the poetic technique employed in its presentation, has been exhaustively discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. To repeat the demonstration tragedy by tragedy, would be as lengthy an undertaking as it is superfluous, since the poetic technique remains substantially unchanged. Moreover, enough has emerged with regard to the poetic materials and their organisation in at least some dramas, to establish

the point in these works beyond reasonable doubt. - As has been seen, the figures of Marquis Posa, Elisabeth of England, and Isabella and Don Manuel are associated with images of suppressed and hidden fire. Analogously, their antagonists are associated with images of open conflagration; and these images are reinforced by a host of more literal references, from every side, to their fiery character, and indeed, by that character itself as it is gradually revealed in action. - Both Lerma and the Prince himself testify to Carlos' "heisse Blut" (I,6. and II,2.), and this characterisation is supported by a great number of stage-directions. But it is chiefly in respect of his passion for Elisabeth, that Don Carlos becomes associated with imagery of fire, indeed becomes the focal point of this extensive image-pattern. The feverish flush which Marquis Posa, at their first meeting, observes on his friend's face, is the outward mark of the passion which consumes the Prince. "Ein entsetzliches Geheimnis brennt auf meiner Brust" (I,2.) Carlos confesses to his friend, and later in the same scene:

Acht höllenbange Monde sind es schon,
.....
Dass dieses Feur in meinem Busen wütet..(ibid.)

and the image-pattern that announces itself here, in the exposition, continues to be associated with Carlos' passion throughout the course of the tragedy. Posa describes Carlos' renewed request to speak to his mother as "dieser neue Fiebertraum" (II,15.), and in his last conversation with the Queen, looking back upon the events of the intervening time, refers to Carlos' disastrous passion as to "dieser hoffnungslosen Flamme" (IV, 21.). And Carlos himself rounds off the pattern when, in his final encounter with the Queen, he says:

Fürchten
Sie keine Wallung mehr von mir. Es ist
Vorbei. Ein reines Feuer hat mein Wesen
Geläutert.
(V, 11.)

Similarly, Maria is the evident centre of the vast network of images connected with fire that extends throughout the tragedy. In a letter to Goethe, Schiller outlines Maria's character and function in the tragedy in the following words: "Ihr Schicksal ist nur heftige Passionen zu erfahren und zu entzünden".[1] And indeed, the play bears out this description. Inflammatory herself, she inflames all around her. Kennedy describes Maria's passion for Bothwell as "der Wahnsinn blinder Liebesglut" (I, 4.) and this passion, throughout this important expositional scene, is described in terms of fire. Bothwell is "Der Schreckliche, der Euch ... erhitzte"; Maria's cheeks

sonst der Sitz
Schamhaft errötender Bescheidenheit,
Sie glühten nur vom Feuer des Verlangens.
(I,4.)[2]

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1. 18th June 1799, ed. cit., vol.VI, pp.45 f.

2. Altogether, Kennedy's speech is interesting for the way in which it depicts the rise of Maria's passion and its gradual subjugation of the "higher" intellectual functions. This process is portrayed by the extensive employment of synekdoche. Passion weaves a "Band" around Maria's "hellen Sinne". She has "Kein Ohr mehr für der Freundin Warnungsstimme, Kein Aug für das, was wohlanständig war". Modesty flees from her cheeks, aglow with the fire of desire; finally she displays her shame, "Mit dreister Stirne". Maria quite literally "loses her head", and it is not too much to say that these words foreshadow her final fate, for throughout the play, and especially when the question of her life or death is at issue, Maria is synekdochically described as "Dies königliche Haupt". Thus, by this speech, the personal and the political become interwoven, and this is borne out by the fact that without any transition Kennedy goes on to describe

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Friend and enemy concur in this characterisation of Maria. Burleigh calls her

> Die Ate dieses ewgen Kriegs, die mit
> Der Liebesfackel dieses Reich entzündet.
> (II,3.)

He counters Maria's confession that she had wished to reconcile Scotland and England, with the words:

> Auf schlimmem Weg verfolgtet Ihr dies Ziel,
> Da Ihr das Reich entzünden, durch die Flammen
> Des Bürgerkriegs zum Throne steigen wolltet.
> (I,7.)

These descriptions - and they could be multiplied - are borne out by Maria's behaviour. Confronted with the fatal interview with her rival she says:

> Nichts lebt in mir in diesem Augenblick
> Als meiner Leiden brennendes Gefühl
> (III, 4.)

A little later in the same scene she likens herself to fire and Elisabeth to water; and this characterization assumes objective significance through the fact that it is independently corroborated by the words of Leicester. In the preceeding act he incites Elisabeth to go and see her rival and argues that nothing will hurt Maria more

> als sich
> Von deinen Reizen ausgelöscht zu sehn.
> (II,9.)

The final words of affront that seal Maria's doom are spoken by her "von Zorn glühend" (III,4.) - an eloquent contrast to the smouldering fire she accuses Elisabeth of hiding in her breast! In the ensuing scene with Mortimer, full of images of fire, we actually witness the flame of her passion spreading to her rescuer and incensing him as she had been incensed before.

(continued from previous page)
the political outrage Maria committed: she takes her lover to Parliament and forces the judges to acquit the murderer "Im eignen Tempel der Gerechtigkeit".

A good deal has already been said about the central association of Beatrice with the imagery of fire that pervades Die Braut von Messina. It will suffice here to recall that both the dream of her father and the oracle given to her mother concur in stressing the inflammatory nature of her being, and that what is prophetically foreshadowed is borne out by the action of the tragedy. For Beatrice inflames both her brothers with the fire of her own being and engulfs her family in destruction.

Such imagistic links suggest a close interconnection between the tragic protagonists. How close, may be gathered from the precision with which the imagery associated with each of them interlocks: the tragic heroes seek to suppress the fire deep down inside them and to keep it imprisoned there. That inner restraint, in the case of their opponents, becomes a palpable dramatic reality. They are imprisoned, in fact or metaphorically - Carlos describes himself as a

Gefangner
Auf diesem Grund, wo ich einst Herr sein werde
(II,2.)

Maria is described as "lebendig eingemauert" (I,1.), and Beatrice repeatedly as "die Wohlverschlossene" (II,6.): - and their's is a flame that will out. Carlos' first intimation of his love "ein entsetzliches Geheimnis brennt auf meiner Brust" is immediately followed by the words "es soll, es soll heraus" (I,2.). Analogously, Kennedy's defence of Maria

Zum Freveln fesseln sie zu enge Bande

is countered by Paulet's

Doch wusste sie aus diesen engen Banden
Den Arm zu strecken in die Welt, die Fackel
Des Bürgerkrieges in das Reich zu schleudern...
(I,1.)

and a similar image, again from Paulet's lips, concludes

the opening scene of the drama:

Kein Eisengitter schützt vor ihrer List
Weiss ich, ob diese Stäbe nicht durchfeilt,
Nicht dieses Zimmers Boden, diese Wände,
Von aussen fest, nicht hohl von innen sind
Und den Verrat einlassen, wenn ich schlafe.

Such images of eruptive forces breaking out of their imprisonment recur throughout the tragedy, in the closest association with the figure of Maria, who herself takes them up in the confession scene and endows them with a heightened significance. What has been the symbol of her passion now becomes the symbol of her faith. Fired by the faith of her fellow-believers, it transcends all earthly fetters:

Da wird die Glut zur Flamme, und beflügelt
Schwingt sich der Geist in alle Himmel auf.
(V, 7.)

And the concluding image of the first scene is echoed, and transfigured, in the simile Maria finds to describe the final liberation of her soul:

wie den Apostel einst
Der Engel führte aus des Kerkers Banden,
Ihn hält kein Riegel, keines Hüters Schwert,
Er schreitet mächtig durch verschlossne Pforten,
Und im Gefängnis steht er glänzend da -
So überrascht mich hier der Himmelsbote,
Da jeder irdsche Retter mich getäuscht!
(V,7.)

And so again Beatrice, actually and metaphorically, breaks out of the confinement in which she is held. Twice does she actually leave her place of hiding, driven "mit mächtgem Drang,"by "die Macht des Bluts", (II,1 and 6.) and it is on these occasions that Don Cesar, "der Jüngling mit dem Flammenauge" (II,1.), finds and re-discovers her. The deeper significance of these actions is pointed by Diego. Recalling her presence at her Father's funeral, Diego concludes that it was there that she was espied by her robber:

Denn ihrer Schönheit Glanz birgt keine Hülle.
(II,6.)

But it is by the images she herself uses to describe her relation to Don Manuel, that the irrepressible, eruptive nature of her being is best expressed:

Den Schleier zerriss ich
Jungfräulicher Zucht,
Die Pforten durchbrach ich der heiligen Zelle -
(II,1.)

and, a little later in the same scene:

Vergib, du Herrliche, die mich geboren,
Dass ich ... mir eigenmächtig mein Geschick erkoren-
Nicht frei erwählt ichs, es hat mich gefunden;
Eindringt der Gott auch zu verschlossnen Toren,
Zu Perseus' Turm hat er den Weg gefunden,
Dem Dämon ist sein Opfer unverloren.
(ibid.)

Does such interlacing imagery not lead us to infer that Don Carlos, Maria Stuart and Beatrice, striving to escape from imprisonment, embody, in a separate being, those elemental forces within the tragic hero which he would keep in perpetual suppression? Indeed, the connection between the protagonists extends still further. Their interdependence is such as to suggest that they are the parts of one spiritual whole, of one person. The denial, on the part of the tragic hero, of the vital spark within him constitutes a threat to the life of his antagonist. And here again the imagery serves to point the inner connection.

Ich bin nur noch der Schatten der Maria
(III,4.)

Maria Stuart says to her rival, shortly before she accuses the latter of smothering within her "die wilde Glut verstohlner Lüste" (III,4.); and similarly, as Isabella's vital impulses smoulder in the depth of her soul, all but stifled, - Beatrice leads a life that is a living death.

Und so erwuchs ich still am stillen Orte,
In Lebens Glut den Schatten beigesellt.
(II,1.)

And when Don Carlos pleads with his Father:

Mein Hiersein
Ist Atemholen unter Henkershand-
Schwer liegt der Himmel zu Madrid auf mir
Wie das Bewusstsein eines Mords
(II,2.)

the image of heavy oppression and death which he uses, links his predicament, not only with his Father's despotic rule, but more intimately with Posa's endeavour to suppress his deeper life. - The reciprocal nature of this dependence is illuminated by words such as those spoken by Shrewsbury, when he has failed to save Maria's life:

Ich habe deinen edlern Teil
nicht retten können -
(V,15.)

he says to Elisabeth. She had maimed her own life by murdering her rival; a spiritual dependence of which Maria too shows herself conscious, when she warns her "sister": "Ehrt in mir Euch selbst." (III,4.) In Die Braut von Messina, the mutual dependence of the protagonists upon one another has found expression in the imagistic conception of the members of the ruling family as members of one organism: the life of each depends upon the life of the other. And indeed, this conception is borne out by the action: for Don Cesar's murder of his brother means his own suicide.

The protagonists in the rest of Schiller's tragedies are related in precisely the same fashion. Karl Moor, Ferdinand, Max Piccolomini, Queen Isabeau, and Romanov, like Leonore in Fiesco, Don Carlos, Maria Stuart, Beatrice and Don Cesar - they all embody in separate dramatic figures those vital impulses which the tragic hero, intent on persisting in contemplative indeterminacy, keeps in

perpetual suppression. And it is through these figures that the motive forces which, concealed from the consciousness of the tragic hero though they be, do in fact determine him, become patent and are brought to the reader's notice. These characters are as fully determinate as the tragic heroes appear to be free. Rash and fiery of temperament, they soon find themselves in the thick of an emotional predicament, and are propelled towards catastrophe by the relentless logic of the outward situation and their own passions. So strong are the impulses by which they are determined, that they do not realise that they have chosen, and what they have chosen, until long after they are irretrieveably committed by their choice, and that they do not become aware of the splendour of their human heritage until after they have lost it.

To reveal the profoundly determinate character of these figures, Schiller has used a variety of means, dramatic, psychological and poetic. Of these, certain image patterns associated with the ~~pro~~antagonists are most interesting in the present context; for they illuminate yet more sharply the poetic connection between the tragic protagonists. Just as the attempt of the tragic hero to remain in a state of aesthetic indeterminacy finds expression in the imagery of sight, of altitude and in the expansive character of the scenic background associated with him, so the determinacy of his opponent is poetically realised by his association with imagery of blindness, of depth, and by the extreme constriction of the scenic background against which he is placed. Karl Moor, for instance, begins his catastrophic course with the words: "Siehe, da fällts wie der Star von meinen Augen, was für ein Tor ich war, dass ich ins Käficht zurückwollte!" (I,2.) His lawless roamings end in the voluntary acceptance of

imprisonment, and in the recognition that when he thought he saw, he had in fact been blind. He dissociates himself from his fellows, saying: "Toren ihr! Zu ewiger Blindheit verdammt! Meinet ihr wohl gar, eine Todsünde werde das Äquivalent einer Todsünde sein? Meinet ihr, die Harmonie der Welt werde durch diesen gottlosen Misslaut gewinnen?" (V, 2.) Again, Don Carlos' headless passion leads him into blindness, humiliation and imprisonment. At the nadir of his career, this state becomes a palpable theatrical reality. Marquis Posa finds him in his prison "an einem Tische sitzend, den Kopf vorwärts auf die Arme gelegt, als wenn er schlummerte." The transliteral significance of this stage direction emerges at the end of this scene. His confusion dispelled by Posa's explanations, Carlos exclaims - and the stage direction reads "wie aus einem Traume erwacht" - : "Ha! Nun endlich! Jetzt seh ich - jetzt wird alles Licht"(V, 1.). The concrete and the metaphorical interact, as so often with Schiller, and together produce the symbolical. The blindness, however, which Carlos evinces in his relation to his friend, is only part of a more enveloping blindness: the blindness of his passion. While he loves he is thus afflicted and it is only when his passion is spent that he begins to see. Early on in the drama Posa had likened his friend's infatuation to a "Fiebertraum" (II,15.). In the last scene of the play Carlos cuts short the Queen's avowal of her love with the words:

> Vollenden Sie nicht, Königin - Ich habe
> In einem langen, schweren Traum gelegen.
> Ich liebte - Jetzt bin ich erwacht.....
> (V,11.)

Throughout the decisive discussion between the Piccolomini, which concludes the second part of the trilogy, Octavio uses the metaphor of blindness to describe his son's passionate entanglement with Thekla. He introduces the

revelations he is about to make to his son with the following words:

> Viel noch hast du
> Von mir zu hören, Freund, hast Jahre lang
> Gelebt in unbegreiflicher Verblendung.
> Das schwärzeste Komplott entspinnet sich
> Vor deinen Augen, eine Macht der Hölle
> Umnebelt deiner Sinne hellen Tag -
> Ich darf nicht länger schweigen, muss die Binde
> Von deinen Augen nehmen.
> (Pic. V, 1.)

And, interrupted by Max, he continues:

> So ernsten Grund du hast, dies Licht zu fliehn,
> So dringendern hab ich, dass ich dirs gebe.
> (ibid.)

Max' indignant rejection of the suggestion that Thekla is a bait held out to him by Wallenstein, Octavio counters with the words:

> O! öffne doch die Augen!
> (ibid.)

And finally he exclaims:

> ..... einen
> Verblendeten entdeck ich, den zwei Augen
> Zum Toren machten, Leidenschaft umnebelt,
> Den selbst des Tages volles Licht nicht heilt.
> (Pic. V, 3.)

Max himself confirms that Octavio has spoken truly. His passion blinds him, even when he has made the decision to obey his duty. Despairingly, he cries:

> In mir ist Nacht, ich weiss das Rechte nicht zu wählen.
> O wohl, wohl hast du wahr geredet, Vater....
> (Tod. III,21.)

And in this tragedy too, the inner impasse into which his passionate nature has led him has found its reflection in the outward circumstances of his death. Max and his Pappenheimer are killed surrounded on all sides by the enemy:

> Nicht vorwärts konnten sie, auch nicht zurück,
> Gekeilt in drangvoll fürchterlicher Enge.
> (Tod, IV, 10.)

The same sense of utter constriction is voiced by Thekla:

> Nicht Ruhe find ich, bis ich diesen Mauern
> Entrunnen bin-sie stürzen auf mich ein -
> ..... Was ist das für ein Gefühl!
> Es füllen sich mir alle Räume dieses Hauses
> Mit bleichen, hohlen Geisterbildern an -
> Ich habe keinen Platz mehr - Immer neue!
> Es drängt mich das entsetzliche Gewimmel
> Aus diesen Wänden fort, die Lebende!
>
> (Tod, IV, 11.)

By its repetition, and its transposition on to the plane of imaginative experience, the outward setting of Max' death assumes a significance which transcends the merely local and concrete. And yet another feature of Max' death deserves attention: its lowliness. He is thrown off his horse, the messenger relates,

> Und hoch weg über ihn geht die Gewalt
> Der Rosse.....
>
> (IV, 10.)

and here again, Thekla invests the real and accidental with a deeper symbolical meaning:

> - Da kommt das Schicksal-Roh und kalt
> Fasst es des Freundes zärtliche Gestalt
> Und wirft ihn unter den Hufschlag seiner Pferde -
> - Das ist das Los des Schönen auf der Erde!
>
> (V, 12.)

To reveal their full meaning, however, these passages must be read in conjunction with Wallenstein's dream, related earlier on in the tragedy and quoted once before in a different connection.

> Und mitten in die Schlacht ward ich geführt
> Im Geist. Gross war der Drang. Mir tötete
> Ein Schuss das Pferd, ich sank, und über mir
> Hinweg, gleichgültig, setzten Ross und Reiter,
> Und keuchend lag ich, wie ein Sterbender,
> Zertreten unter ihrer Hufe Schlag.
>
> (Tod, II,3.)

Wallenstein's nightmare is the fate Max suffers in reality. Does not this formal connection suggest that Max is the dramatic embodiment of the unconscious levels of Wallenstein's

personality? And does it not illuminate the contrast between Wallenstein's conscious endeavour to interpolate aesthetic distance between himself and the elemental forces within and without, and Max' humble surrender to these forces? Again, Maria Stuart is throughout the play associated with imagery of blindness, of depth and of extreme confinement. And so intertwined are these imagistic strands in the poet's imagination, that they are frequently gathered up into one complex metaphor. This is the case, for instance, in the words Shrewsbury addresses to Elisabeth:

> Reich ihr die Hand, der Tiefgefallenen;
> Wie eines Engels Lichterscheinung steige
> In ihres Kerkers Gräbernacht hinab -
>
> (II, 4.)

and in Maria's own words at the beginning of the third act:

> Bin ich dem finstern Gefängnis entstiegen
> Hält sie mich nicht mehr, die traurige Gruft?
>
> (III,1.)

With the exception of this act, the action, in so far as it is centred in Maria, takes place in the confined space of her prison,and as the play draws on, this dramatic fact is so interwoven with the fabric of the poetry, that it becomes invested with a more than factual, a poetic meaning. - Again, the depth to which Maria has sunk, is brought home by the combined means of imagery and palpable fact. Maria calls herself "den tiefstgesunkenen" [Menschen]; Elisabeth asks:

> Wer war es denn, der eine Tiefgebeugte
> Mir angekündigt?
>
> (III,4.)

and Maria's reply ends in the words:

> ich will vor ihr mich niederwerfen,
> Die mich in diese Schmach herunterstiess.
>
> (ibid.)

A host of similar images and references combine to create the impression that Maria dwells in a subterranean abode -

surely an invention of the poet? - in a realm below that in which Elisabeth resides. And indeed, the contrast - and the underlying connection - between her situation and that of the tragic heroine is illuminated by the words of Leicester:

> Stehst du nicht blühend da in Jugendkraft,
> Welkt jene nicht mit jedem Tag zum Grabe?
> Bei Gott! Du wirst, ich hoffs, noch viele Jahre
> Auf ihrem Grabe wandeln, ohne dass
> Du selber sie hinabzustürzen brauchtest -
> (II,3.)

In the light of such passages even the staging of Maria's death - her execution takes place below ground, beneath the feet of the terrified Leicester - must be judged to signify something more than Schiller's taste for the cruel and horrific.[1] - Maria's blindness is emphasised by Kennedy in the exposition of the action:

> ergriffen
> Hatt' euch der Wahnsinn blinder Liebesglut
> (I,4.)

Kennedy says, describing the Queen's passion for Bothwell, and:

> Alle Geister der Verdammnis
> Musst er zu Hilfe rufen, der dies Band
> Um Eure hellen Sinne wob.
> (ibid.)

And this judgment is independently confirmed by Shrewsbury's words:

> Geblendet ward sie von der Laster Glanz.
> (II,3.)

In a similar fashion, the antagonists in the remaining tragedies could be shown in their association with the image patterns of blindness, depth and constriction; one need only think of the description of Beatrice's prison-like seclusion -

> Verborgner war sie nicht im Schoss der Erde
> (II,6.)

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1. Cf.e.g.H.Cysarz, op.cit., p.337,who writes: Der Schlussaufzug der Stuart ist dem Areopag so nahe wie

(continued next page)

and of Demetrius' incarceration of his rival Romanov; but the preceding illustrations have sufficiently shown the point.

Thus, the tragic protagonists are equally one-sided. The predominance of the intellectual functions in the one is matched by the predominance of the instinctual functions in the other; as the tragic hero denies his determinacy, so his antagonist denies his freedom. In this tragic one-sidedness neither character can persist; and the interlocking of the imagery connected with each suggests that his own fate will be decided by his acceptance or rejection of his opponent. For his opponent is but the external embodiment of that aspect within himself which he has denied. Thus, in the act of accepting the other, each reaffirms and accepts the 'other' in himself: the outward reconciliation is a symbolic token of an inner process of integration, of the catharsis that takes place within the individual.

The tragic hero, then, achieves the re-integration of his personality by the conscious acceptance of his elemental impulses. He accepts himself as a part of nature, determined by natural laws. This acceptance is poetically realised through the eventual association of the tragic hero with the imagery of blindness, depth and constriction which is primarily centered in his opponent and marks the natural bondage of the latter. This association may be more or less explicit. Sometimes, it is effected by an action of the tragic hero or a change of outer circumstance. These, however, are so closely woven into the verbal fabric of the play that they themselves become charged with a more than local and literal significance. Thus for example,

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dem Grand Guignol: oben Gebet und Sakrament, Abschied und Himmelfahrt; unten wird das Schafott gezimmert; und schliesslich muss Leicester die Zuschauer auch noch zu Ohrenzeugen des Scharfrichters machen.

we witness acts of profound symbolic import, when Marquis Posa goes to join Don Carlos in prison, knowing that Phillip's bullet will find him there; or when he draws his friend down by his side, saying:

> Komm, lass uns niedersitzen -
> Ich fühle mich erschöpft und matt.
> (V, 3.)

Is this the Posa who formerly had renounced

> Die lächerliche Wut
> Der Neuerung, die nur der Ketten Last,
> Die sie nicht ganz zerbrechen kann, vergrössert,
> (III,10.)

who had rested satisfied in the contemplation of freedom because realisation inevitably meant limitation? And is this the Posa who visualised himself keeping vigil[1] for his friends, themselves oblivious of the surrounding dangers? These are the actions of a man who is conscious that he has released forces beyond the control of his intellect and will, and who is at peace in his acceptance of these forces. Similarly, Wallenstein's acceptance of those forces which formerly he had sought to subjugate, has found poetic expression through the symbols of decline and prison. His last words are words of surrender:

> Gute Nacht, Gordon!
> Ich denke einen langen Schlaf zu tun,
> Denn dieser letzten Tage Qual war gross.
> Sorgt, dass sie nicht zu zeitig mich erwecken.
> (V, 5.)

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1. He seeks to allay the Queen's apprehensions saying:

> ..... Die Gefahr
> Mag auf-und untergehen um Sie her,
> Sie sollens nie erfahren. Alles dies
> Ist ja nicht so viel wert, den goldnen Schlaf
> Von eines Engels Stirne zu verjagen. (IV, 3.)

Similarly, he justifies his reticence towards Carlos with the words:

> Warum
> Dem Schlafenden die Wetterwolke zeigen,
> Die über seinem Scheitel hängt? - Genug,
> Dass ich sie still an dir vorüberführe,
> Und, wenn du aufwachst, heller Himmel ist. (IV, 6.)

That Wallenstein's career ends in the fortress of Eger, is of course a historical fact. In the hands of the poet, however, it becomes more than that. For by stressing the prison associations of Wallenstein's last abode[1] and by thus relating it to an already well established image pattern, Schiller incorporates it into the imagistic structure of the tragedy and endows it with poetic potency. Moreover, the symbolic significance of this setting, and the specific nature of Wallenstein's reaction to it are brought out by means of contrast and parallel: for Wallenstein's acquiescence in the constraint of a situation into which his own actions have led him, is thrown into relief by the astrologer's panic and the claustrophobiac nightmare of his sister; on the other hand, it recalls the submission of Max and Thekla when, hemmed in by adverse forces on all sides, they accept inevitable death. By this formal link - and it is one of many - the tragic hero, in the end, comes to be invested with that integrity and wholeness which we associate with the lovers.

And so, too, Johanna's acceptance of her natural bondage has found poetic expression through the symbols of decline and imprisonment. In the utmost humiliation, driven by physical need, she returns to just those "niedern Hütten" from which she had issued. (V, 1-3.) And she, like Wallenstein and Posa, permits herself supinely to be imprisoned. The same Johanna who had called herself "die Jungfrau", or even "der Retter" (prolog 3.), who had voiced her indignation at her suitors, saying:

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1. Cf. e.g. Gordon's: Er selber hat dies Schloss mir anvertraut,
Das ich in seinen Kerker soll verwandeln. (Tod. IV,2)
and the opening monologue of Act IV; its first words are "Er ist herein". (Tod, IV,1); also the words of the Countess Terzky: ....schwer ist mir das Hez in diesen Mauern,
Und wie ein Totenkeller haucht michs an,..(Tod. IV.9.)

Und ihr erblickt in mir nichts als ein Weib
(III,4.)

has now come to acknowledge the limitations of her sex:

Erschreckt dich ein gefesselt Weib?
(V, 10.)

she asks of Fastolf, and later she reiterates:

Und ich bin nichts als ein gefesselt Weib!
(V,11.)

The anguish of her confined spirit is epitomized in her final prayer:

Leicht ist es deiner Allmacht, ehrne Bande
In dünnes Spinngewebe zu verwandeln -
Du willst, und diese Ketten fallen ab,
Und diese Turmwand spaltet sich - du halfst
Dem Simson, da er blind war und gefesselt
Und seiner stolzen Feinde bittern Spott
Erdultete. - Auf dich vertrauend fasst' er
Die Pfosten seines Kerkers mächtig an
Und neigte sich und stürzte das Gebäude -
(V, 11.)

The metaphorical reference to Samson's blindness is borne of Johanna's own immediate situation. The warring elements within her once released, her vision fails her.

Kein Gott erscheint, kein Engel zeigt sich mehr
Die Wunder ruhn, der Himmel ist verschlossen
(V, 6.)

she laments as she is led to her prison. And when she is shut in the windowless tower, the intensity of her wish to see underlines the more strongly her actual blindness. Impatient of the watchman's inability to make out the course of the battle, she cries:

Hätt er <u>mein</u> Auge oder stünd ich oben,
Das Kleinste nicht entginge meinem Blick!
Das wilde Huhn kann ich im Fluge zählen,
Den Falk erkenn ich in den höchsten Lüften
(V,11.)

and then again:

Könnt ich nur durch der Mauer Ritze schauen,
Mit meinem Blick wollt ich die Schlacht regieren!
(<u>ibid</u>.)

And indeed, the same blindness which Johanna here experiences, overtakes Wallenstein and Marquis Posa when eventually their aesthetic distance breaks down, and long repressed feelings and vital impulses well up, clouding their consciousness. Deeply stirred by the death of Max, Wallenstein is unable to discern the star that had been the token of his contemplative remoteness from the world. Looking into the night, he muses:

> Am Himmel ist geschäftige Bewegung,
> Des Turmes Fahne jagt der Wind, schnell geht
> Der Wolkenzug, die Mondessichel wankt,
> Und durch die Nacht zuckt ungewisse Helle.
> - Kein Sternbild ist zu sehn! Der matte Schein dort,
> Der einzelne, ist aus der Kassiopeia,
> Und dahin steht der Jupiter - Doch jetzt
> Weckt ihn die Schwärze des Gewitterhimmels
> .....
> Mir deucht, wenn ich ihn sähe, wär mir wohl.
> Es ist der Stern, der meinem Leben strahlt,
> Und wunderbar oft stärkte mich sein Anblick.
> (Tod, V,3.)

The dark agitation Wallenstein perceives is the reflection of his darkly agitated spirit, caught up in the currents of life, and carried away from its moorings. This passage forms yet another poetic link between Wallenstein and Max. For, earlier on in the tragedy, Max uses a very similar image to describe the forces that brew all around him - the very forces that will eventually engulf him in darkness and destruction:

> Es geht hier etwas vor um mich, ich sehs
> An ungewöhnlich treibender Bewgung;
> Wenns fertig ist, kommts wohl auch bis zu mir.
> (Pic, III,3.)

His deeper emotions once released, Wallenstein, so static before, is torn by the same conflicting pulls, the same uncertainty that Max had experienced before him. And the connection with Max which the imagery suggests, is indeed borne out by Wallenstein himself. For the image of

his lucky star suddenly comes to stand for Max, and it is of him that he continues to speak. - And so, too, as Marquis Posa's aesthetic distance breaks down he is overcome by blindness. In prison with Carlos, he recalls the moment of that inner revolution:

> Da wird es Nacht vor meinen Sinnen.
> Nichts - nichts - kein Ausweg - keine Hülfe - keine
> Im ganzen Umkreis der Natur! Verzweiflung
> Macht mich zur Furie, zum Tier - ich setze
> Den Dolch auf eines Weibes Brust.
>
> (V, 3.)

After this, the words that follow sound paradoxical.

> Jetzt fällt ein Sonnenstrahl in meine Seele Doch jetzt -

Posa continues, and goes on to describe the plan of rescue which at that moment had flashed through his mind. Is it not strange that the blinding of his senses should so immediately be followed by the illumination of his soul? And does not perhaps the paradox of the formulation reveal a fundamental paradox of experience; that Posa was in fact blind while he deemed himself all-seeing, and that, conscious of his blindness he at last perceives well and truly? For indeed, what he here perceives is the truth about his relationship to the prince, a truth to which he had blinded himself before, and which now he can clearly formulate:

> Das Königreich ist dein Beruf. Für dich
> Zu sterben war der meinige.
>
> (ibid.)

Time and again Posa marvels at his blindness while he yet strove to see and to foresee, and at the complexity of character and motive which he now perceives in the full awareness of his limitation.

> Nein! Das,
> Das hab ich nicht vorhergesehen - nicht
> Vorhergesehn, dass eines Freundes Grossmut
> Erfinderischer könnte sein als meine
> Weltkluge Sorgfalt.
>
> (V, 1.)

he exclaims when he learns why Carlos had failed him. Again, learning of the warning which Lerma had loyally given to Carlos, he asks:

> Der hat dir gesagt? - Ja, nun
> Wird alles, alles offenbar! Wer konnte
> Das auch voraussehn? - Lerma also? - Nein,
> Der Mann hat lügen nie gelernt.
>
> (ibid.)

And so, too, bewilderment and wonder are in his reply to the passionate outburst the Queen levels at him on hearing of his resolve to die - the same Queen whom he had deemed exempt from all emotion. He rejoins - and the stage direction reads "betroffen, für sich":

> Nein! Darauf
> War ich nicht vorbereitet -
>
> (IV, 21.)

Similarly, it is in the scene in which his outer vision fails him that Wallenstein attains the most delicate insight into the character of Max and the nature of his own relationship with him; and in similar circumstances, Johanna, too, is able for the first time to see the truth about her relation with Lionel, and the relation between their countries.

This paradox is only part of the larger paradox experienced by those of Schiller's tragic heroes who, through the conscious acceptance of their own determinacy, enter into a new wholeness of being: Marquis Posa, Wallenstein and Johanna. It is only when they relinquish the false freedom of aesthetic indeterminacy and yield to their elemental impulses, that the deepest springs of their power are released and they experience a late and profuse flowering of their sensibilities. Committing themselves truly, they become truly freed. Losing their life, they gain it. This experience is reflected in Posa's last words to the Queen:

Königin! -
- O Gott, das Leben ist doch schön!
(IV, 21.)

It informs the words of Max's soldiers, the concluding words of Wallenstein's Lager:

Und setzet ihr nicht das Leben ein,
Nie wird euch das Leben gewonnen sein.

The same experience has received what is perhaps its most moving formulation in the words of Kennedy, shortly before the death of Maria Stuart:

- O Sir! Wir litten Mangel, da wir lebten,
Erst mit dem Tode kommt der Überfluss zurück.
(V, 3.)

CHAPTER THREE

The preceding chapters have traced a number of fundamental features common to Schiller's tragedies, which may be summarised under the headings of tragic theme, tragic personnage, and structure of tragedy respectively. The tragic theme has been found to be concerned with the integration[1] of the individual. Onesidedness, the fixed dominance of one complex of functions over another, is a tragically untenable human condition. And in particular, it is the predominance of the intellectual functions over the elemental impulses which Schiller singles out for his principal tragic theme.[2] This theme is centered in the person of the tragic hero, its chief carrier. And here a second, apparently contrary, feature is added to the first. The tragic hero, though in fact onesided, maintains a

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1. The theme might also be stated in more familiar terminology as being human, or individual freedom. My reason for preferring to speak of integration is that the term connotes a process involving the whole personality in the totality of its functions. The word freedom, in Schiller scholarship, has so often been equated with freedom of the spiritual side only of the individual, that for the clear statement of a more inclusive conception such as is advanced here a fresh term had best be employed.

2. In the definition of 'onesidedness' as the tragic theme this thesis is in agreement with Robert Petsch (op.cit.). It differs in that Petsch defines Schiller's type of tragedy as "die Tragik der leidenschaftlichen Einseitigkeit" (op.cit., p. 35). Onesidedness in the eyes of Petsch is always the predominance of the empirical, sensuous self of the hero over his 'intelligible', ideal self. Thus, in his view, Franz Moor is a victim of his passions no less than his brother Karl, Elisabeth no less than Maria Stuart, indeed even more so. (Cf. op.cit., p.213.) By the
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contemplative pose. To himself and others, he appears to be resting in the enjoyment of the totality of his functions rather than in the exercise of any of them. He aims at preserving himself, as far as possible, in an indeterminate condition, remaining in the realm of the possible rather than descending into the actuality of binding feeling or action. This discrepancy between his real condition of tragic onesidedness and his pose of aesthetic totality and freedom is expressed, throughout the tragedies, by the related symbols of the would-be liberator who is a tyrant, of the pretender to the crown who is a usurper. - Finally, the principle of externalisation has been found to be operative throughout the tragedies. As a result, they exhibit a structure in which certain basic features remain constant. The tragic protagonists represent, not so much the human psyche in the round, in one of its infinite individual variants; rather do they represent one single stratum of the psyche, in such a fashion that only together do the protagonists form a complete human whole. Thus their individual roles and mutual relations are strictly laid down. They are complementary opposites. To the dominance of intellectual impulses in the one corresponds the dominance of elemental impulses in the other. And on their mutual solidarity depends the spiritual survival of each, much as the single organs of one body interdepend on one another for the proper discharge of their functions. -

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rigid application of this scheme Petsch constantly finds himself at variance with the text and must condemn as inconsistency any sign of poetic variety. This is the inevitable result of superimposing, on to the individuality of each tragedy, a scheme derived from Schiller's theory which in its turn is unquestionably interpreted in the light of Kantian doctrine.

Thus, given the principal features of content and structure, onesidedness on the one hand, and externalisation on the other, a number of other features of Schillerian tragedy follow by implication. We can define the nature of the tragic conflict, both in terms of the tragic individual and in terms of his relation to the protagonist: for the inner psychological conflict is externalised in the relation between the protagonists and thus finds its necessary expression in the movement of the plot; we can define the 'villain' as the character whose onesidedness is, or becomes, complete and who thus forfeits his humanity; and finally we can, conversely, define the nature of tragic catharsis as the restoration of that full humanity by the acceptance, on the part of the hero, of his repressed elemental impulses and the pass to which they have brought him.

Such are some of the implications of tragic theme and method of presentation. A short scrutiny of the tragic hero too will show that from his principal trait, his contemplativeness, there flow a number of features associated with Schillerian tragedy and perplexing to the critic; the striking number of retarding motifs, usually associated with the hero; the dearth of action, at least as far as he is concerned; the fact that what decisive action furthering the plot there is, so often does not come from him and is contrary to his intentions; the selfconscious, analytical bent of the hero; his speculative probings, in dialogue or soliloquy, into his own motives and into the nature of man generally; and the general philosophical tenor of the tragedies which these preoccupations of the central figures help not a little to create: do not all these features seem to have their focal point in the contemplative disposition of the hero?

The analysis of the products of Schiller's poetic practice has thus yielded fairly comprehensive conclusions as to the view of tragedy that is operative in them all. In favour of these conclusions may be cited the basic quality of the principles that have been put forward; basic in the sense both that a great variety of the features of the tragedies are explained by them, and that they operate throughout the tragedies. But if their fruitfulness and homogeneity commends these principles, their undeniable oddness makes them suspect. It may be asked why a dramatist should feel moved to create, time and again, characters that are not representatives of humanity but fragments of it, abstractions of the analytical psychologist rather than creations of synthesising nature. Why should the reader or spectator be asked to see rousing actions and resounding conflicts as something other than themselves, as so many 'externalisations' of recondite processes in the hero's soul? Why in particular should he be expected to go 'behind' the compact reality of historical situations, persons and problems, robbing them of their intrinsic interest which presumably made Schiller dramatise them, and instead discovering in them significances of an entirely different order? Is this not reading into Schiller's classical simplicity[1] the sophistication of another age? - And lastly, the notion of a tragic hero whose hallmark is the assumption of a contemplative pose, is certain to be called into question. Hamlet is generally held to be the exception proving the rule that tragic heroes are men of

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1. The quality of classical simplicity was only recently put forward as the core of Schiller's greatness by Humphrey Trevelyan, in a letter that appeared in the Literary Supplement of the Times (24.II.1950).

action. And none more than Schiller's heroes, in the eyes of the more popular writers on his tragedies.[1] Moreover, the conclusions put forward here conflict with what is probably the most deeply engrained tradition of Schiller scholarship: the tradition that sets him firmly into the ideological framework of Kant. From the early works of Düntzer, Berger, Petsch to the recent studies of Wiese, Fricke, and Witte, there is scarcely a critic who has not reinforced the notion that in Schiller's tragedies it is the creative side of man which through its passionate impulses incurs guilt, and the intelligible Person which transcends it. To maintain, on the contrary, that the hybris of the Schillerian hero, which constitutes his tragic guilt, lies in the predominance of his Person, is to reverse a scale of values that has never been questioned.

It is with such doubts and questions in mind that we turn to the aesthetic writings of Schiller's maturity, notably to the essays Die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, Über das Pathetische and über das Erhabene. Do these lend any support to the view of tragedy that has emerged from the tragedies themselves? And if so, do they offer an explanation for the strangeness of some of its features?

Before entering on the discussion of Schiller's theory, a few preliminary questions of a more general nature should be asked. Firstly, what bearing do conclusions derived from Schiller's theory have on the conclusions derived from

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1. Cf. Kühnemann, Cysarz, Deubel; also Hermann Schneider, Schiller, Werk und Erbe. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1934, and many others. The more nationalistic readings of the last two decades naturally tend to stress the virile, active qualities in Schiller's heroes cf. e.g. Hans Fabricius, Schiller als Kampfgenosse Hitlers. Nationalsozialismus in Schillers Dramas. Berlin, 1934. Here the title tells its own tale.

his poetic practice? Secondly, what kind of approach should be brought to bear upon the theory, in the context of the present study? And thirdly, what kind of correspondences between poetic practice and theory should be looked for and where should we look for them?

An answer to these questions must now be outlined. First~~ly~~: it must at once be said that even if the theory completely corroborated the view of tragedy which the tragedies themselves imply, this correspondence would not, in my view, conclusively prove that it is the view of tragedy which in fact informs Schiller's dramas. In view of the fact that the conclusions advanced in the earlier chapter present certain difficulties, such an inference would be tempting; it is nevertheless illegitimate. The aesthetic doctrine of any one artist and the aesthetic insights actually embodied in his practice may be far apart. What aesthetic principles are in fact implicit in the artistic practice can only be finally determined by an analysis of the practice. Thus the conclusions of the previous chapters must, in the last resort, be accepted or rejected on their own merits. It is true, however, that the conclusions derived from the theory, especially if the latter have been reached by an independent analysis, do considerably support the conclusions drawn from the practice, even if it does not finally prove their validity.

In this connection the second question arises. How can the theory best be approached, in such a way that the conclusions derived from it have independent force, and yet bear as directly as possible on the conclusions derived from the artistic practice~~s~~? For it is the relation between the two with which this thesis is concerned. The procedure that suggests itself in order to reach independent results is to ignore, for the time being, the conclusions drawn

from the tragedies themselves and to discuss the theory in terms of the categories with which Schiller himself operates in the majority of the essays, i.e. the categories of Kantian philosophy. This procedure has the clear advantage of avoiding a question begging argument, a danger that would arise if the categories of the practice were superimposed upon the theory: for thereby the very uniformity in Schiller's view of tragedy which is the issue in question, would be construed in advance. This danger can, however, be avoided in practice, if the categories derived from Schiller's artistic creations are employed as so many working hypotheses, to be rejected, modified, or accepted according to whether the actual material in its complexity bears them out. There are strong reasons in favour of this procedure. For endless attempts to deal with Schiller's essays on tragedy in terms of the philosophical framework in which they are cast have failed to bring to light any distinctive point of view in the individual essays, their connection with each other, and, most of all, their connection with the Ästhetische Briefe. So great is the power of the system from which the concepts stem, that critical minds are almost inevitably sidetracked onto philosophical ground, into the discussion of philosophical issues: the specific aesthetic problems with which these essays deal, are by-passed unnoticed - a fact which is reflected in the widespread editorial habit of grouping Schiller's aesthetic writings under the name of Philosophische Schriften. Indeed, the categories with which Schiller operates may not be distracting for the critic alone. It may well be that they are inadequate to express his own aesthetic insights and positively obscure the direction of his thought. Artists' insights are often at variance with, and in advance of, their theoretical formulations. This is especially likely to be the case at a point in

history when aesthetics ~~were~~ was only just beginning to emerge as a discipline distinct from philosophy, forced to effect its emancipation with the tools of, and within a conceptual framework supplied by, the latter. In such a case, a careful reading of the theory in the light of the practice may be the only way of establishing the deeper meaning of the individual essays as well as their common centre. - Should such an illumination be achieved, moreover, we may claim with greater certainty, than had seemed possible, that the principles derived from the analysis of Schiller's poetry are in fact his creative principles. This is virtually proven by the fact that they are found to operate at a deep level of his theoretical thinking, organising it intuitively where his conscious intellectual categories have failed to organise it logically.

The third question concerns the propriety of enquiries into the relation between the ideological content of the tragedies and that of the theory. This enquiry has tended, of late, to occupy Schiller critics - especially in Germany - virtually exclusively, and if only for this reason this thesis must deal with some of its difficulties and dangers. Ideological questions, it is true, inevitably thrust themselves upon the attention of the critic of tragedies and theory of tragedy. For no other literary genre concerns itself so urgently and centrally as does tragedy with defining the nature of the human personality and the world in which it is placed. It embodies whole systems of moral and metaphysical judgments, which together comprise the composite judgment made by the tragedy as a whole. And this preoccupation of tragedy with ultimate questions will be necessarily reflected in discussions of the art form as such. It is by reason of what Schiller would call, in the

eighteenth century meaning of the word, their strong pathological interest, that ideological questions have tended to become the chief or exclusive issue in discussions of Schiller's tragic practice and theory. The impact of the ideological component of art is understandably at its most violent in times of crisis, when old ideologies are crumbling and new ones are being sought for. At such times, 'ideas' tend to be disengaged from the aesthetic context in which they function, and instead to be placed in the context of life. This tendency is apparent in every one of the more recent German studies. No matter whether we consider the work of Fricke, Wiese, Kommerell, Deubel, Gumbel or the most recent one of Kurt May:[1] in all alike the question of Schiller's view of the tragic in tragedy has been imperceptibly replaced by the question of Schiller's tragic view of life. The identity of these two problems is taken for granted. And it is the legitimacy of this assumption which must now be examined. It seems that it rests on two silent presuppositions: the first one is that from the tragic view articulated in tragedy we may directly infer that the author held corresponding tragic beliefs. The second one is that these beliefs are the sole and sufficient cause of the tragic voiced in tragedy. These presuppositions are closely connected. The first arises from a critical, the second more directly from an aesthetic fallacy. The critical fallacy is that of mistaking a statement or statements made <u>in</u> the tragedy for the statement made <u>by</u> the tragedy as a whole, and of assigning this partial statement to the author. This fallacy can take several forms. The procedure adopted

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1. Kurt May, Schiller. <u>Idee und Wirklichkeit im Drama</u>. Göttingen, 1948.

without exception by the aforementioned critics, is to isolate that complex of statements - usually the most explicit - which is centred in the tragic hero. The hero's tragic awareness is then identified with the tragic, and that with the author's beliefs. Thus Fricke, Wiese, Kommerell, May etc. come to attribute to the tragedies and their author an outlook that is peculiar to the tragic hero: the discrepancy that he feels between his intentions and their consequences, the dualism he perceives between the realm of ideas and the realm of reality and history, the essential hostility of the world of which he is conscious - all these are regarded as constituting the objective tragic content of Schiller's dramas. A view of the tragic in Schiller is thus constructed which puts him into the closest proximity to Kleist: and indeed it is no accident that the latter has increasingly become the point of reference, from which Schiller's conception of tragedy is viewed and evaluated, often explicitly so.[1]

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1. Cf. Gerhard Fricke, especially Die Problematik des Tragischen im Drama Schillers, Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts. Frankfurt a. Main, 1930, and Erfahrung und Gestaltung des Tragischen. Von deutscher Art.1941. The prototype of the tragic, for him, is Kleist's, and he measures Schiller's tragedies by this standard, rejecting those on which classical ideology has left the dominant imprint, as not truly tragic, and valuing the others, esp. Demetrius in the measure in which they have relinquished those ideological presuppositions and approximated to the absolute tragedy of Kleist. For Mr. Fricke, Demetrius represents the apex of Schiller's achievement as a tragedian, because in this drama Schiller conceived of a fate, "das hier bereits nicht mehr die klassischen Züge ehern erhabener Notwendigkeit, sondern die weit gefährlicheren, kleistischen Züge des Zufalls und der Willkür trägt. (op.cit., p.63) Kurt May, (op.cit.) adopts Fricke's distinction but rejects his evaluation. The preoccupation with Kleist, however, is no less strong than in the case of Fricke: a whole chapter on

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This procedure ignores the difficulty, presented especially sharply by drama, of arriving at the total intention of a work of art. It forgets that every statement is made in a local and psychological context which will modify its significance. It forgets that the hero himself is merely one verbal structure within the structure of the whole, modified by a great many other structures of the same or different kinds. We can certainly not assume that we may infer the author's position and total intention from the tragic hero's utterances. Where the latter sees disconnections and discrepancies, the tragedy as a whole may - and inthis case does - suggest connections and correspondences. The dualism, which in the view of the tragic hero is objective, rooted in the nature of things, is on a larger and more complex view perceived to be a subjective, psychological phenomenon.

But even when the total meaning of the tragedy is brought to light, the question remains whether what it says may be ascribed to the poet as his personal belief about the nature of the world. Wellek and Warren[1] bluntly state

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Robert Guiscard in a book on Schiller is sufficient proof of that. Gumbel (op.cit., p.137) speaks of the later Schiller's "Hinwendung zur Wirklichkeit, zum Dasein in seiner Tragik, zur Person, zur Süssigkeit und Verwirrung des Gefühls" (!) Words such as these might be lifted straight from Fricke's Gefühl und Schicksal bei H. von Kleist, Berlin 1929. Their ineptness to describe any phase of Schiller's poetic development requires no comment.

1. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature. New York, 1948, p.70.

that "it is not self-evident that a writer needs to be in a tragic mood to write tragedies or that he writes comedies when he feels pleased with life." By this token, can we with any more justification ascribe to a writer a definite and lasting tragic outlook merely because he continues to write tragedies embodying a definite type of tragic vision? Robert Heilmann agrees with the reservations of Wellek and Warren, but adds a clue to the problem of the relation between the philosophy embodied in a work of art and its author. 'To leap from poetic practice to assumptions about personality and philosophy is to come near to the old fallacy of reading dramatic lines as if they were statements of the writer's opinions. The completed work of art is a considerable clue to the type of mind which the artist possesses; but generalisations about that type of mind can follow only upon an understanding of the work as a structural whole.'[1] The operative word is 'structural'. Inferences as to the philosophy of the writer are possible only if consideration is given to the formal structure in which the content is aesthetically organised. Through its structure, the work of art may say something that transcends its content. In the case of Schiller's tragedies, the basic structural characteristic of externalisation for instance will be of as much, or more, account in the assessment of Schiller's own views as is the tragic which is aesthetically organised in this structure: for if anything, it is the form rather than the content of a work of art which expresses the artist's mind.

The second presupposition underlying recent Schiller criticism is closely connected with the first one. The failure to appreciate form as a vital factor in the

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1. Op.cit., p.296.

critical analysis of art is paralleled, on the aesthetic level, by the failure to appreciate literary forms as a vital factor in the creation of art. The critics whose work is being discussed assume that experience and work of art stand in a simple one to one relation of cause and effect. This aesthetic assumption is in part engendered by aesthetic doctrines such as that of Hebbel, who does indeed see tragedy as the necessary and direct result of tragic metaphysical experience; and of late Emil Staiger[1] has made a similar attempt to deduce the chief poetic genres directly from so many modes of experiencing - an undertaking which, being at variance with his own critical practice, testifies to the strong hold still exercised by this aesthetic doctrine on the leading minds of the Continent. Partly, too, this doctrine is fed by the critical practice we have been discussing, with its tendency to stress the life values in a work of art at the expense of its art values. How prevalent is the centrifugal tendency to view art as an outcrop of experience leading back to more experience, the following quotations may show. Kurt May, for instance, asks concerning the morally dubious character

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1. Emil Staiger, Grundbegriffe der Poetik, Zürich, 1946. In his recent article entitled 'Zu Schillers Agrippina' (Trivium, Jahrgang VIII, Heft 4.), Professor Staiger revokes the premises of his poetics and instead proceeds on the assumption that a poet may write tragedy because he wishes to produce an effect of a certain kind. Unfortunately Professor Staiger fails to maintain this aesthetic approach consistently. He uses statements of a distinctly aesthetic character, demanding to be interpreted within their aesthetic context, as material for psychological inferences, and, in turn, adduces psychological or biographical evidence in support of Schiller's aesthetic intentions. This procedure inevitably impairs the systematic value of observations which are often full of interest.

of some of Schiller's heroes: "Wie wäre er zur Darstellung einer solchen Grösse gelangt, hätte er nicht mit dem Amoralismus eine Möglichkeit durch Dichtung, durch poetische Verdichtung, zu bannen gehabt, die ihm selbst als Gefahr von Ursprung an mitgegeben war?"[1] Again, May predicts the revival of the ethico-religious type of tragedy on the grounds that "ein neues Zeitalter wird nach den Erschütterungen und Katastrophen des vergangenen die Erfahrungen nicht wünschen dürfen und würde sie nicht zu ertragen vermögen, auf Grund deren es eine neue Radikalisierung des tragischen Welterlebens als Preis bezahlen müsste, um dafür - den Zwang und die Kraft zur Gestaltung einer neuen spezifischen und reinen Tragödie zu gewinnen."[2] A title such as that of the recent work Tragische Literaturgeschichte[3] is itself telling. What does tragisch signify here? That the book deals with the history of the literary genre of tragedy? With a tragic genre? Or with its tragic history? Questions of this kind are not facetious. One need only recall the confession which B. von Wiese makes at the outset of his history of German tragedy, whereby "die Geschichte der deutschen Tragödie von Lessing bis Hebbel für ihn selber zu

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1. Op.cit., p.30. Ellen Terry put the matter in a nutshell when she replied to a similar argument that by the same token Shakespeare must have been a woman. - cf. also W. Dilthey, Von Deutscher Dichtung und Musik. Leipzig, 1933. Dilthey says: "Schiller ist der tragischeste unserer Dichter, weil er in der Jugend hart gegen sich selbst war, weil er später seinen Körper und sein Leben nur als Material grossen Wirkens ansah, und weil er schliesslich lange Jahre in der feierlichen Nähe des Todes, nur das rätselhafte Problem seines eigenen Schicksals vor Augen, seine höchsten Werke hervorbrachte!" (p.348.)

2. Op.cit., p.222.

3. Walter Muschg, Tragische Literaturgeschichte. Bern,1948.

einer ergreifenden Tragödie geworden ist, bei der die noch glaubende und vertrauende Seele immer stärker in die Unentrinnbarkeit des Unglaubens, in das Wagnis des Zweifels und die Verzweiflung hineingerissen wird."[1]

The Erlebnis-theory of art is bound to leave its mark on the interpretation of Schiller's theory of art as well. If tragedy is taken to be the reflex of tragic experience, then the poet's theoretical pronouncements on tragedy may be expected to treat of the tragic nature of being, from which tragic experience and therewith tragedy flow. Accordingly Schiller's theory of tragedy has been read as a straightforward philosophical treatise on the tragic nature of the world and the tragic personality within it. "Schiller bekennt", says May, speaking of Über das Erhabene, "was er als Gläubiger zu glauben vermag",[2] just as the same critic had sought to explain the shift of interest from Wallenstein to Max and back to Wallenstein (after Max's death) by comparing it to the "Auf und Ab in den Regungen der Seele eines Gläubigen".[3] True, in Über das Erhabene Schiller does depict an essentially tragic picture of the world of nature and history; and this is parallelled, in Über das Pathetische, by a vision of man in which all the tragic possibilities inherent in human nature are realised. But can we assert that Schiller necessarily believes what he describes? To do so is to forget that in these essays Schiller moves in an aesthetic universe of discourse. Critics like May, or Deubel, persistently overlook the fact that Schiller treats of the tragic world or the tragic

1. Op.cit., p.32.
2. Op.cit., p.97.
3. Op.cit., p.47.

personality as so many kinds of subject matter peculiarly suited to evoke a certain aesthetic effect; just as they forget that in the tragedies themselves Schiller organises the same kinds of subject matter so as actually to evoke the aesthetic effect proper to tragedy. They forget, in short, that this desired effect has a decisive part in the selection and presentation of the subject matter. - Thus theory and practice are treated analogously. The controlling point of view - aesthetic discursive or aesthetic poetic, as the case may be - is ignored, elements are disengaged from their modifying context and endowed with intrinsic metaphysical significance. And what goes for metaphysical elements goes for moral ones too. Schiller's concentration, both in his tragedies and in Über das Pathetische, now on the moral hero and now on the great criminal, has not once in recent Schiller criticism been discussed on the aesthetic level, which is the level appropriate to the discussion of art and theory of art. Instead of explaining these alterations in the subject matter in terms of the different kinds of effect they produce, they have been at once identified with differing and contradictory attitudes of the poet himself. May's whole book is devoted to tracing a moral and an amoral trend in Schiller, reflected in his theory and practice; the same contradictory make-up is the upshot of Fricke's second study, and Cysarz, with his opposition between Schiller the bourgeois and Schiller the demonic realist, pursues similar paths. - Once the elements of theory and practice are freed from the constraint of their aesthetic organisation, there is no end to the tendencies and attitudes that can be found running through both, and no end to the personalities that can be construed on the basis of such findings.

Any answer then to the problem of the relation between

Schiller's practice and theory of tragedy in simple biographical terms - in terms of the poet's moral or metaphysical beliefs or psychological make up - must be regarded as suspect. An aesthetic problem requires, first and foremost, an æsthetic solution. Wellek and Warren formulate the essential weakness of the biographical approach very clearly: "The biographical approach", they say, "forgets that a work of art is not simply the embodiment of experience, but always the latest work of art in a series of such works ... determined by literary tradition and convention."[1] Schiller's correspondence with Körner and even more with Goethe about the subject matter and treatment proper to tragedy and other art forms, his reading of Aristotle and his discussions of Greek and Shakespearian tragedy, should put any critic on his guard against assuming that experience was the only or even the chief factor that counted in the writing of his tragedies and in their theoretical discussion. One need only listen to words such as the following, to realise to what extent formal, technical considerations determined his treatment and even his choice of any given tragic material: "Ich habe mich dieser Tage viel damit beschäftigt", he writes to Goethe",[2] "einen Stoff zur Tragödie aufzufinden, der von der Art des Oedipus Rex wäre und dem Dichter die nämlichen Vorteile verschaffe. Diese Vorteile sind unermesslich, wenn ich auch nur das einzigen erwähne, dass man die zusammengesetzteste Handlung, welche der tragischen Form ganz widerstrebt, dabei zum Grunde legen kann, indem diese Handlung ja schon geschehen ist..." Not that the experiential element is denied as a powerful factor in

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1. Op.cit., p.72.
2. 2nd Oct. 97. ed.cit., V, pp.269 ff.

Schiller's artistic creation, and therewith, theory. But here again it is useful to recall a warning of Wellek and Warren: 'The artist', they say, 'may 'experience' life differently in terms of his art: actual experiences are seen with a view to their use in literature and come to him already partly shaped by artistic traditions and preoccupations.'[1] This qualification needs to be remembered in the interpretation of the theory of tragedy no less than of the tragedies themselves. The tragic subject matter which these essays discuss - the tragic human personality and the tragic world in which moral chaos reigns - undoubtedly has its roots in experience: but it is experience that has been selected, stylised and intensified by a maker of tragedies; and a maker of tragedies is by no means necessarily a tragic personality, but an artist who knows what aesthetic effects he wants to induce and how to induce them. That Schiller himself had no compunction to see his profession in this matter of fact way, may be gathered from the fact that he uses the words Poet and Macher synonymously.[2]

The relation between the artist's personality and his work then is an exceedingly complex one, and any shortcut from the subject matter of his art to his experience and thus to the man is unwarranted. Indeed, at the risk of sounding paradoxical, we may say that the only reliable guide to the man behind the work of art is its form. If so, it is for the feature of externalisation which we had found to be the structural peculiarity of Schiller's tragedies, that we may expect to find a clue in that part of his theoretical writings which testifies most directly to Schiller's personality and beliefs: the Ästhetische Briefe. Conversely, we may well

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1. Op.cit., p.72.
2. Cf. his letter to Goethe, 27th March 1801. Schiller's Briefe, ed. cit., VI, pp.262 f.

find a clue for the seemingly most personal element of his creative work, its tragic subject matter, in the apparently more limited and technical essays on the theory of tragedy. To expect such an intersecting of the threads running between theory and practice is merely to do justice to the indivisibility of form and content in art.

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Whatever the starting point and specific subject-matter of Schiller's essays, there is not one which does not sooner or later lead to a discussion of the double nature of man, to the spiritual and the physical side of his make-up and their interrelation. The title of Schiller's dissertation Über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen sets the theme which was never to cease to occupy him, and here already the conception of the "heilsame Gleichgewicht, die Harmonie der Seelenwirkungen" is advanced. (para. 26).[1] As early as Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet, the bearing of art on this question of integration is recognised: it is the theatre which by the mittleren Zustand it induces, is called upon to reconcile the opposition in man's nature, to bridge the gap between Thier and Verstand.[2] The twin essays Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen und über die tragische Kunst explain the mixed emotion called forth by tragedy by the conflicting response it evokes in the two sides of human nature, whilst the two later studies on the sublime, Über das Pathetische and Über das Erhabene, starting from similar premises, proceed to define more closely the aesthetic potentialities of this opposition. Essays on limited aesthetic or critical topics, such as Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen, as well as the reviews Über Matthisons Gedichte or Über Bürgers Gedichte lead to the same central problem. Questions of style and poetic

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., I. pp. 175 ff. (1780)
2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., III, p. 513. (1784)

diction reduce themselves to the more basic question of the interrelation of sense and sensibility in the creative and the aesthetic act, and ultimately, to the question of their integration in the human personality of the poet. This ultimate question of the integration of sense and spirit becomes the explicit concern of a series of essays: Über Anmuth und Würde, Über den Nutzen aesthetischer Sitten, and the crowning piece of Schiller's theory, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. Finally, Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, bases its theory of poetic and psychological types on the preponderance of the natural or spiritual side in different ages and individuals.

There can thus be no doubt that the problem of psychological integration which is the central theme of Schiller's tragedies, takes up an equally central place in his theoretical thinking. And there is an attendant feature which recurs with remarkable constancy in every discussion of the psychological make up of the human personality, however different the context in which it may appear. This is Schiller's habit of describing the inner functions and their interrelations in terms derived from the social and political sphere. Whether by way of metaphor, simile or explicit analogy, Schiller's thinking about the moral and intellectual functions on the one hand and the vital impulses on the other is largely conceived in terms of kings and commoners, and the relation between these inner forces in terms of the different relations that obtain between ruler and ruled in a democracy, tyranny, oligarchy, anarchy and the like. - In Über den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer Sitten for instance, we read of "das moralische Forum, das Gewissen," [1] of the "Joch des

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., X, p.421, (11.) 18 f; cf also p. 423.

Instinkts"[1] "die Parthey der Vernunft"[2] of taste as the "Gewährsmann der Moralität"[3]. In its counterpiece, Über die Gefahr ästhetischer Sitten we find refined sensuality spoken of as a "treubrüchigen Untertan ... der sich gegen seinen Oberherrn auflehnt: sie will als eine Majestät angesehen seyn."[4] The unchecked elemental driving forces are regarded as "despotisch beherrschend".[5] Reason is "die höhere Autorität"[6]; it has "die Befugnis des Gesetzgebers"[7]; it is the "wahre Beherrscher"[8] of the will. In Anmuth und Würde Schiller says: "Bey der Würde also führt sich der Geist in dem Körper als Herrscher auf ... Bey der Anmuth hingegen regiert er mit Liberalität"[9] and he distinguished between true and false dignity, saying "Wenn die wahre Würde zufrieden ist, den Affekt an seiner Herrschaft zu hindern ... so regiert die falsche Würde auch die willkührlichen [Bewegungen] mit einem eisernen Zepter..."[10]

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1. ibid. p. 419. l.16.
2. ibid. p. 417. l.24.
3. ibid. p. 415. ll. 4f.
4. ibid. p. 410. ll. 12f.
5. ibid. p. 412. ll. 26f.
6. ibid. p. 413. l. 2.
7. ibid. p. 413. ll. 3f.
8. ibid. p. 413. l.26.
9. ibid. p. 113, ll. 7f.
10. ibid. p. 124. ll. 11f.

These are only a very few of similar images that literally permeate Schiller's prose, and help to imprint on it its characteristic stamp, virile and dramatic. Dramatic in the sense, both that they dramatise internal forces and tensions into outward forces and conflicts, and that they actually represent the nuclei of those comprehensive metaphors that recur in the dramas themselves. The description of unchecked vital impulses as treulose Unterthanen brings to mind the Mohr in Fiesco, looting and burning, Karl Moor, whose impulsiveness makes him the enemy of society, Johanna, who loves the enemy of her country and so herself becomes an outcast, Melchthal, whose rashness makes him a captive in his own land, and Parricida, the exiled murderer of his emperor. Similarly the imagistic conception of an overweening reason ruling with an eisernes Zepter has become a palpable dramatic symbol in the political tyranny of Fiesco, Philipp of Spain, Elizabeth of England, Isabella, King Boris and Demetrius. In many places in Schiller's essays, the compactness of image and metaphor gives place to elaborate analogy. In Über Anmut und Würde, for instance, he elucidates the relation between spirit and senses as follows: "Wenn ein monarchischer Staat auf eine solche Art verwaltet wird, dass, obgleich alles nach eines Einzigen Willen geht, der einzelne Bürger sich doch überreden kann, dass er nach eigenem Sinne lebe und bloss seiner Neigung gehorche, so nennt man diess eine liberale Regierung. Man würde aber grosses Bedenken tragen, ihr diesen Nahmen zu geben, wenn entweder der Regent seinen Willen gegen die Neigung des Bürgers, oder der Bürger seine Neigung gegen den Willen des Regenten behauptete; denn in dem ersten Fall wäre die Regierung nicht liberal, in dem zweyten wäre sie gar nicht Regierung. Est ist nicht schwer, die Anwendung

davon auf die menschliche Bildung unter dem Regiment des Geistes zu machen. Wenn sich der Geist in der von ihm abhängenden sinnlichen Natur auf eine solche Art äusert, dass sie seinen Willen aufs treueste ausrichtet und seine Empfindungen ... ausdrückt, ohne doch gegen die Anfoderungen zu verstossen, welche der Sinn an sie, als an Erscheinungen, macht, so wird dasjenige entstehen, was man Anmuth nennt. Man würde aber gleich weit entfernt seyn, es Anmuth zu nennen, wenn entweder der Geist sich in der Sinnlichkeit durch Zwang offenbarte, oder wenn dem freyen Effekt der Sinnlichkeit der Ausdruck des Geistes fehlte."[1] A little later in the same essay, Schiller makes a yet more fundamental distinction: "Es lassen sich in allen dreyerley Verhältnisse denken, in welchen der Mensch zu sich selbst, d. i. sein sinnlicher Theil zu seinem vernünftigen, stehen kann.... Der Mensch unterdrückt entweder die Foderungen seiner sinnlichen Natur, um sich den höheren Forderungen seiner vernünftigen gemäss zu verhalten; oder er kehrt es um, und ordnet den vernünftigen Theil seines Wesens dem sinnlichen unter und folgt also bloss dem Stosse, womit ihn die Naturnothwendigkeit, gleich den anderen Erscheinungen forttreibt; oder die Triebe des letzten setzen sich mit den Gesetzen des erstern in Harmonie, und der Mensch ist einig mit sich selbst. ... Das erste dieser Verhältnisse zwischen beyden Naturen im Menschen erinnert an eine Monarchie, wo die strenge Aufsicht des Herrschers jede freye Regung im Zaum hält; das zweyte an eine wilde Ochlokratie, wo der Bürger durch Aufkündigung des Gehorsams gegen den rechtmässigen

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1. Ibid. p. 94. ll. 7f.

Oberherrn [nicht] frey ... wird, vielmehr nur dem brutaleren Despotismus der untersten Klassen ... anheimfällt. So wie die Freyheit zwischen dem gesetzlichen Druck und der Anarchie mitten inne liegt, so werden wir jetzt auch die Schönheit zwischen der Würde, als dem Ausdruck des herrschenden Geistes, und der Wollust, als Ausdruck des herrschenden Triebes, in der Mitte finden." [1] The bearing of this analogy upon the symbolism of the dramas is even more striking than was the case with the metaphors quoted above. Does not this passage read like a precise description of the large facts and situation in Maria Stuart? The picture of the monarchy which Schiller evokes here, recalls the monarchy of Elizabeth, to whose strenge Aufsicht not only the captive Maria but also Elisabeth's own favourite Leicester testify; [2] whilst the description of anarchy calls to mind the state of Maria's native Scotland rent by civil strife as a consequence of Maria's contempt of law and order. That such outer facts and situations are the externalisation of the psychological condition of the dramatis personae, has been shown in detail in the analysis of Fiesco. It is no less true here. Thus we may say that the dramatic technique of externalising the dominant trend within the individual in his place in society, and his psychological in his political fate, is extended into Schiller's discursive thought. What is the significance of this all pervasive symbolism? Its recurrence would suggest that it is based on the perception of objective and essential connections between the individual and the social spheres.

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1. ibid. pp. 95 ff.
2. cf. III. 8.

This suggestion is borne out by the Ästhetische Briefe. For here, the relation between individual and society itself becomes the object of the enquiry. It is the political and social situation revealed by the French revolution which prompts the investigation into the nature and potentialities of the individual, and the results of this enquiry are in turn examined as to their policital and social implications. This whole procedure testifies to Schiller's belief in the closest interdependence of social and psychological phenomena. This is borne out by Schiller's account of ancient Greek and modern European society. The political and social structure peculiar to each is seen as the reflection, and the product, of the inner psychological structure peculiar to the individual of each period. In each case, it is the inner scene which determines, and will determine, what takes place on the outer political scene. Thus, in the light of historical experience and psychological facts, the serious political and social reformer is forced to take the long way through educational reform of the individual. This recognition is voiced at the outset of the letters, in the programmatic declaration "dass man, um jenes politische Problem in der Erfahrung zu lösen, durch das ästhetische den Weg nehmen muss, weil es die Schönheit ist, durch welche man zur Freyheit wandert." [1] What, in Schiller's view, is the precise nature of this relation between the individual and the social whole, the state? A preliminary definition is advanced in the fourth letter. "Jeder individuelle Mensch" says Schiller, "trägt, der Anlage und Bestimmung nach, einen reinen idealischen Menschen in sich ... dieser reine Mensch, der sich mehr oder weniger deutlich in jedem Subjekt zu erkennen gibt, wird repräsentiert

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1. letter II. ibid. p. 278. ll. 17f.

durch den Staat; die objektive und gleichsam kanonische Form, in der sich die Mannigfaltigkeit der Subjekte zu vereinen trachtet. Nun lassen sich aber zwey verschiedene Arten denken," - Schiller continues - "wie der Mensch in der Zeit mit dem Menschen in der Idee zusammentreffen, mithin ebenso viele, wie der Staat in den Individuen sich behaupten kann: entweder dadurch, dass der reine Mensch den empirischen unterdrückt, dass der Staat die Individuen aufhebt; oder dadurch, dass der Staat Mensch wird, dass der Mensch in der Zeit zum Menschen in der Idee sich veredelt." [1] Here then is the objective basis of a metaphor which is not only characteristic of Schiller's philosophical thought but the pivot on which the structure of his tragedies hinges. More than that, the inner significance of the metaphor becomes fully explicit. To compare an individual to the state is to stress not only its character of complexity, but also its wholeness, in which its complexity is contained. Both these characteristics, but especially the wholeness of the individual are stressed in the above definition. The proper relation between individual and state is that in which the body politic wholly represents the individual - i.e. represents the whole individual. The individual, by a process of refinement, becomes the state, rather than being subsumed under the state by obliterating in himself what is inimical to the social whole. What kind of relation between whole and part is it, in which the part, although fully participating in the life of the whole, yet retains a life of its own? In discussing this question in the subsequent paragraphs of the same letter, Schiller rejects the analogy of the artifact, be it a mechanism or a work of art. For the

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1. letter IV, ibid., p. 282. ll. 3 ff.

material of both, being "gestaltlos", is subjected to the purpose of the whole. The parts are there for the sake of the whole, but they do not reflect it: they are not ends in themselves. It is different with the human individual in his relation to the social whole. For "hier kehrt der Zweck in den Stoff zurück, und nur weil das Ganze den Theilen dient, dürfen sich die Theile dem Ganzen fügen." [1] Here, the parts are not given quantities of "gestaltlose Masse": they have their own "Eigentümlichkeit", their own characteristic distinctive quality; they are units of life. It is on the basis of these fundamental distinctions that Schiller introduces the correct analogy under which the nature of the relation between individual and state is to be apprehended. It is that of the natural organism. The state, he says, ought to be "eine Organisation" [2] ... die sich durch sich selbst und für sich selbst bildet." [3] This ideal Schiller saw realised in the

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1. ibid., p. 283. ll. 18 ff.
2. The conception of a natural organism, from the 4th letter onwards to letter 8, recurs time and again throughout the discussion of the relation between individual and the state, together with its logical opposite, the conception of a mechanism. In every critical discussion of the Asthetische Briefe known to me, it has been accorded at the most a loose descriptive value. This is however seriously to underrate its significance. This whole section of the essay is based on a careful study of Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment, the first reference to which occurs in a letter to Körner of March 3rd, 1791, especially on the 'Analytik der Teleologischen Urteilskraft', paras 62-68. Although Schiller for the most part avoids technical language, it is clear that he fully accepts the - strikingly modern - set of definitions of the natural organism advanced by Kant and operates with them throughout his section in a more meaningful and precise way than is immediately apparent. Thus it would seem advisable to regard this conception as a truly scientific analogy, central to the argument and capable of illuminating it.
3. ibid., p. 283. ll. 26 f.

"einfachen Organisationen" of the early Greek city states; and in the following letter he gives us some idea of what he means by it. He speaks of "jene Polypennaturen der griechischen Staaten, wo jedes Individuum eines unabhängigen Lebens genoss, und, wenn es Noth that, zum Ganzen werden konnte ... " and opposes to these early organisations the "kunstreiche Uhrwerke" of modern states, "wo aus der Zusammenstückelung unendlich vieler, aber lebloser Theile ein mechanisches Leben im Ganzen sich bildet." [1.] This conception is confirmed by a passage which occurs, in an aesthetic context, in Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen. There Schiller defines the organic product as one "wo nicht bloss das Ganze lebt, sondern auch die einzelnen Theile ihr eigentümliches Leben haben", and again he opposes this whole to the "mechanische Werk, wo die Theile, leblos für sich selbst, dem Ganzen durch ihre Zusammenstimmung ein künstliches Leben ertheilen." [2.] In either definition, the criterion of the natural organism - as against the mechanical artifact - is the life of the parts of which it consists. However far we pursue the whole into its constituent parts, at no point do we come to dead matter, organised, it is true, by the whole and for the sake of it, but not organised in itself and feeding the living unit of which it forms part, and from which it in turn draws sustenance. It is this vital interdependence of organic part and whole which Kant formulates in his definition of an "organisiertes Product der Natur" as that "in welchem alles Zweck und wechselseitig auch Mittel ist."[3.]

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1. letter VI. ibid., p. 289. ll. 21 ff.
2. ibid., p. 393. ll. 32 ffl
3. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft. Sämmtliche Werke, ed. Felix Gross. Leipzig, 1921. Vol.VI. p. 265. cf also the following definition (ibid., p. 262.):

(continued next page)

It is in the light of this context that Schiller's rejection of the artifact as a proper analogy for the relation between state and individual must be understood: "Hier kehrt der Zweck in den Stoff zurück", he says, "und nur weil das Ganze den Theilen sich fügt, dürfen sich die Theile dem Ganzen fügen."[1] Der Zweck of which he here speaks, is first and foremost that inner purposiveness or Bildungstrieb - the word is used by Kant - which is peculiar to the constituents of a natural organism. It is only when the biological connotation of the term is recognised that its moral significance - which arises from it - can be rightly interpreted. Similarly the meaning of the sentence which follows almost immediately, can now be more closely defined: "Aber eben deswegen, weil der Staat eine Organisation seyn soll, die sich durch sich selbst und für sich selbst bildet, kann er auch nur inso ferne wirklich werden, als sich die Theile zur Idee des Ganzen hinauf gestimmt haben."[2] A natural organism can only come into being when all the constituents associated in it are themselves organised. Thus we are led to the conception of the human individual as a spiritual organism conceived on the analogy of a natural organism.

(continued from preceding page.)

"In einem solchen Produkte der Natur wird ein jeder so, wie er nur durch alle übrige da ist, auch als um der anderen und des Ganzen willen existierend, d.i. als Werkzeug (Organ) gedacht: welches aber nicht genug ist (denn er könnte auch Werkzeug der Kunst sein und so nur als Zweck überhaupt möglich vorgestellt werden); sondern als ein die anderen Teile (folglich jeder den anderen wechselseitig) hervorbringendes Organ, dergleichen kein Werkzeug der Kunst, sondern nur der allen Stoff zu Werkzeugen (selbst denen der Kunst) liefernden Natur sein kann: und nur dann und dareum wird ein solches Produkt, als organisiertes und sich selbst organisierendes Wesen, ein Naturzweck genannt werden können."

1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X. p. 283, ll. 18 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 283, ll. 26 ff.

This conception can be traced back to the earliest beginnings of Schiller's thought. In his dissertation Über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen, he speaks of the "Organismus des geistigen Lebens",[1] and this is not to be taken metaphorically, but quite literally: for his whole thesis on the complete interdependence of body and soul rests on the assumption of the exact correspondence of structure of the two. Thus he compares body and soul to "zweyen gleichgestimmten Saiteninstrumenten ... die neben einander gestellt sind",[2] each echoing the sound evoked from the other. The same conception recurs in Über das gegenwärtige Teutsche Theater. In the Selbstrezension of Die Räuber of 1782, Schiller explains the moral decay of Franz as being the result of the disrupted balance "der ganzen geistigen Organisation"; and he compares this psychological disturbance with the disturbance caused in the physical organism by disease.[3] In Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet, the analogy of the human spirit with a natural organism recurs in conjunction with the problem of the effect and function of art. It is e.g. implied in the following description of the effect of art: "... heilsame Leidenschaften erschüttern unsre schlummernde Natur, und treiben das Blut in frischeren Wallungen."[4] The same conception becomes explicit in the introduction to the Philosophische Briefe, in which Schiller justifies the extreme and erroneous views which in the subsequent letters are to be put before the reader: "Scepticismus und Freidenkerei" - he says - "sind

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., I, p.144, l. 18.
2. Ibid., p.165, II, 9.ff.
3. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., II, p.362, ll. 2 ff.
4. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., III, p. 524, ll. 5 ff.

die Fieberparoxysmen des menschlichen Geistes, und müssen durch eben die unnatürliche Erschütterung die sie in gut organisierten Seelen verursachen, zulezt die Gesundheit bevestigen helfen ... die Kenntniss der Krankheit musste der Heilung vorangehen."[1] - The Philosophische Gespräch in Der Geisterseher is permeated by the symbolic conception of the human spirit as an organism. The existence of a harmony between man's freedom and his natural destination, for instance, is explained as follows: "Was also bei ... dem Mineral und der Pflanze die ursprüngliche Form leistet, musste hier von einem innern Principium erhalten werden, gegen welches sich die Beweggründe oder die bewegenden Kräfte dieses Wesens ohngefehr eben so verhielten, als die bewegenden Kräfte der Pflanze gegen den beständigen Typus ihres Baues."[2] This thought is elaborated and summarised as follows: "Das moralische Wesen ist also in sich selbst vollendet und beschlossen, wie das, welches wir das organische nennen, beschlossen durch seine Moralität, wie dieses durch seinen Bau, und diese Moralität ist eine Beziehung, die von dem, was ausser ihm vorgeht, durchaus unabhängig ist."[3] In this last definition the rejection of any purposiveness but an inner one is implicit, and indeed throughout the discussion the viciousness of the conception of Zweck, except in this immanent sense, is stressed. Thus another link between the spiritual and moral realm on the one hand and the organic realm on the other is established.[4]

1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., IV, p. 32, ll.21.ff.
2. Ibid., IV, p. 290, ll.7 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 306, ll, 13 ff.
4. The purely functional conception of purpose advanced here, about which more will be said later on in this chapter, is all the more striking, as it dates from well before Schiller's study of Kant's Third Critique, let alone his nearer acquaintance with Goethe.

The symbolic conception of the human spirit as a natural organism is again taken up in the Sixth of the Ästhetische Briefe, where Schiller likens the perfect harmony of the human spirit to the beauty of the body brought about "durch das freye und gleichförmige Spiel der Glieder";[1] and it recurs again in the following letter where he draws a detailed analogy between the development of man towards higher forms of spiritual life and the gradual evolution in the realm of nature from primitive to higher physical organisms.[2] And just as he had conceived of the ideal state as an organism, realised in the Polypennatur of the Greek polis, so again he looks to the Greek individual as an embodiment of the ideal of a spiritual organism, in which the single functions interact and feed each other and together contribute to the life of the whole of which they are part. "Damals bey jenem schönen Erwachen der Geisteskräfte hatten die Sinne und der Geist noch kein strenge geschiedenes Eigenthum; denn noch hatte kein Zwiespalt sie gereizt, mit einander feindselig abzutheilen..."[3] And just as it is a characteristic of the Greece city states that "jedes Individuum eines unabhängigen Lebens genoss und, wenn es noth tat, zum Ganzen werden konnte,"[4] so, analogously, the single psychological tendencies in the individual "konnten im Nothfall ihre Verrichtungen tauschen ...."[5] This interchangeability of the single functions as Schiller well knows, does not appertain to the whole

1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p.294, ll. 2 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 295, ll.12 ff.
3. Letter VI, ibid., p. 287, ll. 28 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 289, ll. 21 ff.
5. Ibid., p. 288, ll. 2 f.

of organic nature, but is the distinguishing mark of simple, rudimentary organisms; but the subordination of the activity of the single functions to a common interest, i.e. to the life of the unit as a whole, and conversely the dependence of this whole, however highly developed and hierarchical, on the activity of all its functions, is of the essence of organised life as such; and Schiller stresses precisely this unity and totality which is the characteristic mark of an organic life, in his description of Greek humanity: "So hoch die Vernunft auch stieg, so zog sie doch immer die Materie liebend nach, und so fein und scharf sie auch trennte, so verstümmelte sie doch nie. Sie zerlegte zwar die menschliche Natur und warf sie in ihrem herrlichen Götterkreis vergrössert auseinander, aber nicht dadurch, dass sie sie in Stücken riss, sondern dadurch, dass sie sie verschiedentlich mischte, denn die ganze Menschheit fehlte in keinem einzigen Gott."[1]

In modern civilisation, this integration of the psychical tendencies in the spiritual organism of the individual, and the corresponding integration of the latter in a corpus communis has broken down; a process of disintegration which, though long prepared, it took the chaos of the French revolution fully to reveal. And here again, Schiller relates the two interdependent processes in strictly analogous terms, the biological reference of which is unmistakeable. He sees the justification of the authoritarian state in the universal depravity that followed its liquidation. Can the state be blamed, he asks, for seeking "durch die Schwerkraft zu scheiden und durch die Kohäsionskraft zu binden, wo an eine bildende noch nicht zu denken war? ... Die losgebundene Gesellschaft, anstatt aufwärts in das organische Leben zu eilen, fällt in

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1. Ibid., p. 288, ll. 4 ff.

das Elementarreich zurück."[1] Similarly, he describes the disintegration of the political organism: "Es war freilich nicht zu erwarten, dass die einfache Organisation der ersten Republiken die Einfalt der ersten Sitten und Verhältnisse überlebte; aber anstatt zu einem höheren animalischen Leben steigen, sank sie zu einer gemeinen und groben Mechanik herab."[2] Neither the individual nor the state, he concedes, could have remained or developed further at the level of organisation at which they were at the peak of Greek antiquity: "Nicht verharren; weil der Verstand durch den Vorrath, den er schon hatte, unausbleiblich genöthigt werden musste, sich von der Empfindung und Anschauung abzusondern und nach Deutlichkeit der Erkenntniss zu streben: auch nicht höher steigen; weil nur ein bestimmter Grad von Klarheit mit einer bestimmten Fülle und Wärme zusammen bestehen kann. Die Griechen hatten diesen Grad erreicht, und wenn sie zu einer höheren Ausbildung fortschreiten wollten, so mussten sie, wie wir, die Totalität ihres Wesens aufgeben .... "[3]

"Die Kultur selbst war es, die der neueren Menschheit diese Wunde schlug."[4] These words mark the gulf that separates Schiller's philosophy from that of Rousseau. The simple unity of primitive organisations had to be disrupted for higher ones to be able to evolve. To see the historical process in terms of natural evolution is to accept its inevitability, and to see it, not only as regress and loss, but also, albeit in another direction, as corresponding

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1. Letter V. Ibid., p. 285, ll. 23 ff.
2. Letter VI. Ibid., p.289, ll. 17 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 292, ll. 15 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 288, ll. 32 f.

progress and gain. "Die mannigfachen Anlagen im Menschen zu entwickeln, war kein anderes Mittel, als sie einander entgegenzusetzen,"[1] Schiller writes; and once again, the fact that he regards this "Antagonism der Kräfte", as the great instrument of spiritual evolution shows to what extent the analogy with the biological organism pervades his argument. The process he describes here is the same as that which operates throughout organic nature, producing higher forms of organisation from more primitive ones. The inborn tendencies of the spirit, like those of a natural organism, become realized 'through activity manifesting itself in a polarity of opposing forces..., of increasingly differentiated characteristics'.[2] "Indem der reine Verstand eine Autorität in der Sinnenwelt usurpiert und der empirische beschäftigt ist, ihn den Bedingungen der Erfahrung zu unterwerfen, bilden beide Anlagen sich zu möglichster Reife aus. Indem hier die Einbildungskraft durch ihre Willkür die Weltordnung aufzulösen wagt, nötiget sie dort die Vernunft, zu den obersten Quellen der Erkenntnis zu steigen und das Gesetz der Nothwendigkeit gegen sie zu Hilfe zu rufen."[3] Thus, through their opposition, the single functions become progressively more defined, and more refined, in their specific activities.

The process of psychological differentiation, however, is not the only force at work in the individual. It goes hand in hand with a tendency towards social and professional specialisation, a tendency necessitated by the increasingly complex structure of modern societies. It is the socially useful function or set of functions in the individual, on

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1. Ibid., p. 292, ll 27 f.
2. Quoted from E.M. Wilkinson, 'Tasso - ein gesteigerter Werther' in the light of Goethe's principle of 'Steigerung', The Modern Language Review, vol. XLIV, No.3, July 1949.
3. Ibid., p. 293, ll. 2 ff.

which society puts a premium, encouraging its intensive cultivation at the expense of the rest.[1]

It is this combination of psychological and social forces which, in Schiller's view, spells danger. The increasing differentiation of some tendencies is all to the good, as long as it finds its corrective in the activity of the other tendencies in the individual. But the result of the increasing social pressure is, on the contrary, "... dass die übrigen Anlagen des Gemüts vernachlässigt werden, um der einzigen, welche lohnt und ehrt, alle Pflege zuzuwenden."[2] And indeed, once a single tendency

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1. Professor Jung has discussed at length the advent of Christianity as an important cause of these social and psychological changes (op.cit., pp.102 ff.). Although Schiller does not explicitly mention this factor, there is no doubt that he was aware of its importance. He stresses it in the original version of Die Götter Griechenlands in stanzas which he later suppressed in view of their extreme outspokenness. Furthermore, Kant had pointed out the revolutionary psychological effect of Christianity in a footnote to the Critique of Practical Reason with which Schiller at the time of writing the Asthetische Briefe was of course familiar. He draws a sharp distinction between all Greek philosophies on the one hand and Christianity on the other. The difference between them, in his view, lies in the absolute moral standard proclaimed in the Gospels. However differing were the conceptions of the summum bonum held by the various Greek schools of philosophy, they all agreed in the assumption that the ideal could be reached by the "blossen Gebrauch der natürlichen Kräfte. Die christliche Moral, weil sie ihre Vorschrift (wie es auch sein muss) so rein und unnachsichtlich einrichtet, benimmt dem Menschen das Zutrauen, wenigstens hier im Leben, ihr völlig adequat zu sein, richtet es aber doch dadurch wiederum auf, dass, wenn wir so gut handeln als in unserem Vermögen ist, wir hoffen können, dass, was nicht in unserem Vermögen ist, uns anderseit werde zustatten kommen..." (Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, ed. Reclam, p. 153.)

2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 290, ll. 16 ff.

has been permitted to luxuriate unchecked, it will actively devitalise the rest and thus usurp the life of the whole. "... mit der Sphäre, auf die man seine Wirksamkeit einschränkt, hat man sich auch in sich selbst einen Herren gegeben, der nicht selten mit Unterdrückung der übrigen Anlagen zu endigen pflegt."[1] The inevitable end of this process is the breakdown of the psychological organism as a healthily functioning whole.[2] Thus, whilst the whole species is represented in the Greek individual and in the Gods conceived in its image, Schiller, turning to modernity, describes it as follows: "Wie ganz anders bey uns Neuern! Auch bey uns ist das Bild der Gattung in den Individuen vergrössert auseinander geworfen - aber in Bruchstücken, nicht in veränderten Mischungen, dass man von Individuum zu Individuum herumfragen muss, um die Totalität der Gattung zusammenzulesen. Bey uns, möchte man fast versucht werden zu behaupten, äussern sich die Gemütskräfte auch in der Erfahrung so getrennt, wie der Psychologe sie in der Vorstellung scheidet, und wir sehen nicht bloss einzelne Subjekte sondern ganze Klassen von Menschen nur einen Theil ihrer Anlagen entfalten, während dass die übrigen, wie bey verkrüppelten Gewächsen, kaum mit matter Spur angedeutet sind.[3]

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p.289, ll. 8 ff.
2. Again, this disintegration of the individual has its exact parallel in the disintegration of the social whole; the similarity of the description of both processes is striking. Of the individual Schiller says - "[Es] zerriss der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit entzweite ihre harmonischen Kräfte." (letter VI.) Of the state - "Endlich überdrüssig, ein Band zu unterhalten, das ihr von dem Staate so wenig erleichtert wird, fällt die positive Gesellschaft .. in einen moralischen Naturstand auseinander.."(letter VI.). There can be no doubt, that the words Band and Bund signify the integration of divers tendencies in one organism, and this is in fact the connotation these words have in the tragedies, especially those of Schiller's last period where they occur remarkably frequently.
3. Ibid., p.288, ll.10 ff. (My underlining.)

It is not too much to say that these words mark that inner centre of Schiller's tragedies from which their form and content flows. They explain at once the theme of Schiller's tragedies, their structure, and the inner connection between the two. The theme of tragic one-sidedness necessitates the structure of externalisation. For the tragic individual, conceived in the image of modern man, is not a whole, an organism. He is an isolated stratum of the human psyche, as separate from the rest as it appears to the analysing psychologist: an embodiment of one overgrown function which in its isolation cannot survive. To live, he must replace the function or functions which are atrophied yet indispensable. These functions, "kaum mit matter Spur angedeutet" in himself, are palpably embodied in his opponent. Only together do the tragic protagonists represent that Totalität der Gattung which lived in every Greek. In their reconciliation lies their regeneration. Together, in the closest mutual interdependence, they form one single organism, they share one common life. Apart, they must perish. This is the nature of the relation that holds between Karl Moor and his brother Franz, between Fiesco and Leonore, Luise and Ferdinand, Posa and Carlos, Wallenstein and Max, Elisabeth and Maria, between the two hostile brothers of Messina, and between Demetrius and Romanov. "Ehrt in mir Euch selbst", Maria says to Elisabeth,[1] truly recognising the bond between her 'sister' and herself. Failure to recognise it in time leads to physical death; the refusal to accept it altogether means moral atrophy. - Schiller has repeatedly used the symbol of blood relationship to express the

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1. Maria Stuart. III, 4.

inescapable interdependence of the protagonists; nowhere more poignantly than in Die Braut von Messina, where a great body of imagery combines with the outward action in showing that the two brothers share a common life, and that Don Manuel's murder means Don Caesar's suicide. The community of interest, which the protagonists of the tragedies fail to establish, for the first time becomes realised in Wilhelm Tell, the drama in which Schiller transcends tragedy. By their bond of friendship, Rudenz and Melchthal, and through them, the estates they represent, regain that completeness and integrity which they lacked while they were yet apart.

> Ihr
> Sollt meine Brust, ich will die Eure schützen,
> So sind wir einer durch den anderen stark -
> (IV. 2.)

is Rudenz' formula for their indissoluble unity. And this unity is but the symbolic reflection of the unity within the hero himself. For Wilhelm Tell is the first Schillerian hero who transcends tragic onesidedness. An organism with all its functions intact, he represents the Totalität der Gattung in his individuality; he is a self-sufficient living whole within the larger whole of the nation. And being whole, he masters fate.

Only when we realise how deep-rooted is Schiller's conception of the human spirit as an organism, are we able fully to appreciate the quality of his tragedies. The moral and psychological necessity whereby the individual who has become onesided must perish, has its roots in an all-pervasive natural necessity, whereby the life of an organism depends upon the integration and interaction of all its functions. This is the more true, the higher we move on the ladder of being: truest of the most complex and vulnerable organism, the human being. It is because

the spirit, in becoming onesided, violates the laws of nature, that the ensuing tragedy bears the stamp of finality and universal truth. -

Similarly, it is only when we keep in mind the organic, even the biological connotation which the conception of the individual possessed for Schiller, that we can recognise the peculiar moral complexion of his thought and his tragedies. Critics have universally assumed that Schiller regarded the intellectual functions of the personality as inherently more valuable than the instinctual ones, and that indeed he identified our moral self with the former: and while the Ästhetische Briefe have often enough been recognised as being irreconcilable with this conception, his tragedies themselves have, time and again, been quoted in its support. Such a reading however fails to take account of the dynamic, functional view of the human spirit which is entailed in conceiving it as an organism. All the functions of an organism are equally indispensable to its life. Hence no one function, taken by itself, is good or bad, or better or worse than another. Its goodness or badness is relative to its integration with, and contribution to, the functioning of the whole. The whole is the only standard of value that is absolute. That activity is good which springs from the life of the whole and furthers it. Conversely, any activity, however differentiated in itself, which disengages itself from the living context of the whole and is inimical to it, is bad; the meanings of totality and morality coalesce. This revolutionary conception Schiller formulated with uncompromising sharpness as early as Der Geisterseher, in the Philosophische Gespräch; and he himself felt the conception advanced there to be so out of keeping with the character of the Prince, who expresses it, so direct an intrusion of his own personal credo, that he deleted it in the later

editions of his work. Nowhere, not even in the Ästhetische Briefe, are the moral implications of the organic conception of the human personality brought out as explicitly and forcefully as here. Therefore it is worth while quoting from it at some length. Schiller defines "Schlimm und Gut" as "Prädikate, die eine Handlung erst in der Seele erlange", and "Moralität" as "eine Beziehung, die nur innerhalb der Seele, ausser ihr nie gedacht werden kann."[1] These preliminary definitions are then elaborated as follows: "Sobald wir uns also eine Handlung als in der Seele vorhanden denken, so erscheint sie uns als die Bürgerin einer ganz andern Welt, und nach ganz anderen Gesetzen müssen wir sie richten. Sie gehört einem eigenen Ganzen zu, das seinen Mittelpunkt in sich selbst hat, aus welchem alles fliesst, was es gibt,gegen welchen alles strömt, was es empfänget. Dieser Mittelpunkt oder dieses Principium ist .... nichts anderes als der innewohnende Trieb, alle seine Kräfte zum Wirken zu bringen, oder was eben so viel sagt, zur höchsten Kundmachung seiner Existenz zu gelangen. In diesen Zustand setzen wir die Vollkommenheit des moralischen Wesens, so wie wir eine Uhr vollkommen nennen, wenn alle Theile, woraus der Künstler sie zusammensetzte, der Wirkung entsprechen, um derentwillen er sie zusammensetzte, wie wir ein musikalisches Instrument vollkommen nennen, wenn alle Theile desselben an seiner höchsten Wirkung den höchsten Antheil nehmen, dessen sie fähig und um dessentwillen sie vereinigt sind. Das Verhältniss nun, in welchem die Thätigkeiten des moralischen Wesens zu diesem Principium stehen, bezeichnen wir mit dem Namen der Moralität; und eine Handlung ist moralisch gut oder moralische böse, je nachdem sie sich

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., IV, p. 300.

jenem nähert oder von ihm entfernt, es fördert oder hindert." - "Eine gute Handlung" is one "wobei mehr Kräfte thätig waren, und umgekehrt." "Und dadurch, dass weniger Kräfte bei ihr thätig waren, wird eine schlimme Handlung schlimm, und so umgekehrt."[1]

Thus, once the integration or totality of the spiritual functions is regarded as the absolute moral value, all other values are relative to it. To endow the intellectual functions, the Formtrieb, with an independent moral value denied to the instinctual functions, the Stofftrieb, as Schiller's critics are wont to, is to fly into the face of Schiller's most deeply rooted convictions.[2] Indeed, recognising the over-development of the intellectual functions as the typical feature of modern civilisation, Schiller tends, in the Ästhetische Briefe, to stress the value of the instinctual and emotional functions quite particularly, by way of a corrective against the prevailing tendency. In the 13th letter he writes: "Einem jeden dieser beyden Triebe seine Grenzen zu sichern, ist die Aufgabe der Kultur, die also beiden eine gleiche Gerechtigkeit schuldig ist, und nicht bloss den vernünftigen Trieb gegen den sinnlichen, sondern auch diesen gegen

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1. Ibid., pp. 300-302.
2. Robert Petsch (op.cit., pp. 95 ff.) actually quotes a part of the above passage in evidence of his thesis that tragedy, for Schiller, is caused by the one-sidedness of the human personality. It is almost incredible that in the face of a passage such as this, he should have persisted in operating, as he does throughout the discussion of the tragedies, with a fixed scale of values, whereby the 'moral' function is intrinsically valuable and tragic guilt lies in the excess of the instinctual functions alone. The inability even of this penetrating critic to see, let alone to accept, the conception of morality implied in Schiller's conception of Totalität and made fully explicit in the Geisterseher, only goes to prove the revolutionary nature of Schiller's ideas. His critics, after a century and a half, have not yet begun to catch up with him.

jenen zu behaupten hat."[1] And again, in a footnote to the same letter: "Der schlimme Einfluss einer überwiegenden Sensualität auf unser Denken und Handeln fällt jedermann leicht in die Augen; nicht so leicht, ob er gleich ebenso häufig vorkommt und ebenso wichtig ist, der nachtheilige Einfluss einer überwiegenden Rationalität auf unsre Erkenntniss und auf unser Betragen."[2]

And as in the theory, so in the tragedies. The formal juxtaposition of the portagonists and the analogous opposition of the minor figures reflecting it, tells us that the predominance of the intellectual functions in the one is no better than the predominance of the instinctual functions in the other. No matter which direction onesidedness takes, it falls equally short of the moral ideal, by reason of being onesided. Posa's "Egoism der Vernunft" is as much of an aberration as Carlos' "Egoism der Sinne"; Elizabeth's rationalism as immoral as Maria's blind passion; Rudenz' spiritual arrogance as inadequate as Melchthal's instinctuality. Even Johanna is placed into such a formal relation of juxtaposition to the Queen Mother Isabeau, leader of the rival army, and by this means even her excess of pure spirituality is shown as fundamentally on a par with the licentiousness of the latter, and equally distinguished from true morality. Johanna's exclusive cultivation even

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, pp. 315 f.
2. Ibid., p. 317, ll. 18 ff. The whole of this footnote, as also the preceding one, discusses very movingly the harm that the predominance of the intellectual functions has done in the field of philosophy and science on the one hand and in the moral sphere on the other. These remarks, too long to be quoted here, read like a commentary on his own tragic heroes, and should be read in conjunction with what follows.

of the 'highest' function, is rejected in favour of the cultivation of all functions. Morality lies in the integration and interaction of all functions; and it is in this that Johanna is shown to have failed. For once roused, her instincts are at war with her conscious will. The man she loves is the enemy of the cause her spirit serves.

The overdevelopment of one function does not, however, merely lead to the devitalisation of the rest; having broken the life-cycle which sustained it, and which it sustained, the usurping function luxuriates for a while and then dies. It is the operation of this law which informs Schiller's plays with their characteristic tragic irony, manifest - on the level of the big dramatic symbols - in the inevitable drift of the usurper from the freedom he once championed to tyranny, and thence to death. As has been shown, this outward drift is but the reflection of inner decay: the decay which overtakes the aesthetic function as it usurps the fuller life of the personality.

This pattern of the tragedies, too, is borne out by theory. The decay of the impoverished organism becomes palpable when Schiller, in Der Geisterseher likens the "Mensch, der seine moralische Krone verlor", to a "Frucht, an welcher die Fäulnis nagt."[1] - a passage whose central metaphor sheds a vivid light on the significance of crown and usurper in the tragedies. Again, in the Ästhetische Briefe, the onesided modern individual is likened to verkrüppelte Gewächse, and this simile leaves no doubt that the overdeveloped function must eventually perish together with the organism it has destroyed. This conclusion

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., IV, p. 308, ll. 14 ff.

is amply borne out by the fact that when Schiller comes to describe the modern individual, the organic imagery that had prevailed in the earlier letters, comes to be replaced almost entirely by mechanical images. The individual, formerly a living part of the living social whole, is now characterised as a lifeless fragment, which together with its likes, makes up the artificial life of the state. - Moreover, in a formal argument from first principles Schiller has unanswerably demonstrated the logical impossibility of a onesided existence. "Sobald der Mensch nur Inhalt der Zeit ist," he says, "so ist er nicht, und er hat folglich auch keinen Inhalt. Mit seiner Persönlichkeit ist auch sein Zustand aufgehoben ... Sobald der Mensch nur Form ist, so hat er keine Form, und mit dem Zustand ist folglich auch die Person aufgehoben." (Letter XIII.)[1] The logical correlation of the two basic concepts of Person and Zustand implies that to posit one, we must posit both; analogously, the empirical interdependence of the two functions that correspond to these concepts implies that to preserve one we must preserve both. Unless we are all that we are meant to be, we are naught - a realisation which has left its imprint on the very language of the tragedies: for both Johanna, who seeks to be pure Person, and Beatrice, who is the embodiment of pure Zustand, refer to themselves alike in the third person: this impersonality betokens that in a deeper sense both alike, being onesided, lack 'personhood'. Thus from his first principles Schiller is led to the central conception of the Ästhetische Briefe: the conception of a "Wechselwirkung zwischen beyden Trieben, wo die Wirksamkeit des einen die Wirksamkeit des andern zugleich begründet und begrenzt, und

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 319, ll. 2 ff.

wo jeder einzelne für sich gerade dadurch zu seiner höchsten Verkündigung gelangt, dass der andere thätig ist." (Letter XIV.)[1] The argument seems to have come full circle. The organic interdependence of functions that characterised the human spirit at the dawn of civilisation, is put before us as the ideal of the future. Indeed, it is as Schiller has adumbrated in an earlier letter: "Die Philosophie selbst, welche uns zuerst von ihr abtrünnig machte, ruft uns laut und dringend in den Schooss der Natur zurück - "[2] (Letter VIII.): Schiller shows the necessity of a return to an organic form of spiritual life. But it is not merely a return he stipulates; it is a return on a higher plane. For the integrity entailed by the ideal of "Wechselwirkung" is vastly different from the primordial unity of the Greek spirit "bey jenem schönen Erwachen der Geistes-Kräfte."[3] What lies between that beginning and the final goal is nothing less than civilisation, with its opposition, progressive differentiation and specification of latent tendencies. Unlike Rousseau, Schiller accepts this process as the very condition of upward development. In the 13th letter we read: "Seine Kultur wird also darin bestehen: erstlich: dem empfangenden Vermögen die vielfältigsten Berührungen mit der Welt zu verschaffen, und auf Seiten des Gefühls die Passivität aufs Höchste zu treiben; zweytens: dem bestimmenden Vermögen die höchste Unabhängigkeit von dem empfangenden zu erwerben, and auf Seiten der Vernuft die Aktivität aufs Höchste zu treiben."[4] Differentiation and

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1. Ibid., p. 320, ll. 4 ff.
2. Ibid., P. 297, ll. 25 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 287, l. 28.
4. Ibid., p. 316, ll. 21 ff.

specialisation, the curse and potential blessing of modern civilisation, are to be intensified to the utmost limit. But this is not sufficient. The opposing tendencies are to be organised in an encompassing unity, in such a way that the surplus energy of each contributes to the life of the other, which limits and sustains it, and both together sustain and are sustained by the whole they form.[1] Out of this unity of intensified opposites - "Aus der Wechselwirkung zwey entgegengesetzter Triebe und aus der Verbindung zwey entgegengesetzter Principien - "[2] (letter XVI) - a new function emerges. And so close is the analogy of the spiritual process described by Schiller with the evolution of a higher form of organic life from a lower one, that we may well summarize it in the concluding words of a scientific essay by Goethe: "Was in die Erscheinung tritt," says Goethe in the short essay entitled Polarität, "muss sich trennen, um nur zu erscheinen. Das Getrennte sucht sich wieder, und es kann sich wieder finden und vereinigen; im niederen Sinne, indem es sich nur mit einem Entgegengestellten vermischt, mit demselben

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1. This conception of a symbiosis, or community of interest, is elaborated in the last paragraph of letter XIII. It will be noticed how closely this ideal of a unity of intensified opposites is anticipated in the Philosophische Gespräch of Der Geisterseher, where "Vollkommenheit" is defined as that condition of the whole, "wenn alle Theile desselben an seiner höchsten Wirkung den höchsten Antheil nehmen, dessen sie fähig sind und um dessentwillen sie vereinigt sind." (Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., IV, pp. 300-301.) The failure to recognise Schiller's insistence on differentiation as the condition of spiritual reintegration is the mark of that section of Schiller's critics who approach him from a Georgean point of view. Stressing the return to some vague hellenic beauty, they inevitably romanticise Schiller and rob his vision of human development of the power and precision which it possesses because it is based on the apprehension of universal laws of nature.
2. Ibid., p. 328, ll. 26 ff.

zusammentritt, wobei die Erscheinung Null oder wenigstens gleichgültig wird. Die Vereinigung kann aber auch im höheren Sinne geschehen, indem das Getrennte sich zuerst steigert und durch die Verbindung der gesteigerten Seiten ein Drittes, Neues, Höheres, Unerwartetes hervorbringt."[1] The "Dritte, Neue, Höhere, Unerwartete", which results from the union of the intensified opposites of the human psyche, is the Spieltrieb. Schiller addresses it and the activity engendered by it as "die höchste aller Schenkungen," die Schenkung der Menschheit", as "unsere zweite Schöpferin". (letter XXI.)[2] And indeed, does not the aesthetic activity re-create us in a deep sense of the word, not only because it discloses to us the living form of beauty outside ourselves, but more essentially because, in that momentary "Vereinigung und Auswechslung der Materie mit der Form" (Letter XXV)[3] that in the aesthetic act occurs within us, the human spirit itself becomes living form and thus fulfils its destination as the highest of Nature's organic creations?

To sum up Schiller's aesthetic treatise in the words of a scientific essay written some ten years later by Goethe, is neither an arbitrary confusion of distinct spheres of thought nor an anachronism. As has been seen, the conception of the human spirit as a natural organism is not only basic to the Ästhetische Briefe, but can be traced back to the beginnings of Schiller's thought, and recurs in closest connection with his speculations on the effect and function of art. Indeed, it is no wonder that an artist

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1. Goethes Werke, Weimar Ausgabe. II, 11. p. 166.
2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 348, 11. 6 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 386, 11. 7 ff.

with a medical background and training, reflecting upon the bearing of the aesthetic activity on the human personality as a whole, should do so in terms of the scientific conceptions familiar to him. Schiller thus naturally tended to see a connection between these two spheres, and in this predisposition he was decisively confirmed by Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft. Here the aesthetic discipline and that of the organic sciences are shown in their intrinsic connection. For the central conception indispensable for both is that of organic form. This unity is reflected in the very structure of the third Critique, which falls into two main parts dealing in strictly parallel fashion with the products of art and of organic nature respectively. It was this unifying approach which caused Goethe to cherish the Critique from his first study of it in 1790 onwards.[1] Here he found the confirmation he needed that his artistic and scientific activities were not disparate, but complementary, and that the processes he discerned operating throughout the organic realm of nature, were the same as those which operated in his creative imagination. One man at least had grasped "dass die höchste und einzige Operation der Natur und Kunst die Gestaltung sei ..."[2]

Thus, by the time Goethe and Schiller met, in July 1794, each had been reinforced by Kant in his natural impulse to regard aesthetic and natural organic phenomena as related. The famous conversation that took place after

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1. Cf. the essays Einwirkung der neueren Philosophie, Bildungstrieb, Anschauende Urteilskraft. Furthermore cf. Goethe to Eckermann, 11. April 1827 and also his letter to Zelter, 29. Jan. 1830. In Campagne in Frankreich Goethe owns that Kant's scientific writings had first given him the idea of the 'Urpolarität aller Wesen'. (Goethes Werke, ed. cit., I, 33. p. 196.)

2. Goethes Werke, ed. cit., 200. p. 192. Letter to Zelter 30. Oct. 1808.

a session of the Gesellschaft der Naturfreunde they had both attended, has been reported differently by Goethe and Schiller. According to Goethe's account in the Annalen vom Jahre 1794, the subject of the conversation was his own morphological approach to nature conceived as "wirkend und lebendig, aus dem Ganzen in die Teile strebend", and this was followed up by a demonstration of the metamorphosis of plants; the morphological context of the conversation is even more emphasised in the introductory paragraph added to the same account in Glückliches Ereignis.[1] According to Schiller's account to Körner, written soon after the meeting, on Sept. 1st, 1794, the topics of the same conversation were "Kunst und Kunsttheorie".[2] There is no need whatever to assume a faulty recollection on Goethe's part, as has often been done; for there is no real discrepancy between the two accounts. They suggest, rather, that the centre of interest of the conversation was the underlying conception of organic form which links the aesthetic and scientific spheres, and with which both men, albeit from different points of view, were equally preoccupied. That the one remembered the scientific aspect uppermost in his mind and the other the aesthetic aspect from which he was accustomed to approach the problem, matters little: they were both talking about the same problem of "Gestaltung". This is supported by the fact that in his first letter to Schiller after the meeting Goethe encloses an essay "worin er die Erklärung der Schönheit, dass sie Vollkommenheit mit Freiheit sei, auf organische Naturen anwendet."[3] The fact that this essay was sent to Schiller

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1. Goethes Werke, ed. cit., II, 11. Allgemeine Naturlehre, I, p.17.
2. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit., IV, p.2.
3. Ibid., p.2.

without explanation or comment, and clearly in direct continuation of their conversation, would seem to indicate that the central topic of that earlier talk had been form as the basic phenomenon of art and organic nature.

During Schiller's stay in Goethe's house, which followed shortly upon this conversation, Goethe acquainted him in detail with his own morphological and optical studies.[1] From Schiller's report to Körner it becomes clear that it is the connection between Goethe's scientific activities and his "poetischer Charakter", which interests him in particular. Indeed, this emerges already quite clearly from the letter to Goethe of Aug. 23rd. 1794, which followed the meeting in Jena and inaugurated their friendship. Schiller recognises, as no one before him had done, that the deepest significance of Goethe's scientific studies lies in their connection with his artistic development. To him, Goethe's unique achievement is that he let his creative activity and its products be permeated with the very laws of nature which disciplined intuition had disclosed to him. It is his scientific studies which enabled Goethe, "Ihrer Imagination das, was ihr die Wirklichkeit vorenthielt, durch Nachhilfe der Denkkraft zu ersetzen, und so gleichsam

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1. Cf. Schiller's letter to his wife, Sept. 16, 1794. Ibid., p. 18. Also Schiller's letter to Körner, Oct. 8, 1794. Ibid., p. 39. The extent of Schiller's active interest in Goethe's scientific studies can be gathered from a tribute Goethe pays to him in Die Geschichte der Farbenlehre. He recalls, "wie er an meinem Bestreben lebhaften Antheil genommen, sich mit den Phänomenen bekannt zu machen gesucht, ja sogar mit einigen Vorrichtungen umgeben, um sich an denselben vergnüglich zu belehren. Durch die grosse Natürlichkeit seines Genies ergriff er nicht nur schnell die Hauptpuncte, worauf es ankam; sondern wenn ich manchmal auf meinem beschaulichen Wege zögerte, nöthigte er mich durch seine reflektierende Kraft vorwärts zu eilen, und riss mich gleichsam an das Ziel, wohin ich strebte." Goethes Werke, ed. cit., II, 4. p. 310.

von innen heraus und auf rationalem Wege ein Griechenland zu gebären"; it is they which enabled him, "die alte, Ihrer Einbildungskraft schon aufgedrungene, schlechtere Natur nach dem besseren Muster, das Ihr bildender Geist sich erschuf, [zu] korrigieren."[1]

Words such as these inevitably recall the Ästhetische Briefe, written in their first draft before the decisive rapprochement with Goethe had taken place, and now about to be cast in their final shape. For the long cherished plan finally advanced in these letters bears a curious resemblance to the pattern Schiller had discerned in Goethe's own development. Here Schiller points the way through art to a higher form of nature, just as he had recognised Goethe's way as leading through nature to a higher form of art. And because nature, in the modern world, has deviated from her norm and herself stands in need of correction, it is the conscious intellect which must lead the way to either goal. As Goethe must reach his goal "durch die Nachhilfe der Denkkraft", "auf rationalem Wege", so Schiller declares: "die Philosophie selbst, welche uns zuerst von ihr abtrünnig machte, ruft uns laut und dringend in den Schoos der Natur zurück",[2] thus outlining his own philosophical task. It is because Goethe's development, but for a reversal of emphasis, was the same as that which Schiller envisaged for himself and his time, because scientific education fulfilled an analogous function in Goethe's life to that of aesthetic education in the thought and being of Schiller, that the latter was able to size up so precisely the pattern of Goethe's development and the place of science in it. That reconstitution of the human personality according to

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1. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit., Vol. III, pp. 471 f.
2. Ästhetische Briefe, Letter VIII, Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 297, ll. 24 ff.

the laws of organic nature which is Goethe's means to a higher mode of aesthetic creativity, is the final goal of Schiller, and vice versa. This goal became capable of more precise definition, once Schiller entered into direct contact with Goethe, became acquainted with his scientific studies and could observe the way his mind worked. The residue of this revelation is to be found in the final version of the Ästhetische Briefe, composed in the first flush of friendship in the weeks that followed his first visit to Weimar. It is Goethe's image that is reflected in the central conception of these letters: the conception of a Wechselwirkung between the opposed functions of the psyche, whereby the human spirit is defined as a natural organism governed in its upward ascent by the developmental processes that operate throughout the organic realm of nature. And we may surmise that it is this dynamic conception of an ideal yet to be realized, as much as the lovely description of the Greek past, which Schiller had in mind when he wrote to Goethe "Sie werden in diesen Briefen Ihr Portrait finden, worunter ich gern Ihren Namen geschrieben hätte..."[1]

That Goethe, in his turn, recognized in the letters that organic totality to which he aspired in his being and creating, is evident from the acknowledgment that he found therein "was ich für Recht seit langer Zeit erkannte, was ich theils lebte und theils zu leben wünschte..." it is especially clear from his concluding words: "so wollen wir getrost und unverrückt so fort leben und wircken und uns in unserm Seyn und Wollen ein Ganzes dencken, um unser Stückwerck nur einigermassen vollständig zu machen."[2]

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1. 20 Oct. 94. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit., IV, p. 40.
2. 26 Oct. 94. Goethes Werke, ed. cit., IV, p.203.

It is only when the Ästhetische Briefe are read as a morphological study of the human spirit that we can do justice to the depth and precision of their thought, and to their historical significance as the first document of a remarkable partnership.

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3.

The previous section of this chapter has advanced an explanation for two of the three main characteristics of Schiller's tragedies: the tragic theme of onesidedness and the structural characteristic of externalisation. But by that very token, how are we to explain the third recurrent feature of Schillerian tragedy, the contemplative character of the tragic hero? Why should the hero, afflicted as he is with the tragic flaw of onesidedness, assume a contemplative pose, an appearance of totality, which directly contradicts his tragic condition? The Ästhetische Briefe, it is true, contain a pointer in the direction of our hypothesis. In the 21st letter Schiller discusses the effect and function of the aesthetic state. It restores to man that totality which he possesses potentially "schon vor jedem bestimmten Zustand, in den er kommen kann," but which in point of fact he loses "mit jedem bestimmten Zustand in den er kommt." [1] In a footnote Schiller then distinguishes between two characteristic reactions evinced by two psychological types vis à vis the determinacy of reality and the loss of potentiality it implies. "Gewisse Charaktere...", he says, "können den Zustand der Bestimmungslosigkeit nicht lang ertragen, und dringen ungeduldig auf ein Resultat, welches sie in dem Zustand ästhetischer Unbegrenztheit nicht finden. Dahingegen breitet sie bey andern, welche ihren Genuss mehr in das Gefühl des ganzen Vermögens als einer einzelnen Handlung desselben setzen, der ästhetische Zustand in eine weit grössere Fläche aus. So sehr die ersten sich vor der Leerheit fürchten , so wenig können die letzten Beschränkung vertragen." This distinction is finally

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1. Sämmtliche Werke, ed.cit., X. p.348, ll. 7 ff.

clinched in the concluding sentence, which runs as follows: "Ich brauche kaum zu erinnern, dass die ersten fürs Detail und für subalterne Geschäfte, die letzten, vorausgesetzt dass sie mit diesem Vermögen zugleich Realität vereinen, fürs Ganze und zu grossen Rollen gebohren sind." [1]

The words Grosse Rollen forge a surprising link between this passage and the dramatis personae of Schiller's tragedies. For is not that unwillingness to accept constraint which Schiller regards as characteristic of the man of parts, the distinguishing mark of the tragic hero? Fiesco's words: "Nicht der Tummelplatz des Lebens - sein Gehalt bestimmt seinen Wert" (III,2.); Wallenstein's "Es macht mir Freude, meine Macht zu kennen" (Pic. II, 5.), "Die Freiheit reizte mich und das Vergnügen" (Tod, I.4.); Elisabeth's "Was man nicht aufgibt, hat man nicht verloren" (Maria Stuart, II.5) -: all these betoken that deep reluctance to exchange unlimited potentiality for limited reality, the riches of contemplation for the rigours of action which, Schiller tells us, is the mark of a character cut out for Grosse Rollen. Thus the Ästhetische Briefe concur with the tragedies in stressing the contemplative tendency of the tragic hero, just as both had concurred in defining onesidedness as the tragic fact. Why however the tragic hero should evince a tendency so conflicting with his actual condition, and what manner of connection may hold between the two, the Ästhetische Briefe do not say. To answer these questions, we must turn to Schiller's other aesthetic writings, notably to the essay Über das Pathetische.

In his review of Matthisson's poems Schiller is led to define the aesthetic sensation in contradistinction to the merely pleasant sensation: he concludes that whilst

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1. ibid., p. 348, ll. 24 ff.

the latter bears the character of freedom, the distinguishing mark of the former is that it combines freedom and necessity. The meaning of this general statement becomes much clearer from the definition that follows it: poetry is the art "uns durch einen freyen Effect unsrer productiven Einbildungskraft in bestimmte Empfindungen zu versetzen." [1] The first function which an object, to be aesthetic, must fulfil is to evoke a free imaginative response. The second function is to evoke a controlled response. These two requirements, Schiller argues, at first sight seem to be mutually contradictory. For according to the first "müsste unsere Einbildungskraft herrschen und keinem andern als ihrem eigenen Gesetz gehorchen"; according to the second, on the other hand, "müsste sie dienen und dem Gesetz des Dichters gehorchen." [2] The apparent contradiction, however, is easily resolved. For the law of association which governs the aesthetic imagination, is not purely subjective and arbitrary. It is itself governed by the nature of things and the objective connections that hold between them. Thus the productive imagination, contrary to mere roaming fancy, has its own secret and universal law. By observing that law, the poet can calculate and control the imaginative response he evokes. Yet, since it is the law of the imagination itself which he observes, the resultant response will nevertheless be free. To be true to the law of the productive imagination, however, means to be true to the nature of things. Thus by presenting to the imagination "das reine Object" [3] the poet

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1. ibid., X. p. 238, ll. 23 ff.
2. ibid., p. 239, ll. 1 ff.
3. ibid., p. 239, l. 29.

ensures its autonomous activity, controlled, yet free.[1] Not only is there no contradiction between these two effects. They are inseparable, and to try and attain one without the other is to forfeit both. "...denn sobald der Dichter das Spiel unserer Einbildungskraft durch keine innere Notwendigkeit lenken kann, so muss er es entweder durch eine äussere lenken, und dann ist es nicht mehr unsre Wirkung; oder er wird es gar nicht lenken, und dann ist es nicht mehr seine Wirkung; und doch muss schlechterdings beides beysammen sein, wenn ein Werk poetisch heissen soll."[2] The final conclusion is "dass die höchste Freyheit gerade nur durch die höchste Bestimmtheit möglich ist."[3] What

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1. Schiller's explanation of the laws governing artistic creation is modelled extremely closely on Kant's discussion of the aesthetic effect of the work of art on the recipient. When we make an aesthetic judgment about an object, Kant says in the Kritik der aesthetischen Urteilskraft, we are aware of the "freie Gesetzmässigkeit der Einbildungskraft" in relation to this object. We feel that our imagination is at once "frei und doch von selbst gesetzmässig ..., d.i. dass sie eine Autonomie bei sich führe..." This apparent paradox Kant resolves in precisely the same way as Schiller did after him. The laws of the productive imagination - which Kant, like Schiller, distinguishes from the imagination in its reproductive function, - coincide with the laws of the understanding which in their turn determine the laws of natural objects. cf. Allgemeine Anmerkung zum ersten Abschnitte der Analytik, ed.cit., pp. 99 ff.

2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 241, ll. 15 ff.

3. ibid., p. 239, ll. 10 f.

goes for poetry, goes for all art. In the preface to Die Braut von Messina the same conviction is formulated in general terms: "Auf der Wahrheit selbst, auf dem festen und tiefen Grunde der Natur errichtet sie [die Kunst] ihr ideales Gebäude." [1] And indeed the same principle extends to whatever aesthetic ingredients are possessed by a work of nature or an artifact, whether, taken as a whole, these are aesthetic or not. In the essay entitled Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen, in which Schiller distinguishes between scientific, popular and poetic diction, he reaches identical conclusions. The mark of poetic diction, he says, lies "in einem glücklichen Verhältniss zwischen äusserer Freyheit und innerer Nothwendigkeit..." [2] "Die Begriffe entwickeln sich nach dem Gesetz der Nothwendigkeit, aber nach dem Gesetz der Freyheit gehen sie an der Einbildungskraft vorüber." [3] And here again, Schiller does not consider these opposing requisites of poetic diction, i.e. diction with a claim to aesthetic value - to be incompatible in reality and at best seemingly reconciled by the poet's skill. They are genuinely evoked, one through the other, because so far from being incompatible, the existence of each depends upon that of the other. "Das wahrhaft Schöne gründet sich auf die strengste Bestimmtheit, ... auf die höchste innere Nothwendigkeit; nur" - Schiller significantly adds - "muss diese Bestimmt--heit sich eher finden lassen, als gewaltsam hervordrängen." [4]

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., XIV, p.5, ll. 18 f.
2. Sammtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p.394, ll. 15 f.
3. ibid., p. 395, ll. 3 ff.
4. ibid., p. 398, ll. 24 ff.

The true artist "studiert ... den menschlichen Bau unter dem Messer des Anatomikers, steigt in die unterste Tiefe, um auf der Oberfläche wahr zu seyn, und frägt bey der ganzen Gattung herum, um dem Individuum sein Recht zu erweisen." The true poet "behorcht ... die Menschheit in seiner eigenen Brust, um ihr unendlich wechselndes Spiel auf der weiten Bühne der Welt zu verstehen..." [1] Each time it is the poet's imaginative apprehension of the reine Object in its necessity, which ensures an imaginative response that is both free and controlled; whether the object be a system of logical relations, as in a treatise, the human body, as in a work of plastic art, or the human soul which is the object of the poet.

But, according to the definition advanced in the review of Matthisson's poems, art does something more than merely stimulate the imagination. Its primary task is to induce an emotional response: "uns durch den freyen Effect unsrer productiven Einbildungskraft in bestimmte Empfindungen zu versetzen." [2] This second operation involves an apparent contradiction analogous to that encountered before. The emotions aroused by any given object, like the imaginative associations it evokes, would seem to differ as between one individual and the next, as between one time and another: yet the poet's task is to induce "bestimmte Empfindungen." This problem is solved in an analogous fashion to that presented by the imagination. As the poet controls the imagination by presenting what is objectively true, so he controls the

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1. ibid., p. 406, ll. 4 ff.
2. ibid., p. 283, ll. 23 ff.

emotions by communicating feelings which are universally valid. To be universally valid, Schiller argues in the review of Matthisson's poems, the emotional response of the poet must not be restricted to his particular individuality or his particular situation: it must be capable of being shared by any given person at any given moment. "Der Dichter kann also nur insofern unsre Empfindungen bestimmen, als er sie der Gattung in uns, nicht unserm specifisch verschiedenen Selbst, abfodert. Um aber versichert zu seyn, dass er sich auch wirklich an die reine Gattung in den Individuen wende, muss er selbst zuvor das Individuum in sich ausgelöscht und zur Gattung gesteigert haben."[1] He must respond as "Mensch überhaupt"[2]. Thus for art to discharge its function of inducing an imaginative activity itself controlled by a dominant emotional response, the reine Object must be apprehended by and permeated with, the reine Subject or, as Schiller has it, the reine Gattung.[3]

This second requisite of art is stressed emphatically throughout Schiller's aesthetic writings, as early as the review of Bürger's poems. The two attacks on Bürger are indeed concerned with little besides the necessity of what Schiller, for short, calls "idealisierte Empfindungen".[4] It is they and they alone that become communicable and thus create the impression of sincerity and spontaneity. "Mennschlich heisst uns die Schilderung eines Affekts, nicht

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1. ibid., p. 240, ll. 17 ff.
2. ibid., p. 240, l. 25.
3. ibid., p. 240, l. 21.
4. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., vol. VI, p. 336, l. 9.

weil sie darstellt, was ein einzelner Mensch wirklich so empfunden, sondern was alle Menschen ohne Unterschied mit empfinden müssen." [1] And the operation by which the poet can arrive at feelings that are universally communicable, already here is the same as that later described in Über Matthison's Gedichte : ".....Kann dies wohl anders geschehen," Schiller asks, "als dass gerade soviel Lokales und Individuales davon weggenommen wird, als jener allgemeinen Mitheilbarkeit Abbruch tun würde?" [2] And he goes on to urge "dass an der selbsteignen Person des Dichters nur insofern etwas liegen kann, als sie die Gattung vorstellig macht..." [3] "Will er .... einen Kunstzweck erreichen, d.i. will er allgemein rühren, so entschliesse er sich von seiner noch so sehr geliebten Individualität in einigen Stücken Abschied zu nehmen... alles, was ausschliessend nur an seinem einzelnen, umschränkten, befangenen Selbst haftet, und alles, was der Empfindung, die er darstellt, ungleichartig ist, davon zu scheiden..." [4]

In the review of Matthison's poems, Schiller sums up the position he has reached as follows: "Von jedem Dichter--werke werden also folgende zwey Eigenschaften unnachlass--lich gefodert : erstlich : nothwendige Beziehung auf seinen Gegenstand (objective Wahrheit); zweytens : nothwendige Beziehung dieses Gegenstandes, oder doch der Schilderung desselben, auf das Empfindungsvermögen (subjective Allgemeinheit)." [5] The second requisite of poetry,

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1. ibid., p. 336, ll. 16 ff.
2. ibid., p. 336, ll. 19 ff.
3. ibid., p. 336, ll. 31 ff.
4. ibid., p. 337, ll. 5 ff.
5. ibid., p. 240, ll. 29 ff.

he goes on to explain however, modifies the first. To induce a free yet controlled imaginative response, the poet must present the reine Object. But this, it now turns out, can never be any given wirkliche Object: for the empirically real is always a special case of its kind; its particularity will evoke particular emotions that are unique to the experience of it and it alone, and thus incapable of being universally communicated. "In einem Gedicht muss alles wahre Natur seyn, denn die Einbildungs--kraft gehorcht keinem anderen Gesetze, und erträgt keinen andern Zwang, als den die Natur der Dinge ihr vorschreibt; in einem Gedicht darf aber nichts wirkliche (historische) Natur seyn, denn alle Wirklichkeit ist mehr oder weniger Beschränkung jener allgemeinen Naturwahrheit. Jeder individuelle Mensch ist gerade um soviel weniger Mensch, als er individuell ist; jede Empfindungsweise ist gerade um soviel weniger nothwendig und rein menschlich, als sie einem bestimmten Subject eigenthümlich ist." [1] Thus in the creative act, the individuality of the object, no less than that of the subject, must be transcended. The individualising tendency of the imagination which Schiller discusses at length in Über die Nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen, [2] must be modified by the generality of the emotion which permits the object to be apprehended only in its generic character. This double operation, in which subject and object are divested of their particularity, is the secret of poetry. "Nur in Wegwerfung des Zufälligen und in dem reinen Ausdruck des

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1. ibid., pp. 240. f.

2. ibid., p. 390, ll. 8 ff.

Nothwendigen" - Schiller concludes his argument - "liegt der grosse Styl." [1]

This distinction between the poetically true and the historically or empirically real is so basic to the argument advanced in this chapter, that it is necessary to document it as fully as possible. It is already implicit in Über das Gegenwärtige Teutsche Theater, where the crass naturalism prevalent in contemporary English and German drama is regarded as no less remote from poetic truth than the artificialities of French Classicism. And already here the operation is indicated by which the empirically real is transmuted into the aesthetic: the "Finnen und Leberflekken" [2] of nature, i.e. the specific and accidental, however magnified, do not make art. In the essay Über die tragische Kunst, the same distinction recurs more explicitly. By a "treue Darstellung des wirklich Geschehenen" [3] the tragic poet falls short of his own end of inducing a controlled emotional response. To achieve it, he must leave empirical reality and be true solely to "dem strengen Gesetz der Naturwahrheit, welche man im Gegensatz von der historischen die poetische Wahrheit nennt." [4] So divergent are these two spheres that "bey strenger Beobachtung der historischen Wahrheit nicht selten die poetische leiden, und umgekehrt bey grober Verletzung der historischen die poetische um so mehr gewinnen kann." [5] The same distinction is made in the review of Bürger's poems. By his faithful portrayal of a given emotion, the poet

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1. ibid., p. 241, ll. 9 f.
2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., II, p.344, ll.5-6.
3. Sammtliche Schriften, ed.cit., X, p. 37, l.3.
4. ibid., p. 37, ll. 13 ff.
5. ibid., p. 37, ll. 15 ff.

merely achieves "einen historischen Zweck": he informs his readers of a particular event "das in ihm selbst vorgegangen." [1] This is sharply distinguished from the "Kunstzweck" the poet sets out to achieve: to achieve that end, the poet has to strip the empirical experience which had taken place "unter gewissen Umständen", of all its accidentals, eliminating "alles, was der Empfindung, die er darstellt ungleichartig ist." [2] The break with naturalism is finally accomplished in Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie, Here Schiller states "dass die Kunst nur dadurch wahr ist, dass sie das Wirkliche ganz verlässt und rein ideell wird," [3] and he draws the important consequence "dass der Künstler kein einziges Element aus der Wirklichkeit brauchen kann, wie er es findet, dass sein Werk in allen seinen Theilen ideell sein muss, wenn es als ein Ganzes Realität haben und mit der Natur übereinstimmen soll." [4] This same conviction has already been formulated in almost identical terms in a letter to Goethe, written a few years earlier: "Der Neuere..." Schiller writes, "schlägt sich mühselig und ängstlich mit Zufälligkeiten und Nebendingen herum, und über dem Bestreben der Wirklichkeit recht nahe zu kommen, beladet er sich mit dem Leeren und Unbedeutenden, und darüber läuft er Gefahr, die tiefliegende Wahrheit zu verlieren, worin eigentlich alles Poetische liegt. Er möchte gern einen wirklichen Fall vollkommen nachahmen, und bedenkt nicht, dass eine poetische Darstellung mit der Wirklichkeit eben darum, weil sie absolut wahr ist, niemals koinzidieren kann." [5]

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., VI, p.337, ll.1.ff.
2. ibid., p.337.
3. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., XIV, p.6. ll. 18.ff.
4. ibid., p.6. ll. 28 ff.
5. 4 April 94. Schillers Briefe, ed.cit., V, pp.167 ff.

It was the business of art, then, to be true: "wahrer als alle Wirklichkeit und realer als alle Erfahrung."[1] For only by being true can art communicate that universal emotion which it is its highest purpose to evoke. The letter to Goethe confirms what the review of Matthison's poems had suggested: that the operation whereby the real is transmuted into the true and thus into the aesthetically potent, is one of apprehending the object in its pure generic character. "Der wirkliche Fall" can never be aesthetic: its essence is obscured by the accidentals and the inessentials, the "Zufälligkeiten und Nebendingen", that cluster around it, and make it and the emotions occasioned by it, too unique to be communicable. The portrayal of the "wirkliche Fall" - the unique emotion, situation, action, character - is a private record; it informs of itself, but does not communicate itself. This typical and generic character of the aesthetic object is stressed everywhere. It is touched upon in Über das Gegenwärtige Teutsche Theater. In the review of Bürger's poems, Schiller recalls Lessing's precept "keine Selten--heiten, keine streng individuellen Charaktere und Situationen darzustellen",[2] and he only dissents from Lessing in that he does not confine this principle to the tragedian, but extends it to the lyrical poet who must maintain "eine gewisse Allgemeinheit in den Gemüthsbewegungen, die er schildert."[3] In Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen a new category is introduced to express the generality and indeterminacy of the aesthetic object: constituted as it is by generic

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., XIV, p.6. l. 27.
2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., VI, p.326, ll. 1 f.
3. ibid., p. 326, ll. 3 f.

properties, its individual existence is conceived as possible, rather than actual: "Der schöne Schriftsteller stellt uns die Sache, von der er handelt, vielmehr als möglich ... vor, als dass er uns von der Wirklichkeit ... derselben überzeugen könnte ..." [1] And the same category recurs in the Ästhetische Briefe, where the artist is exhorted "aus dem Bunde des Möglichen mit dem Nothwendigen das Ideal zu erzeugen," and to leave to the common intelligence "die Sphäre des Wirklichen." [2] The preface to Die Braut von Messina, finally, in a passage which reveals the influence both of Kant's conception of the Ding an sich and of Goethe's conception of the Urphänomen, justifies on ultimate philosophical grounds the typical character of the aesthetic object. Goethe's maxim "dass die Erfahrung nur die Hälfte der Erfahrung ist" [3] holds good not only for cognitive experience but for aesthetic experience par excellence. The aesthetic object is not 'given' any more than the object of knowledge. The aesthetic act in which we apprehend it, itself is an act of synthesising subject and object, ideal and empirical components. Thus Schiller says: "Die Natur selbst ist nur eine Idee des Geistes, die nie in die Sinne fällt. Unter der Decke der Erscheinungen liegt sie, aber sie selbst kommt niemals zur Erscheinung. Bloss der Kunst des Ideals ist es verliehen, oder vielmehr, es ist ihr aufgeben, diesen Geist des Alls zu ergreifen und in einer körperlichen Form zu binden. Auch sie selbst kann ihn zwar nie vor die Sinne, aber doch durch ihre schaffende

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., X, p.395, ll.16.ff.
2. Letter IX, ibid., p.301, ll. 4 ff.
3. Maximen und Reflexionen, No. 1072. ed. Hecker, Schriften der Goethe Gesellschaft, XXI, 1907; or Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen, No. 751 ed. Müller. Stuttgart, 1943.

Gewalt vor die Einbildungskraft bringen und dadurch wahrer seyn als alle Wirklichkeit und realer als alle Erfahrung." [1] This 'ideal' nature "ein treuer Maler des Wirklichen" is bound to miss: "er wird die zufälligen Erscheinungen, aber nie den Geist der Natur ergreifen." [2] That "die Kunst des Ideals" consists in apprehending its objects in their typical, generic character, becomes plain from the main argument, regarding the nature and function of the chorus. The chorus is introduced into drama, finally to sever its sphere from reality - as "eine lebendige Mauer ..., die die Tragödie um sich herumzieht, um sich von der wirklichen Welt rein abzuschliessen und sich ihren idealen Boden, ihre poetische Freiheit zu bewahren." [3] It succeeds in this its function "die individuell auf uns eindringende Wirklichkeit von uns entfernt zu halten," [4] bystressing, in a variety of ways, the generic character of man, the object of tragedy. The chorus, musing as it does about "das Menschliche überhaupt," [5] and embodying reflection, that tendency of the human mind which "immer von dem Besonderen ins Allgemeine gehen will" [6] is thus

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., XIV, p.6. ll. 20 f.
2. ibid., p. 5. ll. 32 f.
3. ibid., p. 7. ll. 29 f.
4. Schiller's Briefe, ed.cit., V. p. 310. (letter to Goethe, June, 26. Dec. 1797.)
5. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed.cit., XIV, p.10. ll. 10 f.
6. ibid., p. 9. ll. 33 f.

"selbst kein Individuum, sondern ein allgemeiner Begriff."[1] It personifies - and magnifies - thetypical in a threefold fashion: representing it, presenting it, and voicing it. But it does more. By its reflective presence, the chorus breaks the violence with which the action affects the spectator; not only by interspersing the violent action with the calmness of its reflections and by thus imbuing the spectator with its own reflective mood, but principally by modifying the passion of the dramatic characters themselves: "denn sie sind keine wirklichen Wesen, die bloss der Gewalt des Moments gehorchen und bloss ein Individuum darstellen, sondern ideale Personen und Repräsentanten ihrer Gattung, die das Tiefe der Menscheit aussprechen. Die Gegenwart des Chors, der als ein richtender Zeuge sie vernimmt und die ersten Ausbrüche ihrer Leidenschaft durch seine Dazwischenkunft bändigt, motiviert die Besonnenheit, mit der sie handeln, und die Würde mit der sie reden."[2] By the introduction of the chorus, therefore, action and character no less than the reflective element in tragedy, are subjected to the same idealising treatment, in accordance with the principle that "der Künstler kein einziges Element aus der Wirklichkeit brauchen kann, wie er es findet, dass sein Werk in allen seinen Teilen ideell sein muss, wenn es als Ganzes Realität haben und mit der Natur über--einstimmen soll."[3] Each time the universal, typical character of the compositional ingredient is brought to the fore; and especially the prevalence of the generic in the

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1. ibid., p. 10, ll. 6 f.
2. ibid., p. 11, ll. 24 f.
3. ibid., p. 6, ll. 28 f.

characters is psychologically motivated by the presence of the chorus. Through the latter, the passions of the characters themselves are filtered. They are able to contemplate their active selves from a distance as it were; they become aesthetic beings themselves and thus are able directly to induce in the spectator the aesthetically transmuted emotions proper to a work of art. "Sie stehen gewissermassen schon auf einem natürlichen Theater," - so Schiller concludes the main argument of the preface - "weil sie vor Zuschauern sprechen und handeln, und werden eben deswegen desto tauglicher, von dem Kunst-Theater zu einem Publikum zu reden." [1]

With this discussion of the dramatis personae in the more general context of what makes any given object aesthetic we have arrived at Über das Pathetische. It is in this essay that Schiller discusses at length by what specific operation man, the principal object of tragedy, becomes aesthetically tractable. And it is in this essay too that the surprising connection between the generic and the aesthetic character of the tragic hero which emerges at the end of the preface to Die Braut von Messina, becomes fully understandable.

At the outset of Über des Pathetische Schiller describes the aim of art as "Die Darstellung des Übersinnlichen" [2] and the aim of tragic art in particular as the presentation of "die moralische Independenz von Naturgesetzen im Zustand des Affekts." [3] The object of tragedy is thus the moral

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1. ibid., p. 11, ll. 31 f.
2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, P.150, ll. 12 f.
3. ibid., p. 150, ll. 14 f.

being of man; and the question arises by what manner of poetic treatment this object becomes aesthetically tractable. A clue to the answer is already contained in the definition quoted above: it is a negative quality - Independenz - which, springing as it does from a moral source, sets man apart from the rest of nature, that must be manifested. A further indication is given in the distinction Schiller draws between a morally and an aesthetically great object. We speak of the former, he says, in the case of a man whose "moralischer Charakter" [1] is manifest; of the latter, when what is manifest is "bloss seine Bestimmung dazu". [2] It is with the further elaboration of this distinction that the second part of Über das Pathetische which deals with the art-form of tragedy is concerned.

What exactly is the meaning of "moralische Bestimmung" as contra-distinct from "moralischer Character"? And why should man's "moralische Bestimmung" be the aesthetically fruitful aspect of his moral being?

To answer the first question mention must be made of two different senses in which, according to Schiller, the term 'freedom of the will' can be used. The will is morally free when it is determined by the moral law. To be thus determined, however, the will must first of all be free from the coercion of natural impulses. As Schiller has it: " ... eine sittliche Verbindlichkeit des Willens lässt sich nur unter Voraussetzung einer absoluten Independenz desselben vom Zwang der Naturtriebe denken." [3] Freedom of the will in the first sense, that is, the freedom to be morally determined, logically presupposes freedom

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1. ibid., p. 167, l.34.
2. ibid., p. 168, l.1.
3. ibid., p. 170, ll. 6 ff.

of the will in the second sense, that is freedom of the will from any determination whatsoever. To say this, however, is tantamount to saying that the moral will presupposes the possession of a will as such. Man, as opposed to an animal, decides by an act of will whether his actions are to be determined by a given natural impulse or not. The actual determination of this will by the moral law constitutes what Schiller calls man's "moralischer Character"; its mere existence, however, constitutes his moral potential, or, as Schiller has it, his "moralische Bestimmung". Of this will Schiller says already in Anmuth und Würde: "Schon der blosse Wille erhebt den Menschen über die Tierheit;" whilst " der moralische erhebt ihn zur Gottheit." [1] In Über das Erhabene he reiterates, more explicitly: "Der Wille ist der Geschlechts--charakter des Menschen ... Alle andere Dinge müssen; der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will." [2] Thus man's will, which makes him independent of all coercion by natural laws and capable of being determined by the moral law, is his generic characteristic. It thus becomes clear why Schiller should have singled out man's moral potential rather than his actual moral character as that aspect which is fruitful for aesthetic purposes. As has been seen it is in virtue of just this, its generic character, that Schiller deems any object to be aesthetically effective. To demand that the poet should stress the "moralische Bestimmung" of man, the chief component of tragedy, is therefore only to be consistent. Time and again, Schiller, in Über das Pathetische, explains that to stress the generic character of his hero is to perform the chief aesthetic

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1. ibid., pp. 106-107.
2. ibid., p. 214, ll. 4 ff.

operation incumbent on the tragic poet. It is his job to concentrate on the presentation of "das moralische Vermögen überhaupt" and of "die Möglichkeit einer absoluten Freyheit des Willens," not on "den Gebrauch dieses Vermögens und auf die Wirklichkeit dieser absoluten Freyheit des Willens." [1] The poet, for instance, may choose to present a moral action, e.g. the self-sacrifice of Leonidas; but he may stress only that much of its moral character as is in his aesthetic interest. He will lightly pass over the fact that in sacrificing himself, Leonidas' will was determined by the moral law. Instead, he will concentrate on the "Darstellung des, von allem Zwang der Instinkte unabhängigen, sittlichen Vermögens." [2] Were he to do the former, he would throw into relief "die sittliche Verbindlichkeit des Willens durch welche ihm sein Objekt auf das strengste bestimmt wird"; [3] he would not be presenting the will but an individual and fully determinate volition; and in thus presenting the real he would fall short of the poetically true, which is always the generic. The poet's task is not to show that Leonidas "die heldenmütige Entschliessung <u>wirklich fasste</u>", - but merely, "dass er sie fassen <u>konnte</u>." [4] Again, the poet may choose to treat of an action that is of doubtful moral worth, e.g. the self-immolation of Peregrinus Proteus at Olympia. And again, it is no more in his interest to pursue the negative moral implications of this action than it had been to pursue the positive

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1. <u>ibid</u>., p. 168, ll.14 ff.
2. <u>ibid</u>., p. 168, ll.31 ff.
3. <u>ibid</u>., p. 170, ll. 1 f.
4. <u>ibid</u>., p. 170, ll. 32 ff.

moral implications of Leonidas' deed; he may not linger on the fact that Proteus, by his suicide, offends against the moral law of self-preservation, nor on the quality of the motives which in fact prompted him to do the deed. The poet's concern is solely to bring out the generic characteristic of man made manifest by this action: "..[das] Vermögen des Willens ...., selbst dem mächtigsten aller Instinkte ... zu widerstehen." [1] In presenting the action of Proteus as fully determinate, the poet acts against his better interest "weil ... durch die Einschränkung des Willens auf eine einzige Bestimmungsweise... dem Freyheitstriebe der Phantasie widersprochen wird." [2] He exploits the aesthetic potentialities inherent in his subject-matter by stressing "das blosse Vermögen, absolut zu wollen ... die blosse Anlage zur Moralität ..., weil schon durch die blosse Möglichkeit, uns vom Zwange der Natur loszusagen, unserm Freiheitsbedürfniss geschmeichelt wird." [3] The poet gains his end when, in Schiller's own words, " ... ich das Individuum verlasse, von dem Verhältniss seines Willens zu dem Willensgesetz abstrahiere, und mir den menschlichen Willen überhaupt, als Vermögen der Gattung, im Verhältniss zu der ganzen Naturgewalt denke." [4] Through this aesthetic operation on the part of the poet "schwingen wir uns von dem Wirklichen zu dem Möglichen, und von dem Individuum zur Gattung empor"; if he fails to perform it, "steigen wir vom Möglichen zum Wirklichen herunter, und schliessen die Gattung in die Schranken des Individuum ein." [5]

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1. ibid., p. 171, ll. 8 ff.
2. ibid., pp. 171 - 172.
3. ibid., p. 171, ll. 27 ff.
4. ibid., p. 171, ll. 13 ff.
5. ibid., p. 172, ll. 3 ff.

Poet and moralist thus share a common object: the moral being of man; but they radically diverge as to the particular facet of this complex phenomenon each singles out and accentuates. The moralist passes from the will as such, the mark of the class, to the consideration of individual volitions which to him are valuable in the measure in which they are determined by the moral law; his concern is with Gesetzmässigkeit. The poet on the other hand, here as always, must shun the individual, the merely particular, for his concern is with bare freedom of will, with Ungebundenheit;[1] he will dwell on the mere force of that faculty which is the distinguishing mark of humanity, unconcerned with the specific direction it takes in this or that individual, and the use to which it is put in any given case;[2] and if he chooses for his subject--matter a volition or decision actually determined by the moral law, "so wird er wohl thun, es so zu behandeln, dass nicht so wohl unsre Vernunft auf die Regel des Willens, als vielmehr unsre Phantasie auf das Vermögen des Willens hingewiesen werde."[3]

As the poet must avoid the morally determinate so he must avoid the fully determinate, the empirically real,

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1. ibid., p. 173, ll. 9 ff.
2. cf. ibid., p. 173, ll. 12 ff. and also p. 175, ll. 31 ff. Exactly the same distinction is made in Gedanken über den Gebrauch des Gemeinen und Niedrigen in der Kunst, where Schiller says: "Zweytens sehen wir in der ästhetischen Beurtheilung auf die Kraft, bey einer moralischen auf die Gesetzmässigkeit." (ibid., p. 211, ll. 19 f.)
3. ibid., p. 173, ll. 2 ff.

altogether.[1] The fundamental distinction between the real and the poetically true which, as has been seen, pervades Schiller's aesthetic thought from Über das Teutsche Theater onwards, is reiterated here with incisive force. The real, clustered about with accidentals as it is, is never the poetically true. The poetically true, and effectual, is the generic: "....es ist die poetische, nicht die historische Wahrheit, auf welche alle ästhetische

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1. Here again, the closeness of Schiller's position to that of Kant is striking; all the more so, since Schiller is concerned with artistic production, Kant with aesthetic appreciation. Explaining the personal, yet communicable nature of the aesthetic judgment, Kant argues that it is based on an indeterminate concept of the object of our judgment. If we had a fully determinate concept of it, we would know it. Our judgment would be cognitive, not aesthetic. Also we would be able to prove the truth of our judgment. If, on the other hand, no conceptual element were involved in our judgment, we could not explain that claim to universal validity which each aesthetic judgment makes qua judgment. Thus Kant concludes: "Das Geschmacksurteil gründet sich auf einem, obzwar unbestimmten, Begriffe ... der sich gar nicht durch Anschauung bestimmen, durch den sich nichts erkennen, mithin auch kein Beweis für das Geschmacksurteil führen lässt. Ein dergleichen Begriff aber ist der blosse reine Vernunftbegriff von dem Übersinnlichen, was dem Gegenstande ... als Sinnenobjekte, mithin als Erscheinung zum Grunde liegt." (Dialektik der Ästhetischen Urteilskraft, §57. ed. cit., pp. 220 ff) As becomes clear from the last sentence, it is the object apprehended as logically indeterminate, which induces that indeterminate yet harmonious activity of the cognitive faculties - the understanding and the imagination - which is peculiar to the aesthetic state. For the further definition of the latter, cf. especially Analytik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft, §9 (ed. cit., pp. 69 ff.)

Wirkung sich gründet. Die poetische Wahrheit besteht aber nicht darin, dass etwas wirklich geschehen ist, sondern darin, dass es geschehen konnte, also in der inneren Möglichkeit der Sache. Die ästethische Kraft muss also schon in der vorgestellten Möglichkeit liegen." [1.] The specifically artistic operation lies in stripping the real - whether it is an imagined or an actually existing reality - of all its individual determinacy and any appeal deriving therefrom; for such an appeal will always be based on what Schiller calls a "Privatinteresse" [2.] and in turn will give rise to it. To Schiller, this process of stripping the object and the motions it evokes of all but their pure generic character, is the essential forming process. [3.] It is with regard to this operation that he says "... nur der Stümper borgt von dem Stoffe eine Kraft, die er in die Form zu legen verzweifelt."[4.]

The sharp accentuation of the generic character of man as the chief material of tragedy brings Schiller's views on that poetic genre into line with his aesthetic views in general. It may be as well to recall these by once more quoting the fundamental definition of poetry advanced in the review of Matthisson's poems: poetry is "die Kunst ... uns durch einen freyen Effekt unsrer productiven Einbildungskraft in bestimmte Empfindungen zu versetzen." [5.] This twofold effect proper to poetry,

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X. p. 174, ll. 1 ff.
2. ibid., p. 174, l. 25.
3. This conception will be discussed more fully in the concluding section of this chapter. cf. pp. 275 ff.
4. ibid., pl 174, ll. 26 ff.
5. ibid., p. 238, ll. 23 ff.

Schiller tells us in Über das Pathetische, is produced by tragedy and produced by the same means as always, namely the generic character of its material. It is this which ensures the freedom of the imagination, to safeguard which is the first duty of the poet. For "bei der ästhetischen Schätzung ... wird der Gegenstand auf das Bedürfnis der Einbildungskraft bezogen ... Das Interesse der Einbildungskraft aber ist: sich frey von Gesetzen im Spiele zu erhalten." [1] The poet observes this law and induces a free imaginative response by avoiding the over-determinacy of the individually real and keeping to the unlimited truth of the generically possible. "Um seiner selbst willen muss der Dichter diesen Weg einschlagen". Schiller argues in a passage strongly reminiscent of one already quoted from the review of Matthisson's poems - "denn mit unserer Freyheit ist sein Reich zu Ende. Nur solange wir ausser uns anschauen, sind wir sein; er hat uns verloren, sobald ein Gegenstand nicht mehr als Erscheinung von uns betrachtet wird, sondern als Gesetz über uns richtet." [2] And again, only the object apprehended in its generic quality will induce a universal emotional response such as is proper to art: the pleasure that derives from aesthetic activity. "Der Dichter, auch wenn er die vollkommensten sittlichen Muster vor unsre Augen stellt, hat keinen andern Zweck, und darf keinen andern haben, als uns durch Betrachtung derselben zu ergötzen. Nun kann uns aber nichts ... geistig ergötzen, als was unser geistiges Vermögen erhöht. Wie kann aber

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X., p. 169, ll. 34 f. and also p. 170, ll. 21 ff.
2. ibid., p. 173, ll. 5 ff.

die Pflichtmässigkeit eines anderen unser Subjekt verbessern und unsere geistige Kraft vermehren? Dass er seine Pflichten wirklich erfüllt, beruht auf einem zufälligen Gebrauche, den er von seiner Freyheit macht, und der eben darum für uns nichts beweisen kann. Es ist bloss das Vermögen zu einer ähnlichen Pflichtmässigkeit, was wir mit ihm theilen, und indem wir in seinem Vermögen auch das unsrige wahrnehmen, fühlen wir unsere geistige Kraft erhöht." [1.]

So far there is complete identity between the aesthetic principle governing poetry in general and tragedy in particular. In all alike the object apprehended in its generic character induces the desired aesthetic effect. But in tragedy, this effect is brought about in yet another, and more direct fashion. For the materials of tragedy are human beings, themselves capable of those responses which are to be induced in the spectator. Hence the tragedian has a simple and direct means - Schiller sometimes tends to speak as if it were his only means - of inducing an aesthetic response in the spectator: he presents it in the tragic character. The final aesthetic effect will be all the purer for being not only induced by the form in which the poet presents his material, but already prefigured in the material itself. The principle involved in this practice, in Über das Pathetische is formulated in the words: "Alle Affekte sind ästhetischer aus der zweyten Hand." [2.] It is again invoked at the end of Über das Erhabene where Schiller compares the quality of the aesthetic experiences vouchsafed by art and nature respectively, and comments on

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X., p. 173, ll. 15 ff.
2. ibid., p. 165, ll. 20 f.

the superiority of the former as follows: "Nun stellt zwar schon die Natur für sich allein Objekte in Menge auf, an denen sich die Empfindungsfähigkeit für das Schöne und Erhabene üben könnte; aber der Mensch ist, wie in andern Fällen, so auch hier, von der zweyten Hand besser bedient, als von der Ersten, und will lieber einen zubereiteten und auserlesenen Stoff von der Kunst empfangen, als an der unreinen Quelle der Natur mühsam und dürftig zu schöpfen."[1] It recurs finally and most explicitly in the last aesthetic essay that came from Schiller's pen, in the preface to Die Braut von Messina. As has been seen, the chorus, the idealising organ of tragedy, by one and the same operation throws into relief the generic character of the dramatis personae, and transmutes them into aesthetic beings: "Sie stehen gewissermassen auf einem natürlichen Theater, ... und werden eben deswegen umso tauglicher, von dem Kunsttheater zu einem Publikum zu reden."[2]

In the preface to Die Braut von Messina we are merely told of the twofold effect wrought on the dramatis personae by the idealising operation of the poet. In Über das Pathetische the nature of the connection between those effects becomes evident. For what is the "moralische Bestimmung" of man as distinct from his "moralische Bestimmung"; what his human potential, free alike from the constricting determination by the law of nature and the rule of reason; what, in short, is man apprehended in his generic character if not man in an aesthetic condition? In extending to his human material, to the figure

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X., p. 230, ll. 21 ff.
2. ibid., XIV, p. 11, ll. 31 f.

of his hero, that basic operation by which determinate reality is transmuted into poetic truth, the tragic poet will of necessity create an aesthetic character. For the generically apprehended object and the aesthetic state concur in this "dass beyde jedes bestimmte Daseyn ausschliesse." [1] We are now able to understand the seemingly casual remark in the Ästhetische Briefe quoted at the outset of this section, that it is persons with a strong aesthetic bent that are pre-eminently fitted for "grosse Rollen". And it is to the Ästhetische Briefe that we must turn for final confirmation that the state in which the poet presents his principal characters in fact is the aesthetic state.

The poet, Schiller tells us in Über das Pathetische, must show the hero shorn of all specific determinations and therewith of all specific positive or negative achievements. The tragic hero may not realise " die Würde der menschlichen Bestimmung ... in seiner Person " but he must manifest it "durch seinen Zustand," [2] through that state of complete freedom from all determination which enables him to do as he ought or will. "Durch die aesthetische Kultur" - we read in the 21st aesthetic letter - "bleibt ... der persönliche Werth eines Menschen, oder seine Würde ... noch völlig unbestimmt, und es ist weiter nichts erreicht, als dass es ihn nunmehr von Natur wegen möglich gemacht ist, aus sich selbst zu machen, was er will - dass ihm die Freyheit, zu seyn, was er seyn soll, vollkommen zurückgegeben ist." [3] The aesthetic condition is like the condition in which the poet depicts the tragic character in that either "... uns die Menschheit

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1. Ästhetische Briefe, letter XXI. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X., p. 347, ll. 4 ff.
2. ibid., p. 168, ll. 6 ff.
3. ibid., p. 347, ll. 28 ff.

bloss möglich macht, und es im übrigen unserm freyen Willen anheim stellt, in wieweit wir sie wirklich machen wollen ...."[1] The aesthetic state, like the state embodied in the tragic hero, is void of reality "insofern man auf ein einzelnes Resultat, nicht auf das ganze Vermögen achtet und den Mangel jeder besondern Determination in ihm in Betrachtung zieht."[2] (Letter XXI.) Looked at from another point of view, it is a condition of the highest reality "Weil sie der Grund der Möglichkeit von allen ist .... denn eine Gemüthsstimmung, welche das Ganze der Menschheit in sich begreift, muss nothwendig auch jede einzelne Äusserung derselben, dem Vermögen nach, in sich schliessen ...". (Letter XXII.)[3] Thus the tragic hero himself embodies that aesthetic state of indeterminacy which the tragedy must induce in the spectator. The content, formed throughout and itself aesthetic, is directly reflected in the aesthetic effect of the whole, purified thought that reflection be. This indeterminacy of the resultant effect Schiller, in Über das Pathetische, describes as follows: "Die Dichtkunst führt bey dem Menschen nie ein besondres Geschäft aus, und man könnte kein ungeschickteres Werkzeug erwählen, um einen einzelnen Auftrag, ein Detail, gut besorgt zu sehen ... Sie kann ihm weder rathen, noch mit ihm schlagen, noch sonst eine Arbeit für ihm thun; aber ... zu allem, was er seyn soll, ihn mit Stärke ausrüsten".[4] The complete correspondence of Schiller's

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1. Ibid., p. 348, ll. 15 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 347, ll. 14 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 349, ll. 11 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 175, ll. 9 ff.

views on tragic art with his aesthetic views in general, both as regards the nature of the aesthetic and its effect, is illuminated by the similarity between the above statement and a passage from the 21st aesthetic letter already quoted in part. ".... die Schönheit giebt schlechterdings kein einzelnes Resultat weder für den Verstand noch für den Willen, sie führt keinen einzelnen weder intellektuellen, noch moralischen Zweck aus, sie findet keine einzige Wahrheit, hilft uns keine einzige Pflicht erfüllen ... es ist weiter nichts erreicht, als dass ... ihm die Freyheit, zu seyn, was er seyn soll, vollkommen zurückgegeben ist".[1]

An examination of Schiller's theory, it will thus be seen, confirms the findings from the tragedies themselves. The examination of the dramas had revealed the recurrent pattern of a tragic hero who is in fact tragically one-sided, but deludes himself into believing that he is in a state of contemplative wholeness and indeterminacy. He is for ever the would-be champion of freedom, who has become a tyrant without his knowledge. - If the Ästhetische Briefe confirm that for Schiller, psychological one-sidedness constitutes the fundamental tragic fact, the more narrowly aesthetic essays, especially Über das Pathetische, argue that in order to be incorporated in a tragic work of art, this tragic fact has to undergo a considerable transformation. For the one-sided individual is too narrowly real, too limited and determinate, to be poetically true. To fulfil his aesthetic function, the tragic individual must be freed of his decided moral character - in Schiller's view the distinguishing feature

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1. Ibid., p. 347, ll. 21 ff.

of the modern individual - and restored to his generic human character. But clearly, ~~the~~ though poetic truth has the first claim on the poet, he can not permit it to alter the tragic reality out of recognition. If he did, there would be no tragedy left. He must find a way of stating both, of preserving the tragic character of his material without impairing its aesthetic function. The tragic theory contains some important hints as to how the poet achieves this end. In Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen Schiller, still in the belief that tragedy must present moral actions, ponders on the perplexing fact that immoral actions displaying mere force of will are frequently found to be aesthetically effective. He concludes that the effectiveness of such actions depends on a trick the poet may use in their presentation. The poet does in fact show that the actions of a Richard the Third or an Iago violate the moral law, flouting their own humanity and that of their fellows; but so long as he diverts the attention of spectators from these facts and puts every emphasis on the forcefulness of these actions, their aesthetic effectiveness is assured. In this connection Schiller says: "Dass wir aber ein Vermögen besitzen und auch häufig genug ausüben, unsre Aufmerksamkeit von einer gewissen Seite der Dinge freywillig abzulenken und auf eine andre zu richten, dass das Vergnügen selbst, welches durch diese Absonderung allein für uns möglich ist, uns dazu einladet und dabey festhält, wird durch die tägliche Erfahrung bestätigt."[1] Schiller considers that the poet may exploit the aesthetic potentialities of the

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1. Ibid., p. 15, ll. 5 ff.

wickedly forceful action to the full, without impairing the total effect which derives from the presentation of morality. He achieves this twofold effect by a twofold mode of presentation, presenting the same forceful wickedness now in isolation and thus dwelling on its power, now in the context of the total human situation and thereby stressing its impotence in the face of a morality that rises superior to it. Both these modes, Schiller argues, are indispensable to the full artistic effect, yet each has a different function. The presentation of the full moral reality fulfils an emotional need; it satisfies the heart. The presentation of a forceful personality as morally indeterminate fulfils a more vital function in a more subtle fashion: it is the secret mainspring of the aesthetic effectiveness of the whole: "Der grosse Haufe erleidet gleichsam blind die von dem Künstler auf das Herz beabsichtigte Wirkung, ohne die Magie zu durchblicken, vermittelst welcher die Kunst diese Macht auf ihn ausübte".[1] The crowd experiences the powerful moral sentiments which it is the poet's intention to convey. What it does not know, however, is, that for those sentiments to be communicable at all, they must be aesthetically transmuted, and that, paradoxically, this task falls to the tragic hero in his most villainous aspect.

Already in this early essay, then, Schiller holds that the poet's task is to focus the attention of the spectator as completely as possible on the indeterminate character of the tragic hero which is the main pillar of the aesthetic structure of the whole, at the same time showing his real character, i.e. the motives by which he is in fact determined and the results that ensue therefrom.

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1. Ibid., p. 16, ll. 10 ff.

The same position is maintained in Über das Pathetische. The indeterminate character of the tragic hero must be made manifest, for the poet depends on it for the aesthetic effect he wants to induce; but it will be made manifest in and through the real character of the tragic hero. When Schiller says "Es ist also bloss die vorgestellte Möglichkeit eines absolut freyen Wollens, wodurch die wirkliche Ausübung desselben unserm ästhetischen Sinn gefällt"[1]; or "... nicht die Existenz, sondern das durch die Existenz kund gewordene Vermögen [ist] das Poetische";[2] or "In ästhetischen Urtheilen sind wir also nicht für die Sittlichkeit an sich selbst, sondern bloss für die Freyheit interessiert, und jene kann nur insofern unsrer Einbildungskraft gefallen, als sie die letztere sichtbar macht",[3] he is urging, not that the poet should omit to present the real limited character of the tragic hero, but that it should not be made apparent. And indeed, these conclusions are in complete agreement with Schiller's views on the matter in general, summed up in the Ästhetische Briefe in the following words: "Uebrigens ist es garnicht nöthig, dass der Gegenstand, an dem wir den schönen Schein finden, ohne Realität sey, wenn nur unser Urtheil darüber auf diese Realität keine Rücksicht nimmt; denn soweit es diese Rücksicht nimmt, ist es kein ästhetisches." (Letter XXVI.)[4]

But by what means does the poet succeed in presenting the real character of the tragic hero in a shadowlike fashion,

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1. Ibid., p. 173, ll. 27 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 174, ll. 7 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 176, ll. 29 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 373, ll. 11 ff.

as it were, not so prominently as to detract from the impression of his indeterminacy, yet sufficiently distinctly to mark it as mere appearance? The theory provides no explicit answer to this vital question, but Schiller's theoretical position up to this point is so well defined as to leave no room for guess-work. There is only one solution that fits the pattern of the argument: and that is the solution adopted in the tragedies themselves.

Schiller creates the appearance of aesthetic indeterminacy in the spectator by instilling in the tragic hero the illusion that he is completely free. It is this sense of freedom that he consistently voices. Of his real character i.e. the forces that do in fact determine him from the outset, he is largely unaware. It is through his tragic antagonist in whom his real character is embodied and who is as deeply enmeshed in necessity as the hero himself is free, or deems himself to be free, that we become aware of their existence and their workings. Schiller, in short, achieves his end through externalising the real determinate character of the tragic hero, leaving him free to communicate the sense of indeterminacy on which the aesthetic effect of the tragedy hinges. To recall but one example from the preceding chapter: convinced of her absolute freedom, Elisabeth in Maria Stuart is in fact determined by deeply buried elemental impulses. It is the "wilde Glut verstohlener Lüste" in her that draws her to Leicester and thus leads her to the fatal interview with Maria. But it is in the figure of Maria, throughout the play associated with imagery of fire, that these determining forces are embodied and properly brought to our notice. This relation of partial identity between the rival Queens, made manifest by the imagery, is borne out on the psychological plane and by the formal grouping of the characters.

It is Maria who, in the words quoted above, recognises Elisabeth's real character; and the two Queens are shown to be as one in their love for the same man.

The device of externalisation is thus to Schiller what the Chorus was to become to him in his last period: the instrument of effecting a clean separation of reality from art, the sphere of "Schein". The artist - says Schiller in the XXVIth aesthetic letter - makes use of his supreme right "wenn er den Schein von dem Wesen zurück nimmt und mit demselben nach eignen Gesetzen schaltet ... je sorgfältiger er die Gestalt von dem Wesen trennt, und je mehr Selbständigkeit er derselben zu geben weiss, desto mehr wird er nicht bloss das Reich der Schönheit erweitern, sondern selbst die Grenzen der Wahrheit bewahren; denn er kann den Schein nicht von der Wirklichkeit reinigen, ohne zugleich die Wirklichkeit von dem Schein frey zu machen."[1] This statement does not merely foreshadow the increasingly anti-naturalistic character of Schiller's art as a whole. It also defines the relation between formal and material components within a given work of art. True to his principle that a work of art, to fulfil its aesthetic function as a whole, must be aesthetic on all its levels, he carries over the supreme artistic operation on to the level of the content, through the separation he effects in the central figure of the tragedy. By externalising the real character, the "Wesen" of his tragic hero in a separate existence, the poet is able to do justice to the full force of reality. On the other hand he is free to develop the central figure of the work of art in its pure aesthetic semblance, its "Gestalt", in sovereign disregard

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1. Ibid., p. 372, ll. 9 ff. and 19 ff.

of any but his own aesthetic laws. This poetic being of the tragic hero lies in the illusory image which he has of himself and which he builds up throughout the tragedy by his words and the elusiveness of his behaviour: the image of a completely free, contemplative being.

The contemplative character of the tragic hero, in this his poetic being and his remoteness from the common reality in which he has his roots, is emphatically stressed in a letter written to Goethe on August 24th 1798: "Ich lasse meine Personen viel sprechen, sich mit einer gewissen Breite herauslassen ..... Es ist zuverlässig, man könnte mit weniger Worten auskommen, um die tragische Handlung auf-und abzuwickeln, auch möchte es der Natur handelnder Charactere gemässer erscheinen. Aber das Beispiel der Alten, welche es auch so gehalthen haben und in demjenigen was Aristoteles die Gesinnungen und Meinungen nennt, garnicht wortkarg gewesen sind, scheint auf ein höheres poetisches Gesetz hinzudeuten, welches eben hierin eine Abweichung von der Wirklichkeit fordert. Sobald man sich erinnert, dass alle poetischen Personen symbolische Wesen sind, dass sie, als poetische Gestalten, immer das Allgemeine der Menschheit darzustellen und auszusprechen haben und sobald man ferner daran denkt, dass der Dichter sowie der Künstler überhaupt auf eine öffentliche und ehrliche Art von der Wirklichkeit sich entfernen und daran erinnern soll, dass er es thut, so ist gegen diesen Gebrauch nichts zu sagen".[1] And indeed it must be

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1. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit., Vol. V. p. 418. Schiller's conviction, voiced also in the prologue to Wallenstein, in the XXVIth aesthetic letter, and in the preface to Die Braut von Messina, that the true "ästhetische Schein" never deludes the spectator but, on the contrary, makes him aware of its unreality, is already formulated in Kant's Kritik der Ästhetischen Urteilskraft: "In der

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recognised, how fundamentally the tragic character, in his poetic being, diverges from the laws of psychological and logical probability. In his own eyes, he maintains himself in that aesthetic equilibrium of forces through which, Schiller tells us in the passage of the Ästhetische Briefe quoted at the outset of this section, we must pass momentarily to effect the transition from a determination by the senses to an opposite determination by the spirit. This moment in time the hero, in his inner consciousness, extends indefinitely. Thus he lives in a timeless and changeless world, himself a timeless and changeless being. As his consciousness transcends time, so it transcends reality. For in his aesthetic indeterminacy, he enjoys the sense not so much of what he is but of what he might be, "das Gefühl des ganzen Vermögens", as Schiller has it in the same important passage. He appears to himself as the possible incarnate. Measured by any standard of reality, this being and his world represents one big illusion. And indeed, this is what it is meant to be. For on the hero's illusory image of himself as a being contemplatively poised between the forces of sense and spirit depends his aesthetic potency, and the aesthetic potency of the composition of which he is the centre. "Das Poetische ... liegt gerade in dem Indifferenzpunkt des Ideellen und Sinnlichen",[1] says Schiller in the preface

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Dichtkunst geht alles ehrlich und aufrichtig zu ... sie spielt mit dem Schein, den sie nach Belieben bewirkt, ohne doch dadurch zu betrügen; denn sie erklärt ihre Beschäftigung selbst für blosses Spiel... und verlangt nicht den Verstand durch sinnliche Darstellung zu überschleichen und zu verstricken." (Deduktion der reinen aesthetischen Urteile §53. ed. cit.,pp.205 ff.)

1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., XIV, p. 9. ll. 31 f.

to Die Braut von Messina. On the plane of character, this point of indifference is attained in the apparent contemplativeness of the hero. This contemplativeness is carefully motivated in his real character. It is caused by his secret fear of becoming irretrievably involved in life. Yet to Schiller, this psychological significance is of no more than secondary import. In the preface to Die Braut von Messina its essential aesthetic significance is brought into full prominence. The aesthetic character of the tragic hero is formally motivated by the presence of the chorus - "Die Gegenwart des Chors... motiviert die Besonnenheit mit der sie handeln, und die Würde, mit der sie reden" - whilst the introduction of the chorus itself, in turn, is prompted by purely formal considerations. Thus the primary significance of the hero's contemplative consciousness lies in the formal values that through it the poet is able to communicate. Nothing could be more mistaken than to let the hero's consciousness interpret for us his real character, his relation to other characters, and the world in which they have their being. Of him Illo's words to Wallenstein are ever true "O! Du bist blind mit deinen sehenden Augen!" (Tod. II, 3.) His verbal expansiveness, always at those points in the drama when tension runs high, demanding to be precipitated into action, his protracted hesitancy and his wavering from one contemplated course to another: all these demand not merely to be apprehended in their psychological and dramatic import, but to be directly experienced in their formal significance. They are so many intervals in which the tragic action and the time-stream itself in which it takes place, are suspended and we are transported into a timeless poetic dimension.

In a letter to Goethe, Schiller takes up the distinction the latter had made between tragedy and epic and himself suggests a further way of describing the differences between

them: "Die dramatische Handlung bewegt sich vor mir," he says, "um die epische bewege ich mich selbst und sie scheint gleichsam stille zu stehen."[1] A tragic work of art must be imagined as in constant, rapid movement, so absorbing the spectator's attention that to follow it he must forego all independent freedom of movement. The epic work on the other hand must be imagined as standing still and thus leaving the spectator free to move around it and away from it as he will. Obviously the spatial image in which the consecutive effect in time of literature is here described, is drawn from the sphere of the visual arts. In the light of this description, Schiller goes on to define the peculiar limitation of the tragic genre. It lies in the lack of aesthetic distance it allows to the spectator, just as conversely the epic suffers from an excess of distance. To create a tragic work of pure poetic quality, therefore, the poet is compelled "die individuell auf uns eindringende Wirklichkeit von uns entfernt zu halten und dem Gemüt eine poetische Freiheit gegen den Stoff zu verschaffen."[2] He will seek to combine the immediacy of the tragic action with the aesthetic distance typical of the epic. This epic counterpoise Schiller created above all through the contemplative character of the tragic hero. It is no accident that the preface to Die Braut von Messina, in which the aesthetic character and function of the tragic hero receives its most explicit formulation, should be dominated by the analogy between tragic art and its central figure, and the statue of the sculptor. Through the contemplative being of the tragic hero the tragedy, though deeply moving, attains to

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1. Letter to Goethe, 26. Dec. 1797. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit., V, p.309.
2. Ibid., p. 310.

the still beauty of the sculptured form.[1] And the spectator, moved though he be, is yet left free to move around it, actively responding to its art.

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1. Cf. Chapter Two of this thesis, especially pp. 149. Through Don Manuel's aesthetic awareness, Beatrice, the most elemental and dynamic character in Die Braut von Messina, momentarily attains to the tranquil perfection of the sculptured form. The aesthetic distance which the hero himself interpolates between himself and Beatrice, is transmitted to the spectator and enforced by yet other poetic means. Thus the spectator is enabled to retain considerable freedom from a figure itself lacking in all freedom, and from the tragic action about to issue from this character. Cf. also p. ~~149~~ 116 of the same chapter, and p. 61 of Chapter One.

4.

A full interpretation of Über das Erhabene would fall outside the scope of this thesis. For it deals not with tragic art but with tragic aspects of nature and history and the aesthetic experiences derived therefrom. Nevertheless it is of interest to see, that nature and history in Schiller's view become aesthetic objects in virtue of precisely the same quality which makes any given object aesthetically significant: the quality of indeterminacy. This indeterminacy, it is true, does not, as in the case of art, derive from the generic character of the material presented to the imagination. For in the first place, nature and history are the raw-materials of life, as yet unfiltered and unformed by the processes of art; in the second place, as Schiller points out at length in the review of Matthison's poems, natural scenes to a large extent lack that inner necessity of the component parts and their relations which the human materials of the tragedian and the plastic artist possess and to which the artist, to achieve true beauty, must penetrate. The indeterminacy of great natural or historical scenes derives, not from their inner necessity but, on the contrary, from the absence of any inner cogency whatever. In them, blind chance appears to rule supreme. The great cathaclysms of nature and catastrophes of history defy the mind that seeks to order and to understand them. Their chaos cannot be resolved by an appeal to logical, teleological, or moral principles. It is precisely this indeterminate quality which makes such scenes aesthetically fruitful in that it induces aesthetic distance in the spectator. On the one hand, there is terror in the spectacle "der bedenklichen Anarchie der moralischen Welt .... wo mehr der tolle Zufall als ein weiser Plan zu

regieren scheint und bey weitem in den mehresten Fällen Verdienst und Glück mit einander im Widerspruche stehen."[1] Yet the strangeness of the scene, its refusal to fall into any familiar pattern of experience, tends to inhibit a straightforward emotional response in the spectator. He cannot relate, what he sees, to himself, to his own concrete situation and to his practical needs.[2] And this inhibition of his response in one direction may enrich it in another. "Wie ganz anders," - says Schiller - "wenn man darauf resigniert, sie [die Natur] zu erklären und diese ihre Unbegreiflichkeit selbst zum Standpunct der Beurtheilung macht."[3] ... "Wenn er es ... gutwillig aufgibt, dieses gesetzlose Chaos von Erscheinungen unter eine Einheit der Erkenntniss bringen zu wollen, so gewinnt er von einer andern Seit reichlich, was er von dieser verloren gibt."[4] If, instead of probing into the why and wherefore of the phenomena before him, he allows his attention to be arrested by their appearance and to linger on its strangeness, what he sees will become the "Quelle eines ganz eignen Vergnügens".[5] For by this switch of attention his imaginative powers will be liberated. The forms and rhythms of the scene before him - "das furchtbar herrliche Schauspiel der alles zerstörenden und wieder erschaffenden und wieder zerstörenden Veränderung"[6] - will communicate themselves to him, and fill him with that sense of calm

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., I, pp. 224 l.33 - 225-l.6
2. There is a close analogy between the scene described here and the aesthetic experience to which it gives rise, and the scene described by E.Bullough to illustrate the operation of aesthetic distancing. Cf.E.Bullough, 'psychical Distance'. art.cit., p.88.
3. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p.226, ll. 28 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 225, ll. 12 ff.
5. Ibid., p. 224, l. 34.
6. Ibid., p. 229, ll. 1 ff.

and contentment which he could not derive from its content. But this is not all. It is, paradoxically, these very negative characteristics of the outward scene which, entering into his experience, give it a significance and weight by which it transcends the merely ornamental. In the disconnectedness, lawlessness and lack of purpose of the outer phenomena the contemplative mind sees a symbol of its own freedom: of its own total independence of all natural laws and remoteness from the world of purposes."

"Gerade dieser gänzliche Mangel einer Zweckverbindung unter diesem Gedränge von Erscheinungen, wodurch sie für den Verstand, der sich an diese Verbindungsform halten muss, übersteigend und unbrauchbar werden,macht sie zu einem desto treffendern Sinnbild für die reine Vernunft, die in eben dieser wilden Ungebundenheit der Natur ihre eigne Unabhängigkeit von Naturbedingungen dargestellt findet. Denn wenn man einer Reihe von Dingen alle Verbindung unter sich nimmt, so hat man den Begriff der Independenz, der mit dem reinen Vernunftbegriff der Freyheit überraschend zusammenstimmt .... die Vernunft ... unterwirft sich durch diese Idee das unendliche Spiel der Erscheinungen..."[1]

How the "reine Vernunftbegriff der Freiheit" enters into the experience, Schiller explains in the review of Matthisons poems, where he is concerned to show how the poet of nature, in the artistic vision, permeates the outward object with the content of his own consciousness and thereby draws it into the human orbit. "In thätigen und zum Gefühl ihrer moralischen Würde erwachten Gemüthern-" he says - "sieht die Vernunft dem Spiele der Einbildungskraft niemals müssig zu; unaufhörlich ist sie bestrebt, dieses

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1. Ibid., p. 225, ll. 15 ff.

zufällige Spiel mit ihrem eigenen Verfahren übereinstimmend zu machen. Bietet sich ihr nun unter diesen Erscheinungen eine dar, welche nach ihren eigenen [praktischen] Regeln behandelt werden kann; so ist ihr diese Erscheinung ein Sinnbild ihrer eigenen Handlungen, der todte Buchstabe der Natur wird zu einer lebendigen Geistersprache, und das äussere und innre Auge lesen dieselbe Schrift der Erscheinungen auf ganz verschiedene Weise".[1] The rationalistic Kantian terminology Schiller employs should not blind us to the importance of the insight into creative and aesthetic processes he is affording us here as well as in the corresponding passage of Über das Erhabene. The imaginative faculties once liberated, Schiller is in fact saying, images, often from deep levels of consciousness, will flood into the mind of the artist or be called forth in the mind of the recipient, impregnating the object that he sees.[2] By this process of projection, the perception of the "outward eye" will be transmuted into the vision of the "inward eye" of contemplation. That by these Ästhetische Ideen, as Schiller terms them after Kant, he means images and symbols from levels of the mind deeper than reason, becomes clear from a later passage of the review: "Zeigt ihm die Natur selbst keine Bewegung,"- he writes, - "so entlehnt die stille Welt mit geistigen Wesen, die im Nebelduft streifen, und im Schimmer des Mondlichts ihre Tänze halten. Oder es sind auch die Gestalten der Vorzeit, die in seiner Erinnerung aufwachen.. ..."[3]

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1. Ibid., p. 245, ll. 4 ff.
2. For a discussion of the connection between psychological distance, the release of the creative forces of the imagination, and the consequent projection of its image - content onto the outward object, Cf. J.Thorburn, Art and the Unconscious, London 1925. (pp. 106 ff.)
3. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 248, ll. 28 ff.

Thus too, the "reine Dämon" of his spiritual self, free and utterly unattached to the physical world, which the onlooker contemplates in the demonic lawlessness of the outward scene, may be regarded as an emanation from the deep levels of his imagination, set free by the "Spiel der Erscheinungen" before him. It is this projected image of the human spirit, which focusses his aesthetic vision and enhances the significance of the forms he perceives.

There can be no doubt that Schiller regards the contemplative communion of the spirit with itself described in Über das Erhabene as an aesthetic experience. The frame-work in which he discusses it, makes this perfectly evident. It is the "aesthetische Tendenz" of human beings to cultivate their moral faculties, of which, at the outset of the essay, he promises to treat.[1] Correspondingly he concludes at the end of the essay, that the experience of the sublime must complement the experience of beauty, "um die aesthetische Erziehung zu einem vollständigen Ganzen zu machen und die Empfindungsfähigkeit des menschlichen Herzens nach dem ganzen Umfang unsrer Bestimmung, und also auch über die Sinnenwelt hinaus, zu erweitern".[2] In this essay Schiller shows what he had promised to show in the 15th aesthetic letter: there he had maintained that we are quite human only when we play, not only occasionally, in response to a work of art, but always, vis-a-vis life itself and its "doppelten Ernst der Pflicht und des Schicksals".[3] In Über das Erhabene Schiller shows how man, faced with destruction and death, imagined or real, can maintain his

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1. Ibid., p. 216, ll. 15 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 229, l. 24 - p. 230, l. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 326 ll. 13 ff.

dignity and freedom: he does so by transmuting the world of purposes and forces into a world of play and forms. "Je öfter nun der Geist diesen Akt von Selbst-thätigkeit erneuert, desto mehr wird ihm derselbe zur Fertigkeit, einen desto grösseren Vorsprung gewinnt er vor dem sinnlichen Trieb, dass er endlich auch dann, wenn aus dem eingebildeten und künstlichen Unglück ein ernsthaftes wird, im Stande ist, es als ein künstliches zu behandeln und, der höchste Schwung der Menschennatur! das wirkliche Leiden in eine erhabene Rührung aufzulösen."[1]

It must be conceded, however, that the contemplative experience of the sublime is characterised by the interpolation between subject and object of an extraordinarily great aesthetic distance. The menacing and repellent aspects of such scenes are too prominent for all the emotions that are aroused by them to enter into the experience and to be aesthetically distanced. And what the spectator cannot aesthetically transmute, he must shut out. The result of this is a far-reaching withdrawal of the spectator from the sensuous reality of the initial situation, and the markedly austere, abstract and inward character of his ensuing experience. Time and again, Schiller's formulations betray the awareness of an inner separation that the spectator must effect from his own emotions, so as to make possible a free imaginative response towards phenomena of so disturbing a character. "Fälle können eintreten, wo das Schicksal alle Aussenwerke ersteigt, auf die er seine Sicherheit gründete, und ihm nichts weiter übrigbleibt, als sich in die heilige Freyheit der Geister zu flüchten ... und durch eine freye Aufhebung alles sinnlichen Interesse, ehe noch eine physische Macht es thut, sich moralisch zu

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1. Ibid., p. 228, ll. 16 ff.

entleiben".[1] There can be no doubt that these words, so often quoted as final proof of Schiller's regression to Kant's moral dualism, in fact represent his attempt to extend an aesthetic attitude towards life even at its sternest. It is true that in so defining the state Schiller describes here, we are stretching the conception of aesthetic distance somewhat beyond the meaning in which it is ordinarily used. But we are, I think, entitled to do so, considering that Bullough, the author of the conception and himself so conscious of the sensuous component of aesthetic experience, describes the mental state engendered by aesthetic distance as "this curiously dualistic yet unified psychosis".[2]

A very similar description of the aesthetic effect induced by sublime natural scenes occurs in the Zerstreute Betrachtungen über verschiedene Ästhetische Gegenstände. "Ein gewisser Ernst, der bis zur Feyerlichkeit steigen kann, bemächtigt sich unserer Seele, und indem sich in den sinnlichen Organen deutliche Spuren von Beängstigung zeigen, sinkt der nachdenkende Geist in sich selbst zurück, und scheint sich auf ein erhöhtes Bewusstseyn seiner selbständigen Kraft und Würde zu stützen. Dieses Bewusstseyn muss schlechterdings überwiegend sein, wenn das Grosse oder das Schreckliche einen "asthetischen Werth für uns haben soll".[3] It might be thought, that this excess of distance is due to the fact stressed by Schiller himself in Über das Erhabene, that we are responding to life in the raw, unfiltered and unformed by the artist, and that to experience

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1. Ibid., p. 227, l. 31 - p. 228, l. 3.
2. E. Bullough, 'Mind and Medium in Art'. Contribution to a Symposium. British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XI, 1920-21, p. 40.
3. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., p. 185, l. 29 - p.186, l. 2.

it aesthetically at all it must be experienced from a great distance. But strangely enough, when the discussion moves from the sphere of nature to the sphere of art, Schiller's account of the state induced in the recipient remains unchanged. In Über das Pathetische we read: "Herausgeschlagen aus allen Verschanzungen, die dem Sinnenwesen einen physischen Schutz verschaffen können, werfen wir uns in die unbezwingliche Burg unsrer moralischen Freyheit, und gewinnen eben dadurch eine absolute und unendliche Sicherheit, indem wir eine bloss komparative und prekäre Schutzwehre im Feld der Erscheinung verloren geben".[1] From the context of this passage it remains uncertain whether Schiller is describing the effect of the approaching serpents on Laokoon, a character in Vergil's Aeneid , or whether he is describing the effect of the scene on the reader of the epic: a significant ambiguity. The response to a tragic situation in life[2] it seems, is not basically different from that to a tragic situation in art: both are aesthetic in character, and both show the same excess of distance. - Already in Über die Tragische Kunst, Schiller describes that state of mind which most predisposes us to the aesthetic enjoyment of tragic art as a state of inner separation, of radical withdrawal from the vital

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1. Ibid., p. 165, ll. 2 ff.

2. It must of course be remembered, that the difference between the two kinds of situation is relative. Laokoon and the tragic situation in which he finds himself, themselves are part of a work of art. That Laokoon's response is aesthetic in character - and that this is so, becomes perfectly clear in the course of the argument - is not surprising. For the poet is prefiguring in the poetic character the effect he wants to induce in the hearer. It is because Schiller saw his own aesthetic principle at work in Vergil's treatment of the scene, that he chose it as an illustration for his argument. What is surprising, however, is that the response of the reader to the formed material of poetry should be as highly distanced as the response of the poetic character to life at its ugliest.

reaction of sense and feeling. In this state, we are enabled "mit uns selbst wie mit Fremdlingen umzugehen".[1] By this inner dissociation alone aesthetic freedom becomes possible. For "Sie, die allein fähig sind, sich von sich selbst zu trennen, geniessen allein das Vorrecht, an sich selbst Theil zu nehmen, und eigenes Leiden in dem milden Widerschein der Sympathie zu empfinden".[2] In Schiller's last aesthetic essay, i.e. the preface to Die Braut von Messina, the position is still essentially unchanged."... Das Gemüt des Zuschauers," Schiller says, "soll auch in der heftigsten Passion seine Freiheit behalten; es soll kein Raub der Eindrücke sein, sondern soll sich immer klar und heiter von den Rührungen scheiden, die es erleidet."[3] Formulations such as these lead us to conclude that, in Schiller's view, the spectator of the sublime, so far from distancing the emotions that are aroused in him and transmuting them in the aesthetic act, distances himself from his emotions. His response is free, not because the quality of his emotions has changed, but because they have been shut out.

It might be thought, that this excess of distance is bound up with the violent and conflicting emotions aroused by the sublime, whether we experience it in nature or in art. In fact, however, the position remains unchanged, when Schiller passes from a consideration of the experience of sublimity, with its special conditions, to the consideration of aesthetic experience in general. More

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1. Ibid., p. 20, ll. 30 f.
2. Ibid., p. 21. ll. 3 ff.
3. Sämmtliche Shriften, ed. cit., XIV, p.11, ll. 8 ff.

importantly still, he makes no distinction between the degree and kind of distance involved in the aesthetic experience of the recipient on the one hand, and the creative experience of the artist on the other. The basic operation in each case is the same. The poet, too, and the lyrical poet at that, Schiller declares categorically in his review of Bürger's poems, must "damit anfangen ..... sich selbst fremd zu werden...."[1]. Looking back over the variety of aesthetic experiences with which Schiller concerns himself, the similarity in the turns of phrase he uses to describe them is indeed striking: "sich moralisch entleiben-in sich selbst zurücksinken-mit uns selbst wie mit Fremdlingen umgehen-sich von sich selbst trennen-sich scheiden-sich selbst fremd werden", all these would seem to describe the same psychic condition, a condition characterised by duality rather than unity. Schiller's lack of concern to distinguish between the various degrees of aesthetic distance on the one hand, and between aesthetic and artistic distance on the other, springs from his failure to make any sharp distinction between receptive and creative processes as a whole. From the point of view of modern aesthetics, this must be regarded as a shortcoming of his theory. For among recent writers on the subject there is an increasing measure of agreement on the fact that the two processes and states of mind, though clearly in some way related, are yet far from identical. It is considered to be misleading in practice and unwarranted in principle to infer from the effect of a work of art on the recipient the creative processes that took place in the artist: for in the latter a set of factors arises and assumes a crucial

1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., VI, p. 326, l. 35.

importance which scarcely enters into the experience of the recipient. Schiller in his theoretical writings almost invariably starts out from the analysis of the aesthetic experience of the recipient, basing on it whatever observations he makes on the creative activity of the artist. For a creative artist, this is certainly a strange procedure to adopt. Two reasons for it immediately spring to the mind. Firstly, there is the strong influence of Kant, whose third critique, in accordance with the method adopted in its two forerunners, shifts the emphasis of aesthetic investigations from the object itself to the experiencing subject i.e. to the recipient of the aesthetic experience. Secondly, and probably more importantly, an explanation may be found in Schiller's strong pedagogic bent. The question of the educational function of art was always to the fore of his mind; and thus it is natural that he should approach the problem of the creation of art through an analysis of the effects it sets out to achieve.

This procedure, then, naturally influences Schiller's account of the creative process and, in particular, of artistic distance. Of the latter, actually, he tells us a great deal that is of crucial importance and reveals an insight as clear as that of leading modern writers such as Bullough and Alexander. When for instance we are told in the review of Bürger's poems that the poet must write "aus der sanftern und fernenden Erinnerung",[1] the word 'fernenden' makes it clear that Schiller did not regard temporal or spatial distance as the necessary condition of aesthetic distance, but rather, in some sense, as its effect.

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1. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., VI, p. 326, ll. 28 f.

Time and space may indeed help the poet to gain distance from his emotions: but essentially it is the quality of the aesthetic mood itself - that quality which Schiller describes by the word "Erinnerung" which lifts his vision, as it were, out of the dimension of time and space. It is that quality of the mood, not its remoteness in time, which Schiller means when he says: "ein Dichter nehme sich ja in Acht, mitten im Schmerz den Schmerz zu besingen".[1] Indeed, Schiller is aware of that paradoxical feature of art, by which is at the same time personal and distanced, and effective in the measure in which it succeeds in communicating the intensely experienced without total loss of distance; a feature which E. Bullough has described as the "antinomy of distance."[2] "Aus der sanftern und fernenden Erinnerung mag er dichten" Schiller says and significantly adds, "und dann desto besser für ihn, je mehr er an sich erfahren hat, was er besingt".[3] Again, Schiller knows that the emotions that, so far from excluding aesthetic distance, are in fact engendered by it, are of a peculiar character. They are artistic emotions: "Die Empfindlichkeit, der Unwille, die Schwermut des Dichters," he says in the review of Bürger's poems, "sind nicht bloss der Gegenstand, den er besingt, sie sind leider auch oft der Apoll, der ihn begeistert. Aber die Göttinnen des Reizes und der Schönheit sind sehr eigensinnige Gottheiten. Sie belohnen nur die Leidenschaft, die sie selbst einflössten ..."[4] In this distinction between the emotions aroused

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1. Ibid., p. 326, ll. 24 f.
2. E. Bullough, art. cit., p. 92.
3. Ibid., p. 326, ll. 28 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 326, ll. 17 ff.

by the subject-matter and those instilled by art itself one is tempted to see an anticipation of S. Alexander's fundamental distinction between material passions and formal passions; and Schiller's descriptions of these "idealisierte Empfindungen"[1] as he calls them, in many places foreshadow E. Bullough's formulations almost verbally. The poet, says Schiller, transmutes his emotions into poetic emotions by filtering "alles, was ausschliessend nur an seinem einzelnen, umschränkten, befangenen Selbst haftet und alles, was der Empfindung, die er darstellt, ungleichartig ist ...."[2] In the aesthetic experience, Bullough says, our emotions or affections are distanced from our self "by putting the phenomenon.... out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends .... by permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasise the "objective" features of the experience..."[3] For Schiller, the authenticity of artistic experience lies in its communicability: "Menschlich heisst uns die Schilderung eines Affekts, nicht weil sie darstellt, was ein einzelner Mensch wirklich so empfunden, sonder was alle Menschen ohne Unterschied mitempfinden müssen. Und kann dies wohl anders geschehen, als dass gerade soviel Lokales und Individuales davon weggenommen wird, als jener allgemeinen Mitteilbarkeit Abbruch tun würde?"[4] Whilst Bullough defines

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1. Ibid., p. 336, l.9.
2. Ibid., p. 337, ll. 11 f.
3. E. Bullough, art. cit., p. 89.
4. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., VI, p. 336, ll. 16 f.

artistic experience as "removed from its personal reference and rendered accessible to and effective for the sympathy, understanding and appreciation of others."[1]

But how does the artist attain aesthetic distance from the emotions aroused by his object? Here Schiller's theory leaves us in the dark. The emotions of the recipient, Schiller convincingly explains, are distanced and communicable because the artist puts distanced and communicable emotions into the work of art. His response is effectively controlled by the work of art itself. But what is it that in an analogous fashion controls and fashions the emotions of the artist, so that they become artistic emotions? From what Schiller tells us in the reviews of Bürger's and Matthison's poems, in Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen, and in his preface to Die Braut von Messina, we are left to gather that the artist accomplishes this transmutation in his own spirit, by shedding all that is personal in himself and his response. It is an entirely inward, mental process. As Schiller sums it up in the review of Matthison's poems: "Um aber versichert zu sein, dass er sich auch wirklich an die reine Gattung in den Individuen wende, muss er selbst zuvor das Individuum in sich ausgelöscht und zur Gattung gesteigert haben. Nur alsdann, wenn er nicht als der oder der bestimmte Mensch ... sondern wenn er als Mensch überhaupt empfindet, ist er gewiss, dass die ganze Gattung ihm nach empfinden werde..."[2]

It is here, that the inadequacy of approaching the problem of creative processes exclusively from the angle of

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1. E. Bullough, 'Mind and Medium in Art'. art. cit., p.40
2. Sämmtliche Schriften, ed. cit., X, p. 240 ll. 20 ff.

their effect on the recipient begins to make itself felt, and that Schiller's views diverge sharply from those of modern aestheticians. For the recognition is steadily growing that, in the words of J. Thorburn "the problem of medium is the key to the problem of art."[1] The difference between Schiller's position and that reached by modern aestheticians is summed up by Wellek and Warren's statement that "The artist does not conceive in general mental terms but in terms of concrete material".[2] Similarly, S. Alexander insists that "All attempts to describe the vision of the artist ... are in the air, till we recognise that his vision is reached in the effort to express his mind by particular material means."[3] E. Bullough makes the same point more sharply still, when he writes: "... unless the vision is conceived in terms of the medium, it would be almost an abuse of language to call it vision at all."[4] And he concludes the definition of artistic distance which has been quoted above, with the following words: "And the medium, its treatment, its very limitations and the fusion with the artist's vision in Technique is one of the chief factors of artistic creation forcing the distancing process upon the artist while at the same time it facilitates the maintenance of distance".[5] The material medium facilitates the maintenance of distance because it opens up to the artist a new field of objective problems and interests. As

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1. J. Thorburn, op.cit., p. 37.
2. R. Wellek and A. Warren, op.cit., p. 182.
3. S. Alexander, op.cit., p. 51.
4. E. Bullough, Mind and Medium in Art, art. cit., p. 37.
5. Ibid., p.40. For similar views cf. E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 154 and C.E. Montague, A Writer's Notes on his Trade, London 1949, p. 174 ff.

his attention becomes absorbed in their exploration, his initial emotions about his subject matter undergo a change of character. They lose their personal sting and, like the rest of his materials, become exciting for their own sakes:[1] in the words of S. Alexander, they become "formal passions".[2]

It is Schiller's failure to take note of this concrete factor, which gives to his account of the artistic process its peculiarly abstract quality; a quality, which emerged clearly enough from the exposition of his views given earlier on in this chapter, but upon which it was thought preferable not to comment at that stage of the argument. It will be remembered that in Schiller's view, the poet attains poetic truth by divesting his response to any given object of all personal elements and thus apprehending the object in its generic character. For only by the interpenetration of the pure object and the pure subject will the poet's vision become universal and communicable. What therefore, in Schiller's view takes place in the artistic imagination, is a one-way process tending towards the de-personalisation, the de-particularisation and the

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1. The permeation of the emotion itself with the sensuous and objective qualities of the medium is brought out beautifully by C.E. Montague, op.cit., p.178. He writes: "It is simply that, just as a child's hands love to touch wool because it is soft and warm, and also iron because it is hard and cold, so his [the poet's] mind loves to frame the idea of goodness because it is good and of baseness because it is base... simply because each has its own delicious differentness for the apprehending mind". Cf. also Wellek and Warren op.cit., "Emotions represented in literature are, neither for writer nor for reader the same as emotions in "real life"; they are... the feelings of emotions, the perceptions of emotions". (p.28) These personal and emotional elements "lose all their specifically personal meaning and become simply concrete human material, the integral elements of a work". (p.71.)
2. S. Alexander, Beauty and other Forms of Value, London, 1933, p.55.

de-concretisation of the artist's vision. This process accounts for the spirituality of art and the universality of its appeal. It does not, however, account for its sensuousness and the concrete nature of the insights it affords: for these become explicable only by reference to the sensuous and concrete nature of the medium in which the artist has his vision.[1] Artistic distance operates in opposite directions simultaneously; it does not merely take away and empty out, as it moves away from reality. By the same token, it also adds and enriches, as it discovers a world of forms. As Bullough puts it: "It is Distance which on one side prevents the emptying of Art of its concreteness and the development of the typical into abstractness; which, on the other suppresses the directly personal element of its individualism;"[2] On the whole and especially in his general aesthetic theory Schiller tends to stress the second of these functions. In the essays on tragic art, however, he comes much nearer to striking a proper balance between them. And this is indeed what one would expect, since he is here speaking from the fulness of his poetic experience. For what does the insistence on the contemplative being of the tragic hero signify, but the poet's recognition of his soverign right to make his discoveries in the world of forms?

Schiller's letters to Goethe and Körner on the whole tend to confirm the trend of his more systematic utterances. It is true that, especially in the correspondence with Goethe, we find flashes of deep insight into the power of the material medium over the artist and its influence on

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1. S. Alexander formulates this point as follows: "start with the truth that a work of art is a particular material structure, and the concrete insight of the artist into his subject matter becomes intelligible." (op.cit., p.51.)

2. E. Bullough, 'Psychical Distance'. art. cit., p. 107.

the general direction and the every detail of his vision.[1] Nevertheless the impression remains that, even in these more intimate documents, a passage such as the following more truly represents his fundamental aesthetic convictions: "Jeden der imstande ist seinen Empfindungszustand in ein Objekt zu legen, so, dass dieses Objekt mich nöthigt, in jenen Empfindungszustand überzugehen, folglich lebendig auf mich wirkt, heisse ich einen Poeten, einen Macher. Aber nicht jeder Poet ist darum dem Grad nach ein Vortreflicher. Der Grad seiner Vollkommenheit beruht auf dem Reichthum, dem Gehalt, den er in sich hat und folglich ausser sich darstellt, und auf dem Grad der Nothwendigkeit, die sein Werk ausübt. Je subjektiver sein Empfinden ist, desto zufälliger ist es; die objektive Kraft beruht auf dem ideellen. ..... der vollkommene Dichter spricht das Ganze der Menschheit aus."[2] This definition of the poetic faculty, written as late as 1801, and written at that to a fellow-artist, in its severe abstractness represents no basic departure from the views put forward nearly a decade before in the reviews of Bürger's and Matthison's poems and in the essay Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen. Goethe's reply to this letter is well worth quoting. For although in seeming agreement with Schiller's opinions, it throws the aesthetic temper they manifest, into the sharpest possible relief: "Die Dichtkunst", Goethe writes, "verlangt im Subjekt, das sie ausüben soll, eine gewisse gutmüthige, ins Reale verliebte Beschränktheit, hinter welcher das Absolute verborgen liegt. Die Forderungen von oben herein zerstören jenen unschuldigen produktiven

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1. Cf. especially letter to Goethe, 15 Oct. 99 dealing with Voltaire's Mahomet and other French plays; letter to Goethe, 26 June 97, on Goethe's intended epic "Die Jagd";

2. Schillers Briefe, ed. cit., VI, pp. 262, f.

Zustand..."[1] This artistic credo, as Goethe calls it, does not contain the word medium. But surely it is there in meaning. For to Goethe, it is not the transmission of a distilled spirituality, but the living and limiting contact with the concrete, sensuous and material side of art, that makes the poet. And the last words, expressly directed though they be against the transcendentalism of the Romantics, would seem almost to indicate a gentle withdrawal from that excess of spirituality which is so evident in Schiller's letter, and to hint at its interrelation with Schiller's poetic creativity. Whether this reading is justified or not, it can hardly be doubted that the abstractness of Schiller's aesthetic is determined, not only by Kant's influence on the one hand, and his concern with aesthetic education on the other, but more basically by his make-up as a creative artist. For do we not recognise in his theory the 'grosse Styl' that is so characteristic of his tragic art? The poet Schiller, dedicated to the ideal of totality, in truth, "spricht das Ganze der Menschheit aus", and, we are convinced, speaks to the whole of humanity, more urgently to-day than in his own time; but hardly ever does he speak to the individual with the voice of an individual. Such intimate communion depends on the poet's natural trust in the sweetness and fine discipline of words, and in their delicate power to transmute the sensual into the spiritual: a creative innocence that is only too easily dispelled by the knowledge of the Absolute.

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1. Goethes Werke, Weimar Ausgabe IV, 15. p. 213.

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