

CONSTANTINE PANAYOTOU KYRRIS
URBAN AND RURAL CONDITIONS IN THE BYZANTINE
EMPIRE FROM THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH TO THE MIDDLE
OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

(M.A. THESIS)

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A B S T R A C T

This thesis examines the social conditions in the Byzantine Empire from the end of the XIII to the middle of the XIV century. The crucial facts were: i. the disintegration of the Empire into almost autonomous provinces, which followed the system of *pronoia* granted to nobles on special terms; ii. the sharp class and political struggles.

Firstly the causality of rivalries in both countryside and towns is traced. Such were the one between rich nobility and non-noble masses and those between various sections of the nobility. Special attention is given to the organisation of the various classes and to the relation between imperial internal policy and internal developments. The domination of the nobility in both towns and country and the Western intrusion and Eastern attacks appear as the main obstacles to social and technical progress. The religious issues of *Hesychasm* and *Barlaamism* with their social roots increased social polarisation.

As a result came the civil wars of 1341 - 1354. Then the revolutionary lower classes supported the Palaiologi against the nobles, who supported John VI Cantacuzenus.

In section C the civil wars are studied by comparing several sources. The phases of the wars are co-examined with the social policies of the rival parties. The revolutionaries had no homogeneity and were especially hindered by their noble leaders from taking radical measures. The control of the Palaiologian clique of Constantinople over the popular régime proved fatal for the latter. The agreement of John V. Palaiologus and John VI Cantacuzenus in 1347 re-established the régime of 1341, but did not appease the old rivalries. The new civil war of 1351-1354 combined with a revival of the religious issues followed the pattern of the revolution of 1341-1347, but, like that, resulted in no radical change: the final deposition of John VI was a success of the Palaiologian nobility, not of the

Palaiologian popular masses. John V's policy was generally similar to that of his opponent.

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INTRODUCTION
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
1282 - 1354

a) THE REIGN OF ANDRONICUS II UP TO THE FIRST CIVIL
WAR 1282 - 1321

Under the cultured Emperor Andronicus II Palaiologus (1282 - 1328) the restored Byzantine Empire had to face on two wide frontiers the increased pressure of Serbs, Bulgarians, Angevins, Montferrats, Genoese, Venetians, Albanians and Turks (1) and to stop internal separatism (2). Attica, Boeotia, part of Morea and most Greek islands were under the Franks, and North-Eastern and Central Greece had been under the Angeli and other local magnates since the early XIII century. The Byzantine Morea was secured from disintegration by the appointment of a permanent governor in 1308, while in Epirus after 1296 the Byzantine influence, though weakly established, outweighed the pro-Tarentine elements, which continued the imperialism of the Angevins. In 1296 the Serbs took Dyrrachium from the Angevins, but were stopped for a time through diplomacy from further encroachments on Byzantine lands (1299).

The Empire's support of the Genoese in their war with the Venetians in 1294 - 1299 proved profitable to both foreigners at the expense of Byzantium (1302). Still graver was the loss of Chios and Phocaea to the Genoese (1304)(2a)

(1) See V. Laurent Une famille turque BZ 49 (1956) 349.

(2) Main sources: Pachym.vols. I-II passim; Greg.vol.I passim.Cf. Arnakis Οἱ πρότοι Ὀδοποι. 34f., 45f., 133f., 133f.; G. Ostrogorsky H.B.S. 425 ff.

(2a) ~~Both were actually occupied by the Genoese~~ family of Zaccaria, who recognised Byzantine suzerainty. See

and the Turkish occupation of the major part of Asia Minor by 1300, despite Philanthropenus' resistance, which collapsed after his unsuccessful stand in 1296 (3). Since then the Emperor's suspicions of his generals grew to the extent of dictating a greater use of mercenaries. Thus Alans, Catalans and Turks were used against one another, which only resulted in the devastation of Byzantine lands and the creation by the Catalans of a principality at Athens (1311 - 1388) after their triumphant progress through a disintegrated Thessaly (4). On the Black Sea the Bulgarians took important ports in 1307. Philip of Tarentum recaptured Dyrrachium in 1306 and Charles de Valois backed by Venetians, Serbians and Greek magnates, made unsuccessful imperial claims to Constantinople itself (1307).

With the extinction of the Angeli in 1318 Epirus under Nicholas Orsini passed further into the Byzantine sphere of influence (5) and in 1319 the "burgenses" of several of its fortresses received privileges (6) similar to those granted in 1261, 1284 and 1317 to the merchant class of Monembasia (7). North Thessaly recognised the imperial suzerainty, but the rest of Thessaly stayed under local lords (8), who were unable to

Constanst. Amantus Συμβολή εἰς τὴν μεσαιωνικὴν ἱστορίαν τῆς Χίου, ΕΒΕΣ ΠΑΘ. Περίοδ. Β'. τόμ Β' (1954-5) 158-9.

(3) Greg.VI,8:I,195-202; cf.VIII,12:I,364-2; Arnakis op.cit.47; Pachym.II,215.

(4) K.M. Setton Catalan domination of Athens (1311-1388), Cambridge - Mass. (1948). Cf.George T. Kolias 'Η μεταξύ τῶν Καταλα- νῶν καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου δουκὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων μάχη (1311), ΕΒΕ Σ 26(1956)358-379.

(5) Greg.VIII,1a:I,283.

(6) M. - M.V, 77 ff. Doelger Regesten III nr. 1897.

(7) M. - M.V, 165 ff.

(8) Greg.VII,13:I,279.

resist the Albanian inroads and the Catalan occupation of most of their country. The imperial weakness became more evident when much of Morea was lost to the Venetians and separatist tendencies were emphatically shared even by members of the imperial family. Since the time of the Comneni certain provinces of the Empire had been governed almost as independent states under imperial suzerainty by members of the imperial family. This system reached its logical conclusion under Michael VIII, who associated Andronicus II with himself in the Government of the entire Empire. Andronicus II in his turn associated Michael IX as Co-emperor. But the complete division of the Empire into thoroughly independent principalities governed by the imperial princes, which Irene of Montferrat, Andronicus II's wife (1284 - 1317) had sought to bring about in accordance with Western ideas, was rejected by him (9).

Still worse were other internal developments such as the decrease of financial power, which, together with increased obligations, forced Andronicus to become more moderate in external affairs and to reduce his army and depend after 1304 on Genoese naval power (10). As abuses flourished, and as the nobility and monasteries became more powerful and the Western economic intrusion undermined further the economy of Byzantium (11), prices rose sharply and it became difficult even to feed the population. The new taxes imposed in 1320-1321 (12) and

(9) O.H.B.S. 427,434; Greg.VII,5: I, 233-241; Tafrali Thessalonique des origines 205-6; Lemerle Philippes 187-9; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 33-34. For other similar previous distributions see Ostrogorsky Féodalité 100; Charanis Monastic Properties, DOP 4(1948) 90; Zakythinos Processus de Féodalisation 12.

(10) Ševčenko The Zealot Revolution 614,n.55; O.H.B.S.430.

(11) D.A.Zakythinos Crise monétaire 1-25,40-43, 79-80;89-90; 108-115; Doelger Schatzkammern p.306; still cf.V.L.(aurent) in BZ 50(1957)577-8; he notes an expansion of Byz.coin into the Balkans up to the middle of the XIV century.

the continual control of prices and of wheat trade after 1265 (13) were not very helpful, and coupled with the restriction of the privileges of the nobility and the decrease of national land - for which Andronicus II was held responsible, (14) - caused grievances, especially among the young nobles, who were further discontented because of the length of his reign (15).

His ecclesiastical policy had similar consequences. A champion of Orthodoxy and an enemy of the Union with Rome, he reversed his father's policy (15a). He appointed illiterate old monks as Patriarchs "in order to treat them like slaves" (16); he transferred Athos from his own to the Patriarchal jurisdiction in 1312; he recognised the church dioceses and favoured the Church in general. But some Patriarchs opposed him and asserted their independence (17) with the support of strong groups of ecclesiastics striving for offices and revenues (18). Indeed the political influence of the Church grew dangerously for the State as the years passed and the latter was enfeebled.

So the primary internal political rivalries were

(12) Greg. VIII, 6: I, 317-8; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 89-91 *συνόριθρον*, apparently aimed to feed the people, was one of these; cf.n.13.

(13) C.Bratianu *Études Byz.* (1938) 159-167; N.Banescu *Le Patriarche Athanase I.*

(14) Especially by the nobles, who lost their "pronoiae" Greg. VIII, 6: I, 317-320; VIII, 4: I, 300; VIII, 11: I, 355-6; cf. Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse; DOP 11 (1957) 157; cf. Cant.I,45: I, 220. See further in Section A, Chapter I.

(15) Greg. IX, 1-3: 3, 390-405; VII, 1: I, 284-5.

(15a) Greg. VI, 1: I, 159-160.

(16) Greg. VIII, 3: I, 292; cf. VI, 5: 1, 180-6; VII, 12: I, 360

(17) Greg. VI, 5: I 180 -6; VI, 7: I, 191-3; VII, 1: 215-7; VII,9: I, 258-9 (Athanasius); Cant. I, 44: I, 218-9; I,50-51: I,248-225.

(18) Greg. VI, 2: I, 165-7; V, 2: I, 127-8; VII, 9: I, 261-2. The

between Church and State, the nobility and the Emperor, and the imperial princes and the Emperor. There was also the still politically unformed revolutionary discontent of the lower classes against oppression and poverty (19). The first civil war of 1321 - 1328 originated in these conditions and in a personal quarrel between Andronicus II and his grandson Andronicus III, son of Michael IX -, whose frivolities, extravagance and impatient ambitions had made Andronicus II bar him from the succession (20).

b) THE CIVIL WAR OF THE TWO ANDRONICI:

1321 - 1328.

Andronicus III's main allies were the landed nobility headed by his cousin in the Grand Domestic John Cantacuzenus. A leading part was also played by their Cumano - byzantine cousin Syrgiannis, as well as by the upstart tax-farmer Alexius Apocaucus and by the Protostrator Theodore Synadenus. The Serbs and the Genoese at first aided Andronicus III, while German and other mercenaries served in his army (21). The nobles grasped the opportunity to make party profits, especially by acquiring more land, dignities (22) and political influence (23). They,

most important of them were the Josephites, followers of the Patriarch Joseph, and the Arsenites, followers of the Patriarch Arsenius (second half of the XIII and early XIV century; both anti-unionists).

(19) For frequent revolts against the rich in the 20ies see Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse in DOP 11 (1957) 81, 84-86; *eiusdem* Zealot Revolution (1953) 603 n.2; 604 nn. 7,9; 617 nn. 68-71.

(20) Parisot Cantacuzène 29-36; their differences went back to 1317.

(21) Parisot op.cit.40-41; Ševčenko, Zealot Revolution (1953)612.

(22) Greg. VIII, 4: I,300; VIII, 6:I, 319-320;VIII, 11:I,351-2, 355; IX, 6: I, 419.

(23) Zakythinos Crise monétaire 74;Diomedes Βυζαντινά Μελέτα , A'116-126:land was the exclusive means of influence in politics.

especially Cantacuzenus, paid for the war (24), and both they and the people, attracted by promises and grants (25) gave their full support to Andronicus III (26).

Syrgiannis led the armies of the rebels in the first phase of the war (Easter 1321 - June 1321), which resulted in peace-treaty granting the provinces west of Christopolis to the junior Andronicus (27), although the Empire was still theoretically united. In the second phase (1322 - 5) the old Emperor was re-inforced by Syrgiannis and his party of pronoias, who had been displeased with the junior Emperor and Cantacuzenus over the distribution of lands (28), but he was defeated and had to accept his grandson as Co-emperor.

Andronicus III's marriage to Anna of Savoy (February 1326) just before the Turks took Brussa (6/4/1326) (29), was the starting-point of new cultural influxes from the West (30) and of a Western orientation of Byzantine foreign policy, which culminated in 1327 in negotiations with Charles le Beau and the Pope about the Union of the Churches (31), despite the earlier

(24) Cant. I, 28: I, 137-8; II, 19-20: I, 415-427; I, 56-57: I, 289-294; Greg. XII, 3: 579-584.

(25) Greg. VIII, 11e: I, 355; VIII, 6: I, 316; IX, 2: I, 402-3; Cant. I, 53: 3, 271-2: especially immunities and various privileges were granted.

(26) Greg. VIII, 6: I, 316-320; IX, 3: I, 404; IX, 4: I, 406, 408-9; IX, 2: I, 397-8; IX, 1: I, 392; I, 402-6; cf. Zakythinos Crise monétaire 86.

(27) Tafrali Thessalonique 50-51.

(28) Greg. VIII, 11: I, 351-9; Cant. I, 24: I, 121-4; I, 27: I, 134-5.

(29) Charanis Short Chronicle, B 13 (1938) 341-2; V. Laurent La Chronique anonyme RÉB 7 (1950) 208.

(30) Cant. I, 40-42: I, 194-206.

(31) Omont Projet de Réunion 254-7.

anti-western feelings and attitude of the old Emperor (32).

These negotiations stopped with the resumption of the civil war. This fresh outbreak was caused by the grant of lands and revenues to his party by Andronicus III. These grants were made without the consent of his grandfather and were regarded as invalid by his political opponents, who reoccupied certain of the granted lands (33). Similar causes lay behind the unsuccessful sedition of John Panhypersebastus and the two sons of the chief Minister Theodore Metochites aided by the Serbs in Thessalonica in 1327 (34). In this phase the Serbs, hoping to conquer Greek lands, as they succeeded in doing, aided Andronicus II. The Albanians of Thessalo-Acarmania and Epirus were subjected to the authority of the junior Emperor (35) and the Bulgarians, in their effort to regain the ports and lands lost to the Greeks in 1322 (36), helped him also, the more so as his sister was married to their King. With the support of the Patriarch Esaias and other prelates (37), and of the magnates and the people, who were again attracted by promises and grants (38), the armies of Andronicus III

(32) Greg. VI 1: I, 159 f.; he reversed his father's pro-unionist policy.

(33) Greg. IX, 1-3: I, 390-405; Cant. I, 47-50: I, 228-228; cf. I, 54-55: I, 273-9.

(34) Greg. VIII, 14: I, 373-4; Cant. I, 43-44: I, 208-219; Tafrahi op.cit. 48-49; cf. Cant. I, 59: I, 304-6; I, 50: I, 248-251. For other movements see Cant. I, 55: I, 285.

(35) Cant. I, 55-56: I, 279-285.

(36) Cant. I, 36: I, 172.

(37) Cant. I, 44: I, 218-9; I, 50-51: I, 247-225; Greg. IX, 3 γ - δ: I, 405-7.

(38) Cf. nn. 25-26; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 136-7; Cant. I, 55: I, 279; I, 56: I, 286-8.

once more defeated those of his grandfather, led by the Despot Demetrius and by the Asaneses, who were of the family of Cantacuzenus's wife (39). Despite the Bulgarians' disloyalty the war was decided when the senators of Thessalonica and Constantinople surrendered to Andronicus III and Cantacuzenus, both of whom they trusted. Constantinople was taken on 24 May 1328 and the old Emperor and Th. Metochites resigned (40).

c) BETWEEN THE TWO CIVIL WARS OR ANDRONICUS III'S REIGN:

1328 - 1341.

The new Emperor failed to satisfy fully the expectations of the nobles. Thus his reign was marked by many plots organised by rival groups, who aimed at the acquisition of land and at securing the throne for their "chosen" leaders. The Emperor's first grants (41) were followed by a rather conservative land policy (42). This coupled with his constant tendency to yield to his grandfather (as early as 1321 (43), and later in 1327 (44), and in 1329-1330 (45)), and with his desire to ab-

(39) Cant. I, 52: I, 260-2; I, 54: I, 273-4; I, 56: I, 286-8; Greg. IX, I z - 3: I, 394-7; IX, 4: I, 407 ff. IX, 5: I, 414 VIII, 12: I, 362-4; cf. n. 33.

(40) Cant. I, 54-59: I, 273-306; Greg. VIII, 6: I, 314; IX, 5: I, 412; IX, 6: I, 419-426; IX, 4: I, 408-410. The sacking of Metochites's palace by the mob expressed their anger at his fiscal policy: Zakythinos Crise monétaire 79-80.

(41) Cant. II, 2: I, 316-323.

(42) Cant. III, 8: II 58-64; III, 9: II, 68-69; Greg. XII, 8: II, 595; XII, 5: II, 586. Ostrogorsky Féodalité 101; O.H.B.S. 448. Cf. Section A, chapter I.

(43) Cant. I, 33: I, 163-5; Greg. VIII, 11 n - 3: I, 357; VIII, 6: I, 313-4; Cant. II, 21: I, 104-8; I, 20: I, 98-99.

(44) Cant. I, 49: I, 246-7; I, 57: I, 297-8.

(45) Cant. II, 18-20: I, 412-427.

dicate and become a monk, as well as his poor health (46) alienated him from the nobles. Consequently many of them and many monks turned to Cantacuzenus, whom they trusted as the prospective successor to Andronicus as early as 1330 greeting him as Emperor (47).

Indeed, Cantacuzenus was the real arbiter of public affairs with the alternate co-operation and opposition of the Emperor in internal affairs. Through his initiative and that of his mother, - who had great influence, - the nobles built up a fleet and, with Turkish help, recaptured Chios and imposed Byzantine suzerainty on New Phocaea (1329). Andronicus, however, declined to appoint a Cantacuzenian noble as Governor, of Chios (48) and, continuing his grandfather's reform of the Byz. courts of justice, he emphasised further their ecclesiastical character and increased the judicial powers of the Patriarch (1329, 1337) (49) at the expense of the nobility.

Cantacuzenus was the architect of alliances with the Seljukid Emirs of Western Asia Minor Sarkhan and Amur - both anti-

(46) Cant. II, 13-14: I, 391-411; II, 8: I, 359-360; I, 53: I, 270-1; Greg. IX, 8^B: I, 550; IX 9a,ε:II, 552, 554; IX, 10: I, 439. Still cf. Cant. I, 42: I, 205.

(47) Greg. XII, 10: II 604; XII, 5; I, 586; XII, 6: II, 596; XV, 11: II, 787; Cant. II, 15: I, 396-9; III, 13: II, 83-7; III, 11. II, 74-9; IV, 37: III, 270-1; III, 92: II, 564-8; II, 32: I, 497-8; IV, 24: III, 176-9; Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμᾶν, P.G. 151, 601A-B; cf. Parisot Cantacuzène 80, 138-9, 131-3 (cf. Section A, ch. I, nn. 89-90, 80, 85, 71).

(48) Cant. II, 10-13: I, 375-391; Greg. IX, 9: I, 553; cf. Cant. IV, 12: III, 80-85; Parisot op. cit. 94-98; O.H.B.S. 437-449, 452; C. Amantus Συμβολή εἰς τὴν μεσ. ἱστορ. τῆς Κίου, Ε.Μ.Φ.Σχ. ΓΕΦ., Περίοδος Β', Τόμος Β' (1954-5), 159-168. Lemerle *Émirat* 58-62.

(49) Greg. XI, 3: I, 537-8 (1337); O.H.B.S. 449; Zakythinos Ἡ Ἀλωσις 79-80.

Ottoman and anti-Latin, - whose help proved effective against the "anti-Turkish" alliance of Genoa, Naples, Rhodes and Naxos during their attempt to take Lesbos (1335-6) (50). Their help, however, proved fruitless against the Ottomans, who took Nicaea (2 May 1331) (51) and Nicomedia (1337) (52), raided the European coast intensively, and became a dangerous naval opponent (53). In the Balkans the defeat of pro-Byzantine Bulgaria by the Serbs (28 June 1330) offered Andronicus the opportunity to recapture some ports and towns on the frontier (54); these were retaken by the new **Czar**Iwan Alexander (1331-1371), who concluded an alliance with the new Serbian Kral Stephan Dusan (1331-1355) and had his conquests confirmed by a peace-treaty with Byzantium (55). But the Serbian drive to the south continued more violently under Dusan, who profited greatly from Byzantine internal troubles. The first opportunity occurred with the last conspiracy of Syrgiannis.

Though persistently protected by Cantacuzenus, who considered him as his prospective ally (56), Syrgiannis preferred

(50) Thiriet *Régestes* I pp. 26-27: 7/7/1332; p. 30: 16/10/1333; Parisot *op.cit.* 90-92, 126-9; Guillaud *Correspondance de N.Grégoras* pp. 167-173. Cant. II, 29-31: I, 476-495. Lemerle *op.cit.* 108-115.

(51) Charanis *Short Chronicle*, B 13 (1938) 343; V. Laurent *La chronique anonyme*, *RÉB* 7 (1950) 209.

(52) V. Laurent *op. cit.* 211; cf. his review of H.G.Beck's book on Th. Metochites, in *RÉB* 10 (1952) 272; Arnakis *Οἱ πρῶτοι Ὀθωμανοί* 196-7.

(53) Parisot *Cantacuzène* 131-3.

(54) Cant. II, 2: I, 427-431.

(55) Cant. II, 26-27: I, 458-470.

(56) Cant. II, 4-5: I, 329-336; I, 35: I, 171-2; Greg. VIII, 12: I, 362-4; Cant. II, 18: I, 411-2.

a personal policy and plotted against him. When in 1330, the sick Emperor appointed Cantacuzenus as Guardian of his successor Anna - and probably even offered him the throne twice, which Cantacuzenus claims to have rejected - Syrgiannis with Apocaucus took advantage of the discontent of the Emperor's mother Xene, who secured the loyalty of the people of Thessalonica both to herself and to Syrgiannis as Guardians of the throne (57). Only after her death (15 August 1333) (58) did Syrgiannis embark on his long-prepared adventure to seize the throne before Cantacuzenus. His plot was detected by Cantacuzenus' men, but Syrgiannis escaped to Dušan, whose armies he led on successful expeditions to Kastoria and other Macedonian towns, with the support of the Albanians and of his local partisans. Only after Syrgiannis' assassination (23 August 1334) did Dušan, who was facing an Hungarian attack, offer a peace-treaty to Byzantium, by which part of his acquisitions were confirmed (59).

After the death of Syrgiannis and Xene, and of another pretender to the throne, the despot Constantine - Callistus (1335) (60), Apocaucus, Cantacuzenus and the new Patriarch John Calecas became the most important personalities in imperial politics.

(57) Greg. IX, 10a,b: I, 439-441; X, 6: I, Cant. III, 14: II, 89-95; II, 14-15: I, 391-7; Parisot Cantacuzène 117-125, 156; cf. Cant. II,9:I, 363-370; Greg.XII, 3: II, 579-584; Cant.I,39:I,186: Charanis Short chronicle, B13 (1938) 343.

(58) Parisot op. cit. 113, 118-9.

(59) Parisot op.cit. 121; Cant.II, 24-28: I, 436-473; Greg.X, 5-7: I, 488-501; XII, 2 : I, 577; Loenertz Cydonès, Correspondance I p. 174.

(60) Parisot Cantacuzène 121, 124.

Apocaucus' career had started in the lower ranks of the administration, but he soon managed to become one of the richest tax-farmers. To avoid paying his debts to the Treasury he joined the revolt of Andronicus III in 1321 and made alliances with Ege Leonida, Cantacuzenus and others (61). Cantacuzenus in particular protected him constantly and made him successively admiral (1321) (62), *parakoimomenos* (1327) (63), imperial treasurer (1328) (64) and chief minister (after the victory of the rebels in 1328), despite the Emperor's disapproval of these and other similar appointments to key positions made by Cantacuzenus for his men (65). Yet Apocaucus pursued an ambitious personal policy (66), though Cantacuzenus, continuing his patronage, made him in 1340 admiral of the fleet against the Turks, from which, as from his other offices earlier, the Emperor dismissed him in April 1341 aiming at his annihilation. It was only after Andronicus' death (15/6/1341) that Cantacuzenus restored him as chief minister, hoping to use his talents and his strong party (67), des-

(61) Cant.III, 14: II, 89-90; I, 23: I, 116-9; I, 8: I, 43; I, 21: I, 106; cf. Zakythinos Crise monétaire 81-76.

(62) R. Guillard Le Protostrator, BZ 44 (1951) 232, n.12.

(63) Cant. I, 51: I, 258; I, 53: I, 267-8; Greg. IX, 4: I, 208-210.

(64) Cant. II, 5: I, 338-9; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 86.

(65) Cant.III, 14: II, 89-90; II, 5: I, 338-9; cf. Cant.I, 52: I, 259-260: Syrgiannis appointed by Cantacuzenus as Governor of Thessalonica 1328, and Cant.ib. and II, 1: I, 311; II, 15: I, 398-9: Th. Synadenus Governor of Thrace and then of Constantinople, etc.

(66) Greg.XII, 2 : II, 577; XII, 5: II, 586; XIV, 5: II, 710-711; XIV, 3η: II, 702; Cant.III, 89: II, 550: III, 16: II, 101-3; III, 68: II, 420; III, 10: II, 69-74; cf. III, 36: II, 224-5; III, 51: II, 305; III, 54: II, 322-4; Parisot op.cit.198; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 84; R.Guillard Le Protostrator, REB 7 (1949) 169-170.

(67) Cant.II, 5: I, 338-9; Cant.III, 13-15: II, 83-101; III, 87: II, 540-541; II, 38: I, 535-547; Greg.XII, 9-10: II, 602-6; XII, 4: II,

pite the mutual antipathy between them (68). (Indeed Cantacuzenus despised his protégé because of his low social extraction and this opinion was shared by many of the nobles (69)).

When the death of Andronicus brought their rivalry to the fore, the shrewd upstart had a solid position in higher society, reached through various intrigues, "Napoleonic" marriages, party alliances and a remarkable versatility of policy (70).

John Calecas was similarly of low extraction. He had served as priest to Cantacuzenus and then to Andronicus III. Though married he was created Patriarch by them both in the autumn or winter of 1333 (71), following the imperial custom of encroaching on church affairs (72). But though Cantacuzenus tried to use him as his tool in return for his patronage (73), Calecas soon became an independent factor surpassing all his

584-6; XII, 2: II, 577-8; Parisot op.cit. 27, 163-4, 144-7; Thiriet op.cit. I, p.46, 15/3/1341. The fleet in question was built by Apocaucus himself on funds of the Emperor.

(68) Cant.III, 36: II, 220-1, etc.

(69) Cant. III, 14: II, 89: I, 23: I, 116; III, 27: II,170-1; III, 25: II, 152-4; III, 46: II, 279-280; Greg. XII, 2: II, 577; XII, 4: II, 584 etc.

(70) Cant. III, 19: II, 117-8; III, 15-16: II, 95-106.

(71) Greg. X.7: I, 476-7; XVI, 4a: II, 813-4; Cant.II,21:I, 431-5: The dates in Parisot 113-4, 121 and Tafrali Thessalonique des Origines 293 (1331 or 1334) are definitely wrong, since the above texts date Calecas's election after Syrgiannis' flight, that came after Xene's death (: 15/8/1333) and before the expedition of 1333-4.

(72) Cf. Cant. II, 1: I, 312; Greg. IX, 3-4: I, 403-7; Cant.I, 50: I, 247-252; I, 44: I, 216-9; II, 2: I, 316-322; Greg.VII,11a: I, 270-1; etc. cf. n. 16. Further about this policy of encroachment: A. Michel Die Kaisermacht in der Ostkirche, Ostkirchliche Studien 2 (1953) 1-35, 89-109; 4 (1955) 211-260; 5 (1956)1-32.

(73) Cant.III,6: II,47-52; III,33: II, 199-200;Greg.XV,30:II, 755-8.

predecessors (74). His first opportunity was his appointment as guardian to the Imperial Family during the expedition against Syrgiannis (75), a position which he exploited for acquiring political influence (76). But apparently through Cantacuzenus' reaction, he was no longer in that post when the next expedition to Lesbos and Phoecea took place in 1335-6. Theodora Cantacuzena acted then as Co-regent with Anna, and she crushed a plot hatched by certain nobles under the leadership of the Despot Demetrius, who were helped by the Genoese. Having saved Lesbos (50) the Emperor had to conclude a treaty granting trade privileges to Phoecea, which would continue under Genoese rule while recognizing Byzantine suzerainty - and rushed back to Constantinople, where he showed leniency to the conspirators. Only the two Asans were condemned to imprisonment (77), certainly with Cantacuzenus' connivance due to old rivalries (78). It was from this and similar Cantacuzenian activities (cf. n.57) that a gap was created between them and the jealous Empress Anna (79) and inclined her

(74) Greg. XII, 2: II, 579; XV, 4: II, 759.

(75) Greg. X, 7: I, 496; XII, 3: II, 579-587; Parisot Cantacuzène 139; Cantacuzenus in his relevant passages (II, 24-25) does not mention this tutorship:

(76) Cant. III, 2: II, 16-25.

(77) Greg. XI, 2: I, 531-4; XIII, 16: II, 624-5; Cant. II, 29-31: I, 476-495; III, 17-18: II, 106-116. Parisot op.cit. 129-131.

(78) Cf. n. 39 and 33; Cantacuzenus' silence on his mother's co-regency and on the Asans' participation in the plot is very eloquent, as is his sudden reference to them in 1342; at that time, he says, that **they** were imprisoned since 1336, and he boasts that **he** freed them: Cant. III, 26: II, 160-2; cf. Greg. XII, 16: II, 624-6.

(79) Greg. XXVII, 38: III, 168; XII, 13: II, 618-620: IV, 10 : I, 117-8; XV, 4: II, 758-762; XVIII, 4: II, 886; Cant. I, 28: I, 137-8; II, 40: I, 559; III, 26: II, 162-5; III, 30: II, 185-6; III, 36: II, 220-223; I, 25: I, 125; II, 15: I, 395-7; III, 54: II, 325-7; Parisot op. cit. 90.

to form alliances with despised foreign or low-class elements of Byzantine society and to a permanent attachment to Catholicism (80). So, until the Acarnanian expedition (1339-1340) Calecas had, through such polarising moves, gained sufficient strength to be appointed as guardian once more. This came about in the following manner.

After the death of Stephanus Gabrielopoulos, the strongest Thessalian magnate, in 1334, northern Thessaly was annexed by the imperial Governor of Thessalonica Michael Monomachus, who was then transferred to Thessaly, which became a separate thema. The rest of Thessaly passed to the despot of Acarnania and Epirus John Ducas Orsini (1323-1335) (81). After the latter's murder his possessions were annexed without resistance by Andronicus in 1336 - 1337. The Emperor rather than grant the autonomy claimed by the conflicting Epirotic magnates, only granted some privileges to the towns and appointed Synadenus as imperial governor. Thus an unsuccessful revolt of the displeased magnates, incited by the Catalans and the Angevins, broke out under the despot's son Nicephorus in 1339-1340. While the Emperor and Cantacuzenus were leading an expedition to suppress the revolt, there was an alternation in the power of the rival parties in Byzantium. The Hesychast Controversy (vide infra), which was already a political issue, had brought the Emperor closer to the Patriarch. Together with the court reforms of 1337 (cf. n.49), and the marriage of the Emperor's daughter to the Bulgarian Czar (1338), the renewal of Calecas' guardianship in 1339 - 1340 (82) counterbalanced Cantacuzenus' ascent to the position of dominant

(80) Cant.III,87:II, 536-541. For her alliances see further; cf. Greg.XV,1: II, 748-9.

(81) Cant.II,28: I.470-474; cf.III, 58: II,357; III, 31: II.190-191;III, 39: II, 239; III,90: II,557-9; Tafrali Thessalonique 49-54; Parisot op.cit.121; O.H.B.S. 452 says incorrectly that John Monomachus was the Governor of Thessalonica. Lemerle *Émirat* 119-120.

(82) Parisot op.cit. 80, 131-3, 138-9. This new guardianship,

statesman and national hero of the Empire (83). Cantacuzenus' prestige, however, was further enhanced (84), when he crushed a new conspiracy of Nobles and when the Epirotic magnates surrendered personally to him. The same effect was achieved by the appointment of his reliable nephew John Angelus as Governor of Epirus and of Synadenus as Governor of Thessalonica. Of equal importance were the recapture of Phocaea (1340) and the marriage of one of Cantacuzenus' daughters to Nicephorus, as well as of his son Isidore to a daughter of the Despot Demetrius (85).

By the time of the Emperor's death his growing weakness of character and his inability to control imperial politics (86), had widened the breach between the two parties and led to further conflict. Yet his alignment with the opponents of Cantacuzenus had become more evident in many issues, particularly in the Hesychast Controversy and in land policy. When Cantacuzenus became *protospatharios* of the State on 15 June 1341, he distributed supplementary grants to all pronoiars, both to those who had been neglected and to those who had not been neglected (87), apparently by Andronicus. This was a direct attack on the late Emperor's policy and an eloquent evidence of their differences.

however, was theoretical, as it was limited to the spiritual sphere by Cantacuzenus' reaction: Cant. III, 2: II, 16; cf. II, 32-38 and Greg. XI, 9a - : description of the expedition without reference to Calacas' post.

(83) Parisot op. cit. 80, 131-3, 138-9 for his ambition to reunite the Empire under his sceptre.

(84) Greg. XII, 5: II, 586: especially among the army.

(85) Cant. II, 32-38: I, 494-534; Greg. XI, 6-9: I, 545-555; P.G. 152, 1217-1220; Parisot op. cit. 170-171, 173 n.4, 136-143.

(86) Greg. XI, 11: I, 565-8; cf. IX, 3: I, 404.

(87) Cant. III, 8: II, 58-64; III, 9-10: II, 68-69; Greg. XII, 6: II, 595; XII, 5: II, 586; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 101; Cf. Section A, ch. I, (nn. 105-106) of this Thesis -

d) THE HESYCHAST CONTROVERSY UP TO 1341.

The Monastic Movement of the XIII and XIV centuries continued a tradition of spirituality which went back to early Christian, Oriental and Greek Sources and which had many representatives throughout Byzantine history (88). Gregory Palamas, who was the leader of the movement at its most critical stage in the mid XIV century, had been brought up at the court (1304-1316); but just when he had started his higher studies he decided to follow the monastic path (89). One of the reasons for this decision was probably his rivalry with his fellow-student Nicephorus Gregoras, that very able "barbarian" (90). Mainly on Athos he was initiated (1318-1326) into the most extreme form of Hesychasm. This professed the subjection of profane wisdom to "Theology, which is expert in all learning" (91); the contempt of Greek logic, which was identified with Western thought (92)

(88) I. Hausherr *L' Hésychasme*, OCP 22 (1956) 5-40, 257-285; A. de Ivanka *Le fondement patristique de la doctrine Palamite*, Περὶ πραγμῆνα Ἐκκλησιαστικῆς θεολογίας καὶ τῆς οὐνοῦ ἐπιστολῆς, Ἑλληνικῶν Πατριστικῶν (1955), 129-132. Much Bibliography: in A. Wenger *Bulletin de Spiritualité Orientale*, R.É.B. 7 (1949) 225-243; 13 (1955) 167-173; 10 (1952) 142-150.

(89) *Philothēi λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151 c. 553D-562A; *Neili λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 659A-660B; in this he was mainly influenced by his family connections.

(90) *Philothēi* op.cit. 559A-D; *Greg.* XXX, 21-23: III, 282-5; *Philothēi Antirrheticorum* XII, P.G. 151, 1110B-1111A; *cp:* *Greg.* XXIX, 11: III, 230; XXX, 10: III, 336.

(91) *Philothēi λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 560B-562B; *Neili* op.cit. 660B, 664D-665A; cf. *Tomus Synodicus contra Prochorum Cydomem*, P.G. 151, 694B; *Philothēi Antirrheticorum* I, P.G. 151, 783D-784D; *Tafrahi Thessalonique* 162e3.

(92) *Philothēi λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 584 C-D, 589; *Neili* op.cit. 664A-D; *Tafrahi Thessalonique*, 177.

and seen as dangerous to the monks' position as spiritual masters of the people because it provoked impiety (93); the toleration of profane learning only if dependent on theology (94), (never when the former overshadowed the latter, as in the youthful theories of Nicholas Cabasilas, (95), or in the constant teaching of the Classicist school of Th. Metochites) (96); introspection; belief in the Massalian "prayer of Jesus" (97); rejection of manual work for the adepts (98) (like the Massalians); ability to see the uncreated Light of the Essence of God through his many Energies, in particular the Light of Tabor, etc. (99).

(93) Philothei op.cit. 584 A - C; Neili op. cit. 665; Th. Uspenski Sinodik 32; Greg. Palamas Homily XXXVIII, P.G. 151, 473, 484; cf. Tafrali Thessalonique 146-148, 183.

(94) Gr. Palamas First Talk with Barlaam, P.G. 151, 587; Cantacuzenus' Refutation of Proch. Cydones in Tafrali Thessalonique 168-9, 180 (according to the codex Parisinus Graecus 1241).

(95) Tafrali Thessalonique 150-153; cf. B. Laurdas Νικολάου Καβασίλα Συμφορήματα καὶ ἐπιγράμματα εἰς Ἅγιον Δημήτριον, ΒΕ

22 (1952) 97 ff., where he publishes the text of Nicolas Cabasilas used in M/s by Tafrali; cf. B. Laurdas' Ἐπιγράμματα εἰς τὸν Ἅγιον Δημήτριον κατὰ τὴν ἐξ αἰῶνα, ΒΕ 24 (1954) 279-281; Enepekides Briefwechsel Cabasilas, BZ 46 (1953) 35-36, letter 8 (before 1345); Ševčenko Cabasilas' Correspondence, BZ 47 (1954) 57.

(96) B. Laurdas in E.E.B.Σ. vol. 24 (1954) 277-9; H.G. Beck Theodore Metochites, Die Krise des Byz. Weltbildes im XIV Jhd., (Muenchen 1952); cf. V.L.'s review in RÉB 10 (1952) 271-3; H. Hunger Th. Metochites als Vorlauffer des Humanismus in Byzanz, BZ 45 (1952) 4-19; B. Tatakis Aristôte critique par Th. Metochites, offprint from Mélanges O. et M. Merlier, Athens (1953) pp. 439-445.

(97) Greg. Sinaites Περὶ Ἥσυχίας, P.G. 150, 1316, 1322, 1332; Dem. Cydones Κατὰ Παλαμῶν, P.G. 154, 840; cf. Palamas' compromise with the Massalians in 1317-8: Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρηγ. Παλαμῶν, P.G. 151, 561D - 565A.

(98) Philothei op.cit. 571D, 580A; cf. E. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker pp. 62 - 63a.

(99) D. Cydones op.cit. 837-864; C. Harmenopuli De Haeresibus, P.G. 150 26D - 29; Tomus Synodicus contra Prochorum Cydonium, P. G.

Imbued with such ideas Gregory soon resigned his post of Abbot of Lavra (in 1331) to practise Hesychia, write on it and also against impiety (100) and become a polemicist for Hesychasm, which was under fire from several quarters. The first important attack came from Nic. Gregoras, Metochites and others (1331-2) and it took advantage of the similarities between Hesychasm and Massalianism (101), - in spite of their differences (102) - , and of the strong Byzantine prejudice against them (103). Yet, the most vigorous attack against it came from Barlaam.

Barlaam, a Greek of Calabria, had lived for long as a monk at a Basilian house of Seminara which followed the Byzantine rite but recognised the Pope's authority. He had been influenced by the reviving Hellenic studies and by Scholasticism before he came to Constantinople in 1328 - through Arta, a centre of Latino-Greek culture (104), and Thessalonica. The vacuum created in the Capital by Metochites' fall helped him to become Abbot of St. Sabbas' Convent and Lecturer of Orthodox Mystical Theology at the University. He soon became famous for his use of Aristotle's logic as a weapon for Orthodoxy against Catholicism and for his contempt for Byzantine scholarship, which brought

151, 690 C-691C; Philothei Antirrhoticorum XI, P.G.151, 1059A - 1062B; Greg. XIX, 1; II, 918-9, 935; Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμάν, P.G. 161, 585A-D, 595A, Neili Ἐγκύκλιον. Γρ. Παλαμά, P.G.151, 664A-D.

For all these hesychastic ideas and their relationship with Massalianism cf. E. Werner Volkstümliche Haeretiker pp.61^β - 65 β.

(100) Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμάν, P.G.151, 566D- 582C; Neili op.cit. 660B-662D.

(101) Greg. XIX, 1: II, 918-9.

(102) D. Obolensky **The Bogomils** 221, 251-4, 260; O.H.B.S. 457.

(103) D. Obolensky **The Bogomils** (1948) 168-229; **they** had been fiercely persecuted in previous centuries in Byzantium.

(104) Cant. II, 32 - 37: I, 497 - 534.

him into conflict with Gregoras (1330-1331). This resulted in Barlaam's defeat and his return to Thessalonica (105).

As Gregoras declined to conduct the negotiations for Union with a Papal Embassy in 1334, Barlaam undertook them and wrote much on this problem (106). But his use of Greek logic was then criticised by Palamas, who stood for revealed truth, and by Acindynus and others. Barlaam insisted upon and constantly sought through Logic a common ground which should unite Orthodoxy and Catholicism and create a way for reconciliation with his opponents (107). Owing to his attitude and his knowledge of Western Theology (108) he was sent to conduct further negotiations with the Pope at Avignon (1340) about Union (109). But in that way the gap between him and the Monks, who were anti-Latin and pro-Cantacuzenian (cf.n.47), grew wider, and he became allied to their opponents, Calecas, Anna, Apocaucus, and, after 1341-2,

(105) R.J. Loenertz *Dix-huit lettres de Grégoire Acindyne analysées et datées*, OCP 23 (1957) 115-6, using especially G.Schirò *Barlaam Calabro Epistole Greche* (1954); Th. Hart *The Hesychast Controversy*, M.A. Thesis (1949) 15-23.

(106) Mostly unpublished: P.G.151, 1250-2.

(107) Th. Hart *op. cit.* 23-26; Schirò *op.cit.* 49-47; Loenertz *op.cit.* 118-120. See espec. the early correspondence of Palamas, Barlaam and Acindynus (1335-7) in J. Meyendorff *Les débuts de la Controverse Hésychaste*, B 23 (1953) 107-120; G. Schirò *op.cit.* 229-314. However, Philotheus, *Λόγος εἰς Ἑσυχαστῶν*, P.G.151 586A-588A and Neilus, *Ἐγκώμιον Ἐρ. Παλαμῶ*, P.G. 151 665B-667D, present only Palamas as conciliatory.

(108) Contrary to J. Meyendorff *op.cit.* 87: cf. Greg. XI, 10a: I, 555; Cant. II, 39: I, 543; Tafrali *Thessalonique* 175 n.2; Palamas' 1st letter to Acindynus and Barlaam's reply, in Meyendorff *op.cit.* 108-110; Cantacuzenus *Contra Barlaamum* P.G.154, 695-6; Philothei *Antirrheticorum* XII, P.G. 151, 110-9c; Neili *op. cit.* 664A-D; Schirò *op.cit.* 15ff.

(109) G. Giannelli *Un progetto di Barlaam per l'Unione delle Chiese* *Miscellanea G. Mercati*, III (1946) 167ff.; P.G.151, 1311-2 (*Barlaami Oratio pro unione, Avenione habita coram Benedicto XII Pontifico Maximo*).

Acindynus, all of them despised by the nobility as foreigners or of lowbirth (110).

If Theodora's regency in 1336 thwarted Barlaam's first effort to cause a reaction in the Church to Palamism (111), Calecas' renewed power and Cantacuzenus' absence during the Acarnanian expedition (1339-1340) favoured him. So Calecas, much irritated by the uncanonical councils of the monks (112) called a Synod to examine Palamism, which now emphasised the question of the Light of Tabor (113). In that Synod (10 June 1341) Barlaam made an effort to appeal to the mob (114), but he was defeated by the Palamite majority. Andronicus failed to reconcile the two parties, which would be the only way to save Barlaam (115). So the monks triumphed (116) and Calecas had to order the burning of

(110) Anna: Cant. III, 87: II, 540; Calecas Philothei Δόγος εἰς τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, P.G. 151, 592 B - C; 595A - C; 606 C - D; Acindynus: Meyendorff op.cit. 96; G. Mercati Notizie 12, n. 1; Guiland Correspondance de N. Grégoras 293; Gr. Acindyni Ἐπὶ Ἀἰρέσεων, P.G.150, 859-860; Philothei Δόγος εἰς τὸν Παλαμάην, P.G. 151, 608 B - C; Apocaucus: Guiland op.cit. 9; Cant. III, 17: II, 106 - 7; III, 72: II, 438-9; Cant. III, 15: II, 98-101.

(111) Meyendorff op.cit. 114; Philothei op.cit. 595A - C, 588A - B; 584 D - 585 D; Neili op.cit. 667D - 668C, 664A - 665 D, 666B; Greg. XVIII, 4; II, 886.

(112) Greg. XXIX, 25: III, 239; Philothei op.cit. 593B - C, 592 B - C; Tomus Hagioriticus, P.G. 151, 1225-1236.

(113) Cant. III, 2: II, 16; Greg. IX, 10: I, 557; XXIX, 25: III, 239; Philothei op.cit. 595A-D, 596 A-D, 597A, 592, 594. -

(114) Greg. XI, 1 α - ε: I, 558; Philothei op.cit. 585D, 588A - B, 603C; Neili op.cit. 665D, 664A, 666B, 668C, Cf. Section A, ch.II, nn. 50-55.

(115) Cant. II 40: I, 555; Tomus Contra Barlaam et Acindynum, P.G. 151, 688 B - C, 690 C-691C; Philothei op.cit. 600A-601B; Parisot Cantacuzène 147-152.

(116) See their Tomus Hagioriticus, written certainly by Palamas, P.G.151, 1225-36; Tomus contra Barlaam et Acindynum, P.G.151, 682B-C, 690A-D, 691C-D; Tomus Synedicus contra

the book of Barlaam "Against the Massalians" and give him a warning; but he also asked the Palamites to stop stirring up doctrinal matters, "which was the right of the prelates alone" (117). Yet another Synod was called by Cantacuzenus in August 1341 - when he was guardian after Andronicus' death (15 June 1341) - to deal with the doctrines of Acindynus, who succeeded Barlaam as leader of the movement. Calecas, seeing the Palamitic tendency of the Synod, left it in its early stages, before it condemned his friend and protosyncellus Acindynus, and in the Tome of the first Synod, issued by him in September, he challenged the legality of the second Synod (118). Also in his explanation of the first Synod his main targets were Palamas and the monks, because they had not stopped discussions (119).

Prochorum Cydonem, P.G. 151, 695A-D, 696A, 697B, 710D, 714D, 715A-B. J. Cantacuzenus *πρόσταγμα κατά Καλένα*, P.G. 151, 771A-B; Tafrali Thessalonique 187.

(117) P.G. 151, 618C-D 682A = Tomus contra Barlaam et Acindynum = M.-M. I, 203-4; cf. M.-M. I, 201-216 = P.G. 152, 1241-1253: Calecas' letters about the Synod; cf. Philothei *Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 599C-D, 601A-D; Neili *Ἐγκώμιον Γρ. Ησαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 668D-669B. J. Calecas' Explanation of the Tomus Synodicus of 1341, P.G. 150, 900C-901 C.

(118) Loenertz op.cit. 117-8; Cant. II, 40: I, 555-8; Mansi Concil. XXVI 127f. = P.G. 151, 718C; Greg. XI, 10-11; I, 555-568, Libellus Synodalis Febr. 1346, in P.G. 152, 1275 = M.-M. I, 245; Isidori Patriarchae Testamentum, P.G. 152, 1299; M. Jugie Palamas: La controverse Palamite, in Dict. Théol. Cathol. (1932) 2, 1735-1818, esp. 1785-6; J. Cantacuzenus *πρόσταγμα κατά Καλένα*, P.G. 151, 770D-771D; Philothei *Antirrheticorum XI*, P.G. 151, 1059C, 1088D-1089A-B; eiusdem *Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμῶν*, ib. 601B; Neili op.cit. 669c-670A.

(119) J. Calecas Explanation of the Tomus Synodicus of 1341, P.G. 150, 900-903; cf. a letter of Calecas to the Athonites in 1344, M.-M. I, 238-242 = P.G. 152, 1269-1273.

But meanwhile the political issues between Calecas and the monastic- Cantacuzenian party had become more involved in the controversy, and Calecas used his ecclesiastical authority as a weapon against his political opponents. The rivalries had ripened to the point of explosion. The civil war was inevitable.

e) THE POLITICAL RIFT AND THE
GREAT REVOLTS: 1341 - 1347.

When Andronicus III died on 15 June 1341 his heir John V was 9 years old (120). The latent rivalries manifested themselves at once. Apocaucus suggested that Cantacuzenus should usurp the throne and offered to support him, but Cantacuzenus rejected this proposal. Because of this Apocaucus turned more to the anti-Cantacuzenians and achieved greater influence among their leaders; Cantacuzenus preferred instead to take over as *ἐκτέτοπος* (121), but the offices that he granted to Calecas and Apocaucus with Anna inspired Calecas' claims to the guardianship, based on the precedents of 1334-5 and 1339-1340 and on their party's power (122). But the army reacted to these pretensions and its power was sufficiently great to ensure the appointment of Cantacuzenus as sole *ἐκτέτοπος* early in July 1341 (123). His victorious expedition to Thrace against the Bulgarians and the Turks of Sarkhan, coupled with his grants to the army (n. 87), with his alliances to Amur and Orkhan and with

(120) P. Charanis Short chronicle, B 13 (1938), 344; Loenertz D. Cydonès, Correspondance, I, p. 174 = Chronicon Breve Thesalonicense.

(121) Greg. XII, 2: II, 576-9; XI, 11: I, 560; Cant. II, 40: I, 558-560; III, 1: II, 14-16.

(122) Greg. XII, 3: II, 579; XII, 10: II, 605; Cant. III, 34: II, 307-8; III, 2: II, 18-25; *Ἐπιτομή Ἀρχιερέων* (1346), P.G. 151, 769A; cf. nn. 75-76, 83 and 67.

(123) Cant. III, 3-6: II, 25-47; III, 13: II, 83-7; III, 21: II, 125 - 135; Greg. XIII, 5: II, 586; Parisot Cantacuzène 157-8, 161, 167.

his recognition as sovereign by the Greek and Latin lords of Peloponnese, Acarnania, Thessaly and Thessalonica, increased his power. But Calecas' and Apocaucus' continued intrigues made him come back from Thrace in September (124). Still he continued his conciliatory attitude, until a better opportunity arose, and left for Thrace again on 28 September 1341 to stabilise his authority in the provinces (125). His enemies chose this as the right time to strike.

Calecas assumed imperial power and Apocaucus became prefect of the Capital, of the towns and islands and sole arbiter of public affairs (126). As such Apocaucus demolished the Cantacuzenian State machinery and rebuilt it to suit his party interests. Calecas did the same in the Church. He imprisoned Palamas (1343) and made Acindynus the theoretician of the new ecclesiastical régime (127). Most important of all was the fact that he incited the

(124) Cant. III, 6-13: II, 47-83; Greg. XII, 6-10: II, 591-605; XV, 4: II, 759-760; Cant. III, 16-17: II, 104-7. This recognition was effected through the activities of Theodore Synadenus, whom Cantacuzenus appointed to the critical post of Governor of Thessalonica a little before Andronicus III's death: Cant. II, 1: I, 311; II, 15: I, 398-9; Parisot op.cit. 170-171, 173 n.5; Cant. III, 31: II, 186; Greg. XII, 15: II, 623; Lemerle Philippos 233.

(125) Parisot op.cit. 161-2, 173.

(126) Cant. III, 17-22: II, 106-139; Greg. XII, 10: II, 605-84; 'Αναφορά Ἀρχιερέων (1346), P.G.151, 767D - 770D; Philothei Λόγος εἰς τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, P.G.151, 607A, 609C, 602A, 604A; M.-M. I, 258 - P.G. 152, 1269-1273; Neili Ἐγκύριον εἰς Παλαμά, 771B - 672B; cf. Cant. III, 98: II, 602-3; Greg. XV, 7, 9 f: II, 768, 780. Calecas appointed Apocaucus to his post, but he was soon overshadowed by the latter.

(127) Cant. III, 75: II, 469-470; III, 24: II 144 - 5; Greg. XII, 10: II, 606-610; Philothei op.cit. 601D - 607A; 'Αναφορά Ἀρχιερέων C.767 D - 771B; R.-J. Loenertz Dix-huit lettres de Grég. Acindyne analysées et datées, OCP 23 (1957) 125; R.-J. Loenertz Gregorii

lower classes against Cantacuzenus and his party, which resulted in the confiscation and sacking of their properties, and in attacks, murders and arrests of nobles (128). Cantacuzenus had to comply with the pressure of his supporters and, with the monks' consent, he was crowned Emperor in Didymotichum on 26 October 1341. But he preserved an appearance of legitimism by giving official precedence to the names of Anna and John V. From now on the war began (129). The towns remained faithful to Constantinople except in a few cases where the nobles were stronger than the masses (130). The Empire was divided into rich Cantacuzenian nobility and Hesychast monks, and poor Barlaamitic and Pro-palaiologian masses, led in many towns by the revolutionary Zealots, and by a number of nobles too (131). The rift over the political issue was turned by the masses of Macedonia and Thrace (132) into a wild, planned and ideologically dire-

Acindyni epistulae selectae IX, *EEBΣ* 27 (1957) pp. 89-101; cf. 102-108.

(128) Cant. III, 12: II, 135-9; III, 26: II, 164-5; III, 36:II, 221-2; III, 30: II, 185-6; III, 31:II, 191-2; Greg. XII, 11: II, 608-610; XIV, 15: II, 623. In these attacks Cantacuzenus lost most of his property.

(129) Cant. III, 23-27: II, 139 - 167; Cant. IV, 12: III, 173-4; III, 92: II, 564-6; Greg. XII, 11-12:II, 610-615; P. Charanis Short Chronicle, B 13 (1938) 344; Doelger Kantakuzenos 19ff.

(130) Cant. III, 26: II, 161-2; III, 28-29: II, 180-181; III, 30: II, 184; Greg. XII, 12: II, 613-4.

(131) Cf. above and Greg. XII, 5: II, 586; XVII¹, 6: II, 899; Papadopoulos Kerameus *Ἀνάκλησις ποσ. Στρακ* V, 332-5; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 87-91 Charanis Internal Strife B 15 (1940-1) 208-230; Tafrafi Thessalonique 201-3; Ševčenko Zealot Revolution pp. 603 n.2, 604 nn.7,9, 617, nn. 68-71, and "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 81, 84-86; R.-J. Loenertz Greg. Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX, *EEBΣ* 27 (1957) 91; Th. Uspensky Sinodik p. 81.

(132) Not of S.W. Greece or Thessaly up to Thessalonica: Cant. III, 50: II, 297.

cted social revolt against the rich, which was accompanied by pillage, destruction, massacres and exiles, once a start had been made in Adrinople (133).

Cantacuzenus, being unable to resist Apocaucus' new army and now faced by the hostility of Serres and Thessaly, made a treaty with the Bulgarians and advanced to Thessalonica, devastating the country, whose population took refuge in the towns. To counter-balance his coronation his opponents had John V crowned in Constantinople on 19 November 1341, after which more power passed to Apocaucus and his men (134).

The next phases of the war involved foreign interventions and further social struggles. Synadenus and many nobles were turned out of Thessalonica by the Zealots, and so Cantacuzenus, attacked by the peasants, retreated to the Serbs, who offered him their alliance (July 1342). But when he returned with a Serbian

(133) Cant. III, 30: II, 184; III, 90: II, 558-9; III 28: II, 176-9; Greg. XII, 12: II, 613-4, etc. Cf. section C, ch. I.

(134) Cant. III 28-36: II, 174-225; Greg. XII, 11-16: II, 610-628.- Monomachus turned against Cantacuzenus now, presumably because the latter had appointed Theodore Synadenus as Governor of Thessalonica in 1340 (cf. nn.85, 124) and therefore definitely took it from Monomachus' jurisdiction. Synadenus bore the title "ἡγεμῶν Θεσσαλονίκης καὶ τῶν περὶ ἄχρι Στρυμόνος τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἠερτοχῶν, while Monomachus that of "Ἀρχικ(β') Θεσσαλίας": Greg. XII, 15: II, 623; Cant. III, 31: II, 186-192; Cant. II, 1: I, 311; : II, 15: I, 398-9; V. Parisot op. cit. 170-171, 173 n. 5; P. Lemerle *Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale à l'Époque Chrétienne et Byzantine* (1945) 233. - Guy got cross with Cantacuzenus because the latter had accepted the crown without having consulted him: Cant. III, 32: II, 193-5; cf. Greg. XII, 15: II, 623.

contingent. in the autumn of that year, he found revolutionary regimes established in all towns, which were linked with Const/ple. With their support Apocaucus had successes in the war (135), and through diplomatic contacts with Dusan and the Venetians he alienated the former from Cantacuzenus (1343) (136). But Cantacuzenus had meanwhile been strengthened by his new recognition as Emperor by the Thessalian magnates (winter 1342) (137), where he appointed his nephew John Angelus as semi-independent ruler, who extended his control at the expense of the Catalan possessions of Thessaly.

This was followed by Cantacuzenus' successes in Spring 1343 (: occupation of Berrhoia), by Dusan's open enmity, and by Amur's intervention for him against the Bulgarians (in Didymotichum). Apocaucus asked for the help of the Turkish Emir Sarkhan, (138), while Cantacuzenus with Amur advanced to Thessalonica again; but a fierce new Zealot attack on the nobility of that town in October 1343 made him change his plans and fight his way to Didymotichum (139). From there with Amur's and Orkhan's help he reconquered Thrace (1344-5) and beat the Serbs, though both they and the Bulgarians had taken many Greek lands.

(135) Cant. III, 37-51: II, 225-301; Greg. XII, 16-XII 1-4:II, 624-651; Ševčenko, DOP 11 (1957) ("Antizealot" Discourse), p. 167.

(136) Cant. III, 52: II, 305-9; III, 54: II, 322-4, 327-8; Thiriet Régestes I p. 52, 12/5/1343. The Venetians wanted to form an anti-Turkish alliance.

(137) Apparently frightened by the social revolts: Cant. III, 51-54: II, 305-328; III 55: II, 335-6; III, 71: II, 435; Greg. XIV 3: II 696-702; XII, 10: II, 605.

(138) Cant. III, 51-62: II, 301-383; Greg. XIII, 4-9: II, 651-671.

(139) Cant. III, 63-66: II, 383-413; Greg. XIII 10: II, 671-7; XIII, 12: II, 683; XIV; 1: II 692-3; Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense, in Loenertz, D. Cydonès Correspondance I, 174 (4).

Meanwhile Amur pushed back a Western attack against Smyrna, and Apocaucus in C/ple took desperate measures to save his régime from collapse through poverty; but the customs tax he imposed on the Black Sea Trade displeased the Venetians and Genoese, and not as many revenues were drawn from his protection of Greek trade, as he had hoped, while his confiscation of Church property and other of his measures caused discontent and scorn (140). At last during a visit to a dungeon he was murdered by his political prisoners (11 July 1345), who were subsequently massacred by his faithful mob of mariners (141).

Henceforward Ann in vain used other war leaders from the masses and the Turks of Sar-khan. Orkhan (now son-in law to Cantacuzenus) decided the issue of the war, and, except at Thessalonica, (where a third uprising early in September, 1345 imposed a purer Zealot régime under a new leader, Andrew Palaeologus, almost independent of C/ple)(142), the towns, after brave fighting, surrendered to Cantacuzenus. But the Serbs profited from

(140) Cant. III, 66-87: II, 403-540; Greg. XIII, 8: II, 665; XIV, 1-9: II, 692-729; XIII, 13: II, 689; Cant. III, 95: II, 582-4 Thiriet op.cit. I, pp. 53, 60-61, 62-67, 70, 82 etc. (1343-ff.); pp. 52, 54, 56 (1343-5); Ševčenko Zealot revolution 612-3; "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 164. For Amur: I. Melikoff Sayar Le destân d' Umur Pasha (1954) passim, esp. pp. 96 ff; P. Lemerle L'Émirat d' Aydin - (1957), esp. 180-203; G.M. Thomas Diplomatarium Vene-tolevanticum I (1880) 286-7 (1344). For the adventurer Momitzilos, who was cleared out by Cantacuzenus: Stilp. P. Kyriakides Ὁ Μομιτζίλος καὶ τὸ κράτος του, Ἑλληνικά 2 (1950) 332-345.

(141) Cant. III 87-88: II, 536-546; Greg. XIV, 10: II, 729-740; R.-J. Loenertz, Note sur une lettre de Dém. Cydonès, BZ44 (1951) 405-8; Lemerle op.cit. 210.

(142) Cant. III, 93-94: II, 568-852; Greg. XV, 5: II, 762-4; CIV, 10: II, 740-1; D. Cydones Monodia P.G.109, 639-651; Loenertz, D. Cydonès Correspondance I, epp. 7, 5, 77, 87; Chronicon Breve Thessal. ib. p. 174; R.-J. Loenertz Note, B.Z.44, 1951 405-8; I. Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 145, n. 48; eiusdem Zealot Revolution 603f.

the war and took the most of north-west and central Greece including Athos. St. Dusan was crowned Emperor of Serbs and Greeks (15 April 1346) and behaved in a dangerous byzantine way. To outweigh this, Cantacuzenus had himself crowned again by the Patriarch of Jerusalem in Adrinople (21 May 1346). By that time both parties to the civil war had reached an extreme poverty and misery. These and the external enemies had become a greater danger to both than each side to the other. A last blow was the recapture of Chius and Phocaea by the Genoese (1346). So the need for peace became at last a common demand (142^a).

Anna contacted Cantacuzenus, thus forestalling the Patriarch, whom she deposed in a Synod called by him to rehabilitate Acindynus (3 February 1347). Constantinople was opened to Cantacuzenus by two of her men, while Palamas was freed to act as mediator (143), and the Genoese who ran to her help were defeated by the people, who now supported Cantacuzenus (144).

f) THE LAST YEARS OF JOHN VI'S
REIGN 1347 - 1354.

According to the compromise arrived at, an amnesty was granted and John V married a daughter of John VI Cantacuzenus (21 May 1347), who would be co-emperor for ten years. Palamism

(142^a) Cant. III, 82-96; II, 502-596; Greg. XIV, 10-11; XV, 1-7; II, 729-767; **XV**, 9; II, 780-1; M.-M. III, 124-5, 140; Dušan's policy: M.-M. V, 111-133; A. Guillou *Les Archives de Ménéceé* (1955) pp.124-131; Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 203-211; O.H.B.S. 468; - C. Amantos *op.cit.* 160. Cf. Greg. IV, 11: II, 66-67.

(143) R.J. Loenerts *Gregorii Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX*, E.E.B.Σ . 27 (1957) 100-101; Greg. XV, 710: II; 767-787; Cant. IV, 3: III, 242; M.-M. I, 245; Tafrahi *Thessalonique* 194; *Ἀνατολῆς Ἀρχιεπέωρ*, P.G. 151, 767-770; R. Guillard *Correspondance de N. Grégoras* 354; Cant. III, 99: II, 602.

(144) I. Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution*, 613, n.54; M. - M. I, 243-255 = P.G. 152, 1273-1284.

was Synodically re-established (145) and the new Patriarch Isidorus (17 May 1347) crowned John VI for the third time (146). Palaeologus became Bishop of Thessalonica, but he was not allowed into the city by the Zealots (147).

New internal troubles started soon. Many nobles, displeased by the leviticism, with which Cantacuzenus regarded the Palaeologi (148) and by his failure to be prodigal in land grants (149) and to stop the popular movement offered the throne to his son Matthew. To avoid collapse John VI granted him a principality in Chalcidica and Thrace, where Matthew led the defence against the Turks in 1347-8. But Cantacuzenus faced also the enmity of the bankers and craftsmen of the City who rejected his appeal for contributions to the Treasury (150). Meanwhile in order to face the Turks he negotiated Union with the Pope and an alliance with the Venetians (151) and built up a new fleet. This latter activity led to a Genoese reaction and caused the Galata War (1348-9), during which the people and the bourgeois supported him; but in the end the Greek fleet was destroyed and more territory and rights had to be granted to the victorious Genoese (152). John VI's relations with the lower classes were

(145) Greg. XV, 7: II, 768-781; XXVII, 47: III, 166. Cant. ib. and III, 100: II, 615; III, 97-99: II, 597-615. Summary of the Tomus: P.G. 151, 619C-D, 720A-B; text: M.-M. I, 243-255 = P.G. 152, 1273-1284; J. Cantacuzenus *Πρόσταγμα κατά Καλέκα*, P.G. 151, 769D-774A.

(146) M.-M. I, 256; Philothei *Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμά*, P.G. 151, 613B; Greg. XV, 10-12: II, 786-793.

(147) Neili' *Ἐγκώμιον Γρ. Παλαμά*, P.G. 151, 672C-674B; Philothei ib. 613B-619A; Acindyni *Epistulae Selectae*, E.E.B. **Σ**. 27 (1957), pp. 90, 97; Greg. XXVII, 47: III, 166.

(148) Though half-hearted: Greg. XVI, 4: II, 818; cf. XXVII, 27: III, 148.

(149) As expected: Greg. XIV, 5: II, 708-9; XV, 12: II, 70-1. Exception was made for his relatives.

(150) Cant. III, 83: II, 509-510; IV, 1-10: III, 8-68; Greg. XV, 1-4: II, 795-819; XVI, 7: II, 835-9; XV, 6-12: II, 765-793; XXV,

further improved by his measures for their protection which created a better economic situation; to promote these measures he built a new navy and recaptured Phocæa. Thus trade flourished (153).

The expedition to subdue Thessalonica, combined with vain efforts to repel the triumphant Serbs, - who had just taken Berrhoia and sat on the walls of Thessalonica, - led John VI into new difficulties (1349). Through the help of the imperial Governor of the town and because there was not a Zealot army, John VI with John V and a Turkish contingency entered the town, destroyed the Zealots' régime and set out to free Macedonia (154). But the latent enmity of John V and his circle towards John VII drove them to negotiations with Dušan, who thus broke a recent treaty with Cantacuzenus and continued his conquests. When Venice failed to reconcile Dušan and Cantacuzenus and the Bulgarians rejected his offer for an Anti-Turkish alliance, John VI left John V in Thessalonica as despot of the area west of Christopolis and returned to the City (1350) (155).

14: III, 37; R. Guiland Correspondance de N. Grégoras Lett. 152, pp. 237-243; D. Cydonès Correspondance (Cammelli) (1930) pp. XII-XIII; P. Charanis Short Chronicle, B 13 (1938) 347 n.2; eiusdem Internal Strife, B 15 (1940-1) 154-163; N. Svoronos Le serment de fidélité, RÉB 9 (1951) 113-5, 117-129, 139-140.

(151) R:J. Loenertz Ambassadeurs Grecs auprès du Pape Clément VI.(1348), OCP 19 (1953) 178-196; Thiriet op.cit. p.62, 14/7/1347; Cammelli, D. Cydonès Correspondance lett. 1, pp.1-3, "ante 1347", but, I think, of 1347-8; P.G. 154, 836-7.

(152) Cant. IV, 10-11: III, 62-80; Greg. XVII, 1-7: II, 834-835; 841-867; Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 613-5; Greg. XXV, 17: III, 41; cf. Thiriet Régestes I, p. 66, 13-14/4/1349; p.70, 18/7/1350.

(153) Cant. IV, 12: III, 81-84; Greg. XVII, 1: II 842; Zakythinon Crise monétaire 92-96.

(153a) cf. Cant. IV, 20: III, 140-151.

(154) For the Zealots' contact with the Serbs: Cant. VI, 4-5: III, 31-34; IV, 10: III, 62-63; Cant. IV, 16-17: III, 104-118;

Furthermore the rift between Cantacuzenus and the Palaeologi became greater owing to his appointment of members of his family to important posts. Manuel his son he sent as Governor of Morea (1349), where he established his authority after long struggles (156), and others he sent elsewhere. His oecumenic ambitions, expressed in diplomatic exchanges with foreign powers - e.g. the Mamelukes of Egypt (157) and the Russians (158) - contributed to the increase of rivalry between himself and the Palaeologians, which reached its zenith with the Synod of 1351 (27 May). The Tome issued condemned the new leader of the Anti-Palamites Gregoras, - an old friend of John VI (159), - who

Greg. XVIII, 2: II, 886-9; Tafrali Thessalonique 75, 252, 298; Ševčenko Cabasilas' Correspondence, BZ 47 (1954) 55; cf. Greg. XVI, 1: II, 795; Greg. XXVII, 48: III, 166-7; Guillard in Grégoras Correspondance 311-312; K.-J. Loenertz Note sur une lettre de Dém. Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène, BZ 44 (1956) 407.

(155) Cant. IV, 18-22: 1 (1951) III, 118-166; Greg. XVIII, 2: II, 878-9; XXVII, 42-54; III, 168-171; Tafrali Thessalonique 50-51; Thiriet Révestes I, p. 66, 6/4/1349; 13-14/4 1349; p. 68, 2/3/1350.

(156) Cant. IV, 15: III 85-90; Greg. XXIX, 28: III; 248-9; Zakythinos Desnotat I; Raul Epistulae XII, EEBΣ 26 (1956) 141f.; Guillard Correspondance p. 313; D. Cydonès Correspondance (Cammelli) p. 149.

(157) Cant. IV, 14-15: III, 90-104; Greg. XXIX, 25: III, 240; M. Canard in *Annal. Inst. d' Ét. Orient.* (Algers) 3 (1937) 25-52.

(158) Greg. XXVI, 47: III, 113-4; XXXVI, 20-42: III, 511-521; Guillard Correspondance de N. Grégoras pp. 378-9; P.G. 152, 1233f; 1285 f.; cf. Loenertz Dix-huit lettres de Grégoire Acindyne analysées et datées', OCP 23 (1957) 123-4; M.-M. I, 261-6, 320-2.

(159) Greg. XVIII, 1: II, 870-2; Philothei Antirrheticorum, P.G. 151, 783A, 787A; Guillard ib. 370; Philothei Λόγος εἰς τὸν Παλαμᾶν, P.G. 151, 621A-623A; Greg. XVIII, 3: II, 883-4. Tomus Synodicus contra Prochorum Cydonem, P.G. 150, 698-699, 713; Greg. XVIII, 8: II, 905; XVIII, 51: II, 892; vol II, pp. XXXVII, LXX.

was imprisoned. His followers from all classes were persecuted by the victors (160). This was in fact equal to a persecution of the Pro-Palaeologians.

Meanwhile in spring 1351 Cantacuzenus had entered the Caffa War between Venice and the Genoese (161), - who tried to monopolise the Black Sea Trade (162), - on the Venetian side. This he did at the wrong time and for that reason received disadvantageous terms. Strategic errors on the part of his Aragonese and Venetian allies saved Galata from destruction (163). Still worse, though John V had signed the Tome (164), he continued his contacts with Dušan and the Genoese, in order to counterbalance John VI's favour to Matthew, who became more powerful and hostile to him (165). The junior Emperor was hardly prevented by his

(160) The Tomos: P.G. 151, 717-764 = Labbe-Mansi Concil. XXVI, 127-198; cf. Cant. IV, 23-25; III, 166-185; Greg. XVI, 5: II, 818-834; XVIII-XXIV: II, 869-1146; Th. Hart op.cit. 71 ff. Cf. Greg. XXV, 37-38: III, 63-66; XXV, 4-5: III, 23-25; XXVI, 1-7: III, 68-74; Philothei Antirrheticorum I, P.G. 151, 780B-C, 786A-789B; VII, ib. 924B-926B; Palamas in P.G. 150, 809; Tafrali Thessalonique 196-7.

(161) Greg. XXV, 2a: III, 45; XXVI, 40: III, 106; XXV, 12: III, 46-7; XXVI 24: III, 90.

(162) Thiriet Régestes I, pp. 23, 50, 54-57, 61, 62, 68, 70-76 (1329-1355); Greg. XXV, 17-18: III, 41-45; XXV, 20: III, 45; XXVI, 24: III, 80; XIII, 12-13: II, 683-9; XVIII, 2: II, 876-8; Cant. IV, 18: III, 118; G.M. Thomas Diplomatarium Venetolevanticum I, 278-299.

(163) Greg. XXVI, 27: III, 93-94; XXVI, 34-54: III, 154-171; Cant IV, 10: III, 63-65; IV, 6: III, 42; Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 613 n. 54.

(164) In Sept.-Oct. 1351 or Febr.-March 1352: Loenertz Wan unterschrieb Johannes VI den Tomos von 1351? BZ 46 (1954) 116; Doelger Byz.Diplomatik (1956) 253-4, nn. 18-20; add: Greg. XXX, 3: III, 268; Philothei Λόγος... Παναρεμάρ, P.G. 151, 623D-624D.

(165) Cf. n. 163 and Greg. XXVI, 31: III, 97-99; XXVII, 22: III, 144; XXVII, 29-54: III, 149-171.

mother from entering the war (summer 1351) (166), and it was only by the grant of part of Matthew's territory to him that he was appeased for some time (167). In 1352 John VI was abandoned by his allies and had to sign a separate treaty with the Genoese (6 May) (168), who were now helped by Or-Khan.

The latter's intervention meant important new developments in the political scene. Profiting from the renewed hostilities between Matthew and John V, he sent troops to impose his authority on Thrace (169). Cantacuzenus asked for Or-Khan's help to overcome John V with the result that the Turks dominated his army and court. Then most towns directed by popular movements similar to those of 1341-7, as well as the Serbs and the Bulgarians, joined John V against the Turcophile Cantacuzeni. After John VI had saved Matthew with Turkish troops from the angry mob of Arrinople in summer 1352, the Turks completed the occupation of Asia Minor; they made permanent installations in Thracian towns with Cantacuzenus' tolerance (autumn 1352- spring 1353) and imposed taxes even on C/ple (170). Still their help crushed the resistance of the towns

(166) Greg. XXVII, 26-28; III, 147-9; Philothei op.cit.623D-624C.

(167) Cant. IV, 27; III, 200-209; Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 615-6 nn.62-63; Loenertz in BZ 47: (1954) 116: naval battle of 13/2/1952; OCP 21 (1955) 216, 226; Greg. XXVII, 28; III, 149.

(168) Ševčenko loc. cit; Thiriet op.cit. pp. 77-8, 71: nrs 248, 275.

(169) Greg. XXVI, 25; III, 91-92; XXVI, 10-54 III, 76-119; XXV, 17-27. III 40-52.

(170) Greg. XXVIII, 40-42; III, 202-4; XXVIII, 2; III, 177; XXIX, 1-2; III, 223-4; Cant. IV, 33-39; III, 242-290; D. Cydonès Correspondance (Cammelli) lett. 5 pp. 9-13; lett. 5, pp. 9-13; lett. 6, pp.14-17.

and subdued them to Cantacuzenus, who now reorganised the administration so as to clear it of the Propalaeologians, and under more pressure from the nobility, he proclaimed (spring 1353) and had Matthew crowned (February 1354) as co-emperor (171).

Meanwhile John V with Venetian help had imposed his control in Aenus, Tenedus, Lemnus and other islands and Thessalonica. From there he directed his unsuccessful attempts to cause a revolt against Manuel in Morea and to land in the Capital (Febr. 1354), and also his diplomatic exchanges with the Mamelukes the Genoese and the Venetians (172). His aims were favoured by the growing alienation of the Cantacuzeni from the people, especially after the Turks occupied and began to rebuild Gallipoli and other earth-quake-stricken towns of Thrace on 2 March 1354, from where Cantacuzenus' diplomacy proved unable to remove them (173). John V took this opportunity and, helped by the Genoese Fr. Gattilusio - to whom he gave Lesbos and his sister in return - and by the Genoese of Tzeta - to whom he granted serious concessions (174) - he entered Constantinople in November 1354. The two Emperors agreed that Cantacuzenus would be the senior Co-emperor, taxes would be divided and Matthew would be independent ruler of the area around Adrinople and Rhodope. Yet on 10 December Cantacuzenus

(171) Greg. XXVIII, 17-19: III, 187-9; XXVIII, 30-44: III, 195-204; XXVIII, 66: III, 220; XXVII, 31: III, 152-3; XXV, 36-37: III, 62-5; Cant. IV, 34-38: III, 250-276; Charanis Short Chronicle, B 13 (1938), 347. Cf. Loenertz Chronologie de Nic. Cabasilas, OCP 21 (1955) 212-3 and Chronicon Breve EEBξ 28 (1958) 207.

(172) Cant. IV, 35-39: III, 247-290; IV, 13: III, 88; Greg. XXVIII, 11: III 181-4; XXVIII, 17-19: III, 187-9; XXIX, 5: III, 226-7; XXX, 19-20: III, 236-7; Loenertz in OCP 21 (1955) 212 and EEBξ loc. cit.

(173) Cant. IV, 38-40: III, 226-249; Greg. XXVIII, 67-68: III, 220-222; XXX, 1-4: III, 223-226; H.J. Kissling Das Menāqybnāme Scheich Bedr' Eddin's, Zeitschr. deutsch Morgenl. Ges. Bd 100 (1950) 136-7; Charanis op.cit. 347-8.

(174) Greg. XXXVI, 5: III, 504; XXXVII, 46: III, 553-4 Sp.

abdicated and became a monk, though he did not entirely retire from politics (175).

But John V was not sole sovereign until Matthew resigned too (1358); this came about when, after further hostilities and negotiations, Matthew was at last caught by the Serbs and ransomed by John V (176). Even so, separatism was not avoided. Except for Morea (where Manuel continued to rule until his death (1380) and was joined by his father and Matthew (between 1359-1362), who succeeded him (1380-1383) (177)), Thessalo-Acarmania and Epirus, after Dušan's death (20 December 1355) became an autonomous principality under Nicephorus, who was succeeded by his wife. Even Aenus became for a short time independent under a servant of Nicephorus (178).

So John V was a weak Emperor in a diminished, disintegrating Empire. Terrible humiliations and tragedies were his fate, of which the first came in 1355, when he had, like a vassal, to ransom a son of Orkhan (179). His increase of the taxation on the Venetians (1356) (180) - a repetition of Apocaucus' and Cantacuzenus' policies (cf. nn. 140, 153) - could not be of real help to Byzantine trade or economy, which had been undergoing disruptive pressures for so long. The collapse of the remains of the Empire was only a matter of time.

(175) Cant. IV, 39-42:III, 281-309; Greg. XXIX, 2-7,11-27,38:I III, 224-8, 230-242, 248; XXXVII, 2-12: III, 530-5; Ducas XI,40-42 (Bonn); Cydonès Correspondance (Cammelli) lett.20, lett.38-39 pp. 101-107; lett. 8,p.30; cf. p.XXX; Loenertz Raul Epistulae XII, EEBΣ 26 (1956) 130, 135; cf. Loenertz Les recueils 109.

(176) Cant. V, 44-49: III, 320-360; Greg. XXXVI, 9:III,503; XXXVII, 64-70:III, 564-7; M.-M. I, 448-450: V. Laurent in RĒB 9 (1951) 62-63.

(177) Raul Epistulae XII, EEBΣ 26 (1956) 140-3; Loenertz Chronologie de Nic. Cabasilas, OCP 21 (1955) 212; Grégoras Correspondance (Guilland) 313-6; Cydonès Correspondance (Cammelli) lett. 29 pp. 77-79; lett. 140,p. 158; lett. 190 p.166.

(178) To him John V. granted some towns when he deserted Matthew: Cant.IV,42-43;III,309-319; S.Estopañan Bisanzio y España II

(1943) 35-39; Cydonès Correspondance (Loenertz) I, p. 176; Greg. XXXVII, 30: III, 556-7.

(179) Greg. XXVI, 5-16: III, 503-510; XXXVII, 52-69: III, 558 - 566.

(180) Thiriet Régestes I, pp. 80-81, nr 29: 11/4/1356.

SECTION A: THE AGRARIAN
ORGANIZATION OF THE BYZANTINE
EMPIRE FROM THE END OF THE
XIII CENTURY TO THE YEAR

1341

In this section we shall deal with the land-holding system, whether of rural or urban land. Although there were land-holdings of considerable size in and around the towns, the greatest number of estates being situated in the country, our remarks in this section will apply chiefly to these. While, generally speaking, the same remarks will hold true for the urban landed estates, there was for them a more complicated evolution which we shall study in section B. of this thesis.

SECTION A.
CHAPTER I.

THE IMPERIAL POLICY TOWARDS THE LANDED
ESTATES FROM THE END OF THE
XIIIth CENTURY UNTIL
1341.

a) THE SMALLER LANDED ESTATES

It is now generally accepted that the major part of Byzantine land belonged, as *pronoiae*, ultimately to the State (1). In later centuries, extending its domain, the State disposed of land chiefly according to its own interests, particularly the needs of defence. There were, however, important differences between the "classical" Byzantine system of land-holding, enduring until the XIth century, and the system which prevailed from the XIth century onwards.

The prevalent system of land-holding in the "classical" period was that of small holdings. A great proportion of them were called *στρατιῶναι*, or sometimes *πρόνοιαι*, and were allotted by the State to peasants who, in return, discharged personal military obligations, not as officers, but as simple soldiers. These *πρόνοιαι* were worked by the peasants themselves (1a) and could not, in theory, be transferred to high State dignitaries nor to other powerful people (2). Although they did vary greatly in size (3), they were generally small, unlike what later came to

(1) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 138-9; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 50, 53; 79-71, 89; Arnakis *Οἱ πρῶτοι Ὀθωμανοὶ* 39f; citing Pachym. I, 18; Zakythinos *Despotat I*, 181-2.

(1a) Charanis *On the social structure*, BS 12 (1951) 131-4; Ostrogorsky *op.cit.* 15, 158.

(2) Ostrogorsky *op.cit.* 12.-13.

(3) P. Lemerle *Esquisse*, *Rev. hist.* 120 (juillet-Sept. 1958) pp. 65-70: a *strateia* could sometimes be as big as a *pronoia*.

be known as *ἡμετέρα πρόνοια*. On the death of the tenant, his eldest son succeeded to the estate on the same terms as his father, while other sons either acquired new *στρατιά* (4) or were absorbed into the peasantry.

From the eleventh century onward, the term "*πρόνοια*" was gradually altered to refer to larger land-holdings granted for life as personal possessions under specified terms: they could be neither alienated nor inherited, and they remained always under strict State control (5). Of the two contrasting forms of land tenure which thus existed concurrently, the more recently established proved the more enduring. Despite some State opposition, the *στρατιά* were gradually absorbed by the *πρόνοια*, in much the same way that, in the tenth century and even as early as the sixth century, they had been absorbed by the big hereditary landowners (6).

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, attempts were made to revive the *στρατιά*, first by John Comnenus (1118-1143) in 1121-2 and later, (7), and successively by Manuel I (1143-1180) (8) John Vatatzes (1222-1254) (9) and Michael VIII, with his son and co-emperor, Andronicus II, between 1201 and 1232 (10). In

(4) Ostrogorsky loc. cit.

(5) Op. cit. 11, 15, 67

(6) Loc. cit; cf. Diomedes *Βυζαντινὰ Μεγέτα* A', 31-40, 42 n.2, 103-116.

(7) He installed barbarians as soldiers: Ostrogorsky op.cit. 110-41.

(8) He installed Serbs as shepherds and fixed the value of naval *smallstrateiae*, which he made inalienable; *ib.*

(9) He opposed Cumans against Seljuks: Greg. I, 37: I, 3-9; Pachym, I, 16-18; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 53; Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 62-63.

(10) Cumans in Lemnos and Thasos: Cant. I, 51: I, 259; several barbarians around Constantinople: Charanis. On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 131-4; Pachym. I, 309; Greg. IV, 6: I, 101.

In 1272, Andronicus II was authorized by his father to grant both large and small *πρόνοιαι*, valued at between 24 and 36 hyperpyra, to soldiers; to take their *πρόνοιαι* away from negligent soldiers, and to give the lands of the "δουλοὶ" to mercenaries (11) to **take over the content** of the old *πρόνοιαι* to revive the small holdings. However, it is difficult to accept that any of these *πρόνοιαι* of 1272 were really small *στράτια* in the old sense, since those had normally been valued at 4 hyperpyra; rather, even the smallest of the new grants **was a large πρόνοια** in physical extent. It is characteristic of the nature of those times of transition that the two forms of land-holding should be pursued by the same emperors, and should co-exist as units in the imperial defensive structure (12), though being themselves in obvious contrast, and even opposition, to one another. Nevertheless, the system of big *πρόνοιαι* gradually became the rule. Successive emperors, even the **Lascariids**, who were comparatively prudent, thought that only the *πρόνοιαι* provided an effective means of defence; therefore some of **them favoured the πρόνοια** over the small holdings, and others preferred them exclusively (13).

In the end, the small holdings disappeared, having been either destroyed by raids or wars, or, when left unprotected, **swallowed up** by the big landowners, or even reclaimed by the **State** and redistributed to the large pronoiars. This latter measure was taken by Michael VIII in 1272: he confiscated the lands of

(11) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 96-98, 125.

(12) Op. cit. 63-64.

(13) Pachym. I, 18; II, 389; Zakythinios Crise Monétaire 5.3, 70.

the "Akritae" or borderland smallfreeholder, soldiers of Asia Minor, and granted them a salary ("roga") in exchange. Thus he turned them into national mercenaries, breaking the economic and sentimental attachment to their lands, which had been their prime encouragement to be good warriors. As a result of this imperial policy, the defence of the Akritae soon collapsed and they fled from Asia Minor. (14).

Landless, other smallholders, for reasons of defence or economics, were voluntarily abandoning their lands: The encursive raids of the advancing Turks (15) could easily destroy a small *στρατιά*, but not the much larger *πρόνοια*; if a small holder escaped the depredations of the Turks he was impoverished by the imperial treasury which imposed its heaviest taxes upon him (15a). To relieve themselves of these burdens, many smallholders sold their lands (and themselves, as *πάροικοι*) either to a monastery or to a large *pronoia* who were more adaptable to the conquerors. Thus the *στρατιώται-ἀκριται* diminished greatly, the *πρόνοιαι* and monastic estates were enlarged at their expense, and imperial defence relied more than ever on mercenaries or *πάροικοι* (16).

The mercenaries themselves became in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries, a growing factor in the destruction of the freeholders. An essential part of the Byzantine army, they consisted chiefly of untrustworthy foreigners commanded by officers drawn either from their own ranks or from the Byzantine nobility (*πρόνοιαίριοι*) (17). They were paid an inadequate yearly salary

(13) Diomedes op.cit. 81-87; Hélène Glykatzis-Ahrweiler *La politique agraire des empereurs de Nicée*, B 28 (1958) (app. 1959) 51-66 *eiusdem* Note additionnelle, ib. 135-6.

(15) D. Angelov *Certains aspects de la conquête des peuples balkaniques par les Turcs*, BS 17 (1956) 220-275; cf. Greg. VII, 10: I, 262-3 (1316); Cant. III, 30: II, 186 (1341).

(15a) Cant. I, 28: I, 137; Zakythinos op.cit. 49, 70, 82.

(16) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 14-16; Charanis op.cit. 113-4, 134; Diomedes op.cit; Doelger *Schatzkammern* p.114 (1428); O.H.B.S.428;

and forbidden to do other work which might have helped them support the families which were, it seems either with them or within easy distance of them. (18). It is not surprising that such an army should have become alienated from the peasantry, nor that it should have made angry attacks upon the peasants and their land (19). Such was the Alan army, sent in 1301-2 against the Turks in Asia Minor, which turned, when defeated, to pillage the rural Byzantine population (20). In 1304, both the Catalan mercenaries, and the Alan and Turkish mercenaries whom Michael IX led against the Catalans, plundered Philadelphia and parts of the countryside of Asia Minor (21). In 1309, after their victory over the Catalans, the foreign mercenaries of Byzantium began to pillage Thessaly, but were stopped by their commander, General Chandrenos (22) Other Turkish mercenaries, who had become Christians, abruptly deserted Byzantine service in 1309 (23). During the rebellion of 1321-28, a large part of the army of Andronicus III were foreigners with clearly rapacious tendencies (24). Indeed, this harsh behaviour toward the peasantry characterized not only mercenaries and other foreign troops, (25), but also Greek soldiers, the State army, and even bishops (25a). Furthermore the peasant was beleaguered by organized Greek bandits who seized the opportunity of

Pachym. II, 118, VII, 6: I, 248, XI, 4: I, 540. In M.-M. IV, 392-391-407 (1271): peasants tending to become paroiki, cf. next chapter.

(17) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 15, 97; O.H.B.S. 429.

(18) Cant. I, 48: I, 238-9 (1327); I, 49: I, 241; cf. I, 33: I, 164-5; Greg. Palamas Homily XXII, P.G. 151, 293.

(19) Diomedes op.cit. 94-95; Greg. Palamas in M/S Paris. Gr. 1239 f. 284 r-v, cited by Tafrali Thessalonique 109; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 70.

(20) O.H.B.S. 438.

(21) Op. cit. 439-460.

(22) Th. Magistros Pro Chandreno, P.G. 145, 345; eiusdem Letter to Andronicus (II), Boissonade Anecdota Graeca II, 198; Tafrali op.cit. 109, 209; Greg. VII, 1-8: I, 2214-258 passim.

(23) Greg. VII, 6, 8: I, 248, 254.

(24) Cant. I, 20: I, 98, 110.

the Catalan raids to loot their peasant compatriots in Casandria and in Macedonia generally, (26) where the civil wars of 1321-8 and 1341-7 and the deprivations which followed them so intensified all the destructive factors which had gone before that they caused the virtual disappearance of the independent peasant (27).

Throughout the XIV century, ^{the} decrease in the land-holding peasantry has marked and extensive. The last known measure to be taken on their behalf was in 1372, but it was a vain ~~anachronism~~ ^{anachronism}. (28). Whether any of them managed to survive, or whether the *παροίκαι* which they became managed to preserve any part of the status or rights of the small holders, we shall discover in the third chapter of this section when speaking of the paroikian population.

b) THE GREAT LANDED ESTATES AND
THE POLICY OF THE EMPERORS AN-
DRONICUS II AND ANDRONICUS III
TOWARDS THEM

Since the XIth century the Byzantine landed nobility had been greatly strengthened by various privileges grants and immunities, to the point where they had become distinctly the rulers in the state, dominating the small peasantry and the lower classes of town and country. The predominant form of land grant was now the "pronoia", the once important "Kharistikion" and "Solemnium" having by the XIVth century fallen into abeyance.

(25) Cant. I, 28: I, 137; Pachym. II, 409, 412; Greg. XIII, 10: II, 673; Tafrali op.cit. 209.

(25a) Cant. I, 28: I, 137; Tafrali op.cit. 109; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 67-68, 70.

(26) Th. Magistros Letter to Joseph the Philosopher, P.G. 145, 440; eiusdem Letter to Andronicus (II), Boissonade op.cit. 220; Arnakis *Οἱ πρῶτοι Ὀθωμανοὶ* 44-48.

(27) Cant. I, 28: I, 137; I: :I, 186 (1322); Greg. III, 25: I, 262; Nic. Cabasilas M/S Paris, Gr. 1213, f. 254, cited in Tafrali Thessalique 103; Greg. XXXV, 14: III, 509-511 (1355); Zakythinos op.cit. 73.

Solemnium was in early Byzantine times the grant by the state of the tax revenue of a district to a church or monastery, or to a secular landowner (29). **Kharistikium** was, after the time of the iconoclasts, the grant by the **State** or the **Church** of monastic lands and their revenue to a layman, on condition that he would look after the prosperity of the monastery in question, but would have neither any right to its property nor any military or other obligation in connection with its estates. (30).

The first known "pronoia" was granted, for his services, by Constantine IX Monomachus (1042-1055) to Constantine Leichoudes, without obligation of military service. The grant consisted either of the whole monastic property of Mangana or of an estate thereupon, and **was** to be held, administered, and its revenue used (31) by Leichoudes as if it were a solemnium or Kharishkium. While all three kinds of grant were alike in that they, particularly the pronoia, could not, at least theoretically, be inherited, alienated or transferred. (32), the pronoia differed from the other two in that it has always **State** land, and, from the time of Michael **VII** (1071-8),

(27) Op. cit. 36.

(28) Y. Mořin Doulikon Zevgarion (Sur la **question** du servage à Byzance), Seminarium Kondakovianum 10 (1938) 130f.

(29) Doelger Byzantinische Finanzverwaltung 117, 385.

(30) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 17-19; Charanis Monastic Properties, DOP 4 (1948) 74 - 81; Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 153.

(31) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 20-21; O.H.B.S. 291-2.

(32) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 23-27, 17-19, 28, 32-46; Charanis op. cit. 82f; **Diomedes** Βυζαντινὰ Μεγέτα: A', 61-78. That under Michael **VII** the pronoiae began to acquire a military character is shown by Ostrogorsky op.cit. 23-24 n. 1, 25.

and more especially from the time of the Commeni (1081-1185), it involved military obligations on the part of the grantee. All the population living on a newly granted pronoia became, perforce, paroikoi of the pronoia, a fate which befell many free peasants and "stratiotai" or "akritae" from the Xth and XIth centuries onward (33) as well as to peasants living on patrimonial estates (34) and kharistikia. The monks of Cassandria, which was granted to Adrian in 1084 by his brother Alexis I, feared that they would be forced to become paroikoi, and their consequent exception from this rule proves that, whether this case was one of pronoia or kharistikium or any other form of grant (35), in all forms the population on the land granted became paroikoi. As such, their fiscal obligations to the state were transferred to the pronoiar (36); but, at least until the XIth century, peasants who lived on land not granted as pronoia considered their fiscal obligations not as implying serfdom to the State, but as an element of their free status. Nevertheless, as the structure of the big patrimonial landholdings altered to follow the evelving pattern of organization of the pronoia (which were frequent from the XIth century), the peasants on these estates became paroikoi also. Between the pronoiai and the patrimonial estates the basic difference was that the former always remained State property, granted for a specified time on specified terms, whereas the latter involved no such terms, were unrestrictedly owned and owed only the usual taxes due by all land to the State.

By the time of the fourth crusade the land-tenure system of Byzantium had reached a stage of development very similar to that

(33) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 72-76.

(34) Op. cit. 39-40 n. 2 (1209-1218)

(35) Op. cit. 72 n. 1; Charanis in op.cit. 80 and On the ^{social} structure, B S12 (1951) 142, 152-3 holds that all the inhabitants of a pronoia were free.

(36) Ostrogorsky op. cit. 28-31, 42.

of Western feudalism (37), with one basic difference: the Greek landlords lived mostly in the towns, not, as the Westerners did, in castles on their estates. On this point they came to a compromise with the Latin conquerors in 1204 (38), by which they gave up their towns and, after taking an oath of allegiance, retained their *pronoiai*. All other lands and the peasants thereon, were appropriated by the Latins (39).

Under the Lascarids in Nicaea (with the exception of Theodore II, 1254-8) and under the rulers of the other despotates born out of the disintegration of 1204, the same land-tenure system was favoured as the most efficient means of securing an army for a needy State. Although, as we have seen (40), the small *στρατεῖαι* and peasants were not entirely neglected, the *pronoiai* continued to increase at their expense.

With the Restoration, the system was further expanded by the Palaiologi, who were entirely dependent on and favourable to the landed nobility. By the time of the reign of Michael VIII (1259-82) land rivalry was developing as a result of increasing demands and limitation of space. With the transference to Europe of the Asia Minor Army (1272-73) and the distribution of new *pronoiai* to its troops (41), inter-*pronoiar* antagonism became acute,

(37) Op. cit. 55-61; Charanis On the social structure 95-97; Tafrali Thessalonique 24.

(38) E. Francès Le féodalité et les villes byzantines au XIII^e et au XIV^e siècles, BS 16 (1955) 77-78; Svoronos La vie rurale à Byzance, Ann. - Econ. - Soc. - Civil. 11 (1956) 325; Kirsten Die byz. Stadt (1958) Anmerk. III, nr 24 pp. 26-27; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 51-52.

(39) Chronicle of Morea, ed. J. Schmidt (London 1904) vv. 1597, 1839; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 93; Tafrali op. cit. 205-6; Francès loc.cit.; Kirsten loc. cit.

(40) Cf. part a) of this chapter, nn. 9-16.

(41) Arnakis Οἱ πρῶτοι Ὀθωμανοὶ 38-39; Laurent Une famille turque, BZ 49 (1956) 349; Ostrogorsky op. cit. 92-97; O.H.B.S. 438.

as is evident from documents of the time which while stating that the pronoia was indivisible and carried a revenue of between 24 and 36 hyperpyra, stress that it could be taken from a proniar who neglected his military service and be assigned to a more diligent one (42). Even so, to supplement the pronoiac army mercenaries had to be employed at the expense of the State (43). The most important development of Michael VIII's reign, however, was the introduction of measures allowing pronoiai to be hereditary on a limited scale. Permission was granted only in special imperial chrysobulls, on the strict condition that the pronoia affected should not be subdivided, bequeathed or sold outside the family, and that its military obligations should be binding on its hereditary possessor. (44).

Meanwhile, the monasteries had increased other lands so as to become as powerful as or more powerful than the most powerful of secular landowners. During the reigns of Michael VIII, Andronicus II and III, one central theme in land developments was the constant rivalry between these two classes. (45).

Early in his reign Andronicus II, following the practice of his father, granted to his son Michael IX immense territories in Asia Minor and, when Michael had lost these territories to the Turks, granted him fresh lands in Europe, taken from the suspected despot Michael (46). Further, in 1295, despite the opposition of

(42) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 92-98, 101; Pachym. II, 258.

(43) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 99-100; O.H.B.S. 429; Pachym. I, 130
Diomedes Βυζαντι. Μελέται Α', 88-91.

(44) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 92-109; Charanis. On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 105-7; Pachym. I, 97-98; cf. Ostrogorsky op.cit. 82-83 for the first inheritance in 1232.

(45) Charanis Monastic Properties, DOP 4 (1948) 53-118; cf. D. Angelov Krupnato manastirsko stopanstvo vo Severna i Sredna Makedonija vo XIV vek, Glasnik na Institutot za natsionalna istorija, God 1, Br. 2, Dekemvri 1957 pp.81-138, esp. 129ff.; Zakythinos op.cit.54-56:

(46) Ostrogorsky op.cit.100.

the Church, he created his son co-emperor. This granting of vast estates to his son was part of a continuing process through which the Empire became divided into districts jointly held by royal princes with strongly separatist tendencies (48), a process which can hardly be dissociated from the other disruptive land developments, since the royal districts, as conditionally granted state-lands, were simply larger forms of pronoiae (49). Despite the effects of Andronicus II to keep these developments under control, the continued granting of big pronoiaewas necessarily causing the disintegration of the Empire. As the acquisition of pronoiae became the primary aim of internal politics, particularly influencing the activities of princes and nobles (49a), it increased the rivalry which culminated in the civil war of 1321-28 when the Empire was divided into the opposing forces of the two Andronici (50).

Already by 1295, alarmed by the worsening public finances and by external dangers, Andronicus II had taken measures to reorganize the military pronoiae (51). His manner of doing this was to seize one-tenth of the pronoiae and to expropriate one-third of those seized; a measure which chiefly affected the paroikian population. Yet he found, being short of funds as a result both of his father's great expenditures and the decreasing value of the Byzantine coin as the Western intrusion brought in Italian coins (52), that he was forced to reduce both the pronoiatric and mercenary armies (53). In thus neglecting the noble pronoiers, he

(47) Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 145-6.

(48) Ostrogorsky *ib.*; O.H.B.S. 427; Charanis *op.cit.* 90; Lemerle *Philippe* 187-9; cf. Introduction n.9.

(49) All co-emperors had military obligations.

(49a) Diomedes *op.cit.* A', 116-126; cf. Introduction n.23; Werner *Volkstümliche Häretiker* 48b, 51b.

(50) O.H.B.S.427; Tafrali *Thessalonique des origines* 244-8; *Thessalonique* 205-6.

(51) Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 59-60, 89-91.

(52) *Op.cit.* 10, 111; add Doelger *Schatzkammern* nr116, p.306 (1326); cf. Introduction nn.10-13.

caused their indignation (54), and further increased it by his subsequent systematic policy of favouring the Church, and especially the monasteries, in land matters, to the detriment of secular landholders - a policy illustrated by a long series of documents. However, Andronicus II's favour toward the Church must be seen in conjunction with his systematic subjection of it to himself, assuring, by the appointment of illiterate patriarchs, its co-operation in matters of Church Government (55).

Under Andronicus II, to a greater extent than under Michael VIII, monasteries received grants of State land either taken from pronoiars or confiscated from patrimonial lands or given as *pronoiae* in exchange for monastic lands (57). In fact, in general, such grants were made through the medium of the State, no military estate being allowed, in theory, to pass directly from a pronoiar to a monastery. This indicated the growing monastic power (58).

In order that the Treasury should not lose revenue, immunities were granted sparingly, and then usually only in part, to secular pronoiars, monasteries or patrimonial proprietors.

(53) Greg. VII, 5: I, 233; VI, 1: 158-160; cf. Introduction n. 10.

(54) Cf. Introduction nn. 14-15.

(55) Cf. Introduction nn. 20-25, and part b, nn. 54-67 of next chapter.

(56) E.g. M. - V. V, 58, 66, 67 (1264) 16-67 (Cephalonia); VI, 199-235 (Saint John Theologus of Patmos).

(57) Actes de Zographou A', nrs 10, 15, pp. 45-48; Ostrogorsky Feodalite 139-140, 267; Lemerle op.cit. 224 n. 1 (1286). Actes de Zographou A', nr 53; Ostrogorsky op. cit. 104-5n. 1 (1294). Actes de Zographou A', nrs 15, 17 (1300). Actes de Xénophon nrs 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 52, 58, 84 (1300) = Ostrogorsky op.cit. 139-144.

Mošin Akti 193 = Ostrogorsky op.cit. 142 f., 271f. (1300, Chilandar) Doelger Schatzkammern nrs 37, 93, 96 (1310, Iberon). Ostrogorsky op.cit. 106-7 (Menoikeus after 1313). Op. cit. 144-7 (Chilandar 1321).

(58) Ostrogorsky op. cit. 138 nos, 152-3 (1310, 1334); cf. ib. 146-154 and nn. 102-102a infra.

Immunity from ἀήρ (tax on justice) was in particular almost never granted, at least not in totality, as it seems to have been an especially good source of income. Partial immunity, becoming total by 1320, was granted in 1298-9 to Ephigmenou, (59) whereas from the immunity granted to Russikon in 1311. Four taxes were excluded (60). Already in 1301 total immunity was granted to some possession of Iberon (60a). Total fiscal immunity, in addition to the right of partial inheritance of his pronoiā, was granted to the patrimonial estates of J. Panaretos in 1313 (61). Through the pressure of the Serbian King, the partial immunity of ἀήρ (61a) was made total immunity for Chilandar (62) and total immunity was also granted to Menoikeus (63) in 1321 (64). The instances are few.

With regard to the inheritance of pronoiāe we find similar limitations. In addition to the partial inheritance right granted to J. Panaretos, total inheritance of his pronoiā, but with only partial immunity, was granted to G. Trullenus in 1318 (65).

So, even the rare total immunity was countered by partial inheritance rights, constant obligation to military service, inalienability, specified period of possession and other such restrictions, all of which stressed the supremacy of the State. Although

(59) Praktika d' Esphigménou pp. XIV-XV, cited in Ostrogorsky op.cit. 118 nn. 1-3; cf. Praktika d' Esphigménou 360 ff.

(60) O.H.B.S. 431 n.4; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 110 n. 1, citing Akty Russkogo na sv. Afone Monastyrija nr. 20.

(60a) Ostrogorsky Mémoires et documents pour l'histoire de l'immunité à Byzance, B 28(1958) (app. 1959) 165-254 (general study). For Iberon see ib. 251.

(61) M.-M. V, 109-110; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 106-7.

(61a) Actes de Chilandar nr. 92, 146; cf. n. 59 for the same exemption of the three δημόσια κατὰ κεφάλαια (παρθενοφθορία, φόρος, εὐρεσις θεσαυροῦ) from the immunity of "ἀήρ".

(62) Actes de Chilandar nrs. 41, 60; cf. O.H.B.S. 431 n.4; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 118 citing the Praktikon of Chilandar published by Moštin Akti, 1. 155.

(63) M.-M. V, 94; O.H.B.S. loc.cit.

the basic taxes were usually reserved to it, the State included in its grants of immunity the results of land improvement effected by the pronoiars or monks on their estates (66).

The only measure of Andronicus II to favour the lay pronoiars was that of 1303, when, with the consent of the patriarch Athanasius, he took over some ecclesiastical lands in Asia Minor and distributed them as pronoiæ to the army (67). But this was an exceptional step, dictated by urgent necessity, and was outweighed by his pro-monastic policy and by the above-mentioned strict reservations on pronoiæ. An imposition of new taxes on all property, both in 1294 and in 1321, of which the purpose was to augment the slender State revenue to meet the problems of army expenses, of pacifying grants for the encroaching barbarians, and of feeding a population swollen by the arrival of fugitives from Asia Minor, increased the burden on the pronoiars and on the people generally. The avidity of the pronoiars for new land increased with the decrease of imperial land, which the foreign conquests caused and for which Andronicus II was held responsible (68). Furthermore, such tax-farmers as Apocaucus were dissatisfied with the imperial decrees against the abuses that were making

(64) Through the monks (Cf. Section A, ch. I.) he established his influence in Byzantium.

(65) M.-M. V, 89-90; O.H.B.S. 431, n.4; Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 109-112, 132-3; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 60, 87.

(66) As a stimulus for better cultivation: Ostrogorsky *op.cit.* 107, 110-11, 123, 132, 134-5, 138. Add: *Actes de Kutlunus* nr.10, pp.58-60 (Oct. 1321); nr. 11. pp. 60-64 (1322).

(67) *Pachym.* II, 388-390; Charanis *Monastic Properties*, DOP 4 (1948) 110-1; Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" *Discourse*, DOP 11 (1957) 156.

(68) *Greg. VIII*, 6: I, 317-320. He imposed taxes in kind (e.g. the *σιτόκριθον* (Zakythinos *op.cit.* 89-90) and new taxes (e.g. the *ἀνεπιγνώστικιον* or tax on unregistered *paroikoi*, 1294): P.Lemerle *Un chrysobulle d' Andronic II Paléologue pour le monastère de Karakala*, BCH 60 (1936) 445; Doelger *Schatzkammern* 110-3; Zakythinos *loc.cit.* and 59-60, 82-83, 108-110. Cf. *Introduction* nn. 14-19.

them a scourge of the peasantry and the whole of the lower classes. (69).

The result was the formation of a coalition against Andronicus II and the civil war of 1321-28, during which the emperor maintained his policy. Full immunity and the right of inheritance, including improvements, were granted in October, 1321 to the married Metropolitan of **Serres**, and in 1322 to Alypiou (70). His further grants of pronoiae to Chilandar were confirmed by his grandson Andronicus III in June, 1321 (i.e. after the first phase of the revolt) and further confirmed by himself in September, 1321. (71).

During the course of the rebellion, Andronicus III made promises and grants of immunities and various privileges to the cities and towns of the empire, which were suffering from overtaxation, in order to attract them to his cause (72). He further extended his generosity to his army of mercenaries, securing their adherence by granting to each of them in 1322 lands to the value of ten hyperpyra (72a), grants which were later confirmed by his grandfather (72b). However, it appears that, of all the beneficiaries of the young emperor, the friends of the Grand Domestic, John Cantacuzenus were most favoured by these grants and privileges, even at the expense of other groups of pronoiers in the rebel party, and certainly at the expense of the pronoiers of Andronicus II's party. Therefore, a group of pronoiers under Syrgiannis, one of the leaders of the rebellion, displeased at having been deprived of their pronoiae by Andronicus III after the peace treaty of 1321, passed to the side of Andronicus II (73).

(70) Actes de Kutlumuş nr. 10, pp. 58-60; cf. nr 11, pp. 60-64 (1322).

(71) Actes de Chilandar nrs. 56, 72, 73,

(72) Greg. VIII, G: I, 319; IX, 3b: I, 404; IX, 1 : I, 396-7; cf. Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 138.

(72a) Cant. I, 33: I, 164.

(72b) Cant. I, 38: 1, 186-7; cf. Zakythinos *op.cit.* 87.

(73) Greg. VIII, 11b: I, 352; cf. Introduction n. 28.

The old emperor on the other hand continued to favour the monks, as instanced by his division of a pronoia which had belonged to two brothers, one of whom had become a monk at Xenophon and the other of whom had died; he allotted the share of the former to the monastery(74) and divided the share of the latter between another pronoiar and the State (75). A further instance is his removal of land, before 1325, from another pronoiar, Nicephorus Martinos, and granting it to Menoikeus, which was at that time under the patronage of the Serbian King and his Queen Simonide, daughter to the old emperor (76). Although Martinos was duly compensated, he was dissatisfied with the exchange and took the opportunity of the second phase of the civil war to recover his old estate. In April 1328, it was taken from him again, in exchange for another pronoia, and when peace was restored, both emperors confirmed this most recent grant and forbade the resumption by the pronoiar of his original estate (77). It appears then that - at least when under his direct influence during the short spells of their reconciliation - the young emperor was submissive to his grandfather on land matters. Nonetheless, the influence upon him of his pronoiar supporters was generally the greater, persuading him to grant them fresh revenues and state lands ('royal lands' - i.e. pronoiae) in 1325-7, without the consent of his grandfather. It was the re-occupations of certain of these lands by supporters of the old emperor which initiated the third phase of the civil war (78).

(74) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 153, 330.

(75) Op. cit. 131 (before 1325).

(76) M.-M. V, nr XX, 117-9 (April 1325).

(77) M.-M. V, nrs XXI-XXII, s.a., 119-121; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 147-9; cf. 130-1.

(78) Greg. IX, 1-3: I, 390-405; Cant. I, 47-50: I, 228-248; cf. I, 54-56: I, 273-288; cf. Ostrogorsky op.cit. 136-7.

In September 1325, continuing the monastic policy which was further alienating him from his grandson, Andronicus II granted almost total immunity, with the exception of *εἰσπρακία* to Zographou (79), and in March, 1328 he restored to the same monastery two metochia which had been secularized in the civil war and granted to a pronoiar, who, as in the previous case of Menoikeus, eventually acquiesced in the restoration (80).

In October, 1327, before they had become part of Menoikeus, complete immunity was granted to the hereditary estates of the Margarites - (81). Both the **favour** shown to monasteries and to ecclesiastical officials (82) and the extensive grants for the rebuilding of churches (83) are part of the same policy, which tended to prevent the augmentation and economic expansion of the secular pronoiae.

Two last examples of the land policy of Andronicus III before he became sole emperor in May 1328 were his grant, in April 1328, of lands as patrimonial property to Kalotheos, a Chian noble closely related to Cantacuzenus (84), in March 1328 an act by which he confirmed the transfer of a pronoia to Zographou (85), and in April 1328 his equalisation (*ἐξισοαεῖς*) of the pronoiae of the West, i.e. of Macedonia, Thessaly and Epirus, in order to increase his army (85a). Taken together, these acts indicate an internal contradiction in his policy, though the secularization of monastic properties and extensive grants to secular pronoiar were predominant throughout his reign (1328-41) as during the rebellion (1321-28) (86).

(79) Actes de Zographou nr 13, p.51; nrs 23, 26, pp. 55, 59, Sept. 1327.

(80) Op. cit. nrs. 24, 27, 29-31; cf. 1, 50-51; Ostrogorsky op. cit. 149-150.

(81) M.-M. V, 110 (1343); Ostrogorsky op.cit. 107-8 n.1.

(82) Cf. M.-M. V, 77-84, 90-92, 97, 99, 101-2, 105, 107, 155, 161, 165, 264, 253, 261; VI, 235-259 (: all between 1289 and 1338) Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 156-7.

(83) Greg. VIII, 12: I, 273-7.

(84) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 136-76; Doelger Facsimiles nr 43.

As emperor, Andronicus III at first followed a policy of ample grants to the pronoiars of his party. These grants he extended to the people of Constantinople by exempting them from some taxes, a measure which chiefly benefited the wider class of farmers and city artisans (87). None of either party was obliged to return pillaged property except landed estates (87a). Furthermore, he exempted from any obligation to pay interest all those of his party who had lost their property in the civil war; among whom must have been included those pronoiars whose lands had been confiscated by Andronicus II. But this decree of exemption (after having contributed to the restriction of currency circulation by making the usurers more reserved in their activities) seems to have fallen into abeyance at least before 1347 and perhaps before 1341 (89), creating a further reason for the gradual widening of the already existing gap between the emperor and at least a great number of his allies among the nobility (90). However, since his revenue resources were very scanty, Andronicus was forced, in order to obtain money for his military purposes, to have all the taxes in Thrace and Macedonia meticulously collected, although these provinces were suffering from exhausting Bulgarian and Turkish raids (90a).

(85) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 149-150.

(85a) Cant. I, 56: I, 287-8.

(86) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 155-8; Ševčenko op.cit. 157-8

(87) Cant. II, 2: I, 322-3.

(87a) Cant. II, 1: I, 312.

(88) R. Guiland Le Traité inédit "Sur l'Usure" de Nicolas Cabasilas, *Ἐἰς μνήμην Σπ. Λάμπρου* (1935) 274; Nic. Cabasilas *Κατὰ το-κισθόντων*, P.G. 150, 728; Cant. ib.

(89) Zakythinos Crise monétaire 75-76; R. J. Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas, OCP 21 (1955) 206, 220-4; Ševčenko op.cit. 84-86; Tafrafi Thessalonique 113, n.3.

(90) Introduction nn. 43-47.

(90a) Greg. XI, 1: I, 524; Zakythinos op.cit. 91.92.

In 1329, Andronicus III received money from the nobility for the reconstruction of the army and especially of the fleet of the Empire, a measure which indicates his close dependence upon the nobility, and certainly contributed to a further dependence upon them of the imperial armed forces. In 1340 and 1341, this measure was repeated (91), even though the army was already recruited from their paroikoi by the nobility, paid and thus controlled by them (92). Further support was given to the nobility against monastic encroachments by Andronicus III in his efforts to reorganize the imperial armed forces; behind all these measures, of which examples follow, one can clearly trace the hand of John Cantacuzenus, spokesman for the nobility and an all-powerful influence over the emperor. In 1330-31, Andronicus III granted to the soldiers Barbarinoi, who already had other lands, a metochium of Dochariou consisting of 1500 modioi, previously granted to Dochariou by Andronicus II; and in 1331 he detached 600 modioi of this metochium to grant as a pronoia to another pronoiar (94). Between 1331-8 another 350 modioi were detached from this same pronoia and granted to a further pronoiar. In 1338 he transferred all these estates to the vestiarites Manuel as inheritable pronoiae (being 1890 modioi in area). Only at the latter's request did he then return them all to the monastery, as earlier, at the request of the monks, he had refused to do (95). At a later stage he also granted to the same Barbarinoi the ports

(91) Cant. II, 12: I, 381 (1329); III, 8: II, 58-64 (1340-1); Cf. III, 10; II, 69; Greg. XII, 6: II, 595; O.H.B.S. 449; cf. Cant. II, 38: I, 537-542 (1340) I, 28: I, 138 (1321f.).

(92) Cf. next chapter.

(93) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 157-8; Ktenas Χρυσόβουλλοι λόγοι Δοχῆ ἀριῶ, ΕΕΒΣ 4 (1927) nr 1.

(94) Doelger Schatzkammern nr 62; Ktenas op.cit. nr 2.(1343); Doelger ib.nr 2 = Ktenas 7 (1930) nr 24, pp. 109-110; Doelger ib. nrs 23; 25, 29; Ostrogorsky op. cit. 155, -157. . .

(95) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 154, 109 n.2.

of Leontarion and Small Sea and the village of St. Mamas in Kalamaria, the district where the above-mentioned pronoiae were situated. This village and these ports seem previously to have been a possession of Vatopedi, to which they were returned by Dušan in May, 1346 and April 1348. Similarly the emperor took from Vatopedi its lands at Raphalios and **Krimotas** in Kalamaria, (apparently old pronoiae belonging to homonymous persons) and gave them to unknown pronoiar (95a). Although in ordinary exchanges of lands a compensation was always paid for the lands taken, it does not seem that any compensation was paid to Vatopedi nor to St. George of **Zablantia** nor to other monasteries for the lands taken from them.

Also, at an unknown time, the Sebastokrator John, apparently acting for Andronicus III, took over and enrolled in the military rolls the paroikoi hitherto attached to the monastery of St. George of Zablantia in Thessaly, as a result of which the paroikoi in question became liable to military service either in the imperial army, (if the village of Zablantia remained **State** land), or in the army of the pronoiar to whom the village might be granted (95b).

All these measures constituted an undoubted secularizing policy which hurt the monks by encroaching upon their interests. This situation was aggravated by the fact that, as shown by other chrysobulls and acts of his reign, the emperor continued to grant immunities and rights of inheritance to military pronoiar, especially to those who had helped him in the civil war. In 1337, Alexis Diplovatatzis received the partial right of inheritance, total immunity **a** f from taxes and the right of improving his pronoia, both of which were exempted from military service; although it is not certain that the rest of his pronoiatric estates were likewise **exempted**, (97) it is possible that they were, in view

(95a) Solovief - Mošin Grčke Povelje nrs 11, 36-38, 46-49, 18, 22-26, 29-31 cited in Ostrogorsky op.cit. 158.

(95b) Solovief, - Mošin op.cit. nr 21, 5-7, cited: Ostrogorsky loc. cit.
(96) M.-M.V, 107 (1338); Ostrogorsky op.cit. 111-2.

of the fact that he discharged his military service as eparchos. As a rule, however, a pronoiar never obtained unlimited rights over a pronoiac estate, or exemption from military service, even if the land had been granted to him as a patrimonial holding (98). Furthermore, between 1333-8 Andronicus III took from monasteries several *oeconomiae* (*pronoiae*), that had been granted to them by his grandfather, and restored them to state ownership (99). In July 1337, apparently through the mediation of Cantacuzenus, the Patriarch John Casecas granted to Ignatius Calothesis, of the well-known pro-Cantacuzenus family, the monastery of Taxiarch Michael in Sosthenium, with full immunity for life (99a). This grant appears to have been a belated case of *Kharistikium*.

Nevertheless, the emperor in his land policy did not entirely neglect the monastic interests. In 1328 he confirmed the privileges granted by his grandfather to Zographou (100). In 1333 he granted to the monk Jacobos the yearly tax of 20 hyperpyra collected from the Jews of Zichna (100a), and in 1334, he granted a pronoia as patrimonial land to the Hegumenos of Chilandar. In contrast to the policy of Andronicus II the pronoiar was recompensed to his own satisfaction (101). In that same year, a pronoia which had been donated by a monk and his three brothers to Xenophon, and ratified by Andronicus II, was confirmed by Constantine Macrinus, the Domestic of Andronicus II (102). In 1336 he confirmed the possessions and immunities of the Bishopric of Stagi (102a). In April 1341, Iberon was ordered to pay to

(97) Actes de Zographou nr 29; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 112 ff., 135; ~~eiusdem~~ Mémoires et Documents pour l'histoire de l'immunité^{na} Byzance, B 28 (1958) 249.

(98) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 135, 137.

(99) M.-M. V, 116-7; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 150.

(99a) Letter of J. Casecas, P.G. 152, 1215-1220.

(100) Actes de Zographou nr 27; O.H.B.S. 431, n.4.

(100a) M.-M. V, 106.

(101) Actes de Chilandar nrs 45, 46, 47, 126; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 150-2.

(102) Actes de Xénophon nr 10; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 152-3, 138

the Treasury 200 hyperbyra for certain metochia in Radolivo, and to keep the rest of the revenue (248 hyperpyra) for itself. This arrangement was more favourable to the monastery than to the State (and was altered later in the Civil War, in favour of some pronoiars) (102b). In 1341 Iberon was granted another favour, which **was the** right to restore its fugitive paroikoi to their lands (102c). Furthermore, monastic acquisitions were often not brought to the notice of the State until the monks had made improvements upon them; **pronoiars professed** as monks often donated lands to monasteries; land grants, to earliest monastic support were made either directly by the Serbs and Bulgarians or by the State, under Serb and Bulgarian pressure; in all the above instances the State had usually to yield before accomplished facts and to confirm them. (102d). Other similar cases were not rare (102e).

In this manner the **power** of the monasteries was not really shaken, but rather reasserted under Andronicus III, despite his efforts to satisfy the pronoiars. In general, the contradictory nature of his policy was, while on the one hand granting privileged land to the monks and the right to inherit their land to the pronoiars, striving, on the other hand, to impose certain limits on immunity and inheritance, to secure military service from the lay pronoiars, and to maintain the inalienability of their land. This did not greatly differ from the policy of Andronicus II.

Consequently, together with the reasons outlined in the introduction, (and the favour of the emperor toward the middle classes, which we shall examine in **Section B** of this Thesis), it

n.1, 330 ff.; cf. n. 58a above.

(102a) M.-M. V, 270-3.

(102b) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 159.

(102c) Op. cit. 146-154.

(102d) Doelger Sechs byz. Praktika p.119, l.235; Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 68.

(102e) M.-M. VI, 248-255 (1326-1341) (St. John of Patmos)

alienated Andronicus III from the nobility who, because of their enhanced military role and their being a more immediate target for foreign enemies, wanted more rights and more favourable treatment from the State (103). Those nobles, especially those among the senators of Constantinople who, with the clique of monks and ecclesiastics surrounding the Patriarch Calocas, were undoubtedly satisfied with the emperor's land policy, found their interests in conflict with those of the Cantacuzenian pronoiars. Other problems, notably the Hesychast Controversy (104), soon became entangled in the conflict to make it acute.

With the death of Andronicus III on the sixth of June, 1341, and the assumption of power by John Cantacuzenus as Guardian, the conflict became open. Before leaving on his first expedition, Cantacuzenus distributed supplementary pronoiæ and revenues to all the nobles and senators because, since the revenues and pronoiæ granted them by the emperor had diminished in value, leaving them with insufficient funds, they had been neglecting their military service. In order to restore the pronoiæ to their initial values the Guardian used his own money, money from public contributions, and a certain amount from a political friend, the rich ex-tax farmer, Patrikiotes (105). In making these grants, (not, as Ostrogorsky claims, part of the policy of Andronicus III (106), exposing the failure of the former emperor's policy to maintain the standard desired by the military pronoiars, Cantacuzenus and his party refuted and corrected that policy.

(103) Cant. III, 87:II, 534-6; IX, 18:III, 120; s.c. Estopañan Bisanzio y España 2, ch. X, XI, XVI, XXI; cf. I, II, V, VIII; cf. Cant. III, 87:II, 534-6; IV, 17:III, 116-7; IV, 18-22:III, 118-165 passim.

(104) Cant. III, 13:II, 83-87; IV, 6:III, 40; III, 34:II, 307-8; III, 18-19:II, 106-125; III, 36:II, 218-225; III, 55:II, 328-332; III, 30-31:II, 185-195; III, 49:II, 292-4; Greg. XII, 5:II, 586; cf. Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse DOP 11(1957) 157-8.

(105) Cant. III, 8:II, 58-64; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 101; add Cant. III, 9:II, 68-69; Greg. XII, 6:II, 595; XII, 5:II, 586.

(106) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 154.

SECTION A:

CHAPTER II: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
LANDED ESTATES AND THE STATUS OF
THE PRONOIARS AND OTHER LAND
OWNERS:

a) THE SECULAR LANDOWNERS AND THEIR ESTATES

An essential feature of a pronoia was that it should preserve its initial value. The frequent decrease in their value might be due either to neglect on the part of the pronoiar or the emperor, **or** to strife either between the pronoiar or between the nobles and monks, in which pronoiae, or part of them, were taken by pronoiar or monks from their rivals. As a result, a periodic revision (ἐξίσιωσις) of the extent productivity and ultimate revenue of all pronoiae, as well as of patrimonial estates, was made by the State, followed by the distribution of new praktika to landowners of all classes and kinds, defining the exact extent of their lands, the number of paroikoi and the revenue of each of **them** (1). Most of the pronoiar continued to be real στρατιῶται although a number of them, especially monks and senators, did not in practice discharge military service, but held pronoiae as a favour, (2), like the old Kharistikia. The aim of the "equalization", therefore, **was** to maintain the status of these real στρατιῶται among the pronoiar, to remind them of their obligations to the State and to stimulate their military activity. In addition, the purpose of equalization was to protect all landowners while discovering the extent of their incomes for the use of the fiscal authorities.

At the same time as the pronoiae, through becoming inheritable either partly (3) or entirely (4), increased their similar-

(1) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 103-6.

(2) *Ib.* 102.

ity to patrimonial estates, either secular or ecclesiastic, the economic similarity between the two was also growing. On all kinds of land the working peasant population was composed chiefly of paroikoi (in the general sense which will be explored in the following chapter) who owed seignorial rent to their landlord, thus providing his basic revenue. The increasing incidence and degree of inheritability, immunity and exemption granted, upon earnest application, to all manner of estates (5) was gradually bringing basic similarity to all landholding. All landholders aimed at, and succeeded by various methods in evading taxes, in absorbing the exhausted small peasants and subjecting them as paroikoi to themselves and their interest (6), and in becoming as free as possible of the central authority (6a).

The patrimonial landowners were ultimately the real owners of all their paroikoi's lands (7); but the pronoiars, as holders of State-owned land, could not, at least not always, buy the land of their paroikoi, it being State-owned land under the control of the pronoiar, and transform it into their patrimonial estate (8). Gradually, however, they managed to absorb into their estate, which was situated around a village, the lands of their paroikoi as of free peasants, situated in the village itself (8a). All paroikoi depended upon their land and tended to become his δουλοπαροικoi; although they could themselves be juridic persons, they were often represented by him at court and before the high authorities (9). Both the paroikoi and their estates were registered

(2a) Cf. Cant. I, 56: I, 287-8.

(3) E.g. M.-M. V, 107 (1337) = Ostrogorsky op.cit. 111-2; M.-M. V, 109-110 (1315, 1343) = Ostrogorsky op.cit. 106-7; Actes de Zographou nr 29 (1333).

(4) E.g. M.-M. V, 89-90 (1318) = Ostrogorsky op.cit. 109-110.

(5) Total exemption: M.-M.V, 110 (1327, 1343) = Ostrogorsky op.cit. 111 n.2, 112; M.-M.V, 109-110 (1343) = op.cit. 106-7.

(6) O.H.B.S. 428-9.

(6a) Stein Untersuchungen 20.

(7) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 57, 68-71 = M.-M.IV, 397-8 (1271);

in the praktika of their masters (10), who, apparently because it was their State duty to preserve their pronoiai intact, could claim back a paroikian land if it had been lost, or sold by their paroikoi without their consent (11); so, to some extent they were able to control paroikian sales and transactions. More often than other kinds of landholder, the pronoiers incited their paroikoi to take land from their neighbours, especially from monasteries, and to make it their own, a policy which meant that ultimately the paroikoi would come to be dependent on their masters (12).

The great noble pronoiers, who constituted the major part of the landed nobility, of this period, were officers in the State army. The imperial family and its related families, the patrimonial landowners, the high clergy, the various high State officials and all other notable and economically powerful members of the State constituted the remainder of the nobility, which was, whether living in towns or country, the ruling class (13). Contrary to conditions which had prevailed until the Xth century, when it had been rare to identify those who were powerful in the State

J. Karajannopulos' review of Ostrogorsky's *Paysannerie*, BZ 50 (1957) 179. -(8a) Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 49-50.

(8) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 68-71.

(9) Op.cit. 71-72, 75, 115; Charanis *On the social structure*, BS 12 (1951) 98-99; still cf. next chapter n.32.

(10) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 259f., 368.

(11) Op.cit. 80-81, 104.

(12) M.-M. IV, 32-41, 213, 257, 254, 225, 229, 259, 128, 159, 22, 95, 140-1, 101, 141, 139, 122, 178, 273, 256, 212 (XIII century, around Smyrna); IV, 345, 350, 330, 397, 392 (Greece); Charanis op.cit. 98-102.

(13) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 102; Charanis op.cit. 101; Diomedes Βυζαντινοὶ Μεγέται A', 24 - 30.

(13a) Lemerle *Esquisse*, Rev. Hist. .119, avril-juin 1958, 279-280.

with those who were rich, and those who were weak with those who were poor, it was now, as society had become polarized over the centuries, inevitably the rule so to identify them. A good many foreigners having been admitted and absorbed at various times from an early period, (14), the nobility now thought in terms of class rather than of national interest.

The typical class of the nobility was that of the pronoiars, one of whose basic obligations was to recruit soldiers for the State from among their paroikoi, to equip them and to lead them in battle (15). Their lands, unlike those of the "enrolled soldiers" and smallholders, who themselves worked their lands, were worked by their paroikoi as well. They could even obtain exemption from military service for their paroikoi (16), who thus appear to have continued to fulfill all the functions of the free small soldiers, but under the control of the pronoiar rather than that of the State. As there were many paroikoi in the towns, those pronoiars who controlled towns could often appear as generals of civilian armies, although their forces were as paroikian, as those recruited in the countryside (17). The big monasteries, especially in Macedonia, also recruited armies from among their paroikoi (17a). Such local armies naturally served first of all their immediate masters, the pronoiars, thus further increasing their personal power. Nevertheless there does seem to have existed

(14) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 99-100 (under Michael VIII); 46-53 (1184); 72,79 n.e (XIII cty); Cant.I,30:I,146-9; V.Laurent in BZ49 (1956) 502-3; eiusdem Une famille turque,BZ 49 (1956)347-368 (XIII - XIV cties); M.-M.I,227-8 (1342)(= P.G.152, 1261-2).

(15) Ostrogorsky op.cit.158(1348); Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 159; M.-M.IV, 3,4,2,249,251-3,256; VI,58;V, 13,20; Charanis op.cit. 131-2; Greg. XII, 12: II,614; Dem.Cydones Monodia, P.G.109, 645.

(16) M.-M.IV,249,252-3,256.

(17) Cant. IV, 19: III, 129-134; IV, 18: III, 120,123;cf.E.Fran-
çois La féodalité et les villes byzantines au XIII et au XIV siè-
cles, BS 12 (1951) 86; Zakythinos Despotat II, 179f.; cf. SectionB,
ch.I.

also an army under direct imperial control; this could not have consisted of others than paroikoi - certainly State paroikoi. Though locally recruited, it was under the imperial governor's orders, and was used to assert the imperial authority in several vital regions. Such was the army of Thessalonica which apparently lived on the Acropolis; it was under the command of a local leader who obeyed the imperial governor, who usually came from another town (18).

Whether under State, Church or pronoiac control, the paroikian army, to which mercenaries were added, could not be expected to defend with vigour the imperial soil which belonged not to the paroikoi themselves but ultimately to their selfish and oppressive lords. The officer-pronoians alone could not constitute the army; whatever their bravery, ability, or pronoiac bonds to the State, they could not replace the numerous former small soldiers who had depended a land which was theirs. As the predominance of the nobility in later centuries established the system of pronoiae as the only one possible (19), the small soldiers, with their whole-hearted initiative both in farming and fighting, were extinguished. The military failures of these later centuries were due, among other reasons, to this stratification of society that reduced the peasant to a miserable paroikoian status and turned the energy of the pronoians to purely selfish ends. Similarly, combined with the fact that, the pronoians pre

(17a) D. Angelov Krupnoto manastirko stopanstvo vo severna i sredna Makedonija vo XIV vek, in Glasnik na institutot za natsionalna ist. I, 2, Skopje 1957, 129; eiusdem Agrarnite ot noženija vo severna i sredna Makedonija prez XIV vek, Sofia 1958, 194f; cf. Cant. III, 32: II, 198; Kirsten Byzant. Stadt, Text p.43, n.73p. 29: monks, apparently armed, inhabited the fortress Bera.

(18) Tafrales Thessalonique 57-58; Cant. III, 94: II, 576, 578-580; III, 38: II, 233; Greg. XIII, 1: II, 634-5; cf. Cant. I, 53: I, 271; III: 39: IV, 237-8; IV, 16: III, 109; IV, 19: III, 130-134; III, 39: II, 239-243; III, 33: II, 242-3.

(19) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 26; cf. the previous chapter I, a).

ferred to live in the towns, away from their estates(20), interest in agrarian methods declined, producing stagnation in the development of the generally inferior agricultural techniques, a condition which explains such phenomena as the non-existence of the simple yoke of oxen or of ox-shoeing (and the revolutions in agrarian economy which stem from them) within the Empire. (21) Thus, agriculture being entirely at the mercy of the elements, famine often appeared as a further incitement to social conflict (21a). Similarly, industry, centred among the paroikoi on the domains and in the villages, and in the workshops of the nobles in the towns, could not progress (21b).

The main concern of the pronoiars, as of all land-holders, was the collection of their reveue, the seignorial rent (μορτή , δεικατεία) from their paroikoi(22). This was normal and essential at least from the XIIIth century. It was in most cases paid in cash, except by the monastic paroikoi and it secured to the paroikoi the right to work on the land and to enjoy, themselves, those of its products which the usual exploitation of their masters allowed them (23). The pronoiars lived lavishly, in the big towns, on their rents and on the taxes which the paroikoi owed to the State and which were transferred, usually in part, rarely entirely, by the State to the pronoiars through the chrysobulls or acts in which they were granted their pronoiæ or other types of land (24). In very rare cases were the rents paid in kind or in labour in the XIIIth to XIVth centuries, at any rate not by lay landholders;

(20) Cf. Section B, ch. I, nn.3-5ff.

(21) Conte Lefebvre des Noëttes Le système d'attelage et du boeuf à Byzance et les Conséquences de son emploi, Mélanges Ch. Diehl I (1930) 183-190, cited by Zakythinos Crise Monétaire 63; cf. Diomedes Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται A', 129-130.

(21a) Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 50b.

(21b) Op.cit 51a-b; Francis loc.cit.; cf. M.-M.IV, 3,17,23,24.

(22) Greg. IX, 15,8: I, 393-4,396-7.

(23) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 99,105-6, 113,115,118, 143-4, 147-8, 350; cf Greg. Palamas Homily XXXIX, P.G.151, 484-492 etc.

(24) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 106-7,77-78,135; eiusdem Paysannerie

these preferred money, despite its depreciation, that they might avoid the trouble of converting kind into currency. Therefore the *paroikoi* themselves undertook the exchange which, it being beyond their abilities, they performed in an elementary way. Only on monastic estates were the rents frequently paid in kind, even in the XIVth century, possibly because of the rather closed economy of the monasteries, in contrast to the predominantly monetary economy of the secular estates (25). Only thus can the fact be explained that in the frequent fairs (*πανηγύρεις*) of the XIII-XIVth centuries, most of the goods offered for sale were those produced by exclusive privilege and sold by the monasteries. This privilege included immunity on monopoly or both, for such products as wax, honey, corn, wine, meat and cheese (25a). On the other hand one does find instances of lay landholders who practised, or more often simply controlled through their men, trade and industry (25b).

Usually the landowners had the right to judge their *paroikoi* and consequently to collect the applicable taxes of *ἀήρ*; but in most cases this right was restricted to minor criminal offences, as the serious one were reserved to the State court by the exception from *ἀήρ*, or tax on justice, of certain taxes such as *κόπος*, *εὐρέσις θησαυροῦ*, *παρθενοφθορία* (26). In other cases the State excluded these taxes in the immunity of *ἀήρ*, and withheld other immunities (27), in order to effect a balance and yet deprive all landholders of an additional income. For the same reasons, lawsuits between *paroikoi* of a pronia and a person not of the pronia belonged to the jurisdiction of

15-24; Charanis. On the social structure, BS12 (1951)106,138,142; Greg. Palamas Homily XXXIII, P.G.151, 412-424.

(25) Cf. Ch. III, nn. 9-11 and Appendix of this Section; Werner op.cit.78a-79b.

(25a) Werner op.cit. 47b-48a.

(25b) Cf. Section B, ch. I nn. 4-11.

(26) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 115-8, 122-3 71-72,75-77.

(27) Op.cit. 115 - 8.

the local military governor (28). But even when the pronoiars were supposed to give judgment, this was actually given by an assembly of ἅπαντες οἱ κρείττονες τῆς προν., together with the **notary** and the priest (29), that is to say, by the most notable among the paroikoi. Beyond whatever legal relations existed between the two, the nobles deeply despised the **paroikoi**, as they did all lower and non-noble classes, rarely permitting any of them to take a higher post in the administration or the society generally (30). The authority over the **paroikoi** of the nobles and their higher officials attained, at least in many cases, practically to the point of power over life itself. They could, while running no risk at all of punishment, demand from their **paroikoi** whatever pleased them in the way of illegal extra services, illegal extra rents, taxes on free entertainment for their **guests**, particularly for military and administrative officials and their suites; they could even kill them in anger without incurring any **State** intervention, and with the toleration or approval of the **Church**. Such behaviour, however, naturally caused a deep smouldering hatred in the peasants, which was manifested in smaller or larger revolts, seditions and various local troubles (31).

(28) Charanis Monastic Properties, DOP, 4 (1948) 90; *νηϊτικὸν*; *ΜΒ*, *Μ*. 2 IV, 239, 1240; 419. *Ἡμερολόγιον*, 2, 101, 102-3.

(29) *ΜΒ*, *Μ*. IV, 180-84; Ostrogorsky op. cit. 75, -77, 117.

(30) Cant. III, 40; II, 244-8; III, 25; II, 152-3; cf. Introduction nn. 65, 69; Section B, ch. I, n. 6; further in this chapter nn. 50-55, and above n. 13a. Ph. Koukoules *Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ πολιτισμὸς*; τόμος Β', I (1948) 220-3.

(31) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 87-91; Zakythinis *Crise monétaire* 67-68.

b) THE GREAT ECCLESIASTICAL LANDED
ESTATES

Despite the preventative measures, the expansion of ecclesiastical and particularly of monastic properties continued at an alarming rate long before the Crusades (32). All the emperors eventually yielded to the monks and granted them various privileges (33). A temporary disruption of Church property in 1204 was remedied by the intervention of Innocent III, who averted the secularization of Greek (and Latin) monasteries in Byzantium. Henceforward they flourished; through imperial grants, pious donations or purchases, especially from needy peasants, inheritances and litigations, they came to hold, by the fourth decade of the XIVth century, a vast number of lands in various forms, not excluding the pronoia (34), which of course did not in such cases imply military service. Exemption from taxes was also frequent for monastic lands, in spite of reservations of some taxes for the State.

Especially during the reign of Andronicus II did the monasteries gain the tremendous material wealth which gave them a more dominant role in Byzantine politics. Their scandalous avidity for more land brought them into conflict with the pronoiers and peasants. The "epic" of this conflict is seen in the innumerable documents following and contradicting one another either in a vain attempt to satisfy both parties, or in accordance with the official policy of the moment. The poor paroikoi were used as pawns in the conflict between pronoiers and ecclesiastics; if a paroikos granted his land to a monastery, the grant was annulled by his overlord before or after his death; if paroikoi abandoned a monastic pronoia for a secular one, which usually offered better

(32) Charanis op.cit. 51-100; Diomedes Βυζαντινὰ Μεγέτια A', 40-60, 72-78; Zakythinos op.cit. 54-56, 87.

(33) Diomedes op.cit. 74-78, 174-211.

(34) Charanis op.cit. 100f.; eiusdem On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 110-7; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 104-5 n. 1, 110, 107 n.1. 133.

terms, the monastery refused to release them (35). Even the very act of pious free donation, which was so frequent, was in fact a further aspect of the policy of land absorption, based on the pious mentality of ecclesiastic or lay **paroikoi**, itself the result of distress and intensive propaganda (36). No anti-monastic policy could seriously shake the monastic power, so that it was quite natural that during the XIV century 200 villages and 50 metochia became monastic properties in northern and central Macedonia (37). The monks and other leading ecclesiastics and Church officials, including the Patriarchs, owned much property in the towns, and especially in Thessalonica (38) and Constantinople (39) as well as in the countryside.

The acquisition of pronioiae by the monasteries and the Church was not the result of any direct victory by the monks or ecclesiastics over the pronoiars, even the hereditary ones, nor of sales by the *σπαριῶται* (40), as is often supposed; the inheritance and sale of pronioiae were always subject to the conditions of the individual imperial chrysobulls or acts under which they were granted. Only the State, as ultimate owner of all pronioiae, could give them to the monasteries; and such as they gave were usually lapsed pronioiae or those which had been reclaimed from their holders (41). All such cases indicated the gradual defeat of the State by the Church.

Bishops, abbots and monks were the real possessors and exploiters of ecclesiastical property, despite theoretical opposition to this (42). Their rapacity has no less than that of the secular landholders (43). Even the practice of philanthropy by monks and ecclesiastics, so widespread in the Byzantine Empire at all times, especially in the towns (44), was in fact another

139; Tafrali Thessalonique 98-103; cf. M.-M IV, 7-9, 13, 19, 23, 25, 29-31.

(35) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 63-68, 98-99, 111, 145; Charanis. On the social structure 98-102. Add M.-M. I, 194-5 (1340) = P.G. 152, 1235-6.

(36) Zakythinos op.cit. 55-56; Diomedes op.cit. 221-3; cf. next chapter nn. 68-72; cf. n.79 in this chapter.

principal source of secular power: The parasitic poor became dependent upon them in every respect. It was the possession of secular power which gave the Church that solid position which prepared her succession to the decaying Byzantine State in later centuries, and particularly under Turkish occupation (45). The Archbishop of Thessalonica was the real master of his town, taking an active part in its politics (46); similarly important was the role of

(37) D. Angelov Rosti Struktura Krupnato Monastirskago Zeemlev-ladenija v Severnos i Srednej Makedonij v XIV v, Viz. Vrem. 11 (1956) 135-162. Cf. I. Dučev's review in B.Z. 50 (1957) 261; cf. E. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker p. 47b.

(38) O. Tafrali Thessalonique, 98-103.

(39) Greg. VI, 5: I, 181-6; VIII, 9: I, 254-262; VIII, 11: I, 269-270.

(40) Except in very rare cases, cf. Ch. I of this Section, n. 58.

(41) Ostrogorsky Fēodalitē 138.

(42) Actes de Chilandar nrs 45-47, 126; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 150-152; Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 153; Actes de Kutlumus nr 6, pp. 46-47 (15/4/1300); nr 9, pp. 53-57 (1313-4); nr 2, pp. 37-40 (1257); nr 54, pp. 44-46 (1292, nr 10, pp. 58-60 (October 1321); nr 11, pp. 60-64 (1322).

(43) Greg. Palamas, in Paris. Gr. 1239 according to Tafrali op. cit. 99; cf. Nicolas Cabasilas ib. 98, 102-3; Diomedes op.cit. 40ff.

(44) Diomedes op.cit. 33, 41 n. 1, 37, 45, 99, 290-298; Tafrali op. cit. 94-95; Ph. Koukoules Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμὸς B', I (1948) 64-178, esp. 87-91, 128-178.

(45) O.H.B.S. 433-4; Tafrali 86; D.H. Papadopoulos Studies and documents relating to the history of the Greek Church and people under Turkish domination (1952) 1-26, 122-158; D.A. Zakythinis Ἡ Ἀλωσις 79; eiusdem Ἡ Τουρκοκρατία (1957) 24-29; Ph. Koukoules Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμὸς B' (1952) 369.

(46) Tafrali Thessalonique 86f: the expulsion of Gregory Palamas by the Zealots in 1347 and by John V in 1351; for his jurisdiction over its countryside see ib. 90-95.

most bishops throughout the empire (47).

c) THE INTERNAL CONFLICT WITHIN
THE CHURCH LAND
SYSTEM

The land system of the Church, being organized like that of the laity, involved similar problems and conflicts of interest within itself. The relation of the lower strata of ecclesiastics to the higher was the same as the relation of paroikoi to land-owners. The prelates and higher officials always came from noble families, enjoyed land revenues and exercised full authority over the paroikian lower priests, monks and other churchmen (48). In the XIVth century Gregory Palamas was the most outstanding example of a nobleman holding high monastic office through which his influence was greatly increased; his monastic friends and supporters in the Hesychast Controversy were also nobles holding high ecclesiastical office (49). Like all landowners and church officials, the higher monks did not work on their lands (i.e. the church or monastic lands) themselves, but lived on the revenue of those lands, which were worked by the paroikian lower clergy. Isolated from manual labour, they developed an extreme avidity for material possessions and a great selfish will to subdue everyone and everything to themselves (50). Quite outspokenly, Gregory Palamas presupposed: "Τά τῆς σωματικῆς ἀναγκαῖα χρεῖας εὐπόριστα τεκαίβρατα ὡς ἂν μὴ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπόρως ἔχοντες ἀναγκάζοιντο περὶ τῆν αὐτῶν συλλογὴν ἀσχολεῖσθαι, τὰ πνευματικά καὶ ἀναγκαιότερα προϊέμενοι" (51); and he even assured his public that the Mother of God had promised him and other Hesychast monks **free** provisions for life in order to release them from bodily needs and cares (52).

(47) Cf. Thiriet *Régestes* I, p.76 nr 271 (2-8 July 1355); p.75, nr 265 (2/1/1353); p.74, nr 263 (9/11/1352); p.86, nr 313 (9-10 June 1356): Patras. Cf. M.-M.V, 67-68: Corcyra. Cf. Greg. XXVI, 14-15: III, 81-82: Heraclea.

(47a) Cf. *infra* n. 172.

(48) Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γ.Παλαμῶν, P.G. 151, 533D, 554C; Neili 'Εγκώμιον Γρηγ.Παλαμῶν, *ib.* 659AB; Paris G2. 1238 f. 282v cited by Tafrafi Thessalonique 173; Cant. III, 17: II, 106-7; III, 72: II, 438-9;

Such theories of course meant idleness, in practice, for the higher monks, and favoured Hesychastic inclinations; but meant for the lower clergy hard labour to produce what was necessary for their exploiting superiors (52a).

Not surprisingly, the mass of lower working monks cherished a hatred for their officials, similar to that of the secular paroikoi for their landlords. From this discontented clergy Barlaam recruited many of his allies for his attacks against the Hesychasts; he attracted many laymen and "many monks, i.e. those, [not some of those], who were not adepts of the Holy Hesychia" (53). These could be only the working paroikian monks, who, as "illiterate" and "simple", were easily seduced by Barlaam's dialectics, because they were not exercised in all these things" (54). Such was the case of John Calecas, the married Patriarch of lower origin and limited education, who had been a paroikian priest of Cantacuzenus, (registered among his 'οἰκεῖοι' or paroikoi) (54a); when he was later enrolled by Cantacuzenus on the rolls of the imperial clergy, he continued to be paid by him, (perhaps as his presumed spy at court), as well as by the emperor, until he was created patriarch by them both (55). But Calecas, by following a

J. Kyparissiotis Expositio, P.G. 152, 888.

(49) Philothei ib. 593B-C, 597-598A, 586A-C; Greg XXIX, 25:III, 239; IX, 10: I, 557.

(50) Philothei op.cit. 574A; Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 62 b-63a; cf. below n.52a.

(51) Philothei op.cit. 571D.

(52) Op. cit. 580A.

(52a) Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11(1957) p.119, 48; E. Herman Die kirchlichen Einkünfte des byz. Niederklerus, OCP 8 (1942) 378-442; cf. FD. in BZ43 (1950) 250.

(53) Philothei op.cit. 585 D-~~B~~.

(54) Tomus contra Barlaam et Acindynum, P.G. 151, 680A; Philothei loc.cit.; Neili op.cit. 668A-B; 665C, 667C, 666C.

(54a) For οἰκεῖος cf. M.-M.IV, 5; cf. Cant. III, 94: II, 579.

(55) Cant. II, 21: J, 431-2; Greg. X, 7: I, 496. Cf. Introduction n. 114.

personal policy, stressed his independence of his masters, and symbolized the hatred and contempt felt by the lower clergy for their lords.

Similar to this was the policy of other illiterate patriarchs created by Andronicus II. Being lower, often married monks or priests (i.e. paroikoi), they were appointed that they might be used by the emperor as his tools (56). Michael VIII, appointing the illiterate patriarchs **Arsenius**(57), Germanus (58) and Joseph (59), found that they opposed his pro-Unionist policy, which was favoured by the learned churchmen (60). After Germanus I (+1258), John Becchus and George of Cyprus were the only educated patriarchs. In opposing George of Cyprus and the learned, therefore noble, ecclesiastics created by him (61), the **Arsenite** and **Josephite** monks and churchmen of popular extraction, (who demanded revenues, posts, and offices) expressed the continuing hatred of the paroikian for the higher clergy. Out of similar ~~motives~~ the patriarch Athanasius (1289-93; 1303-10) an austere uneducated monk, opposed the learned monks who lived lavishly in the towns (62). The pro-monastic policy of John of Sozopolis (1293-1303), a **married** monk and father created Patriarch by Andronicus II, favoured chiefly the lower monks (63); furthermore his attacks on the emperor for fixing high prices for salt and iron (which were under imperial monopoly) indicate that his aim in general was to aid the lower classes against **state** exploitation (63a); the antagonism of the noble clergy toward these policies, in addition to their scorn for his illiteracy, eventually forced him to resign.

(56) Greg. VIII, 3: I, 292; VII, 12: I, 360.

(57) Greg. III, 1: I, 55; III, 3: I, 67; IV, 4: I, 93-95.

(58) Greg. IV, 8: **I**, 107; IV, 5: I, 95.

(59) Greg. IV, 8: I, 107.

(60) Greg. V, 2: I, 129-130; VI, 2: I, 168-170; VI, 4: **I**, 176-180.

(61) Greg. VI, 2: I, 165-7; V, 2: I, 127-8.

(62) Greg. VI, 5: I, 180-6; VI, 7: I, 191-3; VI, 11: **I**, 210; VII, 1: I, 215-7; VII, 9: **I**, 258-9.

(63) Greg. VI, 11: I, 210.

(63a) Zakythinis Crise monétaire 90-91.

The support which Niphon (1312-16), another illiterate monk created Patriarch by Andronicus II, gave to the still existing Arsenites, and his persuading the emperor to allow them to return to the Orthodox Church may have had some relation to his being of the same origins as they. Eventually, however, many of his protégés, not being given the revenues and dignities they demanded, returned to the schismatic sect, and Niphon himself, having proved to be lascivious, a lover of wealth and power, and material-minded was expelled (64). John Glykys (1316-1320), his successor, had been a married lower lay man who had reached the office of "logothetes tou dromou" before being created patriarch by Andronicus II (65); Gerasimus (1320-23) was a naive monk (66), as was Esaias (1323-33), (67), who was succeeded by Calecas (1333-47).

The higher prelates lived ^{on} contributions from their priests, their seignorial rents (68) and the profits they received from the sale of the products of Church lands, from which they gained a large proportion as taxes (68a). They were also entitled to certain receipts during the ordination of clergymen, the so-called "simony", which was abolished by Andronicus II in 1295 and was not revived in the XIVth century, despite the vigorous demands of the prelates and the venerable age of that **practice**(69), which was part of the pattern of exploitation of the lower clergy by the higher (70). Furthermore, the metropolitans, bishops and patriarchs, at least since the Xth or XIth century, were authorized by imperial decrees to receive fixed taxes from the faithful laymen, priests and monasteries - (the κανονικόν); and also to call upon their bishoprics to pay extra contributions when the **see** happened to be

(64) Greg. VII, 9: I, 259-262; VII, 11: I, 269-270; still cf. Th. Magistros Λόγος Προσφωνητικός εἰς τόν Παναγιώτατον Πατριάρχη Νίφωνα , P.G. 145, 393B-396A.

(65) Correspondance de N.Grégoras (Guilland) pp91-97; Greg. VII, 11a: I, 270-1.

(66) Greg. VIII, 3: I, 292.

(67) Greg. VII, 12: I, 360.

(68) Tafrahi op.cit. 90.

(68a) Cf. above n. 25a.

in material difficulties. This *κανονισμός* in particular brought the metropolitans into conflict with the leading abbots and monks, chiefly under Andronicus III, who, in some cases together with the Synod, supported the monks against the encroachments of the metropolitans (71). At other times a conflict of interest might arise between two metropolitans, both claiming the enjoyment of land revenues and the consequent jurisdiction of bishoprics or of even larger areas (72).

Further complications, encroachments and counter-encroachments of jurisdiction and interest arose in the cases of those landlords who, by building monasteries (73) and private chapels (74) on their estates, formed an intermediate class between the high clergy and the secular nobility. Such landlords and their heirs were accustomed to treat the estates revenues and clergy of their monasteries or chapels as their own property; in fact, they treated the domestic clergy as another class of *paroikoi*, and their land as *paroikian* land (75). The synod was opposed to this common practice. While recognizing that the heirs of the founders had the right to improve the estates of their monasteries, and to live in the monasteries themselves and enjoy the revenues, or part of them therefrom, it emphasized the authority of the local bishop over all monasteries, and the autonomy of the monks in dealing with internal problems. Although it further forbade by decree any unrestricted modernization, alteration, domination or disposal of the monasteries and the monks by the founders or their heirs (76),

(69) Cf. Ševčenko op.cit. 145-6; M.-M.II, 114, 294.

970) Ševčenko op.cit. § 47, § 49, pp. 138-9.

(71) Ševčenko op.cit. pp. 147-150 (year 1336); M.-M.I, nr LXXXIX p.191= P.G.152,1233-5 (1339); M.-M.I,555-7 (before 1347); M.-M.I, nr XCVIII, pp.221-6 (1341)= P.G. 152, 1256-1260; M.-M.I, nrs CII-CIII, pp. 231-2 (12242, 1343)= P.G.152, 1223-4. For the *κανονισμός* cf. Ševčenko op.cit. 115-6; Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker, p.58.

(72) M.-M. I, nr XCVII, pp.216-221= P.G.152, 1253-6. For other similar possibilities see Nic. Cabasilas in Ševčenko op.cit.pp.112-9, §§ 38-48.

(73) M.-M.IV, 396-9 (1271); M.-M.I, nr XCVIII, pp.221-6=P.G.152, 1256-1260.

yet these founders and heirs retained the right to transfer their monasteries to other, usually larger, ones.

The royal family itself possessed several monasteries, most of which had been granted them by the emperor, but some of which they had themselves founded and in which they sought shelter in times of crisis (77). Like ordinary monasteries, even these royal ones were not immune from encroachments by other nobles on their rights or lands (78).

Even the lesser clergy and laity might possess hereditary monasteries (μετόχια), but perhaps more than the greater monks they could not avoid submission to the local bishop, or absorption by bigger monasteries. Although they could improve their monasteries, as being their own property, they could not usually alienate them, except to the Church, or sell them or grant them (79). Evidently we have here to deal with an intermediate class, between paroikoi and "free" men, which can be distinguished only with difficulty; a kind of small holder which we shall discuss in the following chapter. Unlike these were the paroikoi of the State, or "free" paroikoi, who, it seems, on donating their lands to a monastery, became monastic paroikoi, in the same manner as State paroikoi, on subjecting themselves to lay landowners, became their paroikoi (80)

(74) Cant. III, 15: II, 96; cf. E. Herman *Chiese Private diritto di fondazione negli ultimisecoli dell'impero bizantino*, OCP 12 (1946) 302-321; cf. F.D. in BZ 43 (194) 504.

(75) Cf. M.-M.I, nr XCVIII, pp.221-6(1341). Cf. above, n.55, and below, n.81.

(76) M.-M.I, nr XCVIII, pp.221-6(1341); P.G.152, 1223-6, Indict. XI, Febr.; cf. M.-M. I, nrs CII (1342) and CIII (1343), pp.231-2.

(77) E.g. see A. Guillouf *Les Archives de Ménécée* pp.142-4: Chrysobull of Dušan, 1/10/1955-20/12/1355. Cf. M.-M.I, nr. XXXVI, pp. 312-7 (1351), and R. Guillard *Οἱ Βυζαντινοὶ αὐτοκράτορες καὶ τὸ θέλημα τῶν Μοναστηρίων*, EEBΣ 21 (1951).

(78) M.-M.I, nr XXXVI, pp.312-7.

(79) P.G.152, 1223-4, Febr., Indict. XI (sineanno). Cf. Guillouf op. cit

Those landowners who possessed private Chapels were, at least to a great extent, masters as well of the clergy and estates attached thereto. (81), although we must suppose at least a partial dependence of such clergy upon the local bishops. Indeed, all public churches and monasteries, together with their estates and clergy, were to a certain extent dependent upon the landowner on whose land they stood, as well as upon their respective bishop (82).

In conclusion, we may say that ecclesiastical overlords regarded all men connected with their estates, both clergy and laity, primarily as economic units, in the same manner as lay lords regarded their tenants, and that this view was shared by the tenants themselves. That is to say that each, according to his position in the hierarchy, had an economic function to fulfil. Between the ecclesiastical and lay hierarchy there was no sharp dividing line; all were part of the general pattern of the economic hierarchy of the landholding system.

cit. pp.131-2, esp. 131 n.3 (1346). Cf. the small paroikoi Genikiotae = M.-M.IV, 265-6 (s. a. = XIII century). Cf. D. Angelov Krupnoto manastirskavo etc., Glaznik na Inst. za natz. ist. 1, 2 (1957) p. 84; cf. above n. 36.

(80) E.g. see the case of the Planetae: M.-M.IV, pp.67, 25, 71, 74-75, 86-88 (between 1242-1257); P. Charanis. On the social structure, BS 12 (1951), 124-5; cf. next chapter nn. 51-52.

(81) E.g. Calecas, who belonged to Cantacuzenus' clergy, was his οἰκεῖος = παροικος : Cant. II, 21:I, 431-2. Cf. nn. 75, 54a and 55.

(82) M.-M.IV, 36-40 (1234-7); Ostrogorsky Feodalitè 43-44, 75-76. Cf. Section B, ch. I, passim.

SECTION A, CHAPTER III.

THE PAROIKIAN POPULATION.

The term paroikoi included the vast majority of the peasant population in the last centuries of Byzantium. At least since the X - XI centuries, the State, in its effort to "protect" the small holders against the encroachments of the big landowners, i.e. to secure its revenues from their taxes, transformed them into State paroikoi and their lands into State lands. But they continued to be attached to their lands as before (1).

Both those peasants who had become dependent on great landlords and those who lived on state-owned lands were generally called paroikoi and were all in the same way dependent on their masters. Those on State lands; the paroikoi demosiaroi (2) were liable to the State for taxes. Such lands as we said, were usually granted as pronioiae or as patrimonial estates to the nobility or to monasteries. In such cases the paroikoi who were found on those lands were transferred with part or all of their taxes to their new lords and became dependent on them for as long as the lands-in-question were still assigned to them (3). The paroikoi of pronioiae were dependent on their masters in the sense that they paid part or all of their taxes to them, were at least in part

(1) G. Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 12-24, 25ff., 69. E.g. M. - M.IV 38 (1234-7), 331-333 (1274); Ostrogorsky Féodalité 67-70, 108-7; Diomedes Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται A', 42 n. 2, 37f. 44ff.

(2) Fr. Doelger Ein Fall slavischer Einsiedlung in Hinterland von Thessalonike im X Jhrdt, Sitzunber, Bayer. Akad; Histor.Klass, 1952, 4, 1, 11 A1 = J. Karajannopulos' review of Paysannerie in B.Z. 50 (1957) 171, 167-173. The term demosiaroi alone meant either free or enslaved peasants who owed a tax to the State.

(3) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 77-78; XIII century, eiusdem Paysannerie 15-24. The immunities granted to landlords on such lands and on the taxes of their paroikoi prove that both land and paroikoi ultimately belonged to the State.

judged by them or their men in cases of dispute among themselves, and were protected by them against the encroachments of outsiders; still they were not tenant peasants in the sense applied to the term in the classical Byzantine times (4), though their degree of dependence on their lords was not absolute, because they retained some of the rights of free peasants.

By the XIII and XIV centuries paroikoi with or without land allotments are found everywhere, on both pronoria and patrimonial lands (5). They lived on a different level from their lords and followed a long family tradition in their professional specialisation, as for example, νομικοί, ἱερεῖς, νοτάριοι, γυναιχοί, ἀγροπάροικοι. They formed a society apart from their lords (6), which was graded into κρείττους, μέσοι and lower, according to their economic and social status (7).

Most of these grades had their lands and other possessions such as animals or houses, and paid taxes for them or, in rare cases, discharged personal services also and made gifts in kind to their lords. In the latter category were included the ἀτελεῖς πάροικοι, who only owed service to their lords by virtue of imperial order or other arrangement. These were distinct from the τέλει πάροικοι, who owed taxes in the first place, and services too, if the latter were demanded (8). However, it seems that a corvée of 12 or sometimes 52 days' work a year on their lords' lands was due by all sorts of paroikoi in all estates in the XIII century; similarly all paroikoi who held land, paid several taxes in kind in that same century.

(4) P. Charanis On the social structure of the later Roman empire, B 17 (1944-5) 42, 44; eiusdem Monastic Properties, DOP 4 (1948) 89-90. Cf. Ch. I, a) of this Section, and Ch. II, a) nn. 26-29 of the same Section.

(5) Cf. Section A, Ch. II nn. 3-5.

(6) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 75-78; cf. D. Angelov Zur abh_{ängiger} Bevölkerung in Makedonien im XIV Jhdt (in Bulg.), Istor. Pregled 13 (1957) 30-66; cf. F.D. B.Z. 50 (1957) 534.

(7) Ostrogorsky Féodalité ib. and 79, 80, 86, 238; M. - M. IV, 80-84 (1251); 12 (1235); 128 (end of XIII century); F.D. BZ 26 (1926) 109; Doelger Lavrauskunden, BZ 39 (1939) 60; 43 (1943) 154; Zakythinon Crise monétaire 64f.

(8) M. - M. VI, 254-5 (1321); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 66.

But both taxes in kind and services, in the XIV century were, as a rule, commuted into money taxes (9). Only the monastic paroikoi continued to pay their taxes very frequently in kind, as is seen from monastic praktika of the XIV century (10), apparently because the monasteries conserved and developed a rather closed economy. On the other hand a monetary economy prevailed in these secular estates because of the tendency of the secular landowners to live in the towns, where they needed money despite its depreciation (11). Thus the paroikoi of the secular estates had to sell their produce for money, and so became involved with foreign and Greek traders (12). Of course the lowest ranks of paroikoi who had no land could not have such experiences.

These lowest ranks included the δουλοπάροικοι, the δουλευται and the μίσθιοι, who had no land and worked only their masters' land. The first possessed simply a παροικικὸν ζευγάριον (yoke of oxen), while the second and third class used their masters' yoke (δουλικὸν ζευγάριον) (13). All three classes were called also ἀκτῆμονες and all had fiscal obligations to their masters because they worked their lands (14). At the bottom were the ξένοι or ἐλεύθεροι, i.e. landless and untaxed paroikoi, ἀνεπίγνωστοι τῶν δημοσίων = not registered in the public fiscal rolls, who were at the direct service of their lords (15). These were usually drawn from

(9) M.-M. IV, 182 (s.a.); III, 10-101 (1324); Arnakis Οἱ πρῶτοι Ὀθωμανοὶ 49; Zakythinos op.cit.64-70. Cf. the Praktikon of Michael Monomachus, Ostrogorsky Féodalité 112-120 and Appendix I of this chapter.

(10) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 115-6, 350, 365.

(11) Cf. Chapter II nn. 25-25a, Section A. Cf. D. Angelov Anti-feodalik dviženija b Trakija i Makedonija prez sredata na XIV bek, Istor. Pregled VIII 4/5/ (1951-2) 440. He thinks that this change was related to the expansion of trade and the internal market: Werner op.cit.78a-79b .

(12) Zakythinos op.cit. 69.

(13) Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 7071; Féodalité 162 n.1; Charanis On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 143f; E.g. δουλευται :M.-M.VI, 214 (1263); 182 (1221); 260 (1497); M.-M. V, 11 (1259), 259 (1263).

freed prisoners of pirates, wandering dispossessed small holders and destitute paroikoi who were compelled by need to subject themselves under heavy terms, which tended to bind them to their masters' land. Because they were untaxed, the eleutheroi were less expensive for their masters, who competed with one another and with the monasteries to acquire them (15a).

The acquisition of new paroikoi by the big landlords was usually restricted by the State at the time of the Lascarids and the Palaiologi to that of eleutheroi, certainly because of the scarcity and high value of agricultural labour (16), but also to some extent because of the State's wish to avoid losing taxes through such acquisitions (17). For the protection of landowners, the passing of paroikoi in general from one domain to another was also prohibited (18), because the landowners had organised a constant demand especially for eleutheroi. These were getting more scarce as the Empire's boundaries diminished (19) and as the State wanted to keep as many of these eleutheroi on its lands as possible (20) in order to turn them into normal tax-paying paroikoi

(14) B.Z. 43 (1950) 154: Four praktika of Xenophon dated between 1300-1338 by Fr. Doelger.

(15) Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 69-70; Charanis op.cit. 138-143; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 64, 69.

(15a) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 341f.; Werner op.cit. p. 50a.

(16) This is Ostrogorsky's view: Paysannerie 31-37; Zakythinos op.cit. 36, 73.

(17) This is Karajannopoulos' view in his review of Ostrogorsky's Paysannerie, B.Z. 50, (1957) 174-177. The paroikoi granted by Alexius I to his soldiers were state-owned, hence tax-paying ones: Ostrogorsky Féodalité 28-29.

(18) M.-M. V, 83 (1319: privileges to Jannina); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 37-38, 68; cf. M.-M. VI, 215 (1263).

(19) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 38-40; M.-M. IV, 248 (mid XIII century) VI, 215 (1263); cf. Zakythinos op.cit. 36.

(20) Actes de Chilandar nr 30 (1314).

by registering them in its fiscal rolls. Yet the land-owners often managed to keep the status and increase the number of their *eleutheroi*, though the latter could apply for their registration, if they wanted (21), which involved their lords in expense.

If the *paroikoi* had not completed a period of 30 years in a domain, - after which they could not normally be evicted (22), - they belonged to the category of *προσκαθήμενοι*, who were usually untaxed *eleutheroi* and had not a "dominium utile" over their lots; this "dominium utile" was the main element of the status of the *κτηματῖαι* or landed *paroikoi* and distinguished them from the free peasants of the previous centuries, who had a "dominium directum" over their lands (23).

From the XI century the normal *κτηματῖαι παροῖκοι* were always enumerated with their lands (24). They could be *ζευγαράτοι*, who possessed one yoke of oxen, or *διπλοζευγαράτοι*, who possessed two yokes, or *βοιδάτοι*, who possessed only one ox, and all possessed land usually ranging between 100 and 200 *modioi*, that is from 20 to 40 arable acres (25). The variations of their possessions were reflected in variations of their revenues and their tax obligations, as well as of their economic and social status in general. Such variations are to be studied in many *praktika* which have survived (26).

The usual relation of tax to land was 1 hyperpyron to 50 *modioi* of land and one (*ζευγάριον* =) yoke to 100 *modioi* of land (27). But the *paroikoi* of the monastic estates usually paid more taxes than those of the *pronoia* lands and lived in relative poverty. This was due to the better conditions which existed on

(21) M.-M. VI, 390 (1307); M.-M.V, 89-90 (1318): They could be registered in a "praktikon".

(22) M.-M. IV, 37 (1234-7).

(23) Charanis op.cit. 140-142; M.- M.I, 428 (1366); VI, 255 (1321); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 66-67, 63; Actes de Kutlumus 11, 30, p.63 (1322); Karajannopulos artic. cit. 180; Zakythinos op.cit. 64.

(24) Ostrogorsky op. cit. 69.

(25) Charanis op.cit. 140-2; A. Andreades Deux livres récents sur les finances Byzantins, BZ 28 (1928) 287-323; see also Ostro-

the military pronoiae, which were generally favoured by the State in order to yield better military service, and which therefore were carved out of the most fertile soil and supported more paroikoi. When a pronoia was transferred to a monastery, the taxes on it were increased from $1\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyra paid by pronoia paroikoi, to $2\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyra, the usual rate paid by the monastic paroikoi (28).

However, as a result of various devices on the part of the landlords, the paroikoi had usually to pay far more than the amount fixed by the State. The pronoiar Michael Monomachus received another 34 hyperpyra besides the $50\frac{1}{2}$ officially assigned to him, so in total received $84\frac{1}{2}$; the 34 came from unofficial taxes on the salt-pits near Chandax (18 hyperpyra) and on the boats and the port of both his two villages Chandax and Nision ($15\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyra). In these illegal overtaxations Monomachus was helped by the imperial πρωτοκυνηγός και ἀπογραφεὺς John Vatatzis no doubt in return for a bribe, as was customary (29).

Most controversial points arise in connection with the rights and obligations, and the degree and nature of dependence of the paroikoi on their lords and their position in the general pattern of interdependences, which characterised medieval society (30).

To begin with, the paroikian status was inherited only by the heirs to the land, and not by the other children of the paroikoi. Yet there is no doubt that the majority of the children of the

gorsky Féodalité 259-368.

(26) Cf. Appendix I of this chapter; Werner op.cit. 49a-50b; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 259-368.

(27) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 119, 140.

(28) Op. cit. 119, 144.

(29) Op. cit. 119-121; Greg. XIV, 11: II, 141 for Vatatzis' illegalities; cf. R. Guiland Vénalité et Favoritisme à Byzance, RÉB 10 (1952) 35-46. Add D. Cydonès Correspondance (Loenertz) I, Propylæum II, τῷ βασιλεὶ Ἰωάννῃ τῷ Παλαιολόγῳ, Constantinopoli, 1371 autumn, p. 15, ll. 33-36, §10; pp. 16-17, 20-22.

(30) Zakythinos Processus de Féodalisation 6f. (:1303, 1341, 1342); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 74.

paroikoi had no other choice but to be enrolled in some class of paroikoi, this being more probably, in the beginning of their career, the class of the land-less eleutheroi or some other one approaching it. The paroikoi were not always required to live in the village where they had been registered: they could move with the permission of their lord, provided they discharged their obligations (31). With the exception of their lowest classes who were represented by their masters, the paroikoi could appear in court as juridic persons in a dispute (32). They could also acquire land of their own (33), even land from their lords (34), in addition to their paroikian land. In such cases the paroikoi belonged to the special category of ὑποστατικοί, i.e. they were considered to have double status: concerning their paroikian lot they were paroikoi, while concerning their γονικὴ or personally owned land they were freeholders (35). From this followed the fundamental fact that the paroikoi could sell to their lord only their personal, patrimonial land and never their paroikian parcels (36), which ultimately belonged to their lords and through them to the State. The paroikoi could sell their personal lands without the permission of their lords; similarly they could sell their paroikian parcels normally without (37), but sometimes, rather rarely,

(31) Some paroikoi lived in Smyrna as artisans, but were considered as paroikoi, since they could fulfil their obligations: M.-M.IV, 2-3 (1228); cf. 20 (1235); 24 (1251); 261-2 (1244); F. Doelger Sechs Byzant. Praktika, p. 119, l. 235; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 65-68.

(32) M. - M. IV, 212-4 (1262); M.-M.IV, 92 (1283); M.-M.IV, 36-40 (1234-7); op.cit. of Ostrogorsky 43-45; cf. Chapter II of this Section, n. 9.

(33) M.-M.IV, 13 (1235), 198 (1232); Charanis On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 138.

(34) M.-M.IV, 60-61 (1231); Ostrogorsky op.cit. 55-56.

(35) Doelger Schatzkammern pp. 57, 189; eiusdem Sechs byz.Praktika 6, 21; cf. the Archontitzae in M.-M. IV, 391-409 (1271); Werner op.cit. 50a; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 64.

(36) Karajannopoulos in B.Z.50, 178-9, n.45; E.g. M.-M.IV, 192-3 (1236); Ostrogorsky Féodalité 68-71.

with their lords' permission (38). This permission seems to have been indispensable in cases of sale of a part of a lord's patrimonial estate by the occupying paroikoi (39) because this land was not his own, like the pronoiatic or State land, but was patrimonially owned by his lord. Also the sale of a paroikian land was apparently inadvisable, if not illegal after the completion of the 30 - year period which was necessary for a peasant to become paroikos (40), especially as the lord could easily transgress the law and turn him out of his land (41).

In all cases of sales of paroikian land, pronoiatic or patrimonially - owned by a great lord, the basic element of the sale, that constantly presupposed the approval of the lord, was the stipulation of the epiteleia (42), an annual tax paid by the buyer to the master of the paroikos for the payment of the seller's obligations to the fiscal authorities or to his master. If the property sold was exempted from taxation, the epiteleia went into the pocket of the seller's master (43). In fact no permission was needed in such sales in so far as the initial epiteleia was sure to be regularly paid by the new purchaser, whoever he might be. The epiteleia in this respect emphasises the strong monetary character of Byzantine economy, even in its rural transactions and the importance attached by both landowners and State to the colle-

(37) M.-M. IV, 167f. (s.a.: 2nd half of XIII century); 231 (1293) Charanis op.cit. 128-9; Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 44-45.

(38) Actes d' Esphigmenou, 7-8, nr 4 (1301); Doelger Pinanzverwaltung 67; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 47-48. This is the only case which implies such permission according to Ostrogorsky.

(39) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 69. Cf. below n.87.

(40) Karajannopulos' review of Paysannerie, BZ 50 (1957) 178 n. 4 M.-M. IV, 192-3 (1236); M.-M. IV, 3966-9 (1271); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 64.

(41) Cf. infra n. 4f.

(42) M.-M. IV, 134-5 (1232); Ostrogorsky op.cit. 57,63,68; M.-M. IV, 84-85, 131-2 (s.a.), 92-93 (1283): The $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ Scoullatos was rewarded by John bishop of Smyrna with a parcel of land, but he had to pay annually $\frac{1}{4}$ hyperpyron; when his descendants later sold it, the purchaser, Lembiotissa, had to pay an epiteleia of 4 Koukkia,

ction of their revenues in money. Furthermore the epiteleia irrefutably proves that, even if the paroikos had in some ways the right of free disposal of their paroikian lands, in fact these were not theirs, though they were registered in their names and were used by them; the paroikoi were always under some obligation to the State, as the ultimate owner of their lands, or to their lord, who had taken the place of the State (44).

A lord had the right of preemption on the land of his paroikoi and he normally intervened when it was in danger of being usurped by somebody else (45) in order to "protect" it; but, in spite of his right of preemption, he did not intervene when the land of his paroikoi was sold (46). The reason for this contradiction seems to be that usurpation would mean loss of his paroikos' land as a tax paying property (47), whereas sale meant simply a change of the person who paid the epiteleia. It was for this reason that the lord often exploited the sale of his paroikos' land to get a higher rate of epiteleia and he used all his influence to that end (48). Consequently the sales effected by his paroikoi did ultimately concern him as a source of profit and the purchases effected by them pleased him as transactions from which he could derive more revenue if the lands purchased came under his control, as usually happened (49).

until it exchanged it for another parcel of a pronoiia.

(43) Hélène Glykatzi L'Épitéleia dans le Cartulaire de Lemviotissa, B 25 (1954) (app. 1955-6) 71-93. Cf. F.D. (Doelger's) review in B.Z. 49 (1956) 501-2; Doelger Finanzverwaltung 55; eiusdem Schatzkammern Nr 33.

(44) M.-M. IV, 77-79 (1232).

(45) M.-M. IX, 130 (1283); Cf. nn. 74-75 infra.

(46) M.-M. IV, 84-85, 92-93 (1283).

(47) This seems to have affected in the end both the pronoiatic and patrimonial lands of the paroikoi, since their patrimonial lands too almost always became to some extent dependent on their masters and they themselves owed them at least some of their taxes. The loss of a pronoiatic - paroikian land would also mean a breach of the lord's obligation to the State to preserve the integrity of his pronoiia; cf. Féodalité 80-81, 104.

This phenomenon certainly belongs to the whole process of subjection of the paroikoi and limitation of their freedom. One further trait of this limitation was that they could never become free of their obligations. In this they differed from the few slaves of that time, who could be liberated by their masters (50), though their social and economic status was not enormously different (51). Also despite the principle that the paroikoi had stable tenure of their lands (52), they were often so dependent on their masters that the latter could evict them from their paroikian lands even when they had completed the legal 30 years of tenancy and could treat them in a very capricious manner (53). Furthermore, the paroikoi inherited certain military obligations from the time when they had been freeholders, implied in the grant of the old small *στρατεῖαι*. These obligations were transferred from the State to the pronoiars and landowners, with the result that the paroikoi became militarily dependent on them also (54).

At least the lower categories of paroikoi could be given away like cattle, with or without land, especially in the last centuries (55), and personal subjection to their lords was in fact widespread (56). They were often at their lord's disposal (57), and though sometimes they resisted an "illegal" situation which

(48) Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 61-62.

(49) Cf. n. 47 above.

(50) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 72-74.

(51) The *δουλοπαροικία* had after all the same economic results as those which slavery produced in ancient societies.-

(52) Cf. above nn. 4, 22-23: "dominium utile". Cf. n. 62.

(53) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 64; M.-M. IV, 396-9 (1271); cf. infra n.41. -

(54) Cf. Section A, Chapter II, nn. 16-21.

(55) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 64-65 = M.-M. IV, 236 (1261); Viz.Vrem. 6 (1898) 449; Actes de Chilandar nr 30 = Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 21 (1314); Actes de Kutlumis nrs 14, 7 (1328); nr. 6 (1343); M.-M.VI, 254-5 (Sept. 1321); M.-M.I, 482 (1366). - Nic.Choniates (Bonn) 272-3 mentions donations of paroikoi by Alexius I (1081-1118) to his soldiers (=pronoiars); cf. Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 28-29.

(56) Cf. above and M. - M. IV, 414-6 (1272).

affected them, - which proves that they had a certain degree of legal knowledge, at least of the common law relating to them, - in the end they could not avoid being treated by their lord according to his whims (58).

The paroikoi's primary obligations to their lords came to be financial ones. The cases of paroikoi who lived in towns, but whose lands were situated in the country, fully confirm this view (59). Only in cases of financial exhaustion were the paroikoi tied to the land and such dependence was secondary, being a result of financial dependence. Such cases were moreover infrequent (60).

The most important remnant of the freedom of paroikoi was their right to buy and sell. This was substantially limited by the plain fact that, especially when landless, they rarely had enough money to buy a holding; - on the contrary in later centuries they more frequently became progressively subjected to their lords. Even when they managed to buy, or in any other way to acquire land, they could not become exclusively freeholders and release themselves from their paroikian status for that reason alone (61), though they were tenants and masters of their holdings (62). Their right of

(57) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 89-91; cf. previous chapter nn. 30-31.

(58) E.g. M.-M. VI, 254-5 (1321, Sept.); cf. Ostrogorsky op.cit. 275ff. = Paysannerie 21, 66.

(59) This is also true of paroikoi who had lands in several different places, and of the ὑποστατικοί.

(60) Only in such cases was the attachment of paroikoi to the soil really valid, cf. Diomedes Βυζαντινοὶ Μελέται A', pp.39 n.2, 36; ib. Appendices Γ' and Δ', pp. 216-223; cf. L. Bréhier Vie et Mort de Byzance I (1948) 596: "Parèques = paysans libres ou non, attachés à un domain"; this attachment now proves not always necessary; cf. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker p. 49a-b; cf. infra n.110.

(61) E.g. M.-M. IV, 84-85, 92-9; 131-2 (1283): the case of Scullatos, cf. above n.42: the heirs of Scullatos and the buyers of his land continued to pay taxes to the church of Smyrna, which had given him that land, as was usual for paroikian lands. Cf. M.-M.IV, 60-61 (1231); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 55-56; cf. 51-52.

(62) Cf. above nn. 4, 52, 22-23; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 62-64; Charanis On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 142.

free sale does not in itself prove that the paroikoi possessed a freehold status (63), given that their lord was interested only in securing the epiteleia and not in who would be the tenant of his land, as we have said (64).

Still there are certain cases which point to the existence of certain further traces of sui generis freedom incorporated in the status of many peasants. These have given rise to the theory of the survival of freeholders in the later centuries, which we shall examine briefly here, by studying some concrete examples.

The priest John Poleas of Mantaia and his son both sold 30 hereditary olive-trees to Myzithras in 1259; the Poleases paid their taxes directly to the State and not to a landowner, while Myzithras had to pay a yearly epiteleia of $1\frac{1}{2}$ nomisma to them and not to any landowner - their master - or to the State (65). Since no landlord is mentioned as interested in the stipulation of the epiteleia, or in the sale, the Poleases appear to have been free-peasants, though in this case freedom can only mean that they were no subject to a landowner. But their direct fiscal obligations to the State show that they belonged to the wider class of State-owned paroikoi (παροικοὶ δημοσίων) rather than to a distinct free peasantry, unless we consider these obligations as an insufficient testimony to their paroikian status, since such obligations are always incumbent on all adults in any State.

However when John Poleas appeared somewhat later as paroikos of the landowner Syrgaris, he demanded back 10 of the sold trees, apparently under the pressure of his lord, who would expect a paroikian revenue from them at some time if they returned to the

(63) Cf. M.-M. IV, 231 (1293); Charanis op.cit. 128-9; Ostrogorsky op.cit. 44-45: The Neochoritae sell freely, but still are paroikoi.

(64) Cf. above nn. 37-48. -

(65) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 75-76.

possession of his paroikos. So John Poleas' case illustrates the passage from the freehold or State-paroikos' status to that of paroikos under a landowner and on the other hand that the State's overlordship on the peasantry would never have reached such an extent of intervention in their transactions as the landowners did; therefore the paroikoi of the State were allowed more freedom by it and approached more to the status of the freeholders.

Levounis and his wife and son, who sold to Chilandar a small parcel of land on Strymon in 1307 as a patrimonial estate (γρονική γῆ), seem to have been of a status equivalent to that of the Poleases, i.e. free or State-owned peasants (66). Their holdings were considerably smaller than those of the smaller pronoiars of 1272 or 1342 (67), so they are excluded from being small pronoiars. Similarly the Planetae of Mantaia: these, when one of them became a monk at Lembiotissa in 1242, gave $\frac{1}{2}$ of their hereditary land to Lembiotissa, bequeathed the rest to it and undertook to pay the monastery a tax that would be paid by the latter to the fiscal authorities, without as yet owing it any paroikian taxes proper or becoming the monastery's paroikoi: the Planetae only wanted the monastery's protection (68) and therefore seemed certainly to have been in the transitional stage from the status of free or State-peasant to that of monastic paroikoi. Indeed, while in 1242 the Planetae were not yet paroikoi under any lord, from the year 1251 they appear as paroikoi of Lembiotissa (69). Both the bequest and the donation appear as free acts and involved neither State confirmation nor any lord's approval; this may point to the fact that the Planetae were free peasants. But their fiscal obligations to the State (epiteleia) show them to be State-paroikoi, like Poleas and Levounis. The absence of any State intervention in their acts proves that, if we consider their patrimonial

(66) Op.cit. 133; Actes de Chilandar nrs 24, 14.

(67) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 124-5, 96; 24-36 hyperpyra were the revenues of the pronoiar of 1272, and 10-12 of those of 1342.

(68) M.-M. IV, 67 (1242), 71 (1251), 87 (1257) 89 (s.a.); Charanis op.cit. 124-5; Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 58-59.

(69) M.-M. IV, 25 (1251); 74-75 (1255); 86-87 (1257).

lands as ultimately State-owned and the Planetae as State-paroikoi the State, like the landowners, was primarily interested in the revenues to be secured from its lands in money rather than in their actual holder. While, as we noticed, this freedom brought the State-owned paroikoi nearer to the status of free peasants (70), on the other hand it meant relaxation or even absence of State control over its paroikoi and its lands, which led to the easy passage of both under the control of the big landowners, secular or ecclesiastic. Even if we accept the possibility that some or all the Planetae became paroikoi of Lembiotissa only in respect of the land which they granted to it while they remained free in respect of the part which they kept (71), there is no doubt that the ultimate fate of all such donators was paroikia, i.e. subjection to a lord (72).

Further cases lead to similar conclusions while revealing some more aspects of paroikia. A parcel of patrimonial land of Koutoulis, who was paroikos of Lembiotissa evidently by virtue of another or other parcels of paroikian land (73), was usurped by Keramaris, the notary (paroikos) of Gabalas. During several stages of the conflict that followed, both opponents used Cuman help to recover the parcel from each other; but after Koutoulis' death (1283) and apparently because he had no heirs, Lembiotissa intervened and recovered it from the son of Keramaris (74). It is doubtful whether the monastery would have done so if Koutoulis had had an heir to his patrimonial land. The absence of State intervention to recover this heirless land (if we accept with Ostrogorsky, that the patrimonial lands and their peasant owners were State-owned and paroikian) was perhaps due to the same reason which was given in connection with the Planetae: that the

(70) Karajanopoulos in B.Z.50, (1952) 179 holds firmly that the *γονικαὶ γαῖαι* were really *γονικαί*, i.e. patrimonial.

(71) I.e. they became *ὑποστατικοί*, cf. n. 35 above.

(72) Cf. nn. 35-37 of the previous chapter.

(73) I.e. he was also *ὑποστατικός*, cf. n. 71 above.

(74) M. - M.IV, 130 (1283) Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 51-52, cf.46, and Feodalité 68-71; J. Karajanopoulos in BZ 50 (1957) 178-9; cf.n. 45 above.

State was primarily concerned with securing its taxes rather than with the actual holder of its lands. Therefore a relaxation of rules followed, which the lords of the paroikoi exploited to obtain gradually more rights over both the paroikoi and their lands. It was thus that the landowners obtained the right of preemption (75).

Similarly the pronoiar Petritztes reclaimed in 1257 10 olivetrees from Lembiotissa to which they had been bequeathed by one of his paroikoi only after the death of this paroikos, who apparently had no heirs (76). One further step was the "illegal sale" of paroikian land by the Gounaropouloi to their pronoiar (1236). This sale was retroactively forbidden because (77): the lands were paroikian and therefore could not be sold by their tenants to anybody, according to Karajannopoulos (78), or to their pronoiar only, according to Ostrogorsky (79). Karajannopoulos' theory, however, seems strange in the light of our established conclusion that, once the epiteleia was paid the pronoiars and the State did not mind who might hold the land, while the State certainly had every reason to maintain the pronoiatic status of its paroikian lands and to avert their patrimonial appropriation by landowners through purchases from their paroikoi: Indeed Ostrogorsky's view is proved reasonably sound by the remark of the imperial decree of 1236 that the lands - in - question had not been sold to the pronoiar, - which was illegal -, but forcefully usurped by him, and that the act of sale was false and had been forged later to give a legal façade to that illegal appropriation (77). This indirectly but clearly points out that a paroikian land could be legally sold, except to its pronoiar.

Of the status of *ὑποστατικοί* seem to have been the paroikoi Archontitzae of Nicolas Maliasenus in Thessaly: After the latter founded the Nea Mone on the former's land, he decided to buy it "out of humanity" from them, though "he could simply have taken it, if he had wanted", since it belonged to a territory that had been granted to the Maliasenoi as *γονικὴ γῆ* by the Emperor (80).

(75) Cf. above n. 45. Cf. M.-M. I, 38-39, nr. XX, s.a.: the case of the widow of Sagittas.

(76) M.-M. IV, 69-72.- (77) M.-M. IV, 192-3.

But in other cases the Maliasenoi relentlessly bought from their poor peasants their patrimonial lands at the lowest prices, when the latter were unable to maintain them and preferred to buy instead an ox or a pair of oxen, with which to till either the rest of their own lands or those of their masters (81). The sale of their hereditary lands by the Archontitzae proves that they were *ὑποστατικοί* and that they tended to lose the free part of this status and become mere paroikoi or *δουλευταί*. As a matter of fact only four of the peasants in question called Maliasenoi their masters (82). Michael Archontitzes in one case calls them *κύριοι καὶ σὺθένται* (83), but in another one he does not (84). This was not a meaningless formality, but expressed the fact that in part they were paroikoi of Maliasenoi, by virtue of their paroikian lands; but in part they were free, by virtue of their patrimonial lands, i.e. they were *ὑποστατικοί* (85). But the land on which the Moné had been built had belonged previously to the Komnenoi, forefathers of the wife of Nic. Maliasenos (86), so it was a patrimonial land of the latter. On that the Archontitzae were paroikoi,

(78) B.Z. 30 (1957) 178 n. 45. The Gounaropouloi were paroikoi of Pantokrator (M.-M. IV, 13: 1225; M.-M. IV, 187-8: 1228), then of Lembiotissa (M.-M. IV, 3: 1228). John Gounaropoulos appears in 1235 as paroikos of Lembiotissa; but not in 1281 (Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 46-47), which however may well mean that he was paroikos to somebody else rather than that he became free.

(79) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 67-68; cf. 80-81, 104; Paysannerie 46-47; Charanis On the social structure, BS 12 (1951), 48-102; cf. above, n. 36.

(80) M.-M. IV, 397-8 (1271); (81) M.-M. IV, 391-411 (1271).

(82) M.-M. IV, 408, 411, 397, 401; Karajannopoulos B.Z. 50 (1957) 178-9; Ostrogorsky in Paysannerie 54 says that all the peasants of n. 81 called Maliasenoi their lords.

(83) M.-M. IV, 397 (1271).

(84) Karajannopoulos ib.

(85) F. Doelger in B.Z. 49 (1956) 501-502.

(86) M.-M. IV, 397 (1271); Karajannopoulos op.cit. 199-180.

but that land was not State land or pronouia, though it had been such before it was granted by the Emperor. Therefore the paroikoi on it and their holdings belonged closely to and were under the direct mastery of their lords, who could claim their land back from their paroikoi (87). It is only thus that we can explain the "a posteriori" purchase of the land on which the Moné was built and its appellation as *δικαία πράξις*.

Other cases show the possibility of a multiple function of some paroikoi. The peasants Genikotae, who donated a monastery situated on their land to Lembiotissa (88), appear to have been collective possessors of it, but this does not prove that they were also free peasants, because we know of other collective holdings of land by paroikoi (89). Of other peasant collective possessors of land, some were paroikoi of one lord and other not so (90), though the latter would possibly have been paroikoi of another not mentioned lord rather than free and if free they were State paroikoi. Even one and the same peasant could have been a paroikos of two lords at the same time (91), and members of the same paroikian family could have belonged to two or more different lords (92).

Further cases of initiative and collective possession by peasants, which on first sight appear to concern free peasants, after closer scrutiny are shown to concern paroikoi. Such were the peasants who retook possession of some lands of an Epirotic

(87) Cf. above n. 39.

(88) M.-M.IV, 265 (sine anno, indict. **XII**, octobri).

(89) M.-M. IV, 3 9-3 (1271-2); 196-7 (1240); cf. Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 53-54; eiusdem Féodalité 69 n.1.

(90) M.-M.IV, 196-7 (1246); Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 55-56.

(91) E.s. Xenos Legas in 1231 was paroikos of Syrgaris through 18 olive-trees, which he sold to Lembiotissa and the epiteleia of which had to be paid to Syrgaris, to whom the trees belonged, - but he was also paroikos of Lembiotissa through other lands elsewhere: M.-M.IV, 60-61 (1231).

(92) M.-M.IV, 134-5 (1232)

pronoiar which he had usurped from them (93).

Though no lord is mentioned over them and though they insisted on keeping what they had seized for themselves, as if they had a personal interest unexpected from paroikoi and familiar only to free peasants, it is quite possible that they were landed paroikoi, who acted in their own interests or on their lord's secret instigation, like the Neocharitae of 1293 (94).

So the collective holding of land by peasants in the later centuries has a clearly paroikian character, though it can possibly derive from the old free village community. The members of such communities, as is well known, were complete owners and cultivators of their land, and were considered by the State Treasury as "a fiscal unit" charged with collective responsibility to it for their taxes (*ἀλληλέγγυον* or *ἐπιβολή*) (95). The continuation of *ἐπιβολή* on small peasants up to the XIII century (96) must have been the link, while the *ἀλληλέγγυον* imposed on big estates had already in 1028 been annulled in the interests of the big landowners (97). On the other hand the annulment by Leo VI (886-912) of the law of protimesis, which favoured small holders by enabling them to buy an estate in the middle of their lands. (98) also belonged to the whole process of subjection of the peasantry.

(93) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 89f. (XIII century).

(94) M.-M. IV, 233 (1293).

(95) Lemerle *Esquisse*, *Rev. Histor.* 119, avril-juin 1958, 282-4, 277-9, ; *Rev. Histor.* 120, juillet-septembre 1958, 88-94; Charanis *On the social structure*, *BS12* (1951) 118; Diomedes *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται* A', 9-11, 31, 50, 57, 62-63, 163; E. Werner *op. cit.* 69b-70a

(96) Fr. Doelger *Das Fortbestehen der Epibole im mittel- und spät-byzantinischer Zeit*, *Studi in memoria di Aldo Albertoni*, tom II (1934) 3ff; *B.Z.* 35 (1935) 14; see especially J.B. Pitra *Dem. Chomatianus*, in *Analecta Sacra et Classica*, *Spigilegio Solesmensi Parata* 7 (1891) 319ff; cited by F. Doelger *ib.*; cf. the collective tax paid by the paroikian colleagues of Mich. Archontitzes in 1271 to their lord Maliasenus: M.-M. IV, 397-8.

(97) By Romanos Argyros: Diomedes *op. cit.* 62-63; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 49-50.

peasantry.

This process was the basic pattern of the social evolution of the peasant population in the later centuries and counter-balanced whatever traces of freedom might have survived in their order. These traces were incorporated in the system of paroikia: the lord's rights were superimposed upon those of the paroikoi, limiting and submerging, but not quite extinguishing them. Even in cases in which the sources do not inform us exactly as to the social and legal status of the selling and buying small peasants, it is as paroikoi in the wider sense of paroikoi of the State that we must with Ostrogorsky tend to consider them rather than with Doelger, P. Charanis and J. Karajannopoulos as free peasants in the old sense (99). The ὑποστρατικοὶ and other peasants of multiple loyalties and bonds clearly confirm this view since the paroikian quality stands as the basis of their status.

One last case, which the scholars in question use as definite evidence of their theory against Ostrogorsky's rather too sweeping generalisation of complete subjection and paroikian status of all peasants (100), is the case of Phanari (101). Michael Gabrielopoulos, despot of Thessaly, in a letter of 1342 addressed the archontes of his town of Phanari with the words ἄρχοντες τοπικοί, μείζονές τε καὶ μικροί, χρυσοβουλλᾶτοι καὶ ἔξκουσοῦτοι (102). These μικροί are thought by Charanis to have been small holders. But this overlooks the fundamental fact, shown in their appellation of ἄρχοντες χρυσοβουλλᾶτοι καὶ ἔξκουσοῦτοι, which indicates clearly that they were noble (στρατιῶται) pronoiers and landowners. The term μικροί is simply meant to denote a gradation

(98) Diomedes op.cit. 109; Pitra op.cit. 307ff.; Zakythinos loc. cit.

(99) Pr. Doelger Die Frage des Grundeigentums in Byzanz, Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences V, 1 (Nr.18)

(100) Either to the State or to individual landowners and monasteries.

(101) Charanis op.cit. 118f.; 129.

(102) M.-M. V, 260; Zakythinos Processus de Féodalisation p.7 n. 3.

of rank in the nobility (103); non-noble peasants could in no case have been addressed as *ἀρχόντες* by a magnate, as in no case could they have had such a status. Also the immunities from military service (*τραπεζωνική φύλαξις*) and taxes and the confirmation of their lands, that Gabrielopoulos granted to them all, lay nobles and clergymen by an oath sworn in their favour (104), prove undoubtedly that the archontes - in question were landed nobility, not small-holders. This is further confirmed by the general process of evolution of the Byzantine towns in the later centuries, according to which the former bourgeois or demos were replaced in their administration by the landed nobility (105). So the theory of the absolute survival of free peasantry receives a decisive blow and can be declared to be untenable.

Nevertheless, we must examine some rather theoretical and philosophical arguments put forward in favour of this theory, especially by Karajannopoulos (106). If, he says, one considers the tax obligations, payments, and services due by the *paroikoi* as the main traits of their status (107), or if one emphasizes their payment obligations (108), then one necessarily tends to reduce all men to the *paroikian* status, presumably because all or nearly all men have such obligations at all times and in all places. In reply to this one should note firstly that the above-mentioned traits were not the only ones which characterized the *paroikoi* class, nor, in so far as they did characterize it, were these aspects of the

(103) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 96-98, 125.

(104) One of the first examples of a feudalist-tinted oath in Byzantine history: Zakythinos op.cit. 7-8; cf. Section III, Ch. I, n.70 of this Thesis.

(105) Kirsten *Die Byzantinische Stadt*, Text, pp. 38-39; Anmerkungen III nr 25, p.27, nrs. 42-43 p. 28. Perhaps the most that we could say about these archontes is that they were nearer to their lands and their problems, as well as to military service than *pro-noiars* in other bigger towns, but in no case that they were small peasants. A similar example was that of the 500 small landowners of Melnik in 1242: E. Kirsten op.cit. Anmerkungen III, nr 68, p.28, based on G. Acropol. ch. 44.

(106) BZ 50 (1957) 181.

(107) Like Ostrogorsky, *Paysannerie* 66.

paroikoi class constant either at all times or for all its constituent sub-classes. Rather they varied according to the varying demands of history and life itself. Secondly, in so far as the determining factor of paroikian status was *its* dependency upon an overlord, whether or not in relation to land, all men in such a condition may indeed be said to be, to some extent, paroikoi, a conclusion which in no way renders Ostrogorsky's conclusion absurd.

On the other hand we should have to agree with Karayannopoulos that since the elements of freedom are the juridic capacity, the right of free sale and purchase of land, the active and passive inheritance and the freedom of movement, and since in the Byzantine sources we find people endowed with these, we are obliged to recognise the existence of a free peasantry in Byzantium, even though they are called paroikoi, call the landowner their lord, and could be arbitrarily transferred from their land by their lord's caprice or by the administrative authorities. These limitations did not wholly refute their freedom, but only diminished it in the cases attested by the sources, while their basic free characteristics were retained. Even when given as accessories of a pronia or other land - i.e. because of their services, - they were free to acquire land (109), if they could manage it. This last point provides the clue to the crux of the matter. It is what was possible, feasible and attainable in practice that matters, not what was theoretically permissible. The point is not whether some small-holders survived or whether any of their characteristics survived in the paroikian status, but whether or not they were an active economic factor (110).

So, we must modify Karajannopoulos' assertions by saying that the elements of freedom could survive incorporated in the elements of paroikian subjection, which tended to overcome

(108) Like Ostrogorsky again, op.cit. 67; cf. *Féodalité* 364f.

(109) Karajannopoulos op.cit. 181-2.

(110) Diomedes *Βυζαντινά Μελέτα* A', 221.

the former and in numerous cases to reach almost a point of bondage to the soil. But the predominance of the monetary obligations of the paroikoi while favouring their subjection, at the same time tended to prevent their complete bondage to the soil and to secure certain limited liberties, especially to the landed paroikoi. But for the landless and poorer paroikoi (δουλευταί, ἐλεύθεροι etc.), who approached a state of slavery without ever actually reaching it, these liberties gradually disappeared.

This intermingling of elements of freedom with elements of subjection characterised the paroikian population of Byzantium and its agrarian society in general (as well as the urban society, as we shall see) (110a). It must have been one of the reasons why movement between the agrarian lower and higher classes could have existed and why even non-noble paroikoi could have been elevated to the status of big pronoiars (111).

Class divisions, conflicts and hatred between the oppressed paroikoi and their lords could not have been averted by this intermingling. The lords' contempt for the class of manual workers and the lower classes in general (112) was fundamental to their relation with them. From such a division developed the gradual polarisation of society into exploiters and exploited (113), which produced the smaller or greater social conflicts of

(110a) Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 49-50b; cf. infra n.60.

(111) E.g. the Vestiarites Vasilis Vlatteros, a pronoiar who was related to the paroikoi Gounaropouloi, therefore he was also of paroikian origin (: first half of XIII century): Ostrogorsky Féodalité 65-69; cf. Section B, ch. I, and Section A, ch. I for other upstarts; cf. Greg. VIII, 11b: I, 352; Werner op.cit. 50B n. 49.

(112) Cant. III, 14: II, 89; I, 23: I, 116; III, 27: II, 170-171; III, 25: II, 152-4; III, 46: II, 279-280; Greg. XII, 2: II, 577; XII, 4: II, 584 etc.

(113) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 99, 105-6, 113, 115, 118, 143-4, 147-8; cf. Section B, ch. I^I.

1296 in Asia Minor (113a), and of the third, fourth (114a) and fifth decades of the XIV century (115). The indignation of the peasantry against tax-collectors, caused, for instance, frequent attacks on the latter and the seizure of their money (115a).

As far as we know there was no political organisation or party representation of any section of the peasantry, paroikian or not (115b). There were protogeroi or protevontes or proestoi, who represented and led the local rural communities mainly in fiscal but also in other matters arising in the relations of the community with the authorities (116), but these could not have been other than the local gentry (*ἀρχοντες τοπικοὶ*) (117), who

(113a) The agrarian population of the W. Asia Minor out of discontent with the fiscal policy of Andronicus II unsuccessfully revolted under Alexis Philanthropenus against the Emperor: Pachym. II, 215; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 90.

(114) Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 81, 84-86; eiusdem Zealot Revolution 603 n. 2, 606 nn. 7,9; 617 nn.68-71.

(114a) Revolt of the village Bukovik, full of Bogomils, against its dynatos in 1330: E. Werner op.cit. 66b-67a, according to D. Angelov in B.Z. 51 (1958) 374-378.

(115) See Introduction E) - F), and Section C.

(115a) M. Treu Theodori Pediasimi eiusque amicorum quae extant (Potsdam 1899) p. 20; Cant. I, 19: I, 93; Greg. I, 319; I, 392; Zakythinos Crise Monétaire 85-86.

(115b) E. Werner op.cit. 70 a.

(116) Tafrali Thessalonique 60. They existed in previous centuries too: An. Andréades Deux livres récents sur les finances byzantins, BZ 28 (1928) 287f.

(117) Cf. infra n. 102.

of course served their class interests. Thus any conscious claims by the paroikoi were few and unsystematic, like those of the oppressed lower classes of the towns; they were limited to sporadic local seditions or revolts (118), which were easily suppressed. But besides their increasing hatred for their noble oppressors, the paroikian population was gradually maturing towards a revolutionary political ideology and activity under the influence of their numerous colleagues who lived, or took shelter near and within the towns, especially in the big towns of the Empire frequently and for prolonged periods during raids and external or civil wars (119); but peasants also out of distress became artisans in the towns (120). Still there is no evidence that the peasants, in whatever manner they lived in the towns, became free citizens (as happened in the West), even those who lived there as artisans. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe, as we shall see in section B, that they were all of virtually paroikian status.

All these ~~urbanised~~ peasants naturally could not avoid being imbued with the ideology of the mariners, labourers, artisans and other lower strata of the towns, who were on a similar economic and social level. The events of 1341, when these lower strata revolted with the peasants (121) under leaders mostly from among their class (122) against their common oppressors, the

(118) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 87-89; M.-M. IV, 254-5; cf. n. 8 infra.

(119) Cant. III, 30: II, 186; III, 76: II, 476 (1344); IV, 5: III, 33 (1347); I, 28: I, 137 (1321-2). For Thessalonica see Greg. XIII, 10: II, 673 (1341); Greg. Palamas Homily XXIV, P.G.151, 33. For Didymotichum: Cant. III, 51: II, 301-2.

(120) M.-M. IV, 2-3 (1228); 20 (1235); 24 (1251).

(121) Cant. III, 50-52: II, 297-302; III, 48: II, 287-9; III, 57: II, 349-350; III, 30: II, 184; III, 90: II, 558-9; III, 28: II, 176-9; Greg. XII, 12: II, 613-614.

(122) Cant. III, 46: II, 281-2; III, 65: II, 733-4; Greg. XII, 12: II, 615-6 (Didymotichum 1341). Cant. III, 29: II, 176-7 (Adrinople). For noble leaders of the Zealots see Introduction n. 131, and Section C, ch. I-II.

noble landlords, prove that there was a political link between town country populations, which developed into a serious political factor during the XIV century (123).

A P P E N D I X T O C H A P T E R I I I
O F S E C T I O N A.

From the classic praktikon of the two villages, Nission and Chandax, of Michael Monomachus (1333) we learn the following about the economic status and the incomes of his paroikoi, - a condition which seems to have been typical of all the paroikoi during our period, except that as the value of money fell rapidly their income also tended to decrease.

1. No one of the 28 paroikian families in question had more than one child. This is a rule to be noticed in very many cases in our period (123a). This would indicate that the oppressed condition of the paroikoi was such as to make it difficult for children to survive.

2. Each family in one of Monomachus' villages, Chandax, had a boat, as fishing seems to have been one of the main concerns of the paroikoi wherever it was possible.

3. Each family in Chandax paid 1 hyperpyrum as base tax to their lord, in total 28 hyperpyra, for the rise of their own parcels of land.

4. They paid also 7 hyperpyra in total for their lord's own land which makes 34 ($\frac{1}{2}$) hyperpyra: the $\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyrum was a surplus in favour of the lord, after the accountant had made a (deliberate) slip in the addition.

5. They paid also a complementary sum for their use of the waste lands of their villages, 5 hyperpyra.

6. Also another $9\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyra as ζευγαριατίκιον, and

7. Two (2) hyperpyra as κανίσκια, χειροδεκατεία, ἀήρ - except φόρος, παρθενογονορία και εὔρεσις δησουργῶν, which had to be paid directly to the State, as the latter reserved the judgment of

these crimes and their legal dues (ἀνήρ) to itself.

So the total payments reached $50\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyra (124).

From other examples we learn more about the economic gradation of the paroikian population. From these we have chosen a praktikon of 1300 from the monastery of Chilandar, which deals with lands which had been taken from their patrimonial owners and pronoiars and given to the monastery. One family in the village of Gradir paid $\frac{1}{2}$ hyperpyrum, while 17 in the ex-pronoia of Devlitzinus paid 2-3 hyperpyra each, having arable lands, vineyards, yoke oxen and small flocks. Three families had each 1 ox and 50 modioi of land. Another three had each 1 pair of oxen and 100 modioi. The one family taken from the pronoia of Nicephorus Chrysos had a pair of buffalo, 5 cows, 10 pigs, 8 beehives, 125 modioi of land, 6 modioi of vines and 1 orchard of 2 modioi. It paid the monastery as much as the richest family of the ex-pronoia of Devlitzivus, i.e. 5 hyperpyra. But the families of the old pronoia of Gazis Syrianos had no land, and even poorer were the paroikoi of 2 other ex-pronoiae. In one of them the 19 families had sufficient cattle, but no land, and only 6 had some vineyards, therefore they had to till the land of the monastery as δουλοπαρόικοι. The 19 families paid the monastery $17\frac{5}{6}$ hyperpyra in total; Nine (9) families of the ex-pronoia of Gazis Syrianos paid 11 hyperpyra, 7 of that of Devlitzinus paid 11 hyperpyra, the 1 family from that of Nic. Chrysos paid 5 hyperpyra, and 2 others with land of medium size from other pronoiae

(124) Ostrogorsky Féodalité 82-86, 119-121; cf. Les Praktika Byzantins ;ib. 300 - 302.

paid 2 hyperpyra each. Seven (7) families of ἐλεύθεροι in Gradač were without land, most of them were without cattle, and their origin was unknown (125).

(125) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 141; Les Praktika Byzantins ib. 271, 300-301; Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 46b-50b. Každan's percentages of the rural classes cited on p. 50b seem arbitrary.

S E C T I O N B

U R B A N C O N D I T I O N S I N T H E B Y Z A N T I N E
E M P I R E F R O M T H E E N D O F T H E X I I I
C E N T U R Y U P T O 1 3 4 1

I N T R O D U C T I O N :

T H E I M P E R I A L P O L I C Y T O W A R D S U R B A N
P R O B L E M S

Though the Byzantine towns did not disappear during the dark ages of barbarian raids before the VII century, they did however undergo a deep change: they assumed an essentially military character and became *καστρα*; but at the same time they did not stop being commercial and industrial centres, particularly the big cities; Many merchants lived in them and with their taxes contributed to the State treasury. All towns were subject directly to the Emperor through his delegates, who defined local policy and executed the imperial orders (1). A number of towns enjoyed privileges, which transferred the internal administrative power to them. This happened especially in Jannina and Thessalonica (2).

While the military character of the towns was intensified during the Crusades, it seems that already long before the Fourth Crusade a more or less important section of the landed nobility had settled and obtained great power and vested interests in the towns. This was a basic point of distinction between the Western nobility who lived in their castles, from which they controlled their dom-

(1) E. Kirsten *Die Byzantinische Stadt*, V,3 (text) pp.14,20f., 27; D.A.Zakythinos *Despotat II*, 166-169.

(2) Kirsten *op.cit.* 38f.,165-169.

ains, and the Byzantine nobility (3).

In 1204 the Byzantine nobility were in control of most towns. They were the "nobles habitatores" or the middle and lower ranks of the nobility, as distinct from the grand magnates and territorial despots (4). They were so strong as to determine the policy of the towns besieged by the Crusaders and to come to terms with them; they swore an oath of allegiance to the Crusaders and helped them to occupy the Byzantine countryside, which was controlled by and depended on them. In return for their co-operation the Crusaders left them in peace and contented themselves with a share in all Greek pronoiae; only in the case of the greatest magnates did the Crusaders replace Greek landowners by Latins (5). When the Greek nobles stopped co-operating with the Latins the latter were turned out of the towns by the initiative of the nobles alone, and Byzantine authority was re-established there. Henceforward the growing power of the Greek nobles in the towns went side by side with the growing disruption of the **central** authority.

The split of 1204 and after enabled many provincial cities and towns of the Empire to become capitals or local principalities and assume the structure and character of a metropolis after the example of Constantinople (6). But still the defence policy of the State prevailed in them all, either in capitals of local principalities or dependencies of such capitals, either in old or new-

(3) E.g. in Corinth in 1142 there were several nobles: E. Kirsten op.cit. text pp. 37, 39; Anmerkungen III, nr 36, p.27; cf. Anmerk. I III nr 24, pp. 26-27; nr 20, p.26; cf. N. Svoronos. Vie Rurale à Byzance; 11 (1956) 325-335. Cf. F.D., B.Z. 50 (1957) 533; Zakythinos Crise Monétaire 51.

(4) E. Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk. III nr 68, p. 29; nr 24, pp.26-27; nr 32, p.27; Zakythinos Despotat II, 174-5.

(5) G. Ostrogorsky Féodalité 55, 93; Tafrahi Thessalonique 205-206, 24; E. Francis La Féodalité et les villes Byzantines au XIIIe et au XIVe siècles, BS 16 (1955) 77-78. Theodore Branş, townlord of Adrinople, signed a treaty of alliance with the Venetians in 1206; Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk. III, nr 24, pp.26-27; cf. O.H.B.S. 377.

ly-built towns (7). In contrast, in countries taken by Bulgarians, Serbs and Belgians in the XI-XII centuries a network of towns, routes and stations of a predominantly commercial character were erected on the ruins of the Byzantine and Crusaders' buildings (8).

Under the system of the pronoia the *κάστρα* resembled small states controlled by the pronoiaars, who were definitely established as town-nobility, but still under the sovereignty of the central authority, when such an authority existed (9). It was such small states that the Palaiologi, the Lascarids before and the Serbs after them had to unite in order to create their empires, though the nobility of those states never ceased to cherish separatist tendencies against the imperial authority. Each land magnate had his *κάστρον* or *καστέλλιον* or even many *καστέλλια*, which were small towns, centres of his pronoia (10). Such autonomous tendencies we find throughout our period; they were evident in Epirus and Acarnania during Andronicus III's and Cantacuzenus' expeditions (1336-1337, 1338-1340) (11).

On the other hand, the Emperors, in order to establish their authority and suppress these tendencies, or sometimes as a reaction to Western mercantile intrusion, to some extent supported whatever bourgeois elements existed in the towns, by granting them extensive commercial tax immunities and other privileges,

(6) Kirsten op.cit. Text, pp. 34-35; Anmerk. III nrs 7-8, p.25; Diomedes *Βυζαντιναὶ Μεγέται Α'*, 116-126; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 116.

(7) Kirsten op.cit. p.35 (Text); Anmerk. III, nr 40, pp.27-28. Zakythinos *Despotat II*, 157, 165-6.

(8) As in the West: Kirsten op.cit. p. 34 (Text); Anmerk. III, nrs 1-4, p. 25.

(9) Cf. Section A, Chapter I, nn. 49-49a; cf. E.Kirsten above, n.6.

(10) Melissenoi in Thessaly: Kirsten pp. 35-36 (Text); Anmerk. III, nrs 6-12, pp. 24-25, 27. Angeloi Rhadiporoi in Edessa: Cant. I, 54: I, 274 (1328); Angeli in Kastoria: Cant. ib.

especially in times of war (12). Such were granted to Monembasia in 1142, 1261, 1284, 1317, 1332 (13), to Jannina in 1319 (14), and to other Epirotic towns in 1335 (15). These Epirotic towns through the influence of their urban middle classes seem just for this reason to have remained loyal to Andronicus III who granted them privileges in 1338 (16).

But the imperial policy towards the urban middle classes was not far-reaching and far-sighted enough to protect them from their very powerful opponents, the nobility and the Western merchants, and to elevate them into a socially economically and politically powerful factor within the Empire. It was a rather spasmodic occasional and incoherent policy, which was made indispensable on the one hand by the similar measures granted by the Catalans, Serbs and Franks in the Byzantine areas occupied by them (17), and on the other hand by the need to face the Western penetration and the local ἀρχόντες τοπικοί and pronoïars, especially the big ones, who hardly accepted such measures (18). The burghesses undertook in return to maintain their κάστρον. This reveals the basic military motives and considerations behind the granting of privileges (19), which in no case took place in time of peace (20).

In the end the Italian entrepreneurs and merchants were more favoured than their local Greek colleagues and industrialists - who diminished in numbers, leaving crafts and industries in the hands of the foreigners (20) by the State and the Greek

(11) Cant. II, 32-38: I, 494-534; especially see II, 35: I, 515-518; Cf. Greg. XI, 6f.: I; 545f.

(12) E. Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk. nr 20, p.26.

(13) M.-M.V, 165-168 (1317, 1332); V, 154f. (1284); cf. 172 (1142).

(14) M.-M. V, 77f., 154f.; Doelger Regesten nr 1897; Zakythinós Crise monétaire 86, 113.

(15) Cant. II, 34: I, 509-510; cf. O.H.B.S. 443; other cases; Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk. III, nr 40, pp. 27-28; nr 20, p.26.

(16) Cant. II, 33: I, 502-505. Zakithinos Crise monétaire 86, 113.

magnates who controlled the State machinery. The presence of the se Westerns in the Byzantine Empire helped to retain the static land regime, with which they closely co-operated to thwart all local commercial and industrial progress.

After 1204 Genoa took the lion's share of the carrying trade in Byz. territories. Both she and Venice were exempted from taxation in the Byzant. Empire, while the other privileged Western Republics paid 2% tax. Venice dominated the South isles of the Archipelago and a set of important ports on the mainland, and Genoa the Northern part of the Aegean isles, to which Chios was added in 1304 (22). Their catastrophic influence on Byzantine trade and the bourgeoisie is evident in various ways (23). The old control of trade and economic life by the State and the State monopolies were relaxed from the XII century onwards and decayed at about the same time as Western commercial intrusion occurred, i.e. during the XII and XIII centuries. This coincided with the strengthening of the pronoia system and the dissolution of the State, as well as with its growing military preoccupations.

The policy of the Lascarids, which aimed at reviving the regulated closed economy and protecting local production, and which brought much gold to the State and the middle classes (24), was soon reversed by Michael VIII Palaiologus, whose increased

(17) Kirsten op.cit. (text) pp.36-37, 42; Anmerk.III, nrs 10, 11, 13, pp. 25-26.

(18) Kirsten op.cit. pp. 42, 37 (Text), citing Boyatzides and Bees; M.-M.V, 168 (1317); P.G. 152, 1217-1220 (Jannina after 1319).

(19) Kirsten (text) p.38; Anmerk. III, nr op.cit. 24, pp.26-27.

(20) Both the Byz. Burgus and the Venetian Kastellia on Greek soil were governed and defended mainly by merchants: Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk.III, nr 44, p.28.

(21) The silk industry in Corinth survived after 1167 in Jewish hands: J. Starr The Jews in the Byz. Empire 223 cited by Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk.III nr 58, p. 29; cf. M.-M.V.156 (1301); cf. Zakythinos Crise monétaire 38. In Morea the Western merchants replaced the Greeks with the exception of the Monembasiotes and a few others throughout the Empire (: Kirsten op.cit. Text p.40),

privileges to the Westerns were paralleled by his importation of arms and other manufactured articles from the West, according to the treaty of Nymphaion (1261).

Michael's policy was more or less continued by his successors, despite some limited, transitory and self-contradictory measures aimed at protecting the middle classes (25). The old imperial control of the guild organisation gradually weakened (26). This like the relaxation of State monopolies was scarcely an imperial favour to the middle classes, but rather the necessary result of indifference and inability on the part of the State. It did not help the middle classes to develop, though it left them much freedom in their organisation. No limitation seems to have been imposed in later centuries by the State on the number of the members of each trade, as had happened in the Middle Byzantine period (27). This discouraged specialisation at a time when it was most needed, but helped the movement of people and ideas from one class to another.

especially in Thessalonica. In the latter town the mariners' guild suggests that in the XIV century there was a considerable class of shipowners and merchants, who employed them. In Monembasia the comparatively flourishing trade also indicates that there was a considerable number of mariners.

(22) It was restored in 1346 after its loss in 1336: Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 51b-52a; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 38.

(23) Kirsten op.cit. Tex. p. 41.

(24) J. Vatatzis: O.H.B. 3. 393-4; Zakythinos op.cit. 38, 87.

(25) Zakythinos op.cit. 38-39, 89. Cf. Apocaucus' and John Cantacuzenus' similar measures in Introduction nn.140, 153, 180 and in Section C, chapters I-II.

(26) Ibn Batoutah Voyages II, 431; Charanis. On the social structure BS12 (1951) 152.

(27) Arist. Sideris *Ἱστορία τοῦ Οἰκονομικοῦ Βίου Α'* (1950) 264f, 270.

On the other hand this together with several other reasons, such as the Westerners' privileges, exports being unequal to imports and the consequent devaluation of the Byzantine coinage - despite the control of prices and of the wheat trade after 1265 - led to the exorbitant growth of the prices of many commodities such as gold and wheat, which were dangerously scarce and hoarded or illegally exported by the Italian merchants (28). The Byzantine coinage was gradually replaced by the sounder Western coinage (29), though one can find it expanding into the Balkans up to the middle of the XIV century (30).

The recurrent violent reactions of the populace, (whether or not including the decreasing and desperate middle classes, who probably instigated the reactions) against the Venetian merchants - did not suffice to save the national trade and industry in the first half of the XIV century (31). This reaction and the privileges granted to the bourgeoisie prove that the latter had survived and fought for their survival, which could have become the basis of Byzantine economy (32).

But this was a desperate struggle since the trade of the Black Sea had been lost to the Venetians and especially to the Genoese, who colonised its coasts and even took over the greater

Byz.

(28) Bratianu *Études* 159-167; Zakythinos *op.cit.* 90-91, 1-25, 30f., 40-43, 10 -116; Grég. VIII, 6: I, 317-8; M.-M.VI, 101.

(29) Zakythinos *op.cit.* 10-20 and *passim.* Add Doelger *Schatzkammern* p. 306 (1325).

(30) V. Laurent *in* B.Z. 50 (1957) 577-8.

(31) G.M. Thomas *Diplomatarium Venetolevanticum* I, 257-9; 114 (= M.-M.III, 101) (1324); *Diplom. Ven.* I, 82-85 (1310); V, 164, 166, 168 (1320); 104 (1317); I, 230 = M.-M.III, 106 (1332); *Diplom. Ven.* I, 341-345, 337-338 = M.-M.III, 114-120 (1349); *Monumenti Storici* I, 234-5; V. 168; M.-M. III, nr'XXVI, p.111 (1342); *Heyd Commerce du Levant* I, 460; Fr. Thiriet *Régestes* I, p.26, 18/6/1332; p.62. 19/2/1348; p.65, 20/1/1349; p.66, 13-14/4/1349; p.46, 15/3/1341; p.39, 11/18/2/1339 (Thessalonica); p.42, 17/2/1340; p.40, 23/2/1339; p. 34, 11/7/1334 and 19/1/1336; p.26, 18/7/1332, pp.47-48, 5/6 1341, and 19/7/1341, etc.

part of the trade of Constantinople (33). The gold trade was almost completely in the hands of the Italian merchants (34). So their Byzantine colleagues were left with only a very small proportion of the foreign trade and were losing more and more ground even in local trade (33). The Ragusaeans, like other Western merchants, in the XIV century and earlier, exported from Byzantium and the Levant hand and manufactured products; in the XV century, however, they exported food and raw materials. This shows that in the XIV century industry to a certain extent was still alive in the Byzantine Empire and the Levantine Countries but was steadily declining in the subsequent centuries (35). Monetary economy still existed in the three later centuries (36), but it continued to elude the Byzantines.

The tragic position of the Byzantine merchants and ship-owners in the later centuries appears from the fact that we find as many as 235 of them in Ragusa between 1286-1460 (37). This points to the gradual transference of the centre of gravity in trade and industry from the Byzantine world to the West and the transplantation of the remnants of the Byzantine bourgeoisie to other places in the Mediterranean, where more favourable conditions existed. So the Byzantine towns were gradually left with **only** a small proportion of their former population (38). The privileges granted by the Byzantine Emperors to the Westerners included Ragusa from the XIV century, and this town was under Venetian sovereignty between 1204 and 1358. These privileges certainly attracted many Greeks, who could not enjoy them in their

(32) Despite Kirsten op.cit. 37, 40 (Text) and Anmerk.III nr 51, p. and ^{and} 28, Bratianu Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'Empire Byzantin (1936)106; cf. E.Francès Féodalité etc.BS 16 (1955)96.

(33) Zakythinos Crise monétaire 39-40; cf. Gr. Palamas Homily XXII, P.G.151, 293:

(34) Kirsten op.cit. 40f. (text) citing Lopez.

(35) W.S.Vucinich's review of B.Krekič 's Dubrovnik i Levant, Spec.33,2 (Apr.1958) 297-300; B.Krekič Nekoliko podataka obavljene nja Grka u starom Dubrovniku 1280-1460, Ist.Glazn.3-4 (1950)139-143, according to V.I.,BZ 45 (1952) 219.

own country and therefore, sought for them by emigrating to and becoming subjects of foreign towns which enjoyed them (37).

In several cases the Emperors treated the middle classes and the nobles as separate classes and by their grants to the one they did not infringe the rights of the other. The *δυνατοὶ* received their usual promise, offices and grants reserved only for them, while the middle classes and the *δημοί* received commercial, administrative and municipal privileges like those granted to Monembasia Jannina etc. As stated above (39). Such *δυνατοὶ* we find in almost all the towns and cities of the Empire in the XIV century (40). Their opposition to the middle and other non-noble classes appears so sharp in 1341 and before, in the third decade that it seems to indicate that it was the result of a long evolution, though in the Byzantine Empire we do not find the marked but fruitful contrast between bourgeoisie and great land-owners, which existed in the West (41).

The higher clergy as a rule followed the way of the higher lay classes and the lower that of the lower (42). The Bishop of each town was granted several privileges and a wide jurisdiction by the Emperors (43).

(36) V. Chatzinokolov. Allgemeine Geschichte der Volkswirtschaft (in Bulgarian), Bd.2 (1957), according to I.D. in B.Z.50 (1957) 535.

(37) Kreki & Dubrovnik i Levant, according to F.D., BZ 49 (1956) 495; Vucinich loc. cit.

(38) Cf. Zakythinos op.cit. 37, 72-73 (1332).

(39) Cf. above nn. 12-20.

(40) Cf. above nn. 3-5, esp. 9-20, and ch.II of this Section.

(41) Kirsten op.cit. Ann. III, nr 20, p.26.

(42) M.-M. V, 260-1 (1342); Zakythinos Processus de féodalisation p.7, n.3. Cf. Section A, ch.II, nn. 36-39.

(43) M.-M. V, 84ff.- (44) Tefrali Thessalonique 106-109.

The lower classes were generally left to the mercy of the higher and richer classes (44). They were only rarely, locally and exceptionally protected by the State. This was done, for instance by Michael IX in Thessalonica in 1319-1320, when he was ruler of that town (45). Therefore the lower classes tended to revolt against their oppressors (46). The State itself saw them only as mere numbers liable to exploitation through taxation and other means, such as the imposition of high prices on the goods still subject to imperial monopoly. This sometimes caused a reaction by some Patriarchs of low descent, such as John XII (1293-1303), who favoured the lower monks and opposed the high prices imposed by Andronicus II on salt and iron. These were two items of wide popular use which were, as we saw, included in the State monopoly as late as that time (47).

New taxations on the lower classes were often imposed (48). From them and especially from the peasants the major part of the taxes of the State were collected (49). Popular indignation at such measures was widespread and was utilised by several opportunists or ambitious powerful men such as Alexis Philanthropenus in 1296, when he revolted unsuccessfully against Andronicus II (50). On the other hand they could not be stopped by such theoretical steps as the prohibition of abuses by Andronicus II (51) or by philanthropy (52), or by spasmodic protection

(45) Nic. Chumnos *Εγκώμιον εἰς τὸν βασιλέα*, Boissonade *Anecdota Graeca* II, 46; Tafarli *op.cit.* 105-6; cf. Theodori Hyrtaceni *Μονωδία ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ τοῦ ἀσπίκου βασιλέως κυροῦ Μιχ. Παλαιολογ. τοῦ Νέου*, Boissonade *op.cit.* I 254-268.

(46) E.g. in Potidaea, Thessalonica, Pheres about 1319-1320: Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution* 603, n.2, 604 nn. 7-19, 617 nn. 68-71. Cf. Dem. Cydones *Ἐπιστολὴ τῷ Μεγ. Πριμικερῶ τῷ Φακρασῆ*, P.G. 154, 1213; Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 84; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 117-9; Theod. Magistros *De subditorum officiis*, P.G. 145, 409B-C. For Heraclea: Triantaphyllis - Grapputo *Anecdota Graeca* (1874) pp. 1-2 (= Philothei Coccini Homilies).

(47) Zakythinos *op.cit.* 90-91; cf. above n. 24.

In conclusion the State of things in the towns greatly resembled that of the countryside, of which the towns were projection in many respects. The fundamental characteristic of urban conditions in the XIII and XIV, centuries was that the same nobility dominated both the countryside and the towns, their economy and life and, through them, Byzantine politics. Their presence in the towns was so oppressive as to create unfavourable conditions for the development of the middle classes and thereby to stop every possibility of democratic evolution of Byzantine town life (53). Still the urban movement of the Byzantine Empire of the later centuries can be divided into two parts one connected with the bourgeoisie as a more or less distinct though fading class, and the other connected with the town nobility. Both contributed to the creation of independent despots and towns and to the last Byzantine urban revival (54), which was also linked to the administrative break-up of the Empire and was definitely dominated by the urban nobility and its allies the Western merchants (55). This state of things led directly to the revival of the closed economy and to collapse (56).

(48) E.g. cf. Introduction for this **Thesis**, 12; Section A, ch. I.nn. 51, 68.

(49) Cant. I, 28: I, 137- Zakythinos op.cit. 49, 70 (1321).

(50) Zakythinos op.cit. 89-91.

(51) M.-M. IV, 250; V, 77-84.

(52) Cf. ch. II of this section.

(53) M.J. Sjusjumov Kol Gorodov v Istorya Vizantii, **VizVrem** 8. (1956) 26-41; cf. I.D. in B.Z. 49 (1956) 503; cf. Zakythinos Despotat II, 225, 217-218.

(54) E. Francès La féodalité et les villes Byzantines **au XIII et au XIV siècles**, B.S. 16 (1955) 76-81) and L.Bréhier (Les Institutions de l' Empire Byzantin (1949) 214) think that the urban movement was inspired exclusively **by** the urban nobility (Cf. Zakythinos; Crise monétaire 34-35). But the privileges granted by the Emperors **separately to the middle classes** disprove this assertion. - (56) Zakythinos op.cit. 37, 69.

(55) Ostrogorsky H.B.S. 459; E. Francès op.cit. 86; N.G.Svoronov La vie rurale à Byzance, Ann:Econ-Soc.Civil, 11 (1956) 325-335.

S E C T I O N B

C H A P T E R I

T H E S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C S T A T U S
O F T H E U R B A N P O P U L A T I O N .

a) T H E N O B I L I T Y

The Byzantine nobility of the towns including the high clergy and monks were, as we have stated, mainly the same as the nobility of the countryside. They lived in luxury usually in the akropoleis of the towns, especially in the big towns and cities, and there they took part in politics and war.

From there they exercised control over their country and town possessions, which included local lands, flocks and parokoi in and around several towns (1).

The estrangement of the nobility from the management of their estates had contributed to the stagnation of the development of agricultural techniques (2). Cantacuzenus admits that he did not know the exact number of his possessions and he gives only an approximate number (5,000 cows, 10,000 pairs of agricultural oxen, 2,500 mares, 200 camels, 300 mules, 500 asses, 50,000 pigs, 70,000 lambs), which were scattered throughout many towns of the Empire, i.e. in and around them (3).

The role of the nobles in the towns was not any more progressive than in the countryside. They played a double role neither purely seignorial nor purely bourgeois. Like the monks and other important ecclesiastics who were aligned with them, they

(1) Zakythinos Despotat II, 225, 211-226; Greg. XIII, 10:II, 674; Cant. IV, 18: III, 119-120 (1350). Cf. Gregory Palamas Homily XXXIII, P.G. 151, 412-424; Homily XX, ib. 273f.

(2) Cf. Section A. Ch. II, nn. 16-17, 2025.

(3) Cant. III, 30: II, 184-5. Cf. Zakythinos Crise monétaire 6-57; Greg. XII, 15b: II, 623; Cant. III, 31: II, 190-192; III, 49: II, 292-4. For Berrhoia: Cant. IV, 18: III, 119-120.

possessed houses, land and workshops in the towns and had the monopoly of whole products, such as oil, wax, wine and honey. Their workshops were run by their paroikoi and endowed with privileges at the expense of the middle classes. They also possessed privileged markets and strove to achieve a monopoly of trade at least in those specific places. This means that they extended their immune position in the countryside to the towns. (4). Some of them even

(4) E. Francès La féodalité et les villes byzantines au XIII au XIV siècles, BS 16 (1955) 86; N. Svoronos La vie rurale à Byzance, Ann. Écon. - Soc. - Civil. 11 (1956) 331f.; Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 51a-b, especially nn. 53-55, and pp. 47b-48a. To these many other cases should be added; such are: Arsenius Zamblacon, who possessed houses and shops in Thessalonica: Cant. III, 42: II, 256; Greg. XIII, 2: II, 637. Theodore Synadenus in Serres: P. Lemerle Actes de Kutlumus (1945) p. 68f; P. Charanis On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 104-105. Tarchaniotes: P. Lemerle ib. 124f. - The nobles of Adrinople: Cant. III, 28-29: II, 176-9; III, 38: 234; G. Akropolites 44-45 (Heisenberg). - The nobles of Thessalonica, Constantinople, Didymotichum and Berrhoia: Cant. III, 58: II 354-9; III, 32: II, 195-7 (D/chum); III, 57: II, 350-354. The nobles of Phanari of Thessaly: M.- M. V, 260-261 (1342); Zakythinos Processus de Feodalisation p. 7, n. 3, p. 8; E. Kirsten Die byzantinische Stadt, Anmerk. III, nr 25, p. 27. - For the Angeloi Rhadipori of Edessa: Cant. I, 54: I, 274. For John Angelus in Castoria: Cant. I, 54: I, 273-4. In Melnik (1242) there were 500 landlords, which excludes the possibility that they were the higher aristocracy: Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk III, nr 68, p.29; Akropolites ch. 44: they must have been the lower nobility. Manuel Asan's old family possessions in Bizye and other small Thracian towns: Cant. III, 79: II, 490-491. - For Man. Asan's, Constant. Palaiologus' (uncle of Andronicus III), Demetrius Zamblacon's possessions in Pheres see Cant. III, 87: II, 534-5. The senators and army leaders who supported Cantacuzenus in 1341 threatened to give up their towns to the Serbs and Bulgarians if he were not crowned: Cant. III, 25: II, 153-4. In Peloponnese before 1355 πρότερον οὐδενὸς ὄντος πλὴν τῶν πόλεων: Cant. IV, 13: III 89; cf. Zakythinos Despotat II, 178-179, 225. Other cases: Cant. III, 24-29: II, 154-181; III, 92: II, 564-5; Greg. XII, 5: II, 686; XII, 6: II, 596; see also Cant. III, 13: II, 83-87; III, 11: II, 74-79; III, 50: II, 296-300; III,

practised trade personally (5). Thus they appropriated and controlled a great part of the wealth and of the industrial developments of the towns, despite their deep contempt for arts, crafts, commerce and liberal professions (6) and though their primary interest was land (7).

Their economic activity extended to usury for which they used the revenue from their landed estates in town and country as capital, to lend at heavy interest to the lower classes or to needy nobles (8). This activity was favoured by the extreme rarity of gold in the later centuries and by the increasingly high interest rate (9). Thus the nobles acquired further control of the urban economy of the Empire, especially after the Serbian raids and the civil war had cut them off from the control of their rural lands, closed them in the towns and turned them more to trade and industry, where these were possible (10).

48: II, 287-9; III, 46:II, 277-282. Further examples see in D.A. Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 56-60; P. Charanis *The Aristocracy of Byzantium, Studies of Economic and Social History in Honor of A. C. Johnson* (1951) 336-355.

(5) G. Kalothetos of Chios: Fr. Thiriet *Régestes* I, p. 69, 2/3/1350.

(6) Ph. Koukoules *Βυζαντινὸν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμός*, B, I (1948) 220-223; Cf. Introduction to this Thesis n. 69, and Section A, ch. II, n. 30.

(7) Diomedes *Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται* A', 99. *Add. Greg.* VIII, 11:I, 351-2, 355; IX, 6: I, 419.

(8) Svoronos loc. cit. in n. 4. Add the case of Adrinople, *Cant.* III, 29: II, 175-9; cf. Nic. Cabasilas *Κατὰ τοκιστῶν*, P.G.150,727-749, espec. 736-741, 748; R. Guiland *Le traité inédit "Sur l'Usure" de Nicolas Cabasilas*, *Εἰς μνήμην Σπυρ. Λάμπρου* (1935) 269-277; R. Loenertz *Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas*, *OCP*.21 (1955) 2 206, 220-224; Sevcenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, *DOP*11(1957) p. 85-86; Diomedes loc. cit.; Tafrali *Thessalonique* 113, n. 3: Cf. Section A, ch.I, nn. 88-89.

(9) Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 74-75.

(10) Werner *Volkstümliche Häretiker* 53a; Tafrali op.cit. 97.

As a whole the nobles' economic activity was not creative. It was limited to static avidity for wealth and influence and was never moved by the love for enterprise or by the capitalist genius. They themselves rarely became involved in the practical problems of their enterprises, which they simply exploited through their men. Thus no real progress in commercial and industrial techniques could be effected because of the lack of immediate interest by those concerned. On the other hand this injured the interests of the non-noble traders, industrialists and manufacturers, to whom it left no scope for developing bourgeois republics as in the West (11).

The number of the nobles was not very great: actually they formed only the minority of the urban population. In Thessalonica a thousand nobles were expelled from the towns in 1341 (12), but some of them remained. So they had been more than a thousand altogether, about 1100 out of a population of 100,000, i.e. 1% of the whole.

In Melnik in 1342 the nobility numbered 500 (13). But they were certainly distinguished into various grades according to their possessions (14).

Neither all the 500 of Melnik nor all the 1,000 of Thessalonika could have belonged to the first rank. Similarly the appellation of the _____ of Phanari (15) shows this

(11) M. Ja. Sjusjumov *Vol Gorodov v Istorija Vizantii*, *Viz. Vrem.* 8 (1956) 26-41, according to I.D.'s notice in *BZ* 49 (1956) 503; cf. Introduction to this Section n. 53.

(12) *Cant.* III, 38: II, 233-4; cf. *Tafrahi Thessalonique* 19-29; Werner op. cit. p. 53a, n. 72, and p. 52a.

(13) Kirsten op. cit. *Ann.* III, nr 68, p. 29; cf. Text pp. 42-43. Still cf. *Cant.* III, 28: II, 176-7: *ὁ δήμος τοῦ δυνατοῦς κυβερταί, ἐν κ' ἐχίγης ὄντας* (in Adrinople, 1342). -

(14) *Zakythinos Crise monétaire* 57-59.

(15) M. - M. V, 260 (1342); cf. Section A, ch. III, nn. 101-104.

gradation, which becomes greater when we take into consideration how many kinds of people composed the nobility: PRONOIARS, big patrimonial landowners, high State officials, the imperial family and related families, high clergy, all manner of notables and rich people, Greeks and foreigners absorbed by the Greek nobility (16), privileged intellectuals (17), fiscal functionaries who were enriched and emerged as strong political figures during and between the civil wars (18) and others.

The usual denominations of the nobility show their prominent position in society (19). Their wealth reached a scandalous point, and they kept their riches and lived in great luxury in the towns (20), where they built houses on the Akropolis (21). Their power was based on wealth which advanced them to offices and finally to the ranks of the long established nobility (22).

A noble origin came to be an essential feature of social distinction, but usually only when it was accompanied by wealth. In

(16) Cf. Section A, chapter II, nn. 13-15.

(17) Tafrali Thessalonique 30.

(18) Such as Apocaucus, Patrikiotis, Vatatzis etc. Cf. Zakythinos op. cit. 76-77.

(19) Δυνατοί, πλούσιοι, ἄρχοντες etc.: Tafrali op. cit. 19-29.

(20) Cant. III, 26: II, 160-165; Cf. nn. 21-22.

(21) Cant. III, 93: II, 570-571; III, 94: II, 576, 579: "Ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῆς ἄκρας" were nobles. The akropolis of Thessalonica πόλει τινὶ ἔοικε μικρᾷ, καὶ οἰκήτορας ἔχει ἰδίους: Cf. Kirsten Die Byzantinische Stadt (Text) p. 39. In Servia, Berrhoia, Edessa and elsewhere there was the same arrangement: Cant. III, 18-19: II, 139-133; cf. II, 13: I, 388-9 (New Phocaea); I. 54: I, 270-272 (Thessalonica).

(22) Theod. Magistros De subditorum officiis, P.G. 145, cc. 501-504

most cases the established nobility distinguished themselves strictly from the other classes, even from the rich bourgeoisie, though the latter as a rule enjoyed the same opportunities as the nobility (23). In their hands was concentrated all the existing gold of the Empire either stores in very primitive ways or deposited in the Venetian and Genoese banks of the East, so that it was withdrawn from circulation (24). Thus the nobility contributed to the reinforcement of the closed economy by reinforcing the restricted circulation of money, which was further restricted by other factors as well (25).

Wealth alone, no matter how it had been acquired, was not always the only constituent of nobility and did not necessarily lead to the moral respect and prestige with which nobility was vested. Yet there were rich people, who, though scorned by the nobility proper because of their low birth, were given higher posts in the State hierarchy (26). Others were more or less ennobled because

(23) Tafrali loc. cit; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 74; E. Werner op. cit. 52a.

(24) Zakythinos op. cit. 74-76; Ševčenko Zealot Revolution pp. 612, 614, 617.

(25) Such as the limitation of the markets of consumption, the lack of means of transport and safe roads during the raid and civil wars: Zakythinos Crise monétaire loc. cit. and 69. - Real industrial and commercial capitalisation became impossible and the methods of exploitation remained primitive, the emphasis being laid on the land possession: op. cit. 74; cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 24-26

(26) E.g.: Cant. III, 25: II, 152-6; III, 46: II, 279-280; III, 25: II, 152-3; III, 14: II, 89-93: Apocaucus. - Greg. XIV, 11: II, 741-3: John Vatatzis. Cant. III, 40: II, 244-8: Apelmenes, a protégé of Cantacuzenus. - Cant. II, 25: I, 251ff; Greg. XI, 3: I, 553: the Senator Sphrantzes. - Cant. III, 85: II, 530-534; III, 71: II, 435-7; Greg. XIV, 9: II, 727; Stilpon P. Kyriakides Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται VII, Ὁ Μομιτζίλος καὶ τὸ κράτος τῆς Μακεδονικῆς (1950) 332-345: Momitzilos. - For John Vatatzis see Cant. III, 76: II, 745-8; III; 90: II, 552-8. - See Cant. III, 95: II, 532-5; IV, 10: III, 62-63; Greg. XXVI, 47-48: II, 123-4 for Tobrotitzas (1345). - Greg. XV, 6: II, 766; Cant III, 95: II 584; I. Ševčenko Zealot Revolution p. 613n. 53; R. Guiland

they became related to very powerful families (27), or they were often accepted in marriage by the nobility, simply for their wealth and influence, (28). Still sometimes the upstarts married within their own class (29), thus intensifying their feeling of inferiority. Loss of riches usually implied loss of political and social power and distinction (30), and eventually of nobility itself if that had been attained.

Only the nobles and the high classes aligned with them enjoyed higher education, which was offered in most cases by the Church and sometimes by laymen (31). They including the noble higher clergy and monks composed the usually cruel, arrogant, selfish, privileged classes (32). Experts in politics and war, and masters of the people, they provided the higher administrative officials, state and army dignitaries, counsellors or opponents of Emperors and princes, ministers and prominent members of local and imperial senates (33). They considered themselves to

Études de Titulature et de Titulature et de Prosopographie Byzantines I, Le Protostrator, REB 7, 2 (1950) 170: Phakeolatos, a Gasmul upstart. - Cf. Vasiles Vlatteros Vestiarites, apparently an ex-pa-roikos who became pronoiar: Ostrogorsky Féodalité 65-69; cf. Section A, ch. II, n. 111. Add low-class Patriarchs in Section A, ch. II, nn. 55-67; cf. Introduction to this Thesis nn. 61-74 for Apocaucus and Calecas.

(27) E.g. Manuel Tagares the Grand Stratopedarch, because of his bravery was given a girl from the family of Andronicus II in marriage: Cant. I, 18: I, 91. Cf. Tobrotitzas above, n. 26.

(28) E.G. Apocaucus: Cant. III, 19: II, 117-8. For his daughter who married John Asan in 1347, see Greg. XVI, 1: II, 797.

(29) John Vatatzis' son married a daughter of Calecas: Cant. III, 90: II, 552-3, while Vatatzis' daughter married Apocaucus' son: Cant. III, 76: II, 475-6 and loc. cit. - Tobrotitzas married Apocaucus' daughter in 1345: Cant. III, 95: II, 584.

(30) Tafrali Thessalonique 20-22; Zakythinis Crise monétaire 76.

(31) Tafrali op. cit. 161-4; Ph. Koukoules Βυζαντ. Βίαι καὶ Πολιτ. Α', I (1948) 35-137. Cf. Koukoules op. cit. 37 and I. Ševčenko Nicolas Cabasilas' Correspondence, BZ 47 (1957) 49-50.

(32) E.g. Cant. III, 28: II, 176-177; Greg. XII, 12: II 613-4; further details: Tafrali op. cit. 104-116.

(33) Cant. III, 24-29: II, 144-181 (1341); cf. III, 92: II, 564-5 (1346); Greg. XII, 5: II, 586; Cant. III, 13: II, 83-87; III, 11: II, 74-79; Greg. XII, 6: II, 596; Cant. III, 50: II, 296-300; III,

be the only section of society qualified to fill these offices (34). One and the same prominent family through its different members could have excelled in several of these offices and branches of social activity (35). Even noble women were distinguished in public life and culture (36). They were predominant in conspiracies and plots and the social gatherings which hatched them (37). As the first instructors of noble children, they transmitted to them all those specific class aptitudes and abilities, which the nobility monopolised. For that reason Byzantine noble women were highly esteemed: when one of them died, her children, if under age, were protected and brought up by the Emperor at court, so that they might be educated as noblemen (38).

As we have seen, the higher clergy and monks of towns were another class of the nobility, whose practices they followed and with whom they co-operated or whose rivals they were (39).

48: II, 287-9; III, 46; II, 277-282; Tafrali op.cit. 19-29.

(34) Cant. III, 40; II, 244-8; cf. D. Cydones Monodia, P.G. 109, 648; Greg. XII, 12; II, 613.

(35) Tafrali loc. cit.

(36) E.g. Cantacuzenus' mother, cf. Introduction to this Thesis n. 111. Cf. for others; Tafrali op.cit. 156; Greg. VIII, 3: I, 293-4; Sphrantzes. Hist. 21, 139. Irene of Montferrat: Introduction n. 9. Anna: cf. Section B. Others in V. Laurent La direction spirituelle des grandes dames à Byzance, La Correspondance Inédite d'un Métropolitain de Chalcédoine, RÈB 8 (1950) 64-84. (XIV-XV centuries); V. Laurent La direction spirituelle à Byzance. La Correspondance d'Irène Choumnaina Paléologina avec son second directeur, RÈB 14 (1956) 48-86.

(37) Greg. XII, 13; II, 619.

(38) Cf. Gregory Palamas, Philothei Λόγος εἰς τὴν Πάλαμᾶν, P.G. 151, 553D-562A; Neili Ἐγκώμιον Γρ. Παλαμᾶ, ib. 659A-660B; cf. Introduction to this Thesis n. 89.

(39) Greg. Palamas Homily XLI, P.G. 151, 512-513; Cf. Section A, ch. II, parts B), C), especially part C) in the beginning. E.G. Arsenius Tzamblacon possessed houses and other property in Thessalonica (1341): Cant. III, 42; II, 259-260.

The transition from lay nobility to clerical nobility was not unusual and implied the transformation of urban lay estates into churches or monasteries (40). As spiritual leaders of society they frequently guided and inspired the lay nobility, especially the Emperors, in their policies (41). Their increased privileges and judicial authority in the XIV century (42) gave them a more important social role that of inspecting the lay authorities (43). Into this class, as into the lay nobility, some people of lower origins managed sometimes to intrude (44).

(40) E.g. see M.-M. I, nr XCVIII, pp. 221-6 = P.G. 152, 1256-1260: The Domestic Phocas Meroulis erected a Church in his estate situated near the gate of Komnenos in Constantinople, which he then converted into a convent and to which he granted several lands before 1341 (:cf. Section A, ch.II, nn. 73-75). Cantacuzenus together with Nicolas Cabasilas and Demetrius Cydonès had in mind to become monk in the monastery of St. Mamas in Constantinople, but later they chose Manganon. To this Cantacuzenus made many grants (Cant. IV, 16: III, 107-8, 1349) because, like the convent of Martha, to which his wife Eugenia-Irene retired, it was closely financially linked with him (ἐπὶ πατρῶου κλήρου) by his father's interitance (Cant. IV, 42: III, 307 [1355]). Originally Cantacuzenus wanted to become a monk of Vatopedi (Cant. IV, 24: III, 176-8). There he had his skete (οἰκητήριον) made at his own expense, when he was Grand Domestic, - little before 1341. Like many other nobles he also kept a chapel in his house (Cant. III, 15: II, 96; cf. E. Herman Chiese Private diritto di fondazione negli ultimi secoli de l'impero Bizantino, O.C.P. 12 (1946) 302-321. Nicolas Cabasilas' family possessed land in Siderokausia, which together with its paroikoi, he granted to Vatope di in 1347 (I. Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, in DOP 11 (1957), 169). - A great number of noble monks lived in the towns, where, as we saw, they possessed immense lands, churches surrounded by landed estates or chapels with their maisonettes and gardens, or houses and shops. These they let to individuals, though they were not their actual owners except in rare cases (: Ševčenko op.cit. 161 and especially para.12, p.96; Tafrali Thessalonique 98 citing Paris, Gr. 1213, f. 249).-

b) THE NON - NOBLE LOWER CLASSES OF
THE "DEMOS"

The numerous non-noble classes of the town-population were composed of artisans, mariners, workers of every kind, hand-workers, farmers, paroikoi, slaves, merchants and traders, though the outstanding representatives of the latter two categories belonged to the middle or even sometimes to the upper classes. The lower strata of the non-noble classes possessed nothing or almost nothing and were under the pressure of the nobles as well as the middle classes (μέσοι).

Their usual denominations show their lower position in the social scale. (45). They were considered by the nobles to be ready to rebel and revolt (46) and to deserve to occupy no public post,

The noble monks, divided into orders (Nicephorus Chummos Θεσσαλονικῶσι Συμβουλευτικῶς) Boissonade Anecdota Graeca II, Paris 1830, 145) steadily enriched their fortunes by donations from pious people and by skilful purchasing of the best estates. Their worldly activities extended even to navigation, commerce, fairs etc. These were made by them in order to sell their products, but they caused great reaction from many sides (: Tafrafi Thessalonique 98-99; Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 47b-48a; cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 25-25b).

(41) Gregory Palamas was personally attached to John Cantacuzenus, who consulted him frequently and underwent his influence on several issues (N. Greg. XXIX, 11: III, 230). Similarly the monks of Athos influenced Cantacuzenus (Cant. IV, 24: III, 176-8; Greg. XVI, 5: II, 826-7; Cant. IV, 16: III, 107).

(42) See Introduction to the Thesis, n. 49; O.H.B.S. 448-449.

(43) Tafrafi Thessalonique 89.

(44) E.g. Calecas, cf. above nn. 26-29; Introduction to the Thesis nn. 61-74; Section A, ch. II, nn. 55-67.

(45) Tafrafi op.cit. 31-39; Th. Magistros De subditorum officiis P.G. 145, 501; Greg. XII, 12: II, 613-4; XIV, 10: II, 734-739, esp. 735 6; Greg. Palamas First Homily (1350), P.G. 151, c. 13; Greg. XIII, 10: II, 674; VII, 8: I, 257; V, 2: I, 127; VI, 1: I, 171; Greg. VIII, 113 :

nor handle political matters (47). Of course all non-noble classes lived in the outskirts of the towns, within and without the walls of the town.

1. FARMERS.

A parallel to the presence of the nobility in the towns was the presence of various kinds of farmers in them. Both these phenomena express the interdependence of town and countryside, and the merging of the one into the other. This was based on the legal extension of the territory of all Byzantine and Levantine towns over a range of several miles beyond their walls and on the fact that both town and countryside shared to some extent a common population.

In Thessalonica a great number of small cultivators were living: they were the paroikoi ἀτελεῖς of convents and monasteries in the towns and close to it, refugee serfs who came back as δουλευταί, free daily salaried field workers, προσκαδήμενοι and ἐλιύθροισι, all of Greek or Slav or Koutzovalachian or other various "barbarian" origins (48). From our evidence it rather appears that all these types of farmers together formed a great part and perhaps the majority of the population of that town. They cultivated their fields and gardens around the town (49) and tended their flocks of sheep or oxen in them, as in Berrhoia (50).

I, 355; Philotheus Vita S. Sabbae in Ath. Papadopoulos-Kerameus Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσοχμιτικῆς Ἐταχυλογίας, V, 194; Philotheus, Homily in Triantafyllis - Grapputo Ἑλληνικά Ἀνεκδότα p. 64.

(46) Philotheus in Triantafyllis- Grapputo loc. cit.; Tafrali op. cit. p. 32, n. 6, citing Theod. Magistros, Ad. Patriarcham Niphonem, in Paris. Gr. 2629, f. 138v.

(47) Isidorus in Paris. Gr. 1192, f. 89v = Tafrali loc. cit. nn. 7, 3. Cf. Introduction to this Thesis n. 69; cf. above nn. 26ff.

(48) Tafrali op. cit. 35-39; cf. 33, 97, 103, 29; P. Charanis Internal Strife, B. 15 (1940-41), 214.

(49) Greg. Palamas in Par. Gr. 1239, ff. 208 v-z. 182v = Tafrali

In Didymoteichum's outer quarters a considerable number of farmers lived (51), as is proved by the fact that, when they were expelled from the town with their families in 1341 (52), they left behind them an agricultural vacuum, which caused a **stoppage of agriculture** (53). They or the lower classes in general including the lower clergy of the town were divided into **fratris** and subject to obligatory work at least for public purposes and in times of danger (54). This latter obligation was apparently a part of the paroikien obligations of the lower urban and rural classes. But the lower clergy belonged also to their metropolitan's jurisdiction (55), and a conflict of jurisdiction between the State and the Church authorities for the right to lordship over these paroikoi was not impossible (56).

Many farmers also lived in Constantinople and possessed lands, gardens and fields inside and on the outskirts of the town (57). Outside Heraclia of Thrace there were **κηπία** of vegetables

op.cit. 29 n.1, 104; n.1: Palamas blames those who left their town on Sunday to work in their fields out of their town: Cf. Tafrali op.cit. 35-37, 97, 103; Cf. Greg. Palamas Homily XXIV, P.G. 150, 333, and XXXIX, P.G. 150, 484; Cf. Greg. XV, 12: II, 793; **ἔληλαμένον (Παλαμᾶν) τῶν τῆς πόλεως (Θεσσαλονίκης) ἀγρῶν καὶ προαστείων πρὶν ἔγγυς γενέσθαι πυλῶν καὶ πρὶν ἔγγυς ἐληλυθέναι τείχους.**

(50) Greg. XIII, 10: II, 673-4; When in 1343 "the Thessalians were closed up in their town-walls with their flocks of sheep and oxen, the penury of food that ensued caused famine and diseases and many deaths by starvation, hence a violent commotion. Those who had landed estates and fields outside became angry at the pillage of their fields by the enemies, and those whose flocks died of starvation felt great indignation; and those who were poor by birth planned disturbances and attacks against the rich". The poor paroikoi appear here as part of those who had flocks and took refuge in the town. But further on it is explicitly stated that some of them were rich, (cf. above n.): i.e. they were nobles who lived in the towns and owned lands patrimonially outside them together with flocks. Of course their flocks were looked after by their paroikoi such as Marzelatos (cf. n.1, 3 etc. and Volkstümliche

belonging to small farmers (58) in the town. Οἱ ἴψω τῶν τευχῶν οἰκοῦντες of Edessa and Servia (59) were certainly farmers, and farmers certainly were also a great many of the inhabitants of all the various κῶμαι and πόλεις of Thrace, which the Didymoteichians pillaged for provisions (60), as well as of all the κῶμαι pillaged every now and then by the rival parties in the Empire and by Amur in the civil war of 1341-9 (61).

2. MANUAL LABOURERS.

The class of diggers mentioned in Adrinople in 1341 (62) and certainly existing all over the Byzantine towns and cities,

Häretiker of Werner, espec. pp. 54b - 55a).

(51) Cant. IV, 18; III, 119 - 120; cf. III, 32; II, 195-6.

(52) Cant. III, 46-48; II, 280-289.

(53) Cant. III, 51; II, 301-3; III, 57; II, 349-350; Cf. Greg. XII, 12; II, 615-616.

(54) Cant. III, 48; II, 287-9; cf. fratricide in Peloponnese in 1366: Raul Epistulae XII, éd. Loenertz, E.E.B. Σ.26 (1956) p. 154, ep. 7, ll. 19-20.

(55) Cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 81-82.

(56) Cf. Cant. ib. the clergy of Didymoteichum protested against the order they received from the State authorities to take part in the obligatory digging of a trench in 1341, by claiming that they had to submit to the orders of their metropolitan alone.

(57) Greg. IX, 6: I, 421; cf. XXVIII, 62: III, 218; D.A. Zakythinou Ἡ ἀλωσις τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ ἡ Τουρκοκρατία (1957) 82-83; eiusdem Crise monétaire 37; cf. Greg. XXXVI, 1b: III, 510.

(58) Cant. IV, 28; III, 209; Greg. XXVI, 12-13; III, 78-79.

(59) Cant. III, 19; II, 127-134; cf. Greg. XXXVI, 14: III, 510 (1355).

(60) Cant. III, 57; II, 345-6; III, 57; II, 349-350; III, 54: II, 326-7.

(61) Cant. III, 64; II, 350-351; III, 30; II, 186; III, 32; II, 196; Greg. XV 1: II, 747-8.

were undoubtedly paroikoi of the fields or μισθιοι, landless daily paid agricultural workers or ἐλεύθεροι, wage-earners or day-labourers. Farmers would have also been the numerous manual workers of Didymoteichum: οἱ χειροτέχναι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοις ὁ θῖος ἦν ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν, περνοῦντες καὶ ἐργαζόμενοι διέξων τῶν ἀναγκαίων εὐποροῦντες (63). But in these χειροτέχναι would possibly have been included artisans of the lower rank.

From among these and the other lower classes of the demos soldiers were normally recruited by the town nobles (64) or by the Emperor's men (65).

Therefore the town χειροτέχναι, μισθιοι and artisans were not a specific, separate class, but were recruited from among the proletariat generally and destitute rural paroikoi, who became wage-earners in town jobs, but could easily be forced to return to their previous occupation or to miserable idleness, if necessary.

The critical economic situation in the countryside, combined with the collapse of Central authority turned many ἐλεύθεροι and μισθιοι from the countryside into the towns ((65a). There

(62) Cant. III, 29: II, 176-7: Branos the leader of the populace against the Cantacuzenian nobles, was a digger.

(63) Cant. III, 55: II, 335-6: that some of them or all of them were farmers or in some way acquainted with farming is proved by the fact that those of them who did not revolt remained in the town and were rewarded for this by the grant of the land previously occupied by the fugitives' houses, which were razed to the ground. This land was used by those who remained πρὸς λαχανισμόν: cf. Cant. III, 48: II, 287-9.

(64) Cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 15-18.

(65) This is made clear by the fact that two men of John V. Palaiologus, Komitopoulōs and Vatatzis, generals of an army of 1000 men each, were encamped at the outer quarters of the town and led the lower people, who lived there: Cant. III, 46-48: II, 280-289: Πρὸς τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην στρατιὰν μέγα δυνάμενοι; cf. n. 69, where similar cases are mentioned.

they found themselves in a situation similar to the one they had left behind. Their submission and misery were continued as a prerequisite of the organisation of their urban occupations, which were under the same or similar masters as their countryside occupations. Nobles, *δυνατοί*, enterprisers, rich merchants and work masters took advantage of this surplus labour offered and employed them as porters, port workers, apprentices and helpers, granting in exchange a hunger wage (66), which the employers, in their rapacity, even refused sometimes to pay (67). Some of them became artisans in the towns (68).

This movement especially happened at times of raids, civil wars and famines in the countryside, when a great number of countryfolk were obliged to take shelter in the towns (69). In 1341-2 the movement of the country population into the towns due to the raids of the Cantacuzenian army was such as to be called by Cantacuzenus a real "transference of the countryside into the towns" (70), which did not happen then for the first time. As a result of this transference and of the wars and raids which caused it, the agricultural economy was led to destruction. This affected the urban economy too, which to some extent depended on the rural one.

(65a) E.g. see Pachym. II, 318f., 335.

(66) Werner op.cit. 52a-b. See n. 67 on pp. 25-26.

(67) Th. Magistros De subditorum officiis P.G.145, 533-536; Nic. Cabasilas "Antizealot" Discourse, ed. I. Ževčenko, D.O.P. 11 (1957) para. 43, p. 116: *καθάπερ τοῖς χειροτέχναις τῶν ἔργων, ὅτι καταβάλλουσι τοῖς μισθοῦς οὐδεμίαν εἴσονται χάριν, ἔστι μὲν πολλὴ χρεία ταῖς πόλεσι τούτου τοῦ γένους, καὶν τις ἐκβάλλῃ τοὺς ἀνδράς οὐδὲν κωλύει πᾶσαι εὐδὴν ἀποχωλεῖναι τὰς πόλεις.* Still they are not saviours of the towns, as

they receive salaries, which makes them better than the other mob; cf. para. 44: *ὀικτρὸν βαυτὸν εὐρήσεις, χειρωνακτῶν καὶ καπήλων οὐδὲν βελτίω.*

(68) M.-M. IV, 2-3 (1228); 20 (1235); 24 (1251).

(69) E.g. in 1307: Greg. VII, 6: I, 246. Cf. Cant. I, 28: I, 137 (1321); Tafrahi Thessalonique 103, 16; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 46-47.

This dependence was related not only to the fact that a great deal of the working population and the ruling class of the towns came from the country; but also that the great rural domains and villages run by *paroikoi* possessed all or nearly all the installations and equipment needed for the transformation of agricultural products into consumption goods, for which the towns offered the best markets (71), while the towns themselves did not possess such equipment, at least to the degree that we know in modern times; nor could they use any raw products in times of siege despite the proximity of the countryside. Thus the agrarian character of the Byzantine towns in later times (72) was at the same time an advantage and a disadvantage for them. By tying to some extent the towns to the rural economy and society it made them its slaves and its exploiters.

On the other hand the lower classes of the country and the town performed the tasks of a limited industry and commerce to the profit of their masters in an elementary way, as, because of their position they had no interest in nor the ability or means for promoting them to a higher level.

So real industrial and commercial capitalisation became impossible and the methods of exploitation remained primitive, the emphasis being laid on the possession of land (73).

(70) Cant. III, 30: II, 186; cf. III, 32: II, 196; Greg. XIII, 10: II, 623-4. For previous similar movements see Greg. VII, 10: I, 262-3 (1316). Cf. also above nn. 48-53; cf. Section A, ch. III, nn. 119-120.

(71) E. Francès *La féodalité et les villes Byzantines au XIII et au XIV siècles*, BS 16 (1955) 86; E. Werner *op.cit.* 91a-b.

(72) P. Lemerle has emphasized the agrarian character of the Peloponnesian towns in later times: P. Lemerle *Une province Byzantine: Le Peloponnèse*, B 21 (1951) 352; E. Kirsten *op.cit.* *Amerika* III nr 43, p.28; cf. Cant. IV, 13: III, 88-90 (1354f.); Zakythinos Despotat II, 225, 178-9ff.

(73) Cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 24-25; cf. Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 74; cf. above nn. 1-11, 23-25.

3. SLAVES.

The trade of slaves was extensively practised in the XIV - XV centuries by the Western merchants, especially the Genoese, who exported them from Caffa in Crimaea to the West via Pera in Constantinople (74), which thus could not but have some of them through such sources or through war captives (75).

The number of slaves in the Byzantine Empire in the XIII and XIV centuries seems to have been relatively small. They were foreigners: Serbs, Syrians, Moslems and other barbarians (76) and were used especially in ecclesiastical estates as "hagiodouloi". Unlike the paroikoi, who could generally not be freed from paroikia, they could be freed from slavery (77).

The general concept of freedom at that time was, at least in theory, very different from that of the modern world. The slaves enjoyed no legal support, had no property and their testimony in court was extracted by torture. When they were freed, they did not fall into the proletarian or paroikian status (78), - which was the normal status of poor people without property, - but they became ἑλεύθεροι, παντελεύθεροι πολῖται Ῥωμαίων. Still usually this happened on the condition that they would serve "freely" their liberator and his descendants, while they would be at liberty to act as "free" men (79).

(74) So in Florence and Tuscany a big problem was created by the abundance of slaves from the East, especially after 1363: Iris Origo *The Domestic Enemy: The eastern slaves in Tuscany in the XIV and XV, centuries*, *Speculum* 30 (1955) 321-366, cf. H.G.B.'s notice in *B.Z.* 49 (1956) 205.

(75) *Cant.* II, 32: I, 497. - (76) *Cant.* ib.

(77) Ostrogorsky *Paysannerie* 72-74.

(78) I.e. they did not become dependent on any seignorial rural or urban lord: M. Ja. Sjusjumov *Opravovom položenii rabov v Vizantii*, *Učen. Zapiski Zverdlosk, Gosud. Pedag. Instituta za 1955 God.*

But their ultimate economic and social status was not very different from that of the propertiless lower ranks of paroikoi, the ἰλευθέρου, δουλοπάροικοι, δουλευταί, δουλευτοπάροικοι and μίεθιοι (80). Their political role was non-existent, since they had no political rights or consciousness (81).

4. MARINERS.

The mariners lived in the towns near the sea (82) and were numerous and influential in the coastal towns such as Constantinople, Thessalonica, Monembasia, Patras, and Corinth. They were the εὐργαξ καὶ χυδαῖος ἄχλος and τὸ ἀσύνετον τοῦ δήμου par excellence, which means that they belonged to the lowest ranks of the lower classes and were deeply despised by the nobility because among them were many disloyal and troublesome Gasmuls (83).

In Thessalonica, where we have the classic case of a mariners' guild, they were employed on hire by the shipowners and by the higher officers who administered the ships, i.e. the captain and the ναύκληρος (84). Their occupation consisted in performing all tasks in the ship and more especially in the transportation of commercial goods from one port to another. A special contract was always agreed before each voyage between the mariners (ἀποτακτάρηδες, μερίται) and their ναύκληρος, who was usually the owner of the ship and shared the profits of commercial voyages with merchants to whom he hired the ship or, if he happened to be

(79) Ostrogorsky Paysannerie 73-74.

(80) Op. cit. 70-71; Cf. Greg. Palamas Homily XXII, P.G. 151, 293: εὐ μικρὰς μάξης πολλὰ κτεῖ δουλοὶ γίνονται πολλοὶ δεσποτῶν ἀπανθρώπων ? This is apparently true of both slaves and paroikoi.

(81) Cf. Anne Hadjinicolaou Marava Recherches sur la vie des esclaves dans le Monde Byzantin (1950) (Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes).

(83) Greg. XIV, 10: II, 734-9, esp. 735-6; Cant. III, 88: II, 541-6; cf. above n. 45 and next chapter.

(82) Cant. III, 94: II, 575; IV, 36: II, 109; Greg. XIV, 10: II, 736.

(84) This term had various meanings: shipowner, captain, hirer

merchant and shipowner at the same time he enjoyed the profits himself. The contract included such terms as the specific time limits of the mariners' employment, the specified kinds of services that they were obliged to render and the agreed rate of their salary. But their employers seldom complied with these terms and usually sought to break them by extending the time of the trip, by imposing other trips and paying less than what had been agreed. This caused bitter complaints among the mariners, who to protect their interests used the power of their guild. Through it they appealed to the court, which, given the corruption of justice at that time, was forced to regulate the law-suits - in-question in a reasonably just manner only by the pressure of their guild (85). On the other hand the State favoured the mariners as a means of pressure against the Latins (86), and also because it feared the power of their guild.

So the mariners appear to have been a sort of hired free labour like the lower artisans and labourers (87). In this they differed from the *paroikoi* and formed a more or less genuine proletarian town class not pre-occupied with or related to land and its problems.

As piracy was frequent (88), they had to carry arms all

of a ship, manager of a ship, who collected the fares and might be even ignorant of the art of sailing, etc: Ph. Koukoules Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμὸς Ε' (1952) 367-8.

(85) Tafrahi op.cit. 33.

(86) Op. cit. 33-34; Koukoules op.cit. 368-369; Diplomatarium Venetolevant., Monumenti Storici V, 166, 313/ 1320.

(87) Cf. above nn. 62-70, and below nn. 97-100.

(88) Zakythinus Despotat II, 174.

the time for their protection, and this became a normal feature of their life. This and their mobility from port to port imbued in them revolutionary ideas and tendencies and made them seditious, conscious of themselves and quarrelsome. As a result they became influential and strong enough to lead the other lower classes in rebellions (89), which the peasants could hardly visualise.

The role of the mariners' guild consisted in fixing salaries, regulating differences among mariners, merchants, ship-owners and captains. This and the fact that its president appears to have been a noble (90), point to the possibility that the guild contained all ranks of seamen; though evidently their lowest ranks were more numerous and influential than the others and they gave their colour to the whole guild.

As a noble their president was of course designated by the Government (91), in the same way as in the X century when the Byzantine economy was under the close control of the State (92). Indeed it seems that the very existence of the guild was a survival of that old State-controlled guild of the mariners, which acquired a great degree of autonomy during the later centuries because of the dissolution of the State authority.

The presence of the State appointed noble president of the mariners' guild certainly proves this survival without proving that the guild was subject to the town authorities (93). On the other hand it appears that the mariners' favour towards their

(89) Cant. III, 94: II, 575; Tafrafi op.cit. 32, 34; P.Charanis Internal Strife, B.15 (1940-41) 212; I. Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 615; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 45. Cantacuzenus says: Περὶ ἧν (πύλην θαλάσσης) οἰκοῦντες πᾶν τὸ ναυτικὸν οἱ πλείστοί τε ὄντες καὶ πρὸς φόρους εὐχερέστερ, ἀλλωστε καὶ ὡπλισμένοι ἅπαντες, ὡσπερ τὸ κρατίστὸν εἶσι τοῦ δήμου καὶ σχεδὸν ἐν ταῖς στάσεσι πάσαις αὐτοὶ τοῦ παντὸς τμήθους εἰσηγούνται προθύμως ἐπομένου ἢ ἂν ἀγνοοῦσιν αὐτοὶ (1345). Cf. Cant. III, 94: II, 568: ἡ γὰρ τὸν δήμον. Cf. Cant. IV, 36: III, 109: Τοὺς παραθαλασσίους κατεχάρθανε (Andrew Palaiolog), ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ ὡπλιῆς (1349-1350), cf. Greg. vol. II, 736: Ἡ Ἀποκαύκου γυνή --- πᾶν τὸ Γαβ-

president was based on his support of their aspirations for better conditions (94). Furthermore the possibility cannot be discarded that this support was founded on some other relationship between them, such as the election of their president by the mariners from among a list of nobles or on a community of interests of the higher strata of the mariners and the noble president.

Similar guilds of mariners must have existed in other coastal towns too; But it is only from Thessalonica that we have the most concrete information. To this we may add Constantinople

μουλικόν. -- πείθει, τὰς τριήρεις αὐθημερὸν ἄφεμένους ἅπαντας, ὅ-
πλα δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀνειληφέντας καὶ θέλη πάντα, περιεληλυθέναι
(: the arms were in the mariners' and Gasmuls' possession, but the
latter had placed them in their ships and had only to pick them up,
not for the first time); cf. Theod. Magistros Oratio de Regis Of-
ficiis, P.G. 145, c. 509 (cf. cc. 517, 544): when the fatherland is
in danger, the people pick up their arms and fight for it; cf. Greg.
XIII, 10: II, 674-675 (=XIV, 10: II, 736=) n. 95 below.

(90) Tafrafi Thessalonique 34. Michael Palaiologus, the leader of the Zealot party up to 1345, who was Michael Katharus Palaiologus, the illegitimate son of the despot Constantine Palaiologus, son of Andronicus II (:P. Lemerle L' Émirat d'Aydin, p. 162), was also very probably the leader or one of the leaders of the mariners, or at least he could influence them, since the latter were the most vital section of the Zealot party: Cant. III, 93: II, 568-574; 94: 574-582; esp. 573, 575, 568: The Zealots ἤγον τὸν δῆμον (p. 568), and the mariners τὸ κράτιστόν εἰσι τοῦ δήμου καὶ σχεδὸν ἐν ταῖς στάσεσι πάσαις αὐτοὶ τοῦ παντός ἐξηγούνται πλήθους προθύμως ἐπομένους ἢ ἂν ἄ-
γωσιν αὐτοὶ (p. 575). Andrew Palaiologus, the successor of Michael in the leadership of the Zealots (1345-9) after Michael's murder, is explicitly mentioned as the President of the mariners guild too. That office might have been held by Andrew even during Michael's life, as there is no evidence as to when Andrew succeeded to it. The latter was also a noble, since he took part in the nobles' assembly called by John Apocaucus in Thessalonica in 1345. With Coca las, another noble, he first agreed with the other nobles, but later took the opportunity to become leader of the Zealots because

whose numerous "Gasmulicon" or lower mariners of half Greek origin seem to have been in some way organised like the mariners of Thessalonica (95). We may also add Monembasia, where there were numerous mariners living on trade and piracy (96).

of his post as president of the mariners: Cant. III, 93: II, 568-570; 93-94: 573-577; (cf. W. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 58a). Andrew was a noble: Cant. IV, 15: III, 104-5, where his title σ^{ϵ} ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης is mentioned; Cod. Paris. Gr. 1148, f.135 (cited by G. Kordatos Ἀκμή καὶ Παρακμή τοῦ Βυζαντίου (1953 300-301), where he is mentioned as σ^{ϵ} δεσπότης Παλαιολόγος.

That Cocalas was a noble see in Cant. III, 93-94: II, 574, 581; I, 48: I, 232-6: I, 43: I, 208-216; Tafrahi 59; M.-M. I, 177

(91) Charanis Internal Strife, B.15 (1940) 212 accepts this with some doubt.

(92) Christophilopoulos Τὸ Ἐπαρχικὸν Βιβλίον Λέοντος τοῦ Σοφοῦ καὶ αἱ Συντεχνίαι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ (1935) 46f., 37f. cited by Arist. Sideris Ἱστορία τοῦ Οἰκονομικοῦ Βίου Α' (Athens (1950) 263-266, 270 E. Werner op.cit. 69b.

(93) Ἐχουσι δὲ καὶ ἰδιάζουσιν ἀρχὴν αὐτοὶ (the mariners) παρὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως. Διὰ τε οὖν τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐνοίαν ἣν εἶχον πρὸς αὐτὸν (Andrew Palaeologus), προθύμως ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἐλάμβανον τὰ ὅπλα: Cant. III, 94: II, 575; cf. D. Cydones P.G.109, c.640: Ὁ δ' ἐνταῦθα λιμὴν... ὁ αὐτὸς ἀντὶ πόλεως τε ὤν καὶ λιμένος, καὶ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ εἰς τὴν θάλατταν λήγουσαν περιεχόμενος, ἀλλ' εἰς πόλιν ἑτέραν.

(94) Cant. loc. cit.

(95) Greg. XIV, 10: II, 736: Ἡ Ἀποκαύκου γυνή... πᾶν τὸ Γασμουλικὸν πείθει, τὰς τριήρεις αὐθιμερὸν ἀφεμένους ἅπαντας, ὅπλα δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀνειληφότας καὶ θέλη περιεληλυθέναι, cf. above n. 89.

(96) Zakythinos Despotat II, 174-175, 179.

5. THE BUILDERS' GUILDS

The evidence about the builders' guilds proves that they existed in both towns and countryside, and were composed of different layers.

On top was the chief mason or protomaistor of the builders, who, probably by some legal statute, appears as witness in sales of properties (97), and as employer of less specialised builders whose small daily wages he paid (98). Between the apparently propertiless builders and the protomaistores stood the τεχνίται, who were usually highly specialised masons, employing theless specialised workers, but themselves being under the orders of the protomaistor. So the protomaistor and the τεχνίται belonged more or less to the middle or upper middle classes, while the έργάται definitely belonged to the lower classes (99). It is certain, however, that the οικόδομοι and τεχνίται and even the protomaistor worked together with and guided their employed workers, while they themselves were employed by the monasteries or other landowners or by the State itself. The rise of members from the lower to the upper ranks of the guild does not seem impossible.

(97) E.g. George Marmaras, a protomaistor, appears as witness in a sale of property to the monastery of Iberon in a document of 1326: Fr. Doelger. Schatzkammern nr.116, pp.305-308, espe 307; pp.112,169. He is also mentioned in a document of Zographou of 1327: Actes de Zographou 25, 23, 72; cf. E. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker p.58b, n.126a.

(98) Fr. Doelger op.cit. nr 102, pp.267, 270 (1421): είσήζεν (σπρωτομαίστωρ) έργάται 100, whose wage was 4 aspra per day; άνδρας οικόδομους... Ανδρέαν Καμπανάρην, Άργυρόν Ζιζιλίνου υιόν, Γεώργιον Μονομάχον, οίτινες έκτισαν διαφόρους τινάς χρείας τών έν τοις κήποις φρεάτων καί ύδροχυτών... ώς τεχνίτης έκλήθη καί έβαλε 10 έργάται; cf. Ph. Koukoules Βυζαντινών Βίος καί Πολιτισμός, Β', I (1948 Athens 245, for their small wages.

(99) Cf. Fr. Doelger ib. 270, where a distinction of έργάται from τεχνίται is made. To the οικόδομοι belonged the specialised

Still the employment of the guilds by the State or by the monasteries or by rich estate-owners was not completely typical of the pattern of land possession and land relations. It was certainly typical of the free enterprise and the free relations of the town economy, though the guilds themselves seem to have preserved a certain degree of exclusiveness. They did not allow the ordinary man to enter and the respective art or craft was only transmitted to the children of the families that traditionally exercised this craft. Evidence of this can be found in the recurrent family names of people who exercised the same art for generations, and it was inherited from the older economic system, which was partially controlled by the State (100).

The fact that several foreigners had infiltrated into the higher ranks of the builders in the XIV century, possibly points to the decline of Byzantine techniques and their inferiority to those of the West. Only this can explain why Anna of Savoy in 1346 put a Genoese Phakeolatos in charge of the repairs of St. Sophia (101) and John Cantacuzenus in 1347ff. ordered the Latin John Peralta, leader of the Latin mercenaries of Cantacuzenus to rebuild St. Sophia with Astras the Grand Stratopedarch (102).

τεχνῖται, whose advice was invaluable in technical and artistic matters. E.g. in 1307 Andronicus II consulted experienced builders (= architects or masons or high layers of τεχνῖται) about the extent and nature of certain damage to St. Sophia and paid them several thousand gold coins for these repairs: Greg. VII, 12:I, 273. Cf. also for builders Greg. IX, b:I, 419; XIV, 10: II, 732.

(100) Sideris op.cit. 263, 264, 266, 270; Werner op.cit. 69b; see also Ersnt Kirsten Die Byzantinische Stadt, Anmerk. III, nr.101, p. 31, citing F. Taeschner and A.K. Orlandos.

(101) Cant. IV, 4: III, 29-30.

(102) Cant. IV, 41: III, 301. Cf. below n.114.

6. OTHER GUILDS.

Other guilds did certainly exist, but they mostly belonged to and like those just described, included people of the middle class

These will therefore be discussed in the **Section** dealing with these.

C) THE MIDDLE CLASSES OR MESSOI

There was an inevitable decline in the civil professions in the Byzantine towns in the later centuries. With the exception of Thessalonica this happened especially in the lower parts of the towns, which were normally occupied by dealers, manual labourers etc. (103). But the very grant of privileges by the Emperors to the bourgeoisie - despite the emphasis laid on the military obligations - and the violent reaction to the Western merchants are evidence of the continued existence of a bourgeois middle class in the towns (104).

What was left of the Byzantine middle class included ship-owners, merchants, artisans especially workmasters, master craftsmen, small freeholders of land, practisers of liberal professions and minor clergymen. Though originally inferior (105), they stood economically and socially between the rich nobility and the *πέρητες* or lower strata according to the fundamental triple division

(103) E. Kirsten Die Byzantinische Stadt, (Text) pp.38, 40; cf. Cant. III, 29: II, 176-177; III, 55: II, 332-336.

(104) Cf. Introduction to this **Section**, *¶*n.31-32.

(105) Cf. the *paroikoi* who left their estates and became artisans in the towns: M. - M. IV, 2 - 3, 20 - 24 (1228, 1235, 1257).

of population in all Byzantine towns (106). But as riches were the basic criterion of social value (107), undoubtedly a part among them, becoming richer despite the above-mentioned impediments to enrichment (108) approached and/or attained the level of the nobility whose methods of social predominance and oppression they used (109).

This happened particularly in Thessalonica, which was the entrepôt for both Macedonia and the hinterland (110). On the other hand the greatest part of the *meçoi*, especially the artisans shopkeepers and lower intellectuals came under the control of the nobility of the towns, who competed with them in all respects and managed to exclude them from every prospect of success in commercial life (111). This brought them closer to the poor, who were the most numerous section of the population (*οἱ πολλοὶ*) (112).

The artisans included a number of women artisans, such as those found by Ibn-Batoutah in Constantinople in 1328 (113). As they were self-supporting middle-class artisans, their presence in the arts and crafts apparently points to the inability of Byzantine industry in the later centuries to grow into big enterprises. This is further shown by the presence of several foreigners, especially Westerners in eminent posts of a number of artistic and other professions (114).

(106) P. Charanis On the social structure, BS 12 (1951) 148-9.

(107) E. Werner *in* Volkstümliche Häretiker ^{52a} Cf. Philotheus, Vita S. Sabbae in A. P. Kerameus' *Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας* V, 194; Th. Magistros De subditorum officiis, P.G. 145, 501-504, (: the nobles had to show respect to the enriched bourgeois); cf. Tafrali Thessalonique 20-22, (the loser of riches lost his social prestige).

(108) Werner loc.cit.; cf. Cant. III, 93: II, 570-571; III, 94: II, 576, 579; III, 40: II, 245-248; III, 36: II, 218-225.

(109) Cf. Introduction to this Section.

(110) Tafrali op.cit. 29.

(111) Op. cit. 27-30; Werner loc.cit.

(112) Cf. above b): These *μεçoi* took part in the revolts of

A section of people appear in 1328 to occupy public buildings on hire in Constantinople, - in the same way as farmers (State paroikoi) occupied State land, - on condition that they paid a fixed rent to the State (115). The close similarity of this section of the people and of their way of life and legal status to those of the rural State paroikoi confirms the belief that, if they were artisans too, they were State-employed artisans. This was a very important extension of rural paroikian relations in town life, which shows the predominance of State-owned or - controlled town property and the dependence of many town people on the State for their housing or shops. This must have been a remnant of older State control of town relations, and it imposed such limitations as the guild organisation and a specified location of each trade in the town.

This divided each town into specialised quarters and streets (116). As late as the reign of Andronicus III we still find this division (117), which was widespread throughout the Balkans, Italy and the oriental towns (118) and was linked with a centralised conception of town life and a corporate society.

1341ff., which were made by the poor: Cant. III, 28: II, 178-9; III, 29: II, 180; III, 38: II, 232-235.

(113) Ibn Batoutah Voyages, trad. C. Defréméry - B.R. Sanguinetti, I Paris (1853) 431-2.

(114) E.g. the painer Praepositus: Cant. III, 87: II, 540-541 (1344); in masonry we find Phakeolatos and John Peralta: Cant. IV, 4: III, 29-30 (1346-1347); in medicine: an Italian doctor, who looked after the Grand Logothetis Gabalas in 1344: Cant. III, 80: II, 493-494; **three** "Persian" (= Turkish) doctors appear in the court of Andronicus III: Greg. XI, 9: I, 554; cf. above nn. 101-102.

(115) Cant. II, 2: I, 322-3: "He (Andronicus III) stopped the more violently exacted contributions and granted immunity to all those who possessed vineyards or buildings in public places and paid a fixed rent to the State, and he granted them a chrysobull confirming this exemption from tax". Public buildings would have been houses and shops.

This conception was apparently preserved in the guilds already described above and in the corporation of advocates, which Ibn Batoutah saw active in Constantinople in the fourth decade of the XIV century (119). The advocates belonged to the middle classes, as did doctors, professors, teachers, clerks of advocates, small functionaries, customs officers, notaries philosophers and writers, as well as all practisers of liberal professions. From these people the State recruited most of its civil servants for smaller posts, which the nobility scorned (120). If we take into consideration the mixed character of the mariners' guild - partly State-run and partly autonomous - , we may suppose a similar organisation in the guild of the advocates of Constantinople. This must have been the case with the customs - officers, notaries and other civil servants, either organised in State-run guilds as in previous times (121) or not.

The guild of teachers, which had been active in the classical Byzantine centuries (122), lasted up to an unknown period. And it was not unusual for people from the liberal professions to rise easily to distinction through ability and wealth, and even to take higher offices in the State (123). On the other hand

(116) Koukoules op.cit. B', I (1948) 236-9; Kirsten disagrees to this concerning the later centuries: op.cit. Text p. 46: Anmerk. III, nr 100, p.31; cf. E. Werner op.cit. 69b.

(117) Ibn Batoutah op.cit. II, 531; P.Charanis On the social structure, **BS** 12(1961) 152.

(118) G. Bratianu Les assemblées d'état en Europe orientale au moyen âge et l'influence **du** régime Byzantin, Actes du VIe Congrès International d'Études Byzantines (Paris 1948) I (1950) 35, 58, espec. 38-44.

(119) Ibn Batoutah op.cit. II, 444. However this did not **check** the venality of the judges: Tafrafi Thessalonique, 61-64.

(120) Tafrafi op.cit. 28-29, 81-84.

(121) Sideris op.cit. 267-8. - The notaries of villages were State or pronoiotic paroikoi in the later centuries. So the town notaries may have been similarly civil servants.

(122) Koukoules op.cit. A', I (1948) 136-137.

several professions of the middle classes could not usually be found in the smaller towns. Presumably this was due to the fact either that they could not find a sufficient clientele there to support them or that the people of bigger towns paid more for their services (124).

Perhaps the most important point to be stressed about the urban middle classes is that they possessed or tended to buy land as the main source of their income. This was true of the middle classes, of the *καστρα* proper and of the *κωμπούλεις* (125), but also of many people of the big towns, who thus followed the example of their fellow-citizens the "nobles habitatores" (126): The basic pattern of economic, social and political success was land possession, adoration of land and exaltation of land as the exclusive source of enrichment (127). This became the preoccupation of the town people too. Though it was an old trait of Byzantine economic life (128), in the later centuries it contributed as much as did the appropriation of considerable trade and industry by the nobles, and the privileges granted to the Westerners, to the adulteration of bourgeois development. Partly as a result of this altering of its economic direction and purpose (129) the bourgeoisie proved unable to carry out or practise any great industrial development or commercial enterprise and was inevitably destined to collapse.

(123) Tafrahi op.cit. 30. Some examples: Nic. Gregoras, Alex. Apocaucus, Theod. Metochites etc.

(124) E.g. In Didymoteichum in 1344 Amur could not find a doctor to treat him: Cant. III, 66: II, 404-405. This might have been due to the flight of the lower and some of the middle classes in 1342 from that town (Cant. III, 48: II, 287-9) or caused by the previous scarcity of doctors.

(125) Kirsten Die byzantinische Stadt p.39 (Text); Zakythinos Crise monetaire 74.

(126) Kirsten op.cit. pp. 42-43 (Text); Zakythinos ib.

(127) Cf. Werner ~~Volkstümliche~~ Häretiker (cf. above a) 52a.

(128) Sideris op.cit. 296-7, n.2; Levtchenko Byzance (1948)p. 169f. - (129) Sideris op.cit. 297-8.

d) THE MAIN FOREIGN COMMUNITIES

The following part of this chapter is included in the interests of completeness, but is not intended to be an exhaustive study of the foreign communities.

1. THE GENOESE.

After the treaty of Nymphaeum (1261) the Genoese established themselves permanently in ports, towns and cities of the Empire, their main stronghold being Galata. According to this treaty and to another of 1275 in the region of Cassandra and in Thessalonica they were granted free trade facilities, a "logge", a house for their consul, an administrative council, a church, baths, an oven and houses for their merchants (130). Still it is improbable that in Thessalonica itself they actually achieved all these concessions except that of a consul.. There was, however, a Genoese Colony there (131) with insignificant commercial activity in the late XIII and the first half of the XIV centuries (132).

After Andronicus II's further favour to them the Genoese fortified Galata in 1304 so that it became invincible. Henceforward the Emperor relied on them for naval help (133). The nobility of Byzantium cooperated with them on several occasions, as in 1334-5 against Andronicus III (134) and in 1321 with him against the Elder Andronicus (135). Galata provided a good resort for their assets (136) and for their lives, if necessary.

(130) Zakythinos *Grise monétaire* 45; P.G.161, c.1026f; Zachariae von Lingenthal *J.G.R.* III, 575-6.

(131) Heyd *Commerce du Levant*, 1, 456-7, 450.

(132) Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution* 603-617, esp.603, 613.

(133) Ševčenko *op.cit.* 614 n. 550.H.B.S. 430; Greg. XI, 1 I, 526-7.

(134) Greg. XI, 2a: I, 530.

(135) Cant. I, 8: I, 38-39; cf. Ševčenko *op.cit.* 612; also in 1347 with John V against John VI: Cant. IV, 6: III, 38-43;

On the other hand there was a general anti-Genoese feeling among the lower classes of the Empire in the XIII and XIV centuries, which increased with the Byzantine-Genoese political conflicts (137).

However, the Genoese society itself of Galata was torn by class divisions. In 1336 the Genoese merchants and lower classes, pressed by penury, lack of food and water and severe destruction, revolted against their leaders and obliged them to yield to the besieging Byzantines (138).

The Genoese policy toward the Byzantine Empire exploited every dissension in Byzantine politics and all social conflicts. It usually backed the usurpers in order to effect a balance between the opposite factions. Their penetration into Byzantine society and politics was such as to enable them to know all serious Byzantine developments (139).

Many items of news about developments in Genoa and the West reached Constantinople through the Genoese mariners and traders. The Genoese internal struggles after 1318 at the time of Andronicus II and III and, later, the revolution of Simon Boccanegra and his fall, were reported by the Genoese crews. News of other civil wars in the known world of the Mediterranean was also carried in this way. "All this information is Genoese, not Byzantine world perspective" (140), and it evidently exerted a

Ševčenko op.cit. 615-616, n.63; cf. Section C.

(136) Ševčenko op.cit. 613; Zakythinos *Étise monétaire* 74, 112.

(137) Greg. X, 8a: I, 501-2 (1333); XI, 2a: I, 530 (1334); XV, 8: II, 775-6 (1347); Cant. III, 99: II, 604-607 (1347); cf. above Introduction to Section B, nn. 31-32.

(138) Greg. XI, 1n: I, 528;

(139) Ševčenko ib; 613-617.

(140) Ševčenko ib. 611-612.

psychological influence on the Byzantines.

Most important was their role in the debasement of the Byzantine gold coin. Despite the imperial limitations on the import and export of wheat by foreigners (141), the Genoese bought wheat on silver currency from abroad and sold it to the Byzantines on gold hyperpura, which they hoarded (142).

2. THE VENETIANS

The Venetians were bitterly opposed to the Genoese and they held equally important positions in the Empire. By the treaties of 1265 and 1277 permission was granted for them to have a house for their consul in Thessalonica. These and other buildings for their dependent community could be anywhere in that town except on the Acropolis. They could have similar facilities in Constantinople. But it is certain that, although in Thessalonica they had small habitable houses, they were faced with every sort of inconvenience caused by the indigenous people. They were obstructed from unloading their goods, and in securing their food, especially vegetables (143). They were even hindered when they needed to go ^{to} their consul. They were beaten and maltreated in every way by Greeks, Gasmuls and the local administrators.

All these incidents are reflected in the frequent mention of damages in the Venetobyzantine treaties and were taken into consideration when these treaties were renewed (144). Thessalonica's developed middle classes seem to have shown more enmity

(141) Cf. Introduction to this Thesis, n. 13.

(142) R.H. Bantier L'oret *l'argent en Occident à la fin du XIII^e et au début du XIV^e siècle*, *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres* (1951) 169-174; still cf. V.L. (aurent) in *B.Z.* 46 (1953) 472, who states that the Byzantine gold coin was rare.

(143) Sp. Lambros *Τὸ ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ Βενετικὸν Προξενεῖον καὶ τὸ μετὰ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἔμποριον τῶν Βενετῶν, Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 8 (1911) 206-228, especially 206-209.

to the Westerners than the other parts of the Empire; so the orders of the Emperor to pay the Venetians indemnities were not executed strictly by the local authorities despite the protests of the Venetian Consul of Thessalonica Marco Celsi in 1319-1320. Hence we find that later they demanded the return of their houses and church.

The new Veneto-Byzantine agreement of 1322 promised them certain ameliorations and no vexation. They were granted permission to buy imported wheat. However, despite the orders of the Emperor they were not yet able to take possession of the houses promised to them in Thessalonica. Instead they were granted money. This attitude of the Thessalonicans is evidence of their localist, independent spirit (145). Furthermore, the attacks on the Venetians continued, so that they proceeded to ask for indemnities for damages inflicted upon them in several parts of the Empire, and for exemption from taxation (146). This situation lasted right up to the end of the XIV century.

On 19/7/1341 the Venetian ambassador, while offering condolences to John V on his father's death and assuring him of Venetian support, did not forget to ask for the 19.000 hyperpyra promised by Andronicus III to them as indemnities (147). Indeed Andronicus had promised that sum, but he does not seem to have accepted their claim that they should not pay "commercium" (= purchase tax) for the wheat they purchased from Turkish-occupied areas, since no pledge of security had been given to them by the Empire in those areas (148). These strained relations were further manifested by the continuing attacks on the Venetians in Thessalonica (149) and elsewhere. At the same time the Venetian conflicts with the Genoese endured

(144) See Introduction to this Section, nn. 31-32.

(145) Tafraï op.cit. 126-129; cf. Zakythinos Crise monétaire 45; Fr. Thiriet Les Vénitiens à Thessalonique dans la première moitié du XIV siècle, B 22 (1952-3)323-332.

(146) Cf. Introduction to this Section, nn. 31-32. Further attacks: Fr. Thiriet Régestes I, pp.77-78 nr 275, 13/8/1355;pp.

for a long time and frequently assumed very dramatic forms (150), the zenith being reached in the period beginning in 1348 (151).

3. THE JEWS.

The Jews were always numerous in the Byzantine Empire. Most of them were found in Chalkis, Negrepont, where they usually lived within their walled Ghetto, in Moden, Koron, Glarentza, Adrinople, Zichna, Chrysopolis, Patras, Durazzo, Rhodos, Chios, Crete, Jannina, Cyprus (152) and Thessalonica (153).

They were occupied with various industries, mainly with silk and tapestry-making (154), both within and without their prescribed quarter. They were protected by the Church and by the Law and usually they lived on friendly terms with the Christians, whom they even influenced religiously in some cases (155). They enjoyed the basic rights of the urban population and stood in the same legal position as the Christians (156). Except perhaps in Jannina from 1319 onwards, they had to pay a special annual tax, which continued for centuries (157).

79-80, nr 289, 30/1/1356; nr 291, 11/4/1356; p. 83, nr 303, 31/7/1356; p. 88, nr 325, 12/22/4/1358 etc.

(147) Thiriet op.cit. p.47, 19/7/1341.

(148) Op.cit.p.48, 16/3/1341; cf. p.51, 19/6/1341; p.47, 5/6 1341; p.54, 15/3/1344; p.56, 24/2/1345.

(149) Op.cit. p.39, 11/18/2/1339; p.42, 17/2/1340 etc. cf. Introduction to this Section nn. 31-32, and above n.146.

(150) Op.cit. p. 50, 27/7/1342; p.51, 3/4/1343; Cf. p.23,3/6 1379.

(151) Cf. Section C.

(152) Kirsten Die byzantinische Stadt, Anmerk. III, nr 19, p.26; nr 80, p.30; Text pp. 44, 37; Übersicht über die Geschichte des Judentums von Jannina, (for Jannina) by N. Bees in ^{BN 12} 1921) 159-171.

(153) Ostrogorsky H.B.S. 358 (XII century); Fr. Doelger Zur Frage des Jüdischen Anteils an der Bevölkerung Thessalonikes im XIV Jhd, The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume (Jewish Social Studies, Publications nr 5) (1953) 129-133; cf. F.D. in B.Z.46, 473.

(154) Cf. Introduction, ^a b) to this Section n. 21.

Their persecution in Epirus, Nicaea and Thessalonica after 1204 (158) was temporary. Very soon the Jews, especially those who were Venetian subjects, were firmly established in the towns as merchants, money-lenders, tanners and craftsmen. John Vatatzis' enmity towards them, - which perhaps was related to his policy of protecting local industries (159) - was later replaced by Michael VIII's tolerance. His successors followed the same policy. While before 1203 the Jews of Pera were compulsorily enclosed in their Ghetto, under Andronicus II, they were not excluded from living inside the walls of Constantinople. Their quarters were near the Venetian Colony and their Craft guilds, like those of all foreigners and of the indigenous population were indesignated parts of the city. The Venetian Jews were allowed to erect their buildings in a leased space. They paid a collective tax, but no discrimination was made against them (160).

(155) M. - M. V, 83 (1319); M. - M. I, 174-5f. (1337); Tafrali Thessalonique 39-40; cf. P.G. 152, 1220-1223: attack of some ἑπικου on Jews in Thessalonica because of religious dissensions.

(156) P. Charanis The Jews in the Byzantine Empire under the first Palaiologi, *Speculum* 22 (1947) 75-78.

(157) S. Čirkovič Spuren der Judensteuer in den Byz. Ländern, *Zbornik Rađova Viz. Inst.* 4 (1956) 141-7; cf. V.I. in B.Z. 50 (1957) 535; F. Doelger Die Frageder Judensteuer in Byzanz, *Viertel Jahr-schrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 26 (1931) 1-24; J. Starr Romania: the Jewries of the Levant after the IV crusade (1949, Paris) passim; eiusdem The status of the Jewries in the Levant after the IV Crusade, *Actes du VIe Congrès International d'Études Byzantines* (Paris 1950) 199-204; Zakynthinos *Crise monétaire* 87, n.6 citing M. - M. V, 106 (1333).

(158) This was one of the rarest in Byzantine history and the first since their persecution by Leo III in the early VIII century: Ostrogorsky H.B.S. 142; a for their persecution by J. Vatatzis in Nicaea, and by the despotate of Epirus, cf. J. Starr in *Actes du VI Congrès Byz.*, p.200.

(159) Ostrogorsky H.B.S. 394.

(160) J. Starr ib. 200-202; Romania 63ff. Cf. the demand of the

4. OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNITIES.

Other such communities were those of the Armenians, the Slavs, the Goutzovalaquions, the Albanians and the Turks.

The presence of Armenians in some towns of the Empire is indisputable. Their churches, such as the one in Thessalonica, make it certain that a whole community existed there, though we do not know its number. Their occupations included the arts, crafts and commerce (161).

In Thessalonica and in other towns there were numbers of Slavs. Like all foreigners they were scorned, even though they had become assimilated into the Greek culture, as in the case of Acindynus (162). This contempt for them was apparently due to the fact that many of them were engaged in the lower occupations, such as farming and sheep rearing on the outskirts of the towns.

The Goutzovalachians were shepherds who lived around Thessalonica and elsewhere (163). Their upper class was at least partly hellenised and formed part of the Byzantine nobility. Thus it was removed from the wider Roumanian masses, to which it belonged by blood (164).

The Albanians were nomads in Epirus, Thessaly and Acarnania and in steady conflict with the Byzantines (165). Still some

Patriarch Athanasius that the Emperor Andronicus II should leave Constantinople and stay out of it: N. Gregoras *Histor. Byz.* C. Bonn vol. II, p. 1189.

(161) Tafrali Thessalonique 40-41.

(162) Loc.cit.

(163) Cant. I, 30: I, 146-149.

(164) E. Francès Păstorii vlachi din imperiul byzantin in secolele XIII-XIV, in *Studii i Revista de Istorie* 9 (Bucarest 1956) 139-146, according to V.L., in B.Z. 49 (1956) 502-503; cf. Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* p. 49.

(165) Cant. II, 24: I, 475 (1333); II, 32: I, 494-497; cf. Halil Inalcik art. *Arnavütlik* in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* c.653 (recent

of them moved into the Byzantine towns of Epirus after 1356 (166).

Several Turks were included in the imperial guard. In Polianina, Lesbos, Lemnos, Thasos and other places of the Balkans there were small Turkish communities from the early XIV century (167).

There were also Pisan, Florentine, Ragusan, Narbonnean and other Western merchants (168).

The role of all these communities of foreigners in Byzantine society and economy varied from time to time and from community to community. Generally speaking each community played the part dictated by its social status and interests at a given moment. More actively intermingled with Byz. developments were those elements that had special concerns in the Empire, and those who had been deeply assimilated by its culture and life.

edition).

(166) S. Estopañan (ed. of) Chronicle of Komnenus and Proclus in Bizancio y España 2, ch. VIII, p. 39; cf. Cent. IV, 43: III, 317-9

(167) V. Laurent Une famille Turque, B.Z. 49 (1956) 349-368, esp. 367; cf. Cent. I, 51: I, 259:

(168) Zakythinios Crise monétaire 40.

CHAPTER II
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE URBAN
CLASSES AND THEIR POLITICAL
ORGANISATION.

a) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE URBAN CLASSES.

The relative social position of the different urban classes is generally reflected in their distribution in the plan of the towns. As a rule the non-noble classes lived on the slopes of the lower town, at the foot of the garrison headquarters (1). The farmers and lower classes of the urban population lived on the outskirts and even in the countryside around (2). The mariners preferred to live in the district near the harbour (3). The akropolis was reserved for the nobility (2), while the middle class occupied the space in between the Akropolis and the lower part of the town.

The limits between these class divisions were not strict, and a mixing of the classes was not unusual. This is attested by the fact that the houses of several rich people overshadowed those of the poor with their height and luxury and that the rich often took over the houses of their poorer neighbours (4). But since the nobility was living exclusively on the Akropolis, it is probable that these rich people were upper middle class, not nobles.

(1) E. Kirsten Die byzantinische Stadt (Text) p.45; cf. pp. 38-39; Adrinople: Cant. III, 28; II, 176B; Thessalonica: Cant. III, 38; II, 234B; cf. E. Kirsten op.cit. Anmerk. III, nr 91, p.30.

(2) Kirsten op.cit. (Text) p.39; in Servia we find this order: Cant. III, 19; II, 130-133; in Berrhoia: Cant. III, 18; II, 119-126; in Thessalonica: Cant. III, 94; II, 579-580; I, 54; I, 270-2; in New Phocaea: Cant. II, 13; I, 388-9; the demos of the Akropolis referred to by Cant. III, 94; II, 579 were certainly nobles: ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῆς ἀκρας... πόλις γὰρ ἔοικε μικρᾷ καὶ οἰκήτορας ἔχει ἰδίους.

A change of masters could change the ethnological composition of each of the main groups, as happened in Berrhoia under the Serbs (5). At that time a section of the Greek nobility had retained their rights and wealth: only this can explain the friendly relations of some Greeks with the Serbs (6), and the fact that there were some civilians who cooperated with them (7). There was a similar situation in Edessa during the second civil war (8). On the contrary all Greeks were persecuted in Jannina under the Albanians after 1356 (9), and in Servia we find no trace of pro-Serbian feelings during the second civil war (10).

There was undoubtedly a certain degree of movement and exchange between lower and higher classes (11). But this did not destroy the barriers erected by differences of wealth. There was no legal barrier to the ascent of poor people to higher posts of the State and higher sections of Society once they showed the ability for this, but such promotions were exceptions. The basic pattern of social organisation was the abysmal inequality in the distribution of wealth among the social classes. This tended to create chaos in their relations and was further aggravated by a

Cf. Cant. III, 57: II, 345-354; III, 55: II, 335-6; III, 29: II, 176-7; III, 54: II, 326-7; III, 64: II, 390-391; III, 30: II, 186; III, 32: II, 196; Greg. XVI, 1: II, 747-8; Heraclea- Cant. IV, 28: III, 209; Greg. XXVI, 12-13: III, 78-79.

(3) Cant. III, 93: II, 570-571; III, 94: II, 576, 579.

(4) Nicephorus Chumnos *Θεσσαλονικεῦσι Συμβουλευτικῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης*, ed. J. Fr. Boissonade *Anecdota Graeca* II, 169-171; cf. Cant. IV, 40: III, 291 (1354): The Catalans pushed back the mob of Constantinople and burnt some of the houses of the people which were situated near the Palace.

(5) Cant. III, 18: II, 119-126: Berrhoia (1344f); (6) *Ib.* p.124.

(7) *Ib.* pp.120, 123. —(8) Cant. III, 19: II, 127-130.

(9) Sirac Estopañan *op.cit.* 2 (1943) p.39, ch.VIII (1356f); pp. 43-44, ch.XVI ff. and esp. XIX.

(10) Cant. III, 19: II, 130-134.

(11) E.g. note Apocaucus and others, above, **Section B**, ch. I nn.

a strong hatred of the poor for the rich and contempt of the rich for the poor and the ignoble.

While in the X century and before one cannot claim an absolute and frequent identification of the notable and the socially powerful with the rich on the one hand, and of the socially insignificant with the poor on the other (12), in the XIII and XIV centuries these two identifications tended to become more and more frequent, absolute and unavoidable (13). Despite the existing interchange of classes, the social division tended to an extreme and irreconcilable polarisation, whose basic pattern was the **cruel** exploitation of the poor by the rich. The rich of whatever class in their pursuit of more and more wealth persecuted ruthlessly the poor (14).

There was no difference between the methods of exploitation and oppression used by the nobility and those used by the upper middle classes (15).

The agricultural strata of the towns, being the lower transitional class between town and country suffered from the miseries of both and enjoyed the least of the benefits of either. They were the first, immediate and constant targets of all raids (16), of exploitation, oppression by the nobles, taxes, penury and all such evils.

18, 26-29.

(12) P. Lemerle *Esquisse*, in: *Rev. Histor.* 120, Juillet - Septembre 1958, 65-70.

(13) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 71-72; Tafraïi *Thessalonique* 103-108, 29, 97-98; Diomedes *Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται* A', 97-98; cf. above, **Section** A, ch. II, n. 13a.

(14) Th. Magistros *Ad Patriarcham Niphonem*, P.G. 145, 393; Philotheus' *Homelies*, Triantafyllis-Grapputo *Ἑλληνικά Ἀνέκδοτα*, pp. 45-46; Tafraïi *op. cit.* 105; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 46-47; Charanis *Internal strife B 15 (1940-1941)*, 221-225.

(15) Tafraïi *op. cit.* 111-116; Alexius Makrembolites *apud Ihor Ševčenko*, *Zealot Revolution* 615-617; "Antizealot" *Discourse*, DOP 11 (1957) 138-139; *Cent. III, 28: II, 176-177*; *Greg. XII, 12: II, 613-614*

The conflict between the rich and the poor resulted often in a surrender of the poor (17). This meant that they were obliged to sell their small urban properties to the rich at very low prices or that their properties were confiscated or actually robbed by their avid rich and powerful neighbours, in the same way as rural small properties were confiscated or robbed or sold (18). The audacity of the rich was such that, against all the laws of social cooperation, all contracts and conventions of civilised life, they refused sometimes to pay the salaries of their workers (19). Their contravention and transgressions of penal law became the law of life in the towns as in the countryside.

From their high houses the rich practised every sort of robbery as a most arrogant manner. Even the rich upper middle classes followed them in rapacity, ferocious gangsterism and inhumane oppression (20). It seems that together with usury, such cheating prevailed in all commercial activities. Crushing terms accompanied all loans granted by usurers, who were hated by Greek people (21). Usury had been abolished in the IX century, and again

(16) Tafrafi op.cit. 16; Greg. VIII, 6: I, 246 (1307); Cant. I, 28: I, 137; cf. above, ch. I of this Section, 1. The Farmers, esp. nn. 50-52.

(17) Nic. Chumnos Θεσσαλονικεῦσι Συμβουλευτικός περί Δικαιοσύνης, in Boissonade Anecdota Graeca (Paris 1830) II, 169-171, 174, 153.

(18) Cf. Section A, Ch. I, a), and all that section, passim. Especially see Nic. Chumnos' Ἐγκώμ. εἰς Βασιλέα, Boissonade Anecdota II, 46f.

(19) Th. Magistros. De subditorum officiis, P.G. 145, 533-536.

(20) Greg. Palamas Homily XXXIX, P.G. 151, 489-492; (Cf. Tafrafi op.cit. 106): Καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι, οὐχ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρχοντες μόνον..... φιλαργυρίαν νοσοῦντες... τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πτωχῶν ἀρπαγὰς ἔχουσιν ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις αὐτῶν, πλεονεξίαν ἀγαπῶντες. Καὶ οὐχ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρχοντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι, πόσα γὰρ ἐπιζήμια τοῖς ἀγοράζουσιν οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν κἀπηλοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι ἔμποροι ἐπιτεχνῶνται μηδὲ μέτροις καὶ σταθμοῖς ὅτε δύνανται χρώμενοι.
Ἔως πότε τὸν οἶκον τῆς προσευχῆς εἰς οἶκον ἐμπορείας ἢ ἐμπαθείας λόγον ποιήσετε; Cf. Dem. Cydones Correspondance (Loenertz) I, ep. 71, C.A-sanae, P/sum, Ven. 1370-1, p. 103, l. 16. ἄνδρὶ γὰρ ἐμπόρῳ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ τιμιώτερον; cf. ib. epist. 97, Georgio Philosopho, in

in 1328 by Andronicus II, who wanted to protect the victims of the Civil war of 1321-8 (22) but all prohibitions were in vain. There are even instances of its extensive practice by the clergy (23).

As a result no effect was produced by the defence of the poor by certain intellectuals (24), such as Demetrius Cydones (25), Theodore Magistros (26), Nicolas Cabasilas (27), Gregory

Peloponnesum, Constantinopoli 1365, aestate pp. 132-4, ll. 50-51: ἀπόλοιτο τοῖς καταράτοις ἐμπόροις τὰ χρήματα καὶ ταύτην πείσαιεν δίκην ὧν ζημιώσῃ τοὺς φίλους.

(21) Nicolas Cabasilas Κατὰ τοικιζόντων, P.G. 150; c. 733, 728, 741, 748; R. Guillaud le Traité inédit "Sur l' Usure" de Nicolas Cabasilas, Εἰς μνήμην Σπυρ. Δάμπρου (1935) p. 274; Nic. Chumnos in J. F. Boissonade Anecdota Graeca II, (Paris 1830) pp. 174, 187, 137, 171-2, 46: The rate of interest was 12%; cf. Tafrahi op.cit. 112 P.n. 5 citing Greg. Palamas in Paris Gr. 1239, ff. 162-165; Eustathius in Contra insuriarum memoriam, P.G. 136, 440, cited by Tafrahi ib. n. 4.

(22) Cf. nn. 87-90 of ch. I, section A; Guillaud loc. cit.; Nic. Cabasilas Κατὰ τοικιζόντων P.G. 150, 728, Loenertz Chronologie de Nic. Cabasilas, OCP 21 (1955) 220, 223, 206; Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) pp. 85-86; eiusdem Cabasilas' Correspondence BZ 47 (1954) 54-55; Cant. II, 25: I, 322-3; II, 1: I, 311-312; cf. Nic. Cabasilas in Paris Gr. 1213, f. 277-8 (- Guillaud ib, and Tafrahi op.cit. 105 n.2, 113 n.3. Greg. I, 319; Diomedes Βυζαντινά μελέται A! 95.

(23) Nic. Cabasilas Κατὰ τοικιζόντων, P.G. 150, 733, eiusdem "Anti-zealot" Discourse, ed. Ševčenko, DOP 11 (1957) p. 92, para.4; pp. 153, 156, where usury seems to be implied.

(24) Tafrahi op.cit. 106-7.

(25) Dém. Cydonès Correspondance, éd. Loenertz I, e.p.77, τῷ μεγάλῳ Πριμικηρίῳ τῷ Φακρασῆ , Thessalonicae, Constantinopoli, 1372, poste IV, 10 2p. 110, ll. 28-31; Tafrahi op.cit. 113 n.5, citing Paris Gr. 1213, f. 389v. Cydones op.cit. ep. 5, τῷ βασιλεῦ τῷ Καντακουζηνῷ, Constantinopoli, 1347, pp. 1-2: it probably refers to the fallen aristocrats of Thessalonica. Cf. op. cit. pp. 26-31, ep.5.

Palamas (28), Alexius Makrembolites (29), and Theodore Hyrtacensis (30). Even the ecclesiastical charitable institutions (31) were of no use. Transgression of the penal law, injustice and oppression became solid organic parts of social philosophy and of economic and social reality. They had supplanted the normal rules of behaviour and the Law of the State. It is characteristic that the usurers considered their demands to be lawful, although the Justinian Law which permitted usury had been repeatedly abolished. In their opinion it was still valid (32).

The atmosphere of social tension prevalent in the countryside (33) had its counterpart in the towns. In each case a corrupt Administration cooperated closely with the rich, helping them to avoid payment of their taxes by various falsifications and transgressions of the law and by cruel oppression of the poor from whom alone excessive taxes were actually collected (34). So the

p.14 (1371), ep. to John V. Palaiol. ("the vices are natural"); p.15 para.10, ll. 33-36; pp. 16-17, pps. 2-14; ep. 5, pp. 26-31, in Thracia 1346, IX, 2 (: vivid, pessimistic description of low class misery); ep. 62, *Amico in aula potenti*, Constantinopolin, C/poli 1355-7? ll. 20-31 pp. 94-95; ep. 114, *Proceri Aulae Ioannis Palaiologi Augusti*, C/polin, C/poli 1372-3, pp. 152-3; cf. ch. III, section A of this Thesis, n. 29; I possess two undated and unpublished letters of Cydones granted to me by père Loenertz, - which show a deep compassion with the poor. They are: the letter to Chloros [v^ecticaliaris] noted under nr 321 in D. Cydonès Correspondance, ed. G. Cammelli p. 185 (; cf. also R.J. Loenertz Les recueils p. 46); and the letter to the Prefect of fishing (τῷ τῆς ἀλιευτικῆς προστατουῦντι, piscatui praefecto) noted in Cammelli's addition under nr 267, p. 178 (; cf. also Loenertz ib.). Both come from the codex Urbin. Gr. 135 (u), ff. 173-175, and should possibly be dated after 1383. -

(26) Th. Magistros Λόγος Προσωνητ. εἰς Πατρ. Νίφωνα, P.G. 145, cc.399, 409; eiusdem Ἐπεδαλονικεῶσι Συμβουλευτικῶς in Par. Gr. 2629f. 138v= Tafrali op.cit. 105; Th. Magistros also exalted the protective measures of eminent Byzantines for the poor. Such were Th. Metochites (: See Th. Magistros Λόγος Προσωνητικῶς τῷ Μ.Α.τῷ Μετοχίτῃ, P.G.

ἐν τέλει (= officials) were hated as much as the rich. No State control checked their arbitrary activities; hence several of them became excessively rich. Alexius Apocaucus, Patrikiotes, John Vatatzis and others already mentioned, all reached the higher ranks of political life without any hindrance or check to their injustices to interfere with their ascent (35).

145, 388 A - 392; cf. V. Laurent in *RÉB* 7 (1950) 145-150) and the Patriarch Niphon. Still of the first we know that he was an oppressor of the people (: Introduction to this Thesis n. 40), and of the latter that he had amassed a big fortune (Section A. ch. II, n. 64). In his works published in P.G. 145, cc. 388A-533 Magistros preaches the need of social justice and concord of all classes. All these works date before 1328: Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution* p. 604. - Note the fact that Acindynus was a pupil of Magistros: Greg. Acindyni *Epistulae* IX, *EEBΣ* 27 (1957) p. 27; cf. *Mercati Notizie* p.233, n. 13, and P.G. 150, 859-860 - Acindynus' ἱερομ. which state his low origin, which may have some relation to his friendship with Magistros.

(27) Cf. above nn. 21-23.

(28) Cf. above n. 20; add Homily IV, P.G. 151, cc. 57-64; X, ib. c. 140; XXIV, 320: XXXIX, 484-492; XLI, 512.

(29) Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution* pp. 615-617. This author, an ex-employee of the tax-farmer Patrikiotes, is one of the rare lower class XIV century authors, whose social writings have survived.

(30) Theod. Hyrtacensis *Πρὸς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα Προσγώνημα*, *Boissonade Anecdota Graeca* I, (1829) 248-253, esp. 250-251; *Μονωδία ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ... Μιχαήλ Παχ.* (1320), ib. 254-268.

(31) *Tafrali Thessalonique* 102-3, 94-95:

(32) P.G. 150, 128 - Nic. Cabasilas *Κατὰ τοκιζόντων*.

(33) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 88-91; cf. Section A, Ch. II, III,

(34) *Tafrali op.cit.* 108-109 n. 1 citing Greg. Palamas' Homily, in *Paris. Gr.* 1239, f. 284. Add: Max Treu *Theodori Pediasimi eiusque amicorum quae extant* (1899) p. 20: *Κατήει τις βαρὺς φόρων ἀπαιτητῆς ἐκ βασιλείως ὃς δεινὸν ἠγείτο εἰ μὴ τῷ κεφαλαίῳ τὸ κέρδος ἐξισωθεῖν ἀνθ' ἀπλῆς εἰσπράξῃται τῶν ἀπαιτήσεων.*
Cf. Greg. IX, 6: I, 426; IX, 2: I, 402-403.

The sale of offices was a normal practice in the Empire of the Palaiologi and was practised even by such personalities as John Cantacuzen⁸² and Theodore Metochites (35). Andronicus II was angry with Alexius Apocaucus' illegal enrichment when the latter was a State official. This, however, was due to his failure to pay the State what he had promised and to his low origins rather than to the illegalities themselves (37). Similar illegalities were practised by many others. So favouritism and clique interests became a common phenomenon (38).

To such illegalities should be added the privileged position of foreigners, which was encouraged by the ruling classes and caused the well-known reaction of the Byzantine populace (39).

As a result no philanthropy such as that practised by the Brotherhood of the Abraamites in Thessalonica (40) or that practised by the monks (41) could really alleviate the widespread misery of the lower classes.

(35) Cant. III, 8: II, 63; Ostrogorsky Féodalité 102; Cantacuzenus was proud of the political friendship of Patrikotes the ἀπογαρπεύς.

(36) O.H.B.S. 445; Greg. VIII, 4: I, 302; IX, 6: I, 425f; XIV, 11: II, 741.

(37) Cant. I, 23: I, 116-119.

(38) R. Guillard Venalité et favoritisme à Byzance, R.É.B. 10 (1952) 35-46.

(39) Cf. Introduction to this Section, nn. 31-32, 19-28; Section B, ch. I, nn. 24, 25.

(40) Tafrafi op.cit. 102; Zakythinis Crise monétaire 47.

(41) Section A, ch. II, nn. 36-39.

The social philosophy of the lower classes was, therefore, gradually crystallising into a theory of the need for justice, based on a nearly "Marxist" conception of social phenomena. This is made apparent in such sources as the following extract, where the central theme is that the exploitation of the poor is the source of the riches of the wealthy: Says Nicephorus Gregoras:

"καὶ ἦν ἀκούειν τῶν μεμφιμοίρων λεγόντων τί τε ἄλλα καὶ ὡς πενήτων ἦν εἶματά τε καὶ δάκρυα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήματα (τοῦ Σε β' ἔρ. 11 Παισιχίου), συνεισφερόμενά τε καὶ χορηγούμενα παρ' οἷς ἐπατέροιστο τόλεών τε καὶ χωρῶν διοικήσις Ῥωμαίων: Ἴν' ἐκείνων μὲν ἀπηνῶς χρωμένων τοῖς τελαικίμοις Ῥωμαίοις, οἳ τίσιν ὠνητοῖς ἀναραπόδοις, αὐτοὶ ἐπιτείχισαν τοῦτοις τὴν εἰς βασιλεῖα καταφυγὴν καὶ μὲν τὸ μέγα τοῦτο δεινὸν ἀνεκδίμητον πανταχόθεν ἔθεν ὁ τῆς δίκης ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἰς τὸ τέλος κεκοίμηται, ἀλλὰ διανέστη καὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ὄψε καὶ μόλις ἐπήνεγκε νόλασιν. Ταῦτα παρὰ πολλῶν ῥεόμενα ... (42).

(42).

This was basically the same theory as that of Alexius Makrembolites maintaining (between 1324 and 1345) in Constantinople to a poor priest shaken in his faith, that everything is common property including the land and all its produce, even though avarice and tyranny have appropriated and usurped them. "The rich, he says, need the help of us the poor, as it is we who work the land, who build the houses and the ships, we are the craftsmen (χειρεπι-στήμονες), by whom the towns are preserved" (43).

Here are the basic elements of the revolutionary "Zealotic" ideology, which inspired the great revolts of 1341-1349 and later

(42) Greg. IX, 6: I, 425-6 (1328); Zakythinos Crise monétaire 79-80.

(43) See Ševčenko Zealot Revolution pp. 616-617.

and helped to formulate the policies of the revolutionary régimes in most Macedonian and Thracian towns at that time.

Still besides the fundamental conflict of rich and poor there were other antitheses within the society of the XIV century, as we have already seen in previous chapters (44). Such were the antitheses between noble lay-men and noble clergymen, between various groups of nobles and rich, between nobles and middle urban classes, between lower and higher urban middle classes between rich noble and non-noble and poor ignoble classes, between the Greek urban classes and the Western foreign Communities who tended to replace them. There were also local and general differences, dynastic and administrative divisions and many other splits, which brought about the gradual dissolution and complex antinomy that led to the civil war beginning in 1341.

However the basic pattern to which all these antitheses were reduced was the conflict of rich and poor and the subjection of the latter to the former. It was this subjection rather than national class solidarity that was expressed in such deep-rooted social behaviour as that attested by Theodore Magistros, who states that "in times of common danger the people were expected to arm themselves and fight against the enemy", as if no social contrasts existed (45).

b) THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION
OF THE URBAN POPULATION.

The organisation of Constantinople was the model that the other towns mainly followed. Like Constantinople, almost all towns had their Senate or βουλή. In Constantinople the Senate, dating from very old times, continued to exist until the end of the Empire, but was transformed into a restricted body of high

(44) Cf. Section A, ch. I-III, passim; Introduction to the Thesis nn. 10-20 etc. passim; cf. all the chapters of Section B, passim.

(45) Th. Magistros De subditorum officiis, P.G. 145, c. 509.

dignitaries under the Emperor (:Μεγάλη Βουλή). They were selected from among the rich, and often from the noble rich. The ἔκκριτοι or προὔχοντες or ἄρχοντες of every city or town formed its senate (46), which undertook the direction of local affairs, political missions as well as all other public responsibility (47).

Through the Senate the nobility and the rich asserted their political power and influence, especially since the exclusive municipal Senates had disappeared in the X Century and reappeared in the wider political sense in the XIII century with the dissolution of the centralist State autocracy. In Melnik in 1246 all the town's nobility formed its Βουλή (48). In Thessalonica in 1322 we find the following divisions in the structure: a) the Senate, b) the Army c) the People, d) the Clergy (49). As a rule almost everywhere the Senate was composed of all the nobles over a certain age, including the higher clergy and the army officers, who took part in its sessions (50).

The law schemes worked out by the judges and magistrates were sanctioned by the Senate and the Archbishop (where such prelate existed), or by the local bishop or higher clergy official, and the lay officials. The authorities of the towns took their oath before the Senate and the Archbishop or bishop. The president of the Senate, however, was not local, but the imperial governor of the town: So it was not the symbol of State independence as in

(46) Tafraли Thessalonique 75-76. For the Μεγάλη Βουλή of Constantinople see: Cant. III, 2: II, 20-25; III, 3: II, 25-30; III, 23: II, 139-142 (1341-2); cf. Kirsten op.cit. p. 39 (text); Anmerk. III, nr 39; cf. D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz I, epist. 7 (1345) aestate vel autumno, Berrhoiae) Τῷ βασιλεῦ Καντακουζηνῷ in Thracian, p.32.

(47) E. Kirsten loc. cit.

(48) Akropolites 44, 377 (Heisenberg).

(49) Cant. I, 31: I, 145f.; cf. Philotheus Vita S. Sabbae in A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας V, 174; Tafraли op.cit. 50, 71-72, 74-75, 84.

(50) Cant. loc. cit. and III 93-94: II, 573-575: for this latter case (of 1345) see Loenertz Note sur une lettre de Démétrius Cydonès

Western Europe (51), but of centralist tendencies of the State and of the political power of the nobles of the provinces.

However, the Greek scholar Apostolos Vakalopoulos does not agree with the above-mentioned structure of the Senate. Based on Edessa of Mesopotamia, which at the close of XI century had a Βουλὴ of 12, and on the fact that the council of nobles recognised by the Venetians for a little in 1424 - according to the tradition - was also composed of 12, he holds that the same should have happened in Thessalonica and in all the towns of the Empire for a long time before 1424. This seems to be confirmed by the 12-member senates of Thessalonica and the other Greek towns under the Turks, following the Byzantine tradition (52). It is also confirmed by evidence when an important matter was examined, or a trial of political importance was made: Then an Assembly of Bishops, of the Senate and of the nobles, as distinct from the Senate itself, or of representatives of all these classes also distinct from the Senate, was held (53). Especially important was the following case: In 1327 Andronicus III asked his grandfather to allow him to enter Constantinople or to send him representatives of the Senate, of the officials of the ekklesia (Church) and of the educated section of the people (λόγιοι) in order that they might hear and transmit correctly what he had to say. Andronicus II fearing his grandson's influence on the people (δημοχαρεῖς λόγοι) as well as on a section of the nobility dispatched two of the leading clergymen, two of the selected churchmen (τῆς ἐκκλησίας λογάδες) and four of the notables from among the people (τῶν τοῦ δήμου προκρίτων).

à Jean Cantacuzène, in B.Z. 44 (1951) 407, n.6. For the presence of the clergy nobility in the Senate: M.-M. I, 174-8(s.a).

(51) Kirsten loc. cit. and esp. Anmerk. nr. III, 38, p. 27; text p. 39; Tafrafi op.cit. 71-75: This was partly the consequence of the grants of privileges to the towns' middle classes, from which the nobles also profited.

(52) A. Vakalopoulos Συμβολὴ στὴν ἱστορία τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης ἐπὶ Βενετοκρατίας, 'Ανάτυπον εἰς τοῦ τόμου Κ. Ἀρμενοπ. (1953) 11-12, 13-16.

(53) Greg. XI, 2: I, 531 (1335); IX, 2: I, 397-403.

From these the young Emperor formed an Assembly and talked to them of his policy to save the Empire from its enemies, as it had been neglected by his grand-father. He also proclaimed that he wanted to stop unjust taxation and the cruelties committed by tax-collectors in performing their duties, and that he needed money to pay his army of liberation and salvation.

When these delegates returned to Constantinople, they became the best ambassadors of Andronicus III's party and influenced the masses to the extent that they became dependent on and partisans of the young Emperor (54).

Here we are confronted with a clear distinction between Senate and the nobility and the notables in general, which seems to confirm Vakkelopoulos' point. Nonetheless we have other cases which indicate that as a rule all the nobles formed the Senate. Such was the ἐκκλησία of the nobles of the army (chiefs) and of the most notable of the other citizens called in Thessalonica in 1345 (55). The nobles of Adrianople, who called a people's assembly in 1341 (56) assumed the functions of a βουλή: one might even assert with Tafrahi that in reality the whole nobility formed the βουλή, even if not all were present in the actual collegium of the 12.

(54) Greg. IX, 2: I, 397; cf. IX, 3: I, 403-407: Esaias speaks to an assembly of ὄχλος.

(55) R-J Loenertz, Note sur une lettre de Démétrius Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène, BZ 44 (1951) . 407; Cant. III, 94: II, 575. Cf. D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. R-J. Loenertz I, epist. nr. 7, to John Cantacuzenus in Thrace, aestate vel autumnno 1345, Berrhoeae, p. 34: ἀποκτείνασα δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν τόσους καὶ τόσους (ἢ θεσσαλονίκην): so, all the nobles were the βουλή, since those killed were the βουλή; cf. nn. 48-50. Cf. also possibly the epist. 76, Gratias actas ~~modeste~~ recusat, Constantinopoli, ib. p. 109. Loenertz has not dated it, but it seems to have been written between 1345 and 1349. Cf. also epist. 99, exuli, Constantinopoli, pp. 136-7, ll. 26-27: ἡ βουλή τότε φυγῆς ὑμῶν ἐτιμήσαντο. Βουλή means possibly here the whole population of Thessalonica, if the letter were written between 1345 and 1349,

The power and will of the nobles was given direction not only in the *βουλή*, but also in inter-noble or family social gatherings in their town homes, "where they talked until late at night on political matters" (57). Indeed the towns' nobility, being often military took a leading part in the formation of policies and politics and in the work of the *βουλή* itself. Gradually they were stabilised and crystallised into an authoritative town patriciate, a more or less permanent class, like that of Constantinople which formed the *μεγάλη βουλή* (58). In Monembasis, however, we find no *βουλή*, but three leading families, who directed the towns affairs, which had formerly been in the hands of the sea-farers (59).

Therefore in conclusion we may state that the number of the members of the Senate varied at different times and in a different places. But in fact all powerful nobles exercised political power whether in or out of the *βουλή*, since the nobility influenced the people by various means. They took all important political decisions and swayed the people (*ἐνήγον τὸν δῆμον*), because this was their primary ability (60). This *ἐναγωγή* was in fact a political activity of the governing class or body, whether legally recognised as a *βουλή* or senate or not. It belonged to the general process by which the *ἄριστοι* gradually replaced the original *καστηνοὶ* in public affairs and assumed the political initiative that had belonged to the latter.

at the time of the "ochlocracy" of the Zealots as I am inclined to suggest.

(56) Cant. III, 28: II, 176-177.

(57) Greg. XII, 13: II, 619: "all those who excelled in political power and glory and directed the royal affairs, such as Cantecuzenus' mother, often convoked such gatherings", in which plots, plans, policies and conspiracies were discussed or enacted or formed. These gatherings may have often defined the main trends of Byzantine developments.

(58) D. Cydonès Correspondance, éd. Loenertz, epist. nr 7, p. 33f; Cant. III, 2: II, 19-20 (1341); cf. n. 46 above.

(59) E. Kirsten op. cit. p. 39 (text); Anmerk. III nr. 37. p. 27; Zakythinos Despotat II, 174-175.

Thus it happened that in the end the nobles' word was generally binding on the demos, except in revolutionary times (61). This gradual subjection of the demos to the nobles had political as well as economic and social consequences: the *ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ* (= bourgeois or *καστρηνοὶ*) put up as judges by the demos in Janina and other towns, or were reduced politically to impotence, since it was the nobles who called the *ἐκκλησία*. Together with the higher clergy, especially the Bishop or Archbishop, as we have said, they became the politically decisive *βουλή*, who led public affairs.

The case of the representatives of the Senate, of the clergy and the notables sent by Andronicus II to his grandson in 1327 and of their influence among the people confronts us with a classic case of *ἐναγωγή τοῦ δήμου* by the nobility (62). The fact that no delegate of the middle or lower classes was included in the group sent by the Elder Emperor, shows even Andronicus' III's real degree of consideration and respect for the people's views, for whom he claimed to be fighting. For him, as for every noble, the people had to be politically used, swayed and induced to serve his interests. He made no demand that the popular assembly should also be represented in that delegation. However he promised immunities to the people and revenues to the army, and the

(60) In Berrhoia in 1342 they decided to pass over to Cantacuzenus - few dissenting - and imposed their will on the people, whom they led, in a general assembly. However the representatives of the Assembly (cf. below) included: Astraperes for the nobles, Allelouias for the demos and Syros for the Clergy (Cant. III, 58: II, 350-354). Similarly "*ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἐδεσσαίων τῆς αὐτῶν* (nobles) *ἐξήρτητο γνώμης* " in 1328 (Cant. I, 54: I, 274) and the people of Bizye was led by the Asans, who had extensive property there (1343) (: Cant. III, 80: II, 494): (*Σχεδόν ἤγειτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀσάν*).

(61) Kirsten op.cit. p. 43, (Text); Anmerk. III nrs 68-69, p. 19. An important example was the claim of the nobility of Thessalonica in 1345 from Manuel Cantacuzenus to grant immunity to their town as a whole, and dignities and revenues for themselves and the army these were their terms for fighting the Zealots to the end and surrendering Thessalonica to him. This initiative would normally

Patriarch spoke some time later to an Assembly of ὄχλος ἀγοραῖος .
in defence of Andronicus III's policy and at the same
time inciting them to rebellion against Andronicus II. Nonetheless
theoretically, the *δημοκρατία* never ceased to be regarded as a
political entity in their dealings with the Emperor, although the
decisive power behind them, whom they had to obey, was the aristo-
cracy. Disobedience as in 1341 in Adrianople, Didymoteichum and
other towns meant the beginning of the civil war.

In theory the *δημος* was a community subject to the Emperor
through the *dux* or *στρατηγός* , i.e. the governor of the *thema*,
whose presence, title and character stressed the military impor-
tance of the towns (63). But in revolutions even his authority
was challenged by the *δημος*, and in peace it was challenged by the
nobility, who dictated their will to him. This was the case even
in newly-founded towns of the XIV-XV centuries like Vheres, Komot-
tine and Drama (64).

The people's Assembly, the existence of which is attested
since the end of the XII century and more definitely since the
year 1197, when Alexius III first called one as a means of raising
funds (65), played an important part in the politics of the XIII
and XIV centuries. It replaced the older "demoi" and parties that

have belonged to the middle classes (Cant. III, 94: II, 574-575).

(62) Cf. above n. 54.

(63) D. A. Zakythinos Μελέται περὶ τῆς διοικητικῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ
τῆς ἐπαρχιακῆς διοικήσεως ἐν τῷ Βυζαντινῷ κράτει, *ΕΕΒΣ* 21 (1951) 197ff.;
cf. *Synodus poeniseccleasticis afficit quosdam rebelles Epiri*,
P.G. 152, cc. 1217-1220 (nr. III).

(64) Cf. above n. 61.

(65) Nic. Choniates 631 (Bonn). According to Werner Volkstüm-
liche Häretiker p. 54a, since the X century the towns' popular
assemblies had nothing to do with people's representation; cf. P.
Charanis Internal Strife, *BIS* (1940-41) 219 - 220.

had disappeared in the mid - XI century (66). But the hippodrome where the "demoi" used to meet, continued to be used occasionally for State ceremonies up to the mid - XIV century.

Theodore II tried to use the Assemblies of the people in order to gain the support of the urban middle classes and Michael VIII called them for fiscal matters. Likewise Andronicus I had based his power on all classes, *μεγάλα* , *μέσα* , *μικροί* (67).

The assembly of all - classes that was called by Cantacuzenus in Constantinople in 1347 (68) resulted from his experiences in the civil war, where he had learnt to take the people into account, and also from established political Custom, which was the regular practice in Adrianople (1341), Berrhoia (1342-3), Thessalonica, Constantinople, Artá, Thomokastron and elsewhere in the Empire (69). This assembly was called in order to gain information about and to confirm fiscal measures and great political decisions at critical moments (70). It did not draught laws nor criticise the rulers. Those who took part in it were soldiers (= army officers), clergy, merchants, artisans and the people, who sometimes imposed such an assembly on the Emperor. This happened in 1341, when the city and especially the financiers of Constantinople forced the Emperor to call ^{an} Assembly of all classes to secure its approval for extra taxes and duties (70).

(66) Werner op.cit. 69a-b; R. Guillard La disparition des Courses *Études Byzantines*, Offprint from *Mélanges O! et M. Merlier* (1955) 17pp.; F.D., B.Z. 49 (1956) 203.

(67) Eustathius of Thessalonica *De Thessalonica urbe a Latinis capta* (Bonn) p. 399 cited by P. Charanis *On the Social Structure*, BS 12 (1951) 149, n. 242.

(68) Cant. IV, 5: III, 348; IV, 12: III, 80 (1347); cf. III, 4: II, 34 (1341); Raul *Epistulae XII*, ed. Loenertz, E.E.B.Σ. 26 (1956) p. 154= epist. 7 (1366), ll. 20-24 (for Peloponnese).

(69) For these examples see above. For Thomokastron and Artá see Cant. II, 32-38: I, 494-534, esp. 35: 515-8; cf. Introduction to this section n. 11 (1337).

(70) Cant. III, 4: II, 94 (1341, C/ple): Werner op.cit. 54a.

This happened in several cases when the Emperor or the nobles felt it wise to secure the Assembly's approval.

Such Assembly was presided over by the Governor of the town in question or by one of the nobles or by the Emperor, if it was called in Constantinople. Sometimes it was called by the Bishop, as in Thessalonica, or even by the demagogues, as in Thessalonica in 1321, when this town passed to the rebel Andronicus III (71). Similarly in 1327 the Patriarch Hesaias called by bells ὄχλον ἀγοραῖον πλεῖστον to support the Junior Emperor; with them were included the nobles who collaborated with him (συστήματα εὖ γεγονότων) (72).

Whatever the power of the people's Assembly, it never included legislation, because the latter always remained with the βουλή, the κριταὶ and the magistrates, and above all with the Emperor. These defined the policy of the Empire and directed all its affairs except for the confirmation of fiscal measures thus restricting the people's role almost to nothing. The only right of importance which remained with the popular Assemblies, was that of electing people for several offices of the State machinery. This seems to have been practised at least in some liberal towns which tended to separatism, such as Thessalonica, as we learn from an undated letter of Demetrius Cydones (73).

(71) Then the demagogues called the Assembly by bell-ringing: Greg. VIII, 11 : I, 356. About the bishop's initiative in calling the Assembly see Tafrafi op.cit. 74, n2, where Theod. Magistros Θεσσαλονικεῦσι Περὶ Ὁμονοίας, Paris.Gr. 2629f. 130v. is cited.

(72) Greg. IX, 3: I, 405-46; cf. IX, 2-3: I, 397-407.

(73) Dem. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz I, epist. 68, civi, Thessalonican, Constantinopoli, p. 100-101: πάνυ δὲ ἤσθην ἀκούσας ἐπὶ σὲ τὰς τῆς πόλεως φήφους ἐλθούσας, οὔτε γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἔδοξας ἱκανὸς πράγμασι χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἠὲδοκίμησεν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσασα ὃν ἐλέσθαι ἐχρῆν. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ τὸ τοῦ χρόνου μῆνος ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ μόνον ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ζητουμένων αἰρεθῆναι τινά. Τὸ δὲ μὴ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον προστεθῆναι τῷ σχήματι, τοῖς ἐλομένοις ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς αἰρεθεῖσιν ἔχει ζημίαν, μὴ τοίνυν μισθὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ μὰ γράμματα ζήτηι"...

If such a right was exercised, it certainly gave rise to serious political plots, fermentation and rivalries, in which the people's power came to be emphasised and enhanced, though it is improbable that lower class people would have been elected. Therefore it was natural that demagogy would flourish in the Assemblies, even though they were rarely convoked, had no regular, fixed session times or legislative duties, and were simply instruments of the ruling class (74). Everybody had the right to speak in them, but not to oppose the prepared decisions of the Senate (βουλή) and the nobility (75). So the right of free expression was not real.

Still, although the popular assemblies emphasised the restricted political life and role of the wider masses, there is no doubt that they played some part in the formation of concrete sociopolitical ideologies, such as that of the revolutionary Zealots and of various intellectuals (such as Nicolas Cabasilas, Demetrius Cydones, Alexius Makrembolites, Nicephorus Choumnos, Theodore Magistros, Theodore Pediasimus, Theodore Hyrtakenus and others).

This seems to have been written to Cabasilas or to another friend not during the Zealotic régime, of which D. Cyd. disapproved, but after its collapse. Cyd. was in Constantinople since 1345.

(74) Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker, 54a. This point cannot prove Werner's **assertion** (ib.) that in the XIII century the Assembly no longer consisted of all the citizens, but included only the δυνάτοί, the officials and the militia. Werner's claim is only valid concerning such cases as those noted in n. 60, which refer to a variation of βουλή.

The Zealot phenomenon did not appear suddenly in Byzantine society and political ideas, but grew gradually out of the specific conditions already described. At the same time it developed from the ferments that took place among the people and reached their highest point in the popular Assemblies (76). In them the poorer masses became more conscious of themselves and of their power, the more so because they felt more isolated from the upper classes, who hated them bitterly and treated them with contempt, but sometimes showed them respect and flattered them, as in the civil wars (77). The Assemblies were the only physical means of effecting an all-class gathering, which was so necessary for the exchange of views and the building up of political links, ideas and parties.

In such an elementary political life as that of the Assemblies and certainly also of the guilds the lower classes found an outlet for bitter feelings, sharpened their political acumen, and gradually transformed themselves into an organised, well-equipped party, which was rich in new, revolutionary ideals and visions. These ideals fascinated even the profoundly embittered and backward rural and some of the urban middle classes. The nobles' prestige disappeared before that of the new poor class leaders, who matured in the guilds and in these Assemblies (77a). The

(75) Tafrahi's citation of Cant. III, 93: II, 573 (in his *Thésalonique au XIV siècle* pp. 74-75n. 4) as an example of free speech in the assemblies is misleading, because the above passage refers to an ἐκκλησία of the nobility, of the army (chiefs) and of the most notable of the other citizens. So it was not an all-class assembly: Loenertz, *Note sur une lettre de Démétrius Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène*, B.Z. 44 (1951) 407; Cant. III, 94: II, 575.

(76) Cf. *Theod. Magistros Desubditorum Officiis*, P.G. 145, 544: Zealot = one who sacrifices oneself for the sake of the people.

(77) This was often shown in convocation of Assemblies by the rebel leaders, who consulted thus the people on constitutional and political matters: Charanis *Internal Strife*, B 15 (1940-41) 221f; Greg. IX, 2-4: I, 397-409, esp. 406; VIII, 6: I, 319.

great demagogue Muzalon of the XIII century was followed by others of equally humble origin in the XIV century, such as Alexius Apocaucus, John Vatatzis, Kōmitopoulos, or by others of noble birth who turned to the people, like Michael and Andrew Palaeologus in Thessalonica (78). At that time no doubt they offered new ideals to attract the poor. In Adrinople in 1341 before any leader had appeared the people were opposed to Cantacuzenus and spoke boldly in the Assembly; but the majority seem to have been afraid of the nobles, who had flogged any who expressed views in opposition to their own. This practice continued until the demagogues such as Branos the digger and day labourer, Mongdoughis and Phrangopoulos began their activities. The leaders of the people of Constantinople that Al. Apocaucus used for his propaganda after 1341 against Cantacuzenus were ἀποροι, χάλιοι, ὑπὸ πενίας ἐτοίμως ἔχοντες καὶ τῶν θεινοτάτων κατατοχμῶν (79). Such must have been the leaders of the revolts of the twenties (80), i.e. demagogues from the lower classes, whose very existence evidently depended on the ecclesia of all classes, since it was here that they received their training.

Our concluding remark in this Section refers to the relation between assembly and βουλὴ. The obvious political opposition of these two bodies reflected the deep social and economic contrast between poor and rich, that lay at the bottom of Byzantine politics in the later centuries.

(77a) For these changes see evidence in Section C, chapters I and II.

(78) For demagogues see Tafrali Thessalonique p. 73, n. 5, citing Isidorus, M/S Paris Gr. 1192; cf. Greg. XIV, 11: II, 741 for Vatatzis. Cf. further for them in Section C.

(79) Cant. III, 22: II, 136-7.

(80) Ševčenko Zealot Revolution p. 603 n. 2; p. 604 nn. 7, 9: p. 617, nn. 68-71.

Opposing the Assembly led by the demagogues were the influential βουχὴ of the nobles, who were the political leaders of the urban population. Eventually the βουχὴ succeeded in replacing the καστρηνοὶ in their political roles (81). The long struggle for this replacement we have already seen in previous parts of this Thesis. The final phase of this very dramatic conflict we are going to see in the following pages, which deal with the Zealot revolution and the rural and urban conditions between 1341 - 1355.

(81) Kirsten Die byzantinische Stadt (Text) p. 43; Anmerk. III, nrs 68-69, p. 29.

SECTION C:

URBAN AND RURAL CONDITIONS
IN THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE
DURING THE GREAT SOCIAL
UPHEAVALS OF 1341-1354.

S E C T I O N C

C H A P T E R I: U R B A N A N D R U R A L
C O N D I T I O N S B E T W E E N 1341
A N D 1347.

The urban and rural conditions of the period 1341-1354 are inextricably related to the social and political revolts and the policies of the leaders of the two rival parties. These revolts were the logical outcome of the social, economic and political contradictions of the preceding period. They greatly affected the social structure of the Empire though they did not bring about far-reaching and permanent changes in it.

a) F R O M 1341 T O T H E D E A T H O F
A P O C A U C U S (1345).

In both towns and country the elements of subversion prevalent among the lower classes had been active for a long time before 1341. The political issue of the succession to Andronicus III was exploited by the clique of the upstart Apocaucus, John Calecas the Patriarch (after 1342-3) and Acindynus the leader of the Barlaamites as well as by a group of Senators, pronoiars, financiers, merchants and State officials (1), led by Anna of Savoy the Empress (2). All these had various reasons for being dissatisfied with Cantacuzenus during the reign of Andronicus.

(1) Cant. III, 2-19; II, 14-125, passim (1341); III, 20-22; II, 125-137; III, 81; II, 112 Greg. XII, 15; II, 623f; XII, 3-11; II, 579-610; cf. Cant. IV, 5-6; III, 33-43; τινὲς τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχθρῶν [Καντακουζηνῶ] οὐκ ὀλίγων, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐργαστηρίοις ἐμπορευομένων ἀργυραμοιβῶν δυσμενεύοντες (in 1347). Cf. Charanis, Internal Strife, B. 15 (1940-1) 220-3; R. J. Loenertz Dix huit lettres de Grégoire Acindyne analysées et datées, OCP 23 (1957) 17-9.

Their main reason for discontent was his favourable **policy** to his friends the provincial pronoians in land matters and other critical issues (3).

Most significant was the fact that the clique of Constantinople came to be dominated by the three upstarts (Al. Apocaucus, John Calocas and Acindynus) whose political policies were dictated by their feelings of inferiority to the nobles and the latter's contempt for them (4). The three upstarts depended for their power on their pronoian friends and mainly on the lower classes, from which they were descended (5), and whose **antinoble** feelings and Barlaamitic religious inclinations they used as political weapons (6).

After the death of Andronicus III Cantacuzenus strengthened his position, by granting supplementary pronoiae to all the military nobility of Constantinople and the whole of Macedonia and Thrace (7), who had long been expecting them from him (8).

(2) Greg. XV, 3: II, 753-4: **she** hated Cantacuzenus and his wife Eirene for their power during her husband's life.

(3) Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP (11 (1957) 157-8; Cant. III, 24-27; II, 144-173; III 28: II, 178-9; cf. III, 2: II, 19-21; **cf. also** the Introduction to the Thesis nn. 68-69; Section A, ch. I, Cf. Greg. XII, 10-11: II, 605-611; Cant. III, 36: II, 218-225; III, 26: II, 160-165.

(4) Cf. Introduction to the Thesis part C).

(5) Cf. Cant. III, 4: II, 34; Werner, Volkstümliche Häretiker 54a, nn. 85-86; Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρηγ. Παλαμᾶν, P.G. 151, 608B - 609A - B and Acindynus Κατὰ τῶν αἰρέσεων Γ. Παλαμά, P.G. 150, 859.

(6) Philotheus Vita S. Sabbae, A.P. Kerameus Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας V, 332-335; Cant. III, 98: II, 602-3; M. - M. I, 243-255 = P.G. 152, 1273-1284 CIX, Libellus synodalis Cf. Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρ. Παλαμᾶν, P.G. 151, 600-612ff.; Ἀναφορά Ἀρχιερέων, P.G. 151, 767 D - 770D.

(7) Section A, ch. I, nn. 72-73, 84, 104-106.

(8) Greg. XIV, 5: II, 708-9.

Apocaucus turned against the mass of the Cantacuzenian nobility and with the support of the anti-Cantacuzenian nobles of Constantinople he took over the leadership of the army and the navy (9). Next he incited and armed the revolutionary demos of Constantinople, whom he influenced, through his ἀποροι and λάλοι agents (10). In October 1341 the mob started plundering the property of Cantacuzenus in Constantinople and many of them received offices and hours as a result (11). Although this was in no way a program of social reform (12), it caused a strong reaction on the part of the noble partisans of Cantacuzenus. As leaders of the towns' armies they forced him to accept the crown (26 October 1341) (13), despite his moves to reconcile himself with the clique of Constantinople (14). After that almost all towns (15) refused to recognise Cantacuzenus against the will of their nobility. This was **the** first serious anti-noble manifestation in the later centuries

(9) Greg. XVI, 10: II, 605-606; Cant. III, 16: II, 99; III, 82: II, 506; D. Cydones Μονωδία, P.G. 109, c. 640: οὐς δὲ δύε χειραίνειν ἔδει ὡς σφίσι τῆς ἀρχῆς περικοπτομένης, ἐγγέλων, ὡς περ προστιθέντες ταῖς οὐσί. Cf. Introduction to the thesis n. 127.

(10) Cant. III, 22: II, 135-137; cf. III, 24-25: II, 152-6; Greg. XII, 12: II, 607.

(11) Greg. XII, 10-11: II, 608-610; Cant. III, 22-23: II, 135-144; III, 26: II, 160-165; III, 88: II, 541-6.

(12) George Chumnos' "democratic" declarations in the βουλή in August 1341 were mere propaganda: Cant. III, 2: II, 19-21.

(13) Cant. III, 24-28: II, 144-162; III, 46: II, 279-280; III, 14: II, 89-90; III, 92: II, 564-567. Lemerle L'Émirat d' Aydin 148, n.1.

(14) Greg. XII, 11: II, 610-611; XII, 12: II, 614-5; Cant. III, 25: II, 159-160; III, 33: II, 199-204; XII, 14: II, 620.

(15) Except Pamphilos, Koprinos and the fortress Empylion in Thrace: Cant. III, 26: II, 160-161; III, 30: II, 184; III, 50: II, Add also Prosoikos; Cant. III, 42: II, 256-258.

of the Empire and soon developed into a deep social rift. The people arrested the nobles and sent them as prisoners to Constantinople (15). Throughout Macedonia and Thrace, both in town and country, class war broke out between rich and poor (16). The only part of the Empire which remained peaceful and loyal to Cantacuzenus was that situated West of Thessalonica, i.e. Central, Western and Southern Greece, provinces with a strongly aristocratic social structure (17). Apocaucus and his men (οἱ Βυζαντινοὶ πρόεδροι) continued the instigation of the masses against the rich, to expirpate the latter and take over their positions. Their weapons included aphorism and anathema (18), which were unusual in the hands of the lower classes.

On the other hand the monks and their hesychastic leaders openly supported Cantacuzenus and urged him to undertake the leadership of the struggle of the nobles and Hesychasm against the lower classes and Barlaamism (19). Cantacuzenus sent his married nobles back to their homes to protect them against the revolutionaries and to keep them as a reserve (20). However this proved useless against the people's force. The nobles failed to influence the people of Adrinople in an all-class assembly (21), and under the leadership of a digger and two artisans the mob rose violently against the rich, whom they arrested and whose property

(16) Greg. XII, 12: II, 613; Cant. III, 50: II, 296-300; IV, 35: III, 255; cf. Werner op.cit. 52b; Lemerle L'Émirat d' Aydin 158.

(17) Cant. III, 50: II, 296-8; Lemerle ib.

(18) Greg. XII, 12: II, 713-4; XII, 10: II, 607-8; Cant. III, 30: II, 188-190; Greg. XII, 13: II, 616 (:during John V's coronation); Cant. III, 36: II, 218-225.

(19) These identifications appear clearly from the following texts: Greg. XVI, 5: II, 826-7; Cant. IV, 24: III, 173-4; cf. Tafrali Thessalonique 202-203. The struggle of the nobles appeared to be and in fact was identical with the struggle of Hesychasm against Barlaamism, or of Orthodoxy against Heresy, or of law and tradition against atheism, subversion and socio-political revolution; cf. Introduction to the Thesis, part d), espec. nn.91-96, and more esp. 93. Greg. Palamas' religious policy corresponded to

they sacked. This was a wave of spontaneous revenge against the arrogance and oppression of the rich, which included both nobles and the higher middle classes of town and country. It was also the start of a general upheaval throughout the Empire, whose mobs were induced by their leaders to adopt the cause of John V Palaiologus as their flag according to a well-known pattern of Byzantine politics (22). Cantacuzenus speaks clearly of a common rebellion of almost all the towns together (23), in which no distinction as to family was made by the rebels (24). This implies that there was a central leadership of the rebellions (25) and that the limits of the two camps depended to some extent on political criteria and not merely on class criteria (26). This is further indicated by the fact that in times of danger several of Cantacuzenus' men fled from him to Constantinople (27). Also to the leaders of the revolutionary party besides these already mentioned were added such nobles as the eparch of Thessaly Michael Monomachus and Sir Guy de Lusignan Governor of Pheres (28).

to or was identical with Cantacuzenus' social policy: Greg. XVIII, 6:II, 899; cf. G. Mercati *Notizie* p. 221, n.2: text of an adversary of Aczindynus, where the monks appear as a solid party: *Τὰ παρὰ τῶν καλογήρων λεγόμενα.*

(20) Cant. III, 28: II, 173-5.

(21) Greg. XII, 14b: II, 620-623; Cant. III, 30: II, 185-190.

(22) Cf. Charanis *Internal Strife, Byz. 15* (1940-41) 208-230: he stresses the role of the people in dynastic and public affairs, esp. see pp. 219-221.

(23) Cant. III, 28: II, 178: *ἐστασίαζον πάσαι κοινῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους*; III, 30: II, 184: *ὡσπερ ἐκ συνδήματος*. Cf. Enveri *Les gestes d' Umur Pasha* in Lemerle *l'Émirat d' Aydin* 151.

(24) Cant. III, 28: II, 176-95; Greg. XII, 12 - : II, 613-4, Neili *Ἐγκώμιον Γρηγ. Παλαμά*, P.G. 151 672 D (1347); Kirsten *Die Byzantinische Stadt* (Text) p. 45; Anmerk. III nr 31, p.30; p. 38, Anmerk. III, nr. 32.

(25) Cf. Cant. III, 30: II, 185-6.

(26) Cf. Charanis loc. cit; Cant. III, 29: II, 179-181.

(27) Cant. III, 29: II, 179-181; Greg. XII, 12: II, 615-6.

(28) Cant. III, 31: II, 190-192; III, 45: II, 276-7; Greg. XII,

The easy passage of people such as the noble protostrator Synadenus in summer 1342 from Cantacuzenus' to Apocaucus' alliance (29) points to the same conclusion, as does the fact that the Palaeologian party threatened to deprive the Cantacuzenian nobles of their lands and give them to others, and that they promised grants to nobles who would obey the Cantacuzenians (30).

Meanwhile the revolutionary regimes were stabilised in the towns and country of the Empire.

After the success of the people the government of Adrianople was shared between Branos the digger who led the guard, and Manuel Apocaucus, representative of Constantinople (31), according ^{to} a classic pattern which prevailed in all Propalaeologian towns during the period of the revolution. The presence of the Palaeologian representatives was a measure taken before the revolts (32), but it was intensified and used for more specific purposes during the revolts, apparently to mitigate and control the power of the local popular zealotic movements.

Similar Propalaeologian regimes under upstarts and Palaeologian nobles who led their armies were established all over Thrace and Macedonia (33). Behind these mixed regimes old separatist tendencies were encouraged and served by the people's anti-cantacuzenian and anti-noble revolt.

15: II, 623. Others elsewhere: Greg. XII, 14: II, 620; Cant. III, 30: II, 185-7; III, 38-35: II, 235-243. Irene Choumnaina Paleologina: R. J. Loenertz Dix huit lettres de Grég. Acindyne analysées et datées, OCP 23 (1957) 136, 133. Their chief motive was discontent with Cantacuzenus on land or political matters.

(29) Cant. III, 32: II, 193-5; cf. Cant. III, 32: II, 195-6 for Constantinus Palaeologus son of the Dux Michael; cf. III, 49: II, 292-6; for the date cf. Lemerle *l'Émirat d'Aydin* 148 n. 1.

(30) Cant. III, 39: II, 240; Greg. XII, 12: II, 615-6; cf. Cant. III, 30: II, 185-190.

(31) Cant. III, 78: II, 484-5.

(32) Cant. III, 46-47; II, 279-283: two "servants" (οἰκέται) of Anna of Savoy led the army of Didymoteichum in 1340-1341.

Thus political criteria overshadowed class criteria, which is confirmed by further facts. After John V's coronation (19/11/1341) in Constantinople Apocaucus consolidated his official governing clique, of which he became the dictator (34). His special attention was given to the appointment of suitable low-class people, many of whom were his relatives, for administrative posts especially in the army. To these he gave many grants and in return he used them to direct the popular movement (35) and to unite and control the Zealot party to his advantage. Therefore, although these regimes deprived the Cantacuzenian nobles of their property and in some cases gave the lower classes a chance of freedom (e.g. Rentina) (36), such freedom from oppression does not appear to have been the rule, nor was there any real difference between the two systems - Cantacuzenian and Palaiologian - as regards their social program, despite their partial differences of social basis. No widespread social reforms were effected by the

(33) John Vatatzis is, an upstart ex-governor of Thessalonica, became governor of the towns of Rhodope: Cant. III, 32: II, 195-199; cf. III, 33-35: II, 200-218. A similar régime was established in Pamphilon when the people arrested its governor Michael and sent him to Constantinople: Cant. III, 56: II, 339-341, - In Heraclea Young Men became governors and leaders of the town: Philothei Homily in Triantaphyllis - Grapputo Anecdota Graeca pp.65-66, 13. - Goudelis, a "toaster" of Anna, was appointed governor of Polystylon by Apocaucus in 1342: Cant. III, 46: II, 277-8. - In Anaktoroupolis (= $\text{H}\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$) we find as late as 1350 Alexius from Velikoni of Bithynia, a mercenary of Apocaucus as governor; he practised piracy there; after Apocaucus' death (1345) he, like many others, elsewhere, became dictator of that town, he looted Christoupolis and tried to subdue Christoupolis, Thasos and Lemnos: Cant. IV, 17: III, 114-5. - In Gratianoupolis of Chalcidica we find the upstart Angelitzis, who had imprisoned the nobles and now freely enjoyed the treasures he had illegally discovered: Cant. III, 69: II, 423-5. - In Skopelos in 1342 the people out of favour for Apocaucus disobeyed their pro-cantacuzenian governor

rebels, except perhaps in Thessalonica, which crucial case we shall now consider.

The revolutionaries of Thessalonica were known as Zealots. While in March 1342 Cantacuzenus managed to take Melnikon, the Zealots of Thessalonica incited the people (37), expelled the

and to their disaster they unsuccessfully attacked the "Scythians": Cant. III, 51: II, 302-4. - In Garella we find a local archon Kontostephanos, and John Katsbolenus, a servant of Anna (οἰκέτης), who apparently controlled Kontostephanos as her representative: Cant. III 75: II, 473-4. - Komitopoulos and Vatatzis, οἰκέτοι of Anna too, were leaders of the Army of Didymoteichum. They had been appointed by Anna long before 1341 or before any revolt could be presaged, apparently to watch Cantacuzenus' movements at those critical times: Cant. III, 46-47: II, 281-3. - In Apros, Gallipolis, Aenus and all other towns Governors were appointed by Anna and the Constantinopolitan régime: Cant. III, 77: II, 478-9, 483-4. - In Bizye the Governor George Palaiologos was obviously appointed by Constantinople after 1341: Cant. III, 79: II, 488-9. - In Adrinople we have seen Brenos and Manuel Apocaucus at first: Cant. III, 78: II, 484-5. After Apocaucus' flight to Cantacuzenus (ib. we find Paraspondylos as Governor and a bitter anti-cantacuzenian "popolero", Mangaphas as his colleague (loc.cit.). - In Tzernomianou we find Hierax, an anti-cantacuzenian οἰκέτης of Anna as Governor: Cant. III, 85: II, 525. - All towns' authorities imitated the central authorities of Constantinople: οἱ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν πόλεων ἐπιτετραμμένοι... κολαστικοὶ τινες καὶ ἀνήμεροι καὶ θηριώδεις ἐφιλοτιμοῦντο εἶναι. -

Ever low-class people (e.g. Glykas) undertook espionage under the cover of confessor: Cant. III, 50: II, 299-300.

(34) He even aspired to the throne: Greg. XII, 10: II, 606-7; cf. Cant. III, 51: II, 305; III, 22: II, 135-9; III, 39: II, 218-225; cf. III, 17-19 for his intention to make Andronicus his son-in-law Emperor or King; cf. III, 54: II, 322-4, 327-8.

(35) Cant. III, 36: II, 218-225; Cant. III, 51: II, 305.

(36) Cant. III, 45: II, 270-277.

(37) For the real meaning of the cross, which they used as emblem

governor the leader of the party and 1000 nobles from the town and pillaged their properties. Thus they enriched themselves and compelled the middle classes either to join their party or to suffer the same fate as the nobles (38). These facts together with the presence of refugees from the islands and barbarian countries have proved that the majority of the Zealots belonged to the poorer classes and were their leaders (38a).

Still there were several nobles such as Michael Palaiologus, who had been their leader until 1345 (39), and also the despot Andrew Palaiologus, who had been one of their original leaders (40). Other nobles such as Cocalas (41), G. Isaris and Chebaron (41a) seem occasionally to have belonged to the party. These richer members of the party, who included **entrepreneurs**, merchants and foremen tried to stop the people from pillaging (42).

Probably because the party included these richer members, at least in the beginning it did not yet envisage any program of social reform. Added to this, reform at that time was not possible because of the influence of the socially conservative clique of Constantinople, who in 1342 imposed on the Zealots a bishop of

and legitimistic pretext, see E. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker 65a-b.

(38) Cant. III, 37-39: II, 225-243; Neili Έγκώμιον Γρ. Παλαμά, P.G. 151, 672D; Greg. XIII, 10: II, 672-6, especially 674f; cf. XIII, 1: II, 634; N.A. Bees Ἀρμενοπουλικά Ἀνάλεκτα, Τόμος Κ. Ἀρμενοπούλου, (1952, Thessalonica) 370; cf. Cant. IV, 17: III, 118: ἐπὶ τῷ διαρπάζειν τὰ τῶν ἔχόντων ἄποροι ὄντες αὐτοὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά... ἰδίαις ὠφελείαις ἔνεκα.

For the date cf. Lemerle L'Emirat d'Aydin 148n.1.

(38a) Philotheus Vita St. Sabbae, Kerameus Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσοχουμικῆς Σταχυολογίας V, p. 194; cf. Tafrahi op.cit. 258 n.2.

(39) Cant. III, 93: II, 568-574; 94: 574-582; Cf. Section B.ch. I, nn. 90, 97.

(40) Cant. III, 93: III, 93: II, 568-570; 93-94: 573-577; IV, 15: III, 104-5: εἰ ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης; G. Kordatos Ἀκμή καὶ Παρακμή τοῦ Βυζαντίου, Athens (1953) pp. 300-301:

their own choice, Makarios (1342-1345 or 46) (43), and a new governor, John Vatatzis (1342-1344) the well known upstart ἀπογραφεὺς (44). The latter shared authority with the chief leader of the Zealots Michael Palaiologus, (45), - like Manuel Apocaucus in Adrinople and others elsewhere (46), - and with other lower class young Zealot leaders and officials (47). It was the presence of such nobles and Palaiologians that mitigated the fury of the mob and as a result no noble lost his property if he was pro-palaiologian. On the contrary the pro-palaiologian nobles received more land in reward (48). This happened to one hundred of the thousand noble refugees from Thessalonica when, fearing the pillage of their properties and other dangers to their families in Thessalonica (49) they including Koteanitzis and later Synadenus returned to the town and submitted to the victors (50). (1342).

In the meantime the devastation of the country and the attacks on the towns by the Cantacuzenian army resulted in turning against the usurper even those few towns which had stayed loyal to

(41) Cant. III, 93-94; II, 574, 581; Cf. I, 48: I, 232-6; I, 43: I, 208-216; M. - M. I, 177; Tafrali Thessalonique 59, 242-8.

(41a) R.-J. Loenertz Dix-huit lettres de Grég. Acindyne analysées et datées, OCP 23 (1957) 126-7, 133, 139.

(42) E. Werner op.cit. 53b, 60b; Cf. D. Cydones Monodia, P.G. 109, 641: Οὐς δὲ δυσχεραίνειν ἔδει ὡς εἶσι τῆς ἀρχῆς περικοπτομένης, ἔγειδων, ὡς περ προστιθέντες τοῖς οἴσει.

(43) Cant. III, 34-35; II, 209-218; Greg. XII, 14: II, 620; Parisot Cantacuzène p. 182; Philothei Λόγος εἰς τὸν Παλαμῶν, P.G. 151, 579 C-D; cf. P.G. 153, 904B; Tafrali Thessalonique des Origines 296; Gregorii Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX; ed. R. - J. Loenertz EEBΣ 27 (1957) 100, ll. 74-75.

(44) P. Lemerle Philippos 236; Greg. XIV, 11: II, 741: he succeeded to Michael Monomachus, ex-archon of Thessalonica: Cant. III, 58: II, 355-6.

(45) Cf. Charanis Internal Strife, B 15, 221-3; cf. Apocaucus' influence in Thessalonica (1342-3).

(46) Cf. above nn. 31-33.

(47) Philotheus Vita S. Sabbae, in A.P. Kerameus Ἀνάλεκτα Γερο-

him, except Didymoteichum, his centre. The rural population moved into the towns for safety, since many Turks and other barbarians took the opportunity to make raids on Thrace (51). Thus the popular régimes were strengthened in the towns, and when Cantacuzenus faced theirs and Apocaucus' solid power, he had to retreat to Serbia in July 1342 (52) after repeated failures and under the fierce hammering of his army by the rural population (53), who appeared as allies of the urban rebels. Apocaucus' presence in Thessalonica with a fleet and an army at that time, besides attracting a number of hesitating nobles to his party (54), points to his close relations with the Zealots of that town and their strategy, as well as to his role as coordinator of the noble and the non-noble sections of his followers.

When Cantacuzenus returned with a Serbian contingent, he met with great opposition from the people, whom he faced as his class enemy (55). In Thessalonica itself there were mob attacks on Cantacuzenian monks, whose property was seized by Apocaucus

βουλευτικῆς σταχυολογίας V (1895) 195; Nicolas Cabasilas "Antizealot" Discourse, ed. Ševčenko, DOP 11 (1957) p. 93 ~~cf~~ above n. 38, and Heraclea in n. 33.

(48) Cant. III, 39: II, 237-243.

(49) Cant. III, 39: II, 242: ἐδόκει φοβερὰ τοῖς εὐγενετέροις μάλιστα προσόδων μεγάλων ἀποστερουμένους. Cf. further p. 243.

(50) Cant. III, 43-44: II, 243-253; Greg. XIII, 1-2: II, 633-5.

(51) Cant. III, 30: II, 185-190:

(52) Cant. III, 40-42: II, 255-260; Greg. XIII, 2-3: II, 636-8; Lemerle L'Émirat d'Aydin 148 n. 1.

(53) Greg. XIII, 23: III, 638.

(54) Cf. n. 52.

(55) Cant. III, 42 - 45: II, 255-275.

and distributed to his partisans (56). Even the armed rural classes of Didymoteichum tried in vain in 1342 to revolt against the Cantacuzenian garrison, but were defeated and fled to other towns with their families (57). Among the fugitives some from the middle classes must have been included, since in spring 1344 Amur could not find a doctor in Didymoteichum (58). However this may have been a previous scarcity of doctors which was a common condition in all small towns. Henceforward as no farmers existed, no agriculture flourished in the besieged Didymoteichum - except market - gardening -, and the Cantacuzenians who lived there existed on the loot they obtained from the neighbouring towns (κώμας) (59). On the other hand these people who remained in Didymoteichum took over the space which had been occupied before by the houses of the expelled and used it πρὸς λαχανισμόν (60), which must have been an elementary horticulture, but not farming. The χειροτέχναι (artisans) lived on their work, while the remaining middle class, presumably lacking any possibility for trade during the siege, suffered hard from indigence (61). Thus their role diminished more and more, as happened all over the Empire at the time of the civil war (62), due to the war itself and especially to the Cantacuzenian tactics, which aimed at exhausting both towns and country and so causing their surrender (59).

(56) Cant. III, 42: II, 255-7. Gr. Acindyni Epistulae selectae IX, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, *EBEΣ* 27 (1957) p. 91, ll. 51-55.

(57) Cant. III, 38: II, 287-9. This revolt may have been incited by the two "servants" of Anna who led the army of the outskirts of Didymoteichum and influenced its people; Cant. III, 46-47: II, 279-827.

(58) Cant. III, 66: II, 403-4.

(59) Cant. III, 51: II, 301-5; Greg. XII, 12: II, 615-6; cf. Cant. III, 49: II, 292-3: looting of Bheres; cf. Cant. III, 54: II, 326-7: looting of other towns by the Didymoteichians; III, 56: II, 345-6. This proves that the classes expelled were farmers, cf. Section B, ch. I, n. 60. For the help of Umur to Didymoteichum in January-February 1343 against the Bulgarians, see Lemerle *L'Émirat d'Aydin* 158-9, 150-1.

After Serres refused to surrender to Cantacuzenus (63), Edessa became the first town to capitulate to him (end of 1342) owing to the influence of the nobles (64). It was at that critical time that the magnates of Thessaly, presumably frightened by the spreading social upheaval, dismissed Michael Monomachus who was till pro-palaiologian (65), and offered Cantacuzenus their submission. With the consent of his army and nobles Cantacuzenus appointed John Angelus his nephew as governor under strict terms:

This was bilateral oath agreement, by which Cantacuzenus abandoned a part of his rights of sovereignty, and John Angelus became the titular not of a government, but of an apanage. This was contrary to the predominant Byzantine theory about the unity of the Empire, though in previous times it had partly been applied (67). This mutual contract imposed limitations and duties on both

(60) Cant. III, 48: II, 288-9.

(61) Cant. III, 55: II, 332-4; Zakythinis Crise monétaire 76.

(62) A.A. Vassiliev 'Ιστορία τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Αυτοκρατορίας 324-1453, transl. by D. Savranis (Athens 1954), 856-7; Al. N. Diomedes Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται A', 129; Levtchenko Byzance 276.

(63) Cant. III, 49: II, 292-4: It was apparently influenced by Constantine the father of Andronicus Palaiologus, son-in-law to Apocaucus: Cant. III, 54: II, 322-4, 328.

(64) Cant. III, 51: II, 301-2.

(65) Cant. III, 31: II, 190-192; cf. further on.

(66) Cant. III, 53: II, 309-322, espec. 312f.; Zakythinis Processus de féodalisation pp. 8-11.

(67) Cf. Introduction to this Thesis nn. 8-9.

parts in what may be called a feudal manner: John Angelus' authority was restricted by some clauses while Cantacuzenus' sovereignty was limited by other clauses (68).

This arrangement was certainly the outcome of the internal decomposition of the Empire, which was one of the basic trends of the civil war and favoured deviations from centralistic organisation. John Angelus, for example, behaved in Thessaly as a feudal lord with military preoccupations when he took the monastic land of St. George of Zablantia in Trikkala in 1342 and distributed it to his soldiers as *pronoiae* (69).

That the *pronoia* system was behind such arrangements and developments becomes clear from cases like the following:

In 1342 the magnate of Thessaly Michael Gabrielopoulos took an oath toward his vassals of the fortress of Phanari, ἄρχοντες τοπικαί, great and small, lay and clerical ones, χρυσοβουλλᾶται καὶ ἑξκουσεᾶται. By this oath he confirmed their land possessions, fixed their taxes and military service, exempted them from the guard of fortresses and from all participation in expeditions for three years. Further he undertook the obligation not to cede Phanari to anyone but his own heirs, not to install a Frankish Guard, and not to permit the colonisation of Albanians there. On the other hand he specified that, if any one of those ἄρχοντες were accused of felony and insubmission, he would be judged by an assembly of all the archontes and he alone would be punished (70). This feudalistic oath, involving mutual obligations of landlord and vassal shows the same general process of the Byzantine society towards firmer land relations as in the West and in no way points to a revolutionary tendency towards free "bourgeois" conditions.

(68) Zakythinos ib. 11-16.

(69) P. Charanis Monastic Properties, DOP 4 (1948) 112.

(70) Zakythinos op.cit. 7-8. Cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 101-105.

This is further shown by the land policy of both parties during the period of the civil war in 1342-3. To counteract Dušan's grants to landowners and monasteries in Macedonia, both parties also made grants to them, which were merely a continuation of their old policy. The lay and church landowners exploited the situation to secure more privileges and the permanence of their possessions. Thus they succeeded in turning great numbers of their pronoiae into hereditary estates and receiving many more pronoiae and other lands.

In January 1342 John V exempted Zographou from three taxes (71), apparently to attract that monastery to his cause. In the same month of 1342 under pressure from the Bulgarian Czar, John V presented to the same monastery the village Chandax, - which had previously belonged to Michael Monomachus, who had proved an unenthusiastic follower (72), - and confirmed their lands and rents (between 10 and 12 hyperpyra) to the small pronoiar Klazemenites of Serres. He also granted them inheritance and total immunity, and the right of amelioration in return for their military services, which remained theirs and their descendants' obligations (73).

On the other hand in November 1342 John VI, continuing his policy of September 1341 (74), also granted to Kyr Georgis one of his men, a big land taken from a disloyal follower (Nikephorus Cantacuzenus) as inheritable possession with the right of amelioration. Its revenue reached 150 hyperpyra (75). Similarly in October 1342 John V or VI, granted inheritable immunity to the landowner Margarites for his lands in Kato Uska, and the vineyards and public lands of Rachona (near Pheres) (76).

(71) **Καστροκλισία, σταρκία** and **ὄρικη** : Actes de l'Athos 13, nr 31, cited by QHBS: 431, n. 4 (= Actes de Zographou nr. 31)

(72) Actes de Zographou nr. 31; cf. Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* p.122.

(73) Lemerle Actes de Kutlumus nr 20 = F. Doelger *Schatzkammern* nr 16, cited in Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 124-5;

(74) Cf. Section A, ch. I, end

(75) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 123.

(76) A. Guillou *Les Archives de Ménécée*, 118-9.

Further evidence exists about John V's policy. In May 1343 he detached a piece of land that yielded a yearly rent of 20 hyperpyra from the pronoia of the Western Knight Sir Manuel Mesopotamites and granted it to him as an hereditary estate with the right of amelioration (77). His promonastic policy included such measures as this.

In May 1343 he confirmed to Docheiariou all those lands at Pegai and Hermilia that had been taken from it during Andronicus' reign. These had been granted to several pronoiers and then were given to Manuel Vestiarites, through whose mediation in 1338 they were returned to the monastery (78). In 1343 the anti-Palomite Chabaron of Thessalonica gave a gift to the monastery of Philanthropos Sôtêr (78a).

On the other hand the Synod of the Church of Constantinople between 1342 and 1344 issued several decrees and letters with regard to land matters, which resemble those of the previous regime. In June 1342 the Synod granted heredity and full excoissia to a Genoese landowner, who had become orthodox and held lands of the Greek Church (79). The Patriarch John Calecas in August 1342 issued a letter concerning the dispute between the small landowner Prassinos Corat. and the metropolitan of Chius: the former accused the latter of usurping the revenues of a small monastery (St. Panteleimon) and of the Church of St. Nicolas, which belonged to him as patrimonial estates. The Patriarch ordered that the revenues should be enjoyed by neither of the two, but by the monks (80). This may have been a measure in favour of the lower monks. By another order the same Patriarch in March 1343 granted the Patriarchel Monastery of Sôtêr in Selymbria to monks (81).

(77) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 126; Lemerle Actes de Kutlumus nr 21.

(78) Ostrogorsky op.cit. 156-7; cf. above Section A. ch.I, nn. 93-95.

(78a) M.-M. II, 324 (1399; XII). It had been built by Irene Chomnaina Palaiologina: Loenertz, OCP 23 (1957) 133, nn.3-4.

(79) M.-M. I, 227-8=P.G. 152, 1261-2; Johannes XIV Patriarcha scribit Metropolitanæ Philadelphiae, ut providet in causa Johannis Januensis (6850-1342)(letter).

The principle of succession during the period under examination appears to have prevailed in the evolution of the pronoia. In August 1341 the nun Xenia Sultanina, widow of a pronoiar was granted by John V a piece of land with a yearly rent of 100 hyperpyra as full property. It was taken from the pronoia of her husband valued at 350 hyperpyra, that had passed by right of succession to her son after his father's death (82). Such cases prove that the pronoia lost its original character and the rent extracted from it was transformed into a kind of pension. This had rarely happened before (83), while during the civil war it seems to have flourished together with the principle of succession. Still this principle was an exception and evidently resembled economically and politically and belonged to the category of grants to monasteries in order to attract them to John V's party, the more so as such grants were frequent (84). As a rule the Byzantine State only granted the right of inheritance to the legal heirs of pronoiar, and the right of ameliorations; but never did it grant them the right of unrestricted disposal of their pronoiae (: dot, sale, possession, consecration to church and bequest)(85). This did not even happen at the time of the revolution, though the transformation of the pronoia into family hereditary apanage was very frequent at that time (86).

(80) M.-M. I, CII, p.231-2 (6850-1342)=P.G.152, 1264-5 (order); cf. similar cases before 1341, in Section A, ch. II, nn. 71-82, espec. nn.79,76.

(81) M.-M. I, p. 232 (6851-1343)=P.G.152, 1265 (order).

(82) *Regel χρυσόβουλλα Βατοπεδίου* nr 5, pp. 20-21, cited in Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 130-131.

(83) Section A, ch. I. n. 77.

(84) Cf. H.Hunger *Kaiser Johannes V. Palaiologos und der Heilige Berg, Drei Inedita aus einer Handschrift der österreichischen Nationalbibliothek* (Phil.gr.241), BZ 45 (1952)357-9.

(85) Ostrogorsky *Féodalité* 132-4.

(86) Cf. Section, A, Ch. I, nn. 96-97.

The further developments of the revolution had a clearly social basis. Thus already in 1342 Apocaucus became alienated from several of his noble allies (: George Choumnos, Const. Asanes etc) who apparently changed their allegiance upon realizing that the dynastic anti-cantacuzenian war was turning into an anti-aristocratic popular movement under Apocaucus' direction. Thus the whole system of Constantinople was in danger (87). Although the audacity of Serres (88) and the extreme scarcity of money and provisions made Cantacuzenus' position very difficult (89), the balance continued to tilt in his favour when the Berrhoians at an all-class assembly under the influence of the nobles decided to offer their town to him (May 1343)(90).

Berrhoia was followed by Servia, Platanon, and several fortresses (:Petra, Soskoa, Steridola) which yielded a number of soldiers under the Governor Michael Monomachus and with Dusan's encouragement frustrated the attempt of the Thessalonican Cantacuzenians to give it up too. Apocaucus had for the second time arrived in the capital of Macedonia with about 100 ships and presumably improved the organisation of the Zealots (91).

However defeatism spread among the Palaiologians, its chief spokesman being Michael Monomachus (92), whom, however, we

(87) Cant. III, 54: II, 325-9; III, 55: II, 335-6.

(88) Where Cantacuzenus' ambassador was slain with the consent of the apparently Barlaamite Metropolitan:) Cant. III, 55: II, 328-332.

(89) Cant. III, 57: II, 350-351.

(90) (Note the role of Arbenos, a noble vassal of Dušan:) Cant. III 57: II, 351-4. At this assembly the Berrhoians elected an embassy consisting of Astraperes, a noble, Allelouias of the people, and Syros of the clergy, to see Cantacuzenus. There was opposition to the surrender; this came from the Palaiologian minority, who may have been the mob: - cf. R. J. Loenertz Note sur une lettre de Dém. Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène, B.Z.44 (1951) 406; D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz (1956) I, lettre nr 6, pp. 31-32; Cf. Lemerle L'Émirat d'Aydin 150-151, 158.

(91) Cant. III, 58: II, 355-9; Parisot Cantacuzène 191, 193-4;

find leading a looting expedition against Berrhoia in 1343 (93). This was followed by the second expedition of Umr to Greece, which caused a terrible devastation in the countryside of Thessaly and Macedonia around Thessalonica: many Byzantine farmers were captured by the Turks (94). This Cantacuzenus thought to be the appropriate time to grant rewards for their services to the nobles of Thessaly and Berrhoia. He appointed Manuel his son governor of Berrhoia and the towns around it (95).

Then with Umr he advanced up to the outskirts of Thessalonica, which was well-guarded by the army and people in arms. The people had been shut up within the town walls with their flocks

Lemerle ib.

(92) Cant. III, 60:II,368-372. He stressed the great resources of the nobility, to which Apocauca^t and the people's resources could not be compared; cf. Cant. III, 59: I⁴, 367-8 (1343); III,75: I¹, 469-470 (1344). The causes of Monomachus' defeatism may go back to his loss of property, cf. above n. 72, by order of John V. However one cannot agree with Ostrogorsky (Féodalité 122) that his lands were taken from him because of his attitude in 1341. since there is evidence of it only after he had been deprived of his property. On the contrary Monomachus in 1341-2 had been very loyal to Constantinople (: Cant. III, 31: II, 190-192) and his loss of property may have been due to a sheer need on the part of the State and the pressure of the Bulgarian Czar (cf. Cant. III, 66: II, 403-5) and not to the unfavourable feelings of John V and his government towards Monomachus. Cf. above n. 44.

(93) (This happened after his conversation with Apocaucus) Cant. III, 62: II, 379-382.

(94) The farmers under Dušan's jurisdiction were warned by Cant. and secured themselves in fortresses, e.g. cf. n.95. For Umr see Lemerle L'Émirat d'Aydin 144-166.

(95) Cant. III, 63-64: II, 383-394; Greg. XIII, 10:II, 669-672; Chron. Breve Thessalonicense in R.J. Loenertz D. Cydonès Correspondance I, p.174 (1343); R.J. Loenertz Note sur une lettre de Dém. Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène, in B.Z. 44 (1951) 406-7, where only Cant. III, 57-58 is given as evidence.

of sheep and oxen (96). Commotion was caused by the shortage of food that ensued causing famine, diseases and many deaths from starvation. "Those who had landed estates and fields outside were angered at the pillage of their fields by the enemies. Those were lamenting whose flocks died of starvation; and those who were poor by birth planned disturbances and attacks against the rich" (97).

The poor (*paroikoi*) appear here as part of those who had flocks and took refuge in the town. Further on it is explicitly stated by Gregoross that some of them were rich: they were nobles, who lived in the towns and owned flocks and lands outside. **Their** flocks were of course looked after by their *paroikoi*.

To prevent any further treachery on the part of the remaining nobles, the more radical among the Zealots of Thessalonica, who consisted of the urban peasants, and paupers (98), delivered a second terrorist attack on the nobles and on the richer middle classes aligned with them. Many of these were expelled from the town (99).

When Thessalonica was abandoned by Cantacuzenus it declared itself independent (summer 1943) (100).

Henceforward the Thessalonicians could evidently go outside the town walls and cultivate their lands, and the ecclesiastical and lay authorities of the town exerted full jurisdiction over the towns belonging to the thema of Thessalonica (101). After this time anti-church ideas seem to have prevailed among

(96) Cf. D. Cydones *Monodia*, P. G. 109, 641.

(97) Greg. XIII, 10: II, 673-5; cf. E. Werner *Volkstümliche Häretiker* 54b-55a; cf. D. Cydonès *Correspondance*, éd. Loenertz I, ep. 1 (1347, to John Cantacuzenus), esp. pp. 3-4, paras. 4-8. Cf. N. I. Pantazopoulos, *Τόμος Κ. Ἀρμεναπούλου* p. 512.

(98) E. Werner *in*, op. cit. 60b-61a, 58b.

(99) Cant. III, 64: II, 394-7; Greg. XIII, 9-10: II, 671-5; *Tafrahi Thessalonique* 236-8; E. Werner *op. cit.* 54b-55a; Lemerle *L'Émirat et Aydin* 152-3.

the lower classes (πένητες) (102). But the leaders of the Zealot party were religiously indifferent and were very probably influenced by humanistic ideals, which were revived in the Byzantine Empire at that time (103).

With the help of the Turks of Amur and the Bulgarian lower class adventurer Komitzilos and his army of poor people, Cantacuzenus captured many towns and villages before in the end of autumn 1343 he reached Didymoteichum (104). From there with the help of the Turks he continued his fierce attacks on other towns and villages (κῶμαι), and these resisted vigorously, villagers were captured by the Turks and the countryside of Thrace was deserted because the remaining peasants took shelter in the towns (105) (spring 1344). The situation was made more acute by hurricanes and thunderstorms (θεομηνίαι), that destroyed the vineyards for many years to come (106). The peasants

(100) Greg. XIV, 1: II, 695. For the date: Lemerle op.cit. 154-5.

(101) Cant. III, 83: II, 571.

(102) This may have been related to revolutionary Bogomilitic influence (: Werner op.cit. 65a-b), the more so as such heretics existed in Thessalonica for a long time before - and after our period (: Werner op.cit. 62b). Still we should not forget the basic relation between Bogomilism and Palamism, and the great respect of the Bogomils for Palamas, whom they considered an authority: Werner op.cit. 65a, 67a. Cf. below n. 168.

(103) Werner op.cit. 67a-b; Browning *Komunata na Zilotite v Solun (1341-1350)* *Istoricheski Pregled* vol. VI, 4-5 (1950) 524, cited by Werner ib.

(104) E.g. the fortresses of Merope, Povisdos, St. Eirene; Slavobulgarian nomads on the mountains of Merope: all these had been under Cantacuzenus at the time of Andronicus III, so Cantacuzenus' agents amongst them must have been numerous Cant. III, 64-65: II, 398-403; for Komitzilos cf. St. Kyriakides 'Ο Μομιτζίλος καὶ τὸ κράτος του, *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται* VIII, *Μακεδονικά* 2 (1950) 322ff. (Cantacuzenus also took Morra and other towns in Rhodope, of which he appointed John Asanes as governor) Cant. III, 66: II, 403-6; Greg. XIV, 1: II, 692-3; cf. Cant. III, 61: II, 432-3; Lemerle loc.cit.

were left without animals and the soil remained untilled (107). Meanwhile, Anna bribed Uzun to leave, and granted nine towns to the Bulgarians in exchange for their alliance (108).

From Komotini and other nearby towns and fortresses which surrendered, Cantacuzenus created the small nucleus of a despotate (109), while other towns were destroyed (110). At that time the clique of Constantinople turned more toward the people, whom it wanted to flatter. Thus it convoked an all-class assembly to whom it accused Cantacuzenus of overweening ambition (111). Then the clique managed to attract Momtazilos and his army, but in the end he became independent (112). - Probably as a result of these developments it became necessary for Cantacuzenus to refuse further promises of land grants to his followers, who had been demanding specific rewards after his victory (113). His refusal presaged his future compromise with the Palaiologians and was probably dictated by the increasing scarcity of land after the progress of the barbarians, as well as by his feeling that the primary aim of his partisans to receive big gains from the war was unrealistic (114). He claimed that the lands demanded by them

(105) Greg. XV, 1: II, 748; Cant. III, 76: II, 476.

(106) Greg. XIV, 6: II, 711-714.

(107) Greg. XV, 1: II, 747-8.

(108) Cant. III, 66-68: II, 405-418; Greg. XIV, 1: II, 693-4; Lemerle op.cit. 156-7.

(109) This was under Matthew his son (Cant. III, 67: II, 412-5; Greg. XIV, 4: II, 703), who had been governor of Morrha, the towns of Rhodope and Chalcidica before the civil war: Cant. III, 26: II, 160-2. To the above towns Cantacuzenus added Gratianoupolis and Hyperpyraeion: Cant. III, 68-69; II, 415-427; cf. III, 71: II, 432-3;

(110) E.g. Messene in Thrace Cant. III, 70: II, 428-9.

(111) Cant. III, 68: II, 417-9; Greg. XIV, 3: II, 697-702.

(112) Cant. III, 70-71: II, 427-437; Greg. XIV, 4: II, 703-707; he was offered offices by both parties!

(113) Greg. XIV, 5: II, 708-9.

(114) Was this related to the widespread fame that Cantacuzenus intended to resign : Cant. III, 72: II, 439-440 (it was esp. propagated by Apocaucus).

were not his, but, belonged to all those who subjected themselves to the Emperor. He promised rewards other than lands, because he now wanted to bridge the breach with the opposite party and to attract those landowners and nobles who had rallied to the Palaiologi; the latter could be sure that his victory would not mean the loss of their property!

Thus he refuted the prevalent doctrine that all land belonged primarily to the State as personified by the Emperor, who only granted it to his loyal subjects on special terms. Hereafter this appeared in several cases, when Cantacuzenus confirmed their lands to Palaiologian landowners who joined his party. Such was the case of John Watazis, lowly-born governor of the fortress Megali Karya. Through him Megali Karya, Polyboton (a town governed by his relatives), **Peristasis** and other towns became allied to Cantacuzenus (end of 1344), because, after he had been deprived by Constantinople of his post of governor of Thessalonica (115), he was granted the office of Grand Stratopedarch and yearly revenues by Cantacuzenus (116).

To cope with such measures John V's government continued similar grants. In November 1344 in addition to other gifts made to the Grand Stratopedarch John Choumnos for his constant fidelity, John V granted him also the village of Loktista near Zichna and many properties around with a rent of 40 hyperpyra. All these lands had previously been held by a disloyal pronoiar (Mavrophoros), who apparently joined John VI's party and later that of Dusan (117). They were granted to Choumnos as hereditary estates (*κατὰ λόγον γονικότητος*) with the right of amelioration. They were also freed of fiscal obligations except *γένος, παρθενοφορία καὶ εὐρεσις θησαυροῦ*, i.e. only the low justice remained in Choumnos' hands.

(115) Greg. XIV, 11: II, 721-3; Cant. III, 93: II, 968.

(116) Cant. III, 76: II, 475-477.

(117) Actes de Philothée nr 8; Doelger Schatzkammern nr 8, and Tafelband nr 8 cited by Ostrogorsky *Feodalité* 122-3.

Meanwhile, however, Apocaucus' breach with his noble allies in Constantinople became greater. The Patriarch and others (: e.g. J. Gabalas the grand Logothetes) increasingly desired peace now that Cantacuzenus' power was growing and that of Apocaucus diminishing. Despite this the war continued (118) and Pheres and other towns of Thrace and Macedonia (: **Platamon**, Serbia etc.) through the influence of their nobles surrendered to the usurper (119), despite the hatred of their people for him. Then he took Apros, and looked other towns (: **Daphnidion**, Propontis). So all Thracian towns as far as Pontus, except Hexamilion; Kallioupolis, Aenus, Adrinople, chora and Bizye (120) were forced to surrender.

Some interesting aspects of the political and social character of the civil war are illustrated by the cases of Adrinople and Bizye. The Cantacuzenian party had been preserved in Adrinople to some extent - after their capture and dispatch to Constantinople in 1342 (121). Its members were nobles who had escaped capture in 1342, and middle-class people who "decided to join Cantacuzenus at this critical point when the balance of power was ^{tilting} in his favour". Their premature attack against the lower-class people who governed the town broke the latter's resistance, as they were already suffering from the war. Manuel Apocaucus, governor of Adrinople, who evidently represented Constantinople (122), passed to Cantacuzenus and the people's leader, Branos, had to give up the keys of the town. But the victors when drunk were caught in the houses of the rebels by the

(118) But Apocaucus became more moderate to his colleagues: Cant. III, 72-73: II, 437-447; Greg. XIV, 5: II, 710-711; XIV, 3: II, 696.

(119) Cant. III, 73-75: II, 443-473; Greg. XIV, 3: II, 702-703; Greg. XIV, 3: II, 702-703;

(120) Cant. III, 76-78: II, 475-485: Chora expelled Cantacuzenus' men who went to help them after an earthquake.

(121) Cant. III, 29: II, 179-180.

(122) Cf. above nn. 31-33.

people and were overcome. Then Bizye was looted by Cantacuzenus (123). - Soon after in an assembly the Bizyans decided to surrender to Cantacuzenus "ἀδίκως τε πολεμουμένω... δυναμένω βλάπτειν". They allowed their bishop and their governor George Palaiologus to flee to Constantinople and chose two of the nobles, two of the clergy and two of the people as ambassadors to Cantacuzenus (124). All the people and the nobles received him, and in return for their surrender Cantacuzenus ordered that Anna's and John V's names should be mentioned before his name and that of his wife. As a result of this ostentatious legitimism many other small towns around Bizye joined the usurper, who, however, secured them from reversal to Palaiologism and rebellion by appointing Manuel Asanes as their governor. As Manuel had property and other interests in theme his appointment meant that he was granted back his property which had been taken by the rebels. The appointment of a bishop of Cantacuzenus' confidence consolidated further his control in Bizye.

In order to stop Cantacuzenus' advance and appeal to the people Apocaucus took over as Judge and administered justice in Constantinople (125). He also attacked again his allies the Constantinopolitan nobles (end of 1344) (126), but he could not any longer trust even the people.

This appeared clearly when in 1345 (spring) Orkhan came to Cantacuzenus' help and both the Greek and Turkish armies devastated Thrace as far as Constantinople. Then Apocaucus forbade the people of the city to approach the walls, which were guarded only by his very loyal men (127).

(123) Cant. III, 78: II, 484-8.

(124) Therefore some nobles had survived the popular attack of 1341-2 in Bizye too.

(125) Cant. III, 79: II, 488-493; Greg. XII, 10: II, 607f; The Bishop appointed in Bizye was the ex-Patriarch of Jerusalem.

(126) Cant. III, 80: II, 493-8; Greg. XIV, 3: II, 696-7; XIV, 3: II, 701-2; XIV, 8-9: II, 722-6.

(127) Cant. III, 81: II, 498-502; Greg. XIV, 9: II, 727.

Early in 1345 the intervention of the Genoese of Gllata had a social as well as an economic importance. The Genoese ambassador to Cantacuzenus adopted a hostile attitude to Apocaucus when the latter imposed taxes and established a customs post at Hieron in Bosphorus to control the trade of the Black Sea. This was made necessary by the continued loss of many towns (128) and their revenues and was probably also aimed at appealing to the Greek middle classes and to his closer collaborators. For the latter's sake he rejected their new offer by Cantacuzenus to resign if his party were granted the pronoias they wanted, while the offices granted by the clique of Constantinople to their followers should be kept (129).

But Apocaucus' fiscal measures were dictated by more general needs too. Already since 1342 the Byzantine towns suffered from scarcity of wheat and of fish (*ταριχευτά*) coming from Maiotis-Yrimaea because of the Genoese monopoly. So the Byzantines turned to a new market for provisions, that of Western Asia Minor and other agricultural lands now under Turkish control. From these they obtained large quantities of wheat (130). But the adherence of the Turks to Cantacuzenus imposed on Constantinople the need to depend on the Black Sea Trade again. This brought them into conflict with the Genoese and forced the imposition of the above mentioned measures.

However their financial results for Constantinople were meagre or nil, since it had neither ships nor money enough to organise this post efficiently (131).

(128) Since Cantacuzenus had advanced as far as Kamelou Gephyra and taken Regium, Athyra, Damokraneia, Selymbria, Apameia, Derkon; see n.129.

(129) Cant. III, 82-85 II, 503-525.

(130) Greg. XIII, 12: II, 683-7; Zakythinos Crise monetaire 40-43.

(131) Cant. loc.cit; Ševčenko The Zealot Revolution 612-3. This was the second such measure of Apocaucus since the first one would have been that mentioned by Diplomat.Venetolevant. I, p.273 (1344)= F.Thiriet Régestes I, p.54: 19/3/1344, unless Cantacuzenus (loc.cit.)

Therefore Apocaucus turned again to other measures to save his régime. He seized the riches of churches and used them for military purposes such as building and manning ships (132) and repairing the walls of Constantinople, which he did in August 1344 (133). But neither these nor the big loan of 30,000 ducats from Venice in August 1343 (134) nor the new coins struck at this period could save Apocaucus (135).

Meanwhile Cantacuzenus took Adrinople, whose Palaiologian governor and the local leader surrendered together with near-by fortresses. Tzernomianou through its governor (Hierax), a servant of Andronicus III, also surrendered. To all Cantacuzenus gave legitimistic promises and reinstated them in their original posts (136) according to his well established custom (137). This did not happen in the case of Momitzilus, who was killed on the 7 July 1345 by the Turks of the usurper; after brave resistance his low-class Greek army was defeated, and his town (Xantheia) and fortresses (in Merhope - Morrha) surrendered (138).

is referring to 1344 too; cf. Cant. III, 87: II, 534-6

(132) D. Cydones Second Speech to John Cantacuzenus, ed. G. Cammelli, B.N. J. 4 (1925) p. 78 (:1342); Cant. II, 243, 357, 537 (1344-5); Greg. XV, 1: II, 748; cf. XIII, 1: II, 634; XIII, 7: II, 658-9 (1343); XIII, 8: II, 665; (1343) XV, 11: 788-9 (1341); Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 163-4; cf. Nic. Cabasilas' "Anti-zealot" Discourse, *ib.* para. 6, para. 23, para. 24, para. 26, para. 28.

(133) Ševčenko *ib.* 167-8.

134) The pledge put was the imperial crown, which was never returned: M. - M. III, 124-5, 140; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 92, 99; Fr. Thiriet *op.cit.* *passim*, very frequent references.

(135) Zakythinos *op.cit.* 92, based on T. Bertelè *Monete e Sigilli di Anna di Savoia Imperatrice di Bisanzio*, Roma 1937.

(136) Cant. III, 85: II, 527-9; cf. above n. 33.

(137) Cf. above n. 125.

(138) Cant. III, 86: II, 529-534; Greg. XIV, 9: II, 727-9; Lemerle *L'Émirat d'Aydin* 210-211.

The most important aspect of the urban developments was the increasing opposition of various classes to Apocaucus. The only resource that remained to him was the sea-trade (139), and his only supporters the mariners. When he was killed by his noble prisoners (11 July 1345) the mob of mariners attacked the prisoners and killed many of them, while others took shelter in Galata (140).

In Pheres the Cantacuzenian faction was active, but the pro-serbian noble party was also strengthened dangerously (141), while independent tendencies appeared elsewhere. Early in 1349 John Vatatzis of Megali Karya, after his victories over the armies of Constantinople, planned to create a principality (142). Many Thracian towns ruled by his relatives (143) joined him to avoid Cantacuzenus' yoke. Even after Vatatzis' murder they resisted Cantacuzenus for a long time - (144).

b) FROM THE DEATH OF APOCAUCUS
TO THE VICTORY OF JOHN CANTACUZENUS 1345-1347.

During the short siege of Constantinople by Cantacuzenus

(139) Cant. III, 87: II, 534-541; Greg. XIV, 5: II, 710-711; cf. Cant. III, 71-72: II, 433-442, esp. 437f.

(140) Cant. III, 88: II, 541-6; Greg. XIV, 10: II, 729-140; D. Cydones Second Speech, B.N.J. (1925) p. 81; I. Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 612-613. Note the attack of the mob against the huts of the monks of Nea Mone, which shows their hatred of the higher clergy. For the date of Apocaucus' death (11 July, not 11 June) see Lemerle L' Émirat d' Aydin 210.

(141) Cant. III, 87: II, 534-5; III, 89: II, 546-7 (:only the presence of the Turks in the usurper's army saved Pherres from Dušan early in 1345).

(142) For this he negotiated with Anna and the Turks of Sarkhan, cf. n. 145; cf. also Lemerle op. cit. 219-220.

(143) Cf. above n. 33; Lemerle loc. cit.

(144) The guard of Empyrites gave up their governor, apparently a Cantacuzenian, to Anna and returned to their house on leave, i.e. they demobilised themselves! This shows the wish of the people to get rid of military services: cf. n.145, and Lemerle loc. cit.

both he and his opponents' party used agents from the lower classes, for military purposes. This once again reflects the high importance attached to the lower classes by both parties, but it did not serve to unite them. The people themselves remained unmoved by such activities and in Sylembria and Hieron they continued their revolutionary role and successfully fought against Cantacuzenus' army when it looted their towns (145).

However the peasants of the town which had surrendered to Cantacuzenus took advantage of their surrender to cultivate their land after a long time and Cantacuzenus encouraged his work in order to attract their favour and to restore the broken economy of the countryside (146) in the interests of his own party (146).

After Alex. Apocaucus' death there was a third outbreak of the Zealots of Thessalonica, which was of the highest importance for the development of the urban conditions of that town. John Apocaucus, the son of Alex. Apocaucus and grand primicerius, had been governor of Thessalonica since 1344 (147).

Though secretly friendly to Cantacuzenus, he had been reluctantly obliged during his governorship (1344-5) to acquiesce to the increase of the power of the Zealots and the actual dictatorship of their leader, Michael Palaiologus (Catharus), with whom he was supposed to have been co-governing the town. Before his father's death he had never openly opposed the Zealots, although he negotiated secretly with the Cantacuzenians of Thessalonica, because he was bitter with Michael and the Zealots who overpowered him and reduced his authority almost to nothing. From the Cantacuzenians and others he formed a considerable party, because many Thessalonicans had been
angry with

(145) Cant. III, 90-91: II, 552-564; Greg. XIV, 11: II, 741-3; D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz I, p. 35, ep. 9, τῶ ἰωάννῃ Καντακουζηνῶ, para. 6.

(146) D. Cydonès op. cit. ep. 7-8, pp. 32-34-: 7: Beroae 1345, aestate vel autumno; 8: Beroae 1345, aestate vel autumno? -

(147) He had replaced J. Vatatzis in 1344 apparently on Alexius' initiative, as his agent to check the Zealots; cf. above nn.43-45; cf. Greg. XIV, 10: II, 740-741. -

Michael Paleologus for his arrogance, bad treatment and confiscation of property (148).

This latter policy was due to the ascent of more radical elements to power in the town. Such were the country paroikoi, who had sheltered in Thessalonica, and the lower classes of it under the leadership of the mariners (149). Because of their influence a program of social reforms was implemented by the Zealots, which effected both lay and ecclesiastical estates (150). This *ὑβρις* and *δήμεισι* (150) must have become at his state (1345) identical with what we know from Nicolas Cabasilas' controversial treatise as a more or less concrete program of social reform, which, according to another source, "did not take into consideration the law consecrated of old" (151).

The people first fearlessly seized the produce of the nobles' fields. Then taxes were imposed either by the people themselves or by the Zealotic authorities on the rich landowners and on their produce in kind (152). These were extended to confiscation of properties of the rich lay men and then to sequestration of the revenues of the ecclesiastical estates, to imposing direct taxes in kind on them and to making regulations affecting the monks and the nuns. If we accept that Cabasilas' treatise

(148) Cant. III, 93: II, 568-9: *ἔδήμειε καὶ ἐφυλάκιζε.*

(149) Cf. Werner op.cit. 58a Still his supposition that the mariners did not themselves belong to the party of the Zealots, but were only allied to them, seems rather wrong, cf. above.

(150) *Ἐδήμειε... καὶ περὶ τὰ δεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ὑβρίζοντες... μοναχίαν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι... ἡδέικουν ἀδείως καὶ διεπόρθουν τὰς χώρας ἐπιόντες καὶ τὰς κοινὰς συμφορὰς ἀεορμάς ποιοῦμενοι ἰδίας εὐπραγίας.*
Cant. III, 93: II, 569-570; cf. Cant. III, 38: II, 233 (1342): *ἄποροι εἰς ὑβριν ἔζηνηγεγμένοι... διαρπαγή... ; ib. p. 243: εὐδὺς ἀνάγκη ἐκ δεμελιῶν ἀνεσπασθαι ὀρμῆ τε ἀλογίστω καὶ κέρδους ἐπιθυμία τοῦ δήμου ἐπομένου.*

But at that stage (1342) the wish of the Zealot mob to pillage had not yet been formed into a concrete social reform program. Cf. Greg. Palamas Homily I (1350), P.G. 151, cc. 12-13, referring to 1345.

(151) Greg. XIII, 10: II, 674: He speaks of popular desires, which the Zealots could control, and which therefore they followed,

refers to Thessalonica's Zealotic régime - with which we have in all probability to do (153), - all these "anti-church" measures were effected by the ecclesiastical authorities of Thessalonica in apparently close cooperation with the Zealots. Further they took from the church for their use or for others many paroikoi with their land, which may and may not mean freeing of the paroikoi (154). This was illegal in Cabasilas' view, as it voided all principles of donation, which make the owner sole disposer of his possessions (155), and it broke the laws of private property (156)

apparently by formulating them into a system; cf. Apost. Vakaopoulos Συμβολή εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης ἐπὶ Βενετοκρατίας, Thessalonica (1950) pp. 3, 5-6; cf. Nicolas Cabasilas in Ševčenko, "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP (1957) p. 102, para. 21; p. 94, para. 9; p. 111 para. 96; p. 96, para. 14.

(152) Dem. Cydonēs Correspondance, ed. Loenertz I, epist. 81, pp. 113-4 (1341-5), Amico cum sui pometi malis. The date I presume from the fact that it was only between 1341 and 1345 that Cydonēs could have a garden of course in Thessalonica before he left it in 1345, whose produce was claimed as tax! -

(153) This matter has been recently discussed by two scholars, I. Ševčenko in his often-referred to study Nicolas Cabasilas' "Anti-Zealot" Discourse, A Reinterpretation, DOP 11 (1957) 79-171, and by E. Werner in his equally mentioned Volkstümliche Häretiker etc., Wiss. Zeitschr. der K. Marx Univers. Leipzig, 8 Jahrg. 1958-9, pp. 45-83. Ševčenko rejects Tafreli's view that the "Antizealot" Discourse really referred to the Zealots and he points that it referred to certain secularising measures of the Byzantine State and probably of Alex. Apocaucus. The rich arguments of Ševčenko do not seem to destroy fully Tafreli's supposition, which is supported anew by E. Werner. We think that, even if the Discourse refers to Apocaucus' measures, these measures were also part of the Zealots policy, the more so as we have already noted the close cooperation of Apocaucus and the Zealots. On the other hand there is a surprising correspondence of what is well established as Zealot policy and of the measures of the opponents of Cabasilas in the Discourse, as we saw in nn. 150-151; cf. also nn. 154-155ff. These

Cabasilas believed that the ἀρχοντες of his Discourse were honest, but they broke the law under the guise of apparently reasonable pretexts (157), such as feeding the poor laymen and clergy (priests) decorating churches and arming ships, mariners and soldiers in order to chase away the enemies and bring peace to the nation. "The monks, who sit inert at home, do not need much to live on, in the archontes' view, while the army and the walls are badly in need of ecclesiastical money, at least to the same extent as the servants, farmers, bakers and builders" (158).

and many other items of evidence can persuade that Tafrali's and Werner's view is correct. Here we have tried to base our arguments on acceptable evidence other than Cabasilas' Discourse and to bring in the latter as evidence only when it closely corresponds to generally-accepted sources of the Zealot history.

(154) Cf. the case of Martina above n. 36.

(155) Nic. Cabasilas in Paris 1213, f. 246, cited by Tafrali Thessalonique p. 263, n. 2=1. Ševčenko "Anti-Zealot" Discourse DOP 11 (1957) p. 92, para. 4; cf. Ševčenko p. 126-7. This cf. to the crucial passage of Grec. XIII, 10: II, 674 (cf. above n. 151). This surprising correspondence of the two sources, as well as of Cant. III, 93: II, 569-570 adds to Werner's and Tafrali's views.

(156) Nic. Cabasilas in Ševčenko "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) p. 101, para. 21; p. 94, para. 9; p. 96, para. 16.

(158) Op. cit. paras. 6-8, pp. 93-94; cf. para. 20, pp. 100-101; para. 23, p. 102; para. 24, p. 103. Further developments of these ideas are to be found in the rest of the Discourse, paras 7-60. Cf. Tafrali Thessalonique 267-81.

(157) N. Cabasilas in Ševčenko op.cit. p. 91, para. 1; cf. ib. p. 126.

This may mean the usual salaries paid by the ecclesiastical authorities to their employees, as the "siteseis hiereon" signified the usual grants of each Metropolis to its priests and other clergy. Still in this case it may mean the special grants which were awarded to them and which were taken from a revolutionary sequestration of Church estates (159). This is further indicated by the special mention of repairs of houses and of ameliorations of lands effected by that money (160).

The justifications put forward by the revolutionaries are summarised in their good use of the estates seized, in the inherent power of all authority over the property of their subjects, in the fact that they followed custom in their practice of philanthropy to the clergy and that they thus fulfilled the donors' will and they did not contradict the law, since they used their donations well; they also claimed that some property had been given to them quite freely while other property had been seized on the death of its clerical owners, some of whom had been poor monks (161).

One can discern here the Byzantine idea about the omnipotence of the State used as an ideological weapon in the hands of Cabasilas' opponents, whom we identify with the revolutionaries; and also the Byzantine tradition of philanthropy transformed into and used with "socialistic" ideas. Contrary to this Cabasilas asserts the sanctity of private property against any intervention of the State, and attributes to the authorities only the duty of guarding the law and not the right of being masters of the people (162).

(159) Cf. Tafrali op.cit. 258, n. 3.

(160) Tafrali ib; Ševčenko loc. cit. in n.158 above.

(161) Ševčenko op.cit. para. 48, p. 119; para. 55, p. 120; pp. 93-95, paras. 5-10; cf. para. 14, p. 96; para. 20, p. 100; para. 38, p. 112; para. 50, p. 120; para. 34, para. 1101

(162) Ševčenko op.cit. paras. 11-12, pp. 95-96; cf. para. 14, p. 96; cf. Charanis *Internal Strife*, B 156 (1940-41) 226-7. However seizure of Church property by the State for defence needs had had been effected frequently in Byz. history, by Heraclius, the Iconoclasts (7-8 centuries), by Andronicus III etc: Werner op.cit. 57 a-b.

The metropolitan of Thessalonica tried to impose on his suffragan towns the same consecrations (163). He sought to behave like a King, to appoint governors of the suffragan towns and to rule over all them. As a result some simpler priests were cheated by him and paid dues to the Archbishop for all possible consecrations (164). These were the so-called *καρονικόν* (165), by which the new realm of Thessalonica used to reinforce its finances (166).

There seem to have been clashes between the Bishop of Thessalonica, who belonged to the leading group of the Zealots, and the remainder of the party (167). This may have been due to the anti-religious excesses of some Zealots. On the whole they used religion only in so far as it served their political purposes, and were themselves anti-religious or religiously indifferent (168).

(163) The ordinations effected by the Archbishop were not, in Cabasilas' view, related to the right of usurpation valid in the Bishop's town. Cf. below n. 193.

(164) Ševčenko op.cit. pp. 113-6 = Cabasilas paras. 39, 40, 41, 43.

(165) Ševčenko ib. p. 147.

(166) E. Werner op.cit. p. 58a, n. 124; p. 67b.

(167) Werner op.cit. 67a-b, 68b; Ševčenko p. 119, para. 48. For him cf. n. 193.

(168) Greg. Palamas Homily XXXVIII, P.G. 151, 484. For the anti-religious ideas of the Thessalonican deacon Bryennios, who did not believe in resurrection, see. P.G. 152, 1220-3; cf. Cant. III, 93: II, 570-571, where other excesses of the Zealots are mentioned, such as rebaptizing some of the people to purify them of their contamination by Contacuzenus; cf. I. Ševčenko op.cit. p. 145, n. 48; E. Werner op.cit. pp. 65b-66bf. ; see ib. for the Zealots' derision in Taverns of the Christian mysteries and for their arrogance. These excesses were probably related to neo-Bogomilitic ideas: Werner ib. - ; but they had been widespread among the thinkers of the lower classes such as Alexius Makrembolites: Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 617-8; cf. similar tendencies

Given the anti-religious tendency of the lower classes (168) this attitude of the Zealots to religion and the Church, as well as the whole totalitarian Church and State régime with its encroachments on private property (169) for social aims made the Zealots and their régime popular (170). But in fact the Zealots were continuing some of the old Byzantine practices (171), though there is no evidence that they really granted the confiscated property or some of it as pronoise to their army of Thessalonica (172). On the contrary the Zealots never formed a Zealotic army, (173) relying instead on the army of Constantinople, to whom some lands may have been granted as pronoise, since it was organised in the traditional Byzantine way.

Still the Church officials and the rich, including the nobles and the high middle class were not satisfied with the policy of the Zealots. So they formed an anti-zealot front (174), whose existence is made clear by the following facts:.

Constantinople's progress in Thrace encouraged John Apocaucus to realise his plan of attacking and killing Michael Palaiologus openly! The Zealots then went into hiding and were not helped but rather attacked by the people and especially the middle classes who were displeased with their excesses. John Apocaucus arrested the most eminent Zealots and imprisoned them near

of the Casmuls of Constantinople: Greg. XIV, 10II, 737-8. Cf. The anti-magic decrees of John Calacas in 1339(: P.G.152,1124-6, 1228-1232; cf. M.-M. I, 301: *Kallistus*). For the general anti-religious tendency of the lower classes (cf. Pachym. lib.IV, c,26; cf. above n. 102.

(169) Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) p.99 = Cabasilas' "Discourse" para. 19.

(170) Ševčenko ib. p. 101, para. 21; p.121, para.53; p.122, para. 54.

(171) Werner *Vollständige Häretiker* 57a-b.

(172) This was Jakovenko's assumption: Werner op.cit. 57,n.117; Ševčenko op.cit. p. 170.

(173) Cf. further on, ch. II of this Section, nn. 51-55.

(174) Werner op.cit. 57b.

Platamon and other small towns which were governed by him, and another group of Zealots (*εὐρηστέον*) he expelled from the town (175). Then he rallied many Cantacuzenians around himself on the Akropolis; among them were a number of people who only then appeared as Cantacuzenians(175). Suddenly Apocaucus through fear of his father appeared anti-cantacuzenian and forced the rich people who had professed to be pro-cantacuzenian, to pay heavy sums to him in order to save their lives (176).

This crucial passage of Cantacuzenus proves three essential points: a) that a number of Cantacuzenians had remained in Thessalonica despite the Zealotic regime; b) that the measures of the Zealots had not previously been far-reaching enough to effect the confiscation of all the properties of all the rich classes of the town (177). Therefore we cannot speak of total Zealotic Socialism or State-Socialism. It is almost certain that the rich Cantacuzenians who were looted by John Apocaucus belonged mainly to the upper middle classes, who had not been previously expelled from the town (178). Their properties were spared to a certain extent by the Zealots, in order to provide a source of riches for John Apocaucus. They had been, however, partially confiscated by the Zealots (179), thus making their owners anti-Zealots (180).

(175) Werner op.cit. 58a.

(176) Cant. III, 93: II, 571-2.

(177) Cf. Loenertz, D. Cydonès Correspondance I, pp.1-9, esp. p.3, para. 7 (Constantinopoli, Johanni Cantacuzeno, 1347, epist. nr1); cf. Cant. III, 94: II, 574-6: names of such nobles; cf. R.-J. Loenertz Dix-huit lettres de Grégoire Acindyne analysées et datées, OCP 23 (1957) 126: G. Isaris, a land-owner of Thessalonica, was pro-barlaamite and lost nothing of his property until after 1344; i.e. possibly after July 1345 when he became Palamite; cf. next chapter n.49.

(178) Cf. above nn. 98-99, 175-177; cf. next chapter n. 45.

(179) Cf. above nn. 148-161.

(180) Cf. Werner op.cit. 55b, who however thinks that the anti-religious measures of the Zealots were the only cause of reaction against them.

The third point proved is that in the small towns and villages that belonged to the régime of Thessalonica there was not a strong Zealotic party; but what did exist was concentrated among the lower classes of Thessalonica itself. Apparently this made Apocaucus trust his Zealot prisoners to the landowners who still remained in the towns, where the lower rural and urban classes did not have the same revolutionary spirit as their counterpart in Thessalonica.

A fourth fundamental point is that at that time (1345) Thessalonica was not threatened by any external enemies; therefore its peasants, being out in their fields (181), could not reinforce the ranks of the poor of Thessalonica; as the former were unorganised, they needed the leadership of a town party, that would put them into action (182). But the absence of the peasants was a source of weakness for the Zealots and caused their inertia when Michael was assassinated.

After Alexius Apocaucus' death (11 July 1345) John Apocaucus openly returned to his Cantacuzenian loyalty and called an assembly consisting of the nobles (ἀρίστων), the army and the most eminent citizens (183). Among them were George Cocalas, a politically opportunistic noble, and the moderate pro-zealot noble Andrew Palaiologus ὁ ἐνὶ τῆς τραπέζης and president of the mariners' guild (184). It was decided by this assembly to surrender Thessalonica to Cantacuzenus (185).

(181) Cf. above n. 101.

(182) Browning op.cit. 520; Werner op.cit. p.55b, 56a; cf. p. 60b- 61a.

(183) Werner op.cit. 57b.

(184) He had been spared by Apocaucus when he expelled the nobles. This sparing was due to his moderation.

(185) Tafrahi 239-242; Werner 56a; Cant. III, 93: II, 572-4; R:J. Loenertz, Note sur une Lettre de Dém. Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène, B.Z. 44 (1951) p. 407: he corrects Tafrahi Thessalonique pp 74-75, who called this an all-class popular assembly. For Andrew's titles: Cant. III, 94: II, 575; IV, 15: III, 104; cf. above, Section B, ch. I, n. 97.

They sent a deputation to Manuel Cantacuzenus in Berrhoia to present the following terms for the surrender: a) **immunity** for all the class of the town (κοινῆ τῆ πόλει); b) offices and revenues should be granted to John Apocaucus and the other nobles according to the prevalent pattern of urban conditions,

While Manuel accepted, Andrew, who felt he was ignored by J. Apocaucus, and G. Coccalas, who aspired to the governorship of Thessalonica, **reacted** by inciting the mariners to revolt. Both called in those Zealots, who had been in the vicinity of Thessalonica, and when the latter appeared they became the leaders of the mariners and the lower classes again. Some of the people stayed neutral, and others, apparently the middle classes, sided with the army against the Zealots. In the pourparlers and subsequent clash Coccalas played an ambiguous part and eventually sided with the mob, whose victories were marked by many atrocities. But a few nobles again survived the massacre (July-August 1345) and others were exiled by the new βουλή apparently formed by the Zealots (186). When Apocaucus came out to attack the Zealots, Coccalas bribed the leaders of Apocaucus' army (186a), who did not want to kill their relatives and fellow-citizens (187). But despite Coccalas' and Palaiologus' efforts the mob looted the arms of the surrendered army and the houses of the inhabitants of the Akropolis, where J. Apocaucus had taken shelter with his followers. The mob's fury was renewed when a contingent of Cantacuzenus arrived from Berrhoia to take over the town from the nobles, and it burst into a "cruel massacre", which included several nobles (τῶν βουλήν) and John Apocaucus (188).

(186) D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz I, epist.99, Exuli, Constantinopoli (1345-99) pp. 136-7, esp. ll. 26-29ff: ἡ τότε βουλή συγγενῶν ὑμῶν ἐτιμήσατο.

(186a) For them cf. Section A, ch. II, nn. 17-18; cf. appendix I to this chapter.

(187) D. Cydonès Monodia..., P.G. 109, cc. 640, 641, 644: αἵματι δὲ συγγενῶν.

(188) Cant. III, 94: II, 575-582; Greg. XIV, 10: II, 739-741; Tafrali op. cit. 242-9; D. Cydonès Monodia ib. 645-9; D. Cydonès Lettre, Nic. Cabasilas in Boissonade Anecdota Graeca nova p.314 =

So the mob of δούλοι , πένητες , πάροιχοι and mariners and artisans became masters of the town again (189), which was lost to Cantacuzenus. The spirit of revolution spread again, this time from Thessalonica to the other towns (190), and the new regime could do as he liked (191). Undoubtedly, then, many poor people rose to higher positions "to such an extent that a servant could not be found, as all of them had been awarded offices " (192).

Loenertz, Cydonès Correspondance I, ep. 87, Nic. Cab. Chamaëto, Thessalonica? Constantinopoli 1347, pp. 120-121; D. Cydones First Speech to J. Cantacuzenus, B.N.J. 3 (1922) 68-79; Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense in Cydone's Correspondance, Loenertz I, p. 174; Cydones op.cit. pp. 1-9, esp. 4-6, paras 7-11, (1347); cf. Werner op. cit. 56a-b; cf. 58a; 55a; Loenertz Note, B.Z. 44 (1951), p. 407-8, n. 6; p. 408, n. 2. - Werner op. cit. 55a wrongly calls the mariners leaders of the movement, since they were rather the leading fighting force under the political leadership of Cocalas and Andrew Palaiologus. To the latter Philotheus, (Vita S. Sabbae in Kerameus' *Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμ. Σταχυολογ.* V, 329) ascribes all responsibility for the massacre. Andrew and Cocalas, however, tried to limit the massacre, which included nobles of their own rank and families as social enemies of the mob. Still the motives of the two noble Zealot leaders were not social, but only political. Social reform was imposed on them by the mob. So Pharmakis, a brother-in-law of Cocalas, was vainly hidden by the latter: the mob forced him to surrender Pharmakis, whom they killed (Cant. ib) However Prochorus Cydones was saved by a "terrorist" who was bribed (Loenertz, Cydonès Correspondance I, ep. 1, para. 10; cf. ep.7 (1345) pp. 32-34; ep. 26, 1345 pp. 55-56. - The nobles killed are called βουλή by D. Cydones; this proves that they all formed the βουλή : ep.7, 1345, p.34: ἀποκτείνασα μὲν τὴν βουλήν, ἀποκτείνασα δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶσους καὶ τῶσους . Cf. Section B, ch. II, n. 55. - The point is made by Charanis Internal Strife, B 15 (1940-41) 221 that the populace remained unmoved by the assassination of Michael Palaiologus, but it rose up and massacred the nobles only after the latter had offered the town to Cantacuzenus, i.e. only after a political

But the only known leaders of the Zealots were Michael and Andrew Palaiologus, G. Coculas and the Archbishop of Thessalonica (193).

issue was involved. This is groundless, because it ignores the fact that the people saw in Cantacuzenus the symbol of oppression; therefore they never missed the social importance of his taking Thessalonica. This is stressed by the fact that John Apocaucus became identified by the nobility and the Church with Saint Demetrius as early as the XIV century, as we see in some curious icons dated from 1384 onwards: A. Xyngopoulos **Ἅγιος Δημήτριος ὁ Μέγας Δούξ ὁ Ἀπόκαυκος, Ἑλληνικά** vol. 15, dedicated to Socrates Kougeas (1957) 122-140, esp. 137-9.

(189) D. Cydonēs *monodia*, P.G. 109, 648; Greg. Palamas Homily I, P.G. 151, 12f.; S.T. Gorianov *Kratkie soobsheniia i zametki, Pervaja Gomiliia Gregorija Palami, Kak distotchnik k istorii vosstaniia Zilotov, Viz.Vrem. I (XXVI) (1947) pp. 265-6*; E. Werner op.cit. 56b; Loenertz, D. Cydonēs *Correspondance I*, pp. 4-7, paras. 7-11; ib. epist. 43, **Ἰσιδῶρω μοναχῶ**, Constantinopolim, In Thracia 1346 pp. 77-79; Epist. 87. Nic. Cabasila *Chamaeto Thessalonice* am Constantinopoli 1347, pp. 120-1; epist. 7, 61, p. 34 Cantacuzeno, Thraciam, 1345, aestate vel autumnno, Berrocae; cf. possibly epist. 76, **Gratias** actas modeste recusat, Constantinopoli; p. 109, undated: perhaps 1345-9; also epist. 99, exuli, Constantinopoli, perhaps 1345-9, pp. 136-7, where in ll. 26-27 we read: **ἡ θουχή τότε φυγῆς ὑμῶν ἐπιμήσαντο**: this may mean **θουχή** of the mob formed by the Zealots.

(190) D. Cydonēs according to Charanis **Internal Strife, B. 15** (1940-41) 217.

(191) Greg. XVI 1: I, 796.

(192) D. Cydonēs' II Speech to J. Cantacuzenus (1347), ed. D. Cammelli, B.N. J. 4 (1923) p. 79; cf. P.G. 109, 648; cf. Greg. Palamas Homily I, P.G. 151, cc. 12-16. This was of course a rhetoric excess: Werner op.cit. 58a.

(193) The latter was Makarius (1342-1344 or 1342-6), as Tafrali *Thessalonique des Origines au XIV siècle* p. 296 supposes. In 1346 for a little the seat was occupied by the Cypriot Hyakinthos: G. Mercati *Notizie* pp. 221-3; Loenertz *Grég. Acindyni. Epistulae Selectae*

Some time after 1345 the Protosebastus Alexius Metochites, a delegate of Constantinople was accepted by the Zealots as co-governor (194). This indicates that Constantinople had recognised the regime of Thessalonica in its new form, despite the fact that it broke the laws of private property, which Byzantine tradition considered sacred (195).

Metochites' presence, on the other hand, guaranteed the security of the property of the remaining higher middle classes (merchants, entrepreneurs and foremen as well as of the nobles who led the Zealots. So the already noted partition of the leadership of the Zealots, which corresponded to an internal division of their social background (196), was perpetuated by Constantinople to its own profit. However, the presence of the representative of Constantinople must also have been due to the relationship of the new leader of the Zealots, Andrew Palaiologus, with the ruling family of Constantinople (197). Still the fact that after 1347 the Zealots did not respect the reconciliation between Cantacuzenus and Constantinople illustrates that there was yet a more decisive issue than the dynastic one between them and Cantacuzenus (198). This was the social issue, which was promoted by the popular basis of the Zealotic movement and by its efficient leaders (199), though the latter were always overshadowed by their noble

IX, EEBΣ 27 (1957) p. 91. In July 1345 ff. the bishopric appears vacant: Cant.III, 93-94:II, 572-5.

(194) Cant. IV, 16; III, 108-9; not mentioned by Lemerle *Philippes* 236f.

(195) Cabasilas in I. Ševčenko, "Antizealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957 para.21, p.101; para.9, p.94; para.14, p.96; Tafrali Thessalonique 269, n. 5; Ap. Vakalopoulos Συμβολή στην Ιστορία της Θεσσαλονίκης ἐπὶ Βενετοκρατίας (1950) (offprint from Τόμος Κ. Ἀρμενοπούλου) pp.3, 5-6.

(196) Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker pp. 586, 82a.

(197) In the same way John Apocaucus before him had probably been imposed on Thessalonica by the previous leader of the Zealots Michael (Catharus) Palaiologus (: Werner op.cit. 54a,) and by Alexius Apocaucus the former's father.

or upstart colleagues (200). As a result the mariners themselves, though they always remained the fighting force of the movement, never rose its leadership (201).

After the loss of Thessalonica for Cantacuzenus, Matthew Cantacuzenus managed to defeat the army of Hierax, General of Constantinople in Thrace, and to subdue all the towns of John Vatatzis (202). The loss of Chius to the Genoese and Cantacuzenus advance up to Selymbria again (203) forced Anna to resort to the last measures in order to save her regime. These had a social importance as they consisted of closer co-operation with the lower classes and especially with powerful upstarts, who could still appeal to the masses, according to the old pattern of the revolution.

Some of these upstarts were Phakeolatos, a rich Gasmul (204), and Balicas, archon of the Thracian town Carbonas, whose brothers (Theodore and Tombroditzas) took the maritime towns of

(198) Werner op.cit. 59a.

(199) Cf. Greg. XVI, 1: II, 796.

(200) This happened with Apocaucus and Calecas: Section B, Ch.I, nn. 35-38. Cf. Philothei Λόγος εἰς τὸ Παλαιολόγον, P.G. 151, 608 B-609B: a Palamite general of Peloponnese who served Anna during the civil war. This was a typical example of the infiltration of Palamites into the Palaiologian ranks.

(201) Werner op. cit. 58b, n. 126a; cf. D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz I, ep. I, (1347) pp. 4-6; cf. above n. 188.

(202) Cant. III, 94: II, 582.

(203) (From where he made secret contacts with his followers in Constantinople): Cant. III, 95: II, 582-3.

(204) Cant. III, 95: II, 582-3: He was hated by the Genoese for his anti-Genoese activities. See further: I. Ševčenko, Zealot Revolution p. 613, n. 53; Guillard Études de Titulature et de Prosopographie Byzantines, B. Le Protostrator, R.É.B.7, 2 (1950) 170; Greg. XV, 6: II, 766-7; XV, 8: II, 774.

Pontus for Anna, but they failed to take Selymbria (205), which, however, never stopped its commercial relations with Constantinople, though it belonged to Cantacuzenus (206).

In the meantime Cantacuzenus had acquired the support of the Turkish armies of Orkhan and Sarkhan from Asia Minor (207). They invaded Thrace, Macedonia and Bulgaria and their invasion was accompanied by rapings, terrible looting, murders and massive capture of the Greek population (208). The fields remained **unsown** as no oxens were left for plowing and neither in the countryside nor in the towns was there any employment or source of income (209).

This desperate situation pressed both parties and especially the poor, but also the rich, who could not find any help in taxation, as the peasants had nothing to pay (209). Great numbers of people emigrated and the towns were evacuated (210). Anna had to take the treasures of the Church and the properties of the rich (211), many of whom took shelter in Galata, where they found security for their assets (212).

All the attempts of the clique of Constantinople to distract the attention of the people with anti-palamitic synods were

(205) Cant. III, 95: II, 583-4. That Balicas was of low origin is proved by Cantacuzenus' phrase: *Μπαχικαν τινά*. Cf. I. Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, DOP 11 (1957) 162.

(206) Cant. III, 97: II, 601-602.

(207) Cant. III 95: II, 584-589.

(208) Cant. III, 96: II, 589-596; cf. *Ἐνδομήσιων ἤτοι χρόν. σημειωμάτων σερὰ α'*, nr 60, ed. Sp. Lambros, *Ν. Ἑλληνομνημῶν* 7 (1910) p. 142 (:1346 = *5ων δ'*: *ἐπέρασαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι εἰς τὴν Δύσιν*).

(209) D. Cydonès Correspondance ed. Loenertz I, ep. 18, *Τῷ δευπότῃ Ἐμμανουὴλ Καντακουζηνῷ*, Berrhoeam, In Thracia 1346, pp. 47-48; cf. Greg. VII, 10: I, 262-3 (1326-7); XXIX, 3-4: III, 224-5 (1354).

(210) Zakythinis Crise monétaire 69, 84, 92.

(211) Greg. XV, 1γ: II, 747-750, who claims that she used them to her own profit; cf. Cant. IV, 5: III, 33 (1347).

(212) Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 613.

vain (213). These could in no way solve the pressing social, financial and feeding problems of the Empire. On the other hand the second Coronation of Cantacuzenus in Adrinople on 21 May 1346 - following that of **Dušan** on 25 September 1345 (214) - gave the opportunity to his military noble followers to demand a consolidation of their land possessions and acquisitions through the coronation of **Matthew Cantacuzenus** as King. Still Cantacuzenus had to reject this claim (215), thus presaging and apparently facilitating his imminent compromise with the Palaiologi, which became more inevitable as **Dušan** advanced at the expense of the Byzantine world and both parties of that world were terribly exhausted.

Dušan's progress was accompanied by generous grants and privileges - especially to the influential clergy of Athos and several other parts of Northern Greece, as well as to Greek lay nobles, who were thus attracted to his party. These grants did not differ essentially from those awarded by the two Byzantine parties of the civil war and prove a similarity of social outlook on the part of all three. The years beginning in 1345 seem to have been the most fruitful for **Dušan**. To those years belong most of his Chrysobulls or decrees concerning grants. Such were his decrees to the Bishop of Pheremiae Kyprienos in 1345 (?) (216).

(213) Such was the Synod of 1344: Parisot Cantacuzène 217-8 = Greg. XVI, 5 ; XV, 7' ; M.-M. I, 238-242 = P.G. 152, 1269-1273; cf. M.-M. I, 202-216; Mercati Notizie 198-206; Cf. also the Synod of 1345: P.G. 150, 773-4, and two others in 1342: M. Jugie Palamite (controversé) DTC 11* (1932) 1785-6.

(214) O.H.B.S. 463, 466.

(215) Cant. III, 92: II, 564-8; Greg. XV, 5: II, 762; cf. Grég. Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX, ed. Loenertz, E.E.B. 27 (1957) p. 100, letter nr 5, anno 1346 V-VI (?)

(216) A. Guillou Les Archives de Ménécée (1955) pp. 120-122.

Another in September 1345 allowed the monks of Prodromos of Menece to install "free" (= taxless) peasants in all their lands and those of their monastery. It also extended to them and their personal lands the immunity granted previously to all the lands of the monastery (217).

By a chrysobull of October 1345 Dušan granted immunity to all the metochia of that monastery (218). A decree of 1345 - April 1346 granted to the monastery of Saint Anastasia Pharmakolytria in Kastitza the small property of the brothers Demetrius and George Myrievlos, who were priests and clerks of the church of Zelichova. He also exempted from taxation that property as well as all the properties of the monastery (219). Other privileges were granted by Dušan between the end of 1345 and April 1346 to Kallinikos the abbot of Chilandar (220).

Other grants of Dušan were more immediately linked with the civil war developments. Thus in January 1346 by ^achrysobull he annulled the Byzantine taxes to the benefit of Iberon (221) and thus attracted its monks to his party. The story of these taxes was this. Apparently because the Monastery of Iberon had supported Cantacuzenus at some time before 1346, it was deprived by Constantinople of part of its revenues from its metochia (in Radolivo, Ovilo and Dobroviće). This part, amounting to 243

(217) Op. cit. pp. 122-123.

(218) Op. cit. pp. 124-131.

(219) Op. cit. 131-2. For all these and other grants cf. also M. -^m. V, 108-129 (1341-6)

(220) Guillou op. cit. p. 133.

(221) Soloviev-Mošin Grčke povelie nrs 6, 17, cited in Ostrogorsky Féodalité 159; cf. also F. Doelger Sechs Byzant. Praktika p. 119, l. 241.

hyperpyra had been granted to it in 1341 and the monastery paid only 200 hyperpyra as *κεφάλαιον* (222). But later more than 248 hyperpyra were demanded by the State. Thus the monastery henceforward paid 100 hyperpyra as *zeugaretikion*, and another 200 hyperp. as *κεφάλαιον*, i. e. 400 hyperp. in all, first to the State Treasury and later to certain stratiotae (pronoiers) (223). In this way certain military needs of the State were satisfied, until the Serbian Czar intervened.

His intervention extended to other monasteries too. Like John V (224), so Dusan by a chrysobull of May 1346 granted to the monastery of Vatopedi other villages of St. Mamas in Kalamaria "with all its rights, as it had been held by the warriors (pronoiers) Varvarini and by those who had been holding it before them". By the same chrysobull Dusan restored to Vatopedi the lands of Raphalios and Krimotas (225). By another chrysobull of April 1348 Dusan confirmed these and other grants to Vatopedi and in addition he restored to it the ports of Leontarion and Small Sea, which had also been held by the pronoiers Varvarinoi (226). In November 1348 he restored to the monastery of St. George of Zablantia the village of Zablantia with its ten paroikoi. As seen in Section A, these had been taken without any compensation for State military purposes (227). This is an example of how the process of paroikoi being lost to the Byzantine military service continued during the revolution.

(222) Cf. Section A, chapter I, n. 102a.

(223) F. Doelger *Sechs Byz. Praktika*, ib., cited in *Féodalité* 159. It seems that the difference between the original 248 hyperpyra of *zeugaratikion* and the 200 hyperp. paid later comes from a decrease in the monastery's revenues in the meantime or from a concealment of part of its revenues by the monks.

(224) Who in 1343 had to confirm to Dochiariou lands of the pronoiers Varvarini and Neokastrites, cf. above n. 78.

(225) Apparently by Andronicus III: A. Guillou op.cit. pp.157-8= Soloviev - Mošin *Grčke povelje* nrs 11, 36-38, 46-49; *Regel Χρυσόβουλ-λα Βατοπεδίου* nr 6, 22-24, cited by Guillou ib.

(226) Guillou op.cit. 157 Soloviev-Mošin op.cit. nrs 18, 22-26, 29-31, *Γυδας Έγγραφα Βατοπεδίου* nn. 23/4-7, cited by Guillou ib.

Thus Andronicus III's (and possibly John V's) secularising measures were reversed by the Serbian Czar, who thus weakened the military power of the Byzantine world and strengthened the parasitic elements who were the noble monks.

Other subsequent measures of Dusan attest the above-mentioned central theme of his policy and are especially adopted to the existing Byzantine land regime. Such was his prostagma of April 1348 to George Phokopoulos (apparently a Greek landowner), which confirmed the act of the Greek Governor of Serres and of the other imperial and ecclesiastical officials of that town, who had granted privileges to Phokopoulos (228).

Such a widespread intrusion of the Serbs into the life and society of the Empire created great problems, which needed a great personality to face efficiently. This seems to have brought about a change in the political conscience of even the lower classes who had been supporting Anna and turned them to Cantacuzenus (229). Such people finally surrendered Constantinople to Cantacuzenus (230).

This opportunity was grasped by several clergymen and monks, who were displeased with the Patriarch Calecas: They filed a report against his excesses, which were mainly financial, and a Synod deposed him on Anna's orders (1 February 1347) (231). The latter hurried to deprive Calecas of the initiative to negotiate with Cantacuzenus and to punish him for his wavering friendship (232).

(227) Section A, ch. I, n. 95b: Soloviev - Mošin Grčke povelje nrs 21, 5-7, cited in Ostrogorsky's Feodalitë 158.

(228) Guillou op.cit. no. 134-5.

(229) Cant. III, 97: II, 597-8.

(230) Cant. III, 97: II, 598-602.

(231) Cant. III, 98: II, 602-4; IV 3: III, 21-28; Ἀναγορὰ Ἀρχιερέων, P.G. 151, 767-770D; Πρόσταγμα Καντακυζῆ, P.G. 151, 769D-774A; Tafrafi Thessalonique 193-5; cf. M.-M.I, 227-8 (1342) and 235-7.

(232) Greg. XV, 9: I¹, 781-4.

Meanwhile Cantacuzenus entered Constantinople, where looting took place. Anna called the Genoese of Galata to her help, but they were defeated by the army of Cantacuzenus and the people of Constantinople. Contrary to expectation the latter did not side with Anna and the Genoese as they hated them as foreigners and allies of the Byzantine rich classes, whom they equally hated (233). Cantacuzenus now appeared in a new light, as a national hero who fought against the foreigners. He called an assembly of Bishops and notables to whom he explained his position and whom he requested to mediate and avoid further bloodshed. At last an agreement was reached, of which the most important aspect was that each would keep the possessions he had before the war (3/2/1347) (234).

Thus the political aspect of the civil war appeared to have ended, but in actual fact the political and social struggles involved in it continued.

(233) Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 613, where the important source Alexius Makrembolites is analysed. Add Greg. XI, 2a: I, 530; X, 8a: I, 501-2 (1333).

(234) Cant. III, 100: II, 610-615; cf. Greg. 252 XXVII, 47: III, 166; D. Cydones Oratio ad J. Cantacuzenum Secunda, ed. G. Cammelli, B. N.J. 4 (1923) 77-83.

S E C T I O N C
C H A P T E R II
U R B A N A N D R U R A L C O N D I T I O N S
B E T W E E N 1347 A N D 1354.

a) 1347-1350: THE SUPPRESSION OF THE ZEALOTS IN
THESSALONICA.

The agreement of 3/2/1347 was gladly accepted by the Constantinopolitan Palaiologian nobility, but the Cantacuzenian nobility outside Constantinople accepted it with reluctance and refused to swear allegiance to John V. The economic matters were arranged by Cantacuzenus in such a way that none of either party was obliged to return pillaged property except the landed estates (κτήσεων) which were still in their possession. To those who had lost their lands Cantacuzenus gave compensations, "which brought full satisfaction to all" (1).

In this way the confiscations of lands belonging to churches, to Cantacuzenus and other nobles by Apocaucus and Anna were annulled, and what remained of the Empire returned to its old land regime (2). Nicholas Cabasilas appealed to Anna to again make valid the law that Andronicus III had put into practice after the first civil war (1321-8); by that he had exempted all those

(1) Cant. IV, 1: III, 8-10; cf. a similar arrangement in 1328: Cant. I, 52: I, 265; and especially I, 53: I, 271; II, 1: I, 311-312. Cf. Section A. Ch. I, n. 87a, and generally 87-90. Cf. Charanis Monastic Properties DOP 4 (1948) 114; N.I. Pantazopoulos τόμος Κ. Ἀρμενοπούλου p. 512.

(2) Cant. IV, 12: III, 80-81: τὰλλα (χρήματα) ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου καὶ ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν : therefore the royal lands confiscated by the Palaiologian régime were now returned to Cantacuzenus.

of his party who had lost their property in the war from the obligation of paying interest to other richer noble usurers, who had turned into exploiters of the destitute town nobles during the civil war (3), especially those of Thessalonica (4). But there is no evidence that Anna accepted Cabasilas' suggestion. However what follows may point to the possibility that she supported the impoverished nobles, among whom was Cabasilas' father between February 1347 and 1349 by land grants and immunities (5). Other nobles such as Demetrius Cydones turned successfully to Cantacuzenus for restitution of their losses in the civil war (6).

Andronicus' law had apparently fallen into abeyance before 1347 and perhaps long before 1341 (7). Therefore its restitution was needed and claimed by the nobility, who were in conditions similar to those of 1328.

(3) R. Guiland *Le traité inédit "Sur l'Usure" de Nicolas Cabasilas*, *Εἰς μνήμην Σπυρίδ. Λάμπρου* (1935) p. 275.

(4) R.J. Loenertz *Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas*, OCP 21 (1955) 223-4.

(5) Nic. Cabasilas *Κατὰ τοκισόντων*, P.G. 150, 727-750; Guiland *ib.* p. 276 ll. 11-15; Ševčenko *Cabasilas' Correspondence* BZ 47 (1954) 55-56.

(6) D. Cydonès *Correspondance* I (ed. Loenertz, 1956) *epist.* 1 (1347, Constantinopoli) to John Cantacuzenus, pp. 1-2; *espec.* p. 6, *para.* 11: "as you helped all, help me"; cf. *ib.* *epist.* 88, Constantinopoli 1348, *viro religioso*, pp. 121-2, *esp.* p. 122 ll. 33-36: *εὐνοίᾳ καὶ χάριτι μεταδίδοι*; cf. *epist.* 99, *exuli*, Constantinopoli pp. 136-7 *esp.* ll. 27-39: *ὕμεις δὲ δεσποτῶν ἀνοήτων ἐλευθερώσαντες τὴν πατρίδα, οἴσθα μὲθ' ὧν ἐγκωμίων κατήχθητε---*

(7) R. Guiland *ib.* 274-7; cf. Nic. Cabasilas *Κατὰ τοκισόντων*, P.G. 150, 727-750, *esp.* 728; *Cant.* II, 1: I, 312; II, 2: I, 322-3; R.J. Loenertz *Chronologie de Nic. Cabasilas*, O.C.P. 21 (1955) 206, 220-224; I. Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" *Discourse*, DOP 11 (1957) 85-86; Ševčenko *Nic. Cabasilas' Correspondence*, BZ 47 (1954) 55-56; *Tafrahi Thessalonique* 113. n. 3.

Cantacuzenus' other moves were to grant offices to his relatives, sons and some eminent nobles only (8), as well as to restore Palamism (9) and to consolidate his position by marrying his daughter (Helen) to John V (21/5/1347) (10). His favouring of a limited number of nobles in his policy of grants (11) and the maintenance of Palaiologians in their posts (12) from the very beginning created bitter complaints, which appeared together with other causes in the all-class assembly of 1347 in Constantinople. This assembly was asked by the Emperor to make financial contributions for the restoration of the fighting power of the State. This was accepted by the majority of the nobles and other eminent

(8) Cant. IV, 5: III 33-36.

(9) Cant. IV, 3: III, 20-28; Ἰωάννου Καρτακουζηνοῦ Πρόσταγμα κατὰ Κοιπέκα, P.G. 151, 769D - 774D; Libellus Synodalis, P.G. 152, 1273-1284= M.- M. I, 243-255, XIX (Febr. 1347); Ἀναφορά Ἀρχιερέων, P.G. 151, 767D - 770D. In Greg. Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX, ed. Loenertz, *EEB* 27 (1957) pp. 103-104, Epist. 6 to Maximus Caloherus, 1347. X - XII, we see that Acindynus still calls Calecas the Patriarch; cf. epist. 7, Ἀθανασίῳ μοναχῷ εἰς Θεσσαλονίκη, post 1347. X - XII. Cf. Greg. XVIII, 5: II. 894.

(10) Cant. IV, 4: III, 28-30; Greg. XV. 11: II, 788; cf. Charanis Short Chronicle, B. 13 (1938) 347. Note the nobles' new claim that Matthew should be crowned too: cf. Section C, ch. I. n. 215.

(11) Cant. IV, 5: III, 33-36; cf. III, 4: II, 34 (1341); E. Werner Volkstümliche Häretiker p. 54a. Further cases: Cant. IV, 5; III; Cant. IV, 32: III, 237; Cant. IV, 28: III, 211.

(12) E.g. cf. Cant. IV, 35: III, 255; cf. the former Chapter.

citizens in the hope that the lost towns would be re-occupied and therefore more *pronoiae* would be acquired. However some of the impoverished classes such as the artisans, bankers and some dissatisfied nobles of Anna's party rejected the request, as they considered it another form of oppression and robbery and a continuation of the civil war for Cantacuzenus' own interests. So his plan did not materialise at that stage and no navy was built, while the Genoese unsuccessfully tried to exploit this split in the parties and use John V and certain Palaiologian Senators against Cantacuzenus (13).

Cantacuzenus' failure to unite the social and political components of the Empire was also seen in the continued attacks of the lower classes (*δημοί*) on the nobles. Their lands continued to be confiscated despite the arrangement of 3/2/1347 and they themselves were imprisoned in Constantinople and all the towns of the Empire, where popular resistance to Cantacuzenus was still active. The nobles who suffered in this way thought their leader's conciliation with the Palaiologi and their supporters treasonous and turned again to his son Matthew, who was then despot of Chalcidica (14) and Komotini (15), and whom they tried to persuade to form an autonomous principality around Didymoteichum and Adrinople (16). Only the intervention of his parents, who

(13) Greg. XV, 12: II, 790-1; cf. Greg. XIV, 5: II, 708-9; Cant. IV, 5-6: III, 36-43; cf. IV, 11; III, 68-80; Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 84, 93-94; Werner op. cit. 54a, 59a n. 130; Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution* pp. 615-6. Zakythinos thinks that the bankers and craftsmen who opposed Cantacuzenus were the well to-do class, who held the gold and had been enriched because of the civil war. Ševčenko stresses the balancing role between the two parties played by the Genoese to serve their own interests.

(14) Cant. III, 69: II, 426-7; IV, 10: III, 66-67; cf. IV, 42: III, 310-311; IV, 27: III, 208-9.

(15) Cant. III, 67: II, 414-5.

(16) Cant. IV, 7: III, 43-48; Kordatos *Ἀκμή καὶ παρακμή τοῦ Βυζαντίου* (1953) 233; cf. 302.

were pursuing the compromise between the opposite factions, prevented this plan from materialising at that time (17). As a reward Matthew's principality was granted more autonomy by Cantacuzenus (autumn 1347) (18).

Further social disorder was caused by the plundering of the Thracian population by the Turkish troops of Suleyman. Cantacuzenus had requested the latter's help when he had unsuccessfully tried to defend Berrhoia against the Serbs (19). This worsened the economic situation (20) which had not yet recovered from the civil war. Added to this the whole country was ravaged by the plague of 1348. So, in order to appease and attract the people, Cantacuzenus toured the Thracian towns with John V, the symbol of legitimacy (21). This political demonstration of Cantacuzenus had also a profound social significance as it seemed to have linked for a time the divided parties and classes of society, which ran the same danger from the plague.

We see this in the fall of the last stronghold of the popular resistance, Medea of Pontus, to Cantacuzenus in 1348, in his friendly treatment of Tombrotitzas its governor (22) and in

(17) His mother's intervention is shown in Cant. IV, 8: III 48-49 and his father's in Greg. XVI, 4: II, 813-4; cf. Charanis Short Chronicle, B 13 (1938) 347, n. 2.

(18) Cf. Introduction to the Thesis n. 150.

(19) Cant. IV, 4: III, 30-32; Greg. XXVIII, 41-42: III, 203. In Berrhoia there was a pro-Serbian party of nobles.

(20) Werner op.cit. 59a, n. 130.

(21) Cant. IV, 8: III, 49-53; cf. *Ἐνθυσμήσεων, ἢ τοῦ χρονικῶν σημειωμάτων σειρά α'*, nr 61: 1348, ed. Sp. Lambros in *Νέαι Ἑλληνισμῶν* 7 (1910) p. 142; for the actual perishing of the 2/3 or 8/10 of the population of Constantinople see Zakythinis Crise Monétaire 70. Further details of the plague: D. Cydonès Correspondance, ed. G. Cammelli (1930), epist. nr. 360, p. 190; Loenertz Chronologie de Nicol. Cabasilas, OCP 21 (1955) 210; D. Cydonès Correspondance, ed. Loenertz I, epist. 57 (1352-3), Scribae, p. 89; cf. epist. 88, Viro Religioso, Constantinopoli 1348, pp. 121-2, esp. p. 122, ll. 43-56.

his success in restoring the finances of the Empire and in building a fleet. As a result further Turkish raids were repelled in Hellespontus and Chalcidica (23) and an expedition against Dusan was undertaken (24). But his diplomatic exchanges with the Pope (25) and the Venetians (26) against the Turks were unfruitful. During the Galatan war (15 August 1348 - 5 March 1349, which resulted from the building of the Byzantine fleet, there were further social and political changes in both Galata and Byzantium. In Constantinople ships and bourgeois houses were destroyed by the Galatans who were united in the fighting. This and the Genoese blockade turned the anti-Latin lower classes to Cantacuzenus. They contributed to replacements in the navy and the army and were placed in important posts. Through them the war continued despite the half hearted attitude of some wealthy Byzantines, who were pro-Galatans (27). Numbered amongst those was the Emperor Cantacuzenus himself (28), while his wife Irene supported the lower classes (29). The result of this war was a victory for the Genoese (5 March 1349) due partly to the inferiority of Byzantine war techniques.

(23) Cant. IV, 10: III, 66-68;

(24) Greg. XVI, 6: II, 834: spring 1348. Umur had not been able to help him once he was killed in May 1348. Lemerle *Émirat d'Aydin* 227-229, 237.

(25) Cant. IV, 94 III 53-62; J. Meyendorff *Les débuts de la Controverse hésychaste*, B 23 (1953, app. 1954) 90, n.2; cf. Loenertz *Ambassadeurs Grecs auprès du Pape Clément VI (1348)*, OCP 19 (1953) 178-196; cf. Introduction for the Thesis n. 151.

(26) Thiriet *Régestes* I p. 62, 14/7/1347; Cydonès *Correspondance* (Cammelli) lett. 1, pp. 1-3; D. Cydonès *Κατὰ Παλαιὰ*, P.G. 154, 836-7; cf. Introduction *ib.*

(27) As Galata for them was a safe for their assets: Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 74, 112; cf. the previous chapter nn. 233, 128; esp. see Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution* 612-3.

(28) This is perfectly explained by the close relations of Cantacuzenus with some of the Genoese nobles of Galata; such was Paganis d' Oria, successor of Boccanegra (1351-2) and leader of

This was made inevitable by the Byzantine policy of dependence on the Westerners for arms and war articles, a policy which had been initiated by Michael VIII and continued by his successors and by Cantacuzenus himself in such activities. as his demanding a Venetian licence on 7 March 1349 and later on 2 March 1350 to import arms, "segna" anchors and other naval accessories from Venice for the Byzantine fleet (30).

In the end Cantacuzenus had to give in and grant the Genoese the lands they demanded (March 1349) (31). This displeased the urban classes who had trusted him, and caused a renewal of hostile feeling towards him. They accused him of misuse of public money, but he called a new all-class assembly, in which he disproved it, and showed that he himself had contributed large amounts to the State Treasury (32). In order to counteract the poverty he fixed the following new taxes for the first time in Byzantine trade policy (33):

the Genoese fleet of 70 ships (Cant. IV, 26: III, 198; IV, 27: III, 209-210) during the Galatan war, Cf. his close relationships with Godefroy, protosebastos in Sylembria, who was his friend (1346) (Cant. IV, 96: III, 589) and with Aregos the abbot of the Frères Mineurs in Constantinople, who became also his friend in 1345 (Cant. III, 82-83: II, 503-509; III, 85: II, 522-3; cf. I.Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 612-3); add Francès, a Latin who was in Cantacuzenus' service (:Cant. IV, 9: III, 53-54 (1347)) and was used by him as Ambassador to the Pope, cf. R.J. Loenertz Ambassadeurs grecs auprès du pape Clément VI (1348), OCP 19 (1953) 178-196, esp.178-9; Lemerle L'Émirat d'Aydin 224-5.

(29) Cant. IV, 11:III, 68-79;cf. Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 613-617; Charanis Short Chronicle, B. 13 (1938) 338, 347.

(30) F.Thiriet Régestes I (1956) p. 66, 7/3/1349; p.62, 2/3/1350 The new fleet was built under the supervision of Phakeolatos: Cant. IV, 10:III, 63: IV, 11:III, 74) and was commanded by him (Cant. IV, 11:III, 76-77); Phakeolatos was a Genoese.

(31) Note the important source Alexius Makrembolites used by Ševčenko ib. and add Greg. XVIII, 1-4; Greg. XVIII, 7: II, 865-870; XXV, 17: III, 41; Thiriet op.cit. I, p.66, 13-14/4/1349; p.70, 18/7/

a) a merchant ship (ὁ λκός), which imported wheat from abroad, would pay 1/2 gold coin for each medimnos to the Treasury;

b) the farmers would pay one gold coin for every 50 choae (that they sold ?);

c) those (merchants) who bought from farmers would pay twice that tax (= 2/50) because they were richer (than the farmers) and easily earned the sum paid many times over;

d) the traders instead of 1/10 (= 10/100) should pay 1/50 (= 2/100) (34).

Thus a) he controlled and exploited the important wheat trade, which was mostly in the hands of foreigners;

b) he alleviated the peasants, as it was mostly those and not their landowners who paid taxes to the State for their produce (35).

c) he put a reasonable tax on merchants' purchases from farmers;

d) by going further than Apocaucus in 1345 (36) he reduced the tariffs of the customs dues paid by both the Byzantine and non-Byzantine traders to the old percentage of 2/100, which had been valid for most Westerners for a long time (37). This was probably aimed also at encouraging other nations' ships (besides the Genoese) to start trading again in the Byzantine port instead

1350:cf. Zakythinos Crise monétaire 94, L. Brehier Vie et mort de Byzance (1948) 443. Cantacuzenus' claim that he gave in willingly and out of magnanimity (Cant. IV, 11: III, 79-80) is groundless.

(32) Professor Zakythinos says "deux ou trois millions" out of misinterpretation of "20-30 μυριάδες χρυσού" = 200,000-300,000: Crise monétaire 94.

(33) Greg. XVIII, 7: II, 870.

(34) Cant. IV, 12: III, 80-81.

(35) Cf. Section A, ch. II, passim

(36) Cf. Section C. ch. I, n. 74.

(37) Cf. Greg. XVII, 1 γ: II, 842, 12-21: Τοὺς ἐκ θαλάσσης οἰκονομικώτερον τρόπον κουφίσαντος φόρους βουλομένους καταίρειν εἰς τῶντων Βυζαντίων λιμένα, ὃ μάλιστα τοῖς Λατίνοις ἦν αἰεὶ βοηθεῖν καὶ κραταιότερον αὐτοῖς τὸ διηνεκῶς ἐργαζόμενον.

of in Galata, which received 87% of the customs dues of the Bosphorus (38). However its chief aim was to increase the Byzantine trade and shipping which aim was realized soon afterwards by the creation of an "unprecedented" number of Byzantine merchant ships and by their rapid mastery of the sea (39).

(38) This is a Andreades' (Ἔργα I, 449), as well as P.Kalligas opinion (P. Kalligas *Μελέται Βυζαντινῆς Ἱστορίας*, (1894) 497), cited by Zakythinos *Crise monétaire* 95, n.1; Cf. also Heyd, *Commerce du Levant* I, 498ff., and Ostrogorsky *H.B.S.* 471, though there is a reversal of the real sequence of events even there: the destruction of the Byzantine fleet by the Genoese is dated in early 1349 after the measures of Cantacuzenus. But in fact the destruction of the fleet preceded the measures: *Cant.* IV, 10: III, 66-68; IV, 12: III, 80-86; cf. *Greg.* XVI, 1-4: II, 795-819; XVII, 1-7: II, 841-867; Ἀλέξιος Μακρεμβολίτης, *Λόγος Ἱστορικὸς* in I. Ševčenko *Zealot Revolution, Προβλεπὰ εἰς Στ. Π. Κυριακίδην* (1953) 613-5; A. Papadopoulos Kerameus *Ἀναλόγητα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας* I (1891) 150-157; cf. P. Charanis *Short Chronicle*, B.13 (1938) 347. Add *Greg.* XVI, 7: II, 835f.; *Cant.* IV, 5f: III, 33f.

(39) *Cant.* IV, 12: III, 80-81: Professor Zakythinos (*Crise monétaire* 95) accepts that the merchant tax was increased from 10% to 50%, because πεντηκοστίας means 50%. However this appears to be wrong from the context and n. 38, as well as from the increase of the Greek navy that ensued (: cf. Zakythinos *ib.* 95), as a result of the decrease of customs. The word πεντηκοστίας is evidently a corruption of the ancient πεντηκοστή, which meant 2/100 tax! (See *Liddel-Scott Greek-English Lexicon*, ed. 1940 p.1362b word πεντηκοστή). Therefore even philologically the dubious passage becomes quite clear. Cf. D. Cydonēs *Correspondance* ed. Loenertz I; τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἰωάννῃ Παλαιολόγῳ 1371, "Constantinopolit" p. 21, para.21, ll 23-24: ἢ τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἑκατοστὰς ἐπὲρ ὧν παρ' ἐμοῦ δανείζονται πράττομαι, where ἑκατοστὰς has a similar meaning

Through his policy Cantacuzenus flattered the non-noble classes to preserve and consolidate his throne. This same aim is to be traced in his unsuccessful attempt to recapture Chios and his recapture of Phocaea from the Genoese in 1348. There he appointed Leon Kalothetos, a Chian noble of his party (40) and merchant of wheat and salt as governor (41). This was in accordance with the well-known pattern of noble traders. But it was also a revival of the old pr noble policy of Cantacuzenus and must have counted for the new turning of the middle classes against him.

The fall of Thessalonica to Cantacuzenus was the turning - point in social problems. After their victory over John Apocaucus and the nobles (1345), the Zealots led by Andrew Palaeologus governed the town with the co-operation of the protosebastus Alexius Metochites, the new governor appointed by Constantinople (42) after 1345 (43). The régime frequently defied Cantacuzenus' authority (44) and assumed full power in the town. Terrorism was a permanent feature of the régime in its attempt to save itself from the defeatism of some of the middle classes and of some nobles who had survived (45).

Still we know from some sources that in Thessalonica, despite the intensive class and political war that accompanied the

(40) Cant. IV, 12: III, 80-85. For their relations cf. Cant. II, 12: I, 385-6; II, 13: I, 390-1; II, 10: I, 322-5. He had been checked out of Chios by Alexius Apocaucus due to his Cantacuzenianism: Cant. IV, 12: III, 80-85; Lemerle *Émirat* 196.

(41) Thiriet *Régestes* I (1956) p.69, 2/3/1350.

(42) I.e. by Isaac Asanes, Phakeolatos, Kinnamus and Anna, who formed the new government.

(43) Possibly soon after that year and anyway between 1345 and 1349; R: J. Loenertz *Emmanuelis Raul Epistulae* XII, *EEB* 26 (1956) pp. 133-4, epist. 7, ll. 3, 9-15. Cf. the previous chapter, n.194.

(44) E.g. in 1347M. - M. I, 258.

(45) Tafrali *Thessalonique* 249-250; Greg. XV, 2: II, 793; Cant. IV, 1: III, 8-9; IV, 15: III, 104-5; Philothei *Λόγος εἰς τὴν Παλαμᾶν*, P. G. 151, 613B-D-619; Neili *Ἐγκώμιον τῆς Παλαμᾶς*, P. G. 151, 672 D-673.

régime, there was a considerable degree of democracy (46). But the confiscations continued (47), and for this reason the lower classes supported the Zealots (48). But after the massacres of 1345 most of the intellectuals in the city turned against the regime (49) and there was a growing reaction against the Zealots,

συνασχημονεῖν αὐτῇ καὶ τῆν στάσιν συνεπεγεῖρειν = 672D; Ap.Va-
kalopoulos, Συμβολὴ στὴν Ἱστορίαν τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης ἐπὶ Βενετοκρα-
τίας (1950)pp. 5-6; R.J. Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas
Cabasilas OCP 21 (1955) 208. Especially note Neili op.cit. 673A:
Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπεικειῖς τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ σώφρονες.....φέρειν οὐκ εἶχον
ἀμύνειν ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ' αὖτως οἷοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ πρὸ τούτων γε τῷ δικάῳ.

(46) E.g. Note the open anti-Barlaamitic activity of Charadzas in the town between 1344-6; R.J. Loenertz. Greg. Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX, E.E.B.Σ 27 (1957) letter 2, p. 92 letter 3, p. 95; cf. also the open reprimand of the Zealots by an Andrino-
politan (who had been naturalized in Thessalonica) for their conduct towards Palamas: Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρ.Παλαμᾶν, P.G.151, 644; cf. 614. Cf. the "Anti-zealot" Discourse of Nicolas Cabasilas.

(47) Neili op.cit. 672D: σφίσι δ' αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν τῆς πατρίδος
κακῶν παρεῖχον πλουτεῖν.

(48) Neili op.cit. 673A: ὁ γὰρ ὄμιλος θαλάττης δίκην, οὐχ ὅποι
δέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ προσπίπτων ἄνεμος ἐκταράττοι, φερόμενος ἀτάκτως
καὶ θορυβούμενος τοῖς στασιασταῖς πολλὴν παρεῖχεροπήν, τὴν οἰκείαν
μοχθηρίαν εἰς πέρας ἄγειν. John V. was no more related to the
Zealots then: op.cit. 673B.

(49) Note the flight of Const. Harmenopoulos to Athos in 1346-7, though he had worked under the Zealot regime for long and had been anti-palamite: Greg. Acindyni Codex Marc.Gr.155, f.82r, 83r-v, 88r, cited by I. Ševčenko "Anti-zealot" Discourse, D.O.P. 11 (1957) p. 168; cf. P.Lemerle Note sur la carrière judiciaire de Constantin Harmenopoulos, in Τόμος Κωνστ. Ἀρμενοπούλου (1952) pp. 243-9; D.Cydones and Nic.Cabasilas are found in Cantacuzenus' service in 1345-9ff; Cant. III, 93-94; II, 573-5(1345); IV, 16; III, 107 (1349). Thomas Magistros was also shaken in his Barlaamitic belief and stopped his pro-Calecan (and pro-zealot)

which was possibly increased by the anti-religious attitude of at least some Zealots (50). This shocked the religiously minded classes.

Metochites' authority was annulled by the open split between Thessalonica and Constantinople. The Zealots were ready to call in the Serbs as their allies. This would mean a loss of revenue and office for him and so he became the spokesman of the reactionaries. Together with some of the army and dissatisfied citizens he invited Cantacuzenus to take the town (51). This move shows that the army, whether composed of Thessalonians or not, certainly did not contain Zealots or members of the lower classes, a condition which was one of the fundamental tactical weaknesses of the régime. Added to this were the lack of a genuinely popular leader (52), the Zealots' association with the Serbs which gave arguments to their opponents (53), the partiality of their confiscations, which left many rich intact until the end of the régime (54) and prevented a total reform of society from being effected and the peace between John V and John VI, as a result of which a number of the populace stopped supporting the Zealots (55).

activity in Thessalonica between 1344-1346: Greg. Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, *EEBΣ* 27 (1957), letter 4, *Τῷ Μαγίστρῳ, Thessalonicam, Constantinopoli 1344-6*, pp. 95-97. - Other Barlaamites changed faith at the same time (1345-6): *Op. cit.* pp. 96-108; and R.-J. Loenertz *Dix-huit lettres de Grégoire Acindynus analysées et datées*, *OCP* 23 (1957) 126 (: G. Isaris, a Barlaamite landowner of Thessalonica) until about 1345. Cf. also the previous chapter n.177.

(50) E.g. Note the exclusion of Greg. Palamas from Thessalonica in 1347: Neili *op.cit.* 672C-674B; Philothei *op.cit.* P.G. 151, 613B-619A; Greg. XXVII, 47: II, 166; Acindyni *op.cit.* *EEBΣ* 27 (1957) pp. 90, 97.

(51) *Καὶ ἄλλους συναγαγακτοῦντας πολίτας καὶ στρατιὰν αὐτῷ προσέχουσας*: Cant. IV, 16: III, 109. For the army cf. Section A. ch. II, nn. 17-18. Section C, ch. I, n. 96.

(52) For the need of a popular leader in every revolutionary

So, when Metochites openly split from Andrew Palaiologus (1349), the latter had only the support of the mariners. The anti-zealot forces overwhelmed them and both Andrew and the mariners had to abandon the town. Their houses were sacked by the "people" and Andrew fled to Dusan and then to Athos (56). He failed to secure Dušan's help for the Zealots, but they themselves called him to their aid and openly showed they no longer paid allegiance to John V (57).

The social issue that lay behind the dynastic pretext now became evident, especially after John V's and Anna's compromise with Cantacuzenus the leader of the nobles (58) and her part in the suppression of the revolution side by side with John VI and the nobles (59). At that time of crisis many of the citizens of Thessalonica preferred Dušan to Cantacuzenus. The long siege of

movement see Sebastian Haffner in *Observer* 22/3/1959 pp. 6-7, esp. p. 7, cc. 1-2.

(53) Cant. IV, 16: III, 108-110.

(54) Cant. IV, 16: III, 109: Οἱ Ζηλωταὶ δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸν δῆμον ἄγειν οὐκ ἠδύναντο οὐκέτι, οὐδὲ διαρπάζειν τὰς οἰκίας τῶν ἐχόντων (1349).

Cf. IV, 17: III, 117: Ἐπὶ τοῦς ἀρίστους διαστασιάζοντας (1350).

(55) Cf. Charanis *Internal Strife*, B.15 (1940-1) 227-8.

(56) For the real meaning of this flight see now Werner *Volkstümliche Häretiker* pp. 68b - 69a, 59b - 60a: As a bankrupt politician he was welcomed on Athos as a refugee; cf. J.M. Hussey *The Byzantine world* (1957) pp. 127-8.

(57) Cant. IV, 16: III, 108-111.

(58) Cf. Werner op. cit. 59a and 60a.

(59) Cf. the two passages of Nicolas Cabasilas' *Panegyric to Anna*, ed. M. Jugie, *Izvestija Russk. Archaeol. Inst. v. Konstantinople* 15 (1911) 118, ll. 37-119, 3, and the concluding part in *Ἑλληνικά*, 9 (1936) p. 204 (ed. V. Laurent), cited by I. Ševčenko *Nicolaus Cabasilas' Correspondence*, B.Z. 47 (1954) p. 56. Alexius Metochites might have been the instrument of Anna's new anti-zealot policy, if we may call any of her previous policies pro-zealot.

the town by the Cantacuzenian forces and the Turks, its long isolation from the outside world had tired the people and led them to the decision that the only solution to that terrible situation was their surrender to the Serbs (60). The lower classes supported the Zealots up to the last moment and were not concerned with their proserbian policy or with their anti-religious measures (61).

On the other hand it seems certain that the Zealots had already grasped the idea that there could be no place for a radical republic within the Byzantine Empire as long as it was under the central authority of the nobility (62) and especially of Cantacuzenus, whose social policy they watched anxiously and compared to that of Stephen Dušan.

So Dušan was invited by the Zealots and besieged Thessalonica with troops. When Cantacuzenus reached the town supported by Turkish troops and ships (winter 1349-1350), he found the lower classes (*δημος*) led by the Zealots in sharp conflict with those nobles who still survived. With his appearance this conflict stopped abruptly, because the Zealots had no army of their own and the army of the town passed to the side of Metochites (63). The people received Cantacuzenus joyously, and in an assembly of all classes he expanded his policy and accused the Zealots of treachery and robbery. He then had the most eminent Zealots arrested and taken to Constantinople, and the remainder were expelled from Thessalonica (64).

(60) Cant. IV, 16: III, 110, 113: κίνδυνος... (ὄν) οὐχ ἡ ἄδυνα -
μία τῶν ἐνοικοούντων μᾶλλον ἐπήγαγεν ἢ ἡ μοχθηρία.

(61) Oppose this to Tafrali Thessalonique au XIVE siècle p.252.

(62) Cf. Werner op.cit. 60a, citing 5 R. Browning Komunata na Zilotite b Solun (1342-1350), Ist. Pregled VI, 4-5 (1950) p.523.

(63) Cant. IV, 16-17: III, 111-116; Greg. XVIII, 2: II, 876-7; cf. Werner op.cit. 58b-60a; about the time: Emmanuelis Raul Epistulae XII ed. R. J. Loenertz, EEB 26 (1956), pp.137-8, 11229-240; R. J. Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas, O.C.P. 21 (195) 223 (As regards John V, who served as smokescreen for Cantacuzenus by accompanying him (Cant. IV, ib. III, 113-4; Werner op.cit. 60a; Tafrali op.cit. 252), there is no evidence that Cant. had sent John V to Th/c

In this manner Cantacuzenus imposed his authority on the much coveted town of Thessalonica (65) and put an end to its revolutionary régime, whose collapse meant the collapse of the whole revolutionary movement within the Empire, despite some isolated cases of long resistance. The prolongation of the régime had become impossible because of the overwhelming superiority of the resources of the nobility, who were able to crush the movement at its very core, Thessalonica. Other factors contributed to its downfall. Such were the lack of a strong industrial and commercial bourgeoisie throughout the Empire to take over the leadership of the revolution from the nobles of the Palaiologian Party, the increased influence of the hardly organised mob within the Zealot party, and the already stressed lack of a popular leader, which allowed the nobles to assume leadership of the Zealots' party.

Still the Zealot movement was an important illustration to them of the crisis of the landed regime throughout the Empire and the whole of Europe (66). The crisis proved that the dissensions and conflicts of the social classes and parties were so wide that no possibility of national unity existed. The development of both urban and rural conditions was leading the Empire to a definite disruption, which is apparent further in the documents of this period which deal with land questions. Such was the chrysobull of April 1348 of John VI Cantacuzenus, which confirmed certain possessions and rights to the monastery of Saint Maria of Megaspelaion.

Tafrahi (252-3) and Werner (60a-b) suppose. On the contrary Cantacuzenus intended to send him there with Matthew, but this did not materialise: Cant. IV, 16: III, 113-4; IV, 17: III, 114-6.

(64) Cant. IV, 17: III, 114-8; Tafrahi ib.; Werner ib. and cf. p. 54n 88; cf. D. Cydonès Correspondance, ed. G. Cammelli (1930) l.nr.4, a congratulatory letter.

(65) Then Greg. Palamas entered it at last as its official bishop and tried by speeches to attract the people to submission: Greg. Palamas Homily nr. 43, P.G. 151, cc. 9-549; Neilos Ἐγκώμιον ἑρ. Παλαμά, P.G. 151, 617, 673-4; Greg. XXVI, 7-9; III, 74; Philotheus Λόγος εἰς ἑρ. Παλαμῶν, P.G. 151, 618.

(66) E. Werner op. cit. 80a-81b; cf. 69a-79b.

in the Peloponnese (67). An act of October 1348 speaks of the ἀρχοντόπουλοι of Serres, who had taken "free" paroikoi from the lands of Alypion, later incorporated in those of Kutlumus, and tried to transform them into paroikoi of their own. In the end they were obliged by the ecclesiastical tribunal of Serres to restore those paroikoi to the monastery (68). Privileges were granted by Cantacuzenus between 1349 and 1350 to the Peloponnesian noble Emmanuel Raul (69).

These and other documents show that the practices of the landowners did not stop during the civil war, and they continued as before during John Cantacuzenus' reign (1347-1354). For instance: By a prostagma of October 1349 John VI out of the pronoia belonging to the grand pronoiar Demetrius Devlitzinus and valued at 400 hyperpyra, detached a part whose annual rent was 100 hyperpyra and granted it to him as a hereditary possession (70). And again, in January 1351 John V during his new conflict with John VI transformed the οἰκονομία of the grand adnouiastes George Katzares (2400 modioi and 48 hyperpyra annually) into hereditary pronoia under the strict obligation of military service to be rendered by his heirs (71). The small amount of the annual rent of this pronoia shows that, like the Klazomenites, Katzares was a small pronoiar. The obvious conclusion is that the small pronoiar like the lower classes (δῆμος) and the middle classes sided with

(67) M.-M.V, 191-3.

(68) P. Lemerle Actes de Kutlumus nr 21; cf. Ostrogorsky Féodalité 125-6 and Paysannerie 39.

(69) Emmanuel Raul Epistulae XII, ed. R. J. Loenertz EEBΣ 26 (1956) pp. 148-9, epist. 5 (1362) ll. 5-10; cf. pp. 137-8, 133, Epist. 1 (1355-1360) ll. 73, 229-245; epist. 2 (1355-1360) pp. 140-142.

(70) Ktenas Χρυσόβουλλοι Λόγοι Δοχειαρίου nr 4, pp. 291-2; Doelger Schatzkammern nr 10; cf. Ostrogorsky Féodalité 127. Further a chrysobull of October 1349 fixed the village of Ermilia as the possession of Devlitzinus and granted him the right of amelioration and heredity upon it.

(71) Cf. also the case of the small pronoiar Klazomenites:

John V, while the greater pronoiars were on Cantacuzenus' side.

This class division lay at the basis of the civil war (1341-9) and continued afterwards up to 1354.

b) FROM THE FALL OF THESSALONICA UNTIL THE FALL OF
OF CANTACUZENUS 1350-1354

As if in exile John V stayed in Thessalonica (72) from where he extended his influence on Tenedus and other islands that sided with him (73). John VI, having rejected an anti-Genoese alliance with the Venetians (74) turned to liberate Macedonia from Dušan and thus provide further lands for his followers the grand landowners.

Berrhoia had been especially re-shaped by Dušan to suit defence needs. The Greek nobles were expelled and many Serbian military nobles (1530) were installed in their place. Their main property seems to have been herds of oxen, which were fed for them by paroikoi in the suburbs of the town. Dušan had brought 10,000 porter-paroikoi from all over his Empire for the building of the Akropolis, as there was not enough available local labour, the town population belonging apparently to the upper classes.

The people of Berrhoia supported Cantacuzenus and so the town was soon taken. Several Serbian nobles were hidden by their Greek friends. This shows that a considerable approximation of the two nationalities had been achieved (75).

Ktenas Χρυσόβουλλοι Λόγοι Δοχειαρίου nr 5, pp. 293-4;
cf. Ostrogorsky Féodalité 127.

(72) Greg. XXVI, 12: III, 78 (1350).

(73) Cant. IV, 27: III, 200-201; cf. IV, 38: III, 276. His mother's fear that if alone in Thessalonica John V would be driven into dangerous alliances (Cant. IV, 16: III, 112-3) apparently with Dušan and the revolutionaries, proved true to some extent.

(74) Cant. IV, 18: III, 118-9; IV, 25: III, 185-190; Greg. XXV, 18: III, 44-45.

(75) Cant. IV, 18: III 119-126; cf. Tafrafi Thessalonique 273. Note the two akropoleis of the town and the role of Marzelatos,

In Edessa Cantacuzenus expected the nobles to lead the lower classes in support of his cause. On the contrary they all refused to surrender to him as a spirit of independence had been developed in all classes during their eleven year resistance to Dušan, to whom eventually they freely surrendered. The Government of the town consisted of four nobles and of the most powerful of the citizens, who were apparently Greek. When the town was taken, the pro-serbian noble citizens (76) were expelled and a guard of Byzantine nobles was placed in it. Then the towns, villages and fortresses around Edessa and Berrhoia (namely Staridola, Petra, Soskos, Devre, Ostrovos, Notia, Lykostomion and Kastrion of Thessaly) gave themselves up to the victor (77).

Servia (tá) on the border of Bottiaia and Thessaly, was governed by a Serbian noble (Prealibos) and resisted Cantacuzenus successfully. It was divided into three circles by three successive walls, and on Prealibos' orders the lower classes in the outer circles of the town were told to defend their families against Cantacuzenus; but through fear they turned to the invader, and when his attack failed they took to flight to Berrhoia. This was a rare case of lower class people following Cantacuzenus.

During Dušan's absence there were many other towns whose Serbian nobles courted Cantacuzenus, as he appeared to them to be a strong leader whom they wished to follow. Some even deserted to him, but Cantacuzenus did not judge the number and power of these deserters strong enough. So he stopped his expedition

Cantacuzenus' paroikos who had passed to the service of the serbs, in effecting the surrender of Berrhoia.

(76) That such citizens could have been Greek nobles we know from other cases, in which the latter retained their rights under Dušan and formed the basis of his régime: A.V. Soloviev *Les archontes grecs dans l' Empire serbe au XIV^e siècle*, BS 2 (1930) 275-287 (in Russian, with French summary); as cited by D. Zakythinou *Crise monétaire* 59.

(77) Cant. IV, 19: III, 127-130; cf. Tafrali *op.cit.* 273-4.

after he had appointed two able nobles as governors of Berrhoia and of his Thessalian towns. Then he returned to Thessalonica, from where he unsuccessfully attacked Gynaikokastron, which was helped by the Serbs (78).

The agreement already reached between Cantacuzenus and Dušan after this failure was annulled through the intervention of some dissatisfied Greek nobles belonging to the immediate circle of the two Greek Emperors. They were furthering the cause of John V and were supported by the people of Thessalonica, where the pro-palaiologian Zealot traditions were still alive (79).

John V remained in Thessalonica, Cantacuzenus went back to Constantinople and Dušan turned his attention to Edessa. He was successful in taking this city, and then he proceeded to expel all Greek nobles, keeping only the lower classes (80). Thus by showing his sympathy with the lower classes he proved that he knew and exploited the social problems of the Byzantine world.

(78) Cant. IV, 19: III, 130-135. For the social division of towns cf. D. Zakythinos Despotat II, 179f. For the surrender of Gynaikokastron see Cant. IV, 20: III, 136-7. Tafrali's claim that Gynaikokastron was given up by Belkos (op.cit. 274) is due to a misunderstanding of the text of Cantacuzenus.

(79) Cant. IV, 20-22: III, 137-166. Cf. Greg. Palamas Homily I, P.G. 151, c. 9-17.

(80) Cant. IV, 22: III, 163-166: the Bulgarian mob supported Cantacuzenus' plans.

(81) Cant. IV, 22: III, 157-162; cf. Greg. XXVIII, 52: III, 169; cf. Tafrali op. cit. 274-5.

(82) Cant. IV, 23: III, 166-9 Philothei Λόγος εἰς Γρηγ. Παλαμᾶν, P. G. 151, 621A-622D; Neili Ἐγκώμιον Γρ. Παλαμᾶ, P.G. 151, 674B-674D: Acindynus seems to have still been alive, though he did not take part in the Synod; Greg. Acindyni Epistulae Selectae IX, éd. Loenertz, *EEB* 27 (1957) 89-108, dated between 1335-1351, in Constantinople; cf. R. - J. Loenertz 18 Lettres de Grég. Acindynus analysées et datées, *O.C.P.* 23 (1957) 114-144, dated between 1335 and 1358.

After Cantacuzenus' failure to attract the Bulgarians into an alliance against the Turks he gave his attention to finding a solution (81) for the overdue ecclesiastical problems, which were closely linked with the social problems. The Synod he called in Constantinople on 27th May 1351 (82) once again condemned Barlaamism and Acindynism (83). The social importance of this was that it resulted in the persecution of the many non-noble followers of Barlaam and Acindynus and all other progressive elements throughout the Empire. Free thought was suppressed and even Cantacuzenus' old friend Nicephorus Gregoras, though a noted intellectual, was imprisoned without John V and Anna being able to intervene (84).

This time Cantacuzenus called an assembly of the notables - i.e. of his loyal nobles - and not of the people, as he had previously done, in Constantinople, in which he read and criticized Gregoras' History and proved its "falsity" (85).

(83) Cant. IV, 23: III, 169-171; IV, 24: III, 179-183; N. Grégoras Correspondance, éd. R. Guiland (1927) 354-5; cf. the Tomus in P.G. 151, 718-1186; cf. Philothei Antirrheticorum, P.G. 151, 773-801, espec. 777-8, 784, 786-9, 1110, where the social aspect is apparent.

(84) John V was in Thessalonica since 1350 and Anna since 1351: Cant. IV, 27: III, 204-7; Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas, O.C.P. 21 (1955) 223, 225, 216-220; Greg. XX-VII, 26-28: III, 147-9. For Gregoras' love of the exact sciences see A. Garzya Un opuscule inedit de Nicolas Cabasilas, Byz. 24 (1954) (app. 1956) 523. - Another intellectual who from that time stopped approving of Cantacuzenus' policy though he was still his premier, was Dem. Cydonès: Loenertz op. cit. 212; Dém. Cydonès Correspondance éd. Loenertz I (1956) p. 11, Johanni Palaiologo, Constantinopoli 1371, autumnno, paras. 3-5. Cf. F. Doelger Byz. Diplomatiek (1956) 253-4 nn. 18-20, (where September or October 1351 is given as date of John V's signing of the Tomus). Cf. below n. 107.

(85) Cant. IV, 25: III, 183-5.

(86) It was just the day before the anti-Barlaamitic Synod: Bertolotto in Atti della Societa Ligure, tome 28, p. 554 cited by Zakythinos, Crise Monetaire 43.

The Galata War (1351) was the opportunity for further Byzantine social struggles. The Genoese desire to monopolise the trade of the Black Sea affected both the Venetians and a few surviving Byzantine merchants. One of the Genoese successes was in extracting from Cantacuzenus the monopoly of wine in Pegai and Galata on 26 May 1351 (86). The people who suffered most from this were the Byzantine merchants, whose coin had in twenty years (1331-1351) depreciated by 20% (87). The Genoese wanted to make Caffa in Crimaea the only centre of trade in the Black Sea and to concentrate all trade routes around it, so that they might receive large revenues (88). In the same way they had managed in 1348 to collect much revenue from taxes, amounting to as much as 200.000 gold coins, from the port of Constantinople, while the Byzantines collected only 30.000 (89). These aims and actions united the Venetians and Byzantines against them (90). When the war broke out in June 1351 (91), the main targets of the Byzantine middle classes and nobility led the mob (93)

(87) Greg. XXV, 27: III, 52; cf. Zakythinos op.cit. 113-5(:8/12/1351); cf. Cant. IV, 26: III, 192-3; Greg. XXV, 17: III, 41-43; XXV, 20: III, 45-46; cf. G.M. Thomas Diplomatarium Veneto-levantinum I, pp. 254-9 (1342); 278-285 (1344); 229-300 (1345); 278-285 (1344); 320 (1344-8), for the Caffa war which was continued by the Galata war.

(88) Greg. ib.; Cant. ib.

(89) Greg. XVII, 1: II, 841-2; cf. C. Amantus ΣΧΕΒΕΙΣ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Τούρκων ἀπὸ τοῦ 11^{ου} αἰ. ᾠνάς μέχρι 1453, O.E.Σ.Β. (1955) 72-73; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 40, 83.

(90) Even since 1350, when Cantacuzenus was in Thessalonica, he was offered Venetian alliance but he rejected it then: Cant. IV, 18: III, 118; Greg. XXV, 18: III, 44-45; cf. Tafrafi Thessalonique 273. See the other phases of the completion of the alliance in Cant. IV, 25-26; III, 189-191.

(91) Greg. XXVI, 40: III 106-7: the war started after the Synod of 27 May 1351.

(92) Cant. IV, 26: III, 193-6f.

(93) Cant. IV, 30: III, 223. Cf. I. Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 615: "The Genoese and the Byzantine Little Man were the supporters or dupes of the Galata war... there was a class solidarity in the upper strata of the belligerents".

and made an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the Galatan bourgeoisie and its fortress. On the other hand the Venetians in exchange for their supposed help to the Byzantines managed to multiply their "tabernas" in Constantinople: This was in accordance with the already valid treaties which allowed them free purchase and sale of wine in the city (94), which appears to have been a basic merchandise. As during the Galatan war, so now the Venetians exploited the marked anti-Genoese feelings of the Byzantine people to extract more privileges and expand their already great influence (95).

During the Genoese War the latest rivalry of John VI and John V broke out into a new civil war, which resulted in further social conflicts. Under the influence of the anti-cantacuzenian nobles (96) and of a group of mainly Thessalonican mariners (97) and shipowners (98) John V signed an alliance with Dusan against his father-in-law. Through the intervention of John V's mother Anna no fighting occurred at this time (99) and John V received as reward Aenos and the towns of Chalcidica, which were part of Matthew's principality (summer 1351) (100).

(94) F. Thiriet *Régestes I* (1956) pp. 68-69; 2/3/1350.

(95) Cf. Tafrafi op.cit. 126.

(96) Though they were old anti-cantacuzenians: Cant. IV, 33:III, 241-2.

(97) Cant. IV, 35: III, 255-7; Cf. IV, 36: III, 268-9; cf. Greg. XXVIII, 18-19: III, 187-8 (:attack of John V on Constantinople in spring 1354, with mariners as his main followers.

(98) *Ναύαρχοι*: Cant. IV, 39: III, 282-3; Greg. XXIX, 19-20: III, 236-7: John VI's attempt to be reconciled with John V, cf. below: they might have been middle class people or nobles who usurped bourgeois occupations. For the continuation of Zealot traditions in Thessalonica after 1349 cf. Greg. Palamas Homily XXXIX, P.G. 151, c.484; Philotheus *Λόγος εἰς τὸ Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 647.

(99) Cant. IV, 27: III, 200-208; Greg. XXVII, 26-28: III, 147-9; Neilus *Ἐγκώμιον τῶν Παλαμῶν*, P.G. 151, 675; Philothei op.cit. P.G. 151, 625; cf. Loenertz *Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas*, O.C.P. 21 (1955) 216-220, 223, 225; Tafrafi op. cit. 275-7.

(100) Cant. ib. 208-9; Cant. IV, 32: III, 239-240; esp. see Greg. XXVII, 29-54: III, 149-171.

Despite the non-intervention of Dušan and John V, the Genoese continued fighting against Cantacuzenus. They took Heraclea of Thrace (101) and Sozopolis of Pontus (102) and took the people prisoners, whom they released only after payment of ransom by the rich (winter 1351-2). Sozopolis had refused to accept Cantacuzenus' help (103) on the pretext that her own forces were sufficient. Actually the refusal concealed anti-cantacuzenian feelings, which had survived the revolution of 1341-9. On returning to their towns the people were granted immunity by Cantacuzenus, and thus they were able to rebuild them (102).

In Constantinople itself, all classes gave continuous support to Cantacuzenus and his war effort (104). But owing to the intervention of Orkhan and the desertion of the Venetians and Catalans as well as to the declaration of war by John V, after February-March 1352 Cantacuzenus had to sign a separate treaty with the Genoese on 6 May 1352 (105).

Meanwhile, difficulties having arisen between John V and Matthew over lands which had reluctantly been granted to John V by

(101) Cant. IV, 28-29: III, 209-213, 217-8; cf. Greg. XXV, 14-15: III, 81-82; XXV, 19-25: III, 42-51; XXVI, 12-15: III, 78-82; XXVI, 34-35: III, 100-102; cf. Dém. Cydonès Correspondance, éd. Loenertz I (1950), epist. 64, Legato John Cantacuzenis, Thraciam, Constantino-
poli, 1352 vere, l. 61-62, p. 98: ἐτῆλας τῆς ἡμῶν ἀβουλίας. Gregoras claims that Philotheus was responsible for the conquest of Heraclea due to his negligence. This proves that the bishops were thought to exercise part, if not the whole of the political authority in their town. Cf. Section A, ch. II, n. 46.

(102) Cant. IV, 29: III, 214-8; cf. Greg. XXVI, 17: III, 83-84; XXVI, 14-15: III, 81-82.

(103) Except the brother of their Governor, Krybitziotis, cf. n. 102.

(104) Cant. IV, 30: III, 223-8: they especially helped their defeated allies the Venetians and the Catalans; cf. Greg. XXVI, 21-23; III, 88-90.

(105) Cant. IV, 31: III, 228-234; Cf. Ševčenko Zealot Revolution 615; Loenertz Wan unterschrieb Johannes V den Tomos von 1351? B.Z. 47 (1954) 116; cf. Introduction to the Thesis nn. 167-9.

Cantacuzenus, (106) the young Emperor was persuaded by his followers to go to war (107). This had already happened by the time of the Byzantine-Genoese treaty of 6/5/1352, which was apparently signed by John VI hurriedly in order to free his military force for the war against John V.

Many of the towns of John VI promptly surrendered to John V (108). Among these was Adrinople, where Matthew and other nobles ran the danger of being killed by the mob in their support of John V (end of summer 1352). However they were saved by the intervention of Cantacuzenus and his army of foreigners. But the mob continued their resistance for some time. When they eventually surrendered they were treated leniently. Some towns were taken by Cantacuzenus (109) and other were mercilessly plundered (110).

(106) These were small towns round Adrinople and Didymoteichum itself: Cant. IV, 32: III, 237-8.

(107) Ib. between February and March 1352 John had to sign the Tomus of 1351, but this was merely a result of need: R. - J. Loenertz *Wan unterschrieb Johannes V Den Tomos von 1351?* B.Z. 47 (1954) 116; cf. Doelger *Byzantinische Diplomatie* (1956) 253-4, nn. 18-20, where September and October 1351 is given as the time of John V's signing of the Tomus; cf. above n. 84.

(108) Cant. IV, 33: III, 241-2. Then the town Tzybe, in Thrace, was taken by the Turkish allies of Cantacuzenus: Greg. XXIX, 29: III, 224; cf. *Dém. Cydonès Correspondance* ed. R. - J. Loenertz I (1956) ep. 13, *Κατακλισην*, Constantinopoli, 1352 autumn, pp. 40-42, esp. p. 41, ll 41-42f. (?). But Cantacuzenus (IV, 33: III, 242) claims that it was taken by the Turkish allies of John V!

(109) Cant. IV, 33: III, 242-247; Greg. XXVIII, 2-8: III, 177-182; cf. *D. Cydonès Correspondance*, éd. R. - J. Loenertz I (1956) epist. 57 (1352-3), *Scribae* p. 89. Cf. Greg. XXVIII, 34-36: III, 198-200; cf. *Zakythinos Crise monétaire* 79.

(110) These were Morrha and other towns of Rhodope which had sided with John V, and even Chalcidica, where the Morrhaians had sent their flocks for pasture: Cant. IV, 34: III, 351-2.

Realising his unpopularity John Cantacuzenus offered peace terms, but they were not accepted because they stipulated that John V's nobles should come under his jurisdiction. But as John VI's Turkish army was overwhelming, John V was obliged to retire to Tenedus, Lemnus and Thessalonica, which had remained loyal to him. From there he organised his resistance with Venetian money (end of summer-autumn 1352) (111).

Now Cantacuzenus for the first time replaced all the Palaiologian governors of the towns with his own noble supporters (112). This being able to subdue the people, he broke off relations with all but the nobles. Though the State was growing poorer, he continued to make grants to his loyal nobles (113), which could in no way overpower the increasing propalaiologian popular wave. John V became the symbol of the popular revolt once again; though his entourage was composed chiefly of nobles (114) and only to some extent did it include people from the other classes, such as mariners and shipowners (115). This inner contradiction of the Palaiologian party, traced already in the first revolts (1341-9), continued in this new phase and even later.

(111) Cant. IV, 34: III, 247-254; IV, 38: III, 276; Greg. XXVIII 7-8: III, 181-2; XVIII 19: III, 188: D. Cydonès Correspondance, éd. Loenertz I (1956) ep. 13, Τῷ Καντακουζηνῷ, Constantinopoli 1352, autumn p. 41; cf. Tafrali Thessalonique 277-8. For the Venetian loan of 5,000 ducats to John V 14 1352 see M. - M. III, 124f., cited by Zakythinos op. cit. 99.

(112) Cant. IV, 35: III, 255-6.

(113) Such was the grant of fixed revenue of 100 stateres to Archos in 1352, which, however, Archos did not manage to collect: Dém. Cydonès Correspondance, éd. Loenertz I (1956) epist. 60, p. 92, l. 27, 1352 vere, Constantinopoli, Legato John Cantacuzeni Augusti in Thraciam; cf. epist. 61, p. 92, Γεωργίῳ Συναδηνῷ τῷ Ἀστυῶν, Aenum? Constantinopoli 1355-7?

(114) Greg. XXVIII, 10: III, 183.

(115) Cf. above nn 97, 98.

Meanwhile Dušan, the third factor in Byzantine urban and rural conditions, continued his favourable land policy towards the Greeks. In February 1352 he confirmed to the church of Saint Anastasia Pharmakolytria of Zichna the village Ostrini (116). This village together with its homonymous small monastery of Theotokos the Ostrini, the church of St. Anastasia and a land of 200 modioi near the castle of Zichna had been held by the monk Jacob by virtue of an imperial chrysobull as patrimonial property. Later this monk gave all these to the monks of Prodromos Menoikeus on condition that they would undertake his subsistence for life (116a).

A chrysobull of Dušan dated May 1352 confirmed George Phokopoulos' property in Serrhes (117), while another one dated 1/ October 1355-20 December 1355 confirms to the monastery of Prodromos on Menoikeus the church bearing the same name and its land of 24 modioi near Zichna. These, together with a whole village, where they were situated, had been patrimonial property of Irene Choumaina Palaiologina, who gave them to Prodromos. Later a part was sold and in the end all the village was given to the monastery by her through the chrysobull of Dusan (118).

A last measure to be mentioned was John V's granting of exemption from βιταρκία, καστροκτισιά and ὄρικη to the monastery Russicon of Athos in September 1353 (119). This meant a victory

(116) A. Guillou Les Archives de Ménécée (1955) pp. 136-7: Pro-stagma of February 1352 by Dušan; cf. the ἐπισμὸς of 1352-3 (?), ib. pp. 139-141.

(116a) A. Guillou op. cit. pp. 139-141 = Dusan's decree of 1352-3.

(117) Op. cit. 138-9; cf. M. - M. V, pp. 130-133.

(118) A Guillou op. cit. pp. 142-144.

(119) Akty Russk. Mon. nr 21 of 1353, and Actes de l' Athos 13, nr 31 of 1342, cited by Ostrogorsky H.B.S. 431 n. 4.

for the monks and was evidently one of the deeds of necessity imposed on John V by the new civil war of 1350-1354, though it fits perfectly in the whole policy of John V.

But what appealed to the people were the Zealotic traditions of a section of John V's entourage, a group of mariners. It was, with their support, as well as with that of the Galatans, that John V made an attack on Constantinople in Spring 1353. This attack failed because the people were unable to help him as they were terrorised by the army of Cantacuzenus led in his absence by Irene his wife (120).

As a result of this attack the nobles of Constantinople took the final step to dispossess John V (121). In an assembly of nobles in spring 1353 (122) Mathew was crowned Co-emperor (123) followed by his anointing in February 1354 (124). Thus they hoped to secure their lands through Matthew, who was their puppet.

John V's principality now extended over Thessalonica, Lemnus, Samothrace, Imbros, Lesbos and Tenedos, Thessalonica being its capital (125). Within these territories internal struggles continued, which indicates the lack of an articulated social program by John V and his circle. An example of these struggles is seen in Tenedos, where the Italian governor appointed by John V was expelled by a strong Tenedian noble, Pergamenus. This expulsion probably took place on Cantacuzenus' instigation, but the

(120) Cant. IV, 35: III, 255-6; Greg. XXVIII, 18:III, 187-8; XXIX, 5: III, 226.

(121) Cant. IV, 35-36: III, 256-260; Greg. XXVIII, 19: III, 188: the indignation of the nobles at John V's social connections.

(122) Similar to the one of Thessalonica of 1345, cf. Cant. III, 93: II, 573-4.

(123) Cant. IV, 36-37: III, 260-270; cf. R.J. Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas 1345-1354, O.C.P. 21 (1955) 212.

(124) Cant. IV, 37-38: III, 270-276; Greg. XXVIII, 30-31:III, 195-197; XXVII, 38-39: III, 201; XXVIII, 43: III, 204; XXIX, 17-18: III, 234-6; Loenertz op.cit. 213.

(125) Greg. XXIX, 5: III, 226 (Spring 1354);Cant.IV,38:III,276; cf. Tafrali Thessalonique 280.

people of Tenedus helped John V to recover the island (126).

The social conflicts which eventually destroyed the Empire were also apparent after the earthquake in Gallipolis, and the capture of it and other Thracian towns by the Turks on 2/March 1354. Many prisoners were taken, but of those who escaped some went to the Byzantine towns and others to the Venetian possessions in the Aegaeen or to Serbia. In the Byzantine towns they became serfs and beggars and no mercy was shown to them, but in the Venetian and Serbian territories they received better treatment and privileges and became farmers and oarsmen (127).

Cantacuzenus' efforts to resist the Turks, who had already intruded into Constantinople itself and imposed taxes on its population (128), were limited to diplomatic exchanges only as he was busy planning principalities and granting privileges to his family, espec. to Matthew. This widened the gap between the two parties. Consequently Cantacuzenus' attempt at reconciliation with John V at that critical time (1354) failed through the vigorous intervention of the shipmasters of the latter's entourage (129).

(126) Cant. IV, 38: III, 276-7; cf. Tafrali op.cit. 278-9; Zakythinos Crise monétaire 57.

(127) Cant. IV, 38: III, 276-281. Cf. Greg. XXIX, 1-4: III, 223-6 H.J. Kissling Das Menâqiyonâme Scheich Bedr. Ed-din's, Z.D.M.G. Band 1 100 (1950) 136-7; cf. Zakythinos op.cit. 70-73; Charanis On the Social Structure, BS 12 (1951) 113-7; Charanis Short Chronicle, B.13 (1938) 347-9.

(128) Dém. Cydonès Correspondance ed. G. Cammelli (1930) p.11, epist. τῷ δεσπότῃ Μανουὴλ Καντακουζηνῶ (1353); cf. Zakythinos op. cit. 82.

(129) Cant. IV, 39: III, 281-4; Greg. XXIX, 19-20: III, 236-7. John V was then in Tenedus (:Greg. XXIX 5στ': III, 225), where he had just come with his fleet of τριήρεις : Cant. IV, 37-38: III, 275-6; IV, 42: III, 309; Greg. XXIX, 39: III, 249-250; cf. Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas, O.C.P. 21 (1955) 213.

The Peloponnese offered Cantacuzenus an important opportunity to consolidate the land, power of his family, which was endangered in Northern and Eastern Greece. Already in 1349 he had appointed there Manuel his son as despot, who had controlled the wild local civil war among the land owners of that province and revived town life, though he faced new uprisings from time to time. These were especially intensified during the new civil war of 1350-1354, when John V incited a group of Peloponnesian nobles against Manuel. After that peace and prosperity prevailed in the Peloponnese, As the towns were now destroyed by the uprisings, the nobles obtained land in the countryside, where, contrary to their previous habit of living inside the towns, they started farming and breeding flocks (130). This was an important change in the urban conditions of the peninsula, and it must have been the custom for the whole Empire, as we have seen in previous chapters. It was also one of the main causes of the decline of urban life in the Byzantine world, as it was deprived of its urban leaders.

After the loss of Thrace, it appeared that Cantacuzenus' only resort was resignation. But when John V with the help of the people of Constantinople and the Genoese adventurers Gattiluso entered the city (131), his resignation was not accepted by the nobles. Instead they persuaded him to ask for the help of the Turkish nobles of Thrace and of the Byzantine armies from nearby parts of the Empire. Before the arrival of this help successful negotiations between John V and VI resulted in an agreement (132), by which amnesty was granted, supremacy was kept by

(130) Cant. IV, 13: III, 85-90; cf. Emmanuelis Raul Epistulae XII, ed. R.J. Loenertz, *EBE* 26 (1956) epist. 2, Ioasaph monacho ex imperatore Cantacuzeno, in Peloponnese, 1355-1360, pp. 140-142; D.A.Zakythinou Despotat 98-100, 179f. Note the Asan's help to John V. (131) Ducas XI, pp. 40-41; Greg. XXXVII, 46: III, 553-4; Sp. Lambros Συμβολή εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τῶν ἐν Λέσβῳ δυναστευόντων Γατελούζων, *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, τόμ. 6 (1909) 39-48, 488-492; W. Miller *The Gattilusii of Lesbos (1355-1462)*, B.Z.22(1913), 406f.

(132) Note the role of Greg. Palamas in these negotiations, in

Cantacuzenus, the revenues could be shared between the two Emperors and the status quo was preserved. Matthew, the symbol of the more extremist Cantacuzenian landed nobility, was made independent ruler of Adrinople and the towns of Rhodope for life (22 November 1354) (133).

But the dissatisfaction with John Cantacuzenus was widespread and it was increased by his role in the recent installation of the Turks in Thrace and was expressed in an assembly of nobles in Constantinople, in which he urged peace with the Turks until foreign help came to the Byzantines (December 1354) (134).

Even after the agreement of 22/11/1354 was made the Constantinopolitan mob's fury against him and his noble followers persisted, and demonstrations and looting took place. The people were apparently led by some nobles, - who supported Palaiologus or who were formerly Cantacuzenians, and they supposed that their activities helped their beloved John V. Their activities were

which he was ambassador of John V, though not long before he had been expelled from Thessalonica due to his Cantacuzenian loyalty. Philothei Λόγος εἰς τὸν Παλαμᾶν, P.G. 151, cc. 616, 626 (spring 1354).

(133) Cant. IV, 39-40: III, 284-292; Greg. XXIX, 26-28: III, 241-2: Ducas XI, 42. The mob plundered openly the properties of the rich Cantacuzenians such as Phakeolatos, and even public establishments such as the armoury, from where they apparently took arms for their anticantacuzenian fighting. The Patriarch Philotheus, who was procantacuzenian, had to abandon the city secretly to avoid the wrath of the mob: Greg. XXIX, 33-37: III, 245-8; Cant. IV, 40: III, 291; (Sp. Lambros, ed.) Ἐνδυμήσεις, ἡτοι χρονικῶν σημειωμάτων σειρά πρώτη, nr 64, Νέος Ἑλληνομνημῶν τόμος (1910) p.14 (:1355!: a mistake in dating; Loenertz Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas O.C.P. 21 (1955) 213; R.-J. Loenertz Chronicon Breve, EEB 28 (1958) 207, 9.

(134) Cant. IV, 40-41: III, 292-304.

undoubtedly increased by the presence of recent miserable fugitives from the Thracian towns, who considered Cantacuzenus and his noble followers - now their cruel masters (135) - responsible for the loss of their lands and their tragic fate. But the people were of no more use to John V after his new compromise. Therefore he was unmoved by their eager support and ordered them to be dispersed by force (136).

So John VI's final resignation was inevitable, and came on 10 December 1354 as a result of the pressure of the Palaiologian nobles (137).

The social struggles continued during the new civil war between John V and Matthew, that started in spring 1355 and ended in 1358 with John V's victory. The people of the towns of Chalcidica and Thrace enthusiastically supported John V again, as he was still their only hope (138).

Other political events also gave the opportunity for further social struggles (soon after 1354) following the same pattern as those that we have been analysing (139).

(135) Cf. above nn. 127-128.

(136) Cant. IV, 41: III, 304-6; Greg. XXIX, 30:III, 243, cf. Dém. Cydonès Correspondance, ed. G. Cammelli (1930) let.8 (anepigraphum) p.20.

(137) Cant. IV, 42: III, 306-309; Greg. XXIX, 30: III, 243-244; Emm. Raul Epistulae XII, ed. Loenertz, EEBΣ 26 (1956) pp. 130, 135; Epist. 1, Ioasaph monacho eximperatore Cantacuzeno, Constantinopolim, Thessalonicae 1355-1360.

(138) Cant. IV, 42: III, 309-314; IV, 44-49: III, 320-360.

(139) Cant. IV, 43: III, 315-319.

But as previously, so subsequently John V's policy was never basically different from that of his opponents. This is made amply clear by the fact that he kept Dem. Cydones, Cantacuzenus' premier as his own premier too, apparently because Cydones' policy coincided with his own policy on church, social and political matters (140). A further example of this policy was John V's grant in 1355 of his sister and of Lesbos to Francis Gattilusio as reward for his help in the recapture of Constantinople (141). This was a land grant conforming to the pattern of the land régime that we have known and in no way differed from it. Even John V's opponents such as Matthew Cantacuzenus were given a certain liberty of land possession and movement (142).

Therefore the hopes of the people that a real change might come from John V soon proved groundless. Neither he nor the Zealot revolution altered any of the social and economic evils of the Empire for ever or even for a short time (143). We find them continuing right down to the end of the XIV century (144) and to the end of the Empire itself, to whose collapse they greatly contributed.

(140) R. - J. Loenertz *Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas*, O.C.P. 21 (1955) 213.

(141) W. Miller *The Gattilusii of Lesbos*, B.Z. 22 (1913) 406f.; *Greg. XXXVI*, 46: III, 553-4; *Ducas XI*, 40-41 (Bonn).

(142) After Matthew's defeat in 1358 (cf. above n. 138), he was sent by his father to Peloponnese as "aide" to his brother Manuel: *Cant. IV*, 42: III, 311-312, since the other area left to the Empire was too narrow for Matthew's avidity.

(143) *Dém. Cydonès Correspondance*, éd. Loenertz I (1956) epist. 62, *Amico in aula potenti*, Constantinopolim, Constantinopoli 1355-7?; pp. 94-95, ll. 20ff.; γεωργῶν καὶ πεινήτων... τετραχοῦ αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμήσας ἔκείνοι ; cf. ll. 26-30; cf. *Greg. XV*, 1: II, 747 (1354: peasants' distress due to raids).

(144) *Greg. Palamas Homily IV*, P.G. 151, cc. 57-64; X, ib. 140; XXIV, ib. 320; XXXIX, ib. 484-492; XLI, ib. 512. Cf. Isidorus Archbishop of Thessalonica in the end of the XIV century, in *Paris.Gr.* 1192, ff. 226 r - v, 237 v - 238, cited by Tafrali *Thessalonique* 116-7; *Dém. Cydonès Correspondance*, éd. Loenertz I, loc. cit; ep. 77,

Τῷ μεγάλῳ πριμικηρίῳ τῷ φακράτῃ , Thessalonicam, Constantinopoli 1372, post IV, 10?, pp. 109-110; cf. epist. 94, Civi , Thessalonicam, Constantinopoli 1365, aestate, pp. 128-9, esp. ll. 29-30, p. 129; epist. 96, Georgio Synadeno Astrae, Lemnum, Constantinopoli 1364 X. 8-1365, pp. 130-132; epist. 103, Simoni Atumano, Archiepiscopo, Thebas, Constantinopoli 1367-8, hieme, pp. 139-141; epist. 106, Demetrio Palaiologo Magno Domestico, Thessalonicam, Constantinopoli 1371-2, pp. 143-4; epist. 108, Georgio Synadeno Astrae, Lemnum, Constantinopoli, 1362 exeunte, pp. 145-6; epist. 109, Constantino Asanae, in insulam nescio quam, Constantinopoli 1361-2, pp. 146-8; epist. 114, Proceri Aulae Johannis Palaiologi Augusti, Constantinopolim, Constantinopoli 1372-3, pp. 152-3; epist. 124, Nicolao Cabasilae Chamaëto, Thessalonicam, Constantinopoli, 1364 incipiente, pp. 161-2; epist. 125, Nicolao Cabasilae Chamaëto, Thessalonicam, Constantinopoli, 1364 aestate, p. 162; cf. also the two unpublished and undated letters of Cydones on social matters, which we mentioned in Section B, ch. II, n. 25.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S

For the sake of brevity I have put together bibliography and abbreviations. In this I have followed other recognised scholars' works such as St. Runciman's Crusades.

I have made no abbreviation of the title of those books or articles which are only rarely used in this Thesis.

A. SOURCES

1. GREEK SOURCES

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TOMUS CONTRA BARLAAM

ET ACINDYNUM, P.G. 151, 679-692(1341)

= Συνοδικὸς Τόμος γεγραμμένος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐξελεγχάσαις καὶ ἀποβαλλομέναις τὴν τοῦ Βαρθολαᾶμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνου δυσσεβείαν μεγάλαις συνόδοις, ἐν αἷς οὐχὶ Ἐκκλησία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Σύγκλητος καὶ οἱ καθολικοὶ παρῆσαν Ῥωμαίων κριταί... καὶ βασιλέως ... ,
P.G. 151, 679-692(1341).

TOMUS SYNODICUS III

(1351), P.G. 150, 842-885

= Συνοδικὸς τρίτος Τόμος κατὰ Βαρθολαᾶμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνου τοῖς προτέροις ὁμόλογος. Ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τοὺς ὑστερον ἀκολουθήσαντας τῇ τούτων πλάνῃ, τὸν ... Ἐφέσου καὶ Γάνου, Γρηγοῦν τε καὶ Δεξιῶν
etc.; cf. also P.G. 151, 717-764 = Mansi-Labbe *Concil.* XXVI, 127-198: Τόμος Συνοδικὸς ἐκτεθεὶς παρὰ τῆς θείας καὶ ἱερᾶς Συνόδου τῆς συγκροτηθείσης κατὰ τῶν φρονοῦντων τὰ

Βαρχαάμ τε καὶ Ἀκινδύνου ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας τῶν εὐσεβῶν καὶ ὀρθοδόξων βασιλέων ἡμῶν Καντακουζηνοῦ καὶ Παλαιολόγου!

TOMUS SYNODICUS CONTRA PROCHORUM CYDONEM, P.G. 151, 693-716

= Τόμος συνοδικὸς κατὰ Προχόρου ἱερομονάχου τοῦ Κυδωνίτη τοῦ φρονήσαντος τὰ Βαρχαάμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνου, ἐξ οὗ δέικνυται οὐ μόνον ἡ ἀγριότης τοῦ Παλομά, ἀλλ' ὅτι συνοδικῶς ὠρίσθη γίνεσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἐκκλησίᾳ κατ' ἔτος εἰς μνήμην αὐτοῦ.

P.G. 151, 693-716 (Date: 6876=1368).

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C. OTHER ABBREVIATIONS

N.

= Footnote

S.a.

= Sine anno

O.E.Σ. B.

= Ὄργανισμός Ἐκδόσεως Σχολικῶν
Βιβλίων, Ἀθῆναι.