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RELIGIONENS VARP OCH TRASOR

En festskrift till Åke Sander

INNEHÅLL

INGÅNG

Med denna samling artiklar vill vi uppmärksamma och uttrycka vår tacksamhet gentemot vår kollega och vän professor Åke Sander. Genom sin omfattande och allsidiga forskning är jubilaren överlag svår att avgränsa och han är därför besvärlig att placera in i några enkla kategorier, genres eller akademiska fack. Medan vissa ser en spretighet och yvighet i detta förhållningssätt är det enligt oss snarast ett uttryck för både nyfikenhet och en öppenhet inför vetenskapens möjligheter och begränsningar. Detta karaktärsdrag har tagit Sander till så varierande områden som filosofi – speciellt inom fenomenologins område – migrationsforskning, beteendevetenskap och fältforskning. Hans nyfikenhet startade i en förundran inför den fenomenologiska forskning som framför allt har förknippats med den tyske filosofen Edmund E. Husserl (1859–1938). Åke disputerade 1988 inom området praktisk filosofi på avhandlingen *En tro – en livsvärld: en fenomenologisk undersökning av religiös erfarenhet, religiöst medvetande och deras roller i livsvärldskonstitutionen*. Vid tidpunkten för disputationen fanns en koppling mellan den unga religionsvetenskapliga institutionen och den något äldre filosofiska institutionen. Vid den förstnämnda institutionen blev Åke sedermera lektor i tros- och livsåskådningsvetenskap för att sedan bli professor i religionsbeteendevetenskap. För oss redaktörer, samt för flera av bidragsgivarna i denna festskrift (med undantag för Carl Martin Allwood och Ingemar Karlsson), var det vid den religionsvetenskapliga institutionen som vi kom att stifta bekantskap med Åkes innovativa och i vissa fall provocerande synsätt på både forskning och undervisning. Ja, till och med på livet i stort!

Från början av 1980-talet och fram till dags dato har en viktig del av Åkes forskning kommit att handla om migration, integration och kulturmöten samt religiösa förändringsprocesser; inte minst med inriktning mot islam och muslimer i Sverige och Europa. Tillsammans med internationella forskare som till exempel Stefano Allievi, Jørgen S. Nielsen, P.S. van Koningsveld, John Rex, Jan Hjärnø och Jochen Blaschke kom Åke att lägga grunden för det som idag betraktas som studiet av islam och muslimer i Europa. Inom detta forskningsområde har Åke publicerat ett flertal klassiska texter som kan anses vara pionjärstudier. I relation till dessa och likande områden byggde Åke upp forskningscentret Kulturkontakt och Internationell Migration (KIM) vid Göteborgs universitet. Förutom att lägga en grund till studiet av islam och muslimer kom detta institut, och inte minst dess föreståndare, att bidra med en solid forskning inom området för etnicitet och migration (det som sedan har kommit att få namnet IMER-forskning). Vid sidan av den akademiska forskningen kom KIM också att bli en viktig mötespunkt mellan akademin och praktiker som arbetade med frågor som rörde kulturmöten, integration, mångfald och diskriminering. Flera av de rapporter som publicerades vid KIM kan sägas motsvara det som vi idag kallar för uppdragsforskning eller samverkan med det omgivande samhället (tredje uppgiften).

Även inom området religionsbeteendevetenskap – det vill säga religionspsykologi och religionssociologi – har Åkes mångfacetterade vetenskapliga intresse kommit till uttryck. För oss som under många år har deltagit i olika akademiska sammanhang med jubilaren – först som studenter, sedan som doktorander och sedermera kollegor – står det klart att vissa mönster återkommer som ofta handlar om att sätta vetenskapens gränser på prov. En i grunden prövande, vetenskapsteoretisk förankrad attityd till lärande, utbildning och forskning har präglat Åkes gärning inom akademin. Det har också inneburit att han inte har svurit sig till *en* religionsbeteendevetenskaplig teoribildning eller metod, utan istället uppvisar en genuin öppenhet inför såväl fältbaserade undersökningar, kvantitativa enkätstudier, biologiskt förankrad kognitionsvetenskap och psykoanalys samt globaliseringsteorier och den religiösa erfarenhetens psykologi. Det finns emellertid en vurm för en mer empiriskt förankrad forskning, där Åke allt som oftast betonar vikten av fältstudier, människors erfarenheter och livsberättelser. Hans engagemang i det vetenskapliga arbetet utmärks av en många gånger medryckande framåtrörelse, vilket också är tydligt i undervisningssituationer där det yttersta målet sällan tycks vara att studenterna ska kunna "rätt" saker utan istället aktiveras och rustas för att själva kunna forska, argumentera och analysera. Inte sällan sker detta genom att

utmana och provocera vanemässigt tänkande, för att på så vis osäkra tillvaron och skapa utrymme för att ompröva invanda mönster.

Den som har rest med Åke har ofta fått utstå både prövningar och roliga stunder. Förutom en nyfikenhet som ofta kommer till uttryck i både vetgiriga och vassa synpunkter på konferensbidrag eller forskare som inte har lyckats att förklara hur de tänker eller hur de har gått tillväga har han en stor social kompetens. Kontakter knyts lätt med andra människor och samtidigt som vissa kan bli stötta av hårda men välmenande synpunkter när det gäller forskning, blir andra nyfikna och fascinerade över Åkes berättelser om strapatsrika resor i Indien och andra världsdelar. Vem kan inte låta bli att fångas när någon berättar om hur man bilar till Afghanistan genom Iran eller hur man grillade orm till middag i Sudan eller hur nyplockad och solmogen mango smakar i Afrika. Efter dessa exotiska utsvävningar kan han på samma lättsamma sätt berätta hur han har spelat golf i Sverige eller hur sen han har varit med att lägga i båten inför sommaren. På resor framkommer också hur många kontakter och vänner Åke har runt om i världen. För oss innebär dessa kontakter ett stort ansvar och vi har ett arv att förvalta om vi skall kunna leva upp till jubilarens tempo och förväntningar.

Åke har länge visat ett stort intresse för Indien och inte minst för Varanasi, som i stort sett inrymmer alla världens religioner och är en av hinduernas heligaste städer. I Varanasi knöts kontakter med Banaras Hindu University (BHU), som grundades 1916, och under 2000-talet reste han dit med studenter för att utföra fältarbete, besöka tempel och närvara på skräddasydda föreläsningar med BHU. I boken *India on my mind*, som redigerades tillsammans med kollegan Daniel Andersson, samlades texter från studenter som hade deltagit på resorna. I denna bok ger studenterna uttryck för sin förundran (och ibland förvirring), men uppvisade även en stor fascination för det stora landet i Sydasien. I mötet med en urgammal, men högst levande, religion fick de sätta sina akademiska kunskaper på prov.

Åke har ofta framhållit att en religionsvetare bör lära sig att verkligheten är mycket mer mångfasetterad än vad böckerna ger sken av och att studier av religion engagerar alla sinnen. Studiet av levande religion kräver såväl närvaro och praktiska färdigheter som en djup förståelse av den religiösa utövaren. Indiens enorma religiösa mångfald visade sig i ett sådant avseende vara ett tacksamt område för religionsvetenskapliga studier. Gradvis fick engagemanget för Indien en fastare form. Institutionen för litteratur, idéhistoria och religion vid Göteborgs universitet kunde utöka sin närvaro genom medel från International Office, vilket gjorde det möjligt att underteckna ett avtal om ett student-, lärar- och forskarutbyte med Banaras Hindu University i 2008. Genom

stöd från STINT kunde han dessutom medverka till att knyta kontakter med Jadavpur University i Kolkata och aktivt bidra till att utveckla religionsvetenskap i Indien, som idag befinner sig i en uppbyggnadsfas. På senare tid har även kontakten med Pondicherry University i Sydindien förstärkts genom återkommande studiebesök och fältarbete. Genom åren har Åke varit involverad i ett stort antal konferenser och han har föreläst och undervisat vid ett antal indiska universitet, vilket har stärkt kontakten med svenska universitet vad gäller studiet av religion. En del av samarbetet har bestått i att bjuda in indiska forskare till Göteborgs universitet. Åke är uppskattad i Indien för sina teoretiska och praktiska kunskaper om religionsvetenskap och religionssociologi. Dessutom är han omtyckt bland sina indiska kollegor för sin vänskap, anspråkslöshet, gästfrihet, samarbetsvilja, entusiasm och generositet. Flera av bidragen i denna antologi är författade av kollegor som är verksamma i Indien.

Avslutningsvis kan det vara motiverat att säga något om varför vi inte har valt att lyfta fram fler av Åkes publikationer i denna korta inledning. Det är helt enkelt för svårt att välja vilka som skall inkluderas. Endast på Institutionen för litteratur, idéhistoria och religions hemsida återfinns 90 publikationer och för den som söker på Libris blir listan ännu längre. Om någon har tvivlat på jubilarens betydelse vittnar hans publikationslista på en omfattande och mångsidig akademisk karriär som få kommer i närheten av. För oss som försöker att gå – eller rättare sagt snubbla – i hans fotspår har mycket att leva upp till när det gäller forskning, publicering, internationalisering och kontakter med det omgivande samhället. För att lyckas med detta måste vi precis som Åke undvika att gå i en för tidig akademisk pension och hålla oss alerta och nyfikna på både det omgivande samhället och på det som vi så kärleksfullt kallar vetenskap. Med dessa avslutande ord önskar vi en produktiv och givande tid som pensionär, men också att du Åke fortsätter att komma till oss och ställa kritiska, krångliga och i vissa fall provocerande men alltid tankeväckande frågor.

Daniel Enstedt, Göran Larsson & Ferdinando Sardella

Sudha Sitharaman

ELEPHANT IN THE MIRROR

Religion in Contemporary India

I have over the last five years been critically engaging with the idea of contemporaneity of religion – its structures of organization and its authority, the integrative and disintegrative functions, the enactments in the name of religion and the seeming "threat" that some of these enactments posit to the project of modernity. In narrating the history of modern institutions, we mark the separation of religion from state and science, as crucial steps to our liberation from bigotry and superstition. The limits that we assign to religion in modern society, the serious alarm that transgression of those limits are met with, and all these even when they posit the task as one of moving away from it – either in seeking or in partializing, particularizing and incidentalizing it.

For more than two decades now, theorists of modernity have grappled with the resurgence of religion and the contemporary salience of politico-religious movements, along with their cognate processes, secularization and modernization, across the world.[1] The exposition of the fallacies of linear-deterministic narratives of the secularization theory, ineluctably anchored in the separation of state and church and the private-public divide, foreground the dynamic nature of the publicness of religious imagery and values that not only universalizes European experiences but also the definitions of religion that are employed in studying colonial and post-colonial societies and their policies. Yet, another spate of studies interrogate the monolithic understanding of secularism, and the variation of forms that this separation of state and religion may take, thus providing a picture of secularism that better fits the actual practices of secular states.[2] Much of this theorizing

has emphasized that secularism involves less a separation of religion and politics, but rather, how religion is made an object of the state's regulatory capacities of intervention thereby fashioning religious life and sensibility to fit the presuppositions and ongoing requirements of liberal governance.[3] These newer approaches have thus effected a separation between secularism's normative standards and the analytic categories used to understand them, bringing back to focus the questions of sovereignty of the state and the indeterminacy of its secularity. Despite explorations in a few cases, we have not exhausted the possibilities of learning from how processes of secularization and the project of secularism may actually unfold in a multi-religious society, for instance India, and its unique understanding of secular neutrality and notions of equidistance from all religions. The myriad juxtaposing of state and religion in contemporary India and the secularities that it bequeaths may offer us a foothold to deepen our understanding of the relationship between secularism and secularization. Here too, secularism is invariably conceived of in relation to the state, whether in terms of a separation from or management of religion. If we begin problematizing the idea that secularism and secularization is invariant in its different forms and differing contexts, along with the significance of religion across societies, it becomes clear that notions of governmentality of the state tie closely to the idea of secularism.[4] The temporal variations in the idea of the state, particularly over the last decades of the twentieth century compels us to recalibrate the emphasis on the state, as a source of governmentality, in terms of an active remolding of religious thought and practice.[5] With globalization, the middle classes seem susceptible to consumerism, refashioning the state that once was a considerable source/appeal for self-definition, which is now conjoined with the market as yet another source of self-fashioning and self-expression.

In this retrospective, selective version, the intent is not to present a presentist account, but rather to explore how we could move forward picking up questions that pop-up on the way. So what I will do here is to take you through the work I engage with, in snapshot form, and leaving out the details all along, persuading you to see some coherence. I place before you four "moments of rupture", if I may say, specifically chosen for their sheer ordinariness, to help us reflect on the broad range and diversity of theoretical and empirical work on the subject of Religious Studies in contemporary India. Building on incidents, which are located in a certain posturing that "secularism is stance taken about religion", may serve as a useful context for raising and discussing some of the questions in understanding religion/the secular in contemporary

India. This essay then is a place to yet again articulate a position, gesturing towards the question of the subject that might help us configure our work on religion.

SECULARISATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF *Dharmika Parishats* IN KARNATAKA

This shall be our first case study, which I believe helps us raise some interesting questions on issues of governmentality of the state. Here, I examine certain amendments in the Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011, henceforth Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011.[6] The stated objective of the amendment to the Endowments Act 2011, among others, is to protect the "hereditary rights of *archakas* (temple priests who perform rituals in temples)" and the "trustees of the temples".[7] The case is instructive for it provides an interesting opportunity for us to think about innovative solutions to problems in religion that are driven by secular, welfarist state policy.

In April 2012, the Karnataka Forum of Temple *Archakas* and *Agamakaras*[8] submitted a memorandum demanding that there should be no "reservation" in the selection of the *archakas* in temples and that the retirement age for the priests should be done away with. They were expressing their displeasure with certain amendments in the Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011 that was passed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (hereafter BJP) government then in power in the South Indian state of Karnataka. The *archakas*' forum condemned the amendments and declared that limiting the retirement age of *archakas* to sixty-five years was illogical, as one's "ability" to be involved in the divine "ripens" with age and experience; therefore, such a move by the government is "baseless", "irrational", and "unscientific" to say the least. Additionally, they also questioned "the practice of appointing *archakas* based on the certificates awarded by universities" as against hereditary rights – where *archakas* and temple servants are trained in the traditions of *agama-veda* – as being against the Hindu "*dharma shastras*". They also expressed derision over converting temples or religious places on the lines of government offices and bringing "temple priests" under "service rules" and "reservation procedures" like in regular jobs. Those who avail of reservations, they said, are generally undisciplined in their "food habits"; and additionally, they may not be of the "right-living", so as to be able to follow the "practices". The memorandum submitted by the *archakas*' forum addresses several issues concerning the practices in temples and their administration, as

different experiences rooted in part in traditions other than those to which the secular inspired reforms belong. Thus, compelling the state to engage in a reconsideration of what is essential to Hindu religion and what is not; especially those that are not in congruence with the claims of the secular state.

The debate on the *dharmika parishat* (religious council)[9] foregrounds two aspects: firstly, the centrality of the legal institution of the state in directing and shaping the process of secularisation in modern societies and the legitimacy and limits of such constraints in modern democracies; and secondly, the assertion of religious beliefs in law making and governance by politically mobilised religious groups. The demands raise complex questions about the neutrality of the state in matters of religion.

What is intriguing is that the amendments came from the BJP, a party that claims to be "truly" secular for it purports to believe in principles of equality and rejects the special protection given to the minorities as appeasement, and thus chooses meticulously to describe its adversaries as pseudo-secular. Thus, secularism is the banner under which the BJP propagates a vision of "Hindu Rashtra" along with other Hindu organisations with which they share a similar vision of nation-building. The notion of a Hindu Rashtra is not being modelled on the principles of *agama-veda* or *dharma shastras* as the *archakas*' forum wants it to be. However, in its current attempts to reform Hindu temples and Hinduism, the state exhibits an extraordinary secular posturing. For here, the secular state has not simply cordoned off religion from its regulatory ambitions but has sought to remake it through the agency of the law. Clearly, when viewed from the perspective of reforming Hinduism, the BJP reveals itself in its civilising and disciplinary aspects; a perspective that immunises religion from politics in the context of the nation state. For the "traditionalists", the cultivation of moral subjectivity was never constructed simply through legal codes; it was cultivated through a range of disciplinary practices embedded in their traditions such as *agamas, vedas* and *dharma shastras* that has been referred to. The language of the secular state addresses the citizen rather than the faithful, and therefore is in danger of easily being assimilated into an identitarian view that vitiates the religious character of Hinduism, rendering it a political ideology.

The state has the power and authority to decide what should count as essentially religious and what scope it can have in social life. It is through this principle that, crucially, secularism has been established historically. And it is this same principle that is presumed in secular practice today. This does not mean that the state can decide on matters

of religious doctrine, but that it can decide what about doctrine is essentially a religious matter. In consequence, secularisation is not a rejection of religion, but a plea for a particular kind of religion. Even as the secular state retains its power to regulate religious subjectivities and practices and remains committed to the principle of neutrality, it has to counterbalance it with conflicting demands of the religious minorities and majorities, who appeal to the state to curtail and/or extend their and others' ability to practice their religion. Does the adoption of secularism lead to the process of secularization in society? Or is it the other way round? Is there a way of speaking about the "religious" in forms other than as a vestige of the pre-modern times or in terms of fundamentalism?

BABA-DATTA IMBROGLIO: FAILURE OF CATEGORIES

In a wild and beautiful location, set midway up the Baba Budhan hills in the Chikmagalur district of Karnataka, stands a cave shrine, popularly known as Baba Budhan *Dargah*.[10] The cave shrine is not a mortuary shrine but a hermitage, a place of saintly visitation and mystical meditation. Devotees throng this place every year, as they believe that *dargahs* are portals through which they can invoke the deceased saint's blessing and intercession. The cave houses an altar or seat, which is believed to be the *chillah*[11] (altar or seat of the deity) of Dada Hayath Meer Qalandar, while many see it as the *peetha* (i.e. seat of religious reverence) of Swamy Dattatreya. Further, others believe that Dada Hayath Meer Qalandar and Swamy Dattatreya are two forms of the same divinity. Dattatreya, as described in the Hindu Puranas, is the three-headed representation of Brahma, Vishnu and Maheshwara and is accompanied by four dogs. Dada, as the legend has it, was a close associate of Prophet Mohammed, who travelled to India to preach Islam. Syed Shah Jamaluddin Maghribi – popularly called Baba Budhan, a native of Baghdad – came to Chikmagalur in the 16th century via Yemen and continued this spiritual lineage. It is his successors who are now the *sajjadah nashins*[12] of the shrine. For centuries, both Muslims and non-Muslims have venerated the saints at this shrine. It is considered by many as a symbol of communal harmony and syncretism.

The *dargah*, a "multi-religious" centre with a complex array of identities, has today become a domain of mutually exclusive categories of self-identification, of exclusion and tensions among groups in the Baba Budhan shrine.[13] The *Guru Dattatreya Peetha Samvardhana Samiti* (Committee for the Development of Datta *Peetha,* hereafter *Samiti*), an outfit floated by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council or

VHP) along with Bajrang Dal, has vowed to liberate the shrine from what they claim to be "Muslim control" and re-establish Hindu entitlements to the *peetha*. Since the late 1980s, they have been organising a *Datta Jayanthi* in the month of December claiming that the *chillah* of Dada Hayat Meer Qalandar is actually a *peetha* of Lord Dattatreya. They demand that *agamic*[14] forms of worship be introduced in place of those in practice, and that a Hindu *archaka* be appointed in place of the *mujawar* (Muslim priestly attendant), who now performs the rituals in the shrine. Contestation over the proprietorial status of the shrine and the daily/periodic religious observances and practices (whether Hindu or Islamic) has been unresolved for more than sixty years now, requiring state and judicial intervention. The other party to the dispute is the Indian state which attempted to bring the *dargah* under the Waqf Board (the institution that governs Muslim endowed properties) thus considering it a Muslim place of worship. Interestingly, the Muslim custodians of the *dargah* supported the Muzrai Department's[15] stand arguing against the Waqf board's claims on the grounds that the *dargah* was not exclusively a Muslim shrine, since both Hindus and Muslims venerated it. *Karnataka Komu Souharda Vedike* (Forum for Communal Harmony) filed a Public Interest Litigation urging that the "secular" character of the shrine be retained, the practice of celebrating *Urs*[16] be continued and exclusive Hindu rituals and Datta Jayanti celebrations be stalled. The secularists cry foul over the ways by which the state has ended up privileging majoritarian religious norms calling into question the professed liberal secular ethic of religious neutrality.

The Baba Budhan imbroglio helps us to re-consider our understandings of normative secularism. In places of common worship, formal categorizations of the state prevent deeper understanding of the polysemanticity of the shrine's practices, or even the imaginations of their worshippers. The state remains blind to its own normative framing of what constitutes "inclusion" by ignoring the fact that a particular religious group's demand for inclusion or recognition itself requires that such a group is able to recognize itself, and articulate this self-recognition, within the terms of liberal national discourse. Would the solution to this imbroglio lie merely in making the principle of religious neutrality more resilient in practice in a manner that all religions be allowed equal space and voice on par with the majority? How do we understand "new" religious practices that come into being at different historical times? Should explanations lie in history or belief/faith? What is it that makes practices "religious" and not political (secular)? How does one distinguish faith from non-faith? Is secularism then the most effective political solution for warding off religious strife?

It is believed that Dada Hayat Mir Qalandar (hereafter Dada) had two disciples – Baba Fakruddin of Pennagonda (Andhra Pradesh) and Baba Hyder Saftar Rahamathulla of Mulbagal (Karnataka), whom he supposedly sent to preach Islam. Their two shrines are part of Dada's *wilayat*[17] and sacred geography and are considered *murid* (disciple or literally the committed one). In 2010, when I was doing my fieldwork in Chikmagalur, I encountered Mr. Firoz Khan who had spared no effort to save the shrine in Baba Budhan hills in the various courts of law. And, on one occasion, when we (Khan saab and I) were looking into the archaeological records to ascertain the historical date of Dada,[18] we ran into an inscription which placed Dada in the year 1005 AD (according to the Archaeological Report of Mysore). With naïve credulity, I asked Khan saab, "how can Dada be a *Pir* (spiritual master) to somebody who came 500 years later?" Khan saab replied, "madam, why not?… if Dada who lived 1005 years ago can help me heal kidney stones… why can't he be *Pir* to his *murids* (disciples)… the two Babas who lived 500 years ago?" I was a little disconcerted by the narrative because it had all simply been a story to me, one that I had never really reflected upon.

My conversations with the devotees at the *Urs* also revealed that most people regard Dada to be intimately and integrally involved in their lives calling into question our notions of time and history. As days passed, I was exposed to the stories of devotees' experiences and dreams: comprising of unexpected encounters, magical coincidences and networks of meaning and community. I realized that a distant memory of an encounter with the saint had transformed and become part of the collective memory of Dada. The inherently social character of humans reveals itself in memory, even when it is seemingly the most personal recollection. An intimate landscape of personal devotion remade through public form, for devotees now visit the *dargah* and keep their vows in fulfillment of their wishes. As Asad (2003) writes, the unilinear and homogenous time of modern history, in spite of it being essential to thinking and acting critically, is only one kind of time people imagine, respond to, and use. Modern history clearly links time past to time present, and orients its narratives to the future.[19] But, as Reinhart Koselleck points out, present experience is also a re-encounter with what was once imagined as the future.[20]

The political solution that secularism proffers lies in this particular idea of history that it prescribes, which is not the way people live their lives. How then must we understand spirits and deities as cohabitants

with the living? How do we understand Dada's capacity to harm and bless? Following Gilles Deleuze, could we understand them as "varying thresholds of life" (both human and nonhuman)? If so, how do we conceptualize relationships of power between these thresholds? Could the explorations of meaning from the perspective of faith possibly offer a different understanding? Is there a possibility of critique from within faith? In modern society, where knowledge is rooted in a-religious ways of life and a-religious science, religious belief (the inner state of mind) is a precondition rather than an inference that is built through practices and discourses on the mystical virtues of shrines as also on the lives and miracles of saints etc., in other words, based on the knowledge of social institutions and practices. The question to ask therefore is the following: is belief then an inner state of mind or a constituting activity in the world?

SACRED AND SECULAR EPISTEMOLOGIES

In early April 2012 the Department of Sociology at Pondicherry University decided to reorganize and update the syllabus of the Masters' Programme. Like all Central Universities in India, the department had decided to introduce hard and soft-core papers. Being a new addition to the department and having a specialization in Sociology of Religion, it was not considered unusual for me to introduce a paper on Religion and Society. However, a dilemma arose as to what should be taught in this paper? Or, what should students of Sociology interested in working in/of religion read for their course work? The syllabus had to have a framework that would view "religion" from an ethnographic and historical perspective rather than from a theological one.[21]

Since, I wanted to begin by problematizing the idea of "religion", often used to refer to particular aspects of India's cultural traditions, and the "resurgence" of the religions and religious movements in contemporary times, both of which called forth for a fresh appraisal of the theories of Sociology of Religion, I thought it appropriate to include a unit on the Satya Sai Baba movement and another on Sri Aurobindo, for the reason that we were located in Pondicherry. In addition, I wanted to explore the relationship between global religious movements and modernity, as also how devotion is constructed in various urban milieus among the middle classes. And so, as part of the suggested readings that were offered, I introduced a unit on New Religious Movements (NRMs) and on the body of discourse surrounding contemporary interest in self-spiritualism (represented for instance by Mata Amritanandamayi, Sri Sri Ravishankar and others) as opposed to organized religion,

self-spiritualism seeks to heal, handle and magically transform modernity and its crises (e.g. consumerism) and which also manifests an autonomy of the self and the internalization of religion or humanistic expression. The suggested readings were from known Sociologists whose published works had appeared in peer reviewed journals.

The Board of Studies that included professors of Social Sciences from premier institutions of higher education were opposed to such a move. The Board questioned: how could one teach the students about false cults, charlatans and masqueraders? Should a student of Sociology of Religion engage in the hermeneutics of suspicion or what Lawrence Babb (1983: 116) calls "the anthropology of credibility" rather than trying to prove what "really" happened or trying to excavate some "true" presence?[22] I countered: don't we discuss anything appalling in the classrooms? Aren't we theorizing about discriminatory caste practices? What is caste? How does it work? If caste is anachronistic, how does one understand the tenacity of caste in modernity? Their responses confirmed my hypothesis about the secular moorings of our own disciplines. For knowledge production (through academic research) and reproduction (through education) are both part of the process of co-constructing religion (alongside state constructions of religion, popular constructions of religion and official religious constructions of religion), and this incident is an indicator of how knowledge about religion is framed in the Indian academia, particularly its pedagogy.

To argue further, how would a historian engage with, for example, the mystical experiences of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa?[23] More importantly, can we bring together the sacred and secular epistemologies in comprehending the world around us? I make this suggestion in full awareness that the secular arose in conjunction to the sacred and required its negation as a valid form of knowledge for social or scientific enquiry. In the secular culture of the academy today, the realm of the sacred is acceptable as Philosophy, as Theology, as a subject proper of Anthropology, History, Sociology, and as the fecund muse of poetry and art. In short, the sacred is deemed as a source of inspiration or an object of study. It is not, however, seen as offering a conceptual framework that can contribute to an understanding of things other than itself. The larger issue is not whether one believes that Paramahamsa is "real" or fraudulent but whether the study of such movements say anything about the dilemmas of modernity's categories and the constraints of disciplinary rubrics.[24] There are religious movements today that have their roots in India (Aurobindo, Rajneesh, Mahesh Yogi et al.). They are, depending on the context, spatially dispersed and international or global in the sense that they are based on cultural practices and ideas

that have traveled from one location to another and have also been translated. They are transnational, trans-religious, universalizing (because they seek to go beyond one national or religious community or at the least, point to some universals), and post-colonial since their growth has occurred in post-independence India and elsewhere. They have also been implicated in colonial histories and their effects and seek to invent other memories and spatialities. Apart from these, there are also wellness programmes such as Crystal Therapy, Reiki, which with their claims of ensuring the personal well-being of their followers through specialized programmes (meditation, *satsang*[25]*, yoga*, *ayurvedic* lifestyle approaches) and products (herbal and natural) are in keeping with the idea of modernity. Moreover, I thought it would be interesting to look at how, for instance, the idea of "well-being" has been transformed from a socially rooted concept to a more individualized notion through institutional means, that is something saleable. This delineates how well-being that was earlier a part of the everyday ritual activity has now assumed a packaged and customized new *avatar* or embodiment in the present, keeping pace with the changing lifestyles of the people. How may we then understand emerging urban religiosity? The Hindu Right has certainly been reductionist in its understanding of Hinduism, but we still need to recognize that there is more to religiosity-in-the-urban than the construction of communal identities. Are religious sensibilities, except perhaps in the form of violence, fundamentalism etc., external to the creation of urban modernity?

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

What I place before you through the particular events enunciated above are the divergent and multiple habitations of religion in modernity and contemporary India. Each of these "moments of rupture" have been organized and structured in a secular context and there is a possibility that each contains an "excess" that is not captured in its historical meaning. I arrived at this conclusion through a squint-eyed engagement with the historical embeddedness of religions in modern forms of power, constituting a structuring condition for action and moral agency. Could the exploration of meanings from the perspective of faith possibly bring us closer to understanding that excess? To begin with, how does one respond to the semantic choice between faith and religion to refer to a complex field that may encompass rituals, ethics, aesthetics, pedagogies, forms of life, community, ideology, culture, the quotidian, the spiritual and the material? Are "faith" and "religion"

two terms with the same referents? If not, then to which practice or discourse might we attribute the cause for divergent meanings: to the "secular"/"political" treatment of religion that defines "lived practices" in contrast to religion as institution, to traditions that claim to *exceed* the western concept of religion, or to embodied ethics of form? Does the answer lie in "unpacking" the very concept of faith itself despite the moot question: what is faith? The unpacking of faith may lead us to review concepts such as "politics", "power", "rupture", "crises", "event", "organization", "ethics", "transcendence" and "immanence". Would such an "unpacking" help us to see beyond the dualisms generated by different disciplines and work towards categories, methods and theories that engage with the history of the disciplinary formations and their inscriptions within modernity? Would that help to engage with the creative and unexpected modernity of religious movements and their locations within contemporary capitalism, transnational processes and urbanization? The opposition between organized religion and self-spirituality, fundamentalism and secularism, false cults and true religion, or knowledge and faith is symptomatic of a particular vision of modernity.

Indeed, even in the present, the coherence is not self-evident. Therefore, even as I map the contours of the contemporaneity of religion, I continue to struggle to find some clarity and coherence in what I am doing now. If asked to bring it all into some coherence, what I have been struggling to articulate about all through is the question of the "subject" of religion today.[26] There are two framing protocols in operation here: a) subject-making is not an interiorised task here and b) the subject arises only in being made legible within a discursive regime, and it is only in this relationality that subjectification can be understood. The "subject" here being a subject of investigation (knowing) as well as the question of what the coordinates of the subject-position of religion are (being). The former has been moving towards a certain "crystallizing" into an interrogation of scholarship on what constitutes religion and the secular as concepts historically embedded in modern forms of power that have brought together sensibilities, knowledge and behaviors in a new and distinct way. The direction the latter appears to take is in seeking to position religion as a normative ideal interpellating persons and groups, and/or as part of modern political logics, even while remaining precarious, and thus being open to re-formations that could at once be destabilizing and reproducing.

1   See, e.g., Talal Asad: *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (California, 2003); José Casanova: *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago, 1994); and Charles Taylor: *A Secular Age* (Belknap: Harvard University Press, 2007).

2   See, for instance, Asad: *Formations of the Secular* and Talal Asad: "Trying to Understand French Secularism" in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.): *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* (New York, 2006), 494–526; Akeel Bilgrami (ed.): *The Crisis of Secularism in India* (Durham, 2006); William E. Connolly: *Why I Am Not a Secularist* (Minneapolis, 1999); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan: *The Impossibility of Religious Freedom* (Princeton, 2005).

3   See Saba Mahmood: *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and Feminist Subject* (Princeton, 2005) and his article "Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation" in *Public Culture* 18: 2 (2006), 323–347.

4   Often, we distinguish between *secularism* as a political doctrine, and *the secular* as that historical space of concepts, norms, sensibilities, attitudes and dispositions that it draws upon for its practical intelligibility. There is also a concern about the relations between the two, which is sometimes indexed by the term *secularity*. See Hussein Ali Agrama: *Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt* (Chicago, 2012).

5   See Humeira Iqtidar: "Secularism Beyond the State: the 'State' and the 'Market' in Islamic Imagination" in *Modern Asian Studies* 45:3 (2011), 535–564.

6   See Sudha Sitharaman: "Secularisation and the Establishment of *Dharmika Parishats* in Karnataka" in *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVII: 24 (2012), 20–23.

7   The Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011, 2.

8   *Agamakaras* are those who follow the agamas. Agamas in Sanskrit literally means "that which has come to us". Agamas expound a variety of subjects and they are really the manuals, on which Hindu rituals are based.

9   *Dharmika Parishats* are non-governmental governing bodies for all matters pertaining to the administration of Hindu religious institutions.

10 *Dargah* is a shrine or tomb (or by extension a lodge) built over the grave of a revered religious figure, often that of a Sufi saint. For more information about Sufism in India see S. A. A. Rizvi: *A History of Sufism in India*, Vol. I and II (New Delhi, 1986).

11 *Chillah* is a place for 40-day retreats of religious seclusion and meditation.

12 Literally *sajjadah nashin* means "Sitter on the Carpet", i.e., the successor of a Sufi saint or one who sits on the seat of a departed saint.

13 For details see Sudha Sitharaman "Conflict over Worship: A Study of the Sri Guru Dattatreya SwamyBababudhan Dargah in South India" in *Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual. (eds)* Gita Dharampal-Frick and Robert Langer (Wiesbaden, 2010), 205–233. See also Sudha Sitharaman:

"Limits of Syncretism: Bababudhan Dargah in South India as a Paradigm for Overlapping Religious Affiliations and Co-existence" in Andreas Pries, Laetitia Matzolff, Robert Langer, and Claus Ambos (eds.): *'Synkretismus' Negation und New Definition* (Wiesbaden, 2013), 70–109.

14 The *agama*s are sectarian and monotheistic texts dedicated to Vishnu, Shiva and Devi which determine the procedures of worship of the deity. Here, "Agamic Forms of Worship" refers to a ritual manual of Dattatreya worship, who is considered by some to be an *avatara* of Lord Vishnu and by others, of Lord Shiva. See Antonio Rigopoulos: *Dattatreya: The Immortal Guru, Yogin and Avatara* (Albany, 1998).

15 The general overseer of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments in the state.

16 "*Urs*" literally meaning "wedding", refers to the ceremony commemorating the death anniversary of a saint or a mystical union with his/her beloved God. The main occurrence in the *Urs* is the public celebration of the saint's power.

17 It refers to a spiritual state as well as a power bestowed on a saint due to his devotion to God and strict following of *shariat*.

18 Following a judgement from the Karnataka High court that in 2007 ordered a fresh public hearing to list the practices in the shrine before Hyder Ali (1720–1782).

19 Cited in Asad: *Formations of the Secular* (222–223), where he writes "(W) e make a false assumption when we suppose that the present is merely a fleeting moment in a historical teleology connecting past to the future. In tradition the 'present' is always at the centre. If we attend to the way time present is separated from but also included within events and epochs, the way time past authoritatively constitutes present practices, and the way authenticating practices invoke or distance themselves from the past (by reiterating, reinterpreting, and reconnecting textualized memory and memorialized history), we move toward a richer understanding of tradition's temporality".

20 Reinhart Koselleck: *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 257.

21 The course should, I thought, include the diversity in/of cultures of what may be termed the "non-Hindu world" too and introduce the seminal theories in Sociology of Religion as well as explore the relation between religion and other areas of social life such as economy and polity. Religion after all is not an *a priori* category; rather it is geographically and historically contingent. The diachronic processes within religion, i.e. movements, sect formation, institutional forms as well as organizational dynamics would be addressed in this course. Finally, I thought the course should explore the issues of secularization and civil religion.

22 Lawrence Babb: "Satya Sai Baba's Magic" in *Anthropological Quarterly* 56:3 (1983), 116.

23 I have in mind the controversy around two recent publications: Jeffrey Kripal: *Kali's Child: The Mystical and the Erotic in the life and Teachings of Ramakrishna*, Chicago, 1998) and Peter Heehs: *The Lives of Sri Aurobindo* (New York, 2008).

24 Although recognized as a religious studies scholar outside India, I am a Sociologist in a country where there are few departments of Religious Studies in the universities. Today, I attend professional meetings in depart-ments of Anthropology, Sociology, Religious Studies, and South Asian studies – an act of hopeful dialogism rather than a sign of intellectual schizophrenia.

25 Spiritual discourse or sacred gathering.

26 An adumbration of this reconstruction is inspired by Saba Mahmood's work titled *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and Feminist Subject* (Princeton: 2005), in the tradition of recent remaking of the practice of ethnography that successfully scales the problem of the micro-macro.

Ferdinando Sardella

PHENOMENOLOGY AND YOGA IN ÅKE SANDER'S EARLY AND LATE WORKS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims at reviewing one of the earliest and latest works of Åke Sander relating to the theory and method of phenomenology. The first text is Sander's doctoral dissertation from 1988 whose title in Swedish can be rendered as *One Faith – One Lifeworld: A Phenomenological Investigation of Religious Experience, Religious Consciousness and Their Roles in the Shaping of Life-worlds*.[1] It consists of an in-depth analysis of what constitutes religious experience and how to study it and is influenced by his studies in Philosophy as well as Faith and Reason at the University of Gothenburg in the 1980s. It is an interesting review of important aspects of the theoretical foundation of the History of Religion in the 20th century, at a time when the study of religion in Sweden critically questioned its theological roots. The analysis carried out will then be compared to a recent article published in 2015 named "Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation: Commonalities and Divergences" in which Sander returns to foundational aspects of phenomenology but this time with a strong basis in Indian philosophy and thought.[2] The chapter ends by highlighting Sander's work towards a comparative approach exemplified by his exploration of Edmund Husserl's theory of phenomenology and Patāñjali's *Yoga Sūtras*. This review chapter is of relevance not only for the field of philosophy of religion, but also for the sociology and history of religion, as well as for the history of science.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND THE MAKING
OF LIFE-WORLDS

One Faith – One Life-world is a comprehensive and ambitious philosophical and theoretical work divided in four parts. The introduction discusses Sander's position within the philosophy of religion and his ideas about the relevance of studying religious experience. The second part presents and discusses the characteristics and structure of religious experience based to a large degree on the works of Mircea Eliade, William Jones, Rudolf Otto and Joachim Wach. In the third part Sander develops a phenomenological framework for an effective analysis of religious experience by examining the theoretical framework developed by Edmund Husserl, Aaron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schütz. In Part Four Sander presents a phenomenological analysis of the material presented in Part Two with the help of tools developed in Part Three. His conclusion is that typical religiosity is not primarily constituted by theoretical propositions and a set of beliefs but is based on a set of skills, a position that will be further developed in his article on Phenomenology and Yoga. Religiosity according to Sander is thus constituted by a certain mode of perception, a pattern of experiencing and seeing the world (a life-world), which by necessity leads to new forms of awareness, belonging and above all, action.

In Sander's view, the twentieth century (at least up to 1988) has been strongly influenced by ideals of logical positivism and "related philosophical movements".[3] This turn towards "objective" approaches has led to an emphasis on studying texts, objective religious behaviour, and accumulation of archaeological and historical facts about the origins and development of world religions. Taking a different approach, Sander aims at studying the behaviour of religious virtuosi whose life and experiences for millennia have inspired the founding of new religions. This stance is supported by among others William James, according to whom "personal religion" is primary, while churches and theologies are secondary, outgrown from the original experiences of outstanding religious leaders.[4]

According to Sander, most religions are at heart pre-theoretical, because they in their early phases deal with direct experiences of a non-empirical kind that only later are systematized in theologies, social structures, and rituals for the benefit of those who lack access to them. Sander contends that it is on the basis of "religious experiences and their internalization" that persons that had mystical experiences become religious, rather than due to epistemological or ontological knowledge.

The religious person after a transformative religious experience adopts a "pattern of interpretation" (*tolkningsmönster*) that allows her

to structure, order and map the world according to a specific "mental code". The pattern of interpretation influences her perception of the world as well as a large number of her cognitive processes. The acquisition of this pattern occurs not through theoretical studies alone, but more importantly through practice, and leads to the acquisition of personal realization and virtue, a perspective that Sander compares to Aristoteles' "practical wisdom" (*phronesis*). Through the medium of her faith in peculiar religious experiences and this code of interpretation a religious person is able to constitute a *life-world*, a specific sphere of meaning that shape actions, perceptions and thoughts.

TRANSCENDENCE

A key aspect of religious experience is the relation between the religious person and transcendence, variously defined. Sander distinguishes between several ways to understand the alleged *experience* of transcendence. One is named *consciousness transcendence* (*medvetandetranscendens*) (T1) and refers to anything that is beyond the awareness of the subject. The immanent in this case is the subject's experience. This instance can be further divided in two subcategories: the intention and purpose behind an act (T1.1) and the genuine experience of performing the act (T1.2). A second level is *sensory transcendence* (*sinnestranscendens*) (T2), which refers to all that is transcendent to the subject's ordinary sense perception. Within this category it is important to distinguish between: a) what is empirically transcendent in relation to ordinary sense perception due to the sensory limitations of the subject at a particular time (T2.1); and b) what is in principle not possible to perceive through the senses (T2.2) since the source is beyond the range of human senses and sensory tools. A third category is *experience transcendence* (*erfarenhetstranscendens*) (T3). According to Sander much of the strength and attraction of religious experience is that it gives access to a deeper, more cohesive and truthful reality. Those who had these experiences speak of entering the deepest recesses of being and the root of existence through an "inner eye", and access a dimension of existence that humans are generally unaware of.[5] In the accounts of many religious experiences, the subject tells that she witnessed the cradle of life itself, hidden in the deepest recesses of life.[6] Experience transcendence is understood here as an inner experience beyond ordinary, sensory awareness. A fourth category is *semantic transcendence* (*semantisk transcendens*) (T4). It has two distinct subcategories: one that includes phenomena that cannot be semantically expressed due to lack of appropriate terms in a particular language domain (T4.1). The

other consists of what in principle cannot be communicated through symbols since it is ineffable, such as in the case of a religious experience of the divine (T4.2). The fifth and last category is *metaphysical transcendence* (*metafysisk transcendens*) (T5). Transcendence refers in this case to that which is beyond the external world. This category has also two subcategories. The first one is what is generally discussed in theology and philosophy of religion, i.e. a space or territory located beyond the kind of physical cosmos explored by the natural sciences (T5.1). In this sense, transcendence refers to multiple worlds such as the Christian concept of God's abode. The second subcategory (T5.2) is linked to the world of everyday experience, generally understood as the "paramount reality" of everyday life (*vardagsvärlden*). Transcendence here refers to alternate modes of consciousness, such as in the world of fantasy and imagination, the world of dreams, or the worlds of the schizophrenic and mentally ill. T5.2 is not based on a theory of multiple worlds like T5, but explores alternative patterns of experience within ordinary life-worlds. This subcategory includes accounts of experiences of God, if God is understood as immanent to the life-world.[7]

THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE HOLY

Sander proceeds from this detailed analysis of transcendence to a detailed study of the "Holy" and the work of Rudolf Otto, a well-known theologian that has also contributed to the History of Religion. According to Otto, the encounter with the Holy prompts the experience of "*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*" (tremendous and fascinating mystery), which is divided into three stages: a) the moment of the terrible; b) the moment of the overpowering (majesty); and c) the moment of energetic vitality.[8] The tremendous is a power that is "rastlos und restlos, drängenden … bezwingenden, lebendingen" (tireless and complete, urging … overpowering, full of life).[9]

The Holy, however, is also *fascinans* (fascinating), which in religious language is indicated by words such as love and grace. This fascination is in opposition to the alienation and fear of the tremendous, and leads to the idea of liberation, rebirth or salvation. The key role of liberation is reinforced by phenomenologists such as Gerardus van der Leeuw for whom (arguably) "religion is always directed towards salvation … in this respect all religion, with no exception, is the religion of deliverance".[10] This statement, however, may be a bit too exclusive. Liberation in religious language may not only refer to an otherworldly dimension, but also to the idea of an experience of liberation in the here and now. For Otto *tremendum* and *fascinans* are central ingredients of a typical,

deep religious experience, which also reflects his characteristic Abrahamitic perspective.[11] The Holy is for Otto nonetheless Janus-faced: overwhelming, threatening, annihilating, unreachable, but also intimate, attractive, healing, liberating.

The Holy, according to this analysis, is also experienced as *ens realissimus*, a supreme, absolute reality that is richer and more complete than the ordinary world. It has in itself supreme value and is the basis of the value of anything else. The meeting with this complete whole is understood as transforming on several levels, and is an inclusive, intimate experience in which the subject feels to be an object of the Holy's concern and attention (*angådd*).[12]

The extraordinary experience of the Holy, according to Sander, however carried through, may result in a disconnection with reality and possibly the subject's alienation from those who live in an ordinary life-world. The subject may experience a "mental cataclysm" and "a new power in the mind", which reveals to her the true being and existential reality of humanity and the world.[13] Through this experience, the subject integrates, structures and organises all experiences in an absolute, united and cohesive life-world, a "holy cosmos".[14] In the words of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, this new experiential world becomes

> integrated in an all-embracing frame of reference, which now constitutes a universe in the literal sense of the word because *all* human experience can now be conceived of as taking place *within it*.[15]

An intensive religious experience is in Sander's interpretation life transforming, and the subject of that experience feels compelled to live in a new world characterized by structure and order beyond external and internal chaos and fragmentation. This new reordering of reality becomes an axis that can function as a guide in life and which, according to Durkheim is stronger than the desire for physical happiness and satisfaction.[16] The fear to lose that axis is so great that the subject rather seeks death than live without it.[17] Religious experience thus compels the subject to undergo a process of "alternation", a term suggested by Berger and Luckmann.[18] In this transformative process, in Sander's words, the subject reviews her previous life and if the religious experience is sufficiently intense, a firm need for conversion emerges.

THE WAYS OF CONVERSION

Conversion is brought about by a radical restructuring of the subject's interpretation of reality and her ways of feeling, thinking, and acting. A

subject can also be converted to political ideologies such as nationalism and communism and undergo similar stages of transformation. Sander considers though here only conversions born of religious experience.

Under the influence of extreme religious experiences the religious specialist feels that mundane life is meaningless, fragmented and without value, filled with vanity and driven by the cravings of an untamed ego. A number of religious disciplines enable then the subject to move beyond the liminal stage between unfulfilled religious life and ordinary life. One example is the path of yoga and meditation of India's classical religions, which will be discussed below. What motivates the religious specialist is a strong craving for union with an absolute truth and an ultimate concept of the real.

According to Sander's presentation of conversion, salvation and rebirth in religious terms refer to the transformation of a religious subject from an old to a new persona, and the transfer from an old to a new life-world.[19] For Sander, this sort of "salvation" implies a creative change of personality and inner consciousness. It is through this transformation that the religious subject begins to see the cosmos as ordered and structured. The mundane world is now seen as corrupting, inimical and alien to the pure, authentic and free inner being of the subject.

As a result of religious experiences, religious specialists have arguably tended to resent the ordinary life-world of their domain. This is corroborated, according to Sander, by the fact that many such virtuosi have throughout history isolated themselves from society.

Religious experience may be rather brief, but acts nonetheless as an "ontological shock" leading in some cases to existential crises, particularly in the case of those with no religious background. The subject wishes now to navigate the ordinary world in a way that accounts for her religious experience and legitimates it. According to Sander, one way to conceptualise the dilemma of parallel life-worlds is through the theory of multiple realities, which was developed by William James, Alfred Schütz and Aron Gurwitsch. Schütz and Gurwitsch in particular have developed their theoretical frames from Husserl's theory of phenomenology, which in the following will first receive attention.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDMUND HUSSERL

According to Sander, Husserl's main project is to put consciousness (*medvetande*) at the centre. Husserl's phenomenology is a reflexive activity that problematizes the natural and unreflective attitude towards the world by suspending any claim to objective existence of our objects of experience (*epoché*).[20] This does not imply that the phenomenolo-

gist denies or doubts the existence of an objective world, but it means that she suspends any judgement about its real existence. What is left is awareness of the world, a reality that Husserl calls *transcendental* to consciousness itself. The world is "reduced" to phenomena in the flow of consciousness, which are constituted and framed by the intentions and purposes generated by the flow of consciousness itself. The reduction does not imply that objects are erased or abstracted from ordinary experience, but that the experience of the object itself is understood as the phenomenon, which takes place within the realm of consciousness. Sander, however, argues that Husserl's phenomenology is not just a theory, but a practical skill to be learnt, a position that he explores in more detail in the article from 2015 discussed below.

Phenomenology implies to step back as an agent and become a reflexive observer to such a degree that social activities, personal interests, engagements and motivations do not longer affect the consciousness of the observer.[21] Each act or perception is then understood as preceded by a meaning (*noema*), which comes between perception itself and the perceived reference object. Every act according to Husserl is constituted and correlated with a meaning or specific conscious content. This content is an *idea* and does not belong to the physical world nor the object observed.

Ordinary perceptions most often presuppose a direct connection between perception and concrete objects such as a house, a wall or a tree. The meaning applied to these perceptions, which creates a cohesive and structured representation of the reference object within the consciousness of the observer is though omitted. Husserl's phenomenology explores the process of perception as a tripartite structure, whose full interpretation has been a subject of debate among phenomenological commentators: a) the object of reference, b) the correlation of the object to an intentional meaning (*noema*), and c) an intentional act with the object constituted by the *noema*. It is the meaning of the act itself, the middle part, which is the phenomenon. In ordinary dealings the subject simply assumes epistemological objectivism. Perception and the objects of perception are seen as directly linked in an objective way, and the world as ordered and structured more or less in the way we perceive it. The phenomenological reduction gives the subject the possibility to discover the role of consciousness in the process of perception.[22] In the words of Gurwitsch:

> Phenomenology is then characterized as a systematic study and theory of subjectivity for the sake of an ultimate clarification and elucidation of objects of any description whatsoever. Such clari-

fication is attempted by means of descriptive analysis of the appearances of objects through acts of consciousness.[23]

MULTIPLE REALITIES

The epistemology of conscious acts allows an exploration of the various worlds of meaning that the subject creates and lives in, i.e. her life-worlds. According to Schütz, these worlds can be understood by analysing the multiple levels in which reflexive experience takes place. First is the level a person experiences when she is not reflecting over herself, but spontaneously acts within her life-world. These experiences are "taken for granted". The next level consists of self-reflexive experiences. When the self reflects over herself she distinguishes between multiple *types* of experience such as the physical experiences of the body, the consciousness of the mind, the experiences acquired while playing different roles (mother, wife, student, politician) and the critical distancing from such roles. Other levels are awareness of one's own acts of consciousness, awareness of emotions, awareness of the process of decision making, and awareness of choices that the subject makes in the course of meaningful acts in line with personal values and relevancies.[24] According to William James, multiple realities in our conscious experience, and particularly those that go beyond our ordinary awareness, should in fact be accepted as legitimate aspects of everyday life. Regarding those alternate states of consciousness James writes:

> our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question, – for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality.[25]

According to Schütz, however, empirical data that deviates from the finite province of meaning of the subject and the environment in which

she lives tend to be suspended. Schütz argues that those informational contents are neglected and "do not stand any longer within the focus of our attentional interest in life".[26] The experience of everyday life thus tends to suspend any doubt that the interpretation of the world, other people and things within a specific provincial domain of meaning are true, while information that is not relevant or contradictory to that domain is brushed away.[27] For example, the idea that the subject is only conscious and active during the course of a lifetime is to a large degree alien to Indian thought. According to this analysis, an Indian yogi holding the view of an eternal self may regard the idea of death of the conscious self as a form of ignorance born of the epistemological reductions of a particular cognitive province and thus discard it. The reverse, of course, may also be the case.

From Schütz's analysis of multiple realities, Sander derives the concept of "multiple selves". The complete self is formed by a number of integrated and reciprocally communicating sub-selves that are linked to key areas of life and action. Each sub-self consists of a homogenized, organized and structured section of a person's total consciousness, mass of knowledge and experience.[28] These levels of personal being, however, are ultimately integrated in the religious experience of love.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND YOGA

The detailed investigation of phenomenology in Sander's doctoral dissertation is the basis for the article "Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation: Commonalities and Divergences" published in the *Journal of East-West Thought.* The article builds on the extensive analysis of Husserl's phenomenology carried out in *One Faith – One Life-World* and goes beyond a *typical* Judeo-Christian domain to explore in detail the life-world of religious specialists in India.

Sander observes that many Western philosophers for a long time have spoken about an alleged difference between "Western rational thinking" and "Eastern, irrational, mystical-metaphysical brooding".[29] He abstains from a direct comparison between Western and Eastern philosophy, but suggests instead the existence of a "striking resemblance" between Husserl's *epoché* on one hand and the methods advocated by Patañjali, the author of the renowned *Yoga Sūtras*, on the other. The bracketing or suspension of judgement of Husserl's phenomenology (*epoché*) is a skill according to Sander and not only a theoretical understanding about the nature and function of consciousness. As already pointed out, Husserl aims at purging consciousness (often referred to as "mind" in Western philosophy) from those subjective layers of meaning

that generate a schism between the experiencing subject and "the things in themselves (*die Sachen selbst*)".[30]

The problem of yoga begins with a parallel issue. The human condition is seen as determined and influenced by a number of internal and external determinants that need to be overcome in order to achieve an unconditioned, non-temporal state of conscious existence. According to Sander, Indian thinkers discovered that it was relatively easy to grasp external determinants such as biographic impressions, or cultural and social patterns, but it was much harder to understand

> the structure and organization (*vāsanā*) of the normally unconscious, deeply rooted properties of one's mind (needs, dispositions, motivations, impulses, etc.) (*saṁskāras*) and then methodically [transcend] them.[31]

The yoga system described by Patañjali according to Sander clearly addresses one of the aims of phenomenology, i.e. how to reach a state where the subject and the object become united in the consciousness of the observer in an experience free from prejudice and judgement. The problem is how the subject can learn to perceive an object directly through unmediated intuition.[32] Husserl's phenomenology says little about how to acquire this skill, if according to Sander, one compares it with the techniques outlined in the yoga system of Patañjali. Patañjali's eight stages of yoga place great emphasis in teaching a discipline that elevates the subject to alternate levels of perception and consciousness through meditation and concentration. At the last stage (*samādhi*) the practitioner, after eliminating the determinants in her consciousness, reaches a complete union with the object of meditation and thus complete absorption.

Sander concludes that phenomenology and yoga fundamentally differ in their aims, despite the similarities: in the first case the aim is the creation of a scientific theory designed to be the basis of science; in the other it is uprooting the cause of suffering and opening the realm of transcendental awareness for the *ātman*, the eternal self, achieved through a conscious union with the personal (or impersonal) Potency underlying the cosmos (*brahman*).

CONCLUDING WORDS

This overview has allowed access to some of Sander's ideas about phenomenology and yoga. The greater part of Sander's analysis of phenomenology has been formulated in Swedish in the 1980s and have so far

been inaccessible to an international audience. This selective overview has hopefully amended the lacuna to some degree, and for this purpose Sander's study of phenomenology has received more attention. It is important though to keep in mind that this review is by necessity selective and only to a limited degree is capable to reflect the amount of detail, precision and complexity that is visible in Sander's writings.

Sander has argued that phenomenology allows to study and understand the construction and perpetuation of social and cultural patterns on the basis of an intricate study of the multiple layers of human consciousness. This theoretical and methodological approach has proven to be particularly fruitful in the study of religious experiences, which more "objective" approaches would necessarily miss.

In the article "Phenomenological Reduction" Sander draws parallels beyond what appears to be a Judeo-Christian frame of reference. The encounter and, to a degree, comparison with Indian philosophy cast new light on the possible practical limitations of Husserl's phenomenology. This study is consciously carried out on a liminal territory between two diverse, albeit not entirely alien, "life-worlds": the "Eastern" and the "Western".

A future development for a comparative philosophical dialogue may be the inclusion of the philosophical school of Vedānta, the idealist philosophy of India *per excellence*. Several schools of Vedānta discuss in detail the absolute reality of transcendental consciousness and the "provincial" reality of the world of everyday experience, as well as their relation. They also discuss various levels of perception and knowledge, and their epistemology of illusion (*maya*) is quite sophisticated; the study of religious love, which is carried out in terms of the yoga of *bhakti* (devotion, sharing), is also highly developed. A comparison between phenomenology and Vedānta, their respective epistemologies and their ideas about the structure of consciousness seems to be a natural step forward.

One challenge for a Husserlian phenomenological approach is that a radical use of the *epoché* may lead to absolute idealism, i.e. the idea that reality is simply the product of the subject's consciousness. This is an issue that the philosophy of Sāṃkhya, the foundation of the philosophy of Yoga, averted by positing the existence of Nature (*prakṛti*) as eternally real beyond the subjective experience of the non-material self (*puruṣa*).

Sander's analysis of Husserl's phenomenology and Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtras* is intriguing and does not lack in depth and insight. Phenomenology had a great impact during the 20th century for the theory and method of the study of religion, and its merits and limitations have been addressed in various fields of research such as the History of

Religions.[33] As a method, phenomenology still retains its value and is important for areas of research that require a deep understanding of multiple realities, intentionality, and multi-layered human agency in the social, political and cultural life-worlds of the 21st century.

NOTES

1   Åke Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld: en fenomenologisk undersökning av religiös erfarenhet, religiöst medvetande och deras roller i livsvärldskonstitutionen* (doctoral dissertation in Practical Philosophy, University of Gothenburg, 1988). Sander's extensive doctoral dissertation consists of two volumes: the first presents the main body of the text and has a total of 372 pages and the second part contains footnotes and the bibliography (220 pages). It is written in Swedish, but contains a summery in English.

2   Åke Sander: "Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation: Commonalities and Divergences" in *Journal of East-West Thought* 5.1 (2015), 29–60.

3   Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld*, 360.

4   William James: *The varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature: being the Gifford lectures on natural religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902* (London; New York, 1902), 30–31.

5   Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 45.

6   Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 28–31.

7   Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 31.

8   Rudolf Otto: *Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen* (Gotha, 1929) Chapter IV, referred to in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 34.

9   Otto: *Das Heilige*, 29, referred to in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 36.

10 Gerardus van Der Leeuw: *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (New York, 1963) 683, referred to in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 38.

11 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 36–37.

12 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 42.

13 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 43.

14 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 44.

15 Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann: *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York, 1966) 96, quoted in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 44.

16 Émile Durkheim: *Suicide* (Glenco, 1951) 240, referred to in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 46.

17 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 46

18 Berger and Luckmann: *The Social Construction*, 157, referred to in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 46.

19 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 50.

20 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 64.

21 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 67.

22 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 70.

23 Aron Gurwitsch: *The Field of Consciouness* (Pittsburgh, 1964), 5, cited in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 71.
24 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 244.
25 William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (London, 2002 [1916]), 301, quoted in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 230.
26 Alfred Schütz & Maurice Natanson M: *The problem of social reality* (The Hague; London, 1962), 233, referred to in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 238.
27 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 238
28 Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 246.
29 Sander: "Phenomenological Reduction", 30.
30 Sander: "Phenomenological Reduction", 30.
31 Sander: "Phenomenological Reduction", 32. See also in Sander: *En tro – en livsvärld I*, 3.2.3.1., 3.3.3.8., part IV section 4.1, for a discussion of the factors that influence and determine the subject's experience.
32 Sander: "Phenomenological Reduction", 54.
33 See for example Gavin Flood: *Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion* (London, 1999).

Ruby Sain

THE SOCIOLOGY OF
HINDU RELIGION

Religion begins with a tremendous dissatisfaction with the present state of things, with our lives, and a hatred, an intense hatred, for this patching up of life, an unbounded disgust for fraud and lies. He alone can be religious who dares say, as the mighty Buddha once said under the Bodhi Tree, when this idea of practicality appeared before him and he saw that it was nonsense, and yet could not find a way out. When the temptation came to him to give up his search for the truth, to go back to the world and live the old life of fraud, calling things by wrong names, telling lies to oneself and to everybody, he, the giant, conquered it and said, "Death is better than a vegetating ignorant life; it is better to die on the battlefield than to live a life of defeat." This is the basis of religion. When a man takes this stand he is on his way to find the truth, he is on the way to God. That determination must be the first impulse towards becoming religious.
   Swami Vivekananda

It would be an onerous task to trace the times religion first flourished in India. To keep it brief, it has often been contended that explorations of religion in India are as old as the history of India itself. This is upheld by the fact that a legion of Indian thinkers dating back to ancient and medieval times centred most of their accounts and writings around religious traditions such as "Hinduism" – the latter being vibrantly delineated in the sacred Upanishads, the Puranas, the Vedantas, the *Bhagavad Gita*, the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata*, and the like.
   The expositions generally expressed in the aforesaid sacred texts

underlined the ideas of ethics, values and laws. In that connection, scholars came to the realization that religion, or "*dharma*" as they referred it to, should be beaconed by some laws and rules that would in turn provide for a systematic life-pattern and the required principles for all individuals in society. It was widely postulated that the large mass of people would abide by standing orders only if these were authorized in religious texts – and hence, slowly and subsequently, these testaments emerged as major sources of adherence to and maintenance of a disciplined, harmonious and peaceful life, flavoured with optimum happiness derived from a rich lifestyle, both materially and spiritually. The theorem continued and was even considered by social law makers up to the 19th century.

In discussing Hinduism, the majority religion of Indian culture, certain lineaments must be brought to light. Hindu society has aimed at building up a broad-based, integrated society in which the individual's spiritual, psychical and physical well-being is well looked after. This can be attributed to the certitude that the organizers of ancient Hindu society possessed wisdom, knowledge, experience of human values, and formulated principles and disciplines that could efficaciously look after both the individual and society. Although the caste system remained in place, being for many years the pivot on which the whole community life revolved, it was "*dharma*" (righteousness) that gained paramount significance in lending social relations a deeper meaning, thereby moralizing the social behaviour of the Hindus.

Coming to the dominant social institutions of the time, it must be stated here that most were patrilineally structured, following the innuendos in the Vedas, the Dharma-shastras, the Buddhist and Jain texts, as well as the law-digests. Mention should also be made of the *Bhagavad Gita*, which is a historical and textual marvel in many ways. In just 700 (in some lesser known versions 745 or 750) *shlokas* (song, or a category of verse line), the book offers deep philosophical insights which can stimulate the followers of any philosophical school, besides showing practical ways of going about life for people of every temperament. Its teachings are lofty, rational, unbiased and quite free from sectarianism and bigotry. The teachings are believed to have come through the lips of Krishna, who is thought to be an incarnation of the Supreme God, hence the name *Bhagavad Gita*, i.e. the Song of the Lord. If one studies the text attentively, what is explicitly stated is that God is present within all of us, yet He transcends all forms and limitations, pervades the universe, and is beyond time. He is also able to express Himself in a form that suits the people of a particular time in a way that their problems can be addressed, thereby enabling them to relate

to those teachings and find answers to the questions that haunt them. The sacred Gita, thus, educes such an appeal that it can even endear an atheist to lay his hands upon it, provided he is capable of going beyond the mere words of the text and get to the underlying principles that it testifies.

Due to the fact that the *Gita* succinctly deals with important questions of human existence as well as enumerates the ways to salvation, it is the most revered book of the Hindus. Besides, it is also considered to be the gist of all Upanishads, and by some it is regarded even as a separate Upanishad standing on its own. However, since all good things must come with a price, the Gita too has not been spared from harsh scrutiny. It received a lot of flaks, but its author(s) unflinchingly accepted them, improved some of its statements, and even synthesized and included them. The *Gita* accepts the *karma-kanda* (the ritual-based part) of the Vedas and improves the idea by introducing the idea of *nishkama karma,* that is, desireless actions done for the good of the world. It accepts the *jnana kanda* (the knowledge-based part) of the Vedas, but combines it with action and devotion in what may be described as a *proto* "Practical Vedanta". It accepts the *Samkhya* idea of the duality of matter and consciousness in the manifested creation, but also stresses the Vedantic idea of an all-pervading reality beyond them.

Another interesting notability of the *Gita* lies in its positive declaration of the worship of God in any form. This is concreted by its attempt to explain the idea of incarnation or divine descent along with the nature of Shrimad Bhagavan (Krishna), which it does in a very unique manner. What is equally interesting to note is that the Gita authorizes anyone, irrespective of sex, caste and religion to obtain an understanding of it through reading its enchanting verses. Such and many other enthralling facets of the Gita prodded a host of eminent thinkers such as Shankaracharya, Ramanuja, Madhavacharya, Swami Vivekananda, Tilak, Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, Radhakrishnan and Swami Chinmayananda to compose commentaries and essays on it. It has thus become evident how sweeping the magnetism of the *Gita* has historically been.

However, the *Gita* is not the only text of the Hindus that bear testimony to the Indian society of ancient times. The two epics, i.e. the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, also fittingly narrate about the same. While the former portrays the hero Rama as both an Avatar and an incarnation of the Almighty, the latter delves into the deepest insight of the soul of the Indian people. Furthermore, the Dharma-shastras (the law books) hold equal and immense sociological importance because of their concern and implications on the social living of the Indians.

It would be erroneous to assume that Hindu texts are the only ones that have single-handedly presented an image of Indian society; the sacred texts of the Buddhists and Jains equitably hold great sociological weight in that regard. The Pali Canon gives a fair idea of the social structure of the Buddhist period. A review of these texts acquaints one with the pattern of family-living, as well as the roles played by family members, both in a normative and deviational form. The Jain text *Nayadhammakatha* offers a similar contribution; it provides materials on patterns of family, inter-personal relationships of the members and the social network existing between the family of *orientation* (in which one is born) and the family of *procreation* (one which is created after marriage).

It can thus be asserted that the *Bhagavad Gita*, the Hindu epics, the Dharma-shastras, the Buddhist and Jain texts, and even the Puranas (which are widely referred to as "the Veda of the common people") have furnished a comprehensive range of materials that are collectively encyclopaedic in scope. However, it was the tenets of the *Gita* that greatly influenced Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), the modern reformer of Vedanta philosophy.

By nature, Vivekananda was a follower of the path of knowledge, with a strong belief in Advaita Vedanta since his early years. He was the chief disciple and apostle of Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1836–1886) and his affinity for Vedanta was combined with a burning love for and urge to serve humanity – something that he strived for all his life. He was a prince of knowledge and selfless service, exactly as Krishna wanted Arjuna to be (as found in the *Gita*). As such, the exegesis of Ramakrishna as "modern day Krishna" with his teachings "*Shiva jnane jeeva seva*" (service to all creatures as God) and "*Jato mat tato path*" (different opinions are different paths to the same goal) cannot be entirely denied. Vivekananda, on the other hand, has been thought of as a "modern day Arjuna", although he went far beyond the image alluded for him and became more like a personification of the teachings of the *Gita*.

Going backwards in time, one can find Raghunandana, a social theorist of North India of the 16th century, who was a fellow devotee of Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (1485–1533). Raghunandana exercised an all-round influence on society, disseminating the principles espoused by his Guru. He later became an inspiration to Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1773–1833), one of the most seminal figures in the development of modern social sciences in India. Roy's Brahmo Samaj was largely interwoven with the tenets of Hinduism. He used this platform to fight against er-

ror, falsehood and credulous naïveté. He stood for rationality against blind superstition, logic against blind faith and science against dogma. He questioned the very validity of every (unprogressive) institution in the Hindu social structure, and instead advocated the adoption of new Western knowledge, if India was to secure a place in the community of modern nations. Ram Mohan also established the *Atmiya sabha* (Society of Friends), a forum for free discussions and exchange of ideas on religious, political and social issues. In his sociology of religion, he asserted his progressive ideas in opposition to Christian missionary ones and virtually laid the foundation for a comparative method in the study of social behaviour and practices. Caste with its structures and strictures was questioned by him, whereby he surmised that the caste system had no sanctions in the Shastras (religious texts), and that achievement instead of ascription should be used to gauge the inferiority or the superiority of men. By attempting to reform and modernize what he perceived to be a credulous and dogma-stricken Indian society, Ram Mohan Roy heralded a functionalist and pragmatic approach to the concept of religion – a pursuit incipiently associated with the eminent French sociologist David Émile Durkheim.

Apart from the efforts of Vivekananda, Ram Mohan Roy and others, the process of evangelization deserves a special mention too; the advent of the evangelical Christian missionaries was also an important phenomenon in the social life of India. During the period from 1793 to 1833, many missionary societies were active in Bengal, for example the Baptist Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, The Church of Scotland, the British and Foreign Bible Society among others. All of these played a significant role in spreading and advocating reforms of Hindu society. However, it was the Dharma Sabha in Calcutta (now Kolkata), which by 1830 stood as a strict defence force of traditional Hindu patterns of life and living, that vindicated what was perceived as the characteristic "essence" of customary Indian society.

All this suggests that the field of sociology of Hindu religion is not uncharted by Indian intellectuals. But the only lacuna remains in its *faux pas* of not being presented in an organized, systematic manner. The time has come to work on this trajectory with a new kind of consciousness and methodical commitment. The need of the hour rests in the folds of Indian society, which needs to expand its horizons about the epistemological, ontological, and methodological study of religion, thus enriching the subject in all of its dimensions.[1]

NOTE

1   The following sources have been consulted for this chapter: Anil Chandra
    Ghosh and Jagadish Chandra Ghosh: *Srimad Bhagavad Gita* (big edition)
    (Kolkata, 2014); Jayadayal Goyandka: *Tattva vivechani, Srimad Bhagavad
    Gita* (Gorakhpur, 2012); Benoy Kumar Sarkar: *The Positive Background of
    Hindu Sociology: Introduction to Hindu Positivism* (Kolkata, 1985); Swami
    Jagadishwar Ananda: *Srimad Bhagavad Gita* (in Bengali) (Kolkata, 2013);
    Swami Vivekananda: *Bhagavad Gita as Viewed by Swami Vivekananda* (Kol-
    kata, 2009) and *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, Vol. 1, 3, 9
    (Kolkata, 1947).

Rajani Ranjan Jha

OMBUDSMAN IN
A NON-WESTERN CONTEXT

A Study of India's Federal Ombudsman Enactment

The Ombudsman institution has been closely associated with democracy, democratic development, governance and public administration. It is viewed as an easy mechanism of grievance redressal in the hands of common people against the power, discretion of the government and the bureaucracy that operationalize them. With the adoption of welfare philosophy by many countries in the post World War II period, governments took upon themselves the burden of taking care of the citizenry. It increased the functions of governments, which led to increase in numerous types of citizens' grievances against the government and its functionaries. In the words of Bernard Frank, they range from simple clerical error to oppression such as: injustice, failure to carry out legislative intent, unreasonable delay, administrative error, abuse of discretion, lack of courtesy, clerical error, oppression, oversight, negligence, inadequate investigation, unfair policy, partiality, failure to communicate, rudeness, maladministration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, arrogance, inefficiency, violation of law or regulation, abuse of authority, discrimination, errors, mistakes, carelessness, disagreement with discretionary decisions, improper motivation, irrelevant consideration, inadequate or obscure explanation, to all other acts that are frequently inflicted upon the governed by those who govern, intentionally or unintentionally.[1]

OMBUDSMAN FOR THE COMMON MAN

In the above listed situation of grievances, redressal is often discriminatory. Justifying the need of the desirability of having an ombudsman

for England, Lord Shawcross rightly wrote in the preface to the Whyatt Report:

> the man of substance can deal with these situations. He is near to the establishment; he enjoys the status or possesses the influence which will ensure him the ear of those in authority. He can afford to pursue such legal remedies … as may be available. But too often the little man, the ordinary humble citizen, is incapable of asserting himself.[2]

In fact, it is the common man who is most in need of protection against such disadvantages. If left uncared, disregard of people's feelings may result into grievous consequences. Dissatisfaction may lead to alienation and finally may take the form of revolt against the system, which obviously no government wants. The governments, therefore, cannot afford to disregard the feelings of their citizens. It is, therefore, imperative for a civilized human society to set up stable, effective and trustworthy institutions to serve the people in various ways and in a timely manner.

OMBUDSMAN AGAINST INJUSTICES

It is not only the stability aspect of the system that should be taken into account in the state-citizen relationship but also other considerations emanating from the very application of democratic polity. In the democratic world of today the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is not a static phenomenon like the previous forms of governments, but a changing one.[3] Those who are in the capacity of governors today become governed tomorrow due to the very nature of democratic polity. Therefore, those who are the holders of power today must also be careful that official lapses, omissions, injustices if tolerated today may oppress them tomorrow when they will not be in power. The rulers and the ruled, thus, equally benefit from the mechanism(s) that corrects governmental mistakes and help prevent their recurrence.[4]

The main problem before the modern administrative system is how to provide the citizen with an institution within the democratic framework which enjoys his confidence and to which he can have easy access for the redress of his grievances. It was equally important that such a system should be cheap, easily accessible, quick, impartial, objective, independent and held in high esteem.

It is basically to meet this need that many countries in recent decades have adopted the institution of Ombudsman. The institution had its origin in the Swedish constitution of 1809, as an effective mechanism for handling the grievances of the public against administrative impropriety and insensitivity.[5] Appointed as an officer of Parliament, the Swedish Ombudsman was officially known as Justitio Ombudsman (Commissioner of Justice). Later, it was adopted by many countries and in recent years more and more countries are opting for this institution on their own, also because it has been recommended by international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank etc. as a means of ensuring good governance and better service delivery to the citizens. However, to go back to the roots, the word Ombud is a Swedish word which refers to a person who acts as a spokesman or representative of another person.[6] In Swedish public law, however, Ombudsman means an appointee of the Parliament of Sweden for the supervision of the administration. In Norway and Denmark it generally means a person who has a public duty imposed on him/her which he/she must discharge. The English translation for Ombudsman is Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration – a term used for the Ombudsman in England. But, it is in the Swedish sense that the word Ombudsman is generally used and understood all over the globe. In the United States the term has been somewhat loosely used and any complaint handling mechanism has been given the name of Ombudsman. As a result, one finds Ombudsman institutions functioning both at public and private levels in the United States such as Ombudsman for Navy, Consumer Protection, Local Government, Business, Environment Protection etc.[7] This trend got more currency in the development of the Ombudsman institution in other parts of the world in later years.

WHAT IS AN OMBUDSMAN?

The unrestricted use of the term "Ombudsman" posed the possibility of the very idea behind the establishment of this institution getting diluted or lost. This concern was seriously taken note of by many persons/scholars intimately associated with the development of the Ombudsman system. Prominent among such persons have been Professor Donald C. Rowat of Carleton University, Ottawa and Bernard Frank, Former Chairman of the International Ombudsman Institute. Rowat has rightly cautioned that if the unrestricted use of the term "Ombudsman"

was allowed to continue because of its growing popularity, "the Ombudsman idea may become its worst enemy".[8] Efforts were thereafter initiated to define the term "Ombudsman". The committee of the International Bar Association resolved in 1974 that the term "Ombudsman" should mean only grievance handling mechanism and defined it as

> an office provided for by the constitution or by action of the legislature or parliament and headed by an independent, high-level public official who is responsible to the legislature or parliament, who receives complaints from aggrieved persons against government agencies, officials, and employees or who acts on his own motion, and who has the power to investigate, recommend corrective action, and issue reports.[9]

Later, Gerald E. Caiden et al. in the *International Handbook of the Ombudsman,* Vol I. *Evolution and Present Function*, (1983) defined "Ombudsman" broadly as:

> The Ombudsman is an independent and non-partisan officer (or committee of officers …) often provided for in the Constitution, who supervises the administration. He deals with specific complaints from the public against administrative injustice and maladministration. He has the power to investigate, report upon, and make recommendations about individual cases and administrative procedures.
>
> He is not a judge or a tribunal, and he has no power to make orders or to reverse administrative action. He seeks solution to problems by a process of investigation and conciliation. His authority and influence derive from the fact he is appointed by and reports to one of the principal organs of state, usually either the parliament or the chief executive. [10]

On the basis of the above definitions key elements and salient features of the Ombudsman system can be understood and will be presented below.

KEY ELEMENTS AND SALIENT FEATURES

Ombudsman is a high public official appointed by either the Parliament or the Chief Executive. The office of the Ombudsman is provided for in the constitution of the country concerned or it is the result of the legislation passed by the national Parliament or state legislature, as the case may be. His status is kept at a higher level usually equivalent to the

Chief Justice of the highest court of the country. As a high public official his security of tenure is guaranteed. He cannot be easily removed from his office. Normally, the removal is done by the legislature after determination of a cause supported by two-thirds majority of the House.

A person appointed as the Ombudsman is generally a non-controversial person who by his own merit commands public confidence and is held in high esteem. The success of the Ombudsman institution largely depends upon the personal qualities and public image of the incumbent.

Extended Arm of Legislature

Ever since its origin in Sweden the office has been so closely associated with the legislature that it has been called the "extended arm of legislature." Not only the Ombudsman is appointed for supervising and controlling the administration but also for protecting the rights of the citizens. The Ombudsman gets his/her strength from the legislature. He is the representative of the people's representative. In this sense, he may be said to represent the democratic element in society. In many countries during the appointment of the Ombudsman the Leader of the Opposition is also consulted. This process of consulting the opposition lends credence to the Ombudsman as it emerges from the choice of both the government and the opposition. His annual report, which the Ombudsman is obliged to present, is placed on the table of the House and may occasion debate and discussion. Some countries have the provision of Select Committees of the House on Ombudsman to coordinate the activities of the Ombudsman. Thus, everywhere there is a close linkage between the Ombudsman and the Parliament/Legislature.

Independence

Even though an appointee of Parliament, the Ombudsman is totally independent from it. That the Ombudsman is independent from the Executive administration hardly needs any reiteration. In fact, one may put it as such that the most striking element of the office of the Ombudsman is its independence. The very appropriate remark of Bernard Frank that "the Ombudsman must be free from any control by any other officer and, if he is subject to supervision, then whatever he may be he is not an Ombudsman" beautifully brings out the seminal importance of independence in the whole concept and operationalization of the Ombudsman system. Additionally, the Ombudsman should not only be independent in terms of legal position of his office but he must

also appear to be so to the general people. The people in general should have confidence in the independence of the Ombudsman.[11]

Objectivity and Impartiality

The whole idea of Ombudsmanship is based on the principle of impartial investigation by an office which is not a part of the administration and who has no interest in being protective of any act and omission or commission on the part of the administrative functionaries. The Ombudsman office is in fact based on the premise that an objective, impartial investigation from an outside independent agency who is not involved in decision making will not only bring out the objective state of affairs but will lead to the improvement of public administration. For the Ombudsman, therefore, to operate with objectivity and fairness is very important.

Easy Accessibility

An Ombudsman is a grievance redressal body against the functioning of the complex, dingy, serpentine corridors of bureaucracy and government. Therefore, the Ombudsman must be easily accessible by the general public especially the poor, marginalized, disadvantaged sections of society, who are most in need of his help. Approaching the Ombudsman is not only easy but inexpensive as well so that anybody can approach him. In most countries of the world the Ombudsman can be reached by personal visits, letter, phone (in many cases toll free numbers), fax and internet.

Power to get Information

Ombudsman is empowered to call for information from any quarter and has the right to inspect all government documents and files excepting those relating to national security. Even in the case of papers relating to national security the British system introduced an ingenious provision under which the Ombudsman himself can see all documents but shall not disclose any matter whose disclosure may be dangerous to the safety of the state.[12]

Suo Moto Power

The Ombudsman, unlike the court and many such institutions, has the authority to act on his own motion or initiate investigation without

any reference from any complainant. He may start investigation on the basis of newspaper reports, radio, television etc. But this special power is not available to some Ombudsmen such as those instituted by the British and the French.

Ombudsman and Court of Law

One very clear thing is that the Ombudsman is different from a court of law. No counsels are required before the Ombudsman, plus the procedure of approaching the Ombudsman is user-friendly, simple, easy, and available virtually at no cost to the complainant. Unlike the court it is quick, non-taxing and free from botheration. Many matters of maladministration, which cannot be raised before a court of law are the favorite areas of the functioning of the Ombudsman. Once a complaint is filed before Ombudsman he, in fact, is the moving spirit. That the Ombudsman is different from a court of law must be clear to the general public especially in those developing societies that have a colonial past. People fight shy of or are afraid of approaching a court of law because of their not-so-happy experiences or bad reputation of the functioning of courts during colonial rule.

Ombudsman for the Public Sector

In its classical sense, the Ombudsman's activities are related only to the public sector. The Ombudsman has the authority to receive complaints against the functioning of government departments and agencies and to thoroughly investigate them. On finding a wrong done to the complainant he also has the authority not only to criticize the agency involved but also to suggest corrective action so that the grievance of the complainant is redressed.

Ombudsman as a Mediator

Finding fault with the agency complained against is not the main role of the Ombudsman. His job sometimes is also to find a solution for the already harassed complainant in cooperation with the bureaucracy. For effectively playing this role of a mediator between the problems of the complainant and the bureaucracy, what is required on the part of the Ombudsman is the social capital of confidence building among the bureaucrats regarding his intention and role of improving public services and not being an agency moving about to punish the erring officials.

Recommendatory Institution

The institution of Ombudsman is a recommending body. It does not have any enforcement and binding power of executing its decisions except in the two Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Finland. His power in most other countries is only of persuasion, mediation and conciliation that makes him more acceptable to the administration. In this context Guy Powles rightly says: "to give him such (enforcement power) would be to depart from the peculiar and valuable characteristics of this institution".[13]

Independent of Government

The Ombudsman is not a part of the governmental machinery and is independent of its creators – the Executive and the Legislature. His is a high powered office, which humanizes the concept of administration by looking into the grievances of the ordinary people free of cost, objectively and quickly. He, thus, creates confidence among the common man in the government and administration. He functions as the ray of hope for those who have been otherwise harassed and exhausted at the hands of a faceless bureaucracy.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

Some scholars have tried to trace the origin of Ombudsman in ancient civilizations such as in the medieval periods etc. but as a watchdog of public administration in the modern age it definitely traces its origin to the Swedish Constitution of 1809. After Sweden, Finland established its Ombudsman office in 1919.

Danish Ombudsman: Distinctiveness Begins

It was, however, with the establishment of the Ombudsman office in Denmark (1955) that the real spread and uniqueness of the Ombudsman system started taking shape. The Danish model was distinct from the Swedish one at least on three accounts. Firstly, whereas the Swedish Ombudsman was a prosecutor of erring civil servants, the Danish one was an investigator of maladministration. Secondly, the Danish Ombudsman's report was in the nature of a recommendation, whereas the Swedish one formed the basis of legal action against erring officials including the courts. Thirdly, whereas the Danish model apart from redressal of individual grievances provided guidance for administrative

improvement, the Swedish model was based on the punishment of the individual concerned.[14] This, in the opinion of Jan-Erik Lane substantially transformed the role of the Ombudsman from a disciplinary body to an institution exercising influence. The Norwegian Ombudsman (1962) was more or less based on the Danish model. Till now, the Ombudsman was confined to the Scandinavian soil.

New Zealand's Ombudsman: Inspires Many

In 1962 New Zealand, a Commonwealth country, adopted the office of Ombudsman known as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Out of the two terminologies, The Parliamentary Commissioner and Ombudsman, the public more frequently used and recognized the office as Ombudsman.[15] The New Zealander model of Ombudsman influenced the Australian, Indian (first established in 1971 at provincial level) and Pakistani Ombudsman system.

Today no continent is bereft of the office of the Ombudsman. Different countries and continents have opted for different models of the Ombudsman system but some of the main elements remain the same. We have Ombudsman in the form of commission in many countries, there are also Ombudsmen for human rights and supra national Ombudsmen such as the European Ombudsman. We have also an Ombudsman in international bodies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Health Organization.

The foregoing description suggests that the presence of an Ombudsman has a prophylactic effect on administration because it humanizes the concept of administration. It stands for fairness, objectivity and accountability in administration. The Ombudsman serves as the hope of the poor man to get justice and fair treatment easily and virtually at no cost. But the Ombudsman has no enforcement power. He has the strength of persuasion, conciliation, mediation, and his own transparency and integrity. The Ombudsman enjoys the trust of the complainant and also of the person complained against. If he does not, the Ombudsman's authority will be eroded and credibility damaged.

With this background, the chapter in the following pages describes how and why in the non-Western context of India the enactment of the federal Ombudsman legislation was not only inordinately delayed, but required special efforts on the part of a 82 year old Gandhian: Anna Hazare.

India became independent in August 1947. Increasing corruption in Indian public life attracted occasional public attention during the early 1950s. It was, however, in 1959 that the then Chairman of the University Grants Commission and a former Finance Minister of India, C. D. Deshmukh, speaking at a public meeting in Madras raised the issue of high level corruption in India and called for the establishment of a high-level, impartial, standing judicial tribunal to investigate and report on complaints, and added that if such a tribunal were set up "I shall be happy to make a beginning by lodging half a dozen reports myself".[16] The confirmation that corruption in public life was increasing came from one of the Congress Presidents who is reported to have said that congressmen who were paupers before Independence had become millionaires.[17] Hurling of charges against some of the Ministers of the Government of India became almost a daily affair and ad hoc enquiries had to be instituted in one or two cases. Apparently, it looked impossible to any longer brush off the demands for some kind of high level permanent enquiring body.[18]

At about the same time as the atmosphere in Indian political life was surcharged with talks of corruption against Ministers and some of the top ranking civil servants, a report by the Justice, the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, was published in Britain containing a strong case for the Ombudsman institution. This had an impact in India because through the report the interest in the institution of Ombudsman was aroused.[19] Probably, however, there were other reasons as well. The demand for an Ombudsman was born of a sincere desire to improve the standard of Indian administration by providing an institution where people could freely register their grievances against malfunctionings of the administrative apparatus. Significantly, no such office had so far been created in the country. Moreover, the demand could also stem from the desire to be on par with the contemporary standards of combating corruption and maladministration.[20] The Ombudsman idea now started gaining favor from many quarters in India. In fact, various institutions, committees, commissions, organizations, scholars, eminent jurists and people from various walks of life started recommending the institution.

The question of having an Ombudsman for India was for the first time raised in Parliament on April 3, 1963 by L. M. Singhvi, an eminent jurist, while participating in a debate in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) on demands for Grants of the Ministry of Law.[21] The then Law Minister A. K. Sen while giving a non-committal reply to Singhvi's proposal,

underlined all the same the importance of making a serious study as to how the institution of Ombudsman could effectively work in the federal set up of India.[22]

The H.C. Mathur Committee, constituted by the State Government of Rajasthan to suggest administrative reforms, in its report in September 1963 recommended the appointment of an Ombudsman, or a Commissioner to enquire into complaints against high officials, including Ministers of the State. [23] Sometime later while addressing the All India Congress Committee at Jaipur on November 3, 1963 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that he was seized seriously by the problem of combating corruption in administration. What he said then is important to be mentioned in the present context. He stated that the office of the Ombudsman fascinated him since the office had the overall authority to deal with charges even against the Prime Minister and commanded everyone's respect and confidence. Nevertheless, he felt that in a big country such as India the system might not provide the right solution.[24] It appears that this remark by Nehru dampened the interest of the Union Government for the Ombudsman institution for the time being.

Meanwhile a Parliamentary Committee on the Prevention of Corruption headed by K. Santhanam was constituted in 1962 "to review the problem of corruption and make suggestions".[25] On the recommendations of this committee submitted in March 1964, the Government of India established the Office of the Vigilance Commissioner at the Central level to deal expeditiously with cases of corruption in Central and All India Services. However, this office was not empowered to deal with cases of corruption against public men, i.e. persons belonging to the political class. Pressure was also mounting on the Government inside the Parliament for establishing in India an office analogous to the Ombudsman. It is learnt that by April 1965 there was almost unanimity in the Lok Sabha regarding the desirability of such institution in India.[26] Yet no action was taken. Later, the high powered Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) under the chairmanship of Morarji Desai constituted by the Government of India recommended the appointment of two special authorities designated as the Lokpal and the Lokayukta to look into cases of grievances and corruption against public men and public servants in India.[27] A draft bill – The Lokpal Bill (1966) was submitted by the Chairman of the Commission on October 20, 1966 for the consideration of the Government.[28] The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill (1968) based mainly on the pattern suggested by the ARC was introduced in the Parliament, but could not be passed due to a split in the ruling Congress Party and the subsequent dissolution of the House. In its final report also the ARC in 1970 again emphasized the need of

setting up these offices. The Government of India accepted the recommendations, and the bill that was passed by the previous Lok Sabha was reintroduced in the fifth Lok Sabha with an identical title, i.e. "Lokpal and Lokayuktas, Bill 1971" on August 11, 1971. This Bill was not passed even though the Government had a massive majority in Parliament. The Government could find time to pass other laws and even substantive amendments to the Constitution (the 42nd Amendment), but could not manage to pass this much publicized and long awaited Bill, which lapsed again with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in January 1977. It is worthwhile to remember that it was during the period of this Lok Sabha that Jayaprakash Narayan started his mass movement on the issue of corruption in the country which led to the imposition of internal emergency in the country in June 1975 and finally the defeat of the ruling Congress party in the Parliamentary elections in 1977.

In his first broadcast to the nation after the formation of the first non-Congress Central Ministry in 1977, which largely accepted him as its mentor, Jayprakash Narayan said that his first expectation from the Government was that it would enact the Lokpal Bill to eradicate corruption from public life.[29] But this bill was also not passed.

Political Class and Lokpal Legislation

It is important to note that, whereas the Ombudsman institution has developed in most of the Western democracies primarily as a grievance redressal mechanism, in the Indian context it was viewed from the very beginning as a corruption fighting agency. The very idea that the Lokpal would be a check not only on high level ministerial and bureaucratic corruption but also on what is termed as "ministerial autonomy" and discretion used many times by the holders of power without any valid ground turned almost the entire political class as enemy no. 1 of the Lokpal project. The inclusion of Members of Parliament within the jurisdiction of Lokpal made the passage of the Bill very difficult as later events showed. Otherwise, how can one explain the non-enactment of a series of the Lokpal Bills introduced in Parliament in 1968, 1971, 1977, 1985, 1989, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2011 – a period during which different political parties formed the government at federal level?[30]

When the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government under Dr. Manmohan Singh came to power in 2004 the Prime Minister had strongly supported the idea of establishing a Lokpal institution which could look into cases of corruption even against the Prime Minister. But no action was taken during the entire period of UPA I (2004-09) in this direction.

UPA II and the Challenges of Corruption

The UPA II Government came to power again under Manmohan Singh in 2009. After some time, corruption emerged as the major cause of public anger and frustration involving politicians, civil servants and law enforcement agencies. Why does corruption bother both the common man and the sensible people of India? Put briefly, because it is anti-developmental. It not only blocks the channels of service delivery but it compromises the quality of service delivery also, it causes huge loss to the public exchequer, creates an unfavorable climate for foreign investors and increases the cost of government subsidized services. It works against the poor because most of the cases of prevalence of corruption are noticed in areas related to such programs, which are meant for improving the lot of the poor and the marginalized sections of society e.g. programs relating to poverty alleviation such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS), removing illiteracy (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan), improving public health (National Rural Health Mission) etc. Welfare programs in tribal areas are the worst affected. The situation has much worsened since late Rajiv Gandhi's often quoted remark made some 30 years ago that out of 100 only 15 paisa reached the beneficiary. The nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and criminals, which the Vohra Committee had deeply studied and reflected upon, have truly started parallel governments in many parts of our country. Corruption makes our system porous and weakens our efforts towards national integration and compromises our fight against international terrorism. It weakens our democracy by slowing down the pace of economic development and the fruits of development, which do not reach the poor, thus creating a distrust in the very apparatus and institutions of democracy. People are losing faith in democracy and a significant number of people resort to extra-constitutional means in the form of the spreading wings of Naxalism and Maoism in many parts of the country. In short, no area of our public life is unaffected by corruption.

Many studies undertaken by the World Bank and others have shown how much ordinary Indians have to pay as a bribe in order to get day to day public services, which are their entitlement. This hampers the growth to full potential of the Indian economy in the competitive world of globalized economy.

During the UPA II regime many scams like the 2G Spectrum scam (2008), Commonwealth Games scam (2010), Adarsh Society scam (2012), Chopper scam (2012), Tatra truck scam (2012) and Coalgate scam (2012) etc. had surfaced and there was no visible end in sight.[31]

The Government appeared to have moved into an indecision mode. The onset of the process of globalization which was euphorically depicted as the rising ambition of the middle class after 2008 turned into "transition to an age of anxiety". [32] Added to it was a change in the nature of the Indian State from a welfare state to a minimalist facilitator state. The number of middle class population has considerably increased and it is roughly estimated to 400 million. The vision of a shining India captured their imagination. Many among the young had grown up in the globalization phase of the Indian economy and their vision and expectation from the government was determined by the vision of a corruption-free, clean, smart, functional and accountable political system. The reality on the ground, however, was almost the opposite. Corruption was going on unbridled giving the signal that the institutional arrangements of dealing with corruption had not only failed, but there was no answer in sight to this malady afflicting Indian society and polity. People in general had lost faith in the investigation carried out by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) – the main investigating wing of the Central Government. The "ethical deficit" of the government and governance had multiplied. Despite occasional rhetoric, the political class was not interested in tackling corruption. This was the general impression. The belief was gaining ground that the hydra-headed monster of corruption could not be tamed through the institutional arrangements then in place.

Anna Movement for Lokpal

It was with this background of desperation among the general public on the issue of corruption that Kishan Baburao Hazare, better known as Anna Hazare, announced his decision to undertake a fast till death for instituting what he and his team termed "Jan Lokpal" (People's Ombudsman). The idea was to pressure and force the Central Government to institute the strong Lokpal institution that had remained elusive for more than five decades.

Government after Government since the early 1960s, as stated earlier, had failed to take any concrete action against corruption and institute the office of the Ombudsman. Anna Hazare had retired from the army after miraculously surviving an attack during the India-Pakistan war of 1965, and had settled in his village Ralegaon Siddhi in the district of Ahmed Nagar in Maharashtra. He started living an ascetic life in a temple outside the village, which he renovated out of his own pension savings and inaugurated welfare schemes for the villagers. Very soon, Anna became a synonym for public spiritedness, honesty, simplicity and self-sacrifice for the good of the community. Anna not only developed

his village as a model village, but also started new projects related to forestry, water conservation etc., which became a model of implementation in other villages for the Maharashtrian government. Clad in spotless white *dhoti*, *kurta* and Gandhi cap, writes Mukul Sharma, Anna Hazare evokes an image of reverence and respect "characterized by culture, tradition and religion, including much persuasion and notably some coercion".[33] When Anna announced that he would spearhead the movement against corruption for the institution of Lokpal, he had behind the well-known background of a person with a clean image, who had vowed "to dedicate his life in the service of the humanity", with no personal involvement in politics and no family. He had first engaged the Maharashtrian government on the issue of corruption by launching *Bhrastachar Virodhi Jan Andolan* (The People's Movement against Corruption) in 1991. In 2005 six Cabinet Ministers of the Nationalist Congress Party resigned after an eight day hunger strike by Hazare.[34] People saw in him some glimpses of Gandhi and one of his oft quoted remarks was "as long as there is life in my body, I will keep protesting". As a result, when Anna started his movement he became, to quote Tushar Gandhi: "an icon of the desperation being felt by the people in India". No wonder the political class became nervous, squirming.[35]

Team Anna and its Methodology

The Ombudsman movement of Anna Hazare was supported by an eminent group of distinguished, highly motivated and well known citizens, who had made their name and fame in various fields of activities and had now joined hands with Anna as they considered it a call of the nation. This group included Arvind Kejriwal, who had a technical engineering background and a reputation for having quitted government service for the service of the common man, he is a Ramon Magsaysay Awardee for courageous service to the people and now Chief Minister of Delhi; another Magsaysay Awardee supporting Anna was Aruna Roy, a social activist and founder of the Mazdoor Kishan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), who contributed significantly to the passing of India's Right to Information law; K. S. Hegde, former Supreme Court Judge and Lokayukta (State level Ombudsman) of Karnataka, known for his tough stand against corruption; Shanti Bhushan and Prashant Bhushanand, a duo-team of lawyers, father and son; Kiran Bedi, a retired Indian Police officer: all lended active support to Anna's movement and the Ombudsman movement. This inspired the young middle class and others throughout the country to also lend their support to the movement.

Beside the traditional methods of sit-in non-violent *dharna* and candle light marches carried out in many parts of the country, the organizers of the movement also freely employed modern gadgets and social media such as Twitter, Facebook, websites, which are frequently used by educated young people of today's India. The media's support for the movement was truly 24/7. Anna's fast until death movement for Ombudsman was constantly advertised to the public through electronic media. The press also extensively covered the movement.

Supporters of the Movement

The Anna Hazare Movement was said to have attracted only the educated urban middle class, who were aspiring for a shining India, an India of 2020 APJ Abdul Kalam's vision; an India in which corruption was a thing of the past and the political class was held in check by overseeing mechanisms such as the Lokpal. However, the "democratic element" of the movement, Mohanty points out, "caught the imagination of a vast number of common people who not only were present in Delhi's Ramlila Maidan but also thronged solidarity rallies in big and small towns all over India."[36]

Concluding Observations

Initially when Anna Hazare started his movement he did not have the support of major political parties. The Government and political parties in Parliament saw it as a fight between the people and the authority of the Parliament. But when they understood the size of the "massive popular will" supporting Anna's initiative, the Government and political parties in Parliament had a second thought. Anna was raising an issue, which had been the demand of the nation for the past five decades but the political parties had simply refused to formulate it into an effective law. In this context, the movement's demand that in a liberal representative democracy, the ultimate sovereign – the people or a group of people – has the right to mobilize public opinion and place its views directly before the Government/Parliament for policy formation, caught the imagination of the people. His emphasis on the power of the people was remarkably important as the same message was echoed by Jayaprakash Narayan during his movement in 1974-76, which led to the routing of the Congress Party in the parliamentary elections in 1977. In this case also, Parliamentary elections were close. In a state of almost nervousness the Government took the "unusual step" of inviting Anna's representatives for talks on the nature and modalities of

the Lokpal Bill – a procedure that perhaps happened for the first time in the Parliamentary history of independent India. Pranab Mukherjee (now the President of India) was entrusted by the Prime Minister to head a group of Ministers to negotiate with the anti-corruption campaigner. A "sense of the House Motion" was also moved by Pranab Mukherjee reflecting the desire of the nation and the House in favor of the Ombudsman institution. Finally, the Lokpal Bill (2013) – though not entirely to the satisfaction of Anna and his team – was passed by the Parliament and became the Act I of 2014 after getting the assent of the President of India.

The thrust of the movement was to use the institutional tools of democracy and force the government into acting in accordance with the will of the people.[37] It was the first time in independent India that a movement forced the Government to pass a legislation, in this instance for instituting the Office of the Lokpal. This showed that social movements cannot be brushed away, if they have the support of the masses. This movement in fact opened a new dimension of democratic life in India, "which we shall have to address"[38] remarked Pranab Mukherjee in his capacity as President of India, while delivering the Intelligence Bureau Endowment Lecture in Mumbai on December 19, 2013.

NOTES

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20 Rajeev Dhawan: "Engrafting the Ombudsman Idea on a Parliamentary Democracy: A Comment on the Lokpal Bill", *Journal of the Indian Law Institute* (New Delhi, July – September1977) Vol. 19, No. 3, 262.

21 *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. XVI, 3 April 1963, cc 7556-58 and 1789–93.

22 Ibid., cc 7592–93. Also *see Public Administration* (Kanpur, May 1963), Vol., 1, No. 5, 1.

23 See the *Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee (*Jaipur, 1963).

24 See *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi, November 4, 1963).

25 *Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption* (New Delhi, 1964), 7.

26 See L.M. Singhvi's Preface to M.P. Jain: *Lokpal: Ombudsman in India* (New Delhi, 1970), xi.

27 The Federal level Ombudsman was designated as the *Lokpal*, meaning People's Commissioner. The *Lokayukta* meant People's Procurator.

28 See *Annexure of the Interim Report of the Administrative Reforms Commission on Problems of Redress of Citizens' Grievances* (New Delhi, 1967), 26–34.

29 See *The Hindu* (Madras, April 14, 1977). Earlier in his broadcast to the nation of April 4, 1977, Morarji Desai, the Prime Minister, had also promised to establish such a machinery to probe charges of corruption.

30 The periods for Indian governments formed at federal level have been: Congress 1947-1977; Janata Party 1977–79; Congress (I) 1980–89; Janata Dal led Democratic Front 1989–91; Congress (I) 1991–1996; Janata Dal led United Front 1996-1998; National Democratic Alliance 1998-2004; United Progressive Alliance 2004–2014 and National Democratic Alliance since 2014.

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Rana P. B. Singh & Pravin S. Rana

HERITAGESCAPES OF INDIA

Contemporary Scenario and Programmes for Conservation

A country with a 5000-year old history in continuity and contrasts,
a civilization united by its diversities and distinctiveness, keeping
live experiences of the richness of culture/s, the glory of the past, the
turbulences and triumphs, nevertheless keeping all together leading
the march in the cybernetic sphere, while preserving the landmarks of
each era, the achievements of each age, the legacy of the regime – all
those tied together in its vast geography that was created, re-created,
maintained, continued and passed on from one generation to another
on the long passage of time – thus evolved India's heritagescapes.
  Anonymous

1. BACKGROUND: CONTEXT AND CONCERN

In the Indian tradition, heritage is called "*dharohara*", which is a combination of two words, i.e. *dharā* ("mother earth, Prithvi/Lord Vishnu who holds"), and *ihara* ("endeavour of identity through time"). The word also carries the meaning of "bearing" and "preserving" the surface of the earth. Prithvi is also called *dhara*, *dhri*, *dharti*, *dhrithri*, meaning that which holds everything.[1] This is a way to explain it, i.e. in terms of "root" ("*shrota*") and "identity" ("*asmitā*"). The word also signifies a framework of continuity, of interconnectedness and a personality of culture; in terms of space it combines microspace, site (*sthān*), extended space, habitat (*paryāvāsa*, extended as "*dwellingness*") and regional projection, territory (*parikshetra*), and ultimately the link to the terrestrial and the cosmos (*brahmānda*). Additionally, it also con-

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notes tangible, intangible and visual attributes. In other contexts the word "*dharohara*" also refers to a spatial-functional symbol that links "locality" and "universality", consisting of four hierarchically covering layers, viz. *sthān* (site), *parikshetra* (defined territory), *simānta* (border transition), and *brahmānda* (cosmos).

All in all the word "*dharohara*" thus connotes a wide and expanded frame, therefore it is better translated as "*heritagescapes*" (mostly in plural) and should be explained in the purview of "heritage ecology" in relation to "deep-spiritual geography".[2] It possesses the "spirit" of spirituality and interconnectedness that have roots in past given messages, existence in present experiences, and envisioning the future, what is called "*sanātana*" (Essenceness-Beingness-Becomingness) that in the passage of time and space represents eternity. This works in a unified totality for psychological well-being or for soul and spiritual healing.[3] It is to be noted that the Sanskrit word "*sanātana*" denotes that which always is and has neither beginning nor end, i.e. that which is eternal. This may be compared to the philosophy of sustainability that carries the seeds of "existence-maintenance-continuity" (*sandhrita* and/or *samposhita*).

The word "*dharohara*" is used differently in various regions of India and in contexts such as ascendancy, continuity of tradition, property rights, monuments, etc. It stands for *wholeness*, but also "holiness" (referring to sacred attachment and site of divine feeling).[4] However, one should keep in mind that in Indian thought lifeways have always been prescribed under the purview of *dharma*. Dharma denotes "the natural way" for all kinds of objects and realities. For example, the *dharma* of the wind is to blow, the *dharma* of water is to flow, the *dharma* of honey is sweetness, so the *dharma* of a human being is to save the *dharohara* and sustainably transfer it to the coming generations. This is *sanātana dharma* – the Eternal Natural Way of "existence-maintenance-continuity". In Eurocentric philosophy, however, such ideas are often projected and propagated as "static, despotic, and irrelevant to world history".[5]

2. SCALE OF THE UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE SITES AND THE INDIAN SCENARIO

Out of 1031 heritage sites in the world (as in September 2015; cf. Table 1), 32 heritage sites (Cultural 26, Natural 6) from India are included in the World Heritage List (cf. Table 2, Fig. 1). However, the Indian government has declared 150 places as national heritage sites on the basis of the criteria adopted by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI).

Table 1. UNESCO World Heritage Properties, September 2015.

Zone	Natural	Cultural	Mixed	Total	%	State Party represented
Africa	37	48	4	89	9	33
Arab States	4	73	2	79	8	18
Asia-Pacific	59	168	11	238	23	35
Europe & North America (including Israel, Russia)	61	420	10	491	48	50
Latin America & Caribbean	36	93	5	134	13	27
TOTAL	197	802	32	1031	100	163

Source: UNESCO WHL, 2015 updated.[6]

In India, the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the Indian National Trust for Art, Culture and Heritage (INTACH) and Indian Heritage Society (HIS) are the prime organisations responsible for protection, conservation and preservation of heritage sites. It is claimed that the ASI has not been maintaining traditional conservation practices and was exceeding its brief by setting up unnecessary structures, and that the comprehensive heritage environmental plan has not been taken into account.

In its projects, INTACH emphasises that India's living culture is being compromised somewhere on the way between India's historical continuity and India's acceptance of modernity. Planning strategies should therefore follow a middle path, maintaining the harmony of deeply implanted cultures while at the same time taking into account future urban development. The use of terms such as "area conservation", "heritage zoning" and "heritage ecology" reflect this approach.

Table 2. India: Heritage Properties as in the UNESCO World Heritage List, September 2015.

Se.	Category	No.	Heritage Properties (Year of inscription)

Cultural Heritage

Se.	Category	No.	Heritage Properties (Year of inscription)
1.	Forts, palaces, Tombs	7	Agra Fort (1983), Fatehpur Sikri (1986), Humayun's Tomb, Delhi (1993), Qutb Minar complex, Delhi (1993), Red Fort Complex (2007), Taj Mahal (1983), the Seven Hill Forts of Rajasthan (2013)
2.	Monuments	5	Hampi (1986), Mahabalipuram (1984), Pattadakal (1987), Khajuraho (1986), Rani ki Vav (The Queen's Stepwell) at Patan (2014)

3.	Caves, ancient murals	3	The Ajanta Caves (1983), The Elephanta Caves (1987), The Ellora Caves (1983)
4.	Buddhist monuments	2	Sanchi (1989), The Mahabodhi Temple Complex at Bodh Gaya (2002)
5.	Ancient temples	2	Great Chola Temples: Gangaikonda, Airateshvara, Brihadeshvara (1987), Sun Temple at Konârak (1984)
6.	Archaeological landscape	2	Champaner-Pavagarh Park (2004), Rock Shelters of Bhimbetka (2003)
7.	Mountain railways (counted as one group)	3	Darjeeling (1999), Nilgiri Mountain Railway (2005), Kalka-Shimla (2008)
8.	Churches	1	Churches and Convents in Goa (1986)
9.	British architecture	1	Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly Victoria Terminus) (2004)
	Total	26	

Natural Heritage Sites

1.	Natural parks	4	Kaziranga (1985), Keoladeo (1985), Nanda Devi and Valley of Flowers (1988), Sundarbans (1987)
2.	Sanctuaries	2	Manas Wildlife Sanctuary (1985), Great Himalayan National Park at Kulu, H.P. (2014)
	TOTAL	32	

Source: ASI Reports and other documents collected by the authors.[7]

3. india's hindu religious world heritage sites

Hinduism in India is simultaneously and inseparably cultural and religious, tangible and intangible, historical and present. As a result, Hindus in India possess colourful heritagescapes, a combination of mystical-religious sacredscapes and ancient monuments, all drawn from a variety of literature and traditions. The 2015 UNESCO World Heritage Sites lists 1031 properties, 32 of which are in India (cf. Table. 1). Eight of these 32 sites are associated with Hinduism and their main characteristics in terms of history, culture and relation to well-known deities are given in Table 3.

Table 3. India: WHL Hindu Religious Heritage Sites (8) and their Characteristics.

Se.	Name of WHS; year of inscription	Period, dynasty; major God	Main temples, and important monuments
1.	Chola temples; 3 main granite temples (1987, 2004)	Chola dynasty, 10th–11th centuries, king Rajendra I; Shiva	Brihadishvara, Gangaikondacholapuram, Darasuram, and Airavatesvara temple, Shiva as Kankal Murti, Peruvudaiyar Koyil.
2.	Hampi monuments and temple complexes (1986)	Vijayanagara empire, 14th–17th centuries; Rama, Krishna, Shiva, Vishnu	Hazara Rama Temple complex – stories from the Ramayana, Krishna Temple complex (by king Krishnadevaraya), Virupaksha complex, the Vittala Temple Complex (7th century)
3.	Mahabalipuram/ Mamallapuram; monolithic granite sculptures (1984)	Pallava-kings, ca 7th century; monolithic sculptures, the Ganga river, the five Pandavas (from the epic Mahabharata)	Sculptures of rock-cut caves, monolithic temples or five Rathas hewn out of a large boulder, bas-reliefs in the open air, and structural temples – five Pandavas (Yudishthira, Bhima, Arjuna, Nakula and Sahadeva), and wife Draupadi; the Shore temple (Shiva); Thirukadalmallai temple (Vishnu), Varaha rock-cut temple (Vishnu)
4.	Pattadakal (1987)	Chalukya dynasty, 7th–8th centuries; Shiva and Jain	9 Shiva Temples, and 1 Jain Temple; interfacing sculptures of North and South India; Shiva temples of Virupakha, Mallikarjuna, Kashivishwanatha, Sangameshvara, Chandrashekhara, Galaganatha, Kadasiddhesvara, Jambulingeswara and Kadasiddheshvara.
5.	Khajuraho; an area of 22 temples (1986)	Chandela dynasty, 9th–11th centuries; Shiva, Vishnu, Goddess,	Temples of Chaturbhuj (Vishnu), Devi Jagambi (Goddess), Duladeo (Shiva), Javari (Vishnu), Kandariya Mahadev (Shiva), Lakshmana (Shiva), Varaha (Vishnu)
6.	Sun temple, Konark (1984)	Ganga dynasty king Narasimhadeva I, 13th century; Sun god	Sun temple with huge chariot drawn by seven spirited horses on twelve pairs of exquisitely decorated wheels.
7.	Elephanta Caves (1987)	Chalukyas and Rashtrakutas, 5th–8th centuries; Shiva	Shiva in his various forms, Shiva-Parvati Ardhanarishvara (androgen)
8.	Kailahsanatha Temple, Ellora Caves (1983)	Rashtrakuta dynasty king Krishna I, 8th century; Shiva, also Buddhist and Jain images	The caves are world-known for rock-cut temples containing elaborate carvings on the walls; mount Kailasha and Shiva is a megalith carved out of one single rock.

Sources: compiled from ASI Reports, and other illustrating documents.

[8]

Fig. 1. India: Unesco World Heritage sites, September 2015.

Hindu religious World Heritage Sites may further be categorized, generally speaking, according to their association with major deities and their various representations or *avatars*. Consequently, though monistic/monotheistic, Hindu religion appears polytheistic. One god often dominates a sacred territory based on cosmic principles, and other auxiliary or associated gods have supporting functions. In fact, many Hindus focus on one "god" at the time according to what Max Müller termed "*kathenotheism*";[9] this is why Hindus are often viewed as *Panchadevapujaka* (simultaneous worshippers of five gods) since they sequentially worship the images of the archetypical five categorical divinities, i.e. Shiva (god of dissolution/re-creation), Surya (sun-god),

Ganesha (elephant-headed god), Devi (mother goddess), and Vishnu (god of sustenance and life) (cf. Table 3). Here follow a short description of these deities:

(i) *Shiva*, one key divinity of the Hindu pantheon, known as the cosmic dancer and god of dissolution-recreation. Five of the eight WHS are predominantly associated with Shiva. The image of three heads (*trimurti*, in Elephanta cave, no. 7) are said to represent three essential aspects of Shiva: creation, protection, and dissolution. The temple of Brihadishvara (Chola, at Thanjavur) is built on granite and sandstone slabs, and is surrounded by life-size images of eight deities protecting the temple; their placement conforms to axial and symmetrical rules of geometry. Virupakha (Hampi) symbolizes the god of progeny who controls the river Pampa/Tungabhadra. The nine Shiva temples at Pattadakal portrait various forms and narratives related to Shiva. Ardhanarishvara (Elephanta) represents the sublime form of Shiva, who controls the two forces of self and Nature, i.e. male (*purusha*) and female (*prakriti*). Shiva is also here represented as a cosmic dancer (*Nataraja*), the lord of yoga, and killer of a demon. The Kailasanatha Temple (Ellora) incorporates Mount Kailasha (his resort) and Shiva and is possibly the world's largest monolithic structure. It is carved out of one single basalt rock-cut with four parts, i.e. the body of the temple, the entrance gate, a Nandi (Shiva's carrier) shrine and a group of five shrines surrounding the courtyard.

(ii) *Shiva* and *Vishnu* (the god of sustenance) together or side-by-side is the other prevailing depiction in the religious WHS. The territory of Mahabalipuram displays both images, i.e. that of Shiva (Shore temple), and Vishnu-Varaha (the boar-form of Vishnu, the rock-cut temple, and the Thirukadalmallai temple). The giant open-air reliefs such as the famous "Descent of the Ganga", and other sculptures depicting stories from the *Mahabharata* (e.g. Pancha Rathas, the five chariots) show the close relationship between Shaivism and Vaishnavism in Hinduism. Similarly, the religious heritage buildings at Khajuraho represent a combination of three religious groups, viz. Shaivism, Vaishnavism and Shaktism (goddess worship). Of the twenty-two temples in Khajuraho seven are dedicated to Shiva, seven to Vishnu, four to Devi (the goddess), one to the Sun-god, and the remaining three to Jain Tirthankaras. Only Matangeshvara among these shrines is functionally active in terms of rituals and festivities. The location of these temples is linked to a perspective of cosmic geometry. According to tradition, in order to comprehend the deeper spiritual connections found in these temples it is required to have a strong understanding of how the human and the divine interact.[10]

(iii) *Surya*, the Sun-god, is represented in most Hindu temples as an auxiliary image. At Konark, however, there is a 13th century temple of Surya riding on a chariot with seven spirited horses and twelve pairs of exquisitely decorated wheels, representing the 7 days and 12 months, respectively. Since the images were removed long ago from the main temple, the sanctuary is no longer regarded as a holy place or a functional temple. In the northeast corner of the Konark compound a modern building houses the old doorway arch showing the planets of Hindu cosmology, i.e. Sun, Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in personified form. They are seated cross-legged on lotuses, each carrying in the left hand a water pot and in the right a rosary.[11]

(iv) *Vishnu*, god of sustenance, has also the form as Krishna. As patron deity, Vishnu is represented in four places on the WHS Tentative List. At Srirangapattanam, Vishnu is reclining on a snake bed with his two wives on one side, Sridevi (goddess of wealth) and Bhudevi (mother Earth), as well as Brahma ("the cosmic creator"). The surrounding shrines include images of Narsimha (a "Man-Lion" form), child Krishna, Srinivas, Hanuman (the "monkey deity") and Garuda (the "eagle-man" carrier of Vishnu). The temple complex of Ranganathasvamy at Srirangam is one of the largest religious complexes in the world and contains a large temple dedicated to Vishnu, representing his many forms such as Narsimha, Rama, Hayagriva, Krishna, and Dhanvantari. The sacred compound has 21 *gopurams* (towers), 39 pavilions, 50 shrines, the *Ayiram kaal mandapam* (a hall of 1000 pillars) and inside several small bodies of water. The 1000-pillars hall is made of granite with sculptures of riding horses and is unique among all Hindu religious shrines.

(v) *Goddess/Devi*. In most cases and in most religious heritage sites the female counterpart of the male deities is represented as the goddess or *devi*. The Swayambhu Alyam ("Mother Earth" or *Bhu-Devi*) temple related to Swayambhu Gudi and Rudreshvara (both, forms of Shiva) at Kakatiya contains unique depictions.

4. framing hriday and prasad

The Government of India's Ministry of Tourism and Culture and the Ministry of Urban Development are attempting to view the relationship between tourism and cultural development as complimentary. Both ministries want to preserve the ancient roots of heritage properties and the traditions of spirituality, sacrality and pilgrimage. As a result, two innovative national programs have emerged: (i) *Heritage city*

Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY), and (ii) *Pilgrimage Rejuvenation and Spiritual Augmentation Drive* (PRASAD). With these programs the ministries of Tourism and Culture as well as Urban Development collaborate to strengthen and promote heritage sites and centres of pilgrimage-tourism.[12]

(i) National mission of HRIDAY

The National mission on HRIDAY was launched on January 21, 2015 with the allocation of five billion rupees (circa 84 million USD) for the next 27 months. It aims at revitalising through conservation and preservation the distinct and unique characteristics of the *heritage cities*, and to maintain the continuity of their traditions of heritage (tangible, intangible, and cultural landscapes, including written, oral, and performed ones) to ensure that they will be used as a resource for sustainable development and ecological restoration. In a broad sense, it aims at bringing together urban planning, economic growth, and heritage conservation in an inclusive manner with the objective of restoring, reviving and strengthening the heart and heritage of the city. It is hoped that beautification, conservation, and sustainable development will grow in a more rational and sustainable way. Consequently, a holistic view of the site is being pursued in terms of its cleanliness, planning, the livelihood of its people and economy.[13] The major twelve sites selected at priority level include Varanasi, Amritsar, Warangal, Ajmer, Gaya, Mathura, Kanchipuram, Vellankini, Amaravati, Badami, Dwarka, and Puri. None of them are official religious WHS yet, and only eight are broadly associated with Hinduism; however, in their respective development plans the emphasis has not been laid on religious codes and symbolic meanings. This strategy may enhance universal values and encourage mass awakening for preserving and maintaining religious heritage sites, while making them more functional for the society and the environment.

Cultural heritage sites represent though in several cases a certain people's time-specific (both short and long term) understanding of the divine order and humankind's response. "Religious" from that point of view may refer to something scientific, recreational, aesthetic, economic and sacramental. The metaphorical meaning of "HRIDAY" (literally "*heart*") is a core concern that may reflect a holistic approach for the "inclusive-sustainable development of heritage-and-pilgrimage cities" in India, in which religion may also play an important role.

The protection, augmentation, management, authenticity and integrity of properties (both tangible and intangible) are also important

considerations, together with the above specific characteristics. In this context, three basic meanings for the understanding of heritage sites can be drawn:

- *political* – to assure responsibility for the decisions;
- *cultural* – to save culture rootedness and a sense of continuity; and
- *didactic* – to promote citizen participation.

These meanings can be broken down into six elemental *values*:

- *aesthetic*: the visual-iconographic beauty of the building, site, and so on;
- *spiritual*: the significance of the asset in providing understanding or enlightenment or in representing a particular religion or religious tradition;
- *social*: the role of the site in forming cultural identity or a sense of connection with others;
- *historical*: connections with the past;
- *symbolic*: objects or sites as repositories or conveyors of meaning, and
- *authenticity*: the uniqueness of visiting "the real thing".

(ii) The National mission of PRASAD

The National mission for "*Pilgrimage Rejuvenation and Spiritual Augmentation Drive*" (PRASAD) is included in the Union Budget 2014-2015, and proposed a one billion INR (circa 17 million USD) initiative. It aims at beautifying and improving the amenities and infrastructure at pilgrimage centres of all faiths. Under PRASAD, old historical-cultural pilgrimage routes and associated sites that have heritage repositories can be developed. However, no detailed plans for such pilgrimage-heritage cities have yet been made. Even in reference to Varanasi, where a good mass of detailed works on pilgrimage routes is already available, no plans have yet been formulated. We personally opine that Varanasi should be conceived as a model pilgrimage-heritage city, since it can record the continuity and popularity of at least fifty pilgrimage routes. These are well marked, mapped and supported with explanatory literature.

As in the case with HRIDAY, it is clear that interconnectivity and reciprocity between pilgrimage and tourism are integral to human travel. "Pilgrimage-tourism" is an expression that underscores an un-

derlying metaphysical and life philosophy defined in the deepest sense, in which the sacred-and-profane interact. Pilgrimage-tourism can then easily be seen as a strategy for heritage awakening and deeper experiences that transfer religiosity and enrich global humanism and spirituality. The sustainable frame of pilgrimage-tourism and heritage should be promoted in three ways: in philosophical, organisational, and managerial terms. The eco-healing approach to pilgrimage-tourism is a post-modernist path in which pilgrimage becomes a bridge between recreation and spirituality; this sort of pilgrimage-tourism may provide a rational alternative for promoting cultural consciousness, become a strategy for poverty alleviation but also help heritage preservation and facilitate the encounter with religion and spirituality.

UNESCO supports both PRASAD and HRIDAY since they complement UNESCO's work on heritage conservation and sustainable development. Clearly, a deep attachment is a pre-requisite for the awakening (of awareness) and action; once a person develops deep feeling (of love) to a place he/she will help caring for it. Realization and revelation are inseparable. As the "caring for the place (the *Earth*)" is inherent in pilgrimage-tourism, it provides opportunity to intimately sense and feel deeply for a place and its people – their behaviour, their heritage, and the present in which they live, act, and sustain their cherished tradition. People's appreciation for Religious Heritage Sites often only develops gradually given the prevalence and diffusion of the modern and the secular. Due to the nature of the secular state, in which religion is defined as personal, religion is not properly exposed and promoted, despite the fact that it so strongly controls people's life, their pilgrimages and many other related activities.

5. EPILOGUE: FROM PERSPECTIVE TO APPEAL

Cultural heritage sites related to religion are the true representatives of a perceived "divine order" and the human's deep involvement with faith. This is how they may be accepted as a religious "resource", but they have scientific, recreational, aesthetic, economic and sacramental values too. At a holy place one may get close to what one perceives as the ultimate good. Cultural heritage offers a rich source of environmental well-being in terms of human beings' deep attachment to their identity and support for continuity and existence. Carl Jung has already acknowledged spirituality as an integral aspect of human nature and a vital force in human life. To realise and reveal that vital force, one needs to preserve the religious resources of cultural heritage – i.e. the shape

of the spiritual landscape. Following Confucius' wisdom, Swan has established the idea of cosmic integrity: "Heaven directs things, the earth produces, and man co-operates to create success".[14]

For a religious heritage to become a resource for development first it needs to be documented, then protected, and finally utilized according to specific heritage guidelines and legislation. Only then, with an increased stakeholder awareness and participation, will policy efforts and interventions become sustainable – environmentally, socially, and culturally. We may separate ourselves from the web of our heritage in the pursuit of modernity and secularism, but it will always be at the cost of our hearts and souls.

A recently founded Global Hindu Heritage Foundation (GHHF) uses non-violent actions of mass awakening to preserve cultural heritage among Hindu communities around the world. This helps to conserve and preserve Hindu Religious Heritage Sites, contributing to Hindu heritage ecology in service of humanity through the ethics of integrating humanity with the ancient Hindu presence of "divinity".[15] The current emphasis on architectural preservation overlooks the dialectics between the tangible and intangible forms of heritage. As important as it is to preserve significant material remains from the past, the knowledge base and skills that produced them should be preserved as well in order to support a living heritage tradition.[16] Obviously

> with the ongoing integration of new forms of 'universal value', the *heritagescape* will continue to expand, complexifying participants' conceptualisations of their position with others in history and in the world – their very heritage – linking them with disparate times and places, and orienting them towards meaningful future activity.[17]

It is thus crucial to achieve that noble goal of making happy, friendly and good heritagescapes – incorporating *satyam, shivam, sundaram* (the truth, the good, the beautiful).

NOTES

1   See the *Sathapatha Brāhmana*, a Vedic text, dated circa 5th century BCE: 10.56.6; 10.59.25; 10.68.48.
2   Rana P. B. Singh: "Heritage Ecology and caring for the Earth: a search for preserving harmony and ethical values" in *National Geographical Journal of India*, 41 (June 2, 1995), 191–218, cf. 197.
3   Rana P. B. Singh: "Heritagescapes of India: Appraising heritage ecology" in

Singh, Rana P. B.: *Geographical Thoughts in India: Snapshots and Visions for the 21st Century* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2009), 351–393.

4 Rana P. B. Singh and Pravin S. Rana: "Heritagescapes of India: Appraising Heritage Ecology" in Singh, Rana P. B. (ed.) *Heritagescapes and Cultural Landscapes* (New Delhi, 2011), 87–128.

5 Edward Said: *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993), 198.

6 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat/

7 Web: http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/in; also Singh and Singh "Heritagescapes of India: Appraising Heritage Ecology", 95, f.n. 4.

8 cf. Rana P.B. Singh: "Heritage Value of Religious Sites and Built Archetypes: The Scenario of Hinduism, and illustrating the Riverfront Varanasi" in *Aatmbodh, the Journal of Knowledge of Self*, 12 (Spring 2015), 1–23, ref. p.20.

9 cf. Diana L. Eck: *Banaras, City of Light* (New York, 1982), 40.

10 cf. Singh (2015), f.n. 8, p. 5.

11 Rana P. B. Singh: "Sacredscape and urban heritage in India: contestation and perspective" in Shaw, Brian and Jones, Roy (eds.): *Contested Urban Heritage: Voices from the Periphery* (London, 1997), 101–131, ref. 124.

12 cf. Singh (2015), f.n. 8, ref. pp. 13–14.

13 Rana P.B. Singh: "Banaras, the Cultural Capital of India: Visioning Cultural Heritage and Planning" in *SANDHI, A Journal of Interfacing Science-Heritage and Technology-Tradition of India*, vol. 1 (no. 1, February 2015), f.n. 8, ref. p. 20.

14 James A. Swan: *Nature as Healer and Teacher* (New York, 1992), ref. p. 233.

15 cf. V.V. Prakasa Rao: *Global Hindu Heritage Foundation. Championing the Global Preservation of Hinduism*. Web: http://www.preservehinduism.org/; 2007), accessed on May 28, 2015.

16 cf. D. Fairchild Ruggles and Amita Sinha: "Preserving the Cultural Landscape Heritage of Champaner-Pavagadh, Gujarat, India" in Silverman, Helaine and Ruggles, D. Fairchild (eds.): *Intangible Heritage Embodied* (New York, 2009), 79-99.

17 Michael A. Di Giovine: *Heritage-scape: UNESCO, World Heritage, and Tourism* (Lanham, 2009), ref. 429.

Asha Mukherjee

GLOBALIZATION

Dynamics and the East-West Dichotomy

GLOBALIZATION: CULTURE AND DYNAMICS

Globalization refers to the process whereby the world becomes "one place". The globe has compressed into a locality where various others have become neighbors with whom we must necessarily interact, and whom we must listen and relate to. The more widespread contacts we make, the more global culture we receive. In this sense the notion of a global culture must be distinguished from the one modeled after the nation state. Globalization may be seen as an attempt to homogenize culture, a project for creating a common culture and unifying it out of the need to ignore, refine, synthesize and blend local differences. Globalization may also be viewed as the outcome of our interdependency. The flows of information, knowledge, money commodities, people and images have intensified to the extent that the perception of spatial distance has vanished. We all live in each other's backyard. This involves reductions in barriers and establishing contacts that underscore the idea of "one world" as part of the project of modernity. This process helps to connect people physically, legally, culturally, and psychologically. Hence, globalization leads to a shift in the social space of the world as a whole. This change in spatial structure affects the whole society as well as each individual. It is interrelated with the individual's economic, political, social, moral and cultural life as well as with patterns of knowledge, identity and social ecology. Hence, globalization has its own *dynamics* of social change.

Today, whether we like it or not, social life must recognize the new patterns that emerge from the process of globalization. New techno-

logies connect people to collaborate in sharing knowledge, without regard to geography or language. Globalization is related to Internationalization, Liberalization and Universalization. But we also need to realize that there is nothing called "global culture", nor "local culture" as such, although we do use such concepts. Assuming the key role of these categories, a local culture is a particularity that is opposed to the global, i.e. the culture of a relatively small, bounded space in which the individual lives and engages in daily face-to-face relationships. It is the habitual and repetitive nature of everyday life and culture that an individual gradually learns to master. The common stock of knowledge of a group of people, inhabitants of a physical environment, space, building etc. is relatively fixed; it has persisted over time and may incorporate rituals, symbols and ceremonies that link several diverse people to a place and a "common sense" perception of the past. The sense of belonging, the common regimented experiences and cultural forms that are associated with a place are crucial to the concept of local culture. Yet, the concept of local culture is a relational one. The drawing of boundary around a particular space is a relational act, which depends upon the figuration of significant other localities within which one seeks to situate oneself. Therefore the global and the local as discussed herein are not real dichotomies separated in space and time. The processes of globalization and localization are necessarily bound to each other. If a culture is defined as a mechanism that allows to relate to others by way of trust, freedom and social relationships then it is ever flowing and never static at any point in time or space. It is placed in the past, present and future all at once. Thus both an internal dynamism as well as an external one are constitutive parts of globalization and culture. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the paradoxical consequences of the process of globalization, i.e. the awareness of the finitude and boundedness of the planet and humanity. It does not produce homogeneity, but on the contrary familiarizes us with diversities and the extensive array of local cultures. The process of globalization leads thus to migration, intermingling of cultures, and an increasing perception of differences.[1]

GLOBALIZATION, MODERNITY AND RELIGION

Differences in culture, religion and language naturally create separations among human beings. Exclusiveness and social rigidity are integral parts of a culture. But, culture is never static; it is always changing. Its growth and transmission are carried out through communication in the form of language, symbols, and literary and artistic forms that play

a critical role in an individual's development. The more communication takes place between various individuals and cultures the more steps are taken towards globalization and "humanization", leading to a decrease of conflicts. In this sense, the process of globalization should result in the understanding that the world is a single place where increased contact and more dialogue among different nation states is unavoidable; we have now a dialogical space in which we can expect many disagreements, clashes and conflicts but also agreements for cooperation and a working consensus. It is bound to increase our web of interdependence and power balance. This means that in the present condition it is more and more difficult to retain simplified images of "me" and the "other". But this does not imply that non-Western cultures will simply give way to the logic of modernity and adopt Western approaches to it. Globalization cannot be taken to imply that there is, or will be, a unified world society or culture. To draw this conclusion would be a mistake. Such an outcome may though have been the target of a particular nation-state in the past, and that possibility cannot be ruled out for the future. The theory of modernization was initially developed with the assumption that as each non-Western nation eventually was modernized it would move up the hierarchy and duplicate or absorb the dominant global culture to the extent that ultimately every locality would display the cultural ideals, images and artifacts of the globally dominant way of life. That dominant culture was framed by Europe in the nineteenth century and by the United States in the twentieth century. The assumption that all local cultures would eventually give way under the force of modernization to some kind of cultural imperialism and that all particularities would be linked together in some symbolic hierarchy proved to be wrong in the 21st century. The unification of culture in a strict sense appears today to be impossible. Modernization has failed to give rise to widespread cultural imperialism; on the contrary, it has led to multiple modernities and multiculturalism.

The process of globalization and homogenization is in no way a gentle process and power politics have always played an important role in promoting its goals. In this respect, the West has been thought as having the moral right and duty to guide and educate all others because of the self-proclaimed need to "civilize" the rest of the world. The West has for a long time understood itself as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own image. One must though always question the "universality" of such claims. Nonetheless, this process can also be seen as the development of a global culture in a less totalitarian sense, i.e. through the creation of various interdependencies of practices, bodies of knowledge, conventions in lifestyles, etc.

Åke Sander (2015a) following Peter Berger (1997) makes a distinction between technological/economic globalization and cultural globalization – presented as "hard" and "soft" respectively – within the frame of for example Westernization and Easternization. The first hard pattern of globalization often leads to the soft one through large scale migration.[2] The multiculturality and multireligiosity generated in that way are often met with strong resistance in many parts of the world, especially in Islamic countries, but also in India and China. These nations are at present working on new ideologies to meet the new challenges brought about by "hard" processes of globalization. If we look at the relation between modernity and religion in the Western context we find two models: one is American and the other is French or European. The first assumes that religion and modernity can thrive together side by side, without much conflict. The second assumes that the two cannot go together, as modernity necessarily excludes and marginalizes religion. Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Freud, Nietzsche and others all agreed that with the rise of modernity, religion as a whole would gradually diminish its influence. They believed that the increase of modernity would lead to more and more secular states and more and more secularized individuals. The assumption was also that the rest of the world would follow the European model. The choice for the world was and still is in many persons' mind: "man without God" or "man with God". Sander, however, writes:

> it appears that it is the American brand of modernity that is spreading throughout the world: the one in which religion and modernity are thriving very well together in places like China, India, South-East Asia, Africa, Arabia and Latin America.[3]

Religion is thriving in many modernizing countries but also in modern nations such as the United States. Interestingly, we have now a paradox: the more modernity, the more religion, and the less modernity, the more (again) religion. Independently from modernity, it seems that we all have to live with religion. An argument for this state of affairs is that religion is thriving in underdeveloped countries because they are not enough "civilized". Religion is though thriving in modernizing countries such as India, but also in modern countries in Europe and America due in fact to modernization and globalization and their widespread consequences. Religion is now thriving everywhere. People in the developing world react against modernization by taking shelter of religion, like in India and Turkey; people in the United States turn to religion as seen in the emergence of right wing Protestant Evangelicals; in Europe,

millions of Muslim immigrants have made Islam and Islamophobia a part of everyday life. In the Middle East, Muslim political groups are gaining power and influence. Events like 9/11, radicalism, extremism and terrorism are matters of serious debate and concern all over the globe.[4] Earlier it was thought that people who were weak, poor, uneducated, and ignorant were the ones embracing religion, but today the world is witnessing an upward movement of educated middle classes towards religious faith, against the predictions of Marx and Weber. Sander argues with Peter Berger (1999) that India, China, Turkey along with Latin America provide clear examples of this trend.[5] Therefore, the crucial connection between modernization and secularism has proven to be wrong: it was in fact a "category mistake". Sander asserts instead that the relation is between "modernization and pluralism".[6] Modernization provides more choices and competition. This means that religious belonging in a modern context is no longer taken for granted; adults have more choices of faith and commitment beyond the religion that they learn at home. Sander argues therefore for the key role of religion in the modern world:

> today religion has come to play a significant role in the public and intellectual lives of many peoples throughout the world. This can be seen, for example, in the increased number of university departments and other intellectuals that are dedicated to the study of religion, as well as in the number of educated middle class people that are in some way or another involved in religion, from fundamentalists Christians, Muslims or Hindus or New Age, yoga or mindfulness practitioners. Due to globalization, the WEIRDs (Western[ized], educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) are becoming more and more similar all over the world.[7]

Sander also interprets the rise of religiosity in North America as part of a "commodification of religion" regulated by demand and supply dynamics similar to the ones found in trade.

Samuel Huntington traces the reasons for the rise of religiosity in the complex interplay between globalization and religion. According to Huntington, in an early phase Westernization promotes modernization. In later phases, however, modernization promotes de-Westernization at two levels: at the societal level modernization enhances the economic and political power of society and encourages people to be culturally more assertive; at the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken, which leads to a crisis of identity. Religion provides an answer

to that crises.[8] Sander, along with Campbell discussed below, argues that the currents of modernization and Westernization do not move in one direction. Modernization in regard to the East promotes both Easternization and de-Easternization: Western modernity is influential and hegemonic (thus conducive to de-Easternization) but it is also perceived as a different kind; the result is the rise of multiple modernities that in many respects differ from Western (European or American) modernity and are instead conducive to Easternization.

POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Sander writes about various reactions of individuals and social groups to globalization depending on their degree of tolerance: zero tolerance among fundamentalists and maximum tolerance among pluralists. Pluralists tend to express serious concern about the rise of anti-liberal fundamentalism and intolerance around the world. For pluralists, phenomena such as the Protestant fundamentalism in the United States, *Hindutva* in India, Islamism in the Arabic world, Islamophobia in Europe and the tendency towards ghettoization and particularism among diaspora populations in the West are of great concern.

Let me briefly discuss some of the possible as well as factual responses to the process of globalization by individuals and social groups. One response may be further immersion in local culture and resistance by maintaining a long-established identity and refusing to be drawn into wider collectivities and broader cultural flows. However, this is difficult to achieve without military and economic power. A second response is escaping modernization. Members of ethnic groups sometimes romantically pursue a simpler and more natural life and find there a sense of being at "home". A third one is the option of nation-state participation, which allows a greater recognition of regional and local diversity and multiculturalism. A fourth response is represented by peoples, who travel to and enter the domain of other cultures and take along their own. This is seen in the case of short and long term tourists, or of those who enter the local workforce as working class. A fifth response is shaped by those with a professional culture framed by a cosmopolitan approach. They live and work in a "third culture" and are happy to move between local cultures. They develop practical and working relationships in multicultural settings that enable them to communicate with persons around the world. The sixth and last response comes from those that do not judge local cultures depending on their progress towards an idealized level of modernity. They partake of higher education within the ranks of the emerging middle classes and actively

participate in the local consumer culture. They gaze over other cultural settings with eager curiosity and view them as "amazing places". They are able to work and live within third cultures and properly represent them to "tell it from the native's point of view". They enjoy both the reproduction of the effect of the real, the immersion in it in controlled or playful ways, and the examination of the backstage areas on which it draws.[9] If we accept Sander's characterization of zero tolerance and maximum tolerance, all the six types of responses discussed above fall under the second category of maximum tolerance. It would be hard to find anyone falling into the first category, since even someone with zero tolerance would show some tolerance for the sake of having working relationships with the despised "others", motivated if nothing else by economic and social interests.

GLOBALIZATION AND VALUE CHANGES

Sander agrees that globalization has become one of the most significant determining factors affecting not only the way people think about norms, values and ethics, but "their actual conduct as well".[10] Using the distinction proposed by Shweder (1997) between the *ethic of autonomy*, *the ethic of community* and *the ethic of divinity*, Sander explains in detail how this distinction captures the phenomena of transformation of norms and values and the actual conduct of individuals in a globalized context.[11] Liberalism, which advocates the *ethic of autonomy* and the fundamental freedom of an individual goes all the way to create space for rights, liberty and justice without interfering much with the freedom of others. The theoretical basis for this perspective is found in the writings of John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and others and is mostly found in Western secular societies. The *ethic of community* is based on the idea that the individual is a member of larger units such as families, tribes, caste, community and nations. According to this view, these larger units are real and more important than individual interests and therefore the individual must compromise in order to protect them. Furthermore, each individual has an obligation to perform her duties in hierarchical order. The moral concepts of respect, honor, reputation, partnership, patriotism etc. are all part of the greater unit of ethical responsibility. The *ethic of autonomy* in this sense goes against the *ethic of community*: individual goals are selfish and dangerous for the existence and development of the community. The second type of ethics is more common in less modernized societies where the State cannot guarantee its citizens protection and their basic needs and liberties. In these societies various communities, religions,

social classes etc. often serve as a sort of social insurance guaranteeing individual survival and safety. This is close to the contractual theory of justice developed by Robert Nozick. Nozick argues that a minimum state structure would naturally arise out of an association of human beings "even though no one intended this or tried to bring it about, by a process which need not violate anyone's right."[12] In the first case it is the state which guarantees the welfare of the individual, while in the second, it is the society or the community that guarantee and protect individual welfare, and their relation is reciprocal. The third ethic, *the ethic of divinity*, is based on the idea that the individual is a "child of God" whose body is a temple and whose acts should be carried out accordingly. *The ethic of divinity* discourages what degrades the individual, or dishonor the Creator, or violates "the will of God". This ethic is understood to be objective and independent of human judgement and gives rise to the notions of sin, purity, pollution and degradation. From the point of view of the *ethic of divinity*, the Western secular commitment to individual liberty and freedom is perceived as hedonistic, and a celebration of the lower instincts of humanity. Sander argues that

> up to the second half of the twentieth century, the areas of the world dominated by one or the other of this ethic largely existed in isolation from each other. Since then, however, and especially from the 1980s onwards, the situation has dramatically changed with the rise of globalization and pluralization. This has had serious consequences for the many people and countries in the so called developing world.[13]

A little deep understanding of the three types of ethics that we have discussed above reveal that these types are not truly as different as they appear to be. The first and the second are two sides of the same coin. An individual is always part of a community and a community is always constituted by individuals: the two cannot be separated. Furthermore, strictly speaking, John Stuart Mill (1957) does not leave much place for autonomy in his utilitarian framework; it is Immanuel Kant (1949) and his followers such as John Rawls (1971) and Robert Nozick (1974), who make the principle of autonomy their foundation.[14] For Rawls and Nozick both *ethic of autonomy* and the *ethic of community* are equally important. In Plato's ideal state, the well-being of the individual is part of the state's well-being. Justice is *ethic of autonomy* as well as *ethic of community*. In Book I of the *Republic*, Plato defends some odd views through the sophist Thrasymachus, but later Socrates gives a more positive definition of justice. Justice is "self-control" from

passion and desires. It is achieved through the "performance of one's proper function". Individual pleasure, passion, and various forms of self-interest are seen as an abuse of the ideal life or "just life", since they contain features that go against reason. The ideal State and its political well-being requires the regulated cooperation of all the three social classes represented by silver, copper and gold. The coordination of different functions is itself justice, which leads to well-being. To use an example, it is like the relation between music and nodes, without which there would be no music; however, the presence of nodes alone does not lead to music. Coordination is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Plato presents the nature of justice or ethics in terms of coordination, both within the state and within the individual. Socrates tries to prove that justice is not merely a means to well-being; rather it is an essential part of it. If there were no risk of punishment or other ill consequences, a person may rather choose to be unjust, although this aspect is not much discussed by Plato. His model of the ideal State is based on the ideal life of man. Every human has an ideal life and a duty to perform. Some important aspects of justice are that it is inseparable from the principle of equality and that justice and self-interest can and do conflict with each other.[15]

To take another example, Indian civilization bases its ethics on *Dharma*, an extremely complex concept to explain. *Dharma* may refer to human dignity and worth in terms of justice and benevolence, and as virtue required for human fulfillment along with the theological insights and metaphysical doctrines that explain it. *Dharma* has both descriptive and prescriptive contents; it tells the way things are and the way things ought to be, i.e. the nature of man and his obligations or duties. *Dharma* also transcends man and accompanies him in the world beyond, thus it is said that it accumulates through the process of re-birth. *Dharma* can thus be understood as religion, as human dignity, as the metaphysical foundation of human rights, as customary morality, as reflective morality, as justice, as law, as consideration for others etc., which are all related to each other. The question is which of the three types of ethics categorized by Sander fits in the concept of *dharmic* ethics, if we do grant to *dharma* the status of ethics. In order to understand the Indian notion of ethics (*niti* or *dharma*) we need to consider all three types of ethics discussed earlier, i.e. the *ethic of autonomy*, the *ethic of community* and the *ethic of divinity*. Sander elaborates over a three-dimensional value system in Hindu life: "respect for elders, tradition and traditional norms and values as well as emphasis on the spiritual".[16] This value system is represented for example by the RSS (*Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, The National Voluntary Association,

i.e. Hindu nationalists) and may sound strange even in India. A balance though is often suggested instead for the benefit of the urban youth and the wealthy Westernized, educated, industrial elite. The Indian urban youth is greatly influenced by television, internet, Facebook, and other sorts of social media, which have changed their lifestyle, dress, music, including their perspective on values and norms. Global culture is conveyed through the media, but in India there are also a number of hybrid Indian-Western cultural programs and serials promoting Indian traditional values for women. Spirituality and cultural fusion play indeed an important role in the Indian market. The important point here is that all sorts of fusion take place within the three types of ethical norms mentioned above, but also hard and soft globalization, East and West, the rural and the urban, the poor and the rich, the elite and the middle class, the educated and the uneducated. Yet, it is hard for Indians in India to accept full-blooded Western culture and globalization upfront. Hindutva politicians, who represent the voice of the "socially conservatives", reject Evangelical Christianity as well as "sinful" Western morals, rendering foreign direct investments harder. In this way, economic globalization or hard globalization is restricted or filtered. A critical assessment and evaluation of the process of globalization has always been carried out in India since independence as part of the engagement with modernity and Westernization. Many protracted debates between Nehru, Gandhi, Tagore, Zinnah as well as other key intellectuals in South Asia were based on a recognition of the rich and deep tradition, culture and civilization of India. Several attempts have been made to create a workable fusion of modernity and Indian traditions, developing in the process a local brand of modernity. The development of a unique brand of Indian modernity has been a challenge for all political parties. The admission of foreign companies in the Indian market as part of the process of economic liberalization has been and still is a matter of protracted debate in the Indian parliament.

India has consistently been a cultural transmitter and it has been a key player in the so called "Easternization of the West", which is nothing more than the plain transfer of Indian culture from India to Europe and North America. Even if India's youth find Western culture seductive – a product of globalization (both hard and soft) – there has been a critical assessment of Western modernity at every stage and on all levels. This has led on several occasions to stagnation in technological and economic development, such as in the well-known cases of the Narmada dam, the Nano car project, delays in major metro construction projects in India's major cities, etc. This shows that various initiatives towards what are perceived as technological and economic "Westernization",

which imply changes in the pattern of local traditions, have been carefully assessed through critical examination. This critical evaluation of globalization is extremely important for the East, but also for the West.

Furthermore, the point that these types of ethics have a temporal and geographical place such as "modern" or "less modern" and are situated by statements such as "up to the second half of the twentieth century they existed in isolation", is not convincing. In fact, if we look at history we will find that these ethics have never existed in isolation. The *ethic of divinity* has in many occasions been accompanied by a rational search for profit under the notion that by making economic gains people would be "saved". This ethics included the denial of immediate consumption for the purpose of re-investing one's profits. The grace of "God" was bestowed to those who worked hard and were successful financially. In the words of Max Weber:

> The development of the concept of the calling quickly gave to the modern entrepreneur a fabulously clear conscience – and also industrious workers; he gave to his employees as the wages of their ascetic devotion to the calling and of co-operation in his ruthless exploitation of them through capitalism the prospect of eternal salvation.[17]

THE EAST-WEST DICHOTOMY

Following Berger and Frankl, Sander in his article "Hinduism Meets the Global World: the 'Easternization' of the West?" (co-authored with Clemens Cavallin) points out that due to globalization, migration and increasing ethnic and religious diversity that has emerged during the phase of modernization, secularization and post-modernization, the Western mind has suffered from alienation. It has also grown a hunger to recapture the spiritual and existential meanings of life lost along the way, a need so compelling that it appears to be almost genetically based.[18] There is a sort of persistent breakdown of traditions in the West and an attraction for Eastern traditions has emerged instead as a compelling phenomenon. The West is taking much interest in health, well-being and self-realization after a phase of expanding consumerism. Accepting Eastern traditions of health and well-being as an alternative seems to be a natural outcome of globalization and easier connectivity.

East and West are often taken as reciprocally opposed and based on exclusive cultural values. The East is perceived as spiritual, introverted, synthetic and subjective while the West is seen as materialist, extroverted, analytic and objective. The question though is: does this dichotomy really exist? Hajime Nakamura has looked for an answer

to such question and argues that "the East is used as if there is a single cultural unit which is common to all Eastern countries, this is rather unfortunate". He presents five criteria commonly used for classifying widespread thinking and then he rejects them all by saying that "there is no such thing as a single fundamental principle which determines the characteristic ways of thinking of people".[19] Various factors influence the way people think. Family lineage, climate, environment, material conditions, religious ideology and language, none of them can be taken to exclusively determine or regulate peoples' thinking. Furthermore, the belief that the West is rational and the East is spiritual is also incorrect. The West almost up to the 18th century was as spiritual as the East, if not more. It is only after the scientific revolution that we notice a rise of secular thought. Chinese and Japanese cultures also need more detailed analysis, since they have strong traits of rationality beyond spirituality. How do we otherwise explain the contribution and commitment to social life of the Zen monasteries? East Asian people by and large share the view that all men are one in essence. Indians are prone to tolerate the co-existence of differing philosophical thoughts in the diverse metaphysical schools. With all these differences taken into consideration, we do not find any typically "Eastern" standpoint among either the Chinese, Japanese or Indians.

The characterization of a people's way of thinking as typically Eastern or Western is too simplistic as it does not capture the real complexity and pluralism of that peoples' thought. If we just focus on India, China, Japan and Tibet, which share a Buddhist heritage, we will find so much variation that we will not be able to draw a unified picture. Within the East are found many differences in philosophy, including several understandings of the nature of the empirical world, and the same holds for India as well and any other country in the East, for that matter.[20]

Sander also argues that when it comes to exchanges between India and the West

it is undeniable that since the 1960s (with a decided movements forward from the period of British rule to then) the influence of various Indic traditions on Western culture, society, philosophy and spirituality, and even on the Western psyche itself, has been surprisingly profound. Indeed so unexpected is today's penetrating outcome that it would have been beyond the wildest imagination of even the late 19th and early 20th century missionaries who travelled from Britain, Scotland and other parts of Europe to "civilize" India's "heathen" population.[21]

Sander refers here to data collected by Eric Kaufmann that points to the fact that countries such as India with larger religious populations and their diaspora tend to have higher and more rapid levels of population growth than nations with more secularized citizens, and thus the impact of their religion on the world is on the rise. Such a fact on a global scale, inclusive of other populations from prominent world religions, may well lead to the gradual diminishing of liberal secularism and Western modernity, and the "religious inheriting the earth".[22] The influence of Eastern cultures and religions is also on the rise due to their increasing global economic power.[23] It was previously widely assumed that with secularism and modernization religion would gradually disappear, but several studies have shown that immigrants from religious backgrounds tend to become more religious after settling into host secularized countries. In the last fifty years there has been a renewed and growing interest in the academic study of religion and scholars are seriously studying the lives of religious individuals and large religious diaspora communities, looking for new methods to study such complex phenomena. Sander argues that earlier the world was divided according to religions and their geographical boundaries: Christianity in Europe and the Americas, Islam in the Middle East, Hinduism in India, Buddhism in China, Japan and East Asia. In the 21st century, however, most religions have populations spread out in almost every society of the world, and thus "almost everyone is everywhere". The pattern of religious pluralism has increased in the US, the UK, in Europe and Canada, giving rise to migration studies and other related disciplines.[24] If migrants live in the West and make the West their home for all practical purposes, they also naturally carry with them their own way of living. They also develop ways to keep their traditions and cultures alive, which in turn affects the Westerners around them and their hosts' way of living. Two persons living as neighbors side by side will interact and at least to some degree get to know each other's cultures. This is not only natural, but also desirable.

Globalization has enhanced the role of religion through the search for identity, belonging and the search for meaning. As Robertson has rightly stated: "globalization is at the same time the universalization of the particular and particularization of the universal".[25] Globalization and particularization bring the "hybridization of tradition", that is the selection of what is valuable and relevant and the reshaping of religious tradition according to the needs of the local environment. The process has prime examples in the Hindu and Buddhist diaspora. It is a process that can be described as universalization, de-traditionalization and re-traditionalization.

Sander finds the notions of "East" and "West" intriguing and discusses Colin Campbell's thesis of the Easternization of the West, which according to Campbell is taking place from the 1960s onwards. Sander agrees with Campbell that the Eastern influence has been an integral part of Western religious and intellectual life from the early beginnings of Western civilization. The influence dates back to the ancient Greek Pythagoreans and reached the New Age movements of today under the umbrella of Western Esotericism. Western Esotericism moved East through, among others, Vivekananda's interpretation of Hinduism as a tolerant, universalistic tradition, which accepts the truth of all religions without any need of conversion. Campbell contends that Western religious traditions such as Christianity entail a dualism between God and God's material creation, i.e. the idea that the human and the divine are entirely separated. This is in sharp contrast to Eastern traditions, which according to Campbell are based on the non-dual conception of an impersonal divine force that permeates the universe, and hold the view that the world is an emanation from God rather than a creation.[26] Sander argues that Campbell is wrong and that within many Hindu traditions we find alternative views of understanding the relation between God, the world and humanity, such as simultaneous duality and non-duality. For this reason, non-dualism or monism cannot be the sole criterion for discussing Eastern – and particularly Indian – traditions. Sander further argues that globalization ultimately entails both the Westernization of the East and Easternization of the West or *east in the west* and *west in the east*. Hinduism, Islam and Christianity though are all going through a phase of tension between protectionism and universalism as a result of globalization. In India there is on one hand an emphasis on the unity of Hindu culture, national identity, and indigenous religions, which collectively lead to an attempt to restrict conversions to Christianity. On the other hand, Hindus try to propagate a universal, "glocalized" Hinduism for a Western audience involving intense practices, but free from the requirement of conversion.

It cannot be any longer contested that Indic traditions have an impact on the West. As mentioned earlier, with modernity and globalization the distant "other" has become the next-door neighbor. One not only gets to know the other but in the process both affects and is affected by this encounter even with minimum communication. The dress, food, culture, tradition, language of the "other", which were earlier only seen on television or in movies are no longer distant realities, but part of everyday life. This profound change cuts across the East-West divide. The new phenomenon is neither a Westernization of the East nor an Easternization of the West, but just a human phenomenon,

bringing people together with common concerns for well-being (health, self-realization). Anything leading away from such goals bring people to fight one another. The relation with neighbors may not always be friendly, it may be antagonistic and in such cases instead of homogenization we would have an assertion of differences. But the differences are not to be confused with dichotomies. Campbell states that the East and the West are dichotomies, but they are not, they are at best different ways of looking at the world. In my view, the divide between Easternization and Westernization rests on an over-inflated dichotomy. The harmless distinction between East and West has led to the idea of an absolute dichotomy of "spiritual" versus "rational", "objective" versus "subjective", often advocated by scholars. One dichotomy becomes dependent on the other, and have then consequences for our experiences of the real world.

CONCLUDING WORDS: THE ROLE OF REASON

19th century Europe faced a crisis in the sense that Western culture, which had developed on the foundation of thousands of years of literature, religion, philosophy and arts, was collapsing. The foundation on which human existence depended on was deeply shaken and human existence increasingly meaningless. The crisis was indeed about the Western role given to reason, an unchallengeable faith on the possibilities of reason that made it the principle of reality and the ultimate criterion of philosophical inquiry. Even Marx saw self-alienation of humans from themselves being lost in mass industrialization as the necessary consequence of the control exercised by "Western" reason. It is almost accepted by all that the crisis originated from a certain understanding of reason and if this is the case then the simple way out would be to eliminate the root of this problem. A number of attempts have been made by Western and particularly French intellectuals in the last three centuries, but most of them have been unsatisfactory. Without going into details of these trials, we need to ask nonetheless whether the crisis is really only European, as Husserl has spoken of it. If it is European then by implication the rest of the world does not have a crisis. Or even if it has a crisis, it is not the same that Europe has. But we realize now with great concern that the Crisis of Reason that was faced by Europe in the 19th and 20th century is today faced by many Asian countries through the far reaching impact of Western education and the globalization of Western culture.[27]

It was an assumption of "European" reason that Reality and Knowledge were separate and they needed to be brought together. The object

is always an object in relation to a subject. Being is also supposed to be objective when it is placed in a relation of inter-subjectivity with others. The subject is the agent or the "Self", who knows Being, and Being is the object of knowledge. Reason plays the role of distinguishing between subject and object. But once they are distinguished by Reason they also need to be unified, as Hegel has shown, by negation again and again. But the question is how can we transcend the divide between object and subject and also reason itself, which negates again and again? This is precisely the point that needs to be solved, and at that moment wisdom from the classical Indian philosophical traditions may be useful as an alternative framework. Western Reason has taught us that the distinctions inherent in reality are absolute, but they are not. Nihilism has resulted from these distinctions and by mistaking Nothing for Being. As long as we believe that Reason is the sole means to approach reality, nihilism is going to stay; but if we find a way to be one with reality without the subject-object divide, the Crisis of Western Reason may be solved. No doubt, we cannot deny or ignore the Western concept of Reason and yet we want to explore other alternatives in order to be free from the Crises and "experience and be in tune with" primordial reality. It is perhaps in this light and with these motivations that we should understand the world that has emerged, in which "religion is thriving".

I would like to conclude with a quote from K.C. Bhattacharya, who on several occasions has rejected the universalism of reason or of religion:

> It is sometimes forgotten by the advocates of universalism that the so-called universalism of reason or of religion is only in the making and cannot be appealed to as an actually established code of universal principles. What is universal is only the spirit, the loyalty to our ideals and the openness to other ideals, the determination not to reject them if they are found within our ideals and not to accept them till they are so found.[28]

NOTES

1 Mukherjee, Asha: "Professor Hajime Nakamura's Concept of Asian Mind and its Essential Features" in S.R. Bhatt (ed.) *Buddhist Thought and Culture: with Special Reference to the Thoughts and Works of Professor Hajime Nakamura* (Delhi, 2005), 337–346.

2 Åke Sander: "Norm and Value Changes in a Globalized World" in Staffan Olofsson (ed.) *Den Trogne Arbetaren i Vingården*, Festskrift to Bo Claesson, LIR skrifter (Göteborg 2015a); Peter Berger: "Four Faces of global culture" in *National Interest* Fall 1997, Issue 49 (1997), 23–30.

3   Sander "Norm and Value Changes in a Globalized World", 7–8.
4   Åke Sander and Göran Larsson: "An Urgent Need to Consider How to Define Islamophobia", *Bulletin for the Study of Religion*, Vol. 44, No. 1, (2015), 13–17.
5   Peter Berger: "The Desecularization of the World" in Peter Berger (ed.) *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids, 1999).
6   Sander: "Norm and Value Changes in a Globalized World", 10.
7   Sander: "Norm and Value Changes in a Globalized World", 12. In regard to the notion of WEIRD, Sander quotes J. Haidt *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York, 2012), 96–98.
8   Samuel Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996).
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SPIRITUALISTISK
BEVISFÖRING I NY TAPPNING

Omvändelseberättelser och redigerings-
tekniker i *Det okända*

Reality-program med spiritualistiska medier har blivit internationella tittarsuccéer under 2000-talet, med produktioner som *Most Haunted* och *6th Sense*. I Sverige kommer trenden till uttryck i serierna *Förnimmelse av mord* (2003), *Andarnas makt* (2003–2004) samt i den populära långköraren *Det okända* (2004–), där medier undersöker och rensar hem från störande andar. Genom programmen har medierna, varav majoriteten har bakgrund i spiritualistiska organisationer i Sverige och/eller Storbritannien, fått tillgång till ett nytt digitalt utrymme och blivit kändisar på köpet. Tv-inträdet har dock inte varit ovillkorat, utan medierna har fått anpassa sig till rådande trender i den kommersiella tv-sfären. Detta har inneburit att de varken haft möjlighet att välja tv-format eller programmens inriktning. Huvudsakligen har de fått ett rum inom reality-tv, en genre där verkliga personer agerar inom ramen för koncept och situationer som skapats för tv i underhållningssyfte.[1] Villkoret för att ta plats i den "digitala offentligheten" har därmed varit att acceptera och anpassa sig till detta format. Jag har tidigare beskrivit hur hemsökelsetemat i *Det okända* medfört förändringar i deltagarnas mediumskap. De har nämligen anammat en praktik som majoriteten inte tidigare ägnat sig åt och som inte haft någon framträdande position inom spiritualismen: att "rensa hus" eller driva ut andar.[2] Tv-serien har dock inte bara inneburit ett brott med den spiritualistiska traditionen. *Det okända* innehåller dessutom ett missionerande drag som kan studeras utifrån ett kontinuitetsperspektiv.[3] Flera i redaktionen bakom programmet är tydligt "troende"[4] och *Det okända* söker på olika sätt övertyga tittaren om att hemsökelserna, liksom mediernas förmåga att

kommunicera med andar, är verkliga. På Internet har verklighetsanspråken diskuterats flitigt av både skeptiker och troende. Kommunicerar medierna med andar eller är de cyniska bedragare? Som religionsvetare har man (tack och lov) privilegiet att kunna ställa sig utanför debatten och fokusera på andra spörsmål, som vilka övertygandestrategier som används och var de har sina rötter. I artikeln exemplifieras både hur *Det okända* knyter an till en spiritualistisk argumentationstradition med rötter i 1800-talet, och hur redigeringstekniker från reality-genren används i övertygande syfte.[5]

SPIRITUALISTISK BEVISFÖRING

Medan andekommunikation förekommit i en mängd historiska religiösa traditioner måste spiritualismen ses som en modern rörelse.[6] Den fick sitt genombrott i Förenta staterna år 1848 då systrarna Kate och Maggie Fox utformade ett knackningssystem för kommunikation med avlidnas andar – ett system som utvecklades till de för spiritualismen kännetecknande seanserna.[7] Spiritualismen spreds därefter till olika delar av världen. I Sverige grundades den första föreningen 1878 och kring sekelskiftet fick den flera efterföljare.[8] Spiritualismen växte fram parallellt med de naturvetenskapliga akademiska disciplinerna, vilket präglade den på flera sätt. I likhet med andra nya religiösa rörelser har inställningen till dessa varit ambivalent. Samtidigt som man sett dem som trångsynta (dess företrädare har till exempel varit ovilliga att acceptera kunskap baserad på religiösa erfarenheter) har man framhållit att den egna världsbilden är förenlig med spjutspetsforskning. Åtskilliga försök har också gjorts att genom naturvetenskapligt influerade metoder bevisa existensen av en andevärld dit man kommer efter döden.[9] Under slutet av 1800-talet grundades flera organisationer vars syfte var att framlägga sådana bevis. Två exempel är engelska Society for Psycical Research (1882) och Svenska samfundet för psykisk forskning (1890).[10] I fokus för undersökningarna stod medierna, vilka sågs som kanaler till andevärlden, och de underliga företeelser som börjat dyka upp i seansrummen, som ektoplasma, andematerialiseringar och föremål som verkade förflytta sig av egen kraft. Det gjordes då försök att testa medierna för att utröna om fenomenen var autentiska (i betydelsen från andevärlden) eller om de var fabricerade. Även seanserna var viktiga ur övertygandesynpunkt. Tanken med dessa var nämligen att medierna skulle leverera uppgifter (namn, karaktärsdrag och livshistorier) från andevärlden som besökarna skulle bekräfta som tillhörande avlidna anhöriga.[11]

Spiritualister tog också tidigt tekniska innovationer i sin tjänst i jakten på bevis. De båda fotograferna Frederick. A. Hudson och William

Hope blev mycket uppmärksammade för sin strävan att fånga ande-aktiviteter med kamera, och fotografierna de presenterade – porträtt av personer omgärdade av skugglika gestalter och bilder av medier med "ektoplasma" rinnande ur mun, näshåla och öron – uppfattades av många som övertygande.[12] Personliga redogörelser (i muntlig och skriftlig form) spelade också en viktig roll inom den tidiga rörelsen. I den svenska tidskriften *Efteråt?* (1891–1922) publicerades regelbundet en berättelsegenre som kan beskrivas som en form av spiritualistisk omvändelseberättelse, där en skeptisk huvudperson genom att uppleva en rad underliga händelser gradvis övertygas om andarnas existens.[13]

De vetenskapliga ambitionerna gav inledningsvis spiritualismen gott anseende, men gjorde den samtidigt sårbar för vederlägganden. Kring sekelskiftet 1900 ertappades flera kända medier med att smuggla in "ektoplasma" till seanser, fabricera "andeknackningar" och många av andefotografierna avslöjades som bedrägerier, vilket fick rörelsen att förlora i popularitet.[14] Den bevisande ansatsen har trots detta förblivit stark, och företrädare har fortsatt att bruka ny teknik i bevissyfte. Under den andra hälften av 1950-talet försökte tysksvensken Friedrich Jürgenson spela in anderöster via radio – ett experiment som utmynnade i böckerna *Rösterna från rymden* (1964) och *Radio- och mikrofonkontakt med de döda* (1968).[15] Under 2000-talet har mobilkameror och sociala medier gjort det möjligt för privatpersoner att själva skapa och sprida bild- och ljudupptagningar. I synnerhet filmklipp och fotografier föreställande små flygande ljuspartiklar – så kallade orber – har blivit populära. Idag kan man på både Facebooksidor och i spiritualistisk nischade Internetfora som Spiritualism i fokus se hur sådana bilder sprids och presenteras som bevis för andlig aktivitet. Några av skribenterna framhåller även att man genom träning kan lära sig att se orberna med blotta ögat.[16]

Spiritualister i tv

I ljuset av spiritualisternas historia av att använda nya tekniker och (mass)medier i bevisföringssyfte är det inte så underligt att dagens medier har valt att medverka i tv, trots begränsande möjligheter att påverka programmens innehåll. Utöver drivkraften att bli känd (som förvisso inte bör underskattas) är det tydligt att de sett sitt deltagande som en möjlighet att övertyga tittarna om att det finns en andevärld.[17] Första gången medier medverkade i en svensk reality-produktion var 2003, i Kanal 5:s satsning *Förnimmelse av mord*.[18] Bland medierna fanns bland andra Jill Petersson, Jörgen Gustafson, Lena Ranehag och Terry Evans, och som titeln antyder bestod deras uppgift i att försöka klara upp

olösta mordfall (och ett par försvinnanden). TV4 Plus har dock blivit den i särklass viktigaste digitala arenan för denna typ av program. Redan under startåret 2003 värvade man producenten till *Förnimmelse av mord*, Caroline Giertz, som sedan dess varit drivande för utveckling av genren och som fungerat som både producent och programledare i *Det okända*. Hösten 2003 köpte TV4 Plus in danska *Åndernes magt* (som gavs titeln *Andarnas makt*), en serie där medier driver ut andar ur danska hem.[19] Serien omredigerades dock för att ges en lokal inramning; de danska "fallen" presenterades av programledaren Malin Berghagen Nilsson från en studio på Häringe slott, där de avslutningsvis kommenterades av svenska medier. *Andarnas makt* blev så populär att kanalen redan året efter skapade en egen, inhemsk, version: *Det okända*. Man rekryterade då medier från tidigare produktioner, som Elisabeth Lannge, Jörgen Gustafsson, Lena Ranehag, Anders Åkesson, Iris Hall och Terry Evans. *Det okända* har producerats kontinuerligt sedan starten 2004 och innehållsmässigt har få förändringar skett. Medan enstaka avsnitt behandlat healing, privata seanser, spådomskonst och klärvoajans, har tonvikten hela tiden legat på husrensningar. Serien har dock inspirerat till spinoffer med annan inriktning, som talangjakten *Akademien för det okända* (2007) och *En natt på slottet* (2014–).

REALITY OCH VARDAGLIGHETEN

På vilka sätt söker då *Det okända* (eller personerna bakom programmet) övertyga? Man skulle kunna säga att redan genren bär med sig sådana möjligheter. Reality, som fick ett globalt genombrott i mitten av 1990-talet (och som i Sverige kommit till uttryck i serier som *Expedition Robinson*, *Farmen* och *Big Brother*), bygger nämligen på att visa upp verkliga, vardagliga, människor, även om dessa agerar i situationer som skapats för tv. Som andra reality-program anspelar *Det okända* på alldagligheten, vilket här också bidrar till att skänka trovärdighet till spökerierna och mediernas förmåga att tala med de döda. Serien utspelar sig i hemmiljö, där tittaren får insyn i de boendes kök, sov- och badrum, barnkammare och förvaringsutrymmen. Medievetaren Eva Kingsepp som studerat serien har myntat det träffande begreppet "IKEA-kontext", och påpekat att vardagligheten hos de boende och deras hem fungerar autentifierande; det är inga "flummare" som fått andar i huset utan helt vanliga människor.[20] Man kan också se hur filmtekniska grepp från reality-genren används för att skänka trovärdighet till konceptet. Redigeringsmässigt består reality av kollage av sammanklippta intervjusektioner, filmklipp och dramatiserade händelser som görs begripliga genom en pålagd speakerröst (voice-over)

som för handlingen framåt.[21] *Det okända* följer i samtliga avseenden denna redigeringsmall, men här bidrar den karaktäristiska speaker-rösten (Giertz) till att trovärdiggöra det tittaren kommer att se under programmet. I varje episod understryker den allvarliga rösten att medierna inte getts någon information om vare sig de personer som sökt deras hjälp eller den plats dit de kallats, något som bidrar till att skapa en övertygande inramning till programmet och mediernas arbete.

BOENDE SOM OMVÄNDA SKEPTIKER

Det okända har också en argumenterande berättarstruktur, och det är möjligt att i denna finna paralleller till äldre tiders spiritualistiska om-vändelseberättelser.[22] I detta fall är det de boende som får den berättar-mässiga funktionen som övertygade skeptiker, och tittaren får genom programmets tre delar följa deras resa. Även om många onekligen ver-kar "omvända sig" måste denna berättelse ändå ses som resultatet av en redigeringsprocess där man sammanfogat valda klipp från intervjuer och mediernas besök, vilka tolkas och ges mening av speakerrösten. I den första delen introduceras de boende – nästan samtliga barnfamil-jer – och deras problem. Ofta redogör de för hur de känt sig iakttagna på vissa platser, hört steg, sett skuggor i ögonvrån eller i sällsynta fall angripits av osynliga inkräktare. Det är uppenbart att åtminstone nå-gon i familjen tror att de har "andebesök", annars hade man knappast vänt sig till *Det okända*.[23] I det sammanvävda berättarkollaget betonas dock starkt deras skeptiska hållning, vilket bidrar till att stärka deras trovärdighet. Speakerrösten poängterar till exempel att de tidigare varit kritiska till övernaturliga fenomen men att upprepade oförklar-liga händelser i hemmet fått dem att ifrågasätta sin hållning. I regel är kvinnorna redan inledningsvis mer "öppna" än männen (som ofta är ifrågasättande eller rent av avfärdande), men även de uttrycker oro över att de kan ha inbillat sig alltsammans. Speakern förstärker reto-riskt osäkerheten genom att framhålla att de kan ha fel eller rentav vara lite tokiga. Kanske har den manlige skeptikern rätt?

Därnäst anländer ett av medierna som, tätt följt av nyfikna familje-medlemmar, börjar undersöka hemmet. Berättartekniskt fungerar den-na del som ett omskakande steg på vägen mot omvändelse. Under sin husesyn "upptäcker" mediet olika andar som befinner sig på platsen, både anhöriga "på besök" från andevärlden och en obehagligare vari-ant. Momentet där mediet pekar ut anhöriga känns igen från äldre (och samtida) seanser, där de boende kopplar samman de karaktärsdrag me-dierna beskriver med avlidna personer i sin närhet och således "bekräf-tar" deras uppgifter. Dessa klipp är ofta känsloladdade, och både män

och kvinnor torkar tårarna då de "känner igen" mormor eller pappa och får motta budskap från dem. De obehagliga andar som utpekas som orsak till värre störningar beskrivs av medierna som personer som tidigare bott på platsen och inte "gått över till andra sidan", och i den andra delens dramatiska avrundning kämpar mediet med att förmå dem att lämna hemmet och gå över till andevärlden.

Den tredje delen inkluderar en uppföljning där Giertz intervjuar familjemedlemmarna. Narrativt utgör detta moment slutpunkten; det är nu de boende blivit omvända och "kommer ut" som troende. I regel beskriver de mediets besök som omtumlande och framhåller att de "träffsäkra" beskrivningarna av deras avlidna anhöriga övertygat dem om att det finns en andevärld. Nästan samtliga poängterar också att det blivit lugnare i hemmet, vilket de presenterar som ytterligare belägg för att det funnits andar på platsen, som mediet lyckats avlägsna. Det är tydligt att Giertz under intervjuns gång inbjuder de boende att forma sina berättelser i enlighet med omvändelsemodellen, genom direkta frågor om hur besöket påverkat deras inställning. Ofta vänder hon sig specifikt till män som uppgett sig vara skeptiker och frågar, i lätt retsam ton, om de reviderat sin uppfattning – en fråga som brukar resultera antingen i försiktigare uttalanden som "jo, det är ju konstigt att mediet kunde veta så mycket om mig" eller också i helomvändningar som "detta har verkligen förändrat mitt sätt att se på världen". I somliga fall förstärks omvändelsetemat genom att speakern avrundar programmet genom en kommentar som "ja även skeptikern har ändrat åsikt, och äntligen har det blivit lugnt i hemmet".

ÅTERBLICKAR SOM ÖVERTYGANDESTRATEGI

Medan omvändelseberättelserna kan sägas ha förts över från skriftligt till digitalt format har massmedial och teknisk utveckling också skapat nya möjligheter att övertyga.[24] Jag har beskrivit hur *Det okända* använder typiska realitygrepp för att signalera att vad tittaren kommer att få se är "på riktigt". Det är dock inte bara det överordnade konceptet som skänks trovärdighet genom realitymässig redigering; det arbete mediet utför hemma hos familjerna bearbetas på liknande sätt. För att underlätta för nytillkomna tittare innehåller reality-produktioner korta återblickande repriser där tidigare händelser illustreras genom svartvita, suddiga klipp.[25] I *Det okända* har dessa klipp också en annan funktion: att skapa tilltro till mediernas förmåga att kommunicera med andar. I programmets andra del, där mediet "diagnostiserar" hemmet, redogör vederbörande ofta först för upplevelser han eller hon menar att de boende haft på olika platser: de kan till exempel ha hört steg i hallen

eller känt sig iakttagna. Mediet kan då även peka ut vissa rum som särskilt starkt påverkade av andliga energier och därmed obehagliga att vistas på. Klippen från mediernas besök bryts dock av återblickar från programmets första del – intervjupassager eller dramatiserade händelser – som valts ut så att de boendes berättelser och mediernas iakttagelser framställs som samstämmiga. Därigenom ges en vink om att det faktiskt finns något övernaturligt i hemmet som både familjen och mediet kommit i kontakt med. Låt mig ge ett exempel. I ett avsnitt som sändes den 29 oktober 2008 undersöker mediet Jörgen Gustafsson en gård utanför Västerhaninge. Efter att ha hälsat på familjen som bor där börjar han sin sedvanliga tur genom huset, åtföljd av modern och tonårsdottern. Då han kommer upp på övervåningen stannar han till i ett av rummen och ser plötsligt berörd och lätt förvirrad ut. Här introduceras ett svartvitt dramatiserat klipp från programmets första del, där fadern i familjen ses dammsuga i just detta rum, samtidigt som han (i form av speakerröst) återger en underlig upplevelse han hade vid det tillfället. Mannen beskriver denna som "en hårresning", som om någon "smekte sakta över snagget" på huvudet. Omedelbart därefter återförts tittaren till mediets undersökning och Gustafsson som förklarar att två andar brukar uppehålla sig i rummet. Han konkluderar att de "måste göra något åt det här: här var det nästan värst utav alla ställen".[26]

arkivbesök och "andeskapande"

Att söka belägga de uppgifter som medier presenterar har varit ett återkommande inslag vid spiritualistiska seanser och det har varit besökarna som förväntats bekräfta dem. *Det okända* har fortsatt i samma spår, men har även introducerat ett nytt sätt att söka och presentera bevis. Programmets tredje del innehåller, utöver uppföljningsintervjuerna, ett moment där en av *Det okändas* reportrar beger sig till olika arkiv för att i de historiska källorna "hitta" de osaliga andar medierna pekat ut. Inslaget för tankarna till historisk forskning eller grävande journalistik, aktiviteter som kan tänkas väga tyngre och ge ett mer seriöst och objektivt intryck än seansernas personbaserade bekräftelser. Tittaren får här följa hur reportern, tillsammans med en arkivarie, söker efter spår av historiska personer vars namn, yrken och levnadslopp stämmer överens med information som mediet uppgett. Momentet är tydlig missionerande och man söker i praktiken snarare belägga än vederlägga mediernas uppgifter. I regel har mediet i fråga lämnat relativt mångtydig information, vilket förenklar processen. Har vederbörande till exempel angett att den ande som "fastnat" var en Anna, Anne eller Anna-Karin som arbetat på en gård som legat på platsen och som av-

lidit 1860 eller 1816 i en olycka kan man se hur reportern (eller programledaren) förhandlar med uppgifterna i arkivmaterialet. Hittar man inte någon historisk person som haft Anne eller Anne som förnamn används ibland mellannamn. En Greta Maria Anne Petersson kan till exempel presenteras som den "Anne" som mediet talat om. Även årtal och plats kan omförhandlas. Har det inte legat en gård precis på platsen, men väl en bit bort, är det förmodligen denna det rör sig om, och årtalen mediet uppgett är kanske inte så exakta. Det finns dock avsnitt där programledaren framhåller att man inte kunnat bekräfta något av det mediet berättat.[27]

Det är inte bara arkivforskningen som verkar trovärdighetsskapande i denna sista del av programmet. Avslutningsvis ges "andarna" kött på benen i ett moment bestående av reprisklipp från mediernas besök, "bildbevis" i form av äldre fotografier från trakten, tidningsutklipp, detaljer från arkivens mantalslängder och om möjligt fotografier på "anden" i fråga.[28] Speakerrösten redogör under vägens gång för andarnas (ofta tragiska) livsöden, och sammanför då historiska uppgifter med dem som mediet angett. Att på detta sätt visualisera och "berätta fram" andarna ger förstås intryck av att det var just dessa personer som medierna haft kontakt med. Speakerrösten förhandlar nu också diskrepanser mellan mediernas utsagor och den information man fann i arkiven. I ett par avsnitt antyds att medierna kan ha rätt, men att de myndighetspersoner som fört in uppgifter i kyrkoböcker och mantalslängder utlämnat känsliga uppgifter, som existensen av oäkta barn till mäktiga personer. I de fall där reportern inte lyckats presentera övertygande historiskt material beskrivs detta ändå inte som belastande för mediet. Speakern, som rör sig inom en spiritualistisk förståelsehorisont, kan till exempel avrunda med en kommentar som "vi har tyvärr inte lyckats ta reda på vem mannen vårt medium hade kontakt med var", där det tydligt signaleras att andarna faktiskt fanns där och att mediet kommunicerat med en av dem.

UTANFÖR TV-RUTAN

Personerna bakom *Det okända* har fortsatt ett spiritualistiskt projekt som syftar till att belägga existensen av en andevärld. Det är värt att betona att motiven bakom detta står att finna i såväl kommersiella intressen (att skapa underhållande tv) som i personligt engagemang. Från ett historiskt perspektiv har programmen fått en funktion som påminner om den som de bevissökande organisationerna hade under 1800-talets andra hälft. Det nya massmediala formatet (tv) har dock gjort det möjligt att nå ut till betydligt fler personer. Under åren som gått har *Det*

okända också lyckats attrahera en stor tittarkrets. Hösten 2011 sågs serien av i genomsnitt 195 000 tittare med en relativt jämn fördelning mellan män och kvinnor.[29] Något man kan spekulera i såhär avslutningsvis är huruvida serien lyckats övertyga sina tittare. Det faktum att tron på andar och mediers förmåga att kommunicera med dem ökar i landet skulle kunna indikera att *Det okända* faktiskt bidrar till att forma samtida svenskars religiösa föreställningar.[30] Något annat som stödjer en sådan tolkning är att antalet personer som vill få sina hus "rensade" verkar ha ökat också utanför tv-rutan sedan seriens start.[31] I varje fall är det tydligt att *Det okända* väcker en rad olika känslor bland sina tittare. Under de två år som jag studerat spiritualistiska medier i reality-serier har jag, i helt ovetenskapliga sammanhang, haft möjlighet att diskutera programmet med personer med mycket olika inställning. Bland dessa finns skeptiker som inte kan begripa hur "man kan ge plats åt bedragare i tv", personer som beundrar de "träffsäkra medierna" och en grupp som "egentligen inte tror" men som tycker att programmet "är läskigt". En av de senare, en kvinna i tjugofemårsåldern, berättade skrattande att hon inte vågade se *Det okända* av rädsla för att det skulle börja spöka i hennes lägenhet. Är andarna verkliga eller är de sociala konstruktioner? Oavsett om *Det okända* lyckats övertyga dig är det kanske bäst att ta en titt under sängen innan du somnar. Bara utifall att …

NOTES

1   Se Stella Bruzzi: *New Documentary. A Critical Introduction* (London, 2000), 75–98.
2   Jessica Moberg: "Hemsökta hus och medielogikens spöken. Spiritualistiska mediers inträde i svensk tv under 2000-talet" i *Aura: Tidskrift för akademiska studier av nyreligiositet* [under utgivning].
3   Eva Kingsepp: "Medier i medier. Det okända och döden som ett annat sätt att vara" i Hirdman (red.): *Döden i medierna. Våld, tröst och fascination* (Stockholm, 2012), 138.
4   Förutom att det lyser igenom i serien har Giertz själv tillkännagett i kvällspressen att hon tror på andar, spöken och mediers förmåga att kommunicera med dessa. Hon har även publicerat det gudinneorienterade nyreligiösa verket *Ashimas bok* (Stockholm, 2006) som hon tillskriver inspiration från gudinnan. Även Sara Newihl, mångårig reporter bör ses som troende, då hon och hennes sambo själva sökte hjälp från redaktionen då de menade att det börjat spöka hemma hos dem (*Det okända*, 5/3 2008).
5   Studien bygger på en genomgång av samtliga avsnitt av *Det okända* mellan 2004 och 2011.

6 Jag gör här en åtskillnad mellan spiritism som övergripande kategori som inkluderar en mängd former av andekommunikation i olika historiska och samhälleliga kontexter, och spiritualism som refererar specifikt till traditionen med rötter i 1800-talet.

7 Se Janet Oppenheim: *The Other World. Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850–1914* (Cambridge, 1985).

8 Inga Sanner: *Att älska sin nästa såsom sig själv. Om moraliska utopier under 1800-talet* (Stockholm, 1995), 351.

9 Alex Owen: *The Darkened Room. Women, Power, and Spiritualism in Late Victorian England* (Chicago, 1989).

10 Oppenheim: *The Other World*, 32, 199–203; Sanner: *Att älska sin nästa såsom sig själv*, 393.

11 Se Oppenheim: *The Other World*.

12 Owen: *The Darkened Room*, 41; Oppenheim: *The Other World*, 46, 70–77.

13 Sanner: *Att älska sin nästa såsom sig själv*, 358.

14 William H. Swatos Jr.: "Spiritualism as a Religion of Science" i *Social Compass* 37:4 (1990), 471-482.

15 Friedrich Jürgenson: *Rösterna från rymden* (Stockholm, 1964); Friedrich Jürgenson: *Radio- och mikrofonkontakt med de döda* (Uppsala, 1968).

16 Se t.ex.: https://sv-se.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.379386788753285. 94680.293538674004764&type=3[sidan tillgänglig 29/1 2016]; http:// spiritualism.ifokus.se/discussions/4dbd97e288f4725bed0003f4-orb [sidan tillgänglig 21/8 2015].

17 Se t.ex. *Det okända* (12/10 2003), TV4 Plus.

18 Serien producerades i två säsonger.

19 Begreppet "utdrivning" förekommer i de danska programmen men har inte fått samma genomslag i den svenska kontexten, där man hellre refererat till praktiken som "husrensning".

20 Kingsepp: "Medier i medier", 140.

21 Bruzzi: N*ew Documentary*, 75–98.

22 Liknande berättelser finns i självbiografier skrivna av några av tv-medierna. Ett exempel är Elisabeth Lannges *Budbärare från det okända* (Norrköping, 2008).

23 Det är tydligt i många avsnitt att några av familjemedlemmarna verkligen är rädda. Det finns också indikationer på att många redan har någon form av nyreligiöst engagemang, även om speakerrösten istället betonar deras tidigare kritiska hållning. Bland de kvinnor som intervjuas använder flera nyreligiöst präglade begrepp som "energier". Därtill kan en uppmärksam tittare se såväl drömfångare som kristaller, änglastatyer och rökelsekar pryda fönster, skåp och bord i flera av hemmen.

24 *Det okända* är redigeringsmässigt intressant, då serien blandar tekniker från reality med sådana som känns igen från skräckfiktionen, däribland mörkerfilter, kontrastförändringar och snabba zoomningar. För en mer uttömmande diskussion hänvisas till Moberg: "Hemsökta hus och medielogikens spöken".

25 Även om jag inte intervjuat tittare misstänker jag starkt att de flesta inte reagerar på hur återblickarna används, eftersom de förekommer i så många andra reality-produktioner.

26 *Det okända* (29/10 2008), TV4 Plus.

27 I dessa fall betonas istället de boendes bekräftelse att det blivit lugnare efter mediets besök, och speakerrösten framhåller att det viktigaste är att friden i hemmet återställts.

28 Även de boendes anhöriga ges på detta sätt "kött på benen".

29 Kingsepp: "Medier i medier", 134.

30 Sven-Eric Morhed: "Om tron på det oförklarliga i en vetenskaplig tids-ålder" i Bråkenhielm (red.): *Världsbild och mening. En empirisk studie av livsåskådningar i dagens Sverige* (Nora, 2001); Ulf Sjödin: "The Paranormal in Swedish Religiosity" i Davie, Heelas & Woodhead (red.): *Predicting Religion. Christian, Secular and Alternative Futures* (Aldershot, 2003).

31 Moberg: "Hemsökta hus och medielogikens spöken".

Göran Larsson

KALIFATET SOM INTE
BLEV SOM MAN HADE TÄNKT SIG

De som lämnar Islamiska staten[*]

Sedan sommaren 2014 har framväxten av den Islamiska staten i Syrien och Irak (förkortat som IS) varit föremål för ett stort antal journalistiska och vetenskapliga studier.[1] Rörelsens brutalitet, ideologi/teologi och dess historiska rötter har belysts och analyserats i både populärvetenskapliga och akademiska texter. Även det faktum att omkring 300 svenska medborgare kan ha anslutit sig till IS har bidragit till en växande uppmärksamhet i Sverige.[2] Enligt uppgifter från *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence* har så många som 20,000 personer från olika delar av världen anslutit sig till IS och liknande rörelser som förespråkar våld. Av dessa uppskattas cirka 4 000 komma från Västeuropa.[3] De utländska stridande utgör en betydande del av IS totala mängd soldater, men framför allt är det personer från Syrien och Irak som stöttar och strider för IS. Genom att ett litet antal avhoppare från rörelsen har gjort sig kända kan vi få en bild av varför individer både ansluter sig till och lämnar en rörelse som IS. Samtidigt som denna sorts vittnesmål kan vara färgade av det faktum att individer vill lämna och ta avstånd från sitt tidigare liv är dessa röster betydelsefulla att analysera eftersom de kan ge oss en bild av varför vissa individer lockas till en rörelse som IS. Stuart A. Wright pekar på detta faktum när han skriver:

> Important insights may be culled from those adherents who find
> continuation untenable. Locating sources of disillusionment or
> disaffection can tell us as much about attachment and commitment-
> building as studying consecrated devotees. By exploring how com-
> mitment is weakened or destroyed we advance our understanding

of factors and processes that sustain commitment. In sociological terms, attachment/commitment processes and mechanisms are often mirror images of detachment and withdrawal.[4]

På basis av den knapphändiga information som finns tillgänglig har föreliggande kapitel som syfte att dels ge en övergripande bild av varför individer väljer att lämna IS och dels att knyta dessa berättelser till forskning om inträdde samt utträde ur religiösa rörelser. Väl medveten om de metodologiska problemen som finnas när man skall jämföra olika individers berättelser och olika typer av rörelser oberoende av tid och rum är mitt fokus i föreliggande kapitel främst inriktat på att jämföra olika berättelser som just handlar om varför individer lämnar ett religiöst engagemang som har tagit upp en stor del av deras liv och som i vissa fall också kan ha varit destruktivt för individen och det omgivande samhället.

AVHOPPARE FRÅN IS

Enligt *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence* har totalt 58 individer lämnat IS sedan januari 2014 till och med augusti 2015.[5] Mörkertalet kan dock vara mycket större och siffran avser endast personer som öppet har vittnat om att de har lämnat IS. Det faktum att avhoppare löper en stor risk att bli dödade innebär att många väljer att inte offentliggöra sitt avståndstagande – ett faktum som speciellt gäller för de som fortfarande lever kvar i områden som domineras av IS eller som ligger i närheten av områden som kontrolleras av rörelsen.[6] De som offentligt har lämnat IS fördelar sig på följande länder enligt ovan nämnda rapport:

Tabell 1: Antal individer som har lämnat IS uppdelade efter nationalitet. Källa: Neumann: *Victims*, 16.

Tabellen ovan visar att merparten av de som offentligt har lämnat IS – genom att till exempel meddela detta i intervjuer med dagstidningar eller via sociala medier (speciellt på Youtube) – har sin bakgrund i Syrien. Detta är kanske inte konstigt, med tanke på att merparten av de som har anslutit sig till konflikterna i Syrien kommer från Mellanöstern och Nordafrika, men också från andra delar av den så kallade muslimska världen.[7] Uppgifterna är överlag osäkra och mörkertalet är förmodligen stort. Antalet som lämnar eller minskar sitt engagemang i rörelsen utan att ta avstånd från IS i ett publikt sammanhang är antagligen större. I tabellen ingår exempelvis inte 17-årigen från Lund som lämnade IS och som återvände till Sverige under hösten 2015. Under september 2015 blev hans avståndstagande från IS offentligt.[8]

Likt många andra avhoppare var lundensaren besviken på IS eftersom deras tolkning och tillämpning av islam inte överensstämde med hans bild av vad som var "sann" islam. För att manifestera sitt avståndstagande från IS publicerade han följande text på Facebook.

> Under de senaste månaderna jag spenderade i den Islamiska Staten uppenbarades sig en annan verklighet inför mina ögon som pressade mitt bröst. Bakom dem uppriktiga bröder och systrar som infinner sig på gatorna och i hemmen, bakom dem överväldigande affischerna som kallar till Tawheed [enhet] och bakom de svarta flaggorna som stolt fladdrar i luften, så existerar det en högmodig 'Aqeedah [dogm, lärosats] som nu har blivit någonting stressande.
>
> Jag lämnar dess öde till Allâh, för jag är endast en enkel tjänare, och det påverkar inte Allâhs slutgiltiga beslut varesig jag försvarar den eller gör det motsatta. Men jag stödjer härmed inte Islamiska Statens handlingar. De har en extrem tro när det kommer till takfir [att förklara någon som icke-muslim, det vill säga kafir/kufar], och de förlöjligar nobla 'ulama (lärda). Lärda som Allâh har väglett oss genom, vilkas uppriktighet är välkänd. Jag stödjer inte IS, bl.a. på grund av deras uppförande mot både muslimer och oskyldiga icke-muslimer. Jag stödjer inte dem då de dödar muslimer, bryter förtroenden och löften, inte följer vår religions balans i alla aspekter och då de förkastar råd från dem som inte är med dem.[9]

Hans berättelse tycks dock vara långt ifrån unik. Även den svenska säkerhetspolisen vittnar om att många återvändare har blivit besvikna på IS. De skriver:

Erfarenheter från olika europeiska länder visar att många som stridit i Syrien och sedan återvänt till sina hemländer lider av sina erfarenheter. Det kan handla om skuldkänslor för handlingar de begått, besvikelse över hur vistelsen var, eller om psykiska besvär efter att ha varit rädda och bevittnat grymheter.[10]

Peter R. Neumanns rapport *Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors*, som för tillfället är den mest omfattade rapporten om avhoppare från IS, innehåller ett flertal skildringar som pekar på att många är besvikna. Enligt Neumanns analys är det fyra berättelser ("narrativ") som återkommer när avhoppare motiverar och förklarar varför de har valt att lämna IS. De fyra narrativen kan sammanfattas på följande sätt:

Figur 1: Motiv till varför avhoppare lämnar IS.

"Infighting"

Istället för att slås mot Assad-regimen så slåss man mot andra sunni-muslimska grupper. Detta leder till "fitna" (arabiska för splittring, söndring)

Brutalitet - men inte endast mot fienden

Brutalitet mot andra sunni-muslimer och inte endast mot "fienden" (här ofta definierats som icke-muslimer och muslimer med så kallade felaktiga synsätt, speciellt shia-muslimer)

Korruption och oislamiska beteenden

Orättvisor, rasism, korruption, nepotism, själviskhet snare än vad som uppfattas vara "islamiska" dygder (det vill säga rättvisa, kamratskap, osjälviskhet)

Dålig livskvalitet

Besvikelse på livskvaliten, inga eller få hjältedåd, "tristess", inget lyxliv, soldater som kanonmat, brister i infrastrukturen (elbrist, etcetera).

Källa: Neumann, "Victims".

Figuren ovan pekar på att avhopparna som inkluderats i Neumanns rapport har drabbats av vad som närmast kan liknas vid en kognitiv dissonans (se nedan). Att gå med IS motsvarande helt enkelt inte vad anhängarna hade hoppats på och verkligheten i Syrien och Irak överensstämde inte med deras behov, önskemål och drömmar om ett bättre liv.

VÄGAR UT

För att kunna analysera avhoppares berättelser måste en distinktion upprättas mellan de som lämnar frivilligt och de som blir "utplockade" ur en rörelse mot sin vilja (detta gäller framför allt metoder som har används inom den så kallade anti-kultrörelsen[11]). Inom forskningen är det även vanligt att skilja mellan avhoppare som är desillusionerade (*disil-*

lusioned), känslomässigt avståndstagande (*disaffectioned*) och de som bryter med en rörelse (*disaffiliated*). Till den senare kategorin kan även så kallade avhoppare (*defectors*) inkluderas och hit räknas exempelvis de som lämnar "något" (till exempel ett land, en regim eller en rörelse). Skillnaden mellan dessa "typer" kan oftast placeras längst en glidande skala där den första kategorin främst inkluderar personer som har tappat intresset och engagemanget medan de sista kategorierna omfattar de som aktivt och publikt tar avstånd från sitt tidigare engagemang.[12] Till den sista kategorin räknas ofta avhoppare eller apostater (om det handlar om religion) som har en stark önskan att vittna om hur dåligt livet var i den tidigare rörelsen. Bland dessa är det inte ovanligt att hitta så kallade karriärapostater eller "professionella ex" som har gjort en karriär på att kritisera den rörelse/organisation som man tidigare tillhört.[13] Samtidigt som studier visar att både konvertering liksom olika grader av avståndstagande bäst kan beskrivas som "en ofta utdragen, mångfacetterad och individuell process, snarare än den konfliktladdade händelse som annars framställs" [14], menar andra att ett återkommande drag att personliga kriser har betydelse för både inträde och utträde. Bert Schuurman och Edwin Bakker skriver till exempel:

> It is striking that personal crises are frequently the instigators of both movements towards and away from extremism and terrorism.[15]

Men i linje med tidigare konverteringsstudier är det också tydligt att vägen ut ur en rörelse kan ta sig många olika uttryck. Sällan handlar det om en enskild händelse utan snarare om en dynamisk process som kan leda till ett minskat intresse och till slut till ett avståndstagande.[16] Trots att utträdet är en komplex och dynamisk process tycks de flesta som lämnar eller "hoppar av" en rörelse av egen vilja gå igenom följande steg.

Figur 2: Inträde/utträde ur en rörelse

Källa: Wright: "Disengagement", 711–712.

Den avgörande punkten i flödesschemat tycks vara när "tvivlaren" upplever en kris som utlöser en stark känsla av det som Leon Festinger kallar för kognitiv dissonans. Festinger sammanfattar sin teori på följande sätt:

> This theory centers around the idea that if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent. Two items of information that psychologically do not fit together are said to be in a dissonant relation to each other. The items of information may be about behavior, feelings, opinions, things in the environment and so on.[17]

En upplevelse av kognitiv dissonans tycks vara en starkt motiverande faktor för förändring.[18] Men samtidigt som en kognitiv dissonans eller en generisk socialpsykologisk förklaring[19] framstår avgörande för de som lämnar en rörelse kan också individer som fortfarande är aktiva i en rörelse uppleva olika former av kognitiv dissonans – det vill säga en spänning mellan ideal och realitet. Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford och Ross Frenetts studie av västerländska kvinnor som har anslutit sig till IS innehåller exempelvis vittnesmål om att allt inte har blivit som kvinnorna hade hoppats på när de kom till Syrien och Irak. Vid sidan av ett starkt stöd för IS och dess anhängares användning av våld vittnar kvinnorna exempelvis om rasism mot icke-arabiska muslimer (främst mot västerlänningar som har anslutit sig till IS), brist på solidaritet och avsaknad av stöd till de som blir änkor.[20] Även kvinnor som har en bakgrund från Syrien som också har lämnat IS vittnar om att änkor blir dåligt behandlade, men dessa kvinnor menar istället att det är de "utländska" kvinnorna som får en bättre behandling än de inhemska kvinnorna som tillskrivs en lägre status.[21] Till exempel har en av kvinnorna som har blivit änka twittrat hashtagen #Nobodycaresaboutthewidow och en av kvinnorna i Hoyle, Bradfor och Frenetts studie skriver:

> The Muhajireen [de som ansluter sig till kampen] are also subject to mistreatment and discrimination from the locals. Many are welcoming, hospitable and eager to help whilst many others aren't.[22]

Trots att vi inte har några uppgifter om hur kvinnorna de facto bemästrar de problem som nämns i citatet ovan är det möjligt att spekulera i ett antal strategier som kan användas för att mildra eller helt ta bort upplevelsen av kognitiv dissonans. En möjlighet är att de ser "problemen" som prövningar från Gud. En annan möjlighet är att de ser den

faktiska situationens reela problem som en illustration av det faktum att det är nödvändigt att skilja mellan "islam" (idealet) och muslimers beteende (realiteten som visar att människor kan begå fel tillskillnad från "islam" som uppfattas som något ofelbart). De som beter sig på ett "felaktigt" sätt kan också framställas som hycklare som endast säger att de är muslimer. Genom sina tankar och sina handlande visar de att de inte är "äkta" muslimer.

Utöver förklaringarna ovan är det även möjligt att motsättningar och ouppfyllda löften om att allt skulle bli bra när man kommer till Syrien och Irak eller när IS styr leder till ett fördjupat engagemang. Om detta är en plausibel tolkning är det även möjligt att se kvinnornas reaktioner som en slags copingstrategi ("en metod för att uthärda" och handskas med en svår situation[23]) när profetior och löften inte infrias. Exempelvis menar Lorne Dawson att många medlemmar i så kallade apokalyptiska nya religiösa rörelser är kapabla att möta kognitiv dissonans i form av motgångar och oinfriade förutsägelser (till exempel att jorden inte har gått under vid ett visst datum) genom att omtolka centrala tankar i teologin eller genom att engagera sig ännu hårdare i rörelsens mål. Istället för att dessa "motgångar" leder till avhopp eller besvikelse kan de till och med vara en källa till fördjupad tro och till ett intensivare engagemang.[24] En sådan tolkning skulle till exempel kunna tillämpas på de tre avhoppade kvinnorna som Azadeh Moaveni intervjuade i *New York Times*. Trots att de hade känt en stigande aversion mot IS valde de att gå med i IS kvinnliga "moralpolis" ("Khansaa brigaden") innan de lämnade rörelsen.[25] Huruvida detta är en medveten eller omedveten strategi eller om det endast skall ses som ett desperat försök att övertyga sig själv om att man har handlat rätt och att man helt enkelt måste fortsätta kampen eftersom det finns ytterst små möjligheter att ta sig ifrån de områden som kontrolleras av IS är svårt att säga. Här krävs framtida studier och intervjuer med avhoppare och återvändare för att kunna ge en djupare bild av dessa frågor.

AVSLUTNING

Samtidigt som många representanter för svenska myndigheter har uttryckt en glädje över att 17-åringen från Lund nu vittnar om IS och dess grymheter är det andra röster som har uttryckt en oro för att avhoppet eventuellt inte är genuint.[26] Många frågar sig om hans avhopp är äkta eller om det endast är ett försök att få strafflindring för eventuella brott som han kan ha begått i Syrien och Irak. Samtidigt som detta kan vara "en fjäder i hatten för samordnarens [Mona Sahlins] utåtriktade verksamhet" och en viktig början på en svensk exit-verksamhet

för individer som ansluter sig till våldsbejakande tolkningar av islam är det inte säkert att han tar avstånd från så kallade fundamentalistiska tolkningar av islam.[27] Utan att fördjupa sig i frågan om vad som kan avses med fundamentalistiska tolkningar (något som till exempel Svenska dagbladets journalist Per Gudmundson inte förtydligar i sin text om den 17-årige svensken) indikerar tidigare studier av avhoppare att många som lämnar en rörelse inte nödvändigtvis återgår till ett liv i majoritetssamhället. Flera av de som lämnar en radikal rörelse väljer ofta att engagera sig i en ny rörelse som också kan uppfattas som kontroversiell enligt majoriteten.[28] I sammanhanget bör det till exempel påpekas att ingen av de 58 avhopparna från IS i Neumanns studie tycks betrakta våldet mot shia-muslimer och andra religiösa och etniska minoriteter som felaktigt. Det var endast IS våld mot sunni-muslimer som avhopparna tog avstånd ifrån. Neumann konstaterar:

> Brutality, therefore, didn't seem to be a universal concern: it was seen through a sectarian lens, and caused outrage mostly when its victims were fellow Sunnis.[29]

Det är inte heller tydligt huruvida avhopparna de facto tar avstånd från IS anspråk och ambition att upprätta ett kalifat med hjälp av våld. Kritiken mot IS tycks främst vara på individnivå – det vill säga att det är personer som missbrukar och utnyttjar situationen – och på basis av Neumanns rapport är det inte tydligt om avståndet också innefattar en systemnivå.[30] Om detta är en korrekt tolkning så är avståndstagandet främst inriktad mot det faktum att vissa personer inom IS har missbrukat islam ("systemet") och tillämpat vad som anses vara "oislamiska principer" snarare än mot användningen av våld för att uppnå ett samhälle baserat på islam.

Samtidigt som det kan finnas fog för en viss skepsis mot de som hoppar av från en rörelse som IS så är det nödvändigt att samhället finner vägar och tillvägagångssätt för de som vill hoppa av från våldsbejakande rörelser.[31] Erfarenheter från tidigare avhopparverksamhet (så kallade Exit-projekt som till exempel utförs av Fryshuset i Stockholm[32]) visar att den som lämnar en auktoritär rörelse ofta befinner sig i en mycket känslig och utsatt situation.[33] Ett utträde kan ofta innebära ett socialt stigmata och de som endast bemöts av avståndstagande och disciplinära åtgärder och ingen plan för hur individen skall komma tillbaks till en situation där han eller hon kan leva inom och tillsammans med majoritetssamhällets medlemmar kan mycket lätt hamna i en annan våldsbejakande och kriminell miljö.[34] Schuurman och Bakker är mycket tydliga på denna punkt:

> If the literature offers one clear point of guidance, it is to emphasize that reintegration programs should also focus on social and practical aspects of deradicalization and disengagement. […] For instance, by helping to develop a new sense of personal meaning through work or education or building alternative social ties through reconciliation with family.[35]

Sammantaget kan man konstatera att ur ett positivt perspektiv kan de som lämnar en rörelse som IS vara en betydelsefull resurs för samhället i arbetet med att bekämpa och förhindra att andra ansluter sig till rörelser som anammar våldsbejakande tolkningar, men detta innebär också ett ansvar att ta fram tillvägagångssätt som kan användas för att hjälpa avhoppare att lämna en våldsam miljö och återinträda i samhället.[36] Detta återinträde kan antingen bygga på ett förändrat beteende (det vill säga att man inte är beredd att använda våld, men att man inte nödvändigtvis överger sin tidigare tillhörighet eller syn på världen) eller på en kognitiv förändring där individen tar aktivt avstånd från sitt tidigare liv. Medan den första utgångspunkten ofta benämns som disengagement i den internationella litteraturen omnämns den andra utgångspunkten vanligtvis som en form av deradicalization.[37] För att uppnå en framgång i detta arbete är det först och främst nödvändigt att definiera vad som avses med en "framgång"; med andra ord vad skall uppnås och på vilka sätt? Utan en tydlig målbild går det inte att mäta graden av framgång. Det är också nödvändigt att arbetet bygger på ett förtroende mellan "klient" (det vill säga den som vill lämna en rörelse eller ett beteende) och den som "vägleder". Samtidigt måste arbetet också vara baserat på en respekt för mänskliga rättigheter, en stor portion av flexibilitet (det finns inga "one-size-fits-all" lösningar) och de som arbetar måste därför vara både lyhörda för insatsers eventuella politiska och sociala implikationer vilket kräver att "vägledarna" är välutbildade inom sina respektive områden enligt Schuurman och Bakker.[38] Misslyckas samhället med dessa båda uppgift finns en överhängande risk att avhoppare antingen sugs upp av kriminella rörelser eller av nya rörelser som har kommit på "bättre" modeller för att införa just deras förståelse av hur samhället bör organiseras. Vad dessa nya modeller kan innebära återstår att se, men det finns anledning att tro att dessa inte nödvändigtvis eller automatiskt kommer att bli mindre våldsamma eller mindre tvingande än IS.

* Arbetet med följande kapitel har genomförts inom ramen för forsknings-projektet "Att lämna islam. Apostasi, religionsfrihet och motsättningar i ett mångreligiöst Sverige" som finansierats av svenska Vetenskapsrådet.

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Ingemar Karlsson

THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN SYRIA

A report from the Swedish embassy in Damascus dated June 5 1980

I arrived in Syria to take up the post as head of mission at the Swedish embassy in Damascus on June 16 1979. The same day a series of political assassinations of Alawites culminated when Alawite cadetts at the artillery academy in Aleppo were massacred. When the report below was written, approximately one year later, Syria was on the brink of a civil war. This uprising was brutally crushed in the city of Hama in February 1982. Following the uprising the regime referred to the brutal methods that were used as "the Hama rules", an expression meant to be a reminder and to deter all opposition. While it is likely that Bashar al-Assad – the current president of Syria – probably had his father's rule in mind when he brutally responded to the first signs of opposition that followed after the Arab spring revolutions that took place in 2011, he forgot that memory is short and that a majority of Syria's population were not born when the opposition was massacred and silenced in 1982. To put the current conflicts in a historical context and to show how I interpreted the situation at the time, the following text is a copy of a report that I wrote back to Sweden in the summer of 1980.

THE REPORT

When Hafez al-Assad took power in Syria by staging a military coup d'état in November 1970 a long period of internal stability started, unprecedented in the country's history since its indepence. Syria was then considered to be the most unstable country in a chronically unsta-

ble region. During the 24 years that followed after the French left Syria the country had experienced twenty military coups d'état.

After his successfull coup d'etat Assad was regarded as a sort of national saviour. His so-called "corrective movement" had done away with the dogmatism that characterized the earlier leftist Baath-regim and even considerably eased the repression of the overthrown Attasi-regim. Assad launched a policy called "infitah" (opening) which meant encouragement of the private sector and foreign investments and initiation of an economic cooperation with the neighbouring Arab states, especially Jordan.

Furthermore, restrictions on foreign travels were eased and Western press became available, although censured. The aim of this policy was first of all to attract the mainly Sunni business bourgeoisie and secure its support. At the same time Assad tried to broaden the basis to the left by creating in 1972 the so-called Progressive National Front which also included the Communist party and two minor Arab socialist parties whose members were given seats in the government.

During the years 1970–75 this policy proved to be succesful and Syria experienced a period without major internal political problems even though the secular policy of the Assad regime met resistance from Muslim fundamentalist circles. Thus in 1973 Assad was forced to retreat when the draft of the new constitution failed to postulate that islam was the state religion. This led to violent riots in the city of Hama which in their turn forced changes in the draft to prescribe by law that the president must be of the Muslim creed.

The improved relations with the conservative oil states led, especially after the war in October 1973, to a growing economic assistance and during 1971–1975 the formerly stagnating Syrian economy could show an average annual growth of 14 %.

The internal stability was accompanied by a pragmatic foreign policy. Assad was doing his best in trying to keep both Moscow and Washington at the same distance. After the October War diplomatic relations were established with the USA. Syria accepted the UN resolutions 242 and 338. A separation of forces agreement on the Golan heights was negotiated. In February 1975 Assad declared for the first time that he was prepared to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for a return of the Golan Heights and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza.

During 1976 both the domestic and the international scene became tense. As a consequence of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon the economic assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was withdrawn. Furthermore, the growing enmity against Iraq resulted in a stop of the

transit of the Iraqi oil export which in 1975 brought 130 million US dollars in revenues. The regime had however calculated with an unchanged high level of economic assistance. The public expenditure thus grew and the adjustment to a gloomier monetary reality could soon be felt.

Furthermore during the years with an uninterrupted flow of economic assistance development projects were initiated on a such scale that it was impossible to complete them. The ease with which it was possible to acquire hard currency lead to leniency as far as the scrutinization of suggested projects was concerned, A growing tendency to invest in new prestigeous projects could be seen while more urgently needed investments into existing industries were neglected. Above all, this artificial economic boom was followed by a growing inflation which averaged 25 per cent in the years 1975–77. In the same period housing prices grew by 300 per cent, and *rashwa* (corruption) followed at the same pace.

In foreign policy the Syrian engagement in Lebanon became a growing burden and it soon had a negative impact on the moral of the army. The higher officers used their service in Lebanon for private enrichment, and this further increased a general dissatisfaction with the existing corruption. Finally, Sadats journey to Jerusalem was a blow to the Syrian policy in the Middle East. The Camp David Agreement had the bilateral approach that Assad had been fearing most; one in which the Golan Heights were not mentioned at all thus leaving it to rest as one of the problems that could possibly be discussed when all other problems have been solved. Assad received nothing in return for his pragmatic foreign policy and thus the negotiations at Camp David forced him to get closer to Moscow, away from the non-alignment policy he had pursued until Sadat's initiative. Syria was thrown back into isolation, this time also within the Arab world, and suddenly, maverick states like Yemen and Libya seemed to be the closest allies, a company that an average Syrian rather detested.

The factors that triggered the political assassinations that became the start of the regime's growing political difficulties were, however, first of all the growing influence of the Alawite minority and the emphasized secular policy. Members of the Alawite sect, to which president Assad belongs, have gradually taken over key positions within the administration, the military, and the Baath party and this at a significant disproportion to their numbers within the population. Approximately 70 per cent of the population of Syria are Sunni Muslims while the Alawites make up a bit over 10 per cent, the same as the Christians. Even though the number of Alawites in the governing bodies is not directly eyecatching – only two of the 37 government members are Alawites – they have got almost all key posts in the "regional command" of the Baath Party

which is the governing body in reality. Every highly placed Sunni state functionary is also being controlled by often formaly subordinated Alawite. This has led to a serious loss of balance among the various ethnical, religious, and political groups, and family clans that existed during the first years of the new regime, a balance which is of utmost importance for the internal stability.

Furthermore, also Syria has come to experience an Islamic revival even though no parallell to Iran can be drawn. There is no Syrian Khomeini. The higher priesthood is appointed and paid by the government and it does not engage in any agitation against the regime. Nevertheless, this relationship has not prevented a growing influx to fundamentalist groups that are united in their opposition against the regime, partially because they consider the president and all Alawites to be heretics and partially because they strictly oppose secularism. The Sunni majority has also of old looked down upon the Alawites who were traditionally considered to be gypsy-like vagrants living isolated and cut off from the rest of Syria in the Alawite mountains east of Lattakia. Together with other minorities like Christians, Druzes, Circassians and Kurds they were without any political consequence untill the French mandate power started recruiting army officers from these minorities.

Assassinations against Alawites in leading positions that started in 1977 were staged by these Muslim fundamentalist groups who were given the common denomination "the Muslim Brotherhood" even though it was not clear to what extent The Muslim Brotherhood was involved.

During 1977 and 1978 no fewer than twenty Alawites in leading positions lost their lives and no perpetrator had been apprehended. The regime's measures to counter these attacks were to further increase the guard around the potential victims which made the other side invent new a tactic. At the beginning of 1979 the attacks were first of all directed against the security police and mainly against the premises of the Baath-partie's youth organisation. Many of those situated in larger cities were blown up and in Damascus a bomb was placed in a room in the party center. These attacks were carried out without any loss of lives while the attacks against the all-present security police, the so called *mukhabarat,* led to several casualities

This wave of violence culminated on 16th June 1979 when Alawite cadetts at the artillery academy in Aleppo were massacred. The person behind the attack was the Sunni captain on duty, a long-time member of the Baath-party whose field of responsibility was ideological instruction. Over seventy cadettes were murdered and the perpetrators fled from the scene.

The attacks were gradually spreading and also directed against Sunnis who were accused of collaboration with the regime, against regime-friendly religious leaders and against the Russian advisors.

In the media campaign and in the statements from the government that followed all the blame for the political violence was put on The Muslim Brotherhood, Israel, and the USA. The Aleppo massacre was followed by executions. Fourteen persons were hung in Damascus, even though they were not involved in the massacre in Aleppo but sentenced earlier for crimes against state security and alleged membership in The Muslim Brotherhood. It is quite likely that they were criminals sentenced to death earlier for other crimes and now used as warning examples.

It has to be admitted that apart from these drastic measures the reaction of the regime in face of the violent deeds were during a long period surprisingly mild – a similar internal situation in Irak would have caused summary mass executions. Assad himself kept an almost defensive attitude, he admitted economical and judicial mistakes on the part of the regime and gave a prospect of political changes. An anti-corruption campaign got under way but it soon turned out to have the opposite effect than intended as only minor commercial actors were arrested while those who so to say personified corruption, that is president's brother Rif'at and his circle, were not investigated.

The Baath-party congress that followed at the end of the year was marked by a surprisingly open critical debate but did not lead to any changes in the party leadership. After the congress the salaries of all state employees including the army were raised by 50–75 per cent for those with the lowest wages and by 10–25 per cent for all others. At the beginning of the new year (1980) the government was reconstructed. The majority of its 37 members were now young technocrats in their 35–40-ties. The purpose of this appointment policy was to give an impression of renewal and efficiency but it was hampered by the fact that there were no signs whatsoever that the power of the hated brother of the president was being limited. As a political gesture, about one hundred political prisoners were released, mainly persons from the left-wing opposition.

These measures had no political effect. On the contrary they rather gave the impression that the regime was on the defensive, an impression that was further strengthened by Assads appearances on the TV where he looked almost frightened in contrast to his earlier appearances when he used to radiate self-confidence.

The assassinations continued and at the beginning of March the opposition seemed to consider the time ripe for an open confrontation

with the regime. The tactic that proved to be so successful in Teheran was employed and a civil disobedience movement was formed in Aleppo and Hama in northern Syria. In Aleppo the whole bazaar, next to Fez the largest in the Arab world, closed down as well as all shops whereupon the military tried to open them by force. Fighting in the streets broke out which lasted a few days and left 60 dead and more than 100 injured. Also in Hama, the Sunni stronghold, the shops closed after a general school strike. No open fighting ensued though. In Damascus the shopkeepers were enticed secretly but they did not follow the example of the other two cities and thus the situation remained normal except for a noticeably larger number of *mukhabarat* throughout the city.

Simultaneously with these strikes acts of terror committed against Alawites and Baath-party members were intensified. I have got the opportunity to read the weekly report of the vice-minister of internal security to the minister on political crimes. The report that normally was of a half-page length now consisted of five pages and showed that the attacks became more spread, also to parts of the country that were untill then untouched by the violence, like Deir az-Zor close to the Iraqi border and other larger towns like Idlib. The worst situation was in Hama where the opposition killed 80 persons considered to side with the regim that week. All over Syria 100 persons lost their lives in political assasination.

Even more serious for the regim than these assassinations was the fact that also other groups critical of the Alawite regim who untill then only had observed the actions of the opposition with a silent approval now began to act more openly and demand political reforms. This opposition is however very heterogenous and the only factor unifying them is their opposition against the Assad regime. No political demands have been presented as yet except unsigned leaflets demanding release of political prisoners, free elections and above all equal rights, i e an end to the Alawite minority hegemony. It is thus difficult to discern any organised groups within this opposiiton. The largest and the one that, if organised, could represent a more serious threat than the Muslim fanatics is the Sunni bourgeoisie which has always constituted the backbone of the country's economy, both in the cities and in the countryside. The opposition from this group is based partially on their exclusion from the centers of political power and partially on their having lost control over the economic life. They now watch how almost all bigger transactions pass through the hands of the Alawites and are not willing to accept that the Alawites have taken over their earlier dominant role within the private sector and the posts within the public administration that offers the best possibilities for fast enrichment.

Opposition however also exists within the Baath-party itself: the left wing opposes what they consider to be Assad's concessions both to reactionary Muslim fundamentalists and by furthering the private sector to the economical interests of the bourgeosie. The leaders of these groups are in exile and they want to bring Baathism back to more rigorous and pure Arab-socialist radicalism.

There are also secessionist groups within all left-wing parties that form the Progressive National Front and are part of the government. As the opposition within the Baath-party they could count on outside support, first of all from Iraq. Even the Muslim opposition could count on support from outside. Damascus has accused first of all Jordan but also the so called reactionary Arab states of having supported the Muslim Brotherhood both materially and morally which probably can not be excluded. There is no doubt though that the Muslim opposition in northern Syria has received support, even material, from Erbakan's National Salvation Party in Turkey which would consider a purely islamic regim in Syria to be of advantage for their own political endeavours.

Finally, it should be pointed out that also the Alawite minority is split, both along political lines and due to old clan rivalries. Assads archenemy, the strong man of the previous regime, Salah Jedid, is for example Alawite and even his followers have most likely a fair share in the number of political killings.

In the beginning Assad tried to react by political counter-moves. The criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood was diminished. Instead USA, Israel, and Sadat were said to be the archenemies with the common aim to overthrow the Syrian regime because of its successfull resistance against the Camp David agreements. Members of the Progressive National Front were promised an increased political influence and a permission to publish their own newspapers as well as political activities at the universities, but not in the army. No measures were though taken in this respect in reality.

Furthermore, a series of trade union congresses were organized to expresss the support for the regime. The unions that refused to participate – engineers, advocates and physicians – were dissolved and then re-created. In connection with these congresses Assad declared that militias of workers, farmers, students, etc would be created and immediately armed. This has however not happened for the evident reason that every such militia would have an overwhelming Sunni majority with a doubtful loyalty. The lack of weapons is the weakness of the Muslim opposition. These countermeasures were so clearly empty of any meaning that they were considered to be just another proof of the regime's weakness and the attacks continued.

Assad decided to play it the hard way. During the night between Easter Saturday and Easter Monday the central parts of Hama and Aleppo,were occupied by government troops and every house was searched for regime opponents and weapons. The troops acted with great brutality and a number of summary and often bestial executions took place, among others of prominent representatives of the doctors trade union in Hama. In Aleppo eyewitnesses have spoken about corpses being dragged behind tanks through the streets in the center of the town and people being killed openly.

Both these cities are now besieged and at times even occupied by the troops. Nevertheless, the attacks against symbolic targets, even persons, among them the Soviet advisors who are seen as symbols of the regime, continue.

This type of actions cannot bring the regime down. The active core of the fundamentalist opposition seems to consist of only two thousand persons. There is however neither a political nor a military cure against this religious fanaticism with its hatred of the Alawites. The Assad regime is now in a vicious circle. The larger the scope of the killings, the greater the dependence of the feared Alawite militia and security forces will be which in its turn only will ignite more hate.

The unity within the army is of decisive importance for the regime's survival, a fact that both sides are well aware of. Armed attacks by the fundamentalist opposition continue with the same stregth almost daily even in Damascus. Yesterday for example ten members of the security police were killed on their way by bus to the airport. The purpose of these attacks is most probably to forcibly create civil war circumstances which would compel the army to act and thus risk falling appart along sectarian lines. This could be the beginning of the minority regime's downfall. Assad has however so far carefully avoided this pitfall. In Aleppo and Hama the troops of his brother Rifaat, the so-called defence brigades that count 25 000 men and function as a sort of pretorian garde have been deployed together with the *quwwat khassa*, the special forces known for their brutality, under the commando of the Alawite Ali Haidar. The army units are kept only for emergency outside these two cities. There are no signs of any split within the army. A parallell with Lebanon comes automatically to mind but has to be dismissed since in Syria there is no firmly established organisatorial structure based on ethnic, religious or clan affiliation. Furthermore, during his more than ten years in power Assad has been able to purge the army of officers who were not considered to be totally reliable. A number of his closest political advisors as for example Mustafa Tlas, the Minister of Defence, are Sunnites and they are indebted to Assad for their posi-

tions. They see in the present regime a guarantee for their continued dominating political influence in the army.

It is difficult to see any way out of the internal political crisis and a long hot summer is to be expected. There are no signs of a "fin de régime". Assad's power base seems to be intact, as mentioned above, and the regime is also protected by half a dozen various security organisations, all of them under the presidents control plus a number of elite-units, first of all the abovementioned special forces, under the command of the president's brother. The time when a general with his troop could drive with tanks into Damascus och take the power are over. All the sophisticated equipment that Syria has got from the Soviet Union, like the T-72 tanks, have not gone to Golan or Lebanon but to Rifaat Assads special forces for an eventual "internal" use. These have carried out series of demonstrative maneuvres in the vicinity of Damascus with the presence of the defence minister Tlass.

Rifaat Assad is said to have declared that he would first turn half of the city into ruins if he should be forced to leave Damascus. Irrespective of whether this is true or not few doubt that a massacre would await the city should the situation in Damascus become risky for the regime. A voluntary retreat on the part of Assad is unthinkable not least due to the risks of massacres this would entail for the million Alawites living in Syria. Should Assad loose power the developments to be expected are so dramatic that this perspective in itself serves as a strong restraining factor.

The weakest point of the regime – its total dependence of the President and his brother's special forces – have, paradoxically, become a guarantee of its continued existence.

The broad passive opposition is probably well aware of the fact that in case of Assad's downfall the only likely alternative, and this after a period of bloody chaos, is either a Muslim fundamentalist regime of Iranian character or a return of the Baath-party's left-wing branch. Both these alternatives are odious for the overwhelming majority within the opposition. Not least the leading circles of the Sunnite bourgeoisie would give preference to Assad if they had to choose between these two alternatives. The recent terror acts – explosions in cinemas, in shops selling liquor and in banks in Aleppo and Hama, and death threats against children going to school seem alien to the large majority of the Sunni opposition who understands that the regime is militarily too strong to be overthrown and who now seems to be getting tired of the personal consequences the internal unrest has caused them. There is hardly any business activity going on and in Aleppo the students have lost the whole year due to a strike to no avail.

If Assad can make political use of these moods the silent support for the militant opposition could be noticeably diminished. He could achieve this through satisfying the Sunni bourgeoisie politically and economically by giving them an increased influence in the political organs and at the same diminishing the Alawite dominance in the private sector. This policy entails however several difficulties. Assad is too much dependent on people like his brother Assad who is the symbol of the dissatisfaction with the regime and thus he cannot carry out any substantial personnel changes as they would be immediately seen as a sign of his weakness. An increased influence in economy of the Sunnites would be opposed by his own supporters who now profit from the system.

Any radical political changes can not be expected. Assad might try to satify the non-fundamentalist opposition by some economic measures but the armed attacks will probaby continue and be met with gradually more brutal methods. The regime however has such instruments of power at its disposal that the only way to bring it down would be a simultaneous liquidation of the president and his brother, an unlikely scenario. If this would happen it would lead to a chaos in Syria with severe consequences for the whole region.

When assessing the international consequences of the internal political situation in Syria it should be taken into consideration that Assad has been the most consistent Arab politician during the 1970- ies. Under his rule Syria has, in contrast to earlier regimes, become a stabilising factor in the Middle East due to Assads pragmatic policies. The internal difficulties together with Carter's policy in the Middle East have forced Assad to leave his earlier principles to try to keep an equal distance to both superpowers.

Should the Assad regime be overthrown and replaced by either a radical branch of the Baath-party or fall into the same fundamentalist abyss as Iran the consequences would be noticeable far outside the borders of this already unstable region. It is only wishful thinking to believe that a new regime in Syria would be internally less repressive than the present one or that it would support the solution of the Middle Eastern conflict in accordance with some Camp David-formulas. One prediction can however be maid.

A post-Assad Syrian regime would be substantially more "rejectionist" than the present one.

Daniel Enstedt

ISLAMISKA STATEN, HIJRAH OCH JIHĀD

Religionsbeteendevetenskapliga perspektiv

INLEDNING

Islams närvaro i det mångreligiösa Sverige har skett genom migration från länder och regioner som länge har varit präglade av islam, som Turkiet, Mellanöstern, Afrikas horn och Balkan. Från att ha varit en minoritetsreligion som framför allt har förknippats med arbetskrafts-invandring har islam kommit att bli Sveriges näst största religion; idag finns muslimska organisationer och föreningar från hela världen repre-senterade runt om i landet. De muslimska grupperna är också mycket heterogena när det gäller kulturella, religiösa, socio-ekonomiska fakto-rer och det finns inte en enhetlig syn på religion och religiositet.[1] Den ökade muslimska synligheten i form av moskéer och islamiska insti-tutioner har kommit att aktualisera den offentliga diskussionen om vilken plats religion och religiositet skall få i det offentliga rummet.[2] I den offentliga diskussionen om islam har bland annat frågor om kläd-sel, slaktmetoder och byggandet av moskéer dryftats. Samtidigt har en ökad anti-muslimsk – "islamofobisk" – retorik framträtt i det svenska samhället.[3] Med kulturgeografen Lily Kongs ord kan man beskriva si-tuationen som att

> the intersection of these [rasifierade och könade] discourses with reworked Orientalist leanings that construct Islam as antithetical to 'western' culture and Muslim women as the embodiment of a 'fundamentalist' and repressive religion […] young Muslim men's masculinities are shaped by markers of social difference and loca-lity, and thus are multiple and fluid.[4]

En sådan betoning av religiös tillhörighet, som det här är fråga om, har inneburit, menar Kong vidare, att "young Muslim people are increasingly defining their identities in terms of their religion, as opposed, for example, to their parental country of origin".[5] Religionens framskjutna plats som identifikationsobjekt har, som Synnøve Bendixsen visar i sin studie av unga muslimska kvinnor i Berlin, medfört att andra och tredje generationernas migranter vänder sig till islam "in a quest for authenticity, an individual identity, and as part of their group orientation".[6] De unga muslimska kvinnorna söker, menar Bendixsen, efter en "renare" och mer autentisk form av islam än den kulturella, urvattnade varianten av islam som de tillskriver sina föräldrar.

I föreliggande artikel ska jag diskutera en motsvarande vändning till islam i Sverige, närmare bestämt den som har varit förknippad med rekryteringen till Islamiska staten (*al-dawla al-islamiyya*) och krigsföringen i Syrien och Irak. Islamiska staten har från flera håll – bland annat av FN och USA:s president Barack Obama – pekats ut som en av de värsta terrororganisationerna i modern tid. Även om det är svårt att ange en exakt siffra så uppskattas ett hundratal individer från Sverige, i huvudsak unga män, men också kvinnor, ha anslutit sig till IS. En av dessa män, här kallad Amer, intervjuades i Göteborgs-Posten med anledning av sitt deltagande i IS krigsföring. Amer avfärdar bestämt den kritik som har riktats mot Islamiska staten från muslimskt håll: "De är hycklare. De vet att vi har rätt, men de låtsas något annat för att passa in i det västerländska samhället."[7] Därtill framhåller Amer att Koranen uppmanar alla rättrogna muslimer till att utföra jihād, även om det skulle innebära att andra muslimer riskerar att dö på kuppen. Det är emellertid inget egentligt problem för Amer, som menar att det inte är alla som kallar sig muslimer som är "riktiga muslimer". För de "riktiga" muslimerna, som enligt Amer följer Koranen och profeten Muhammeds ord, finns ingen död: "Det här livet är bara en prövning, en prövning som avgör vilket liv vi kommer att leva efter döden. Det här livet är inte viktigt. Det är vad som händer efter döden som är viktigt".[8]

Det förekommer inte någon rekrytering till IS, menar Amer; det rör sig snarare om ett kall från Gud: "Om du ska ansluta dig till kampen så är det för att du är kallad av Gud. Det vet du själv, ingen annan kan berätta det för dig."[9] Det är frågan om människor som ansluter sig till Islamiska staten – deras personlighetsprofil, egenskaper och drivkrafter – som kommer att dryftas i det följande, där Amers berättelse får tjäna som en utgångspunkt. Närmare bestämt kommer jag härnäst att beakta några psykologiska och sociologiska perspektiv på hur det kommer sig att unga män och kvinnor ansluter sig till islamistiska rörelser som IS. Eftersom forskningsläget ännu är skralt när det gäller Islamiska staten

kommer jag att vända mig till tidigare forskning om terrorism – bland annat självmordsbombares psykologi – som har en del beröringspunkter med rörelsen, även om det också finns uppenbara skillnader. Först ska jag emellertid teckna en bild av hur Islamiska staten framställer sig själv i olika media, främst genom den internetbaserade tidskriften *Dabiq*. Den Islamiska staten har lockat till sig människor från en rad olika länder. I det följande fokuserar jag i huvudsak på IS-anhängare från Sverige och gör därmed inga anspråk på att förklara hela den Islamiska statens uppbyggnad och medlemsprofil.

Dabiq och islamiska statens självbild

Den 1 juli 2014 kungjorde Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – IS självutnämnde ledare och sedermera även känd som Kalif Ibrahim – kalifatets återkomst och med det muslimers rättigheter och värdighet. Platsen var den stora moskén i Mosul, som IS hade intagit i början av juni samma år. Delar av talet i Mosul publicerades därefter den 5 juli i det första numret av den engelskspråkiga, webbaserade tidskriften *Dabiq*.[10] Talet är att betrakta som ett första offentliggörande av den Islamiska statens intentioner och inriktning. Bakr al-Baghdadi: "Soon, by Allah's permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honor, being revered with his head raised high and his dignity preserved."[11] Tanken om ett återupprättat Kalifat omnämns i samma andetag som uppmaningen till jihād och utplånandet av fienden. I en värld som beskrivs som delad mellan de rättrogna och de otrogna kallar al-Baghdadi muslimer till att emigrera (*hijrah*) till den Islamiska staten. I synnerhet högutbildade muslimer, som läkare och ingenjörer ombeds bege sig till Syrien och Irak; det framställs till och med som deras plikt (*wajib 'ayni*).[12]

En mer detaljerad utläggning om hijrahs betydelse publiceras i det tredje numret av *Dabiq*, där hyckleri omnämns som en motpol till bredvilligheten av att utföra hijrah. Oviljan till hijrah och jihād framställs i själva verket som ett uttryck för otro och apostasi. I *Dabiq* beskrivs förvisso även den inre kamp som muslimer kan uppleva dagligdags när det gäller hijrah och jihād: "This condition described is probably one many Muslims experience daily. There is no solution for it except by taking the first step towards jihād – hijrah."[13] Det råder emellertid ingen tvekan av vad innebörden av jihād och hijrah är i *Dabiq*: det handlar primärt om att ansluta sig till Islamiska staten och krigsföringen i Syrien och Irak. En eventuell tvekan eller oro inför att ansluta sig till IS framstår som överflödig: "Do not worry about money or accommodations for yourself and your family."[14] Kalifatet tillhandahåller

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allt som behövs, som exempelvis en fungerande sjukvård.[15] I retoriken ställs också en förnedrande tillvaro i icke-muslimska länder mot livet i Kalifatet:

> The modern day slavery of employment, work hours, wages, etc., is one that leaves the Muslim in a constant feeling of subjugation to a kāfir master. He does not live the might and honor that every Muslim should live and experience. […]. Whereas when you compare the situation of the Sahābah after hijrah and jihād, you see that the dunyā came to them without them following its tail. They dedicated their lives to Allah, so the dunyā came to them unwillingly.[16]

Istället för att vara förslavad i icke-muslimska länder, och vara tvungen att underkasta sig de otrogna, kan de rättrogna muslimerna alltså välja Kalifatet, där de inte längre behöver slita för att få materiella, världsliga ting (*dunyā*). Genom att välja hijrah and jihād, och på så sätt bli Muhammeds följeslagare (*Sahābah*) i Kalifatet, får anhängarna tillgång till vad de tidigare strävade efter. Den tidigare depriverade tillvaron i utanförskap, förnedring och förtryck ställs alltså emot befrielsen i Kalifatet.

Det är i huvudsak män som avbildas och kommer till tals i *Dabiq*. Vid iftār-firandet under Ramadan sitter män samlade på filtar; i förgrunden av en bild ses en man mata en av pojkarna, medan den motsatta sidan visar upp en manlig militär som ligger död på marken.[17] Döda män och segergestikulerande IS-krigare, sprängda byggnader och vapenarsenaler skapar sammantaget en bild av IS som en mansdominerad rörelse. Islam är, enligt *Dabiq*, inte fredens religion utan svärdets.[18]

I *Dabiq* varvas utläggningar om kalifatet, jihād och hijrah med ocensurerade bilder på döda människor från Islamiska statens sammandrabbningar i regionen. I *Dabiqs* hittills utkomna nio nummer förklaras emellanåt, men inte alltid, grundläggande muslimska termer och begrepp; tidskriften är dessutom skriven på engelska. Språket kan närmast beskrivas som arkaiskt och mässande, medan bilderna och layout rör sig mellan dataspelsestetik, Hollywoods dramatiserade bildspråk och dokumentära skildringar av döda kroppar och krigsscenarior. Det är, som Charles H. Lippy och Eric Tranby skriver i ett annat sammanhang, inte bara ett *faktiskt* krig utan också "a theatrical form of violence; in other words, it is as a symbolic act. It uses images of a cosmic war between good and evil or martyrdom and is performed to dramatize a cause".[19] Samtidigt efterliknar *Dabiq* mer traditionella tidskrifters format, vilket skapar ett trovärdigt uttryck. *Dabiq* är emellertid inte den enda källa till information om IS på nätet. Det finns en uppsjö bilder och videoklipp där människor avrättas eller där en IS-

anhängare, ofta i stridsmundering, uppmanar potentiella kandidater att ansluta sig till kampen.

RELIGIÖS NATIONALISM OCH DRÖMMEN OM ETT KALIFAT

Det kalifat som Islamiska staten har utropat sträcker sig över den landsgräns mellan Syrien och Irak som Sykes-Picot-fördraget drog upp 1916. Även om Kalifatet inte är en nation i formell mening så finns det flera begynnande tecken på nationsbygge.[20] Krigsföringen i Syrien och Irak inbegriper en strävan att uppnå territoriell självständighet. Statsvetaren Gunnar Jervas urskiljer några faktorer som har bidragit till att en religiöst underbyggd terrorism fått en renässans de senaste decennierna, där revolutionen i Iran, som utgjort en förebild för många senare islamistiska rörelser, är den kanske främsta och mest tongivande faktorn. Det som utmärker religiöst motiverade terrorister är, menar Jervas, att de anser sig föra ett heligt krig och inte skyr några medel när det gäller att uppnå sina mål. Det övergripande målet är vanligtvis att utplåna det onda på jorden, för att istället upprätta en ny ordning som genomsyras av den egna religiösa övertygelsen.[21] Jervas lyfter även fram olika sociala och ekonomiska förändringar som gynnat uppkom-sten av den hänsynslösa formen av terrorism som framkommit under senare tid. Han menar att många muslimer upplever en frustration över de egna islamska ländernas oförmåga att förhindra exploateringen av deras mark och naturtillgångar. Denna exploatering beskylls ofta USA och dess allierade ligga bakom.[22]

Den religiösa och nationalistiskt präglade diskursen kring Islamiska staten tenderar att framhålla IS-anhängarna som Guds folk och mot-ståndarna som ondskans hantlangare. Det finns inga neutrala eller oskyldiga civila människor då man endast kan stå på en sida av konflik-ten. Utifrån en sådan ståndpunkt är även civilbefolkningen att betrakta som part i målet. Det är uttryckligen en tydlig dualistisk världsbild som frodas i IS propaganda och retorik. I en sådan föreställningsvärld ten-derar motståndarna att dehumaniseras, medan hjältarna återfinns på den egna sidan av konflikten. Inte minst i krigssituationer är det vanligt att parterna dehumaniserar varandra, bland annat för att rättfärdiga handlingar som drabbar en civilbefolkning. Den dissonans som kan uppstå med dödandet av jämlika människor reduceras om fienden de-humaniseras. Dessutom bör varje tillstymmelse till empati för fienden undermineras eftersom empati är aggressionens och dödandets främsta fiende.[23] Härnäst ska jag vända mig till frågan om huruvida detta krä-ver en specifik personlighetstyp.

I Maxwell Taylors numera klassiska och omdiskuterade terroristprofil framställs den typiske terroristen som en ensamstående man strax över 20 år som har läst något inom humaniora på universitetet. Han tillhör medel- eller överklass och vände sig till terrorism efter att ha stiftat bekantskap med marxistiska idéer.[24] Även om det är vanskligt att fastställa sådana personlighetsprofiler så har flera försök gjorts, inte minst inom säkerhetspolisen, i syfte att kunna förutse terrorattentat. Antaganden om terroristers *trait* – en för individen bestående och grundläggande egenskap – har vanligtvis gjorts utifrån ett litet antal empiriska analyser, som sedan generaliserats. Av den moderna personlighetspsykologin bedöms emellertid ett *trait* som en bristfällig indikation på hur en människa kommer att bete sig i en specifik situation.[25] Det finns dock en rad andra psykologiska förklaringsmodeller som vill ge svar på frågan om terroristens psyke.

Richard Perlstein menar att en narcissistisk besvikelse har en avgörande psykobiografisk betydelse hos 90 procent av terroristerna. Narcissism definieras här som ett intrapsykiskt regleringsverktyg som förmår individen till att försvara jaget från hot och skada.[26] Narcissism kan därtill ses som det sätt på vilket individen relaterar till den yttre världen och dess potentiella förmåga att stärka, tillfredsställa och kompensera individens Jag. Perlsteins förklaring är relativt väl mottagen och accepterad av psykoanalytiker.[27] Flera andra teoretiskt besläktade försök att patologisera terrorister har gjorts. Redan i inledningen av ”The Childhood Origins of Terrorism” slår Lloyd deMabuse fast att roten till terrorism inte står att finna i amerikansk utrikespolitik, utan snarare i den familj terroristen vuxit upp i. Islamistiska terrorister är enligt deMabuse, kort sagt, en produkt av ojämlika, könsstereotypa och fundamentalistiska system som segregerar familjen i två delar: mannens och kvinnans. Barnen växer upp i kvinnans del där mannen inte är närvarande.[28] Joan Lachkar baserar likaså sina antaganden om terroristens personlighet på en föreställning om att fadern ofta är frånvarande i långa perioder i Mellanösterns muslimska samhällen. Vid de tillfällen männen närvarar är de känslomässigt otillgängliga, vilket beror på de muslimska samhällenas polygamiska struktur, menar Lachkar.[29] Sådana föreställningar om den muslimska terroristens personlighet baseras på Freuds teori om oidipuskomplexet. Den kamp mot auktoriteter som utförs av en terrorist antas därmed bottna i en omedveten kamp med fadern.[30] Terroristen befinner sig här i ett symbiotiskt förhållande till modern som den frånvarande fadern möjliggjorde när han inte avbröt den incestuösa relationen mellan mor och son. Eftersom inte sonen

mötte något motstånd från fadern i det oidipala stadiet kunde symbiosen med modern fortgå till vuxen ålder.

I samma anda resonerar Joan Lachkar kring självmordsbombarens psyke utifrån borderlinepersonlighetens särdrag.[31] Lachkar formulerar det på följande sätt: "both the borderline and the terrorist think they have separated from mother's body, but they are forever stuck living emotionally in utero".[32] Barnet blir överstimulerat av moderns närvaro, menar Lachkar, eftersom fadern är otillgänglig. En överstimulans av en kärleksfull moders närvaro gör det svårt för barnet att kontrollera sin sexualdrift. Senare i livet straffar pojken andra människor för sina okontrollerade incestuösa driftsimpulser.[33] Terroristens uppfostran innebär, utifrån ett sådant perspektiv, att de uppfattar sina drifter som farliga och agerar därför ut dem irrationellt och impulsivt. Borderlinepersonligheten är distanserad från sina behov, vilket innebär en frånvaro av impulskontroll och förmågan att göra rationella omdömen. En grundläggande rädsla för att bli övergiven och tillintetgjord är kännetecknande, liksom en brist på verklig jaguppfattning och realitetsprövning.

MOTIV OCH DRIVKRAFTER

Det finns en tendens inom forskningen att förenkla de bakomliggande psykologiska processer och mekanismer som motiverar en terrorist. Det florerar en myt om terroristen som framställer *honom* som psykologiskt avvikande, vilket framgått av ovanstående psykoanalytiskt grundade resonemang. Terroristen antas ha en empatistörning och en patologisk dragning till våld. Terroristen beskrivs vidare som antisocial, paranoid och narcissistisk, eller, som ovan, med en borderlineproblematik. På så sätt reduceras komplexa mekanismer och processer till relativt enkla psykologiska termer och psykopatografier. Efter den 11 september 2001 återupplivades ånyo myten om terroristen. Det som återkommer i de förklaringsmodeller där terroristen patologiseras är en tankefigur där en extrem och avvikande *handling* antas spegla ett extremt och avvikande *psyke*. Nasra Hassan menar att detta är ett direkt felaktigt och missvisande antagande. På frågan om självmordsbombarens psykologi ger hon istället följande svar: "What is frightening is not the abnormality of those who carry out suicide attacks, but their sheer normality. They are so normal for their communities and societies."[34] Även Andrew Silke menar att majoriteten terrorister inte har en speciell personlighetstyp eller lider av en psykisk störning. Detsamma gäller självmordsbombarnas personligheter, som snarare bedöms stabila och inte särskilt anmärkningsvärda ur ett personlighetspsykologiskt per-

spektiv.[35] Det finns ingen särskild personlighetstyp som är benägen att hemfalla åt terrorism och det är i analogi med ett sådant resonemang rimligt att anta att även IS-anhängarna vanligtvis har en normal psykologisk profil. Människor väljer att bli medlem i en terrorgrupp och utför terrorhandlingar av flera olika skäl. Den övervägande delen av IS-anhängarna är sannolikt inte psykiskt störda.

Även om människor som är beredda att utföra terrorhandlingar inte kan kategoriseras utifrån en psykisk störning, en särskild personlighetsorganisation eller profil, så kan man diskutera de psykologiska motiv och drivkrafter som utmärker en IS-anhängare. Det är främst två saker som kännetecknar en IS-anhängares motivation. Anhängaren är vanligtvis mycket starkt motiverad, vilket bidrar till acceptansen av dödande. IS-anhängaren verkar därtill i grupper som stärker denna motivation. Interaktionen med andra som uppmuntrar till hijrah och jihād gör att kandidaterna undviker tvivel och argument som strider mot deras uppfattning.[36] Utöver dessa två aspekter kan hämndmotivet och frustrations-aggressionshypotesen tilläggas; de har anförts som centrala motiv när det gäller att förstå den religiöst motiverade självmordsbombarens psykologi och kan även tas i beaktande i relation till rekryteringen av IS-anhängare, de uppenbara kontextuella skillnaderna till trots.

Hämndmotivet har länge framställts som ett av palestinska självmordsbombares viktigaste motiv; viljan att hämnas är så stark att attentatorn är redo att offra sig själv. Dessutom kan hämnden upplevas nödvändig och rationell för att återupprätta den egna stoltheten, värdigheten och självkänslan, som har kränkts av motståndaren. Hämndbegäret påverkas också av attentatorns erfarenhet av våld, övergrepp och orättvisor som drabbat honom själv eller den egna familjen.[37] Det är vanligt att attentatorn nämner hämnd som motiv i sin avskedsvideo och sitt testamente, som upprättas inför attentatet. Enligt Avishai Margalit är självmordsattackerna ett uttryck för hämnd på israelernas militära och politiska oförrätter. Det är dessutom viktigt att attentatorn vet att hämnden blir erkänd och accepterad i den egna gruppen.[38] Även i *Dabiq* anförs hämnd som motiv, men vanligtvis mer indirekt än i de palestinska självmordsbombarnas videotestamente. Det rör sig snarare om att återupprätta en förlorad värdighet och undslippa en förtryckande tillvaro, än att hämnas explicita oförätter.

Frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen, som först utvecklades av John Dollard redan på 1930-talet men omformulerades av Leonard Berkowitz under 1990-talet, är en förhållandevis populär psykologisk förklaring av terrorism. Hypotesen beskriver, kort sagt, olika reaktioner på frustration: aggressiv, defensiv eller utebliven reaktion. Frustration är förvisso inte den enda orsaken till aggressivt beteende, menar Berko-

witz, utan en av flera negativa upplevelser som kan leda till aggression. Frustrationen skapar negativa och obekväma känslor och det är dessa känslor, inte frustrationen i sig, som kan utlösa ett aggressivt beteende. Om exempelvis en människa hindras från att nå sina mål kan det leda till frustration, vilket kan utlösa ett aggressivt beteende.[39]

Frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen är emellertid problematisk när det gäller att förklara och förstå den enskilde IS-anhängaren och de kollektiva grupprocesser som skapar terrorism. Engagemanget i terroristgrupper och genomförandet av ett attentat antas, utifrån frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen, ske genom en rad enskilda händelser. Terroristen reagerar då aggressivt på de negativa känslor frustrationen skapar. Även om man på en samhällelig nivå finner orättvisa i samhällen där terroristattentat utförs kan man inte utgå från att det finns ett samband mellan attentaten och orättvisa. Det finns, kort sagt, orättvisa samhällen utan terroristattentat. Frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen är en förenkling, även om ett terroristattentat kan, åtminstone delvis, vara motiverat av de negativa känslor som frustrationen framkallar.[40]

Anslutningen till Islamiska statens krigsföring i Syrien och Irak kan inte enbart förklaras utifrån personlighetspsykologiska perspektiv där individuella liv och erfarenheter analyseras. Även de sociala aspekterna kring IS-anhängaren bör belysas mer utförligt, liksom det sociala sammanhang anhängaren ingår i inför anslutningen till IS.

PSYKOLOGISKA ASPEKTER AV TILLHÖRIGHET

I *Dabiq*, liksom i mycket av det material som sprids på nätet, hyllas IS-soldater och framställs som förebilder. I webbaserade videoklipp riktar IS-krigare sig till människor runt om i världen och uppmanar dem att ansluta sig till Islamiska staten. Det finns en mängd propaganda där tillvaron i IS beskrivs i positiva ordalag. Det finns intressanta paralleller med hur självmordsbombare, med Avishai Margalits ord, har framställts i Palestina:

> If it is easy to question whether being a *shahid* [sv. martyr, vittne] secures an immediate entrance to paradise, no one can doubt that being a *shahid* secures instant fame, spread by television stations /…/ which are watched throughout the Arab world. Once a suicide bomber has completed his mission he at once becomes a phantom celebrity. Visitors to the occupied territories have been struck by how well the names of the suicide bombers are known, even to small children.[41]

Självmordsbombaren framstår här som en hjältefigur, någon att se upp till och identifiera sig med. Det är en sådan bild av självmordsbombaren som många palestinska ungdomar ser upp till och beundrar.[42] Självmordskandidatens vetskap om att attentatet kommer att betraktas som martyrskap – och martyren som hjälte – är en viktig psykologisk förutsättning för att attentatet ska genomföras. Om hjälterollen svärtas ner är det inte lika attraktivt att ta den. Hjälterollen måste därtill vara socialt accepterad, respekterad och hyllad, annars riskerar den att förlora sin attraktivitet.

En terrorgrupp kan erbjuda medlemmarna en alternativ kultur, vars normer och värderingar skiljer sig från det övriga samhället. En sådan grupp strävar vanligtvis efter likformighet inom gruppen där medlemmarna inte lämnas utrymme att ifrågasätta gruppens normer och värderingar. En terrorgrupp kan dessutom ge en person som upplever sig alienerad från det övriga samhället en känsla av tillhörighet. En sådan person tenderar, mer eller mindre, att överge sitt individuella ansvar och identifiera sig med gruppen.[43] Deltagandet i en terrorgrupp kan även uppmuntras av den egna gruppen, vilket också framgår av Islamiska statens uppmaning till hijrah och jihād. Anslutningen till Islamiska staten kan i vissa sammanhang uppfattas som ett naturligt steg för en muslim i Sverige; att utan godtagbara skäl *inte* ansluta sig till rörelsen kan uppfattas som svek och förräderi av övriga gruppmedlemmar.[44] Det är i den sociala grupp som presumtiva IS-krigare ingår i innan de ansluter sig till IS i Syrien och Irak som de får stifta bekantskap med rollen som IS-krigare, vilket medför särskilda förväntningar och krav. Under förberedelseprocessen bekräftar gruppen kandidatens roll och gruppens perspektiv stärks hos individen allteftersom interaktionen med medlemmarna fortskrider. I den kognitiva förberedelse som föregår anslutningen stärks också övertygelsen om att fienden är organiserad i maskopi med andra, exempelvis med västmakter som USA.[45] Det är därmed en dualistisk världsbild som stärks, där gränsen mellan de goda och de onda blir allt skarpare.

ISLAMISKA STATEN, GRUPPROCESSER OCH IDENTITET

För svenska muslimer utgör Islamiska staten en av många identifikationsmöjligheter. Hur kommer det sig då att rollen som IS-anhängare är tilltalande för de svenska muslimer som vänder sig till Islamiska staten och dess krigsföring i Syrien och Irak?

I Peter Bergers och Thomas Luckmanns kunskapssociologi är kunskapsförmedling själva kittet i samhällets dialektik; det är den av

människan skapade objektifierade kunskapen som internaliseras i interaktionen med signifikanta andra.[46] Subjektiva verkligheter är beroende av det som Berger och Luckmann benämner plausibilitetsstruktur: "den specifika sociala bas och de sociala processer som krävs för att den [subjektiva verkligheten] skall vidmakthållas".[47] Det är därtill den nära omgivningen som definierar de roller som står till buds för individens identitetsformande. Ett närliggande teoretiskt perspektiv kommer till uttryck med det av Louis Althusser myntade begreppet *interpellation*, som handlar om hur subjektet blir till. Utgångspunkten står att finna i en artikel från 1964 där Althusser skriver om subjektets tillblivelse utifrån Sigmund Freuds och Jacques Lacans psykoanalytiska perspektiv:

> Freud upptäcker i sin tur att det verkliga subjektet, individens innersta väsen, inte har formen av ett ego, centrerat kring "jaget", […] utan att subjektet är decentrerat och konstituerat av en struktur som i sig inte heller har något annat "centrum" än "jagets" imaginära misskännanden, det vill säga annat än de ideologiska formationer som det "känner igen sig" i.[48]

De ideologiska formationerna, som Althusser här omnämner, föregår alltså subjektet: subjektet träder alltid in i en redan formulerad ordning.[49] Subjektet är en effekt av ideologiska formationer, inte dess *primus motor*. Inträdandet i den imaginära ordningen, som Jacques Lacan för samman med vad han kallar spegelstadiet (*le stade du miroir*), ligger till grund för subjektets igenkännande. Subjektet känner därmed igen sig – blir till – i en ideologisk, kulturellt inbäddad bild, som är förankrad i en för subjektet relevant plausibilitetsstruktur.[50]

För att klargöra detta samband ytterligare ska jag vända mig till Judith Butler och hennes teoretiskt besläktade antagande om hur "jaget" blir till. Butler har påvisat hur interpellationen inbegriper förväntningar på subjektets beteende, språk, föreställningar och begär. Men Butler understryker också att subjektet omöjligt helt och fullt kan känna igen sig i interpellationen vilket, som hon uttrycker det, "implies the instability and incompleteness of subject-formation".[51] Interpellationens oförmåga att fullständigt benämna subjektet framträder dessutom när Butler diskuterar sociala och politiska grupperingar:

> The identity that the name confers turns out to be empty, and this insight into its emptiness produces a critical position on the naturalizing effects of this naming process. The emperor has no clothes, and we are somehow relieved of the prejudicial and phobic logics

that establish the "Jews" or any ethnic minority as the "cause" of any array of social anxieties.[52]

Interpellationens implicita strävan efter enhet, via en nödvändig avgränsning och uteslutning, fallerar alltså då den appliceras på en partikulär social gruppering. Dessutom är detta benämnande, eller namngivande, också bedrägligt då det är tomt på liknande sätt som kejsarens (den sociala gruppen) nya kläder (benämningen) är "tomma". Men även om man kan få insikt om att det förhåller sig på detta sätt – att kejsaren är utan kläder – så reproduceras ständigt denna fördomsfulla och fobiska logik i sociala grupperingar och deras framställningar och berättelser om sig själva. Interpellationen gäller därför inte bara subjektets tillblivelse, utan också gruppers tillblivelse. Hur interpelleras, benämns och avgränsas då subjekten och grupperingarna i det mediematerial och den diskurs som florerar kring Islamiska staten?

Den anti-muslimska och islamofobiska diskursen i Sverige fungerar som en spegel i vilken IS-anhängare känner igen sig. Den negativa bilden inverteras och kroppsliggörs inte utan stolthet, vilket bland annat Amers berättelse ger uttryck för. IS-anhängarna antar därmed roller som "hjältar" genom att anamma en negativ stereotyp av muslimer som har florerat i västerlandet under de senaste decennierna. Detta kommer också till uttryck i intervjun med Amer ovan där han förkroppsligar den islamofobiska diskursens negativa stereotyp av "muslimen" och på så vis bekräftar den. Som Nilüfer Göle påpekar:

Islamism as a collective social movement enables Muslim actors to adopt voluntarily the religious attributes that are considered potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of a modern [secularist] culture.[53]

De negativa, stereotypa bilderna av islam som en patriarkal, maskulin, misogyn, våldsam och förmodern religion får näring av Amer och hans gelikar genom deras berättelser och handlingar.[54] Andra, mer liberala, former av islam avfärdas, av såväl IS-anhängare som islamkritiker, för att de uppfattas vara tillrättalagda, västvänliga eller direkt felaktiga.

Även om de medialiserade bilderna av Islamiska statens krigsföring kan uppfattas som extrema och avvikande, innebär det inte att det återspeglar en intrapsykisk störning och avvikelse. Handlingarna kan i själva verket ses som rationella och logiska i en specifik social grupp.[55] För att förstå fenomenet IS och rekryteringen till rörelsen bör intrapsykiska aspekter ställas mot grupprelaterade processer, makrosociologiska aspekter som rör migration och globala processer, samt

situationsbetingade faktorer. För att en människa ska lämna Sverige och ansluta sig till Islamiska staten krävs en i Sverige lokalt förankrad plausibilitetsstruktur som inte bara gör handlingen rationell, logiskt och verklig utan också eftertraktad och nåbar. Om rollen som IS-anhängare svärtas ner och ses som opassande av gruppen förlorar den sin funktion som identifikationsobjekt, vilket kan leda till en minskad förekomst av IS-motiverad krigsföring, hijrah och jihād. Att i det här sammanhanget tala om patologiskt störda individer saknar i princip förklaringsvärde. Det handlar snarare om att se hur handlingen görs rationell och normaliseras i den sociala grupp som IS-anhängarna tillhör vid tiden för rekryteringen. En sådan social bas finns såväl online som offline. Den digitala aspekten av IS-anhängarnas aktiviteter följer dem även på plats i Mellanöstern; videomaterial kan distribueras på nätet, texter och bilder publiceras i olika sammanhang. Den sociala basen måste därtill uppfattas som trovärdig och autentisk för anhängaren. Det är först med avsaknaden av en sådan plausibilitetsstruktur som den individuella handlingen kan patologiseras, där en avsaknad av realitetsprincipen och sekundärprocesser istället blir framträdande.

NOTER

1 Göran Larsson & Åke Sander: *Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmentation? A Contextual Study* (Berlin, 2007).

2 Nilüfer Göle: *Islam in Sicht: der Auftritt von Muslimen im öffentlichen Raum* (Bielefeld, 2004).

3 Mattias Gardell: *Islamofobi* (Stockholm, 2011).

4 Lily Kong: "Global Shifts, Theoretical Shifts: Changing Geographies of Religion" i *Progress in Human Geography* 34:6 (2010), 758.

5 Kong: "Global Shifts, Theoretical Shifts: Changing Geographies of Religion", 758.

6 Synnøve Bendixsen: "Islam as a New Urban Identity? Young Female Muslim Creating a Religious Youth Culture in Berlin" i Glenda Tibe Bonifacio & Vivienne S. M. Angeles (red.): *Gender, Religion, and Migration: Pathways of Integration* (Lanham, 2010), 95.

7 Axel Håkansson: "Göteborgare strider med IS" i Göteborgs-Posten (12 oktober 2014)

8 Håkansson: "Göteborgare strider med IS". En i sammanhanget något oväntad ståndpunkt är Amers syn på Sverige: "Sverige är världens bästa land. Här hade jag velat leva mitt liv om inte allt var som det är."

9 Håkansson: "Göteborgare strider med IS".

10 Det har utkommit flera nummer av *Dabiq* efter det att föreliggande text skrevs. Här tas endast de första nio numren i beaktande.

11 *Dabiq. The Return of the Khilafah*, (2014), nr. 1, 8.

12 *Dabiq. The Return of the Khilafah* , 11.

13 *Dabiq. A Call to Hijrah*, (2014), nr. 3, 28.

14 *Dabiq. A Call to Hijrah*, (2014), 33.

15 *Dabiq. They Plot and Allah Plots*, (2015), nr. 9, 24–26.

16 *Dabiq. A Call to Hijrah*, 29.

17 *Dabiq. The Flood*, (2014), nr. 2, 34-35.

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19 Charles H. Lippy & Eric Tranby: *Religion in Contemporary America* (New York, 2013), 202.

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21 Gunnar Jervas: ”Traditionella typer av terrorism” i Gunnar Jervas (red.): *Terrorismens tid* (Stockholm, 2003b), 32-33.

22 Gunnar Jervas: ”Mellanöstern som terrorismskapare” i Gunnar Jervas (red.): *Terrorismens tid* (Stockholm, 2003a), 92-93.

23 Elliot Aronson: *The Social Animal* (New York, 1999), 227–228, 299–300.

24 Maxwell Taylor: *The Terrorist* (London, 1988), 124.

25 Howard S. Friedman & Miriam W. Schustack: *Personality. Classic Theories and Modern Research* (Boston & London, 1999), 249.

26 Richard M. Perlstein: *The Mind of the Political Terrorist* (Wilmington, 1991), 7. Johan Cullberg menar att den narcissistiska personlighetsproble-matiken karaktäriseras av en klyvning mellan två motsatta självbilder. Den grandiosa självbilden söker bekräftelse för att undertrycka den negativa självbilden. Människor och företeelser i omgivningen bedöms utifrån deras förmåga att tillfredsställa den narcissistiska personlighetens behov att få den grandiosa självbilden bekräftad. Se Johan Cullberg: *Dynamisk psykiatri* (Stockholm, 2001), 229f.

27 John Horgan: ”The search for the Terrorist Personality”, i Andrew Silke (red.): *Terrorists, Victims and Society. Psychological Perspectives on Terror-ism and its Consequences* (West Sussex, 2003), 14.

28 Lloyd deMabuse: ”The Childhood Origins of Terrorism” i *The Psycho-dynamics of Terrorism* i *The Journal of Psychohistory* 29:4 (2002).

29 Joan Lachkar: ”The Psychological Make-up of a Suicide Bomber” i *The Psychodynamics of Terrorism* i *The Journal of Psychohistory*, 29:4 (2002), 356.

30 Horgan: ”The search for the Terrorist Personality”, 14-15.

31 Borderlinepersonligheten, den emotionellt instabila personligheten, är inte helt lätt att avgränsa mot psykotiska eller neurotiska störningar och tillstånd. Diagnosen har ofta använts när en patient hamnar utanför andra diagnoskriterier Se Cullberg: *Dynamisk psykiatri*, 211–212.

32 Lachkar: ”The Psychological Make-up of a Suicide Bomber”, 355.

33 Lachkar: ”The Psychological Make-up of a Suicide Bomber”, 360.

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36 se Gavin Cameron: "The Mindset of the Terrorist" i *International Encyclo-paedia of Terrorism* (Chicago & London, 1997), 261.

37 Andrew Silke: "Becoming a Terrorist" i Andrew Silke (red.): *Terrorists, Victims and Society. Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Conse-quences* (West Sussex, 2003a), 39f.

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42 Christoph Reuter: *Med livet som vapen. En bok om självmordsbombare* (Lund, 2003), 201.

43 Cameron: "The Mindset of the Terrorist", 257–261.

44 Jfr. Silke: "Becoming a Terrorist", 37.

45 Jan Hjärpe: "Självmordsbombare som spjutspets" i Gunnar Jervas (red): *Terrorismens tid* (Stockholm, 2003), 110.

46 Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann: *Kunskapssociologi. Hur individen uppfattar och formar sin sociala verklighet* (Falun, 1998), 83. Sambandet mellan den sociala verklighetens tre dialektiska moment beskrivs på följande sätt av Berger och Luckmann: "Samhället är en mänsklig produkt. Samhället är en objektiv verklighet. Människan är en social produkt." Berger & Luck-mann: *Kunskapssociologi. Hur individen uppfattar och formar sin sociala verklighet*, 78. Denna dialektik är ständigt pågående, i vardagslivets detaljer såväl som i gruppers förändrade konstitution.

47 Berger & Luckmann: *Kunskapssociologi. Hur individen uppfattar och for-mar sin sociala verklighet*, 180.

48 Louis Althusser: "Freud och Lacan" i *Psykoanalytisk Tid/Skrift* 1 (2002), 33.

49 Judith Butler: *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York, 1993), 225.

50 Jacques Lacan & Bruce Fink: *Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English* (New York, 2006), 75–81.

51 Butler: *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*, 226.

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54 cf. Daniel Enstedt & Göran Larsson: "Telling the Truth about Islam? Apostasy Narratives and Representations of Islam on WikiIslam.net" i *CyberOrient* 7:1, (2013).

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Clemens Cavallin

APPLIED RELIGIOUS STUDIES

Four Ideal Types

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in the late 19th century, the self-understanding of religious studies has been marked by attempts to construct a demarcation line between itself and Christian theology, its significant Other.[1] Underlying such attempts is the idea of a scientific study of religion seeking knowledge about religious phenomena based upon empirical facts, abstaining from value judgements and metaphysical discussions regarding religious beliefs and practices. Religious studies is, then, foremost an activity of theoretical reason, leaving to extra-academical contexts, such as politics, the application of scholarly knowledge. This ideal has, however, probably never been upheld in its purity; if it is even possible.[2]

With the corrosive critique of postmodern approaches undermining a strict separation of fact and value, the principle of empirically based objective research and education within the humanities and the social sciences has been challenged by emancipatory agendas, for example, feminism, post-colonialism and GLBT rights.[3]

To this, we need to add the increased salience and political influence of religion, which have made questions pertaining to religious identity and belief high priority for policy makers.[4] Furthermore, the transformation of the university from an educational institution for civil servants to the central engine of the information society has made it crucial for all its parts, including the humanities, to provide proofs of social utility or risk being rationalised away.[5]

This new situation of religious studies is foremost a feature of the Western world; the institutionalization of the discipline is not evenly

spread over the globe. This is clearly illustrated by the book *Religious Studies: A Global View*, despite its intention to provide insights also into religious studies outside of Western Europe and North America.[6] The idea of an academic study of religion distinct from theology – that is, a study that does not privilege any religion – travels around the globe on the waves of westernization and modernization. In his chapter on religious studies in North Africa and West Asia, Patrice Brodeur writes:

> The historical development of this academic discipline, on both discursive and institutional levels, is completely intertwined with the development of various initially European modernities, later exported to most regions of the world. At the heart of these modernities lay the powerful positivistic scientific discourse out of which emerged a 'science of religions' (*Religionswissenschaft)* or 'sciences of religion.'[7]

However, at some places the adaptation of state secularity worked against the institutionalization of religious studies, as in the case of India, which has very few departments of religious studies, or of the comparative study of religion.[8] The following discussion will thus be more relevant to the countries where the discipline is well established, but will also be of interest for those trying to expand religious studies into new territory.

My main point is that the present situation makes it necessary to discuss the question of applied religious studies. For some scholars, such a coming together of theoretical and practical reasoning is a chance for religious studies to make a contribution to a better society. For others, such an extension of the academic study of religion into the world of policy decisions and practical application is a betrayal of the proper limits of scientific studies.

One scholar of the first category is the German professor Udo Tworuschka, who is championing a *Praktische Religionswissenschaft*. In one of his characterisations of the proposed discipline, he writes:

> Practical Science of Religion does not only perceive, describe and analyse actions. It also deals with "mediation processes" by different media. Analyzing present, problematic realities the Practical Science of Religion wants to facilitate "better" realities in the future by reflected problem-solving action (normative component). The interests of this new discipline of the Science of Religion are among other things pacifying, restraining conflicts, humanizing.[9]

Interestingly, Tworuschka explicitly connects applied religious studies (the practical science of religion) to a normative component, which empowers the discipline to distinguish between "good" and "bad" (or humanizing an dehumanizing) social realities. Such a move can begin to dissolve the difference between religious studies and theology; that is, if one of the criteria to distinguish religious studies as non-theological is its value neutrality. In 1993 in his article "Utility, understanding and creativity in the study of religions," Chris Arthur argued for such a rapprochement between religious studies and theology.

> It would, I think, be more appropriate to think of work in this area as having two aspects, 'pure' (a descriptive, analytical approach principally concerned with ideas) and 'applied' (concerned with using those ideas to build something new). … Likewise, the endless accumulation of descriptive data about religions would be of rather questionable value unless we planned to do something with it. In other words, the relationships between religious faiths and the disciplines which examine them are no longer as rigidly straight-forward as was once imagined.[10]

However, not all scholars are enthused by an applied dimension. In his article "The Politics of wishful thinking? Disentangling the role of the scholar-scientist from that of the public intellectual in the modern academic study of religion," the Canadian scholar Donald Wiebe rejects the idea that religious studies has to show proof of social and cultural relevance. He also offers a forceful critique of Russell McCutcheon's vision of a socially engaged discipline providing a radical critique of religions. To include social, political and religious activities at departments of religious studies would, according to Wiebe, "devalue the cognitive objectives of the modern university and will undermine it as an institution dedicated to rational inquiry in search for public knowledge of public facts."[11]

Closely connected to the question of the appropriateness of including normative concerns in religious studies is the question of *how* such values are to be derived. That is, the scholar eager to develop applied religious studies has to face the question of the rationality of the goal of application. As Wiebe indicates, when the academic study of religion takes upon itself the task of social relevance, the danger is that it becomes an arena of conflicting extra-scientific interests fighting for hegemony – with other words, an ideological battlefield.

In the following, I will outline four versions of applied religious studies as a basis for a discussion of the movement toward practical

application. I have designed them as Weberian ideal types and not as detailed representations of actual positions of individual researchers. I acknowledge that many approaches fall outside of this simplified picture, but I believe that it still captures key positions.

The first is the "modernist" approach, which insists, as Wiebe above, on the strict separation between facts and values. The second is the postmodern approach with its characteristic combination of emancipatory discourses and constructionism. The third is the utilitarian one, which insists on the necessity of the economical usefulness of academic discourses. The fourth is based upon the close connection between is and ought in the notion of human rights and natural law.

With this overview, I want to contribute to the rethinking of religious studies that takes its practical application seriously. Even those who want to resist this development need to handle the increasing focus on, for example, Global Challenges, on the part of research funding agencies.

For my own part, I see opportunities worth pursuing, but, at the same time, I recognize that there are decisive dangers with including an applied dimension in religious studies. My foremost concern is the rational foundation of the values that such a move infuses into the discipline.

IDEAL TYPE 1.
MODERNIST APPLIED RELIGIOUS STUDIES

The modernist version of religious studies flows from basic features of modernity, or more correctly modernism, the ideological affirmation of the processes of modernisation.[12] Its important principles are not exclusive for religious studies, but are features of modern science in general, and the efforts to build a scientifically based society.

One of the central principles, which has profound consequences for religious studies, is the modern self-limitation of reason. The scope of rational thought is limited to the empirical world and logics; metaphysics that try to stretch reason beyond this border is by the modernist considered as mere speculation without any rational foundation. With this follows the powerful development of the disenchantment (*Entzauberung*) of the human life world.[13]

This self-limitation of reason makes on the one hand the object, religions, into irrational speculations, which provide explanations lying outside the empirical world, as gods and demons. On the other hand, it places religious studies firmly within an immanentist worldview – one studies religion as merely a human creation.

Connected to the judgement of the non-empirical as either unknowa-

ble or non-existent is the problematic foundation for values and norms, as these cannot be simply be read of the empirical data. The ought-dimension, with other words, the whole world of human praxis, has lost its foundation in supra-empirical spheres and entities, such as God, the gods, fate, the eternal law, or the supreme intellect. The foundation of morality and human practice seems, then, dangerously close to be irrational – values based on human feelings and desires are simply superimposed upon a neutral material world.

For religious studies, this means that it is merely theory driven empirical studies of religious phenomena – the results of which are used within different instrumental lines of reasoning, such as politics, economics or the military. However, there is no absolute rational foundation for the objectives (power, money, victory); the final goal where the chain of instrumental reasoning stops is arbitrary and temporary.

The ideal of a totally objective study of religion, neutral in questions of values, norms and feelings, has, however, through its particular European genesis, its own value framework, a kind of immanentist soteriology. The Enlightenment invested great trust in the free use of human reason – though it was ascetic through self-limitation, purged by critique and the rigorous use of philosophical and scientific methods. Reason was considered to have the ability to create a better human world and positive value was affixed to the enlightened mind, and to the formation of such a mind. For example, Kant, remarked in his short text "What is Enlightenment?"

> Enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the lack of understanding but rather in the lack of the resolution and the courage to use it without the guidance of another.
> […]
> I have placed the main point of enlightenment – mankind's exit from its self-imposed immaturity – primarily on religious matters since our rulers have no interest in playing the role of guardian to their subjects with regard to the arts and sciences and because this type of immaturity is the most harmful as well as the most dishonourable.[14]

In this enlightenment perspective, traditional religion is a human discourse that ambiguously restricts the free use of human reason, while at the same time overstepping the limitations of proper reasoning: religion both restricts the freedom of reason and takes liberties with

it. According to Kant, the enlightened mind relies on freedom, but is simultaneously through rigorous critique obliged to use its freedom within a modern, more limited, sphere of intelligibility. With increasing enlightenment, religion as both overstepping the proper limits of reason and as restricting the freedom of reason fades away – what remains is perhaps merely a sentimental ground for ethics.

This is old style modernism that influenced many of the founding fathers of religious studies. However, with the new vitality and salience of religion in the late 20th century, the modernist argument has shifted to consider religion as natural. Not only is it wholly the product of material circumstances, but it is also built into the very physics of the human person, typically the brain. The most conspicuous theoretical development within this new line of thinking is the cognitive study of religion.[15] The idea that through the gradual lifting of self-imposed immaturity (i.e. modernisation), humankind would lose its religion (i.e. secularisation), is not credible in the light of simultaneous religious resurgence and increasing modernisation.[16] If freedom in itself cannot guarantee the withering away of religion, then this must be achieved by the restriction of freedom in the name of freedom. The basic opposition within enlightenment between freedom and critique then comes to the surface.

Applied modernist religious studies, thus, forms graduates that relentlessly reduces the supra-empirical claims of religions into their material matrix. Through critique, they expose the lack of rationality of religious dogma and ritual (their ideological nature) by meticulous historical analyses of religious traditions. In this way, religious studies supplies support to the maintenance of the secular state as founded on human will and reason, and not on religious worldviews.

This ethos suffuses the famous theses on method by the historian of religions, Bruce Lincoln. For example in the third of his thirteen theses, he states:

> History of religions is thus a discourse that resists and reverses the orientation of that discourse with which it concerns itself. To practice history of religions in a fashion consistent with the discipline's claim of title is to insist on discussing the temporal, contextual, situated, interested, human, and material dimensions of those discourses, practices, and institutions that characteristically represent themselves as eternal, transcendent, spiritual, and divine.[17]

In the twelfth thesis, he insists on the heretical imperative in the historical study of religion.

Although critical inquiry has become commonplace in other disciplines, it still offends many students of religion, who denounce it as "reductionism". This charge is meant to silence critique. The failure to treat religion "as religion" – that is, the refusal to ratify its claim of transcendent nature and sacrosanct status – may be regarded as heresy and sacrilege by those who construct themselves as religious, but it is the starting point for those who construct themselves as historians.[18]

The problem for the secular state is that it is hard to provide ultimate rationality for its legal and moral norms. The solution is a basic realist principle, in the sense that an enlightened (scientific) society requires that decisions on common actions rest on empirical facts; supra-empirical claims are data non grata. In the same way, the realist principle restricts the goal to the empirical material world. The basic application of modernist religious studies is thus to keep religion out of the public arena, to show in what ways it is unreasonable, building as it does on an unfettered imagination, or evolutionary instincts blown out of proportion. For example, in his book *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon,* the philosopher Daniel Dennett argues for a naturalistic study of religion, which breaks the spell cast by religions. In the book, he refers to himself as a "bright," a term analogously coined to "gay" signifying people with a non-supernaturalist worldview (naturalism). Dennett's advocacy for a scientific study of religion has a decisive applied dimension. In his approach, the understanding of religion as a natural phenomenon naturally leads to policy decisions.

Although there are risks and discomforts involved, we should brace ourselves and set aside our traditional reluctance to investigate religious phenomena scientifically, so that we can come to understand how why religions inspire such devotion, and figure out how we should deal with them all in the twenty-first century.[19]

The book thus ends with discussions on how to restrict the ability of parents to raise their children religiously and how to counteract religion in education and in the public sphere.

The most problematic feature of this kind of application is that through the ascetic modern reason the irrationality of religion is decided beforehand, *a priori*. There is, thus, in applied religious studies modernist style, with its insistence on the purity of reason, a troubling ideological secularist dimension, which is not open to discussion, as it is foundational: the freedom of the enlightened mind builds upon the

self-limitation of reason. If proponents of religious traditions who have not embraced modernism resist such an application of religious studies, this should not come as a surprise.

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IDEAL TYPE 2:
POSTMODERN EMANCIPATORY RELIGIOUS STUDIES

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As the child of self-confident modernism, born at the zenith of its technological success, postmodernism carries radical doubt (critique) one step further, and challenges reason itself, by portraying it as driven by lust for power and without an objective fundament. The proud creations of modern science are, then, as all cultural artifices, merely constructions, that is, human products, inescapably formed by the particular conditions of their creators. If modernism has at its heart the purity of the mind, postmodernism sees the particular ascetic nature of the modern mind as only one of many forms of impurity. According to this interpretation, postmodernism is radical modernism; it does not only expose religions as ideology, but considers religious studies itself as based on a particular form of ideology.

One central concern for this project is the critique of the notion "religion"; it is analysed as a western construction created in order to single out certain human actions and beliefs as religious, thus creating one of the preconditions of a secular state. This western taxonomy of religion and non-religion (sacred and secular), does not easily fit other cultures, thus doing violence to the material, which is arbitrarily cut up according to an enlightenment worldview.[20]

In his book *The Ideology of Religious Studies,* Timothy Fitzgerald argues such a position.

> The construction of 'religion' and 'religions' is therefore part of a historical ideological process. In subsequent chapters I sketch the development of this process in Europe and suggests that the invention of the modern concept of religion and religions is the correlate of the modern ideology of individualism and capitalism. … The industry known as religious studies is a kind of generating plant for a value-laden view of the world that claims to identify religions and faiths as an aspect of all societies and that, by so doing, makes possible to separate 'non-religious' conceptual space, a fundamental area of presumed factual objectivity.[21]

In this way, the universality of religious studies is undermined, as it cannot even distinguish its own object of study, without actually creating

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it. Accordingly, religious studies mainly has to be content with studying itself or to dissolve into disconnected microstudies.

If one tendency of applied postmodern religious studies has been the demotion of its own discipline and the destabilising of the strong modernist self-confidence in the striving for a scientific society, then its normative concerns lie elsewhere. It has influenced religious studies mainly through a will to empower women and minorities: ethnic, religious and sexual.[22] By gender studies and GLBT studies, scholars use the critique of reason as a way to denaturalise human nature: exposing hetero-normativity or patriarchal value systems. If the modernist application is closely connected to the secular state, then the postmodern is tied to the multicultural state. All forms of oppression, particularly those posing as based upon nature itself, are to be unmasked and unravelled. There is often an almost seamless connection between analysis and practical application.

In her overview "Critical feminist studies in religion," Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza maintains that both the deconstructive and creative potential of feminist analysis are integral to her approach.

> This critical analytics must be judged in terms of its heuristic power to investigate and deconstruct relations of domination as well as to articulate alternative religious visions for personal and societal change and transformation.[23]

She emphasizes that, besides explaining what is wrong, feminist studies of religion also have to be practical and "must identify the agents that seek to bring about change." And, "Finally, a critical theory must be *normative*, i.e. it must clearly articulate practical goals, ethical norms, and theoretical visions for a different future free from domination."[24]

The particular postmodern version of applied religious studies thus manifests itself primarily as strong normative discourses arguing in favour of gender equality and the empowerment and safeguarding of sexual minorities within religions. Individual scholars do this both through their scholarly work and as public intellectuals trying to protect the minority in question from religious judgement and by exposing theological arguments that argue against this as merely founded on interests of power or similar non-rational motives.

Still, if for modernist applied religious studies the main contradiction was between insisting on intellectual freedom and simultaneously on the limitation of that freedom, then postmodern religious studies of the emancipist variety is undermined by its use of constructionism and different forms of relativism.[25] If emancipation does not have any ulti-

mately real or objective value foundation, but is only a bid for power for a group lacking a privileged position, is it then irrational?

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IDEAL TYPE 3:
UTILITARIAN APPLIED RELIGIOUS STUDIES

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When looking at the history of religious studies, which stretches a little more than hundred years back, we can see many examples of applications of the modernist and some of the postmodernist variety; the third ideal type, the utilitarian, is, however, not that conspicuous. This is bound to change, as higher education worldwide is undergoing a rapid transformation in this direction.[26] If the 19th century University had as its main purpose to educate civil servants, including priests, with an increasing importance attached to research as the century drew to its close, then the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st have witnessed a major transformation in the direction of economic usefulness. Besides massification of the university, the increasing use of sophisticated information technology and the impact of globalisation processes have put the university at the very heart of the knowledge society, and it thus has to deliver on these high expectations.[27]

In their 2009 report "Trends in Global Higher Education: Tracking an Academic Revolution," Philip Altbach, Liz Reisberg and Laura Rumbley highlight the danger that developing countries will not have the resources to respond to these challenges and consequently drift further and further behind. However, also in the Global North these adaptions do not come without some anguish. Under the heading "The struggle for the soul of higher education," they write:

> The traditional societal mission of higher education has been under pressure for the last half century. Universities, traditionally seen as key cultural institutions to be responsible for public enlightenment, are increasingly obliged to respond to the many new pressures described in this report. The "commercialization" of higher education has placed considerable strain on its social mission.[28]

For example, in Sweden, the rationalisation of state funded universities is empowered by increasing use of quantitative measurements, such as the number of articles written, patents registered, completed higher education credits, or number of teachers who have formal pedagogical competence. The academic bureaucrats relentlessly pursue the optimisation of the modern university (you need to increase the measure of X, or …), and the old enlightenment values that focused on the libera-

ting forces of free reason seem like old ghosts. It is material wellbeing as defined by the democratic, or despotic, organs of the state that is in focus (that is, the Challenges to address), and the performance is carefully measured and put into increasingly complex data systems. The problem is, of course, how to connect the teaching and research at the university directly to the desired social outcomes.

In such a situation, it is difficult for religious studies to uphold the value of the search for knowledge for its own sake; the system put pressure on the discipline to provide arguments of its usefulness. It has to show how the applications of the knowledge it produces relate to different forms of social wellbeing, for example, by focusing on religion and health or the threat of religious terrorism. The problem is that the values imposed upon science and scholarship are not ultimately rationally founded, but based upon the present will ruling the political system, either liberal democratic as in Sweden or totalitarian as in China.

The function of utilitarian applied religious studies is to help the nation address pressing social issues, as there seems to be little potential for religious studies to contribute to economic growth directly. Such applications respond both in a direct way to government funding and more spontaneously to the general pressure of social relevance. A present issue in the Western world, obviously, concerns the question of terrorism and religious extremism, the latter that somewhat contradictorily is often claimed to have nothing to do with religion.

For an example of how an arena for applied religious studies can be constituted, we can look at my *alma mater*, the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden. In 2015, Segerstedt Institutet was inaugurated at the university, as the result of a special assignment of the Swedish government, saying, "The University of Gothenburg is to develop and disseminate knowledge and methods to reduce the recruitment of people to violent ideologies and movements and to racist organisations."[29]

The Vice Chancellor, Pam Fredman, underscored the applied function of the institute in her address.

> The Segerstedt Institutet will provide a meeting place for academia and practice. It is through interaction between various actors and between the scholarly world and practical experience that the new institute will make a difference.[30]

In his speech on the inauguration day, the prime minister emphasized even more the applied dimension. He said that the initiative to create the institute sprung from the conviction that we can make a difference, that it is possible to create resistance movements and that we had an

obligation to do so, "We are not spectators to what is happening today – we are active participants."[31]

When the government in this way directly intervenes into the structure of the university to rouse it to address a particular social problem, the result can be controversial. For example, in connection with the inauguration, in an article in the national newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, eighteen scholars from Gothenburg wrote,

> A focus on fighting violence-affirming extremism means that the university is subordinated to a political discourse originating from the agendas of some parliament parties; something which is highly problematic if our universities are to live up to the principle of political independence and to encourage critical thinking.[32]

This conflict illustrates nicely the problem facing applied religious studies when taking its social relevance seriously – in this case, the fight against racism and terrorism. For how is a centre, or an individual scholar, to evaluate the norms and values that flow into religious studies if there is no objective basis of those values? Is it merely a question of individual preferences or political shrewdness? No amount of knowledge about religions will decide this normative question, which is vital for religious studies if it is not only to become the servant of the present political majority.

The basic problem with applied utilitarian religious studies that takes the political exhortation to be useful seriously is, thus, akin to that afflicting the two previous ones, namely, the modern radical separation of fact and value. The utilitarian approach has accepted the relativity of values and non-foundationalism of theoretical reason, while at the same time embracing pragmatism, settling for what seems to work and what people prefer, not putting any moralistic restrictions on these.

IDEAL TYPE 4.
NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS BASED APPLIED RELIGIOUS STUDIES

When it comes to religious studies, in contrast to theology, I do not think there are strong developments yet of an applied dimension taking the close connection between ontology (human nature) and normativity as its point of departure. This would actually require a break with a fundamental principle of modernism (and postmodernism) and risk the accusation of being anti-modern in one of its many guises.

There are two candidates for this ideal type based respectively on

natural law theory and on universal human rights. However, in their book *Religion and Human Rights*, John Witte and Christian Green put forward the thesis that a list of human rights cannot stand on its own, that it is dependent upon belief systems for its operation.

> [T]he human rights regime is not static. It is fluid, elastic, and open to challenge and change. The human rights regime is not a fundamental belief system. It is a relative system of ideas and ideals that presupposes the existence of fundamental beliefs and values that will constantly shape and reshape it. […] it is the *ius gentium* of our times, the common law of nations […][33]

To choose human rights as the basis of values for applied religious studies is thus to look for a consensus, without arguing that these values and norms are natural, in the sense of objective, that is, being valid irrespective of human views.

In 2015, Udo Tworuschka reformulated his vision of a discipline of applied religious studies.[34] To achieve a value platform for what he calls a humanizing critique of religious traditions and religious phenomena, he considers the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights a good platform. According to Tworuschka, the problem is, however, that it can be too abstract to support the interventions of applied religious studies. Therefore, he suggests that such a minimal consensus of ethical principles can be supplemented by overlapping norms of wisdom found in religious traditions. This complementary view of religion and human rights harmonises with the position of Witte and Green. Nevertheless, Tworuschka seems to favour basic liberal values such as tolerance, dialogue and the freedom of religion. The major problem that his position highlights is that if one bases the value foundation of applied religious studies on a minimal consensus of values (what almost every human community could agree on), then these will be too abstract to be of practical use. And, conversely, the "thicker" the value foundation is, the more partisan it will be, and consequently more controversial.

On the other hand, a natural law position, or an understanding of human rights as based on human nature, provides applied religious studies with a normative framework independent of the political will, or the popular consensus. Such an approach to applied religious studies has a similar tendency toward emancipation as postmodernist studies, but does not see freedom as lying in the distance between the physical body and human self-determination. A natural law position put basic restraints upon modern autonomous individuals, arguing that they

share a basic human nature. The goal is understood more in the manner of human flourishing than as radical freedom.

In his book *Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-evaluation*, Howard Kainz characterises natural-law theory as a group of theories that

> emphasize the objectivity of morality, which is to say that there are at least a subset of moral norms that are not merely the products or creations of subjective viewpoints or to be judged by subjective intentions, but based in human nature, the nature of society, or evolving nature.[35]

Then, the crucial question is how a universal human nature is to be defined. Especially, as such a nature seems to run counter to the basic anthropology informing both the modern, postmodern and utilitarian ideal types. How can it escape the accusation of being merely a set of norms constructed by humans, moreover informed by a theological position, and then injected into a presumed objective human nature?

On the other hand, in his article, "Theocentrism and Human Rights: A Critical Argument," Andrew Fiala criticises the argument put forward by, among others, Alasdair MacIntyre that, "secular or humanistic foundations of rights-talk are unstable, relativistic, and incapable of generating universal consensus."[36] And thus in need of religious backup. His solution is to abandon speciesism and take the capabilities of sentient animals as the starting point, especially their sufferings. In this way, he shifts the focus from human rights to animal rights. He ends the article without elaborating his position further – it is a mere starting point, but it illustrates the problem of finding a stable foundation for human rights without a supernatural anchor or religious backdrop.

It is thus doubtful whether strong versions of natural law and human rights approaches will be influential within religious studies at secular universities and colleges. The most probable scene for such approaches is private colleges based upon religious or alternative worldviews. A complication is that these often do not include religious studies, as this discipline is characteristically connected to the project of enlightenment modernity. Instead, the likely result is forms of applied (practical) theology addressing contemporary problems.

FINAL THOUGHTS

I have raised the issue of applied religious studies primarily because of the mounting pressure facing universities in the western world to prove their usefulness. The interested parties often measure the desired utility

in economic terms; for example, in 2014, the Danish government decided to cut down on university programs with poor job prospects, saying that no student should end up "unusable."[37] In the same manner, there is an intensifying discussion in the United States regarding the cost and actual benefits of liberal arts education.[38] The ideal of knowledge for its own sake seems increasingly fragile.

My main question was whether religious studies, then, should include an applied dimension, or even give birth to a new discipline, as suggested by Tworuschka. If the answer is yes, then the ensuing question is – how is it to be done?

In order to begin exploring the alternatives, I formulated four ideal types to capture the most influential positions. The first was the modernist, which by making a strong difference between fact and value, insists on the autonomy of the discipline of religious studies. Nevertheless, through its foundational naturalism, it has an elective affinity with the secular state that reduces religion to the private sphere. The postmodern type of applied religious studies mostly finds its expression in emancipatory studies and interventions, while the utilitarian type embraces the needs of the multicultural state, offering its services for furthering interreligious understanding, integration and tolerance. At the same time, it does not hesitate to join the fight against religious extremism and terrorism. The final type of applied religious studies takes as its point of departure inalienable rights connected to the human person.

During the writing of this article, I became increasingly concerned about the foundation of the values supposed to guide the application of religious studies; that is, who is to formulate the goals of application, and how are they to choose the guiding values? The first question concerns the autonomy of religious studies, and the second the value rationality of the interventions into the social world of religions. If we, as in the modernist type, make the distance between is and ought unbridgeable, or as in the postmodern type insists on the constructed and relative nature of all values, then, at least to me, the danger of exacerbating the culture wars of our age seems unavoidable. However, as in the utilitarian type to merely put oneself at the service of the present political will seems dangerous, for who knows what party will be in power next, and what agenda it will pursue. In that light, the regime of human rights seems a reasonable foundation for applied religious studies. Nevertheless, in their most basic formulations, they are quite abstract, and when people apply them to a particular society or situation, this requires extensive interpretation. Then the question of their foundation becomes acute; are they connected to a human nature and thus inalienable, or are they the results of political decisions, which can

be changed? Can rights be added, modified or taken away? Also in this case, when the proponents of applied religious studies get into the business of application, they will run the risk of uncritically taking the side of one part in a conflict that is both cultural and religious. In a democracy, as the utilitarian, they probably will take the part of the ruling majority; and, in other cases, the ruling elite or party.

As at present, I do not see a clear way out of these conundrums, I cannot propose a simple solution for scholars in religious studies, who want to develop an applied dimension, for example, at Swedish public universities. My exhortation is, simply, that we as scholars should not venture into such a development without first seriously discussing the values and goals governing this extension of our discipline into the world of practical affairs. My hope is that this article will contribute to such a critical discussion.

NOTES

1   For a collection of different conceptualizations of the relationship between theology and religious studies, see Darlene L. Bird and Simon G. Smith (ed.): *Theology and Religious Studies in Higher Education: Global Perspectives* (London, 2009). In my article, I apply the notion of religious studies broadly to non-confessional studies of religious phenomena. These have at different times either been distributed over several disciplines such as sociology of religion, psychology of religion, and anthropology of religion or collected within a discipline and department. In this respect, the emergence and growth of history of religions and the phenomenology of religion had a special place, though the latter has received heavy criticism for hidden theological assumptions. Especially, the phenomenology of religion, as put forward by Mircea Eliade, has been the focus of an extensive debate since the 1980s. For an overview, see, for example, Douglas Allen: *Myth and Religion in Mircea Eliade* (New York and London, 2002), and for a recent attempt to argue for the necessity of the phenomenology of religion, and a reinterpretation of Eliade, that takes the criticism into account, see Jason Blum: "Retrieving phenomenology of religion as a method for religious studies" in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 80:4 (2012), 1025–1048.
2   Cf. Luther Martin and Donald Wiebe: "Religious studies as a scientific discipline: The persistence of a delusion" in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 80:3 (2012), 587–597.
3   Ursula King: "Is there a Future for Religious Studies as We Know It? Some Postmodern, Feminist, and Spiritual Challenges" in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 70:2 (2002), 365–388; Melissa M. Wilcox: "Outlaws or in-laws? Queer theory, LGBT Studies, and Religious Studies" in *Journal of Homosexuality* 52:1-2 (2006), 73–100; Richard King: *Orientalism and religion: post-colonial theory, India and the mystic East* (New York, 1999).

4   The literature on the subject is understandably large, but, see, e.g., Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah: *God's Century, Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York, 2011); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge: *God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith is Changing the World* (New York, 2009).

5   Sheila Slaughter & Larry L. Leslie: *Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University* (Baltimore, 1997). There are many voices defending the humanities and the particular American form of liberal arts, see for example, Martha Craven Nussbaum: *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton, 2010) and Gordon Hutner & Feisal G. Mohamed (eds.) *A New Deal for the Humanities, Liberal Arts and the Future of Public Higher Education* (New Brunswick, 2015).

6   Gregory Alles (ed.): *Religious Studies: A Global View* (London, 2008).

7   Patrice Brodeur: "North Africa and West Asia" in Gregory Alles (ed.): *Religious Studies, A Global View* (London, 2010), 88.

8   Pratap Kumar: "A Survey of New Approaches to the Study of Religion in India" in Peter Antes, Armin Geertz and Randi R. Warne (eds.) *New Approaches to the Study of Religion Vol. 1, Regional, Critical, and Historical Approaches.* (Berlin, 2004), 127–146. Vasudha Narayanan: "The History of the Academic Study of Religion in Universities, Centers, and Institutes in India" in *Numen* 62.1 (2015), 7–39.

9   Udo Tworuschka: "Practical Science of Religion: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations" at http://udotworuschka.jimdo.com/forschung-vermittlung/practical-science-of-religion. For a critique, see Anne Koch: "Review of Udo Tworuschka and Michael Klöcker (eds.): Praktische Religionswissenschaft: Ein Handbuch für Studium und Beruf" in *Religion* 40 (2010), 352–353.

10 Chris Arthur: "Utility, Understanding and Creativity in the Study of Religions" in *New Blackfriars* 74:867 (1993), 16.

11 Donald Wiebe: "The Politics of Wishful Thinking? Disentangling the Role of the Scholar-Scientist from that of the Public Intellectual in the Modern Academic Study of Religion" in *Temenos* 41:1 (2005), 7–38. For an analysis see Clemens Cavallin: "Religion as a Human Phenomenon vs. Openness to Transcendence" *Anviksiki* VII (2012), 189–222, and Clemens Cavallin: "Religion som ett mänskligt fenomen" *SEGL: Katolsk årsskrift for religion og samfunn* (2014), 301–310.

12 Modernism has many meanings, for example, the Catholic theological modernism of the 19th century and the different forms of aesthetical modernism of the same period. In this article, I use modernism as referring to ideological positions giving positive value to the different modernization processes, characterized by great trust in the human reason. In the case of religious studies, this takes the form of a strict scientific approach to religious phenomena, and the affirmation and upholding of the secular nature of higher education.

13 Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (eds.): *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (London, 1987).

14 Immanuel Kant: "What is Enlightenment?" in James Schmidt (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteen-century Answers and Twentieth-century Questions* (Los Angeles, 1996 [1784]), 62–63.

15 The number of publications within this field has grown rapidly since the turn of the millennium, and it now has its own association (IACSR, International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion) and journal *Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion*. For an overview, see Ilkka Pyysiäinen & Veikko Anttonen (eds.): *Current Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion (*New York, 2002) and the reader of D. Jason Slone (ed.): *Religion and Cognition: A Reader* (London, 2006). For later publications see, for example, Fraser Watts & Léon Turner (eds.): *Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays* (Oxford, 2014), and Armin W. Geertz & Jeppe Sinding Jensen (eds.): *Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture: Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative* (London, 2011). The uses of cognitive studies by proponents of the so-called New Atheism (for example, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett) has provoked book length rejections of the claims of having explained away religion, or decisively undermined its plausibility. For example, James Jones in his book *Can Science Explain Religion? The Cognitive Science Debate* (Oxford, 2016) argues that such applications of cognitive theories are mistaken, and that cognitive science is neutral in relation to the rationality of religious beliefs. The debate is interesting from the viewpoint of the idea of applied religious studies, and puts the finger on the centrality of ontological assumptions in such attempts, in this case physicalism. On the other hand, cognitive studies have spawned attempts at what Gabriel Levy in his review of James van Slyke's *The Cognitive Science of Religion* (Surrey, 2011) in *Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion* 2:1 (2014), 80, calls "Cognitive Theology" or "Cognitive Apologetics." Similar tendencies (but in much milder forms) are present in Justin Barrett: *Why Would Anyone Believe in God?* (Walnut Creek, CA, 2004).

16 However, for a robust defence of the secularization thesis, see Steve Bruce: *Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory* (Oxford, 2011).

17 Bruce Lincoln: "Theses on method" in *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 8 (1996), 225–227.

18 Lincoln: "Theses on method".

19 Daniel Dennett: *Breaking the Spell, Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (New York, 2006), 28. For a critical evaluation, see Armin W. Geertz: "New Atheistic Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion. On Daniel Dennett, *Breaking the spell* (2006), and Richard Dawkins, *The God delusion* (2006) in *Contemporary Theories of Religion, a Critical Companion* (London, 2009), 242–263.

20 The literature on the concept of religion is, of course, immense, but see Tim Murphy (ed.): *Defining Religion: A reader* (London, 2011); and Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk (eds.): *The Pragmatics of Defining Religion: Contexts, Concepts and Contests* (Leiden, 1999).

21 Timothy Fitzgerald: *The Ideology of Religious Studies* (New York, 2000), 8–9.

22 Lisa Fishbayn Joffe & Sylvia Neil (eds.): *Gender, Religion, & Family Law: Theorizing Conflicts Between Women's Rights and Cultural Traditions* (Waltham, 2013); Ursula King & Tina Beattie (eds.): *Gender, Religion, and Diversity: Cross-cultural Perspectives* (New York, 2004); Kari Elisabeth Børresen, & Inger Hammar "The Gender of Religion; Emancipation och religion

– en möjlig ekvation?" in *Køn, religion og kvinder i bevægelse* (Roskilde, 2000); Ursula King (ed.): *Religion and Gender* (Oxford, 1995).

23 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza: "Critical Feminist Studies in Religion" in *Critical Research on Religion* 1:1 (2013), 43.

24 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza: "Critical Feminist Studies in Religion," 44.

25 Cf. Melissa M. Wilcox: "Outlaws or In-Laws? Queer Theory, LGBT Studies, and Religious Studies" in *Journal of Homosexuality* 52:1-2 (2006), 95. For more overview articles, see Claudia Schippert: "Implications of Queer Theory for the Study of Religion and Gender: Entering the Third Decade" in *Religion and Gender* 1:1 (2011), 66–84, and Kent L. Brintnall: "Queer Studies and Religion" in *Critical Research on Religion* 1:1 (2013), 51–61.

26 Philip Altbach: "Globalisation and the University: Myths and Realities in an Unequal World" in *Tertiary Education and Management* 10:1 (2004), 3–25.

27 There is a book genre of its own analyzing the present state of higher education with titles containing words indicating crisis and decisive change, ranging from the scholarly to the sensational see, for example, Gerard Delanty: *Challenging Knowledge: The University in the Knowledge Society* (Philadelphia, 2001); Edward P. St. John & Michael D. Parsons: *Public Funding of Higher Education Changing Contexts and New Rationales* (2005, Baltimore); Jon McGee: *Breakpoint, The Changing Marketplace for Higher Education* (2015, Baltimore); Ryan Craig: *College Disrupted: The Great Unbundling of Higher Education* (New York, 2015), and Kevin Carey: *The End of College* (New York, 2015). The spate of titles speak of a sense of change and disruption to come.

28 Philip Altbach, Liz Reisberg & Laura Rumbley: *Trends in Global Higher Education: Tracking an Academic Revolution* (Paris, 2009).

29 "The Segerstedt Institute Inaugurated by Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven" 2015.08.14, medarbetarportalen.gu.se, accessed 2016.02.20. My translation from Swedish.

30 Ibid.

31 "Initiativet till Segerstedtinstitutet springer ur övertygelsen om att vi kan göra skillnad" 2015.08.17. http://www.gu.se/omuniversitetet/aktuellt/nyheter/detalj/-initiativet-till-segerstedtinstitutet-springer-ur-overtygelsen-om-att-vi-kan-gora-skillnad-.cid1315097, accessed 2016.02.20. My translation from Swedish.

32 "Nya rasisminstitutet alltför styrt av politiska agendan" *Dagens Nyheter* 2015.08.14. http://www.dn.se/debatt/nya-rasisminstitutet-alltfor-styrt-av-politiska-agendan, accessed 2016.02.20. My translation from Swedish.

33 John Witte & M. Christian Green: "Introduction" in John Witte & M. Christian Green (eds.): *Religion and Human Rights* (Oxford, 2012), 32.

34 Udo Tworuschka: "Verpflichtendes Verstricktsein in die Welt, Praktische Religionswissenschaft" in *Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift* 32:2 (2015). In the article, he refers to my fourfold typology of applied religious studies (based on a preliminary version of this article), and writes that the fourth type is close to his own approach.

35 Howard P. Kainz: *Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-examination* (Chicago, 2004), xv.

36 Andrew Fiala: "Theocentrism and Human Rights, a Critical Argument" in *Religion and Human Rights* 3 (2008), 226.

37 Jan Petter Myklebust: "Minister Cuts 4,000 Study Places with Low Job Prospects" *University World News* issue 337 (2014.10.03) http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20141002163554769

38 See, for example, Allie Bidwell: "As Industry Changes, Some Liberal Arts Colleges Still Thrive" *U.S. News* 2015.03.25 http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/03/25/as-industry-changes-some-liberal-arts-colleges-thrive; and the blog connected to the course CSP 57 "Liberal Arts at the Brink? Navigating the Crisis in Higher Education" at Occidental College, https://makingliberalarts.wordpress.com.

Henrik Bogdan

ADVAITA VEDANTA AND OCCULTISM

The Case of Kenneth Grant
(1924–2011)

INTRODUCTION

One of the most prominent and enduring Eastern influences on Western spirituality from the late 19th century onwards, is the Hindu philosophy of non-duality, Advaita Vedanta. While the founding of this school is usually, and incorrectly, attributed to the mediaeval philosopher ādi Śaṅkara (788–*c.*820), it is in particular its modern versions that have attracted Westerners.[1] Usually referred to as *neo-advaita* by scholars, this collective term covers a wide range of different interpretations of classical advaita teachings, framed within the broader context of colonialism and modernity. 19th century and early 20th century proponents of neo-advaita were influenced by Orientalism and the Eurocentric dismissal of Hinduism as a degenerate form of religion based on superstition and idolatry.[2] While distancing themselves from more popular forms of Hinduism, such as the worship of deities through statues and strict adherence to Brahmanic rituals, early Hindu neo-advaita reformers such as Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) and Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) not only embraced advaita, but even argued that non-duality is the very essence of Hinduism, the core around which the most significant teachings and practices circle. The modern Hindu self-understanding saw Hinduism as a rational philosophy (i.e., advaita) based on reason rather than faith, but it was also heavily influenced by modern Western discourses on democracy and nationalism.

The earliest, and arguably most important, movement that advocated neo-advaita, the Brahmo Samaj founded by Ram Mohan Roy, broke with the Brahmanical tradition in maintaining that *mokṣa* or liberation

is available to all men and women, irrespective of their caste or social position. The democratisation of Hinduism was taken even further by Vivekananda at the World Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago 1893, where he presented advaita as a universal path to liberation that went beyond the traditional borders of religion. Vivekananda's message was highly successful in the West, especially among Theosophists and other esoteric groups who found Vivekananda's universalism congenial to their own notions of universal brotherhood and the existence of an ancient, perennial religion underlying all current religious traditions.[3]

While being conscious of the fact that advaita is not a single, coherent tradition, the short and concise definition offered by Phillip C. Lucas serves the purpose of this paper quite well. Lucas writes: "Advaita Vedanta philosophy asserts that Absolute Reality (*Brahman*) is formless, non-dual awareness, and that the supreme goal of human life is the realization that the inner self (*atman*) is not separate from Absolute Reality – 'Atman is Brahman'."[4] The notion that the individual is separate from the divine or absolute is thus an illusion (*maya*) and it is only through an experience of the unity of existence that the illusion can be overcome. As will be discussed presently, the focus on *experience* is central for the understanding of the appeal of neo-advaita on Westerners.

Although much has been written on the reception of neo-advaita in the West, surprisingly little has been published about the relationship between advaita and British occultism, especially the influence of advaita on occultists such as Aleister Crowley (1875–1947) and Kenneth Grant (1924–2011). One notable exception is Gordan Djurdjevic's recent monograph, *India and the Occult* (2014), in which a few pages are devoted to advaita in Grant's work.[5] Djurdjevic approaches the subject from a comparative approach in which esotericism is seen as a universal category, and interesting and thought-provoking as this approach may be, I will limit my theoretical discussion to the study of *Western* esotericism, in its restricted sense, i.e., as a non universal analytical category, used specifically for understanding Western currents and notions.

In this paper I will thus focus on Kenneth Grant, and especially on the influence of Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950) on Grant's work. After a discussion of the central themes of neo-advaita in the writings of Grant, I will explore some possible etic or analytic readings of the appeal of neo-advaita on occultism from the broader perspective of the study of Western esotericism, with special focus on the experience of absolute knowledge and "universalism" as a strategy of legitimacy.[6]

Kenneth Grant, born 1924, is in the field of occultism best known for his Typhonian Trilogies and his close association with Aleister Crowley and the British artist and occultist Austin Osman Spare (1886–1956). Grant worked as Crowley's secretary for a short period in the 1940s and came to adopt Crowley's magical and religious system Thelema, a system which he continued to study and expound throughout his life.[7] After Crowley's death in 1947, Grant belonged to a small circle of thelemites, which in England circled around Crowley's former disciple Gerald J. Yorke (1901–1983), who sought to preserve Crowley's published and unpublished writings. In the early 1950s Grant and his wife Steffi (b. 1923) worked with Yorke in typing copies of Crowley's diaries, letters and manuscripts before the originals were being sent off to Crowley's successor as head of his magical orders, Karl J. Germer (1885–1962). The 1950s proved to be a highly formative period in Grant's own magical philosophy and the Typhonian Trilogies, published between 1972 and 2002, are to a large extent based upon the teachings he encountered and the experiences he had during this period. Apart from Crowley's Thelema it was in particular the artist Austin Osman Spare's peculiar form of magic – Grant collaborated closely with Spare from 1949 to the artist's death in 1956[8] – and Hindu tantra as taught by his fellow Ordo Templi Orientis (an initiatory order that Crowley was the head of) initiate David Curwen (1893–1984), that formed the basis for his magical system, as I have discussed elsewhere.[9]

It is not known when Grant first came in contact with advaita, although it seems that he did so perhaps as early as his late teens or early twenties, probably through his early interest in Theosophy. In his memoire of his time as Crowley's secretary, *Remembering Aleister Crowley* (1989), Grant emphasises the importance of Oriental Mysticism:

> My main interest was (and still is) in Oriental Mysticism. When I volunteered for the army, at the age of eighteen, it was with the expectation of being sent to India where I had hopes of finding a guru. But the gods decided otherwise. Within eighteen months of joining, my health broke down and I was discharged.[10]

Grant did not have to travel all the way to India to find a guru, but found one in Crowley who was living at the Bell Inn, Aston Clinton, Buckinghamshire, when Grant first wrote to him in November 1944. It is significant, I think, that Grant states that his main interest *was* Orien-

tal Mysticism, since – as we will see – advaita lies at the core of Grant's magical philosophy.

Grant's interest in advaita becomes evident from 1953 onwards. It appears that Grant went through some sort of spiritual crisis in the spring of that year and that he turned away from Thelema and instead embraced "Oriental Mysticism". The only testimony we have to this shift is an unpublished letter to a German fellow thelemite, Friedrich Lekve (1904–1956), dated March 27, 1953, in which he wrote:

> I have […] been undergoing certain interior changes which make it impossible for me to continue as a follower of A[leister] C[rowley] or his doctrine. […] I do not quite know how to explain or describe the circumstances which have led up to my abandonment of Thelema as a system of thought and as a system of magick. As you no doubt will have gathered from various remarks I made when you were here, as also from certain books I had much respect for, I am really 'tuned' more to the Oriental (especially Indian) systems of Mysticism than to Western Schools of Magick. For a long time now I have felt the utter futility of trying to bolster the ego by acquiring useless siddhis [magical powers] and suchlike occult powers. Also, I feel I know too little to venture to help others on a path that is by its very nature absolutely interior and personal to each and every individual. The practical formulae of magick no longer interest me and I can no longer undertake to impart what I know in this direction to other people. I wish to be rid forever of any connections I may have had in the past with A.C.'s doctrine or practice.
>
> I have learnt certain lessons in the past few months which have determined me in my rejection of his system and theories (particularly his theories), and I will not bore you with details here. Suffice it to say that I have had enough.[11]

While it is evident that Grant quickly overcame his rejection of Thelema as shown by the fact that he launched the New Isis Lodge of Ordo Templi Orientis in 1955, the rejection, temporary as it may have been, is significant as it shows the importance placed on Oriental Mysticism by Grant. But what did he actually mean by Oriental Mysticism? The answer is: advaita.

SRI RAMANA MAHARSHI'S ADVAITA IN GRANT'S WORK

Two months later, in the May 1953 issue of *The Call Divine* – a journal published in Bombay devoted to the teachings of Sri Ramana Maharshi

– an article by Grant appeared. Entitled "Arunachala Siva, the Void Nature of the Self", the article deals with Maharshi's method of introspection, which simply put, consisted in reducing meditation practices to one single question: Who am I?[12] This was the first in a string of articles published in *The Call Divine* throughout the 1950s in which Grant comes across as a devotee or follower of Maharshi and his pragmatic approach to advaita.[13] Significantly, with two exceptions, these articles are written from a strict advaita perspective using the same language, themes and examples as other articles published in the journal. In contrast to many other articles, however, Grant makes no references to his own experiences or practices, but limits his discussions to the works of Maharshi. This stands in sharp contrast to, for example, his wife Steffi Grant's article "A Dream", published in the April 1954 issue of *The Call Divine*, in which she focuses on her own experiences in relation to advaita teachings.

The two articles "One and the Same: A Note on the Tree of Life" and "Resignation", stands apart from Grant's other articles on advaita in that they openly discusses Western esoteric themes in the light of Hindu advaita. The first article, published in July 1954, compares the kabbalistic Tree of Life with Maharshi's teachings on non-duality and argues that the two systems expresses the same Truth. Or to use Grant's own words:

> The above is a tentative interpretation of the major Key of the Western Tradition in the light of the initiated Eastern Wisdom, and to the writer's mind no greater help of soldering the love of East for West, and *vice versa*, may be given the demonstration that differences appear only upon the surface of the two traditions and not of the Heart, where all is one and the Same.[14]

The notion that the Western and Eastern traditions essentially are one and the same is something which Grant would return to and expound upon endlessly in his Typhonian trilogies – a theme which I will return to shortly. The second article, "Resignation", was published in September 1955, around the same time that the New Isis Lodge was launched. It is evident that Grant by now had overcome his temporary rejection of Crowley's doctrines, and in the article Grant tries to reconcile Crowley's famous dictum "Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law" with the Eastern approach of "Letting things take their course", again by arguing that the ultimate end of the two traditions is one and the same.

And so, the Eastern method (of *Advaita*) contemplates the ever tranquil and Immutable *Shiva* by the resignation implied by the words "let things take their course", while the highest initiates of the West – now as ever – contemplate the ever-restless stirrings of *Shakti* by the same resignation which is equally implied in the precept "Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law"; for by 'doing the true will', i.e. letting all parts of the picture fulfil themselves evenly without let or hindrance, we come to see the illusoriness of the picture and its mirage-like beauty cast in the shining waters of the Unmoving *Shiva*.[15]

Although Grant more or less stopped publishing articles on advaita in Indian journals in 1960 (he only published a few more in the mid-1980s and the early 1990s), he continued to take an active interest in advaita, particularly in the works of Maharshi, Thakur Haranath, Srimata Anandamayi Ma, and Sri Ramakrishna. Grant not only corresponded with leading advocates of advaita, including Arthur Osborne (1906–1970), the British-borne editor of *The Mountain Path* (a journal founded 1966 devoted to the teaching of Maharshi published in South India), but even acted as Haranath's British representative for a while and helped to bring out the three-volume work *Lord Haranath: A Biography* (1970–73) by Akella Ramakrishna Sastri.[16] In 1970–71 Grant wrote the entries on Anandamayi Ma, Haranath, Ramana Maharshi, Sai Baba, and Sivananda for Richard Cavendish highly influential encyclopaedic series *Man, Myth and Magic*, alongside entries on occultist subjects such as Dion Fortune and Austin Osman Spare.

ADVAITA IN THE TYPHONIAN TRILOGIES 1972–2002

These specialised early articles and encyclopaedia entries apart, Grant's magical philosophy is expressed particularly in his Typhonian Trilogies, nine volumes published between 1972 and 2002. Throughout these volumes Grants refers repeatedly to advaita teachings and the Indian mystics that he studied already in the 1950s. What is striking is the way that he uses advaita to explain and legitimate Western occultist practices and teachings, and I would even argue that non-duality as expressed by advaita forms the cornerstone upon which Grant bases his own particular current of contemporary occultism, usually referred to as the 'Typhonian Tradition'. This is not the place to discuss the complex nature of this current, but briefly stated the Typhonian Tradition can be seen as a *bricolage* of Neo-Vedanta, Hindu Tantra, Western Sex-

ual Magic, Surrealism, ufology and Lovecraftian gnosis set in the wider context of Thelema; it is a practical epistemological system aimed at spiritual enlightenment and the transcending of the illusion of duality.[17]

Already in the first volume of the Trilogies, *The Magical Revival* (1972), Grant praises *advaita-marg* or the path of non-duality as the "most profoundly spiritual Path now open to humanity",[18] and in a later book, *Outer Gateways* (1992), he goes even further and states that the teachings of advaita is the only way to avoid the destructive forces of the kali yuga, or modern age.[19] While Grant sometimes has been criticised for idiosyncratic interpretations of the teachings and doctrines he uses as building-blocks for his Typhonian Tradition, it is evident that his understanding of advaita remains true to the way that non-duality is expressed by thinkers like Maharshi and Haranath, as seen by the definition he offers in *The Magical Revival*.

> Lit. Not-two. The Vedantin doctrine of Non-duality, which reveals the supreme nature of the Self to be One, not two or many; i.e. nothing exists apart from the Self (Atman), yet all things are forms assumed by the Self.[20]

As mentioned, Grant frequently refers to advaita teachings when explaining Western occultists concepts; for instance, in *The Magical Revival* and *Cults of the Shadow* (1975) he refers to advaita when discussing Austin Osman Spare's magical system, especially the so-called Death Posture,[21] and when discussing Crowley's ontological formula of 0=2 he refers explicitly to Not-Two or advaitan non-duality in both *Aleister Crowley & The Hidden God* (1973) and *Outer Gateways*.[22] Other examples of referring to advaita can be more personal in the sense that he is referring to the biography of one advaitan philosopher or another. For instance, in *Nightside of Eden* (1977) he sees a parallel between Haranath's supposed encounter with a higher being and the Golden Dawn chief MacGregor Mathers' (1854–1918) account of his meeting with the so-called Secret Chiefs in Bois de Boulogne outside Paris.[23]

One of the most conspicuous aspects of Grant's trilogies is the use of fiction, particularly the fictional works of H.P. Lovecraft (1890–1937), and Grant repeatedly argued that Lovecraft had through his dreams unconsciously tapped into the same magical current that Crowley was consciously in contact with. The fictional works of Lovecraft – particularly those connected to the Chtulhu mythos (or Necronomicon Gnosis as Grant calls it), did not only correspond to Crowley's Law of Thelema and *The Book of the Law,* but more importantly explain and give deeper understanding of them. However, a close reading of

Grant's Typhonian trilogies shows, at least to my mind, that Grant's use of Lovecraft's fictional work – but also that of other authors such as Arthur Machen (1863–1947) and Sax Rohmer (Arthur Henry Sarsfield Ward, 1883–1959) – was not restricted to a comparative enterprise, but seems to have had a more practical function in the sense of challenging the way that the reader sees fiction and reality. In this Grant was influenced by Surrealists such as Salvador Dalí (1904–1989) and their method of challenging the notion of the real, and in particular referred to Arthur Rimbaud's (1854–1891) formula of total derangement of the senses, which to Grant meant an active overstimulation of the senses which would lead the mind to transcend reality as we know it. It is here that we find advaita at the very centre of Grant's work: the notion that reality is composed of an objective and a subjective world, or an inner and outer world, is an illusion that one has to be freed from. By mixing fiction with historical fact the border between these worlds is increasingly being questioned, and ultimately it can be transcended.

A great deal more can be said about Kenneth Grant and advaita, but for our present purpose I hope that I have at least demonstrated the importance of advaita to Grant, which in itself is interesting given the fact that Grant is one of the most, if not *the* most, influential British occultist after Crowley. However, I would like to conclude this paper by briefly exploring the relevance of this case study for the wider study of Western esotericism.

ADVAITA, OCCULTISM, AND THE STUDY OF WESTERN ESOTERICISM

As mentioned at the outset of this paper, much has been written about the influence of neo-advaita on Western spirituality. Kenneth Grant is by no means unique in terms of his interest in advaita, not even if we limit the discussion to the influence of Ramana Maharshi, arguably Grant's main source on advaita. Ever since Paul Brunton's popular work *A Search in Secret India* (1934) – which Grant, incidentally, had a copy of – Maharshi has been read and studied by such diverse thinkers as Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), Joseph Campbell (1904–1987), Thomas Merton (1915–1968), W. Somerset Maugham (1874–1965), and his teachings continue to be promoted by spiritual teachers such as Eckhart Tolle (b. 1948), Gangaji (born Merle Antoinette Roberson, 1942–), and Arunachala Ramana (born Dee Wayne Trammell, 1929–2010).

In his study of Ramana Maharshi and neo-advaita in North America Phillip Charles Lucas analyses what he calls the "Ramana effect" whereby he "attempts to understand how the Maharshi, in spite

of his disinterest in founding a mass spiritual movement, appears to have inspired a host of spiritual teachers and organizations dedicated to spreading their own interpretation and expression of his Advaitic teaching and practice in North America".[24] Lucas frames his analysis within theories on religion and globalization, especially Thomas Csordas' theory of the importance of *portable practice* and *transposable message* for rituals and beliefs to move successfully into a new cultural setting. Lucas argues that the simplicity and transcultural nature of Maharshi's method of self-enquiry (introversion of the mind grounded in the question, "Who am I?"), and the universality and transformability of the Maharshi's message can be understood from the perspective of Csorda's two factors, and thereby explain the success of the Maharshi's message in North America. The experiential aspect of Maharshi's self-enquiry and the universal nature of his message are also emphasised by Thomas A. Forsthoefel, but from a theoretically more problematic perspective, namely that of perennialism.[25] When analysing the use of advaita in the writings of Grant, it becomes apparent that the experiential dimension of Maharshi's method of self-enquiry and the universal nature of his message – which both Lucas and Forsthoefel emphasis albeit from different perspectives – are central discourses which Grant returns to throughout his published works.

If we look at the first discourse, the experience of transcending the illusion of duality, from the perspective of the study of Western esotericism, it ties in nicely with recent research on esotericism by scholars such as Wouter Hanegraaff and Kocku von Stuckrad, who both emphasise the construct of identity and claims to absolute knowledge (*gnosis*), or to put it simply: esotericism is characterised by an emphasis on gnosis, rather than on rationality or the reliance on religious authority, and this gnosis should be understood as a revelatory experience that leads to an encounter with one's true self as well as with the divine aspect of existence. The quest for perfect or absolute knowledge in esotericism is often related to discourses of secrecy in the sense that the salvific knowledge strived for by esotericists is an experiential knowledge which is impossible to communicate. It is an experience which each esotericist has to experience on his or her own. To Grant, Thelema and advaita have the same goal, the experience of transcendence: discovering and doing one's true will is seen by Grant as analogous to the Maharshi's "Who am I?"-method of introspection, and the ultimate goal is the "crossing of the abyss" or the total annihilation of the ego. Grant not only used surrealist techniques such as fiction and art to transcend the illusion of duality, but, more importantly he devised a peculiar system of dream-control whereby the initiate is believed to reach a state

between dreaming and dreamless sleep, called the Mauve Zone which ultimately would lead to a unity with the All. Grant commented on this in *Outer Gateways* in an, for him, unusually clear and detailed way:

> The universe, as the word itself declares, is a single world. The duality of subject/object does not obtain in that state: 'it is as it is'. […] In the forefront of consciousness should be held firmly the awareness that all that is seen, or experienced, is a manifestation of the Self, not 'my'-self or 'your'-self, or any other specific self. The term Self signifies only objective Consciousness; it is therefore without Subject, or it may be considered as pure subjectivity. There will be experienced a gradual, in some cases a sudden, change of viewpoint, a sign that the centre of awareness is shifting from the phenomenal to the noumenal, from the world of appearance to its underlying reality. The Great Work consists in the stabilising of this state of awareness. All sense of difference will vanish, until the ultimate difference is finally abolished.[26]

To my mind, the experiential shift alluded to by Grant lies at the core of all his works, which for analytical purposes can be interpreted as an example of absolute knowledge or gnosis as understood in the field of Western esotericism.

The second discourse, the universal nature of advaita, can be understood from the broader perspective of Western esotericism as a legitimating strategy. In his very useful study of strategies of legitimating esoteric positions in modernity, Olav Hammer argues that these strategies fall into three main categories: appeal to constructed tradition, appeal to science and appeal to experience.[27] Although Hammer briefly discusses emic speculations about the all-encompassing nature of different cultures (when discussing the first category – appeal to constructed tradition), he does not discuss universalism us such. Given the importance attributed to universalism in many esoteric traditions, I would like to propose that the appeal to universalism should be seen as a fourth category. In the case of Grant, it is obvious that he uses the advaitan claim to universalism as a legitimating strategy: the ultimate goal of all "spiritual culture" is the doctrine of non-duality; the very "fact" that all "genuine spiritual cultures" share the same goal, "proves" it validity and legitimacy. This notion is expressed repeatedly by Grant; for instance, in *Aleister Crowley & The Hidden God*:

> The natural spirit of the East, in its deeper rootage, is in complete accord with the doctrine of Thelema. That this is so may be proved

by comparing the basic tenets of Thelema with the Chinese Way of the Tao, the Vedantic doctrine of Advaita, and the pivotal philosophy of Hindu and Buddhist Tantricism.[28]

The appeal to universalism is by no means unique to Grant – it can easily be found in the writings of such diverse esoteric authors as Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891), Aleister Crowley and Julius Evola (1898–1974), to mention just a few, and it would thus be pertinent to explore the appeal to universalism as a legitimating strategy on other modern esoteric currents.

In sum, then, Grant can be seen as an illustrative example of the influence of neo-advaita upon occultism, and that two central discourses of neo-advita in the West – the experiential dimension and the universal nature of the message – can be fruitfully analysed from the perspective of the study of Western esotericism.

NOTES

1   For a discussion of pre-Śaṅkara forms av advaita vedanta, see Karl H. Potter (ed.): *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume III: Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils* (Princeton, N.J., 1981).

2   Richard King: *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and 'The Mystic East'* (London & New York, 1999), pp. 118–142.

3   The notion of a perennial tradition that underlies all religions is deeply imbedded in Western culture. On the one hand it derives from the idea that when all religious traditions are stripped of their outer dogmas and rituals, a 'true' and 'universal' religion is revealed – something that scholars such as Ivan Strenski has identified as 'natural religion'; see Ivan Strenski: *Thinking About Religion: An Introduction to Theories of Religion* (Malden, MA, 2006). On the other hand, the notion is also dependent on the Renaissance tradition of *philosophia perennis*, i.e., the construct of an unbroken philosophical tradition from antiquity to contemporary times; see Wouter J. Hanegraaff: *Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture* (Cambridge, 2012), especially chapter 1.

4   Phillip Charles Lucas: "When a Movement Is Not a Movement: Ramana Maharshi and Neo-Advaita in North America", in *Nova Religio* 15:2 (2011), p. 93.

5   Gordan Djurdjevic: *India and the Occult: The Influence of South Asian Spirituality on Modern Western Occultism* (New York, 2014), pp. 96–100.

6   For a brief introduction to Kenneth Grant and his particular form of occultism, see Henrik Bogdan: "Kenneth Grant and the Typhonian Tradition", in Christopher Partridge (ed.): *The Occult World* (Oxon, 2015), pp. 323–330. See also Henrik Bogdan: *Kenneth Grant: A Bibliography* (London, 2015).

7   Thelema designates Crowley's philosophical and religious system. See Henrik Bogdan: "Aleister Crowley: A Prophet for the Modern Age", in Christopher Partridge (ed.), *The Occult World* (Oxon, 2015), pp. 293–302.

8   On Grant and Spare, see Phil Baker: *Austin Osman Spare: The Life and Legend of London's Lost Artist* (London, 2011), pp. 209–223; Kenneth and Steffi Grant: *Zos Speaks! Encounters with Austin Osman Spare* (London, 1998).

9   Henrik Bogdan: "Editor's Introduction", in Aleister Crowley and David Curwen: *Brother Curwen, Brother Crowley: A Correspondence*, edited by Henrik Bogdan (York Beach, ME, 2010), pp. xviii–xlviii.

10 Kenneth Grant: *Remembering Aleister Crowley* (London, 1989), p. v.

11 Kenneth Grant to [Friedrich Lekve], March 27, 1953. Kantonsbibliothek Appenzel Ausserrhoden.

12 For an introduction to Maharshi's mysticism, see the classic collection edited by Arthur Osborne: *The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi in His Own Words* (London, 1962).

13 Grant's Indian articles were collected in one volume, together with his other essays on Eastern mysticism: Kenneth Grant: *At the Feet of the Guru: Twenty-Five Essays* (London, 2006).

14 Grant, *At the Feet of the Guru*, p. 48.

15 Grant, *At the Feet of the Guru*, p. 68.

16 Personal communication from Michael Staley. Kenneth Grant is mentioned, and a letter from Grant to the author is quoted, in volume two of Akella Ramakrishna Sastri's *Lord Haranath: A Biography* (Rajahmundry, 1970–73).

17 On Grant's Typhonian Tradition, see Henrik Bogdan: "Kenneth Grant and the Typhonian Tradition", in Christopher Partridge (ed.): *The Occult World* (Oxon, 2015), pp. 323–330.

18 Kenneth Grant: *The Magical Revival* (London, 1972), p. 80.

19 Kenneth Grant: *Outer Gateways* (London, 1992), p. 66.

20 Grant: *The Magical Revival*, p. 226.

21 Grant: *The Magical Revival*, p. 213; Kenneth Grant: *Cults of the Shadow* (London, 1975), p. 195.

22 Kenneth Grant: *Aleister Crowley & Hidden God* (London, 1973), p. 42; Grant: *Outer Gateways*, p. 71.

23 Kenneth Grant: *Nightside of Eden* (London, 1977), p. 130.

24 Lucas: "When a Movement Is Not a Movement", p. 94.

25 Thomas A. Forsthoefel: "Weaving the Inward Thread to Awakening: The Perennial Appeal of Ramana Maharshi", *Horizons* 29:2 (2002), pp. 240–259.

26 Grant: *Outer Gateways*, p. 151.

27 Olav Hammer: *Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age* (Leiden, 2004).

28 Grant: *Aleister Crowley & The Hidden God*, p. 70.

Daniel Andersson

PILGRIMEN

*"Vart rider du, herre?" – "Det vet jag inte", sade jag, "bara bort
härifrån, långt bort härifrån. Ständigt bort härifrån – bara så kan
jag nå mitt mål." – "Du känner alltså ditt mål?" frågade han. "Ja",
svarade jag, "jag sade det ju. Bort härifrån – det är mitt mål"*
  Franz Kafka, *Uppbrottet*

Den här texten handlar om pilgrimen, turisten och resenären, samt om
landet Indien och om världens mest säljande guideböcker. Jag försöker
här att resonera kring det faktum att många olika resenärer som är ute
"on the road" i dagens globaliserade värld mer och mer vill heliggöra
sitt eget resande och undvika att själva kalla sig turister. De talar i ter-
mer av *vagabonder*, *pilgrimer*, *resenärer*. Detta gäller alla nationaliteter
och det gäller också dem som designar guideböcker. Min tanke är att
det egentligen inte är så stor skillnad på turisten och pilgrimen, utan
att det var den unge medelklassturisten – *backpackaren, ryggsäcks-
turisten* – som på 1970-talet i sitt eget resande drog upp en skiljelinje
som inte fanns. Man var tvungen att särskilja den äldre turisten från
den yngre, den mer stabile resenären med god ekonomi från den flack-
ande luffaren.

Men den enda skillnad som egentligen finns är intentionen, graden av
nyfikenhet och öppenhet inför det man ser.

Ett exempel på hur guideböcker drar gränser mellan turister och "riktiga" resenärer – att själva språkbruket har förvandlats – kan hämtas från Lonely Planet, världens största reseguideboks-företag.

Lonely Planet grundades 1973, i kölvattnet av hippierörelsen, beatnikrörelsen och ett flera decennier långt intresse för asiatiska religiösa och filosofiska tankeströmningar. Syftet med bokserien var att underlätta resandet för *backpackers*, dvs västerländska, urbana, sekulära, ofta belästa ungdomar som sökte sig bortom de redan då upptrampade stigarna som vandrats av charterturismens något äldre garde. Syftet var också att finna nya områden att upptäcka, områden som inte mutats in av charterturismen.

"Båtar lägga till vid nybyggd kaj, dumma männskor kalla oss malaj, be malaj dansa äkta dans, malaj dansa dans som aldrig fanns", sjunger Povel Ramel redan på 1950-talet i sin satir över söderhavsöturismen, just den turism som en backpacker inte ville bli associerad med.

*Lonely Planet*s böcker säljer i miljontals exemplar varje år och det idealistiska och alternativa syftet är inte lika tydligt längre. *Lonely Planet*s första boktitlar hade som undertitel *On A Shoestring*, det vill säga att man skulle leva så billigt och så "native" som möjligt och göra så lite avtryck på jorden som möjligt. Dagens resenärer ger sig i första hand inte ut i världen på en budget som ska understiga 15 dollar/dag. Idag reser backpacker-generationen med tyngre packning än en charterturist och är lika oavbrutet uppkopplad. Turismen har blivit en massindustri och på många håll är invånarna totalt beroende av turismen för att överleva. På de mest avlägsna platserna dansar "malajen" en dans som aldrig fanns. Och i publiken sitter både backpackers och åldrande tema-gruppresenärer. Idag har *Lonely Planet* över 500 titlar och täcker 195 länder.

I det tidiga 1970-talet besökte backpackers samma ställen som charterturisten: stränder, tempel, ruiner, städer. Men snart tog han eller hon sig vidare till mer avlägsna regioner. Samtidigt var de beroende av likasinnade, av västerlänningar. Ingen vill ju sätta sig helt själv i en by i Pakistan, ty där kan ingen se och bekräfta en och där finns det varken billig öl eller varma sandstränder.

Idag finns det knappt några upplevt ursprungliga (av modernitet, kapitalisering och "västernisering" ej exploaterade) ställen kvar. Men backpackerturisten behöver dem. Annars blir han eller hon enbart en vanlig turist, inte en sökare, inte en vandrare. Och det här sistnämnda är viktigt. En opposition kan nämligen spåras i det vardagliga talet "on the road" när resenären kategoriseras. Vi kan skilja mellan den äldre

charter- (package-) turisten och den yngre *luffarturisten*, backpackaren. En annan opposition är *resenären – de där hemma*. Ytterligare en annan är *pilgrimen* kontra både *lokalbefolkning* och vardagliga (charter-) *turister*, som anses mer statiska, som är ute efter det bekväma resandet och mindre ute efter varaktig bildning och religiösa upplevelser. Ty lite vid sidan om har vi just pilgrimen, vars intresse för andliga platser eller religiösa patos gör honom/henne lite främmande för de andra hedonistiska figurerna. Extra poäng ger det om man levt med "lokalbefolkningen" – den högsta formen av arkeotopisk turism.

Resemålen måste (av "rätt" personer, exempelvis de som skriver *Lonely Planet*s böcker) anses exotiska, i varje fall hävdar jag att det var så när böckerna började skrivas, och intentionen lever nog kvar idag. Det man söker är det "äkta" och "oexploaterade". Man lever billigt, eller vill få det till att se ut som man gör det. Detta är någonting som vi också möter hos de europeiska manliga äventyrarna, Fawcett, Livingstone, Galindo, Stephens. Det som lockade var det exotiska, äventyret, manlighetskulten i vedermödan.

Det pågår ett rollspel därute. Interagerandet med andra turister tar sig olika uttryck beroende på vem du upplevs vara och vem du anser att du själv är. Det är ett förhandlande om identiteter, precis på samma sätt som det pågår ett ständigt förhandlande om vad en fulländad turist-kanon ska bestå av. Vilka platser är *the top ten*? En charterturist kan inte med framgång ta rollen som en backpacker eller en vagabond (även om charterturisten för några dagar kan "resa" själv, bortom gruppen). En backpacker vill inte heller förknippas med all-inclusive-turisten. Guideböcker beskriver resenären med skiftande ord och begrepp. *Lonely Planet*, som är den bokserie som står i fokus här, skiljer diffust mellan *wanderers*, *trekkers*, *pilgrims* och *vagabonds*. Det är ett medvetet spel med ord.

Ju fler som blir enbart "turister" och ju fler som försöker att "go native" och upptäcka det hittills icke upptäckta, desto större strävan bland dem som inte vill bli förknippade med "alla andra", att skapa en ny identitet. Då blir, hävdar jag, det uråldriga begreppet "pilgrim" användbart. Ty en pilgrim är väl ingen turist? Eller?

Men först några ord om resandet, turisten och pilgrimen.

RESAN, TURISTEN, PILGRIMEN

Jesus och Moses ökenvandringar, Muhammeds besök på berget, Buddhas sökande i vildmarken, Teseus i labyrinten, boernas vandring, Maos långa marsch, Gandhis risbonde-manifestation… många kulturer och civilisationer har sin kultur-grundläggande vandring, sin hero's

journey, som kan tolkas symboliskt, enligt Jungs psykologi, strukturellt, enligt Lévi-Strauss' mytologi, eller universellt, enligt antropologen Joseph Campbell. Den sistnämnde finner fyra sekvenser i vandringen, i resandet, i den mänskliga strävan efter något annat. Huruvida detta är applicerbart på alla former av turism eller resande låter jag vara osagt; det är en teori, en bild, som tecknas här.

> Resenären, pilgrimen, turisten, finner vägen
> vedermödor längs vägen (separation)
> ankomsten till målet (separation, en initiering)
> återvändandet till hemmet.[1]

Att resa hör till den mänskliga tillvaron. Människan har i alla tider rest för att finna nya åkermarker, för att finna sig nya makar och makor, för att handla, för att upptäcka, för att kriga. Hon har rest för att lära sig ting om sin omvärld. Hon har rest för att människan är en resande varelse. Civilisationen "has a relatively precarious hold upon us and there is an undoubted attraction in a life of absolute freedom once it has been tasted. The 'call o' the wild' is in the blood of many of us and finds it safety in adventure".[2]

Människan har rest över land och över hav och ofta har hennes resande klätts i någon form av sökande efter en inre eller en yttre mening, en transcendental utmaning. Människan har burit reliker med sig på sina vandringar, reliker som sedan blivit pilgrimsmål. Hon har tagit sig över öknar och berg i missioneringssyfte.

Att resandet har blivit än viktigare än det någonsin varit visar nutidens stora globala skiftningar. Turism är en av världens viktigaste näringsgrenar med hundratals miljoner mer eller mindre informellt anställda i alla regioner och i alla klimatzoner. Möjligen härstammar vårt ord turist från latinets *tornare* eller grekiskans *tornos*, cirkelrörelse, en rörelse runt en axelpunkt. Det är en resa som har en startpunkt och ett mål som man ska komma tillbaka till, som en passagerit, som en pilgrimsvandring. Resan kan symboliseras av ryggsäcken, som är en annorlunda accessoar än väskan med hjul på. Även om begreppet turism som sådant inte har använts i Väst i mer än drygt etthundrafemtio år så är resor till heliga platser, och med dem en förknippad ekonomi i form av vandrarhem, guideböcker etc, ett fenomen med långa historiska rötter.

> Tourism comprises the activities of persons traveling to and staying in places outside the usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited.[3]

Man kan göra det ännu kortare: turisten är den som reser bort för att se nya saker och för att slappa. Västerländsk turism har ofta handlat om att ta sig från kallare till varmare trakter för en period. Till definitionen kan läggas att om du pratar de inföddas idiom så blir du automatiskt mindre av en turist. Men du är fortfarande en *främling*, en pilgrim.[4]

Olika former av individuellt resande har existerat länge, medan nutidens västerländska turism har sitt egentliga ursprung i flera olika traditioner. Vi kan se gesällvandringar och pilgrimsfärder som tidig turism. Vi kan se en tidig turism i resandet i bildningssyfte bland adelsungdomar, ett resande som nådde sin kulmen på 1800-talet.

Därefter har vi, som sagts ovan, fenomenet med liftande som tog fart främst i Amerika på 1950-talet, tack vare bilismen (Kerouac: *På drift*). Beatnikrörelsen var bohemisk och delvis inspirerad av en västerländsk läsning av zen.

Sedan kom hippiekulturen och man började ta sig fram längs en rutt från Europa till Marrakesh till Israel till Indien till Himalaya. Ett nytt klädmode kom att skapas, ett som fortfarande lever kvar. Det var ett mode med (upplevt) indiska influenser, halsband, vida kläder, pannband, sandaler, fritt växande hår och skägg, gärna med en blomma bakom örat. Naturlig skönhet bortom modeindustrins kollektiva fördumning.

Och fortfarande är Indien det hägrande målet för många. Det är Indien som lockar – både för backpackers och för mer vanliga, trygga resenärer. Det Indien som finns därute är romantiserat, lockande, "färgglatt" och mångpolärt. De dåliga tingens Indien – kastsystemet, barnarbetena, svälten och korruptionen – blir något som ens eget ego ska övervinna och växa ur.

En så kallad luffarturist är en som mer eller mindre själv bestämmer sin resrutt, sitt färdsätt och sin resas längd och som ofta vill vara ute lite längre.[5] Backpackern söker sig – liksom de andra resenärerna – till sin grupp, till hostels (mer än hotell) och till ett mer aktivt förhållningssätt. På programmet står exempelvis rafting, sandboarding, surfande, festande, längre vistelser på klassiska ställen som Varanasi, Bali och Cuzco.

En pilgrimsresa däremot har traditionellt inte benämnts som vare sig turism eller "leisure". En vanlig definition är att en pilgrimsresa måste innehålla en målplats, en rörelse och en motivation. Det är, sägs det ofta, "a journey to a sacred place or shrine" där mikro-, meso- och makrokosmos möts. Pilgrimsfärder och ekonomi kan dock inte separeras. Runt en pilgrimsplats föds – säsongsmässigt eller ej – en ekonomi, baserad på var pilgrimen vill sova, vad han/hon vill äta, köpa, se, uppleva och få med sig tillbaka. En vid definition av pilgrimsplatsen och "pilgrimandet" är: "a set of ritual actions involving speci-

fic human communities, institutions and organized travel to and from sacred places".[6]

Det sägs också att en pilgrimsfärd inte är ett mållöst vandrande, och inget sökande för sin egen skull. En pilgrim är inte heller enbart en för många socialt accepterad flyktväg bort ifrån en moderna världen, stressen, kraven eller vad man nu kan tänka sig. En pilgrim är en volontär och en finnare, mer än en sökare.

En pilgrim eftersträvar oftast sammanhang och sammanbindningar. En pilgrim eftersträvar ofta – utifrån religionshistoriska aspekter – holism mer än förändring. Men ibland är förändringen av varaktig art: då blir pilgrimens resa en initiationsrit som för alltid skapar en ny människa. Liksom judarnas bar mitzva och de kristnas konfirmation för alltid förändrar personens religiösa status i gruppen kan en vandring till ett specifikt mål också förändra en människas roll.

> A pilgrim dies temporarily as a secular man and attains the godhood during the time of pilgrimage.[7]

LONELY PLANET REVISITED

Vi kan ana att en pilgrim, enligt en sorts historisk gängse förklaring, inte är en simpel charterturist som enbart lämnar sitt land för att under en kortare period få slappa, re-kreera sig och bada. Men om vi återgår till *Lonely Planet* – guideböckernas självlysande ledergestalt – så kompliceras bilden.

Jag har jämfört några guideböcker om Indien. Den första är från 1987 och heter *India – A Travel Survival Kit*. Beteckningen säger mycket; det är inte enbart tal om att resa utan om att överleva, *go Indian*. Den andra är från 2005 och har samma titel. Den tredje är *Rajastan, Delhi, Agra från* 2011. Jag har inte med den första editionen som kom från 1981. Den hette också *India – A Travel Survival Kit* och blev det året utnämnd till världens bästa guidebok. Anledningen till att dessa årtal är med är personlig. Jag besökte Indien för första gången 1988 och senare 2007 till 2012. Skälet till den assymetriska tematiken – landet Indien som helhet kontra en del av Indien, nämligen Rajastan-området, är enkel. Landet Indien täcks idag inte enbart av *en* guidebok utan av ett dussintal. Det som var heltäckande faktabeskrivningar för trettio år sedan är idag uppdelade på flera delar.

Tittar vi på hur det mest kända av alla turistmål, oavsett om du är fakir-resenär från Södermalm eller japansk grupppresenär, så ser vi att *Lonely Planet*s beskrivning av Taj Mahal har ändrat form.

1987 beskrivs Taj Mahal på en sida. Det är en jordnära beskrivning med mest fokus på historiska fakta. I upplagan från 2005 täcker Taj Mahal två sidor. Texten är mer utarbetad och dessutom klädd i ett innovativt språk: "sunrise is the magical time", "magical allure", etc.

I *Rajastan* 2011 får Taj Mahal 7 sidor samt omslaget på boken (men det är inget ovanligt när det gäller guideböcker om Indien). Texten är historiskt beskrivande, kartorna bra, språket i än högre utsträckning färgat av New Age-terminologi. Lägger vi till detta observationen att språkbruket i *Lonely Planet* har förändrats från en sekulär, ungdomlig jordnära vokabulär till en begreppsvärld som definitivt är mer "andlig" så ser vi ett mönster. Den som reser bort kallas vagabond, *traveller*, *pilgrim*, *trekker*, *searcher*. Platserna som besöks – det gäller pyramiderna i Egypten såväl som Macchu Picchu och Taj Mahal är inte längre enbart spots utan "power places". Man skulle kunna teoretisera över detta utifrån ett postmodernt perspektiv: det är du själv som definierar vem du är. Om jag ser mig själv mer som en pilgrim än som en turist som köper sin paketresa hemma och inte lägger mycket pengar i landet man kommer till, ja då är jag det. Att man beter sig likadant själv – i indierns, peruanens, kenyanens ögon – är oviktigt. Den västerländske "pilgrimen" är dock till dels beroende av massturismen eftersom den bidrar med service. Man behöver också stereotypen *turistus vulgaris* för att kunna definiera sig själv.[8] Den postmoderna autonoma människans tro och vetenskapens (av många upplevda) monopol på sanning banade vägar för hur sekulariseringen kom att tillåta *valet* religion. Detta är Sindre Bangstad inne på i sitt definierande av sekularism som en "politisk doktrin" som möjliggör tolerans och diskussion kring religiösa förståelseformer. Med försvagningen av religionens maktdimension, eller "de-institutionalisering", har människors religiositet, gått *life-as* (öde) till *subjetive-life* (val).[9]

Globaliseringen och den postmoderna skepcisismen mot beprövad vetenskap har exempelvis lett till att medicinsk turism blivit en växande bransch. Långt från etiska kommittéer kan man i fattigare turistmiljöer världen över driva projekt och experimentella behandlingar som inte tillåts i Väst. Behandlingarna utvärderas inte enligt västliga metoder.[10]

Det globala resandet förstör jordens ekologi och allt som är ursprungligt samtidigt som "the original" är förutsättningen för resandets existens. Globaliseringen skapar en likriktning som turismen göder men som samtidigt punkterar resandet. Varför ska man resa om det ser likadant ut därborta som härhemma? Samtliga resenärer vill – oftast – ha det bekvämt inom de ramar som de olika grupperna sätter upp. Och alla vill vara tillsammans med likasinnade. Det ovan nämnda hippiemodet är ju till för en exklusiv grupp som har råd att leka "indier".

Bekvämlighet kostar och den handlar alltid om bra restauranger, bra resmål, värme och intryck. Och här – hävdar jag – är pilgrimen en främling och en turist.

Vi anknyter till Joseph Campbell ovan. Att finna vägen innebär att man ger sig ut på sin vandring, ofta i grupp, men med ens eget individuella "uppvaknande" i blicken. Vedermödorna kan liknas vid labyrinter (som i katedralen i Chartres, som imiterar vandringen till Jerusalem), trappor upp till svårtillgängliga grottsystem (som i Ellora i Indien) eller floddalar (Ganges). Uttrycken och platserna skiljer sig åt, men pilgrimsvandringar och vallfärder har alltid varit en del av de religiösa uttrycken, att fullgöra en religiös plikt, att be, bli välsignad eller botad.[11] Pilgrimandet ökar världen över. Pilgrimen är en mycket viktig religiös aktör i postmodernitetens tidevarv.

Ibland är det innersta målet på platsen dolt för andra än de ytterst få invigda – som exempelvis Det Allraheligaste i Jerusalems tempel eller Amun-Re-templet i Karnak, vars innersta endast kunde besökas av Farao och översteprästen.

Katolicism och buddhism är de nutida världsreligioner som är mest kända för sina pilgrimsplatser. Från 300-talet ser vi i den kristna sfären hur pilgrimsplatser skapas runt levande helgon, ofta eremiter och martyrer. Man sökte efter *potentia,* kraft, och *praesentia,* närvaro. Kodord var långsamhet, frihet, tystnad, enkelhet (allt det som vi idag absolut inte kan förknippa med turism). Man besökte helgonbilder i tystnad. Statyn blir helgonet, liksom i alla polyteistiska miljöer.[12] Ett helgon, en bild, en staty, har också talismanska egenskaper – den beskyddar den som tror på dem.

Återvändandet är det som binder samman trådarna i ritualen. Man återvänder till det invanda, det slentrianmässiga. Är det transformationen och förändringen som resenären, turisten och pilgrimen vill åt? Eller är det känslan av samhörighet, connectedness? Eller handlar det i sann postmodern anda om att re-kreera sig, re-laxa, re-definiera sitt individualistiska liv?

Platsen får – av skiftande skäl – en helig status, ett sacred space. Människor kommer till den heliggjorda platsen för att finna just helighet och hierofani. Ritualer – cirkelvandring, böner, danser – knyts till platsen. Runt platsen växer så småningom upp informella – och sedan

formella – institutioner. Om det går illa, eller väl, tas platsen över av religionen i sig och blir en global kultplats – Bodh Gaya, Muktinath, Kagbeni-dalen. Inte sällan kan de första uppenbarelserna accepteras av folket men kritiseras av kyrkan och/eller auktoriteten. Med tiden tar det "folkliga" över.

En pilgrimsplats kan vara en gudaplats, en relikplats där man samlat in benbitar från Buddha, träflisor från Jesu kors, ett hårstrå från Muhammed. Hinduism är i liten utsträckning en religion knuten till reliker, medan buddhism och kristendom är det; kejsar Ashoka är en av de första härskarna vi känner som byggde upp ett "heligt rum" med pilgrimsplatser.

En pilgrimsplats är ofta en plats där mirakler sägs ha skett, där människor har blivit helade, erfarit livsförändrande upplevelser, mött personer och varelser. I fallet med Santiago i Spanien handlade det om synen av en stjärna över en åker. Den tolkades som att det blivande spanska skyddhelgonet Jakob hade uppenbarat sig för att ge sina trogna kämpar kraft inför kampen mot morerna. Staden fick namnet *Den helige Jakob av Stjärnans åker* – Santiago de Compostela. Kristenhetens heligaste plats i denna bemärkelse låg också taktiskt placerad där man ansåg att Världens ände var.

En pilgrimsplats är "öppen" för alla till skillnad från "stängda" imperiestäder och orter. Därför är egentligen inte Mekka en pilgrimsort på detta sätt, ty den är inte till för allas sökande. Men exempelvis Varanasi som ligger där Ganges gör en ovanlig krök är öppen för alla som vill ta sig dit.

Vilka är "the principles for location"? Har man funnit några sådana? Victor Turner föreslog att "pilgrimage sites occur at locations around the periphery of the pilgrim population",[13] men detta har inte kunnat bevisas, även om man har kunnat se att kullar, berg och vattendrag ofta finns vid en pilgrimsplats.

En pilgrimsvandring avslutas ofta med en cirkelvandring runt den heliga platsen, som exempelvis i Indien benämns som en tirtha. Cirkelvandringen, circumbulationen, utförs av alla oavsett om man är katolik i Rom eller japan i Japan eller hindu i Varanasi. Vandringen får inte vara planlös.

> Aimless wandering does not lead to pilgrimage; nor does trekking through an alien, albeit dramatic landscape such as adventure tourism.[14]

På en plats för pilgrimer finns mat, gemenskap, skydd, minnen, äventyr och mirakelberättelser. Alla ovan nämnda platser är idag också

turistplatser. En turism har fötts, en där tid är pengar och där estetik kan krocka med fysikalitet. Där det finns guidehäften till salu i varje "pilgrimshotell".

Även en konfessionslös människa (en turist som enbart reser enligt den rutt som *Lonely Planet* stakar ut) kan erfara något som kanske kan benämnas heligt, andligt, övernaturligt. Såsom konstnären som söker sig till ikonografiska platser – författaren till caféernas Paris, målaren till Firenze, arkitekten till Venedig eller New York – för att få kraft och inspiration, låta sig beskäljas av lärofädernas skaparförmåga. Och en konfessionslös människa kan mycket väl "köpa" med sig pilgrimens ting hem till det "sekulära" hemmet – en korg, en figurin, en staty, en gudabild, en karta, en rökelseflaska etc. Pilgrimandet blir turism.

Även sekulära platser kan bli pilgrimsmål. I Amerika ("the United States is a nation with the soul of a church")[15] kan man besöka sekulära platser, som då har erhållit en religiös pilgrimsstatus. Mängder av landmärken i USA har en helig aura, en pilgrimens status och beskrivs ofta som tempel, helgedomar och heliga platser. "Americans have created sacred spaces, the most obvious example being Washington D C".[16] Alla stora ritualer som sker i Washington är familjära för amerikanerna. Capitolium blir ett tempel som pilgrimen/turisten/vandraren samlas kring och går runt i en cirkelrörelse från A till B till C och tillbaka.

AVSLUTNING

Something hidden. Go and find it, Go and look behind the Ranges.
Lost and waiting for you. Go![17]

Jag inledde den här texten med att säga att den skulle handla om pilgrimen, turisten, resenären, landet Indien och *Lonely Planet*. Idén som framförs genom en vindlande argumentering är att *Lonely Planet*s köpare är turister som vill vara lite mer, nämligen pilgrimer och vandrare. Även de som formger *Lonely Planet* är resenärer och skriver som om det vore en stor skillnad på charterturister och backpackers. Men alla besöker samma tempel och ruinstäder, samma "heliga" floder och samma restauranger. För peruanen som säljer inca-konst, bilder på lamadjur och shamanism och för indiern som säljer uråldrig visdom, healing och yoga spelar det föga roll om främlingen är en trekker, en charterturist eller en utländsk pilgrim. Skillnaden hos aktören ligger inte i de yttre attributen utan i den nyfikenhet som främlingen visar gentemot den miljö han eller hon hamnar i. Både turisten, resenären, sökaren finner en väg, går längs vägen, ankommer till ett mål och återvänder. Historiskt är det ingen skillnad på en pilgrim och en turist. Rollspelet som

existerar turistgrupperna emellan handlar om status, om individualism, om identitet. Det handlar mindre om målet, platserna.

Lonely Planet var en modern guidebok som fångade upp en hel generation av resenärer. *Lonely Planet* är idag en postmodern produkt som fångar upp nya generationer, och nu med ett språkbruk som passar den hyperindividualiserade världen vars anspråk på andlighet, individuellt växande, och intryck är större än någonsin i turismens historia.

"Religionens återkomst" på ett individuellt plan kan till viss del förklaras med utbud, tillgång. Inte minst internet erbjuder transnationella organisationsformer och ett informationsutbud som tillåter ett mångkulturellt axplock. "Valet" att vara en mer andlig resenär uppmärksammas idag av media och debatter i allmänhet. Att vara en pilgrimsresenär sticker ut från omgivningens normer. Det är ett exempel på att medvetenheten kring religion har ökat, en medvetenhet som *Lonely Planet* idag både formar och göder. Turisten blir en pilgrim. Turisten är en icke-rörlig person, pilgrimen är i rörelse. Vi vill alla vara i rörelse. "What follows is the great principle of Life. Everything is moving".[18] Och vad som finns på berget, i öknen eller i den religiösa byggnaden är upp till resenären att finna.

NOTER

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3   Från The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), i Michael Stausberg: *Religion and Tourism: Crossroads, Destinations and Encounters* (New York, 2011), 6.
4   Nils G Holm: "An Integrated Role Theory From the Psychology of Religion: Concepts and Perspectives" i Spilka & MacIntosh: *Psychology of Religion* (Boulder, Colorado, 1992).
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6   John McKim Malville & Baidyanath Saraswati: *Pilgrimage. Sacred Landscapes and Self-Organized Complexity* (Delhi, 2009), 312.
7   Malville & Saraswati: *Pilgrimage*, 26.
8   Olsson: *Myten*, 46.
9   Sindre Bangstad: *Sekularismens ansikten* (Lund, 2012), 35. Se även Daniel Andersson & Åke Sander (red): *Det mångreligiösa Sverige* (Lund, 2015), 107–109.
10 Josef Milerad: "Medicinska pilgrimsresor" i *Läkartidningen*, 102:4 (2005), 202.
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12 David Morgan (ed): *Religion and Material Culture. The Matter of Belief* (London, 2010), 265.
13 Robert Stoddard i Malville & Saraswati: *Pilgrimage*, 163.
14 Malville & Saraswati: *Pilgrimage*, 5.
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16 J F Meyer: "Washington, D.C. and Power of Pilgrimage" i Malville & Saraswati: *Pilgrimage*, 311.
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Carl Martin Allwood

LOCALISM IN HINDUISM

Alain Daniélou's description of the caste system in the light of conclusions in cognitive psychology and social science

This contribution deals with localism as a feature of Hinduism. My starting point is the notion that Human knowledge and understanding develop locally and thereby are dependent on the locally pertaining conditions in the knowledge communities in question.[1] After a short discussion of the heterogeneous nature of Hinduism as a tradition of thought, I describe and discuss examples of localism in Hinduism.[2] Next, after an introduction of the French Hindu convert Alain Daniélou (1907–1994), as an extended illustration of localism in Hinduism, I describe his rendering of the Hindu caste system. Finally, some features of Daniélou's rendering of the cast system are briefly related to some conclusions in cognitive psychology and the social sciences about effects of localism. By localism is meant tendencies to stress, assume, or, to be "captured" by the importance of the local and local conditions in one's thinking and action.

THE NATURE OF HINDUISM AS A RELIGIOUS TRADITION

David Smith described Hinduism as "a sponge, a forest, precisely because, like Topsy, it just growed [sic!]. There was no overall authority, no inquisition, no Synod to rule and regulate what men thought; practice was regulated and behaviour was governed by caste councils."[3] The extent to which Hinduism should be seen as a unitary phenomenon is a controversial issue.[4-5] The opponents to the idea of Hinduism as a unitary phenomenon argue that the differences between forms of Hin-

duism as practiced in different geographical locations and in different segments of society are too large for it to be meaningfully captured under one label.[6-7] However, concerned stakeholders may obviously have an interest in arguing for the unitary identity of Hinduism. Thus, Lipner pointed out the interest of Hindu rightwing elements to maintain an understanding of Hinduism as having a stable unchanging nature.[8] Those who see Hinduism as a unitary phenomenon usually point at the Vedas as the unifying core, although Halbfass noted that "While proclaiming the sanctity of the Veda, the Hindu tradition seems to be turning away from the Vedic ways of thought and life".[9]

At the end of the day, the perspective taken by Smith that Hinduism and other religions should best be seen as having competing voices "each with varying notions about what is orthodox and who is 'in' and who is 'out'", and that religions are "neither monolithic entities nor […] unchanging over time, despite the claims often made for them by their theologians"[10] appears realistic and in line with current thinking about culture in the social sciences and the humanities.[11] In brief, a reasonable approach to what Hinduism is may be to see it as the sum of competing voices.[12] In the words of Atran et al., written in support of their concept of culture, this means "to treat variability as signal rather than noise."[13]

LOCALISM IN HINDUISM

Localism in Hindu thought can be found clearly with respect to space but not as clearly with respect to time. For example, with respect to time, the revelation of the teachings regarded as central may not to the same extent be seen as limited to a specific period in time by most Hindus compared to how it is seen by most followers of Islam. To illustrate, the possibility that the Vedas are the *final* revelatory statement does not seem to be emphasized in Hinduism to the same extent as for the Qur'an in Islam. For example, Daniélou, describing Shaiva philosophy, argues that in this philosophy "The nature of knowledge is to evolve […] it knows periods of progress and decline. […] The sacred book valid for all time and people is a fiction."[14] Here an ongoing historical developmental process is recognized.

Furthermore, in contrast to at least Islam, Hindu tradition seems to have less of a tendency to recognize specific individuals as primary founders, although as noted above the Veda scriptures are often, or commonly, taken as a common denominator. Again, and in contrast to the delivery of the Qur'an, the Vedas are not seen as clearly delivered from God directly but is conveyed via rishis (seers) whose

historical status is contested.[15-16] Local anchoring of the development of understanding is exemplified in the idea that some rishis may have been drinking a hallucinogenic drink, *soma*,[17] in order get better vision and to come closer to the gods,[18] but this seems to be an indication of spatial localism.

The importance of the local in Hinduism is clearly evident with respect to space. First of all, geographical space is divided into the sacred (with degrees) and the non-sacred. This means that India, the homeland of Hinduism, is sacred and the rest of the world is, not just not sacred but also, disallowed for "correctly believing" Hindus. This is implied in the doctrine of *Kala pani* (black water), valid for some of the denominations in Hinduism. This doctrine says that it is an offence for Hindus to leave India by sea. As described by Gopalakrishnan "The Baudhayana Sutra, one of the Hindu Dharma Shastras, says that 'making voyages by sea' (II.1.2.2) is an offense which will cause pataniya, loss of caste. It offers a rather difficult penance: 'They shall eat every fourth mealtime a little food, bathe at the time of the three libations (morning, noon and evening), passing the day standing and the night sitting. After the lapse of three years, they throw off their guilt.'"[19]

India is in this context called *Bharat* which stands for its people being subject to the dharma (sacred law or teaching, including duties). Knott characterizes Bharat as "the realm of dharma, the Hindu universe", and continues "*bharat*, the land ritually purified by the Brahmin and surrounded by *kala pani*, the black waters."[20] Thus, leaving India implied leaving the world of Hinduism.

Some reasons given for why leaving Bharat was not acceptable are very practical. For example, abroad or on a ship it would be impossible to carry out one's daily religious observances and one would be cut off from access to the holy Ganga water. In addition one would meet *mlecchas* (foreigners, in the pejorative sense of barbarians, savages).

To illustrate, at the end of the 19th century Swami Vivekanada, after having visited the United States, went to the Dakshineshwar Kali temple near Kolkata where he had often visited his guru Sri Ramakrishna. However, although he could not be refused to enter the temple, an extra evening worship was done later, after his visit, to purify the temple.[21] That the *kala pani* is still an active doctrine in India today is evidenced by the case of Vishnunarayanan Namboothiri, a Hindu priest, who at the end of the 1990's, after having visited a conference in England, was not allowed to enter his temple (the very orthodox Sreevallabha Temple

in Thiruvall, a town in Kerala) unless he recited the 'Gyatri mantra' 1008 times. This he refused, but in the end he was allowed to enter after he had purified himself by sprinkling holy water.[22]

The sacred nature of Bharat and the local character of Hinduism is also illustrated by what Eck described as "what one might call the 'locative' strand of Hindu piety" and further "the place itself is the primary locus of devotion" […] In the wider Hindu tradition, these places, particularly those associated with waters, are often called *tirthas*, and pilgrimage to these *tirthas* is one of the oldest and still one of the most prominent features of Indian religious life. A *tirtha* is a 'crossing place,' a 'ford,' where one may cross over to the far shore of a river or to the far shore of the worlds of heaven."[23]

Hindu localism also shows in that it is a very decentralized tradition within India, to some extent without any centralized organization. As expressed by Kinsley "Hindus also have acknowledged that differences exist among the regional areas of the Indian subcontinent, and the Hindu Law Books accept regional customs and peculiarities as authoritative."[24] Similarly, traditionally casts and subcasts had their own councils following their own regulations,[25] indicating recognition of local conditions as a precondition for understanding.

ALAIN DANIÉLOU

In the context of this chapter Alain Daniélou is a person of interest in his own right. He claimed to be the first (of two) Western persons ritually initiated into Hinduism. In this sense his voice can be seen as one of the many voices of Hinduism. Daniélou may have held a slightly idiosyncratic form of Hinduism as he, for example, did not seem to have believed in reincarnation.[26] His relation to Hinduism also illustrates how Hinduism can handle the non-local, in the form of a *mlecca* with a deep interest in the teaching.

Daniélou was born 1907 into an upper-class, cultural family in Neuilly-sur-Seine, close to Paris.[27] His father, fairly absent in the home, was a politician who held many national ministerial posts. His mother, from Norman nobility and a Catholic, founded a religious order named "Order of Sainte-Marie". The young Alain quarreled with his mother and spent his time improving himself in singing and dancing. In the early 1930's he made many adventurous trips, among others to Afghanistan. He came to India in 1932, already knowing for example Udai Shankar, dancer and brother of Ravi Shankar. After only a short time in India he acquainted Rabindranath Tagore, poet and literature Nobel Prize winner (1913). For more than 15 years he studied Hindu music,

Sanskrit, Indian philosophy and Hindu religion at the Banaras Hindu University. From 1949 to 1953 he was research professor at this university. In Varanasi he rented a maharadjah mansion on the Ganges where he lived for many years with his partner Raymond Burnier.

Through his friendship with Vijayanand Tripathi, a "great scholar of Benares", and his son Brahmanand who was studying to become a Brahmin priest, he came into contact with Swami Karpatri, who later "ordered Brahmanand to perform my initiation rites, as well as Raymond's."[28] Danielou's Hindu name after the initiation was Shiva Sharan ("the protégé of Shiva"). Before this event Brahmanand had taught Daniélou "Hindu rites, customs, and proprieties: the ritual baths in the Ganges at sunrise, the dietary restrictions, the *puja* ceremonies, the acts of purification, the days of fasting."[29] This teaching also included "very arcane [secret] details of tantric rites".[30] It seems that before his initiation Daniélou also received teaching from Swami Karpatri, which met some practical difficulties since Daniélou was at that point considered a "*mleccha*, a barbarian who is assimilated with the lowest castes of artisans; he can never touch a Brahman, or enter his house nor can he recite the *Veda*."[31] Daniélou claims, as noted above, that he and Burnier "it seems, are the only foreigners who were ever initiated and incorporated into orthodox Hinduism."[32] However, later at least one further Westerner, Baba Rampuri from California, was initiated into the Naga sannyasa (an ekadandi section) in 1970, one year after arriving in India.[33]

Swami Karpatri (1907–1982) was a monk in the Hindu Shaive dashanami 'single-staff renunciation' (*ekadandi sannyasi*) monastic tradition, generally associated with the Advaita Vedanta tradition (where *Atman* and *Brahman* are seen as one, a nonduality). Wikipedia notes that: "Any Hindu, irrespective of class, caste, age or gender can seek sannyāsa as an Ēkadaṇḍi renunciate in the Dasanāmi tradition."[34] Somewhat similarly, Daniélou wrote "Shaiva initiation is open to everyone, without distinction of caste or sex. A Shudra can thus become the Guru of a Brahman".[35] This might help understanding why Daniélou could be initiated into orthodox Hinduism. Karpatri later "created a political movement, the Jana Sangh (people's assembly)."[36] This party, also called Ram Raiya Parishad, was founded in 1948, and Daniélou notes that he acted as an advisor to this party for example on matters relating to how people in the West reacted to modernist versions of Hinduism by e.g., Sri Aurobino, Vivekanada and Gandhi, "which to them seemed unbelievably elementary and puerile."[37]

In his autobiography *The way to the labyrinth*, Daniélou also described how he and Burnier seem to have been cast out from Hinduism. The reason was that Burnier had married an Indian girl from a

Brahman family which was a breach of a promise they had made at their initiation into Hinduism "never to marry outside of our case [...] Suddenly we were strangers again, men without faith or law who should normally have become outcasts, rejected by the two communities the couple belonged to."[38] He also noted that "marriage is a social contract, and a union between two different races is strictly forbidden"[39]. Possibly because Daniélou had been identified in the circles of the Jana Sangh party, Karpatri later advised Daniélou to return to Europe which he did in 1960. After a very successful career as a musicologist in Europe, Alain Daniélou died 1994.

THE CASTE SYSTEM ACCORDING TO ALAIN DANIÉLOU

In one of his books Daniélou describes the caste system and how it is justified according to the form of Hinduism he adhered to.[40] A fundamental bolt in this context is the concept of "race", although Daniélou is unclear about what he means with "race". He writes that "the four successive ages gave rise to the four creations or races of man, which are therefore at different stages of development corresponding to the four ages of life."[41] The older the race, the more advanced (of the color white of course!). The four race colors are "not directly equated with Caucasian, Oriental or Negro but are related only in a wide analogical manner."[42] Each race has specific characteristics which make them good at some things and poor at others and thus "these characteristics will enhance a functional activity in both biological as well as social organization."[43] However, he stresses that the races are of equal value, on this he even quotes the Mahabaratha Shanti Parva 188 "There is no superior caste. [...] The beings created by him were only divided into casts according to their aptitude."[44] In other places he seems to equate, or at least do not distinguish, "ethnic elements" and race.[45]

Daniélou further asserts that "the Hindu law makers" claimed that it is necessary to keep the casts (races) apart in order for each person to attain his fulfillment. And he notes that the "caste corresponds essentially to a function, a profession reserved for a corresponding type of individual. Once the relationship is established between the group and the function, it is maintained by racial selection, together with special forms of education, eating habits, costumes, and ethics, which differ from group to group, so as to favor the individual's specialization."[46]

Moreover, starting training of the individual early in a setting that is already specialized for the profession will allow "the individual to attain a perfection of his type."[47] Moreover, each person is seen as "a link

in the endless chain of humanity. He is the result of the characteristics accumulated by his ancestors. He himself must perfect the link he represents in order to pass it on to the next, and this is why, to the Hindu, he must observe all the rules that assure the continuation of his type, his race, of what he received as a gift at birth."[48] In *While the Gods play* Daniélou says "The progress of the human species rests on the increasing usefulness of each of its elements and varieties."[49] In the larger perspective, each caste specializing in its own professions means that "The qualities and abilities of each improve over the generations so as to form an efficient, harmonious society that is capable of carrying out the role assigned to the human species in the plan of creation."[50] He also stated that the aim of the caste system is "the harmonious coexistence of the various races and different sorts of human beings"[51] and that the Hindu social system "is the only system that has ever been able to establish a tolerant multiracial, multicultural society, which Moslems and Christians have vainly sought to destroy."[52] I next relate the caste system as rendered by Daniélou to some concepts in research in cognitive psychology on problem solving that support some parts of Daniélou's reasoning and I then note other aspects of caste contradicted by modern social science.

THE CASTE SYSTEM Á LA DANIÉLOU RELATED TO CONCEPTIONS OF THE LOCAL IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The concepts of *weak methods* and *strong methods* derive from somewhat different research literatures in cognitive psychology. Both concepts refer to ways of solving tasks or problems.[53] Weak methods are usable in many contexts but due to this they at the same time don't accomplish very much. A prototypical weak method is *the trial and error method*, that is, to simply do *something* and then to learn from the outcome of this action. Another example is always doing something that decreases the distance between the present situation and one's goal state. Weak methods can be used in many situations because they only use information that occurs in most situations. This also, in contrast to strong methods, is what makes them fairly ineffective since they often utilize very little of the information available in the situation (only that part of the information that will tend to reoccur in many other situations).

Strong methods on the other hand, are very effective when they can be used because they utilize a large part of the information in the situation. At the same time, as a large part of the information they use tends

to be more or less unique to the situation, they are often not possible to use in other situations. Research has shown that over time, when people practice a skill, they utilize more of the information in the situation they train in and thus tend to use strong methods more. However, this is only the case as long as the situation they are in is fairly stable. If it changes, the person has to rely on more weak methods that are less effective but that utilize information common to many situations.

The parallel to Daniélou's rendering of the caste system is easy to see. When people practice for generation after generation in the same circumstances they are likely to develop very effective strong methods. Diamond mentions fine-graded ecological specialization among "multiple casts of fishermen fishing by different types of methods in different types of waters"[54] as an example of "prudent resource management by ecologically specialized Indian castes".[55] Given this for all professional groups, over generations the society as a whole can become increasingly effective. However, it should be noted that this thinking assumes a stable environment, but societies live in a world with changing circumstances. In fact, for better or worse, modern societies tend to be built on the premises of change.

Seen from the standpoint of much of current social science, including its current common implicit moral views, it is also clear that the caste system has many other deficiencies. For example, apart from the immorality of forcing individuals to have professions they might not like to have, Daniélou described the Hindu perspective view of the individual as seen as "but a transitory moment of the species, which is a permanent reality. It is the species that represents one aspect of the divine game […] of creation."[56] In contrast, modern society and current social science tend to see individuals as of value in themselves.

Moreover, as suggested by history, too much occupation with, and veneration of, the local may give rise to unfortunate violent ideologies such as Nazism.[57] For example, Meera Nanda argued in the Indian context that "there is a substantial overlap between the metaphysics of Hindu nationalism and Nazism."[58]

Finally, the caste system may be seen as a waste of resources since individuals are hindered to work in the profession where they are gifted and motivated to work. In addition, research on creativity has clearly shown that a manifold of interactive different perspectives, each allowing access to somewhat new information, is important for creative and innovative thinking;[59] something that may be needed for a society to survive in the world today. For this reason the localism inherent in the caste system might lead to stagnation.

In brief, given its decentralized development, it may not be surprising

that the feature of localism in Hinduism shows many types of effects, both positive and negative. For example, a tolerance of diversity in Hinduism co-exists with, what is likely to be less constructive, tendencies towards violent nationalism and the like.

NOTES

1 For the purposes of this chapter no distinction is made between knowledge and understanding. It should also be noted that in our present time internet and other improved means of communication presumably makes knowledge communities less concretely local, but they remain local (bounded) in a more abstract sense.

2 Such tendencies may be less characteristic of Christianity and Islam where knowledge instead to a somewhat higher extent may be treated as served from above. However this suggestion will not be developed in the present chapter.

3 David Smith: *Hinduism and modernity* (Malden, MA, 2003), 99.

4 E.g., the essays in John Llewellyn: *Defining Hinduism A reader* (London, 2005).

5 Furthermore, no assumption of essentialism with respect to religions is made in this chapter. Instead I argue that religious traditions, including Hinduism, should be seen as heterogeneous and overlapping and interacting with other traditions. However, in order to keep this text short I will occasionally use terms such as "Hindu", "Hinduism", "Islam", etc. and other expressions which may give an impression of essentialism but this is not intended.

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7 Brian Smith: "Questioning authority: "Constructions and deconstructions of Hinduism" in Llewellyn (ed.): *Defining Hinduism A reader* (London, 2005), 102f.

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9 Wilhelm Halbfass: "The idea of the Veda and the identity of Hinduism" in Llewellyn (ed.): *Defining Hinduism A reader* (London, 2005), 16f, 17.

10 Brian Smith: "Questioning authority", 103.

11 E.g., Scott Atran, Douglas L. Medin, & Norbert O. Ross: "The cultural mind: Environmental decision making and cultural modeling within and across populations" in *Psychological Review* 112: 4 (2005), 744–776; Fredrik Barth: "An anthropology of knowledge" in *Current Anthropology* 43:1 (2002), 1–18; Terry Eagleton: *The Idea of Culture* (Oxford, UK, 2000).

12 Smith: "Questioning authority", 103.

13 Atran et al., 766

14 Alain Daniélou: *While the gods play* (Rochester, VE., 1987), 87.

15 Thomas J. Hopkins: *The Hindu religious tradition* (Belmont, CA, 1971).

16 Alain Daniélou, with Jean-Louis Gabin: *Shiva and the primordial tradition* (Rochester, VE., 2007 [2003]), 10.

17 Soma seems to have been a hallucinogenic drink made from a plant called "Soma". According to David Kinsley: *Hinduism A cultural perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993), p. 12, drawing on, at that time, recent research, this plant was in fact a type of mushroom (*Amanita muscaria*, the Fly Agaric), but later on this has been questioned and other suggestions as to the identity of the specific plant in question have been made.

18 Ibid.

19 Vrindavanam S. Gopalakrishnan: "Crossing the ocean" *Hinduism today*, July/August/ September (2008), Magazine Web edition.

20 Kim Knott: *Hinduism A very short introduction* (Oxford, 1998), 94.

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22 Ibid, and *D Jose* http://www.rediff.com/news/jul/15jose.htm, retrieved July 5, 2015.

23 Diana L. Eck: "India's Tīrthas: 'Crossings' in sacred geography" in *History of Religions*, 20:4 (1981), 323f, 323.

24 Kinsley, *Hinduism A cultural*, 7

25 Lewis. S. S. O'Malley: *Indian caste costumes* (Calcutta, 1976).

26 Daniélou with Gabin: *Shiva*, Preface, xiii.

27 This and the following draws on Daniélou's self-biography: Alain Daniélou: *The way to the labyrinth Memoires of East and West* (New York, 1987, [1981]) and on the Wikipedia, the latter especially for information on Swami Karpatri and his tradition.

28 Ibid, 139.

29 Ibid, 136.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Retrieved from the Web 1 July 2015.

34 Retrieved from the web 3rd of July 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dashanami_Sampradaya

35 Daniélou: *While the gods play*, 145.

36 Daniélou: *The way to the labyrinth*, 139.

37 Daniélou with Jean-Louise Gabin: *Shiva*, 20.

38 Daniélou: *The way to the labyrinth*, 194.

39 Ibid.

40 Alain Daniélou: *Virtue, success, Pleasure and Liberation The four aims of life in the tradition of ancient India* (Rochester, VE, 1993).

41 Ibid, 24.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid, 26.

45 E.g., ibid, 34.

46 Ibid, 37.

47 Daniélou: *Virtue*, 38.

48 Ibid, 73.

49 Daniélou: *While the gods play*, 158.

50 Ibid, 162.

51 Daniélou: *Virtue*, 32–33.

52 Daniélou: *The way to the labyrinth*, 319.

53 E.g., Carl Martin Allwood: "Diagnos av mentala förmågor i ett multikulturellt samhälle" In Allwood & Johnsson (eds.): *Mänskliga möten över gränser – Vård och omsorg i det mångkulturella samhället* (Stockholm, 2009), 191f.

54 Jared Diamond: *Collapse How societies choose to fail or survive* (London, 2011), 307.

55 Ibid, 558.

56 Daniélou: *While the gods play*, 157.

57 Compare e.g., Victor Farias: *Heidegger and Nazism* (Philadelphia, 1989).

58 Meera Nanda: *Prophets facing backward Postmodern critiques of science and Hindu nationalism in India* (New Brunswick, NJ, 2003), 10.

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Chitaranjan Das Adhikary & Ashok K. Kaul

RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE

A Derivative Discourse

Sociological enquiry of religion is premised on a master theory of religious decline in modern times.[1] There has been a long list of social scientists from Weber, Marx, and Freud to Berger and Mills who have held that religion will gradually fade and cease to be important with the advent of industrial society. The death of religion was the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most of the nineteenth and twentieth century.[2] Religious decline or the desacralization thesis commonly found among sociologists has its origin in Europe. When it was first used about the end of the Thirty Years' War in Europe in 1648, it referred to the transfer of properties from the church to local kings and royal houses. Similar transfer of church properties to the state also formed a part of the achievements of the French Revolution. Later in England, George Holyoake used the term "secularism" to refer to the rationalist movement of protest which he led in 1851. In its pursuit of the project of Enlightenment and Progress through the replacement of the mythical and religious view of the world with the scientific and technological-industrial one, Europe brought about a differentiation or separation of the political sphere from the religious one. This process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols came to be variously referred to as the secularization or desacralization of the world.[3] Thus "secular" not only means a state-religion separation but also includes among other things a) the diminution of the role of religion, b) this-worldly orientation rather than orientation towards the supernatural, c) the replacement of the "sacred" or "mystical" conception of the world with

the view that the world or society is something that can be rationally manipulated and socially engineered, and d) a view of religious beliefs and institutions as human constructions and responsibilities rather than as divinely ordained mysteries. Secularism since then has dominated the thinking of nineteenth and twentieth century social scientists. Increasing secularization came to be taken for granted with industrialisation and modernisation of societies and nations. Jeffrey Hadden summarized thus the secularization paradigm:

> Once the world was filled with the sacred – in thought, practice, and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm.[4]

In a nearly similar vein it is argued that religion, as an arbitrary belief system that is based on faith and emotion rather than reasoned weighting of the evidence, is predicted to decline in countries in which the average intelligence of the population is high, and to rise or remain at a high level in countries in which the average intelligence of the population is low. Other attributes of advanced societies that might be responsible for religious decline include rising prosperity and consumerism, advances in the educational system, reduced government regulation of the religious economy, or decreased societal dysfunction.[5]

These positions have been attacked by many in contemporary times. The world today has witnessed a rapid religious ascendancy. Contrary to the enlightenment prognosis of a decline in the religious commitment of people as they become more and more modern, we now find them turning more to traditional sources of existential meaning in their modern everyday life. There is now a mushrooming of sects, cults, Gods and Goddesses; people follow these competing religions in ever increasing numbers, express them openly, volunteer to take up values, attitudes, ethics, work, consumption etc. which are avowedly religious in content. Gods have suddenly become bankable. More modern and urbane Indians flock to sacred shrines and follow wise saints. Cultic religion comprising several godheads believed to be living on earth in human form (incarnations or "avatars") as godmen and gunwomen – which is presumably unique to India and undoubtedly India's bane and shame – has been a booming industry in India and through India in other countries, especially in the global context.[6] The Vaishnodevi temple in Jammu & Kashmir had 700 000 visitors in 2015. There is a threefold

increase in the number of devotees of Shirdi Saibaba.[7] Godmen (wise, miraculous and religious men) are doing brisk business. Added to this already complex plural religious scenario are the numerous new age spiritualities and the customised personal practices outside the main organised religions of the world. In short, more people want to be believers. Queues in temples are getting longer day by day. There is no truth in the proposition that religion will decrease with the increase in modernity. In the global context there is surely an upsurge in most of the traditional religions such as the Orthodox Church, Evangelicalism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and religiously inspired revival movements in smaller communities such as Shintoism in Japan and Sikhism in India. Hindu popular ritual finds today echoes in distant shores through the efforts at internationalisation of ISKCON. The Islamic resurgence from North Africa to South East Asia is not only bringing about a restoration of orthodox Islamic believes but also is (re)populating ways of living and thinking which run opposed to many modern ideas of everyday morality, the role of women, the State, health, abortion etc. The revival across different countries is also far from uniform, compounding the problem of a generalization. The pro-democratic revival movement *Nudhat-ul-ulama* in Indonesia is different from the Islamic revolution in Iran. An equally competing religious movement of Evangelical Protestantism – including also Pentecostalism – has seen a sharp increase in its number of converts in South-East Asia, South Korea, the Philippines, the South Pacific, throughout sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. All this points to the truth that the world today is experiencing a reversal of secularization, if not an outright denial: "The world today is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever … Modernisation has led to some kind of secularisation but it has also provoked powerful movements of counter secularisation".[8] Berger even refutes the very process of secularization. He points to the fact that the world we live in has always been a religious world. The pointers are strong enough to suggest that it is time to bury the secularization thesis. After nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophesies and misrepresentations of both present and past, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories.[9]

There is however no consensus among the proponents who oppose the secularization thesis. Is the present day religious resurgence a mere loss of secularity or is itself a reaction to secularist imposition? To put it in other words: is this desecularization or counter-secularism or secure secularism? These questions are far from settled. While Berger seems to suggest counter-secularization, Norris and Inglehart propose that societal modernization, human development, and economic inequal-

ity drive up the levels of religious belief and activity. They argue that feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are a key factor driving up the level of religiosity, and that the process of secularization – a systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs – has occurred most clearly among the most prosperous social classes living in affluent and secure post-industrial nations. They believe though that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal, survival-threatening risks.[10]

Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, R. Stephen Warner and others provide a religious market theory to explain religious resurgence. Religious market theory postulates a link between levels of religious competition and levels of religious observance. It draws causal linkages between the patterns of religious supply (the number of denominations competing for adherents and kinds of state regulation) and religious demand (strength of belief and practice). Dissimilar levels of spiritual behaviour evident in various countries are believed to result less from "bottom up" demand than from variance in "top down" religious supply. Religious groups compete for congregations with different degrees of vigour. Established churches are thought to be complacent monopolies taking their congregations for granted, with a fixed market share due to state regulation and subsidy for one particular faith that enjoys special status and privileges. By contrast, where a free religious marketplace exists, energetic competition between churches expands the supply of religious "products", thereby mobilizing religious activism among the public.[11]

Change in religious culture is also being explained by a mechanism of generational replacement. This hypothesis predicts that in countries in which young people are far less religious than the old, religiosity is likely to decline; and in countries in which young people are more religious than the old, religion is likely to rise. Similarly social learning theories that emphasize the emulation of successful individuals predict that the religious beliefs of the social elite give direction to ongoing trends.[12] Religion is expected to rise in countries in which educated and high-status individuals tend to be more religious than low-status individuals and to decline in countries in which high-status individuals have below-average religiosity. Another school of thought proposes that religiosity is a familial trait and is transmitted by family environment and shared genes.[13] Therefore religion is predicted to rise in countries in which religious people have more children than the less religious, and decline in countries in which religious people have below-average fertility.

Secularism assumes a different meaning in South Asia compared to Western Europe. In South Asia, given the immense importance of religion in everyday life, secularism has always meant religious tolerance. A secular state implies neither a non-religious nor an antireligious state. Rather, it means a state that affirms its national religiosity in no uncertain terms. Politics in South Asia, unlike in first world countries in Europe and North America that tend to reject anything religious as non-modern at least in theory, acknowledge the equality of religion because it cannot afford to ignore its overarching importance in the life of their constituencies. The state-religion separation is incomplete, if there is any pretence of separation at all. The Western antonym of "secular" is "religious". In South Asia and particularly in India by contrast the antonym of "secular" is "communal".[14] Critics of secularism maintain that because secularism denies the importance of religion in the lives of the people of South Asia, it is an impossible credo in this region.[15] Others like Ashis Nandy contend that the idea of separation between state and religion in search for modernist secularism entails essentially an *imposition* in the South Asian context. Nandy calls it the tyranny of the modern secular State and advocates for an ethno-politically appropriate alternative consisting of a non-modern, pre-secular concept of religion that will have the potential for stimulating pluralist tolerance. Religion in non-secular South Asia has never been the same through various periods of time. Peter Van Der Veer draws our attention to the relevance of colonial history, various post-colonial transformations of the public sphere, religious movements and the South Asian diaspora in understanding South Asian religiosity. He points out that a pluralistic Hindu tradition – in this sense similar to other South Asian religions such as Sikhism, Buddhism and Islam – has been moulded as a monotheistic and text-based religion through orientalist and indigenous constructs.[16] In a similar vein Hefner also points to a *modularised Hinduism* in post-colonial India modelled on a reformist version of Islam and Christianity.[17] In any case, the resurgence of religion along with the process of globalization has entered the sphere of higher education too. Debates exploring religion as possessing an integrating social value in the world of consumer markets can offer a paradigm shift away from the secular legacy.[18]

The South Asian theatre presents a varied picture for the exploration of religion as a conflicting issue. India is virtually alone among the postcolonial states in Asia to have adopted religious neutrality as a key feature of its constitution and as a cornerstone in its strategy for nation-building. The Nehruvian scientific-modernist legacy, which always

viewed religion as vestiges of tradition destined to obliteration through the operation of the inexorable laws of history and the presence of a sizable non-Hindu population in the country, probably warranted the choice of secularism as a guarantee for equal religious freedom to all. Though secularism was included in the Preamble late in 1976, constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, non-discrimination on the basis of religion for employment, education etc., state neutrality in matters of religious choices were existing from the very beginning. Indian secularism has always been problematic. Lately, a secular disenchantment is visible in the form of increasing communalisation and the rise of Hindu nationalist parties in the country. Another South Asian state, Bangladesh, is a moderate Islamic democracy. The Majority of its population (90%) are Sunni Muslims. There are also Shias and Ahmadiyyas. Approximately 10% of the population in Bangladesh are Hindus. Secularism has always informed Bangla nationalism, which has its centre in culture and language. Bangladeshi Hindus and Muslims joined the Bangladesh Liberation Army, which fought for the country's independence. Secularism was part of the preamble to the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh along with nationalism, socialism and democracy. However, the subsequent military regimes led by Ziaur Rahman supported by right wing political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Parties replaced secularism with Islamic Bangladeshi Nationalism in 1977. Finally, in 1988 the country's second military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad declared Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. Since then there has been a flip-flop between religion and politics. With the Awami League in power led by Seikh Hasina secularism is back into the political agenda. Sri Lanka has the longest continuous history of Buddhism of any Buddhist country. Around 200 BC, Buddhism became the official religion of Sri Lanka. Nearly 70% of its population follow Theravada Buddhism. Besides Buddhism, Hinduism is also found among 16% of the population mostly concentrated among the Tamils of the North East provinces. Other religions found in Sri Lanka are Christianity (7%) and Islam (7%). Like Sri Lanka, Bhutan has a predominantly Buddhist way of life. Buddhism was the state religion until the introduction of the Constitution of Bhutan in 2008. Even after the introduction of secularism under constitutional democracy Buddhism remains the source of meaning, literature, philosophy and politics in Bhutan. The state has also a small number of Hindus mainly among immigrants in the southern part of the country. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded in 1947 as a Muslim state. However it continued to be accommodative of Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Ahmadiyya minorities till the assassination of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. During the military regime of Zia ul Haq,

the islamisation of Pakistan was nearly complete through the introduction of the Blasphemy and Sharia Law. Another desecularising force in operation has been that of Jamaat-e-Islami. The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal is a country with religious, social and cultural diversity. There are several religious and ethnic groups. The 2001 Census classified the population of Nepal into six broad religious categories: Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, Kirat, and others. Hindus accounted for 80.62 per cent, followed by Buddhists (10.74 per cent), Muslims (4.2 per cent), Kirat (3.6 per cent), Christians (0.45 per cent) and others (0.4 per cent). Religion has a long history of inseparability from the politics of the country. The constitution of 1990 recognised Hinduism as a state religion. The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) sought to define Nepal as secular, inclusive and fully democratic albeit large scale resistance has emerged across different sections of Nepalese society.[19]

Religion in South Asia and secular claims present a complex picture characterised by religious resurgence and its study contributes immensely to the understanding of the process of desecularization. These South Asian complexities increase manifolds as the region gets drawn into the vortex of globalization. Globalization spells mobility for man in the fields of technology, capital, values and religions. Most religions have been expansionist throughout their histories. However, the spread of religion through missionaries was qualitatively different from what we see today. While former times saw the chasing of territories and places, today's missionaries look for constituencies and adherents. The study of place has nonetheless given rise to new fields of study such as sacred geography or the spatial practices of sacred space.[20]

This opens up for many questions such as: how to understand the rise of religion in a presumed modern non-religious world? Why is secularism losing ground? How to explain the conditions that produce these religious swings? Can we make predictions about the forms this rise will take in democratic states? How will religion develop in a global era? How does religious revival works within the frame of already existing social divides? Does religion magnifies the divisions or mutates them? Is radicalization a precondition to religious resurgence? Does the process of desecularization hasten fundamentalism? How does it affect the politics of identity?

THE CASE OF VARANASI

The intention here is not to claim to provide definite answers to the above questions, considering their complexity. However, the present effort is expected to add to our ability to find an answer. The present

chapter explores religious resurgence with Varanasi as a backdrop. Varanasi has been one of the oldest seats of spirituality and religious salvation. *Kashi* – known as the City of Lights – or modern Varanasi is an ancient city known for learning and knowledge. It is mentioned in the Mahabharata, the Puranas, the Vedas and the Upanishads. It is said to be more than 4000 years old. Historians tell of a living city from the 600 AD. It has hosted almost all religious movements of India. Maharsi Vyasa, Kabir, Tulsidas and more, all belong to Varanasi. There are more than 300 maths and 1500 temples in Varanasi today. The present study contends that with no concomitant variance in degrees of spirituality a new middle class religiosity is on the rise. More *Jagatgurus* find their place in this sacred landscape. More new rich and young are devotees, always ready to offer more *daan* (charity) they are always in need of more *punya* (merits). Religion has gone global in ambition and reach. Benares wants to attain a leadership position in civilizational spirituality. Recruiting international devotees, flaunting celebrity clients, establishing chains of posh member-recruitment offices is the order of the day.

Religion is found in every society. Small, big, primitive or postmodern, most peoples have a sense of some unseen power, worshipped and woven around a complex set of beliefs and practices. This is truer now than it was earlier. In the words of Peter Berger: "the world today is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever … Modernisation has led to some kind of secularisation but it has also provoked powerful movements of counter secularisation".[21]

Theorizations of religion by the social sciences are few and far between barring the period following WWII. While religion is presumed to be based on experience beyond the empirical, sociology has posed itself as an empirical science at the expense of the study of religion. Early anthropological engagements with religion are found in Max Müller and Edward B. Tylor, who represent the naturalistic and the animistic school respectively.[22] Robert Lowie's thesis of religion as "awe and mystery" is also an important contribution.[23] Sociological treatments of religion can be found in Durkheim's totem, Weber's Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism, Simmel's forms of social relationship, Guy Swanson's "organised cluster of purposes" and social patterns (1960), Robert N. Bellah's ritual roots, Peter Berger's desecularization of the world (1999), Norris and Inglehart's secure secularization (2004), and Meera Nanda's God market (2011).[24] Added to this are piles of secularism literature by Madan, Vanaik, Nandy, etc.[25]

While religion as a source and consequence of social change has been the theme of most of these studies, very few have focused on society as a source of religious change. The present study thus explores such trends

of change in Varanasi. The study is ethnographic in nature. It covers six selected Hindu temples and *Maths* (or *mutts*, i.e. "ashrams"). The choice of Hindu places is motivated by the fact that they are the most exposed to secularization compared to other more isolated and insulated religious communities. The six temples and mutts are Sidhpeeth Kabirchaura Math, Jangamvadi Mutt, Guru Ravidasji Temple, Kring Kund Kinaram Baba, Kashi Vishwanathji, and Sankat Mochan Temple.

FIELD NOTES

1. *Sidhpeeth Kabirchaura Math*

Sant Vivek Dasji is a famous and popular temple in Varanasi. 100 *kabirpanthis* (followers of saint Kabir) on average visit the temple every day. The visits soar to 5 000 to 7 000 on Kabir Jayanti (celebration) or Kabir's Guru Puja. 80 % of the visitors are *kabirpanthis*, the rest are foreigners and VIPs. Pilgrims come from Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh. The mutt lacks any kind of missionary material and structure. It is now struck by decline and nearby competition. People come here in search of happiness and to resist the onslaught of caste injustice.

2. *Jangamvadi Mutt*

The mutt is more than 1 000 years old and propagates knowledge about the school of Shivadvaita. It owns a large property that includes cinema halls that have been built through donations from Aurangzeb, Kashi Naresh and others. People donate in the name of family members and others. Translocal devotees often come from Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. The facility can receive 400 people at the time. The mutt has a number of literatures, a website with online booking, etc.

3. *Guru Ravidasji Temple*

The full name of the temple is Shree Guru Ravidas Charitable Trust Janmasthan Mandir. Sant Niranjan Dasji Maharaj from Punjab is presently the head of the temple. 2 500 000 devotees visit the temple on Ravidas Jayanti, mainly from Punjab and Haryana. 3 000 to 4 000 devotees visit the temple every day. Highly placed bureaucrats, politicians, judges, NRIs (non-resident Indians living abroad) are among the devotees. Devotees come for puja and tourism. Ravidasji stands for

the ideology of "man cannot live without religion". The temple owns a hostel, the Sant Sarvan Dasji Yatri Niwas with sixty beds and various hotels. It has websites and tour operators. CD and DVDs as well as literature that presents the temple.

4. *Kring Kund Kinaram Baba*

The place of the ashrama is known as Aghori Peeth Baba Kinaram Sthal. 3000 to 4000 devotees visit the ashram on Tuesdays and Sundays. 70000 to 100000 devotees gather on February 10 (Nirvan Diwas) every year. Most devotees are from Uttar Pradesh. Devotees from Bihar and South India also visit the ashram. Astha (a humanitarian trust), problems such as childlessness and trouble in marriage are some of the reasons that bring people here for relief. The Kundsnan (bathing place) in the Ashram is a major attraction. There is a continuous expansion of the infrastructure funded by donations. The devotees are mostly urban, literate people. Young couples in particular frequent the temple. Website and literature are available.

5. *Kashi Viswanathji*

Kashi is considered a sacred city for auspicious death and liberation, the place where Shiva reveals himself as a Jyotirlinga, and where 330 million Gods reside (this is stated in the Preta Khanda of *Garuda Purana*). The Kashi Viswanathji temple is run by a Government trust. It is one of the richest temple in India. 100000 devotees come each day to the temple and 400000 to 500000 visit it in the month of Sawan. Translocal devotees from South India and from lower castes or classes compose the majority of the devotees. Young and educated urban devotees are also found in large numbers. Salvation, peace, good wishes and blessings are the prime motivations for the visitors worshipping in the facility. Instruments for dissemination include a website for online donations, CD/DVDs, sponsored programmes, etc.

6. *Sankat Mochan Temple*

25000 devotees visit the temple each day but 50000 on Tuesdays and Saturdays. Devotees mainly consist of young urbanites and tourists. Devotees come for receiving good wishes and blessings, out of personal faith, or due to the auspicious value of seeing and be seen by the deity (*darshan*). The temple is run by a trust headed by Birbhadra Mishra. Hanuman Jayanti attracts large crowds.

DISCUSSION

The six cases explored here present a varied picture. In one case religious change (or even a u-turn) is caused by Hindu truth claims, in another case it is for the magic of fulfilling cherished wishes, and in yet another it consists of social resistance. No clear picture emerges, of course. A common thread is the return of the religious. Crowds in the future will continue to swell due to the risk society brought about by modernity. Insecurity, individualism, personal desires will continue to be the prime motivators for being religious. These motivations are though non-spiritual in nature. They are personal (marriage, child etc.), professional (job, income, business, etc.) or political (identity, resistance, competition, etc.). On the supply side there is also evidence of increasing digitalization and the use of other modern technology. Spirituality comes as a package convenience that includes lodging, food, sightseeing and much more. Religious bodies are constantly upgrading and customizing themselves in a competitive religious market. During interactions with different groups of devotees at different points in time and place it was also found that religion is regarded as one tool among others for gaining material success. The religious market reacts to new trends but does not control the flow of change and globalization. Globalization causes a sort of "time-space vacuum", cutting across class distinctions. Religion has now become more instrumental in content, or in the words of Clifford Geertz a "Rationalised Religion". It is neither a failure of systemic secularism nor an end of pristine religion. It is now more of a cycle of dialectical tension between the two. At the same time, religion provides meaning in the realm of contemporary "manufactured uncertainties". Thus in the current sense, it is both a resource and a source of identity that collides with its super-structural formations.

NOTES

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