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DOES PARTY POLITICIZATION OF CORRUPTION AFFECT VOTER TURNOUT?

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be negative. We argue that voters' willingness to participate in elections will increase when parties politicize the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsiveness to voter concerns. We test this claim by using individual-level data from CSES coupled with unique context data on party politicization of corruption in campaigns. Our findings show that higher perceived levels of corruption are associated with lower voter turnout but that the negative effect of perceiving high corruption on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals' corruption perceptions exert a significant negative impact on turnout. By politicizing anti-corruption measures, political parties are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting voters' decision whether to vote or not.

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Introduction

The negative effects of corruption on a number of policy outcomes are by now well-established knowledge (on economy, see Bentzen, 2012; on human well-being, see Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011 and Charron et al., 2014; and on social and economic inequalities, see Gupta et al. 2002; Jong-Sung & Khagram, 2005). It is also evident that corruption affects people's willingness to participate in politics. Even though there is no complete consensus on this matter, almost all country comparative studies at hand find that corruption negatively affects citizens' propensity to turn out to vote in elections (McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Davis et al., 2004; Chong et al., 2015; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 2013, Sundström and Stockemer, 2015; Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016), as it destroys the link and trust between decision makers and the people, which in turn corrodes the political system resulting in increasingly cynical, distrustful and apathetic voters (Andersen & Tverdova, 2003, Bauhr & Grimes, 2014; see also Kostadinova, 2009; Warren, 2004: 328).

In this article, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be negative. Depending on how politicians handle the issue, the negative effects of corruption may be reduced. More specifically, we argue that people's willingness to participate in elections will increase when parties address the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsiveness to voter concerns. Party politicization of corruption should thus have a mobilizing effect on voters because the awareness of the problem would reasonably increase, as well as the intensity in the campaigns and – not least - also by the fact that there are parties that actually promise to do something about a serious problem that concerns most voters (see Special Eurobarometer, 2012 & 2014). The presence of parties that politicize corruption will thus increase the incentives to vote among voters who perceive high levels of corruption and moreover increase the likelihood that the problems with corruption will be solved or at least dealt with, in contrast to situations where no parties raise the issue, leaving voters with the impression that nobody cares. In the latter situation the motivation to vote is arguably severely dampened.

No studies have as far as we know of examined the potentially mobilizing effect of party politicization of corruption and hence our aim is to fill that gap in the previous literature, by investigating whether the negative effects of voters' perception of corruption on turnout is moderated when parties campaign on anti-corruption. By linking party politicization of salient – and sometime neglected – issues to voter mobilization, our study makes novel contributions to the research fields of

different political and societal effects of corruption and what accounts to variations in voter turnout.

We apply multilevel modeling combining individual-level data and country-level data from 20 countries from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set and a unique data set on party politicization of the issue of corruption in election campaigns. We test two hypotheses and the findings suggest that higher perceived levels of corruption are associated with lower turnout (H1) but that there is a positive interaction effect, which indicates that that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a problem on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized (H2). The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals' corruption perceptions exert a significant negative effect on turnout. In this respect the political parties are important actors. By politicizing anti-corruption measures they are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting people's behavior in terms of whether to vote or not.

In the following section we define corruption and discuss previous findings regarding corruption and turnout. We then turn to the discussion about how party politicization of corruption should affect the relationship between corruption perceptions and voter turnout, i.e. the assumed mechanisms at work, followed by our hypotheses. We then discuss the data and the method applied, after which the analysis is presented. The final section concludes the findings and discusses ways to develop the research field further.

Corruption and turnout

In this article we are primarily interested in political corruption, which has been defined as the "manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth" (quote from Transparency International, 2013). Political corruption is then "the abuse of public office for private gains" as well as "all private misdeeds, such as excessive patronage, nepotism, secret party funding, and overtly close ties between politics and business interests" (Stockemer et al., 2013:2). Thus, political corruption is rather grand than petty in nature.[1]

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[1] Grand corruption exists at the highest level of government and refers to acts distorting the central functioning of the state. Petty corruption exists in the everyday encounter between public officials and citizens and refers to acts where

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There is a strong consensus among scholars about the severe social and political consequences of corruption. The majority of studies on corruption and turnout also confirm these findings, but there are also studies reaching the opposite conclusion. Below, we discuss the previous findings.

Presence of corruption is argued to *decrease* turnout, because "[c]orruption /…/ breaks the link between collective decision-making and people's power to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy" (Warren, 2004: 328). Also in material terms corruption affects people negatively as the probability of inefficient delivery of what citizens are democratically entitled to, such as various public services, increases (Warren, 2004; Stockemer et al., 2013). According to this view, corruption thus corrodes the political system resulting in increasingly cynical, distrustful and apathetic voters (Andersen and Tverdova, 2003; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Davies et al., 2004; see also Kostadinova, 2009).

In a study covering 72 countries between 1984 and 2009, Stockemer et al. (2013) found that countries with better control of corruption had higher turnout rates. On average, a one point increase in corruption control measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index was associated with two percentage points higher turnout when controlled for other factors such as compulsory voting, importance of the election, degree of proportionality in the electoral systems, size of the state, electoral competitiveness and GDP/capita. These findings were supported also in a regional level study, where Sundström and Stockemer (2015) analyzed turnout rates in 172 regions in Europe and found that high quality of government was associated with higher turnout. Thus, there is strong evidence that corruption, regardless if measured as control of corruption or as aggregated measures of individual's perceptions of quality of government, has a negative effect on voter turnout.

Also on the individual level, studies show that perceptions of electoral fraud have negative consequences for turnout (McCann and Dominquez, 1998; Birch, 2010, Davis et al, 2004). In Mexico, McCann and Domiquez found that only the opposition voters were less inclined to vote, whereas Simpser (2012) found a more general effect of decreasing turnout at the state level. Moreover, in a field experimental study in twelve Mexican municipalities, Chong et al. (2015) showed that infor-

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public officials abuse their power when citizens try to access public services such as schools, hospitals and police departments (Transparency International).

mation about corruption significantly decreased actual turnout. In a comparative study of Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, Davies et al. (2014) concluded that perceptions of corruption did not translate into voting for opposition parties, instead perceptions of corruption was associated with non-voting in all three countries. In a country comparative study, using CSES data, Birch (2010) found that voters who perceived the election as fair participated to a higher extent than those who perceived the election as unfair. Bågenholm & Charron (2016) have shown that the most likely response from voters - in 24 European countries - to a corruption scandal in their most preferred party, is to stay home in the next election. Studying Spanish local elections, Costas-Pérez (2014) found that while corruption scandals were associated with lower turnout overall there was a higher degree of abstention among independent voters. Strong partisans', i.e. voters who always support the same party, propensity to vote was not affected by corruption scandals. Going beyond malfeasance and fraud in the electoral process, Dahlberg & Solevid (2016) showed, when analyzing 26 countries using CSES data matched with system-level data from the Quality of Government Institute, that perceptions of corruption in general was associated with lower turnout rates, but only in low and medium corrupt countries. In the most corrupt countries, by contrast, no such association was found.

Why corruption would *increase* turnout has been explained by the fact that the expected gain by remaining in office is high in contexts where rent-seeking and misuse of public office through for example bribe taking and soliciting are prevalent. This in turn leads to increasing campaign spending for both incumbents and opposition, which mobilize the electorate and make them vote to a higher extent. Studies on county and gubernatorial elections in the US find that abuse of public office increases voter turnout (Karahan, Coats, and Shughart 2006, 2009 & Escaleras, Calcagno and Shughart, 2012). Escalereas et al. (2012) for example found that the higher the number of corruption convictions of public officials, the higher was the turnout rate in gubernatorial elections 1979-2005. Another reason for why corruption would increase turnout is found in the clientilisic relationship between politicians and voters in for example in some Latin American and African countries. When voters and politicians are connected in a clientlistic relationship or network, the provision of public goods is handled through these networks rather than through government agencies. As a consequence, to cast a vote is associated with personal benefits in terms of more access to public goods for the voter (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007).

In a study using both experimental design and survey data from the Afrobarometer, Imman & Andrews (2015) found that Senegalese voters are more prone to vote when they perceive the government as corrupt, but only among non-partisan voters. Kostadinova (2009) also finds a weak positive effect of perceived corruption on turnout in eight post-communist countries using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, but the effect is more or less washed out by the negative effect of corruption perceptions on political efficacy, which in turn suppress turnout.

Although previous research points in different directions in terms of the effects of corruption on voter turnout, all comparative large N-studies, both on the aggregate level (Stockemer et al., 2013, Sundström and Stockemer, 2015) and at the individual level (Birch, 2010, Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016), point in the same direction: corruption and malpractice tend to decrease voter turnout. We find it relevant to explicitly re-test this in a first hypothesis. In short,

H1: The higher perceived level of political corruption among voters, the lower the probability that they will vote.

Despite the rich number of studies explaining why turnout differs across voters and countries as well as the emerging research on the relationship between corruption and political behavior, no studies have to our knowledge examined the mobilizing effects of corruption politicization.[2] Hence, the main contribution of our study is to examine to what extent this presumed negative relationship between corruption and turnout is affected when political parties politicize the issue of corruption in election campaigns. The next section develops this argument further.

Politicization of corruption and its assumed impact on turnout

We consider politicization to occur when an issue is brought to the general knowledge of people and in this study party politicization thus refers to situations when political parties are publically debating specific issues during an election campaign. Party politicization of corruption can either occur when parties raise the issue and suggest ways to come to terms with corruption, without making any references to the other parties or politicians or when party representatives accuse one's political antagonists of being corrupt, implicitly meaning that such behavior would come to an end

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[2] Davis et al. (2004) analyze the extent to which opposition parties in three Latin American countries manage to mobilize dissatisfied voters on corruption issues. However, they only look at the voters perceptions of corruption and voters' party preferences and not if the parties actually politicize the issue of corruption in the electoral campaign.

if the electorate votes for the party in question. For party politicization to occur, the issue must thus be brought up by political parties during the election campaign.[3]

But why would an increased focus (politicization) on an issue (corruption), that we know have a negative effect on turnout, have a reversed or moderating effect on the relationship between corruption perceptions and turnout? We argue that it is just because of the increased attention the issue of corruption gets when it is politicized which assumingly increases the party responsiveness in the eyes of the voters. In the absence of studies that look at the effects of politicization of previously neglected but important issues on turnout,[4] we instead draw on the findings on the effects of politicization on party choice, which show that corruption to some extent matters in terms of electoral accountability. From previous studies we know that anti-corruption rhetoric is a successful electoral strategy, especially for new parties that previously have not been involved in corruption scandals and which thus have more credibility than established ones (Bågenholm & Charron, 2014). From the reverse angle, most studies on corruption voting find that corrupt politicians and parties are punished by the electorate, but to a somewhat lesser extent than one would expect, given the graveness of the issue (see for example de Souza and Moriconi, 2013 for an overview). It has been suggested that this is more likely to occur when the incumbents are accused of being corrupt by other parties or actually been involved in corruption scandals (Bågenholm, 2013). We thus expect that it is only when voters are offered a trustworthy alternative, which seeks to remedy the problem of corruption, on an issue which voters find widespread and highly worrying, that the level of participation in order to "throw the rascals out" will increase.

By politicizing a previously neglected issue of great importance for the voters implies party responsiveness, which we think is one important mechanism at work here. Party responsiveness has mainly been used as the dependent variable in relation to voter turnout in previous research (see for example Besley & Burgess, 2001; Martin & Claibourn, 2013; Peters & Sanders, 2015), where higher turnout is associated with greater responsiveness from the parties, as the number of people who is

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[3] Other actors can naturally politicize the issue of corruption. Media is the main source of information when it comes to exposing corruption scandals. In order to have a mobilizing effect on turnout, we do however assume that it is party politicization that matters, because voters then would be encouraged to support those parties that promise to combat corruption, one way or another. If only the media politicizes the issue by for example revealing systematic corrupt dealings among one or several political parties, but with no parties picking up on the story, we would expect, in line with previous research, that this would lead to voter apathy and hence lower turnout. In this article, we are only looking at party politicization, however.

[4] As far as that strand of literature looks at the effect on voting behavior, it is party choice that is in focus, not whether it has a mobilizing effect and increases voter turnout.

thought to monitor the politicians is higher. We argue that this relationship is as likely to work the other way around, as the voters' apathy and resignation is turned into hope when they are presented with alternatives who promise to make a change. This is basically along the same lines as the argument why political efficacy would have a positive impact on turnout, i.e. "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process /…/ the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954: 187, quoted in Kittilson & Anderson, 2011, see also Kostadinova, 2009). In a context where there is "electoral supply" – in this case credible parties that politicize corruption – turnout is likely to increase (see Kittilson & Anderson, 2011) in part as a consequence of higher political efficacy.

It is also likely that voters would react similarly to corruption to that of negative campaigning, which has been defined as to criticize the "record of the opposing party or parties; questioning the judgment, experience and probity of opposing leaders; and generating fear about what the future might hold if the opposing party or parties were in power" (Sanders and Norris, 2005: 526). Negative campaigns have been shown to be mobilizing because they increase voters' attention and problem awareness, which increases the interest and feelings of excitement. As a consequence, voters perceive a closer electoral race. In addition, negative information might enhance information about the candidates. In short, negative campaigns make voters pay more attention to the electoral campaign, which makes them more inclined to vote (Martin, 2004; Brooks, 2006). Being accused of criminal activities, which corruption allegation implies, naturally sharpens the conflict and raises the stakes between the contestants and that in turn assumingly also increases the media attention and thus voter awareness of the problems and the alternatives.

Naturally, we cannot know exactly what sentiments the perceived presence of corruption causes to voters, but considering the fact that corruption is a criminal act which violates the norm of impartial and just handling of public matters, in combination with the fact that a majority of EU citizens both think it is a widespread phenomenon and a grave problem for their countries (Special Eurobarometer, 2012 & 2014), we find it likely that voters who perceive high levels of corruption would be keen to correct for the injustices and harm they suffer by voting the rascals out.

There are thus two potentially adversary forces to take into account when hypothesizing about the effects of corruption and turnout. On the one hand, the demobilizing effect when perception of

corruption is high, in line with hypothesis 1, and on the other hand, the mobilizing counterforce when politicization and increased party responsiveness occur. In short, we argue that whether the issue of corruption is politicized or not conditions the negative effects of the perception of corruption on turnout. To be more specific, we test whether the hypothesized negative effect of perceiving political corruption on turnout is reduced when corruption is politicized in the campaign. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Perceiving politicians as corrupt decreases turnout less in elections where parties politicize the issue of corruption compared to elections where they do not.

Data and measures

We use data from *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES) module 2, collected during the period 2001-2006 in post-election surveys in 34 countries. In addition, we use a subset of a larger dataset on politicization of corruption in all 32 European democratic countries covering 215 parliamentary elections from 1981 to 2011 (see Bågenholm 2013 and Bågenholm & Charron, 2014).[5] For the purpose of our study, three non-European elections have also been coded (New Zealand 2002, Canada 2004 and Australia 2004). When we merge the CSES data with our politicization dataset, 20 countries remain. The information on politicization of corruption has been collected primarily from election reports in three political science journals: Electoral Studies (ES), West European Politics (WEP) and the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR). The goal has been to have every election covered by at least two of these journals and, in the case there has been only one report available, to look at additional sources, such as European Parties Elections & Referendums Network (EPERN), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and The Economist. The election reports have a common structure (background, electoral system, the contending parties, the electoral campaign, the results and the outcome), even though the contents and extent of the sections can vary somewhat. There is naturally a potential risk that the issue of anti-corruption has been under reported, especially if the issue was peripheral in the campaign and/or advocated by smaller parties. However, we consider the risk of missing cases in which corruption has been a prominent feature of the

[5] The dataset on politicization of corruption can be requested from the authors.

campaign to be rather small, i.e. the frequency of the issue is hardly overstated. The use of several sources for each election further diminishes that risk.[6]

The electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric, i.e. referring to the need to fight corruption in more general terms, and/or corruption allegations against other parties during the election campaign. While the word "corruption" has obviously been the main indicator of whether the issue has been present in the election campaign or not, in order to be coded as an instance of politicization, the "sender" must also be an identified political party, and not for example the media or any other actor. The coding was unproblematic in most cases and, in those reports where some ambiguities arose, the complementary sources were used to clari- fy any uncertainties. There are a few instances, however, where the word "corruption" was not used in the reports, but where it nevertheless was obvious that politicization of the issue is at hand, e.g. in some cases where scandals involving politicians taking bribes are described - but without explicit- ly stating that it is a "corruption scandal" - and where parties have been said to "take advantage" of that situation or having "attacked" their opponents for that reason, but again without the explicit use of the word corruption. In order not to miss these instances, it has therefore been important that the whole reports have been read thoroughly, rather than using the search functions to find the relevant sections.

Because of missing data for some of our key variables and due to the fact that we have restricted our analysis to countries that are categorized as Free according to the Freedom House index, our analyses are based on a total of 20 countries.[7]

Turnout

The dependent variable of turnout measures whether the respondent voted or not in the last na- tional election. As with all survey questions on electoral participation, respondents consistently over-report their turnout rates as a result of memory flaws or social desirability bias (Belli et al., 1999; Dahlberg & Persson, 2014; Granberg & Holmberg, 1991; Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). In

[6] Some studies use data from the Comparative Manifesto project to estimate how much an issue is highlighted in an election campaign. We find this strategy problematic because it cannot be assumed that issues in manifestoes actually are debated during the campaign, which in the case of the specific issue of corruption (see Bågenholm, 2009). If the issue is not publically debated, we do not consider it as politicized, as most voters do not read the party manifestoes.
[7] *Freedom in the World.* Freedom House's annual global survey of political rights and civil liber- ties (www.freedomhouse.org).

our country sample, self-reported turnout is considerably higher than the official turnout in all countries and differences are particularly large (> 20 percentage points) in Canada, Romania, Ireland and Hungary (see figure 1 in Appendix 2). Since validated turnout measures do not exist at the individual level in the CSES data, we have constructed a weight variable at the system level based on the official turnout rates, which is used in the analysis in order to correct for the overestimated turnout levels within the countries included in the analysis.

Corruption perceptions

As mentioned, several previous studies estimating corruption effects on electoral turnout is carried out as aggregated country level studies since few data sets include both measures of individuals' corruption assessments and turnout measures. The CSES module 2, is one of few datasets that both includes individual turnout and a survey item measuring perceptions of *political* corruption. The question reads: *How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread (coded as 4 in our analyses), quite widespread (3), not very widespread (2), it hardly happens at all (1)?* Although political corruption is one of many ways to ask about corruption in a society, the above questions fits nicely with the definition of corruption we discussed earlier. Still, the survey question does not capture respondents' personal experience of corruption which could have been a valid measure as well.[8]

To validate our corruption measure, we have matched voters' corruption perceptions with corruption measures at the aggregate level. As already addressed in the theoretical section, we can expect some correlation between citizens' perceptions of corruption and global corruption as assessed by Transparency International (TI). Such a correlation at the aggregate level also indicates validity in our measures. Figure 2 in Appendix 2 illustrates the correlation between the country means in corruption perceptions based on the CSES data versus the mean placement in Transparency International's corruption perception index (both variables are here rescaled ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 is equivalent to a high degree of corruption). There is a strong relationship between the two (b=.55, R^2=.81), which simply means that, when corruption is widespread in a global sense according to TI, citizens also tend to judge political corruption as being widespread and vice versa. However, there are some exceptions to this rule, for example in Germany and Canada, where there is a difference

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[8] The data can be sought from CSES Secretariat, www.cses.org, Centre for Political Studies. Institute for Social Research. The University of Michigan. The data can also be downloaded from: www.umich.edu/~cses.

between how TI judges the presence of corruption vis à vis how citizens perceive the same phenomenon.[9]

Corruption politicization

The politicization variable is coded as a dummy variable where 1 equals that corruption is politicized in the election and 0 that no such politicization took place. As mentioned earlier, the electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric, i.e. referring to the need to fight corruption in more general terms, and/or corruption allegations against other parties during the election campaign. Table 1 displays whether or not politicization of corruption took place in the election campaign among the 20 parliamentary democracies included in this study. Evidently, corruption politicization is more common in countries with less control of corruption. The 2002 Irish election and the 2004 Canadian election are exceptions to this pattern.

TABLE 1, POLITICIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Corruption politicized in the election campaign	Corruption not politicized in the election campaign
Bulgaria 2001	Australia 2004
Canada 2004	Belgium 2003
Czech Republic 2002	Finland 2003
Ireland 2002	Germany 2002
Italy 2006	United Kingdom 2005
Hungary 2002	Iceland 2003
Poland 2001	Netherlands 2002
Romania 2004	New Zealand 2002
	Norway 2001
	Portugal 2002/2005
	Spain 2004
	Sweden 2002

Control variables

Aside from corruption assessments, the remaining independent variables at the individual level are chosen to represent the most important explanations as to why turnout differs between voters. Among the *individual* level explanations, the most commonly used is the Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) distinguishing between voters' a) resources, such as socioeconomic position and cognitive capability, b) motivation, for example interest in politics, and c) mobilization, that is, to what extent the voter is part of a recruiting network. In short, studies investigat-

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[9] As illustrated in figure 3 in Appendix 2, there is both notable between-country variation in citizens' corruption perceptions as well as large within-country variation in terms of standard deviations from the mean.

ing individual level explanations to turnout conclude that citizens with more economic and cognitive resources have a higher propensity to participate than citizens with fewer resources (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, Franklin, 2004, Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). In addition, another important conclusion is that citizens with more socioeconomic resources tend to have more cognitive skills and thus tend to be more motivated and are more likely to being asked to participate which altogether lead to a higher turnout (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995).

When we shift our attention to differences across individuals' propensity to turnout to differences in turnout across countries, the relative importance of individual level explanations to turnout diminishes. Instead, institutional explanations, such as features of the electoral system, are more important since they more directly modify the individual's costs of voting (Franklin, 2004). Of the *institutional* level explanations, countries with compulsory voting and PR systems have higher turnout. In addition, a higher voting age and facilities for postal voting and automatic registration also lower the cost of voting and leads to higher turnout (for an overview, see Blais, 2006).

All our individual level variables are based on the original variables included in the CSES module except for age, which is coded into seven categories. Education is based on the original eight categories. Marital status is coded as a dummy where 1 equals married or cohabitant and single or divorced equals 0. Income has four categories and is based on percentile values. Employment and party identification are also entered as dichotomous variables. Political knowledge is constructed as an additive index based on three information items included in the data (see the Appendix 1 for detailed coding instructions). To have voted in prior election and whether one was voting for an incumbent party or not in the prior election both enter as dichotomous variables. Unfortunately, social trust, being one of the key explanations to corruption perceptions, is not included as a question in CSES. However, following Kostadinova (2009), we are controlling for internal and external political efficacy, measured as people's belief in the system to be responsive to their needs as well as people's beliefs in themselves regarding their ability to change the political system (see Appendix 1 for summary statistics and additional information of the variables).

Regarding the system level variables, there are several factors that ideally should be accounted for according to prior research. When comparing turnout across countries, variables associated with the electoral system, such as proportionality, effective number of parties and compulsory voting are important to control for (Franklin, 2004; Blais, 2006). Population size, unicameralism and closeness

in an election are three other factors that have been suggested to have an indirect effect on turnout. Regarding closeness, the idea is simply that if the race is expected to be close, the political parties and their representatives will increase their efforts to mobilize the voters (Franklin, 2004).

Corruption, politicization and turnout

Table 2 presents a multilevel regression model predicting voter turnout. Model 1 contains the corruption assessment variable together with the individual level variables known to affect turnout. In accordance with our first hypothesis, perceiving corruption as a problem is associated with lower electoral participation. Thus, for each step on the corruption assessment variable (which varies from "hardly happens" to "very widespread"), turnout decreases significantly with -.369. More substantially this means that under control for all other variables at the individual level, the probability of voting is .92 when corruption is seen as a minor problem while the predicted probability of voting is .82 when corruption is perceived as a major problem. Hence, the effect is small but significantly different from zero. Although the control variables are of less interest here, we find significant effects of almost all individual level variables indicating that citizens who are female, older, highly educated, married, have higher income, high political knowledge, and identify themselves with a political party, have higher internal and external political efficacy have higher turnout compared to citizens who are male, younger, lower educated, single, have lower income, lower political knowledge, no party identification and lower efficacy. The strongest predictor of turnout in model 1 is by far to have voted in prior elections, which is not surprising since it for long has been argued that voting to a large extent is a process of socialization. All these variables are related to the standard explanations when it comes to predicting turnout. In this case this confirms that our data is valid and perhaps more importantly, that our main independent variable, corruption perceptions, is a valid additional explanatory factor.

Since we are restricted to a sample of 20 countries we cannot include all the suggested system level variables in the same model. In order to determine which variables that are of greatest importance to include, we have conducted a set of regression analyses where we incorporate all our variables pertaining to the individual level together with the politicization variable jointly with each of the system-related variables in subsequent order (i.e. one system control variable at a time). In this procedure the decision rule has been to only include variables that a) have a significant impact on the

model by themselves, or b) have a substantial impact on the effect politicization of corruption (see Appendix 1 for coding rules, data sources and summary statistics of all system level variables and see table 1 in Appendix 3 for regression output).

These analyses left us with three variables for inclusion: our main independent variable, politicization of corruption, the global perception index from Transparency International and compulsory voting. However, the global corruption perception index and politicization of corruption are two variables that are highly correlated (r = .78), simply because fewer parties are trying to politicize on corruption where corruption is less of a problem. Nevertheless this means that if both variables are included simultaneously the effect from both variables cancels out due to multicollinearity. If we instead include the two variables one at a time in separate models, both factors exert a significant negative impact on turnout. Since we don't have enough data to include them both at the same time we have decided to primarily use politicization of corruption. Model 2 estimates the effect of the above-mentioned system level variable, compulsory voting, known to explain differences in turnout across countries as well as the effect of our variable measuring politicization of corruption. The result indicates a positive and significant turnout effect of compulsory voting (1.695) and a negative and significant impact of the politicization variable on turnout (-.974).

TABLE 2, CORRUPTION AND TURNOUT (UNSTANDARDIZED LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS, RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Corruption assessments	-.369***		-.360***	-.473***
	(.092)		(.092)	(.108)
Sex	.076		.076	.078*
	(.047)		(.047)	(.047)
Age	.490***		.491***	.493***
	(.093)		(.093)	(.093)
Education	.404***		.402***	.398***
	(.116)		(.116)	(.116)
Marital status	.180***		.180***	.179***
	(.051)		(.051)	(.051)
Employed	.064		.064	.065
	(.088)		(.088)	(.088)
Income	.296***		.297***	.296***
	(.088)		(.088)	(.088)
Political knowledge	.907***		.908***	.904***
	(.085)		(.085)	(.085)
Party identification	.664***		.663***	.664***
	(.051)		(.051)	(.051)
Voted in prior election	1.956***		1.954***	1.953***
	(.059)		(.059)	(.059)
Voted for incumbent in prior election	-.201***		-.200***	-.199***
	(.062)		(.062)	(.062)
Internal efficacy	-.470***		-.471***	-.471***
	(.077)		(.077)	(.077)
External efficacy	.647***		.648***	.649***
	(.080)		(.080)	(.080)
System level				
Compulsory voting		1.695**	1.255	1.267
		(.816)	(.810)	(.816)
Corruption politicized		-.974**	-.915**	-.941**
		(.453)	(.451)	(.454)
Corr. assessment.*Corr. politicized				.419**
				(.207)
Constant	-1.094***	2.383***	-.958***	-.973***
	(.289)	(.254)	(.294)	(.295)
Std.Dev. Intercept lev 2.	1.009	.81	.802	.809
Roh	.236	.166	.164	.166
Log Likelihood	-6451.0827	-7952.6035	-6447.7926	-6445.7474
PRE	7.25	.00	7.51	7.54
Observations	26.650	26.650	26.650	26.650
Number of countries	20	20	20	20

*Comment: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. For Portugal two election studies are included in the CSES module 2, which are for the elections of 2002 and 2005, but the results are unaffected by the time aspect. Turnout is weighted according to actual turnout rates in respective country. PRE is proportional reduction in error. It is the percentage reduction of the total error in prediction, knowing the model versus not knowing the model.*

In model 3, the individual level variables and the system level variables are estimated at the same time as an additional control and the main finding is that very little happens. The negative impact of individual perceptions of corruption remains and thus, H1 is confirmed.[10] It should be mentioned that the result also is stable and robust under the inclusion of additional control variables on the system level such as unicameralism, the effective number of parliamentary parties, global corruption and aggregated turnout. Although the direct effect of politicization is still negative, the main question is how the presence corruption politicization affects the relationship between corruption perceptions and voter turnout.

In model 4, we therefore include an interaction term between individual corruption assessments and the corruption politicization variable. In line with our second hypothesis, we obtain a positive and significant effect of .419. In terms of predicted probabilities this means that when corruption is perceived as being widespread but corruption is not politicized by a party, the probability of voting is .74. However, when corruption is politicized the probability of voting among those perceiving corruption to be widespread is .81. This result is good news since it implies that the initial negative and significant effect of corruption perceptions on individual turnout is disappearing when corruption is politicized by a party. However, the politicization of corruption does also mean that turnout is decreasing somewhat among those who do not perceive corruption to be a major problem, although not significantly so. The explanation for this is found in the fact that turnout is on average lower in countries where corruption is politicized (the average value of turnout is .77 when corruption is not politicized compared to .61 when it is being politicized). More importantly though is the fact that there is not a significant difference in turnout due to individual differences in perceptions of corruption when corruption is being politicized by a political party. These results are also robust when we include system measures of global corruption and aggregated turnout into the equation. The only difference is that none of the system related variables reach statistical significance when they all are included at the same time (the average correlation between compulsory voting, aggregated turnout, global corruption and politicization of corruption is roughly .60).

To further understand the interaction effect, figure 1 displays the marginal effect of voters' corruption assessments at different levels of politicization of corruption. The graph illustrates the average

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[10] Politicization of corruption has also been operationalized and measured based on a different data source (not included in table), which is the proportion of sentences in party manifestos related to corruption. The results in model 4 is confirmed also when this alternative operationalization is used and the interaction effect is in this case (.375).

marginal effects on the probability to vote of perceiving political corruption when corruption is not politicized compared to when it is.

FIGURE 1, INTERACTION EFFECT, CORRUPTION ASSESSMENTS AND POLITICIZATION OF COR-RUPTION ON TURNOUT (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES)

Comment: Corruption assessments=1 = It hardly happens at all. Corruption assessments= 4 = Very widespread. When comparing differences in means, confidence intervals of 84 percent should be used instead of the traditional 95 percent level since CI:s of 84 percent corresponds to p=.05 (Julious 2004).

As shown in the graph, the negative effect of corruption assessments on turnout disappears when corruption is politicized in the electoral campaign. Perceiving political corruption as a problem is associated with lower turnout only in countries with no politicization of the corruption issue. Thus, politicization of corruption in the election campaign removes the negative effect of perceiving political corruption on turnout.

Conclusions

The general aim of this article has been to contribute on the emerging research examining how the presence and perceptions of corruption affect voters' political behavior. Although previous studies reach different conclusions, the majority of the studies referred show evidence that perceiving corruption as a problem is associated with a lower propensity to vote. Departing from this negative relationship, the more specific aim of our study has been to test if the politicization of corruption

by political parties in the election campaign affects the negative relationship between corruption and turnout. Being a first test of the politicization hypothesis, we used a measure of politicization defined in terms of whether a political party brought up corruption/clean government issues and/or accused their opponents for being corrupt in the election campaign.

In sum, the results presented indicate support for our first hypothesis, that is, levels of electoral participation in the 20 parliamentary democracies studied are lower when political corruption is perceived as widespread. However, and in line with our second hypothesis, party politicization of corruption actually moderates this general negative impact of corruption. The positive interaction effect indicates that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a problem on turnout is reduced in an election context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, the individual corruption perceptions exert a significant negative effect on voting (i.e. if a voter perceives that there is corruption at the system level but no party is politicizing corruption, the probability to vote is significantly lower). On the other hand, if corruption is politicized by a party, there is no significant effect of individual corruption perceptions on voting (i.e. even if a voter perceives that corruption is occurring on a system level, it does not affect the probability to vote). Hence, the politicization of corruption on the system level reduces the negative effect of individual corruption perceptions on turnout.

Furthermore, our results suggest that political politicization of a neglected issue of great concern to the voters may have a mobilizing effect. Not only does politicization of corruption impact vote choice – as previous research has found – but also the extent to which people turn out to vote in the first place. We argue this happens because voters perceive both the political parties to be more responsive and also the efficacy to be stronger in such situations, i.e. a sense that the parties both have the willingness and intention to curb corruption. These results thus indicate that the relationship between responsiveness and turnout can go both ways. Not only do elected representatives enhance their responsiveness as a consequence of high turnout as suggested in previous studies, it is also the case that by focusing on neglected issues, the parties can affect the extent of voting intentions.

This is good news for the functioning of electoral accountability, which is one of the cornerstones of representative democracy. Needless to say, the presence of corruption is never a good thing nor is the perception of widespread corruption. But given that it is the case, it is arguably more condu-

cive for enhancing mobilization to address the issue and suggest ways to remedy the problem than to avoid talking about it at all. It is when the issue is neglected or purposely swept under the carpet, that voters get demobilized and apathetic. Whether the parties actually will effectively combat corruption once in office is a different matter and whether they exploit the issue of corruption or not both affects voting behavior and party strategies in subsequent elections. Politicization of corruption can only be bad if there are no real intentions and just a strategy to win support in the short run. In such cases, voters' trust and engagement will most likely decrease and apathy will prevail.

To take this strand of research to the next step there are a couple of shortcomings which would preferably be remedied. One is that we cannot make use of the time series element in the politicization data since the comparative voter studies at hand are cross-sectional. If we were to expand our study in time, we would have to abandon the individual voter perspective, and the micro-macro approach used here and work with aggregated data only. Despite the downside of using aggregated data only, such a design would learn us more about how the over-time fluctuations in degree of politicization of corruption affect turnout. Furthermore, in an ideal situation the relationship between individual level assessments and party politicization of corruption should also be more thoroughly elaborated with regard to levels of global corruption and aggregated turnout but today this cannot be conducted in a satisfactorily manner due to limitations in data availability. A further elaboration of the current study would moreover be to look into more detail to the extent corruption is politicized and – if data holds – test if it matters whether corruption is politicized through scandals and allegations or more as a political issue, such as a pledge to combat corruption as well as differentiate between credible and non-credible corruption fighters, by for example take the parties previous track record, i.e. involvement in corruption scandals, into consideration.

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Appenix 1: Coding of variables

Individual level variables

Voted (B3004_1): "In current election, did respondent cast a ballot?" (Voted=0) (Did not vote=1).

Corruption assessments (B3044): " How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it hardly happens at all?" (Very widespread=4) (Quite widespread=3) (Not very widespread=2) (It hardly happens at all=1). The variable is centered around the mean in our analyses.

Sex (B2002): coded as (Male=1) (Female=2)

Age of respondent (B2001): coded as: (16/21=1) (22/30=2) (31/40=3) (41/50=4) (51/60=5) (61/70=6) (71/max=7)

Education (B2003): (Elementary school =1) (High school (2/3)=2) (Upper Secondary (4/6)=3) (University (7/8)=4). Original CSES coding: 1=None, 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Primary completed; 4=Incomplete secondary; 5=Secondary completed; 6=post-secondary trade/vocational school; 7=University undergraduate degree incomplete; 8= University undergraduate degree completed.)

Maritial Status (B2004): (0= Widowed, Divorced and Single) (1=Married or Cohabitant)

Employment (B2010): (5=0) (1/4=1) (6/12=1) (97/max=.) Original CSES coding: 1= Employed - full-time (32+ hours weekly); 2=Employed - part-time (15-32 hours weekly) 3=Employed less than 15 hours; 4=Helping family member; 5=Unemployed; 6=Student; 7=Retired; 8=Housewife/home duties; 9=Permanently disabled, 10=others (not in labor force).

Income (B2020): Original CSES coding employed, (1=Lowest Household Income to 5=Highest Household Income)

Political Knowledge: Additive index based on Political information items 1-3 (B3047_1; B3047_2; B3047_3) coded as: (Correct=1) (Incorrect=0).

Party identification (B3028): "Are you close to any political party?" (No=0) (Yes=1)

I control for external

Internal political efficacy (B3013): "Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself? (1=It makes a difference who is in power, 5= It doesn't make a difference who is in power).

External political efficacy (B3014): Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you

place yourself? (1= Who people vote for won't make a difference, 5= Who people vote for can make a difference).

System level variables

Politicization of corruption. Coded 1 if corruption is brought up by a political party as an election issue or if corruption allegations against parties/representatives/incumbents occurred in the election campaign. Coded 0 if corruption is not mentioned in the election reports.

Global corruption perception is based on Transparency Internationals corruption perception index (CPI). The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). (see Transparency International 2012). The variable is reversed and centered around the mean in our some of our analyses.

Proportional Electoral System: is taken from "Database of Political Institutions" (Beck et al 2001)

Compulsory voting (0=non-compulsory Voting) (1=Compulsory voting).

Effective Number of Electoral Parties: is measured as the effective number of parliamentary parties calculated by the vote-shares using the index of Laakso and Taagepera, also known as Herfindahl's index of concentration (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as that: $H = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2$ where p_i is the population proportion for group i of votes and where 1/H then is the effective number of parties.

GPD growth/capita is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013) compiled by Teorell et. al. (2013).

GPD/capita is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013) compiled by Teorell et. al. (2013).

Population (thousand) is taken from Maddison (2003)

Electoral Closeness in an election is here computed as 1- the difference in vote-shares of the two largest parties in each election.

Unicameralism is coded as a dummy based on information from Gerring et al (2005) and Johnson & Wallack (2006).

TABLE 1, SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES

Voted	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
overall	.862	.345	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.094	.603	.984	n = 20
within		.333	-.122	1.259	T-bar = 1154.75
Corruption assessments					
overall	.596	.302	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.188	.343	.855	n = 20
within		.247	-.259	1.252	T-bar = 1154.75
Sex					
overall	1.506	.500	1.000	2.000	N = 23095
between		.034	1.466	1.606	n = 20
within		.499	.900	2.040	T-bar = 1154.75
Age					
overall	.530	.275	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.039	.438	.597	n = 20
within		.273	-.067	1.091	T-bar = 1154.75
Education					
overall	.585	.247	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.075	.476	.745	n = 20
within		.235	-.159	1.109	T-bar = 1154.75
Marital status					
overall	.678	.467	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.090	.568	1.000	n = 20
within		.459	-.072	1.109	T-bar = 1154.75
Employed					
overall	.946	.227	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.040	.815	.987	n = 20
within		.223	-.041	1.130	T-bar = 1154.75
Income					
overall	.489	.328	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.036	.432	.573	n = 20
within		.327	-.084	1.057	T-bar = 1154.75
Political knowledge					
overall	.583	.299	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.104	.387	.793	n = 20
within		.281	-.210	1.196	T-bar = 1154.75
Party identification					
overall	.481	.500	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.170	.303	.998	n = 20
within		.478	-.517	1.178	T-bar = 1154.75
Voted in prior election					
overall	.853	.354	.000	1.000	N = 26650

	mean	SD	min	max	N
between		.077	.737	.977	n = 20
within		.348	-.124	1.116	T bar = 1332.5
Voted for incumbent in prior election					
overall	.339	.473	.000	1.000	N = 26650
between		.162	.000	.555	n = 20
within		.449	-.217	1.277	T bar = 1332.5
internal efficacy					
overall	.335	.321	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.097	.160	.501	n = 20
within		.308	-.166	1.175	T-bar = 1154.75
external efficacy					
overall	.690	.295	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.084	.559	.823	n = 20
within		.285	-.133	1.131	T-bar = 1154.75
global corruption perception index (ti)					
overall	-.255	.260	-.587	.332	N = 23095
between		.303	-.587	.332	n = 20
within		.004	-.263	-.236	T-bar = 1154.75
compulsory voting					
overall	.082	.248	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.245	.000	1.000	n = 20
within		.000	.082	.082	T-bar = 1154.75
corruption politicized					
overall	.296	.457	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.489	.000	1.000	n = 20
within		.000	.296	.296	T-bar = 1154.75

Appenix 2

FIGURE 1, SELF-REPORTED TURNOUT (CSES) COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL TURNOUT (R=.67)

Sources: CSES module 2; www.parties-and-elections.eu; www.aec.gov.ac; www.elections.ca and electionresults.govt.nz.
Comment: For Portugal, the graph reports the mean turnout (both self-reported and official) of two elections. The correlation between official and self-reported turnout in CSES is .67.

FIGURE 2, CORRELATION BETWEEN AGGREGATED COUNTRY MEANS OF CORRUPTION PER-
CEPTIONS (CSES 2001-2006) AND CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX (TI).

Source: CSES module 2 and Transparency International 2012, taken from Teorell et. al., 2013.
Comment: Portugal occurs twice in the graph since both the 2002 and 2005 election is included in the CSES dataset. The
Portugal observation on the line is the 2002 election and the Portugal observation below the line is the 2005 election. Please note
that the corruption perception variable has been reversed, i.e. high values = less perceived political corruption.

FIGURE 3, CORRUPTION ASSESSMENTS BY COUNTRY (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS,
CSES)

Source: CSES module 2. Comment: Lower scores indicates less/ no political corruption.

Appenix 3

TABLE 1, CORRUPTION AND TURNOUT (UNSTANDARDIZED LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS, RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS), TEST OF DIFFERENT SYSTEM LEVEL VARIABLES.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Corruption assessments	-0.359***	-0.359***	-0.368***	-0.370***	-0.369***	-0.372***	-0.374***	-0.360***	-0.368***	-0.369***
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Sex	0.077	0.077	0.076	0.076	0.077	0.076	0.077	0.076	0.076	0.076
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Age	0.491***	0.489***	0.489***	0.491***	0.489***	0.490***	0.487***	0.490***	0.490***	0.490***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Education	0.401***	0.397***	0.402***	0.404***	0.400***	0.404***	0.397***	0.401***	0.403***	0.404***
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Marital status	0.180***	0.181***	0.181***	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***	0.181***	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Employed	0.064	0.065	0.064	0.064	0.066	0.064	0.067	0.063	0.065	0.065
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Income	0.297***	0.297***	0.296***	0.296***	0.296***	0.295***	0.296***	0.297***	0.296***	0.295***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Political knowledge	0.909***	0.906***	0.908***	0.906***	0.906***	0.907***	0.903***	0.909***	0.907***	0.907***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Party identification	0.665***	0.666***	0.664***	0.662***	0.666***	0.664***	0.666***	0.666***	0.665***	0.664***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
	1.955***	1.956***	1.956***	1.955***	1.955***	1.956***	1.956***	1.955***	1.956***	1.956***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
	-0.202***	-0.202***	-0.202***	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.202***	-0.201***	-0.201***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Internal efficacy	-0.471***	-0.472***	-0.471***	-0.470***	-0.471***	-0.470***	-0.471***	-0.472***	-0.470***	-0.470***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
External efficacy	0.647***	0.645***	0.647***	0.649***	0.647***	0.648***	0.644***	0.647***	0.648***	0.647***
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Corruption politicized	-1.071**									
	(0.479)									
Global corruption perception index (ti)		-1.479**								
		(0.692)								
Proportional electoral system			-0.754							
			(0.926)							
Compulsory voting				1.590*						
				(0.888)						
Effective number of parties					0.206					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
					(0.143)					
Unicameralism						-0.498				
						(0.483)				
Electoral closeness							0.007			
							(0.009)			
GDP/capita								0.000**		
								(0.000)		
GDP/capita growth									-0.009	
									(0.016)	
Population (thousands)										0.000
										(0.000)
	-0.803***	-1.376***	-0.400	-1.236***	-1.977***	-0.864**	-1.151***	-2.435***	-0.990***	-1.176***
	(0.295)	(0.296)	(0.903)	(0.279)	(0.670)	(0.363)	(0.304)	(0.671)	(0.338)	(0.367)
	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650
	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.