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Individuals Doing Politics

Urban participation, social media
campaigning and online nano-
politics

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how we should understand *individuals doing politics*. How should we understand people who are clearly involved with political issues – through electoral processes, city planning, or ranting on social media – but would usually not identify as politicians or activists, nor channel their political projects through established political communities or organisations?

Broad changes in the technological, regulatory, and governing systems underlie the importance of individuals in politics, participation and the media landscape. Because of these changes, we now live in a world in which we need to understand how individual actors participate and do politics so that we can comprehend how contemporary politics and participation work.

This work presents an outline for a sociological theory of political action by integrating a pragmatist approach to habits and situations with theories dealing with cultural and tangible repertoires and resources, and by constructing a grammar of political speech that makes realising and inspecting the legitimacy of claims based on individual interests easier.

Understanding individual interests as a basis of political argumentation is relevant if we want to understand political culture, in which individuals, in addition to collective structures, are the key players. This dissertation develops conceptual tools for understanding the legitimacy of argumentation based solely on individual interests. The theory of grammars of commonality by Laurent Thévenot is used as a basis for this development. In the remodelled grammar of individual interests, the legitimacy of political claims rests on the recognition of the rights of individuals and the construction of representative groups: even if actors act as individuals, they rhetorically construct a wider group of people, sharing their opinion, to back the claims. Empirically, argumentation based on individual interests is shown to play a relevant role in Finnish political culture, which is a feature less highlighted in previous studies.

The empirical articles are focused on individuals doing politics in two different domains. These are participation in urban planning in Helsinki and the use of Facebook as both the nano-level context for political participation and as the organisational tool for individual campaigners in presidential elections.

Firstly, the grammar of individual interests is a legitimate way of presenting critique against urban planning, and, thus, attempts at making urban planning more communicative do not necessarily make it more deliberative. Conflicts in urban planning can and should be thought of as political conflicts.

This argument leads to a new definition for the often pejoratively used term Not in my Backyard (NIMBY): if participation based on individual interests is as legitimate as participation based on common goods, no reason should exist to classify some people participating in local land-use conflicts as NIMBYs. The term is better used to describe the *conflicts*, in which local residents act against planned land-use.

Secondly, this dissertation presents evidence of a new type of political campaigner: one with a background in technology or advertising rather than in politics and who is connected and as independent as possible. This campaigner uses Facebook and other similar tools to create ad hoc campaign groups, utilises the cultural repertoire of the Internet, and participates in politics when (and only when) he or she sees fit. This kind of campaigner was crucial to the success of Pekka Haavisto in the 2012 presidential elections.

As a context for nano-political action, Facebook also affects the way politics is done. The concept of nano-politics refers to the smallest possible public political gestures, which are, in this case, using the Facebook like button to send political signals. Facebook users do reflect on their liking pattern on the basis of previous likes, and their networked audience affects their liking behaviour. At the same time, the “material” tools provided by Facebook, such as the like button, are used by activists and “normal” users alike creatively and reflexively: these users send a wide range of signals by using the simplest of tools, and they often reflect on their own liking behaviour.

This dissertation connects to a long line of studies showing the importance and heightened role of the individual in political participation. The phenomenon is investigated in relation to the planning authority and government in general, in relation to electoral politics, and in relation to a more generalised understanding of politics as something that all kinds of people do in the course of their lives.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan tapoja ymmärtää politiikkaa yksilöiden toimintana. Kuinka meidän pitäisi ymmärtää niitä ihmisiä, jotka selvästi puuhailevat poliittisten asioiden parissa – osallistuvat vaaleihin, kaupunkisuunnitteluun, tai valittavat sosiaalisessa mediassa – mutta eivät itse identifioituisi poliitikoiksi tai aktivisteiksi, saati kanavoisi osallistumistaan perinteisten poliittisten organisaatioiden kautta?

Yksilön merkitystä politiikan analysoimisen kannalta korostavat laaja-alaiset muutokset niin teknologiassa kuin hallinnollisissa järjestelmissäkin. Jotta 2010-luvun politiikkaa (sanan laajassa merkityksessä) voidaan ymmärtää, täytyy ajattelun huomioida sitä tekevät yksilöt, pelkkien kollektiivisten rakenteiden sijaan.

Tässä väitöskirjassa esitetään luonnos sosiologisesta yksilöllisen poliittisen toiminnan teoriasta. Se perustuu pragmatistiselle käsitykselle tilannekohtaisesta luovuudesta ja tapojen institutionalisoitumisesta, joka yhdistetään toimijalle käytössä olevia resursseja korostavaan kulttuuriteoriaan. Näiden lisäksi työssä kehitetään työkaluja ymmärtää ensisijaisesti toimijoiden omaan etuun nojaavaa poliittista puhetta legitiiminä osana poliittista kulttuuria.

Tällainen omaan etuun perustuvan poliittisen argumentaation legitiimiyden hahmottaminen on keskeistä poliittisen kulttuurin toimijalähtöiselle ymmärtämiselle. Laurent Thévenot'n yhteisyyden kielioppi toimii perustana tälle kehittelylle. Tässä työssä esitellyssä *yksilöiden edun kieliopissa* poliittisen argumentaation legitiimiys pohjataan yksilöiden oikeuksien tunnistamiselle sekä yksilöiden kyvylle rakentaa tuekseen edustuksellisia ryhmiä: vaikka toimijat toimisivat ensisijaisesti yksilöinä, he vetoavat retorisesti usein laajojen ihmisjoukkojen tukeen. Tällainen omaan etuun perustuva argumentaatio näyttäytyy työn empiirisissä osissa relevanttina ja legitiiminä tapana edistää omaa asiaansa suomalaisessa poliittisessä kulttuurissa. Tätä piirrettä ei ole aiemmassa tutkimuksessa korostettu.

Väitöskirjan empiiriset artikkelit keskittyvät yksilöiden poliittiseen toimintaan kahdella eri alueella: toisaalta osallistumisessa kaupunkisuunnitteluun Helsingissä, toisaalta Facebookiin sekä nano-tason poliittisen osallistumisen ympäristönä että itsenäisten kampanjoitsijoiden organisaatiotyökaluna presidentinvaaleissa.

Väitöskirja osoittaa yksilöiden edun kieliopin – eli toimijoiden oman edun – olevan hyväksytty osa suomalaista poliittista kulttuuria, ainakin esitettäessä kritiikkiä kaavamuutoksia kohtaan. Kaavoituskiistoja pitäisikin ajatella perustaltaan poliittisina kiistoina: yritykset avata kaavoitusta deliberaatiivisen demokratian suuntaan antavat tilaa myös suoralle oman edun ajamiselle.

Tämän myötä myös NIMBY (not in my backyard)-käsite pitää määritellä uudelleen. Mikäli oman edun ajaminen on poliittisessa kulttuurissa hyväksyttävänä pidetty tapa osallistua, samalla tavalla kuin yhteisen hyvän ajamiseen perustuva osallistuminen, ei ole järkeä luokitella osaa kaavoitukseen osallistujista nimbyiksi. Käsitettä pitäisikin käyttää jatkossa lähinnä kuvaamaan sellaisia *konflikteja* joissa asukkaat vastustavat muutoksia alueellaan.

Tässä väitöskirjassa myös esitellään uudentyyppinen poliittinen kampanjoitsija. Nämä itsenäiset kampanjoitsijat ovat verkottuneita, taitavia teknologian hyödyntäjiä ja tulevat pikemminkin mainos- tai teknologia-alalta kuin politiikan sisältä. Nämä kampanjoitsijat rakentavat tilapäisiä itsenäisiä kampanjaryhmiä Facebookin ja vastaavien työkalujen avulla, hyödyntävät internetin tarjoamia kulttuurisia repertuaareja ja osallistuvat politiikkaan ainoastaan silloin kuin se sattuu heitä innostamaan. Pekka Haaviston (vihr.) menestys vuoden 2012 presidentinvaaleissa oli monella tavalla tämän tyyppisten kampanjoitsijoiden ansiota.

Muodostamalla ympäristön nano-poliittiselle toiminnalle Facebook vaikuttaa myös politiikan tekemisen tapaan. Nano-politiikan käsite viittaa tapaan ymmärtää tykkää-napin käyttäminen pienimpänä mahdollisena poliittisen toiminnan välineenä. Facebookin käyttäjien verkottunut yleisö, samoin kuin heidän aikaisemmat tykkäämisensä, vaikuttavat päätökseen tykätä tai jättää tykkäämättä jostakin. Samaan aikaan kaikkein yksinkertaisimpiakin työkaluja, kuten esimerkiksi juuri tykkää-nappia, käytetään luovin tavoin. Niillä lähetetään todella monenlaisia sosiaalisia signaaleja, jotka ovat paljon monimutkaisempia kun pelkkä tykkään/en tykkää.

Tämä tutkimus kytkeytyy osaksi yksilöiden poliittisen osallistumisen korostamista esittävien tutkimusten pitkää linjaa. Tässä väitöskirjassa ilmiötä tarkastellaan ennen kaikkea vaalipolitiikan, sosiaalisen median ja muuttuneen hallintotavan kautta. Poliittikka ymmärretään asiana, jota kaikenlaiset ihmiset tekevät osana normaalia elämäänsä.

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The university of Helsinki has been so much more than just a place for learning for me. I've met wonderful people, I've debated and done politics, and I've lived a full academic life within the old walls. I want to thank Rami Ratvio, Pia Letto-Vanamo, Sami Syrjämäki, Anna-Maija Pirttilä-Backman, Kim Zilliacus, Sampo Ruoppila (now in Turku), the whole student union (especially Katri Korolainen), all the people I met through Helsinki Challenge, and all the teachers and students at the non-department of Finnish Literature.

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When I graduated from high school, my mother took me to a hat maker to buy the traditional student cap. While I had my head measured, my mother told me that the same hat maker made the caps for her and for her mother – and that perhaps would in time manufacture my doctoral hat as well. Being 19, I naturally told her that would not be the case, as I would never do anything as boring and long-ass as a doctoral dissertation. In this, as in countless other things in life, she knew better. I owe her everything.

My parents were courteous enough to wait until I got a study right at the Department of Sociology to tell me that they both had done minor studies in sociology. Thus, what I thought had been just the way the news and the world was discussed at home, turned out to be sociology. I want to thank my dad especially for the intellectual encouragement and sparring I've got from him.

Together with my sister Kaisa we learned how to live this life on our own, and how to always have each other's back. You have countless times shown me what family means, and what a varied place the world is. You mean the world to me.

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At Louhos, Kallio

October 2016

Veikko Eranti

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LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

This dissertation is based on the following publications:

- I Eranti, Veikko (2014): Oma etu ja yhteinen hyvä paikallisessa kiistassa tilasta. *Sosiologia* 51(1).
- II Eranti, Veikko & Lindman, Juho (2014): Sosiaalinen media Pekka Haaviston vuoden 2012 presidentinvaalikampanjassa. *Politiikka* 56(2).
- III Eranti, Veikko & Lonkila, Markku (2015): Social significance of Facebook Like Button. *First Monday*, 20(6).
- IV Eranti, Veikko (2017): NIMBY as Conflict of Valuations and Interests. Accepted for publication in *Sociological Review* (Doi: 10.1177/0038026116675554).

The publications are referred in the text by their respective roman numerals.

1 INTRODUCTION

While completing the final revision of this dissertation, I was procrastinating by surfing Facebook, as one does. I came across a post by a bridge: Kruunusillat¹ was responding to a critique presented against it by a retired MEP in a newspaper column. The post was rather long, but presented a nicely written rebuttal of a nonsensical and fact-less column using the style of political fact-checking. I chuckled and enjoyed reading the post. Because the post also happened to match my political views, I shared it with my Facebook friends and followers, wondering how the former politician might feel about being owned in a debate by a bridge. During the first hour, it received 30 likes, and within 24 hours, 34 more.

This was doing politics.

This dissertation is about how we should understand *individuals doing politics*. How should we understand people who are clearly involved with political issues – through electoral processes, city planning, or social media rambling – but would usually not identify as politicians or activists, nor channel their political projects through established political communities or organizations? These individuals create collective structures as they see fit and then dump them when they are no longer needed. From this perspective, collective structures, such as parties and neighbourhood associations, are possible results, not starting point, of the analysis. The perspective of this dissertation is, thus on the creativity of political action of the individual actors, and how their participation should be understood.

In this dissertation, and especially in the original articles, we meet three principal characters whose ways of doing politics are investigated. First, we meet residents of Helsinki, often called NIMBYs², who are invested in their surroundings and who campaign against changes in their neighbourhoods. Next, we meet tech-savvy online political activists without backgrounds in party politics, who are re-imagining electoral campaigns. Finally, we meet regular Facebook users, who like away and deal with nano-political situations all day long.

Broad changes in the technological, regulatory, and governing systems underlie the importance of individuals in politics, participation and the contemporary media landscape. Because of these changes, we now live in a

¹ Kruunusillat is a debated infrastructure project in Helsinki that connects the new Eastern parts of the city with the city centre. They have an active Facebook page.

² Not in my backyard

world in which, in order to understand contemporary politics and participation, we understand how individual actors participate in and do politics.

The process of doing politics, by individuals or collectives alike, is always defined by where it happens: what is the context for the action? This is especially relevant when building an actor-centric theory of political participation. Using the repertoires and tools available in the situation in which politics happens creates potential for the creativity of political action. Here, we can consider two aspects of the situation as being especially meaningful.

The *first* are the “material” surroundings that provide the grounds for participation and politics. These range from technical tools, such as the Facebook like button, that make it possible to send signals in social networks, to forests that can be qualified and used as a basis for argumentation when fighting for your backyard. Whether the physical built environment of a city or the virtual “built environment” of social media, these surroundings both limit the paths and actions of actors and make new, creative routes and ways of doing politics possible.

The *second* defining aspect of the situation of political action is what is often called political culture. Following Ann Swidler (1986), I understand culture as a collection of repertoires available for actors. When political acts are undertaken, these actors (residents, techno-politicians, Facebook users) engage with, utilize, cultivate and inhabit these repertoires, turning them into arguments, organizations, justifications, memes, protest letters, and other political objects³.

More poetically, political culture is a landscape with formations. It is a dormant background structure, a valley with a repertoire of possible paths, old rocks brought by the Ice Age, streams and forests. Only when actors engage with this background do different shapes and structures on the landscape become meaningful and relevant. For an army marching through a landscape, a rock is meaningful only if it is either in the way or useful as cover in a battle (it becomes qualified, as suggested by Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006, 129, citing Carl von Clausewitz). Some features are needed and used, some paths are trampled and turned into highways, and some wither away and are forgotten, and who knows whether we have used the most suitable features or only the ones we came by first?

The most suitable way to understand culture for this project is that it is the ever-changing set of possible repertoires, tools and their usages for actors. Actors act as they are wont to do: by using physical, virtual, cultural, and organizational resources as they see fit.

³ Naturally, all “material” resources have to be culturally constructed to be accessible, and all “cultural” resources are actualized as signs with material components (see, e.g., Heiskala 2014). While the dichotomy is theoretically not airtight, it helps to illustrate things.

Beginning the analysis of doing politics from the perspective of individuals also affects how we analyse political *argumentation*. We must go further from the often-taken sociological path of focusing on common good and collective argumentation to, instead, analyse argumentation based on individual interests. This work presents empirical evidence of this type of participation and argumentation in the Finnish political culture and builds the theoretical tools needed to analyse them. A significant portion of this work is dedicated to presenting and evaluating the works of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. Based on a critical reconstruction of Thévenot's work, I present a way of understanding the "liberal" notion of politics – how individual interests are integrated and legitimized into political cultures and commonalities – as a contest of individual wills (rather than as a contest of higher common principles). This reworking is the main theoretical contribution of my thesis.

Despite the focus on individual interests and individual wills, the political projects described in Articles I through IV are by no means atomistic. Articles I and IV describe local oppositions to building projects. Though the analysis is focused on the comment letters sent by individuals to a city planning authority (and is, thus, in part, an analysis of a particular implementation of participatory democracy), these actors are not working without social ties, or socially determined cultural and material repertoires of action. They talk with their neighbours, and, in some cases, draft their comments together. Social ties, class, and old-school social organizations all exist among and influence actors. Actors also use the language and the argumentation they believe to be most effective; in other words, they assess the political culture and act accordingly. However, in the area of city planning and concerning the participation mechanism in question, the participants must act and be recognized as individuals.

The ways in which individuals act are also influenced by the interaction situation, which is governed by its own ritualistic rules. Article III analyses interaction rituals and dynamics in an online context through the social meanings given to the Facebook like button. Facebook combines the heightened *network sensitivity* created by the audience individuals collect through Facebook with the rituals of interaction. Since social networking sites like Facebook are central political arenas, understanding the rules of the interaction situation is crucial for analysing analyzing politics.

Article II, which analyses the 2012 Finnish presidential election and the campaign of Pekka Haavisto, makes a different, yet related point about individuals in political action. Party organizations have long represented the most salient collective structures, the most consolidated and official form of social movements. Changes in political systems, in political culture, and in technological and legal environments lead to situations in which party borders are blurred and the hierarchical collective gives way to more loosely connected groups and even super-charged individuals (such as superstars of fundraising, meme-making, and analytics). There is no reason to think that

similar dynamics would not play out in other social movements. In the age of social movements such as #tahdon2013, #blacklivesmatter, and #pelipoikki, the differences between an organized social movement and a single frustrated user with a good hashtag⁴ blur and, in some cases, lose their significance altogether.

The empirical material in this work is collected in Finland; thus, some of the answers and distinctions regarding political culture given in this work focus specifically on Finnish political culture. Technology, however, has a way of making things global. While many cultural elements are local, Facebook and its changing algorithms, functionalities, and de-stabilizing effects on politics are global. The same can be said about the alleged trends of individualization and the emphasis on citizen participation in politics. Thus, it is possible to develop conceptual tools that allow us to understand phenomena that transcend the borders of local and national.

When it comes to questions of political participation and the nature of the polity, French and American writers have traditionally given radically different answers. These writings and traditions work as a theoretical sounding board for studying Finnish political culture. Building a cohesive theoretical toolkit using US and French writings and using it to analyse Finnish political culture necessarily raises some problems related to travelling concepts (Luhtakallio 2012) and the different ideological constructs of polities. One of the main inspirations for the studies I have carried out was the comparative research between the US and France (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, Moody & Thévenot 2000, Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye, 2000) – not because of the method of comparison in itself, but because of the conceptual differences it brought to fore. In this body of literature, two pictures of political culture are painted: one with *only* the common good as a legitimate justification and the other with private interests serving as the cornerstones of the polity. I could not immediately place Finland on either side of this division. The research done thus far on Finnish political culture using justification theory, such as the works by Luhtakallio (2012), Ylä-Anttila (2010b), Ylä-Anttila (2016), Lonkila (2011), and Lehtimäki (2016), has not tried to systematically describe the relation between the Finnish polity and private interests. One of the theoretical contributions of this dissertation is that it builds tools to address this question, which is also done empirically in articles I and IV.

⁴#Tahdon2013 was a highly successful campaign to enable same-sex marriage. Despite being known by its hashtag, it did not use Twitter as a core organizing tool. #Blacklivesmatter is a US social movement that was born on Twitter following the 2013 to 2015 police shootings of unarmed black men in Ferguson and elsewhere. While the hashtag and related Twitter activism have been highly visible, supporters also engage in traditional community organizing and advocacy. #Pelipoikki was an anti-racism demonstration organized in the fall of 2016.

This thesis is organized into five main parts. This text as a whole creates a more general-level framework of political sociology to combine the themes of the original articles. In the sections of this chapter, I present background discussions on individuals in politics from the points of view of general zeitdiagnostical theory, participation and urban planning, and the use of technology and social media in (electoral) politics. These sections, along with the present introduction, outline what I mean by individuals in this work and why they represent a relevant perspective for doing research on a phenomenon as collective as participation and politics. I also present a selection of the voluminous empirical literature on the subject.

Chapter 2 builds and collects tools for understanding actors' creativity and its limits, as well as the cultural, interactional, and tangible resources that are available to actors. This chapter reflects the literature on social movements and collective action, as well as the situational understanding of reality and its implications for political sociology.

Chapter 3 begins by presenting and analysing the pragmatic sociology of *On Justification* (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006[1991]). This analysis has two goals: On one hand, it works as an example of the creativity-through-repertoire approach to action in general and the political action of non-traditional collective actors specifically. On the other hand, this chapter advances Laurent Thévenot's idea of grammars of commonality to a version that is better suited for analysing individual interests and the ways in which individuals make claims in public disputes, both as individuals and as self-appointed representatives of larger collectives.

In Chapter 4, I present the empirical articles and their data, methods, and results. My doctoral dissertation as a whole is based on independent articles that do not share common methodological, theoretical, or empirical groundings. They do, however, all address the questions of participation in political processes that occur not through traditional collective systems, such as associations (very important for Finnish political culture) or parties (though one article discusses party politics, it focuses on how individual campaign groups subvert these structures). I present the methodological and empirical approaches in these articles. Chapter 5 concludes the main theoretical and empirical contributions of my work.

1.1 INDIVIDUALS, CITIZENS, AND CIVIC LIFE

Different writers have told the story of the fading importance of political institutions and the rise of (often somehow poetically lost) individuals differently: For Robert Putnam (2000, esp. 177–182), generational changes, TV, and changes in work and urban structures have caused a decline in social capital, which manifests as the decline of all kinds of collective and civic activities. For Micheletti (2003), individualized actions, such as shopping, be-

come carries of civic virtues. For Bellah et al. (1996), even the collective forms of civic life in the US are, at their deepest levels, imbued with the spirit of individualism that has run through the centuries in that country. Finally, for Inglehart (1997), the fading importance of political institutions and the rise of individuals speaks to changes in the macro value system from materialistic to post-materialistic.

On the policy level, the decline in electoral turnout and the perceived decline in other civic activities takes the headline of a “crisis of democracy”, which in Finland, even reached the level of an official governmental programme (Valtioneuvosto 2003). Electoral participation was in decline, and many authors globally (Putnam 2000, Dalton 2008) pronounced democracy to be in a severe crisis. At the same time, however, a counter-trend was emerging. Participatory budgeting (e.g., de Sousa Santos 1998, Boldt 2016), deliberative democracy, and all sorts of participatory channels created for individual citizens were being implemented around the world. The electoral campaigns of Howard Dean and Barack Obama in the US and Pekka Haavisto in Finland showed signs of a new type of electoral campaign, complete with new types of political activists: young, networked, project-oriented people who became involved to have the experience of a lifetime, not a lifetime of experience (see, e.g., Juris 2005, Häyhtiö & Rinne 2009, Rinne 2011, Bennet & Segerberg 2012).

For general-level sociological analyses, individualization has been one of the strong meta-narratives of recent years. It also, in many ways, serves as the backbone for much of the discussion reviewed in the previous paragraphs. The withering of strong, dominant social institutions, such as classes, families, and religion, has been said to be the new dominant structure of life (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002). For Giddens (1991), the central theme of late/heightened modernity, which is how he describes the times in which we are living, is the construction of individual life choices. This heightened importance of life styles contrasts the more stable, traditional structures of the past, such as employment and family.

From the heightened importance of life choices, Giddens drew the conclusion that the *substance* of politics will be in these lifestyles (or life-politics) – in contrast with the emancipatory politics of previous eras (see also Rinne 2008, 2011 for his account of reflexive politics). With 25 years of hindsight, we can say that Giddens was both completely right and completely wrong in his zeitdiagnose: life-politics (by which many movements are known under the rubric of *new social movements*) are important and happening everywhere, but emancipatory politics (as he defines the areas of political struggle that have to do with rights, material well-being, and the like), or the need for them, did not disappear.

We could say that electoral politics are also shifting from a collective, election-centred political life and understanding of politics towards politics hap-

pening on more individualized grounds. Dalton (2008) conceptualises this change in terms of citizenship as a change from *citizen duty* to *engaged citizenship*. He characterises citizen duty as a system of citizenship in which “citizens vote, pay taxes, obey the law” and engaged citizenship as “independent, assertive citizens, concerned with others”. He also sees the political consequences as shifting from “voting to protest and direct action” and as democratic ideals focusing on “pressuring democracy to meet its ideals” (Dalton 2008: 4). He uses both US and cross-cultural surveys to show how this global change in citizenship coincides with what Inglehart (1997) called post-material values.

If Dalton finds his redemption in a new style of political focus in citizenship, Schudson (1998), in his reading of the history of American civic life, finds it in the changing *subject* of civic life. For him, the analysis of Putnam – and other critics from the same tradition – misses the point about changes in voting and public discussion. We have entered the age of right-bearing citizens, an age in which politics often takes the life-political turn that Giddens envisioned and in which these citizens also find new ways of doing politics.

The idea of rights is not, in itself, central to this work, but it helps us think about two ideas that are relevant. Firstly, a right-bearing citizen (whether engaged or not) bears these rights as an individual. She makes decisions about her rights contextually, but essentially as a one-woman constitutive unit (see Habermas, 1996, 22–23). Secondly, not all individuals are citizens. To be a citizen, one must be qualified in a certain way and have a certain relation to the state apparatus. In the grammar of (liberal) individuals, as is reconstructed in Chapter 3.4, these two ideas come together as the building blocks of a polity: Politics is about constructing a subject who possesses a right to be heard and whose opinions must be taken into account. In elections, this is easy: The qualification of the individual lies within the formal definition of citizenship. In deliberations and discussions, these definitions become much murkier.

In their 2014 article “Civic action,” Paul Lichterman and Nina Eliasoph try to locate what actually makes an action *civic*. For example, an accountant working for a political party is still mostly doing accounting, not necessarily participating in creating new political futures or deliberating about the future of society. They anchor the “civicness” of acts in situations of acting and interacting. This point of view makes political action the property of a situation, rather than something that is recognizable from the structures. Following this line of argumentation, we can think of individuals doing politics in situations, without a strong commitment to the historical interpretation of individualization as a general-level sociological phenomenon.

Individuals also play a key role in many writings about macro-level ideological changes happening in society. In *New Spirit of Capitalism*, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) write about how capitalism simultaneously re-

quires a *justification* – a moral promise about equality and possibility – and is able to encompass the main critiques directed towards it. *New Spirit of Capitalism* focuses on the justification and critique of changing capitalism (or how capitalism changes between the 1960s and 1990s) and concludes with an analysis that argues that individuality, connectivity, and flexibility are the primary common goods valued and provided by the new capitalist system. Pierre Rosanvallon (2008, 2013), in turn, looks at how the justification and legitimacy of *democracy* is changing and finds individuals as the new key players.

Rosanvallon (2013) suggests that we are entering the age of the politics of closeness, in which the central idea of politics is no longer to seek collective representation, but to bring forth the variety and uniqueness of each person's individual life situation. Laurent Thévenot (2015) calls this the grammar of *individuals in a liberal public*: the structure of the importance and legitimate political usage of private interests, even in public discussions. Instead of deliberations between common goods, we will have individuals demanding that their idiosyncratic preferences and interests be recognized and preferably addressed.

We can also find these changes within global, macro-level politics. Here, the changes take the form of international co-operation and treaties, such as Agenda 21 (UN 1992) and the Maastricht Treaty (EU 1992). Both include some version of the subsidiarity principle: that political decisions should be made as close to individuals as possible. These treaties do not directly dictate national laws, but set an idea that is implemented differently in different national contexts. For example, Helsinki, like many other cities, created a local implementation of Agenda 21 (see Niemenmaa 2005 for Helsinki Agenda 21 and Alasuutari 2009, Alasuutari & Qadir 2014 for the process of domesticating international policy processes to fit local contexts and the epistemic governance behind these projects).

In Finland, these changes, together with the 1995 EU membership, coincided with a thorough change in administrative culture. This could be summarised as the beginnings of a move from a centralized control system to a more open participatory system (Tiihonen 2006: 92, Heiskala & Luhtakallio 2006).

The 2000s also saw the arrival of the discussion about the “crisis of democracy” in Finland. It turned out that, despite Finland's reputation as a country with engaged citizens and hundreds of thousands of voluntary associations and NGOs (Alapuro 2005), Finnish citizens were actually much more detached from the political system than those in most easily comparable Nordic countries: They voted less, were less active in political organizations and parties, and were less interested in politics (Borg 2005). In Dalton's (2008, Chapter 8) distinction between the duty-based and engaged dimensions of citizenship, Finns had nearly the lowest scores on *both dimensions* in international comparisons. Furthermore, compared to those in France, political

conflicts in Finland were more often downplayed and depoliticized (Alapuro 2005, Luhtakallio 2012). However, other Nordic countries have also witnessed a change in civil society: NGO membership is increasingly explained by individuals' need to socialise and self-interest, rather than collective identification or a conviction to change the world (Wollebæk & Selle 2010).

These developments have led the Finnish state to take, sometimes through experiments, sometimes through legislation, an active role in the development of democracy. The government launched a special initiative for promoting participation at both the municipal level (Kettunen 2002) and the level of the whole society (Valtioneuvosto 2003, Borg 2005). This democracy policy aimed to build individual competences and avenues for individual participation, but did not radically rethink the role of the individual or consider other methods of direct democracy (Perälä 2015).

In sum, we are approaching a situation that might as well be called *the politics of precious individual snowflakes*, in which everyone's private interests are unique and beautiful, supremely well-addressed by capitalist societies, finding expressions in idiosyncratic and loose ways, and very difficult to fold into a collective or general will.

1.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 2010s: DEVELOPMENTS AND TENSIONS

The process of moving towards a system in which relations between individuals and the government are more "direct" than they have been in the past has had a particularly strong effect on how participation in urban planning, compared to the other areas of government, is organized in Finland. The Finnish urban planning process, which previously could be described as a field for heroic artist-designers and architects, has been developing in a more communicative direction. Where government and municipal officials used to see themselves as being in the position where they could *define* and even dictate what the common good was, they must now be part of a *discussion* about the common good and how it should be defined (see, e.g., Jauhiainen & Niemämaa 2006: 61 & 234–237, Bäcklund, 2007: 63, Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010, Bäcklund et al. 2014, Niitamo 2015; most of these writers also present remarks that are more critical of this process).

The Finnish Land-Use and Building Act, which regulates planning and urban development, was renewed in 1999 to include ideas influenced by communicative planning and deliberative democracy (e.g., Haila 2002, Bäcklund 2007, Saad-Sulonen 2014: 40–43; for an evaluation of the act, see Mäntysalo & Jarenko 2012, Staffans 2012, Ministry of the Environment 2014: 151–156; and for the analysis of the Helsinki implementation in relation to the implementations of other cities in Finland, see Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010: 344). The act gives city residents the right to be heard when urban plans are

changed and when significant new developments are planned, as well as, after decisions have been made, the right to challenge the legitimacy of these changes in court.

While the act itself may be influenced by the ideas of deliberative democracy, it also legitimizes many of the elements of liberal or aggregative democratic participation (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010, Mäntysalo & Jarenko 2012). The deliberative and aggregative modes of the law are in tension: Though the idea is to enable deliberation and discussion, the law can also be used simply to state the preferences of the residents. From the perspective of the actors, it becomes less about the mode of participation *intended* by the law and more about the mode that is made *possible* by the law (Mäntysalo & Jarenko 2012). As an example, from the point of view of the citizens, both individual interests and close affinities are presented in the form of comments that argue from principles other than common good.

The Land-Use and Building Act, as well as its implementation in Helsinki, grants individual residents the right to influence local planning. The changes brought about by the new law, both specifically and in general, have created huge pressures for the municipal planning organization, which must now find ways to open both the procedures of planning, and the decision-making processes. This is done in order to include individual residents and their opinions and expertise in the process (Bäcklund 2007: 24–29).

The central problem for the planning organization is, then, how to incorporate into the planning process the input offered by these actively participating individuals. The municipal structure expects to receive from the citizens primarily subjective opinions and testimonies about individual and local circumstances, not factual, objective, or apolitical information. The participating residents, of course, do not know this, and they likely would not conform even if they did know. These contradictory expectations can lead to a situation in which participation resembles customer feedback rather than democratic participation by citizens and, ultimately, in which the expertise of individuals is, perhaps, not recognized (Niemenmaa 2005, Bäcklund 2007, 158 – 159, 198, Pellizzoni 2011, Bäcklund et al. 2014: 315, Saikkonen 2015).

In sum, the problem has been that planning officials were, for a long time, given supreme status in defining the common good of the city (Staffans 2004), and the new age of individuals with situated knowledge about their surroundings (Bäcklund 2007) challenges this status. All in all, it seems that the Finnish governing structure is not quite sure what to make of these participating individuals. On one hand, the political system sees the activity as a positive signal and a much-needed development of participation, which requires training and encouragement (Perälä 2015); on the other hand, their inputs can easily be seen as messy, as nuisances or as overall difficult to incorporate into the official planning structure (e.g., Niemenmaa 2005, Bäcklund 2007, Saikkonen 2015; this dualism can be clearly seen in Luhta-

kallio [2012], who suggests that, depending on the party, politicians exhibit both viewpoints, as do city planners in Niitamo [2015]; these conflicts also have a founding on the level of the law, as can be seen in Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010, Mäntysalo & Jarenko 2012, Bäcklund et al. 2014).

If the planning process is inherently local and, by definition, centralized in the Finnish context, the politics that individuals do in social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat), as a phenomenon, sits comfortably at the opposite end of the spectrum. Still, the changes it brings to political organization and communications are not entirely dissimilar. On one hand, social media has given established organizations and social movements new tools for propagating their messages and for getting in touch with existing and potential supporters. On the other hand, it has enabled a completely new type of political protest network – for example, the global version of the Occupy movement – and has fuelled new types of protests, such as the 2011 London riots (see Bennet & Segerberg 2012).

Even though social media comprises of networks and is about being “social”, it also, in many ways, emphasizes the role of the individual over the collective. In a hyper-connected network without central hierarchies or pre-set structures (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), viral content spreads as propagated by individual users.

The way in which Dalton describes engaged citizens, as was presented earlier, is a useful way of thinking about these actors: They are individual, autonomous, and responsible. The clear break-through moment for this kind of citizenship in the US was, tellingly, the 2007 to 2008 Obama campaign in the US presidential elections and primaries. This campaign was able to tap into the changing norms of political ways of doing citizenship and the generational changes highlighting it (Dalton 2008: 187) using social media. Article II in this work looks at the 2012 presidential campaign of Pekka Haavisto from a similar perspective.

It is perhaps no coincidence that this kind of engaged citizenship, which is not as closely linked to previous electoral politics, has been highlighted in the dramaturgy of presidential campaigns, which are simultaneously the most established of establishments, but are also pronouncedly about individual actors: the presidential candidates (see Alexander 2010).

Social media also changes the dynamic of the public sphere, such that established media brands with long journalistic traditions are forced to compete for readership and roles with individuals armed with only their own time and social media accounts. Social media has greatly diminished the role of traditional gatekeepers. Connected, resourceful individuals can operate on an entirely different level of distribution, and, using cheap, modern tools, they can also can deliver production value that was unimaginable just 15 years ago. Bennet and Segerberg (2012) have described the changes these technological

developments create in the organization of social movements by dubbing the phenomenon the *logic of connective action*.

The term *logic of connective action* is used to describe the mode of action behind technology-enabled protest-movement-networks (such as the Occupy movement), which rely on easily personalized political action frames and on social media to organize and spread political messages. The individual plays a central role in this analysis: These movements rely on viral propagation and the spreading of memes, which constitute their organizational form. Bennet and Segerberg contrast this process with the resource-reliant model of collective action, in which social movements are the central actors and arbiters of resources. Individuals, thus, become the locus of action: They choose the frames, they employ the resources, and they operate by using the cultural repertoires available to them (see also Castells 2007 on the logic of mass self-communication and Juris 2005 for technology and activism).

The logic of connective action, as well as the advent of social media in general, has created all kinds of new possibilities, structures, and campaign styles in formal politics (i.e. the politics of parties, electorates, presidents, etc.) that are interesting for political sociology (see Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011, Vergeer 2013). The 2007 to 2008 campaign of Barack Obama had ripple effects throughout the world (Karlsen 2013, Lilleker et al. 2014, Gibson 2015), even though many of the same elements were already present in the 2004 US democratic campaign of Howard Dean (Hindman 2005, Kreiss 2012).

Social media also supports even more autonomous styles of individual campaigning in line with the concept of connective action: spontaneous campaign organizations, individual projects, and crowdfunded electoral campaigns (Gibson et al. 2013, Strandberg 2013, Bimber 2014). These campaigns can also benefit from what I have termed Autonomous Individual Campaigners (Eranti & Lindman 2016): Citizens who can organize their own campaigns within the larger framework created by the “official” campaign.

The open and decentralized nature of social media and blogs can also be seen as having the potential to decentralize both campaign communications and intra-party power structures (Heidar & Saglia 2003: 222, Cormode & Krishnamurthy 2008, Zittel 2009, Gibson et al. 2013, Carlson et al 2014). Party organizations, in general, have been developing from social movement-style mass parties towards campaign machines whose main function is to win elections.

This new model of open, volunteer-based, connective, and even citizen-initiated campaigning (Juris 2005, Bennet & Segerberg 2012, Gibson 2015) might bring radical changes to party organizations (Vergeer et al. 2011). While mediatized electoral campaigns used to require numerous highly paid professionals and centralized and professionalized party structures, the emphasis now lies more on capable individual actors. The use of social media

enables participation based on the individual interests of citizens and allows people to participate in novel ways other than completing campaign tasks laid out by the central party organization.

1.3 CRISIS IN THE STATUS QUO

Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2006) define a crisis as a situation in which the status quo has been challenged and things cannot continue as they are, without some kind of solution to the conflict that is present. For them and the pragmatist sociology they represent, this solution comes through justification and tests. Normalcy can be restored by deploying justifications and discussing. Other events that might happen in these situations include stronger breaches, revolutions, and protests.

Participatory politics, the political use of social media, and forms of deliberative democracy bring these kinds of crises to people's everyday lives. In their mundane form, these crises can usually be thought of as invitations to engage. An endless meeting (Polletta 2004) in which the future of an area is decided or a resident's knowledge about an impending change in the area creates a situation that must be resolved before the status quo can be restored.

Then again, the participatory processes I present in this work are also deeply related to actual crises happening in the lives of random, ordinary people. When the planning apparatus fixes its gaze on an area, the status quo is disrupted. Not all proposed plans become reality, but until the issues are resolved, a constant uncertainty hovers over people's everyday environments. (Not all, or even most, planning changes are *bad* for the area; however, they certainly are often felt that way and do change things.) In this sense, elections are also a kind of crisis: The governmental system cannot continue and normalcy cannot be restored until elections are held and Sami Borg⁵ calls the results.

To understand individuals doing politics, we need to look at the creativity of action, the collective structures, the social movements and how individuals interact with them, and the repertoires that are used in political processes to deliberate and to justify things. We need to look at the situations in which politics is done and to consider how the interactions and contexts of these situations define political action. These are the subjects of the next chapter.

⁵ Sami Borg is a political scientist and the director of the FSD. For years, he has acted as the official commentator on the main news feed of the general elections from the Finnish Broadcasting Company, announcing the results when they seem clear.

2 CREATIVE POLITICAL ACTION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN SITUATIONS

In this chapter, I outline a framework of thinking about the political action of the individual in sociological terms. In the process, I engage with pragmatist ideas of situated creativity (Joas 1996) – that in real-life situations, people have critical capacity (Boltanski 2011, Boltanski & Thévenot 1999) to engage critically with the world, and denounce inequalities based on varied criteria.

After that is sorted out, I'll move to a reading of works dealing with political culture – on the defining aspects of the situations where individual political action happens – and social movements, which compose a set of tools, frames, and identities individuals can use, alone and together. In the last section, I look at how interactions in situations can be used in sociological analysis of participation and politics.

The overall strategy follows Heiskala (2000): starting from actor-centric theory, and broadening the focus by using different ideas of habits and habituation to understand how culture works influences these actors, and how even the creative action of these actors is constrained by cultural formations.

This approach is taken in order to construct a rough framework, which allows us to take individuals as the locus of attention, but not to forget the social nature of human life and politics⁶.

2.1 THE CREATIVE SITUATION – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY

Boltanski and Thévenot (2006[1991], also Thévenot 2015, and Boltanski 2011) repeatedly speak of *crisis* as a moment when ordinary action cannot continue anymore, when something needs to be done to resolve a conflict without resorting to violence. To allow for continuation, both in terms of action and in terms of peaceful social order, they outline a set of justifications, which operate on a higher level of abstraction.

But in order to understand the critical situation, and the potential to critical action (Boltanski 2011), we need to look at the moment of crisis a bit more closely. This crisis can be seen as a special case of situation, as used by pragmatists (Joas 1996, Dewey 2006[1927], Kilpinen 2009). A situation is when

⁶ In this work, I read the importance of the actor in political space through the dual-action lenses of pragmatist and cultural sociology. Rinne (2008, 2011) makes similar arguments about the importance of the situation and the actor in understanding politics, but builds his argumentation from phenomenology.

action happens, when actors can follow known paths, or adopt creative strategies of action. This leads Joas to classify pragmatism as a theory of situated creative action (1996, 132). Boltanski and Thévenot write from the pragmatist perspective. Their emphasis on creativity shows when compared to Bourdieu (Boltanski 2011), which was their initial point of divergence: rather than following clear paths of action from habitus or class position, actors have a critical capacity of their own. The terminology adopted by Boltanski and Thévenot lays emphasis on the urgency of the situation – a crisis is not a normal situation, but a conflict, a meeting of opposing forces of some kind. (But see Dalton 2004, for a different look on Bourdieu and Joas.)

A crisis, in the empirical material of this work, could be an impending change in the urban plans of the area, an attempt to build a new part of the city on the shores of Meri-Rastila – or it could be a presidential election, always approaching at their pre-destined timetable. But it can also be a simple question of whether to like a post on Facebook, which at the same time is made by actor's good friend, but contains political content she is unsure about.

In order to have a broader understanding of political action, we also need a broader and perhaps more nuanced understanding of these situations. Terming a situation *crisis* puts emphasis on the *reactive* nature of conflict-resolution and thus justification – it is something employed only when necessary, in order to avoid the collapse of social fabric (Thévenot 2011, Boltanski 2011. This is also notable in *New Spirit of Capitalism* by Boltanski and Chiapello, where changes in the economic order create a need for new ideological justification).

Political action, as an illuminating case among all action, can of course be *proactive* as well as *reactive*. New political projects are formed, new social movements are created, and new topics are politicized – in the meaning of being rendered as playable (Luhtakallio 2012, Palonen 2003). Thus, to understand politics and political action, we need to have concepts for these openings.

There is one great advantage in using the metaphor of crisis: it is something distinct from the everyday stream of events. In times of crisis, habitual action cannot be followed (Kilpinen 2009, Dewey 2006[1927])⁷. So what lies between the generality of *situation* and the specificity of *crisis*? One way to proceed would be to think of *opportunities* in the same manner as crises. If crisis is a negatively connoted situation, a meeting of opposing forces which requires active work if social order and the continuation of the situation are to

⁷ There is a potential for a mix-up here: in a general level sociological theory of action, one can always assume mind-states of the actor, or some other *inner* factor to cause the crisis of action in absence of changes in outer world. When speaking specifically about political action, the focus is more on the relation between the actor and the world.

be preserved, an *opportunity* could be a positively connoted situation, where new formulations, new identities, new collectives, and new justifications (or new combinations of old ones) can be developed or deployed, in order to bring some change in the world. An opportunity is a situation where new things can be made playable – where the non-reflexive “old way of working” *could* go on, but where it would seem that the actors can gain more by doing something else.

The use of the concept of opportunity here is inspired by the social movements school of thought that emphasises political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1998), and the idea that changes in economic or political or actor-state relations can make social movements successful or seriously hinder their possibilities in changing the world. These opportunities do not need to be economic in nature, or do not need to come because of structural changes.

The on-going stream of events is of course not neatly divided into situations, crises and opportunities. They are used as an analytical tool, to understand the possibility of a proactive critical or creative action⁸. Thus, trying to posit a too rigorous idea of when there is an opportunity would be outside the scope of this work – but certainly we can see empirical experiences of such cases. We can think of, for example, the political situation that led the Green party to abandon the previously dominant strategy of participating in presidential elections in order to boost general political themes, and adopting a strategy of actively seeking presidency in the 2012 elections (as described in article II.) Part of the reasoning behind this strategic change was related to the perceived weakness of the Social Democrat candidate, Paavo Lipponen, who, despite his legendary status in Finnish domestic politics, was widely seen as a face-saving “dignified loser” candidate for the party.

The problems arising from analytical divisions such as between crises and opportunities can perhaps be circumvented by referring to how actors themselves frame, or attribute these situations. Goffman (1974, 10-11), in line with the phenomenological roots of his sociology, was interested in how actors understand situations “in accordance with principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them.” Researching these understandings of the situations was what he originally called Frame Analysis – where the frame was a concept employed to understand the classifications of situations. We could think about the *crisis* as an *objective* situation, where something needs to be done in order for the social reality to continue existing as it is, and *opportunity* as a framing given to a situation where new political acts are possible by the actor. A similar de-

⁸ The idea did not work out too well for the scholars of opportunity structures– they found out that it was pretty hard to clearly tell, whether opportunities for social movements are more bountiful when the political situation gets more dire or more oppressive, or when it gets more liberating and more permissive. See Edwards 2014, 83-87.

velopment was made by McAdams, Tarrow & Tilly (2001:43-46): they proposed moving from the idea of objective opportunities and threats to the attribution and processes through which movement actors frame situations as such.

To continue from an earlier example, it is by no means self-evident that a former heavy-weight politician such as Lipponen would be a weak candidate – rather, that is only one of the possible framings or attributions of the situation. It was believed that he would be unable to gather a large coalition from different factions of Social democrat–Greens–Left-wing voters, but that was confirmed only after the Haavisto campaign. In a similar way, a resident who actively aims at shaping the city surrounding her can see an opportunity, when urban planning fixes its gaze on an area. The residents of Etelä-Haaga used the impending changes in the area to argue for the importance of fixing worn-down structures.

Regardless of whether actors interpret situations as crises or opportunities, their responses usually contain an element of habitual action. For Boltanski and Thévenot, and in the types of responses they describe, these habits come in the form of a limited available number of critiques (or justifications) (See Dalton 2004 for a stricter analysis of the relation of habits, habitus and creativity). Dalton (2004, 604) also emphasizes the need to see that all action includes simultaneously habitual and creative elements: “Creativity (...) emerges from the nature of routine activity itself”, which “can never be specified with absolute precision and demands ‘interpretation’ or ‘performance’ in the concrete realization of action” (620).

So adapting Joas (1996: 132-133): in situations that are framed by the actor as crises and opportunities, the actor constitutes the situations and creates new modes of action, affected by habits and other path-dependencies, using the resources available to her in the context of the situation at hand. The action is creative (the tools are always used in a contextual way, the situation is classified as an opportunity or crisis by the actor, new modes of action can be invented) but also habitual (things are not always new, but usually follow paths laid by the actors’ previous experiences).

In the next three sections, I look at political culture as a context and source for repertoires of action to be used creatively in these situations, resources available for actors, and lastly, the micro-level interactions and social interpretations as determinants of these situations.

2.2 POLITICAL CULTURE PROVIDING REPERTOIRES FOR ACTION

What is the context for all the political action? What are the habits and institutionalizations, in the context of political action, and how should we think about them? In this sub-section, I look at how creative action of political actors is contextualized, made possible and constrained by political culture.

In the following I am following Lichterman & Cefai (2006), who define political culture(s) as “sets of symbols and meanings or styles of action that organize political claims-making and opinion-forming, by individuals or collectivities. (...) culture structures the way actors create their strategies, perceive their field of action, and define their identities and solidarities“. As was covered in the previous section, culture both works as a creative resource, something to be used strategically, but also creates dependencies. So here habit is used to sneak in structure to guide and empower the actor (Heiskala 2000).

In this (and the next) sub-section, I present several theories that have tried to explain how existing and (somewhat) established social movements work in relation to cultural and physical repertoires, in what kinds of contexts they work, and how they go on changing the world. The social movement studies I refer to in this section are presented in order to complement the picture of the creativity of action, bound by habits. Following Lichterman and Cefai (ibid.) we can ask, how should we think of repertoires, strategies, and identities, when thinking from the perspective of individual actors doing politics?

Swidler (1986) argues that existing culture, defined as shared symbolical constructs, gives actors a toolbox of possible actions, with which to operate in the culture. It is important to note that this toolbox does not contain only discursive strategies, but also repertoires of action, political resources and connections between actors that are available in given situation. All these constitute the supply of political action repertoires and argumentation for the actors. Swidler divides life into two different modes: settled periods, where these cultural toolboxes can perhaps be a stagnating force, and unsettled periods (see: crisis), when ideologies are formed, and when (rather) stable ideologies act as the driving generator.

Developing this idea further, Luhtakallio (2012, 12) uses comparison to stress the importance of context for the toolbox: not all tools are the same, even if they look the same. She also stresses reflexivity – the metaphor of repertoire or toolkit easily lends itself to thinking that this repertoire is somewhat static and that the process of choosing a tool is straightforward and does not affect the actor. This is not the case: tools are *reflexive* in a way that is not possible for a hammer. While Swidler speaks of strategies, Luhtakallio links these to the pragmatic notion of habits – which are always collectively negotiated, interaction-based and procedural.

These habits, in turn, form the cornerstone of Ylä-Anttila’s (2010a, 290) first steps in building a pragmatist theory of social movements. Decisions made by actors are not always optimal, but rather follow habitual paths. Ylä-Anttila defines political culture as a “historically formed whole, composed of the shared habits of making politics, interpretations made of them, and from those stabilizing and longevity-bringing institutional arrangements that are built on the basis of these habits“. This is a stricter pragmatist-anchored formulation of what Swidler alluded to, when she wrote of how in the period of

settled lives, political culture constrains political action and directs it to the existing strategies (1986).

Within social movement studies, the ideas of cultural repertoires, and of repertoires of collective action, are well developed (Tilly 1979, 8-9): “...particular times, places and populations have their own repertoires of collective action... [it] significantly constrains the strategy and tactics of collective actors.” (8-9). Tilly also makes an important distinction: these repertoires are comparable to repertoires of “jazz or commedia dell’arte rather than that of the opera or Shakespearian drama” – they are always available for mutation, improvisation and developments, despite their restrictive nature (see also Edwards, 2014:229; Williams, 1995: 126)

Following Boltanski and Thévenot, for the residents of Helsinki, these repertoires appear as an understanding of the possible moral formulations that can be employed when denouncing plans to build and change their neighbourhoods. The justifications, or formulations of common good, are recognized by the actors and employed when sending the dispute letters to the city planning authority. For Youtube user TheIsojunno, a music producer, it meant participating in the Haavisto presidential campaign by creating mashups of Haavisto’s speeches and some dubstep beats – using the repertoires of electronic dance music and political Youtube mashup videos to express political statements.

Where Swidler discusses unsettled lives – revolutions and ruptures – she investigates the role of more solidly-formed ideologies. I think we can better understand political action in all times by following the ideas of *situations, crises and opportunities* presented in Chapter 2.1. It is precisely in the cases of unsettled lives that “culture” assumes super-generative, tool-box like qualities, where actors can creatively use the cultural tools to challenge existing structures, when situations can be seen as opportunities. And also, the moment of crisis Boltanski and Thévenot are writing about, the rupture when status quo cannot be held up, is when creativity flourishes and when tools are used to great advantage.

Ylä-Anttila (2010a, 297-298) focuses on explaining how action is habitualized and institutionalized into structures, rather than explaining how actors go on using these structures creatively. It explains how the formations of the terrain of the political culture are formed⁹.

Ylä-Anttila also suggests the direction taken next in this chapter: frames, opportunity structures, organizational techniques and resources could be seen as similar elements that actors use to construct their political action. And yet, despite praising the virtues of an understanding of political culture based on

⁹ Since we are mostly dealing with cultural formation, most of these institutions exist mostly as signs or collections of signs. For the institutionalization process of signs, see Heiskala 2000, 2014.

the pragmatist conception of action, Ylä-Anttila is strongest when he explains how *collective structures can emerge*, not explaining the creative action taken by the actors – even though these structures are reflexive and always created through action.

In the cited writings about political culture, the actors are often assumed, at least implicitly, to be connected to social movement organizations or some other groups. To understand how individuals engage reflexively with elements of culture, but are constrained (or guided by habits), we need a bigger toolbox: a framework with which to understand how resources, and cultural tools work together, and how cultural context can be used as a resource.

2.3 CULTURAL AND TANGIBLE RESOURCES

The social movement framing literature (the seminal text is Snow et al, 1986; for a review and reflection by the same authors 15 years later, see Benford & Snow 2000; for analysis of relation to Goffman's framing, see next subsection, for a critique, see Benford 1997) offers one understanding of these resources. Frames are cultural resources par excellence: ways of presenting issues in a way that makes them relatable, or in a way that helps them have a bigger impact. Framing is usually seen as strategic action, as a way of presenting your message in a way that resonates with the intended recipients.

The Justification theory (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006[1991]) provides a different understanding of cultural resources: *scales of evaluation* (Lamont 2012) for arguments based on the common good, and a vocabulary for handling the distinction between the common good, private interests and intimate, familiar attachments (Thévenot 2011, Thévenot 2015, Chapter 3 of this work). When solving conflicts and doing politics, individuals often choose from an ultimately limited pool of models of criticism that have been made available to them, historically (Silber 2003, see also Lamont & Thévenot 2000 for the idea of justifications and market references as cultural repertoires with differences in national concentrations).

While there are similarities between justifications and frames, they are by no means the same thing. Frames do not need to be *about* the common good – even though the abstract frame of *injustice* or *justice*, recognized as a dominant way social movements frame conflicts (Benford & Snow 2002), is obviously closely related to same ideas of plurality of justifications – or, for that matter, about private interests either. Perhaps it is best to think of it as a selection of perspective. When one thinks about justifications, one thinks of solving conflicts and defining the relative merits of different solutions (or worth of participants) through the use of tests. Framing (as defined by Benford & Snow) is a strategic process, where issues are presented in a chosen way to further an actor's own agenda: what are the related actors, which historical conflicts are linked to the conflict at hand, which politicians are de-

nounced in the process. Framing in social movement organizations often involves the use of an injustice frame – which in turn can be analysed by using the justification theory. So frames definitely can *use* justifications, but it would make no sense to treat them as the same thing.

For example, residents acting against new developments in Rastila can frame the issue in a way that connects the situation either with other parts of Eastern Helsinki – or frame the situation as an environmental conflict. If one thinks of the Goffman's perpetual questions, *what is happening here*, one could also say that framing, on a broad level, happens before justification. Once the Rastila land-use dispute is framed as a dispute in Eastern Helsinki, one can deploy multiple justifications – from technical traffic modelling to a civic perspective of treating Eastern Helsinki on par with other parts of the city – to fortify the argumentation.

Collective identities can also be seen as part of the cultural resources described here. They are constructed, and for social movements, constructing them is one valid line of action (Edwards 2014, 142-144, Polletta & Jasper 2001). But they are not a *necessary* condition for action, when action presents itself as an opportunity that seeks the individual, rather than the other way around.

One can also think of the whole semiosis, or at least the locally available parts of it, as being part of these cultural resources (Heiskala 2000). Floating signifiers (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) offer one glimpse to the world of signs: populist movements use signifiers (the visible part of the sign; that which references something) that are emptied of their original meaning and can be constructed as populist symbols (but see also Ylä-Anttila 2016: not all populist signifiers float – often appropriation could be a better word for the process).

Frames, justifications, symbols, and collective identities are different ways of understanding cultural repertoires as shared resources. Resource mobilization theory (RMT, see McCarthy & Zald 2002 for a thorough review of the original formulations and more recent development) gives us tools to think about material resources, focusing on the tangible and monetary resources and labour as used by social movements. Social movement organizations are, in many ways, not different from other human projects: they require meetings, meeting spaces, media attention – and when projects grow more ambitious and professional, workers, managers, brand consultants, communications infrastructure, logistics; everything a corporation or an industry might need, despite completely different motives and agenda-settings. Even though many other writers contributed to the discussion, the resource typologies have not been thoroughly developed – and it seems that the link between cultural repertoires and resources has not been made (McCarthy & Zald, 2002).

The main benefit of thinking in terms of resource mobilization theory is to emphasize the calculative nature of the political process, and the rationality

of the actors. While cultural resources are different from physical resources, calculations and strategic choices also happen when choosing between these repertoires. This is of course one of the key insights from the framing discussions (Snow et al. 1986, Benford & Snow 2000) – that framings can be strategically selected. And it is also fruitful to emphasise the banally material nature of protests or political action: the level of monetary resources available has been shown to have a clear effect on the level of protests (McCarthy & Zald 2002). A great deal of effort in the Haavisto campaign went to ensuring that even the minimal level of resources were available for the campaign: fundraising through micro-donations was crucial for the success of the campaign. Even if the accountant of the party is not himself doing politics, the actors who actually do the doing would pretty soon run wither out of cash or into serious problems without the function.

What I suggest is treating the different conceptualizations of cultural repertoires presented earlier as complementary with the RMT idea of structural resources.

In the situation interpreted as crisis or opportunity, an actor constructs her line of action creatively by using the cultural repertoires and structural resources available for her in the context, while also being constrained by the habits and institutionalizations.

These resources can be tangible (money, cars, buildings), explicitly cultural (frames, justifications, repertoires of action, collective symbols), linguistic (signs, slogans), organizational (available forms of organization and technologies of organizing) and identity-related (available collective identities), legal (available “legal technologies”), relational (personal networks), performative (interaction situation and how its rules are maintained or broken) etc.¹⁰

Established social movement organizations, such as parties or “global brand” NGOs, can be understood to function as pre-curated collections of these resources. While these organizations try new strategies and new issues, intra-organizational path-dependencies often lead them to follow known paths, even if the territory itself transmutes into something quite non-familiar, even if suddenly the peaceful valley is engulfed by an unfamiliar jungle. These social movement organizations offer actors a readymade all-inclusive smorgasbord of political action: ideologies, social networks, tested and trusted frames etc. Habitus and existing social structures, class positions and personal networks can also have a similar effect. They offer habits of life, or maybe even a collection of habits of the heart (Bellah et al 1996). They offer a readymade set of institutions and ways of relating to these institutions.

¹⁰ These lists are never exhaustive.

Habitus, class position and position within existing social circles are both generative and constraining: for an investment banker, it is easier to buy influence in elections, but socially harder to start evangelizing the advantages of anarcho-syndicalist society – which for a student of sociology would seem like a more normal idea (See Williams 1995.)

So actors are constructing their strategy or course of action from existing elements. The political culture, as a context for this act of construction, is the *generally available collection of resources and repertoires*. The next sub-section discusses how these resources are employed: how people act within a political culture, and how interaction and its rituals affect this action.

2.4 FRAMES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE

The first sub-section of this chapter was about how we should conceptualize the situation, in how it creates crises and opportunities for political action. In sociology, both generally and for this thesis specifically, the works of Erving Goffman on every-day interaction situations, and how they are understood, must be noted.

The concepts of Goffman, with the emphasis on roles assumed temporarily, situational effects, and inter-personal co-ordination, allow sociologists to build sensitive and multifaceted frameworks and understandings of diverse situations, and to move from abstract to concrete interaction situations. This view of interaction and the organization of reality has been used by many influential writers in social movement studies. They have been working both on the mediated communications of social movements, and about how these movements work on the everyday-interaction level. For Goffman, interaction situations are always tricky, contain the possibility of losing face, and rely on the shared interpretation of the laws of the situation to be completed without breaches (Goffman 1967[1955]).

Goffman, in his analysis, is not concerned with the directly political (or, one could argue, even directly societal) construction of reality: “I am not addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their social lives” (Goffman 1974, 13). But, naturally, the experience changes behaviour, and the macro level structures become meaningful only through this experience. Goffman proposed that we always, in a given situation, ask “what is going on here”, and that our answer to this question determines, how we react and what part of ourselves we put forward. Frame analysis was the “slogan” Goffman himself gave to the “examination in these terms of the organization of experience” (Goffman 1974, 8, 10-11). Or as Ian Hacking put it, Goffman leads us to ask “how people are made up day by day, within an existing institutional and cultural structure” (2014, 299).

Frame analysis then became one of the dominant methods and frameworks used in social movements research literature, and also in broader cultural

sociology (Snow et al 1986, Benford & Snow 2000, Gamson 1985). It is notable that Goffman, the perpetual jester of sociology, was always interested in cases where frames, or principles of organizing reality, are misleading, are interpreted wrongly, or any way lead to a hilarious breakdown (or at least slight reassessment) of the situation. Framing, in social movements literature, however, is serious business: frames are strategically chosen, master frames are developed, injustices are presented. All in a form that facilitates communication. Micro-mobilizations happen through the expansion, amplification and transformation of these frames (even Benford himself calls framing a “cliché” in social movement studies, see 1997, 415).

Thus, in the use of the social movement framing literature, framing and the analysis of the structure of the individuals’ experience, is taken to the abstract level. Framing is no longer something that happens almost subconsciously, an assessment necessary to functioning in every situation, but something that is deliberately crafted by message senders. It is transformed into strategic action.

To give an example, think of the last time you (or someone you know) browsed the Facebook newsfeed. When you came across a particularly engaging political link, did you form a strategic SWOT analysis of the merits and demerits of liking the said content, or did you just instinctively click the blue thumbs-up button?

We can separate between two different ways of thinking about politics and social movements in Goffmanian terms. The first is the earlier presented method of taking the fundamental idea of interpretation and rituals in social situations, and directing it towards thinking about strategic action. I call this the *strategic framing* perspective. Here, the idea of research is to point the “camera” in the same direction as Goffman would, to the rules of the situation and the individuals’ understanding of these rules, but to be interested in completely different phenomena than Goffman was: the strategic ways of forcing your interpretations of the situation to others (see Gamson, 1985).

The second way is to follow the breaches and transgressions and rituals of these social situations and their rules that Goffman described, and seek to give, as it were, political interpretations to these breaches, and to find situations where they are politically motivated. I call this the *political interactions* perspective¹¹.

¹¹ These perspectives can perhaps be thought about with what Reed (2013) terms the *discursive* and *performative* dimensions of power. The strategic framing perspective could be seen as an attempt to use discursive power, to use “symbolizations and linguistic conventions, and meaningful models of and for the world” to “control the actions of others, or to obtain new capacities.” Political interactions, in contrast, are performative power: researching them can tell us “how situated action and interaction exerts control over actors and their future actions” (Reed 2013, 203).

Luhtakallio (2013) uses frame analysis to construct sociological methods for interpreting social movement related images in the political interaction perspective. The central question of Frame Analysis is always “what is happening here” – for Goffman, “here” denotes a physical interaction situation, and “happening” refers to the flow of actions and changing circumstances. In analysing images, these same questions can be asked: what seems to be happening in this image? And are there reasons to doubt the first interpretation? Luhtakallio’s comparative work shows that the political culture affects how gender is represented and how activist media produce images in France and Finland. She analyses the images produced by activists not through master-frames and strategically communicated injustices, but rather by using frame analysis as an analytical strategy to make sense of the situation.

For Lichterman & Eliasoph (2014), the important Goffmanian concept is the scene-style – a set of action-patterns that are related to a recurring and identifiable set of circumstances, a scene. They use these different scenes to separate between what they term civic action and non-civic action: situations where people are deliberately and sustainably trying to do something good for the society, in contrast to “normal” or other situations. This separation is used to move beyond thinking about some groups as civic groups (which would imply that everything they do is civic), and every other group as non-civic (which would imply that only civic actors do civic things).

Political interaction is at the heart of their analysis: young people, who participate in co-ordinated action with elements of both “genuine” social movement-type civic goals and goals of social work and empowerment, are able to distinguish between these two goals on a situational basis. They interpret the reality in the situations and tune their behaviour accordingly. And when breaches happen, such as when a youth group thought that they were receiving a prize for the civic action they had done, but instead are given resources because they are “in need” or “at risk”, they carry significant weight for the individuals (Lichterman & Eliasoph 2014, Eliasoph 2011). In similar manner, Edwards (2014, 214-223) terms individualized intentional breaches of situational norms by those of lesser social and political status *misbehaviour* – when the structure denies more direct forms of rebellion, the social situation might be the weakest link.

In article III, which is very much about *political interaction*, we use Goffman’s earlier work on Face-work (1967), on deliberate attempts at maintaining a positive self-image, as well as other participant’s positive appraisal of you in a situation, to understand the dynamics of Facebook like button. This usage naturally means we have to think situation in the terms of virtual situation, which might not be as immediate as a physical situation, and that we have to stretch the notion of Face, since it can no longer be tied to the immediate physical situation.

For Goffman, face-work is something that happens through the most minute of gestures – raised eyebrows, shifting weight from one foot to another, sideway glances all convey much information. So for us, Face-work is a tool to understand nano-political action: Facebook Like button (or the new-fangled emojis: haha, wow) is the online equivalent of these minute actions. Whereas undeniably way less subtle than the latter, they constitute an important corpus of face-work taking place in contemporary online sociability

These nano-politics, and social media in general, blur the distinction between micro-level interaction and public-level media. In the age of the newspaper, a message spread through the reading public just because an editor decided it should spread. In the age of social media, the process of spreading and the nature of the media make it dependent of these micro-level interactions. Some of the behaviour on nano-level is strategic, on the level of strategic framing, but we assume that, with billions of likes sent every day, much of it happens on the level of political interaction.

3 JUSTIFICATION THEORY AND THE GRAMMARS OF COMMONALITY

In the previous chapter, one of the elements of the creativity of the individual was the ability use cultural repertoires in conflict-resolving. This chapter is dedicated to one of the possible conceptualizations of such repertoires. In this chapter, we look at how claims are justified, conflicts are resolved, and the construction of the common good is situationally understood. *On Justification* (2006[1991]) by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, with its numerous further developments, have given us tools to approach these questions¹².

In what follows, I present the justification theory and pragmatic sociology with their major developments. I focus specifically on the elements that are applicable to discussions on the public sphere. This move from philosophical and anthropological level to the political sociology in the public has been characteristic of what could be called the HEPO¹³ operationalization of the justification theory – using the complex theory mainly as a description of culturally available repertoire of justifying claimsmaking (See eg. Luhtakallio, 2012, Ylä-Anttila 2010b, Ylä-Anttila 2016, Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio 2016, Lehtimäki 2016, Gladarev & Lonkila 2013, Lonkila 2011, Lehtonen & Lonkila 2008, Ylä-Anttila & Kukkonen 2015, Articles I and IV in this work.)

3.1 ON ON JUSTIFICATION

As noted in Section 2.1, human beings have a critical capacity – a capacity to justify their positions, to challenge existing structures and situations (Boltanski 2011, Boltanski & Thevenot 2006, 1999). If this capacity was *completely* creative, flexible, and free, arguments would often be complete gibberish, and compromise between these would be all but impossible – this would also make sustaining a common society (even with all the possible reservations) impossible¹⁴. As noted in Chapter 2.2, justifications are one part of this

¹² This chapter is a direct result of the efforts of Politics After Modernity reading group. This text only reflects the interpretations of the author – which certainly are not all shared by the other members. This is the sweetness of social theory.

¹³ Helsinki Research Group of Political Sociology, www.politicalsociology.org

¹⁴ Boltanski, and especially Thévenot in his later works, are building a picture of a *pluralistic*, not an *atomistic* society – and this difference is related to having a discreet but large number of possible justifications. I thank Tuukka Ylä-Anttila for this observation.

shared set of cultural repertoires. This means that they have to be recognizable by others, otherwise communicating¹⁵ with them would be impossible.

Justification theory is actor-centric, rather than structural, in the pragmatist vein – with cultural repertoires at individuals' disposal (see Chapter 2.1 in this work). These repertoires are dynamic and local, but not random, or always easily changeable. They are institutionalized habits (Gronow 2008, Kilpinen 2009, Heiskala 2000).

Through analysis of modern-day texts and manuals, ethnographic research, and excursions through western moral history¹⁶ Boltanski and Thévenot found six orders of worth – six definitions of the common good that can be referenced in support of a position in a conflict situation (2006, 1999). Using a different conceptualization, these can be described as repertoires of evaluation: each order of worth forms a scale, with which things, people and arrangements can be evaluated based on a shared principle (See Lamont 2012, Lamont & Thévenot 2000). These repertoires can then, in political argumentation, be delivered to support given positions.

The model of an order of worth, presented in *On Justification*, includes more than just the common good, or principle of evaluation. Individuals, as well as non-human things and arrangements, can be ordered according to a set principles of the common good. These orderings are always temporary; they change according to situations and according to the arrangement of material objects in these situations. This ordering is what allows us to resolve conflicts – since the basis of the ordering is supposed to be shared and generally understood, all parties of the conflict can, once the ordering is decided upon, agree on it as the basis of the compromise or solution.

The idea of temporality (or situationality) is introduced to keep the basis in common humanity clear: even if an actor is once worthy – right in the question, uses her environment to win a test to qualify her opinions – she cannot claim always to be in that position. This also allows for situational creativity and critique – a person, who is “worthy” in one context (father, when deciding the marching order of the children on a field trip), might not be worthy in all situations (politics, car crashes, building of a nuclear power plant), and even if he is, it is not because he is a father (Boltanski 2011: xi, *On Justification*: 65-79). This shift to situational qualifications and the critical capacity of individuals, and to focusing on actors instead of structures was originally intended as a move against the project of Bourdieu – against the idea of rela-

¹⁵ Both in the sense normally meant, and in the specific way Thévenot uses it in 2011, 2015: making things common.

¹⁶ With authors such as St. Augustine, Saint Simon, Bousset, Rousseau, Hobbes, Adam Smith. This moral-philosophical background is only one facet of the work, and shall not be further discussed here – except for the case of Rousseau and the relation between general will and the common good.

tively stable habitus and entrenched class positions or fields (Boltanski 2011, Boltanski and Thévenot 1999).

There exists a limited repertoire of principles of common goods, which can be referenced in a situation, crisis or opportunity, when status quo cannot or will not continue as it is. Disputes between these common goods can be resolved either by forcing compromises between them, or by using tests. To test is to use the definition of the common good as a tool for evaluation: which of the proposed ideas or plans actually delivers what it promises? This is what separates justifications from being “mere” frames or discourses in the sense of social movement framing (Benford & Snow 2000) – they are not only about words, but can always be challenged and tested with real-world physical objects.

In land-use disputes, these definitions of common good, or orders of worth, are used to criticize the proposed changes in urban environments. The construction of the claims and the argumentation supporting them often relies on the material urban environment – local area is mobilized as part of the argumentation.

Next, I shall present these principles of valuation, or *orders of worths*,¹⁷ using examples from the data used in Articles I and IV: said arguments against changes in the urban landscape in two parts of Helsinki, Haaga and Rastila. In Haaga, new housing is being built to complement an existing urban area, and in Rastila, a beloved recreational green area is being considered for a place of a new urban development (for a more thorough explanation, see chapter 4.1). Each order is presented here with a test: how arguments on the rhetorical level might be resolved by referencing the physical (etc.) surrounding.

¹⁷ These presentations are most directly adapted from Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 2000, for it presents the formulations in their most understandable form. One reason for the impenetrableness of the concepts is that the original choices of terms was in some places rather poetic, and the original model presented much more complicated when compared to what is usually used in empirical operationalization and what is presented here.

1. The Domestic Order, where **tradition** and esteem are the modes of evaluation.

The area [of Haaga] has a rich history and tradition. It should be preserved as it is.

Here, the tradition and history of the area are seen as valuable as such. A *test* would be to see, which of the possible plans leaves the area suitably untouched. In the case of Rastila (presented in Article IV), the active residents decided that all the possible options contained too drastic changes for the survival of the traditional outlook, and rejected them. Another way of testing this claim would be to see, whether the area of Haaga actually qualifies as a historically preserved neighbourhood, and if it does, in which sense?

2. Civic order where **collective interest, equality and solidarity** are used as the modes of evaluation. The relevant test is that of solidary and egalitarian principles: is the plan just? Was the process correct? Did everyone have her legal change to participate in the discussion? Are all areas treated equally?

Haaga already has less green area than other parts of the city – it is not fair, if they are reduced even more.

In the civic order, since the evaluation is based on collective interest and solidarity, weight is given for arguments of justness and fairness on the collective level, not from the perspective of individual rights. (This distinction is explored in more detail later.) So a *test* would be to find out, which of the competing plans treats different parts of the city in an equal way, or to see whether the participation-process was done properly, whether information about the planning change was available for all residents, and whether the final decision was made by a democratically elected body.

3. Industrial Order is based on **efficiency**. Good is evaluated by what is efficient, measurable, and technically provable and reliable.

Our model shows that the streets here would be severely congested, if these new houses were built.

The industrial order of worth has been shown to be the one most commonly available in Finland – the biggest hammer in the toolbox (Luhtakallio 2012). A *test* could be a computer simulation of different traffic models, or the comparison between how many residents can use the new developments.

4. Green order is not included in *On Justification* (which is a clear omission), but it is described by Lafaye & Thévenot (1993). The mode of evaluation is based on the **environment**: things, which preserve nature, conserve biodiversity, or help it to flourish, are valuable.

The forest in question is a habitat for diverse groups of animals and plants, including foxes and birds. It should be left to grow.

In this order, a *test* is: what is sustainable? What is renewable? What helps biodiversity? Often in environmental conflicts, the central issue is not, whether the sustainable or environment-friendly outcomes are preferable, but how to define them. Thus, conflicts often happen inside the green order, and about qualifications inside sustainable solutions (Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 2000, Ylä-Anttila & Kukkonen 2015).

5. Fame Order, where things are evaluated based on their fame, renown and popularity among people. What is **famous**, well-liked or receives the most eyeballs, is good.

As we can read from the words of a famous psychologist N.N, we should have more recreational areas in the city.

Tests are constructed based on popularity, audience and recognition. As we can see in article III, the Facebook like is very much a creature of the Fame Order – all billions of status updates are easily rankable in order of popularity based on signals sent with the Like button.

6. Inspired order is constructed by valuing grace, **spirituality** and individual **creativity** – everything, where people work with passion, enthusiasm, and inspiration. Even though it is based on religious texts, the phenomena it describes are by no means only limited to religious concerns. Inspired evaluation happens in the realms of art, in creativity management, in science.

The forest gives us residents a change to regain mental strength and breathe among the bustle.

Tests are based on creativity, newness, but also holiness, deepness and on the level of commitment. In empirical research, this order has not usually been part of the Finnish toolbox used in public discussion, but was found in e.g., in the emphasis on creativity in Finnish yearly corporate earnings reporting (Malmelin 2011) – and in the data in Article IV, where discussion about the silhouette of Helsinki, especially when approached by the sea, takes a completely inspired turn: in the comment letters, the beautiful silhouette of Helsinki becomes the central device for evaluating planning.

7. Market Order, where evaluation is based on the **monetary** good, and functioning of the markets, on competitiveness. What makes money in market works, and is good.

The proposed planning changes would be detrimental to the economic well-being of the city.

This is the central evaluative principle of capitalism – what is seen as valuable by others is valuable, and things that are seen as more valuable, *are* more valuable. One of the projects Boltanski and Thévenot undertake in *On Justification* is to show that the market order, despite common assumptions, is very much a moral order indeed, dependent on the separation of things and

persons and so on (43-63). A *test* would be to see which of the competing plans cause the greatest rise in the apartment prices in the area.

* * *

The specific philosophical construction of these principles is, of course, both much more nuanced and much more poetic, than is possible to present here. In *On Justification* and in subsequent articles (most notably Boltanski and Thévenot 1999), the authors present an eloquent and thorough model where each of the orders of worth includes an exemplary idea of a “city” that functions as the referent, a principle of making differences between people in things, and a symbolic sacrifice that is required in order to fulfil the required degree of worths. This model is reproduced here only insofar as it is necessary in order to use these justifications empirically, in public or semi-public discussions: to understand them as cultural repertoires of evaluation available for actors doing politics.

In *On Justification*, the civic order of worth functions as a sort of meta-order or model: the civic generality is one where “all relations, if they are to be legitimate, must be made publicly known with the reference to the collective entities (...) that ground their general interests” (11)¹⁸. If the idea of common goods and orders of worths is dependent on the idea of general will, and represents argumentation about how that general will should manifest itself, its historical referent is in Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* (1762). All of the original six orders of worth base their model of common good on a seminal text in political philosophy, and for civic worth, that text is also *The Social Contract*. So the model of public justification is, as a whole, based on the idea of general will as a transcendent concept: not a sum of individuals wills, but a collective thing above those – the will of a sovereign (formerly monarch, recently state).

Next, I shall (shortly) present comparisons, critiques and further developments, before moving into regimes of engagements and grammars of commonality, which are Laurent Thévenot’s project of broadening the analytical framework to include differing ways of constructing both the argumentation, and thus also the community.

3.2 CRITIQUE AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE JUSTIFICATION THEORY

Boltanski and Thévenot focus on interactions between people and objects on the abstract and personal level – on theoretical texts and on interaction situations. Their focus isn’t on public justification. Actually, in their work, the concept of public hardly figures at all, even though all of it is understood to

¹⁸ For this (and many other) idea(s), I am grateful to Eeva Luhtakallio and Tuomas Ylä-Anttila. See also Ricœur, 2000.

happen within the context of a Habermas-style public sphere (Habermas 1991, Boltanski 2011, Lamont & Thévenot 2000 – also referenced in *On Justification*).

Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila (Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio 2016, Luhtakallio 2012, Ylä-Anttila 2010b) focused on analysing explicitly *public* justification, by operationalizing the theory as public justification analysis. They aim at providing a clearly-defined method of describing usage of the common good in media debates. They combine the political claims analysis, developed by Koopmans & Statham (1999) to analyse protest events and political claims presented in them, with the idea of justifications. A justification is the usage of the orders of worths to back a claim presented. The resulting method recognizes different usages of justifications (critique, compromise, claims-making) and different types of actors (NGOs, individual citizens, states) and makes a quantitative difference between critical and positive justification. This sort of justification analysis aims at building a quantifiable picture of a debate or an issue (see Ylä-Anttila & Kukkonen 2015). It tries to understand how political actors present their argumentation in a situationally relevant way.

One of the critiques of the justification theory (illustrated by Honneth, 2010) is that the genealogy of the orders of worth is dubious at best. Boltanski and Thévenot illustrate six different justifications, which they base on ethnographic data, political philosophy and different French workplace manuals. These six are perhaps as good a description of different possibilities as any, but there are bound to be some problems with their universal application. Within the theory, they are thought of as being universal and thus completely independent of the broader context of political culture – of the broader repertoire of cultural tools and symbols.

If justifications are mainly thought as different definitions of the common good, and if the fact that these are historically contingent and evolving concepts is acknowledged, we stand on firmer ground. They might seem the same all around the world, but their usage and construction is different (See Luhtakallio 2012, 12). It is not possible to produce a definitive and non-changing set of definitions for the common good – but this is not necessary either. These justifications are thought to be an evolving project: when Boltanski and Chiapello wrote the *New Spirit of Capitalism* (2005), they proposed that the order of the *project* could be in the process of formation – it has not always existed, but rather represents the changing moral framework of contemporary society (they also respond to the critique in page xxi, see also Wagner 1999).

Sorsa and Eskelinen (2011) criticize the Justification theory and public justification analysis specifically for not including differences between diverse moral philosophical orientations – deontic, utilitarian, and virtue-based ethics. This critique, while providing a possibility of a more detailed empirical

analysis of moral conflicts in the public, does not pose an existential challenge to the theory. Sorsa and Eskelinen are primarily concerned about conflicts and critiques *within* an order of worth, but look at it from the perspective of a moral conflict. Intra-order conflicts, according to *On Justification*, are resolved with tests, with using the material world to test the claims made. So it perhaps does not matter as much, whether differences between competing ideas stem from the difference between deontic and value-based ethics, if a test can be used to settle the conflict between these competing ideas.

Their other main critique of Sorsa & Eskelinen highlights the fact that justification analysis is not suitable for analysing all kinds of moral conflicts in the public sphere. Their example comes from the area of economic policy, and especially *There-is-no-alternative* politics: if some actors have strong enough status within a discursive field, they can use their position to suppress critical ideas and speakers. *On Justification* does indeed focus on certain kinds of moral discussion. The central idea of Boltanski and Thévenot is to present possibilities for civilized discussion – a discussion which can reach conclusions and which includes all the speakers. In their construction, eugenics is an illegitimate worth (despite having founding texts and a clear principle for evaluating the worths of individuals), because it does not treat all humans equally. Thus, discussions based on racist motives and arguments about the superiority of a race (or a religion) are left outside the framework. This operation has clear benefits, but also limits the possible targets for analysis – and brings in a normative streak into theory.

Boltanski and Thévenot were by no means the first to recognize importance of using different definitions of the common good and to place emphasis on the conflict over the definitions (see Plato, Aristotle). Waltzer's *Spheres of Justice* (1983), based on a similar idea of plurality in the instances of justice, is a work in moral philosophy, not sociology – but served as one of the inspirations for Boltanski and Thévenot, along with Rawls (*On Justification*, 14-15). The concept of assemblages and qualified non-human actors as part of the justifications, as well as the empirical focus, separate Boltanski and Thévenot from Waltzer (Ricoeur 2000, 86, see also Wagner 1999).

Williams (1995:129) comes closer, when he suggests that there exists a “repertoire of rhetorical constructions of public good”, which is “historically and culturally bounded”. For Williams, scholar of religion and religious social movements, there are three different models of how common goods are constructed: covenant, contract and stewardship. *The stewardship* model requires that humans are seen as mere stewards, and that the primary concern is that of how the nature is doing: “humans are not a privileged species, the good society will live in harmony with nature, not dominate it for its own purposes.” This is similar to Lafaye & Thévenot's green worth (1993). Williams' third model is presented in Chapter 3.4 – since it is directly linked to the way common good and general will are used in these theories.

For purposes of this discussion, the *Covenant* model is more interesting. It is built on the traditional US religious conception of a moral community – where moral authority always derives from God (130-131). This model is defined by its reliance on a transcendent authority, much like that of the inspired order in *On Justification*. In practice, the way Boltanski and Thévenot write about the inspired polity comes closer to a more general sort of inspiration, creativity, and vision than the pure religious moral authority posited by Williams. This might be because of differences in the public spheres of the US and France – the latter of which guards its secularity quite vigorously. In Finnish political discussions, inspiration-based arguments rarely if ever actually refer to religious practices or the authority of God. Williams brings the model of the covenant closer to the domestic order of worth, with God as the authoritarian father figure. According to Williams, the model has implications also outside purely religious settings or communities. In non-religious settings, similar ideas are manifested as *duties* – towards the polity or the state, or towards the grand figures of the communities or parties (for comparison, see the duty-based model of citizenship presented in the introduction, by Dalton 2008).

This is also one way of highlighting the habitualized and thus normative nature of the public sphere: in the Finnish urban planning tradition, this kind of referring to moral authority would be inconceivable. The covenant model of common good is not part of the cultural repertoire.

If justification theory has another important milestone on the level to *On Justification*, it is *The New Spirit of Capitalism* by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello. They present a macro level cultural look at how capitalism, and especially its “justification” have changed between the 1960s and 1990s. *New Spirit of Capitalism* uses much of the same concepts and ideas as *On Justification*, but has a surprisingly different take on them, in particular vis-à-vis the focus of analysis.

New spirit of capitalism is not intended as a pragmatist analysis on the justifications for diverse positions used by people in situations. Rather, it continues the Weberian project of searching for the *geist* of capitalism – the legitimacy of the collective of institutions and relations known as capitalism. For Boltanski and Chiapello, the term the *geist*, or one important part of it, is the justification. In their telling, capitalism always needs a moral system to provide legitimacy for it, and promising justice where capitalism naturally provides none. In a word, it needs justification. Thus, Boltanski and Chiapello use the same orders of worths that were used to settle critiques and conflicts on a micro level in *On Justification*, to explain and settle institutional level uncertainties of the whole modern human life. The power of the formulations given in *On Justification* is that they seem completely adaptable to this kind of macro level grand theorizing.

For earlier 20th century industrial capitalism, this justification came from stability – workers in industrial context could rely on rather stable careers, and rising standard of living. In *New Spirit of Capitalism*, Boltanski and Chiapello present the order of the *project* as the new spirit of capitalism. It is now 8th justification. The logic of belonging and ordering comes from projects (temporal assemblages of peoples and things with a stated purpose, always reconnecting, always worried about what the next project could be and could one be part of it) and the common goods used in evaluation are those of flexibility, adaptability and connectivity, in the spirit of Castells (1996).

This kind of justification actually can be seen in the empirical material used in this work. In Articles I and IV, some of the arguments for (and against) specific land uses are about flexibility and being open for future projects, and being able to direct flows of people better. It is also clear that the justification of project is the central guiding principle behind the electoral campaign of Pekka Haavisto described in Article II: an electoral campaign is conducted, not by stable party organisation but primarily by a loose collection of volunteers connecting on Facebook. The valuable campaigners were those with skills needed in the moment – but also those who could forge links between separate campaign groups (see also the logic of connective action, Bennet & Segerberg 2012).

3.3 THREE GRAMMARS OF COMMONALITY

After *On Justification*, Laurent Thévenot focused on recognizing different types of action, and how they relate to justifications, public discussion and political action. While *On Justification* is a forcible book, and includes the possibility of being an all-encompassing theoretical work (describing all the possible acts of valuation and disagreement possible), it clearly feels like some types of arguments and actions could be analysed more deeply using different vocabulary – to stay within the realm of common good would be to operate residual categories.

One of the most important pointers in this direction comes from the comparative work Laurent Thévenot did with Michèle Lamont (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, Thévenot & Lamont 2000), where clear differences in construction of the public good, and the importance and legitimacy of individuals and their preferences, were shown between the US and French polity (Moody & Thévenot 2000). The justification theory is focused on the different models of common goods, and all the justifications are, by definition, collective. Thus, references to the private interests of the actor, though numerous in empirical situations, cannot be easily incorporated in the justification analysis.

Thévenot's solution was to present three types of cognitive formats and ways of engaging with the material world, that are related to three general types of presenting arguments and solving conflicts called grammars. (For engage-

ments, see Thévenot 2001, 2007, and for the grammars, see Thévenot, 2011, 2014, 2015.)

On Justification presented the level of justifiable public action, where arguments, people, and arrangements are general, based on a higher common principle of evaluation, and rely on the concept of general will. In this type of action, or argumentation, there is no place for intimate arrangements, and special attention to loved ones. Thévenot proposed two other regimes of engagements that are below the level of abstraction of the presented regime of publicly justifiable action.

These regimes of engagements are regime of familiarity and regime of the planned action. Each of the three regimes is related to what Thévenot (2011, 2015) calls the grammar of commonality: set of functional rules about how claims are presented and evaluated, how can people voice their differences and grievances, but still be part of the same community, and how to separate legitimate claims from non-legitimate ones.

I shall first present these regimes, and then engage in a critical re-reading of the regime of the plan, and its related grammar of liberal individuals. This grammar of political participation has been previously undertheorized within the justification theory¹⁹. For Thévenot, the central question is, how are communities kept together, despite of differences between members (2015, 82). As with justifications, these grammars are here interpreted as cultural repertoires, with evaluation and valuation on central place.

In *On Justification*, all evaluation is based on abstract level common good. The idea of three different regimes opens the possibility of different criteria for evaluation. So, in addition to the cognitive formats and relation to the material environment, also the mode of evaluation plays a crucial role. It is notable, that the ideas underlying these three grammars exist in some form already in *On Justification*. The Market Worth includes notions that lean towards the liberal grammar, and the domestic worth is almost identical to what was here described as the grammar of close affinities: domestic mode of generality is described as being expressed in terms of trust and being based on “personal attachments to persons and things,” “established traditions and precedents” and within economic context being valorized by “specific experience acquired by staff members” (2006, 10). And as previously was shown, *On Justification* is written from the point of view of the civic order of worth.

¹⁹ Which is not to say that various branches of liberalism are undertheorized as such. This work is not the right forum for the constructive re-reading of the tradition of liberalism, which is why the concept is avoided as much as possible: when used sloppily, it definitely creates more problems than it solves. See Habermas 1996, Benhabib 1996 and Mouffe 1999 for liberalism in the context of deliberative democracy.

The regime of familiarity and the grammar of close affinities are on the “lowest” level, most intimate and most dependent on the personal. The central good is familiarity and feeling of ease, emotions are expressed and emotional attachment to people, objects, and places are cherished. We react more forcefully to threats against places that are dear to us. Lonkila (2011, also Gladarev & Lonkila 2013) has a fine depiction of St. Petersburg park activists that refer to particular trees as their brothers. They oppose cutting the trees, but not because of abstract principles of common good, but because the trees are really meaningful to them, because they are emotionally attached to these trees. And Ylä-Anttila (2016) shows how a cultural symbol with strong emotional resonance can, even in public discussions, be appropriated for populist political use. This political use gets its power precisely from the strong relation and familiarity.

The relation to objects is central in many ways (Thévenot 2001): one feels at ease in one’s home neighbourhood, when one almost intuitively knows where everything is, knows the opening times of shops, knows the people who one meets in the streets, has an emotional attachment to many of the objects surrounding daily rituals (trees, rocks, little nooks and crannies in the paths), and constructs personal arrangements (what side of the road is usually taken, which coffee shop one visits, where one jogs). Pleasure is derived from routines and uncontested habitual action.

When moving from the personal level towards the public, the regime becomes a *grammar of close affinities*, which is a delicate thing: how to communicate these private arrangements and personal attachments in a way that is meaningful to anyone besides the speaker? It is possible, but obviously the nature of the public sphere (Habermas 1991) severely limits these possibilities (see Ylä-Anttila 2016). Blok & Meilvang (2014) have used the level of familiar engagements to highlight the problems political actors are having in presenting knowledge created and relevant in the familiar format to the public discussion in the context of local land-use disputes.

The model of community implicit in the grammar of close affinities is somewhat closed and limited – it is based around the idea of intimate connections, and these are not forged easily. Thévenot (2015) alleviates this by highlighting the role of hospitality, of the possibility that stranger, if shown the sacred places of the community, can appreciate them and the bonds that make them meaningful, even if she does not share the connection herself.

The regime of planned action and the grammar of liberal individuals in the public is what could also be called “business as usual” – aspiring towards goals, choosing the means of reaching those goals, “projecting yourself in the future”. This is contrasted with the regime of publicly justifiable action, in which action is “oriented by the demands of public order” and “evaluation must be valid for a third party and characterized by generality and legitimacy” Thévenot 2007, 417). The regime of public justification is, thus, con-

structured as a *special case* of purposeful action – for all the action consists of demands made in the public must be purposeful, and depend on the idea of actionable plans (Thévenot himself does not explicitly define the relation between these two regimes of engagements in these terms).

This approach becomes problematic when moving from the cognitive formats to public (or semi-public) agreements or disagreements – when moving from cognition and relation to objects to arguments made in the public polity²⁰.

The grammar of individuals in the liberal public (see Thévenot 2011, 2014, and 2015), which is based on the regime of plan, clearly grasps something relevant about public goods and arguments: not all arguments build on the *expressed* or *explicit* idea of the common good. Some people are only worried about themselves and their monetary well-being, other people value deals and plurality of opinions more than agreement or even a possibility of a general will. This is shown in Articles I and IV in this work: many residents of the contested parts of the city are explicitly and solely concerned about their own properties and backyards – or that of their immediate communities.

This mode of making direct references to the individual interest of the actor is seen as *less general* and *less legitimate* than referencing the common goods, or justifications. This shows in Thévenot's own comparative work: in France, individuals and references to individual preferences were seen as illegitimate in public discussion, while they were sometimes even used as the backbone of argumentation in the US (Moody & Thévenot 2000, Thévenot & Lamont 2000)²¹.

But the same research (*ibid.*) also shows that this feature of legitimacy is not universal. In the US, it was seen as a completely ordinary way of presenting political claims. But even there, one can question, at what point a reference to the good of a small number of people turns from private interest to the common good (as is done in Moody & Thévenot 2000, Thévenot & Lamont 2000)? And in Article I in this work, residents of Helsinki routinely argue on the basis of their own interest, and even that of the neighbourhood, or small group. So we have to do something to the problems of legitimacy and gener-

²⁰ It is entirely possible that these problems *only* manifest themselves when we look at the public or semi-public level of politics, and do not present themselves in e.g. ethnographic research, or in other situations more directly linked to individuals in cognitive situations.

²¹ Regarding the all-encompassing nature of *On Justification*: of course all arguments possible *could* be interpreted as being somehow about the common good – voicing private interests could be seen as tacitly endorsing market worth, or only being a different mode of civic justification, or whatever. This, while possible, would completely move all the work done in *On Justification* into the realm of residual categories. I suggest that a more substantial interpretation of certain arguments can be arrived at by defining them in different terms, and that the categories presented in *On Justification* are better utilized if they are used only as references to the common good (in relation to the concept of general will.)

ality: how to construct legitimacy not based on common goods and general will? At the same time, we can attest the problem of the level of the collective actor: in public discussions, it is not only individuals who argue based on their private interests, but also collectives, and even more often, individuals who claim to represent a collective (see Eranti 2011, Chapter 7).

3.4 THE GRAMMAR OF INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS

How can comments not based on common goods be legitimate? To answer that question, we must also engage with the questions of commonality and generalizability: the grammar of liberal individuals (as presented by Thévenot) is seen as being of a lesser level of abstraction than the grammar of public justification, but also crucially as being able to include differing opinions within the same community. Justifications operate on the level of principles, of abstract common goods put into tests in situations. Because these goods are abstract, and by definition based on common humanity, they are available for everyone as a repertoire of actions and rhetoric. So how would the grammar of individual interests meet these requirements?

In what follows, I reconstruct the grammar of liberal individuals operating in the public (Thévenot 2014, 2015), using a model of how common goods are constructed that differs from the one that is used in the grammar of public justification. I shall call it the grammar of individual interests – to both distinguish it from the original usage by Thévenot, and to distance it from the reference to the unclear and polysemic concept of liberalism. I shall also do this reconstruction without referencing the regimes of engagements, because the idea is based on the hierarchical idea of ordering different actions based on generalizability of the arguments. In the theory of regimes of engagement, rooted in a kind of ad-hoc cognitive structuring, the common good, constructed through the general will, is always the most abstract. In this reconstruction, the grammar of individual interests is based on a completely different idea of how the common good works. The reconstruction requires that we first understand the relation of public justification, general will, and the sovereign a little better.

In the grammar of public justification, the explicit aim of the prototypical discussion is to resolve situational conflicts by referring to most general level foundational ideas available in political culture. This happens by referencing common goods – general principles. These general principles always argue about the *good for all*, about the general will. *Thus, the model of public justification is a model of deliberation*: situations are formulated as conflicts of different public goods, compromises between them are made, and in the end, the polity as a collection of rational actors comes to an informed decision. It is implied that the theoretical model for this decision is unanimous. (see Polletta 2008, and Young 1996, for this kind of deliberation).

The grammar of public justification is linked with the concept of sovereign: deliberation – between shared formulations of the common good – is about finding an agreement on the general will, which then works as the basis of application of sovereign power (see Rousseau [1762] for *The Social Contract*, discussion on it in *On Justification*, 107-111, Baczko [1988] on the social contract and the French revolution, Iris Marion Young [1996] and Seyla Benhabib [1996] on deliberative democracy contrasted with interest-based or aggregative democracy, and Rosanvallon [2013] for the legitimacy of interest-based democracy).

This sovereign, earlier personified by the monarch, is usually an abstract description of the state. But a concrete example to highlight the idea of the sovereign: in Helsinki urban planning, this sovereign power lies within the city planning authority. It ultimately makes all the decisions in city planning, in conjunction with the democratically elected councillors. Thus, the residents that are arguing against planning changes using the grammar of public justification are trying to win the support of the sovereign: to prove that their position is what is good for everyone, not just for themselves.

In the grammar of individual interests, in order to make a legitimate claim, an actor must construct a subject that can legitimately argue its interests – and then nominate herself as the legitimate representative of that subject. The general will is not assumed to be a transcendent property of a sovereign entity, but composed of all the individual wills – all the interests and wills are legitimate and relevant (cf. Young 1996, 126-128, Rosanvallon 2013, 274-276.).

The prototypical case of the legitimate interests of subjects is the idea of the referendum: without any regards as to the *reason* or *justification* behind individual votes, each citizen as a right-carrying subject chooses an alternative, and the idea with most votes (or more usually, the one with over 50% of votes) gets chosen. In a referendum, the sovereign acts based on votes, not based on arguments. The deliberation is a separate action from the actual decision (See Baczko 1988, Young 1996, 120-121, Rosanvallon 2013).

What is implied is the legitimacy of differing opinions and claims, even without justifications. This does not mean that the level of generality or generalizability is necessarily lower than in publicly justified positions. Whereas the generality in public justification comes through *principles* – arguments are always about what is the common good – the generalization in the grammar of individuals comes through the construction of the subject as a group of people sharing an opinion. While the general model is based on the idea of individuals as the subjects with claims, interests, and individual wills, these subjects can also be constructed as larger bodies (Moody & Thévenot, 2000).

The difference in the collectives between the civic order of worth and the grammar of individual interests is, that the latter operates without the notion of suppressing your own will for the good of the collective that is evident both

in the civic order and in the grammar of public justification. These are opt-in communities. The legitimacy of these kinds of constructed subjects is an interesting question that is explored by Rosanvallon (2013), and is not pursued further here.²²

To show how these subjects are created and their interest argued, I take an example from Article IV. In the comment letters sent to the city planning authority about an imminent planning change, many residents of Rastila constructed “the people of Rastila” as the *de facto* writer of their comment letters. The implied argument is that “the people of Rastila” is a political subject that a) can legitimately comment on whether a new neighbourhood should be built in the forest near the current Rastila, and that b) the opinion of this subject is unanimously against the new development. They were able to represent this subject in the media and act as a unified actor in opposition to the plan. (See Alapuro [2010] and Bourdieu [1991] for analysis of this kind of representation within political actors and voluntary associations – this constructed representation can also be seen as an act of dominance dispossession of the people who the actor claims to represent.)

The subject of “people of Rastila” was inclusive, but with two conditions: to join it, one had to 1) share the opinion, and 2) be from Rastila (this latter is not as strict: the membership is not dependent on the personal experience and relation, as it would be in the grammar of close affinities). In this example, this subject was both an existing thing (some of the residents formed a social movement that acted against the planning project, see Article IV), and a fiction: these subjects overplay both their popular support and the unanimity of the people. The majority of the “people of Rastila” did not participate in any kind of discussion, and in a comparable case in (almost) neighbouring Marjaniemi, it turned out that the majority of the residents were in favour of the contested change in land use – despite strong public opposition presented in the name of “the people of Marjaniemi” (Kuparinen 2005).

Since the grammar of individual interests is based on the idea that the general will is a sum of individual wills, all individual positions can be legitimately expressed. Whereas the grammar of public justification requires a *higher common principle* to be used in the evaluation, in the grammar of individuals, small groups can present their positions, their individual wills,

²² And at the same time, the rules of the political culture are not identical to everyone. While everyman might well say “I’m only in it for my own backyard,” that same option is not available for the more public members of the community, such as politicians and representatives – at least not in same capacity. The same is true for publicity: it might as well be that we hope that the world would be a place where everyone’s first thought would be the common good, and that is why newspapers and public officials are probably expected to present these justifications more prominently.

and still be treated as individuals, not collective actors in the sense of the civic worth.

One of the greater imbalances in the sociology of engagements has been the differing levels of explication between the three regimes and grammars. Earlier I tried to show, how we could think about grammar of individual interests as legitimate and generalizable, in what follows, I present vignettes about what the grammar of individuals is on the substance level.

Rosanvallon (2008: 25-26) divides suspicion and opposition against elected or otherwise ruling political organs into two main branches. The first suspicion is suspicion of the ability of elected or chosen leaders or planners to fulfil and bring forth the general will. The other suspicion, a more fundamental form of what he calls counter-democracy, is based on what he calls liberal disbelief on whether general will exists at all. The central idea is to protect the individual and her interests against the central planner or decision maker. This is one formulation of the individual grammar. These two different types of suspicion have been said to be exemplified by European (former) and American-style liberal (latter) political systems (Moody and Thévenot, 2000; Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye, 2000, Lamont & Thévenot 2000).

Within the urban planning literature, the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) has been the focal concept for discussions on the tension between the common good and private interest. Many analyses of NIMBY conflicts are rooted in the idea of the private interests of individuals (Freudenberg and Pastor 1992, Gibson 2005, Moody and Thévenot 2000, Wolsink 2006). Even though the general model of the grammar of individual interests is the referendum, negotiations and discussions are also part of the repertoire. These discussions are not deliberations on the relative merits of common goods, but rather trading, haggling, and presentation of individual situations and subjectivities. On the rhetorical level, the actors make demands, broker deals and issue ultimatums rather than not argue about principles on the general level. (Thévenot 2007, 2014, 2015; Moody and Thévenot, 2000).

Many formulations of politicization (Luhtakallio 2012, 12, 170-190) are built around the idea of a rise in generality. This rise in generality has usually been seen as move to a more abstract level, and that has usually meant moving from one's own private interest towards the common good. Since we already know that this is not the only way to present legitimate political claims, we will need to modify the thinking around this rise in generality. Luhtakallio underlines the fact that "the recognition of the possibility of conflict is central to politicization" (ibid. 186, see also Palonen 2003: an issue becomes political once it is playable). This conflict need not to be a conflict between principles, it can also be a conflict of interests (between, not within, individuals).

Rosanvallon (2013) proposes that we should not look for a *rise* in generality, but a way to *lower ourselves* into generality. In his view, generality can be built as the sum of all the specificity of individual situations. The often-used

metaphor of *rising* to generality means leaving all the specificity below, and only seeing what is common and general – it means purifying oneself (and the situation) of the dirty details. The idea of Rosanvallon is, that we can also reach generality by wading in the details, since these details *are* what individual lives are made of. These details and individual situations are all unique in some ways, and what can be generally recognized is the fact that from outside the situation, it is hard, if not impossible, to see the whole picture.

The lowering into generality would happen through the level of publicity – if an actor publicly presents her situation and asks for recognition of its uniqueness, she shares only some aspects of it and – willingly or not – presents itself as a *general* case, even when arguing based on the specificity of her situation. This is clearly not the same as arguing from a common good – but neither is it just a private uttering of grievances. A similar kind of contextualization can be said to happen when presenting private affinities in public – this happens in the form of a story. Since the central intention is to communicate the situation and communicate the special relationship, an evocative narrative must be formed (Young 1996, 130-133).

In the participation in city planning, planning officials see the value of comments and participation by individuals for providing contextual information, or subjective opinions, on how the planning change specifically affects their lives (Bäcklund 2007 158-170). Personal opinions and individual comments are valued not *despite* their being personal and individual, but *because* they are personal.

Earlier, in Chapter 3.2, two models of how the common good is constructed according to Williams (1995) were presented. These two models include and suppose a higher common principle, or a common good, and are thus compatible with the ideas of public justification. But it is the third model, *the Contract*, which helps us to highlight the differences between the grammar of individual interests, and the grammar of public justification. In Williams' *Contract* model of the common good (133-137) the creation of the public good happens through equal rights and citizenship, and “inclusion and participation in society”. For Williams, this is deeply rooted in individual rights, and takes its formations from classical texts of liberalism. While Boltanski and Thévenot focus on how the general will is channelled and how individuals are subsumed, Williams emphasizes negative individual rights, and the individuality of the citizens: “The contractual model's language of rights varies between the notion of liberty (the right to be left alone) and the notion of entitlement (the right to the means for achieving inclusion)” (ibid. 133). Williams also claims that this individuality does not lead to an atomized state of anomie, but rather that it always includes some elements of communality and some sense of responsibility towards a larger community. This falls quite nicely in line with what was outlined earlier about the grammar of individuals.

To sum up: in the grammar of individual interests, the common good is seen to rise out of the private interests of relevant actors. These actors can be individuals or constructed community-level political subjects. In public discussions, the central rhetorical move is to construct the interest-holding actor – such as a smaller community within a city – and claim to represent this community. These communities are opt-in: all that is needed for membership in them is to accept the interest as it is presented. Since these interests are not articulated as principles, they can be adopted, discarded, haggled over, and eventually compromised (cf. Polletta 2008).

We now have a concept of how conflict resolution and goal-setting²³ in a complex society might work. It includes three possible higher level scales of evaluation: one based on actors pursuing their self-interest, one based on common goods, and one based on intimate relations between people and the material world. In addition to this, the grammar of common goods is defined by struggles of the very definition of the common good, struggles between common goods, and the struggles of measurement within the common goods. Conversely, the grammar of individual interests is defined by struggles between generalizable interests of individuals, and the grammar of private affinities by strong emotional attachments. This threefold interpretation of justification is presented in table 1 below.

	Common Good	Individual Interest	Close Affinities
Scale of Evaluation	Multiple common goods	Self-interest of actors	Intimate and emotional connections
Defining Struggles	1) Over definition of common good 2) over situationally relevant common good 3) over measurement within a definition	1) Between interests 2) Over construction of legitimate collective subjects 3) over representation within the collective	1) generalizing private attachments 2) over inclusion into community 3) over symbols, commonplaces
Nature of the Community	General Defined by State Humankind	Flexible Situationally constructed Meso-Level	Particular Based on Familiarity and sharing Exclusive

Table 1: Three Grammars of Commonality

²³ The discussion in this subchapter has built on the idea that deliberative democracy (Young 1996, Benhabib 1996) is ontologically related to common good – and thus the grammar of common good is modelled on the ideas of deliberative democracy. We could say that in order to accommodate both the plurality of the definitions of common good, as originally proposed by Boltanski & Thévenot (and here note the similarities and the direct link with Waltzer, 1983), and the plurality of the grammars of commonality as presented here, the model of deliberation needs to be rethought. One possible way of doing this would be to follow Mouffe (1999, 200) and to use her idea of Agonistic pluralism, where democracy (and thus deliberation) includes elements of both competition and co-operation. For the relation of this theory of democracy to participation in planning, see Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010)

As a coda to this discussion, we have to note the ultimate futility of all of this. The creativity of action and the creativity of actors means that all attempts at chopping such a continuous, culturally dependent, and ever-changing phenomena such as political action, participation, and rhetoric into a discrete number of immutable boxes, no matter how well-defined, will always be a fool's errand on some level. *Panta rei* – these things will always escape our precious little boxes. This does not mean we should not try – but that our attempts and toolboxes must live with this and be adaptable (this was, of course, is also noted in *On Justification*, as well as by Boltanski 2011).

The argument presented here does not radically conflict with the spirit in which the theory of grammars of commonality is written. But it highlights the importance of the idea of the sovereign and the general will, and the multiplicity of ways it can be understood. It also highlights the idea of representation and political (collective) subjectivity as paramount to the legitimacy of argumentation in the grammar of individual interests.

Thus, it perhaps sets a way for us for better understanding the pluralism of argumentation when understood as a cultural repertoire of valuation and justification, available situationally to individuals doing politics.

4 DATA, METHODS AND RESULTS

This section presents the original publications, articles I–IV, and their results. The methods, materials, and analyses are presented as done in the original articles. Results are interpreted within the theoretical framework presented in earlier chapters.

4.1 ARTICLES I AND IV

In articles I and IV, the residents of Haaga and Rastila faced a perceived outside threat to the continuation of their everyday lives. To deal with the crisis, they used the individual-level deliberative channel provided to them by the Helsinki land-use policy: they sent dispute letters to the planning official. In these letters, they strategically made political claims in opposition to the changes in their neighbourhoods. These claims used a diverse mix of argumentative strategies: the residents discussed common goods using different definitions of common goods, and proposed tests for different common goods. However, they also argued on the basis of their individual interests and the fundamental uniqueness of their situation and habitat. To make these claims more convincing, they creatively transformed the physical locations of Haaga and Rastila to an endless series of qualified objects (trees, roads, birds, 8 000-year-old shores of the Litorian sea, unique vistas from the window of a flat in Haaga), which were deployed in support of their argumentation. Their success in these land-use conflicts might have been limited – details change, but progress is inevitable – but this does not mean that their efforts were in vain. The residents constructed political subjects in their argumentation: the “residents of Haaga” as a claims-maker or a political actor is not a naturally existing subject but one that needs to be created through multiple engagements.

ARTICLE SETTING, DATA AND METHODS

Articles I and IV examine the situated creativity of specific individuals doing politics: residents acting against disputed land-use cases in their neighbourhoods. These people utilise cultural (and sometimes, also more tangible) resources and qualify their surroundings by using them as parts of their argumentation when engaging in NIMBY-type conflicts in urban planning.

Articles I and IV share the same root, the justification theory, and even partially the same data. Although they are both empirical articles, they make theoretical contributions – they answer different questions and offer different conceptual clarifications.

The articles examine the dispute letters sent to the City Planning Authority of Helsinki by individual citizens to analyse their argumentation about disputed land-uses cases and, because the citizens are virtually always in opposition to the changes, the justifications for their opposition. Article 1 focuses on Finnish political culture and the legitimacy of the grammar of individual interests (see Chapter 3.4), whereas Article IV focuses on the concept of NIMBY (not in my backyard), and what the argumentation of the residents acting against developments can tell us about the concept.

The land-use disputes analysed in more detail were 1) an urban renewal plan in Haaga, which proposed the development of 700 new apartments suitable for families (The City-Planning Board 23 February 2009), and 2) a new development for 15 000 people in Rastila (The City-Planning Board 28 November 2012). These two plans were chosen because they represented different ethos in the urban plans– the first being more local and conservative in nature, and the second being more radical and garnering more intense citywide interest. Article I focuses on Haaga dispute, which produced 107 dispute letters. Article IV compares the Haaga case with the Rastila land-use dispute (137 dispute letters) and uses a sample of 321 dispute letters from all over the city to compare these two to the distribution of the grammars of commonality in the entire city. These dispute letters were discussed by the city planning authority in 2012 and attached to the minutes of the meetings. These minutes are public in Helsinki.

Article I analyses the dispute letters sent by the residents of Haaga. The central assumption of this article is that although we cannot know the specific motivations of the people for sending the letters, we can safely assume that they believe, at least on some level, that their comments can be influential. If not, why would they have gone through the trouble of sending the comment letters? These letters are then used as a proxy of Finnish political culture in this specific case. In this article, pragmatic sociology is a tool that gives a more analytical description of the choices, vocabulary and grammar that are available to everyday political actors in Finnish society.

Article IV presents a theoretical view of the NIMBY phenomenon. It defines NIMBY as a spatial political conflict and relates the different strands of the NIMBY literature to questions concerning democracy, participation and the three different grammars presented earlier. The benefit of pragmatic sociology is that it allows research to take a third position between conflicting moralistic positions – neither always for local opposition nor always against it. This third position is especially important when researching NIMBY movements and NIMBY discussion because the discussion has been dominated by rather moralistic tones. By looking at the justifications used in the process, it becomes possible to open up the NIMBY discussion for a more analytical analysis.

NIMBY is seen as a label that is better at describing the conflict than the people who are parts of the conflict. These NIMBY-type conflicts are the kinds of crisis situations described earlier.

ARTICLE I AND IV RESULTS

In the papers, key argumentation rests on how the repertoires of evaluation, especially public justification and individual interests, are empirically used by the actors themselves in the conflicts.

The major contribution of these two papers is that they use justification theory and, more specifically, the three grammars of commonality with the reconstructed form presented in section 3.4 to empirically analyse what the residents see as legitimate ways of disputing urban land-use in their vicinity – how they present the situated critique in a situation that is interpreted as a crisis and how they creatively use their environment to present this critique. The distributions of the grammars of commonality used by residents can be seen in Figure 1 below. The clearest result is that the grammar of individuals is a legitimate way of building political argumentation in Finland or is at least a legitimate way of arguing against a land-use case in the area. This result is highlighted in article I.

The results also show that participation cannot be thought of as simply deliberation or a neutral way of collecting information from citizens. The land-use conflicts are better seen as political conflicts, in which the central disputed item is the mode of evaluation. This result is highlighted in article IV.




Figure 1: Distribution of the grammars of commonality in two cases and in the entire city (%).

NIMBY conflicts are spatial political conflicts in which citizens and residents act to influence planning and building decisions by fighting over the systems of valuation used in the decision making and thus the relevant facts of the situation. NIMBY is therefore defined from the points of view of the residents and not those of the planners or city officials.

NIMBY conflicts can be seen as much as conflicts of evaluation as they are conflicts of interests. All NIMBY conflicts are about a specific place, but some, based on close affinities, are uniquely rooted in the specificities of the place and the relations between the place and its residents. In the two cases, the commenters aimed at presenting the conflict on a more general political level: as a conflict of values (public justification) or interests (individual valuation) rather than a locally situated conflict about special relations to the place (close affinities).

The opposition against the Haaga land-use case was successful in changing the minutiae of the plan. Many details were changed to better suit the demands of current residents. The citizens, however, were completely unable to change the bigger picture of the plan or to stop the new developments. In Rastila, the activists failed in their project to halt the building of the new area. The issue was politicised at the city level and was ultimately decided in the municipal council. Because the land-use case was not about building more houses into an already built environment but rather about expanding

the city to a recreational forest, the details were less important to the residents, and most attention was given to the general idea of the plan.

It is no surprise that the possible changes happened to the small details. It corresponds to the idea put forward by Bäcklund (2007, 198) that the participation by individuals primarily gives the planning apparatus contextual information from the area that is planned. The planner is still the one who makes decisions about the common good. Thus, by receiving information about the land-use conflicts from the residents, the planner can make better decisions.

When a local land-use conflict gains citywide political attention, the picture looks different. Staffans (2004) noted that those citizens who went beyond the boundaries of participatory structure – those who used media and publicity, informal means or a wide variety of tricks – were influential. The findings from Rastila point to a different direction. The conflict in Rastila was politicised in an explicit and party-political way, and the dispute was ultimately decided in the city council of Helsinki. The residents of Rastila used a wide variety of channels and even developed their own detailed plans for the area. This public orientation is visible in Figure 1: the residents used the grammar of public justification clearly more often than did the residents of Haaga.

Industrial, domestic and green justifications were the three most commonly used justifications. The industrial justification, as has been noted earlier, has been seen as the default mode of Finnish politics, the repertoire that is most prominently available to everyone. The results strengthen this observation. The industrial justification was used in both land-use disputes, as well as in the citywide sample, in similar numbers.

The difference between the conflicts is seen in the differences between the usage of green and domestic justification. Residents of Haaga framed their opposition in terms of tradition, the milieu of the area and the necessary continuation of what existed previously. The domestic justification was suitable for the conflict because the idea of the land-use was to build more houses in what is currently seen as a historic area with a specific feeling. The plan was to build new houses between existing structures, thus disturbing the everyday surroundings of current residents. This “domesticity” might also explain the high prevalence of the grammar of familiar affinities seen in Figure 1.

In the Rastila case, the plan was to build a completely new housing development in the forest near current buildings. Because this plan revolved around a forest that was going to be cut down and not about the intimate surroundings, the residents turning more towards a green justification is unsurprising. Strategically, this might not have been the best move; in the discussion in the city council that eventually resolved the conflict, green arguments lost to market-based argumentation.

As Mäntysalo and Jarenko (2012, see also Bäcklund & Mäntysalo 2010) noted, despite being deliberative in ethos, the Finnish land-use and building act, in practice, gives ample possibilities for individual participation that do not need to conform to the norms of the common good. The commenters in Rastila, Haaga and all over Helsinki were willing and able to critique urban plans, support the critique with justifications and mobilise their physical environment as a part of their arguments. They acted creatively as individuals.

4.2 ARTICLE II: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF CAMPAIGNING

Article II (*Sosiaalinen media ja kampanjointitapojen muutos* in Finnish) explores the 2012 presidential campaign of Pekka Haavisto (Green Party), who unexpectedly came second in the race. His campaign was run in a much more open way than any previous (almost) successful electoral campaign in Finland. The focus of the article is on how social media changed the way electoral campaigns are run. The paper was co-authored with Dr. Juho Lindman²⁴.

The article examines elections, which can be thought of as a perpetually occurring crisis from the perspective of political actors—normal action cannot continue, someone wins and others lose on a pre-set date. However, the changing technologies (social media) and changing legal environment (campaign funding laws) highlight the role of opportunity. Autonomous individual campaigners, many of whom are professionals in non-political fields and first timers in electoral campaigns, forged a free-pulsing electoral campaign, which mostly organised itself in social media. They used any technical tools available (Facebook polls and custom web pages for crowdfunding, video-editing software, YouTube for distribution) and were able to tap the shared collective nationalist symbols and re-appropriate them for a more progressive use (Flashmob Finlandia). At the same time, however, these autonomous individual campaigners were constrained by the most mundane of things, such as the lack of funding, national-level organisation, resources and, worse name-recognition when compared with the main opponent; they also lacked experience in the later stages of the presidential race. They ended up winning many battles and losing the war. Nevertheless, they probably opened new possibilities for Finnish electoral politics. From the campaign, a new political

²⁴ The 2012 elections colonised Facebook and Twitter newsfeeds in levels unseen in any previous elections. The sheer amount of normally non-political Facebook users who were, in one way or another, engaged in the elections was surprising: they wrote endorsements, created and shared memes and solicited micro donations. This phenomenon piqued my interests, so naturally, I asked my Facebook friends to write an article about it with me. Luckily, Dr. Lindman was interested.

figure, the autonomous individual campaigner – one with a background in technology, advertising or in other creative industries, is acutely aware of shifting cultural meanings and symbols, and is technically adept – emerged victorious.

The article is an explorative case study that maps an interesting electoral campaign through key-person interviews, social media materials and electoral funding records. It focuses on how individual actors participate in a traditionally very centrally organised type of politics: the presidential elections. It also explains how these actors rely on the organisational tools that are available to them, mainly social media tools, such as Facebook groups, to create temporary collective structures. These structures are used during the campaign and discarded afterwards. The article also explains how the context for political action, the social media, influences the cultural repertoires of action that are available to the actors.

ARTICLE SETTING, DATA AND METHODS

The 2012 Haavisto campaign was run seemingly in a paradoxical way. The literature on mediatisation and professionalisation in electoral campaigns (Mancini 1999, Negrine 2007, but also Gibson 2015, Gibson et al. 2013) suggests what we intuitively know: modern electoral campaigns are primarily created in the media through ads, talk show appearances and crafted slogans. The Haavisto campaign obviously did all of these, but it also included a strong online component. The official campaign spent heavily on then-nascent social media marketing, which was amplified by the “unofficial” campaign created by interested individuals with little or no connections to the official campaign. These online campaign groups were left without oversight from the official campaign office.

The viral part of the campaign was composed of multiple independent campaign groups and projects that had different levels of engagement with the official campaign. We analysed different types of materials created by individual groups and distributed through social media, such as photos, YouTube videos and Internet pages.

We identified four individual campaign projects that contributed to the overall campaign, conducted key-person interviews with both party campaign officials and autonomous activists in the project groups, as well as collected and analysed social media materials produced by the four individual groups. Our intent was to present and analyse the campaign materials produced by these four groups and use the analysis to discuss the novel dynamics of social media and electoral campaigns. The analysis was enriched with electoral funding records because micro donations and the dynamics of crowdfunding were of central importance to the campaign.

The main themes of the interviews were the role social media in the organisation and formation of the campaign groups, the motivations for participating

in the campaigns and the reason(s) why these campaigns were not organised as part of the official campaign. In total, we conducted seven interviews focusing on personnel from the campaign group and officials of the Green Party. In addition to official campaigners, we included individuals who participated mainly through independent activity groups on social media. The interviews were conducted as open-themed interviews and took place after the campaign.

To complement these interviews and social media campaign materials, we drew from the campaign memorial co-authored by Haavisto's campaign manager and published as a book entitled, *President of Hearts* (Kämppi and Lähde 2012).

ARTICLE II RESULTS

As noted briefly in Section 3.2 but missing from the analysis in article II because of a different theoretical framing, the entire organisation of the Haavisto campaign was guided by the project order of worth described by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005). It was a project in which people contributed their personalities and skills for a limited amount of time, and the project had a defined outcome or end point. A worthy participant had the needed skills and personal connections and was able to turn these into useful assets for the campaign. These good participants were also (essentially) self-directed and acted without direct oversight from the campaign organisation.

Volunteering in a rhizome-like free-flowing memetic Internet electoral campaign is not about handing out leaflets on the streets but rather about creating viral videos with one's laptop, with or without endorsements by the official campaign. The good participants, who possessed these technical skills, are members of such networks, have access to relevant technologies and are super-charged – they can be said to hold the key to virality and thus the key to organising these campaigns in their fingertips.



Picture 1: A screenshot from TheIsojunno's YouTube video "Haavisto Plays Dubstep"

You cannot have an army of Internet warriors working without oversight to create memes and adding fuel to the fire without picking up some cultural elements from the Internet as you go. For the YouTube user TheIsojunno, his skills and technical equipment, his repertoire of shared symbols and his default repertoire of action made clear that the most natural form of political campaigning would not involve going out on the streets. He would rather spend a few hours on his computer and create YouTube videos with electronic music. These videos garnered almost 10 000 views before the election, which are not really that much, at least compared with big viral hits, but have a good bang for the buck. Picture 1 above shows a screenshot of TheIsojunno's video, "Haavisto Plays Dubstep", in which a Photoshop-edited picture of Pekka Haavisto on a DJ set is shown, while a dubstep song with samples from Haavisto's speeches plays in the background. For TheIsojunno, the presidential election was an event in which he was able to use and manipulate the particular collection of signs he was most familiar with and use them politically.

These individual campaigners used framings, organisational links, technologies and cultural representations, such as memes, in a creative way to conduct an electoral campaign, in which participation was also rewarding in itself. Another example of this usage is The Pekka Male Voices Choir, which was organised in social media with the use of existing social networks (the YL Male Voices choir) and their resources (practice areas in a student house). Flash mob was a part of the repertoire of protest available for this campaign group. They appropriated a clearly nationalist symbol, the Finlandia Hymn, which they were able to reclaim. They connected with another campaign group, the Filmmakers for Pekka Haavisto, to film the flash mob. Then, the

official campaign used money collected through micro-donations to broadcast the recording (or the short film/ music video) in primetime TV.

All these were done by individual campaigners, without direct organisational links to the official campaign and without oversight, by using frames, symbols, social networks and organisational techniques available.

In the examples we present in the article, social media was used primarily as *a means of organising*: Facebook and social media enable fast non-hierarchical organisation among people who do not previously know one another. Organising and inspiring core volunteers were more important than attracting a large number of page views. The central idea of the Haavisto presidential campaign was to encourage autonomous participation with the use of social media. The campaign organisation believed that it could not succeed in the elections by using traditional organising techniques. Social media was used to collect funds, recruit campaigners and motivate those who already expressed willingness to participate in the campaign.

The increase in social media organising in itself also leads to a decrease in the power of the central organisation. When almost anyone can found his or her own Haavisto group, create events, share them on Facebook and have thousands of spectators, the full control of the campaign by the campaign organisation becomes impossible.

In the Haavisto campaign, key campaign ads, the majority of the funding and even campaign themes were created or solicited via campaigners working autonomously from the official campaign organisation.

The article also makes a point about electoral research and why it is important that sociologists research elections. The strands of political science that are based purely on reductionism (which, of course, does not describe all political scientists) cannot capture the dynamics of volunteers, frames, ideologies and memes. A related point can be made about studying losing electoral campaigns: The Haavisto campaign did not produce a president, but it did set a rather forceful example and shook Finnish social movement culture.

Another related point is that the Haavisto campaign also finely illustrates the cycles when new innovations become institutionalised and written in law. The campaign finance reform (2009) changed the nature of financing electoral campaigns and made possible the crowdsourced nature of the Haavisto campaign. These changes, in turn, set examples for a slew of follow-up projects and broadened the repertoire available for future projects, both within and outside electoral campaigns.

One of the biggest phenomena in 2016 US politics was the primary campaign of Bernie Sanders, a “democratic socialist” aiming for Democratic nomination. The unofficial slogan of his campaign was #feelthebern, which was created by a group of volunteers and organisers separate from the actual campaign and closely resembled the Haavisto groups presented here – People for

Bernie and their digital strategist Winnie Wong. The hashtag was created to resonate and engage people, especially the younger ones, on social media (Lazzaro 2016). The cultural repertoire of the Internet is leaking.

4.3 ARTICLE III: THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACEBOOK LIKE BUTTON

In article III, the everyday use of the smallest online signal possible, the Facebook like button, is explained to be a surprisingly creative endeavour. The interaction situation is no longer a physical, fleeting moment but a stretched and continuous field of interaction that is governed by ritual laws of interaction. The article highlights the importance of the interaction situation for nano-politics: viral political symbols, such as those created in the campaign in article II, depend on likes to survive and spread. The like button, albeit governed by interaction rules and happening inside a “social” network, is an individualistic tool – each user of Facebook is constantly in a situation in which he or she has the opportunity to like an almost limitless number of things. In addition to idiosyncratic preferences, these patterns of likes are cultural repertoires in themselves. Because social media is becoming more and more important in its role in how news is made, spread and interpreted, these processes do not remain merely interactional. They have larger consequences.

Facebook, with its billion of active daily users and three billion daily likes is both the leading social network and perhaps the leading cultural reference point of our current world. Article II focused on how Facebook can be used in organising an electoral campaign and how it should be understood as an organising tool rather than as a media platform in these contexts. The viral nature of Facebook and the central importance of this virality for participation and politics conducted on Facebook highlight the importance of how the mechanisms and tools of Facebook are used in political processes. It is also an important part of the changing repertoire of tools: the specific nature of the Facebook Edgerank algorithm²⁵ and ever-so-slight alterations to it might mean the difference between a successful social movement and a one-night fad, or between being elected and being forgotten.

Article III is a Goffmanian exploration of the use of the Facebook like button. It constructs Facebook as a “physical setting” comparable to physical situations, in which Goffman analysed the attempts at keeping and saving face.

²⁵ Edgerank is the algorithm (or a group of algorithms) that Facebook uses to determine what an individual user sees in his or her newsfeed. In addition to Google’s PageRank, it might be the most important player in modern communications because it can determine what we can know, what we can see when we are online and what we can interact with.

The article uses the perspective of political interaction – when the rules of interaction in the situation also determine the outcomes of political participation or they, at least, channel the political action. An individual liking (or not liking) content on Facebook is also one of the perfect metaphors for an individual doing politics.

Some of the Goffmanian concepts need to be translated to better suit mediated surroundings, such as Facebook, but one needs to keep in mind that Goffman himself also hinted at the possibility of face-work in mediated situations. The empirical data of this article are from a small classroom survey, which is used more for illustrational purposes.

As noted in Chapter 3.1, the Facebook like button, in all its simplicity, seems to be the perfect embodiment of the fame order in *On Justification*—it allows one to “like” any content on Facebook, and it signifies how many users in total have liked the content. (Facebook now also shows information on how many users have shared the content. Almost everything said about liking can *mutatis mutandis* be applied to sharing because liking on Facebook is also a public action.)

Therefore, the like button creates an instant test for popularity: How many people have liked the link? How many have shared it? This information easily separates the worthy from the unworthy (in the language of *On Justification*). However, the empirical findings from article III also show a more nuanced picture. The theoretical framing of the article combines face-work (Goffman 1967) and ego-network analysis to understand the social context of liking, social signals sent with the like button and the social reasons for liking and non-liking.

The understanding of the nuanced face-work and the qualitative understanding of the heightened network sensitivity presented in the article help us understand what is called nano-level politics – how political signals, such as the like button, work on the smallest possible scale.

Article III can also be seen as an exploration of how creative individuals use technological tools for a much broader spectrum of actions than probably was originally intended, and how this creativity is tied to the interaction situation.

Researching social media, especially researching specific features of one web page (and a set of apps) is a tricky thing; it is always historical work. In the winter of 2016, Facebook replaced the simple like button with a set of animated emojis; in addition to the like button, we now have “love”, “haha”, “wow”, “sad” and “angry”. Therefore, the detailed results of the paper (published in June 2015) are already historical. This change, however, does not affect the broader theoretical results.

This article was co-authored with Professor Markku Lonkila.


Article III has a clear division of its theoretical and empirical parts. In the theoretical part, we explore the notion of face – feeling at ease in a social situation – and how the everyday identity work can be applied to online contexts. Face-work is the conscious (and unconscious) effort we all put into social situations to keep our positive self-identity, as well as other people’s positive evaluation of us.

As a tool for the positive evaluation of social gestures, the Facebook like button is a good conductor for face-work. It presents nano-level interaction, the smallest signal that can be sent on Facebook. Our theoretical understanding can be divided into the following two parts:

- 1) On Facebook, the situation in which face-work is done is and is not similar to the physical interaction situation. Face-work is asynchronous in the same way that the use of Facebook is asynchronous. This asynchrony also means that we need to reconsider the notion of face – in such an asynchronous setting, the face stretches.
- 2) All actions on Facebook happen in front of a networked audience, which, on the one hand, is hand-curated by the user and, on the other hand, often includes a surprising number of people *not* chosen by the user. This all creates heightened network sensitivity to users and affects the usage of the like button.

On Facebook, we therefore have two contexts. The algorithms and the features of the program define the *technical context*. This technical context defines what is possible, what actions can be performed and how such actions are broadcast to other users. When Facebook, in early 2016, added other possible reactions to the like button, it changed the technical context. The *social context* is formed by actors’ Facebook friends and their friends’ friends (or even potentially everyone on Facebook), if their security settings allow this.

The study was conducted among 26 Finnish university students in the spring of 2013. We chose a convenient sample of students because of the exploratory nature of this article and our focus on understanding the broader framework of sociality on Facebook. The respondents were 25 years old, on average, seven were male, and all respondents had a Facebook account for an average of five years. They were given a structured questionnaire concerning their motives and methods for using the Facebook like button.



Picture 2: A Facebook user and his or her personal network audience. User F4 sees that users F1–F3 have already liked the object posted by the original user. F4’s decision is influenced by this information.

The first group of questions concerned social pressure. Basing on our theoretical views, we hypothesised that to conduct face-work on Facebook, the users need to pay constant attention to what other users are thinking – that the *social context* has an effect on how the *technical context* is put into use (this model is presented in Picture 2). We thus inquired if the respondents, in general, considered the opinion of their Facebook friends whenever they used the like button, and if so, if they had a specific friend or friends in mind. We also asked if the respondents checked, before liking some-

thing on Facebook, who else liked it, if they had regrets regarding their liking activities because of social reasons and if they tried to align their likings with their Facebook friends’ perceptions of their Facebook behaviour. The latter questions were meant to determine whether face-work happens and whether it is affected by the networked nature of Facebook.

The second group of questions addressed the creativity of different likes on Facebook. We tried to gain insights into the multiple motives for the use of the like button in social interaction. In addition to the intended use of the like button as a positive evaluation of other users’ posts, we wanted to determine how it was used to build up and maintain a public face and to make, strengthen and break relationships. We compiled a list of 16 ways or modes of using the Facebook like button.

RESULTS: NANO-POLITICS OF FAME, CREATIVITY OF THE LIKE

Our empirical data suggest that users do reflect on their liking on the basis of previous likes and that the networked audience affects users’ liking behaviour. We also found that liking is used in a wide variety of ways, which range from regulating a conversation to signalling the strength of ties between users and maintaining a face in situations that threaten it.

The first result shows that Facebook users do, at least, sometimes think of the social impact and consequences of their liking behaviour both prior to and after using the like button. Most of the respondents were worried about

losing face because of their liking behaviour, and most of them adjusted their liking behaviour after checking who their previous likers were.

Secondly, we looked at the wide variety of signals that the like button sends. Individuals utilising the simple binary button find a huge number of ways to send complex signals by using it. In addition to liking things that one “likes”, our respondents used the like button to flirt, tease, let other users know that they still exist, moderate discussions (if one likes a comment in a long comment thread, one does not need to respond to it) and tell both Facebook and the other user that the link between them is an important one.

Although the number of respondents was fairly small, the article shows the surprising complexity and richness of both the signals sent by the like button and the social thinking that happens before a user likes anything on Facebook. From 26 respondents, we identified many different uses for liking and for non-liking, as well.

The results of article III help highlight two things – how interaction rituals and the social context affect the use of Facebook and thus the nano-politics of the like button. As explored in section 2.4, the use of the concepts by Erving Goffman helps us analyse interaction situations that have political implications, such as the use of the like button, with conceptual clarity not achievable by other means. On the other hand, the important takeaway is related to the creativity of the action. The like button is (or was) a superficially simple way of communicating a positive evaluation of something, but in the hands of users, it was transformed into a surprisingly varied conductor of all kinds of social dynamics. The situated creativity of individuals doing politics takes over these kinds of technical tools.

5 CONCLUSIONS: PANTA REI

Individuals have an abundance of legal, technical and cultural resources that they can exploit to bring about change in the world, and they are recognised as relevant actors within formal participation systems. Instead of complaining over breakfast, we can create memes on Facebook and spread them around the world. Instead of complaining about how new developments are ruining the neighbourhood, we are legally allowed to comment on these building projects and engage with all sorts of activities in our intimate surroundings to change the course of development. The resources and repertoires available also constrain us – we are not the ultimately liberated “free” individuals that some scholars of online participation fantasised about. Even if individuals are not tied anymore to the formal and traditional organisational structures, we are constrained by the rules of interaction situations.

The way by which individuals do politics is understood in three parts:

1) All political action happens in a situation, which can, because of internal or external factors, be interpreted as a crisis or an opportunity: as binding conflict in which a solution must be found, and as a realisation that, for some reason, what previously seemed impossible is now doable. When residents face imminent plans to change the neighbourhood, they also have the opportunity to improve the details of the plan while disputing the broader goal of the development.

2) More specifically, political action happens in the context of political culture. This political culture manifests not only as institutions that limit possibilities for creative action but also by providing cultural tools, repertoires of symbols, frames and justifications that can be effectively and creatively deployed. These cultural tools, together with more tangible resources (such as money, property or video production tools), form a large toolbox (Swidler 1986). Actors create their strategies for action by utilising available resources. This strategizing is not (only) calculative and interest maximising but also affected by emotions, connections and institutions. Therefore, if making electronic dance music videos is what you know, and you want to contribute to a political campaign online, then you do politics by utilising the repertoire of electronic dance music videos.

3) The deployment of these strategies and the use of these tools occur on the micro and nano levels of interaction, as well as on the macro level of the public. Social media blurs the distinction between these two – it is simultaneously an interactional arena with some of the dynamics from face-to-face encounters; a place for connecting, organizing, and strategizing; and a news distribution system or media. The interaction situation both constrains and channels political action. Therefore, an actor holding political views that are

controversial among his or her Facebook audience needs to consider twice before performing the important likes: in addition to doing politics, he or she needs to maintain face in front of his or her audience.

This work presented an outline for a sociological theory of political action by integrating a pragmatist approach to habits and situations with theories dealing with cultural and tangible repertoires and resources, as well as by constructing a grammar of political speech that makes realising and inspecting the legitimacy of claims based on individual interests easier.

Empirically, articles I–IV present investigations into the repertoires of legitimate argumentation, the creativity of political actors in social media politics and the rules of interaction situation governing the nano-politics of liking on Facebook.

Firstly, the grammar of individual interests is a legitimate way of presenting a critique against urban planning, and, thus, attempts to make urban planning more communicative do not necessarily lead it to being more deliberative. This result can with some reservations, be thought to be relevant for the broader Finnish political culture. Conflicts in urban planning can and should be thought of as political conflicts.

Secondly, we saw the advent of a new type of political campaigner: one with a background in technology or advertising rather than in politics, connected and as independent as possible. This campaigner uses Facebook and other similar tools to create ad hoc campaign groups, utilises the cultural repertoire of the Internet and participates in politics when (and only when) he or she sees fit. As a context for nano-political action, Facebook also affects the way politics is done. Facebook users do reflect on their liking pattern on the basis of previous likes, and their networked audience affects their liking behaviour. At the same time, the “material” tools provided by Facebook (such as the like button) are used by activists and “normal” users alike creatively and reflexively: these users send a wide range of signals by using the simplest of tools, and they often reflect on their own liking behaviour.

The articles in this work also present two conceptual developments. The concept of nano-politics is presented in article III. It refers to the smallest possible public political gesture, which is, in this case, using the Facebook like button to send political signals. Article IV argues that NIMBY is useful only as a descriptive term, that it should not be used to refer to people participating in local land-use conflicts, but it could be used to describe these conflicts.

The main theoretical contribution is the reconstruction of Thévenot’s “grammar of individuals in the liberal public” to the *grammar of individual interests*: a way of constructing legitimacy of political argumentation based on the (assumed) representation of groups sharing the same opinions. This formulations avoids both the pitfalls of assuming the cognitive format of the plan being uniquely constitutive in the argumentation based on individual interests, and the problems arising from the assumption that arguments

based on the common good enjoy a special legitimacy in all political cultures. Therefore, the role of individuals doing politics can be researched as an empirical question.

The investigation on the grammars of commonality conducted in Chapter 3 tells us that we need a broader view of the legitimate ways of participating in democratic discussions than what, for instance, deliberative democracy can offer us, here following Mouffe's critique (1999). Perhaps, we should approach it as a descriptive question: What kinds of justifications, in the broad sense, do people bring in democratic disputes? In other words, what kind of system and understanding of participation and democratic systems is actually constructed, if one follows the pluralist and actor-centric ideas of Boltanski and Thévenot? How should we understand the totality of pluralistic democratic structures, and how can both collective-first and individual-first approaches and all the different scales of evaluation used by actors be incorporated? These are questions worthy of further investigation.

In the world of political participation, only change is certain. What can be trusted upon is the ability of the revolution to forge its own means (see Edwards 2014, xii and 235), or, as Heraclitus put it, *Panta rei*: Everything is in flux, and nothing abides.

In this work, this constant flux was understood theoretically as a natural consequence of the creativity of action (Joas 1996). Actors are not only calculative and rational, nor are they only bound by structures – they are also guided by non-binding habits that leave room for new engagements and new ways of actions to form and for new habits to habituate – for creativity of the political action. Even if you cannot step into the same stream twice, the riverbed still is here, as well as the concept of the river.

Even if everything is in flux and nothing abides, the flux can be understood by focusing on actual individuals doing politics.

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