

Chapter 12: Identity, Rationality, and Emotion in the Processes of State Disintegration and Reconstruction

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I wish to address both a substantive and a methodological issue in this chapter. Substantively, I will discuss the process of state disintegration and reconstruction. Here, I will draw on the experience of Eastern Europe following the collapse of Communism. Today, more than twenty new states occupy the territories formerly held by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the process of breakdown and rebuilding is incomplete, especially in terms of identity issues. For example, while most people have some understanding of how the first Yugoslavia collapsed, few appreciate how the second “rump” Yugoslavia and the surrounding territories remain in flux. Albanians and Slavs are working toward new political and social equilibria in Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and the three mixed municipalities in Serbia proper (Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedje). In Montenegro, the Slavic population is divided over whether they are Montenegrins, Serbs, or simultaneously Montenegrins and Serbs. In the Sandzak, people are debating whether they are Bosnjaks or just Muslims. In Moldova, a Dniestrian Republic rules a sliver of land on the left bank of Dniester River while the Gagauz have been given ethno-territorial autonomy within the entity on the right bank. In the Baltic republics, citizenship laws continue to be a matter of controversy.

Methodologically, I wish to address the relationship between rationality and emotion within the process of state disintegration and reconstruction. For this topic and this region, I would argue that it is necessary to consider both. Here, ethnic politics mixes reason with anger, resentment, and contempt.

There is hardly a single group in the region that does not feel a sense of victimhood and resulting anger. A core element of identity in the Baltic states rotates around Soviet deportations and killings; in Bosnia, various ethnic cleansings dominate republic and local politics; Albanian identity is shaped by Serbian discrimination and the forced mass exodus of 1999. The horror of the Second World War still casts a shadow over the region. Violence and a memory of violence affect the political processes involved with identity change through both reason and emotion. Rationally, violence affects expectations and destroys the foundations for trust. Emotionally, anger destroys the ability to adopt new common identities. How can one adopt a common identity category with members of a group who are associated with killing and domination? As Steve Van Evera asserts, violence can harden identities to the point that they resemble primordialism.¹

¹ Steve Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!" *Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association*, 12 (Winter 2001): 20-22.

As I have argued elsewhere, the emotion of resentment has had a ubiquitous presence in the politics of Eastern Europe.² The nature of modernization (rural peoples speaking one language displacing urban residents speaking another), along with the occupation policies of the Second World War and the ethno-federal systems of Communist rule combined to create a high level of ethnic awareness and sense of ethnic hierarchy in the region. To a significant extent, identity policies during the disintegration of states in the 1990's aimed to establish the dominance of one group over another. For instance, some languages became "official" languages while others would no longer be used for administrative purposes. New citizenship laws determined who and who wasn't a legitimate resident of the state. The composition of police forces and bureaucracies shifted. Resentment, an emotion resulting from a sense of unjust domination, has resulted.

In this paper, however, I wish to primarily discuss the role of two other related emotions—anger and contempt. Both have significantly altered, and continue to affect, the ethnic demography of Eastern Europe. This paper will build upon the combinatorial framework introduced by Chandra and Boulet in Chapter 5 and the model found in Chapter 6—"A Baseline Model of Change in an Activated Ethnic Demography." Both of these chapters are built on assumptions of rational choice. As they state, "We do assume that ordinary voters and political entrepreneurs are instrumental actors who make decisions through a process of conscious calculation of the payoffs associated with alternative categories, and that, no matter what the nature of their motivations and payoffs, individuals will prefer to be in the smallest winning majority for which they are eligible.." (Chandra and Boulet, Chapter 6, p. 9) While this assumption provides a coherent baseline, for certain phenomena related to state disintegration and reconstruction, it does not capture the important effects of emotion described above.

There are four sections to the paper. First, I will relate Chandra's framework in the introduction to the subject of state collapse and reconstruction by creating a six-stage sequence. Second, I will show the general applicability of many of the features of the Chandra model through the example of Moldovan identity politics. Third, I will make some general observations about the relationship between emotion and interest. Fourth, I will show how Chandra and Boulet's specific model of ethnic demographic change can be modified to take into account the effects of the emotion of anger that is an important force in many cases involving violence. Fifth, I will discuss the emotion of contempt. Brief concluding comments follow.

1. Outline of Chandra's Framework in Relationship to State Disintegration

Chandra provides us with a new set of definitions for the discussion of identity creation. A category is a term of description. Categories are composed of one or several qualifying characteristics that are termed attributes. "Attribute-dimensions are an array of mutually exclusive attribute-values which belong to the same family and encompass all of a specified population. "Category-dimensions" are an array of mutually exclusive categories which belong to the same family and encompass all of a specified population. As they state, "The basic building block of our theories of ethnic identity change should

² Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

be this repertoire of attribute-values and attribute-dimensions (for both individuals and populations) rather than a repertoire of categories and category-dimensions. Categories and category-dimensions are derived from this repertoire of attributes (p. 10)”

What role does a state play in this definitional scheme? In many multiethnic entities, the state is crucial in forming and maintaining attribute-dimensions and category-dimensions. In the introductory chapter, Chandra uses Yugoslavia as an example. In former Yugoslavia, there was a category-dimension of “nation” composed of the categories of Serb-Croat-Macedonian-Montenegrin-Slovene-Muslim. The state determined the qualifying attributes for membership in these categories, and constructed and maintained this category-dimension through its institutions. Most importantly, each of these nations had representation and power through republic level government. The state often tinkered with this dimension through changes in census categories and political upgrading of autonomous republics like Kosovo; a small percentage of the population called themselves Yugoslavs. However, for most of the post-war period, this state-based dimension of identity categories remained fairly stable. An individual’s perception of the most relevant family of identity categories could not ignore this reality. The stability of the state meant the stability of this dimension and its categories. In turn, the attributes composing categories were relatively stable. The inherent attributes of language and religion (or former religion) were the most obvious qualifying characteristics.

What does the disintegration of a state mean in this definitional scheme? The collapse of the state means the end of the institutions that maintained dimensions. Perceptions of families of categories are disrupted and no longer make sense. While the impact of state disintegration on old dimensions is at least somewhat clear, changes at the level of attribute and category are not. When a state disintegrates and a category-dimension collapses, categories and attributes may also lose their meaning and coherence. Chandra traces a process building from attributes to categories, and the placing of categories on category-dimensions. But there may be a reverse process with the collapse of a category-dimension leading to a collapse of categories and a “loosening” of attributes. If attributes become “free-floating,” that is, divorced from their connection to a category, identity entrepreneurs then have an enhanced ability to recombine them to form new categories. The task here is to identify the constraints on such strategies and specify when those constraints operate.

The following schema represents one possible interpretation of the process of state disintegration. Six stages are specified.

1. Relatively stable categories ordered into one or more category-dimensions exist before disintegration. Before the state disintegrates, individuals identify themselves with existing categories comprised of one or several attributes. It is important to note that Chandra discusses only inherited attributes in their framework. As they define it, an inherited attribute is a “characteristic that an individual acquires at birth from her parents or ancestors.” The key distinction is that an inherited attribute is based on a shared rather than private knowledge. Thus, Chandra holds that the set of feasible attributes are those

that are "either visibly displayed on the person or about which there is a collective record (p. 8)."

2. A variety of factors come into play to diminish and destroy the state. Economic decline and crisis, institutional factors, the end of ideology, changes in the international security system and other factors may drive the state toward disintegration. Compounding the matter, changes in identities themselves may help bring down the state. As evidenced by the differences among Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, this process may or may not involve violence.

3. Attributes are loosened from stable categories. As state-based dimensions collapse, categories can also start to lose their meaning and disintegrate. The specific attributes that comprised these categories can become available for recombination into new categories. Also, new attributes or attributes not formerly part of old categories become part of the mix. For example, religious attributes that were taboo under an old Communist order may now come into play. In short, there may be a large feasible set of "floating attributes."

4. Identity entrepreneurs string "floating" attributes together. Periods of disintegration should provide ideal conditions for identity entrepreneurs. Under these conditions, identity entrepreneurs choose among a set of attributes to create new identity categories that will attract the support of a winning coalition. Multiple identity entrepreneurs may exist to offer many new categories to the general population.

5. Individuals in the general population choose the best possible category to enhance their goals. Given the set of categories developed by identity entrepreneurs, individuals will choose the category best suited to achieve basic goals. Often, this choice will simply involve coordination of identity choice with others.

6. Categories become relatively stable once again. A new state usually forms a set of institutions that helps create, maintain, and give meaning to categories. In effect, new category-dimensions are formed. The system of attributes, categories, and attribute and category dimensions moves toward relative stability.

Within this schema, the rational choices emphasized by Chandra are found in the fourth and fifth stages. Making a rational choice can be defined in terms of relationships between desires (preferences), information, belief formation, and action. Rational choice says little about the content of desires but insists that they be stable and consistent. The individual then seeks information relevant to desired goals. Based on this information, a belief is formed about the best method or strategy to achieve the goal. An optimizing action results.

In Chandra's framework, this rational action cycle can be seen running twice. Political entrepreneurs desire certain things--votes, mobilization for a movement or a riot, recruits for a civil war. They seek information relevant to their goals. One key source of this information is the distribution of inherited attributes in the population. The political

entrepreneur then becomes an identity entrepreneur. This actor forms a belief that it is possible to string together a combination of attributes most likely to attract the support of an optimal coalition. A set of actions follows. The identity entrepreneur then assigns the combination of attributes a name, imbues the name with meaning, and works to maintain the category by making sure those adopting the name receive payoffs.

The rational choice cycle then turns a second time among individuals in the mass. Individuals desire to be in the winning coalition. They then seek information about how to be in the winning coalition. One key source of information is the nature of existing categories and the attributes that make up those categories. Individuals then form beliefs about which categories will best help them reach their desired goals. An action follows. The individual tries to acquire the attributes of the winning category. In the third chapter of this volume, Chandra and Boulet develop a model based on Riker's theory of minimum winning coalitions that specifies possibilities for change in an ethnic demography based on the choices made during this cycle.

2. An Example: The Breakdown and Reconstruction of Moldavia/Moldova

The transformation of Soviet Moldavia into Moldova conforms to the general contours of the breakdown and reconstruction outlined above.

Relatively stable categories ordered into category- dimensions exist before disintegration. Although the history of present day Moldova is complex, the Soviet state was effective in creating relatively stable identity-categories arrayed on the dimension of "nationality." The Russian Empire gained control of the Romanian-speaking region from nominal Ottoman control in 1812 and named it Bessarabia. In the turmoil at the end of the First World War, a Bessarabian assembly voted for unification with Romania. The Soviet Union never accepted the loss of this territory, however, and responded by creating a Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on the left bank of the Dniester River. Although Romanian speakers were a minority on this territory, the entity symbolized the continuing Soviet claims on Bessarabia.³ The Second World War allowed the Soviets to act on their claim. In a secret protocol attached to the Molotov-Ribbentrop accord, the region was assigned to the Soviet Union. Soviet control was brief as Romania recovered the territory with the German invasion of the USSR in 1941. The tables turned again when the Soviet Union took control of the area from Romania after the conclusion of World War II. The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed from historic Bessarabia and a sliver of land on the Eastern bank of the Dniester River that had comprised the interwar Moldavian Soviet Republic. Romanian speakers made up only thirty per cent of this eastern territory.⁴

³ Stuart Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 132.

⁴ This brief historical gloss leaves out many significant details. For summaries (with slightly different treatments) of the complex history and politics of Moldova, see Daria Fane, "Moldova: Breaking Loose from Moscow," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 121-153; Jonathan Eyl and Graham Smith, "Moldova and the Moldovans," in *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, Graham Smith, ed., (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 223-244; Alla Skvortsova, "The Cultural and Social Makeup of Moldova: A Bipolar or Dispersed Society?" in Pal Kolsto, ed., *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet*

When the Soviets gained control in 1944, they immediately set out to construct a new identity category of “Moldovian” to separate the region from Romania. In order to create this category, they first attempted to subtract Romanian from the attribute-dimension of language and replace it with the supposedly distinct language of “Moldovan.”

“Moldovans” were told that they spoke their own language, not Romanian. Accordingly, the alphabet was changed from Latin to Cyrillic. The flow of literature from neighboring Romania was strictly controlled. History books were rewritten to emphasize the distinctiveness and continuity of Moldovan culture. The new nationality category of “Moldovan” then was created, in which membership was based on speaking the “Moldovan” language.

Corresponding to policy throughout the rest of the Soviet state, all Soviet citizens were required to declare a nationality and the category was on all identity documents. In Moldova, the membership criteria for the nationality category included those who spoke the newly defined language of “Moldovan” but also had room for those who spoke other languages. “Romanian” meanwhile was effectively obliterated from the category-dimension of “nationality.” Table one below shows figures for both Soviet passport and ethnic self-awareness in Moldova. Note that only .1% entered “Romanian” as their nationality despite a higher proportion of those who were aware of themselves as “ethnically” Romanian. But, as we see, 63.5% of the population, presumably many of them speaking the language once identified as “Romanian,” entered “Moldovan” in the Soviet passport. Because this figure is larger than the 58% of those who felt themselves to be ethnically “Moldovan” we can surmise that it included those who spoke other languages. In fact, as we will see shortly in Table 2, almost a fifth of those who declared themselves “Moldovan” by nationality did not think in the “Moldovan” language and many of these were Russian speakers.

Table 1		Soviet Nationality versus Ethnic Self-Awareness	
Moldova		Soviet Passport (N= 1200)	Self-Awareness (N= 1200)
Moldovan		63.5	58
Romanian		0.1	3.4
Ukrainian		12.1	11.1
Russian		13.3	12.8

Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), pp. 159-196; Igor Munteanu, “Social Multipolarity and Political Violence,” in Pal Kolsto, ed., *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 197-231.

Gagauz		3.4		3.6	
Bulgarian		2.1		2.1	
Jewish		0.9		0.7	
Belarusian		0.3	-		
Roma		0.3	-		
Polish		0.3	-		
German		0.3		0.3	
No Passport		3.3	-		
Other		0.3		1.1	
Mixed				6.8	

Table from: Pal Kolsto, ed.; *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) p. 33.

A variety of factors come into play to diminish and destroy the state. The demise of the Soviet state need not be discussed here. Specific features of Soviet administration would play critical roles in the nature of the Moldavian SSR's collapse, though. The Soviet Fourteenth Army, as well as a disproportionate share of the Moldavian Republic's heavy industry, was located on the left bank. With the decline of the Soviet state and its system of central planning, the interests of both elites and mass on the east region of Moldova were highly threatened.

Attributes are loosened from stable categories and identity entrepreneurs string "floating" attributes together. During perestroika and the decline of party control, the meaning of the language attribute was transformed. Nationalist organizations arose to challenge the claim that a Moldovan language really differed from Romanian. Identity entrepreneurs had clear incentives to pick up on these nationalist themes concerning language. Partly because of their concentration in urban areas and on the more heavily industrialized left bank, Russians and Ukrainians tended to dominate key positions in industry and politics. In one list of key positions in leading plants and institutes in 1980, Moldovans held only 4 of 69 positions.⁵ Furthermore, the mass of Romanian/Moldovan speakers was threatened by creeping linguistic Russification. The relative power of the Russian language versus the Moldovan language can be seen in the language repertoires of other minorities. According to one survey one hundred per cent of Ukrainian respondents declared that Russian was either the language that they thought in (49.6%) or a language they were fluent in (50.4%). On the other hand, less than one in six of these Ukrainian respondents claimed to have bothered to learn Moldovan fluently (0.8% thought in Moldovan and 14.3% claimed fluency).

⁵ Munteanu, p. 204.

In 1988, Moldovan groups stated three demands—the recognition that Moldovan and Romanian are the same language, the reinstatement of the Latin script, and the recognition of the Romanian language as the state’s language. After much struggle, all three became reality. For clarity, however, I will refer to the Romanian language spoken by Moldovans simply as Moldovan throughout the rest of this section. Although the rights of minorities would be respected, all members of the state administration would be obliged to know and speak Romanian in their duties. Graham Smith sums up the larger significance of the move toward making language the dominant indicator of identity in Moldova:

. . . it amounted to extracting an open admission from their government that the republic was theirs and theirs alone, and that all other ethnic groups in Moldova were not ‘nations’ but rather ethnic minorities whose rights should be respected but whose claims could not be considered equal to the interests of the majority. The concept of a ‘Moldovan’ at last had a meaning.⁶

Table Two⁷ shows respective total percentages for language (the language one thinks in) and nationality in Moldova.

Identity	Total	Language		
		Moldovan	Russian	Other
Moldovan	61.4	50.2	6	5.2
Russian	12.8	0.4	11.3	1.1
Ukrainian	11.1	0.1	5.5	5.5
Other	14.7	4.1	3.5	7.1

Table 2: Moldava Nationalist and Linguistic Breakdown (percent)

In effect, Moldovan entrepreneurs were redefining the membership criteria for the nationality category “Moldovan,” replacing an expansive combination of attributes on the dimension of language (“Moldovan-speaking” or Russian-speaking or other) with a restrictive one (only Moldovan). As shown in the Table 2, a little over fifty percent of the population used Moldovan as the language they thought in. Only one in about six Russians and Ukrainians considered themselves fluent in Moldovan,⁸ and, as shown by the Table Two, practically none of them thought in Moldovan. A large pool of key positions would now be transferred to the Moldovan speakers. Furthermore, the language

⁶ Smith, p. 223.

⁷ Derived from Pal Kolsto and Olav Melberg, “Integration, Alienation, and Conflict in Estonia and Moldova,” in *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002). The language scores represent answers to what language the respondent thinks in.

⁸ Pal Kolsto and Olav Melberg, “Integration, Alienation, and Conflict in Estonia and Moldova,” in *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), p. 62, see Table 2.41.

move provided the possibility of unification of Moldova with Romania. Note from Table 2 that there is no alternative winning coalition that could be initiated by those defined by Russian or Ukrainian nationality and language. Prospects became increasingly bleak for Russophones.

Along the lines of constructivist premises, identity entrepreneurs were at work to counter the consequences of the move to language. As a first response, non-Moldovan speakers sought a political solution through alliance with Moscow. They also initiated a series of strikes in the Russophone areas. With little success in intimidating Moldovan nationalists, the next option was partition of the emerging new Moldovan state. On September 2, 1990, a Dniester Republic comprising the largely Russophone areas on the left bank, as well as the largely Russophone city of Bender, was declared.

The identity politics of this new creation were in some ways remarkable. Neither language nor the existing nationality attributes adequately capture the salient identity that emerged. Rather, a new "Soviet" nationality defined a Dniestrian. In effect, the Russian, Ukrainian and other minority nationality labels merged into the new "Soviet" nationality. A small number of Moldovans also adopted this identity attribute. Grigore Maracuta, at one point the Transnitrian Parliamentary Chairman, chose to migrate because he felt more comfortable with the Soviet-oriented ideology on the left bank.⁹ As Stuart Kaufman sums up, "The Transnitrian Russophones were the group, including Russified Moldovans and Ukrainians as well as Russians, that considered Russian its language and the Soviet Union its country."¹⁰ In effect, a Dniestrian can be anyone who does not identify with both the Moldovan nationality and the Moldovan language. Tables Three and Four show the language and nationality figures for the right and left banks.

Identity	Total	Language		
		Moldovan	Russian	Other
Moldovan	74.7	61.1	7.3	6.3
Russian	7.8	0.3	6.9	0.6
Ukrainian	9.7	0.1	4.8	4.8
Other	7.8	2.1	1.9	3.8

Table 3: Moldova Nationalist and Linguistic Breakdown on the Right Bank (percent)

⁹ See Kaufman, p. 147. American political scientist Charles King and David Laitin also concur that a hybrid identity emerged in Dniestria.

¹⁰ Kaufman, p. 130

Nationality	Total	Language		
		Moldovan	Russian	Other
Moldovan	29.9	24.5	2.9	2.5
Russian	40.7	1.4	35.9	3.4
Ukrainian	24.5	0.2	12.15	12.15
Other	4.9	1.3	1.2	2.4

Table 4: Moldova Nationalist and Linguistic Breakdown on the Left Bank (PMR) (percent)

Essentially, about a quarter or third of the population in each case could be denied full access to a variety of pay-offs. On the left bank, the excluded group is basically the 24.5% of the population located in the Moldovan language/Moldovan nationality category. On the right bank, those not fluent in the Moldovan language were excluded from several economic and political benefits. In terms of Chandra's model, this outcome supports maximizing behavior. In both cases, the result represented a stable minimum winning coalition that rewarded members with an increased share of society's goods.¹¹

Note, however, that there were other “minimum winning combinations” in the Left Bank that were not considered feasible options. Additional factors, as well as domestic demography, need to be taken into account in explaining why these counterfactuals were ruled out. In the case of the Left Bank, the smallest coalition would have been composed of just Russian speakers (52.15%). Two issues eliminated the option of a Russian-speaking coalition from consideration. First, because Russian and Ukrainian are such close languages, distinctions based on this cleavage would be difficult to enforce. This suggests that “visibility” may perhaps be an important restriction defining the “operative repertoire” of minimum winning categories in this context. Second, the Dniester government could ill afford to antagonize neighboring Ukraine through discrimination against Ukrainian speakers. In fact, in order to appease the international community as a whole, leaders on the Left Bank needed to avoid overtly discriminatory politics. Given these constraints, Dniestrian elites arguably did the best they could in forming a minimum winning coalition. In theory, furthermore, Moldovans could have united with Ukrainians on nationality to form a smaller minimum winning coalition. However, in reality the separation of Russians and Ukrainians on this score would be extremely difficult given their intertwined histories and general russification. Other combinations too which could produce the right numbers were not viable options. For instance, Russian nationality could be combined in a category with Other-speakers (essentially Ukrainian speakers). However, such a category would exclude Russian speaking Ukrainians. It seems unlikely that Russians nationals would accept Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians but exclude Russian speaking Ukrainians

Individuals in the general population choose the best possible category to enhance their goals. Soon, militias formed on each side. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in

¹¹ This argument applies, I believe, whether the language numbers are in terms of “thinking in the language,” as represented in the tables above, or in terms of answers regarding “fluency.”

1991, the situation lapsed into civil war. The situation compelled most citizens to pick a side. With the support of the Russian Fourteenth Army, the Dniestrians repelled attacks from right bank regime and the situation eventually stabilized. The civil war, however, resulted in 1,200 dead and 6,000 wounded.

Categories become relatively stable once again. In some ways, the level of stability of post-partition Moldova is remarkable. At the time of this writing (January 2005), almost no analyst can imagine a new outbreak of violence in the foreseeable future. It is also notable that the nationality hybrid created on the left bank during the waning days of the Soviet state has survived the end of the Soviet state that it was based on. Identity entrepreneurs create new histories of the Dniestrian people. For instance, the Second Congress of Dniester local Soviets declared in 1990:

The Congress views the historical processes that have taken place on our ancient land since the time of Kievan Rus as the formation of a coethnos that now inhabits the southwestern part of the country (the USSR). This coethnos is made up of descendants of the inhabitants from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, Germany, Greece, and other countries.¹²

This coethnic mythology still reigns. Identity is not based on language in the Dniestrian Republic. Russian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian are all official languages, even though in practice Russian is dominant.

On the right bank, all predictions that Moldovans would soon unify with Romania have proven unfounded. New institutions have been formed which provide pay-offs to those in new positions of authority. As Smith points out about the situation in independent Moldova, "(N)ew and highly prestigious occupational niches were created for Moldova's intellectual elites with statehood who realized that their interests would be best served through securing the survival of an independent Moldova."¹³ For Moldovans, a merger with a large mass of fellow Romanian speakers, especially those in a poor and impoverished state like Romania did not seem to assure higher pay-offs than those awarded to Romanian speakers in Moldova. In retrospect, it is not surprising that Moldovans have remained independent from Romania.

Along the lines of Chandra's and Boulet's model, the stable partition of Moldova results from two stable coalitions. There is little incentive for elites to destabilize the situation. Along lines of the fifth stage in the sequence, there is also little incentive for individuals in the mass to deviate. Neither the remaining russophones in Moldova nor those identifying with both the Moldovan language and nationality in Dniestria have the numbers to politically challenge the status quo.

In sum, the general progression of events conforms to the six stages above. The Soviet Union did possess a relatively stable set of identity categories based on the dimension of nationality. State institutions, such as ethno-federal territories, helped perpetuate a stable

¹² Quoted by Skvortsova, p. 175.

¹³ Smith, p. 240.

demography. With the breakdown of the Soviet central state, attributes could take on new meanings. Moldovan identity entrepreneurs enhanced the salience of language in order to create a minimum winning coalition that would shift resources and jobs to a relatively small majority. Russophone identity entrepreneurs countered with their own strategy. Individuals in the general population conformed. A relatively straightforward story about the disintegration and reconstruction of Moldova can be told relying solely on rational choice assumptions and mechanisms.

However, there are aspects of this story, and especially of the stories that have emerged from the Yugoslav wars, that remain somewhat inexplicable without reference to emotion. One such point relates to the stability of Moldova's partition. Rationality alone seems insufficient to explain the stability of this new state. The Dniestrian Republic is not internationally recognized. Its economy is in dire straits with little prospect for improvement. In 1995, the average monthly wage in Dniestria was seven to ten US dollars making it one of the poorest regions in the former USSR. Even though elites may be able to obtain a large share of Dniestrian goods, the pathetic state of the economy would not seem to make this option so attractive. Long-term prospects would appear to favor reconciliation with Moldova and another round of identity change involving a new common identity. The reason this option is not taken, at least in part, probably stems from the 1,200 dead and the civil war that occurred in the recent past. In short, the emotion of anger may still cast a cloud over reconciliation and new identity dynamics. This is the subject of the next section.

3. General Comments about Emotion and Interest

A common saying in the United States goes, "Never get so mad that it costs you money."¹⁴ But of course the saying exists because our emotions often do get in the way of our material interest. Emotions, rather than monetary interests, often come to drive the progression of divorce suits and disputes over wills. When strong emotions pervade decisions, individuals come to ignore relevant information and form irrational beliefs through wishful thinking, or they simply can't bring themselves to do actions that they may in fact know are in their material interest.

In my own fieldwork in Kosovo, I have met Serbs whose property has ended up on the Albanian side of ethnic divisions. They have known for several years that it would be in their interest to sell the property and move on with their lives; they have no expectations of returning to live on the property and little expectation of receiving a higher price in the future. In the meantime, they often live in the squalid conditions of refugee life. For some, the emotion of hopelessness may have produced inaction. However, others are driven by the emotion of spite. They cannot stand thinking about how Albanians will benefit from Serbian suffering and dispossession. As the years pass, however, more and more of them will sell. Spite, like many other emotions, has a half life. It is subject to decay over time. While the emotion erodes, interests remain.

In the Balkans, emotions have also been tied to the surrender of war criminals to the Hague and the issuance of apologies for wartime atrocities. For instance, it would have

¹⁴ My father gave me this advice, and I have heard it elsewhere, so I believe it is common.

been in the material interests of Serbs to admit to wrongdoing and fully cooperate with the international bodies immediately after the fall of Milosevic. However, a significant segment of the population saw these actions as humiliations. Serbian resentment against the unjust dominance of the West supported Kostunica's policy of refusing complete cooperation on these issues. Slowly, the Serbs. Like the Croats, will eventually bow to international pressure thus and receive the international rewards that they have foregone for many years. Resentment will fade, economic and political interests will remain. But the process takes years to play out.

Many emotions have half-lives and their force erodes. Anger, the focus of the next section, like spite and resentment, is such an emotion. Other emotions do not possess this property, but are based on stable cognitions which can support fairly constant dispositions. As discussed below, ethnic contempt is an emotion defined by a cognition that a target group is inherently inferior or defective and the action tendency is to shun that group. The emotion can be the foundation of exclusionary and hierarchical social systems. The cognitions and beliefs that produce this emotion can go on indefinitely. In fact, they are often handed down to one's children and as a result ethnic contempt can sustain social separation across generations.

Ethnic contempt, like the emotions defined by half-lives, can conflict with economic interest. Consider the case of American professional baseball leagues. Until the late 1940's, no major league team allowed Black players. No formal rule existed; the ban was only sustained by a "gentleman's agreement" that in turn was partially supported by social stigmas against Blacks and the intermixing of races. When the color line was broken, teams had incentives to recruit the best players from the Negro Leagues. Those teams with the most racist ownership that still avoided Blacks often began to lose more games.¹⁵ There was a cost to ethnic contempt. The only remedy for these teams was to also recruit Black players.¹⁶ Eventually, all teams began to seek the best players regardless of race. Correspondingly, along lines of the contact hypothesis, racism on the field, if not the front office, largely disappeared. Here, material interest drove cooperation that in turn diminished the emotion.

To come back the central issue of this chapter, emotions are clearly a central focus of political leaders when attempting the reconstruction of states. Perhaps the most famous speech in US history is Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. In anticipating the difficulties that lie ahead in reconciling North and South after the end of the Civil War, Lincoln concluded his speech with the words "with malice toward none." Unfortunately,

¹⁵ This point is often made in reference to the Boston Red Sox. The Yawkey owned club was often seen as racist and Black players were scarce. This fact is often cited as a primary reason for the failure to win the World Series for 86 years. This point is a major issue in a recent HBO documentary film. For other teams, the incentives to recruit Black players often went beyond victories on the field. The Busch family, famous as brewers of Budweiser Beer, owned the St. Louis Cardinals during the period of integration. August Busch directed the team to recruit Blacks because "Blacks drink beer" and it would be excellent advertising and public relations to have several Black players. See Ken Halberstam (Book on the 1964 World Series).

¹⁶ Also see Lawrence Summers' January 2005 speech about women and the sciences in academia. He makes the argument, unsurprisingly given his background as an economist, that barriers to women in terms of prejudice should not exist due to competitive pressures.

as Lincoln undoubtedly knew, the presence of malice after bloody civil conflict is usually pervasive, a point which leads into a discussion of anger.

4. Anger

In his article "Primordialism Lives!" Stephen Van Evera discusses factors that impede identity change. He writes:

Conflict enhances the hardening effect of mass literacy on identity by enhancing the emotional impact of recorded national memories. The experience of warring or oppressed peoples, filled as it is with tales of common struggle and sacrifice for the common good, creates a stronger we-feeling than the experience of people who escape these tragedies; hence it has stronger effects when national scribes record and purvey it.

For this reason groups in conflict are especially poor candidates for identity change, and identity change is an especially unlikely remedy for ethnic conflict.¹⁷

A common feature of state collapse is the possibility and reality of violence.¹⁸ In turn, violence creates anger. The current politics of reconstruction in Bosnia are almost certainly hampered by anger. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims do not hold each other in contempt. It would be hard for such racially, linguistically, and culturally similar groups to see each other as inherently defective. But they do see each other's actions during the war as brutal and despicable. Given the tens or hundreds of thousands killed, the hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the existence of concentration camps and mass rape, it would be impossible not to hold this cognition. Among many Bosnians of all backgrounds, the emotion of anger has heightened the desire to punish the other side rather than cooperate. The result does not appear to be in the best interests of the population. Bosnia's GDP per capita is on par with some of the poorest states in the world. Its level of \$1800 per capita GDP is far below its 1990 level. Some might hold that the problem simply lies with the lack of proper incentives. However, international administrators have tried a wide variety of rewards, penalties, and threats in an effort to create a new common Bosnian identity. Thus far, they have had little success. More than likely, the emotional baggage of the war and atrocities is a major factor in preventing any such shift.

Emotion is a mechanism that explains shifts in motivation. When under the influence of emotion, individuals modify what they want. Sometimes emotions act as "switches--an emotion may heighten one desire above all others even if the action that results damages the long-term interests of the individual. In other situations, emotion works to diminish or enhance an interest. Specific emotions can be distinguished by two qualities—cognition and action tendency. Fear is the cognition of danger with an action tendency

¹⁷ Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!" *Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association*, 12 (Winter 2001): 20-22.

¹⁸ Two stages seem most likely to see violence. As in Moldova, the introduction of new attributes may provoke a backlash. In other cases that are in a final stage of stabilization, losers in the process may use violence to disrupt the emerging equilibrium.

for fight or flight. The three emotions mentioned in the introduction can be discussed in these terms. Anger is the cognition that an agent has committed a blameworthy action against you; the action tendency is to punish that agent. Contempt forms from the cognition that an object or group is inherently defective; the action tendency is to shun that object or group. Resentment is the cognition that one is in an unjust status position vis-à-vis other individuals or groups; the action tendency is to commit actions that reduce the status of these individuals or groups.

These emotions can also be linked to social interactions. If I think that individuals with attribute X are threatening, the emotion of fear results when I meet them. I become more psychologically and physically ready to commit certain defensive actions. In the remaining sections, I will show how these emotions, in conjunction with the rational interest based model of Chandra and Boulet affect changes in ethnic demographics during the processes of state disintegration and reconstruction.

At this point, we can relate anger to Chandra and Boulet's model. I refer specifically to Figure 6 in Chapter 3. Here, Chandra and Boulet depict a scenario with two minimum winning categories. According to the rational choice assumptions of the model, they "expect the initial outcome to be an ethnic demography based on the smaller of these minimum winning categories (p. 21)." However, when violence produces anger, it would be difficult to predict that the smaller minimum winning coalition will always be chosen. Bosnian Muslims, for example, are currently unlikely to modify their identity repertoire in a way that will produce an association with Bosnian Serb perpetrators of violence. In Kosovo, Albanians continue to shun any identification that would include Serbs and other minorities.

Does this mean that cases of violence are likely to breed the near-primordialism that Van Evera predicts? This need not be the case. Event-based emotions, unlike object-based emotions, are likely to fade with time. Interest, on the other hand, does not. Jon Elster has discussed this effect in his work on transitional justice pointing out that in the trials collaborators following the Second World War sentences were almost invariably more severe immediately after the war than two or three years later.¹⁹ This insight suggests an addition to Chandra and Boulet's model in the form of an "anger function."

Such a function can be illustrated with reference to Chandra and Boulet's Figure 6. Consider the following three variations of the same scenario. In each case, assume that foreign whites have committed violence against every other category. As a result, Blacks are angry at whites. Assume further that this anger has helped create the following preferences in the aftermath of violence. 1) Above all, one wishes to be in a winning coalition. 2) Against assumptions of maximization, one prefers to share the pay-off with a higher number of non-perpetrators (MWC1) than a lower number that includes members of the perpetrator group (MWC2). 3) As anger recedes, the willingness to accept the costs (MWC1-MWC2) involved with the bigger coalition recedes. If the costs of the bigger coalition pass a certain threshold determined by the amount of time that has

¹⁹ See Jon Elster. "Memory and Transitional Justice." Unpublished manuscript delivered at the "Memory of War" Workshop, MIT January 2003.

passed since the violent events, the individual will become ready to re-identify despite lingering anger 4) At a certain point, the emotion recedes altogether and has no effect (extinction point).

	Black	White
Foreign	0.4 (a)	0.25 (b)
Native	0.3 (c)	0.05 (d)

Table 1: Table A

	Black	White
Foreign	0.4 (a)	0.2 (b)
Native	0.4 (c)	0.0 (d)

Table 2: Table B

	Black	White
Foreign	0.45 (a)	0.07 (b)
Native	0.45 (c)	0.03 (d)

Table 3: Table C

Table 5 composed of sub-tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 (Reproduction of Chandra and Boulet's Figure 6)

In each case above, the optimal, that is smallest, winning coalition would include foreign whites. However, anger prevents any immediate change in identity that would allow such a shift. Foreign Blacks would rather coalesce with other Blacks than switch their identity to foreign despite that higher pay-offs such a shift could generate. The three scenarios exhibit three different costs of anger. In scenario A, the difference between minimum winning coalition 1 (MWC1--all Blacks) that does not include whites and minimum winning coalition 2 (MWC2-foreign) that would include whites is only 5%. In scenario B, the difference increases to .2 and scenario C to .38.

How long will individuals accept the costs of anger and exclusion? If anger recedes, eventually interest will override emotion. The population, and elites, will have incentives to induce identity shift. The relationship between acceptance of lower payoffs and time can be modeled in different ways. The graphs in the appendix represent "anger curves." Figures 1 through 4 show initial high levels of anger that recede according to linear, exponential, inverse exponential, and mixed exponential functions. In all figures, anger is assumed to become extinct in ten years. The line represents the point at which interest begins to outweigh anger, where individuals no longer wish to forego the available pay-off on account of anger. At this point, individuals may come to think that they are "cutting off their nose to spite their face, that it is "time to get on with things," to "bury the hatchet." The English language is filled with metaphors that capture these ubiquitous qualities of human nature. We might also expect to see various reconstructions of history at this point. For instance, in order to justify an identity shift that includes members of a former perpetrator group, elites might be expected to claim that the group "wasn't really that bad" and that "they were manipulated by evil leaders."

The linear model suggests that anger recedes steadily and consistently. The exponential function suggests that the original anger maintains itself for a considerable amount of time and then fades quickly. The reverse exponential function indicates that the initial high level of anger fades quickly but then lingers at some level for a long time. The mixed function models a sustained initial high level of anger followed by a rapid drop and then a lingering phase where anger remains a low level remnant of social interaction.

An important point here is that they would make different predictions in terms of ethnic demographic shift. With the linear function, the population would be ready for a shift from Black to foreign in nine years in scenario A, six years in scenario B, and just 2.4 years in scenario C. The respective numbers for all the functions are:

Linear: 9, 6, 2.4

Exponential: 9.5, 7.7, 4.9

Inverse Exponential: 6.9, 3.7, 1.3

Mixed Exponential: 7.8, 5.5, 3.45

This exercise yields the insight that identities are more likely to resist change when the difference among pay-offs is small. Under these assumptions, if there is a sizable difference in pay-offs between equilibria and if anger recedes exponentially, we should expect a very rapid switch in the saliency of identity (1.3 years in the example above). On the other hand, if the pay-off is low, sub-optimal identities may be maintained for the length of the existence of anger. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive. One might think that small differences might be overcome more rapidly than large ones, but the analysis here suggests that the avoidance of high costs primarily drives the outcome.

Of course, different levels of violence produce different intensities of anger. The initial point and extinction points of the curves would need to change correspondingly.

Modeling Anger after Extreme Violence

Primordialists might claim that often nations are created through genocidal levels of violence or long historical periods of domination. These memories, as suggested by the Van Evera quote above, become part of history textbooks and folklore that “national scribes purvey and record.” Violence becomes memory. In turn, anger, and its effects on identity shift arise in generation after generation.

While such criticism undoubtedly has some merit, the model above could be modified to address some of these issues.²⁰ Assume that those who are alive at the time of genocidal violence retain a constant high level of anger their entire lives. Assume further that they pass down the memory of victimhood to following generations and that the individuals in these following generations become aware of their legacy at age fifteen. However, with the passage of time the ability to pass down the emotional intensity of the violence becomes increasingly difficult. Time passes, new events occur. The vividness of the memory of violence becomes part of a past that cannot be emotionally captured.

²⁰ I owe most of this section to my research assistant, Mark Finlayson.

These elements can be captured through a series of demographic assumptions. First assume a normal population distribution with a life expectancy of 65 years and a standard deviation of ten years. Assume that children become aware of their cultural conceptions of victimhood at age 15 with a standard deviation of three years. The product of these two curves yields a curve representing the "aware population." To model the gradual decrease in the intensity of this culturally inherited anger, assume that the ability to hand down anger starts at the maximum 0.5 level (the highest possible difference between MWC 1 and MWC2) and decreases linearly with an extinction time of 25 years. This assumption is captured graphically by Figure 5 (Genocidal MWC Differential Model). Thus, those born 25 years after the violent event, despite the efforts of in-group members) can no longer feel anger at a level that would generate acceptance of lower pay-offs in identity coalitions.

Given these assumptions, the resulting anger function is represented by Figure 6. Here, for the first twenty years after the genocidal violence, anger prevents any consideration of identity switch regardless of the trade-offs in terms of MWC1-MWC2. However, as survivors die off and the ability to transfer the vividness and intensity of the violence to descendants declines, the overall population becomes less ready to maintain the losses created by the identity status quo. With the higher pay-offs associated with scenario C, the population will be ready to shift identities in about 40 years. It would take over seventy years for scenario B, and almost eighty years for scenario A. In this example, anger finally dies out as a force on identity after eighty years.²¹

Several instances of Eastern European violence would seem to have such a progression. In earlier research, I worked in Lithuania. Often, when I mentioned my fieldwork to American Jews, they would provide me with a lecture on Lithuanian collaboration with the Nazis against the Jews during the Second World War. This violence had occurred more than fifty years earlier, but the resulting anger had been passed down across generations and across the ocean. That violence was probably playing a role in the ever-dwindling number of Lithuania's Jews. The category Lithuanian and Jewish may have been a difficult one to accept, especially with the surge of nationalism in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet state and the reconstruction of independent Lithuania.

Bosnia may provide a field of variation to see which of the above models applies. Identity shift in Srebrenica, the location of genocidal mass killing, may follow the second pattern while areas of Bosnia that saw much less violence might follow variations of the first. In Kosovo, regional difference in the level of violence, for example, between Pec with high violence and Pristina with lower level of violence, might be used to assess the political nature and function of anger.

5. Contempt

As discussed above, emotions can be defined by their cognitive antecedents and action tendency. Ethnic contempt is the cognition that a group is inherently inferior or defective; the action tendency is to shun that group. The emotion is closely related to the

²¹ This outcome generally obtains even with shorter extinction rates. The demographic assumptions largely drive the outcome.

phenomenon of stigma, undoubtedly one of the ugliest features of human interaction. In Chandra's constructivist terminology, ethnic stigma can be defined as the negative emotional reaction to one particular attribute. The phenomenon is perhaps most clear with non-ethnic attributes. Individuals often recoil at the sight of people exhibiting signs of the AIDS virus. There is a sense that there is something inherently wrong with the AIDS-infected individual, and the action tendency is to avoid that person. The emotion of contempt is defined by this combination of a cognition that a person or group is inherently inferior or defective combined with an action tendency to shun that person or group. At least some forms of racism also fit here. One particular attribute, skin color in this case, produces a very negative emotional reaction in an out-group. There is contempt for individuals with a specific skin color—those that possess that attribute are inferior and should be excluded from many social interactions.

The sources of ethnic stigma and contempt are not always understood. Clearly, institutions such as slavery and apartheid help to create and sustain racial stigmas. In some instances, a history of conflict and cultural separation can convert ethnic difference into ethnic contempt. Julie Mertus describes such a process as taking place in the former Yugoslavia as Serbs developed ethnic contempt toward Albanians in Kosovo:

Kosovo was an abstraction, a set of myths in the popular imagination. Over time, the nationalism became racialized, that is, difference was framed in terms of perceived physical differences in skin, nose, ears, IQ, sexuality. In this sense, nationalism became "written on the body." Slurs against Kosovo Albanians shifted. No longer referred to as "white hats" (alluding to the hats worn by men in traditional dress), a sexualized imagery of Albanian men and women was adopted. In the mainstream Serbian and Yugoslav presses, Albanian men were declared to be rapists, although Kosovo had the lowest reported incidents of sexual violence in Yugoslavia. Albanian women were portrayed as mere baby factories, despite statistics indicating that the childbirth rates of urban Albanian women and those of other urban women in Yugoslavia were nearly identical. Accused in the past of being culturally inferior, Albanians increasingly were depicted as genetically inferior as well. This is racism of the purest sort. (Mertus, p. 8).

The existence of stigma is also evidenced by pejorative terms or slurs. The actual term used in much of Serbia and Macedonia is usually not "Albanian" but the pejorative "shiptar." In Macedonia in 2002, a school in the northwest region was re-named to honor an Albanian teacher. In response, an estimated 30,000 Macedonian children participated in blocking the main highway between Tetovo and Skopje. At one point the young protestors were reported chanting "gas chambers for the shiptars."²² The fact that school children employ such negative epithets is evidence of a transmission of stigma across generations. Albanians in Kosovo have their own pejorative term for Serbs, "shkija." In Kosovo, the attribute of "Serb nationality" generates ethnic contempt. In the

²²Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Friday November 1, 2002
(www.iwpr.net/?index.pl?archive/bcr2/bcr2_20021011_5_eng.txt)

pogroms of March 2004, all Serbs, even the elderly, were attacked. Regardless of the target's political or social background or characteristics, simply possessing the attribute "Serb nationality" made the individual a legitimate target. Despite the rhetoric of some Western-oriented elites, it is apparent that for the majority of Kosovo's Albanian population the category "Serb" implies an inherent problem. Serbs remain isolated in sealed off enclaves and association with Serbs is basically taboo. In the south Balkans, some level of ethnic contempt exists toward Albanians, Serbs in some regions, and Roma almost everywhere.

The existence of ethnic contempt and stigmatized attributes poses clear challenges to common thinking in constructivist approaches to ethnic groups. Above all, ethnic stigmas can be a severe constraint on choice. Constructivist theory usually emphasizes the fluidity of identity choice. Elites are seen as free to create parties or platforms that appeal to different identities or combinations of identities. Individuals are assumed to be able to emphasize the aspects of identity that further their own goals. But ethnic stigmas limit choices. Ethnic minorities possessing the stigmatized attribute cannot choose to have majorities end their negative emotions about that attribute. The majorities themselves cannot just choose to end their emotions and prejudices. Furthermore, stigmas limit the choices of political elites and identity entrepreneurs.

Clearly, stigmas involve imposition of identity. There is seldom a reason to choose to possess a stigmatized identity. Although identities can be created and chosen, the general population is often ready to ignore the choices of some groups and impose its own version of identity. Consider the case of the Egyptians in the Balkans. There may be no better example of the social construction of ethnic identity than the "Egyptians" of Kosovo and Macedonia.²³ In the late 1980's, Slobodan Milosevic targeted Albanians as the source of problems in the south Balkans. The regime stripped Albanians of their positions in the government. A plethora of Serb-dominated security forces made life difficult for Albanians in the region. Building an identity on the attribute of "Albanian-speaking" was not an optimal strategy. One segment of the population began to form a new category in response.

For some of the Albanian-speaking Roma, folklore about Egyptian origins became the basis of a new category. Entrepreneurs combined a set of attributes that included Albanian-speaking and Muslim religion with certain demographic and historical characteristics. Egyptians were different than Roma, they claimed. Egyptians live in towns, have a relatively higher standard of living than Roma, and a history of specialized occupations. They claimed to have a distinct culture that separated them from the Ashkali, (another set of Albanian-speaking Roma) as well. As evidence, in 1991 they presented a book of regional Egyptian folklore to the Egyptian ambassador in Belgrade. In 1992, Macedonian Egyptians demanded their own radio and television programs.

²³ Much of this section is from Ger Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

Given the state of pay-offs for certain identity categories, the movement appeared to be astute. The value of being a Roma is not high in political, economic, or social terms, not to mention the power of local stereotypes. The value of being an Albanian at that time and in that place had drastically declined. The optimal choice was to be neither Roma nor Albanian, but to become Egyptian. This construction tied the group to a foreign country with associational benefits. For instance, they have been invited to the Egyptian embassy on certain holidays. In the early 1990's, the construction also produced immediate pay-offs from the ruling regimes in Belgrade and Skopje. Milosevic, for obvious reasons, declared that up to half of the group calling themselves Albanians may in fact be Egyptian. Serb and Macedonian academics "uncovered" new sources and interpreted old ones to support the claim. This case demonstrates how identity entrepreneurs can string together a set of attributes to create a new category. One set of upwardly mobile Albanian-speaking Roma accepted the category as a way to preserve and enhance their social and economic position during a period of political turmoil and identity flux.

However, both choice and imposition mechanisms have been at play for the Roma in Kosovo. The events in Mitrovica in 1999 are informative on the imposition side. Over eight thousand Roma lived in a compact area in Kosovska Mitrovica on the south side of the Ibar River in the beginning of 1999. The neighborhood was known as Ciganska Mahala and was one of the largest, wealthiest, and most stable Roma communities in all of Eastern Europe. While everyone knows that Serbian forces drove hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo during the NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, few people know of the ethnic cleansing of Ciganska Mahala. When the Albanian population and the Kosovo Liberation Army returned to Kosovska Mitrovica, they completely cleansed Ciganska Mahala. Under the watch of NATO, the neighborhood burned for seven days and nights. Not a single Roma dwelling was left standing.

While some of the residents of Ciganska Mahalla might have chose to adopt the Egyptian identity, it appears that the majority population and its armed members did not really care about this choice. There is little evidence of remorse over Ciganska Mahala. It was a Roma neighborhood and, in the eyes of many of the majority population, it could be legitimately cleansed. In 2002, the area was slated to become a shopping mall and recreation area. As things are, violence had become the ultimate arbiter of identity.

Contempt and the Reconstruction of States

In larger states, stigmatized groups can often be marginalized in ways that make them inconsequential in the larger political order. In some cases, as indicated by Ralph Ellison's book, stigmatized groups can become "invisible." After all, the action tendency of contempt is to shun and ignore the object of the emotion. However, the process of state breakdown and reconstruction will often create situations in which the political status and power of stigmatized groups become a pivotal issue. The situation changes largely because state breakdown produces new demographics that increase the relative size of the stigmatized group. These groups become significant both in term of their ability to project force and their relevance to electoral outcomes.

The Moldovan case provides an example where the Gagauz minority--a marginalized group, if not a stigmatized group—became the focus of a larger political struggle and ended up with an enhanced political status. The Gagauz would seem to have been a poor candidate to become part of a model for ethnic tolerance. Comprising only 150,000-160,000 total in southern Moldova, the Gagauz are a poor, largely rural, Turkic-speaking Orthodox group. While perhaps not the object of contempt in the same way as Roma or Kosovar Albanians, the Gagauz were certainly marginal. During the tail end of World War II and the immediate post-war years, the community was the victim of both Stalinist repression and famine. Culturally, the language and culture was neglected with only thirty-three books published in the Gagauz language during the Soviet period; Gagauz children were taught in the Russian language.²⁴ During the perestroika period, Gagauz demands for heightened autonomy and cultural protection were met with derision by Moldovan legislators. The Moldovan Supreme Soviet denied that the Gagauz were not a real "people" but rather, as some parliamentarians proclaimed, were "Bulgarians assimilated by the Turks."²⁵

Within a few years, however, the Moldovan parliament overwhelmingly approved a Gagauz autonomous territory. This entity would have three official languages--Gagauz, Moldovan, and Russian. There was no question that the Gagauz were a fully recognized group defined primarily by nationality (many Russified Gagauz speak Gagauz poorly). As one commentator summarizes, "It is noteworthy that the decision to proceed with Gagauz territorial autonomy and the terms of that autonomy have met with a political consensus in Moldova; the government has not faced any political or societal backlash . . ."²⁶

To keep the comparison in mind, in Kosovo a poor and largely rural minority was stripped of its autonomy and subject to ethnic cleansing while in Moldova a poor and largely rural minority was elevated to territorial autonomy without backlash. The differing outcome in these cases was not always apparent during the process of breakdown and reconstruction. In 1990, Gagauz leaders demanded political autonomy and set up elections for a new political entity. In response, tens of thousands of Moldovan volunteers converged in the "march to the south" to prevent these elections. A quickly formed alliance of Gagauz, volunteers from Dniestria, and Soviet troops from Ukraine who acted as buffers worked to repulse the Moldovan volunteers. A compromise was then reached among relevant elites in which a moratorium was declared both for Gagauz elections and Moldavian Supreme Soviet's edict rejecting autonomy for Gagauzia. After this confrontation, attention was again focused on the conflict with Dniestria that was described previously. When the Dniestria situation stabilized, Moldovans essentially set upon a policy of appeasement of the Gagauz culminating in the agreement granting territorial autonomy and multiple official languages in 1995.²⁷

²⁴Kaufman, p. 160. Also see Vladimir Socor, "Moldova's Gagauz Republic Organizes and Becomes a Precedent for Europe," (www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_001_007_005.htm).

²⁵Skvortsova, p. 186.

²⁶Socor, p. 3.

²⁷I am skipping over some important issues in intra-elite bargaining here for the sake of parsimony.

In identity terms, the Gagauz case illustrates a situation in which a poor, marginal group confronts a majority group in the midst of state reconstruction and comes away as a new and apparently respected territorially based nationality group. Coming back to Chandra's theory, in Moldova attributes were loosened from stable categories and strung together in new ways in negotiations among elites. The new categories become accepted by the population and become relatively stable once again.

The case suggests a mechanism for the mitigation of contempt. Ethnic contempt is based on the cognition of a group's inferiority. In this case, this cognition became challenged by certain political realities. The Moldovans were confronted with stalemate with the Gagauz in October of 1990. Their "march to the south" was blocked by a combination of Gagauz, Dniestrian, and Soviet forces. How were the Moldovans to interpret being blocked by a small and, in many ways inferior, people? One solution to this situation of cognitive dissonance is a reevaluation of the opposing group's worth and status. In this particular case, the outcome was undoubtedly helped by a relatively low level of ethnic contempt (certainly in comparison with Roma, for example) and the interests at stake. Moldovans wanted to preserve their gains without risking further conflict. They also wanted to set an example with the Gagauz for possible reconciliation and settlement with Dniestria. Finally, there were few economic goods and little military threat emanating from the Gagauz territories. What small level of contempt that Moldovans felt for the Gagauz was likely to be overcome by these interests.

Breakdown and reconstruction can create confrontations transform stigmatized and marginal groups into important actors. If the breakdown of larger states creates many smaller states, as in the case of the USSR and Yugoslavia, the process can also create demographics that increase percentages of stigmatized groups that make them an important focus of electoral politics. These groups may become either targets of exclusion or targets of inclusion. In either case, the stigmatized group no longer remains invisible. When a stigmatized group becomes politically important, the emotion of contempt also becomes salient. The question becomes whether this emotion can be incorporated into constructivist models.

Integrating Contempt into Constructivist Models

A. Individual Trade-offs

In the case of contempt, individuals do not wish to be included in a category which contains significant numbers of stigmatized individuals. However, there are limits to how far individuals allow their emotions to control their behavior. They might wish to exclude those with the stigmatized attribute, but if the political or economic costs of exclusion are high, they may act against their natural, emotion-based aversions in order to satisfy these interests.

As with anger, the costs involved with contempt can be modeled along a variety of indifference curves. Consider Figure 7. The vertical axis represents interest measured by the percentage difference between two winning coalitions. The horizontal axis represents

the “costs” of contempt measured by the percentage of individuals with the stigmatized attribute within the category. How these indifference lines should be drawn is of course a matter of debate. The modeler would have to incorporate not only insights from social psychology, but also anthropological knowledge about the relationships among groups within the culture or society under investigation. Figure 7 simply includes four different hypothetical possibilities:

Figure 7 Here

Line M: In some cases, individuals may see a straightforward relationship between interest and their aversion. They will accept small numbers of members of the stigmatized group (from now on designated by the letter S) even if the pay-off is small, but they will accept large numbers of S only if the pay-off is large. Here, the individual accepts the inclusion of 1% S for a 1% decline in MWC. A 5% inclusion rate would require a 5% drop in MWC, a 20% S rate would require a 20% drop, and so on.

Line N: This linear relationship can be modified to represent more and less severe forms of contempt. Line N shows a function in which every 1% decline in MWC creates acceptance of 5% S.

Line O: In other cases, individuals accept high costs to be in a category completely free of S, but once the barrier is broken additional numbers of S create relatively low emotional costs.

Line P: Sometimes individuals might not see a cost for inclusion until the numbers reach significant levels. In effect, “a few are all right,” but too many of them diminish the value of the category. This form of contempt is represented by line P. Here, emotional costs do not kick in until the category includes 20% S. Then costs increase at the same rate as in function M.

The meaning of these indifference curves can be illustrated with reference to the matrices in the previous section seen in Table 5 and its three sub-tables. To recall, the question here is the trade-off between moving from the race dimension to the foreign-native dimension. The latter produces better economic and political pay-offs by producing lower MWCs. In the case of anger, the switch comes from the natural erosion of the emotion.

The same tables can be used to illustrate the nature of contempt. Let us assume that Blacks and Whites lived together in an autocratic state. That state breaks down and leaves Blacks and whites in a democratic political system with large incentives to form winning coalitions with just over 50%. Let us further assume that Blacks have contempt for whites and are reluctant to join categories that include whites. MWC1 is the size of the all-Black winning coalition while MWC2 is the number for the foreign-native winning coalition. Thus, in Table 5.1, Blacks in the upper left cell can choose between an all-

black category with a MWC of .7 or switch to identification on the foreign attribute with an MWC of .65 and a percentage S of 38%. The MWC differential is .05 and the percentage S in this category is 38%. In 5.2, MWC differential is .20 and Percentage S is 33%. In 5.3, MWC difference is .38 and percentage S is 13%.

What outcomes can be predicted? Figure 8 plots the situations represented in the sub-tables of Table 5 on top of the indifference lines seen in Figure 7.

Figure 8 Here

In two cases, the method predicts an outcome regardless of which of the four functions of contempt applies. For 5.1, the predicted outcome is no movement from all-Black. For all four functions of contempt, the 5 point gain in MWC cannot outweigh the emotional costs associated with 38% S. For the situation illustrated by 5.3, the method here predicts movement to the foreign-native dimension for all functions of contempt. The gains created by a 38 point advantage in MWC far outstrip the costs associated with 13% S. The outcome for Figure 5.2 is not so clear. If contempt works along the lines of function N, O, or P then we should expect that the foreign/native dimension becomes the basis for politics. If function M applies, then the prediction is that the black/white dimension will remain the primary axis of politics.

B. Elite Calculations

The constructivist approach developed above and in other chapters envisions political elites surveying the matrix of salient identities and forming minimum winning coalitions. With the existence of a stigmatized attribute, however, calculations become more complex. Identity entrepreneurs must not only offer an attractive MWC, but they must consider whether individuals driven by contempt will accept a category that includes members with the stigmatized attribute.

To illustrate some the strategic constraints and opportunities of elites, consider another example with three attributes and many winning coalitions.

		Language		
		1	2	3
Religion	A	0.05	0.10	0.15
	B	0.20	0.05	0.05
	C	0.20	0.15	0.05

Table 6

Imagine that in the pre-collapse period, members of religions B and C have an aversion to religion A, in effect, they hold members of that religion in contempt. In the rebuilding stage, these groups find themselves in the proportions represented by this matrix. Because of the ethnic contempt for religion A, elites of both B and C first bind their

groups together to form a winning coalition with 70% of the population and 0% S. Over time, however, it becomes clear that new smaller winning categories can be formed by combining one religious attribute with a single language-based attribute. In fact, in the situation above, both B and C can combine with any single language-based attribute to form a winning coalition smaller than B/C. However, all of these new categories will contain members of A, the stigmatized group. Below are the various possibilities measured in terms of MWC advantage versus the B/C option and percentage S in the new category (B/1 will indicate a category containing all cells with either B or 1 as an attribute. B1 represents the individual cell with B and 1).

B/1: 10, 8.2%
 B/2: 15, 20%
 B/3: 20, 27.3%
 C/1: 5, 7.7%
 C/2: 5, 16.7%
 C/3: 10, 25%

These figures can again be plotted. A/1 and A/2 also form winning coalitions (A/1: 15, 55%; A/2: 20, 60%). The status quo (B/C) is represented by the 0, 0 point.

Figure 9 here.

If contempt function M applies, then the model makes a unique prediction: elites will move to create category B/1. Even though the MWC gain is higher in other options, the low percentage S drives this option to the left of the indifference curve. Under function M, individuals would continue to prefer B/C over other options. C elites cannot propose a category better than the status quo. Under function M, the cost of inclusion outweighs the benefits of a smaller winning coalition for every choice.

If contempt follows function P, B/1 would not be an acceptable alternative but both B/2 and B/3 would be improvements from the status quo. B/3 would be the slightly better choice among the two. Again, C elites could not provide a better choice than the status quo.²⁸

C. Adding Complexity: The Distribution of Contempt and Stigma Across Cells

The above analysis assumed that all members of the non-stigmatized population hold the same levels of contempt. In order to contemplate more complex situations, consider the matrix below.

Language

²⁸ As Line O runs parallel to M, B/1 would be the optimal choice under function O. Along the same lines, B/3 would be the best choice under function N.

		1	2	3
Religion	A	0.10S	0.10S	0.10
	B	0.10S	0.05	0.10
	C	0.10	0.15	0.20

Table 7

The matrix again represents a distribution of attributes along the dimensions of language and religion. In this case, three attributes are represented in the matrix. The presence of a stigmatized attribute is represented in the matrix by the letter S. In this example, suppose that half of the individuals in the cells designated with S possess the stigmatized attribute along with the designated attributes of language and religion. Thus, in cell A1 10% of the population speaks language 1 as their primary language and identifies with the religion A. Half of the individuals in this cell, or 5% of the total population, also possess the stigmatized attribute S. In this example, 15% of the population possesses the stigmatized attribute but these numbers are found only in three cells: A1, A2, B1. No significant numbers of those with the stigmatized attribute speak language 3 or practice religion C. On the other hand, 33% of those practicing religion A also possess the quality S.

How might we expect levels of contempt to vary across such a matrix? Extensive work on the contact hypothesis shows that interaction among groups can reduce levels of prejudice and stigma.²⁹ Without reviewing this voluminous literature, a few common sense assumptions might be made. For instance, those who already share attributes with stigmatized individuals might be likely to experience lower levels of ethnic contempt. As mentioned, in the example above 33% of those with religion A possess the stigmatized attribute. The emotion of contempt depends on the cognition that those with the stigmatized attribute are somehow inferior. But how inferior can a group be if they are worshipping the same God in the same way in the same country?³⁰ Would the 67% of A religionists without the stigma feel the same level of ethnic contempt as members of religion B (20% S) and especially religion C (0% S)?

In surveying the matrix in Table 5, the following are the percentages of S for each attribute. A: 33%, B: 20%, C: 0%, 1: 33%, 2: 17%, 3: 0%. These figures might provide a rough guide to the distribution of ethnic contempt. If we form a rough estimate of high, medium, and low sharing of attributes, then a member of cell A1 would score high on interaction on both language and religious dimensions. Consequently, the level of contempt for non-S members of A1 could be assumed to be low. In contrast, members of C/3 never interact with stigmatized individuals in religion and speak a language that no As speak. Cell C3 would be zero on both dimensions and could be assumed to have very

²⁹ See H.D Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), for one of the most complete discussions of work on the contact hypothesis.

³⁰ It's not hard to come up with examples that go against this point, Blacks in the US South for example, but I am making a general point here.

high levels of ethnic contempt. Following a simple scale, this logic leads to the following distribution of contempt across the matrix:³¹

		Language		
		1	2	3
Religion	A	Very Low	Low	Medium
	B	Low	Medium	High
	C	Medium	High	Very High

Table 8: Relative Levels of Ethnic Contempt

For graphical simplicity, assume that these values are connected to the trade-offs between emotion and interest in the following manner:

Figure 10 Here

In this figure, three lines draw different ratios between percentage increase in MWC and percentage increase in S. The line farthest left shows a function in which every one percentage increase in S is matched to a three percentage increase in the MWC value. The middle line is the same as function M in the previous diagram, indicating a 1:1 ratio. The farthest line is drawn according to 3:1 ratio. The areas in between these lines correspond the designations in Table 8. Individuals with very high levels of contempt will only move off a status quo if the new category presents a situation represented in the area to the left of line E. Those with high levels of contempt will move to any point to the left of F, and so on.

Now we can return to the calculations of identity entrepreneurs. In their calculus, they must consider four factors: 1) MWC 2) %S 3) the distribution of contempt 4) the play of opposing identity entrepreneurs. Along lines of the process previously outlined, identity entrepreneurs emerge and combine attributes into new categories in their effort to create new minimum winning coalitions. Assume that in the example above identity entrepreneurs first emerge from religious groups. Given this particular distribution, there are a multitude of possible winning coalitions.

In the hypothetical matrix above, political entrepreneurs from religious group C are likely to put forth a strategy based on excluding all S. C elites could choose the strategy that promises the smallest winning group, C/2. It seems just as likely though, given their homogeneity, that they would choose C/3. This choice would represent the only possible winning strategy that would completely exclude S.

³¹ Level of contempt can be connected to the average S on both dimensions combined. In this example, let us say that an average S on both dimensions of above 20% produces a low level of contempt, an 11%-19% rate produces a medium level, a 2-10% is associated with a high level, and very high of contempt is found with levels of S below 2%.

Assuming that C/3 is established as the status quo, how might entrepreneurs from opposing religious groups respond? The situation is illustrated in Figure 10. C/3 is represented by the 0, 0 point in Figure 10, competing categories are also indicated. As opposed to the previous analysis, the situation becomes more complicated when the distribution of contempt comes into play. Identity entrepreneurs must consider the nature of each cell. To see why this is the case, consider the options of B elites. If they play B/2 against C/3, two cells—B3 and C2 come under direct competition. B elites are in effect offering the individuals in these two cells a package of MWC and S vs. the status quo. In effect, B elites offer individuals in these cells an improvement of 15 points in MWC but a cost of the inclusion of 20% S. On the surface this deal would seem attractive. However, both of these cells rank high in contempt. Looking at Figure 10, category B/2 lies below the F line and is not an acceptable option.

Likewise, option B/3 would fail to displace C/3. In this match-up, the cells under competition would include A3, B3, and C3. Here, cell C3 would in effect act as a veto player. Given its very high level of contempt—it is the only cell with no connection whatsoever with stigmatized individuals—members of C3 will reject any alternative to the right of the E line. Without the inclusion of cell C3, the category would fail to generate a majority.

In this scenario, identity entrepreneurs from religious group A actually have a better choices than B elites. The category A/1 again puts two cells in direct competition with the category C/3—A3 and C1. Critically, both of these cells hold medium contempt and neither will defect from category A/1 as it represents a position above the G line. Despite the fact that the category A/1 contains all of the society's stigmatized individuals, the choice remains an attractive option in comparison to the "pure" choice of C/3. In effect, this category embodies a coalition of the most tolerant. These members of society are willing to be grouped in a category that contains 30% S in order to obtain the benefits offered by a smaller winning coalition. A/2 seems to be an attractive option, but again the C2 cell lies below the trade-off line. For A/B, the problem lies with the high contempt level of cell B3.

Conclusions

The breakdown and reconstruction of multiethnic states is an important topic in its own right. For the purposes of this volume though, the key aspect of these processes is that they usually generate strong emotions. The often violent nature of state-breakdown produces victims and strong emotions of anger. The reconstruction of states often recombines ethnic groups into new demographics. Reconstruction also can create smaller states. In these smaller states, stigmatized groups sometimes become a larger percentage of the population. These groups can no longer be marginalized with the result that citizens of the new state must confront their own emotions of ethnic contempt.

Political science models assume that individuals and leaders pursue interests, but also that they pursue interests under constraints. This chapter has sought to analyze one particular type of constraint on action—emotions. Although largely ignored by political science, emotions can be powerful constraints on action. Under the sway of anger, an anger

perhaps caused by killings and humiliations, individuals cannot freely pursue every option. Long-standing and culturally embedded ethnic contempt prevents individuals from considering choices based on political and economic benefits alone.



Yet, while emotions constrain and proscribe choice, they do not eliminate choices. Emotions often have a dynamic quality. Anger recedes over time. Contempt cannot be maintained in the face of new political realities that challenge the cognitions that the emotion is founded on. Violence may create emotions that “freeze” identities, but the relentless influence of interest may serve to eventually thaw these identities. We know that ethnic contempt and prejudice can fade in new circumstances. The problem is that we don’t have a good grasp of how emotion and interest interact. Political scientists analyze interests, but they only hope that emotions do not interfere too much with the logic of their models.

This chapter has tried to create simple models that combine emotion and interest. These models generate predictions and might serve as the basis of more sophisticated hypotheses. In order to be really useful, much more work would need to be done. A truly interdisciplinary effort synthesizing social psychology, anthropology, and political science is required. In the end, the promise of these models can only be realized through extensive empirical work.

Such hard work, however, promises significant rewards. In this chapter, I have used cases from the Balkans. We cannot understand and guide the political processes occurring between Slavs and Albanians in the region without consideration of emotion. We certainly cannot understand the politics involved with the Roma in Eastern Europe without incorporating ethnic contempt. Beyond this region, it is doubtful that the political processes currently unfolding in the Middle East can be fully understood without including emotion in our study. At the time of this writing, Iraq is being reconstructed. Violence has produced anger; occupation has produced resentment; new institutions attempt to create respect among the state’s constituent ethnic groups. In this situation, and future situations, we cannot simply hope that emotions will not interfere too much in the bargaining, constitution-building, and institution creation of the rebuilding process. We need to understand the influence of this integral aspect of human nature.

APPENDIX

Anger Curves

Figure 3: Linear: $y(x) = 0.5 - 0.05x$ Figure 4: Inverse Exponential: $y(x) = 0.5 - 0.5(x/10)^2$

Figures 1 and 2 (to be relabeled)




Figure 5: Exponential Decay: $y(x) = 0.5(1 - x/10)^2$




Figure 6: Mixed Exponential

Figures 3 and 4 (to be relabeled)

'Genocidal' MWC Differential Model




Figure 1: MWC Differential as a function of Time between Birth and Event




Figure 2: Average MWC Differential over Time

Figures 5 and 6 (to be relabeled)




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10

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